PSYCHOLOGICAL DISPOSITIONS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

by

ALAN HUGHES

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy, Australian
National University.

Department of Political Science,
Research School of Social Sciences.

June 1970.
This thesis is my own original work.

Alan Hughes

ALAN HUGHES
For Hans and Sophie Scholl,
and the men and women
of the 20th July, 1944;
especially, Claus Schenk, Count von Stauffenberg

INVICTIS PAX
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td></td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One</td>
<td>Introduction: Psychology and Politics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two</td>
<td>The Australian Political Context, 1960-67</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three</td>
<td>The Samples of 1963 and 1966</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Four</td>
<td>The Social Geography of Political Attitudes in 1963</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five</td>
<td>An Investigation of the Relation of Dispositions to Political Attitudes in 1963</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six</td>
<td>Problems and Solutions in Measuring Psychological Dispositions</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Seven</td>
<td>Dispositions and Their Correlates</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Eight</td>
<td>The Structure of Political Attitudes in 1966</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Nine</td>
<td>Psychological Dispositions and Political Attitudes</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Ten</td>
<td>Political Conversation in a Small Group</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Eleven</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDICES

1. The Questionnaire of the 1963 Survey 537
2. The Questionnaire of the 1966 Survey 550
4. The 1966 Survey: Additional Data in Validation of the Alienation Scale 598
5. Confidential Appendix for Examiners 602

BIBLIOGRAPHY 603
This study of psychological dispositions and their interrelations with political attitudes is both theoretical and empirical. In its first aspect, it dwells on themes general to advanced industrial societies; the empirical investigation is located in urban Australia.

It has had many sources of guidance, but my gratitude goes first to Professor Alan Davies and Dr Frank Knöpfelmacher of the University of Melbourne, and to Mr Talis Polis, of Latrobe University, who each, in their, shall I say, very different ways, inspired my interest in this enterprise. My thanks also go to my supervisors at the Australian National University, Dr Don Aitkin, Professor Robert Parker and Mr Michael Kahan, for their sustained encouragement in many improbable vicissitudes. Mr David Bottomley and Mr Irving Saulwick, of the Australian Sales Research Bureau, undertook the interviewing reported in Chapter Six et seq. at cost (or possibly beneath it) and deserve my acknowledgement of their generosity to academic research.

I owe much to the friendly assistance of Dr Ken Forster, of Monash University, Miss Mary Rose, of the Australian National University, and Mr Beau Sheil, of
the University of Sydney, who assisted me by computer programming. The statistical operations were, in the case of factor analyses, standard routines, and in all others, at my discretion. I must also thank Mrs Jan Rubenstein, who typed this, for her extraordinary patience, and my parents, for their help in making me and it.

Most of all, my gratitude goes to my wife, Wendy, without whose support this work could not have been completed.

ALAN HUGHES

MELBOURNE.
1.1. Introduction

'The subtlety of Nature,' said Bacon, 'is a great many times more subtle than the subtlety of Logic.' The complexity of the actual social world demands, not merely invites, empirical methods of investigation, which are indispensable for a proper understanding. In humane studies, deduction from first principles is a path that leads directly to error. An intuitive anticipation of what kind of things may be found, on the other hand, is likely to be an aid to scholarly investigation of human activity, since our ordinary understanding of social processes is often a useful short-cut: there is no need to behave like the blind men trying to discern the shape of the elephant, if we are, in fact, sighted. This thesis is primarily a statistical investigation, sometimes with an aim of defining structures not previously known; but where structures are already identified, or common knowledge can be adduced, then it is addressed to a better description of the structure and an investigation of its correlations.
It is an interdisciplinary study, in one aspect concerned with four major psychological dispositions, which are regarded as already identified. These are alienation, conceived as social estrangement; the authoritarian personality tendency of the 'Right'; ethnocentrism; and anxiety. Since the first three of these have not been well measured, nor their structure well described, this study is partially addressed to the development of adequate measures for them. An empirical test of the disparateness of their identity is also introduced. In part, therefore, this thesis lies in the domain of social psychology. In considering the correlations of the dispositions and their social meaning, it dwells partly in sociology; and in investigating and identifying disparate structures of political opinion, not previously well recognized, its purpose is best described as political science. Whilst the measurement of the psychological dispositions, on the one hand, and of political attitudes, on the other, are both intended to be substantive to the thesis, the focal point of the research is at the connections to be discovered between the two i.e. its central concern is with political psychology.
Greenstein\(^1\) has recently suggested three divisions of heuristic utility in organizing the issues of enquiry into personality and politics: the 'individual case study,' diagnosing a single actor; the 'typological study,' to 'classify actors and to explain the origin and behaviour of the types in the classification'; and 'aggregative analysis,' to explain features of the larger social and political system.

In its separate investigation of each of the four psychological constructs mentioned above, this study falls within the second category. It is concerned with modal psychological processes which throw light on individual functioning. The alienated man, for example, is first considered as a possibility, in that the connectedness of the various sentiments said to be associated with social estrangement is first tested, and their cohesiveness shown not to be a result of their covariance with anxiety. It is argued here, also, that alienation cannot be regarded as a social modality of anxiety. The social incidence of alienation and its statistical correlations with other psychological constructs.

---

constructs are then elaborated, in accordance with the general strategy endorsed by Lasswell\(^1\) of moving outwards, as it were, from 'nuclear types'. The implications of the investigation of the dispositional paradigm for an understanding of individual actors is then illustrated by introducing two men, 'John' and 'Patrick', both interviewed in depth; the first is alienated, the second not.

A general qualification to the characterization of this investigation as a typological exercise of the kind described by Greenstein should here be made. Whilst it is recognized that each of the four constructs bears upon modes of personality functioning, it is not suggested here that each wholly describes a type of person. A person may be highly alienated and ethnocentric but not anxious or authoritarian, for example. Whilst this thesis does not attempt a typology of persons, in the sense of the preceding sentence, it is also oriented away from the qualities of political actors considered as unique persons. The methodological approach of this research, consisting chiefly in correlational analysis of data from mass surveys, is inclined to lead the reader away

from an appreciation of the idiosyncratic qualities of the dispositions and political views of individuals. Its main hope is that an understanding of general processes will lead back, as it were, to finer insights into the variety of what individuals feel, think, and do.

The thesis is broad in its scope, extending to four dispositions and their relation to the structure of political attitudes on policy matters, political perceptions and voting behaviour. It therefore extends in some degree into the third division of research described by Greenstein, aggregative analysis. It attempts to define, in a limited area, some of the norms, in the statistical sense, of the interrelations of dispositions and political attitudes in an Australian urban context. Although broad in scope in this sense, it does not aim to provide anything approaching a psychological interpretation of all Australian political events or circumstances in the contemporary period. The argument will, indeed, emphasise many of the limitations of 'psychological' influences on politics, in general, and of the influence of dispositions, in particular.

The four dispositions were chosen because my primary interest, like that of many, lay in the political repercussions of sentiments of aggression and insecurity.
Its primary inspiration was drawn from the research of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford\(^1\) into the psychodynamics of ethnocentrism, but also from the dramatic, even if methodologically unsound, intervention of Srole\(^2\) in the chain of associated work which followed in such quantity, indicating the need to take into account social frustration and uncertainty. My attention was also excited by the comedy of errors which followed from the intrusion of acquiescence into the measures, which is reviewed in extenso. Anxiety was added as the psychological disposition of most general interest, apart from the first three. It is considered that these four dispositions all deserve the term 'psychological,' because they are all related to features of personality functioning, and are all in some degree opaque to the common understanding, thus entitling them to be qualified by the name of a specialized discipline. Alienation, on which the term 'psychological' sits least easily, is so described because, conceived as social estrangement, it refers to a very large part of the individual's relations with his

---


social environment, including some areas of which he may be unaware. The term 'disposition' was chosen because of its generality, its implication of inclination to action, and because it did not connote intention in the same degree as 'attitude,' although intention is not precluded by it. Disposition is defined by English and English\(^1\) in the relevant sense as 'a general term for any (hypothesized) organized and enduring part of the total psychological or psycho-physiological organization in virtue of which a person is likely to respond to certain statable conditions with a certain kind of behaviour.'

The manner in which the dispositions are measured, their incidence and interrelations charted, and their influence upon political attitudes investigated in this milieu is perhaps best described by a brief summary of the structure of this thesis.

1.2. The Structure of this Thesis

This Introduction touches upon some theoretical considerations, including the present status of the 'behaviouralist' approach to politics, with which, in broad terms, I am in sympathy; and also on the place of

the process named verstehen in social inquiry. The principle of parsimony is also briefly discussed. It suggests what might be considered original, or novel, in this work, considered as a research enterprise.

Chapter Two provides a very brief sketch of the political environment within which this study is set. Beginning with the normative values (what is 'given') in Australian politics, it proceeds to some implications of the present quasi-Federal system, and then to a description of the policies of the main political parties. The new electoral equilibrium established by the Labor 'split' of 1955, and the Federal elections of 1963 and 1966 are discussed. These were contemporaneous with the surveys of disposition and attitude carried out by the writer, the report of which is the substance of the thesis. The nature of Australia as an immigrant polity, and the impact of the external events of the period on Australians' conceptions of their situation is then considered.

Chapter Three describes the two samples surveyed in 1963 and 1966, and compares them with population parameters. The 1963 sample was of voters in Melbourne only; the 1966 voter sample, the survey of which was funded by the Australian National University as the principal substance of this thesis, was of 400 voters, 200 in Melbourne and
200 in Sydney. A 'captive' sample of 155 low-grade public servants was also surveyed in 1966 as a preparatory step to the main operation. The internal sociological structure of the 1966 voter sample, on which the most important survey was conducted, is described in detail.

Chapters Four and Five are essentially reports of preliminary empirical work on the data of the 1963 survey, although a selective review of some empirical work done in recent times is included. Chapter Four introduces electoral findings of the conventional kind, but its principal subject matter is a cluster analysis, based on a correlational analysis, of opinions on policy issues (the data obtained in 1963) which suggested that there may have been three dimensions of radicalism in (principally internal) policy matters, and that the conception of a single 'Left-Right' continuum is a most inappropriate one for political analysis; indeed, not viable at all. It then proceeds to develop a predictive model for likely changes in political opinion, given what we know of likely sociological change.

Chapter Five, the matter of which has already been published, but which has been amended in minor ways to

---

make it appropriate in this chapter sequence, describes exploratory findings of the interrelations of authoritarianism of the 'Right', ethnocentrism and alienation, their social incidence and their relation to the dimensions of political opinion, or 'political attitudes', the discovery of which is reported in Chapter Four. The scales used here for the dispositional constructs are regarded as tools for only short-order preliminary work, being brief, although 'balanced' instruments. The report of their use, apart from its substantive value, forms an integral part of what might be termed the intellectual history of this enterprise, and their shortcomings, together with the methodological deficiencies of the early work of Chapter Four, noted in the text, led directly to the major enterprise described in Chapter Six. This was the construction of adequate paired-alternative measures for alienation, authoritarianism (always meaning of the 'Right' in this thesis) and alienation. Item pools for these were administered to 'captive' samples of low-grade ('Fourth Division') public servants in Melbourne and Sydney, and those items which retained their cohesiveness in the way described in Chapter Six were then conserved for candidacy for the final scales, the content of which was determined after their administration to a sample of
400 voters in Melbourne and Sydney. An adapted form of the Cattell IPAT anxiety measure was also administered. A large number of questions were also asked about the respondents' policy opinions, their perception of political situations, political participation (remembered and intended vote, membership of organizations and political conversation) and background data such as self-chosen social class, education, the income of the householder, age, sex and religious affiliation.

Factor analysis (or principal components analysis) was used for five purposes: firstly, to test the disparateness of the items supposed to tap the four psychological constructs, and so, by inference, the disparateness of the constructs themselves; secondly, to identify groups of items capable of defining sub-scales of each major construct; thirdly, to test the stability of the three sub-scales of anxiety by factor analysing the anxiety items alone; fourthly, to define five sub-scales of alienation (apart from those developed in the second exercise) for the purpose of testing their cohesiveness when covariance with anxiety was withdrawn by the method of partial correlations; and lastly, to explore the interrelations of the political policy items, with the aim of arriving at a solution capable of indicating how
many 'dimensions of radicalism' were suggested by the available data.

Chapters Six to Nine are the main substance of this thesis. They describe the exercises above, and the more adequate and reliable measures which were the outcome. Chapter Six describes the development of the 'psychological' instruments; Chapter Seven is more discursive, and considers the social incidence of the dispositions, the variations in their interrelations and the implications of these findings; Chapter Eight explores in detail the political findings, the structure apparent in political attitudes and the means at hand for measurement; and Chapter Nine unites the two sets of findings, psychological and political, using correlational analysis and tests of significance to discern bridges between the two. There is theoretical discussion of the mechanisms linking the dispositions with each other in Chapter Seven; of the links between political attitudes in Chapter Eight; and of links between the two in Chapter Nine. Inconstancies as well as constancies in relationships within different social and educational groups are also noted, and speculative explanations proffered in every case of apparent variation, as is appropriate to an exploratory enterprise.

Chapter 10 is an excursus: it contains a speculative
discussion of a tape-recorded political conversation in a small group, which has the advantage of portraying political opinions in conflict in situ, as it were, partly to recall to the reader the immense complexity of both the structure and function of political attitudes in situations of personal interaction. The Chapter has the added purpose of showing how such contrived situations may be useful in suggesting hypotheses which may be testable with data from larger samples.

Chapter Eleven selectively reviews some general findings and concludes the work.

1.3. What is Original in this Thesis?

The main claims to originality lie, firstly, in the construction and validation of three measures of dispositions: alienation, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. The first and last of these have satisfactory reliability coefficients, and are suitable for general research use. The reliability of the second is modest, but it is capable of being used as a 'core' instrument for the development of an authoritarianism scale with items more central to personality functioning, the desirability of which is argued throughout the text. The procedure for demonstrating, by factor analysis, the disparateness of each of the four constructs, and the
substantive outcome, which is consistent with the hypothesis of disparateness, is also an original departure. So too, is the test of the cohesiveness of alienation as social estrangement, when the covariance with anxiety of each element of the construct is withdrawn.

The application of these instruments to a representative mass sample in an Australian urban milieu is another way in which this research contributes something new. A very general exercise in cartography was involved, which began with the charting of the social incidence of the dispositions, went on to the exploration of their interrelations, and the variations in interrelations in different social groups. No previous analysis of the structure of psychological dispositions or political attitudes in Australia of this degree of generality, or even one approaching it, has been attempted, and it is suggested that the discovery of the dimension of 'Conscience' radicalism, for example, and its separateness from other dimensions of political sentiment, although specific to the Australian urban context, may have applications elsewhere. The report of the relation of the psychological dispositions to political attitudes, and the theoretical discussion of the interconnections between them, whilst new in its substance for Australia, varies from previous
work in other places\(^1\) in differentiating between the 
varieties of political radicalism and conservatism. The 
charting of the social incidence of these varieties in 
Australia, whilst not original in technique to social 
psychologists, has not been done in this way by political 
scientists. Throughout Chapters Seven to Nine, attention 
has been paid to both constancies and inconstancies in 
correlations in differing groups, for each of which a 
tentative explanation has been afforded. In short, the 
psychological instruments are new, the differentiation of 
the varieties of political sentiment is original and the 
general cartography of their interrelations in the 
Australian urban context has yielded facts of substantial 
importance, not previously known.

\textbf{1.4. Some Theoretical Considerations}

The reputation of political psychology has, in 
recent times, undergone a change for the better. This is 
partly through the careful balancing of the nomothetic 
and idiographic approaches to the problems of analysis by

\(^1\) For example, H. McClosky, 'Conservatism and Personality,' \textit{American Political Science Review}, 52 (1958) pp. 27-45.
Greenstein¹ and others. It is now generally recognized that without a comprehension of the special opportunities which may occur for psychological influence, which relies very often on an idiographic study paying attention to what is peculiar to a situation, the generalizations afforded by nomothetic research resemble an armoury of weapons whose potency is uncertain from time to time and case to case.

Greenstein² has specified some of the circumstances in which 'personality' factors may influence political behaviour. Systematization of this kind is desirable and necessary, but there remains an irreducible residue of judgement about the quality of particular socio-political environments, a Fingerspitzengefühl for the occasions when psychological influence is likely to become not merely an accident of events but systemic. To say this implies the methodological utility of verstehen³ in its elderly and still somewhat disreputable sense of

² Ibid.
³ The most well known analysis of this is that of T. Abel, 'The Operation Called Verstehen', American Journal of Sociology, 54 (1948) pp. 211-18.
insightful understanding of the normative elements of a culture. It does not necessarily follow from this that I recognize verstehen as one means by which the social scientist comprehends the situation, but in fact I would also argue its utility in this sense. In the methodological point, I follow Strauss, himself varying a theme propounded by Weber. Strauss's position is discussed in a recent conciliatory article by Kalleberg. Strauss avers that human behaviour cannot be understood 'without being aware of the standard of judgement that is inherent in the situation and accepted as a matter of course by the actors themselves.'

There is another sense of verstehen, seeing the meaning of a situation from the viewpoint of the actor, before stepping back into the shoes of the social scientist, which, as Kalleberg rightly points out, is useful to those of the 'behaviouralist' persuasion in political analysis, (with which psychological analysis of political behaviour is closely allied) and is a common ground with those of a 'traditionalist' persuasion.

---


2 Quoted in Kalleberg, ibid.
There are five ways in which, I would submit, that *verstehen* in both senses is useful to the 'political psychologist.'

(i) The first is very general, and has to do with the presence of 'meaning' in the social world as opposed to the natural order investigated by scientists. It has been well put by Schutz.1

The world of nature, as explored by the natural scientist, does not 'mean' anything to the molecules, atoms and electrons therein. The observational field of the social scientist, however, namely the social reality, has a specific meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living acting and thinking therein. Thus, the constructs of the social sciences are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, namely constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene, whose behaviour the social scientist has to observe and to explain in accordance with the procedural rules of his science.

(ii) The second way is more particular. Construction of the items of an alienation scale, for example, of necessity requires *verstehen* both in comprehending the viewpoint of the actor and cultural norms. But here *verstehen* is used as an ancillary process to empirical investigation.

(iii) Having constructed an alienation scale, and applied it to empirical use, the social meaning of the

---

correlations obtained has then to be explained, a procedure again sometimes requiring a very general understanding of behaviours in a culture. Here the use is partly methodological, since it may lead on to further 'operational' research, and partly epistemological, since empathy here contributes to the overall understanding of the observer in human terms.

(iv) As has been suggested above, intimate understanding of a socio-political system may assist the analyst to perceive opportunities for, say, psychological influence on political events, which may not be apparent to an observer with only formal knowledge. This is another aspect of the methodological utility of verstehen.

(v) The behavioural scientist will, and in my view should, try to test the insights, derived in the way described, by empirical procedures e.g. by operationalizing the constructs and measuring them and their correlations in a sample. But whether or not he does so, comprehension of a socio-political situation must extend beyond formal knowledge, reducible to numerical or linguistic expressions, to at least a momentary communion with the meanings of the situation in the minds of the actors therein i.e. verstehen of individual feelings; and also of the human implications for the culture, perhaps in
what is foreseeable i.e. cultural verstehen also.

The acceptance of the meanings of situations as seen by their actors, and still more of the 'cultural implications' of empirical findings, multiplies the data of social research in a manner unnerving to the more simplistic proponents of attitude scale technology, since nomothetic generalization, or even the construction to be placed on described social situations, becomes difficult. This is so even when value judgements of the analyst are excluded in principle. The principle of parsimony, which is a fundament of science, is more difficult to apply when data of these kinds are admitted. If the concept of intention is also admitted, as I think it should be, the stockade containing the babbling horde of data groans and bulges under the stress. Nevertheless, since it is the explication of social reality and not an (illusory) convenience for social commentators which is the primary concern of social science, it follows that what is said in a general way about the data must be said very carefully, after looking in every direction. A difficulty in verifying a complex proposition does not reduce its epistemological status. Lafitte,¹ in arguing 'the simple proposition has no special status'

That an intense narcissistic need for personal approval is typical of the schizoid character may be hard to verify not only because of the complexity of the work involved but also because specifying the operations is rendered difficult by the terms of the proposition. 'Narcissistic need,' 'schizoid character' and even 'personal approval' do not have self-evident meanings.

The principle of parsimony, of applying the most economical construction to the available data, is not, of course endangered by this argument. What is being pointed out is that its application may be extraordinarily difficult.

The use of verstehen in this thesis is most obvious in the second, third and fourth ways outlined above. General questions of method are raised again in Chapter Nine. It will be obvious from the text of Chapters Seven to Nine that another methodological orientation of this work is anti-reductionist, or 'contextualist,' to use Greenstein's term. But not only must the overt behaviour and sometimes dormant dispositions or attitudes of the political actors be understood within their context; intended actions, which usually, but not necessarily, involve a value orientation must also be

---

taken into account. It is argued here that some phenomena are political *per se*, and have few sociological or psychological correlates. The fact that most workers in this field now acknowledge the independence of political behaviour in many of its aspects is one of the main reasons why political psychology is now more reputable. Despite the wide claims for originality made above for this thesis, I would not, indeed dare not, argue that it explains more than a tiny fraction of contemporaneous Australian political activity. The recognition of the many factors which may be at work in shaping events is exemplified in Smith's\(^1\) schematic map for the analysis of personality and politics, especially in his complex Figure 2, where not only feed-back but the engagement, or disengagement, of dispositions and attitudes are accommodated. This may be contrasted with the work of earlier theorists, particularly Eysenck\(^2\) whose approach was, by implication, heavily reductionist. Figure 17 in his book\(^3\) is an early counterpart of that of

---

Smith, and implies a loose governance by 'ideology' of attitudes, and, in their turn of 'habitual opinions' and 'specific opinions.' Although Eysenck's argument is more sophisticated than his diagram might suggest, there is a dearth of discussion of politics *qua* politics everywhere in his work. In advancing the conception of 'Tough-Tender-Mindedness' as the principal dimension governing opinions on social issues apart from a single 'radical-conservative' political dimension, he omits (i) to describe anywhere the technical features of the factor analysis on which the conception is based; (ii) conjures up a construct validation based on James' discussion\(^1\) of temperamental types which is at unacknowledged and possibly unseen variance with his own: James' 'tenderminded' type is 'monistic' and 'dogmatical' as opposed to 'pluralistic' and 'sceptical'. The whole analysis reeks of confusion between larger and smaller issues: 'Abolish abortion and licensing laws' is the cryptic label attached to *one point* of his Diagram 25.\(^2\)

This kind of work may bring the whole body of psychological research into politics into disrepute, and, I fear, did so. The main ground of the feeling

against such research in the 1950s was that it tended to be simplistic and reductionist, and, indeed, derisory of politics: in other words, it was felt that it made a puerile and misguided attempt to diminish the human stature in the political domain.

This was not true of the work of Adorno and his colleagues, and it is principally to them, and those psychologists who followed up their work, and engaged the sympathetic attention and, indeed, the admiration of political scientists, that we owe the present burgeoning interest in the bearing of psychological dispositions on political attitudes. The difficult birth of the psychology of politics is, in one way, no cause for surprise, for it is a peculiar creature, having the features of both art and science. Possibly the Germans were right in giving that psychology which practices verstehen and is idiographic in inclination one of their improbably long but evocative titles: Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie (literally, cultural science psychology). As practised in this thesis, political psychology is not of this type, since it has a nomothetic intent; but it is deferential to it. 'Statistical research' said Collingwood,\(^1\) 'is

for the historian a good servant but a bad master. It profits him nothing to make statistical generalizations, unless he can thereby detect the thought behind the facts about which he is generalizing'. This is true also for the student of the psychology of politics. But it is not merely the 'thought' of the actors to which we wish to penetrate; it is to their unconscious or half-aware motivations. The measurement of psychological dispositions makes this possible. Moreover, statistical research has the great virtue of putting a distance between the analyst's prej udgements and the eventual outcome of his analysis: it makes it easier for him, in Collingwood's own phrase, 'to work against the grain of his own mind'.

---

1 Ibid., p. 305.
2.1. Introduction

This Chapter fulfils the promise of Chapter One in providing a very brief sketch of some features of the Australian political scene. Particular attention is given to the political system as it bears upon the 'political' matter of the more substantive parts of the thesis in Chapters Four and Eight, e.g. the policy opinion items, perceived situations, and voting trends. Some crucial features of the system as it functions may not emerge in surveys of the mass public. A notable case in point is the central role of the Democratic Labor Party and its social base in a section of the Victorian Catholic vote, mobilized by the National Civic Council. This will be treated also, although the highly compressed presentation here can hardly do justice to its significance, not to say its theatrical potential, as a highly successful, at times semi-clandestine operation, led by a lay organizer and publicist, Mr. B.A. Santamaria. But we must first turn to what is most, not least,
obvious in Australian politics.

2.2. Legitimacy: What is 'Given' in Australian Politics

Gallup Poll (Australian Public Opinion Polls: hereafter, APOP) findings are of some interest here, and an admirable guide to them has been provided by Goot. However, as is so often the case, the socio-political character of Australia has been better described by historians, of whose works the most generally highly regarded is perhaps that of Hancock, and by writers offering a general commentary, such as the brilliant autobiography by Horne, describing his boyhood in an Australian country town, than by political scientists. Davies and Encel have produced a general sociological commentary, and Davies' studies in depth of five second-rank political activists gives a vivid impression of the ambience of Australian politics.

1 M. Goot, Policies and Partisans: Australian Electoral Opinion, 1941 to 1948, Occasional Monograph No. 1, Department of Government and Public Administration, University of Sydney (Sydney, 1969).
2 W.K. (Sir Keith) Hancock, Australia, (Brisbane, 1961; first ed. 1930).
During this period, as through almost its entire history, the constitutional government of Australia was at once 'effective' and regarded as 'legitimate' in the senses described by Lipset. Considered in relation to other countries, it was a very stable system. Australia has never faced the prospect of civil war, and only once the prospect of invasion (by the Japanese, in 1942). Only a few towns in the far North-west (for example, Darwin, in 1942) have ever been subjected to aerial bombardment. Parliamentary government and the prerogatives of a strong, independent judiciary are so much a matter of course that no APOP question about their desirability was asked of the public in the period. Australians are wedded to the federal system and to the present structure of the constituent States. An APOP question about the desirability of the present number of States found overwhelming support for it (of the order of 75 per cent) in 1967. Federal elections are held frequently (every three years) and there is overwhelming support for this also, as well as for voting being compulsory. About the desirability of the Federal Upper

---

House, the Senate, which represents the States equally, there is a more even division of opinion, but still a majority in support (1961 and 1965). ¹

The nature of Australian patriotism is a curious one. The Australian Labor Party has been less of an enthusiast for the Imperial idea than the conservative parties (presently the Liberal and Country Parties), but the generally accepted concept of a wider loyalty has impeded the growth of a parochial chauvinism. The notion of Empire and its obligations has impelled this small nation to send a variety of military expeditions abroad, beginning with a small contingent sent to fight the 'Mad Mahdi' in the Sudan in the 1880s, a larger one to the Boer War, and a huge volunteer army of 400,000 (for a nation with a population then approaching five million) in support of the 'Mother Country' in the First World War. The idea of the military expedition, embarked upon to protect some threatened interest far away, has a high place in the Australian imagination. 'War' does not carry much sense of immediacy to the Australian locale: it is A Great Moment when the men volunteer, embark, and sail away, some to return as heroes. Voting is compulsory, but war, until recently, was not. But a

¹ Ibid., p. 126.
moral imperative was involved. The young Donald Horne is asked anxiously by his father in the 1930s: 'You'd go if you had to, wouldn't you, son?' Only after the threat of Japanese invasion was a limited form of conscription for overseas service introduced, even then with great reluctance. Conscription for the war in Vietnam came as something of a shock to the public. Australia has always cast itself in the role of a plucky ally, and this partly explains the early general support for the Vietnam commitment.

Australians combine republican manners and an affection for the Crown of England, which is nearly always seen as a symbol of the country's British inheritance. Support for continuing our present ties with Britain rather than becoming an entirely separate Republic waned from about 65 per cent to 55 per cent between 1966 and 1968.\(^1\) However, the celebration of the principle of Constitutional Monarchy is prominent in the rituals of the armed services, the churches, the Law, the independent and State schools and all State as well as Federal Parliaments. Indeed, it is the practice of some States, such as Victoria, still to invite

\(^1\) M. Goot, \textit{ibid.}, p. 125.
distinguished Englishmen to act as Governor, the
Queen's representative; but the habit of doing the same
in the Federal sphere died during the period, and it
seems most unlikely that any future Governor-General
will be an Englishman.

Australia tends to see itself as a kind of social
microcosm of the United Kingdom and Ireland, with the
English upper class left out, and a higher proportion of
Scots and Irish. Englishmen, Scotsmen and Irishmen are
not regarded as foreigners. Despite the increasing
economic, political and academic orientation to the
United States, Americans are regarded with more curiosity
and some resentment. The National Anthem remains 'God
Save the Queen', although there is a seemingly perpetual
public debate on the desirability of a purely Australian
alternative. The nature of Australia as an immigrant
polity is a subject to which we shall return.

The Federal Government has been formed by a
coalition of the Liberal and Country Parties (the former
the larger partner) since 1949, without interruption, and
these had gradually taken on the appearance of being the
normally ruling parties, despite a vigorous Labor

---

1 The APOP found overwhelming popular support for 'keeping the Union Jack in our flag' in 1967. Cf. M. Goot, ibid., p. 125.
opposition. This had split in 1955, when the 'Anti-Communist' (later, the 'Democratic') Labor Party was formed, but the Australian Labor Party maintained a very large (40 to 50 per cent) share of the vote throughout the period.

We shall now briefly consider the 'effectiveness' of the Federal Government during this period. Its chief implication, as of this discussion of 'legitimacy', is of stability and confidence in the regime.

2.3. 'Effectiveness' of Government: Economic Growth

Australian society is an affluent one, especially by comparison with its neighbours in Asia. The Gross National Product per head in 1967, in 1967 U.S. Dollars, was $2143, compared to $326 in Malaysia, and $1158 in Japan. It is also one growing steadily more affluent. After a minor recession in 1960-61, the annual growth of the G.N.P. per head at constant prices was 3.7 per cent, between 1962 and 1967. This was achieved despite a population growth of from 10.3 million in 1960 to 11.6 million in 1966. Moreover, consumer prices rose only

---

2. Ibid.
moderately during this period: if the financial year 1952/3 is taken as a base of 100, the Consumer Price Index was 125.7 in 1963/4 and 138.9 in March, 1967.\(^1\) Personal consumption expenditure showed a marked increase per head, and a smaller proportion devoted to basic necessities, such as food and drink.\(^2\) In terms of selected indicators of economic growth, production of steel increased from 1.5 million tons in 1951/2 to 5.6 million tons in 1965/6, an annual growth rate of 9.8 per cent.\(^3\) The number of motor vehicles per 1000 of population increased from 187 in 1951/2 to 331 in 1965/6, reflecting an annual growth rate of 4.2 per cent.\(^4\) Expenditure on education by all Public Authorities rose (at current prices) from $280 million (Aus. dollars) in 1959/60 to $530 million in 1965/6, a considerable increase even when deflated for rising costs and the growth in population.\(^5\) Australia is not, however, a heavily taxed country, compared with other Western nations. In 1965, total taxes were 29.9

---

3 Ibid., p. 8.
4 Ibid., p. 8.
5 Ibid., p. 8.
per cent of National Income in Australia, compared with 33.6 per cent in the U.S.A., 37.9 per cent in the United Kingdom, and 51.2 per cent in France.¹

This brief review indicates an economic situation in which consumers' rising aspirations were steadily fed, where no rentier class was enraged by galloping inflation, where immigration could be sustained without greatly retarding the growth of real income per head and demands for more spending in the public sector on services such as education were being met with some degree of satisfaction; in short, where social change was gradual, orderly, and favourably regarded by the community at large. This is not to say that there was contentment with, for example, the level of spending on public services. It could have been, and was, in fact, argued that public expenditure should have been rising more rapidly than it did. Indeed, this issue penetrated the mass consciousness both at the level of individual experience and public debate. There was a vociferous demand for more and better educational facilities, and as Table 3.16 in Chapter Three suggests, the younger generation were indeed becoming better educated than their elders. But there was little in the overall socio-economic situation to provoke a radical

challenge to the bases of the established system; rather, proposals for gradual reforms were given a slowly widening circulation in an increasingly well educated and financially more 'comfortable' political public. The left-of-centre fashion was for reformism, not extreme proposals, and the data of the surveys of 1963 and 1966 should be considered in this light. The general improvement in living conditions was not entirely uniform, but such pockets of poverty¹ as remained in Australian society were not easily politically mobilized: they were amongst pensioners, handicapped people, deserted wives with families, and recent immigrants from Southern Europe. 'Poverty' as a global issue was not to be raised until 1968-69.

_Tout bref_, it is easy to see why most Australians regard their politics as almost a light-hearted game, to be played with detachment and some cynicism. When an affair of state becomes _important_, it ceases, in common parlance, to be 'political'; it becomes a 'public' or 'national' issue. There is no dispossessed ruling class, which history has passed by, longing for a restoration of

¹ See e.g. R.J.A. Harper, 'Survey of Living Conditions in Melbourne-1966,' _Economic Record_, 43 (1967) pp. 262-88. Harper concludes that about five per cent of Melbourne's population were then living in 'poverty', by Australian standards.
an ancien régime; no Great Pretender; no local equivalent of the Action Française. The grand issues of style, capable of arousing great emotion, have been settled long ago. Modernists in Australia often feel, indeed, that the ancien régime is too long with us; but they would not trouble to cross the street in the cause of a republic. The main issues in internal politics are socio-economic: who is to get how much of the growing cake of national production. These are matters fought over by political syndicates of interested groups, organized as political parties; but before we consider them we must note an ironical feature of the Federal system.

2.4. An Implication of the Federal System

A federal system is one in which power is divided between a central authority and political authorities for the constituents, in such a way that neither can, by its own fiat, withdraw powers from the other. It is sometimes remarked that by virtue of this inbuilt inflexibility, federations tend to conservatism. I wish here to argue the reverse for Australia. The Constitution spells out the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament, leaving the residue to the States. In 1942, through its power to levy taxes, which it holds concurrently with the States, the Commonwealth Parliament passed four Acts, later held
to be *intra vire* in peace time, which had the effect of taking over all taxation of incomes, previously levied by the States. The Commonwealth, now in possession of this principal 'growth' tax, makes grants to the States from its Consolidated Revenue, which account for about 55 per cent of their total receipts of revenue.¹

Since they have few 'growth' taxes of their own, the States are thus heavily dependent upon Commonwealth generosity to finance the services they are constitutionally empowered to provide, in the field of education, for example. Section 96 of the Constitution permits, but does not compel, the Commonwealth to attach any conditions it pleases to the grants to the States. Conditions are, in fact, applied to about one fifth² of these grants. But notice the implication here: should the Commonwealth wish to *usurp* the policy-making functions of the States, it could apply conditions to *all* its grants, including ones requiring their expenditure to be matched, dollar for dollar, by the States. The Commonwealth would then have *de facto* withdrawn, unilaterally, powers now in the hands of the States. Since this extraordinary capability


lies with the Commonwealth, it follows that Australia does not have, in the strict sense, a federal system, but one better described as quasi-federal.

The result of the present financial relations between the Commonwealth and the States is that the Governments of the States, whatever their political complexion, will be mendicants pressing the Commonwealth for more funds for public projects in great demand, especially in education, whilst at the same time avoiding the odium attached to levying extra taxation. It follows that (a) actual policy-making discretion is, in most fields, really in the hands of the Commonwealth, on to which our surveys are, therefore, properly focussed; and (b) that since the pressure from the States is always for increased spending, the quasi-federal system, as it now functions, has a radical, and not a conservative bias.

As we shall see, policy alignments between the major parties are more distinct than in the United States, for example. The A.L.P. applies continuous pressure for greater expenditure in the public sector, and the Government Parties have to fend off its electoral challenge by an apparently good performance, which is measured in the eyes of the press and the public largely by the degree
to which it satisfies the demands of the States. It is seldom recognized how closely the Labor Party and the Governments of the States, nearly all conservative in Party complexion, are associated in pressing for increased public expenditure.

2.5. The Main Political Parties and the Elections of 1963 and 1966.

The structure of Parliamentary Government within which the Parties operate has been described, inter alia, by Davies, Crisp and Miller. The House of Representatives is pre-eminent, and, as British constitutional principles have been received, a Federal Government which does not command a majority in this House must resign. The two major surveys on which this thesis is based were accordingly taken during the elections for the House of Representatives in 1963 and 1966. The Australian political party system has a mild family resemblance to its British relative, as the analyses by

1 In 1970, all are governed by non-Labor Ministries.
2 A.F. Davies, Australian Democracy (Melbourne, 1958).
Jupp\(^1\) and Overacker\(^2\) make clear, although it should be noted that the creation and rise to power of the Australian Labor Party antedated its British counterpart by about twenty years, and the British system contains no counterparts of the Country Party and the Democratic Labor Party.

All Australian Parties of significance are oligarchies. Their mass membership is small, and has very little influence on policy. This fact probably contributes to the detachment and mildness of interest on the part of the Australian voter. The Liberal and Country Parties are coalitions of urban and rural capital, with an electoral base in the urban middle class and the general country population. The A.L.P. has its electoral base in the urban working class, and its State and Federal Conferences are heavily dominated by the representatives of its affiliated Trade Unions.\(^4\) Australian politics is the politics of class and interest group, well understood to be so by the public. The interest group struggle is


\(^4\) In 1968, there was an infusion of Parliamentary Leaders into the A.L.P. Federal Conference.
carried on continuously through strikes and collective bargaining between unions and employers, within a framework of arbitration tribunals and 'conciliation' commissions. But neither party can hope to govern without obtaining voters from the 'other side of the class fence', and this fact is widely supposed to account for a convergence in their domestic policies. Labor no longer proposes nationalization, but instead concentrates on proposals for new or revived public corporations, or redistributive proposals which would, on balance, favour the working class, and improved public facilities, by, for example, greatly increased grants to the States for their education systems. The Liberal and Country Parties' habit is to propose more modest increases in public spending, limited income redistribution, and to emphasise the American alliance and the British connection. Although the A.L.P. stands neither for a republic nor for any change in Australia's system of alliances with the U.S.A., its refusal to support the sending of troops to combat the insurgency in Malaya, in 1955, or to Vietnam in 1965, was taken up by the Government as symbols of a weak defence policy.

In both elections, the A.L.P. was led by Mr. Arthur Calwell, who epitomized that type of elderly Labor
politician indifferent to middle class support and suspicious of intellectuals. In 1963, the Prime Minister was Sir Robert Menzies, the darling of suburban middle-class matrons, an orator of the grand style, devoted to both the Imperial connection and the American alliance. He resigned in January 1966 and his place was taken by Mr. Harold Holt, an amiable team leader, well regarded but scarcely 'the man Mr. Menzies was' (The title is almost always overlooked in common conversation: 'Mr' Menzies is a title with a dignity all its own).

The 1963 elections were dominated by issues of domestic policy, with the parties taking well-defined stands of the kinds outlined above and discussed in Chapter Four. They were won handsomely by the L.C.P. Coalition. The Australia-wide results are set out in Table 2.1.

**TABLE 2.1.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lib. Party</th>
<th>Country Party</th>
<th>A.L.P.</th>
<th>D.L.P.</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Votes: 37.1%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats: 52</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The electoral system for the House is based on single-member constituencies and preferential voting.

---

If no candidate has a majority of votes on the first count, the second preference votes of the least successful, at the full value of one vote, are successively allotted until a majority for one candidate is attained. It can be seen that the second preferences of the Democratic Labor Party, of which 80 to 90 per cent went to the Government Parties, were important in this outcome. Had they gone the other way, the A.L.P. might well have won.

In 1966, the elections were, at the level of public debate, very much concerned with issues in external policy, particularly Australia's commitment of troops to the war in Vietnam and conscription of a proportion of twenty year olds for service in that war. There was some conflict over economic issues, but they assumed much less public prominence than in 1963. The issue of the American alliance was dramatized by a pre-election visit to Australia for the President of the U.S., Mr. Lyndon Johnson, from October 20 to October 22, during which he was lionized by the public. At both elections, the D.L.P. was a vociferous proponent of a 'strong' defence policy posture, with an ideological pace in its

---

rhetoric matched only by the miniscule Communist Party, alleging Communist influence in the A.L.P., particularly in Victoria. There was some substance in this latter claim, but not a great deal.¹ That the public was more indifferent to external issues than the politicians realized is demonstrated by the data of Chapter Eight. The Government Parties inflicted a crushing defeat on the A.L.P., which was probably partly a result of growing public impatience with Mr. Calwell's leadership.

TABLE 2.2

1966 House of Representatives Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>A.L.P.</th>
<th>D.L.P.</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lib. Party</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Party</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.L.P.</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.L.P.</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government Parties would have won the 1966 elections even if the D.L.P. had amalgamated with the A.L.P., but the D.L.P.'s support is clearly vital to the Liberal and Country Parties when their electoral stocks are low,


as they were in 1961, and were again to be in 1969.¹
A note on the genesis of this unusual Party and the
general balance of electoral power may here be useful.

2.6. The Labor Split of 1955 and the Balance of
Electoral Power

From the early 1940s until 1954, a lay Catholic
movement led by Mr. B.A. Santamaria² worked within
Australian trade unions to combat Communist influence.
The 'Catholic Social Movement,' as it was called, was
a semi-clandestine affair, for fear of raising
Protestant hackles, but operated with non-'Movement'
allies in 'Groups' officially endorsed by the A.L.P.
After gaining control, with their allies, of a number of
key unions in Victoria and New South Wales in the late
1940s and early 1950s, the 'Groupers' found themselves,
willy-nilly, in a position of power within the A.L.P.
At the height of its influence, there were actually some
eighty members of the 'Movement' itself³ as delegates at

¹ For a discussion of the 1969 elections, see A. Hughes, 'Political Review,' and B.A. Santamaria, 'Struggle on
Two Fronts: the D.L.P. and the 1969 Election,' Australian
² For a brief history of the 'Movement,' see B.A.
Santamaria, "The Movement": 1941-60 - an Outline' in
H. Mayer (ed.) Catholics and the Free Society; an
Australian Symposium, (Melbourne, 1961) pp. 54-103.
³ Interview by the writer with Mr. B.A. Santamaria,
2 November 1956.
the Victorian State Conference of the A.L.P., a cohesive body large enough, with its allies, to command control of the Party in that State. However limited its aims may have been, its militancy alarmed many A.L.P. members, particularly as it seemed to be behaving as a Party within a Party. Late in 1954, the then Federal Leader of the A.L.P., Dr. H.V. Evatt, possibly fearing that the 'Movement' was seeking to replace him, organized intervention in the affairs of the Victorian branch of the A.L.P. by the Party's Federal bodies, which culminated in the departure of the 'Groupers' (the 'Movement' and their allies) from the Labor Party in 1955 to form a body first known as the 'A.L.P. (Anti-Communist)' and later the 'Democratic Labor Party.'

The D.L.P. and the 'Movement,' now renamed the 'National

---

1 A somewhat unsatisfactory account of the history of the 'Movement' and the split in the A.L.P. has been given by T. Truman, Catholic Action and Politics (Melbourne, 1959). The title is misleading, since the 'Movement' was never officially 'Catholic Action' i.e. a lay body whose policy is directed by the Bishops, who bear responsibility for its actions. The 'Movement' was in the category 'action of Catholics,' i.e. a lay body whose policy was directed by its lay leaders, who bear the entire responsibility for it, although it received personal support from influential members of the Catholic hierarchy in Victoria. Other Catholics could, and did, oppose it. A more reliable account of the Labor 'split' is contained in R.A. Murray, The Split: Australian Labor in the Fifties, (publication forthcoming).
Civic Council' have been in implacable opposition to the A.L.P. ever since. This is a central fact of Australian politics, since it is the D.L.P. voters' second preference votes which have sustained the Liberal and Country Party Federal Government in every crisis, and prevented A.L.P. victories. In electoral terms, it seems that about half the Victorian Catholic community votes for it. It has little Protestant support. To put the point baldly, these events have had the effect of detaching a large part of the Irish working class and petit bourgeois vote from the A.L.P., a section of its electoral base which had previously been amongst its most loyal supporters. Since the basic position of the D.L.P. has been to allege a Communist threat to the country from without and within, and to concentrate on external politics, the result of this fragmentation of the Labor social infra-structure has been to determine the balance of electoral power in favour of the conservative parties, who are more in harmony with the D.L.P. in external affairs. This new electoral equilibrium has thus had the paradoxical effect of settling domestic economic policy questions on quite other grounds, i.e. defence policy. Nobody can understand the course of Australian politics without
knowing this. However, although it is a fact of crucial importance, it can almost escape notice in a mass survey of the electorate, such as those described here. It has therefore been imperative to describe this contextual feature of Australian politics separately.

Even had the A.L.P. not suffered this critical loss of support, it would probably have seen its electoral strength ebbing during this period. There is a long-term sociological drift against the A.L.P., brought about by the expansion of the middle class and the contraction of the working class. This is a reflection partly of the changing structure of the workforce,¹ in particular the growth of its professional and higher clerical components, and partly of the rising tide of affluence, which has encouraged middle class identification amongst higher income manual workers. The embourgeoisement of the Australian urban electorate, manifest in the occupationally mixed streets of the prosperous outer suburbs, has given an old-fashioned ring to working class politics and a contemporary air to being middle class in life-style and outlook. The

¹ See Trends (published by the Rural Bank of New South Wales) 6 (1964) No. 3, where the occupational census data for 1947 and 1961 are compared.
A.L.P., especially when led by Mr. Calwell, could not easily keep pace with this changing situation. Its corporate image, built around conferences chiefly of semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers, was simply all wrong. Its policy position on domestic affairs was more in harmony with the electorate's mood (as both the APOP surveys and those reported here confirm) but the advantage was difficult to exploit, mainly because of the unpopularity of its 'Left' position on foreign policy. There is (see Chapter Eight) an overwhelmingly strong conviction that Communism in Asia is a danger to this country, and issues where the Government's policy has clearly been unpopular (for example, in its decision to send conscripts to Vietnam) have been encapsulated in the larger defence issue, on which the A.L.P. was not trusted by the electorate. The A.L.P.'s electoral position was partly retrieved in 1969 by its new-look leader, Mr. G. Whitlam, but in the period to which we are addressed, its support was comparatively low.

Of all the disparate political sentiments most surely identified in this thesis, in Chapter Eight, the Left-Right continuum in foreign policy is the one most free of sociological and psychological correlates, and the most susceptible to influence by political leaders,
who must sometimes act in ways dictated by external events. It is, therefore, the one most liable to future flux, not having its roots in any secure sociological or psychological ground. The implications of the changing nature of Australia's international position will be noted in this political introduction; but it might as well, before doing so, to return to Australia's nature as an immigrant polity.

2.7. **Australia as an Immigrant Polity**

Most Australians, and their fathers, are not immigrants, but the polity was in its first style a colonial one, with institutions transplanted from the United Kingdom. The period after the Second World War saw a flood of immigration from Southern Europe, as well as the traditional British source, a phenomenon which at first nearly raised the hair on the heads of British Australians. (All Australians are, by law, still both 'Australian citizens' and 'British Subjects'). After the first shock-wave of immigration from the Continent, Australians came to accept their new multiplicity. As Table 2.3 suggests, they were much less resistant to migration of Jewish people, Greeks, Italians or Negroes (but not Chinese) in 1964 than in 1948.
TABLE 2.3
Desirability of Immigrants of Four Race or Nation Groups, 1948 and 1964
'Keep them out' (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negroes</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews:</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks:</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians:</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese:</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The percentages refer to the proportion of all respondents expressing this sentiment.

The patterns of immigration and the life-style of the immigrants are described in works cited in Chapter Six. Suffice it is to say here that in the case of Jews, Italians and Greeks, the pattern has been one of integration rather than assimilation. That is to say: these three groups have formed communities with marked internal links, and also connections with the host society; each group therefore retains a special character which has not been dissolved. In the case of Italians and Greeks, this has been as much the result of happenchance as of deliberate policy, these migrants having settled

---

1 The 1948 sample is a Melbourne one (n=370) reported in O.A. Oeser and S.B. Hammond (eds.) Social Structure and Personality in a City (London, 1954) p. 55. The 1964 sample is Australia-wide, (n=474) reported in A. Huck, The Chinese in Australia, (Melbourne, 1967) p. 93. The characteristics of the sample, which appears adequately representative, are discussed at pp. 98-100.
mainly in the inner-city areas, giving them a changed and distinctive atmosphere.

In many Australians, of British, Irish and European stock alike, there is often faintly discernible in their outlooks a nostalgia for their countries of origin. The Anglican Church is still, officially, 'The Church of England in Australia.' A Kiplingesque 'public school' tradition persists. 'Land of Hope and Glory' is still sung with feeling at school concerts. Irish folk songs are played to small drinking groups of Irish descent. Illustrated maps of Italy adorn the walls of 'espresso' cafes. Australians bring to each other, sometimes with trembling hands, the images of their homelands far away. The dominant British tradition is overtly passionate only on rare occasions. When Sir Winston Churchill died, in 1965, an enormous fund was raised for Fellowships in his memory. A memorial service to him was held in St. Paul's Anglican Cathedral, in Melbourne, at which the Lieutenant Governor, Sir Edmund Herring, delivered the oration. When he quoted the famous speech of determination to fight on, and came to the sombre passage contemplating defeat, the struggle to be carried on by 'our Empire beyond the seas,' his voice
broke with emotion.\textsuperscript{1} It was no wonder, when the British decision to withdraw troops East of Suez was announced, that many Australians, particularly the older generation, felt strangely bereft.

2.8. External Events

The war in Vietnam was the first in which Australia participated without Britain as an ally. The American orientation presented new problems. Australia is a much smaller nation in relation to the U.S. than it is to Britain. Moreover, Australians were not sure of how they were viewed by this mighty power: whether or not the great flood of affect disgorged upon President Johnson in 1966 was to be requited. If the U.S. were to retreat into isolationism, as the British were withdrawing from the Indian Ocean, what would become of us? Within the British Empire, in which Australians had felt themselves first-class citizens, there was an intrinsic 'overseas' commitment. The reality of the disintegration of the Imperial system in the 1950s was partly concealed from Australians by continuing British military activity in South-east Asia, first in suppressing the Communist insurgency in the Malay peninsula, and then in the defence of Malaysia during 'Confrontation' by Indonesia. Both of Australia's 'great

\textsuperscript{1} Observation of the writer.
and powerful friends' (as Sir Robert Menzies liked to call them) were still seen to be active in the region. When Sir Robert Menzies retired, the Imperial mantle seemed to vanish with him. An active debate arose about the Australian-British relation in 1967. In April, The Bulletin, a weekly which had been a strident advocate of the new American orientation, spread over its cover: 'Britain: The End of the Affair?' When, on July 18, Britain announced withdrawal of its forces East of Suez by the mid 1970s, there was a nation-wide sigh of regret. The Sydney Morning Herald ran three editorials on the subject in one week. On 20 July it said: 'Britain perhaps has been no bad guide for us in the past, but we must find our own sign posts for the future.' On 22 July, in an editorial headed 'Twilight of an Empire' it spelt out the general mood: 'To anyone with the slightest sense of history, this week has been of profound and moving significance. For the announcement that Britain will withdraw her troops East of Suez by 1975 means the formal end of the British Empire.'

There can be no doubt, however, that many of the close associations between Britain and Australia will continue. The mixture of amusement and affectionate

1 The Bulletin, 8 April, 1967.
fascination with which Australians regard the British monarchy was admirably captured by a columnist\textsuperscript{1} in the Melbourne Herald, 10 July, 1967:

Imperial Grandeur east of Suez has now rubbed thin. Back in London, the splendid fairytale continues in the sonorous unchanging language of the Court Circular. Listen-

The Queen this evening visited the new Jewel House and the Chapel Royal of St. Peter Ad Vincula at the Tower of London. Her Majesty was received upon arrival by the Constable (Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer) who presented to The Queen the Keys of the Tower, which Her Majesty was graciously pleased to return . . . .

The point of this short account of Australia's inheritance and its present international position, which was, in 1966, somewhat uncertain, and now, in the light of American withdrawal from Vietnam, increasingly so, is twofold. Firstly, if this multiplicity of national inheritances is to continue to exist with internal harmony, then the psychological grounds of harmony and disharmony have to be understood. This thesis, which is in large part an analysis of the antecedents of disharmony, of ethnocentrism, is directed towards that end, as part of its more general purposes. Secondly, it bears upon the nature of the Australian outlook, and on Australians' conception of themselves and others, in the new and strange external situation which was emerging when the

\textsuperscript{1} Geoffrey Tebbutt.
attitude surveys reported here were carried out. The attitudes have therefore to be understood in this context.

2.9. **Conclusion**

This introductory sketch of the Australian political scene is meant to provide the reader with some contextual understanding of the structure of dispositions and attitudes to be explored. To many, it will be superfluous, but it has been offered in the conviction that the stuff of politics is in only some aspects related to psychological disposition, and that no study of political attitudes can be complete without a survey, however brief, of the environment in which they are held. The apertures through which we can look at the structure of disposition and attitude in the population are the samples surveyed, and these will now be described.
CHAPTER THREE

THE SAMPLES OF 1963 AND 1966

3.1. Introduction

The major survey, the matter of which is reported and discussed in Chapters Six to Nine, is that of the sample of voters in Melbourne and Sydney of October-November 1960, (n=595) taken just before the Federal elections for the House of Representatives in that year. Since the interview was a long one, varying from ninety minutes to four hours, considerations of expense dictated that more time be given to the interview itself rather than the discovery of the location of the interviewee. This meant some lack of precision in the accuracy of sampling, but with the compensating advantage of being able to administer long and reliable scales for the psychological dispositions. It is nevertheless important to test the accuracy of sampling by comparing some sample characteristics with available parameters for the relevant populations, and this is the main purpose of this chapter. In addition, the internal characteristics of the 1966 sample are examined in some
In refining the instruments for the voter survey of 1966, use was made of a captive sample of low-grade (Fourth Division) Commonwealth Public Servants, which is described at Section 12.2.1 of Chapter Six, in the course of the account of method.

The voter survey of 1966 was funded by the Australian National University and carried out by a Melbourne polling organization, Australian Sales Research Bureau. It was possible, in this survey, to control sampling procedures closely. In the preliminary exercise of 1963, which was a survey of a sample in Melbourne only, interviewing was done by volunteers, and it was not possible to dictate procedures with the same rigidity. However, the representativeness of the samples is adequate, judged against population parameters.

A statistical note may be offered here on the technique of applying tests of significance in this thesis, mainly the chi-square test, to non-random samples. Since these tests are, in principle, intended to test differences between independent random samples, it follows that the generalizations which they make possible are, strictly, generalizations to hypothetical universes of content of which the samples are random samples. The
population to which one generalizes is thus a hypothetical, not an actual one. The point of this Chapter, however, is to demonstrate a close identity between the hypothetical and actual populations, by showing that the characteristics of the non-random samples are closely related to population parameters, so that these samples have approximately the same function as (admittedly superior) random samples would have had. However, this special meaning of the tests of significance should be kept in mind.

The model of all the sampling techniques described in this chapter is that of stratified cluster sampling, but the actuality of procedure in 1965 departs markedly from the model. The 1966 voter sample is a closer approximation to it. It is moderately large, sufficiently so to permit small disproportionalities to reach significance. Although it is confined only to the two biggest cities in Australia, there is a general uniformity in Australian urban life, as the conclusion to Chapter

---


2 A procedure for drawing a precise sample of the Australian electorate and its application is to be found in M. Kahan and D. Aitkin, *Drawing a Sample of the Australian Electorate*, Occasional Paper No. 3, Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University (Canberra, 1968).
Four suggests, which make it seem likely that the trends to be discerned in it apply to urban Australia generally. But we shall first consider the sample taken for the preliminary exercise of 1963.

3.2. The Melbourne Sample of 1963

3.2.1. Method of Interviewing and Sampling

Interviewing was done by some thirty volunteers, all of them University graduates or undergraduates, during the six weeks 8 November – 21 December 1963. The period of interviewing thus spanned the elections, which were held on 30 November.

Thirty locations were selected within the metropolitan area by the following procedure. An estimation was made of the proportion of the electorate within each major metropolitan division – inner, established, outer, and marginal – on the basis of the data of the 1961 Census. Within each division, the number to be drawn from the various municipalities was derived directly from the population ratios. The locations allotted to each municipality were then randomly selected. Two streets were specified adjacent to each location.

The sample was confined to persons eligible to vote and fluent in English.

Interviewers were instructed to proceed from a
particular intersection and in a given direction in a specified street. They were asked to administer the questionnaire to the first ten willing voters in the houses in that street, provided that no more than one voter from each household was to be interviewed, and that they should try to arrive at the same numbers of women and men.

Thus the formal target was 600 interviews, although it was anticipated that because of the voluntary nature of the interviewing, only about 400 would be effectively completed. The final sample was 437.

The questionnaire administered in the interview is set out in Appendix 1 to this thesis.

3.2.2. The Representativeness of the Sample

Table 3.1 compares the sample percentages intending to vote or having voted for the various political parties (those undecided or refusing to answer this question were excluded) with the actual vote reported for the metropolitan area by the Commonwealth Electoral Officer.¹

TABLE 3.1

Vote in 1963
(percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L.C.P.</th>
<th>A.L.P.</th>
<th>D.L.P.</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

=100%

The sample does not appear to be as closely representative of denominational or age groups. The tables below compare the survey data with those for the metropolitan area from the 1961 Census.¹ The latter may not, of course, correspond closely with the figures for the voting population.

TABLE 3.2

Religious Affiliation
(percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church of England</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Christian</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

=100%

TABLE 3.3

Age (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Census (Adult popln. only)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 36</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-55</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 55</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.2 = 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some underestimation of the youngest age group might be expected, in view of the method of sampling.

The attempt to obtain about equal numbers of men and women was successful.

TABLE 3.4

Sex (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample:</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus the sample seems adequately representative of sociological characteristics, and closely representative of political opinion.

3.3. The Melbourne-Sydney Sample of 1966

3.3.1. Method of Interviewing and Sampling

Interviewing was carried out by a polling organization, as noted in the Introduction to this chapter, commencing in Melbourne on 5 November 1966 and in Sydney on 6 November 1966. The period of the survey ran up to election day, 26 November. By a mischance,
three interviews in Melbourne were completed after the election.

The intention was to obtain 200 completed interviews in Melbourne and 200 in Sydney. Forty locations within each of the two metropolitan areas were designated, spread over each city on the basis of the 1961 Census data, but arbitrarily discounting the inner-city area in both cases by 25 per cent to allow for the non-voting migrant population. As in the 1963 survey, interviewers were instructed to proceed from a particular intersection (the location designated), in a given direction in a specified street. They were asked to administer the questionnaire to the first five willing voters in that street, provided that not more than one voter in each household was to be interviewed, and that for each quota of ten interviews, they should try to obtain equal numbers of women and men.

The sample was again confined to persons eligible to vote and fluent in English.

In an effort to obtain a more correct proportion of young people, who were under-sampled in 1963, interviewers were instructed to give first preference to a voter under 30 years, if one was present. In the absence of a voter under 30 years, any willing voter was interviewed, without
discrimination as to age.

The questionnaire administered is set out in Appendix 2 to this thesis. As noted above it is a very long one. Of the 400 interviews completed, some had missing responses on one or more of the political policy items (n=5) and some had missing responses on one or more of all the dispositional scale items, (n=22). Since the factor analyses required an identical sample for each correlation, all those interviews with one or more blanks on the political policy items were excluded from the analysis of political policy items, and subsequent breakdowns by background data. The maximum size of the sample used in the 'political' analysis was therefore 395.

An identical consideration led to the exclusion of the 22 interviews with one or more blanks on all the dispositional scale items. Members of the minority groups mentioned in the ethnocentrism scale were excluded from the dispositional analyses, as the items of the ethnocentrism scales referred to themselves, and responses could not, in principle, measure an attitude to an out-group. These numbered 23. The sample used for the dispositional scale analysis, excluding these two groups, was 355. If all questionnaires with any blanks on the political policy or dispositional items were excluded,
The sample size is indicated in every table. Maxima range from 352 to 395. Its representativeness is not seriously affected by the reduction, as the figures below demonstrate, except that, of course, the small proportion of the sample (approximately five per cent) who are actually members of the Jewish, Greek or Italian minority groups are not included when the sample is reduced to 352. However, this deficiency is more than compensated by the increased clarity of the analysis, a consideration which outweighed the small drop in representativeness and sample size.

3.3.2. The Representativeness of the Sample

Table 3.5 compares the sample percentages intending to vote or having voted for the various political parties with the sum of the actual votes of both metropolitan areas reported by the Commonwealth Electoral Officer.¹

### TABLE 3.5

Vote in 1966 (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L.C.P.</th>
<th>A.L.P.</th>
<th>D.L.P.</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample (n=395)</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample (n=355)</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual:</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The sample figures exclude those undecided or refusing to answer this question.

The D.L.P. vote is somewhat under-represented, and the L.C.P. vote somewhat over-represented. The general balance of the samples of both sizes is adequate to our purposes.

The data of the Census of 1966 have not yet been officially published, but personal communications of the figures were made to the writer by the Commonwealth Statistician, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, in Canberra, and the Deputy Commonwealth Statisticians in Melbourne and Sydney. Only figures for the entire population, juvenile and adult, are available for religious affiliation. Census figures for the proportion in each age group were categorized on a slightly different basis from those in the sample. Table 3.6 sets out data for religious affiliation.
TABLE 3.6

Religious Affiliation (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sample (n=395)</th>
<th>Sample (n=355)</th>
<th>Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church of England:</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian:</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist:</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic:</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian:</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Christian:</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion:</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

=100% =100% =100%

As in 1963, it seems that agnostics or atheists are more prepared to offer this self-description in a sample survey than a census. The expected under-representation of 'Other Christians' and 'Non-Christians' is evident, although here again, overall representativeness is adequate.

Table 3.7 exhibits data for age groups.

TABLE 3.7

Age Groups (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>21-35</th>
<th>36-55</th>
<th>56 and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample (n=395):</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample (n=355):</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Census:</td>
<td>20-34</td>
<td>35-54</td>
<td>55-and over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a more accurate representation of younger people than in 1963, probably achieved by the constraining
instruction to interviewers. But the elderly are under-sampled.

Table 3.8 indicates that the attempt to obtain about equal numbers of men and women was successful.

TABLE 3.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sex (percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample (n=395):</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample (n=355):</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These data, taken together, suggest that the sample is representative of the sociological and political characteristics of the parent population to a degree adequate to our purposes.

3.3.3. Further Characteristics of the 1966 Sample

Obviously, a sample of this moderately large size is capable of suggesting the sociological characteristics of the parent population, as well as those political and psychological features to which this thesis is addressed. Some cross-tabulations of sociological data are provided below, since they are of general assistance in clarifying the data more central to our interest. In exhibiting these data, the same format as for those in the main substantive chapters has been adopted, the rationale of which is discussed at the beginning of
Chapter Seven. The tables are of percentages; the probability figures below are derived from the frequency tables from which the percentages are derived, collapsed to four cells. This format, it is hoped, preserves clarity in exposition with the added and necessary stringency provided by tests of significance.

Those with data refused or missing have been removed from the relevant tables.

Table 3.9 exhibits the relation between education and self-identified social class. The relation is close, but does not approach identity.

TABLE 3.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>(percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle (a)</td>
<td>Working (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower:</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\((p < .001, n=321)\)

(a) Four 'social class' categories were offered: 'Upper middle,' 'Average middle,' 'Lower middle' and 'Working'.

