THE KINGLY MAN: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE MONARCHICAL THEORIES OF THE
HELLENISTIC AND ROMAN EMPIRES

by

Mary Cecilia Sheather

A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
of the Australian National University

September, 1977
All sources for this thesis have been duly acknowledged, and the thesis is my own composition.

Mary C. Sheather
This thesis examines the attitudes to government common to Greek and Roman writers who lived between the advent of the Hellenistic Age and the heyday of the Roman Empire in the second century A.D., and who wrote theoretical works dealing directly or indirectly with monarchical government. This was, for most of them, the only form of government worthy of serious consideration.

The aim of the thesis is to analyse the extent to which the term 'political' is a misnomer for the works of these writers. The writings are examined to discover the views of the theorists on the position of the individual in relation to society, on law and the ruler, on the characteristics deemed kingly, on the imagery of kingship, on the connection of the ruler with the divine and on his position vis-à-vis the philosopher.

The conclusion reached is that the true concern of most of these writers for most of the time is not to set out how a ruler should relate to his subjects as a head of government, but to present an individual who is the model of the perfect man and for whom most dealings with his subjects are simply opportunities for him to demonstrate those social qualities which he shares with all outstanding men.

For these writers, religious, moral or philosophical, rather than political concerns have suggested this picture of the ruler, and their king has taken over and embodied the impersonal elements of government described by Greek theorists of the polis. Thus we can see that for these writers, political life does not have an independent existence, any more than it did in the days before the concept of citizenship had been developed in Greece.
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INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM

In the fourth century B.C. monarchs at the head of Empires displaced the *polis* from its position at the centre of political speculation. The *polis* itself had come to maturity in the fifth century, and since then theorists had analysed and justified it from a variety of standpoints, and opposed those such as the Sophists who were attempting to undermine the old supports of the city-state and its law. From this time on, until the high point of the Roman Empire in the second century A.D., and beyond, writers, Greek and Roman, developed a brand of political theory that, in its concerns and preoccupations, was at odds with the speculation that had gone before it in Greek or Roman city-states.

In general, the writers of treatises on government were now content to entitle their works 'On Kingship', and having dissected this topic, they considered they had said all that was necessary. The way in which they discussed government showed they were interested particularly in the moral character of the ruler. They often suggested that the traditions and laws of democratic or 'constitutional' government could be retained under a monarchy, but most preferred to appeal to arguments showing by direct comment or analogy the benefits of individual rule. Such arguments were frequently extended to embrace the religious and philosophical spheres, and to find reasons for kingship there. This at first glance evinces little of the concern about the nature of the government displayed by earlier writers, and it is this aspect of writings on kingship which we wish to examine here.

Perhaps, however, even the classical writers on political philosophy had shown inconsistencies and felt uneasy with some of their conclusions? To determine if this is so, we may begin by examining just
how classical images of the state could suggest and reflect a view of
the right way for government to operate. The use of such imagery was a
popular, if unscientific, method of analysing society and its structures,
and is an illuminating instance of how material drawn from areas not
obviously political could enter political discussions. Because of this,
it may give us some insight into the kind of writing we are dealing with
in the works on kingship, suggesting how far or how little these
differed from what had gone before.

Writers on political life, ancient and modern, rely heavily on two
images of society and government that allow discussion to be conducted
in terms of analogies. One shows the state as an organism, like the
human body. The other describes it as something which an expert or
craftsman must transform. The presumption is that this is a valid way
of discovering the key to the structure of society. The first image, of
the state as the 'body politic', may be used to justify quite different
forms of government, just as it may be put forward with varying degrees
of subtlety. The ruling class may correspond to the head, with the
lesser elements occupying less vital positions, or else it may be the
stomach, nourished by the activities of the other parts and thereby
maintaining the whole body. Where the state is considered a human
person, a more flexible correspondence is possible, as Plato showed
(though of course for him it was really the other way about — the person
was best seen as the state). The application of this analogy in any of
its versions may demonstrate that the government has the right to play a
dominant role in every area of life, or may encourage the formation of
subsidiary organizations. Aristotle and non-totalitarian versions of
modern conservatism would support the latter course.3

1 See, e.g., Livy 2.32. for the latter version, which Livy introduces
apologetically: prisco illo dicendi et horrido modo.

2 In the Republic Plato, by providing parallels in the parts of the
state to the parts of the soul as he saw them, justified the presence in
the state of three types of people, and did not offer to his rulers the
usual material rewards demanded by 'the head' in society!

3 Coleridge gives a typical account of the balance desired: 'The true
patriot will reverence ... whatever tends to ... bind [component
individuals] together more closely as a people: that as a multitude of
parts and functions make up one human body, so the whole multitude of
his countrymen may, by the visible and invisible influences of religion,
language, laws, customs, and the reciprocal dependence and reaction
In either case the image inevitably implies a degree of co-operation between all parts of the state. Each has a role to play, and even though those proposing the analogy may do so merely to pacify the citizens of humble station, this is an attempt to foster harmony through an active response. Consent is important, however obtained. In a comprehensive description of the state in this way, accounts of such virtues as justice and moderation are important, for through them society maintains a balance of its elements. Because constant adjustment is necessary to avoid tensions coming from overlapping areas of activity, this image is to a certain extent dynamic, and can therefore foster change, though societies employing it do not commonly welcome novelty.

The other analogy of government draws on the arts and crafts for its inspiration, although paradoxically downgrading them in the process.* On this view, a statesman moulds the shape of society as a craftsman fashions his product. The end-result, set as a goal before the statesman-craftsman, may be the same as that which the supporters of the organic state hope to achieve — namely harmony and co-operation. But we expect to find substantial differences in the societies patterned after such different models. Similarly if a political theorist uses both models, contradictions and inconsistencies are likely to result.

The organic image is essentially naturalist in that it conceives of man as naturally social, or at least, through need of others, compelled to be so. In a state which took this seriously, the rulers would feel themselves bound by many ties to the other classes. The differences of trade and agriculture, be organised into one body politic. But much as he desires to see all become a whole, he places limits even to this wish, and abhors that system of policy which would blend men into a state by the dissolution of all those virtues which make them happy and estimable as individuals' (From The Friend — Sec. I, Political Knowledge, Essay 14).

* 'While the philosophers conceive of politics as an art or craft, and thereby pay an implicit compliment to the arts and crafts, they use the analogy in a sense which is ultimately detrimental to the craftsman. Since all arts require specialized knowledge ... and since one man can attain this specialized knowledge only in one art, it follows that the art of politics can be practised only by a professional class which has acquired such specialized knowledge', Ernest Barker, Greek Political Theory (Methuen Paperback, London, 1960 reprint of 1918 edition), p.35.
would be less significant than the common bond. When anyone accepts the 'ruler as craftsman' image on its own as the true account of political reality, he acknowledges the leading man—or men—as a deus ex machina who is likely to have very little in common with his subjects. Because of this, however, these subjects are able to attain among themselves to a form of equality consisting in their shared lack of power. In executing tasks at the behest of the sovereign, whether as ambassadors or public servants, they are more like actors listening to the prompter than true participants in government. To fit the image, all except the ruler must be passive and inanimate: the material of the craftsman, the instrument to be played on by the musician, the sick body to be cured by the physician.

What position did Aristotle take, at the end of the age of independent poleis, in the debate over the state's nature? Aristotle certainly attached great importance to the structure of society, and therefore found the organic image of society very helpful. He was naturally concerned to define clearly the constituent parts of the polis, and proceeded analytically. To begin with, he enunciated: 'The constitution is an organization of those living in a polis' (Pol. 1274b). It is then necessary to know what makes a citizen a citizen, and Aristotle accepts, with reservations for states that are not democracies, that a citizen is defined 'by having a share in judicial functions and office-holding', τῷ μετέχειν κράτους καὶ ἀρχῆς (1275a). The positive content given to citizenship inevitably restricted the number of those who qualified for membership. Within Aristotle's best possible state, the government exists primarily to bring about the good life, and this he believed to be the natural goal in all states, though many had gone astray in putting forward other ends.

When the state has such a task to discharge, it is unlikely that other institutions will even consider claiming a share of its political functions. Aristotle, to be sure, moved away from Plato's position by asserting that groups such as the family and the village had a right to an independent existence within their own sphere. Still, he looked to public life to provide many of the satisfactions and impulses to virtue.

Cf. Plutarch, Moralia, 813e-f.
which a contemporary liberal democracy considers best produced by an individual's personal decision in his private life.

Although Aristotle idealized the *polis* and gave it, in theory, a role it could never have fulfilled to his satisfaction in practice, in analysing its structure he was recognizing its claims. When he examined the government of society as an art, he was less careful about preserving the legitimacy of the form of government that he knew. In much of the discussion in the *Politics* and in the *Ethics* too, he puts forward the political art as the master science. This was, of course, nothing new. Plato had developed the idea, especially in the *Politicus*. Sophists like Protagoras gained added eminence by asserting that the political skill they taught was the one thing necessary for all-round excellence. Protagoras, however, optimistically anticipated that all men could be taught the political art, having a natural bent for it, whereas Plato and Aristotle clearly felt that the evidence was against this. Yet there had been so far little need to draw up a theory which would allow for the possibility of one man alone possessing the true art. What is significant is that in some places in Aristotle, the master-science undergoes a subtle change from its exalted state when

there is a shifting of values which seems to result in an enthroning of ethics or moral philosophy, with "nomothetics" or political philosophy serving as its chief minister.\(^6\)

The confusion evident here explains in part how easy it would be for theorists of Hellenistic times to come to surprising conclusions about the precise object of political science.

When Aristotle views politics as an art or as a technique for transmitting a moral code, his response to it is limited in a way that is not so apparent when he sees society as a functioning unit. For here he had the reality before him, and he was not able to reduce its complexity and variation to headings in a textbook of political morality. This meant that any political theory granting an active role to one element or one member of society and complete passivity to the rest was not feasible, in his view, except in a Utopian vision.

Aristotle himself reduces the idea of such a theory to absurdity by pointing out how difficult it would be to distinguish between those who should rule and those fit only to be ruled (Pol. 1332b). Monarchy may well be the best form of government in theory, but in the world of imperfect beings with which he was familiar, there was little point in investigating the matter. Aristotle therefore protects himself from the charge of negligence by stating that if one man or group of men could be found whose excellent qualities surpassed those of the rest of the state, he or they would no longer be part of the state, but would transcend it, for κατὰ δὲ τῶν τούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος (Pol. 1284a). Aristotle suggests that ostracism would be the solution in this case, though later (1288a) he changes his opinion and opts for resignation in such an unnatural situation: 'the only course left is to obey such a man and for him to be sovereign not by turns but absolutely'.

Political theorists after Aristotle seem to be trying to do what he considered impossible by making such an arrangement the norm. Writers from Isocrates onwards describe a state in terms of the ruler who is above it, and talk of a law which is embodied in a person, and to which therefore the ruler need not defer. The establishment of monarchies in the Hellenistic world meant that a once-remote possibility — that an individual on a different level from the rest of mankind should emerge to rule all the others — seemed to have become a reality.

Where political thinkers could use the theories of Plato and Aristotle, they of course continued to do so, for the respectable air these gave to conclusions already (we may suspect) determined by events was indispensable. In some ways, everything now seemed much easier. When Aristotle defined rule as an art like shoemaking or carpentry, he was faced with a problem. No one would seriously consider taking turns at practising the mundane arts, yet in the important matter of governing the state, this alternation seemed to be required if all citizens were alike in nature despite differences in non-essentials. This dilemma could appear to be resolved when writers decided that Aristotle's careful analysis of the grades in society and the part they played in politics was irrelevant. The one meaningful distinction then became that between the king and his subjects, for the king alone possessed the political art. If a king's rule obtained its character from his moral
qualities, then moral philosophy retained its place in political thought, or, it may be, became a substitute for it.

The issues raised here lead us to wonder whether the form of political analysis we encounter from now on takes over so completely that the lessons of the *polis* were entirely forgotten. We need to see if it is possible to find any continuity in thought or if it is in fact a mistake to describe Hellenistic political theory and that of the Roman Empire as 'political' in the strict sense at all. Perhaps we may come to agree with Bosanquet that with the decline in the Greek city-state 'the political or social philosophy of the great Greek time not only lost its supremacy, but almost ceased to be understood'. Is it true, as he goes on to claim, that from this time on till the rise of the nation states, 'men's thoughts about life and conduct were cast in the mould of moral theory, of religious mysticism and theology, or of jurisprudence'? 7

With the end of the city-state as a significant political force, the image of society as an organic whole lost much of its relevance if applied to a *polis* that was no longer self-sufficient. If writers still accepted the image as appropriate to an empire, even though it was less clearly suited to a society no longer bounded by the confines of the city-state, perhaps they were still theoretically committed to seeing political life as the natural means of achieving a fulfilled existence. What view did they have of society and its origins to support or be influenced by their specific recommendations on the rule of one man?

If there are elements common to both classical and Hellenistic political philosophy, we should expect them to differ in respect of the position they occupied in the whole, and in the precise meaning attached to each. This we might suppose to apply, for example, to the interpretation of law, freedom and equality. To present the law that found its personification in the ruler as the same as Aristotle's impersonal, impartial prescription of the state is no mean achievement! How was this done?

The monarch as described by the philosophers has great need of the powers of persuasion and reason, and this fits in well with classical portrayals of the διμοιρόγος bringing into being the harmonious state. How different was this situation from the traditional one in the polis? We may wonder if an increasing use of the appeal to the Logos immanent in the ruler is evidence of a more thorough process of mystification, when men turned from a situation in which most of them were powerless and endowed the reality of power with a metaphysical dimension.

Though Plato in the Republic implies that without the appropriate external conditions the state could not achieve true harmony, the duties of his philosopher-rulers tend to be restricted to effecting changes within the soul of the individual citizens. From the accounts given of the tasks of the monarchs of the Hellenistic and Roman Empires, it seems that here too the moral effect predominates — or are more tangible blessings anticipated?

We should seek to discover whether the political philosophies of the theorists bestowed a blessing on a view of rule as the use of intelligence, rather than of will or might, as seems to be the case. Perhaps, then, they would have considered Polybius's account of the emergence of kingship as reflecting the ideal: καὶ δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ βασιλεὺς ἐξ μονάρχου λανθάνει γενόμενος, δὲναν παρὰ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρχής μεταλαβὴ τὴν ἥγεσιν ὁ λόγιμος (6.6.12). A definition of kingship like that given in the Suda which contrasts tyrannical exactions with income obtained 'with reason and benevolence' σὺν λόγῳ καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ (Suda B148), implying that only the latter is valid, would also encourage this attitude. The qualities, and especially the virtues, of a king would seem to bulk large in the writings on kingship, and this suggests that politics had become a matter of ethics. It had been so, of course, for an idealist philosopher like Plato, but he had apportioned particular virtues to particular classes in the Republic, and Aristotle had decided that the virtues of a good citizen and a good man need not coincide. The virtues on which most frequent stress is

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8 Note, e.g., Plato's description of the statesman and his task of reconciling the different elements in society in the Politicus (305e, 310e).

9 Pol. 1276b, δὲ τοῦτο οὖν ἐνδεχέται τοιάτῳ ἰώτα σκοποῦσιν μὴ κεκτήσαν τὴν ἀρετήν καθ' ἑν σκοπεῖς άνήρ, φανερόν.
laid by the writers on kingship certainly appear to be those of the self-sufficient man, who would be just as actively virtuous if living away from his fellows. What effect would this have on political philosophy?

If we look for precedents for describing monarchy in images, we may remember Plato's auxiliaries who had been in the position of pupils, and in view of metaphors in which the Hellenistic and the Roman Emperors are described as educating those in their care, it may seem that there is clear continuity here. But the auxiliaries were eventually to govern in their turn, if judged suitable, so that the parallel quickly breaks down. We may suspect that the tutoring performed by the emperors fits more appropriately into the 'craftsman-material' image. Similarly, in the often-used 'father-child' analogy, because the child-subject never comes of age, the normal process of growth provides a defective comparison. We need to look at the other images used, and discover their purpose, and, as well, to see if any of them are incompatible.

Parallels drawn between the rule of God over the universe and that of a monarch over an Empire tended to reinforce the idea that the subjects' role was essentially passive, just as was humanity's situation when it was confronted with the workings of providence. Many of the images used to give life to this analogy depended on the everyday language of craftsmanship, for the religious sphere was just as much indebted to this source as was the political. The particular trend of feeling and thought shown in, for example, Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus could provide a useful service to theorists of monarchy by offering an alternative to the limited background of the city-state, although the religious impulse to monotheism might itself be indebted to the direction taken by political thought and events for its metaphors.

We must see if there is any political reason for the frequent advice to monarchs in works on kingship to avail themselves of the services of philosophers. This may, in effect, be an attempt to broaden the ruling base and gain recognition for the claims of the wise to be practitioners of the political craft, or merely an attempt, without any theoretical justification from a particular view of society, to regain the lost dignity of those who were not monarchs. Certainly, the presence in a political discourse of a character who is very often the
writer's *alter ego* introduces a note that is somewhat foreign to the professed topic, and shows the conflict that can exist between the claim that the wise man is king and the assertion that a king is a wise man. Wherever the definition bestowing a royal title on a wise and virtuous individual is accepted, the monarchy that the writer is allegedly supporting is actually being undermined. When retirement can be held up as preferable to a life of public activity for the philosopher, the values of political life have been found wanting. But when writers advocated withdrawal from society, they may have seen this as moving beyond the confines of the state, or perhaps they were acknowledging that inactivity was the only sensible political stance for those who were now subjects rather than citizens. Did they reach this decision because in describing and justifying a monarch they were actually describing and justifying 'Embodied Law', an agent of God, the virtuous man or the sage, but not the true governor of a state?

After we have examined these problems, perhaps we may be able to determine what the transition from classical political ideals really is. Is the new product, as Ehrenberg has described a passage on kingship in the *Suda*, 'no more than abstract theory, deriving entirely from the spirit of the Polis, knowing nothing of the true nature of the Hellenistic state'?

Is it perhaps, in general, the exact opposite, an apology for individualism encased in a political framework, and hence concerned only marginally with social relations?

THE WRITERS

After the fourth century B.C., few people could any longer have an influence on public affairs, and this alone might seem a good reason for refraining from writing political treatises altogether. Certainly politics became less and less the absorbing business it had once been. Yet we know that many of the Hellenistic writers on philosophy counted a περὶ πολιτείας among their works — Zeno and Chrysippus for instance among the Stoics — and at the same time essays on the monarchy abounded. Diogenes Laertius records Cleanthes, Spheres and even Epicurus as

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authors of a περὶ Βασιλείας, but none of these has survived. Interest in this topic was unflagging; writers of the Roman Empire up to Themistius in the fourth century with his panegyric portraits of the monarch continued the tradition of providing a theory of kingship and a model of the king, undeterred by the fact that no monarch showed much enthusiasm for their more stringent injunctions, although his propaganda machine might well make use of the theory.

This investigation will be limited to those writers who, from the fourth century B.C. in Greek territory to the second century A.D. in the Roman Empire, expounded a philosophy of autocratic rule, or provided a general account of politics in which this form naturally occupied an important place. Historians who offered analyses of the state and government in the course of their works will not be used for independent evidence, as their aim was essentially to recall events, not to justify them or provide alternative ways of viewing society from that of the pragmatists who were making history. However, where incidental comment may serve the purpose of highlighting or providing insight into political attitudes, these works will be quoted. Historians such as Polybius, Diodorus and Dio Cassius, and such writers as Athenaeus and Diogenes Laertius are significant sources of material on events and attitudes before their own time.

The first writers to take monarchy as both an ideal and a realizable form of government for Greeks were Isocrates and Xenophon, and it is in their works that the overlap between the old ideas and the new should be greatest. In looking for answers from their works to the questions asked above, we should also attempt to determine how aware they were of the changes taking place and their implications, and to what extent they tried to reconcile the polis as an autonomous unit and the institution of monarchy.

Isocrates was born in 436 B.C. but his life as an orator belonged to the fourth century when he turned to oratory as a career after his family's financial losses in the Peloponnesian War. He was probably influenced by the prevailing sentiment that prompted Gorgias to deliver his Olympic Discourse on harmony among the Greeks, and he too responded to the pressing questions of the day with his own solutions. In public life he gave the orator a high place for it was his task to encourage
the citizens to follow the best policies.

There is disagreement over how much influence Isocrates had on subsequent political theory and practice. Welles assigns great significance to him as ushering in and partly causing monarchical government in Greek territory, but Ehrenberg believes this vastly overemphasizes Isocrates' importance. Wickert in his article on the *princeps* describes Isocrates' position thus: 'Der politische Denker und Publizist, der vielleicht mehr als irgendein anderer ein Recht darauf hat, Vater des Hellenismus genannt zu werden.' This is because he has in a large measure formulated
die Forderungen, welche die Theorie und darüber hinaus die öffentliche Meinung überhaupt in der hellenistischen und dann in der hellenistisch-römischen Welt an den Herrscher stellte.

Isocrates' life encompassed the days when the Athenian Empire was at its height, and the rise of Philip of Macedon. He was equally ready to advise the Athenians on restoring the former glories of its constitution (with a rejuvenated Areopagus as the watchdog of its civic morality), to exhort Philip to unite the Greeks behind him in an attack on Persia, or to give precepts on kingship to Nicocles of Cyprus (in which case he was aware of being an innovator). He did not regard kingship as the only worthwhile form of government, but he could contemplate it as it existed in his day in relatively humble form, and make an early attempt to translate to it the values of the *polis*. What is important about his works for our purpose is that in them

11 'The Hellenistic monarchy was not created by Philip or Alexander or their successors, it was created by Greek theoreticians and publicists; it was not designed to extinguish the Greek city but to preserve it', Article 'The Greek City' in *Studi in onore di Aristide Calderini e Roberto Paribeni*, Vol. 1 (Casa Editrice Caschina, Milan, 1956), p.95.


14 See *To Nic.* 8.
'monarchical theory found a basic form'.

Xenophon's career as a soldier and particularly his service with the Greek mercenaries, who had in 401 supported Cyrus the Younger, confirmed him in the attitudes of the country gentleman who values above all things order and stability, but at the same time this experience gave him an awareness of forms of government other than the democracy of his native Athens. His friendship with Socrates developed his powers of reflection just enough for him to be prepared to question some accepted values. His banishment from Athens, probably after he had joined up with Spartan forces, could only have strengthened him in his belief that rule by an outstanding individual is best.

Xenophon throughout his writings maintains a keen interest in the working out of political problems, and in different works proposes a variety of solutions. His theory of monarchical government appears in the *Cyropaedia* and the *Hiero* most clearly, but elsewhere he expresses views which also accord with such a preference, or at least are no barrier to it. As a conservative Athenian citizen, however, he was at particular pains to describe the rule of one man in a way that would not offend his fellows. The result is a minimizing of the differences between types of government and a stress on the importance of individual action.

Aristeas, the author of the *Letter to Philocrates*, claims to be an official at the court of Ptolemy Philadelphus (285-247 B.C.) in Alexandria, but it is clear that this apologist for the Jewish religion, who describes the translation of the Hebrew pentateuch into Greek, is Jewish himself. There is still debate over whether his intended audience was Jewish or Greek, whether, that is to say, Aristeas was hoping to give the Jews self-confidence and a sense of pride by recounting how their representatives from Palestine had been treated by

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an emperor, or whether he wanted to catch the ear of any potentially sympathetic Gentiles. The letter has been variously dated, but for a variety of reasons there now seems agreement that it falls within the second century B.C. What is most important for our theme is the fact that Aristeas includes in his letter a record of Symposia at which, he claimed, the seventy-two Jewish translators had answered the king's questions, some of which deal with topics which the king thinks especially important for one in his position. For this part of the work we must suppose a Hellenistic source or sources.

Fragments recording the political sentiments of the early Cynics and Stoics survive in second-hand accounts and deserve some attention, although their use is limited by their paucity. Pythagorean (or rather pseudo-Pythagorean) texts, though difficult to date, are often helpful in conveying the tone of the theory of monarchy in its most extreme form. The writings on kingship are preserved in Stobaeus, and deal especially with the relation of the king to the deity.

In his writings on political philosophy, Cicero provided what could be taken as a theoretical justification of the Roman principate before it came into existence. Whereas Aristotle's vision had been bounded by

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17 'The author seems to have been a man whose knowledge of public affairs was moulded in the last years of the second century' is the conclusion of Oswyn Murray, 'Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship', p.339.
18 'Der Brief des Aristeas ist zwar kein glaubwürdiger Zeuge geschichtlicher Vorgänge, aber über Zustände und Anschauungen der hellenistischen Zeit wohl unterrichtet. ... Wir haben hier einen ausführlichen Fürstenspiegel vor uns, der freilich jüdisch beeinflusst sein kann, aber in Wirklichkeit nur davon zeugt, dass damals die Anschauungen überall gleich waren', Wilhelm Schubart, 'Das hellenistische Königsideal nach Inschriften und Papyri', Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete, 12 (1936), p.4.
19 E.R. Goodenough, 'The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship', YCL, 1 (1928), pp.55-102 dates the fragments to at least before Posidonius (following Theiler), or in any case to the Hellenistic period. Louis Delatte, in Les Traités de la Royauté d'Ephante, Diotogène et Styénidas (Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège, Liège, 1942), assigns them to the second century A.D. Thesleff, An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period (Åbo Akademi, Åbo, 1961), considers Delatte's evidence inconclusive and believes the extracts can be dated on philosophic, historic and linguistic grounds to the third century B.C.
the limits of the city-state, Cicero, who also lived in a period of profound change, already knew the Roman Empire before there was an Emperor, and could reflect this awareness in his writings. We might expect his conclusions to have given to his successors the ability to integrate the political reality and the theory of autocratic rule of the oikoumene more successfully than Greek theorists had done.

Cicero, despite his unenviable position as a novus homo, regarded his political activity — his service of the state, as he saw it — as of supreme importance. From the time when he first spoke under the Sullan dictatorship in defence of a man whose property one of Sulla's freedmen coveted, Cicero was certainly in the very thick of the conflicts that were raging in the Republic. The only exception to this was the time of his prudent sojourn in Athens — to study philosophy — after the youthful boldness of the Pro Roscio Amerino. His consulship in 63 B.C., with the Catiline conspiracy and its suppression the most noteworthy events of the year, convinced Cicero of his own indispensability, as well as of the need for the concordia ordinum of which he had spoken before.20 In the Pro Sestio this became the concordia omnium bonorum.

Yet Cicero was aware that this slogan was not of itself sufficient to institute a united front against any potential despot, and he soon found that his ideal, Pompey, would not be the man to lead such a coalition, although for a long time he kept alive a foolish hope that Pompey could yet be shaped to his wishes. The De Oratore, De Republica and De Legibus, all written, it appears, in the fifties, are works which display much learning and much careful thought,21 but there is no doubt that Cicero's political career was in his mind as he wrote, and the same is true, to an even greater extent, of the De Officiis composed in 44 B.C.


21 But this does not quite justify Strasburger's comment that 'für die Feststellung des geistigen Abhängigkeitsverhältnisses muss scharf unterschieden werden zwischen Ciceros realpolitischen und seinen staatstheoretischen Gedankengängen', Concordia Ordinum, p.1. Cf. the comment of Béranger: 'Cicéron n'a pas été un homme d'action, mais chez lui, la
This fact of course makes these treatises more useful for our investigation than if they were completely theoretical and based entirely on Greek models, but it also means that we must not be surprised to find inconsistencies in these expositions on government and the ruler. These are the works we shall, in the main, be using, although when ideas expressed in a speech seem to have an application and significance apart from the particular political situation being covered, these will be referred to, in passing.

Philo lived in Alexandria at a time of its cultural and philosophical pre-eminence. As a Jew, and a wealthy one, he occupied an ambivalent position. Without Alexandrian citizenship, he could still play an important part in the affairs of the city as they affected the Jewish population. As Egypt was now ruled by deputy—a prefect of eques-rank governed it as the emperor's personal property—this meant that a Jewish community leader would sooner or later come into contact with imperial government, even if at one remove.22 As we know, Philo himself had the dubious pleasure of seeing Gaius' government at first hand, when he led the delegation of Alexandrian Jews to Rome to seek redress of grievances, after anti-Jewish disturbances in A.D. 38.

Josephus refers to Philo as being famed ἀπὸ πάντω (Ant. 18.8.1) and as Goodenough comments this is 'a strange statement to make of one entirely preoccupied with philosophic speculation'.23 He concludes that Philo must have been active in the public life of the Jewish πολίτευμα for a long time before he was entrusted with the charge of the delegation, but when he claims to find frequent veiled expressions of hostility to Rome in Philo's work, he is on less secure ground. Philo may well be accusing those rulers considered tyrannical (in, for example, Som. 1.81-92), but we cannot show that he opposed all of them

théorie n'est jamais restée de la spéculation pure; chez lui, la politique ne se sépare jamais de la morale; inversement la morale embrasse la politique' (Cicéron précurseur politique', Hermes, 87 (1959), p.115.

22 'Philo's being a subject of the great Roman Empire, in a province of the emperor himself, was then a highly important part of this political setting', Erwin R. Goodenough, The Politics of Philo Judaeus (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1938), p.4.

indiscriminately.

Claudius was far less of a threat to the Jews than Gaius with his demands to have his statue set up in the temple in Jerusalem, even if the Jews of Alexandria were disappointed at their failure to obtain citizenship — assuming that this was part of what they hoped to achieve. Goodenough shows Philo triumphing — 'eventually they accomplished the impossible. He won from Gaius a niggardly toleration for the Jews' but Tcherikover sees Philo's mission as 'a complete failure'. Certainly only the death of Gaius could free the Jews from fears about what position the changeable emperor might take up in regard to them.

Tcherikover finds Philo's ideas of reconciliation with the government and the Greeks 'directly in line with the ideas of Aristeas', but in one respect at least, Philo did not have the special position of the Jews acknowledged as he would have liked, for the 'traditional' rights of the Jews were not taken by Rome to include full citizenship with the Greeks in Alexandria.

Philo, we can be sure then, had felt the full weight of the imperial rule, and must have come to a reasonable understanding of how it worked. His interest, of course, was in how this government affected the Jewish community, but as Legatio 50 shows, he was able to see Roman rule in a general way. His family's social and economic position must have made it seem reasonable for him to search for common ground with men of a similar background of other nations, and to deplore the fanaticism of those Jews who had little to lose by rebellion. His brother is known to us for his wealth — he could lend the always short-handed Herod Agrippa 200,000 drachmae without much prospect of repayment — and Alexander's son, Tiberius Julius Alexander, pursued a career in the Roman public service which necessitated his abandoning his religion, as he became first procurator in Palestine, then prefect of Egypt.

26 Ibid., p.67.
In philosophy, Philo is able to write with familiarity of the philosophical schools popular in his time, despite his obvious intention of using from them only what suits his apologetic purpose. At times, however, his own adoption of Hellenistic thought-forms is what strikes us most, and this is particularly so when he deals, directly or indirectly, with political theory. Philo's patriarchs are hardly the same as those of the Pentateuch. Most consistently in the *De Josepho* and in a less secular way in the *De Vita Mosis*, Philo expounded a theory of sole rule, in the former case by deftly upgrading Joseph's situation as Pharaoh's right-hand man to that of a (virtual) chief of state. Even in the other works, however, he frequently makes indirect political comment. Thus we are justified in using Philo as a witness in our analysis of the course of the theory of kingship.

**Seneca**'s father, the Elder Seneca, was a man of wealth and a scholar from Corduba in Spain. Rome, however, was to be the place of his sons' education, where Seneca became interested in the school of philosophy founded by Q. Sextius, which would seem to have been a Roman—and very austere—form of Stoicism. Seneca's political career began late, perhaps partly because of his ill-health. It was interrupted by his exile under Claudius on a charge of adultery with Julia Livilla, Gaius' sister, behind which accusation we can perhaps see a wish to put out of the way members of an Anti-Messalina faction.

Seneca on his recall, due to Agrippina's intercession, in 49 A.D., quickly obtained the praetorship and appointment as Nero's tutor. At last he was becoming active in public life—and with a vengeance! He, alone of our writers, had what would seem to be a golden opportunity to influence a future ruler by constant association and counsel, and Seneca did his best. In the *De Clementia* he provides us with an officially acceptable exposition on the duties of kingship, but here as in his other writings he is more than simply a propagandist for the government.

We know that Musonius Rufus was greatly admired by Pliny (*Ep*. 3.11), but the latter tells us little about him. Tacitus and Dio Cassius,

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29 The various fragments, collected mostly by his pupils, tell us
however, mention that he was banished by Nero in A.D. 65, Tacitus says because of his distinction as a teacher of philosophy (Ann. 15.71). He is also known to have been a friend of Rubellius Plautus, put to death as a possible rival by Nero in 62 A.D. In 69 we hear of Musonius as ambassador to the Flavian army outside Rome, preaching peace to the troops of Antonius Primus, behaviour Tacitus characteristically describes as *intempestiva sapientia* (Hist. 3.81).

With Vespasian in power, Musonius attacked the Stoic philosopher Publius Ignatius Celer for being involved in the downfall of Barea Soranus (Tac. Hist. 4.9), and was fortunate enough not to be exiled in Vespasian's expulsion of the philosophers from Rome (see Dio 65.13.2) although he too was later banished, to be recalled under Titus, who appears to have been his friend. Musonius was thus well placed to comment on the nature of true kingship, a topic which must have been frequently discussed in his circle of friends and admirers, and an example of his teaching on this subject survives.

*Dio of Prusa* and *Plutarch* present the views of provincials who achieved success under the Empire (though not without considerable changes of fortune in Dio's case). If a positive political value could be found in the Empire as a universal community, we should find it expressed in their work. Dio's preoccupation with the nature of monarchy is shown by the fact that he wrote five discourses directly on little about Musonius himself, and at times even two philosophers named Musonius have been postulated, to account for alleged differences between the fragments preserved by Epictetus in Arrian's work and those coming down to us in the compilation of Lucius, and also to explain inconsistencies in details of his life (see the article 'Musonius the Etruscan' by Charles Pomeroy Parker, *HSCP*, 7 [1896], 123-37). It is, however, hardly necessary to assume such a coincidence to solve these difficulties, to the extent that they do exist. See, especially, Cora Lutz, "Musonius Rufus "The Roman Socrates"", *YCL*, 10 (1947), note 85, pp.21-2, and A.C. Van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe* (Van Gorcum, Assen, 1962), pp.5-11 and 158-9.

On their backgrounds, see C.P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971), esp. pp.34-5. 'With Dio of Prusa Plutarch can profitably be compared. Both men, offspring of good provincial families, went to Rome as students of rhetoric in the early years of the reign of Vespasian; both men were again in the city under Domitian, and there is reason to think that both, who bitterly hated that emperor, returned to the East without his favour', G.W. Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969), p.110.
this topic, and others such as On Law and On Opinion where his reflections give us useful supplementary information on his attitude.\footnote{K.H. Waters, 'Trajan's Character in the Literary Tradition', in Polis and Imperium, edited by J.A.S. Evans (Hakkert, Toronto, 1974) sees little historical value in these works: 'The orations of Dio should be totally disregarded [as evidence on Trajan's character] ... since on the one hand they merely reflect the traditional quasi-philosophical view of the ideal monarch and on the other cannot be proved to have any direct connection with Trajan at all' (p.235).} Plutarch was less exclusively concerned with justifying the emperor's position, and his political precepts are directed mainly at provincial politicians (although he appears to forget this occasionally when describing the glory of their position). Still, his Advice to an Uneducated Ruler and many reflections on the rule of one man in The Lives, especially those on Alexander and Numa, show him just as aware as Dio of the need to provide a theoretical explanation and justification of the monarch's position.

Dio Chrysostom was born about 40 A.D. in Bithynia into a family with a tradition of local public service. Early in his life he became a sophist, and is known to have been an opponent of the Stoic Musonius Rufus. At some stage his attitudes changed profoundly, so that when Domitian expelled the philosophers from Rome (93-4 A.D.), Dio was among them. His years of exile from Rome and from his estate at Prusa introduced him to the life of the poor, and he himself adopted the Cynic garb and acquired something of a reputation for philosophy with those among whom he travelled.

After Domitian's death, Dio returned to Rome and was well received by Nerva (see Oration 45.2). It is generally considered that this cordiality was imitated by Trajan,\footnote{For widely differing attitudes to the credibility of our sources on Dio, note the view of Bowersock who refers to the story told by Philostratus (VS 17) of Dio accompanying Trajan in the Emperor's golden chariot and giving him advice on how to rule (which Trajan could not, unfortunately, understand), and comments that although it is not necessary to believe this anecdote 'the relationship implied by this story is credible anyhow' (Greek Sophists, pp.47-8), and compare this with the view of K.H. Waters, 'Trajan's Character in the Literary Tradition', pp.237-8: 'The whole fictitious episode is part of the sophistic hagiography to which Philostratus was addicted and which became quite fashionable in the second century'.} although the letters between Pliny

\footnote{31 K.H. Waters, 'Trajan's Character in the Literary Tradition', in Polis and Imperium, edited by J.A.S. Evans (Hakkert, Toronto, 1974) sees little historical value in these works: 'The orations of Dio should be totally disregarded [as evidence on Trajan's character] ... since on the one hand they merely reflect the traditional quasi-philosophical view of the ideal monarch and on the other cannot be proved to have any direct connection with Trajan at all' (p.235).}

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and Trajan in which Dio figures give no indication of this. In any case, Dio was well aware of the political situation of his time, and one of his friends, a Roman consular, had been executed by Domitian (13.1). Dio preached in many Greek cities on the need for concord within and between cities. His arguments here and elsewhere show Stoic and Cynic influences, and his speeches on kingship invoke many commonplaces from these traditions.

Like Dio, Plutarch was both an orator and a philosopher, although he did not adopt Dio's Stoicism and, indeed, disapproved of Stoic philosophy strongly in some respects. His life, too, was without the reverses of fortune that came to Dio from his time in exile under Domitian. Some of his public duties were undertaken in the imperial service or as representative to Rome on behalf of his province, although municipal life also took up much of his attention.

Plutarch's birthplace may have been only a small town, but he did not live out his life in a provincial backwater away from contacts with the centre of the Empire. Plutarch travelled early to Athens and Alexandria, and later on, to Rome, to obtain the best education possible, or to take part in diplomatic missions. Many of his friends were Roman; others like himself were prominent Greeks who obtained citizenship and recognition from Rome. Many of Plutarch's Roman friends managed to prosper under Emperors from Nero to Hadrian, although some like Arulenus Rusticus and Nigrinus Avidius were put to death by Domitian and Hadrian respectively. From what we know of Plutarch's public life we can reasonably assume that he would have agreed with Seneca's conclusion that there was no reason for rebelling against monarchical government as such. He was realistic about political life in his own day, although he probably gained considerable pleasure from looking back in

35 'Dion ist der Theoretiker und Redner, der am liebsten in allgemeinen Kategorien spricht; Plutarchos ist der Essayist, der mit beiden Füssen auf der Erde steht und in dessen Werken sich ein reges Interesse für die konkrete Wirklichkeit abspiegelt', Palm, *Rom, Römerstum und Imperium*, p.31.
the Lives on the outstanding men Greece had produced in her days of glory.

Pliny the Younger grew up during the rule of the Flavians and at an early age began a career at the bar, shortly afterwards entering on the first of the senatorial offices. His progress up this ladder suffered no check during the reign of Domitian, although Pliny was closely associated with some of those who formed what has somewhat imprecisely come to be called the 'Stoic opposition', and on Domitian's death he laid a charge against the prosecutor of Helvidius Priscus who had been put to death under Domitian. In this way, under the safe regime of Nerva, he was able to show his solidarity with the 'dissidents' of earlier years. Cases dealing with the behaviour of provincial governors also took up much of his time. For September and October of the year 100 Pliny was consul and moved the vote of thanks which became the Panegyric, in which he 'hoped to encourage our Emperor in his virtues by a sincere tribute, and to show his successors what path to follow to win the same renown, not by offering instruction but by setting his example before them' (Ep. 3.18).36

In 111 A.D. Pliny was given a special commission as the emperor's representative in Bithynia and Pontus which had long been trouble-spots. The Panegyric and occasionally parts of Pliny's extensive correspondence, including the letters written to Trajan while Pliny was in Bithynia, and the imperial replies, can be a rich source of information on the way in which conscientious Roman men of affairs came to terms with monarchy.

The last example to be considered is the work of Aelius Aristides, or rather the Roman Oration — in which the ruler of Rome as well as his city comes in for attention — and the Ἐλευθερία which Aristides may have composed, and which at any rate was written, most probably, under one of the Antonines.37

36 Durry comments, in his edition of the Panegyric (Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1938) that 'la philosophie morale des stoïciens et des diatribes avait lancé dans le monde tout un ensemble d'idées dont on retrouve ici la trace, sans qu'il soit possible... de trouver une source dominante, à laquelle se réfèrent toutes ces nobles pensées!' (p.40).

37 The arguments about the date and authorship of this work are set out by C.P. Jones, 'Aelius Aristides, Ἐλευθερία', JHS, 62 (1972), 134-52. He argues that the work shows evidence of having been composed in the reign of Antoninus Pius, very likely by Aristides.
The career of Aelius Aristides spanned the reigns of Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius and Commodus. Though a provincial from a small town in Mysia, he was able to exert influence in court as a famous orator of the second Sophistic to obtain exemption from public office and the liturgies expected of him, and later to obtain imperial assistance for rebuilding Smyrna, his adopted home, after it was devastated by an earthquake in 178 A.D. As a young man he had visited Rome, probably in 144, and delivered the Roman Oration, and perhaps at this time too, the Εἰς Βασιλέα. These works show the point of view and interests of a Greek visitor, but also possess the general character of hortatory descriptions of rule. The Roman Oration, to be sure, deals with the theme of administration in an impersonal way,38 but this does not mean that kingship and the character of the king are entirely neglected.39

Aelius Aristides, as a rhetorician summing up the sentiments of his predecessors, comes at a convenient stage for assessing the values to which he was the heir, and perhaps for finding conclusive answers to the questions we have put.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Before we begin analysing the texts, let us briefly examine the historical situation in which the earliest of these works were written, and the ideas that had assumed importance at this time. The society of early fourth century Greece was one which placed a high value on a self-contained community where each man's goal was to succeed as a citizen. This did not necessarily mean that the state was an harmonious unit. Clearly the contests for success would often lead to violence and


39 'There are some ideas in the speech of Aristides which cannot be found, at least so clearly and so fully expressed, in any other work. Such are the favourite views of the second century on the character of the enlightened monarchy and on the relations between the monarchy and the different classes of the population of the Empire; the characterization of the Empire as a coherent aggregate of free, self-governing city-states', Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2nd ed., 1957), vol. 1, pp.130-31.
bitterness but still it was within this fairly close-knit group and from its approval that a man derived such importance as he possessed.40 (A woman of course, was never in this society in any significant sense.) In the fourth century, before the rise of Philip of Macedon, inter-city hostilities seemed to pose no immediate, serious threat to the internal stability of Greek city-states, despite the effects of the Peloponnesian War on Athenian society and the impact of the war between Sparta and Thebes.

But there were examples showing the importance monarchy might come to have in the territorial monarchies of Dionysius of Syracuse and Jason of Pherae. Here the polis as an independent administrative unit no longer counted; rather, an empire not relying on a single city's pre-eminence was the significant entity. In keeping with this change, one man and not a city assembly made the decisions.41

After the death of Alexander, the balance of power shifted to the new states and in particular to the kingdoms of the Ptolemies, the Seleucids and the Antigonids. These rulers had to govern many non-Greek peoples. Even the Antigonids' sway extended mainly over partially Hellenized Macedonians and others with still less contact with Greek culture. For them there could be no question of allowing popular participation in forms of government evolved by Greeks. These forms were inappropriate in Empires covering a vast amount of territory, and, with the Seleucids at least, many national elements. Greeks in such Empires or in their own now insignificant poleis in Greece could no longer be expected to view the polis as the centre of the universe, providing a pattern of government for all civilized men to follow.

As Ehrenberg notes, 'there were no citizens in the Hellenistic

40 'In den Kreis des städtischen Staates war das ganze Leben des Bürgers gebannt. Damit is die Verantwortlichkeit jedes Bürgers in der Sorge für das öffentliche Wohl verbunden; von diesem öffentlichen Wohl hing das Wohl des einzelnen Bürgers ab', E. Elorduy, Die Sozialphilosophie der Stoa (Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Leipzig, 1936), p.135. Note too the comments of Ehrenberg in The Greek State, esp. p.91ff. The funeral speech of Thucydides expresses the essence of the relationship between a man and his polis in ideal form (see Book Two, 1.35-46).

41 See Isocrates Phil. 14-15.
states'. Government was now τὰ βασιλικὰ πράγματα. The important elements of royal rule included its unaccountability, and all the insignia of royal dignity, derived partly from Oriental tradition. Dignitaries were 'friends' of the king. Thus the way was opened for monarchy to become respectable: 'Now for the first time [it] left the realms of the heroic past, of barbaric despotism or political degeneration, and became a tangible fact in the "Greek" reality of the day.'

The historians of this change whose works we possess lived, in general, late in the Hellenistic era or under the Roman Empire. They came, for the most part, from cities, but what they recorded were the power struggles of empires in which city-states became from time to time involved, often to their cost. The protagonists were now kings, rarely (except for an Aratus) statesmen from a polis.

Long before the power politics of emperors became the main material for historians, however, attitudes likely to lead to approval of one-man rule were by no means uncommon in the cities. Strohm believes that monarchical tendencies were evident even in democratic Athens, and points to Pericles' position as προστάτης. Ehrenberg claims that this is to misinterpret Pericles' position (and Stroheker agrees). Certainly individuals like Alcibiades may have had visions of wielding supreme power, but what is important is that such visions did not become reality. However, the attempts made by such individuals to escape from the confines of the polis and its restrictions became more frequent as community loyalty weakened, and the activities of ambitious personalities may have prepared people more readily to accept the claims of, for example, Demetrius Poliorcetes.

42 Ehrenberg, The Greek State, p.158.
44 Ehrenberg, The Greek State, p.177.
Freedom became for many equivalent to 'persönlicher Anteil an der Herrschaft', and monarchy naturally came to be seen as 'einseitiges Herrschaftsverhältnis eines Einzelnen'. It is assumed that such rule is something all men desire (see, for example, Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 1.3.2, and the mention of those praying for τυραννίδα). This is a mark of the individualism of the time, and parallels in some ways the self-seeking of the city-states themselves, for whom as a body freedom frequently meant freedom to subjugate other cities.

This wish to develop the well-endowed individual free of all constraints was one element in Sophistic thought, and the political (in the 'power politics' sense) and technical advantages of monarchy are spelt out in the debate on the best form of government described, or rather invented, by Herodotus, under Sophistic influences (in Herodotus, 3.80). This was not the only or even the dominant influence on subsequent theorising — such realistic pragmatism ill became idealist thinkers — but undoubtedly such ideas on rule could have given an impetus to the schemes pursued by the founders of the Hellenistic monarchies. The ethical side of kingship theory at this early stage with its emphasis on the duty to care for the subjects — a task whose performance separates the true king from the tyrant — may seem far removed from the claims that the strongest should prevail; yet in the stress laid on the person of the king as outstanding by writers

47 Julius Kaerst, *Studien zur Entwicklung und theoretischen Begründung der Monarchie im Altertum* (Oldenbourg, Munich and Leipzig, 1898), p.9. Strohm, *Demos und Monarch*, p.21, makes the same point: 'So schafft sich der Machtwille das Gleichheitsprinzip, zerbricht es und drangt weiter. Der Machtgedanke muss letzten Endes zum monarchischen Gedanken werden, denn wer seine persönliche Autarkie sicher stellen will, wer nicht gehorchen will, um nicht zu Massregeln gezwungen zu werden, die seinem persönlichen Nutzen widerstreiten, für den ist die endliche Sicherheit erst dann geschaffen, wann er selbst der Höchste ist, der Stärkste, wenn er μόνος ἄρχει, allein herrscht.'

48 And, as Stroheker comments, 'Zu den Anfängen', p.403: 'Dass diese Vorstellung von menschlicher Ungleichheit und die aus ihr abgeleitete Begründung einer hierarchischen Gliederung des monarchischen Staates einen überaus wichtigen Grundstein zu weiteren Ausgestaltung der Theorie darstellte, steht ausser Frage.'

49 Bringmann points out that 'die hellenistische Monarchie kam diesen "erzieherischen" Tendenzen insofern entgegen, als sie das Herrscherideal der "Fürstenspiegel" in die Terminologie der Diplomatie und der offiziellen Verlautbarungen rezipierte' (*Studien*, p.108). 
advocating monarchy we can see a continuation of this theme of 'to the
victor belongs the spoils'. Here is then no περὶ βασιλείας, but we can see one stage of the process leading to it.\textsuperscript{50}

Alexander, as an individual and as a myth, also made a substantial contribution. Diodorus Siculus, in the first century before Christ, drew a picture of Alexander with 'the typical virtues of the Hellenistic monarch, magnanimity, kindness, and love for his subjects' and implied that 'successful statesmen are righteous'.\textsuperscript{51} Alexander may or may not have merited Diodorus' description of him, but the qualities looked for in a king quickly became part of a stereotype, accompanying historical developments set in motion by Alexander himself.\textsuperscript{52}

The advent of the Roman Emperors was not therefore an event occurring in an historical vacuum. Behind writers on monarchy of the first century were the experience of and the reflection on three centuries of Greek monarchy, which had taken a variety of forms but had prompted basically similar responses in observers. The tradition at Rome of powerful individuals in politics imposing their will on the state made monarchical government more likely to be acceptable in

\textsuperscript{50} Stroheker stresses that, as far as Sophistic theorising goes, 'auf jeden Fall wurde damit das monarchische Problem noch nicht im Sinne der späteren Literatur Περὶ βασιλείας eigenständig behandelt, sondern blieb völlig eingefügt in ein umfassenderes Schema der Staatstypen', 'Zu den Anfängen', 389.


\textsuperscript{52} For a clear exposition of the main points for and against seeing Alexander as the originator of the 'Hellenistic' view of kingship, see especially the later works of W.W. Tarn − 'Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind', \textit{PBA}, 19 (1933), 123-66, and his two-volume work, \textit{Alexander the Great} (University Press, Cambridge, 1948), Appendix 25, sections 3 to 6—and the article 'Alexander and the Stoics', \textit{AJPh}, 58 (1937), 59-82 and 129-51 by M.M. Fisch who shows the considerable change in Tarn's own views as the figure of Alexander comes more and more to dominate his picture of Hellenistic political theory and practice.

In the light of the evidence, we can only endorse Andreotti's comments ('Per una Critica dell' Ideologia di Alessandro Magno', \textit{Historia}, 5 (1956): 'La speculazione sulla forma monarchica di governo s'inizia ben prima di Alessandro per esigenze critiche della societa ellenica dei secoli V e IV a. Cr., seguendo motivi maturati nella cultura greca contemporanea. Queste linee maestre della dottrina politica, specie per la loro essenza astratta ed universale, sono riprese e sviluppate per tutta la filosofia antica, dalla Stoa di mezzo a Dione di Prusa, ad Elio Aristide ed a Temistio' (p.295).
practice, despite the reservations of the die-hards about acknowledging the new regime as 'kingship'. There was therefore no reason for widespread hostility to monarchy as a form of government at this stage in the Roman or Greek regions of the Empire.

These developments in politics do not in themselves account for everything in the treatises written on kingship. We cannot assume that the works bore any relation to the reality of government. Still, it is reasonable to suppose that the existence of empires under the rule of one man, and the development of sentiments favourable to this state of affairs, had something to do with the form of government that theorists chose to write about! What is more debatable is whether Adam's claim can be verified:

Diese Schriften sind weder einfach Ausdruck der historischen Situation, in der sie geschrieben wurden, noch entstanden sie unabhängig von der sie umgebenden Realität; sie spiegeln in eigentümlicher Weise die Bedingungen, auf Grund derer sie einerseits in der vorliegenden Form entstehen konnten, die sie andererseits aber auch auf ihre Art zu beeinflussen suchten, indem sie eine gewisse Modellvorstellung enthalten.53

Chapter One of this thesis, entitled 'Society and Kingship', looks at the attitudes to society of our writers, seeing if and how these were related to their espousal of monarchical government. Chapter Two, 'The Place of the Law in Kingship Theory', examines how works on kingship reconciled the law and the ruler. Chapter Three, 'Qualities and Functions of Rulers', analyses the qualities deemed desirable in a king, and the characteristics regarded as typical of a healthy society, to find out what these tell us about the kingly ideal and its political significance. Chapter Four, 'Images of Government', shows how analogy and metaphor contributed to the picture of the ruler and his people. Chapter Five, 'Religion and Kingship', investigates the connections between the religious and political spheres, looking for instances of influence in either direction. Chapter Six, 'The Philosophic Man and the King', attempts to discover how these two ideal types of the successful individual reacted upon each other, and what the result may have been for political thought.

In general, in thinking about a society, we start from these people in this place, but it is very unusual to retain this simplicity. There is a particular human organization in a particular environment, but we commonly describe and interpret it in terms of some leading element, which we see as its organizing principle. The difficulty is that this element can be very variously identified. For example, a very large amount of ordinary social thinking has started, in effect, from the King. It is not these people in this place, but the King of this place and his subjects. ...

You start from the King, or from the existing social order, and then everything that happens is related to that. Thus service at court, in the army or in the fields is the significant social activity, and life outside such functions is conceived and regulated to such ends. Thinking about law and institutions is in terms of the more perfect functioning of this system, and the significant image is that of the single organism, in which each person in the society has 'his part to play'.

Raymond Williams in The Long Revolution.
CHAPTER ONE

SOCIETY AND KINGSHIP

A political theorist is likely to hold an opinion on what form of political structures is best suited to human beings only when he also has come to a conclusion on the origin and nature of society. Holding to a particular account of the development of social relations and of the state of nature which may have existed before 'civilization' may encourage people to adopt certain political attitudes to the problems of their own day, or beliefs they already hold may lead them to adopt a specific historical and social outlook. What is important is that the two are connected, and most theorists naturally appeal to an account of human nature to justify their conclusions, whether or not it was in such a theoretical way that they themselves were originally convinced of the rightness of a form of government.

This fact impinges on our topic of theories of kingship, since several of the writers examined offer opinions on how society developed and on the forms of government theoretically available, and we may well find in these sections of their works insights into the writers' attitude to monarchical government. How much validity is there, for example, in Valdenberg's claim that a basic pessimism about mankind in general gives rise to a wish for a ruler who will arrange all that is disordered in society and take upon himself the individual's burdens?1

Accounts of the life of primitive man frequently show it as a state in which government was unnecessary, either because each person was self-sufficient or because divine rule made mortal rulers redundant.

1 'Que le pessimisme soit logiquement lié avec l'idée monarchique et fournisse des conditions favorables pour son développement — c'est à peine si l'on en peut douter', Vlad. Valdenberg, 'La Théorie monarchique de Dion Chrysostome', REG,40 (1927), p.144.
Organized social life then appears as second-best, devised to meet a changed situation in which the most noteworthy factor is the difference between men. But where the emergence of the means of social intercourse is seen as a natural and beneficent process, the emphasis is more likely to be upon man as a social being whose needs and sense of affinity with his fellows alike predispose him to undertake joint activities.

The earliest speculation on the origin of society in ancient Greece to have survived shows the former view predominating. Hesiod's golden race ἔτι Κρόνου Ἄγαν, ὅτ' οὐρανῷ ἐμβασέλευεν (W & D, 111) and apparently required no organization by mortals. This view of the past began to be countered by another which became increasingly popular in the fifth and fourth centuries. This claimed that man's early condition had been far from enviable. Some great change must have brought man to form social relationships and given him the techniques of civilization. Was this the work of one individual, or of the majority of the people, or of some impersonal force (which could of course have been embodied in an individual)?

Protagoras, if we are to believe Plato, saw the development of political life as a process distinct from purely technical inventions. The latter, a gift from Prometheus, appeared on the scene early. The former was also a gift, or rather its components αὐτώς and δοκεῖ were

2 As a modern example of a man with very decided views on the relation between society and inequality among men, we can cite Rousseau: 'Dès l'instant qu'un homme eut besoin du secours d'un autre, dès qu'on s'aperçut qu'il était utile à un seul d'avoir des provisions pour deux, l'égalité disparut, la propriété s'introduisit, le travail devint nécessaire ... etc.' (Discours sur l'Inégalité).

3 This is the line taken by Voltaire, for example, who claims 'loin que le besoin de la société ait dégradé l'homme, c'est l'éloignement de la société qui le dégrade' (from the article 'Homme', Questions sur l'Encyclopédie, 1771). Cf. his poem, Le Mondain, 'regrettera qui veut le bon vieux temps/ Et l'âge d'or, et le règne d'Astrée,/ Et les beaux jours de Saturne et de Rhée,/ Et le jardin de nos premiers parents;/ Moi je rends grâce a la nature sage/ Qui, pour mon bien, m'a fait naître en cet Âge/ Tant décrié par nos tristes frondeurs' (who no doubt included Rousseau).

4 'By the classical period of Greek thought the idea of a past Golden Age had been very widely replaced by the view of man's early condition as "brutish" and "disorderly"', W.K.C. Guthrie, In the Beginning (Methuen, London, 1957), p.95.
bestowed by Zeus 'to make political order possible and create a bond of friendship and union' (Prot. 322c). Men in general, granted such a boon, moved on from this point to make their own society in a co-operative effort not requiring a particular technē although each individual, by application, could improve himself.

Everything in this account of the original state of society encourages the belief that there is no need for one person to think for and rule over his less-gifted fellows. Society is in essence a good; without it, men would not long survive. Yet it is of course conceived of also as a remedy for previously existing evil. Man cannot, in practical terms, live alone, and once the procedure of political activity had been set in motion, it would go on, we may assume Protagoras to have believed, until it reached the sophistication of Athenian democracy with its own forms of decision-making and officeholding. In Protagoras' views as we have them from Plato, there is no concern with the forms of government that a society may adopt at various stages of its history.

We also find an account in Diodorus (which probably goes back to Democritus or one of his contemporaries, perhaps Protagoras) which shows man's primitive state as unenviable, and describes how need was the primary spur to mutual aid, and how associations formed in fear drew men's characters into sympathy with each other's ways. Necessity had the assistance of the hands, speech and clearness of mental vision (ψυχῆς ἀγχύσνοια). In a fragment that survives, Democritus says that homonoia, the social harmony that enables joint actions to be taken, has brought the greatest benefits to man in society (fr. 250 DK). Despite this Democritus also believes that auxapēkēa is important, and stresses that conviction and the persuasion of Logos are better guides to true virtue than law and necessity (fr. 181 DK). The latter are therefore second-best. Here, society and its institutions are not seen as leading to the ideal life for man. No detailed account of the actual development of political institutions is given, although from what we can

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5 Vlastos, in 'On the Pre-History in Diodorus', AJPh, 67 (1946), argues that the similarity between Diodorus' account of the emergence of society (with the stress on the role of necessity), and the fragments of Democritus on the subject — see e.g. fr. 144 DK — makes Democritus the likely source of Diod. 1.8 (pp.51-9).
surmise of Democritus' preferences he may well have granted the gifted individual a high place in government. It is unlikely, however, that he rated the ruling art of such significance and difficulty as to be reserved for exercise by one man, or a very few.

The Anonymus Iamblichii, which goes back perhaps to Democritus himself, perhaps to one of his contemporaries like Antiphon for its source, also found necessity the spur to the formation of society. This is a reflection of the awareness at this time of man's social nature, which made the idea of the completely self-sufficient primitive untenable, even if the social bond itself emerged only through tension and fear. Once societies have been formed, it is to the advantage of their members that law and justice prevail, and that there is not rule by one individual. Early benefits and inventions are not ascribed by Anonymus to one outstanding person or hero-figure. Far from the original monarch being replaced by the law when he eventually becomes corrupt or proves unsatisfactory, it is the monarch, that is the tyrant, who emerges from the breakdown of law and justice.

In the works of Critias such as we have them there is a more cynical account given of the origin of society's mechanisms. For Critias, justice was derived from the need to change men from a disorderly and beastlike state: ἢν χρόνος, ὄτ’ ἢν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος/ καὶ θηριώδης ἰδανός ἡ’ ὑπερήτης,/ ὦτ’ οὐδὲν άθλου οὔτε τούς ἐσβλοίη ἢν/ οὔτ’ αὖ κόλασμα τοῖς κακοῖς ἐγόνετο./ θάνειτάμοι δοκούσιν ἀνθρώπου νόμους/ θέσθαι κολαστάς, ῆνα δέκη τύραννος ἢ. (fr. 25 DK).

Plato revived the theory of the Golden Age, when he ascribed

6 See e.g. DK fr. 49: γαλετὸν ἀρχεσθαι ὕπο χερεύονος, and fr. 75: κρέσσου ἀρχεσθαι τοῖς ἀνοίκτοις ἡ’ ἀρχειν. Note also fr. 267: φύσει τὸ ἀρχεῖν οὐκήπολο τῷ κρέσσοιν.

7 He says, for instance, that πολλοὶ λόγοι μὴ μαθόντες ζωῆς κατὰ λόγου (DK fr. 53), which, as G.J.D. Aalders notes ('The Political Faith of Democritus', Mnemosyne, Ser. 4, 3 [1950], p.310), 'may imply that not only educated people are able to rule'.

8 On the 'Anonymus', see Andrew Thomas Cole, 'The Anonymus Iamblichii', HSCP, 65 (1961), 127-163, where the claims made for various fifth century figures are weighed. The writer concludes 'the evidence points to the work of an Athenian follower of Democritus, much more influenced than his master by late fifth century rhetoric — perhaps one of the second generation of Sophists' (p.155).
degeneration to the development of more involved social bonds. This is described in most detail in the Republic in the account of the natural city's decline into a fevered city. This view also found favour with the Cynics (whose opinions Plato may here be partly parodying), as well as with the more extreme Sophists who viewed the introduction of law as a restraint on gifted individuals (like themselves). Although the Cynics held the unordered, primitive life in such esteem, Antisthenes, the founder of the Cynic school, wrote Lives of Hercules and of Cyrus the Great, who were certainly seen as rulers in some sense and hence part of an ordered political system. Antisthenes' heir, Diogenes, appears to have cultivated the image of the noble primitive far more consistently than Antisthenes did. Many of his comments make it clear that the results of civilization were not, in general, of benefit to man, as he saw it, but we have no information on what form of government or social organization Diogenes might have considered 'natural'.

In the Politicus, Plato shows a transition from the Age of Kronos when men had no political institutions of their own, but 'a god was their shepherd' (271e), to the Age of Zeus where men had to develop their own social arrangements. This appears to put society as we know it in an unfavourable light, but Plato does suggest that the morally responsible individual may not have existed in the sheltered life under Kronos — and hence that initiative in developing various forms of social relationships may be one positive characteristic of civilization, however that is to be defined.


10 Höistad's conclusion after analysing our sources of information on Diogenes is that 'the historical Diogenes represented a perhaps extreme, Socratic type of asceticism which is consistent with corporate and social ideas of an idyllic and eudaemonistic character, with the emphasis largely on educational ends', Cynic Hero and Cynic King (Carl Bloms, Uppsala, 1948), p.138.

11 Politicus 272b-d. Εἰ μὲν τούτων ὁ τρόφιμος τοῦ Κρόνου, παρούσης αὐτοῦς οὐκότι πολλῆς σχολῆς καὶ δύναμεως πρὸς τὸ μὴ μόνον ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ καὶ θερίως ἄνδρῶν δύνασθαι συγγυνεσθαι, κατεργάτῳ τούτως σύμμαχον ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν, μετὰ τὰ θηρίων καὶ μετ᾽ ἄλληλων ὀμιλούντες, καὶ
acknowledges that the life of a man on his own is precarious, and that society is productive of good — although the good is to be imposed on man's essentially intractable nature. At the same time he again describes the simple life of the Age of Kronos, and suggests that if it is to exist once more, men will need godlike rulers resembling as much as possible the demigods who ruled them at that time. Plato's portrait of the shepherds left on the hills as survivors of one of the periodic world floods, and setting out to acquire the techniques of civilization (but comparative happy in their simple state [677a ff.]) is in striking contrast to the other portrait of primitive man as a flock tended by a deity (see 713c-714a). In the first case man himself progresses in the arts and skills of society, in the second early man is truly a child of nature with no moral autonomy.

On the whole, Plato would seem to have acknowledged the need for a stratified social structure and the exercise of power by some over others, but saw this in many ways as an unfortunate necessity. That the very nature of men prompted them to social intercourse is never explicitly admitted. Rather, he maintains that, with divine protection gone, men need to be organized to overcome the defects that their vices will introduce, and this requires a particular art. Under its guidance, society may prosper, but the social structure will remain unchanged. The Republic is of course the work where Plato's expectations of the few and distrust of the many are most dramatically expressed.

A social compact such as we find hinted at in the Republic in Glaucon's speech would have involved the conscious coming-together of people seeking their preservation by the surrender of certain rights,
and regarding this as the lesser of the two evils. Plato does not accept this account of the development of government, but clearly felt it was a challenge to be answered, and in fact his own version of the development of the simple society is in some respects similar to it.14

Those sections of the first speech against Aristogeiton (generally considered to be by Demosthenes) which have come in for close analysis on the grounds that they constitute passages from a lost work, On the Laws, are also significant for our theme because of the account given of society. The debate on the date of composition is still continuing, and while Gigante finds in it traces of Stoic and neo-Pythagorean influences impossible before the third century B.C., de Romilly sees nothing in it which would make a fourth century date impossible:

Il ne paraît pas exact de dire que l’éclectisme un peu livresque de certains passages soit impossible au IVe siècle: les discussions sur la loi étaient alors déjà anciennes; et beaucoup de notions avaient été pleinement élaborées dès avant Platon: la littérature du temps suffit à le prouver.15

In general, we may say that the ideas about society expressed here were by no means original in the fourth century, but reflect opinions that were widely taken up from the late fifth century onwards.

For the author, nature in man is inclined to evil, since it is irregular and particular to each individual. Laws, however, are stable and aim at the just, the fine and the useful (Cont. Aristog. 1.15-16). The word ἀτακτος generally employed, as de Romilly notes, to describe the life preceding organized and civilized existence16 suggests that the

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14 It is interesting to compare Rep. 358-9 with Milton's version of this compact and the attitudes this displays (in 'The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates'): 'No man who knows aught, can be so stupid to deny that all men naturally were born free, being the image and resemblance of God himself, and were, by privilege above all the creatures, born to command, and not to obey; and that they lived so, till [after the fall] they agreed by common league to bind each other from mutual injury, and jointly to defend themselves against any that gave disturbance or opposition to such agreement.'


16 de Romilly, La Loi, p.165.
writer sees no special advantages in primitive life, and does not consider that it offers any pattern of society to be imitated by his contemporaries. Man's emergence into a life of law and order is not attributed to any one cause. Divine intervention, the decision of the wise or the agreement of the many are all possibilities suggested. A political position derived from this theory could therefore take a variety of forms and support the rule of an elite or of the Athenian democracy with equal consistency. What is certain is that, as individuals, men cannot be truly self-ruling.

To complete this brief survey of attitudes to society expressed before the rise of theories of kingship, we may summarize Aristotle's views. He is not concerned to present to us an historical or mythical Golden Age, but is more interested in describing the unchangeable social units of family and state. Only incidentally does he comment that men were originally ruled by kings (Pol. 1252b). Most important, therefore, for Aristotle is the fact that it is natural for man to live in society. His approach to government springs from this belief, except for occasional inconsistencies.

We are now in a position to inspect, firstly, the works of Isocrates and Xenophon to determine the extent to which the problems of society and its structures appear as important, and to see how their attitudes on kingship fit into the social framework they erect, or are at odds with it.

ISOCRATES

Isocrates does not indulge in the more imaginative reconstructions of early society, some instances of which we have just given. But he too makes certain assumptions on the manner in which man acquired the skills of civilization, confining his attention, for the most part, to the actions of the Athenians. Their united efforts brought about the kind of life enjoyed by the men of Isocrates' own day, and as de Romilly notes, 'non seulement la patrie donne le jour aux citoyens, mais elle les élève'.\textsuperscript{17} This civilization came about because the city of Athens

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ib.}, p.131.
demonstrated not only a love of the gods, but also a love of men, for Athenian citizens did not grudge sharing this wonderful gift of ordered life with others (Paneg. 29).

Isocrates tends to describe the development of society in a very specific way, not caring to present any general view of mankind, but wishing simply to account for the prestige of Athens, although occasionally he relates his remarks to a universal context. This is so, for example, when he attributes to 'philosophy' the discovery and development of the civilizing gifts, education in affairs, and the cultivation of gentle manners (Paneg. 47). Almost immediately this becomes a source of confusion in Isocrates' thought. 'Power of speech', the main element in philosophy as he defines it, is the particular and natural possession of men, but at the same time 'good and skilled powers of speech' are outside the scope of the ordinary people (τοὺς φαύλους) (Paneg. 48).

Since this is so, the eulogies made in praise of Logos and its effects must be seen as recommending a particular form for the political institutions that depend on these qualities, and for relations in society in general. When we recollect that Logos alone distinguishes man from the beasts, we can see how control of society in Isocrates' view could rightly be concentrated in those who were gifted with the art of persuasion. Mankind 'did not start out with the advantages presently enjoyed, but gradually joined together to bring this way of life into being' (Paneg. 32). The change from living in the manner of the beasts (τὸ ἡπιωτῶς ζῆν) to forming these human societies with their laws and crafts was due to the Logos (which gave decrees on what was just and unjust, fair and base) and not to humanity as a whole (Νίο. 6-7).

Logos and the law appeared simultaneously when men began to gather together in cities (Antid. 82) but it is the former in which Isocrates has most faith. In this sense we may say: 'Il n'est pas contre la loi: simplement, il regarde par-delà.' What is important is that man has progressed beyond the animal-like stage without needing divine

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18 It corresponds to the impulse to civilization provided by χρευα in Diodorus' thought. See Diodorus 1.8.
19 De Romilly, La Loi, p.185.
assistance, just as Protagoras appears to have implied in mythic form, but for the latter the political virtue which proceeds only by way of justice and wisdom must be shared by all men, for otherwise states could not exist. Isocrates makes no such avowal. Neither does he construct a primitive Golden Age or sigh after a lost state of innocence, despite his belief in the decadence of his own society.

Instead he recalls that in the early days of Athens’ history neither oligarchies nor democracies were known, but monarchies governed the barbaric races and all the Hellenic states. Athens itself was most excellently governed by the ancestors of its present citizens who 'were as much superior to those who rule with absolute power as the wisest and gentlest of mankind may be said to excel the wildest and most savage of beasts' (Panath. 119-121). Their excellence consisted in the fact that they trained the multitude in the ways of virtue and justice and great sobriety. When Isocrates refers to a specific ruler, Theseus, he makes the same point. It was this particular individual who was responsible for collecting the inhabitants of Attica together and setting them free to compete with each other in virtue. He thus showed them that ῥάδων ἔστιν ἀμα τυραννείν καὶ μηδὲν χειρον διακελόν τῶν εξ ἔσου πολιτευομένων (Hel. 34). The 'good old days' of Athens are then a paradigm for political life, and at that time men believed that the sole rule of an individual was more reliable and more truly shared than democratic rule over themselves (Hel. 36). This is highlighted by the gloomy account of pre-civilized life (that is, before Theseus), when some sought to enslave others and rule them by force, and themselves lived dangerously with enemies within and without (Hel. 32).

Part of the difficulty of obtaining a clear view of Isocrates’ attitude to society and his belief about the part that the individual should play in it occurs because, as Mathieu notes 'il aime à personifier ses idées politiques en un héros ancien, Héraclès, Agamemnon ou Thésée'. This personification shows us instances of Logos in action and incorporated in particular people, and is at odds with his assumptions elsewhere of a 'wide dispersal of political areté'.

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21 E.g. in Paneg. 28, 105-6, but cf. Nic. 15-16. The phrase is from
The best period of government of historical times, Isocrates believed, was in the pre-Marathon past of Athens and Sparta when the ruling citizens did not neglect the common good nor exploit their own advantage by disregarding the interests of others. 'They made it their care because it was theirs but rightly kept their hands from what was not' (Paneg. 76). Men in those days were frugal and incorruptible (Areop. 24ff.). This, of course, was a time when, if Athens was no longer ruled by one man, still only a few outstanding citizens made the political decisions. This means that what corresponded to the Golden Age for Isocrates was not a time without law or government: only a few laws were needed, however, as agreement in a few principles will bring accord on private and public matters (Paneg. 78).

