EVIDENTIALITY IN LAMJUNG YOLMO

Lauren Gawne
Nanyang Technological University
<lgawne@ntu.edu.sg>

Abstract

Lamjung Yolmo is a Tibeto-Burman language of the Bodish branch spoken in Nepal. Like related languages it has a verbal system that includes evidential distinctions. In this paper I look at the role of these evidentials in interaction, and in relation to other features of grammar. These features include their relationship to events, interaction with subject person, endopathic verbs and negative polarity. I also look at constructions with no overt evidential marking, and evidential elision, to give a more rounded representation of the role of evidentiality for speakers of Lamjung Yolmo, and explore its role in audience perception of utterances.

Keywords: Tibeto-Burman, Yolmo, evidentiality

ISO 639-3 codes: scp

1 Introduction

Evidentiality is a well attested feature of Tibeto-Burman languages (LaPolla 2003b), particularly within the Bodish branch. In this paper I examine the evidential forms in the Lamjung variety of Yolmo (ISO 639-3 SCP), with particular focus on their relationship to other features of the grammar and the role they play in interaction. In taking this broader focus I hope to help drive forward the discussion on evidentiality in this linguistic area, and demonstrate that evidentiality cannot be analysed in isolation.

Descriptions of the forms and functions of evidentiality are well represented for Tibeto-Burman languages (Caplow 2000; Garrett 2001; LaPolla 2003a; Grunow-Härsta 2007; Hongladarom 2007; Hyslop 2011; Lidz 2007; Willis 2007), and I have given a basic description of the copulas in Lamjung Yolmo (Gawne, forthcoming). As Tournadre and LaPolla (2014) observe “Simply saying evidentials mark source of information does not capture all of the actual uses of evidential marking”. Instead, like them I take a much broader approach to what needs to be considered when discussing the use of evidentiality. In this paper I focus on a number of systems with which evidentiality interacts, including person-marking, endopathic verbs and negation to give a more nuanced picture of how speakers of Lamjung Yolmo use these forms in interaction. I also look at constructions without evidential marking, and elision of evidential forms, as well as listener perception of evidentiality, to give a more rounded picture of evidential use in the language.

Yolmo is a Central Bodish language spoken in Nepal (Hari 2010). The majority of Yolmo speakers are from the Helambu and Melamchi Valleys area north of Kathmandu, but there are around 700 speakers from half a dozen villages who reside in Lamjung, over 100kms from the original

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1 Yolmo is also known as Yohlmo, Hyolmo and Helambu Sherpa.
settlement. These Yolmo speakers have lived in Lamjung for around 100 years, and while their language is still highly mutually intelligible with the Yolmo of the Melamchi and Helambu Valleys there are some lexical and syntactic differences. Yolmo is also closely related to Kyirong (ISO 639-3 KGY, Huber 2005) and Kagate (ISO 639-3 SYW, Gawne 2013b)

Examples of Lamjung Yolmo are drawn from a corpus of elicited and naturalistic data, archived with Paradisec (catalog.paradisec.org.au/collections/LG1). Each example includes a reference with the speaker initials and the archival file number of the recording, which is also the date. One example in this paper comes from a written record, and is marked accordingly. Naturalistic examples also include a time code.

2 Evidentiality in Lamjung Yolmo

In this paper I will look the interactional use of evidentiality in Lamjung Yolmo, and a number of grammatical features with which it interacts to create complex patterns and distribution in usage. I begin by introducing the evidential forms, their semantics and basic functions in Section 2.1. I then explore how they interact with different event types (§2.2), grammatical subject (§2.3), endopathic verbs (§2.4) and negation (§2.5). These topics all explore how people choose the appropriate evidential form in interaction. In Section 2.6 I look at utterances with no marked evidential value, either through an evidentially unmarked grammatical structure, or elision of the evidential element in interaction. In Section 2.7 I examine the attention that interlocutors pay to the evidential forms people choose.

2.1 Lamjung Yolmo evidential forms

Lamjung Yolmo has a set of copula verbs. Not only do these verbs function as standard copulas, but like many Tibeto-Burman languages a subset are also used in auxiliary verb constructions (Anderson 2006) where they contribute modal information, which includes evidential categories. Copulas are not inflected for person, number or politeness level and many do not distinguish tense. Instead they have functions that include equation and existence.

Table 1 presents the copula forms in Lamjung Yolmo. The distinctions along the side denote functional distinctions, including arguments licensed and tense, while those along the top are the semantic distinctions. The negative form is presented beneath each affirmative form, and italicised.

**Table 1: The Lamjung Yolmo copula system**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Egophoric</th>
<th>Dubitative</th>
<th>Perceptual evidence</th>
<th>General fact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equation</td>
<td>yìmba mìn</td>
<td>yìndo mìn öl</td>
<td>(dùba) (minduba)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existential</td>
<td>yè mè</td>
<td>yêto méto</td>
<td>dù mindu dûba minduba</td>
<td>ôngge mëongge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>past</td>
<td>yèke yèba mèke mèba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in Table 1, only the existential egophoric copula has distinct forms that occur in the past tense. The yèba form is related to the lexical -pa past tense suffix. The yèke form cannot be morphologically analysed as the -ke suffix is a non-past tense suffix for lexical verbs.
Semantically, there are four different categories of copula verbs in Lamjung Yolmo. The first is the egophoric, which is similar to the Standard Tibetan egophoric in that it is an evidential form that encodes information that is known personally by the speaker (ego Garrett 2001; Tournadre 2008). It is different to Standard Tibetan though, as the speaker does not have to be either the subject or closely affiliated with the subject\(^2\) to use the form, giving it wider scope. The dubitative is an epistemic marker that indicates reduced certainty on the part of the speaker, it is not an inferential evidential as there is no focus on or source needed to make a statement with a dubitative, although it can be used in similar situations. The perceptual evidential is for all kinds of sensory evidence. That it draws attention to the sensory means that it draws attention to the act of perception, which means that it can contextually acquire a pragmatic sense of ‘newness’ of information that others have confused for mirativity in related languages (DeLancey 1986; Hill 2012). The general fact copula is for those very generally known facts about the world, such as sugar being sweet. It is not frequently used in daily interaction. That the system includes copula forms that are epistemic (the dubitative) as well as evidential is one indicator that evidentiality is not a grammatical category that exists in isolation, but is part of the larger repertoire of modal options that speakers can draw on in interaction (see Gawne 2013a for a more detailed discussion).