(b) 'Higher' education refer to Leaving Certificate or above, including University education. The Leaving Certificate is taken at about 16 years of age.
'Middle' education refers to Intermediate Certificate or a Trade Certificate. The former is taken at about 15 years of age. 'Lower' refers to any lesser qualification. Very few of the sample would have failed to complete primary education (ending at 12 years). Table 3.10 shows the relation between income of the head of the household (whether or not the respondent) and self-identified class of the respondent.

### TABLE 3.10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Class</th>
<th>Higher</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Lower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower:</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .001, n=297)

(a) 'Higher' income refers to $60 per week or more; 'Middle' income to $45 - $60 per week; 'Lower' income to less than $45 per week.

Again, the relation stops far short of identity, especially at the lower level of each variable.

Table 3.11 depicts education of the respondent by householder's income.
The relation is less marked than in the two previous cross-tabulations. These three variables, householder's income, education level and class, are all dubbed 'status' variables in the text. The usage is loose but convenient.

The relation is less marked than in the two previous cross-tabulations. These three variables, householder's income, education level and class, are all dubbed 'status' variables in the text. The usage is loose but convenient.

### TABLE 3.11

**Education by Householder's Income**

(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>65 = 100% (n=94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38 = 100% (n=108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower:</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17 = 100% (n=118)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .01, n=320)

The relation is less marked than in the two previous cross-tabulations. These three variables, householder's income, education level and class, are all dubbed 'status' variables in the text. The usage is loose but convenient.

### TABLE 3.12

**Self-identified Class by Religion**

(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15 = 100% (n=214)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working:</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9 = 100% (n=106)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(difference between Protestant and Catholics, p < .01, n=280).

Catholics are disproportionately numerous amongst the self-identified 'working class'.
TABLE 3.13

Education by Religion
(percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100%  (n=105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100%  (n=117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower:</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100%  (n=126)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(difference between Protestant and Catholics,
p < .02, n=294)

Catholics are disproportionately uncommon amongst the well educated. However, there is no reliable relation to be found between householder's income and religious denomination.

TABLE 3.15

Age by Religion
(percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than 36:</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36 - 55:</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56 or older:</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(difference between Protestant and Catholics,
p < .02, n=300)

Catholics are more numerous amongst the young.
TABLE 3.16

Age by Education
(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 36:</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-55:</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 or older:</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= 100% (n=123)\( \text{\( p < .001\text{, \( n=350\) )} \end{equation}

The younger generation are very much better educated than their elders.

3.4. Conclusion

The brief foregoing summary of some of the sociological characteristics of the sample gives some evidential bases for the following trends: the electorate is becoming better educated; the proportion of Catholics in the community seems likely to increase, and, as the better educated younger generation grow older and accumulate status and possessions, the proportion of the electorate declaring itself 'middle-class' will rise sharply. The three 'status' variables, education, class identification and householder's income, are moderately to strongly related to each other, but in no case does the relation approach identity. As we shall see, they occasionally exhibit differential relations with political opinion.
The two samples seem adequate peep-holes through which to observe the population, judging by the degree to which their characteristics approximate to population parameters, in so far as these are known. The following two Chapters, Four and Five, describe preliminary exercises in the identification of 'structures' in political opinion and their relation to some psychological dispositions, measured by short scales, in the 1963 Melbourne sample. These are followed by a major exercise in the construction of longer dispositional scales on the basis of the 'captive' sample of public servants and the voter sample of 1966. This is described in Chapter Six. This, with the following Chapters, Seven to Nine, forms the major substantive part of this thesis. Differences in the structure of political attitudes in 1963 and 1966 are noted.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN 1963

4.1. Introduction

This chapter and the following one report findings of an exploratory survey of 1963, which was a precursor to the more elaborate one of 1966. In the course of analysing the data of the 1963 survey, a number of devices were employed which were developed more fully in planning the 1966 survey and analysing the data therefrom. In addition, the shortcomings of the 1963 survey indicated ways of carrying out a more satisfactory empirical exercise in 1966. These two chapters, therefore, deal essentially with work preliminary to the main corpus of the research embodied in this thesis, which is contained principally in Chapters Six to Nine.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to review in extenso theoretical or empirical work on the structure of political attitudes. This whole thesis, indeed, aims principally at reportage of empirical work by the writer in the Australian setting and discussion of its implications. This emphasis is based on a
consideration of the relative merits of undertaking an extended discussion of new empirical work, as against a comprehensive review of the literature. The former course was chosen. However, here, as elsewhere, relevant literature will be selectively touched upon. Where deep delving in the literature is actually required to show the rationale of this research, as in Chapter Six, this has been done. In Chapter Five, a lighter review seemed appropriate.

A sample of 437 Melbourne voters was surveyed by the present writer during the Federal Elections of 1963.

The survey was sponsored by the Victorian Fabian Society, to whom thanks are due for permission to report the outcome here. It was conceived, planned and directed by the writer.\(^1\) The investigation was necessarily an exploratory probe. Beneath the spidery furrows of the Australian Public Opinion Poll's (APOP) percentages,\(^2\) the field of public opinion research in this country was at this time almost unploughed. The

---

\(^1\) I owe a special debt of gratitude to David Bottomley of Nation's Opinion Service, Melbourne, who made technical services available free of charge.

\(^2\) For an index of these, see M. Goot and J. Ilbery, *Australian Public Opinion Polls: Index 1941-1968*, Occasional Monograph No. 2, Department of Government and Public Administration, University of Sydney, (Sydney, 1969).
cross-tabulation of political opinion beyond party and occupation was a modern wonder which Australian political science had seldom employed. Where more detailed studies have been undertaken in the time since this survey, the findings have often emerged as disparate snatches of information, which related to various points of interest, but do not disclose much in the way of organic structures in political attitudes.\(^1\)

A general survey of the attitudes of the Australian electorate is now being carried out under the auspices of the Research School of Social Sciences of the Australian National University, under the direction of D. Aitkin and M. Kahan. But until the date of the 1963 survey reported here, and indeed since, there has been little Australian political cartography reported. It therefore seemed worthwhile to conduct a survey oriented to the

discovery of whatever general patterns might exist in the material, as well as the illumination of particular puzzles. Accordingly, an attempt was made to cover a rather wide area in each interview, to extract as much information as was practicable in the time available, and to make some sort of invasion of the forests of possible intercorrelations. The purpose was essentially to try to throw up a number of hypotheses, especially ones which might impart a general order to the data, which could be tested in future more detailed investigations.

The sample and interviewing procedures have been described in Chapter Three. The questionnaire (the relevant parts of which are to be found in Appendix 1 to this thesis) included items probing opinions on twelve major political questions, views on the relative importance of five election issues, the party for which the respondents voted in 1961 and the party of their choice in 1963, the main reason for the choice in 1963, the degree of interest taken in politics and the extent of participation in political discussion. The interviewers also administered three short dispositional scales to each respondent, designed to measure authoritarian tendency of the Right, alienation, and hostility to minority groups or out-groups.
Respondents were also asked their occupation, marital status, number of children, educational level, class identification, and religion and frequency of church attendance. Age and sex were estimated by the interviewer.

The sample has been shown (in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of Chapter Three) to be closely representative of its parent population in its voting intention, and adequately representative of religious and age groups. It contains roughly equal numbers of men and women. Its size makes it of special value in the search for systematic correlations, although the relative magnitudes of these have to be interpreted with caution.

This chapter will sketch some findings of the conventional kind; discuss the results of a 'cluster analysis' of a table of intercorrelations of political opinions, which suggested that there may be not one, but three dimensions of radicalism in Australian politics; examine some sociological correlates of each dimension of radicalism and attempt to draw some conclusions as to likely future shifts in opinion.
4.2. Some Findings of the Conventional Kind

4.2.1. Associations between Vote and Age, Sex, and Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LCP</th>
<th>ALP</th>
<th>DLP</th>
<th>Undecided (DK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 36:</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11 = 100% (n=109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-55:</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4 = 100% (n=180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 55:</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5 = 100% (n=98)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 suggests that the younger and middle-aged groups differ very little from each other in their voting intentions, whilst the older group may be more conservative. However, the difference between the older and middle-aged groups is not significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LCP</th>
<th>ALP</th>
<th>DLP</th>
<th>DK &amp; Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men:</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3 = 100% (n=196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women:</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9 = 100% (n=206)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The well-known tendency of women to be attracted to the Parties of respectability and refinement is perhaps a little in evidence in Table 4.2, but the main beneficiary

---

1 By 'conventional', I mean findings which have emerged in the past using well-established techniques of analysis. These are mainly those of the APOP. A useful summary of APOP data of December 1961 is contained in A.F. Davies and S. Encel, (eds.), Australian Society: A Sociological Introduction (Melbourne, 1965) at pp. 109-13.
of aversion from the A.L.P. may be the D.L.P. However, the difference between L.C.P. and A.L.P. voters by sex is not significant in this table.

The usual relations between vote and occupational status, and vote and self-identified social class were obtained. Figures for the former are given in Table 4.3.

TABLE 4.3
Vote in 1963 by Occupational Group (a) (b) (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>LCP</th>
<th>ALP</th>
<th>DLP</th>
<th>DK &amp; Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'White collar'</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Professional, managerial, small business and clerical)</td>
<td>100% (n=166)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Blue collar'</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manual)</td>
<td>100% (n=145)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Duties, Retired, etc.</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100% (n=83)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Voters are here classified by the occupation of the head of their household.

(b) The difference between 'blue collar' and 'white collar' workers by vote (L.C.P. and A.L.P. only) is highly significant (p < .001).

4.2.2. Identification of the 'Tractable' Vote

An effort was made to identify the actually or potentially 'floating' group of voters, hereafter called
the 'tractable' vote. Those who stated that they always voted for a particular party were classified separately from those who were less fixed in their voting habits, that is, those who either

(1) voted for the same party in 1961 and 1963, but stated that they did not always do so;
(2) were undecided on their 1963 vote;
(3) actually switched their vote intention from 1961 to 1963; or
(4) were new voters (mostly under 25).

The high proportion of tractable voters shown in Table 4.4 probably represents a 'ceiling' figure, since it may include a number who always vote for the same party but are loath to admit it to an interviewer (or themselves).

The internal structure of the tractable vote is displayed in Table 4.5.
TABLE 4.5
Structure of the Tractable Vote
(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undecided:</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New voters:</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those who switched, 1961-1963:</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP 1961 and 1963, but 'not always':</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP 1961 and 1963, but 'not always':</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP 1961 and 1963, but 'not always':</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 'floating' categories:</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>= 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This crucial group of voters was distinguished so that their views on some alternative policies, and on the relative importance of a number of election issues, could be considered separately from those of fixed loyalties.

4.2.3. The Structure of the DLP Vote

The size of the D.L.P. sub-sample is small (n=47), and breakdowns within it must therefore be approached cautiously. Nevertheless, some of its characteristics emerge quite clearly:

79% of the D.L.P. voters were Church-going Catholics; and 62% of them stated that they always vote for that party.

The section below on 'opinion leaders' indicates that it is a disproportionately talkative and politically conscious vote: and the figures above suggest that it
contains a higher proportion of young people and of women that do the two major parties. It is not drawn disproportionately from any particular occupational group social class.

On most domestic issues, habitual D.L.P. voters were about midway in radicalism between the habitual supporters of the A.L.P. and L.C.P.; on some external policies, however, they tend to be more radical than either (See Table 4.15). They are the only group with a majority in favour of relaxation of the White Australia Policy, and have the highest proportion in favour of increased economic aid to Asian countries.

The propensities of the Catholic vote as a whole may also be of some interest. The Catholic sub-sample numbered 125, and of these 95 had been to Church during the preceding month, outnumbering those of the major Protestant denominations who had done so (76). About half of the votes of Church-going Catholics went to the D.L.P.

TABLE 4.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LCP</th>
<th>ALP</th>
<th>DLP</th>
<th>DK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote of Church-attending Catholics, 1963 (Percentages)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= 100%
4.2.4. The Incidence of Politically Persuasive Talk

Some research on voting behaviour, notably that by Lazarsfeld in the United States,\(^1\) has suggested that there may be a two-step flow of information and influence, in the first place from the mass media to the more interested and articulate voters (his so-called 'opinion leaders'), and secondly from these (mainly through casual conversation), to tractable voters among the less interested.

Whether or not aggressive political talkers may 'lead opinion' in the same way in Australian society today is a question to which the data of this survey as yet provide no definite answer. It may be that the influence of political talk is lower here because our society has less grass-roots cohesion than the community of 'joiners' which Lazarsfeld explored in Ohio. The two-step flow may have become obsolescent with the introduction of TV.

Nevertheless, on the assumption that political talk has probably remained at least of marginal significance, it seemed worthwhile to adopt Lazarsfeld's method of identifying 'opinion leaders'.

---

Interviewees were asked:

'Have you tried to convince anyone of your political views recently?'

and

'Has anyone asked your advice on a political question recently?'

If the interviewee answered 'yes' to either of these questions, he or she was classified, following Lazarsfeld, as an opinion leader. The proportion of opinion leaders in the major political groupings is shown in Table 4.7.

**TABLE 4.7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proportions of Opinion Leaders by Party Affiliation (Percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amongst those always voting LCP: 18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amongst those always voting ALP: 38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amongst those always voting DLP: 45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amongst 'tractable' voters: 33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Its high proportion of opinion leaders may assist the Labor vote to resist the pressure of the predominantly anti-Labor mass media.

'Opinion leaders,' defined in this way, were on the whole proportionately spread amongst occupational groups, but a little more numerous than average amongst skilled manual workers, and amongst housewives very rare.

4.2.5. The Relative Importance of the Issues: Comparisons Between Voting Groups

Interviewees were handed a card on which were
printed five 'election issues': Foreign and Defence Policy, education, Housing, Social Services, and Unemployment and Economic Policy. Two types of card were used, each of which listed the issues in reverse order to the other, as an attempt to offset the influence of any particular listing order. They were asked:

'In your own personal opinion, which of these election issues is of first importance?'

When a response was given, they were then asked which was second, third and fourth in importance, the fifth being taken to be of least importance. The results are shown in Table 4.8. The numerical ranking given to the various issues has been averaged for each voting group, to indicate how the different groups see them in order of importance.

**TABLE 4.8**

**Average Ranking of Election Issues**

Amongst those always voting LCP:

- Education 2.20 (First importance)
- Housing 2.74 (Second importance)
- Foreign Policy 2.99 (Third importance)
- Unemployment 3.37 (Fourth importance)
- Social Services 3.64 (Fifth importance)

Amongst those always voting ALP:

- Education 2.34
- Housing 2.47
- Unemployment 2.54
- Social Services 3.46
- Foreign Policy 4.21
TABLE 4.8 (Cont.)

Amongst those always voting DLP:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>3.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amongst 'tractable' voters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
<td>3.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The notable features here are clearly the consistent prominence attributed to 'education' as an election issue, the wide disagreement over the importance of foreign policy, the apparent indifference to 'social services' as an issue, and the fairly close agreement between 'tractable' and A.L.P. voters, on the one hand, and L.C.P. and D.L.P. voters, on the other. Whatever prevented a drift to the A.L.P., it would not seem to be opposition to the A.L.P.'s stress on education, unemployment and economic policy as election issues.

4.2.6. The Divisions of Opinion on Twelve Major Political Questions

In order to avoid the effects of 'agreement tendency', two or more alternative views, instead of a single opinion, were presented in each case. The alternatives
were phrased so as to correspond to the usual conservative or radical positions. The questions, and percentages agreeing with each alternative, are shown in Table 4.9.

TABLE 4.9

Opinions on Twelve Political Issues (a) (b)
(percentages)

(a) The alternatives labelled 'Radical' and 'Conservative' in the tables which follow are denoted by an asterisk. The labelling is necessarily arbitrary in some instances, and represents no more than a convenient shorthand.

(b) A note on the approximate standard error for a random sample (which this is not) of this size may here be useful. For response splits of the order 70/30, the sampling error is about 6.5 per cent; i.e. the probability that the value estimated will be within the range 6.5 per cent above or below the sample figure is .95.1

Age Pensions

'Do you think age pensions should be increased,* 81%
or should they be kept as they are now, for the time being?' 13%

Other opinion and Don't know 6%

100%

1

TABLE 4.9 (Cont.)

### Defence Spending

'Do you think Australia should increase its spending on **defence**,\* 59% or does Australia spend enough on defence already?' 23%

Other opinion and Don't know 18%

### Child Endowment

'Do you think **child endowment** should be doubled,\* 19% or be raised by a smaller amount,\* 46% or be kept at the present rate?' 24%

Other opinion and Don't know 11%

### Education

'Should government spending on **education** remain about the same as it is now, 5% or be moderately increased, 32% or be greatly increased?'\* 58%

Other opinion and Don't know 5%

### Public Enterprise

'Should the Commonwealth Government start up **new business enterprises of its own**,\* 29% or should it keep out of new business ventures?' 45%

Other opinion and Don't know 26%
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
<th>Other/Don't know (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationalization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should the government avoid nationalization and promote private enterprise, or should it nationalize some business monopolies?</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aboriginal Welfare</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the aborigines: do you think the government should spend more on their welfare and education, or spend about the same as it does now?</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Aid to Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia now gives equipment to Asian countries to help them develop. This aid amounts to about £5 million a year. Do you think this aid should be increased, or kept about the same as it is now?</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>White Australia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think the White Australia policy should be kept as it is, or should the policy be relaxed to allow greater number of Asians to settle in this country?</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 4.9 (Cont.)

Capital Punishment

'Do you think the death penalty for murder should be abolished,* 31%
or
should the death penalty be kept?' 56%
Other opinion and Don't know 13%
100%

Economic Planning

'Should the government start more detailed economic planning,* 50%
or
should it use only the present controls?' 24%
Other opinion and Don't know 26%
100%

Capital Gains Tax

'If a man gets income from increases in the value of stocks and shares that he owns, should such income be left free of tax, 40%
or
should it be taxed?*' 49%
Other opinion and Don't know 11%
100%

The meaning of the figures above is limited by the representativeness of the sample, and also by the fact that the 'conservative' and 'radical' percentages can be influenced by the phrasing of the questions. The significance of these divisions will be discussed below,
after an attempt has been made to uncover some structural features of the data through the introduction of rather more adventurous statistical techniques than have been employed so far.

4.3. A Cluster Analysis: Three Kinds of Radicalism?

The first step taken to clarify the relationships between views on the issues set out above was to arrange the data in tables to indicate which opinions were more closely associated. Views on each issue were conceived as scattered along a conservative-radical continuum specific to that subject; the questions related to each issue may be regarded as providing a cutting-point dividing those towards the radical and of the hypothetical scale from those more conservative. The fact that each continuum is split at a different point and that a different set of questions would have produced different splits is not material, provided that the data can be arranged in such a way that the splits are not extreme. (The method of coping with the 'Don't know' and 'Other opinion' categories is set out in Appendix 3 to this thesis). Once a two-way split on each issue, representing the division of opinion, has been obtained, the data may be set out in 2 x 2 tables indicating the strength of the relationship between opinions on the different issues.
For example, the relationship between views on hanging and the White Australia policy is displayed in Table 4.10.

TABLE 4.10

Opinions on White Australia and Capital Punishment
(Frequencies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>White Australia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rad.</td>
<td>Cons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital Punishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 224 202 = 426 Grand Total

It is evident by inspection that there is some correlation between opinions on these issues. For this table, the tetrachoric correlation coefficient is .38, indicating a moderate positive relationship between radicalism on the two issues: that is, those radical on one of these issues tend to be somewhat more radical than overage on the other.

The assumptions involved in computing the tetrachoric coefficient are set out in Appendix 3. All tetrachoric coefficients displayed in this chapter have been estimated by using Davidoff and Goheen's table\(^1\) and

corrected for marginal splits at points away from
the median by Jenkins' method.\(^1\)

Table 4.11 sets out the correlation coefficients
for every possible combination of issues, computed
from 2 x 2 tables such as the one above.

\(1\) W.L. Jenkins, 'An Improved Method for Tetrachoric r,'

\[ \begin{array}{cccccccccccc}
1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 & 11 & 12 \\
\hline
1.00 & -0.03 & 0.46 & 0.18 & 0.18 & 0.36 & -0.02 & -0.02 & 0.12 & 0.05 & 0.06 \\
1.00 & -0.07 & 0.25 & -0.11 & -0.19 & 0.05 & 0.06 & -0.05 & -0.21 & 0.11 & 0.08 \\
1.00 & 0.26 & 0.30 & 0.37 & 0.35 & 0.05 & 0.06 & 0.04 & -0.23 & 0.07 \\
1.00 & 0.14 & 0.15 & 0.14 & 0.24 & 0.21 & 0.20 & 0.37 & 0.24 & 0.12 & 0.08 \\
1.00 & 0.18 & 0.06 & 0.08 & 0.16 & 0.11 & 0.12 & 0.08 \\
1.00 & 0.42 & 0.21 & 0.15 & 0.14 & 0.08 \\
1.00 & 0.14 & 0.27 & 0.25 & 0.13 & 0.13 & 0.06 \\
1.00 & 0.43 & 0.36 & 0.13 & 0.06 \\
1.00 & 0.36 & 0.05 & 0.12 \\
1.00 & 0.19 & 0.14 & 0.12 \\
1.00 & 0.21 & 0.06 \\
1.00 & 0.12 & 0.06 \\
\end{array} \]

(a) For a sample of 400 or more, correlation coefficients of .10
or higher are significant at the .05 level of confidence; those of
.13 or higher at the .01 level of confidence. The former are marked
by one asterisk; the latter by two.
We are now in a position to consider whether there are groups or clusters of issues which go together, or more precisely, which are significantly more closely associated with each other than with issues outside the cluster. This can be done by means of a formal statistical treatment of the table of correlations known as a 'cluster analysis'.

The method used has been that suggested by Fruchter.\(^1\) This allows little scope for subjective judgement or discretion, and requires that in order to be admitted to a cluster, an item (or 'issue') must have substantially higher correlations with the items already in it than with other items outside it; and that in the outcome, the average intercorrelation between items within a cluster must be significantly higher than the average correlation between items in the cluster and those outside.

It may be useful to dwell on the meaning of a 'cluster' before proceeding to the results of the analysis. The notion may be illustrated from some popular views of the dimensions of radicalism. It is commonly supposed that opinions on, say, the White Australia policy, on the one hand, and increases in child endowment, on the other, are

not closely associated; that is, given a person's views on the White Australia policy, we would be unable to predict with any confidence whether or not he is likely to be radical or conservative about endowment. That this supposition is well founded is indicated by the table of correlations above. There is no discoverable relation between opinions on these two issues; they vary independently of each other. But one might very well suppose that views on endowment might be systematically connected with views on age pensions; that is, that persons radical on the one issue may be more radical than average on the other. This is also shown to be the case. It is also true that opinions in favour of modification of the White Australia policy are connected with views on increased aid to Asian countries.

Now these two groups of issues, White Australia - economic aid and pensions-endowment, will, on these suppositions, represent 'clusters' in the sense we have been using the term. There is a closer relationship between the issues within each cluster than obtains between those within the cluster and the issues outside. We might speak of a 'social service radicalism' and an 'Asian-oriented radicalism', in describing this situation, to indicate that there are two sorts of
radicalism involved. We need not mean by this that the two types of radicalism are totally unrelated; merely that one finds empirically that relations between the two troups of issues are much looser than those within each group.

My expectations as to the sort of clusters which would emerge from the data reflected one set of stereotypes about the groupings of political issues in Western societies. I thought that opinions on hanging, White Australia and economic aid might intercorrelate relatively closely and form a cluster representing a 'conscience' radicalism, and that the remainder, with the exception of opinions on defence, might cohere to represent a general socio-economic radicalism, only loosely related to the first cluster.

These expectations were not fulfilled. Instead, three distinct clusters were defined by the analysis. They are constituted as follows:

Cluster 1. Opinions on age pensions, child endowment, aboriginal welfare, nationalization, and Commonwealth business enterprise.

The B-coefficient (or 'coefficient of belonging'), which gives the ratio of the average intercorrelation of the variables in a cluster to their average correlation with variables
not included in the cluster) for this cluster = 3.48. (The minimum significant value for a B-coefficient has been set\(^1\) at 1.30.) The mean of intercorrelations in the cluster = .30.

For reasons set out below, the continuum represented by this cluster is labelled the 'Established' radicalism-conservatism.

**Cluster 2.** Opinions on economic aid to Asian countries, the White Australia policy and the death penalty.

B-coefficient = 3.74.

Mean of intercorrelations in the cluster = .37

The continuum this represents has been labelled 'Conscience' radicalism-conservatism.

**Cluster 3.** Opinions on defence spending, expenditure on education, economic planning and a capital gains tax.

B-coefficient = 2.50.

Mean of intercorrelations in the cluster = .21.

The continuum represented here has been labelled the 'New' radicalism-conservatism.

This means, for example, that opinions in favour of increased defence spending, increased expenditure on education, the introduction of a capital gains tax and

---

\(^1\) By Fruchter, *op.-cit.*, pp. 12-17.
economic planning tend to go together; that opinions
against these measures are also related; and that
opinions on this group of issues are substantially more
closely related to each other than they are to opinions
on other issues.

The mean of the intercorrelations of items in Cluster 1 with those in Cluster 2 is .10; of those in Cluster 1 with those in Cluster 3, .08; of those in Cluster 2 with those in Cluster 3, .10. Statistical significance is achieved at .10. Thus in two cases out of three, the three kinds of radicalism are shown to be related to a degree which only just reaches statistical significance.

In view of the exploratory nature of this investigation, and the novelty of some of the methods employed, it may be as well at this point to note some of the strengths and weaknesses of the statistical basis of the three clusters.

Given the relative magnitudes of the correlations in Table 4.11, this three-cluster resolution is clearly unavoidable. The moderately large size of the sample and the low threshold of statistical significance enable low but systematic correlations to be identified unequivocably. But the relative magnitudes of the correlations here depend in large part on the validity of the procedures
set out and discussed in Appendix 3 for dichotomising opinion on each variable. Whilst these procedures appear the most readily defensible, there are other possible means of doing so. A violent test of the stability of this cluster resolution is to reverse these procedures in every case, and to adopt the least plausible means of dichotomising opinion on each variable. When this is done, the chief effects are the reduction of the division between the 'Established' and the 'New' radicalisms, and the reduction of the internal consistency of the latter.

A replicatory study would have been required to clarify these relations with certainty. However, the correlations set out in Table 4.11 represent the best obtainable data on the relationships between these issues, and lead directly to the three-cluster hypothesis which has been adopted.

With these caveats in mind, we may now take a closer look at the implications of the pattern of correlations, and enter some speculation on the political grounds of the cohesiveness of each cluster.

It will be noted that all the significant correlations (those at or above .10) are moderate to low. Clearly no comprehensive ideologies govern opinions on political issues in this sample. In view of the low correlations exhibited, it is more appropriate to speak of sentiments influencing opinion.
A diagrammatic representation of the relations within and between the three clusters can be derived as follows. Let us take initially the two continua or dimensions represented by the 'Established' radicalism (Re) and 'Conscience' radicalism (Rc). The two continua, Re and Rc, may be regarded as defining the axes of a two-dimensional space, and arbitrarily represented as orthogonal (at right angles) to each other. Now the relation of any particular item to the axis Re will be indicated by its mean intercorrelation with items in the cluster defining Re, except for items within the cluster Re, for which the average correlations with the other items in it will serve this purpose. The relation of each item to the axes Rc and Rn may be similarly obtained.

It should be borne in mind that the correlations on which the diagrams are based are approximate and subject to sampling error. For example, for a sample of this size, the 95 per cent confidence limits of a correlation of .40 are .48 to .32; and of a correlation of .20, are .29 to .11. The account of the implications of each diagram is meant to clarify the meaning of the sample statistics only.
Figure 4.1 displays the relationship between issues of the 'Established' radicalism and 'Conscience' radicalism.

The adjacent point on the $R_c$ axis defines the closeness of the relation of an issue to 'Conscience' radicalism. Thus a radical opinion on the White Australia policy is the most closely related to this cluster.
Hanging is a little less closely related to it, but the difference is slight. Adjacent points on the Re axis indicate the closeness of relation to 'Established' radicalism. Here views on child endowment are the most closely related, and aboriginal welfare least, although once more the difference is not great.

The correlations of the 'Conscience' radicalism issues with others in the 'Conscience' radicalism cluster range from .34 to .40, whilst the correlations of the 'Established' radicalism issues with others in the 'Established' radicalism cluster range from .27 to .37. The 'Established radicalism cluster is thus a little less internally cohesive than the 'Conscience' radicalism cluster.

Some connections between the clusters are evident. Amongst the issues of 'Established' radicalism, welfare spending on aborigines has the closest relation (about .22) with 'Conscience' radicalism. However, its place in the 'Established' radicalism cluster is secured by its higher average intercorrelation with those issues (about .27).

Opinions in favour of nationalization and new government business enterprises also display a relation with the other type of radicalism, but this barely achieves statistical significance. The same is true of radical views on hanging and White Australia. The fact that all
issues lie within the two axes, in the one quadrant, indicates a consistent, but not here strong, relation between the two radicalisms.

This discussion has been entered in terms of radicalism, for the sake of semantic and conceptual convenience. However, the correlations imply that conservative opinions are also related in precisely the same way. Opposition to a change in the White Australia policy is also most closely associated with opposition to 'Conscience' radicalism.

FIGURE 4.2
Relationships within and between Clusters Rₙ and Rₒ (The 'New' radicalism and 'Conscience' radicalism)
Figure 4.2 exhibits the relationship between the 'New' radicalism and 'Conscience' radicalism. The issue most closely related to 'New' radicalism is education spending; the least closely related to 'New' radicalism is defence. Education spending has also a marked relation (about .25) to 'Conscience' radicalism, but is retained in the 'New' radicalism cluster because of its higher correlation there (.29). Like aboriginal welfare, it is something of a 'bridge' issue. Views on planning, a capital gains tax and economic aid to Asian countries also cross-relate significantly to the other dimension of radicalism.

The mean correlations of 'New' radicalism issues with the 'New' radicalism cluster range from .15 to .29, and it is less internally cohesive than 'Conscience' radicalism or 'Established' radicalism.

Defence spending falls outside the quadrant and is thus negatively related to 'Conscience' radicalism, although not to a degree which achieves statistical significance.
Figure 4.3 displays the relationship between 'New' radicalism and 'Established' radicalism. Cross-relationships here are less marked than in either of the two preceding Figures. Only views on aboriginal welfare spending, planning and education are significantly related to both clusters.

Defence spending again falls outside the quadrant,
and has a slight non-significant relation with the 'Established' radicalism.

Inspection of the three Figures indicates that economic planning, education spending and aboriginal welfare spending are the only issues which significantly relate to all three dimensions of radicalism.

* * * * *

The cluster labelled 'Established' radicalism-conservatism contains issues of long standing: the extension of social services and public ownership. A radical position here is oriented towards income redistribution and some movement towards a collectivist society, objectives which have a traditional appeal for socialists. The expansion of social services seems now regarded by all social and political groups as desirable, within certain limits, (see Tables 4.9 and 4.15) but of relatively little importance (see Table 4.8). The extension of public ownership is on the whole unpopular.

The 'New' radicalism-conservatism cluster, by contrast, contains a number of issues - defence commitments, economic planning and education - which have come into prominence in the post-war period, almost, one might say, in the late 1950s. The remaining issue, the introduction
of a capital gains tax, has yet to be seriously raised in Australian politics.

After those 'undecided' are distributed, there are radical majorities, ranging from 55 per cent to 75 per cent on these four issues.

The emphasis on education rather than social security suggests that it may be associated with rather more individualistic values than those of the 'Established' radicalism. The radical orientation here is not to a collectivist arrangement but to the insistence on a more rational order of priorities in the economy and in society to be achieved through political action. In short, it looks surprisingly like the objective correlative, in an Australian context, of the views of contemporary British socialists of the Right. It is rather as if the electorate had Crosland's 'Future of the Left'\textsuperscript{1} up its sleeve. But as the discussion below suggests, it is probably more superficial.

The 'New' radicalism, as it emerged in this survey, seemed to represent the outcome of a sort of prudential review of the problems of an affluent capitalist society against social criteria which do not question the

fundamentals of that society, but on the contrary, are widely accepted within it, even perhaps generated by it. It seeks only to rationalize this social system, and to make it more self-consistent.

Since this kind of radicalism manifests a concern over a perceived imbalance in social priorities, and deficiencies in governmental performance, it must be more dependent than the 'Established' radicalism on political circumstances as they change from time to time. When this survey was conducted, the memory of the Liberal and Country Party government's miscalculation in monetary policy (the mismanaged 'credit squeeze' of 1960-61) was still fresh in respondents' minds. It very likely influenced replies to the question about 'economic planning', which might have been simplistically understood as 'management'. 'Defence neglect' and a decline in facilities for secondary education were much in the news. The 'New' radicalism is perhaps best interpreted as a wave of dissatisfaction generated by governmental lapses in competence, and not as a principled and self-sustaining political orientation. In general, the proportion radical on these issues might be expected to fluctuate with the need for remedy.

The 'New' radicalism is, as one might expect,
particularly popular amongst the post-war generation (See Table 4.12). It represents the impact of quite a different set of social conditions from those which obtained when the issues of the 'Established' radicalism were first exposed to public debate. The economic crisis of the inter-war period, with its characteristically low level of technological innovation and climate of social despair, pointed up the necessity for adequate social services, and suggested, to some, the desirability of a fundamental change to a collectivist society, and public ownership of the means of production.

In short, the 'Established' radicalism issues are those of the climate of pre-war pessimism; the 'New' radicalism issues are those of the climate of post-war optimism.

The cluster labelled 'Conscience' radicalism-conservatism represents issues on which intellectuals commonly take a radical stance, accompanied by rather less than a conscientious majority of the electorate. The radical view had still to make up a good deal of ground on two out of three of these issues, whilst a roughly even split remained on White Australia.

This dimension of radicalism seems to represent a concern for out-groups; the objects of it are Asians
presently outside the Australian national system, and criminals whose lives may be taken by the state. Radicalism here essentially will rely on imaginative empathy. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that opinions on this cluster of issues have a psychological basis; authoritarian personality structure and racial prejudice, as we shall see in Chapter Five, have independent negative relations with radicalism on all three issues. Social despair also has a part to play through its positive relation with prejudice.

4.4. The Prospects for the 'Established' and the 'New' Radicalism

Having briefly examined the nature of the three dimensions of political opinion suggested by the data, we may now speculate on the future prospects of the two kinds of socio-economic radicalism that have been identified. The most interesting question here is what movements in opinion are likely to take place even if the relative strength and stance of the major political parties remains more or less unchanged; that is, what relatively independent shifts in opinion may be expected in the electorate. This will lead to a consideration of the relative attractiveness of the 'Established' and the 'New' radicalism as electoral propositions. The discussion
will rely heavily on the evidence on the sociological correlates of opinions on the various issues set out in Tables 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14, set out at the end of this chapter.

The outstanding feature of the sociological relations of the 'Established' radicalism is the negative correlation with social class, the well-known tendency of the middle class to be less radical than the working class on most of these issues. The differences are significant on both issues related to government economic enterprise, where even the working class group has conservative majorities when 'Don't knows' are distributed; and also on pensions, although here the correlation arises only because the middle class, whilst radical in the majority, is less enthusiastic than the working class about pension increases. Increases in expenditure on aboriginal welfare also command general support despite the weak negative class correlation. Of all the issues in the cluster, only endowment escapes an association with social class.

None of these issues exhibits a significant over-all correlation of any kind with educational level.

Opinions on most items in the cluster correlate positively with youth, i.e. young people tend to be more radical than older people, even, rather surprisingly, on
pension increases. The question arises as to whether the differences here are ones specific to the process of ageing and its social correlates, or whether they represent a division between generations: a change in the way youth perceives these issues, which will persist even as the younger generation grows older.

The former view is better supported. There is independent evidence of a positive correlation between increasing age and middle class identification. The 'Established' radicalism, which is explicitly socialist, entails not merely adjustment, but changes of some magnitude in the socio-economic system. The opposition of older age groups may be founded in even a modest stake in the established order. The radicalism of youth is therefore likely to be dissipated by the accumulation of status and possessions. Moreover, it can be argued that as clerical and professional categories annexe a growing proportion of the work force and as the tide of economic prosperity rises, increasing middle-class identification will reinforce hostility to government enterprise, and

1 Cf. APOP data cited in A.F. Davies and S. Encel, (eds.) *Australian Society*, (Melbourne, 1965) at p. 112.

2 A comparative analysis of the census data of 1947 and 1961 is to be found in a publication of the Rural Bank of New South Wales, *Trends*, 1964, Vol. 6, No. 3.
perhaps sap the present strength of radical opinion on social services. Child endowment would be exceptional to such a trend, because of the absence of a class correlation with opinion on this issue. In this case, the high correlation of radicalism with youth may perhaps inflate support for it as time goes by.

On the whole, there is thus no likelihood of general views on this cluster of issues becoming more radical, unless more energetic and effective steps are taken by opinion-forming agencies to effect a fundamental change in the position. There is the further point that even where radical policies of this kind enjoy the support of a majority of tractable voters, as in the case of expansion of social services, they are seen to be low in importance as election issues by all political groups in the electorate (see Table 4.8). They were, incidentally, rated lower by middle-class than by working voters, and lower by youth than by age. Given the occupation trends mentioned above, and the likelihood that the educational level of the electorate will slowly rise, they will probably recede in significance. Thus while it may be argued that the parties can and should take a radical position on social services, to do so in these terms will not improve a party's electoral strength. A more dramatic presentation of the problem of poverty
as a general issue may attract some sense of urgency and enable publicists to draw on the resources of 'Conscience' radicalism. But on the whole, the prospects for radicalism on the issues of the 'Established' radicalism are not good.

The issues of the 'New' radicalism cluster are a different proposition. There are no significant class differences here; if anything, the middle-class is slightly more radical. On three of the four issues, education, planning and a capital gains tax, the sample shows a marked relationship between radicalism and youth, highly significant in the case of education, and approaching significance on planning. The absence of significant class correlations with this cluster entails an important conclusion: the radicalism of youth will not here be defeated by increasing middle-class identification. Here radicalism is of recent origin and connotes a desire for adjustment, not fundamental change. The age correlation probably has a different meaning to that observed in the case of 'Established' radicalism. What we have in this case seems to be a cleavage in the way the generations perceive the issues, where the radicalism of youth represents a change in attitudes which will persist even as age increases.

There is also a positive correlation between
radicalism and educational level on all four issues, significant in the case of planning and a capital gains tax, and approaching significance for education.

It follows from the associations we have noted that as the present younger generation grows older, and as the educational level of the electorate increases, the proportion of radicals on these issues may well rise, and in the case of education rise sharply.

The data also present evidence that those who are radical on some issues in this cluster tend to rate them more important than do those who are conservative. This trend is to be observed in the case of education, defence spending and foreign policy. A further conclusion follows from this. Not only will the proportion radical on these issues rise, but the proportion rating them important will also rise. This view is supported by the following tendencies exhibited in the data: young people rate education more important than do older people, and the more educated and the middle-class rate education and foreign policy higher in important than do the less educated and the working class.

In sum, the issues of the 'New' radicalism appeared to have the following attractions as an electoral proposition:

(i) A majority of 'tractable' voters were radical, when 'Don't knows' are distributed, on every issue in the cluster.
(ii) These majorities seemed likely to increase.

(iii) One of the issues which it comprehends, education, was rated as being of most importance by all political groups, and it and the other issues seemed likely to increase in importance in the minds of the electorate.

(iv) Those radical on education and defence spending were also willing to embrace proposals which might augment the revenue available to pay for expansion in these fields, namely a capital gains tax and economic planning.

We may thus conclude that the issues of the 'New' radicalism may come increasingly into prominence in Australian political discourse, and that both the electorate and the political parties will give it greater attention. However, as the foregoing discussion indicates, the kinds of dissatisfactions it represents are susceptible to political remedy. Better governmental performance can defeat the 'New' radicalism from time to time, but efficient performance must be sustained if it is to prevent its recrudescence.

4.5. The Prospects for 'Conscience' Radicalism

The future prospects for 'Conscience' radicalism seem moderately good, although not as promising as for the 'New' radicalism. The sample exhibits some correlation
with youth for all three issues, although the differences are weak and nowhere approaching significance. The same holds for its association with social class: the middle class sample is in every case slightly more radical than the working class, but the differences are too small for confident generalization. The overall positive correlations with education are significant only for economic aid, although the differences between extreme groups (at primary and university level) are significant for capital punishment and White Australia also.

Given the sociological trends mentioned in the preceding section, these associations taken together suggest that the radical view on White Australia will slowly gather strength, and the conservative majorities on capital punishment and economic aid to Asia will gradually be eroded.

4.6. To Conclude

A cluster analysis of responses to twelve political opinion items elicited by this survey had yielded three clusters, which seemed to represent three dimensions of radicalism-conservatism. The first related to opinions on social services and public ownership, and was labelled the 'Established' radicalism; the second to opinions on increased education and defence spending, and the introduction of a capital gains tax and economic
planning, the 'New' radicalism; and the third to opinions on increased economic aid to Asia, modification of the White Australia Policy, and the abolition of capital punishment, 'Conscience' radicalism.

Opinions within each cluster of political issues had a moderately close relationship: it was possible to predict, for example, that respondents with radical views on aid to Asia would contain a disproportionately high number in favour of the abolition of the death penalty. But links between the clusters were far more tenuous: confident predictions could seldom be made from opinions within one cluster to opinions within another.

For each group of issues, a basic predictive model has been developed, based on two assumptions: first, that the proportion of the educated and those with middle class identification will increase in the electorate, as a result of rising prosperity; and second, that the relation of each of these sociological variables with radical opinion will remain constant. The relations of the two socio-economic dimensions of radicalism with education and class identification indicate a positive prognosis for the 'New' radicalism, but a negative one for the 'Established' radicalism. Each has a positive association with youth, which, however, will probably assist only the 'New' radicalism. The sociological
relations of 'Conscience' radicalism are weak, and it seems more useful to think in terms of psychological influences and political leadership in making predictions here.

The clarification of the relations between the issues of the 'New' and 'Established' radicals, obviously the area where the conclusions based on the data of this preliminary study have been the most hazardous, would have required a replicatory survey with the following desiderata:

(i) The elimination of 'Other opinion' as a possible response.

(ii) The minimisation of 'undecided' responses through the employment of a 'pressure-to-choose', if not 'forced choice' format.

(iii) The rephrasing of a question about economic planning, with clear reference to control of non-governmental business enterprise.

(iv) The inclusion of questions on a wider range of political issues.

Whilst no replicatory survey was possible at the time, these lessons were applied in the 1966 survey, whose findings are discussed in Chapter Six to Nine. We turn now to a discussion which touches on the relation of psychological dispositions to political attitudes, and data from the 1963 survey which shed a forward light on these in the Australian urban context of the time.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES IN 'ESTABLISHED RADICALISM' CLUSTER</th>
<th>ISSUES IN 'NEW RADICALISM' CLUSTER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pensions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger:</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older:</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p &lt; .05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endowment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger:</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older:</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p &lt; .001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aborigines</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger:</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older:</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p is n.s.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commonwealth Enterprise</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger:</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older:</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p is n.s.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationalization</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger:</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older:</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p &lt; .10, n.s.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 4.12 (Cont.)

ISSUES IN 'CONSCIENCE RADICALISM' CLUSTER

Econ. Aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rad.</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Younger:</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>10=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older:</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>11=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s.)

White Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rad.</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Younger:</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older:</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s.)

Hanging

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rad.</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Younger:</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older:</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>14=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s.)
Notes to Table 4.12

(a) The statistical significance of differences related to age, education, and self-identified social class has been determined by the chi-square test. This was not performed on the tables of percentages shown, but on two by two frequency tables from which the categories 'Don't know' and 'Other opinion' were in every case excluded. The result of each test on the frequency tables has been entered beneath the percentage tables as a guide to the magnitude of the differences shown; the probability values are for random samples.

(b) Subjects responding 'Other opinion' and those with no recorded response on any particular issue have been excluded from the sample for that issue. (These are in no case more than 8 per cent of the total in Tables 4.12 to 4.15.) The composition of the samples is thus not identical.

(c) Here, as in the following tables on class, education, and Party affiliation, cases with data missing on the background variable for each table have been removed from that table.

(d) As in Tables 4.13 and 4.14, the sample has been split as nearly as possible to the median of the background variable. Here, 'older' means 46 or more; 'younger', less than 46.

(e) Absolute numbers in the samples: less than 46, 197-214; 46 or more, 187-196.
TABLE 4.13
Political Opinions by Self-identified Social Class (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Pensions</th>
<th>Defence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working:</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .001)

Endowment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Rad.</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working:</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s.)

Aborigines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Rad.</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working:</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .10, n.s.)

Commonwealth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Rad.</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working:</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .01)

Enterprise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Rad.</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>17=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working:</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .05)

Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Rad.</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working:</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s.)

Planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Rad.</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working:</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s.)

Capital Tax

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Rad.</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working:</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s.)
### TABLE 4.13 (Cont.)

**ISSUES IN 'CONSCIENCE RADICALISM' CLUSTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Econ. Aid</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rad.</td>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>D.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle:</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>11=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working:</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>9=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[(p \text{ is n.s.})\]

**White Australia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Econ. Aid</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rad.</td>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>D.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle:</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working:</strong></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>7=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[(p \text{ is n.s.})\]

**Hanging**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Econ. Aid</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rad.</td>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>D.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle:</strong></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>12=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working:</strong></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>13=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[(p \text{ is n.s.})\]

(a) See notes to Table 4.12.

(b) Absolute numbers in the samples: middle class, 168-180; working class, 192-202.
### TABLE 4.14

Political Opinions by Education (a) (b) (c)

**ISSUES IN 'ESTABLISHED RADICALISM' CLUSTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Pensions</th>
<th>Defence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower:</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s.)

**ISSUES IN 'NEW RADICALISM' CLUSTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower:</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower:</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower:</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower:</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s.)
TABLE 4.13 (Cont.)

ISSUES IN 'CONSCIENCE RADICALISM' CLUSTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Econ. Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower:</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .02)

White Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rad.</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower:</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s.)

Hanging

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rad.</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower:</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s.)

(a) See notes to Table 4.12.
(b) Here 'Higher' means Intermediate Certificate (taken at about age 15); 'Lower', any lesser qualification.
(c) Absolute numbers in the samples: Intermediate or higher, 207-225; less than Intermediate, 188-203.
### TABLE 4.15

**Political Opinions by Party Affiliation (a) (b) (c) (d)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ISSUES IN 'ESTABLISHED RADICALISM' CLUSTER</th>
<th>ISSUES IN 'NEW RADICALISM' CLUSTER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pensions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rad.</td>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>D.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP:</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP:</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP:</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractable:</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endowment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rad.</td>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>D.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP:</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP:</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP:</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractable:</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aborigines</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rad.</td>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>D.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP:</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP:</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP:</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractable:</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commonwealth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rad.</td>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>D.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP:</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP:</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP:</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractable:</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationalization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rad.</td>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>D.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP:</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP:</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP:</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractable:</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .001)  
(p is n.s.)  
(p < .001)  
(p < .001)  
(p < .01)  
(p < .05)  
(p < .001)  
(p < .001)  
(p < .05)  
(p < .001)
TABLE 4.15 (Cont.)

ISSUES IN 'CONSCIENCE RADICALISM' CLUSTER

Econ. Aid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rad.</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LCP:</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>14=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP:</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP:</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractable:</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>13=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s.)

White Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rad.</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LCP:</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>11=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP:</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>5=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP:</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractable:</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s.)

Hanging

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rad.</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LCP:</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>12=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP:</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP:</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10=100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractable:</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>16=100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .02)

(a) Voters classified 'LCP', 'ALP' and 'DLP' are those who 'always' vote for those parties.

(b) Voters with 'Other opinion' are excluded.

(c) The probabilities below each cross-tabulation relate to the significance of the difference between LCP and ALP voters only.

(d) Absolute numbers in the samples: always LCP, 105-112; always ALP, 123-131; always DLP, 27-30; tractable, 114-124.
CHAPTER FIVE

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATION OF DISPOSITIONS TO POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN 1963

5.1. Purpose and Method

The purpose of this investigation was to test the hypothesis that some psychological factors, such as authoritarian personality orientation, may be important in influencing political attitudes and decision-making. This suggestion obviously could not apply equally to all kinds of political decisions. In the case of domestic economic policy, for example, the movements of the political actors may be chiefly related to the kinds of class or group pressures to which they are subject; there may be no need at all to refer to the peculiarities of individual functioning in explaining the political process. However, special studies of the attitudes of groups and individuals may have particular point in explaining decisions on issues of foreign policy, and such domestic matters as capital punishment or migrant assimilation, because attitudes on these questions cannot readily be related to clearly defined interests. In these areas, an approach that seeks to interpret political events in
terms of antecedent social and economic conditions, or institutional conflicts, cannot be expected to provide the answers.

This argument is in part accessible to empirical verification. If it can be shown that voters' attitudes on these kinds of issues are liable to be influenced by psychological factors, then it becomes plausible to maintain that dispositions among politicians are also likely to be affected by them, either directly or through sensitivity to the climate of opinion in the electorate.

This chapter reports the results of the administration of three short dispositional scales, intended to measure authoritarian orientation, alienation, and ethnocentrism, to the sample of 437 Melbourne voters whose political attitudes have been described in Chapter Four. The administration of the scales took place in the same interview in which the political and 'background' questions were asked.

The brevity of the scales used necessitates caution in the interpretation of the findings reported here. But at this stage, it seemed desirable to make a preliminary investigation before returning, as it were, with the longer and more valid instruments whose construction is described in Chapter Six. The marvellous confusion of previous
research will now be briefly reviewed.

5.2. Authoritarian Orientation and Alienation: Some Previous Research

The concept of the authoritarian personality was evolved by a group of American and German psychologists and sociologists on the basis of empirical research amongst samples of highly prejudiced subjects in the U.S. after the last war.¹ Their research was related to earlier work by Fromm,² and parallel findings by Dicks in a sample of German prisoners of war were simultaneously reported in 1950.³ The term 'authoritarian' is here used in a technical sense. It relates to a personality pattern, or syndrome, widely diffused in Western societies, which combines a number of interrelated characteristics commonly regarded as unpleasant by liberal intellectuals: the authoritarian type is aggressive, inflexible, submissive to in-group authorities and generally punitive. These personality characteristics have been shown to be systematically related to each other and frequently to have their roots in emotional relationships experienced

³ H. Dicks, 'Personality Traits and National Socialist Ideology,' Human Relations, 3 (1950) pp. 111-54.
in infancy, as well as in later institutional or class conditioning. The psychodynamic basis of the syndrome is hypothesized to lie in conflicts between strong, thrusting instinctual impulses towards aggression and destructiveness, and a rigid set of moral norms perceived as binding by the authoritarian personality but as external to the self. The conflicts are controlled by the relatively weak 'ego' only by resort to a number of unconscious defence mechanisms, notably 'projectivity' (the tendency to impute one's own repressed desires to others), 'anti-intraception' (rejection of the subjective, the imaginative and the tender-minded) and stereotypical thinking. These in turn facilitate the more conscious defence 'stratagem' of ethnocentrism, which may be loosely described as hostility to, or intolerance of, out-groups, combined with exaggerated glorification of the in-group.¹ The syndrome is dubbed 'authoritarian' because it predisposes the individual to recruitment to an authoritarian movement of the Right; but as Shils and

¹ A more precise definition and discussion of 'ethnocentrism' is to be found in Chapter Six. The discussion of 'alienation' in this chapter is also necessarily somewhat cursory, and the nature of this disposition, conceived as social estrangement, is also discussed in more detail in that chapter, as well as Chapter Seven.
others have pointed out,¹ similar psychological characteristics are concentrated also on the extreme Left.

Numerous dispositional scale surveys have lent support to the findings of the original researchers that authoritarian personality characteristics are linked with hostility to minority groups.² However, much empirical work done with the standard device for measuring authoritarian orientation, the California F scale,³ has been shown to be of dubious value because of an important methodological weakness in scale construction. The F scale is all-positive in form, that is, every 'item', or statement, with which the interviewee is asked to agree or disagree is phrased in such a way that the 'authoritarian' response is in every case agreement. It is therefore possible to score highly merely by virtue of having a generalized tendency to agree with questionnaire items. The importance of this

deficiency was clarified in a study by Chapman and Bock,¹ who analysed eight studies which had employed both positive and 'reversed' F scales (ones where disagreement with the items registered authoritarianism) and concluded that, on the positive scale, for college populations in the U.S., 'content variance' (reflecting authoritarianism) probably accounts for only 30 to 40 per cent of the total variance, the remaining reliable variance (the upper and lower limits of which were fixed at 70 and 85 per cent) being divided between agreement tendency and the interaction between agreement tendency and content variance, in proportions which varied markedly from sample to sample. In short, agreement tendency was, apparently, often nearly as important as authoritarian orientation in determining scale scores.²

It follows that where researchers have reported significant correlations between two all-positive scales, purporting to measure, for example, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, these may be interpreted in some cases as meaning simply that two imperfect measures of agreement are quantitatively similar.


² This brief discussion of the problem of infection of scores by acquiescence is also intended as a mis-en-scène. The controversy surrounding the subject is considered in extenso in Chapter Six.
tendency will correlate with each other, which is not very remarkable.

The present study attempts to avoid this difficulty by using 'balanced' scales, i.e. ones where half the items are positive, and the other half reversed. On this type of scale, respondents with very high agreement or disagreement tendency will have their scores driven towards the arithmetic mean, but this kind of contamination of the variance should not seriously distort correlations between the scales.

There has been remarkably little research on the relation between authoritarian orientation and political opinion. Eysenck\(^1\) has provided some evidence on its relationship to opinion on capital punishment and harshly punitive treatment of sex offenders, as did the original American researchers; but his T measure is of dubious validity. Lipset\(^2\) has suggested that the apparent tendency of working-class-samples to score higher than middle-class samples on measures of authoritarianism should lead us to shift our gaze from the lower middle-class when on the look-out for threats to the democratic order or libertarian


values. Sanford\(^1\) has reported a finding that in a large (n=963) Philadelphia adult sample, high F scale scorers were disproportionately reluctant to engage in political activity. In the United States, authoritarianism has been found not to be related to Party choice by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes.\(^2\)

A brief review of the generally thin and inconclusive findings of the research into the relations between authoritarianism and political attitudes has been provided by Kirscht and Dillehay.\(^3\) Their book provides a comprehensive, although not very critical review of the more general literature on authoritarianism.

The only reported work with an F measure in Australia (apart from this one) has been a survey of a sample of schoolchildren conducted by Knopfelmacher and Armstrong.\(^4\) They found that correlations between F and ethnocentrism scales were not invariant with respect to religious

---

denomination. Significant correlations were obtained between F and E scales in Protestant and Jewish schools, but the correlation dropped below the level required for statistical significance in a Catholic school. This finding is not of great importance, since the Catholic sample was quite small (n=47), the correlation was in the expected direction although non-significant, and the difference between the correlation in the Catholic sample and the averaged correlation for the other groups was not itself statistically significant. On the other hand, the results obtained with a rather different measure of attitudes to out-groups, the Bogardus scale, which measures 'social distance' from out-groups but not necessarily hostility to them, indicated that the Catholic sample different significantly from the other groups in that the usual correlation between the F and the Bogardus scales was in the Catholic case uniquely reversed. Thus it seems that institutional influences may in certain circumstances act as a solvent of the usually reliable connection between authoritarianism and prejudice.

However, the study had two methodological flaws. Firstly, the F and E scales employed were all-positive, and therefore contaminated by agreement tendency to an unknown extent; secondly, the Bogardus measure did not
refer exclusively to groups distinctly alien to all the sub-samples, but included British and Italians. It is therefore difficult to say how far scores on the Bogardus scale reflected rejection of out-groups. The data of this survey are accordingly ambiguous.

A chain of research initiated by Srole\(^1\) had also suggested a need for caution in predicting from F scale scores to ethnocentrism. In a large (n=401) adult sample in Springfield, Massachusetts, a significant first-order correlation between an F scale and a measure of ethnocentrism was substantially reduced when 'anomia' was held constant. This last term was used to refer to a breakdown in the individual's sense of attachment to society, expressed as a feeling of meaninglessness, social isolation, and powerlessness to achieve life goals, a conception approximating to some meanings of 'alienation'. Since the correlation between his anomia scale and ethnocentrism was not much affected when authoritarianism was in turn held constant, Srole concluded that F scale scores do not stand in close relation to ethnocentrism independently of the anomia factor. This suggested that the magnitude of the correlations between F and E measures found in previous

research might be accounted for in large part by their common variance with alienation. Srole's work was naturally regarded as menacing to the view that rejection of minority groups was mainly a function of personality structure, which had until then appeared well supported by the empirical evidence. The position was indeed even more confused than it appeared. Srole's F and anomia scales were very short (five items in each) and all-positive. The measure of ethnocentrism was a mixture of scores on an all-positive 5-item scale and 'spontaneous comments' elicited by projective-type pictorial stimuli, and therefore subject to some contamination from agreement tendency. The meaning of the pattern of intercorrelations between these three scales is quite obscure. It may be that Srole's study merely showed that the correlation between two oblique indices of agreement tendency will be reduced if a third index of agreement tendency is held constant, a finding difficult to interpret and perhaps scarcely worth the trouble.

The Springfield survey provoked replications by Roberts and Rokeach,¹ and McDill,² all achieving distinction

by their use of short, all-positive scales for the three variables. Both found their F and anomia measures to be related, and reported moderate and statistically significant residual correlations between the F and anomia measures and ethnocentrism, when anomia and F were respectively held constant. Both also drew highly precarious conclusions as to the relative importance of authoritarian orientation and anomia as determinants of ethnocentrism. Like Srole, they found an independent negative relationship between their measures of anomia and social status.

McDill went so far as to perform a factor analysis of responses to all fifteen positive items in his three scales, together with four other positive F scale items and one reversed item. Not surprisingly, his analysis extracted a common factor, which was almost certainly agreement tendency or something inextricably confounded with it. This he labelled 'a Weltanschauung which is negative in nature', representing 'a dim world view'. 'Negative Weltanschauung' might appear to be a rather inflated term to use for a generalized tendency to agree with questionnaire items.

A study by Dean claimed correlations between measures

---

of powerlessness to achieve life-goals, normlessness (defined as disintegration and conflict in moral values), and social isolation. He combined the three scales to form an alienation measure, and found a weak but significant negative relation between it and occupational status, and a weak positive relation with advancing age. The sample consisted of 384 adults in Columbus, Ohio.

The nature of all twenty-four items in Dean's scale is not reported, but of the six given in illustration five are positive. There is therefore no assurance that this study avoided the methodological weakness of those described above.

Empirical research on alienation, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, before the date of the Australian survey reported in this chapter, thus presented a somewhat occluded picture. Many of the correlations obtained between the various scales may well have been the result of common variance with agreement tendency. Moreover, the higher authoritarianism and alienation scores reported for working-class and elderly respondents might be accounted for in the same way. The social geography of agreement tendency has yet to be mapped with clarity.

An urgent need for the construction of paired-alternative or balanced scales was evident. So, too, was the necessity
for specifying more exactly the meaning of whatever concept of alienation was embodied in a particular scale.

Empirical research and conceptual discussion in the U.S. after the present Australian survey have resulted in some advances in method and in substantive findings. In 1963, Neal and Rettig,¹ using a large (n=603) urban sample, constructed a paired-alternative measure of 'powerlessness' and a balanced measure of 'normlessness', each of twelve items. A factor analysis using varimax rotations suggested that scores on the two scales together were governed by a unitary construct, within which four empirical divisions were discernible: the political and economic domains of powerlessness and normlessness emerged as separable components. 'Normlessness' was here understood as a judgement, by the respondent, that immorality and fraud were rife. The content of the items was strictly confined to the polity and the macro-society, and did not enter the field of personal relations.

No significant relationship was found between any of these components and Srole's measure of anomia nor with a 'status-mobility' scale (which registered a penchant for unscrupulous social climbing).

In 1965 McClosky and Schaar\textsuperscript{1} presented a 9-item 'anomy' scale of satisfactory reliability, together with data on correlations with personality characteristics for a large but unrepresentative sample. Unhappily, the scale is all-positive, the items somewhat vague in meaning, and the personality tests not adequately described.

This research has been sharply attacked by Srole,\textsuperscript{2} mainly on the grounds of sampling and interviewing deficiencies. He adverts briefly to the problem of infection of scores by response-set, but proposes no solution other than careful interviewing. Obviously many unsatisfactory measures are still in use, and the correlates of 'alienation' are not known with any certainty. A \textit{sine qua non} for

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\end{thebibliography}
useful research is the construction of scales on which scores are less likely to be affected by agreement tendency. The employment of balanced scales in the present exploratory study in an Australian urban sample (hopefully) avoids the methodological traps into which so many researchers have plunged headlong. However, whilst balanced scales offer distinct advantages over all-positive measures, they are not necessarily free of response-set contamination. The requirements for balancing out agreement tendency may not hold. The development of scales using only paired-alternative items is an attractive means of eliminating these difficulties. The short scales employed in this chapter can only be presented with some diffidence. Their utility lies only within the scope of a preliminary investigation.

5.3. Hypotheses for the Present Study

The erratic career of empirical research in this field suggests many points of interest; but its uncertainties indicate that, for this initial investigation, the data should be tested against only conservative suppositions. Each is stated in a null form; the data of the Melbourne survey were used to test and possibly reject formal hypotheses of no relation:
1. That an F measure will not correlate with a measure of socio-economic status.
2. That an F measure will not correlate with age.
3. That an alienation measure will not correlate with a measure of socio-economic status.
4. That an alienation measure will not correlate with age.
5. That an F scale and an A (alienation) scale will not correlate with each other.
6. That an F scale will not correlate with an E (ethnocentrism) scale independently of A.
7. That an A scale will not correlate with an E scale independently of F.
8. That the degree of association between F and E measures in a Catholic church-going sample will not differ from that in other religious or non-religious groups.
9. That F is unrelated to political activity and interest.
10. That A is unrelated to political activity and interest.
11. That neither F, A, nor E measures will show any relation to opinions on political issues.

Having set up this tabula rasa, we may proceed to a description of the measures used in this survey.
5.4. The Authoritarian Orientation Scale

This scale was constructed as follows. Six items were abstracted from the original all-positive 29-item F scale. The criteria for selection were that they should be amongst the top fifteen in discriminatory power, i.e. in the magnitude of their correlation with scores on the scale as a whole; that they should appear to be amongst those least specific to right-wing authoritarianism; and that they should not refer to sex offences, in order to maintain untroubled rapport with interviewees. Three of these six items were then 'reversed'. In phrasing the reversals, an attempt was made to capture the psychological as well as the semantic negation of the original items. The six items were then administered to the sample, and the pattern of responses was examined in order to determine whether any should be excluded from the scale.

An attitude scale of this type is normally required to be internally consistent, as a sign that responses are related to a unitary underlying continuum. The usual criterion for this is that responses to each item should correlate significantly with scores on the scale as a whole. A more stringent requirement is that each item's average correlation with all other items should be statistically significant. The latter criterion was initially adopted in this case.
Tetrachoric correlation coefficients, corrected for 'unevenness of split' by Jenkins' method, were computed for the relation of each item with every other. The average correlation of these for each item was then calculated. The items, with their average correlation with the others, are shown in Table 5.1 in descending order of discriminatory power.