This idyllic state was therefore necessarily strongly hierarchical, and is presented nostalgically by Isocrates. The simple life—though not too simple for the wealthy few, we may assume—was presided over by simple government, but power and rule did most certainly exist. Each man, Isocrates implies, knew his place, and the poor depended on the beneficence of the rich, instead of making claim to a share of their wealth as a citizen's right. The duties of a ruler in this situation would not include becoming deeply involved in changing the structure of the society of which he was the head, or, even, of adapting himself to it. His tasks, therefore, would have to lie elsewhere.

XENOPHON

Xenophon has little interest in any of his works, except the Memorabilia, in making general statements on the nature of man, or the sorts of societies he should form, or in speculating on the origins of human institutions. The assumptions on which he proceeds are, however, fairly clear. He wishes to restore the virtues of the landowners in the


Cf. Paneg. 77: οὐδὲ τὰς ἁρασύτητας τὰς ἄλληλων ἐξῆλθαν, οὐδὲ τὰς τόλμας τὰς αὐτῶν ἔκακουν, ἀλλὰ δελνύτερον μὲν ἐνύμφετον εἰςαί κακῶς ὕπο τῶν πολιτῶν ἀκούειν ἢ καλῶς ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἀκοδήγηκεν, μᾶλλον δ' ἡχύνουτ' ἐπὶ τοῖς κοινοῖς ἁμαρτήμασιν ἢ νῦν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐδώκες τοῖς σφετέροις αὐτῶν.
political arena, 'et c'est pourquoi il ne peut éprouver que de la méfiance à l’égard des utopies de la République de Platon'.

He has noted, to be sure, the instability of the forms of government men have devised, reflected on the number of monarchies and oligarchies destroyed by popular factions and on the fragility of tyrannies, and found it strange that animals are so readily taught to obey their masters, when man is not (Cyr. 1.1.3). He believes that the problem may be solved if, in fact, animal life is taken as a model.

When Xenophon turns to the past in disillusionment with the present, he sees, not the Age of Gold, but Socrates — and Socrates looking to the ideal of a stable society, embodied to some extent in Sparta, but having existed also in Athens' past: 24 Τοιγαροδὴν πολλῶν μὲν μεταναστάσεων ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι γεγονωσι (the Athenians) διέμεναν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν, πολλοὶ δὲ ύπὲρ δικαίων ἀντιλέγοντες ἐκέτρεον ἐκεῖνοις, πολλοὶ δὲ ὑπὸ κρειττόνων ὑμβριζόμενοι κατέφευγον πρὸς ἐκεῖνους. (Mem. 3.5.12).

When Aristippus in the Memorabilia proclaims his belief that the life of the self-sufficient man is best, Xenophon comes close to putting forward through the mouth of Socrates a view of human nature which contradicts this anti-social outlook. There is, Socrates says, no middle road by which one can avoid ruling or being ruled, and simply pursue one's own freedom (Mem. 2.1.11ff.). Interestingly enough, the answer to Aristippus takes the form of the allegory of Prodicus on Hercules' choice between virtue and vice. Co-operation in the common good is the keynote of one speech, and shows the right way to restore the Athenians to their former position (Mem. 3.5.16). 25 Acknowledging

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24 At the end of his life 'doutant de l’avenir, déçu par le présent, il finit par se retourner vers le passé, et s’il y trouve, au lieu de l’Age d’or, l’injuste condamnation de Socrate, du moins aperçoit – il une dernière fois la physionomie de l’homme incompris d’Athènes ... pieux, juste, tempérant, [etc.]' (ib., p.493).

25 πότε δὲ οὔτω πείσονται τοῖς ἀρχούσιν, οὐ καὶ ἀγάλλονται ἐπὶ τῇ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀρχώντων; ἢ πότε οὔτως ὁμοθεσοῦσιν, οὐ γε ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ συνεργεῖν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ συμφέροντα ἐπηρεάζοντο ἀλλήλους καὶ θεονοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, μάλιστα δὲ πάντων ἐν τῇ ταῖς ὕδαις συνδόσι καὶ τοῖς κοιναῖς διαφέρονται καὶ πλείστας δικαίως ἀλλήλους ὑλικοὺς καὶ προαιροῦμεν μᾶλλον οὗτω κερδαίνειν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων ἡ συνωφελούσις αὐτοῖς, τοῖς δὲ κοινοῖς ὧσπερ ἀλλοτρίως χρώμενοι περὶ τούτων αὐ μάχονται καὶ ταῖς εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα δυνάμει μᾶλλονα χαίρουσιν;
the significance of government, Socrates says a man must have friends to help him make a career in public life (Mem. 2.6.26).

Such community participation in affairs of common interest is not, however, fully worked out — and this is even more true of the Cyropaedia where the portraits of Cyrus and his friends are not supplemented by information on the public and regular administrative side of government. The justification for this emphasis in Xenophon's work is the importance for him of the individual, especially the ruling individual, in the state. The way in which the ruler relates to others is through the rewards he offers, and as Skard notes:

sonst hat ... die ἐυρεγέτης-Idee, die Kyros vertritt, mit den griechischen Anschauungen keine Verwandtschaft; es ist durchaus ein ἐυρεγετεῖν τοὺς φίλους, nicht ἐυρεγετεῖν τὴν πόλιν.26

The same point is made in another way by Höistad, stressing that 'the monarchic ideal which Xenophon constructs on this foundation necessarily remains on the plane of individual ethics without political or social facets'.27

However, Xenophon has something to say about the development of society and the important elements in it in the Memorabilia, where in the fourth book he describes the logismos by means of which men consider, and arrive at perception, and learn through remembering. This, too, is the source of the devices which increase enjoyment in life and ward off evil (Mem. 4.3.11). Common life, also, develops from the power of expression, along with laws and political activity (Mem. 4.3.12). We would like to know more about the logismos and its role, but Xenophon does not elaborate on these few comments. He is more at home describing the efficacy of mutual help in social relations at the direct level, using the analogy of the hands and the feet.28 Man's assistance to his

26 Eiliv Skard, Zwei religiös-politische Begriffe: Euergetes-Concordia (Dybwad, Oslo, 1932), p.50.
27 Höistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King, p.79.
28 See Mem. 2.3.18-19: νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη, διάκεισθαι, ὅσπερ εἰ τῷ χείρε, δές ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ τῷ συλλαμβάνειν ἄλληλου ἑποίησεν, ἀφεμένῳ τούτῳ τράποντο πρὸς τὸ διακωλύειν ἄλληλα, ἦ εἰ τῷ εἶδος θεοῦ μονὴ ρητολογίαις τρόπος τὸ συνεργεῖται ἄλληλον, ἀμελείαν τούτου ἐπιδοξοῖς ἄλληλος. οὐχ ᾧν πολλὴ ἀρετὰ ἐν καὶ κακοδαιμονία τοῦς ἐπὶ ὕψεις ρητολογίας ἐπὶ βλάβῃ κρήνησει;
neighbour results from the social instinct, but it is balanced by a
hostile feeling which is just as natural: φύσει γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ
ἀνθρώποι τὰ μὲν φιλικά· δέονται τε γὰρ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἑλεοῦσι καὶ
συνεργοῦντες ὡφελοῦσι καὶ τοῦτο συνιέντες χάριν ἔχουσιν ἀλλήλους· τὰ δὲ
πολεμικά (2.6.21).

Xenophon's wish is that the co-operative instinct will prevail
among men, since ἄνευ ... ὀμονοίας οὔτ' ἄν πόλεως ἢ πολιτευθείη, οὔτ'
οίκος καλὸς οἰκήθει (Mem. 4.4.16). As an ex-military commander on whom
the responsibility of leading the Greeks to safety in the Anabasis had
fallen, he places a high value on order in every sphere of life,
regarding war, agriculture and politics as similar in this respect: ἔστι
δ' οὔθεν οὔτως ... οὔτ' εὔχρηστον οὔτε καλὸν ἀνθρώπος ὡς τάξις (Thec.
8.3). It is therefore understandable that the leader or leaders in any
group will have, and be expected to have, a great influence on those
under them. This is for Xenophon the only way in which a society can
function, even at the level of the household. He is fundamentally
pessimistic about the ability of the average person to function
autonomously. The closest one can come to the ideal life is by living
simply, in the manner of Socrates. Xenophon repeatedly praises him for
his qualities of frugality and hardihood. The self-sufficiency that
Socrates displayed, even though he is himself reported as criticizing
the form it took in Aristippus, was of such a high order that he was a
fine example of his own dictum that 'to want nothing is to resemble the
gods' (Mem. 1.6.10).

In some ways, Xenophon's social analysis always remains superficial,
and, as Höistad points out:

It is remarkable that Xenophon, who as a military expert might
have been expected to appreciate that a totality is something
which transcends a mere aggregate of individuals, in the
Cyropædia never evolves the idea of the state, 29
but regards society more as a group of individuals.

Neither Isocrates nor Xenophon took such an interest in the nature
of society as to work out a coherent approach for examining its
constituent parts or analysing its origins and the impulses that

29 Cynic Hero and Cynic King, p.80.
preserved it, as some of their predecessors and contemporaries did. These two writers were unlikely to find in monarchy a form of government that conflicted with any cherished values of the state as they knew it. When they described kingship under its various facets, we may surmise that their attention would not be focussed on questions of actual political and social relevance.

ARISTEAS

The interests of Aristeas, the next writer whose work concerns us, were somewhat different, but did they include society as a complex functioning unit?

The writer of the letter to Philocrates does not refer to the Jewish equivalent of the Age of Gold in any of his work, nor does he put forward — as he has no occasion to — any account of life in the past, whether innocent or brutish. Of the present structure of society he has little to say. Nevertheless in the account of the justification of the Law by Eleazar it is stated that the whole reason for prescriptions about food and animals is to bring about justice and the habit of justice in social life (169).

In the questions and answers of the symposia section of the letter, however, of most concern is the king's personal behaviour, and his relations with his subjects seem important only to the extent that they provide instances of this. Certainly the king is expected to display benevolence and mercy to his subjects, and he is advised to pay special attention to the various ethnic groups in his kingdom. The philosophy behind the letter, however, as Schubart remarks 'viel mehr den einzelnen Menschen als die Gemeinschaft in Volk und Staat betrachtet.'

As an individual the king is quite clearly simply a man (263), so that however great the gap between ruler and ruled, it is of degree and not of kind. There are not two kinds of men, one fitted for ruling, one for being ruled.

The most far-reaching comment on men in general is given in answer

to the question 'why does virtue not receive a good welcome from most of mankind?'. The sage replies that this is because all men are by nature intemperate and have a penchant for pleasure, whence come naturally injustice and the wave of greed (277). Such a gloomy view of man in the mass has inevitably an influence on one's outlook on society and its organization. Men for their own good must, it seems, be controlled from above — which means imposition of standards by earthly rulers for most, and deference to divine standards by the ruler.

HELLENISTIC ATTITUDES

The Stoics, despite the influence on them of Cynic doctrine, seem always to have retained a belief in man's social nature.31 Diogenes Laertius, at any rate, reports of them that they said the wise man would not live in solitude: κοινωνικός γὰρ φύσει καὶ πρακτικός (D.L. 7.123). Goodness and sociability go hand in hand, so that only the wise man may be able to live in the Politeia envisaged by Zeno (see D.L. 7.33).

'Ομολογία is the basis of true friendship, and Ὀμόνοια as for the neo-Pythagoreans is essential for the welfare of any community (D.L. 7.124, SVF 1.263). Baldry claims that Zeno in his Republic with its ideal conditions was setting forth a vision of what might be and not describing an idyllic past, despite the primitive nature of some of the regulations.32 This does not mean that the early Stoics did not believe that their ancestors lived in a way more appropriate to the wise (who considered all but the good 'indifferent') than the sophisticated contemporary existence.33 One later Stoic, at least, Posidonius,

31 'Aussi opposé à l'individualisme qu'on peut l'être, apprenant à l'homme à se considérer non comme une simple partie (μέρος), mais comme un membre (μέλος) d'un vaste organisme social, où chacun a pour devoir de s'intéresser au perfectionnement des autres, Zénon donne à l'esprit purement négatif et frondeur du cynisme un espoir positif en même temps qu'un caractère philanthropique', J. Bidez, 'La Cité du Monde et la Cité du Soleil chez les Stoïciens', BAB (1932), pp.270-1.


33 As Bidez claims, though with some exaggeration, 'l'idéal du Portique, d'après les formules de Zénon du moins, nous ramènerait à une sorte d'âge d'or où le règne absolu de la Raison nous dispenserait d'avoir aucun autre droit que le droit naturel', Bidez, 'La Cité du Monde', p.272. This was of course theory, not practice. He also
concerned himself with theories of society's origin, and ascribed to philosophers both the political and the technical discoveries that made civilization possible (Sen. Ep. 90.5,7). This attitude clearly was not one involving praise of the simple life, and proves that the Stoic ideas on society as on other matters did not stand still after Zeno.

From the beginning, however, Stoic social theory had been more than simple advocacy of a primitive way of life; essential to it was belief that there were two kinds of men, the good and the base (see SVF 1.216). The good, obviously a minority, are blessed in every way and Stoics believe φίλων ἐν μόνοις τοῖς σπουδαῖοις εὐναυ, διὰ τὴν ὁμολόγησα (D.L. 7.124). The good and wise seem then to form a community only with each other. Their relation to the evil men making up the majority of humanity could only be as sovereign. Thus what looks at first glance like an assumption of the equal right of all to live as they please appears on closer inspection to do little to encourage belief in the equality of all men or to forward the claims of all to participate in government. The 'natural' man is not as common as one might expect.

To Polybius no philosophical label can properly be attached, but he does present a view of society in Book Six of his history into which the position of the monarch is also fitted, despite his interest in the mixed constitution of the Romans. He believes that the human race has already been destroyed many times. Social groups formed from the

comments, with similar lack of precision, 'toujours, depuis l'époque où Zénon se formait chez le cynique Crates jusqu'au siècle d'Épictète, les Stoïciens, dans leurs cités idéales, ont cherché un retour à l'état de nature' ('La Cité du Monde', p.287).

34 'The theory that there was a great difference in capacity among various individuals and that responsibility for the good of the whole should be placed upon those of greater capacity may have been accepted by the Stoics generally. At any rate it was held by Posidonius', Margaret E. Reesor, *The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa* (Augustin, New York, 1951), p.54.

35 F.W. Walbank, *Polybius on the Roman Constitution*, CQ, 37 (1943), refers to his reaching 'a frame of mind in which he recognized in the Stoic anacyclosis a more adequate explanation [of the Roman constitution's] development than in the mixed constitution of Dicaearchus' (p.88), although T.A. Sinclair, *A History of Greek Political Thought* (2nd ed., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967), claims that 'he betrays no real knowledge of Stoic doctrine and it would be a mistake to attach a label to him or to expect much philosophy from him' (p.272).
survivors of cataclysms were united simply because their weakness made joint action necessary. Virtue was not innate, but emerged as men learnt to use their reason and make decisions about what kind of conduct would benefit and what harm the community (6.6.4ff.). Naturally the first ruler was the strongest man, but sociability and true kingship developed together (6.5.10). Such kingship was monarchy based on the reason and judgement of the ruler. Polybius therefore saw the rule of one man as an off-shoot of the advance of society, though he did not expect it to endure unchanged in any community. What is important is his contractual view of all social groups and his pragmatic approach to the question of the best type of government; a king's position comes about only because he is of use to his fellows. He is therefore firmly embedded in his society, unlike his position in much of the theory of society we have examined so far.

Because Polybius has so few philosophical presuppositions, he can afford to consider the question of society empirically, and come to a different conclusion from the theorists'. Yet even he shows an interest in the personality of the ruler which partly draws his attention from the complex interrelationship of ruler and society.

For Epicurus and his followers, also, society was a product of an agreement, since 'there never was an absolute justice' (D.L. 10.150). So only by using the capacity to make covenants (συνθήκες) with one another for their mutual preservation can people know justice or injustice (ib.). Self-sufficiency within this framework is each individual's best chance of happiness. An elite of the wise is still assumed, but such an elite is unlikely to have anything to do with public life (see fr. LVIII and fragments 81 and 87 Bailey). There is no logical relationship between the social outlook of the Epicureans and any particular form of government. 'Friendship' for them had no political meaning, and if society was all, it was the small intimate society of kindred spirits.

If the neo-Pythagorean writers on kingship took notice of the views of Archytas (or his later imitator and namesake), they would have been aware that he had definite views of the ideal society. The best condition for a polis is to be self-sufficient (p.86). This is actually a call for a Spartan existence, but the social implications are not
worked out. Education in the society's customs inculcates desirable social habits, bringing about harmony (p.88).

For Ecphantus, the most metaphysically inclined of our writers, man has achieved the highest development among the animals on earth, with the king being as it were the summit of human achievement (p.272 and p.244). The most significant fact about men is the existence among them, as in all the universe, of ψυλλύα (see esp. p.279). The ψυλλύα existing in political societies is a faint reflection of the ὑμόνοον of the universe (p.275 and cf. Euryphemus περὶ Βάσου, V, pp.914-5).

The independent, direct imitation of the deity with no need of obedience, that quality so close to necessity, is the best way for mortals to achieve virtue (pp.277-8). One obvious way for men to come to self-reliance is for them to reduce the number of their wants, and this Ecphantus, like Archytas, advocates (p.279). This should abolish the need for government, but since men are weak, the principle of rule and subordination must come into play, and 'nothing unruled can be found' (p.274).

Diotogenes is concerned to show how the good man (i.e. the true king in particular) differs from unreasoning animals (p.266) and he too is interested in the harmony of the earthly rule (pp.264-5). For this to come about, strangely enough, the king must be unlike other men, since he has to impose harmony from above (7b.). Like Ecphantus, Diotogenes and Sthenidas stress the need for rule and subordination throughout the cosmos (see esp. p.265 and p.271), but for Diotogenes justice is the basis of the harmony that results (p.269 and p.264), although we are not told what this justice implies for the subjects, since it seems to be a kingly rather than a human quality. The social doctrine of all these works has then no meaning apart from the theory of kingship in which it is embedded.

CICERO

The theoretical basis of Cicero's attitude to society and its origins is inextricably linked with his attitudes as a Roman politician, but we can adduce a certain consistency of belief behind the shifts and
argumenta ad hominem of his career. Thus he puts forward with considerable persuasiveness a view, owing much to the Stoics, which argues for the natural sociability of man, especially the wise man. This quality derives both from traits man shares with the gods, and from the purposes for which men come together. In the first book of the De Officiis, Cicero claims society is founded on justice and service, and although desire for self-preservation and propagation of the species is strong in man as in the animals, the capacity to look to the future and plan ahead makes co-operation among humans more permanent (De Off. 1.11). Cicero in the De Republica is at pains to stress that the most powerful impulse to association in primitive man was not utilitarian (the wish for mutual protection) but because there is naturalis quaedam hominum quasi congregatio (De Rep. 1.39). Cicero elaborates on this by saying what man is not: non est enim singulare nec solívagum genus hoc (ib.), no doubt having in mind here those such as the Epicureans whose theories of social origins tended to see little positive value in the larger social units.

In the De Legibus Cicero also sets forth the rationale behind a society governed by law when he describes men as bound together naturali quaedam indulgentia et benivolentia, tum etiam societate iuris (De Leg. 1.35). This natural love for one's fellow also appears in the De Finibus (e.g. 3.63). We can agree with Reesor that society as shown here is based on three fundamental aspects of man, that he is by nature a social animal, that he feels a natural affection for his fellow men, and shares with them certain fundamental capacities.

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36 This emphasis probably derives partly from Panaetius. See Maximilian Schäfer, 'Des Panaitios ἄνηφρος ὄρχως bei Cicero', Gymnasium, 67 (1960), p.508: 'Wir befinden uns also mit diesen Zusammenhängen zutiefst in panaitianischem Denken und sehen ihn hie[r]bei in Gegnerschaft zu einer auch von Polybios (VI 5) vertretenen und von Epikurs Schule verfochtenen Ansicht, die erste Ursache des Sichzusammentuns mit andern sei ein Schwächegefühl wie bei Tieren, die sich einem stärkeren Leiter als Führer und Schützer der Herde unterstellen.'

37 Cf. Laelius 27: a natura mihi videtur potius quam indigentia orta amicitia, applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi, quam cogitatione quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura.

38 Margaret Reesor, The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa, p.52.
Whom, though, does Cicero hold responsible for the development of society from its primitive state? This, after all, for many thinkers is the most important question to be asked about society, and on the answer they give to this depends their subsequent theoretical position. We need then to know if Cicero's account is one that shows a true concern for the integration of men into an harmonious state which uses the abilities of all.

The *De Inventione* puts before us a *magnus vir et sapiens* whose knowledge of the human potential leads him to persuade, *ratione*, other men, who, through the use of *ratio* and *oratio* become civilized (*De Inv.* 1.2). In the *Pro Sestio* Cicero assumes that those *primi virtute et consilio praestanti* brought men together and led them from their savagery to justice and gentleness, and the comforts of town life (*Pro Sest.* 91). In the *Tusculan Disputations* the philosophers were the people who first created civilization (*Tusc. Disp.* 5.5; cf. 1.62). Not all men therefore were responsible for the emergence from barbarism. Rather, it was the work of an elite, however defined. Cicero obviously does not, however, believe that those excelling in force and strength began the process — differing in this respect from Polybius, for example.

In whatever guise society appears, speech is for Cicero crucial to its foundation. This is an obvious agent for change and communication, but Cicero makes it much more. We notice how Isocrates (*Ant.* 235) equates 'sophist' with 'sage' and how Cicero similarly is quick to identify *eloquentia* with *sapientia* (cf. *De inv.* 1.5). This collocation of wisdom and oratory was, of course, common in the Hellenistic age.39

He constantly refers to the fact that language is the one advantage men possess over the animals (see e.g. *De Orat.* 1.32) and asserts through the mouthpiece of Crassus that no other force than human eloquence could have been strong enough aut dispersos homines unum in locum congregare aut a fera agrestique vita ad hunc humanum cultum civilis etque deducere aut iam constitutis civitatibus leges iudicia iura describere (*De Orat.* 1.33). Speech is again the unifying force in the discussion on the origin of society at the beginning of the third book of the *De Republica*: (ratio) homines antea dissociatos iucundissimo inter se sermonis vinculo

conligavit (De Rep. 3.3) and when Cicero is describing man's debt to Providence in the De Natura Deorum, he waxes eloquent on the power of speech 'which has bound us together in the bonds of justice, law and citizenship. It has raised us from a life of brutal savagery' (Nat. Deor. 2.148). In the De Legibus, the vis orationis is conciliatrix humanae maxime societatis (De Leg. 1.27).

Speech is one important expression of ratio. It gives man the ability to extend the influence of his mind over others posse dicendo tenere hominum coetus mentes alicere etc., but significantly Cicero considers that this gift, which nature has granted to all, appears fully developed in very few (De Orat. 1.30). Because of the facts of man's nature, certain structures and attitudes have grown up: appareat a natura ipsa, ut eos quos genuerimus amemus, impelli. Ex hoc nascitur ut etiam communis hominem inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videre (De Fin. 3.62-3). What then are the principles behind existing societies and governments? Firstly, their vinculum is ratio et oratio, quae docendo discedendo, communicando disceptando iudicando conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate (De Off. 1.50). The definition of man given in the De Legibus shows the same emphasis: animal hoc providum sagax multiplex acutum memor plenum rationis et consilii (De Leg. 1.22). The orator combining ratio and oratio in himself can therefore claim to be of considerable importance to the state. The individuals who are the medium of transmission of ratio are not visualized as being in any sense detached from the society they are.

40 IAM vero domina rerum ... eloquendi vis quam est praeclara quamque divina: quae primum efficit ut et ea quae ignoramus disceder et ea quae scimus alios docere possimus; deinde hac cohortarum hac persuademus, hac consolamur affectos hac deducimus perterritos a timore, hac gestientes comprimimus hac cupiditatem iracundiasque restinguimus, haec nos iuris legum urbiu societate devinxit, haec a vita inmani et fera segregavit.

41 'Genauer führt I 50 aus, wie ratio et oratio die menschliche Gemeinschaft binden. Mit ratio et oratio gibt Cicero oft das Wort λόγος wieder ... und bezeichnet damit richtig dessen beide Seiten, den λόγος ἐνδυδέος und den προφορικός ... Die Redner feiern seit Isokrates Nik. 5 und Antid. 254 den Logos als Gründer der staalichen Gemeinschaft ... und denken dabei an die Rede, die Überredung; hier schwebt Cicero mit Panaftios zunächst die Sprache als Verständigungsmittel vor (vgl. ND. II 148)', Pohlenz, Antikes Führertum, p.19, note 1 (Teubner,1934, reprinted Hakkert, Amsterdam, 1967).
affecting, and the society itself is just as necessary as they are in any developments: urbes vero sine hominum coetu non potuissent nec aedificari nec frequentari (De Off. 2.15).

Cicero has no fear of the material benefits of civilized life, as some of the Stoics he followed did. In De Officiis 2.60, he perfunctorily criticized extravagant expenditure, but much more in character is his account of how men have laboured together to produce all the comforts and conveniences of society. Such things are impossible sine hominum labore et manu (see 2.12-15 on this theme). Only communis vita, teaching men to seek help from each other, could have brought about protection from the elements. Cicero includes the working of metals, importing and exporting goods, ductus aquarum, derivationes fluminum, agrorum irigationes, moles oppositas fluatibus, portus manu factos (2.14) among the benefits of society, thereby accepting that a complicated and sophisticated life is a necessary part of the fully human personality. Even if early man could have done without a political order because of his few wants, as Plato, for example, had suggested in describing his first polis, obviously such a civilization as Cicero depicts could not.

One inevitable accompaniment of this kind of life is a social structure that arranges for the few to possess the highest works of men's hand and mind and the many to labour for the former select group. It is not therefore so surprising to find Cicero suggesting an alternative reason for the development of society to that of natural instinct: hanc ... ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, res publicae civitatisque constituta sunt (De Off. 2.73).42 To avoid appearing too inconsistent, Cicero explains: etsi ducem natura congregabantur homines, tamen spe custodiae rerum suarum urbi praesidii quaerabant (ib.).

Cicero has little hesitation in dividing men up into those who should rule and those who should obey. He shows the wisdom of choosing 'the best' to preserve the state: praesertim cum hoc natura tulerit,

42 'With all the fervour of a true Roman, Cicero believed that the mission of his country was to make the world safe for property', Charles Norris Cochrane in Christianity and Classical Culture (Oxford University Press, London, 1957 paperback reprint of 1944 edition), p.45.
non solum ut summi virtute et animo praeesse inbecillioribus, sed ut hi
etiam parere summis velit (De Rep. 1.51, cf. 3.36). The past, as the
time of the foundation of the first society, can now be brought in to
appear in one respect at least as a model for the present. The earliest
form of government was monarchical, and the kings were the men who were
most just and most wise. So long as most rulers were of this kind, we
may infer, laws were unnecessary (see De Leg. 3.4).43 Even if virtuous
rulers are no longer as plentiful as once they were, they are still to
be hoped for, since the exercise of imperium is essential.

When Cicero deals with questions on the nature of government, it is
this aspect rather than the social interrelationships that he brings
into prominence, despite his interest in analysing man as a social
animal. However, he never quite gives up his vision of the society
where all the elements work together, for he is always ready to make
vigorous protest against the self-sufficient individual who imagines
that he can do without his fellows: nec verum est, quod dicitur a
quibusdam, propter necessitatem vitae, quod ea, quae natura desiderat,
consequi sine aliis atque efficere non possemus, idcirco initiam esse cum
hominibus communitatem et societatem (De Off. 1.158).

We should nonetheless compare with this his description of the out­
standing man, who by his own gifts brings about harmony in the society,
not leaving this to his fellows' natural sociability (De Rep. 2.69).
Cicero's political outlook was not, of course, strictly pro-monarchical
by any means, but his social theory could certainly be brought to accord
with this form. He believed that rule was itself a good and if his
discussion on government covered all three forms of government and
finally showed a mixed form triumphant, this does not mean that the
figure of the princeps, however defined, ever disappears from view in
Cicero's writings on political theory.

PHILO

Philo's view of society almost always appears in the framework of

43 Whether men were obeying the best of their kind or the laws,
imperium was necessary at all levels (see De Leg. 3.3).
his view of the universe, and this is a universe where, far more clearly than is the case with the Stoics for example, who in many ways shared Philo's political views, the necessity for rule is ever present. The lawgiver, Philo explains, gives an exordium which excites our admiration, and which consists of an account of creation implying that 'the World is in harmony with the Law and the Law with the World' (Opif. 3) and that 'the man who observes the Law is by this fact a citizen of the world' (ib.). The idea of interaction between the human and the divine that is developed, in various places, along with the theory that man, in his non-corporal nature, is an imitation of the Word of God, demands a particular view of man's nature and society. Only a society which mirrors the divine order is acceptable or, even, truly human.

The ideal society which for Philo parallels the Greek Age of Gold, is in one sense that of the first man, associated with God but at the same time wise and a king in his own right, exercising his dominion over the rest of creation (Opif. 148). But what it was possible to state as natural to the first man cannot be affirmed in the same unqualified way for his descendants: 'As generation follows generation the powers and qualities of body and soul which men receive become feeble' (Opif. 141). For man the constitution can no longer be simply nature's right reason (ὁ τῆς φύσεως ὀρθὸς λόγος, Opif. 143) but needs the addition of a human artificial arrangement (see e.g. Jos. 31).

Although Philo describes the existence of the first man in his solitary state in idyllic terms, he still considers sociability to be part of man's nature. Man is ἀγελαστικῶς καὶ σύννομον ἐφὼν, 'and by nature ordered to harmony and social intercourse' (ἡ φύσις γεννησασα [man] πρὸς ὀμόνοιαν καὶ κοινωνίαν ἐκάλεσε, Dec. 132). This is brought about by the Logos which brings men together into a harmony and mixture of customs (ib.). Nevertheless, man as he is also needs some external form of government, and Philo has no wish to provoke the Roman authorities by appearing to decry rule as such. The need for caution naturally tends to make his remarks on government very general, but at the same time as he describes political structures, he lets us see the drawbacks of their 'superadded' elements. Only rule that can be ascribed directly to the intervention of God, as was the case with the patriarchs' power, can be of real, worthwhile significance.
The type of government actually adopted hardly matters to Philo, and certainly we find no exposition of the different forms that have developed. Instead democracy is described in such a way that the term can have little political meaning in the strict sense. It may appear as the opposite of both mob-rule or tyranny (Agr. 45-6) and may also describe government by a 'ruler and guide' for the 'congregation' of the herd (Agr. 45). Abraham's attack on the nine kings can be described as due to his ambition to establish in the soul 'democracy, the best of constitutions, instead of the rule of tyrants and overlords, and legality and justice instead of lawlessness and injustice' (Abr. 242). The rule of each nation in turn over all the others can even be described as 'democratic' and 'best' (Immut. 176).

That order which is equality ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίᾳ, κυριότατα φάναι, κόσμου ἐστὶν, ἐν δὲ ἄστεαυν ἡ οὐνομασία καὶ πολιτείαν ἀριστή δημοκρατία, ἐν τε αὖ σώμασιν ὑγεία καὶ ἐν φυχαῖς καλοκάγαθρα (Spec. Leg. 4.237). Repentance can be described as the turning from mob-rule, the vilest of misgovernments, to democracy, the best-ordered form (Virt. 180). These are highly idiosyncratic applications of the word, quite different from the description in the De Josepho where the rule under the law of ἄρχοντες βουλευταὶ τε καὶ δικασταὶ and the presence of the crowd (τὰ δῆλα) introduce an element of reality into the account (Jos. 63-4). Mob-rule in the De Fuga is however left behind for the orderly, regular government under a king (Fug. 10). This is in contrast to the De Josepho, where the people are the real 'king' and the statesman's real task is to serve them (Jos. 148). So, just as the absolute rule of one man may in some circumstances be termed democracy, that of the people may be called kingship.

Philo's views on the nature of man do give us more clues than this, however, as to the type of society which he favoured. Not only was he opposed to letting loose the worst elements which he believed to be present in most men — hence he had little time for ochlocracy — but he also viewed lack of rule, anarchy, with great alarm, implying by this term not just self-rule, primitive autonomy and independence (no longer, Philo believed, a real possibility), but the leaving of people to their own devices, when they are ill-equipped to take charge of themselves.
Philo insists that if a city is abandoned by its rulers it becomes a prey to two very great evils, anarchy and lawlessness (Det. 141). He emphasizes elsewhere that lack of rule is a danger in whatever situation it occurs, for 'what is more fraught with confusion than want of government? Are not houses without a ruler full of offence and confusion? Are not cities left without a king destroyed by the opposite kind of rule? Do not countries and nations and regions of the earth lose their old abundant happiness when their governments are destroyed?' (Som. 2.286-7). The strongest contrast between anarchy and order occurs when Philo claims that it is the nature of anarchy to plot mischief and of government to bring salvation, and chiefly so where law and justice (νόμος καὶ δίκη) are honoured, and that means government based on reason (σὺν λόγῳ) (Som. 2.154).44

This indeed is the important factor in all these examples—the necessity of the rule of reason. Most of the instances actually occur in arguments on the need for reason to rule the passions and the senses. Rule in actual cities of course is often the result of convention, since rules in different cities, countries and nations are laid down by human ordinance, by those who first embraced the apparent in preference to the true. This fact does not prevent Philo from again and again defining government as right reason at work. Even if it is true that 'political life is a thing varied and multiple, liable to innumerable changes brought about by personalities, circumstances, motives, individualities of conduct, differences in occasions and places' (Jos. 32),45 Philo still places great hopes in it.

Sometimes the language used may reflect a wish to flatter rulers, as when Philo talks of the general expectation, when Gaius came to the throne, that life under a guardian, a shepherd of the civilized flock, would now follow with the change (Legat. 20). In fact, however, the description is reminiscent of Plato's language on the semi-divine governors of primitive men in the Laws. The civilizing effect hoped for is very like that described in accounts of the development of society,

44 Πέψυκε γὰρ ἀναρχία μὲν ἐπίθεουλον, ἀρχὴ δὲ εἶναι σωτήριον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ νόμος καὶ δίκη τετυμπασ᾽ αὐτῇ δὲ ἔστιν ἢ σὺν λόγῳ.

45 Τολκύλου γὰρ πολιτεία καὶ πολιτροπόν, μυρίας δὲς ἐνδεχομένη μεταβολῆς, προσώπους, πράγμασιν, αἰτίας, πράξεων ἱδιότητι, καλῶν καὶ τῶν διαφοράς.
from the fifth century on. \(^{46}\) Certainly the hopes raised in this case were soon dashed by Gaius' behaviour, but Philo's expression of them shows that he can at least sympathize with the belief that the good and civilized life can come about only through government, especially government of an individual.

Rule based on reason is closely allied to man's habits of sociability and kindliness, yet it is in the ruler or rulers that reason — and presumably its social concomitants — must be present in the highest degree, since unfortunately man as a whole often falls far short in this respect and so πληθυνδ' ὃς νόμῳ φύσεως ἥγεσιν ὑπὲρ ἀνάγκης δεῖ (Agr. 31). On the other hand, when Philo describes how the cities of Palestine came into existence, he shows the Jews, originally a farming people, eventually coming together because of increasing social feeling and friendliness, and building cities (Spec. Leg. 2.119). As Goodenough comments, Philo does not appear to regard this process as peculiar to the Jews, 'for he describes it as "quite what was to have been expected", though it was the absence of precisely these virtues [of sociability, etc.] which made city life in general appear to him in other moods to be the source of civic turmoil and lawlessness'. \(^{47}\)

When Philo gives reasons why the Mosaic law could not be handed down in the city — among other things, human society is so corrupted by arrogance which leads men into mutual injustice, impiety and oppression (Dec. 2ff.) — he is writing in his most pessimistic vein, and at the same time expressing the belief, dear to the Cynic-Stoic tradition, that the simple unorganized life may also be the most innocent. With this in mind, it is interesting to examine the few places where Philo allows himself to indulge in apocalyptic speculation on a Utopian consummation of history. The vision of the future when enmity between man and man, and man and the beasts will be at an end is described in the usual Utopian fashion: there will be abundance in harvests, fertility in men and beasts, the taming of wild animals and so forth (Praem. 87ff.). Philo, however, gives no detailed account of an anomic community, and indeed supposes that there will be a Messianic ruler leading his people

\(^{46}\) E.g. in Polybius 6.7.1-2.

\(^{47}\) Erwin R. Goodenough, The Politics of Philo Judaeus, p.82.
at this time. His main concern, it seems, is to draw the lesson of the need for conquest over the beasts within, and for cultivation of the virtues.

The ideal life in the here and now is lived by such groups as the Therapeutae and the Essenes who reduce their wants to a minimum and embody the paradox that, although very poor by the world's standards, they consider themselves very rich 'judging contentment and frugality to be great abundance, as in truth they are' (*Prob.* 77). In what they can do without — 'all traffic, all commercial dealings, and all navigation' (*Prob.* 78) — they resemble the members of Plato's first city, as also in the fact that there are no masters and slaves among them, since the principle of equality prevails, in accordance with nature (see *Prob.* 79). There is therefore no private property in the strict sense. This life, Philo suggests, is most pleasing to God, as well as displaying love of one's fellow-men. It is free from the artificiality of constitutions and laws which are additions to nature. It is, then, the way men are meant to live, but it is clear that only a few can ever do so. Philo assumes that the Therapeutae will always have less enlightened friends or relations to whom to give up their wealth. For most men, Philo suggests another, less radical course. Abraham brought himself to do obeisance 'not out of any feeling of respect for those who by nature and race and custom were the enemies of true reason, but rather because he feared their power and formidable strength and took care to give no provocation and therefore won the prize of virtue' (*Som.* 2.90). So too must the Jews of the Roman Empire behave.

True social theory cannot be built out of such a situation. Advice given at such a time can only be provisional. More significant, therefore, are the descriptions of the best state, actually a 'political' account of the sage's soul (e.g. *Abr.* 261), where peace and good order prevail. As we have seen, however, while Philo is perfectly prepared to refer to such abstractions as these and to ascribe their existence to a patriarch or similar person who mediates divine favour, he does not show us any society exhibiting these qualities in operation. What we can say of him is that, unlike the Cynics, when he has decided that the simple life where the *Logos* is present to all directly is unrealizable, he is willing to go to the other extreme and sanction a large measure of
external compulsion by government. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that he still hopes that the usual panoply of power and methods of worldly kingship can be discarded.\textsuperscript{48} Philo's ideal would be rule by a king unlike any that the Hellenistic or Roman world had yet seen.

SENECA

Seneca's motive, in the \textit{De Clementia}, for referring to a past Golden Age is, in the context in which it occurs, very clear. He is praising Nero for speaking in a way worthy of the \textit{publica generis humani innocentia} (\textit{Clem.} 2.1.4). Innocence, indeed, had long been considered one of the chief characteristics of primitive man, and was often associated with a life where men were subject to no authority unless it was that of a divine or heroic being. To learn Seneca's true opinions on mankind in its infancy, therefore, we must examine his \textit{Epistles}, where he deals with the question without any ulterior motive.

Here, in Letter Ninety, we find that philosophy is not an inborn attribute of man but must be acquired. Hence we may suppose that the fellowship of men, derived from the teaching of philosophy, is also something to be worked at, and is not innate (\textit{Ep.} 90.3). Early man, it appears, far from being without a ruler, was under the authority of the best, that is, the wise (\textit{Ep.} 90.5) in an idyllic relationship where power was never abused and subjects never rebelled. (Compare Seneca's account of the simple life of early man under the rule of Saturn in his \textit{Phaedra} 525ff. and see also the \textit{Octavia} 397ff.)

Perhaps equally importantly, expertise in rule and expertise in invention did not, in Seneca's view, go hand in hand, since the former was worthy of great thought, the latter the result of mere skill (\textit{Ep.} 90 11, 24). Seneca's own predilections emerge clearly in his rhetorical question: 'How, I ask you, can you consistently admire both Diogenes and Daedalus?' (\textit{Ep.} 90.14). The ideal life, even if it necessarily includes both ruler and ruled, is nonetheless simple, and it includes Cynic elements — although elsewhere Seneca is far more restrained in his advocacy of poverty.\textsuperscript{49} Although Seneca gives an account of government

\textsuperscript{48} See \textit{Mut.} 152.

\textsuperscript{49} Note 49 over page.
by the wise in the Golden Age, later in the letter he appears to retreat from this view, and to adopt the notion that ignorance was the basis of the innocence of the first men, and that such ignorance was less worthwhile than the wisdom acquired after effort (Ep. 90.44, 46). In any case, there is clearly no possibility that the organization of primitive society could be applied to an age where men, if they are to live in accordance with nature, must now do so consciously and with effort. Any new Golden Age, therefore, needs its 'clement' Nero, and we cannot indulge in visions of self-sufficient individuals dispensing with all formal institutions. Even for men a dis recentes, such a situation never existed (see Ep. 90.44).

The naturalness of government is therefore established, but this of course says little of the precise form it should take. Seneca himself is somewhat ambiguous about the principle of rule. No one can rule who is unable to be ruled, he writes (Ira 2.15.4). But then in talking of the Stoics and comparing them with other philosophers, he describes the former as suited to rule and the latter to obey, just as naturally as is the case, he claims, with men and women respectively (Const. Sap. 1.1). Seneca is here more interested in the matter of self-rule than of external government, yet man's position in the universe means that he must obey its decrees, and so earthly government has to be fitted into the framework of a world of rational beings where hierarchy and differentiation are essential.

The most obvious characteristic of men of all times is gregariousness, so that when Seneca comes to define man in the abstract, this is what he stresses. The Stoics wish hominem sociale animal communi bono genitum videri (Clem. 1.3.2), and, again, man is sociale animal et in commune genitus mundum (Ben. 7.1.7). This is an important addition to the more often stressed Stoic view of man as a rational animal. But Seneca elsewhere defines man thus: in homine optimum quid est? Ratio; hac antecedit animalia, deos sequitur. Ratio erga perfecta proprium bonum est, cetera illi cum animalibus satisque communia sunt (Ep. 76.9).

Sociability, however, may be rather different in application from what we might expect, since for Seneca, following Democritus, 'one man

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may mean as much as a multitude' (Ep. 7.10), which seems to contradict the argument of Letter Five:— *Hoc primum philosophia promittit, sensum communem, humanitatem et congregacionem* (Ep. 5.4). Seneca lays equal stress on both elements when in *De Beneficiis* (4.18.2-3) he notes that God has given man two things, reason and fellowship, which make him, from being a creature at the mercy of all, the most powerful of all creatures, 'and so he who, if he were isolated, would be a match for none, is the master of the world'.

On balance, it is clear, Seneca saw individuals as bound together in one way or another, either through possessing a similar nature or because of an instinct of sociability, but he did not trace the growth of the various social units in the meticulous fashion of an Aristotle. He stressed that any damage to a part of the greater commonwealth harms the whole: *nefas est nocere patriae; ergo civi quoque ... ergo et homini, nam hic in maiore tibi urbe civis est* (Ira 2.31.7). We are all born for a life of fellowship (*ib.*). So too in the Ninety-Fifth letter to Lucilius, when discussing the duty of a philosopher to his fellow men, he emphasized the unity of the world in accord with Stoic tenets: *omne hoc, quod vides, quo divina atque humana conclusa sunt, unum est; membra sumus corporis magni. Natura nos cognatos edidit, cum ex isdem et in eadem gigneret. Haec nobis amorem indidit mutuum et sociabiles fecit* (Ep. 95.52).

This picture of the world can be felt to be true only in the appropriate social situation, where men are not subject to the selfishness that greed, envy and fury can cause — and here we can refer once more to Seneca's picture of early man, and see what lessons it had to offer the civilized world. One factor to which Seneca attributes considerable significance is the absence of private property: *in commune rerum natura fruebantur; sufficiebat illa ut parens ita tutela omnium, haec erat publicorum opum secura possessio* (Ep. 90.38). As well, any picture of the past of Rome itself was painted in the same austere colours: *Scilicet maiores nostri, quorum virtus etiamnunc vitia nostra sustentat, infelices erant, qui sibi manu sua parabunt cibum, quibus terra cubile erat, quorum testa nondum auro fulgebant, quorum templum nondum gemmis nitebant*, he comments ironically (Helv. 10.7).

Even in this society and that of the first men, there existed, as
we have noted, authority and subordination; so rule in itself cannot be evil in Seneca's eyes. He is more interested in determining the differences between good and bad rulers than in contemplating the structural differences between monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. The use made of law is less important in assessing a ruler than are his kingly qualities or their absence. Seneca makes no attempt, as some of his fellow writers did, to claim that monarchy could in some way contain the best features of democracy. He has no need to, he seems to feel, since 'it is nature's way to subordinate the weaker to the stronger' (Ep. 90.4). According to this belief, it is reasonable to criticize Brutus if his act was caused by fear of the name of king, since a state reaches its best condition under a king (Ben. 2.20.2), because 'there is nothing dangerous in a man's having as much power as he likes if he takes the view that he has power to do only what it is his duty to do' (see Ep. 90.4).

Certainly the loss of the 'good old ways' had partly caused the need for a strong hand, and Seneca may well have regretted the necessity. At the philosophical level, however, he did not do so, since he agreed with the assertion of Posidonius on the subject: illo ... saeculo, quod aureum perhibent, penes sapientes fuisse regnum Posidonius indicat. . . . hactenus Posidonio adsentior (Ep. 90.5, 7). What was good enough for the Golden Age, we may suppose, is good enough for the contemporary society. All that remains to be found is the sapiens!

MUSONIUS RUFUS

Although Musonius Rufus does not go into details on the sort of society he thinks best, at any rate in any of the surviving extracts of his teaching, he does display a fairly consistent approach to the nature of man and to man in society. He believes that man's nature is fundamentally noble (Stob. 2.9.8, p.183) πρὸς ἀρετὴν γεγονέναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον. To go against this nature by returning evil for evil is to act like a beast, not a man, whereas the opposite sort of behaviour is ἡμέρου τρόπου καὶ φιλανθρώπου (Stob. 3.40.9, pp.536-7). In general we can say that to act out of consideration for oneself alone is to be non-human and like the wolf or any of the wildest beasts λύκου μὴδὲν
Such a person has no part in common life or co-operation or justice. Of all the animals only the bee can be a true example for man in its sociability. These then are the qualities that form the basis of a human existence, and we may assume that Musonius saw them also as the foundation of political and social institutions. Man for him was not a creature to be coerced into goodness but a free agent, since all men can acquire virtue. Such is his conclusion in his non-political comments.

DIO CHRYSOOSTOM

Dio's most comprehensive definition of man occurs in the Thirty-Sixth Discourse, the Borysthenic, where the meaning of ἄνθρωπος is, he claims, known only to the man who has expert knowledge (ὁ ἐμπειρός, 36.19). This is not surprising since the definition 'man is a mortal animal endowed with reason' could presumably be fully comprehended only by those examples of man who fit the definition — and these, oddly enough, appear to be few. Logos then takes precedence over justice as the defining characteristic of man.

If Dio is unable to produce many instances of individuals or societies worthy of their partnership with the gods in the possession of reason, does he believe that examples could be found most easily in a particular form of society, past or present, or that a particular form of government encourages men to be worthy of their title? Is government in fact a good or a necessary evil?

Dio seems to believe that early societies showed a high proportion of the wise and prudent — for most men of earlier times were of this kind (1.8). Not only so, but the first human beings did without fire, houses and such 'necessities', and subsequent inventions were directed unnecessarily to making life more comfortable instead of promoting courage or justice. As a result, life became constantly less agreeable. Prometheus was therefore rightly blamed for his civilizing activities (6.25, and see too 6.28-9). 50

Note 50 over page.
This outlook, in clear contradiction to the view of Isocrates, for example, on the development of society, is a reflection of Dio's Cynic-Stoic attitudes which stressed the need for self-sufficiency and simplicity. His comments on actual, if idealized, societies reinforce the impression that for him the ideal individual is one to whom government is unnecessary because he possesses of himself the controls it imposes on the ordinary members of society. The Scythians, although without houses or cultivation, are nevertheless able to play their part as citizens (πολιτεύομαι) with justice and in accordance with law (69.6). In the Euboean discourse Dio describes the idyllic life of simple peasants whom he allegedly met on his travels during his exile. To one of their number the polis assembly seems a strange and, Dio implies, useless body (7.23). Living free from taxes and the duty of public services would appear to be the ideal life in which freedom can flourish (see 7.28). The account of man which Dio provides in the Euboean discourse takes note of man's social needs but still allows for each individual's claims to manage his own life:

Δες δή πολιτεύομαι τινα ἐπιμέλειαν, μη πάνυ τι πράσως μπορεῖ ῥαδίμως φέροντας τὴν εἰς τὰ ἀτύμα καὶ δούλα σώματα ὑπὲρν, ... ταῦτα ... ὃ καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος ἄταν ἢντιμον καὶ ὄμορφον ὑπὸ τοῦ φύσαντος δεοῦ ταῦτα σημεῖα καὶ σύμβολα ἔχον τοῦ τιμάσθαι ὑπακοὺς, καὶ λόγον καὶ ἐμπελρίαν καλῶν τε καὶ ἀδικρῶν, γέγονεν (7.138).

Elsewhere Dio expresses much more pessimistic conclusions: life is difficult and full of deceit, wickedness, grief and countless other ills, and this is because of the folly and pride of men (32.15 and see 74.4). Indeed, in some ways men are worse than unreasoning animals, who are often gentle and helpful to their own kind (40.32 and see 40.40). Solitude, a life away from the company of frail humanity, may be the only safe course (74.23).

The folly of most people can be offset only by the appointment of a wise and prudent man as leader, and even the foolish and weak recognize that it is best for them to live under direction. Rule of the best is, after all, natural (2.71; 3.50). The man who, having managed his own life admirably, endeavours by the persuasion of speech combined with

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50 'In Or. 6, 25 and 29 we have a negative view of Prometheus. Prometheus' gift of fire to mankind has been a bane. Cynic allegory has utilised the myth to demonstrate its own pessimism about civilisation' (Ragnar Höistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King, p.57).
goodwill and a sense of justice to train and direct a great multitude of men and to lead them to better things (4.124) would presumably be fit for such a task. Precisely how such a person would fit into the government structure is not clear.

Dio does refer to the typical forms of government and their degenerate opposites but without going into detail. Interestingly, though, he clearly considers democracy, although 'specious and inoffensive in name' impractical, since in it the self-control of the common people is expected to produce one day an equitable and lawful constitution (3.46). This sceptical outlook is typical of Dio's attitude to rule in all its facets. He does not believe then that man's original state of innocence can be taken into account when dealing with the problems of a sophisticated society. In fact he claims that θην κακών οἱ ἀνθρώποι that is, than slaves (74.9) and goes so far as to assert of mankind: 'Εδόξουν δὲ μου πάντες ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔπος εἰναιν (13.13).

Here we find a Stoic with a deep sense of the harmony and fellowship prevailing in the cosmos and a profound conviction that this should be mirrored in human relationships concluding paradoxically that the human race in general is not responsible enough to take its affairs into its own hands. The metaphysical justification of kingship — that only such a rule parallels God's rule over the cosmos — is therefore fortified by a utilitarian one. Those who possess πνεῦμα and λόγος, the cure for man's ills provided by the gods (32.16), are likely to be the good men and preservers of cities whom society needs (32.3).

PLUTARCH

Plutarch's concern for the old values of the polis appears frequently not only in the Moralia but also in the examples of patriotism and statesmanship chosen in the Lives. His ideal society is never explicitly described, but clearly it would possess the qualities of restraint, simplicity and order (Agis 7.2). The way Plutarch describes the reforms of Agis and Cleomenes suggests that in many aspects they conformed to his own ideals, and these reforms were an
attempt to restore the much-admired (but inimitable) government of
Lycurgus, the symbol for many Greeks of the Golden Age.\(^{51}\) Plutarch's
description of the reigns of Agis and Cleomenes no doubt owes much to
the work of Phylarchus,\(^{52}\) but Plutarch clearly adopted it with
enthusiasm, adding his name to the long list of those for whom Sparta,
in its legendary early days or as 'restored' later, was a model for
political and social life.

Plutarch displays a similar concern for the simple life in the *De
amore prolis*

\[\text{This devaluing of what separates man and beast, with the implication}
\text{that the further man departs from his original condition, the worse he}
\text{becomes, seems to put Plutarch on the side of those like the Cynics who}
\text{saw man's best state as existing in the past, and viewed contemporary}
\text{civilization with disfavour.}
\]

Certainly, there is some truth in this assessment of Plutarch, but
it would be giving a one-sided account of his attitude to take up this
aspect alone. For Plutarch, the nature of man is in many ways a given,
and his metaphysical assumptions, with their stress on the dualistic
forces contending throughout the universe, lead him to see man as such
as inevitably prone to evil in part of his nature.\(^{54}\) This view

\(^{51}\) On idealization of Sparta see F. Ollier, *Le Mirage spartiate* (de
Boccard, Paris, 1933 and 1943, reprinted in one volume by Arno Press,
1973).

\(^{52}\) See on Plutarch's account of Agis and Cleomenes, F. Ollier's
article, 'Le Philosophe stoicien Sphairos et l'oeuvre réformatrice des
rois de Sparte Agis IV et Cléomène III', *REG*, 49 (1936), 536-70.

\(^{53}\) As Babut comments: 'On y trouve ... l'idée qu les animaux peuvent
servir d'exemples aux hommes et leur montrer où est la véritable vie
selon la nature, dans la mesure justement où ils sont restés plus
proches de la nature que l'homme' (Babut, *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, p.74).

\(^{54}\) 'Contraste entre le pessimisme moral des Stoïciens, associé à un
optimisme métaphysique, et l'optimisme de Plutarque sur l'homme, qui se
conjugue avec le pessimisme de sa vision du monde', comments Babut,
*Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, p.363, of *Dion* 47.4.
predisposes Plutarch to be most concerned with the majority of mortals who are neither super-human sages on the Stoic model nor deep-dyed villains, like the traditional figure of the tyrant. He therefore judges men less harshly than do the followers of Stoic teaching, but also holds a less exalted view of the potentialities of human nature than they.

Man's reason which, we have seen, Plutarch regards as a doubtful blessing, is not even, he believes, the best instrument for arriving at the truth, although he invests the ruler with the Logos of God in Ad Principem (780f). We may however suspect that here he was adopting a common theme for rhetorical effect rather than expressing his own conviction. Through the mouthpiece of Mestrius Florus, he expresses the opinion that

\[ \text{διώς ὃ' ὃ ζητῶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῷ εὐλογοῦ ἐκ πάντων ἀναιρεῖ τὸ ἱαμάθον; ὅπως γὰρ ὃ τῆς αὐτίκας ἐπιλεγέτει λόγος, ἐκείθεν ἄρχεται τὸ ἀπορεῖν, τουτέστι τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν. ὅπερ τρόπον τινὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἀναδιορίζειν οἱ τοῖς ἱαμαθίους ἀποστολέοι (680c-d).} \]

This wish to leave man, in some sense, with questions unanswered, a being open to awe and wonder, means that Plutarch does not believe rationalism alone can solve man's problems. He is willing to rely on the communications of divine origin, and if these come through a human medium, that too is no doubt acceptable. Such a view is not likely to lead Plutarch to a profound analysis of political organizations to determine which form gives greatest scope to human reason and responsibility.

One characteristic that Plutarch has no hesitation in bestowing on man is sociability. This he sees originating in instinct: αὖτῇ γὰρ ἡ προσδεχομένη καὶ ζητοῦσα φιλίαν καὶ ὄμιλλαν χρεία διδάσκει τῷ συγγενεῖς τιμῶν καὶ περιέπεμν καὶ διαφυλάττειν, ὡς ἄφιλους καὶ ἀμήκτους καὶ μονοτρόπους ἔνν μὴ δυναμένους μηδὲ τευχότας (479c).

The love which we have for our children is then the basis of our social life and administration (see 495c), Plutarch claims. The larger organization builds on the smaller, elemental one, as for Aristotle, and is therefore a natural growth. The state is in essence a unity in which is expressed in a formal way the force that binds men together:
There is, however, no particular form that a state must take. Plutarch asserts that a state cannot survive without belief in and worship of the gods, but that states could be found without walls, or books or kings or houses or property, and doing without currency, knowledge of theatres or gymnasia (Adv. Col. 1125d-e). The only general precept can be found in the law that always gives the first rank in the government to him who does what is right and recognizes what is advantageous (817d-e). In different places, Plutarch highlights the value of different forms of rule. In the Life of Dion, for example, he describes how Dion thought democracy better than tyranny, in the lack of a healthy aristocracy (Dion 12.2). When he advises an old man to retain his position in public life, he describes the cares, labours and occupations of the office of king (790a).

He has, then, no doctrinaire pronouncement to make, but prefers to emphasize in all situations and contexts man's need of his fellows, and the need for moderation and avoidance of excessive severity to others — or to oneself. Of a too strict regimen, he says:

Such an attitude may seem to be in conflict with the declarations on simplicity in life, but for Plutarch simplicity is never the same as austerity. Indeed men who maintain the severe demeanour and standards of old are almost out of place in a modern setting, and Plutarch appears to criticize them for inflexibility:

Moderation and diplomacy are the qualities Plutarch finds most use-
ful in public life, even if, in a perfect world — perhaps at the time of some long-ago ancestors — these were not necessary. Plutarch does attempt to avoid the accusation of pandering to the evils of the day by describing how God governs the universe without force: 'not using compulsion, but making persuasion and reason introduce that which must be' (Phoc. 2.5). He is himself never tired of stressing the importance of speech in human society and he finds the traditional division of speech into ἐνδιάθετος and ἐν προφαρή, pointless, 'because the aim and end of both the speech in the mind and the speech in the utterance is friendship, towards oneself and towards one's neighbour respectively' (777b-c). An orator's speech may even be, for Plutarch, as important as his character in achieving political ends: δημαργωγύα γὰρ ἡ διὰ λόγου πεποιθομένων ἑτῆν 'for leadership of a people is leadership of those who are persuaded by speech' (802e). Experts can help ordinary imperfect men to see the way that they should go, and divine power may pick out the gifted individual from his fellows. This is so even though mankind is naturally disposed to form social groups. Plutarch takes society as he finds it, and this leads him, for all his human sympathy, to concentrate on the figures of great and significant men, which in most cases means great leaders.

PLINY

For Pliny the world of the primitive society had little to offer his own day. When he refers to animal life it is to lay down the rule that power should not go to the stronger as with cattle (Pan. 38.7). Pliny's general attitude to the community shows nothing to contradict his specifically political pronouncements, even if it does not determine their expression. He believes individual views should be weighed rather than counted, a principle he would no doubt see as espoused by the ancients (see Ep. 2.12.5) and this probably requires that important choices be made by certi electique (see Ep. 7.17.12 and cf. 9.5). Most people are easily led and behave as circumstances dictate (Pan. 44.8). So clearly then some kind of authoritarian rule is the best solution for all.
ARISTIDES

In the Roman Oration, Aristides gives clear indications of his views on society. For him the life of primitive man held few attractions. The 'early days' here refer in general to the time before Roman rule and are pictured as hard and boorish βίος σκληρός τις καὶ ἄγροικος (R.O. 101). Aristides mentions the legend of the Golden Race of men only to dismiss it (103). The reign of Kronos idealized by so many writers he depicts as one of violence and cruelty to be contrasted unfavourably with that of Zeus, which of course parallels the leadership of Rome on earth. What Aristides particularly deplores in the ways of former times is the untrammelled violence of rulers. He sees no pristine state where men could rule themselves.

The benefits of settled government are many, but Aristides is most impressed with the trade and commerce that converge on Rome as the centre of the Empire (llff.). A life of order and regulation allows communications to unite scattered sections and introduces the advantages of civilization (see 101). The life of nomadic Scythians is introduced when Aristides refers sarcastically to the peripatetic habits of the Persian kings, and is obviously unenviable (18).

Aristides does not of course wish to suggest that the benefits of orderly government have been paid for too highly; instead he claims that imperial government has also brought true freedom (36). Now citizenship is taken to mean καθοδίτηκε κοινή τῆς γῆς δημοκρατία ὑπ' ἐνι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ κοινητῷ (60). The test of citizenship is not ethnic, but as had been the case with Isocrates' ideal depends on character (63). Aristides suggests that good government by definition implies a hierarchy with all fitting quietly into their proper places, and this the Empire of course displays. It is in fact a mixture of the three basic forms, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy (90). This assertion means that Aristides believes that all possible ideals for society can be achieved under the rule of one man.
CONCLUSION

Almost all these writers accepted that some men were better than others just as automatically as they believed that men as a whole were superior to women. They considered that only if this fact were recognized in a society's very structure could it function properly. This view often but not always springs from a pessimism about humanity in general, although most writers have a high regard for the capabilities of man in the abstract, endowed with reason.

Most writers also claim that it is natural for men to live in society and see the instinct to associate with one's fellows as commendable, but this is offset by their belief that the benefits of harmony and order were originally brought to men by demi-gods or mythical heroes, or were worked for by a few outstanding figures. Even the writers who most keenly advocate the simple life (e.g. Dio, and in some respects Philo) felt that the mental and moral failings of the majority suggested a need for guides in society to bring about — as peaceably as possible — the conditions in which humanity could develop. These men must be those few able to be truly self-sufficient and self-directing, and like the rulers who had led people from barbarism to civilization, they would personify the qualities of which the community had need. The ruler in this aspect is an individual outstanding because of high moral character and ability to harmonize society.

The socially useful qualities of αἄδεξ and ἀγαθη which, for Protagoras, were granted to all have now become restricted to and embodied in the ruler alone. Because of this there seems to be no need for a writer to pursue his concern for the society any further by describing how the ruler in fact affects the state in its functioning and fits into its structure. His impact is chiefly moral, and hard to assess by ordinary criteria — but the writers supply us with no alternative way of determining if a particular society under a king is functioning as it ought.
When your Majesty says, 'Let a thing be done,' it's as good as done— practically, it is done— because your Majesty's will is law.

W.S. Gilbert, The Mikado.
CHAPTER TWO

THE PLACE OF THE LAW IN KINGSHIP THEORY

INTRODUCTION

That use of the term νόμος in Greek political life which may best be translated as 'law' was the end-product of an evolution which had associated the word with a wide range of meanings.1 From being used to describe 'the way things are under Zeus' (e.g. in Hesiod, W & D 276ff.)2 where the way of life of both man and beast is νόμος, it could come to signify a type of order of nature.3 A meaning closer to that of 'custom' emerges elsewhere (e.g. W & D 388, 'this is what is done on the plains')4 when ordering becomes that which is done over and over again.

The sense of cultic tradition in Hesiod (fr. 322, ὃς κε πόλις βέζησθο, νόμος δ' ἄρχατος ἄριστος), gives way in Theognis to a more secular sense, when it appears in his polemic against the 'upstarts' in the polis in v.290, and vv.53ff.: λαοὶ δὲ ὃς ἄλλοι, οὐ πόσοθ' οὔτε ὥκαις ἔδεσαν οὔτε νόμους (53-4). Ehrenberg's comment on this, 'die νόμοι sind politisch geworden',5 may be too sweeping, but Ostwald's belief that they refer to

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2 τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώπου νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων, ἰχθιός μὲν καὶ ἄραι καὶ οἶκων πεπεσυνός/ ἐσθεν ἀληθεῖς, ἐπὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ μετ' αὐτοὺς/ ἀνθρώπου 6' ἔδωκε δίκην, ἦ πολλῶν ἀρίστην/γύνεως.
4 οὗτος τοι πεδών πέλεται νόμος.

Note 5 over page.
a condition of orderly civilized society is still an acknowledgement that the position of the polis has now entered into the definition.\footnote{Die Rechtsidee, p.117. Gigante, NOMOS BAΣΙΛΕΥΣ, p.47, says that the δόκιμος and νόμος approved of here in opposition to the ἐκτραπέλον νόμος 'indicano solo una vita ordinata e civile'. Stier, 'Νόμος Βασιλεύς', p.236, claims v.290 shows that in Theognis' use of νόμος there is no question of 'Laws', but of 'ein Leben in den geregelten Formen der Sitte'.}

Heraclitus continues this process. The fragment that notes: 'the people must fight for their law as for their city walls' (fr. 44, DK) was to be the first of many expressions of devotion to the constitution ('Staatsordnung' — Stier)\footnote{Martin Ostwald, Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969), p.30. See also p.22 on 11.289-90.} of the polis by citizens who gave widely different accounts of what this constitution meant. It is important to recall that elsewhere (fr. 33, DK) Heraclitus himself defines νόμος as obeying the counsel of one man, and that he also derives all human νόμοι from one divine νόμος (fr. 114, DK):

By the late fifth century at the latest, law for a democratic polis became a written and hence fixed expression of state order.\footnote{Die Rechtsidee, p.117. Gigante, NOMOS BAΣΙΛΕΥΣ, p.47, says that the δόκιμος and νόμος approved of here in opposition to the ἐκτραπέλον νόμος 'indicano solo una vita ordinata e civile'. Stier, 'Νόμος Βασιλεύς', p.236, claims v.290 shows that in Theognis' use of νόμος there is no question of 'Laws', but of 'ein Leben in den geregelten Formen der Sitte'.} Even in non-democratic states law was supported as a safeguard against tyranny. As Demaratus, the Spartan exile, told Xerxes, the Greeks whom the Persian king was attacking had a master in νόμος, and this they feared much more than the great king's subjects feared him (Herod. 7.104).\footnote{Die Rechtsidee, p.117. Gigante, NOMOS BAΣΙΛΕΥΣ, p.47, says that the δόκιμος and νόμος approved of here in opposition to the ἐκτραπέλον νόμος 'indicano solo una vita ordinata e civile'. Stier, 'Νόμος Βασιλεύς', p.236, claims v.290 shows that in Theognis' use of νόμος there is no question of 'Laws', but of 'ein Leben in den geregelten Formen der Sitte'.}

Nomos had by now triumphed over thesmos as the term which would henceforth apply to individual pieces of legislation, while retaining a general meaning compounded of the nuances it had acquired in the course of its development.\footnote{Die Rechtsidee, p.117. Gigante, NOMOS BAΣΙΛΕΥΣ, p.47, says that the δόκιμος and νόμος approved of here in opposition to the ἐκτραπέλον νόμος 'indicano solo una vita ordinata e civile'. Stier, 'Νόμος Βασιλεύς', p.236, claims v.290 shows that in Theognis' use of νόμος there is no question of 'Laws', but of 'ein Leben in den geregelten Formen der Sitte'.}

\textsuperscript{5} Die Rechtsidee, p.117. Gigante, NOMOS BAΣΙΛΕΥΣ, p.47, says that the δόκιμος and νόμος approved of here in opposition to the ἐκτραπέλον νόμος 'indicano solo una vita ordinata e civile'. Stier, 'Νόμος Βασιλεύς', p.236, claims v.290 shows that in Theognis' use of νόμος there is no question of 'Laws', but of 'ein Leben in den geregelten Formen der Sitte'.


\textsuperscript{7} 'Νόμος Βασιλεύς', p.237.

\textsuperscript{8} For the arguments on the date of this change, see Ostwald, Nomos, p.59, and Part II, Chap. 3.

\textsuperscript{9} ἐλέεθέρου γὰρ ἔδυνες οὐ πάντα ἐλέεθεροι εἰσί· ἐξεστὶ γὰρ σφί δεσπότης νόμος. τὸν ὑποδειμαύνουσι πολλῷ ἐτὶ μᾶλλον ἢ' οὐ σοι σε.

\textsuperscript{10} 'The radical difference between the two terms suggests that the change from θεσμος to νόμος came about at a time when the Athenians were disenchanted with living under laws imposed upon them from above, and decided instead to consider as laws only norms which they had themselves ratified and acknowledged to be valid and binding', Ostwald, Nomos, p.55, and cf. Ehrenberg: 'Die θεσμος sind jetzt νόμο; das geschriebene Gesetz usurpiert das Wort, das bisher nur das ungeschriebene der Sitte bedeutet hat' (Die Rechtsidee, p.122).
The division of law into the written and the unwritten helped to establish the discussion about law at a philosophical level. Both forms appeared initially as manifestations of the divine will, but explanations of both in human terms become more common as the fifth century proceeds. Thucydides' unwritten laws obtain their force from men's fear of public disapproval (Thuc. 2.37), and are quite different from those to which Antigone appeals (Soph. Antig. 450ff.), which have their source in heaven.

Law both written and unwritten became to some a burden, assuming the role of the tyrants by whose downfall it had triumphed. Nature, by contrast, was not thus arbitrary in her rule, and when law lost the respect it had formerly possessed and was seen with the eyes of the critic and not of the believer, it appeared to rest on no very stable foundation. Nomos, to vindicate its claims on man, needed to moderate its demands for exclusive consideration. Protagoras accorded it a role as a preserver of civic peace. Though the origin of law might not be divine nor its decrees immutable, it had still a useful and necessary part to play in the polis.

The challenge to which it began to be subjected in the fourth century was more subtle than that coming previously from the upholders of Nature. Of Plato one can say: 'Auch für ihn ist der alte νόμος - Staat nicht mehr vorhanden; die Hinrichtung des Sokrates, die die reaktionäre Demokratie auf ihrem Gewissen hatte, machte den Bruch endgültig.' Yet Nomos still appears, not merely as the δεύτερος πλοῦς of the Politicus and the Laws but also in the Laws as associated with 'opinion, diligence, reason and art' (892b). It can be dispensed with or grudgingly accepted as second-best by those as bold as Plato, but does not fail to keep turning up as catchcry or description of a government.

In the fourth century Athenian orators like Aeschines were fighting a rear-guard action to retain νόμος as the true ruler of the state and oppose it to the rule of the individual, seen as an evil, totally

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12 See Politicus 294-5 and Laws 875c for emphasis on the laws' failings.
incompatible with νόμος. In his speech against Timarchus, Aeschines made this antithesis clear: εἰ δ’ ἔστε ... ὅτε τὰ μὲν τῶν δημοκρατουμένων σώματα καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν οἱ νόμοι σύζουσι, τὰ δὲ τῶν τυράννων καὶ ὀλγαρχικῶν ἀπεστάλη ἣ μετὰ τῶν ὄπλων φρουρά (Cont. Tim. 5), and Hyperides refers to the threat of being compelled to have a despot's τρόπος as one's νόμος (6.20). A little later on he refers to the best political situation: ο(ὗ) γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἀκελλήν, ἀλλὰ νόμου φωνήν χαριεῖσθαι δεῖ τῶν εὐδαμόνων (25).

The funeral speech by pseudo-Lysias (about 390 B.C.) shows how strongly men clung to the polis-law, when it describes how the early Athenians set up civilized society, 'having law as their king and reason as their teacher' (19). The source of the Anonymus Iamblichi has not been conclusively determined, but the ideas expressed in it reflect attitudes common in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. It supports the high value placed on law by the traditionalists. Nomos and 'the just' should rule, and without law and justice monarchy is likely to emerge. Only by acting in accordance with the law could the ambitious man hope to succeed within the polis framework. Law and monarchy are therefore incompatible, although law itself is often personalized, as here. This is important to remember as we trace the development of νόμος through writers concerned exclusively or mainly with the monarchical form of government.

We may contrast these conclusions with those of the pseudo-Platonic Minos which offers several possibilities in the course of the dialogue. These range from the widely held belief that law is 'the resolution of the polis' restated by the interlocutor as 'state opinion', through the suggestion that what people call laws are state treatises of kings and good men, to the a-political conclusion that law is 'the discovery of what is' (314c-317d). The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum keeps its attention on the polis and the constitution. For its author, law is 'a joint agreement of the polis' ὑμολόγημα πόλεως κοινῆν (1422a).15


14 Anon Iam. ch.6 (p.100, Pistelli, Teubner edition of the Protrepticus of Iamblichus).

Note 15 over page.
Aristotle too gave a hint as to what was to come, though no doubt he was considering a purely hypothetical case. Although deeply concerned to expound the nature of polis constitution and law he too could envisage one man so much superior to his fellows in the state that he (Aristotle) had to admit κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἦστε νόμος· αὐτὸς γὰρ εἶναι νόμος (Pol. 1284a — Cf. his later claim that where citizens are equal it is neither right nor just for one man to be sovereign over all, whether there are to be laws, or whether there are to be no laws but ὃς αὐτὸν δύνα νόμον [1288a].).

With the laws as they existed Aristotle saw limitations in the general nature of their prescriptions, but still found in them the advantage that they were unmoved by passion, unlike men (Pol. 1286a). Politics 1287a with its equation of law ruling to God and Nous ruling shows how even Aristotle was inclined to personify this 'impersonal' force. For Aristotle too there was still a basic incompatibility in the rule of one man and of law (Pol. 1287a-b).

ISOCRATES

We should not expect to find a detailed analysis of the value of law in Isocrates' works. He was too preoccupied with generalities to pay much attention to the ordering of society in detail and too concerned with giving advice to Hellas to develop a sustained theory on the best way to legislate on internal affairs. He does, however, make certain assumptions in his use of political terms, and his application to different situations of varying meanings of νόμος is significant.

This is particularly so when he avails himself of the popular pair of antithetical terms νόμος and φύσις, for in these cases it suits his purpose to find fault with the law for its inflexibility and narrowness,

just as Plato did in the *Politicus*, and as he showed Callicles doing in the *Gorgias*. That νόμος which Hippias is recorded in the *Protagoras* as criticizing for its limited outlook Isocrates regarded as worthy of so little respect that he could sometimes dispense with it in theory altogether. When he gives advice to Demonicus, he praises the young man's father and model for preferring φύσις to νόμος in his dealings with his friends (*Dem. 10*). Due order and strict adherence to forms and conventions are here inferior to standards at once more comprehensive and more vague.

In a strictly political context, Isocrates draws the contrast sharply, deploring, as he makes Athens deplore, a situation in some Greek cities, where citizens by nature could be deprived of citizenship by law (*Paneg. 105*). Indeed the passage occurs in a section of the *Panegyricus* devoted to a rhetorical and hyperbolic account of the benefits of the first Athenian Empire. We may therefore conclude that Isocrates was not in fact advocating that law be abrogated in favour of 'nature' throughout the common fatherland of Greece, but rather using a Sophistic theme for his own purposes, that is, to exalt Athens as the champion of freedom and equality. Despite this, the use of the expression shows that *polis*-law no longer commanded the respect it once had done.

The elevation of unwritten laws could also be at the expense of those that were written. Isocrates praises the Athenians for upholding ancient custom and ancestral law against the sacrilegious Thebans in the days before the Trojan War (*Paneg. 55*). He describes the same incident similarly elsewhere (*Panath. 169*), but in this case he adds that such custom and law do not come about through man's nature but are laid down by a divine power. This was what Sophocles had affirmed perhaps in response to those moderate Sophists of his day like Protagoras, who admitted the need for laws and customs, but regarded them as coming about through purely human contacts which varied from place to place. Just as, even earlier, Heraclitus had sought to bind human and divine

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16 The *Demonicus* is here assumed to be by Isocrates, or at least to come from his school. On this point see Claude Mossé, *La Fin de la démocratie athénienne* (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1962), p.388, who accepts it as genuine. Norlin's comment, in the Loeb edition of Isocrates, Vol. 1, p.3, is: 'The authenticity of the discourse has been challenged ... but on insufficient grounds.'
law together by deriving all human laws from one divine law (DK fr. 44), Isocrates rendered the traditions of a community sacrosanct by accepting their divine origin.

There is then a clear contrast in his thought between custom and written law. The former sufficed for the men of old, for a multiplicity of written regulations is unnecessary for good men of worth (Paneg. 78). Indeed, daily habits develop the right disposition in a man far more satisfactorily than law does. Isocrates contrasts justice in the soul, the portion of those who are well-governed, with the statutes inscribed on porticoes which should be unnecessary in a good city (Areop. 41). "Ἡναίοικαν are more important than ψηφιδιασματα and can be acquired only by education (ib.). Isocrates can hardly be said to have a very high opinion of laws as they are. He approves of law in the abstract in its early sense, but not of individual items of often, to him, objectionable legislation.

Ancestral laws, however, acquire a sanctity due to their antiquity. They are also important as instances of the use of reason. For reason, which separates men from beasts, makes it possible to use persuasion instead of force, to found cities, pass laws and acquire the arts of civilization (Nic. 6). In the Panegyricus we see that Athens was the first to put an end to the lawlessness and discord prevailing among the Greeks and introduce the benefits all now enjoy, 'for she was the first to lay down laws and set up a polity' (Paneg. 38-9).17 Her laws were for those who settled disputes with reason and not violence (Paneg. 40). In such accounts Isocrates grants a high place to Logos for its political and moral influence, but does not really show how the co-operative virtues become active as a result of its presence. We are not told if a contract was at the root of the social developments he describes, or if the eloquent persuasiveness of a few brought about the desired result in the rest. Here as elsewhere Isocrates prefers to speak in general terms.

17 As de Romilly notes: 'En passant de Lysias à Isocrate, on découvre, en effet, que ... la loi n’est plus seulement parallèle à la raison: elle en est l’expression, ou, si l’on préfère, la traduction pratique. Le pas n’est d’ailleurs pas franchi partout. Car il est des passages d’Isocrate où l’on voit seulement la loi se confondre avec la civilisation', de Romilly, La Loi, p.173.
Written law, when compared with education in moral habits, comes off very much second-best, partly because Isocrates tends to see laws as made for evil-doers rather than for good men, who do not need them. Law for him is as it stands a punitive device, and not of itself a means of education arrived at by discussion and consensus (see Areop. 40-41). His dissatisfaction with the process of decision-making at Athens is not surprising. It accords with his admiration for the polis of the days of Solon and Cleisthenes, when, as he saw it, the Areopagus was a powerful institution, exercising a moral charge over the citizens. The laws passed in this period do not come under the general condemnation. They were not like those passed in his own day, he claimed, full of confusion and contradiction. They were few, but adequate for those using them, just and profitable and harmonizing with each other. Those which concerned matters of joint activity were devised with special care (Panath. 144).

This suggests that Isocrates could at times have regard to the social aspect of laws, but the whole tenor of his argument shows that these laws were simply the expression of already-existing sentiments, and had no original contribution to make. They were therefore 'written down in a few days' (ib.) and Isocrates heaps scorn on those who imagine that the best men emerge from a state where laws are written with the greatest attention to detail (Areop. 39).

Isocrates (or at least the author of the To Demonicaua), does use νόμος in another sense, devoid of political or social meaning, but justified by the history of the term. A man's life, he explains, can be an example and his behaviour a 'law' for his son (Dem. 11). In a very similar way, a king's behaviour has value because of the example it can provide to the subjects. This account of royal influence avoids the necessity of Isocrates' providing a thorough-going political theory of kingship, when he comes to deal, in the two Nicocles' speeches, with the relationship of ruler and ruled. Subjects obey the laws laid down by kings, but the monarch's way of life is a stronger law (Dem. 36). Isocrates stresses that this deference to the sovereign power can also hold for other forms of government. Just as one man who is a citizen in a democracy must pay court to the multitude, so one living under a monarchy should revere the king (ib.). Yet it is clearly easier to
set up one man whose life is to be a law than to put forward a crowd of individuals of different habits and attitudes to serve the same purpose.

The constitutional problems associated with allocating to the citizens their appropriate functions in the state are bypassed, and good citizenship becomes a matter of adopting a private moral code in imitation of the ruler and deferring to his judgement in any matters affecting society. Isocrates assumes that not only should the moral habits of a city resemble those of its rulers, but that in fact they do so (To Nic. 31, cf. Nic. 37). This does not explain how subjects under a cowardly and self-indulgent tyrant could ever possess the courage and energy required to overthrow him! The words of the ruler are also to be imitated and regarded as laws (Nic. 62). The virtues which will be inculcated in this way appear to be those concerned with general courteous and sociable behaviour and trustworthiness, and Isocrates, speaking as Nicocles, does not hesitate to show the worldly advantages these will bring.

Though a king is expected to embody the law for his subjects as well as to lay it down in a more formal way (Nic. 56, and note the reference to τοὺς νόμους τοὺς βασιλείαν), he is not himself impeded in his actions by law. Certainly it is fitting that the judgements of kings in matters of justice should be invariable 'like well-ordained laws' (To Nic. 18) but often Isocrates presents law as something restrictive, hampering corrective action, and, in particular, preventing prompt and innovative behaviour in the field of foreign affairs. (Philip is fortunate in being free of the 'politics and laws' binding men in most states [Phil. 14-15, 127].)

Law has a positive meaning for Isocrates only as one step in the process of civilization, a step taken many centuries before his own time. Apart from this, only νόμοι or τὰ νόμιμα in the broad sense are of value, whether these mean the customs of a country (as in Archid. 1), the way of life of an exemplar who is generally a ruler, or the collective moral outlook inherited from one's ancestors. They do not find favour when they are the decisions of the community arrived at by discussion and incorporated into the written legislation. The emphasis is moral rather than political in the sense the polis would recognize.¹⁸ The law is not

¹⁸ Note 18 over page.
personified as it was in the works of writers as different as Plato or pseudo-Lysias.\textsuperscript{19} It is, however, most effective when it is embodied in an individual or his actions. The description of the government of Theseus in the Helen shows very clearly and indeed almost prophetically how law could in the future be accommodated to the rule of one man and the language of democracy used to exalt monarchy. Theseus 'was so far from doing anything against the wishes of the citizens that he made the people master of the government' (κύρων τῆς πολιτείας). The people, however, believed that his sole rule was better than democracy, 'for ... so lawfully (νομίμως) and well did he administer the polis that even to this day traces of his mildness may be seen remaining in our institutions' (36-37). We may suspect that 'lawfully and well' are in Isocrates' view interchangeable, and that both refer to good order prevailing in the state rather than to any situation brought about by legislation.\textsuperscript{20}

XENOPHON

Xenophon throughout his works maintains a keen interest in the working-out of political problems, and in different compositions proposes a variety of solutions suitable to the different situations under discussion. This explains in part why in a work like the Cyropaedia or the Hiero he advocates monarchical government as the ideal, while discussions in the Memorabilia or the Oeconomicus admit other constitutions for consideration.

In all these works, however, we do gain the impression of a mind pragmatic but with certain firm opinions — or prejudices — which will appear as elements in any political proposals he makes. Because of

\textsuperscript{18} It is appropriate to recall here de Romilly's comment quoted in Chapter One, p.38: 'Il n'est pas contre la loi: simplement, il regarde par-delà'(La Loi, p.185).

\textsuperscript{19} See p.76 on pseudo-Lysias and note Plato's Crito, passim.

\textsuperscript{20} 'L'on voit ... que le respect dû aux lois compte peu, en fait, pour un des écrivains les plus avertis d'Athènes, dans lequel on se plaît à voir un prophète de l'unité grecque réalisée à l'époque hellénistique sous l'égide macédonienne', Mosse, La Fin de la démocratie athénienne, pp.388-9.
this, the conclusions he draws from an analysis of contemporary Athenian society and an account of an idealized Persia are not so far apart as we might expect.

The prevailing tendency among the more extreme Sophists of the late fifth century to undermine νόμος for the sake of φύσις struck no responsive chord in Xenophon, who did not meet the challenge to society that this posed head-on, but rather wanted to see both elements working together for the general good. In the Hiero, for example, νόμος, here more closely resembling the compulsion of custom than law, completes the work of nature in instilling affection for a person into his kin (Hiero 3.9). When both these forces, custom and nature, are lacking, as in the relations of a tyrant who hate rather than love him, such a ruler can hardly expect to gain the goodwill of his subjects either (ib. and cf. Oec. 30). Obviously, Nomos has here hardly any contact with the political sense; it falls into the category defined by Ostwald as describing 'the sphere of human conduct or of conduct of the gods judged by human standards'.

Another meaning of νόμος bringing it nearer to the sphere of public life, but not to any formal institution, is used to express the generally-held belief that when a city is captured the persons and possessions of those in it belong to the conquerors (Cyr. 7.5.73). This is of course no law or decree of the people, nor legislation from a lawgiver but rather customary behaviour sanctioned by use (cf. Thuc. 3.66.2). Νόμος for Xenophon can also suggest a state of law and order, without implying anything as to the form of government under which it exists. Those who have no care for the 'lawful' are associated with οἱ ἄνθρωποι (Hell. 4.4.3) and contrasted with νόμοι άνθρωποι who feel proper horror at the violation of religious sanctions by the killing of suppliants at the altar. Even the exhortation of Thrasybulus to the assembly after the overthrow of the Thirty, encouraging its members to abide by the established νόμοι, is really an appeal for a return to law and order (Εξέταστε δὲ ὅσα ἔχετε εὐθέως ταράττεσθαι ἀλλὰ τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς ἁρχαίοις χρῆσθαι) and not a call to adhere to the statutes (Hell. 2.4.42).

From Xenophon's analysis of the right way to run a household we learn a little more of what he understands by νόμος. A householder rules his domain as if it were a polis, and it is appropriate for him to possess τί ἠθους βασιλεύον (Oec. 21.10). Yet his rule is not to be arbitrary, for he is to use the laws of Draco and Solon as examples of what he wishes the regulations on his property to be: laws placed for the teaching of justice (Oec. 14.4). We discover therefore that the householder's 'political' rule is ethical rather than administrative. The laws are merely a means to a moral end; the method of their establishment is of no essential significance. In fact, where Draco and Solon failed, in prescribing punishment for evil behaviour but not reward for good, the 'laws' of the King of Persia may be invoked as more satisfactory examples (Oec. 14.6-7).

For Xenophon, then, rule by regulations over private territory can be 'political' and 'lawful'. He therefore offers little hindrance to a transfer of terms from one sphere to another, if this can make his point more clearly, or help, in practice, to the attainment of the desired object, in this case the production of virtue. Nevertheless, he is aware of the way in which νόμος was understood in the contemporary Athenian democracy and through the mouthpiece of Pericles, appropriately enough, provides a definition of law suitable to this form of government: law is 'whatever the multitude, coming together and approving, has written up, declaring what is prescribed and what forbidden'. Hence this logically leads to the definition: 'whatever the ruling part of the city, after deliberation, writes up as obligatory is called law' (Mem. 1.2.42-3). Such a definition is not the final answer because the essence of lawfulness is still lacking and under Alcibiades' persistent questioning Pericles eventually changes his position and concludes that whatever anyone compels rather than persuades someone to do, whether he puts it in writing or not, is force rather than law (Mem. 1.2.45). This means that 'law', simply because it is written, does not have unquestioned claim to our adherence.

While dismissing the claims to legitimacy of the tyrant and his decree, or the masses acting on a whim, Xenophon also deprives himself

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22 Cf. Plato, Politicus, 259b-c and note Aristotle, Politics 1252a, who disagrees.
of any simple objective test of the lawfulness of legislation, for to
discriminate between force and persuasion might be of considerable
difficulty. Since he does not accept a criterion like joint decision-
making to distinguish true and false law we conclude that this did not
impress him as the most important fact about the law.

When intent on expounding the duties of a citizen with regard to
the civil authority, Xenophon is willing to overlook the problems
involved in determining legality. He accepts that the lawful is the
just (Mem. 4.6.6, 'those obeying the law do what is just', and 'I say that
the lawful is just' and 'covenants which the citizens have made on what
is prescribed and forbidden are laws' — Mem. 4.4.12-13. But such
acceptance does not bind him to any form of government and the same
definition appears in the account of the education of Cyrus. Every law
considered as a fait accompli confronting the citizen was to be obeyed
and especially by the prince who has prescribed the law for all (Cyr.
1.3.17-18).

The presence or absence of law is important in determining if a
particular instance of one-man rule is kingship or tyranny; the former
is rule over willing subjects, in accordance with cities' laws — how
arrived at we are not told; the second, rule over unwilling subjects
and not in accord with the laws but just as the ruler wishes (Mem.
4.6.12). This certainly implies a measure of consultation in the making
of the laws, or else Xenophon must have envisaged the legality of a
particular decree being determined only after its implementation, when
the response of the subjects to it could be gauged.

Agesilaus of Sparta is the example Xenophon provides of the king
who obeys the laws of his country 'preferring to rule and be ruled law-
fully at home rather than having the greatest power in Asia' (Ages.
2.16). Xenophon elsewhere expresses his praise of the king for this:
'among the greatest benefits to his country I place this, that he was
clearly particularly obedient to the laws' (Ages. 7.2). This occurs in

23 See e.g. Cyr. 1.3.17: τὸ μὲν νόμιμον δύκαλου ἔλνας, τὸ δὲ ἄνομον βύαλον.
a list of the private virtues of the king; that is, his willingness to abide by the law is a quality of his character, not a description of his rule in constitutional terms. This obedience was clearly demanded on occasions by diplomatic expediency (see *Hell.* 5.4.13) and its significance appears to be derived more from the wholesome example it provides for the subjects — who, after all, would want to disobey when he saw the monarch obeying? — than from its demonstration that the ruler adheres to a fixed constitution.

Xenophon develops the relationship of the ruler and the law in a slightly more abstract way in the *Cyropaedia.* Cyrus, he says, saw that men appear to become better on account of written laws, but a good ruler he considered a 'seeing law', βλέψων νόμος, because capable not only of giving orders but of seeing a disorderly person and punishing him (8.1.21-22). These tasks are not, in a monarchy, distributed to different people, and even the first, τάττεων, is a personal activity rather than a social one.

Clearly the 'seeing law' is just a metaphor here, and has not reached the stage of being a personification. The king carries out the tasks performed at Athens by the servants of the law, that is to say, the citizens in their various capacities. Xenophon does not suggest that the ruler can be termed a law because of the example of his own life, as Isocrates does, though we might have expected it from his account of the ruler's task. For him the 'seeing law' has more the character of a nomophylax, as described by Xenophon himself:

εδόδασκον δὲ [my wife] ὅτι καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὔνομομυμέναις πόλεωι
οὐκ ἀρκεῖν δοκεῖ τοῖς πολιταίς, ἀν νόμους καλοὺς γράφωνται,
ἀλλὰ καὶ νομοφύλακας προσαυροῦνται, ὃτι λέγεις ἐπισκοποῦντες τὸν
μὲν πολιοῦντα τὰ νόμιμα ἐπανούσαν, ἀν δὲ τὸς παρὰ τοὺς νόμους
πολὺς, ζημιοῦσι (Οἰς. 9.14).

This may be an indication that εὔνομα is more important than νόμοι are; what is to be desired is the orderliness which Solon obtained for Athens, before νόμοι became 'laws'.

In keeping with this loose definition of νόμος is Xenophon's stress on the educative function of law, ignored by Isocrates. Laws come first in a list (comprising laws, teachers and rulers) of the elements necessary for producing honourable men (*Cyr.* 3.3.53). The laws will
grant a free and honoured life to the good, and a wretched, painful and unlivable one to the base, while the teachers and rulers will show and teach and accustom the citizens to do what is right. As a result such sentiments will be 'engraved' on men, a more significant achievement, we may assume, than the engraving of regulations on stone (3.3.52).

The educational scope of the laws presupposes a particular structure of society, and indeed Xenophon explicitly states that the majority of the laws are for teaching especially two things — ruling and being ruled (Cyr. 1.6.20). In Aristotle's Politics this learning is necessary for all the citizens (e.g. 1261b: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχουσιν οἱ δ' ἀρχονταὶ κατὰ μέρος ὀσπερ ἄν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι), even if Aristotle considered it unfortunate that men do not naturally fall into clear and exclusive categories of those suitable to rule and to serve. Xenophon had no such problem, as he believed that they did.

Unlike some of the orators of his day, Xenophon could not be satisfied with showing law as the work of men. He stressed the significance of the Delphic Oracle's pronouncement that the best way to please the gods lay in obeying the city (Mem. 4.3.16). The unwritten laws also derived their sanction from the gods. For they were the very ones Xenophon has Socrates prompting Hippias to define as 'those held in every country in the same way' and 'I think that gods place these laws for men' (Mem. 4.4.19). Xenophon is concerned to prevent a decline into relativism, whether the laws being attacked were written or ancestral, and Socrates is his exemplar here: προεύθετο (Socrates) μᾶλλον τοὺς νόμους ἐμίλησεν ἀποθανεῖν ἡ καρανομῶν τὴν (Mem. 4.4.4). Xenophon can be quoted to appear as a staunch upholder of law only so long as the process of popular law-making is not seen as necessary for the definition. For him only force, vaguely defined, invalidates legislation, but this is a moral and not a political judgement.25

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25 'Selon toute vraisemblance, il s'agissait, pour Xénophon, d'attendre le moment où le triomphe des idées philosophiques se traduirait dans l'ordre politique par l'établissement de lois qui seraient conformes aux exigences de la justice et de la raison. A ce moment serait vraiment réalisée l'identité du νόμος et du δίκαιον. Jusque là il fallait apprendre aux gens à respecter toute loi pour elle-même, parce qu'elle était la loi, les habituer à une discipline', Jean Luccioni, Les Idées politiques et sociales de Xénophon (Ophrys, Gap, Paris, 1947), p.132.
We need to remember that at the very time when Isocrates and Xenophon were, however unwittingly, setting νόμος off on its new path, Athenian orators who clung to the old image of the polis continued to use νόμος in the civic sense. If the views of such men had been universal and had persisted, political writers of the following centuries would have formed an opposition to monarchical government and its propaganda, or else had their catch-cry banned. Then, νόμος could only with difficulty have been taken over as a key-word in writings on kingship. We can say, therefore, that Isocrates and Xenophon had provided 'law' with a future, by extending its meaning and detaching it from its context in the polis and its constitution.

ARISTEAS

The unofficial influence that might be exercised by the writing of such a treatise as the Letter of Aristeas to Philocrates — and writers like Aristeas appear to have been uniformly sanguine in temperament — was the only way in which a man could follow in the tradition of the citizens of the polis, for whom the guarantee of a share in shaping policy had itself been provided by the law. The first reference to νόμος in the text clearly sets out the special Jewish character of the work. Law is now the divine law written in Hebrew characters, of supreme significance as the religious expression of a people, and including in its literature a whole history (3). Certainly the history itself was taken as an account of the results of obeying or disobeying the divine commands, but to term the whole of this 'law' is to use the word in a way unknown to the Greeks.

The law established by God, the sovereign master and creator known to others as Zeus (15), is a description of the Torah more comprehensible to the Greeks as an equivalent of νόμος. Neither Sophocles nor Plato would have quarrelled with ascribing to the law a divine origin. Isocrates, as we have seen (Panath. 169), recognized a νόμος of this kind. Jewish law is linked to the kingship of Ptolemy by way of a god who is responsible for both. This suggests that the law can in some way be compared with a political structure, paralleling but not excluding institutions such as monarchy.
Eleazar's parting advice to the seventy-two translators contains the remark that living rightly consists in keeping the laws (127). Such a remark, however, does not enlighten us as to the content of the laws nor show whether ΤΑ ΝΟΜΙΜΑ were limited to the injunctions of the Torah, but the equation of the law with living rightly was nothing new to Greek thought. Right reason is nevertheless introduced not as the law immanent in the universe as with the Stoics but as a reality behind the prescriptions of the Torah (161).

We should expect the law of the state to be more prominent in the questions put by Ptolemy on the duties of kingship than in the narrative that precedes or follows the symposia section, and this is the case, though Aristeas is tactfully imprecise in the injunctions he records. The king, to avoid lawless acts, must recollect that it is God who has given legislators their thoughts for the sake of preserving human lives (240). This implies that the ruler should exercise a general benevolence in his commands rather than that he should adhere to his own law.

Aristeas does record explicitly that kings should follow the laws (279) — the result will be that they will be doing what is just and so be able to redeem the lives of men — but there is nothing which gives flesh to this bare injunction. It is clear however that the result of the king's following the laws is more moral than political.26

Elsewhere there is little constitutional restriction shown on the king's power. Appeals to his love of glory and wish for praise are the only ways of ensuring that a king to whom everything is permitted (253) will not give way to anger and use his power of life and death cruelly. Similarly one respondent tells the king that monarchs have no need to be deceitful. Since they may do as they wish, no harm can come to them for revealing the truth (206). Certainly, public opinion seems in some way to take the place of a formal constraint on the king, and ἘΘΟΣ ΧΡΗΣΤΟΝ and a suitable education ensure, one supposes, that the king will keep

26 Only if we take 'laws' in a less than formal sense is Schubart's following comment true for the Letter: 'Zwar gibt ihnen der König Gestalt in seinen Gesetzen, die er auch selbst zu achten hat, und er sorgt dafür, dass Gesetz und Recht im Lande herrsche; er ist Schöpfer des Rechts, Diener des Rechts und Schützer des Rechts' (Schubart, 'Das hellenistische Königsideal', p.6. He is commenting on justice-related qualities.).
the laws he has made for others (see 290).

The slight stress laid on law by Aristeas reflects the position of νόμος in Ptolemaic Egypt:

Le monarque hellénistique légifère, non pas par des lois νόμοι, mais au moyen d'"ordres", προστάγματα, ou de "règlements", διαγράμματα. À quelques exceptions près, les actes normatifs du roi, lois par excellence, ne sont guère qualifiés de νόμοι.27

Номои there were, both νόμοι τῆς χώρας and νόμοι πολιτικοί,28 but these were effective only because the sovereign was prepared to countenance their operation in cases where his regulations did not apply. Nomoi here would be better translated in its early sense of custom, so long as this implies the binding power of a rule of conduct (perhaps even written) stopping short of that belonging to an actual work of state legislation.

The νόμος πολιτικός τῶν Ἰουδαίων29 was probably of more relevance to the Jews in Egypt than the prescriptions of the king. Those men abiding by the law of Moses (i.e. the Torah and its interpretation) would describe it by the word νόμος only when the latter had lost its link with the polis. The king is connected only indirectly with these rules of the second rank by confirming their validity.

Aristeas sees the royal office as involving the exercise of virtues which all men may possess, though in a varying degree. Thus while he does not set specific limits to the king's power, neither does he proclaim him law incarnate. His concern is not to give an account of


28 'The native law ... was translated into Greek and then confirmed by the king. In contrast to this, Greek law was composed of the νόμοι πολιτικοί, the laws of the citizens of the three Greek Poleis and the numerous Greek Politeumata', Ehrenberg, The Greek State, p.215.

Cf. Modrzejewski, 'La Règle de Droit', p.150, 'il faut distinguer les règles, pratiquées par la population autochtone du pays conquis, νόμοι τῆς χώρας, des règles importées en Égypte par les immigrants. L'adjectif πολιτικὸς s'impose'.

29 Tcherikover and Fuks (CPJ, p.36), refer to the 'possible hint of some "political law" of Jews' in their document No. 128 (i.e. P. Ent. 23 on pp.236-8).
kingship in metaphysical or mystical terms nor to describe the
terms of society in which kingship finds its place at the summit.
He hopes that moral excellence in the ruler will assure the happiness
and well-being of the subjects, and in the elevation of the quality of
justice, he finds a substitute for the rule of formal law.30

It is interesting to notice that, whereas in the fourth-century
speech Against Aristogeiton, law was a gift of God (among other things),
in Aristeas many other entities are so described (as e.g. love, the
ability to do good and abstain from evil, universal popularity, the
glory of kingship, the possession of intelligence and the ability to
judge).31 All the items, except the glory of kingship, could belong
just as appropriately to the private individual as to the monarch. So,
too, we may note that when Plato used the term δεσμος he did so
metaphorically to refer to the unwritten laws or universal customs which
bind the state together. When Aristeas uses the same image, it is much
more abstract. Now it is φιλανθρωπία that is the 'bond of goodwill'
(265) — and the change to this quality is typical.

HELENISTIC ATTITUDES

The Stoics may be considered partly responsible for the free use of
νόμος from the third century B.C. on. Εὔνομος for Zeno was the object
of political organization, and νόμος was the 'pasture' — νομος — on which
the human herd was nourished in common (Plut. Mor. 329b). It was also,
and more significantly, the right reason penetrating all things, one
with Zeus, being the ruler of all that is (D.L. 7.88), as Chrysippus
noted.32 The reason or Logos is natural law (φύσις νόμος — SVF 2.528).
Diogenes Laertius reports this: 'by nature and not by convention,
justice as well as law and right reason exist' (D.L. 7.128). In fact,

30 See e.g. 189, 209, 212, 232, 259, 267, 279, 280, 292 for references
to justice.

31 See e.g. 229, 231, 225, 224, 276.

32 'Besonders innig wird nun aber von der Stoa der Zusammenhang
zwischen der Menschennatur und der allgemeinen Natur oder Weltvernunft,
die Harmonie zwischen den Bedürfnissen und Forderungen menschlicher
Gemeinschaft und der im Weltall geltenden gemeinsamen Ordnung betont',
Kaster, Studien, p.64.
Chrysippus began his book on the law with the words: ὁ νόμος πάντων ἐστι βασιλεὺς θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων πραγμάτων (SVF 3.314). This is a development of Pindar's much-quoted verse33 which first elevates what is now universal nomos into a person. The poleis too are no longer the small, self-contained political communities (these are called poleis but are not so) but συνοικία η ὁ δῆμος ἀστείσθαι τῇ σύστημα καὶ πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ νόμου διοικοῦμεν (SVF 3.327). Both these tendencies show how the early Stoics could come to support a universal monarch, if he was seen to embody nomos.

The Epicureans took little account of political life, except to warn against it, and conclude that laws were made for the sake of the wise, to prevent them from suffering harm (fr. 81, Bailey), but from the beginning the Pythagoreans had concerned themselves with questions on the best type of government. The neo-Pythagorean writers were the heirs, perhaps we should say the illegitimate heirs, of a tradition which made much of law. Even in their most extravagant descriptions of kingship they remembered this and paid deference to νόμος. But what exactly is this νόμος? The work of Archytas, 'On Law and Justice', described how the law exercised an educative and harmonizing influence on men (p.82). This law was not a matter of written regulations, however. Archytas deplores these as much as did Isocrates (see p.86). It was closer to custom and at the same time in accord with nature (pp.83-4). On one occasion he writes that the living law is the king, and the inanimate law the written one (p.82). This is susceptible, as Armand and Louis Delatte note, of two interpretations, one understanding the king as himself the embodiment of the law, the other, as interpreter and upholder of the law.34 Archytas goes on to say that the ruler follows and abides by the law, thus developing the moderate side of his statement.

What of the neo-Pythagorean writers on kingship? For Diotogenes, the basis of the monarchy is most lawful and just, but he too describes the king as living law or lawful ruler, evincing the same ambiguity as we met in Archytas (p.263). At the end of this extract, he again describes the king as νόμος ἐφύξος accompanying it with the account of

33 νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θεῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων.
him as ἄρχων ἐπὶ ἀναρχείαν (p.265). Ecphantus too sees the king and the law as interchangeable terms (p.274). This in the context seems to suggest a common task for king and law of bringing about εὐθυσία (just as it exists in the universe) which implies nothing ἀναρχία being found (p.274). Diotogenes, in his extract On Holiness, stresses, again like Archytas, that laws should be found in the habits of the citizens, not on houses and doors (p.36). Throughout, the educative and persuasive rather than the public, compulsive side of law is emphasized by these writers, and only in association with the ruler.

CICERO

Cicero, somewhat like Isocrates and Xenophon, lived in an age of transition from a time when law was assumed, at least in theory, to be the basis of government, to an era of autocratic rule. Cicero also provided arguments for monarchical government while still maintaining the importance of the law (see e.g. De Rep. 1.55-64).

Law, indeed, was for Cicero a most necessary concept in political life. It was the basis of the Roman state, and the laws that state possessed, together with its way of life and customs, were, in his view, the cause of its supremacy (see De Rep. 5.1-2). It may therefore appear difficult for Cicero to reconcile his theorizing on the rule of one man with his belief in the law's impersonal sway over the lives of men, yet he certainly made the attempt.

His serious analysis of law as such shows awareness of the profound difference between law in states (including the Roman Republic) and the law of nature (see e.g. De Leg. 1.42ff.). Under another aspect, Cicero sees law as one means of bringing about for the many what the teachings of philosophy effect for the few, that is, correct behaviour (De Rep. 1.3). Laws are here seen as superior in impact (see too De Rep. 3.7). Cicero could attack law as it existed, on many counts: Iam vero illud stultissimum, existimare omnia iusta esse quae sit in populorum institutis aut legibus (De Leg. 1.42). Not only may the written law of states be objectively no true law, but a law may in some
sense exist even if a state takes no account of it:

\[\text{nec quia nusquam erat scriptum, ut contra omnis hostium copias in ponte unus adsisteret, a tergoque pontem interscindit tuberet, idcirco minus Coolitem illum rem gessisse tantam fortitudinis lege atque imperio putabimus (De Leg. 2.10).}\]

This purism does not appear in dealing with the actual laws proposed in the *De Legibus*. As he acknowledges, *nihil habui sane (aut) non multum quod putarem novandum in legibus (De Leg. 3.12)*, and indeed there is little attempt to connect the specific laws with the ideas on law in general given in the prooemia by showing their logical derivation from the principles expressed there.

Law, as Cicero describes it, in its essence is what connects men with the gods in *communio iuris* (De Leg. 1.23); ‘it is highest reason inborn in nature, *ratio summa insita in natura*, ordering what should be done and forbidding the contrary. This exists in man — confirmed and perfected by mind’ (De Leg. 1.18). In Book Two, Cicero is even more dogmatic: law is not something worked out by the talents of men, nor anything decreed by the people, but something eternal, ruling the whole world by the wisdom of command and prohibition (De Leg. 2.8). This is of course the Stoic definition, and appears in expanded form in the *De Republica*: ‘True law is right reason, in accord with nature, applying to all men, unchangeable and eternal. By its commands, this law summons men to the performance of their duties, by its prohibitions it restrains them from doing wrong.’ But, unlike the laws of states, its commands and prohibitions always influence good men, but are without effect upon the bad (De Rep. 3.33).

Further on in the *De Legibus* Cicero brings law down into the sphere of civic life when he describes how laws were discovered by individuals *eosque qui primam eiusmodi scita sanxerint, populis ostendisse ea se scripturos atque latus, quibus illi adscitis susceptisque honeste beateque viverent (De Leg. 2.11)*. Such rules drawn up and put into effect were called laws. Any judgement about which pieces of legislation merit this title must be subjective.

Cicero expresses his awareness of the gap between the law as it exists in states and the true law most clearly in the *De Officiis*, where he describes the *ius gentium* and the *ius civile*. The former in his
account of it becomes the equivalent of the law of nature and like it
does not apply at the level of the civitas, even though ideally it
should do so (De Off. 3.68-9); the gap between ideal and reality is
due to depravatio consuetudinis.

Because, then, Cicero sees law as the substance of which human
affairs retain only the shadow and images (ib.), it is easy for him to
dismiss actual law from his considerations of the ideal. Law on earth
is an imperfect representation of a divine reality, which only some are
able to grasp; these privileged individuals may be observing the 'law',
while ignoring the law of the state. As Wirszubski notes:

It seems that the political experience both of his own and of
the preceding age led Cicero to the conclusion that legality
did not alone suffice to secure the freedom and well-being of
the State and its citizens. He thought the constitution ought
to have a moral basis and a moral purpose, and, as such, it
ought to have permanent validity irrespective of political
expediency or the changing moods of the people.35

A person possessing such an insight would guide his life non Quiritium
sed sapientium iure (De Rep. 1.27).

We can see then how Cicero could unite the civil leaders and the
laws in a bond where the leader's character became itself a law:

Videtis igitur magistratus hanc esse vim ut praesit
praescribatque recta et utilia et coniuncta omni legibus. Ut
enim magistratibus leges, ita populo prassunt magistratus,
vereque dici potest, magistratum legem esse loquentem, legem
autem mutuum magistratum (De Leg. 3.2).36

Despite the radical assault on the position of positive law that
this passage seems to contain, we may agree with Lepore, when we take
the subsequent amplification into consideration, that

As Smethurst comments of both Cicero and Isocrates, 'even when
discussing specifically political problems they adopt a moral rather
than a legal or constitutional standpoint' ('Cicero and Isocrates',
pp.306-7).

36 G.J.D. Aalders, 'ΝΟΜΟΣ ΕΜΠΤΥΧΟΣ' in Politeia und Respublica ([edited by
Peter Steinmetz], Palingenesia 4, Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1969),
iminizes the significance of this passage: 'Nicht nur ist hier der
Magistrat an die Stelle des Königs getreten, sondern der Magistrat ist
auch die Verkörperung von Gesetzen, die von anderen geschaffen und die
schriftlich fixiert worden sind' (p.327).
tutto questo sviluppo mostra chiaro che non può identificarsi qui la legge con il singolo ed il suo arbitrio, ma che d'altra parte ogni ordinamento astratto ha bisogno dell' interprete e dell' incarnazione individuale e concreta di esso.\textsuperscript{37}

Cicero expresses the task of public figures in a more mundane but essentially similar way in \textit{Pro Cluentio} (146): \textit{legum ministri magistratus, legum interpretes iudios.}

The moral impact of the magistrates may well lie outside the interpretation or application of a particular law. In the \textit{De Officiis}, Cicero expresses the belief that it is desirable that those at the head of the state be like the laws which are led to punish, not through anger, but through a sense of justice (1.89, cf. Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, 1287a-b). This is no radical devolution of power to officials enabling them to be their own law henceforth. But if this wish were to be fulfilled in an actual system of government, statesmen might then acquire much of the sanctity of the law which they were allegedly merely imitating.

In \textit{De Republica}, Cicero has the advocates of aristocracy explaining that a leading-citizen does not impose laws on the people which he does not obey himself, a moderate and conventional view, but the \textit{princeps} also 'puts forward his own life as a law to his citizens' (1.52). We note that here the \textit{principes} of section 51 have coalesced into one person, no doubt under the influence of the preceding phrase, \textit{virtute vero guberna rem publicam}. To maintain a clear distinction between ruling and being ruled, Cicero sets the one over against the many. (We may compare this with the description of the \textit{man} looked for in 2.69, who provides an example in his own person, instead of issuing formal legislation.)

The origin of law as Cicero describes it also goes further in the direction of providing one individual for our admiration. In the \textit{De Officiis}, Cicero shows justice originating under one just and good man, while laws were discovered to replace this method of government, when the monarchy failed to maintain its high standing (2.41-2). With a slightly different emphasis, he explains in the \textit{De Republica} that there was nothing so 'kingly' as the explanation of justice, which included

the interpretation of the law which private citizens were once accustomed to seek from their kings (5.3).\textsuperscript{38}

We may think that if laws replaced personal absolute rule, they were an improvement on it, but Cicero, like Plato in the \textit{Politicus}, describes the transition as an unfortunate necessity, but one which need not be binding in an ideal situation.\textsuperscript{39} Neither, it seems, did these laws need to apply in moments of crisis. In the \textit{Eleventh Philippic}, Cicero asked by what law or right Cassius' activity in Syria could be justified, and himself supplied the answer:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Eo quod Iuppiter ipse sanxit, ut omnia quae rei publicae salutaria essent, legitima et iusta haberentur. Est enim lex nihil aliud nisi recta et a numine deorum tracta ratio, imperans honesta, prohibens contraria. Huic igitur legi paruit Cassius, cum est in Syriam profectus, alienam provinciam si homines legibus scriptis uterentur els vero oppressis suam lege naturae (Phil. 11.28).}
\end{quote}

Traditional definitions of magistracy break down, for \textit{in conservanda civium libertate, esse privatum neminem} (De Rep. 2.46). Law, then, as we meet it in Cicero, can be no bulwark against or obstacle to the rule of one man.

PHILO

'\textit{Law is nothing else than reason prescribing what should be done and forbidding what should not be done}' (Praem. 55). This Stoic

\textsuperscript{38} 'Non credo s'abbiano a spendere molte parole per dimostrare quel che è chiarissimo a chi abbia seguito la scorsa delle dottrine degli altri filosofi e storici: qui si ha appunto che la funzione più tipica della regalità è l'\textit{explanatio aequitatis}, lo stesso che \textit{interpretatio iuris} (per ciò che non vi sono leggi prima e all'infuori dei re), e che i privati chiedono al re ... il \textit{ius}: e il re quindi è interprete, e \textit{arbiter litis}, giudice, ché non ve n'è altri privato, e tutto si attua per mezzo di risoluzioni regie' (Filippo Cancelli, 'Sull' origine del diritto secondo un moto ricorrente in scrittori ellenistico-romani, e Cicerone: "de Re Publica" 5.3', \textit{Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris}, 37 (1971), p.336.

\textsuperscript{39} Omnes antiquae gentes regibus quondam paruerunt. Quod genus imperii primum ad homines iustissimos et sapientissimos deferebatur (De Leg. 3.4). Note too \textit{De Off.} 2.42, referred to above, which clearly shows law as a poor substitute for monarchy.
definition of law occurs fairly frequently in Philo's works, and shows how he had adopted one important element of the contemporary Graeco-Roman culture. It fails to show the way in which he modified it to embrace the Jewish law, or rather to apply to this law alone. The result of this modification had little influence on contemporary political thought. Yet it is important to consider this process, for it is merely the most dramatic instance of the many reworkings of themes taking place in the centuries of the Hellenistic and Roman Empires.

Whether Philo was initiating his fellow-Jews into the deeper mysteries of the Torah, or writing an apologetic work for sympathetic Gentiles, the Law was his constant concern. The books of the Exposition of the Law, probably written to reveal to non-Jews the treasures of the Pentateuch, deal with many topics, cosmology, the principles guiding the Jewish nation and their application in rules and ethical attitudes, the sanctions attached to these prescriptions, and the incarnation of the Law in persons. For all of these, Law is the term covering the right order which has been imposed by God, the supreme lawgiver, and mediated through the Logos.

In the De Opificio Mundi the stage is set. As Philo noted elsewhere (Vit. Mos. 2.37), 'the making of the universe constitutes the beginning of the laws'. Here then we see man and universe both created after a pattern and subject to a law. This law is in Stoic terms right reason, but for Philo this does not mean simply cosmic harmony. It signifies also a divine ordinance and this presupposes a personal director (see Opif. 143). This aspect of the law of nature, the source of all law, had not received such stress in the writings of Hellenistic philosophers, if we may judge from the fragments of their work that we possess. Rather, Nomos and the deity had tended to become indistinguishable.

Plato identifies the Lawgiver as Creator and Father transcending every virtue and excellence (Opif. 7-8). This transcendence does not deter Philo from using the language of political theory to emphasize the overriding control of God, who, like a charioteer or a helmsman, directs

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each thing where he wills 'according to law and right' κατὰ νόμον καὶ δικαιον (Opif. 46). Philo's law then is a personal communication from God. Pre-classical Greece had regarded law as a gift of a god or hero. What Philo claimed for the Jewish law, however, was uniqueness as the revelation of the will of God, as well as universal applicability.

When a contrast had developed in Greece in the fifth century between written and unwritten laws, polis laws often appeared second-best. As the prestige of the cities declined in the next century, it was not surprising that unwritten laws should come to refer no longer to local custom but to a natural or cosmic right order. Thus the Stoics discerned a law of nature in what was the true polis of men, the entire cosmos, the home of all that was mortal and immortal. Only by living in accordance with it could man attain to virtue and hence happiness.

In Philo's justification of the order followed in the Pentateuch, he stresses the specifically Jewish addition to this point of view. Moses, he says (Vit. Mos. 2.48), began his account with the creation of the universe to show that the same person, the father and creator of the world, was also truly its lawgiver, and that the man who obeys the laws will take pleasure in following nature and being in accord with the universal order. A little later, Philo explains that to describe an earthly city's origin, as Plato did, for example, and prescribe laws appropriate to it is to demean law. The genesis of the 'megalopolis', i.e. the universe, was, however, suitable as a starting point, as the laws to be described later were the very image of the constitution of the universe (see Vit. Mos. 2.49-51).

The Greeks had turned to a supra-terrestrial law as the norm partly through dissatisfaction with the actual laws of cities. Philo is able to turn this to good account by asserting with the backing of non-Jewish sources that civic laws were full of error. The exception was, of course, the law of Moses. It was Philo's aim to demonstrate that the law of God handed down by Moses reflected the nature of the universe, and to reveal the failings of all man-made laws, which are mere additions to nature, excesses without avail (see Jos. 30-31, and cf. Mut. 104).41

41 Jos. 30-31: ἔστι δ' ἡ πλεονεξία καὶ ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀκυστία, δι' ἅς
His attack on the actual laws in force among other peoples makes much of their liability to change. Philo also uses his discussion on the nature of the politician in De Josepho 28-31 to express his scorn of the laws, so-called, passed by the crowd, the real ruler, because it is not content with the law of nature. A Sophist condemning all civic laws as unnatural could not show more distrust of the processes of society than Philo seems to evince here. Yet Philo does not despair of organized society, simply because his scepticism in one respect is caused by his certainty as to the right way to run the state. The task of the politikos as described in De Somnitis 1.220-224 is difficult and his life is defiled simply because his soul has not been host to the biblical guidelines which are the source of well-ruled cities.  

The Law of Moses, as a positive law, might appear to outsiders simply as a useful, if somewhat idiosyncratic, set of instructions delivered by a tribal god to his people. As such, it did not affect non-Jews, except for rousing their antagonism if they experienced its exclusiveness. Philo realized only too well that for the Jews to bring upon themselves the dislike and prejudice of the people with whom they had to live was to threaten their very existence. He did not write merely for prudential reasons, however, but because of his philosophical inclinations he could sympathize with the Hellenistic thinkers who had seen law as a metaphysical reality rather than a set of rules. It was clear that his main task was to find a way in which the written law of Moses could be equated with the law of the philosophers.

Philo, like the Stoics, saw positive law as an insufficient guide
for right living, and accepted their conclusions on the pattern of
behaviour to be found in the cosmos. He shows his readiness to adopt
their terms but alter their reference most clearly in his use of the
expression 'unwritten laws'. For him they generally refer to laws that
are not in the Decalogue, or else, by extension, to individuals. He
endeavoured to describe the patriarchs in a way that would win the
approval of the Gentiles, by showing that these untutored men of virtue
did, without the law, what the law commanded. Hence the law, when it
came, was truly the law of nature, yet the same could not be said of the
divergent views of other races.

Thus in the introduction to De Decalogo he explains how he will
pass from describing the patriarchs — the founders of the Jewish nation
and themselves unwritten laws — to give an account of the written laws
(Dec. 1). Here we have the expression 'unwritten laws' used in the same
ways as at the end of the De Abrahamo: τοιούτος ο θύς τού πρώτου καὶ
άρχηγος τού ἔθους ἑστών, ὡς μὲν ἔννοια φύσουσι, νόμοις, ὡς δ' ὁ παρ
ἐμοῦ λόγος ἑδεικε, νόμος αὐτὸς ὡς καὶ θεσμὸς ἄγραφος (Abr. 276). Else­
where (e.g. Spec. Leg. 4.149–150, Virt. 194), Philo suggests that the
lives of the virtuous contain in themselves examples of good conduct, or
unwritten laws.

This is Philo's own contribution to personalizing the laws, but he
also avails himself of the notion of living law, which had come into
common use in political discussion. This refers once to the patriarchs (Abr.
5) and is in the same vein as the description of them as unwritten laws.
When applied to Moses, however, the political element — political, that
is, in the broadest sense — appears. Because his duty as legislator or
as king is the same as that of the law, to command what is right
and to forbid the opposite, it is reasonable, Philo concludes, to term
him 'living law' (Vit. Mos. 1.162 and 2.4). Indeed, the political gifts
are effective only in association with the tokens of divine approval

διδασκάλεια φρονήσεως καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ὁσιότητος, ἐν οἷς καὶ ἡ τῆς
Ἀλλής ἀρετῆς μεταποίησις μεγαλοπρεπῶς διερευνᾶται.

43 See e.g. Abr. 16: πολλὰ μὲν οὖν οἱ νομοθέται, πολλὰ δὲ οἱ παντοχόοι
νόμοι πραγματεύονται περὶ τοῦ τῶν ψυχῶν ἐλευθερος ἔλεγχων χριστῶν
ἀναπλήρωσαι. ὡς δ' ἄνευ παρανυόεσις δύχα τοῦ κελευσθήναι γενόμενος εὐελπίς
ἀγάφα μὲν νόμω δὲ πάλιν αὐτομαθεῖ τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην πεπαλαθεῖται, δὴ
ἡ φύσις ἔσηκε.
and providence such as the gift of prophecy.

If law can be embodied in one man, it cannot be brought about simply by the agreement of the members of the community. Philo insists on the need to believe that the laws are not the inventions of a man, but quite clearly the oracles of God (Dec. 15). Law may therefore be described as divine (see Opif. 143, Migr. 130, where the law is defined as divine reason) and in this way we may see an individual who has God's favour described as 'either God or his Logos or divine law' (Jos. 174).

This occurs to be sure in a remark of Joseph's brother, and is an expression of wonder, not a statement about God or law as such, but the closeness that it implies between person and abstraction shows how strong was Philo's tendency to personify law, while placing it in a context where its cosmic significance was most fully displayed. This could only reduce the direct social impact of law.

Elsewhere the laws and customs of human contrivance are measured against those of nature. They are generally found to be far inferior but in association with right reason may have a part to play in fitting the individual for life. Law in the polis sense is not present here, so poses no threat to the adoption of monarchical government as an ideal. But law in the senses we have examined, though occasionally identified with or coming through individual leaders, still maintains a certain independence because of its religious basis. This very fact, however, also meant that for Philo it could easily be detached from its social setting, and so was unlikely to appear in opposition to the ruler who claimed to act in accord with it.

Philo, as a Jewish writer, was not able to vest a Gentile monarch with the authority of the law of the patriarchs in his theorising, but he could go very close to this in the Legatio and clearly found no difficulty in the idea on political grounds.

SENeca

From Seneca, we receive a very different kind of evidence, and as our first Roman theorist of the Empire, what he has to say about law is
of particular significance. For him, law was far from being a univocal term, and of its various meanings not the least important was that derived from the Stoic philosophy he espoused. This law of nature is indeed as much his concern as any state law despite his political involvement. It may refer to the structure of the universe (Cons. ad Helv. 6.8), where all is movement, and thus explain the process of death in mankind. In fact Virtue recognizes difficilas temporum as a law of nature (Vit. Beat. 15.5). It is then part of the wise man's task to recognize nature's rule — natura enim ducetur utendum est (Vit. Beat. 8.1) — and as a good Stoic, Seneca saw this not simply as accepting the inevitable but as a positive step towards virtue: ab illa [natura] non deerrare et ad illius legem exemplique formari sapientia est (Vit. Beat. 3.3). This link between an amoral decree about man's destiny and the behaviour expected of man allows the law of nature to acquire an ethical content and to appear in some cases almost the equivalent of unwritten law (in the sense used, for example, by Sophocles and Xenophon). No one departs from the law of nature and sheds the man in him to such an extent that he is evil merely for the sake of being evil (Ben. 4.17.3).

Law in this sense has little connection with political life and consequently it is not surprising to find that the distinction between the Empire and the world where the law of nature holds sway is often stressed: officia civis amisit? Hominis exercet (Tranq. 4.4). This is quite different from the attitude common in the days of the Republic when the Stoic oikoumene and the Roman Empire were seen as coterminous. Seneca goes so far as to acknowledge two commonwealths: duas res publicas animo complectatur, alteram magnam et vere publicam3 qua dii atque homines continentur ... alteram,oui nos adscriptis condicio nascondi (Otio 4.1).

In the De Clementia, the political essay addressed to Nero, Seneca cannot maintain this division and must therefore turn to an idealized

44 Cf. Cons. ad Helv. 13.2: si ultimum diem non quasi poenam, sed quasi naturae legem aspicis ex quo pictore metum mortis eieceris, in id nullius rei timor audebit intrare.

45 Prima che "Romano", Seneca si sente "uomo": prima delle leggi positive di Roma vi è la legge di natura, che stringe fra di loro tutti gli uomini proprio in quanto sono uomini", Italo Lana, Seneca e la politica (Giappichelli, Turin, 1970), p.41.
portrait of the ruler. In his endeavour to fit him into the cosmic framework adopted elsewhere, he describes the character of the ruler and explains that his power is not harmful, if adjusted to the law of nature, and this we have a right to expect, as nature herself fashioned the king (Clem. 1.19.1-2).

We can see that Seneca's aim is to remove monarchical rule from the area of political debate and conflict, where a variety of forms of government could compete for approval. Had he been a consistent advocate of the tranquil life of retirement, he would have had no need to develop such a theory. State rule and the rule of the cosmos would have been kept strictly separate, the one governed by imperfect human law or the will of one man, the other by the law of nature which is the law of God. Only Seneca's preoccupation with the status and value of political activity compelled him to use the rhetoric of politics to join the two spheres.

Law in the sense of a body of regulations for a state is not given any basis in nature. Before such laws existed, one man was both the leader and the law to his followers: *eundem habebant et ducem et legem* (Ep. 90.4), for it is nature's way that the weaker should submit to the more powerful (*ib.*). This is a theme going back to Plato and common in Pythagorean political thought. The best person and thus the most powerful is of course the wise man, and for Seneca such an individual played the part assigned to the demigods in Plato's Age of Kronos. Law embodied in a person, then, makes its appearance at the beginning of man's history. Law by itself develops not from man's sociability but from the vices of men whereby a kingdom became a tyranny and law is needed to repair the situation. It is therefore a remedy for a failure on the part of society (cf. its introduction in the *Polticos*) and here too the wise make up for the deficiency.

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Lawgivers such as Solon and Lycurgus bestowed benefits on the rest of mankind, through a fixed body of laws, so that law is the result not of nature but of art. Yet the social hierarchy can still be said to maintain the natural order — the wise prescribing for the less wise — and the wise man is the means of bringing the law of life to light and making life conform to universal principles (Ep. 90.34). Art therefore builds on nature: nature does not work its will unaided. Indeed nature as it applies to man always needs to be interpreted in a specific way which takes account of reason, and its meaning is thereby changed considerably.

Seneca tends to down grade law as legal prescription at the same time as he elevates custom. The conventions of human life are more binding than any law (Ben. 5.21.1). Here Seneca sees law as inevitably restricted in its range. We may compare Aristotle's comment that the law in itself has no power to secure obedience save the power of custom (Politics 1269a). Law also fails to account for a large portion of the moral life (Ira 2.28.2), for the principle of duty has a far wider application than that of law. Seneca is the typical Stoic here when he exclaims at the multitudes of demands laid upon man by a sense of duty, by humanity, generosity, justice and integrity, qualities all outside the statute books.

Though Seneca views written law primarily under its negative aspect: leges a scelere deterrent, praecepta in officium adhortantur (Ep. 94.37), he concedes it may yet have an important role in leading to right behaviour if it not only commands but also teaches. What shows this is that states with defective laws will have defective morals (Ep. 94.38). Here the pedagogic role of the law makes it similar to a ruler whose task is also to educate rather than to command.

Laws that win commendation from Seneca are not those developed in the life of the forum. The benefits bestowed on mankind by Zeno and Chrysippus were greater than if they had carried laws and in fact they did so, not for one state but for the whole of mankind (Otio 6.4). Again we see here that actual governments and external regulations are unimportant when placed alongside the moral injunctions which accord with nature and are brought into prominence by philosophy.
Because state law is so limited, one of the main prerogatives of a king is his power to preserve life by actually breaking the law. He alone can do this, while everyone is able to break the law to destroy life (Clem. 1.5.4). The personal intervention of the ruler supplements the deficiencies of the law, just as for Aristotle the application of equity makes up for the lacunae in the law.

Paradoxically, however, Seneca also claims that the law is derived from the ruler, for Nero is told that he can bring it into the light of day (Clem. 1.1.4). The image is of the ruler bringing forth laws into light from darkness, and the immediate reference of Seneca's remark to Nero is no doubt to the transition from Claudius' reign to his successor's; yet we should not ignore the connection thus made between the ruler as source of law, and the philosopher who is also the means of bringing into view the law of nature (Ep. 90.34). Seneca is still far from making the ruler the embodiment of the law and indeed he does not precisely attribute to him the functions of a legislator. The monarch is to make use of law — considered as a good — and transcend it when it is seen as a limitation on truly kingly actions.

Certainly Seneca does not look to law to effect the smooth functioning of state machinery. The task of the lex is to inspire, as law of nature, the man seeking true wisdom, so that he becomes contented with his situation, and shapes his actions accordingly (Ep. 90.34). If these actions are to be political, they may be so in an informal way, and just as fruitfully, Seneca believes, as when they are related to the exercise of an official position. No king need then fear lex as his rival, unless he clearly transgresses the law of nature, a possibility which in theory Seneca does not admit, even though his examples of evil behaviour in the case of Gaius and other rulers are many.

Musonius Rufus enjoyed the favour and suffered the displeasure of several monarchs. Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch and Pliny the Younger were contemporaries who all took part in some way in public life under the Empire. These later writers were to witness further instances of unworthy rulers who quite clearly did not abide by the law of nature. What response did this fact evoke in them?
Musonius Rufus comments on the king's relationship to law just once in his speech to the 'king' of Syria, but this is a most important instance for us. He tells how the king needs to be blameless and perfect since he must be living law 'as the ancients called it'. This involved εὖνομαν μὲν καὶ ὅμωνον μηχανῶμενον, ἄνωμαν δὲ καὶ στάσιν ἀπεέργοντα (p.283) and the way to arrive at this state is of course through learning, coupled with possession of an outstanding nature (p.284). There is nothing here about any other practical information that the king should possess, or about his subjects and how he should relate to them by means of the laws. For Musonius the personal law that is the ruler is all that counts.

Dio Chrysostom

Dio, as well as writing specifically on kingship and tyranny, also composed essays on law and custom; so that we find in his works allusions to the position of law in a variety of contexts. Immediately, we are confronted with contradictions, but it is not surprising that the value of law varies between Orations 75 and 76 which are very much in the style of compositions of the New Sophistic school, made to order to express a particular point of view. For on the one hand we find law as necessary to public life as διάνοια is for the sanctity of the individual (75.10), while, on the other, in Oration Seventy-Six law is necessary only because all men are not good, and a weakness in law is that it cannot bind kings as custom does (76.4 — a piece of special pleading if ever there was!). The simplicity attributed to law in one essay is a quality of custom as opposed to law in the other (see 75.4 and 76.4).

In a wider sense, law derives its importance from being closely linked with the reasoning element. Just as someone without reason is not in fact a man, neither is there a polis without the element of law, and lawfulness presupposes an intelligent and ordering power (36.20). In the universe as a whole, this reasoning power is most manifest, under a rule of the most righteous and perfect, and with τύχης τε ἀγαθῆς καὶ
δαυμονος ὁμοιος καὶ προνοιας the world is guided, and man also, since he has a common nature with the universe, for they are both ordered by ἐν ὕμνοι καὶ νόμῳ, and share the same polity. This is therefore the true source of νόμος, allied here with the more lofty word ἡθομος which strongly suggests the imposition of a decree. A man becomes νόμιμος as well as ἡθομικός καὶ κόσμος by defending and not opposing this polity (1.42-3).

Like Isocrates, Dio sees φύσις as making up for the omissions of the law — boys share citizenship with men, being citizens by nature though not performing the duties of a citizen or having a share in law (36.23). In this respect law needs supplementing, although it is not shown competing with a standard that is more objective and therefore superior. Yet to establish the laws of nature as the true guide for man (see 80.5) is to decry the laws made by man. Even the laws of Solon and Draco, of Numa and Zaleucus were far from perfect, and to claim that justice resides in laws made by men themselves strikes Dio as ridiculous; he makes the contrast as impressive as possible. On one side is the law of nature, abandoned and slighted by men, on the other, tablets and statute books and inscribed pillars treasured for the legislation they contain, and this Dio believes is a proof of the folly of men (ib.).

When Dio discusses the requirements and characteristics of the polis, he defines it in typically Stoic terms, as a mass of men dwelling in the same place and regulated by law (36.20), but he does not then explain whether this refers to the divine law of the cosmos or that made by man. Neither does he propose that the two may be harmonized in actual legislation as Cicero had done.

Laws exist because of orders and regulations, but Dio does not suggest that they should be arrived at by consultation or after ascertaining the popular will. The very general sense in which Dio uses the term means that he can accord a life following justice and the laws even to the Scythians despite their lack of the other marks of civilization, and their nomadic life (69.6). He is not interested in describing their social structure and showing how this can be so, but wishes simply to present a Stoic point of view on the, to him, useless
accretions of sophisticated urban life. He can then hardly place much value on formal political structures of the city or empire.

In the essays on kingship, law is placed under the control of the king, but is not described consistently. Because the king is greater than the laws, he has a need of the most scrupulous justice (3.10, cf. 62.2-3). This indicates that he cannot be called to account for his actions by any tribunal in the state, but only by his conscience or by divine justice. Further on in the same essay Dio explains this even more frankly: ἀρχή is the lawful ordering of and caring for men in accord with the law, kingship is unaccountable ἀρχή where the law is the decree of the king (3.43). Nothing, it seems, could be plainer. Law under a monarchy bears no resemblance to a δόγμα πόλεως, and is clearly used by an extension of the political meaning of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. An individual has ousted the community. Such a conception of law needs a supporting mythology to compensate for its detachment from its roots, and in the first discourse on kingship Dio provides it. Here kingship has as her right-hand man νόμος, also called right reason, counsellor and supporter, apart from whom it is not right for Monarchy, Justice, Good Order and Peace to do or contemplate anything (1.75).

This expresses a metaphysical not a constitutional reality. It may provide a standard for distinguishing the king from the tyrant, but this must be arbitrary. We should note that the associates of 'Lady Royalty, child of Zeus', are precisely those mentioned in Hesiod as the Horae, the offspring of Zeus and Themis. The early language of personified and deified virtues and vices serves as a substitute for political comment.

In Discourse Fifty-Six, the atmosphere is quite different. Here Dio rejects the definition of kingship as irresponsible ruling and ordering of men, and argues that power-sharing was the basis of Agamemnon's rule and of the Spartan kings' (56.5ff.). This is hardly to provide constitutional precedent for limited monarchy, however, although Dio attempts to make Nestor's advice seem part of a regular process of consultation. More typical of Dio's attitude is his remark that for a king to transgress the divine order is worse than for a private citizen, for it is the duty of a ruler to look to the νόμος and θεσμός of Zeus.
and order and rule justly and well (1.45).\textsuperscript{47}

The good king may act in accordance with his own, presumably just, laws, but no doubt Dio believes it is important to stress adherence to more intangible prescriptions, as these are more basic, since a regulation as such has no intrinsic worth.

\textbf{PLUTARCH}

Plutarch refers to the structures of the \textit{polis} more frequently and in more detail than does Dio. In his discussion in \textit{An Seni Respublica Gerenda Sit}, for example, a democratic and lawful polity is envisaged as under the direction of a man who is accustomed to being ruled for the public good no less than to rule (783d). This sounds like the definition of the good citizen in Aristotle, but has not much relevance to the Empire and its sole ruler, and indeed the Empire is not what truly concerns Plutarch here. The municipal government to which he referred fulfilled in some ways the role of the Classical \textit{polis} government, but it was wishful thinking for Plutarch to describe the magistrates' function as ruling. \textit{Nomos} in any case may in Plutarch be used to mean simply a correct procedure for conducting any political contests which are unwarlike; these are accomplished 'by law and reason with justice' (νόμῳ καὶ λόγῳ μετὰ δίκης, 784f.). For Plutarch often indicates by νόμος the general and early sense of custom and habit, such as the 'law' whereby older men are called upon to speak first (784c). \textit{Nomos} does clearly still retain its connection with justice (as e.g. its use in 817d-e shows), but its task can then mean granting office to the man acting justly rather than the working out of the definition of the just through a coherent piece of legislation.

When used by Plutarch in an elevated sense, νόμος is no prescription of any actual political body; the \textit{Logoi} of philosophers, if they are engraved firmly in the souls of rulers and men in government, and control their actions, acquire the force of laws (779b). Indeed the

\textsuperscript{47} Thus we cannot agree with Valdenberg's sweeping comment: 'Tout montre que Dion professait la légalité du pouvoir royal, sa soumission à la loi' (Valdenberg, 'La Théorie monarchique', p.159).
Logos of the philosopher is a law chosen by him (Stoic. Repug. 1033b). We can see than that there is little need for a law inscribed on stone, if the soul of the ruler has been influenced in the right way. In his advice to an uneducated ruler, Plutarch expands on the role of this νόμος which is 'king of all'; it is not written down in books or on wood, but is a living Logos within the ruler, always dwelling with and guarding him and never allowing him to be bereft of its direction (780c). No doubt Pindar would have been surprised to find his phrase on law as king of all, mortal and immortal, used in this context!

When Plutarch brings νόμος onto the political scene in his theoretical works on rulership, he does so in a very personal way. Νόμος and δίκη are associated, for δίκη is the end of νόμος, which is itself the task of the ruler, but here the ruler is not enlightened by philosophers. Rather he is effective because he is the image of God who orders all things (780e). In a yet more detailed account of Zeus' part in the correct governing of the world, Plutarch describes Zeus himself as Dike and Themis and the eldest and most perfect of laws (781a-b). This way of expressing the relationship perhaps obviates the risk — evidenced in Anaxarchus' reported comment to Alexander — that Dike, Themis and Nomos may appear as subservient to Zeus, and dependent on his arbitrary will, rather than being absolutes which he too must obey. For once the first claim is accepted, every act of a king also may well be considered as righteous and just (ib.).

Elsewhere (Alex. 52.3, see also 52.4), Plutarch records Anaxarchus as urging the king to consider himself the law and the determination of what is just. This may be safe in the case of Zeus whose law is unchanging, but Plutarch could see the dangers in proclaiming the theory of absolutism so openly, even though many of his own comments on Nomos

48 Plutarch may be more captivated by the image here than by the reality behind it, but Babut's objection that Plutarch elsewhere considers this idea un-Greek does not prove he found it unsuitable in all circumstances for his own day. (Babut comments: 'On y lit que le souverain est l'image du Dieu qui administre l'univers ... mais cette idée, qui rappelle la conception stoïcienne et pythagoricienne, si répandue à l'époque hellénistique, selon laquelle le roi est comme l'incarnation de la loi ... traduit-elle vraiment les vues de Plutarque? On peut en douter, d'autant qu'un passage de la Vie de Thémistocle la présente comme étrangère à l'hellénisme', Babut, Plutarque et le stoïcisme, pp.85-6.)
could also lead to this identification of the monarch and the law.

*Nomos* has a different meaning when Plutarch uses it to describe the benefit that might have resulted to the world had Alexander lived longer. 'One law', he says, 'would have governed all mankind, and they would have looked towards one standard of justice as a common source of light' (330d). Here the νόμος is still intangible and has little to do with that νόμος which ruled the *polis*, though it has clearly a social content lacking in the philosophical interpretations of it, since it refers to a system under which all men would have similar treatment.

In general, however, even for Plutarch with his interest in civic affairs, νόμος was not an immutable common agreement owing its origin to the people or anything like this, but rather a word to conjure with, particularly useful when it lent credence and validity to monarchical claims.

**PLINY**

On his accession to power Trajan appeared as the restorer of order and internal peace and justice after the turmoil of Domitian's reign and the caretaker regime of Nerva. He was therefore an ideal object on which Pliny and his fellows could lavish all the hopes of legality in the imperial administration. Domitian had employed all the devices of the tyrant. Trajan must naturally appear to be the exact opposite. It followed from this that he had to have law on his side.

Thus, in cutting out the internal ills of the state, Trajan, with farsighted strictness, was deemed to be taking care 'that the state based on laws should not appear to be overturned by laws' *ne fundata legibus civitas eversa legibus videretur* — in this case those of which the delators had taken such advantage in Domitian's day (*Pan.* 34.2). Pliny is at pains to stress that respect for the laws remains. Reform has not meant that the laws to punish evildoers are no longer enforced. But now it is the laws, an impersonal force, and not the informers, which are feared, and this is as it should be (36.2).

The *princeps* is to set an example in his respect for magistrates
and for the authority of the laws, and to encourage moderation in those lodging complaints (Pan. 60). This is more the behaviour of a first citizen than of a monarch, and Pliny's continued emphasis on Trajan's position as consul brings his role within the framework of constitutional forms. In this way reverence for the laws presents no problems about whether the ruler is above these prescriptions or not. 'Did someone approach him as a prince (Trajan) answered that he was a consul' (77.3). Yet there is no compulsion on the princeps to assume this figure, as Pliny elsewhere makes very clear: 'You have subjected yourself to the laws, Caesar, the laws which no one drew up for a princeps' (65.1).

Pliny records the revolutionary sentiment 'never heard before' that the princeps is not above the laws, but the laws above the princeps, non est princeps super leges sed leges super principem, but reduces the significance of this by presenting Trajan in the next phrase in changed robes of office: idemque Caesari consuli quod ceteris non licet (ib.). Only as consul is he thus bound! Again, on Trajan's departure from the consulship he swore that he had, while holding that position, done nothing against the laws (65.2). Trajan receives similar praise for a decision which does not display respect for the established law of the state so much as for the law of nature. The removal of death duties from an extra category of newly-made citizens — in the case of a father inheriting from a son — is hardly as great an example of conformity to nature as Pliny tries to make it appear (see 38-9). It is not likely to be found high in the Stoic order of activities for the virtuous man, but it does express a belief in the value of kinship, a value the 'father of his country' would be expected to exemplify.

The way the subjects obey the emperor is the same as the way in which they obey the laws. Pliny does not subsume the laws under the person of the emperor — this would be essentially un-Roman — yet the implication is that the monarch's wish is law, even though Pliny assumes that the fulfilment of that wish will be to the subjects' benefit. Just as the emperor's moderating effect on the desires and passions is granted a status akin to law, so law itself is not that in the statute books but a living entity! Laws 'live with us and amongst us' and also exercise a personal moral influence (Pan. 24.4). When law is

Note 49 over page.
connected to the person of the ruler, it may be put to bad use, but this
does not diminish its general fair fame.

Whether the emperor allies himself with the laws within a
constitutional framework, or performs tasks which have the virtues of
laws, for Pliny there is no conflict of law and ruler. A good emperor
issues good laws and abides by those already in existence when these are
worth preserving, but he is obviously not shackled by them. The
question of whether the emperor is above the laws or not, raised and
answered by Dio (differently in different places), is never brought up so
starkly here and for obvious reasons. Pliny cannot eulogize Trajan
without reference to the laws as they still had reassuring associations
in his day for Romans at least. A denial of absolute power in the
princeps would be undiplomatic, yet an outright acceptance of the
principle that the ruler was ipso facto above the law would sweep away
the necessary facade of republicanism. Law such as Pliny refers to can,
however, present no real challenge to monarchical government.

ARISTIDES

Aelius Aristides in his work in praise of Rome has little reason
for giving an account of the laws prevailing in the Empire or of their
position in relation to the emperor, but his occasional references are
nonetheless illuminating. There is a casual mention of the law of
nature which decrees that unjust rule will produce evil consequences for
those who use it (R.O. 20). The laws of the state may also be
significant. Aristides illustrates Alexander's failure to exercise rule
over an empire in a settled way by asking rhetorically: 'what laws did
he ordain for each of his peoples?' (26). The imposition of laws is
therefore a mark of true kingship, and as such was reserved in its
finest development for Roman rule.

\[49\] Während im Hellenismus und sogar noch im I. Teil bei Seneca den
Gesetzen, so weit es ging, juristische Verbindlichkeit zuerkannt wurde,
tritt nun der Princeps weitgehend an die Stelle der Gesetze', says Adam,
Clementia principis, p.116, and although this is not a sufficiently
balanced view of what Pliny says, it seems justified by what he implies
of the prerogatives of the princeps.
The advantage of a large Empire is that there may be common laws for all (R.O. 102). We notice that, in the exaggerated terms of a eulogy, but obviously without fear of assaulting cherished myths, Aristides can comment, of 'the present great governor', 'one would say that justice and law (δικαιοσύνη καὶ νόμοι) are in truth whatever he decrees' (107).

CONCLUSION

From the beginning of its use in Greece νόμος, as we have seen, had a variety of meanings — just as lex was to have in Rome, although to a lesser extent. It looked for a time as if developments in the polis were to make the meaning of 'written law', an impersonal entity, triumph over the others, but this tendency was soon reversed. Νόμος, once the catchcry of the democracy, was taken up by the supporters of monarchy and came to mean the transcendental law, often described as the Logos, to which the king gave life — which he in fact embodied — or, at the very least, the body of legislation promulgated by the king.

We may see in the early tendency to personify νόμος a precedent for this later unorthodox use. It was almost as if the theorists had from the beginning felt uneasy in dealing with an abstraction and were more comfortable talking about a 'law' that was actually flesh and blood. So law, which we might think of as at the opposite end of the spectrum to absolute monarchy, became in the end its helpmate.
Certainly then that people must needs be mad or strangely infatuated, that build the chief hope of their common happiness or safety on a single person; who, if he happen to be good, can do no more than another man; if to be bad, hath in his hands to do more evil without check, than millions of other men. The happiness of a nation must needs be firmest and certainest in full and free council of their own electing, where no single person, but reason only, sways.


Whenever man is put over men, as the better nature ought ever to preside, in that case more particularly, he should as nearly as possible be approximated to his perfection.


From my own chosen masters, then, Scott and Homer, I learned ... a most sincere love of Kings, and dislike of everybody who attempted to disobey them. Only, both by Homer and Scott, I was taught strange ideas about Kings, which I find for the present much obsolete; for, I perceived that both the author of the Iliad and the author of Waverley made their Kings, or King-loving persons, do harder work than anybody else.... I observed that they not only did more, but in proportion to their doings, got less than other people ...

CHAPTER THREE
QUALITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF RULERS

INTRODUCTION

In the treatises we are examining the writers describe the ideal king and very often praise a particular monarch, who is the recipient of the work, for living up to the ideal; in doing this, naturally enough, they mention the qualities they consider it desirable for a ruler to have. We might expect to find also a precise account of his tasks and duties, but these occur surprisingly rarely.

When Herodotus began the theoretical discussion of types of government among the Greeks with his 'Persian debate', he defined certain elements that he deemed indispensable to the forms of government he described. Even if the institutions associated, for example, with the πλήθος ἀρχον are 'embodied in but not identical with democracy', and if the λογομυχα resulting is 'not a form of government but a political principle',¹ what Herodotus does stress is that under such a manner of rule the actions would not be the same as those performed under a monarchy. He shows the difference by describing the institutions appropriate to government by the people — sortition, accountability of magistrates, public deliberation (3.80).

Alongside this, however, Herodotus provides an account of monarchy which dwells on the personal qualities of the ruler, rather than on the means by which his power is exercised. The effectiveness of the monarch depends on his being 'the best man for the job'. Thus we must already 'in der damaligen Diskussion für den vorbildlichen Monarchen eine durch Dikaiosyne und Sophrosyne bestimmte ethische Grundhaltung

¹ Ostwald, Nomos, p.112, p.111.
Technical skill is no less important as an argument in favour of monarchy. If the ruler is the best man for the position, his judgement will need to be in keeping with his character; his control of the people will be beyond reproach, 'his measures against enemies and traitors kept secret more easily than under other forms of government'.

Aristotle in the *Politics* gives us a schematic account of forms of government when in Book Three he analyses the various influences at work to bring about a particular constitution and emphasizes the importance of qualities such as noble and free-birth, wealth, justice and political arete to the state, because εξ οίν πόλεων συνέστηκεν, ἐν τούτοις ἀναγκαζόν πολεμεῖσθαι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν (1283a).

Just as rule of more than one is aristocracy and rule by the many is polity so long as the good of all is aimed at, one-man rule for the benefit of the whole community is kingship. This to be sure brings an element of subjectivity into the description, though the subsequent introduction of 'rule over willing subjects in accordance with the law' into the definition offers a more precise standard (*Pol. 1285a*). Aristotle also lays down guidelines on the choice of a king and here the criterion is the potential ruler's private life: (βέλτιον) κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ βοῦν ἕκαστον κρίνεσθαι τῶν βασιλέων (1271a).

Yet he does not, of course, leave it at that. For him only a society of a certain kind is suitable for absolute monarchy; only a


3 συγγρότε τὸ ἀν δουλεύματα ἐπὶ δυσμενέας ἀνάρχας οὗτω μάλατα (*Her.* 3.82). Note also ἔχω ... γνώμην ἡμέας ἐλευθερώθην τὰ τοῦ ἐνα ἀνάρχα τὸ τοιούτοι εἰροπτέλεεν (*ib.*.)

4 Montesquieu's comment on the deficiencies of Aristotle, in particular in describing monarchy, is worth noting here: 'L'embarras d'Aristote paraît visible quand il traite de la monarchie. Il en établit cinq espèces; il ne les distingue pas par la forme de la constitution, mais par des choses d'accident, comme les vertus ou le vices du prince; ou par des choses étrangères, comme l'usurpation de la tyrannie, ... Les anciens, qui ne connaissaient pas la distribution des trois pouvoirs dans le gouvernement d'un seul, ne pouvaient se faire une idée de la monarchie' (*De l'esprit des lois*, XI, 9).
community which can be governed by free people who are leaders with the ability and virtue for political rule is fitted for aristocracy; and clearly one where the people have the political capacity to rule and be ruled in accord with the law which allots offices on a basis of worth to those who are well-off should have a politeia. A monarchy, then, appears to be for a less developed society where the divergences in excellence are more profound among men (see Pol. 1286b).

In the theory of government worked out in the city state at this period, therefore, monarchical rule was assessed in constitutional and political terms. A king should be good — to be a true king, a 'god among men', must be good — but his position still depended on the existence in the kingdom of a certain sort of society. Virtues, however, were important in any theoretical discussion of government and citizenship, since it was the duty of the state to cultivate them in the citizens, and it was assumed that such virtues varied according to the positions occupied. Ruling naturally entailed special responsibilities. What is important to notice is that Aristotle concludes that the virtue of a good citizen differs from that of a good man because it is partial. This division is, significantly, overcome where the ruler is the citizen referred to, 'since we take it for granted that the good ruler is both good and wise' (Pol. 1277a). That rule is being used for the good of the subjects is of course a difficult matter to determine unless all a ruler's actions and motivations are examined. In any case the stress falls here on results rather than on the political process by which these results were achieved.

The virtues the ruler possesses should be those which are most appropriate to him for his task, so that he will owe his position to his acquired or innate characteristics. Aristotle stresses this very point in the Ethics: 'the friendship of a king for his subjects expresses itself in benevolence, in which he excels them, for doing good is his business' (1161a). For Aristotle the virtues had the best field of operation in the public sphere, and private life and its transactions were a poor imitation of this, necessarily limited in their scope of

5 φιλία φαύνεται ... βασιλεύει μὲν πρὸς βασιλευομένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας: εὖ γὰρ πολεῖ τοὺς βασιλευομένους, εἴπερ ἄγαθος. ὃν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ὧν ἐν πράττωσιν, ὃσπερ νομεύεσ προβάτων.
action; but he was in most cases realistic enough to describe the situation as he knew it in the polis, where the virtues were exercised in an atmosphere of competition, and justice rather than beneficence was the most relevant quality.\(^6\)

In suggesting that ruling on a full-time basis alone gave scope for true goodness, Aristotle was considering an ideal case, or else seeing the citizen from the standpoint of his (temporary) position as ruler in a polity.\(^7\) This is not quite the same as concluding that the monarch is the only worthwhile 'representative' individual, embodying all the virtues, and needing subjects for no other reason than that without them as passive recipients of his beneficence his qualities would have no realization in fact.

The way in which a monarch is described obviously reveals much about the political theory of the writer. In the lists of the characteristics required in a king which we will be looking at, we may see a disenchantment with that side of political life of which writers from Herodotus onward had attempted to give an account. There the centres of power in a state and the structures of society were just as important as the ruler's personal qualities, but in this concentration on the individual the very function of rule may be described in a way that diminishes the element of power; sole rule may then even come to

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\(^6\) Note C. Spicq's description of the typically kingly virtue, philanthropia: 'Elle unit sens politique et générosité. ... Sa valeur essentielle est la bienveillance (eúdoia, philopórbhúsios), et parce qu'elle est d'abord et de façon prépondérante l'apanage des dieux et des rois, cette philanthropie est honte condescendante vers les sujets, les malheureux, les victimes', 'La Philanthropie hellénistique, vertu divine et royale', Studia theologica, 12 (1958), p.188.

\(^7\) Note the comment of Eiliv Skard, Euergetes-Concordia, that 'die Idee des basileus euergetis in der Philosophie lässt sich nicht verfolgen; (but) Zwei Stellen aus Aristoteles sollen hier stehen' (p.56 note 1). He then quotes Pol. 1285b: τέταρτον δ' εὖδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ήρωικοὺς χρόνους ἐκούσας τε καὶ πάτρας γυγύρισαν κατὰ νόμον. διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρῶτους γενέσας τοῦ πλῆθους εὐεργέτας κατὰ τέχνας ἡ πάλειμον, ἡ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἡ ποράς χώραν, ἐγγύνοντο βασιλεῖς ἐκόντων καὶ τοὺς παραλαμβάνουσιν πάτρων, and 1310b: kingship κατ' ἄξονα γὰρ ἔστιν, ἡ κατ' ἄξονα ἀρετὴν ἡ κατὰ γένος, ἡ κατ' εὐεργεσίαν, ἡ κατὰ ταύτα τε καὶ δύναμιν. ἄπαντες γὰρ εὐεργετήσαντες ἢ συνάμενοι τὰς πάλεις ἢ τὰ ἔθνη εὐεργετεῖν ἐτύγχανον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης, οἱ μὲν κατὰ πάλειμον κυλὸσάντες δουλεύειν, ὡσπερ Κόρος, οἱ δ' ἐλευθερίαν ἄπαντες, ὡσπερ Κόρος, ἡ κτίσαντες ἢ κτισμένοι χώραν, ὡσπερ οἱ Δακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ Μολόττων.
be called a servitude, or a station which must not be left, as we shall see.

We may feel that a writer who uses such language is more concerned with describing a good man — believed to be perfectly displayed in the ruler — than in showing a politician at work. To the problems of fourth-century democracy writers offered the 'unico moderatore':

La soluzione si ottiene deducendo logicamente dalla perfezione etica le virtù e le qualità pertinenti alla cura di uomini — giustizia, moderazione, filantropia, benevolenza. L'immagine del sovrano viene costruita con tratti immobili ed eterni, senza nessun riferimento storico e senza nessuna seria prospettiva di articolazione costituzionale nello ambiente contemporaneo.8

The characteristics and functions examined below are those which appear most frequently linked to the position of the ruler, even though they may often be recommended for others too.

Thus the representatives of the polis whom we are considering refer in their works to the qualities they believe desirable in citizens in general, but both Isocrates and Xenophon also provide eulogies of dead rulers — of Evagoras of Cyprus and Agesilaus of Sparta respectively — and 'advice to a ruler', in the To Nicocles and the Hiero. These works are notable for their loose internal structure, brought about mainly by the inclusion of lists of virtues and civic acts drawn from the stock wisdom of the day, particularly, in Isocrates' case, from the gnomic poets. To these compositions of both sorts with their descriptions of civic virtues and kingly qualities we shall now turn. We shall be trying to assess how important, in the writers' view, these personal attributes are in government. This should help us to understand their attitude to the function of rule and to determine whether the community retained any of its former significance for theorists.

ISOCRATES

In the To Nicocles, Isocrates does at least give us a clear

8 Andreotti, 'Per una Critica dell' Ideologia di Alessandro Magno', p.287.
description of his view of kingship in his definition of the ruler's task, with which he believes no one would wish to quarrel. A king 'puts an end to a city's misfortunes, preserves it (διαφυλάσσει) when it is doing well, and makes it great when it is small' (To Nic. 9). We are not told how a ruler is to do this, nor is the basis of his power discussed, but it is important to keep this account in mind, since such precision about the royal duties is rare.

The virtues that Isocrates recommends to young men are piety to the gods, reverence for parents, moderation in all aspects of life (Dem. 13-14), modesty, justice and self-control (αἰσχύνη, δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη), respect for friends, obedience to laws, self-improvement in matters of learning, courtesy and the like (Dem. esp. 15, and 20-40 passim). Such virtues, while appropriate for a private citizen, are, Isocrates implies, also those of a king, for he advises Democritus to 'imitate the character of kings and follow their ways' (Dem. 36). The purpose of such a course of conduct in the subjects is the winning of esteem and favour (εὔνοια) rather than their personal moral development.

Certainly the qualities Isocrates recommends to the ruler Nicocles are similar to those above — piety, truth and justice (To Nic. 17ff.), urbanity and dignity (To Nic. 34) and again he has Nicocles claim, as royal virtues, justice and temperance (Nic. 29ff.). Advocacy of these traits is of course mixed in with advice of a more utilitarian kind, and even the encouragement to virtue is reinforced by appeals to self-interest. But Isocrates nonetheless considers such qualities an important part of a ruler's qualifications: ἡσυχία ταύτης τυμαχώς τῶν ἄλλων προέχεις, τοσούτων καὶ ταύτης ἁρετάς αὐτῶν διούσεις (To Nic. 11).

There is a responsibility on a ruler, simply because he is a ruler, to display virtue. Thus in the model ruler, Theseus, Isocrates sees authority and beneficence as two elements of equal importance, the one granting him the right to rule (τῇ μὲν ἐξουσίᾳ τυραννῶν) the other endearing him to the people (ταύτης δ' ἐὐρεγεσίας ἡμαργών, Hel. 37). His wish is for monarchy to be able to function without the use of force or fraud — a highly unlikely possibility. This idealism reappears in Isocrates' discussion on activities that are politically efficacious, where he tells the Athenians in The Peace that virtue and its elements are most effective, whether for gaining money, reputation or anything
else, or happiness in general, and recommends the usual virtues, piety, moderation and justice on these grounds (Peace 63 and 31-2).

Isocrates' account of Evagoras' life tells of his wonderful achievements but also stresses just such qualities, although courage and wisdom, goodwill and self-control here complete the list (Evag. 23, 43ff.). Isocrates had frequently referred to the Athens of former times as beneficent, and owing its elevated position among the Greeks to that fact, but he applies this quality to the monarch, especially Philip, with such frequency that Skard comments that it cannot be denied 'dass die εὐεργετικὴς-Idee ein Grundgedanke der ganzen monarchischen Agitation des Isokrates gewesen ist'. 9 The term carried no odious political connotations, and so Isocrates could advise Philip: "Εὐεργετεύν, Μακεδόνων δὲ βασιλεύειν, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων ὡς πλεύστων ἄρχειν (Phil. 154)."10

Philanthropy also appears as a kingly quality. The king must be φιλάνθρωπος καὶ φιλόσολος (To Νίκ. 15). Philip must show the Greeks τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν καὶ τὴν εὐνοίαν and again πραότητα καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν (Phil. 114 and 116).11 One of a king's main tasks is to create harmony (note εἰς ὧν ὕμνοναν δὲ καταστήσας [Panath. 77] and χρῆ ... τοὺς ὀρθῶς βασιλεύοντας ... τὰς πόλεις ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ πειράσοντα διάγειν [Νίκ. 41]).

While Isocrates stresses the king's need for a certain measure of skill, at times he also appears to rate personal excellence above this: 'Rule yourself no less than others' —

καὶ τοῦθ' ἥγοι βασιλικάτατον, ἃν μηδεμιὰ δουλείας τῶν ἥδουν,  

9 Skard, Euergetes-Conoordia, p. 55.
10 Cf. Evag. 45, τοὺς μὲν φίλους ταῖς εὐεργεσίας ὑπ' αὐτῷ πολούμενοι, τοὺς δ' ἅλλους τῇ μεγαλοψυχῇ καταδουλούμενοι, and note Skard's comment (ib. p.58) that 'es ist etwas ganz verschiedene, über Barbaren und über Hellenen zu herrschen; ... Man hat wohl angenommen, dass das Wort εὐεργετεύν hier [in Phil. 154] nur ein Euphemismus sei; ... aber das Wort εὐεργετεύν enthält keine Unklarheit, wir haben hier keine Umschreibung; εὐεργετεύν heisst: εὐεργέτης sein. Die zwei anderen Worte — βασιλεύειν, ἄρχειν — sind ganz klar, enthalten staatsrechtlich unzweideutige Begriffe; dasselbe lässt sich von dem Wort εὐεργετεύν sagen'.

Here we find a concern for individual moral effort that can easily be detached from the political position of the recipient of the advice, but the emphasis may also reflect Isocrates' belief that the ruler's example had a powerful impact on the character of the subjects. He expresses this view frequently as a general principle. The early Athenians excelled their neighbours, and their kings

So, let a single man attain to wisdom, and all men who are willing to share his insight will reap the benefit (Panag. 2).12

This moral impact explains why it is so monstrous for the worse to rule the better (see To Nic. 14) even if the qualities in which 'the better' excel have little direct connection with the administration of the state. Rule, far from being unalloyed self-indulgence, is rightly seen as a burden —

Theseus did not, like others, hand over

A good king like Evagoras left out 'none of the things which are advantageous for kings to possess, but from each kind of constitution picked out the best' —

12 Cf. To Nic. 31: μὴ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἄξιον κομίσαις ξῆν, τοὺς δὲ βασιλεῖς ἀτάκτως, ἄλλα τὴν σωματὶ συμμετέχον περισσεύμα τοῖς ἄλλοις καθότι, γιγνώσκοιν, ὅτι τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης ἡδονή ὁμολογεῖται τοῖς ἄρχοντις. Note also Areop. 22: ὅλα ταύτης ψυχὰς τὴν πόλιν, οὐκ ἐξ ἀπαντῶν τὰς ἀρχαίς κοινοῦντες ἄλλα τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ τοὺς ἴκανούστοις ἐφ' ἐκαστον τῶν ἐργῶν προκρινοῦσθεν. τοιούτους γὰρ ἱκείσθην ἔσεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οὐδὲν περ ἄν ὄντος οἱ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστησόντες, and Nic. 37: βουλώμενοι ... παράδειγμα κατανέμει τοῖς τρόποι τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολιτῶς, γιγνώσκοιν, ὅτι φιλεῖ τὸ πλῆθος ἐν τροστίς τοις ἐπιτηδεύμασα τοῦ βυὸν διὰγελυν, ἐν οἷς ἄν τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς αὐτῶν ὀργῶι διατρίβοντας.
This suggests that the qualities of the leader enable him to be all things to all men, so that he can bypass the normal procedures and transcend the different forms of government by which various interest groups seek to realize their aims. His task of reconciliation will effectively take him out of the political arena as it took Theseus who established the demos at the head of government only to find himself called upon to govern (Hel. 36). Under all constitutions, if well-run, man can live well (Panath. 132); how many people govern is not for Isocrates the most important question.

Isocrates likes to suggest that a king can rule without much use of force, since he naturally believes that persuasion is the best way to achieve results (see To Nic. 24 with the encouragement to rule τῷ πάντας ἠττάσομαι τῆς σῆς διανοόμας). This avoidance of political reality is striking in one who is in many ways so down-to-earth and pragmatic.

XENOPHON

Xenophon's concern that men in power should be virtuous is even more noteworthy than Isocrates' and he shows consistency in the values he espouses, whether the setting is democratic Athens with Socrates as the hero, or the court of Hiero or Agesilaus with one-man rule the norm. The qualities Xenophon looks for must include the virtues since ruling is for him not merely a skill, but an aretē as well (Mem. 4.2.11).

These desirable traits consist of piety, justice, self-control, courage, wisdom and patriotism and such characteristics as urbanity and

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13 But see Phil. 107 where Isocrates implies that different peoples need different forms of government: ἡπίστατο (Perdiccas)... τοὺς μὲν "Ἑλλήνας οὐκ εὐθυμένους ὑπομένειν τὰς μοναρχίας, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους οὐ δυναμένους ἄνευ τῆς τοιαύτης δυναστείας διοικεῖν τὸν βίον τοῦ σφέτερον αὐτῶν. This is no doubt an example of Isocrates' diplomatic intercession on behalf of the Greeks and their special position. Philip was not, perhaps, for all Isocrates' praise, quite the ideal ruler he could accept as another Theseus for Athens, and in any case many other Athenians would hardly have accepted Philip in this role.
foresight. These were possessed by Agesilaus whose character and deeds are both described much as Isocrates described Evagoras. The king's position as set forth by Xenophon is sharply distinguished from that of mere claimants to the throne; kings and rulers are not those who hold the sceptres or those who have been selected by a particular body of people or have had the luck of the lot or got their way by using force or deceit, but rather those who know how to rule (Mem. 3.9.10). The duties that appear most important reflect Xenophon's own preoccupations. 'It is ... hardly surprising to find that he tended to regard the problem of government as one of securing and maintaining discipline, and the good citizen as identical with the good soldier, or rather the good officer.'

The two types of activity belonging naturally to the ruler are encouraging virtuous activity and rewarding those who perform it (and in general αὐτῇ ... ἡ ἐπιμέλεια διὰ χαρίτων γέγονεται) and pronouncing censure and punishment (Hiero 9.2). Such a function of course necessitates the ruler's possessing all the important virtues himself. In piety, honesty, self-discipline and consideration for others he should be a model for all (see Cyr. 8.1.21ff.). The king is chosen not so that he may take good care of himself but so that those under him may prosper (Mem. 3.2.3). This of course is the criterion Aristotle uses to separate the good institution of kingship from the bad one of tyranny, but Xenophon, unlike Aristotle, makes no attempt to analyse the society that could produce these forms of government. 'Es ist für seine Anschauung bezeichnend, dass das Hauptgewicht immer auf die Persönlichkeit des Herrschers fällt.' Therefore the benefits performed by the

14 Compare Ages. 3-9 and summary, 11, and Evag. 43: ἐν τοιαύταις ἡ ἐπιμέλεια αὐτοῦ καταστήσας οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκάστην προσπιπτόντων οὐδὲ περὶ ἐν πεπλημμένως εἰξεν, ἀλλ' οὕτω θεοφιλῶς καὶ φυλακηρωπῶς διώκει τὴν πάλιν ὡστε τοὺς εἰςαψκυμενούς μη μάλλον ἐναγάγει τῆς ἁρχῆς ἤπλον ή τοὺς ἄλλους τῆς ὑπ' ἐκείνου βασιλεῖας. Άκαντα γὰρ τὸν χρόνον διεξελέσειν οὐδένα μὲν ἀδικῶν, τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς τιμῶν, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἀπάντων ἁρχῶν, νομίμως δὲ τοὺς ἐξαιμπτότων κολάζων.

15 Βασιλεῖς δὲ καὶ άρχοντας οὐ τοὺς τὰ σκηντρα ἔχοντας ἔφη εἶναι, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀρετεύνετας, οὐδὲ τοὺς κλήρως λαχάνες, οὐδὲ τοὺς βιασμένους, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐξαιμπτότας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐκστασιμένους ἁρχεῖν.

16 T.A. Sinclair, A History of Greek Political Thought, p.171.

17 Skard, Euergetes-Concordia, p.49.
ruler are done for friends, and not for the polis in general.\(^{18}\)

Xenophon attributes to Agesilaus the belief that it was the task of a good king to benefit his subjects as much as possible (Ages. 7.1).\(^{19}\)

Cyrus was called father at his death and clearly this is a title of a benefactor more than of one who is grasping (Cyr. 8.2.9). The tyrant Hiero is advised to surpass all in deeds of benefaction (Hier. 11.14); unsolicited generosity to anyone brings the benefactor the favour of the recipient (Ages. 4.4). The display of philanthropia is commendable in general (note Cyr. 1.21, φυτήν δὲ φιλανθρωπίας, cf. 1.4.1) and kings especially may hope to obtain the goodwill of their associates in this way.\(^{20}\)

The ideal king is more concerned to lead the citizens to every virtue than to lead them against their enemies (Ages. 10.2). He must therefore as a first step to this exercise control over himself: this for Xenophon as for Isocrates is a precondition for rule over others. Agesilaus, for example, judged himself less by his rule over others than by his rule over himself (ib.). This self-control entitles a ruler to set himself up as an example, and the sight of one who may do as he pleases exercising self-restraint inspires subjects to emulation (Cyr. 8.1.30). Thus we see how 'the state reflects the character of the leading citizens' (Ways and Means 1.1)\(^{21}\) and 'whenever the leader becomes better the habits [of the state] improve, and whenever he degenerates [they become] baser' (Cyr. 8.1.8).

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\(^{18}\) As Skard (ib. p.50) also notes: 'Es ist dies mehr das Ideal eines freigebigen und leutseligen Junkers als das eines Königs.' Höistad makes a similar comment (Cynic Hero and Cynic King, p.79): 'The monarchic ideal which Xenophon constructs on this foundation necessarily remains on the plane of individual ethics, without social or political facets. The εὐεργετής-idea, which Cyrus represents, is non-political: it is exclusively εὐεργετεῖν τοὺς φίλους, never εὐεργετεῖν τὴν πόλιν ... Thus the eulogy of Cyrus becomes a eulogy of the good man rather than the great prince.'

\(^{19}\) Gottlob Barner, Comparantur inter se Graeci de Regentium Hominum Virtutibus Auctores (Schirling, Marburg, 1889), shows how frequently the idea of 'doing good' and 'benefiting' appears in Xenophon, commenting: 'Virtutes iam regis quales sint, copiosius explicatur apud utrumque' (i.e. Xenophon and Dio, p.22).

\(^{20}\) Cyrus had his favoured courtiers to dine with him οὐδένος ὀφει καὶ τοὸς κυσὶν ἐφολεῖν τυν καὶ τοῦτο εὔνολαν (Cyr. 8.2.4).

\(^{21}\) ὅτε πάντες τῶις γὰρ ἄν οἱ προστάται δει, τοιούτου καὶ οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ κολύ γύνονται.
Indeed the right to rule itself depends on a man's being morally superior to those ruled, and Xenophon has Cyrus proclaim that he does not think it suitable for anyone to rule who is not better than his subjects (Cyr. 8.1.37). He seems to believe that there is a special type of person whose moral and intellectual character fits him for rule. For such a person, governing may well bring satisfaction but it is hardly a source of pleasure as generally understood.

Agesilaus is at the service of the laws (μάλιστα τοις νόμοις λατρεύων, Ages. 7.2), and Cyrus believes a ruler is distinguished not by his easy life but by his forethought and love of effort (Cyr. 1.6.8). True rule can therefore be considered in some measure a burden imposed by a sense of duty, and thus as far as possible unlike the tyrant's way of conducting affairs (see Mem. 2.1). Cambyses and Astyages can be contrasted on the grounds that one practised kingly behaviour, the other tyrannical (Cyr. 1.3.18). Rule in accord with law over willing subjects alone is entitled to be called kingship but there is no hard-and-fast way of assessing when this occurs. What is clear is that persuasion is the preferred method of obtaining compliance (see Mem. 1.2.10 and 1.2.45) and Xenophon, like Isocrates, shrinks from the realities of power politics. Xenophon's 'king', in short, is no rounded political figure, working within a complex social structure, but simply a noble individual.

ARISTEAS

The questions and answers on kingship that appear in the Symposia of Aristeas' letter deal almost exclusively with the king's private behaviour and only occasionally refer to external matters, when, for example, the approved way of having public buildings erected or of organizing the army is discussed. Even here however the problem is

22 See e.g. Cyr. 1.6.25: καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων δὲ, ἢν μὲν ἐν ἄθρετοι ζωῇ, τὸν ἄρχοντα δὲ τοῦ ἡλίου πλεονεκτοῦντα φανερὸν εἶναι. ἢν δὲ ἐν χειμῶνι, τοῦ φύσις· ἢν δὲ διὰ μόνην, τῶν πόλεων· πάντα γὰρ ταύτα εἰς τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων συλλαμβάνει.

23 See Mem. 4.6.12: βασιλεύων δὲ καὶ τυραννίζοντα ἁρχάς μὲν ἀμφοτέρας ἤγετο εἴναι, διαφέρειν δὲ ἀλλήλων ἔνδυμες. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκόντων τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ νόμους τῶν πόλεων ἁρχὴν βασιλεύειν ἤγετο, τὴν δὲ ἀκόντων τε καὶ μὴ κατὰ νόμους, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὁ ἁρχην βούλομαι, τυραννίζον.
posed in terms of the correct moral attitude. Yet there are after all different types of moral behaviour. How similar are the injunctions on conduct given by the seventy-two Jewish sages to those provided by Isocrates and Xenophon (taken as precursors of the counsellors of kings of the Hellenistic Age)? What definition of kingship did they assume?

Firstly, the importance of justice as a royal and private virtue has clearly not declined, but it is here applied to rather strange situations. Thus the permanence of the works of a king is ensured by his granting justice to the builders (258-9), and for success in war one needs justice and an appeal to God (193). Justice is important in dealing with legal pleas and a just king will of course be impartial (291, 191). But this is the closest that an answer comes to connecting this virtue with a particular part of the administrative process. In general justice is assumed to be an element in all the contacts of a virtuous and well-educated king with his subjects:

Da steht denn an erster Stelle die Gerechtigkeit, aus der Platon alle übrigen Tugenden gerade im Hinblick auf den Staat abgeleitet hatte; δικαιοσύνη oder τό δίκαιον, τά δίκαια sind der Kern aller Herrschertugend.25

Other areas of life in which justice is to be exercised could be the concern equally of the private citizen. In some cases this interest in improvement of character in all aspects can be accounted for by seeing the origin of a particular question-and-answer not in a treatise on kingship itself, but in the writer's need to make up the number of questions by adding some on general topics (see e.g. 212 and 232). The king comes closest to being a representative of justice and its dispenser in a concrete way in the account of how he should fit in with the multitudes, of diverse origin, in his kingdom (παμμηγὼν δικαίων ὸντων, 267). Here the ruler by means of justice assumes the proper role for

24 Oswyn Murray, 'Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship', p.355, notes how the 'common idea' that 'the king's aim should be justice in every action (189) and thought (212)' is 'surprisingly little emphasized', and suggests that this may be because in Egypt 'the notion of absolute justice required qualification to meet a situation where more than one system of law applied'. Perhaps too there was a certain reticence among the Jews about involving the king with this attribute so much associated with Jahweh, even though the king was advised to imitate God in other respects. He should be just but not Justice itself.

each. What is really being sought here is a harmonizer and reconciler rather than a judicial officer, and this question shows evidence of the Jewish composition of the letter in its concern for those elements of the society which are alien to the rest.

Equality is recommended, but purely as a means to avoid personal temptations to pride, so such advice would be appropriate to any man in high position. The stress on the fact that the ruler leads men as a man (and hence should preserve equality) — 'God humbles the proud and the gentle and humble he exalts' (263) — though reminiscent in some ways of Isocrates' advice, seems to be derived more from the common Jewish expression of this sentiment. It is a frank avowal of the chances and changes of fortune that may befall the great, and somewhat at odds with the deference to the powerful shown in most of the answers.

Other qualities invoked include those suitable for all men — temperance and piety, for instance — but also that particularly recommended to monarchs by Isocrates and Xenophon — self-control. It is once more the touchstone of the kingly nature, supplying the definition of the essence of kingship; for kingship is ruling oneself well (καλῶς ἀρχέων ἐαυτὸν, 211). The 'highest rule' is 'having power over oneself and not being carried away by one's desires' (221-2). Attention is here directed away from the ruler's public duties to such an extent that a private definition of rule has taken over.

That the ruler is the source of all bounty is one of the chief motifs of the Letter. In this respect it resembles the official documents of the Ptolemies which detail the acts of beneficence of the monarch. In view of the frequency with which the philanthropia of the prince is praised in them 'il est clair qu'aucun "philosophe" n'est responsable de la mise en valeur de cette vertu du Souverain, ni même de sa prééminence sur toutes les autres qualités'. This characteristic appears to be the most 'kingly' quality mentioned (and see e.g. 208, 288) and yet the sentiments expressed often apply just as well to any

26 Cf. N.T. Luke, 1.51-2: διεσκόπτοις ὑπερηφάνους διανοῶν καρδίας αὐτῶν· καθελέν δυνάτας ἀπὸ ἑρώων καὶ ὑψίσθεν ταπεινοῦς, and note also the sources for such expressions in, among other places, 2 Sam. 22.28; Ps. 147; Job 12.19, 5.11; and 1 Sam. 2.7-8.

27 Spicq, 'La Philanthropie hellénistique', p.185.
man in comfortable circumstances.\textsuperscript{28} Obtaining goodwill of subjects or friends is still of primary importance (190, 205). There is a certain acknowledgement that the king's position of itself demands exceptional displays of generosity, and ἐπιμέλεια is closely linked with this (see 207 on this quality).\textsuperscript{29}

The intellectual qualities which are important in rule are mentioned comparatively rarely: possessing an acute intelligence and being able to judge each detail 'is a gift of God' which will enable the monarch to be aware if he is being deceived (276), but most references to the powers of perception are more concerned with the paternal caring role of the king. His mind must be occupied with the care (ἐπιμέλεια) of his people, and good counsel (ἐύβουλία) consists in correct action with deliberation, having in mind the ill results of the opposite course (245, 255).

The king's constant study of official journals has in view the people's amelioration and preservation — ἐπιστήμων καὶ διανομή (283, cf. 240).\textsuperscript{30} Care and watchfulness (μέριμνα καὶ φροντίς) are needed to ensure that no wrong be inflicted on the people by those set over them (271). The support of friends is ensured by foresight for the multitudes over which the king rules (190). This care resembles the attitude of pity for the failings of the weak; the king is to deal with the subjects and wrong-doers as one would wish to be treated oneself, and to admonish the good very gently (207).\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{28} See Murray, 'Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship', p.350, note 2 for a list of questions and answers not specifically applicable to kings.

\textsuperscript{29} Cf. 290. The king is great and οὐ τοσοῦτον τῇ δόξῃ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ πλούσιῳ προσόχῳ, ὅσον ἐπιμελεία καὶ φιλανθρωπία he surpasses all men. See the comments of Hans Kloft, Liberalitas Principis (Böhlau, Cologne and Vienna, 1970), pp.30-31, and, for historical instances of royal beneficence and care, see e.g. Welles, Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period, Letter 25 with the mention of φιλανθρωπευτικά and εὐνοία (of subjects towards the kings, clearly because of gratitude for favours) and Letter 52, where φιλανθρωπός καὶ πρόνοια are used with a very concrete sense.

\textsuperscript{30} See 240. The king will do nothing lawless, but knowing ὅτι τὰς ἐπιστήμας ὅ θεὸς ἔδωκε τοῖς νομοθετήσαι πρὸς τὸ σφίξασθαι τοὺς βίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων he will follow these impulses. (Note also 273.)

\textsuperscript{31} See Murray, 'Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship', p.360, note 1, on instances of the use of ἐπιμέλεια, ἀλαλοσύνη and ἐνέργεια, all of which qualities are related to God and thence to the ruler.
These attributes of themselves suggest that the king is indeed to be like a god on earth whose task is to think for his subjects and to care for their needs; that he should also by his example affect their moral lives is not stressed. Only once are patience and gentleness advocated as a means of turning wrong-doers from wickedness and leading them to repentance (188). The Hellenistic monarch appeared to Aristeas far more as an individual abstracted from the task of positively improving them by his example and precept than were the ideal monarchs described by his Athenian predecessors in this genre. The ruler's character, however, is of immense importance to himself.

When the essence of being a king (ἀναγκαίωτατος τρόπος βασιλεύας) can be defined as 'being incorruptible, sober and a lover of justice' (209), 'given to the exercise of self-control' (211), we are a long way from Aristotle and his definition — the rule of one man aiming at the common good, and based on merit (Pol. 1279a, 1310b), and 'sovereignty over the greater part of affairs with the subjects' consent' (1313a). These considerations may be implied in Aristeas' answers but they are not what constitutes kingship for him. Still less, incidentally, is the possession of the art of ruling — Plato's alternative definition of kingship offered in the Politicus — relevant to the Hellenistic monarch we meet here.

The 'greatest thing' in kingship — the subject of the last question — does, appropriately, involve the subjects, pointing to the results of the actions and attitudes previously recommended to the ruler: 'for the subjects to subsist always in a state of peace and to procure justice quickly in their suits' in this 'greatest thing' (291). Such a situation requires an orderly administration and a considerable bureaucracy, as well as all the virtues advocated previously. Yet the former are not described in the advice on governing. It should be noted too how limited these aims are in comparison with those of Plato and Aristotle for whom the state by government action was to bring about the good life for each citizen.

Ultimately for Aristeas kingship exists; it is not an institution which can be questioned. He is not interested in theoretical discussion about forms of government. If we ask the question, what is the justification for the existence of kingship, Aristeas' answer is given indirectly.32

Note 32 over page.
We may indeed conclude that although at one level kingship exists for the benefit of the subjects, the king's main care is to behave well in that state of life to which it has pleased God to call him. Similarly, references to what would constitute bad behaviour in an unfit ruler apply just as suitably to a bad man.

**HELLENISTIC ATTITUDES**

The Hellenistic Empires by their very existence provided food for thought for political commentators as well as leaving for posterity considerable material on the practical business of running a kingdom and disseminating propaganda. Polybius worked within this framework of particular political and social views, and himself described the qualities of kings and the essence of kingship in his systematic account of the development and downfall of various constitutions. Not every monarchy, he asserts, can be truly called kingship, but only that voluntarily accepted by the subjects, where they are governed rather by an appeal to their reason than by fear and force (6.4.2).

A king is expected to display particular traits and here too the contrast with the tyrant is maintained, for it is the part of a tyrant to do evil and make himself master of men by fear against their will: it is that of a king to do good to all (5.11.6). This doing good is the exercise of a benefactor's role which we have encountered as one of the frequently-mentioned traits, and consists in beneficence and humanity, φιλανθρωπία, which merit the people's love (ib.).

Kingship in fact takes its origins from the help rendered by the strong to the weak (6.6.8). Yet the constitution by which a country is governed, if it is a good one, should itself determine the fortunes of a state and the king should be one of many virtuous men. When the high qualities of the leading men alone are responsible for a state's success,

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33 Thus, Cleomenes was συμπαθός ἄγεμον καὶ βασιλικὸς τῇ φύσει because he was, among other things, ἀνήρ γενόμενος καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὑμνίως ἐπιστείλον καὶ πρὸς πραγμάτων οἰκονομίαν εὐφυής (Polybius, 5.39.6).
this is in Polybius' eyes a ground for assessing a constitution as a failure (6.43.4ff.). But he still maintains that the constitution itself should be largely concerned with the implantation of particular qualities in the citizens and should advocate fortitude and temperance, which are of course also recommended to kings (6.48.4).

Diodorus Siculus, writing at the end of the Roman Republic, records the traits allegedly required of the early kings of Egypt in the first volume of his universal history. The king must be self-controlled and just, noble-spirited, truthful, beneficent, mild in exacting vengeance, but more than equalling a benefactor in his return of benefits (1.70). When he describes Alexander (Book 17, passim) he shows him uniting all the virtues of the chief — especially φιλανθρωπία.35

The ideal put forward here bears a certain resemblance to the image of the king displayed by the documents of the royal chancelleries, but this suffers from a limited point of view: 'Si tratta di caratteri immutabili, che vengono a delineare il reggitore ideale, in virtù di un'analisi dottrinale e non per successivi apporti dell' esperienza storica.' This conclusion of Andreotti disagrees with that of Skard, who does not distinguish sufficiently between theoretical and historical validation of monarchical government. The attribution of these qualities to the ruler brings about only the former: the realistic definition of kingship observed in the Suda is totally at odds with the theory (see Suda B147 Δ).

34 'It is obvious that the account [in Diodorus 1.70] is based on an idealized "philosophical" view, appropriate to the Ptolemies rather than to their Persian or Egyptian predecessors' (Hadas, introduction to Aristeas to Philocrates, p.43). Anne Burton, in a recent commentary on Book One of Diodorus, takes a different view, and sees the 'idealistic representation' of the king's life as 'Egyptian not Greek in origin' (Diodorus Siculus Book I: A Commentary [Brill, Leiden, 1972], p.209).

35 See Robert Drews, 'Diodorus and his Sources', AJPh, 83 (1962), p.392 for references to Alexander's virtues. (Drews here gives the original of Hamilton's remark on Diodorus' attitude to successful statesman, quoted in the Introduction, note 51.)

36 Andreotti, 'Per una Critica', p.287, note 138. Andreotti believes that the corruption of the fourth-century democracy called for an ideal ruler whom no actual monarch could reasonably be expected to personify. See note 8, this chapter.

37 In discussing Isocrates' contribution to the political debate, Skard comments, of philosophical justifications of monarchy already
Cynics and Stoics also put forward the picture of the king but somewhat ambiguously.\(^{38}\) We find that Diogenes is reported as referring to the Persian king as 'the most wretched creature' (Dio, Or. 6.35), while the sage is described in terms that Isocrates, for example, would apply to the king, and this probably reflects fairly accurately the attitude of the historical Diogenes. Epictetus comments of Diogenes, the model of Hellenistic Cynicism,

\[\text{ἀγε, Διογένης ὁ' οὐκ ἐφύλει οὐδένα, ὃς οὕτως ἰμέρος ἦν καὶ φυλακήρωμα, ὥστε ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοσοῦτος πόνος καὶ ταλαπωράς τοῦ σώματος ἀσμένος ἀναδέχεσθαι; (Epic. 3.24.64).}\]

Antisthenes recommends that πόνος which kings are elsewhere encouraged to assume as a good, instancing the trials of Hercules and Cyrus, the former the epitome of the benefactor, the latter of the ideal king (D.I. 6.2). This account refers to qualities which the idealistic definition of kingship in the Suda also stresses:

\[\text{ἡ βασιλεία κτήμα τῶν κοινῶν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ δημόσια τῆς βασιλείας κτήματα. δοῦ τὰς ἀνάγκας καὶ μεθ' ὑβρις εὐσφαίρεις ὡσπερ τυραννικάς ἀκολούθης μυστήριον συν, τὰς δὲ σὺν λόγῳ καὶ φυλακήρωμα τῶν εὐσφαίρων ἀπαρτίσθεις ὡσπερ κηδεμονίαν τιμᾶν (Suda B 148).}\]

The theorists could also be encouraged in the belief that kings might themselves share these views by the recorded comment of Antigonus Gonatas that 'kingship is an honourable servitude' (Ael. VH 2.20). worked out, 'die Schwierigkeit lag eben darin, in den Traditionen des Volks Anhaltspunkte für die neue Institution zu finden'. He concludes: 'Solche Anhaltspunkte zu finden, dazu hat Isokrates ausserordentlich beigetragen.' In this way, he believes, Isocrates gave monarchy not only 'ein hohes Ziel und damit eine moralische Berechtigung' but also 'eine geschichtliche Legitimation' (p.66, Euergetes-Concordia). In the paragraph that follows this, however, Skard modifies this conclusion, admitting that neither Alexander nor his Hellenistic followers employed εὐφρενία as the basis of their rule. He maintains simply: 'Wer über das traditionsreiche, unglückliche Griechenvolk regieren wollte, musste als ein εὐφρενίτης erscheinen, — das hat Isokrates nicht nur dem Philipp, sondern auch den späteren Mazedonierkönigen und noch den römischen Erobern verkündigt' (ib.).

\(^{38}\) The exaggeration of royal power and prestige was by no means to their liking, and as Kaerst points out, 'die Philosophie, die ja die Sorge für das Wohl der Unterthanen für die Aufgabe des Alleinherrschers erklärt hatte, hat sich dagegen gewandt' (Julius Kaerst, Studien, p.59). Kaerst cites on this the 'Cynic-Stoic' fragment of kingship in the Suda, which is quoted later in this text.
Alexander may appear as the model in some accounts. Strabo, relying on the Cynic Onesicritus who accompanied Alexander on his expeditions, records the alleged praise of the Macedonian by the Gymnosophists: μόνον ... αὐτόν ἐν ὀλλοῖς φιλοσοφοῦντα — 'he was the only philosopher in arms, and they concluded that it was the most valuable thing in the world that those who should happen to be wise should have the power to persuade the willing and to compel the unwilling to practise self-control' (Strabo 15.1.64). The king's moral role had for Onesicritus eclipsed everything else. Eratosthenes, third-century head of the library at Alexandria, who expressed the view that the Cynic-Stoic Aristo and the sceptical Academic Arcesilaus were the greatest philosophers of his day (Strabo 1.2.2), seems to be the source of the description of Alexander preserved in Plutarch (Fort. Alex. 329ff.)39 where the Cynic flavour is strong. He refers too to the conquest of the willing by Logos, of the unwilling by force of arms, and — more significant for our investigation — describes Alexander as κοινός ... ὀθόδεσθεν ἀρμοστὶς καὶ διαλλακτὶς τῶν ὄλων (329c). Plutarch a little further on cites Eratosthenes directly, using, with reference to the king, the Cynic phraseology ἀδιάφορα usually associated with the imperturbable wise man, and referring to the king as ἴγεμών κοινός καὶ βασιλεύς ψυλάθρωπος (329f-330a).

Among the Pythagoreans with fragments preserved in Stobaeus, the writers on kingship were not the only ones to provide definitions of rule. Kallikratidas described the ἐυστατικὰ ἀρχὰ as for the benefit of the ruled alone, and to be distinguished from political and tyrannical rule, which served respectively both ruler and ruled, and ruler alone (V. pp.683-4). There is a continual concern for finding a form of government that will meet this essentially moral requirement. Hippodamus (V. p.913) shows the good and prospering citizen possible only where there is εὐνομία and in his περὶ πολιτείας explains that kingship is the best form of government because it is the form which imitates the divine, but because of the difficulty of keeping it pure.

and not a prey to τρυφά καὶ ὑφρος he prefers a mixture of constitutions (pp.35-6). Archytas, whose writings may take us back to the fourth century, also brings in evidence for the concern of Pythagorean thought that the ruler rule not for his own sake but for those under him (p.218). He stresses too that his account of the qualities required in a ruler applied to a 'true' king.

The three writers on kingship develop these suggestions, describing the king in detail. The qualities they ascribe to him contain little that is new and are also found in the official texts of Hellenistic monarchies. The king's tasks according to Diotogenes are three: leading an army, executing justice and giving due attention to the gods. Knowledge of the task is important (note ἐπισταθεῖς, ἐκμαθῶν, ἐκλογασμένος). The ruler must be ἁγεμῶν, ἐπιστάτας καὶ δαμουργὸς of the σύσταμα (p.264). A religious element enters with the juridical functions which are connected closely with the idea of bestowing benefits (ib.). The king's worth is indeed judged by his possession in outstanding measure of aretē, not by his wealth or power or the strength of his army (p.266). Diotogenes tells us that aretē is important because it alone is the preserve of good men (ib.); in other words the qualifications of a king are the same as those of a good man.

The same extract emphasizes the king's need for self-control as a prerequisite for his controlling others. Superiority in virtue is in fact part of his proof of fitness for rule; from it derives his ability to impose harmony on his subjects (p.265 and cf. pp.268-9). He must also display his kingly qualities (and hence appear neither too harsh nor too gentle, avoiding extremes) by giving an impression of majesty, being gracious (which involves being just, equitable and merciful, p.268) and inspiring fear and awe. These are semi-divine attributes.

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40 See Armand Delatte, Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne, pp.154-5 on Hippodamus.

41 Λέε δε τον ἀληθινὸν ἄρχοντα μη μόνον ἐπιστάμονα τε καὶ δυνατόν ἡμεν περὶ το καλὸς ἄρχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλανθρωπον (Archytas, p.218), and cf. Aristoxenus in VP 183: οὔτε γὰρ οἷς ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε πάλιν εὐ ποτὲ ἀν οἰκηθήναι μὴ ὑπάρξαντος ἀληθινοῦ ἄρχοντος καὶ κυριεύοντος τῆς ἄρχες τε καὶ ἐπισταθώς ἐκουσώς.

42 Note χωρίζοντα μὲν ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν παθῶν, συνεγγύζοντα δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς (p.268).
designed to call forth a response of reverence and not simply obedience in the populace (pp.267-70). Diotogenes describes the true (p.266) and perfect (p.264) and good (p.269) king, and whoever does not possess the characteristics given here is in theory no ruler. Yet despite the fact that all kings are supposed to behave as Diotogenes describes (the word δελτίον of the ruler's obligations is very common in these extracts) this does not make the writer wary of the possible corruption of monarchical government, but rather enables him to show up his ideal in yet brighter colours.

For Sthenidas the wisdom required for rule is the chief quality necessary. Its effects will be a mixture of private and public virtue if the ruler makes himself μεγαλόφωνος τε καὶ ἄμερον καὶ ὀλυγόδεα and shows πατρικὰν διάθεσιν (p.270). The divine component of rule while accounting for the importance of particular attributes such as gentleness and caring shows up once more the cosmic dimensions of the ruler's qualities, so that there is little point in the writer's describing the ruler as an exemplar for his subjects. The justification of kingly rule also implies a judgement about human society and presumably about society in the universe: οὐδέν δὲ ἀδικλειετον καλὸν οὐδὲ ἀναρχον (p.271). Rule and subordination are not an unfortunate necessity, but an ideal which is in fact attained.

Echphantus goes into the situation of the king more deeply. For him the king is one who rules with virtue (p.276) of which εὖνοοι is an important part (ib.), but what this can mean is described in very lofty terms: (ἐν) μὲν δὲν βασιλέα κρῆμα εὐλοκοτες τε καὶ ἀδικλειετον εντι καὶ δι' ὑπερβολὰν θεϊοτατος δυσεξικτον ἀνθρώπῳ (p.273). The king is self-sufficient (pp.279 and 277), so that he can command his own life by the same virtue as that with which he commands men. This means that he is actually independent of his subjects, even though his connection with them is elsewhere shown as important. Thus one of the most important tasks of Echphantus' king is setting an example to be followed (pp.277-8). By wielding his influence the king can secure obedience, but this is a term the writer finds distasteful, for a deed of obedience is very close to being one of necessity, and the use of force and necessity must diminish zeal for imitation, since the bond of goodwill must be lacking (p.278, cf. Polyb. 6.4.2).
Ecphantus too sees the ruler as a harmonizer (pp.275-6) who is effective because he possesses all the looked-for virtues. By means of ἀρετή he has justice, self-control, fellow-feeling and related qualities (p.279). That the king be truly king is also demanded (p.278), which is an acknowledgement that there may be tyrannical and false rulers. The qualities of the ruler must determine into which category he will fall. This highly theoretical description of monarchical government could be called a 'soft sell' for it does not even pretend to come to grips with the problem of power, and Ecphantus mentions the true king without pausing to consider that a false king, despite his being a 'bastard usurper', may not, unfortunately, always succumb to that vertigo allegedly assailing those who climb without warrant to a lofty height (p.273).

CICERO

Before looking at Cicero's account of one-man rule, we need to consider whether he is really describing monarchy in all the examples where he appears to do so, and if so, whether his theory does have any practical application, or indeed is meant to refer so directly to the current political situation that its importance as theory is minimal. Cicero differs from most of our other writers on monarchy, who lived under monarchical government or were disaffected members of a democracy, in not seeing the institution of kingship as the obvious solution to every political problem. But where he expresses a view of rule in which his terms show that commenting on one-man rule is the most natural way for him to talk about government, even if this form is not itself under discussion, we can take this as evidence of the impact of a particular theory of government which it is important to discover and record.

Cicero's expressions of opinion about what we may term, as a comprehensive expression, the princeps have lent themselves to a wide variety of interpretations. He has been taken to be the originator of a programme of monarchical government which Augustus took over (by e.g. Reitzenstein), a claim strenuously denied by Heinze who sees princeps

as a generic term;\textsuperscript{44} as intending Pompey to fulfil the role of princeps (Meyer);\textsuperscript{45} as at any rate suggesting that the state needed one man either to set right its wrongs and then retire into private life (see Gagé)\textsuperscript{46} or to exercise a permanent but not precisely explained influence on government (this is Magdelain's contention).\textsuperscript{47}

The terms by which Cicero denotes political leadership are many — princeps, moderator, rector, etc. — but the difficulty lies in deciding how these terms, which may have a variety of meanings, are being used in any context. Yet it is important to note that the words frequently appearing in association do gain a certain stability of meaning in similar contexts. Thus we find that

\textit{il termine princeps è presente in tutto lo sviluppo unitario del pensiero politico ciceroniano a partire da questo momento (the composition of De Rep. 2.51) come perfetto equivalente degli altri termini con cui si designa l'uomo politico.}\textsuperscript{48}

Principe can nevertheless have two basic meanings, the one indicating superiority of rank, the traditional epithet applied, for example, to a leading figure in the Senate, the other signifying priority of initiative, and so appropriate to one who acts on his own, and not as part of the government.\textsuperscript{49}

The earliest coherent accounts of the princeps appear in the De Oratore, and have often been used to support the view that what Cicero is referring to is an actual head of state, with a particular and precise position in the government, but this is hard to substantiate, as the expression associated with it (\textit{auctor consili publici}) is elsewhere combined with senator bonus (e.g. in De Orat. 1.215) and so Cicero is

\textsuperscript{44} R. Heinze, 'Ciceros "Staat" als politische Tendenzschrift', Hermes, 59 (1924), 73-94.


\textsuperscript{46} J. Gagé, 'De César à Auguste', RH, 177 (1936), 279-342, esp. p.324.

\textsuperscript{47} André Magdelain, \textit{Auctoritas principis} (Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1947), Chapter One.

\textsuperscript{48} Ettore Lepore, \textit{Il princeps}, p.34.

probably not hinting here at an outstanding individual acting on his own authority. To accept that Cicero was not contemplating absolute rule by an individual princeps either within the framework of the constitution or outside it does not mean, however, also denying his concern to emphasize the importance that one respected citizen could have for affairs of state, even if simply by way of example.

When we come to the De Republica, we need to consider Cicero's intention in each section and in particular to distinguish between those places where the ideal civis is presented, especially with Scipio as model (e.g. in Book Six and the end of Book Two and what remains of Book Five), and the so-called excursus on monarchy (Book One, 54-65). Pöschl tends to discuss this section as if it were on the same basis as the other arguments given for one-man rule, or the preceding constitutional discussion, which approach Lepore rightly, it seems, rejects. He holds that here we have an account of a different order, which is not looking at the dictatorship for instance as the embodiment of the royal qualities idealized in the abstract. The excursus on kingship might seem to deal unambiguously with the rex whom the Romans knew only as the unmourned kings of their ancient history, but the influence here is probably from political theory, in particular from Academic and Old Stoic sources. Here 'non si fa ancora sentire prepotente l'attrazione pratica delle monarchie ellenistiche e l'influenza della loro propaganda'.

The figure of the princeps appears in the rest of the De Republica with a number of associated terms and differing connotations, but though L. Brutus, for example, auctor et princeps (2.46), and Plato, princeps ille (2.21), are instances of men leading by priority in initiative,

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50 As Lepore, Il princeps, points out, p.49, and see as well pp.46-8 for his arguments against Wagenvoort on this.


52 Lepore, Il princeps, p.83.
they are hardly helpful in showing what Cicero had in mind for his elusive 'statesman'. More useful are the titles which appear in discussions on the search for the leading man — tutor and procurator (2.51), rector (2.51; 5.6; 6.1; 6.13), moderator (1.45; 5.8), gubernator (1.45, in gubernanda re publica; cf. 1.52 virtute vero gubernante r.p.), conservator (2.46, in conservanda libertate; 6.13, conservatores; 2.64 and 1.12, conservare), paene divinus vir, summus vir, vir ingenio et virtute praestans\(^53\) (1.45, 54; 2.46) prudens\(^54\) (2.67). These terms occurring in a variety of texts can be more easily explained as the equivalent of the πολιτικός of Greek theory than as uniformly pointing to an absolute ruler.\(^55\) Scipio Africanus is told of the reward that

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\(^{53}\) Lepore concludes on praestans vir: 'Vedremo ... che da questo momento esso diviene sinonimo perfetto di princeps, in tutti e due gli usi' (Lepore, Il princeps, p.60).

\(^{54}\) 'L'accento batte sul vir prudens come prototipo del princeps rector a sottolineare fuori degli ordines il valore della φρόνημα individuale', Lepore, Il princeps, p.106.

\(^{55}\) 'Finora ... va tenuto presente che già l'as pne lessicale ha riconfermato ancora una volta la vicinanza del nostro princeps al πολιτικός della tradizione greca, estendendo questo carattere a quiusque "erit rector et gubernator civitatis" (II, 51; si pensi del resto all'uso del plurale p.es. in VI, 13) e a ciascun "optimo" (III, 36), implicitamente escludendo un'interpretazione monarchica o di preminenza del singolo' (Lepore, Il princeps, p.76). There is a surprising degree of concurrence among writers more recent than Reitzenstein and Heinze about this picture of the princeps (although not all see in this figure evidence of Cicero's political perspicacity, as Lepore seems to do). Thus Gagé comments: 'Il semble donc très probable que Cicéron a bien tracé le portrait idéal de l'homme d'Etat en quelque sorte prédestiné, qui, sorti du cercle des princeps, les dépasserait et s'imposerait à tous par son autorité, prendrait par une sorte de droit naturel, en cas de trouble, la direction de l'État et, le cas échéant, recevrait à sa mort, dans l'au-delà lumineux du monde supralunaire, l'immortalité sidérale promise à ses pareils ... il semble bien que Cicéron n'aît nullement prévu le 'principal' comme une institution permanente. L'important est que, chaque fois que l'État aura besoin d'un pareil tuteur, il le trouve', 'De César à Auguste', pp.322, 323.

Compare Béragner's comment (Cicéron précurseur politique', p.111): 'Si le tyran offre un type exclusif, son antithèse prend une figure protéiforme. Il incarne des vertus diverses qui, émanations de la Vertu, justifiaient chacune isolément la montée au pouvoir: protecteur, sauveur, restaurateur de l'État, fondateur, bienfaiteur, simple citoyen au nom de tous, père. Or, ces qualités, reconnues ou revendiquées, sont celles que Cicéron attribuait au citoyen par excellence, voué au service de l'État idéal', and see also Pierre Grenade, 'Remarques sur la théorie ciceronienne dite du "principal"', Mélanges d'Arch. et d' Hist., 57 (1940), esp. p.42, and Martin van den Bruwaene's article 'La Notion du prince chez Cicéron', in his Études sur Cicéron (Desclée de Brouwer, Brussels, n.d.), p.71, note l.
will come to 'all those who have preserved, aided, expanded their country' (6.13) and the titles of tutor et procurator are granted to 'whoever will be rector and gubernator of the state' (2.51). These expressions then show us something of what will be expected of the leader, whatever position he holds.

Cicero gives initially a very simple definition of kingship: *cum ...

... penes unum est omnium summa rerum, regem illum unum vocamus, et regnum eius rei publicae statum* (1.42). In the excursus he describes *rex* as *nomen quasi patrium* (1.54) and the outstanding quality of kingship he considers to be *caritas* (1.55), but good kings also display *diligentia* (1.54), *potestas, iustitia* and *sapientia* (2.43). Self-control means that he who rules does not impose laws on the people that he does not obey himself (1.52). His life shapes the nature of the state: *talis est quaeque res publica, qualis eius aut natura aut voluntas qui illum regit* (1.47). Cicero thus believes that any leading figure should be able to leave an example to his subjects to follow: *suam vitam ut legem praefert suis civibus* (1.52). This in Book Two of the De Republica is extended to embrace the idea of the ruler as a person bringing harmony out of discord and offering himself as a mirror to the citizens (*ut sese splendore animi et vitae suae sicut speculum praebat civibus*, 2.69). The king's self-rule is for Cicero the precondition of his ruling others (1.52), and the parallel between rule over self and rule over others is drawn in such a way that self-control and the advantages of kingship are considered complementary (see 1.60). Not surprisingly, then, Cicero firmly pronounces that those eminent *virtute et animo* should rule over the weaker (1.51). For some men servitude is useful in restraining their base instincts (see 3.36).

These qualities which the ruler should possess and which can no doubt be considered desirable attributes in any statesman are also elements in the character Cicero draws of the public-spirited Roman he hopes his son will be. Roman society, even at this stage of its history, still tended to describe the individual's life by reference to his

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56 'Von besonderem Interesse ist hier, dass die Prinzipatsidee mit *concordia* in Verbindung gesetzt wird, indem das Vorbild des Princeps die Eintracht schaffen soll' (Skard, Euergetes-Concordia, p.96).
political activity. Thus he attempts to show how to men like Scipio, government is an opus left them by their ancestors, the procuratio atque administratio rei publicae (De Rep. 1.35), and this is so whatever their official position may be at any particular time. Ratio is the means by which the statesman brings about the desired effect in the state.

The king or kingly figure is frequently contrasted with his opposite, the tyrant. Cicero is aware of the danger of the king's degeneration. Only his virtuous character prevents him from being a tyrant — simul atque enim se inflexit hic rex in dominatum iniustiorem, fit continuo tyrannus (2.47-8), cum rex iniustus esse coepit, perit illud ilico genus, et est idem ille tyrannus (1.65). The tyrant is the epitome of the anti-social, and stands outside human nature (De Off. 3.32). Cicero does admit on occasion that freedom and kingship itself are incompatible (see De Rep. 1.47; 2.43) and accepts that this is a genuine disadvantage, just as is the loss under a monarchy of commune ius et consilium (1.43).

The 퐰퐿퐿퐿퐿퐿퐿 was for Plato the same as the βασιλι̊κ̊ς (see esp. Polit. 393d), for when he marked off the expert he needed to show only one individual. A practitioner has a task to perform on an object, the object for the statesman is the body politic, and so to speak of more than one person would be nonsense. Cicero in the theoretical parts of the De Republica seems to have much the same view.

We cannot help noticing Cicero's concern for society as a whole, his wish, most clearly expressed in his favourite phrase, concordia ordinum, and, as he came to see this as too narrow, in concordia omnium bonorum, that all parts of the state would 'pull together' for the common good. But Cicero, in his philosophical speculation on government, involved as he is in finding his 'statesman' is more interested in determining the character best able to perform the functions of ruling than in considering precisely how he will emerge in Roman society.

57 De Rep. 2.43: ea-forma civitatis mutabilis maxime est hanc ob causam, quod unius vitio praecipita in perniciosissimam partem facillime decidit.

58 De Rep. 1.47: nulla alia in civitate, nisi in qua populi potestas summa est, ullum domicilium libertas habet; 2.43: desunt omnino et populo multa qui sub rege est, in primisque libertas. Note also De Rep. 1.55: hac (libertas) omnes carere, sive regi sive optimatibus serviant.
PHILO

For Philo more than for any of the writers we have considered in this chapter so far, the qualities of an individual confirmed him as ruler or disproved his claim. Philo's starting-point differs from that of those writers on kingship who in theory at least saw their work as a political treatise. His political reflections appear only incidentally, except when he is recording historical events in the *Legatio ad Gaium* and the *In Flaccum*, and in the more or less consistently political interpretation of the *De Josepho*. His comments on the correct behaviour for man are, naturally, part of his main theme, and apply far more importantly to the life of the virtuous individual than to that of the king. We have then to see whether this behaviour is also presented as suitable and necessary for the monarch, and whether there are extra 'kingly' qualities necessary if he is to perform his task well.

The assumption behind Philo's discourse is that this world is itself ruled monarchically by God. Not surprisingly Philo's definition of the king on earth takes account of this fact, and is considerably broader in scope than those we have previously come across. The king is the living law (and the law is a just king) and the king and lawgiver have the task of superintending not only mortal but also divine matters (*Vit. Mos.* 2.4-5).

The virtues of men in general are of course derived from the Decalogue, but Philo interprets these in such a way that in many cases they take on the familiar forms of Greek virtues: 'each of the ten pronouncements separately and all in common incite and exhort us to wisdom and justice and godliness and the rest of the company of virtues' (*Spec. Leg.* 4.134). The basis of morality is right reason (*Opif.* 143), for Philo a divine law under which the first man followed God step by step in the highways cut out by the virtues (*Spec. Leg.* 4.144). In practice, while piety, wisdom, prudence or temperance are urged on all, justice is found to need a separate exposition because of its social effects (see *Spec. Leg.* 4.136-238).

In the *De Virtutibus*, Philo discusses the need for courage, humanity (*φιλανθρωπία*, which he places next to piety), repentance (whereby men turn to the pursuit of piety and justice, and become 'temperate,
self-controlled, modest, gentle, kind, humane, serious, just, high-minded, lovers of truth, superior to the desires for money and pleasure') and true nobility (Virt. 182 and passim, cf. list Vit. Mos. 2.185). Elsewhere Philo brings forward the specifically social virtues: 'During this span [of life] what can be meet for you to do but to study fellow-feeling and goodwill and equity and humanity and what else belongs to virtue?' (Spec. Leg. 1.295).

The ruler is in all cases one who possesses these virtues. Justice and equality are particularly characteristic of him (Vit. Mos. 1.328). Indeed they may be the very basis of authority and if he is to be perfect at his task, a legislator should possess all the virtues fully and completely (Vit. Mos. 2.8). Yet some virtues are more closely associated with particular situations and others have less affinity. What a ruler such as Moses displays in abundance is the range of virtues most becoming to him:

ταῦτα δ' ἦσαν ἐγκράτεια, καρτερία, σωφροσύνη, ἀγχύνολαί, συνόδεις, ἐπιστήμη, πόνοι, κακοπόθεια, ἰδιούων ύπεροφίαν, δικαιοσύνη, προποτα πρὸς τὰ βέλτιστα, ψάγοι καὶ κολάσεως ἀμαρτανώντων νόμιμοι, ἔπαινοι καὶ τιμαὶ κατορθούντων πάλιν σὺν νόμῳ (Vit. Mos. 1.154).

Only towards the end of the list do we notice qualities belonging particularly to public life, and Philo claims that they also are intrinsic to the kingly character. Legislation itself is akin to love of humanity, of justice and goodness, and hatred of evil (Vit. Mos. 2.9). Philo's explanation of these virtues depends largely on showing the relationship of men to their fellows, which they preserve, and this contrasts with his emphasis on the individual in his description of the ideal qualities of Moses.

Community values such as harmony and fellowship are basic in Philo's work only in particular contexts, and equality is then the obvious result of this common nature of all men (see Spec. Leg. 4.237, cf. 166). The ruler should procure the good-will of his subjects, but Philo does not stress his activity in bringing about harmony and unity in the society except in the Legatio in his description of the rule of Augustus (143ff.).59 The ruler has a special capacity for his task, but this is

59 But see Abr. 261: αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλαι βασιλεῖαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καθίστανται,
a divine gift more often than a skill or art, except when rule becomes the profitable shepherd's art (see *Praem.* 54 and *Jos.* 2).

The ruler's task of improving his subjects seems at first glance to rank high in Philo's list, but the use Philo makes of the king or lawgiver as the model for the people suggests that future generations are the ones who benefit rather than the ruler's own subjects (see *Vit.* *Mos.* 1.158-9 and *Virt.* 70). Only rarely does he bring into prominence the reforming role of the ruler, and then in a vague way, with reminiscences of Aristotle's 'outstanding man' (see *Praem.* 113-4).

The effects produced by the exercise of the ruler's beneficence could hardly count as moral improvement, for the emphasis in these instances is on the character of the giver and on the gratitude which the generosity will produce in the recipient. The tone of *Spec. Leg.* 4.184 is typical: the ruler should preside over his subjects like a father over his children so that he himself may be honoured in return as by true-born sons, 'and therefore good rulers may be truly called the parents of cities and nations in common'. Ruling for the material benefit of subjects is the way Macro advises Gaius to wield his power (*Legat.* 51), and this is the type of behaviour Philo praises in the gods and heroes whom the emperor wrongly fancied he was imitating (*Legat.* 81ff.). Language applied to God but couched in terms of earthly government illustrates Philo's ideal of the ruler as benefactor.

Rulers, by showing *σεμνότης*, *δεινότης* and *εὐρεγεσία* will induce in the subjects *αὐλός*, *φόβος* and *εὐνοία* (*Praem.* 97) which when blended and harmonized in the soul render subjects obedient to rulers. Once more, then, the very qualities of most social impact are made to function, it seems, simply to legitimate the rule of one man and not for their importance in the structure of society. When Philo discusses the

60 Cf. Diogenes, p.267, where the qualities *σεμνότας*, *χριστότας* and *δεινότας* are necessary to the good king, and note the comments of Louis Delatte, *Les Traités*, p.264, who describes the Philo extract as 'le parallèle le plus exact qu'on puisse rapprocher du texte de Diotogène'.
ruler's use of these qualities, much of the concern for fellowship evidenced in his general ethical discussion has vanished.

The spiritualizing of rule so that it becomes more a matter for a king of self-rule than of ruling others (or rather so that the second is seen to come about only as a consequence of the first) does appear in Philo, but limited to the sphere of sexual ethics. To this Philo attaches considerable importance in the De Josepho. Along with skill in the shepherd's craft of tending others and in household management, both foreshadowing rule of a kingdom, self-control appears as a necessary characteristic of the statesman, but with a restricted scope (Jos. 54).

The ruler's source of authority derives initially from his character (Abraham is admired for his nature τελειωτέρας οὐσίας ἣν κατὰ ἀνθρώπου, Virt. 217), and this the subjects generally acknowledge as justification for his position. Moses was appointed by God with the free consent of the people who were to be governed by him; he did not attain power with troops or weapons (Praem. 54). The lawgiver can indeed be termed a god θεὸς ὁ αὐτὸς ὁδός ὁ ἀπεκαθήσθη ἐν καὶ διὰ τούτῳ ἄρχων παντὸς ἄφρονος (Mut. 128). Rulers are therefore of a higher nature than ordinary men, and should naturally exercise control over the latter, though in a responsible way:

The only problem is in testing and selecting the person best fitted by nature to command (Virt. 54).

The need to separate the true king from the false claimant appears continually in Philo's writing. The conclusion may be that only God has the qualities to satisfy the requirements. All human rule is only a poor imitation of his kingship. On the other hand Philo does occasionally describe the true earthly king (as in the account of Moses — see above, Vit. Mos. 1.148). The principle is boldly laid down. Real wealth is the abundance of virtues which we must believe to be true and equitable sovereignty, ruling in justice over all, in contrast to the
bastard governments which have no right to the title (Abr. 25). Rulers in the true sense (ὡς ἀληθῶς) are those who perform the actions of noble men, filling the cities (because of their nature and their παρουσία ὁφθη) with plenty and abundance, with order and peace (Spec. Leg. 2.21-2). The connection between the ruler's personal behaviour and these public benefits is taken for granted but not explained.

Another way in which the king is 'marked off' from false claimants is by contrasting him with the tyrant and describing the qualities of both. An account of God as king, with qualities the opposite of the tyrant's, provides the example for earthly rulers: invested with a gentle and lawful rule, he governs all the heaven and the cosmos with justice, combining ruling with caring (Provid. 2.2-3).

Freedom may appear as opposed specifically to bad monarchical government. The definitions of freedom show that in one sense, freedom and slavery can correspond to conditions where there are, as guardians and rulers, respectively laws and harsh and difficult masters (Prob. 45). Freedom may also be something possessed only by the wise man, and the foolish man is therefore a slave, in accord with Stoic doctrine (cf. Sob. 57). When Philo deals with the position of the Jews under Gaius he defines these terms by reference to the character of the ruler:

This shows that absence of servitude may be possible under a monarch, depending on his nature, but Philo does not consider the external manifestation of liberty especially important. This also implies, however, that he is not too concerned if 'the multitude who are like cattle require a master and a ruler, and have for their leaders men of virtue', presumably the wise as counsellors, but actual kings 'are more often in the position of the sheep than the shepherd' (Prob. 30-31). True kingship may well end up being rule of the better element in the soul, and whoever has this is free.

Although Philo never directly questions that man's social nature
determines his life, his ambivalent feelings about the effects of men on each other in the public sphere mean that he does not invoke the king as a permanent agent of cohesion, apart from the influence he wields through his private character.

**SENECA**

The qualities Seneca expects to be present in a candidate for imperial office are set out most clearly in the *De Consolatione ad Marcellam* where he describes Marcellus (Augustus' nephew and chosen successor who died in 23 B.C.) as *adolescentem animo alacrem, ingenio potentem, sed frugalitatis continentiaeque in illis aut annis aut opibus non mediocriter admirandae*, *patientem laborum, voluptibus alienum quantumcumque imponere M i s aut annis aut opibus non mediocriter admirandae* (2.3). This is a typical portrait of the ideal ruler, and here Cynic traits predominate. Other accounts of the way people in general are expected to behave do not dwell so one-sidedly on the isolated, self-contained individual. Not only are patience, fortitude and perseverance, and every quality that pits itself against hardship and subdues fortune desirable virtues, but so too are 'liberality, moderation and kindness' (*Vit. Beat. 25.6-7*).

In the *De Clementia*, Seneca notes the characteristics to be looked for in a king, describing him as benevolent in action (e.g. 1.19.9), as clement (*passim*) and moderate (e.g. 1.11.1). He exercises, in other words, the qualities desirable in any man of position like Seneca himself, only with vastly wider scope for good or ill.

The moral element in government means that a ruler is able to influence the whole state. Beneath the sway of a good and merciful ruler, *iustitia, pax, pudicitia, securitas, dignitas florent,... opulenta civitas copia bonorum omnium abundat* (*Clem. 1.19.8*). This can be explained by the fact that *tradetur ista animi tui mansuetudo diffundeturque paulatim per omne imperii corpus, et aucta in

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61 Cf. *Cons. ad Polyb. 12.3*: *Illo moderante terras et ostendente quanto melius beneficiis imperium custodiatur quam armis;* and on clemency, *Cons. ad Polyb. 13.2*, with the reference to Claudius' *clementia, quae ex virtutibus eius primum optinet locum.*
similitudinem tuam formabuntur — all things will be moulded into your likeness (2.2.1). The De Clementia takes it for granted that the ruler’s task is to cure the moral ills of the state. Clementia is important because displaying it is the best way for a king to do this.

While Seneca indicates that this virtue is peculiarly suited to the ruler (1.3.3) — nullum tamen clementia ex omnibus magis quam regem aut principem decet — he also stresses that no other virtue is more seemly for a man, for none is more human (1.3.2). There is a certain tension between the 'regal' quality of such-condescending benevolence — which justifies its possessor in his power — and the need for all men to acquire it and thereby lessen the ruler’s prestige in this area, as we might suppose. The ruler’s greater capacity to save others means, however, that he can be the best exemplar of the virtue (see 1.5.3).

Despite Seneca’s concern for the development in the king of a sense of his position and his introduction of a mystical element into the discussion in the De Clementia, he does not here stress that the king needs self-rule if he is to be qualified to rule others. Perhaps this is because there is considerable discussion of self-rule in the expositions of the correct behaviour in the sage, and the characters of king and sage bear a close resemblance.

Significantly, Seneca presents kingship as an eternal reality, certainly, but one which is a task for the king to take up as an individual. He makes frequent use of the paradoxes which other writers on kingship employ only in passing (except, that is, for Dio Chrysostom). The statio which the ruler must not desert applies also to the private citizen ('the noble soul, ... taking care to conduct itself honourably at the point of duty where it is placed' — in hac statione qua positus est [Ep. 120.18]) and to the public servant ([non licet tibi] assidua laboriosi officii statione fatigatum corpus voluptaria peregrinatione recreare — Cons. ad Polyb. 6.4). This concept implies the presence of self-regulation in the individual who keeps to his statio, and has obvious Stoic derivation. Seneca’s ruler, therefore, has his duty put before him in a number of guises:

Beobachtet man, wie stark das Motiv der statio in der stoischen Gemüts-und Gedankenwelt verankert ist, so wundert man sich nicht mehr, wenn man feststellen müsste, dass eben
dasselbe Motiv auch auf die stoische Lehre von den Pflichten eines Fürsten eingewirkt habe.  

The worldly kingdom itself is, ideally, unimportant. Among the rulers of the Golden Age of early man, officium erat imperare, non regnum (Ep. 90.5). Rule is indeed a burden — ingens tibi onus imposuit i (Clem. 1.1.6). It may even be described as a servitude: servitus est, non imperium is a statement he agrees with (Clem. 1.8.1), and later explains: est haec summæ magnitudinis servitus non posse fieri minorem (1.8.3). This too does not apply only to kings. It is a general precept, for 'a great fortune is a great slavery' (Cons. ad Polyb. 6.5). But the restrictions placed on those who are to exercise their power rightly are in theory enormous, though self-imposed. They stem from the ruler's conscience and in no way derive from any external imposition. If they did so, there would be no longer a true monarchical government, in Seneca's terms.

Seneca also describes the rule of the king as a cura. As Béranger notes 'avec cura, le cas se complique'. Here we may believe that Seneca is referring to an official position, but his actual expressions and the use of the term in analogous situations in other writers suggest that in this case too the emphasis is moral rather than institutional. Is, cui curae sunt universa (Clem. 1.13.4) is a general

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63 Cf. Cons. ad Marc. and the reference to the onus imperii which Augustus had begun to place on Marcellus (2.3).
64 The precise meaning of honourable servitude is a much debated issue. For different approaches, see H. Volkmann, "Εὐδοξος δουλεύα als ehrenvoller Knechtsdienst gegenüber dem Gesetz", Ph, 100 (1956), 52-61, and 'Die Basileia als Εὐδοξος δουλεύα: Die Beitrag zur Wortgeschichte der Duleia', Historia, 16 (1967), 155-61, and J. Béranger, 'Grandeur et servitude du souverain hellénistique', Etudes de Lettres, 7 (1964), 3-16. Adam in Clementia principis, pp.27-30 and p.120, attempts to show Seneca's nobilis servitus to have a different sense from the Hellenistic counterpart, but we agree with Griffin, Seneca, p.145, that she has not proved her point.
65 Jean Béranger, Recherches sur l'aspect idéologique du principat (Reinhardt, Basel, 1953), p.187. Béranger refers to the use by other writers of cura. Tacitus and Pliny often use the word in this sense (on Pliny see later). Cf. also Philostratus, Life of Apoll. 5.29.3 and 8.7.6, for θομοτής used in the same sense. 'La légitimité ne repose pas sur des institutions, mais sur la valeur morale du souverain' (Béranger, ib., p.195).
description of the king which Seneca develops by introducing the notion of the parts of the state, of which the ruler is one. But precise details are not forthcoming. The king is firmly based when 'all men daily find his concern to be vigilant for the safety of each and all' (Clem. 1.3.3).

The autonomous individual may be found in the person of the philosopher, but, in general, freedom under a monarchy has to be defined in a special way, if it exists at all. Marcus Brutus could be held to blame for having hoped that liberty could exist where the rewards both of supreme power and servitude were so great (Ben. 2.20.2). This very revealing passage shows that 'servitude' does not come only to the monarch chained to his duty, and indeed Seneca suggests that a true Stoic should not be upset about this. What is important is the nature of the ruler, since there is no better condition a state can reach than being under the rule of a just king (ib.). Thus a tyrant may be painted in the darkest colours in order to demonstrate how different the good king is from him: *Quid interest inter tyrannum ac regem (species enim ipsa fortunae ac licentia par est), nisi quod tyranni in voluptatem saeviunt, reges non nisi ex causa ac necessitate? Mere names mean nothing,* for *tyrannus ... a rege factis distat, non nomine* (Clem. 1.11.4 and 1.12.1), and the most significant difference is in the mercy displayed by the one, not in the institutions of government at all.

The king's qualities and functions are therefore those of the outstanding Stoic individual, and as such Seneca depicts him in his descriptions. In such a philosophic sphere Seneca feels at home and this too is his way of avoiding confrontation with unpalatable realities. The king is simply in the position of any man striving after virtue: his kingship complicates this task, but does not alter the nature of the difficulty of achieving this object.

It is then easy for Seneca to claim to justify kingship in its original form as being that system where men 'entrusted themselves to the control of one better than themselves' (*commissi melioris arbitrio, Ep. 90.4*), for nature, as he says, has the habit of subjecting the weaker to the stronger (ib.) and here weaker and stronger seem to be the equivalent of worse and better.
MUSONIUS RUFUS

Musonius Rufus believes that philosophy teaches and trains the king in the qualities he most needs. These are justice, moderation, courage and reason, which all mankind should possess (passim). The king's task, in which these virtues assist him, is to be a saviour and benefactor of men (p.280). Rule need not however mean rule over others in all cases, since the title of kingly person may belong to one who has only a couple of subjects, or who rules only himself (p.285). Yet Musonius retains the idea that the king should impose good order and harmony on society (p.283) although he gives no actual suggestions on how this should be done.

DIO CHRYSOSTOM

Of all our writers on kingship, Dio Chrysostom gives perhaps the most thorough account of the qualities a monarch needs. His definition of kingship given in 3.45,'a form of government where we have a city or a number of peoples, or the whole world, well-ordered by one good man's judgement and virtue', shows a difference in emphasis from that given a little earlier, 'kingship is irresponsible government where the law is the king's will' (3.43). The transition from this initial factual account to the morally-weighted one is made without comment, but is indicative of Dio's approach in general.

A king, to do his 'well-ordering' with 'judgement and virtue', needs to be made 'just, prudent, temperate and humane' (1.6). The field for such virtues in a king may be more extensive than those of private citizens – having to do with war and peace, concord, honour to gods and care of men (ib.). Similar lists appear in the other discourses on kingship. Oration 2.26, for example, demands that the ruler be humane, gentle, just, lofty and brave in character and above all take delight in bestowing benefits. Elsewhere the pre-eminent kingly virtues can be reduced to two – courage and justice – but this is simply a succinct version of Homer's βασιλεύς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής (2.54).

The need for a ruler to rule himself before he undertakes to rule others requires mention in a special category. It constitutes the theme of Oration 62, 'On Kingship and Tyranny': 'If a person cannot guide a single soul and that his own, how could he be king ... over unnumbered thousands ...?' (62.1). Diogenes tells Alexander that if he is self-controlled and knows the royal art of Zeus, there is nothing to prevent his being a son of Zeus (4.21). This approach is consistent with the Cynic element in Dio's philosophy in that the self-reliant, self-ruling man emerges in strong colours, qualified to rule by his character, and indeed ruling in fact even if his only subject is himself.67

Dio does, however, bring his speech back to the original theme of ruling peoples, by making the common assertions about the king's duty to care for and improve his people: 'the good king looks upon himself as being king (βασιλεύειν) not for the sake of his individual self, but for the sake of all men' (1.23). Helping men is his god-ordained duty (3.55), and a king is expected to try to elevate his subjects morally as well as materially, although Dio emphasizes this aspect to different degrees in different discourses. In 3.7 he conceives of the king's moral influence as a more or less inevitable side-effect of his holding power: 'When a man governs and holds sway over all mankind, his prudence avails to help even the imprudent ... his temperance serves to restrain even the intemperate' and so on with the other cardinal virtues. The most ambitious claim to reform, where a man 'having managed his own life admirably, endeavours by the persuasion of speech combined with goodwill and a sense of justice to train and direct a great multitude of men and to lead them to better things', occurs in a context which leaves the political authority of such a person unclear, which perhaps betrays Dio's lack of concern on this point (4.124).

The king's goodwill and solicitude are to be exercised in a rule that he holds because God has everywhere appointed the superior 'to care for and rule the inferior', which means that 'for the foolish he has made the wise to have care and thought, to watch and plan' — προνοεῖν καὶ

67We find several traces in Dio of one feature of [the] individual-ethical παθέτα, namely the social-ethical corollaries: ἀρχεῖν ἐκποιεῖν ἀρχεῖν ἀνθρώπων. This ἔγκρατες = ἀρχῇ in its widest meaning is teachable, and this is the aim and purpose of Cynic παθέτα' (Höistad, Cynic Hero, p.179).
The paternal care and indeed tenderness that Dio calls for are necessary because 'the shepherd's business is simply to oversee, guard, and protect flocks, not, by heaven, to slaughter, butcher and skin them' (4.44). The 'shepherds', to justify their claim to rule, need training for the task (see 49.2), but, granted their permanent superiority in this as in other fields, there is little danger of failure.

The titles granted to God as the king's model reveal the public face of monarchy, showing what functions 'must at the outset be inherent in the royal function and title' (1.41). Such duties are those which impel the king to protect the weak and bring men into unity, just as Alexander proclaims that the king, as well as displaying the common virtues of a good man, must also take delight in bestowing benefits, which activity approaches more nearly to the divine nature (2.26). The titles of saviour and protector of men are gained when a ruler carries out his tasks well (see 3.6). Yet the motives behind acts of generosity of the kindly and humane king are not necessarily altruistic. Dio emphasizes now the love won by this behaviour (1.20), now the fact that whereas other functions of royalty are obligatory, that of benefaction is alone voluntary and blessed, that is, at the ruler's whim (1.23). Viewed in this light such acts lose much of their universality and fail to emerge as a consistent organized substitute for rule based on justice and consultation.

The paradoxical description of rule as a burden not only suggests that such irksome duties as fall on his shoulders should be borne more nobly by a king than they would be by a private citizen (3.5 and 4.24) but that the larger portion of all burdens will fall to him because of his kingship, and that he should embrace them with open arms: 'He is actually more fond of toil than many others are of pleasure or of wealth' (1.21: cf. 62.3). The ruler who does accomplish his task is weighed down by cares (3.55), but can console himself with the reflection that he is following a noble precedent. Hercules toiled and struggled to win eventual fame (8.28), while Diogenes the Cynic bore

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68 Cf. 4.21: ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἂς σώφρων καὶ τὴν τοῦ Δίος ἐπιστάμενος τέχνην τὴν βασιλικήν, and 2.44 βασιλικὴν παυδευσάν.  
69 As Béranger comments on the use of the word πόνος (Recherches, p.179): 'Les fatigues, physiques et morales, que comportait l'exercice du pouvoir sont évoquées avec complaisance'.
with insults just as Odysseus had done from the suitors 'for he really resembled a king and lord' (9.9). Dio does not propose the Cynic life in its externals as a model for rulers, but does use similar expressions about the solitary individual and the monarch immersed in the cares of an Empire.

The effect of the king's labour on his subjects is unimportant in comparison with what his efforts tell us about him as an individual discharging his duty. If he fails to fulfil his task he may be called no true king but a slave, even though holding office (see e.g. 14.18). This of course is far from being a political description, but stems from Dio's belief that 'in every respect human beings, because of their depravity, are farther removed from a state of freedom' [than any formal slavery would bring about] (74.9). Freedom belongs to the king himself in a spiritual sense — 'you will never be king until you have propitiated your attendant spirit, and, by treating it as you should, have made it commanding, free-spirited and kingly'. (4.75). That is, freedom applies most truly to the individual who, 'enamoured of independence in the spiritual sense' (νοητοελθοδός αὐτονομίας ἔρωτι, 80.3), can be free, and in the midst of subjects independent. Only οὐ φρόνωμοι can be free in this way and can do as they wish (14.17). Thus freedom must be defined as the understanding of what is permitted and what forbidden, slavery as ignorance of this (14.18). When Dio uses the 'political' sense of freedom he still links it closely to moral development, for it is absence of virtue in the Alexandrians that makes Rome limit their freedom.70

The same lack of concern at differences of structure in themselves appears when Dio analyses democracy in terms appropriate to monarchy as if only through the examination of one man can political analysis proceed (32.25ff.).71 The terms that are important do not describe the structures of government but are related to individual activities, so that preservation can come only from guardians and leaders, willing stewards delighting in the city's order. A demos must acquire these

70 See 32.51: Freedom is not advantageous for the Alexandrians and so God has given them παιδαγωγοὺς τοὺς φροντιστέρους τῆς πόλεως.

71 In 32.27-8 Dio explains that democracy is of two kinds, one good, accepting frank speaking in its critics and grateful to those νομοθετοῦσι καὶ διδάσκοντοι ... ὃν (democracy) ἐγὼ τύθημι τῆς θείας καὶ βασιλικῆς φύσεως, and the bad kind, more common and resembling a tyrant.
traits if it is to possess a 'divine and kingly nature' (32.26-7).

Dio distinguishes monarchy and tyranny, true and false kingship, by means of the character of the ruler, and is emphatic that there will never really be a foolish or unjust king (62.7). He refers to the 'true' king (1.15; 2.69), the 'ideal' and 'good' king (1.11, 12; 3.25), the 'good' shepherd (3.41). The tyrant, by contrast, is one unworthy to rule (2.75). Lists of the qualities displayed by kings and tyrants (see 1.11-36 and 3.39-41) set out the contrast in personal ability and inclination and show that 'the man who does not possess the right qualities, i.e. a character firmly formed along individual-ethical lines, is not a basileus at all, however great his power as regards external things'. Dio's descriptions of the benefits of concord and unity in a state occur not in his essays on kingship but in the speeches addressed to fractious cities. He contributes little that is original to this theme and does not introduce the emperor as reconciler of intra-city or even inter-city disputes, except in an ironic way (32.69-71).

PLUTARCH

In Plutarch's Life of Solon the friends of the statesman are described as urging him to seize absolute power and not to be concerned for the name of the thing 'as if the virtues of him who seized it would not at once make it lawful sovereignty' (βασιλεία) (Sol. 14.4). Plutarch does not claim to agree with this view, and yet in one of his pieces of advice on statecraft he gives an account of government to the uneducated ruler which assumes that the ruler himself is responsible for the working out of wisdom and law in the state, and therefore presumably the source in some measure of these qualities (see e.g. 780e). The rulers' functions must however be related to the fact that they 'serve god for the care and preservation of men' (780d).

With his task so defined, the ruler's personal qualities will necessarily bulk large in a description of his office. Not surprisingly, then, we find Plutarch liberally scattering throughout his political

72 Höistad, Cynic Hero, p.187.
works lists of virtues and gifts of intellect possessed by the good ruler or exemplified in the lives of former rulers, particularly Alexander the Great. Plutarch shows Alexander's superiority to Darius not by stressing his military strength but by pointing out that he excelled 'in virtue and greatness of soul, in courage and justice' (339b), precisely the qualities which he believes should be possessed by all men.

The long list of virtues given later shows the same concern for all-round excellence with a certain stress laid on those qualities most likely to win the esteem of the king's associates:

εὐσέβειαν περὶ θεοῦς, πίστιν πρὸς φίλους, εὐτέλειαν, ἐγκράτειαν, ἐμπειρίαν, ἀφοβίαν πρὸς θάνατον, εὐφυχίαν, μιλανθραπίαν, ὑμηλάν εὐάρμοστον, ἀφευδῆς ἁθῶς, εὐστάθειαν ἐν βουλαῖς, τάχος ἐν πράξεσιν, πρῶτα δῆξης, προαύρεσιν ἐν τῷ καλῷ τελεσθοργῷ (342f).

Almost everything is here that could reveal the good man, except, this time, justice. That Plutarch does not consider these traits most fitting for kings alone is clear from his attribution of individual virtues possessed by Alexander to various renowned figures, not all kings, and two indeed, Pericles and Thermistocles, the statesmen of a democracy (see 343a).

The gentler virtues naturally predominate in the instructions Plutarch gives to municipal 'statesmen' (see especially 823f and 824d-e) and so could not be taken on their own as indicative of what Plutarch expected of a ruler holding supreme power, yet on occasions he appears to forget the distinction, and in the middle of describing polis dependence on the emperor refers to local rule in the same grandiose way as he had defined the task of government for the uneducated ruler, when it had been appropriate to employ the language of monarchical government.73

Enumerating the virtues of Alexander in 332c, Plutarch sums up by saying πᾶν ἔργον ἐκ πασῶν ἐσκε τῶν ἀρετῶν μεμεξῆθαι and then slips into a discussion of the virtue of the wise man, without having explicitly granted Alexander this title, though clearly implying his right to it.

73 See e.g. the description of the politician in 823f: ψ ... τοῦ λογίκου καὶ πολιτικοῦ σμήνους ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν ὁ θεὸς ἔδωκεν.
The ascription of virtues in this way was more or less perfunctory, but Plutarch does relate the ruler's character to his duties in a more detailed fashion and attempt to show its importance. The whole personality of the ruler is involved, as appears when he explains the situation in the *Ad Princípem*, 'just as a rule, if it is made rigid and inflexible, makes other things straight, when they are fitted to it and laid alongside it, in like manner the sovereign must first gain command of himself, regulate his own soul and establish his own character, then make his subjects fit his pattern' (780b; cf. *Num.* 20.8, *Mor.* 800b and *Cleom.* 13.1). Command then is in the first place self-command which Plutarch sees as ultimately producing a moral effect in the society. This comes about because of the incapacity of the masses to rule themselves and their lives, so that in many cases political rule means thinking for the people who are unable to make their own decisions about their physical and moral welfare. Κηδεμονία emerges as an important attribute of the ruler (812b; 823a) along with care and concern ἐπιμέλεια καὶ φροντίς (787b; cf. 817d).

Εὐθουλία is a common component in the lists of qualities, combining the notions of intellectual endeavour and the putting of this to public use (see 776e-f and 326e). Its importance is explained by Plutarch in his essay *De Fortuna* where it emerges as the source of ἐγκράτεια and σωφροσύνη for pleas in court, of καρτερία and ἀνδραγαθία in dangers, and of εὐνομία and δικαιοσύνη in public affairs (97e). Plutarch in fact grants considerable scope to the intellectual faculties in his political advice. The basis of political activity he defines as 'choice of policy arising from judgement and reason' (798c, κρύσις καὶ λόγος). Therefore kings must have accepted reason as a ruler over them before they can benefit society (779e).

The *An Senē* also stresses the need for mental endowments in those guiding others. These servants of Zeus are to provide counsel, foresight and speech to their city, for they hold royal rank in the states

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74 Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἵλωται ὦδ’ οἰκουρούς ὦδ’ ἀπράκτους ἥξουν εὖναι θεῶν μαθητὰς, ἄλλα βασιλεῖς, ὡς εὐθουλίας ἐγγενεόμενης καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ χροστήριτος καὶ μεγαλοφορούντης, κάντες ἐμελλον ὄσει θησαυροφάνες καὶ ἀπολαύσειν οἱ χρόμενοι (776e-f): πρὸς ἀμάχους δυνάμεις καὶ ἀπειρα φύλα καὶ κοταμούς ἀπεράτους καὶ πέτρας ἀτεσσόμενας, εὐθουλίας καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ καρτερίας καὶ σωφροσύνη παραπεπόμενος (326e).
in accordance with their wisdom (789d-f). We may assume that in this respect Plutarch saw their duties as similar to those of monarchs. He himself says a little further on (790a) that the office of king is the most perfect and greatest of political offices, and has the most cares, labours and occupations. Public service in general though not presumably making such onerous demands requires zeal, forethought for the common good and wisdom (817d). The mental habit of public men consists in deliberation, wisdom and justice and experience of the right times and words (792d).

The intellectual qualities are attributed to Alexander along with moral excellence, to account for his success (e.g. διάνοια, φιλοσόφου σύνεσις, φρόνημα). Plutarch does not believe that good intentions without the right training and mental capacity will suffice for either a leader in a polis, or an emperor. In this sense he is close to the earlier writers on politics such as Plato and Aristotle, and part of his justification of monarchy depends on this capacity being assumed to be present in the claimant.

One of the terms most frequently employed in Plutarch for denoting socially-approved behaviour is φιλάνθρωπος which is combined with other words to develop a special meaning in a particular context. Certainly kingship provided instances where this virtue was most appropriate, e.g. τεχνών δὲ καὶ φύσεων ἀγαθῶν αξίησιν εὐμένεια καὶ τιμὴ καὶ φιλανθρωπία βασιλείας ἐκκαλεῖται (333e). However its meaning has no restricted political application. Plutarch does attempt to display it as a public virtue (see 796e) — although in 823a it has a private reference — but here it does not refer to one man ruling alone, and in the Lives it is generally applied to the activities of heroes (note too Mor. 172b where Artaxerxes pronounces a course of action βασιλείας καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν and cf. 178b where, so long as another rules, Philip tells Alexander, Alexander himself should be φιλάνθρωπος and thus gain popularity). Renoirte, in her discussion of the significance of this quality for

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75 See 343a: τὴν δ' Ἀλεξάνδρου φύσιν, εἴπερ ἐκ πολλῶν συνήρμοσε καὶ συνεδρηκαί ἄρετῶν ὁ γεννήσας θεός, ἂρ' οὐκ ἐν εἴπομεν ἔχειν φρόνημα μὲν τὸ Κύρου, σωφροσύνην δὲ τὴν Ἀγησίλαος, σύνεσιν δὲ τὴν Θεμιστοκλέους, ἐμπεμβαίνει δὲ τὴν Φιλίκτου, τόλμως δὲ τὴν Βρασικῆς, δεινότητα δὲ καὶ τολμητεία τὴν Περσίλεως; and 338e οὕτω βασιλείας ἐκδήμησε καὶ συμπαθῶς ἐδάκρυσεν, όπτ' ἀπείτον αὐτοῦ τὸ σύφορον ἐν τῷ φιλανθρώπῳ γενέσθαι καὶ λαβεῖν ἀδόλυτας ἐγκλήμα τὴν χρηστότητα (and note too 332c and 331b ff.).
Plutarch notes that for him 'elle est même une vertu morale autant qu'une vertu sociale ou qu'un principe politique'. It is therefore well-suited to be a substitute for the values his society could not preserve under a monarchical government.

In *Moralia* 824, Plutarch shows the limits of what can be desired and perhaps brought about by any subordinate ruler; harmony and reconciliation in the population (824d). Though Plutarch's object here is partly to show provincial officials how to avoid attracting the unwelcome attention of the central authority, the ideal of freedom from disturbance is also offered to rulers in general. For all of them the value of freedom in any other sense was gone and social cohesion was to take its place, though in fact this ideal too was hard to realize. Plutarch's actual description of government confirms the intimations we gain from these hints. He implies that a monarch accepting reason as a ruler over him as he recommends will be a slave to duty (779e). Alexander had a kingly and god-like task (folios) the object of which was to order all men by one law and to render them submissive to one rule and one customary manner of life (342a). His achievement was important, not the manner of his arriving at it. It is therefore perfectly natural for Plutarch to write that the behaviour of Augustus became more kingly and useful to the people (folio) towards the end of his life (784d), for these terms are not in his view contradictory. Alternatively, Plutarch accepts that even in an apparent democracy, one person may be in fact the sole ruler (802c, where he copies Thucydides' description of Pericles).
Towards the end of the 'Precepts of Statecraft' he discusses two values important in political life — freedom and concord. The first, he admits, must be limited by government from Rome — so one of the chief catchcries of Greek politics is now no longer meaningful. The second still rests in the hands of the municipality to produce, unless of course the citizens are to have harmony formally imposed on them from above. Such a harmony Plutarch takes account of only as regards the local scene. He could refer to Alexander's aim of being a governor and reconciler of the whole world as a suitable object for a king to strive after, but did not apply this vision to the Empire that he knew.

He thus left out of consideration one of the most statesman-like activities which would seem an obvious element in any discussion on kingship and its justification. His attention was instead on the ruler as an individual and on his virtues and abilities. The very thesis of 'On the Fortune of Alexander' is that great men rule by right of virtue rather than fortune (337d). The statesman is the natural ruler of the state (813c), but does not need to hold office to be entitled to the name of statesman, so long as he is κοινωνικός καὶ φιλάνθρωπος καὶ φιλόποις καὶ κηδεμονικός καὶ πολιτικός ἀληθῶς (796e, and see 791e for the converse case where a king is no true ruler).

PLINY

In the Panegyricus, Pliny does not set out to provide a theory of kingship. Rather, his assumptions about rule emerge from his recording of the qualities which he praises Trajan for possessing. He does not give a precise definition of monarchical government — his desire to adhere to the diplomatic view of the princeps would have made it difficult to specify it as monarchy and to acknowledge the implication of doing so — but on occasion he provides a fairly comprehensive list of the ruler's duties. The true care of a prince is

reconciliare aemulas civitates, tumentesque populos non imperio magis quam ratione compescere; intercedere iniquitatisibus

Charakter, so dass auch mit einer weniger geeigneten Staatsform die von der Gottheit vorgezeichneten Staatsziele erfolgreich angestrebt werden können.'
The account of duties given earlier (4.4) is less ambitious and more traditionally 'Roman'.

To carry out the impressive assignment of ruling an Empire the ruler needed many qualifications to which Pliny refers haphazardly through the speech. Trajan is *castus et sanctus* and 'like the gods' (1.3), not differing in this respect from any noble-souled subject. So too the references to the emperor's humanity, duty, clemency and restraint, moderation and courtesy evoke qualities that all should possess (see 2.6-7). The very virtues that proclaim Trajan a *princeps* (4.6) are those well becoming a Roman of the old school— and this was indeed the light in which it was most convenient for him to be seen.

His moderation and frugality appear not as instances of conquest of self from which external rule could flow, but as examples of good behaviour in keeping with his general character as a Roman gentleman.

Yet the outward effect of the emperor's character, Pliny assures us, is felt also by the subjects: 'We are deeply in your debt and doubly so— for your own character and even more for the improvement it has made in our own' (41.4). Trajan's actions indeed were directly geared to this end: *amas constantiam civium, rectosque ac vividos animos ... foves et attollis* (44.6). Pliny exploits this theme for the emperor's credit but does not make it the basis of his justification of Trajan's position. Neither does he relate Trajan's talents to his moral excellence, except in military matters.

Trajan's actions in public life are naturally important in a speech that must refer to the record of government. Some of the instances cited are hardly what we would expect. Trajan's table manners, we are told, are an instance of *humanitas* (49.5); so too may his tact to the senators be (71.5). *Clementia* and *monsuetudo* appear in practice to mean the emperor's punishing without vindictiveness the informers of previous reigns, and his remission of inheritance tax for certain categories of

79 'I often used to wonder ... what great gifts should be proper to the man whose word or gesture of command could rule land and sea and determine peace or war.'
newly-made citizens (35.1; 38.5). These are not everyday acts in the administration but special cases. The emperor's generosity (liberalitas) is referred to frequently; it is shown by his increasing the number enrolled to receive the food distribution and his arrangements of this procedure (28.4; 25.5), and by his gladiatorial shows (33.2; 34.3), in other words by the 'bread and circuses' which kept the masses quiescent. Clearly Pliny does not set his sights too high here.

Benignitas is used in similar contexts — for the export of grain, the opening to the public of imperial gardens (32.3; 50.7), and again with reference to the tax removal (39.3). Magnitudo (see 61.4-5) and indulgentia (69.6) ring the changes on the same theme of the emperor's generosity. Pliny has no doubt that the emperor's task can most fittingly be described as a burden, a care, or a post. His recourse to these expressions is significant because 'onus, labor, statio et les notions connexes suggéraient invariablement un comportement, une activité, une pensée, bien distincte d'un emploi technique, magistrature ou fonction'.

The burden of supreme power was taken up by Trajan only at the state's most dire need (5.6). Who, asks Pliny, would voluntarily shoulder your burden of responsibility? (44.4). The cares of state (48.1) are so extensive that they require almost divine capacities (see 80.3), yet there is a certain informality in the term, as can be seen from Pliny's rhetorical question: Quis nostrum idem curae, idem sudoris insumit? (77.6, cf. 44.4: curae tuae moles). All men have a cura to attend to, even if cura can be associated with patientia as an instance of princely concern for another (86.5). The ruler's statio inevitably involves him in difficulties (neo te prospera et laeta stationis istius, sed aspera et dura ad capessendam eam compulerant, 7.3; cf. pro laboriosa ista statione, 86.3). Throughout, the emphasis is on Trajan's personal efforts in a trying situation.

With such a concept of good government in mind, there is nothing to prevent Pliny's defining tyranny and principate in terms of the moral

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80 Béranger, Recherches, p.187.
81 See Béranger, Recherches, p.217: 'La cura rei publicae n'est point une institution. C'est un état d'esprit.'
value of each: a true prince is most welcome to those who can least endure a tyrant (*dominum*, 45.3). At the beginning of the speech the contrast is put thus: 'We are talking of a fellow-citizen, not a tyrant (*tyranno*), one who is our father not our overlord (*domino*)'(2.3). Pliny was fortunate in having a foil for Trajan in the figure of the Arch-tyrant, Domitian. At the same time, he had to show how the principate could be described as legitimate government or tyranny according to the character of the office-holder, not by employing any more objective test.

The amount of freedom left to the subjects must also be seen as depending on this personal element, however at odds with the former meaning of the word *libertas* this use of it may be. Pliny, in fact, uses the word in various senses. The *libertas* associated with *securitas* in 27.1 shows the attenuated notion of the concept, reinforced by Pliny’s references to Trajan’s injunctions to the citizens to be free: 'You exhorted us to resume our freedom' (66.2), 'you bid us to be free and we shall be free' (66.4), 'he will always understand that in making use of the freedom he granted we are acting only in obedience to him' (67.2, cf. 78.3 and 87.1). Freedom in the political sense cannot be recovered, and Pliny does not fear to say so – 'the rewards of virtue are now the same under an emperor as they were in times of liberty' (44.6; cf. 57.4 and 69.5). There is an awareness of paradox in *eodem foro utuntur principatus et libertas* (36.4).

The way in which the ruler is chosen and his methods of rule determine how much freedom is permitted, as well as the whole tenor of

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82 ‘Ni Auguste, ni Tibère ne voulaient du *dominus*::... Mais les usages submergeaient les intentions. Pline le Jeune, dans le Panégyrique, joue du thème avec complaisance [in 2.3; 7.6; 85.2]. Ce qui ne l’empêche pas, quand il écrit à Trajan, de commencer ses lettres par *domine*’ (ib. p.37).

83 ‘How very different is this concept of freedom — if indeed it is freedom which is enjoyed at an emperor’s bidding — from that which Livy had in mind when he wrote that *libertas* "suis stat viribus nec ex alieno arbitrio pendent"!’, Wirszubski, *Libertas*, p.168.

See too, on this, Adam: 'Der Gegensatz zwischen *principatus* und *libertas*, zwei Erscheinungen, die Tacitus als *res olim dissociabiles* bezeichnete, wird von Plinius kaum empfunden: ... Indem auf solche Weise die entscheidenden Kriterien nicht mehr in politischen und staatsrechtlich fassbaren Institutionen, sondern in moralisch-ethischen Kategorien gesehen werden, nimmt es nicht wunder, dass Plinius im folgenden sogar erklärt, gerade der Principat des Trajan bedeute ein *resumere libertatem* (66,2; vgl. 78,3)’ (Adam, *Clementia principis*, p.114).
the reign. To choose a successor a ruler should judge that person 'closest and dearest' whom he finds to be 'the noblest and nearest to the gods' (7.5). Trajan returns to Rome as emperor — but still 'one among us all, (par omnibus) the greatest of us simply because you are the best' (21.4). In conformity with this selection on moral grounds, rule is exercised by persuasion of various sorts — 'all honour to your noble wisdom ... for this has enabled you to see an accepted custom take the place of what used to be an arbitrary decree' (quod antea vis et imperium, nunc mores vocarentur, 46.5). No doubt Pliny believes that imperial rule in the right hands displays the workings of that 'natural' law which does not reduce the human race to the level of the animal world, where power and authority go to the stronger (38.7).

The result of such government is peace and concord and so disoant invicem capiant (gentes) quanto libertati discordi servientibus sit utilius unum esse cui serviant (32.2). Such qualities as were once important in public life are now no longer truly public for the ruler who possesses them most perfectly thereby affects the citizens only in their personal lives and not as active members of the state.

ARISTIDES

Aelius Aristides specifies in the speech on kingship what qualities he considers most becoming to a ruler; indeed he says in the beginning that he is going to speak περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ φιλανθρώπου βασιλέως (p.98). The king is praised for his piety, justice and philanthropy (p.101) and the writer gives examples of the king's manifestation of all the key virtues, including moderation, self-control and intelligence as well as those already mentioned (p.103ff.). As part of his care for his subjects the king displayed foresight (πρόνοια, pp.103, 107), and in

84 The weakness of judgement of the majority of mankind — and hence their need for a leader of a different quality — appears in Ep. 5.9.7: Est omnino iniquum, sed usu receptum, quod honesta consilia vel turpia, prout male aut prospere cedunt, ita vel probantur vel reprehendentur. Inde plerumque eadem facta modo diligentiae modo vanitatis, modo libertatis modo furoris nomen accipient.

85 Note the claims made for Trajan as protector in the letters of congratulation on his anniversary in Epp. 10.52, and 10.102.
general he surpassed all other kings in every good quality (p.112). This is no doubt the reason why he rules (Aristides in fact says τὰλαν τοῦτο καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας ὑπερέλετο, p.100).

It is to the king's credit that his character has not changed from the time when he was a private citizen (pp.101, 107) and, conversely, that even before he assumed office he was worthy of it (p.99). One of the main ways in which the king proves his worth is his refraining from the cruel and avaricious behaviour of his predecessors (pp.100-101 and 103-4). Aristides implies that the king was concerned to be a king 'in truth', that is one patterned after the king of the universe (pp.106-7), and that he knew he would achieve this only by being approachable, humane and courteous (p.106). The king can grant the citizens the freedom taken from them by a previous ruler (p.105), but clearly this quality means little more here than freedom from fear. These qualities suit the king when he is fulfilling his function in a personal, individualized way, but tell us little of how he administered the state.

CONCLUSION

The writers we have examined for their attitudes to the function of the ruler are concerned first and foremost with the ruler's personality as a pre-eminent individual. What they expect of him is, in general, what they would expect of anybody making efforts to be virtuous. In most of the definitions of kingship there is mention of acquiring knowledge or self-control or some other virtue appropriate to humanity as a whole, although particularly suited to one with responsibility for others. The king, then, has a wider field in which to exercise such qualities, and so more may be required of him. His functions, important as they are, are still described as if they were carried out in an informal, person-to-person basis, and are often made to appear unrewarding and difficult, rather than the opposite. Some elements of glory may creep in — this is so especially with the Neo-Pythagoreans and Plutarch — but such 'rewards' are generally connected with the character of the ruler and are not intrinsic to his office.

What is striking here is the similarity in the writers' views on
the qualities considered desirable in a ruler. This is not simply a matter of earlier writers influencing later ones, for different traditions are involved. Rather, over an extensive period of time, a consensus had become established among theorists about the characteristics of the ideal ruler. (This does allow for individual differences. Thus we notice Dio stressing Cynic traits in some parts of his works on kingship.) The unanimity of view heightens the impression that the moral concern is paramount. There is considerable overlap here with the official 'government' view of a ruler, and we are often unable to determine who is the originator and who the imitator, but what we can say is that here the meaning of 'political' has been narrowed down until it means something quite different from that which had applied in the world of the polis.
These groups within a society can be distinguished according to whether, like an army or an orchestra, they function as a single body; or whether they are united merely to defend their common interests and otherwise function as separate individuals. In one case an aggregation of impersonal units to form a body with a single purpose; in the other case a suspension of individual activities for the purpose of rendering mutual aid. ... The point I am making is that in the more primitive forms of society the individual is merely a unit; in more developed forms of society he is an independent personality.

Herbert Read, *Anarchy and Order*, pp.36-7.

The plainest exposition of national personality is this — that a nation fulfils the great condition of a person: namely, that it has unity of acting, and unity of suffering; with the difference that what is physically single in the one, is joint, or morally single, in the other.

William Gladstone, *The State in its Relations with the Church*.

The people are the masters. They have only to express their wants at large and in gross. We are the expert artists: we are the skilful workmen, to shape their desires into perfect form, and to fit the utensil to the use. They are the sufferers, they tell the symptoms of the complaint; but we know the exact seat of the disease, and how to apply the remedy according to the rules of art.

Burke, speech on Economical Reform, 1780.
CHAPTER FOUR
IMAGES OF GOVERNMENT

INTRODUCTION

From the time when Homer described the king as 'shepherd of the people' the essence of political structures had been given shape in Greek thought by a variety of images, more or less appropriate to the actual situation. Some terms concentrated on the figure of the ruler, introducing the ruled simply to complete the definition as in the shepherd metaphor above. Others sought to convey the truth about society as a whole, and to show how the various elements in it fitted together. Thus the comparison of the state with the human organism was being used in the fifth century to show the interdependence of the parts, and in particular the effect of stasis in the body politic.

It was perhaps natural for analogies and metaphors to develop a life of their own and continue to be used even when no longer applicable, but this meant that such language could itself determine how a situation would be viewed, regardless of the actual constitution or institution under scrutiny. Society and family were commonly compared, but a

1 See e.g. *Iliad*, 2.105; 2.254.
2 We may note Sophocles, *Antig.* 1015: καὶ ταῦτα τῆς σῆς ἐκ φρενὸς νοσεῖ πόλεις; Herodotus, 5.28: (Miletus) νοσήσασα ἐς τὰ μάλιστα στάσει, and Thucydides, 8.64: αἰ πόλεις ... τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπολογού εὐνομίας οὐ προτιμήσαντες. This analogy can also be used, of course, as a substitute for thought when applied too rigidly — cf. that by Francis Bacon in *Essay* 29, 'Of the true Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates' (*Essays*, Everyman edition, p.95): 'No body can be healthful without exercise, neither natural body nor politic; and certainly, to a kingdom or estate, a just and honourable war is the true exercise.' Note, however, Diderot's conclusion in the article on peace in the *Encyclopédie*: 'La guerre est un fruit de la dépravation des hommes; c'est une maladie convulsive et violente du corps politique; il n'est en santé, c'est-à-dire dans son état naturel, que lorsqu'il jouit de la paix.'

. Note 3 over page.
change in the structure of the former, if not paralleled by a change in the latter, meant that an interpretation based on this comparison was no longer appropriate. A return to monarchical government from a democratic form of rule could revive the metaphor. This might then become a substitute for any analysis of society and the function of its parts able to reveal the position of the monarchy more adequately.

Aristotle uses analogies that describe society and others which concentrate on the individual. In the *Politics* he stresses the need for the happiness now of the whole (1329a), now of the part (1264b), but always before him is the task of finding a solution for possible conflict between the individual — especially in an official capacity — and the state. He takes structure and processes seriously. Though in one sense they are means to an end — that is, the good life — not only the end-product but the methods used to attain it must be scrutinized, to see that dissatisfaction does not arise from the form of government itself.

Aristotle's *polis* is not a purposeless biological organism — it is much more than that — but he can still make use of the image. He also employs the language of household rule, despite initially denying the validity of such language in a political context (see 1252a, and cf. 1259b), and the household could of course provide examples of rule

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3 Cf. Solon's description of himself 'spreading his strong shield over both sides', a non-combatant standing outside and above the conflict of parties (*Anthol. Lyrica Graeca*, Vol. 1 fr.5.5). This of course contradicts the injunction Plutarch records him making in his laws, that a citizen not stay neutral in any civic dispute.

4 εὔδαμονα δὲ πάλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἄλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας.

5 ἀόυνατον δὲ εὔδαμονεῖν ὄλην, μὴ πάντων ἢ μὴ τῶν πλείστων μερῶν ἢ των ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαμονίαν.

6 He explains the problem in *Pol.* 1332b: τὸ τε γὰρ ἔσον ταύτων τοὺς ὁμοίως, καὶ χαλεπῶς μενεὶν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεστηκυάν παρά τὸ δύκαιον, μετὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑπάρχουσι νεωτέρουσιν βουλόμενον πάντες οὐ κατὰ τὴν χώραν, τοσοῦτοις τε εἰναὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τὸ πλῆθος ὡστ' εἰναὶ κρείστως πάντων τούτων ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀδύνατων ἔστιν.

7 E.g. in 1253a: καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἔστιν. τὸ γὰρ δλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἰναὶ τοῦ μέρους ἀναλογο-μένου γὰρ τοῦ δλον οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χεῖρ, εἰ μὴ ὠμοιόμοις.

8 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οὐκ οὐσίαν πολιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικὴν καὶ οἰκονομικὴν καὶ δεσποτικὴν εἰναὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν (1252a). (See over page.)
which were kingly, such as of a father over his children (note Ethics 1161a). In his analysis of the relationship of the soul to the body and intelligence to desire, Aristotle finds instances of absolute and royal rule, and if this 'political' account of the person is valid, it will very likely also seem to have relevance to the government of a community, and to encourage the adoption of these forms of rule as ideal.

To describe society and the way it is governed simply in personal terms is to ignore the intricacies of constitutional forms and official positions important for their own sake and not merely because of those who hold them. A new impulse had been given to such descriptions when ruling came to be seen as an art or science — a τέχνη — by thinkers as different as Protagoras and Plato. An individual could determine to acquire this skill like any other, and exercise it on his fellow-citizens as a carpenter or sculptor would work with his material. The helmsman and the charioteer are favourite examples of those holding such an unchallenged authority.

To see rule as nothing more than a skill was an extreme position to adopt; in most cases moral considerations gave the metaphor a different turn, and showed the practising politician as a regenerator of his fellows because of his ethical superiority. His rule would then be effected principally by precept and example. The ruler becomes the teacher of his subjects, who possess a certain dignity and importance because they are capable of profiting from instruction, but who must always remain his pupils. If they could be expected one day to be the equal of the ruler ethically or intellectually, there would be no justification for the ruler's retention of supreme power, and his task as teacher would be restricted to passing on the correct values to the next generation.

καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἄρχει καὶ τέχνην, ὡς ἐλευθέρων μὲν ἄμφοτέν, οὔτε τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς τέχνων δὲ βασιλικῶς (1259a-b).

9 See 1254b: ἣ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει διεξοδικήν ἀρχήν, ὧν ὁ νοῦς τῆς ὀρέξεως πολιτικῆς ἡ βασιλικῆς.

10 See Plato's Protagoras 319a: Ἄρα, ἐφίνη ἐγώ, ἐπομεῖ σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ύποσχενθάναι πολεμῶν ἄνδρας ἀναδοκὰς πολίτας.
The ruler's claim may be fortified by the revelation that his position is natural\(^1\) (just as much as the examples of authority encountered in the animal or insect world, where one creature exercises unchallenged control over the others in the group). This idea was familiar to the Sophists, but the analogy also came to be used to refer to ethical superiority in particular individuals by philosophers opposed to the Sophistic viewpoint. The hesitation of Aristotle (especially in *Pol.* \(1332b\)), and even of Plato in the *Politics*\(^2\) on the possibility of determining who these superior beings were was not shared by those who followed them. This tended to turn politics into ethical supervision by an elite offering a quasi-mystical justification for their position. By examining accounts of the duties of the ruling power and the images in which they are clothed, we may be able to determine how the choice of monarchical government was justified, and on how rational and consistent a basis this was done.

**ISOCRATES**

Basic to Isocrates' perception of government is his belief in the part played by *Logos*. In itself, this does not entail government of a particular kind. It is a possession of humanity in general, and is a sign (σημεῖον) and an image (εἰκών) of a mental and spiritual state (*Nio.* 7). It is in fact one of the main images related to the governing process that Isocrates uses. He credits *Logos* with being the one socializing force among men, distinguishing them from the beasts — τοῦτο (i.e. eloquence) μόνον ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν ζῴων ἑδον ἐφιμεν ἔχοντες (*Paneg.* 48). More than this it makes possible persuasion, the formation of cities, crafts and laws. (We may compare the effect of the *politikē technē* in the myth in the *Protagoras*.) Most important of all, *Logos* determines what is just and unjust, what base and fair; if this were not decided, no social intercourse would be possible (*Nio.* 6-7).

\(^1\) Note Gorgias' pronouncement (*Hel.* 6 [DK fr. 11]): ζέψυκε ... οὖ τὸ κρείσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔσονος κωλύσατα, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔσον ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄγεσθαι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κρείσσον ἄγεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἔσον ἔπεσθαι.

\(^2\) See *Polit.* 301d-e: Νῦν δὲ γε ὡς ὑπὲρ σὺ ἔστι γυνύμενος, ὡς δὴ φαίμεν, ἐν ταῖς πόλεις βασιλεύσεις οἶς ἐν συμφερόντες ἐμψυχέται, τὸ τε σῶμα εὖθες καὶ τὴν φυκὴν διαφήμων εἰς, δεῖ δὲ συνελθόντας συγγράμματα γράφειν, ὡς ἐσθηκεν, μεταθέσοντας τὰ τῆς ἀληθεστάτης πολιτείας ἕχυν.
This broad view is constantly being narrowed to make Logos refer specifically to rhetoric; on this criterion τῶν δὲ λόγων τῶν καλῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐχόντων οὐ μετὸν τοῖς φαύλοις, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς εὖ φρονοῦσης έργον δύνας (Paneg. 48). If men's culture is manifested in speech, it is clear that they must have been educated liberally (Paneg. 49).

Education, then, puts men in possession of the tool of Logos, and just as Isocrates advocates the development of the intellect and powers of expression in a general way, so he believes those speeches to be the best which teach men in power how they should deal with the people, and teach individual subjects how they should be disposed to their rulers (Nio. 10). The former task is the more important, for those educating private citizens benefit them alone, but anyone turning those who rule over the multitude to a life of virtue will help both groups (To Nio. 8).

There is no doubt that Isocrates believed that the arts to help man on the path to virtue were education and diligence (παιδεύως, ἐπιμέλεια, To Nio. 12, cf. Antid. 209-14). He endeavours therefore to implant in the monarch a desire to 'learn his job' by practice and theoretical study (To Nio. 35). Not surprisingly, many of the precepts given here are such as would be appropriate to a private citizen. Care of the soul as an athlete cares for his body is the king's primary duty (To Nio. 11), and the analogy used is the same as the one put before Demonicus, encouraging him to pursue virtue for his own improvement by developing his soul with moral precepts (σκοποῦσθαι λόγους, Dem. 12). Only so, no doubt, can the king perform his functions of putting an end to the state's distress, preserving it in prosperity and making it great when it is small (To Nio. 9), for when a man has acquired the art appropriate to the mind (here ψυχή) his mind is able to fulfil its task, as the Antidosis puts it, deciding on personal and public questions (περὶ τῶν ιδίων καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν, Antid. 180).

For the ruler's greater enlightenment, Isocrates compares the rule of a king to rule over horses or dogs (To Nio. 15). This resembles the use other writers make of the image of the shepherd-king, and shows that Isocrates too felt no inappropriateness in the language Plato made current in the Politicus. In his frank-speaking, Isocrates sees himself as doing his duty by the state, and this too he sees as an art. The only cure (φάρμακον) for ignorant souls is for the spiritual physician
to blame them with the use of λόγος for their evil-doing, just as if applying the therapy of cautery or cutting (see Peace 39-40). This comparison is applied to a democracy, but would fit far more appropriately in a state under monarchical rule.\textsuperscript{13}

We might say the same of Isocrates' attitude to the sovereign offices in the state in the Areopagiticus. Here Isocrates approvingly records the opinion of those in the pristine democracy: 'They believed that the rest of the people would reflect the character of those who were placed in charge of their affairs' (Areop. 22). This makes sense only when the rulers do not need to depend on the populace for election and approval and when their numbers are few. This belief in the pedagogic function of rule sets up almost as great a gap between the teacher-ruler as model and the pupil-subject as imitator as does the view that the counsellor of the people is a physician. Appropriately it reappears in the Panathenaicus, this time applied to the early kings of Athens. The kings 'trained the multitude in virtue and justice and great sobriety' (Panath. 138). Similarly, because 'the manners of the whole state are copied from its rulers' (To Nic. 31) the king must make his behaviour an example (παράδειγμα) to the subjects. (The same idea is repeated in Nicocles 37.) The image is the one used in the Demonicus where a son is urged to pattern himself on his father (Dem. 11). The same work also recommends imitation of the king's behaviour (Dem. 36), so that the king is clearly a father-figure as well as a teacher.

In works addressed to Athens, Isocrates proclaims that every polity is the soul of the state (Panath. 138, Areop. 14), having the same power over it as the mind does over the body. This is another way of saying that as the sovereign power is so will the state be. It does not apply to one form of government more than to any other — we may note the impartiality of Demonicus 36 on this point — but the comparison lends itself more naturally to government in a few hands or in the hands of one rather than to a democracy with changing personnel and conflicting views. It is a static outlook, for the 'mind' it describes affects the 'body' while the reverse does not appear to be true. It is also a

\textsuperscript{13} The capacity for independent, decisive action in a monarchy is one reason for Isocrates' admiration of Philip's government which could 'get things done', and this would apply particularly to punitive action. See Phil. 14, 15, 127.
narrower view than we find, for example, in the Antidosis where the influence is that of the older generation upon the younger by way of education (174) and so the whole way of life is the example to be followed and not simply the attitudes of an elite.

Mutual co-operation among all sections of the community does come in for praise — Isocrates has Nicocles explaining that the success or failure of the whole depends on each of the parts — but he goes on to say that the subject should therefore be no less careful of his, the ruler's, interests than of his own. Public affairs then are not truly public (see Nic. 48-9 and cf. Peace 120 where Isocrates suggests that the state should cultivate virtues, just like an individual). At a theoretical level, Isocrates can advocate the use of elements from different forms of government in combination or even refer to government in a democracy in personal terms proper to sole rule. Thus (our ancestors) resolved that δεί τὸν μὲν δῆμον ὁπερ τύραννον καθεστάναι τὰς ἀρχὰς (Areop. 26). Personalizing rule in this way naturally leads to seeing government as an individual.

The net effect of these ways of describing the relationship between ruler and ruled is to give the impression that what is important in government is not the form that it takes but the character and guidance of those in authority; that the art of ruling is a specialist skill, and that much of the task is to do with bringing about right conduct.

XENOPHON

A former pupil of Socrates as Xenophon was could hardly fail to see ruling as an art. This attitude naturally implied criticism of most people taking part in public life for having failed to acquire the necessary skills. To advocate the rule of experts is to advocate a hierarchy, and Xenophon was prepared to accept this. He went even further for he defined political and ruling excellence in general as the fairest virtue, the greatest art (ἡ καλλίστη ἀρετή καὶ μεγάλη τέχνη) because it belongs to kings and is called royal (Mem. 4.2.11). This is a curious outcome for a discussion on politics in general, especially as these words are put into the mouth of a Socrates who was a loyal if
critical member of the Athenian democracy.

If abstraction from the real society became the hallmark of later political theory, this example shows that the process started early. The adjective 'kingly' can however be used in a non-political way (which may be implied in the usage above), for elsewhere in the Memorabilia Socrates contends that kings and rulers are not those who hold the sceptre nor those elected by anybody at all, nor those chosen by lot nor those using force or deception, but those knowing how to rule (ἐξουσιαστευόντας ἀρχεῖν, Mem. 3.9.10). This is similar to Plato's conclusions expressed most emphatically in the Gorgias (see 463-4) and followed through in the Republic and subsequent works, and is no doubt in accord with the historical Socrates' belief in the importance of knowledge in every sphere of life, and his contempt for the ignorance of the practitioners of politics.

Rule if it is an art is also much more than a mere technical process — and here the element of personal ethics comes in. Even the laws seem designed by their authors to teach. What they teach is in one case justice (Oec. 14.4), in another the ability to rule and be ruled (Cyr. 1.6.20). The ruler's influence is of course even easier to describe in personal terms, and Xenophon stresses the inculcation of standards of conduct by those in charge. He explains that the rulers must be teachers, who will not only promote virtue in accordance with the laws but also show that the way to happiness lies through virtue (Cyr. 3.3.53).

The lack of concern with defining political terms in a political way appears clearly in the Oeconomicus where household management becomes a polite 'writ small' despite the fact that this transgresses Aristotle's carefully drawn boundaries. Here (13.5), the householder explains that whoever is able to make men fit for rule is also able to teach them to be in sole charge (διδασκόντων ἀνθρώπων) and whoever can do this can make men kingly. Kingly ἡσυχία is defined as the ability to inspire a spirit of determination and rivalry and eagerness to excel in one's subordinates, and so is the greatest thing in any task performed by men. Because it is an art it needs to be taught, although Xenophon insists that the right sort of nature is also a prerequisite and so too
is a divine element (Oec. 21.10-12).\(^{14}\)

The portrait of the king presented to us is as much that of a father as a teacher. Xenophon has Chrysantas reflect on this (Cyr. 8.1.1), and throughout the last book of the *Cyropaedia* has examples of paternal care on the part of Cyrus and the response this aroused in the subjects (Cyr. 8.1.44; 8.2.9; 8.8.1). These are comparable to the instance given of paternal concern for a son’s improvement where a father will look to his own character to ensure that the model of behaviour he provides will be as good as possible (7.5.86).

Xenophon frequently invokes the image of the shepherd-king, citing Homer as his authority, when he has Socrates describe the ideal ruler-general as shepherd of his people. The similarity is in the type of care necessary in both cases, for

\[ \text{Westep tòv tòvov év elw melèeov, oìwv sòwv te esonvai ai oìs kaì tà épistídeia èxouou kaì, oì èvenka treπovta, touto èstai, outov kaì tòv stratipíovn elw melèeov dév, oìwv sòwv te oì stratipíovta esonvta kaì tà épistídeia èxouou kaì, oì èvenka stratipíovta, touto èstai (Mem. 3.2.1).} \]

The same point is made in the *Cyropaedia* where Cyrus remarks on the resemblance between the tasks of a good herdsman and a good king, both having as their object the happiness of their charges (Cyr. 8.2.14). The definition of happiness for both groups of 'herds' would come from the herdsman who knows what is best for animal or human stock. This aspect comes out more clearly in the beginning of the *Cyropaedia* where the intractability of the human herd is compared with the docility of their animal counterparts who have no objections to being 'fleeced' for the benefit of their master (Cyr. 1.1.2). Perhaps we should balance this view with the sobering consideration of a 'herdsman', such as Critias, whom Socrates is recorded as chiding for being so unbusiness-like as to kill his herd (see Mem. 1.2.32).

In general the descriptions of the kingly craft under various

\(^{14}\) Xenophon shows the principle of 'rule of the best' at work in all the arts and crafts in Mem. 3.3.9: 'Εκείνο μὲν ὁποῖον οὗτος, ὅτι ἐν παντὶ πράγματι οἱ ἄνθρωποι τούτοις μᾶλλον ἐθέλουν πειθότας, οὐκ ἂν ἠγώνατα βελτίστους εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἐν νόσῳ, ὅτι ἂν ἠγώνατα ἱατροκιάτατον εἶναι, τούτῳ μᾶλλον πειθόντα, καὶ ἐν πλοὺς οἱ πλέοντες, ὅτι ἂν κυβερνητικάτωτα, καὶ ἐν γεωργίᾳ, ὅτι ἂν γεωργικάτωτα.
aspects show it in an idealistic, one might say sentimental, light, which may prevent us from perceiving it as essentially a justification of the possession of sovereignty, but Xenophon does provide this explicitly as well: a king is so by nature (φύσει) just as there is a natural (φυλομένος) leader of the bees in any swarm (Cyr. 5.1.24). This is going further than Isocrates' essentially pragmatic justification of sole rule would have taken us, and is a pointer to the attitude that subsequent writers were to adopt.

The criterion of expertise, by which actual holders of power could be judged and found wanting, contains the potential for a radical attack on the status quo. The result may be the emergence of opposition to a particular government — on moral and intellectual, not political grounds, be it noted — or the development of an a-political outlook such as that taken by the Cynics. This is of little help in making the ultimate choice of a form of government or in showing how the government should work from day to day, or what consultative procedures, if any, should be adopted. Xenophon himself does not balance his account of rule as an art by any description of society in terms of the parts of a whole working together.

ARISTEAS

In the Letter of Aristeas there is little development of imagery as the form of question and answer at the symposia does not allow for a coherent account of the ruler and his task under a metaphor. What is noticeable, however, is the great stress Aristeas lays on the value of imitation in political affairs. This appears initially (in the first question-and-answer, 187-8) in the relationship advocated between God and the king when the king is urged to imitate God's mercy. This parallel between the rule of God in the cosmos and of the king in Egypt is frequently drawn. God is a benefactor of mankind; the king by looking at his works will behave in the same way (190). Specifically in lawsuits he will not rouse the hostility of the loser but demonstrate the indulgence of God (191-2).

The simple practice of piety leads (210) to the reflection that
imitation of the deity is necessary for the king. This should apply to all men but the writer shows an exclusive connection between the deity and his mortal representative (see 254). Only in the debate on the appointment of magistrates is a subordinate described as imitating his royal master and thereby improving himself (280).

Here then the objects of care exist not even as sheep to be protected or a ship of state to be steered or children of a fatherly king, although this last relationship is implied by the attitudes recommended to the king. All the writer's concern is for the king's private growth in virtue. In his position in life he has certain duties to perform which exalt him above all other men and impose obligations on him. In questions on the treatment of foreigners and of minority groups in the kingdom (e.g. in 257, 267) we have a glimpse of social problems of which a Jewish writer would be particularly aware. The principles proclaimed enjoining equality and positive discrimination in favour of foreigners are strikingly out of the line of concern of most writers on kingship and of Aristeas himself elsewhere. Allegorization of kingship — it is really 'mastery of self' (222) — is common in the Letter and leads away from involvement in the political expression of rule just as much as the 'political' imagery we have analysed so far.

HELLENISTIC ATTITUDES

Hellenistic theorists on politics who belonged to a particular philosophical school — Cynic or Stoic, in the main — have not left us enough of their works to provide examples of their use of imagery to bolster political theory. Only some hints remain. The Stoics specifically describe the kingly craft as an ἐκστήθησις, which does not require the man possessing it to rule over many (SVF 3.618). The use that Diogenes the Cynic makes of the motifs of the physician and steersman is to compare his own skill in imparting virtue and in governing men to such professions as these, where knowledge can command obedience (D.L. 6.29). Just as those with these skills are obeyed even in slavery in matters where they are the experts, so should the true ruler be.
This does not tell us about the king, however, but about his Cynic replacement. Yet it does show that rule in its most esoteric sense appeared to Cynics as an art, and whoever possessed it, whatever his actual status, was entitled to be served, simply because of his ability. This ability also implied a capacity to teach (see D.L. 6.30 and 7.48). The comments of the Stoics, similarly, give the impression that if anyone is to be compared to a craftsman of any sort, it is their wise man, who is not only king but also ὁ κοινομικός etc., as well (SVF 1.216). Zeno seems to have regarded the well-run state as a herd, if we are justified in seeing Plutarch, Fort. Alex. 329b, as applying directly to his ideal state.15 There is no clear mention of a shepherd, however, and we must be wary of assuming that here we have a full-blown instance of this analogy.

_Homonoia_ is to the Stoics of this time an ἐπιστήμη κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν (SVF 3.630), and we assume that it can therefore be brought about in a society only from outside by one who possesses this knowledge. From the little information we have we can tentatively conclude that there were no images employed, in the philosophies which had anything positive to say about political life at this time, which were at odds with those we have considered so far.

Our neo-Pythagorean writers were not behindhand in expressing their theory on the monarchy in becoming imagery. They had the example of pseudo-Archytas in the _peri νόμου καὶ ἐκπαιδεύσης_ where the writer notes that the ruler must be understanding, powerful and a lover of men, for it would be strange for a shepherd to be a hater of his sheep (μυστρόβατος, p.218). Ruling people requires many skills and Diotogenes, referring to the king's ἔργα, stresses the learning involved (note _ἐπισταθεῖς, ἐκμαθῶν, ἐκλογισμένος_, pp.263-4). He compares the ruler to a helmsman, a charioteer and a doctor, all of whom are skilled in vital tasks (p.264). God can rightly be called a 'rearer and teacher' of all, says Sthenidas, and the king should copy him in adopting these roles (p.271). Diotogenes depicts the _polis_ as a lyre which the king must

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15 Alexander fulfilled Zeno's ideal that μὴ κατὰ πόλεως μηδὲ ὅθενος ὁκλώμεν ὡδόσις ἐκαστοί διαφωνοῦντο δικαίος, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώνθεα δημότας καὶ πολίτας, εἷς δὲ βίος ἢ καὶ κόσμος, ὦσπερ ἄγελης συννάμῳ νόμῳ κοινῷ συντρεφομένης (Mor. 329a-b).
play on expertly (p.266).

These writers eagerly seized on the well-worn comparison of the king and the head of a household (Sthenidas speaks of the king's display of πάτρων διάδοσιν, p.270), and Ecphantus refers directly to his close relations to his subjects, 'like that of a father to his son and of a shepherd to his flock' (p.276). Diotogenes offers Zeus' benevolence in his capacity as father of gods and men as an example to the king (p.270).

The only comparison with the animal world is when Ecphantus shows that the true claimant to the throne is like the eagle who alone can face the sun (p.273). This means that whoever is of the royal species is born so, and a usurper cannot fail to be detected, and so the status quo everywhere is vindicated. The state of society as a whole is referred to only indirectly (and then as polis), most noticeably in the metaphor of the lyre mentioned above. For all the emphasis on μονωματα the body politic does not appear in these works on kingship. The writers display, however, in extreme form the concern we have already found in other theorists to describe government under a variety of names drawn from other fields of life where hierarchy and authority prevailed.

CICERO

The imagery of government and its task in Cicero is one of the most striking examples of the adoption of Greek-derived expressions and attitudes to explain a political point of view. Clearly these images were used because Cicero saw them as the most appropriate to reveal the nature of rule in Roman society also, and they easily took root in the new atmosphere, as Lepore describes:

Non ci sembra che le serie semantiche individuate e i sinonimi adoperati rivelino [sic] altro che un uso metaforico di alcuni termini, spesso mutuato dall'ambito e dal linguaggio filosofico greco, ma assimilato perfettamente dalla esperienza linguistica romana.16

The language employed by the Greek political theorists whom Cicero followed was, as we have seen, best suited to depict one-man rule, and

16 Lepore, Il princeps, pp.44-5.
he himself uses terms not originally from the sphere of government both
to reinforce a message in the speeches, or to provide an explanation in
the more theoretical texts. We may say that in general the terms lead
to the view that ruling is an art calling for intelligence yet also
requiring practical applications.

Such titles as *conservator, custos, rector, moderator, tutor,*
*procurator, gubemator* and so on appear more or less significant at
various stages of Cicero's career and his theoretical development. That
Cicero and his hearers always considered the origins of these terms when
applying them to the political sphere is unlikely, but enough of their
basic meaning survived for Cicero to make extended metaphors by using
such expressions as the helmsman's guiding the ship of state (the helms-
man of course being *gubemator*).

This particular term in fact appears early in use in Rome, but it
is only with Cicero that it acquires an association with political life.
In the *Pro Roscio Amerino* (80 B.C.) it appears as a recurring metaphor
(e.g. 22, *cum unus omnium gubernet*; 51, *homines qui ... ad gubernacuла*
*r.p. sedere debebant*; 131, *cum solus rem publicam regeret orbemque*
terrarum gubernaret [with reference to Sulla]).

From the year 62
owards the term becomes even more common, and we may expect that,
corresponding as it does to the *κυβερνήτης* of Plato (*Rep. 488d*), it will
apply particularly to the individual who holds most power.

*Conservator, custos* and their variants appear notably in the year
of Cicero's consulship, not surprisingly in the speeches against
Catiline, where the notion of preservation from threats to Roman liberty
and safety. and the implication that Cicero himself could alone repel
the danger made the use of such words appropriate and effective.

*Regere* when it appears in works before the *De Republica* has no
specific reference to one-man rule, but *rector* first becomes important
in the *De Oratore* in association with *auctor consili publici*, showing its

17 Cf. *Pro Murena* (delivered in 63 B.C.) 74: *tu ... gubernacula rei*
*publicae petas ...? and 83: *totam rem publicam vos in hac causa*
tenetas, vos gubernatis.

18 εἰ μέλειε τῷ δινῷ νεώς ἄρχικος ἔσπειραι, ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει ἡντε
τινες βουλοῦνται ἡντε μή, μήτε τέχνην τούτον μήτε μελέτην οὐδὲνοι
δυνάτον εἴναι λαβεῖν ἄμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικήν (*Rep. 488d–e*).
underlying meaning of one who initiates action. **Moderator** like **rector** comes from a verb generally used to indicate 'atti morali, psicologici, pedagogici' \(^{19}\) while **tutor** and **procurator**, rare before the **De Republica**, still retain enough of their original meaning to warrant the insertion of *quasi* when they occur there (2.51, cf. **De Orat.** 3.3: *quasi parens bonus aut tutor fidelis*, said of a consul).

The **De Republica** provides the most ample development of these terms in a context which may well seem to demand that they refer to a **princeps** ruling on his own. But this is not always the case. **Gubernatio** in 1.2 and 1.12 refers to men in general going into public life. Yet later on (1.45) in *gubernanda r.p.* clearly indicates one individual (**magnus quidam civis et divinae paene vir**). It is not clear whether a statesman is here being singled out to take command like the helmsman on a ship, or whether Cicero is making a passing reference to the foresight of any man who may happen to be **moderans cursum**, as, for instance, a consul. (At any rate, he is still called *civis.*). But the analogy of the helmsman is taken as a decisive argument against the choice of rulers by lot (1.51) and in the rhetorical question *virtute vero gubernante rem publicam, quid potest esse praesolarius?* (1.52) we can observe a natural tendency for this line of thought to end in the recommendation of the rule of the few and ultimately of the one.

In the **excursus** on monarchy (**De Rep.** 1.54-65), Cicero devotes considerable attention to the argument by analogy and again makes use of imagery which seems to demonstrate the inevitability of the rule of one man. Thus Scipio claims *uni gubernatori, uni medico, si digni modo sint iis artibus, rectius esse alteri naves committere, aegrum alteri quam multis* (1.62). \(^{20}\) Thus monarchy too makes more sense. Again in discussing the moderator (**quo referre velimus omnia** as he mentions in a letter to Atticus in 49 B.C., **Att.** 8.11.1), he says *ut enim gubernatori curaeus secundus, medico salus, imperatori victoria, sic huic moderatori*

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\(^{19}\) Lepore, *Il princeps*, p.44.

\(^{20}\) 'Ces trois termes ont un point commun: dans les trois cas, l'agent exerce son action sur l'objet et n'en fait guère partie, le pilote n'est pas considéré comme passager bien qu'il soit dans le bateau, le général est essentiellement distinct de la troupe lorsqu'il s'agit d'organiser la victoire, enfin le cas du médecin est clair' (van den Bruwaene, *La Notion du prince*, p.72).
rei publicae beata civium vita proposita est (De Rep. 5.8). We notice how moderator has here become the term for the ruler, without any qualification, bringing with it the association with rule over the passions (e.g. Q. fr. 1.1.38: moderari vero et animo et orationi cum sis iratus ... non mediocris ingeni).  

The use of conservare (De Rep. 2.46 of L. Brutus, 2.47 of a good king) shows the continued stress on saving the state from some danger which may or may not be specified. Individual initiative is most suitable for such an undertaking. As to rector and regere there is in the De Republica hardly any sense left of the earlier frequent meaning of ruling the self (as in e.g. Fam. 4.14.1). But this unofficial term provides a conveniently wide frame of reference for Cicero's ideal statesman to fit into. The rector's role is one of guidance (see De Rep. 5.6: Hanc [verecundiam] ille rector rerum publicarum auxit opinionibus, perfectique institutis et disciplinis). He exercises prudent foresight (6.1: Totam igitur expectas prudentiam huius rectoris, quae ipsum nomen hoc nacta est ex providendo), he possesses every needful virtue and skill (2.51: sit huic oppositus alter, bonus et sapiens et peritus utilitatis dignitatisque civilis, quasi tutor et procurator rei publicae; sic enim appelletur quicumque erit rector et gubernator civitatis). The words tutor and procurator here retain their original sense which makes for their effectiveness, as well as suggesting Greek philosophical connections. This is also true of the occurrence of the

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21 'Semmai il suo uso trasferisce nell'ambito politico certi valori in uso nel linguaggio filosofico dell'ambito psicologico, etico e retorico (si ricordi il motivo della μετροποιήσεως già presente in De Oratore e che tornerà in un passo anche in De Republica)', Lepore, Il princeps, p. 71.

22 Cf. also De Rep. 6.13: nihil est enim illi principi deo, qui omnem mundum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat acceptius, quam concilia coetusque hominum iure sociati, quae civitates appellantur; harum rectores et conservatores hinc profecti hue revertuntur.

23 Pöschl points out that by these terms Cicero is showing the character required in a leader, rather than giving a description of an official position (Römischer Staat, pp. 117-8): 'Cicero will ... mit der neuen Bezeichnung des tutor et procurator einen Begriff schaffen, der dem des platonischen φύλαξ entspricht und der wie dieser schon in seinem Namen nicht die Vorstellung des Herrschens, sondern der treuen Fürsorge und liebevollen Hingabe trägt, eines Staatslenkers, der die königliche caritas des 1. Buches verkörpert.'  

Lepore too stresses the philosophic undertones to the expressions, Il princeps, p. 71: 'L'idea di tutela o di procura mutuata dal campo giuridico indica non una posizione di superiorità e di pieno
words, or rather, of *tutela* and *procuratio* in combination in the *De Officiis* (1.85) where a ruler's duty is the care of the state as a whole without thought of self, a sentiment attributed there to Plato.

The impact that all these titles make does not suggest a concern to specify precisely the political role of the figure bearing them, but rather a wish to bring in an extra-political dimension. Cicero refers in his discussion on government to rule as a science, that is, as purely theoretical, despite his expressed belief that *virtus in usu sui tota positae est* (*De Rep.* 1.2). This type of discussion, especially that taking place in the *excursus*, fits in awkwardly with, for example, the historical account of Roman rule given in Book Two. It shows how the approximation of *basileus* and *politiikos* developed in Greek thought, especially by Plato, could appear even in the work of a practical Roman. In the comparisons that are justifications for monarchy

le analogie empiriche della *familia*, della *domus* e delle *artes* ... servono a render più immediata la deduzione fondamentale ma non fanno che precisare sempre meglio il valore speciale della monarchia e dell' *unus* riflettendo appunto quella più minuta disanima dell' *áρχη* e del *χύρον*.24

Cicero clearly shows the connection between royal and paternal roles. Not only does he refer to the word *rex* as *quasi patrium nomen* (1.54), but he describes how a king *consulit ut pares populo* (2.47). Those who live under a beneficent king like Romulus do not call their rulers *eri* or *domini*, *denique ne reges quidem, sed patriae suetodes, sed patres, sed deos* (1.64). There is even an element in aristocratic

trasferimento di capacità, come vorrebbero alcuni, ma solo un rapporto di rappresentanza fiduciaria, in cui se va rintracciata una risonanza di idee filosofiche stoiche, l'individuo assume semmai un ruolo subordinato rispetto allo stato.'

However, his criticism of van den Bruwaene for finding a radical transfer of power implied (i.e. from the state to the *tutor* and *procurator*) is hardly justified in view of Bruwaene's cautious conclusion: 'Les deux termes de *tutor* — personne qui a la tutelle d'un mineur ou d'un incapable — et de *procurator*—celui qui gère pratiquement les affaires, évoquent l'idée d'une incapacité de fait de la part du corps de la République et un transfert de capacité à une personne qui devient en quelque sorte l'État par procuration. Évidemment, cette définition manque de nuance, et nous n'oublions pas que Cicéron a écrit *quasi* devant le double terme, ce qui indique que les mots ne sont guère adéquats à sa pensée, mais que, d'autre part, telle est bien la direction dans laquelle il cherche' (*La Notion du prince*, p.63).

government that is quasi regium and it consists of patrium consilium populo bene consulentium principum (1.65). In general, we can see how the hated term of rex is itself transformed by acquiring an association with the paternal role.

The examples from the arts of sole rule given in the excursus on monarchy are much the same as those appearing around the figure of the rector, summus vir, moderator and the like in the rest of the work and show that the latter cannot really be separated from the concentrated theoretical analysis that takes place in Book One. The imagery of the king includes comparison of his rule over his subjects with that dominion of mind over feelings referred to as the use of consilium (1.60). This connects the argument with the method of Plato and Aristotle who patterned public life on a model of the relationship in the soul. Such a view of rule also appears in 2.67 with the reference to the Indian or Carthaginian guide over the elephant, who is a model for the prudens needing self-rule before all.

With the musical analogy by which Cicero sets out the task of the man being looked for, we move at last into the social area and gain some idea of how Cicero envisages his statesman fitting into the society, performing his 'duty and function' — officium et munus — in the most comprehensive sense. We see at once that he stands outside the rest of the state, as a pattern to be imitated, a mirror to his fellow citizens by reason of the supreme excellence of his life and character (2.69). Therefore he is able to harmonize the conflicting elements, that is the different classes in the state.

Up to this point, concord had been suggested as resulting from popular measures (2.54: homines concordiae causa sapienter populares) and as a quality of the rule of Numa (2.27: cum ... summa in pace concordiaque regnavisset). But now Cicero explains his belief that harmony comes rather from the resolution than the absence of conflict and not as the democrats would claim facillimam ... in re publica esse posse concordiam, in qua idem conducat omnibus (1.49). We can remember

25 'Via via che al di là dei singolo ordines si rivela l'edificio statale, si fa più viva l'esigenza di riempire di un contenuto concreto la sua forma e di precisare il compito e i caratteri dell'uomo e della classe politica' (ib., p.106).
Cicero's own attempt at producing a *concordia ordinum*, but here what is suggested is not the sharing of rule by two upper orders but the consent and collaboration of all three classes in a fixed political order, under the supervision, however, of a figure who will apply *moderata ratio* to all problems. It is interesting to compare this conception with Cicero's description of the bonds linking members of society in the *De Officis* where he uses the old organic image (*De Off. 3.22*). There the fact of mutual dependence is set out, with no attempt being made to prescribe the imposition of order or co-operation.

Cicero in describing political activity prefers to use here an image which reinforces the account of the efficacy of the leader's example, and which unites concord and justice. But such devices as these, in association with the others looked at, have a part to play in overcoming the formal difficulties in the way of granting an individual powers that cannot be contained in any traditional framework of government.

**PHILO**

Philo assumes without question that ruling is a science like any other which the sage may acquire. He cites, among subheadings of ethics, the political craft, the economic, the kingly (dealing with the control of men), and the legislative (*Ebr. 91*). Failure to pursue the appropriate measures to acquire any form of learning is most blameworthy, for it is lack of education (*ἀπαλέος*) which is the cause of τὸ ληπτὲν (*Ebr. 6*).

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26 See on this image, 'Die Fabel des Menenius Agrippa', Wilhelm Nestle, in *Klio*, 21 (1927), p.354: 'Verfolgen wir nun die Geschichte dieser organischen Staatsidee, die dem griechischen Denken frühe in Fleisch und Blut überging, von ihren Ursprüngen über den Hellenismus bis in die römische Kaiserzeit, so erhalten wir damit gewissermassen eine Genealogie der Meneniusfabel.'

27 This motif had been popular from fifth-century Greece onwards. Note too *De Fin. 3.63*: *ut enim in membris alia sunt tamquam stibi nata, ut occult, ut aurea, alia etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant ... sic ... formicæ, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. Multo haec coniunctius homines.*

persons) which produces wisdom, something which great persons must seek and attain. Such leaders, however, are not those who have subdued land and sea with arms, but those who through the powers of the soul (ψυχῆς ὄνωμες) have conquered the medley and confusion of the multitude which beset it (Ebr. 113). Political activity has here been restricted to rule within the soul, with no necessary outward manifestation.

Philo as the earliest writer of the Empire to deal with government on the theoretical level sets the tone of the discussion, in his references to specific arts and crafts as parallels to be used quite uncritically for elucidating the political order. Yet even these images may be made still more irrelevant by being applied also to private figures. Thus the ruler guides the ship of state, as he did for Plato, for the benefit of all (Legat. 50), but it is the wise man who is elsewhere described as being the helmsman and ruler, and who takes over other images commonly applied to the head of state (see Abr. 272 and cf. Virt. 61).

Philo's image of the ruler as physician takes up the theme of Plato on the true and false leaders (expounded particularly in the Gorgias). Laws and magistrates are like doctors, but gatherings of the young are like cooks catering merely to pleasure (Jos. 63). The function of the ruler is thus predominantly moral, dealing with the care of the soul. A people who kick against the goad rob themselves of the lesson of submission, which also teaches how to govern, when they reject the ruler who acts virtuously (Jos. 79).

Philo's use of the image of the householder shows that he follows Plato and Xenophon in confusing various forms of rule and thereby rendering the science of politics even more abstract, and more divorced from activities that call for the co-operation of men and not simply for decisions in the private intellectual and moral order. As he says,

οἰκία τε γὰρ πόλις ἐστὶν ἐσταλμένη καὶ βραχεῖα καὶ ὀικνομικὰ συνημμένη τῆς πολιτείας, ὡς καὶ πόλις μὲν ὀίκος μέγας, πολιτεία δὲ κόλυμα τῆς ὀικονομία (Jos. 38).

Clearly the supreme rule of one man was the pattern to be drawn from household government. Reservations on this do appear, however, when Philo sharply distinguishes the kingly power from fatherly kindness (Fug. 98). Only the former has the ability to achieve submission
through fear. This momentary political realism, accepting the separation of the public and private spheres of life, re-emerges when over-gentle rulers are condemned in the same breath as tyrants (Agr. 47, but cf. Spec. Leg. 4.184: good rulers are common parents of cities and nations).

The pastoral image is common in Philo's writings to describe the ruler's task, and while it is true that this is one of the images 'qui, sans plus appartenir en propre à aucun système, sont devenues de simples formules de rhétorique', in places the detailed treatment given to the metaphor endows it with more than a decorative function. In the De Josepho Philo describes in some detail why practice in the pastoral art is so suitable an apprenticeship for a future king. Care of an animal herd gives a foundation for care of men, the fairest herd of all, and is the best method of entry into government and military command (Jos. 2). In the De Vita Mosis the same point is argued. But elsewhere (in e.g. Prob. 31), the image takes a different turn. Homer erred, says Philo, in applying the term 'shepherds of the people' to kings: the title should be applied to the good who would be better than the kings who are more often in the position of the sheep than the shepherd.

The true ruler's main task is shepherding the foolish flock, 'leading them to the true principles of culture and every virtue', and not, as we might expect, in organization, conquest or economic expansion (Agr. 44). This image is applied directly to the Roman Empire in the Legatio ad Gaium (20, 44), as an ideal which Gaius signalily failed to incorporate. Few kings could be expected to measure up to the threefold standard of the politikos put forward by Philo in De Josepho 54, where the qualities of a good shepherd, a good householder and a good ruler of self are deemed indispensable, and exemplified by Joseph, whose position

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31 τοιομενη γαρ μελετη και προγυναυσια βασιλειας το μελλουτι της ημερωτατης των άνθρωπων επισταταιν αγελης (Vit. Mos. 1.60).
tends to be described as if Pharaoh did not exist.

Philo certainly does provide exceptions to his general attitude to rule as the task of the royal craftsman. Like Aristotle he objects to a part taking precedence over the whole (Vit. Mos. 1.323), but the very need for harmony in any unit seems to call for a figure external to it to bring it about as God did when

and this is Philo's message rather than the importance of introducing the ruler as a part into the harmonious whole of society. Thus when he uses the analogy of the body he shows the head being conspicuous over the body 'not for its own glory but for the benefit of the beholders' (Praem. 114).

Moses, Philo argues,

Examine the political language in Philo's works can be misleading, for it often occurs as an illustration of the 'political' power of God, the one true king. We shall find other writers who describe monarchy similarly concerned to transfer the kingdom they portray from earth to heaven (or rather to the community of 'gods and men'), but their intention is generally to fix more firmly the earthly monarch in the process. For Philo, the monarch becomes insignificant in comparison with his creator. The portrait of Joseph in the De Josepho, built up so

\[32\text{ The passage continues:}\ \text{ἐξ ἑαυτῷ ἔστιν ἐπιμελεῖς αὐτῷ καὶ ταῖς εὐεργείαις τοῦ ἐπιμελεῖς τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τῆς μεταφορὰς πρὸς τὴν ἁμέλειαν. τοῦτα μεταφορᾶς προσέκει καὶ μεταφορὰς τῆς ἰδιότητος, εἰς ἔστιν ἐπιμελεῖς τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ της μεταφορὰς πρὸς τὴν ἁμέλειαν. as Louis Delatte comments, comparing this passage to that of Diotogenes, p.264, and taking into consideration the images of Spec. Leg. 4.186, 'tout ce développement tend à prouver que le chef politique doit être avant tout le bienfaiteur de ses administrés', Les Traités, p.253.}
carefully on the common images for rulers, is elsewhere entirely rejected (e.g. in Som. 1.221)\(^{33}\) and this can only weaken the relevance of Philo's 'political' imagery to actual government.

SENeca

Seneca did not have the freedom of Cicero, his predecessor in the working out of Roman political theory, to put forth the 'pros and cons' of all forms of government. Instead, his was the responsibility of evolving a language which would be appropriate to imperial government. He could choose from the theory of the Greeks and the practice of the Romans who were still in many ways unwilling to admit that their government was a kingship in the common sense of the word. In the De Clementia where the emphasis is on monarchy as the Romans now knew it, Seneca had to give advice to Nero in the most palatable form possible. It is therefore natural that he should provide as many congenial images of the royal role as he could. As his pronouncements on political life are not confined to this hortatory work, we find material also on this aspect of kingship in his other essays as well.

Seneca reveals rule as an art when he compares the king's treatment of his subjects to the physician's behaviour with his patients (Clem. 1.17.2). This brings the ruler's use of punishment into the area of personal correction — once more we have the 'care of souls' being postulated as part of government. Not the maintenance of an organization, but the remedying of individual ills is the foremost object of government on this view. The husbandman tending not merely the trees that are straight and tall, but also those that have grown crooked, straightening them out with props, is an image leading to the same conclusion (see Clem. 2.7.4), and stressing even more the passive situation of those who are reformed by the ruler.

Examples of lesser forms of power are also useful to the monarch, as Seneca makes clear. He instances a teacher's power over his pupils

\(^{33}\) καὶ τὸν χωρίου τούτου εἰσάγει Μωσηῆς ψυχικῶς αἴματι πεσωμένον ἐκελοὶ καὶ ὁ τού πολιτευομένου βίος πέφυται, πολεμῶν τε καὶ πολεμοδύμην καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν προσπαθεισῶν ἀθουλήτων συμπυκνῶν βαλλόμενος καὶ τοξευόμενος.
and that of a tribune or centurion over his soldiers (Clem. 1.16.2). That these positions are best exercised with restraint does not alter the fact that the images are concerned with different, and in one case private, areas of life and that their effect is to justify removing kingly rule from the constraints of the constitution. Kings and princes and guardians of the public order are equated, the last title attaining almost official rank (Clem. 1.4.3).

The task of teaching the subjects belongs in particular to the laws, for Seneca refuses to accept Posidonius' limitation of law to 'instructions mixed with threats' (Ep. 94.37). Laws, he affirms, do not only command, they also teach (ib.). Yet he also claims that consilium must originate with the ruling power (Clem. 1.3.5) and that history itself shows that the sapientes were the first to pass laws to guide the lives of men (Ep. 90.6). How in fact the king relates to the law is left conveniently vague.

Seneca has no hesitation in applying the 'father' image to the emperor, alluding to the official title pater patriae to reinforce his message (e.g. in Clem. 1.14.1-2 [eum] appellavimus Patrem Patriae; cf. 1.13.1 where the soldier is custos parentis). The point of the analogy is the gentleness required of the ruler towards his erring children. Seneca also frequently introduced comparisons from nature into his work to stress the exalted nature of the king. To believe that kingship among men can derive its justification from the bees' use of a 'monarch' (see Clem. 1.19.2) is to be committed also to a belief in some species of superman whose claims cannot be questioned. Seneca contrives to draw moralising conclusions from the fact that the queen bee has no sting (Clem. 1.19.3) but this is merely to encourage a merciful disposition in the king, not to suggest a basic change in policy.

Seneca might seem a more promising source than most for an awareness of the social dimensions of government. When he discusses human nature in general this is certainly so: Membra sumus corporis magni, he writes. Natura nos cognatos edidit, cum ex isdem et in eadem gigneret. Haec nobis amorem indidit mutuum et sociabiles fecit (Ep. 95.52). His society here however is purely spiritual (cf. Ep. 92.30: Totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est et deus; et socii sumus eius et membra). Certainly Seneca does introduce something like this into his discussion
on monarchy when he explains to Nero 'all will shape themselves into your likeness. From the head comes the health of the body' (Clem. 2.2.1), but this is a very one-sided relationship. This common theme of the ruler's power to determine the character of his subjects has little connection with analyses on the nature of man in society such as we find elsewhere in Seneca's work.

In the De Ira for example he develops this speculation with regard to the state and insists on how obvious the sanctity of the part is, once the sanctity of the whole is accepted, and introduces the argument of enlightened self-interest: 'What if the hands should wish to harm the feet or the eyes the hands?' (Ira. 2.31.7). Only if the parts are protected and loved can the society as a whole be preserved. Seneca does not here suggest that one part alone is to give this protection and love. He does so, however, in Letter 114.24, when in an extended comparison of the soul and the king he notes: 'The king when he is pursuing an honourable course, cares for the safety of the body entrusted to him.' The king as the soul or mind of the body is not just a part, even the most important part, of the body politic but he is different in kind from the rest: _totum corpus animo deservit_ (Clem. 1.3.5). The relationship cannot involve mutual love between equals, of the Stoic kind. Seneca remarks to Nero, 'you are the soul of the state, and the state your body' (Clem. 1.5.1), and the ruler appears as the breath and chain of the Empire (Clem. 1.4.1). Here the metaphysical interest has begun to override the political, for the king resembles under these aspects the sage as Seneca elsewhere describes him (e.g. Ep. 115.3).

All these metaphors fail to provide any development in political theory but seek to find an acceptable role for the king to adopt in the tradition of Hellenistic monarchies. They suggest that the _de iure_ balances to royal power still existing — the senate and the consuls — are irrelevant to a true account of government. Fathers and tutors, whose conduct the king imitates, act on their own after all in a one-to-one relationship with a child or pupil. For Seneca then the imagery of

34 'Le "corps de l'État", le "corps de l'Empire", soit. Mais le corps a une tête ... le chef idéal, c'est le princeps. Affirmation de l'unité sous la forme du corps; affirmation d'un principe monarchique naturel, logiquement déduit de cette proposition' (Béranger, _Recherches_, p.231).
kingship has been used to turn the king from a political creature, whose
task is social and administrative and who exerts his will through
institutions such as the army and the courts, to the ideal private
person who achieves results by moral suasion and example, supported by
an aura of mystic unity with all parts of the Empire.

MUSONIUS RUFUS

In the essay 'That Kings Also Should Study Philosophy', Musonius
Rufus stresses that the one who is to save and benefit men (a truly
kingly task) must understand what is good and bad, hurtful and harmful,
and so on, to men, such being the task (τέχνη) also of the philosopher
who τέχνην πεποίησεν ταύτην εϊδέναι τι φέρει πρὸς ἀνθρώπου εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ
παραδειμνόναι (p.280). In fact, the claim to be a practitioner in any
task does not have to depend on the number of those affected by it.35

Musonius' conclusion is:

καὶ ὁ καὶ βασιλεὺς παραπλησίως τῷ κεκτημένῳ πολλοῖς ὑπηκόους
ὁ ἔχων ἐνα ἡ δύο τοὺς πειθουμένους αὐτῷ, μόνον ἐχέτω τὴν τοῦ
βασιλευτεῖν ἑμπείριαν· ὡσεὶ καὶ βασιλεὺς εἰς ἁν (p.286).

Thus he believes that the title βασιλεὺς may be due to one who rules
over friends, or family or self, although he does not see the house­
holder as such in an analogous position to that of the ruler.

Musonius Rufus has no overt reference to the state or the Empire as
an organism, but he does place great emphasis on the duty of the king to
implant harmony (εὐνομίαν μὲν καὶ ὑμνώναν μηχανώμενου, ἀνομίαν δὲ καὶ
σόδαν ἀπείροντα, p.283). Still, the general impression that the
language of Musonius leaves is that ruling is an art or skill, and that
considerations of policy and structure are irrelevant.

35 Thus ἦν τρόπος οὐδέν ἄττων τοῦ ἑρατεύοντος πολλοὺς ὁ ἑρατεύων
ὁλίγους, εἰ γε ἐξελ τὴν ἐμπείριαν τὴν ὑπερεκή καὶ μουσικὸς οὐδέν ἄττον
τοῦ ὁδόσκοντος πολλοὺς ὁ ὁδόσκων ὁλίγους, εἰ γε ἐξελ τὴν μουσικήν·
καὶ ὑπερεκὴς ὑμοῦς τῷ χρωμένῳ πολλοῖς ἔπειτο ὁ χρωμένος ἐνι ἡ ὁδοί, ἕν
γε ἐπιστήμων τῆς ὑπερεκῆς ὑ (pp.285-6).
DIO CHRYSTOSM

Because 'most men are fools' (13.13) and do not therefore display the *Logos* that distinguishes them from the animals, Dio Chrysostom concluded that education has to bring out of their folly those who are teachable, while the rest of mankind should be directed by the *Logos* present in those who are truly human. The conjunction of παίδευσι and λόγος produces 'good men, preservers of cities' (32.3). In this way the art of ruling makes its appearance. Hercules' education provides an excellent example of training in leadership. It was simple, yet enabled him to choose between tyranny and kingship (1.61ff.). Such a simple education is elsewhere (4.29) described as ἡ δαίμονις in contrast to ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη, and those who receive it are entitled to be called 'sons of Zeus', πεπαιδευμένος ὡς Ἡρακλῆς ἐκεῖνος (4.31) and are thus capable of performing the tasks of rule for which Hercules set the pattern. The ruler learns his task because it is truly a profession (ἔργον αὐτοῦ καὶ τέχνην ταύτην, 3.55) which may be defined as the care of men. The instruments of government are therefore the ruler's judgement and virtue (3.45); no other tools are necessary.

Because men learn with difficulty from those who know (11.1) and even the ruler himself is likely to be in need of advice when he has attained power (49.7), he may well become a servant of the wise man's γνώμη (49.8). The kingly craft may therefore be known best by one who is not the king. The ambivalence about the kingly craft as Dio describes it appears in the Fourth Discourse where a graduate of the heavenly school of learning is the true king (see 4.21, 26). This may mean that the pupil of Zeus or of a disciple of Zeus will, like Minos, learn 'justice and the duties of a king' (4.40) and, perhaps, not exercise these skills, but the point of this section as of the whole discourse is that kingship is not a matter of external rule but of propitiating the attendant spirit (4.75). The kingly technē of Oration 53.11, of which Minos was the first and greatest practitioner, is not elaborated on in sufficient detail for us to understand its effects on the subjects.

Dio's use of the common comparison of the art of rule with

36 ἡν δὲ καὶ πεπαιδευμένος ἀπλῶς.
particular trades and skills adds little that is new. A charioteer must steer his vehicle, a ship needs a helmsman and a state needs a ruler who will perform his corresponding function 'in a kingly way' (4.25). The ruler's task can be described in terms of the care a physician shows. Preventive medicine is applied by saviours and guardians to those capable of salvation, while treatment for the seriously ill is the work of 'magistrates, laws and dicasts' (32.17-18). The ruler can be referred to equally appropriately as a teacher of a virtuous way of life. For the monarch to justify his claims to sole rule, he must always surpass his subjects. Dio felt that he had a clear case of such a teacher-pupil relationship in the treatment by the emperor's representatives of the people of Alexandria. Here we see Rome sending out ταυδαγωγοι, that is, troops, to improve the masses by their company (32.51).

This metaphorical description of the forces of law and order as guides of naughty children is no doubt ironic, but it also indicates the reality which is elsewhere so carefully veiled by Dio's accounts of the rulers. May not much of the leader's moral influence have been of this nature — and are we to see this implied in Dio's statements on the impact of the ruler's moral virtues, even though this appears to be limited to effecting ethical regeneration in the subjects peaceably? Dio himself may have given the moral influence and advice the highest place. That this instance of an acknowledgement of the use of force is so striking highlights his failure in general to confront this aspect of rule.

Dio is particularly fond of describing the king as 'father of his people' (e.g. in 1.22). He justifies kingship by calling it a care to be exercised in the manner of a solicitous father, accompanied by kindness and affection. No other way of leading or ruling men is appropriate (53.12). This means that Dio is following the common practice of using the language of kinship to make the pressure of monarchical government more bearable. But this argument from the role assumed may also work in the opposite direction. Being a ruler is pleasant for those who 'know the art'; the art of rule, Dio remarks, may be exercised over oneself, one's own household, the greatest state or the world (49.2-3) and there is therefore no special significance in the size of one's domain. Once
more Aristotle's sharp distinction between spheres of rule has been forgotten (he himself of course being the first offender in this respect).

Dio is also unable to resist the temptation of introducing the image of the ruler as the shepherd or herdsman of his people (e.g. 1.17; cf. 49.2). The positions of ruler and shepherd can be compared because in both cases there is need for πρόνοια, σωτηρία and φύλακα (4.44). The ruler devotes his attention (προσέχει τῶν νοτών) to himself and his subjects, being a true guide and shepherd of his people (1.13). Without the qualities of a good shepherd, a ruler is not merely a bad one but is no true emperor or king at all (3.41).

When Dio seeks enlightenment in the world of nature he too makes the connection between gentleness and superiority in the 'king' bee, as Seneca had done (4.62-3). The bull's leadership of the herd reveals its qualities of solicitude, its saving function and its deference to higher authority (2.69-70). These the leader would do well to imitate. The claims are moderate, inasmuch as the leader here excels the subject in degree of perfection, not in nature. Yet the superiority he does allow the monarch both here and in 3.50 (where 'herds of cattle and swarms of bees' provide 'close parallels and striking analogies showing that it is natural for the stronger to care for and govern the weaker') is considerable.

Only occasionally does Dio suggest that the task of preserving the health of the body politic belongs to the parts of the body working in harmony, and not to the physician working from outside, and then this line of thought is not pursued. Yet it does throw a different light on government from that suggested by the metaphors he generally uses. In the discourse on concord in Nicaea, the citizens of an harmonious city together form the eyes, ears, tongues and minds, just as if a god had granted the city a soul (39.5). So too discord in the state, like sickness in the body, spreads to every part and the cure is for each part to recognize its union with the whole. That part which is sick, however humble, calls for greater attention than the sound (50.3-4).

There is a connection made between government by one and the presence of friendship and concord when Dio describes the rule of the
universe, which is in one sense a city (literally defined as an organization of human beings) and, in another sense, a living creature. \^{37} Here is found the sanest and noblest form of kingship (36.29-32) — which suggests that the task of imparting harmony is all-important to the monarch. But the question of earthly kingship does not arise here. In his speech on concord in Nicomedia, Dio shows ὀμόνοια as the civic form of well-being, which appears in the body as health, and on the international scale as peace (38.14), but again does not link this with the rule of one man over the Empire.

In Dio's discourses we find the clearest instances so far of kingship as an ethical ideal, justified by the obvious fact that both intellectually and morally few men are capable of self-direction. The machinery of the state therefore is geared to providing such direction from outside.

PLUTARCH

For Plutarch, as for Cicero, politics involved more than the performance of a public activity — it was a way of living that lasted a lifetime (Mor. 791c). But he too conceived of it in more limited terms as an art, a μάθημα whose ingredients were βουλή, πρόνοια and λόγος (789d). Even though the discussion is on making one's way in politics at the municipal level, Plutarch emphasizes the intellectual element, and cannot refrain from introducing the 'kingly art' as the supreme example of rule: old men hold royal rank in the state in accordance with their wisdom ἡ τῆς πρόνοιας (789f).

Wisdom seems to be the prerequisite for true statesmanship, and the uneducated generals and rulers are the ones who capsise (780b). Older statesmen therefore have the task of instructing the young in political skills (790d-f). Plutarch, like many of the writers we are considering, does not rest satisfied with a definition of rule in the political sense. He describes how the teacher himself needs first to be taught, one who imparts order and cultivation must be ordered and cultivated within

\^{37} It is interesting to note Dio's care to explain that he is not suggesting the same thing could literally be both a city and a living being.
The imposition of order is the same task as fell to the lot of Plato's philosopher-kings. Here, as there, the comparison with the craftsman is obvious. For both writers, society is a *tabula rasa*.

The ruler's task is therefore similar to those performed in a variety of skilled occupations. The ruler is a δημοσιογόνος of justice and lawfulness (807c). Hence he must choose the right associates as his tools just as does an architect or ship's captain (807c and 812c). He must steer the ship of state well at his life's end, and experience in statecraft is as important as practice for ship's captains or charioteers (790d-e).

Plutarch uses the well-worn analogy of the physician ambiguously. Sometimes he shows him apart from the body of the state (in e.g. 818d-e and cf. Ἑυστ. 4.3), which is the picture frequently applied to an absolute ruler, but he also shows us the local 'physician-politician' himself part of the infected body, desperately trying to ward off interference from Rome in local affairs (815a-b). The ruler as teacher trains men to be good subjects (816f) and uses persuasion, arguments and threats to ensure good conduct (818c). Even the man who holds power alone, whom the philosopher is advised to cultivate, does not have his pedagogic role spelled out too precisely: he is solicitous for men (780d), and Plutarch obviously expects the ruler to 'hold others up', to teach, to impart culture and order as well as to rule: in general, to make others fit his pattern (780b).

The distance between ruler and ruled is maintained in Plutarch's description of the ruler as the sheepdog guarding the sheep (781c) even though the point of the analogy is the care exercised by the animals for their charges, whose welfare is more important to them than their own. Plutarch, too, boldly declares that the statesman is by nature — φιλόσοφος — the ruler of the *polis* like the leading bee in the hive (813c). He has charge of the rational and political swarm (823f).}

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Plutarch devotes a considerable space to showing how the state is or should be a unity, referring to it in terms drawn from the concept of the state as an organism. Rome in the time of Romulus was a 'feverish' state (Num. 8.1) though Numa softened and shaped it as if his task were a mere craft exercised on an inanimate object. The king is intimately associated with the production of ὄμονοια in the body politic: thus in Num. 20.8, the subjects

τὴν ἄρετὴν ἐν εὐδήλῳ παραδεύγματι καὶ λαμπρῷ τῷ βύζ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ὁμόνοιας, ἐκουσώς σωφρονοῦσι καὶ συγκατασχηματίζονται πρὸς τὸν ἐν φιλίᾳ καὶ ὄμονοιᾳ τῇ πρὸς αὐτοὺς μετὰ ὀγκασθείνης καὶ μετρολίτητος ἁμύνον καὶ μακάριν βίον, ἐν ὃ τὸ κάλλιστον ἀκάσις πολιτείας τέλος ἔστιν.

Lycurgus is praised because 'he thought that the happiness of an entire city, like that of a single individual, depended on the prevalence of virtue and concord within its own borders' (Lyc. 31.1).

The polis, still the social unit of which Plutarch thinks first, 'is, as it were, a living being' and must therefore preserve its oneness over time as well as space (Mor. 559a). Even for the relatively powerless local politician Plutarch prescribes the duty of instilling concord and friendship in those among whom he lives (824d). In all these cases Plutarch hints at the complexity of social structure but does not go into detail. He suggests that the statesman or the king will occupy a position outside the body of the state rather than simply at its head, and does not therefore find an opening here for the idea of the Empire as a well-functioning organism. Its regulatory devices are indeed seen as a threat to local autonomy (814e-f).

The awareness of the sociability of man is strong in Plutarch, more so than in most of his contemporaries (although he too can see society as a 'suspicious and capricious beast', 800c). The influence on him of theories of monarchical rule is also strong, however, and works in the opposite direction. In many of Plutarch's comments the sphere of political activity is the polis, and down-to-earth advice for the local politician is combined incongruously with a language and imagery developed to describe the rule of kings.

38a Relatively powerless, that is to say, in comparison with the increasingly bureaucratised centre of decision-making in the Empire, and in comparison with the influence such a class of men had once had over events beyond their polis boundary.
PLINY

The occasion for which the Panegyric was composed meant that Pliny could not indulge too extensively in esoteric flights of fancy, and we can assume that the terms in which he analyses Trajan's rule will be close to the emperor's understanding of himself and his task. Classes of society are likely to be mentioned and Pliny must make at least formal reference to the notion of the sharing of powers by the emperor and senate.

Within this framework a theory of monarchy based partly on constitutional claims, partly on extra-political elements, emerges. One of the most impressive justifications of the ruler's position that Pliny introduces is the uplifting influence of the emperor on the young among his subjects, but, unlike Plutarch and Dio, he does not claim that the ruler is actually the counsellor of all. Thus after the rhetorical opening of Chapter 47: 'How in your role as chief citizen you fashion the life and habits of youth!', Pliny explains what this really means: 'In what honour do you hold masters of rhetoric! In what esteem teachers of philosophy!' (47.1). Pliny describes the emperor's rule by the soothing term of tutela (e.g. in 94.3, tu enim iam tunc illum in tutelam recepi). Similarly, as governor of Bithynia and Pontus, Pliny writes to Trajan on the anniversary of his accession that protection - tutela - of the human race had been transferred to him on that day (Ep. 10.102). 39

Rule by persuasion and reason appears as a theme even in Pliny's account of Trajan's behaviour in the judiciary where he describes his conciliatory role tumentes populos non imperio magis quam ratione compescere (Pan. 80.3). The ethical and intellectual role of the king is reinforced by his appearance as a father figure to his people, of which image Pliny makes great play. This quality acquired formal status in the title pater patriae but even apart from this use the attitude in

39 'La tutela n'existe pas séparée de l'individu. Elle demeure personnelle, exerçable dans tous les domaines. La bienveillance impériale est une manifestation d'homme à homme. Elle dépend de l'initiative privée, non d'une codification. Elle est libéralité spontanée, renouvelable, au plus une obligation morale', Béranger, Recherches, p.259.
the speech is clear: eras ... in animis in iudiciis nostris, i.e. even without Trajan's acceptance of the title, (pater patriae) (21.3; cf. 2.3 non de domino sed de parente; 39.5 communis omnium parens). 40

For Pliny the respublica and its citizens could be 'summed up' in the princeps in a way reminiscent of the sharing of sorrows and joys by Plato's guardians in the Republic. But with them, all felt together the same emotion; one individual did not epitomize all the rest. Pliny goes so far as to imply that no benefit need be asked of God for the state if the salus of the princeps is prayed for, as this includes all possible individual requests (94.2). The only occasion on which Pliny discusses the state in terms of the body politic is also the point at which he expresses the glimmerings of a social awareness. It is in vain, he says, for the ruler to support the nobility, if he neglects the plebs: like a head deprived of its body the former will totter with its disequilibrium (instabili pondere, 26.6) 41 but here again, the ruler is detached from the conflict of interest and moderates tensions from above. So the general impression we receive of Pliny's attitude to government from his use of imagery is that for him the ruler as an individual is all-important.

ARISTIDES

It was left to a non-Roman, Aelius Aristides, to claim the art of rule as a Roman discovery, by bringing in the extent of Empire as the test of success, a consideration which before this had been little in evidence (see Roman Oration 51). The Greeks, although they had excelled in other forms of wisdom, had not known this art and so the Athenians and indeed all the Greeks could win battles but not hold an Empire (ib.). The emperor of the Βασιλέας is in no danger of suffering from such deficiencies. He is a person who is educated and has learnt what is

40 Note also 4.2, parens noster; 29.2, parens noster; 57.5, pater patriae; 67.1, parens publicus and 87.1, parens publicus.

41 Cf. the discourse of Galba in Tacitus, Histories 1.16: Si immensum imperii corpus stare ac librari sine rectore posset, dignus eram a quo res publica inaiperet, and Béranger's comment (Recherches, p.222): 'L'essentiel n'est plus le corpus imperii, déjà banal, mais ce qui en découle, le princeps directeur.'

41a Vergil had of course expressed this idea without elaboration in Aen. 6.851-3.
needful; he neglects no duty but puts his soul in order, and hence is likely to be without fault in his external relations (p.102). The lack of such training in previous rulers is directly related to failure to retain as king the virtues possessed as a private citizen (p.107).

Aristides makes the point that all realize that it is best to be ruled by one's betters — 'accordingly all are held fast and would not ask to secede any more than those at sea from the helmsman' (R.O. 68). Again in the Εἰς Βασιλεία the king is likened to the helmsman of a ship, 'no inexperienced one, but rather the most skilled' (ἐμπειροδέταις) of kings and the most outstanding in wisdom (p.103); hence he can bring the troubled ship of state to a safe harbour. This speech also suggests that the king has a pedagogic role by hinting at the educative function of royal punishments (p.105). A ruler, in Aristides' view, should perform his task with the care of a horse trainer, taking into account the different personalities of his 'charges' (R.O. 96).

Aristides at one stage displays a certain hesitation in taking up the metaphor of the ruler as father because of the danger of equating king and master of a household, and having government and slave-management undifferentiated as with the Persians (R.O. 23). Such wariness seems to have disappeared a little further on when governors are described as standing in greater awe of the great governor than one would of a despot (32), and he even goes so far as to claim that in fact Rome had brought it about that the whole world was, as it were, one house (102). It is therefore not surprising to find that in the Εἰς Βασιλεία the emperor should be (and is indeed more than) the universal father (p.106). In the Roman Oration Aristides also invokes the old analogy of the shepherd and the true king, to show where the Persian rulers failed (18). The king addressed in the Εἰς Βασιλεία has on the contrary given proof of his excellence by being a 'shepherd of the others' (p.106).

In the second century when these works were written we can still find Aristides talking of the civilized world as ailing, and being brought back to health (R.O. 98). Harmony is most important, but its presence is due to the leader — ὢστερ αὐλὸς ἐκκεκασθαμένος, οὕτως ἡπασα ἡ οἰκουμένη χορὸν ἀκριβώστερον ἐν φθέγγεται, συνενχωμένη μενελυν τοῦ ἄπαντα αἰῶνα.
The Εἰς Βασιλέα, again, shows the emperor as a physician, himself uninfected by the illness of the 'great unhealthy body' of the state (p.102). Aristides is thus a faithful preserver of the most common imagery used since at least the fourth century B.C. to refer to, describe and justify monarchical government.

CONCLUSION

There is a clear similarity observable in the type of language used by these writers to describe the ruling power. All make use of the clichés which linked government to the arts or other occupations requiring skill and the exercise of undisputed authority. All see the principle of superiority and inferiority, applying in other spheres than the civic, as valid also for public life.

Philo in the early days of the Roman Empire expressed most explicitly what all would have assented to: 'Rule' or "command" (τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς εὑρος) is a category which extends and intrudes itself, I might almost say, into every branch of life, differing only in magnitude and amount. For the relation of a king to a state is the same as that of a head-man to a village, of a householder to a house, of a physician to his patients, of a general to an army, of an admiral to the marines and crews, or again of a skipper to merchant and cargo vessels or of a pilot to the seamen.' (No doubt the list could go on indefinitely!) 'All those have power for good and for worse, but they ought to will the better and the better is to benefit instead of injuring as many as they possibly can' (Spec. Leg. 4.186).

This idealism found safeguards against abuse of power virtually irrelevant, but it often emerged that the true ruler should not be the one exercising power in the state at all, for the mere possession of the right qualifications resulted in self-rule and the moral rule over others by example that was true kingship. A multitude of analogies from non-political activities diverted attention from the public scene, and softened any incongruity in the turn taken by a discourse.
The connection frequently made between the presence of harmony and
good order in a state, and the actions of a detached, superior figure is
perhaps natural if the ruler epitomizes in his person the unity desired
for the whole, much as Hobbes described in *The Leviathan*, Part I, ch. 16:
'A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or
one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every
one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the
Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person
One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one
Person: and Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude.'

But what perhaps begins as a way of expressing concern for the
unity of the whole social body in its orderly functioning itself often
becomes once again a discourse on the individual. Under the Empires,
monarchy was the one form of government on which it was reasonable for
discussion to take place. Such discussion was a convenient vehicle for
the development of an ethic of individual behaviour and we need not then
be surprised that frequently this becomes the real message of the essays
and speeches.
The most powerful principle which governs man is the religious principle. ... Man was made to adore and to obey.

Benjamin Disraeli.

Le rationaliste préfère un humanisme éclairé, fondé sur la dignité de l'homme, l'équilibre intérieur et la culture de l'intelligence; le mystique prosterne la créature humaine aux pieds de son dieu et la pousse à lui faire le don total de sa personne et de sa vie, à suivre les directives qu'il lui donne; le rationaliste est partisan d'un État laïque, gouverné grâce aux lumières de la raison et de la sagesse pour le bien de la collectivité; il respecte la personne du souverain, consent même à lui reconnaître des mérites supérieurs à ceux des autres hommes, mais se refuse à voir en lui un dieu; le mystique est enfin à vouloir que la politique soit subordonnée à la religion et que le gouvernement de l'État ait pour principes les conseils de son dieu, pour fin son service; il va souvent jusqu'à croire que la divinité s'est incarnée dans le souverain.

Jean Beaujeu, La Religion romaine à l'apogée de l'empire, I, p.33.
CHAPTER FIVE

RELIGION AND KINGSHIP

INTRODUCTION

Kings and rulers of ancient Greece had from Homeric times been credited with more than human greatness, and later were revered as, at least, demi-gods who had achieved the immortality denied to ordinary men.\(^1\) An attempt to overleap the boundaries between the human and the divine without warrant was however a risky business,\(^2\) but clearly the more common this became, the safer it appeared,\(^3\) until in the third

\(^1\) But we must note that the distinction between men and gods was still preserved by Homer: 'On the one hand, Homer never confused "godlike" with "divine"; he never crossed the line between the mortal and the immortal. Hesiod spoke of "a godlike race of hero-men who are called demi-gods", but there were no demi-gods in the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*. Kings were honoured like gods, but never worshipped', M.I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus* (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1967), p.157. The one possible exception is Odysseus' description of the 'blameless king', *Odyssey*, 19.109ff.


\(^3\) Louis Delatte claims that 'les Grecs divinisent les hommes avec une facilité déconcertante', and that 'la ligne de démarcation entre les dieux, les héros et les hommes n'est pas toujours bien marquée' (*Les Traités*, p.129). This applies particularly to writers like Heraclitus, Empedocles and Pindar. Nemean Ode 6 is an obvious instance, but in many other places Pindar, as we have seen, lays the emphasis on the risks of forgetting the difference. For Heraclitus and Empedocles the 'divine man' is the seer and prophet.

A.D. Nock, discussing the honours accorded to Hellenistic kings, comments: 'To the Greeks there was often a shading off of the distinction between man and god, and in addition to this general tendency of thought we have to reckon with two widespread ideas, the one that the gods of popular worship were men deified by grateful humanity, the other that the soul of a man or at least the soul of an outstanding
century Euhemerus could explain the origin of the gods in the elevation of the benefactors of mankind, and religious awe gave way generally to cynicism and indifference.

Aristotle shows the ambivalent attitude held by the men of his time towards the exceptional individual. He describes the man excelling his fellows in the polis, 'like a god among men' (ὡς πρ... θεόν ἐν ἄνθρωποι—Pol. 1284a). He claims that one could as soon contemplate ruling over Zeus as expect such a person to be a subject (1284b). Yet Aristotle sees little likelihood of someone of this kind emerging, and elsewhere notes that if there were one class in the state surpassing all others both physically and mentally as much as gods and heroes are supposed to surpass mankind, then it would be only right for them to be obeyed without question. But such an assumption he found difficult to make (see 1332b).

But philosophers seeking to explain and justify kingship, and being confronted with the developing ruler-cult, could not let the matter rest there. For they had to consider how the king fitted into the structure of the world of gods and men. His authority, in any case, could not easily be explained solely in human terms, as that of an assembly or council in a polis could. Its supernatural derivation seemed an obvious alternative explanation. But how was this to be accounted for?

To begin with, all the writers, as we have seen, accepted without question that some men were better than others and that a society could function properly only if this fact were recognized in its structures. The ruler who alone can lead men to virtue must himself possess exceptional moral and other qualities, and hence he will attain to a more than human stature, for, as Bowersock has explained it, 'man is capable of virtue, and virtue is divine; hence there is something divine in a virtuous man'.

Pythagoras appears as the great exemplar of man was in a sense divine. All the same a difference remains' (C.A.H. vol. 10, edited by Cook, Adcock and Charlesworth [University Press, Cambridge, 1952], p.481).

here: 'Er ist der ἀνήρ, der zwischen Gott und Mensch steht. Schon Aristoteles beruft sich auf eine in Pythagoreerkreisen gangbare Einteilung der vernunftbegabten Wesen: τὸ μὲν ἔστι ἥθος, τὸ δ' ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ οἶον Πυθαγόρας.'

A man invested with the role of king must then have received a divine commission to rule and care for a people. This close association of the ruler with the deity implies that his task is not only to represent God on earth but also to imitate him. The subjects for their part are likely to do best if they take the king for their model, as far as is possible. In this way the earthly society becomes ultimately a copy of the divine.

Theorists can therefore feel justified in investing the monarch with a religious authority, and can indeed suggest that the whole purpose of royal rule is to infuse into the subjects something of the king's divinely-derived virtue. This, we should note, is, on the surface, as far removed as possible from the ruler cult. How far any writer goes in reconciling these two aspects of the divine in kingship, the cultic and the moral-metaphysical, depends on his own attitude. In general, there is found in our writers a protest against the excesses of the cult and an attempt to place virtuous conduct at the centre of any account of the ruler's divine qualities. The intangible and inward honours of grateful hearts are to be cherished more than temples and statues.

ISOCRATES

In the introduction to the Panegyricus, Isocrates complains that the men who obtain recognition and honours in states are those who excel in physical achievements, and not, as should be the case, those who have laboured on behalf of the common interest and have made their souls fit to aid others (Paneg. 1). This deficiency he in some measure made good


6 Thus he puts forward the premise, in discussing Athen's claims to recognition: εἰ δὲι τοῦτος ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ τιμάθαλ τῶν ἔργων, τοὺς ἐπεδροτάτους δύναται καὶ μεγάστην δύναμιν ἔχουσι (Paneg. 21).
in his own works when he dealt with outstanding benefactors of society. Individuals who excelled clearly interested him as objects of addresses and as topics to dwell on. He preferred to point to the exploits of Theseus rather than to give a general account of the development of Athens and its institutions. With this in mind we must approach his remarks on the nature of such people with care, and distinguish different types of comment. A remark that reveals a belief in the connection between political excellence and superhuman characteristics meriting divine or semi-divine honours may be mistaken for mere rhetoric — or vice versa — and it is clear that Isocrates is not producing in his works a properly-developed apologia, based on religious grounds, for any particular form of rule. What is important in his view is the general principle that worth be given its due. This means in one account that proportional equality should be the basis of any government (Nic. 14).

This is for him a common-sense arrangement, but in addressing individuals Isocrates often ventures further and grants them an authority that has a supernatural source. The divinity, though not acting personally in human affairs, inspires some men to speak, others to act (Phil. 150-51). The nature of this relationship is not made clear, and it certainly has no institutional form. In his advice to Nicocles, Isocrates points out the folly of comparing kingship to a priesthood which could be the job of anybody at all (To Nic. 6), so that what we meet here is certainly no priest-king figure. But in the Areopagiticeus he claims that even the present constitution is made by God (Areop. 62).

The ruler may appear sometimes as the representative of the deity, yet in the address which Isocrates puts in the mouth of Nicocles, the king in justifying his possession of power refers to his behaviour, and derives his claim from his ancestors and not from any divine mandate. The appeal is to empirical evidence, and shows that such power is to be put to strictly utilitarian uses.
Nevertheless, history could show how elevation to semi-divine status had come about through acts of valour. Philip of Macedon's ancestors included the great hero Hercules who was raised to the company of the gods by his father Zeus because of his virtues (Phil. 132). So too the exploits of the Athenians in the Persian wars entitle them to the same honours as demi-gods, and ensure them a deathless glory (Paneg. 84). The actual conquest of the Persian Empire Isocrates sees as a yet more exacting task. So here he tells Philip, to spur him on, that the gods have judged and 'you would be the best leader' (Phil. 151).

Isocrates does not suggest that Philip's or any other leader's task is to reproduce in an earthly kingdom the heavenly state, nor that the king is the image of Zeus, but he does hint — and this is the first case of an argument that is to become common in later writers — that monarchy resembling as it does the rule of Zeus over the gods may for that reason be the best form of government (Nio. 26). His reservations were because it seemed too rash to assert that the myths of the gods were true. But even if such stories could not be verified, the fact that men imagined such a structure was a sign that πάντες τὴν μοναρχίαν προτιμῶμεν (ib.). This ingenious argument, based as it is on public opinion, circumvents the problems that an examination of the different forms of government might pose.

When Isocrates ascribes the role of saviour and benefactor to some heroic figures he paints the past in epic colours, linking it with a present which ought to be equally glorious. Hercules is praised in the Panegyricus because he was a benefactor of all men (Paneg. 56; cf. Phil. 76). Isocrates urges Philip to be a present-day benefactor of Greece (Phil. 154). There is no religious significance in this expression as yet, but in linking a current εὐεργέτης to an heroic figure of legend, the elevation has been made easier.

In a fragment allegedly recalling the opinion of Isocrates, we read

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8 On the actions attributed to Busiris, he comments (Bus. 32) ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῆς τῶν θεῶν ἡμάτητος, τὸ δὲ τῆς τῶν θεῶν δυνάμεως ἔργον ἐστιν and note also: Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὦ ὁ πόλεως τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐξ ἐκείνων γεγονόσας οὐδεμιᾶς ἡγοῦμαι κακίας μετασχέσειν, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὺς τε πάσας ἔχοντας τὰς ἀρετὰς φύσει καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τῶν καλλύστων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἡγεμόνας καὶ δίδασκαλοὺς γεγενηθῆναι (Bus. 41).
that he described the gifted among his pupils as children of the gods. If this is so, it is not surprising to find him thinking it natural that men looking at the honours and wealth of dynasties should all consider those in charge of monarchies equal to the gods, ἵσοδέοις (To Nic. 5). Isocrates himself however does not share this view, and when he wishes to extol the character of Evagoras he contrasts him with other rulers — they cannot claim to be good whether they be mortal or demi-god or immortal (Evag. 39). In this case supernatural attributes are dismissed as unimportant when compared with moral excellence, and are contrasted with it, rather than being seen as rising from it or causing it. Later in the same work the criterion is once more virtue, but now Isocrates comments:

"Ὡς τ' εἰ τινες τῶν προγεγενημένων δι' ἀρετὴν ἄθανατοι γεγόνασιν, οἰμαι κάκευον ἡμιώδουν ταύτης τῆς δωρεᾶς (Evag. 70).

Here as often immortality and honours after death, if real, are the sign and acknowledgement of supernatural qualities. Nothing is said to prove that Isocrates concedes the premise. The same goes for his remark a little further on:

εἰ τινες τῶν πολιτῶν περὶ τινος τῶν προγεγενημένων ὑπερβολαῖς κέρανται, λέγοντες, ὡς ἂν θεός ἐν ἄνθρωπος ἡ δαίμονι θυτός, ἀπαντα τά τοιαῦτα περὶ τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν ἰδεῖναι μᾶλιστ' ἄν ἄμελλεν (Evag. 72).

Taeger notes the hesitation here and concludes:

Hier künden sich also nicht die religiösen Ideen an, die bald unter dem Eindruck eines übergewaltigen Geschehens die göttliche Verehrung eines Menschen dulden und fordern werden, sondern hier spricht die allgemeine Zersetzung, die unter dem Einfluss der ionisch-attischen Aufklärung die hergebrachte Religiosität bedroht und gestattet, einen Fürsten aus den Randgebieten des griechischen Siedlungsraumes wenigstens nach seinem Tode in einem Enkomion neben die Gestalten der mythischen Vorzeit zu rücken.10

The advice in the letter to Philip, if we assume that this letter is correctly ascribed to Isocrates, comes at the end of the rhetorician's life. His comment that once Philip had brought the Persian monarchy to


10 Taeger, 'Isokrates', p.358.
heal, there would be nothing left for him to do but to become a god (Ep. 3.5), might seem an unambiguous declaration that the transformation of a political ruler into a divine figure had become a theoretically acceptable doctrine. But here hyperbole is just as likely to account for the language:

Isokrates krönt seine Aufforderung mit einem Adynaton, das er bei dem Makedonen selbst als bekannt voraussetzen durfte, um die Grösse der gestellten Aufgabe und ihres Lohnes zu zeigen. Der Sieg über den Perserkönig ist die höchste Stufe, die Philipp zugänglich ist; und wir brauchen hier nicht weiter auszuführen, dass diese Interpretation allein in das Bild passt, das wir von Isokrates' politischem und religiösem Denken in der letzten Periode seines Lebens uns machen können.11

We may see here a challenge to excite Philip's ambition rather than the enunciation of a theory of divine kingship. Certainly Isocrates expresses his disgust at the proskynesis practised in the Persian monarchy and the treating of the Persian king as a god, as he saw it (Paneg. 151), though perhaps his attitude had softened in the decades since that speech.

Isocrates' position is probably that of the average rational man of his day for whom much of the religious belief of the past had become meaningless. 'So sind Begriffe wie ιερατος bei ihm völlig entleert, während σωτηρ und ευεργετης nach wie vor rein menschlich gewandt bleiben.'12 However, his use of these terms in his writings on monarchy brought them into the vocabulary of works similar to his that were to follow. There, their meaning could well be more ambiguous.

XENOPHON

Après avoir exposé, dans la "Cyropédie" et la "Vie d'Agésilas", ses conceptions sur la royauté idéale nourrie uniquement d'humanité, Xénophon certifie, dans son "Économique", que le monarque, pour commander avec efficacité, doit être doué d'une qualité divine qui subjugue ses sujets lorsqu'ils le regardent.13

11 Taeger, 'Isokrates', p.357.
12 Taeger, Charisma I, p.125.
This account of Xenophon's variations in approach highlights the fact that in him we find the same contradiction as appears in Isocrates between an analysis of a situation in human and political terms without any outside influence, and the temptation to see the ruler on a different level from his subjects and deriving his authority from that fact. Yet Xenophon is far more concerned with details of administration than is Isocrates. The training of troops, improvement of a state's economy and so on are topics which he goes into thoroughly, and even in analysing the factors making up the ideal king, his concern is with the concrete expression of virtue.

Xenophon is very much aware, nonetheless, that his heroes are exceptional men, and they exist in large measure abstracted from society, since Xenophon does not show us the structure of the community they are to lead. Leaders are those who have an inborn love of honour and praise, who differ most among men from the beasts of the field, and who are to be considered 'men' and no longer mere humans (Hieros 7.3). This is not as precise as we could wish, and yet it is in the tradition of Greek attitudes on the elevating effect of praise and honour, and the need to strive to attain these and in this way achieve whatever immortality might be possible for one who was still, after all, a man. Immortality is still seen as unattainable, and so the jester Philip can say οὔτε γὰρ ἔγωγε στουδάσας ἄν δυναμὴν μᾶλλον ἦπερ ἄθραντος γενέσθαι (Sym. 1.15).

Divine warrant is assumed for rule in general, and prayer and sacrifice to the gods precede any decision made by a ruler, especially in the Cyropaedia. More than this, however, Xenophon shows the leader in any situation obtaining this position with the consent, if not the active involvement, of the gods (Anab. 7.7.22). A ruler such as Agesilaus is praised by various groups of people in personal terms, glorifying his possession of such qualities as 'being devoted to his family', 'being an unfailing friend', a 'champion' of the oppressed and — significant for our purposes — for his friends in danger 'a saviour second to the gods' (Ages. 11.13). Taeger finds that 'behalten auch die alten Begriffe σωτήρ und εὐεργέτης bei ihm ihre ursprünglichen Inhalte unverändert', and yet it is important that the connection of saving

14 Taeger, Charisma I, p.120.
acts with a ruler who is close to the gods has been made clear.

Xenophon is too down-to-earth and practical to go further than this and venture on comparisons of divine and kingly rule, or suggest that a ruler should model himself on the king of the gods. He prefers to emphasize the divine or heroic origins of rulers like Agesilaus who counted Hercules among his ancestors (Ages. 1.2). The kings of Sparta offered the public sacrifices because they themselves were ἀνὸ θεοῦ (Lac. 15.2). Xenophon does claim, too, that the gods cause particular honour and favour to dance attendance on a ruler (Hier. 8.5) without explaining exactly what this means.

On one occasion he goes so far as to suggest that the laws of Lycurgus had, as the object of the regulations on the honours paid to dead kings, the wish to show ὅτι ὦ ἥ άνθρώπους ἄλλ' ἦς ἠρως τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς προτετμηκαί (Lac. 15.9). That ruling bore some intrinsic relationship to divinity Xenophon was prepared to admit, but as Taeger has noted, over-emphasis on this point would not accord well with his belief in the duty of rulers to display the piety and humility of a mere man when they wished to obtain the favour of the gods, although such contradictions are not always absent from his work.¹⁵

Several expressions in Xenophon, although in themselves restrained, point the way ahead. The capacity to rule over men who serve willingly he describes as godlike (Oec. 21.12) and this is one of a number of positions described in this way. 'Dieses θεού wurzelt aber nicht in der alten charismatischen Sphäre, sondern in der Seelenlehre des Sokrates-schülers', says Taeger,¹⁶ yet this title is not lightly given and its association with the business of government can hardly be accidental. Perhaps we may take as Xenophon's considered conclusion the remark he puts into the mouth of Simonides: ἐνολγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἐκ θεῶν τυμή τῆς καὶ χάρις συμπαρέπεσθαν ἀνδρὶ ἄρχοντι (Hier. 8.5).

¹⁵ For an account of the conflict between Xenophon's old-fashioned piety and his fitful bursts of rationalism, see Taeger, Charisma I, pp.118-20.
¹⁶ Taeger, Charisma I, p.119.
ARISTEAS

In the Letter to Philocrates we find no theories of outstanding semi-divine individuals, no ἐαυτῶν ἀνήρ who appears in the person of the king. Instead the stress is all on the role of the king as God's deputy on earth. The position is clearly a very important one, but it is not described in exaggerated language. Simply, the king is chosen for his post, which involves care for the welfare, temporal and spiritual, of his subjects.

This attitude owes more to the Jewish than the Greek influence. It is the oriental view of kingship, with the emphasis on the ruler's sacredness much weakened by the fact that kingship developed late among the Jews and was clearly viewed as a dubious improvement by those who recorded it. 'I will not rule and my son shall not rule among you' says Gideon, when offered the kingship of his people (Judges 8.23). Judges certainly are specifically called upon to be saviours, endowed with the spirit of Yahweh (Judges 3.9-11), but the exalted personality of the judge is the last of his claims to sovereignty.

The request for a king in the First Book of Samuel, 'give us a king to rule over us, like the other nations' (1 Sam. 8.5), is shown as a spurning of Yahweh's rule, and the disadvantages of monarchy are vividly described (1 Sam. 8.11-18). The advent of monarchy is recorded favourably in some sources, however, and a mystique of kingship can be found, contrasting the beneficent order under a king with the days when 'there was no king in Israel; every man did that which was right in his own eyes' (Judges 17.6; 18.1; 19.1; 21.25). However, 'the first objections to monarchy as such seem to date from the eighth century'.

17 C.R. North, 'The Old Testament Estimate of the Monarchy', The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures, 48 (1931), suggests that accounts hostile to monarchy were the product of a time, probably in the eighth century, when the Jews were becoming disillusioned with the institution of monarchy from their own experience (see p.1ff.).

18 Erwin R. Goodenough, 'Kingship in Early Israel', Journal of Biblical Literature, 48 (1929), pp.182-3, believes that 'while the judge-ruler is described in royal language throughout, he lacks any claim to personal pre-eminence.... The judges rule simply as God's agents, and their dignity seems not to have involved the overshadowing of their subjects with their personal manifestations of royalty'.

and frequently they emphasized the evil of rulers' making claims to
divine or quasi-divine honours.20

There is in Aristeas no hint of any alternative form of political
life to kingship, much less of any 'levelling' suggestions about the
equality of all men under God. Such views would hardly have met with
approval from those who supported the Ptolemies. Aristeas does nonethe­
less give a different stress from that of theories already existing
which made the king superhuman in his own right and not simply as the
intermediary of the deity.

Ptolemy is told that it is God who maintains the prosperity of his
kingdom (15), for He is the Master and Creator of the universe (16).
Ptolemy himself is shown acknowledging that God has preserved his
kingdom in peace with the greatest glory throughout the entire world
(37). Because he has been granted this gift and this trust, the king
has a heavy responsibility. He has not, after all, been selected at
random, but on the basis of ethical criteria: 'God has given you
supreme responsibility as your value deserves' (θεῷ δόντος σοι καταξίως
τῶν τρόπων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, 219). There is little suggestion, however,
that the qualities sought from rulers were to be charismatic. This
selection of the ruler concerns God alone, and Aristeas does not imply
that popular approval had been sought and obtained, even at the most
superficial level.

God, furthermore, allots glory and great riches to kings (224) and
no-one is king by his own will alone, for 'kingship is a gift of God'
(ib., cf. 'Power is a gift to you from the Lord, Sovereignty is from the
Most High' — Wisdom 6.3). Many of the qualities required of a king are
also described as gifts of God; to make oneself agreeable to everybody
is to have received a free gift from God, the best (225). So too love,
the power of piety, is a gift of God (229). To be a performer of good
deeds and not the opposite is also δώρον θεῷ (231). These are only the
most obvious expressions of the belief that God is the source of the
disposition that enables the king to attain to personal excellence and
to perform his special royal duties.

20 See on this J.M. Powis Smith, 'Traces of Emperor-Worship in the
Old Testament', The American Journal of Semitic Languages and
The king is not without a pattern to follow in God, since gentleness (188) and mercy and indulgence even to faults (207-8) are attributes of God. Elsewhere, Aristeas describes God ruling the world with clemency and without the least anger and the king is advised to imitate Him in these respects (254).\textsuperscript{21} Such imitation may just as easily be referred to as 'following the law', that is, the laws and the divine command are complementary, the former, indeed, derived from the latter. In the most basic matters of government, the divine model is to guide the king. This is so too in his performance as a benefactor and saviour of his people. There need not be a particularly strong religious significance in these titles, but even Schubart, who, in 'Das hellenistische Königslisteal', treats them in connection with the mortal and not the divine or heroic aspects of the king, admits that 'freilich kann es nicht gelingen, reinlich zu scheiden'.\textsuperscript{22} Certainly we can say that there are variations in meaning in the use of these words, from the physical preservation referred to in the advice to the king in choosing generals who will save their men (281), to the preservation and even improvement of men's lives described as brought about by lawgivers, and the suggestion that the king should save human life (279, 292).

The king's role as benefactor is related specifically to God's in two of his replies: the king, in drawing to him the affection of his subjects by his beneficence will be following God's example, 'for He is the universal benefactor' (ὁ θεὸς θάνατος αὐτῶς ἁγαθῶν ἔστη, 205). Again, a sage tells the king: 'Just as God is the benefactor of all men, so you imitating him make yourself the benefactor of your subjects' (281). The language is relatively restrained, but there is no doubt that such a role makes the ruler especially close to God.

Aristeas has no hesitation in proclaiming that, for all this, the king remains a man (263). The king's superiority is real, but based firmly on his excellence. He is urged to surpass all men by the bright-
ness of his soul (16) as he does by his gentleness and humanity; these also are gifts of God (290). This is in line with the trend we have observed so far in our writers, for rule to be justified on ethical grounds. The king must render his account, however, to God alone who gives him power. Hence his relationship to God, though not granting him super-human status, is part of what it means to be a king and shows religion to be one important basis of monarchy.

HELENISTIC INFLUENCES

Of the various cultural influences at work in the fourth century in areas of Greek rule, not all favoured the conversion of the kingly office into a sacred or divine position. Nor did those people who wished for various reasons to surround monarchy with a religious glow all understand the same thing by this. One could also oppose extraordinary honours being paid to a ruler on conservative religious grounds or for rationalistic reasons. The devout Greek who took to heart Pindar's warning on the folly of attempting to become immortal would be affronted by the claims of a mere mortal, however high his position, to be worshipped alongside the traditional gods.

One who questioned the whole framework of Greek religious belief would rather be inclined to scoff at aspirations to divinity in a ruler, though he might be willing to accede to a ruler's demands for recognition as divine for political reasons. Such a person was, however, likely to turn to an alternative explanation of why a ruler should have a special relationship with the gods to that given by the king. Indeed, most thoughtful men might well believe that a ruler's moral excellence could alone exalt him, and would eschew the more extravagant and mystical accounts of the king's position.

The piety of the old-fashioned, however, was no longer sufficiently strongly rooted to be an efficient opposition weapon, and 'entscheidend ... ist ... die Tatsache, dass die staatlichen Kulte, aber auch die Volksreligion durch Geschichte und Aufklärung so weit zersetzt sind, dass sie keinen unüberwendlichen Widerstand mehr gegen Missbrauch zu leisten vermögen und Formeln gestatten, gegen die echte Religiosität sich
leidenschaftlich auflehnen musste'. There were no doubt many who were willing and even eager to fill the gap left by the decline of traditional beliefs with worship of a ruler about whose existence and power there could be no doubt, and political theorists could not ignore this trend.

The Stoics and Epicureans had no objection in principle to elevating men to heroic status. Founders of philosophic schools, such as Epicurus himself, often received great honour after their deaths. But this does not mean that they approved of extending such recognition to monarchs, especially to those still alive. Philodemus records a saying of Chrysippus from the first book of his *πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον*, asserting that men are changed into gods (SVF 2.1076), but there is no such remark applied to rulers in particular. Yet benefactors of mankind, it seems, were especially suitable subjects for reverence, and indeed the Stoics accepted the doctrine of Euhemerus that deification of mortals who had helped their fellows was the origin of many of the members of the Greek pantheon. It is a stock Stoic theme that good men are godlike, and so once a monarch becomes accepted as the model of the good and beneficent man, he may also acquire such an attribute.

Polybius leaves on record his view that religion and belief in the gods and their punishments are useful tools for the statesman to obtain submissiveness from the populace (6.56). No doubt he would have

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23 Taeger, 'Isokrates', p.360.
24 On Epicurus and the reverence paid to him after death, see Weinreich, 'Antikes Gottmenschentum', p.643: 'Wie unwiderstehlich der Drang war, den Weisen in göttlichen Formen zu ehren, beweist nichts deutlicher als die Aufnahme solcher Formen durch den Garten Epikurs. In der Schule, die die alte Religion so entschieden bekämpfte, genoss das Schulhaupt selbst göttliche Ehren.'
25 On this point see Babut, *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, p.464: 'Il nous suffit de noter ici que le stoïcisme est en principe étranger à l'idée d'une divinisation d'êtres humains, mais que sa position sur ce point manque encore de netteté, moins sans doute par suite d'une hésitation à se prononcer, que par indifférence pour une idée qui ne menace nullement sa conception du divin et pourrait même au besoin s'y intégrer.'
26 And we must also take into account, as has already been suggested, that 'this rendering of divine honors to human beings while yet on earth was not an outgrowth of extreme superstition, but was made acceptable by the rationalistic attitude toward the gods current in educated circles of the time', A.E.R. Boak, 'The Theoretical Basis of the Deification of
accepted the ruler cult for the same reason, but we have no cause to believe that orthodox Stoics took such a blatantly pragmatic approach to the question. More commonly, we may believe, a moral and religious apology would be made for monarchy, with the utilitarian motive for defining it in religious terms hovering somewhere in the background.

The Pythagorean doctrine on honours paid to mortals seems to be revealed by the statement attributed to Pythagoras in the Life of Pythagoras of Iamblichus that friends were to be honoured like gods (V.P. 259). The Pythagoreans tended to narrow the gap between god and man, by talking of the three kinds of beings existing, gods, men and, in between, kings or, in one case, also wise men (Scholia on the Iliad, A 339-40a, Erbse, vol. 1, and A 340, Dindorf, vol. 3).

Our writers on kingship express a similar attitude. For Ecphantus, the king alone retains a connection with his divine origins that most men, weighed down by much earth, have lost (p.244). Diotogenes expresses the relationship of king to God in terms of the charge of men with which God has entrusted the king (p.266). More often, however, for these writers the king's imitation of God is significant. This imitation is more than an ideal; it is assumed to exist of necessity, as divine and human rule are parallel to each other. This is not surprising, says Ecphantus, as God, the best workman, himself fashioned the king, using himself as archetype (pp.272 and 245). Diotogenes explains this correspondence between God and king in terms of the kingdoms each rules. As God has power in the cosmos, so has the king in the polis, and as polis is to cosmos, so the king is to God. Thus the king's rule, like God's, is unexamined (p.265).

Sthenidas claims that the king's possession of wisdom means that he will be an imitator and emulator of the first God (p.270). The imitation, that is, takes an essentially ethical form. Diotogenes too


27 'La théorie du droit divin de la monarchie est bien exprimée dans la phrase: ο δέδωκεν ο θεός αὐτῷ τὸν ἀγεμονίαν' comments Louis Delatte. He adds that this concept of divine right 'apparaît souvent chez les théoriciens, surtout à partir de l'époque impériale' and sees it viewed as a welcome alternative to granting the king divine status (Les Traités, p.262).
emphasizes that the king's majesty is the quality by which he imitates divinity (pp.267 and 268). The very institution of monarchy is an imitation of the divine order (p.270). One of the main tasks of the king is cultivating the gods (pp.264-5), since the best must be honoured by the best (p.265). In the opinion of Ecphantus, the king passes on to his subjects for imitation the character he has acquired while imitating God (pp.277-8) so that all men will, even indirectly, have some share in the divine nature. The only limitation on the king's divinity is the recognition that there are other, more divine, beings than he (p.274). This in fact restricts the king's activities very little since he is the interpreter of the divine mandate. His authority is derived then not so much from his position in the state as from his links with the supreme ruler of the universe.

CICERO

In the introduction to the De Republica Cicero makes a clear connection between the earthly civitas and the divinely-organized cosmos: 'There is nothing in which human excellence approaches more closely to the godhead than founding new states or preserving those already founded' (1.12).\(^2\) This grants a considerable religious significance to such founders or preservers, while not directly suggesting that they may make any exceptional claim to being no longer merely human. Even in the De Oratore a similar note had been sounded when Cicero declared that the art of oratory was the gift of a divinity (even though unaided nature bestowed on man a great capacity for it), so that id ipsum, quod erat hominis proprium, non partum per nos sed divinitus ad nos delatum videretur (De Orat. 1.202). A great man does not lightly lay down the munus humanum adsignatum a deo (De Rep. 6.15).

The individual who is to save the state and almost, it seems, interrupt the decline of the forms of government (a decline described as inevitable for all forms but the mixed one) can be described as paene

\(^2\) Pöschl, after mentioning Plato, Rep. 500b-c, comments: 'Das ist die Vergöttlichung des Menschen, die Cicero für den wahren politischen Führer beansprucht.' He goes on to compare this idea to that expressed in Plato, Laws 708d (Römischer Staat, p.183, note 110).

\(^2\)a The heroic honours offered to founders of cities had prepared the ground for this development. See, e.g., Thuc. 5.11 on honours given to Brasidas as second founder of Amphipolis, and Demos. 19.20 on the cult in honour of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the liberators (and in some sense second founders?) of Athens.
divinus (De Rep. 1.45). This reinforces the high value that was put on government itself at the beginning of the De Republica, but also shows that praise can be bestowed on a person who is noteworthy in being outside the traditional structure. Elsewhere the art of good government (ratio civilis et disciplina populum) and the right character (bona ingenia) together bring about incredibilis quaedam et divina virtus (De Rep. 3.4).

Because not all men are able to interpret the divine will in matters of government, only some chosen souls will be entitled to these descriptions, but they are bestowed on man as such in Stoic thought because of mankind's share of reason: Est igitur, quoniam nihil est ratione melius, eaque (est) et in homine et in deo, prima homini cum deo rationis societas (De Leg. 1.23). Thus die Natur des Menschen und die Natur des Staates werden weder aus der Idee des Guten abgeleitet, noch konstruktiv nach der Verwirklichung der vier Kardinaltugenden bestimmt, in denen sich Natur und Arete des Menschen und der menschlichen Gemeinschaft erfüllen, sondern dem stoischen Naturbegriff untergeordnet in der Weise, wie es das erste Buch von De legibis zeigt, das auf die ausführliche Behandlung in de rep. ausdrücklich zurückverweist (leg. I.27).²⁹

Hercules as the hero is an example of the rank ascribed to the benefactors of humanity whose souls are not merely immortal but divine (De Leg. 2.27; cf. De Off. 3.25 and the mention of Herculem illum quem hominem fama beneficiorum memor in concilio caelestium collocauit). These accounts are generally of an a-political type, not bound strictly to a particular form of government, but, by their emphasis on the individual, they predispose us to see kingship as the obvious equivalent in the political sphere.³⁰

This becomes even more likely when we consider the reward promised to Scipio (in Book Six of the De Republica) and likewise to all those who patriam conservaverint, adiuverint, auxerint (6.13). Scipio himself

²⁹ Ib., p.151.

³⁰ Cf. De Nat. Deor. 2.62: Suscepit autem vita hominum consuetudoque communis ut beneficiis excellentis viros in caelum fama ac voluntate tollerent. Hinc Hercules hinc Castor et Pollux ... hinc etiam Romulus, ... quorum cum remanerent animi atque aeternitatis fruereuntur, rite di sunt habiti cum et optimi essent et aeterni.
is told deum te igitur scito esse (De Rep. 6.26) but here he is addressed as a rational being, not as leader, and the close connection between state service and an immortal destiny that Cicero generally maintains is broken. Scipio is divine si quidem est deus qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit et moderatur et movet id corpus cui praepositus est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps deus (ib.).

What Cicero emphasizes is the command exercised by mind, and he is not especially concerned with whether an internal agent or a deity separate from man has control. Still, such language can easily be applied to the political sphere, though the topic here is religious and teleological. In this sense, we can see how the life of the civitas is an example which may be applied to the microcosm of man or the macrocosm of the universe, but which may in its turn be influenced by these spheres. The result is that, throughout, rule is hallowed and its various forms intertwined.

Political argument takes on a new dimension when, in the assimilation of the divine and the human, God is described in terms appropriate to the leading figure in the Roman state. Cicero refers to God as magister et imperator, legis huius (i.e. the true law, right reason) inventor, disceptator, lator (De Rep. 3.33). The citizen of the world, aware of the nature of reality, will grasp ipsum ea moderantem et regentem (deum) (De Leg. 1.61), or will perhaps prefer to believe that the divine form of government is aristocratic: sit igitur ... persuasum civibus dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores deos (De Leg. 2.15). This is, however, far less common.

Cicero uses the argument that, as there is kingship among the gods, so there should be among men, as part of the philosophical justification of monarchical government. He refers to Jove quem unum omnium deorum et hominum regem esse omnes docti indocitique consentiunt (De Rep. 1.56). Cicero may not have intended this argument to be decisive (he even admits that this belief about the deity may be erroneous) and Lepore rightly stresses also how unrelated theory and practice could be at this time. For Lepore, 'piuttosto sembra evidente nel nostro passo l'intonazione e il carattere teoretico più che politico-prammatico del motivo', and he emphasizes the various sources available:
In *De Rep.* I,56 la giustificazione teologico-cosmologica della monarchia ci riconnette a tutta una tradizione greca che comincia con il tardo Platone, e con l'Aristotele platonizzante, combinandosi con elementi non platonici o addirittura pre-platonici, e sfociando in quelle correnti cinico-stoiche, peripatetiche e neopitagoriche.31

What we find in Cicero's works on political philosophy is a willingness to use arguments from various traditions to show the relationship existing between the man leading his country well as an individual and the divine order which grants him special favour. However far this speculation was removed from political reality, the theory at least was important, and showed how ready Cicero was to import religious sentiment and atmosphere into his political thought.

PHILO

The first impression Philo gives us of his views on man's relation to God in his introduction to his exposition of the laws, *De Opificio Mundi*, is when he says that man is patterned after God's image. Here we are shown mankind as a whole without any consideration of differences in individuals. Basing himself on the text ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἶκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὀνομάσων (Gen. 1.26), Philo develops a view of the world which sees it as a progression from God through his *Logos* to spiritual man made according to this *Logos*, that is to say, divine reason. Man as he actually is has a spirit unhappily compounded with a body which provides the earthy, less exalted element. Man's union with and at the same time separation from the divine as a result of this combination is a common theme in Philo:

κάς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ψυχείστατον λόγῳ θείῳ, τῆς μακρὰς φύσεως ἐμμαγεῖτον ἤ ἄποθεσμά ἢ ἀπαύγασμα γεγονός, κατὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κατασκευὴν ἁπάντε τῷ κόσμῳ (*Opif.* 146).

God breathed into man the divine breath, which was a sort of colony of his blessed and fortunate nature sent here for the help of our race, so that man is both mortal and immortal (*Opif.* 135). This is a very similar sentiment to that of Ecphantus who describes men thus: Ἐπὶ δὲ γὰς ἄνθρωποι ἄφρεκτοι, hardly able to rise from mother earth αἱ

This vision of man seeks to elevate humanity above its apparently 'material' state. The elevation comes, not from an individual's own virtues or efforts, but from outside, divine intervention. Nevertheless, the endowments of some men are exceptional, and reflect a particular relationship between them and God. There are, after all, two kinds of men, the heavenly and the earthly. The heavenly, in as much as it is made in the image of God, has no part at all in the mortal and earthly reality. Although this sometimes refers to the ideal man or the disembodied soul of man, it can also refer to the wise, for whom heaven is the true home and who have, even on earth, risen above their surroundings (see Conf. 77-8).

Those in whom the divine element predominates are of course the patriarchs of Israel, whose authority derives from the divine mandate granted them because of their excellence. The source of their authority is, for Philo, God, directly intervening in the affairs of men. In a general sense, without God's directing care the business of kings and subjects cannot go aright (Vit. Mos. 2.5) but specifically this means that the king is one who non ab hominibus, sed a deo ordinatus sit (QG 4.76). Moses too is the elect of God (Legat. 50).

Philo repeats the common theme that it is just for the better part to rule always and everywhere and for the worse to be ruled (LA 1.72), and as the good is scarce and the evil abundant, it is hard to find a single wise man while of inferior men there is a countless multitude (LA 1.102). The good man's portion is then the whole world, and hence he becomes a partner with God and can even be described in the same way (Vit. Mos. 1.157-8, cf. 1.155). Moses received the authority which the people willingly gave him, with the sanction and assent of God (βραβεύοντος καὶ ἐπινικύοντος θεοῦ, Vit. Mos. 1.163). Joseph, appointed to a high position in Pharaoh's court, claims that not the action of his brothers but God was the cause of his present position: he is a ἕπιρετης καὶ διάκονος to administer boons and gifts for mankind (Jos. 241).

Philo does not often describe rulers as the counterpart of God on earth; he prefers to give a prescription to them of how they should...
behave, rather than consider their metaphysical position. One exception
is the fragment preserved by Antonius Monarchus [= Migne P.G. 36 765ff.]
where the king's authority makes him like God. Yet though he is here
δομολος and an εἰκὼν θείκη this is how mankind in general is often
described by Philo (e.g. in Opif. 69).32 In this case, however, the
king alone is the highest thing there is on earth and so his element of
divinity is higher than most people's. (For a description that is in
some ways comparable to this, see LA 3.82, where Melchizedek, the
priest-king, has the Really Existent as his portion and thinks about Him
in a way that is 'high, exalted and sublime'.)

The mystic interpretation suggested here is not so much a part of a
philosophy of kingship as the temporary ascription to the monarch of a
role that Philo more commonly granted to Jewish patriarchs, examples for
the rest of mankind, or to good men who followed the Royal Road (see
e.g. Immut. 159-60). Nonetheless, Philo does use the three-tiered
structure that goes from God to the father of a household by way of the
political figure of the king, thus showing the continuing power of such
an image. These parallels discovered in the universe satisfy the
need for order even when, as here, the point being made is about the
nature of God: as parents are in their families to children, so is a
king to a city and God to the cosmos: ὁ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς συγγενεῖσιν πρὸς
tέκνα γονεῖς, τοῦτο βασιλεὺς μὲν πρὸς πόλιν, πρὸς δὲ κόσμων ὁ θεὸς
(Provid. 2.3). It is not surprising to find, then, that just as the
king may borrow titles from private life and become, as we have seen,
the father of his people, so too he may borrow a divine title and be
princeps principum, iaeque divinum, et rex regum, optimus et generosus
(QG 4.76). He can be described as universal father — πατὴρ κοινός — a
title commonly given to Zeus (Spec. Leg. 4.184), and can even, as with
Moses, be called 'god and king of the whole nation' (Vit. Mos. 1.158).
These titles do not in fact constitute an acknowledgement of the ruler's
divinity, but certainly kingship seems to need a greater than human
power animating it in order to function efficiently.

32 As Isaak Heinemann comments of the comparison, Philons griechische
und jüdische Bildung (Breslau 1929-1932, reprinted Olms, Hildesheim,
Weise, Op.m. 69 nebeneinander.'
In the Life of Abraham, Philo, discussing the wise man, compares his position to so many other roles, including the one of ruler, that, although the general point he wishes to make is clear, no one item on the list can be considered, by the mere fact of its presence there, to have a special connection with kingship. Truly, says Philo, the wise man is the first of the human race, as a pilot in the ship, or a ruler in the city, or again as a soul in the body or the mind in the soul, or once again heaven in the world or God in heaven (Abr. 272). The king may be first in his world as God in the whole universe, but he shares his pre-eminence with experts in less elevated situations. His value then cannot be assessed simply in terms of the comparison, nor can his relationship to God.

A more personal approach sees the monarch as saviour of his people, a role which may be limited to providing material benefits and protection from an enemy, but which may also come to have a religious significance when the king 'saves' because of his close connection with the deity. This could be so only when God already had a clearly-defined salvific function, and for Philo this was so in two senses. God was a preserver of what he had made (see QC 4.130) and also, as Bréhier says, Philo 'y joint (i.e. to the Stoic idea) le sens mystique du dieu libérateur'. When this term is applied to a king, the general sense of 'caring for a people' predominates. This may be an attribute applied to any individual who has protected the state, but when Philo records the sentiments that people had expressed at the accession of Gaius while he was still regarded as ὁ σωτήρ καὶ ἐυεργέτης (Legat. 22) the titles in this context suggest a more than human excellence.

This is quite different from suggesting that the ruler be deified. What Philo approves of is of the kind of reputation as a ruler that Augustus had earned; he was πρῶτος καὶ μέγιστος καὶ κοινὸς ἐυεργέτης (Legat. 149). The king is encouraged to imitate the divine virtues and in this way come close to God: ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαι προσήκει τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς ἀρχονταῖς, εἰ γέ τις αὐτῶς φροντίς ἐστιν ἐξομολόγεται τῆς πρὸς θεὸν (Spec. Leg. 4.188), and such imitation means doing good to the

subjects, as well as enabling them to have a God-like model to work from. Moses, for example,

καθάπερ τε γραφὴν ἐν δεόντου γυμνημένην ἐαυτὸν καὶ τὸν ἐαυτοῦ
βῶν εἰς μέσον προσαγών πάγκαλον καὶ θεοειδές ἐργὸν ἑστηκε
παράδειγμα τοῖς ἐθέλουσι μιμεῖσθαι (Vit. Mos. 1.158).

Although for Philo monarchical government often turns out to be a
description used metaphorically for the rule of reason in the soul, this
does not mean that we should take notice only of those cases where king-
ship in the 'true' public sense is meant. Since monarchical rule is
interrelated at all levels, and the divine government provides a guide
and pattern for them all, this shows us once more that 'government' in
Philo has no independent existence.35

SENeca

The most noteworthy element in Seneca's attitude to men and his
view of what made some worthy of more honour than others is his profound
respect for the Stoic wise man. Seneca does not himself divide up man-
kind into the wise and foolish in quite as dogmatic a fashion as the
early Stoics did — motivated in this partly perhaps by some uncertainty
as to where he should place himself! — yet he is clear on two points:
the wise man is a rare creature, and he rises by his wisdom far above
his mortal nature. In one of his more moderate expressions of this
belief Seneca describes how there is friendship between good men and
gods due to the harmonizing power of virtue (conciliante virtute, Prov.
1.5). The rareness in itself implies that the wise or good man stands

34 'Nous retrouvons ici le parallélisme que nous avons signalé à
plusieurs reprises entre la religion des mystères et la soteriologie

35 This attitude, according to Heinemann, is typical of Judaic
thinkers of the time: 'Wenn die Propheten zugleich der Religion wie der
Erhaltung des geliebten Staates Rechnung trugen, wenn der rein
hellenische Staatsbegriff sich durch die Einbeziehung der religiö-
sittlichen Ideale in die politische Sphäre vom römischen fühlbar abhob,
aber doch den Machtgedanken und die geschichtliche Wirklichkeit im Auge
behielt, saugt in den beiden jüdischen Theorien der hellenistischen
Zeit, der palästinischen wie der alexandrinischen, das Ethische und
Religiöse gleichsam das Politische völlig auf' (Philons griechische und
jüdische Bildung, pp.201-2).

35a In this, he was of course following on from developments in Stoicism
since the time of Panaetius, if not before.
out from his fellows as a matter of course. It is not often that magna et excedentia solitum ac vulgarem modum ... gignuntur (Const. Sap. 7.1), as he says to Serenus, almost granting the latter's point on the difficulty of finding any example of the Stoic sage. Such a person, however, may be said to be free of the laws governing human nature (Brev. Vit. 15.5). Because of this all ages are at his service as at a god's, and he is not bound by the constraints of time (ib.).

This may be taken as mere hyperbole, but more significant is the actual relationship of the good and wise man to the deity. We have mentioned that Seneca believed friendship existed between the two, but he also saw kinship here. The good man is god's pupil, imitator and true offspring (discipulus eius aemulatorque et vera progenies — Prov. 1.5). This is because of necessitudo et similitudo (ib.). The wise man has been brought into proximity to God (he is in vicinum deo perduotus, Cons. ad Helv. 5.2). Elsewhere Seneca repeats this with heavier emphasis: the wise man is vicinus proximusque dis, and, apart from the fact that he is mortal, is similis deo (Const. Sap. 8.2, and note Ep. 65.24 on the parallel between God and the soul).

Seneca then has no basic objection to making the similarity between men — at least some men — and God as close as possible, and though the wise man is of course pious, his godlike self-sufficiency comes from his own efforts more than from the assistance of the deity. The ascent of the soul is significant as much because man is thereby raising himself above the human as because it leads to union with God. These examples show that Seneca subscribed to a view which could quite easily grant reverence to a mortal, and hence there is no absolute bar to his accepting that a ruler could also occupy a position which made him like God.

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36 In some way man can even be said to be superior to the gods if he is wise. See Marion Altman, 'Ruler Cult in Seneca', CPh, 33 (1938), p.202 and Epp. 53.11 and 73.14.

37 Where the ruler was the object, scepticism about claims to divine status might just as easily result in 'going along with' the contemporary attitudes. Note Taeger's comment on Seneca, Charisma II (Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1960), p.502: 'Seine Ablehnung und Skepsis verhindern freilich nicht, dass er dort, wo er durch gesellschaftlich-politische Rücksichten gebunden ist, oder wo er seinen eigenen Vorteil verfolgt, sich der üblichen Formeln rückhaltlos bedient.'
In some respects the language used for the king's situation is like that used of the wise man. Seneca describes the ruler asking himself: *egone ex omnibus mortalibus placui electusque sum, qui in terris deorum vice fungerer?* (Clem. 1.1.2). This deputizing for God becomes increasingly stressed in writings from this period on, and is associated with the idea of the ruler as one sent to imitate on earth the rule of the gods. This divine government is sometimes seen as held by Zeus, sometimes described in general terms as a higher rule, parallel and analogous to kingly rule. As imitation occurs only if there is an essential similarity in form between the model and the imitator, monarchy alone can reproduce on earth government corresponding to that most obvious among the gods.

A monarch has therefore the duty of interpreting the deity to his subjects – *optime hoc exemplum principi constituam, ad quod formetur, ut se talem esse civibus, quales sibi deos velit* (Clem. 1.7.1). The comparison here acknowledges the power of the gods over the ruler, but does so fairly superficially. The message seems to be simply: 'do unto men as you would have the gods do unto you'. Seneca does not here suggest that the ruler himself is divine, although this is certainly suggested in other parts of the *De Clementia*. Seneca sees the citizens thanking Nero for the benefits he has brought them, and Seneca himself refers to the ideal king as one who bears himself in a godlike manner (*qui se ex deorum natura gerit*), who is beneficent and generous and uses his power for better ends (Clem. 1.19.9). The king, like the gods, cannot descend from his lofty eminence (Clem. 1.8.3). When Seneca writes of the 'divine hand' of Claudius in the *Consolatio ad Polybiun*, flattery is probably dictating his choice of words (*Cons. ad Polyb. 13.2; cf. 14.2, divina auctoritas*), but we can agree with Altman that although it is rather difficult to understand Seneca's view of emperor-worship from the scattered passages where he specifically mentions it, his Stoic doctrine of the Δεος άνήρ is clear and predominant. He has so completely torn down the barrier between god and man that the transition is an easy matter.

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38 Cf. Ben. 3.15.4: *Generosi animi est et magnifici iuware, prodesse; qui dat beneficia, deos imitatur.*

39 Altman, 'Ruler Cult in Seneca', p.201.
In this sense, it is perfectly reasonable for Seneca to conclude *deum esse* (Augustum) *non tantum iussi credimus* (*Clem. 1.10.3*), since Augustus has shown by his deeds that he merits the title. The ruler appears performing his proper task *deorum ... sibi animum adserens* (*Clem. 1.5.7*). Seneca does not go into detail in propounding a theory of the distribution of divine blessings via the king but he does hint at such a notion in his description of the ruler as *spiritus vitalis* (*ille est enim vinculum, ... ille spiritus vitalis, quem haec tot milia tradunt, Clem. 1.4.1*). At the same time we can recall, as Delatte notes, that 'un des portraits les plus enthousiastes qu'en (i.e. of the sage) a tracés Sénèque ... contient bien des traits qui rappellent les qualités qu’Echphante attribue au roi'.

The wise man is here the one who *aderit levabitque (nos) si colere eam (faciem) voluerimus* (*Ep. 115.5*). On the other hand Seneca can also describe the effect of Claudius on his secretary Polybius in the following similar terms: *quotiens lacrimae suboriuntur oculis tuis, totiens illos in Caesarem derige; sticabuntur maximi et clarissimi conspectu numinis* (*Cons, ad Polyb. 12.3*). The divine power held by the ruler is *gregatim ac publice servare* (*Clem. 1.26.5*).

Seneca is however aware of the limitations on this divinity. He refers to the bereavements of the Caesars, which show that 'not even they who are said to be born from gods and to be destined to give birth to gods can have the same power over their own fortunes as they have over the fortunes of others' (*Cons, ad Marc. 15.1*). For Augustus this meant that *nemo magis ex omnibus mortalibus hominem esse se, dum inter homines erat, sensit* (*Cons, ad Polyb. 15.3*).

The role that the *princeps* was called upon to play was one given to him by God (see e.g. *Clem. 1.1.2*), whereas the wise man's situation was largely achieved by his own efforts. For both, however, it could be said that *si cui virtus animusque in corpore praesens, hic deos aequat, illo tendit originis suae memor* (*Ep. 92.29*). All men after all can ultimately trace their origin back to the gods (*Ep. 44.1*) and social status does not, at least in this case, come into the matter (see *Ep. 31.11*).

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Because of his position, the king is elevated to a near-divine status at one moment, yet the next, when Seneca's Stoicism gains the upper hand, he is only one of many men who are potentially divine because of their possession of reason. Still, Seneca comes close to investing the king, like the wise man, with mystical powers. In all these instances, then, he avoids facing the reality of political life, either by assimilating the king to some other figure, or by disguising his powers under a mantle of qualities that resemble God's.

MUSONIUS RUFUS

Musonius Rufus makes no extravagant claims for the king as incarnation or representative of divinity. All he suggests is that the king should be a true imitator of Zeus in his care for his subjects (p.283). Whereas any man with self-control has dignity, such a quality in a king makes him godlike and worthy of reverence (p.282). Godlike virtue Musonius elsewhere expects of all men, for he claims that man alone of all creatures on earth resembles God, having his virtues. So, when he lives as he ought he may well be considered like him; hence men of virtue are considered godlike (Stob., Flor., 117,8). Thus the king and the good man coalesce.

DIO CHRYSSOSTOM

In Dio's opinion the man excelling in virtue has a reasonable claim to rule others and make them better than they could be unaided. This implies that the main purpose of government is such improvement. The distinction accorded to the morally outstanding men and accepted by most philosophic schools of the time did not of itself however bolster the spiritual position of the ruler. But beliefs about the exalted existence after death of good men could be applied to kings who were examples of such goodness, and so we find this used as an incentive to encourage kings to virtue, as individuals, not as monarchs (3.54).

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41 See 2.71, kings should be taught το δεξιν ἀνθρώπων μὲν τῶν ὄμοιων κρείττονα φαινόμενον ἄρχειν, and note also 3.62.
It is only when the king's task becomes an act of salvation that a certain divine activity is associated with royalty, and for Dio the saving function is an important element of rule. A king rules because his superiority means that he must save his subjects. This may be on a physical or spiritual level, but for Dio the latter is obviously more important. Dio describes kings as deified for the safety of the realm, real guardians (κηδεμόνες) and good and righteous leaders of the people (32.26). But further on in this speech to the people of Alexandria he mocks those who apply the terms 'saviour' and 'god' to a pitiful human being (32.50). Only his behaviour can allow a ruler to claim such a title; in other words it does not come automatically with accession to the throne, at least in theory.

The ability to rule correctly comes from imitating the rule of the gods. This is more profound than a mere pious desire to act in a way pleasing to the gods; it implies a certain correlation between the heavenly and earthly kingdoms. Imitation of the greatest and first king and ruler of the universe (μεγίστου καὶ πρῶτου βασιλέως καὶ ἄρχοντος) is a duty particularly appropriate to kings who could rightly be called 'Zeus-nurtured' and like Zeus in counsel, as Homer says (1.37-8). In the First Discourse Dio devotes considerable space to an account of the divine administration of the universe to show an example to the earthly ruler. The imitation is not because the ruler is of a different species from his fellows. Mortals and those who administer the affairs of mortals have a duty to imitate Zeus and these classes are at least not suggested as being mutually exclusive. Dio constantly moves from consideration of the ruler bearing the responsibilities of the kingdom, to dwell on a citizen of the divine kingdom, and brings these two elements of his thought into formal harmony by explaining that any offence against the divinely-imposed order of the world is far greater and more evident to all when the ruler is the one erring (1.43).

Good kings are not produced as models of God without effort on their part. In the discourse on Homer Dio instances this for the case of Minos, called an associate and pupil (ἀδελφότης and μαθητής) of Zeus. Good kings in their turn, learning the kingly art, should 'shape their rule with an eye to (Minos), patterning their own conduct after a God', ἀφομοιοῦντας θεῷ τοῦ αὐτῶν τρόπον (53.11; cf. 1.38: 'practically all
good kings have been μαθηταὶ καὶ ζηλωταὶ of Zeus'). Minos also appears in the Fourth Discourse on kingship as the ideal imitator. The description δωτρεφεῖς and δυνατοῖ when applied to kings means that they receive the teaching and instruction called divine to help them in their work (4.41).

The precise way in which rulers are to imitate the deity is in ethical action, as the titles granted to God as king show. The king is advised to imitate the sun, which is a god, in doing his task without complaint (3.57; cf. 3.37). The king must in particular imitate its power and love of humanity (3.82). This link between god and king is straightforward and coincides with the duty of men to take up their position in the community of men and gods making up the cosmos.

To be sure, the ruler does possess a mandate for his special position. Dio sees this exemplified in Homer's description of the king 'to whom the son of Saturn gives the sceptre, making him the law-giver that he may rule the rest' (II. 2.205-6, cited in 1.11). This charge is, however, conditional on the king's showing virtue (1.12) but it appears to apply only to a monarchical form of government, since this alone parallels the divine form. Hence Dio refers to μακρὰ δαίμων Βασιλεία, Δίος βασιλέως ἐγγυός (1.73) and mentions 'that man, the ideal king' to whom God has apportioned the right to give orders only (3.8). Zeus' protection of the one possessing this power depends on the king's fulfilling the purpose of the mandate, which is 'helping mankind' (3.55).

Piety towards the gods is of course the first of virtues (1.15) but service of the gods is also a means of increasing the king's own importance: 'He believes in good spirits and demi-gods, which are the souls of good men who have cast off their mortal nature, and in conforming to this belief he does no small service to himself' (3.54). Here we have just a hint of the utilitarian function of religion for the

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42 See 1.39; 2.75; 36.31, 35 and 12.75.
43 Dio often mentions this fact. See 1.45 ἄτε οὕτω παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς ἔχοντων τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν (referring to kings) and 3.55 ἄτε ύπό τοῦ μεγάστου θεοῦ ταχεῖς ἐπὶ τούτο τὸ ἔργον. As Valdenberg points out ('La Théorie monarchique de Dion Chrysostome', pp.148-9), 'ce n'est pas dans toutes les formes de l'État que le gouvernement reçoit son pouvoir de Zeus, mais seulement dans la monarchie'.

royal regime, but unlike Isocrates and Cicero, Dio does not spell out the theory that the monarchy considered as the form of government prevailing among the gods gives the divine sanction to earthly monarchy (although he sometimes implies that it does), nor does he suggest that because men imagine monarchy to prevail among the gods this shows it as the highest form of rule that can be envisaged. Dio argues instead for the importance to good men of a belief in elevation to semi-divine status as a return for practising virtue. The king, as one type of the good man, will naturally expect to be one of those so rewarded. Hercules is the ideal here, as the hero who on earth had been entrusted by Zeus with the kingship of all mankind (1.84).

Not only does Dio show a monarch deriving his power from God, but he finds it reasonable to describe such rule in terms which link it clearly with divine rule, even where the theme of imitation does not appear. Trajan's power is second only to that of the gods (3.3). The happy and god-given polity he rules can best be illustrated from that government of the universe which is under the control of the first and best god (3.50); so, of the earthly ruler it can be said that if he is self-controlled and knows the royal art of Zeus, 'nothing prevents you (i.e. Trajan) being a son of Zeus' (4.21). The combination of the ethical and technical qualities in this quotation is typical of Dio. Indeed here the ethical excellence seems to produce the skill in the royal — and divine — art. A king who takes delight in bestowing benefits also reveals a quality bringing him close to the nature of the gods (2.26).

Dio does not properly face up to the fact of the ruler's authority as emissary from God, since he does not consider the risks of abuse of this claim. He hopes no doubt that that by his description the king will recognize what character a deputy of God should display, and act accordingly. He does not present to us the king in all his facets but only in those where he most resembles other good men striving for excellence and its rewards. His position differs from theirs only in its caring salvivic aspect which is also the basis of his special relationship to God.

44 So too those who possess virtue are represented as gods, heroes and demi-gods, and men like them are appointed kings and rulers on account of their goodness (69.1).
Plutarch is more disposed than Dio to argue boldly that between gods and men there exists another species of individuals, but he does not stress so much the waywardness of most men and derive from this the need for earthly rulers to be superhuman. They may still in fact be so, however, and in his Lives Plutarch provides examples of individuals who were clearly superior to their fellows, and he describes the love engendered in states and peoples for an individual because of his virtue as at once the strongest and most divine (821f).

What entitles such people to this respect is the fact that they have the special task of providing salvation; a ruler attends as a service of god to the care and safety of men (780d). He is a public blessing (κοινον δεικος), in other words he supplies many of the benefits also expected from the gods (779b). We note here the comparison of priests obtaining blessings from the gods with philosophers influencing rulers to make them more just, more moderate and more eager to do good (778f).

When Plutarch discusses the divine qualities which the ruler should imitate, we see that he has more than Dio to tell us of the way in which the king mirrors Zeus, for he does not merely describe the kingdom of gods and men and recommend that the ruler duplicate it like a good Stoic, by the exercise of virtues on his subjects' behalf. Instead he talks of the nature of the ruler's position in the universe as a whole. The monarchy is necessary so that the gifts and blessings bestowed by the gods may be rightly enjoyed, but not only kings but also law and justice are indispensable. These two elements of a good society depend, however, on the ruler because he is the image of God who orders all things (780e). This resemblance is due solely to the ruler's virtue, and Plutarch expands on this to show how it involves goodness and mercy (προσ τα καλα και φιλανθρωπον άρωμονουντας ένωνος, 781a). The ruler is God's metaphorical image and light (μυεμα και φεγγος) just as the sun

45 Cf. Aratus 14.3 where Plutarch records the verses inscribed to Aratus by the fellow-citizens whom he brought back from exile: δύνας δ’ ελπόν', "Αρατε, τεν νάστολο τυχόντες στάθαιεν αντι άρετας हो δικαλοσύνας σωτήρος σωτήρας θεος, δι οτι πατρίδι τα σφ δαμόνου θείαν τ’ ὁπασας εὔνομαν."
Zeus can be imitated by the king because he is in many of his manifestations a 'political' figure, as counsellor and protector of cities associated with Themis and Justice. The king in his turn becomes a model for others. He appears in the Life of Numa, for instance, providing by his life a shining example of virtue (ἐυδήλως παραδείγματι καὶ λαμπρῷ τῷ βίῳ, 20.8) enabling the many to imitate him to their profit. This obviates the need for naked power as an element in (theoretical) monarchical rule.

The source of the ruler's power is also, of course, God, who has given the ruler the charge of the rational and political swarm, and he can be said to have fulfilled his task if he produces 'quietness and tranquillity' (ἡσυχία καὶ πραΰτης) in the people (823f). The Lives give us instances of this 'call'. Romulus 28.2 describes how God sent Romulus for a certain length of time to perform his task of founding the city of Rome, destined to have the greatest authority and reputation. Plutarch also describes Alexander the Great as having come from God as harmonizer and reconciler — 'God sent him forth and then summoned him back' (Fort. Alex. 330d). This accords well with Plutarch's explanation, in his 'Advice to an Unlearned Prince', of the duties of the ruler, and whence these derive.

Numa is exhorted by his relations to consider kingship a service of God (Num. 6.2). Such a position can be a field for, among other things, worship of the gods and piety (ib.). The qualities of such 'servants of Zeus' are counsel, foresight, and ability in speaking (789d).

The ruler's participation in divine or semi-divine status must then be by this road of service. Plutarch defines clearly what it does not imply, and has no time for the adulation which the flatterers of Alexander bestowed on him and which Alexander himself encouraged (even though this may have been for propaganda reasons and not because he was himself convinced of his divinity, Alex. 27 and 28). The most royal

46 See 781b, 789d and 819e. Zeus either is, or is closely associated with, Dikē and Themis.

47 'Il n'y a pas d'hommes "divins", sinon en un sens figuré et second, il n'y a que des hommes avisés qui ont su, tels Alexandre, Numa ou... (continued over)
and divine title is 'The Just', and Plutarch explains that of the three components of divinity, immortality, power and virtue, the last is the most lofty and god-like, as well as being the only good belonging to the gods of which man too is capable (Aristid. 6.1-2). \(^{48}\) Plutarch does in fact on occasions assign immortality to man but he is careful to define what this means and who the recipients of this divine gift are. Only the soul can survive death, and Plutarch quotes Heraclitus: 'A dry soul is best flying from the body like lightning from a cloud'. This shows that it must be undefiled. Virtues and the souls of good men go from men to heroes and heroes to daimones and ultimately attain divinity (Rom. 28.6-8). This cannot come about however, \(\nu\omicron\upsilon\mu\omicron\ \pi\omicron\lambda\epsilon\omicron\omega\varsigma\), so the political capital to be derived from the fact is small. \(^{49}\)

The king, then, is once more reduced to a level with all good men, but Plutarch's general attitude is reminiscent of Cicero's in the Somnium Scipionis where the 'father of his country' is given a particular assurance of a blessed divinity after death, although detachment from worldly affairs is also recommended as a way of hurrying in this happy state (De Rep. 6.29). The political importance of hommage

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Sertorius, renforcer leur autorité en donnant à croire qu'ils étaient inspirés directement par la divinité, et des hommes à l'âme sainte et sage, que les dieux consentent à distinguer "du reste du troupeau" (Babut, Plutarque et le stoïcisme, p.469).

\(^{48}\) 'Plutarch does more than express his disapproval of the ruler cult, for he points out what he believes the true glory of the prince to be, namely virtue, especially political virtue and absolute justice', Kenneth Scott, 'Plutarch and the Ruler Cult', TAPA, 60 (1929), p.126. And yet, 'it is it be noted that Plutarch makes outspoken criticisms of the self-deification of Hellenistic kings without any feeling that what he says might be taken as reflecting on Roman practice', Nock, C.A.H. vol. 10, p.489, note 2.

\(^{49}\) 'La première remarque suggérée par ce texte est que Plutarque, pour sa part, ne voit aucune contradiction entre la condamnation du culte des souverains et de l'espèce de divinisation qu'il implique, et l'idée d'un cycle de transformation des âmes, pouvant les faire accéder à la condition divine: les mots \(\omicron\upsilon\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\ \pi\omicron\lambda\epsilon\omicron\omega\varsigma\) s'appliquent évidemment aux décrets instituant les cultes impériaux, et cette pseudo-divinisation est expressément opposée à la vraie, à celle qui se conforme à l'ordre naturel' (Babut, Plutarque et le stoïcisme, p.471).

However, as Bowersock points out ('Greek Intellectuals', p.191), Plutarch 'is not saying that there is anything wrong with organizing worship of one who through virtue has become divine. It is a question of priorities: virtue first, then legislation'. Bowersock would not accept Babut's claim that the cult necessarily implies 'a kind of divinisation' (see pp.187-8).
rendered to the monarch was a fact of life in the Hellenistic and Roman Empires, but Plutarch seems unwilling to come to terms with it except as a recognition of human virtue, reflecting divine virtue through imitation and association with the gods. He does however acknowledge that a ruler's commerce with a deity, or a reputation for this, may win acceptance of his new measures by the people for whose benefit they are intended (see *Num*. 4.7-8). This, at least, shows a trace of realism in Plutarch's make-up.50

If full divinity is denied to a living monarch, the possession of divine ancestors is certainly not. Thus Alexander could claim Hercules as his ancestor (334d and *Alex*. 2). This fact does not, however, destroy the basis of Plutarch's approach to the question of deification. Service of gods and men is the only way to win elevation to more than human status. But, just as for Dio, only God can be the judge of the king, in the sense of condemning him during his lifetime.

**PLINY**

In the *Panegyric* Pliny puts forward what we may take to be the official view, at least for the duration of Trajan's reign, on the position of the king with respect to the gods. But, despite the fact that he has no intention of giving any sort of theory to account for this position, he is compelled to explain in what sense the link between the divine and the human worlds takes shape in the king. That even in the context of an official vote of thanks such details appear shows just how important a basis they were for the whole exposition of Trajan's achievements. What needs to be explained by recourse to a religious element is indeed the outstanding achievement, the amazing generosity, for *hominisne istud ingenium est, hominis potestas, renovare gaudia redintegrare laetitiam*? (61.9).

The response to this rhetorical question involves a particularly

50 'La superstition, malgré sa nocivité, peut dans une certaine mesure concourir à des fins honorables: dans les mains d'un politique avisé, elle devient un moyen de gouvernement' (Babut, *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, p.508).
strong emphasis on the government of the Empire as a commission from the gods. But Pliny does not derive the proof for this, as so many of our writers do, from an appeal to the divine order of the world, followed by the conclusion that such an order should be manifested on earth through the rule of the emperor. Instead he argues that, 'if there were still doubt as to whether it was by the hazard of chance that our rulers were given to earth, or by some spiritual power (numen) it would now be clear that our princeps was divinely appointed' (1.4).

This assertion is followed by the claim that Trajan was found, not by the hidden power of the fates, but openly, by Jupiter himself. Such a conclusion that divine approval blesses the emperor was a platitude, but Pliny goes into the matter a little more deeply than this. In the very discussion of the process of royal adoption the opinion of men and the opinion of the gods are both together seen as resulting in the choice of Trajan (8.1). (We can compare Philo's account of the emergence of the patriarch.) The balance goes quickly to the side of divine appointment sibi ... gloriae illum di vindicaverunt: horum opus, horum illud imperium (8.2; cf. 10.4), although earlier he is willing to concede that pax et adoptio et tandem exorata terris numina dedissent (Trajan as ruler) (5.1).

The very force of this concept of the emperor as God's deputy overshadows that type of elevation where the king on earth is actually made to correspond to the ruler of the gods, in which case the relationship between the two may almost be as between equals. Pliny does nonetheless frequently describe the ruler's task as an imitation of that of the supreme god. This may be expressed as connected with his personal morality: quod enim praestabilius est aut pulchriorius munus deorum, quam castus et sanctus et dis simillimus princeps? (1.3). This also extends more widely to the exercise of his duties; the emperor is charged with a duty on earth, which the gods may now leave to him without a second thought, devoting themselves to their own world. It is clear then that he is to hold power just as they did before — postquam ad te imperi summam, et cum omnium rerum tum etiam tui potestatem, di transfulerunt (56.3). The parens mundi on whom the parens publicus is modelled is now free and is relieved of this part of his duties. The king henceforth fulfils the divine role for the whole human race (80.5). In some
respects Trajan appears to perform his duties too well since Pliny records a prayer that the gods will imitate Caesar's behaviour! (74.5).

The 'saviour' aspect of rule plays an important part in the Panegyric, mostly referring to material benefits. But when Pliny uses the actual term salus, he refers in most cases to the ruler's own security: this is all that is necessary for the Empire to prosper. Without Trajan's prospering, there is no hope for the nations. With it, all is assured (see 94.2; 72.1).

In the ruler's acts, there is a divine power revealed which the ruler himself mediates (80.3). But the emphasis on power needs to be balanced by another aspect of the ruler's nature, and so Pliny gives an account of the attainment of divine status, from the bottom up, as it were, as a consequence of virtue, and this involves him in an effort to distinguish between true and false claims to affiliation with the gods. It is natural that he should wish to show how much Domitian's behaviour failed to conform to that of the ideal monarch in his arrogant assumption of divine titles as in other ways. In the process, Pliny has to make it clear that the institution of monarchy could not of itself ensure divine approval, or participation in certain divine characteristics. What is important is the virtue which brings the reward of divinisation after death. Paradoxically, the very 'commonness' of Trajan gives him a claim to exaltation — te ad sidera tollit ista communis humus et confusa principis vestigia (24.5). The ethical attitude accompanying it dictates the rightness or wrongness of a successor's deification of his predecessor: 'You have given your father a place among the stars not to frighten the citizens, nor to insult the powers nor for your own honour and glory but because you believe him to be a god' (11.2).

Suggestions of this reward for good conduct abound (see esp. 35.4), and Domitian, who claimed for himself what he did not deserve, is held up as a horrible example of the abuse of the ruler cult. His 'divinity' was not merely an instance of presumption; it was a mockery because it was not based on human qualities as it should have been (see 24.5). Pliny therefore announces with relief of Trajan: nusquam ut deo, nusquam ut numini blanditamur: non enim de tyranno sed de cive, non de domino, sed de parente loquimur (2.3). He wants to emphasize, instead,
what truly is worth honouring in the emperor — *divinitatem principis nostri, an humanitatem temperantium facilitatem, ut amor et gaudium tulit, celebrare universi solemus?* (2.7). As Scott comments of both the Younger and the Elder Pliny, 'for both, as doubtless for all the upper classes of Roman society, there seems to have existed no religious belief in the imperial cult, and it appears to have been accepted and observed by them only for its theoretical and practical value as a political institution'. Even here as we have seen there were limits to what was acceptable. Yet there can be no doubt that Pliny was perfectly prepared to link the imperial government to religious sentiment.

ARISTIDES

For Aristides, the Roman Empire parallels the kingdom of Zeus (*R.O.* 103) and just as prayers are addressed to God so they may be to the emperor with perfect propriety (*R.O.* 32). This does not make the ruler the equal of God, but for a citizen his presence probably makes a greater impact, and all the religious feelings can have him for their object. In the *Euβ Βασιλέα* too, the king is described as 'divine' (p.98) and further on we obtain some insight into what this means when the king thinks it right to imitate the 'king of the universe' by displaying the qualities of *φιλανθρωπία* and *πρόνοια* (p.107). Again we find that 'divinity', to some extent at least, depends on the ruler's moral qualities. From these late sources we can see that the same religious emphases are important as were so in the earlier writings on kingship.

CONCLUSION

None of our writers claimed without qualification that a monarch was a god. All found some other way of expressing the sense of the ruler's superiority to ordinary mortals in terms that had, at the least, religious associations. A ruler might be seen as the supreme god's

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representative on earth, or at any rate in his kingdom, with the writers assuming perhaps that he held this position only if and so long as he used his powers well. This meant the ruler imitating the government of Zeus, assumed to be a pattern for rule as such.

The link between the divine and human worlds worked to the benefit of autocratic rule since, as we have seen, monarchy in heaven was assumed to justify and indeed demand as its counterpart monarchy on earth. Hence political debate about the best form of government became pointless. Indeed, most of our writers were more interested in setting up the ruler as a model for humanity, endowed with reason, and possessing virtues entitling him to his position. Yet they eschewed, for the most part, the mystical outlook which saw something of the divine in the monarch *qua* monarch. In either case, however, the actual function of the king — his ruling a kingdom — receded into the background.
On ne s'imagine Platon et Aristote qu'avec de grandes robes de pédants. C'étaient des gens honnêtes et comme les autres, riant avec leurs amis. Et quand ils se sont divertis à faire leurs lois et leurs politiques ils l'ont fait en se jouant. C'était la partie la moins philosophe et la moins sérieuse de leur vie; la plus philosophe était de vivre simplement et tranquillement.

S'ils ont écrit de politique c'était comme pour régler un hôpital de fous. Et s'ils ont fait semblant d'en parler comme d'une grande chose c'est qu'ils savaient que les fous à qui ils parlaient pensaient être rois et empereurs. Ils entrent dans leurs principes pour modérer leur folie au moins mal qu'il se peut.

Pascal, Pensées.
CHAPTER SIX

THE PHILOSOPHIC MAN AND THE KING

INTRODUCTION

When philosophers in late fifth-century Greece turned to ethics as a more fruitful field of study than natural philosophy, they began to bring philosophy and political theory into contact in a way that was to blur the boundaries between them for a long time to come. Philosophy in Plato's hands became a sophisticated metaphysics as well, but the same range of interests did not extend to all who called themselves philosophers. The term philosopher could in fact be used fairly widely. It applied for example to those giving training in the oratorical side of education, as Isocrates' speeches make clear. At the same time it acquired associations with a retiring, withdrawn way of life, described most vividly by Callicles in the Gorgias:

A story ascribed to Pythagoras compared the life of men to the Greek games where some went to win glory from their prowess, some to make a profit, and some to see and reflect on the sights:

1 We notice Socrates' denial of any expertise in natural philosophy in the Apology 19d.


* Isocrates, as we shall see later, claimed for himself the title of philosopher, and would have considered Plato's activities those of a sophist.
toūs mēn γὰρ χρημάτων καὶ τρυφῆς αἱρεῖ πόρος, τοὺς δὲ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας ζημερὸς φιλοσοφίας τε δοξομανεῖς κατέχοντον. ἐξεικνυότατον δὲ εἶναι τούτον ἀνθρώπου τρόπον, τὸν ἀποδεξίμην τὴν τῶν καλλύστων θεωρίαν, δὴ καὶ προσονομάζειν φιλόσοφον (V.P. 58).

How far back such notions went is difficult to determine, and it is still more difficult to find the first use of the actual word φιλόσοφος which is also attributed to Pythagoras. If we adopt a conservative view and decline to see any contemporary basis in the stories about Thales' absentmindedness (see Theatetus 174a and contrast Herodotus 1.75, 170), or about how easily Democritus was deceived in a question of succession, we may at least conclude, with Jaeger, that 'toutes les anecdotes qui font des anciens philosophes des adeptes conscients de l'idéal de la vie théorétique sortent ou bien immédiatement de l'école platonicienne, ou bien sont nées sous l'influence de l'idéal platonicien immédiatement après'. This still places the origins of this attitude to philosophy back as far as the fourth century. The tradition of a belief, from early times on, that philosophy imposed on its practitioners a life removed from the public view is supported by the reference in the Hippias Major (281c):

τὸ ποτε τὸ αὖτων ὡς τοι οἱ παλαῖοι ἔκεντον, ὡς ὄνοματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφίς, Πλιτακοῦ τε καὶ Βὐάντος καὶ τῶν ἀμφι τῶν Μιλῆσιον θαλήν καὶ έτι τῶν ἐστερού μέχρι Ἀναξαγόρου, ὡς ἡ πάντες ἡ οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν φαίνονται ἀπεχόμενοι τῶν πολιτικῶν πρᾶξεων;  

There grew up the idea that the philosopher was a remote, aloof figure whose very retirement and separation from others gave him an importance in his own eyes at least. This appears most clearly in the story recorded by Diogenes Laertius, on the authority of Antisthenes, of Heraclitus' renunciation of a kingship (D.L. 9.6). Earthly honours, when compared with the self-sufficient life of the philosopher, are seen to be unimportant. Democritus, in several of the fragments attributed

3 Quoted by Robert Joly, who does not accept that the roots of these stories go back only as far as the Platonic circle, in Le Thème philosophique des genres de vie dans l'antiquité classique (Académie Royale de Belgique, Brussels, 1956), p.24.

4 And so 'la vie contemplative n'a un aspect politique que dans l'État idéal' (Joly, Le Thème philosophique, pp.100-101. He is referring to Plato here).

to him, displays a similar independence, but it was in the works of Plato and Aristotle that the confrontation was worked out in most detail. Plato showed Socrates upholding a different set of values from those of the *polis*, even while determined to obey its laws. The individual must still bow his will to the state's, but he may judge and condemn it as he does so. Never again can Anytus and his kind be assured of the undivided loyalty of the best men (the worst are not under discussion here, their loyalties being to self, and state service being a mere means of self-aggrandisement).

Disaffection could easily lead the philosopher to turn his attention away from the sordid field of politics to pursue his concerns in peace. In practice this is what happens for the most part, but in theory the philosopher makes no such abdication. At the very least if a ruler cannot be a philosopher he should take the advice of one. Such is the burden of Plato's message, and it was to be repeated frequently in the centuries following. Such a view was based on the belief that the rule of men was itself a serious matter in reality and not simply in the opinion of the ignorant and those easily impressed by the trappings of power. It showed, moreover, a belief that the true definition of rule could come only from the philosopher — and thus that the exercise of rule like the pursuit of philosophy was possible for only a few select individuals. What else, after all, was rule but control over those who could not control themselves, in their own best interests? The forms of government which had been classified were therefore irrelevant, but clearly it could be taken for granted that no true government could be in the possession of the majority who had no philosophic ability.

These conclusions seem to warrant an intrusion of one sphere of life into another, which may appear unjustifiable once the original close relationship between the two no longer exists and the occupation of sage has become almost a profession. But a truly radical assault on

6 As Plato described in his Seventh Letter, esp. 325. He did also, to some extent, come to separate the philosophic life from that of the public figure in the *Statesman*, which, with the *Sophistes* and a never-written *Philosophus*, was to contribute to a trilogy on these three figures. For a discussion on this point, see pp.20-22 of J.B. Skemp's edition of *The Statesman* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969 pbk. ed.).
political structures could go even further and pronounce reigning
monarchs no true kings, since the term king could legitimately apply
only to the man who possessed wisdom — at which point all claims of the
political life to significance are rejected, as previously in Plato's
day its claims to autonomy had been. The philosopher having drained
political terms of their ordinary meaning substitutes for it his own and
serenely ignores his actual lack of power. This, at least, is the
impression the writings give us.

The fourth century, however, was an age of transition when the
pressures of political life were still directly felt in the poleis. At
this stage, could the essentially practical minds of Xenophon and
Isocrates show awareness of and concern for the special position of the
philosopher, and, if so, did this affect their political outlook, in
particular their views on the rule of one man? The last question
becomes increasingly important when we go from the Hellenistic Age into
the days of the Roman Empire, and discover detailed expositions on
monarchy together with clearly developed attitudes on the life of the
philosopher and on the duty of the citizen-subjects to contribute to the
life of the state.

ISOCRATES

Isocrates and Xenophon both lay claim to some expertise in
philosophy. In Isocrates we find that the term philosophy possesses
several meanings. In the Panegyricus it is a civilizing force (derived
from the Logos) which took part in discovering and developing the

7 As H. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity (Mentor, New
York, 1964), points out (p.120): 'He (i.e. Isocrates) was not a
philosopher. Nevertheless, we must not blame him for having claimed so
constantly and so eagerly the title of φιλοσοφία, φιλοσοφεύω, for he had a
strict right to it: in the mouth of a fifth-century Athenian, ... these
words simply evoked in a general way the ideas of disinterested
intellectual activity and culture; ... It remains true that there was
nothing of the philosopher about him in the sense in which the word has
been understood ever since Plato's time.' Cf. the comment of Mathieu,
Les Idées politiques, p.175: 'Isocrate, comme on le sait, prétend faire
de son enseignement une "philosophie", et même, à l'en croire, la seule
qui soit vraiment digne de ce nom.' Mathieu also provides a partial
justification of this title: 'Il y'a lieu de remarquer dès maintenant
que le souci qu'il a toujours d'unir la morale et la politique trahit
improvements bestowed by Athens upon the rest of the Greek world. It was responsible for education in affairs of state and civilized behaviour to others (καὶ πρὸς τε τὰς πράξεις ἡμᾶς ἐπαύδευσε καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλους ἐπράμυνε); that is, its scope was chiefly social and ethical (Paneg. 47).

Isocrates goes on to include skill in words as an element in philosophy; it is this which μόνον ἐξ ἀκάντων τῶν ἐφων ἔφυμεν ἔχοντες, but at the same time he pronounces that good and skilled powers of speech are beyond the scope of ordinary people but are the possession of 'a well-ordered mind' (Paneg. 48). It is in this respect that the wise and the ignorant are furthest apart (Paneg. 49). This is certainly an elitist view of the philosopher-orator to whom Isocrates is referring, yet he does not of course expect such a person to depart from the gatherings of men. Acknowledgement of his success can come after all only from a community, although this 'philosopher' is not quite the equivalent of the ordinary public figure. At times, oratory itself becomes the same as action in Isocrates' mind, but in general he shows that there is a need for the man of action as well as the man of ideas.  

Philosophy has to be carefully distinguished from its unworthy counterpart. But there are those who claim too much for it: πεποίηκασιν ὡστε δοκεῖν ἁμείον δουλεύσαμες τοὺς ἡθυμεῖν αἱρουμένους τῶν περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφῶν διατριβῶν (Soph. 1 and cf. Antid. 266 and Panath. 263 on the correct use of the term). Timotheus is an instance of a public figure who is also a 'philosopher' — τῷτ' ἐφιλοσοφεῖ καὶ τῷτ' ἐπραττεν (Antid. 121) — but clearly Isocrates is using the term very loosely here and wishing simply to indicate that his hero made the right decision.

une affinité de pensée avec cette recherche de la vérité morale qui semble avoir été la tâche essentielle de la prédication socratique dans les dernières années et qui du moins était la partie de cette activité qui intéressait le plus grand public' (p.31).

8 'La divinité n’agit pas personnellement sur la destinée humaine, mais elle inspire certains hommes qui, soit par la parole, soit par l’action, doivent entraîner tous les autres. Isocrate, persuadé que nul ne peut lui être supérieur par l’éloquence, va donc chercher un homme d’action, à partir surtout du moment où les faits lui prouvent que la parole seule ne peut suffire à diriger les Grecs', Mathieu, Les Idées politiques, p.96.

* On this point see Jaeger, Paideia III p.49 (see p.255 n.11 below for publ. details).
It is important, however, for philosophy and action to work together for the state's benefit. The prerequisites Isocrates announces for acquiring the 'philosophy' he teaches are consistent with this attitude. The first need is natural talent in the student as well as ability in the chosen field, next education to produce epistēmē, and, thirdly, practice (Antid. 186-7). This list is geared to Isocrates' own aim of producing orators, and he claims that his philosophy is concerned with weighty matters for the benefit of all while others espouse a philosophy merely for profit, concerned only with conflict (cf. Hel. 6).

Nothing shows the object of Isocrates' concern more clearly than the frequency with which he combines philosophy and πόνος (see e.g. Antid. 247 where the effort and the mental endeavour complement each other). Nicocles is described as the first person possessing a tyranny and wealth who undertook to philosophize and to labour (Evag. 78), i.e., to think and act properly. There is therefore no need to set one against the other, and certainly devotion to philosophy does not entail any abandonment of a previous way of life. Even in referring to the Spartans Isocrates can find matter for praise not only in their nature and order of life and their love of effort, but also in the truth of their philosophy (Panath. 260).

Experience and philosophy can indeed be taken as two sides of the same coin. Philosophy shows the way to go, while practice at tasks makes one able to deal with affairs. Philosophy therefore is the business of choosing the direction in which to proceed. Even writing in praise of a ruler like Evagoras may now itself become a philosophic activity, though none of those περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν δύναις heretofore thought of applying their learning in this way (Evag. 8). But Isocrates appears to have no doubts about his correctness in doing so.9

Some of Isocrates' phrases about philosophy are reminiscent of Plato's. Nicocles is urged ἐκπεμπειν ταύτα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν ἀσκεῖν (Evag. 80). This involves setting a high value on φρόνησις which is particularly important for those in charge of weighty matters (ib.).

9 See e.g. Paneg. 186 where Isocrates describes how any person of capacity would want to 'labour and stretch their wits' to record the praises of whoever will conquer Asia.
Such care seems to refer however more to personal accomplishment than to reflection on ultimate questions in natural, ethical or political philosophy.

In the *Antidosis* Isocrates describes philosophy as the discipline (ἐπιμελέως) discovered for the mind (see 181, 304), but it is not a science which gives exact information on what should be done. The power of conjecturing results from true philosophy which is modest in its aims (271). Isocrates takes issue with those who term 'students of philosophy' the men who 'ignore practical needs and delight in the mental juggling of the ancient sophists, while refusing the title of philosopher to those who pursue and practise those studies which will enable us to govern wisely both our own household and the commonwealth, which should be the object of our toil, of our study and of our every act' — πονητέου καὶ φιλοσοφητέου καὶ πάντα πρακτέου ἐστῶν (*Antid.* 285).

Philosophy is therefore an appropriate study for a ruler (*Antid.* 71) and the Letter to Alexander, if genuine, provides further evidence that Isocrates held this belief strongly. Alexander is reported to be φιλοδοξος καὶ φιλοσοφος and this last is expanded into οὐκ ἀφρόνως ἀλλὰ νοοῦ ἑχόντως (*Alex.* 2). There is every reason to believe that φιλοσοφος is defined by this last phrase, yet it is not, as we see, the special function of a ruler to be a philosopher, as with Plato. It is simply a useful accomplishment if he can 'philosophize'.

The description of philosophy given in the *Busiris* comes closest to defining the extent of its operations — ταῖς ὀκταίς φυσικῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀσκησιν κατέδειξαν, ἵνα καὶ νομοθετήσαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν δυνατών ζητήσαι δύναται (*Bus.* 22). This general account of philosophy includes the utilitarian element as well as what we might consider more conventional, 'other-worldly' aspects.10 These last, however, have little importance here or elsewhere in Isocrates in affecting the substance of his remarks.

Philosophy for Isocrates is the means of separating the cultured few from the masses and of leaving the latter behind. However, in the

10 We notice that later on in this speech the benefits for the social order of the fear inspired by religion and 'philosophy' are highlighted.
very moment of Isocrates' proclaiming the *Logos* at the service of the political world, this world was disintegrating. But Isocrates had ensured that his *paideia* would continue to serve the political order.\(^{11}\) Since the *Logos* of Isocrates can be a tool for princes, and is itself almost a personal force, a teacher of philosophy can ensure its use by the monarch by transmitting this skill to him (for skill it then becomes).

This interpretation of government, however much it may broaden the scope of rule, does not present any real challenge to the state and its structures by offering the philosopher as an alternative ruler over 'souls', who alone has true claim to the title of king. The merging of the two functions into one still leaves the political element dominant, in contrast to Plato's method in the *Republic*, but the philosopher as accessory to the ruler is here sketched for the first time when Nicocles is told to cultivate τοὺς δὲ νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ δυναμένους ὅραν πλέον τι τῶν ἄλλων (To Nic. 53).

Isocrates does not seriously consider metaphysical speculation to have a place here, except for its use as a propaideutic (*Antid.* 266). We must conclude that if Socrates had lived to see Isocrates' career develop, he would have been disappointed in his hopes for him as a philosopher (see *Phaedrus* 279a). Nowhere, either, do we find in Isocrates' writings any appreciation of the philosopher as one who has opted out of society but maintains the respect of the discerning who alone can see that he represents the truest values of man.\(^{12}\)

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\(^{11}\) This is not to deny the truth of Jaeger's comment as it applies to the *polis* order: "State and culture — which had complemented and strengthened each other in the fifth century — were drifting further apart every year. Then poetry and art had transfigured the life of the political community. Now, philosophy and culture bitterly criticized it, and they were supported by many of the politically disaffected", *Paideia*, III (Blackwell, Oxford, 1947), p.154.

\(^{12}\) Schubart has the following interesting comment on Isocrates' role in building up the portrait of the ideal king, which philosophers would later take over to produce a composite 'philosophic man-king': "Während Platon weniger den König als den geborenen Führer im Auge hat und sein Merkmal in der rechten Verbindung von Mannhaftigkeit und Besonnenheit findet, legt Isokrates bereits den Grund für das Königsbild, das die Philosophie des Hellenismus ausgestaltet und die öffentliche Meinung ebenso übernimmt wie ausmalt", W. Schubart, 'Das Königsbild des Hellenismus', *Antike*, 13 (1937), p.287.
XENOPHON

Xenophon's view of the nature of the philosopher differs just as much from the impression we receive of this figure in Plato as does Isocrates'. He too acknowledges that there is some confusion in the meaning of the term 'philosopher'. He records that Socrates was accused of the charge commonly levelled against philosophers by the masses (Mem. 1.2.31). This was no doubt the one of trying to make the worse cause appear the better. Self-styled philosophers claimed that a just man could never become unjust (Mem. 1.2.19). What such people often disputed about was 'the nature of things' (Mem. 1.1.11).

Justice and wisdom, discussed in Memorabilia 3.9, might at first glance have little in common with each other, and indeed seem to be contradictory values, so that the wisdom of a philosopher needed more precise definition by Socrates in the Memorabilia. The understanding of the task of the philosopher that was generally accepted emerges clearly in the explanation of Euthydemus: 'I did feel confident that if I was a student of philosophy, that would provide me with the best education in all things needful to one who would be a gentleman' (Mem. 4.2.23). There is no question here of philosophy becoming a threat to the polis interests of the citizen and diverting his attention from his public duty, no Socrates 'stargazing' and drawing upon himself the ridicule of his peers. Socrates is certainly shown questioning Euthydemus' grounds for confidence, but he does not challenge this interpretation of the role of philosophy.

Xenophon, indeed, defines the general objectives of Socrates' pupils in their association with him thus: They

Μὴ δίκαιοντας, ἢν ὅλης ὑδατοροικοὶ ἡ δικαινικὸς γένοις, ἄλλῳ ἴνα καλὸς τε κακῶς γενόμενοι καὶ οὕκη καὶ οἰκτέοις καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ φύλοις καὶ πάλιν καὶ πολίταις δύναις καλῶς χρῆσθαι (Mem. 1.2.48).

When Socrates explains that δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἢ ἰλλῆ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ σοφώ έστι (Mem. 3.9.5), this does not really display any incompatibility with the students' aims, even though the terms may here be wider than their utilitarian goals required. Even here it is interesting to note how Xenophon exhausts the content of wisdom, once he has described the
practical virtues, instead of going on from justice and the other virtues to wisdom, and showing how they all derive from it, as we might expect.

Socrates as the ideal philosopher is self-sufficient and independent, but Xenophon is careful not to suggest that Socrates approves of Aristippus' anti-social predilection for withdrawing from ordinary society, rather than belonging to the class of rulers or of ruled (Mem. 2.1). Such a course of action is no part of his teaching and in view of Xenophon's accounts of the active lives of Cyrus and Agesilaus and of the keen interest in affairs of state depicted in the Hellenica and the Anabasis, we could hardly expect a portrait of Socrates which made him appear as an ἄφοι in the derogatory sense. Those who cultivate wisdom are nonetheless an identifiable class (note Mem. 1.2.10 — οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἄρα ἄσκοιντες) who choose persuasion rather than violence to effect their wishes — but this, of course, is at the personal level.

The idea of the philosopher retiring from public life is far from Xenophon's thoughts. If he was aware that popular conceptions of the wise man tended to portray him as a recluse shunning the company of the agora (see Gorgias 485d above) he does not refer to such a view. He does, however, show that Socrates' life could appear to some such as Antiphon to be evidence that the philosopher did not become happier than other men, as one might expect of those who studied how to be virtuous (Mem. 1.6.2).\(^\text{13}\)

The deliberate choice of a particular way of life engages Xenophon's interest as a topic only when he introduces the tale of Prodicus about Hercules' choice between the life of virtue and that of vice, and this is not really the same as choosing or rejecting the philosophic life (see Mem. 2.1.21-34). The philosopher is therefore no threat to the importance of public life, for he is fitted into the city-

\(^{13}\) Ἡ Σωκράτες, ἐγὼ μὲν ἴδον τοὺς φιλόσοφους εὑδαλμονεστέρους χρήσαντα γιγνεσθαι. σὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς τάναντα τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀπελευκέναι. θέσον γοῦν οὔτως οὐδ' ἀν εἴς δύο θέσου ὑπὸ διαφόρη διαστάσεως μείνεις. See too Mem. 1.6.15 for the criticism Xenophon records, but does not accept, that Socrates took no part in state affairs.
state without any difficulty. Only the triumph of his ideas in the political arena is lacking, and meanwhile the legendary Cyrus can provide a sketch of a sovereign who 'ressemble souvent à un philosophe couronné'.

Isocrates and Xenophon have different concerns in their writing, but for both philosophy is defined in practical and political terms:

Leur éloignement pour les grandes théories métaphysiques, leur souci de morale pratique et de bonheur parfois terre à terre en faisaient des esprits qui tout naturellement devaient se rencontrer sur certains points.

**ARISTEAS**

Aristeas spends little time in the Letter analysing the nature of philosophy or the ruler's relation to it. Indeed, a direct reference to it occurs only once (256) where the definition of philosophy stresses its practical implications. Philosophy is

\[ τὸ καλὸς διαλογίζεσθαι πρὸς ἐκαστὸν τῶν συμβαίνοντων, ... καὶ μὴ ἐκφέρεσθαι ταῖς ὁρμαῖς. \]

Learning these skills, the Jewish sage adds, comes from praying to God. Nothing is said of any course of study and there is no connection made between the king's particular role and his duty to acquire knowledge himself or obtain advice from those of his friends who may be called philosophers. Nevertheless we must not forget that the setting, with the king questioning a number of wise men to obtain their opinions on various topics, is a commonplace of the Greek philosophic tradition. The legendary confrontation of Alexander the Great and Diogenes could serve as a model.

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To claim that Aristeas conceives of Judaism as mainly Greek philosophy with the addition of the belief in the one God is reasonable so long as we broaden our definition of philosophy here to include moral commonplaces. The actual impacts of the counsel given here is not described since the narrator has to assume that Ptolemy already possesses all the characteristics desirable in a monarch. The advice given in no way compromises his position, nor is there any suggestion that the wise man is the true king. Rather the king himself is wise and is likely to become still more so by his good sense in heeding judicious recommendations.

HELLENISTIC ATTITUDES

In both Epicurean and Stoic thought, the philosopher is a clearly-defined figure who is the chief object of attention in any ethical treatise. For he is the one who, alone among men, is able to reach the standards required of the true man, that is, the wise man. Both schools of thought gained many adherents in the Hellenistic Age, and so their views on the philosopher and on his relations to society and the state cannot be neglected, despite the fragmentary nature of the evidence from this time.

Epicureanism dealt a severe blow to the integration of the philosopher into the community when it proclaimed that community to be held together simply by mutual need and fear (see D.L. 143 = KD 14, D.L. 150 = KD 31 and 33) and drew the wise man away from involvement in state affairs. Political life came a very poor second after personal life. As Voelke interprets the Epicurean attitude,

un homme sain d'esprit ne s'occupera pas des choses de l'Etat, il préférera mener une vie oisive! ...La vie politique ruine complètement le bonheur! ...Que les ambitieux se donnent tout

17 As Victor Tcherikover asserts in *Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews*, p.351.

18 Jewish wisdom literature could have given some warrant for this view. The Book of Wisdom, itself heavily influenced by Greek ideas, gives (7.25) a definition of wisdom which, as L. Delatte remarks (*Les Traits*, p.206), 'réunit les qualités qu'Ecphante attribue à la royauté et au roi', and this wisdom kings should acquire.
le mal qu'ils veulent et se créent tous les tracas possibles, le sage sait que la couronne de l'ataraxie surpasse en valeur toutes les dominations!  

Put positively, this becomes the famous injunction λάθε βιώσας!

We cannot therefore expect to find in the writings of the Epicureans any information on how to live in society, where society is the city-state or a larger entity. They could give no support or encouragement to anyone with political inclinations or a wish to reform public life, nor could the particular form of government be of concern to them, when all forms were alike irrelevant to the sage. The only outstanding individual with whom he was concerned was the figure of the wise man, so the problems of the king would be meaningless to one living his life as he ought.

The Stoic viewpoint is far less dogmatically condemnatory. Indeed the view of the social life of man developed in the doctrine of oikéωσις gives the widest possible scope to the social impulses — but such impulses are here harnessed to the universal society of the cosmos:

Il n'y a donc plus ni sphère de l'individuel ni sphère du social indépendantes de la sphère du cosmique: tous ces domaines se recouvrent.

As well, the Stoics no less than the Epicureans had their gaze for the most part fixed on the sage and hence while 'l'opposition entre le sage et l'insensé est sans doute une des données les plus traditionnelles de la pensée grecque' yet 'avec le Portique elle est poussée à l'extrême et revêt presque le caractère théologique d'une opposition entre élus et réprouvés'.

Still, because society is an indispensable prerequisite for the full development of the human faculties, the sage must himself be part of a

20 Ib., p.116. This however implies, as Émile Brehier has pointed out (Chrysippe et l'ancien stoïcisme [2nd ed., Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1951], p.263), that 'cette cité idéale (of the sage) est déjà réalisée d'une façon aussi parfaite que possible: le monde pris dans son ensemble est cette cité dont les dieux et les hommes sont les citoyens, et dont Zeus est la loi éternelle'.
21 Voelke, Les Rapports, p.128.
society which in one case (in Zeno's Republic) consists only of an elite who are the sole possessors of all the necessary virtues because of their share in the Logos. The good man (philosopher) can be described as among other things βασιλικός τε καὶ στρατηγικὸς καὶ πολιτικός καὶ οἰκονομικός καὶ χρηματιστικός, while the base ἄπαινα τούτοις ἐναντία ἔχειν (SVF 1.216). There are, that is to say, two kinds of men (ib.). Clearly here the philosophers are envisaged as being at the head of a society composed of both the good and the bad, i.e. the wise and the unwise, where rulers are chosen by the same criteria as are applied to determine the wise man. Yet other accounts suggest that the non-wise is unable to perform even the duties of a subject satisfactorily (see SVF 3.615). But this clearly poses a dilemma for it means that

un bon nombre des vertus accumulées sur la personne du sage demeurent sans emploi et perdent toute signification s'il n'a de relations qu'avec d'autres sages. A quoi bon en effet être législateur, roi, juge, général, pédagogue, dans une cité uniquement formée de sages, c'est-à-dire d'êtres qui d'eux-mêmes et en toute circonstance agissent selon la droite raison? ... C'est donc à une impasse qu'aboutit cette volonté de détacher absolument le sage du reste de l'humanité!  

Yet the very claim of the sage to be king over others was in a sense itself an anti-political statement, for it presented a challenge to actual rulers and proclaimed that the possession of power could be justified only on grounds which were foreign to political considerations.

When a Stoic had before him the ideal philosopher as a pattern of individual perfection he could not but describe the king as he saw him after the same fashion, since the sage was of course the true king. The Stoic delight in paradox meant that politics was sometimes included in those matters of no account. It is not always easy to decide whether any particular statement is referring simply to a political situation in a vacuum or whether its author is claiming the right to make judgements on actual kings, and theoretically to depose the unworthy on the basis of their lack of wisdom.

22 Voelke, Les Rapports, p.131.

See the comment of H.C. Baldry in The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought, p.158: 'Zeno rejected this belief that those whose souls are not governed by reason could be free from strife, and regarded inclusion of the unwise, even with inferior status, as impossible.' Note, too, his conclusions in 'Zeno's Ideal State', pp.3-15, especially the argument drawn from D.L. 7.33.
Writers of the Middle Stoa appear to have been less concerned with describing a model kingdom than were their predecessors. They attempted to deal with the actual situation and their most outstanding representatives, Panaetius and Posidonius, gave advice to Roman politicians of the Republic. Hence their writings showed fewer signs of preoccupation with monarchical government. They were still concerned, however, with the figure of the sage, and could not avoid discussing his role.

Retirement from public life, which was to become such a contentious issue for Stoics of the Roman Empire, assumed a significance also in Stoics from Chrysippus onwards. Perhaps the most that we can say of the latter's theoretical preferences (as distinct from his behaviour in practice) is that

Chrysippe insiste plus que ses prédécesseurs stoïciens sur la contemplation: simple préférence personnelle d'ailleurs qui ne pouvait modifier la doctrine officielle de la vie mixte.  

Indeed there is evidence that the Stoa had a reputation for encouraging participation in public life. Diogenes Laertius notes (7.123): ἀλλὰ μὴν σοῦ ἐν ἔρημῷ, φασί, (i.e., the Stoics) βιώσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος κοινωνικὸς γὰρ φύσει καὶ πρακτικὸς. But even by the time of Chrysippus the actual situation of non-involvement must have made an impression on the theory, which had always, from its Cynic derivation, contained elements favouring detachment and autarchy (note the ambiguity of D.L. 7.121), so that Plutarch could attack the Stoics by taunting them with the words of Chrysippus: τὸν ψ ρόνιμον καὶ ἀπάραγον εἶναι καὶ ὀλυνοπάραγον, καὶ τὰ αὐτὸν πράτειν (Stoic. Repug. 1043b = SVF 3.703). And yet what this actually implies is of course by no means clear, and even Plutarch's remarks after this show another side to their views.  

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24 The diversity of opinions on Stoic attitudes to politics is well reflected in the quotations below:
'Par là (the examples of Stoic advisers to monarchs), on voit qu'il n'est pas possible de souscrire sans réserve au jugement sévère de
But such a tendency, at the very least, provided no impediment to the emergence of the completely self-sufficient sage.

The influence of Pythagorean theory on the development of the philosopher as an identifiable type, set apart from others, is of great significance, however much of the record on this point we may ascribe to later reconstruction and the false attribution of fifth-century ideas to the mythical figure that Pythagoras had become. There is a strong tradition that Pythagoras or at least his school was responsible for making the name ὕλοσοφος the one applied thereafter to those striving after wisdom, but not arrogant enough to claim the title of σοφός with its overtones of divinity (see V.P. 58-9). The philosopher as spectator of truth (see D.L. 8.8) is separated off from those eager for fame and fortune — and hence, we may assume, from those who participate in public life. Thus Plato says that the successors of Pythagoras ἦσαν καὶ νῦν Πυθαγόρειον τρόπον ἐπονομάζοντες τοῦ βου διάφανος τῇ δοκοῦσιν εἶναί ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις (Rep. 600b).

Later Pythagorean (or neo-Pythagorean) writers maintained much of this tradition even in their works on political themes. Sthenidas in his treatise on kingship lays it down that the king must be wise even though his wisdom is not the true wisdom of the first god, but rather an ἐπιστάμα (p.271). The line of thought here seems to be that the wise man and the king both reflect and serve god on earth — hence their assimilation into one person is only natural. For Echphantus νοῦς is the pre-condition for ἐνομοσύνα and τάξεις in the universe, while correspondingly the φρόνασις of the king enables him to possess the virtues (p.279).

Here the king because of his cosmic role, does not precisely with-
draw — a contemplative figure — from the strife of life, but he comes to occupy an isolated peak between God and mankind, since his influence upon his subjects does not come so much from positive action on his part as from imitation of him by those below.

CICERO

At one level Cicero is not an obvious candidate as spokesman for the isolated philosophic individual. In his speeches, naturally enough, he praises the practical man of affairs for whom philosophy and its practitioners may be useful butts for point-scoring humour — for example, in the Pro Murena (60-63) where he mocks the Stoics. Occasionally, however, in an atypical speech like the Pro Archia, he deems it wise to show philosophy and cultural endeavour in general in a more favourable light.25

Cicero’s theoretical writings are of course a different matter, and in them he deals with philosophy as if it affected life seriously, though it is the ethical aspect of it to which he attaches most importance. Here the figure of the philosopher is ambiguous, particularly when put beside the public figure in the works where both make claims to supremacy. On the positive side, Cicero is willing to bestow on Plato the title of princeps (De Rep. 2.21) and can describe wisdom as princeps omnium virtutum (De Off. 1.153). He defines philosophy, after a rhetorical outburst in praise of it (quid enim est, per deos, optabilius sapientia, quid praestantius, quid homini ... melius, quid homine dignius?), as rerum divinarum et humanarum causarumque, quibus eae res continentur, scientia (De Off. 2.5).26

Despite this, Cicero’s most common attitude is that expressed at

25 E.g. Pro Archia 2: Omnes artes, quae ad humanitatem pertinent, habent quoddam commune vinculum et quasi cognatione quodam inter se continentur.
26 Cf. De Fin. 5.7: Ex eorum (i.e. the philosophers) enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis historia, omnis sermo elegante sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad illum rem illustriorem satis ornatus possit accedere. Ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes exstiterunt.
the beginning of the De Republica: nihil ... dicitur a philosophis, quod quidem recte honesteque dicitur, quod (non) ab ipsis partum confirmatumque sit, a quibus civitatibus iura discripta sunt (De Rep. 1.2). So philosophers when compared with statesmen are of only moderate value but may take some credit to themselves if they put forward proposals for others to carry out — since they have investigated and written so much about the state, and have therefore performed some service for it (De Rep. 1.12).²⁷

This still leaves philosophers in a fairly humble position. Only when they emerge with claims to counter those of the statesman could they be considered a threat to the political values of Rome. There is a suggestion of such a threat in De Republica, Book One, where Scipio describes those who claim all as their own not by the law of the Quirites but by that of the wise (De Rep. 1.27). Indeed only by the test of humanitatis artes are men shown to be truly worth the name of men (De Rep. 1.28).²⁸

Cicero is willing to admit that ideally sapientia governs the state, making it irrelevant whether just one man or several actually possess power (De Rep. 1.52) and in the De Legibus he claims sapientia as the mother of all good things when he derives it from the eternal law and shows its part in developing the moral sense (De Leg. 1.58 and end of 59). Yet the qualities that here seem particularly the property of philosophy and its adherents are the very ones that elsewhere he requires of the statesman in a greater degree, that is, magnificientia et despicientia rerum humanarum (De Off. 1.72), and the political claims put forward by the spokesman of the Stoics for the sapiens in the De Finibus 3.75 should not be accepted as Cicero's own, though the right to the title of rex, he might have agreed, should rather go to the wise man

²⁷ As Cicero puts the value of both ways of acting in De Off. 1.19, Virtutis ... laus omnis in actione consistit, a qua tamen fit intermissio saepe multique dantur ad studia reditus; ... Omnis autem cogitatio motusque animi aut in consiliis cangiendis de rebus honestis et pertinentibus ad bene beatique vivendum aut in studiis scientiae cognitionisque versabitur.

²⁸ Cf. De Fin. 5.11; Vitae autem degendae ratio maxime quidem illis (i.e. the Peripatetics) placuit quies in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum, quae quia deorum erat vitae simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima.
than to Tarquin who neque suos mores regere poterat neque suorum libidines (De Rep. 2.45).

But it is particularly about the challenge of the life of the full-time philosopher, the life of retirement from public affairs, that Cicero has most to say. Any yielding to the temptation to embrace this life meant acknowledging the failure of political involvement to satisfy the needs of man; it was even an admission that man's social side might have to take second place to his intellectual interests. It is doubtful if a political theory worked out by one holding this view consistently would be anything but an expression of the philosophical predilection for the rule of the best, that is, the rule of the wise. We should not expect to find in it any analysis of the structure of society, or any apprehension of a king's duties beyond those that came within the ken of the philosopher himself.

Cicero was well aware that the 'choice-of-life' question had been thoroughly canvassed before his day, and that not only the Epicureans had espoused the life of retirement. Theophrastus could also be cited as a more respectable example — and he, we note, had written more than one περὶ βασιλείας. Cicero of course deplores retirement that has self-indulgence as its aim, but at least men who left politics for this reason were not likely to be of the calibre to contribute much to the state in any case. He is primarily concerned lest true philosophers (like himself) may fail, through retirement, to use talents which could be of considerable benefit to the community. The rights of people of different temperaments to different ways of life he acknowledges, to the extent of conceding that exemption from public service may be granted on account of ill-health or for some grave reason (De Off. 1.71).

Yet Cicero rates the absolute claim of the state highly just as Plato shows Socrates deferring to the city's laws in the Crito. One must give a return to one's country for existence and education, with the greater share of one's most important powers of mind, ability and wisdom (De Rep. 1.8). The despised alternative is described here as otium though Cicero also uses this word for the well-earned rest from public endeavour, or for an abstention from public activity that may, in

See D.L. 5.42 and 5.49.
some instances, be blameworthy. Cicero also decries the division of life into completely separate spheres which had meant that since the time of Socrates philosophers had taken to themselves the right to expound on both good living and good speaking, which formerly had been held by such public figures as Pericles, Themistocles and Theramenes or by orators like Gorgias and Isocrates. The orator and the public figure almost merge in Cicero's account since the former may profoundly influence policy.

One form taken by Cicero's campaign to retain men in public life was the investigation he made into the sometimes conflicting demands of otium and dignitas especially in the Pro Sestio. What he wished to achieve was a compromise, and the danger lay, he felt, in the tardiness of honest men in coming to the defence of the state, through their wish to enjoy otium even without dignitas. Fear of the same response dictated his introductory justification of participation in public affairs in the De Republica: Quae (disputatio de re publica) ne frustra haberetur, dubitationem ad rem publicam adeundi in primis debui tollere (De Rep. 1.12). Circumstances on occasion made him more sympathetic to such a point of view, as his letters show, and as a certain weakening

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30 See especially 'Cum dignitate otium', REA, 43 (1941), 172-91, by Pierre Boyancé.

31 See De Orat. 3.59-60. Socrates hoc commune nomen (of philosophy) eripuit sapienterque sentiendi et ornate dicendi scientiam, re cohaerentes, disputatationibus sui separavit (60).

32 Whether the otium of the Pro Sestio is to be taken as a private or a public state has been a matter of much dispute. See, on this, besides the article by Boyancé mentioned above, 'Cicero's Cum Dignitate Otium: A Reconsideration', JRS, 44 (1954), 1-13, by Charles Wirszubski. His contention is that 'there can be no doubt that he [Cicero] thinks of cum dignitate otium primarily in terms of the tranquillity of all and the dignity of the "best"' (p.9). It is useful, however, to consider the conclusion of Manfred Fuhrmann, 'Cum dignitate otium', Gymnast., 67 (1960), p.497. 'Ein Vergleich der Sestiana mit der Schrift über den Staat, eine Betrachtung der Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede beider Werke lehrt, dass Cicero nicht so sehr eine schroffe Wendung von der Politik zur Philosophie, insbesondere zur griechischen Staatsphilosophie, vollzogen als vielmehr seine eigenen, durch die Reden der Jahre 63 und 58 dokumentierten politischen Konzeptionen durch die Einkleidung in ein philosophisches Gewand umgebildet und erweitert hat. Politisches Programm und philosophische Utopie sind bei ihm nur durch eine schmale Grenze voneinander getrennt'. See also Jean-Marie André, L’Otium dans la vie morale et intellectuelle romaine (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1966), pp.295-304 and Lepore, Il princeps, pp.144-54.

33 Ἐλ μενετέον ἐν τῇ πατρῴᾳ τυραννουμένης αὐτῆς. Ἐλ παντὶ πρόπρῳ
of his resolution evident in the De Officiis confirms.  

Exceptional talent for doctrina may justify a claim for exemption from public life (De Off. 1.71) and otium may even be used in the service of the state, since Plato and many others in their retirement taught people to be better citizens, more useful to their countries (De Off. 1.155). Cicero even suggests that nobilissimi philosophi longeque principes and men severi et graves might justifiably retire, when nec populi nec principum mores ferre potuerunt (De Off. 1.69) — a clear reference to his own situation in 44 B.C., though in the De Republica he had claimed (1.9) that such a course of withdrawal meant ignoring the fact that there is no better reason for going into public life than to avoid obeying wicked men. There is no doubt, however, that Cicero still values the life of the statesman more highly (it is fructuosior et aptior — i.e. for fame) than the philosophic (which is facilior et tutior, De Off. 1.70) and Joly is justified in asserting: 'Quand il étudie la question pour elle-même, la position de Cicéron est extrêmement ferme et précise: il opte sans hésitation pour la vie politique.'

Abstention could be justified then only in specific instances on a temporary basis. Even at the end of Cicero’s life, he showed no clear

34 Referring to De Off. 1.71, E. de St. Denis comments: ' Qui ne voit l’importance de cette concession, et l’abîme qui sépare les deux thèses, celle du De Re publica et celle du De Officiis?' (La Théorie ciceronienne de la participation aux affaires publique, RPf, 12 (1938), p.195. He concludes (p.213): 'La formule du philosophe a changé, parce que la situation politique de l’homme a changé.'

35 A. Grilli, Il problema della vita contemplativa nel mondo greco-romano (Fratelli Bocca, Milan-Rome, 1953), p.121, note 3, believes Cicero does not intend his comments here and in 1. 70 to indicate sarcasm, as Max Pohlenz (Antikes Führwertum) believes (pp.46-7). Grilli's argument here seems the more convincing.

36 Joly, Le Thème philosophique, p.162.

37 'Rien ne permet ... d’affirmer que, pour l’auteur du De Republica, la vie contemplative soit un bien autonome: même le ... haec caelestia semper spectato, illa humana contemnito ne peut s’entendre que de celui
awareness that the way of the 'political man', as he conceived it, was henceforth to be blocked, and could be enjoyed only vicariously by philosophers describing what they took to be kingship. Yet for him, as a Roman, to have gone as far as he did in pointing out the worth of philosophy and the philosopher was significant, and probably made the 'abdication' of later Roman writers easier.

PHILO

Many of the definitions of the wise man to be found in the appropriate sections of Von Arnim's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* are derived from Philo, and we may well consider him in his attitude to the philosopher to be in the line of those Stoics who had devoted much attention to the individual as a sage. We should note that Philo's work displays two attitudes which appear throughout his writings in different contexts, one evincing great concern for the theory of the Law and its interpretation and explanation, the other taking account both of social structure in a general sense and of the contemporary political situation.

The unavoidable fact of the Empire and the emperor set a limit to what could be expected realistically for society, as well as providing some sort of touchstone when discussion on government occurred. The wise man appears both in contexts where individual needs are being stressed and also where Philo's concern is the society at large, and clearly this figure provides a challenge to that political choice based on the belief that life can best be lived and improved by an ordered and organized existence in a community under a political leader or leaders. And here too we must be aware that some of Philo's responses may be derived just as much from his Jewish inheritance as from the Hellenistic environment.

Philosophy for Philo is that way of viewing the world which was expounded most coherently by Moses who had attained the very summit of qui a pleinement satisfait, sur terre, aux obligations de la virtus', Jean-Marie André, *L'Otium dans la vie morale et intellectuelle romaine*, p. 313.
philosophy and had been divinely instructed in the greater and most essential part of nature's lore (Opif. 8). By this philosophy, man becomes immortal (Opif. 77) and on this he ponders every seventh day (Opif. 128). Despite the similarity of much of this to non-Jewish accounts of philosophy, Philo limits his discourses to exposition of a text in line with current philosophical thinking rather than developing an argument coming from unsupported reason or from a Platonic mystical perception. This 'philosopher' must also then be different from those of the Gentiles. Moses, for instance, is the chief exemplar for Jewish philosophers, and proves, to Philo's satisfaction, that Plato's remark that good government could come about only when kings were philosophers or philosophers kings was substantially true (Vit. Mos. 2.2).

The attitude to wisdom of the Book of Proverbs: 'Αρχὴ σοφίας φῶς Κυρίου (1.7) is one that no Greek would adopt. The confidence that power and wisdom go together, found in Proverbs 8.15, where wisdom says δι’ ἐμοῦ βασιλεὺς βασιλεύοντος, καὶ οἱ δύνασται γράφοντο δικαιοσύνην is countered by the pessimism of Ecclesiastes 9.16: ἀγαθὴ σοφία ὑπὲρ δύναμιν· καὶ σοφία τοῦ πένθος ἔξουσιαν. We need to remember that Philo worked within this tradition.38

Using Moses as an example of a philosopher king does not of itself constitute an attack on political values, but shows Philo trying to reconcile public life and contemplation. A similar connection is made for Abraham but here his qualifications as σοφὸς seem to ensure that he will also possess those political skills which make him head of the human race

These are only comparisons, but they endow the wise man with a leadership not only over himself but by implication over others too. Philo in effect throws down the challenge to authority: 'in truth the wise man is first among mankind' (ib.) but elsewhere he does not simply offer a new type of king. In the De nominum mutatione, he asserts: καὶ γὰρ

38 But note also Wisdom 6.20-21: ἔκλησιμὰ ἡ ἀγαθὴ σοφίας ἀνάγεται ἐπὶ βασιλεῖς. Εἰ σοὶ ἡ ἐκκλησία ἐπὶ θρόνοις καὶ σκέπτροις, τύμφασθε σοφάν, ἕνα εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν βασιλεύσητε, and 24.πλήθος ὁ σοφὸς σωτηρία κόσμου, καὶ βασιλεὺς φρόνυμος εὐστάθεια δήμου.
The content of the wise man's wisdom is explained in Vit. Mos. 1.29, 'he displayed the dogmas of philosophy through his daily deeds, saying what he thought and acting in a way consistent with his words in a harmony of reason and life'. In other words, the philosopher here is not simply a theorist.

However, Philo is not inflexible on this point; in the division between the learning of the philosopher and earthly learning the former appears as the commandment of the 'father', right reason, which pursues truth, while the latter is the mother or education, concerned with obeying the conventional laws established in cities, peoples and countries by those who have looked for appearance rather than truth (Ebr. 34). Here a mixture of the two is recommended. Yet later on in the same work, Philo extends the field of the sage's action to include the political life: 'When his power deals with the amelioration of human ways of behaviour it becomes ethics ... which ... as political science deals with the life of the city, ... as the science of royal power with the government of men, as legislative power with commands and prohibitions.' So that the sage now appears as one who has numerous titles and names (Ebr. 91-2) but 'in all these he will be seen to have one and the same shape' (Ebr. 92).

The wise and good man may therefore claim to possess true kingship. That this is kingship in a metaphorical sense is shown most clearly by the description of the first man as possessing wisdom and kingship; his wisdom derived from the fact that he had been taught by wisdom's own lips, for he was made by divine hands. 'He was moreover a king, and it befits a ruler to bestow titles on his several subordinates' (here of course the animal world—Opif. 148). The royal way frequently referred to belongs to the only true King and this way is wisdom (Immut. 159-60). Here the view is strictly religious and the Stoic sage is far away. The

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39 So too he says of the man with God for his leader, i.e. the wise man, κατ' ἐμὴν δὲ διάνοιαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡγεμόνων, ἑπτατετραμήνος τὰ περίγεμα, ὁδα μεγάλου βασιλέως, θυρώσις ἀθανάτου, διάδοχος (Prob. 20).

40 And after listing the good man's virtues, Philo can comment ὃν τὸς ἠ πλοῦτος ἐπέξεσε ἡ βασιλείας καὶ δυναστείας κυρίως ὑψελλωστέρα; (Abr. 24).
wise man does not inherit a royal title but acknowledges God as king. This in its own way also denies the significance of earthly kingship.

Philo, however, also makes frequent use of the Stoic adage that the wise man is king in its simple straightforward form. The kingship of Saul (that is, actual rule) cannot come into effect until the king has left behind the baggage of the body and can listen to the principles and rules of kingship — 'and we pronounce wisdom to be kingship and the wise man to be king' (Mig. 197). Another point about the kingship of the sage who possesses the four royal virtues is that this king is appointed not by men but by nature, the infallible, the incorruptible, the only free elector (Som. 2.243). Such 'kingship' is described just like political supreme rule, as irresponsible. Philo goes into some detail to emphasize the paradoxical nature of this kingship. Abraham, when described in the Bible as 'King from God among us' (Gen. 23.6) could not resemble a king in the earthly sense since his material resources were minimal and he was a migrant with not even a city to dwell in. His kingship then must have been of the mind, and so his wisdom was the criterion by which he was judged king (Mut. 152).

Philo does draw out a political consequence here by hinting that the prudent man, the brave man and so on are kings over their opposites (or at any rate entitled to be called so — Mut. 153). A similar suggestion that actual rule should be a consequence of spiritual kingship appears when Philo writes that the kingdom of the sage, unlike other kingdoms established by wars etc., comes by the gift of God and is taken by the virtuous man, who brings no harm to anyone (perhaps unlike the king in public life?) but ensures the acquisition of good things to all his subjects, to whom he is the herald of peace and order (εὐθυνόμενοι καὶ εὐνοικόποι καταγγέλλαν, Abr. 261). Kingship and freedom are associated in the sage; he alone is noble and rich, so that all earthly values are upset by him (Sob. 56-7). The sages are called shepherds because this is a title of kings — but the herd is as much the irrational tendencies in man, as actual people (τῆς ἄνθρωπος ἀκαθαρσίας ἁλόγου φορᾶς, Agr. 41).

In spite of all Philo's attempts to set up the sage as the model of the ruler, it is still true, as Goodenough notes, that:
As the ideal king is a sage, every sage is essentially a king, since kingliness is a matter of character, not of external position. The kingliness of a private citizen has little practical importance beyond making him a complete individualist as over against the government.41

These claims to kingship of one sort or another are different in tone from the passages (e.g. in Abr. 22-3) in which Philo advocates retirement from public life as the best course for an honourable man to take. Such promptings, as well as hesitations on the advisability of such a step, are frequent, and introduce many of the common arguments for and against the move. Because the practical comes before the theoretical and is a sort of prelude to it, retirement should not be undertaken hastily (see Fug. 33), and indeed both practical and contemplative lives have their place (Dec. 101). If the motive for withdrawing from the world is unsociability, it may even be blameworthy (see Immut. 17-19 and Mig. 90). It is none the less true that the soul of the wise man finds its fatherland in heaven and the earth is a foreign country (Agr. 65). The men who have retired from active life may still contribute towards the state's well-being by the excellent advice which they put forward (Virt. 3). But the best condition is clearly that of those who retire altogether, like the Essenes, who are 'self-governing and free by nature' (Prob. 91). No earthly government is of any real account when compared with the monarchical rule of God, and they are most fortunate who acknowledge its dominion alone.

SENECA

When we come to examine Seneca's writing for evidence of his attitude to the philosopher, we are struck by the fact that he says so little about the king's duty to study philosophy and apply it to his rule. On the other hand he rarely avails himself of the Stoic expression that the wise man is king. The hints he gives of this way of thinking are generally vague, for example, si vis omnia tibi subicere, te subice rationi, multos reges si ratio te rexerit (Ep. 37.4). The idea, however, occurs much more frequently.

What we do find is that in Book Two of the *De Clementia* Seneca turns from talking about the king's tasks, and the qualities he should bring to their performance, to a discussion whose subject is what the wise man ought to do. The wise man will not show pity, but will give support, for instance (*Clem.* 2.6.3). The assumption that the king himself should be wise is made without comment, evidence of how easily Seneca can combine the two characters into one. What he says elsewhere on the competing claims of philosophy and public life shows that the true king has become for him the man who is wise and is therefore a member of the true kingdom of the universe. The extent to which Seneca espouses this view depends on his situation at any particular time, in relation to the emperor. But the wise man can in certain respects be compared to a god (*Ep.* 87.19) and so too can the king (e.g. *Clem.* 1.5.7).

A Stoic philosopher may indeed claim a special superiority since he is considered as born to command where other philosophers must obey (*Const.* Sap. 1.1). Attalus, Seneca's teacher, was therefore entitled to call himself a king and indeed more than a king: *plus quam regnare mihi videbatur*, cui liceret censuram agere regnantium (*Ep.* 108.13). This is indeed a high claim which takes the philosopher above the world of politics and makes its concerns appear petty. Adam, after considering the relevant passages, concludes that 'Seneca überträgt hiermit also auf den Weisen fast alle diejenigen Eigenschaften und Fähigkeiten, die nach östlich-hellenistischer Auffassung den König auszeichnen'. Ethics is no longer a part of politics, but the philosopher, the ethical guide, himself prescribes behaviour for the ruler, or rather, having donned the

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42 But of course *'les titres mêmes des ouvrages, du De Clementia ou de son pendant le De Ira, prouvent qu'en dernier ressort la personnalité du prince est l'élément déterminant et que la seule espérance à formuler est que le Prince soit un sage': ...Etre un sage, c'est s'oublier pour n'être plus que le serviteur de la loi positive aussi bien que de la loi morale*, Jean Sirinelli in *Histoire des idées politiques: Tome premier* by Jean Touchard (3rd ed., Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1967), p.82.

43 After advising Lucilius to pay court to philosophy, Seneca says (*Ep.* 53.11), *omnes mortales multo antecedes, non multo te di antecedent.*

44 And see too *Clem.* 1.7.1.

45 Traute Adam, *Clementia principis*, p.75, and note her examples of comparable statements made of the king and the philosopher, on pp.75-7.
royal attributes he becomes a model for the king. Seneca is perhaps the first to spell out actual political consequences 'angesichts der Regierungsform des Principats'.

In one sense the result is a devaluation of the ruler when compared with the wise man. But it is also a dignified admission of defeat on Philosophy's part, when confronted with an impossible situation. In the mythical Golden Age government was actually in the hands of the wise (Ep. 90.5) but now concern with government has given place to concern over individual behaviour. The good man nowadays passes laws non uni civitati, sed toti humano generi (Otio 6.4). In Seneca's essays and letters the wise man emerges as totally self-sufficient, ruling himself alone: hoc nempe ab homine exigitur, ut prosit hominibus, si fieri potest, multis, si minus, paucis, si minus, proximis, si minus, sibi. When he renders himself useful to others he is actually engaging in public affairs (Otio 3.5).

The most effective assault on the claims of public life comes from that section in the De Brevitate Vitae where Seneca describes the plight of Augustus wishing for but never obtaining release from his task (4.2), even if the general conclusion is put no more strongly than maior pars aetatis, certe melior Rei publicae data sit; aliquid temporis tui sume etiam tibi (18.1). The wise man, it is suggested, will be free from the engrossments of the state — integrae semper libertatis et solidae, solutus et sui iuris et altior ceteris (5.3).

Seneca shows hesitation about recommending retirement as a valid choice in some of the letters, stressing that for the philosopher with his gifts of sensus communis, humanitas et congregatio physical retirement may not be necessary to the pursuit of virtue (Ep. 5.4). He concludes temperetur vita inter bonos mores et publicos (Ep. 5.5). Athenodorus, Seneca notes, says that the best course is actione rerum et rei publicae tractatione et officiis civilibus se detinere (Tranq. 3.1)

46 Ib., p.79.

47 'Für die hier interessierende Frage ist es von Bedeutung, dass gerade mit der wechselseitigen Beeinflussung der Ideale von rex und sapiens der sapiens bei Seneca Züge annimmt, die politische Konsequenzen haben, da sie notwendig dem Herrscher etwas von dessen Wirkungsraum entziehen', Adam, Clementia principis, p.79.
but nonetheless admits that this is a counsel of perfection. Seneca himself shows his own ambivalent attitude by first attempting to moderate the expression of Athenodorus' surrender to the pressure of circumstances, but in the process of the argument coming to very much the same conclusions.

Why should life away from the market place and the court house exercise such an attraction on one who was himself so closely involved in the governing of the Empire? The sense that the company of men in general is not likely to promote the true peace of an individual is one explanation. The wise man, or even those on the way to wisdom, are rare among the mass of less-than-perfect people who may impair the inner withdrawal necessary for philosophic thought. From this point of view the sapiens should avoid contact with most of humanity. Here the claims of the organic society modelled, Seneca himself tells us, on the bee-hive break down most decisively and pessimism predominates, a pessimism in marked contrast to the apparent optimism in the De Clementia about society and about the function and performance of the king.

In the De Tranquillitate Animi Seneca forcibly expresses his provisional conclusion multum et in se recedendum est (17.3). He goes on in the De Otio to conclude that there are in fact two commonwealths and that the true one is that which embraces the whole world and can be served by contemplation (Otio 4.1-2). The wise man is content with himself (Ep. 9.3). Indeed, Seneca hints that if the sage enters the fray of public life he may come into conflict with those in power, as well as with the masses (Ep. 14.7 — sapiens numquam potentium iras provocabit). Men expect that the reason for retirement may very well be taedio rerum civitum et infelicis atque ingratae stationis paenitentia (Ep. 56.9). Such a motive accounts for the relief of the philosopher when given his congé by the emperor (nullis enim plus praestant quam quibus frui tranquillo otio licet — Ep. 73.1).}

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48 See Epp. 7 and 8.

49 As Alberto Grilli, quoting Castiglioni, puts it (Il problema, pp.249-50): 'Dal De tranquillitate alle Epistole, attraverso il De otio, esiste una linea di successione nitida e naturale ... Il primo scritto preludio al ritiro ...; il secondo lo giustifica alla luce della teoria filosofica, le lettere esprimono in atto ciò che è e può dare la solitudine operosa, in cui si affina lo spirito.'

50 'Siccome, per realizzare gli ideali della vita contemplativa, è
Seneca as we have seen was not so consistent that he always held to the anti-social line outlined above. He had described the aim guiding him in his previous involvement in public life as the desire *ut amicis propinquisque et omnibus civibus, omnibus deinde mortalibus paratior utiliorque sim* (Tranq. 1.10). Here he sought support for this activity in the advice but not the example of the early Stoics. The progressive weakening of this view emerges clearly in Seneca's explanation of what doing good service to the state may involve. Admonishing young men instills virtue into their minds and so a man teaching the meaning of justice and piety to the next generation is surely performing as important a task as the praetor's (Tranq. 3.3-4). Duty no longer coincides with civic duty: *officia civis amisit? Hominis exerceat* (Tranq. 4.4).

The inevitable conflict of ideals between an earthly kingdom and one made up of the wise appears clearly in the *De Beneficiis* where the Cynic Demetrius is described as talking of the kingdom of the wise, great and secure, and is contrasted with Gaius and his inverted values (Ben. 7.10.6-11.1). If the sage may justifiably withdraw into seclusion, then it is acceptable to leave the government to its own devices — an obvious admission of its relative unimportance.

**MUSONIUS RUFUS**

Since Musonius Rufus wrote a treatise 'That Kings too Should Study necessaria la securitas, il filosofo apprezza grandemente colui (il re, il principe) che dispone le cose in modo da consentire ai sudditi di attendere serenamente al loro perfezionamente interiore (I. Lana, *Seneca e la politica*, p.42).

51 Seneca is at great pains to convince himself of the usefulness of philosophy, in the broad sense. André claims that 'tous les atermoiments de Sênèque, toutes ses fluctuations sur le problème du "genre de vie" idéal, s'expliquent par la foi dans la mission active de l'intelligence et de la philosophie, mère des techniques et des institutions' (*L'Otium*, p.536). This is in general true, although Seneca denied that technical inventions were sufficiently valuable for mankind to have merited the attention of philosophers (see *Ep. 90.7ff.*).

52 'Sênèque a systématisé, dans les *Lettres à Lucilius*, ce Protreptique à la philosophie qui la présente comme un asile sacré et inviolable, comme une militia exigeante', André, *L'Otium*, p.538.
Philosophy' he was clearly concerned with the relation the monarch should have with philosophy and philosophers. His own experiences under Nero were proof that the views he held could be considered a threat: 'He was put into chains because of his wisdom' (Life of Apoll. 4.35). In order to benefit his subjects the ruler needs to understand what is good and bad, harmful and helpful, and so on. This is precisely the philosopher's task, as his τέχνη ἡ εἰδέναι τὸ φέρει πρὸς ἀνθρώπου εὐδαίμονίαν ἢ κακοδαίμονίαν (p.280).

Justice can be applied only when its nature is understood, and this can be done only through philosophy. The same could be said of self-control and courage: in all cases knowledge holds the key to performance. Other practical results of philosophy are the ability to tell true from false and the gift of verbal proficiency. Here Musonius shows the philosopher triumphing over the professional orator (see on these points pp.280-83).

General excellence then is what a king needs and what philosophy alone can produce. The conclusion Musonius comes to is that the good king must necessarily be at the same time a philosopher (p.285). Here we have him bypassing the recognized political account of the ruler.

What follows completes this process by standing the original conclusion on its head. The philosopher must needs be royal (p.285). Kingship Musonius then proceeds to define as 'being able to rule well peoples and cities, and being worthy of ruling men' (ib.). Whether or not the philosopher actually does rule does not affect the definition, since even rule of self can entitle one to be called king. A reference to Socrates for confirmation of this claim (p.286) triumphantly completes a thesis that now claims the opposite of what it set out to prove. In the process the king in the political sense has disappeared.

THE 'STOIC OPPOSITION' AND THE MONARCHY

Here we must pause to consider one form of political activity, or inactivity, which developed in the second half of the first century and has often been associated with the Stoic school of philosophy. This was
the 'Stoic opposition' to the monarchy, of which Thrasea Paetus was the most outstanding exemplar, although for him pointed absences from the Senate and from public life generally were the means whereby he made his attitude to Nero's rule clear.

The difficulty is in deciding how far philosophy motivated Thrasea Paetus and his followers, and how political their opposition to the government really was. This becomes particularly important when we consider the reputation for subversion that philosophy seems to have acquired by the time Vespasian expelled the philosophers from Rome. And how did the Stoic view of ideal kingship change, if we accept that Stoics were in the front ranks of the opposition?

Certainly Tacitus describes Thrasea's last hours, spent discussing the immortality of the soul with the Cynic philosopher Demetrius, in a way which stresses his philosophic affiliations (Ann. 16.35). Tigellinus could play on Nero's suspicions of Rubellius Plautus by describing him as possessing the arrogance of the Stoics, who breed sedition and intrigue (Ann. 14.57). Seneca himself confirms that such an opinion of the Stoics was fairly common (see his Letter 73). Under Vespasian, Helvidius Priscus, the son-in-law of Thrasea, adhered to the Stoic philosophy, not to indulge his leisure hours under a respectable appearance, Tacitus tells us, but to arm himself against the risks of a public career (Hist. 4.5). In the reign of Domitian, others of the senatorial class suffered for writing lives of the political martyrs, and philosophers were again expelled en masse from Rome.

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53 Adam considers that 'Seneca zeigt also, wie Thrasea, im Anfang eine durchaus positive Einstellung zum Principat. Wachsende Kritik und Entfernung beider aus der Politik lassen sich jeweils an konkreten politischen Vorgängen verfolgen und haben nichts zu tun mit einer allgemeinen vorgefassten, philosophisch-stoisch bestimmten Abneigung gegen diese Staatsform', Clementia principis, p.68.

54 There is of course an ambivalence about government inherent in Stoicism: 'In so far as Stoics were prepared to acknowledge the emperor of the day as the embodiment of their lofty ideal of kingship. Stoicism might be welcome and become a kind of semi-official philosophy; Stoics, who despaired of improvement and acquiesced in a quietist contemplation of their ideals, may have been unwelcome, but nevertheless harmless; if, however, Stoic tenets were wedded to the Roman tradition of political activity... Stoic idealism might, in the eyes of the Roman government, become dangerous', Wirszubski, Libertas, p.145.
There is, however, no evidence of a coherent united opposition based on philosophy. It is true that 'Tacite nous dit ... que Stoïcien signifiait pour les délateurs intrigant et rebelle' but it is more likely that 'le stoïcisme n'est point la cause de l'opposition mais seulement le moyen pour les opposants de légitimer occasionnellement les distances qu'ils prennent par rapport à l'autorité impériale'.

Was this opposition related to the character of a particular ruler or was it an hostility to monarchical government as such? Rostovtzeff believes that in fact the opposition as early as Nero's reign had become philosophical under the leadership of Thrasea Paetus, and derives the hostility of the government to the movement from its use of the popular theme of the tyrant, the counterpart of the ideal king, and the Cynic-Stoic belief that succession should pass by adoption and not be hereditary. But we have no evidence that this particular version of the rule of the best played a part in discussions of the time, and Pliny the Younger, who does appear to favor adoption, is hardly reliable as a witness for Stoic thought.

There does still seem to have developed an attitude either of indifference or hostility to the government on the part of the more concerned members of the Senate, and this can be called philosophical so long as we make it clear that the word is here being used very loosely. This movement intensified under the Flavians whose own path to the throne was certainly not through any connection with the original ruling

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55 Jean Sirinelli in Jean Touchard's Histoire des idées politiques, I, p.83. Griffin takes up essentially the same position: 'It is quite clear that the grounds of Thrasea's opposition to Nero's regime did not follow from his Stoicism: for one thing, Seneca had shown in his De Clementia how Stoicism could be used to justify and provide a monarchical ideology for the existing system. What Thrasea and Helvidius Priscus wanted was libertas senatoria, ... Thus, in so far as there was political opposition, it was not philosophical in origin' — Griffin, Seneca, p.365.

56 'We know that as early as Nero's time the personal opposition had been replaced by one of a philosophical type, of which Thrasea Paetus was one of the prominent leaders' — Rostovtzeff, SEHRE, I, p.114 and see p.116 and II, p.586. So too Garzetti claims: 'Vespasian had to cope with an opposition inspired for the first time by theoretical principles' — Albino Garzetti, From Tiberius to the Antonines: A History of the Roman Empire A.D. 14-192 (Methuen, London, 1974), p.240.

56a There may be a reference to a (Stoic?) debate over adoption in the comment of Vespasian, reportedly made on the arrest of Helvidius Priscus in the Senate (see Dio Cass. 65.12) that either his son would succeed him or no one would (cf.Suet. Vit.Vesp.25).
dynasty. Domitian's reign seemed, no doubt, only to confirm the pessimism about imperial government emerging under Vespasian.

Adam sees a general opposition to autocratic rule as such coming about after Nero, and not simply opposition to a specific emperor,⁵⁷ but there is nothing to show that either the theorists or the men of affairs seriously envisaged a return to the Republic.⁵⁸ What complicates the issue is the fact that, as Michel has pointed out, 'sous l'Empire les problèmes politiques deviennent des problèmes individuels: tout dépend directement des rapports entre le citoyen et un homme, le prince',⁵⁹ and Wirszubski well describes the difficulty of drawing a demarcation line in autocratic despotism 'between the personal character of the despot and his power, because a despot's power is what the despot makes it'.⁶⁰

This accords with our view that at this time much of what passed as political debate could not validly claim that name, since the personality of the ruler dominated the outlook of theorists, and even of men of affairs. In the particular climate that existed in late first-century Rome, with dissatisfaction apparently widespread in the higher ranks until the accession of Nerva, even where opposition did not take the form of the conspiracy of Piso resignation to circumstances might lead to the idealization of the monarch, so that he resembled the sage of the philosophers. It might also result in retirement from the life of public service. And both courses, however innocuous, were likely to

⁵⁷ 'Die Radikalisierung der Opposition unter einem sich verschärfenden Willkürregiment führte in der 2. Hälfte des 1. Jahrhunderts dazu, dass die der Stoa anhängenden Senatoren unter Herrschern wie Nero und Domitian ihre ursprüngliche, weitgehend neutrale, wenn nicht gar positive Einstellung zur Monarchie verloren .... Mit dem immer stärker werdenden Widerspruch gegen die einzelnen Principes verband sich allmählich eine allgemeiner gefasste Opposition gegen den Principat als solchen' — Adam, Clementia principis, p.70.

⁵⁸ They (i.e. Rubellius Plautus, Thrasea, Helvidius and the rest) 'objected, not to the throne, but to its unworthy and, to conservative eyes, "un-Roman" occupant', and 'Boissier is surely right, pace Henderson and Dudley, in describing their opposition as being "pas tout à fait politique dans son principe, mais plutôt morale"', J.M.C. Toynbee, 'Dictators and Philosophers in the First Century A.D.', G & R, 11 (1941-5), p.47.


⁶⁰ Wirszubski, Libertas, p.143.
cause imperial hostility, the former because the sage virtually
displaced the public figure, the latter because abstention implied or
seemed to imply disapproval.

DIO CHRYSOSTOM

Perhaps the most self-consciously philosophical of our writers is
Dio Chrysostom. On many occasions he discusses the position of the
philosopher in society, the mistakes people make in not distinguishing
the true philosopher from the false, and the damage thereby done to the
reputation of philosophy. When he addresses the inhabitants of
Alexandria, Rhodes or Tarsus, he does so avowedly as a philosopher.

The definition of philosophy given in 13.28 is directed solely to
the ethical aspect. To practise philosophy is to seek and strive to be
καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς, but another account of it as learning from the wise
goes into more detail on the results to be expected. Men become
εὐδαίμονες and rulers especially and firstly of themselves and then of
other men (see 13.31-4). Here we have a harmonizing of the two ways of
life — the public one of active service for the benefit of others and
the private introspective one. Potential conflict between the two is in
this way avoided but the priority of self-rule gives an extra stress to
the philosophic life.

The philosopher, as a matter of course, should be wise in all
respects and 'the prudent man, such as the philosopher should be, would
in everything be superior to all the world' (71.8). The oration on
virtue expresses this most clearly. The prudent and righteous and wise
man, that is the good man, is chosen to be king and is willingly obeyed
by other men (69.1). This is because it is not reasonable that some men
should be wise and others versed in human affairs or some versed in
human and some in divine matters (69.4). When a man's soul becomes
rational and his mind good he will be able to manage his own affairs
successfully and those of his neighbours too (ib.). The details given
of all-round excellence show a gradual spreading of the impact of being
wise, good and self-controlled from private to public to divine matters
(see 69.2).
The task of philosophy has a similarly large scope in Oration 22, where philosophers and orators are described as fulfilling in many ways the same role — πολλά μὲν καὶ ἄλλα εὑροῦ τις ἄν καὶ ἐξίμπαντα ἄτεχνος τὰ ἔργα τυνὸς ἐχόμενα καὶ πράξεως κομνὰ τοὺς φιλοσόφους, καὶ ἰδιομον ὄσον μὴ ἁγορατοὶ μηδὲ μύσταρνοι (22.1). Both groups discuss questions which are their especial concern, such as whether one should marry, whether one should go into public life, whether a monarchy should be adopted or democracy or some other form of government (22.3). This last theme in Dio's day was of course treading on dangerous ground.

A different (and more innocuous) appearance is given to the philosopher in the dialogue on philosophy where the life of the philosopher is set apart from all others: καθόλου βύς ἄλλος μὲν τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος, ἄλλος δὲ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων (70.7). This is far more exclusive than the account given of the philosopher king in the second discourse on kingship where Dio explains, through the young Alexander, that it is not necessary for the king to study philosophy to the point of perfecting himself in it; he need only live simply and without affectation (2.26 — ἀπλότητι δὲ καὶ ἀπλῶς).

Nevertheless, if we accept the stern injunction of Diogenes μὴ οὖν πρότερον, ὦ μάται, βασιλεὺς ἐπιχεὐρεῖ πρὸν ἢ φρονίσαι (4.70), this kingly knowledge is itself no light matter, since this essentially non-political acquisition has become a necessary qualification for a king. Indeed in his first oration Dio claims that μόνος δὲ ὁ τῶν φρονίμων τε καὶ σοφῶν λόγως, οὗτος γεγόνας οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πρότερον, ἀνενδής καὶ τέλεος ἥγεμὼν καὶ βοηθὸς εὐπελθοὺς καὶ ἄγαθὴς φύσεως (1.8).

Even if we take the common estimation of the importance of wisdom, popular opinion, claims Dio, is delighted to see wisdom honoured by the greatest power and might (4.2). The man who possesses wisdom as distinct from the self-deception that passes for it with the majority (the perspicacity of the common man is not rated so highly here) will be successful in all that he attempts, since he will know the true object of his actions. Thus, if he should wish to be a general or to hold the other offices or to conduct the other public business in the city, he will do everything well (see 68.3-6; cf. 9.9).

The philosopher here has pre-empted the office of the ruler, since
it is now the former who may rightfully claim to rule, and Dio does not simply assert that a king should have acquired philosophy as one desirable characteristic among others. A philosopher, indeed, is the one person of whom it should be expected that, having taken a government in hand, he should produce a united city (48.14). This is because the true philosopher will be found devoting himself to no other task than that of learning how he will be able to rule well, whether it be ruling himself or a household, or the greatest state, or, in short, all mankind (49.3).

Yet Dio admits that few philosophers have become rulers (49.6) and he explains that the most powerful nations have instead publicly appointed them as superintendents and officers for their kings (49.7). The result was that 'in truth it was the philosophers who ruled, while the kings became their servants and the ministers of their will, though they sat on golden thrones, dwelt in great houses and feasted sumptuously' (49.8).

There is, to be sure, the problem that of the many philosophers who have recommended public life, few have ventured into it themselves (see 47.2-3). This is of course because of the dangers to be met with in society. This does not prevent Dio from claiming that statesmen such as Pericles, Solon and Lycurgus may be regarded as philosophers in politics (22.1-2). Yet Dio also claims, and this is probably more typical of him, that the only truly happy constitution is the partnership of god with god, the term 'god' including man by virtue of his possession of reason (36.23).

PLUTARCH

Like Dio, Plutarch allots an important place in his work to philosophy and philosophers. In discussing the education of children he (or his imitator) announces: ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης παιδείας ὁσπερ κεφαλαίων

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61 'Ces deux courants de pensée, philosophique et courtisan (the one talking of the sage who would one day be king, the other investing the current king with all the virtues) restaient parallèles. Avec Dion ils se confondent' — Sirinelli in Touchard's Histoire des idées politiques, I, p.90.
Indeed the remedy for illnesses or affections of the mind also comes from philosophy. When Plutarch provides a definition of philosophy, it is severely practical. Philosophy enables us to discover τι τὸ καλὸν τι οἱ ἀνοχρόν, τι τὸ δύκαλον τι τὸ λύκηκον (ib).

In the light of such a definition it is not surprising that Plutarch is quick to make a connection between politics and philosophy. 'I consider these to be complete men', he says, 'who are able to mix the political capacity with philosophy, and be possessors of the two greatest goods, being politically active in the common life, and in the calm and unruffled part of their lives being involved in philosophy' (7f; cf. 33b). In the Life of Numa he quotes with approval Plato's remarks that the one way for men to obtain relief from evils was if by some divine chance royal power coinciding with the insight of a philosopher might establish virtue as powerful and supreme over vice (20.6-7).

At a less exalted level, Plutarch's writings on political themes show us the municipal councillor displaying a polis citizen's view of the importance of local government and a tendency to clothe this political viewpoint in the theory of monarchical government, however inappropriate. But to note the pre-eminence given to political life is to take into account only part of Plutarch's attitude, for like most of his contemporaries he was aware that, seen under a certain aspect, all political matters were fragile, and political life existed only through the goodwill of the emperor.

To assess the position that public life and the figures of the ruler and the philosopher occupied in his total outlook we need to investigate a range of texts, for, directly and indirectly, Plutarch touched on these topics frequently. One way to detect the prominence given to the philosopher in his own right is to note the occasions on which he appears alongside or in the person of the politically active individual who is in many cases the king. Even in the 'Advice to an Uneducated Ruler' Plutarch asserts the need for Logos to rule the ruler (779e) and philosophy and political activity appear together, associated with worthwhile activity, in the De Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta (136d).

The doubts about Plutarch's authorship of this work would make it unacceptable as a source if the views expressed were out of keeping with those appearing in works obviously authentic. But such is not the case, and subsequent references reinforce the impression given by the excerpts from this work.
Again in the *De Superstitione* Plutarch associates *φιλόσοφοι* and *πολιτικοί ἄνδρες* as men who can be expected, each no doubt for good, but perhaps very different reasons, to show that God's majesty is associated with goodness, liberality, kindness and caring (167e). There is a certain similarity between the life of a statesman and that of a philosopher (ὅμως δ' ἐστὶ τῷ φιλόσοφῳ τῷ πολιτεύσασθαι) in the fact that for both it is the activity becoming to it rather than the badge of office that gives a title to the practitioner. Life at all times in all parts, in all experiences and activities, universally admits philosophy, and the same can be said of statesmanship (796d-e).

So far we have seen that Plutarch assumes that the philosophical and political lives are not incompatible, that a ruler may indeed find philosophy of great assistance to him in his task (see e.g. *Mor.* 779f — 'when philosophical reason ... has been established as the ruler's coadjutor and guardian, it removes the hazardous element from his power'). Does Plutarch accept that the gifts of the philosopher are in themselves sufficiently comprehensive to allow him to teach the political art also, or can he even use them to override entirely the independence of the political sphere?

Plutarch certainly believes that a ruler's friends may be just as qualified to give advice in their capacity as philosophers as the ruler is to take action, but this is an informal function, taken for granted when friendship as such plays so important a part in the carrying on of government. He is aware that a friend of one in power who attempts to advise a ruler may well be suspected simply of flattery and self-seeking, so that this personal element has its drawbacks (see 776b). A philosopher whose task is the care of the soul is best equipped to counsel one who will then pass on the benefit of his lessons by being solicitous for many, and obliged to be wise and self-restrained and just on behalf of many (776d). The need for the ruler himself to take care in his choice of friends shows the very important place they may be granted in policy-making.

Plutarch criticizes the Stoic equation of the sage with the prudent, just and brave man, orator, poet, general, rich man or king (472a; cf. 1060b), and is clearly not willing to leave the field to the sage. Pronouncements of the wise, he suggests, are not as significant
as actual enactments of real rulers. When he writes that Zeno gave shape to a dream or as it were a shadowy picture of a well-ordered and philosophic community, but it was Alexander who gave effect to the idea (329b), Alexander obviously wins his approval as a man of action over the man of ideas (cf. Lyc. 31.2).

We should therefore expect to find that Plutarch makes no attempt to hold aloft the philosophic ideal of the life of retirement as desirable, and by and large this is so. But this does not mean that he paid no attention to such a possibility — hence his discussions of the topic are useful in revealing the arguments that could be advanced at this time in favour of non-involvement in political life. Plutarch plainly saw the Epicureans as the main proponents of such views since even in theory they decried any sort of involvement in political life — although this could lead them to write a περὶ βασιλείας discouraging their adherents from living with and giving advice to monarchs (1127a).

In the Life of Pericles, Plutarch explains that there is a difference between the life of the theoretical philosopher and that of the man of state; one, being self-sufficient, is directed to what is good, the other displays a virtue involved in human needs where riches are both necessary and good (Per. 16.6; cf. Agis 2.1). Such an instance shows Plutarch tending to favour the politician, and evincing sympathy with his difficulties, even while he presents the life of the philosopher as more elevated in absolute terms. Although we can hardly conclude that Weber is right in claiming Plutarch as 'eine politische Persönlichkeit ersten Ranges', Babut does disregard this practical, even pragmatic, side to Plutarch when he asserts: 'Il faut avouer que Plutarque n’a pas la tête politique. C’est toujours en moraliste qu’il aborde les questions politiques.'

Plutarch’s concern for public life was real, but he did not see it

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as a special area of life with its own code of behaviour different from that of life in general, and so the philosopher had as good a claim as anyone else to be concerned about it. A philosopher who observed his political duty by training a potential or actual leader in the way that he should go has, of course, Plutarch's support (see e.g. Philop. 1.2-4) but there is no suggestion that the philosopher would have any particularly efficacious political theory to offer. He would simply be taking part in an important sphere of life as all men should do, although as a philosopher, he might well see his way more clearly than most.

The Stoic position came in for Plutarch's criticism because of its paradoxes. He mocked at the failure to take part in public life of those Stoics who most recommended it (1043b-c). He was not likely then to see isolation from society as an acceptable alternative to participation, with philosophy entitling one to arrogate to oneself political titles and a spiritual hegemony. A suggestion that tranquillity may demand inactivity is hotly denied (465c).

It is however interesting to examine a passage revealing Plutarch's view on life and compare it with the way in which Aristotle formulates the aim of human existence. Plutarch describes life as a gift from parents and the gods, but the good life not simply as the object of politics, but as brought about through the philosopher's gift of Logos, the fellow worker of ὀίκη and νόμος (1108c). Aristotle had been satisfied to describe the polis as the means to the good life without introducing figures from outside. So even while Plutarch blames the Epicureans for destroying the moral basis of society by their attitude, he goes halfway towards meeting them here, as he does in his account of the effects of Logos in the soul (101d-e):

αὐτάρκης ἦν, ἐὰν μάθης τί τὸ καλὸν κάγαθὸν ἐστὶ τρυφήσεως ἐν πενίᾳ καὶ βασιλεύσεις καὶ τὸν ἀφράγμονα βίον καὶ ἱδρύσην οὐδέν ἤπτων ἀγαπήσεως ὡς τὸν ἐπὶ στρατηγάς καὶ ἱγεμόνας: οὗ βιῶσης φιλοσοφήσας ἄρσες, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ ἡν ἡδῶς μαθήσῃ καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων· εὑρανεῖς ἐκ πλοῦτος πολλοὶς εὑρεθήσεται καὶ πενίᾳ πολλὰ μη μεριμνώντα καὶ δόξα τυμάμενον καὶ ἄδοξά μη φθονούμενον.

PLINY

The Panegyric was not the place for Pliny to lay down his views on
the role of the philosopher in public life. In this eulogy Pliny appears as the typical Roman, concerned only to show how the Emperor Trajan excels in all the Roman virtues and functions appropriate to a public figure. He speaks as a consul, not a theoretician, and his reference to Trajan's honouring of dicendi magistri and sapientiae doctores (47.1) does not imply that Trajan used such people as advisers.

However, in Pliny's letters, philosophers and philosophy are quite often the subject of discussion. Pliny's complaints about the amount of time taken up by his public affairs imply that he wished to devote time to literature and studious pursuits, but it is not likely that philosophy in the strict sense absorbed him greatly. Rather he was concerned to act in accord with the precepts that became a Roman gentleman. In fact, Pliny claimed the support of a philosopher for the high value of his activities. The philosopher Euphrates, he records, consoled him by saying that anyone who holds public office, presides at trials and passes judgement, or expounds and administers justice — thereby putting into effect what the philosopher only teaches — has a part in the philosopher's life and indeed the noblest part of all (Ep. 1.10.10). Pliny might well see himself as corresponding to the ruler whom the philosopher was encouraged so often to instruct in his duties.

Yet, though Pliny praises philosophy, his examples of its operation show that he attached almost as much significance to manner as to matter. The philosopher occupies no special position in relation to the government, and though Pliny refers to the expulsion of the philosophers from Rome in 93 A.D. (Epp. 3.11.3; 7.19.4), he does not go into the reasons for this. His references to Dio Chrysostom (Ep. 10.81), in connection with the litigation taking place in Prusa over Dio's building schemes, do not contain any mention of the latter as a philosopher.

For Pliny to associate himself in a small way with members of the Stoic opposition like Herennius Senecio (Ep. 7.33), or express admiration for Thrasea Paetus (see Epp. 7.19.3; 8.22.3) did not mean

64 'Though in general Pliny felt that the active life was more becoming to a Roman than the contemplative, he is not always consistent. ... Thus, though Pliny on the whole preferred the life of public service, he admired leisure devoted to letters as well' — Mason Hammond, 'Pliny the Younger's Views on Government', HSCP, 49 (1938), pp.133-4. In this, of course, he resembles Cicero.
that he was in any way committed to their views. When he wrote his Panegyric he did so as a loyal citizen (Ep. 3.18) and a consul and nothing more. For him no philosopher could claim to possess royal powers, or show that he ruled a spiritual kingdom. Such assertions he would probably have understood to indicate the speaker's natural wish to be of significance, even though not taking part in government.

ARISTIDES

In Aristides we meet the only one of our writers who explicitly disdained the title of philosopher in favour of that of 'sophist'. We do not therefore find him claiming that the king should be a philosopher still less than the philosopher was the true king. As for the person most suited to advise a monarch, clearly in Aristides' view a sophist like himself was the best choice.

Aristides does reveal something of his view of philosophers, for he claims that they did not 'honour the gods, advise cities, comfort the distressed, settle civil discord or educate the young' (XLVI, vol. 2, p.404 Dind.). This is hardly true but no doubt reflects a view held by some members of society under the Antonines that philosophers were impractical recluses. Marcus Aurelius as emperor should have given the lie to this, but Aristides' attitudes seem put forward rather to elevate his own profession and usurp the philosopher's role than to deny the philosophic function as such.

Certainly Marcus Aurelius had explicitly rejected the notion that for a philosopher retirement meant separation from the affairs of one's fellow men. Such a notion was 'wholly unworthy of a philosopher' (4.3). Yet such a man can still say: 'Alexander, Caesar, Pompey — what were they beside Diogenes, Heraclitus, Socrates?' (8.3). In a way true kingship for Marcus was 'not of this world'. And no doubt it is this aspect of philosophy that Aristides is attacking. Through Aristides, then, we gain some insight into how philosophy could appear at this time.

65 'Aristides' antipathy to philosophers was strong, and his strictures were not altogether just. Philosophers had been known to advise cities, comfort the distressed, settle civil discord and educate the young', Bowersock, Greek Sophists, p.11.
to be holding up a standard that made naught of the claims of society in
the strictly practical sense.

CONCLUSION

The writers on kingship whom we have examined have almost all had
something to say about philosophy. What we have to consider is if their
comments could appear in any way subversive of government in general and
monarchical government in particular. This can happen by implication if
the philosopher gradually replaces the king as the centre of attention,
or by outright comment to the effect that the true king is the wise man.
To some this is the natural consequence of starting with the assumption
that the king should have training in philosophy. The writer may also
decry public life and suggest that the life of retirement and
contemplation is best. This is a logical result of a belief in the wise
man's supremacy, once he is seen as no longer connected with government.
Such attitudes express more than simple opposition to a particular ruler
or even to a particular form of government, though disaffection with a
regime naturally encourages this outlook.

We can see clear evidence of 'subversion' in the writers of the
Roman Empire, although describing the king's character so that it
resembles the philosophic ideal, while political duties take second
place, does occur even before this time. Philo, Seneca, Dio — and even
Plutarch at times — all talk of the wise man as if he were a king, or
rather as if his way of life counted for more than the existence of
monarchical government. They all find that the life of retirement can
be as satisfying and justifiable as the life of the politician. This
must mean that whatever their avowed intentions their support for
monarchy would have seemed a doubtful blessing to any observant king who
believed that his position was the highest possible one and the values
it supported the most important. The theorists posed no direct threat
to the throne, to be sure, but neither were their 'mirrors for princes'
quite what they seemed.
CONCLUSION

We cannot deny that there was considerable continuity between the world of the *polis* and the world of the Hellenistic Empires, and this applies to political theory as much as to anything else. The ideas we have examined on society and law, on the qualities of the ruler and the imagery of rule, even attitudes connecting the king with the deity or substituting the wise man for the king were not unknown in fifth- and early fourth-century Greece, but most of these points of view had to share the field with others. Thus, many theorists then believed that the development of society was the gradual work of many ordinary people; law could mean an agreement of the *polis* as well as other things; forms of government were discussed and compared; society was more than a piece of material to be moulded from outside; God need not have any special connection with political life, or its chief protagonist, and philosophers might be thought to have a duty to be involved in society, not to stand outside or despise it.

What we see is a change of direction, a change of concern at many levels, in the writers who provided a theory for the changed political situation — and we must not forget that this theory corresponded in part to official propaganda from the Greek kings and Roman emperors. This does not mean that the theorists' ideas won unqualified approval from government and people. Catchcries and slogans adopted by government do not prove much about the influence of these writers. Waters stresses how little, for example, those making free with advice to Trajan may have had to do with the imperial functions and personalities, and how little we can deduce about the ruler's character from them.¹ Few are quite as sceptical as this on the reliance to be placed on Pliny and the kingship speeches of Dio for information on Trajan's rule, but we must

¹ In 'Trajan's Character in the Literary Tradition', pp.233-52.
stress that we have not set out to find how well or ill the works examined tally with any actual rule. Our aim has been the more theoretical one of discovering how consistently there can be detected a particular way of viewing government, which we see being first spelled out tentatively in the work of Xenophon and Isocrates. We have to determine if this outlook is truly political, or if it is more appropriate to designate it by some other term.

We have found that there is a certain tension in the views our writers had about society. They often describe it at length as good and natural, and several of them have a deep sense of men's need for one another, but at the same time their distrust of ordinary men is obvious. In describing the origins of society, even those who fully accept that men did not decline from a primitive Golden Age, when all needs were met without effort, write of the outstanding individuals who brought their fellows civilized ways. This naturally implies that any society will be best served by just such a person. Most, we may suspect, make the assumption spelled out by Porphyry in the *De Abstinentia* (4.18) that if all the world were virtuous, there would be no constitution, just as, if all were king, life would be impossible. But, as things are clearly quite otherwise, government, and monarchical government at that, is necessary. The ruler, then, and not the society under him, becomes the main object of attention.

Law, after it lost its position of prominence in the *polis*, could be denigrated in favour of a preferred alternative, such as *Logos*, but *nomos* as a term was never completely dispensed with. It could be personified in the king, or be weakened to mean custom or imply some sort of moral injunction. But it could certainly no longer stand up as an alternative to monarchy, as it had seemed to do at one stage in the fourth century. Law as regulations arrived at by the deliberations of a community no longer had a place in theory or public life. This left monarchical authority unchallenged, and even when the king is encouraged to abide by the laws, these are of course laws of his own making.

When our writers describe monarchical government, they devote a large proportion of their work to accounts of the ruler's personal qualities, clearly assuming that this was the most important part of
government. There is considerable agreement among the writers about the qualities they consider it desirable for the ruler to possess. Self-control and beneficence are two particularly significant virtues, one a characteristic considered desirable in all, and revealing that the ruler is expected to display private morality of a high order, the other what we might consider a virtue especially appropriate to a public figure. Yet this quality is one that stresses the arbitrary ad hoc way in which a king was expected to run his kingdom, guiding himself by kindly impulses in personal relations with his subjects rather than acting according to a fixed norm. The ruler's position is frequently described in terms from which the reference to power is absent, and which make him seem almost the servant of his subjects, in a position none of them would crave for themselves if they were aware of its difficulties. This helps to turn our attention away from actual monarchies where power is significant, to contemplate the ideal ruler working by persuasion and not force.

The impression we receive on reading these accounts is that the ruler is the ideal man, and even his society-related characteristics, such as philanthropia, are meant to give him a chance to display his virtue rather than to relate him structurally to his subjects. Describing him often gives writers the opportunity to express their views on the philosophic hero, frequently cast in the Stoic mould.

One of the most emotionally appealing ways of describing how government works is, as we saw in the Introduction, by the use of key images, which can also determine what qualities the ruler is expected to display. Whereas Plato and Aristotle could see government in terms of either an organism or a craft, our later writers use a range of images almost all of which have the effect of placing the ruler above or over against his subjects. Rarely does the organic image of the state appear and when it does it is soon displaced. Instead the ruler resembles the possessors of expertise and authority in particular fields. This distracts our attention from the power relationship existing between a king and his subjects. Many of the images convey an impression of purely moral suasion, when, by a sympathetic figure such as father or shepherd, a writer anticipates and deflects potential criticism of autocratic rule.
The roles to which monarchical rule is compared are of course ones where the practitioner has a control which is undisputed in ordinary life. In one way, however, this concentration on these metaphors devalued kingship as one independent form of government among others, especially when, as often happened, both king and sage could be described in the same way.

Kings, for all our writers, have some kind of religious significance, but the nature of it varies considerably from being predominantly ethical, when kings are seen as appointed by God because of their virtue, and closest to Him when they imitate Him best, to mystical where a dynamic and personal expression of the deity is mediated through the ruler to his subjects. In all cases, however, a divine mandate to rule, even if it does not vest or presuppose divine characteristics in a ruler, makes him something other than an earthly ruler whose government could be set alongside that in a democracy or an aristocracy, and who could be judged by the people as leaders, in governments using these forms, are judged.

A ruler, related to God by his goodness, is easily transformed into the good man as such when a writer is discussing him, and his strictly political personality vanishes; if his position is more elevated than this he becomes a heroic figure for whom earthly rule is of little real account. Our writers paid lavish compliments to their ideal ruler, particularly where he was considered to be embodied in the ruler to whom the work was addressed, but they stopped short of acclaiming the ruler as divine in an independent, and absolute sense. But for the point we wish to make this is not as significant as the fact that the religious emphasis does, by implication or explicitly, justify monarchy as imitation of Zeus' rule, and short-circuit objections to the institution itself.

The king whose basic qualification for office is that he is wise is no true political figure, part of a society and a state. It is one step further for the philosopher to acquire the traits of ruling of the monarch. Thus it comes about that one who has apparently no connections with government may be the only true governor, and retirement is actually the height of activity.
The writers whom we have looked at composed works in which kingship was avowedly praised, for the most part considering it to be the obvious and best way for people to be governed. Yet what they commend has little in common with the types of kingship that Aristotle examined in the *Politics*, and certainly we gain few insights into the society which the king was to rule. Problems of power relationships are presumed not to exist, which is one way of overcoming them in theory! This of course is not simply part of a propaganda effort, but expresses a particular attitude to government as a mental, emotional and moral fact, but not an institutional one. What concerns these writers, not all equally, but all to a marked extent, is the individual they are examining, whom they create after their own ideal of lofty manhood.

These men have narrowed their options in the political arena. Instead of discussing the range of constitutions and comparing them, they show interest only in the one form. (This does not apply of course to Cicero, or, in some parts of their works, to Isocrates and Xenophon, but they too are apt to discuss even other forms in a way which lends itself to language about the sovereign as one individual.)

They have then limited themselves further, for their one man does not stand revealed as the summit of a society whose intricacies we come to understand as we analyse his manner of government. The individual had come into his own in philosophy in fourth-century Greece, as he did indeed in history as well, and such a person, although he must have had relations with others, is best seen as self-sufficient, and even isolated by his very eminence. He then becomes easier to analyse in simplistic terms. Just as the individual whom the writers understood best was a private person, because most of them were acting in a limited local sphere, so the 'king' had many of the qualities appropriate to such an individual.

We have sought to demonstrate through the use of representative writers how what had been an independent form of debate and discussion on government came to be simply a means for dealing with topics other than the political, under the heading of kingship. There was an obvious need to concentrate on the one person to be depicted, since the outstanding personality was the one that mattered at all levels, now that
the community no longer absorbed a citizen's energies, making him content to be an anonymous part of the whole. If the writer could not himself be this self-sufficient, self-regulating individual, he could at least describe his ideal, who now seemed realizable only in the king.

Some of the writers, particularly the neo-Pythagoreans, emphasize the formal, institutional aspect of monarchy more than do the others, providing almost a mystique of kingship. It may appear more difficult to consider the king they describe in detachment from the paraphernalia of actual government. But the difference is not as striking as the fact that both groups of theorists are after all describing the same sort of person, who is the society he rules, who is wise and good and linked in a special way to the divine order.

There will probably always be controversy over the precise relationship between political theory and practice, between those like Michel, who claim that the Roman principate was born of philosophical speculation, and those such as Syme who vigorously deny any such influence, and see theory following practice. Obviously theorists do not write in an historical vacuum, but equally rulers must appeal to theory in some form to serve as propaganda for their regime. In most

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2 'C'est la nature du régime qui justifie son (i.e. Seneca's) attitude puisque le principat était né d'une réflexion philosophique — et qu'on ne peut guère s'arrêter à mi-chemin de la philosophie', Michel, La Philosophie politique, p.52, and see Syme's The Roman Revolution (2nd ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956), passim.

Béranger shares Michel's view of the importance to be attached to theoretical influence on the imperial government (Béranger, 'Cicéron précurseur politique', p.115): 'Tel fut le principat impérial, mélange de l'excellent et du pire, mais toujours, sous une influence dont il ne peut s'affranchir, ramené à ses origines philosophiques.'

3 Rostovtzeff even goes so far as to claim (and in our view he claims too much) that the speeches of Dio 'expounded a programme on which the emperors and the intellectual leaders of Roman imperial society were agreed', Rostovtzeff, SEHRE, p.131.

Kaerst provides an account of how this apparent similarity of interests could have originally come about, stressing the ethical content of both the philosophic and kingly ideal. (Both ideals were of course developed by philosophers.) 'Wenn der Philosoph in bezug auf seine Person das unbedingte und souveräne Recht des auf sich selbst gestellten, aber vernünftig denkenden und handelnden Individuums behauptete, so konnte dieses individuelle Recht nun doch auch von einem politischen Herrscher auf Grund seiner persönlichen Stellung und Überlegenheit geltend gemacht werden, namentlich wenn durch die Rücksicht auf das Wohl der Unterthanen die Notwendigkeit einer absoluten Herrschaft...
cases, we may surmise a two-way influence, and it is not surprising to find rulers claiming credit for behaviour as an individual, and not just as the most efficient monarch.

An example of the confusion that the use of political language can cause when we know that we may expect to meet with it in many contexts, not all political, is the current disagreement over whether adherents of Stoic philosophy were really interested in government, or were simply describing a spiritual ruler. Perhaps the Stoics themselves, as well as other theorists, would not have considered these as mutually exclusive alternatives. They discussed kingship in terms of a ruler's spiritual hegemony, convinced that they were considering the essence of rule. If a king in the political sense chose to follow

4 Kaerst is not so sure about the influence of the theory on the practice: 'Wenn wir noch einmal zusammenfassend auf das Verhältnis der philosophischen Theorie zu der hellenistischen Monarchie hinweisen, so müssen wir hervorheben, dass wir eine direkte Beeinflussung dieser durch jene nur in sehr beschränktem Masse annehmen können', Die Entwicklung, p.63.

5 Thus Brehier concludes: 'Les Stoïciens sont les premiers à faire une distinction qui, dans leur pensée, est nette, mais qui peut encore être obscurcie par le double sens du mot Polis: lorsqu'ils parlent de la cité cosmique, ils ne veulent entendre rien de pareil à un empire d'Alexandre étendu jusqu'aux bornes du monde; il s'agit pour eux de relations interhumaines, indépendantes de toute forme politique. Mais ils emploient, pour les désigner, le vocabulaire politique, n'en ayant pas d'autre à leur disposition', Bréhier, Chrysippe, p.263.

6 This applies of course to other than the Stoics, but it is particularly important to take account of it in their works. 'La negazione della monarchia nella teoria stoica (where this does occur)
their recommendations, well and good. But if not, the principles were just as valid and could be applied by any individual who fulfilled the other qualifications for rule.

Were we to discover works by members of the 'Stoic opposition' of the first century A.D., we might find that there was a Stoic theory of government that was antipathetic to monarchy and not just on pragmatic grounds. But from what we know of the writings from this circle, it is likely that these Stoics composed only biographies of their hero-martyrs, in this respect showing some similarity to writers of mirrors of kingship.

Occasionally we do find traces of the political reality which these writers were generally so careful to ignore. Dio Chrysostom, in his Borysthenic Oration, is concerned with the social problem of the urban poor in Greece, and offers suggestions on how they might be gainfully and respectably employed. On one occasion he can even provide a practical list of kingly qualities and duties, where the king does appear as a public figure (3.127: 'the ruler ... attends to some matters needing his supervision, acts promptly where speed is needed, accomplishes something not easy of accomplishment, reviews an army, subdues a province, founds a city, bridges rivers, or builds roads through a country'). So too Aristides can imply that the king's tasks include 'putting contributions in taxes, men or ships on a permanent basis', and 'conducting affairs by a routine administration with automatic progress and fixed periods of time' (see R.O. 26). Pliny stresses more than most the ruler's military duties, and Plutarch sometimes gives practical details on municipal government.

However, comments relating the ideal portrait of the king to the actual day-to-day business of government are exceptions. When even Plutarch could assert that without the organs of government, men could live decently so long as they observed the dictates of religion and true philosophy, we see that the real interest of theorists like him was in the spiritual order which made institutional arrangements for government non tiene conto abbastanza della sottile identificazione, per così dire, fra sovrano ideale ed "ἄνηρ βασιλεύως", rimanendo sempre sul terreno teorico, che è l'unico, che possieda un valore assoluto', Andreotti, 'Per una Critica', p.292, note 154.
of secondary importance (see Mor. 1124d-e).\textsuperscript{7} Political life was useful if it served the desired end\textsuperscript{8} but was only a means, not important of itself as a representation of the social interaction in a community. Monarchy was rarely seen, now, as one among other forms of government. The monarch stood outside such comparison, affecting his subjects by means of his personality.\textsuperscript{9}  

His was an essentially a-historical figure,\textsuperscript{10} since the personality

\textsuperscript{7} See also 1125d-e: εὖροις δ' ἄν ἐπίλων πόλεως ἀτελχόστους, ἀγραμμάτους, ἀβασιλεύτους, ἀνάκαυστος, νομίσματος μὴ δεομένας, ἀπεδροσθείρων καὶ γυμνασίων· ἀνέλειφο ἐπὶ πόλεως καὶ ἄδεου, μὴ χρωμένης εὐχαίς μὴ ὄρκους μὴν μαντεῖας μὴν ὀδύσεις ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῖς μὴ ἀποτροπαῖς καίῳν ὀδέες ἐστιν ὀδὸ ἑστώς γεγονός θεωτής.

\textsuperscript{8} 'Die aktive Teilnahme am Staatsleben ist nur soweit berechtigt oder erwünscht, als jene αὐτοκρατομα nicht behindert wird. Insbesondere war dem Anscheine nach die politische Thätigkeit des Weisen (mehr als in der ᾿Οκρατικ-,πλατωνιστικής Πολιτική, in der wir ja auch schon bedeutende Ansätze hierzu gefunden haben) durch die Möglichkeit begründet, für Verbreitung der Tugend zu wirken, und zwar im Sinne der jetzt immer stärker zur Herrschaft gelangenden individuellen Sittlichkeit, so dass das staatliche Leben mehr als Mittel und Werkzeug, weniger als Selbstzweck galt', Kaerst, Die Entwicklung, p.69.

The model was also largely Greek in origin, as has often been pointed out: 'A l'ombre d'une doctrine condensant la sagesse d'une civilisation, un système original romain du principat n'a pu se développer. Le princeps-γεμισαμίου du monument d'Ancyre s'est étiole devant le βασιλέας des philosophes et finalement lui a cédé la place. Tandis que seuls les théoriciens étudiaient en vase clos le souverain idéal, les peuples s'accommodaient de la réalité politique: l'omnipotence de l'impérator — αὐτοκράτορ' , Béranger, 'Pour une définition du principat: Auguste dans Aulu-Gelle, XV, 7, p.154.

Speaking of the political philosophers of the early second century, Sirinelli comments: 'Soulignons encore que, sauf Pline le Jeune qui apportera en quelque sorte l'hommage des Romains, tous ces doctrinaires sont des Grecs ou tout au moins de culture grecque. C'est assez dire que les thèmes qu'ils développent puisent leur origine dans la tradition hellénique ou hellénistique et sont adaptés de près ou de loin à la situation particulière de l'empereur' (in Touchard's Histoire des idées politiques, I, p.88).

\textsuperscript{9} 'Le souverain idéal est "écrasé de soucis", contrairement au tyran qui ne recherche que le plaisir. Sans quitter la place, nous assistons à la controverse philosophique qui sévit depuis Platon. La légitimité ne repose pas sur des institutions, mais sur la valeur morale du souverain', Béranger, Recherches, p.195.

The principate 'consiste ... dans l'exercice permanent d'une auctoritas sans rival, c'est-à-dire dans la possession d'un privilège de nature morale autant que politique et purement personnel, nous voulons dire attaché à la personne du prince ... bien plutôt qu'à ses fonctions', Gagè 'De César à Auguste', p.289.

\textsuperscript{10} 'Zu einem organischen Neuaufbau des antiken Staates eignete sich
of the monarch described was made up of elements which remained, for the most part, constant, and so we should not be surprised to find Marcus Aurelius not feeling obliged to carry over into his administration of the Empire the qualities he strove to acquire as a private individual. At the other end of the social spectrum we see Epictetus, for whom freedom no longer meant freedom from arbitrary rule, but interior freedom and self-rule.

This view of true rulership lasted long after the Empire had become thoroughly bureaucratized and the monarch's personality could have counted for very little with his subjects. Philostratus in his Life of Apollonius of Tyana uses just such imagery and descriptions of the ideal king as we have found in our writers, and after the Empire had become Christian, the language was surprisingly little changed.

We believe that the works we have examined, which either have kingship as their theme or else refer to it in some detail in the course of their treatment of other topics, carry forward these views. Bavarian courts of the 9th and 10th centuries, as well as those of China, Japan, and indeed Greece, continued to use similar ideas in their thinking about the ideal ruler. The works we have examined, which either have kingship as their theme or else refer to it in some detail in the course of their treatment of other topics, carry forward these views.

11 See G.R. Stanton, 'Marcus Aurelius, Emperor and Philosopher', Historia, 18 (1969) 570-87, and note the comment of Sirinelli: 'Sur son métier d'empereur, aucune indication; on dirait qu'il s'épuise tout entier dans la pratique de la justice, vertu générale, ou dans ce devoir d'activité sociale qu'il prêche pour chacun. La morale a complètement absorbé la réflexion politique', Touchard, Histoire des idées politiques, I, p.91.

12 'In the first place freedom to him was an ethical rather than a political concept. Politically it was a passive thing', Chester G. Starr, 'Epictetus and the Tyrant', CPh, 44 (1949), p.26.


Many of the speeches of Themistius also show the language of the kingship theory we have examined applied to Christian emperors. See on this the article by Vladimir Valdenberg, 'Discours politiques de...
of examining a broader topic, are all representative of their times. We have found that they all fail to provide a genuinely political theory of autocratic rule. What they do give is an often interesting, if repetitive account of individual excellence, corresponding to the ideal of the age.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{14} Reese well notes of the writings on kingship of the Hellenistic Age: 'Originally, these tracts were written by philosophers to provide prudent pedagogical advice for the reigning monarch or heir apparent. But soon productions of this genre became the ordinary vehicle for tracing the moral ideal of Hellenism in the form of a mirror for the wise and benevolent king, ideal of the true philosopher', Reese, \textit{Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and its Consequences} (Biblical Institute Press, Rome, 1970), p.72.
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