Functionally, equational copulas are used in constructions that equate two noun phrases. The existential forms are used in existential constructions, but also in locational, possessive and attributive constructions as well, which is common for Tibeto-Burman existential copulas (Genetti 2007: 190; Hari 2010; Caplow 2000; Garrett 2001). There are distinct forms for each of these functions for the egophoric and the dubitative. The general fact copula only appears in existential-type constructions and has no corresponding equational form. The perceptual evidential is used on rare occasion by speakers as an equational, and this appears to be at the periphery of acceptable use.

The copula does not only function as the main verb of a sentence; those in the bolded box within Table 1 can also function as an auxiliary in certain constructions. This is a common use of copulas in Tibeto-Burman languages and is also found in Melamchi Valley Yolmo (Hari 2010: 60) and Sherpa (Kelly 2004: 351). This subset of copula verbs can be used to add tense information as well as epistemic information about the evidential status of the utterance. The structures that include copulas as auxiliaries are perfective and imperfective, habitual and narrative past. In the examples presented below copulas that are used as auxiliaries are glossed AUX. I do not focus on the nature of the auxiliary constructions, but on the evidential contribution of the form to the utterance.

Table 1 presents an initial challenge for discussing evidentiality in Lamjung Yolmo. The first limitation is that this paradigm does not include all of the evidential forms in Lamjung Yolmo. Like many other Tibeto-Burman languages, Yolmo also has a reported speech particle\(^3\) ló that operates external to this set. Therefore, the evidential forms do not exist in one clear syntactic category that can be examined in isolation. I do not discuss the reported speech evidential in any detail in this paper, but it presents its own interactionally complex patterns of use, and is discussed in detail in Gawne (2013a). The second challenge is that this is not exclusively a set of choices between evidential forms; the dubitative form is epistemic. The relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality has been a matter of on-going debate. Some consider evidentiality to be a completely separate

\(^2\) As one reviewer noted, the notion of ‘subject’ is problematic in Tibetic languages, a better term may be something like ‘main speech act participant’ (Zeisler 2012, Tournadre 2014), however for this paper a broad idea of subject captures the main distinction between the egophoric in Tibetan and Lamjung Yolmo.

\(^3\) The Tibeto-Burman forms are discussed as ‘hearsay’ or ‘inferential’, and may be clitics or suffixes instead of free particles. Matisoff (2003: 663) reconstructs *dz(y)ay as a ‘quotative particle’ in Proto-Tibeto-Burman, demonstrating a long areal presence.
phenomenon to modality (de Haan 1997, 2001a; Aikhenvald 2004); a second perspective is to subsume evidentiality within the category of epistemic modality (Bhat 1999); and a third is to consider evidentiality as a category within modality, on an equal footing to epistemic modality (Palmer 2001). In this paper I demonstrate that when we look at these forms in use in Lamjung Yolmo, it becomes difficult to argue that they are entirely functionally distinct categories.

2.2 Evidentials and events
The description of the copula verbs above demonstrates the broad differences in their functions. When we look more closely at how they are used in interaction, it becomes apparent that these basic features lead to the different forms being used for different events. As I demonstrate in this section, the differences lead to additional pragmatic features of these forms. In this regard I pay particular attention to the egophoric and the perceptual evidential, which are the two most frequently used copula categories. In this section I also demonstrate that while these forms are used in different contexts, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive in the contexts in which they can be used - instead speakers can choose to highlight their stance towards an event in the choice of copula they use. As Tournadre and LaPolla (2014) have also emphasised, evidentiality is not about objective evidence, but speakers’ subjective interactional stance, and what they wish to foreground.

The first difference between the perceptual evidential and the egophoric is the specificity of the event being referred to. The deictic function of the perceptual evidential dì is to point to a specific instance of perception involving a specific event.

(1) dì mì thómbo dù
this person tall COP.PE.NEG
‘this person is tall’ (AL 100924-01)

(2) dì mì thómbo yè
this person tall COP.EGO.NEG
‘this person is tall’ (AL 100924-01)

If a person uses the perceptual evidential when describing a tall person, they are referring to a specific incident of seeing a tall person. The event of someone being tall is not a specific event, as it is a property of that person, but the event of seeing this tall person is the specific event that the evidential is indicating. This has also been frequently observed in analyses of the cognate ‘dug in Standard Tibetan (Goldstein & Nornang 1970; Denwood 1999; Garrett 2001: 86, see also Caplow 2000: 20 for Dokpa Tibetan). In all of these analyses a specific instance of perception contrasts with knowledge that has some duration. In Lamjung Yolmo the egophoric evidential points to the person’s own knowledge, and therefore the deictic reference is not to a specific event of perceiving a tall person, but the knowledge state of an individual about the tall person.

The two examples below more clearly illustrate this contrast in the specificity of an event. Example (3) would be used if a person does not have children. Example (4) on the other hand would be used if a speaker did not have their children present at the time of the utterance. This is because the egophoric is for personally known information, while the perceptual points to a specific instance of an event, i.e. the non-presence of the children, but this does not also mean that beyond this event the speaker does not have children.

(3) pìza mè
child COP.EGO.NEG
‘I don’t have children’ (RL 110129-01)

(4)  *pi za mindu*
    child COP.PE.NEG
‘my children aren’t here’ (RL 110129-01)

The egophoric is also preferred for habitual actions, which is further evidence that it is preferred for non-specific events, as opposed to the perceptual evidential, which is preferred for more specific, individual instances.