**TABLE 5.1**

**A Short Authoritarianism Scale (a)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Average correlation with other items</th>
<th>Range of correlations with other items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>What the youth needs is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.11* - .30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>An insult to our honour should always be punished.</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.02 - .37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong.</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.03 - .37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reversed</td>
<td>Obedience and respect for authority are not the most important things to teach children.</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>-.05 - .31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reversed</td>
<td>If it weren't for the rebellious ideas of youth there would be less progress in the world.</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.02 - .19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reversed</td>
<td>If people spent more time talking about ideas just for the fun of it, everybody would be better off.</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.05 - .23**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) For a sample of 400, the 1 per cent level of significance is reached at .13; the 5 per cent level at .10. The former is indicated by two asterisks; the latter by one.
It can be seen that the three positive items and one reversal have significant average intercorrelations with all others, whilst the remaining two reversals fall just short of significance at the 5 per cent level. The difficulty of retaining some psychological meaning in reversing items is well in evidence. However, the last two items were retained in the scale, in view of the desirability of balancing out agreement tendency. The average inter-item correlation in the scale is significant at .15, and higher than that reported for the original F scale on a final test sample.\(^1\) Of the 15 inter-item correlations, 10 are significant. However, this 6-item scale is clearly a weak instrument, with a very modest degree of internal consistency.

5.5. The Alienation Scale

The alienation scales reported in the literature (notably those used by Srole and McDill) were regarded as unsatisfactory, partly because their internal consistency must have been inflated by agreement tendency, partly because their items are sometimes specific to the American social context and idiom, and partly because the wording of the items seems in many cases unnecessarily oblique. However, the attitudes to which the items were intended

\(^{1}\) T.W. Adorno \textit{et al.}, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 261-2.
to refer appear to be coherently related to the literature on alienation and thus to offer a useful starting point for the construction of a scale suited to the Australian milieu. The items of Srole's anomia scale, for example, were intended to tap the following subjective feelings of the respondent:

1. That the social order is fickle and unpredictable, and that one is powerless to achieve one's goals.
2. That society is regressing from goals already attained.
3. That public officials are indifferent to the individual's needs and aspirations.
4. That one is no longer oriented to a set of coherent values, that life is meaningless.
5. That immediate personal relations are no longer predictable or supportive.

These can be reduced to the categories of powerlessness, normlessness and social isolation, which correspond to the sub-scales of Dean's measure. Like Dean, Srole is prepared to admit malfunction at the level of microcosmic social relations, in small groups or voluntary associations, to his conception of estrangement from society. On the other hand, Seeman, in an influential review of the meanings given to the term 'alienation', identified

\[1\]
five logically independent connotations (powerlessness, normlessness, meaninglessness, isolation and self-estrangement), and suggested that a more satisfactory usage would be to confine all of these to the individual's relations with the macro-society. This does not seem to be a tenable position if alienation is viewed as the subjective experience of a social malfunction, since this may well be impacted upon many individuals only at the level of their micro-relations. Accordingly, an attempt was made, in constructing items for this study, to capture dissatisfactions at the personal level as well as grouches against society as a whole. The items, with their average correlations with the others, are given in Table 5.2.
### TABLE 5.2
A Short Alienation Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Average correlation with other items</th>
<th>Range of correlations with other items</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Life seems to be rather meaningless.</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.55**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Life today is a difficult and dangerous business, and it's a matter of chance who gets on top.</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.48**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>One can't hope to become the sort of person one would like to be.</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.55**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reversed</td>
<td>In our society, if you work hard you can usually get ahead.</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reversed</td>
<td>Most people can be trusted.</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reversed</td>
<td>Most members of parliament and city councillors are sympathetic people and do a good job.</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.32**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All these items thus 'work' well. The first and second were intended to capture normlessness (here meaning the absence of reliable norms for the comprehension of governance of social behaviour); the second, fourth and sixth, powerlessness; the third, self-estrangement; the fifth, social isolation. The average inter-item correlation is .26. Of the 15 inter-item correlations 12 are significant. This scale is clearly a stronger
measure than the F scale described above.

5.6. The Ethnocentrism Scale

This was intended to measure hostility or intolerance towards minority groups and out-groups. Since the scale was not intended to trap precisely prejudice (that is, prejudgements of minorities involving derogatory and incorrigible mistakes), the items did not need to have a delusional content. The target-groups selected were Jews, Italians and Japanese. The two items reflecting attitudes to Jewish people were abstracted from Eysenck's anti-Semitism scale, \(^1\) on which they were heavily loaded with the common factor. The others were constructed ad hoc.

The two items referring to Jewish people may be regarded as criterion items, since their validity has been previously established. All the other items have a significant average correlation with these.

The average inter-item correlation for the scale is .29. The three highest inter-item correlations reflect the close relations of the pairs relating to each target group. The scale is thus somewhat heterogeneous. However, if each pair is treated as a separate index of hostility, the three indices all relate significantly to each other. Of the 15 inter-item correlations, 12 are significant.

\(^{1}\) H.J. Eysenck, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-95.
### TABLE 5.3

**A Short Ethnocentrism Scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Average correlation with other items</th>
<th>Range of correlations with other items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reversed</td>
<td>Jews are as valuable, honest and public-spirited citizens as any other group.</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.17** - .72**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reversed</td>
<td>Visits to Australia by Japanese politicians and businessmen should be welcomed.</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.04 - .84**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>The Jews have too much power and influence in this country.</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.09 - .72**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Australians should not be too keen on friendship with Japanese after the lessons of the last war.</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>-.09 - .84**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Italian migrants have not added much of value to the Australian way of life.</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.17** - .60**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reversed</td>
<td>The Italian communities which have settled in the inner suburbs have made them brighter and more pleasant places to live in.</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>-.09 - .60**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All three scales were scored so that 'authoritarian', 'alienated' or 'ethnocentric' responses earned the respondent +2, 'undecided' +1, and 'anti-authoritarian', 'non-alienated' and 'non-ethnocentric' responses 0. Scores on all three could thus vary from 0 to 12. All three
distributions were dichotomized at the median, and respondents classified as 'high' or 'low' on each variable. Relations between them were obtained by computing corrected tetrachoric coefficients from four-cell frequency tables.

5.7. Results

The tetrachoric correlation coefficient is denoted by \( r_t \). \( P \) will stand for authoritarian orientation, A for alienation, and E for ethnocentrism.

The following relationships obtained in the sample between \( P \) and socio-economic status, and \( F \) and age:

\[
\begin{align*}
rt \ F \ SES &= -.27**) \text{ (hypotheses 1 and 2)} \\
rt \ F \ Age &= .24**)
\end{align*}
\]

The first two null hypotheses can be rejected at a high level of confidence. The older group is significantly more authoritarian than the younger; and those with lower social status are more authoritarian than the higher status group.

---

1 The index of socio-economic status was a compound of the occupational status of the head of the respondent's household, using the ratings obtained by Congalton; the respondent's level of education; and the judged status of his residential area. These elements were given an arbitrary loading of 3, 2 and 1. (Cf. A. Congalton, Occupational Status in Australia (mimeographed), University of N.S.W., Kensington, 1963).
The following relations obtained for alienation:

\[ r_t \text{ A SES} = -0.37^{**} \]
\[ r_t \text{ A Age} = 0.18^{**} \] (hypotheses 3 and 4)

The third and fourth hypotheses are thus rejected, and the finding is in accordance with the results obtained by Srole, Roberts and Rokeach, McDill and Dean: the lower status group contains a substantially greater number of alienated respondents than the higher status group. The tendency for the older group to be more alienated is in keeping with Dean's results.

No correlation at all was obtained between the F and A scale scores:

\[ r_t \text{ F A} = 0.00 \] (hypothesis 5)

There is thus no ground for rejecting the fifth null hypothesis. This finding does not establish that no relation between the variables exists; it may be that more sensitive instruments will disclose one. But these data suggest that this is unlikely. The correlations between F and A measures in the United States samples may reflect different social conditions or, as noted above, they may simply be an artifact of the method of measurement.

Since there is no covariance between F and A in this sample, the relation of each with E can be displayed by the simple correlation.
Both the A and F measures are independently related to ethnocentrism:

\[ r_{t} F E = .13^{**} \] (hypotheses 6 and 7)
\[ r_{t} A E = .34^{**} \]

Both correlations are significant beyond the 1 percent level, and hence the null hypotheses 6 and 7 must be rejected. The difference in the size of the two correlations may reflect only the higher internal consistency of the A scale as compared to the F scale.

The sample was divided into Catholic churchgoers, Protestant churchgoers, and non-churchgoers, the last group not having attended a place of worship during the previous month. The relation between F and E is significant only in the non-church sub-sample, and the correlations are depressed in the churchgoing groups:

\[ r_{t} F E (\text{in Catholic sample}) = -.01 (n=94) \] (hypothesis 8)
\[ r_{t} F E (\text{in Protestant sample}) = .12 (n=76) \]
\[ r_{t} F E (\text{in non-church sample}) = .25* (n=230) \]

These data give some grounds for rejecting hypothesis 8, and appear to support the findings of Knopfelmacher and Armstrong that the usual F E correlation is dissolved in the Catholic sample. However, the fact that the E scale employed here includes items on Italians, who may not be perceived as an out-group by Catholics, who share their religious affiliations, suggests the need for a check on this interpretation.
If the Knopfelmacher-Armstrong interpretation is correct, then a correlation between F and anti-Semitic attitudes should break down also in the Catholic sub-sample. The two E scale items referring to Jews were accordingly used to discriminate those high and low on anti-Semitism, and the correlation with F was computed for the three groups:

\[
\begin{align*}
    r_t F & \text{ AS (in Catholic sample) } = .17 \quad (n=94) \\
    r_t F & \text{ AS (in Protestant sample) } = .02 \quad (n=77) \\
    r_t F & \text{ AS (in non-church sample) } = .24^* \quad (n=233)
\end{align*}
\]

Here the correlation between F and anti-Semitism in the Catholic group is not significant, but not much lower than the significant correlation in the much larger non-church group. The correlation in the Protestant sample, however, sinks to nearly zero. These two sets of data seem to offer some grounds for supposing the F E correlation to be lower amongst Protestant churchgoers than the large non-church group, but give only slight support to the hypothesis that the correlation breaks down in the Catholic group. The position thus remains unclear.

Neither the F nor the A measure shows any relation with political interest or activity: 'opinion leaders' and those expressing 'a lot of interest' in politics were just as numerous amongst those 'high' on authoritarianism and alienation as amongst those 'low'. There is thus no reason to reject the null hypotheses 9 and 10.
Sanford's comfortable conclusions in Philadelphia find no parallel here: the Australian political scene seems to accommodate both the authoritarian and the alienated and must reckon with them as participants in discussion.

We may now examine the relationships between the three 'psychological' variables - authoritarianism, alienation and ethnocentrism - and political opinions. A cluster analysis\(^1\) of responses to twelve political opinion items elicited by this survey had yielded three clusters, which seemed to represent three dimensions of radicalism-conservatism. The first related to opinions on social services and public ownership, and was labelled the 'Established Radicalism-Conservatism'; the second to opinions on increased education and defence spending, and the introduction of a capital gains tax and economic planning, the 'New Radicalism-Conservatism'; and the third to opinions on increased economic aid to Asia, modification of the White Australia Policy, and the abolition of capital punishment, 'Conscience Radicalism-Conservatism'.

Opinions within each cluster of political issues had a moderately close relationship: it was possible to

---

\(^1\) Using the method proposed by B. Fruchter, *Introduction to Factor Analysis*, (Princeton, 1954) at pp. 12-17, and described in Chapter Four.
predict, for example, that respondents with radical views on aid to Asia would contain a disproportionately high number in favour of the abolition of the death penalty. But links between the clusters were far more tenuous: confident predictions could not be made from opinions within one cluster to opinions within another.

The issues in each cluster were treated as scale items and scale scores on the three continua of radicalism-conservatism were computed for all respondents. The following table exhibits the relation of these scores to those on the F,A, and E scales:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$r_t$ F with Established Radicalism</td>
<td>$-0.09$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_t$ F with New Radicalism</td>
<td>$-0.06$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_t$ F with Conscience Radicalism</td>
<td>$-0.28^{**}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_t$ A with Established Radicalism</td>
<td>$+0.08$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_t$ A with New Radicalism</td>
<td>$-0.08$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_t$ A with Conscience Radicalism</td>
<td>$-0.06$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_t$ E with Established Radicalism</td>
<td>$+0.10^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_t$ E with New Radicalism</td>
<td>$-0.07$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_t$ E with Conscience Radicalism</td>
<td>$-0.36^{**}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of these relationships are slight or negligible, with two outstanding exceptions: the highly significant negative relationships between both authoritarianism and ethnocentrism and 'Conscience Radicalism'. It would seem therefore that these psychological factors do exercise an influence on political opinion in precisely the area suggested in our initial discussion.

The finding warrants more detailed examination. The
table below indicates that the correlations between the F and E scales hold for each of the three items in the 'Conscience' cluster:

\[
\begin{align*}
rt \ F \text{ with radicalism on economic aid} &= -.15^{**} \\
rt \ F \text{ with radicalism on White Australia} &= -.23^{**} \\
rt \ F \text{ with radicalism on hanging} &= -.22^{**} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(hypothesis

\[
\begin{align*}
rt \ E \text{ with radicalism on economic aid} &= -.34^{**} \\
rt \ E \text{ with radicalism on White Australia} &= -.25^{**} \\
rt \ E \text{ with radicalism on hanging} &= -.16^{**} \\
\end{align*}
\]

All these correlations are significant beyond the 1 per cent level. Moreover, the relation of the F and E scores to opinions on each issue seem to be independent, since the magnitude of the correlations between F and each issue is negligibly affected when covariation with E is constricted by limiting the sample to the lower half of the E distribution; and the same holds for the correlations with E when the F covariation is constricted.

One further point may be considered. It might be objected that, since both F and E are negatively related to education, their apparent influence on opinions on these issues may simply reflect the actual political influence of education.

This interpretation can be shown to be untenable.

Table 5.4 shows the combined effect of high F and E:
TABLE 5.4

Authoritarianism, Ethnocentrism and Conscience Radicalism (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High on Conscience Radicalism</th>
<th>Low on Conscience Radicalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents high on both F and E: 24</td>
<td>76 = 100 (n=102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents low on both F and E: 58</td>
<td>42 = 100 (n=112)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The probability of obtaining by chance alone the frequencies on which these percentages are based is less than 1 per cent.

Now if the above objection were correct, these relationships should dissolve when education is held constant. This can be done by fractionating the data and examining the frequencies for each of four educational levels separately. The operation revealed that the frequencies deviate significantly from proportionality on three out of the four tables on a one-tailed test, and closely approach significance on the fourth, despite the very small size of the samples.¹

¹ In this exercise, only two categories of respondents were examined: those high on both F and E and those low on both F and E. These respondents were divided by educational level into four groups, and the numbers high and low on Conscience Radicalism were displayed. There were thus four tables of four cells. The chi-square test was applied, with the following results:

- Up to 6 years' education: $\chi^2=5.91 \ p<.01 \ (n=51)$
- 7-9 years' education: $\chi^2=2.27 \ p<.10 \ (n=45)$
- 10 years' education: $\chi^2=7.50 \ p<.01 \ (n=49)$
- 11 or more years' education: $\chi^2=3.67 \ p<.05 \ (n=77)$

(All probability values are for the one-tailed directional hypothesis.)
The correlations shown above therefore reflect the independent influence of the attitudinal variables, and not educational level.

It is suggested that this finding is of particular importance since opinions on issues in this cluster exhibit no first-order relationships with age, social class, or education, with one exception: radicalism on economic aid has a first-order relation to educational level. Sorting by standard sociological criteria thus does not effectively discriminate those 'radical' and 'conservative' on the 'Conscience' issues; sorting by psychological criteria, on the other hand, does so quite efficiently. It follows that it is much more useful to work within a psychological frame of reference in this area of political opinion.

We may conclude that the last hypothesis of no relation can be confidently rejected.

5.8. An Interpretative Model

The correlations spelt out above, taken together with what is known about the causal mechanisms involved, suggest the following general hypothesis:
(i) The social condition of the aged and those of lower status generate both authoritarian orientation and alienation, but as discrete phenomena.

Why the old and the poor show more alienation than the young and the rich may not be a question which deserves elaborate discussion. But why are the poor more authoritarian? The following hypothesis is suggested, and will be further discussed in Chapter Seven. It may be considered an alternative to the more conventional explanation based on punitive child-rearing patterns.

The lower reaches of our society do not provide a secure environment. In the working class, skills for the mastery of social and work relations are not effectively taught, and the individual must cling to simple rules of

\[1\] However, a discussion of this question is to be found in Chapter Seven, where the mechanisms described in this section are extensively considered.
conduct to ensure a minimum of personal security. Frustration of all kinds is nevertheless commonly encountered at home, at school, and in a subordinate occupation. The consequent aggressiveness is directed partly at rule-breakers, rebels who challenge the prescriptions which constitute the few certainties, where certainties are scarce.

The old are likewise in a precarious position; but how deep their authoritarianism may run is questionable. Three items in the F scale used here refer to the need for control of young people. Older respondents may thus score high for superficial reasons.

The lack of relation between authoritarianism and alienation is surprising. One would have expected these dispositions to go together; but it seems that the tenacious pessimism of the second does not sympathetically combine with the rigidity and punitiveness of the first.

(ii) Both authoritarianism and alienation promote ethnocentrism.

The process connecting alienation with an outcome in ethnocentrism has yet to be made clear.

Two speculations can be offered. The first is that ethnocentrism represents a generalization of some sentiments of alienation. Pessimism and distrust of society and of immediate personal relations may be gratuitously extended to out-groups and minorities, about whom, after all, less
is known, and little to be hoped for.

The second is that ethnocentrism represents a reaction formation to alienation. The rejection of one's actual in-group, which is implied in confessing alienation, is negated by a spurious identification with a fictitious in-group, whose virtues mark it off from lesser breeds. Ethnocentrism may thus act as an imaginative device for buoying oneself up, and expanding one's identity in a difficult social environment.

(iii) Authoritarian orientation and ethnocentrism both contribute directly to conservatism on 'Conscience' issues.

All three of these political issues involve attitudes to out-groups (Asians and criminals), so the relation can easily be understood.

(iv) Alienation is not here directly related to conservatism on 'Conscience' issues.

These data suggest that it exerts an influence on political attitudes only in so far as it promotes ethnocentrism.

Social frustration does not in itself represent generalized hostility: rather, hostility is an outcome of alienation in certain persons. Alienation may give rise to a perverse development in one's attitudes to other
people, but it need not be intrinsically destructive.

5.9. To Conclude

The initial contention that political opinions in some areas are susceptible to psychological influences is well supported by the data of this survey. The relevant variables seem to be authoritarian orientation and ethnocentrism, with alienation standing at one remove from the latter.

The fact that this can be demonstrated for a sample of the urban electorate suggests that political decision-makers may also be directly or indirectly subject to the same pressures.

How far one might generalize from the findings of this survey is, of course, conjectural. There is a generally accepted view, unsupported as yet by a comprehensive investigation, that there is a bland uniformity in the urban culture of Australia,¹ if one ignores migrants from Europe (which is just what one does). The homogeneity extends from child-rearing practices to the structure of educational, economic, and political institutions. Social experience in rural areas and country towns may well be

¹ See for example, T. Brennan, 'Urban Communities,' in A.F. Davies and S. Encel (eds.), Australian Society, (Melbourne, 1965) at pp. 296-309.
substantially different.\footnote{Cf. an exploratory account of some differences between city and country attitudes: F.H. Gruen, 'Rural Australia', in A.F. Davies and S. Encel, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 253-72.} It therefore seems unsafe to retain expectations based on these data outside the perimeters of the great cities.\footnote{Only one Australian city has yet been accorded a thorough sociometric investigation: Melbourne. The investigation is based on census data. See F.L. Jones, \textit{Dimensions of Urban Social Structure: The Social Areas of Melbourne, Australia} (Canberra, 1969).}
CHAPTER SIX

PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN MEASURING
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISPOSITIONS

1. Introduction

This chapter examines some difficulties in the measurement of dispositions and develops solutions to them.

The major problems brought to light by an illustrative review of research into two major constructs, authoritarianism and alienation, are the infection of scores on positive scales by acquiescent response set, and in the case of alienation, by anxiety.

The consequential difficulties are the failure to demonstrate a genotypical basis for authoritarianism; the failure to show that alienation and authoritarianism measures relate in each case to a unitary construct which is phenotypically cohesive; the absence of proof that these two constructs are unique and necessary, and not conceptually uneconomical extensions of other constructs, such as anxiety; and the likelihood that the pattern of research into related constructs has been grossly distorted.

The solutions proposed are the construction of forced-choice paired-alternative scales for the measurement of authoritarianism, alienation and ethnocentrism; the
validation of the authoritarianism scale against its own internal consistency, and, item by item, against the ethnocentrism measure; the use of a conceptual referent for each alienation item, and an examination of the internal consistency of the putative alienation scale when the covariance of each set of items with an anxiety measure is removed; and the use of factor analysis to examine the empirical discreteness of each construct. The application of each of these solutions is then described.

2. Why 'Measure' Psychological Dispositions?

We measure psychological dispositions because they influence social action, or promote attitudes which do so. Authoritarianism and alienation, for example, both predict to prejudice, and are important for historical explanation as well as having contemporary relevance. The range of political action they may influence is not known with precision.

Psychological constructs of interest to the social scientist are often, like those above, complex and multi-dimensional. Scales are used to rank people on these attitudinal continua chiefly because they are highly economical, and avoid the necessity of coaxing out information at great length, which may involve time
and skills not available to an interviewer. But the business of ranking people efficiently is a complex one. The items of a scale must be valid indicators, and responses to the items must be shown to go together in a meaningful way. Moreover, the same person must be shown to respond in much the same way on different occasions. In practice, there is heavy reliance on the manifest meaningful content of items; but where their primary function is to predict to attitudes and behaviour, they must be shown to do so. Anxiety scales should predict to psychiatrists' ratings of anxiety in the patient; scale items purporting to indicate the personality dynamics of the prejudiced should predict to measures of prejudice. This requirement is more difficult to meet for such constructs as alienation: here, various confessed sentiments of alienation should be shown to predict to each other. For the sake of parsimony, attitudinal constructs should be shown to be unitary, unique and separable. Extraneous response tendencies, such as a systematic tendency to agree with any item proposed by the interviewer, must be rigorously excluded from influence; otherwise they will corrupt research.

The advantages of administering attitude scales to groups rather than persons lie in the discovery of what
functions attitudinal constructs perform. Their
generality of function is never absolute. Psychology,
sociology and political studies are sciences built on
tendency statements. They cannot escape some idiographic
bias. Attitudinal constructs can vary in structure from
group to group and also be various in function. Group
studies are therefore necessary both to provide nomothetic
information and to define its limitations. They provide
the social scientist with a repertoire of explanatory
mechanisms for behaviour. The identification of processes
general within groups is therefore methodologically prior
to a closer understanding of social action in a personal
way.

The purpose of this paper is to elucidate problems
in the measurement of psychological disposition by
considering the histories of empirical research into
two major constructs, authoritarianism and alienation,
to propose solutions, and to report their application.
Three dispositional scales, measuring authoritarianism,
alienation and ethnocentrism, with standardisation data,
are presented for research use.

3. The Relation between a Construct and its Measure

The relation between an attitudinal or personality
construct and its measure is commonly reciprocal. The
entity to be measured may at first be inductively defined by inference from systematic observation; a questionnaire measure is then devised which taps some of its chief characteristics, identified by reference to criterion groups and the measure's own internal consistency; and the measure is then put to empirical use in order to clarify peripheral, and sometimes central features of the construct. Empirical investigation results in a slow accretion of information about the entity to be measured, and sometimes, after the information has been ordered in a systematic fashion, there may be a modification of the measuring instrument. The procedure is a familiar one in the natural sciences. 'Electricity' is a concept which now has a precise meaning in common usage, but one brought to birth by an empirical procedure: 'Abnormal condition of the atoms or molecules of a body usually due to an excess or deficiency of electrons; various kinds were formerly distinguished by the methods of production.' (O.E.D., italics added).

However, the process frequently differs in an important respect from its analogue in the natural sciences, where precise measures of at least the manifestations of a construct are usually available. In the social sciences, the principal measuring instrument often ostensively defines
some of the chief features of the construct under investigation, and not a manifestation of an effect specific to a given set of experimental conditions. Researchers are therefore occasionally in the odd position of having to devise a measuring instrument whilst initially not knowing quite what it is they wish to measure. A systematic defect in the measuring instrument may thus not only corrupt research into the correlates of a construct, but also introduce, or reinforce, misconceptions of central features of the construct itself i.e. of the 'pure' construct as a functional reality. An imperfect measure may, so to speak, abort a concept. The measure of a construct therefore often has a greater epistemological significance in the social sciences than in the natural sciences.

4. The Corruption of Research on the Authoritarian Personality

In the case of loose and rambling constructs, such as that of the 'authoritarian personality' (Adorno et al., 1950),\(^1\) defects in the measurement scales can be peculiarly destructive. A very extensive literature bears on the defects of instruments used to measure right-wing authoritarian personality orientation, and in particular

\(^1\) T.W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality, (New York, 1950).
the contamination of the California F Scale\textsuperscript{1} by acquiescent response set; but it had not yet arrived at a consensus. The most recent review of the literature on authoritarianism (by Kirscht and Dillehay, 1967)\textsuperscript{2} notes the very general concern with contamination by response biases, but concludes only that 'studies to date do not determine the degree to which these biases independently affect F Scale scores....' Other reviews have come to conclusions strikingly in conflict. Rorer (1965),\textsuperscript{3} after an exceptionally comprehensive account of methodological studies of the F Scale, remarks that 'it seems safe to conclude that even if these studies are interpreted unequivocally as showing the effects of acquiescence, they show that effect to be small.' On the other hand, Peabody (1966)\textsuperscript{4} contends that the best evidence supports the view that response bias is generally a major factor in determining F Scale scores, and, in a sweeping attack on the general use of attitudinal scales of this kind, asserts: 'The ignorant and simple-minded have been taken

\footnotesize

\begin{tabular}{l}
\textsuperscript{1} T.W. Adorno \textit{et al.}, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 255-7. \\
\end{tabular}
for fanatical true believers and fascists.' Some
evaluation of the strength of each position is required
as a basis for the assessment of the great body of work
on the psychological and political correlates of
authoritarianism as determined by the commonly employed
measurement scales. If the principal measure has such a
major defect, then the authoritarian individual has been
persistently mis-identified, and research on the nature
and correlates of the construct systematically distorted.

It will be argued here:

(i) That there is a persuasive, but not conclusive
case that the all-positive F Scale, and several other
standard measures of authoritarianism, are extensively
contaminated by acquiescent response set.

(ii) That a satisfactory acquiescence-free measure
of authoritarianism is not yet available.

(iii) That the circumstance (i) has rendered uncertain
many research findings, and in particular the supposed
positive relation with anxiety.

The exploration of the relation with anxiety is of
central significance to the clarification of the F
syndrome. Although the personality organisation of the
authoritarian individual is discursively elaborated in the
original work, the dicta of the original authors indicate
that a high degree of repressed anxiety is central to the
hypothesized personality structure of the highly ethnocentric subject, ethnocentrism being the criterion of the authoritarian. Frenkel-Brunswik (Adorno et al., 1950)\textsuperscript{1} found empirical confirmation of a relation between ethnocentrism, a weak ego and a rigid, externalized superego in a clinically evaluated group of 80 subjects. Diffuse anxiety is generated by the inadequacy of the ego in coping with the severe internal conflict between a strong, thrusting id and an externalized superego, and repressed by recourse to the defence mechanisms of anti-intraception, stereotypy and projectivity, which displace hostility on to out-groups perceived as threatening.

Whilst it is true that many low F scorers are described as 'worriers', their anxiety is characterized as being more superficial and situation-specific than that of high scorers, amongst whom it is typically 'vague and diffuse'.\textsuperscript{2} The deep seated anxiety of the high scorer, although repressed\textsuperscript{3} is kept in check only by frail mechanisms of defence which distort external reality and are readily broken down. 'The repressed, unsublimated and unmodified tendencies are ready to break through and

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{1}] T.W. Adorno et al., op. cit., p. 447.
\item[\textsuperscript{2}] T.W. Adorno et al., op. cit., pp. 412-3.
\item[\textsuperscript{3}] Ibid., p. 485.
\end{itemize}
flood the tenuously maintained social superstructure.¹
The authoritarian is thus seen as prone to bouts of acute manifest anxiety. For confirmation of this portrait of the central personality dynamics of the high F scorer, evidence of correlation between satisfactory measures of authoritarianism and anxiety is thus desirable.

Commonly, the syndrome is characterized phenotypically by reference to its more superficial features, which constitute the sub-scales of the chief measure: conventionalism; authoritarian submission; authoritarian aggression; anti-intraception; superstition and stereotypy; emphasis on power and 'toughness'; destructiveness and cynicism; projectivity; and exaggerated concern with sex. But a genotypical characterization, in terms of its hypothesized central dynamics, which revolve around a theme of latent anxiety, is also to be found both in the original work and in later research.

The maintenance of a genotypical characterization of the authoritarian must rely on the empirical demonstration of a consistent positive relation between the standard measures of authoritarianism and indices of at least latent and preferably manifest anxiety over a variety of human groups. It will be argued that the scanty evidence on

¹ T.W. Adorno et al., op. cit., p. 455.
this point fails, since the relevant studies have been conducted with authoritarianism scales contaminated by acquiescent response set, which itself has a demonstrable covariance with anxiety. The covariance is strong enough to generate an apparent positive relation between authoritarianism and anxiety as an artifact of the defect in measurement.

It is thus concluded that defects in the chief measuring instruments require a cautious assessment of research into the central as well as the peripheral features of the authoritarian construct; that a 'purified' measure is required; and that pending sufficient evidence of a positive relation with anxiety, authoritarianism is best characterized phenotypically i.e. as an actually manifested construct which can be ostensively defined by its principal manifest features, without implication as to its psychodynamic basis.

5. Acquiescent Response Set and the F Scale

Acquiescent response set has been defined by two principal researchers in this field (Couch and Keniston, 1960)\(^1\) as a 'general tendency to agree or disagree with questionnaire items, regardless of their content'. The

term is often used in conjunction with others clearly intended to be synonyms, even in the work of these authors, who refer to 'agreement tendency', as well as 'yeasaying' and 'naysaying'. They make it clear that they regard its negative pole as comprehending 'disagreement tendency'. 'Set' seems preferable to 'style' (Rorer, 1965)\(^1\), since the most authoritative psychological dictionary (English and English)\(^2\) interprets the latter as merely imparting a 'characteristic manner', that will 'influence the attainment of a goal comparatively little'. The use of 'style' therefore seems to beg the question of the degree of influence of acquiescence. The phrase 'regardless of content' is to be interpreted as implying a logical rather than an empirical independence of item content. Cronbach (1946, 1950)\(^3\) has presented empirical evidence that acquiescent response set (hereinafter ARS) is to be found more often when items are difficult or ambiguous (more strictly, obscure), or when they are in an area with which the respondent is unfamiliar. McGee's work

\(^{1}\) L.G. Rorer, *op. cit.*


suggests that the evocation of ARS is very directly governed by the type of item content. Miklich (1966)\(^2\) has criticised the notion that ARS is a quasi-mechanical tendency. He suggests that it is often related to lack of intellectual alertness in the respondent, and is better characterised as 'an uncritical attitude towards attitude-personality questionnaire items'.

The original researchers were aware of possible objections to scales which were all-positive i.e. ones where agreement, in the case of every item, registered positively the characteristic to be measured. Levinson\(^3\) defended the use of such scales chiefly on the grounds that an all-positive version established better rapport with prejudiced subjects and invited them to be candid. Concern that the cohesiveness of the scales might be a function of


ARS was expressed in an early review (Brewster Smith, 1950), although there was little controversy over the extent of contamination before the mid-1950s.

It will be convenient to categorise the evidence for contamination of scores on the all-positive F Scale by ARS under four main heads, distinguished from each other by the type of the main independent variable manipulated; sub-categories reflect the choice, and method of measurement, of the main dependent variable. (Some studies span more than one sub-category).

I: This experimental paradigm involves the administration of reversed F Scale items, and comparison of the correlation of these, considered together as a scale, with scores on the all-positive F Scale. The independent variable is thus the direction of the phrasing of the F Scale items.

Ia: Appraises the effect on the dependent variable, the homogeneity of responses to the two versions of the scale, by noting the degree to which the correlation between them departs from the reliabilities. If the F Scale were free of ARS contamination, the positive and reversed scales might be expected to correlate positively to a degree

approaching their reliabilities. On the other hand, if all systematic variance were contributed by ARS, there should be a high negative correlation. Reversed F Scales have been constructed, and this procedure carried out, by Bass (1955), Leavitt, Hax and Roche (1955) Chapman and Campbell (1957), Jackson Messick (1957), Christie, Havel and Seidenberg (1958) and Clayton and Jackson (1961). The earlier results are reviewed by Christie et al. (1958). Correlations between the positive and reversed scales vary from strongly negative to moderately positive, suggesting a substantial contribution by ARS in a variety of samples. Christie et al. argued that the failure to obtain high positive correlations might be a

7 R. Christie et al., op. cit.
function of inadequate psychological, as opposed to merely semantic, reversal of the original items. They phrased their own reversals in a probabilistic manner, in keeping with what they took to be an anti-authoritarian outlook. They obtained what appeared to be moderate to high positive correlations in a variety of samples and interpreted their results as showing that ARS was not an important factor in influencing F Scale responses, except in some undergraduate samples. However, the magnitude of the correlations obtained by Christie et al. was inflated by corrections for attenuation, and when these are removed, their correlations fall into the same range as those of the previous researchers.

Chapman and Campbell in a later report (1959), have also found only a low positive correlation between positive and reversed F Scales. Their study also has more sophisticated elements (see IIb, below).

All the preceding studies employed limited samples, in almost every case in tertiary educational institutions. Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960), in a

---


moderately large segment of their national sample in the U.S.A., (n=577), found a negative correlation between short positive and reversed F Scales, which suggests that ARS may be somewhat more influential in extra-mural populations.

Ib: This differs from Ia in its consideration of the dependent variable only in that specific attention is given to the proportionate role of double agreements, as opposed to double disagreements, in reducing the correlation between positive and reversed scales. A double agreement is agreement with both a positive item and its reversal; a double disagreement is the rejection of both forms. Concern with this distinguishes the work of Christie, Havel and Seidenberg (1958),¹ whose critique of earlier work is discussed above. They found relatively few instances of respondents given to double agreements in their own sample. On the other hand, Peabody (1961)² in a sample of British and American engineering students, found that the low positive correlation he obtained between positive and reversed F Scales was due to a third of his sample being 'double-agreers' (very few were 'double-disagreers').

¹ R. Christie, et al., op. cit.
Samelson (1964)\(^1\) has pointed out that Peabody's 'double-agreers' might in fact have been making logically consistent and not ARS-determined responses to the content of the positive and reversed items, since the reversed items were 'asymmetrical' and had 'neutral' points different from those of the positive items. Logical consistency therefore frequently demanded double-agreement. This evidence is therefore equivocal in its bearing on the influence of ARS.

Ic: This refines the measurement of the dependent variable by carrying out an analysis of variance. That done by Bass (1955),\(^2\) on his own data, suggested that individuals differ markedly and consistently in their manifestation of ARS. Chapman and Bock (1958)\(^3\) considered eight previous studies employing both positive and reversed F Scales, and, having subjected them to analysis of variance, found that, on the positive scale, for college

---

\(^1\) F. Samelson, 'Agreement Set and Anticontent Attitudes in the F Scale: A Reinterpretation,' *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 68 (1964) pp. 338-42.

\(^2\) B.M. Bass, *op. cit.*

populations, content variance (authoritarianism) probably accounted for some 30 to 40 per cent of the total variance, the remaining reliable variance (the upper and lower limits of reliable variance were fixed at 70 and 85 per cent) being divided between ARS and the interaction of ARS and content, in proportions which varied markedly from sample to sample.

Id: Here, factor analysis is employed to gauge homogeneity of response to the positive and reversed F scales. The single instance of this for the one correlation coefficient, reported by Bass (1955),\(^1\) has been trenchantly criticized by Messick and Jackson (1957)\(^2\) who stated that Bass's factor loadings have an incorrect sign, and by Kerlinger (1958)\(^3\) who pointed out that in such a case the factors can be rotated in an arbitrary fashion.

II: This type of evidence introduces other positive and reversed attitudinal measures, along with F Scales, as part of the independent variable. It multiplies the data on the direction of phrasing in such a way as to permit

\(^1\) B.M. Bass, \textit{op. cit.}


more sophisticated evaluation of the dependent variable, e.g. by making possible meaningful factor analysis of responses.

IIa: Here, factor analysis of this type of data is carried out. Zuckerman and Norton (1961)\(^1\), in a sample of student nurses, used 100-item positive and reversed forms of the Parental Attitude Research Instrument (PARI) as well as F Scales. Their measures of ARS included one based on double-agreements to both positive and reversed forms of the PARI items. This measure of ARS thus avoids the difficulties specific to the interpretation of responses to obscurely-worded F items. They found, by a factor analysis employing orthogonal rotations, that ARS contributed 20 per cent, and authoritarian content 36 per cent, to the variance on the all-positive F Scale. (An application of the Chapman-Bock method of analysis of variance to the data yielded 35 per cent for ARS and 34 per cent for authoritarian content). There is thus a substantial correspondence between these conclusions and those arrived at by Chapman and Bock (under I(c)).

IIb: Another study employing positive and reversed

scales other than F Scales, of a kind which has a relevance *ipso facto* to the contamination of all-positive forms of the latter by ARS, is that of Chapman and Campbell (1959). The additional measures here were of ethnocentrism. It was demonstrated that all-positive measures of F and E correlate significantly more highly than did mixed pairs of measures, i.e. F positive and E reversed, and F reversed and E positive. F reversed and E reversed measures also correlated better than one mixed pair, the F reversed with E positive. This finding was interpreted as indicating that the homogeneity of the direction of the phrasing of items was influential in spuriously raising correlations, because of contamination of all these measures by ARS, even although ethnocentrism scales appeared less affected by ARS than F scales.

III: In the third type of evidence, scores on the all-positive F Scale, as the independent variable, are related to separate measures of ARS. Various studies of this kind, often in conjunction with experimental designs of type Ia, have been reviewed by Christie *et al.* (1958). Most show moderate correlations of the order of .4 - .5.

---


2 R. Christie *et al.*, *op. cit.*
Gaier and Bass (1959),\(^1\) in a study of regional differences, found correlations varying from low to moderate between the all-positive F Scale and the Bass measure of Social Acquiescence (1958).\(^2\) McGee (1962),\(^3\) in a study chiefly concerned with the generality of the ARS trait (discussed in this aspect below), found correlations between the all-positive F Scale, and the Bass Social Acquiescence Scale, an all-positive F Scale and Couch and Keniston's short measure of ARS (1960),\(^4\) strong and moderate respectively, in a sample of undergraduates.

This type of evidence is ambivalent in its bearing on the relationship of all-positive F Scales with ARS. On the one hand the covariance between F and ARS scale scores could be a function of the unidirectional phrasing of the F items; on the other, it might be that acquiescence is an aspect of authoritarianism itself, i.e. that F content covaries with ARS. If the latter is the case, this research

---


\(^4\) A. Couch and K. Keniston, *op. cit.*
does not unequivocally show 'contamination' of the F measure with ARS, but perhaps a meaningful relation of ARS to the F syndrome. (More direct evidence on this point is considered below.)

IV: This research is related to type III, but extends the independent variable in a way which surmounts the difficulty discussed above. It involves the comparison of the magnitude of correlations between balanced F Scales, (i.e. ones with approximately equal numbers of positive and reversed items), and ARS, and all-positive measures F Scales and ARS. If the correlation is higher in the case of all-positive F Scales than with balanced measures, the difference is likely to be a function of contamination of the all-positive scale by ARS through the format. Evidence of this kind is uncommon and inconclusive. Chapman and Campbell (1957)\(^1\) found a slightly higher correlation (.43) between an all-positive F Scale and an ARS measure than between a balanced F Scale and ARS (.32), in a sample of undergraduates (n=144). The measure of ARS was derived from diverse scales, totalling 74 items, in which content factors were balanced out. Couch and Keniston

found significantly different correlations between a short positive F Scale and their criterion measure of agreement tendency (the Overall Agreement Score), and a short balanced F Scale and the OAS. The correlations were .37 and .09 respectively, in a small (n=61) undergraduate sample. However, they simultaneously report non-significant correlations between both the short positive F Scale, and another version of a balanced F Scale, and their short ARS measure.

Any assessment of the strength of the evidence for contamination of the all-positive F Scale by ARS must be qualified by the fact that most of the research has been conducted amongst unrepresentative samples of college students, although there are some important exceptions (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960). However, since it is probable that ARS is negatively related to intellectual sophistication (see Shaw 1961), the nature of these samples is more likely to lead to a conservative, rather an extravagant assessment of the contribution of ARS.

An evaluation of the evidence may best be undertaken

---

1 A. Couch and K. Keniston, op. cit.
2 A. Campbell, et al., op. cit., p. 512.
in the light of the important and very extensive critique undertaken by Rorer (1965). He is principally concerned with experimental designs of type I. Having noted the scanty evidence of 'double-agreement' (type Ib) he contends that 'double-disagreement' 'need not be negativism at all, and may be a perfectly consistent response to item content for which no concept of response bias is required...'

Four main grounds for this contention are advanced:

(i) Double disagreement may not be logically inconsistent, particularly in view of the rather general and heterogeneous content of both original and reversed items.

(ii) Rejection of reversed items, and hence double-disagreement on content grounds, is more likely when the reversed items are extreme, as for example are those of Jackson and Messick (1957).

(iii) The systematic content of reversed items may in any case not correspond with that of the original positive ones. Low correlations amongst reversed scales

---

1 L.G. Rorer, op. cit.
2 Ibid., p. 135.
3 D.N. Jackson and S.J. Messick, op. cit.
have been reported (Mogar, 1960).

(iv) The fact that reported means are generally higher for reversed than for positive F scales also suggests a higher frequency of disagreement than agreement.

It must be admitted that there is considerable force in Rorer's critique, which relies essentially on the principle of parsimony in seeking an explanation for double-negations. His argument is not that the response-set position is untenable, but that it introduces an unnecessary complication.

However, evidence of type Ia, Ib and Ic, whilst it may, in many cases, be attributable to naysaying, is at least suggestive and relevant, if disagreement tendency is accepted as representing the negative pole of ARS. The fact that naysaying may in part be intellectually motivated is not a consideration sufficient in itself to defeat its relevance, since the evidence indicates that ARS can be generated by differing conjunctions of psychological, intellectual and situational factors. The crux of the matter is whether or not the undeniable response tendency in evidence type I, chiefly, but by no means entirely, of naysaying, represents an intellectual stance specific to

---

the content of the F Scale items, as Rorer contends, or whether or not it reflects an underlying disposition related to the ARS continuum.

Evidence of type II is pivotal here, and must influence the construction placed on type I. Type II demonstrates a relation between scores on the all-positive F Scale, and ARS measures based on double-agreement to positive and reversed items on other scales (in the case of IIa), and systematic response tendencies on another measure (here E scales), whether yeasaying or naysaying (in the case of IIb). In these experiments, response tendencies to F Scale items are demonstrably related to yeasaying or naysaying tendencies of a general kind. An ARS construct thus seems required, and Rorer's objection that it is not, is overcome. His otherwise exhaustive bibliography omits a study of type IIa, that by Zuckerman and Norton (1961). Evidence IIb suggests that, in some degree, the ARS loading of F items is specific to item format (i.e. the direction of phrasing), and cannot be considered merely a function of a general relation between authoritarianism and acquiescence.

Rorer's comments on evidence types III and IV are oblique ('There are other studies employing the F scale

1 M. Zuckerman and J. Norton, op. cit.
which are not so easily appraised'). His disinclination to view these as suggestive of the influence of ARS seems to stem from a general doubt as to the validity of ARS measures. There are some vagaries in the evidence on this point, but ones which chiefly serve to emphasize the specificity of response sets, and the difficulty of measuring them, rather than to justify an overall scepticism. Couch and Keniston (1960)\(^2\) derived their criterion measure of ARS, the Overall Agreement score (OAS) from 360 personality scale items, half of which were positive, and half reversed. They were able to show a high split-half reliability for the OAS, and satisfactory relations between the OAS and other ARS measures over a variety of pencil and paper tests with responses of the agree-disagree type. They derived a short ARS scale from the criterion measure, with satisfactory internal consistency. However, the correlation between the OAS and the Bass SAS was quite low, (.30)\(^3\), although perhaps not very surprising, since the approaches of each to the measurement of ARS are dissimilar: the SAS attempts to measure ARS directly by testing agreement with vacuous aphorisms, whilst the OAS mingles

\footnotesize
\begin{enumerate}
\item L.G. Rorer, op. cit., p. 137.
\item A. Couch and K. Keniston, op. cit.
\item Ibid., p. 159.
\end{enumerate}
direct measurement of acquiescence with items addressed to the empirically determined personality traits of the yeasayer. Nevertheless, McGee (1962)\(^1\) found moderate to strong correlations between the SAS, the all-positive F scale and the Couch and Keniston short ARS measure; \((r_{\text{SAS-ARS}} = .51)\) but little relation between these and scores on tests where the respondent guesses the 'true' response in trick tests with no systematic content. Forehand (1962)\(^2\) found little interrelation between ARS measures and perseveration, and Siller and Chapman (1962)\(^3\) were unable to show a relation between ARS measures and social desirability set. Solomon and Klein (1963)\(^4\) found strong to high correlations (when corrected for attenuation) in the expected direction, between the OAS and measures of yeasaying and naysaying tendency derived from positive and


reversed F Scales, in two widely differing samples. Rorer's conclusion that 'acquiescence response style has been made, for all practical purposes, unmeasurable'\(^1\) seems unwarranted. The inconsistencies he notes in the literature are, in many instances, to be anticipated from a theoretical standpoint. It is not to be expected that respondents prone to one response set are also given to all others, e.g. extreme response set and social desirability set (SD). Quite the contrary: ARS and SD have frequently been found to be negatively related, and theoretical explanations have been advanced for this (Miklich, 1966).\(^2\) However, it does seem that the stability of the measures of ARS is confined to the situation in which it is evoked by questionnaires demanding agree-disagree responses, including those of the F Scale type. These are, in any case, the focus of our concern.

It seems that ARS is a construct difficult to measure, and whose influence it is even more difficult to gauge. However, the body of assembled evidence, taken together, of the intrusive influence of ARS on scores on the all-positive F scale seems persuasive, even if, in view of the paucity of evidence of type II, not quite conclusive.

\(^1\) L.G. Rorer, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
\(^2\) D.R. Miklich, *op. cit.*
Chapman and Bock's\textsuperscript{1} assessment of the extent of the contribution of ARS to the variance (about 30 to 40 percent of the total variance) on the all-positive authoritarianism measure is consistent with evidence of types II, III and IV, and may therefore be considered the best estimate.

The rationale for an unusual degree of extrinsic influence of ARS on all-positive F Scale scores, as compared with scores on other self-report measures, has been summarized by Peabody (1966).\textsuperscript{2} The items are intentionally heterogeneous in content and sometimes obscure in meaning. The scale as a whole is multi-dimensional and particularly dependent on a complex relation of item content to a theoretical syndrome. McBride and Moran (1967)\textsuperscript{3} have provided direct evidence in support of Peabody's position, by showing that double agreement on authoritarianism scales is highly dependent upon the relative ambiguity of the items involved.

One further objection to the view that ARS variance

\textsuperscript{1}L.J. Chapman and R.D. Bock, op. cit.
'contaminates' the all-positive F Scale requires examination. There are empirical indications that some degree of acquiescence is intrinsically associated with the F syndrome. The data of Chapman and Campbell (1957)\(^1\) (see above, IV) support this view. Eysenck (1962)\(^2\) found an ARS factor derived from a balanced F measure to be related to the content of the same scale. Zuckerman and Eisen (1962)\(^3\) found moderate relationships between a measure of ARS, the Bass SAS, and a response-set free measure of F (derived from short essays), in a small sample. Solomon and Klein (1963)\(^4\) found a low relation between Couch and Keniston's OAS and a balanced F Scale in a sample of students (n=135), but no relation in a sample of schizophrenics (n=125). However, Clayton and Jackson (1961)\(^5\) found no relation between scores on two balanced F Scales, and ARS scores derived therefrom. Earlier work by Leavitt, Hax and Roche (1955)\(^6\) and Gage, Leavitt and

---

4  L. Solomon and E. Klein, op. cit.
5  M.B. Clayton and D.N. Jackson, op. cit.
Stone (1957) argued an intrinsic relation between the F syndrome and ARS, relying chiefly on the unsatisfactory ground of evidence types I and III, as well as the narrower variance of reversed F Scales, which may reflect the conflicting pressures of set and content. Their chief conceptual ground for the association of ARS with the F syndrome is that ARS seems to be a likely correlate of 'authoritarian submission'.

The empirical evidence is thus suggestive of a low covariance between balanced F Scales and measures of ARS in some samples, and so of a minor degree of intrinsic association, but one not sufficient to account for the major contribution, almost equal to that of content, of ARS to the variance on all-positive F Scales. Most of the influence of ARS on the all-positive F Scale seems therefore likely to be extrinsic, i.e. specific to the format and not the content of the scale, and hence to represent 'contamination.'

6. Acquiescent Response Set and the Correlates of the F Scale

Whether, and in what ways, research on the correlates of authoritarianism has been corrupted by the contamination of the all-positive F Scale by ARS depends on two factors:

(a) Whether or not other all-positive, or predominantly positive, self-report measures are similarly contaminated by ARS; and
(b) the personality correlates of ARS itself.

Both are capable of spuriously raising or lowering relationships. The first question is considered here. Where possible, the type of evidence will be indicated by reference to the methodological paradigms described above.

6.1. Scales of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and ARS

The MMPI scales differ strikingly in the proposition of items keyed 'true' and 'false'. Where all, or nearly all, are keyed in one direction, it is possible that ARS may influence scores. Item-reversal studies of type Ia are capable of establishing a prima facie case for ARS contamination. However, research of this kind, reviewed by Dicken (1967),¹ has 'yielded high correlations between original and reversed items and/or scales, evidence which contradicts the acquiescence hypothesis'. Moreover, Block (1965)² has shown that the factorial structure of the MMPI

remains the same when acquiescence-free scales are factored. A further item-reversal study by Dicken (1967)\(^1\) indicated that little, if any, of the variance of the original MMPI items can be attributed to ARS.

It might be conjectured that MMPI items are less likely to attract ARS than F Scale-type items because they are shorter, less obscure, and more immediately relevant to the experience of the respondent.

In this area, contamination of the all-positive F Scale is thus likely to have lowered rather than raised systematic correlations between personality factors and authoritarianism, except for those with the personality correlates of ARS itself.

6.2. Anxiety Scales and ARS.

The Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (TMAS) (Taylor, 1953)\(^2\), which is predominantly (39 of 50 items) positive, seems uninfected by ARS. Chapman and Campbell (1959)\(^3\), in an item-reversal study of type Ia, found a high correlation between positive and reversed scales of the same

\(^1\) C. Dicken, op. cit.


order as the reliability of each. Adams and Kirby (1963)\(^1\) achieved similar results in a study of the same kind, and also found a zero relation between ARS and content scores derived from the TMAS, suggesting no intrinsic covariation.

The MPI (Maudsley Personality Inventory - Eysenck 1959)\(^2\) 24-item Neuroticism scale is all-positive, but a factor-analytical study by Eysenck (1962)\(^3\) suggests that it, too, is uncontaminated by ARS. The ARS factor was derived from positive and reversed F Scales, and had a negligible loading on the Neuroticism Scale.

The reasons for the lack of ARS contamination of these is presumably the same as for the MMPI scales, which they closely resemble.

6.3. Ethnocentrism Scales and ARS

The evidence here suggests that ethnocentrism scales have some covariance with ARS, but less than the all-positive

F Scale. Chapman and Campbell (1959)\(^1\) found no evidence for ARS covariance in a study of type Ia; but simultaneously report evidence of type IIb from the same sample, which suggests some ARS contamination. Peabody (1961)\(^2\) found high correlations between positive and reversed anti-Semitism scales, and evidence of only minor double-agreement tendencies (type IIb). Gaier and Bass (1959)\(^3\) present evidence in some samples of low covariance with the Bass SAS measure (type III), but do not show it to be extrinsic.

6.4. The Dogmatism Scale and ARS

The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Rokeach, 1956)\(^4\), which is all-positive, seems to be related to ARS to about the same extent as the all-positive F Scale.

Couch and Keniston (1960)\(^5\) found a moderate relation

---


\(^3\) E.L. Gaier and B.M. Bass, op. cit.


\(^5\) A. Couch and K. Keniston, op. cit.
(.40) between their OAS measure and the Dogmatism Scale, partly attributable, in their view, to intrinsic covariance (evidence type III). Peabody (1961)\(^1\) (type Ib) found only low correlations between positive and reversed Dogmatism Scales, and substantial indications of double agreement. The data for the Dogmatism measure correspond closely with those for F Scales, and suggest extrinsic contamination. McBride and Moran (1967)\(^2\) found judged item ambiguity to be as closely related to double-agreement on the Dogmatism Scale as on the F Scale. Rokeach (1960, 1963)\(^3\) has advanced conceptual arguments why ARS might be expected to play only a minor role, if any, in influencing Dogmatism Scale scores, but little empirical evidence. His proposals are chiefly that the variety of the correlates of the Dogmatism measure would be hard to account for on purely response set grounds, and that a set to fake only reversed items may account for Peabody's data. The first of these arguments is insufficient to negate the hypothesis of some ARS contamination of the

\(^1\) D. Peabody, op. cit.

\(^2\) L. McBride and G. Moran, op. cit.

positive measure, and the second is less parsimonious than the hypothesis he attacks.

The correlation between the Dogmatism Scale and the positive F Scale may well be inflated by ARS contamination of both instruments.

The various measures correlated with the F Scale thus seem to be ranged along a continuum of ARS susceptibility, strong in the case of measures of complex social attitudes, moderate in prejudice scales, and weak in personality indices. The ways in which research into the personality correlates of the F syndrome might have been corrupted are considered below.

7. The Significance of the Contamination of the F Scale by Acquiescent Response Set

The significance of ARS contamination of the F Scale emerges in four main ways.

(i) Research into the correlates of authoritarianism may be corrupted by covariance of positive F measures and others with ARS. The danger of this is particularly marked in the case of complex attitudinal measures with social referents, such as all-positive alienation and anomia scales.

(ii) Contamination of the all-positive F Scale by ARS is likely to have lowered rather than raised systematic correlations between personality factors and authoritarianism, except for those with the personality correlates of ARS.
(iii) It is also possible for researchers to have unknowingly described the correlates of ARS, when reporting the correlates of a positive F measure, if ARS is a stable personality trait with its own correlates. Couch and Keniston (1960)\(^1\) found their criterion measures of ARS (the OAS) to be related positive and significantly to a large number of sub-scales of the MMPI, including those measuring prejudice and dependency, and to those scales of Cattell's 16 PF measure which contribute to his anxiety factor, in a sample of 61 undergraduates. The significance of the fact that these are amongst the most commonly found correlates of the F syndrome, as measured by positive scales, hardly requires emphasis. As the MMPI itself does not seem to be much infected by ARS, these correlates of ARS are unlikely to be artifacts of the research procedure. Of particular importance are the association of weak ego strength and anxiety with ARS.

The relation of the OAS to the Cattell anxiety measure was not tested, but one might infer that it would probably be of the order of \(.40\). The reliability of the OAS was reported to be \(.85\). The correlation of the anxiety measure with a 'pure' measure of ARS might therefore

\(^1\) A. Couch and K. Keniston, op. cit.
be expected to be of the order of .45, i.e. they would share about 20 per cent of their variance. The contribution of ARS to the total variance of the all-positive F Scale seems likely to fluctuate from sample to sample, but generally to be between 20 and 40 per cent. Between 4 and 8 per cent of the variance would thus be likely to be shared by such an anxiety measure as this, as a result of the covariance with ARS. This would generate correlations of the order .20 to .30. Correlations between all-positive F Scales and anxiety measures within this range may thus be attributable to contamination of all-positive F by ARS, even when non-positive measures of anxiety have been employed.

Kirscht and Dillehay\(^1\) in their review of the literature relating the F syndrome to anxiety and neuroticism found no studies relating balanced or forced-choice F Scales to anxiety, and no studies with the positive F Scale whose outcome could not be accounted for, in the light of the analysis here, by covariance with ARS.

There is thus no substantial evidence for an intrinsic relation between the authoritarian syndrome and manifest anxiety, which would lend support to its genotypical characterization as unstable, possessed of a weak ego,

\(^1\) J.P. Kirscht and R.C. Dillehay, op. cit.
and confronting deep internal conflicts with defence mechanisms which are only fragile and easily overborne. The commonly employed positive measures are, indeed, probably incapable of verifying the genotypical features of the construct.

(iv) The ARS loading on the positive F Scale may account, in some degree, for the correlations between the items themselves. This throws doubt on the cohesiveness of the syndrome, and so even on the stability of the construct viewed phenotypically. Whilst there is undoubtedly some intrinsic covariation between some of the items, it is not clear that the inclusion of all of the sub-scales of the original measure can be justified. Chapman and Campbell (1959),¹ using a balanced ethnocentrism scale as a criterion, found no justification for the inclusion of anti-intraception as an F sub-scale.

Peabody (1966),² having noted evidence presented by Campbell et al. (1960)³ of the poverty and primitiveness of political attitudes in the general population, and the low proportion of their national sample (12 per cent) showing evidence of using any ideological dimension,

³ Campbell et al. op. cit., p. 234.
concludes that 'social scientists who have been interested in the theories of authoritarianism... have tended to project the complexity of their own views onto their subjects'. This conclusion seems unnecessarily nihilistic, and to mistake evidence of the scarcity of ideological viewpoints, which are in some degree intellectually determined, for lack of evidence of the influence of psychological factors, which do not involve intellectual processes to the same extent.

However, there is some justice in his rebuke. The defects of the chief measure of authoritarianism, the consequent confusion in identifying the construct, and the perils of generalizing from samples of undergraduates, student nurses, convicts and schizophrenics to the population at large should by now be manifest. There is no avoiding the necessity of the application of an adequate measure to representative extra-mural samples, difficult to obtain as they may be.

8. Other Measures of Authoritarianism: Are They Satisfactory?

In arriving at an adequate measure, the positive F Scale is a dubious criterion instrument, since it is likely to infect the derived scale with ARS, or indicate the personality correlates of ARS. The use of balanced
scales, employing the various reversals together with a version of the positive scale, has several disadvantages:

(i) The positive and reversed items will be individually influenced by ARS, and it is unlikely that this will be precisely 'balanced out'. Apart from the hazards of the balancing procedure, there is a systematic reason for this. Variance on the positive scale is influenced by one component, the interaction between set and content, which is unlikely to have a counterpart on the reversed version, because these two elements are there in conflict.

(ii) Respondents with extreme yeasaying or naysaying tendencies will tend to score at the mean. This might well produce spurious correlations with other balanced measures where the individual items might be susceptible to ARS, e.g. ethnocentrism and alienation scales.

(iii) A single statement, with which the respondent is asked to agree or disagree, is not always a clear guide to the nature of the item continuum on which the respondent has to place himself. Respondents may reject items because of verbal quibbles which have little to do with the statement's main tendency. Some of the reversed F Scale items are puzzling when standing alone, since they are constructed as ripostes to the originals. A
forced-choice paired-alternative item is geometrically more complete, since it identifies a continuum by two positions, not one. It thus clarifies the item for the respondent and the response for the analyst.

* * * * *

The most satisfactory measure of authoritarianism so far presented seems to be that of Berkowitz and Wolkon (1964). They paired 25 original F Scale items with the reversals of Bass (1955), and Christie et al. (1958), in order to constitute two forced-choice F Scales, FCB and FCC respectively. The reliabilities, in two college samples, were .41 and .71 for the FCB, and .59 and .69 for the FCC. The positive F Scale was used as a validating criterion, and both forced-choice forms had satisfactory correlations with it, ranging from .69 to .84.

Whilst these scales have the advantage of preserving a relation to the sophisticated psychodynamic theory underlying the all-positive F Scale, some imperfections in the method of constructing these forced-choice instruments are evident. The Bass reversals are merely semantic reversals of the originals, frequently inserting simple

---

2 B.M. Bass, op. cit.
3 R. Christie, et al., op. cit.
negations, and so often leave an anti-authoritarian position something of a mystery for the respondent: whilst the Christie et al. reversals were deliberately phrased to impart a probabilistic, guarded and cautious item tone, which has been shown (Couch and Keniston, 1960) to provoke the yeasayer to his rare disagreements. The two halves of the FCC items may thus attract ARS differentially: those with high ARS may tend to agree more with the positive halves, which are more crisp and exclamatory, and frequently incorporate familiar sayings. There is a strong case for tightly-constructed and substantive reversals, which put an exclamatory gloss on probabilistic content, where this seems desirable. A more eclectic approach to the selection of reversed items from available reversed scales, or their construction ad hoc, could be justified in these terms.

Berkowitz and Wolkon do not report item characteristics. This seems necessary in order to demonstrate that items representing all sub-scales are related to the construct. A forced-choice ethnocentrism scale would be a more satisfactory criterion measure than the all-positive F Scale.

1 A. Couch and K. Keniston, op. cit.
9. The Requirements of an Adequate Measure of a Dispositional Construct

Research into dispositional constructs, especially complex and multidimensional ones which are of use in clarifying types of social interaction, can be extensively corrupted by their measuring instruments if adequate precautions are not taken in building the measure. It is therefore necessary, on occasion, to interrupt the superficial continuity of social research by reconstituting or modifying the original measures, if these prove to be clearly unsatisfactory. The history of research into the authoritarian personality construct suggests that the following precautions are amongst those desirable in building, or rebuilding, measurement scales:

(i) The influence of response sets should be demonstrably negligible.

Forced-choice paired-alternative scales have the advantage of escaping contamination by acquiescent response set, if the two halves of each item are generally matched for 'tone'.

If responses are dichotomised, that is, respondents are directed to make a choice between the two halves of each item without indicating gradations of agreement, then the score will not be infected by extreme response
set. Peabody (1962)\(^1\) has demonstrated that dichotomization of response categories does not appreciably affect results on the F Scale. The successful construction of forced-choice measures will be facilitated if items attracting an 'undecided' response on a permissive pilot run can be omitted.

It is possible that a positional response set (e.g. a set to choose the first half-item of each pair) may be influential on paired-alternative measures. Berkowitz and Wolkon (1964)\(^2\) have foreshadowed a concern with this, but its contingent influence has not, as yet, been explored in the literature. The 'ends' of the scale can be purified by random alternation of the item halves, thus forcing those under a strong set to score in the middle range. Respondents who appear to display a strong positional response set can be extracted from the sample.

Contamination of a paired-alternative measure by social desirability set is possible if the construct dictates a stance on each item which is markedly socially attractive or unattractive. This is difficult to offset, but can be done by matching half-items for social


\(^2\) N.B. Berkowitz and G.H. Wolkon, *op. cit.*
desirability i.e. by forcing the respondent to choose between two equally attractive or unattractive half-items. This may demand considerable ingenuity on the part of the test-builder, particularly since the concept of what is socially desirable or undesirable may vary from group to group or person to person (See Wiggins, 1966).¹

(ii) Items, and sets of items, should have a coherent hypothetical relation to the structure of the construct.

This consideration applies especially if the structure of the construct is merely speculatively defined. The hypothesised relationship should be supported by a detailed empirical item analysis. Criterion measures need not be narrowly conceived: for example, ethnocentrism scales as well as existing measures of authoritarianism may be used in reconstructing an authoritarianism measure. In the case of such constructs as 'alienation', where no universally acceptable criterion groups are available, sets of items should be capable of representing the various dispositions regarded in the theoretical literature as aspects of the generic term.

(iii) The construct to be measured should be shown

to have an identity separate from that of other constructs.

If this condition is not met, researchers may find that they are needlessly multiplying supposed constructs, and sometimes reifying entities not distinct from ones previously explored.

Two techniques may be useful here. Firstly, the method of partial correlations can be incorporated in an item or sub-scale analysis. For example, in order to show that a scale designed to measure alienation does not cohere merely because its items are all oblique indicators of anxiety, the relationships of each item, or sub-scale, with anxiety should be partialled out in examining their relations with each other and the construct as a whole. Secondly, factor analysis can be employed. Responses to items supposed to represent a disparate construct may be factor-analyzed in the company of responses to an assembly of other items representing other related constructs. The factor loadings should turn out to be grouped in such a way as to show that scales, or candidate scales, under examination are measuring entities demonstrably distinct from each other. The employment of orthogonal rotations is a strong test of this.
(iv) The scales should be standardized on variegated, if not representative, samples of normals.

The application of scales to moderately large samples of this kind may provide norms against which deviant samples can properly be evaluated.

10. Alienation: An Uncertain Construct

The career of attitudinal research into 'alienation' proclaims other kinds of problems in identifying a construct than those encountered in the exploration of authoritarianism.

One problem is unavoidable: attitudinal research can tell only half the story, since alienation is understood as a situation of the individual, defined by objective social conditions, as well as an array of sentiments arising out of this situation. In the nature of things, a dispositional scale can indicate only whether the respondent feels alienated, not whether he is alienated. A full-scale analysis therefore requires an investigation of the respondent's environments of work, leisure and creative activity, as well as measurement of his sentiments. Researchers into alienation or satisfaction in the work situation have not been inclined to the use of dispositional scales, but have sometimes employed extensive questionnaires to gauge workers' attitudes.
These survey instruments are often discursive in character (e.g. Blauner, (1964)¹, and Goldthorpe (1966)).²

The main point at which rigorous attitudinal scales can presently make a contribution to knowledge in the field is in clarifying the degree to which the various subjective sentiments of 'alienation' are empirically associated with each other; that is, in the discovery of whether or not 'alienation', in so far as the term refers to subjective sentiments, is a unitary dispositional construct, or merely a cover term for a variety of unconnected dispositions.

Subjective sentiments, consciously felt in some way by the individual, play a large part in the philosophical literature of alienation, but it is not assumed that he sees them as connected, or that he is aware of his total situation; rather the reverse.

The principal authorities are agreed that a tenacious sense of estrangement from society is central to the concept, arising variously from social breakdown, malfunction or disintegration, systematic tyranny in the social system or the individual's blameworthy incompetence. Marx³ is

concerned with the proletarians' experience of
governmentlessness in a tyrannical and inefficient social
system, the separation of the worker from the product
of his work by complex divisions of labour, an associated
but not identical loss of 'charm' in the work to be done,
and the replacement of personal bonds by the cash nexus.
Men are seen in various postures of despair and discontent,
as the creatures of their own putative creatures. This
conception follows that of Feuerbach and Hegel, who
characterized man as the captive of tyrannical religious
and social ideas which he himself has created and continues
to sustain\(^1\.\) Durkheim, Merton and Parsons\(^2\) explored the
psychological impact of rapid social changes which are
held to sweep away the basis of traditional values and to
leave individuals with a sense of social deregulation, or
'anomie', strangers in an unstructured universe, which
offers both more and less than they do or do not have a right
to expect. 'Anomie' is seen as a particular condition
central to the wider concept of 'alienation'.

These appraisals of the nature of social changes
and the concurrent individual malaise which, it is suggested,
will accompany them, thus incorporate predictions about

the likely attitudes of persons and groups which invite empirical endorsement. It is worth remark that none of the authorities confines his analysis only to attitudes immediate to changes in the social system, that is, to mere judgments by the individual as to whether the system is functioning well or badly. They all pursue notions of the psychological consequences of social tyranny or deregulation, and discuss them as of the same genus as partial awareness of an actual change in the social system. Earlier writers followed the same habits. Vico, a philosopher of history of the mid-eighteenth century, remarked of the people in those new cities which could acquire no coherent civil order '....in the midst of their greatest festivities, though physically thronging together, they live like wild beasts in a deep solitude of spirit and will, scarcely any two being able to agree since each follows his own pleasure or caprice....through obstinate factions and desperate civil wars, they shall turn their cities into forests and the forests into dens and lairs of men.'

Seeman (1959) has presented an analysis of the philosophical literature of alienation which is useful

as a starting point for the construction of items related to alienated sentiments. He proposes five logically distinguishable usages of the term, each of which he re-states, somewhat awkwardly, in the language of learning theory. These are given below, along with a critical appreciation:

(i) **Powerlessness:** 'The expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behaviour cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcements, which he seeks.'

Concern with this aspect of alienation is regarded as stemming from Marx's conception of the wage worker as being 'separated' from the means of production, a conception extended by Weber to other individuals in a modern industrial society, who become functionaries rather than creative agents.

Seeman opines that this meaning need have no normative implication, nor, as a definitional matter, an implication that the individual actually feels frustrated. But this latter interpretation seems untenable. Obviously individuals rarely expect their behaviour to encompass all that they hope for. This meaning can only escape a description of universal disappointments if it is addressed to the frustration of what can in some way be regarded,
by the actor or observer, in the given society, as at least approximate to legitimate aspirations.

This aspect of alienation will therefore be construed as a sentiment of the individual that his legitimate aspirations are being frustrated by an exploiting class, or just a spooky 'They', some sort of personal agency; or to a sentiment of being frustrated by social conditions, perhaps obscurely perceived, i.e. by impersonal agency.

(ii) Meaninglessness: 'Low expectancy that satisfactory predictions about future outcomes of behaviour can be made.'

The language of learning theory is here itself unclear. Seeman proposes also that 'meaninglessness' can be defined as a situation where 'The individual is unclear as to what he ought to believe - when the individual's minimal standards for clarity in decision making are not met.' Mannheim is cited as the chief commentator on this condition, and it is clear that it comprehends moral as much as intellectual confusion.

(iii) Normlessness: 'High expectancy that socially unapproved behaviours are required to achieve given goals.'

The chief commentators cited here are Merton and Goffman; Marx might well have been added. The sentiment is close to that of 'meaninglessness', and indeed can be seen as an outcome of a social condition which engenders
feelings of 'powerlessness' and 'meaninglessness'. 'Normlessness' thus represents a hostility to a purely instrumental attitude to means of achieving social goals, which is seen to be widespread but not formally endorsed by the accepted moral code. This formulation of 'normlessness', like Seeman's conception of 'powerlessness', is very broad, and perhaps could be usefully constrained by emphasis on the Marxian view that meaningful human links are under threat from the development of the cash nexus in society, the replacement of gemeinschaft by gesellschaft.

(iv) **Isolation**: The alienated 'assign low reward value to goals or beliefs that are typically highly valued in the given society'.

Here, Seeman suggests that isolation should be confined to hostility or dissent from the reigning value of society as a whole. This follows from his general view that alienation should be seen in relation only to the macro-society, which has certain difficulties. Firstly, it fails to differentiate adequately his conceptions of 'normlessness' and 'isolation'. Secondly, simple folk commonly perceive an isolation arising out of a lack of common outlook (the core of this sentiment of alienation) as an aspect of their immediate social environment, and
are incapable of making sophisticated judgements about the macro-society; indeed, if subjective alienation is a unitary construct, then a sense of meaninglessness may well prevent this.

This sentiment will therefore be extended to isolation from the smaller social group where this arises out of social distrust or a lack of identification with group norms.

(v) **Self-estrangement**: Alienation in this aspect is defined by Seeman as 'The degree of dependence of the given behaviour upon anticipated future rewards', meaning that an individual may do things not for their own sake. Fromm is quoted as defining the condition as 'a mode of experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien'. What is implied in this somewhat cryptic term is a sense that the individual cannot develop and display an integrated personality which commands his own respect, and is socially driven to a form of role-playing which he privately despises.

* * * * *

Seeman's categories of meaning for the subjective sense of alienation, as modified in the light of this critique, will serve as a basis for the construction of scale items for each sentiment.
Empirical research using measures of subjective alienation and anomia has not yet determined whether or not the five sentiments of alienation discussed above are part of a unitary and unique attitudinal construct. There are two main reasons for this.

(i) With one exception, they have employed all-positive, or nearly all-positive scales and sub-scales, which might be expected to exhibit a spurious unity because of covariance with ARS. However, Neal and Rettig (1963)\(^1\) found a correlation between a paired-alternative measure of 'powerlessness' and a balanced measure of 'normlessness' in a large (n=603) urban sample, which cannot be accounted for by ARS contamination. No relation was found between either of these measures and an all-positive scale tapping anomia, devised by Srole (1956).

The construction of paired-alternative items for the five sentiments, and an examination of their interrelations, is thus indicated for the clarification of the nature of the concept.

(ii) Most of the sentiments of alienation are related to anxiety (see below, Table 6.2). It is thus possible for responses to alienation items to covary with each other for this reason alone. Furthermore, this makes

---

questionable the conception of alienation as a disparate construct, since it could be objected that it may better be regarded as a social modality of anxiety.

The solution to this problem lies in the examination of the relation between measures of alienated sentiments when their covariance with anxiety is removed. This can be done by the method of partial correlations. If the residual correlations between the sub-scales are statistically significant and non-trivial, then the construct can be said to be unitary. Another useful general exercise is the factor analysis of a large number of items designed to measure authoritarianism, alienation, anxiety and ethnocentrism, specifying orthogonal relations, to see whether the factor loadings of the items suggest that these constructs are, in fact, empirically disparate.

11. Ethnocentrism in the Australian Context

Scales constructed overseas for the measurement of ethnocentrism often require extensive adaptation for Australian use, and it seemed better to begin at the beginning. The 'target' minority groups selected were Greeks, Italians and Jews. Japanese were also included, but failed to attract sufficient hostility. Paired-alternative items were invented to relate to social distance from, and intolerance and derogatory misconception of each
target group. Only the last of these sentiments is strictly 'prejudice'.

English and English\(^1\) define ethnocentrism, in its stricter sense as 'a hypothesized syndrome of underlying attitudes that involve the following: division of the social world into in-groups with which one identifies and to which one submits and out-groups to which one is hostile; positive stereotypy of the former and negative stereotypy of the latter; and the arrangement of the in-groups and out-groups into an evaluative hierarchy in which the former are always dominant and the latter always subordinate.' It should be noted that such a syndrome can only be inferred from the scale score, since the scale does not range over all the attitudes spelt out in the above definition; for example, positive stereotypy of the in-group was not included. The intent was to focus the scale content on hostility to, and negative stereotypy of named out-groups.

Not all unfavourable conceptions of identifiable minority groups are untrue. An attempt was made, in constructing item halves which reflected derogatory misconception (stemming, hypothetically, from negative stereotypy) to offer statements with a certain currency,

\(^1\) H.B. English and A.C. English, op. cit., p. 189.
but which were, as far as possible, demonstrably false. These items require some detailed discussion. A general reference should be made to the works by Medding\(^1\) and Price\(^2\), for portraits of the Southern European and Jewish communities. Jupp\(^3\) has a good general discussion of the position of migrants in Australia.

The ethnocentric item-halves of items 5, 6, and 7, set out in Exhibit 6.3, are supposed to reflect derogatory mistake in the case of Italians. Item 5, ('street brawls') obtains its currency from press reports of street brawls between Italian migrants and Australians in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the main, what are now Italian neighbourhoods are peaceful, and Italians have a comparatively low rate of violent crime in Australia.

Item 6 ('turn the districts they live in into slums') appears the reverse of the truth. Down-at-heel neighbourhoods, such as Carlton, in Melbourne, have often in fact been rescued from slum status by the regeneration of their residential and shopping facilities, and the opening of a

\(^{1}\) P.Y. Medding, *From Assimilation to Group Survival*, (Melbourne, 1968).


multiplicity of good cafes by Italian migrants since the mid 1950s.

Item 7 ('admire elegance and good manners') is of course hard to verify, but is apparently true in relation to aspiration. Italian migrants tend often to be deferential to Australians.

Item 11, derogatory of Greeks ('seem to be content with a lower standard of living than most Australians') is contrary to the account of industriousness and attempts at upward social mobility given by Price.

Item 12, derogatory (by implication) of Southern Europeans generally ('will take over the country') is intended to be violent in tone and wildly untrue, as Southern Europeans mainly enter the lower ranks of the manual work force, and are not prominent in non-migrant organizations. Greeks have a greater tendency than Italians to aspire to higher education, but they are not numerous in Universities.

Items 15-17 refer to derogatory misconceptions of Jews.

Item 15 ('have too much power and influence') is, in its literal sense, unverifiable, since what is 'too much' must be a value judgement. If it is loosely construed to mean a 'great deal of influence', or a 'dominant influence,' it does not seem to be true, since, whilst Jews
are disproportionately numerous in petty commerce, the professions and academic life, they do not command much influence in banking, big industry, the stock exchange or politics.

Item 16 ('If Jewish people are interested in education, it is probably so they can use it to make more money') has an element of truth, as one quickly sees if one substitutes 'Australians' for 'Jewish people.' However, as in Jewish communities elsewhere in the world, the traditional Jewish reverence for scholarly endeavour and 'high' culture is evident. There is ardent patronage of the theatre, and support of chamber music organizations, for example. The other half of this item ('place great value on education and culture') is a fairer statement.

Item 17 ('are less honest and public-spirited than most') is in its first part the least verifiable derogatory statement, except through some highly unlikely programme of situational tests. To endorse it, however, would seem to entail at least a hazardous extension of impressions gained from limited experience. The latter part ('[less] public-spirited') is contradicted by the many honours bestowed on notable Jews for public service, such as the one-time Governor-General, Sir Isaac Isaacs.

On Item 18, ('seem to keep their money for their own charities') there is contrary public evidence. Each year,
in Melbourne, the press publishes donations given in places of public worship on Hospital Sunday, when money is raised for all hospitals, secular and religious. In 1966, the year of the survey, the five Hebrew congregations gave more, in absolute terms, than the total of Catholic contributions to this appeal, and an amount comparable with that of each of the three major Protestant denominations. Thus Jewish people gave, proportionately, a much greater amount than others.¹

Of the other items of the ethnocentrism scale, No. 1 is a 'soft' lead-in mentioning 'migrants', so that the intention of the scale is not too loudly proclaimed. Items 2 and 3 refer to intolerance of Italians; item 4 to social distance from Italians. Items 8 and 9 refer to intolerance of Greeks; item 10 to social distance from Greeks. Item 13 refers to intolerance of Jews; item 14 to social distance from Jews.

Nine of the eighteen items of the ethnocentrism scale thus have some delusional content, and the scale therefore reflects an important element of the underlying syndrome: distortion in perception of the external world.

12. Applications

12.1. What follows is a necessarily brief account of an

¹ The Age, 24 October, 1966.
application of the solutions proposed above. Three forced-choice measures of authoritarianism, alienation and ethnocentrism were constructed in two stages, the first employing a captive sample of Public Servants, the second a sample of metropolitan voters. Standardisation data for the three scales are set out in Tables 6.7, 6.9, 6.11 and 6.13, at the conclusion of this chapter.

12.2. Stage I

12.2.1. Subjects: 155 Fourth Division Public Servants, consisting of 86 Linesmen-in-training at the P.M.G.'s Schools of Lines in Melbourne and Sydney and 12 additional trainees at the School of Lines in Melbourne; 34 Clerical Assistants in Melbourne; and 23 P.M.G. Clerks-in-training at Sydney.

12.2.2. Materials:

(i) Candidate alienation items: 30 forced-choice items were administered, constructed ad hoc to reflect the various sentiments of alienation discussed above. Those which survived statistical analysis are to be found in Exhibit 6.2. Their manifest content was intended to relate to the sentiments of alienation as follows:

  (i) Powerlessness; impersonal agency:
      Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11.

  (ii) Powerlessness; personal agency:
       Nos. 3, 6, 8, 12.

  (iii) Meaninglessness:
       Nos. 16, 17, 18.
(iv) Normlessness:
Nos. 13, 14, 15.

(v) Isolation:
Nos. 19, 20, 21, 22, 24.

(vi) Self-estrangement:
No. 23.

This classification did not pre-suppose that the items would cluster empirically in precisely the same way, if clusters were discernible; it was merely intended as a logical basis for their inclusion in the scale. The perception of their groupings by respondents could, and did, diverge somewhat from the classification above.

(ii) Candidate authoritarianism items: 26 forced-choice items were administered, consisting of 26 original F Scale items and 26 reversals drawn from the various reversed scales and constructed \textit{ad hoc}, with the intention of providing reversed half-items which had a 'tone' similar to the positive halves. Those which survived the procedures of the statistical refinement set out below are given in Exhibit 6.2, below.

(iii) Candidate ethnocentrism items: 25 forced-choice items were administered, constructed \textit{ad hoc} to suit the special requirements of Australian ethnocentrism. They are described above, in detail, at Section 11. They are set out in Exhibit 6.3.
An anxiety measure: This consisted of 20 items randomly abstracted from Cattell's 40-item IPAT measure of anxiety,\(^1\) under the constraint of preserving the proportion contributed by each of the sub-scales. This is a 'balanced' instrument. These items are set out in the Confidential Appendix to this thesis.

12.2.3. Procedure:

(i) Administration method: The scales were administered to groups at one sitting, each respondent filling in a questionnaire on which the scale items appeared, by himself. At the head of each scale were instructions urging him to avoid an 'undecided' response. Greeks, Italians, Jews and respondents with incomplete questionnaires were removed, leaving a sample of 155.

(ii) Method of analysis: Each item pool for the three scales, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and alienation, was considered separately.

To gain admission to the first two scales, a candidate had to satisfy the following requirements:

(a) The 'split' in the sample had to be 80/20 or better.

---

\(^1\) R.B. Cattell, *IPAT Self-Analysis Form*, Melbourne, 1957. (Published by the Australian Council for Educational Research by arrangement with The Institute for Personality and Ability Testing, Champaign, Illinois, U.S.A.)
(b) The percentage 'undecided' had to be low: 10 per cent or less.

(c) The correlation with the raw score on other candidate items had to be statistically significant at the .05 level, i.e. for \( n=155 \), .16 or more.

In order to gain admission to the alienation (A) scale, a candidate item had to satisfy the following requirements:

(a) The split in the sample had to be 85/15 or better. This is a slightly more liberal requirement than for the F and E Scales, and can be justified by the much higher mean item-total score coefficient (even when covariance with anxiety is partialled out).

(b) The percentage 'undecided' had to be 10 per cent or less.

(c) The first-order item-raw score coefficient had to be significant.

(d) The item-raw score coefficient had to remain significant when the covariance of each item and the raw score on the remaining items with the anxiety measure was withdrawn, by the method of partial correlations.

These steps, with exception of the last for the A Scale,
represent a conventional correlational analysis, which is designed to ensure that each item functions adequately in making discriminations. Step (d) for the A Scale is an innovation.

12.2.4. Results:

These operations excluded 10 of the candidate F Scale items, leaving 16; 7 of the candidate E Scale items, leaving 13; and 4 of the 30 candidate A Scale items, leaving 26.

12.2.5. Discussion

The small number of items which the step (d) for the A Scale excluded (two) show that there is a substantial degree of cohesiveness between the items, which cannot be attributed to their covariance with anxiety. It does not prove that alienation is a unitary construct, since it is not yet established that the items do not form disparate and independent clusters within the putative A Scale.

12.3. Stage II

12.3.1. Subjects:

Subjects were 355 voters in Melbourne and Sydney, drawn from an original 200 in each city. The sampling and interviewing methods have been explained in Chapter Three.

12.3.2. Materials:

The remaining A, F and E candidate items were
administered, together with the 20-item adaptation of the IPAT anxiety measure, along with many political questions.

12.3.3. **Procedure:**

(i) **Administration method:** this is set out in Section 13.

(ii) **Method of analysis:**

(a) A factor analysis of the 60 A, F and E candidate items in company with the 20 anxiety items. A four-factor solution, employing varimax procedures with orthogonal rotations and the insertion of communalities in the diagonals, was specified. The purpose of this was to examine the degree to which the constructs were empirically distinguishable. Extensive cross loading would have destroyed the hypothesis that the constructs were disparate. To explore the variety in the data more fully, varimax principal components analyses, extracting 6 and then 10 orthogonal components, were later carried out. The principal components analyses are described in Chapter Seven.

(b) The 24 items of the A Scale which emerged from the above operations were factor analysed (using varimax procedures) stipulating five orthogonal factors. The items loading more heavily on each
factor were treated as sub-scales related to the five factors. The first-order relations of each of these sub-scales to anxiety and ethnocentrism were examined, and their relation with each other, when the common variance with anxiety was removed by the method of partial correlations, was determined. This was a further test of the discreteness and unitary character of the alienation construct.

(c) Three scales, which would reflect a positional response set, if one existed, were computed from the A, F and E Scales. The respondent scored 1 each time he chose the first option of a pair of half-items, and 0 if he did not do so. Product-moment relations between Positional Response Set Scales 1, 2 and 3, drawn from the A, F and E Scales respectively, were then computed. The order of magnitude of the correlations would indicate whether or not this set was present, and if so, whether it was of negligible, low or substantial magnitude.

(d) A conventional correlational analysis was then performed to determine the reliabilities of each scale; the mean interitem correlations; and the relation of each F item with Ethnocentrism. Medians and quartiles were also determined. These standardisation data are set out in Tables 6.7, 6.9, 6.11 and 6.13.
(e) Product-moment correlations between all four scales were then computed.

12.3.4. Results

(a) The result of the four-factor varimax analysis of the 80 scale items is set out in Table 6.1.

TABLE 6.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Items, Nos:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Candidate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F Items, Nos:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>F Items, Nos:</td>
<td>E Items, Nos:</td>
<td>Anxiety Items, Nos:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I (Alienation)</td>
<td>II (Eth.)</td>
<td>III (Anxiety)</td>
<td>IV (F)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>-.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>-.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 6.1 (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Alienation)</td>
<td>(Eth.)</td>
<td>(Anxiety)</td>
<td>(F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety Items, Nos:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>-.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The principal components analyses extracted at first 6 components, and then 10. The latter was treated as the most convenient device for the definition of sub-scales.

As all items were required to belong to one or other of these, as meaningful elements of a construct, the 10 principal components also governed the final admission of all candidate items to the A, F and E Scales. Items (a) and (b) of the candidate items were more closely related to the 'intra-punitive' sub-scale of anxiety, than to the sub-scales of the A Scale; items (c) and (d) more to the 'extra-punitive' sub-scale of anxiety than to the sub-scales of the F measure; item (e) more closely related to the anti-Semitism Scale of the E Scale than to either of the F sub-scales. These items((a) - (e)) were therefore excluded from all scales and sub-scales.

The anxiety measure was retained in its original form.
(b) Five sub-scales of the A Scale were defined by a five-factor varimax analysis of the 24 A items alone. Each factor was taken to represent a sub-scale of alienation (distinct from but related to the sub-scales which emerged from the principal components analysis), and items were allotted to the various sub-scales on the basis of their highest factor loading. The sub-scales were constituted as in Table 6.2. Their principal conceptual referent is indicated on the basis of those elements in each sub-scale most closely bearing on their a priori classification. The correlations of each sub-scale with the Anxiety and E measures are also given.

**TABLE 6.2 (a)**

The Alienation Sub-scales: Conceptual Referents, and Correlations with Anxiety and E Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-scale No.</th>
<th>Conceptual Referent</th>
<th>Conceptual Relation with Anxiety (Product-moment correlations)</th>
<th>Conceptual Relation with Ethnocentrism (Product-moment correlations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: 1,3,7,10,11,16</td>
<td>Powerlessness: (impersonal agency)</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: 13,14,15</td>
<td>Normlessness</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: 5,17,18,23,24</td>
<td>Meaninglessness and self-estrangement</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: 19,20,21</td>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: 2,4,6,8,9,12</td>
<td>Powerlessness: (personal agency)</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) For a sample of this size (n=355). All
correlations at or above .11 are significant at the 5 per cent level and denoted by one asterisk. Those significant at the one per cent level (at or above .14) are denoted by two asterisks.

The relations between the Alienation Sub-scales are exhibited in Table 6.3.

TABLE 6.3

Relations between the Alienation Sub-scales
(Product-moment correlations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>.39**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.58**</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.53**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.54**</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The residual relations between the Alienation Sub-scales when their mutual correlations with the Anxiety Scale are partialled out are given in Table 6.4.

TABLE 6.4

Partial Correlations between the Alienation Sub-scales
(Covariance with Anxiety Withdrawn)
(Product-moment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.50**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The correlations between the three 'positional response set' scores described above are depicted in Table 6.5.
TABLE 6.5

Correlations between Positional Response Set Scales (Product-moment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Standardisation and item data for all scales are set out below in Tables 6.7 to 6.14.

(e) Correlations between all four substantive scales are given in Table 6.6.

TABLE 6.6

Correlations between Four Psychological Dispositions (Product-moment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alienation</th>
<th>Authoritarianism</th>
<th>Anxiety</th>
<th>Ethnocentrism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alienation</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.40**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnocentrism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12.3.5. Discussion

The pattern of factor loadings in Table 6.1 are 'bunched' within domains located by the putative scale items; there is little cross-loading. These data support the view that four disparate constructs corresponding to those ostensibly defined by the candidate scale items are being measured. The scales were purified by the exclusion of those items which were shown to be ambivalent by a further principal components analysis.
Although the perception of the grouping of the alienation items by respondents differed somewhat from that advanced a priori, the sub-scales defined by a separate factor analysis of these seemed meaningful and related to the sentiments of alienation considered in the philosophical literature. However, the few 'self-estrangement' items tended to be lost through unevenness of response split, or a covariance attributable only to a common relation with anxiety. When the moderate relations between all five sub-scales are assaulted by withdrawing covariance attributable to the common relation with anxiety, they retain relations of about the same order. This emphasizes that the empirical cohesiveness of the construct of 'subjective alienation' cannot be caused by a common loading of alienated sentiments with anxiety, except perhaps for 'self-estrangement'. One function of all sentiments associated with alienation is production of ethnocentrism.

The significant but statistically trivial correlations between the three indices of positional response set indicate that it is of negligible importance in influencing scores on any of the three forced-choice scales tested on this sample.

The overall relations between the four psychological
constructs indicates that both authoritarianism and alienation predict to ethnocentrism and that alienation is heavily laden with anxiety. There is no significant relation between authoritarianism and anxiety. This failure to demonstrate an implication of the hypothesized genotypical basis for authoritarianism suggests that the defence mechanisms of the high F scorer may be quite as efficient in reducing internal conflicts capable of generating anxiety as those of the low F scorer.

The absence of a significant correlation between the F and Alienation Scales suggests that the relation observed in previous research may have been an artifact of response set infection of the scales.

The reliabilities of the Alienation and Ethnocentrism Scales are satisfactory. The reliability of the F Scale is only moderate, and further research will be required in expanding it for general use. As it stands, it may be a useful 'core' instrument. Eleven of the thirteen items of this F Scale predict significantly to the E Scale.

The purpose of the empirical section of this paper has been to illustrate the application of various devices for overcoming difficulties in measuring psychological dispositions speculatively considered in the theoretical section. The three scales developed by their application are intended for research use.
13. A Note on Administration of the Scales

The best form of administration is face-to-face, with the interviewee (if literate) holding cards on which the items appear in sequence. The interviewer should read each pair of statements in turn, from a questionnaire which he holds, after the introductory remarks which appear above each scale. 'Can't decide' is a permissible, although undesirable, response, and should be included in the questionnaire only, NOT on the cards. Scoring should be 2 for starred alternatives, 1 for 'can't decide' and 0 for unstarred alternatives. The stars should not, of course, appear either on the cards or the questionnaire. The scales should be given only non-committal titles such as Questionnaires 1, 2 and 3; not 'Alienation', etc.

14. Exhibits of Scale Items

EXHIBIT 6.1

The Alienation Scale
(Questionnaire 1)

Now on this card, you will find pairs of statements about social opinions. Would you choose the statement out of each pair which expresses your own feelings better? Just say (A) or (B). Even if you find it hard to choose, just say which statement better expresses whatever slight preference you have.
1. A) Our community is an easy and pleasant place to live in.  
   B) Our community is a difficult place to live in.*

2. A) In this society, people seem to get to the top mainly by chance or good fortune.*  
   B) In this society, the better people mostly get to the top.

3. A) Mostly, people are fair in their dealings with me.  
   B) I often feel I am not fairly treated.*

4. A) Nowadays, a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.*  
   B) It is quite possible to plan one's life ahead with confidence.

5. A) In this society, most people can find contentment.  
   B) For most people, the society we live in breeds discontent.*

6. A) Often, people don't appreciate it when you do good work.*  
   B) People usually appreciate it when you do good work.

7. A) I sometimes feel my life is being pushed in directions where I don't want to go.*  
   B) Usually, I can control what happens in my own life.

8. A) My work is of real benefit to me.  
   B) In my work, I feel exploited by other people.*
9. A) I often feel I am only a cog in a big machine.*
   B) In lots of important matters, my decision can affect what happens.

10. A) It's easy to find a job worth doing.
     B) It's hard to find a job worth doing.*

11. A) I can normally do what I want to do in today's set-up.
     B) In today's set-up, I often feel frustrated and prevented from doing what I want to do.*

12. A) In getting ahead in life, it's not what you know that counts, it's who you know.*
     B) What counts in getting ahead is hard work and talent.

13. A) In this society, money will get you anywhere.*
     B) In this society, people's respect for your character will get you a long way.

14. A) Most members of parliament and city councillors are sympathetic people and do a good job.
     B) Most politicians and city councillors are only in politics for what they can get out of it, and are not much good.*

15. A) For most people these days it is more important to make money than to make friends.*
     B) For most people, it is more important to make friends than to make money.
EXHIBIT 6.1 (Cont.)

16. A) The individual these days has a good chance of finding sensible moral standards to live by.
   B) There is a lot of confusion about moral standards these days.*

17. A) Life seems to be rather meaningless.*
    B) On the whole, life makes good sense to me.

18. A) Life has a clear purpose.
    B) There is no clear purpose in life.*

19. A) You have to be careful otherwise people will take advantage of you.*
    B) Most people are quite trustworthy.

20. A) Most people are willing to help someone in need.
    B) In this society people often don't care what happens to others.*

21. A) These days, a person doesn't really know who he can count on.*
    B) You can usually be sure who you can count on.

22. A) I seldom feel lonely.
    B) I often feel lonely.*

23. A) People usually accept and welcome you just as you really are.
    B) With most people, you have to put on a bit of an act.*
24. A) I don't really feel at home in any group of people.*
    B) I really feel at home with the people I mix with.

EXHIBIT 6.2

The Authoritarianism Scale
(Questionnaire 2)

Here are pairs of statements on other social issues.
Would you do the same thing as before, say which statement
you prefer, out of each pair?
Just say (A) or (B). Just choose whichever statement better
expresses your own feelings.

1. A) Obedience and respect for authority are the most
    important virtues children should learn.*
    B) Obedience and respect for authority are not the most
    important things to teach children.

2. A) If people spent more time talking about ideas just
    for the fun of it, everybody would be better off.
    B) If people would talk less and work more, everybody
    would be better off.*

3. A) The artist and the professor are much more important
    to society than the businessman and the manufacturer.
    B) The businessman and the manufacturer are much more
    important to society than the artist and the professor.*
EXHIBIT 6.2 (Cont.)

4. A) The findings of science may some day show that many of our most cherished beliefs are wrong.
   B) Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.*

5. A) Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.*
   B) If it weren't for the rebellious ideas of youth there would be less progress in the world.

6. A) No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or relative.*
   B) A sane, normal, decent person might have to hurt a close friend or relative.

7. A) What the young people really need most is freedom to find themselves, to be creative and sensitive and happy, instead of drudging or learning military discipline.
   B) What the youth needs is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.*

8. A) People who commit sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, should be considered mentally ill instead of being severely punished.
   B) Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.*

9. A) There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.*
   B) Honest people must admit to themselves that they have sometimes hated their parents.
EXHIBIT 6.2 (Cont.)

10. A) Most problems in the society we live in could be reduced by more education.
    B) Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of the immoral, crooked, and feeble-minded people.*

11. A) Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished.*
    B) It's nobody's business if someone is a homosexual as long as he doesn't harm other people.

12. A) It's all right for people to raise questions about even the most sacred matters.
    B) Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question.*

13. A) Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private.*
    B) Study and discussion of what used to be thought personal and private matters is a good thing.

EXHIBIT 6.3

The Ethnocentrism Scale
(Questionnaire 3)

This card has pairs of statements about various nationalities and groups of people in Australia. Would you choose from each pair the statement which expresses your own feelings BETTER? Again, just say (A) or (B).
EXHIBIT 6.3 (Cont.)

If you find it hard to decide, just make a snap choice.

1. A) On the whole, the intake of a large number of migrants from Southern Europe has been a good thing for this country.
   B) The intake of a large number of emigrants from Southern Europe has not been so good for this country.*

2. A) It is a bad thing that the Italians keep to their own neighbourhoods, and do not live like most Australians.*
   B) It is a good thing that the Italians can keep their own customs in this country.

3. A) When Italian people move into a district, they often spoil it for others.*
   B) Italian people should be welcome in any district.

4. A) I wouldn't mind if an Italian married into my own family.
   B) I wouldn't want an Italian to marry into my own family.*

5. A) Italian migrants are more likely to start street brawls than Australians.*
   B) Italians are not more likely to start street brawls than Australians.

6. A) The Italian communities have made the districts they live in brighter and more pleasant places.
   B) Italians mostly turn the districts they live in into slums.*
7. A) Italians admire elegance and good manners.  
    B) Italians don't seem to place much importance on 
        good manners and careful dressing.*

8. A) When Greek people move into a district, they often 
    spoil it for others.*
    B) Greek people should be welcome in any district.

9. A) It is a bad thing that the Greeks keep to their own 
    neighbourhoods, and do not live like most Australians.
    B) It is a good thing that the Greeks can keep their 
        own customs in this country.

10. A) I wouldn't mind if a Greek married into my own 
    family.  
    B) I wouldn't want a Greek to marry into my own family.*

11. A) Greeks mostly try to improve their standard of 
    living.  
    B) Greeks seem to be content with a lower standard of 
        living than most Australians.*

12. A) Australians had better look out, or they will find 
    that the Southern Europeans will take over the 
    country.*  
    B) Migrants from Southern Europe have added much of 
        value to this country.

13. A) When Jewish people move into a district, they often 
    spoil it for others.*  
    B) Jewish people should be welcome in any district.
EXHIBIT 6.3 (Cont.)

14. A) I wouldn't mind if a Jew married into my own family.  
   B) I wouldn't want a Jew to marry into my own family.*

15. A) Jewish people have too much power and influence in this country.*  
   B) The Jews do not have too much power and influence in this country.

16. A) Many Jewish people place great value on education and culture.  
   B) If Jewish people are interested in education, it is probably so they can use it to make more money.*

17. A) The Jews are as valuable, honest and public spirited citizens as any other group.  
   B) The Jews are less honest and public spirited than most.*

18. A) Jewish people seem to keep their money for their own charities.*  
   B) Jewish people give generously to other charities beside their own.

EXHIBIT 6.4

Rejected Candidate Scale Items

A: (a) A) It's often difficult to see why people and organizations act as they do.*  
     B) It's usually plain why people and organizations act as they do.
EXHIBIT 6.4 (Cont.)

(b) A) I am happy to be as I am.
B) I often wish I was somebody else.*

F: (c) A) People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong.*
B) People cannot be divided into two distinct classes - like the weak and the strong.

(d) A) The more you get to know people, the more you get to like them.
B) Familiarity breeds contempt.*

(e) A) Nowadays, when so many different kinds of people move around and mix together so much, a person has to protect himself especially carefully against catching an infection or disease from them.*
B) Even though all sorts of people mix together nowadays, a person should not be finicky about catching a disease from any of them.
Standardisation Data for the Alienation, Authoritarianism, Ethnocentrism and Anxiety Scales.¹

TABLE 6.7

Standardisation Data for the Alienation Scale

| Reliability (parallel forms method): | .681 |
| Range (possible): | 0-48 |
| Mean: | 12.35 |
| Standard deviation: | 8.79 |
| Median: | 10.5 |

Quartiles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Raw Score</th>
<th>% Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High: 18-48</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle (11-17 range: (6-10)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low: 0-5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 6.8

Item Characteristics of the Alienation Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>% 'Alienated' response</th>
<th>% 'Can't decide'</th>
<th>Mean Correlation with other Items (φ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.19**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Some 'criterion group' validation data for the alienation scale, drawn from psychiatric patients and convicts, is presented in Appendix 4 to this thesis.
### TABLE 6.8 (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>% 'Alienated' response</th>
<th>% 'Can't decide'</th>
<th>Mean Correlation with other Items ((\bar{\rho}))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(0.17^{**} = \text{Mean inter-item Correlation.}\)

### TABLE 6.9

**Standardisation Data for the Authoritarianism Scale**

Reliability (parallel forms method): \(0.509\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Raw Score</th>
<th>% Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>17-26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle range:</td>
<td>(14-16)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>0-8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(=100\%\)
TABLE 6.10

Item Characteristics of the Authoritarianism Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>'Authoritarianism' response</th>
<th>'Can't decide'</th>
<th>Mean Correlation with other Items</th>
<th>Correlation with E Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

.15** = Mean inters. Correlation.
.17** = Mean item correlation.

TABLE 6.11

Standardisation Data for the Ethnocentrism Scale

Reliability (parallel forms method): .787
Range (possible): 0-36
Mean: 11.58
Standard deviation: 7.74
Median: 10.5
Quartiles: Raw Score % Sample

High: 17-36 23
Middle range: (11-16) 26
Low: (6-10) 28

=100%
### TABLE 6.12

**Item Characteristics of the Ethnocentrism Scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>% Ethnocentric response</th>
<th>% 'Can't decide'</th>
<th>Mean Correlation with other Items (Ø)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>.21</strong> Mean Inter-item Correlation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 6.13

**Standardisation Data for the Anxiety Scale**

- **Reliability (parallel forms method):** .552
- **Range (possible):** 0-40
- **Mean:** 11.66
- **Standard deviation:** 6.05
- **Median:** 11.5
- **Quartiles:**
  - **High:** 17-40
  - **Middle range:** (12-16) (8-11)
  - **Low:** 0-7
- **Raw Score:** % Sample
  - **High:** 29
  - **Middle:** 23
  - **Low:** 26
  - **=100%**
TABLE 6.14  
Item Characteristics of the Anxiety Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>% Anxious response</th>
<th>% Intermediate response</th>
<th>Mean Correlation with other Items (φ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean = .11*  
Inter-item Correlation
7.1. Introduction

The preceding chapter has advanced the argument of this thesis by describing the development of adequate measurement scales for the psychological constructs with which we are concerned. It is now possible to proceed with greater confidence in charting the social incidence of these dispositional constructs, their interrelations, and, after the structure of political opinion has been explored in Chapter Eight, to investigate their relation to the various dimensions of political attitudes, to perceptions of politically relevant subjects, to voting choice and reasons for voting choice. The concern of this chapter is to pause, before doing so, to analyse the dispositional constructs in more detail, and, in particular, to discuss alienation in a more discursive way. A primary purpose is to attempt some answer to the 'nagging questions' of a general kind referred to by Aberbach in a recent paper¹ on the politics of alienation: 'Which part of the composite

index is causing the relationships described or, better, how does each indicator relate to the various dependent variables? One might also ask: 'How much does the empirical evidence on the particular conception of alienation adopted in this thesis tell about alienation conceived otherwise?'

It will also be argued that alienation (as estrangement), ethnocentrism and anxiety can be usefully viewed as a 'triptich' of dispositions in which alienation is causally dominant. In interaction, these three dispositions constitute a system which will be named after its prime motor: it will be called the 'alienation triptich'. As an analytical device, it provides a useful summation and a partial explanation of the dispositions found in 'cultures of poverty', for example.

This chapter will also explore variations in the inter-correlations of dispositions between different social groups.

A note might conveniently be offered here on the various statistical devices employed in analysing the data and the presentation of findings. Where possible product-moment correlations have been computed; but, since a large number of correlations have had to be computed by calculator, it has often been found more convenient to
use the tetrachoric coefficient, estimated as before by using Davidoff and Goheen's table as reprinted in Edwards and corrected for unevenness of marginal split, where necessary, by Jenkins' method. The level set for statistical significance throughout this thesis is .05. Where a correlation is significant at this level, a single asterisk accompanies it; when the probability is less than .01, two asterisks do so.

A problem arises in assessing the probability of the tetrachoric coefficient. On the one hand, Guilford notes that 'under the appropriate conditions, it gives a coefficient that is numerically equivalent to a Pearson r and may be regarded as an approximation to it.' One of the appropriate conditions, a roughly median split for both variables, is met in most cases of its use in this thesis, or when this is not so, its absence is compensated by Jenkins' correction. Another, that the sample be

---


relatively large, is not met with the same satisfaction, but in nearly all cases the sample exceeds 100. It therefore seems not unreasonable to attach to the tetrachoric the same probability values as for the product-moment correlation, as given in Fisher's table as reprinted in Edwards\(^1\), provided that these are treated with reserve, and that Guilford's cautionary note on the greater variability of the standard error of the tetrachoric is borne in mind: 'The tetrachoric r is less reliable than the Pearson r, being at least 50 per cent more variable ... to attain the same degree of reliability as the Pearson r, one needs twice the number of cases in a sample' (my emphasis). In an investigation of the type of this thesis, which involves the exploration of much untrodden ground, particularly in looking for variations in correlation, a generous estimate of significance seems appropriate, and so, with the above reservations, the levels of significance for the product-moment correlation have been assigned to the tetrachoric coefficient.

On the other hand, considerable uncertainty arises in its use when, for example, the difference between two

tetrachoric coefficients from two independent samples is tested by Fisher's \( Z_r \) transformation.\(^1\) In all such cases, when both coefficients have, in the first instance, differed significantly from zero, the significance of the difference between the two groups has been retested by a more rigorous procedure. The frequencies displayed in the two four-cell tables for each groups have been collapsed in the following manner:

EXHIBIT 7.1 (a) (b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method of Collapsing Data from Two Four-Cell Tables to One</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) 'high' and 'low' mean above and below the median of the total sample

(b) Frequencies, are, of course, entered in the four cells.

This permits testing of the significance of the difference by chi-square.

These procedures seem to preserve the generosity desirable in assigning significance in an exploratory work of this kind, whilst maintaining the appropriate degree of rigour.\(^2\) They are directed towards the avoidance


\(^2\) I am grateful for the advice of Mr. W.K. Bartlett, of the Psychology Department, University of Melbourne, in two personal communications (on 11 December 1967, and 23 January 1970), in arriving at a decision to employ these procedures.
of both Type I errors (rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true) and Type II errors (accepting the null hypothesis when it is false), but with greater emphasis on the avoidance of Type II, i.e. (usually) overlooking a real variation in the data.

In cross-tabulations, a combination of simplicity in exposition and stringency in analysis has been attempted. This seemed best realized by the presentation of percentage tables, accompanied by the probability value obtained by a chi-square test of the frequencies on which the table is based, collapsed to a four-cell table. When a probability value is less than .10, and this seems of any importance, this is also indicated: 'approaching significance' here always refers to a probability value between .10 and .05. Occasionally, extreme groups, e.g. in educational level, are used to test the significance of apparent differences.

Beneath each cross-tabulation, the number is the total sample involved is also given.

In Section 9 of this chapter, figures are used to depict the relations of dispositions to 'background' variables such as income of the householder. Probability values derived from the original frequency tables are again displayed below each figure.
7.2. Ethnocentrism and Anxiety: The Partial Correlation

Covariance between the alienation and anxiety scales is substantial enough to give rise to a non-independent correlation between anxiety and ethnocentrism (displayed in Table 6.6). However, when covariance with alienation is withdrawn by the method of partial correlations, anxiety has no relation to ethnocentrism. The residual correlation is only .03. The commonly held notion that insecurity gives rise to aggressive behaviour thus finds no confirmation here, however true it might be in some circumstances.

7.3. The Effect on the Product-Moment of Constriction of Variance

The standardisation data for the four dispositional scales, set out in Tables 6.7, 6.9, 6.11 and 6.13, indicate that the distribution of the raw scores on the alienation, anxiety and ethnocentrism scales are all positively skewed, with most respondents scoring low, i.e. below the arithmetic mean, particularly on the first two. The distribution of scores on the anxiety scale is leptokurtic relative to the other three. If all four distributions were normalized, some elevation of the correlations could therefore be expected, since three of the four variances would be greater. Quartile scores for all four dispositions, and the tetrachoric correlations between them were computed.
Since the tetrachoric assumes a normal distribution, some inflation of the correlations should follow, if the foregoing argument is correct. Table 7.1 sets out both the tetrachoric correlations between the scales and the product-moment (in brackets):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Alienation</th>
<th>Authoritarianism</th>
<th>Anxiety</th>
<th>Ethnocentrism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alienation</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.16** (.08)</td>
<td>.47** (.41**)</td>
<td>.35** (.36**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>.16** (.08)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.43** (.40**)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety</td>
<td>.35** (.36**)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.16** (.17**)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnocentrism</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) n=352 for the tetrachoric.  
n=355 for the product-moment

It seems that there is a little in this argument, but not much. The variances of the raw scores were not greatly constricted. The point of chief interest is the emergence of the significant correlation between authoritarianism and alienation, which as we shall see in Section 11 of this chapter, is specific to the more educated third of the sample. It is discussed in that section.

7.3. The Principal Components Analyses and the Development of Sub-Scales of the Dispositions

The result of the four-factor varimax analysis of the
80 scale items administered to the Melbourne-Sydney sample has been set out in Chapter Six, the item loadings in Table 6.1. As noted in Section 12.3.3. of that chapter, further principal components analyses were carried out, extracting at first 6 components, and then 10. The latter was used to develop sub-scales of the dispositions. There are two reasons for describing briefly the outcome of these analyses here. The first is that in their use to develop sub-scales, they make possible a more detailed picture of the relations of the elements of the major constructs. The second is that since all items of the major scales were required to belong to a sub-scale, so as to constitute a meaningful element of a construct, the account of the development of the sub-scales completes the history of the development of the major scales.

There is no special virtue residing in the numbers 6 and 10; although, of course, there was a special significance in at first extracting 4 factors, and using varimax procedures, with orthogonal rotations, since this was a strong test of the initial hypothesis that 4 disparate constructs were measured by the items. The absence of much cross-loading and the 'bunching' of factor loadings within their appropriate domains was consistent with the initial hypothesis. The purpose of pursuing the investigation with principal components analyses was simply
to penetrate the data further with the powerful techniques available.

Principal components analysis, as opposed to factor analysis, attempts to explain total variance, and not merely common variance. It is attractive in that it permits variety in the data to exhibit itself more fully; 'warts and all,' so to speak.¹ The components are orthogonal and the eigenvalue of all extracted in both exceeds unity, so that none are trivial. The pattern of the component loadings in each analysis suggested that the best imaginative conception of the unfolding picture was a branching-out of the original four constructs, which in turn sprang from and disclosed their internal structure. Thus, ethnocentrism 'branched out' into groups of items which reflected (a) social distance from, and distrust of Greeks and Italians, (b) fear and distrust of Jews and (c) an assimilationist attitude (as opposed to one favouring integration) towards Southern Europeans. The candidate authoritarianism items displayed two major groupings, one emphasizing respect and obedience, the other anti-intellectualism and a punitive tendency, which,

could be dubbed 'ego-defensiveness.' The branching of the alienation and anxiety items was more complex. If one conceives the process of stipulating more and more components as one which increases pressure on a construct to 'branch out', then alienation must be considered resilient and resistant to pressure: most items remained loaded on the first principal component (these reflecting powerlessness and isolation); some exhibited a complex pattern of both positive and negative loading on a component most clearly related to anxiety; and some, chiefly those on the normlessness and meaninglessness sub-scales (defined by the varimax 5-factor analysis of the alienation items considered alone, reported in Chapter Six) were loaded on the last component extracted. The anxiety items drawn from Cattell's IPAT anxiety measure formed three groups: one where the respondent expressed personal inadequacies and confessed to small faults, seeming to reflect an intra-punitive tendency; one where the items chiefly consisted of physiological symptoms of anxiety, such as insomnia; and one where the items in some way depreciated other people or expressed lack of engagement with a supportive social environment, seeming to express an extra-punitive tendency.

The items of the alienation, authoritarianism and
ethnocentrism scales which survived this analysis are set out in Exhibits 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 of Chapter Six; the anxiety items, which were retained in toto, are copyright, and, as it is customary to safeguard their status by non-publication, they are displayed only in Exhibit 1 in the Confidential Appendix (of which they constitute the entire subject-matter). They can be identified readily by their numbers. Those candidate items (denoted by letters (a) to (e) in Table 6.1) which did not survive the analysis are given in Exhibit 6.4.

The procedure for constructing the sub-scales (one for each principal component extracted) was as follows:

1. The group of items which loaded most clearly and unambiguously on each component was identified. Thus, for example, component I was related to those alienation items which reflected powerlessness and isolation; component II to those items to do with Southern Europeans, Greeks or Italians, which implied social distance or distrust, and also on one item expressing a similar sentiment (but not fear) towards Jews; component 3 to the 'intra-punitive' items of the anxiety scale and so on. Only in one case did a component relate clearly to a substantial number of items of two scales; this was one which related to the items expressing the physiological symptoms of anxiety,
but on which some alienation items had moderate loadings, both positive and negative. Since its most unambiguous relation was to the anxiety items, it was regarded as representing an element of that construct. Each component was therefore able to be treated as the basis of a sub-scale of a construct.

(ii) Having determined the construct to which a component was most clearly related, items were assigned to sub-scales of that construct on the basis of their highest component loading. Where a candidate item was related only weakly to the elements of its 'own' construct, and more closely to the elements of a 'foreign' construct, it was excluded from all the major scales and sub-scales. This applied to relatively few items, (a) to (e), whose fate has been described in Chapter Six at Section 12.3.4. For the sake of content simplicity, the one anti-Semitic item which was loaded more heavily on the anti-Southern European component was placed in the anti-Semitism sub-scale. Likewise, an anti-Italian item with a heavier loading on anti-Semitism was placed in the anti-Southern European sub-scale. The fact that there were few errant items in the ethnocentric group is a point of minor interest. The cohesiveness of the items referring to Southern Europeans on the one hand, and those referring to
Jews, on the other, is probably partly a function of the kind of item one tends to invent about the two groups. Of Southern Europeans, disdain is the dominant motif; of Jews, fear, as of a powerful group with self-regarding purposes.

(iii) All the anxiety items were assigned to the three sub-scales of that construct on the basis of the higher component loading, without exception. Since the nature of the 'branching' of the anxiety items was of intrinsic interest, the stability of it was tested by a separate 3-factor varimax analysis of the anxiety items alone. The outcome of the application of the same procedure was that the extra-punitive sub-scale retained its identity precisely i.e. had the same items assigned to it; but the intra-punitive and physiological scales exchanged items in a seemingly unordered fashion. No reliance can therefore be placed on the disparateness of the latter two sub-scales.

The items constituting the sub-scales, as they emerged from this procedure, are set out in Exhibit 7.2.
EXHIBIT 7.2
(Items Constituting the Sub-Scales)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Scale</th>
<th>Sub-Scale and Number of Sub-Scale</th>
<th>Item numbers (see Exhibits in Chapter Six and Confidential Appendix)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alienation</td>
<td>1. Powerlessness, and Isolation.</td>
<td>1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>3. Conventionalism</td>
<td>1, 3, 5, 6, 9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Ego-defensiveness.</td>
<td>2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnocentrism</td>
<td>5. Anti-Southern European Sentiment.</td>
<td>1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Anti-Semitism.</td>
<td>13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Pro-assimilation Sentiment.</td>
<td>2, 9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety</td>
<td>8. Intra-punitive anxiety.</td>
<td>2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. 'Physiological' anxiety</td>
<td>3, 10, 11, 20.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Extra-punitive anxiety</td>
<td>1, 9, 14, 15, 16.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sub-scales are thus very various in length and strength, ranging from only two items in No. 7 (Pro-assimilation Sentiment) to 18 in No. 1 (Powerlessness and Isolation). Their means and standard deviations, (with scoring as for
the major scales) are given in Table 7.2.

TABLE 7.2

Means and Standard Deviations
of the Sub-Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.25</td>
<td>6.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>5.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These data indicated marked positive skewness of the distributions of all sub-scales except Normlessness and Meaninglessness, Conventionalism and Pro-assimilation sentiment. Obviously, with reliabilities not determined, they are of limited use, but may tell us something of the finer interrelations between the major scales.

7.4. Interrelations between Sub-Scales of the Dispositions

These are displayed in Table 7.3.

TABLE 7.3 (a)

Interrelations between Sub-Scales of the Dispositions (n=355)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(a) Key: A: 1. Powerlessness and Isolation
   2. Normlessness and Meaninglessness
F: 3. Conventionalism
   4. Ego-defensiveness
E: 5. Anti-Southern European Sentiment
   6. Anti-Semitism
   7. Pro-assimilation Sentiment
Anxiety: 8. Intra-punitive Anxiety
   9. 'Physiological' Anxiety
   10. Extra-punitive Anxiety

The notable features and implications of this table are as follows:

(a) Within each construct, the sub-scales correlate moderately or strongly, with two exceptions: despite its relation to Anti-Southern European Sentiment, Pro-assimilation Sentiment is not significantly correlated with Anti-Semitism (the manifest content of the former has to do with Italians and Greeks); and the three sub-scales of the anxiety measure exhibit rather weak intercorrelations.

(b) Both sub-scales of alienation predict to Anti-Southern European Sentiment, Anti-Semitism and all three sub-scales of anxiety, but not to Pro-assimilation Sentiment, nor to either of the F sub-scales.

(c) Both Conventionalism and Ego-defensiveness predict to Anti-Southern European Sentiment and Anti-Semitism,
but only very weakly, and only in the case of Ego-defensiveness significantly, to Pro-assimilation Sentiment. The slight variations in the magnitude of the correlations are consistent with the variation in the lengths of the sub-scales.

(d) Conventionalism and Ego-defensiveness are negatively related to Intra-punitive Anxiety, and positively related to Extra-punitive Anxiety. Thus it seems that those low and high on authoritarianism have their own social modalities of anxiety: the liberals finding the fault in themselves, the authoritarians in others, in keeping with their generally hostile tendency. The overall zero relation between authoritarianism and anxiety conceals this contrapuntal relation.

The difficulty with the genotypical psychoanalytical account of authoritarianism remains, since the magnitude of the positive relation with Extra-punitive Anxiety shows no hint of difference to that with Intra-punitive Anxiety. However, consider the following hypothesis. To confess anxiety seems weak; the authoritarian avoids it, preferring to appear tough; but is caught unawares by the extra-punitive items, where the confession of anxiety involves no self-deprecation. This hypothesis implies that the intra-punitive and 'physiological' sub-scales are infected
negatively with social desirability set from the special viewpoint of the authoritarian, and therefore only the extra-punitive anxiety scale gives a true indication of the relation with anxiety. This conjecture seems plausible, but requires additional data on the influence of response sets, and the use of an extended anxiety scale of the right kind for substantiation. It is clearly an alternative, emphasizing response set considerations, to the 'contrapuntal' hypothesis advanced in the preceding paragraph.

A third possibility is that the defence mechanisms of the high scorers are more efficient than the original authors of the 'Authoritarian Personality' concluded, in the context of the Australian urban culture, which has many pockets tolerant of 'us-them' attitudes, and involves the high F scorer in no special difficulties in a variety of social settings, ranging from informal fraternities of 'one-eyed' football-club followers to war veterans' associations. Universities and school-teachers' common rooms, on the other hand, are liable to be intensely intolerant of ethnocentrism. On the whole, therefore, the genotypical characterization of authoritarianism, based as it is on in-depth studies of individuals, whilst not specifically supported here, can hardly be dismissed.

(e) The three sub-scales of ethnocentrism are also
related to Extra-punitive Anxiety, in greater strength than could be accounted for simply by their common variance with alienation. It may be that the response-set considerations discussed above also apply here.

7.5. Mechanisms connecting Dispositions

7.5.1. Authoritarianism and Ethnocentrism

The relation of these dispositions has been considered previously in Chapters Five and Six; at this point a systematic review of the mechanisms possibly connecting them is appropriate.

(a) We must first consider whether the shared surface content of the F and E scales is itself enough to generate a correlation of the magnitude obtained, but of trivial significance, in the non-statistical sense. The evidence for this appears to be negative. Table 6.10 indicates that 11 of the 13 F items predict to ethnocentrism, whilst only three F items (Nos. 8, 10 and 11) have a manifest punitive content. Moreover, none of these are in the Conventionalism sub-scale, which predicts to both Anti-Southern European Sentiment and Anti-Semitism. This explanation is therefore contradicted by the data, but the desirability of developing an authoritarianism measure consisting of items more central to personality structure, rather than secondary attitude structures, which at some points directly bear on
social issues, is quite obvious. The paired-alternative F scale developed in this thesis is capable of being used as a 'core' instrument which may serve as a starting point not cursed by contamination by acquiescence.

(b) The discussion in the latter part of Chapter Five, of authoritarianism and punitive tendency in lower-status groups differs somewhat from the psychoanalytical explanation, advancing in its stead, as a central theme, a simplistic and aggressive orientation in the working-class arising from social insecurity. The lack of a clear relation between anxiety and ethnocentrism weakens this hypothesis, which may be characterized as one which emphasizes 'conventionalist anxiety.' However, the apparent absence of a general relation between anxiety and ethnocentrism does not entirely destroy it, as the hypothesis describes a special function of anxiety in a particular social location, not a general one. A more powerful objection is the constancy of the magnitude of the authoritarianism-ethnocentrism relation at all educational and both social class levels. (see below, Tables 7.13 and 7.14). This seems to me to weaken greatly the generality of the 'conventionalist anxiety' hypothesis and to limit its possible usefulness to the region of lower social status.

(c) The psychoanalytical portrait of the generation
of authoritarianism and its relation to ethnocentrism,\(^1\) resting as it does on analyses of individuals in depth, emerges with considerable force, albeit in a residual way (in this thesis) and through the elimination of more superficial alternatives. It is not the business of this analysis to offer a critique of the depth studies, but merely to acknowledge their apparent persuasiveness in the absence of other general explanation.

7.5.2. Alienation and Anxiety

(a) It may well be that these covary, in part, because of their common association with threatening social situations; but, as will be made clear later in this chapter, alienation is not a trivial appendage of, say, financial deprivation, and has an independent and tenacious character, with demonstrable personality correlates (in two groups of University students) apart from anxiety. It will be argued that it cannot be considered to be, for example, a social modality of anxiety. Given its disparate ontological status, it is reasonable to suppose it to be an independent cause of anxiety, which in the highly alienated is liable to be diffuse and to arise from a

\(^1\) This has been described at the beginning of Chapter Five. In addition to its elaboration in T.W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality, passim, a more concise account can be found in N. Sanford, 'The Approach of the Authoritarian Personality,' in J.L. McCary (ed.) Psychology of Personality: Six Modern Approaches, (New York, 1956) pp. 261-82.
core of deep-seated social uncertainty. (see Table 6.2 where the positive relation of anxiety to lack of perceived structure in the environment is suggested by the data).

(b) At the same time, it should be pointed out that the alienation-anxiety relation is likely to be reciprocal. High levels of diffuse anxiety are disabling and thus adversely affect the individual's capacity to cope with threatening social situations. An actual social failure would reinforce alienation.

7.5.3. Alienation and Ethnocentrism

(a) In Chapter Five, it is suggested that alienation may give rise to ethnocentrism through the generalization of social distrust from the macro-society to minority groups. This hypothesis views ethnocentrism as incidental to alienation.

(b) It is also suggested in Chapter Five that an individual may negate his confessed distrust of his own society by identifying with a glorified conception of it, as a reaction-formation to social despair. Such an identification might be an ersatz affair, where the individual joins an imagined in-group in a process entailing no actual change in his social relationships. Alternatively, the alienated individual may join an actual group, perhaps
an ethnocentric one, as it is often suggested, alienated sections of the German lower middle class joined the *Sturmabteilungen* in the late 1920s and early 1930s.¹ In this last case, there may be a kind of double resolution of alienation, resulting in its actual reduction with the discovery of a supportive in-group, and a satisfactory discharge of aggressive behaviour, directed towards real and illusory opponents perceived as threatening.

(c) A fairly simple frustration-aggression hypothesis is also quite viable.² The individual develops aggressive activity directed at first toward the real obstacles between himself and his goals. Finding these intractable, as they may well be in many circumstances, such as a large-scale economic depression, he may withdraw and retreat, often into isolation, with reduced hopes, and/or work off his aggressive drives in punitive activity, perhaps merely verbal, directed at minority groups, especially innocuous ones unlikely to retaliate.

(d) The mechanisms connecting alienation with

---

² A summary of the literature of the frustration-aggression hypothesis has been provided by H.T. Himmelweit, 'Frustration and Aggression: A Review of Recent Experimental Work,' in T.H. Pear (ed.), *The Psychological Factors of Peace and War*, (London, 1950).
ethnocentrism suggested above are not incompatible with each other, but, on the contrary, may be mutually reinforcing. Generalization of distrust and the discharge of aggressive drives seem to me equally attractive as explanations of the relation; the data of this thesis do not indicate which may be the dominant mechanism. It seems plausible to suggest that they are complementary.

(e) The least likely explanation of the connection seems to lie in the alienation-anxiety relation, in view of the lack of a clear independent correlation between anxiety and ethnocentrism. However, moderate to high levels of anxiety may well be a force motivating the alienated individual to some activity, at least to an analysis of his situation, perhaps to a self-preoccupation, realistic or otherwise.

In conclusion, to postulate alienation as the prime motor in the tryptich: alienation, anxiety, ethnocentrism, seems theoretically sound. It is not imperative, of course, to group these dispositions alone. Authoritarianism is also a cause of ethnocentrism; and anxiety may have many other causes apart from alienation as estrangement. However, if we stand back to contemplate only the four dispositions considered in this thesis, the most obvious feature of their interrelations is the systematic clustering of these
three, with alienation, within the cluster, acting as the
primum agens. The argument for the usefulness of the
alienation tryptich is pursued below, accompanied by some
ontological house-cleaning.

7.6.1. A Typology of Alienation

A number of typologies of alienation might usefully
be developed on the basis of the conception of it advanced
in this thesis. There are two which compete for obvious
utility. The first is one which characterizes alienation
in terms of which element of the construct assumes most
prominence in an individual or a group. The elements can
be measured by the five sub-scales described in Chapter
Six, in Table 6.2. If, for example, an individual exhibits
(scores high on) the sentiments of meaninglessness and
self-estrangement in a high degree, but shows little sense
of powerlessness, normlessness or isolation, this has
intrinsic meaning which is immediately apparent. This
differentiation amongst the sentiments of alienation is
indeed useful, as we shall see when the relations of the
sub-scales with political opinion i.e. their political
functions are considered in Chapter Nine. Whilst retaining
this type of differentiation of alienation as a resource,
this thesis will not advance it as the typology of most
general utility. It suffers from a high degree of complexity,
if one considers the number of types of the highly alienated one would have to distinguish if one were to be exhaustive.

Another, more economical typology presents itself if we contemplate the relations of alienation the other major dispositional constructs. The discussion of the mechanisms connecting dispositions entered above leads to the conclusion that alienation has two primary functions: the generation of ethnocentrism and anxiety. Indeed, to be plain, it is a cause of both. The generality of these relations and the importance of the three constructs suggests, as a superordinate construct, the concept of the alienation tryptich. Acceptance of this has the convenience of entailing a typology in terms of the overall functioning of alienation. The dominant statistical case of the tryptich (considering only those high, i.e. above the median in alienation) is one where the subject is high on all three dispositions. Less common is the case where the subject is high in alienation but low in ethnocentrism and high in anxiety, or vice versa. Least common is the case where the subject is high in alienation but low in the other two dispositions. Let us label these cases as follows:

I: High in alienation, anxiety and ethnocentrism;

II: High in alienation, low in anxiety and high in ethnocentrism;
III: High in alienation, high in anxiety and low in ethnocentrism;

IV: High in alienation, low in anxiety and low in ethnocentrism.

Since ethnocentrism, through its distortion of the perception of minority groups, implies a hostile sentiment which is in some degree irrational, an ad hoc amendment will be added to the above system: where the subject evidences a generalized irrational hostility, apart from ethnocentrism, we shall add 'A' as an indication thereof. An illustration of such a type is given below. The utility of our amendment will be apparent.

Alienation considered an estrangement has a curious reputation of being simultaneously a pathological condition and a creative perspective, particularly if the alienated person is from a rich foreign culture and is compelled to explore the new society and to see it from both without and within, in order to make his way. The archetypal instance of this is the Jewish immigrant. I shall later argue (in Sections 7 and 8) that this reputation is well deserved, and make use of the above typology in considering how this is so.

7.6.2. The Ontology of Alienation: An Illustration

For something to be considered different from something
else, that is, to have a separate ontological status as a thing, in its own right, two criteria are required in common usage. One is that there should be a disparate manifestation of it, so that it is apparently distinguished from its surroundings. The other is that it should have disparate function. Thus the weary traveller, asking in a strange place for a 'bed', would be dissatisfied with an area of the floor; even if it could be slept on, he would not consider he had been offered a 'bed'. Even a mat, disparate as it would seem, might satisfy him, if it were suitable for sleeping on. The bed should have the function of accommodating the would-be sleeper for sleep. Therefore everything from a soft mat, preferably with a blanket, to a fourposter, is unquestionably a bed, if it can be used for sleeping on.

If these two canons of disparate ontological status are accepted, then alienation, on the evidence so far presented, is not the same thing as social anxiety. Firstly, it has a disparate manifestation of a sophisticated kind: it is factorially distinct from anxiety. In order to make this clear, Figure 7.1 is presented, which displays the alienation and anxiety items located in a two-dimensional space by their factor loadings on the orthogonal factors I and III of Table 6.1 (III having been renamed II for
convenience). It can be seen that the two groups of items form two distinct clouds adjacent to the lines defining the factors. If one were to draw a line at 45 degrees to the point of origin, only two anxiety items and one alienation item would transgress it, out of 44 items.

Secondly, alienation has a function which distinguishes it from anxiety. Alienation generates ethnocentrism, whilst anxiety does not. The relation of anxiety to ethnocentrism is non-independent, as the partial correlation demonstrates.

FIGURE 7.1

Relations between the Items of the Alienation and Anxiety Scales
We may conclude that alienation is not a form of anxiety, but has a separate ontological status.

One further objection might be raised. Even if alienation is not a form of anxiety, might it not be a trivial attitudinal epiphenomenon of a social condition, such as financial frustration? If this were so, then the alienation scores would be a close associate of income level, for example. We shall see, in Figure 7.10, that there is an association, but not a close one. Table 7.4 takes this argument a stage further. It demonstrates that, with education held constant, the relation between alienation and income (of the householder) is trivial, although significant at the middle and higher educated levels.

**TABLE 7.4**

| Alienation by Householder's Income with Education Constant (Tetrachoric correlations) |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| Education                      | Income by Alienation |
| Higher:                        | .31** (n=94)     |
| Middle:                        | .24*  (n=108)    |
| Lower:                         | .17  (n=118)     |

Nor does the income level perform the function of alienation. Table 7.5 shows the relation between income level and ethnocentrism with education constant.
TABLE 7.5

Householder's Income by Ethnocentrism
with Education Constant
(Tetrachoric Correlations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education:</th>
<th>Income by Ethnocentrism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td>-.18 (n=94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>.16 (n=108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower:</td>
<td>.22* (n=118)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These magnitudes are substantially lower than those in Table 7.16 in Section 10, where the relation of alienation to ethnocentrism is displayed when income is held constant.

The purpose of discussing the empirical evidence surrounding alienation in this section at such length is to emphasise that alienation, considered as social estrangement, is a dispositional construct with disparate ontological status, and is not identical with, although related to anxiety, as well as other personality attributes which locate it as a deep level in the individual's attitudes. It may be encountered at all levels of society, and is not a simple derivative of the characteristic social experience at the lower level. To show clearly its importance in forming attitudes, two illustrative studies will now be presented. They are both drawn from interviews conducted during a survey of poverty in Melbourne in 1969, conceived and directed by the present writer. Both studies are of
men, whom we shall name 'John' and 'Patrick', subject to extremely frustrating social circumstances, the first very high in alienation, the second low.¹

John is a Metal Press Operator, aged 27, married, with two children. He earns $70 per week, and was in fact interviewed in error, in the belief his income was lower. He is a lapsed Catholic, and a Mason. He lives with his wife in Fitzroy, a very poor inner industrial area, in a single room, with a shared kitchen (refrigerator in the hall). The room was untidy and fairly cluttered. Few decorations, bare painted brick walls, poor light. His wife was present throughout the interview but made no comment. Although the interview took place in August, Christmas cards still hung on the wall. John's raw scores on the alienation, ethnocentrism and anxiety scales, which were those whose development is reported in Chapter Six, or, in the case of anxiety, adapted as reported in Chapter Six, which were administered along with open-ended questions, were 40 (in the fourth quartirange), 26 (in the fourth quartirange) and 8 (in the second quartirange) respectively. He is thus very high in alienation and anxiety and low in

¹ I must thank here Mr. Gabriel Lafitte who interviewed 'John'. The interview would have been impossible without his capability for writing in shorthand, as well as his quick ear.
ethnocentrism. He nevertheless often lapses into ethnocentric patter, and his conversation teems with symptoms of irrational hostility. In our typology, he is type IIIA.

John is quoted verbatim. Two dots indicate a pause. He began hesitantly, but quickly became garrulous. The sentiments of alienation will be noted as he voiced them. The first to emerge were feelings of isolation and powerlessness.

(Question: If you could choose JUST ONE matter for MORE GOVERNMENT ATTENTION ... which ONE would you choose?)

It's hard to say .. to be honest I really wouldn't know .. to be able to choose it'd be O.K. but you're not able to choose .. This is supposed to be a free country but they never ask the average bloke, you've got to do what the man with the big collar tells you to do. I don't reckon anyone could give you any answer, matey, except the hypocrites. Nobody ever asks the ordinary man.

There followed perspicacity and violent hostility, with isolation and normlessness in close company.

(Question: Would you like to see any CHANGES in SOCIAL WELFARE ARRANGEMENTS for the citizens of this State?)

Yes.

(Question: What changes would you like to see?)

I would like to see a reform .. I mean people that go for these things [sic] and it's a cold air like a business. It's like they're giving you something and they ain't. I mean it all comes out of your taxation and when you get on your feet you pay it
all back. It's this stiff-necked attitude by these welfare mongrels - you can't talk to them, the ordinary man in the street. You want to talk to a person, you talk to them properly, they think you're shit - it's commo tactics, they can shove their charity up their ring.

He always votes for the A.L.P., and is asked why. In the following flood of words, note his habit of not getting things quite right, preoccupation with images of violence, ethnocentric patter (not confirmed by his E Scale score, when he considered his attitudes more carefully) and tendency to use the cliches of racial bigotry as pejorative epithets to be stuck on to politicians or institutions which he sees as oppressive. Normlessness and irrational hostility are manifest.

(Question: What are your MAIN REASONS for voting for the party of your choice at this election,)

'Cause I believe .. this country's been in two Great Wars, Federal Parliament shit themselves both times and Labor's the only party that can run it. When we got a war Labor did a good job. Bolte's a Jew mongrel. I've got nothing against Jews but he's money happy like all of Federal Parliament. I'd say 75 per cent of Labor is Commo but the other 15 per cent get things done, or 35 per cent. This bloody Gorton government's ruined this country, doing this, doing that, lickin' the Yank's arse. The Federal Government is nothing more than a glorified Com party anyway - the pensioners are struggling to live and they got more dagos here

1 The State Premier (not Jewish).
2 The Federal Government (Liberal and Country Party). Mr. Gorton is Prime Minister.
than fucking White Australians. I reckon two out of three people you see here are dagos. They come here, sponge the money dry and piss off home. The Yanks own this joint. They sit up there in Canberra on their big fat butts doing frigging nothing and getting their corn each year just flappin' their mouths. You get a shovel in their hands and see what they're good for. This Gorton, he's a prick - he's lickin' everybody's arse, including his own, taxes on this, taxes on that like he owns the place. You see him on TV and he doesn't know what he's talking about. Manzies¹ was good, I really admired him. We need a Labor Government while we're in the war.² The man in the street has got Buckley's.³ Unless you live in Toorak.⁴ A change is as good as a feed to what we got now. Gorton I reckon is too young to run this country. Kennedy of America, he was different, he was young but he had an old mind, that's why they killed him. I liked Menzies, Pigiron I called him because of the Japanese. Gorton is too young, he hasn't got the experience, not like Menzies, he may have been a bastard but he knew what to do. We shouldn't have our boys getting their guts shot out - the Yanks are getting out now with Nixon, where are our troops being pulled out - our head goes in every time, soon as there's trouble we have to be in it, what about this country?

In all this, two themes seem to be dominant. The first, motivated apparently by anxiety and hostility, is a drive to assume mastery of a situation and emotional catharsis by emotive explication, talking it out. His sharp insight

¹ Sir Robert Menzies, the Liberal Prime Minister 1939-40 (then of the United Australia Party) and 1950-65. In the earlier period he permitted scales of scrap metal to Japan, hence 'Pig-Iron Bob'.
² In Vietnam.
³ 'Buckley's chance', a very slim one.
⁴ Melbourne's elite suburb.
into the realities of social welfare arrangements - 'When you get on your feet you pay it all back' - which owes much to his hostility, are in contrast to this fantasy-laden outburst. The second is a barely-concealed plea for acceptance into the in-group, as one Aussie to another. Ersatz identification, the generalization of social distrust and the aggressive discharge of the tensions of frustration are all suggested here. There are overtones, too, of authoritarian sentiment for a strong leader - 'he may have been a bastard but he knew what to do.' Unfortunately, no F scale was administered.

John was also asked about his day dreams.

(Question: Everybody daydreams sometimes. If you had to name your favourite daydream, what would it be? When you are just sitting back and letting your thoughts drift, what do you LIKE thinking about?) There is a poignant response. He gropes awkwardly for a phrase to express self-estrangement. He returns quickly to a mood of outspoken protest.

Well, I'd like to go to sea, like, you know, just to see the world. I'd always come home, I mean Australia's me home. I mean you're working in a factory - I mean I'm not gratified in myself, but on a cargo boat, you're doing something worthwhile, taking goods where they're needed. I mean I'd be in Vietnam right now - just look at the marbles ballot\(^1\) - they whack your number out of the barrel and you've had it - there's no justice.

\(^1\) Conscription is selective and by lot. Marbles are drawn from a rotated barrel which denote the birthdays of those to be conscripted.
(Question: If you had to name the BEST thing about your life at the present time, what would it be?)

My wife. [no elaboration]

The most oppressive features of his social situation now emerge.

(Question: If you had to name the WORST thing about your life at the present time, what would it be?)

Er - when I had to give up me kids - the social welfare people took them away.

(Why?)

Well, an unfit father.

(Why did they say that?)

Because I've got a police record and because I drink. I was upset, but it upsets the old woman more than me. But it only makes me drink more. That's why I've got an affliction against the rules. I don't like a man in uniform. I obey the rules, but you don't have to like them, matey.

For this tragic man, of less than 30, alienation has been reached by paths made fairly clear by the interview. Even in extremis, as here, it is a situation-relevant disposition, with consequences for personality functioning, but not a personality syndrome. But it is not an inevitable concomitant of objectively frustrating conditions. We turn to Patrick, a homeless man of about 50, jobless, interviewed by the writer after he had spent a night in Melbourne's only free hostel for homeless men. Accommodation is limited,
and it is difficult to spend two nights there. Preference
is given to strangers in the afternoon line-up, where
tickets for the night are distributed. A high
proportion of those sheltering there are handicapped
accident victims or alcoholics. Patrick is a Church-going
Catholic, born in Ireland. His last job was as a
Storeman-Clerk. His income is literally nil, since he
has not applied for unemployment benefit. ('I know it's
silly, but I just haven't been near them'). He is separated
from his wife, who has one young child. His raw scores
on the dispositional scales were 10 for alienation (in
the second quartirange), 4 for ethnocentrism (in the
first quartirange) and 14 for anxiety (in the third
quartirange). He is thus low in alienation, very low in
ethnocentrism and rather high in anxiety. The interview
took place in the echoing dining room of the hostel about
midday. No natural light - only fluorescent light.

In contrast to John, who is self-preoccupied, Patrick's
sympathetic imagination dwells on the unfortunate, although
his pride does not permit him to instance his own case.
Noticing the interviewer writing in long-hand, he slows his
remarks to dictation pace.

(Question: .. JUST ONE matter for MORE GOVERNMENT ATTENTION ..
Which ONE would you choose?)
Oh, Education.

(Probe)

Yes, 'course I'm .. at the present time an ordinary working man can't give his children the education they should get. Even if they are intelligent enough to win scholarships, in a working family, when they come of working age, to help their parents financially they have to go to work. And this is a handicap to their children and the country.

(Question: .. CHANGES in SOCIAL WELFARE ARRANGEMENTS?)

I'd like to see elderly people and all pensioners getting a better deal from the State - nothing to do with the Commonwealth.

(Probe)

Yes, well they already get a small pension from the Commonwealth, this is not sufficient, so the State should be able to help by providing cheaper accommodation and free meals. They already have free medical attention, don't they? [Looks enquiringly]

(Yes)

Ah.

In Patrick's imaginative world, there is a good deal of basic trust. People are 'helped', or will be. Something is being done, but improvements are possible. He spells out general issues calmly. He always votes DLP, and is asked why.

In my book, they have the right attitude towards defence, and family allowances. national development. That's about all, I suppose; that covers everything - of course, foreign policy, too.

When asked about his daydreams, he becomes a little more
agitated and confesses small faults.

One time I knew what I used to think about. What I'd do if I won Tatts.¹

(What?)

Well, it varies .. sometimes I'd like to go for a world trip, sometimes I'd like to just tour Australia and settle down here, other times I'd like to go hom and stay at home, in Ireland. Occasionally, I'd like to think I'd give it all to charity, more to make a big fellow of myself than anything else. That's about it, I suppose.

(Question: .. BEST thing about your life?)

Oh, I'd say peace of mind. The last six months have been an emotional and mental strain. But in the last few weeks I seem to have come to grips with myself and things don't seem at all too bad. It's a domestic and financial thing, I don't know if I could elaborate on it much.

(Family troubles?)

Family, yes, it's anonymous², so what difference does it make?

Patrick adheres to polite, almost courtly conventions, which allow him to keep some distance from the interviewer whilst maintaining rapport. Although destitute, he is socially poised, not pleading for admittance to a fraternal social world. He considers himself, despite his destitution, to be in one, and in fact is so. Even consideration of the worst thing in his life provokes anxiety, but not despair.

¹ A lottery.
² The interview.
The worst .. oh, I don't know, I don't think I'd be capable of holding a job at the moment, though I don't know. If I could get a suitable job I could hold it. I'm not capable of manual, I'm kind of .. [Makes an unclear gesture with his hands]. I used to do clerical work before, storeman for the .. [pauses] If I had a job in that suitable environment I'd jump at it.

(Why couldn't you hold down a job?)

I feel restless. I feel I want to go walkabout.

Patrick has no enemies. In his view, his difficult social position is self-inflicted, and the resolution of it lies within himself, assisted by a helpful chance, quite likely to crop up. He is clear-sighted, if not perspicacious. He has a 'home', in Ireland, and no doubt the Catholic faith. Considered as a foil to John, he is constructive in the face of social difficulty. John is pessimistic and lives in a world peopled by vengeful enemies, seemingly sought for: 'I don't like a man in uniform.' John's hectic exposition of the perilous situation which confronts the whole nation, although at times insightful and intelligently contrived to evoke a sympathetic response, has no happy ending, only a desperate 'patriotic' plea: 'What about this country?' In his personal life, he expects things to get worse: '.. it only makes me drink more'.

One salient fact hardly needs emphasis: in broad terms, the objective social situation of Patrick is much
worse than that of John. He has no income, no wife, no family. John has a good income and his wife's support. The distance between them, and it is a long one, is created by John's alienation.

7.7. Some Characteristics of Alienation Considered as Social Estrangement

'Since the meanings of alienation are so diverse, the entire literature on deviance, psychopathology, political rebellion, withdrawal, and criminality, in addition to much writing on personal misery and unhappiness, is often considered relevant to the understanding of alienation.' So writes Keniston in guiding the reader to the massive literature of alienation. Bell has distinguished two broad genres of alienation: 'estrangement' (feeling alienated) and 'reification' (being alienated). The latter concept owes much to Marx, but the normative overtones of Marx's position lead him to speculate on the nature of the sense of estrangement. The conception of alienation explored empirically in this thesis is of a tenacious sense of social estrangement, and the outcome of this exploration

---

is the proposal of the concept of the alienation trptych, based on the general empirical relation with anxiety and ethnocentrism, which suggests a broader relation to irrational hostility. The argument is that the alienation is a cause of these. Although a situation-relevant disposition, and not primarily a personality construct, it has consequences for the mode of personality functioning.

It has been noted that there are many paths to alienation i.e. that it may arise out of a variety of social circumstances. One of these may be the circumstance of being reared in a family of poverty. In such a case, alienation is not so much a deviant as a characteristically maladaptive disposition. Keniston's remark that 'the concept of alienation in every variation suggests the loss or absence of a previous or desirable relationship' and his question: 'What replaces the old relationship?' may be considered tendentious. There may well be a mode of socialization into alienation amongst the very poor, such that the individual never loses anything, but is accustomed to social distrust, frustration, uncertainty, and anxiety as 'natural' features of social

1 K. Keniston, op. cit., p. 454.
experience. One might conjecture the following six agents of alienation for the children of the poor:

1. An unstable family structure, with the father often absent.

2. Intense sibling rivalry.


5. Pervasive anxiety in the parent(s).

6. Frustration and humiliation at school.

When the disposition of alienation arises out of such conditions, which would conduce to the development of a weak ego structure and the lack of internalized values, which would in turn conduce to a customary social failure, there is no depletion, as there never grew anything to be lost. In such a case, the alienation trystich would be situation-relevant in a much more remote sense, than, for example, in men thrown out of work during an economic depression. Amongst the poor, therefore, we might expect it to move closer, as it were, to the core of personality functioning. Many features of Lewis' concept of the culture of poverty, as they relate to the attitudes and values of people in a slum community, such as fear, suspicion and apathy, lack of trust, fatalism, helplessness, dependence

---

1 For suggestions of these genetic characteristics among some 'cultures of poverty', see Oscar Lewis, La Vida, (London, 1967) pp. xxxix ff.
and a sense of inferiority, strongly suggest that they may be given a theoretical summation in the concept of the alienation triptych. This is true also of the attitudes of the poor in some traditionally poor communities, such as that described by Banfield in a Southern Italian village.  

There, many themes of the alienation triptych, such as social anxiety, preoccupazione ('mingled worry, fear, anxiety and foreboding'), pervasive social distrust, uncertainty and hostility, often expressed as 'jealousy', are to be found.

Having established the notion of the alienation as a functioning entity which characteristically invokes other dispositional constructs, we may speculate on its implications for man in his role as a social analyst, or an interpretative observer of social situations. In his recent analysis of alienated University youth, Bettelheim² attributes sentiments of estrangement and hostility to the prolongation of adolescence, more particularly when the individual is taught speculative habits rather than a craft, a technique for producing finished work with special skills. He quotes with approval Herman Melville's intuitive grasp of

---


the connection between social frustration and irrational hostility:

Whenever I find myself growing grim about the mouth; whenever it is a damp drizzly November in my soul; whenever I find myself involuntarily pausing before coffin warehouses, and bringing up the rear of every funeral I meet; and especially whenever my hypos get an upper hand of me, that it requires a strong moral principle to prevent me from deliberately stepping into the street and methodically knocking people's hats off - then, I account it high time to go to sea. This is my substitute for pistol and ball.

In broad terms, if one contemplates the relationships between alienation, anxiety and ethnocentrism in the mass voter sample, it seems reasonable to expect the alienated observer to be imperfect in his judgment. His anxiety will seek catharsis through 'insights' rather than sustained analysis, particularly when many elements in a historical situation have to be weighed. He is therefore prone to simplistic constructions. He will also tend to seek out culprits, blameworthy persons, classes or institutions.

In sum, the alienated social analyst, or even the non-expert alienated social observer, although likely to be penetrating, as Otto Rank\(^1\) suggests, will tend to be a destructive agent, unusually prone to lapses of judgement. The case of John provides a striking example of this.

In the typology developed in Section 7.6.1., Type IV,

high in alienation but low in hostility and anxiety, would seem the most promising for constructive analysis, which requires both a drive for mastery and good judgement. Fortunately, this type may be more at the higher educational levels (see Table 7.14) where the alienation tryptich is much less cohesive (it is epitomised in Type I, which is generally more common) and the personality correlates of alienation may be muted. But where the social analyst is a marginal intellectual, without assured status and working with 'soft' data requiring careful interpretation, the alienation tryptich may be more cohesive, high levels of anxiety and hostility more common, and the analysis may be prone to mistake. Consider the following dictum of Marx, himself perhaps a case in point, speaking, as it happens, of social conditions engendering alienation. Here the Marxist characterization of alienation spills over into speculation about the attitudinal concomitants of estrangement. He is speaking of capitalism in its developed phase.

Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast, frozen relations ... are swept away. All new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face
with sober senses his real conditions of life and his relations with his kind (my stress).  

Sometimes, as we now know, rapid industrialization disturbs 'all social conditions'; sometimes not. Where, and if it does, and social dislocation disorients the working class and produces a condition of social estrangement, nothing could be more mistaken than the expectation of sober assessment expressed above. On the contrary, it would be more reasonable to expect the kind of outlook exemplified in the account of John, namely, a wildly hostile mood of despair, caricaturing the 'conditions of life' and striving for unreal 'relations with his kind'. Information-saving individuals, whose synthetic capacities are enhanced by good judgement are not likely to be commonly found under such social conditions. However, perspicacity of an incomplete kind can often be expected.

7.8. Alienation Amongst University Students

Much could be written of this; the purpose of this section is merely to present data which emphasize the


constancy of function of alienation in generating ethnocentrism and some indication of relation to anxiety in elite educational groups. The data presented here also suggest that the disposition has important personality correlates, although the samples are of limited relevance. Mr. B. Sheil\(^1\) administered the alienation scale together with the scales of the Eysenck Personality Inventory\(^2\); that is, the neuroticism (N), extraversion (E) and lie scales (L), to a sample of 98 male students from the first year Psychology Course at the University of Sydney in 1968. All subjects filled out Form B of the EPI. Results are given in Table 7.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-.21*</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In June, 1969, the alienation, authoritarianism and

---

1 With whose permission these data are reproduced. They are drawn from personal communications of 9 July 1969, and 11 November 1969. At these times Mr. Sheil, who is a psychologist, was on the staff of the Psychology Department, University of Melbourne.

ethnocentrism together with the Eysenck Personality Inventory, and the Cattell 16 PF Test Profile, were administered by Mr. Sheil to a sample of second-year Psychology students of mixed sex (n=47) at the University of Melbourne. The sample was sophisticated, most subjects being Honours students. Some results are set out in Table 7.7.

TABLE 7.7 (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alienation, Ethnocentrism and Personality Indices in a Sample of Melbourne Students (Product-Moment Correlations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) For the purposes of this table L, N and E refer to the abovementioned sub-scales of the EPI; A and Eth. to the alienation and ethnocentrism measures developed in this thesis; and Angst to the second-order anxiety factor from the Cattell 16 P.F.

The most surprising feature of Table 7.7 is the

---

correlation between alienation and ethnocentrism in relatively sophisticated groups at a high educational level. Table 7.8 indicates that both groups exhibit high levels of alienation; but the Melbourne student sample was low on ethnocentrism in relation to the representative voter sample. The correlation has to be understood within this context, but remains remarkable when one considers the constriction of the variance on ethnocentrism.

TABLE 7.8

Alienation and Ethnocentrism in Two Student Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alienation</th>
<th>Ethnocentrism (a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean: Standard Deviation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students (Sydney):</td>
<td>17.59 9.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students (Melbourne):</td>
<td>17.57 8.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative voter sample:</td>
<td>12.35 8.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The ethnocentrism scale was not administered to the Sydney student sample.

Neuroticism and the anxiety scores are closely related in the Melbourne student sample. Alienation predicts significantly to neuroticism in the larger Sydney student sample, but to neither neuroticism nor anxiety in the smaller Melbourne one. The absence of evidence of a relation between alienation and Eysenck's Lie Scale,
which consists of items which reflect a tendency to try to 'fake good', suggests that the alienation scale may (mercifully) not be negatively infected by social desirability set. Alienation shows a marked negative relation to extraversion in both samples and it would appear that the highly alienated student is located in the 'melancholic' quadrant of the EPI.

Sheil also found a significant correlation in the Melbourne student sample between the alienation scale and three sub-scales of the Cattell 16 PF, displayed in Table 7.9. These are A (Schizothymia-Cyclothymia: aloof, cold-warm, sociable), H (Threctia-Parmia: timid, shy-adventurous, 'thickskinned') and Q4 (Low Ergic Tension-High Ergic Tension: phlegmatic, composed-tense, excitable).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alienation and the 16 PF Sub-Scales</th>
<th>in a Sample of Melbourne Students (a)</th>
<th>(Product-Moment Correlations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aln.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aln.</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-.42**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Aln. here means alienation, A the Sub-Scale of the 16 PF.

The alienated student in this sample is thus cold, shy and tense, as well as introverted and tending to a deviant,
though mild ethnocentrism. The general picture is of a withdrawn, slightly hostile individual. It will be noted that the three sub-scales of the 16 PF are more closely related to alienation than to each other. Although not a personality syndrome, therefore, alienation gives indications of relations with a number of personality correlates. Whilst it may be reached by a chosen path at the higher educational level, rather than one imposed by constricting social circumstances in a working-class environment, it seems nevertheless to involve the alienated individual in more than a pose. Rather, it leads to variations in personality functioning which may not easily be shed.

7.9. The Social Incidence of Dispositions

7.9.1. Authoritarianism

The social correlates of each disposition which have been examined are self-identified social class, education level, income of the head of the householder, and the age, sex and religious affiliation of the respondent. For convenience, the first three are grouped together, as are age and sex. Religious denomination stands alone.

Figures 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 exhibit the relation of authoritarianism with class, education and householder's income.
FIGURE 7.2 (a) (b) (c) (d)  
Authoritarianism by Social Class

![Bar Chart: Middle class vs Working class](image)

(p < .01; n=323)

FIGURE 7.3 (e)  
Authoritarianism by Education

![Line Graph: Higher vs Middle vs Lower](image)

(p < .001; n=350)

FIGURE 7.4 (f)  
Authoritarianism by Householder's Income

![Line Graph: Higher vs Middle vs Lower](image)

(p < .01; n=322)
(a) More respondents placed themselves in the 'middle class' category in the 1966 survey (reported here) than in the 1963 survey; probably because 'average middle' (apparently a very persuasive self-description for an Australian) was offered as a self-designation, as well as 'lower middle class' and 'upper middle class.' Only 'upper middle class' and 'middle class' as well as 'working class' were offered in 1963).

(b) Cases of where data is missing or class identification eschewed have been excluded.

(c) In these figures and all those which follow 'Low' and 'High' refer to those below and above the medians for the whole sample, set out in the standardisation data in Chapter Six.

(d) It will be remembered that the probability values refer to chi-square tests on four-cell tables of frequencies split as near as possible to the median i.e. at below 'middle' on education and above 'middle' on income level.

(e) The educational categories have been described in Chapter Three. 'Higher' refers to Leaving Certificate or above (including University
education); 'Middle' to Intermediate Certificate and/or a Tradesman's Certificate; 'Lower' to less than Intermediate. The three groups are roughly equivalent in size.

(f) Income levels have also been described in Chapter Three. 'Higher' refers to a householder's income of more than $3000 p.a., i.e. more than $60 per week; 'Middle' to a householder's income of between $45 and $60 per week; 'Lower' to a householder's income less than $45 per week. Again, the three groups are roughly numerically equal.

These marked sociological relations confirm those reported with the exploratory scales in Chapter Five. The discussion there is relevant here.

FIGURE 7.5  
Authoritarianism by Age

FIGURE 7.6  
Authoritarianism by Sex

(p < .001, n=352)  
(p is not sig., (hereafter n.s.), n=350)
The data yielding Figures 7.5 and 7.6 confirm those in Chapter Five as regards age, and since a much smaller proportion of the items employed in the paired-alternative F Scale used here refer to control of young people, the positive relation between authoritarianism and age may be regarded as a real one. Older age groups are less educated (see Chapter Three) and have had their outlooks formed in times when higher education was more uncommon and child-rearing methods more autocratic. It is therefore hazardous to suppose that the cross-tabulation indicates that one grows more authoritarian as one ages; it seems more likely that it reflects a generational difference.

No difference is apparent between the sexes.

FIGURE 7.7
Authoritarianism by Religious Affiliation (a)

(p < .001, n=300)
(a) This table (and most of those which follow) collapses the three major Protestant denominations (Anglican, Presbyterian and Methodist) to one category, and excludes groups other than these and Catholics, which are small and cannot serve as a basis for generalization. High Church Anglicans are likely to object to being designated 'Protestant'; I plead convenience.

The differences in Figure 7.7 are marked, but not matched by denominational differences in ethnocentrism (see Figure 7.19). It follows that the correlation in the Catholic sample is depressed, and this is demonstrated in Table 7.18, although the difference in correlation between Catholics and others is not significant. This finding is therefore partially consistent with the Knopfelmächer-Armstrong hypothesis discussed in Chapter Five, although not supportive of it, since the correlation remains significant and not greatly different. The theme of the explanation for the difference in correlation, indeed the dissolution of the authoritarianism-ethnocentrism correlation, advanced by Knopfelmächer and Armstrong\(^1\) is that the more

---

authoritarian of the Catholics acculturate more closely to the liberal values of the Catholic Church on racial matters. Another viable hypothesis is that the scale is not a very good measure of what was intended i.e. the personality dynamics of the prejudiced person, amongst Australian Catholics. The Irish Catholic tradition is the dominant one, and there is amongst them a strong emphasis on sexual Puritanism and a devotion to the Church. The exaggerated emphasis on familial virtues and 'uprightness,' in the Conventionalism sub-scale in particular, are therefore not, amongst Catholics, mildly neurotic individual symptoms; they are the badges of the Irish Catholic sub-culture. Of course, the function of the F items is not entirely vitiated by this fact, since they do predict to ethnocentrism within the Catholic sub-sample, and, of course, it is true that authoritarianism may be culturally transmitted. The point is that the items do not function quite as they were intended, and the case for a genuine 'personality' measure of F is reinforced.

7.9.2. Alienation

Figures 7.8, 7.9 and 7.10 exhibit the relation of alienation to class, education and income, measured as before.
FIGURE 7.8
Alienation by Social Class

(p is n.s., n=323)

FIGURE 7.9
Alienation by Education

(p is n.s., n=350)

FIGURE 7.10
Alienation by Householder's Income

(p < .001, n=322)
The negative relation reported in Chapter Five between alienation and status indices is thus most imperfectly reflected here, being in the expected direction but not significant, in the case of education and class, but highly significant for income. It will be remembered (Chapter Three, Tables 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11) that the relation between these three 'status' indices stops far short of identity. Of the three variables, income offers the most direct opportunities for control of the social situation, and so the reduction of socially frustrating circumstances: hence its reliable relation with alienation.

Whilst the general negative relation between status and alienation is by no means a misleading one, it is wrong to over-emphasise it, and it is clear that there may be many paths to alienation.

**FIGURE 7.11**

Alienation by Age

**FIGURE 7.12**

Alienation by Sex

(p is n.s., n=352) (p is n.s., n=350)
These longer scales thus do not confirm the age relation reported in Chapter Five. The actual difference between broad age groups in the sample is slight. However, the data do suggest that the youngest age group is more alienated than their immediate elders.

**TABLE 7.10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alienation by Age (Sub-Groups)</th>
<th>Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 25:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-45:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p &lt; .10, n.s.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The apparent contrast between these groups may be related to marriage, job-promotion and 'settling down'.

**FIGURE 7.13**

Alienation by Religious Affiliation

(p is n.s., n=300)
Differences here are slight, and might well be a function of covariance with income in the sample.

The relationship of alienation to membership of organizations might be expected to be negative. The data of this survey show no relation between alienation level and membership of trade unions or professional organizations, which is not surprising, since membership of these will, in many instances, be purely nominal. More surprising is the lack of relation between alienation and membership of what was broadly described, in the relevant question as 'any sort of social club.' Where organizational involvement implied a celebration of shared values, as in membership of Church clubs and attendance at religious ceremonies, there is the expected negative relation, exhibited in Table 7.11.

**TABLE 7.11**

**Alienation by Church Attendance and Membership of Church Clubs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church Attendance:</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In last month:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40=100% (n=129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longer:</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50=100% (n=219)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church Club Membership:</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes:</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29=100% (n=45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No:</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50=100% (n=307)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .10 n.s., n=348) (p < .01, n=352)

This table once again suggests the depth at which alienation inhabits, as it were, the personality and outlook of the individual.
7.9.3. Ethnocentrism

FIGURE 7.14
Ethnocentrism by Social Class

(p < .001, n=323)

FIGURE 7.15
Ethnocentrism by Education

(p < .001, n=350)

FIGURE 7.16
Ethnocentrism by Householder's Income

(p < .05, n=322)
These data follow the pattern of the dispositional antecedents of ethnocentrism, the most powerful relation being with education. Even a little education, it seems, is not a dangerous thing, in this regard.

FIGURE 7.17
Ethnocentrism by Age

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Less than 46} \\
\text{More than 46}
\end{array}
\]

(p < .05, n=352)

What has been said earlier of the educational background of older age groups is relevant here. So, too, is their experience of World War II and the Depression. Neither experience would have reduced suspiciousness and hostility, although how long these might 'stick' is a matter for conjecture.

FIGURE 7.18
Ethnocentrism by Sex

(p is n.s., n=350)
FIGURE 7.19
Ethnocentrism by Religious Affiliation

(p is n.s., n=300)

The discussion which follows Figure 7.7 is relevant here. The Catholics may be higher in ethnocentrism than Figure 7.19 suggests, since the out-groups named in the ethnocentrism scale include Italians, who may be perceived as fraternal, since they share their religious affiliation. A further test on differences in Anti-Semitism (not done in this case) is indicated for future research.
7.9.4. Anxiety

**FIGURE 7.20**
Anxiety by Social Class

![Bar chart showing anxiety levels by social class.

Middle class: 40%, 60%
Working class: 20%, 40%

(p is n.s., n=323)

**FIGURE 7.21**
Anxiety by Education

![Line graph showing anxiety levels by education level.

Higher: 20%, 40%, 60%
Middle: 40%, 60%
Lower: 60%

(p < .02, n=350)

**FIGURE 7.22**
Anxiety by Householder's Income

![Line graph showing anxiety levels by income level.

Higher: 20%, 40%, 60%
Middle: 40%, 60%
Lower: 60%

(p is n.s., n=323)

The pattern here is interesting in that the relations
of anxiety with income and class, although negative, as might be expected, are weak and not significant, whereas the relation with education is marked and significant. These data reinforce the suggestion made in Section 7.5.2. that anxiety is related to lack of perceived structure in the environment. Education is likely to assist intellectual comprehension of the environment and reduces anxiety. Income lends a potential for control of the environment, but does not, to the same extent, make it knowable.

FIGURE 7.23  
Anxiety by Age

FIGURE 7.24  
Anxiety by Sex

(p is n.s., n=352)  
(p < .01, n=350)

The data by sex follow the pattern determined by R.B. Cattell for samples in other countries, although the

relation of anxiety to sex is more marked than expected. It may be based primarily on the greater physical vulnerability of women and the normative circumscription of their opportunities for overt initiatives and environmental control in the Australian culture. The sample is rather too small to confirm the curvilinear relation to age described by Cattell, where the very young (about 20) are most anxious, the level of anxiety falling in a gentle gradient thereafter. The sub-samples do however, suggest that those in the youngest group in this sample are more anxious than their immediate elders.

TABLE 7.12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anxity by Age (Sub-Groups) (Frequencies)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 25:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-45:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .05)

These data follow those for alienation, and the reasons may be much the same as this suggested in the discussion of Table 7.10, i.e. ones chiefly related to increasing control of the environment in the transition from youth to early middle age.

No differences in anxiety are apparent by religious denomination.
7.10. Variations in Correlations between Dispositions

Table 7.13 exhibits variations in the correlations between the four major dispositions at each social class level.

**TABLE 7.13 (a)**

*Correlations between Four Psychological Dispositions within Social classes (Tetrachoric Correlations)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>Angst.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(n=215)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>-.45**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst.</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>Angst.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(n=108)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.55**</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst.</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) A, F and E refer to the alienation, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism scales; Angst to the adapted IPAT Anxiety scale.

There are no marked differences in the relation of alienation to anxiety by class, nor in the alienation-ethnocentrism relation by class. In other respects, there are class variations. Whilst no relation is shown between authoritarianism and alienation in the working class, the relation between these two dispositions is significant, both as measured by the tetrachoric (p < .01) and by
chi-square (p < .05), in the middle-class group. As we have seen (Figures 7.2 and 7.14) authoritarianism and ethnocentrism are mildly deviant amongst the middle class, where, moreover, opportunities and occasions for 'mixing freely' are likely to be more common. The authoritarian is not a 'good mixer' outside his own group. In the more fluid middle class situation, it is not therefore surprising to find him mildly frustrated and uncertain of himself; and the (low) authoritarianism-alienation relation is to be expected. Likewise, 'free-mixing' in the higher social class level may dampen the overt expression of ethnocentrism, and even perhaps reduce its actual incidence amongst conventionalist and 'ego-defensive' persons. The reduction in the authoritarianism-ethnocentrism relation (significant by the application of the Fisher Zr transformation test to the difference between the tetrachorics (p < .05) and approaching significance (p < .10) by applying the chi-square test to a collapsed table (see Exhibit 7.1)) is in accord with this hypothesis. It must be recognized that this variation in the correlation is weaker, and its significance uncertain. Its failure to be matched when education is held constant (Table 7.14) throws some doubt on it. In an exploratory work, variations in correlation of this status cannot be totally ignored,
nor accepted without reservation. An explanatory hypothesis is therefore tentatively afforded to each one.

Table 7.14 exhibit variations in correlation at each educational level.

TABLE 7.14

Correlations between Four Psychological Dispositions within Educational Groups
(Tetrachoric Correlations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education:</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>Angst.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=105)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.54**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.57**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here the authoritarianism-ethnocentrism relations are roughly constant at each educational level. Authoritarianism is related to alienation at the higher educational level. The same hypothesis as for class is suggested. Ethnocentrism exhibits a trivial and probably non-independent relation with anxiety at the lower and mid-levels. The two features of chief interest are,
firstly, the apparent reduction of the relation between alienation and anxiety as the educational level rises, and secondly, the apparently higher relation between alienation and ethnocentrism at the middle educational levels, compared with both the higher and lower levels.

The first variation is significant (p < .01) applying the Fisher Zt transformation test to the correlations for the two extreme groups, but not significant, or approaching significance, when the chi-square test is applied to a table collapsing those at the higher and lower levels. We may hold in reserve, as it were, a hypothesis that the emotional management of frustration is made easier by higher education, but the variation in the data is not so great as to demand an explanation. The second apparent variation is more important and better supported. The Fisher Zt transformation test indicates that the difference between the middle and lower level is significant (p < .01), and the chi-square test, applied to a collapsed table where the frequencies for both the higher and lower levels are assembled in one row and for the middle level in another, as in Exhibit 7.1, is also significant (p < .01). (Although the magnitudes of the differences in correlation are not much greater than for the first variation, significance is attained by chi-square in the second case because of
the larger sample). An explanation is thus required. The variation is a curious one. A reduction of the correlation by education could have been expected, since the more educated might employ their intellectual resources to control their aggressive drives. This hypothesis is persuasive but not sufficient for the curvilinear relation. The correlation is also depressed amongst the less educated.

Two statistical hypotheses can be considered and discarded. The first is that there might be attenuation of the variances of both scales at the lower level. An inspection of the frequencies in each quartile range suggests the reverse. The second is that the reliabilities of both scales might be lower in the less educated group because the items might be less well understood. This hypothesis is not plausible in view of the constancy of the authoritarianism-ethnocentrism relation, and the strong alienation-anxiety relation in the less educated group.

Two sociological hypotheses are more persuasive. These are that either there is a greater variability in actual social frustration in the middle educated group, (which incidentally implies that the alienation score is less well related to social frustration in this group than in the other two, since the dispersion of alienation scores
is not greater in the middle than either of the other groups, judging by the quartile scores); or that social frustration at the mid-level of education is more productive of ethnocentrism. A recapitulation of part of Table 3.11 in Chapter Three recalls that there is a greater range of income in the middle-educated group than in the lower, suggesting a greater variability in financial frustration.

TABLE 7.15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Householder's Income by Educational Level (Percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle: 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower: 46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Financial frustration is more the norm in the less educated group, where a high degree of frustration is not deviant from their educational peer group. There is a common norm of 'managing'. At the middle level, however, one can 'go far', 'do well', 'get on'. Frustration at this level seems more likely to lead to aggressive behaviour than at the lower level, where retreat is more probable. Both these sociological hypotheses seem plausible, although the second is preferred, as it does not require us to assume the entailed hypothesis of variability in the alienation-social
frustration relation, for which there are no other grounds. The special position of the middle-educated group, which seems conscious of its 'middling' position, will emerge when eccentricities in correlations between the dispositional constructs and political attitudes are examined in Chapter Nine.

It should be borne in mind, however, that alienation functions independently at every level of income, as Tables 7.16 and 7.17 demonstrate.

TABLE 7.16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Householder's Income:</th>
<th>Correlations between Alienation and Ethnocentrism by Householder's Income Group (Tetrachoric correlations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td>.30** (n=117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>.27** (n=97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower:</td>
<td>.34** (n=108)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alienation shows a relation to 'winning' (achieving an income above the median for the group i.e. $60 per week) or 'losing' (having an income below the group median) amongst the middle educated. Table 7.17 suggests that even within these groups the relation between alienation and ethnocentrism is moderate to strong.
TABLE 7.17

Correlations between Alienation and Ethnocentrism amongst the Middle-Educated Group
(Tetrachoric Correlations)

'Winners' .65** (n=41)
'Losers' .40** (n=67)

In Section 7.9.1, a depression in the authoritarianism-ethnocentrism relation amongst Catholics was anticipated and discussed. Table 7.18 indicates that there is indeed such a depression, but the Fisher Zr transformation test shows it not to be significant.

TABLE 7.18

Correlations between Authoritarianism and Ethnocentrism by Religious Groups
(Tetrachoric Correlations)

Denomination:
Catholics: .35**
All others: .47**

7.11. Conclusion

This chapter has considered in more detail the relations between the dispositional constructs given in broad outline in Chapter Six, both as they emerge from the examination of sub-scales of the constructs, and as variations in the magnitude of the intercorrelations of the major scales indifferent social groups. An attention to detail, both in their internal complexity and in their social context, is clearly necessary for a comprehension of their interrelations and mode of function. Particular
attention has been given to alienation, which is perhaps
the most various in nature and function, as well as the
least well explored. It has been conceived as an estrangement
from the macro-society as well as more immediate social
groups, since its component sentiments seem to be diffused
over both the larger and smaller imagined social worlds.
Whilst disparate from anxiety, it seems to be a cause of
it, as of ethnocentrism, the three constructs together
constituting a tryptich of considerable analytical utility.

In its most extreme degree, where the subject
evidences social despair and uncertainty, along with diffuse
anxiety, symptoms of an unreal conception of external
reality and intense and misguided hostility, it must be
considered a pathological disposition. If central to
personality functioning, it would indicate paranoid
schizophrenia, with a prognosis of deterioration in the
personality structure. However, this seems to be rare,
both because its social incidence is low and because the
disposition, although it has correlates in personality
functioning, usually has a contemporary relevance to the
subject's social situation. Despite this, the possibility
of socialization into alienation cannot be excluded, especially
amongst the poorest sections of the community. In its
lesser degree, alienation, especially when not accompanied
by irrational hostility or a high level of anxiety, as seems more often to be the case amongst the more educated, is a potential motive force for creative social analysis.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN 1966

8.1. Introduction

No depiction of psychological influences on political opinion can proceed before an analysis is done of the structure of political attitudes themselves. This is set out principally in Section 6 of this chapter. This analysis is, of course, intended to be substantive, as well as ancillary to the task of showing relations to dispositions. It might be thought that in Chapter Four, the political analysis had been adequately resolved. This is not so, for several reasons. Firstly, political attitudes, and their structure change over time. The constancy or inconstancy of structure between 1965 and 1966 is therefore of interest. Secondly, whilst the range of questions about opinions on policies asked in 1965 was broad, it did not extend to issues in foreign policy. Nor did it cover a special set of issues which, a priori, would be expected to have a peculiar vulnerability to psychological influences: those concerned with the liberties of individuals and groups. The circumscription of the private as against the public sphere, and the licence of outré groups to
function publicly are both delicate affairs, always at hazard, and likely to be threatened by punitive and aggressive tendencies in the mass public which may overawe a government unwilling to take a strong position on civil liberties.

A third, statistical reason for a further exploration of political opinion lies in the previous use of the tetrachoric $r$, the over-generous category 'Other opinion', and the large numbers 'Undecided' on some questions, which rendered the relationships obtained inconclusive.

An attempt is made here to reduce these problems by the use of a larger number of questions about policy, extending to the field of external affairs; the introduction of a 'Libertarianism' index; instructions to interviewers to try to persuade interviewees not be 'Undecided,' 'Other opinion' not being employed; and the use of factor analysis, not cluster analysis, which incidentally requires the phi coefficient, which is more conservative than the tetrachoric. However, the tetrachoric is used to explore differences in correlation between groups.

This chapter also introduces more information of a different kind to that in Chapter Four, such as reasons for party choice. Beginning with the critically important point of the voter's choice of a party, it proceeds to the structure of opinion on policy issues and winds down, as
it were, in considering such particular phenomena as the cross-class vote.

8.2.1. The Social Correlates of Party Choice

The Gallup Poll has made these well known. The data of the 1966 Melbourne-Sydney sample are displayed principally to show their consistency with the overall pattern, and partly to display some findings not generally familiar. The format for tables and figures is that explained in Chapter Seven.

FIGURE 8.1 (a) (b) 

Vote by Social Class 
(Percentages)

FIGURE 8.2 

Vote by Education 
(Percentages)

FIGURE 8.3
Vote by Income of Householder
(Percentages)

(p < .05, n=266)

(a) The probability values are derived only from chi-square tests of differences between LCP and ALP voters against the sociological variables.

(b) All those 'Undecided' or 'Other' in their voting choice have been excluded from this and other kindred figures and tables. The number of 'Others' is trivial.

There is little that is surprising here, except for the extraordinary tendency of the poor to vote for conservative parties. No direct evidence will be adduced for this tendency; but obviously many people living with, or being a householder with the less than $45 per week will be retired or widowed, with a limited income but preserving a
certain gentility. One interviewee in this category deserves to be remembered. She is an English lady in late middle age living in Glen Iris, Melbourne's paradigm middle-class suburb. She votes Liberal; her husband is a retired Company Manager with an income of $35-45 per week. Asked 'If you had to describe which group of the community you belong to... What would you say?', she replies 'I suppose I'm just a very ordinary person. I've travelled a lot and my family is in "Burke's Landed Gentry".' She always votes Liberal, because '...all my life I have voted Conservative in England. I'm all for education and anyone who is from the educated class has my preference.' This is not a 'deferential' vote and the overall figures indicate little 'deferential' voting in Australia. It is a class vote based on a slightly deviant self-placement. This kind of attitude, it may be conjectured, accounts for the apparent anomaly in the income-vote table.
FIGURE 8.4
Vote by Age
(Percentages)

FIGURE 8.5
Vote by Sex
(Percentages)

The figures for age deviate from the pattern in the December 1961 Gallup Poll data given in Davies and Encel.\(^1\) Then, youth were disproportionately pro-Labor. The discrepancy probably indicates the generational difference mentioned in Chapter Four. A Melbourne polling organization had foreshadowed the change in a survey of young people (aged 16-25) in all States (but principally Victoria and New South Wales) in 1964.\(^2\) Although the sample was of dubious

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 113.

representativeness, it was so overwhelmingly pro-Liberal as to be suggestive of a 'new wave' in Australian politics. Its figures for 'blue' and 'white-collar' young people were very similar: there were fewer than 25 per cent of ALP voters in each occupational group. Labor was becoming, and later clearly became,\(^1\) the Party of the middle-aged, redolent of the 1940s and the Depression.

Women once again show a conservative tendency.

Respondents in the 1966 Melbourne-Sydney sample were asked: 'Have you **discussed** any political topics recently?', a question which, as we shall see, is probably a good index of political concern, and split the sample roughly into two halves. Its content will be labelled 'political talk' and answers categorized 'Yes' and 'No'. (Only one respondent gave 'Don't Know' and is excluded from the relevant tables).

| TABLE 8.1 |
|---|---|---|
| Vote by Political Talk (Percentages) |
| LCP | ALP | DLP |
| **Political Talkers:** | 53  | 41  | 6  |
| **Non-talkers:** | 56  | 38  | 6  |

\(^1\) Even after the swing to Labor in 1969, the ALP had a disproportionately large following amongst the middle-aged. See the APOP poll of 4 October 1969, discussed in A. Hughes, 'Political Review,' Australian Quarterly, 41 (1969) No. 4, pp. 15-24.
(see Table 4.7 in Chapter Four). It may be that the questions which were used to define opinion leaders then were unattractive to middle-class respondents (too aggressive in tone, e.g. 'Have you tried to convince anyone of your political ideas recently?' (my stress).

**TABLE 8.2**

**Vote by Religious Affiliation**

(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>LCP</th>
<th>ALP</th>
<th>DLP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protestant:</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1=100% (n=171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic:</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14=100% (n=90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0=100% (n=21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnostic/Atheist:</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>6=100% (n=15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(difference between Protestant and Catholic n.s.)

Table 8.2 gives a hint of the religious divisions which exist in Victoria, but is interesting chiefly as a good example of how a crucial electoral fact (Catholic support for the D.L.P. in Victoria) can fail to emerge in mass data.

8.2.2. Reasons for Party Choice

The question: 'What are your main reasons for voting for the party of your choice at this election? ', or one like it, had never been put to a mass urban sample in Australia, with the one exception of a study of a by-election in Victoria by Burns. The categorization of response follows that of Burns. 'Party record' is a very general

---

category, oriented to the past; 'party promise or policy' looks to the future. 'Habit/tradition' refers to family tradition as well as personal consistency. 'Class/religion' seemed useful a priori, but is perhaps misleading, since only one respondent gave a 'religious' reason. 'Influence of spouse or other immediate personal influence' and 'Influence of public figure' are self-explanatory. 'Principle or high policy' designates ideological reasons. These can be subsumed under higher-order headings following Burns, as in Table 8.3.

**TABLE 8.3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Choice of Party (Percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responsive:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party record:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party promise or policy: 27(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situational:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habit/tradition:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Religion:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal influence (spouse etc.):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of public figure:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle/high policy 10(%) = 10(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse/no data (a) 15(%) = 15(%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(=100\(\%\) = 100\(\%\)(n=352)\)

(a) Includes those 'Undecided'.

The dominance of 'party' reasons may be partly a function of the question asked. Note the very few respondents who acknowledged the influence of their spouse (mainly of husbands) and the small proportion of 'ideological' voters. This and the absence of a very strong 'class'
influence suggests that most voters do not draw a very harsh line between the major parties. Correlations between opinions on policy issues (to be found in Table 4.11 in Chapter Four and Tables 8.20 and 8.21 in this chapter) are mostly low, and although they are higher amongst political talkers (See Table 8.28) this suggests the low incidence of ideological conceptions in the mass public.

The lack of governance of opinion on particular issues by ideologies in the mass public suggests a similarity in the Australian situation to the general portrait advanced by Converse.¹

'For the truly involved citizen, the development of political sophistication means the absorption of contextual information that makes clear to him the connections of the policy area of his initial interest in other areas; and that these broader configurations of policy positions are describable quite economically in the basic abstractions of ideology. Most member of the mass public, however, fail to proceed so far...'

Amongst the 'political' public, such general connections are more in evidence, as we shall see (Cf. Tables 8.4 and 8.28).

The higher-order headings of reasons for voting choice can be further collapsed, and it is useful to do so here, since we are testing hypotheses in an only moderately

large sample. The 'responsive' and 'ideological' reasons can be considered political per se; and dubbed 'programmatic'; the 'situational' and 'personal' ones are essentially non-political and are dubbed 'Social'. We might expect political talkers to be more 'programmatic' in their reasons for voting choice than non-talkers, and this is in fact so.

TABLE 8.4

Reason for Voting Choice by Political Talk
(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Programmatic</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Talkers:</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-talkers:</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= 100% (n=159) 100% (n=137)

(p < .01, n=296)

This dichotomy in reason for vote also has sociological correlates.

FIGURE 8.6
Reason for Voting Choice by Social Class
(Percentages)

Middle class Working class

(p < .02, n=276)

FIGURE 8.7
Reason for Voting Choice by Education
(Percentages)

Higher Middle Lower

(p < .01, n=296)
FIGURE 8.8

Reason for Voting Choice by Householder's Income (Percentages)

(p < .001, n=262)

At the higher status levels, the voter is more likely to give a programmatic reason for his choice, which is to say that he has a more individualistic style of response; at the lower levels, the voters see themselves in collectivities. Labor, out of office for 16 years, is of course at a disadvantage for 'record'. Tables 8.5 and 8.6 set out differences between supporters of the major parties.
TABLE 8.5

Reason for Voting Choice by Political Party
(Categories Collapsed)
(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Programmatic</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LCP:</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20 = 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP:</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51 = 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .001, n=272)

Table 8.6 expands Table 8.5.

TABLE 8.6

Reason for Voting Choice by Political Party
(Categories Expanded)
(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LCP:</td>
<td>48 Party Record</td>
<td>22 Promise/Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22 Promise/Policy</td>
<td>8 Habit/tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 Habit/tradition</td>
<td>3 Class etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Class etc.</td>
<td>3 Spouse etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Public Figure</td>
<td>2 Public Figure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 Ideological</td>
<td>10 Ideological</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= 100% = 100%

The number of D.L.P. voters is too small to serve as a basis for generalization, but it should be remarked that of the 13 for whom there is data, 11 are 'programmatic' in their reason for vote.
These data suggest that young people and men are more inclined to programmatic than social reasons for their vote but the discrepancies only approach significance.

No disproportionalities in reasons for voting choice are apparent by religious affiliation.

8.3. The Incidence of Political Talk

Various indices of the degree of political concern in the respondent are possible, and the several questions in this area relate well to each other. It is convenient for methodological reasons to split the sample into two equal parts, and the question spelt out above on political talk does so. Responses to the question are closely related to being classed as an opinion leader, using the
same criteria (and questions) as in the 1963 survey, described in Chapter Four.

**TABLE 8.7**

**Political Talk by Classification as 'Opinion Leader'**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Talkers</th>
<th>Non-Talkers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opinion leaders</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-opinion leaders</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(p < .001, n=350)}
\end{align*}
\]

A tendency to talk politics is also related to political interest.

**TABLE 8.8**

**Political Talk by Political Interest**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Talkers</th>
<th>non-talkers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'A lot'</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'some but not much'</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'hardly any'</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(p < .001, n=349)}
\end{align*}
\]

There is a possibility that responses to the question about 'talk' may be contaminated by acquiescence, but it is not a very strong one, since the question relates to a fact of recent immediate experience. In view of its good relations with other relevant questions, its intrinsic interest and its good response 'split', it will be adopted as the chief index of concern with politics. What are the social loci of political discussion?
FIGURE 8.11
Political Talk by Social Class
(Percentages)

(p < .001, n=322)

FIGURE 8.12
Political Talk by Education
(Percentages)

(p < .001, n=349)

FIGURE 8.13
Political Talk by Householder's Income
(Percentages)

(p < .01, n=321)
Political talk is more common at higher status levels. In view of the lack of difference between party supporters, one must infer that higher status Labor voters must be particularly talkative.

In the middle class, there is a greater tendency to talk politics privately, with the family or with friends, than in the working class, where political talk at work or in a club is more common. The difference is not great, but is reliable. Respondents who were 'political talkers' were asked: 'In which one of these groups would you be most likely to discuss a political question?' 'Family or relatives; Friends; At work; In a club or Social organization;' were the choices listed on a card simultaneously handed to them. The results are set out in Table 8.9.

TABLE 8.9

The Favoured Social Locale of Political Talk by Social Class
(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class:</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Friends</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Club</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class:</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class:</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The locales were dichotomized as family/friends and work/club, to test the difference between the private and public locales respectively; p < .05, n=155)

No differences are apparent in frequency of political talk by age or sex.

A further enquiry was made as to the respondents' chief
source of political information, namely to see whether or not the non-talkers were more likely to rely on the mass media or on political talk. However more effective face-to-face contacts may be, the evidence is that both political talkers and non-talkers rely much more heavily on the mass media than on talk for information. The following question was on a card handed to the respondent: 'Do you pick up information on current politics more from TV, radio, newspapers or books etc.. OR more from talking to other people, or just listening to what they say?' The results are set out in Table 8.10.

TABLE 8.10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chief Source of Political Information (Percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Talkers:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Talkers:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p is n.s., n=341)

To sum up, there is a great deal of political talk. It is of marginal significance as a source of information compared to the mass media. It pervades all status levels, but is distinctly more common at the higher level. Its locale tends to be more public in the working class. There is no difference in the incidence of political talk by age, sex

365

or party support, indicating in the last case that upper-status A.L.P. voters must be disproportionately talkative. Political talkers tend to have disproportionately more 'programmatic' than 'social' reasons for their voting choice. As will emerge in Section 8, they also have a more coherent view of the structure of political issues.

8.4. The 'Tractable' Vote

Once again, an attempt was made to identify the proportion of the sample without fixed party loyalties. If a voter recalled the same vote in 1963 as was intended for 1966, he or she was asked: 'Do you always vote for that party?' A negative response placed the voter in the 'tractable' category. Those 'Undecided' in their vote were also classed as 'tractable'. 'New' voters were not included on this occasion unless there were substantive grounds for considering them 'tractable' as above. Even when they are excluded, the tractable vote is large (n=127, 33 per cent of the sample), and constituted as follows.

TABLE 8.11

The Tractable Vote
(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undecided:</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those changing their vote, 1963-1966:</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP 1963 and 1966 but not 'always':</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP 1963 and 1966 but not 'always':</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP 1963 and 1966 but not 'always':</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 'floating' categories:</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This may be in some ways a conservative estimate, since some surveys overseas suggest that an accurate memory of the previous vote is more common amongst consistent voters.¹

Strangely, the number switching to the Right² (from the A.L.P. to the L.C.P. or D.L.P.) almost equalled the number switching to the Left (from the L.C.P. or D.L.P. to the A.L.P.). The decline in the A.L.P.'s electoral support from 1963-1966 was apparently mostly due to the anti-A.L.P. sentiments of the new voters coming of age (or, more rarely, returning to the country), in so far as we can generalize from this sample. The notion of a 'swing' away from the A.L.P. may thus be conceptually misleading. So, too, is the conventional wisdom as to which were the electorally dominant issues, as we shall see.

The tractable group of voters is politically heterogeneous, but considered as a conglomerate whole, it is politically more talkative than voters of fixed loyalties.

¹ See e.g. J.G. Blumler and D. McQuail, Television in Politics: Its Uses and Influence, (London, 1968), p. 185: 'Ninety-three per cent of those who did not change between the two elections [1959 and 1964] reported their 1959 vote correctly, compared with only fifty per cent of those whose voting position in 1964 differed from that of 1959.'

² It is, of course, difficult to rank parties on a single Left-Right dimension. It is nonsense to do the same with policy issues, as the data and discussion below will demonstrate.
TABLE 8.12

**Political Talk by Political 'Loyalty'**

(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voters:</th>
<th>Talkers</th>
<th>Non-talkers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractable:</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-tractable</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= 100% (n=127)

= 100% (n=214)

(p < .05, n=341)

It also shows a slight tendency to higher income.

TABLE 8.13

**Political 'Loyalty' by Householder's Income**

(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income:</th>
<th>Tractable</th>
<th>Non-tractable ('loyal')</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher:</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower:</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= 100%

= 100%

= 100%

(p < .10, n=314)

'Tractables' are also more likely to be more radical on one of the three major dimensions of political attitudes identified and discussed in Section 6, Conscience Radicalism.

TABLE 8.14

**Conscience Radicalism by Political Loyalty (a)**

(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conscience Radicalism</th>
<th>Tractable</th>
<th>Non-tractable ('loyal')</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= 100%

= 100%

(p < .05, n=342)

(a) 'High' and 'Low' here refer to score above and below the median.
No reliable relations can be found between the tractable vote and political interest, being an opinion leader, education level, class or sex. Its high incidence of political talk is therefore probably partly a function of its present uncertainties rather than of a lasting preoccupation with politics. Nor can relations be found with the two other major dimensions of political attitudes, the 'Established Socio-economic Radicalism' and 'Defence Leftism.' The lack of relation with the latter is surprising in an election campaign apparently bringing foreign policy issues to the fore; but as we shall see, their prominence was illusory rather than real. Nor is there a relation with libertarianism.

The high proportion of 'Conscience Radicals' can be understood as a reflection of a lack of rigidity: it is the real issues and not stolid attitudes such as steadfast party loyalty, which grip them. However, the category 'tractable' has few psychological correlates (see Chapter Nine).

8.5. The Relative Importance of Issues

Statistical surveys of large and unremarkable samples, such as this one, can only indicate which issues are salient to the mass public. They can tell us little of those issues which are important to the political intelligentsia, that is, informed public servants, academics, journalists,
the higher echelons of party organizers and men prominent in public affairs, which may move them to political action which sways the mass public by indirection. The National Civic Council and the D.L.P. are important in this regard. The former is a numerically tiny group which exercises an influence quite out of proportion to its numbers, and often not by bringing an issue to public notice, but by appealing to broader loyalties through the D.L.P. to sway voting preferences in a few key seats. Some 'issues' may therefore play a dominant but covert role, not through their salience to the mass public. As we have seen, few voters are oriented directly to policy issues, whilst many have a general party or class orientation.\(^1\) However, since each member of the mass public has one vote, they compel attention.

Interviewees were handed a card, as in 1963, on which were printed six 'election issues': 'Defence,' 'Conscription,' Education Spending, 'State Aid to Church Schools,' 'National Development,' and 'Social Services (pensions, etc.).' Two types of cards were again used, each of which listed the issues in reverse order to the other. Respondents were

\(^1\) For a sceptical elaboration of a model of 'economic rationality' capable of theoretical extension to political decision-making, (The model assumes an orientation to policy goals) see A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York, 1957) at p. 6.
asked: 'In your own personal opinion, which of these election issues is of first importance?' The interviewer then proceeded to obtain rankings of '2' to '6'. Table 8.15 gives the average rankings for each major electoral group. New voters have been grouped separately. A low rank, of course, indicates high importance.

**TABLE 8.15**

**Average Ranking of Election Issues**

**Amongst those always voting LCP (n=91):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Development</td>
<td>2.31 (First importance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>2.63 (Second &quot; )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Spending</td>
<td>2.67 (Third &quot; )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>3.49 (Fourth &quot; )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>4.73 (Fifth &quot; )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to Church Schools</td>
<td>5.13 (Sixth &quot; )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Amongst those always voting ALP (n=77):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Spending</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Development</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to Church Schools</td>
<td>4.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>4.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Amongst 'tractable' voters (n=127):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education Spending</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Development</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to Church Schools</td>
<td>4.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Amongst 'new' voters (n=47):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education Spending</td>
<td>2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Development</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>3.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>3.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>4.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to Church Schools</td>
<td>4.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The notable features of this table are the generally high ranking of 'Education Spending,' and the generally low ranking of 'Defence' and especially 'Conscription.' Although direct comparison with the 1963 survey data is not possible, because of changes in wording and the somewhat different set of issues presented, 'Defence,' although still low, appears to have achieved a slight rise from its position of low importance, and 'Education' to have receded slightly from its position of pre-eminence. The expansion of the description of 'Social Services' to include '(pensions, etc.)' may be responsible for their higher ranking here than in 1963.

It is hardly possible to claim that this election was dominated by considerations of defence policy and the principle of conscription if one considers rankings amongst 'tractable' and 'new' voters. Domestic issues still dominated the outlook of the electorate. The identity between 'tractable' and 'new' voters is noteworthy, as is the contrast between 'loyal' A.L.P. and L.C.P. voters. Some tests of significance of differences, not attempted in Chapter Four, seemed desirable. The differences in rankings\(^1\) of 'Social Services' and 'Defence', as between

\(^1\) Rankings were collapsed to two values: 'high' (in the top 3) and 'low' (in the bottom 3).
A.L.P. 'loyals' on the one hand, and L.C.P. 'loyals' on the other, are both significant \((p < .01\) and \(p < .001\) respectively). The differences in the rankings of 'Defence' and 'Social Services' as between 'loyal' A.L.P. and 'tractable' voters are also both significant \((p < .05\) in both cases). Thus it seems that the identity in outlook of 'loyal' A.L.P. and tractable voters on the relative importance of issues in 1963 was lost in 1966, and that defence policy, although still rated low by crucial sectors of the electorate, acquired a marginal importance in differentiating 'tractable' and 'new' voters from those always voting A.L.P.

8.6. 'Left' and 'Right': The Structure of Opinion on Policy Issues

8.6.1. General Structure

There is a deep confusion as to what is 'Left' and 'Right' in Australian politics, which keeps company both with a dissatisfaction with these terms and their facile use by both academic commentators and journalists.\(^1\) The basic difficulty arises because of a persistence in the use of one continuum. This is not a viable procedure, since

\(^1\) For a striking example of this, see T. Truman, Ideological Groups in The Australian Labor Party and Their Attitudes, (Brisbane, 1965), University of Queensland Papers, Department of History and Political Science, Vol. 1, No. 2. The initial distinction between 'left' and 'right' is made on the sole ground of attitude to nationalization (see pp. 49-50).
policy questions are grouped in clusters, as the analysis in Chapter Four demonstrates, and to generalize from, say, a radical opinion on the issues in one cluster to those in another is hazardous, or, plainly, improper. For the several reasons given in the introduction to this chapter, a refined analysis, using more sophisticated techniques, seemed desirable for the more extensive data of the 1966 survey, partly to delineate a more complete structure, partly to test the stability of the structure discovered in 1963. Table 8.16 sets out the policy questions asked in 1966, the response splits obtained, in the sequence in which they were asked. This was intended to be a 'global' inventory of policy questions i.e. to raise as many questions as time would permit in an interview in which the psychological scales were also administered (there being a grand total of 167 questions). Questions concerning civil liberties, and questions concerning judgements, or perceptions, of political situations are discussed separately.

TABLE 8.16

Policy Questions and Responses, 1966 (a) (b) (c) (Percentages)

(a) There is an intrinsic interest in these response splits, and a note on their approximate standard error for a random sample (which this is not) of
this size may be useful. For response splits of the order 70/30, the sampling error is about 6.5 per cent i.e. the probability that the value estimated will be 6.5 per cent above or below the sample figure is .95.\(^1\)

(b) An asterisk denotes those responses dubbed, for convenience, 'radical' or 'left'. There can obviously be argument with the procedure for Q. 7, where support of the \textit{status quo} as well as one sort of change is dubbed 'left'. This was done because the two latter categories were collapsed for the purposes of computing a scale score, and the best (i.e. nearest median) split was obtained by dividing the first response from those which follow.

(c) Interviewers were asked to stress words underlined.

1. Do you think that Government spending on education should remain about the \textit{same} as it is now, or be \textit{moderately} increased.\(^38\%\)

\textbf{OR}

Do you think it should be \textit{greatly} increased?* \(^60\%\)

Undecided: \(2\%\)

\(= 100\%\)

2. Do you think that the Government should help finance Church Schools ..* 55%

OR

should the Government spent its money on State Schools only? 42%

Undecided: 3%

= 100%

3. Do you think Australia should increase its spending on defence .. 54%

OR
does Australia spend enough on defence already?* 42%

Undecided: 4%

= 100%

4. Apart from the conscription issue, do you support the sending of Australian troops to South Vietnam .. 70%

OR
do you feel it would have been better not to send Australian* troops to South Vietnam? 26%

Undecided: 4%

= 100%

5. On conscription, do you oppose sending National Servicemen, that is, conscripts, to Vietnam ..* 59%

OR
do you support sending National Servicemen, that is, conscripts to Vietnam? 37%

Undecided: 4%

= 100%
6. If Australia were in danger of attack, would you be against conscription for overseas military service ..* 16%

OR

would you support conscription for overseas service at such a time? 84%

Undecided: 0%

= 100%

7. Should Australia seek closer defence ties with the U.S.A. through treaties .. 30%

OR

keep defence ties with the U.S.A. the same as they are now ..* 57%

OR

have looser defence ties with the U.S.A. than at present?* 12%

Undecided: 1%

= 100%

8. Do you think that Australia should set about getting atomic weapons for defence now .. 46%

OR

do you think we should avoid getting atomic weapons at the present time?* 52%

Undecided: 2%

= 100%
9. Australia now gives equipment to some Asian countries to help them develop. Do you think this economic aid should be increased,* ... 46% OR kept about the same as it is now? 51% Undecided: 3% = 100%

10. Do you think the White Australia policy should be kept as it is now ... 46% OR should the policy be relaxed, to allow more Asians to settle in this country? 52% Undecided: 2% = 100%

11. There has recently been a change in government in Indonesia. Should Australia offer special aid and cooperation to the new Indonesian Government ..* 36% OR should Australia be wary of too much aid and cooperation at the present time? 57% Undecided: 7% = 100%
12. On New Guinea

Should Australia spend a lot more on New Guinea development ..* 59%

OR

should Australia spend about the same as it does now? 36%

Undecided: 5%

= 100%

13. Now on political topics here in Australia, should the Commonwealth Government start up new business enterprises of its own ..* 43%

OR

should it keep out of new business ventures? 50%

Undecided: 7%

= 100%

14. Should the Government avoid nationalization and promote private enterprise .. 56%

OR

should it nationalize some business monopolies?* 37%

Undecided: 7%

= 100%
15. There has been much American investment in Australian industry in the last few years.

Do you think that the Australian Government should put special controls on American investment in this country? 55%

OR

should the Government use the same controls as for Australian business? 42%

Undecided: 3% = 100%

16. On economic planning, should the Government use controls to guide business development more closely? 39%

OR

should the Government use only present controls and not interfere with business development? 54%

Undecided: 7% = 100%

17. Suppose the Government does introduce detailed economic planning. Do you think it should use strict controls to force businessmen to do what is best for the country? 17%

OR

use mild controls and discuss its plans with business and union leaders? 80%

Undecided: 3% = 100%
18. If a man owns stocks and shares and makes some money from increases in their value, should such gains be left free of tax .. 47%

OR

should the gains be taxed?* 50%

Undecided: 3%

= 100%

19. Do you think there should be a death penalty for murder .. 49%

OR

do you think there should be no death penalty?* 44%

Undecided: 7%

= 100%

20. Do you think that child endowment should be .. increased?* .. 70%

OR

kept about the same as it is now? 29%

Undecided: 1%

= 100%

21. Should age pensions be kept the same, or moderately increased?.. 41%

OR

do you think they should be greatly increased?* 59%

Undecided: 0%

= 100%
22. Do you think that Australia should be a Republic, with a President as head.*  32%

OR

should it remain a Monarchy, with the Queen as Head of State?  62%

Undecided:  6%

= 100%

In order to obtain the relationships between the 22 items, all responses were collapsed to two categories, those 'Undecided' being allotted to the smaller of the remaining two. (The initial procedure for Q. 7, which gave four possible responses, has been described). Product-moment coefficients (numerically equivalent to the phi coefficient when there are two values for each variable) were then computed. The results are set out in Table 8.17.
TABLE 8.17

Intercorrelations between Opinions on Policies (a)
(Product-moment correlations)

(a) The numbers are identical with those of the questions in Table 8.16.

How many dimensions of radicalism are there in Australian political opinion? One meaningful answer can be given which is only minimally dependent on the subjective judgement of the analyst. This involves the statistical question: how many meaningful independent factors can be extracted from the matrix of correlations above? Five varimax factor analyses were carried out, stipulating from two to six orthogonal factors. For technical reasons, a three-factor solution was unavoidable. These were, firstly, that a two-factor solution was misleading, since,
if one examined the intercorrelations of the items loading on the second factor, they formed two statistically disparate clusters, one having to do with 'conscience' issues such as hanging, the other with issues in defence and foreign policy. Secondly, since the factors extracted under these procedures tend to become weaker as one progresses, it was decided to exclude a solution which extended to a factor without substantive meaning. This required a three-factor solution, since when four factors are extracted, the last, and weakest, exhibits a minority of significant inter-item correlations for those items which are loaded noticeably on it. All loadings of .02 or more were regarded as 'noticeable'. The average inter-item coefficient amongst these approximated zero. A four-factor solution, or one postulating a greater number of factors, is thus untenable, if the factors are required to have substantive meaning.

The factor loadings for the three-factor solution are displayed in Table 8.18.
### TABLE 8.18

#### Factor Loadings of all Policy Items (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Nos:</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>10 (Education Spending)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>20 (Aid to Church Schools)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>63 (Defence Spending)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>60 (Troops for Vietnam)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>51 (Conscripts for Vietnam)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.31 (Conscription in Direct Attack)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.52 (Defence Ties with U.S.A.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.50 (Atomic Weapons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>-.12 (Aid to Asia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>-.16 (Relax White Australia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>-.07 (Aid to Indonesia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.18 (New Guinea)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.08 (New Government Enterprises)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.23 (Nationalization of Monopolies)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.21 (Controls on US Investment)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.31 (Economic Planning)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.04 (Strict Economic Planning)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.16 (Capital Gains Tax)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>-.18 (Abolish Death Penalty)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02 (Child Endowment)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.01 (Age Pensions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.21 (Republic)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The signs (+ or -) of the loadings should be interpreted as in the following examples: Factor III, as discussion hereafter indicates, represents a 'hawkish' sentiment on foreign policy. Item 3 (Defence Spending) is positively loaded on this factor, and item 15 (Controls on US Investment) is negatively loaded on it. Thus 'hawks' want to spend more on defence and not impose special controls on US investment, nor introduce economic planning...
(item 16). The meaning of a cross-loading may be illustrated as follows. Factor I represents (see discussion hereafter) the 'Established Socio-economic Radicalism'. Item 4 (Troops for Vietnam) loads negatively on Factor I and positively on Factor III. Thus sending troops to Vietnam is in accordance with 'hawkish' sentiment and out of sympathy with socio-economic radicalism. Acquiring atomic weapons (item 8) is 'hawkish', but loads negatively on Factor II (representing Conscience Radicalism), and so is in opposition to the latter.

Factor analysis, unlike cluster analysis, does not force an item into one category, so Table 8.18 conveniently exhibits cross-relationships when these are apparent. However, they are relatively rare.

The first factor is related to various socio-economic issues in domestic politics, and also to the question of a change to a Republic. It is clearly the factor most nearly representing the 'Established' radicalism discovered in the analysis in Chapter Four, but has annexed, as it were, the issues of economic planning and a capital gains tax, two of the four issues of the 'New' radicalism. What has happened to the 'New' radicalism, no trace of which seems to remain? The exhaustive analysis undertaken, referred to
in Chapter Four, and set out in Appendix Three, to test the stability of the three-cluster hypothesis reached the conclusion that the cluster of issues representing the 'New' radicalism was a real one, maintaining its cohesion even when the analysis proceeded on assumptions hostile to its existence. The actual web of correlations between its items are set out in Table 8.19. The main connections were those between education spending and the introduction of economic planning, and between education spending and a capital gains tax. When 'Don't know' and 'Other opinion' respondents were excluded, there was a significant connection also between education and defence spending, and between economic planning and a gains tax. What has happened to these relationships? Some correlations between them, as set out in Table 8.17, in 1966, are recapitulated in Table 8.19, and compared with those of 1963 (when those who responded 'Don't know' and 'Other opinion' were excluded).

TABLE 8.19

1963 and 1966 Correlations between Issues of the 'New' Radicalism
(1963: Tetrachoric Correlations
1966: Product-moment Correlations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1963:</th>
<th>1966:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning x Education</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education x Gains Tax</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education x Defence</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>-.07 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning x Gains Tax</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(a) Note that an increase in defence was dubbed 'radical' in 1963, whilst 'keeping it the same' was dubbed 'left' or 'radical' in 1966. This table follows the 1963 convention.

One might expect some depression in the 1966 correlations, because uneven marginal split would depress the product-moment, but not the tetrachoric. However, these figures make it clear that the correlations dissolved, and that a substantive change took place in the structure of attitudes. This was probably due to three things:-

(i) The changed complexion of defence spending. In 1963 it was seen in the context of 'defence neglect.' In 1966 it appeared directly related to the war in Vietnam, and hence lost its connection with those issues which represented a concern with under-spending in the public sector of the economy.

(ii) In 1966, the stock market was recovering from a 'bearish' triennium, and there had been less talk of a capital gains tax. Indeed, the issue of a capital gains tax hung in a limbo, not noticeably related to any of the three Factors.

(iii) The 1963 question on economic planning was probably construed loosely as management of the economy to provide full employment without inflation, and seen
in the light of the badly mis-managed 'credit squeeze' of 1960-61. The change in phrasing of the question with the reference to additional government controls made it clear that what was spoken of went beyond a broad management of the economy, and there was less enthusiasm for it. It became more firmly identified as a socialist proposal.

In short, the death of 'New' radicalism was partly a result of neglect. The A.L.P. did not exploit and nourish the connection between the three issues other than defence spending but instead permitted it to wither, whilst the party focussed attention on external policy.

The sentiment governing this dimension of political attitudes will be called the 'Established Socio-economic Radicalism', or, for brevity, ER.

The second factor clearly represents the 'Conscience' radicalism of 1963. The stability of the cohesion of this group of issues and its disparateness from others is manifest. It is related to the new questions posed about increased spending on development in New Guinea and special 'aid' to and 'co-operation' with the new regime in Indonesia. Its central themes appear to be nurturance and sympathetic identification with the 'other'. The items associated with it do not cross-load extensively on Factor III, nor do
items associated with Factor III cross-load much on it. This is surprising in the case of conscription for Vietnam or even, perhaps, the whole issue of participation in the Vietnam war. The moral argument about the war was still in its initial stages, and it was by no means clear that Australian non-involvement would benefit any group of clearly identifiable victims. Indeed, the contrary could have been argued (and is still tenable): that Australians were defending a civilian population. The case of conscription for Vietnam is a more difficult one, since the conscript is potential symbol of a victim. However, the conscript as rescuer is also a possible mental portrait. It should be remembered that these groups of issues do not assemble themselves in patterns in the outlook of a totally unguided public, but, as has been suggested, their assemblies are plastic and susceptible to a degree of influence by opinion-forming agencies, such as political parties. In the case of the symbol of the conscript, the A.L.P., on the one hand, and the D.L.P. and Government Parties on the other, were rivals, the latter describing him as a 'National Serviceman'. The D.L.P., in the field of external policy, had been a champion of the radical position on the 'Conscience' issues, and this may help to explain why the question of State aid to Church Schools is loaded on Factor II; the suggestion is that this dimension of
radicalism is supported as a cohesive set of issues by a section of Catholic lay opinion which also supports aid to Church schools. Of course, it is also possible that since 'State aid' is probably seen by the mass public as aid primarily to the vast network of poor Catholic Schools, Protestant schools being few and rich by comparison, sympathetic Protestants are identifying with the needs of their Separated Brethren. The meaning of the factor loading on this item is thus unclear. Since opinions on the item seem to be more clearly dependent on immediate self interest (Table 8.20 shows that Catholics are overwhelmingly in favour of 'State aid') it was not included in the scale measuring 'Conscience' radicalism (CR for brevity).

Factor III represents the left-right ('dove'- 'hawk') dimension in foreign policy. It is related to the most obvious issues of defence and the American alliance. Its firm embrace of the question of the acquisition of nuclear weapons is surprising, since this question had not been the subject of much popular debate. The issue of special controls over US investment is loaded most heavily on this Factor. This suggests that the issue was seen as one of relations with US, rather than of economic policy, and its placement in the scale measuring Defence Leftism (the name
is awkward, but clear: DL for brevity) seems appropriate.

The factor loadings can thus form the basis for the construction of three indices measuring 'Established' domestic radicalism (ER), 'Conscience' radicalism (CR), and 'Defence Leftism' (DL), each named after the radical end of the three continua. Items were assigned to each index on the basis of their highest factor loading, with the exceptions of items 18 (Gains Tax) and 2 (Aid to Church Schools), which were placed in no index. A 'radical' or 'left' response on each item contributed a score of 2; 'Undecided' 1, and a conservative choice 0. The item numbers, possible ranges, medians, quartiles, and split-half reliabilities of the three indices are exhibited in Tables 8.20-8.22.

**TABLE 8.20**

**Standardisation Data for the Political Index ER**

**ER (Established Socio-economic Radicalism):**

Item nos: 1, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22. (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range (possible):</th>
<th>0-16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median:</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartiles</td>
<td>Raw Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=352):</td>
<td>% Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>11-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle:</td>
<td>7-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>range:</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>0-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(split-half method): n=395:</td>
<td>.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=353:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The factor loadings in Table 8.18 justify the placement of these and the CR and DL items in their respective scales.
Armed with these three indices, which measure the major dimensions of radicalism as they are to be discerned in the mass public, we can now gauge the extent to which the three dimensions converge. Although varimax procedures
extract orthogonal factors, the items which load on them may, of course, form related groups, as we have seen in the case of psychological constructs. The correlations between the three scales are displayed in Table 8.23.

TABLE 8.23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ER</th>
<th>CR</th>
<th>DL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) n=395

These are low, and in only two cases significant. It follows that the three groups of issues, as measured by these indices, are almost independent. This is illustrated by Figure 8.14, 8.15 and 8.16, each of which shows the relationship of two groups of items in two indices, located in each case in a two-dimensional space by their factor loadings. These are more sophisticated counterparts of Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 in Chapter Four.
FIGURE 8.14

Relationships between ER and CR Items

Education spending is again seen to be the socio-economic issue with the closest relation to CR. Increased spending on New Guinea shows some relation to ER. But what is most striking is the lack of cross-relations.
(a) The sign of the loadings of all items here on Factor III has been reversed, so that the items are displayed in relation to 'doveish' sentiment, in keeping with the nomenclature adopted. The sign of the loading of the DL and ER items on the other two factors is unchanged.
There are more cross-relations evident in this Figure. Economic planning is repugnant to 'hawks' and attractive to 'doves', although more closely related to ER; both domestic radicals and 'hawks' tend to favour a change to a republic; Conscription for Vietnam and participation in the Vietnam war are inimical to those radical on domestic issues.

FIGURE 8.16

Relationships between CR and DL Items (a)
(a) The sign of factor loadings has been changed as in Figure 8.15.

Cross-relations are evident here also. Both 'hawks' and 'Conscience' radicals would spend more on New Guinea. Hawks are hangers, and oppose further relaxation of the White Australia policy. The acquisition of atomic weapons is repugnant to 'Conscience' radicals. Those 'doves' who would oppose conscription even if Australia were in danger of attack tend to be 'Conscience' radicals.

It is therefore convenient to think in terms of a three-dimensional space defined by the three factors, not a unidimensional continuum, when describing what is 'right' and what is 'left' in Australian politics; and not merely convenient, but, if the 22 items were to be regarded as exhaustive, mandatory. The three-factor solution was compelled by the data.

Two qualifications should be made here. The first is that, since the 22 policy questions are not, of course, identical with the universe of all possible content, there are other possible questions. Amongst these are ones concerning civil liberties, which represent a set of minor issues within an important but restricted field. Since they do not have an identity with Conscience radicalism (CR), they are treated as separate. Whether or not they should
be regarded as representing a dimension of radicalism is a matter for judgement; I would prefer to say that, in view of their lesser status in public debate compared with the issues of the three dimensions identified, these items, shortly to be introduced, represent opinions on issues within a distinct field, but have a lesser status (as a 'sentiment') than the major issues, which, each of considerable moment, constitute the three dimensions of radicalism. Others may judge otherwise.

The second qualification is that, although the indices of the three dimensions of radicalism display only trivial intercorrelations, it does not follow that we are justified in regarding the three axes of our three-dimensional spaces as being nearly orthogonal. This is because the indices are most imperfect as measures of the sentiment governing scores on each dimension of radicalism, as is clear from their very modest reliability coefficients. If we 'correct for attenuation' a procedure which assumes each measure to be 'perfect,' i.e. having a reliability of +1.00, then the relationships obtained are those in Table 8.24.
TABLE 8.24

Correlations between the Political Indices ER, CR and DL, Corrected for Attenuation (Product-moment Correlations) (n=395)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ER</th>
<th>CR</th>
<th>DL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.45**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This procedure elevates the correlations considerably, but even the highest (between CR and DL) indicates a shared variance between the two sentiments of only 20%. We must nevertheless, consider the axes of the three dimensional space to be oblique, indicating a low to moderate covariance between the sentiments governing the three dimensions.

8.6.2. Libertarianism

Six questions (put in the form of a choice between paired statements) intended to tap libertarian sentiment were administered to the 1966 Melbourne-Sydney sample. They are displayed in Table 8.25, along with their response splits.

TABLE 8.25

Libertarianism Items and Responses (a) (b) (c) (Percentages) (n=352)

(a) An asterisk denotes the 'libertarian' alternative.
(b) An attempt was made to force a choice between the two substantive alternatives.

(c) The approximate standard error for a random sample of this size is 7% for response splits of the order 70/30.

1. A) The Communist Party should be banned: 52%
   B) The Communist Party should not be banned:* 47%
   Can't decide: 1%
   =100%

2. A) The powers of the Commonwealth Security Police should be restricted to safeguard civil liberties:* 34%
   B) The powers of the Commonwealth Security Police should be strengthened so that they can fight effectively the enemies of this country: 64%
   Can't decide: 2%
   =100%

3. A) Homosexual acts between consenting adults should be punished by law: 45%
   B) Homosexual acts between consenting adults should not be punishable by law:* 50%
   Can't decide: 5%
   =100%

4. A) Long-haired beatnik types are a nuisance and ought to be brought into line with community standards:37%
   B) Long-haired beatnik types are alright on the whole and should not be interfered with:* 62%
   Can't decide: 1%
   =100%
5. A) Powers of censorship over books, magazines and films should be used much less than at present: * 43%

B) Powers of censorship over books, magazines and films should continue to be used the same as they are now: 56%

Can't decide: 1%

= 100%

6. A) Nazi and fascist organizations should be banned: 73%

B) Nazi and fascist organizations should not be banned: * 25%

Can't decide: 2%

= 100%

The public seems more tolerant on social than on political issues, where they are less tolerant than the legal norm: neither Communist nor Fascist parties are banned in Australia. Homosexual acts between consenting adults carry a gaol sentence, but the legislation is erratically policed. The responses to these questions are sufficiently cohesive for it to serve as an index of libertarianism (LIB for brevity.) Standardisation data are set out in Table 8.26. Libertarian responses contribute 2 to the total score, 'Can't decide' 1, anti-libertarian responses 0.
TABLE 8.26

Standardisation Data for the Libertarianism Index, LIB
(n=352)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range (possible):</th>
<th>0-12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median:</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartiles:</td>
<td>Raw Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>8-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle range:</td>
<td>6-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>0-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reliability (split-half method): .492

Item Nos: Mean Correlation with Other Items (Ø)
1 .29**
2 .24**
3 .21**
4 .16**
5 .17**
6 .25**

The relations of the LIB index to the indices of the major political dimensions are displayed in Table 8.27.

TABLE 8.27

Relations of the LIB Index to Indices ER, CR and DL
(Tetrachoric Correlations)
(n=352)

LIB x ER  \( r_t = -.10 \)
LIB x CR  \( r_t = .24** \)
LIB x DL  \( r_t = .27** \)

8.6.3. Political Perceptions

Respondents were asked five questions having to do with their judgement or perception of political situations: one related to the domestic issue of poverty, the other four in the area of external relations. On poverty, they
were asked:

'Do you think there is enough real poverty in Australia to require special government action ... 43%

OR

do you think that poverty is a minor problem which will come right without special government action? 53%

Undecided: 4%

= 100% (n=395)

This question will be designated 'Poverty Problem' for brevity. Responses were not significantly related to any of the political indices (including LIB) except ER (with which the correlation (tetrachoric) = .39**)

In the field of external affairs, they were asked these four questions (the short title follows each):

'Do you think that Communism in Asia is -

a great danger to Australia's security: 62%
a minor danger to Australia's security: 26%

OR

no danger to Australia's security? 11%

Undecided: 1%

= 100%

('Communist danger'; n=395)
'Do you think Australia may be in **grave danger** of attack at some time in the next **ten years** .. 34%

**OR**

do you think there is **little danger** of an attack on Australia in the next ten years?' 59%

Undecided: 7%

= 100%

('Danger of Attack'; n=395)

'Do you think that **Britain** might let us down in an emergency if **they** were in any danger themselves .. 46%

**OR**

do you think they would **help** us, **even** at some risk to themselves?' 51%

Undecided: 3%

= 100%

('Trust in Britain'; n=395)

'Do you think that the **United States** might let us down in an emergency if **they** were in any danger themselves .. 15%

**OR**

do you think they would **help** us, **even** at some risk to themselves? 84%

Undecided: 1%

= 100%

('Trust in the U.S.'; n=395)
Asian Communism is thus seen by most as a 'great threat', and there is some apprehension of 'grave danger of attack'. Overwhelmingly, the US is seen as Australia's most reliable ally, opinion being divided on Great Britain. This survey was, of course, taken before the British decision to withdraw forces East of Suez. These perceptions are in most cases related to Defence Leftism and Libertarianism, but not to the other two indices, except for a negative relation between 'Communist danger' and Conscience Radicalism.

The perception items were treated as continua in the same fashion as the policy items have been, and their relationship to the political indices tested by the tetrachoric coefficient. 'Low' and 'high' on the political indices in Tables 8.28-8.31, which follow, means above and below the median, as in all tables other than those giving standardisation data. Percentages have also been computed for ease of interpretation.
TABLE 8.28

'Communist Danger' by Political Indices CR, DL and LIB (Percentages and Tetrachoric Correlations)
(n=552)

'Communist Danger'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'Great'</th>
<th>'Minor' or None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CR</strong></td>
<td>Low: 70</td>
<td>30 = 100% r_t = -.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High: 57</td>
<td>43 = 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DL</strong></td>
<td>Low: 80</td>
<td>20 = 100% r_t = -.57**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High: 43</td>
<td>57 = 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIB</strong></td>
<td>Low: 77</td>
<td>23 = 100% r_t = -.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High: 50</td>
<td>50 = 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a slight tendency for 'Conscience radicals' to assess Communism in Asia as less threatening than those conservative on this index, and strong tendencies for 'hawks' and anti-libertarians to see Asian Communism as more threatening. Only one item of six in the libertarianism index has to do directly with Communism. The item on the 'Security Police' is also relevant in substance. But the correlation here, as below, with the LIB index seems greater than could be accounted for by these items alone.

We have seen that libertarian sentiment is at odds with 'hawkish' sentiment (table 8.27). It may be that libertarian sentiment is dependent in a diffuse way on feelings of security.
TABLE 8.29

'Danger of Attack' by Political Indices DL and LIB (Percentages and Tetrachoric Correlations) (n=352)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Danger of Attack'</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>rt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low: DL</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low: LIB</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'Hawks', as might be expected are somewhat apprehensive of external attack, whilst 'doves', one might almost say, are prone to a sense of security. The same might be said of anti-libertarians and libertarians, the proportions being very similar.

TABLE 8.30

'Trust in Britain' by Political Index DL (Percentages and Tetrachoric Correlation) (n=352)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Trust in Britain'</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>rt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low: DL</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'Trust in Britain' is not significantly related to the ER, CR or LIB indices. In its relation to Defence Leftism, it is the 'hawks' who are more distrustful of Britain. 'Doves' are curiously old fashioned.
Most people trust the Americans, but 'doves' less so than 'hawks', and libertarians less than anti-libertarians. Doves and libertarians are much less prone to perceive threat or apprehend danger of attack, that is, do not live in an apparently threatening world, peopled by allies and enemies. They may therefore have a margin for scepticism about our greater ally.

The realities of Australia's external situation, although they cannot be debated here, may justify a quite realistic perception of threat and danger, and it would be unwise to see 'hawks' or those who perceive 'danger' or 'threat' as being irrational. There is little to justify speculation on an unreal 'siege mentality'. There is ex hypothesi a good deal of room for stereotypical thinking about the outside world, with which very few people have first-hand acquaintance. However, as we shall see, 'Defence Leftism' and perceptions of threat have rather weak psychological

---

**TABLE 8.51**

'Trust in the US' by Political Indices DL and LIB (Percentages and Tetrachoric Correlations) (n=352)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'Trust in the US'</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$r_t = -.38^{**}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$r_t = -.50^{**}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
correlates. Cues from political leaders seem to play a much more decisive role than psychological dispositions in forming conceptions of the external world. However, libertarianism has strong psychological correlates. Thus it is not the area of the unknown in which policies are structured by dispositions; rather one area of the known world, where aggressive and punitive traits are important in forming attitudes to outgroups perceived as familiar.

8.7. The Social and Political Correlates of Political Opinion

8.7.1. Established Socio-Economic Radicalism

Figures 8.17, 8.18 and 8.19 exhibit the status correlates of ER.

**FIGURE 8.17**

ER by Social Class  
(Percentages)

![ER by Social Class](chart)

**FIGURE 8.18**

ER by Education  
(Percentages)

![ER by Education](chart)

(p < .001, n=323)  
(p < .01, n=350)
The negative relation of ER to class, education level and income is explicable in terms of the conventional wisdom: the higher levels would have their assets diminished, or their businesses regulated, if the proposals constituting the ER index were implemented. There is a minor paradox in the income levels in that the lowest level appears less radical than the middle level; but the difference is not reliable, and the overall negative relation of ER to householder's income significant. It might be noted that the discrepancies exhibited here, although significant, are not very great.

ER has no significant relations with age, sex or a
tendency to talk politics. It is strongly related to vote.

**FIGURE 8.20**

ER by Vote
(Major Parties Only)
(Percentages)

Although the relation in Figure 8.20 is strong, it is evident that many voters are strikingly deviant from the Party norm in their views on policy. All the proposals of the ER index were in opposition to the policy of the Government Parties. However, as has been noted, few voters are oriented to policy.

Figure 8.20 strikes a blow at economic determinism, however, since it shows a stronger relation between political allegiance and policy opinion than is apparent between any sociological variable and policy opinion. Political views are obviously not an epiphenomenon of sociological variables,
and the tables leave a very large space to accommodate detached consideration and intention.

What of the correlations of each issue of ER with social background variables? Table 8.32 employs a compressed method of presenting these. It indicates the significance of a relationship when tested by chi-square. The direction of the difference is given in the notes.

**TABLE 8.32**

The Social Correlates of ER Issues

*Levels of Significance*

*(n=552)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue:</th>
<th>Inc.</th>
<th>Educ.</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Pol.</th>
<th>Talk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education spending:</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>p&lt; .05</td>
<td>p&lt; .01</td>
<td>p &lt; .01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Govt. Enterp.:</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>p&lt; .001</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalization:</td>
<td>p &lt; .01</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>p&lt; .01</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>p&lt; .001</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Planning:</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>p&lt; .05</td>
<td>p&lt; .001</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Strict' Planning:</td>
<td>p &lt; .05</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>p&lt; .01</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Endowment:</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>p &lt; .02</td>
<td>p&lt; .05</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>p&lt; .001</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Pensions:</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>p &lt; .05</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>p&lt; .02</td>
<td>p &lt; .001</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic:</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>p&lt; .05</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>p &lt; .05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(a) Higher income levels are more conservative where significance is attained.

(b) Educational level has no significant relation to any item.

(c) The middle class is less radical, when significance is attained.

(d) Youth is more radical.

(e) Women are more radical than men on Education Spending, less radical on Economic Planning, and more radical on Age Pensions.

(f) A.L.P. Voters are more radical when significance is attained.

(g) Talkers are more radical when significance is attained.

This pattern of detail reveals the openings for a forward strategy for the proponent of Established socio-economic radicalism. Hostility from higher income and class levels is concentrated on the 'old' issues, the nationalization and income redistribution proposals. Proposals for increased spending on education are popular generally but more so amongst political talkers and women. The table once again emphasises the relative importance of political allegiance rather social background factors in shaping opinion. Of course, the reverse mechanism is possible. Those with formed
radical views on the issues of ER may choose to support the A.L.P.

8.7.2. **Conscience Radicalism**

The story here is a relatively simple one to tell. The CR index has no overall significant relation to householder's income, social class, age, sex and vote. There are trivial and non-significant disproportionalities which suggest it may be slightly more common at the higher levels in income, amongst political talkers and in the middle class, but no reliance can be placed on them. If the whole sample is dichotomized, the difference even by education is not significant, but the 'Higher' groups is significantly higher in CR than the 'Lower' group (p < .01), with the 'Middle' group excluded.

Chi-square tests of the relation of all background variables to all CR items disclosed only these significant relations.

(i) The educated are more radical than others on Aid to Asia (p < .05)

(ii) Those higher in income (p < .05) and political talkers (p < .001), presumably partly because of their alertness, were more in favour than others of aid to the new regime in Indonesia.

(iii) A.L.P. voters were more in favour than others of developmental spending in New Guinea (p < .05)
(iv) Women are more opposed to the death penalty for murder than men (p < .01)

The slight, almost absent sociological relations of the CR items are in marked contrast with their strong psychological correlates. In fact, CR issues, and also libertarian sentiment, constitute the great arena within which psychological dispositions are dominant in assembling the opposing forces.

8.7.3. Defence Leftism

Here again, sociological correlates are few. The DL index has no significant relations with householder's income, class, age or tendency to talk politics. The same weak but significant relation which CR has with education obtains: the 'Higher' educated being 'doveish' and the 'Lower' 'hawkish' (p < .05). By vote, however, differences are very marked:

FIGURE 8.21

DL by Vote
Major Parties Only
(Percentages)

( p < .001, n=283)
Of the handful of D.L.P. voters (n=17), 12 are low, 5 high.

A detailed scrutiny, by chi-square tests, of every issue by every background variable shows A.L.P. voters to be more radical than L.C.P. voters on four of the seven issues of the index, at a high level of confidence (p < .001). They differ less on defence spending (p < .02) and the acquisition of atomic weapons (p < .02 and p < .01 respectively) and not at all on the question of controls on U.S. investment. Social correlates are as rare as for the CR issues, but anomalous: despite the weak positive overall relation of education to DL, it reaches significance on only one issue: defence spending, where the educated were more 'doveish' (p < .01). Other 'status' variables play an opposite role. Those at the higher income level were more in favour than others of sending troops to Vietnam (p < .02), as were the middle class (p < .001). Political talkers were less in favour than others of acquiring atomic weapons (p < .05) and more in favour of imposing controls on U.S. investment (p < .05).

We will shortly see that this sentiment has few psychological correlates. In view of this, and the sparseness of sociological correlates, taken with its strong relation to vote, political opinion on the Left-Right dimension in foreign and defence policy may be regarded as a political phenomenon sui generis. There seems no general
class conditioning; little influence by dispositional variables. If we assume that the mass public, especially those less interested in politics, is not very well informed and does not 'make up its own mind' on these issues - a very reasonable assumption - then leadership by opinion forming agencies such as the political parties and the press may play a very big role indeed. One is reminded of the picture of the old and retired mariner pointing out to sea and telling the small boy of the world. The portraits of the overseas world painted by political leaders seems to be accepted largely on trust, and not even, in any marked degree, selectively accepted or rejected by those with differing dispositions. This applies also to defensive activity: the public are told by their rival leaders what is required and adjust their attitudes accordingly to party loyalties. It will be recalled that the issue of foreign and defence policy was rated high in importance by relatively few. Where a group of issues is lacking in salience, the responsibilities of political opinion leaders are great.

8.7.4. Libertarianism

Whilst scores on the index LIB are strongly influenced by dispositions, its relation with the sociological variables is also marked. However, the LIB index bears no
relation to party allegiance. It is in these respects the precise inverse of the index DL. Figures 8.22, 8.23 and 8.24 display the relation of libertarianism to class, education and householder's income.

**FIGURE 8.22**

LIB by Social Class (Percentages)

(p < .05, n=323)

**FIGURE 8.23**

LIB by Education (Percentages)

(p < .001, n=350)

**FIGURE 8.24**

LIB by Householder's Income (Percentages)

(p < .001, n=322)
Libertarianism is more common amongst the middle class, the well off, and emphatically, amongst those with higher education. Five of the six items of the index refer to groups not 'reputable': Communists, Fascists, 'long haired beatnik types', homosexuals, and least 'respectable' of all, 'the enemies of this country.' It is true that the more educated are more directly concerned with censorship of the operation of the 'Security Police', (officially, the Australian Security and Intelligence Organization (ASIO)), which screens applicants for senior public service positions and has a watching brief on political demonstrations. But obviously, being libertarian at the higher status levels, in the terms defined by the index, in most instances requires an imaginative leap into the shoes of an uncommon and different kind of person. The central mechanism involved in being, or becoming libertarian seems likely to be the same as that for Conscience radicalism: sympathetic identification with the other. The Figures also suggest that since libertarianism is more common at the higher status levels, it is in accordance with the reigning values of Australian society: it is 'a free country'. But at the lower status levels, normative considerations are overwhelmed by punitive and aggressive traits. The outré groups named are alien and yet at the same time familiar at these social levels also, but their
existence is deplored. This may be partly a function of aspiration to social respectability, since intolerance of a disreputable group at least distances the respondent from it: 'I'm not one of them.' But psychological dispositions are also important in influencing attitudes of this kind.

FIGURE 8.25
LIB by Age
(Percentages)

FIGURE 8.26
LIB by Sex
(Percentages)

(p is n.s., n=352)

(p .01, n=350)
No reliable difference in libertarianism is apparent by age. Men, perhaps because they are more involved in worldly affairs and usually have a greater range of social experience than women, are more libertarian.

Libertarian sentiment, although not by any means absent, is deviant amongst Catholics, to a degree which cannot be accounted for merely by their disproportionately working-class identification. There is, indeed, a sharp cleavage in the Catholic lay community on libertarian issues, which is reflected in their publications, and which corresponds, at the level of public debate, with the views of the orthodox and oecumenical factions.
Political talkers are much more libertarian than non-talkers. We may construe the category 'political talkers' as the 'political public.' This may be taken with the facts that political talk is more common at the higher status levels and that the higher status levels exhibit more libertarianism. In short, we have a liberal intelligentsia, moving as a powerful influence in the social structure to dampen anti-libertarian sentiment and to support public institutions, such as the Courts, on occasion, and privately founded institutions, such as Councils for Civil Liberties (which exist in most States) which uphold freedoms.
8.75. Perceptions of a 'Problem' of Poverty

All the questions asked about the perception of political situations were related to external affairs, with the sole exception of poverty. Responses to this question were seen to be positively related to the dimension ER. Its social correlates are surprisingly few: it was not significantly related to class, education, householder's income, or age. Nor was it related to a tendency to talk politics. Women, perhaps because of their role as managers of domestic income, are more prone to see poverty as a social problem than men (p < .05) but the difference is slight. There is a distinct relation with vote.

TABLE 8.33

'Problem of Poverty' by Vote (Major Parties Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Problem of Poverty'</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP:</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP:</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .001, n=264)

The relation to vote is not, perhaps, as marked as one might expect, especially in view of the high rating given to 'social services' as an issue by 'loyal' A.L.P. voters. The question has psychological correlates, as will later appear, and it is suggested that 'nearness' to poverty
at the lower status levels, leading to perception of it as a problem amongst those who are poor, or nearly poor, is balanced at the upper status levels by a liberal concern with the issue, enhanced by the perspective afforded by higher education.

8.7.6. Two Residual Issues

The policy issues of 'Aid to Church Schools' and the introduction of a capital gains tax were not placed in any of the political indices. In the case of the former, its low loading on the factor related to the CR issues was ambiguous; in the case of the latter, no factor loadings were apparent. 'State Aid' was something of a fait accompli in Australian politics, with bipartisan support, when the 1966 survey was taken. It has no sociological correlates apart from religious affiliation, but was markedly better supported by political talkers (p < .01). The denominational difference on this issue is great.

TABLE 8.34.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Aid to Church Schools' by Religious Affiliation (Percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Aid to Church Schools'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denomination:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .001, n=291)
As for a gains tax, speculative gains are taxed, but where shares have been bought for 'investment' purposes, there is no tax on capital gains, even when they are realized. This issue has no sociological correlates except by sex, men being more radical (p < .01). Why this should be so, especially as there is no difference by vote, strains this writer's speculative powers. Recalling our hypothesis, advanced in relation to the greater libertarianism of men, that males are more wise in worldly affairs, we can extend this to financial dealings. Support for a capital gains tax reflects, seemingly, more 'business sense'. Women may see capital gains as 'windfalls' and taxing them as being akin to taxing Christmas presents. Political talkers are also more radical than others (p < .02). The lack of support for such a tax by the working class and at the lower income level suggests that the same attitude may be pervasive there, or that there is a general apprehensiveness about any new tax proposals amongst those on marginal incomes. At the lower status levels, there is likely to be little 'business' knowledge. The meaning of a gains tax proposal, even phrased as simply as this, may well be obscure. The poor may therefore be fearful that its incidence may somehow fall on them.
8.8. Variations in Correlations of the Political Indices

Table 8.35 exhibits variations in the correlations between the four political indices by social class.

**TABLE 8.35**

Correlations between the Political Indices ER, CR, DL and LIB within Social Classes (Tetrachoric Correlations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>ER</th>
<th>CR</th>
<th>DL</th>
<th>LIB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle Class</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=215)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working Class</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=108)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.40**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are four variations apparent. The most obvious are firstly, that the tendency for ER to be associated with DL is found only amongst the middle-class, and secondly, that the negative relation between the ER and LIB indices is found only amongst the working class. In the first case, since ER represents measures broadly antagonistic to middle-class interests, those scoring high on this index will be a minority of class rebels, who, if they are policy-consistent in their vote, will tend to class-deviant support of the A.L.P. It would not be surprising that they should adopt the A.L.P.'s 'Left' position on foreign policy
issues. On the other hand, in the working class, ER represents class interest, at least as it is traditionally conceived. Here we find those associated with support of the interest of the in-group intolerant of dissent and deviance, a theoretically consistent pattern.

The less marked variations are the apparently higher relation between DL and LIB, and also DL and CR, in the working class than in the middle class. Applying the Fisher Zr transformation test, both differences in magnitude are significant (in both cases, p < .01). However, the more stringent chi-square test of the collapsed frequency tables finds only the variation in the association of DL and LIB to be significant (p < .05).

The second, less reliable of these apparent variations is difficult to explain. Neither CR nor DL have a significant relationship with social class. If there is a greater strength in the relation in the working class, it may have to do with the antagonism between authoritarianism and DL, which is significant only in the working class (see Chapter Nine). Authoritarianism in both classes is uniformly antagonistic to CR. At this lower class level, therefore, psychological factors play some part in shaping opinions on both political dimensions, and their closer relation may therefore be a function of their partly common genetic basis in the
psychological disposition of the respondents. At the middle class level, the common psychological genesis is not apparent.

The basis of the first, more reliable variation, the greater magnitude of the DL - LIB correlation in the working class, may lie in the fact that libertarianism is deviant in the working class, and argues either an intellectual sophistication or anti-authoritarian disposition, or both. Either would involve an unusual orientation. The small, deviant libertarian group is likely to have an awareness of police harrassment of public demonstrations against the Vietnam war, for example, and to connect freedom to demonstrate, and the liberties with which the LIB index is concerned, with 'Left' views on foreign policy. This hypothesis is consistent with the higher relation of LIB sentiments amongst political talkers, compared with non-talkers, (see Figure 8.28) which is very pronounced.

A priori, political talkers, construed as the 'political public', might be expected to perceive more connection between the different varieties of radicalism, to relate them to each other, and to take up connected positions on the various dimensions. It follows from this hypothesis that the four indices should be more closely correlated amongst political talkers than non-talkers. This is in
fact so, as Table 8.37 demonstrates.

**TABLE 8.36**

**Correlations between the Political Indices**

ER, CR, DL and LIB by Political Talk

(Tetrachoric Correlations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Talkers</th>
<th>ER</th>
<th>CR</th>
<th>DL</th>
<th>LIB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(n=186)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.33*</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.39*</td>
<td>0.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-talkers</th>
<th>ER</th>
<th>CR</th>
<th>DL</th>
<th>LIB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(n=165)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The mean correlation between the indices amongst non-talkers approximates zero. The two low but significant correlations negative in the case of ER - LIB, and positive in the case of CR - LIB, suggest that, in a minor degree, and in the manner the argument above suggests, dispositions form relations between the political indices in the non-political public. However, evidence of an awareness of the connectedness of radical positions is notably absent. By contrast, amongst political talkers, there are no significant negative relations between the dimensions of radicalism, and the mean correlation is significant (at .23**).

The variations in correlations amongst the political
indices between both political and social groups emphasise the heavy dependence of the nature of political outlooks on the social context in which they are held, on the one hand, and on intention and self-orientation on the other. However, this is not to say that the inconstancies in the data overwhelm the constancies. Rather, there is a delicate balance between the two. Moreover, as can be seen, for example, in the explanation for the theoretical consistency in 'interested' groups being anti-libertarian in the working class, some apparent inconstancies merely verify an underlying consistency in the data. Two lessons which can be drawn are firstly, that the interrelations of attitudes and dispositions are very complex and require careful analysis and explication; and secondly, that a reductionist approach which makes simplistic deductions from first causes and attempts to constrain the data thereto is bound to fail. The complementary natures of the ideographic and nomothetic modes of analysis, noted in Chapter One, are very evident. This will appear with more force in considering variations in the relation of psychological dispositions to political attitudes.

8.9. Future Prospects

The model for prediction of trends in political opinion, advanced in Chapter Four, based principally on the sociological trends towards a generally higher level of educational
attainment and the embourgeoisement of the electorate, has now to be briefly reconsidered in the light of the more extensive exploration of political attitudes undertaken in this chapter. We have seen that statistically, the two forms of socio-economic radicalism found in 1963, probably because of substantive changes in the structure of attitudes between 1963 and 1966, are best subsumed under one head.

The issues connected with the index ER have diverse prognoses. Those involving greater expenditure on public services, such as education, and the introduction of moderate 'socialist' measures, such as competing public corporations in new fields of industry, seem not to be fated to encounter a stiffening class resistance. On the other hand, expropriative proposals, such as nationalization, are very likely to do so. Redistributive measures, such as expenditure on cash social services, although more important than seemed to be the case in the earlier analysis, are also likely to attract declining support. However, they are presently popular, and the drift in opinion away from them is likely to be slow.

Libertarianism is a sentiment which relies heavily on both sociological and psychological bases. Given rising levels of general education and greater affluence,
both its sociological and its psychological bases should be strengthened. We can expect a slow subsidence in authoritarian tendency and alienation, if social conditions continue to improve. The climate of opinion will thus become more favourable to individual initiatives in promoting civil liberties, and opinion-forming agencies, such as the press and the political parties, will become increasingly populated by liberals.

Conscience radicalism, where, as we shall see, the influence of psychological dispositions is most dominant, is likely to undergo a gentle accretion in strength, if the overall tendencies to decline in both alienation and authoritarianism develop as the preceding argument anticipates.

Issues in foreign policy are most heavily dependent upon political leadership. The views of political leaders, must of course, turn on the course of future external events, which are difficult to predict. Of all the political dimensions, the future prospects here are most fluid.

8.10. The Cross-Class Voter

The political views of the middle-class Labor voter, and the working-class Liberal voter are of special significance, since neither Party could hope to govern without attracting their support. The evidence is that
middle-class A.L.P. voters share their Party's policy orientation to a greater degree than the politically 'conformist' middle-class i.e. are disproportionately radical on ER and DL. The disproportionalities are greater than for 'normal' Party orientation, i.e. without class being held constant. (see Figures 8.20 and 8.21). In 1966, the A.L.P. had not adopted a comprehensive civil liberties programme, nor was it giving much stress to its more radical position on CR. There is no relation between CR and LIB scores and the Labor vote within the middle class.

TABLE 8.37

Vote by ER and DL Indices Within the Middle Class (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Middle Class (n=180)</th>
<th>ER</th>
<th>DL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP</td>
<td>73 27 = 100% (n=126)</td>
<td>71 29 = 100% (n=126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>26 74 = 100% (n=54)</td>
<td>33 67 = 100% (n=54)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .001, n=180)

Working-class Liberal voters, correspondingly, showed a marked tendency to differ from others of their class in
orientation on these indices, but are also more conservative on the CR and LIB indices. In the latter case, one might hypothesize a desire to distance oneself from 'disreputable' groups, and associate this with a desire on the part of this type of voter to be upwardly aspiring in social status. The two sorts of cross-class voter are, in fact, opposite in number of ways, although not significantly psychologically opposed. The middle-class A.L.P. voter is extending the bounds of his political concern beyond his class; whilst the working-class L.C.P. voter is focussing his politics, as it were, on to another social level. His conservative orientation (evident on all indices) is more general than the partially radical orientation of his counterpart in the working class. Although the sample of working class voters is small, differences within it are striking.
TABLE 8.38

Vote by all Political Indices
Within the Working Class
(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Class (n=84)</th>
<th>ER</th>
<th></th>
<th>CR</th>
<th></th>
<th>DL</th>
<th></th>
<th>LIB</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP: 46</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(n=26)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LCP: 73</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(n=26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP: 26</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(n=58)</td>
<td></td>
<td>ALP: 48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(n=58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p &lt; .10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(p &lt; .05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP: 73</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(n=26)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LCP: 73</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(n=26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP: 48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(n=58)</td>
<td></td>
<td>ALP: 48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(n=58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p &lt; .001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(p &lt; .05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP: 73</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(n=26)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LCP: 77</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(n=26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP: 33</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(n=58)</td>
<td></td>
<td>ALP: 50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(n=58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p &lt; .05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(p &lt; .05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whether people take cues from their chosen party leaders on policy issues, or the reverse, choose parties on the basis of their policy opinion, is a question not answered by these data. Very probably, both mechanisms are at work, the former more dominant amongst the less
politically interested, the latter amongst the 'political public.' A strong forward position, on 'Conscience' radicalism and civil liberties, if taken by the A.L.P., may well enable it to gather more 'cross-class' voters, but the Government Parties, if they do so, may find themselves in the curious position of shedding conservative working-class support. On the other hand, this strategy may be a necessary defensive one, if they are to stop the A.L.P. making inroads into their traditional class base.

8.11. The Catholic Vote and the D.L.P.

The connection between the Catholic vote and the D.L.P. has become a critical factor in the balance of electoral support in Australian politics since the Labor 'split' of 1955, as Chapter Two is concerned to emphasise. The lack of its generality, however, is evident from the smallness of the D.L.P. sub-sample. The phenomenon is more important in Victoria, and, to a lesser extent, Queensland, than in New South Wales.

Some features of general Catholic political attitudes have been touched upon. We have seen that Catholics are generally anti-libertarian (Figure 8.27) and overwhelmingly in favour of State Aid to Church Schools (Table 8.34). It is generally supposed that Catholics are more working class in their identification, than are Protestants, and Table 3.12
in Chapter Three supports this view. They also tend to score higher than Protestants on the ER index, probably as a result of their greater working-class identification.

TABLE 8.39

ER by Religious Affiliation
(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic:</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant:</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .02)

There is a suspicion amongst Protestants of British stock that Catholics are less 'loyal' to the Crown, and this view also is supported by the data, although there remains a 'loyal' majority amongst Catholics.

TABLE 8.40

Republicanism by Religious Affiliation
(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monarchy</th>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Undec.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics:</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants:</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .01)

Of more significance than these 'folkish' sentiments is the political complexion of the D.L.P. It has been repeatedly stressed that, since the sub-sample is too small to serve as a basis for generalization, little can be said on the basis of this survey. That little will now
be said, primarily to serve as the slightest of suggestions for future research with a larger sample. The ratio of the actual frequencies will be given for every case where the ratio of 'high' to 'low' on a political index is, or exceeds 2:1, (an arbitrary level of interest).

D.L.P. voters in the sample are

(i) High on ER (low: 6  high: 13)
(ii) Low on DL (low:12  high: 5)
(iii) Low on LIB (low:12  high: 5)
(iv) Radical on the issue of a capital gains tax (rad: 12  cons: 5)
(v) 'Programmatic' rather than 'Social' in their reason for vote (programmatic:13  social: 2)
(vi) Catholic rather than Protestant (Catholic:14  Protestant: 1)

What little there is to say thus confirms the conventional portrait of the D.L.P. voter, except that, judging from his position on a gains tax and the ER index, he is radical on socio-economic issues, as the data in Chapter Four also indicate.

There is, therefore, the suggestion of a basis for reunion with the A.L.P., whose primary rationale is its economic radicalism. But unless a foreign and defence policy common to the two parties becomes possible, there is little
prospect of this. If the A.L.P. sets itself up the standard-bearer of civil liberties, it may widen the distance between itself and D.L.P. voters.

8.12. Conclusion

Having reviewed in extenso political opinion in the mass public, and its variations, the most outstanding features of its structure will be now noted, in anticipation of the investigation of its relation to dispositions to be reported in Chapter Nine. These are at least three dimensions of radicalism, not one 'Left-Right' continuum. These are the 'Established Socio-economic Radicalism (ER), 'Conscience Radicalism' (CR) and 'Defence Leftism' (DL). These are not closely related to each other. Libertarian sentiment (LIB) is distinct from these, although significantly related to the DL and CR indices. Of all these political sentiments, CR is most lacking in sociological and political correlates. The LIB index has sociological correlates but no relation to vote. It seems that amongst the politically less interested public, there is little relation between the political sentiments, except that generated by psychological disposition. Amongst the 'political public', the dimensions tend to converge.

A further, related argument can be put in the following way: when political leadership is lacking, and class conditioning not apparent (as is the case with the CR
issues), then, most of all, will psychological dispositions have a free reign in forming opinion. This we shall see to be the case.

The basic mechanisms of libertarianism are sympathetic identification with the other (the alien) and a concern for personal autonomy. Since 'libertarians' often have an interest in being left alone (as may be the case with censorship), then we may hypothesize a lesser dependence on external authority for guidance, and by implication, less authoritarian tendency. Sympathetic identification may also be the basis of 'Conscience' radicalism, but, since the measures proposed by the index go beyond non-interference to assistance, nurturance of the other may also be involved.

Inconstancies in the data encountered thus far should prepare us for irregular patterns in psychological influence on political opinion, and indeed, there are apparent eccentricities in this. However, an underlying consistency, if we have recourse to theoretical considerations, is often evident. In analysing the interplay of sociological, psychological and political factors, an understanding both of particularities and general tendencies is required. It is plain, moreover, from the data examined so far, that political opinion is a phenomenon per se, and not a derivative of psychological disposition or class location.
CHAPTER NINE

PSYCHOLOGICAL DISPOSITIONS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

9.1. Introduction

In several ways, the report of the connections between psychological dispositions and political attitudes contained in this chapter is crucial to the development of the argument of this thesis. The research reported in Chapters Five, Six and Seven on the development of adequate measurement scales for the psychological constructs with which we are concerned is intended to be substantive to the thesis, as are the explorations of the structure of political attitudes made in Chapters Four and Eight. Parts of the domain of the total corpus of this research thus lie within the wider realms of social psychology, political science, and sociology. This is inevitable, and indeed the central intention of an inter-disciplinary work. But the central locus of the concern of this thesis lies in the area best described as 'political psychology'. The actual connections between psychological constructs and political attitudes, if any are to be found, are therefore of particular moment. The exercises undertaken in the measurement of psychological dispositions and political attitudes are, de facto, ancillary to this chief concern.
If earlier researchers had produced satisfactory instruments for the measurement of the various constructs in the psychological and political domains, the adaptation of these to the Australian urban milieu might have been describable as a dustpan and hand broom task. As things were, it turned out to be one requiring a large research enterprise in itself: a bulldozer and re-planting operation, to preserve the analogy. It might be remarked here that the instruments developed in this thesis for the measurement of psychological constructs are, on the whole, stronger and more dependable than those for the measurement of political attitudes, as the generally higher reliabilities of the former demonstrate. This is partly an outcome of the fact that the psychological dispositions had long been identified, if not always well measured, in previous research, whereas this was not the case with the different varieties of political radicalism: the scales for the measurement of the political dimensions have come to hand in the course of identification, so to speak. Nevertheless, since the overall structure of political attitudes has now been identified, and the reliabilities of the indices of each political sentiment are known, in every case, an attempt can be made to gauge the intrinsic strength of the relationships to be discovered by correcting for attenuation.
A brief return to part of the Introduction is desirable before describing the relationships obtained in the 1966 survey of the Melbourne-Sydney sample, the culmination of the field work of this enterprise. I chose to call the 'psychological dispositions' by this name because, in the first place, 'disposition' is a term which adequately described a construct inclining an individual to particular behaviours without the inconvenient connotation that the individual is aware of the grounds of his inclination, but it does not preclude awareness. It is therefore preferable to 'attitude' (which connotes a greater degree of awareness) particularly in the case of anxiety. This perhaps, is best described as a 'condition' of personality functioning, but one for which 'disposition' is also a possible description. The prefatory term, 'psychological' is not to be taken to mean that we are concerned with the impact on political opinion of only central aspects of personality functioning: it is merely intended to remind the reader that personality functioning plays a part in the formation of the dispositions whose influence is being measured. This is a truism in the case of anxiety. As the genetic structure of 'authoritarian personality tendency' of the Right had been elaborated in the first place in terms of its psychodynamics, the term is also appropriate here. However,
since the measurement scale is couched in terms of opinion on minor familial or social issues, it must be remembered that here we are dealing essentially with a secondary, more 'attitudinal' structure. This is more obviously the case with ethnocentrism where the scale is patently concerned with larger social issues, but is supposed to tap an underlying syndrome stemming from central personality dynamics.

In the case of alienation, even when considered as social estrangement and not 'reification', the term 'psychological' sits less easily. The primary justification for it lies in the generality with which the construct embraces so large a part of the individual's conception of his relationship to his imagined social world. Whilst, in many cases, the alienated individual may not be aware of the totality of his disposition, in some, he may well be, just as he might regard himself as, for example, an 'anxious', or 'nervy', person. The term 'alienated' is in somewhat restricted use, of course, and the awareness of the disposition may be described differently. In the case of John, the alienated person actually coined his own haunting phrase to describe his alienation: 'an affliction against the rules'.

This recapitulation of the terms in which the
'psychological' constructs have been defined leads to an important general consideration. In so far as the dispositions influence opinion, it does not follow that in that degree the subjects' intentions are dismissed. For example, John, having decided (as he has done) upon an estrangement to which he holds with a conscious tenacity, proceeds immediately to a seen implication of it: 'I don't like a man in uniform.' The concept of intention is itself a construct of considerable complexity, and it is not my purpose to attempt to consider it here at length. It should be pointed out, however, that the alienation, ethnocentrism and authoritarianism scales all involve the respondent in determinations of minor social or familial issues, on every item. Intention therefore plays at least a trivial part in the measurement of these 'dispositions', seen from the respondent's point of view, even if the decisions are taken step by step, item by item. However, the low correlations between the items of the psychological scales suggest that most respondents do not see each construct as a totality, a familiar dimension on which they confidently locate themselves in a manner which is self-aware. By contrast, the higher correlations between the items on the dimensions of political radicalism, and libertarian sentiment also, suggest a much higher degree of awareness and guided
intention. In short, it is suggested that intention and awareness are present to a greater extent in the determination by the subject of his 'political' scores, and to a much lesser extent, although varying from person to person, in the determination by the subject of his 'psychological' scores.

Whilst this point is one of those basic to the whole analysis, it should be stressed that it relates only to the degree of intention and awareness. What should be borne in mind is that, in employing the dispositional scales for alienation, ethnocentrism and authoritarianism described here, we are dealing with instruments measuring secondary attitude structures at some distance from the 'core' of personality functioning, on the one hand, and also from the structure of opinion on political issues, on the other. The task is to see to which dispositions political opinions are related, and in what manner.

For the sake of consistency with the structure of Chapter Eight, we shall begin with an examination of the relation of psychological dispositions to vote and reason for party choice, where psychological correlates are sparse, and often a function of covariance with class identification. From there we shall move through consideration of the psychological correlates of a tendency to talk politics and
of the 'tractable' vote to the main area of discussion, the relationship of psychological dispositions to opinions on matters of policy. Here, correlations are marked and of substantive significance. This chapter will then progress to an analysis of variations in correlation by class and education. Since we have already seen that variations in the intercorrelations of the dispositional scores, on the one hand, and political policy indices, on the other, occur between different social groups, the complexity of the variations in correlation of the two kinds of measures might be expected to be greater, and this is in fact the case. However, certain marked constancies are also to be found.

9.2.1. The Psychological Correlates of Voting Choice

There is no relation between voting choice and the three dispositional constructs authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, and anxiety. However, there is a relation with alienation.

TABLE 9.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alienation</th>
<th>Vote:</th>
<th>Low:</th>
<th>High:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP:</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>= 100% (n=163)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP:</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>= 100% (n=120)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .01, n=283)
This quite pronounced relation remains significant only in the middle class when the data is fractionated.

**TABLE 9.2**

**Vote by Alienation with Class Constant**

(Major Parties Only)  
(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th>Alienation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(n=180)</td>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>High:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote:</td>
<td>LCP: 61</td>
<td>39 = 100% (n=126)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALP: 43</td>
<td>57 = 100% (n=54)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(p &lt; .05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Alienation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(n=84)</td>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>High:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote:</td>
<td>LCP: 62</td>
<td>38 = 100% (n=26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALP: 45</td>
<td>55 = 100% (n=58)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(p is n.s.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be noted that the frequencies are small in the working class sub-sample, and that the disproportionality is about the same as in the middle-class sub-sample. These data therefore suggest that the relation of vote to alienation may be a general one. The relation later to be demonstrated between the 'Established' socio-economic radicalism (ER) and alienation is consistent with this hypothesis. Of all the psychological dispositions, subjective alienation is most variable in its function. This is perhaps, intrinsic to its nature. The question must
always be asked: alienated from what? There is always the possibility of a supportive in-group attracting the alienated stray, or an alternative position to 'allegiance' to the macro-society being on hand. Support of the A.L.P. and its economic orientation seems to be the 'alternative' to an 'allegiant' orientation in the Australian social environment. The importance of comprehending the milieu before comprehending the function of the disposition is once again emphasised. 'Alienation' resembles, mathematically, a non-equation between two terms; the first, the individual's orientation; the second, those of the macro-society and the relevant smaller social groups. Both halves of the equation require special description. We may understand what an 'ethnocentric' disposition may be like in most societies; but the outlook of the alienated person is more opaque before further information is added. Contrast, for example, the outlook of an 'alienated' political prisoner (in a gaol) in a Communist society and that of an alienated intellectual in a Western one. An understanding of the society is a first requirement; an understanding of the nature of the social estrangement and its dispositional and attitudinal correlates is a second. The alternative allegiance, if there is one, likewise requires the environment to be sketched in before comprehension is possible.
A brief note on the small D.L.P. sub-sample. If we employ the same criterion for interest as before, i.e. a 2:1 relation, no disposition appears related to a D.L.P. vote except authoritarianism (Low: 4; High 13).

9.22. The Psychological Correlates of Reason for Party Choice

Both authoritarianism and ethnocentrism are related to a 'programmatic' rather than a 'social' reason for vote. Alienation and anxiety are not related to reason for vote.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Vote</th>
<th>Programmatic</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for Vote</th>
<th>Programmatic</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 9.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Vote</th>
<th>Programmatic</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .02, n=297)

### Table 9.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Vote</th>
<th>Programmatic</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .05, n=297)

However, these correlations are principally a function of the higher incidence of authoritarianism and ethnocentrism.
in the working class, where the 'social' vote is more common. When the two class groups are considered separately, the covariations do not approach significance. There is thus no independent relation between these psychological dispositions and categories of reason for vote: the relation is an artifact of class differences.

9.3. The 'Tractable' Vote

The politically heterogeneous 'tractable' vote shows no disproportionality in authoritarianism, ethnocentrism or anxiety, compared with voters with fixed loyalties; but is reliably more alienated.

TABLE 9.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Voter</th>
<th>A</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>High:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractable:</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100% (n=127)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-tractable:</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100% (n=215)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p < .05, n=342)

An inspection of the quartile scores of the various categories of 'tractable' voters reveals that the alienated are not disproportionately numerous amongst those 'Undecided', but are so amongst those who actually changed their vote in either direction, 'Left' or 'Right' between 1963 and 1966, and also amongst both A.L.P. and L.C.P. voters who did
not change their vote, but stated that they did not always vote for the same party. Alienation is thus hostile to political 'loyalty'.

9.4. Psychological Dispositions and Political Talk

No correlations are apparent here, except for a tendency of political talkers to be non-authoritarian. There is a slight tendency evident in the sample for them to be non-ethnocentric, but it does not approach significance. The finding is consistent with the tendency of political talkers to be libertarian.

**TABLE 9.6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Talkers</th>
<th>Non-talkers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>43 = 100% (n=186)</td>
<td>60 = 100% (n=165)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(\(p < .01, n=351\))

9.5. Psychological Dispositions, the Dimensions of Radicalism and Libertarianism

9.5.1. A General Consideration

A general presumption is made that, if a causal relationship exists, it will flow from the psychological disposition to the political attitude and not vice versa. This need not be the invariant causal direction, but it is expected to be the general one. It requires some justification.
All of the dispositions are inclinations or conditions which are, firstly, of a very general nature, encompassing a large part of the individual's perspective on the social world. Even the possible exception, ethnocentrism, has implications which go well beyond the item content. Secondly, they involve in some degree, aspects of personality functioning. The political attitudes are the sums of opinion on political issues. It seems unlikely that these would redound with greater force upon personality functioning and the symptoms of one's more general relation with the social world. Rather, it seems likely that the psychological disposition will shape the political attitude, consciously or unconsciously.

9.5.2. The 'Established' Socio-economic Radicalism

Table 9.7 displays the relations of each dispositional construct with 'Established' socio-economic radicalism (ER).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ER by Four Dispositional Constructs</th>
<th>(Product-moment and Tetrachoric Correlations) (a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(n=353)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A ER</td>
<td>r = .19**</td>
<td>rt = .33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F ER</td>
<td>r = -.08</td>
<td>rt = .03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E ER</td>
<td>r = -.01</td>
<td>rt = .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst ER</td>
<td>r = .06</td>
<td>rt = .12*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) A stands for alienation; F for authoritarianism, E for ethnocentrism, Angst for Anxiety.
It will be noted that the tetrachoric coefficient mitigates the effect of constriction of the variances, where this exists.

The relation of alienation to the ER index is low but significant. As the introduction to this chapter suggests, allegiance to a well-recognized set of reformist economic policies is a salient alternative to allegiance to the present socio-economic system in the Australian urban context. Corrections for attenuation were calculated on the more reliable basis of the product-moment correlations. These are given in Table 9.8.

**TABLE 9.8**

ER by Four Dispositional Constructs  
(Product-moment Correlations Corrected for Attenuation)  
(n=353)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ER</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>ER</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>.35**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>ER</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>-.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>ER</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst</td>
<td>ER</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>.12*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Anxiety and authoritarianism have slight relations with ER, the more authoritarian being conservative and those anxious more radical.

It would seem that ER stems in part from social frustration. It seems also that the F-ER relation might stem from a conventionalist apprehensiveness of change. However, an alternative hypothesis is viable. This is that both the F-ER and the anxiety-ER relation stem from
the covariance with class, all three being more common in the working class. It may be, also, that a back-reaction is involved in the case of the anxiety-ER relation, that a radical stance is marginally more socially precarious than a conservative one, so that the opinion invokes the disposition.

Table 9.9 indicates which elements of alienation account for the correlation with ER. The correlations are not corrected for attenuation.

**TABLE 9.9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alienation Sub-scales (a)</th>
<th>(Product-moment Correlations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(n=353)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (1) ER</td>
<td>r = .14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (2) ER</td>
<td>r = .15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (3) ER</td>
<td>r = .03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (4) ER</td>
<td>r = .16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (5) ER</td>
<td>r = .19**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Key: A (1) = Sense of powerlessness (impersonal agency).
A (2) = Normlessness.
A (3) = Meaninglessness and self-estrangement.
A (4) = Sense of isolation.
A (5) = Sense of powerlessness (personal agency).

The correlation stems more from frustration, especially a sense of being exploited (A (5)), than from social uncertainty.
9.5.3. 'Conscience' Radicalism

Table 9.10 indicates the relations of dispositions with 'Conscience' radicalism (CR).

TABLE 9.10

CR by Four Dispositional Constructs
(Product-moment and Tetrachoric Correlations)
(n=353)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CR</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>r_t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>-.39**</td>
<td>-.36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>-.33**</td>
<td>-.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relations here are marked and cannot be accounted for by covariance with sociological variables, since CR correlates with only one (education) and in that case only weakly. Nor can the alienation-CR relation be accounted for by covariance with ethnocentrism as seemed to be the case in the earlier analysis, described in Chapter Five, when shorter scales were used. It has an independent influence.

It seems that, in the case of alienation, social distrust is generalized to that 'other' specified in the political questions (Asians and convicted criminals) and/or aggressive sentiment is discharged upon these, perceived as out-groups. Anxiety plays little or no direct role, although the correlation reaches significance when corrected for attenuation; the mechanism suggested is that for radicalism generally, argued above. The radical, on
the other hand, sympathetically identifies with the groups concerned - whether or not they are perceived as the other - and exhibits a generous and co-operative sentiment.

It should be noted that whilst the absence of alienation, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, following the theoretical construction placed upon their function, inhibits identification, it also encourages a nurturant orientation. In our discussion thus far we have concentrated our attention upon the mechanisms of hate, not of love. Since the anti-alienated and anti-ethnocentric item halves are in many cases symptomatic of an affectionate disposition, and not merely absence of hostility, in these dispositional constructs, and in the case of authoritarianism, the negative poles (anti-alienation (or 'allegiance') and anti-ethnocentrism) imply a capacity for a wide-ranging object cathexis.

When the correlations are corrected for attenuation, the correlations range from low to very high. These are displayed in Table 9.11. It should be remembered that it is the sentiment governing opinion on the CR issues which is involved when a correlation is made for attenuation, not opinions on each and every issue. If the latter were the case, near-perfect prediction for the dispositions to opinion each issue would be entailed. What is entailed is near-perfect prediction, when all dispositions are
known, to the sentiment CR.

**TABLE 9.11**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CR by Four Dispositional Constructs</th>
<th>Product-moment Correlations Corrected for Attenuation</th>
<th>n=353</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A CR</td>
<td>r = -.37**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F CR</td>
<td>r = -.93**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E CR</td>
<td>r = -.62**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst CR</td>
<td>r = .14**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Psychological dispositions thus play a dominant, indeed unchallengable role in influencing opinion on CR issues, accounting for much of the variance on the sum of opinion on the various issues (when the correlations are uncorrected) and sharing nearly all of the variance of the underlying sentiment. In the absence of strong political leadership (which was the contemporary and is the present situation) they therefore play a very major role in creating the 'climate of opinion', which will vary on these issues as the dispositions wax and wane in the mass public. However, the introduction to this chapter makes it clear that to say this is not to take a 'determinist' position. Self-awareness and intention can be accommodated within the structure of both dispositions and attitudes.

Once again, the various elements of alienation play a somewhat different role; in this case, two are impotent.
TABLE 9.12
CR by the Five Alienation Sub-scales (a)
(Product-moment Correlations)
(n=353)

A (1) CR r = -.05  
A (2) CR r = -.25**  
A (3) CR r = -.03  
A (4) CR r = -.16**  
A (5) CR r = -.15**

(a) Key as in Table 9.9

Normlessness, isolation and a sense of powerlessness imposed by personal agency are active; a sense of meaningless­ness and frustration by impersonal agency are not. Conservatives on these issues of conscience thus 'know' their enemies when confessing alienation: they are frustrated and scornful of society, and have an idea who is to be blamed. Social uncertainty and vague feelings of frustration are not associated with conservatism (or radicalism) on the CR index.

9.5.4. 'Defence Leftism'

Table 9.13 exhibits the relations of dispositions with 'Defence Leftism' (DL).

TABLE 9.13
DL by Four Psychological Constructs
(Product-moment and Tetrachoric Correlations)
(n=353)

A DL r = .12* r_t = .12*  
F DL r = -.19** r_t = -.12*  
E DL r = .00 r_t = .06  
Angst DL r = .08 r_t = .03
Relations here are thin. Authoritarianism has a low negative relation to 'doveish' sentiment; but 'hawks' are not ethnocentric. The variable role of alienation is notable: we have seen it promote a radical stance on socio-economic domestic issues (ER) and a conservative position on issues of conscience (CR); here it again gives an impetus to radicalism, albeit a small one.

Table 9.14 shows the correlations corrected for attenuation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DL by Four Dispositional Constructs</th>
<th>(Product-moment Correlations Corrected for Attenuation)</th>
<th>(n=353)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A DL r = .23**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F DL r = -.42**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E DL r = .00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst DL r = .17**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That authoritarians should be 'hawkish' is theoretically consistent; but the zero relation between DL and ethnocentrism is puzzling. One might have expected 'hawks' to be somewhat bigoted towards domestic out-groups, as well as the putative 'enemy' to be confronted. But this is not so. There may be two reasons for this; each involving opposed tendencies which, operating together, produce a zero correlation. One may lie in the conception advanced in Chapter Eight of the mechanism by which views on external
policy are transmitted: they are 'handed down' to trustful followers by leaders of opinion. No dispositional influence need be adduced for this process to occur, although there seems to be some selection involved, authoritarians 'choosing' hawkish sentiments, the alienated, 'doveish' ones (perhaps because of their slight orientation to the A.L.P.).

The second may be as follows. The most adamant proponents of a strong defence and foreign policy posture, the leaders of the D.L.P. and the N.C.C., are in fact anti-ethnocentric, proposing closer regional co-operation with non-Communist Asian powers and abandonment of the White Australia policy. In so far as these opinions and the sentiment underlying them is received, it will counteract the ethnocentric underlay of the old-fashioned 'hawkishness', which was often associated with a certain disdain for coloured peoples. The zero correlation with ethnocentrism may be the result of this strange confluence.

Radical sentiment is again associated with a low degree of anxiety.

Alienation plays a radical role for the in-group, as we have seen; a conservative role for the out-group, and now, once again, a radical role, although a lesser one, in shaping sentiments on defence policy. The variability noted above is partially explained by the fact that the elements of alienation which are active in promoting radical
sentiment on the DL issues are somewhat different. Table 9.15 exhibits the correlations with DL of the sub-scales of alienation.

**TABLE 9.15**

**DL by the Five Alienation Sub-scales**

*(Product-moment Correlations) (a)*

*(n=353)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-scale</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (1) DL</td>
<td>r = .09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (2) DL</td>
<td>r = .09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (3) DL</td>
<td>r = .14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (4) DL</td>
<td>r = .00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (5) DL</td>
<td>r = .11*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Key as in Table 9.9.

A (3) (meaninglessness and self-estrangement) and A (5) (powerlessness (personal agency)) are active here, A (3) for the first time in this analysis. It is tempting to suggest that 'meaning' is supplied in external affairs by the A.L.P. leadership; but if those high on this sentiment are particularly susceptible to influence from this quarter, why are they not high on ER? It is possible to sustain the suggestion against this objection by pointing out that external affairs is argued to be the area of greatest suggestibility, and that in other fields, ideas are less liable to be accepted on trust. However, these are two other possible explanations, which are not in conflict with this first. One is that 'doveish' sentiment may in part represent isolationism, which may be peculiarly appealing to those who are uncertain of social verities, and may
seek security in retreat. Another is that this element in the alienation construct may reflect an intellectual uncertainty and a reluctance to be dogmatic, and so be associated with a higher level of education, where, as we have seen, 'doves' are more numerous. However, this hypothesis is undermined by the failure of A and DL to intercorrelate at the higher educational level (see Table 9.22). A (5), which seems to represent a feeling of being exploited, is also associated with 'doveishness' and is more clearly a predisposition to accept labor views. The opposing conservative function of A (5) in relation to 'Conscience' radicalism is easily explicable because in this case and at this time, the Labor Party was not a strident proponent of the radical position on issues of conscience.

9.5.5. 'Libertarianism'

The relationship between psychological dispositions and libertarianism (LIB) was tested only by the tetrachoric correlation. The results are set out in Table 9.16.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dispositional Constructs</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>n=552</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A LIB</td>
<td>rt = .03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F LIB</td>
<td>rt = -0.55**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E LIB</td>
<td>rt = -0.38**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst LIB</td>
<td>rt = .07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 9.16
The relation with authoritarianism is strong, and with ethnocentrism moderate. This is a wholly consistent pattern theoretically. The authoritarian is expected to be hostile and punitive towards outgroups; the LIB index has to do with punitive attitudes towards out-groups on four items out of six, and in the remaining two refers to the restraint of threatening, sinister forces, by censorship and the Australian Security and Intelligence Organization. There is, in fact, one item specifically referring to punishment of homosexuals in both the F scale and the LIB index. Of all the indices and scales, these are the two with the most shared surface content, although, of course, most of the F items are not similar in surface content with those of the LIB index.

However, an objection might be raised at this point that the strong correlation between the authoritarianism scale and the LIB index is not of great substantive significance, and is indeed trivial, because of the degree of shared surface content shared by the two measures. In order to test the strength of this objection, let us, in fact, adopt this view. We will now, for the sake of this argument, regard the LIB index as nothing more than a restatement of the F measure, and see what difficulties this position involves.
The first point of discomfort is that five of the six LIB items are stringently political, referring, for example, to the banning of fascist parties. The remaining one, referring to 'long haired beatnik types' is more loose, but is suggestive of police action. **All of them refer to punishment, banning or elimination of 'outsider' political or social groups.** If we turn to the F Scale, we find that comparatively few items (three out of thirteen) are of this type: the 'outsiders' of the F Scale are homosexuals (also mentioned in the LIB index) sex criminals, and 'immoral, crooked or feeble-minded people' who are to be 'got rid of.' There are many items which have no reference at all to out-groups, such as item 3, which weighs the merits of professors as against businessmen, and item 2 ('talk less and work more'). The obscurantist items 4, 12 and 13, and the 'obedience' item 1, have no mention of out-groups, and the items referring to 'young people' and 'youth' (5 and 7) are very generally phrased. Items 6 and 9 refer only to family 'virtues', phrased in a deliberately exaggerated way. In short, the F Scale seems to do what it is supposed to do, that is, to offer items which range in a general way over the individual's perceived relation with the social world, and to deal in such diffuse themes as anti-intellectualism and over-statement of family 'virtues',
as well as the punishment of out-groups: it is much more a dispositional scale, even if a far from perfect one, than a political questionnaire.

These difficulties are thus sufficiently troublesome as to compel us to abandon this temporarily adopted position i.e. that the LIB index recapitulates the F Scale: it does not. The important thing is to establish a point of balance in this hypothetical symposium. This can be struck by pointing to the closeness of three of the thirteen F Scale items to those of the LIB index, whilst at the same time noting that this in itself would not be sufficient to generate a correlation as high as the one actually obtained. The correlation must be only moderately discounted in order to gauge correctly its substantive importance.

It might be further objected that themes of anti-intellectualism and exaggerated familial 'virtues' are nevertheless 'tied in' with ideas about the punishment of out-groups. But this is no objection. This is precisely the argument. The mistake involved in the objection arises from treating the disposition-index relation as a fact so well known as not to require demonstration, which, whilst it is a point of view flattering to the influence of disposition (and ordinary understanding) is not well founded. 'Common knowledge' in this field is largely confined to
intellectuals influenced by research into the authoritarian personality. In any case, since no prior demonstration has been made of the relation, it is a necessary part of this research enterprise.

The interpretation of correlations corrected for attenuation has to be made with some caution in this case, because of the greater variability of the tetrachoric correlation coefficient, which is employed here. The corrected correlations are displayed in Table 9.17.

**TABLE 9.17**

**LIB by Four Dispositional Constructs**

(Tetrachoric Correlations Corrected for Attenuation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct</th>
<th>rt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A LIB</td>
<td>.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F LIB</td>
<td>-1.00** (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E LIB</td>
<td>-.61**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst LIB</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) actually exceeds unity.

The fact that we are dealing in approximations is emphasized by the F-LIB correlation, where we are in the embarrassing position of having discovered a perfect empirical negative correspondence, *in situ*. The implication of Table 9.17 taken as a whole, is, indeed, that we have an *embarras de richesse*: we are in a position to predict more than 100% of the variance of libertarian sentiment, given a knowledge of dispositional scores. Once again, this makes obvious the need for a 'personality' scale for
authoritarianism which will remove the measure from direct contact with social issues; but the strength of this correlation, taken with that of the LIB index with ethnocentrism, shows libertarian sentiment to be very much a creature of disposition. The notion of libertarianism is a familiar one in its totality, of course, and it would be reasonable to expect both intention and awareness to play a part in making this relation. The high inter-item coefficients of the LIB index items, and its high reliability for so short a measure, are consistent with the view that its cohesiveness reflects the respondents' knowledge of 'what this is about.'

It is in one way unexpected to find alienation playing a positive role in promoting libertarianism, in view of the hostility of alienation to 'Conscience' radicalism, its positive relation to ethnocentrism and the similarity of the mechanisms involved in each of the political sentiments. It should be remembered that the LIB index has a good deal of punitive content, whereas the ethnocentric item halves are more mild in tone, implying no positive action other than not having one of them in the family. The degree of 'aggression' implied in the ethnocentrism scale items is not at all great. Possibly, two conflicting mechanisms are at work in producing the
trivial positive relation between libertarianism and alienation. One may be that, since the alienated person has professed, in part, a distrust of the reigning institutions of the macro-society, and now, in the libertarianism index, is presented with a vivid picture of these bearing down in a punitive fashion on various outgroups, sometimes loosely defined, e.g. 'the enemies of this country', he instinctively steps out of the way, as it were, and opts for them to be let alone, fearing that he, another 'outsider', will be next. On the other hand, he may distrust the named out-groups and wish to discharge aggression upon them. Of these two hypothetical conflicting tendencies, the former appears to be stronger, and produces the low positive relation. The low positive relation of anxiety to libertarianism, although reliable only on the most generous criterion, is consistent with this view.

9.5.6. Political Perceptions
9.5.6.1. The 'Problem of Poverty'.

There are in this instance two significant relations, which are indicated by the tetrachoric correlation when perception of poverty as a social problem is conceived as a continuum, in the same manner as the responses to the policy questions. Table 9.18 sets these out.
TABLE 9.18

'Problem of Poverty' by Alienation and Authoritarianism (Tetrachoric Correlations) (a)

A 'Problem of Poverty' \( r_t = .27^{**} \)
F 'Problem of Poverty' \( r_t = -.17^{**} \)

(a) 'Undecided' being excluded.

The first relation is consistent with the correlation between alienation and the 'Established' socio-economic radicalism. The second is theoretically consistent with the concept of the authoritarian, who may be expected to stereotype the poor as a blameworthy out-group. However, this hypothesis lacks the support of evidence of a correlation between responses to the 'poverty' question and ethnocentrism.

9.5.6.2. Perceptions of Danger in Communism in Asia and of 'Attack.'

Authoritarianism is positively related to a perception of Communism in Asia as a danger to Australia.

TABLE 9.19

Perception of Asian Communism as a Danger by Authoritarianism (a) (Tetrachoric Correlation)

.16**

(a) 'Undecided' excluded.

Responses to the question of the danger attaching to
Communism were not related to the other dispositions. For the more general question about the danger of external attack ('Do you think Australia may be in grave danger of attack at some time in the next ten years ... (etc.)?'), there were low but reliable relations with every disposition, particularly anxiety.

**TABLE 9.20**

'Danger of Attack' by Four Dispositional Constructs (Tetrachoric Correlations) (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disposition</th>
<th>'Danger of Attack' Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>r = .18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>r = .12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>r = .11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst</td>
<td>r = .28**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) 'Undecided' in every case excluded.

All dispositions are positively related to perception of the danger of attack, which is theoretically consistent for authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, which may both predispose to a view of a world where peril of enemy attack is perceived as customary. The relation with anxiety, which implies projection of the subject's personal insecurity onto the conception of the external world, is also theoretically consistent. In fact, the question is not so much why such a relation should be found here for anxiety, as why it was not found in relation to perception of 'danger' in Asian Communism. The answer may lie in the non-specificity of the 'attack' question,
which is worded in very general terms with a slightly sinister innuendo, if an innuendo is sought for.

The positive relation of alienation here is a paradox, since alienation is related to 'doveish' sentiment (DL). The difficulty is not great, since both correlations are low. We have hypothesized a 'reception' of A.L.P. policy orientation on external affairs by the alienated, who score high on the ER index, indicating an allegiance to the A.L.P.'s position on domestic policy. On the more general question of attack as it is phrased, implying the possibility that the attack may be unexpected or sudden, the A.L.P. has, perhaps sensibly, no firm view to hand down. The alienated may therefore be inclined to be influenced by their sense of uncertainty in the social world, and to project it onto the conception of the external world in the same way as those high in anxiety.

9.5.6.3. 'Trust' in Britain and the United States

There is a slight tendency on the part of authoritarians to 'trust' Britain, in the event of an emergency, in the sense intended by the relevant question.

TABLE 9.21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Trust in Britain' by Authoritarianism</th>
<th>(Tetrachoric Correlation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.13*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) 'Undecided' excluded.
No other dispositional correlations are significant. 'Trust in the US' is more general. Significant relations obtained between 'trust in the US' and alienation and authoritarianism, negative in the first case, positive in the second.

TABLE 9.22

'Trust in the US' by Alienation and Authoritarianism (Tetrachoric Correlations) (a)

A 'Trust in the US' \( r_t = -0.23^{**} \)
F 'Trust in the US' \( r_t = 0.27^{**} \)

(a) 'Undecided' excluded in both cases.

The authoritarian's trust in Australia's most powerful ally is easily explicable, the opinion being heavily laden with 'Conventionalist' sentiment. The negative relation with alienation springs, conjecturally, from reception of the A.L.P.'s tendency to play down, at this stage, the importance of the American alliance, and a tendency to generalize distrust in the same manner as in the case of anxiety.

9.6. Variations in Correlations

Having set out the central tendencies of the influence of the four psychological dispositions on political opinion, and noted some of the variety evident in the relationships, the analysis will now be directly addressed to the uncovering of complexities. Table 9.23 exhibits
the correlations between all four dispositions and the four political indices within each social class.

TABLE 9.23

Correlations between Four Psychological Scales and Political Indices within Social Classes (Tetrachoric Correlations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Middle Class (n=215)</th>
<th>Working Class (n=108)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A ER .36**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR -.37**</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DL .06</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIB .05</td>
<td>.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F ER -.09</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR -.27**</td>
<td>-.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DL -.02</td>
<td>-.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIB -.54**</td>
<td>-.54**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E ER -.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR -.36**</td>
<td>-.44*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DL .02</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIB -.36**</td>
<td>-.36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Angst ER .06</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR -.09</td>
<td>.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DL .11</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIB .03</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constancies will be noted first. Authoritarianism and ethnocentrism are the foes of 'Conscience' radicalism and libertarianism in both classes. Alienation in each class is the friend of the 'Established' Socio-economic radicalism. These five correlations are the major connections established between dispositions and political opinion, and to find them undisturbed by variations in class identification is a strong indication of their
regularity.

The inconstancies are to be found in the less reliable levels of lower correlation. Where an inconstancy has no manifest rationale, it will be dubbed an 'eccentricity'. The latter, as we shall see, are more numerous when variations in correlation by education are examined. The four inconstancies suggested in Table 9.23 are the following:

(i) The alienation-'Conscience' radicalism correlation is significant only in the middle class. The difference in magnitude between the correlations in each class is significant (p < .05) by the application of the Fisher Zr transformation test. (Since the lower correlation is not significant, our declared procedure does not require a further test by chi-square). We thus have no reliable evidence of hostility of alienation to radicalism on conscience issues in the working class. This finding, or rather lack of one, is reminiscent of the depression in the A-E relation, reliably determined in the less educated group. In that case, it was suggested that frustration is more liable to lead to retreat than aggression at the less educated level or that frustration had a greater variability amongst those at the middle level of education. Both hypotheses seem to have a possible application here.
Social frustration may have a greater potential for inhibiting sympathetic, nurturant identification with the other in the middle class. Another possibility is that the issues of conscience are less salient generally to the working class, opinions on them less stable and that the influence of alienation is dispersed without it having much effect on what is an area of minor concern. This hypothesis is not supported by the lack of a correlation between radicalism and class on the issues of CR, but remains a viable one. For substantiation, the reliability of the CR index would have to be shown to be lower in the working class, an exercise not done here but suggested for future research. The former two hypotheses thus win a slight preference.

(ii) Alienation is significantly related to libertarianism in the working class only, where the relation is positive. This accords with the 'I may be next' hypothesis advanced to explain the apparent general relation at Section 9.5.5. Apprehensiveness of authority might well be more pronounced in the working class.

(iii) Authoritarianism is significantly related to 'doveishness' (DL) in the working class only, where the relation is negative. It is hypothesized that there
is less informed opinion at the working class level, that views are selectively received from above, and that selection at this less informed level is governed more by disposition. Authoritarians, in keeping with their generally hostile tendency, select 'hawkish' views.

(iv) There is a curious apparent relation, positive and significant, between anxiety and 'Conscience' radicalism in the working class. The relation in the middle class is negative but not significant. The variation was tested also by the chi-square test, which found the difference not significant. However, the significance of the tetrachoric coefficient does not permit us to overlook the eccentricity.

Inspection of the relevant questionnaires suggests that many of these anxious working class respondents find a general sympathy for the 'little man', seeing in him both themselves and others. A fitter of 56-65 says of the A.L.P., for which he votes: 'In the main, [they] have the little people at heart'. He explains his votes as follows: 'They support little people and the working class, including those not in the employed or monied bracket.' He scores near the maximum on the CR index (and on the libertarianism index). This diffusion of sympathetic sentiment seems
is less informed opinion at the working class level, that views are selectively received from above, and that selection at this less informed level is governed more by disposition. Authoritarians, in keeping with their generally hostile tendency, select 'hawkish' views.

(iv) There is a curious apparent relation, positive and significant, between anxiety and 'Conscience' radicalism in the working class. The relation in the middle class is negative but not significant. The variation was tested also by the chi-square test, which found the difference not significant. However, the significance of the tetrachoric coefficient does not permit us to overlook the eccentricity.

Inspection of the relevant questionnaires suggests that many of these anxious working class respondents find a general sympathy for the 'little man', seeing in him both themselves and others. A fitter of 56-65 says of the A.L.P., for which he votes: 'In the main, [they] have the little people at heart'. He explains his votes as follows: 'They support little people and the working class, including those not in the employed or monied bracket.' He scores near the maximum on the CR index (and on the libertarianism index). This diffusion of sympathetic sentiment seems
to be associated with 'worry' over the position of both the subject and others. The relation between CR and anxiety in the working class may be reciprocal. We turn now to variations in correlation by educational level, exhibited in Table 9.24.

**TABLE 9.24.**

Correlations between Four Psychological Scales and Political Indices at three Education Levels (Tetrachoric Correlations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lower (n=127)</th>
<th>Middle (n=118)</th>
<th>Higher (n=105)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A ER</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>-.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F ER</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.30**</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>-.40**</td>
<td>-.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td>-.52**</td>
<td>-.50**</td>
<td>-.46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E ER</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>-.46**</td>
<td>-.47**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
<td>-.40**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst ER</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four of the five major general correlations, the negative relations between authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, on the one hand, and 'Conscience' radicalism and libertarianism, on the other, are not disturbed when
educational level is varied. These four great impulses are present at every level of education. There is indeed a slight suggestion that they are more powerful at the higher level, but no differences in the magnitudes of these correlations are significant.

It is sometimes assumed that dispositional influences are greatly reduced at the higher level. Whilst liberal political views are more common at this level and the two 'negative' dispositions less common, as the data of Chapter Seven and Eight have demonstrated, there is no evidence that the connection between the 'negative' dispositions and conservative views is dissolved at this level, or even reduced.

The other major finding, the moderate but reliable general relation between alienation and the 'Established' socio-economic radicalism, is disturbed at the middle-educated level, where it is trivial and non-significant. This eccentricity is discussed below.

The relative independence of the DL index of psychological correlates is again evident, although some minor and irregular ones are to be observed.

There are, in all, seven inconstancies evident in Table 9.24, most of them trivial. They are discussed below.

(i) Alienation is not significantly related to ER at
the middle educated level. The difference between the lesser of the two significant positive relations (at the lower education level) and that at the middle-educated level is significant \((p < .05)\) by the application of the Fisher Zr transformation test, and the overall discrepancy approaches significance when the chi-square test is applied to a collapsed frequency table of the whole sample.

This 'eccentricity' has a suggested explanation which has a substantive significance for the position of the middle educated. As has been remarked, inspection of the relevant questionnaires reveals that they are often self-consciously aware of their 'middling' position. In a society where most people have a noticeably rising standard of living, their position is not an easy one. They are educationally qualified to gain good incomes (as has been demonstrated) but through lack of drive, opportunity or overburdening commitments may fail to keep up, become 'losers'.

The lack of the A-ER relation at this level stems, I suggest, partly from the different 'meanings' of alienation at the lower and higher levels of education. At the lower level, it is likely to be an imposed disposition, through socialization into alienation, in
the extreme case, or caused by the manifestly frustrating social conditions or working-class social experience, in one way or another. At the higher level, it is more likely to be an intellectual stance, partly *chosen*, as has been suggested in the case of students. It may arise out of uncertainty of social verities or a highly critical normative judgement of the larger and smaller social worlds. There are, of course, at this level also any number of possible paths to alienation, but it is suggested that they result in a disposition more commonly *recognized* in its totality by the subject. At this educational level, he has the social assurance and intellectual expertise to perceive a socio-political solution (partial, to be sure) in a radical stance on the ER issues. Conversely, at the lower level, grouches against society are less likely to result in an intellectual step to ER, but rather a firmer *acculturation* to working class political norms, that is, the radical domestic policy of the A.L.P. At the middle level of education, however, there is often neither the acculturation to working class political norms nor intellectual expertise, and so alienation is more likely to be experienced as a *personal dilemma* without political implications. An outspoken radicalism of
the 'Labor' sort might, indeed, endanger the social status of the subject, who is often in a transitional political phase, shedding, or moving further away, from the collectivist politics of the working class to the individualist stance of the middle class.

Here is another fitter and turner (36-45), identifying himself as middle-class, high in alienation. He earns over $60 per week, and votes Liberal. He is asked 'If you could choose just two matters for more government attention .. which two would you choose?' They both illustrate his very moderate 'individualist' position.

A National Health Scheme - something that covers more than dental care, and general coverage of hospital fees, etc. I think perhaps the person who throws away his money on gambling and drinking, and has nothing, gets more help in time of need than a person who saves steadily and runs into trouble and it is all gone. A National Health Scheme would protect this second person.

Closer watch on gross profiteering - especially chemists - this is not done by grocers and the little man. When you need medicines, they mark up the profits. This is not fair to the average man.

In this case, a 'middle-class' protest rather than espousal of ER - which he rejects in toto (i.e. he scores 0 on this index) - results from his social concerns. He epitomises the suggestion made above. It can also be illustrated by the following response to the same question, reflecting
the apoliticism of the *petit bourgeois*. The speaker is an 'average middle class' widow of 55-65, with an income of less than $15 a week, again a Liberal voter.

Nothing that comes to mind. I think they're doing a good job. I'm on an invalid pension and I think it's marvellous what's being done for us. I don't know why people complain. As far as child endowment is concerned, when I was bringing up my children, I didn't have it, and managed. People expect too much help these days.

The interviewer commented 'This respondent was very adamant about the fact that age and invalid pensions are adequate ... This seems, to me, contrary to what most people think.' The respondent is very high in alienation, and scores zero on ER.

The two cases above are extreme ones, of course, and serve only to illustrate a trend which is countered by many respondents who score high both in alienation and ER (or low on both). The point is that the two conflicting tendencies in the middle-educated group seem to produce the near-zero correlation.

(ii) Alienation is positively related to libertarianism in the working class sample only. The explanation afforded above for this correlation in the working class is also plausible here.

(iii) Another inconstancy is the rather low but significant prediction of alienation to 'doveishness' at the
lower and middle educated levels, but not at the higher educated level. As Table 9.15 demonstrates, the active sub-scales of the alienation measure in this relation are those of meaninglessness and self-estrangement, and a sense of exploitation. In accord with the hypothesis advanced in discussion at that point, it is suggested that these sentiments are possibly promoting Defence Leftism seen as isolationism, or, that at the lower level, there is a 'reception' of A.L.P. policy. At the higher educated level, 'doveishness' has other sources.

(iv) Authoritarianism is negatively related to ER to a moderate degree in the middle-educated sample, but in no other. If the chi-square test is applied to the collapsed frequency table for the whole sample, the discrepancy approaches significance. Once again, it is suggested that this apparent eccentricity stems from the transitional character of the politics of the middle-educated group. At this level, conventionalist and 'ego-defensive' persons are sometimes inclined to distance themselves from the working class by rejecting radical views and associations. Here is the second fitter and turner mentioned above in relation to the first inconstancy, asked to name two 'good things'
about the Liberal Party.

They have handled the unions well. I work in a factory but I don't like to see the Government back down to the Unions. I can't think of any special instances off hand, though.

An authoritarian infusion is also hinted at in his view of what may be 'wrong' with the Labor Party.

The main-obvious-thing is the split in Labor - I mean the A.L.P. and D.L.P. I think this is bad. Anything divided is weak.

Sometimes the middle-educated authoritarian, whilst rejecting Labor policies, is a reluctant, backward-looking A.L.P. voter, for 'individualist' reasons.

An Electricity Council Inspector (36-45), 'Common ordinary working class I suppose', who is radical only on age pensions, says of his reasons for voting A.L.P.: 'Only that I think they are more interested in the worker as a person ... I don't agree with withdrawal from Vietnam but I vote Labor anyway.' He is very high in authoritarianism, endorsing all the punitive half-items.

(v) Ethnocentrism has a substantial and significant negative relation to ER at the higher education level only. This seems to be relatively straightforward in theoretical terms. The ethnocentric person at the higher educated level is deviant, an unusual bigot. It is not surprising to find him expressing an
again high in ethnocentrism and Defence Leftism, found the Liberals 'buttering up America too much. We need dollars but too much was spent on Johnson's trip. Sure we need American help and we need American dollars but in my mind that money what went on all those flags and things, could have been put to better use for the nurses.¹ Waste of money all of it.' The explanation for this eccentricity in correlation virtually leaps off the pages of the questionnaires.

(vii) Anxiety is positively associated with libertarianism, at the middle-educated level only. This eccentricity is amongst the most reliable, being significant (p < .02) when tested by chi-square. In this group aspirations to success involve respectability rather than prestige. This requires the subject to put a clear distance between himself and outré groups of low status, homosexuals, beatniks, Communists. But one badge of high status is tolerance. The upwardly aspiring middle-educated person is thus in an awkward position, wishing to deplore 'bad behaviour' comme il faut, but at the same time striving to exhibit a high-minded liberalism. Libertarian sentiment may thus be ambiguously perceived, in his particular ambience, either as a suspect sympathy with disreputable groups, or as a praiseworthy tolerance.

¹ Nurses were asking for more pay at the time.
According to this hypothesis, therefore, the political opinion creates the disposition, and not vice-versa.

In affording theoretical explanations for these seven inconstancies in correlations between dispositions and political opinion, the social position of the person has often to be considered. Not only an understanding of the general social environment and the nature of subjective dispositions, but also a comprehension of the significance of the social location of the subject and the ways in which his views may be formed at various social levels is necessary, if the variety in the relations are to be explained. Many nuances are exhibited by the relationships, and great complexity. Having attempted to understand some of this complexity, the reader may be left with the false impression that the relationships are so various that few reliable predictions from disposition to political opinion can be made. This is not so, for two reasons.

The first is that, as we noted before this extensive consideration of inconstancies, there are a number of striking constancies to be found. These lie in the special vulnerability of 'Conscience' radicalism and libertarianism to psychological influence, especially by authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, which produces apparently invariant
general relations, moderate when the correlations are uncorrected for attenuation, very strong when they are corrected. There is also a fairly reliable relation between alienation and a radical position on socio-economic questions.

The second reason for confidence in the possibility of reliable prediction is that, once the fact of an inconstancy in a relation is established, and its location noted, the prediction can take into account an unusual correlation, or lack of one, in a particular locale. More research is clearly necessary to substantiate many of the conjectured theoretical explanations for particular inconstancies, but these, too, if shown to be reliable, can qualify prediction so that it is apt to the situation being considered. What is most clear is that a narrowly political, psychological or sociological approach to the understanding of the relation of disposition to opinion is bound to fail. The researcher must have recourse to an armoury of techniques to facilitate and expand the analysis until it is capable of matching the complexity of reality.

9.7. Conclusion

We have established that two of the three main dimensions of radicalism, 'Conscience' radicalism, and the 'Established' socio-economic radicalism are susceptible to high and moderate
degrees of influence, respectively, by psychological dispositions. Opinions on the third dimension, the 'Left' - 'Right' continuum in foreign and defence policy are more independent of dispositional influence, but do not altogether escape it. A fourth continuum of political opinion, libertarianism, is strongly influenced by disposition. The principal interrelations are displayed in Figure 9.1.

FIGURE 9.1

The Principal Interrelations between Psychological Dispositions and Political Attitudes

What do these findings amount to? All these dimensions relate to matters of policy, and it is therefore reasonable to suppose that dispositions (a) create a motive force for radicalism or conservatism in their respective domains at the highest level, that is, they influence decision makers and leaders of opinion as well as the mass public, and (b) that they create 'climates of opinion' in the mass public.
which invite forward policies or negate and impede them. We have also shown that perceptions of political situations are influenced by psychological disposition.

But two objections could be raised with considerable force if we were to go so far as to suggest that political events related to the implementation of these policies are strongly influenced by psychological dispositions. The first is that, as we noted in first introducing discussion of psychological influence in Chapter Five, economic interest groups, through their influence on political parties and governments, play a large part in determining the course of events in economic policy. Likewise, external forces in international relations often compel actions in defence and foreign policy.

The second objection is that, even in so far as we have been able to gauge their influence in the electorate, policy opinions, and hence dispositions influencing policy opinions, play a relatively small part in the voter's choice. True, party record as well as promise may be weighed in terms of policies implemented or proposed and so policy considerations may have more weight with the mass public than may at first appear. The 'political' public, also, is more alive to them, and by personal contact may influence those 'social' voters amongst the less interested. Speakers on the mass media may also
increase the actual impact of policy considerations. But one striking finding is that in exploring the correlates of voter's choice of party, only alienation is a disposition apparently capable of altering the balance between the major parties. Domestic economic policy issues, on which opinions are related to alienation, are, as we have seen, given a much higher rating in importance by voters than defence and foreign policy. Moreover, these two dimensions of policy were, at the time of the major survey, the only two which differentiated the major parties. The A.L.P. and the L.C.P. were not seen to be much different in respect of 'Conscience' radicalism and libertarianism. The dispositions influencing radical opinion, therefore, were operative at the margin of policy determination, and it cannot plausibly be argued that they were central.

However, three important considerations should be borne in mind. The first is that through the erosion of anti-liberal dispositions by rising affluence and levels of education, 'Conscience' radicalism and libertarian sentiment are likely to become more widely diffused, and issues connected with them to increase in importance. The second is that, as this occurs, the major parties may seek to differentiate their positions on these continua in the eyes of the mass public, and indeed, since 1966,
have taken steps to do so. The A.L.P. is presenting itself as the champion of radical opinion in both cases. It follows that the influence of disposition on vote, and, ultimately, the determination of policy, will become more central. Thirdly, this empirical study has been conducted at a time of relative calm, in a stable democracy. In critical episodes, when, for example, basic liberties guaranteed by the state are at hazard, or democratic regimes are threatened by extreme mass movements with an ethnocentric basis, then psychological dispositions may be paramount in influencing the course of events, although still only some of several important factors in any actual situation. One such situation was the collapse of the Weimar Republic in Germany in 1933. It would not be possible to describe the collapse of the Weimar regime without engaging in an analysis which emphasized the themes of alienation, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and anti-libertarian sentiment. The mechanisms connecting these, obtainable by empirical investigation in periods of quiescence in stable democracies, can be useful in forming a repertory of analytical devices for such critical episodes. Indeed, they are of crucial importance, if the analyst of political history is to accomplish his essential task, which is not to be able to 'know' something in its totality, but to be able to say 'I see'.
CHAPTER TEN

POLITICAL CONVERSATION IN A SMALL GROUP

10.1. Introduction

This chapter is an excursus. It consists, in the main, of a speculative discussion of a political conversation amongst a small group of voters after the elections. One purpose of it is to illustrate the complexity of the structure and function of political attitudes (and their relations with dispositions) in situations of actual personal interaction. Another is to show how such contrived situations may be used to generate hypotheses testable on the larger sample (none of these subjects were included in the final voter sample).

Some general problems in attaching a specific meaning to the location of a subject on a continuum by assigning a scale score to him are discussed.

Some data consistent with one hypothesis is advanced. A brief discussion follows of ways in which the influence of psychological dispositions on opinion may be deflected.

10.2. A Political Conversation

This conversation was recorded in December, 1966, a fortnight or so after the Federal Elections. The venue was an office of a market research firm. The writer
chaired the discussion, which was tape-recorded. All five of the other participants had voted Liberal, and been interviewed before Election day. They were invited to participate in a discussion either because they had at that time confessed a 'lot' of interest in politics (in the case of three) or had fallen into one of the two questions designed to identify 'opinion leaders' (all five).

The purpose of contriving these circumstances was partly to illustrate the complexity of expressed attitudes in actual social interaction and partly to see whether any hypotheses capable of being tested with data from the total sample of about 400 might be suggested. Accordingly, the participants were pushed on to as many 'sensitive' topics as possible, the chairman aspiring to the conflicting demands of neutrality and the role of agent provocateur. The interpretation of the fragments of conversation offered below is therefore highly speculative, and is meant to be.

To introduce the participants (the unbracketed data is from their questionnaires):

Mr. A.*: A shoe factory manager, aged 46-55. Education:


Described himself as 'average middle' class.

'No Church, just a Christian.' Father a farmer.
(Tough face, self-concept rough but just? Working class manner.)

Mr. B.: Manager of a civil engineering firm, aged 46-55. Senior Technical College Engineering Diploma. Married, one child under 17. Described himself as 'average middle' class. Non-churchgoing Congregationalist. Father a 'senior' engineer. (Dressed carefully and formally, socially assured, relaxed.)

Mrs. A.: Home duties, aged 36-45, educated to Matriculation. Wife of a graduate engineer, his father being a farmer. Two children under 17. Once again, 'average middle' class. A Catholic churchgoer. Fortuitously, the same surname as Mr. A. (Elegant, charming, physically attractive).

Mr. C.: Sales Manager in an electronics firm, aged 26-35. Had a Trade Certificate and had undergone further technical training. Married, with two children under 17. Described himself as 'upper middle' class. A non-churchgoing Presbyterian. His father a sergeant in the army. (Confident, middle class demeanour; aggressive in discussion.)
Mr. D*: Employed as a metallurgist, a part-time student pursuing an Engineering Diploma, aged 26-35. Married, with one child under 17; refused absolutely to place himself in any social class. A churchgoing Presbyterian. (Awkward, shy, spoke in a hushed voice in the direction of the right lapel of his yacht club jacket.)

They were disposed about a table, thus:

```
Mrs A       Mr B
Mr C
Mr D*       * Watch these
The writer  Mr A*
```

All but one (Mr D*) said they seldom talked politics. The tone of the conversation was often like that of a managerial meeting: issues were discussed in a practical fashion and principles struck a jarring note when they cropped up. Mr A* and Mr D* seemed eager to be socially acceptable to the other three, who were not at all anxious about their own status, and were faintly patronising.

Two conflicting groups emerged in the course of an hour: on the one hand, Mr A* and Mr D*, who might be described post hoc as punitive and dependent; and on the other, Mr C
and Mrs A (non-punitive and independent). Mr C bore
the brunt of such hostility as developed. Mr B preserved
throughout a position of social leadership and withdrew
from violent argument. All except Mr C overstated their
agreement with one another's views; he alone intervened
from time to time to disagree.

The conversation was marked by some sketchy anecdotes
from the personal histories of both Mr A* and Mr D*, which
were evidently intended to add conviction to their opinions.
The early experiences of both men seemed to lie heavily
upon them, and to colour their views. The remaining three
were reticent, apparently untroubled, and never implied
they had been taught wisdom by experience.

Picking over the conversation on tape, in retrospect, led to the following suppositions:

1. Although at one on socio-economic and party political
issues, the discussants exhibited such divisions
on non-economic issues as to suggest two camps:
the 'punitive, dependent' pair of Messrs A* and D*,
who spoke feelingly on their own histories,
sometimes reduced complex problems of causation to
the conspiratorial machinations of persons, admired
strong leaders, were somewhat racially prejudiced,
one in favour of hanging, both for violence generally,
and anti-libertarian. They were of lower status. In contrast to this pair, Mrs A and Mr C either had no personal problems, or sat on them without difficulty; were sceptical of heroes, ascribed social problems to systematic causes capable of being remedied, were libertarian and assured of their own social position. Mr B hovered pensively between them, his support valued and sought by both sides.

2. Both Mr A* and Mr D* revealed their dispositions with caution: sometimes only by the violent language surrounding a 'liberal' formal opinion. They often abandoned punitive opinions when they found they were sailing too close to social rejection.

It is suggested here that these two were trying to shrug off a somewhat authoritarian disposition in the face of middle-class social pressure, through the adoption of liberal opinions on particular issues. They were nevertheless haunted by social disasters narrowly avoided. Their basic dispositions accommodated liberal opinions with some difficulty.

The two speculative interpretations advanced above may now be illustrated from the voices. Two dots indicate a pause; three an omission.
Mr D* on his early life:

I spent the first part - the first eighteen years of my life in a small town called Hay in New South Wales... in the smaller country towns you have the townspeople, and you have the so-called squatters, or cockies. Now, in the smaller country towns there is a very, very strong, and very cliquey groups [sic]...the land owner has their clubs in each of the different towns, and they stick to their group and that's it. They only come to town to shop.

Mr C:

I disagree with that. I believe the division is greater in the city than it is in the country.

[Uproar]

Mr D* [shouting]:

This is a statement of what I've seen, and lived in... [more calmly] they have their own dances, their own ball, they have the Country Club race meeting, picnic races and that sort of thing, and you've got to be in there to get there and that's - that's it.

Despite attempts to change the topic, Mr D* returned frequently and bitterly to the theme of social rejection in country towns.

Mr A reveals a little of his early life in discussing the A.L.P. The group as a whole is pessimistic about the party's future. Mr A* exceeds them all in pessimism.

Mr A*:

...I'd go along with this but I - I - I - can't see, I can't foresee - and I was a member of the Labor Party...
Mr C:

But I think it must [put its house] in order to survive. I can't see any future for the Labor Party unless they do something to resolve their problems.

Mr A* [desperately]:

I can't see it! I genuinely can't see it!

Mrs A deplores class distinction by the Labor Party.

Mr C:

They try too much to project this image of being for the working man, and the working man just doesn't exist... look at the people!

Mr A* is asked for his view:

I'd go along with Mrs A. just as well you're not my wife! [all laugh]. Ugh, go along with it strong - I think it's a matter of growing up...

I think this is the big failing in the Labor Party and why I can never see it coming good, because the people that control it are - like the shop steward that's got a vote at work and I've got to kid to him to be a shop steward anyway - he hasn't got any brains...

...The need for it the A.L.P. is gradually diminishing.

Mr A* links the 'diminishing need' for the A.L.P. to his new paternal role. For Messrs B and C, and Mrs A, it is a matter for other people.

* * * * *

Both Mr A* and Mr D* have their political heroes. The others are sceptical, and sometimes disdain particular politicians.

Mr A* is asked whether the D.L.P. will ever succeed in
convincing people 'that they're not sectarian' (his phrase).

Mr A* [pauses]:

I think they could, yes!...If they get coves like Benson.

Mr C:

Benson's not D.L.P.

Mr A* [raises his voice]:

No, I'm just saying if they can incorporate coves like this - leaders and men - like Benson - I think they could go places!

Mr D* [in a whisper]:

I think I'd agree with that one too.

Mr A*:

...you speak to very few people - even Labor Party men - that don't respect Benson. This is the type of person they've got to get - someone that's shown a bit of courage in their bloody time, and! - a Mason if necessary, just to get this stigma out of their - their party that this is controlled by the Roman Catholic Church.

Mr D* greatly admired President Johnson, and felt that Mr Calwell created 'an uneducated image, for want of a better term' which led many to lose respect for him as a potential national leader.

Neither Mr C nor Mrs A admired Johnson. Mrs A felt that the publicity given to the President's visit was:

Captain Benson, a retired merchant sailor, had won a seat as an Independent candidate at the elections, after being expelled by the Victorian A.L.P. because of his membership of a 'Right-wing' body, the 'Defend Australia Committee'.

---

1
an implicit help to the Liberal Party and I felt that the less - well I just don't think he had a right to come over, I think he meddled in our politics.

So too, Mr B:

Well, I, I don't think too much of President Johnson - he's a bit of a larrikin, although I - from my brief acquaintance with America I - have a very high regard for Americans generally - I think they're hard workers - particularly for Texans, I had a good time in Texas, but President Johnson I think is a.. [vehemently] he's just a politician and a wheeler-dealer..

Mr C:

Exactly.

Mr B:

.. and a real larrikin, in a way.. As to his coming to Australia.. it was just a political move, I think - thought he'd help a bit, and help himself, and help Harold.. [quiet laughter from Mr C at the mention of 'Harold'].

Mr B is asked what sort of an impression Mr Holt made when travelling with President Johnson?

Mr B:

Oh, that made me slightly sick.

* * * * *

A debate on whether or not social class differences exist in Australia had the more authoritarian pair thinking in personal terms of class enemies. Mr D's* grim recollections have been set out.

---

1 Harold Holt, then the Prime Minister and Leader of the Liberal Party.
Mr A*:

I think there's a very small percentage—possibly one and a half percent—that consider themselves high society. Outside that, nought.

The others, however, saw social differences as generated in an impersonal, systematic way, and not as the creature of supposedly exclusive groups. Mr B even discovers in himself a little Marxist residue:

Mr B:

...I think there's another division too. I think there's the division between the people who work for their living on—on wages, and the people—the capitalists, if you like, who own the means of production. ...

not that they're wealthy people necessarily...

* * * * *

Discussion of migrants and migration policy revealed some surprising dissonance between the professed general attitudes and particular opinions accommodated within the one person.

Notably Mr B:

I don't know whether we're going to talk about the colour—the White Australia policy—but I would have views on that, too.

Well I would think that we should preserve the White Australia policy...That's not to say that there are some, perhaps some Asians—Asiatics—that would—wouldn't perhaps be permissible. From my view, I think that if we need to build up the country...population quickly we may have to accept a sort of a quota of perhaps Asians, but [pause] they're not really coloured in the sense that I was thinking about: I mean they are and they aren't.
Chairman [baffled]:

In what way are they not?

Mr P:

Well I mean I'm thinking the - that dark coloured people are ..present..problems, but there is less trouble with - even where intermarriage occurs with, say, Malaysians and people like that.

Chair:

How about Malaysian Indians? When you say dark people are you thinking of Africans?

Mr P [suddenly]:

Well I was thinking about negroes, of course.

Stereotypes seem to be stretched to breaking point here: Asians, Malaysians especially, are made, perhaps, honorary Whites. Messrs. A* and D* declare themselves for a quota system of Asian migration, but nevertheless fail to avoid a fight with Mrs A and Mr C, who want to open the floodgates. Mrs C, indeed, dislikes the idea of any quota system except one based on education.

* * * * *

On the issue of capital punishment, battle was joined on the question of whether a convict (Ryan) who had shot dead a warder in a bid to escape from prison should have been hanged. Mr A* thought it was imperative to hang him, for administrative reasons - the good management of the
prison. Mr B vacillates, and is temporarily attracted to the abolitionist view by Mr C, who reminds him of a case where an innocent man was hanged. Mrs A says she is opposed to capital punishment in any circumstances. Mr D*, still having trouble in grabbing life by the tail, has a special point of view:

There is always that little bit of doubt... no matter how sure - how much evidence there is in favour of the person's guilt. To take that person's life is so final...
This is final. No matter what comes up in the future you can't bring this person back.
However, I wouldn't - I wouldn't be against, say, physical punishment, I wouldn't - I wouldn't be against Ryan getting, ah, two lashes a day for the rest of his life, as a deterrent, or anybody else in a similar category, because this can always be stopped. But to take the person's life, I feel it's - so final.

It is not the violence, but the finality, to which Mr D* is implacably opposed. Rejection, after all, played a notable part in his early life.

* * * * *

The final question was whether or not the Communist Party should be banned. By now everyone was heated. Mr A* shuttled rapidly between permissiveness and a sharply-felt need for counter-violence:

I don't think you can outlaw any political party. I think education, standard of living, can keep them in their place. But certainly if they get, ah, start getting power in a certain direction, give them the option - say that's where you want to live you just go there and live there! Don't
treat them with kid gloves all the time. If they can hit hard, well hit hard back! And no-one should scream if one of them is sent back to - over to China...

Mr B, Mrs A and Mr C are all convinced that social conditions will prove an adequate impediment to the growth of Communism in Australia and find legal measures wrong in principle.

Mr A* states a contingency:

If they can get a cell, in a union, they can tie this country up in two minutes.

Mr D* comes to his assistance:

I'm not talking about suppressing, I mean forcing into the open.

Mr A*:

Yeh.

Mr D*:

Force them out - force them out into the open, where everybody can see what's going on.

Mrs A: [confused]

How do you do [that]? - but I mean - look - what do you do? - they are in the open.

Mr D* [reluctantly]:

Well, yes and no.

[Upoar]

Mr A* [to the aid of Mr D*]:

They're not in the open! No fear! They've got their meetings - underground meetings - don't worry about that!

Mr D*:

And they've got their own little schools!
Mr A*:

And they've got their own school and cadre and own education.

Mr C: [sceptically]

You could say that about the Labor Party and the Central Executive,¹ couldn't you?

Here the tape ends, with the two factions at last shouting at, and down, each other. Mr C, and later also Mrs A, were moved easily to a spirited defence of liberal values; Mr B approaches his own opinions with caution and detachment. But Mr A* and Mr D* have invested a lot of emotional capital in a view of society beset by crisis and emergency, and are loath to give it away.

10.3. A Hypothesis

We will now check this onrush of speculation and proceed with our exercise in method. The purpose is to counterpoint imaginative insight with hard data. We are fortunate enough to have some reliable information about the participants in this discussion, through their interviews. The five participants in this discussion were also given political questionnaires after its conclusion. We are thus in a position (a) to throw some light on what was going on during the discussion; and (b) to see whether any of the processes which emerged in the group discussion have any

¹ The controlling Committee of the A.L.P. organization in the State of Victoria.
generality; that is, can be discovered in the wider sample.

In taking out ideas from the recorded conversation to face the crowd of data from the survey, only a very minor confrontation is planned. Much of the conversational transaction, it was suggested, was related to obtaining, often in an oblique way, social acceptance; and it is to this point that the exercise will be directed.

Table 10.1 shows authoritarianism (F) scores for each member of the group, and their radical or conservative position on three issues, as shown in their written questionnaire before and after\(^1\) discussion:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>F Scale Score</th>
<th>White Australia: Before</th>
<th>After:</th>
<th>Aid to Asia: Before:</th>
<th>After:</th>
<th>Capital Punishment: Before:</th>
<th>After:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr D*</td>
<td>middle</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>- Rad.</td>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>- Rad.</td>
<td>Cons.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the sample as a whole, the median F score was 13.5. Although the relative magnitude of the F scores is as expected, only Mr B is above the sample median. Three are normal (9-14) in authoritarianism, two very low. The three

---

\(^1\) The first questionnaire was that administered about a month earlier; the second immediately after the discussion.

\(^2\) The designation of the raw F scores is as for quartiranges, the first being designated low, the second and third 'middle range'. The standardisation data have been set out at the conclusion of Chapter Six.
issues are ones connected with 'Conscience' radicalism which were touched upon in the conversation.

What is chiefly interesting here is the extraordinary instability of the views of Mr A*, whose outlook has undergone a sea-change since he was interviewed a month before. Taken together with the suppositions elaborated above, these data suggest that 'upwardly mobile' persons of working-class origin may, in the process of seeking social acceptance, adopt liberal opinions on such 'conscience' issues as those above; or adapt their views to those of whatever group they aspire to join, perhaps a conservative one. In either case their current opinion would stem less from dispositions, such as authoritarianism, and more from infection of opinion, so to speak, from the groups in which they seek acceptance. It follows that for the upwardly socially mobile group, the correlation between F scores and opinions on particular issues, especially those susceptible to dispositional influence, should be lower than it is for the socially fixed.

Figures 7.2 and 7.3, displayed in Chapter Seven, indicate that there is a reliable negative relation between both social class identification and education, on the one hand, and authoritarianism, on the other. But whilst the relation is reliable, its magnitude is not great, and there are many high scorers amongst the middle-class and the educated.
Table 9.10, in Chapter Nine, indicates a moderate negative relation between the 'Conscience' radicalism index (\(-.39^{**}\)) and authoritarianism. The CR index (of five items) incorporates opinions on the three issues mentioned above in Table 10.1. There is no reliable relation found between 'Conscience' radicalism and class, and the relation with education is significant only when the 'higher' and 'lower' groups are compared (excluding the 'middle' group).

These data indicate that it is most unsafe to generalise in small group settings from class identification to authoritarian orientation or opinions. A shift to a liberal opinion may be some help, or no help at all, in gaining acceptance in a particular small group. The process of bargaining for acceptance which seemed to emerge in the recorded group discussion involved pressure to a change in a liberal direction in that particular group: the general point, however, seems that to be acceptable, one may have to change in either direction. If this is true, then the opinions of the upwardly socially mobile, and their confessed prejudices, should be uncertainly related to authoritarian disposition. Hence we expect a low correlation.

An 'upwardly socially mobile' group was extracted from the sample as follows. Those 'average' or 'upper' middle class, but without higher formal education (Leaving or above)
were identified, and of these those with higher than average income ($3000 to more than $12000 p.a.) were retained. They numbered 45.

Amongst this group, the F-CR correlation is indeed lower, as Table 10.2 demonstrates. But the difference between the correlation in this group is not significantly different from the rest of the sample.

TABLE 10.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relations between CR Scores and F Scale Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Tetrachoric Correlations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upwardly mobile: F CR ( r_t = .18 ) (n.s.) (n=45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others: F CR ( r_t = .39^{**} ) (n=305)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, a more detailed scrutiny of the data revealed the following: on two issues, hanging and economic aid, the negative relation between the radical position and authoritarianism is absent in the upwardly mobile group. The differences on these issues between the correlation in the upwardly mobile group and that in the rest of the sample is significant in both cases by the Fisher Zr transformation test, and also, in the case of hanging, by chi-square.

This finding is important, since these two issues are amongst the more salient of the CR group.

The data thus seem to suggest that the process of bargaining with one's opinions on the way up acts to some extent as a solvent on their connection with psychological
dispositions. It is not that authoritarians must appear liberals in order to rise: rather one must be prepared to exchange internal psychological formative pressures for external social ones.

The process appears to reflect one of Greenstein's\(^1\) maxims: 'If ... the disposition that is strong is to take one's cues from others, the effects of personal variation on behaviour will be reduced.'

To make a general point, in the larger, 'socially stable' part of the sample, the fact of psychological influence in the area of 'Conscience' radicalism is possibly a result of the absence of a definable self-interest in this area, as the introduction to Chapter Five suggested. These are thus no class or interest group sanctions to be wary of. Here again, one of Greenstein's principles\(^2\) seems to be relevant: 'The impact of personal differences in behaviour is increased to the degree that sanctions are not attached to certain of the alternative possible causes of behaviour.'

The point that has been made about the apparent deflection of psychological influence amongst the upwardly socially mobile, is, of course, that, in their case, there are social sanctions waiting in the wings. They must have


\(^2\) Ibid.
a careful eye to the opinions held in the groups they aspire to join. They are involved in a game situation, where the dice are opinions, and the reward chips, signals of social acceptance.

10.4. The Deflection of Psychological Influence

Apart from the rather special pressures on the upwardly mobile, there are two major contingencies which may deflect psychological influence on opinion. Neither has come very much to the fore in this thesis.

The first is institutional affiliation, especially to political parties. Affiliation to Socialist organizations, which propound liberal opinions on racial harmony, for example, may well dampen the effects of working-class authoritarianism in such societies as contemporary Britain. But since, at the time of this survey, the A.L.P. had not emphasised its radical position on issues of 'Conscience' (except hanging) it exhibited little influence in the mass sample on these.

The second is what may be termed 'moral' or 'intellectual' control by the subject of his own authoritarian impulses. This concept presupposes an authoritarian personality structure in a process of transmutation, with the super-ego, particularly that component of it dubbed the ego-ideal, perhaps playing an active role in persuading, as it were, a compliant ego
to mitigate expressions of hostility. This is likely to be a lengthy and difficult process, since the hypothetical defence mechanisms of the ego which underpin ethnocentrism as a stratagem (namely anti-intraception, projectivity and stereotypy) are unconscious.

The moral deliberations of Mr B, in our recorded conversation, are perhaps a case in point. The hesitancy he displays, taken with his air of command over proceedings, suggests that he has come to an awareness of his authoritarianism in the first place through social interaction. He is introspective and self-critical (deviant characteristics in an authoritarian, but perhaps ones acquired in the course of coping with social difficulties) even audacious: he himself raises the issue of the 'colour - the White Australia policy.' But he does so in order to put forward what is in fact a liberal opinion, after staking out a formally conservative general position. He has adopted the substance of liberalism whilst retaining the conservative form. The first requirement of his 'moral control', and perhaps 'moral control' in general, appears to be some anti-authoritarian element in the super-ego; the second, deliberate contest with anti-intraception.

The pressure (and opportunities) for this kind of 'moral control' of authoritarianism might be expected to
be most marked amongst those with tertiary education, mixing in middle class circles.

The two modes of 'deflection' of psychological influences discussed above are, of course, different in kind: the first is through an external, social influence; the second refers to the deflection of the influence of one kind of psychological disposition (authoritarianism) by other 'internal' psychological mechanisms.

10.5. 'High' and 'Low' Scoring

Reflection on the conversation reported above leads me to two further considerations, the first a speculation, the second perhaps better termed a rumination.

(i) It was something of a surprise to find that the two 'punitive', 'dependent', 'more authoritarian' contestants in the conversational struggle were, in fact, scorers in the middle range of the F distribution. What an argument between very low and very high scorers might have been like is an interesting question. The two 'more authoritarian' subjects nevertheless exhibited what seem unquestionably authoritarian views at times (such as Mr D's proposal that the convict discussed should be lashed every day). At other times, they are not authoritarian in their views. In the middle range, therefore, we may speculate that, rather than finding deepening shades of grey, so to speak, there
are spasms of authoritarianism.

This is, in a way, not out of accord with theoretical expectations, since the work done in the field has been much more concerned with the elaboration of the personality mechanisms of the authoritarian, those of the liberal being somewhat neglected. Most of the theoretical substance of the F Scale used here is to be found, therefore, in the authoritarian item-halves, the non-authoritarian ones being more in the form of after-thoughts or replies, and, taken together, less coherently related to a body of central principles. The zero point of the scale thus resembles a nullity rather than a liberal, and, as we allow our gaze to travel along the scale towards its higher reaches, we see something like an authoritarian ghost taking more and more concrete shape, being solid and fully rounded at the maximum score.

In the central range of scores, therefore, it is not to be unexpected if we find ambivalence as much as neutrality.

(ii) The second point has a general bearing on scale scoring, and so on the general methodology of research with scales. The question of whether the zero end of a scale designates the opposite pole from its maximum, or a neutral point, has seldom been raised. It is an important one. It seems reasonable to suppose that the lower scores
on this paired-alternative F Scale, 'fuzzy' though the non-authoritarian item-halves may be, do not reflect authoritarianism in a minor degree, but an inclination opposed to authoritarianism. Just where the watershed i.e. the true neutral point, may be, is likely to be contentious, but the desirability of treating anti-authoritarian persons as arithmetically negative in their scores seems to me to be clear.

One tenable solution to this problem might be to use the information we have about the empirical distributions and to use quartile scores, negative for the first and second, positive for the third and fourth. Thus, using the standardization data set out at the conclusion of Chapter Six, one might translate the raw authoritarianism scores in these terms to ones with a minimum of -2 and a maximum of +2.

The same procedures are defensible for the ethnocentrism and alienation scales, if these are to be treated as capable of defining polar opposites.

If a standard procedure admitting negative scoring had been in vogue for the past two decades, we might have seen fewer cases where authoritarianism and its correlates had been researched amongst undergraduates and other unsuitable samples, since their preponderantly negative
scores would have made their inappropriateness abundantly obvious. To go looking for fascist tendencies, in the manner of much reported research, amongst University students, in English-speaking countries, is like measuring kangaroos in the hope of quantifying tigers.

This suggestion can only be raised with diffidence at this stage of the argument of this thesis. However, the fact that data from a large, representative urban sample have been obtained and presented makes possible its easy implementation. It seems particularly appropriate to the description of individuals through use of the scales developed in this thesis in later research.

10.6. Conclusion

This excursus has been, in part, designed to show how contrived circumstances may be useful in throwing up hypotheses capable of being tested in larger samples. One, in particular, that upwardly mobile persons may be less susceptible to dispositional influence than to group pressures in forming their opinion on issues of conscience, has been shown to have some limited evidential support in the larger sample. Other considerations have been raised speculatively, with a view to future research. We shall now return to the main themes of this thesis, to point to the pith of its argument and demonstrate the mode and extent of the general analytic utility of its findings.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONCLUSION

11.1. Introduction

A cartographical enterprise requires adequate instruments. A major part of this thesis has been devoted to showing why the instruments in previous use for the measurement of some dispositions have been inadequate, and in constructing more adequate ones. The dispositional measures of authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and alienation, the construction of which is described in Chapter Six and Seven, are held to be adequate for investigation and are offered for research use. In charting the social incidence of these dispositional constructs, and anxiety, we have been breaking new ground in the exploration of the Australian urban environment. In employing correlational and factor analysis in identifying political constructs, we have evolved more modest indices.

However, the process of enquiry in which these instruments have come to hand actually clarified the structure of political opinion itself. Although it has been shown to have changed somewhat between the times at which the two sample surveys were taken, in 1963 and 1966,
the structure has a clarity almost unlooked for; and one of the political dimensions identified, 'Conscience' radicalism, exhibits a constancy over time, a cohesiveness and rootedness in psychological dispositions which suggest that it will persist as a disparate attitude. Sociological considerations suggest it will grow in importance.

Of the four psychological dispositions whose influence on one another and on political opinion has been investigated, it is anxiety which has proved the most disappointing. Although it appears to have a low positive relation to each of the four sentiments of radicalism, and to a very general perception of threat, its relations with other dispositions and political attitudes has been less than might have been expected. As the Introduction notes, this thesis was initially inspired by an interest in the implications of insecurity and aggression. It seems now that, far from being at the core of mechanisms of hate and distrust, anxiety cowers in a corner by itself, so to say, and that confident men possessed of complex social frustrations are closer to a central symbol of the aggressive type. This is not to say that latent or repressed anxiety has no role: on the contrary, there is persuasive evidence from in-depth analyses, dwelling on
the themes of externalization and ego-defence,¹ which cannot be ignored. But this thesis has been concerned chiefly with the function of relatively manifest anxiety.

In exploring the interrelations of dispositions, their influence on political attitudes and the structure of political attitudes, this study has declared its 'contextualist' persuasion, has been concerned to acknowledge the potentiality of intention, and, at almost every stage of the analysis, has argued, implicitly as well as explicitly, the necessity of verstehen in social enquiry, both as a tool of research and a method by which the results of research can be interpreted. A few of the most salient findings are noted below, as a prelude to consideration of the major question of prediction from disposition to action, and from action to a sequence of historical events.

11.2. Psychological Dispositions and Political Attitudes; Constancies and Inconstancies

The five major constancies in the correlation of psychological dispositions and political attitudes are the following:

(1) Authoritarianism is negatively related to 'Conscience' radicalism.

(ii) Authoritarianism is negatively related to libertarianism.

(iii) Ethnocentrism is negatively related to 'Conscience' radicalism.

(iv) Ethnocentrism is negatively related to libertarianism.

(v) Alienation is positively related to socio-economic radicalism.

All these relations are substantial, and only the last exhibits any disturbance when variations in correlation between different social class and educational groups are considered. The mechanisms connecting these dispositions and sentiments have been elaborated in the text. Every apparent inconstancy in relation has been brought forward, and it is a task for the future to determine the reliability of these, perhaps with appropriate samples magnifying those characteristics of individual or group functioning apparently responsible for the inconstancies. This exploratory exercise has been concerned with their initial, tentative identification.

Of the four psychological dispositions, it is alienation, conceived as social estrangement, which is the most various in its function, being the friend of socio-economic radicalism, the foe of 'Conscience' radicalism, a minor ally of a 'Left' position in defence and foreign
policy, and, in a very minor degree, an associate of libertarianism. It is in contemplating this disposition that the unexpected is most in evidence; 'wherein', to quote one clinical usage of the term itself, 'familiar persons and situations appear strange: it is the opposite of déjá vu'. Its most significant role is in its prediction to ethnocentrism, which seems a result either of the familiar frustration-aggression mechanism, or the generalization of social distrust. But its effects go beyond this, as the illustrative case of 'John' suggests: the world is not the place 'John' thinks it to be, nor, one might go on to say, is it the place he is trying to create. At its most extreme, alienation may generate a paranoid world-view, and its creative potential may assume a sinister significance, inventing hostile intentions and imputing them to innocents.

11.3. Psychological Dispositions and Political Interpretation

The independent predictions of both authoritarian personality tendency and alienation to ethnocentrism are empirical findings of very substantial analytical utility to the political scientist. It may be as well, in standing back to contemplate the potential influence of dispositions on political attitudes, to take a case which illustrates

---

1 H.B. English and A.C. English, op. cit., p. 22.
clearly the utility of the knowledge of the interrelations of dispositions themselves. Ethnocentrism is a disposition of considerable political importance, being relevant to the social disharmony or, in extremis, social disintegration, and, when the cultural conditions are ripe for them, capable of generating extremist mass movements of great destructive force.

Before advancing this illustration, it might be salutary to recall that the general utility of psychology to political science has, on and off, been in considerable doubt. As Greenstein has said,¹ in a cri de coeur:

If the political scientist persists in his determination to make systematic use of psychology, he is likely to experience ... discouragement. Much of the research and theory he encounters will seem singularly irrelevant to explaining the kind of complex behaviour which interests him... Psychologists' insights seem irrelevant to political scientists, for the good reason that many psychologists do not conceive of their science as one which should attempt to explain concrete instances of social behaviour, but rather as a means of understanding general principles underlying that behaviour.

The political scientist is often puzzled as to how to apply the findings of psychology, which is nomothetic in its bias, having as its purpose the production of generalizations. Whilst the political scientist is rarely purely idiographic in his concern, that is, trying to portray

a political situation in all its idiosyncracy, he is sufficiently of the two contrasting worlds of social analysis as to be uncomfortable, or even at a loss, in using the tools of either.

Let us consider briefly the circumstances of the fall of the Weimar Republic, to see how difficulties of this kind can be resolved. The later period of Weimar, and that of the National Socialist regime, are, of course, ones where the influence of psychological dispositions had un jour de fête. Indeed, they provided an impulse to the psychological interpretation of political events which had its beginnings in the very distinguished work by Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, and is still active, particularly in the analysis of the fate of European Jewry. The dominant themes have been of a malignant alienation, especially in the middle class, and of a diffusion of authoritarian personality characteristics in the German national culture of the time.

The illustrative case to be presented, in order to show how psychological insights are necessary to an


understanding, is that of the German Jews, as they were seen by their fellow Germans, and as they saw themselves, in the twilight of Weimar. Their self-conception was, in the main, based on a realistic appreciation of experience; the conception of them advanced by the Nazis was that of a social cancer, destroying the nation. It bore little relation to actuality. Jews were in socially exposed positions in petty commerce, the theatre and the professions, but not in a position of great economic or political power. Confronted by this extraordinary conception of themselves as a group, the Jews tried to reason on the basis of an ordinary logical interpretation of experience, attempting to engage on this basis the sympathy of their fellow Germans. A political scientist resistant to the employment of the data of psychology might have taken the same view as they did. In June, 1933, the Zionist paper Jüdische Rundschau appealed in the following terms to the German public:

The National Socialists, in their demonstrations, designate the Jews as 'enemies of the state'. That designation is incorrect. The Jews are not enemies of the state. The German Jews desire and wish for the rise of Germany, for which they have always invested, to the best of their knowledge, all their resources, and that is what they wish to continue to do.

---


Hilberg's\textsuperscript{1} account of earlier events runs as follows: 'In April] The Central-Verein Zeitung, organ of the Jewish assimilationists, had published an editorial, born out of despair, which contained Goethe's famous line of frustrated love: "If I love you, what business is it of yours?" The Zionist paper Jüdische Rundschau thereupon published a reply which stated with defiance: "If I love you, then it is your business. The German people should know: a historical alliance, hundreds of years old, cannot be severed so simply." But it was severed.'

What the German Jews could not understand, and what nomothetic research of the type undertaken in this thesis can tell us, is this: it was not the Jews the Nazis hated. They were not concerned with the actuality of the German Jewish community, in its real relations with the state. What they hated was intrinsic to themselves, their idea of the Jew. In the Jew was the paradigm of the intrusive foreigner, the alien corrupting the national Volk. Ethnocentrism is not a disposition reflecting a realistic appreciation of the out-group. It reflects a stereotype of the out-group, and the more extreme its causal antecedents, alienation and authoritarianism, the more extreme is ethnocentrism, which incorporates derogatory mistake. What the Nazis were arguing

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid., p. 30.
was for the German people to abandon a conception of the Jew based on the logic of ordinary experience, and to put in its place a stereotype which bore no relation to reality, indeed contradicted it. But it was one in which they themselves believed. Here is Hitler epitomising those dispositions apparently possessing the audience to whom he addressed himself: authoritarianism, alienation and ethnocentrism. He is at the dinner table, on 23 January 1942 (the following is a stenographic record of his private conversation).¹ He is speaking of the Jews:

A good three or four hundred years will go by before the Jews set foot again in Europe. They'll return first of all as commercial travellers, then gradually they'll become emboldened to settle here - the better to exploit us. In the next stage, they become philanthropists, they endow foundations. When a Jew does that, the thing is particularly noticed - for it's known that they're dirty dogs. As a rule, it's the most rascally of them who do that sort of thing. And then you'll hear these poor Aryan boobies telling you: 'You see, there are good Jews.'

Here, he is urging his audience to put the opposite construction to the normal one on a datum of experience: an ostensibly generous act is really cunningly selfish. Indeed, more than usually so: 'it's the most rascally of them who do that sort of thing'. What is real is what is 'known' a priori '... they're dirty dogs'. But this 'knowledge' is not based on external reality; it is a

paranoid reconstruction of elements of external reality, with a great deal added. It springs from within the personality of the highly ethnocentric subject. Even the Jews' own consciousness of their motives and actions can be disregarded in the light of this 'knowledge'. Here is Hitler speaking on the night of 1-2 December, 1941.1

Ten years ago, our intellectual class hadn't the least idea of what a Jew is. Obviously, our racial laws demand great strictness on the part of the individual. But to judge of their value, one mustn't let oneself be guided by individual cases.2 It is necessary to bear in mind that in acting as I do I am avoiding innumerable conflicts in the future. I'm convinced that there are Jews in Germany who've behaved correctly - in the sense that they've invariably refrained from doing injury to the German idea ... Probably many Jews are not aware of the destructive power they represent. Now, he who destroys life is himself risking death. That's the secret of what is happening to the Jews. Whose fault is it when a cat devours a mouse? The fault of the mouse, who has never done any harm to the cat?

This 'knowledge' from the inner springs of personality functioning extends far and wide. On 18 October 1941,3 Hitler ruminates:

It's a queer business, how England slipped into the war. The man who managed it was Churchill, that puppet of the Jewry that pulls the strings.

1 Ibid., p. 140-1.
2 My underlining, here and below.
The murder of the Jews in the concentration camps is never mentioned in the 'Table Talk', only deportation. The real nature of the 'Final Solution' had been disclosed to a small group of higher bureaucrats by Heydrich on 20 January, 1942 at a conference at Gross-Wannsee. But on 23 January, 1942, Hitler is saying this:

One must act radically. When one pulls out a tooth, one does it with a single tug, and the pain quickly goes away. The Jews must clear out of Europe. Otherwise no understanding will be possible between Europeans. It's the Jew who prevents everything. When I think about it, I realize that I'm extraordinarily humane. At the time of the rule of the Popes, the Jews were mistreated in Rome. Until 1830, eight Jews mounted on donkeys were led once a year through the streets of Rome. For my part, I restrict myself to telling them they must go away. If they break their pipes on the journey, I can't do anything about it. But if they refuse to go voluntarily, I see no other solution but extermination. Why should I look at a Jew through other eyes than if he were a Russian prisoner-of-war? In the p.o.w. camps, many are dying. It's not my fault. I didn't want either the war or the p.o.w. camps. Why did the Jew provoke this war?

How much this tells of the subject who is speaking, and how little of the Jews! To discuss the world of the concentration camps, of the 'S.S. State', would be to enter a nether region beyond the scope of this illustration, where, perhaps, the alienated imagination, in a monstrous historical episode, had created a physical alternative to

---


the rejected society, with its own complex 'language rules'\(^1\) to avoid even the mention of 'killing' in surroundings of general slaughter. This world must be accorded its own psychopathology, to grapple with an explanation of its **grands grotesques**. Here there is an enclosed character to deviant behaviours, which often, as in the faces in the demonic paintings of Hieronymus Bosch, exhibit an apparent serenity in a grossly eccentric environment.

Let us return to the theme of the illustration, that of attitudes to the Jews in the late Weimar period. Nomothetic research can show how ethnocentrism can come about as a result of disturbing social conditions, via the stepping stone of alienation, and also how it can emerge from the personality dynamics of the authoritarian. But it also tells us what it is; i.e. essentially a disposition of the subject, not of the object, the target group. To be sure, the actual relation of the two in a given society is also relevant: the target group here, the Jews, were seen by some as the paradigm of the foreigner, being actually the descendants of a wave of migration from the East; so that one can regard anti-Semitism, in part, as the result of a dysfunctional relation between the society

\(^1\) Cf. R. Hilberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 555ff.
and the minority group. But most of the dysfunction arises because of the characteristics of the society and of the ethnocentrism within it.

It is important to make it clear, in a general way, what is not argued were. Obviously, the collapse of the Weimar Republic, and the fantastic sequence of historical events which followed, cannot be deduced from a knowledge of the interrelations of the dispositions we have discussed. What is being argued is that the historical situation cannot be understood without this knowledge. But notice that even the generalizations of nomothetic analysis have to be understood within the given culture. Why the Jews should have been the target group for extreme prejudice requires special explanation, that is, complementary idiographic research.¹ That the anti-Semitic stereotype was of the foreigner, not so much, as in English-speaking countries, the unscrupulous money-grubber, is also important, because it clarifies the reason for the centrality of anti-Semitism: the Jew was the symbol of the alien, and therefore, putatively, the natural foe of the organic völkisch nation-state which the Nazis sought to create. Why they sought to create such a state is itself a question

¹ An example of this is a work by P.G.J. Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria*, (New York, 1964).
which requires a delicate analysis of the idiosyncrasies of the historical situation, such as that of Erikson. ¹

The generalizations afforded by nomothetic analysis are modulated by the particularities of the socio-historical situation in a given culture. The idiographic and nomothetic approaches to an understanding of politics are therefore complementary, not opposed.

Cross-cultural research, to establish whether the intercorrelations between dispositions and attitudes discovered in this thesis, in the Australian urban context, are general to other cultures or not, is a desirable future prospect. What one might say, indeed must say, on the basis of the work done here, is that social conditions which are liable to engender alienation, conceived as social estrangement, or which conduce to the diffusion of authoritarian personality characteristics, are surrounded by a penumbra of ominous potentiality. They exacerbate ethnocentrism. Thus to launch an immigration programme during an economic recession is a dangerous enterprise, not merely because it will increase competition for jobs, but because, if a wave of unemployment increases alienation, as would seem highly likely, a growth of irrational antagonism to migrants will follow. One of the main lessons of this

research is that, rather than attempting to predict to attitudes directly from social conditions, it is preferable to consider first the step from social conditions, understood in their particularities, to dispositions, likewise cautiously measured, before attempting to prophesy the structure of opinion on particular issues. Empirical research, heavily qualified by the operation named verstehen, is the sine qua non of such social analysis.

11.4. A Note on the Method of Political Science

A final note on the method of political science and, in particular, of political psychology might here be usefully offered. Of the social sciences, political science is the most various in its method. Indeed, it happens that it has not one methodology, but several. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish it from history, except for its generally contemporary bias. It is therefore appropriate that, for some purposes, it should adopt the methodology of that discipline. At other times, methods more like those of the natural sciences, on the empirico-mathematical model, are useful. This is not confusion; it is simply that, in a discipline addressed to the analysis of affairs of state, the subject matter is as large in scope as life itself, and the variety in techniques of analysis must be broad in order to match the difficulty
of the subject. In the treatment of disposition and political opinion in this thesis, one methodological lesson has emerged with paramount force: it is that, in political psychology, many methods of analysis must be conjoined, and that statistical techniques must be married to a human understanding, before they can be used to display the subject in all its intricacy.
APPENDICES
**APPENDIX I: The Questionnaire of the 1963 Survey**

**VOTERS' OPINION SERVICE**

**PRE-ELECTION SURVEY, NOV. '63**

Good morning/afternoon/evening; I'm helping to carry out a public opinion survey in connection with the coming elections. Would you like to help us by answering a few questions?

1. Did you see either Mr. Calwell or Sir Robert Menzies give their policy speeches on TV?  
   - YES 1.  
   - NO 2.  
   - D.K. 3.

2. (IF YES) Which of them did you see?  
   - BOTH 1.  
   - ONLY CALWELL 2.  
   - ONLY MENZIES 3.  
   - D.K. 4.

3. Do you think age pensions should be increased,  
   - OR  
   - should they be kept as they are now, for the time being? 2.  
   - Other opinion 3.  
   - D.K. 4.

4. Do you think Australia should increase its spending on defence,  
   - OR  
   - does Australia spend enough on defence already? 2.  
   - Other opinion 3.  
   - D.K. 4.
5. Do you think child endowment should be doubled, 1.

OR

be raised by a smaller amount, 2.

OR

be kept at the present rate? 3.

Other opinion 4.

D.K. 5.

6. Should government spending on education remain about the same as it is now, 1.

OR

be moderately increased 2.

OR

be greatly increased? 3.

Other opinion 4.

D.K. 5.

7. Should the Commonwealth Government start up new business enterprises of its own, 1.

OR

should it keep out of new business ventures? 2.

Other opinion 3.

D.K. 4.
8. Should the government avoid nationalization and promote private enterprise, 1.

OR

should it nationalize some business monopolies? 2.

Other opinion 3.

D.K. 4.

9. On the aborigines: do you think the government should spend more on their welfare and education, 1.

OR

spend about the same as it does now? 2.

Other opinion 3.

D.K. 4.

10. Australia now gives equipment to Asian countries to help them develop. This aid amounts to about £5 million a year.

Do you think this aid should be increased, 1.

OR

kept about the same as it is now? 2.

Other opinion 3.

D.K. 4.

11. Do you think the White Australia policy should be kept as it is, 1.

OR

should the policy be relaxed to allow greater numbers of Asians to settle in this country? 2.

Other opinion 3.

D.K. 4.
12. Do you think the death penalty for murder should be abolished? 

   OR

   should the death penalty be kept? 

   Other opinion

   D.K.

13. Should the government start more detailed economic planning, 

   OR

   should it use only the present controls? 

   Other opinion

   D.K.

14. If a man gets income from increases in the value of stocks and shares that he owns, should such income be left free of tax, 

   OR

   should it be taxed? 

   Other opinion

   D.K.
15. (HAND INTERVIEWEE CARD A)
In your own personal opinion, which of these election issues is of first importance? Second? Third? Fourth?
Foreign and defence policy ( ) Education ( )
Housing ( ) Social services ( )
Unemployment and economic policy ( )
(NUMBER ISSUES IN ORDER GIVEN BY INTERVIEWEE)
(OFFICE USE ONLY: For. pol. 1 2 3 4 5
Educ. 1 2 3 4 5
Housing 1 2 3 4 5
Soc. Serv. 1 2 3 4 5
Unemp. 1 2 3 4 5 )

16. For which party did you vote at the last Federal Elections, in 1961?
LCP ALP DLP Com. Other D.K. Did not vote Refuse
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

17. For which party did you intend to vote at the coming Federal Election?
LCP ALP DLP Com. Other D.K. Refuse
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

18. (IF SAME BOTH TIMES)
Do you always vote for that party? YES 1.
NO 2.
D.K. 3.
19. What is your main reason for voting for the party of your choice at this election?

20. (ASK ONLY DLP VOTERS AT THIS ELECTION)

Which party will you give your second preferences to at this election?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LCP</th>
<th>ALP</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>D.K.</th>
<th>Refuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. (ONLY DLP) Why?

22. Do you take quite a lot of interest in current politics?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. some, but not much?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. OR hardly any?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23. (HAND CARD B TO INTERVIEWEE)

Do you pick up information on current politics:
mostly from T.V., Radio, Newspapers, or Books etc. 1.

OR

mostly from talking to other people, or just
listening to what they say? 2.

D.K. 3.

24. Which would influence you more in deciding how to vote:
what you see on T.V., in the newspapers etc? 1.

OR

ordinary conversation? 2.

Neither 3.

D.K. 4.

25. Have you tried to convince anyone of your political ideas recently? YES 1.

NO 2.

D.K. 3.

26. Has anyone asked your advice on a political question recently? YES 1.

NO 2.

D.K. 3.
Here is a list of brief statements of opinion. We're trying to see if political opinions link up with opinions on other issues. You'll probably agree with some, disagree with others. As I read out each statement, would you just tell me whether you AGREE or DISAGREE? If you are UNDECIDED, just say "don't know".

27. What the youth needs is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.
   Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3.

28. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong.
   Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3.

29. If people spent more time talking about ideas just for the fun of it, everybody would be better off.
   Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3.

30. Obedience and respect for authority are not the most important things to teach children.
   Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3.

31. An insult to our honour should always be punished.
   Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3.
32. If it weren't for the rebellious ideas of youth there would be less progress in the world.
   Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3.

33. In our society, if you work hard you can usually get ahead.
   Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3.

34. Life today is a difficult and dangerous business, and it's a matter of chance who gets on top.
   Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3.

35. Life seems to be rather meaningless.
   Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3.

36. Most members of parliament and city councillors are sympathetic people and do a good job.
   Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3.

37. One can't hope to become the sort of person one would like to be.
   Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3.

38. Most people can be trusted.
   Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3.

39. Visits to Australia by Japanese politicians and businessmen should be welcomed.
   Agree 1. Disagree 2. DK 3.
40. Australians should not be too keen on friendship with Japanese after the lessons of the last war.

   Agree 1.  Disagree 2.  DK 3.

41. The Italian communities which have settled in the inner suburbs have made them brighter and more pleasant places to live in.

   Agree 1.  Disagree 2.  DK 3.

42. Italian migrants have not added much of value to the Australian way of life.

   Agree 1.  Disagree 2.  DK 3.

43. The Jews have too much power and influence in this country.

   Agree 1.  Disagree 2.  DK 3.

44. Jews are as valuable, honest and public spirited citizens as any other group.

   Agree 1.  Disagree 2.  DK 3.

Thanks. (RECOVER CARD) This last section is on the characteristics of voters...would you mind telling me, please:

45. What is your occupation? (A FEW DETAILS)

.................................................................

(OFFICE USE ONLY: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0)
46. (ASK ONLY IF ANSWER NOT YET CLEAR)
Are you married or single?
MARRIED 1. SINGLE 2. WIDOW/WIDOWER 3.

47. (IF MARRIED)
Do you have any children sixteen or less - if so how many?
None 7.

48. (ASK ONLY IF NOT HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD)
And what is the occupation of the householder?

.................................................................

(OFFICE USE ONLY: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0)

49. What standard of schooling did you complete?
PRIMARY ( ) SOME SECONDARY ( ) INTERMEDIATE ( )
TRADE CERTIFICATE ( ) LEAVING ( ) MATRICULATION ( )
SENIOR TECH. DIPLOMA ( ) UNIVERSITY ( ) DK ( )
OTHER (Write in) ..............................................

.................................................................

(TICK THE ANSWER GIVEN)

(OFFICE USE ONLY: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0)
50. Would you consider yourself:
   Upper middle class? 1.
   Middle Class? 2.
   or Working class? 3.
   Can't say 4.

51. Would you mind telling me your religious denomination?
   Presbyterian 2. Other Christian 5. Agnostic or Atheist 8.

52. Apart from weddings, funerals, etc., how long is it, roughly, since you last attended Church?
   (Fortnight or less) 1. (Longer) 3.
   (3 - 4 weeks) 2. (Never) 4.

Thank you for co-operating in the survey!

INTERVIEWER ONLY (DO NOT ASK)

    FEMALE 2.


55. Address:
    No.................. Street...................... Suburb............
    ..................................................
56. Comments and interviewer's signature:

................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................

(OFFICE USE ONLY: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0)
APPENDIX 2: The Questionnaire of the 1966 Survey


Good (morning). My name is .... I'm from Nation's Opinion Service. At present we're carrying out a survey amongst voters for the Australian National University .. The University if carrying out this opinion survey in connection with the coming elections .. CHECK: We want to interview as many young voters as possible in this survey .. Is there any voter under 30 years of age here I can interview?

(ALWAYS GIVE PRIORITY TO VOTER UNDER 30)

(NOTE THAT "VOTER" MAY BE ELIGIBLE NOW BUT NOT FOR LAST ELECTIONS)

1. Undecided: 1

The first two questions are about education ..
Do you think that Government spending on education should .. remain about the same as it is now, or be moderately increased .. 2

OR

do you think it should be greatly increased? 3
2. **Undecided:** 1

Do you think that the Government should...

.. help finance Church schools ..

**OR**

Should the Government spend its money on state schools only?

3. **Undecided:** 1

Now a few questions on defence and foreign policy ...

Do you think Australia should increase its spending on defence ..

**OR**

Does Australia spend enough on defence already?

4. **Undecided:** 1

Do you think that communism in Asia is -

A great danger to Australia's security:

A minor danger to Australia's security:

**OR**

no danger to Australia's security:

5. **Undecided:** 1

Apart from the conscription issue, do you support the sending of Australian troops to Sth. Vietnam ..

**OR**

Do you feel it would have been better not to send Australian troops to Sth. Vietnam?
6. Undecided: 1

On conscription, do you oppose sending national servicemen, that is, conscripts, to Vietnam? 2

OR

Do you support sending national servicemen, that is, conscripts, to Vietnam? 3

7. Undecided: 1

If Australia were in danger of attack, would you be against conscription for overseas military service? 2

OR

Would you support conscription for overseas service at such a time? 3

8. Undecided: 1

Do you think Australia may be in grave danger of attack at some time in the next ten years? 2

OR

Do you think there is little danger of an attack on Australia in the next ten years? 3

9. Undecided: 1

Do you think that Britain might let us down in an emergency, if they were in any danger themselves? 2

OR

Do you think they would help us, even at some risk to themselves? 3
10. Undecided: 1

Do you think that the United States might let us
down in an emergency if they were in any danger
themselves ..

OR

Do you think they would help us, even at some risk to
themselves?

2

11. Undecided: 1

Should Australia seek closer defence ties with the
U.S.A. through treaties ..

OR

Keep defence ties with the U.S.A. the same as they are
now ..

2

OR

Have looser defence ties with the U.S.A. than at present?

3

12. Undecided: 1

Do you think that Australia should set about getting
atomic weapons for defence now ..

OR

Do you think we should avoid getting atomic weapons
at the present time?
13. Undecided: 1

Australia now gives equipment to some Asian
countries to help them develop. Do you think this
economic aid should be increased.. 2

OR

Kept about the same as it is now? 3

14. Undecided: 1

Do you think the White Australia Policy should be
kept as it is now? 2

OR

Should the policy be relaxed, to allow more Asians to
settle in this country? 3

15. Undecided: 1

There has recently been a change in government in
Indonesia. Should Australia offer special aid and
cooperation to the new Indonesian government.. 2

OR

Should Australia be wary of too much aid and cooperation
at the present time? 3

16. Undecided:

On New Guinea.. should Australia spend a lot more
on New Guinea development.. 2

OR

Should Australia spend about the same on New Guinea as
it does now? 3
17. **Undecided:** 1

Now on political topics here in Australia, should the Commonwealth Government start up new business enterprises of its own ..

OR

Should it keep out of new business ventures?

18. **Undecided:** 1

Should the government avoid nationalization and promote private enterprise ..

OR

Should it nationalize some business monopolies?

19. **Undecided:** 1

There has been much American investment in Australian industry in the last few years .. Do you think that the Australian Government should put special controls on American investment in this country ..

OR

Should the government use the same controls as for Australian business?
20. **Undecided:** 1

On **economic planning**, should the government use controls to guide business development more closely .. 2

**OR**

Should the government use only **present controls** and **not interfere** with business development? 3

21. **Undecided:** 1

Suppose the Government **does** introduce detailed economic planning. Do you think it should use **strict controls** to **force** businessmen to do what is best for the country ..

**OR**

Use **mild controls** and **discuss** its plans with business and union leaders? 3

22. **Undecided:** 1

If a man owns **stocks and shares** and makes some money from **increases** in their **value**, should such gains be left **free of tax** .. 2

**OR**

Should the gains be **taxed**? 3

23. **Undecided:** 1

Do you think there should be a **death penalty** for murder .. 2

**OR**

Do you think there should be **no death penalty**? 3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you think that child endowment should be increased?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kept about the same as it is now?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should age pensions be kept the same, or moderately increased?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think they should be greatly increased?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think that there is enough real poverty in Australia today to require special government action?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think that poverty is a minor problem which will come right without special government action?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should it remain a monarchy with the Queen as head?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
28. Now a general question. If you could choose just two matters for more government attention.. which two would you choose?

(Record 2 only.. Probe & record verbatim)

(1) .................................................................
(2) .................................................................

29. HAND CARD 1: In your own personal opinion, which of these election issues is of first importance?

(Force choice - record "1" for first)

(then rank order 2 (2nd) to 6 (last))

Rank order

Defence:

Conscription:

Education spending:

State aid to Church schools:

National development:

Social services (pensions, etc):

(If unable to rank precisely 1 to 6)

(record answers and reasons below)

TO BE ASKED ONLY AFTER TUESDAY 8TH NOVEMBER:

30. Did you see either Mr. Calwell or Mr. Holt give their policy speeches on TV?

Yes: 1
No: 2
DK: 3
31. IF YES TO Q.30:

Which of them did you see?  
Both: 1
Only Calwell: 2
Only Holt: 3
DK: 4

32. What do you think of Mr. Holt as leader of the Liberal Party?

(Probe & record verbatim)

33. What do you think of Mr. Calwell as leader of the Labor Party?

(Probe & record verbatim)

34. If Mr. Calwell retired, who would you like to see in his place as leader of the Labor Party?

(Record name - Probe and record)
(comments and reasons verbatim)

35. IF NEITHER CAIRNS OR WHITLAM 1ST IN Q.34:

If it came to a choice between Mr. Whitlam and Dr. Cairns, which of these two would you prefer as Labor leader?

(Force choice)
36. This section is about the images people have in their minds of the various political parties. Take first of all the Liberal Party.

If you had to name just two things wrong with it, what two would you say?

(Probe & record verbatim ONLY 2 things)

(1) ....................................................
(2) ....................................................

37. And if you had to name just two good things about the Liberal Party. What two would you say?

(Probe etc. as in Q.36)

(1) ....................................................
(2) ....................................................

38. Now, the Australian Labor Party. If you had to name just two things wrong with it, what two would you say?

(Probe & record verbatim ONLY 2 things)

(1) ....................................................
(2) ....................................................

39. And if you had to name just two good things about the Australian Labor Party. What two would you say?

(Probe etc. as in Q.38)

(1) ....................................................
(2) ....................................................
40. And finally, the Democratic Labor Party.. D.L.P., If you had to name just two things wrong with it, what two would you say?

(Probe & record verbatim ONLY 2 things)

(1) ....................................................
(2) ....................................................

41. And if you had to name just two good things about the D.L.P., What would you say?

(Probe etc. as in Q.40)

(1) ....................................................
(2) ....................................................

42. Which party did you vote for at the last Federal elections, that is, the Federal elections in 1963?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L.C.P.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.L.P.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.L.P.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER:</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K:</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIDN'T VOTE:</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSWER REFUSED:</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
43. For which **party** do you intend to vote at the **coming** Federal election this month?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L.C.P.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.L.P.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.L.P.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER:</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K:</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSWER REFUSED:</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

44. **IF SAME PARTY NAMED IN Q'S 42 & 43:**  
Do you **always** vote for that party?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K:</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

45. **IF HAVE DECIDED PARTY FOR NEXT ELECTION:**  
What are your **main reasons** for voting for the party of your choice at this election?  

(Fprobe & record verbatim **ALL reasons**)

46. Undecided/no opinion: 1  
Do you think that the A.L.P. and the D.L.P. should **link up** with one another ..  

**OR**  
Remain **as they are**?  

2  

3
47. Don't know: 1

Do you take quite a lot of interest in

current politics .. 2

OR

some, but not much.. 3

OR

hardly any? 4

48. Which daily newspapers do you regularly read, that

is, at least 3 issues a week? Australian: 1

Melbourne - Age: 2

Melbourne - Sun: 3

Melbourne - Herald: 4

Sydney - Telegraph: 5

Sydney - Morn.Herald: 6

Sydney - Sun/Herald: 7

Sydney - Daily Mirror: 8

49. Closely: 1

Do you follow the political news in the

papers .. Occasionally: 2

(read out)? OR Not at all? 3

D.K: 4
50. On television, do you follow the political items ..

Closely: 1
Occasionally: 2

(read out)? OR Not at all?

D.K: 4

51. What one particular political topic, if any, are you especially interested in at present?

None: 1

Topic is: .............................................

52. What is your opinion about it? (Probe)

........................................................

53. Have you discussed any political topics recently?

Yes: 1
No: 2
D.K: 3

54. IF YES TO Q.53 (HAND CARD 2):

In which one of these groups would you be most likely to discuss a political question?

(Force one choice)

Family or relatives: 1
Friends (e.g. when visiting): 2
At work: 3
In a club or social organization: 4
None: 5
D.K: 6
55. Have you tried to convince anyone of your political ideas recently?
   Yes: 1
   No: 2
   D.K: 3

56. Has anyone asked your advice on a political question recently?
   Yes: 1
   No: 2
   D.K: 3

57. **HAND CARD 3:**
   Do you pick up information on current politics ..
   more from TV, Radio, Newspapers, or books, etc. .. 1
   OR
   more from talking to other people, or just listening to what they say? 2
   (Force 1 choice) Can't decide: 3

**HAND CARD 4:**
On this card you will find pairs of statements about social issues. Please say which one out of each pair comes closer to your own view. I will read them out, and you choose "A" or "B". Even if you find it difficult, try to make a choice.
58. A: The Communist Party should be banned .. 1
   B: The Communist Party should not be banned: 2
       Can't decide: 3

       should be restricted to safeguard civil
       liberties .. 1
   B: The powers of the Commonwealth Security Police
       should be strengthened so that they can fight
       effectively the enemies of this country: 2
       Can't decide: 3

60. A: Homosexual acts between consenting adults
       should be punished by law .. 1
   B: Homosexual acts between consenting adults
       should not be punishable by law: 2
       Can't decide: 3

61. A: Long-haired beatnik types are a nuisance and
       should be brought into line with community
       standards .. 1
   B: Long-haired beatnik types are alright on the
       whole and should not be interfered with: 2
       Can't decide: 3
62. A: Powers of censorship over books, magazines and films should be used much less than at present ... 1
B: Powers of censorship over books, magazines and films should continue to be used the same as they are now: 2
  Can't decide: 3

63. A: Nazi and fascist organizations should be banned... 1
B: Nazi and fascist organizations should not be banned: 2
  Can't decide: 3

HAND CARD 5:
Now on this card, you will find pairs of statements about social opinions. Would you choose the statement - out of each pair which expresses your own feelings better? Just say "A" or "B" - Even if you find it hard to choose, just say which statement better expresses whatever slight preference you have ..

64. A: Our community is an easy and pleasant place to live in ... 1
B: Our community is a difficult place to live in: 2
  Can't decide: 3
65. A: In this society, people seem to get to the top mainly by chance or good fortune .. 1
   B: In this society, the better people mostly get to the top: 2
      Can't decide: 3

66. A: Mostly, people are fair in their dealings with me .. 1
   B: I often feel I am not fairly treated: 2
      Can't decide: 3

67. A: Nowadays, a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself: 1
   B: It is quite possible to plan one's life ahead with confidence: 2
      Can't decide: 3

68. A: In this society, most people can find contentment .. 1
   B: For most people, the society we live in breeds discontent: 2
      Can't decide: 3

69. A: Often people don't appreciate it when you do good work .. 1
   B: People usually appreciate it when you do good work: 2
      Can't decide: 3
70. A: I sometimes feel my life is being pushed in
directions where I don't want to go .. 1
B: Usually I can control what happens in my own
life: 2
Can't decide: 3

71. A: My work is of real benefit to me .. 1
B: In my work, I feel exploited by other people: 2
Can't decide: 3

72. A: I often feel I am only a cog in a big machine ..1
B: In lots of important matters, my decision can
affect what happens: 2
Can't decide: 3

73. A: It's easy to find a job worth doing .. 1
B: It's hard to find a job worth doing:. 2
Can't decide: 3

74. A: I can normally do what I want to do in today's
set-up.. 1
B: In today's set-up I often feel frustrated and
prevented from doing what I want to do: 2
Can't decide: 3
75. A: In getting ahead in life, it's not what you know that counts, it's who you know .. 1
B: What counts in getting ahead is hard work and talent: 2
Can't decide: 3

76. A: In this society, money will get you anywhere .. 1
B: In this society, people's respect for your character will get you a long way: 2
Can't decide: 3

77. A: Most members of parliament and city councillors are sympathetic people and do a good job .. 1
B: Most politicians and city councillors are only in politics for what they can get out of it, and are not much good: 2
Can't decide: 3

78. A: For most people these days it is more important to make money than to make friends .. 1
B: For most people, it is more important to make friends than to make money: 2
Can't decide: 3

79. A: The individual these days has a good chance of finding sensible moral standards to live by .. 1
B: There is a lot of confusion about moral standards these days: 2
Can't decide: 3
80. A: Life seems to be rather meaningless .. 1
   B: On the whole, life makes good sense to me: 2
       Can't decide: 3

81. A: Life has a clear purpose .. 1
   B: There is no clear purpose in life: 2
       Can't decide: 3

82. A: It's often difficult to see why people and
     organizations act as they do .. 1
   B: It's usually plain why people and organizations
     act as they do: 2
       Can't decide: 3

83. A: You have to be careful otherwise people will
     take advantage of you .. 1
   B: Most people are quite trustworthy: 2
       Can't decide: 3

84. A: Most people are willing to help someone in need .. 1
   B: In this society, people often don't care what
     happens to others: 2
       Can't decide: 3

85. A: These days, a person doesn't really know who
     he can count on .. 1
   B: You can usually be sure who you can count on .. 2
       Can't decide: 3
86. A: I seldom feel lonely ..  
B: I often feel lonely:  
Can't decide:  

87. A: People usually accept and welcome you just as you really are ..  
B: With most people, you have to put on a bit of an act:  
Can't decide:  

88. A: I don't really feel at home in any group of people ..  
B: I really feel at home with the people I mix with:  
Can't decide:  

89. A: I am happy to be as I am ..  
B: I often wish I was somebody else:  
Can't decide:  

HAND CARD 6:  
Here are pairs of statements on other social issues. Would you do the same thing as before, say which statement you prefer out of each pair - say "A" or "B" ..  
Just choose whichever statement better expresses your own feelings ..
90. A: Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn ..  
B: Obedience and respect for authority are not the most important things to teach children:  
Can't decide:  

91. A: If people spent more time talking about ideas just for the fun of it, everybody would be better off ..  
B: If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off:  
Can't decide:  

92. A: The artist and the professor are much more important to society than the businessman and the manufacturer ..  
B: The businessman and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the artist and the professor:  
Can't decide:  

93. A: The findings of science may some day show that many of our most cherished beliefs are wrong ..  
B: Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never be understood by the human mind:  
Can't decide: 
94. A: Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down .. 1

B: If it weren't for the rebellious ideas of youth there would be less progress in the world: 2

Can't decide: 3

95. A: No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or relative .. 1

B: A sane, normal, decent person might have to hurt a close friend or relative: 2

Can't decide: 3

96. A: What the young people really need most is freedom to find themselves, to be creative and sensitive and happy, instead of drudging or learning military discipline .. 1

B: What the youth needs is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country: 2

Can't decide: 3
97. A: People who commit sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, should be considered mentally ill instead of being severely punished  

B: Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse:  

Can't decide:  

98. A: There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents  

B: Honest people must admit to themselves that they have sometimes hated their parents:  

Can't decide:  

99. A: Most problems in the society we live in could be reduced by more education  

B: Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of the immoral, crooked, and feeble-minded people:  

Can't decide: 
100. A: Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished ..
B: It's nobody's business if someone is a homosexual as long as he doesn't harm other people:
Can't decide:

101. A: It's all right for people to raise questions about even the most sacred matters..
B: Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question:
Can't decide:

102. A: People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong..
B: People cannot be divided into distinct classes - like the weak and the strong:
Can't decide:

103. A: Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private..
B: Study and discussion of what used to be thought personal and private matters is a good thing:
Can't decide:
104. A: The more you get to know people, the more you get to like them .. 1
B: Familiarity breeds contempt: 2
Can't decide: 3

105. A: Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move around and mix together so much, a person has to protect himself especially carefully against catching an infection or disease from them .. 1
B: Even though all sorts of people mix together nowadays, a person should not be finicky about catching a disease from any of them: 2
Can't decide: 3

HAND CARD 7:
This card has pairs of statements about various nationalities and groups of people in Australia. Would you choose from each pair the statement which expresses your own feelings better .. again just say "A" or "B" ..
If you find it hard to decide, just make a snap choice ..

106. A: On the whole, the intake of a large number of migrants from Southern Europe has been a good thing for this country .. 1
B: The intake of a large number of emigrants from Southern Europe has not been so good for this country: 2
Can't decide: 3
107. A: It is a bad thing that the Italians keep
to their neighbourhoods, and do not live like
'most Australians ..

B: It is a good thing that the Italians can keep
their own customs in this country:

Can't decide:

108. A: When Italian people move into a district they
often spoil it for others ..

B: Italian people should be welcome in any
district:

Can't decide:

109. A: I wouldn't mind if an Italian married into my
own family ..

B: I wouldn't want an Italian to marry into my
own family:

Can't decide:

110. A: Italian migrants are more likely to start
street brawls than Australians ..

B: Italians are not more likely to start street
brawls than Australians:

Can't decide:

111. A: The Italian communities have made the districts they live in brighter and more pleasant places.
B: Italians mostly turn the districts they live in into slums:
Can't decide: 3

112. A: Italians admire elegance and good manners.
B: Italians don't seem to place much importance on good manners and careful dressing:
Can't decide: 3

113. A: When Greek people move into a district they often spoil it for others.
B: Greek people should be welcome in any district:
Can't decide: 3

114. A: It is a bad thing that the Greeks keep to their own neighbourhoods, and do not live like most Australians.
B: It is a good thing that the Greeks can keep their own customs in this country:
Can't decide: 3

115. A: I wouldn't mind if a Greek married into my own family.
B: I wouldn't want a Greek to marry into my own family:
Can't decide: 3
116. A: Greeks mostly try to improve their standard of living ..
   B: Greeks seem to be content with a lower standard of living than most Australians:
   Can't decide: 3

117. A: Australians had better look out, or they will find that the Southern Europeans will take over the country ..
   B: Migrants from Southern Europe have added much of value to this country:
   Can't decide: 3

118. A: When Jewish people move into a district, they often spoil it for others ..
   B: Jewish people should be welcome in any district:
   Can't decide: 3

119. A: I wouldn't mind if a Jew married into my own family ..
   B: I wouldn't want a Jew to marry into my own family:
   Can't decide: 3
120. A: Jewish people have too much power and influence in this country.
B: The Jews do not have too much power and influence in this country:
Can't decide:

121. A: Many Jewish people place great value on education and culture.
B: If Jewish people are interested in education, it is probably so they can use it to make money:
Can't decide:

122. A: The Jews are as valuable, honest and public spirited citizens as any other group.
B: The Jews are less honest and public spirited than most:
Can't decide:

123. A: Jewish people seem to keep their money for their own charities.
B: Jewish people give generously to other charities beside their own:
Can't decide:
124. A: I see quite a few Italians in my daily life .. 1  
   B: I seldom see Italians in my daily life: 2  
   Can't decide: 3

125. A: I see quite a few Greeks in my daily life .. 1  
   B: I seldom see Greeks in my daily life: 2  
   Can't decide: 3

HAND CARD 8:

On this card, you will find some statements dealing with difficulties that most people experience at one time or another. Please say frankly which answer is right for you .. Only say "in between" if you can't possibly decide for "Yes" or "No" ..

[Questions 126-145 are 20 items of the 40-item Cattell IPAT anxiety scale. It is customary to safeguard the copyright which attaches to them by non-publication. They may be found in the Confidential Appendix for Examiners.]

This last section is on the characteristics of voters .. would you mind telling me... 

146. FEMALES ONLY: 

Do you go out to work at all .. either full-time or part-time?  
   Not gainfully employed: 1  
   Work full-time: 2  
   Work part-time: 3

(If work, ask Q.147)
147. What is your own occupation? (Probe fully)
Occupation: ............................................
Status: ................................................
Industry: .............................................

148. CHECK IF RESPONDENT IS ALSO THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD ..
IF SO .. DO NOT ASK QUESTION:
Not asked - resp. is H.H.: X

And what is the occupation of the head of the household, that is, the main bread-winner?
(Probe fully) H.H. is .. Male: Female:
Occupation: ............................................
Status: ................................................
Industry: .............................................

149. What occupation did the father of the head of the household follow, during most of his working life?
(Probe fully - if several, write in all)
Occupation: ............................................
Status: ................................................
Industry: .............................................
Occupation: ............................................
Status: ................................................
Industry: .............................................
150. **HAND CARD 9:**
Which number on this card represents the householder's income group?
Write income-code from card in column:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Don't know:</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refused answer:</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

151. **Ask only if answer not clear:**
Are you married, single, or what? Married: 1
   Single: 2
   Widowed: 3
   Separated/Divorced: 4

152. **Omit this question if single:**
How many children 16 or less, if any, have you? One: 1
   Two: 2
   Three: 3
   Four: 4
   Five: 5
   Six or more: 6
   None: 7
153. What standard of schooling did you complete?

(Read out if necessary) Primary: 1
Some secondary: 2
Intermediate: 3
Trade Certificate: 4
Leaving: 5
Matric (Vic) or Leaving Hons. (NSW): 6
Senior Technical Diploma: 7
University (incl. some Univ.): 8
Other standard (describe): 9
Don't know: 0
Refused: X

154. If you had to describe which group or section of the community you belong to .. What would you say?

(Record verbatim)

.................................................................

155. IF "CLASS" NOT SPECIFIED AS LISTED BELOW:

Would you consider yourself .. Upper middle class: 1
(read out)? Average middle class: 2
Lower middle class: 3
Working class: 4
Can't say/refused: 5
156. Is your family Greek or Italian? Yes: 1
     No: 2
     Partly: 3
     DK/Not answered: 4

157. Where were you born - in which country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere (describe)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

158. Into which of these age-groups do you fall ..

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 26</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66 and over</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

159. Are you a member of a trade union or a professional organisation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not answered:</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

160. IF YES:

Which ones? Any others?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
161. Are you a member of a Church Club?  
   Yes: 1  
   No: 2  
   Not answered: 3

162. IF YES:  
   Which ones? Any others?

163. And are you a member of any sort of social club?  
   Yes: 1  
   No: 2  
   Not answered: 3

164. IF YES:  
   Which ones? Any others?

165. Would you mind telling me your religious denomination?  
   Church of England: 1  
   Presbyterian: 2  
   Methodist: 3  
   Catholic: 4  
   Other Christian: 5  
   Jewish: 6  
   Other non-Christian: 7  
   Agnostic/Atheist: 8  
   Not answered: 9
166. Apart from weddings, funerals, etc., how long is it, roughly, since you last attended Church?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fortnight or less:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 4 weeks:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longer than 4 wks:</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never attended:</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not answered:</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

167. Thank you very much for your co-operation in the survey .. should the University want to do a further study on similar lines .. would you be available to give us your opinions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Availability</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surely Yes:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably Yes:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably not:</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely not:</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

168. Circle answer without asking: Male: 1
Female: 2

(Office use only)

169. City:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Melbourne:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Print full name and address clearly)

NAME: .............................................

ADDRESS: ........................................

SUBURB: ........................................

TEL.NO: .............................. Not-on-tel: 1

INTERVIEWER (name): ........................................

(number): ........................................

DATE: .......... AREA NO: ............. INT.NO: ........

INTERVIEWER COMMENTS:

........................................................................

........................................................................
APPENDIX 3: The 1963 Survey: The Reliability of the Three-Cluster Resolution

The tetrachoric correlation coefficient, which is an estimate of the product-moment correlation from a two by two table, is perhaps the most suitable for service as a basis for a cluster analysis, since the alternative, the phi coefficient, distorts the pattern of intercorrelations through its pronounced tendency to low maximums where the splits are uneven. Guilford\(^1\) lists as necessary assumptions for computation of the tetrachoric coefficient that the variables to be correlated must be essentially continuous, normally distributed and linearly related. Of these, the most difficult assumption for the data of the 1963 survey was the second. It is made rather arbitrarily, since nothing is known of the essential nature of the distribution of these variables. However, it would seem not unrealistic to assume that in the context of Australian politics, opinions on issues raised in this survey should tend to be heaped between the extremes of a hypothetical continuum, whilst the questions here sometimes provide cutting points away from the medians of the distributions. The two by two

tables in no case suggest a non-linear relationship between any two variables, on Guilford's criteria. All tetrachoric coefficients have been corrected for unevenness of marginal split by Jenkins' method, as noted in the text.

A cluster analysis may be performed only if the samples for which correlation coefficients have been calculated are identical, or nearly identical. It was therefore necessary for each coefficient to represent the relations between the answers of all respondents, and, since the tetrachoric coefficient can be computed only from two by two tables, to dichotomise opinions on each issue. 'Don't know' and 'Other opinion' categories had thus to be assigned to the most suitable division of each continuum of opinion. The most difficult problem was the allocation of 'Other opinion', which constituted one to seven per cent of responses to each question. This was done by identifying the alternative, radical or conservative, which the internal logic of each question suggested was the one least likely that any 'other opinion' should touch or transcend. This was preserved as a 'pure' category, and the other possible responses were assigned to a 'dump' category. 'Other opinions' were thus conceived as scattered along the continuum in a single direction from
the 'pure' section of it. 'Don't know' was conceived as a category essentially intermediate between the radical and conservative responses, and allotted in each case to the 'dump' category. All determinations of the best 'pure' category were made *a priori*, in scrupulous ignorance of the outcome of the cluster analysis.

An illustration may clarify this procedure. 'Other opinions' on the question concerning child endowment were thought unlikely to be more generous than to favour doubling it, the most generous explicit response offered; more probably, they inclined to its reduction, which was not available as an explicit response category. Support for doubling endowment was therefore designated the 'pure' category, and all other responses, including the substantive ones, were allotted to the 'dump' category.

Six out of the twelve questions on political issues concerned public spending, and since none of these offered reduction as an explicit response, 'Other opinions' were thought likely to congregate at this contingency. On the remaining six questions, the position was less clear, but, with one exception, the number of 'Other opinions' negligible.

Whilst this procedure is the most defensible, there are, of course, other possible ways of dichotomising the
data. It is important to determine to what extent the choice of method in dichotomisation will influence the magnitude of the correlations. One way of testing this is to re-calculate the coefficients with 'Don't knows' and 'Other opinions' allocated to the 'wrong' category, i.e. by selecting the least plausible of the substantive responses to act as the 'pure' category. Another way of measuring associations between opinions on the various issues is to exclude all 'Don't knows' and 'Other opinions' from each pair of issues and to correlate only the residual responses. Table 12.1 exhibits the results of the application of these different procedures where both issues of a pair have a high proportion (more than 10 per cent) 'Don't know' and 'Other opinion'.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>$r_t$ (by most defensible splits)</th>
<th>$r_t$ (by least defensible splits)</th>
<th>$r_t$ (with 'Don't know' and 'Other opinion' excluded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence x endowment</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence x public enterprise</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence x nationalization</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>-.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence x economic aid</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence x death penalty</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>-.10*</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence x planning</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence x gains tax</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endowment x public enterprise</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endowment x nationalization</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.45**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endowment x economic aid</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endowment x death penalty</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endowment x planning</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endowment x gains tax</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public enterprise x nationalization</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.47**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public enterprise x economic aid</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public enterprise x death penalty</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public enterprise x planning</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.48**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public enterprise x gains tax</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalization x economic aid</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalization x death penalty</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalization x planning</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalization x gains tax</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic aid x death penalty</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic aid x planning</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic aid x gains tax</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty x planning</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty x gains tax</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning x gains tax</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following observations may be made:

(i) The effect of reversing procedures for the distribution of 'Don't know' and 'Other opinion' is substantial. The mean difference between the correlations based on the first two procedures = .10; the maximum = .30. The overall relations of the issues of defence spending and child endowment are the least certain, and most dependent upon which procedure is adopted. If the 'least defensible' splits are treated as the basis for intercorrelation, the division between the issues of the 'New' radicalism and the 'Established' radicalism clusters is diminished, and, with the exception of views on defence, they appear as extensions of each other. The internal consistency of all clusters is reduced. The correlations within the 'New' radicalism cluster, which is most affected, are considered in more detail below.

(ii) The effect of excluding 'Don't know' and 'Other opinion' responses is also to increase correlations between the issues of the 'New' and the 'Established' radicalisms. However, an inspection of the tables from which the correlations were computed reveals that the overall division between the two groups of issues arises in part because many respondents who were prepared to take an explicitly radical position on education, planning and a capital gains tax were undecided on the issues of
nationalization and new Commonwealth business enterprises. Thus there are substantive grounds for expecting a looser relation if the responses of the sample as a whole, and not merely its committed elements, are to be accurately represented.

A closer examination of the internal consistency of the 'New' radicalism, the weakest cluster, is necessary to establish a minimum position as to the cohesiveness of this group of issues. All correlations with a bearing on this question are set out in Table 12.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>R_t (by most defensible splits)</th>
<th>R_t (by least defensible splits)</th>
<th>R_t (with 'Don't know and 'Other opinion excluded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education x defence</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education x planning</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education x gains tax</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence x planning</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence x gains tax</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning x gains tax</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.10*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 'most defensible' splits offer five significant correlations out of six; pairs with 'Don't know' and 'Other opinion' excluded offer four; the 'least defensible' splits, only two. The mean correlation on the third basis only barely achieves significance. There is a conclusive case, supported by all three sets of correlations,
for a connection between three of the issues in the cluster (education spending, a gains tax and economic planning). The hypothesis of an overall relation between the four issues is clearly supported by the two stronger of these three procedures, and is not markedly counterindicated by the weakest. It is therefore accepted.

The tenability of the three-cluster hypothesis thus relies in large part on the defensibility of the preferred procedure for dichotomisation. This is clearly better in logic as a means of condensing the primary data, and has the added advantage of producing a greater proportion of even splits (eight of twelve are more even by the preferred method). In sum, the case for the empirical differentiation of the 'New' and the 'Established' radicalisms is persuasive, but by no means conclusive. It is adopted as the best hypothesis afforded by the data of this preliminary survey.
APPENDIX 4: The 1966 Survey: Additional Data in Validation of the Alienation Scale

Whilst it is noted in Chapter Six, at Section 8, that no 'universally acceptable' criterion groups are available in the case of alienation, so that one cannot validate the scale in the same way as one might, for example, validate a neuroticism scale against a hospitalized sample of anxiety neurotics, certain identifiable groups may be useful in testing the alienation scale. These are convicts and hospitalized psychiatric patients. In both cases external circumstances impose a condition of powerlessness in relation to life-goals, at least temporarily, and unless these are very substantially reduced; both are likely to feel isolated from those who share their values; the nature of the administration of gaols and psychiatric hospitals may engender normlessness, especially in the former; in these circumstances, and in this company, the patients and prisoners are likely to feel a sense of meaninglessness; and it seems not unreasonable to hypothesize self-estrangement.

The alienation scale has been administered to groups of convicts and mental patients and students at a
tertiary institution by Mr. Brian Ross.¹ The samples must first be described.

(a) **Prisoners**

These were all male, in two gaols in New South Wales: Long Bay in Sydney, where the sample of prisoners is described by Ross as 'hard core', with an age range of 18-45, and Bathurst Gaol, where the prisoners were recidivist and, in most cases, under 30.

(b) **Psychiatric Patients**

These were in two groups of mixed sex; one in Broughton Hall, in Sydney, a voluntary-patient psychiatric clinic, where the sample was in the majority neurotic, the remainder psychotic; the other in the psychiatric ward of a general hospital, Prince Henry's, in Sydney, where again most were neurotic, some psychotic. The age range of the psychiatric patients tested was 16-65.

(c) **Students**

These were trainee teachers at the Australian School of Pacific Administration, Sydney, being prepared for positions in schools in Papua and New Guinea. They were

¹ With whose permission these data are reproduced. They are drawn from a personal communication of 23 September 1968. At the time of communication, Mr. Ross was located at the District Hospital, Bourke, New South Wales, as psychologist attached to the 'Human Ecology of the Arid Zone Project' of the University of New South Wales.
intended to serve as a group whose norms would approximate those of the normal adult population, which was, in fact, the case. Their age range was 18-32.

The scale was administered to the students, psychiatric patients and Long Bay prisoners in January-February, 1968; to the students once again in June 1968; and to the Bathurst prisoners in September 1968. The normative data obtained are given in Table 13.1, along with means and standard deviations from the Melbourne-Sydney adult sample reproduced from Table 6.7.

TABLE 13.1
Criterion Group Validation Data for the Alienation Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean:</th>
<th>Standard Deviation:</th>
<th>Sample Size:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners:</td>
<td>21.64</td>
<td>12.15</td>
<td>n=83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients:</td>
<td>20.69</td>
<td>10.43</td>
<td>n=58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students:</td>
<td>12.81</td>
<td>10.58</td>
<td>n=99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative Voter sample:</td>
<td>12.35</td>
<td>8.79</td>
<td>n=355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These data indicate that the alienation scale validates well against these criterion groups. Table 13.2 indicates that reliability is also good.

TABLE 13.2
Test-retest Coefficient of the Alienation Scale (Product-Moment) (Students, n=99) (February-June 1968)

.689
This is a satisfactory reliability coefficient for re-administration after an interval of four months, and closely approximates the reliability coefficient obtained by the parallel forms method (.681, as exhibited in Table 6.7).
APPENDIX 5: Confidential Appendix for Examiners

(submitted separately)
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Official Publications

Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 30 June, 1961
Vol (ii): Victoria, Part 1. Commonwealth Bureau of

Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia,
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra,
1966, No. 52.

Statistical Bulletin, Reserve Bank of Australia.

Newspapers and Periodicals

The Age (Melbourne).
The Bulletin (Sydney).
The Herald (Melbourne).
The Sydney Morning Herald.
Trends (published by the Rural Bank of New South Wales)

Interviews

Mr. B.A. Santamaria, Melbourne, 2 November 1956.

Personal Communications

From Mr. W.K. Bartlett, Psychology Department, University
From The Commonwealth Statistician, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics (Re The Census of 1966) (no date).

From The Deputy Commonwealth Statistician, Melbourne (Re The Census of 1966) (no date).

From The Deputy Commonwealth Statistician, Sydney (Re The Census of 1966) (no date).

From Mr B. Ross, District Hospital, Bourke, New South Wales ('Human Ecology of the Arid Zone Project' of the University of New South Wales) (23 September, 1968).

From Mr B. Sheil, Psychology Department, University of Melbourne (9 July, 1969, and 11 November, 1969).

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books


Truman, T., Catholic Action and Politics, Melbourne, 1959.

Articles


1This list includes articles published as chapters in books.


Monographs and Pamphlets

Cattell, R.B., Handbook for the IPAT Anxiety Scale (Self Analysis Form), Melbourne, 1957.

Cattell, R.B., IPAT Self-Analysis Form, Melbourne, 1957.


Congalton, A., Occupational Status in Australia (mimeographed), University of New South Wales, Kensington, 1963.


Kahan, M., and Aitkin, D., Drawing a Sample of the Australian Electorate, Occasional Paper No. 3, Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, 1968.


Unpublished Papers


