THE DEVELOPMENT AND NATURE OF

CHINESE COMMUNISM:

the early years, to 1925

by

Adrian Man-cheong CHAN

a thesis submitted to

THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

FAR EASTERN HISTORY

April 1974
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been submitted in substance for any degree and that it is the result of my own independent research and all authorities and sources which have been consulted are acknowledged in the Bibliography and notes.

Adrian Khan
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Mrs. Doris Craft who has so patiently typed the drafts and the final script and in the process improved them, I want to acknowledge a debt of gratitude.

Professor Wang Gungwu has been a stimulating and patient supervisor. I want to thank him for giving me his time and attention so generously and to absolve him from the many sins of commission and omission in this study.

A three-month visit to this University by Professor Jerome Ch'en of York University had given me many stimulating sessions of discussions. I wish to thank him for his intellectual stimulation and friendship.

Historians are very indebted to librarians. I am particularly grateful to the help given by Mr. Sidney Wang of the Australian National Library and Mr. David Tseng, Deputy Curator of the East Asian Collection at the Hoover Institution. Both have helped me beyond the call of their professional duties. Indeed, Mr. Tseng sacrificed many lunch hours rushing off to the pharmacies to buy medications for my allergy - caused by some vegetation, as yet undetermined, on the beautiful campus of Stanford University.

The companionship and intellectual stimulation of my wife, Andrea, and the innocent curiosity of my son, Gareth (4 years old), made the tedium of the months of writing tolerable.
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to delineate and analyse the development and nature of Chinese communism from the beginning to the death of Sun Yat-sen.

It is divided into two sections. The first section attempts firstly to describe the social milieu in which the founders of Chinese communism found themselves in at, and just prior to, the time when they embraced communism as their revolutionary praxis. Secondly, this section deals with the reasons for the acceptance of communism as the revolutionary praxis and the resultant actions of this acceptance— the participation in the National Revolution.

In the second section, a number of the central issues of Chinese communism pertinent to this period are examined: the communists' concept of the collaboration with the Kuomintang, the nature of the national revolution and the role of leadership, and the peasant policies. Finally, as the Chinese leadership embraced communism partly because of their consciousness of the need of a new culture for China, this study concludes with a discussion of the development of the concept of culture by these Chinese communists.

While this is not, primarily, a study of Chinese communist activities nor a comparison between Chinese and Russian communism, a study of the development and nature of Chinese communism cannot exclude discussions in these two aspects. Therefore, to the extent that such discussions will
clarify one's perception of Chinese communism, these two aspects are brought into purview.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter/Section/Part</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ABSTRACT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECTION ONE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER ONE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Milieu</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER TWO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seedtime of Chinese Communism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART 1.</strong></td>
<td>The Making of the Revolutionary: pre-May 4th Period</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART 2.</strong></td>
<td>After 4th May: Practical Revolutionary Politics</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECTION TWO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Communism during the First Period of Collaboration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER THREE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Meaning of Collaboration</td>
<td></td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER FOUR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Revolution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART 1.</strong></td>
<td>Its Nature</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART 2.</strong></td>
<td>The Proletariat as Leader</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER FIVE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Peasantry</td>
<td></td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards a Socialist Culture</td>
<td>351</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>386</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

To the group of people who had accepted Marxism and founded the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Marxism was more than an epistemology. To them, it was a revolutionary praxis and the theoretical consciousness of that praxis. These people were students, new graduates, their teachers, and generally, may be referred to as members of the Chinese intelligentsia. Before they accepted Marxism, they had at least one thing in common. They were all dissatisfied with the social, economic, and political conditions in China. They all felt that China was being unjustly treated by the foreign Powers. At the same time, they abhorred the social injustices they witnessed in China. It was in their search for ways and means to effect changes that they accepted Marxism.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who became the leader of the CCP during its first years (and throughout the period covered by this study), was the senior man in that group both in age and prestige. He had long involved himself in seeking ways and means of bringing about changes in Chinese society. From as early as September 1915, Ch'en had concluded that the major fault in modern civilization was the 'oppression by the capitalists'. To remove this injustice and oppression, he saw the need for a 'political revolution then to be followed by a social revolution' [in order
To bring about socialism.' To be sure, he had yet to define what he meant by socialism, nevertheless, he did not rule out the eventual need to 'abolish the system of private ownership of property.' At the same time, he took the view that 'the political and economic conditions of one nation have effects on the rest of the world ... the growth or destruction of a nation depends as much on its internal politics as on decisions made external to it.'

It is significant to note that when Ch'en denounced the capitalists, the term he used was tzu-pen chia, the modern term for capitalists. To be sure, later he did use the more traditional term ts'ai-chu, the owners of wealth, in a fairly similar context when he expressed the view that one's concern for one's own country should not extend to the defence of the rights of the aristocracy and the ts'ai-chu, nor to the attack of a smaller and weaker nation. Since he had this tendency to use interchangeably modern and traditional terms, in this study, for the sake of more fluent expression, I have translated the term ts'ai-chu as capitalists rather than as owners-of-wealth.

---

1 Ch'en, 'Fa-lan hsi-jen yü chin-tai wen-ming' (The French People and Modern Civilization) Ch'ing-nien ts'a-chih (The Youth Magazine) I, 1 (15-IX-1915). Ch'en was the editor of the magazine which became the Hsin ch'ing-nien in 1916, (The New Youth) and will hereafter be cited as HCN. It soon became the most influential magazine of the period.

2 Ch'en 'Ching kao ch'ing-nien' (Respectfully informing the Youths), Section 4, HCN I, 1 (15-IX-1915).

Of more significance in the context of this investigation of the development and nature of Chinese communism is the fact that Ch'en was aware of such ideas as the abolition of the system of private ownership in the Marxian sense and the inter-relatedness and inter-dependence of the political and economic conditions of nations.

In short, by 1915, Ch'en was aware of the development of the socialist ideas of Babeuf, Saint-Simon, and others and the extensions by Lassalle and Marx; and saw that the 'distribution and ownership' and the 'intensification of the struggle between capital and labour would amplify the call for social revolutions', as Marx had expounded. He also accepted the idea that socialism was to be the vehicle to bring about social justice, though he had not accepted Marxism as his own revolutionary praxis. And, although he still had not openly espoused Marxism or the revolution as a means of effecting political, social, and economic changes, he did admit to a need to go to war to fight for liberty, equality, and civilization even at the risk of a defeat.

This study traces the development of Chinese communism from the time when a group of people in China came to regard themselves as communists and began to take action to form a political party to the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925. In this

---

4 Ch'en, 'The French People and Modern Civilization' HCN I, 1 p.3 (15-IX-1915).
5 Ch'en, Ibid., p.3.
period, the CCP was still very small numerically but it was an important period from the point of view of the development in the nature of Chinese communism.

Though numerically small, the CCP was very prolific in its publication activities, especially in their efforts to explain and justify their policies and actions. They had the twin task of explaining the necessity for a communist movement and party in China, and their decision to join forces with the Kuomintang (KMT) led by Sun Yat-sen in a national revolution. To do so, they had to explain and justify their conception of the objective realities, especially the socio-political aspects, of China and their means of social reconstruction. This study, therefore, is an investigation and analysis of these Chinese communist explanations and justifications.

Special attention is made to examine the perception of the objective realities of China by the Chinese communists as a means of understanding their decision to become communists and their reasons for adopting Marxism as a revolutionary praxis. Their perception, of course, also influenced their decisions on policies. The major decisions and policies examined here are: their reasons for being communists, their reasons for their participation in the national revolution and their role in it, and the position they have allotted the peasantry in their perception of the revolution in China.

The Chinese communists saw themselves as the political party of the proletariat class in China, and working for the realization and fulfilment of the interests of this class would be their ultimate goal. To achieve this goal, class conflict
would be inevitable. In their efforts at determining the nature and boundaries of the social classes in China, as in most of their decisions and policies, the Chinese communists had received help, advice, and directives from their comrades from the Communist International. However, the Chinese communists were more independent than they had been given credit for by modern historians.

This is not to say that the Chinese communists were not influenced by the developments in Russia, nor to deny that there were many similarities in the policies of the CCP and the Comintern directives. However, on many important issues, such as the nature of the national revolution and the role of the CCP in it and the peasant policies, there seems to be some distinctive differences between the CCP's ideas and the Comintern's ideas, as this study will hope to show. On some occasions, while both the Chinese and the Comintern had held similar ideas, the Chinese communists seemed to have arrived at their conclusions prior to their receipt of the Comintern directives. This did not necessarily imply that the Chinese communists were uninfluenced by the Russian example, but only that the Chinese came to their conclusions through their own efforts in reading about and studying the situations in Russia and elsewhere.

This was also true on certain more fundamental theoretical issues. The Chinese were very strongly influenced by The Communist Manifesto, especially the voluntarist aspects within the revolutionary methodology. By 1921, The Holy Family
was translated into Chinese. Thus, one may be permitted to assume that the Chinese communists had noted that Marx had said that 'it is not "history" which uses men as a means of achieving - as if it were an individual person - its own ends. History is nothing but the activity of men in pursuit of their ends.' Having read these early writings of Marx, one may be permitted to further assume that the Chinese communists would deduce from their reading of Marx the conclusion that the 'victory of a rising class depends upon its awareness of its situation and aims, and upon the effectiveness of its political organization, as well as upon its actual economic position.'

Subsequently, as will be shown in this study, when the Chinese communist came upon Leninism, it was Lenin's *What is to be done?* and the *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* that attracted the Chinese attention. However, there was a significant difference between what Lenin was proposing and the exposition given by the leading Chinese theoretician of the day, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai. The difference was in revolutionary methodology.

Lenin proposed that 'if the revolution gains a decisive victory - then we shall settle accounts with tsarism in the Jacobin, or if you like, in the plebian way.' He advocated this way to settle the accounts with 'the enemies of liberty' as distinct from the reformists of the Russian Social-Democrats.

---

whom Lenin accused of being afraid 'to offend the aristocracy, the nobles, the Court ... [and] ... kindly and polite, as befits gentlemen in white gloves.' Nevertheless, Lenin was quick to point out that while advocating the Jacobin way to settle the accounts with tsarism 'if the revolution gains a decisive victory' his advocacy, 'of course does not mean that we necessarily propose to imitate the Jacobins of 1793, to adopt their views, programme, slogans and methods of action.'

However, Ch'ü Ch'iup'ai, after citing both tracts by Lenin, urged the 'labouring masses to join the national revolution ... [and to] use the "Jacobin" method to accelerate the process of revolution.' This was necessary, according to Ch'ü, if the labouring class wanted to achieve its final goal of socialism. Through the 'Jacobin' method, Ch'ü advised, 'the national revolution, when it reaches its high point, will join with the world revolution and enter directly into socialism.' This was more than merely the settling of old scores that Lenin was discussing in the Two Tactics. Ch'ü advocated such a revolutionary methodology - as distinct from merely a means of settling accounts - because of the special nature of their new collaborator, the KMT. In his view, 'the KMT, because it came from a patriarchal society and because of its historical connections, it has a practice of worshipping militarism and other evil heritage of the secret societies of

7 Lenin, Two Tactics, pp. 55-6 (Peking, 1965).
China's old fashioned lower classes. In the process of investigating the nature of Chinese communism, such distinction between it and the Russian positions are noted as indicative of the development of Chinese communism.

As this is a study of the development and nature of the message that the Chinese communists were trying to propagate, much of the attention will be on the ideas of those who led the Propaganda Department of the Party. Hence, special attention is given to the writings of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, P'eng Shu-chih, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, and Ts'ai Ho-sen, as well as some of the leaders of the labour and peasant movements and the leaders of the Socialist Youth Corps who published frequently. During the period under discussion there were differences of opinions amongst the CCP leaders but they were differences of degree or emphasis and not the more basic differences of lines, to use a communist term. To be sure, after the destruction of the collaboration with the KMT, there was much mutual recrimination and accusation within the ranks of the CCP, leading to the expulsion of Ch'en, P'eng, and many others.

If any pattern of thought was to be detected, it would be that all the Chinese communist writers were, at most times, showing much eagerness and revolutionary zeal and keenness in insisting on a prime and special role for the proletariat in

8 Ch'ü Wei-to, 'Tzu min-chu chu-i chih she-hui chu-i' (From Democracy to Socialism) HCN-Quarterly No.2, pp.100-101 (20-XII-1923). Ch'ü Wei-to was a well-known pen-name of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai.
the national revolution. At the same time, whilst in collaboration with the KMT, the Chinese communists were at great pains to remonstrate publicly that their present stance was merely a tactical necessity demanded by economic and political considerations and that they were very anxious to carry the revolutionary movement into the next stage — the socialist revolution.

One issue that the Chinese communists insisted upon was the necessity to conduct class struggles at all times. Even during the national revolution, when their targets were imperialism and the warlords and their agents, the struggle was seen largely in class terms. It was seen as a struggle between the imperialist-capitalist class of the foreign Powers together with their Chinese agents on the one hand, and the exploited people of China on the other. To be sure, the communists admitted that until the proletarian class was awakened and organized, the special politico-economic conditions in China required the efforts of a nation-wide multi-class front against the foreign scourge — imperialism. But, even during this struggle, that is during the national revolution, class struggle was necessary. This was so because as socialists the nation they proposed to build would not defend the interests of the capitalists. Thus, in the Chinese communist perspective, class struggle is an integral part of the national revolution.

In the process of trying to fulfil their goal, the Chinese communists had always urged the adoption of practical methods rather than idealistic ones. But their ultimate aims were
always quite conspicuous for those who cared enough to read the literature they published. For a time, the Communists conceded the leadership of the national revolution to the Nationalists - the Kuomintang. But while they were making this political concession, their leaders were publishing their doubts as to whether the KMT had reformed and awakened enough to deserve the honour. And, by the end of 1924, within a year of the official foundation of the reconstructed KMT, the Chinese communists were stressing that only the proletariat class was worthy of the leadership of the national revolution. During this period of collaboration, the Chinese communists had never ceased to regard the development of class consciousness and the class struggle as their contributions to the efforts of the national revolution, though such efforts were strongly objected to by their collaborators, the KMT.

This study attempts to delineate and analyse the body of ideas and precepts for action that may be called Chinese Communism, the message that the Chinese communists wished the public and their collaborators to know via their various propaganda media. To a large extent, the development of Chinese communism may be seen as the amplification and enrichment of the germinal ideas of 1920. This process of development involved practical experiences in collaboration with fellow revolutionaries of different ideological persuasion as well as in the labour and peasant movements. The demand for the unity of theory and practice, as to be expected, impinged upon the development of communism in China. At the same time, the
Chinese were also influenced by the comrades from the Communist International. To the extent that the directives of the Comintern affects the development of Chinese communism, Russian communism is brought into purview.

However, the main aim of this study is not primarily a comparative study of Russian and Chinese Communism nor a study of the Russian and other foreign influences on the development of Chinese communism. It is to delineate the development and the nature of Chinese communism, from its founding to the death of Sun Yat-sen, as perceived by the politically concerned in China, the collaborators of the CCP in the national revolution in China, their enemies, and the way the Chinese communists themselves wanted the people to perceive it through the medium of their own propaganda. However, a distinction should be made that such a study is not a study of the activities of the Chinese communists in the period. A study of their activities will involve a different approach and will also demand different source materials. In this study of Chinese communism special attention is directed to the communists' perception of the national revolution and the peasant movement.

The focus of this study ends with the death of Sun Yat-sen. In this period though the CCP still had not achieved any major success in its membership recruitment, it had considerable achievement in its attempt at developing and systemizing its ideas. During the life-time of Sun, the Chinese communists had never denounced or repudiated him though they had issued warnings to and attacks at his allegedly bad advisors and even criticized some of his decisions and plans, often in terms
showing scant respect. However, even when the Chinese communists were criticizing and attacking the KMT in their propaganda, they had always regarded Sun as the one person deserving support during the national revolutionary struggles.

With the death of Sun this central rallying point in the national revolution coalition was no more. The factions within the KMT, which the CCP warned of during the life-time of Sun, surfaced. The Chinese communists as well as their Comintern advisors were, often openly, playing off one faction or leader against another or being manipulated by them in turn. Furthermore, amongst the communists themselves - both the Chinese and the Comintern - there were differences of opinion on policies and positions to adopt in the changing situation. Thus the development of the communist movement and the communist ideology had taken on quite different expressions in the years between the death of Sun and the ultimate destruction of collaboration, as compared with the years when Sun was alive.

With the changing political situation, the demand for a unity of theory and practice - so much a central demand of the Marxist revolutionary ideology - there must, perforce, be changes in theories, or more accurately, revolutionary methodology, for the Chinese communists had never regarded communism as purely theory. After the death of Sun the political situation had indeed greatly changed. Not only did the National Government in Canton manage to consolidate their control over Kwangtung but the CCP had achieved much success as the result of the May 30th Incident and, together with their successes in the rural sector, much increased their confidence and greatly intensified
the tension between the collaborators. To have included the last two or three years of the collaboration in this study would inevitably have changed the nature and direction of this study. Therefore, I have decided to leave the terminal events of the study in 1925 because it provides a convenient break-off point for an investigation of the first phase in the development of Chinese communism. To be sure, while the death of Sun resulted in many changes, there were also unchanging elements in the revolutionary praxis of the Chinese communists. To the very end, they had regarded the United Front as 'united in action to struggle against the enemy [but] in the propagation of ideas each retains its freedom.'

Unlike Lenin and the Bolsheviks who started to define their cultural programme only after their seizure of political power, the Chinese intellectual-revolutionaries had always regarded a cultural programme an integral part of their revolutionary programme, even before they had accepted Marxism. When Ch'en Tu-hsiu founded his Ch'ing-nien tsa chih in 1915 (renamed Hsin Ch'ing-nien in 1916), his expressed aims were to discuss with the youth of the day 'the new means of cultivating oneself and governing the nation ... [therefore] ... the magazine will freely discuss international affairs, scholarship, and ideas.'

---

9 Liu Jen-ch'ing, 'Ho wei lien-ho chan-hsien!' (What is the United Front?) Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien (The Chinese Youth) No.130, (7-VIII-1926).
10 She kao (Publisher's Declarations), Ch'ing-nien tsa-chih 1, 1, p.1 (15-IX-1915).
Since it was this combination of cultural and political concern that helped to lead Ch'en and his colleagues to accept communism, it may be appropriate to conclude this study of the development and nature of Chinese communism with a brief examination of the development of their cultural expressions after their acceptance of Marxism as their revolutionary praxis. Certainly there were similarities between the cultural expressions of the Chinese and Russian communists, as in other facets of expressions. However, there were important spatial and chronological qualifications to these Sino-Russian similarities. In the political sphere the Chinese communists were propagating in their homeland and during the revolution those ideas of Lenin that were expounded in exile. In the cultural sphere, there was even greater chronological disparity. While Lenin concerned himself with a cultural programme only after the October Revolution, with the Chinese revolutionaries, one may almost say that the sequence of concern was the reverse.

This study attempts to assess the development and nature of Chinese communism as perceived by the Chinese in the period under discussion - from the acceptance of Marxism as a revolutionary praxis by certain Chinese revolutionaries, to the death of Sun Yat-sen.

11 Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai's advocacy of Lenin's What is to be done? and Two Tactics will be discussed in the chapter on the National Revolution.

CHAPTER ONE

THE MILIEU

It has often been suggested that Leninism turned the attention of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party to the proletariat rather than the proletariat turning their attention to Leninism.\(^1\) In this study, an attempt will be made to argue the case that it was the socio-political conditions of China that turned the Chinese to communism.

This is not to argue that the acceptance of communism was inevitable, but merely to make a case that their acceptance of communism was not just an academic or intellectual decision. On the contrary, given their perception of their contemporary socio-political situation and their ideological development in the years prior to their acceptance of communism, it was reasonable for the founding fathers of the Chinese Communist Party — especially Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao — to embrace communism in the last years of the second decade of the Twentieth Century. In this chapter, a case will be made that it was reasonable for the future leaders of the Party to say as they did in 1920 on the eve of the formation of the Party, that China was ready for a communist party to be founded to perform its historic duties. To them, the seeding of communism in China was not out of season.

To the group of people who later formed the nucleus of the CCP *The Communist Manifesto* was probably the most important and

---

most often read complete work by Marx and Engels. In the Marxist Study Group in Peking University, the Manifesto was read in its English version, indeed as a text book of the English language for those members who wanted to improve their ability in the English language. In the Manifesto, the Chinese discovered that Marx and Engels had proclaimed that

the communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things ... they bring to the front, as the leading question ... the property question, no matter what its degree of development at the time.

Finally, they labour everywhere for the union and agreement of the democratic parties of all countries.

Amongst the group of worker-students who went to France immediately after the Great War, the Manifesto was translated by one of their members, Tsai Ho-sen, and was a prominent and constant feature in their clubroom in Paris. From this latter group came many of the future leaders of the CCP, such as Chou En-lai, Tsai Ho-sen who became the first editor of the new party journal, Hsiang Tao, immediately upon his return to China, Teng

---

2 See Chin-tai shih tzu-liao (Sources of Modern History) No.2 pp.161-173 (Peking 1955) where a number of announcements by this Group were cited, including one announcing the 'English class'.

3 The Communist Manifesto, Ch.4. Any edition will suffice. The edition used here is by the Foreign Languages Press (Peking 1970) p.76.

Hsiao-ping, Ch'en Yi, Ch'en Yen-nien who was the son of party leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu, and many others. Indeed, by 1920 there were a number of partial and complete Chinese translations of this work. Therefore, irrespective of the importance of the Manifesto in the development of Marx's own political philosophy, this work had a profound influence on the thinking of those who formed and joined the Chinese Communist Party in its early years.

In this chapter, an examination will be made into the socio-political milieu in which the future leaders of the Chinese Communist Party found themselves as they read the message from Marx and Engels. Special attention will be given to those who had contributed much to the theoretical development of communism in China. That is, those people whose main concern, during the period from the founding of the Party to the end of the first collaboration with the Kuomintang were with the Party's Propaganda Department. Available to these people, especially those in Peking were a variety of Marxist literature.

Amongst the Marxist literature available in the library of the Peking University Marxist Study Group were such titles as: Socialism, Utopian and Scientific (in Chinese) and The Origin of the Family by Engels, The Poverty of Philosophy, Revolution and Counter Revolution, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, The Civil War in France, and Wage, Labour and Capital by Marx. Lenin was represented by "Left Wing" Communism, An Infantile Disorder, and The Proletarian Revolution and Kautsky; while Kautsky's Class Struggle, translated into Chinese by the future leader of the Communist Youth Corps Yün Tai-yin, was also present. These
were available in their English version. Altogether, they had over 70 titles in English, almost 80 titles in German as well as a goodly number in French and Japanese.\(^5\) We may therefore say that the intellectual leaders of the Chinese Communist Party were not unfamiliar with Marxist literature before the formal founding of the Party.

However, a communist, whether he be in Western Europe, Russia, or China, does not formulate his ideas against a purely philosophic background but rather in direct relation to his experience. Indeed, we may safely say that while the general principles and the Marxist goal remain basically the same for all Marxists who feel constrained to change the world, the practical application - or, the means of achieving the goal - depends on the socio-political situation contemporaneous to the communist concerned. To the communist, Marxism is more than a body of philosophic thoughts because the rationale for being a communist is not merely to analyse the world but to change it. Indeed, twenty-five years after the first publication of *The Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels informed their readers that:

> the general principles laid down in this Manifesto are, on the whole, as correct today as ever. Here and there, some detail might be improved. The practical application of the principles will depend, as the Manifesto itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, for that reason, no specific stress is laid on the

the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II.

But, what were 'the historical conditions for the time being existing' in China, at least as they were perceived by the future leaders of the Chinese Communist Party?

In order to set in the proper context our appreciation of the reasons given by the Chinese, especially the intelligentsia, to accept communism, it would be appropriate to examine the nature of some of the relevant prevailing socio-political conditions and attitudes in China at the period of time preceding the formation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It may be reasonable to suggest that the year 1895 be regarded as a commencement of our discussion. It was the defeat by Japan that finally shook even the conservatives at the Ch'ing Court into realizing the inadequacy of the piecemeal attempts at national improvement. 1895 was also the year when K'ang Yu-wei organised the kung-chü shang-shu (Petition Presented by Examination Candidates). This remonstrance by the examination candidates of the Imperial Examination, socio-intellectual elites by any reckoning, may be taken as evidence of a new and active politicization of the intelligentsia, a politicization based on a general dissatisfaction with the status quo and the various attempts at improvement. That year also marked the first of many abortive coups attempted against Manchu rule by groups professing

allegiance to Sun Yat-sen.

Even more importantly, in the last five years of the 19th Century, we may begin to speak more significantly of 'national' events, or events of 'national' significance, or 'national' reactions to and perception of events. Technological developments, such as telegraphy, had created a greater sense of awareness, that is, beyond one's own region. One report mentioned that in 1894, China had twelve Chinese newspapers, mostly in the Treaty Ports while by 1898, Shanghai alone had fifteen newspapers. Another study reported that the number of Chinese magazines published had increased from eight to thirty-five between the years 1895 and 1898; while the same report also mentioned an over 300% increase in the number of newspapers and magazines published between 1898 and 1900. Most of these, according to this study, were of radical thoughts. We may well regard increases in these facilities as important factors in overcoming regionalism. Improvements in the communication of people and ideas would certainly have helped in creating a greater sense of national unity and consciousness, as well as in intensifying discontent. Furthermore, through the development of modern communication technology, readers of the daily press and periodicals in inland areas might become more aware of the developments in the outside world. By 1911 even the Changsha

7 Decennial Report, 1892-1901, I, 506. Inspectorate General of Customs. (Shanghai)

Jih Pao (The Changsha Daily) began to carry daily telegrams from Reuters.9

Now that the politically conscious in China, in the first two decades of the 20th century, had the technical facilities for the communication of news and ideas, we may take the next step in our investigation of the nature of the objective reality of China as perceived by the future leaders of the CCP. Or, what were the relevant messages being communicated?

This is not an occasion, nor is there any need, to make any detailed socio-economic survey of China. This is so because our subjects, the future communists, also did not have modern techniques of socio-economic survey nor was there any comprehensive survey being done by anyone at that time. Thus, we may be permitted to estimate, or make an approximation of, our subjects' perception of the socio-economic reality of China by collating and analysing contemporary reports on the regions and provinces where our subjects spent their formative years.

Furthermore, our subjects' background seems to share a certain similarity that tends to lend itself to this type of regional or provincial approximation. All of them spent the early years of their youth, that is at least until the middle of the second decade of their lives, in a rural setting but yet within reasonable distance from a treaty port. The exception was Li Ta-chao whose home was in Lo-t'ing in Hopei and thus making his nearest major urban centre the Imperial Capital, Peking, rather than a treaty port. In all cases, with the

exception of Ch'en Tu-hsiu who was considerably older than the rest of this group, their first educational experience was quite similar. It was received from the local schools or private tutors. This, as we shall show, really prepared them for changes. Furthermore as we shall see, those who came to play influential roles in the development of Chinese communism in the period down to the end of the first collaboration with the KMT shared—through accidents of birth—certain environmental similarities. Ch'en Tu-hsiu from Huai-ning in Anhwei and Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai from Wu-chin (also known as Ch'ang-chou) in Kiangsu were from families with a scholarly tradition and, of course, were located within the cultural and intellectual influence of Shanghai. P'eng Shu-shih, Ts'ai Ho-sen, Mao Tse-tung, and Teng Chung-hsia were from Hunan and all not too distant from Changsha. Yun Tai-ying was born in Liu-hsia in Hupei, near Wuhan and completed his formal education there. His family was originally from Kiangsu province. Lo Chi-yuan, a convert of Ch'en Tu-hsiu in 1920 and T'an P'ing-shan were both Cantonese. Shih Ts'un-t'ung, now known as Shih Fu-liang was from Chu-chi in Chekiang not far from Hangchow. He and Ts'ai also went to France in early 1920 as worker-students.

Before focussing our attention onto the relevant regions and provinces in our effort to obtain a better appreciation of our subjects' perception of the objective reality, it may be advisable to take a brief survey of China's economy, if only to put our discussions in a proper perspective. According to recent
studies, in the last years of the Empire, after 1895 the triple demands of indemnity payments, servicing large foreign loans, and military expenditure wrecked the rough balance between income and outlay which Peking had precariously maintained until that time. From 1895 to the end of the Empire, repayments of principal and interest on indemnity and loans amounted to one and one-half times as much as the total sum borrowed from foreign lenders for railway construction before 1912; and, expressed in another way, this drain in capital represented more than twice the size of the total initial capitalization of all foreign, Sino-foreign, and Chinese-owned manufacturing enterprises established between 1895 and 1913.

Following the 1911 Revolution, the fiscal situation can hardly be conceived to be a change for the better. While nomenclature and bureaucratic structure were soon to experience changes, "the Republican government was even less able to control the revenue resources of China than its predecessor had been." The Central Government, under Yuan Shih-k'ai was too weak to restrain the centrifugal tendencies of the provincial and regional administrations. And, after 1914 we may safely say that the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle were the only major revenues administered by the Central Government. Of course, not all revenues from these taxes went into the Central Government's


coffer. Indeed, from 1912 through to the conclusion of the period under our consideration, 1925, a mere 18% of the total revenue net of first charges of the Haikuan (Maritime Customs) was available to the Peking government for its administrative and other expenditures, the rest was committed to the service of foreign loans and indemnities. The tariff, normally an instrument for the protection and nurturing of the developing indigenous industries, was unavailable to Chinese industries. From 1902 to 1918, the rate of duty collected on imports varied between $2\frac{1}{2}$% to $3\frac{1}{2}$% ad valorum. This was revised in 1923 to 5% and no further major increase was possible until China regained tariff autonomy in 1930.

Income from the Salt Gabelle in fact achieved a greater gross revenue than that of the Maritime Customs, especially from 1913 to 1922. In 1913, in order to secure the Reorganization Loan, 'without which the government of Yuan Shih-k'ai might not have survived, a foreign Chief Inspector was appointed to supervise and in effect control the Salt Administration.' But, even at its most productive year, 1922, only 55% of the net collection was actually remitted to Peking and the rest was retained by the provincial or regional authorities, with or without the consent of Peking. By 1926, a mere 18% was actually remitted to Peking - Chinese $9 million out of a total of Ch. $49 million!

---

That a province or region could so defy the central government suggests an uneven economic development amongst the provinces and also implies that our proposed attempt at regional/provincial survey (that is, those regions from which the future CCP leaders hailed) has some validity as a gauge of our subjects' perception of 'the historical conditions for the time being existing.' Keeping the state of the national fiscal condition in the background as a frame of reference, we may now inquire into the socio-economic conditions of the various regions and provinces which are relevant to this study.

In the context of this study, the region under the cultural and economic influence of Shanghai seems to be the most important. This is so not only because Shanghai was then the most important economic centre of China but also that within this region came three of the most important and influential men in our study of the development of Chinese communism, viz, Ch'en Tu-hsiu of Anhwei, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai of Kiangsu, and Shih Ts'un-t'ung of Chekiang. Here, it seems that the 'sprout of capitalism' was quite apparent. In 1905 a British Consul, a Mr. Sundius, reported that 'in the province of Anhwei, the great bulk of the rice land is not the property of peasant proprietors or village communes, but belongs to some half-dozen powerful families' and that these families 'have ramifications throughout the Empire'. These landlord families were well connected, but the returns which they received from the harvests were not for use locally 'but also would be paid, by means of bank draft, payable at the commercial and industrial centres, where they have manufacturing

* This is a cliché in the literature on Chinese economic history. It came about in connexion with the wide-ranging discussion, in the 1950's, on the first signs of capitalistic enterprises in Chinese history.
and financial interests. In short, then, one might expect the politically concerned to have taken notice of the close economic links between the landlords and the manufacturers and financiers, that is, the capitalist class. Sundius's observation of 1905 was supported by a survey done by the Chin-ling University in 1922 which found that Merchants owned 75% of the land in Wu-hu hsien. Indeed, this process of the commercialization of agriculture, according to some reports, was not only restricted to the large landlords but also to farmers right through the rural industry. One report states that since 1850 farmers were encouraged to specialize in cash crops because of better financial returns and improved transportation to markets. This movement was particularly noticeable near large urban centres where the population increased two to three times faster than the surrounding rural areas. Indeed, this phenomenon, according to the same report, which had its data drawn from 'all sorts of villages' was not restricted to villages near towns. It reported that a higher percentage was noted in areas along railways, that is, where transportation facilities were available. In social terms, this report adds that 'as farm size increased, [the consequence of this process of commercialization] farm receipts rose and large farms earn between twice to five times as much as small farms', and, taking an overview of the

entire period survey by this report, 1890-1937, the author concludes that commercialization increased the number of peasants losing their lands and becoming tenant farmers in a given year.\(^{10}\)

Such phenomena were also noted by contemporary non-communist observers in various parts of the nation. Indeed, concomitant to this process of commercialization of the rural economy was the increasing interest shown by the capitalists - the banks. There was a flourishing growth of rural banks - nung-yeh yin-hang - not so much to provide cheap loans to the needy but as indications that the rural sector was a rewarding place for investment, thus adding to the growth of social disparity.\(^{17}\) Of equal importance as an influence on the contemporary, as an indicator of China's economic trend, was China's industrial development. In the period between 1912 to 1920 the rate and pattern of development was phenomenal, it had achieved the annual rate of 13.8% per annum.\(^{18}\) Undoubtedly, this

---


17 For the observations of rural social injustices and exploitations, see the reports on rural surveys in the Tung-fang tsa-chih (The Eastern Miscellany) XXIV No.16 (25 VIII 1927) and Chang Tzu-ch'iang ed. Kwangtung nung-min yun-tung (Kwangtung Peasant Movement), esp. pp.28-9 where he gave the results for a survey in 1921-2. This was published by the China Christian Alliance in Canton 1926. For the development of the rural banking interests, see Chung-kuo chin-tai nung-yeh shih tzu-liao (Sources of the History of Modern Chinese rural industries) ed. Chang Yu-i III, 176-228. (Peking 1957). In Chang's Volume II, pp.43-130 are reports and source materials on the concentration of ownership.

rate has a built-in upward bias because it is using 1912 as the base, a year of relatively low comparison. However, while in absolute terms the industrial output of China in this period had not been great, to the contemporaries, what mattered was the rapidity of these changes in socio-economic terms. Such changes can only be described as unprecedented. If Engels could see, in 1893, in the Italy of Dante 'the opening of the modern capitalist era', then it would not be unreasonable for our subjects, after reading Engels, to feel that they too were living in an era ripe for action.

If there were economic factors present which might influence the contemporary observer to think that the 'sprout of capitalism' had taken root, there were also direct intellectual influences abroad throughout China, in the last years of the Empire and the early years of the Republic that helped our subjects to accept communism. They were the 'anti-imperialistic' and nationalistic sentiments that were being propagated in the new schools in the first decade of the 20th Century. The decision in 1901 to begin dismantling the examination system which culminated with the total abolition in 1905, was really revolutionary. It may well be regarded as a truly cultural revolution. Concomitant to this abolition of the century old mode of achieving upward social mobility came the establishment of the modern schools and the teaching of such modern subjects as world geography, mathematics, natural sciences, and most

---

19 Engels, Preface to the Italian ed. 1893 of The Communist Manifesto.
important in our context, the teaching of nationalism and anti-imperialism.

The new schools and new curricula required new texts because the elegant commentaries on the Classics, scholarly though they were, were deemed insufficient - not only intellectually so but economically as well, for the traditional route of success via the examinations was now gone forever. It seemed that these new schools were supplied with new textbooks which clearly showed the damaging effects of the 'battle of concessions' to China, especially the years 1895 to 1900. These books put much stress on the injustices of the unequal treaties and the various humiliations suffered at the hands of the invaders from afar. However, perhaps even more revolutionary is the implied intention in such exhortations. In emphasizing nationalism, even if it is only negatively as anti-foreignism, as a means of national defence, this exercise really amounted to a general call to all the students in these schools to accept participatory politics. In seeking support and patriotism from the students of these new texts in these last years of the Empire, the originators of these books were certainly not asking all the readers of these textbooks to participate in national politics - though the introduction of provincial assemblies was an important step in greater involvement in the body politic. Nevertheless, such an implication cannot be avoided, especially to the politically concerned. As mentioned, all the people who

20 Cyrus Peake, Nationalism and Education in Modern China, pp.180-191. (Columbia U.P. 1932).
had major influences on the development of Chinese communism in our period were products of such schools, excepting Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Ch'en, as his autobiography informs us, had the more traditional Classical education and had successfully passed the first degree examination. However, he was also involved in these new schools. In 1899, at the age of 20, he was on record as 'propagating revolution' as a staff member of a normal school in his native Anhwei, and thereafter continued to live the life of a revolutionary, or at least, a changer-of-China. By 1903, after a brief exile to Japan, Ch'en founded, again in Anhwei, his own Patriotic Society (Ai-kuo hui).  

However, it is one thing to establish that there was a climate for socio-political change but another thing to explain the reasons for certain people taking certain directions while some of their colleagues chose other means. To do so, we will have to trace the intellectual development of our subjects especially the way they reacted to contemporary events and ideas. The concept that the scholar had a duty to the state, or empire - a facet of participatory politics - was, of course, very much a part of the Chinese tradition. But, with those who opted for communism that 'duty to the state' involved the replacing of the traditional idea of moral self-perfection with a programme of social transformation.

The intellectual development of Ch'en Tu-hsiu may be regarded as an example of a dissatisfied classical scholar turned communist. To be sure, it was not a sudden decision and in the process of becoming a communist Ch'en went through many phases. In his brief autobiography, Ch'en informed us that the ridiculous scenes he witnessed in the Examination Hall in Nanking in 1897 made him appreciate the words of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao as stated in the latter's Shih-wu pao. Unfortunately for us, Ch'en did not have any footnote in his autobiography informing us which particular sentiment of Liang in the Shih-wu pao had such an effect. However Ch'en recalled that he began to regard himself as a follower of 'Kuang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i ch'ao.' If we check with the Shih-wu pao, we would find that at that time, Liang was expressing his political views in a series of articles entitled 'A General Discussion of Political Reform' (Pien-fa t'ung-i)\(^2\) In these articles, Liang asserted that change was the principle of life; and with the universe (tien hsia, that is, China), under the pressure of the foreign imperialists, the only way available to preserve the Chinese culture and nation was to make political reform. To strengthen China, in Liang's view, the first need would be to enlighten the people via a new education system.

Of course, the subsequent development of Ch'en was not entirely due to the influence of Liang. But, in reviewing the intellectual development of Ch'en, as we shall see, two injunctions from Liang seemed evident: that change was the principle of life, and that the strengthening of China needs to be preceded by the enlightenment of the people. As if to take up

\(^2\) Shih-wu pao Nos. 2 and 3, Aug., Sept. 1896.
the challenge to change, Ch'en joined with the radical Chinese expatriates in Japan in the winter of 1902 to found the Ch'ing-nien-hui, dedicated to revolutionary overthrow of the Empire. His erstwhile comrades later came to remember him as a natural leader. The next year, he returned to his native Anhwei and founded his own Ai-kuo hui. However, there are a number of things worthy of note and which we may regard as germinal in the intellectual-political growth of our future communists. Firstly, Ch'en as with all the other future communists, was prepared and eager for action. The young Ch'en, together with Tsou Lu, and Chang Chi cut off the queue of the Supervisor of Hupei Students in Japan. Ch'en was then twenty-three years old, and we may interpret that action as either a student prank or that Ch'en was prepared to act out his convictions.

Secondly, his associations in Japan among the expatriate Chinese were among the earliest records linking Ch'en with the French revolutionary movements. This group of Chinese revolutionaries had translated a book known as the Great French Revolution, unfortunately there is no record of its original author. The Ch'ing-nien hui, of course, were emulating the Young Italy Movement. And, finally, even at this early stage, his Patriotic Society (Ai-kuo hui) already showed a strong social concern. In his keynote speech at the inauguration of the Society, Ch'en expressed the sentiment that while the strengthening of the

---

nation in its effort to resist foreign exploitation was necessary, the welfare of the people must not be neglected. And, in the constitution of the society, there was no loyalty oath to the leader, decisions would be made by the majority in a ballot. Even then, he was against the libertarianism of the anarchists for, to him, that would amount to refusing to serve Public (or National) Good. While we must record that such sentiments were not exclusively those of Ch'en, and on the contrary, fairly common amongst the group he was associated with, it was Ch'en and the future communists who came to place more importance on the social aspects of their revolutionary programme and accepted more foreign revolutionary ideology. Perhaps, as supporting evidence to this suggestion, we may point to the fact that Ch'en never formally joined the overtly nationalistic Warning Bell group in 1904 though its founders were his old friends. He did, however, publish in that journal a Lamentation to a dead friend. And, shortly after the publication of his poem, the Warning Bell carried an editorial on the use of pai-hua and the future of China, sentiments very similar to those Ch'en later expressed in the Hsin Ch'ing-nien. Of course, there is no way we may demonstrate conclusively that Ch'en was the guest leader-writer.

The next year, 1905, witnessed the first fruit of that official educational propaganda as well as the first major foreign

---

25 See Su pao 7 VI, 25 V, and 7 VI 1903; and KKWH 1st ser. X 423-7.

revolutionary influence. That year marked the first successful nation, or more accurately, empire-wide boycott of foreign goods. Admittedly the target was American goods and the immediate cause was the racially discriminatory laws and practices in the U.S.A. against the Chinese residents. But the intensity of the whole movement, and the lengthy duration of the boycott and the resultant anti-foreign movement and slogans used constrained us to the conclusion that it was an expression of a deeper and more widespread sentiment. Slogans were written in the pai-hua, and demanding not only the revocation of the unequal treaties but also some bearing sentiments thus: The People are useful but the Government is useless. The movement also inspired anti-imperialistic novels bearing such titles as The World of Gold. Credit for some of these must go to those nationalistic and anti-imperialistic textbooks that were then the vogue.

That year also witnessed a revolutionary movement in Russia. This was debated, sometimes rather fiercely, between the expatriates in Japan, that is, between the Liang Ch'i-ch'ao group and the Min-pao group of Sun Yat-sen. The former abhorred the violence while the latter saw violence as inescapable and had some sympathy with the revolutionaries' social programme. However, Ch'en, though in Japan at that time, had parted company, intellectually, with Liang but could not accept Sun's Tung-meng hui. He did not seem to have commented on the event but returned

27 See Chang Chuan-wu, Kuang-hsü sa-i-nien Chung-Mei kung-yüeh feng chiao (The Sino-American labour agreement disturbances in the 31st year of Kuang-hsü), (1966 Taipei). Also see, Wai-chao pao (Foreign Affairs News) of Shanghai Nos.31/32 1904 which editorialized at length the various 'imperialists' partitioning of China, especially mining and railways.
to China before the end of 1906. In 1907, Ch'en was reported to be teaching in an Army School in Chekiang, teaching kuo-wen and writing revolutionary articles. Li Ta-chao who was to play a significant role in the Chinese community movement, entered the Yung-p'ing prefecture middle school in 1905 at the age of 13.

Though his future comrades were then too young, Ch'en was observing and probably influenced by some of the radical sentiments he found expressed in China on his return from Japan. On his return, he must have read in the Shanghai Times the editorial 'On the Foreigners and our National Manufacturing'. The paper pointed out that as big capital will swallow up the small capital, so will the national capital (min-tsu tzu-pen) be swallowed up by foreign capital. He may also have taken note of the coal miners' rebellion during which its leader, one Kung Chuen-tai issued a manifesto calling for the establishment of a republic and a thorough levelling of social inequality.

However, from 1907 to 1911, we have no reliable evidence on the whereabouts of Ch'en apart from the one mentioned by his friend and biographer, Ho Chih-yü that Ch'en went to Mukden to look after the funeral arrangements of his elder brother,

---

28 Ho Chih-yü 'Tu-hsiu chu-tso nien-piao' (a chronological list of Tu-hsiu's writings) in Ho's Tu-hsiu tsung-shu ch'i chung (Seven works by Tu-hsiu), 1948. The debate was published in Min-pao Nos.3-7.  
29 KKWH 2nd ser. IV, 116.  
30 'Lun wai-jen yü wo-kuo chih-tsao t'u-huo', Shanghai shih pao (Shanghai Times) 7 XI 1906.  
Meng-chi.\(^{32}\) There are, however, many unsubstantiated conjectures by scholars.\(^{33}\) We can therefore only assume, from the context of Ho's biography, that Ch'en spent these years teaching in the school in Hangchow and studying.

During the 1911 uprising, he devoted his energies to helping his old friend Po Wen-wei and was active in Nanking.\(^{34}\) Po became the Military Governor of Anhwei in 1922 and Ch'en accepted the position of Secretary-General while concurrently holding the deanship of the Anhwei High Academy.\(^{35}\) Ch'en unlike his friend Po did not join the T'ung-meng hui. In 1912, when Po was defeated by Yuan Shih-kai in the so-called Second Revolution, Ch'en again went into exile in Japan, this time with his patron. There, he was in contact with the other Chinese exiles who had opposed Yuan and also had to flee. Though Ch'en did not join the Sun Yat-sen-led group, he was reported to have been on friendly terms, and indeed fairly closely associated, with men like Huang Hsing, Sun, Tai Chi-tao, Hu Han-min, Liao Chung-kai and Ch'en Ying-shih (Ch'en Ch'i-mei) and planned and hoped for the return to their

\(^{32}\) Ho Chih-yü, op.cit., p.3.

\(^{33}\) Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement, p.42 claimed that Ch'en had been to France but presented no evidence. In his footnotes (p.399) Chow claims 'but we find such record in 1919; likewise J.L.Y. How's M.A. thesis, 'The Development of Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Thought, 1915-38' (Columbia 1949). Two Japanese studies also made the same claim, and also unsubstantiated: Hashikawa Tokio, Chugoku bunka-kai jinbutsu sokan (A Biographical Compendium of Eminent Persons in Chinese Cultural Circles) (Peking, 1940), II, 466; and, Hatano Kan'ichi, Chugoku Kyōsan-tō shi (A History of the Chinese Communist Party) (Tokyo, 1961), I, 32. Hu Shih, however, claimed that Ch'en had never been to France though he knew the French language. (Ch'en Tu-hsiu p'ing-lun).

\(^{34}\) Fu Sen-nien, 'Ch'en Tu-hsiu an' (The Ch'en Tu-hsiu case) Ch'en Tu-hsiu p'ing-lun (Commentaries on Ch'en Tu-hsiu), ed. Ch'en Tung-hsiao, (Peiping, Tung-ya, 1933), p.2.

\(^{35}\) Ho Chih-yü, op.cit., p.3.
homeland. His refusal to accept membership in the T'ung-meng hui must therefore be intellectual or ideological. He was also busily engaged in his private intellectual pursuit. He wrote his study on Chinese synonyms - Tzu-lui-i - as well as his English Reader, a study of the English language intended for use in the Chinese schools and colleges.

Politically he seemed to have been carefully observing the international scene. For, on the 25 VIII, 1914, when Japan declared war on Germany, he joined an informed group called the European Affairs Studies Group. Shortly afterwards, he published what may be regarded as his political credo in the journal founded by Chang Shih-chao - an old friend of Ch'en - in Japan, the Chia-yin tsa-chih (The Tiger Magazine). In this study, Ch'en delineated his concept of the relations between the state and the people, indeed, we may consider this effort as the crystallization of the germinal ideas expressed in the early days of 1902-3 when he founded the Ai-kuo hui in Anhwei. Here also he signalled his rejection of the libertarianism of the anarchists with whom he clashed very strongly after he became a communist. He felt that the people needed a state because men need a co-operative body to guarantee their basic rights and freedom, as well as to look after their welfare. On the other hand, the

---

36 See Cheng Hsüeh-chia, op. cit., pp.764-784; Ho Chih-yü, op. cit., p.3; and KKWH 2nd ser. IV, 299.
37 Ho Chih-yü, op. cit., p.3.
38 See Cheng Hsüeh-chia op. cit., p.784. His article was entitled 'Ai-kuo-hsin yü tzu-chüeh-hsin' (Patriotism and Self-Awareness) Chia-yin tsa-chih, I, 4 (10 IX 1914), pp.1-16.
state also has the duty to provide and guarantee these needs of the people. Unless the state can do so, or accept these ideals as its goal, then it cannot accept the intellectual and emotional loyalty - patriotism - of its people. An awakened people is one which is aware of this contractual obligation between the two parties - the state and the people. That is, it is the duty of the people to love their state if that state is lovable, otherwise true patriotism constrains one to work towards the establishment of such a lovable state. While on appearance, there were some similarities between this concept of Ch'en and Mencius' idea of the right to rebel, on closer examination we find that the rights of the people, suggested by Ch'en were far greater, and were to be egalitarian and participatory in politics. His lament was that the China of his day was not such a lovable state. It could not provide any right or protection to its people. He had advanced from that of a K'ang-Liang reformer to the position of a radical democrat, even by the contemporary Western standards.

In reviewing Ch'en's activities down to 1915, we may detect some pattern which may be regarded as pointers to his future career as the party leader. The pattern may be that once he came to be intellectually convinced of a course of action, he would act on his conviction without reservation. To put this in Marxist terms, we may regard his initial intellectual conviction as the theory and the action, practice. When practice proved the theory inadequate, he would withdraw from action and study. Then, with an improved understanding, theory modified through practice, he would throw himself wholly into another attempt to bring his new conviction to fruition. He would do so with equal determination
but not with stubbornness. All the while, the ultimate goal remained the same though it was perhaps perceived more clearly. Thus, when he decided that the classical education and examination were inappropriate, he joined the staff of a progressive and revolutionary school. When he had decided against monarchism, he forceably cut off the queue of an imperial official. When such bravado failed to achieve the desired end, he withdrew to teach and reflect. His Ai-kuo hui was not a compromise but merely a vehicle to propagate his ideals and to seek a means to define and achieve his goal.

After the 1911 revolution, though the political situation was far from ideal, he felt called to action again. Here, we witness the first of many occasions on which Ch'en was prepared to cooperate with - or, at least, to be in the service of - a warlord, as his friend Po Wen-wei was, albeit a progressive one, provided he be allowed to retain his ideals and, more important, the freedom to propagate his ideals. We may include in this category his service with Ch'en Chiung-ming in Canton in 1920 and later with the Kuomintang (KMT) National Government. Indeed, his comrade, Li Ta-chao was also not above serving a warlord, even a non-progressive one like Wu Pei-fu, if by doing so, long term as well as immediate, benefits might be brought to the cause.

With this second failure in Anhwei, Ch'en embarked on yet another and more thorough period of preparation, education and contemplation. When he returned to action - practice - again, he had come to a new intellectual conviction, communism. And again, he gave his total commitment. He resigned the security of a chair in the prestigious Peita to organise unions for rickshaw
pullers and wharf-labourers in Shanghai, risking imprisonment in the process. This time, external circumstances brought to his side a nucleus of like-minded younger comrades. They all shared a similar perception of the objective reality of China. Furthermore, Ch'en may claim the credit for being an intellectual pathfinder for many of these comrades through his Hsin ch'ing nien and Mei-chou p'ing-lun.

By 1915, Ch'en had come to the conclusion that socialism was the ultimate solution for the social injustices concomitant with capitalism, though his intellectual commitment was not dogmatic. He was of the opinion that social teaching must be compatible with the age, perhaps the lesson of human changeability he learnt from Liang still lingered! He now took the view that 'doctrines rise and fall in accordance with the changes in social structure and living conditions. While a theory may give rise to a certain society, societies also produce certain theories.' To Ch'en, the more complex the nature of social change and the quicker its tempo of change, the faster any particular doctrine would become obsolete, for it was not possible that a teaching could ever be of universal application nor for all times. Though he was fundamentally eclectic, at that particular time, especially in the realm of political theory, his intellectual persuasion tended towards French socialist ideas and by the end of 1918, he seemed to be on the verge of committing himself to the Syndicalist

approach. In this period he felt that only through education and industrialization could China and her people achieve emancipation and strength. But education and industrialization could only be brought about if there was first a suitable political climate which, in his opinion, China did not have. This gradual rejection of capitalism and the revulsion against the exploitation of people in the lower or weaker classes was felt in China even by those who did not become communists. For instance, Wang Ching-wei, anticipating Lu Hsun, called such exploitation cannibalism and the 'civilized people's human sacrifice.'

Contemporaneous to this intellectual development China was experiencing an unprecedented period of industrial development, spurred on by the Great War. The withdrawal of foreign competition in the form of low tariff imports of manufactured goods permitted the indigenous industries to develop at the rate of over 13% per annum, or in terms of net value, the industrial production increased from Chinese $74.9 million to Chinese $169.4 millions between 1913 to 1920. As mentioned earlier, this

---

41 Mei-chou p'ing-lun, 1919 New Year edition's Editorial called for a general strike to change the socio-economic structure of society.

42 HCN I, 2 (15 Oct. 1915) 'Chih-jih chih chiao-yü fang-chen' (Today's Guiding principles for Education). Also see Ch'en's replies to readers as recorded in Tu-hsiu wen ts'ün (The collected works of Tu-hsiu) III, 12 and III, 126. Meisner totally misread these letters and came to the conclusion that Ch'en was then NOT interested in politics, see his Li, etc. 36.

43 Wang Ching-wei 'Hsi sheng chih Yin' (The Meaning of Sacrifice), Tung-fang tsa-chih. It is of interest that Wang noted this prior to the 1917 Revolutions in Russia. Lu Hsun, A Madman's Diary, HCN April 1918.

created a higher degree of imbalance in regional economic condition and growth. Furthermore, as we have also noted, this continued and accelerated the process of commercialization of agriculture, especially in areas more accessible to urban centres - this included areas from which came our future leaders of the CCP. Some of the consequences of this process, as noted in the reports cited earlier, were the gradual impoverishment of the peasantry and the rise of a merchant-landlord class with financial and familial linkages with urban industries. Mao's father, at the time when the young Mao was about to leave home, was in transition from an Upper Middle Peasant to that of the landlord-money lender, through the successful application of his business acumen. With the increasing number of peasants losing their land and becoming tenant farmers there must be an attendant debasement of the quality of life in the country. To the intellectuals, especially those exposed to foreign ideals and particularly those who had suffered such pains as Ch'ü Ch'iü-pai did, and even those who had not suffered personally, as were Li Ta-chao and Yun Tai-yüng, the primitive and idealistic communism of Tolstoy or the idealistic anarchism of Kropotkin must have been attractive. But such moral self-perfection is basically an inward and self-centred exercise. The Russian communists had to reject it. The Chinese, whether Confucian or communist, also rejected it eventually.

As we have noted, Ch'en was urging an egalitarian and participatory political system in his Hsin Ch'ing-nien and later

\[45\] See f.n. 16.
the Mei-chou p'ing-lun. The influence of the former journal on the young intellectuals and students is well known; even the latter had inspired the founding of the Hsing-chi p'ing-lun in Shanghai and the Hsiang-kiang p'ing-lun from Mao Tsetung, Ts'ai Ho-sen and others in Hunan. Therefore, if we keep in proper perspective the contemporary socio-economic conditions - the gradual but increasing impoverishment of the peasantry who were dispossessed of their land and reduced to tenants and in so doing meant that they were becoming the class-without-property, (Wu-ch'ian chieh-chi, or the proletariat); the unprecedented rapid rate of industrialization; the increasingly evident linkage between the urban merchants and landlords, especially near the rapidly growing major urban centres; the years of nationalistic and anti-foreign education - then, we may be in a better position to appreciate the effects on their contemporary readers the clarion calls issued from Ch'en's influential journals. On January 3rd, 1919, the editorial of the new year issue of the Mei-chou p'ing-lun announced that to overthrow the capitalists, the weapon of the workers 'is the general strike of the grand union of the workers.' The May 4th issue of the same journal editorialized that now is the time for China to have a socio-economic revolution. The editorial observed:

The revolution in China has to raise the (political) matters of Europe's First Revolutions except that the revolutionaries in China have to be luo-nung (workers-peasants) class, and not the capitalist class. The target of revolution (in China) will not be the nobility but one resembling the mobility as well as the capitalists: the shih-ta-fu class (the scholar-gentry), the only one in the world.
It is in this context that we come upon Ch'en's end of the year appeal on the realization of democracy. As Ch'en saw the situation in China, the only big capitalist enterprises in China by the Chinese were those by the 'bureaucrat-capitalists'. His democracy had no place for them, but practically everyone else was included. His was a concept of regional self-government with trade and professional unions taking leading roles in the urban units. He wanted all employers and employees to unite and each person will have one vote of equal value in decision making. These regional groupings or governments would have jurisdiction over education, public health, irrigation if in the country areas, roads, food supply, social welfare, cooperative societies, labour conditions, and election, that is, the election of representatives to the higher political units: the provincial and national assemblies. He would, however, exclude all the current political parties, the cliques and factions, and the warlord groups. While Ch'en modestly denied that his concept meant a social revolution, he did say that the suggestions of Dewey and Bertrand Russell were not comprehensive enough in that neither of them gave sufficient attention to both the political and socio-economic aspects of the body politic. He put forward his basic units of democracy as a concept that would adequately cater for both aspects. In reality, his units resemble, functionally, very much like the soviets - the type of soviets that caused the sailors of Kronstadt, and others, to accept the slogan 'All Power to the Soviets', but eventually led to their own suppression.

46 Ch'en, 'Shih-hsing min-chih ti chi-ch'u' (Foundation for the realization of democracy) HCN VII, 1, 13-21 (1 XII, 1919).
He published this article shortly after he had spent a period in jail in Peking for distributing anti-government hand-bills in the streets. Thus, this statement is a clear demonstration that he had not repented but still persisted in his anti-government activities and, in fact, inciting what must be regarded as revolutionary social changes. Having come to such an intellectual position, and taking into consideration his previous pattern of activities, we may be permitted to suggest that Ch'en was intellectually constrained to return to total action. This he did. He resigned his chair and deanship at Peita, leaving his colleague, Li Ta-chao, to do the intellectual proselytizing in Peking through the Marxist Studies Group at the University and other means. He went down to Shanghai trying to organize and unionize the rickshaw drivers, the machine workers, and the wharf-labourers. Whilst in Shanghai, Ch'en also renewed his association with Sun Yat-sen.47

47 For Ch'en's imprisonment, see Hu Shih's account in Ch'en Tu-hsiu p'ing-lun (Critiques on Ch'en Tu-hsiu) ed. Ch'en T'ung-hsiao (Peiping 1933). For the founding of the party cell in Shanghai in 1920, see Ch'i-wu lao-jen, 'Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ch'ing-li ch'ien-hou ti ch'ien-wen' (Recollections of the Events Surrounding the Founding of the CCP), Hsin Kuan-ch'a (New Observer) 1 VII 1957. For the founding of the unions in those early dates, see Wu Min and Hsiao Feng ed. Ts'ung Wu-ssu tao Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo ti tan-sheng (From May 4th to the Birth of the People's Republic of China). (Peking 1951). This is a chronicle of events. For the association with Sun, see Ho Chiang-kung, Ch'in-kung chien-hsueh sheng-huo hui-i (Reminiscences about the Life of the Worker-student) p.24 (Peking 1958). Ho recalled that in October 1920 Sun was invited by Ch'en to give the keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the Machine Workers' Union, organized by Ch'en. Ho and other students were organized to form a bodyguard for Sun.
That Ch'en could achieve so much was more than the result of his organizational genius and quality of leadership, though these qualities were present in obvious abundance. We may suggest that, for the intellectuals of his day, and the workers who were unprotected by any labour laws, Ch'en's concepts were ideas whose time had come. Contemporaneous with Ch'en's article, Feng Tzu-yu published an article in Hong Kong entitled 'Chinese Socialism, its Past and Future'. In it, Feng argued that a Leninist type of socialist revolution was applicable to China now. He argued against the necessity to wait for the industrialization of China because, firstly, Russia did so without industrialization, and secondly, that Marx and Engels issued The Communist Manifesto to the Germans in 1848 when their country did not have full industrialization. He wanted a revolution by the workers, peasants, and soldiers and a government of the proletariat. Though he preferred the change to come via parliamentary procedures, he would not hesitate to use force if such was not forthcoming rapidly enough. Then, in distant Wuhan, Yun Tai-ying, who had been much influenced by Kropotkin, came under the influence of Ch'en's writings and his emissary, Ch'i-wu lao-jen. And, after a study of Engels and Kautsky, Yun became a Marxist-communist and embarked on his active revolutionary career.  

49 For Yun's early political activities, see Ch'i-wu lao-jen, Erh-ch'i hui-i lu (Reminiscences of Feb. 7th), pp.8-10 (Peking 1957). Yun published a translated summary of Engels' The Origin of the Family in Tung-fang tsa-chih (Eastern Miscellany) XVII, 19 and 20 (10 and 25 X 1920), pp.50-5, 67-71. He also translated Kautsky's Class Struggle in this period. The translation was first advertised in the HCN IX, 3 (1 VII 1921).
In this description of the milieu in which the CCP was founded, the explicit effects of the October Revolution and the May 4th Incident were purposely omitted. This is not to deny the influence of these two events. Indeed, their effect on the contemporary intellectual and political developments have been well documented by scholars.\textsuperscript{50} The omission of the October Revolution should not be taken as an attempt to downgrade the influences of the Russian activities in the development of the CCP and Chinese communism. These will be dealt with in subsequent chapters. The intention here is to demonstrate that in China, there was a group of politically concerned people who through a process of observation and study of the internal conditions and external influences, and through the interaction of the fruits of such intellectual activities and practical political experiences, were moving towards a communist denouement, independent of the personal guidance of their comrades from Russia. In this process, they may come to similar conclusions as their Russian comrades and often, as shall be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, develop their own Chinese varieties. For the purpose of this study, however, it is important to keep in mind that by 'the time the May Fourth Movement began, capitalist production and capitalist relations of production already held an important place in the Chinese economy.'\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{50} See, for example, The May Fourth Movement by Chow Tse-tsung (Harvard U.P. 1960).

CHAPTER TWO
SEEDTIME OF CHINESE COMMUNISM

Part I The Making of the Revolutionary: pre-May 4th period.

The period between the resignation of Ch'en Tu-hsiu from his chair at the Peking University in 1919 to the publication of the Manifesto and Resolutions of the 2nd CCP Congress in 1922 may be regarded as a watershed in the development of Chinese Communism. An examination of the activities of, and decisions made by, the newly converted Chinese communists may deepen our understanding of some of their activities and decisions committed in their period of collaboration with the KMT in our period of study.

An examination of this germinal period is necessary because there seems to be some contention by scholars on the nature of the understanding of our subjects, especially Ch'en, vis-a-vis Marxism and Marxism-Leninism. It is alleged that these Chinese had an imperfect perception of the theoretical aspects of the nature of a communist social revolution, and consequently, many of their actions were really little more than following the instructions and directives of their comrades from the Comintern. These are

1 For instance, B.I. Schwartz, in his Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Harper Torchbook, 1958) found that 'Marxism has in its movement eastward ... undergone a slow but steady process of decomposition,' (p.4) and that in China 'it would be more correct to say that Leninism turned their (the Chinese communists) attention to the proletariat rather than the proletariat turned their attention to Leninism' (p.25). And, more recently, a scholar gave credit to Sneevliet for the theoretical and political positions taken by the CCP during this period of our study. (Dov Bing, 'Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP', The China Quarterly No.48, p.681). While Bing's view will be examined in the text, Schwartz's still has to be dealt with. Whether the 'eastward migration' of Marx's idea is a decomposition or not is a subjective value-judgement which is difficult to prove or refute, but what Schwartz said of the Chinese and Leninism is a non sequitur and the student of the history of Marxism will recognise that the same was said of what Lenin did to Marxism by Plekhanov, and Kautsky.
results of serious scholarly efforts and not merely polemics or propaganda, they therefore deserve our serious consideration.

We have mentioned that amongst our group of communists, the most widely read work by Marx was the Communist Manifesto. That being the case, the Chinese must have read in the First Chapter of the Manifesto that:

The bourgeoisie itself ... supplies the proletariat with its own elements of political and general education, in other words, it furnishes the proletariat with weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie.... and, in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole ... [would now] go over to the proletariat... (pp.43-4 Peking 1970 ed.)

As we have seen, these early members of the CCP, especially Ch'en and Li, had long concerned themselves with socio-political injustices and the way to eliminate them. They had long been interested in socialist thought and had the opportunity and facilities to undertake such studies. Therefore, we may reasonably impute that these early Chinese communists qualified for inclusion into that 'portion of the bourgeois ideologists who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole' and went over to the proletariat. To this extent, the question as to whether, in China 'it would be more correct to say that Leninism turned their (the Chinese communists) attention to the proletariat rather than the proletariat turned their attention to Leninism' becomes irrelevant. For, to the Chinese themselves such ideological development was
Marxist, that is, as the result of studying Marx, they were constrained to certain categories of action.

It seems that as soon as he came down from Peita to Shanghai, Ch'en was engaging his efforts at organisational activities, and by May 1920, formed the first unit of the CCP. Immediately afterwards, efforts were made in other centres to form like-minded people into units of the Party. At the same time, we know that Ch'en was also very much involved with the labour movement, organizing unions and trying to awaken the workers into understanding their objective situation. And, as we have noted in the previous chapter, the first communist union in Shanghai was organized in October 1920 - the Shanghai Machine workers' Union.

However, while Ch'en and his comrades were moved by their intellectual commitment into a programme of full-time revolutionary activities, we would be unjust to them if we regard their eagerness as an expression of their imperfect understanding of Marxism and the actual socio-political situation of China. Nor, indeed, were they exclusively concerned with the newly developed urban workers and being politically exclusive. If we examine their political messages carefully, we shall find that their decisions and actions taken during the period of collaboration with the KMT had their origins in this germinal period - and not necessarily lessons brought to them by comrades sent by the Comintern. In short, we may trace the foundation of a collaboration - or united-front tactics in these early days,
before the arrival of Sneevliet or Maring, and that they - the Chinese Communists - were also active in the rural sector, such as organising peasants' associations. The core message in their utterances in this period, as well as in the period of collaboration was the same - the necessity of Class Struggle.

Before examining in detail the development of the thoughts of these Chinese communists, and the consequent actions from their thoughts, it may be appropriate to preface the examination by recalling to our attention their thinking immediately prior to their decision to become full-time revolutionaries. As early as 1916, Ch'en had already felt the need to educate and awaken the youth in particular and the intellectual in general to the importance of politics. While the Hsin Ch'ing-nien magazine had been intended for the education of the youth, this education, Ch'en explained, was aimed at achieving a 'radical realization from everyone in the nation' the need for great improvements in politics and the political parties, so that these will involve the people. Shortly afterwards, he was further pressed by another reader for having too much politics in the articles of the HCN and that such action, according to this reader, was dissipating the energy needed for the promotion of a new culture, new education, and new ideas. Ch'en, in reply, reiterated his concept of education, culture and politics. To Ch'en, politics meant more than the current activities of the war-lords and their careerist hangers-on. On the contrary, it demanded the involvement of the people. While he admitted that the development /evolution -chinhua- of the masses 'must be rooted in education

3 HCN II, 1 (1 IX 1916) reply to Wang Shu-ch'ien.
and industry and not politics, nevertheless, political development must first achieve a certain standard before education and industry can have the proper basis for development'. Indeed, as he saw it, the problem in China was that the masses still regard politics as the work of the politicians. Therefore, he urged that 'from now on, unless a political element is added to the life of the people, unless [the people] will exert all their strength to solve the political problems, then there is no need to talk about education and industry ... as [politics] involves the very life and death of the nation, how [can one] bear to remain silent.'

In short, then, when Ch'en launched his movements for a new education and new culture, he had in mind to create a new political culture through a programme of political education. While politics might not have taken command, the achievement of a new polity was certainly a priority programme.

As far as Ch'en was concerned, a revolution - ke-ming - has two facets: the elimination of the old and the making of the new. He felt that in China, even just in the realm of 'political revolution', the situation has not gone beyond the mere elimination of the old for nothing new has been provided for in its place. Therefore, 'strictly speaking, [China] cannot be said to have a [political] revolution. As to the other types of revolution, nothing has been done.'

However such an unpromising situation did not deter him. To him, politics was the art of the possible. Virtue was not the private preserve of any single political party, nor was the

---

4 Ch'en HCN III, 5 (1 VII 1917): Reply to Ku K'e-kang.
possession of political idealism a substitute for the lack of political achievement. While one should not lose sight of one's political ideals and objectives, in China Ch'en thought that the old is still being rooted out to prepare the ground for the new. The revolution, explained Ch'en, entailed both processes. While accepting that republicanism in politics and the scientific method in learning as the two precious gifts of modern civilization, merely believing in them without actively working towards their fulfilment would not benefit the nation. For to take such a position, in his view, would be almost like practising superstition. Without the active cultivating of those gifts in the people, the national polity will not be strengthened and the constitution will remain mere empty words. He chided the KMT for being over sensitive in believing that every member of the Progressive Party (PP) were schemers and traitors. He thought that even in the PP there were no shortages of respectable people and advised that, for the sake of the nation, the KMT should show some respect for the PP. The latter, Ch'en felt, should awaken to the dangers confronting the nation rather than paying so much attention to the pursuit of power and influence. He then urged the two parties to put their own houses in order and unite to rid the nation of the evils that were besetting its body politic - before someone else would come to destroy the nation altogether. In short, Ch'en was telling the PP to accept higher political principles, and the KMT to be more practical, for the sake of the nation which he believed to be in imminent danger of total collapse or being colonized. The sentiments were certainly those

6 Ch'en HCN III, 5 (1 VIII-1917), reply to Cho Lu-tun.
of a patriot, but his patriotism demanded not only a strong nation but a nation well organized to promote the constitutional well being of the common and awakened people. And, to achieve this high ideal, he rejected the exclusiveness that comes from the immodesty of the idealist, and demanded goal-achieving practicality from the true politician. After all, the aim of education, for Ch'en, was to develop such activism and to eliminate passivity.  

Contemporaneous to the expression of the above ideas occurred many important events in other parts of the world which greatly influenced the subsequent political development of China as well as the intellectual and ideological development of our subjects. The first of these events relevant to our discussion was the February Revolution of Russia. As can be expected, both Li and Ch'en commented on that event.

Li was very concerned with the implications of the February Revolution on China's internal situation and development. As the February Revolution was intricately linked with the Great War, both Li and Ch'en made their comments on the Russian Revolution in that context as well as on its likely effects on the Chinese political scene. In Li's view, both Imperial Russia and Germany were notorious for their bureaucratism - kuan-liao cheng-chih* -

7 Ch'en, 'Chin-tai hsi-yang chiao-yu' (Modern Western Education). A speech delivered at the Tientsin Nankai College, HCN III, 5 (I-VII-1917).

* Kuan-liao cheng-chih seems to connote a somewhat different condition from that of 'bureaucratism'. In the context used by Li, the kuan-liao, unlike the 'bureaucrat' in the normally accepted sense of today, were concerned with political matters as well as the day to day functioning of the government machinery.
and he saw the February Revolution as the rejection, by the Russian people, of this bureaucratism. The implication of this for China, as Li saw it, was that this Revolution should serve as a warning to the bureaucrats in China, and that these people should now realize what would be in store for them should they continue to hinder the development of republicanism in China. 8

Ch'en commented once on the Great War and in a separate article, on the Russian Revolution. However, on both occasions, he was no less concerned with the implications of these events on the Chinese situation than Li, and was just as explicit. Ch'en advocated China's participation in the Great War for a number of reasons. 9 Firstly, it would be an opportunity to show the white people that the Chinese refused to be regarded as a conquered people. If in so doing the whole country would be united, even if China lost the war, the Chinese people 'would at least be able to claim that for the second time - the first time being the efforts against the Monarchist Movement of Yuan Shih-kai - we have demonstrated to the world that our spirit would only bow to justice and not brute force ... and to change the hundreds of years of submissiveness in foreign relations.'

8 Li 'O-kuo ta ke-ming chih ying-hsiang' (The Influence of the great Russian Revolution) Chia-yin jih-kan (The Chia-yin Daily) 29-III-1917. Cited in Li Ta-chao hsüan-chi (The Selected Writings of Li Ta-chao), 81-2 (Peking 1962). (Hereafter to be cited as HC). Meisner seemed to have taken a very different reading of this article of Li. Meisner found in this article that Li had 'suggested that an Allies victory would not be a victory for democracy but would only benefit "those who champion bureaucratic government"'. Op.cit. 59.

9 Ch'en 'Tui Te wai-chiao' (Foreign relations with Germany), HCN III, 1 (1-III-1917).
Secondly, as if anticipating the young Mao Tsetung, Ch'en saw 'war to a society in the same way as suitable exercises to the human body' and that a society which had not experienced war for a long period would show signs of degeneration. On the other hand, war would bring in its train great progress in knowledge. Therefore, he argued, the participation in the Great War would not only demonstrate that the 'yellow slaves' can shed blood on the European battle fields, but also gain for China much new knowledge. In his mind, this knowledge would be gained by those soldiers participating in the conflict as well as those staying at home.

The third reason Ch'en put forward was that China was now divided by 'barbaric troops' of the various nations and thus suffering so much economically that education and industry were unable to develop. He felt that the present situation simply could not be allowed to persist any longer. Therefore, if China would help the Allies, she might gain some financial benefit, in the form of indemnity, and the reform of the tariff arrangements. Another reason for China's participation in the Great War was that China, being a new and developing state, was suffering a common malaise of such nations, that is, internal bickering and disunity. Ch'en felt that an external war might unite the various bickering factions.

Finally, he saw no absolute victory for either side in that the contending nations would need much time to recuperate from their war efforts before further ventures would be made into the

---

10 Erh-shih-pa hua sheng, 'Ti-"yu" chi\h\yen-chiu' (A Study of Physical Education) HCN III, 2 (1-IV-1917).
Far Eastern regions. He felt that the common aims of all European nations in Asia was colonialism - chih-min chu-i. Indeed, in his view, the post-war period would create a new and complex international problem of balance of power and that China should take advantage of it to raise the level of her national strength.

Here, we witness a very nationalistic Ch'en Tu-hsiu whom one can hardly regard as being pro-France or pro-Britain. He did not seem to be suffering from 'an extremely roseate view of the contemporary West': on the contrary, he had every appearance of being a hard headed realist, more of a practical man of politics than an idealist.

When the February Revolution occurred, Ch'en accurately predicted that the new Russian Provisional Government would not make a separate peace with Germany. However, he thought that the politically awakened in China should see the February Revolution not merely as a revolution against the Russian Imperial Family but against 'monarchism' - chun-chu chu-i - and 'militarism' - ch'in-lüeh chu-i. The terms chun-chu chu-i and ch'in-lüeh chu-i seem to denote more than merely a monarchical form of government which had an aggressive inclination towards its neighbours. The combined connotation of these two ideas - chu-i - perhaps points towards the idea of imperialism.

In this statement, Ch'en urged China to participate in the Great War against Germany because this would give China a right

---

12 Ch'en 'O-lo-ssu ke-ming yü wo kuo-min chih chüeh-wu' (The Russian Revolution and Our People's Awakening) HCN III, 2 (1-IV-1917).
to have a seat in the post-war peace conference. As with the statement he published a month earlier concerning China's foreign relations vis-a-vis Germany, Ch'en repeated his view that the international situation after the war will be greatly altered. At the same time, however, he strongly exhorted the people of China to awaken to their present precarious conditions. As Ch'en saw the situation at the time, for China to really survive in the new post-war situation as a viable and independent nation, the Chinese people must make use of the means of modern civilization to develop and consolidate national strength. 'For, as long as militarism - chi'in-lüeh chu-i - continues to be unabated among the great powers, we will never have the opportunity to develop the strength of our nation.' Basically, his statement was an exhortation to his countrymen, and used the February Revolution to bring out the various implications which the international situation had on China's development and future. He was also trying to impress on the readers the urgency of the occasion for China's survival. It should also be noted that while German militarism and expansionism were explicitly condemned, Ch'en, in both articles, did not single out any of the Allies for praise.

Just before the October Revolution, Li expressed some deep anguish over the shattered hopes of political improvement in

13 Ch'en, Ibid. The third of the five Awakenings (Chüeh-wu) that he exhorted his readers to make.

14 However, Meisner, Op.cit., p.59 claimed that this article of Ch'en's 'had relatively little to say about either the February Revolution or the awakening of China. It was essentially concerned with arguing that China should join the Allied cause.'
It was occasioned by the anniversary of the Wu-chang Uprising of 1911. Li felt that the sacrifices of these martyrs in that and the other less successful uprisings were negated by the bickerings among the political parties. He entreated the various factions to atone for their past failures and mistakes by working together diligently for their country.

The significance of this statement will become clearer if we read this entreaty in conjunction with another article by Li published in the same issue of the journal. Here, Li was very critical of the political philosophy and activities of Liang Ch'i-chao and the Progressive Party. In this article, Li was rejecting the political line of Liang and with the repudiation, a turning away from his recent association with the Liang group. Since this was a lengthy article of some twelve pages, we may assume that it was written before the former statement which was merely a letter to the journal offering some of his thoughts provoked by the occasion of the National Day.

Reading the two statements together, we may assume that the anguish and lamentation in the letter may thus be regarded as a confession of his own failure, and perhaps, even as an olive branch extending to his former colleagues - now that the needs of the nation moved him to feel that national need was of great and imminent importance. After all, at about the same time, Ch'en Tu-hsiu was having very similar thoughts. As we have noted

\[15\] Li 'Chih Jih' (This day!) Tai-ping yang (Pacific Ocean) I, 7 (15-X-1917).

earlier, Ch'en was telling the PP to adopt higher political principles, and the KMT to be less exclusive and more practical, and that both parties should awaken to the imminent and serious dangers confronting China.17

In retrospect, it seems that on the eve of the October Revolution, Ch'en and Li were still urging and pleading with their former colleagues, such as Liang and the Chinputang as well as the KMT to work together to build the new China they all seemed to be aiming for, at least theoretically. Some, in the view of Ch'en and Li, were too exclusive and impractical while others were too lax in their principles. At the same time, these two were also addressing an audience of young intellectuals who, like the two professors, were also eager and even impatient for changes. On the other hand, though Ch'en and Li also felt that China was facing imminent danger of total collapse, as practical men of affairs, they were anxious to ascertain that whatever alternative they should now propose, it should be practicable and plausible. Hence, they renewed their determination in the political education of their young readers and their own self-education - to find out more about the objective reality of the Chinese society before promoting a programme and theory of socio-political revolution.

In pursuance of such expressed desires to promote practicality rather than exclusive idealism, the HCN decided to publish some practical guides to social reform. If the new-style

17 Ch'en, Shih-chü tsa-kan (Random thoughts on the contemporary situation) HCN III, 4 (1-VI-1917) see p.6 of this chapter. Once again, Meisner gave a different reading to Li's thoughts on this occasion. Meisner Op.cit., pp.34-35.
politics is to involve all the people, it is imperative that the reformers should be familiar with the conditions of the masses. With such expressed aims in mind, the HCN began to publish articles on social surveys.\(^{18}\) The editor of this report had done social surveys of some aspects of life in the Peking urban areas but now decided to report on rural life and to study rural economic conditions because 'in China only very few people live in cities while most live in the villages. It would not be the 'Politics of the Virtuous' (Hsien-jen cheng-chih) if we do not study conditions in the villages and to examine their good and bad points in order that the educated people living in the cities would know how to develop and improve the conditions of these people'.

The report itself on a district in southeast Kiangsu province, was not unlike that made by Mao Tsetung on Hunan in 1926. That is a record of exploitation of the poor peasants by landlords and corrupt officials. However, what is pertinent to our discussion is the editor's comment at the end of the report. He saw that the situation in China being analogous of that in France just before 1789. This editor, who had researched at Cambridge University, likened the sufferings of the Chinese peasants and their conditions as described in the report to that of the French peasantry at the hands of the aristocracy just prior to the French Revolution. That is, there existed, in his view, a condition in which the peasantry was cruelly exploited and which would lead to a revolutionary condition. As if to

\(^{18}\) HCN IV, 3 (15-III-1918) 'She-hui tiao-ch'a', ed. by Tao Lü-kung.
emphasize his points, he advised the readers to consult the volume on *The French Revolution* in the *Cambridge History of Modern Europe*. The reporter found that the landlords were also the money lenders and always made loans at usurious rates. As if confirming our generalized socio-economic picture in Chapter One, his report also suggested the gradual impoverishment of the peasantry while the landlords-money lenders were able to increase their holdings.

Although the HCN was in the thick of the New Culture Movement, it published another report of rural survey two months later and this time the subject was in Fukien province.¹⁹ In the same issue, Li Ta-chao urged the young people to strengthen their resolve to break new grounds in their political, social, and literary thinking so as to create a new life.²⁰ In so saying, Li was in fact giving support to his colleague, Ch'en, to the idea that the New Culture Movement was a very political movement to these two future communists and many of their contemporaries, and not merely a literary movement.

To Ch'en and his colleagues, their politics was neither a career nor something 'students need not be bothered with but rather, involves all citizens who had the right to participate in political matters'. That, of course, meant everyone who was of age, not a criminal or insane. In Ch'en's view, the people should discuss all political matters ... but that fundamental

---

¹⁹ *HCN* IV, 5 (15-V-1918) Yeh Yuàn, 'She-hui tiao-ch'a' (Social Survey).

²⁰ Li Ta-chao 'Hsin-ti! Chiu-ti!' (The New! The Old!) *HCN*, IV, 5.
politics concerned with the very life and death of the nation and the people. However, this concern for one's own country - call it nationalism if one must - is not to be 'idolized'. This concern for one's own country does not extend to the defence of the rights of the aristocracy and the capitalists, nor to the attack of a smaller and weaker nation. Indeed, the very existence of nations, they admitted, would naturally lead to international competitions, wars, and killings; and, they confessed that the only way such evils can be eliminated would require the awakening of all the peoples of the world to the truth of ta-t'ung.

Such sentiments, nevertheless, should not be taken to mean a call for the spiritual transformation of human nature, but merely a political awakening through a proper and gradual political transformation because they had, by then, accepted a materialistic conception of world development, though it may not necessarily be a Marxist conception of materialism. As further evidence of their practicality, they also accepted the continuation of national, indeed sub-national and regional differences - even such differences as national and regional psychology and dialects - in the foreseeable future.

---

21 Ch'en 'Chin-jih Chung-kuo chih cheng-chih wen-ti' (China's Political Questions of Today) HCN V, 1 (15-VII-1918).
23 Ch'en, 'Jen-sheng chen-i' (The True Meaning of Life) HCN IV, 2 (15-II-1918); 'Yu-kuai lun chih i' (Questioning the Belief in the Devils) HCN IV, 5 (15-V-1918) and his letter in V, 2 (15-VIII-1918). His commitment and hopes in a materialistic science is another case in point.
24 Ch'en in reply to letter from Tao Lu-kung who suggested the adoption of Esperanto. HCN III, 6 (1-VIII-1917).
Nevertheless it was their hope, and conviction, that the process of evolution would eventually eliminate such nationalistic differences.

In the exclusion of the aristocracy and the capitalists - ts'ai-chu - from the membership of the nation which they had in mind to build, we may be permitted to surmise that if they pursued their premises to their logical conclusions, Ch'en and the nationalists of his persuasion would be confronted with a class struggle. We may argue that China in the second decade of the 20th Century had no aristocracy, but to do so would make ourselves appear, in the eyes of Ch'en and his colleagues, pedantic purists. As we have noted from the reports of their social surveys of the rural scene, they likened their own contemporary social conditions to that of France just prior to the 1789 revolution. Furthermore, in their analogy, they regarded the Chinese landlord-money-lender class as the 'aristocracy' in the Chinese rural setting.

An explanation, however, may be required for the concept of ta-t'ung. This need not be a utopian call to return to the simplicity of the rural life of some imagined golden past, nor the anti-machinery Luddite mentality. Indeed, in the very same issue of the HCN which published the article by Ch'en on ta-t'ung was another article explaining how machines would promote this

---

25 While ts'ai-chu really means 'the owner of wealth', the term 'capitalists' was already used by Ch'en since 1915. Thus I feel that to translate ts'ai-chu as 'capitalists' in here is not inappropriate.
The writer specifically dissociated the system he was advocating from 'that of the ancient Chou Dynasty ... or, that of Tolstoy in modern day Russia.' Their new ta-t'ung fully advocated the use of machines on the farms and the factories as labour-saving devices, thus giving the workers more time for recreational and educational activities. What the writer was lamenting was that the machines now belong to the rich while the majority, the poor, were merely working for the benefits of this small rich minority. Under such conditions, it would be proper, so the author argued, for the majority to wage a revolution against this minority and to overthrow the organisational set-up which controls the machines.

Indeed, the author went on, 'This [method of resolving the problem] is already so often discussed in books and newspapers that there is no need to elaborate here.' Then he went on to predict that a violent revolutionary process would occur before the workers can finally gain control of the machines from the rich. Meanwhile, he advised the workers to obtain more knowledge on the workings of the machines and even learn to improve the efficiency of the machines, as well as getting themselves united and organised. To the author, the revolutionary activities were due to commence.

The echoes of The Communist Manifesto are reverberating very clearly in this message to the workers - and the readers of

---

26 Wu Cheng-heng 'Chi-ch'i ts'yu-chin ta-t'ung hsueh' (The Great Unity Discourse on the Promotion of Machines), HCN V, 2 (15 Vol. 1918), reprinted from Lao-tung Chih I, 5.
the HCN. The ideological significance of this message, in the context of this study, is at least twofold. Firstly, the editors of the HCN must have felt that it was a significant message, significant enough for them to reprint it from another magazine. Secondly, this author used the terms kung-jen and lao-tung jen interchangeably to denote the workers of those machines. He was certainly not making the distinction between the toilers - those working in the fields - and industrial workers - those working in the factories - as the Russian communists were wont to do.

If Ch'en and Li, on the eve of the October Revolution, were making their last anguished calls to the various bickering political factions to come together for the sake of the nation, their sentiments in the months after the October Revolution were noticeably more radical. As we have noted, their social surveys emphasized the issue of class differentiation in society and pointed to a coming class struggle, that is, the emphasis was on the sharpened struggle between the forces that would bring forth social betterment and reconstruction on the one hand, and the forces of continued social corruption on the other. Indeed, by August 1918, Ch'en felt that the forces controlling the Chinese society were practically all evil.27

More significant, however, was the statement by Li, 'On Comparing the French and Russian Revolutions'.28 Here he was discoursing as an historian in trying to compare an event of the

27 Ch'en 'Sui-kan lu' (Random Thoughts), 21. HCN, V, 2 (15-VIII-1918).
28 Li 'Fa 0 ke-ming chi-hpi-chiao-kuan' (A Comparative approach to the French and Russian Revolutions), Yen-chih chi-kan No.3 (1-VII-1918).
past with a contemporary issue, and attempting, as historians are wont to do, to evaluate the historical significance of the contemporary controversial issue in an historical context. It is important to bear in mind this last mentioned point when reading this statement by Li, otherwise there is the danger of reading into the statement sentiments which Li might not have intended to convey.

In this statement, Li expressed the view that some had tried to **denigrate** the Russian Revolution simply because the slogan of the French Revolution was Liberty whilst that of the Russian Revolution was Bread. To evaluate history thus, Li felt, was to be ignorant of the fact that the French Revolution was the revolution of the 18th Century, that it was a revolution to establish nationalism - **kuo-chia chu-i** - that it was a political revolution though with the overtones and flavours of a social revolution.

The Russian revolution is a revolution of the early 20th Century and a revolution based on socialism. It is a social revolution as well as one bearing the banner of a world revolution. Since the spirit of the times was different, the nature of the revolutions was different, and we cannot evaluate both in the same terms.

Li, the professor of history, further explained that:

History is the record of the general expression of the thinking people. An authoritative history is that which moves the minds of the masses. But only that history which reflects the thoughts of the masses [of the past] would be authoritative in influencing the minds of
the masses [of today] .... The French Revolution was not only an expression of the French people changing their minds and attitudes but it also changed in the thinking of the 19th Century. The Russian Revolution is not just a sign of the changes in Russian thinking but that of the whole world in the 20th Century.

He likened such 'reflection' to the falling leaves being signs for the coming of the cool autumn.

He then went on to admonish historians to lift up their heads to catch the light of this new civilization of the world and incline their ears to welcome the news of New Russia being built on liberty and jen-tao - the humanly way; and not to be saddened by the seeming confusion of the Russian situation of today. He then urged his fellow historians to seek the new tides of the world.29

This statement indicates to us the acceptance, by Li, of the October Revolution as a desirable event and that it should be

---

29 On this statement by Li, Meisner, Op.cit. 60-68, has a different reading. He argued that while Li was emotionally committed to the ideals of the October Revolution, he was still an idealist, not a materialist. Our main difference seems to stem from the interpretation of the term History in Li's statement 'History is the record of the general expression of the thinking of the people.' Meisner took it to mean 'what happened in the past' whereas my reading is that it was referring to the 'writings of the historians' and that this article of Li's was aimed at the historians. My reason for this reading stems from the very next words Li wrote: 'An authoritative history ...' My contention is that this article by Li does not permit the modern historian to conclude whether Li was then an idealist or materialist but that the article was merely an admonition to historians on how to evaluate a contemporary issue in an historical perspective.
welcomed. Furthermore, it should be welcomed not merely because it was the decision of the Russian people but that it was the harbinger of things to come for the world. As we have noted, on the eve of the October Revolution, both Ch'en and Li were lamenting the failure of the republican experiment in China and they were especially saddened by the unprincipled and impractical politicians. Their last calls to these people, as we have noted, were forlorn and they knew that was to be so. Instead of seeing the political situation in China improving, they saw it degenerating into warlord anarchy. The Peiyang groups split amongst themselves, Sun Yatsen gathered his groups of dissenting parliamentarians and military commanders and headed south to Canton, and, between these two geographical extreme centres, the various military men carved out their own domains and spheres of influence and interest. 30

Thus by the summer of 1918, the political vision of our future leaders of the CCP began to clarify. As we have seen, Li saw, in July, the October Revolution as the harbinger of the liberation of mankind and warned against equating the Allies with the representatives of liberty. Furthermore he also saw 'the fighters of freedom' in the Socialist Party of Germany, the revolutionaries and strikers in Austria, the Young Turk Movement of Atuturk, and even the colonials seeking freedom and

30 See O. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China, chapter 2 'The Revolution that failed', pp.51-80 for a clear and succinct description of the political situation of that time. (Columbia U.P. 1964).
independence from the British Empire. In August, we found Ch'en excluding the aristocracy/landlords and the capitalists from his New Nation. And, by November, when celebrating the conclusion of the Great War, Li proclaimed that the social effects of the 'Victory of the Common People' was democracy — but to him, it meant the defeat of capitalism and the victory of lao-kung chu-i, the ideology of the workers, just as the revolutionaries in Russia and Germany were trying to do.

It was against such an intellectual and socio-political background that Ch'en and Li began co-editing a new weekly journal, the Mei-chou ping-lun (Weekly Review). It was to be a forum of political discussion and comment. Its motto was 'For Justice, Against Hegemony'. In its opening issue, it stated its declared aim as the promotion of a world society without national boundary and one of eternal peace. However, the founders of this journal were certainly not impractical idealists. On the home front, the Review had a message for Tuan Chi-jui and Sun Wen. It said that since both Tuan and Sun were fellow-countrymen — t'ung-pao — and wanting the same rice to eat, they should share the rice so that both may have some.

That message may well be taken as a lighthearted gesture of political humour, but Ch'en's satirical darts, aimed at the Diplomatic Corps in Peking and the Peking Government, were

31 Li 'Pan...ism chih shih-pai yu Democracy chih sheng-li' (The Defeat of Pan...ism and the Victory of Democracy') T'ai-ping yang, I, 10 (15-VII-1918).
32 Li, 'Shu-min ti sheng-li', HCN V 5 (15 Nov. 1918).
33 Mei-chou ping-lun No.1 22-XII-1918, 'The Manifesto'. written by Ch'en Tu-hsiu.
devastatingly accurate - as well as showing us the editor's political attitude. In these statements, again in the opening issue, Ch'en demonstrated clearly that he was harbouring no illusions concerning the nature of politics, both in China and in foreign countries. To him, politics was corrupt for that is human nature, especially those aspiring to be politicians. At the same time, he saw the Foreign powers as the real power behind the Peking Government, hence asked that if the Kaiser was to be tried for war crimes, should not someone in China be tried for the crimes against China - he clearly had in mind not the Germans and Austrians but the existing and still powerful and effective Foreign Powers and their puppets, the warlords.

If those were their views at the end of 1918, we should not be surprised by their - Li, Ch'en and their colleagues - New Year Message for 1919. In it, there are at least two concepts worthy of note for us. Firstly, it is the reconciliation between Marxism and Darwinism, or evolution and revolution. Secondly, having reconciled those two ideas, the authors made a very

34 Ch'en 'Sui-kan lu' Mei-chou p'ing-lun (The Weekly Review) No.1, (22-XII-1918).
35 'Hsin chi yuan' (New Era), Mei-chou p'ing-lun No.3 (5-1-1919). This article was written on New Years Day, but unsigned. The editors of Li Ta-chao hsüan chi (The Selected Writings of Li Ta-chao) included this article in their collection, pp.119-121 but there is no evidence to support this claim. However, if we judge the internal evidences, such as the call for a general strike of all workers, we may detect in this Message influences of French Syndicalist or German Left Socialist thoughts and Li certainly could not claim credit for these influences. On the other hand, Ch'en had the reputation of being the Francophile in that group of intellectuals and had long professed admiration for French Socialism, see his article on The French and Modern Culture, HCN 1, 1 (15-IX-1915). For our purpose, it may suffice if we refer to the unnamed author in the collective, 'they'.
significant analysis of the international situation and made some equally significant proposals.

On the first point, they rejected the hitherto current conceptions of evolution, viz, that it is a struggle for the survival of the fittest and from which comes the idea that it was natural for the strong to annihilate the weak. That is, the argument that allows Darwinism to underpin, ideologically, the practice of class inequality, and for it to be used as an excuse for class exploitation, was denied. On the contrary, they argued that in actual fact, the process of natural evolution calls for a great degree of mutual help from members of the species rather than mutual competition, and therefore, mutual help for mutual protection should be the lesson to gain from the study of evolution. However, it was greed that drove some of the more ambitious to become exploiters and to wage wars amongst peoples and nations; and, it was greed that created the situation in which a minority class effecting economic exploitation over the masses. But such a condition is not natural and such injustices must be eliminated. The means to make the change, they argued, was revolution, and through this process of revolution, 'construct the system of production' so that the 'robbers of labour-super surplus [value] would be eliminated'.

Having come to this position, they then informed their readers that while:

Previously, in a production system under capitalism anyone intending to expand the power of the capitalist class of his nation will resort to war to break the confines of national boundary so as to gather the whole world under one economic
organisation and putting it under his own capitalist government to control. From now on, the system of production has started an extremely great change. The labouring class wants to form a union of the proper producers. [They want to] break down national boundaries, and to overthrow the capitalist class of the world. Their weapon is the general strike of the grand union of the workers. This new era of the world revolution, it is the new era of mankind.

And, after having come to this position, they then felt that in this 'new era of awakening .... even in the darkened China and moribund Peking ... we should make use of this ray of light, and strive to help mankind to go forward and work for the benefit of mankind.'

Now, some of the exhortations may well be discounted as the traditional grandiloquences of new year messages. However, in reconciling Marxism and Darwinism and in placing so much faith in the revolutionary spirit of the working class - lao-kung chieh-chi - we may detect the sentiments of the German Left Socialists, such as Anton Pannekoek and Rosa Luxemburg, as well as, perhaps, being further evidence that the message was, if not entirely written by Ch'en, strongly influenced by him. That Ch'en had tried to reconcile Marxism and Darwinism was obvious and he was to be even more explicit in this shortly afterwards in his now famous reply to young Ts'ai Ho-sen.36

The sentiments of this Message, on the reconciliation of Marxism and Darwinism, can almost be read as a synopsis of a

36 Ch'en 'Correspondence Section', HCN IX, 4 (1-VIII-1921).
tract by the same title, Marxism and Darwinism by Anton Pannekoek, the Dutch Socialist who sided with Luxemburg and was a publicist, since 1906, for the German Social Democratic Party. This pamphlet was available in a Chinese translation in early 1921. It was translated by Shih Ts'un-tung, a colleague of Ch'en and later to be a leading figure of the Communist Youth Corps which was also noted for its Leftist expressions and actions.

However, even if we decide to regard Ch'en as the author of the New Year Message, we should not conclude from that Message that Ch'en was not aware of the realities of the Chinese situation. After all, new year messages do have the tendency to be rather sweeping, though we may detect the general ideological perspective of the writer(s) from such messages. In the very

37 Pannekoek's sociological analysis had been very influential among the left-wing socialists and he had often debated with Kautsky and Lenin. The latter also reviewed Pannekoek's very important pamphlet Tactical Differences in the Labour Movement in Zvezda No.1 Dec.1910 (see Lenin's Collected Works Vol.16, pp.347-352). I should like to acknowledge a great intellectual debt to Mrs. Marian Sawer of the History of Ideas Unit of this University for supplying me with evidence to support my suspicions that the sentiments of this Message and further writings by Ch'en may be found in the writings of Pannekoek.

Ch'en and the Communist/Socialist Youth Corps in China had revered the memories of Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. In 1920 the Youth Corps in Canton, newly founded by Ch'en staged a procession in memory of their heroes' martyrdom. Unfortunately, some of the populace seemed to have confused the two martyrs with a missionary couple in China. (See Ch'en Kung-po The Communist Party and I, p.17. This is from a Hong Kong edition of 1971, published by Ch'un Ch'iu). For Luxemburg's ideas, a succinct account may be found in J.P. Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg (OUP 1966).

38 Pannekoek's pamphlet was available in an English translation in 1912 (Chicago 1912) and the Chinese translation was published by the Commercial Press as a title of their Kung-hsüeh-she collections.
next issue of the *Mei-chou p'ing-lun*, Ch'en again directed his attacks onto the now special duo of targets - the Foreign Powers and their local agents, the Warlords. He was attacking them for their destructive and reactionary policies, that is, Ch'en was again arguing in his old 'nationalist' line - the building of a lovable state which would deserve the love and respect of the citizens; or, for the citizens to build such a state if the present one falls short of that standard. From such an ideological position, it is not difficult to understand the easy acceptance of the idea of a National Revolution against Imperialism and Warlordism. The guns were already trained to that direction while Ch'en and his colleagues were already seeing the coming struggle in terms of class struggle. The objective realities were present, all that was required was new labels. They were, through their writings, intellectually at war with the Foreign Powers and warlords and it was but a small step to consolidate such intellectual endeavours into ideologies.\(^{39}\)

At this point, it is necessary to examine the contemporary meaning of some of the terms used by the Chinese writers. In 1919, our future leaders of the CCP were concurrently voicing

\(^{39}\) Ch'en was most active in making political comments in this journal. He made an attack on the Foreign Powers and the Warlords in No.4 (12-I-1919) and in No.8 (7-II-1919) Woodrow Wilson and his Fourteen Points were attacked, for impractical idealism. Ch'en was certainly not trying to promote the politics of the Anglo-American system in China, as Schwartz & Meisner, have been alleging. In the last mentioned issue, he regarded the victors of the Great War as 'worse than the Bolsheviks'. In No.11 (2-III-1919), Ch'en attacked the idea of international control or influence over Chinese enterprises or territory.
their approval for democracy or a democratic form of government as well as proposing an anti-bourgeois class struggle involving a social revolution with the worker-peasant class – lao-tung chieh-chi – rising up against the capitalist class. Such apparent contradictions have to be explained. Furthermore, in 1919, a great and influential exponent of Western-styled democracy, John Dewey, was visiting China and was closely associated with our Peita-based intellectual-political leaders. Indeed, by the end of 1919, Ch'en published an article entitled 'The Basis for the Realization of Democracy' in which he discussed the ideas of Dewey and Bertrand Russell who was also visiting China at that time. Therefore, we are confronted with at least three alternatives, viz, that Ch'en was a Deweyite, that Ch'en had a special, non-Deweyite connotation for democracy, or, that Ch'en simply did not understand the issues involved.

The last alternative cannot be seriously entertained. The contention that is being put forward here is that if we trace the intellectual development of Ch'en during 1919, the second option is the logical explanation. As Li and Ch'en were to become more and more involved with a social revolutionary movement that was to be based on class antagonism, there is a need for us to examine the nature of class and democracy in their understanding.

40 Ch'en, published in HCN VII, 1 (1-XII-1919).
41 Schwartz, Op.cit., p.22 & Meisner, Op.cit. pp.112-113 take the view that in this article Ch'en was a Deweyite.
As has been noted in the early issues of the Weekly Review, judging from the New Year Message, Ch'en must be regarded as anti-capitalist. As the leading member of the Weekly Review group and its managing editor, that Message would not have contradicted his own views. Then, in subsequent issues in February and March 1919 of that journal, he demonstrated, repeatedly, his aversion to the Great Powers' political and economic exploitation of China. He was certainly not thinking of any Anglo-American model for China.

Li was just as explicit if not more so. By February 1919, he felt that democracy had lost out in the U.S.A. and that the capitalist class was in control and hence the exploitation, not only of others but of their own masses. However, though he felt that the exploited were inclined towards Bolshevism and that such a trend was a world trend, Li would still make the following statement, without sensing any apparent contradiction:

Today everybody wants to develop according to democracy. The present era is the era of democracy.

It seems, therefore, that both Ch'en and Li had their own definition of democracy which was rather different from the understanding of that term by their contemporaries in the Anglo-American world, or even by some of our own contemporaries. It was unlikely that Ch'en and Li did not understand the meaning of

---

42 Li 'Chan-hou chih shih-chieh chao-liu' (The Post-war tendencies of the world), Shen Pao (The Morning Post), 7, 8-11-1919.
43 Li 'Lao-tung chiao-yü wen-ti' (Problems of Labour Education), Mei-chou p'ing-lun No.9 (16-11-1919).
the term. To say so would be patronizing as well as ignorant. Their knowledge of the English language was never challenged. Ch'en had published a four-volume reader of the English language a little earlier. 44

In his discussion of the Problems of Labour Education, Li expressed the view that the labour problems of the post-war world were linked with the problem of democracy, or the lack of democracy. In his view, much of the just rewards of the workers — lao-kung — were taken from them by the capitalists. And, in his view, a true democracy is one in which all share equally the benefits and opportunities resulting from their collective production — sheng ch' an.

Another concept from our subjects that was originated in these early months of 1919 and was to claim great attention later in their political career was national liberation. This is not unnatural especially when they were then openly denouncing those politicians and capitalists who insisted upon 'the principles of imperialism' — ti-kuo chu-i. It was not that our subjects were against law and peace for Ch'en, in the eleventh issue of the Weekly Review, had said that they would respect law and peace, conditionally. They would not blindly idolize law and peace if these concepts were to become instruments of exploitation. 45 Two weeks later, in the Social Comments column of the Review, the editors took advantage of a comment on a

44 Ch'en, Mo-fan Ying-wen chiao-pen (Model English Text). This is a four-volume text on the English language. An advertisement of this study can be found in the HCN V 6 (15-XII-1918).
45 Ch'en 'Wo-ti kuo-nai ho-p'ing i-chien' (My Views on National Peace) Mei-chou p'ing-lun No. 11 (2-III-1919).
discourse by Hu Shih on 'Pragmatism and William James' to **elucidate** further their position on imperialism and the national liberation movement. Having rejected Hu's arguments, the writer asked, rhetorically:

How can there be international peace when governments are organized by politicians and capitalists on the principles of imperialism and ch'an-yeh chu-i! Therefore, Peace and Pragmatism are but dud cheques to cheat the people.⁴⁶

Having taken such an ideological position on international economics and politics, it is only natural that our subjects would extend their support to the various independence and liberationist movements - **tu-li tzu-yu yün-tung**. The various liberation movements they encouraged included the Irish, Korean, Egyptian, and most important in the Chinese context, the Mongolian.⁴⁷ Probably alone amongst the various contemporary politically vocal groups, these future communists defended the Mongolians' aspiration for national independence and they also were alone in not regarding Mongolia as being part of China. Indeed they argued that the first duty for China was to help the

---

⁴⁶ 'Social Comments' Mei-chou p'ing-lun No.13 (16-III-1919). The term ch'an-yeh chu-i really has no exact English equivalent. Taken in context, the nearest explanation in modern usage would be the belief or ideology behind the multi-national industrial enterprises. Or, putting it more tritely, a rough proximation would be 'what is good for the industries is good for all.'

⁴⁷ Ch'en again took the lead with an article entitled, 'Hsueh-sheng yü tu-li yün-tung' (Students and the Independence Movement), Mei-chou p'ing-lun No.14 (23-III-1919). Then, in No.15 30-III-1919) there was an editorial article entitled 'Min-chu tzu-chüeh chu-i' (The Ideology of National/People's Independence).
Mongolians to self-rule, 'after all, the Mongolians had not really received any Chinese beneficience'. To do anything less would be to behave like the Great Powers, they argued. Therefore, we may say that it is only to be expected that when the Review introduced the Communist Manifesto in its Book Review column, the reviewer would agree with Marx and Engels that democracy meant the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that every nation would achieve this happy state under its own conditions and methods.48

It should be with such an intellectual and ideological preamble that we should discuss Ch'en's oft-quoted essay on 'The Basis for the Realization of Democracy'. Here, far from being a Deweyite, we find Ch'en rejecting the ideas of Russell and Dewey as 'not thorough enough'. He was affecting much modesty in his reply to the visiting wise men from the West. But our wise man in the East proposed his own, and by implication more thorough solution to achieve democracy - a solution more suited to the objective realities in China. And, as we have noted, the scheme that Ch'en proposed was more akin to what the sailors of Kronstadt fought and died for, or what Anton Pannekoek had envisaged than anything to be found in Russell's England or Dewey's U.S.A. In any case, at the time of writing, Ch'en had completed his first experience of incarceration at the hands of the Peking government and had probably fled to Shanghai.49

48 Book Review Section Mei-chou-p'ing-lun No.15 (6-IV-1919).
Chiang was a fellow professor at the Peking University and a personal friend of Ch'en. It was Chiang who notified Ch'en that
What is at issue is more than the rectification of names or to debate with modern scholars, but to find out the intellectual and ideological development of those who later became the leaders of the CCP. A study of the timing of the intellectual development of these people will cast some light on the external factors, if any, which might have influenced them. Much has been said by scholars on the importance of the May 4th Incident, the May 4th Movement, and the publication of the Manifesto on China on the 25th July 1919, commonly known as the Karakhan Manifesto on the intellectual and ideological development of these future members of the CCP. That these events did have their influence is not denied here. What is attempted to argue here is that our subjects had already decided that there was a necessity for a socio-political revolution based on class struggle and class antagonism before 4th May 1919, and that they had taken this decision independently through their observation of the objective reality of China and their knowledge of socio-political developments in the historical and international scenes. Subsequent events such as the May 4th Incident and the Karakhan Manifesto and so forth had the effect of reaffirming their decisions and making them more determined to bring their convictions to reality and fruition.

the police were again trying to arrest him (Ch'en) and advised the latter to flee to Shanghai. Also see Chang Kuo-tao, 'Wo ti hui-i' (My Recollections) Ming-pao No.5, p.64. While neither gave the exact date of Ch'en's departure for Shanghai, we know that Chang was sent to Shanghai by Li to discuss political matters with Ch'en towards the end of December 1919.

For a succinct account, see Chow Tse-tung's The May Fourth Movement ch.VIII and IX (Harvard U.P. 1960).
Scholars have not questioned the conversion of Li to Marxism prior to the 4th May 1919. Therefore, the main burden of this proposition is to demonstrate that not only Li but the significant portion of his colleagues, especially those associated with the Mei-chou p'ing-lun were like-minded. As that journal was founded specially as a forum for expressing their political views, then an examination of the issues, leading up to the 4th May 1919, would be of vital importance to this proposition.

A fortnight after the book reviewer of the journal equated democracy with the dictatorship of the proletariat, Ch'en offered the opinion that the Bolshevik Revolution, like the French Revolution in the 18th Century, would be the turning point in the 20th Century for the evolution and changes in human society. A week later, he felt that the moderates of the world were gradually becoming radicalized. Then, on the very next issue, the journal published - on the 4th May - an editorial urging a socio-political revolution in China based on class antagonism. This editorial bears the title:

Chung-kuo shih-ta-fu chieh-chi ti tsui-o

An approximate translation may be: The Crimes of the Scholar-gentry class of China. There is no exact English equivalent for the shih-ta-fu and the leader writer acknowledged that it was a uniquely Chinese phenomenon. More important for our discussion, the fact that nowhere in this issue of the Mei-chou p'ing-lun

51 Ch'en, 'Random Thoughts' Mei-chou p'ing-lun No.18 (20-IV-1919).
was the Shantung Question being discussed. This question, which was the immediate cause of the May 4th Incident, claimed the attention of the entire next two issues of the journal. Therefore, we may deduce from these facts that the sentiments of the editorial of the 4th May issue were not primarily aroused by the events leading up to the May 4th Incident. On the contrary, a case may be put that they were conclusions and results of the observations of the realities in China by the responsible members of the editorial board of the journal.

In surveying the history of revolutions in Europe, this editorial claimed that this history showed two distinctive periods and types. Firstly, in the 18th and 19th Centuries were the Capitalist Revolutions in which the bourgeoisie was pitted against the nobility. These were the political revolutions. The second or contemporary type was the proletarian revolution, and was a socio-economic revolution with world-wide significance, including China. The Chinese, the editorial went on, wished to have a **social revolution now**. The editorial observed that:

The revolution in China has to raise the [political] matters of Europe's First Revolutions except that the revolutionaries in China have to be the *lao-nung* class, (that is, the workers and peasants classes) and not the capitalist class. The target of the revolution [in China] will not be the nobility but one resembling the nobility as well as the capitalists: the *shih-ta-fu* class (the Scholar-gentry class), the only one in the world.

It went on to give two reasons for this analysis. Firstly, the nobility in China had disappeared since the end of the Chou
Dynasty. And, 'what the society now has is this shih-ta-fu class who has held the power of distribution in China for two thousand years, as well as all the political and social positions. The sole aim of their corrupt existence is the acquisition of power and influence. Their character cannot even be compared to the animals.' Their second reason was that apart from the true lao-ning classes, everyone else aspired to become a shih-ta-fu.

Therefore, the revolution must be started by the lao-nung classes. Unless this shih-ta-fu class is overthrown we can never have healthy and clean politics and society in China, nor will our bitter existence be alleviated. We would have no hope for improvement.

The reason that the 1911 Revolution brought forth no good result, reasoned the editorial, was that apart from removing the emperor, it left intact this distributing class. Then, as if to re-assure its readers that such was not an impossible dream, it claimed that:

When the time comes to establish our revolution, it will be easier than the social revolution in Russia, Germany, Austria, and Hungary because in those countries the capitalist class has great power and thus difficult to overthrow.

In our China, because the economy is not developed, we have few large capitalists. This point is one fortunate aspect in China's unfortunate conditions.

This perspective of the world and the Chinese revolution could not have been a sinicized version of the Leninist Thesis presented at the Second Congress of the Communist International
because Lenin presented his Thesis fourteen months after the publication of this editorial. Unwittingly, this editorial might well have been the Chinese response to Engels' conjectures as the latter expressed to Kautsky in a letter:

In my opinion ... countries inhabited by a native population, which are simply subjugated - India, Algeria, etc. - must be taken over for the time being by the proletariat and led as rapidly as possible towards independence. How this process will develop is difficult to say. India will perhaps, indeed very probably, make a revolution ... the same might also take place elsewhere ... and would certainly be the best thing for us...

But as to what social and political phases these countries will then have to pass through before they likewise arrive at socialist organisation, I think we today can advance only rather idle hypothesis.  

The editorial of the Mei-chou p'ing-lun, dated the 4th May, may well be regarded as the Chinese answer to the surmises of Engels. Perhaps, in their own way, they were trying to grasp that opportunity which Marx said the Russians were losing.  

---


54 Marx to the Editors of Otechestvenniye Zapiski, Nov. 1877, in which Marx said: 'I have arrived at this conclusion: if Russia continues to pursue the path she has followed since 1861, she will lose the finest chance ever offered by history to a people and undergo all the fatal vicissitudes of the capitalist regime.' Cited from Avineri, Ibid, p.468.
Not long after the publication of that editorial, Ch'en was arrested in Peking for distributing handbills which protested against the arrest of the students.\(^5^5\) It was upon his release that he published his study on democracy. His flight to Shanghai meant that he was able to devote his time and energy completely to his political and revolutionary activities. He even went so far as to say, in the same issue of the HCN that published his study on democracy, that it was the anti-Bolshevik Powers and not the Soviet Russia or the German Marxists that had disrupted world peace. The revolutionaries merely wanted to build their lao-nung (workers-peasants) government. Of ideological interest is Ch'en's use of lao-nung to describe the government the German Marxists were trying to bring about.\(^5^6\)

\(^5^5\) To get an idea of Ch'en's genuine enthusiasm from a contemporary anti-communist observer, see Hu Shih, 'Ch'en Tu-hsiu yü wen-hsueh ke-ming' (Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the Literary Revolution) in Ch'en Tu-hsiu ping-lun (Critiques on Ch'en Tu-hsiu) ed. Ch'en Tung-hsiao (Peiping 1933),

\(^5^6\) Ch'en 'Kuo-chi-p'ai yü shih-chieh ho-p'ing' (The Bolsheviki and World Peace', HCN VII 1 (1-XII-1919), pp.115-116. 'The Basis for the Realization of Democracy' was in pp.13-21 of the same issue.
Part 2  After May 4th: Practical Revolutionary Politics

While Ch'en was constrained by circumstances to leave academia and soon to take up the life of a practicing revolutionary, it is well for us to investigate what his future collaborators, the KMT, were thinking. At the time when Ch'en was imprisoned, the KMT founded a new theoretical monthly journal, the Chien-she (Reconstruction). In its early issues, we find their leading theoretician, Hu Han-min discussing at some length certain aspects of Marxism. In these studies, Hu had shown himself to be quite well read in the writings of Marx and Engels, including Das Kapital Vol.III and some of Engel's letters in the 1890's, as well as the writings of the European Marxists and their critics.

These studies showed that Hu had accepted a mechanistic version of the materialistic conception of history. That is, he accepted the general Marxist theory on the relation of economics and historico-political development and even the various stages of political development. While Marx and Engels, as we have noted, had, at times, shown suitable vagueness on the political future of the Eastern world - Marx, after all, had never insisted that he was making a revolutionary prescription for all the world - Hu, on the other hand, seemed to have accepted the more mechanistic thoughts of the European Marxists. Consequently, he was at odds with some of the political implications of Marxism.

His acceptance of a mechanistic materialistic conception of history ideologically constrained him to the conclusion that as China was not a capitalist society, a socialist revolution could not be brought about until the capitalist stage was realized, and then, had to wait until capitalism collapsed of its own internal contradiction. Furthermore, he was not convinced of the necessity for class struggle in China.

But the KMT of that time was a mansion of many rooms. Though Hu was a party member of long standing as well as being a theoretician of repute, his ideas were immediately challenged, and indeed rejected, by a comrade of equal standing and repute. The dissenter was Feng Tzu-yu. Feng's reply was written almost immediately after the publication of Hu's studies and was published as his New Year message for 1920 in Hong Kong.58

While Feng never achieved great political power and is now better known as a member of a KMT Right during the first collaboration period of the Canton National Government, his ideas expressed in this Message were of great significance in the history of Chinese communism. Though he was soon to reject many of his own ideas, the seeds sown seemed to have germinated and flourished. Understandably, due credit was not given. For these reasons, we shall have a careful examination of Feng's ideas in order to determine the extent to which the CCP had made use of them and attempted to realize them.

58 Feng Tzu-yü, 'She-hui chu-i yü Chung-kuo (Socialism and China). Written on the 15 Dec.1919 and published as the New Year Supplement of the Hsiang-chiang Ch'en-pao (Hsiang-chiang morning post) in Hong Kong, 1-1-1920. It was re-issued as a pamphlet on the 20th IV 1920, also in Hong Kong.
Feng argued that though China's capitalists were weaker than the European and American counterpart, the lao-tung che (workers), should not wait until the consolidation of capitalism before launching their own socialist revolution. On the contrary, the workers should try to establish socialist policies during the period of political revolution. In his scheme of things, China was undergoing a political revolution.\(^{59}\)

As to the charges that for China to try to establish socialism now would violate the Marxist stages of historical development, Feng replied that the Russian success at the October Revolution had demonstrated that a socialist revolution could be successful during the early periods of capitalism. Indeed, he countered his detractors by saying that when Marx and Engels issued the Communist Manifesto, capitalism in Germany was still in its infancy. As if to demonstrate China's readiness and suitability for a socialist revolution, Feng described his conception of Chinese capitalists. They were: the militarists, the high-ranking bureaucrats, and the Overseas Chinese merchant-investors operating in China. Incidentally, his capitalists in Russia were: the nobility, the large landlords, the high-ranking churchmen, the senior militarists and bureaucrats.\(^{60}\) In his view, the Chinese workers - lao-tung che - had suffered enough and action was needed immediately. As we have seen, this argument resembled very closely the 4th May 1919 editorial of the Mei-chou p'ing-lun.

\(^{59}\) Ibid. p. 4 (The 1920 pamphlet edition).

\(^{60}\) Ibid. pp. 14-15.
As to the method of revolution, he placed great emphasis on propaganda. The audience of his message would be the workers, peasants, and soldiers because these formed the overwhelming majority of the people - *jen-min*. The similarities with later Chinese communist thoughts are all too obvious for elucidation. A successful revolution, argued Feng, must have the understanding and active participation of this majority. He was prepared to work through parliamentary procedures to achieve collectivization which was to be the first step towards the building of communism. But if the parliamentary procedures were to be thwarted by the enemies of the people, there would be no hesitation to use force to conduct this class struggle and to obtain victory. He saw these steps to be unavoidable for China and the world.\(^6\)

In his perception, the era of imperialism was drawing to an end and now the era of 'nationalism' was at hand, but this was to be a new type of nationalism whose aim was to break down national boundaries and work towards cosmopolitanism, and the elimination of the state. There would be a new national constitution which would nationalize land and abolish private control of the means of production, and establish a proletarian government. For, in his view, the majority of the people already belonged to the proletarian class.\(^6\)


Feng reminded his readers that his ideas were extensions of those of his Min-pao days back in Tokyo. It seems, therefore, that while China cannot be said to have a Marxist-Social-Democratic tradition, it is not altogether correct to say that 'those who came into the Communist fold in China were committed to a 'Marxist' revolution long before they had accepted even the basic assumptions of the Marxist world view.' As we have seen, the debates amongst the European Social-Democrats between 1905-1917 were re-enacted in China before the formation of the first CCP group in May 1920. For our purposes, another aspect of Feng's discourse may be of note. Feng pointed out that the workers-peasants-soldiers alliance was not only the alliance of the overwhelming majority of the oppressed people of China but an alliance of the proletarian classes of China. In short, Feng saw the Chinese population containing an overwhelming majority of proletarians. In spite of this, Feng still felt the need to explain to his readers that to have a socialist revolution in China need not wait for full industrialization. To Feng at least, and presumably to many of his readers, the 'proletariat' need not refer to those who work in the Satanic Mills. Thus, from an entirely different source, the concept that China was overwhelmingly a 'proletarian nation' was being introduced to the politically conscious public. Indeed, the message from Feng

63 Ibid. p.3 in which Feng reminded his readers to compare his 1919/1920 ideas with his 1906 ideas in Min-pao No.4, 'Min-sheng chu-i yü Chung-kuo ch'eng-chih ke-ming chih ch'ien-t'u (The Principle of the People's Livelihood and the Future of China's Political Revolution).
was published on the very same day as the more famous one — that is, to modern scholars — given by Li Ta-chao.  

To conduct a social revolution, however, needs detailed knowledge of the social conditions and organisation. As we have noted, the HCN had begun publishing reports of social surveys before the imprisonment of Ch'en. In the four months after his release, the HCN published four reports, a chart to advise would-be surveyors the type of questions to ask, a discussion on the establishment of a rural bank to protect the peasants from the exploitation of the usurers, and providing assistance in the promotion of a programme for the education of the workers. Then, on the issue celebrating May Day, fifteen survey reports were published.

Ch'en was not only publishing reports by others, but apparently, was also busying himself propagating the message to the workers of Shanghai. At the same time, he and Li were very concerned with organizational problems, or more exactly, the lack of organizational experience and experienced personnel. During these months, Ch'en not only pleaded for a greater sense of organization from the supporters of the New Cultural Movement


66 Ch'en 'Lao-tung che ti chueh-wu' (The Awakening of the Workers) HCN VII 6 (1 V 1920). This is a resume of a speech he gave to the maritime workers and in which he exhorted them to be aware or their ultimate objectives: not only just for improved working conditions, but 'the control of politics, military, industries, and to occupy the position of the rulers.'

67 Ch'en 'Hsin wen-hua yun-tung shih shih-mo?' (What is the New Cultural Movement?) HCN VII 5 (1-IV-1920).
but when the Educational Programme for the Workers failed, both he and Li placed the blame on organizational defects, though others blamed the capitalist system. 68

It was not that Ch'en underrated the oppressive nature of the capitalist system, he had shown every evidence of this awareness at the time. 69 However, his sentiments should be taken as evidence for his concern for the practical problems entailed in the launching of a social revolution. This former professor was then 40 years old and quite experienced in the requirements in the organizing of revolutionary activities, or in making radical social changes. And, as we have noted, he was in close liaison with other revolutionaries, including Sun Yatsen who also contributed to the May Day issue of the HCN. Ch'en and his followers were also active in organizing party cells and labour unions in many parts of the country. For the future development of the party, a language school was formed, with the help of their Russian comrade Voitinsky, in Shanghai to prepare promising young comrades for study and training in Russia. As if to provide the ultimate evidence for his belief in being practical

68 See HCN VII 5 (1-IV-1920) which has a collection of opinions by people concerned with the founding of this Programme. Tai Chi-t'ao, who joined the first CCP group which Ch'en founded in May 1920 but soon left and was later to become a leading theoretician of the KMT Right, put the blame on the capitalist system. The reasons for failure given by Li and Ch'en are also included in this collection. Chiang Kaishek contributed $10 to the Programme while Shih Ts'un-t'ung, the translator of Anton Pannekoek, took an active part in the Programme. For more detail, see HCN VII 3 (1-II-1920).

69 See HCN VII 5 for his reasons for the Programme's failure, and his article on the Shanghai textile industry in the next issue, VII 6. In both cases, he accused the capitalists of robbing the labourers' surplus value.
and working within the bounds of possibility, rather than being exclusive, he left the editorship of his HCN at the hands of the translator of the Communist Manifesto and sailed to Canton to serve as Education Commissioner for Ch'en Chiung-ming. There, Ch'en quickly formed a cell and initiated a magazine, the Lao-tung Sheng (Voice of Labour) as the party organ to propagate his message to the workers.

In 1920, the Chinese communists had not only given us an indication of what we may expect of their future political activities, they had also given us some clear indications of their future ideological orientation. The newly formed first unit of the CCP published its own journal, appropriately titled The Communist (Kung-ch'an tang) while Ch'en, Li and their colleagues kept up a prolific rate of writing.

In the first issue of the HCN after the formation of the CCP, Ch'en gave us a discussion of his political views. Here, Ch'en not only repudiated all those Chinese intellectuals who advised against discussing politics, such as Chang Tung-sun and Hu Shih, but repudiated all other forms of political ideas except Marxism. Not only did he regard the dictatorship of the

---

70 Ch'en sailed on the 16-XII-1920. On the day of departure, he wrote to Hu Shih informing the latter of the arrangement concerning the HCN. The Translator was Ch'en Wang-tao. This letter was reprinted in Chang Ching-lu (ed.) Chung-kuo hsien-tai ch'u-pan shih-liao (Historical Materials of Modern Chinese Publications) I, p.7.

71 See Ch'en Kung-po Han feng chi (The Tales of Cold Winds) pp.205-212.

72 Ch'en 'T'an chi &ig-chih' (Talking about politics) HCN VIII 1 (1 IX 1920). There was a gap of four months between this issue and the previous one (1-V-1920).
proletariat, after a class struggle between the capitalist class and the workers (lao-tung che) as the true form of democracy, but also repudiated Revisionist Socialism - that which seeks to bring about socialism through the ballot box and parliamentary means. To him, the state, politics and the law were but tools now in the hands of the capitalists. He felt that revolutionary methods were required to get these tools from the hands of the capitalists in order to build the proletarian state. The same issue also has three articles introducing different aspects of life in Soviet Russia, and three reports of social surveys on various provinces as well as a report on Hong Kong Strikes. Finally, in reply to an inquiry from a reader, Ch'en advised that the liberation of the worker, youth (from old ideas), and women (in order that they may achieve their equality and rights) could only be brought about by class struggle, for he saw these injustices as expressions of the contemporary economic system.\footnote{Ch'en 'Lan-to ti hsin-li' (The Psychology of Laziness) UCN VIII 2 (Random Thoughts) 1-X-1920.}

As an indicator of contemporary public opinion, a full-page cigarette advertisement inserted in this issue, by the Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Co., is quite revealing. It is entitled 'The Truth about Liberation!' The picture depicts a girl with hands bound behind her back and hung by her legs over a cliff. The caption reads: 'Sir! Do you want to realize Liberation? Please take note of the picture and the words.'

The 'words' explain that China is just like that girl, bound hands and feet by foreign loans and capital. To retrieve the lost rights to the foreign Powers, all patriots were urged to buy...
Chinese products. In short, the advertisers openly appealed to the patriotism and economic nationalism of the public to buy their cigarettes - arguing that such purchases would be a contribution towards retrieving the political and economic rights lost to foreign Powers. If the business men would make use of patriotism and economic nationalism to advertise their wares, then similar appeals by the political propagandists must be regarded as judicious adoption of ideas whose time have come.

However, Ch'en was under no illusion that what he had just embarked upon would bring forth quick success. Looking back at the recent failures of idealistic projects, such as the Peking Workers Education Programme, the various cooperative societies, the students' New Culture propagation projects, the learned professor-turned-revolutionary warned against any expectations of quick results. He counselled that success would come only after great endeavours.74

Between the formation of the first unit of the CCP in May 1920 and the departure of Ch'en to Canton on the 16th December of the same year, units were formed in Peking and Wuhan. At the same time, in Shanghai, the Socialist Youth Corps was founded in August as well as a language school while two trade unions, each with its own house journal, were also established before the end of 1920.75

74 Ch'en 'Lan-to ti hsin-li' (The Psychology of Laziness) HCN VIII 2 (Random Thoughts) 1-X-1920.
75 Both formed in September 1920 while the Kwangtung unit was formed in December, presumably after the arrival of Ch'en in Canton, and in Changsha, a unit was formed in 'spring of 1921'. See Chung-kuo kung-ch'1an-tang li-shih chien-pien (A Short History of the Chinese Communist Party), p.21.
Contemporaneous to all these, the Shanghai unit, apart from publishing the already mentioned official organ *The Communist*, also established a workers' broadsheet, the *Lao-tung chieh* (*The Workers*). The Peking group responded with one entitled *Lao-tung che* (*The Workers*) while Ch'en's group in Canton published the *Lao-tung Sheng* (*The Workers' Voice*) and *Lao-tung yü fu-nü* (*The Workers and Women*). Amongst these publications, the most important and the only one available is *The Communist*. As Ch'en was in Shanghai when it was founded, and as he was undoubtedly the most important figure in the party at the time, we may assume that the ideas expressed there would not be contrary to the main trend of his own views. Therefore, we must examine the ideas in this journal if we are to understand the early Chinese communists' ideas.

In its manifesto the editors announced that theirs was an international movement for the sun never sets on the back of the Chinese workers - *lao-tung che* - because Chinese workers may be found all over the world. Since the Communist International had already made contact with the CCP in the person of Voitinsky, we


77 The Librarian at the Shanghai Public Library informed me in August 1972 that their copies of the *Lao-tung chieh* had been sent to the National Library in Peking during the Cultural Revolution. A professor of Party History at the History Faculty of Peking University assured me that the National Library would have the *Lao-tung che*, *Lao-tung chieh*, *Lao-tung Sheng*, and *Lao-tung yü fu-nü* but that they were really small four-page broadsheets while *The Communist* is the important one to consult for my type of study.
are constrained to the view that there was little editorial or ideological direction from the Russian comrade.

However, the articles in all the six issues of this journal may be divided into two groups. Firstly, the original articles written by the Chinese comrades. They are generally more readable and always leavened with appropriate Chinese proverbs or quotations. The second group are the translations. They may be ideological discussions or introducing different aspects of communist activities and achievements in Russia, or elsewhere. Generally, these articles do not read well. They are too obviously translations, written in a stilted style, and often betrayed a patronizing attitude.

The first of the original Chinese articles carried the title 'Remember the Third Anniversary of the Founding of the Russian Communist Government' but, in content, it was almost entirely discussing the situation in China. Citing the Communist Manifesto and The Critique of the Gotha Programme the writer attempted to demonstrate that Marx had consistently advocated the necessity of a Dictatorship of the Proletariat in order to achieve the goals of socialism. Then, arguing that the conditions in China were even more backward than those found in Russia before the October Revolution, the author reasoned that such conditions made the need for a revolution and a dictatorship of the proletariat more urgent. There was no evidence in this article to show that the author found in China a shortage of the proletarian class. His complaint was that the Chinese

---

proletarians were lacking in knowledge, and he cited as an example for his allegation the soldiers of the 1911 Revolution. He lamented that the Chinese proletariat lacked any real understanding of the nature of the revolution at hand and had mistaken socialism for 'getting the wealth of the rich and thus not to have to work any more.' However, he argued that to train the Chinese proletariat before the revolution would mean postponing the revolution to the 22nd Century:

But we can't wait! Therefore, after the Revolution, we must use the communist (Bolshevik) method to train them ... but [we must] not adopt the Bolshevik methods blindly.

In practical terms, this type of revolutionary activity that was being recommended here - one led by a core of politically awakened vanguard - can be considered as both Leninist and Sun Yatsenist. Both were making the claim that they were acting on behalf of an overwhelming majority of the populace, if the latter would only realize it; and both operated with a decidedly minority core of believers. In short, these early Chinese communists would not find any operational incompatibility if they were to be called upon to work with the KMT, as they were soon called upon to do.

Indeed, the methods advocated by The Communist whilst Ch'en was still in Shanghai constrain one to recall some of Sun's efforts in the pre-1911 days, and since. The Chinese communists were certainly action-orientated, or more concerned with the practicality of their ideas rather than the purity or orthodoxy of their theories. However, this should not be taken to mean
that they were ignorant of what we may call the classical Marxist theories, rather, their expressions should be taken as their attempts at the unity of theory and practice, a truly Marxist operational methodology. The main article in the next issue, the last one to be published with Ch'en still in Shanghai, was typical of the original Chinese articles of that journal.

The author opened with a rebuttal to those critics who argued that the Chinese should first learn more about the nature of socialism before launching into a socialist revolution. He regarded such advocacy as 'the thinking of our enemy'. He asked, rhetorically, how many Parisians had read Rousseau or how many workers and soldiers in St. Petersburg or Moscow had read Marx. To this writer, a socialist revolution becomes necessary when the people themselves felt

they had suffered the exploitation of the politics and economics of their time .... [consequently they] want to destroy their contemporary social suppression and to escape the shackles of their government. Therefore, the basic ideas of Rousseau and Marx may be considered to be within everyone's mind. What these two had done was articulating these ideas.

A Lenin or Kautsky might not have used those words, but the sentiments were certainly within the Marxist tradition. And, as he went on, he showed his awareness of classical Marxist

79 Chiang Chun, 'She-hui ke-ming ti shang-chüan'. (On the methods to bring about a Social Revolution) The Communist No.2, pp.2-9 (7-XII-1920).
materialism. The author further explained that

the foundation of social structure is built on human activities - the production of goods and their distribution. ... The causes of revolutions are from these and not invented by human intellect nor abstract theorizing. In short, revolution is not the revolt of philosophic research but from the realities of socio-economic conditions and changes.

Then, to show he had done his homework, he integrated, appropriately, the Marxian slogan immediately after the above statement:

All past social history is history of class struggle.

He then went on to explain the realities of Chinese society in terms of class struggle. As with the other original Chinese articles, this one also quoted a Chinese proverb:

Fu-che tien lien chien mo, pun-che tu mo li chi.

Which, roughly translated means: The fields of the rich stretch from the towns to the distant lanes, while the poor do not have enough land to stand the point of an awl'. This, the author argued is 'indicative of China having two classes, the extremely rich and the extremely poor.'

In the cities, the workers of industrial enterprises in China suffered more than workers elsewhere because the capitalist

80 'Chien' literally means the streets in the towns or markets, while 'mo' means the paths between two fields. The idea to be conveyed here is the vastness of the landholdings of the rich contrasting with the poverty of the tenant farmers.
class in China was international in nature, European, American, and Japanese. He then followed this observation with a masterly piece of theoretical adaptation, reminiscent of that equally original analysis in the Editorial of the 4th May edition of Mei-chou p'ing-lun. This analysis may be regarded as a forerunner of the Chinese communists' analysis of the objective realities of the situation in China in Marxist class struggle terms.

Like all Marxists our author took for granted the class antagonism of the factory workers and the owners, but he explained that the class antagonism in the rural area was no less real or intense. As he saw the situation,

the landlords and the tenants, influenced by ch'an-yeh ke-ming - (Property Revolution would be the nearest translation for this term) - have become the Capital and Labour classes, that is, the wu-ch' an chieh-chi (the class without property, the proletariat) and the yu-ch'an chieh-chi (class with property) the capitalists.

As our writer explained, because of the polarization of wealth, their antagonism is even more obvious because the poverty of the proletariat and the riches of the capitalists were increasing daily. Thus, the opportunity for a social revolution is at hand.

Further, it seems that nature was on the side of the revolution for 'the recent years of war and natural calamity had resulted in tens of millions more proletariat dying from hunger and cold'.

As to the actual tactic, he strongly advised a mass movement, with the politically awakened minority integrating
with the overwhelming masses, as was done in Paris in 1871. He then gave a final, and for us significant, advice to those who felt they were the politically awakened:

Therefore, those of us who want to take part in a social revolution in China must not feel restricted by the theorists, but must endeavour to work on what is practicable.

Judging the above presentation intellectually and as a propaganda vehicle, these original Chinese articles were far superior and more effective than the translated Russian ones. The first such translation that was specially devoted to the Chinese situation must have repelled its readers by its patronizing tone and shaky reasoning. This comrade urged the total reliance on the wisdom and experience of the Russians and furthermore, the Chinese should welcome their wise comrades 'with Oriental voices and smiles' for Russian Bolshevism 'is the protector of the people of China'. Then, Comrade Bek discovered that China had 120 million proletariat which he considered would make China ready for an anti-government movement. He gave no reason for selecting this figure but argued that as 'the Chinese have experience in opposing the warlords, so they are suited to the task of destroying capitalism'.

Though the authors of these original Chinese articles in The Communist used pseudonyms, the arguments presented in them

---

coincided with the sentiments of Ch'en at that time. They were that China was a poor and industrially backward country, and the overwhelming majority of the populace were politically and economically exploited. Hence there was an urgent need to rectify or improve the socio-economic-political conditions of the people and the nation. He was certainly not against industrialization but was of the opinion that industrial advancement need not be brought about by capitalism. 'I deeply believe that foreign capitalism is the sole cause of China's poverty. Therefore foreign capitalism must be overthrown'. Of course, the overthrow of foreign capitalism involved the overthrowing of its ancillary causes - those who in China were helping or benefited by foreign capitalism.

He believed that the process of social evolution would bring about the downfall of capitalism in a given nation, but in China, the entry of the foreign capitalists would also bring down the national capitalists and thus make the struggle of the Chinese workers so much more difficult, especially so because the Chinese workers were not experienced revolutionaries. Hence the Chinese had to use the quicker and more radical revolutionary method. The Chinese workers, in their fight against foreign capitalism and capitalists, were really fighting to defend national independence. Indeed, these themes were amplified and

82 Ch'en 'Kuan-yü she-hui chu-i ti t'ao-lun' (Discussions on Socialism) HCN VIII 4 (1-XII-1920), pp.1-24.
83 Ibid., p.18
repeated in the numerous articles written by Ch'en and his
84 colleagues in the next few months.

However, for our purpose, it is noteworthy to emphasise
that while Ch'en and his colleagues had translated and published
numerous articles describing and introducing the various aspects
of social, political, economic, and intellectual life in the new
Soviet Russia, they never told their readers that they were
trying to build the Russian 'paradise' in China. Russia, when
mentioned in these original articles, was used merely as an
example of using the revolutionary method to 'help' and quicken
the evolutionary process of social development. The theoretical
justification the Chinese employed had been from the masters
Marx and Engels. On the other hand, writings from their
international comrades tended to set up Russia as the example
for China to follow, and as we have noted, regarded Russia as
the final protector of the social revolution.

That the Chinese communists were able to obtain counsel in
theoretical issues from the masters, much credit must be given
to Ch'en. Firstly, he had the editorial office of the HCN moved
from Shanghai to Canton where he could get political
protection. 85 Then, he set about having the major writings of
the masters translated and published. Within months, he was able
to publish such works as The Capital (abbreviated); Wage, Labour
and Capital; Critique of the Gotha Programme; Civil War in
France; On the Jewish Question; The Holy Family; A Contribution

84 See, for instance, the articles in Vol.IX of HCN.
85 There is a Special Announcement in HCN IX 1 (1-V-1920)
announcing the transfer of the editorial office.
to the Critique of Political Economy; The Poverty of Philosophy, and many others. The Russian classics were not neglected and they included such notable ones as Lenin's The State and Revolution; Imperialism: the last Stage of Capitalism; 'Left-wing' Communism: an Infantile Disorder; and Trotsky's Communism and Terrorism and Bolshevism and World Peace.

If the Chinese communists had access to the Chinese translation of the major writings by the Western communist writers, we must, at least, allow them the theoretical possibility of coming to their conclusions through their own reading. Seeing that the most frequently cited works were not those of Lenin or the Communist International but The Communist Manifesto, the "Gotha Programme" and The Civil War in France of Marx and Engels and seeing that they were so fond of reminding their readers that Marx and Engels wrote the Manifesto for the German communists when Germany was not fully industrialized, their conclusion that the objective reality of China constrained them to revolutionary action is thus perfectly understandable, especially if we underline their conception with their knowledge of Pannekoek's theory on evolution and revolution.

Thus, there remains one facet in our examination of the seed of Chinese communism - that of the idea of collaboration in politics in the period of revolutionary activity. The current understanding is that in the beginning, the Chinese were not happy about the prospect and idea of collaboration with the KMT but were persuaded to do so by Maring. Scholars, however, may

86 For a complete list, see advertisement in HCN IX 5 (1-IX-1921).
differ on the nature of Maring's persuasion. After his removal from the party leadership, Ch'en was to claim that Maring made the collaboration issue an order from the Communist International. 87

This study offers the proposition that there is no conclusive evidence to indicate that Ch'en at that time, up to the 1922 Second Congress of the CCP, was against collaboration on the grounds of principle or theory. Indeed, there is strong evidence pointing to a contrary conclusion and that even if Ch'en had any reservations about joining the KMT, they were minor and procedural ones. This, however, is not to deny that in subsequent years, during the period of collaboration with the KMT, Ch'en had cause to feel that many of his actions and ideas were thwarted by the comrades from the International. Of course, to argue thus is not to neglect the unpublished Manifesto of the First CCP Congress contained in the now famous M.A. thesis by Ch'en's erstwhile comrade Ch'en Kung-po, and the importance of this Manifesto will be critically examined.

We have spent considerable effort to demonstrate the fact that Ch'en was a practical man and that he had little time for impractical idealism. Just before his departure for Canton, he reiterated his ideas on practical revolutionary action by using a parable that, in recent years in China, has again acquired currency. He told his readers that the process of social

reconstruction is like sailing a ship, one needs direction and
deavour. One needs to have a direction in social change and
this is the chu-i - theoretical framework - and an ultimate
system which one aims to build. But as he put it in a
picturesque way, social reconstruction could not be brought
about by a wave of the magician's hands, and a new system could
not be expected to fall from the heavens. The old 'cannot be
destroyed instantly', on the contrary, the reconstruction of a
social system can only be achieved slowly and step by step. 88

For the present, therefore, 'as feudalism still has not been
overthrown in China, we [the communists] do not absolutely oppose
[the democrats],' 89 though true democracy and liberty meant, for
Ch'en, an economic system with a proletariat dictatorship. 90

Ch'en was a man of his word. A little earlier, as we have
noted, he invited Sun Yat-sen to give the keynote speech at the
inauguration of a trade union he helped to found. Now, having
come to this conclusion and having counselled his readers so
forcefully and definitely, he put his ideas into practice and
set sail for Canton to take up an appointment as Education
Commissioner for Ch'en Chiung-ming's government.

Once he got to Canton, as we have noted, he formed local
units of the CCP and the SY. His collaborationist activities
also paid handsome dividends. By February 1921, two months after

88 Ch'en, 'Chu-i yu nu-li' (Ideology and Endeavour) HCN VIII 4
(1-XII-1920).
89 Ch'en 'Min-chu-tang, kung-ch'an-tang!' (The Democratic Party
and the Communist Party) HCN VIII 4 (1-XII, 1920).
90 Ch'en, a reply to reader K'o Ch'ing-shih. HCN VIII 3 (1-XI-
1920). 'Lao-tung chuan-cheng' (Workers or proletariat
dictatorships)
his arrival at Canton, a National Association of Trade Unions was founded. Though the CCP did not sponsor this, nevertheless, the Chinese communists were making good use of their unofficial collaboration with the KMT and the opportunities thus offered to work from within. The expressed aim of this association was 'to destroy the capitalist class'.

Ch'en was also very forthcoming with his political views. His prestige as the founder and editor of the HCN, the leading light in the New Culture Movement as well as being a high ranking official in the Education Department of the Government provided him the opportunities and protection to air his views and he certainly did not conceal his ideological position. The sentiments expressed in his public utterances and his action were more than the exposition of his brand of socialism – communism. He took the battle to enemy territories and continued his attack on the Confucian conservatives, the anarchists and socialists of different persuasions. Consequently, he won for himself many enemies, the nickname of 'poisonous animal', a Cantonese pun on his name, and eventually, Ch'en Chiung-ming

91 Wah tze Yat Pao (The Chinese Mail), a Chinese daily published in Hong Kong gave wide coverage to events in the Canton government of the day and the inauguration of this Association was given wide coverage in its issue of 25-II-1921. The HCN IX 1 (1-V-1921) published a number of resolutions and manifestos of this meeting.

92 A series of lectures given at a women teachers' college was published by the HCN Press with the title Ch'en Tu-hsiu hsien-sheng yen-chiang chi (Collected speeches of Mr. Ch'en Tu-hsiu) 1921. A speech given to the Law School in Canton was published in the HCN IX 3 (1-VII-1921) entitled 'She-hui chu-i p'ing-lun' (Critical discussions on Socialism). On each occasion, he espoused the communist line.

The paper's own romanization will be used and not 'Hua-tzu jih-pao'.

/
reluctantly had to dismiss his old comrade and fellow exile in Japan of the Anti-Yuan She-kai days, Ch'en Tu-hsiu. 93

However, one thing of concern to us is very clear. We can definitely say that Ch'en the practical revolutionary was obviously willing to work with those with whom he had strong ideological differences while at the same time, he would use such opportunities to expound his own political philosophy. Indeed, he saw his work in Canton as of such great importance that he decided not to attend the inaugural First Congress of the CCP in Shanghai. Instead, he sent as delegate, his former student of Peita days, Ch'en Kung-po who was planning to go to Shanghai during that summer holiday for his honeymoon. 94

According to another of Ch'en's students, Chang Kuo-tao:

we sent letters and telegrams urging him and the delegates from Canton to come to Shanghai at once. A few days later, Ch'en Kung-po, the delegate from Canton arrived with a letter from Ch'en Tu-hsiu. It was addressed to all the delegates. In it Ch'en explained that his resignation from his Canton post had not been accepted and that he could not get away for the Congress. 95

It seems that the First Congress of the CCP was not regarded as an event of great importance by the leading figures of the Chinese communist movement. Its lack of importance is further

93 See Ch'en Kung-po, I and the communist party, pp. 28-30.
95 Chang Kuo-tao, Ibid., p. 141.
demonstrated by the decision of Li Ta-chao to stay in Peking and send as his delegate a former student, Chang Kuo-tao, to the meeting. The Congress was scheduled in July in order to coincide with the long summer holiday of the schools and universities. Yet the two leaders, Ch'en and Li, both professional educators, had decided to stay away. We may say that the activists at the Congress were the student-demonstrators of the May 4th generation, full of enthusiasm but not so experienced in the practical matter of revolutionary politics. Therefore in any evaluation of the significance of the Congress, its resolutions, manifestos and decisions it is well for the student of CCP history to bear this in mind.

The Congress produced an unpublished Programme and a set of Objectives. The fact that it was not published tells us much about the degree of importance Ch'en attached to this Congress. The Chinese communists, especially Ch'en, had no reason to hide their sentiments expressed in these documents. Any casual reader of the HCN in 1921 would have recognized that it was an organ of communist propaganda and any listener of the speeches given by Ch'en would not have difficulty in identifying his ideological affiliation. Further, as we have noted, Ch'en was most active in making available to the reading public the writings of the major communist writers in having these people's work translated and published. That the Congress decisions were not published nor publicized was probably because of Ch'en's disagreement with

and opposition to them, or that their publication was of little significance, or both.

Between the First and the Second Congress of the CCP - July 1921 to July 1922 - the membership of the Party grew from 57 to 123. Thus, only the most optimistic and unrealistic communist would think they, the CCP by themselves, would bring about the desired socio-political revolution and changes. Irrespective of personal preference, the reality of the situation demanded that should the CCP members want to be effective, they would have to move within existing political structure and hence the necessity for them to develop friendly and working relationships. Besides, they were too insignificant to think in terms of equal partnership, or to use the later communist jargon, the bloc without strategy. This was not lost on the leading and responsible members of the CCP, including Li and Ch'en. As Chang Kuo-tao observed, 'No one amongst us imagines that communism would be achieved in China at an early date.'

Hence, as has been noted, Ch'en kept up his active association with the Canton Government, while Li maintained friendly relationships with a whole variety of socially and politically significant people, ranging from erstwhile colleagues of the New Culture Movement days to the Research Clique and Chihli group of militarists. These communist

99 Chang, Ibid., p.224
leaders entered into such activities with these diverse groups for different reasons. In having a working relationship with Wu P'ei-fu, Li was not hoping for any ideological alliance. On the contrary, the arrangement was entered into by both sides for special reasons of their own. Wu wanted to get more information on his rivals, the so-called Communication Clique and was prepared to appoint Li's recommended friends as inspectors on the Peking-Hankow Railway. Li, on the other hand, was thus able to have his appointees, all communists, to establish communist-led organisations along the railway line's main centres.

The relationship between Sun and Ch'en Tu-hsiu was quite different. They, together with Ch'en Chiang-ming, were long-time acquaintances of revolutionary activities, dating back to the pre-1911 days. They spent their exile together in Japan after the collapse of the anti-Yuan She-kai movement - the so-called Second Revolution, in which they all took some part. In their own ways, they all had concepts of social reform and each regarded himself as a socialist and each regarded himself and his ideas the most suitable for China. Ch'en Chiang-ming, of course, had no political party of his own, though he had his own group of followers amongst whom was the father of Teng Yen-ta who later, as a KMT Leftist, worked closely with the CCP. Indeed, in the context of traditional Chinese politics, both Sun and Ch'en Chiang-ming had their own mu-fu. However, Ch'en Chiang-ming and Ch'en Tu-hsiu were fellow-members of the European

---

100 See Erh-ch'i tsan an shih (A History of the February 7th Massacre) (Peking 1957), and for a contemporary account, the Ching-Han kung-jen liu hsieh shih (The Bloodied History of the Peking-Hankow Workers) (Peking 1923).
Affairs Studies Group in Tokyo in August 1914. In this group, Huang Hsing was the most prestigious member while Sun did not join.

On the other hand, Ch'en Tu-hsiu's refusal to join the Sun group was not entirely ideological. It was mainly because Sun was insisting on all members swearing personal allegiance to him and that they be finger-printed. While Sun might have good reasons for such decisions, especially when he considered his exile was partly due to the betrayal of his former comrades, to Ch'en Tu-hsiu such requirements of membership were not only childish but an ideological and intellectual impossibility.

In spite of these differences, as we have noted, there were close working relations between Sun and Ch'en through the years. The former, even in the dark days before he was able to return to Canton in the summer of 1920, was asked by Ch'en to make a contribution to the special May Day issue of the HCN and was invited to address the inaugural meeting of the first communist founded trade union in Shanghai.

The two Ch'en's apparently thought quite well of each other, hence the Governor's invitation to the communist to chair the Education Commission. Indeed, when the Governor appointed P'eng P'ai to become the Director of Education in their 'ancestral' hsien Hai-feng, Governor Ch'en should not have been unaware of the CCP's rural policies. By that time, the CCP had announced publicly in the HCN the formation of their first Peasant Association in Chekiang.\textsuperscript{101} Indeed, it has been claimed that

\textsuperscript{101} HCN IX 4 (1-VIII-1921) 'Ya-chien nung-min hsieh-hui'. In the Manifesto, published in the HCN, the organizers were openly proposing a proletariat class struggle in the rural sector of society.
the Governor had always been interested in rural and agricultural reforms as well as social reforms even with some socialist flavour. 102

When the governor invited the communist to join him, the former also invited Sun to become the generalissimo. When the generalissimo and the governor were about to come into conflict, the communist, we are told, felt that militarily the CCP should side with the governor, but ideologically they should side with the generalissimo. 103 As the governor's gunners shelled the generalissimo's mansion at 3 p.m. on the 16th June 1922 - that is, before the Second Congress of the CCP - this ideological affinity expressed by our communist thus becomes significant.

While the actual idea of members of the CCP becoming members of the KMT was not in the minds of the Chinese communists until Maring suggested the move - and to Ch'en we have noted certain procedural barriers - the Chinese communist leaders had demonstrated their enthusiasm in practical and close cooperation. To be sure, the CCP members were also active in their separate ways, in organizing the workers, peasants, and students as well in general propaganda work in literature. 104

102 See Ch'en Ching-ts'un (Chiang-ming) hsien-sheng nien-pu (Chronicle of Mr. Ch'en Ching-ts'un), pp. 7-8 (n.p., n.d.) a xerox copy is kept in the University Service Centre (Hong Kong) Library. I have been confidentially informed that it was published by Ch'en's follower in Macau.

103 Ch'en Kung-po, I and the Communist Party, p. 38.

104 For a general recollection by one of the participants, see Ch'i-i-wu lao-jen, 'Chung-kuo Kung-ch'uan-tang ch'eng-li ch'ien-hou ti chien-wen' (Recollections of the events surrounding the founding of the CCP), Hsin Kuan-ch'ia (1-VII-1957). The CCP also founded a Labour Secretariat. There is some disagreement concerning the details on the founding of the Secretariat (see Bing, The China Quarterly Nos. 48 & 56). While the exact date...
Once those procedural barriers were removed, Ch'en really had no strong objection against joining the KMT. And, the barriers were removed. The finger-printing and the swearing of personal allegiance to Sun were not required of the communists who wanted to join the KMT, and, the KMT was restructured.\textsuperscript{105}

To be sure, he would hardly be expected to be a loyal member in the sense that he would accept, in the same spirit as an ordinary KMT member, Sun's Three Principles of the people.\textsuperscript{106}

Yet as a practical man, he was not unaware of the limitations of

\begin{quote}
may be difficult to ascertain, contemporary Chinese evidence provides us with a very close approximation. The party cell in Shanghai at the time published a journal called \textit{Kung-ch'\textasciitilde an-tang} (The Communist). In its 6th issue, dated 7-VII-1921, p.62, was the Manifesto of the Secretariat and the Opening Announcement of the Secretariat's journal, \textit{Lao-tung chou-k'an} (The Workers' Weekly). That issue of \textit{The Communist} announced that 'since the founding of the labour Secretariat by Chang T'ei-li (Kuo-tao) ... the labour movement has flourished.' It also said that \textit{The Workers' Weekly} was then at its 4th issue. It may not be unreasonable to suggest that the Secretariat and journal were founded at about the same time. That being the case, the first issue must have been four weeks old on the 7th July 1921. This would bring the founding of the journal, and the Secretariat, to the 9th or 16th June 1921, depending on ones way of counting. To be sure, Bing was not really at fault. One of his sources, Chang Kuo-tao, recalled that the Secretariat was founded in September 1921 (see Chang's \textit{The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party I}, 169-170). This may be one case where the seemingly photographic memory of Chang Kuo-tao failed him.
\textsuperscript{105}

In 1924, a member of the KMT Rightwing told reporters that the main objection Ch'en had to joining the KMT was the requirement of finger-printing. When that was waived, Ch'en and the communists joined the KMT. See \textit{The Chinese Mail} 5-III-1924 which published a long interview with an anti-communist member of the KMT on the history of the development of the collaboration. The swearing of personal allegiance to Sun, certainly, had ideological implications and to that extent there were ideological objections to joining the KMT but it was part of the admission procedure which Ch'en and others objected to.
\textsuperscript{106}

\end{quote}
his own party of 123 members. Thus, once he joined, Ch'en took a conspicuous part in the affairs of the Canton Government of Sun. Judging by contemporary reports the activities of Ch'en and his party were intending to create and intensify the class struggle within the KMT and the KMT-controlled areas. Their emphasis on class struggle gave them much initial success and much opposition from within the KMT and outside. The Chinese Communists were acting in a way in which all convinced Marxists should be doing, especially if the Marxists believed in the validity and currency of the ideas expressed in The Communist Manifesto.

107 See the Chinese Mail 20-IX-1922. This newspaper gave much prominence to Ch'en and the communist activities in the Canton government, taking an anti-communist view.
Section Two: Chinese Communism during the First Period of Collaboration.

INTRODUCTION

The CCP joined the KMT and the Canton National Government for tactical reasons and out of necessity. Shanghai was no longer a safe place and they were frequently harassed by the police. Since the Chinese communists wanted to continue the publication of their translations of Marxist classics and their own communist ideas, a move became a necessity. However, while we may suggest that in joining the KMT and the National Government, the CCP was seeking a safe refuge, they were certainly not hiding their identity in both the literature they published nor in their political actions. They seemed to have been quite conspicuous, to the outside observer. More than that, they were also sparing little effort in creating and intensifying internal contradictions within the ranks of the KMT. A case will be put here that the policies and the activities of the CCP were not substantially or basically changed at the 2nd Congress nor even the 3rd Congress of the CCP; on the contrary, most of the new developments subsequent to the 2nd Congress had their roots in the pre-2nd Congress period and not contrary to

---

1 Page 3 of The Communist No.3 (7-IV-1921) was confiscated by the police of the French Concession and that was part of the reason for the delay in that issue, four months after the preceding one. Furthermore, not long after the First Congress of the CCP - the Congress itself was disrupted by a police raid - Ch'en, his wife, and a number of CCP members were arrested by the French police. See Chang Kuo-t'ao, Op.cit., p.164 and Ch'iu-wu lao-jen, Hsin Kuan-ch'a, Op.cit.
the general directions manifested in the early period.\textsuperscript{2}

To make such assertions does not imply that the CCP had been totally unchanging. Indeed, they had been quite adaptable. The thesis that is being submitted here is that the CCP had always realized that given the objective realities of China, to usher in a socialist system would require a long process of revolutionary class struggle. Therefore, for practical and tactical reasons, the CCP considered it necessary to work in collaboration with those contemporary political forces that would provide it with better opportunities to achieve the ultimate goal. These tactics would include joining in a government of the 'democratic' elements or even working with 'progressive warlords'.

In so doing, it certainly did not imply the CCP's approval of the goal, the ideology or even the practice of their political partners of the day, nor signify that the CCP were lessening the demand for class struggle. Such action of collaboration merely signified a temporary tactical operational procedure, demanded by the historical conditions of the time.

Furthermore, this submission does not deny that there were considerable influences and even pressure from the Comintern comrades in matters of theory and practice. Nor does this submission imply that there was total unanimity amongst all members of the CCP or even just among the leading members.

\textsuperscript{2} Kuo Hua-lun, Chung-kung shih-lun (An Analytical History of the Chinese Communists) Vol.I, Ch.4 argued that a change came as the result of the Comintern intervention during the 2nd Congress. (Taiwan 1969). Schwartz, \textit{Op.cit.} Ch.4 saw this change at the 3rd Congress.
Indeed, there were not infrequently differences, even major differences, between the Chinese and the Comintern and amongst the Chinese communists themselves on matters of ideology and political action. Often, these differences were made public, or aired publicly.

The propositions being submitted here are that the major and significant decisions made by the CCP, such as the joining with the 'democratic elements' in a national revolution with the Imperialists, compradors and warlords being the enemies of this national revolution; the need to give significant attention to the rural sector of the national revolution - a peasant-orientated revolution policy - were so made not simply because the comrades from the Comintern told them those were the correct policies of the day, but because the CCP themselves had already thought of them, through their own reading of Marxist literature and because of their perceptions of the realities of the Chinese situation. Furthermore, it is submitted here that in the eyes of the Chinese communists the concept of class struggle and the need to have class struggle in order that their goal - the proletariat dictatorship - may be brought about were not less real or urgent simply because for tactical reasons they had to join forces with the democratic elements. Indeed, this formation of a united front in a struggle in a national revolution demanded greater vigilance in the conduct of class struggle. A united front situation, to the Chinese communists, meant that they had, in due course, to inculcate and develop class antagonism amongst their bourgeois partners.

These propositions are made with full cognizance of the various manifestos and declarations made by the many of the
leading figures of the CCP pointing to what seems to be the contrary. The most notable case in point is the famous declaration in Canton in January 1924 when Li pledged the support of the Chinese communists to the cause of national revolution led by the KMT. However, such declarations to the contrary, the CCP had never really tried to hide their real intentions and their goal, as well as their insistence that they, the party of the proletariat, were the real vanguard of the revolution. Indeed, during the period of the first collaboration with the KMT, Chinese communism, in the context of the revolutionary developments in China, may be regarded as the creating, the fostering, and the intensifying of class antagonism and struggle in the rural and urban sectors and within the KMT. The comrades from the Comintern certainly exerted considerable influence in the development of Chinese communism. But the ultimate product was recognizably more Chinese. Indeed, a case may be made that, while the CCP issued many manifestos giving an appearance of compliance with the Comintern, the main thrust of their propaganda message, as perceived by a contemporary reader of their publications, did not always coincide with that from the Comintern. Sometimes, the Chinese communists actually came upon many of their common ideas ahead, or independent, of their foreign comrades, and often were at variance with them.

The development and nature of Chinese communism during the first period of CCP-KMT collaboration will now be examined in four major aspects, in order to demonstrate the above contentions:

1. The Chinese communists' concept of the collaboration.
2. The nature of the national revolution and the role of leadership as perceived by the Chinese communists.

3. The concept of nationalism in this period of the national revolution, as perceived by the Chinese communists.

4. The Chinese communist peasant policies during this collaborationist national revolution.

The resolutions of the Comintern, the instructions and directives of foreign comrades, as far as we can ascertain them, pertaining to these aspects will be brought into the purview of our examination to highlight the distinctiveness and similarities of the Chinese and Comintern positions.
CHAPTER THREE

The Meaning of Collaboration

Shortly after the formation of the first unit of the CCP, Ch'en Tu-hsiu went to Canton to join the administration of Ch'en Chiung-ming who, in the context of his day, may be regarded as a progressive warlord. Governor Ch'en certainly seemed to have given Communist Ch'en much freedom in the propagation of communism. Immediately before he commenced service with the Governor, Tu-hsiu announced his political philosophy thus:

As feudalism still has not been overthrown in China, we [the communists] do not absolutely oppose [the democrats]. But it would be a great mistake for anyone to imagine that 'democratic politics' represent the wishes of the entire people or true equality and liberty. .... Democracy can only represent the expression of the capitalist class, it cannot represent the wishes of the feudal parties nor those of the working (lao-tung) classes.¹

He further explained that only with the total removal of social classes can we talk in terms of 'the wishes of the entire people'. He was, of course, working for the realization of the ultimate goal, the communist state. In other words, as early as 1920, Ch'en was accepting the idea of a long haul towards communism via the road of collaboration with the democrats. At the same time, that is while in collaboration, he would also

¹ Ch'en Tu-hsiu. 'Min-chu-tang yü kung-ch' an-tang' (The democratic party and the communist party), HCN VIII 4 (1-XII-1920). Ch'en, as we have noted, left Shanghai for Canton on the evening of the 16-XII-1920.
work towards the ultimate elimination of the economic class to which his collaborators belonged.

It may well be true that 'despite the presence in China as early as 1920 of an emissary of the Communist International, the decisions of the Second Congress (of the International) regarding collaboration with the bourgeois revolutionaries appears to have had no influence whatever in China at the time'; nevertheless, the sentiments expressed by Ch'en were certainly very Leninist, or Marxist - the Marx of the Communist Manifesto. The influence of this early tract by Marx on the Chinese communists is well known, and Ch'en, writing his idea in November, may well have his Marxism reinforced by Lenin. This was not the Lenin of the 2nd Congress of the Comintern brought over to China by the comrades, but the Lenin as the Chinese communists discovered for themselves.

The November 1920 issue of the HCN published a lengthy excerpt of a speech by Lenin given at the 8th Party Congress of the Russian CP, on national self-determination, in March 1920. In this speech, Lenin was not discussing Asia but Finland. However, it is apparent that editor Ch'en must have found the message appropriate for the local situation. Lenin said:

The methods that the workers (lao-tung chia) employ in ridding themselves of their relationship with the capitalist class differ in different places. But the recognition of both national self-determination and workers' self-determination is not a contradiction, they are merely different

---

In short, the message from Lenin which Ch'en wanted to pass on to the comrades in China was: be adaptable. This is also a typical case which shows how the Chinese communists independently accepted and adopted communist ideas and methods through their own study of the messages from foreign communists, from Marx to Lenin.

As far as Ch'en and his followers were concerned, collaboration was a mere tactical manoeuvre. Their aim was to conduct class struggle through the creation of class consciousness and thence class antagonism. An examination of some of the political actions and agitations in Canton in 1921 will provide some interesting indications about the way the Chinese communists worked.

The agitation for equality for women had long been a plank on the platform of the New Culture Movement and had thus been regarded as an expression of modernization or modernity. However, the communists were able to make use of this issue in Canton to extend their cause of class struggle. On the 28th March 1921, a group of the various women's organizations staged a procession through the city demanding political equality with men, and petitioned the provincial assembly. Next day, Generalissimo Sun Wen and Governor Ch'en granted the women adult

3 The speech, in Chinese, was entitled 'Min-tsu tzu-chüeh' (National self-determination), and published in HCN VIII 3 (1-XI-1920). It was translated into Chinese from the English magazine Liberator (VI 1920 issue) by Li Ch'in-ying, a frequent translator and contributor in The Communist.
franchise. But this only resulted in another demonstration, and this time demanding the rights of political participation - the right to be elected. Apparently, fighting broke out at the assembly building where the demonstration took place and, unfortunately, one of the demonstrators was injured by an assemblyman. While the offending assemblyman was taken to court, some of his colleagues backed the demonstrators and tried to have a resolution adopted by the assembly giving the women their political rights as demanded. This was defeated by 50 votes to 32. The experience moved the women to form a Women's Alliance and make more demonstrations outside the assembly. 4

However, no further gains were made. But, fortunately for them, a new and emotional issue presented itself and the communists turned this half-chance into an overwhelming success. Towards the end of May, the politically conscious women of Canton found their cause celebre in the announcement of the marriage between the principal of a provincial women teachers' college and a comprador from Annam, an Overseas Chinese. What incensed the ladies was not the idea of marriage, but the details of the marriage agreement. Comprador Liu already had seven wives back home and Miss Wu was to be his No. 8, though to be styled a p'ing-ch'i - a wife of equal status. Apart from this offensive title, Miss Wu was to receive a gold watch with a solid gold chain and $30,000, of which 10% was paid as deposit and the rest upon consummation. The actual ceremony was to be in the traditional style with sedan chair and procession.

4 For details see Wah Tze Yat Pao (The Chinese Mail) 28, 31 111; and 4, 9, 11, IV 1921.
To the members of the Women's Alliance, the most galling part was that Miss Wu was one of their members. She was promptly expelled from the Alliance, in spite of her protestation that it was a love-match and asked the Alliance not to interfere on the ground of individual freedom. The Alliance replied by agitating for her dismissal from the principalship. In the end, Miss Wu resigned on the ground that the duties of the p'ing-ch'i would leave her no time for the principalship. The marriage was consummated and Comprador Liu, apparently satisfied, paid over the agreed amount while the Women's Alliance metamorphosed into the Chung-hua nu-chieh lien-ho hui (The Chinese Womens Alliance) and issued a ringing manifesto. It blamed Confucianism for the 'poisonous' social conditions which women had to endure, but what concerns our discussion was the latter parts of their Programme. Included in their demands were:

No. 7. On the principle of class consciousness of the male and female workers (lao-tung), we propose that the women should participate in all the organizations and movements of the peasants (nung-min) and workers (kung-jen).

No. 8. With the men, we participate in the mass movement against the warlords and capitalists.

No. 9. On the principle that a nation has the right of existence, we have to struggle against all foreign imperialist exploiters.

10. On the principle that we unite with people of similar interests, we propose an alliance with womens organizations of the other countries.\(^5\)

---

\(^5\) The Chinese Mail first announced the marriage on the 20-V-1921, giving all the details of the agreement and plans for the ceremony. On the 24th V, the first reaction from the Womens Alliance was reported. The Manifesto of ten points was published.
Judging from this manifesto, the evidence of communist influence was self-evident while the operational method of the Chinese communist in a state of collaboration can only be regarded as effective.

In the domain of the Canton National Government, there was much activity in the labour movement contemporaneous to the struggle for the equality of the sexes. In February 1921, the Chung-hua kung-hui - The China Workers' Association - was constituted. While this was not a communist-led organization, the association had communist participation and adopted as its aims, these slogans:

- To unite the workers!
- To destroy the capitalist class!
- To promote social equality!

This association was initiated by Governor Ch'en in January 1921. He asked Tai Chi-t'ao to come to Canton to help draft a constitution. Instead, Tai remained in Shanghai and sent the draft to Canton. Hu Han-min was then given the task of organizing the association.

While the official government backers of the association were not communists, the former certainly had some progressive

---

For a description of the reconstruction of the Association, see The Chinese Mail, 25-II-1921. The HCN IX 1 (1-V-1921) published the constitution of the Association drafted by Tai Chi-t'ao.

See The Chinese Mail, 19-II-1921.
ideas. Governor Ch'en had envisaged seeing workers' leaders sitting on the boards of directors of industrial and business enterprises. At the very time of the planning of the association, his government intervened, on behalf of the workers, in a wage dispute between the machinists union and the factory owners. 8 Ideologically, the position of the government may be regarded as nationalistic and anti-imperialist. They wanted to improve the socio-economic conditions of the workers and the nation. But, unlike the communists, they did not accept a materialistic conception of history which sees the necessity for class conflict as the social contradiction that provides the motive force for social development. In the Marxist vocabulary, they were not dialectical materialists.

This ideological position was clearly demonstrated in a speech by Chang Chi to the Machinists' Union. 9 This KMT veteran complimented the union for the leading role it took during the Hong Kong General Strike. In his view, the 'greatest danger for the Chinese workers and Chinese industries was the capitalist class formed by the collaboration of foreign and Chinese capitalists.' While he urged the workers to resist exploitation from that quarter by joining the revolutionary party, Chang also appealed to the patriotism of the Chinese capitalists and asked them to join the revolutionary party also.

However, the tide of the workers' opinion was turning against such conciliatory attitudes between socio-economic

8 The Chinese Mail, 4-III-1921.
9 A detailed report of the speech was published in The Chinese Mail, 4-III-1921.
classes. Between February and July 1921, over forty cases of labour unrest were reported. Judging from the slogans used by the strikers, we may obtain some indication of the ideological underpinning of the labour agitations. In March, the machinists had another strike. They and the striking paper-flowers workers of Fo-shan insisted on referring to their employers as 'the capitalists'. When the women workers of the Kwang chou-Sanshui Railways struck for better working conditions, they argued that

A thirteen-hour working-day is against the principles of socialism.

Indeed, even The Chinese Mail, never a friend of the communists, editorialized that China was suffering from three curses:

1. Foreign capitalists and the economic exploitation of the foreign governments with their plans to make China a perpetual slave of the foreign capitalists.

2. The all-evil warlords. The condition of today is three-times worse off than the early years of the republic and six-times worse off than the last years of the Ch'ing Dynasty. There are now over two million soldiers under the various warlords.

3. The politicians who regard the people as their enemies.

---

10 See The Chinese Mail of this period. This daily had at least two full pages per issue devoted to news from Kwangtung province. On the 26 III, even the priests in the temples around Canton went on strike demanding higher pay for their prayerful services.

11 The Chinese Mail 5 III for the Fo-shan strike and 15 III for the renewed strike by the machinists.

12 The Chinese Mail 14-III-1921.
The editor, however, advised the Chinese workers and the merchants - shang - to be of mutual assistance to each other rather than in mutual conflict in face of such formidable enemies.\textsuperscript{13}

If the non-communist or the anti-communist patriots of Canton and Hong Kong were urging a united front of the workers and the bourgeoisie against the warlords, compradors, and imperialists, then as a communist, Ch'en must have felt that Canton would be a fruitful area, and the united front a fruitful method, for his political activities - if he could tread his ideological path astutely. Hence we may better appreciate and understand his decision to stay in Canton rather than to attend the First Congress of the CCP. What was needed in such a situation in Canton in order to reap a good political harvest would be a core of reliable cadres to lead the social agitations into the correct channel of class consciousness. This was indeed an important issue exercising his mind and this was included in the messages he sent to the 1st Congress. He would hardly be concerned with the dogmatic bickerings that took place between some of his former students. As Chang Kuo-tao recalled, one of the four points Ch'en asked the Congress to take special note of was the:

Need of caution in approaching the masses with a view to bringing them into the Party fold.\textsuperscript{14}

This caution apparently had been fruitful. With labour unrest continuing unabated through the latter part of 1921, more

\textsuperscript{13} The Chinese Mail 25-11-1921.

\textsuperscript{14} Chang Kuo-tao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 141, 698; the latter lists the four points.
and more trades formed their own unions and eventually, an Alliance of Trade Unions was formed. It was still officially under the auspices of the KMT. However, in spite of the exhortations of Chang Chi and other KMT veterans, this Trade Union Alliance resolved to include in their constitution the following clauses:

We do not recognize capitalism.
We do not recognize any system of Private Property.
Workers should control the means of production and have the enjoyment of the fruits of production.
We will never agree to being used by the non-working class.

Once again, as with the manifesto of the Women's Alliance, we can witness the influence and the handiwork of the communists. In Canton, as we have noted, the Chinese communists found themselves in a social situation in which the concepts of anti-imperialism and anti-warlordism were already the political ideologies of the establishment. Given the ideological stance of their leader, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the Chinese communists would hardly need any personal prompting from the comrades of the Comintern to embark on the revolutionary path that they had taken. And, judging

---

15 The Chinese Mail 8 & 21-XI-1921. The constitution was published on the latter date.
16 The sentiments of economic nationalism and the sentiments against the economic imperialism of the foreign powers were so strong that the Shanghai Compradors' Association felt constrained to cable similar associations in other treaty ports to call for the formation of a national association to demonstrate and protest their patriotism. They argued that the real aim of the patriotic comprador was 'to maintain the commercial development, and hence the independence of China'. See The Chinese Mail, 28-IX-1921.
from the manifestos and constitutions they had managed to influence, these Chinese communists, though acting in a covert fashion, were overtly true to their ideological persuasion. More than that, they did not compromise their demands, but insisted on promoting class consciousness and struggle.

In the context of the collaboration, what the CCP were doing amounted to a denial of the ideological validity of the political programme of their partners. Like the CCP, both Chang Chi and Tai Chi-t'ao were trying to promote industrialization and the improvement of the lot of the masses. But, unlike their communist colleagues, Chang and Tai tried to avoid class conflict by counselling mutual assistance between the workers and the capitalists through appealing to their patriotism. The communists were trying to promote class consciousness and intensify class conflict.

Judging from the declarations of some of these mass organizations which involved the CCP in collaboration with other political groups - such as the Womens Alliance and the Alliance of Trade Unions - the CCP were not without their successes. But, if their collaborators were as convinced of their own ideological positions as the Chinese communists were of their communism, disagreement and conflict would be inevitable, unless one party gives way. Neither was willing to retreat. According to the communist labour organizer and historian, Teng Chung-hsia, an unpleasant public confrontation occurred at the First National Labour Congress in Canton:

At the welcoming ceremony, the KMT man tried to make propaganda by saying: 'That the Labour Congress can convene freely in Canton is proof that only the KMT will give freedom to the workers'.

At that, our reply was: 'Freedom is a natural endowment and not something for anyone to give us'.

While the CCP was not in charge of this 1922 Labour Congress, they had made effective use of the occasion to propagate their ideas. T'an P'ing-shan, a former Peita student of Ch'en and a convert of the master, was in charge of the organisations for the May Day celebrations held in conjunction with the Congress. His tremendous efforts were apparently so successful that they remembered with great disgust by his political adversaries.\(^\text{18}\)

However, the effecting of a liaison and collaboration between the KMT and the communists must not be regarded as a one-way affair with the communists as the eager suitor using the comrades from the Comintern as the match-makers. The KMT, especially Sun himself, was quite anxious to obtain help from the Soviet Russia and Germany, indeed, Sun had initiated such a movement contemporaneous to the movement of the CCP towards collaboration with the KMT. It is true that when Sun initiated his efforts to form his projected three-way alliance for Russia, Germany and his government, the communists had evinced no foreknowledge. However, when Ch'en was appointed to the committee to draft plans

\(^{18}\) The Chinese Mail 5-III-1924 published a long interview with an anti-CCP member of the KMT on the history of the development of the collaboration. While the interviewee's name was not given in this report, internal evidence suggests he was a KMT member of long standing and very familiar with the leading members of the CCP.
for the KMT-CCP collaboration in September 1922, the hitherto secret negotiation of Sun became public knowledge and was publicized for him by his political enemies and the English press in Hong Kong. Therefore, in order to appreciate fully and in proper context the reasons the communists collaborated with the KMT, we need to examine carefully the political situation, especially the intrigues, in Canton in 1922.

According to the exposé in the Hong Kong press in September 1922, which was based on documents captured by Ch'en Chiung-ming when he expelled Sun in June that year, Sun had sent an emissary, one Chü Ho-chüng, to Germany the previous year trying to effect a tripartite alliance with Germany and Soviet Russia. One such document, dated 26th July 1921, revealed that a substantial sum of money was sent by Sun Yat-sen to Chü Ho-chüng as expenses required by the latter for a mission to Germany. The purpose of the mission was to effect a tripartite alliance comprising Russia, Germany, and China, that is, the Canton administration of Sun. One of the intermediaries Chü was sent to contact was a former German diplomatic representative to China who had also served as the army attaché in the German embassy in Russia. This German gentleman, according to Chü, would come to Canton as a liaison officer but incognito, as far as the public was concerned.

In March 1922, Sun expressed satisfaction with the progress of Chü's mission and ordered Liao Chung-kai to remit another sum of money to Berlin for further expenses incurred by Chü. Sun also ordered that this German emissary should be met in Hong Kong and that means should be found to bring the emissary to Canton secretly. This emissary would have the code name 'H', as
suggested by Chü. While nothing concrete came of this secret attempt at forming an alliance, the very fact that there was an attempt in 1922 had ideological significance especially in the context of the politics of collaboration.

The first significance of this episode is the timing of the release of these captured documents. They were obviously meant to embarrass Sun, by trying to demonstrate that 'Sun harboured Bolshevik ideas and had wanted to establish a Bolshevik government in Canton for some time.' This episode was published at that particular time because it was meant to be a supporting evidence used by the opponents of the collaboration between the KMT and the CCP. This news was leaked to the public just two days after the publication of the names of the committee of eight appointed by Sun to draft a new party constitution for the KMT in pursuance of the decision to make major structural changes to suit the political needs of the collaboration. The one member in this committee receiving special attention was

19 Photographs of the letter sent by Chü from Berlin on New Year's Day 1922 giving an outline of the history of his mission was published in The Chinese Mail 25-IX-1922. The same issue also published the photograph of a telegram from Chü to Sun which was copied in the official stationery of Sun's office as well as a letter, handwritten by Sun to Liao Chung-Kai, explaining the telegram and ordering Liao to pay out more money to Chü. This letter from Sun to Liao was dated 8-III-1922. In this letter Sun expressed his satisfaction of the progress of the scheme to date and asked Liao to make the necessary arrangement to meet his German agent, code-named 'H'. These documents were captured by Governor Ch'en's troops in June 1922. They were in a briefcase belonging to Liao but apparently left behind in flight. Details of this capture were published in the 23-IX-1922 issue of The Chinese Mail.

20 The Chinese Mail, 23-IX-1922.
Ch'en Tu-hsiu. This report hinted darkly that Ch'en, 'the self-styled Marxist communist' was up to some conspiracy and that Ch'en was secretly discussing methods of recruiting KMT members into the CCP.

The second significance of this episode is that the KMT was anxious to form alliances with ideologically diverse partners. The very decision to send Chü off to Berlin to effect the tripartite alliance indicates that Sun was certainly not objecting to forming alliances with the Bolsheviks and the losers in the Great War.

These reports should not be taken as an indication of Sun's ideological re-orientation. Indeed, it was reported that the German Social-Democratic Party had heard nothing of Chü. However, there were rumours that Sun was trying to effect something like the Rapallo accord between Germany and Russia which involved secret military arrangements. It was thought that with the arrival of agent H, the Sun administration might reap some benefit from a similar type of arrangement. In short, what these rumours indicated was that Sun was prepared to

---

21 The entire committee membership was published in The Chinese Mail on the 20-IX-1922. The first indication of the news of the tripartite alliance was on the 22 September issue which gave an outline of the affair of Chü being sent to Berlin and announcing the existence of documents to prove their allegation. These documents were published the very next day.

22 The Chinese Mail 26-IX-1922, sought the opinion of Chiang K'ang-hu, the founder of the Chinese Socialist Party who had just returned from Europe where he attended a Comintern Congress in Russia and met SDP officials in Germany. Chiang reported that the SDP officials had heard nothing of the scheme.

23 See The Chinese Mail 27, 28, 29, 30 IX and 1-X-1922.
enter into secret deals with anyone who might strengthen his position, and that meant some military assistance.

However, it is important to remember that at the very time Sun was despatching Chü to Berlin to sound out the secret scheme, that is, at the end of 1921 and beginning of 1922, Sun was planning his Northern Expedition in Kweilin and turning down Maring's overture of collaboration between the CCP and the KMT. Maring, of course, would not have known of the secret scheme on tripartite alliance which Sun had hoped to realize. The comrade from the Comintern proposed the now famous concept of coalition of many classes. Therefore, it is only to be expected that the ideas of Maring would be rejected. To Sun, the basis of his revolutionary movement was:

The unbroken heritage from the Great Yao, Shun, Yü, T'ang, King Wen, King Wu, Duke of Chou, and Confucius to the present day is the basic principle of my political thought.

In short, Sun was not one who would be interested by systematic ideology and not one who would be particularly worried if his own political principles were somewhat inconsistent. As one scholar on revolutions said, 'With Sun Yat-sen ... democracy easily shaded off into a theory of benevolent and constructive dictatorship, and Marxism, communism, socialism, 'livelihod', the planned society, welfare economics, and anti-foreign and anti-imperialism sentiments were all mixed together.'

---

24 For a succinct account of these events see Mao and the Chinese Revolution, Ch.V by Jerome Ch'en (Oxford U.P. 1967).
25 Ibid. cited from Ssu-min Pao of Kweilin, 28 Dec. 1921.
What interested Sun was results, or in his own terms, anything that would help fulfill his dream of unifying China by 'revolutionary' means. Indeed, this gaining control itself was the revolution. Hence, the very fact of sending Chü to pursue his tripartite scheme was a case in point. Chü was a member of the anti-communist faction of the KMT, and later was to become very antagonistic to fellow-KMT members who co-operated with the CCP. The alliance, if materialised, would not be one cemented by a common political principle or aim but for pragmatic immediate advantage. Indeed, this was how Sun regarded the collaboration with the CCP at the end of 1922. At that time, the most important thing, he told Chiang Kai-shek, was to acquire a base. He saw Kwangtung as this vital base and was prepared to regain it, whether the CCP and the KMT had similar ideologies was of secondary importance. Then, having acquired this base in Kwangtung, the 'revolution' could expand throughout the Southwest and thence the rest of the country, 'having the southwestern provinces as my base, there will then be many ways to bring the revolution to a success.'

That Sun would not let the achievement of his political ambitions be encumbered by ideological consideration may be seen

---

27 See letter from Chü to Sun dated 10-XI-1924 in which the former attacked the HCN and the editorial staff of the Shanghai Min-kuo jih-pao mentioning by name Shen Hsuan-lu and Shao Li-tzu. A photocopy of this letter is in the East Asian Collection of the Hoover Institution, uncatalogued when I read it.

28 Sun's letter to Chiang, dated 21-XI-1922, was reprinted in Kuo Min chou-pao (National News Weekly) IV, No. 14 (22-V-1926). It is also reprinted in Tsung-li ch'uan-shu (Complete Writings of the Director-General), pp. 1009-1012, ed. Hu Han-min (Shanghai, 1930.)
in the way he persisted in his dream of an alliance with the Germans. While he was having discussions with Maring in Kweilin, he despatched to Berlin Teng Chia-yen, an American-educated member of his group, to expedite matters. In Teng's absence, Sun, having been expelled from Canton by Governor Ch'en, went to Shanghai amidst rumours of a peace conference of warlords for a peaceful solution of the political conflict. Whilst in Shanghai, in August 1922, he met Li Ta-chao and admitted the Chinese communists into membership of the KMT without finger printing and the swearing of personal allegiance. Then, after further discussions with Joffe, Sun issued the now famous Sun-Joffe Manifesto. But, his consorting with communists did not indicate any ideological affinity with communism, or indeed any ideology. He demonstrated his non-ideological pragmatism by continuing his efforts to court German capitalism. Eight months after the Sun-Joffe Manifesto, Sun wrote to emissary Teng, who was still in Berlin, thus:

With a view to designing a great plan for the reconstruction of China, you should consult with some of the most influential Capitalists such as Siemens, and with their governments: with Chinese man-power and resources and with mutual co-operation, we will develop the wealth of China, reform our administration, and improve

---


our military strength. In short, by means of German experts and knowledge, in the shortest time, we shall make China strong and wealthy. If such is achieved, China will do everything in her power to help Germany in shaking off the yoke of the Versailles Treaty.

Hence, any evaluation of the motives and actions of the CCP vis-a-vis the KMT has to be made against such a background of political self-interest and ideological pliability of Sun and the KMT - The Chinese communists' new comrades-in-arms.

The CCP, led by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, had demonstrated in 1921-2 - before the Second Congress of the CCP - their willingness 'to make use of the KMT organisational structure as a means for their [the communists'] own propaganda and contact amongst the masses'. Now, when the Hong Kong paper broke the news of the secret negotiation for the tripartite alliance in September 1922, Sun was once again in exile in Shanghai. The intention of that newspaper, as we have observed, was to demonstrate that Sun had long harboured pro-Bolshevik sentiments and hoped that such a news scoop might further damage the credentials Sun had with the Western Powers.

On the other hand, Sun and the KMT were supported by their new comrades, the CCP in the tripartite controversy. The

31 H. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, p.58 (Stanford 1951) but Isaacs was referring to post-2nd Congress activities under the direction of Maring from August 1922. See also Jerome Ch'en, Op.cit., p.91. R.C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, p.64 (Stanford 1953) also supported Isaacs. But as we have demonstrated, T'an P'ing-shan and his comrades were doing in April and May 1922 exactly what Isaacs said they were instructed to do in August 1922.
communists supported this attempt by Sun on the ground that had the tripartite alliance come about, it would then be an alliance of the victims of imperialism. They did so because in their estimation, the KMT 'is a revolutionary party representing (or, 'working towards a') national revolution; and not a political party representing any class; in their party constitution, their demands are the common benefits of the citizenry, not any particular interests of any class; amongst the membership, those representing the capitalist class, the intellectuals and the proletarian workers seem to be of equal strength'.

Editor Ts'ai Ho-sen went further than his party leader. Ts'ai advised that Hong Kong newspapers should not worry themselves over the fear that Sun's tripartite alliance was to be based on Bolshevism. Sun's min-sheng chu-i (People's Livelihood), in the context of the industrialized nations' economies, would 'merely' be regarded as 'national capitalism, means which the imperialists are using to ameliorate class struggle and to extend their political grasp. They are the means employed by Briand of France and Lloyd George and Henderson of Britain...'. Ts'ai went on to add that what the Western Powers are afraid of was not Sun's political theories 'for they are but

32 Ts'ai Ho-sen, the editor of the new party organ Hsiang Tao (The Guide Weekly) supported Sun's attempt in the opening issue of 13-IX-1922 and again devoted a leading story to its defence in No.4 (4-X-1922), on the grounds that such an alliance would enable these victims to escape the scourge of Britain, the USA, France and Japan.

33 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 'Kuo-min-tang shih shih-mo?' (What is the Kuo-min-tang?) Hsiang Tao No. 2 (20-IX-1922).
common ideas. What the Western Powers fear is that the Chinese politics and economy might escape their control. From the perspective of the development and nature of Chinese communism, the entire episode of the attempted tripartite alliance was related to the KMT-CCP collaboration, as the opponents of communism rightly saw. The significant aspects, however, were not the Bolshevizing of the KMT or Sun, but the jointly shared belief - by Sun and the CCP - that neither Sun nor the KMT were class-conscious but merely trying to acquire control of the entire China by 'revolutionary' means without particularizing what was meant by 'revolutionary' other than what was to be planned by Sun and the KMT. Furthermore, the tone which the CCP used in their official journal, The Guide Weekly, in reference to Sun's ideas and the KMT, were quite patronizing. Indeed, in the very first issue, Editor Ts'ai, made use of the rumour that Sun and Wu P'ei-fu might work out a compromise, warned Sun in no uncertain terms that the unhappy history of the KMT hitherto should be a lesson against any further dalliance with the imperialists and their agents, the warlords. Thus, rather than seeing the KMT as an amalgum of three classes, as viewed from the Comintern, the CCP saw their new partners merely

34 Ts'ai Ho-sen, 'Chung-Te-q san-kuo lien-meng yu kuo-chi ti-kuo chu-i ke Ch'en Chiung-ming chih fan-tung' (The Tripartite alliance of China, Germany, and Russian, International Imperialism, and the Counter-revolutionary actions of Ch'en Chiung-ming), Hsiang Tao No.4, p.27 (4-X-1922).

35 Ts'ai, 'T'ung-i, chieh-chai, yu Kuo-min-tang' (Unification, Loans and the KMT) Hsiang Tao No.1, pp.4-6 (13-IX-1922).
as an organizational structure, a means to develop their own propaganda and to contact the masses. And, after Sun's return to Canton in January 1923, the collaboration provided the CCP with a refuge, for they needed a safe base to work.

However, by this time, for the CCP to work in collaboration within existing political structures in order to develop their own propaganda and to contact the masses was already an established practice. Such collaboration need not signify any ideological affinity. A case in point is the collaboration between the North China branch of the CCP under Li Ta-chao and Wu P'ei-fu, who controlled the northern regions of China.

On May 1922, when T'an P'ing-shan and his comrades were making use of the organizational structure of the KMT for the propagation of communist ideas, the CCP also approved the establishment of a liaison between Li Ta-chao and Wu P'ei-fu. The arrangement called for the appointment of five inspectors on the various railway lines in territories controlled by Wu. Li was particularly friendly with Wu's Transportation Commissioner, one Kao En-hung, and the Chief Inspector, Huang Tung. The latter and Li were students together in Japan. These inspectors were placed there to report on any suspicious activities of the so-called Chiao-t'ung Pai (Communication Clique) who were rivals of Wu. At the same time, these inspectors would 'promote ... class education and arouse the workers' class consciousness'.

Indeed, after the February 7 incident during which troops of Wu put down a railwaymen's strike organized by the communists with

36 See Ch'i-wu lao-jen, 'Erh-chi' hui-i-lu (Memoirs on 7th Feb. especially pp. 70-79 (Peking, Kung-jen 1957) for details.
three 'inspectors' playing significant parts, the Peking Branch of the CCP criticized their new collaborators, the KMT.

Shortly after the incident, a memorial service was held in Peking for those who died during that action. It seemed that the KMT was not officially represented. To this, the CCP commented that seeing 'no one from the so-called revolutionaries of the Three Principles of the People bothered to come, is a clear demonstration that the CCP is your (that is, the workers') only friend.' To be sure, the CCP did not expect much from those 'so-called revolutionaries of the Three Principles of the People'.

A little earlier, at the Fourth Congress of the Communist International held in November, 1922, the CCP representative, Liu Jen-ch'ing, told the gathering that:

If we join the party (KMT), we shall be able to show the masses that we too are for a revolutionary democracy, but that for us revolutionary democracy is only a means to an end. Furthermore, we shall be able to gather the masses around us and split the Kuomintang Party.

While Liu Jen-ch'ing was reporting the CCP policies and activities with enthusiasm, the leadership of the Comintern did not seem to share such enthusiasm. Indeed the Russians showed

37 Ching-Han kung-jen liu-hsieh chi (The Bloody Tales of the workers of the Peking-Hankow Railway) was published in March 1923 by the Peking Kung-jen Chou-kan (Workers' Weekly), a CCP organ. The quotation was from p.183. This book had a postscript by Kao Chun-yu, a regular contributor of the Hsiang Tao and a Peita alumni. It also has a number of quotations from Karl Liebknecht, von Heine, and especially The Communist Manifesto.

38 Cited from Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, p.151 (Stanford U.P. 1957). The Chinese delegation was led by Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Emphasis mine.
scant respect. Karl Radek, the first rector of the Communist University for the Toilers of the East (KUTV) replied in a most patronizing manner. The contrast between the attitudes of Liu and Radek was so sharp that the latter's speech bears repeating in some detail. With confidence bordering on pomposity, Comrade Radek said:

As always, I begin by saying: Comrades, do not see things in too rosy a light, do not overestimate your forces. When the Chinese comrade comes and tells us: we have taken root all over China, I must say to him, honoured comrade, it is not a bad thing to feel strong enough, when one undertakes a piece of work, to carry it through successfully, but one must also see things as they are ... The comrades who are working in Canton and Shanghai have not had much success in establishing links with the masses of the workers ... Many of them shut themselves up in their chambers to study Marx and Lenin just as formerly one studied Confucius. Comrades, you must understand that in China neither the question of triumph of socialism, nor that of a soviet republic is on the order of the day. Unfortunately, in China even the question of national unity and of a united national republic is not yet historically on the order of the day. ... 

To the Chinese delegation, especially its leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu who had made a reputation as an anti-Confucianist, this speech must have been disappointing and insulting.

What Liu said in his speech was not really boastful for he was doing no more than reporting to the Congress what the Chinese communists had been doing. What Radek said, however, had demonstrated to his Chinese listeners that this leading member of the Comintern was not only ignorant of the Chinese situation but that his and the Chinese perceptions of the tasks ahead were quite dissimilar. As the Chinese communists entered into a collaboration with the KMT, their actions were geared to 'split the KMT'. By this, the Chinese communists meant that through their action within the KMT, members of the latter party would heighten their class consciousness. And, led by the party of the proletariat (CCP) the awakened members of the non-class based KMT would develop the national revolution into a socialist revolution, through class struggles within the ranks of the members of the national revolution coalition. As has been noted, the new nation that Ch'en Tu-hsiu and his comrades sought to build would not defend the interests of the 'aristocracy and capitalists'.

However, the Comintern seemed to have their own plans for their Chinese comrades. In its first formal instruction on the relations between the CCP and the KMT, the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) declared that:

Article 2. ..... The ECCI considers it necessary that action between the Kuomintang and the young CCP should be co-ordinated.

Article 3. Consequently, in the present condition, it is expedient for members of the CCP to remain in the Kuomintang.

---

Then, as if to re-emphasize their position, the Comintern despatched another instruction to coincide with the Third Congress of the CCP, held under the wing of the KMT in Canton in June 1923. Of interest to the development of the Chinese communists' concept towards the nature of the collaboration, it is worth noting that these May 1923 ECCI instructions laid stress on the peasant movement and urged the CCP to exert the leadership of the working class and to push the KMT toward an agrarian revolution. However, it was silent on the issue of the actual form of the KMT-CCP collaboration, in spite of the patronizing lecture Radek gave to the Chinese comrades at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern.  

The Manifesto of this Third Congress of the CCP bears the outward manifestation of the influence of the ECCI instruction of May 1923 and said that 'the KMT should be the central force of the national revolution and should assume its leadership'. However, this was prefaced by the statement that the policy of the CCP in the preceding year, using the slogans of 'Down with the Warlords' and 'Down with Imperialism' has been the correct policy. Besides, taken in context, this reference to the KMT should not be taken as a sign of a change of heart through the persuasions of the comrades of the Comintern. Indeed, a case may be made that the Manifesto of CCP had some significant departure from the Comintern resolutions and injunctions mentioned as well as the self-denial spirit of the Sun-Joffe

---

41 See Degras, Ibid, p.25 for the ECCI Instructions.
Manifesto. The Chinese communists certainly put an unusual interpretation to the injunction of 'co-ordinating' the CCP activities with those of the KMT. The expression 'the KMT should be the central force of the national revolution' was really a reproach, if the Manifesto of the Third Congress of the CCP is read in context as the intended readers would.

Immediately after the passage cited, the Manifesto went on thus:

Unfortunately, the KMT has frequently adopted two mistaken attitudes:— (a) they desire foreign powers to help them in the national revolution. In thus appealing to the enemy, not only do they forfeit the appearance of leadership in the National revolution, but also, in cultivating a tendency in the people to rely on foreign powers, destroy the spirit of independence and self-confidence of the people. (b) in concentrating on military matters and neglecting propaganda work amongst the people, they thus not only lost the position of political leadership but also lost the sympathy of the people.

Having thus chided their new partners, the CCP then 'hope that all the revolutionary elements in society will concentrate [their efforts] on the KMT, so that the movement for a national revolution may be expedited; and, at the same time, hope that the KMT will repudiate their too outdated outlook and their

reliance on foreign powers and the military'. The CCP felt that 'to propagandize and organize the workers and peasants are our special duties, and to guide the workers and peasants to join the national revolution is our central task' for they saw their task as helping the 'liberation of the oppressed peoples and classes of the world'. The criticism of the KMT, and Sun, on matters of seeking aid from the foreign powers was but a repeat of the criticism issued by editor Ts'ai in the very first issue of the Hsiang Tao.

In short, then, the CCP publicly announced at its Third Congress that its aim in the national revolution was to help make the KMT see the contemporary situation and the needs more realistically - as the communists themselves see the situation. In other words, the CCP saw one of their major roles in the collaboration as a re-direction of the policies and revolutionary methodology of the KMT. Indeed, we may say that since Ch'en Tu-hsiu accepted the appointment to the committee on the reorganization of the KMT, in Sept. 1922, the CCP had used every available means to publicize their views well before the special ECCI directives for the Third Congress of the CCP. In their many journals, the CCP had repeatedly announced that in collaborating with the KMT, the CCP had no intention of becoming

---

44 Ts'ai Ho-sen 'T'ung-i, chieh-chai, yü Kuo-min-tang' (Unification, Loans, and the KMT) Hsiang Tao No.1, pp.4-6 (13-IX-1922) esp. p.6. The issue of peasant policy, especially the question as to whether the policy of the CCP during the period of collaboration was merely mirroring that of the Comintern or even watering down the latter, will be discussed fully in a separate chapter.
more like the KMT. On the contrary, the CCP aspired to change their collaborators. The many journals of the CCP were certainly read by the politically conscious, though not necessarily of similar persuasion as the communists, and had considerable influence over a wide area.  

From the initial committee to investigate the problems of the re-organization of the CCP through the Sun-Joffe declaration to the First Congress of the re-organized KMT in Jan. 1924, the CCP had been at pains to reassure the readers of their journals that they have not given up the idea of class struggle nor have they turned away from their goal of a proletariat socialist state in their adopting a new set of slogans and the goal of national revolution. When questioned on this very point of the theoretical foundation of a united front of the two - proletariat and the capitalist - classes, the official organ replied:

The proletariat is stronger than the capitalist class. This is not only true in the present situation but of all times because at any given

45 Perhaps an extreme case of the influence of CCP literature may be seen in an article by Fei Chüeh-tien in the journal by the so-called Research Clique of the Progressive Party in Peking, Chieh-fang yü kai-tsao (Emancipation and Reconstruction) III No.10 (15-VI-1921), pp.85-104. In the article entitled 'Kuan-yu she-hui chu-i yun-tung wen-ti' (On the question of the socialist movement), the author openly admitted to being influenced by an article in The Communist No.1 (On the 3rd Anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Union) to the extent that 'while China may not have a strong bourgeoisie, China has a majority belonging to the proletariat, hence what is needed is socialism and not capitalism'. He further agreed with the writer of The Communist that this socialist revolution that China needs should be made by a union of the workers and peasants.

46 Reply to a reader, written by Kao Chun-yu, a former Peita man. Hsiang Tao No.4 (4-X-1922), pp.35-6. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was away and Kao had to take over the task of replying to the reader.
time of history, the proletariat is more (numerous than the capitalists). All they (proletariat) need is to unite. Therefore, in the national revolution, the proletariat will take the major (chu-yao) position while the capitalist class will occupy the position of one who is summoned. In other words, this revolution will be directed by the revolutionary masses. The proletariat take part in this revolution because they understand their own class interests, and they are not fighting for the interests of any other class.

The writer further assured the readers that the proletariat were certainly not under any illusion that the national revolution would be their liberation. At best, the national revolution was regarded as a practical way of gaining revolutionary experience and the techniques of organisation so that their ultimate complete liberation may be expedited.

As if to emphasize his points, the same writer in the very next issue of the Hsiang Tao, took advantage of a press report of rumours that Sun Yat-sen, Sun Ch'uan-fang, and Wu P'ei-fu were secretly negotiating a deal, warned the KMT sternly that unless the KMT make plain to the masses that it has irrevocably broken off relations with the warlords and was not retreating from the principles of the (national) revolution then the position of the KMT amongst the people would be endangered. 47

47 Kao Chun-yu 'Fuchien hsien-hsia ti ch'ü-shih yü Kuo-min-tang' (The current conditions in Fuchien and the KMT) Hsiang Tao, No.5 (11-X-1922), pp.40-41. The same author issued a similar warning in the very next issue, No.6 (18-X-1922), p.52; and in No.8 (2-IX-1922) a number of writers, including Kao and Editor Ts'ai commented on the need of the KMT to demonstrate their realization that the working masses (lao-tung chün-chung) were the main force of China's national revolution.
Chang Kuo-t'ao, who came to be known to certain sections of the KMT as one of the more 'verbose theorists' amongst the CCP, warned the KMT that if the latter really wanted to be collaborators in a national revolution, then they should quickly demonstrate to the masses that they were not tools of the warlords and imperialists but were willing to organize the masses against these national enemies.

A fortnight later, our verbose theorist was slightly more theoretical when he told the intellectuals if they really wanted a national revolution for the true independence of China, and if they were 'truly patriotic and see the reconstruction of China as their own duty, then they must unite with China's revolutionary socialists to overthrow the warlords, bureaucrats, and foreign powers; and share (with the revolutionary socialists) the goals of peace, independence, liberty, and unification; and would make the target of their propaganda the villages, factories, shops and schools' and not try to form compromising solutions with the warlords. Not all communists were so verbose. One Tien Cheng,

48 An interview with 'an old KMT member' by The Chinese Mail 20-II-1924 in an article entitled 'Kung-ch'an-tang nei-mu' (Inside the CCP). Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai was another such a one, while Teng Chung-hsia, T'an P'ing-shan and Kao together with Li and Ch'en were the leaders and directors of operations, with the latter two as the chiefs. This writer extended grudging respect to Ch'en for openly practising his belief even risking jail while seeing Li as the 'slippery one' and the 'verbose' ones were mentioned in terms bordering on contempt.

49 Chang Kuo-t'ao, 'Kuo-min-tang ying-fou fu chien ke-ming cheng-fu' (Should not the KMT rebuild a revolutionary government?) Hsiang Tao No.10 (15-XI-1922) pp.79-81. A similar warning was made by one Sun To in the very next issue, dated 22-XI-1922, pp.88-9.

50 Chang Kuo-t'ao, 'Chih-shih chieh-chi tsai cheng-chih shuang ti ti-weichi ch'i tse-jen' (The Political positions and duties of the intellectuals) Hsiang Tao (6-XII-1922), pp.98-100, No. 12.
after mentioning that both the Chinese and the European chambers of commerce in Shanghai were asking the warlords to cut down military expenditure and claiming that approval for the Japanese occupation of Shangtung as good for the maintenance of order, simply posed the question: "Kuo-min-tang na li ch'ü liao?" — where has the KMT gone?  

While the verbose theorist insistently told the petty bourgeoisie that 'at present the only solution to the political problems is for the revolutionary democrats and the various socialist organizations to unite in a revolutionary movement', it was left to the verbally economical Tien Cheng to give the Marxist justification for the tactics of collaboration. In reply to a criticism that in collaborating with the KMT the CCP was betraying its profession of Marxism, Tien Cheng advised his critics to read 'the last chapter of The Communist Manifesto', as well as the Second Congress of the Comintern's resolution on the colonial question. He countered his critics by accusing them of suffering from 'Left-wing Infantilism', while declaring that:

Today the only revolutionary Marxist party is the CCP and only the CCP can represent the development of Chinese Marxism. Any true Marxist should follow the CCP and support nationalist revolutionary movement in China.

We may say that from September to December 1922, that is, from the ministration of Comintern wisdom via Comrade Radek to Liu Jen-ch'ing's speech at the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, the official organ of the CCP was expressing opinions far closer to that of Liu than that of Radek. The discussion on the nature of the KMT by Ch'en Tu-hsiu in the second issue of the Hsiang Tao was quite dissimilar to Radek's or Maring's, his agent in China. Ch'en, as we have observed, saw the KMT as a 'revolutionary party in the national revolution movement, not representing the interests of any class', while Maring, in August, 1922, went into much precise analysis and discovered in the KMT a union of four classes, viz, 'leading intellectuals mostly men who took part in the 1911 revolution; the overseas Chinese capitalist bourgeois elements; the soldiers of the southern army, and the workers'.

While the nature of these messages which the CCP conveyed to their readers fitted in well with the essence of the speech of Liu Jen-ch'ing at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, it also implied that Comrades Radek and Maring were not successful in re-directing their Chinese comrades into their conception of reality nor persuaded by their wisdom on the political demands of the contemporary situation. Furthermore it seems that the lecture by Radek had little success in modifying the message the Chinese communists wanted to spread.

54 For Ch'en, see Hsiang Tao No.2, p.16. For a detailed account of Maring's view, see the article by D. Bing, 'Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP' in The China Quarterly No.48 (Oct.-Dec. 1971, pp.677-697. Quotation is from pp.685-6. It will be observed that my account differs significantly from Bing's.
A week after Tien Cheng explained to his readers that the CCP was really following the injunctions of Marx when they formed a collaboration with the KMT, editor Ts'ai gave the readers further elucidation on the communist's concept of the collaboration. The reason for the national revolution movement in China, explained Ts'ai, was to oppose international imperialism. In China, this involved the warlords who were being used by the imperialists to keep China divided. The majority of the people who suffered the consequences of such exploitation were the workers-peasant class (kung-nung) - which indeed formed the majority of the population - and the 'infantile capitalist class who were oppressed by the foreign capitalists; this is the middle class ... It is the KMT which leads this middle class to the road of the national movement (kuo-min yün-tung) ... while the CCP leads the workers-peasants class to a united front national movement'.

In so saying, Ts'ai explicitly denied the multi-class nature of the KMT which Maring and the Russian comrades were wont to discover. Furthermore, Ts'ai informed his readers, 'from now on, the true master of this movement will be the one who is most loyal in the opposition to international imperialism'. And, he enjoined the KMT to work closely with the CCP in their march forward. To this, party leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu agreed and offered further explanation on the nature and differences of

55 Ts'ai Ho-sen 'Wai-li chung-liu chieh-chi yü Kuo-min-tang' (Foreign Powers, the Middle Class and the KMT) Hsiang Tao No.16, (18-I-1923) pp.125-6. This article was written after the delegates to the 4th Comintern Congress had already returned to China, and was the leading article of that issue of the journal.
the method and aims of the revolution. 56

Revolution, the former professor advised his readers, aims to bring about a higher form of social organization and while to do so may involve certain military aspects, it would be a great mistake to confuse the two. The putsch may be a method to bring about a revolution but it may also be used by the counter-revolutionaries. He further advised his readers not to be confused by party labels but to judge a party and its members by its actions. If these basic principles were fully grasped, Ch'en added:

then we may unite with any party or even military person as a revolutionary move (tactic). This type of union (lien-ho) is purely a revolutionary union, it is a union to propel the revolution through certain stages and it is a union to overcome certain counter-revolutionaries. It should never be a union based on compromise [of basic principles].

As to his newly acquired collaborators, Ch'en said that the KMT were still unable to understand the evolutionary stages of revolution and counter-revolution and thus unable to recognize who was the main enemy in the present situation. In the purview of the subsequent development of Chinese communism, what Ch'en said here may be regarded as putting into layman's language the concept of dialectical materialism and the theory of

56 Ch'en, 'Ke-ming yü fan-ke-ming' (Revolution and counter-revolution), Hsiang Tao, No.16, pp.128-130. (18-I-1923),
contradiction.\textsuperscript{57}

However, though Ch'en had just returned from the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, sentiments expressed in this article cannot be regarded as evincing much influence by the Congress. On the other hand, they fitted in with the trend of development of communism in China as examined hitherto. Furthermore, these ideas expressed by Ch'en can hardly be regarded as in conformity with those expressed in the 12th January 1923 ECCI Instructions mentioned earlier because it would be difficult for any member of the KMT to regard what Ch'en said here as an attempt to 'co-ordinate the actions between the two parties', as the Instructions insisted.

Such divergences of views are more noticeable and significant if these Chinese communist ideas on the nature of the collaboration and their collaborators are placed in the context of the ideological and political development in the KMT at the time. On New Year's Day of 1923, the planning committee of the KMT issued a manifesto.\textsuperscript{58} In this, the national revolution was certainly not seen as a class struggle but quite

\textsuperscript{57} Today, in the context of Chinese communism, credits for such ideas are usually given to Mao Tsetung. But, as can be seen, such concepts were in practice early in the First United Front period. To be sure, Mao developed the theoretical aspects much more fully in his \textit{On Contradiction}.

\textsuperscript{58} This committee was formed as a result of the earlier committee of which Ch'en Tu-hsiu was a member. The earlier committee was formed on the 4-IX-1922 and the latter on the 15-XI, with Hu Man-win and Wang Ching-wei assigned to draft the manifesto. For details of the formation and discussion of this committee, see Tsou Lu, \textit{Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang shih-kao} (Draft History of the KMT) Vol.1, pp.316-321. (2 Vols. Chungking: Commercial Press 1944). Lo Chia-lun, \textit{Op.cit.} pp.574-5 also has a summary.
the opposite. Its proclaimed aim was to unite all the peoples into one great Chinese people. Instead of class struggle, the KMT manifesto resurrected the old Tung-meng Hui slogans of 'Equalization of Land' and 'Regulation of capital', and the Three Principles.

The reply from the Chinese communists was clear and uncompromising, for there was little choice. Sun had never given up his dream of a so-called Peaceful Unification (ho-p'ing t'ung-i) which, in reality meant little more than a partition of China into spheres of domination by the various warlords working under a facade of unity. At the same time, for all his talk of national independence and the retrieval of the Lost Rights, Sun was then quite prepared to see China partitioned by the Powers. Soon after his return to Canton, Sun took advantage of a visit by the new U.S. Minister, J.G. Shurman and importuned the American Minister to 'persuade other powers to agree to undertake a joint military intervention in China for a period of five years.'

Therefore, faced with such a protean collaborator, it is only to be expected that the Chinese communists felt the need to re-affirm their ideological stance. The pages of the Hsiang Tao were replete with warnings and denunciation of the Peaceful Unification and the dangers of dallying with the imperialists. Sun was often mentioned by name. Indeed, one writer went so far as to claim that 'unless [the demands of] the various sections of the nation coincided with [the interests] of the working class (lao-tung chieh-chi) then min-chuan, the 'democracy' segment of

---

59 See Clubb, Op.cit., pp.120-2. And, for the CCP's response to the Peaceful Unification, see Ts'ai Ho-sen in Hsiang Tao No.18 (31-1-1923), pp.141-3. This is a front page article for the issue.
of the Three Principles will never be established'.

Party Leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu made a significant contribution and it was deemed important enough for the article to be reprinted. In this discussion, Ch'en saw the present national revolution as a 'capitalist democratic revolution' and 'urged the KMT to understand and awaken to its task.' The KMT was urged not to resist the Left-wing Tendency within sections of the capitalist class. In any revolution, the former professor explained, it was only a portion of the revolutionary class that was awakened to struggle for the interests of the class. Indeed, within this historically assigned revolutionary class, there might well be many who were against the revolution and even sided with the class enemy.

Then, Ch'en defined for the benefit of his readers the aspirations of this revolutionary capitalist class that should be engaging in revolutionary actions; he also defined what should be those revolutionary actions. The revolutionary capitalists were those who would struggle against the feudal warlords and international imperialism. The counter-revolutionary capitalists were those who would rely on foreign capital, foreign military might and the warlords.

---

60 By Ch'en Yü, Hsiang Tao No.22 (25-IV-1923), p.161. Other warnings may be found in Nos.18, 19, 20, 21 (31 I, 7 II, 27 II, 18 IV, 1923). Editor Ts'ai was the most frequent contributor.
61 Ch'en 'Tzu-ch'an chieh-chi ti ke-ming yü ke-ming ti tzu-ch'an chieh-chi' (The Capitalist Revolution and the Revolutionary Capitalists) Hsiang Tao No.22 (25-IV-1923), pp.161-4. This was included in the collection entitled Chung-kuo ke-ming wen-t'i lurn-wen tsa (Collected Discourses on the Problem of the Chinese Revolution) published by the CCP in Nov.1926.
But we know that the Chinese capitalist class is weak and cannot overcome the feudal warlords and international imperialism. Thus its revolutionary party (the KMT) has often adopted right-leaning policies of compromise.

However, all is not lost for there is 'an escape route right in front of us: join hands with the revolutionary proletariat class and together we will overthrow our common enemies.'

On the other hand, for the proletariat to form a united front with the capitalists is only a temporary message for immediate needs. In emphasizing the split between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary capitalists, and the antagonism that should be fostered between the Right and Left wings, Ch'en was really echoing the sentiments of Liu Jen-ching at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, the speech which drew a patronizing lecture from Radek.

Shortly after the publication of that article, the ECCI sent the aforementioned special May Instructions in preparation for the Third Congress of the CCP. The Manifesto of this Congress has already been noted. But, of greater interest in the context of a discussion on the CCP concept of the collaboration was another manifesto published almost contemporaneous to the Congress manifesto. This second one is the manifesto of the restructured Hsin Ch'ing-nien now coming under the editorship of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai.62

---

62 HCN No.1 (15-VI-1923). The HCN, now an official organ of the CCP, had become a quarterly. Ch'ü had been a lecturer at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV), had been a personal friend of Bukharin, and was to be a leading theoretician of the Party for the next ten years.
In this manifesto Ch'ü reminded readers that the HCN was the leader in the Revolution of Ideas (ssu-hsiang ke-ming) and would certainly continue the role as: 'vanguard of the revolution of ideas.' Ch'ü, who had six contributions in the same issue of the journal, went on to explain that the Chinese society was in the grasp of world capitalism and thus shared the same fate with the world's proletariat. Under such conditions, 'the Chinese capitalist class will naturally rely on the world capitalists and form liaison with them.' Here, Ch'ü was showing a more radical position than that of his leader, Ch'en, in the latter's article just discussed. Ch'ü was not appealing to the Left leaning capitalists. On the contrary, he condemned them without making the distinction of Left and Right amongst the capitalist class. Indeed, on the eve of the formal ceremony of collaboration - the inaugural meeting of the reconstructed KMT in January 1924 - theoretician Ch'ü announced in this prestigious journal:

Therefore, in the true revolution in China, only the proletariat class (lao-tung) can shoulder this great duty. Recent social history in China has clearly demonstrated this. Even in the capitalist revolution, if that is not directed by the working class it will not succeed. Besides, the capitalist class will inevitably sell out mid-way [through the revolution]. The true liberation of China must be the task of the working class.

Under his direction, the editor proclaimed that the HCN would help to point out the rightful direction for this revolution of ideas and thus would become a weapon of knowledge for the working people of China. 'The HCN cannot but be the compass point of the
proletariat revolution of China.'

It is of interest to note that Ch'ü used the terms lao-tung (working-class) and wu-ch'an (without property) interchangeably. But of paramount interest to the suspicious readers within the KMT must be the insistence on the overthrow of the capitalist class by the proletariat. This was certainly not calculated to gain the confidence of the KMT.

Fifteen days after the Hsin Ch'ing-nien manifesto was published, the CCP published another theoretical journal, entitled Ch'ien-feng - The Vanguard. Contributors were the familiar ones to the readers of the Hsiang Tao and Hsin Ch'ing-nien. They included such well known ones as Ts'ai Ho-sen, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, and Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai. In its first issue there were many calls for more revolutionary action on the rural front, just as the Comintern had directed in its May Instructions and just as the CCP had been doing sometime prior to their receipt of the Comintern Instruction. In the context of a discussion on the CCP's concept of the collaboration with the KMT, it is of interest to note that many of the sentiments heretofore mentioned in the pages of the Hsiang Tao were repeated in this opening issue. Considering the time of its publication, one is constrained to the conclusion that opinions expressed here must have been in accord with at least the majority of the CCP leadership, if they did not have their unanimous agreement.

Therefore, it is of significant concern when an article entitled 'The Past and Future of the National Movement in

\[63\]

Ch'ien-feng, No.1 (1-VII-1923). Relevant articles will be discussed in the pages to follow. The development of a rural policy will be discussed in a separate chapter.
China should say that 'the KMT cannot really be considered as a political party ... since (Sun Yat-sen) returned to China (after the anti-Yuan exile) and the reconstruction, the only concern of the KMT was with the military and diplomacy ... it is fearful of imperialism and will never be expected to be against the imperialists.' He felt that the task left to the KMT was for it to take on an anti-imperialist policy seriously, and to remake their programme so as to attract the other revolutionary elements in the nation. Another point of note was the author's concern for the peasants. He asked: 'What is the sense of having a revolution if it has no effect on the peasants?'

Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai also contributed and, as with the article by Sun To, Ch'ü's was also included in the volume entitled Collected Discussions on the Problems of the Revolution in China which was published in 1926. This should signify that ideas contained herein had a wider currency than just in 1923. Ch'ü prefaced his article with a quotation from Marx which stated 'that the Chinese revolution will throw the spark into the overloaded mine of the present industrial system and cause the explosion of the long-prepared general crisis, which, spreading abroad, will be closely followed by political revolution on the

64 'Chung-kuo kuo-min yün-tung chih kuo-ch'u chi chiang-lai' (The Past and Future of the National Movement in China), by Sun To who was a regular contributor to the Hsiang Tao as well. Ch'ien-feng No.1 (1-VII-1923).

65 Ch'ü, 'Chung-kuo chih tsu-pen chieh-chi ti fa-chan' (The Development of the Capitalist Class in China) Ch'ien-feng No.1. The various contributors to this journal differed in their opinions on the peasant movement, but that will be discussed in a later chapter.
continent.\footnote{Marx, 'Revolution in China and in Europe', published in the New York Daily Tribune (14-VI-1953) as a leading article. This English version is cited from Avineri Op.cit., p.73.}

Though Marx was being cited out of context, Ch'ü was using that as an illustration of the supra-national nature of capitalism. In the context of the Leninist concept of imperialism, this statement by Marx was most appropriate. In the context of this study, however, the significant things in Ch'ü's article are that he saw that, in the national revolutionary movement in China, the most organized and the most united class was the proletariat. Naturally, he saw the current social struggles in China in terms of class antagonism. But, as the capitalist class placed so much reliance on foreign capitalists and imperialists, 'the solution to the social problems in China cannot be obtained simply through the giving of political power to the bourgeoisie.' As to the working class in China, 'because of the peculiarity of the Chinese capitalist development, they still only had an awakening to nationalism and few in the working class had a class awakening.' Nevertheless, because the proletariat 'is the most united, it can unite with the petty bourgeoisie and foster the spirit of national revolution within the latter class. In this way, the Chinese proletariat may join hands with the proletariat of the world and realize the great and sustained world-wide social revolution and thoroughly overthrow imperialism.'

On the other hand, there were also other discussions on the united front in this theoretical journal. Ch'en Tu-hsiu
discussed the united front in the revolution of ideas in which he singled out Hu Shih for praise, but in a rather two-edged way. Ch'en found that all the leading members of 'the so-called New Thought Movement thinkers, including Ts'ai Yuan-pei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao ... still have not escaped totally from feudal and patriarchal ideas... The only one who really understands the ideas and culture of the capitalist class is Hu Shih. While his belief in Pragmatism and our belief in the materialist conception of history have great differences, in the revolutionary struggle against feudal ideas, there is a real need to unite [with Hu and like-minded thinkers in the capitalist class].' Of course, such ideas of a tactical united front in a struggle against a common enemy had been the theme of Ch'en at least since he became a communist. And as has been mentioned, such was also the message he gave to his readers shortly after he founded the CCP and just prior to his taking up his first appointment in a united-front situation in the service of Ch'en Chiung-ming in December 1920.

Organizationally, the CCP and the KMT were being drawn closer together, especially since the arrival of Borodin to Canton in September 1923. Borodin has been regarded as having played an important part in the framing of the new KMT constitution which showed the traditional KMT positions on such matters as property ownership and capital rather than the CCP positions. However, this did not stop the senior members of

67 Ch'en, 'Ssu-hsiang ke-ming shang ti lien-ho chen-hsien' (The United Front in the Revolution of Ideas), Ch'ien-feng No.1.
68 R.C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, pp.75-8. (Stanford U.P. 2nd ed. 1967). North was of the opinion that Borodin had a strong influence on the content of the constitution and that Sun and Borodin formed a close working relationship.
the CCP from attacking the KMT, and even Sun Yat-sen himself, by name. Tsai Ho-sen, in particular, was most relentless in such attacks. He accused the KMT and Sun of bowing unashamedly to the capitalists and imperialists, as well as 'having a slavish mentality and have committed grave and serious mistakes against nationalism'. In short then the CCP was attacking the policies and attitudes of the KMT right up to the eve of the opening of the inaugural ceremony of the reconstructed KMT in January 1924, and had done so repeatedly.

In other words, from the perspective of the target of communist propaganda, the collaboration between the CCP and the KMT did not signal any fundamental change in Chinese communism. The readers of these communist journals were in no doubt that the message the CCP leadership intended to transmit on the issue of the collaboration was that it was merely a tactical manoeuvre dictated by circumstances. Indeed, the message practically adjured the readers not to rely too much on the integrity of the KMT but to remember always that the 'real and true revolution' for the liberation of China was a proletariat revolution.

One is constrained to conclude that the purpose in giving such messages was not to cultivate trust and co-operation from the members of the KMT as the Comintern had directed. Nor can such messages be reasonably argued as being made in accordance with the spirit of the Sun-Joffe declaration or the speech Li Ta-chao made at the inaugural meeting of the KMT in 1924.

69 Ts'ai, 'Yu Hua-sheng-tun hui-i tao Ho-tung ho-p'ing hui-i' (From the Washington Conference to Ho-tung's Peace Conference) Ch'ien-feng No.2 (1-XII-1923). Also see Hsiang Tao No.39 (8-IX-1923).
While it was the intention of Borodin and the Comintern to create an environment of trust, harmony, and co-operation between the communists and the KMT, the Chinese communist leadership, through their propaganda media, did not renounce their policy of effecting a complete restructuring of the Chinese society by means of class struggle. The Chinese communists therefore informed the politically concerned members of the public that the collaboration which they were entering into was but a tactical decision and not a departure from their fundamental revolutionary methodology of class struggle. Indeed, as the Chinese communists saw it, the collaboration meant the extension of class struggle right into the KMT which the CCP saw, at best, as a revolutionary movement and 'to split the KMT', as Liu Jen-ching had insisted. Or, as Marx and Engels put it, and the Chinese communists were so fond of citing it, in the final chapter of The Communist Manifesto:

In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social political order of things.
CHAPTER 4
The National Revolution

PART 1  Its Nature

An appropriate symbol of a significant aspect of the CCP-KMT collaboration may be found in a much publicized photograph taken during the First Congress of the re-organized KMT in Canton in January 1924.¹ This is a picture of the delegates leaving the meeting hall after a session. Leading the delegates were Sun Yat-sen and Li Ta-chao. Li was in the centre of the picture with Sun about half a step ahead and to the left of Li, but to the reader, Sun would be on the extreme right of the picture. This symbol of deference created by Li - walking on the right-hand side and slightly behind Sun - would not be lost on the contemporaries. And, judging by the main speech he made to the Congress, this image of deference to the KMT was exactly what Li had tried to create for the CCP.

In that speech,² Li told the gathered dignitaries of the KMT that the communists 'cannot but admire the Tsungli (Sun) and the senior comrades [of the KMT] for their spirit of earnestness and devotion in shouldering the duties of the Kuo-min ke-ming (the national revolution).¹ Indeed, the praise Li had heaped on the KMT was embarrassingly fulsome, and given what had been published in the CCP organs, the suspicions the KMT leadership had on the sincerity of the CCP were not unjustified. Li claimed

¹ See Ke-ming wen-hsien Vol.8, where this photograph is included.
that 'the KMT is the only revolutionary party with a history, ideology and leadership. Only the KMT can be the party to accomplish the national revolution, to liberate the people, to restore the rights of the people, and to affirm the livelihood of the people.' In joining the KMT, Li claimed, the CCP was doing no more than ask for the privilege of sharing with the KMT the duties of the national revolution and to be loyal to the KMT.

As to Sun Yat-sen, a source close to him recalled that Sun decided on the drastic reorganization of the KMT at the time when the forces of Ch’en Chiung-ming were presssing on Canton. On the day he made the decision - 24th October 1923 - Sun explained his decision to his long-time comrade, Tsou Lu, thus:

In re-organizing our Party today, we should maintain the original affection among our members, which has been characteristic of our Party, and adopt the Soviet organization whereby we shall be benefited but free from its evils.

In other words, what attracted Sun to the Soviet model was party organization and efficiency, not ideology. If democratic-centralism was the Leninist spirit of party organization, then what particularly attracted Sun to the Leninist model was the 'centralism' aspect.

This was made clear to the CCP and the KMT in the opening address of the First (re-organized) National Congress of the KMT by Sun. He expounded in no uncertain terms the spirit of the reorganization:

Therefore, if we are going to succeed, we must be united and of one mind. In order to achieve this spiritual unity which is so vital to a political party, the comrades must be prepared to sacrifice their individual freedom, and to put all their ability at the disposal of the Party. Only in this way can the Party itself have both freedom and the ability to command, and shoulder the great work of the revolution and the reconstruction of the country. The failure of the Party in the past was due to the fact that while the individual member enjoyed freedom, the Party as a whole had none; that while the individual member possessed ability, the Party as a whole was deprived of it. Herein lay the failure of the Kuomintang.  

As Sun saw the situation, the two tasks challenging the delegates were 'firstly, to reorganize the KMT so as to revitalize it into a powerful and organized political party; and secondly, to consider the ways and means to be adopted by the Party in order to solve the problems of national reconstruction.'

Finally, the Congress adopted a Declaration. It was divided into three sections: firstly, on the present situation of China; secondly, on the principles of the KMT; and finally, on the political platform of the KMT. For the first time in a KMT official pronouncement, this Declaration denounced imperialism as the fundamental cause of the present troubles in China. It declared that 'imperialism and militarism are working hand in hand

---

4 Speech cited by Tsou Lu, Ibid. p.338.
5 Ibid. p.337.
to the lasting ruin of the Chinese people ... the arbitrary rule of the militarists and the domination of the imperialist are getting worse every day, and China is sinking deeper and deeper into the hell of a semi-colonial condition.'

The second section of the Declaration was an exposition of the Sun Min Chu I - the Three Principles of the People - which constituted the ideological basis of the KMT. This section must have given the CCP leadership much food for thought. While it declared as natural rights the Four Freedoms, nevertheless, it declared that they were to be realized through the very unnatural means of 'guided democracy': that is, these natural rights would only become the rights of the citizenry through three stages, namely the military, the educative, and the constitutional periods.

The Declaration, however, did make an appeal to the workers and peasants, saying:

the KMT pledges to assist the peasants and the labour movement, and to raise the economic status of the peasants and workers in order to increase the effective power of the national revolution. It invites the peasants and the workers to join the Party so as to secure a united front against the militarists and imperialists, for in fighting against these enemies the masses are effecting their own emancipation.'

The important issue, however, was not the involvement of the

---

6 See Ti-i ti-erh tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui hsüan-yen chi chüeh-i-an (Declarations and resolutions of the First and the Second National Congresses of the KMT), pub. by Dept. of Organization CEC of the KMT (n.p. August 1927).
peasants and workers. The guarantee for the fruition of the revolution was Party dictatorship for only a well-organized Party in supreme authority can be trusted to deal effectively with the counter-revolutionary intriguers and imperialist plotters, and to bring about the full realization of the San Min Chu I to the happiness of the masses and the glory of the country.'

The final section had two parts: the internal and external policies of the KMT when it came into power. The internal policies dealt with such issues as the apportioning of power between the central and the local governments. But, as such civil rights were part of the natural rights, which by the definition of this Declaration would not be enjoyed by the citizens until the third stage of constitutional development, this portion of the party platform must be ascribed as futuristic and not of immediate concern. However, the external policies did have their relevance. It was the aim of the KMT to abolish the unequal treaties such as those which provided for the existence of the foreign concessions, extraterritoriality, maritime customs control by foreign powers, etc. The Declaration called for the renegotiation of the treaties on the basis of equality and mutual respect. However, in spite of the warning given by Ts'ai Ho-sen,7 this reorganized KMT of Sun Yat-sen still looked longingly to the securing of foreign loans. The Declaration explicitly assured that all 'properly secured' loans would be repaid but those made by the 'irresponsible military cliques' in their bid for power would be repudiated.

7 See Hsiang Tao No.1, pp.4-6 (13-IX-1922) in which Tsai warned Sun not to rely on loans of the imperialists.
Notwithstanding the pledge of co-operation made by Li Ta-chao in his speech to the Congress, the leadership of the CCP could not but be concerned by the different emphasis and interpretations on the nature of the national revolution between themselves and their collaborators, the KMT. The interests expressed by the KMT on foreign loans must have made the Chinese communists regard their collaborators as uncomfortable bedfellows. Again, since the Chinese communists had repeatedly proclaimed that the workers and peasants, that is the class-without-property or the proletariat, were the main forces - chu-li chün - of the national revolution, the position which the KMT declaration ascribed to these classes must be unacceptable to the communists. To Sun and the KMT, the national revolution was the concern of the Party and the Party was to be the main force of the national revolution. The workers and peasants were 'invited' to join so that they might partake of the benefits of the revolution. This self-image of the party and the national revolution by Sun and the KMT fitted in well with what Ch'en Tu-hsiu had said of the KMT - that it was a non-class-differentiated revolutionary group. That, by inference, was a denial of the Comintern's concept of the KMT - a union of four classes.  

The CCP, however, was not slow in responding to these KMT declarations of ideological positions. Notwithstanding what Li Ta-chao had said in the KMT Congress, the CCP, through the medium of their official journals, made their views on the nature and leadership of the national revolution abundantly clear.

8 See Ch'en in Hsiang Tao No.2, p.16 (20-IX-1922).
Furthermore, they made no effort to conceal what they - the party of the proletariat - intended to achieve in their participation in the national revolution.

The KMT Manifesto on the reorganization and the preamble of the new party constitution were published in full by the CCP official organ, the Hsiang Tao, where they were accorded front-page comments. While the KMT would 'invite' the workers and peasants to participate in the national revolution, the CCP exhorted 'all those who love their country to rise up and unite' to resist the imperialists and the traitors. It urged its readers to join the national revolution so that, together, 'we will first build a political party of the common people (p'ing-min)'. It saw the national revolution as a concurrent development of two movements: the political movement by the common people and the military aspect of the revolutionary movement. It concluded on such an aggressive note so that the real intention of the message would not be mistaken. It saw the reorganization as heralding a new era for the min-chüan (people's right, or democracy) government. The writer said that 'unlike previous occasions when [the common people] left this to the few leaders of the min-chüan movement', this time 'we should actively join the KMT and together realize the national revolutionary movement'. Thus, the immediate CCP reaction to the three-stage process of realizing min-chüan (people's right or democracy) was an explicit rejection.

On the very next day, the theoretical journal of the CCP, the reorganized HCN Quarterly published an article by its editor.

---

9 They were published in Nos.48-9 (12-XII-1923) and the comment was published in No.49, pp.373-4.
Ch'ü Ch'iu-p'ai, which in effect made a liar of Li Tu-chao. While Li publicly proclaimed that the communists, in joining the KMT, were to help the latter to fulfil their goals and not to change it to become more like the CCP, Ch'ü, in a lengthy discourse, claimed that the philosophic commitment of the communists would constrain him to do exactly what Li claimed communists would not do.¹⁰ Ch'ü effectively cited the Communist Manifesto, Lenin's What is to be done?, as well as party leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu to support his argument.

Ch'ü argued that as Marx had approved, as a revolutionary tactic, that under certain conditions there was a need for the various classes to unite,

therefore, irrespective of whether the nation is advanced or backward, under a feudal-militaristic form of government, the proletariat must join and partake in the promotion of a democratic revolution. The more backward the nation concerned, the more powerful will its proletariat be in such a democratic revolution. At the same time [in such a backward nation] there will be better opportunity to change the victory of the capitalists' revolution into a victory for the proletariat revolution.¹¹

In short, he was arguing that since the capitalist class in China was not well developed, the proletariat should participate in the democratic-national revolution so that at the overthrow of the common enemy - the feudal-militarist class - the proletariat might snatch the victory from the capitalists, and that this was

¹⁰ Ch'ü Wei-to 'Tzu min-chihchu-i chih she-hui chu-i' (From Democracy to Socialism) HCN No.2, pp.79-102 (20-XII-1923). Ch'ü Wei-to was a well-known pen-name of Ch'ü Ch'iu-p'ai.

¹¹ Ch'ü, Ibid, pp.82-83.
possible especially in societies where the capitalist class was weak, as in China. Expressing such a view at that time by a communist of such prominence in such an important journal was bound to create suspicion.

Furthermore, Ch'ü warned that as the capitalists were the biggest beneficiary of the democratic revolution, the working class should not be 'content with reformism but should adopt the revolutionary tactic' to change the social structure of society. On the other hand, Ch'ü was not unaware of the fear of having the 'political party of the proletariat' being contaminated through participation in a democratic revolutionary movement. However, he assured the proletarian readers that such contamination would not be caused by certain members of the proletariat party's leadership surrendering to the capitalists, nor by a certain faction of the proletariat party trying to maintain a 'formal independence' in the democratic movement. Indeed, Ch'ü saw such independence as merely in form as well as running the chance of being contaminated. He was, in fact, strongly against maintaining such independence. He argued that since the current need of the Chinese was 'merely a democratic revolution' any slogans proclaiming such independence would only confuse the masses and permit the leadership of the revolutionary movement to fall into the hands of the capitalist class. He advised that 'the duties of the political party of the proletariat are to direct the labouring masses to use realistic slogans - in so doing [the proletariat party] will never become homogenized by the capitalist class.' He emphasized the 'realism' of the slogan

---

12 Ibid. p.86.
because, as he saw the situation,

though the proletariat and the capitalists have similar political slogans [asking for] "democracy", their economic contents will never be similar. If this "slogans of class realism" can be made use of properly, then [the proletariat party] will naturally be able to lead the democratic revolution to its natural conclusion and thus creating all conditions necessary for the social revolution.

Indeed, Ch'ü who had met Lenin and had become a personal friend of Bukharin counselled his fellow-proletarians that there was really no need to risk one's life by shouting:

- We want revolution, we don't want reformism!
- We want socialism, we don't want democracy:

As Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai was a member of the Central Committee of the CCP, any survey of the development of Chinese communism must take cognizance of his ideological statements, especially if they were published in the leading theoretical journal of the Party - the HCN. Far from the conciliatory tone Li Ta-chao adopted in this speech at the KMT Congress, Ch'ü was making an unmistakeably aggressive statement on the eve of the Congress. Indeed, he saw the collaboration of the CCP with the KMT in the national revolution as an indication of the capitalists giving a concession to the proletariat. Citing himself - a sure sign of his self-confidence, for the only other authorities cited were Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Ch'en Tu-hsiu - Ch'ü argued that because of the economic conditions existing in China, there existed a political

---

13 Ibid. pp. 87-88.
situations in which the capitalist class with their democracy and the proletariat class with their socialist labour movement were intermingled. This was so because the process of industrial and economic developments in China were different from those in Europe and the U.S.A. and hence, political movements would be different. Therefore, in China, the democratic and socialist revolutions would be more closely related. Indeed,

if the Chinese capitalist class wants to develop their potentials, they must remove the warlords-militarists, and they must eliminate [the influence of] imperialism. But, if the capitalists want to eliminate these two, they have no option but to rely on the labouring masses of China and the proletariat class of the world: the capitalist class of China cannot but give in to socialism.\(^1\)

This statement implied some divergences within the CCP on the nature of the KMT. Party leader, Ch'en, had claimed that the KMT was a non-class revolutionary party. The Comintern, especially due to the influence of Maring, saw in the KMT a front of four classes.\(^2\) Ch'ü, on the other hand, had consistently referred to the KMT here as the political party of the capitalist class, sometimes simply as 'the capitalist class'. Furthermore, he viewed the socio-political development in China as a series of distinct class struggles.

To Ch'ü, the current major class contradiction was one between the feudal-militaristic class on the one hand and the

\(^{1}\) Ibid. p.92 citing his article in Ch'ien-feng (Vanguard) No.1 (1-VII-1923) entitled 'Hsien-tai Chung-kuo ti kuo-hui chi yu chün-fa' (The Warlords and the national Assembly system in China today).

capitalist and proletariat classes on the other. To Ch'ü, this was a peculiarly Chinese situation. But, because of the very special nature of the Chinese situation,

only with the direct action of the proletariat class can the revolution be a thorough one in the removal of the twin obstacles of Chinese capitalism (feudalism and warlordism). That is, the revolutionaries must use the methods of the working class to bring about the national revolution. In the process of the national revolution, the labouring class will become more important every day until it grasps the power of leadership. As the final goal of the labouring class is socialism, therefore, at the very zenith of the national revolution, China can join with the world revolution and directly enter into socialism.¹⁶

In so saying, Ch'ü had introduced two new ideas on the nature of the Chinese national revolution. Firstly, the participation of the proletariat was a necessity, not only for the ultimate success of the revolution but also because their participation was needed by the Chinese capitalist class. Furthermore, if the proletariat class could understand and appreciate properly their objective position in the national revolution, then their role would not only be that of the 'main force' but eventually would acquire the power of leadership. Having acquired this position, the proletariat would then be able to lead the Chinese revolution directly into socialism by completing their struggle against the capitalist class. While other writers, such as Ts'ai Ho-sen, had implied such

developments, Ch'ü now stated this explicitly and emphatically. This may well be called the Chinese version of the concept of the continuous revolution.

The influence of the 1848-vintage Marx and of Lenin on this statement by Ch'ü is obvious, and these influences were duly acknowledged. Ch'ü had numerous quotations from both. The writings of Lenin which most influenced Ch'ü here were *What is to be done?* (1902) and *Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (1905). This is of great significance because it shows that Marxism in China in the 1920's was going through the similar vicissitudes experienced by the Russian Social Democratic Party between 1894 and 1905. Since Ch'ü had already demonstrated his concern for the need to realize socialism in a practical, and not dogmatic, fashion,\(^\text{17}\) and since he was personally familiar with the Russian leadership, a review of the development of communist ideology during these crucial decades will set this discussion on national revolutionary theories and tactics by Ch'ü in a more relevant perspective.

During the last twenty years or so of the life of Marx, he had engaged in a serious study of the Tsarist economic conditions. However, he was careful to avoid taking sides in the deepening controversy current at that time over the prospects of capitalist development and the potentials of a socialist revolution in

\[^\text{17}\] In 11-IV-1921, while Ch'ü was in Moscow, he already said that should the socialist revolution occur in Germany then, it would take a different form to the Russian 1917 Revolution because of the socio-economic differences of the two countries: see Ch'ü Ch'iu-p'ai wen-chi (*Collected Works of Ch'ü Ch'iu-p'ai*) 1, pp.113-115 (*Peking* 1953-4).
Russia. While neither Marx nor Engels doubted, after about 1870, that the Tsarist regime would soon collapse, in the lifetime of Marx, they would venture no further than to issue a tantalizing statement to the effect that:\footnote{The 1882 Preface to the Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto. Any edition will suffice but this passage is cited from the English edition published by the Foreign Languages Press, (Peking, 1970), p.18.}

If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting point for a communist development.

The Russian disputants were, on the one hand, the Social-Democrats who saw the system of common ownership of land by the peasants - the \textit{obshchina} - as a hindrance to socio-economic development. And, on the other hand, the Populists who hoped that the \textit{obshchina} system would enable Russia to 'pass directly to the higher form of communist common ownership,'\footnote{Ibid., p.17.} thus bypassing the need for a full-scale capitalist system.

Though this dispute seemed academic during the lifetime of Marx - for after all, the disputants were mainly the radical intelligentsia with no mass following - it became relevant from the mid-1890's. In 1894, when the third volume of Capital was published, the Russians sought in it the confirmation of their respective ideological positions. While the readers in Western Europe might seek in this concluding volume signposts for the analysis of mature industrial capitalism, the Russian Populists and the Social-Democrats sought in it the impact of capitalism
on the peasant economy. The Populists claimed that the peasant community was holding its own while the 'Marxists' denied it.²⁰

The Marxists in Russia were by no means unanimous. After 1894, there came the phenomenon of 'legal Marxism': the legally published Marxist literature trying to demonstrate that Russian capitalism was indeed progressing, even though there was general backwardness in the country. Thus, one faction from amongst the Russian Marxists gave encouragement to capitalism along liberal lines on the ground that capitalism was a necessary, indeed beneficial, stage of historical development. Another faction, the so-called Economists, accepted the general position of the first group while adding emphasis to the need for trade unionism. The third and largest faction demanded that the political duty of the Social-Democrat was to overthrow the autocratic monarchy.

Henceforth, the dispute transcended the realm of mere academic disagreement for in the next few years the Russian Marxists were to undergo more changes. Those intellectuals whose ideological development constrained them to reject Marxism tended to opt for liberalism in politics, rather than to become 'revisionists' as was the case in Germany and Western Europe. Peter Struve, the Social-Democrat who co-authored the 1898 Minsk Manifesto and a founding 'Legal Marxist' became a liberal in politics. Those accepting Marx, the Marxist Social-Democrats, over the period 1903-1905, split into the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions.²¹

²⁰ See Lenin, 'Who are the "Friends of the People"?' or 'The Development of Capitalism in Russia'. Any edition.
²¹ Detailed discussions on these developments may be found in L. Schapiro The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (London 1960) or E.H. Carr The Bolshevik Revolution, vol.1 (London 1950).
The two pamphlets by Lenin which were cited by Ch'ü were landmarks in the Bolshevik-Menshevik split as well as being signposts indicating the direction of action of the Chinese communists. *What is to be done?* was written in 1902 mainly as a counter to the 'Economic' faction of the Russian Marxists. In this pamphlet Lenin developed at great length the concept that the 'socialist consciousness' of the working class was injected into it by the radical intellectuals who, as professional revolutionaries, were really the purveyors of the socialist world-view. This was promptly noted by Trotsky and others as a statement for a Jacobinical style of organization that would lead to dictatorship, not the short-term dictatorship of the 1848 Marx. 22

In 1905 Lenin published the tract *Two Tactics* in which he expanded into a revolutionary strategy what Marx had proclaimed in 1848 in the *Communist Manifesto*. Here, Lenin was planning a strategy for the Russian revolution which would be more than merely complementary to the revolution in the West - as Marx had said in the 1882 Preface - but would enable Russia to catch up with the West. It was never part of Lenin's aim to conduct a revolution against the Monarchy so as to usher in the bourgeois rule. He had already rejected the concepts of the Legal Marxists and the Economists. The task before Lenin, then, was to transform a bourgeois revolution into a proletarian one. In other words, he was trying to work out the strategy to bring about what Marx had earlier proclaimed: 'the proletarian dictatorship'.

---

22 See Trotsky's tract *Our Political Task* (Geneva 1904).
Here, Lenin was trying to design a revolutionary strategy which would commence as a bourgeois revolution, in the Marxist sense, but in the process would bring the proletariat and the peasantry to the forefront. Thus, we find Lenin, on the one hand, confessing that a bourgeois revolution 'is in the highest degree advantageous to the proletariat ... [and] ... is absolutely necessary in the interests of the proletariat' because a bourgeois revolution is one that 'most resolutely sweeps away the survivals of the past, the remnants of serfdom (which include not only autocracy but monarchy as well) and most fully guarantee the broadest, freest and most rapid development of capitalism'.

Yet, on the other hand, Lenin argued that for a decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism, bourgeois revolution was not enough because [the bourgeoisie] need tsarism with its bureaucratism, police, and military forces for use against the proletariat and the peasantry too much to be able to strive for its destruction ... the only force capable of gaining a decisive victory over tsarism is the people, that is the proletariat and the peasantry.

In short, then, the Leninist strategy was a revolution which may be described or defined as a 'democracy' but certainly not 'bourgeois'. It will be a democracy because only the 'people' can achieve a 'decisive victory'. It will not be bourgeois because the bourgeoisie does not form part of the people, excepting the 'rural and urban petty bourgeoisie'. But then, the

23 Lenin, Two Tactics, p.44 (Peking, 1965).
24 Ibid., p.52.
latter would not be the 'main forces' in comparison to the proletariat and the peasantry. In any event, the 'bourgeois democrats' were, by nature 'inconsistent' and thus unreliable.  

As for the operational method whereby the people would achieve this decisive victory over tsarism and bring about this state of democracy, Lenin advised, citing Marx, the adoption of 'the Jacobin, or if you like the plebeian way ... [for] the Jacobins of contemporary Social-democracy [are] the Bolsheviks.' By the Jacobin way, Lenin meant that the revolution would be raised 'to the level of the consistent democratism of the proletariat ... that is, the proletariat and the peasantry ... [will] ... settle accounts with the monarchy and the aristocracy in the "plebian way", ruthlessly destroying the enemies of liberty, crushing their resistance by force, making no concessions whatever to the accursed heritage of serfdom, of Asiatic barbarism and human degradation.' However, it is worth noting that in spite of such an advocacy, Lenin, in the very next sentence, denied that he was advocating the 'methods of action' of the Jacobins of 1793. Indeed, he maintained that he was doing 'nothing of the kind.' 

Within fifteen years - in 1919 - the socialists in China, through their own study and observation, had already come to the conclusion that to fulfil the Marxian call in the Communist Manifesto, a revolution with the proletariat and the peasantry at the forefront was necessary. Furthermore, the Chinese

25 Ibid., p. 53.
26 Ibid., p. 56.
27 See the 1920 New Year Messages of Li Ta-chao and Feng Tzu-yu cited in a previous chapter.
communists had already arrived at the conclusion that through a revolutionary process social changes may be expedited and that their revolutionary goal was to do just that. Now, Ch'ü was to provide them with a strategy for this national-cum-socialist revolution, clothed in the latest fashion of Marxist-Leninist slogans.

However, while Ch'ü cited Marx and Lenin, his own strategy had gone beyond the Leninist strategy of 1905 - a strategy which caused the Bolshevik-Menshevik split over the Jacobinical elements in Lenin. Ch'ü agreed with Lenin to the extent that the national revolution in China, a 'democratic revolutionary movement of the people, ... cannot be achieved by peaceful means but must be by an understanding of the views and methods of revolutionary socialism.'

The objective realities in China, as Ch'ü saw them, were also different from the Russia of 1905 when Russian capitalism and industrialization were much more developed and advanced than the China of 1923. However, there were other differences as well. China was no longer a monarchy as Russia was in 1905 but, as with many other lands, had become a victim of international imperialism. Indeed, Ch'ü commented that if the true socialist party in China - the CCP - were to rely solely on the 'industrial proletariat ... it would not have survived... [thus] while in the advanced nations the proletariat leads a united front towards a workers' (lao-kung) dictatorship, in China [the process] is from a national movement (kuo-min yün-tung) united front to a

---

revolutionary dictatorship (ke-ming tu-tsa'i chih) and then further advancement [into socialism]. He agreed with Lenin in that both denied that capitalist democracy can be equated with a true and thorough democracy. And, as if to try to emulate the Leninist strategy - in forcing the Bolshevik-Menshevik split - Ch'ü denounced Sun Yat-sen's People's Livelihood and People's Power (Min-sheng chu-i and Min-chu chu-i) as programmes for the development of capitalism.29

In spite of such strong denunciation right on the eve of the first congress of the reconstructed KMT, Ch'ü still urged the people to support the national revolution, and provided reasons to demonstrate the urgency of a proletariat participation of such a revolution. In 1905, Ch'ü explained, the Jacobinical elements in the Leninist strategy proved divisive. In 1923, Ch'ü, the disciple of Lenin, urged a Jacobinical operational method as reason for participation in a united front. Indeed, while Lenin denied that his operational method was Jacobinical, though in substance it was, Ch'ü had no such reservations.

Furthermore, his reasoning was hardly calculated to win the trust and confidence of his new comrades in the national revolution. Ch'ü reasoned that as the masses had had no political or revolutionary experience, and as such experiences could not be gained from books alone, they had no choice but to join in a national revolution - in order to gain the necessary political experience for a proletariat dictatorship. He further explained that in this national revolution, the proletariat

should use the 'Jacobin' method to expedite the process of the revolution.

In so doing, according to his strategy, the proletariat would 'realistically experience the lack of thoroughness' of the capitalist revolution, especially in its lack of complete opposition to the foreign Powers and the warlords. Then, having thus become experienced, 'the proletariat will have acquired the political knowledge and experience to take [the revolution] to a higher state ... in other words, use actual and contemporary economic objectives to change the KMT, so that it will progress from a hazy revolutionism - ke-ming chu-i - to a truly democratic revolution and a people's revolutionism.'

This article by Ch'ü is a significant landmark in any investigation into the concept of national revolution at this stage of the development of Chinese communism. It is so not only because of the very timing of its publication but also because of the importance of the vehicle of publication and its author. The HCN had long had a nation-wide reputation and, by 1923, had become the leading theoretical journal of the CCP. Ch'ü, by then a writer of some note, was its editor - he even designed its front cover. Furthermore, Ch'ü was a member of the Central Committee of the CCP recently returned from Russia, at the invitation of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, after having served as a lecturer in the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow and as a personal friend of Bukharin. Therefore, his pronouncements - even if published under his best-known penname - must be regarded as authoritative.

Thus, just as the collaboration between the KMT and the CCP was being officially formalized at the January 1924 KMT Congress, we find two of the leading members of the CCP issuing apparently contradictory proclamations. On the one hand, there was Li Ta-chao who, as an official CCP delegate to the Congress, telling the gathered dignitaries that the communists joined the KMT out of respect for Sun Yat-sen and his pioneering comrades. Indeed, Li insisted that the communists shared the same goals with the KMT and that in collaborating with the KMT, the communists were merely trying to expedite the fulfilment of those goals, and certainly not to change or Bolshevize the KMT.

On the other hand, we find Ch'ü openly proclaiming that in joining the KMT, the communists were merely adopting a tactical necessity as demanded by the objective reality of the economic-political situation in China. In so doing, the CCP was decidedly not compromising its principles. On the contrary, the party of the proletariat was merely using the opportunity to gain revolutionary and political experiences, and to try to change the socio-political outlook of the KMT, if possible. If the latter was not possible, and if the KMT refused to accept the demands of social development, then they would just have to go into the dustbins of history.

However, from the perspective of the Chinese communists, the differences in the two proclamations were more apparent than real. It may be argued that the positions stated by Li and Ch'ü were not mutually exclusive. The communists and the KMT were in agreement on one of the Three Principles of the People, the *Min-chu chu-i* which is generally translated as Nationalism. To
both the CCP and the KMT, it meant the recovering of the lost economic and political rights taken away by the foreign Powers in the series of so-called unequal treaties and the assertion of economic and political independence. Both agreed that the foreign powers were backing the various warlords and thus prolonging the state of disunity in China. To the communists, the struggle to regain these lost rights was one requiring the capitalists working in collaboration with the proletariat and the peasantry, indeed all patriots. On the other hand, the communists had never been enthusiastic, and were often very critical, of the other two Principles - the Principles of Democracy and Livelihood - the socio-economic programme to be carried out after the regaining of political and economic independence. It was in these areas and issues that the two parties would and did come into conflict. Thus, given the communist view of social development, we may say that the speech by Li was not a lie, it was merely a partial truth. Li, together with the other communists in China, saw the necessity for a national revolution to be carried out by a wide collaboration of social classes, but to the communists, the national revolution was only a step towards the socialist revolution during which some capitalists would part company with the proletariat and the peasantry.

However, as the national revolution was the only and final revolution for the KMT, future conflict between the two collaborating parties thus became inevitable. While Li may be guilty of not revealing the total and ultimate designs of the CCP, the CCP as a whole could hardly be so accused for in their
various journals they had made their ultimate designs, and their strategy in obtaining them, abundantly clear.

On the other hand, the apparent differences in the two Chinese communist positions may be considered as indicative of the methodological, and even ideological, fluidity within the CCP at the time. There were considerable differences within the leadership of the CCP, amongst the Comintern agents sent to China, and consequently, between these agents and the Chinese leadership of the Party.

Such differences of opinions on the nature and tactics of the collaboration and the national revolution existed within the CCP ever since these very issues were raised. Back at the 3rd CCP Congress in June–July 1923, when the Party met to work out the strategy of the national revolution, it had resolved to form a CP faction in any organization other than the CCP to which the CCP members belonged, as for instance the KMT. Maring, according to Chang Kuo-tao, put forward a Rightist programme hoping to ingratiate himself with the KMT. In the end, the Congress adopted the concept of the CP faction as well as accepting Maring’s proposals, but the latter ‘were not implemented.’

Chang further recalled that Borodin even tried to convince the Chinese communists that ‘there were many patriots amongst the warlords’ but Maring’s replacement, Voitinsky, told the Chinese communists that they should disregard Maring and that the

32 Ibid., p.320.
Comintern really had hoped that the CCP would join the KMT to revolutionize the latter.\textsuperscript{33} The Chinese communists, however, did not really need that reassurance from Voitinsky.\textsuperscript{34} At the same time when Ch'ü published his theoretical statement on communist strategy, members of the Peking Branch of the CCP were already laying down their demanding, and indeed condescending, conditions for the CCP to join the KMT - in a KMT journal.

This was the newly founded monthly, \textit{Hsin min-kuo}, (New Republic) which 'was the organ of the recently established KMT organization in Peking and was edited by Fan Ti-jen, a non-Communist.'\textsuperscript{35} It also published contributions from Li, Chang Kuo-tao, Kao I-han, Liu Jen-ch'ing and other communists and may thus be regarded as a window to view the attitudes of the Peking Branch of the CCP on the collaboration, and the national revolution.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., pp.317-320. Chang claimed that the Shanghai, Peking, and Hunan branches, i.e. a majority, of the CCP had questioned the resolutions of the 3rd Congress and demanded the recall of Maring. Voitinsky seemed to have been able to get on well with the Chinese who objected to Maring's overbearing attitude.

\textsuperscript{34} In spite of Chang Kuo-tao's effort in trying to create the impression that he was acting to provide a mellowing effect between the KMT and CCP, in March 1923 the Peking Branch of the CCP published a fiery pamphlet to commemorate the February 7th Incident. It was entitled Ching-Han Kung-jen liu-hsieh chi (Bloody Tales of the Peking-Hankow Railways Workers) and was published by the Kung-jen chou-pao, (Workers' Weekly), an organ of the Peking Branch of the CCP in which Chang was a leading member. It attacked Sun's Three Principles, and citing Karl Liebneckt, von Heine, and the Communist Manifesto and proclaimed that the CCP was the only revolutionary party.

\textsuperscript{35} Chang, \textit{Op.cit.}, p.326. The \textit{New Republic} was first published on the 15 November 1923 with articles by Li, Sun, and Liao Chung-kai on its first issue as well as advertisements for the HCN, Hsiang Tao, and \textit{Ch'ien-feng}, - all CCP journals.
The first issue had nothing really controversial. Even Liu Jen-ch'ing said no more than that the Chinese revolution and problems confronting China had world-wide implications in that while the overthrow of the warlords was a prime necessity, revolutionaries should not forget that standing behind the warlords and supporting them were the foreign Powers. However, the issue did give a full coverage to the Fifth National Students' Congress held in Canton in August 1923. Amongst the resolutions carried in that Congress was one sponsored by the editor of the Hsin Chung-kuo, Fan Ti-jen, a non-communist as Chang Kuo-tao recalled.

The resolution was entitled 'On the Methods to Overthrow the Warlords'. Amongst the methods suggested there were two which were of significance to our discussion on hand. Firstly, the students were called upon to take part in propaganda work with the soldiers of the warlords 'to tell them that they are all members of the proletariat'. Secondly, the students were urged to join the labour movement because 'the labouring class - lao-tung - is the main force - chu-li chün - of the national revolution'. The labouring class was the main force in the national revolution because 'they are the strongest in class struggle. If we are separated from them, then the real revolution would be impossible. The workers - kung-jen - had

37 Ibid., pp.114-127.
38 Ibid., p.122 'Ta-tao ch'un-fa fang-fa ti i-chüeh-an' (Resolution on the Methods to Overthrow the Warlords).
already started to shed their blood for the revolutionary cause, as they so bravely did along the Peking-Hankow Railway.'

However, the communist contributors were most explicit in the next issue in telling the readers the communist's concept on the collaboration with the KMT and the way the CCP members would regard the national revolution. It might well be a coincidence that the second issue of the Hsin Min-kuo was published on the very same day that Ch'ü published his ideas on a Jacobinical methodology - the 20th December 1923. But, it seemed obvious that on the very eve of the KMT Congress, the Chinese communists spared no effort in announcing publicly their future political intentions.

In this issue was a contribution by Kao I-han, a former Peita colleague of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and a CCP member, written in reply to a letter from a reader who had lost all confidence in political parties. Kao, citing Ch'en\textsuperscript{39}, said that his approval of the KMT activities was certainly not an enthusiastic one. However, 'though the KMT in Kwangtung has not achieved much, at least it has not suppressed the freedom of association and publication: and, when the nation was being betrayed by Yuan (Shih-Kai), Tuan (Ch'i-jui), and Chang (Tso-lin), the KMT tried to fight for the nation.' But he also set forth his conditions for joining the KMT, and his intentions whilst in the KMT. He

\textsuperscript{39} Kao's article, a reply to Teng Ch'o-ming, was in Hsin Min-kuo volume I, No.2 (20-XII-1923) and citing Ch'en's article 'Pei-ching-pien yü Kuo-min-tang' (The Peking Coup and the KMT) in Hsiang Tao No.31/32 (joint issue) published on the 11-VII-1923, when Ch'en urged Sun not to rely on the generals in the Southwest but on the masses to fight a genuine national revolution.
joined because he wanted to help expel the 'old gang', that is, those who were against his new programme. His programme, which he would try to fulfil by becoming a full-time cadre working in the Party, was to 'change the KMT into a socialist political party because merely being sympathetic to the working class - lao-tung - was not enough.'

The 'non-communist' editor, Fan Ti-jen, contributed an article which must have endeared him to the hearts of the communists. As if to confirm the views of communist Kao I-han, the editor openly stated that 'the democratic - min-chu - revolution is a revolution of the capitalist class because its success will benefit the capitalists. This is so in the French Revolution and the recent revolution in Turkey'. Then, the editor went on to attack the economic policies in terms which no communist had done:

While Sun Chung-shan's Democratic Revolution was not entirely a one-class affair, according to (KMT) Party Constitution we can see that it will only benefit the capitalists. In the overthrowing of the warlords and bandits, the KMT will improve transport and commerce. In unifying currency, the KMT will make business practice easier. In regaining customs and tariff, the KMT will offer protection to local industries, and in reducing interests the KMT will improve liquidities for business. All these are the opposite to the class interests of the working class (lao-tung) ... the capitalists in the KMT still have not

---

awakened, and still prefer to be slaves to the warlords.

However, Fan still urged the working class to work within the KMT. In Fan's estimation, not only did the working class form 60-70% of the KMT membership, but 'since industries in China still have not developed to the stage of total class conflict, both sides are still under foreign and warlord oppression and should therefore come together under the framework of the KMT which would bring the two classes together to fight their common enemies.'

If a member of the KMT, albeit a radical member of the party, would write in such a tone in an official organ of the party and in the capacity of the editor, we may be permitted to assume that there was a considerable portion of the politically concerned who would be receptive to such views. While there is no denying that the politically concerned sector formed only a minor proportion of the total population of the nation, nevertheless, the former did form a significant segment of the target of political propaganda by such organs as the Hsin Min-kuo, HCN, and Hsiang Tao. Apparently, the propaganda was getting to the target.

While it is always difficult for the historian to ascertain public opinions, in this very month of December 1923, there was an opinion poll conducted in Peking on the political awareness of the people. The Peking University celebrated its 25th Anniversary on the 17th December 1923 and the University declared as Open Days the 16th and 17th. During these two days, five professors of the University conducted a test on the visitors to
the University with the aim 'to find out the political opinions of the people towards Chinese politics, and not to influence the visitors.' Over the two days, 1007 visitors answered the ten questions put to them. They gave their answers privately, in a 'voting booth', on the question paper. Confidentiality was strictly maintained, indeed, apart from the five professors, very few people had foreknowledge of the test. The respondents had an average age of 26, ranging from 16 to 40 and three quarters of them listed themselves as belonging to the hsüeh-chieh, that is, either students or teachers of educational establishments, with the rest spread fairly evenly between the business sector, the military, politics, workers, and eleven journalists.

Whether these visitors to the University formed a cross-section of the population is not the point at issue - they were most certainly not a fair sampling because the proportion of students-teachers in the total population simply could not be 75% - but these respondents might be regarded as a fair representation of those politically concerned who formed the targets of the propaganda efforts. In response to the first question, on their attitude to the Tsao K'ün presidency, there were 202 who avoided the question. But of those who made an answer, an overwhelming 97% were opposed to Tsao, including 75% of those listed as politicians as well as 87% of the military men. Their reasons were that Tsao was the leader of the bad warlords, corrupt, and 'a servant of British and American

\[41\] 'Min-yi ts'e-liang' (Tests of popular opinions), Hsin min-kuo 1 No. 4 (20-11-1924).
imperialism'. Even those who supported Tsao were not really enthusiastic for they merely regarded him as 'the only possible president under the circumstances' and that 'he might temporarily hold and halt [the deterioration] in China's international position.' We may conclude from here that these answers pointed to the fact that the politically concerned in China were worrying about the position of China in the international scene and that a substantial proportion of these were against imperialism.

Of greater interest to the propagandists were the responses to questions on political actions, reading habits, and methods to 'save China'. An overwhelming 81% would not obey the new constitution of Tsao K'un and a 94% felt that a 'national revolution is the best means to save China from the warlords and foreign control.' Almost three out of five, 59%, thought that China should be friendly to the Soviet Union and 13% preferred the U.S.A., while 20% thought that both were exploiters of China. However, Lenin was certainly the most admired non-Chinese person in the world, scoring 227 votes, with Woodrow Wilson a poor second with 51 votes. But Leon Trotsky had to share equal sixth place on 12 votes with the Kaiser and thus behind Tagori who scored 17 and Einstein 16. Bertrand Russell came third with 2 ½ votes. Marx, on the other hand, had to be content with equal fifteenth with Lloyd George and Napoleon on 6 votes thus putting them behind Gandhi, John Dewey, and Bismarck, all with 9 votes.

However, on political ideology, Socialism was a distinct favourite with 291 followed by Sun's Three Principles with 153 and Democracy a poor third with 66 votes. Thus, perhaps not
unexpectedly, Sun was also the most respected Chinese with 473 votes with Ch'en Tu-hsiu second on 173, and the former chancellor of Peita, Tsai Yuan-pei third with 153. All the rest failed to score higher than 45 which went to Tuan Ch'i-jui sharing it with Hu Shih. Liang Chi-chao scored 29, Wu Pei-fu 27 and Li Ta-chao 25 and the rest all under ten. Tsao K'un had a solitary vote, putting him on equal standing with Wellington Koo, Confucius, Lao Tse, Tsai Shao-fan, and Han Wu-ti.

On reading materials, Peking's Shen Pao and Shanghai's Min-kuo jih-pao were equally popular, but in the weekly, a more significant result was shown. The Hsiang Tao was the most popular with 222 votes (almost three times more votes than the most popular dailies) with Hu Shih's Nu-li Chou-pao (the Endeavour Weekly) a second with 127 and the Communist Youth Corps' Weekly, Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien a distant third with 37 but it shared equal second favourite position with the female readers with whom the Nu-li only managed one vote.

While nothing conclusive can be drawn from these figures, one may be permitted to say that the communist journals were getting a significant readership from amongst the politically concerned. The organizers of the poll omitted to find the most popular quarterly journal, but admitted that the HCN had actually received many votes. The political propagandists for the national revolution must have been very heartened by these results, especially when the respondents favoured the involvement of the student movement in the national revolution by a ratio of two to one.
Therefore, if these propagandists of the CCP were to appear radical, they were really reflecting the general opinions of their readers, and were certainly not too far ahead, ideologically, of their readers. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, however, must be regarded as an exception. Apart from an outright advocacy of Jacobinism in his own HCN, he was also openly advocating Socialist Culture and Civilization through class struggles, which he saw were already in progress. By that he meant that the current social organization, value - both economic and cultural - were bourgeois and, consequently, should be struggled against and replaced by the new socialist-proletarian values. Indeed, he felt that this struggle, a class struggle, had already commenced in China and urged his readers in the non-partisan Tung-fang tsa-chih to rise up and take part in the coming and present struggles.

However, it was more than mere coincidence that the Chinese communist writers were so explicit in announcing their attitudes on the national revolution on the eve of the KMT Congress. From another perspective, the first eight months of 1924 may be regarded as a period of ideological confrontation between the KMT and the CCP and that some of the apparent radical pronouncements were really defensive gestures.

From the 7th January to the 24th August 1924, Sun Yat-sen

---

\[42\] Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 'Hsien-tai wen-fa ti wen-ti yü she-hui chu-i' (Socialism and the Problems of Modern Civilization) Tung-fang tsa-chih (Eastern Miscellany) XXI, No.1 (10-1-1924). It was written on the 8th XI 1923. The Taiwan reprint of this journal has changed Ch'ü's name, as well as omitting many articles by communist writers.
delivered his lectures on the **San Min Chu I** - The Three Principles of the People - at weekly intervals in Canton, the seat of the National Government. Though we now have the word of Sun's widow that the lectures were made up 'on the spur of the moment. It all depended on the political situation and the audience', to the Chinese communists of the time, those lectures presented a tremendous challenge. If the Chinese communists were to retain their own political, and more particularly ideological, identity, they were constrained to delineate the ideological boundaries between themselves and the KMT.

That this latter point was important was noted by members of the CCP as well as the KMT. Appearing on the same issue as Ch'ü's proclamation of a Socialist Civilization was one by a KMT member of long standing, Yu yu-jen. He denied the socialist's claim that the KMT was a capitalist party, at the same time, argued that China was not really suffering from the exploitation of capitalism but rather from imperialism and the warlords. Therefore, the Chinese people should heighten the 'spirit of the people' - **min-chu ch'ing-shen** - to save the nation, and not further divide this spirit. Then, as if to take up the challenge from communists like Ch'ü, Yu wrote thus:

I prefer to disregard rumours about the dangers of a socialist party and KMT collaboration for

---


the KMT is not a capitalist party as was Kerensky's, besides, Lenin, in his New Economic Policy, has really admitted that pure socialism is not yet workable in current conditions.

He then adjoined the socialists to study the Min-sheng chu-i - Democracy - assuring them that if they would do so, they would realize the wisdom of Sun Yat-sen and would come to help Sun and the KMT in the national revolution. Indeed, Yü appeared to have been quite confident that through their collaboration with the KMT, the CCP would change - from their advocacy of socialism to what Yü regarded as the more practical advocacy of Min-sheng chu-i.

The more important issue was not whether the KMT was a multi-class party, a Chinese version of Kerensky's government, or even Ch'en Tu-hsiu's conception of a non-class revolutionary party bent on an anti-imperialist and anti-warlord course if prodded along by the CCP. What was at issue was the leadership of the national revolution. Certainly, Ch'ü Ch'iupai did not press this point even when he was advocating a Jacobinical method, nor did Kao I-han when he listed the conditions for joining the KMT and intentions after joining it. However, by claiming that the national revolution was but a preliminary step, however necessary, in the total revolutionary programme, Ch'ü, or anyone else who held similar views, was in fact making an implied claim to the leadership of the revolution for the communists. After all, according to the communist perspective, the national revolution would not be a 'thorough' one and true democracy would not be achieved unless the party of the
proletariat would be there to ensure that the revolution was directed along the correct path - the elimination of the capitalist system.

Similarly, in making the claim that if the CCP join the KMT and study the teachings of Sun, especially his Min-sheng chu-i, the Chinese communists would not only collaborate wholeheartedly with the KMT but would also change the communist programme and goals to those of the KMT, implied that the KMT should take the leadership of the national revolution. Furthermore, to the KMT members and leadership, the national revolution was to be the revolution and not a transit step towards a socialist revolution. And, the revolutionary programme therefore really involved the acquisition and expansion of a territorial base and thence, the implementation, through a period of KMT tutelage - by the KMT alone - into the nirvana of Min-sheng chu-i. At that time there would be no special role envisaged for the CCP in this KMT scheme except to be absorbed into the KMT.

Therefore, at stake in this ideological confrontation was the very existence of the CCP. Looking at the situation from this perspective, the pronouncements of the Chinese communists hitherto were more than those of the zealous evangelicals but were acts, often desperate ones, of defence of their right and need to exist. Indeed, they were acts of defiance.

The Chinese communist leadership was not unaware of the issues at stake and was eager, if not anxious as well, to consolidate their ranks. While Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the Central Committee of the CCP had always considered Shanghai as their
homebase and headquarters, they were naturally anxious that the other centres, especially Peking and Canton, would coordinate their activities particularly in such a crucial period. However, the Central Committee (CC) and Ch'en were to find that the presence of a Soviet Embassy and Comrade Karakhan in Peking and Comrade Borodin in Canton made matters difficult.

As Chang Kuo-t'ao recalled, 'within the ranks of the CCP, the Peking and Kwangtung District Committees were forever tending to behave as though they were sovereign, independent bodies. Sometimes, while ignoring CC directives as a matter of local expediency, or through their contacts with Karakhan in Peking or Borodin in Canton, they would obtain Comintern views direct.'45 As to the Kwangtung District Committee, Chang recalled, they often gave as a reason for disobeying CC directive: 'Borodin's ideas'. However to venture into a discussion of the details of factional politics of the communist movement would be a diversion in a study of the nature of Chinese communism. Suffice to say, on the debate on the concept of the national revolution, while there were some differences in emphasis amongst the Chinese communists these differences were not of a regional nature. In short, whatever influences Karakhan and Borodin might have asserted on their Chinese comrades - and, in spite of the creation of what Chang Kuo-t'ao called 'sovereign, independent bodies' in the Peking and Kwangtung District committees - there was a general uniformity in the communist message projected by the Chinese comrades.

The concept of leadership in the national revolution, of course, was a corollary to the issue on the nature of the national revolution. Thus, as was to be expected, the Chinese communists were very much aware of the expected contention as soon as it became the decision of the Party to collaborate with the KMT. Thus, we find that while the Manifesto of the 3rd CCP Congress offering the leadership of the national revolution to the KMT, as the 'KMT should do' in spite of its mistaken outlook, the CCP at the same time claimed for themselves the role of the 'vanguard' and the 'main force' of the national revolution in another manifesto published on the 1st July 1923.\textsuperscript{46}

Thus, taking into consideration all the major CCP pronouncements in their various journals as a whole since the 3rd CCP Congress, the KMT could not but feel that the CCP, in trying to join the KMT, really wanted to change the KMT into the communist image. It was true that the Chinese communists were talking earnestly about the need to have a thorough-going national revolution to rid the country of its imperialist and warlordist exploitations. They even agreed that a national revolution would need to be led by a kuo-min tang - a political party of the people of the nation - but, they also made no secret

\textsuperscript{46} Manifesto of the journal Ch'ien feng (Vanguard) 1-VII-1923. This was an official CCP organ and its Manifesto claimed to be the vanguard and main force of the national revolution and the KMT leader.
of their opinion that the KMT had lost its revolutionary elan and that many of its members had become stooges of the imperialists. Consequently, and because of the peculiar politico-economic conditions in China - being a semi-feudal and semi-capitalist society and at the same time exploited by international imperialism-capitalism - the party of the proletariat had to join forces with all nationalistic revolutionary elements to salvage the nation from further exploitation and to set it on the proper course of nation-building. In short, while the CCP would concede the 'leadership' to the KMT merely as a tactical manoeuvre, the communists had consistently maintained that they were the vanguards and they, being the party of the masses, knew the direction to the ultimate goal of the revolution.

The KMT, of course, disputed the communist interpretation of the ultimate goal of the revolution, hence the subsequent dispute over the role of leadership would be inevitable. During the intervening six months, from the 3rd CCP Congress in June-July 1923 to the KMT Congress in January 1924, there had not been any evidence of any change from the CCP on these issues. On the contrary, there was an intensification of the propaganda message. It is only to be expected that some senior members of the KMT decided not to accept the declaration of Li Ta-chao given

Contributors of No.1 of the Vanguard, including Ch'ü, Ch'en and Tsai all made such implications. Sun To's 'Chung-kuo kuo-min yü-n-tung chi h kuo-chü chi chiang-lai' (The Past & Future of China's National Movement) openly lamented the 'degeneration' of the KMT, Vanguard, 1 pp.2-9.
at the KMT Congress. In spite of the assurance given by Li, editor Ch'ü and his Jacobinical message must have aroused much concern. The response of the 'senior comrades' of the KMT to the collaboration with the CCP was one of unremitting opposition. Their main target was Ch'en Tu-hsiu. This was not unnatural for Ch'en was certainly the best known as well as the most prestigious and feared member of the CCP. As Ch'en himself recalled shortly after the break down of the collaboration, 'for almost a year, the KMT always sabotaged or resisted the movement for reorganization.'  

Just prior to the KMT Congress senior comrade Teng Tse-ju, head of the Kwangtung Branch of the KMT, led ten other senior comrades to present a secret submission to Sun Yat-sen on the 29th November 1923 as a last ditch attempt to stem the Red Tide.  

These senior comrades found that Ch'en's willingness to work with other warlords, such as Ch'en Chiung-ming, and the criticism the Communists had aimed at the KMT, Sun, and the Three Principles objectionable. In other words, it was not the 'exclusiveness' of the communist's tactics but his practical tactics that these senior KMT comrades objected to. Furthermore, these senior KMT men were of the opinion that Ch'en already had too much influence over the KMT. They had suspected that it was Ch'en who wrote the new KMT Constitution because the Party

---


49 Teng Tse-ju, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang erh-shih nien shih-chi (Historical records of the KMT in the past 20 years), pp.289-291 (Shanghai 1948).
Platform now included the two main communist slogans:

    Down with the imperialists.
    Down with the warlords.

These KMT senior members felt that to accept such slogans would alienate international support and sympathy as well as the really powerful centres and sources within China.

They also had foreboding concerning the pledge to democratize the KMT. As the office of Director-General, the title Sun held, was to be made elective, Teng and his like-minded comrades were afraid that 'with the vicissitudes of circumstances, five years from now, Ch'en Tu-hsiu probably will be elected as Director-General'. Their attitude really demonstrated the traditional cliquish mentality of these senior comrades as well as their contempt for the rank and file members of the party. Their fear of democratization, however, was not entirely without foundation. At the time of the Teng petition, the KMT had just had their first exercise in internal democratization. Canton City was divided into twelve districts in the re-structured Party and the members of each district elected their own district committee. The communists had some success in these district elections and the most noticeable success was T'an Ping-shan. As well as being the communist representative on the KMT's Acting Executive Committee, he was elected chairman of the 10th District.\(^50\)

---

\(^{50}\) For details, see Kuo-min-tang chou k'an (The KMT Weekly) No. 2 (2-XII-1923), p. 2. This was an official organ of the Acting Executive Committee of the KMT in Canton 1923.
However, Sun Yat-sen had no lack of confidence in his own control of the Party. While his reply avoided direct comment on the senior comrades' fear of communist subversion, Sun did explain to them the drafting of the KMT Constitution:

The Constitution was prepared by Borodin at my request and checked by myself. The original was in English and was translated into Chinese by Liao Chung-k'ai. Ch'en Tu-hsiu had no part in it.

For our discussion, however, it was Sun's explanation to his old comrades on their ideological doubts that is most pertinent. As the reply was a communication between comrades of long standing as well as being old friends and being of a confidential nature, we may regard this as a sincere attempt by Sun to explain his actions to his comrades.

Sun explained that 'essentially, there is really no difference between the Principle of People's Livelihood and Communism ... the Principle of Nationalism (Min-chu chu-i) is a timely remedy [for the ills of China] and not an obsolete relic of the past.' Sun further revealed that the Russians had 'ordered the Chinese communists to join the KMT' whereas the Chinese communists had wanted to monopolize Russian friendship. At the same time, Sun was confident that 'if the Russians want to co-operate with China she must co-operate with our Party and not with Ch'en Tu-hsiu'. He then assured his senior comrades

---

51 In 1912, Sun and his group dropped the Min-chu chu-i from his party's platform because prior to 1911 it was a slogan for their anti-Manchu sentiment and, by 1912, was considered no longer appropriate. This was taken up by the KMT after the establishment of the Canton Government. For sources of quotations, see Note 49 supra.
that 'if Ch'en disobey our Party, he will be ousted.'

Another prominent senior comrade who had reservations was Tai Chi-tao. His opposition to the CCP and his position within the KMT were quite unlike those of Teng and his fellow petitioners. Tai was versed in Marxism and was in the original Communist Unit founded by Ch'en in Shanghai in 1920 but, out of loyalty to Sun and his disbelief in the necessity for class struggle, he left the CCP. He was against co-operation with the Russians because he was against reliance on foreign loans and consequently declined to serve on the Acting Executive Committee of the KMT, which was in charge of the details of the re-organization of the KMT in 1923. However, he was prevailed upon to change his mind and attended the KMT Congress as well as accepting membership in the Central Executive Committee and headed the Propaganda Department. His biographer claimed that he tried to persuade the members of both the collaborating parties to work harmoniously towards the common goals. However, he left Canton in June 1924, possibly a victim of intra-party politics for he told Chiang Kai-shek that:

The old order has broken down, the new order has not yet been established. It is inevitable that each acts according to his will ... Since

---


a correct view cannot be reached, whence comes the tranquility?

However, Tai continued his anti-communist activities in Shanghai and returned to Canton to serve Chiang Kai-shek, after the death of Sun, as the leading anti-communist theoretician in the KMT.

Another senior comrade, Tsou Lu, who headed the Youth Department of the Party and the Presidency of the Kwangtung University made good use of his position to suppress communist activities and was particularly active in his efforts to counter the influence of the Socialist Youth Corps. Although he was unable to suppress entirely the communist activities in the University, he did much to extend patronage to the KMT students and brought over many to his anti-communist stance.54

Dissension was, however, quickly becoming more and more noticeable and open. By March 1924, Sun felt constrained to issue a circular instruction admonishing Party members that they had no individual freedom and must therefore observe Party principles and policies unconditionally.55 But, that was not to be an effective move. By June, his own son, Sun Fo, and another member of the Central Executive Committee, Huang Chi-lu, a Canadian-Chinese and staunch anti-communist, jointly submitted a proposal to the CEC to discipline the Chinese communists for

alleged illegal activities.56

Then, two weeks later, the Central Supervisory Committee of the KMT sought to impeach the CCP over what had been referred to as the so-called T'uan K'an case. The T'uan K'an was an official organ of the Socialist Youth Corps (SYC) and the offending issue was No. 7, dated the 11th April 1924. In this issue were the Manifesto and certain resolutions of the 2nd Congress of the Corps. The senior comrades who brought the charge of impeachment were Teng Tse-ju, Hsieh Ch'ih, and Chang Chi. While the first two had demonstrated their opposition to the collaboration from its beginning, Chang was the sponsor of Li Ta-chao in the latter's application to join the KMT and a long-time colleague of both Li and Ch'en dating back to the pre-republican days.

This case deserves careful consideration, not only for the interest it aroused at the time it occurred, but it was also an important landmark in the development of the Chinese communists' concept and attitude towards the national revolution and its leadership. There were also signs that this case was an outward expression of factional disputes within the KMT. Being an official impeachment, the CCP was obliged to put forward a defence, or at least to offer an explanation. This they did, most effectively. Not only were the leading communist theoreticians called upon to put forward a defence, but, as the

result of this challenge, the communist theoreticians took up even more explicit and determined stances over the issues of class and leadership in the national revolution.

The accusers of the CCP made much of the secretive nature of the T'uan K' an but judging from the allegedly offensive portion of the journal which the senior comrades of the KMT brought to the Party's attention, the CCP really had no need to keep those matters confidential. However, as that journal was available to members of the SYC, and as the offensive matters were resolutions and the Congress Manifesto, such a charge of a secretive act must have had other motivations.

Indeed, these offensive materials came to the notice of the Central Supervisory Committee of the KMT, a committee of 'senior comrades', via a devious course. Tseng Ch'i, who was the founder of the Chinese Youth Party, had secured the offensive materials from France and he immediately considered those materials a violation of the spirit of the collaboration. At that time, according to Tseng, Tsai Yuan-pei and Wang Ching-hui were also in France and he referred the materials to them asking them to bring them to the notice of Sun for action. To Tseng's annoyance, both Tsai and Wang not only refused to be intermediaries, but also held that the materials were not as damaging as Tseng thought they were. Thus rebuffed, Tseng sent the materials to Hsieh Ch'ih in Shanghai.57 Hsieh and Chang Chi agreed with Tseng. The

two senior comrades then gathered some of the materials they already had on the CCP and came to Canton to lodge impeachment proceedings against their collaborators on the 18th June 1924. These senior comrades objected to the SYC's resolutions calling on its members 'to assist the CCP in expanding the organization of the KMT throughout the country' especially because the CCP and the SYC wanted to 'propagandize the national revolution amongst the toiling masses on a scale so large as to expand the national-revolutionary KMT'. These senior comrades also found it particularly objectionable that these Resolutions called on the individual SY to 'work in unison with the members of the CCP both in words and deeds,' and, at all times, tried to 'maintain the independence and rigid organization of the SYC' from other youth organizations.

As with their elders, the SYC were also prone to publicize their strategy and this also made the senior comrades in the KMT worry enough to conclude that their worst fears had materialized. Amongst the strategical instructions which proved objectionable were, firstly, work at all times in cohesion with the CCP and to draw the KMT closer to the Soviet Union and away from the greedy and wily imperialists. Secondly, in matters of propaganda, the YSC pledged to emphasize political propaganda amongst the masses while hoping that in so doing, they would prevent the KMT from indulging in its penchant to rely on military action as well as mere reformism in social, especially labour and agricultural, matters. At the same time, the SYC would work to ensure that in their political propaganda, the
forces of the national revolution would not make compromises with
the imperialists and warlords.

As these admonitions to the SY were carefully worded so as
to appear that they were not urging disobedience towards the KMT
directives but to work towards ensuring that the KMT would
continue in an acceptable (to the communists) revolutionary
track, the senior comrades really had no case to effect an
impeachment of their new collaborators. After all anti-
imperialism and anti-warlords as well as a better socio-economic
condition for the masses were slogans and programmes that formed
integral parts of the Three Principles of Sun. On the other
hand, in spite of the presence of these ideas in Sun's Principles,
the Chinese communists' conception of these programmes were
certainly different because they saw the development of the
national revolution in class terms - as a series of class
struggles involving temporary alliances of the proletariat and
other classes in order to overcome certain obstacles of history.

These senior comrades also charged that the communists, in
spite of Li Ta-chao's explanation at the KMT Congress, were still
forming a 'party within a party' and this, these zealous KMT
comrades contended, constituted a violation of the terms of
admission into the KMT. However, apart from the lack of logic
in this argument, this charge really amounted to a denial of the
agreement made between Sun and Joffe as well as the new KMT
Constitution. As the communists were admitted to the KMT as
individuals without their renunciation of their CCP membership,
it therefore implied that the terms of admission permitted the
communists to continue membership in the CCP which would involve,
of course, the receipt of instructions from the CCP. There was no demand on the communists that while they were in the KMT they must not associate with each other, provided that they would act to realize the policies of the KMT as stated in its platform and not to flout party discipline. Of course, this provision would not preclude the communists having different interpretations as well as having varying degrees of emphasis on the various planks of the platform and their intentions. Nevertheless, the unity of action by members of the CCP within the KMT did not constitute a violation of the admission agreement between the two parties.

As well as trying to impeach the CCP, Hsieh Ch'ih, Chang Chi, and Sun Fo went to see Borodin demanding an explanation. Borodin, when shown the offending materials, claimed he had not seen them previously. However, when questioned whether there should be a 'party within a party', Borodin replied:

That a political party should have factions is inevitable. However, the Party's (i.e. KMT) CEC cannot realistically be regarded as the "centre" of the party. Therefore, it is natural that within the Party there will be

---


59 Subsequent conversation revealed that Borodin knew of the actions of the SYC but he was technically correct in that he could not read Chinese. Jen Yu-wen, who met Borodin when the latter was on his way home in 1927 whilst passing through Feng Yu-hsiang's territory, confirmed in a personal interview that Borodin had no Chinese. Jen was Feng's Foreign Affairs Commissioner.

60 In stating that the CCP was the Leftwing of the KMT, Borodin was stating a position not in conformity with the Chinese's own view, as will be demonstrated.
factions, and will have Left-wing and Right-wing divisions. For instance, Fang Jui-lun's group and their Manifesto on Sino-soviet relations may be regarded as the Right-wing and the Communist Party the Left-wing.

He further defended the CCP actions by accusing the KMT of lacking in resolution almost immediately after the January Congress. Therefore, Borodin explained, 'the CCP ... on seeing that the CEC of the KMT could not exert any uplifting efforts as well as seeing so many Right-wingers in its midst, could not but organize a corps within the Party'. He reiterated that the Comintern was of the opinion that in the Chinese revolution only the KMT Constitution was to be used and not any other ideology. 'Hence if any member of the CCP or SYC, upon joining the KMT, would not obey this order then that member will be regarded as having disobeyed orders.'

Such circumlocution would hardly be expected to pacify the senior comrades, especially when Borodin also told them that:

The KMT is dead, it can no longer be regarded as a political party. We can only speak of KMT members and cannot talk of the KMT as a party. With the entry of new members, such as the communists and their forming of organizations and party groups, the old party members' competitive spirit may be aroused and the Party may thus be resuscitated.

The senior comrades stoutly argued that the CCP and the KMT were two separate parties and not two factions. However, Borodin showed much confidence and challenged his visitors that if the
majority wished to do so then they were free to expel the CCP members from the KMT.

Borodin, who was appointed by Sun to the position of Senior Advisor, not only stood his grounds at the onslaught of the senior comrades, but had also demonstrated that his confidence in his judgement of the political situation was well placed. Sun could not afford to do without the help of the Soviet Union and, consequently, was very irritated and embarrassed by this impeachment attempt. When Chang Chi took the case to Sun in a personal interview, Chang not only failed to convince Sun of the dangers of harbouring communists in the KMT but he was also strongly reproached by the leader. Worst of all, these senior comrades, Chang and Hsieh, had to endure a pronouncement from Sun which, as much as anything else, had endeared Sun to the communist cause. It was at this confrontation that Sun was reported to have told his visitors that

If you do not approve [of the communists' entry into the KMT] I may dissolve the KMT and join the CCP myself.

Though these senior comrades clearly lost this battle, they were determined not to lose the war. They soon returned to

---

Shanghai after their failure in attempting to persuade Sun to change his mind. However that failure only spurred them on to redouble their efforts. They rallied like-minded comrades together as soon as they returned to Shanghai and continued their agitation. They also made great efforts to strengthen their case for impeachment, and for the next round of the confrontation. As an official request for the impeachment of the CCP had been made, the case had to be heard and discussed by the CEC of the KMT and there obtain the final decision. The senior comrades marshalled their resources and obtained new evidence while the communists, who had stood their ground during the proceedings to date, took the offensive. They called on all their best theoreticians to state their case.

The case was taken up during the 4th conference of the CEC of the KMT which commenced on the 3rd July 1924. On the 7th July, a manifesto was issued over the names of Shao Yuan-ch'ing and Wang Ching-wei in which the acceptance of the communists was re-affirmed. It proclaimed that the Three Principles of Sun were 'the sole foundation for the Chinese revolutionary movement ... therefore whoever has revolutionary courage and determination, and espouses the Three Principles, regardless of which party one formerly belonged to, one is sincerely invited to join the Party.' Then, without naming any person, it went on to chide those making allegations against the communists, saying that to harbour such

---

suspicion would create 'psychological barriers' between members of the KMT. While it promised a plenary session of the CEC to 'reach a thorough solution', it also re-affirmed that 'since our Party shoulders the mission of the Chinese revolution, it is necessary to rally all the revolutionary elements in the whole country. Therefore, the criteria for membership depend on whether their speech and conduct are in agreement with the principles, the platform, and the regulations of the Party regardless of their past affiliation.'

Thus, it is obvious that this oracular manifesto cannot be expected to soothe the friction between the ideological factions, for, once again, it left undefined the contested meaning of such vague terms as Democracy or People's Livelihood. Indeed, this decision still implicitly permitted the communists to continue with their own definition of the People. Furthermore, it did not preclude the communist contention that the national revolution was but a stage in the total revolutionary process of the 'people'.

The Second Plenum of the CEC of the KMT was scheduled for the 15th August 1924. However, before allowing the impeachment to be thoroughly studied, Sun consolidated the organizational structure of his Party through the establishment of a Political Council on the 11th July. The Council was intended to amalgamate the Party's functional and policy-making aspects into

---

63 There are many versions on the council. Lo Chia-lun, Op.cit., p.722 listed names and some details and his study was based on Council minutes. Wilbur and How, Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisors in China, 1918-1927, p.152 (NY 1956); T'ang Leang-li, Foundation of Modern China, p.169 (Lon. 1928) have slightly different accounts, especially on the number of members.
one organ. It was, in the manner of Lenin's concept of
democratic centralism, to be 'responsible' to the CEC on matters
of party affairs but it was empowered to act first then report
back to the CEC for ratification. It was also to be the
executive conduit for political and diplomatic decisions of Sun.
It consisted of seven members with Sun as chairman and Borodin
as senior advisor but not officially a member. Tan P'ing-shan
was the CCP member on the council but was soon replaced by Ch'u
Ch'iu-pai. As there was no provision for such a council in the
Party Constitution, its establishment meant that its authority
depended on Sun. It also implied that the constitution might be
tampered with by the party leader, or whoever happened to possess
the necessary power to assert the authority. It may be argued
that the arrangement suited the putschist mentality of the
Russian Bolsheviks and Borodin certainly made good use of it.
In its first meeting, it resolved to appoint Kan Nai-kuang, Ku
Ying-fen, and P'eng P'ai as agricultural investigators, with
Borodin as their advisers. At that time, and indeed all through
the collaboration to 1927, Kan was a 'leftist' with views on the
peasant movement almost identical to those of the communists'  

At the Second Plenum, the senior comrades found themselves
thoroughly defeated by the rhetoric and logic of the young CCP
representative, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai who was then only twenty-five
years old but already made a member of the Political Council of
the KMT as well as the Central Committee of the CCP. In the end,

---

64 See Kan's speech On the Beginnings of the Peasant Movement (Nung-min yin-tung | ch'u-pu) to the Political Education class at the Chungshan University. (Canton, 1927)
the Plenary Session of the CEC resolved that 'those whose conduct violates party regulations, and who are unwilling to engage in the revolutionary movement of the Three Principles, or do not oppose the warlords and imperialism, or do not support the toiling masses, regardless of what school of thought they might espouse, must be disciplined by the Party'.

To make the rout of the senior comrades complete, the resolution actually affirmed the historical conception of the communists. And, if one is to regard this resolution as the orthodox interpretation of Sun's Three Principles of the People, then the opponents of the communists had every need to institute bodies such as the Society for the Study of Sun Yat-senism after the death of the Director-General. And, taking such a perspective, theoreticians of this ilk, such as Tai Ch'i-tao, may be regarded as the founders of Sun Yat-sen-revisionism. If the anti-communists in the KMT later became 'revisionists' it was at least partly because the Second Plenary Session of the CEC resolved to accept a materialistic conception of history: it asserted that

The communists are the proletariat in the growing Chinese industrialized society. They are also a part of the political organization that has emerged from the natural class struggle. Even if

---

65 The text of the Resolution was published in Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang chung-yao hushan-yen hs'in-ling chi, p.82. (Important Declarations and Instructions of the KMT of China, n.p. Dec. 1925, published by the Political Department of the Military Academy of the KMT. Chou En-lai was then the Head of the Department.)

66 Ibid.
we could dissolve the existing Chinese Communist Party by human force, it does not follow that the Chinese proletariat can be exterminated, for surely they will be organized again.

Later, much later, it was alleged that Sun allowed such a resolution to go through because of tactical reasons. It was alleged that privately, Sun's real feeling was that 'in the circumstance, the only way to deter the Chinese communists from inciting class conflicts and sabotage to the national revolution was to place them under the leadership of the KMT and subject them to the Party's unified direction. ... so that, by the time the Northern Expedition was successfully completed and the Three Principles carried out according to schedule, it would then be too late for the Chinese communists to disrupt the national revolution even if they should so try.'

However, only a person as devious and as ignorant of the 'schedules' of the Three Principles as Chiang Kai-shek would fabricate such an explanation thirty-three years after the event. According to the schedules of the Three Principles, after the military liberation of the country by the defeating of the warlords and imperialists, there would come an indefinite period of party tutelage. Besides, one does not deter the incitement of class conflict by resolving to admit that class struggle is a natural historic phenomenon, and that the CCP is the political party of the proletariat.

67 Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, pp.24-25 (N.Y. 1957). Chiang's implication was that he was the trusted confidant of Sun.
Judging from the available records of that fateful Plenary Session, the more likely explanation was that the gathered dignitaries, even if they were strongly anti-communist, could not find any adequate argument to counter the brilliant defence put up by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai. On the other hand, if what Sun had in mind was in fact what Chiang alleged that Sun had informed him, then Sun's strategy would not succeed for Ch'en Tu-hsiu seemed to have the same strategy in mind when he agreed to the collaboration. In April 1923, when Ch'en was offering a prescription to defeat the warlords, he recommended a unified democratic national revolutionary front of all classes who were against the exploits of the imperialists, warlords, and compradors. However, he insisted that in this united national movement the labouring classes were not only the ones demanding 'real democracy' but also the most powerful, determined and forceful element in the struggle for real democracy. Thus, 'not only is the labouring classes - lao-tung - the important element but is already the bravest vanguard.' He then claimed that the workers' actions in recent times, such as the February 7th Incident, had demonstrated the workers' willingness to struggle for min ch'üan (Sun's term for Democracy) on behalf of the Chinese people.

However, a little later, after the 3rd CCP Congress Manifesto claimed that the KMT 'should have been the leaders of the national revolution' and Ch'en himself led the CCP to

68 Ch'en, 'Ts'en-mo ta tao chün-fa' (How to Overthrow Warlords). Hsiang Tao, No.21 (18-IV-1923) pp.152-4.
participate in the KMT, Ch'en was alleged by his erstwhile comrade Chou Fo-hai to have adopted the strategy of:

Firstly, make use of the cover of the KMT to expand CCP activities. If we openly use the name of the CCP, we may frighten away the people. Then, we will communize the KMT. Once we gain membership we can obtain, in the KMT, positions of power and change its policies. While nominally retaining the name of the KMT we will effectively annihilate the party.

Writing in 1927, the ex-communist Chou Fo-hai was probably anxious to demonstrate that he indeed had a fan-shen - turn over the body - but, as far as Ch'en was concerned, he was really saying nothing more than what he did when he first went to Canton to serve as education commissioner for Ch'en Chiang-ming. He was always the practical revolutionary.

By August 1924, the Chinese communists no longer needed to hide their intentions and identity, at least in the CEC of the KMT. To be sure, as any reader of the many CCP journals would know, the CCP had never been hesitant in announcing to the world their ultimate goal and their strategy in obtaining that goal, even on the eve of the KMT Congress. Eight months later, the CEC of the KMT, through the influence of communist participation had come to perceive class struggle as natural and an integral part of socio-political development, and that the existence of a

---

party of the proletariat as an inevitable development of history. In short, the decision of the Second Plenary Session meant that the KMT leadership at that particular time shared with the communists the communist perception of the national revolution. That is, the KMT's decision meant the admission that during the national revolution - a struggle against imperialism and its stooges to regain national independence - the proletariat would rise, and be led by their own party, a communist party, to continue the social struggle against, and then to overcome capitalism thus fulfilling the natural and historic role of the proletariat as a social class. It would certainly be wrong to imagine that such a deterministic and materialist conception of history was the unanimous view of the KMT. By the same token, one may be permitted to suggest that in obtaining this resolution from the CEC and thus defeating the clumsy attempt at impeachment, the CCP, especially Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, were effectively intensifying the class struggle and the conflict potential between the CCP and the KMT, and within the KMT itself.

Events in August 1924 may be taken as expressions of a series of attempts by the Chinese communists to test their strategy of dialectical materialism. In this instance, they may be taken as attempts to test the contradictions within the KMT and to split it into two. If the KMT members who kept a watchful brief over the activities of the CCP had read the various communist journals carefully - the impeachment attempt, based as it was on the published materials of the CCP, suggested that these communist journals were carefully read - then, they would be left in no doubt that the communists had not only adopted the
materialistic conception of history but materialistic dialectics as their world-view (yü-chou-kuan) and philosophy-of-life (jen-sheng-kuan).

On 1st August, in the midst of the impeachment incident, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, the newly appointed CCP member of the Political Council who also held the position of an alternate-member of the CEC of the KMT, published a statement on his revolutionary philosophy. In it, Ch'ü argued that the world-view and philosophy-of-life in each age and period reflected a class background. Thus, he explained, that the development of pragmatism after the May 4th Movement was not accidental. It was then a period during which the patriarchal society in China was very much shaken under the attack of international capitalism. The people, in looking for a new philosophy of life and world-view suitable for the new conditions found pragmatism suited to the needs of the day. 'This marked the development of the intellectual revolution of the "Third Estate". But whether pragmatism now holds a revolutionary position in European and American intellectual circles is a doubtful matter.'

Then, bringing back the debate conducted by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao and Hu Shih in 1919, Ch'ü said that the slogan 'More studies on Problems and less discourses on Isms' had little intrinsic value and its suitability depended on time and place. 'If it is used by China's Third Estate to resist the oppression

---

70 Ch'ü 'Shih-yen chu-i yü ke-ming che-hsüeh' (Pragmatism and Revolutionary Philosophy), HCN Quarterly No.3 (1-VIII-1924), pp.10-16.
71 Ibid., pp.10-11.
of the warlords, then it is a revolutionary concept of action. In Europe and America, the capitalists are using it to deal with the actions from the labouring class, there it is reactionary.'

On the other hand, it would be a mistake to treat this line of argument by Ch'ü as coming to the defence of the pragmatists. In fact, he took the debate a step further than where Ch'en and Li left off. Ch'ü argued that it would be a misconception of history to think that because China was a backward nation and thus in need of scientific knowledge that pragmatism should be the philosophy-of-life (jen-sheng-kuan). While pragmatism might be a good method for the acquisition of scientific knowledge, it had little value as a precept to live by because it had little to do with the realities of life and human needs.

Indeed, as Ch'ü saw it, pragmatism as a world-view has no absolute nor objective reality for it was but a subjective and idealistic world-view. Therefore, he argued that what the pragmatist thought as truth would, to him, a communist, be merely expedience. 'The aims and desires in real life depend entirely on what we decide as beneficial or profitable. Thus, according to pragmatism, seeing that the important criterion is profit and that profit means different things to different people, the pragmatist can only say that: as there are many types of profit there will be many types of truth.'

72 Ibid., p.11.
73 The debate was conducted in the pages of Mei-chou ping-lun (Weekly Review), founded by Ch'en and edited, in turn by Ch'en until his imprisonment, then Li until he had to flee, and Hu who finally stopped it. The Debate was in Nos.31-37 (20-VII to 31-VII-1919).
74 Ibid., pp.14-5.
He then went on to explain that while some might see in the above some resemblance to Marxist materialistic dialectics, to the Marxist, the difference could not be more distinct. He explained that as a Marxist he realized that one's perspective of the world, and one's conception on what is beneficial and profitable depended on one's contact with the external. In short, one's attitude depended on one's social class. **Pragmatism** then might be a useful tool for class struggle in defending class interest but it would be in no position to discern the truth. Indeed, 'the spirit of **pragmatism** (that is, as a tool) is already included in materialistic dialectics... **Pragmatism**, therefore, can only recognize what is profitable as truth. As a means of social understanding, it can only point myopically to compromises. It is not a revolutionary philosophy'.

What Ch'ü was putting forward, in the midst of the impeachment case, was that the KMT senior comrades might choose to see the world through different perspectives from the ones the communists would prefer, but, if one would still insist on being a revolutionary, one simply could not afford the luxury of looking at the world and judging it with outdated criteria. In linking the anti-communists with Hu Shih, though without naming the latter, Ch'ü was, in fact, accusing the anti-communist senior comrades of being too willing to effect compromises with the Northern warlords and rejecting the revolutionary ideology, as Hu was doing.

---

Editor Ch'ü demonstrated his fighting spirit by pressing on with this ideological attack and publishing three more articles in the same issue on the same theme. One of the articles was by Ch'en. He mentioned Hu Shih by name and bracketed him with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Chang Chun-mai as voices from the past defending reactionary ideas. Then, pushing the theme further, the two contributions by Chiang Hsieh-seng argued that the social reconstruction which the proletariat were now engaged in were more than merely a question of bread but involved the struggles to open new roads for human culture.

Indeed, this series of articles were aiming at targets larger and more important than the senior comrades. In effect, they may be regarded as the first official CCP response to the lectures of Sun Yat-sen. In his lectures on Min-sheng chu-i, or People's Livelihood, Sun explicitly denied the necessity for class struggle and Marxist materialism. Instead, Sun saw 'social evolution ... [in] ... social and industrial reforms.' However, the alternative proposed by Sun cannot be regarded as systematic, and Ch'ü and his comrades must have wondered what their

---

76 They are: Ch'en Tu-hsiu 'Ta Chang Chur-mai chi Liang Jen-kung' (Replies to Chang Chur-mai and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao), pp.1-10. Chiang Hsieh-seng, 'Wo-chanchieh-chi ke-ming yu wen-fa' (The Proletariat Revolution and culture) pp.16-22 and his 'Wei-wu shih-kuan tui jen-lei she-hui li-shih fa-chan ti chieh-shih' (The Development of Human Social History as Explained by the Materialistic Conception of History) pp.22-38. HCN Quarterly No.3 (1-VIII-1924).

77 San-min chu-i. The edition used is the 1962 edition published by Hai-wai in Taipei. It includes the six lectures each on Min-chu and Min-ch'üan and the four on Min-sheng as well as Chiang Kai-shek's Supplementary talks on Min-sheng. This quote is from p.195, Lecture 1 of Min-sheng.
Director-General had in mind. On one hand, Sun spoke of 'destroying the merchants' for their profit making and mentioned that the solution or method for this destruction was to enlighten the people and urge them to develop co-operatives. And yet, he would say:

What our KMT propose is *Min-sheng chu-i*. It is not only the highest ideal but also the motive force of society and the centre of all historical movements. If *Min-sheng chu-i* can be brought into practice, then social problems will be solved, and if social problems can be solved, mankind may then enjoy great felicity.

Today, we will distinguish between communism and *Min-sheng chu-i*. We may say that communism is the ideal of *Min-sheng* and *Min-sheng chu-i* is communism in practice. The two ideologies - *chi-i* - do not have many differences. What needs to be distinguished is method.

No Leninist, especially those urging a Jacobinical method of action would accept such interpretations of history nor such solutions to social problems, nor indeed such views of social problems. Sun not only denied the existence of capitalists in China, on the grounds that by comparison to the major capitalists in America and Europe the Chinese variety would be poor men, but also - even at this late stage - insisted on the

---

78 Ibid., p.203; Lecture 1, *Min-sheng*.


necessity for using foreign capital to develop Chinese industries.\textsuperscript{81}

In reply, the communist writer wrote, rather pointedly, that\textsuperscript{82}

Some say China can avoid class struggle and can walk a felicitous road, that China has not been proletarianized and that there is no distinction between the labouring class and the capitalist class, and hence it is not suitable to discuss communism in China. While it may be good to harbour such wishes, recent history has clearly demonstrated such wishes and talks as fallacious.

Then, to demonstrate that capitalism and class struggle had already occurred and was still happening in China, Chiang Hsieh-seng listed the Hong Kong Seamen's Strike, the Railways incidents and the various disputes, which often resulted in deaths, in the various types of factories. Then, Chiang added:

I can resolutely say: China now has capitalism and China now has class struggle. In future, China will have a proletarian revolution. This is not just my individual desire but an objective and materialistic tendency.

Then, directly denying the Sun-styled linkage between Min-sheng and communism, Chiang replied:\textsuperscript{83}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{81} Ibid., p.222, Lecture 2, Min-sheng.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Chiang Hsieh-seng, Op.cit., p.37.
\end{itemize}
The power to produce is the motive force of human social development but until the productive power reaches its highest point, then the process of development cannot but have class differentiations. The existence of class will lead to class struggle and the final step of class struggle is the destruction of classes. This is the law of the development of human society. The proletariat will be victorious over the capitalists and will destroy the system of private ownership and then build a communist society.

As these were the views of the communists at the beginning of August, the resolution of the CEC of the KMT may thus be regarded as a resounding communist success. To achieve this success, editor Ch'u did not leave it to the power of persuasion of his journal but personally devastated the anti-communists, albeit with an argument bordering on sophistry. He argued that methodologically speaking the two parties were in basic agreement for both advocated revolutionary dictatorship. Ch'u argued, not without reason, that the period of Tutelage was in fact another name for revolutionary dictatorship and that even the KMT senior comrades would not deny that during this period, the aim of the Party would be to develop the nation economically without the rise of capitalism, as would be the case in a bourgeois revolution without party dictatorship.

As to the question of the communists working in the KMT, Ch'u argued that the communists were concentrating their efforts on the workers and peasants - party of the common people (p'ing-min). Ch'u argued that it was also the expressed desire
of the KMT to have these people joining the national revolution. Hence, the communist propaganda must be regarded as part of the total propaganda for the national revolution. Though the KMT's propaganda would not include class struggle as the communists were doing, Ch'ü said that both parties agreed that the workers and peasants needed to be awakened to the national needs. To Ch'ü, this awakening was the awakening to class consciousness, otherwise these classes would not join the national revolution.

Then, making use of Sun's expressed aim to eliminate capitalism, Ch'ü explained that the two parties were really very similar. Both anti-imperialist, anti-warlord, against class exploitation, both also wanted to eliminate capitalism, and both were trying to build a classless society of all the people. The elimination of capitalism implied that capitalists were not allowed to enjoy privileges of the Society of All people - ch'üan-min she-hui. Hence, Ch'ü claimed that the CCP was really helping the KMT to expedite the achievement of their shared goals. He then apologized for the rough wording that might have been used in the communists' various writings, but explained that they were really indicative of the eagerness of the communists in their anti-imperialist and anti-warlord endeavours. 84

84 From the Statement by Ch'ü given to the 2nd Plenum of the CEC of the KMT, on the 19-20 Aug. 1924. The original is in the KMT archives in Taiwan. I have a xerox copy, in my possession, of the minutes of the Plenum in which Ch'ü's speech is included. My source for this copy is confidential.
That speech by Ch'ü at the CEC of the KMT, while it gained the young communist the CEC resolution which suited the CCP line, also gained him the hatred of the Shanghai-based senior comrades. They totally forsook their comradely spirit and resorted to violence. At the October 10 National Day of that year in Shanghai, a meeting was sponsored by the KMT to celebrate the anniversary of the 1911 Revolution. It seemed that plans were made to assassinate Ch'ü who was one of the scheduled speakers at the celebration. Fortunately, he received warning of the plan while he was on his way to the meeting. While he escaped unhurt, one of his students at the Shanghai University was beaten to death. The police of the French and British Concessions were tipped off and they searched his residence, confiscated his books and forced him to go underground for a while.

In seeking the aid of the imperialists to attack their communist collaborators, these anti-communist KMT members had demonstrated that they were more anti-communist than anti-imperialist or anti-warlord. From then on, instead of

---

85 Yang Chih-hua (Mrs. Ch'ü), 'Recollections about Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai' (I Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai), Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao VIII (VII-1958), pp.30-31. This is admitted by KMT historian, Li Yun-han, Ts'ung jung-kung tao ch'ing-tang (From the Admittance of the Communists to the Purification of the Party) I, 331 (Taipei, 1966). Li called it an unfortunate incident by some KMT members who could not control their anti-communism.

86 Ch'ü was teaching in that university's Sociology Department. It was jointly run by the KMT and CCP. See also Hsiang Tao No.87 (15-X-1924), pp.716-720.

87 See Teng Chung-hsia and others in Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien No.50 (18-X-1924).
retreating, the Chinese communists had made anti-imperialism and anti-warlordism the twin test for loyalty to the cause of the national revolution.

However, the plot to murder Ch'ü was more than merely an attempt by sections of the KMT to silence a brilliant adversary. There were powerful forces within the KMT which were pushing the party, and the national revolution, in a direction against the one which the communists would want to go. In his address to the CEC of the KMT, Ch'ü defended the various slogans adopted by the SYC for the national revolution. Amongst the slogans mentioned in his speech was:

- Prevent the KMT from forming an Alliance with the Feng (-tien)-Che (-kiang) Militarists; and Prevent the KMT [from adopting] Reformist Labour [policies].

While the communists were really quite confident that they would have the trade unionists backing them, the penchant of the KMT leadership for forming alliances with warlords did worry them. At the same time, the effectiveness of the communist propaganda also worried the KMT, for both parties had very similar targets for the propaganda.

The significance and the communists' insistence (as well as the denial by the senior comrades of the KMT) on the importance of the proletariat leadership of the national revolution, the necessity for class struggle during the national revolution, as well as the anti-warlord slogans can be clearly

---

88 Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Speech at the 2nd Plenum of the CEC of the KMT, 19-20 August 1924, p.7 (of the original transcript).
perceived if this debate between Ch'ü and the KMT can be seen against the background of the military-political situation of China at the time. The second Chihli-Fengtien war was on the horizon. The KMT had hoped to gain from the trial of strength between the Chihli clique of Ts'ao K'un and Wu P'ei-fu and the Fengtien clique of Chang Tso-lin and Tuan Ch'i-jui, by siding with the latter. When the impeachment was in progress, the negotiation between Sun Yat-sen, Chang Tso-lin, and the latter's colleague in Chekiang, Lü Yüng-hsiang was also in progress. The immediate theatre of action was the conflict between the Chekiang tuchun, Lü and his counter-part in Kiangsu, Ch'i Hsien-yuan and Sun Ch'uan-fang of the Chihli clique. The Kiangsu-Chekiang War broke out on the 3 September and by the 15th September, Chang Tso-lin marched his troops on to Shanhaikwan and the Second Chihli-Fengtien War broke out. On the 18th September, Sun Yat-sen, as if to insist on demonstrating his preference for militaristic methods to reliance on the masses, issued his Northern Expedition Manifesto and led his troops to Shaokwan in northern Kwangtung province.

Indeed, as the impeachment process was in progress, the Chinese communists were to see their collaborators sending no less a personage than the Director-General's own son, Sun Fo, to Fengtien to meet the sons of Chang Tso-lin and Lü Jüng-hsiang, that is, Ching Hsüeh-liang and Lü Shao-chia. This was the so-called Meeting of the Three Crown Princes - San tai-tse
The result of the Fengtien negotiation was the Triangular Alliance. But, Sun Yat-sen, who had taken on the grandiose title of Generalissimo after Ts'ao K'un became the president, was angling for yet another partner - Feng Yu-hsiang. Sun sent his brother-in-law, H.H. Kung, to Feng who had earlier held back when Sun's first emissary Hsü Ch'ien failed to win the Christian General over. Brother-in-law Kung was more successful especially when Feng was able to see, after the commencement of hostilities, what his participation might achieve.

If the Chinese communists found such negotiations between their collaborators and the various warlords distasteful, they must have been even more concerned to know that Senior Advisor and Comintern comrade, Borodin, not only approved of these negotiations but encouraged them. However, they were not deterred. Instead of following the example of Borodin, the Chinese communists redoubled their efforts in their anti-imperialist and anti-warlord propaganda.
All the leading propagandists of the CCP were active during this period. Party leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu vehemently denied that the socialists - meaning the CCP - were the Leftwing of the KMT, as Borodin had suggested. He insisted that the 'revolution of the KMT will only benefit the capitalist class' because of the semi-colonial conditions in China and the necessity to liberate the country from the exploitations of the imperialists, the working classes and the capitalists had to work together. Thus, Ch'en strongly advised the KMT and its capitalists not to forget the interests of the working classes. He then explained what his party's intentions were in the present state of 'party co-operation':

1. The various classes co-operate but not amalgamate because classes do not amalgamate.

2. The national revolution is a political co-operation, not a compromise or co-operation between capital and labour because economically speaking, the two classes have no common ground for co-operation.

He then warned the KMT that while they should strive hard to liberate the Chinese capitalist class from the exploitations of

---

93 Ch'en, 'Kuo-min-tang tso-yu-p'ai chih chen i-i' (The true Meaning of the Left and Right wings of the KMT) Hsiang Tao No.62 (23-IV-1924) pp.495-6.


95 Ch'en, Ibid., p.568.
the foreigners, they must not sacrifice the interests of the working classes in this struggle. If the KMT ever forget this, then not only would the liberation of the capitalists fail but the KMT would also alienate the most powerful forces of the national revolution, and the most revolutionary forces - the workers and the peasants.

As to the various Great Powers, Ch'en not only attacked the actions of the British and American governments but the Japanese as well. Indeed, during this period when the KMT were seeking an alliance with the Japanese-backed Chang Tso-lin and Tuan Ch'i-jui, Ch'en did not spare either. Then, while young Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai attended the CEC of the KMT to deliver a personal rebuttal against the charges of the 'senior comrades', Ch'en also published a long reply to the charges contained in the impeachment incident. He naturally denied the accusation that the communists were sabotaging the national revolution. On the contrary, he accused the accusers of being disloyal to the ideals of the national revolution. Indeed, he claimed that the entire impeachment exercise was really a factional fight between the Left and Right wings of the KMT, between the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary factions.

96 Ch'en in Hsiang Tao, see Nos.73, 75, 76, 79 (9, 23, 30 VII and 20-VIII-1924 when he attacked the U.K., U.S.A., and France. In Nos.73, 77, 79 he singled out Japan for criticism. On many occasions he simply made no distinction between the Europeans, Americans, and Japanese.

97 Ch'en 'Wo-men ti hui-ta' (Our Reply) Hsiang Tao, No.83, pp.673-678. (17-IX-1924, that is, two days before Ch'ü's appearance at the CEC of the KMT).
With the party leader taking the lead, the other Chinese communist writers took up the call energetically. P'eng Shu-chih, a product of the KUTV, was probably the most abrasive. While not all members of his party would care to use the same words P'eng used, his position gave his words added importance. He had taken over the editorship of the Hsiang Tao from Ts'ai. He claimed that since the 1911 Revolution, most of the truly revolutionary elements were already dead, and that 'since 1911 the KMT, apart from Sun Yat-sen and one or two leaders, 99% are compromisers ... and self-servers'. As with the other communist writers, P'eng viewed the war as being master-minded by Japan and France on the side of the Fentien Clique and the U.S.A. on the side of the Chihli Clique. Thus, he urged his readers not only to regard the conflict as merely a fight between warlords, or even warlord factions backed by foreign Powers, but also as an example of imperialism in action. He then called on the people to rise up and eliminate imperialism and the warlords.

The CCP issued their Third Manifesto on the Contemporary Situation in China, which also saw the conflict in terms of the various imperialists trying to extend their power and influence while spilling Chinese blood in the process. It also

---

98 Peng Shu-chih, 'Kuo-min-tang yu-pai fan ke-ming ti ching-chi pei-ching' (The Economic Background of the counter-revolutionary KMT Right-wing), Hsiang Tao, No.82, pp.665-666 (10-IX-1924).
100 See Hsiang Tao, No.82, pp.657-660 (10-IX-1924).
denied the validity of a slogan then used by many in the KMT: 'To oppose the Chihli Clique is to fight for the nation and the people'. Instead, the Manifesto argued that to be really 'for the nation and the people' in the struggle for national liberation demanded the slogans of: anti-imperialism and anti-warlordism. The Manifesto counselled against any 'peace talks' with the warlords and urged the people to unite and overthrow the murderous warlords and all imperialism - Japanese, French, American, British, etc.

Indeed, Ch'en, P'eng, Ts'ai Ho-sen, Kao Ch'un-yu, and Chang Tai-lei urged the national revolutionary movement to adopt the spirit of the Boxers and oppose all forms of imperialism. Labour organiser Teng Chung-hsia angrily warned the leaders of the KMT to stop flirting with the warlords, whether regional ones like Lu or major ones like Chang Tso-lin. He warned that unless the leadership would quickly repair the damage which the Rightwing of the KMT was doing to the party, the KMT would be unfit to fulfil its task in the national revolution. He then reminded the KMT that according to the party constitution adopted at the January Congress, the task of the national revolution was 'anti-imperialism and anti-warlordism' and not to seek liaison with them.

---

101 Hsiang Tao No.81 (3-IX-1924) was a special issue on the Boxers Rebellion in which all the CCP leading members contributed. 102 Teng Chung-hsia, 'T'ung-chih Huang Jen ti szu' (The Death of Comrade Huang Jen) Chung-kuo ch'ang-nien, No.50, pp.1-3 (18-X-1924). This journal was published by the Socialist Youth Corps.
Unfortunately for Sun, in spite of all his scheming and liaison with the Fengtien factions as well as manifesto-issuing, no sooner had he set up new headquarters in Shaokuan as his forward command for his Northern Expedition, than he found that his home base was under attack. This was the so-called Revolt of the Shang-tuan, the Merchant Corps, when violence broke out in Canton on the 10th October 1924.

This was led by Ch'en Lien-po, the comprador of the British-owned Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and also linked with the resurgence of the forces of Ch'en Chiung-ming who was in league with the Chihli Clique. Ch'en Lien-po, who was also the president of the Canton Chamber of Commerce, was urged on by the British Consulate in Canton to form a Merchant Defence Guard and then a government to replace the National Government of Sun. However, when a shipment of nine thousand rifles and machine guns arrived on board a Norwegian steamer at Canton, they were seized by Sun. During the ensuing bargaining for the release of the weapons, hostility broke out on that fateful Anniversary Day of the 1911 Revolution.

However, immediately prior to the outbreak of hostility in Canton, there was a massive and significant propaganda campaign conducted by that influential Chinese newspaper, the Chinese Mail, in Hong Kong. Ever since the establishment of National Government in Canton and the ousting of Ch'en Chiung-ming, that

---

103 See Ke-ming wen-hsien X, pp.41-43 for documents concerning this incident.

104 The campaign ran from the 4th-14th Oct. 1924 in the Chinese Mail (Wah Tse Yat Pao), sometimes a 2, or even 3, full pages were devoted to it.
daily had been informing its readers that within the National Government there was a vital struggle between the CCP and the pro-Communist Left KMT on one side and the anti-Communist Right KMT on the other side. Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Tan P'ing-shan were the devil genii of the Left with the former being portrayed almost as the very personification of evil. ¹⁰⁵

Now, on the 4th October, just a week before the conflict, the paper informed its readers that the anti-communist KMT Rightwing had been engaged in an almost life-and-death struggle with the communistic Leftwing. ¹⁰⁶ What made this propaganda campaign different from its previous attempts was its timing as well as the intensity of the message not the content. Its Special Correspondent in Canton had read the Hsiang Tao carefully, thus testifying to the influence and importance of this CCP organ and the messages contained therein.

This campaign was, in fact, a rehashing of the impeachment of the CCP and the SYC, with the comments voicing the views of the accusers of the communists. As the proceedings were supposed to have been in camera, a case may be put that in their eagerness to rid themselves of the influence of the communists, this diverse group of anti-Communist KMT members were prepared to pool their varied resources even though in some respects, this

¹⁰⁵ See, for example, the Chinese Mail, 21 and 28-II-1924 written by Liu Cheng-yu a former Republican Party member of the House of Representatives in 1912.

¹⁰⁶ Detailed references were given on the articles in the Hsiang Tao, especially those by Ch'en Tu-hsiu; as well as a journal by the so-called Anti-Communist Group, the Wu-tang ti-kan (Special journal for the Protection of the Party).
group had links with both sides of the Second Chihli-Fengtien War. Indeed, the impeachment incident and arguments presented were published in great detail, including reprinting the offending articles and resolutions by the SYC that were presented as evidence by the accusers. It was presented as a Bolshevik plot with Ch'en Tu-hsiu as the chief culprit. It labelled all those who were not siding with the anti-communist group as communist elements within the KMT. The newspaper was also concerned with the effective penetration of the CCP-led peasant and worker movements, especially with their success in the rich Canton Delta.\(^\text{107}\)

In contrast to these self-styled protectors of the party who were prepared to engineer the downfall of the Canton Government, the latter was saved - to a very large extent - by the first appearance of two 'People's Armies', which probably confirmed the worst fears of the anti-communists. They were the volunteers organized by Tan P'ing-shan into the workers self-defence corps and the peasants self-defence corps. They marched into Canton and put themselves at the disposal of Sun's government even though Sun was about to give up Canton.\(^\text{108}\) These two People's Armies made significant contributions to the


\(^{108}\) See Ke-ming wen-hsien X, pp.44-45 in which Sun disclosed his desire to give up Canton to Chiang Kai-shek.
eventual rapid collapse of the merchants revolt.\textsuperscript{109}

If the Chinese communists had harboured any hope that Sun, after this event, would realize who his supporters were or that he might then genuinely embark on his proclaimed national revolution of anti-imperialist and anti-warlord campaigns, then they would be sorely disappointed. With the timely change of allegiance of the Christian General, Feng Yu-hsiang, the Chihli Clique of Tsao and Wu was defeated and Sun rekindled his hope of getting his wishes through negotiation what he had hitherto failed to get in the battle fields. He went to Peking hoping to negotiate with the victorious warlords for a national unity. He left Canton on the 13th November telling the people he was on a mission to promote the power of the people, by first promoting the power of the military to combine with the people then, somehow, would lead to the transition from military power to power of the people. By people, Sun had meant his group and himself who had, somehow and unexplained except by the adoption of the name 'National' come to be the self-appointed representatives and spokesmen of the people.\textsuperscript{110}

When he got to Shanghai, he reiterated his desire for a national assembly and the abolition of the unequal treaties. Then, he continued his way to Peking via Japan. In his stopover

\textsuperscript{109} See Lo Chia-lun, Op.cit., p.694; and Ho Yang-ling, Nung-min yün-tung (The Peasant Movement, a source book) ch. VIII (Nanking, School of Party - KMT - Affairs, March 1928, 2 vols.) Both are impeccably anti-CCP sources.

\textsuperscript{110} See Sun's 'Manifesto on Going to Peking', in Kuo-min-tang chung-yao hsüan-yen hsüan-ling chi (Collection of the Important KMT Manifestos and Orders), pp.22-26.
in Kobe, he informed his audience that he was an advocate of Sino-Japanese amity and wished to build a programme of peace and development on the foundation of Pan-Asianism which, of course, would have Sino-Japanese amity as its basis. At the same time, Sun repeated his desire to abolish the unequal treaties. Little wonder, then, that the ruling junta was unhappy to see Sun. Instead, Chang and Feng agreed to recall Tuan Ch'i-jui, made him the Provisional Executive, and had him declare that the junta would respect all the existing treaties and commitments with foreign Powers.

Meanwhile, the Chinese communists, having observed the clay feet of the Nationalist Generalissimo, felt that they had to make their position clear. It is worth recalling that at their 3rd Party Congress in June-July 1923 the Chinese communists publicly announced in the Congress Manifesto that they would try to dissuade the KMT from a position of total reliance on military means and to urge their collaborators not to neglect the people but to make political propaganda amongst the people. Now their worst fears seemed to be materializing before their very eyes.

However, for tactical reasons, the communists did not attack Sun. After all, they had helped to build his image as the leader of a popular national revolutionary movement and if they were to attack Sun so soon after the commencement of collaboration they

111 'Pan-Asianism', a speech Sun made in Kobe on the 28th Nov. 1924, in Sun Chungshan hsien-sheng yen-shuo ch'üan-chi (Collected Speechs of Mr. Sun), pp.9-18.
they would be inviting doubt on their judgment, if nothing else. Therefore, they warned Sun against listening to his bad advisors as well as urging him to take note of the unfaithfulness of some members of the KMT. So, shortly before Sun left for his trip, the CCP propagandists launched a concerted attack on the imperialists and their stooges, the warlords.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu took the lead in proclaiming that any reliance on Tuan for a real peace would be doomed to disappointment. If a peaceful situation was to be the desired goal, Ch'en warned that it would not come through campaigns against one warlord or another, 'but only by the complete sweeping away of all imperialism and warlords.'\(^1\) Ts'ai Ho-sen identified Sun Fo as a member of the KMT Rightwing and denounced all warlords including Tuan and Feng, while at the same time, wished Sun a successful peace conference - 'an anti-imperialist, anti-warlords, and anti-Rightwing peace conference ... [which would] ... represent the interests of the four hundred million revolutionary people'.\(^2\)

P'eng Shu-chih concurred with his two comrades. But he also warned the workers and peasants and their organizations not to be deceived into thinking that their liberation is at hand. He warned them against putting their trust in 'traitors'

\(^1\) Ch'en, 'Pei-ching cheng-pien yu Chung-kuo jen-min' (The Peking coup d'etat and the Chinese people), Hsiang Tao No.89 (29-X-1924), p.733. This is the front page article of the issue.

\(^2\) Ts'ai had two articles in this issue. They had similar sentiments, but the article cited was the 'Pei—ching cheng—pien yu Kuo—min—tang' (The Peking coup d'etat and the KMT), Ibid, pp.736-737.
like Tuan or Feng. He regarded the latter as having sold out to the Japanese and European imperialists and urged the workers and peasants to rise up and be awakened to their task - of greater struggles in the national revolution.¹¹⁵ Unlike his comrades who called for the cleansing of the KMT, P'eng appealed to the 'oppressed masses' to intensify their class struggle.¹¹⁶

However, in view of Sun's determination to talk to the northern warlords the Chinese communists were reluctant to break with Sun, so they took a slightly different tack. After all, since the conference in Peking was styled as a peace conference and the nation was weary of war, the communists found it difficult to oppose a call for peace. But they would not give up. Ts'ai Ho-sen advised Sun to redouble his anti-warlord propaganda while urging him to demand political freedom from the Peking junta.¹¹⁷ Ch'en warned that the only thorough resolution to the recurring troubles from the imperialists and the warlords was a prolonged insurrection by the revolutionary masses, although as a temporary tactic, there might be a case for making use of one group of warlords against the most reactionary warlords. But, 'the party of the national

¹¹⁵ P'eng Shu-chih, 'Pei-ching cheng-pien yü tou-chi wu-ch'ih ti kung-t'uan chih ching-ch'iu' (The Peking coup d'etat and the shameless and opportunistic requests of the 'public groups') Hsiang Tao, No.89, pp.737-9 (29-X-1924).

¹¹⁶ Ch'en called for a cleansing in the same issue, p.739, 'Su ching nei-pu' (Cleanse the interior).

¹¹⁷ Ts'ai, 'Huan-ying Sun Chungshan hsien-sheng li Yüeh lai Hu' (Welcome Mr. Sun's departure from Kwangtung and his arrival at Shanghai) Hsiang Tao, No.91, p.757 (12-XI-1924).
revolution' must make clear to the people its political programme and to expose utterly the schemes of the imperialists and warlords. He conceded that maintaining political power was not a bad thing during the present situation otherwise, mentioning recent events in Canton, the counter-revolutionaries would be able to oppress the people even more. But, a revolutionary party must not compromise and turn its back on the revolution solely in order to stay in power. 118

The tactics of the CCP, then, was to voice their approval for Sun to go north and at the same time openly urge him to denounce, rather than to make compromises with, the very people he was to talk to in Peking. The Peking victors, Chang, Tuan and Feng, were described as totally devoid of principles, opportunistic and self-seeking agents of imperialists, and the junta was merely a temporary alliance drawn together in order that they might defeat opposing groups of warlords. Ts'ai Ho-sen warned the people that they must be prepared to embark on the road to revolution because if they waited for the warlords to improve the conditions of China it would be a forlorn dream. 119

On the eve of Sun's Pan-Asianism speech in Kobe, the CCP

118 Ch'en, 'Kuo-min-tang ti chengchih tai-tu' (The Political Attitudes of the KMT), Hsiang Tao No.91 (12-X-1924), p.758.

119 Ts'ai Ho-sen, 'Tuan. Feng, Chang san p'ai ch'un-fa an-tou chih pei-fang cheng-chü' (The Secret Struggles of the Tuang-Chang-Feng warlord factions in the political situation of the North), Hsiang Tao No.91, pp.758-761 (12-X-1924).
issued a proclamation on the political situation in China. It warned that the various warlord conflicts really meant that no one imperialist power had complete control over China but all were still struggling to increase their influence, using the warlords as their agents. The CCP announced that it would support the formation of a national assembly if it was truly national and representing the people, and not militarists, of China; and that the CCP would support Sun's attempt to negotiate for a national government provided this government so negotiated would be merely a temporary one and pledged to the total opposition of imperialism, whether Japanese, British, or American. They also wanted this new government to be totally opposed to the militarists but would support the ordinary people to participate in politics. This latter prescription was to include 'the arming of the Peasant Associations' self-defence forces.'

In truth, the Chinese communists had lost faith in the ability of the non-worker-peasant classes to remain faithful to the ideals of the national revolution. Thus, while Sun was trying to negotiate with Tuan and finding himself having to retreat from his original position the CCP made their position abundantly clear by publishing a special National

---

120 See Hsiang Tao No.92, pp.765-767 (19-XI-1924). Its full title was 'Chung-kuo Kung-chan-tang tui yü shih-chü chih chu-chang' (The Attitudes of the CCP on the Present situation).

121 See Tung-fang tsa-chih XXI, No.23 (10-XII-1924), pp.1-4. Tuan, after deciding to respect all foreign commitments, announced that he would convene a Reconstruction Conference and not Sun's National Assembly.
Revolution Edition of the *HCN Quarterly* with Ch'en and P'eng each contributing a significant statement. The significance of these statements went beyond the dispute between the collaborating parties of the national revolution but in the development of the Chinese communist's conception of the national revolution.

The issue opened with an article by P'eng significantly titled: 'Who is the Leader of the Chinese National Revolution?' He admitted that the national revolution involved many classes, the working class, the capitalists, the peasants, the handicraft workers, the petty bourgeoisie, the toilers of all types, and even the lumpen proletariat but in view of the situation in the world and the tendencies of the various social classes in China, only the Chinese working class deserves to be the leaders of the Chinese national revolution, only they can be the leaders.

To P'eng, the proletariat should lead the petty bourgeoisie and other classes within the ranks of the national revolution to struggle against the compradors, the feudal warlords and the imperialists, 'otherwise, the national revolution will be aborted.' He still distinguished between the 'national revolution' and the 'proletariat revolution' which should follow the former but he was no longer urging the KMT to awaken to

---

122 P'eng, 'Shui shih Chung-kuo kuo-min ke-ming chihling-tao che', *HCN Quarterly* No.4 (20-XII-1924), pp.1-14 or pp.455-469 in the overall pagination.
123 Ibid., pp.13-14.
their historic duties as the leaders of the national revolution - as the Manifesto of the 3rd Congress of the CCP had done.

If P'eng Shu-chih had deviated from the CCP policy of mid-1923, then he did so with the complete agreement of his leader, Ch'en Tu-hsiu. The latter followed P'eng's discussion with a magisterial survey of the national movement of the past twenty-seven years and came to the same conclusion as P'eng. He took the view that the national movement (kuo-min yün-tung) in China came about as a reaction to the defeat by Japan in 1895. To Ch'en, a national movement was one in which 'the masses were involved, unlike the 'Constitutional Defence' movement which was really a conflict of northern and southern militarists. The latter movement not only had no participation from the masses but also had absolutely no significance in the relationship between the people (min-tsu) and the foreign powers.'

In that twenty-seven-year period, he recognized four different national movements, viz, the 1898 Reform Movement, the Boxers Incident, the 1911 Revolution, and the May 4th Movement. However, they all ended in failure because the masses were not properly organized and the leadership did not understand the nature of the development of the social classes. Basically, Ch'en conceded, in all four cases, too much reliance was placed

---

125 Ch'en, 'Erh-shih-ch'i nien i lai kuo-min yün-tung chung so te chiao-hsün' (Lessons from the National Movements of the past 27 years), HCN Quarterly No. 4, pp. 15-22 (20-XII-1924).

126 Ibid., p. 15. The 'Constitution Defence' movement was the Canton National Military Government founded by Sun and others on the 10-IX-1917.
on the petty bourgeoisie and the intellectuals and that was a basic contributing factor for their eventual failure. Since the May 4th Movement, however, with the development of urban industries in China and the international revolutionary tides, the Chinese revolution developed into a new direction. 'This new direction was the enabling of the most revolutionary proletariat class to join the revolution, and the beginning of this class to demonstrate their social strength.'

Then, reviewing the past twenty-odd years - over which he was actively involved in the national movements - the former professor saw this lesson:  

Of the various classes in society, only the last one - the proletariat - is the most uncompromisingly revolutionary class as well as being the natural enemy of international capitalism and imperialism. They are not only the main force in the social revolution of the imperialist-capitalist nations, even in the national revolution of those nations oppressed by capitalism-imperialism they are the 'governors' of the war. They govern and encourage all the friendly troops which have compromising tendencies - the peasants, handicraft workers, the revolutionary intellectuals, the lumpen proletariat (the soldiers and bandits) and the petty merchants - and urge and direct them to attack, uncompromisingly, the imperialists and their

127 Ibid., p.19.
128 Ibid., p.22.
running dogs - the nation's militarists, bureaucrats, wealthy merchants, corrupt gentry, big landlords, and the anti-revolutionary intellectuals. Only through this way can the national revolution achieve its true goal - national liberation.

Thus, over the past twenty months or so, the position and role of the working class in the national revolution - as perceived by the Chinese communists - had developed from that of the 'important element ... the most willing and strongest fighter for true democracy ... [and] ... the bravest vanguard' in 1923 to become the only class capable of leading and directing the battles against the enemies of the national revolution. Indeed, as P'eng saw the lessons of recent events, 'only the workers and peasants are true revolutionaries ... only they can shoulder the great task of the Chinese national revolution.'

This new state of affairs came about because the Rightwing of the KMT had become reactionary and counter-revolutionary. Its Leftwing, while 'undoubtedly wishing to oppose the Peiyang warlords - those servants of the imperialists - and imperialism, ... still have not quite understood [the realities of the social

129 See Ch'en 'Tsen yang ta tao ch'üen-l'a' (How to Overthrow the Warlords) Hsiaong Tao No.21 (18-IV-1923).


situation], and had not sided firmly with the common working people.' Even those who understood might not always find the courage to act upon their convictions.\(^{132}\)

Thus by the end of 1924, the CCP with a membership of about 950, came to the conclusion that their collaborator in the national revolution, the KMT, had now split into three factions, Right, Centre, and Left. The Rightwing had demonstrated itself to be reactionary and counter-revolutionary. The Centre was uncertain and opportunistic,\(^{133}\) while the Left might know what was right they often lacked the courage of their convictions. Thus, it was left to the CCP, the Leftwing of the national revolution coalition - not the Left of the KMT as Borodin had suggested - to lead the forces in the national revolution and to set its direction.

At the same time, however, as Ch'en had pointed out, even during the process of the revolution, the revolutionary forces needed 'political power', or a revolutionary base. Ch'en being a practical man of politics, realized that with such a small party it would not be a practicable proposition to establish their own political power or revolutionary base. Thus, some type of arrangement that would be less than the ideal would have to be made. As his own life had demonstrated, he was quite

\(^{132}\) Wei Chin, 'Kwangtung cheng-fu yü kuo-min ke-ming' (The Kwangtung Government and the National Revolution) HCN Quarterly No.4 (20-XII-1924), p.29.

\(^{133}\) Ch'en, Ts'ai, and P'eng were of the same view in Hsiang Tao No.85 (1-X-1924) which evoked a retort from the KMT and followed by a rejoinder from the CCP. See Hsiang Tao No.92, pp.769-772 (19-XI-1924).
prepared to make strategic compromises, provided there were no compromises of principle or the ideal. Once again, faced with a collaborator that was showing a penchant for liaisons with warlords and to compromise, Ch'en could not but issue stern warnings to his collaborators while trying to devise new strategies appropriate to the new situation. The CCP must now come forward to lead.

Under such new political conditions, a re-assessment was in order and the 4th CCP Congress was convened in Shanghai in January 1925. In its Manifesto, it urged the people to demand a truly national assembly to give expression and representation to the masses and to oppose resolutely the victorious warlords in Peking. It also urged the people to stop the warlord-sponsored Reconstruction Conference. But, while the CCP urged the masses to get organized and demand a national assembly - kuo-min hui-i - it stopped short at making an open support for the KMT demanded national assembly. Reference to the KMT, unlike the 3rd CCP Congress Manifesto, was noted for its absence. While Sun was waiting on his death-bed hoping Tuan Ch'i-jui and Feng Yu-hsiang, with whom Sun had a Quadrilateral Alliance, would agree to negotiate for some sort of national conference, the CCP denounced those warlords as the

134 Ch'en 'The Political Attitudes of the KMT' Hsiang Tao No.91, p.758 (12-XI-1924) discussed such strategic compromises.

135 Twenty delegates attended, representing a membership of 950. This meeting, held in Shanghai, was convened in secret because of the political condition of the time. The terminal dates of the Congress is unknown but the Manifesto was dated the 22 January 1925, when it was published in the Hsiang Tao No.100, pp.833-835 (28-1-1925).
'most reactionary' as well as being stooges of Japanese imperialism.

Since they had decided that the KMT had already split into three factions, it is to be expected that given their acceptance of materialistic dialectics as their world-view and their materialistic conception of history, their plan of action would be to exploit this contradiction within the ranks of the KMT. This they resolved to do, and at the same time, re-affirmed the position of leadership of the proletariat in the national revolutionary movement. In short, the coming years should witness a class struggle within the ranks of the national revolution forces, with the Left - the CCP - openly declaring that it was their aim to lead the KMT Left and at least some of the KMT Centre from the reactionary KMT Right who had cast their lot with the enemies of the revolution.

In the meantime, Sun failed to persuade the northern warlords to accept his ideas and the national assembly did not materialize. Tuan's Reconstruction Conference also failed to reconstruct the ailing body politic. Sun, having failed to respond to medical treatment, died in Peking on 12th March 1925.

In the last years of his career, Sun had been disappointed and betrayed by his militarist allies on many occasions. When he announced his decision to collaborate with the Soviet Union and the CCP, Sun had just been ousted, again, from Canton by Governor Ch'en Chiung-ming. Having established the National

---

136 These were decisions of the 4th Congress. Cited from Huang Ch'u-mu, Chung-kuo Kung-chan-tang chien yao li-shih (A Short Selected History of the CCP) pp.36-37 (Peking 1956. Cited from 4th ed. 1962).
Government in Canton with the help of the Russians and in collaboration with the CCP, he still seemed impatient to embark on his oft-mentioned Northern Expedition. As if impatient of the slow process of effecting a mass-based national revolutionary movement, Sun never gave up hope of manipulating the uneasy alliances of the warlords to his own benefit. The Second Chihli-Fengtien war seemed to have been a temptation too great for Sun to resist. Unfortunately for him, Sun did not realize or did not seem to have realized until too late, that political power comes out of the barrel of a gun, especially in warlord politics.

As a practising politician and revolutionary, it is only to be expected that Sun's ideas and operational methods would vary according to circumstances, especially when he was not intellectually committed to a systematized political philosophy. It seems, therefore, that on his death-bed when he could see that his life-long effort in manipulating the fluid warlord alliances had failed him, Sun turned again and for the last time to the Russians and the communists. While historians will have no definitive way to decide or divine his true state of mind in his last days, Sun did leave behind the best weapon - in the form of a message to the Soviet Union - the Chinese communists could ever hope to have in their coming struggle with the KMT; and, the CCP had been grateful to him ever since.137

137 This 'gift' was Sun's last message to the USSR. The CCP published it in full in the very next issue of the HCN Quarterly after his death (No.1, 1925, pp.51-2). Here, Ch'en Tu-hsiu published it as Sun's affirmation of his (Ch'en's) own analysis of the contemporary situation in an article entitled 'Leninism and the People's Movement in China' (Lieh-ning chu-i yü Chung-kuo min-tsu yün-tung). Chang Kuo-tao, Op.cit., p.396, recalled that Sun's letter 'was drafted jointly by Borodin, Soong Ch'ing-ling and Wang Ching-wei and was ... [endorsed] ... and signed by Dr. Sun.'
The CCP had never attacked Sun while he was alive, they only claimed that he was poorly advised. But Sun left no political heir and no prescribed method of succession. While the CCP had no aspiration to gain the leadership of the KMT, they had announced their intention of leading the national revolution which now had risen to a 'higher' stage involving intensive class struggles between the classes in the Chinese society in general as well as within the ranks of the comrades of the national revolution. It seemed to the CCP leadership that the national revolution in China had approached the point where the revolutionary process would reach 'the highest state ... [and the proletariat] ... would be able to merge with the international revolutionary forces and directly achieve socialism. It is of interest and import to a discussion of the development of Chinese communism to note that while the Chinese communists on behalf of the proletariat would claim leadership of the national revolution by late 1924, their Russian comrades were not so forthcoming. As late as December 1926, the Comintern was still of the opinion that 'at this stage, the leadership of the movement passes more and more into the hands of the proletariat.' That is, the proletariat were not yet the leaders.

138 Ch'u, 'Tsu min-chu chu-i chih she-hui chu-i' (From Democracy to Socialism) HCN-Q No. 2 (20 XII 1923), p. 100.
139 Theses adopted at the 7th Plenum of the ECCI, cited from Eudin & North, Soviet Russia and the East (Stanford U.P. 1957) p. 358.
Accordingly, the CCP elevated into the central leadership comrades with a penchant for class struggle. The CCP also created the Political Bureau in order to improve the organizational structure for such an undertaking. Members elected to the Poliburo were Ch'en, Ts'ai, Ch'ü, Chang Kuo-tao and probably P'eng. Amongst those elected to the Central Committee, either as full members or as alternate members, were such activists in the labour movement as Lo Chang-lung, Hsiang Ying, Wang Ho-po and Teng Chung-hsia. There were also comrades experienced in collaborationist politics, such as Li Ta-chao and Tan P'ing-shan. The Poliburo held weekly meetings, at the Shanghai residence of Voitinsky, to formulate major policies while the day to day practical matters were discussed in a newly established body known as the Central Work Conference - chung-yang kung-tso hui-i. Amongst the regular participants were P'eng who was the new chief of the propaganda department, and Jen Pi-shih the newly elected secretary of the Communist Youth Corps. This body, which began life as the CYC, changed to become the Socialist YC and now in 1925, reverted to its original name. Wang I-fei, also known as Wang Jo-fei attended as secretary of the Shanghai Regional Committee while Liu Shao-ch'i and Li-Li-san attended as members of the Labour Movement Committee and Hsiang Ching-yü, wife of Ts'ai, attended as head.

140 See Chang, Kuo-tao 'Wo-ti hui-i' (My Recollections) No.13 in Ming Pao (Jan.1967), p.88, in which he excluded P'eng but P'eng insisted he was a member. See Ross Dowson, 'Chinese Revolutionarists in Exile', International Socialist Review (Summer 1963), p.78 who interviewed P'eng in Paris that year.

141 Chang, 'Wo-ti-hui-i' (hereafter known as Hui-i) No.13, p.90, or, his Rise of the CCP, p.404.
of the Women's Movement Committee. Many of these newcomers to the leadership were alumni of the KUTV, as well as the student-worker movement in Western Europe.

With this fusion of the new and the experienced, the CCP were able to revitalise the labour movement in accordance with the resolutions of the 4th Congress which called for the seizure of the proletarian leadership of the revolution, increasing the proletarian content in the KMT membership and exploiting the internal contradiction within the KMT. As Chang recalled, they met to discuss 'how the CCP could unite with the Left Wing of the KMT to win over the Centre and oppose the Right Wing.' Peasant associations and their development were issues of major discussions at these meetings.

They centred their attention on the Shanghai area where there was a concentration of industrialization and foreign industrial investment, especially by the Japanese. The CCP, led by Chang, Teng, Li and Liu were ably complemented by the CYC, led by Yung Tai-ying, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai and their radical students from the Shanghai University. Apart from the efforts at unionization, they engaged in such Marxian activities as founding the Workers' Part-time School, Workers' Association for the Promotion of Virtue and Workers' Social Clubs. Aided by the high-handed and repressive actions of the Shanghai authorities

---

143 Chang, Rise of the CCP, p.405.
and the factory owners, 1925 witnessed a resurgence of labour protests and strike actions. While class struggle might have been a novel concept, anti-imperialism was an easily understood plank on the CCP platform. With the omnipresence of international capitalism in the industrialized sector of Shanghai, the CCP comrades successfully followed Sun's last wish of anti-imperialism as a way to national liberation.

By May Day, 1925, the CCP were able to convene the Second National Labour Congress in Canton as well as the First Kwangtung Provincial Congress of Peasants. The achievements of the Labour Congress 'laid the organizational groundwork for the May 30th Movement which immediately followed it.' This Labour Congress was officially sponsored by the General Union of Railway Workers in the North which Chang Kuo-tao played a large part in its revival after the February 7th Incident, the General Labour Union in Central China, the Workers' Congress of Canton, and the Seamen's Union of Hong Kong. That is, the CCP was not linked to the Congress in an official capacity, though 'the Labour Movement Committee of the CC of the CCP actually made the preparations for the Congress.'

This Congress provided an appropriate example of the modus operandi of the CCP in the post-4th Congress style of national revolution, involving an intensification of class struggle. Anti-imperialism was a slogan that needed no explanation in China at the time and no one, unless one willingly courted the accusation of being unpatriotic, would

---

dare to be against such a slogan. It was the desire to improve the sad state which they found in China that led the young students and their professors to turn to socialism. Now, as members of the CCP, they saw as their duty the awakening of the masses to their objective reality and to the struggle to improve their lot. The communists, and others, in China had long accepted the concept that China was a proletarian nation. Now, the communists were to fuse the two concepts as a means to introduce the concept of class struggle. As the imperialists were to be struggled against, so should their running-dogs—the warlords and those who exploited the masses. The exploited ones on the other hand struggled not only for their own class but for the liberation of China.

This Labour Congress convened with 277 delegates representing 165 workers' organizations with a total of 540,000 members. They met to express their opposition to the imperialists and their running-dogs. It was so because the respective class interests were in conflict and thus would lead to the exploitation of the working class 'unless [the exploiters] are first overthrown.' There was to be a united front, the Congress Manifesto went on, for the workers had to unite with the organized 210,000 peasants and the thousands of revolutionary soldiers because 'the liberation movement of the embittered and toiling masses of China [requires] firstly, the progressive proletariat class to lead the great peasant masses; and secondly,
to form an alliance with the proletariat classes of the world to struggle together, in order to obtain final victory.'

The Congress also resolved to organize more unions and educate the members and masses to realize their common goal, and to educate the masses so that they would be awakened to realize the objective conditions of China and of themselves. Then, after listing the numerous ways of conducting such propaganda, the resolutions also warned that outside Kwangtung such activities could well be dangerous and counselled that in such areas operations should be conducted in a clandestine manner. For practical measures, the Congress also listed the nineteen most disreputable exploiters of the Chinese masses. Amongst them were Feng Tzu-yu, and such notable compradors and business men as Sir Robert Hotung, Huang Huan-ting and Ma Chao-chun. Given such an array of enemies, the Congress called for the formation of armed self-defence brigades by the trade unions and similar organizations. In spite of such slogans and resolutions all were done in the name of 'close co-operation between the KMT and the CCP.'

However, their manifest plan to form a united front with the peasants and the soldiers was not new. Even a labour organizer such as Teng Chung-hsia had long accepted the

---

148 Ibid., pp.3-5.
importance of involving the peasantry in the national revolution. By the end of 1923, Teng had acknowledged that even a warlord like Feng Yu-hsiang had realized that the peasants were struggling against exploitation. And, in view of the various land-reduction and other peasant movements in Chekiang, Shansi and in Hai-feng in Kwangtung and the peasants' eagerness to form themselves into peasant associations, 'the Chinese peasants have demonstrated they have arrived at the stage of revolutionary awakening'. Teng found that the peasants' ability to learn the technique of revolution and their valour were certainly not inferior to those of the workers.

The holding of the provincial peasant movement congress at the same time as the labour movement congress testified to the realization 'that the influence of the revolution had spread to the remote countryside.' True to their claims, these peasant associations were operating under the auspices of the Canton Government's Peasant or Rural Department and true to their resolves, the rural action comrades agreed with Marx and Engels and brought 'to the front, as the leading question ... the property question.' And, they were met with strong

---

150 Teng Chung-hsia, 'Lun nung-min yün-tung' (On the Peasant Movement), Chung-kuo ching-nien No.11, pp.2-4 (29-XII-1924). This was an organ of the Communist Youth Corps. This article was from a series by Teng on the three forces in the national revolution: workers, peasants, and soldiers; and he described them all as main forces - chu li chün of the national revolution.

151 Ibid., p.3.


repressive reaction by the local government and landlords.

Whilst their opponents formed their private militia, the min-tuan, the peasant associations in turn attempted to form their own armed self-defence forces. There were frequent conflicts and this was the cause of much concern to the CCP and the Rural Department of the Canton Government. The peasant associations viewed their struggles in terms of class struggle. And, to their chagrin, the rural comrades found that all too frequently, the county chiefs - hsien chiang - though nominally members of the Canton Government and even members of the KMT, tended to side, or be in league, with the landlords. This often drove the peasant self-defence forces underground and the peasant associations as a result, often suffered loss of property and even lives.

Of course, the peasant movement had been in action for some considerable time prior to the first provincial congress in May 1925. By February 1925, it was reported that 'imperialism and its tools' had perpetrated evil and reactionary deeds against the peasant associations. These 'tools' included the 'evil gentry in league with local bandits and soldiers.'

---

154 See Chung-kuo nung-min (The Chinese Peasant) No.1, p.13. The News Section (1 Jan. 1926) where great concern was shown. This was the official organ of the Provincial Rural Department. Chang (The Rise of the CCP, pp.472-3) recalls that Borodin was against the intensification of class struggle, a position opposed by his Chinese comrades.

155 Chung-kuo nung-min No.1, News Section.

156 'Kwangtung sheng nung-min i-nien lai chih fen-tou pao-kao ta-kang' (A Brief Report of Peasant Struggles in the Past Year in Kwangtung Province), Chung-kuo nung-min Nos.6-7 (July 1926). Hereafter, this Report will be cited as 'Summary'.

The peasant movement, however, was staffed by well motivated graduates from the Peasant Movement Training Institute conducted by the young Mao Tse-tung and others. Thus, in spite of heightened reaction the Second Provincial Congress of the Peasant Associations, held in May 1926, was able to report a threefold increase in membership while the movement had been able to extend into three times as many counties as they had the previous year.  

Nor had the CCP neglected to put into practice their new strategy concerning the 'third member' of the three 'main forces of the national revolution' - the soldiers. Almost immediately after the 4th CCP Congress, efforts were made to organize a Young Servicemen's Club to woo the cadets at the Whampoa Military Academy. It was a communist-led united front type of organization and its effect was the consolidation of the communist elements in the Academy with the Left-leaning ones. But the communists did not stop at the Academy. Their presence and influence were also prominent in the regular army. On 19th September, 1925, when Political Departments were formalized in the army, Chou En-lai became the chief of the Political Department of the First Army while communists occupied four of the five positions in the divisional level of that Army. The heads of the Political Departments in the Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth Armies were Li Fu-ch'un, Chu K'o-ching, Lo Han

157 See 'Nung-min hsieh-hui ch'ing-fang pao-kao' (Report on the Affairs of the Peasants Association), Chung-kuo nung-min Nos. 6-7 (July 1926), pp.10-19. Hereafter to be cited as 'Affairs'. 

and Lin Tsu-han respectively, and all were communists; so was the head of the Navy's Political Department, Li Chih-lung. As Ch'en Kung-po recalled the situation, when he was the Chief of the Political Department of the Military Council of the Canton, the heads of the three sections of his Department were all communists. Even at the Military Council there were two Russians in the Political Department acting as advisors.\textsuperscript{159}

This was strongly resented by some KMT officers who responded by forming a Sun Yat-senist Society after the death of Sun. It seemed that the communists and the Left-KMT had tried to gain control of this society but were 'squeezed out'. Consequently, this Society became the focal point of anti-communist actions within the military.\textsuperscript{160} According to Chiang Kai-shek, the Society was formed to counter the influence of the communist-sponsored League of Military Youth.\textsuperscript{161} The latter was directed by Chou En-lai and Kao Yü-han, a politics instructor at the Academy and a communist since his Peita days and was the sole CCP member in the Supervisory Committee of the KMT. Through their efforts, communists were appointed to the positions of political commissars in the various army units. Kao seemed to

\textsuperscript{159}Ch'en Kung-po, \textit{Wo yü Kung-chan-tang}, pp.56-57.

\textsuperscript{160}Wilbur & How, \textit{Op.cit.}, p.259; being Doc.24, 'Questions and Criticisms concerning Stepanov's Report'. This supports Ch'en's recollection.

\textsuperscript{161}Chiang, \textit{Soviet Russia in China}, pp.35-6. He recalls that the communist Young Servicemen's Club was formed on 25-I-1925, the Sun-Yat-senist Society was formed on 29-XII-1925 but no exact date was given for the League's formation, only indicating that it was sometime earlier.
have angered Chiang by accusing the latter of lacking in revolutionary ardour.  

In their intensified efforts towards class struggle and in their efforts in intensifying the contradictions within the KMT and the three main forces - kung, nung, ping - of the national revolution, the Chinese communists were really putting into practice their publicly announced theoretical perception of the national revolution. In the pages of the HCN Quarterly in 1924, the CCP propagandists were making claims to be the leaders of the national revolution on the ground that the proletariat were the only ones worthy of the leadership class of the national revolution. By 1925, the CCP propagandists were insisting that their 'weapon' of the national revolution was Leninism.  

Ch'en Tu-hsiu further insisted that 'the contemporary national movement - min-tsu yün-tung - must ... have and appreciate Leninism, an anti-imperialist and international national movement.' He then gave Sun's final message to the Soviet Union as evidence that the founder of the

\[162\] Chiang, Chiang Chieh-shik hsien-sheng tsui-chin chih yen-lun (Recent speeches by Mr. Chiang) p.19 (Peking, IX-1926).


\[164\] Ch'en, 'Lieh-ning chu-i yü Chung-kuo min-tsu yün-tung' (Leninism and the Chinese National Movement) HCN-Q No.1 (1925) pp.13-14. The last phrase cited, the original Chinese reads: kuo-chi min-tsu yün-tung, and may conceivably be translated into 'international people's movement.'
KMT had understood the changing requirements of the national revolution.

P'eng Shu-chih agreed with his leader. The former explained:

Formerly, there were some doubts as to "Who should be responsible for the leadership of the Chinese national (min-tsu) revolution?" But, since the February 7th Struggle, this lesson has been completely solved for us by objective realities. Only the Chinese working class can be responsible for all the revolutionary duties - from the national revolution to the proletariat revolution. The February 7th Struggle has proved that China's working class (kung-jen) is the only vanguard and leader (ling-tao che) of the Chinese national revolution.

In short, according to P'eng, the revolution in China was still a national revolution. But, unlike the Manifesto of the CCP's 3rd Congress where the communists urged the KMT to wake up to their duties as the leaders of the national revolution, now the working class led by its class party - the CCP - would not only be the vanguard but also assume leadership of the revolution.

Ch'en then explained what had become of the previous class of leaders, the capitalist (tzu-chan) class. This had become factionalized into the counter-revolutionary Right, the non-revolutionary (fei-ke-ming) Centre and 'those with a revolutionary tendency ... by chance [they have] revolutionary

tendencies but are prone to compromises.' Given such a low opinion of even the Leftist capitalists, Ch'en could not but conclude that in China's national revolutionary movement if the working class did not join the struggle, the movement would never be victorious.  

Ts'ai Ho-sen took the opportunity of the anniversary of the February 7th Incident to remind his readers that efforts at working out a compromise with the warlords would be doomed. He reminded his readers that while Sun was still trying to negotiate with Tuan Ch'i-jui in Peking the compradors and the warlord, Ch'en Chiung-ming, were attacking Canton. This, Ts'ai argued, demonstrated that the workers and peasants were the real pillars of the national revolution in China. At the same time, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, who always tried to demonstrate the historical inevitability of his perception of socio-political development, explained with considerable theoretical sophistication the differences and significance of the February 7th Incident of 1923 and 1925.

Ch'ü explained that at one time, the CCP had proposed and urged the united action of all democratic elements. But, since

---

166 Ch'en, 'Chung-kuo Kuo-min ke-ming yün-tung chung kung-jen ti li-liang' (The Power of the Workers in the Chinese national revolutionary movement), Hsiang Tao No.101, pp.844-5 (7-II-1925).

167 Ts'ai, 'Sun Chung-shan ping hou ti-kuo chu-i yü chün-fa chih yin-mou' (The Treachery of the Imperialists and the Warlords since Sun's illness), Hsiang Tao No.101, pp.841-2.

that time, the capitalist class and others had not given due importance to the strength of the workers and, on the contrary, concentrated on military activities. He then accused the Rightwing of the national (min-tsu) revolutionary movement of trying to destroy the unity of the working class by claiming that certain workers' representatives were Bolshevik terrorists. Therefore, Ch'u explained that 'the Right of the national revolutionary movement would certainly use governmental power to destroy the workers' movement. This year's February 7th anniversary ... signifies the achievement of class consciousness by the workers ... not only will the workers be able to guarantee their own independence in class struggle ... but will also defend the headquarters of the main force of the national revolutionary movement.'

This was a very serious charge and a significant statement. The 'Right of the national revolutionary movement', for Ch'u, was but another name for the KMT in the context of the united front, just as the CCP styled itself as the Leftwing of the National Revolution. As has been noted, Borodin had referred to the CCP as the Leftwing of the KMT, in his interview with the would-be impeachers of the CCP. Now, in Feb.1925 Ch'ü not only found that the proletarian class had arrived at that stage of development in which they were ready to conduct independent class struggles, but also that the KMT had practically forfeited its eligibility to be considered revolutionary. The necessity for having the KMT in the national revolutionary movement was practically defined out of existence.
On the other hand, given the trend of development of Chinese communism as expressed by these theoreticians, this was the only possible conclusion, and even the 'logical' conclusion. As the Chinese communists perceived the revolutionary situation in China, the party of the proletariat - the CCP - entered the ranks of the national revolutionary movement because China was suffering from two types of exploitation. The nation as a whole was oppressed by international imperialism and capitalism, hence it was beholden upon all who wanted to have an independent China to join the ranks of the national revolutionary movement. At the same time, as communists, their revolutionary goal was a proletarian China. Thus it was beholden upon every communist to struggle against every class which would stand in the way of accomplishing this goal. Earlier, the Chinese communists were of the opinion, at least in their publications, that the proletariat did not have the necessary experience in the process of revolutionary politics and not enough of the proletarian class were awakened to their objective situation. However, as has been noted, the Chinese communists had long expressed the conviction that China was already a proletarian nation.

Now, the communists felt that these deficiencies in experience and consciousness were being alleviated and the proletariat was strong enough for independent action. More than that, the national revolutionary movement had advanced to the stage in which the ranks of the bourgeoisie had developed irreconcilable cleavages. Even the Leftwing of the bourgeoisie, according to this new communist perception, were wavering as
was the historic behaviour of such an economic class during the transitional stage between the national and socialist revolutionary movement. Further, the Chinese communists were now interpreting their anti-imperialist struggle in terms of class struggle. As they saw their struggle as being part of an international revolutionary movement against international capitalism and imperialism, the Chinese communists argued that in the Chinese theatre the revolutionary activities were between the Chinese proletariat and the Japanese and other capitalists.

That the CCP placed great store on such conceptual development may be judged by their official publications. Their weekly, the Hsiang Tao, in its comments on current events had given its readers ample examples of their new thinking. Now, in the leading theoretical journal of the party, the HCN Quarterly, editor Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai expounded in considerable detail the historical basis for this perception and conception. It is worth recalling that eighteen months earlier, Ch'ü, in the same journal, urged the adoption of the Jacobinical revolutionary methodology. And, barely six months previously, P'eng

---

169 See, for example, Ch'ü's article, 'Ti-kuo chu-i ti yung-pu yü Chung-kuo p'ing-min' (The Servant of Imperialism and the common people of China) Hsiang Tao No.104, pp.868-870 (28-II-1925). This was published under the name Hsiang Lin, one of the many pseudonyms of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai.

170 Ch'ü, 'Sun Chung-shan yü Chung-kuo ke-ming yün-tung' (Sun Chung-shan and the Chinese Revolutionary Movement), HCN-Q No.2 (1-VI-1925), pp.1-14. This was the opening article of the issue and was published under Ch'ü's own name, not a pseudonym.

171 Ch'ü, 'From Democracy to Socialism' HCN-Q No.2 (20-XII-1924).
Shu-chih declared in the self-same journal that the proletariat was the only class worthy and capable of assuming the role of leadership in China's national revolution. Now, editor Ch'ü, in his first official comment in this journal since the death of Sun agreed with Comrade Peng.

Ch'ü declared that in the last year of Sun, the people's (min-tsu) revolutionary movement in China began to embark on a new road, which was truly representative of the proletarian class of the Chinese people and truly able to conduct a thorough revolution.

Furthermore, this new proletarian class would be able to lead the 'great masses of peasants and all the common people (p'ing-min) to engage actively in revolutionary struggles against all the scholar-gentry class, the comprador class and their reactionary powers, and to prevent the capitalists' policies of compromise and to overthrow directly imperialism and its tools, the warlord class.'

A very significant point in this article by Ch'ü, in the context of the Chinese communist's conception of the evolution of the national revolution, was the understanding of the term the common people, p'ing-min. Ch'ü argued that Sun had always led the 'lower classes in society' - hsia-teng she-hui - even before the 1911 Revolution. This social group had the common people as its main support and that the Tung-meng hui was the

---

172 Peng, 'Who are the leaders of China's National Revolution' HCN-Q No.4 (20-XII-1924).
173 Ch'ü 'Sun and the Chinese Revolutionary Movement', p.13.
political party representing this lower class, which in turn served as the foundation for the Tung-meng hui. 'These so-called "lower strata of society", and only these, can shoulder the responsibility of the true people's revolution (min-tsu ke-ming).'

Ch'ü further explained that in order to resist the Great Powers, Imperial China needed more than just the p'ing-min. She also needed the Manchu aristocracy and the scholar-gentry class as well as the p'ing-min class - the so-called Third Estate and the peasant class. At the early stages of national (min-tsu) awakening, all these classes shared the common tendency to resist the foreign Powers. Unfortunately, Ch'ü informed his readers, according to the historic development of the Chinese economy and politics, the various classes would expose their own class characteristics even during their opposition to the foreign Powers. The different classes would make use of the anti-foreign movement to work for its own class interests.

Even within the Third Estate, or the Common People or p'ing-min, there were classes with opposing economic interests. Before the overthrow of their common enemy - the aristocracy of the Ch'ing Dynasty and the scholar-gentry class - their differences were not very apparent and there was no internal struggle, Ch'ü explained. Hence, the Tung-meng hui was able to encompass many diverse elements. But, with the

---

174 Ch'ü, Ibid., p.5 the beginning of Section III.
175 Ch'ü, Ibid., p.5 last paragraph.
176 Ch'ü, Ibid., pp.5-6.
177 Ch'ü, Ibid., p.7.
revolutionary struggles extended from the political into the social sphere such as the attempts to fulfil the slogan Equalization of Land Rights, and into anti-imperialistic actions, then the warlords, compradors, capitalists, the scholar-gentry class would all leave the ranks of the revolution. This left the petty bourgeoisie and the masses of the common people. Fortunately, at this time, the people's revolutionary movement (min-tsu ke-ming yun-tung) obtained a new army - the 'revolutionary proletariat who will be the true vanguards of the revolution as well as the leading class of the revolutionary movement.'

As with his party leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Ch'ü also cited Sun's final message to the Soviet Union as proof that the Chinese revolutionary movement needed the help and co-operation of the Russians. Finally, reviewing the Chinese revolutionary movement over the 'past half century' Ch'ü was able to report much progress. One of the evidences of progress was the use of slogans, (k'ou hao). He felt gratified that the former slogan of 'Wealthy Nation and Strong Army' (fu-kuo ch'iang-chün) had been replaced by 'Oppose all forms of Imperialism and Abolish the Unequal Treaties'. He also noted progress in revolutionary methods, from militarist insurrections to the alliance of the workers and peasants, and from a policy of allying with Japan to joining hands with the proletariat of the world. In a gesture of calculated magnanimity, he claimed that 'This bitter

178 Ch'ü, Ibid., pp.8-12. The quotation is on p.12.
and difficult road reflects the life and works of Sun Chung-shan.  

At the very time when this article by Ch'ü was going to press, the anti-communist elements of the CCP-KMT united front were preparing their counter arguments. The communists' argument, as presented by Ch'ü and others, was based on their perception of history. That is, according to their understanding of the materialistic conception of history, the Chinese communists saw history as Marx and Engels did: 'the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles' with the proletariat the ultimate victors. The anti-communists in the ranks of China's national revolution denied this. Furthermore, since the Chinese communists based much of their argument on their own interpretation of the ideas of Sun - trying to demonstrate that Sun was perceiving the development of the Chinese revolution in a similar fashion as the communists - the anti-communist theoreticians also felt obliged to argue that they and not the communists were, the true interpreters of the ideas of Sun Yat-sen.

The leading KMT theoretician who led the counter attack was Tai Chi-t'ao. He had been a close associate of Sun for a long time as well as being an old friend of Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Indeed, Tai was a member of the first unit of the CCP in Shanghai in 1920. Now in mid-1925 Tai still proclaimed that the ultimate goal of the KMT was the same as that of the CCP: communism. Citing Sun, Tai said that 'Min-sheng chu-i

(People's Livelihood) is socialism and is also called communism, which is the same as Tai-tung chu-i (the Concept of the Great Unity). Furthermore, Tai agreed with Sun that 'Communism is the ideal of People's Livelihood, and People's Livelihood is Communism in Practice.' He went further than Sun by claiming that both the aim and nature of People's Livelihood and communism were 'completely the same ... they both want to solve the same problems ... and both break national boundaries, having the entire world as their objective.'

However, in spite of such similarities, the two concepts, as Tai saw them, were completely different in both their philosophic foundation and method of realization. Instead of the Marxist materialistic conception of history, People's Livelihood had its philosophic foundation in the 'traditional Chinese ethical and political philosophies' and was concerned with matters wider than mere economic issues, but also with 'education and enjoyment'. While communism was to be realized by revolutionary means involving class struggle, Tai claimed that to achieve People's Livelihood one would need a national revolution. However, the national revolution envisaged by him involved 'political reconstruction, using the power of the state to achieve the goals. Therefore [People's Livelihood] proposes to use revolutionary dictatorship, using the revolutionary powers of the various classes to prevent the

180 Tai Chi-t'ao, Sun Wen chu-i chih che-hsüeh ti chi-chu (The Philosophical Foundation of Sun Wenism), p.18 (Shanghai VIII-1925). This was first drafted in Canton in May and completed in June of 1925 in Shanghai.
181 Tai, Ibid., pp.18-19.
expansion of the power of [any individual] class but to expand the powers of the state to build a common economic social system and thus gradually eliminate classes.' He then introduced a term that now has come to be associated with his former secretary, Mao Tse-tung. Tai claimed that China 'is really like a sheet of white paper' and Sun would write on it his Three Principles. This task of fulfilling this revolutionary programme would belong to the party once led by Sun, else imperialism would be able to leave its marks on it.¹⁸²

He saw that the forces confronting each other in China today were not that between opposing classes. 'In China, the opposing revolutionary forces and the anti-revolutionary forces are the awakened and the unawakened. Therefore, what we have to do is to awaken the entire people and not just one class'.¹⁸³ Indeed, according to his scheme of things, once 'the ruling class is awakened, they will join the national revolution and fight for the interests of the ruled; the capitalist class will fight for the interests of the working class; the landlord class will fight for the interests of the peasant class.' To the unbelievers, Tai pointed to Prince Peter Kropotkin of Russia as an example of what an awakened person would do in transcending class interests.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸² Tai, Ibid., p.23.
¹⁸³ Tai, Ibid., p.41.
¹⁸⁴ Tai, Ibid., pp.44-45.
Since Tai regarded Sun and the latter's ideas were truly Chinese and that they represented the 'resurrection of Chinese ethics and culture' - that 'orthodox ideas and ideals of Yao, Shun, Confucius and Mencius' - he could not but have contempt for Marxist revolutionary ideas of class struggle and the Chinese Marxists. As expected, Tai saw the role of the CCP in the KMT-led national revolution as parasitic, and the members of the CCP and the SYC/CYC were either misguided zealots or hypocrites. He was particularly angered by the manipulations of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and what Tai regarded as the lack of moral rectitude in Tan P'ing-shan for the latter's efforts in making troubles within the KMT while holding a senior position in it. The CCP organ, Hsiang Tao, also came in for special criticism for rumour-mongering. Tai's anger was not unjustified for the CCP writers had never been slow in publicising their aim in effecting a class struggle within the KMT and, as had been demonstrated, had even attacked the very fidelity of the KMT comrades towards Sun and the national revolution.

Since Tai had challenged the validity and necessity of the CCP's conception of the national revolution and openly called

185 Tai, Ibid., p.43.
186 Tai, Kuo-min ke-ming yü Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang (The National Revolution and the Chinese KMT) p.51. (Sept.1925 Shanghai). This pamphlet was a continuation of the earlier one and was a direct challenge to the CCP's concept of the national revolution. It was an influential pamphlet and noted by the CCP.
187 Tai, Ibid., p.65.
188 Ibid., p.65.
into question the integrity of the CCP leadership, the Chinese communists had no other option but to face the challenges squarely. Ch'en, in an open letter to Tai, insisted that Tai and his like-minded comrades had a basic theoretical mistake: that the latter group 'only see the need for a racial (min-tsu) struggle but failed to see the need for a class struggle.' \(^{189}\) He reiterated the communists' perception of the anti-imperialist struggle as not merely a struggle between the Chinese people and the people of any country, or countries, which had exploited China, but a struggle between the exploited people of China and the exploiting class from the foreign Powers as well as within China's borders.

Then, apart from warning Tai that such a way to misinterpret Sun would only be welcomed by the reactionary forces, Ch'en made a brilliant riposte which amply demonstrated his professorial linguistic and debating skills. He denied the allegation that the communists were luring away KMT members by arguing that since 1924, the number of KMT members joining the CCP was tiny compared with the number of communists joining the KMT. Touche!

Ch'en's view was shared by the other leading members of the CCP. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai concentrated his counter attack on the theoretical side. In the same issue he claimed that recent experiences such as the May 30th incident and the publications by Tai had demonstrated two things. Firstly, they indicated

\(^{189}\) Ch'en, 'Chi Tai Chi-tao ti i-feng hsin' (A Letter to Tai Chi-tao), Hsiang Tao Nos.129-130 (11, 18-IX-1925), pp.1186-1190, 1196-7.
that the capitalist class had betrayed the interests of the people, min-tsu, thus forcing the working class to unite with the revolutionary masses to resist the renegades. 'This is the class struggle of the Chinese proletarian class in the political sphere. From one perspective, the working class is struggling for their class interests; from another perspective, the proletariat is also struggling in the national (min-tsu) liberation movement.' The second lesson learnt was that 'the nature of the people's liberation movement (min-tsu chieh-fang yüên-tung) in the national revolution is the struggle between the exploited and oppressed classes in China and the imperialist class. At the same time, within the people's liberation movement, there is bound to be class struggles between the proletarian class and the capitalist class, and, realistically, this cannot be avoided.'

Lo I-nung counselled against reliance on the military and claimed that four-fifths of the troops in Kwangtung were anti-revolutionary and the remaining fifth was untrustworthy, and he urged the re-organization of the military. P'eng Shu-chih thought that for the Chinese people to be liberated from

190 Ch'ü 'Wu-sa yüên-tung chung chih kuo-min ke-ming yü, chieh-chi tou-cheng' (The National Revolution and Class Struggle in the May 30th Movement), Hsiang Tao No.129, pp.1183-1186 (11-IX-1925). Quotations from p.1185. Ch'ü used the phrase: 'kuo-min ke-ming chung ti min-tsu chieh-fang yüên-tung'. Since he implied that the min-tsu liberation movement was within the national revolution, I am constrained to use the term 'people's liberation movement', if only for the lack of a better term.

imperialism and its tools and for the national revolution to be successful, the only way would be for the Chinese workers to stand up for the struggle and 'to lead' the struggle. He urged the Shanghai workers to realize their potential and understand their position and duties in the national revolution in China and the Chinese proletarian revolution. He informed them that they were the 'workers of Petrograd' and should, therefore, model themselves after the Petrograd workers and be ready for their final task in the Chinese proletarian revolution.  

Against this background of such an irreconcilable ideological confrontation, the CCP called an enlarged plenary session of the Central Committee which met in October, 1925 in Peking. It resolved to continue the efforts at conducting class struggles within the ranks of the KMT by opposing the KMT Right-wing and uniting with its Left-wing. At the same time, the Enlarged Plenum resolved to 'expand and strengthen our Party everywhere, especially where the KMT's influence exists. Our Party should actively enter the political arena and carry out our ideological strategy and struggle everywhere.' It then put forward certain 'concrete terms' as guides to future action within the national revolution. The party members were enjoined to expand their political propaganda and organization independent of the KMT, especially in Kwangtung, and at the same time, should try to win over to the CCP the allegiance of the workers and

---

192 P'eng, 'Shanghai tsung-kung-hui pei feng yu Shanghai kung-jen hou ti tse-jen' (The Closure of the Shanghai General Union and the Future Duties of the Shanghai Workers) Hsiang Tao No.132, pp.1207-8 (5-X-1925); quotation cited from p.1208.
peasants. However, the comrades were instructed 'not to join the KMT nor engage in its work, particularly the work in higher-level of the Party machinery, with the exception of Party headquarters which are absolutely under our influence.' Furthermore, though there would still be co-operation in places where the KMT had influence, such as in Kwangtung, the Chinese communists were told that they 'must not yield one inch of ground to the KMT in terms of the theory and practice of class struggle in all movements.' Finally, the comrades were informed that instead of seeing the KMT as having a Left, Centre, and Right, they should correct their perception for there were really only two factions, viz, the Left and the Right; unfortunately, 'at the moment, ... the so-called Left is merely talk' while the former Right had become reactionary and the former Centre, the new Right.¹⁹³

Thus, apart from the re-defining of the factions within the KMT, the general conception of the nature of the national revolution and the role of the CCP in it at this Enlarged Plenum were really a re-affirmation of the ideas expressed by the leading CCP propagandists during the months prior to the plenum. Now, instead of individual comments, the ideas hitherto expressed by individuals in the numerous articles in the Hsiang...

¹⁹³ 'Resolutions on Relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT'. An English translation, which is followed here, can be found in Wilbur and How, Op.cit., pp.234-236, being Document 20.
Tao and the HCN Quarterly had become officially sanctioned ideological positions.\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{194} Ch'en Tu-hsiu claimed, in his Letter to all Comrades of the Party, written on the 10th XII 1929, that he had wanted to take the CCP from the United Front but, in the face of opposition from the Comintern representative, as well as 'lacking in resoluteness, I did not insist on my proposal'. But, judging from the sentiments in his writing before the Plenum and comparing them with the resolutions of the Plenum, one is constrained to feel that if Ch'en had real disagreement with the Comintern representative, then this disagreement had intensified with the passing of years and in the recalling of them. An English translation of Ch'en's Letter may be found in Chinese Studies in History III, No.3 (1970, USA), pp.224-247.
CHAPTER 5
The Peasantry

As mentioned earlier, both Li Ta-chao and Feng Tzu-yu had found it necessary to proclaim on New Years Day 1920 that China was a proletariat nation. That being the case, these two revolutionaries argued, China should adopt the Leninist revolutionary method of forming a front of the workers, peasants and soldiers - the proletariat classes of China. To them as well as many of their readers, there was nothing incongruous in those proclamations. China was undeniably poor and a great proportion of her population were, for all practical purposes, without property. Furthermore, in the Chinese context, the three sections within this proletarian group - nung (peasants), kung (workers) and ping (soldiers) - were really three sections of the same social group. It was, as observed by our two revolutionaries, the inability to maintain a subsistence living in the villages that forced the unpropertied to seek a livelihood in the cities or to join, or be conscripted into, the armies of the warlords. The two writers, and their readers, would have little trouble in seeing the peasantry as a matter of great concern in the revolutionary movement in China, though the exact nature of this concern might, and did, differ.

The first major discussion of rural policies by the Chinese communists was in the journal The Communist.1 The

---

1 Chiang Chün, 'She-hui ke-ming ti shang-chio' (On the Methods to bring about a Social Revolution), The Communist No.2, pp.2-9 (7-XII-1920).
author, after citing the Marxian slogan that 'All past history is history of class struggle', went on and expanded the slogan into his theoretical framework for a revolution. He explained that:

the foundation of social structure is built on human activities - the production of goods and their distribution ... The causes of revolutions are from these and not invented by human intellect nor abstract theorizing. In short, revolution is not the revolt of philosophic research but from the realities of socio-economic conditions and changes.

The realities in Chinese society he saw was one of class exploitation and struggle. After setting the Marxist framework with the appropriate quotation from The Communist Manifesto and an explanation in Marxist terms, he skilfully applied the theory into the concrete situation of China. Indeed, he did so quite creatively. He again commenced with an appropriate quotation, this time, a Chinese proverb:

Fu-che tien lien chien mo, pun-che tu mo li chi

An approximate translation of it would be: The fields of the rich stretch from the towns to the distant lanes, while the poor do not have enough land for even the point of an awl to stand on. This, the writer argued, was 'indicative of China having two classes, the extremely rich and the extremely poor.' The two classes, traditionally, meant the 'landlords and the tenants.'
He considered China to be in the midst of her own industrial revolution, but with some distinctive features compared to the industrialization processes in Europe, the USA or Japan. Though China was not as prosperous as these other lands, her proletariat were actually suffering more intensely than the counterparts in the other lands because of the very special type of capitalist class found in China. Arguing in the Leninist fashion, he saw the capitalist class in China as an 'international capitalist class, that is, a confrontation between the Chinese working class and the international capitalist class.' From this not unexceptional analysis of the industrial economy, he extended his theme into the rural sector, thus:

In China, the landlords and the tenants are the two opposing classes. This has been in existence for a long time. Now, under the influence of the industrial revolution, the two classes come to be the capital and labour classes. ... with the increasing poverty of the proletariat matching the increasing wealth of the propertied class, the opportunity for a social revolution has arrived.

In short, this Chinese communist was giving witness to the observation of Mr. Sundus, the British Consul in Anhwei province in 1905.²

² Decennial Report, 1902-11, pp.282-3. In his report, the Consul observed that 'the great bulk of the rice land is not the property of peasant proprietors or village communes but belongs to some half-dozen powerful families [which] have ramifications throughout the Empire'. Not only that, but these landlords 'have manufacturing and financial interests' in the urban centres. In short, the landlords, manufacturers, and financiers were seen by this foreign observer as the one capitalist class.
That other group of important members in the dramatic personae of the development of Chinese communism, the worker-student group in France, upon observing China from distant and industrialized Western Europe, concurred with Li and Feng. Their views were given eloquent expression by the pen of Ts'ai Ho-sen. Furthermore, Party Leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu agreed with his young admirer and counselled the young man not to regard Marxism as a 'completely mechanistic philosophy'.

Ts'ai argued that the peasants of the non-industrialized nations and the proletariat of the industrialized nations were suffering the exploitation of international capitalism, and hence, giving rise to a need for a social revolution. China was in such a situation, therefore a social revolution was called for. In his view, of the four hundred millions in China, three hundred and fifty millions were in dire poverty. They could either fight their own way out of such a situation or allow China's economic masters, the five Great Powers, to decide their fate. He therefore saw that a social revolution was unavoidable. What was needed was for the awakened members of the proletariat class to awaken fellow-members of the same class. This, Ts'ai argued, was the Marxist way of having a social revolution. 'The capitalists of the foreign nations

---

3 Ts'ai, 'Ma-ke-ssi hsüeh-shuo yü Chung-kuo wu-ch'ien chieh-chi' (Marxist Teaching and the Chinese Proletarian Class), HCN IX No.4 (1-VIII-1921) 'Correspondence Section', pp.4-9. The letter was written on the 11 Feb. 1921.

4 Ch'en, his reply to Ts'ai, Ibid., pp.9-10.
are the masters of the proletariat in China. Therefore, to say that class struggle in China merely involved the overwhelming majority of the workers against the few pitiful local capitalists is to forget China's international economic condition. To do so is to forget that the foreign capitalists are already the masters of China's proletariat. Therefore, I firmly claim that class war in China is an international class war.\(^5\)

Looking at this concept from another perspective, what Ts'ai was saying was that there was really no difference between the peasants and the workers in the factories. In Ts'ai's view, foreign capitalism and industrialization, as well as the inability to erect a tariff barrier to protect the Chinese economy led to sufferings in rural life which Ts'ai himself had experienced. Now, living in industrialized Western Europe and working in the factories there, Ts'ai saw the same economic situation existing in France as his native Hunan in that the workers were oppressed by the owners of the means of production. Hence, if the industrial workers were calling for common ownership of the means of production, so should the workers in the rural conditions of China. This, of course, was not a new idea even in the China of the days of Ts'ai.\(^6\)

However, in the context of the development of Chinese communism, the most interesting feature of this exchange between


\(^6\) See Tung-fang tsa-chih XVIII, No.13 (10-VII-1921), pp.25-36 'Nung-yeh chih she-hui chu-i fa' (The Socialisation of the rural industries) was just a typical example of the many that this nation-wide journal published. This particular one, by Hsi Ch'en, put forward ideas that were practically the same as Ts'ai's.
Ts'ai and Ch'en was not so much the ideas of a young zealot from Hunan being enlightened by his French experience, but the timing of its publication in the pages of the HCN. Ts'ai, as has been mentioned, was not unread in Marxist literature. He translated *The Communist Manifesto* for the group of Chinese worker-students in France. He may therefore be expected, as Marx enjoined all communists, to see as the leading question in the revolutionary struggle the 'property question.'

Together with the exchange of letters between Ch'en and Ts'ai, the HCN in the very same issue, published the results of the first communist-led peasants' association in the province of Chekiang. To the contemporary readers, a conclusion might well be made that the reporting of the latter was a timely and practical illustration of the theoretical discussion. Indeed, the editorial board seemed to have been very interested in the peasant association for in the very next issue, a speech delivered at that peasant association by a leading organizer was reported in great length. These two issues of the HCN were the first two issues to be published since the first CCP Congress.

The Ya-chien Peasant Association, in Hsiao-shan hsien of Chekiang, was probably the first communist-led or inspired

---

7 Hsüan Lu, 'Nung-min tsu-chüeh' (Peasant Self-determination) HCN IX, 5 (1-IX-1921). Hsüan Lu was also the reporter to the HCN giving the account of the opening of the peasant association and its affiliated primary school, in the previous issue of the HCN. The writer could be Shen Hsüan-lu who was the father-in-law of Yang Chih-hua who later became the second wife of Ch'u Ch'iui-pai. Shen was from Cheking province and was closely associated with the CCP.
peasant association in China, although it is very little known today. Judging by its manifesto and constitution, its political allegiance was unmistakable. Its Manifesto opened with a most provocative statement, rivalling that famous manifesto by Marx and Engels thus:

In Chinese history, the peasants have been the most respected people. Unfortunately, the spirit of this respect has been drowned by the poisonous water of the capitalism of the Third Estate.

The peasants in the association might not understand who were the Third Estate, but the language certainly was in conformity with that used by the political radicals of the May 4th operation. The Manifesto went on to proclaim the rejection of the 'political system of the Third Estate' because 'the development of the economic system they worship would make the development of our poverty faster than the growth of their wealth. The pain engendered by this bad economic system is suffered equally by the workers and peasants alike.'

---

8 The other, more notable, association was P'eng P'ai's in Hai-Lu-feng which was founded in 1922. See Shinkicki Eto, 'Hai-lu-feng - The First Chinese Soviet Government' Pt. I in the China Quarterly No.8 (Oct.-Dec. 1961) pp.161-183. Eto did not mention the Ya-chien association.

9 'Ya-chien nung-min hsieh-hui hsüan-yen' (Manifesto of the Ya-chien Peasant Association), HCN IX No.4 (1-VIII-1921). It has two pages. Quote cited from p.1. According to this report, the Manifesto was proclaimed on 26-IX-1921 which was obviously impossible, given the date of publication of that issue of the HC. It could be as late as July as the 25th July was the latest letter mentioned in the Correspondence column.
Therefore, it went on, the members of the Third Estate were not worthy of the power of control of the economic system.

In so saying, the Manifesto provided a practical example to the Chinese communist concept of equating the rural poor with the urban poor. In this case, they had as their common class enemy the Third Estate, which in the rural situation meant the landlords who had ownership of the means of production. The Manifesto went on to say that

We recognize that land is the tool whereby the peasants use their strength to nurture mankind.

However, the Manifesto admitted that it would be a long time before this means of production would come to be owned by the organization of the peasants, but it, nevertheless, urged the peasants not to forget that 'the lands of the world belong to the ones who farm them.'

In its constitution, the association made their social stance abundantly clear. They stood in opposition to the landlords while regarding as good friends all 'productive workers and activists in the cause of socialism.' It admitted into membership all those who planted and cultivated their own land. While it agreed with the Manifesto that common ownership


of the means of production - land - was a distant goal not to be forgotten, the association did try to do the next best thing. It claimed for its members the right to decide on the rate of land rent and interests on loans. These were to be varied and dependent on the yearly average surplus, after the average expenditure required by the members were deducted.\(^{14}\) And, should such a decision provoke the wrath of the landlords and thus result in any legal dispute, the entire membership would become the accused. On the other hand, should any member lose his rented land as the result of the association's decision on rent, then this unemployed member's livelihood would become the responsibility of the association.\(^{15}\)

Reporter Hsüan Lu announced that the Constitution and the Manifesto were approved by a meeting of the entire village of Ya-chien and an executive committee of six had been elected.

Since their ultimate goal was still some distance away, plans were made with this long-term project in mind. Consequently, a primary school was established. Its aim, however, was quite different from that which one normally associates with a primary school. In the manifesto\(^{16}\) of this new school, a claim was made that prior to the surrendering of tariff autonomy, 'the strength and the spirit' of the great majority of the masses were 'robbed by the monarchical political system.' Since

\(^{14}\) Ibid., Art. 8.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., Art. 9.

the surrendering of tariff autonomy, there was a new robber. This was the European and American educated 'propertied class' who robbed the products of the proletariat, the class without property.

The school, therefore, was to provide the children of the proletariat the opportunity to escape from the powers of the capitalist class. The children would be educated with the aim of learning to understand and effect social changes. In short, the students were to be educated combatants in the forthcoming class struggles. Hsüan Lu reported that this manifesto for the school of peasant association was proclaimed and explained to the gathered masses on the opening day of the school. The gathering included 'workers, peasants, capitalists, landlords, bureaucrats' and students and, upon explanation, the masses understood the message. This, said Hsüan Lu, indicated the need to propagate the same message to the interior of China and to organize the peasants. 'The only thing lacking was the determination and revolutionary zeal of the educated proletariat'.

The wording of the various manifestos and the constitution clearly demonstrated that the peasant association was communist inspired. On the other hand, it would be most unlikely that those documents would be widely, or indeed easily, understood in the rural communities in which the Ya-chien association was located. To be oppressed by the 'capitalism of the Third

17 Hsüan Lu, his comments at the end of the Manifesto of the School.
"Instate' was a concept that needed much explanation to the Chinese peasant community. Thus, reporter Hsüan Lu had to explain the meanings and significance of the proclamations. And, it is of interest to note that in spite of the European expressions of the official proclamations, the explanations were in very colloquial Chinese expression. This really demonstrated a certain degree of adaptability and sophistication of the Chinese communist propagandists.

Reporter Hsüan Lu himself delivered a speech to the peasants of Hsiao-shan hsien. The audience consisted of peasants from twenty to thirty villages. He told them how they were being exploited by the lao yeh (old masters) rather than using such terms as capitalists or members of the Third Estate. Instead of arguing that the proletarian class should revolt against oppression, he reminded them that when they were children they were unable to attend schools while the children of the landlords did; that when they were sick they dared not spend much time resting because of the heavy burden of work they had to complete. And, he reminded them that they and their children would still have to work very hard only to die poor. He then reminded them that they were forced to stay poor because the results of their labour had to go to the lao yeh, while the peasants had nothing left over. In short, what would have been the surplus of the peasants' productive labour were being enjoyed by the landlords.

---

18 Hsüan Lu, 'Nung-min tzu-chüeh' (Peasant Self-determination) HCN IX, 5 (1-IX-1921), being an address given to the Hsiao-shan peasants. It has four pages.
19 Ibid., p.1.
Thus, in a way eminently understandable to any peasant, 

 introduced and explained the concept of surplus value and 

 the connotation of economic exploitation in which one class 

 suffered at the hands of another. He went on, producing 

 figures, to demonstrate how the appreciation of value of 

 reclaimed land, and their corresponding appreciation of land 

 rents were actually already paid for by the peasants—through 

 a fair evaluation of the labour put into the improvement of the 

 land by the peasants themselves. He used this to demonstrate 

 that it was not the silver of the rich that bought the land but 

 the sweat of the peasants. He went on to remind them that 

 unlike the peasants, the rich had organized groups under arms 

 to protect and extend their private property systems, and 

 reminded the peasants of the local saying that 'whatever your 

 hands can grab are yours'. Indeed, if he had wanted to, 

 he had a perfect opportunity to introduce the Proudhonist 

 concept of 'Property is Theft'.

 He then advised his audience that the only way to escape 

 the perpetuation of this fate was for the peasant to gain the 

 right of self-determination, such as the peasants in Turkey and 

 Russia were doing. The land, having been wrested from nature 

 by the labour of the peasants, should be publicly owned. But 

 to do that successfully, the peasants themselves must quickly 

 unite and organize themselves into associations. He warned them 

 against disorganized or poorly organized insurrections for this 

 \[\text{Ibid., p.2.}\]

 \[\text{Ibid., p.3.}\]
would be little better than the robbery conducted by the 'capitalist class'. He insisted that 'the country belongs to the labourers (lao-tung che).' Thus, after using the common colloquial language to introduce the new communist concepts, he concluded with the more standard appeal of class struggle.

Then, as if in response to these published reports by Hsüan Lu, Chou Fu-hai commented on the very same issue that some people were harbouring the mistaken belief that because the peasantry were generally conservative, therefore the proletariat dictatorship system would be inappropriate in China. Instead, Chou argued that 'it is just because the peasants were conservative that China needs the dictatorship system [in the socialist revolution].' And, he cited the Russian example as demonstrating the rightness of the policy. Though the Ya-chien Peasant Association had not achieved the fame of the Hai-lu-feng Soviet of P'eng P'ai, it was certainly not unnoticed by the contemporary CCP leadership. In 1923, noted labour organizer Teng Chung-hsia cited this movement in Hsiao-shan hsien as evidence that the peasants in China 'have already arrived at the period of revolutionary awakening' and that their revolutionary ability could certainly rival that of the progressive workers.

---

22 Ibid., p.4.
23 Chou Fu-hai, 'Ti-k'ei-t'ai-to chih yü nung-min' (The Dictatorship system and the peasants). HCN IX, 5 (1-IX-1921) Random Thought No.126.
24 Teng Chung-hsia, 'Lun ning-min y'un-tung' (On the Peasant Movement), Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien No.11 (29-XII-1923), pp.2-4. Quote cited from p.3. This was an organ of the CYL, and hereafter will be cited as CKCN
This was a generous accolade. But if Teng was exaggerating the achievement of the Hsiao-shan movement he was but praising it for being the first of such peasant movements, and was doing no more than acknowledging what must have been common knowledge of the time. In the self-same sentence, Teng mentioned other movements in diverse areas and regions of China. They were P'ing-hsiang in Kiangsi province which commenced a similar movement in 1922 and where another one had just commenced in the same province in Ma-chia-ts'un. Then, there were the other peasant movements in Yen-tien in the Ch'ing-tao area, the Hai-feng movement in Kwangtung and the Heng-shan movement in Hunan. In the context of this discussion, Teng's view is of particular interest for it indicates that to the contemporary Chinese communists, the activities in Hsiao-shan hsien marked the first of their peasant movements. Furthermore, the movement in Chekiang was adjudged as the beginning of the general peasant awakening and the more familiar Hai-feng movement was but one of many. Indeed, Teng regarded the peasantry as one of the three main forces of the revolution, the other two being the workers and soldiers.

At the time of the founding of the Ya-chien Peasant Association, the CCP still had no formally established department on rural activities. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the ideological orientation of the Ya-chien Peasant Association was that of the CCP and, as has been noted in 1923,

25 Teng, Ibid., p.3.
26 Ibid., p.2.
Teng Chung-hsia proudly claimed that was the first expression of the revolutionary awakening of the peasants, as with the situation in Hai-feng. What these reports and statements indicate, therefore, was that from the very inception of the CCP, various members were already taking the programme of social revolution and class struggle to the countryside though there was no formal rural department in the Party. In the early years of the CCP, with such a small membership and the omnipresence of physical danger from the various warlords there was little organizational coherence. Indeed, when the Ya-chien Association was founded, the Party had about 57 members - that being the generally accepted membership.

Nevertheless, as Teng reported, there were movements, similar to the Ya-chien one, starting in other regions of China by individual members or groups of members. The best known of these were the ones in Hai-feng and Lu-feng organized by P'eng P'ai. However, that the Hai-lu-feng movement was more successful was due, at least in part, to the sympathetic attitudes of the local warlord - Ch'en Chiung-ming - who had demonstrated certain degrees of socialist inclination, even to the extent of inviting the well-known radical thinker, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, as the Commissioner of Education for Kwangtung when the Warlord was the governor.

---

27 For detailed development of the Hai-lu-feng movement, see Shinkichi Eto, 'Hai-lu-feng - The First Soviet Government' Pts.1 and 2, The China Quarterly Nos.8 & 9 (Oct. and Jan.1961/2). Here, Professor Eto demonstrated clearly that the Soviet depended very much on the attitudes of Ch'en Chiung-ming.
However, the lack of a central organization did not imply the lack of interest on the part of the Chinese communists on the peasant movement. Until the CCP joined forces with the KMT in their National Government in Canton, the Chinese communists had no secure territorial base. And, without such a base, peasant movements must perforce be regional, relying much on the ability of the regional leadership to survive the hostile environment. On the other hand, the peasantry formed an integral part, indeed a main part, in the Chinese communism that was being developed during the early years of the Party. Certainly, while the Chinese communists, and some others in China, had long come to regard China as a proletarian nation, the majority of the proletarian class were regarded as unawakened to their objective reality. Hence, there was a need, an urgent need, for the party of the proletariat, the CCP, to enlighten the masses of their social-economic-political situation. To this end, another noted labour organizer of the CCP, Chang Kuo-t'ao, in discussing the political duties of the educated class, concluded in these ringing exhortations:28

If they are true patriots and truly want to reconstruct China, they must unite with the revolutionary socialists in China, and have as their common goal the overthrow of the Foreign Powers and the warlords and to build a united, peaceful, free, and independent China. And, together, bring this message to

---

28 Chang Kuo-t'ao, 'Chih-shih chieh-chi ts'ai cheng-chih shang ti ti-wei chi ch'i tse-jen' (The Political Position and Duties of the Educated class), Hsiang Tao No.12 (6-XII-1922), pp.98-100. Quotation cited in p.100.
every village, every factory, every shop, and every school, and, to organize them to take part in this urgent political struggle. If they understand their position and duties, they will not shrink from them but will endeavour to win for China the revolutionary victory similar to that of Turkey. (emphasis added)

It might be little more than political sloganeering to include the villages as a target for the duties of the educated class and place the peasants as one of the targets of their propaganda effort. But, in the context of the development of Chinese communism, the fact that both Teng and Chang who were more noted at that time for their work as labour organizers saw it necessary to include such a slogan was of great importance. It indicates that in their conception of the social revolution there was a direct need to involve the peasantry, and an urgent need. The fact that as a party the Chinese communists were unable to bring into effect their desired revolutionary programme was of less concern. At the time of writing, at the end of 1922, the CCP had no territorial base and a membership of about two hundred. Thus, they were in a position to do little more than create propaganda. And, in their propaganda, the peasant movement had a central place in their programme of the social revolution.

Indeed, it may be argued that the Chinese communists could not be expected to do anything else. As noted earlier, they became communists and launched their social revolution because they perceived that the objective realities of China called for their efforts to lead a revolution. All that remained to be done
and hence the positions and the duties of the presumably politically enlightened and educated, would be to inform the masses of these objective realities and to awaken them into action and to liberate themselves. When the opportunities presented themselves, as in Hsiao-shan and Hai-lu-feng, there were the awakened members of the educated proletariat to lead and to try to enlighten and organize.

As the peasant masses formed the overwhelming majority of the Chinese population, any effort to propagandize them would require a very significant force of propagandists. And, until the CCP had their territorial base they were in no position to train such an army of propagandists. But, their very acceptance of communism constrained them to act thus, otherwise they would, intellectually and politically, lose the very rationale for their existence as a political party. If China was a proletariat nation needing only someone to enlighten the proletarian masses, then members of the political party of the proletariat - and, by definition, that was how every communist party member must regard themselves - must make the effort. And, as demonstrated, they considered that the hour to launch their revolution was at hand.

In short, then, until the founding of a special training school for rural cadres - and such an idea would have been out of the question when the CCP had no territorial base - there was only one group whom the Chinese communists could turn to for help. They were the educated class that Chang Kuo-t'aO mentioned. More precisely, this educated class meant student, middle school students who formed the target of the communist
propaganda. Thus, the CCP strategy in these early years involved a two-tier effort. Firstly, they had to awaken the members of this educated class to their tasks and to accept the CCP's conception of the objective realities in China. Then, this educated class would become so enlightened and awakened that they would undertake the revolutionary task in the countryside. To be sure, in the process of realizing this, the two-tier strategy would merge and the boundaries of the tiers would not be easily defined. However, in order to investigate the CCP strategy on the peasant movement in these early years, we would need to examine the ways in which the communist student movement was being conducted. This may well be regarded as a fortunate coincidence, because it is difficult, by definition, to have records on the propaganda messages to the illiterates. But because the CCP were using the students as their agents, we can examine the communist messages to the peasants through a study of what the students were taught to propagate, and how to propagate.

It may be argued that in making use of the students the Chinese communists were approaching the peasant movement with less than total seriousness. However, to do so would be to disregard the history of the CCP and the background of the Chinese communists. It was true that much of the work done in the peasant movements was by members of the Socialist (or, Communist) Youth Corps led by members of the CCP. These youths were the students who had sided with the communist cause, just as many of the leading members of the CCP had done. Such leaders of the CCP as Teng and Chang, as well as Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai,
Tsai-Ho-sen, P'eng Shu-chih, Chou Fo-hai, and leaders of the SYC such as Yun Tai-ying and Shih Chuan-tung, were students of the May 4th generation who, like the students they were now propagating the message to, followed such teachers as Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao into the CCP.

Given such a background, it becomes quite understandable that Chang Kuo-t'ao should tell the students that they had two duties, one was to work for the benefits of the students themselves and the second and greater one was their political duty to their nation. But, this former student-activist warned that while the students in China occupied an important position in society, 'if they are divorced from the masses, the students will achieve nothing. If the merchants, workers, peasants, or soldiers can learn to organize themselves and be awakened, their strength and effectiveness will be much greater than that of the students.'

Therefore, he saw that the greatest task students could perform, and the most important and urgently required task, was 'to go into the midst of the people to propagate ... I hope that all the students of China will not forget to unite closely and intimately with the people and not to leave the people ... those students who have the spirit of revolution will quickly go to the people to propagate the revolutionary message.'

In the mind of Chang, while the students were not a power group, they were certainly the most active.

---

29 Chang Kuo-tao, 'Hsiieh-sheng yün-tung ti wo chien' (My View on the Students Movement), Hsiang Tao No.17 (24-I-1923) pp.138-140. Quotation cited from p.139.

30 Ibid., p.140.
This was indeed the official policy adopted by the First National Congress of the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps, held in Canton in May 1922. It was at this meeting that the name was changed from Communist YC to Socialist YC. The original name, however, was re-adopted during the Third Congress of the Corps in 1925. At the First Congress of the SYC the members took the view that

At this stage of the revolutionary struggle and in view of the political and economic conditions in China, we, the proletariat, and the poverty stricken peasants should help each other in this revolutionary struggle; and together form the real strength of the proletariat. We must not adopt the posture of a bystander or take a position in opposition [to the above decision] else the life of the feudal system will be prolonged.

Furthermore, the Congress reminded its members that while they would all hope to achieve victory in the democratic revolution, such a victory did not mean a total liberation. On the contrary, upon the successful conclusion of the democratic revolution would come the revolutionary movement in which the proletariat would oppose the capitalist class. 'The aim of this revolution is the adoption of the worker-peasant system. That is, the

31 See the official explanation given at the 3rd Congress whose Manifesto asserted that it was time to make its identity unambiguous. The Manifesto was published in CKCN No.69, pp.295-8 (7-III-1925).

32 Cited from the Preamble of the SYC Constitution. A report on this Congress together with its Manifesto and Resolutions were published in HCN IX, No.6, pp.117-129 (1-VII-1922). Quotation cited from pp.119-120.
political power will reside with the proletariat. The speed that this revolution will take to be realized will depend on the international situation and the organizational ability and power of the Chinese proletariat class.\textsuperscript{33}

Among the many resolutions passed by the Congress was one concerning education. It had five sections but it is Section One that is of interest to this context. This concerned the Education Movement of the Young Workers and the Young Peasants.\textsuperscript{34} On the latter, the Resolution took the view that as 'the young peasants were more backward than the young workers, special endavour should be made on their education movement so that they will understand their social position and that unless communism is realized, they will not be liberated.' The method they decided to employ was to spread socialism through the medium of village schools as well as helping the peasants to organize peasant associations.

What the SYC Congress had resolved to do in their peasant movement, as we have demonstrated, were really amplifying and formalizing what most of them had read in the pages of the HCN concerning what had happened in the Ya-chien Peasant Association in Chekiang. Since the Congress was a national organ, there was thus a need to formalize policies. However, looking at the peasant policies of the Chinese communists from the perspective of the development of Chinese communism, we are constrained to

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p.120. That is, from the Preamble.

\textsuperscript{34} Cited from Ibid., p.126.
conclude that the Chinese communists came to their conclusions independent of the directives of the Comintern. Their international comrades sent the Chinese directives in May 1923 which were to be discussed at the 3rd CCP Congress in July 1923. But, as has been demonstrated, the Chinese communists were already having some practical experiences some considerable time prior to the sending of these gems of wisdom.

To argue thus is not to deny Soviet influence in the development of Chinese communism. Detailed accounts of the rural developments in Soviet Russia had long been reported on the pages of the HCN and the Ya-chien Peasant Association was obviously modelled after the Soviet models. However, what is being submitted here is that as with so many facets of the development of Chinese communism, the peasant policies of the Chinese communists were much influenced by the Soviet situation, but the influences did not come as the result of Comintern directives. They came as the result of the Chinese communists reading and observing the situation in Russia and then decided on their own models. We may say that the Chinese adoption of foreign communist ideas, from Marx to the Russians, was an active process and not a passive one of merely acting under Comintern instruction or direction.

The Young Socialists seemed to be young people who meant what they had resolved. In the coming months, they became very

35 The directives were published in Eudin and North, Op. cit., pp. 344-346.
36 See, for example, HCN VII Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 (1-XI, 1-XII-1920); 1-I, 1-IV-1921) as well as all subsequent Numbers in 1921 where many articles on rural development in Soviet Russia were published in Chinese translations.
active and achieved considerable success, so much so that they were being deeply resented and feared by their ideological and political opponents. However, while contemporary non-communist reports gave witness to the disruptive effects of these communist-led peasant activities and thus provided eloquent witness to the effectiveness of the programme of 'student-organized peasant forces', there seems to be some doubt as to whether the CCP leadership was unanimous in their devotion to the peasant movement.

This doubt seemed to have been echoed by Teng Chung-hsia and the cause of this uncertainty seemed to have been certain statements made by Ch'en Tu-hsiu. In the CKCN Teng published a series of articles on the 'three main forces of the revolution' - the workers, the peasants, and the soldiers. In his first of two studies on the peasant movement, Teng spent considerable time in demonstrating that 'the Chinese peasants have already arrived at the stage of revolutionary awakening' and added that the more 'enlightened warlords, such as Feng Yu-hsiang' had already taken note and advantage of this. While Teng used such expressions as 'proved', 'I am certain' and even mentioned that 'though

37 See Wah Tse Yat Pao (The Chinese Mail), 31 March and 4 April 1924 reporting the disruption caused by the SYC in Shun-te. It claimed that the work was initially started by Tan Ping-shan about a year ago. A Foreign Correspondent also noted 'student-organized peasant forces' instigated by the Kwangtung Regime was causing chaos in China. See The Chaos in China (n.p. 1923) being reprints of articles in the Peking & Tientsin Times, June and July 1923, p.48; in the Hankow Collection, HKU.

38 Teng, 'Lun Nung-min yun-tung' (On the Peasant Movement) CKCN No.11 (29-XII-1923), pp.2-4. Teng was not praising Feng per se but only said that Feng was able to take advantage of latent revolutionary energy of the peasants.
theoretically there is little chance of a peasant revolution but if we realistically examine ..., he refrained from announcing the name of the person with whom he was debating.

In his second article, however, the mystery was solved. In his opening paragraph, he lamented the neglect of the peasant problems by the various sections of the community especially the neglect shown by the press and other publishing media. He then mentioned that there had only been one good discussion on the peasant situation and that was an article in the CCP journal Ch'ien-feng (Vanguard) entitled 'The Chinese Peasant Problems'.

Teng claimed that this article by Ch'en was accurate in its analysis of the peasant conditions in China and 'may be used for references'. What he would do, however, would be to describe the 'conditions of the peasant movement. If this is understood, we may then understand the strength and the degree of the peasants' awakening as well as their position in the revolutionary movement'.

Teng then went on to describe quite fully the developments in Hai-feng and Heng-shan, the two peasant movements in Kwangtung and Hunan respectively, on the ground that when he wrote his first study on the peasant movement he did not have all the sources. Having called in these two witnesses on the success of communist-led peasant movements, Teng concluded that the

---

39 Teng, 'Chung-kuo nung-min chuang-k'uang chi wo-men yün-tung ti fang-chen' (The Conditions of the Chinese Peasants and the Directions of our Movement) CKCN No.13 (5-I-1924), pp.5-10. Quote cited from p.5. Ch'en's article was published on the 1st July 1923.
40 Teng, Ibid., p.5.
strength of the peasants' awakening has already arrived at the stage where the peasants would dare to resist the oppressing class. Such brave actions compare favourably with the striking Hong Kong seamen and the railwaymen of the Peking-Hankow Railways. This is really a happy phenomenon for the future of China's revolution!" \(^41\)

To be sure, there were other statements by Ch'en that Teng could have mentioned although in saying what he had already said, his readers were left in no doubt that he was more optimistic about the chances of success and the revolutionary elan of the Chinese peasants. In this article by Ch'en which Teng referred to, the Party Leader felt that the present need for China was a national movement to eliminate the influence of the foreign Powers and to overthrow the warlords and bureaucrats.

'Therefore, the peasant question cannot be neglected because over 70% of the Chinese people are peasants.' \(^42\) He had the rural society divided into ten segments, ranging from the large landlords to the hired labourers. While he did claim that the landlords 'use the methods of capitalism to rob others of their surplus labour and thus should be regarded as belonging to the middle class', \(^43\) he did exhibit a certain lack of confidence in the potential of the revolutionary elan of the peasants. He saw

\(^{41}\) Teng, Ibid., p.9.


\(^{43}\) Ch'en, Ibid., p.53.
only 40% of the rural population as 'landless peasants' who would be expected to join the revolutionary ranks and even this figure had to include those who own some land but not enough for subsistence without selling out their labour. Thus, in his insistence on demonstrating the readiness of the peasant masses for revolutionary action, Teng was really making his reply to the lack of faith on the part of his leader who had exhibited uncertainty and low opinion on the revolutionary preparedness of the peasants.

At the time of his writing, the 29th December 1923, Teng could have cited some even less encouraging remarks by Ch'en on the peasants. However, these latter remarks have not been unnoticed by modern scholars because these latter remarks seemed to point to some strong disagreement within the leadership of the CCP. Shortly after this article in the Ch'ien-feng, which must have been written before the 3rd CCP Congress which was in session when the journal was published, Ch'en made a reply to a reader's letter in the Hsiang Tao on the peasantry. In this oft-quoted reply, Ch'en wrote:

---

44 Ibid., pp.53-4.
45 Ch'en 'Reply to reader', Hsiang Tao No.34, p.258 (1-VIII-1923. This was cited by Eto, Op.cit., P1, see Note 59. Eto argued that "Ch'en ... [and] the Central Headquarters of the CCP did not take an active part in the peasant movement". (p.178). Five years later, Stuart Schram, quoting the same article, agreed with Eto. (See Schram's Mao Tse-tung [Pelican 1966] pp.78-9). Schram also cited an article by Ch'en in the HCN-Q 4 (Dec. 1924) to show that Ch'en remained the same during that period. Schram, however, conceded that some individual communists worked within the KMT on the peasant movement, during the early years.
According to my humble opinion, Sir, your proposal that there should be a communist movement in the villages is somewhat romantic. This is so because a communist movement needs the factory workers as their main force. Amongst the small peasants in China, over half are self-supporting (i.e. owning sufficient land for subsistence). In this petty-capitalist class, their conception of private ownership is strangely strong. How can we conduct a communist movement? ... At the present time, only the national movement is suitable for the villages. Besides, the national movement is China's urgent need, and only the national movement can overthrow the warlords and open the way for a communist movement.

To be fair to Ch'en, there were extenuating circumstances for those remarks in the Hsiang Tao and the HCN-Q. On the former occasion, Ch'en was replying to a reader who wanted a purely proletariat communist revolutionary movement. While the Chinese communists, even in 1923, had expressed different views on the nature of the national revolution to those of the KMT, it would be impolitic and impractical for Ch'en or any Chinese communist to espouse openly a purely communist movement. Indeed, as we have noted, Ch'en had always eschewed such exclusivist revolutionary movements and tendencies. On the latter occasion, in late 1924, the Chinese communists were then insisting that only the proletariat class was capable and worthy of leading the national revolution. By then, while the CCP was still talking about a national revolution, it was a national revolution entailing class struggle within the ranks of the nationalists.
Therefore, this latter statement, as well as the one in Hsiang Tao, should be read against such a background.

However, Ch'en did mention, in a very pointed way, the revolutionary unpreparedness of the peasants. This statement, if read in context, was much stronger than the ones heretofore cited and Teng would have noticed it. It was published in December 1923, again in the Ch'ien-feng, shortly before Teng wrote his articles. Here, Ch'en was discussing the various social classes in the national revolution in China. Here, Ch'en took great pains to emphasize that the national revolution which he was concerned about was not a democratic (min-chu) revolution but a class struggle.

To be sure, this argument was quite a conventional one for the Chinese communists. It simply meant that as China was a semi-colonial state the proletariat was not yet strong enough to wage a revolutionary struggle against the imperialists and capitalists without the aid of some other allies from other classes. Hence, in view of the peculiar economic and political situation in China, a national revolution was needed, but only to pave the way for a socialist revolution. This was how Ch'en argued his case here. Writing on the eve of the inauguration of the KMT-CCP National Government and KMT Party Congress in Canton, he, not unexpectedly emphasized the importance of a 'united front strategy of many classes', as he explained, 'even

46 Ch'en, 'Chung-kuo kuo-min ke-ming yü she-hui ke chieh-chi' (The Chinese National Revolution and the various social classes) Ch'ien-feng No.2 (1-XII-1923), pp.1-9. Teng's articles were published on the 29th XII 1923 and 5-I-1924.
in advanced countries, the capitalist revolution, their capitalist classes used the slogan of the whole people - ch'uan-min - in their attack on the aristocracy. 47

However, he did see certain peculiar points for the Chinese situation. He argued that 'from now on, in the national movement, the merchants, workers, and peasants naturally become the main motive forces of the revolution, but the revolutionary elements of "intellectual" class - chih-shih - will act as links of the various classes and the student movement is a case in point.' Here Ch'en was, in fact, reverting back to the very traditional view of Chinese society. He actually used the traditional term shih to denote the chih-shih or intellectual class. 48 He was seeing Chinese society in the traditional four classes, the shih (scholars), nung (peasants), kung (workers), shang (merchants). During the May 4th period and since then, the national movement had seen the shih class at the centre stage. This, Ch'en claimed, was a sign of development. This was the Third Stage of the national movement, with the events of 1898 Reform as the First Stage and the 1911 Revolution as the Second Stage. The next stage would be characterised by the withdrawal of the capitalist class from the national movement. 49

In accordance with the Marxist-Leninist framework of analysis, Ch'en regarded this new shih class as one without economic

47 Ch'en, Ibid., pp.2-3.
48 Ch'en, Ibid., pp.4-5.
49 Ibid., p.2.
foundation and therefore not an independent class, but with wavering political views and could be revolutionary as well as counter-revolutionary.

While what Ch'en had said hitherto had been quite unexceptional, he had some strange things to say concerning the peasant movement. In a 'communist social revolution, one would naturally seek the peasants' sympathy and help because such a revolution needs the strong proletariat class as his main force.' But he also saw problems with the concept of private ownership so prevalent amongst the peasants, with 'everyone wanting to be a landlord.' Therefore he suggested that

The Chinese peasant movement must wait until the successful conclusion of the national revolution before being activated. [It will commence] after the development of national industries, after the general capitalization of agriculture, after the agricultural proletariat can develop and be concentrated, only then will the villages have their true communist social revolution, or the need to have one. (emphasis added)

Indeed, he used the term fanciful to describe any call for the inclusion of the peasantry or the peasant movement into the national movement because 'we cannot satisfy their demands and they cannot realistically join our movement. [If they join] it would indeed be a great loss to the urgent needs of the national revolution'.

50 Ibid., pp.6-7.
Given these remarks from Ch'en, what Teng wrote in the pages of CKCN may thus be regarded as a polite but firm rejection of the Party Leader's perception. To be sure, the proponents of the peasant movement in the Chinese Communist Party, such as labour leaders Teng and Chang Kuo-t'ao and others, had taken a position quite dissimilar to that taken by the Comintern directives of May 1923. The Comintern's position was that the 'revolution can be victorious if it becomes possible to draw into the movement the basic masses of the Chinese population, that is the peasants with small holdings.'\(^5^1\) As noted, Ch'en in his article in the July issue of The Vanguard, saw strong capitalistic tendencies in this group. Furthermore, the Comintern saw 'the peasant problem [becoming] the central point of the entire policy of the CCP.'\(^5^2\) Ch'en, by December 1923, saw the peasant movement as detrimental to the Chinese national movement while Teng tended to agree with the Comintern comrades, but only up to a point.

The Comintern insisted that the peasant movement must call for the 'confiscation of landlords' land, confiscation of monastery and church land, and the passing of this land to the peasants without compensation; the abolition of the practice of the starvation lease; abolition of the existing system of taxation; of the practice of the 'squeeze'; abolition of the customs barriers between provinces; destruction of the institution


of tax-farmers [otkupshchiki], abolition of the mandarinate; creation of organs of peasant self-government to take charge of the confiscation of land, and so forth, and so forth.\(^5^3\)

In calling for the abolition of monastic and church land, the Comintern comrades seemed to have been more influenced by the situation in Russia than China; and, if the Chinese comrades decided to pay little notice to the details of these directives, then their actions are very understandable, especially in view of their insistence on the special conditions of the Chinese revolution not to mention the rather obviously inappropriate nature of some of these directives.

Besides, the Chinese communists had long been involved with their own peasant movement before the arrival of these words of wisdom from afar. From as early as the Ya-chien Peasant Association in 1921, the Chinese communists had come to the conclusion that the total abolition of the landlords would take a long time, involving a process of education and propaganda. The prospect was not one of rapid success, nevertheless, they accepted the challenge with an undaunted spirit, with perhaps the above mentioned exceptional expressions of Ch'en.

Those remarks by Ch'en deserve further investigation for they might not be in total accord with the overall revolutionary perception of Ch'en. Contemporaneous to the expression of those cited views, Ch'en also published contrary ideas. In the

\(^{5^3}\) Ibid., Directive No.3.
opening issue of the CKCN, Ch'en, writing in one of his commonly known pen-names, admonished the young readers, the students, that while they were the more awakened people in China, they should not forget that their strength was not great and that they certainly 'cannot match the merchants, workers, or peasants in strength for conducting class struggles.' Their task, the former professor advised, was to awaken the other classes and endeavour to link the various classes together in a national united front. Unless Ch'en in 1923 was involved in some deep-seated intra-party dispute or being very inconsistent, and there is no real evidence to support either proposition, one is constrained to re-examine what Ch'en meant by the term 'peasant movement' - nung-min yün-tung - when he used it in December 1923.

In this particular article, the main thrust of the message was that no one class, not even the workers, should embark on the revolutionary task single-handed because of the special political and economic situation in China. On the contrary, he urged that the various classes - merchants, workers, peasants, and scholars (shang, kung, nung, shih) should work together for a united front in a national revolution. In the section in which he discussed the peasants, he commenced with the words 'the peasants form an overwhelming majority of the population of China, naturally they give great strength to the national

54 Shih An (Ch'en) 'Ch'ing-nien men ying-kai tsen yang tso!' (How should the Young People Act!) CKCN No.1 (20-X-1923) pp.2-3. Quotation cited from p.3.
revolution. If the Chinese peasants do not join the national revolution it will never succeed as a mass revolution.' Yet, it concluded with the sentiment that to launch a peasant movement now would be detrimental to the national revolution. We are thus constrained to investigate what Ch'en meant by the concept of a 'peasant movement'.

Ch'en was in fact espousing sentiments similar to the reply he made to the reader of the Hsiang Tao when asked if a communist social revolution should be launched in the villages. Ch'en was, in December 1923, as he was in August, firmly against it. Yet, in the intervening months, he had admonished the students to launch their movement to awaken the peasants. A plausible explanation for all these seeming contradictions may be culled from all these statements. Here we found the Chinese communists launching themselves into a peasant association movement, quite independent of the Comintern directives, in 1921. By 1923, they had started a number of such movements in many parts of China with varying degrees of success. Their experience had taught them that, as in the Hai-lu-feng associations, much depended on not antagonizing the local warlord too much unless there was a countervailing force. Indeed, in their first attempt, even before they experienced any opposition in the Ya-chien Peasant Association, they admitted that common ownership of land, however justified, would only be realized after a prolonged progress of struggle.

55 Ch'en, Ch'ien-feng, No.2, Section 5, pp.5-6 (1-XII-1929)
Now, the Chinese communists found that suddenly their Comintern comrades, having decided to take part in the national revolution, presented them with a set of obviously inappropriate directives. It was not that the Chinese communists were not interested in having a peasant movement or involving the peasants in their national revolution. What the Chinese communists objected to was a communist-styled revolution in the villages which the Comintern directives entailed. To the Chinese such directives were impractical and unrealistic, and the Comintern comrades, in calling for the abolition of monastic and church holdings, had demonstrated that they were but transplanting their Russian experience to China. The Chinese communists seemed determined to maintain their own policies because their perception of the objective realities in China constrained them to their own conclusions — both in their dealings with the peasants and in other aspects of the revolutionary development. This was not to say that the Chinese communists were always successful in maintaining their independence but merely to show that the development of Chinese communism was not always being directed by the Comintern comrades. Viewed thus, the positions of Teng and Ch'en were really not so dissimilar because both disagreed with the policies of massive abolition called for in the Comintern directives. While the Chinese scheme was also aimed at a rural class struggle, the Chinese communists realized that the exploited class had to be awakened first.

Ch'en was in fact in substantial agreement with Teng and the proclaimed programme of the movement in Ya-chien. In his
article in The Vanguard, while agreeing that the peasants formed a major motive force in the national revolution, Ch'en was also arguing against those who felt that 'the peasants will immediately commence a communist-styled socialist revolutionary movement.'\textsuperscript{56} It was such a style of 'peasant movement' that he was against and he described such ideas as 'crude'. But, he was of the opinion that the peasants should participate in the national revolution. However, he did depart from Teng in \textit{relegating} the communist-styled socialist revolution in the rural sector until after mechanization of the rural industries. It would be unlikely that the Party Leader should consider that it was his duty to correct a reader's allegedly mistaken ideas more than once, and to report this correction in a theoretical journal. Up to that period, apart from this reader of the Hsiang Tao, the only person or organization urging such a radical rural policy of land confiscation on the CCP was the Comintern. While Ch'en did not mention the Comintern in this article but used the vague expression 'some people', it may be reasonable to assume that Ch'en had in mind these Comintern directives.

According to a Japanese source, the 3rd Congress of the CCP did water down the rural policy directives of the Comintern.\textsuperscript{57} In a number of ways, the method of rural propaganda, and the message, were distinctly different from those which the Comintern had directed. Teng, while showing great pride and enthusiasm in reporting the peasant associations in Hai-feng,

\textsuperscript{56} Ch'en, \textit{Ibid.}, p.5.

and Heng-shan and elsewhere, even likening them to the striking seamen and railwaymen, and looking forward to a nation-wide co-ordinated movement, strongly warned the student-activists to be realistic and not to be carried away by their enthusiasm. He placed great emphasis on organizations, hoping to unite the peasants into associations by appealing to their self-interests. Indeed, he urged the students to induce the peasants to identify their interests with the associations that the students would be forming.\textsuperscript{58}

However, on the method of educating and indoctrinating the peasants, the students were strongly advised not to adopt as their slogan 'communist revolution' because\textsuperscript{59}

in China, the hired-labourers are not as numerous as the self-supporting peasants or the tenants ... and because the peasants still have strong views on private ownership. He then reminded the students of the wise words of 'Mr. Ch'en Tu-hsiu who said:\textsuperscript{60}

They oppose the landlords only because they want to transfer what the landlords own to themselves.

Therefore, Teng warned that if 'high slogans' were used, the peasants might be scared away. He therefore advised that the

\textsuperscript{58} Teng, 'The Conditions of the Chinese Peasants and the Directions of our Movement', \textit{CKCN} No.13 (5-I-1924), p.9.
\textsuperscript{59} Teng, \textit{Ibid.}, pp.9-10.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Ibid.}, p.10.
slogans should be 'restricted to "Limitations on Rent", "Limitations on Ownership", "Overthrow the Corrupt bureaucrats and gentry", "Overthrow the Warlords", "Boycott Foreign Goods", and "Realize the National Revolution"', and so forth. He was very emphatic on these issues.

In advising the student-activists to be cautious, Teng was certainly not telling these youngsters to disregard their ultimate aim of gaining control of the country. In advising the students on revolutionary methods, Teng simply suggested that the various economic issues were devices to induce the peasants to identify the economic programme of the peasant associations with their own interests. However, there was to be the political side of the movement. This involved free elections and popular control of such financial expenditures as irrigation. But more importantly, Teng urged the students to work towards a democratization of the min-t'uan, or peasants militia. These organizations, as Teng pointed out, were traditionally under the control of the gentry or large landowners who, being wealthier and hence better armed, were stronger than the peasant associations. While the landlords might use the militia to ward off the bandits, if the militia could become organized by the peasants, 'then, when the opportunity comes, they can be used as the army for the revolution.'

He reminded his readers that in Hai-feng, in spite of the numerical strength

61 Teng, Ibid., p.10.
62 Ibid., p.10.
of the peasant associations, they were eventually defeated because they could not match the military might of Ch'en Ch'ung-ming's troops.\footnote{63}

So it was that as members of the CCP openly joined the KMT in January 1924, the Chinese communists had already devised a strategy for their rural activities. Certainly, they were adopting the slogan of a national revolution and not a communist-socialist revolution, but they took such a step only because of necessity, and they openly regarded such a move as a strategic retreat. More importantly, they let it be known that the strategy of a national revolution was but the initial step towards the goal of an eventual take-over of the political powers. For a well-known communist such as Teng Chung-hsia to publish such a statement could not but cast doubt on the credibility of the protestations of Li Ta-chao at the KMT Congress. And, the contemporary observers, such as the Chinese Mail of Hong Kong and the Correspondent of the Peking and Tientsin Times certainly had cause to worry about the communist agitation in the Chinese countryside.

That the Chinese communists had intended that their point of view be known publicly, and to the KMT, was quite evident. Indeed, in expressing his views on the various 'main forces', especially the peasants, on the national revolution, Teng and his fellow communists had the imminent KMT Congress in mind. Shortly after the new KMT Constitution was published, the CKCN published a lengthy two-part critique on the constitution by a

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.10.}
regular contributor to the journal. While expressing general approval of the programme, the writer urged that the KMT should carry out their promises to the workers and peasants. But the author let it be known that for the KMT to earn or deserve their leadership in the national revolution in the labour and peasant movements, then the KMT was expected to carry out the programme as discussed by Teng Chung-hsia, and not simply regard the poor in the cities and countryside as merely vagabonds and bandits. These people, the writer claimed, were victims of the social system and the national revolution was the means to rectify the system. Indeed, he went on, in a national revolution the aim of the revolutionary government 'must be to emphasize the benefits of the peasants, workers and the vagabonds.'

Furthermore, the CKCN was insistent that their rural programme was not the same as the so-called New Village programme of the May 4th 'dreams'. These earlier ones were inspired by the Tolstoy-model and not based on the concept of

---

64 Tan Yi, 'P'ing Kuo-min-tang cheng-kang' (Critique on the Political Programme of the KMT) in 2 parts CKCN Nos.18-9 (16-II-23, II-1924), pp.1-4 and pp.1-7.
65 Ibid., Part I, p.3.
66 Ibid., Part II, p.5.
67 Tan Yi, 'Ho wei kuo-min ke-ming?' (What is the National Revolution) CKCN No.20 (1-III-1924), pp.1-6. Quote from p.3.
68 Lin Ken, 'Huang-kang ti hsiang-ts'un chiao-yü yün-tung' (The Village Educational Movement of Huang-kang) CKCN No.20, pp.6-9. Lin was formerly a member of the New Village Movement.
class struggle that the Chinese communists were now espousing. To be sure, some of the workers of the new programme had personally experienced the New Village programme but they now looked back on their experience as one of childish dreaming. For now, their aim was to prepare the peasants to embark on the road to economic and political struggle. They did not expect rapid success for they realized that apart from the shortage of manpower to carry out the programme to such a wide area, there was also a shortage of money. Therefore, in the initial stages, the students were counselled not to antagonize the local notables until their own movement's foundations were established. Indeed, the students were told that if necessary they might even enlist the help of these notables though ultimately the aim of the movement was to suppress the oppressors of the masses.

As to their new collaborator - the KMT - the Chinese communists informed their following of student-activists that the relationship between the two parties was certainly not of antagonism. Yun Tai-ying, a leading figure of the SYC, informed his readers that Sun Yat-sen was a sincere old revolutionary. But, Yun added, Sun 'is already a sixty-years old man ... the Chinese revolution, I am afraid, is not a matter that concerns Mr. Sun alone. As to how to improve a revolutionary party, I

---

69 Ibid., pp.8-9.
70 Ibid., p.9.
am afraid it is also not a matter solely the responsibility of Mr. Sun. What Yun wanted was for the KMT to be 'like the Bolshevik Party in Russia.' Warming up to the theme, Yun revealed his great dissatisfaction with the then current programme of the KMT. As with his CCP colleagues in other spheres of the collaboration, Yun also took the view that he was in basic agreement with the Three Principles of Sun but that the Chinese communists felt that the KMT had been misapplying or had misunderstood the Principles. To Yun and his communist colleagues, the Three Principles meant 'the leading of the workers, peasants, and soldiers and the ordinary citizens ... into the revolution. This would be many tens of times more effective than the present military movements. Therefore, I am of the opinion that all those who desire to remake society must help him (that is, Sun).'

In short, then, the leaders of the SYC were instructing their young followers that the KMT had, hitherto, inaccurately understood the real meaning of the national revolution. Thus, he hoped and urged that 'all will try hard to change and improve the KMT so that it can properly shoulder the task of the revolution.'

---

71 Yun Tai-ying, 'Tsao tang' (The Making of a Party), CKCN No.21 (8-III-1924), pp.7-11. Cited from p.8. This article was a reply to a query from a reader on the best way to help China.

72 Yun, Ibid., p.9.

73 Ibid., p.9.

74 Ibid., p.10.
The rural strategy of the CCP, at the commencement of the official collaboration with the KMT in the Canton National Government was thus made abundantly clear. The activists were told not to reveal their communist identity too quickly or openly partly because to do so might antagonize the powerful elements on the land and partly that might scare away their ideologically backward quarry. They were instructed to adopt slogans of a national revolution and identify themselves as members of the KMT, which in fact they were. But, in practice, they were to interpret the KMT message in a fashion quite unlike what the KMT members had hitherto done. In fact, the message and the image of the KMT were to be remade into the communist mould. As one field worker reported, 'We should not merely remember to "Recover Lü-Ta" or "Remember Lenin" ... but we should also pay attention to, and make use of, every local incident to teach the masses so that they will learn to resist [oppression] and rise up to join the revolution.'

To be sure, many of these student-activists in the fields would need more than the advice and directives such as those given by Teng. But, it was apparent that the advices of Teng were very seriously taken. One young man reported that in the Hupei region where he was working, the peasants were rather more backward than the picture painted by Teng and wrote to the CKCN for help. Yun Tai-ying not only counselled patience but

75 Meng Yuen, 'Shui-shen huo-jo ti Hunan' (Hunan in Deep water and Hot fire) CKCN No.25 (5-IV-1924), pp.2-5. Cited from p.2. Lü-ta stands for Lü-shun and Ta-lien, two treaty ports which remained in Japanese hands after World War I.
76 'Nung ts'un yün-tung' (Village Movement), a Correspondence Section, CKCN 29 (3-V-1924), pp.12-14.
advised the young man to be careful always of the power structure of the locality and the psychology of the local peasants. Certainly the aim of the village movement was to unite with the peasants to oppose and remove the oppressive landlords and local corrupt gentry, but first, the workers had to gain the confidence of the peasants. Unless that was accomplished there would be no hope of organizing any association.

More importantly, Yun not only counselled against any unnecessary and premature arousal of antagonism, even from those who were the natural class enemies, but, for tactical reasons, there might be a need to seek a temporary united front with them to face the greater enemy. To put it in a more sophisticated communist expression, the field workers were enjoined to seek out which was the prime contradiction and try to overcome that first before dissipating one's energy unnecessarily. Yun pointed out the very successful actions in Shun-te in Kwangtung as an example of how such tactics might be called into use. In Shun-te, the field workers made friends with the local gentry and, using their name, called upon the peasants to join the min-ch'üan - the militia. At the same time, other workers addressed themselves to the self-supporting peasants and the tenants, classes which Party Leader Ch'en had previously warned that harboured ambitions of being landlords. Appealing to their self-interest, the workers

77 Ibid., p.13.
induced peasants to join the militia and reduce the role of the gentry to one of supporter. This way, the militia came under the control of the peasants who would then be in a stronger position in their requests for rent reduction, or loans at a more reasonable rate. Certainly, the movement in Shun-te had the benefit of being led by an experienced communist, Tan P'ing-shan, but nevertheless the main force of the workers were middle school students and the SYC.80

Some field workers were more adaptable than our worker in Hupei, in spite of the different social conditions they might encounter as compared to the generalized picture and the optimism given by Teng Chung-hsia. In Shantung, a field worker found that in the Kwang-jao hsien had a rural population of which over 90% were classified as self-supporting peasants.81 This, on the reckoning of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, would make the place one with a strong tendency towards being totally reactionary. But, the workers there were resourceful and were able to inculcate the concept of class struggle even in that area — where the people would normally be regarded as having a strong urge to be landlords. As the peasants had to sell their products through a middle-man in cash and as there was a bout of inflationary action in the economy, the producers found that the returns for

80 A good description of the Shun-te movement was recorded by the Wah Tse Yat Pao, 8-VII-1924.
81 Ch'ün Ts'ai, 'Shantung Kwang-jao hsien nung-min sheng-huo' (Peasant Life in Kwang-jao hsien of Shantung) CKCN No. 30 (10-V-1924), pp. 9-12.
their labour were so meagre that they were often in debt, to
the buyers of their goods. The chief of the hsien was in league
with the buyers whom the field workers described as capitalists.
By not being dogmatic in their approach, the workers were able
to organize the peasants into self-defence militia, the min-tuan,
against the exploiting class — the corrupt bureaucrats and
capitalists.

Indeed, the student-led village movement (hsiang-ts'ung
yün-tung) was getting so encouraging that with the coming of the
summer long vacation, Yun Tai-ying began to make hopeful plans
for a massive action with tens of thousands of students to take
to the fields. Judging from the results and in the context of
the total programme of the CCP, this village movement was of
increasing importance in the second half of 1924 and the first
half of 1925. Only with the labour incidents associated with
the May 30th Movement was public attention drawn to the labour
movement vis-a-vis communist activities in China. Indeed, the
labour front was so quiet that 'by 1924 there were hardly any
[labour] organizations left [in Shanghai] that were under
Commemunist influence'; and even Teng Chung-hsia had to concede
that the labour front was inactive in the winter of 1924.82
Of course, the lack of strike action in Shanghai did not mean
the lack of activities on the part of the CCP. As already noted,

---
82 Quotation cited from Chesneaux, Op.cit., p.232; see also his
chapter IX 'Two Years of Retreat' (i.e. 1923-24), pp.211-236.
For Teng's comment, see his Chung-kuo chih-kung yün-tung chien
shih (A Brief History of the Chinese Labour Movement) Chapter 8,
the communists were re-establishing the major unions and, ideologically, making claim that the proletariat class was the only worthy one to lead the national revolution.

Thus, just before the summer vacation began, Yun made a strong appeal to the students pleading with them to participate in the village movement during the coming holidays. He appealed to their revolutionary ardour certainly, but he also made strong appeals to their sense of duty as the intellectual class and their sense of justice. Indeed, the CKCN had assumed that the love for one's country constrains one to participate in the national revolution and that Yun's particular burden was really to explain that the village movement was the most suitable and urgent expression of being a patriotic youth of the new style. Yun hoped that in every region a village movement study group would be organized to study what needed to be done and to co-ordinate activities. But, if some were unable to attend such a study group, Yun urged them not to preach revolution and bloodshed at the very first opportunity. On the contrary, the students were urged first and foremost to win the friendship and confidence of the peasants.

To further help those who could not participate in such study groups, the CKCN published a do-it-yourself questionnaire

83 Yun, 'Yü pei shu-chia ti hsiang-ts'un yün-tung' (Prepare for the summer vacation's village movement) CKCN No.32 (24-V-1924) pp.4-10. See especially Section I, pp.4-5.
84 See Cheng Han, 'Chung-kuo shih ti hsuieh-che' (The Chinese-style scholars) CKCN No.32, p.1 (24-V-1924).
86 Yun, Ibid., p.9, Section 10.
for participants of the village movement written, again by Yun.87 Again the importance of the work was emphasized. Now, Yun insisted that the Chinese revolution would not succeed until the peasants themselves thirsted for the revolution because the workers were numerically weak and, as the soldiers were really the male members of the peasantry, a revolutionized peasantry would achieve the bonus of a revolutionized soldiery.88 The labour leaders in the CCP might not have approved of Yun's exaggeration of the importance of the village movement but numerically there were more members enrolled into the peasant associations than into the trade unions when the two movements held their joint National Congress of May Day 1925.

The student-activitists were not the only workers in the village movement. Since the formation of the KMT-CCP collaboration, a Peasants' Department was established by the Canton Government. It was authorized by the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the KMT, 'but with no previous experience all activities were merely in the planning stage.'89 However, a series of surveys were soon authorized and, judging from the plans made, the intention of the peasant movement being planned

87 Yun, 'Nung-ts'un yun-tung' (Village Movement) CKCN No.37 (28-VI-1924), pp.8-12.
88 Yun, CKCN No.37, p.9.
89 Lo Ch'i-yüan, 'Pen-pu i-nien-lai kung-tso pao-kao kai-yao' (Short Report on the Activities of Our Department for this Year) Chung-kuo Nung-min (The Chinese Peasant) No.2, 1926. Hereafter cited as Report. Lo was then the Secretary of the Department.
was one of instilling class consciousness. One of the plans for which the Peasants' Department had the approval of the CEC was that there should be four types of peasant associations, those for the self-supporting peasants, those for the tenants, those for the hired labourers and the peasant self-defence militia organizations. However, there was no evidence that such a plan was actually carried out for the very formation of a single peasant association in a given area was difficult enough to achieve, as shown from the reports of the field workers mentioned above in the CKCN. At the same time, it is necessary to keep in mind that until the first graduates were produced by the Peasants' Movement Training Institute in August 1924, the student-activists were the only reservoir of manpower available.

The Chinese communists were very much in control of the leadership of this Department, so much so that their erstwhile collaborators remembered those days with much anger. As Tsou Lu, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chou Fo-hai recalled the situation, P'eng P'ai and the other communists were not only in control of the running of the Peasant Department and the Institute, but the communists were also recruiting only sympathetic students and manning the various front organizations with their selected people. Indeed, Tsou Lu claimed that P'eng P'ai had boasted

---

that 'anyone who did not agree with him would not dare to remain as Head of the Peasant Department.'

The peasant movement seemed to have achieved much success, especially in Kwangtung province. When the First Peasant Movement Congress convened in Canton on May Day 1925, the Institute had graduated 288 workers for the movement in its first three classes. And, the Congress itself was able to claim it represented a total membership of about 200,000 enrolled in the peasant associations scattered over twenty-two hsien. These successes were noticed by their opponents and, as a result, oppressive reactions increased almost correspondingly.

The students of the second class of the Institute were given an unexpected practical experience in military affairs when the Merchants' Revolt occurred in the midst of their training session. Furthermore, the First Annual Report of the

---

91 Tsou Lu, Kuo-min-tang shih-kao (A Draft History of the KMT) I, 386. (Shanghai 1929). Also see Chiang, Soviet Russia in China, p.31 (NY 1957); and Chou Fo-hai 'Wo t'ao ch'u liao chHih-tu Wuhan' (My escape from Wuhan the Red Capital), Ch'en and Chou, Op.cit., p.150.

92 See Chung-kuo nung-min Nos.2-9, 1926. These articles are reprinted in Kung-fei huo-kuo hui-pien IV, pp.253-295, especially pp.259-276. (Collected Documents on the National Calamity by the Communist Bandits) (Taipei 1961).

93 There appears to be some differences on the actual numbers in the membership. According to 'Summary' of Chung-kuo nung-min Nos. 6-7 (July 1926) there were 117 delegates representing over 180,000 members. Ho Yang-ling's Nung-min yün-tung (The Peasant Movement) gave 210,000 in IV, p.20 (Nanking 1928) and Eto accepted Ho's figures in the former's 'Hai-lu-feng...' II, 153.

94 From the Chung-kuo nung-min (The Chinese Peasant) reprinted in Kung-fei huo-kuo hui-pien (hereafter known as KFHK) IV, p.265.
Kwangtung Provincial Peasants Associations was replete with reports of oppressive actions taken by the landlords and the militia (min-t'uan) against the activities of the peasant movement. In February 1925, the Report recalled, 'imperialism and its tools' were perpetuating more evil and reactionary deeds while the 'evil gentry', in league with the local bandits and soldiers, looted and burnt the Peasants Association headquarters in many hsien.\(^95\)

But, of more relevance to this discussion was the background of the students of the Institute. Of the first three classes—the only ones which the occupational background of the students were recorded and the ones relevant to the period under discussion—their background bore witness to the suggestion in this study that the rural movement of the Chinese communists was heavily staffed by students. The first class 'was mainly students of the May Fourth Movement who had participated in the 'To the People' movement' during the May 4th period.\(^96\) The second class had 30% of the intake classified as 'students', 10% 'from the peasant associations', that is, those who had participated in the rural movement but were now returning to receiving formal training, 22% were classified as workers, 30% as peasants and another 8% as 'girl students'.\(^97\). If the last mentioned meant that those young women were students but the

---

95 See 'Summary', Chung-kuo nung-min, Nos.6-7.
96 KFHK, IV, p.259.
97 KFHK, IV, p.259.
female counterpart of the other 30% of male students, then, the class had a 38% of school students. On the other hand, those young women might be from other walks of life but classed as students after having joined the Institute, then the second class still had a 30% of school students. Judging from the age recorded, it seems that some of the enlisted women were too old to have been students but some were under twenty years old.\textsuperscript{98} In the third class, although the percentage of students had dropped to 22.6% nevertheless, just over 70% of that class were under twenty-five years old.\textsuperscript{99}

It is of interest to note that the second class had an initial intake of 225 members which was only second to the final and sixth class which was the most comprehensively trained class under the direction of Mao Tse-tung. The large intake at the second class showed signs of lack of care in the selection process for many found the military training too strenuous and resigned, while others were frightened by the Merchants Revolt and fled.\textsuperscript{100} Indeed, this seemed to give witness to the idea that the upsurge of rural activities in the latter part of 1924 was, in some ways, a compensatory action vis-a-vis the labour movement. The second class of the Institute commenced on the 21st August 1924 under the direction of CCP member Lo Ch'i-yüan. But, the large number resulted in some embarrassment to the

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., p.265.

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., p.270.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., p.263.
organizers because there was a shortage of space as well as instructors. Such haste, in both preparation and recruitment — which resulted in a drop-out of 37% of the original enrolment — becomes more understandable if the rural and labour movements at that time were seen in the special light of 1924.

Contemporaneous to the second class of the Institute, the SYC organ, the Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien reported the death of a comrade, one Liu Tun, who died of exhaustion. Yun Tai-ying, who was then the secretary of the Corps published parts of a number of letters this fallen comrade had written to him. In one of these letters the writer, Liu Tun expressed the ideas that since the May 4th Movement and especially since the February 4th Incident, great progress had been made in the labour movement. As to the peasants, while the work there was difficult, natural calamities, wars, and other exploitation had made many realize the need to unite and struggle. However, while the labour movement is temporarily in a doldrum, the workers are still an army in hiding. Now [we] should promote the peasant movement. Even if it ends in failure — and, I am sure it will suffer great attacks — it can be made into another revolutionary army. Therefore, we should still participate in the realistic movement of the present. Otherwise, the "Down with the Warlords" call will become tedious before it can reach the people. If

101 Ibid., pp.262-263.

this call cannot be amongst the people,
and if [the people] have no such demands,
the warlords will not be overthrown easily.

In short, Liu Tun regarded the extra promotional efforts on the rural movement as necessary, especially at the time when the labour movement was not getting much action. It was not that the labour movement organizers were not hard at work but that the opportunity for open struggle - strike actions - was not readily available.

The use of students as active participants in the rural movement was not without its drawbacks. As the rural movement had encountered much active resistance, the Institute began to offer military training commencing with its first class, though as mentioned, part of the reason for the military training was to weed out the weak and the fainthearted. But, more fundamentally, these students - the intelligentsia - did not form an economic class and the organizers complained that some of these had no appetite for revolutionary actions. Some, coming from the 'petty bourgeoisie' were 'either opposed to military training or could not withstand the hardship and withdrew voluntarily.' At the same time, this leavening of the class by the students seemed a necessity if it was to be a successful operation. Not only were they zealous, or could be so, but some instructors found that the other students had such a low level of educational attainment as to render the training ineffective.

103 KFHK IV, p.260 and p.271.
104 Ibid., p.272.
At the Institute, these first three classes were under the direction of CCP members, with P'eng P'ai directing the first class, Lo Ch'i-yüan the second and Yüan Hsiao-hsien directing the third.105 In their teaching, the peasant movement was taken as a part of the national revolution because the CCP believed that the revolution would not succeed unless the workers and the peasants were wholeheartedly supporting the national revolution.106 The purpose of the Institute was, therefore, to train personnel for the peasant movement.

Thus, just as the CCP had perceived the role of the workers in the national revolution as the proletarian vanguard in steering the successful revolution into its socialist phase, so the CCP also perceived the peasant movement in similar class struggle terms. That is, in the national revolution, the peasants would not only be enjoined to support the anti-imperialist activities of the national revolution but would also learn to commence class struggle for their own class interests. As with the labour movement, the concept of class struggle was integral to the totality of the struggles entailed in the national revolution. Indeed, such endeavours in the peasant movement was regarded as a means 'to promote the progress of the national revolution.'107 The awakening of the peasants to struggle for their own class interests, especially through the

105 KFHK IV, pp.260, 262, 270.
106 Ibid., p.253.
107 Ibid., p.254.
introduction of a materialistic conception of history, was taken by the CCP as an integral part of the CCP's contribution to the efforts of a national revolution.

As the Chinese communists had such an aim in mind for their peasant movement, it would be expected that they would foresee strong resistance, as they had experienced in the labour movement front. It seemed that after their acquisition of a territorial base in Kwangtung, the Chinese communists were making better preparations for their peasant movement than their labour movement, at least in their preparation for armed resistance. From the very first class at the Institute under the direction of P'eng P'ai, the trainees were given some military training. Though the entire class lasted only one month, the trainees were given ten days of military training. Having just been expelled from his home county of Hai-feng, P'eng P'ai would certainly appreciate the importance of military strength in the peasant movement. Indeed, the graduates of the first class were expected to be 'warriors' as well as promoters and organizers of the peasant movement and the peasant associations.108

At the second class, the students had the benefit of such notable instructors as Lo Ch'i-yúan, Tan P'ing-shan, and Yuán Hsiao-hsien. Apart from having the experience of the Merchants Revolt as a practical lesson, the students' instructions on propaganda methods included the emphasis of the peasant

108 Ibid., p.260.
associations and militia as defenders of the interests of the peasants class and that the landlords were the oppressors. By the third class the differentiation of classes in the rural scene was seen in terms of the exploiting and the exploited classes. By then, the Institute was able to claim, with some pride, that their graduates had been at the vanguard of the struggle between the peasants and the landlords. And, judging from the results of the final examination of this class, the organizers proudly reported that the students now understand 'the special characteristics and systems in social revolution, the causes of revolutions and their tendencies.' At the same time, the reports showed that the organizers were very proud of their students' grasp of the importance of the peasant movement, the methods of investigation of rural conditions, and the methods of propaganda. And, most importantly, the students were trained to acquire 'the real meaning and significance of class.'

These, of course, were in conformity with the general and expressed perception of the nature of national revolution according to the perspective of the Chinese communists. They had expressed similar views in the context of their perception on the nature of the leadership of the national revolution and the position of the CCP in it as well as in the context of the proletarian or labour movements. To the Chinese communists, the national revolution had at least two integral components:

109 Ibid., pp.265-6.
110 Ibid., p.271.
111 Ibid., p.272.
united front of a number of classes in China against the exploitation of the imperialist-capitalist class of the foreign Powers while at the same time there would be an intensification of the class struggle within the social fabric of China.

In short, then, the Chinese communists in this period viewed their activities in the rural areas in much the same light as their activities in other sectors - as part of the general movement in the national revolution. Putting it in another way, the nature of Chinese communism in relation to the rural sector of China developed along similar lines to those in other sectors of communist activities in China.

Such was the conclusion which the Chinese communists themselves arrived at after working in the peasant movement. And, that was exactly what they had previously announced that they would try to do, after having perceived the conditions of China according to their own perspective. As the Chinese communists began to organize the training classes at the Institute, their comrades announced through the medium which had long been concerned with the peasant movement - the Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien (The Chinese Youth) - that the most urgent task in the revolution was not to conduct revolutionary movement amongst the soldiers but revolutionary movements amongst 'the peasants, workers, and even the vagabonds.' Yun Tai-ying, in discussing

---

112 The above mentioned quotes from the KFHK IV were but reprints from the official journal of the Peasant Department of the Canton Government, the Chung-kuo nung-min (The Chinese Peasant) where there were detailed reports on the various classes of the Institute.
'The Chinese Revolution and the World Revolution', stressed that

We have to make the peasants, workers, and even vagabonds of all China realize that only through revolution can their problems be solved. They have to rely on the revolution to destroy all exploitations and disturbances by the warlords; they have to rely on the revolution to abolish all illegal rents and taxes; and they have to rely on the revolution to resist the powers of the foreign nations so that their industrial and rural enterprises may be benefited.

Yun regarded such lines of action as those demanded of a semi-colonial state, such as China, in its process to acquire independence. It would be a nation-wide revolution against the warlords and the imperialists. To that extent it was to be a national revolution. Nevertheless, he was calling for these revolutionary movements amongst the peasants, workers, and vagabonds because 'if we do not overthrow the warlords, we will not be able to organize a revolutionary people's government - ke-ming ti jen-min ti cheng-fu'. In calling on the peasants as participants in the anti-warlord segment of the national revolution, Yun may be considered as having ante-dated Mao Tse-tung in making a similar call in the latter's famous Report of the Examination of the Peasant Movement in Hunan. As with

114 Yun, Ibid., p.9.
115 Ibid., p.5.
116 Mao, Hsiang Tao No.191 (12-III-1927), especially p.2063.
Mao, Yun was also very practical. Whilst the ultimate aim was to involve the peasants in the national revolution, he advised that the best way to succeed was not to talk so much about specialized matters and 'national events, or even the good and bad points of the political parties and factions in the nation' as the revolutionary workers themselves were wont to discuss, but to discuss with the peasants the price of rice and the rates of interest. In short, he was reiterating what he had published earlier in trying to get the peasants to identify their interests with those of the peasant movement which, in turn, would awaken them to the fact that their economic plight was the result of the economic and political exploitation of their class enemy, the landlords and the warlords. And, in arousing the opposition of the peasants towards these enemies in terms of class struggles, the Chinese communists would lead the peasants into the communist concept of a national revolution which involved class struggle as an integral part. For anyone, including the KMT, to oppose such actions would be to betray the national revolution.

Therefore, it can be seen that the peasantry occupied an integral position in the revolutionary thinking and praxis of

---

118 Yun, CKCN No.29 (3-V-1924), p.14 'Nung-ts'un yün-tung' (Village Movement).
119 Tan I, 'Kuo-min-tang chung ti Kung-ch' an-tang wen-ti' (The CCP Question in the KMT) CKCN No.41 (19-VII-1924), pp.1-5, especially p.5. The date seems to be a misprint and should have been at least the 26-VII-1924.
the Chinese communism. The workers were certainly the vanguard and the main force. But, the peasants who were also members of the proletariat, were also members of the main force only that they needed more effort to awaken to the objective realities. The peasant movement was certainly a part, an important part, of the national revolutionary movement. And, as in the other sectors of the national revolutionary movement, the rural sector also called for the introduction and then intensification of class struggle. Such a struggle was perceived as an integral part of the national revolutionary movement and insisted on in their literature by the Chinese communists. As has been noted by Professor Eto and others, the rural policies of the Chinese communists were not the same as those directed by the Comintern given prior to the Third CCP Congress. The Chinese policies subsequent to that Congress were in line with their practice and policies prior to that Congress.
EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION: TOWARDS
A SOCIALIST CULTURE.

While Chinese communism in this period was very much influenced by the Marxian ideas in The Communist Manifesto, the revolutionary praxis of the Chinese communists during these early years of the national revolution was very much in accord with a Leninist interpretation of Marxism. The actions of the Chinese communists seemed to be the practical expression of the 1905 injunction of Lenin when he proclaimed that

A Social-Democrat must never for a moment forget that the proletariat will inevitably have to wage the class struggle for Socialism even against the most democratic and republican bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. This is beyond doubt.... Hence the temporary nature of our tactics of 'striking jointly' with the bourgeoisie and the duty of keeping a strict watch 'over our ally, as over an enemy,' etc. All this is beyond the slightest doubt.¹

However, as Barrington Moore, Jr. has observed, 'if one speaks of Leninist theory, it is usually necessary to speak of it as it existed at a given point in time and at a given stage of its development.'² As we have noted, in 1923 the leading Chinese communist theoretician, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, had given considerable notice of Lenin's 1905 tract, Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in

¹ Lenin, Two Tactics, pp. 90-91 (Peking, 1965).
the Democratic Revolution. Herein lies a major point of variation between Chinese and Russian communism. Lenin was writing his piece whilst in exile in Geneva and the Chinese were reading it in China and applying it during the first stages of their national revolution.

This last point is of importance. This is so not only because Lenin's great tactical flexibility would never make him regard doctrinal purity as an end in itself but also because when Lenin was making his pronouncements he did not envisage a drawn out united front type of national revolution in his homeland, such as one confronting the Chinese communists. In spite of the tough stand taken in 1905 in the Two Tactics, the exiled Lenin did not persist in stirring the fears of the bourgeois and peasant leaders whom the Bolsheviks sought to effect a limited tactical alliance. Thus, as late as October 1915, Lenin would issue a thesis suggesting that

the task confronting the proletariat of Russia is that consummation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia in order to kindle the socialist revolution in Europe. (emphasis his)

While this implied that his ultimate goal was socialism, it was also apparent that at that time Lenin thought it would first develop outside Russia. Yet, within days of the founding of the new government in Russia, Lenin voiced strong objections against

it and declared that 'the revolutionary proletariat can ... only regard the revolution of March 1 (14) as its initial, and by no means complete victory on its momentous path. It cannot but set itself the task for a democratic republic and socialism.'

In short then, when the time of action came, Lenin had no use for his 1915 thesis and showed neither trust in, nor disposition towards, co-operation with the bourgeois parties. Instead of working towards the 'consummation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution', Lenin reserved his strongest objections to the leftist elements in the new government. He claimed that

Not only this government, but even a democratic bourgeois republican government, were it to consist exclusively of Kerensky and other Narodniki and "Marxist" social patriots (i.e. those socialists supporting the war) cannot lead the people out of the imperialist war and guarantee peace.

However, he was not entirely certain what the future programme should be. He would go as far as granting the proletariat of Russia the title of 'the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat of the whole world' because the Russians seemed to have the 'honour of beginning the series of revolutions'. Nevertheless, he was of the opinion that 'single handed, the Russian proletariat cannot bring the socialist revolution to a victorious conclusion

---

5 Lenin, 'Draft Theses', Ibid., p.290.
only starts it. In so saying, he was really echoing what Marx and Engels said in 1882 that the Russian Revolution might become the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West. Indeed, as Barrington Moore, Jr., observed, 'when in 1917 a second revolutionary upheaval in Russia suggested to Lenin the possibility of success, he left behind him in Switzerland the ideological baggage of parliamentary democracy without taking with him a definitely socialist programme.'

When he returned to Russia in April 1917 in the famous sealed train, Lenin was no longer satisfied with parliamentary government and wanted nothing short of 'a republic of Soviets of Workers', 'Agricultural Labourers', and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom.' And, after the surprisingly swift Bolshevik conquest of power, Lenin remarked to Trotsky:

You know, from persecution and a life underground, to come so suddenly into power ... 'Es Schwindelt' (my head spins).

---

7 Marx & Engels, Preface to the 1882 Russian translation of The Communist Manifesto
Indeed, in revolution the appetite for change comes with eating. While Lenin and the Russian communists achieved power rapidly by a coup d'état, the situation confronting the Chinese communists was very different and they realized the differences. Hence, the Chinese had always talked and planned in terms of prolonged struggles. The revolutionary experience of the Russian communists really provided little concrete examples for the Chinese to follow. For, even during the interregnum between the February and October Revolutions in 1917 when the Bolsheviks held their Sixth Congress (in August) to discuss party organization, its top leaders - amongst them included Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev - were either in hiding or under arrest.

The Chinese communists, however, were not in exile though in certain situations they had to operate secretly. But, as a member of the National Government coalition in Canton, the CCP was operating openly. Thus, in their formulation and projection of their ideology, the Chinese communists were not writing for an audience of fellow-exiles as their Russian counterparts were doing but were openly appealing to their fellow citizens around them and in other parts of China. The Chinese Communists were certainly aware of this environmental difference.¹¹

¹¹ Eg. When Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai advocated the Jacobinical method for the Chinese revolution in 1923, he admitted that such an advocacy was going further than what Lenin would allow. But, he argued that the method was necessary because China was economically more backward than Russia, while politically, China was no longer a monarchy as Russia was before the revolution. See Ch'ü's 'From Democracy to Socialism', HCN-Q No.2 (20-XII-1923).
The Chinese communists were undoubtedly taking lessons from the Russian experience but not blindly. Before they had become communists, Ch'en Tu-hsiu and his friends and colleagues were searching for ways and means to change the ethos of Chinese society. Before they embraced Marxism, Ch'en and his fellow intellectuals - chih-shih fen-tzu - were not certain of the means which they should adopt to effect the changes, nor indeed were they certain of their goals. However, they all agreed that China was in need of urgent radical changes. Those intellectuals who eventually became communists also shared the conviction that there was an urgent need to remove the fundamental causes of the social inequality they found in the Chinese society.

While they were searching for the means and goals they were also active in trying to awaken the Chinese people to share their vision. These people were certainly dissatisfied intellectuals, but compared to the dissatisfied intellectuals in pre-revolution Russia, there were major differences in the nature and expression of their dissatisfaction and an understanding of these differences may be of help to an understanding of the decisions and expressions of these Chinese intellectuals after they had become communists.

A fundamental difference between pre-revolutionary Russia and pre-revolutionary China was that regardless of the faults and weaknesses in Russian society, Russia was still a great power, a feared and formidable factor in the international scene. On the contrary, pre-revolutionary China had been defeated in every war, and, with the decision to abolish the
Examination System, signified to all that even the Court agreed to the need for basic changes. In a germinal discussion on the general differences between the attitudes of the pre-revolutionary intellectuals in China and Russia, the late Professor Mary C. Wright had observed that the Chinese intellectuals, in contrast to the Russian intellectuals were politically nationalistic. This, she explained, was the result of the different international status of the respective states. She further observed that the Russian intellectuals' basic hostility to the state per se seemed lacking in the Chinese intellectuals. This was properly explained that traditionally the bureaucrats and intellectuals in China had been largely the same people whereas in modern Russia, say since 1762, there was an 'abhorrence of state service by Russian intellectuals.' As a result of such differences in socio-political background, she found that 'the Chinese intellectuals do not seem to have been alienated from society in the sense that Russian intellectuals were.'

The leaders of the communist revolutions in both Russia and China were certainly intellectuals. The Chinese leadership were university professors, young graduates and students, and though the Russians were mainly exiles they may be regarded as déclassé intellectuals. In view of their differences in

---

13 Ibid., p.177.
socio-political background and attitudes, as suggested by Professor Wright, we may expect that such distinctions would have their influences on those intellectuals in both countries who had decided to take the communist revolutionary path. As has been noted at the beginning of this chapter it is difficult to speak of the Leninist revolutionary strategy, even right up to the eve of the October Revolution. Lenin certainly did not have a carefully worked out revolutionary strategy, whilst in exile, to be practised in his homeland in order to bring about the desired results. Indeed, as he had confided to Trotsky, he was surprised by the rapidity of the Bolshevik success.

A most distinctive aspect between the two groups of revolutionary intellectuals was the cultural aspect of their respective programmes. Indeed, one may be permitted to suggest that the Chinese revolutionary intellectuals turned to communism as a result of their cultural programme while the Russians, at least the Leninists, really had no cultural programme to speak of even after the October Revolution. As it was in the realm of ideas - the development and nature of communism - that the Chinese intellectuals-cum-communists had expressed dissimilarity vis-a-vis the Russian counterparts*, it may be appropriate to round off this study of Chinese communism with an examination

* While stressing dissimilarities in this study, I am aware that in matters of practicality, the CCP was often called upon to perform tasks as the result of directives from their Comintern comrades. However, it is not the purpose of this study to discuss those issues but merely to delineate certain aspects of the development and nature of Chinese communism
of the more cultural aspects of the development of Chinese communism.

Lenin came from the popular-educational as well as the revolutionary tradition of the Russian intelligentsia: his father was a radical inspector of schools under the tsar. But neither Lenin nor the Bolsheviks in general can be said to have a coherent cultural programme prior to the October Revolution. Lenin, as has been demonstrated, was rather preoccupied with the problem of adopting his protean ideas to the changing political situations in Russia and amongst the fellow exiles in Geneva. Indeed, 'Bolshevik propaganda, being purely materialistic and scientific, could appeal to the proletariat but failed to gain the emotional sympathy of the intelligentsia or the peasantry.'

More than anything else, the events from his return to Finland Station to the Bolsheviks' seizure of power had amply demonstrated Lenin's talent in grasping opportunities and in organization. It seemed that his attitudes to culture were also preconditioned by his penchant for revolutionary organization. This was nowhere better demonstrated than in the second speech he made at the First All-Russian Congress on extramural education which opened on 6 May 1919. This was in fact a congress of the leading cultural figures meeting to discuss cultural policies for the new Soviet Republic. Lenin's

---

speech, given on the last day and entitled 'On the deception of the people by slogans of freedom and equality' deserved to be recalled. The speech, lasting one and a half hours, was an attack on the anti-Communism of the socialist and liberal intelligentsia. In part, Lenin proclaimed:

I have shown you that the dictatorship of the proletariat is inevitable, necessary and undoubtedly obligatory in order to escape from capitalism. Dictatorship means not only force - though it is impossible without force - but also a higher level of labour organization than before. That is why, in my short welcoming speech, I underlined this basic, elementary and most simple task of organization; and that is why I regard all intellectual fantasies of "proletarian culture" with such ruthless hostility. ... The task of proletarian discipline is to distribute bread and coal in such a way that there is a careful attitude to each unit of coal and each unit of bread ... If we solve this very simple, elementary problem, we shall ... win. ... The basic task of "proletarian culture" is proletarian organisation.15

Though the speech failed to convince the Social-Revolutionaries, anarchist, Bundist and non-Communists in the Congress to the Bolshevik concept of enlightenment, it provided an enlightening glimpse into the mind of Lenin.

In Marxist terminology, what Lenin was trying to do was to create a new social base through the rearrangement of the superstructure. He wanted to bring about the 'base' of proletarian democracy and communism by reconstructing and re-organizing the superstructure - 'the task of proletarian discipline is to distribute bread and coal ... the basic task of 'proletarian culture' is proletarian organization.' To be sure, the concept of the superstructure influencing the base is Marxian and the Chinese communists would certainly not deny such a possibility. However, the approach, and assumption, of the Chinese communists were very different. As has been mentioned, those Chinese intellectuals who became communists, especially Ch'en Tu-hsiu, were moved by the social injustices they witnessed in the society. Ch'en, after associating himself with revolutionaries for many years, founded the Hsin Ch'ing-nien magazine in the hope of awakening the intellectuals. In a reply to a query from a reader, Ch'en expressed his attitude thus:

The foundation of progress of the masses is in education and industry and not in politics. But politics must progress to above a certain level before education and industry can have the proper milieu for development.

Now, as has been noted, in making this reply, Ch'en was explaining to the reader the reasons for politicizing the magazine, a decision which this reader regarded as a turning away from the original aim of educating the youth. In wording

16 Reply to Ku K'e-kang, HCN III, 5 (1-VII-1917).
his reply thus, Ch'en was putting forward the proposition that in the political and educational aspects they were not mutually exclusive but complementary. This reply, therefore, may be taken to be an amplification of the earlier statement on literary revolution, 'A Treatise on Literary Revolution',\textsuperscript{17} where he enunciated the three fundamentals of the literary revolution:

1. Down with artificial, untrue, aristocratic literature! Create a natural, simple, lyrical people's (kuo-min) literature!

2. Down with rotten, unrealistic literature based on quotations! Create a new, true, and realistic literature!

3. Down with the obscure, unclear, difficult literature of "woods and hills" which is remote from life! Create a clear social literature which is popularly understood!

Unlike the Bolsheviks who had to struggle to define the concept and nature of culture in the new society they were ushering forth\textsuperscript{18}, the Chinese revolutionaries regarded the cultural component of their programme as an important integral in the totality of their programme. Furthermore, whilst Lenin sought to bring forth this new culture through the reorganization of the means of distribution, after his seizure of political


\textsuperscript{18} See Fitzpatrick, \textit{op.cit.}, chs.5 "Proletkult" and 6 "The Arts".
power, the Chinese approach was very much the reverse. The Chinese revolutionaries wanted to awaken their compatriots to the need for change by a cultural-cum-political process of enlightenment. They were not ruminating in exile but in the cultural and political centres of the nation - Shanghai and Peking. To say so certainly does not imply any lack of courage on the part of the Russian revolutionaries. That the Chinese revolutionaries had so much freedom was very much due to the relative weakness of the Chinese state, vis-a-vis Russia.

The revolutionary significances and implications of the statement by Ch'en Tu-hsiu on literary revolution must be seen in its contemporary context. This statement concerned more than mere literary matters but was a very political statement, especially so if compared to that by the Deweyite, Hu Shih. The best known contribution by Hu was his article 'Suggestions for a literary reform', with its now well-known eight-point programme. However, compared to the statements by Ch'en to date, Hu's statement was not political but merely literary. Further, it was basically negative - seven of his eight points were admonitions of what not to do - and, in calling for the avoidance of the use of allusions (Point Seven) Hu's 'suggestions' may even be regarded as of doubtful literary value. To Ch'en however, the cultural programme was but a part, albeit an important integrant, of the total revolutionary programme to reconstruct China.

When Ch'en founded his *Ch'ing-nien tsa-chih* in 1915 (renamed *Hsin Ch'ing-nien* in 1916) his proclaimed aims were to provide a forum to discuss with the youths of the day 'the means of cultivating oneself and of governing the nation ... [therefore] ... the magazine will freely discuss international affairs, scholarship, and ideas.' In short, he regarded the educational and cultural aspects of his programme inseparably integrated with the political activities. So when he launched his attacks on Confucianism - which he described as 'the idol that had lost its magic and an ossification of the past' - Ch'en was concerned 'not only with constitutional rule but with the realities of our lives and the basic questions concerning ethics and intellectual thoughts.' Indeed, he reminded his readers that before he had launched this attack on Confucianism, he had already urged the readers to be concerned with such matters. The message Ch'en liked to remind his readers of was:

Since the introduction of Western culture into our country, we are first awakened to the inadequacy of our scholarship, this we all know. Secondly, [we are awakened to the inadequacy of] our politics and the political situation in recent years is evident enough.

---

20 She kao (Publisher's Declaration) *Ch'ing-nien tsa-chih*, I, 1 (15-IX-1915).

21 These concepts were expounded in the opening article of the journal by Ch'en, entitled 'Ching kao ch'ing-nien' (Respectfully informing the Youths).


23 Ch'en, 'Wó-jen tsui-hou chih chūeh-wu' (Our Final Awakening), *HCN*, I, 6 (15-II-1916).
The readers of his journal would certainly remember that Ch'en had already proclaimed that in his opinion the highest form of Western culture was French culture and the greatest gift from the French culture was socialism. By the time Ch'en made his proposal for a literary revolution he had made two more strong attacks on Confucianism and his colleagues also published more articles in his journal.

Thus it was that before Ch'en announced his programme for a literary revolution, he had already demonstrated a strong concern over the detrimental sociopolitical effects that the old culture - Confucianism - had on China. In other words, from the perspective of one in search of a praxis to effect a sociopolitical reconstruction of China, Ch'en in 1915-6 was already of the opinion that in any programme of sociopolitical change there must be included an integral programme to change the cultural ethos as well. In his various statements against Confucianism, he specifically emphasized the detrimental effects of Confucianism on the sociopolitical aspects of Chinese life and society. In his call for a literary revolution, he was delineating more clearly these detrimental effects of Confucianism on culture as well as pointing out, more succinctly,

---

24 Ch'en, 'Fa-lan-hsi jen yü chin-shih wen-ming' (The French and Modern Civilization) HCN, I 1 (15-IX-1915).

25 Ch'en, 'K'ung-tzu chih tao yü hsien-tai sheng-huo' (The Way of Confucius and Contemporary Life), HCN, II 4 (1-XII-1916); 'Tsai lun K'ung-chiao wen-ti' (Another discussion on the Problem of Confucianism) HCN, II 5 (1-I-1917). Two more discussions on Confucianism were published in the HCN, I 6 (15-II-1916) and II 1 (1-IX-1916).
the relationship between the literary and the sociopolitical aspects of a culture and to show that the two were inseparable, especially to those aspiring to bring forth revolutionary changes to the Chinese society.

In his three-point programme for a literary revolution, Ch'en called for the replacement of 'aristocratic literature' with a 'people's literature'. In so doing, he presented many reasons, some of which may be called negative and some positive. He rejected aristocratic literature because it 'bears no relevance to the evolution and progress of society and civilization'. This may be regarded as a negative reason and tallies with the new democratic system he proposed shortly afterwards - where the large bureaucrats (ta kuan liao) and militarists will have no place in it. The positive reasons stemmed from the premise that the literary revolution was a part of the general sociopolitical revolution. Hence, he argued that he wanted to destroy the three types of old literature because they were 'not concerned with the universe, with Life (jen-sheng) and society.' He claimed that such types of literature were responsible for the unsavoury attitudes of the people. Therefore, he insisted that

28 Ch'en, 'Literary Revolution', pp.3-4.
if one desires innovation in politics, one cannot but innovate literature - because it occupies the position of the moving 'spirit' (ching shen) of politics.

Therefore, since Ch'en later decided to resign his chair and deanship at Peita in order to devote his total attention to the innovating of the Chinese society, one would be justified in expecting that in his programme of sociopolitical innovation, there would be included a cultural or literary segment. As far as Ch'en was concerned, his commitment was total. To him the issues 'are so clear that the opposition must not be given any grounds for discussion. We regard our proposal as absolute and will not permit others to reform it.' As to Hu Shih, he explained that 'although we have unfurled the revolutionary banner, although we cannot retreat, we dare not regard our ideas as absolute or that these ideas cannot be reformed.'

It seems appropriate, however, at this juncture to comment on a linguistic feature of this literary revolution. Hitherto the essays by Ch'en, Hu, and their colleagues, were written in a modified literary style rather than the vernacular (pai hua, or the plain speech) style. This remarkable state of seeming inconsistency had not gone unnoticed by modern scholars. But, as Kuo Mo-jo explained, objectively there is no real inconsistency. He argued that merely to write in the vernacular

29 Hu's statement was made in a letter to Ch'en, 9-IV-1917 from New York and Ch'en's statement was his reply to Hu. Both published in HCN, III 3 (1-V-1917) Correspondence Section.
does not make a piece of writing revolutionary, nor can one conclude that simply because something is written in the classical literary style that it would be non-revolutionary. He cited as examples the translation of Adam Smith by Yen Fu, done in the classical literary style, as a contribution to the revolutionary literature. At the same time, he noted that there were various translations of the Christian Bible into the pai hua, indeed into Cantonese and Fukienese and 'cannot be more in the vernacular (pai), but can we recognize these [translations] as representative literature of the literary revolution!'  

In so saying, Kuo was not really belittling the radicalism involved in the use of pai-hua as a medium of literary endeavour. His argument really focussed on the sociopolitical aspects of the literary revolution. A basic assumption underlining Kuo's argument was the materialistic conception of history. Based on such a conception, Kuo not unexpectedly came to regard the introduction of the capitalistic ideas of Adam Smith into the pre-capitalist 'feudal socio-economic environment of 19th Century China, as Yen Fu had done,' a revolutionary or progressive step. Likewise, the introduction of the Christian religion - the opiate of the people - albeit in the vernacular, would have to be regarded as a retrograde step.  

---

At the time of the publication of his statement on the literary revolution, Ch'en was not yet persuaded to the materialistic conception of history, although he was already espousing the ideas of realism in the arts — which, to him, meant 'writing and painting about life and actual events.'

Hence if one accepts the materialistic conception of history, one's concepts of the real and progressive and the desirable goals, would differ from those who hold different concepts of historical development. Such a difference in views would inevitably lead to conflict, whether in the realm of political ideology or theory of art, and this is especially true if those demanding changes were uncompromising, as Ch'en had declared himself to be. In the exchanges between Ch'en and Hu, one may detect that the seeds of conflict had already been sown.

Those who would like to preserve the old ways or ideas would naturally be the opponents of the innovators. However, within the group of innovators, the acceptance of Marxism by some members would inevitably lead to irreconcilable conflicts within the group. That such a phenomenon would not be avoided was the result of the divergent world views, though the opponents themselves might still be on personally friendly terms. Ch'en and Hu seemed to remain on friendly terms and retain certain intellectual respect for each other through their lives. Indeed, Hu pleaded for leniency when Ch'en was being tried as a

---

32 Ch'en was already of this opinion in December 1913; see Reply to Readers column, HCN, I, 4 (15-XII-1915).
political prisoner by the Kuomintang regime - his plea was made on the ground of Ch'en's contribution to scholarship. All innovators, Ch'en and Hu or Marxists and non-Marxists, wanted to be realistic. But if they espoused different world views, then their concepts of realism will be different. As a result what was real for one need not be so for the others.

Those who eventually became Marxist would consider the existence of class struggle not only unavoidable but necessary because, to them, only through class struggles would the old be destroyed and the new established. From the perspective of the materialistic conception of history, human endeavours reflect class interests - in the sociopolitical as well as cultural aspects. To those who believed that the materialistic conception of history as scientific, they would naturally regard anyone who claimed to be realistic yet denying such a world view as dangerously deviationist and mouthpiece of the reactionary forces; and as such had to be opposed most resolutely. From the exchanges between Ch'en and Hu, we can see that Ch'en already had such resoluteness even before he became a Marxist.

When Ch'en issued his call for a literary revolution in February 1917, he was not yet a Marxist though he had shown much admiration towards socialism. This demand for a literary revolution was made before Lenin and his comrades were able to seize political power. However, as has been demonstrated,

33 See Hu's contribution to Ch'en Tung-hsiao (ed.) Ch'en Tu-hsien p'ing-lun (Peiping 1933).
Ch'en's concept of a literary revolution meant more than merely the use of the vernacular and stylistic and linguistic changes. He saw in it a movement with strong sociopolitical implications. In pursuance of the declared aim to have a 'people's literature' and the desire to write and paint life (sheng huo) realistically, came the need to involve the people — to know more about the people and to enable more people to know about the new literature that these revolutionaries espoused or hoped to create. Hence, social survey reports found their places in the pages of the Hsin Ch'ing-nien as well as the mass education programme being carried out by Ch'en and his colleagues and students. These literary revolutionaries soon saw the need to found a more political channel of expression. Thus the Weekly Review — Mei-chou p'ing-lun — was founded in 1918. By New Year 1919, these literary revolutionaries were exhorting their readers to overthrow capitalism and the capitalists in order to bring forth the New Era.  

To be sure, though the editorial board of the HCN and the Mei-chou p'ing-lun shared the key personnel — with Ch'en occupying the key role in both — not all shared this vision of a new culture. Compared to his colleagues Ch'en and Li Ta-chao, Hu Shih was certainly not a revolutionary, whether in the realm of politics or culture, even in the sense defined by Hu himself.  

Mei-chou p'ing-lun No.2 (5-I-1919). The editorial.
His exchanges with Ch'en demonstrated his hesitancy even at the very onset of the new cultural movement. Now in 1919, this Columbia University-trained doctor of philosophy virtually announced his departure from the ranks of the literary revolutionaries within two years of his return to China. In the so-called 'Problems and Isms' debate in 1919, mainly between Hu and Li in the Mei-chou p'ing-lun (Ch'en was imprisoned) Hu really declared his rejection of the political implications of the literary revolution. Li, realizing his fellow professor's desire to be uninvolved, apologized to Hu for making the latter having to suffer such mental anguish. Li openly declared that to accuse Hu of being guilty through associating with revolutionaries of Li's ilk would be libel. Nevertheless, Li declared that 'I still think that the spread of Bolshevism will bring great changes to world culture. We should study it, introduce it so that the truth [about Bolshevism] may shine and spread over human society.'

Li's absolution of Hu may be regarded as a watershed of the literary revolution for it marked the separation between those who accepted the Marxist or materialistic conception of history and those who denied it. To those who accepted such a perception of history, the new culture was communism and could only be achieved through class struggles. To those who would

35 Li, 'Tsai lun wen-ti yü chu-i' (Another discussion on Problems and isms), Mei-chou p'ing-lun, No. 35 (17-VIII-1919).
36 Li, 'Chieh-chi ching-cheng yü hu-chu' (Class Conflict and Mutual Help), Mei-chou p'ing-lun, No.29 (6-VII-1919).
not accept such an interpretation of human social development, to be associated with people who would accept such a view became, as was the case of Hu, a source of personal embarrass-
ment. One may be permitted to say that such developments were inevitable in that the acceptance or rejection of the materialistic conception of history inevitably leads one to certain conclusions. In Li's case, having accepted the materialistic conception of history, he naturally accepted the inevitability of class struggles as the means of eliminating social classes. And, as a consequence, he could not but see 'economic explanations in the changing ideas in modern China' and that anti-Confucianism was not only a 'narrow' cultural movement nor even a social movement, such as the freeing of oneself from the traditional patriarchal dominations. Anti-
Confucianism became also an economic movement because 'the labour movement of China is also an anti-Confucian class movement'.\footnote{Li, 'Yu ch'ing-chi shang chieh-shih Chung-kuo \textit{ch'in-tai} szu-
hsiang pien-tung ti yüan-yin' (Economic Explanations for the reasons of the changing ideas in modern China) \textit{HCN} VII 2, pp.47-53 (1-I-1920), cited from p.52.} This was so because these people believed that 'culture addresses itself to military matters, to politics (actual political matters of government and even political philosophy) and capital [that is, the means of production] [though] culture involves sciences, religion, ethics, the arts, literature and music, etc.'\footnote{Ch'en, 'Hsin wen-hua yun-tung shih shen-mo?' (What is the New Culture Movement?) \textit{HCN} VII 5 (1-IV-1920), pp.1-4; cited from p.1.}
To be sure, it cannot be said that at this time, 1919-1920, that Ch'en, Li or their comrades had a fully developed theory of socialist culture or what Ch'en here called New Culture. It seemed that by New Culture he meant the social conditions which were the goals of his agitations and not the cultural movement which someone like Hu Shih had in mind. Hence, while Ch'en would say that 'New Culture addresses itself to military matters, to politics, etc.' he quickly pointed out that what had been hitherto understood as the cultural movement was quite a different thing. He explained, 'Politics, industrial enterprises, and transportation are necessities of life. Culture comes as these develop. We cannot say that politics, industries, and transportation are culture.' The creation of culture, he went on to explain, was a long term undertaking and that the cultural movement and the social movement were two different entities and for anyone to confuse them was to be ignorant of the meaning of culture.\(^{39}\) In short, it meant that New Culture was the end product of a combined cultural-social movement.

At about this time a group of young intellectuals returned to China after their studies in Japan and formed the Creation Society. The leading lights in this group were Kuo Mo-jo, Yü Ta-fu, Cheng Fang-wu, and Chang Tzu-p'ing, and published the Creation Weekly (Ch'uang-tsao chou-kăn). While they opposed the Literary Research Society (Wen-hsüeh yen-chiu hui) of Hu Shih, the Creation Society at that time was quite distinct, at

\(^{39}\) Ch'en 'Wen-hua yün-tung yü she-hui yün-tung' (Cultural Movement and Social Movement) HCN IX 1 (1-V-1921).
least theoretically, from the position of Ch'en and Li. They claimed to espouse socialism but, as Kuo recalled that at that time they were really 'individualists'. Since they had contributed little to the development of the concept of socialist culture, they are being excluded from this discussion. However, to do so is not to deny that members of the Creation Society did make considerable contribution to the development of the theory of socialist culture. Their contributions were made in what may be regarded as the Second Phase in the history of the development of this theory or concept - the period after the termination of the First National Revolution, after 1927, when the development of this concept was complicated by the appearance of the Left Oppositionist ideas. To delve into this very interesting period, however, would be beyond the scope of this study.

Ch'en who proposed the literary revolution and led the call for a socialized and politicized New Culture, played a leading role in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. The evolution of his political opinion, as well as those of his comrades', paralleled the evolution of their cultural opinions. Such a parallel development, of course, was to be expected. Having accepted the materialistic conception of history, as Ch'en explained, one naturally takes the view that 'the social relations of production form the foundation of

---

social economy and that the laws and politics build on such a foundation.' The former professor went on to explain that 'all systems, culture, and the formations of the ideas of any period change with the changing economic structure.' Thus by dedicating their lives and energy to the realization of a communist society, their cultural goals would then be the realization of a socialist culture.

As has been demonstrated, there was an apparent dichotomy in the activities of the Chinese communists in the period under discussion. They were in collaboration with the KMT in a national revolution. Numerically, the KMT was certainly the major partner, but as has been demonstrated, the Chinese communists took great care to point out to their contemporaries that the collaboration was but a mere tactical step dictated by circumstances. They had never concealed their ultimate aims nor had they really tried to conceal their lack of respect, indeed contempt, towards their collaborators. Their cultural expressions were parallel to their political ones. This, of course, was to be expected, given their conception of New Culture.

As befitting a revolution calling for a united front tactic, Ch'en also called for a 'united front in the revolution of ideas.' According to the perception of the Chinese communists, the reactionary forces in the national revolution included the remnants of feudalism, militarism, and imperialism.

41 Ch'en, 'Ma-k'o-ssu hsüeh-shuo' (Marxism), HCN IX 6, p.5 (1-VII-1922).
hence the necessity for a united front tactic. Likewise, there was a necessity in the revolution of ideas. Therefore, though 'Hu Shih's pragmatism and our historical materialism are naturally different, in the revolutionary struggle to sweep away feudalist thoughts there is a need to unite.'

This was so because in Ch'en's view Hu was the only major literary figure truly representative of the capitalistic culture while all the other so-called New Learning scholars still 'had one foot in feudal-patriarchal thoughts'.

As has been noted, the Chinese communists claimed at this very time that they were the vanguard of the national revolution. Thus one may expect that they would not be content just to remain in the same stage of ideological development as Hu. Indeed, to be content with that would be to deny the materialistic conception of history. Thus we find one of the more outstanding students of Ch'en, Teng Chung-hsia, while cheering Hu for his efforts in countering the conservative thinkers, accusing Hu of really working against the revolution. In Teng's view, Hu was guilty of denying the imminent danger of imperialism to China and for not supporting the national revolution of the KMT-CCP. Teng's view was certainly consistent with his world views - the materialistic


43 Teng Chung-hsia, 'Nu-li Chou\ku\an ti kung tsui' (The Guilt and Merits of the Endeavour Weekly) Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien (CKCN) No.3 (3-XI-1923).
conception of history. To be bourgeois and capitalistic in a feudal milieu would be progressive. But to remain so in a semi-feudal and semi-colonial milieu in which the national revolution had already commenced with a communist vanguard would be going against the current of sociopolitical - or, historical - development. He therefore advised that since the feudal influences had not been entirely eliminated there was a need to form a united front with Hu Shih and his ilk. But, 'society is in the process of evolution. Frankly, the evolution of the economic structure of the society will see the capitalist system overthrowing feudalism and capitalism will, in turn, be overthrown by communism.' He regarded such developments as the truly New Cultural Movement and dismissed his opponents as the 'new reactionaries'.

For Teng to have espoused such views on the very eve of the formal opening of the First Congress of the restructured KMT was more than mere student radicalism. Culture, as Ch'en had told his readers was the superstructure and reflects the base - the economic system - of a society. In their revolutionary programme, the Chinese communists were attempting to effect changes to both the cultural and the socio-economic-political aspects of society concurrently. For, unlike Lenin and the Bolsheviks, the Chinese revolutionaries had hoisted the banner of cultural revolution before they had accepted the materialistic conception of history. Hence, after the acceptance of this new

44 Teng, 'Chung-kuo hsien-tsai ti zu-hsiang chieh' (The Contemporary Chinese Intellectuals) CKCN No.6 (24-XI-1923).
world view, they naturally brought their cultural revolution forward as an integral part of their total revolutionary programme.

Teng was firmly in agreement with his party leader, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, and a leading theoretician of the party, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai. Both leaders published similar views on the eve of the KMT Congress, as if to make sure that there would be no ground for doubt. In the Twentieth Anniversary issue of the widely read literary journal, The Eastern Miscellany, Ch'ü proclaimed that 'civilization is but the power of mankind over nature.'

However, he explained that while skill might denote the materialistic aspect of civilization, 'the skills that carry a mystical nature are the skills of the feudal period, and skills of a scientific nature are the civilizations of the capitalistic class but the skills that are even more advanced, those with an artistic nature, are the civilizations of the proletarian class.' As Ch'ü explained it, this new civilization could be achieved through socialism by the 'full development of science.' This, to Ch'ü meant 'class struggle in the realm of ideas' in the same way as class struggle in the realm of sociopolitics. The achievement of the 'artistic civilization of socialism along this path (class struggle) together with the other

45 Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, 'Hsien-tai wen-ming ti wen-ti yü she-hui chu-i' (The Problems of Contemporary Civilization and Socialism) Tung-fang tsa-chih (The Eastern Miscellany) XXI, 1, pp.1-11 (10-I-1924, but article was written on 8-XI-1923), cited from p.1.
46 Ibid., p.3.
endeavours of mankind as well as historical and social
determinism, are objective facts and not subjective fatalism.' 47

Ch'ü then directed his readers to his elucidation of
such objective facts as the natural processes of historical
development in another article he had written in his own
journal, the HCN. 48 In the issue that published this explanation
was an article by party leader, Ch'en. 49 In his article, Ch'en
also took the view that the materialistic conception was the
natural and scientific view. Indeed, editor Ch'ü and party
leader Ch'en repeated their arguments in the very next issue. 50

Since the Chinese communists had long proclaimed that
China was a proletarian nation and that the goal of their
revolutionary activities was a proletarian society achieved
through a process of class struggle, though temporarily styled
a national revolution, they naturally regarded their cultural
aim as the bringing forth of a proletarian culture - a culture
of the people. However, while together with Lenin, the Chinese
communists would say that 'bread is the basis of culture' the
Chinese went on to say that 'the proletarian revolution does
not only seek to solve the bread problem but also to seek a new

47 Ibid., p.11.
48 Ch'ü, 'Tzu-yu shih-chieh yü pi-jan shih-chieh' (The Free
World and the Natural World) HCN-Q No.2, pp.37-47 (20-XII-1923)
written on the 24-XI-1923.
49 Ch'en, 'K'o-hsiieh yü jen-sheng-kuan hsü!' (Preface to Science
and Attitudes of Life) HCN-Q No.2, pp.31-36; written on the
13-XI-1923.
50 Ch'en, 'Ta Chang Chun-mai chi Liang Jen-kung' (Replies to
Chang Chun-mai and Liang Jen-kung/Ch'i-chao) HCN-Q No.3 pp.1-10;
Ch'ü 'Shih-yen chu-i yü Ke-ming che-hsüeh' (Experimentalism and
Revolutionary Philosophy) HCN-Q No.3, pp.10-22 (1-VIII-1924).
path for human culture.\textsuperscript{51}

In short, as the Chinese communists officially entered into their collaboration with the KMT in the national revolution, the banner of literary revolution which Ch'en hoisted in 1917 had been replaced by the banner of cultural revolution. To be sure, when Ch'en suggested his literary revolution, he had in mind more than merely literary activities in the narrower or normal sense of the term. Now, having accepted the materialistic conception of history, the Chinese communists took the view that 'spiritual life (ching-shen sheng-huo) is determined by material life; in other words, the development of culture depends on the materialistic—economic—foundation.'\textsuperscript{52} At the same time, the Chinese communists certainly accepted the idea that culture is the product of all mankind and not just the domain of any particular class. However, since the social and political development of history since the period of primitive communism meant the development of classes and exploitations, the cultural goal of the communists in the total revolutionary programme was to return culture to all people by the elimination of classes—the creation of a classless society through class struggle.\textsuperscript{53}

Meanwhile, as they were actively engaged in a revolutionary

\textsuperscript{51} Chiang Hsia-seng 'Wu-ch'an chieh-chi ke-ming yu wen-hua' (The Proletarian Revolution and Culture) HCN-Q No.3, pp.16-22 (1-VIII-1924); cited from pp.18-9.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p.19.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., p.20.
struggle in a class divided society which was also being exploited by imperialism - that is, during the national revolution - 'the new literature that deserves respect is that which would arouse the spirit (ching-shen) of the people to participate in the movements for national independence and democratic revolution. 54

Social injustice compelled Ch'en and his colleagues to work to build a nation and society that they could love. Their 'lovable state' meant more than just a strong nation with an army that would bring military glory but a state which would offer protection to the rights of its citizens. They regarded it as part of their task to create an awakening to the need for a new and just social ethos. This, to them, included the rejection of certain aspects of the traditional culture and replacing it with a new one. When in their process of searching for a new culture - a new sociopolitical culture - they came to accept the materialistic conception of history as their new world view. This acceptance constrained them into action - political and cultural.

Of special interest to this discussion, however, is the fact that when Ch'ü and Ch'en were publishing their ideas on a socialist culture and civilization, Ch'ü was also publishing his significant comments on Lenin which have been discussed earlier. 55 As the Chinese communists were launching their

54 Yun Tai-ying, 'Pa ku?' (Eight-legged?) CKCN No.8, pp.3-6 (2-VIII-1924); cited from p.4.
55 Ch'ü, 'From Democracy to Socialism', HCN-Q No.2, pp.79-102 (20-XII-1923).
national revolution, Ch'ü, one of their leading theoreticians, was discussing Lenin's writings of 1902 and 1905 (*What is to be done?* and *Two Tactics*) - his writings in exile. While Lenin would urge the use of the 'Jacobin method' to settle scores with Czarism, Ch'ü, a longtime student of Russian literature, would quote Lenin but suggested that the Chinese communists should use the Jacobin Method to wage their revolution. While the Comintern would advise that the impact of imperialism together with the weakness of the Chinese proletariat necessitated the strategy of a national revolution, the Chinese communist did not oppose the advice but added that the more backward the country the stronger the proletariat in such a revolution and the greater the chance of such a revolution giving success to the proletariat.

This study does not attempt to answer the value-loaded judgment that Marxism 'in its movement eastward ... had undergone a slow but steady process of decomposition'\(^56\) nor is this an attempt to evaluate the degree of orthodoxy in Chinese Marxism or Communism. The Chinese communists, however, regarded themselves as Marxists and Leninists. It seems that there was some justification for them believing that they were Marxists and were conducting their revolutionary activities approved by Marx and Lenin. The Chinese communists thoroughly endorsed the injunction by Marx and Engles, published in 1848.

the communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things. In all these movements they bring to the front, as the leading question, the property question, no matter what its degree of development at that time.

Forty years later, in 1888, Engels commented that 'however much the state of things may have altered ... the general principles laid down in this Manifesto are, on the whole, as correct today as ever. Here and there, some details might be improved. The practical application of the principles will depend, as the Manifesto itself stated, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing.' In 1922, the Chinese communists used this section of the Manifesto to justify the timeliness of their revolution.

The Chinese communists were also undoubtedly Leninists. They accepted Lenin's view of imperialism - as well as his many other ideas written in exile. While Lenin might not have a systematized ideological baggage with him in the sealed train

across Europe and while the rapidity of the Bolshevik success caused his head to spin, the Chinese communists were trying to conduct their revolutionary activities in their homeland along the ideological guidelines uttered by Lenin — during the exiled years. At the same time, the Chinese revolutionaries were also including a cultural component in their revolutionary programme — a component which the Russian communists began to concern themselves with, seriously, only after the accession of political power.

To the Chinese communists, the development and nature of Chinese communists in the period under discussion, to 1925, were Marxist and Leninist. To others, this development as well as the nature might be unorthodox and even in the process of decomposition. To the historian confronted with such judgments, he can but delineate what the Chinese were trying to say to their contemporaries and to bear in mind the advice that 'to what a man thinketh in his heart, so is he.'

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHINESE WORKS

To list the numerous articles written by the Chinese communists in the various journals would be needless padding, especially since adequate identifications have been given in the footnotes. Suffice to say that in the journals listed below, especially those published by the communists, intensive and extensive examinations have been made.

PERIODICALS:

Ch'en pao (The Morning Post)

Chia-yin tsa-chih

Chieh-fang yi kai-tsao (The Emancipation and Reconstruction)

Ch'ien-feng (The Vanguard) published by the CCP.

Chien-she chou-k'an (The Construction Weekly)

Chüeh-wu (The Awakened)

Ch'ing-nien chou-k'an (The Youth Weekly, Canton) by the SYC.

Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien (The Chinese Youth) by the SYC.

Chung-kuo hsüeh-sheng (The Chinese Student)

Chung-kuo nung-min (The Chinese Peasant)
Hsiang Tao chou-pao (The Guide Weekly), by the CCP.

Hsien ch'iu (The Pioneer), by the CCP.

Hsin-ch'ao (The Renaissance)

Hsin chiao-yü (New Education)

Hsin chien-she (New Construction)

Hsin Ch'ing-nien (La Jeunesse), by the CCP since 1923.

Hsiang-chiang ch'en pao (The Hong Kong Morning Post)

Huang-pu ch'ao chou-k'ăn (Whampoa Academy Weekly)

Hsin kuan-ch'a (The New Observer), by the CCP after 1949.

Hua-tzu jih-pao [Wah Tse Yat Pao] (The Chinese Mail)

Hsin Min-kuo (The New Nation)

Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao (The Red Flag Waves), by the CCP since 1949.

Jen-min chou-k'ăn (The People's Weekly, Canton), by the CCP.

Kung-chan tang (The Communist), by the CCP.

Kung-jen chou-k'ăn (The Workers' Weekly, Peking).

Kuo-min chou pao (The National Weekly)

Kuomintang chou-k'ăn (The KMT Weekly)

Kuo-min jih-jih pao (The National Daily News, Shanghai)
Li-t'ou chou pao (The Plough-head Weekly)

Lü Ou chou-k'ân (Journal Chinois Hebdomadaire)

Li Shih Yen-chiu (Historical Research, Peking)

Mei-chou p'ing-lun (The Weekly Review, Peking)

Min Pao (The People's News)

Min Sheng (The People's Voice)

Ming Pao yüeh-k'ân (The Bright Monthly, Hong Kong)

Nu-li chou pao (The Weekly Endeavour)

Pei-ching ta-hsüeh yüeh-k'ân (The Peking University Monthly)

Pu-erh-sai-wei-k'e (The Bolshevik)

Nung-min yün-tung (The Peasant Movement)

Shao-nien Chung-kuo (Young China)

Tung-fang tsa-chih (The Eastern Miscellany). The original edition is used. The Taiwan reprint has made numerous alterations to articles written by the communists, some are even totally removed.

Shanghai Shih-pao (The Shanghai Times)

Yen chih (The Statesman)

Tien yi pao (Providential Justice Daily)
Non-periodical materials:

Chang Chi 張繼
Chang Pu-ch'uan hsien-sheng ch'uan-chi (The Complete works of Chang Chi). (Taipei, 1951).

Chang Ch'ing-lu (ed.) 張靜嵐
Chung-kuo hsien-tai ch'u-pan shih liao (Historical Materialis on Modern Chinese Publications) 8 vols. (Peking, 1957).

Chang Kuo-t'ao 張國焘
"Wo te hui-i" (My Recollections 我的回憶) in Ming Pao Monthly, 4-15 (April 1966-March 1967).

Chang Yu-i (ed.) 章有義

Ch'en Chi-tien 陳啟天
Fan-0 vil fan-kung (Anti-Russia and Anti-communist). (Shanghai, 1929). 反俄反共

Ch'en Kung-po 陳公博
Chung-kuo li-shih shang ti ke-ming (Revolutions in Chinese History). (Shanghai, 1928). 中國歷史上的革命
Han Feng chi (Collected Writings), (n.p. 1944).

Ssu-nien ts'ung cheng lu (Four years in government service), (Shanghai 1938). 四年從政錄

Ch'en Kung-po & Chou Fo-hai 陳公博 周佛海
Hui-i lu ho pien (The Joint edition of Memoirs), (Hong Kong, 1968). 回憶錄合編

Ch'en Tu-hsiu 陳獨秀
Kao ch'uan-tang t'ung-chih shu (A Letter to all comrades of the Party), 1929. The edition used is that in the Hoover Institution Library.

生平信同名書
Ch'en Tu-hsiu (ed.) 靈獨秀
Chung-kuo ke-ming wen-ti lun-wen chi (A Collection of articles on the Problems of the Chinese Revolution), (Shanghai, 1926). 《中國革命問題論文集》

Ch'en Tung-hsiao (ed.) 陳東曉
Ch'en Tu-hsiu p'ing-lun (Critiques of Ch'en Tu-hsiu), (Shanghai, 1933). 陳獨秀評論

Chia I-chun 賈逸民

Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石
Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng - Min-kuo shih-wu nien i-ch'ien chih Chiang-Chieh-shih hsien-sheng (Mr. Chiang Kai-shek - Mr. Chiang Kai-shek before 1926), ed. Mao Ssu-ch'eng. 20 vols. n.p., n.d., the editor's postscript was dated October, 1936. Referred to here as Chiang's Diary) 《蔣介石先生—民國十五年之前蔣介石先生》

Ch'en Shu-liang 陳叔梁
Wu-sa t'ung-shih (The Tragic History of May 30th), (Shanghai, 1927). 《五卅痛史》

Ch'en Ta 陳達
Chung-kuo lao-kung wen-ti (Labour Problems of China) (Shanghai, 1929). 《中國勞工問題》

Ch'en Tu-hsiu 陳獨秀
Shih-an tzu-chuan (The Autobiography of Ch'en Tu-hsiu) (Shanghai, 1938). 《尊庵自傳》

Chin-tai shih tzu-liao 近代史資料
Sources of Modern History, a series (Peking 1955-)

Chu Chi-hua (Chu Hsin-fan) 朱其華 (朱新藩)
Chung-kuo ke-ming yi Chung-kuo she-hui ko chieh-chi (The Chinese Revolution and the various Chinese Social Classes) 2 vols. (Shanghai, 1930) 《中國革命與中國社會各階級》
Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 鬱秋白


Chung-kuo ke-ming chung chih cheng-lun wen-t'ı (Controversial Questions of the Chinese Revolution) (Wuhan, 1927).


Ch'u I 鐘祥

Wu-sa tsan-an (The Tragic Case of May 30th) (Shanghai, n.d.) 五卅惨案

Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang chung-yao hsüan-yén hsüh-ling chi (Important Declarations and Instructions of the KMT of China), published by the Political Department of the Military Academy of the KMT of China (Dec 1925, n.p.) 中國國民黨重要宣言訓令集

Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang ti-i-erh-san tz'u ch'üan kuo tai-piao ta-hui hui-k' an (Collections of documents of the First, Second, and Third congresses of the KMT of China), n.p. Propaganda Department of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT, Oct. 1931. 中國國民黨第一次、第二次全國代表大會案刊

Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang hsüan-yen hui-k' an (Collection of Declarations of the KMT) n.p., by the Propaganda Department of the CEC of the KMT, June, 1927. 中國國民黨宣言案刊

Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang ti-i-erh-san tz'u ch'üan kuo tai-piao ta-hui hsüan-yen chi chieh-i-an (Manifestos and Resolutions of the First, Second, and Third National Congresses of the KMT). n.p. by the Department of Organization of the CEC of the KMT, August, 1927. 中國國民黨第一次、第二次全國代表大會宣言及決議案

Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang-yuan tsai hsüan-ch'üan kung-tso shang tui-yu chieh-chi tou-cheng ying-ch'u ti tai-tu The Attitudes the KMT members should adopt in their propaganda work on the question of Class Struggle. (Shanghai, Executive Hqs. of the CEC of the KMT, 1925) 中國國民黨員在宣傳工作上對於階級鬥爭應取的態度.
Chung-kuo nung-min yün-tung kai-k'uang
(Conditions of the Chinese Peasant Movement), n.p. but probably Canton, Department of the Peasantry of the CEC of the KMT, 1926.

Chung I-mou 鍾贻謀
Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung (The Peasant Movements in Hai-lu-feng), (Canton, 1957).

Chung-kuo ke-ming yün-tung shih
(History of the Chinese Revolutionary Movement), (Yenan, 1937).

Feng Tzu-yu 冯自由

Ho Chiang-kung 何長工
Ch'In kung chien hsueh sheng-huo hui-i (Memories of the life of the worker-student), (Peking, 1958).

Ho Yang-ling 賀揚靈
Nung-min yün-tung (The Peasant Movement), 2 vols. by the School of Party Affairs (March 1928, Nanking).

Ho Kan-chih 何幹之
Chung-kuo hsien-tai ke-ming shih (History of the Modern Chinese Revolution) (Peking, 1957).

Ho Yueh-seng 何嶽僧
Chung-kuo pa-kung shih (A History of Strikes in China) (Shanghai, 1927).

Hou Feng 侯楨

Hsi Ch'en 西塵
"Nung-yeh chih she-hui chu-i-fa" (The Socialization of the Agricultural Industry), Tung-fang tsa-chih XVIII No. 13, pp. 25-36 (10-VII-1921).
Hsiao Feng 萧枫

Ts'ung wu-ssu tao Chung-hua jen-min kung-huo-kuo ti tan-sheng (From May 4th to the Birth of the People's Republic of China), (Peking, 1951).

Hsieh Pen 谢彬

Min-kuo cheng-tang shih (A History of the Political Parties of the Republic), (Shanghai, 1924).

Hsien-tai shih-liao 现代史料

(Materials of Modern History) 4 vols. Edited by the Hai-t'ien Publishing co. (Shanghai, 1934-5).

Hsin-hai ke-ming hui-i lu 爱革命回忆录

(Recollections of the 1911 Revolution), edited by the Chung-hua jen-min cheng-chih hsieh-shang hui-i (The People's Political Consultative Council of China, Peking, 1961-2).

Hu Ch'iao-mu 胡乔木

Chung-kuo Kung-ch' an-tang ti san-shih nien (Thirty years of the Chinese Communist Party), Peking, 1951.

Hu Han-min 胡汉民


"Wei-wu shih-kuan p'i-p'ing chih p'i-p'ing" (A Critique of the Criticism of the Materialistic Conception of History), Chien-she I 5 (Dec 1919).

Hu Hua 胡华


Hu Shih 胡适

Hu Shih wen-ts'yun (Collected Essays of Hu Shih), Shanghai 1926.
Hua Kang


Huang Ch'ang-ku

Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng pei-shang yü shih-shih hou hsiang-ch'ing (A detailed account of Mr. Sun Yat-sen's going to the North and his Death). Shanghai, 1925.

Hung-se wen-hsien

Red Documents. (Yenan, 1938)


I-chiu-i-chiu nien nan-pei i-ho tzu-liao (Historical Materials on the 1919 North-South Peace Conference. (Peking, 1952).

Jen Yu-wen


Ko Kung-chen


Kung Chi

Chung-kuo chin-tai cheng-chih szu-hsiang shih-liao
(Historical Materials on Contemporary Chinese Political Thought), n.p. 1948.

Kung-fei huo-kuo shih liao hui-pien
(Collected Historical Documents on the National Calamity caused by the Communist Bandits), 4 vols. (Taipei, 1964).

Kung-hui wen-hsien
Materials on the 2nd and 3rd Congresses were printed but the 4th were in manuscript form. Used in the Hoover Institution Library.

Kung-jen yün-tung
(Labour Movement), Shanghai, June 1972.

Kuo Chan-po

Chin wu-shih nien Chung-kuo szu-hsiao shih (An Intellectual History of China of the last Fifty Years)
Peking, 1955.

Kuo-fu ch'An-shu

Kuo Hua-lun


Kuo Mo-jo

Mo-jo wen-chi (Collected Writings of Mo-jo), 17 vols.
(Peking, 1957-63).

Kwagtung nung-min yün-tung pao-kao
Li Aug
Hung-se wu-t'ai (The Red Stage), (Chuchiang, Kwagtung, 1942).

Li Chien-nung
Tsui-chin san-shih nien Chung-kuo cheng-chih shih (A political history of China for the last thirty years), (Shanghai 1930).

Li Jui

Li Ta-chao
Li Ta-chao hs'uan-chi (Selected Writings of Li Ta-chao) Peking, 1962.

Li Shu
"1905 nien Wo-kuo ke-ming ti Chung-kuo" (China of the 1905 Russian Revolution), Li-shih yen-chiu 1955 No. 1 pp. 1-18 (Jan 1955). 

Li Yun-han
Ts'ung jung-kung tao ch'ing-tang (From the Admittance of the Communists to the Purification of the Party) 2 vols. Taipei, 1966.

Lo Chia-lun
Liu-shih nien lai Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang yi Chung-kuo (The KMT and China in sixty years), Taipei 1959.

Ma Ch'ao-ch'iu

Ma Hsü-lun
Wo tsai liu-shih siu i-chien (My Life before Sixty) Shanghai, 1947.
Miu Ch' u-huang 张楚黄


Mif, Pavel

Chin-chi shih-ch'i chung ti Chung-kuo Kung-ch' an-tang (The CCP in critical days). Trans. into Chinese from Russian, Moscow: Sun Yat-sen University, 1928.

Pa-kung ti cheng-ts'e
(Policy of Strikes) n.p. by the Propaganda Department of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike Committee, n.d.

Pa-kung yü tung-cheng
(Strike and the Eastern Expedition), n.p., n.d. by the Propaganda Department of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike Committee.

Pan Su 彭

Chung-shan ch'u-shih hou liu-shih nien ta-shih (Major events in the sixty years after the birth of Sun Yat-sen) Shanghai, 1928.

Radek, Karl


Sha-ch'i t'ung-shih

Shao Yuan-chung 邵元冲

Chung-kuo chih ke-ming yün-tung chi' i pei-ching (The revolutionary Movement of China and its Background), Shanghai, 1927.

Shen Yun-lung 沈雲龍

Ssu-ma Hsien-tao 蘇聯陰謀之證實編

Pei-ta hou chih ko-p'ai szu-hsian (The various schools of thought after the Northern Expedition) Peiping, 1930

Shu Ch'ing 蒲鈞

Kung-chan-tang yin-mou ta pao-lu (The great exposure of the Communist Conspiracy), Canton, San-min Club, 1924

Su-lien yin-mou wen-cheng hui-pien (Collections of documentary evidence of the Soviet Russian Conspiracy), 10 vols. Edited and translated by the Peking Metropolitan Police Headquarters, Inspection Bureau, Commission of Translation and Compilation. Peking, 1928. This has been partially translated into English by Wilbur and How (see below).

Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙

Tsung-li ch'üan-shu (Collected Works of the Director-General), ed. Hu Han-min 5 vols. (Shanghai, 1930).

San-min chu-i (The Three Principles of the People), with two essays on Min-sheng (People's Livelihood) by Chiang Kai-shek added (Taipei, 1962).

Tai Chi-tao 戴季陶

Sun-wen chu-i chih che-hsueh chih chi-ch'u (The Philosophical Foundations of Sun Yatsenism), Shanghai 1925. 孫文主義之哲學之基礎

Kuo-min ke-ming yü Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang (The National Revolution and the Chinese KMT), Shanghai 1925.

Tai Chi-tao hsien-sheng pien nien chuan-chi (A chronological biography of Mr. Tai Chi-tao), Taipei, 1958.

T'an P'ing-shan & Feng Ch'u-p'o 譚平山、馮菊坡

Kuo-min yün-tung shung chih min-tuan wen-ti (The Problem of the People's Militia Corps in the National Revolution) by the Canton Propaganda Committee of the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, 1923.
Tang-shih hsüeh-hsi ts'ian k'ao tsu-liao
(Reference Materials for the Study of Party History)
Siu-yuan, 1952.

Teng Chung-hsia

Chung-kuo tsu-kung yün-tung chien-shih (A Brief History of the Chinese Labour Movement), originally published in Moscow, 1930; edition used was published in 1938 by Hsin-hua she but n.p.

Ting Shou-ho, Yin Hsu-i, & Chang Po-chao
Shih-yüeh ke-ming tui Chung-kuo ke-ming ti ying-hsiang
(The Influence of the October Revolution on the Chinese Revolution), Peking, 1957.

Ting Shou-ho & Yin Hsu-i
"Wu-ssu hsin wen-hua yün-tung" (The New Cultural Movement of May 4th) Li-shih yen-chiu 1939 No. 4, pp.1-35

Teng Tse-ju

Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang erh-shih nien shih-chi (Historical records of the KMT in the past twenty years), Shanghai 1948.

Ti-i-tzu kuo-nei ke-ming chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti kung-jen yün-tung
(The Labour Movement during the first period of the Chinese internal revolutionary war; collected source materials of Modern Chinese History) Peking, 1954.

Ti-i-tzu kuo-nei ke-ming chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti nung-min yün-tung
(The Peasant Movement during the first period of the Chinese internal revolutionary war; collected source materials of Modern Chinese History) Peking, 1955.

Tseng Ch'i

Tseng Mu-han hsien-sheng i-chu (Posthumous writings of Mr. Tseng Ch'i) Taipei, CEC of the Chinese Youth Party 1954

Tsou Lu

Tsou Lu

Ch'eng-lu wen-hsüan (Literary Writings of Tsou Lu)
Shanghai, 1948.

Tsui Shu-chin

Sun Chung-shan yu Kung-chan-chu-i (Sun Yat-sen and Communism), Hong Kong, 1954.

Tu Ping-po

Chung-kuo tsui-chin pa-shih nien lai ti ke-ming yu wai-chiao (Revolutions and Diplomatic Relations in China during the last eighty years), Shanghai, 1933.

Wang Chien-min


Wang Shen-jan

Chin-tai erh-shih chia ping-ch'uan (Critical Biographies of twenty contemporary scholars), the biography of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, (Peking, 1934)

Wang Yao


Wo-min hsien-tsai wai shih-mo cheng-tou? (What are the causes of our present struggles?), published by the Jen-min chou-k' an Press - ran by the CCP - in Canton, 1926, and included articles by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Chou En-lai etc.

Wu Ch'en-hsi

"Chung-kuo jin-hang-yeh ti nung-yeh chin-jung" (The Rural industry liquidity of the Chinese banking system), She-hui hsiieh tsa-chih (The Social Science Journal) VI, 3 (XI-1935).

Wu Ch'i

Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang shih (A History of the Chinese KMT) published by the Central Army Academy, Nanking, 1929.
Wu Hsiang-hsiang


Wu I


Wu-ssu shih-ch'i ti Chung-kuo ke-ming yün-tung

(Chinese revolutionary movements during the May 4th Period) ed. by Hung Huan-chuang, Peking, 1956.

Wu-ssu sa-chou-nien chi-nien chuan-chi

(A special collection of essays commemorating the Thirtieth Anniversary of May 4th), Shanghai, 1949.

Yang Chih-hua

"I Ch'iu-pai" (Recollections about Ch'iu-pai) Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao VIII, pp. 24-56 (VII 1958)

"Chü Ch'iu-pai yu nung-min" (Chü Ch'iu-pai and the peasants) Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily) 18-VI-1950, p. 3.

Yin Wei-lien

Chung-kuo ke-ming shih (A History of Chinese Revolutions), Shanghai, 1929.

Wu-ssu shih-ch'i ch'i-k'an chieh-shao

Huo-pu chih-hang wei-yüan Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai tui-yu pa-yüeh shih-chiu erh-shih liang-tien chih chun-yah ch'uan-ti hui-i i-shih lu chih sheng-ming

(A Record of the Declaration by Alternate member of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, on the 19th and 20th August to the Plenary Session of the Committee)

This is a handwritten report of the speeches by Ch'i to the CEC's 2nd Plenary Session in made in response to the impeachment submitted by the KMT Control Committee. (1924)

Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang chung-yang Chien-ch'a wei-yüan hui shen-ch'a pao-kao shu

(Report of the Investigations by the Central Control Committee of the KMT)

This is the letter of impeachment submitted by Chang Chi, et al, to the CEC against the KMT and contained the various evidences of alleged CCP misdeeds, dated 13 August 1924.
NON-CHINESE WORKS

Avineri, Shlomo

Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization
(New York, Anchor Books 1969)

The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx.
(Cambridge U.P. 1968)

Baron, S.H.

"Plehanov's Russia: the Impact of the West upon
Oriental Society". Journal of the History of

Brandt, Conrad

Stalin's Failure in China 1924-1927. (Harvard U.P.
1958)

Brandt, Conrad; Schwartz, Benjamin; Fairbank, John K. ed.

A Documentary History of Chinese Communism. (Harvard
U.P. 1952)

Borg, D.

American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928.
(New York, 1947)

Bottomore, T.B.

Classes in Modern Society. (London 1965)

Carrere, D'Encausse, H.

L'U.R.S.S. et la Chine devant les révolutions dans
les sociétés pré-industrielles [par] Hélène Carrere
d'Encausse, [et ] Stuart R. Schram. Paris, A. Colin,
1970.

Carrere d'Encausse, H. and Schram, Stuart

Marxism and Asia. (London 1969)

Chambre, Henri

From Marx to Mao Tse-tung. (P.J. Kenedy & Son, New
York, 1963)

Chang, Carsun

The Third Force in China. (Fookmen Associated, New
York, 1952)
Chang, Kuo-t'ao


Ch'en, Jerome

Mao and the Chinese Revolution. (London 1965)
Mao. (New Jersey 1969)

Ch'en, Joseph I.


Chen, Kung-Po


Chen Pan-tsu (Ch'en T'an-ch'iu)

"Reminiscences of the 1st Congress of the CCP" Communist International (British ed.) XIII, 9, pp. 593-6, (Sept.-Oct. 1936)

Chesneauux, Jean

Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China, 1840-1950 (Stanford U.P. 1972)
The Labour Movement in China: 1919-1927 (Stanford U.P., California 1968)

Childs, David

Marx and the Marxists (London 1973)

Chow, Tse-tsung

The May Fourth Movement - Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Harvard U.P. 1960).

Clubb, Oliver Edmund 1901.-

Communism in China as reported from Hankow in 1932. (New York, Columbia U.P. 1968)
Twentieth Century China (New York, 1964)

Crowley, James B.
Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation. (New York, 1970)

Decennial Report, 1902-1911
Inspectorate General of Customs. (Shanghai, 1913)

Degras, Jane (ed.)
Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1917-1924. (Oxford U.P. London 1951)

Dowson, Ross

Drachkovitch, Milorad M, and Branko Lazitch (ed.)
The Comintern: Historical Highlights: Essays, Recollections, Documents. (Stanford, Hoover Institute, Published 1966)

Eto, Shinkichi

Eudin, Xenia Joukoff, and North, Robert C (ed.)

Evans, Ernestine
"Looking East from Moscow". Asia, Dec. 1922.

Fei Hsiao-tung
China's Gentry. (University of Chicago Press 1953)

Fischer, Louis
Feuerwerker, Albert


Fitzpatrick, Sheila


Franke, Wolfgang


Gaimusho Jōhōbu (Foreign Affairs Information Bureau)

Gendai Shinjin Meikan 現代史人名鑑
Toa Dubun Kai Chozabu (外務省情報課 ). (Tokyo 1928)

Gaster, Michael


Gray, Alexander

The Socialist Tradition, Moses to Lenin. (London 1946)

Gray, Jack (ed.)


Grieder, Jerome B.


How, Julie


Hsüeh, Chun-tu

Revolutionary Leaders in Modern China. (New York 1971)
Hu, Sheng

Imperialism and Chinese Politics. (Peking 1955)

Isaac, Harold

The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. (Stanford U.P. 1952)

Johnson, Chalmers A.

Revolutionary Changes. (University of London Press 1968)

Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power. (Stanford U.P. 1962)

Hatano Ken'ichi (ed.) 浜野健一

China Kyōsan Tōshi 中国共産党史

Gaimusho Jōhōbu. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Public Information Bureau, Tokyo, 1932)

Kuo, Thomas C.T.


Labeledz, L. (ed.)


Leichtheim, George

The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays. (New York 1967)

Leng, Shao Chuan; Palmer, Norman D.


Lenin, Vladimir Il'ich

Collected Works. (45 vols.) (Moscow 1960-70)

Levine, Steven A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher/Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lewis, John</td>
<td>Marxism &amp; Modern idealism. (London, Lawrence &amp; Wishart 1944)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowe, Donald M.</td>
<td>The Function of &quot;China&quot; in Marx, Lenin and Mao. (University of California, 1966)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marx, K. and Engles, F.</td>
<td>Manifesto of the Communist Party. (Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1970)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meisner, Maurice</td>
<td>Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism. (Harvard U.P. 1967)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moore, Barrington</td>
<td>Soviet Politics - The Dilemma of Power. (Harvard U.P. 1959)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Peake, Cyrus

Nationalism & Education in Modern China. (Columbia U.P. 1932)

Pipes, Richard


Revolutionary Russia (ed. by R.P.). (Harvard U.P. 1968)

Radek, Karl

The architect of Socialist Society. (Moscow Cooperative Publication Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, 1934)

Roy, David Tod

Kuo Mo-jo: The Early Years 1892-1924. (Harvard U.P. 1971)

Roy, M.N.

Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China. (Renaissance Publishers, Calcutta 1946)

My experiences in China. (Calcutta Renaissance Publishers 1938)

Russell, Bertrand


Sawer, Phillipa Marian


Scalapino, R.A. & Yu. G.T.

The Chinese Anarchist Movement. (University of California Press 1961)

Scalapino, Robert & Shiffrin, Harod

Schram, Stuart


Schwartz, Benjamin I.


Serg, Victor (Pseudonym of Viktor K'vovievich Kibal'chieh, 1890-1947)


Seton-Watson, Hugh

The Pattern of Communist Revolution. (London, 1st ed. 1953)

Sjaardema, Henryk

Asian Materials - International Press Correspondence. 1921-1927. (private printing 1959)

Smedley, Agnes


Snow, Edgar

Red Star Over China. (New York 1937)

Journey to the Beginning. (London 1959)

Sun, Yat-sen


Tan, Chester C.

Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century. (New York 1971)

Tang, Leang-li

The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution. (London 1930)

The Foundations of Modern China. (London 1928)
Tawney, R.H.  
**Land and Labour in China.** (First published in 1932. Edition used: Beacon Paperback (Boston) 1966 with an Introduction by Barrington Moore, Jr.)

Thomson, George  
**From Marx to Mao Tse-tung: A Study in revolutionary dialectics.** (London 1971)

Thornton, Richard C.  
**The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, 1928-31.** (University of Washington Press, 1969)

Trotsky, Leon  
- **The First Five Years of the Communist International.** (translation John G. Wright 2 vols., New York Pioneer Publication 1945)  
- **Permanent Revolution.** (Calcutta 1947)  
- **My Life.** (New York, 1930)  

Tsui, Shu-chin  
"The Influence of the Canton-Moscow Entente upon Sun Yat-sen's Political Philosophy".  

Tucker, Robert C.  
**The Marxian Revolutionary Idea.** (New York 1969)

Wales, Nym. (Helen Foster Snow)  
**Red Dust.** (Stanford U.P. 1952)

Wang Ching-wei  
**The Chinese National Revolution: Essays & Documents.** (Peiping 1931)

Wang, Tsi C.  
**The Youth Movement in China.** (New York New Republic 1928)
Whiting, Allen S.
"A New Version of Shan min Chu I". The Far Eastern Quarterly. (May 1955)

Wilbur, C. Martin
"The Ashes of Defeat". The China Quarterly 18, April-June 1964)
"The Influence of the Past: How the Early Years Helped to Shape the Future of the CCP." The China Quarterly 36 (Oct.-Dec. 1968)

Wilbur, C. Martin and How, Julie Lien-ying

Willmott, W.E. (ed.)
Economic Organization in Chinese Society. (Stanford U.P. 1972)

Wright, A.F. (ed.)
Confucian Persuasion. (Stanford U.P. 1960)

Wright, Mary C.
China in Revolution. (Yale U.P. 1968)

Wu, Ellsworth Tien-wei

Yakhontoff, Victor A.
The Chinese Soviet. (New York 1934)

Yu-Ang-Li
"The Communist International and the Founding of the Communist Party of China". Communist International (American ed.) VI, Nos.9-10 (March-April 1929)