The second difference between the perceptual and egophoric categories is the level of engagement with the context. By using the egophoric copula and deictically referring to their own knowledge, the speaker is showing that they have more personal knowledge of the context than if they had used the perceptual evidential, which involves pointing to something that they have perceived, indicating that someone else could also see what they are talking about. This means that for (2) the person speaking would have to be acquainted with the tall subject of the sentence so as to know they are tall. It should be noted that this is not on the level of close personal proximity as the egophoric in Tibetan, which would involve the speaker being closely related to the subject. Instead the relationship between the speaker and the subject is not as rigid, simply that the speaker knows the person, without necessarily any personal connection. This is a wider version of Garrett’s (2001: 41) concept of ‘intimacy’ in of Standard Tibetan. The more personally acquainted with the knowledge a speaker is, the more appropriate the use of the egophoric becomes. Caplow (2000: 51) notes for Dokpa that it is possible to make copula choices to express a greater sense of involvement in an event. By using personal evidentials (equivalent to Lamjung Yolmo egophoric) to describe the states or activities of others, the speaker can indicate a personal connection in a way that using the perceptual evidential does not capture.

The final distinction between the egophoric and perceptual copulas is that of a newly perceived event. This builds upon what we have already observed in relation to the specificity of an event and the speaker’s intimacy with the event, and stems from the fact that speakers prefer to only mark something as perceived if the act of perception was recent.

To return to the descriptions of the tall person in (1), the perceptual evidential would be used if the tall person was a new acquaintance, or someone who has grown tall since you last saw them. This is because after a period of time it is not necessary to flag the specific instance of seeing the tall person (and their remarkable height); instead the egophoric would suffice. The perceptual evidential therefore predominantly marks recently perceived information, in contrast to the information that already exists as part of an individual’s personal knowledge. This has also been observed in the cognate form in Standard Tibetan (Tournadre 2008: 298; Vokurková 2008: 111) as well as Kyirong (Huber 2005).

That there is a sense of newness should not be confused with mirativity. DeLancey (1997: 33) defines mirativity as information “new or surprising to the speaker, regardless of whether the information source is first- or second-hand.” In the examples above, the perceptual evidential in Lamjung Yolmo includes only events directly perceived by the speaker, so we can discount the ‘second-hand’ information part of the definition. The difference between ‘new’ and ‘surprising’ information is worth considering, as they are quite different. While speakers may often use the perceptual evidential to show that something is newly perceived they are not necessarily surprised by these events, or lack “psychological preparation” (DeLancey 1997: 35) to deal with the events they are describing. Also, to describe these forms as ‘mirative’ is to take away from the fact that their primary function is to indicate perceptual evidence (see Hill 2012 for a more detail discussion with regard to Standard Tibetan). Others have separated out newness and surprise in their discussions of
perceptual evidentials in closely related languages, including Huber (2005) in her discussion of Kyirong and Zeisler (2000: 39-40), who takes into account a number of different Tibetic languages.

Although the perceptual evidential forms in Lamjung Yolmo are not grammatical miratives, there are some specific instances where we see them used with a strong sense of surprise, or counter-expectation. This is most frequently the role of the emphatic dúba form. Examples elicited for different contexts can show how they are used. The two examples below could be used as statements about the location of the speaker’s child. Sentence (5) would be used if a mother had left her child in someone else’s village and knew that the child was being looked after. Example (6) would be used if the mother expected that her child was at home, and found that instead the child was at another person’s house. The choice of the emphatic perceptual evidential over the regular perceptual evidential indicates that the information in (6) is not only new to the speaker, but also surprising. This would be further emphasised by an increase in pitch and volume, and other communicative indicators such as the accompanying gestures.

(5) ṅà=ki píza khé=ki yùl=la yè
1SG=GEN child 2SG=GEN village=LOC COP.EGO
‘my child is in your village’ (SKL 101023-06)

(6) ṅà=ki píza khé=ki yùl=la dúba
1SG=GEN child 2SG=GEN village=LOC COP.PE.EMPH
‘my child is in your village!’ (SKL 101023-06)

This distinction can also be illustrated with more naturalistic examples. In this recording, I was performing a brief magic trick for AL. In this performed activity, I showed her the empty bag, and demonstrated for her that there was nothing inside. She observed this empty state (7) before I made a bank note ‘appear’ in the bag, and then she exclaimed (8).

(7) nà=la tso àŋ mindu tòŋba-řaŋ du
inside none COP.PE.NEG empty- EMPH COP.PE
‘there is nothing inside, it is empty’ (AL 110217-03 01:50)

(8) (laughs) ḡaŋa-řaŋ dúba
money-EMPH COP.PE.NEG
(laughs) ‘there is money’ (AL 110217-03 02:02)

Here the speaker expected an empty bag and had observed the state with the perceptual evidential, however the appearance of the money was contrary to her expectations (as indicated by the laughter, and exclamation immediately afterwards that her daughter should come and see the trick, as well as by the use of the emphatic dúba).

These examples demonstrate the kind of psychological unpreparedness that DeLancey sees as key to mirativity. It is, however, only one use of the dúba form, which also has a non-past and an interrogative function, which may also relate to some of the features that make it effective as a marker of counter-expectation in interaction. There are also intonation cues such as increase in speech volume for others to tell that speaker is surprised. At best we can only say that in Lamjung Yolmo what DeLancey defines as mirativity is a pragmatic extension of the perceptual evidential, and not a core feature of its semantics.

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The examples above show that different contexts call for either an egophoric copula or a perceptual evidential. Although they are the two most commonly used forms, neither can really be considered the ‘default’ different contexts call for different preferred forms.

2.3 Evidentials and person
The nature of evidentiality is such that the relationship between the speaker and the subject of an utterance influences the evidential form used. As we see in examples (9)-(11) the first person forms will often occur with egophoric, because this is the most appropriate evidential form to use for actions you perform, as you have personal knowledge of these actions. The perceptual evidential is more appropriate for second and third person subjects because you are a witness to their actions.\(^4\)

(9) ỳà tó sà-teraŋ yè
1SG rice.cooked eat-IPFV AUX.PE
‘I am eating rice’ (AL 100929-01)

(10) khé tó sà-ku dû
2SG rice.cooked eat-IPFV AUX.PE
‘You are eating rice’ (AL 100929-01)

(11) khó tó sà-ku dû
3SG rice.cooked eat-IPFV AUX.PE
‘He is eating rice’ (AL 100929-01)

This type of patterning is similar to that of ‘conjunct/disjunct’ or ‘egophoricity’ systems (Hale 1980, DeLancey 1992, Floyd et al. forthcoming), in that first person is distinct from second and third person through a self/other distinction this is accompanied by an interrogative structure where second person subjects in questions hold the same egophoric value as the first person declaratives. Lamjung Yolmo the mechanism is the egophoric evidential, and the question structure also occurs. I argue elsewhere (Gawne 2013a, in prep) that these analyses are limited, because they do not account for the full relationship between the evidential forms and different subjects, or the full relationship between evidential forms and other grammatical features. Although some elements of the discussion in this section will be familiar to readers acquainted with the conjunct/disjunct and egophoricity literature, I do not present them within such terms.

Lamjung Yolmo speakers can also encode surprise at their own non-volitional actions with the perceptual evidential, as per (12), although this form would be marked to draw attention to the unexpectedness of their own dancing. Example (12) would be appropriate if the speaker had intended to not dance all evening and found themselves pulled into the action.

(12) ỳà tàpse tchám-ku dû
1SG now dance-IPFV AUX.PE
‘I appear to be dancing’ (RL 110204-03)

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\(^4\) Two different imperfective forms are used in these constructions. Both indicate an event with internal duration, and it has not been possible to date to determine if any difference exist in their semantics. The -ku form can only occur with the perceptual evidential, while the -teraj form can occur with the egophoric, perceptual or dubitative, which accounts for their distribution to some extent. For more discussion of the past/non-past tense forms and perfective/imperfective aspectual forms see Gawne 2013a, forthcoming.
As Hargreaves (1991, 2005) showed for Kathmandu Newar, the semantics of the perceptual and egophoric evidentials in Lamjung Yolmo interact with the volitionality of the action. The egophoric cannot be used for first person non-volitional because the speaker’s knowledge of the event is not drawn from their existent knowledge state. Although volitionality is not a strong component of the semantic distinction of these verbs with first person, it is still one of the dimensions on which they operate.

There are some contexts in which the same copula is used regardless of the person-marking of the subject. For example, when talking about a person’s name the egophoric is used if you are talking about your own name, the name of your interlocutor or another person (13)-(14).

(13) ŋà=gi min rádz yimba
1SG=ERG name Raj COP.EGO
‘my name is Raj’ (RL 110204-03)

(14) khó=gi min sòm yimba
3SG.M=ERG name Som COP.EGO
‘his name is Som’ (RL 110129-01)

When we consider that the perceptual evidential is only used when there is external evidence of something (or internal evidence for first person subject endopathic verbs, see Section 2.4) then it makes sense that speakers would use the egophoric for all speakers, as there is no external evidence of what a person’s name is. There are some fringe cases where the perceptual might be appropriate, such as reading a name tag of a person whose name you were not sure of, but speakers were reluctant to agree with such scenarios, perhaps because it was quite specific, unlikely and not a particularly polite interactive move.

The perceptual evidential can be used for volitional first person actions, as long as another self undertakes those actions. Example (15) would be appropriate if the speaker was looking at a photograph or a video of themselves at a funeral, lighting one of the many butter candles that are burned during the ceremonial proceedings:

(15) ŋà=gi bòti pár-tera dü
1SG=ERG candle(Nep) light-IPFV AUX.PE
‘I am lighting a candle’ (RL 29/10/10 book 4, p. 18)

In this example there is never any doubt that the speaker was acting volitionally in the image. The perceptual evidential is not being used because of a lack of volition, it is being used as its semantics indicate, for a witnessed event. This is only possible because the speaker is referring to an image of himself lighting a candle. It is not the action, but the perception of the action that is the focus here. Garrett (2001: 78, 166) also discusses scenarios where speakers use the perceptual evidential when talking about another version of oneself, such as in an image or video, as do Denwood (1999) and Tournadre (1998, 2003).

2.4 Endopathic verbs
Endopathic verbs offer an example of how the choice of copula form can interact with the semantics of other verbs in an utterance. Endopathic verbs are a subset of verbs relating to internal feelings, cognitive processes and sensations. Examples include kyáa ‘feel cold’, tóo ‘feel hungry’ and tèmba sàl ‘remember’. This class of verb differs from other verbs in that they are used with the perceptual
evidential for first person subject, but the perception is personal and internal, and unobservable by others. Tournadre and LaPolla (2014) discuss endopathic as a type of sensory access, but one that is internal and not accessible to others. Talking about other people as having the same states and emotions cannot be done using the perceptual evidential copula, as it is not possible to have perceptual evidence of the internal states of others. In these situations the egophoric form is used instead. These parameters mean that endopathic verbs have a different general split in egophoric and perceptual evidential for first versus second and third person subjects; with the perceptual evidential being used for first person subjects and the egophoric forms being used for second and third person subjects. Tournadre (1996: 206, see also Tournadre and Dorje 2003: 197-198) observes this patterning for Standard Tibetan and forged the ‘endopathic’ terminology. It has also been discussed by Garrett (2001: 19) for Standard Tibetan and Caplow (2000: 23) for Dokpa. It appears to be a relatively common feature of the Tibetic branch of Tibeto-Burman languages.

There is one interesting example of the use of the egophoric copula with a second person endopathic verb in a declarative utterance in the Lamjung Yolmo corpus. In a telling of the story of the Jackal and Crow (Kelly & Gawne 2011) the crafty Jackal manages to get the crow to drop the fish he is holding by flattering him into singing. In his strategic flattery the Jackal declares that the Crow can sing (16).

(16) tsàro khé lú nèn cée yè
crow 2SG song sing know AUX.EGO
‘crow, you know how to sing songs’ (RL 101027-01 01:46)

Here the Jackal is presuming familiarity with the Crow’s (fictitious) ability to sing. In a second telling of the story, when the Crow shows reluctance to sing, the Jackal further goads him (17).

(17) lùndi làp-sin yimba ná kí
jackal say-PST COP.EGO PART or
khé=kí lú nèn mé-cée dìba
2SG=ERG song sing NEG.NON.PST-know AUX.PE.EMPH
‘(the) jackal said ‘perhaps you […] don’t know how to sing a song’5 (RL 101027-01 04:48)

Here the Jackal has shifted to the perceptual evidential to indicate that the Crow has provided no evidence of his ability to sing, indicating that he does not know how.

For first person, the use of the perceptual evidential for endopathic verbs does not occur if the utterance involves a habitual internal state or feeling (18). This is because of the focus on perception being related to a specific event as discussed in Section 2.2.

(18) còole jíma ðùmaraj ṇà=la tóo yè
morning sun every 1SG=DAT hunger COP.EGO
‘every morning I feel hungry’ (AL 091005-02)

There are also examples where the use of different copulas with some endopathic verbs can actually give rise to difference sense. To demonstrate, (19) would be uttered if the person was ill in a

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5 Note that the use of the egophoric in the first line of this utterance is a part of the fixed grammatical construction yimba ná kí that will not be discussed in this paper, but is examined in Gawne 2013a.
way that left no physical trace, such as a headache, while (20) would be for contexts where there were visible symptoms of the illness, such as vomiting, or sweating.

(19) mò nà-ti yè
3SG.F be.ill-PFV AUX.EGO
‘she became ill’ (AL 120127-01)

(20) mò nà-ku dù
3SG.F be.ill-IPFV AUX.PE
‘she appears ill’ (AL 120127-01)

Therefore, it is not just the fact that a verb is in the endopathic category, but also the accompanying evidential information, that determines whether it is endopathic in context. If ‘endopathic’ in Lamjung Yolmo is broader than a sub-set of verbs, this may indicates that what we see is a larger pattern in the conception of the cognitive delineation between ‘self’ and ‘other’ that is similar to Hargreaves’s (2011, 2012) analysis of internal state attribution in Kathmandu Newar. Hargreaves distinguishes between ‘self’ and ‘other’ in terms of knowledge structures, of which internal state attribution is one component. Such an analysis is concerned with looking at the way speakers construct knowledge attribution across the whole language. This treatment, rather than just a fixed list of ‘endopathic verbs’ in the grammar is a more holistic way of considering how people use these structures.

Garrett (2001: 80) observes that the judgments Standard Tibetan speakers have about endopathic verbs and their modal properties are “quite robust”. When I overtly discussed the preferred copulas for different verbs with Lamjung Yolmo speakers I also got quite consistent descriptions from them, on which the above analysis is based. The endopathic verbs are not necessarily a clear-cut set that are easily distinguishable from other verbs, which we can observe from a broader range of the corpus data. While the existence of endopathic verbs does appear to be robust, there are fringes where speakers’ reported usage is different to actual production.

Above I observed that endopathic verbs occur with perceptual evidential forms for first person subjects, however the use of egophoric evidentials for endopathic verbs with first person subjects appears to be at the fringes of general acceptable use. There are many examples such as those in (21) and (22) where first person constructions are given with the egophoric instead of the perceptual evidential.

(21) ŋà=ki née-teranja yè
1SG=ERG think-IPFV AUX.EGO
‘I am thinking’ (RL 110204-03)

(22) ŋà=ki sém há kò yè
1SG=GEN mind know AUX.EGO
‘I know’
(lit. ‘my mind knows’) (AL 120122-02)

It is possible that because speakers are producing these utterances in elicitation they are not referring to their own cognitive processes, but are using the egophoric to mark something more generic. Given how consistent the general attitude to endopathic verbs is amongst speakers, This is likely not the case. It is also possible in (22) that this is a more habitual or durative sense of knowing, or that the relationship between a person and their mind might be a complex internal state. It appears
that the boundary between what constitutes perceived knowledge that is internal to oneself and personal knowledge is a contextual gradation rather than grammatical absolutes.

2.5 Evidentials and negation

The relationship between the copula forms and negative polarity is worth considering, as the scope of the negation in relation to the propositional content and copula semantic is not always straightforward. This section provides a brief description of how negation and the semantics of the copula verbs interact. I have included this section because the relationship between negation and evidentiality is often overlooked in descriptions of these systems, the relationship to negation is also worth considering because it provides a different way of considering the relationship between evidentiality and modality, as I discuss below. All of the copulas in the paradigm have a single negative equivalent. This is different to lexical verbs, which have two different negative prefixes, with one being used for non-past and the other being used for past and imperative constructions.

For the egophoric copulas, the evidence is internal and tied to the assertions people make, and is not part of the scope of the negation. Below are examples of negated egophoric copulas, including both a copula of identification min (23) and one of existence mè (24). The speaker is not negating their knowledge state, but only the propositional content of the utterance.

(23) mó gòroṅ mìn
   3SG.F Gurung COP.EGO.NEG
   ‘she is not Gurung’ (AL 110217-02)

(24) ñà jāmu jāya mè
   1SG with money COP.EGO.NEG
   ‘I have no money with me’ (RL 120217-02)

In neither of these the participant can be said to be negating their own knowledge of the proposition they are putting forth, so we can say that the negation scopes does not include the evidential value of the utterance.

The dubitative forms in (25) and (26) also include both an identification form (mìnɗo) and an existential form (mè ɗo).

(25) kauli mìnɗo
    cauliflower(Nep) COP.DUB.NEG
    ‘it is probably not a cauliflower’ (SL 120214-02 10:44)

(26) mí ɗo mè ṭo
    person come COP.DUB.NEG
    ‘the person is probably not coming’ (RL 101028-04)

In this situation the negation has scope over the content of the clause, but not the possibility, so the evidential is not within the scope of the negation.

The perceptual evidential copulas have the clearest relationship between the evidential value and negation of all of the forms under consideration. Both of the utterances in (27) and (28) involve a person looking at the thing that is being referenced.
With the perceptual evidential in Lamjung Yolmo, it is not the act of perceiving that is negated, but the information that is being described with the perceptual evidential. Therefore, the negation does not incorporate the perceptual evidential.

The general fact copula has restricted use in Lamjung Yolmo, but speakers consistently use it in the appropriate context in elicitation. The negative form is presented in (29).

(29) kélay sè Ṯàrmu mèò ge
lapsi sweet COP.GF.NEG
‘lapsi (fruit) are not sweet’ (RL 101125-01)

The scope of the negation with the general fact copula is quite difficult to discern compared to some of the other examples. It is possible that it can be interpreted that the negation scopes over the evidential, and so it could be that lapsi are sweet, but this is not a generally known fact. However, in this specific instance (given that lapsi are very sour), and what appears to be the case for all uses of the general fact, the negation scopes under the evidential and is instead negating the property of the item referred to, and not its status as a general fact.

I cannot include the reported speech particle in this discussion, as there is no negated reported speech form, not is it possible to negate the particle. The reported speech particle is only used when there is a specific reported speech event that can be marked, the absence of a speech event (or the presence of another speech event) do not meet the conditions for its use.

Willett (1988) and de Haan (1997) have argued that evidentials are distinct from the category of modals because negation does not scope over evidentials. Although the perceptual evidential in Lamjung Yolmo scopes over negation, this is not a definitive reason to exclude it from a discussion of modality, especially given that the dubitative, which is clearly modal, also appears to scope over negation.

### 2.6 The absence of evidentiality

When looking at the interactional weight of evidential forms, it is also worth remembering that in Lamjung Yolmo they do not occur in all utterances. As mentioned in Section 2.1, there are constructions like the basic past (30) and non-past (31):

(30) tònlá dèmmu lè zò-sin
before like.this work make-PST
‘before (he) worked like this’ (AL 091108-01 39:20)

(31) nà tàpsè tó sà-ke
1SG now rice.cooked eat-NON.PST
‘I am now eating rice’ (AL 100930-01)
This utterance could be used regardless of whether the person has been seen or not. As it can be used for a specific instance of something it is not possible to just assume that there is a default modal value assigned to these copula-less constructions. Garrett (2001: 113-114) observes that in Standard Tibetan those verbs that are unmarked with a copula are underlyingly egophoric; however in Lamjung Yolmo, given that the egophoric has a wider range of use, it is not possible to say whether a speaker would be drawing on perceptual or personal knowledge in many cases where there is no overt marking. In (30) the speaker is looking at an image of a man working, using her perception and referencing a specific event. It would appear that overt evidentiality is not relevant to these clauses, and epistemic certainty is assumed because it has not been marked otherwise as uncertain.

The use of copula-less tensed constructions is quite frequent in some genres of discourse. This includes explications and first person narratives. I will begin by looking at these, and then move on to examples where speakers alternate between constructions with less predictability. In these instances I will explore what motivates the lack of copula use, and what that says about construction of knowledge in interaction.

The genre with the most obvious absence of evidential forms is explication. There is no use of perceptual evidentials across the explication recordings in the corpus, and very few examples of the egophoric copula. Explication involves talking about an abstract set of actions, rather than a specific individual event, which would explain why the perceptual evidential is not used. In this genre the speaker uses egophoric forms very infrequently too. This may be because again they are not speaking of a specific event, and therefore their person knowledge of the actions does not need to be foregrounded, or perhaps because they are giving instructions on actions they do not need to foreground their personal knowledge, with a default egophoric reading similar to Garrett’s analysis discussed above.

First person narratives also exhibit low use of copula forms. The use of the picture narrative Family Story activity (San Roque et al. 2012) provides an interesting example of this, as we can compare the first person telling to the third person and general descriptive tellings of the story of a family drama in a small village. The third person description of events include use of the perceptual evidential, as well as some egophoric forms, while the first person descriptions use few egophoric constructions and many copula-less constructions. For example, in the fifth card of the story, the man and his wife are sitting in court after he has hit her. The actual hitting event is presented in a subsequent card (as the images are initially given to participants out of any clear narrative order), but the man is restrained and the woman is heavily bandaged. The utterances in (23) are from the first time SBL is describing the cards.

(32)  pèemi gòo róp-sin dù khyóga=ki kyàp dùba
wife head break-PST AUX.PE husband=ERG hit AUX.PE.EMPH
khyóga=ki kyàp yèʈ
husband=EGO hit AUX.DUB
‘the wife’s head was broken, the husband hit her, the husband probably hit her’
(SBL 101124-04 01:10)

Here SBL uses a narrative past to describe the wife’s state, before claiming that the husband hit her. Although this statement is based on assertion SBL uses the emphatic perceptual evidential. He realises that he does not actually have any perceptual evidence of the event itself, only the residual evidence of the wound and so downgrades the epistemic assertion of his statement in the next utterance. This example is interesting it itself in that it shows people monitor their own evidential use to ensure that it matches their own knowledge state. It is also useful to compare it to a later iteration of
the same events. When he is reporting these events from the perspective of the husband in the final
telling there is no evidence marking used (33).

(33) òolegi kyàp tér-sin
and.then hit give-PST
‘and then I hit her’ (SBL 101124-04 28:23)

Although actions and events reported by first person can use the egophoric copula it appears
that in extended narratives speakers find modally-unmarked tense sufficient. This is not surprising, as
the modal value of events relayed by a participant (although in this case a hypothetical participant)
can be inferred to be egophoric knowledge. There are some utterances like (34) that do overtly mark
egophoric in narratives that otherwise have large stretches without the use of any copulas.

(34) ŋà=la láure kwèla tér-ti yè
1SG=DAT soldier(Nep) clothing give-PFV AUX.COP
‘the soldiers gave me clothing’ (SBL 101124-03 25:42)

However, even when telling your own story, things still happen to other people. In such situations though,
the first person narrator uses a modally unmarked past tense (35)-(36) construction.

(35) ònda rò dzàti dzàmmà bònti-sin
that.way friend group all say(Nep)-PST
‘in that way, all my friends spoke’ (SBL 101124-03 27:02)

(36) ðàmба=la kyàp-timaraŋ pèemi ŋù-sin
cheek=DAT hit-after wife cry-PST
‘After (I) hit (her) on her cheek, my wife cried’ (SBL 101124-03 30:38)

This indicates that the speaker does not feel the need to mark that they witnessed the event if
the narrative framework appears to make it clear to others they were a participant in the events. This
then raises the question of why speakers will chose to use these copula-less modally-unmarked forms
in interaction when they also have the option of marking the information modally. There are some
general observations that can be made from the Lamjung Yolmo corpus about how speakers alternate
between modally marked and unmarked forms, but it is important to note that there is no way to
predict whether a speaker will chose to use a construction that includes a copulas in auxiliary
function, such as the -ku dù imperfective construction, or when they will use an unmarked past form
lie -sin. Both constructions are used with the same verbs, often in the same context, so we can rule out
the possibility that there may be something inherent about the action or the internal logistics of an
event that dictate which form is appropriate. It is possible then that speakers are making a primary
choice as to whether they want to mark the internal aspect of the event, as in choosing the
imperfective construction, mark their evidential status as a secondary feature of the construction.

That some constructions do not have any evidential value is not a flaw or an absence in the system, but a
basic feature of it. As I have shown in this section, speakers prefer these constructions for specific discourse
types and can use different constructions to mark something using the set of copulas should the communicative
need arise. Just because the speakers are not using overt copula forms does not mean that they are not
cognitively tracking this information.

So far I have focused on those constructions where the use of copulas is not licensed as part of
a grammatical utterance. There are also situations where there is no overt copula marking due to
omission as a natural feature of interactional discourse. There are some types of interaction where speakers frequently omit copula verbs from constructions where they are included with high frequency in elicitation. We see this in particularly in genres where one participant talks more than the other, including narrative and explication. In (37) ST uses a perfective marker \(-ti\), which is followed by either an egophoric or a perceptual evidential in elicitation. In (38) the same speaker uses a nominalising suffix \(-kandi\), which usually followed by an egophoric in elicited version of the same construction.

(37) \(t\text{ch}u=la\) \(l\text{u}-ti\)  
\(\text{water=LOC put.into-PFV}\)  
‘put into the water’ (ST 120307-01 00:02)

(38) \(t\text{sh}e\) \(y\text{indzo-}ni\) \(p\text{aba} \) \(k\text{yur-kandi}\)  
\(\text{cooked.be from-FOC skin throw-NMLZ}\)  
‘remove the shell (from the egg)’ (ST 120307-01 00:18)

The lack of overt copulas in these individual examples is explained by the fact that these utterances exist in a larger context. Any evidential that would be present could be inferred from context. For example, with the explicative texts the speakers were not referring to a specific instance of an event, but a general description of a frequently performed task. The lack of evidence marking does not detract from the speaker’s role as the author of an utterance. As Aikhenvald (2004: 79) observes, the ability to do this relies on the sentence being in ‘connected speech’ where the interactional context makes clear what evidence the speaker intended. Aikhenvald presents a narrative as an example of connected speech, but there is no reason to assume that other interactions cannot support the absence of copula verbs. De Haan (2001b: 197) acknowledges that evidentials are optional in most languages. He summarises that the motivation for this optionality “can best be seen as either the absence of evidence or a choice on the part of the speaker not to express his/her evidence for the action described.” In most examples from Lamjung Yolmo the first motivation does not appear to be particularly robust, as speakers omitted copula forms when they had direct visual evidence. The second motivation appears to be closer to the reason that Lamjung Yolmo speakers omit copulas, although they appear to do this simply because the evidence should easily be inferred from context, and not to avoid making a modal claim. Aikhenvald (2004: 78-79) discusses this process as one of ‘omission’ rather than optionality, which reflects a focus on languages with obligatory marking of evidential information on every sentence, such as Tucano and Tariana (see also Aikhenvald 2003). In a language like Lamjung Yolmo, where the system is flexible enough to allow for a great deal of variation, talk of ‘omission’ implies that there is a rigidity to the system and that it is context that distorts this, whereas to talk of ‘optionality’ is to accept that a system like that found in Lamjung Yolmo is naturally variable depending on the interactional needs of the speakers, this is a key feature of Tournadre and LaPolla’s (2014) definition of evidentiality, where they refer to it as the speaker’s ‘strategy’.

This requires us to consider just how important the Lamjung Yolmo copula verbs, and the modal distinctions they provide, really are for the interactions in which they are used. As I have shown, there are often-used constructions with no modal status, and even in situations where a copula could be used speakers often omit them if they assume that their modal status is recoverable from context. Thus it appears that the copula verbs of Lamjung Yolmo, while useful (and in some contexts still necessary), do not carry the same kind of obligatory use as is described for some of the languages of Amazonia (Aikhenvald 2004), nor even closely related languages like Standard Tibetan (Garrett 2001).
2.7 Do people attend to evidential information?

In this paper so far, I have argued that the evidential and epistemic choices available in Lamjung Yolmo are important grammatical features for indicating knowledge and stance in interaction. As speakers draw on a range of information to make these choices, it follows that their interlocutors would attend to this information. Much of the discussion about evidentiality focuses on the evidential choices people make, it is also important to consider how these choices are taken up by the interlocutors who hear them. This can be difficult to trace in discourse, and so I created an experimental activity that I named the “Multiple Reports task” to try and access some of these intuitions. The task was designed so that there was a short scenario given, such as a new goat in the village, or a question about what was being cooked for dinner. There were then two different remarks from two people on an element of this event. The two reports were given with one different detail, and had different evidential values, for example one person might have said the new goat was brown and used an egophoric evidential, the other black with a perceptual evidential. The participants were then asked which of the two reports they thought was most likely to be true (the information encoded by each copula was switched for each participant, so as to see if the content of the utterance was affecting their choice). The intention of this experiment was to see how much attention speakers paid to modal information encoded in copulas by seeing which. There were ten different scenarios, with reports of different modal weigh. This task was run with five people. This was not enough speakers to be able to perform a quantifiable analysis of the answers given, but the task did give some insight into how speakers might process evidential information.

Of the ten scenarios there were only two where the clear majority of participants chose the report with the same copula form. In the first of these two scenarios, a participant is told that their friend has a new dress, which they have not seen. They are given two reports about the dress, each saying it is a different colour (red or green). One report uses the egophoric copula yè to describe the colour of the dress and the other uses the emphatic perceptual evidential düba in their description. Regardless of which colour it marked, all participants chose the answer with the perceptual emphatic over the egophoric copula. Those participants who gave a reason said it was because the person who used the perceptual evidential had seen the dress. In many ways this was one of the better designed of the Multiple Reports scenarios as there is minimal chance of external context distracting from the binary choice. It also indicated that people place value on their interlocutors providing perceptual evidence. In the second of the two consistently answered scenarios, participants were asked which report they believed about what food was stored in a vessel. The two reports varied in the type of common food stuff stored (rice or corn) and in the use of either an emphatic perceptual evidential or an utterance with an egophoric evidential and a reported speech particle. Only one person did not choose the emphatic perceptual evidential. Therefore, in these situations where someone is describing a specific event, the perceptual evidential is considered by speakers to mark more direct knowledge than the egophoric copula with the reported speech particle, indicating second-hand information.

This may seem to be a straightforward order of preference for certain types of evidence, except it does not hold across all scenarios, even for the same speaker. VL had said that the emphatic perceptual was preferred over the egophoric when describing the dress in the first scenario described above, and that the perceptual evidential was preferred to the reported speech particle in the second. This was in concord with the responses of the other participants. In another situation two people describing the colour of a new goat purchased by someone in the village, one person used the perceptual evidential dü, while the other used the egophoric yè. In this scenario VL appeared to have different intuitions, in that she did not want to presume that one report was more likely to be correct that then other, instead stating that both participants saw the colour of the goat (39).
This is of interest because the other two times she chose a perceptual evidential over the egophoric or reported speech particle, stating that the person who used the perceptual evidential presumably saw the item or event, while the person using ego-marking or reported speech had not. It is possible that because scenario one was early in the task VL was still getting used to the format, but it is also possible that the ‘egophoric means no visual perception’ idea is not as strong as Lamjung Yolmo speakers’ introspection about some contexts indicates.

Although speakers appear to share some consensus in the situation above, in eight of the ten scenarios there was a great deal less agreement. There were some scenarios where the choice of modal or evidential expression did not appear to make any difference to which of the two options people chose. This included situation ten, where participants were given reports that their shoes were either outside or in another room, with one marked with a perceptual evidential and one marked with a reported speech marker. Across all of the performances of this experiment participants chose either option and did not appear to be swayed by which one was marked with which form. UL, VL and KL all preferred the report that the shoes were outside with the perceptual evidential. AL and RL preferred the outside option marked with the reported speech marker. In this situation the cultural politeness (not usually enacted in village life) of not wearing shoes inside may have influenced decisions more than the evidential forms. Given that this task was only performed with a small number of speakers across a fixed set of scenarios, it is best to not draw any strong conclusions about the lack of agreement in terms of the modal information given in the multiple reports; however it does indicate that perhaps speakers may not pay as much attention to modal information in Lamjung Yolmo as de Villiers et al. (2009) argues that they do in Standard Tibetan.

3 Evidentiality looking forward
In this paper I have demonstrated that the nature of evidentiality in Lamjung Yolmo is complex, interacts with other elements of the utterance and its context, and is grounded in interaction. It is likely that with the growing body of language documentation work that focuses on interactional data such descriptions will become more common.

Evidentiality is part of speakers’ larger stance-taking repertoire, and as such interacts with many other features of the language, including epistemic modality. There is no reason to follow Bhat’s (1999) lead and completely conflate evidentiality with epistemic modality. It is not necessary to assume a direct relationship between the type of evidential used and the certainty that the speaker has about the information. Although it is possible to ascribe a sense of certainty to the contextual use of evidentials in Lamjung Yolmo, this is an interactional dimension of these forms, and not an intrinsic value. Therefore, it does not make sense to talk about evidentials as a type of epistemic modality. De Haan (1997, 1999, 2001a, 2005) argues that evidentiality is not a form of modality, in part because it is fundamentally deictic in its function. Considering the deictic function of evidential forms is a useful way of conceptualising their function, but it does not detract from the fact that speakers use this deictic function in interaction, and part of that function is to signal their stance towards the propositional content.

With this wider perspective on evidentiality, it is not surprising that it interacts in complex ways with many other features of language, but it is important that we capture the range of these interactions. Although I have covered many key features of evidential use in interaction in this paper, there are still many others that could be considered, including question structures and reported speech frames, both of which I discuss in detail in Gawne.
Strong interactive data that also includes the wider function of evidentiality also gives us stronger grounds for quality cross-linguistic comparison, and a basis from which to begin understanding further questions, such as how children acquire languages with evidentiality.

**Abbreviations**

1 first person 2 second person 3 third person AUX auxiliary COP copula DUB dubitative EGO egophoric EMPH emphatic ERG ergative F female FOC focus GEN genitive GF general fact IPFV imperfective LOC locative NEG negative NMLZ nominaliser NON.PST non-past PART particle PE perceptual evidential PFV perfective PST past SG singular

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