

MAKING *HIZBIYYIN*

HIZBUT TAHRIR IN SOUTH SULAWESI

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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is the result of my own research. Where I have drawn on the work of other scholars due acknowledgement has been made in the text.

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July 23, 2009

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ABSTRACT

This sub-thesis examines the emergence of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) through its methods of recruitment and indoctrination. A branch of international Hizbut Tahrir (HT), in comparison to the performance of other transnational Islamist movements in Indonesia, HTI shows rapid mobilization, strong cadre building and a deep grasp of and adherence to central HT ideology. HT has been present in Indonesia since the early 1980s, initially as an underground organization, then from 2000, as a formal Islamist movement. The transition to democracy and the lifting of political restrictions at the end of the Soeharto regime in May, 1998 facilitated the rise of HTI.

This study focuses on the strategies and processes of recruitment and indoctrination employed by HTI, taking as a case study its members in Makassar, South Sulawesi. It will demonstrate the importance of innovative recruitment techniques and intensive indoctrination to understanding HTI's success. It will discuss HTI perspectives on *da'wa* (predication) and activities for recruitment and mobilization as outlined in their publications. Furthermore, through interviews conducted in the field, it will examine the experiences of rank and file members in dealing with their acquaintance with HTI and their processes of participation and membership. Most recruitment takes place through interpersonal relations between HTI members, the *hizbiyyin* and existing social networks. Furthermore, *hizbiyyin* actively seek converts by establishing and maintaining new social relationships in order to guide others to participate in HTI activities, before leading them to further levels of commitment.

This sub-thesis will also explore how indoctrination has a determining role in creating dedicated *hizbiyyin*. This is mainly conducted through weekly *halqa*, or study clubs, which serve to keep new recruits learning, moulding their minds and behaviour and maintaining unity of thought among the members. Besides discussing the social background of *hizbiyyin* and the psychology of youth, it will show the impact of intensive indoctrination on them by analyzing their narratives given in interviews.

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

aqidah (Ar. *aqīda*): faith or belief

BKIM, Badan Kerohanian Islam Mahasiswa: Student Association for Islamic Propagation

BKK, Badan Kordinasi Kampus: Campus Coordinating Board

BKLDK, Badan Koordinasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus: Coordinating Board of the Institution of Campus *Da'wa*

Caliph: successor to Muhammad as head of the Muslim community through the ages

Caliphate: a single, centralized Islamic state, such as the Ottoman Empire

Da'wa: Islamic missionary activity, proselytizing, also predication to make Muslims more observant Muslims

daris (Ar. *dāris*): student

Darul Islam: The Abode of Islam, also the name of an Islamic-state movement that rose up in rebellion against the central government in Indonesia, 1948-1962

Darul Kufr: The House of Unbelief

Daulah Islam (Ar. *ad-daula al-islamiyya*): the Islamic state

DDII, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia: Islamic Predication Council of Indonesia

Dema, Dewan Mahasiswa: Student governments

DF, Dirasah Fardiyah (Ar. *dirāsa fardiyya*): individual learning in HTI

DPD I, Dewan Pimpinan Daerah I: Provincial Executive Committee of HTI

DPD II, Dewan Pimpinan Daerah II: Executive Committee for District Level, HTI

DPC, Dewan Pimpinan Cabang: Executive Committee for Sub-District Level, HTI

fikrah (Ar. *fikra*): way of thinking, thought

FOSIDI, Forum Studi Islam Ideologis: Forum of Islamic Ideological Studies

FOSDIK, Forum Studi Islam Kontemporer: Forum of Contemporary Islamic Studies

FPI, Front Pembela Islam: Islamic Defence Front

GEMA Pembebasan, Gerakan Mahasiswa Pembebasan: Student Liberation Movement, an HTI university student organization

Gerakan Tarbiyah: (Islamic) Education Movement

Hadith: Traditions of the Prophet, collections of the sayings and practices of Muhammad

halal (Ar. *halāl*): permitted, that which is allowed according to Islamic law

halqa: circle, used in the sense of an Islamic study circle or club

harakah (Ar. *haraka*): movement, in international Islam

haram (Ar. *harām*): forbidden, sinful, that which is prohibited under Islamic law

hizbiyyin (Ar. *hizbiyyīn*): members of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia

HMI, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam: Muslim Student Association

HT, Hizbut Tahrir: Party of Liberation

HTI, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Indonesian Party of Liberation

HTI Muslimah: women's wing of HTI

HUMAS, Hubungan Masyarakat: spokesperson for HTI

Ijma': agreement or consensus of expert legal opinions in Islam

Ikhwanul Muslimin: Muslim Brotherhood, MB

IMM, Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah: Muhammadiyah Student Association

IPB, Institut Pertanian Bogor: Bogor Agricultural Institute

jahiliyyah: 'an ignorance of Islam', referring both historically to the time before Islam and in contemporary times, a term used by the Muslim Brotherhood

Jamaah Tabligh: Group for the propagation of Islam

Jemaah Islamiyah, JI: Islamic Community, covert jihadist organization, founded in Malaysia in 1993 and based in Indonesia since 1998

jihad: Literally 'struggle', denoting Islamic holy war; at present, the term is associated with violence under the banner of Islam

kaffah (Ar. *kāffah*): total, comprehensive

khalifah: caliph

khilafah: caliphate

kufur (Ar. *kufīr*): unbeliever, infidel, unbelieving

Laskar Jihad: Jihad Troops

LDK, Lembaga Dakwah Kampus: Campus *Da'wa* Institution

Lembaga Tahfidzul Qur'an: Institute for Qur'anic Memorisation

LMD, Latihan Manajemen Dakwah: Preaching Management Training

mabda': basis of thinking, ideology

mafahim: concepts

maslahat: benefit, the common good

MB, the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna; an organization stressing the completeness of Islam, pan-Islam and the need to defend Islam in holy war

MIPA, Matematika dan Ilmu Pengetahuan Alam: Faculty of Mathematics and Science

MM, *Min Muqawwimat*: the title of HTI book *Min Muqawwimat an-Nafsiyyah al-Isamiyyah* or Pillars of Islamic Personality

MMI, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia: Council of Jihad Fighters of Indonesia

MPR, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat: People's Consultative Assembly, Indonesia's supreme decision-making body

MU, *Mutaba'at Usbu'iyah*, study activity following weekly *halqa* in HTI

Muhammadiyah: the largest modernist Muslim organization in Indonesia

mushrif: supervisor (male)

mushrifah: supervisor (female)

mutabannat: most salient books by An-Nabhani used in *halqa* in HTI

NKK, Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus: Normalisation of the Campuses, Ministry of Education policy controlling student action on the campuses, 1978

NU, Nahdlatul Ulama: Revival of Muslim Scholars, the largest traditionalist Muslim organization in Indonesia

Perda Shari'a: provincial bylaws permitting the implementation of *shari'a*

pesantren: traditional Islamic boarding school in Indonesia

PII, Pelajar Islam Indonesia: Indonesian Muslim Students association

PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Prosperity and Justice Party

PMII, Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia: Indonesian Muslim Students Movement. NU's tertiary students organization formed in 1960

PNS, Pegawai Negeri Sipil: Indonesian government employees

PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: Unified Development Party, amalgam of Islamic parties under regime pressure in 1973

Al-Qur'an: the holy book of Islam

Salafi: general term for movements that seek to return to the example of the early generations of Muslims; in recent decades it has been used to denote the most strictly puritanical of these movements

santri: student at traditional Islamic boarding school, also a pious Muslim

shari'a: Islamic law

shura: consultation and deliberation, often refers to the basic notion of democracy in Islam.

Sunnah (Ar. *Sunna*): normative practice or exemplary behaviour of Muhammad

tabanni (Ar. *tabannī*): process of adopting ideas, term used in HT

tadarruj: gradualism, term used by the Muslim Brotherhood

takbir (Ar. *takbīr*): proclamation of “*Allahu Akbar*” (God is Most Great)

tariqah (Ar. *tarīqa*): method or way

tatsqif (Ar. *tathqīf*): culturing, HT term

thaqafa mutabannah: adopted canon of Hizbut Tahrir

thaqafa ghayr mutabannah: un-adopted canon of Hizbut Tahrir

tsaqafah (Ar. *thaqafa*): culture; in HTI usage canon, knowledge or insight

UI, Universitas Indonesia: The University of Indonesia

UIN Alauddin, Universitas Islam Negeri Alauddin: State Islamic University of Alauddin, formerly Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN), State Institute for Islamic Studies

UMI, Universitas Muslim Indonesia: Indonesian Muslim University

umma: community of believers, the community of Muslims

UNHAS, Universitas Hasanuddin: Hasanuddin University

UNM, Universitas Negeri Makassar: State University of Makassar

Waspol, Wawasan Politik: political insight, term used in HTI

NOTE: the rendering of Arabic terms and proper names follows both international convention and Indonesian usage by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. No diacritics are given in the thesis.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background

On 12 August 2007, the stadium Gelora Bung Karno Jakarta was filled with some eighty thousand Muslims attending an international caliphate conference held by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, Indonesian Party of Liberation). Cries of the *takbir*, 'Allahu Akbar' proclaiming the greatness of God rang through the stadium as invited speakers from different countries called for the restoration of the caliphate, the introduction of Islamic *shari'a* law, and the unity of the *umma*. Never before in Indonesian history had such a large rally called for the re-establishment of universal Islamic governance and a rejection of western ideologies. Indeed, Hizbut Tahrir is a transnational Islamist movement which pursues a global agenda. The mass participation of HTI members in this international conference signalled the growing popularity of transnational Islamist movements in Indonesia.

The emergence of transnational Islamist movements has in part marked the return of Islamic radicalism in post-Soeharto Indonesia. The fall of Soeharto's authoritarian New Order regime on 21 May 1998 led to democratization and openness. Many political aspirations and expressions which were suppressed in the old regime could now be voiced and contested. The rise of political Islam is one consequence of this. The tendencies of political Islam in post-New Order Indonesia have been expressed through the establishment of a large number of 'Islamic parties' using Islam as their ideological basis; the implementation of *shari'a* in several provinces through bylaws (*Perda Shari'a*); the proliferation of radical Islamic groups such as Laskar Jihad (Jihad Troops), Front Pembela Islam (FPI, or Islamic Defence Front), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and Majelis

Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Council of Jihad Fighters of Indonesia);¹ and the mushrooming of Islamist media.² This phenomenon prompted a questioning of the general perception that Indonesian Islam is both moderate and peaceful.

The existence of Islamist movements in Indonesia has gained attention from both the international media and academics, especially in the wake of the 9/11 2002 attack in the USA and several bombing incidents in Indonesia. This was due to the involvement of a number of groups, such as Laskar Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah in violence and terrorism. As a result, some analysts and scholars suspected the presence of an al-Qaeda network in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia.³ In this regard, there is a tendency to regard the Islamist movement in Indonesia as inspired by that of the Middle East and as ‘militant’ and therefore violent. This tendency, however, overlooks the fact that some transnational Middle Eastern Islamist movements, such as Gerakan Tarbiyah and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia use peaceful means in achieving their goals. Ayoob is right to state that “most contemporary transnational Islamist activities do not fall within the jihadist description”.⁴ In this respect, it should be noted that transnational Islamist movements take various forms, ranging from missionary activity (*da'wa*) to overtly political concerns.⁵

Due to its political concern and uncompromising stance, I categorize Hizbut Tahrir as an ‘Islamist’ and ‘radical’ movement. Islamism is generally viewed as the concept or discourse which regards Islam as a political ideology.⁶ In this respect, “Islamists see Islam not as a mere religion, but as a political ideology

¹ Azyumardi Azra, “Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia”, in Virginia Hooker and Amin Saikal (eds.), *Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004) 133-34.

² Syamsul Rijal, “Media and Islamism in Post-New Order Indonesia: The Case of *Sabil*”, *Studia Islamika* 12: 3 (2005) 421-74.

³ See for example, Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2002); Zachari Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Boulder and London: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2003).

⁴ Mohammed Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World* (USA: The University of Michigan Press, 2008) 134.

⁵ *Ibid.* 134-35.

⁶ Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (London: I.B.Taurus Publishers, 1994) ix; Bobby S. Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism* (London and New York: Zed Books, 1997) 17.

that should reshape all aspects of society”.⁷ Fitting in this category, HT conceives Islam as ideology (*mabda'*) and a complete system which should rule all aspects of Muslim lives, including politics, economy, law, foreign affairs and so forth. To uphold this 'complete system', Islamists share a common view on the need of the implementation of *shari'a*, but they adopt different methods, ranging from accommodation to rejection of Western concepts. Among Indonesian Islamist movements, it is HTI which shows a more radical position as it struggles to re-establish a global caliphate in order to replace the existing system of nation-state governance. However, the term 'radical' in this sense has no connotation with violent action. Rather, it refers to the HT notion which seeks to bring dramatic change in the system of government by propagating a total rejection of ideologies and ideas derived from the West.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is deserving of academic attention for several reasons. Firstly, it is part of a global movement which imports its ideology from the Middle East and has a clearly transnational political agenda. Emphasizing Islam as its sole ideology, HTI is not reluctant to reject Western ideologies and ideas, such as capitalism, secularism, democracy and the sovereign nation-state. In Indonesia, this kind of Islam appears new and somewhat alien for the Muslim majority who follow the mass organizations of the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the modernist Muhammadiyah. Secondly, in contrast to these organizations, HTI does not involve itself in parliamentary politics, and yet it has attracted a growing membership. In relation to its size, HTI officials avoid mentioning exact numbers. However, Fealy estimates an HTI membership of at least several tens of thousands⁸ and I predict this number will gradually increase in the future. Although HTI is still a small minority group, its rallies and campaigning have won extensive media coverage. On all of these counts, it is important to explain the factors which draw people to participate in this particular transnational Islamist movement.

⁷ Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Umma* (London: Hurst Company, 2004) 58.

⁸ Greg Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia: Seeking a 'Total' Islamic Identity", in Shahram Akbarzadeh and Fethi Mansouri (eds.), *Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West* (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007) 156.

One method of researching the motivations and processes of people in joining such a movement is through an ethnographic study. Analyzing the social, political and economic contexts of a phenomenon is not sufficient, as the actors are subjects who respond in particular ways to their surrounding realities. Ethnography allows us to understand the way in which Islamist groups express their faith and identity by exploring worldview, feelings and experiences. This is because the task of ethnography is “to investigate some aspects of the lives of the people who are being studied, and this includes how these people view the situations they face, how they regard one another, and also how they see themselves”.⁹ This study, therefore, will seek to explain the process of participation of people in HTI and the meanings and identity they attach to their affiliation.

Scope of the Study and Research Questions

This study deals with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, focussing on the rank-and-file members who dedicate themselves to the organisation. Since HTI has grown most rapidly in the big cities in Indonesia, I will take Makassar, South Sulawesi as a case study. There are two reasons for choosing this city. First, Makassar is both the capital city of South Sulawesi and the largest city in Eastern Indonesia, serving as the central base of HTI's recruitment in this region. Secondly, South Sulawesi is a province which has historical linkage to staunchly Islamic kingdoms of the past and an armed rebellion, Darul Islam (The Abode of Islam) led by Kahar Muzakkar (1950-1965).¹⁰ Its dominant ethnic groups, namely the Bugis and Makassarese, are strongly attached to their Islamic identity,¹¹ and recently some of its regencies, such as Bulukumba

⁹ Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, *Ethnography: Principles in Practice* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007) 3.

¹⁰ For a good account of Darul Islam in South Sulawesi, see Barbara Sillars Harvey, *Traditions, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi, 1950-1965*, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis (Chicago: Cornell University, 1974).

¹¹ See Mattulada, “Islam di Sulawesi Selatan”, in Taufik Abdullah (ed.), *Agama dan Perubahan Sosial* (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1983) 209-322; Christian Pelras, “Religion, Tradition, and the Dynamics of Islamization in South Sulawesi”, *Indonesia* 57, Achipel (April 1993) 133-54.

have implemented Islamic *shari'a* through bylaws (*Perda Shari'a*). This study seeks to understand the participation process and appeal of HTI based on its members' own perspectives, regarding them as ethnographic subjects who speak for themselves.

The act of participation and commitment to Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is pivotal to this study. The central research question is: why and how young Indonesian Muslims join and become committed to HTI? In this respect, recruitment and conversion processes to HTI will be explored. The social background of the members and socio-political settings will be investigated. The study also asks: why did recruits choose HTI rather than one of the many Islamic organizations in Indonesia? How far has their participation in HTI had an impact on or transformed their individual and social lives? Furthermore, this study also investigates the process of their acquaintance with HTI and mechanisms of indoctrination in the movement.

Significance of the Study

Many works from various perspectives have been written in order to explain the rise of religious fundamentalism in the contemporary globalizing world. The explanation often emphasized is that religious fundamentalism is a manifestation of a crisis of identity among believers, with the believers attempting to preserve a distinctive identity by returning to the past.¹² According to Ruthven, fundamentalist groups are engaged in a 'search for meaning' in the midst of the era of globalization.¹³ In the context of the Muslim world, the explanation of Islamic fundamentalism in relation to identity formation is more complex and profound. In Muslim countries, Islamic radical movements have used Islamic identity as a means of cultural reassertion and resistance against the perceived ills of Western imperialism, modernization and globalisation. In several cases, the movements reassert their Islamic

¹² Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family and Education* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993) 3.

¹³ See Malise Ruthven, *Fundamentalism: The Search for Meaning* (New York: Oxford, 2004).

identity in opposition to secular and authoritarian governments as well as to local traditions, which are perceived to be not 'Islamic' enough for them. Noorhaidi Hasan, who studied Laskar Jihad, notes that both the impact of globalisation and Indonesian domestic problems contribute to the appeal of Islamic radical movements for young Muslims seeking some form of certainty.¹⁴ This study will examine whether this assumption holds true for HTI members based in Makassar, South Sulawesi.

Looking at international Hizbut Tahrir (HT), several works have attempted to explain the rise and appeal of the movement among young Muslims. Some of these have drawn on the relationship between Islam and globalization. Roy, for instance, refers to the term 'globalised Islam' in order to explain how Muslims in the West are affected by globalisation, westernisation and their position as a minority.¹⁵ Such Muslims of the younger generation who are questioning religious authority and who find themselves caught between Western culture and the localised culture of their parents are prone to join transnational movements offering instead the global Islamic identity of the *umma* (Islamic community). However, most studies of Hizbut Tahrir are taken from Europe and Central Asia, while little attention has been given to HT in Southeast Asia, especially in countries where Muslims are a majority. Indonesia, boasting the largest Muslim population in the world, provides an interesting case where HT has gradually grown and expanded without facing political pressure from the state, as has happened in certain Arab countries. Accordingly, this study seeks to fill this gap. As the research is conducted in South Sulawesi, this study will also enrich the literature about Islam in Eastern Indonesia, a region sadly neglected by scholars. More importantly, it will see the dynamics and development of HTI in a regional context.

¹⁴ Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006).

¹⁵ See Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. For a comparison, see also Peter Mandaville, *Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).

Review of Related Literature

In global scholarship, the current works on Hizbut Tahrir have been written mainly from the perspectives of security experts and social movement theorists. The former has a tendency to identify whether the organisation poses a potential threat of violence while the latter seeks to explain the causal emergence and development of HT, using political opportunity structure, resource mobilization and framing.¹⁶ All studies of this kind assess pertinent elements of HT such as ideology, political context, networking, recruitment strategies and activities. Little attention, however, has been paid to explaining the movement from the points of view of its rank-file members.

In the Indonesian context, there have been several works on Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia using theories of fundamentalism and social movements. Most are generally concerned with the question of the ideology, emergence and activities of HTI. The works of Rihlah Nur Aulia¹⁷ and Syamsul Arifin,¹⁸ for instance, deal with HTI in an attempt to decide whether it can be categorized as an Islamic fundamentalist movement. Aulia delineates six characteristics of Islamic fundamentalism which include: 1) scripturalist understanding of Islam, 2) viewing religion as a complete system, 3) being fanatics, exclusive, radical, militant and intolerant, 4) countering modern ideologies, 5) truth monopoly and 6) opposing pluralism and relativism. She then uses these characteristics to analyse four HTI ideas on the Islamic caliphate, the concept of *shura*, the relation between Islam and the state and women and politics. Aulia comes to

¹⁶ For the former studies see for example: International Crisis Group, “Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to the Threat of Hizb ut-Tahrir”, in *ICG Asia Report 58*, 30 June, available at: www.crisisweb.org, 2; Jean-Francois Mayer, “Hizb ut-Tahrir The Next Al-Qaida, Really?”, *PSIO Occasional Paper 4* (2004); Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, “Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group That Remains Nonviolent”, in *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18 (2006) 315-334; Didier Chaudet, “Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Islamist Threat to Central Asia?”, in *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 26, 1 (2006) 113-115. For the latter studies see: Emmanuel Karagiannis, “Political Islam in Uzbekistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami”, in *Europe-Asia Studies* 58: 2 (March 2006) 261-280; Emmanuel Karagiannis, “The Rise of Political Islam in Kazakhstan: Hizb Ut-Tahrir Al Islami”, in *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 13 (2007) 297-322.

¹⁷ Rihlah Nur Aulia, *Fundamentalisme Islam Indonesia: Studi atas Gerakan dan Pemikiran Hizbut Tahrir*, M.A. Thesis (Jakarta: UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 2004).

¹⁸ Syamsul Arifin, *Ideologi dan Praksis Gerakan Sosial Kaum Fundamental: Pengalaman Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia* (Malang: UMM Press, 2005).

the conclusion that HTI does represent an Islamic fundamentalist movement. In a similar vein, Arifin explains in his work what he calls “the ideology construction and type of social movement of HTI”. The author emphasizes the important role of Islam as ideology in HTI's agenda. He concludes that HTI could be categorized as a social movement which combines redemptive, transformative and revolutionary types. However, Arifin does not elaborate in depth on HTI using the social movement theories current among contemporary scholars. In this respect, he merely presents a descriptive analysis of HTI's ideology, *da'wa* process and activities. Both of these authors are more concerned with the fundamentalist ideology and the rhetoric of the movement represented within HTI publications and the leaders' voices rather than those of the members themselves.

Several other works provide a profile and general assessment of HTI. The book by Khamami Zada¹⁹ is the work most referred to by scholars of Islamist movements in Indonesia, since it was the first to deal with the proliferation of what he calls ‘radical Islamic groups’ in the transition era after the fall of Soeharto. The book includes HTI along with other Islamist movements such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Laskar Jihad, Ikhwanul Muslimin (The Muslim Brotherhood) and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI). Zada argues that the emergence of the movements is caused by two factors: first, disillusionment with the state which has failed to bring stability makes certain people turn to Islamic *shari'a* as a solution; and second, the domination and hegemony of the West in Muslim countries generates Islamic solidarity to resist the West. This author, however, provides no more than a general discussion of the issues by examining the common socio-political characteristics of all Islamist movements in terms of ideas and actions. The book does not contain a detailed discussion, or even a brief profile of the Islamist movements, including Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia.

¹⁹ Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002).

Jamhari and Jahroni,²⁰ in their edited work of *Gerakan Salafi Radikal*, include HTI in the framework of radical *salafi* movements emerging after the fall of the New Order. They argue that the rise of Islamic radical movements, including HTI, is the direct political consequence of the fall of the authoritarian state. Without employing any particular perspective or theory, their work gives an introductory account of HTI, along with other movements, delineating its historical background and ideology based on the ideas of An-Nabhani, the founder of Hizbut Tahrir and on HTI publications. While discussing the origin and emergence of HTI on Indonesian secular university campuses, it also discusses the main agendas of HTI, such as the establishment of *shari'a* and the caliphate, as well as building an Islamic economic system. The work, however, falls into sweeping generalizations by characterizing the various Islamist movements, either transnational or local, under the common category of '*salafi*'. This is problematic as several movements do not regard their ideology as *salafi*. Moreover, it focuses more on socio-political factors in explaining the rise of the movement without exploring its internal strategies and activities.

A different view is provided by Imadadun Rakhmat,²¹ who traces the transmission of what he calls 'Islamic revivalism' from the Middle East to Indonesia through such avenues as the Tarbiyah Movement, the Salafi Movement, and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, arguing that the ideology and methods of these movements are transmitted from the Middle East with no local modification. Rakhmat discusses a brief history of HT's emergence, *da'wa* methods and its strategies, both to survive and to expand its influence and networks. In addition, he briefly traces the first penetration of HTI ideas through figures such as M. Mustofa and Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi to students at the tertiary Bogor Institute of Agriculture (*Institut Pertanian Bogor*, IPB). Although the author is successful in demonstrating the links of transmission of Islamic revivalism, he seems to treat each of the three movements

²⁰ Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds.), *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2004).

²¹ M. Imdadun Rakhmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal* (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2005).

independently, while overlooking their respective context and dynamics. This study also excludes a discussion of the recruitment and participation of people in HTI.

Particular attention to the discourse of HTI has been paid by Muhammad Iqbal Ahnaf.²² He analyzes the ways in which it is expressed and articulated by two radical Islamic groups in Yogyakarta, namely HTI and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), especially in the creation of what he calls ‘the image of the other as enemy’. Critically examining the actual words and images of HTI and MMI publications, speeches, and activities, Ahnaf finds four discourse patterns used in constructing the ‘other’: ideologization, demonization, insistence on the idea of the ‘clash of civilizations’ and imagining the victory of Islam. For the author, the image construction of the ‘other’ as enemy represents a ‘symbolic violence’ which has the potential to incite actual physical violence. Besides analyzing flaws in the arguments of these groups, especially those related to doctrinal justification, he also postulates that their radical arguments are counterproductive, considering the fact that Indonesian society is religiously and ethnically plural. Positioning HTI and MMI in the same category runs the risk of sweeping generalization. In this case, the author unfortunately does not examine the differences of the two organizations in discourse production. This is an important consideration, as the former is a transnational movement while the latter is a purely local one. Moreover, Ahnaf often makes inadequate descriptions of Islamic terms, historical narratives and Islamist organizations. He, for instance, states that MMI is far better than HTI in terms of organizational structure and leadership, while the fact is in the reverse.²³

The works of Agus Salim²⁴ and Greg Fealy²⁵ have provided current social perspectives in explaining HTI. Salim's work is the first to apply contemporary

²² Muhammad Iqbal Ahnaf, *The Image of the Other as Enemy* (Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2006).

²³ See *Ibid.*, p. 6.

²⁴ Agus Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004): Its Political Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilization, and Collective Action Frames*, Unpublished MA Thesis (Jakarta: Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, 2005).

²⁵ Fealy, “Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia”, 151-164.

social movement theories to explain the rise of Islamic activism in Indonesia. Salim analyses the rise of HTI from 1982 to 2004 using three social movement theories, namely political opportunity structure, resource mobilization and collective action frames. Providing rich data, he explores the earlier emergence of HTI and its transformation from quietism to collective action and political activism. He observes three periods in the emergence of HTI: first, a hibernation phase (1982 to 1999), a formative phase (2000) and an escalating phase (2002-2004). He argues that HTI's emergence was precipitated by its grievances with the Indonesian multi-dimensional crisis, facilitated by political opportunity structure and supported by its mobilizing capacity, frames and ideas. Salim does not, however, elaborate on young Muslims' response to HTI's ideology and frames and the process of their acquaintance and engagement in HTI.

Fealy, while examining the history, structure and discourse of HTI, is more concerned with the definition of Islamic identity and the nature of its appeal to HTI members. He argues that "HTI's metanarrative or totalizing account of the condition of the Muslim world and the remedy for its problems" should be taken into account in order to understand Hizbut Tahrir's appeal. Borrowing post-modernist notions of metanarrative, Fealy shows how HTI has made use of metanarrative in its discourse, as can be seen in its publications and power point presentations. Critically examining the discourse, Fealy comes to conclusion that it is HT's radical agenda which attracts people to join the organization. In this case, he asserts that the appeal of Hizbut Tahrir lies in its 'total' Islamic identity, which indeed is often emphasized by HTI. Focusing on HTI's meta-narratives, his study does not deal with recruitment and indoctrination as the way of creating its members, the *hizbiyyin*.

Ken Ward, in a recent article, examines HTI's current position by discussing its origin, its ideology and its strategies for achieving power.²⁶ He provides a critical analysis on HTI's stance towards violence and terrorism as well as the

²⁶ Ken Ward, "Non-violent Extremists? Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 63: 3 (June 2009) 149-164.

Indonesian government's response to the movement. Although HTI rejects acts of violence, he analyses that the movement “does not eschew violent rhetoric. Its language is indeed often vitriolic as it denounces the enemies of Islam, the indigenous servants of capitalism and imperialism, or the assorted social ills that those forces have inflicted on Indonesia.”²⁷ In addition, he shows several cases where HTI did not directly denounce Muslim acts of violence and terrorism but described them as the result of Western manipulation and conspiracy. Ward also explains that the Indonesian government has not taken harsh measures to contain radical Muslim groups to avoid being criticized as ‘anti-Islam’. Predicting HTI is likely to grow, he doubts the movement can gain political power in the near future considering the gap between HTI's goal and ‘traditional Indonesian national aspiration’.²⁸ In his article, however, Ward does not provide a discussion of HTI's recruitment and participation processes.

Having reviewed publications relating to HTI, it is clear that none of works have seriously attempted to investigate the factors which make young Muslims join and make a commitment to the movement. Among them, Fealy's work comes closest to my study in dealing with HTI's appeal to its members. Yet, the process of recruitment and indoctrination is not examined. Therefore, I will attempt to fill this gap in our knowledge.

Main Arguments

This study argues that both recruitment strategy and indoctrination have played crucial roles in achieving high participation in HTI and the commitment of its members. Compared to other Islamist groups, HTI members are more active and committed, as can be seen in their strict adoption of HT ideology in thinking and practice, their intensity in attending *halqa* and HTI public events and their energetic activities in disseminating HTI messages and recruiting new members under the name of *da'wa*. Recruitment is systematically undertaken by HTI either through public activities or personal contact. I found that most recruitment takes place through interpersonal ties. In this respect, *hizbiyyin*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 158.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 162.

utilize pre-existing social networks by approaching and guiding their friends and relatives to participate in HTI activities. In addition, they actively make new acquaintances in order to direct new contacts to HTI. In approaching prospective members, *hizbiyyin* use intellectual and emotional arguments rather than spiritual. I also point out that participation in HTI is not a sudden process, as there is a lengthy training and induction scheme to follow, namely studying several selected HTI texts and showing dedication and sacrifice to the movement, before moving to induction. Borrowing a sociological model of conversion and theory of joining Islamic radical groups, I will show three processes of joining in HTI: cognitive opening, religious seeking and socialization.

While recruitment works to attract people to initial participation, indoctrination through *halqa*, on the other hand, is essential in order to change the perspectives of recruits and implant in them HTI beliefs. Young Muslims, especially those who experience crisis and alienation are more susceptible to HTI indoctrination. HTI's religious messages and utopian promises wrapped in revolutionary language are appealing to young adults who seek power and identity. In the movement, disaffected youth can gain certainty, social bonds and relief from anxiety. *Halqa* works not only to keep recruits learning by shaping their thinking, but also maintains their uniformity of thought and deepens their belief in HTI. Added to this, social interaction among members helps to maintain their commitment to HTI as the movement provides a strong solidarity and control mechanism among them.

Methodological Notes

This study takes an interdisciplinary approach based on literature research, in-depth interviews and participant observation. It attempts to explain the Muslim engagement in Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in Makassar, South Sulawesi. Literature research in this study includes survey bibliographies of fundamentalism studies, new religious movements, scholarly works on HTI and HTI publications. The primary data in this study is collected from

interviews, observation and HTI publications, while the others are secondary. I analysed numerous HTI texts which are used in intensive *halqa*. Moreover, I observed HTI pamphlets hanging on information boards of several university campuses in Makassar. The messages and advertisements on pamphlets are important to analyse in conjunction with the recruitment strategy on campus. Since my study deals more closely with HTI members themselves, I conducted in-depth interviews and participant observation during fieldwork of two months. The interview with *hizbiyyin* and HTI leaders was not always easy since the local spokesperson (*HUMAS DPD I*) restricted opportunities for me to interview members, except while in his presence, arguing that the spokesperson is the only representative of HTI to provide valid information to journalists and researchers. This situation led me to find informants on several campuses by seeking information from friends, the pamphlets and attending HTI activities. Many male *hizbiyyin* were reluctant to be interviewed, while female ones were relatively open, as long as they were accompanied by their friends during the interview. However, many of my informants felt suspicious towards me, worrying that I was an ‘agent of the West’ (*antek Barat*) who studied them for the project of weakening their movement. Yet, by explaining that my research was purely for academic purposes and expressing sympathy with their struggle I could overcome this communication barrier. In order to protect my informants, I refer to them using pseudonyms, except in the case of the local HTI leaders.

The in-depth interviews were conducted to investigate the motivation of the members, their views on Islam and social realities, their individual experiences and feelings before and after joining HTI, as well as their social background. In this regard, use of a life-history technique was important. I interviewed twenty HTI members, comprising five professionals and fifteen students from four universities: Universitas Hasannuddin (UNHAS), Universitas Negeri Makassar (UNM), Universitas Muslim Indonesia (UMI) and Universitas Islam Negeri Alauddin (UIN Alauddin). In addition, I interviewed two local leaders of HTI in South Sulawesi (spokesperson and HTI Muslimah leader of DPD I) aiming

at tracing the history and development of HTI in the region and the recruitment strategies employed in expanding the membership.

Participant observation was essential in order to see members' behaviour and commitment. I gained opportunities to engage with *hizbiyyin* in the movement's public activities, including a national Muslimah seminar, a monthly *Halqah Peradaban* (*Halqa* of Civilization) seminar, and two long marches: one following the national Muslimah seminar, which coincided with Mother's Day (*Hari Ibu*) and the other was commemorating Islamic New Year. During a seminar and rallies, I took photos and recorded speeches, presentations and orations, as well as collecting their papers and leaflets. In order to understand their feelings and their spirit of motivation, I joined the long marches with *hizbiyyin* for several kilometres and interacted informally with them. This interaction also allowed me to ease my relationship with HTI members for leading on to further interviews.

The Structure of the Sub-Thesis

This sub-thesis comprises five chapters. Chapter One is an introduction which includes background, scope of study and key questions, significance of the research, literature review, methodology and sub-thesis structure.

Chapter Two discusses the emergence of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia. It begins by introducing HT origins and ideology as background. Further, it provides a brief discussion of the origin and general development of HTI in Indonesia from the authoritarian New Order Era to the post-Soeharto era, along with its socio-political contexts. Aside from global factors, it shows how the nature of the state influences the way HTI has developed in terms of mobilization and expansion. Subsequently, it illustrates the local development of HTI in South Sulawesi.

Chapter Three examines *da'wa* and recruitment activities of HTI in South Sulawesi. The doctrinal basis of *da'wa*, its methods and activities are first provided in order to understand the missionary nature of the movement. The chapter then examines the strategies and the processes of HTI recruitment in South Sulawesi, ranging from seminars and discussions to interpersonal relations. Next, it analyses the processes of conversion to HTI using perspectives from several works on new religious movements and radical Islamic groups. It underlines three processes of participation in HTI: cognitive opening, religious seeking and socialization.

Chapter four examines HTI indoctrination and its impact on young Muslims. It begins by examining the methods and processes of indoctrination in the movement. Next, it explains the nature of the young adults and the social composition of HTI members in Makassar in relation to their susceptibility to HTI ideology and indoctrination. Finally, this chapter deals with the strong impact of intensive indoctrination upon *hizbiyyin* by analysing their indoctrinated narratives on Islam as a total ideology, the quest for a caliphate and *shari'a* and their resistance to capitalism and democracy.

Chapter five provides the conclusions of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

THE EMERGENCE OF HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA

Introduction

The topic of Islamic radical movements in Indonesia - also referred as 'Islamic fundamentalist', 'Islamist', 'militant', and 'hardliner' - has won significant attention from scholars and observers. The mushrooming of such movements was apparent especially after the fall of Soeharto in 1998. The topic became even more interesting after the bombing attacks in a number of places in Indonesia from 2002 to 2005, which revealed the existence of an Islamist terrorist network in Southeast Asia called Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Various studies have been produced in response to the emergence of Islamic radical movements and terrorist groups. However, a lack of knowledge of the dynamics of Islamic movements in the region has resulted in misunderstandings and generalizations.

In general, Islamic radical movements in Indonesia can be categorized into the local and the transnational. The first, local group has emerged as a response to political and social changes in Indonesian history, without the strict adoption of and having no global links with those of the Middle East. This category includes the Darul Islam movement in West Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi during the 1950s and several Islamist movements emerging in the post-Soeharto reform era, such as MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) and FPI (Front Pembela Islam). These groups were shaped wholly by Indonesian socio-political contexts and have no exact reference in terms of ideology or organization to any particular movement in the Middle East. Their struggle is limited to the nation, though they share the global agenda of Islamism, namely the implementation of *shari'a* or the establishment of an Islamic state. Transnational Islamist groups, on the other hand, draw direct inspiration, ideas,

ideology, methods and networks from movements in other parts of the world as a result of globalization and human movement. In this respect, to borrow Mandaville's words, their "primary modes of organization and activism transcend the territorial boundaries of nation states".¹ In the Indonesian context, this sort of movement includes Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, the Salafi group, Jemaah Tabligh, and Jemaah Tarbiyah. These movements all have their origins in the Middle East and South Asia.

Focusing on Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, HTI, this chapter argues that its emergence and rapid development is inseparable from global and Indonesian socio-political contexts alike. Facing repression from the authoritarian state in Soeharto's New Order era, HTI operated underground and focused on education through its *halqa* (study circles) and confined its activities to university campus mosques. However, after the fall of Soeharto, HTI emerged into Indonesian public view, utilizing the new democratic political sphere to advance its cause by conducting various rallies, producing media and hosting seminars and discussions, etc. in order to disseminate its ideas and to gain public support.

The first part of this chapter deals with the origins and ideology of Hizbut Tahrir. The second part discusses the history of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia and its general development from the New Order era to Post-New Order era and explores the socio-political contexts. The third part deals with the emergence and development of HTI in a local context by reference to HTI in South Sulawesi.

Hizbut Tahrir: Origins and Ideology

Hizbut Tahrir was founded in East Jerusalem in 1953 by the Palestinian Islamic legal scholar and political activist, Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani (1909-1977). An-Nabhani was educated in law at al-Azhar University in Cairo, and later worked

¹ Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2007) 279.

as a religious teacher in high school, a chief clerk and then judge in the Islamic courts in Palestine.² Some writers suggest that he was a sympathizer, if not a member, of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), an Islamist movement of Egyptian origin founded in 1928. It is likely that An-Nabhani interacted with the MB ideas during his study in Egypt, for the impact of MB influences can be seen in his political and religious thought, especially in the idea of the completeness of Islam and Islam as the solution for the *umma* in dealing with any problem, whether political, economic, social or cultural. Apart from this, An-Nabhani was also attracted by the ideals of the Syrian *Ba'th* party which upheld Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism, while basing his political views on Islam as the basic principle rather than the secular.³ An-Nabhani called Hizbut Tahrir an Islamic political 'party' rather than an Islamic organization, following the trend of emerging Arab political parties since the 1930s. In relation to this, Suha Taji Farouki regards An-Nabhani as "one of the first Arab intellectuals to argue the case for a modern political party using the constructs of Islamic discourse".⁴

The establishment of HT appeared as a response by An-Nabhani to Western colonialism which had led to the fall of caliphate, the loss of Palestine and the separation of Arab-Muslim countries into a number of nation-states. His primary concern was therefore to unite the Arab-Muslim countries under a single caliphate.⁵ In many of his works, An-Nabhani shows a pre-occupation with liberating Muslim countries from the impact of Western imperialism. In his *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir* (Understanding Hizbut Tahrir) he wrote:

“...It (HT) stands against colonialism in all its forms and aims to liberate the *umma* from the colonialist intellectual leadership and to remove its cultural, political, military and economic influences from the Islamic lands. It also aims to change erroneous and distorted concepts

² Suha Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate* (London: Grey Seal, 1996) 1-2. See also International Crisis Group, "Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to the Threat of *Hizbut Tahrir*", in *ICG Asia Report no. 58*, 30 June (2003) 2.

³ Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest*, 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, ix.

⁵ Taji-Farouki, "Islamists and Threat of *Jihad*: Hizb al-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun on Israel and Jews", in *Middle Eastern Studies*, 36: 4 (October 2000) 22.

spread by colonialism which restrict Islam to personal worship and morals”.⁶

It is also worth noting that An-Nabhani’s reaction to the West is more radical than that of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Hasan al-Banna, since he made an absolute dichotomy between Islam and Western civilization, echoing the division put forward by the later leader of MB, Sayyid Qutb between Islam and the *jahiliyyah* (an ignorance of Islam). In this regard, An-Nabhani conceived of Islam as a ‘self-sufficient principle’, a ‘comprehensive and thoroughly modern ideology’ and superior to other ideologies coming from the West, i.e. capitalism and socialism.⁷

HT is a transnational Islamist movement with a distinctive political orientation. Differing from other Islamist groups, HT declares itself to be a political group, not an intellectual, spiritual or a social group.⁸ However, it does not engage in electoral politics, since it explicitly rejects democracy. HT views democracy as an ‘unbeliever system’ (*sistem kufur*) which is contrary to Islam. For HT, Islam only recognizes God as law maker, not human agency. Therefore, HT regards it *haram* (prohibited) for Muslims to adopt and propagate it.⁹ Opposing the separation between religion and state, HT views politics as any effort to care for and maintain the matters of society in accordance with Islamic law and the solutions of Islam.¹⁰ This is in line with the stated aim of HT, namely “to resume the Islamic way of life and to convey the call of Islam to the world.” This for HT means “bringing Muslims back to living an Islamic way of life in *Dar al-Islam* (the domain of Islam) and in an Islamic society in which all of life's affairs in society are administered according to the rules of *shari’a*, regarding what is *halal* (lawful) and *haram* (prohibited) under the protection of

⁶ Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir* (Jakarta: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2007) 128.

⁷ Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest*, 37-45.

⁸ Hizbut Tahrir, *Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir: Partai Politik Islam Ideologis* (Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 2000) 1.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 59. For HT's radical rejection of democracy, see Abdul Qadim Zallum, *Demokrasi: Haram Mengambilnya, Menerapkannya, dan Mempropagandakannya* (Bogor: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 1994).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 23.

the Islamic state, which is the Khilafah, the Caliphal state”.¹¹ Thus the restoration of the caliphate, in HT's view, is essential in order to achieve the glory of Islam.

The re-establishment of the global caliphate is the major emphasis of HT's struggle, and due to its adherence to the ideal of *khilafah*, Peter Mandaville identifies HT as a *khilafist* group.¹² In the view of An-Nabhani, the caliphate of the Ottoman Empire, abolished in 1924, was the only authentic form of Islamic government to have a historical and doctrinal basis. Its restoration was axiomatic to ensure the comprehensive implementation of *shari'a*. If an Islamic state under the rule of a caliph were re-established it would spread Islamic ideas and precepts all over the world, “restoring the *umma* to its golden age as dominant in the world and spearheading a mission to liberate the globe from the evils of capitalist hegemony”.¹³ An-Nabhani asserted that the appointment of a caliph is an obligation upon Muslims. Albeit that the form of Islamic government is a debatable issue among Muslim scholars, An-Nabhani interpreted the caliphate as an obligation confirmed by the Qur'an, