ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
FOR INTERNAL CONSULTANTS

BARRY N. GUY

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This essay is the work of the undersigned and all sources used have been acknowledged.

B. N. GUY
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PREFACE

This paper develops a broad conceptual framework for internal change agents in organizations. It considers a range of important factors in the organization which are postulated to influence the form and progress of change, and also provides a critical analysis of relevant theoretical approaches to the dilemmas and opportunities posed by these factors.

There is no treatment of specific organization development strategies or techniques. Rather, the objectives are to discuss in terms applicable to a variety of organizations, some of the critical situational variances facing internal change agents and to establish some principles and guidelines which may assist them in planning for change.

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Along with communities and curriculums, organizations are increasingly objects for "development". Organizational change has been around for a long time - it has always been the prerogative of leaders, or the mission of particular interest groups, to modify the structure or function of their organization. However it is only in the last twenty-five years that a body of theory and practice has emerged for the development of organizations. Development refers to change specifically concerned with reorganization towards increased effectiveness and optimal rationality. Lievogoed (1973), in a useful clarification of 'change', 'growth' and 'development', shows that the concept of development (unlike the former two) calls for:

(a) goal setting (the direction of the development)
(b) policy making (the strategies of the development process)
(c) planning (the concretization of practicable steps).

The proliferation of concern and interest in systematic approaches to organization development (OD), to the extent that the field is now a quasi-discipline, probably reflects a number of factors:

(a) the increasing rate of change in external and internal variables which are important to the survival and growth of organizations (e.g. market conditions or characteristics of the workforce)
(b) the increasing sophistication of organization and management theory in general, and consequently, in concepts and methods for attempting to change organizations in predictable ways
(c) the increasing recognition of the potential gains - and the considerable risks - that may attend significant modification to organizational structure and process variables.
Basic organizational attributes tend to be relatively stable and enduring phenomena - the structure and patterns of activities seemingly underpinned by inherent damping mechanisms which resist change (Kaufman, 1971) or allow only minimally acceptable changes away from some equilibrium configuration (Schon, 1973). This is not to deny that organizations change constantly, operationally and in the perceptions of their members - what is referred to here are formally implemented programs of organizational change with the characteristics of development as outlined above.

The pressures acting upon an organization which engage the inherent damping mechanisms and which may be the antecedents of an OD program can be analysed and classified according to two cross cutting dimensions:

(i) pressures arising from either external or internal forces
(ii) pressures emerging from proactive or reactive responses on the part of organizational members.

These are illustrated in Figure 1 together with examples of typical internal and external forces towards change.

Figure 1: Pressures toward change.
Pressures towards change may build up strongly, but they will not necessarily produce a disequilibrium of the basic organizational variables. Typically, the rising forces generate not change, but what Shirley (1974, 1975) has aptly called "organizational stress - stress in sentiments, activities, interactions or performance results." Essentially there is a state of tension being experienced by some members of the organization. However there may not be either a recognition of the need for change (especially at the executive levels of the organization), or a grasp of the appropriate strategies and methods for change. For example, in one Government bureau, a specialist staff group agitated for a period of seven years before agreement to undertake a major OD program was achieved. In this case, the pressures towards change could be classified in the lower right hand quadrant of Figure 1 - they were the reactive responses of a small group of members who perceived widespread problems of poor job performance and low job-satisfaction within the organization.

There is some research evidence on the reaction to change pressures. Tranfield, Smith, Gill and Shipton (1975) report on their study of the introduction of OD programs into a number of North American corporations. Most often, it was concluded, the initial stimulation came from some high status member of the organization as a result of a perceived need for change but "this need was not identified and extensively diagnosed but was often based on intuition, fancy or fashion." Hepworth and Osbaldeston (1975) cite a number of studies of European organizational change programs, where it was found that firms usually had multiple objectives in initiating change but operational considerations (e.g. raising productivity) were foremost. Concern for new values about work, or human resource development were important too, but apparently were considered secondary to immediate operational objectives. In some instances very specific factors for the genesis of a
change program could be identified e.g. the merger between two companies or the introduction of a new senior executive.

Whilst it usually happens that the stimulation for change originates with the perceptions of a high status member of the management group, in one substantial OD program in an Australian government authority, a trade union organization played a major role as a catalyst in getting the project started (Bochner, Ivanoff and Watson, 1974). The Federal Council of the staff association, recognizing pervasive inefficiency and dissatisfaction in the organization, employed an external behavioural science consultant to survey and analyse staff opinion. Bochner et. al. report that the subsequent discussions with management on the problems uncovered were instrumental in getting acceptance of the need for an OD program. As will be discussed below in greater length, this is an example of the perceptions of lower level members leading to proposals for change.

In most after-the-event analysis of organizational change projects, it is virtually impossible to tease out the real reasons for change from the rhetoric and cant (e.g. "the creation of a problem solving climate throughout the organization"; "to change the organization's culture towards greater openness and trust"). It seems safe to say that regardless of where the initial pressures emanated from, change began because someone with sufficient "policy clout" at least sanctioned the program and provided provisional funds for it. The key executive may have been influenced (perhaps inspired) by a variety of sources - management seminars, proposals from staff groups, contact with external consultants or executives in other organizations. There is impressionistic evidence that all these factors have applied in a number of Australian Public-Sector organizations which have experimented with OD. Additionally the effects of a favourable economic climate (in private firms) or a favourable political climate (in government agencies) must not be under-
estimated. With both funds and encouragement for innovation readily available, the four years of 1972-1975 under a freewheeling Labor Government were the halcyon days for OD in the Australian federal bureaucracy (Guy, 1975). Paradoxically, a climate favourable to OD may be least present at the time of greatest need. It stands to reason that an organization requires the maximum utilization of its resources - people, materials and funds - during times of stringency or severe external competition, for instance. However, organizational leaders may, understandably, be reluctant to commit resources to developmental work during hard times. The paradox perhaps can be resolved by the realization that OD is not a luxury item. It may be a vital necessity if the problem is one of motivating a smaller workforce, or working more efficiently with reduced financial and other resources. And it may be "that only a few strategic experiments, can be tried at most, and that new activities cannot be added without subtracting old activities" but, the organization "no longer has the resources to buy delay" (Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck, 1976).

One other tantalizing factor underlying the impetus for change and which begs research confirmation is the effect of one or more dominant personalities on the implementation and, of course, maintenance of a change program. Hepworth and Osbaldeston (1975) noted several examples of how "A dominant or influential individual in the top management of a company can often play a very significant role in the introduction of new methods of work organization." In at least one Australian organization a whole series of substantial change efforts have been energized in quite difficult circumstances almost single-handedly by one very bright, tough senior executive. The writer hypothesizes that in any significant organizational change effort the personalities of the key agents of change are crucially involved. These individuals must have the competence, drive, personal commitment and the dramaturgical qualities to withstand the concerted forces of opposition that will invariably come their way.
CHAPTER 2: AROUSAL TO ACTION

There is no reality except in action.  
Jean-Paul Sartre

The articulation of change pressures, the mobilization of forces and the preparation of strategies for change may come from several focal points within the organization. At the risk of oversimplification, these are shown as four main source vectors in Figure 2.

![Diagram of principal vectors for organizational change]

**Figure 2: Principal vectors for organizational change**

**VERTICAL DOWNWARDS** change vectors are those instigated by key organizational executives (or, in many instances, the relatively autonomous leaders of sub units). The essential point is that the moves for change are emanating from those at the apex of the authority hierarchy.

Consequently the implementation, at least, of the change effort may be fairly easy - notwithstanding the problems of obtaining broad understanding, consensus, and commitment within the executive group.
HORIZONTAL change vectors are those planned and exerted by specialist staff (i.e. non-line, advisory or support) individuals or groups within the organization. Staff personnel typically function as "internal consultants" to line management by providing professional and technical expertise to operational areas of the organization. (To a certain extent horizontal vectors may be considered also as emerging from lower and middle line managers whose influence with senior management is limited.) The most critical factor effecting the potential of internal consultancy groups to initiate significant change is the organizational DISTANCE from the central policy making body - the one or more executives who must approve a proposal for a change program. Formally, the 'critical distance' may be the number of administrative levels between the subordinates making change proposals and the key executives (Patti, 1974) or it may depend on the workings of decision making mechanisms within the organization. Less formally, it may depend on a host of social, psychological and other linkages which exist or can be established between individuals and groups at the two levels (see final chapter for a more detailed discussion of 'linkage').

BOTTOM UP vectors for change are those emerging from members at the lower occupational levels of the organization or their representatives on staff associations, joint staff/management committees, works councils etc. Such change vectors seem to have rarely played a direct role in change programs in Australian organizations, marked by apathy, indifference and a fairly instrumental attitude to work on the part of many employees. In the near future, the effects of the growing consciousness of industrial democracy (e.g. greater demands for participation, rising expectations about the quality of worklife) may be expressed in much greater bottom up pressure (and hopefully, feasible proposals) for change. Note - sometimes "bottom up change" is used to refer to instances where a low power manager makes innovative
changes which do not significantly exceed the boundaries of his authority, (or if they do, he is willing to take the risk) and it is hoped that by a sort of percolator effect change will spread up through the organization. For an extended argument for this latter form see Beer and Huse (1972).

Direct EXTERNAL vectors for change (not to be confused with external pressures for change) are rarely the originating source of change programs in organizations. There are some reports available to radical political/social action groups which have made specific efforts to achieve change in organizational structures or procedures, but generally there is little empirical evidence in this area.

The preceding four-way vector analysis of action arousal logically covers the possible sources of proposals for change. The relative importance of the vectors, however, is a factor dependent upon many variables within the organization. A central premise of the subsequent discussion is that one of the vectors, viz. the horizontal, will be to an increasing extent the most significant source of proposals and plans for OD programs in many contemporary organizations - especially those growing in size, structural complexity, capital intensity and geographical dispersion. The next chapter turns to a more specific discussion of 'horizontally' planned organizational change.
CHAPTER 3: THE UNEASY PARTNERSHIP

The rest of this paper will consider some of the important situational variances, concepts and strategies of OD mainly from the perspective of a staff specialist group. That is, it will primarily be concerned with change planned, evangelized, implemented, maintained and evaluated by a non-line internal consultancy group (ICG). Hopefully, much of the material will have wider relevance.

The basic objectives of this chapter are to consider the fundamentally important issue of the integration of the ICG's efforts with the line management function, and then compare the relative merits of internal versus external consultants as the midwives of change.

CHANGE AND LINE MANAGEMENT

Organizational consultants, internal or external, generally have no executive power in the organization and furthermore, they will not necessarily be effected by the changes in policy or practices being introduced in the OD program. Broadly their role is to identify problems, generate a range of solutions and make recommendations to operational managers - who are, typically, their principal 'clients' within the organization.

However, as Weir and Mills (1973) point out "often the role of the supervisor and line manager as a 'change catalyst' is not adequately recognized, yet clearly the assumption of this role could prove very valuable to those managers and staff specialists initiating changes". The basic issue is thrown into sharper relief by Burke (1976) who cites studies which "argue that OD is a line management function, and the consultant's primary responsibility is to facilitate the change which the manager has the power to implement." In addition to power (relative to his location in organizational
space) the line manager has operational knowledge and skills, close contact with the staff members, established connections in the informal organization and other attributes which can assist (as well as hinder) change.

It follows that a basic change-management problem for the ICG is to integrate their efforts with operational managers. It is the line manager who will be most directly involved in the application of an OD program at the work face. He/she will have the day-to-day responsibilities of attempting to make the change work within a particular operational area. The writer has observed in a number of organizations how problems emerging from line/staff conflict have posed serious difficulties for the implementation of change. In the early stages, especially, a split may develop between the ICG and the relatively uncommitted and busy line manager. In part, this probably reflects a tendency of the ICG to impose new alternatives on the line manager without really getting to understand the operational problems. In part also, in some organizations it probably reflects the tendency of many line managers to be sceptical of virtually any staff advice. Margerison (1972) usefully discusses a number of approaches to internal consultancy, essentially based on shared diagnosis and problem formulation by consultant and line manager, which may help to overcome some of these difficulties. Baker and Schaffer (1969) using a similar collaborative model, present a number of very practical guidelines to assist an ICG in their 'uneasy partnership' with line management.

Arguably, the line manager - a technical specialist in some productive function of the organization - needs consultancy advice because the knowledge and skills required to plan, design and conduct organizational change programs have become so sophisticated. Planned organizational change, involving projects of any substance, has become a specialist, semi-professional field. So that although the actual 'nuts and bolts' operations
of OD are part of the line management function, this needs to be complemented
by consultancy expertise. This may be in a range of disciplines (e.g.
Operations Research, Organization and Methods Studies) but will particularly
involve Behavioural Science theory and practice.

INTERNAL VS EXTERNAL CONSULTANTS

A question which may have to be settled early in the history of an
organizational change program is whether to draw upon internal consultancy
resources at all. Wouldn't it be preferable to contract a well known
external consultant with a good 'track record'? This question seems important
because (i) OD programs seem to have been orchestrated about equally as often
by both, and (ii) in many instances an external consultant has played a major
role initially and then handed the monitoring and maintenance of the program
over to an ICG. (c.f. many of the projects described by Andreatta and
Rumbold, 1974)

To a certain extent the use of expensive, renowned external consultants
seems to have reflected a behavioural science mystique which has enveloped
the field of OD. However, there is a growing recognition amongst management
that the long term success of OD depends upon the resources for innovation
and change emerging from within the organization. This awareness has led to
much greater reliance of ICGs to plan and implement OD programs than was the
case a decade ago. A review of the writings of practitioners indicates,
however, that there are potential advantages and disadvantages associated
with both internal and external consultants. Material adapted from Dunphy
(1975), Lippitt (1969), and Lippitt and Lippitt (1975) together with the
writer's observations of several ICGs is summarized in table 1 (p.12).
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<th>DISADVANTAGES</th>
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<td><strong>EXTERNAL consultants</strong></td>
<td><em>Capacity to take greater risks and be more confrontative in the organization</em></td>
<td><em>Difficulties in obtaining a realistic assessment of the organization quickly</em></td>
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<td><em>(Ideally) maintains independence of power structure</em></td>
<td><em>Possibility of deception by some organizational members</em></td>
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<td><em>Previous experience with particular methods</em></td>
<td><em>Often favours one particular approach</em></td>
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<td><em>Detachment in face of internal conflict</em></td>
<td><em>May be seen as political agent of management</em></td>
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<td><em>Reputation depends on ability to achieve results</em></td>
<td><em>Effects due to part-time consultancy</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>Free to leave on project completion</em></td>
<td><em>May develop over-dependency in client system</em></td>
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<td><strong>INTERNAL consultants</strong></td>
<td><em>Greater insight into workings of the organization - especially political realities</em></td>
<td><em>Personally linked to power and reward structures of the organization</em></td>
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<td><em>Personal stake in the outcome of a project (and its aftermath)</em></td>
<td><em>May take time to acquire special knowledge or skills</em></td>
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<td><em>Continually on hand to monitor progress</em></td>
<td><em>Possibly, low credibility in eyes of some line managers</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>No additional compensation over normal salaries</em></td>
<td><em>Potential for staff/line conflict</em></td>
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**TABLE 1**: Potential advantages and disadvantages associated with internal and external consultants
A balance of these factors will probably be settled on purely pragmatic grounds e.g. the use of an ICG may be cheaper; there is only a handful of skilled consultant change practitioners in Australia (Dunphy, 1975) and the situation which this paper is principally concerned where moves for an OD program start horizontally in the organization: e.g. where an internal group desiring change takes on the role as an ICG largely through its own efforts. ICGs have tended to emerge from Personnel, Training and Management Services departments. The self styled 'change agents' are often inspired by books, films, training courses, journal articles etc. on behavioural approaches to improving organizational effectiveness, individual job performance and job satisfaction and they have the necessary optimism that such approaches may be of benefit to their own organization. Unfortunately training in the skills of organizational change is not readily available in this country. Ideally internal change agents require a multidisciplinary background e.g. training in Economics, Psychology and Sociology, (Hines in Dunphy 1975); and field training in association with a skilled practitioner, (Dunphy 1975).

In general the state of OD training in Australia is such that members of ICGs have little recourse but to learn through their own experience - by thinking, planning and doing OD. There are, additionally, encouraging signs of the establishment of networks of OD practitioners and occupational interest groups which devote some of their activities to the field in the form of seminars and workshops.

The subsequent discussion will rest on the assumption that an ICG is playing a major role in the change program. It seems that this will be quite typical of OD. For as many OD practitioners (e.g. Davis, 1976) recognize, a common thread of successful OD work is "the presence of very good, strong inside people ... Personnel specialists or OD specialists, or whatever."
The basic objective of this chapter is to discuss some facets of the development of an ICG, on the underlying assumption that to some extent, these are manageable processes. A primary concern for an internal group adopting, (or in some instances, allocated) a role as change agents is to establish the set of 'state variables' describing their group. This notion, drawn from general systems theory, refers to the quantitative and qualitative levels of the set of variables which describe a system at a particular time. ICGs are obviously composed of a large set of variables – characteristics of members (skills, values and attitudes), homogeneity of the group concerning philosophies and goals, positions of group members in formal organizational structures, access to resources etc.

To illustrate, the state of an ICG in a government department will be briefly but not exhaustively described. After considerable agitation from personnel and training staff, senior management sanctioned the establishment of a group of four members drawn from different areas of the Management Services Section to "explore staff-development and manpower-planning issues." Investigation of OD concepts and methods was explicitly not part of the group's charter. Two members of the group had fairly extensive knowledge of contemporary human resource management ideas, one had previous experience in the implementation of staff development programs. Over a period of time the group made extensive contacts with OD practitioners in other private and government organizations, and was generally working towards preparing a major OD program for the organization. After several months operation about $10,000 had been spent and all proposals put to senior management had been soundly rejected. The group saw that its biggest problem was gaining credibility with senior management and it attempted to do this in two ways (i) by having a series of small changes implemented with successful outcomes, and (ii) by liaising with an informal middle management group which could make recommendations to senior management. The critical state variables for this particular ICG were
(a) a philosophy of OD considerably at variance with the prevailing management philosophy concerning change.
(b) a relatively low position in the formal authority structure.
(c) some linkage (formal and informal) with other groups within the organization.
(d) a set of alternative strategies for achieving their ultimate aims.

Amongst the issues facing the integration of an ICG into an effective change managing group, two others seem to be of special importance and consequently are to be discussed at some length viz. the ICG's basic values concerning change, and potential power resources available to the group.

The ICG's basic values concerning change

The value orientation of much OD theory and practice has a strong humanistic ring. Change is essentially good because it is directed towards increased learning, creativity, autonomy, responsibility, fulfilment etc. at the individual level; greater openness, trust and collaboration at the group level; improved effectiveness and capacity to adapt to changing conditions at the system level. These and similar values have been espoused by writers such as Likert, Argyris, Maslow and Bennis and have had a profoundly influential effect on organization and management theory in the last two decades. The fact that they seem to have had little effect on management practice, however, questions their real significance. It is suggested that the humanistic values are really abstract ideals which offer very little of utility for the actual planning and conduct of OD programs. A more pragmatic philosophy underlying a change effort seems to require that the ICG have clarified the following issues:
(a) the setting of realistic goals and objectives which are relevant in the socio-political context of the organization and which are compatible with the inevitable limitations imposed by economic factors or legal requirements.

(b) the capacity and skills of the members to work in a behavioural arena, and the degree of personal and group responsibility they are willing to carry for this.

(c) the ethics of encouraging others in an organization to adopt a particular value system or 'preferred' forms of behaviour.

(d) the ability and willingness of members to engage, where necessary, in interpersonal conflict, confrontation and negotiation in which individual positions in the organization may be jeopardized.

Potential power resources

The position of the ICG in relation to an number of formal structural variables (especially authority, communication, and allocation of functions) will determine to a large extent their problems and prospects for change. Even more pertinent, however, is the political structure which is superimposed upon the formal relationships. Following the writings of a large number of authors (e.g. Zaleznik (1970)), it is an axiom of this paper that the organization is inter alia an open political system and consequently, power relationships are ubiquitous within organizations. Power is a systemic concept because it emerges from the relationships within a social structure - it is not a property of individual actors, although the aspirations and commitments of individuals form the basis of the power play. Groups, as well as individuals, with different interest, goals and ideals compete for access to and control of resources in many forms - material, functional and symbolic. Staff groups usually have relatively low power within the organization because: the members have only moderate level positions in the formal authority hierarchy; the group has no line authority; and the group has little control over resources valued by others in the organization. ICGs characteristically gain influence (i.e. "determine" the behaviour of others) through the credibility and usefulness of
their recommendations to line management and the interpersonal and political strategy skills of the members of the ICG.

The political dimensions of internal consultancy

It is submitted that the ICG's skill in acquiring and strategically mobilizing power resources will strongly influence the acceptance and application of the change program by the clients in the organization. A general theoretical framework of power sources amongst sub-units in complex organizations will be briefly mentioned here before moving on to a more directly relevant theoretical analysis of the political context for an ICG. Hickson et al. (1971) advance a number of hypotheses to explain the intra-organizational power of sub-unit groups in terms of group's abilities to cope with the uncertainty faced by other groups; to avoid having activities substituted by another group; and the degree to which group's activities are central to many other activities in the organization.

The constructs of coping, substitutability and centrality proposed by Hickson et al. (1971) may provide transitory sources of power for 'temporary' groups such as an ICG. A more developed theory of sources of influence potentially available to ICGs resides in the seminal writings of one author which will now be examined in some detail.

Pettigrew (1973) draws on his empirical study of a computer systems ICG to establish some rudimentary proposals about the political behaviour of client and consultant groups. In later presentations (Pettigrew 1974, 1975 a, b) he generalizes these into a series of propositions which seem applicable to a wide range of consultancy contexts. With some adaptations, these propositions form the basis of this section.

All change proposals which imply significant modification to organizational structural or procedural variables will inevitably have political consequences because they make demands against the "resource sharing system of the organization". Contingencies, interests, opportunities, areas under control, etc. by individuals, groups or sub-units within the organization may seem open to expansion or contraction because of the proposed changes. Pettigrew (1975 a) argues that the perception of these
threats or advantages by different political actors in the system releases "political action". One of the central factors which mediates this action is the degree of dependency one actor has upon another — power being inversely proportional to dependency. Sources of power may be open to an ICG if other sub-units in the organization can be made dependent on the ICG in some way significant to their own functioning. In addition to acquiring power resources, the main additional problems for the ICG are "controlling and tactically exploiting the power resources".

Pettigrew (1975 b) develops five potential power resources for ICGs and ways in which they might be used. These resources will be restated here and then interpreted in terms of an ICG attempting to introduce a behaviourally oriented change program into an organization.

(i) **Expertise** — possession of technical competence which is in demand by clients and not readily available elsewhere is a source of consultant power. The ICG can strive to develop a market for behavioural science concepts and techniques and try to convince clients that behavioural approaches (e.g. to issues of job satisfaction or job performance) are important to the client group's prosperity. The client group may also be persuaded that such special skills cannot be conveniently or economically obtained by alternative means, and that the alternative of going without is undesirable.

(ii) **Control over information** — members of an ICG typically have boundary spanning roles (i.e. contact across sub-unit boundaries and with relevant others outside the organization) consequently "they are potentially able to influence the resource allocation process in their organization through a process of collecting, filtering and reformulating information." This resource appears to be relatively weak, but certainly not without use, in the introduction of an OD
program - OD being considered as 'something for the future' by many client groups, busy with everyday operational problems. However, information from respected external sources can be fed into the organization and, most importantly, "seeded" in the most appropriate places e.g. during management development workshops or supervisors' courses.

(iii) Political access and sensitivity - the nature and quality of relationships that members of the ICG have with leaders and other influential members of client groups will be critical to the receptivity and acceptance of proposals for organizational change. The concept of linkage alluded to previously is highly relevant here - the ICG can endeavour to establish contact and good working relationships with key members throughout the organization - especially those with policy making and executive decision functions. Linkage can be established through formal means (e.g. membership on a policy committee) or through a vast range of informal means (e.g. after-work social interaction). Political sensitivity is a more subtle concept - it refers to such things as the need to be aware of the moves and countermoves of others advancing their own interests and how these may be capitalized upon; the relative power of client groups; and the possibility of establishing trading relationships where credits and favours may be drawn upon when required.

(iv) Assessed status - positive evaluation by relevant members of client groups may assist the ICGs change efforts. Status will depend in part on the image of competence and assurance projected by the ICG and also on the ability to anticipate what is most relevant for the client group, both in terms of task requirements and their political context. One technique for raising assessed status is to facilitate successfully small projects for the client (the outcome of which
can be readily evaluated and appreciated) and build on this success in order to gain acceptance of more extensive projects subsequently.

(v) **Group support** — the amount and quality of support aroused from other groups within the organization may be a most important resource for the ICG. A projected OD program, for example which may achieve greater job effectiveness but also promises to introduce greater "democracy in the work place" can possibly expect widespread support from organizational members who would directly benefit from more democratic working arrangements. Depending on the nature of the OD program and the way it is presented to staff, the ICG may potentially be able to generate at least some "grass roots" support, as well as the interest (if not active support) of staff representative groups and sympathetic managers in the organization.

Political factors may also have very real personal significance for the members of an ICG proposing change — for instance, in terms of "career anxiety" (Pettigrew, 1975 a). Typically, when moves for a change program are presented to an executive group by an ICG, the change agents gain general approval (but of a non-committal sort) to come up with some sort of a proposal. What tends to happen is that the ICG spends a considerable amount of time and effort designing a program (usually emphasizing the benefits while playing down the drawbacks) which is eventually presented for management's consideration. Managers then more or less passively decide to accept or reject the proposals without any real commitment or ownership on their part. Responsibility for the program rests largely with the ICG. Thus it is the ICG's mission to make sure it works, "or at least to make sure that it looks as if it is working; it is, after all, his [or their] own career[s] in the organization that potentially is on the line" (Porter, Lawler and Hackman 1975 ).
A closely related issue which can only be summarily discussed here concerns the establishment of the ICG as a functional system in itself. That is, the interpersonal relationships, distribution of roles, teamwork effectiveness, methods of coping with internal conflict, dispersion of leadership and so on. Obviously a fundamental (and unrelenting) task of the ICG is to weld itself into a united, effective change managing group. In many instances it will be necessary for the ICG to employ some of the OD 'team building' techniques (c.f. Beckhard, 1972) on itself to develop a satisfactory working climate for its members. This is clearly not just a preliminary task however. To illustrate, one small task force which was introducing democratic work style groups into a government department on a progressive basis found its change managing role to be a continuous learning process: the approaches, techniques and roles of task force members being considerably modified by the experiential process of doing OD in an intractable organization. Two sources relevant to the growth of ICGs will simply be referred to as it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss team development in the ICG in depth. Pettigrew (1975 a) outlines a model of the developmental phases which an ICG may pass through (to culminate in demise, absorption, consolidation or renewal); and Steele (1975 pp. 109-138) provides some highly useful material on the "effective consulting team process".
CHAPTER 5: LEADS AND HUNCHES

It is just as well that man is a social animal, since the sheer complexity and contradiction of the social field in which he has to live is so formidable.

R. D. Laing

For the purposes of this paper it is assumed that the ICG is composed of a group of members, perhaps self-selected or perhaps appointed as a project team by higher management, who may not yet be an integrated, effective change managing group, but who are unified by their recognition of the need for change and the decision to try to do something about it. As most texts on the technology of OD (e.g. French & Bell 1973, Margulies & Raia 1972) suggest, the first substantive task facing the ICG is a comprehensive diagnosis of the present functioning of the organization. Special attention is of course directed to the "hurting" parts, but broadscale systemic analysis must be stressed so that "the extended and interactive effects of a change in any one part of the system on the other parts may be anticipated and traced" (Shirley, 1975).

This task is not easy because at present there is no 'universal' organizational model available in the literature despite many attempts to develop one. The growing recognition that organizations are complex, multivariate social systems composed of highly interactive variables operating at several different levels has led many organizational theorists to a 'contingency' approach to organizational analysis and design (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1973). In this view the components and relationships are seen as reflecting the specific properties of the domain the organization is in. An implication of the contingency approach is that all current organizational models can, at most, only be partial models, with many conceptual and methodological limitations upon their correspondence with organizational reality. Consequently, attempts to establish a theoretical framework to guide analysis of a particular organization probably are best made by
putting together principles from a variety of sources depending upon their perceived congruence with 'the way things are'. Bass (1974) discussing approaches to organizational research has made a very apposite comment here: "Investigators need to give more credence to their own observations, sensations, feelings, as well as those of other astute observers who have tried to articulate the nature of the problem and have proposed models for representing the problem."

The writer has found the following theoretical frameworks to be useful for suggesting the most relevant organizational variables:— perhaps the most comprehensive integrating model (i.e. it is a synthesis of many earlier models) is that of James and Jones (1976); a more concise but less useful framework is provided by Van de Ven (1976); relatively simple models of organizational analysis written specifically within an OD perspective have been provided by French and Bell (1973 pp. 36-40), Selfridge and Sokolik (1975), and Shirley (1975); a pioneering attempt to apply facet analysis to the problem of classification of OD variables has also recently appeared (White and Mitchell, 1976).

Contingency concepts show that few generalizations can be teased from these and other similar sources. Organizational analysis is best considered an eclectic process, where variables are classified as appropriate into various 'panels' (James and Jones, 1976) such as external factors, structural elements, process variables, and mediating variables. Additionally, variables may be cross classified by level of analysis i.e. individual, group, sub-unit or organizational. The aim of this phase of diagnosis is to establish a coherent and realistic model of the organization, for as Tichy, Hornstein and Nisberg (1976) assert "Organization models are assumed to be at the core of all organization change work. The models provide guidelines for selecting diagnostic information and for arranging the information into
It is pertinent to make a distinction between the diagnostic tools and the diagnostic mode at this point. The former refers to the data collection methods of applied social research (e.g. systematic interviews, questionnaire surveys, participant-observation, analysis of records etc.) which are elaborated in readily available sources. The latter refers to the approaches to data collection emerging from assumptions about (a) the most appropriate ways to obtain useful and valid data and (b) relationships between data collection and the realization of change.

These issues are important because data collection is an organizational intervention per se, and for a variety of reasons, it has been shown that participative organizational diagnosis, in which general staff involvement is optimised according to member’s interests and skills may have profound influence on the ultimate success of organizational improvement efforts. These principles are most evident in one diagnostic mode which has been used widely in OD, the 'action research' approach (e.g. for a review and bibliography see Cunningham, 1976). In essence, action research stresses joint collaboration between researchers (i.e. in the present discussion, members of the ICG) and a diverse range of other organizational members to generate and analyse data, and develop solutions leading to change. This approach has its costs and benefits (e.g. see Tichy, Hornstein and Nisberg, 1976 p. 111) but with careful pre-planning by the ICG, the balance should be towards the latter.

The crux of the problem of valid, effective data collection, diagnosis and action planning goes beyond the problems with diagnostic tools and approaches. For at the heart lies the fundamental problem of organizational research, that of establishing unequivocal links between dependent and meaningful patterns."
independent variables. It is usually inordinately difficult for the 
organizational analyst to connect particular outcomes to specific causes. 
This is for many reasons, of which the following can be readily documented 
in the literature:

(a) Most organizational behaviour can be shown to be of multifactorial 
causation i.e. the outcome of the effects of many variables.
(b) These variables tend to interact in highly complex ways so that the 
effect of any one depends on the levels of many others.
(c) Between cause-and-effect many intervening variables may exert moderating 
influences.
(d) In many instances there may be a long time lag between the action of 
a 'causal' variable and the 'effect' to show up in some outcome.
(e) The effects of various input variables often depend critically on the 
organizational level at which they are operating.
(f) External factors - totally or partially beyond the control of organiza­
tional members - may have considerable effects on internal events.

It is against this backdrop that the OD practitioner attempts to 
analyse the organization, identify problem behaviours and their causes, and 
plan appropriate intervention strategies. And, it appears that little 
assistance can be obtained from current organizational research most of 
which is of the cross-sectional, correlational type from which no cause­
effect inferences can be drawn (Staw, 1975). It follows that practitioners 
must largely work from their own intuitive resources: careful observaton, 
sensitive perception, insightful reasoning and artful planning.

A GUIDING IMAGE

In spite of these difficulties, an overarching paradigm for data 
collection, diagnosis and action planning will be proposed. In part this 
draws upon suggestions derived from Bowers, Franklin and Pecorella (1975)
and White and Mitchell (1976), who provide two quite different theoretical approaches to the classification and analysis of independent and dependent variables in OD.

The diagnostic tools provide indices, with some degree of internal validity (White and Mitchell, 1976 p. 67), of 'problem' behaviours. These are included among the patterns of individual and group behaviour which can be mapped onto one or more of the conceptual categories in the organizational model being employed. Since organizational effectiveness is of primary concern, the categories which come to the forefront are various performance variables. For instance, they may emerge as discrepancies on various output measures (e.g. productivity or work quality, group morale or individual's job attitudes); or in other instances they may emerge as role performance elaborations which are not called for in formal work role prescriptions (e.g. behaviour directed towards personal goals incongruent with organizational goals).

These problem behaviours are assumed to be causally linked, in relationships varying in degrees of strength and directness, to a number of precursor variables as illustrated in the top part of figure 3. These precursors may also be represented as levels on various conceptual categories in the organizational model.

Figure 3: Overarching paradigm of OD data collection, diagnosis and intervention.
Many potential precursors have been suggested in the literature, too many to explicate in detail. Consequently, only the main classes in which they seem to fall will be given along with a single illustrative example in each case:

(a) elements of organizational structure - excessive role formalization  
(b) process variables - inappropriate leadership style  
(c) organizational climate - vague promotion policy  
(d) individual member factors - low 'work role centrality'.

As indicated in the lower part of figure 3, interventions are planned and implemented to ameliorate the problem behaviours but these are never directed towards the behaviours themselves (Bowers et al., 1975 p. 395). Only individuals or groups can change their behaviour, or in essence, the underlying perceptions, values and norms.

A number of change targets, of different forms and at different organizational levels may be impinged upon by the intervention. The connection between the change target and the precursor variables may be relatively direct (e.g. when an element of structure is debureaucratized to some extent) or it may be mediated by a host of intervening variables (e.g. when an individual's career planning is subject to the 'educational' input of a clarified promotion policy).

Depending upon the form of the intervention, and its scope and complexity, some combination of structural, procedural, cultural and individual change targets may be involved. As Bowers et al. (1975 p. 393) make clear "For constructive organizational change to occur, there must exist an appropriate correspondence of the treatment (action, intervention) with the internal structural and functional conditions of the organization for which change is intended." Direct changes may be made in organizational
structure, policy or work practices; in other variables designed to support, reinforce and maintain desired behaviour, which especially includes organizational climate factors (cf. LaFollette and Sims, 1975); and also include informational and experiential inputs to encourage individuals to acquire new knowledge and concepts, changed beliefs or attitudes or upgraded skills.

If the change targets have been 'hit', and the organizational situation is supportive, a variety of mechanisms of change may be engaged. A satisfactory theory of these has hardly yet begun to be developed, so it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss possible processes of change. The theoretical explanation of individual change espoused by Edgar Schein (Bennis, Berlew, Schein and Steele, 1973 pp. 237-266) seems most valuable, however. In essence, this is a sophisticated elaboration of the familiar Lewinian 'unfreezing-moving-refreezing' phase theory of change. Additionally, the five mechanisms hypothesized by French and Bell (1973 p. 108) seem to have considerable usefulness for action planning.

At organizational levels above the individual and small group, the mechanisms of change are clearly of such complexity as to defy current theoretical treatment. As White and Mitchell (1976 p. 58) suggest, the OD practitioner is generally in the situation of manipulating a wide range of independent variables, then measuring a large number of dependent variables "in hopes of capturing somewhere the changes caused by the ... intervention".

Amongst the dependent measures, a number of criterion variables will be of especial significance - those behavioural responses of individuals and groups which presumably contribute towards improved organizational functioning in one way or another. Typically a range of 'hard' measures (e.g. productivity, absenteeism, labour turnover, spoilage rates etc.) and 'soft'
measures (e.g. supervisor's reports, attitude survey responses etc.) are employed. The establishment of satisfactory criterion variables having desirable conceptual and methodological qualities is part of the broader issue of OD evaluation. This is also a field yet to be developed. However some first tentative steps have been taken in the papers of Armenakis, Field and Mosley, 1975; Mack, 1974; Nadler, Jenkins, Mirvis and Macy, 1975; Nielsen and Kimberley, 1976; White and Mitchell, 1976 to which the interested reader is referred.

As an overall Framework, this representation has conceptual neatness and completion. At the practical level, of course, there are a myriad of difficulties. The most fundamental of these probably revolves around the ICGs scope of responses to the precursors of problem behaviour. Where precursors can be distinguished, whether by intuition or empirical 'evidence', often because of organizational realities, the appropriate interventions may have slim feasibility anyway. For instance, due to problems of operationality, costs or likely consequences (Porter, Lawler and Hackman, 1975 pp. 482-485) or because precursors are vital elements of the organization's power structure and hence not readily amenable to change.
Perhaps the central diagnostic task for the ICG is to assess the readiness and the capacity of the client system to change (Beckhard 1975, Lippitt 1969). It is difficult to assign relative values to these two criteria: 'readiness' may be present but not the wherewithal, or vice versa. In some instances neither may be apparent, and the ICG is faced with an ex nihilo problem. In determining the 'readiness' for change a formula developed by Gleicher (cited in Beckhard 1975 p. 45) may be helpful:

\[ C = (abd)^x \]

where \( C \) = change, \( a \) = level of dissatisfaction with the status quo, \( b \) = clear or understood desired state, \( d \) = practical first steps toward a desired state, and \( x \) = 'cost' of changing. The formula is just a neat expression of the idea that the combined weight of dissatisfaction, expectation and expediency must be greater than the exactions change will demand. Assessment of the distribution of 'unreadiness' in the client system is also important, as an indication of where change strategies may best be directed. The 'capacity' to change may turn out to be a limiting condition. This is illustrated by the events of late 1974 in a number of Australian organizations, where hard financial times caused OD programs to be either wound down or eliminated altogether.

At the practical level there are a number of issues which may hinder the diagnostic phase (aside from questions of the cost- and time-effectiveness of various diagnostic procedures which will not be dealt with here). Some which have been observed will be briefly outlined.

An early handicap which has been observed for several ICGs is the difficulty in drawing meaningfully upon the OD experience of other organizations. There are few well documented studies of organizational change programs available. In general, this is due to the formidable task of carrying out rigorous research on organizations, and in particular, the complications in collecting valid data about change processes while they are occurring. Post hoc analyses of OD projects also are equivocal, as it is often impossible to separate out the effects of multiple confounding variables or to determine the precise effect of independent variables (Kahn, 1974). It is
probably advisable to maintain a cautious and sceptical view of OD results obtained in other organizations, whether favourable or unfavourable. In essence, although research utility studies are to be encouraged, the change program has to be developed to suit the specific circumstances of the organization.

Another practical issue which has emerged frequently (especially where consultant and client groups are working jointly towards a change program) is establishing "problem ownership" - or in terms of the earlier discussion, the locus of the precursor variables. There is a tendency for client groups to displace responsibility on to other areas of the organization or on to the ICG itself. An especially troublesome variant of this problem is when the organizational diagnosis 'points the finger' directly at senior managers. This represents a difficult situation for an ICG which has been operating under the sanction of that management group itself. Casey (1975) presents a diagnostic tool which seems useful for clarifying problem ownership, although it is not very helpful in the central problem of shifting the centre of gravity for problem responsibility on to the client system.

The potential for reactive effects from diagnostic activities should also be of concern to the ICG. In a number of Australian OD programs the gathering of data per se led to later difficulties. Staff interest and involvement were aroused by diagnostic surveys and group meetings and expectations for particular improvements raised. In one instance, the excessive delay in data analysis and diversion of senior management interest from the project seriously damped staff faith in the OD project. In another instance, the relatively meagre demonstration of action emanating from the data collection phases partially accounted for the subsequent low proportion of staff who participated in the project.
CHAPTER 6: FIELDS WITHIN FIELDS

... some organizations can be renewed through new leadership and new ideas. Others need a more massive influence of new blood or far reaching organizational changes. Still others can only be renewed by taking them apart and putting them together again. And some cannot be renewed at all. John W. Gardner

This chapter aims to map out some factors within 'organizational space' which seem critical to an ICG's prospects for introducing an OD program. The discussion will not be directly concerned with OD "craft skills" (Smith, 1976) or with specific OD intervention techniques. Rather it will be concerned with a pragmatic analysis of relevant situational variables for an ICG in a typical organizational setting, and some potential approaches to these.

Since rigorous research evidence on planning for organizational change is sparse, the analysis is based on advice gleaned from OD practitioners' reports, the writer's observations and impressions of several ICGs, and on some generalizations about behaviour in organizations. A guiding framework is shown in figure 4 where four clusters of critical factors are illustrated.

![Figure 4: Sets of organizational factors critical to ICG change proposals.](image)

The clusters will be elaborated in the text as though they are independent, but as the overlap of circles is intended to suggest, the factors are highly interactive both within and between clusters.
ADMINISTRATIVE IMPACT

This refers to the effects of proposals for change on the organization's power structure, authority hierarchy and the value base of decision makers. Reverberations and reactions may occur at all levels within these systems, with the most significant being at the level of senior managers in the initial phases.

A basic assumption of this paper is that the primary goal of the ICG is to obtain the substantial support and commitment to relevant action by the key organizational executives. The nature of the action will vary depending on the characteristics of the planned OD program. In any event, the key policy makers should be fully knowledgeable about the aims and priorities of the change project; they must be willing to sanction the necessary resources; and preferably they should be committed to the necessity and value of the project. However this does not imply that the change program must be directed at the senior management group. Rather, these are necessary conditions: once satisfied, they enable change efforts to be started at any point within the organizations. In most Australian OD programs on which data is available (e.g. see Andreatta and Rumbold, 1974) the change goals have tended to focus on events at relatively low levels within the organization. It seems reasonable to assume that in all these instances the projects had "(i) the support of top management and (ii) either personal involvement by key middle managers or introduction of a protective top management umbrella over the project for a definite period of time" (Porter, Lawler and Hackman, 1975 p. 475).

Managerial, and to a lesser extent supervisory reaction to change will reflect the goal and value orientations associated with these organizational roles. Managers obviously have certain priorities and preferences, and since they are held accountable for aspects of organizational performance will
naturally want to maintain certain prerogatives, e.g. to define objectives, determine policy and co-ordinate the activities of different parts of the organization. Top management also will have fairly comprehensive plans in mind for the future development of the organization. Decision making behaviour will also probably reflect value positions, personal as well as organizational goals, and 'dynamics' of the political structure. Given these considerations, a central issue for the ICG in trying to enhance managerial receptivity to innovate proposals resides in the 'need for reassurance'. Concrete proof of the success of an OD program can never be provided, although it may be demanded by some managers. However, various data and supporting evidence may be assembled to provide sceptical administrators and lower line managers with reasonable assurance that performance objectives will at least not be jeopardised, and that they could probably be improved by some form of OD intervention.

Another central issue to be dealt with emerges from managerial authority, and its associated beliefs and values. Manager's concern over possible erosion of authority may be manifested in many ways, but at the crux the real fear seems to be concern for loss of control of particular procedures and operations. Structural elements, such as the formal distribution of authority and responsibility, provide the ultimate means of getting certain things done, or not done. Consequently, proposals which will require changes to authority, control and responsibility structures will need to evoke credibility that organizational member's behaviour will still contribute to the attainment of organizational goals.

As well as realistic disquiet over performance achievement, concern for personal status and influence will colour management response to change proposals, particularly at middle and higher levels. At lower levels, the concern may be less with personal or organizational benefits, rather be more
with the day-to-day demands of implementing a new system, and the practical difficulties this will entail.

The ICG's approaches to these issues should focus on the macro-organizational level. It does not seem overfanciful to suggest that they should be striving to tie the change proposals in at the corporate planning level, with long term mission goals and the strategy of senior leaders. Clearly the ICG must be perceived by these leaders as a worthwhile component of the corporate planning process. This implies an astute sensing of the goals and values of the top managers, an intuitive grasp of the internal power structure and a penetrating appreciation of the traditions and norms which infuse the organizational climate. Generally in Australian organizations it seems that human resource management specialists have not functioned in depth at the corporate levels - in the review, interpretation or development of human resource policy - and this seems to be the ideal for the ICG to strive towards.

The administrative impact of change proposals also seem to be predicated on the disconfirmation value of the proposals. The changes planned need to elicit interest, if not enthusiasm, and avoid a negative backlash (counter-moves and resistance to change in 1001 forms) which could forestall any further moves for change in the organization for years to come. The degree of 'motivating discrepancy' seems to rest finely on an exquisite fulcrum as Porter et al. (1975, p. 480) attest: "Somehow the consultant must introduce material to the organization which is sufficiently discrepant from the status quo to provide impetus for change - but not so deviant as to be rejected out of hand by organizational managers". Confounding the issue even further, and making planning much harder for the ICG, is the observation that the disconfirmation required (i.e. how much the ground must shake beneath people's feet before they will think of moving from the status quo) tends to
vary considerably between different areas and levels of the organization. This seems to be an alternative affirmation of Smith's (1976, p. 286) view of "multiple realities" in organizations.

RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

Any substantial OD program will require commitments of considerable organizational resources including funds and time which could be directed towards more productive goals in the short term. Time is needed for line management to analyse and review proposals, for staff skills training and for the work of the members of the ICG. It seems clear from the experience of several organizations that an OD program cannot be mounted on a part time or 'as other duties allow' basis. Specifically committed resources are mandatory, so the essential problem for the ICG is to convince those in the organization who allocate such resources that the commitment is likely to be an investment. The dilemma is that developmental work generally requires the application of resources for a considerable period of time before the payoff, in 'hard' criteria, starts to emerge.

Additionally, evaluation of an OD effort in hard criteria terms may not take into account more qualitative improvements - for instance the capacity of staff to respond to new demands, find creative solutions to problems, plan thoroughly against future contingencies etc. The general experience in a number of Australian organizations which have implemented OD programs is that dramatic improvements in work quantity do not occur. Over a period of time, anywhere from two to five years, benefits may accrue in things such as: improvements in work quality, more effective integration between sub-units, or enhanced labour retention. The time for 'cultural' changes to permeate through the organization may be an even longer term phenomena - changes in those affective and stylistic components which presumably underlie the organizational climate could take up to a decade in a large complex organization.
Factors such as these have probably accounted for the trend away from large system wide OD projects which characterised much of OD in Australia in the 1960s, towards smaller, more manageable units of intervention. A consequence of this, is that the ICG may be able to capitalize on the 'small-steps' and 'build-on-success' principles. The course of change can be speculated to run as follows: start with a low resources 'demonstration' project — gain confidence of other managers — change program moves laterally through the organization — wider evidence of improved performance — change program moves vertically through the organization.

TECHNOSTRUCTURAL IMPACT

This term is derived from one of the constructs of Friedlander and Brown (1974, p. 320) and is used here to refer to the organizational impact due to changes in production technology (techniques, procedures, work flows etc.) and in structural elements of the organization (role formalization, centralization of decision making and authority, configuration etc., James and Jones, 1976). These technostructural aspects are thoroughly embedded in organizational process variables — the patterns of behaviours of individuals and groups which constitute day to day role performance. Since they are such core components of the organization, changes in technostructural features, or perhaps simply perceptions of impending changes in them, provide some of the most weighty difficulties for the ICG. This probably reflects a number of factors, including:

(a) structural elements are the main means by which organizational leaders maintain control of the organization

(b) in most private sector, and certainly all public sector organizations, technostructural features are subject to powerful external forces

(c) individuals have needs for a certain degree of structure to provide stability and predictability to organizational life
(d) the recognition that structural changes per se will not necessarily produce the required changes in organizational member's behaviour.

It is factors such as these which account for the range and variety of reactions to technostructural change. Means of dealing with likely behavioural responses are well spelt out in the literature (e.g. Lippitt 1969 pp. 149-152) and are taken up in general terms below. The more technical aspects should be subject to widely inclusive planning and ideally this should be a line management responsibility since it is obviously the line function which bears the brunt of the technical and structural changes.

The essence of the planning is in comprehensive socio-technical analysis i.e. the thinking through of the effects of any change on all other elements within a particular work system, as well as the likely consequences for all other linked parts of the organization. Obviously as the scope and complexity of technostructural changes increases the need for co-ordination and co-operation across sub-unit boundaries will increase. This is predicated on the setting up of effective across-boundary communication and decision making mechanisms.

A satisfactory approach can be envisaged in terms of project teams of staff, or staff representatives, from all sections of the work systems involved with an overall 'steering' task force made up of line managers at various levels. ICG members would act as resource persons and facilitators to all of these groups.

HUMAN PROCESSUAL IMPACT

This term is also derived from a construct of Friedlander and Brown (1974 p. 325) and is used here to refer to the impact of change on the behavioural processes and underlying perceptions, values and attitudes of
the people in the organization. Some theories of organizational change rest on the assumption that 'changing organizations' really means 'changing people in organizations'. This is clearly true, but, depending on the circumstances, only a part of the domain of factors involved (cf. Schein, 1973).

Many of the human responses to change can be consolidated under the issue of 'response to uncertainty'. Amongst other things, the main benefits organizations provide their members with are security and stability. Consequently many members seem to have an inherent dislike of situations which are ambiguous or at variance with existing beliefs or values. Hence it follows that all moves towards change being taken by the ICG should be cast in forms which have as one of their aims the reduction of uncertainty. These apprehensive reactions can clearly occur in many ways - personal insecurities, devisiveness between groups, managerial 'tunnel vision' and so on - and apparently account for a major conclusion which can be drawn from several Australian OD studies.

This is the vital importance for the ultimate success of an OD program of the organizational culture which preceeded the change effort. The implication for the ICG is that a large proportion of their activities should be directed at 'culture preparation'. Broadly this refers to a range of educational activities which present OD concepts to staff at all levels and which gradually involve them in developmental considerations. The intentions at the heart of these activities are to evoke a general feeling of a need for change, to clarify uncertainty, to influence people positively about the benefits of OD, and to provide some sense of scope for personal participation in organizational improvement.

As part of these activities, but having wider significance, the ICG can work on 'seeding' and 'linkage' mechanisms. The former refers to the
dissemination of information in places where it is likely to strike root and grow. For instance, appropriate material may be introduced into staff and supervisory training, management development courses and so on. The later refers to the establishment of meaningful links with receptive, influential people throughout the organization, managers in key line areas - especially those with linking-pin roles - being of prime importance. Some ICGs have consciously planned influence attempts with such individuals: sensing their needs and priorities, establishing contact, mutual analysis of the utility of OD techniques, monitoring of outcomes etc. Additionally much of the spadework for developing receptivity to change can be done through the interactions and relationships of the informal organization.

CONCLUSION

With broad brush strokes, this paper has attempted to depict the organizational field for internal consultants striving towards change. As this chapter especially indicates ICGs are really working within fields within fields within .... And if the fields have the degree of complexity implied, then are there grounds for optimism? In large organizations, can groups of individuals with clear limits upon power and sources of influence have prospects for introducing change and contributing to the development of the organization? The accumulating evidence, to be realistic, is equivocal. Some groups have. And some haven't, presumably because of lack of internal order, or because the forces opposing change in the organization were too intimidatory. This paper can have little to say about the latter, but it is hoped that an analysis of some of the factors suggested here will assist an ICG to define their field of action more sharply and to mobilize their resources more fruitfully.
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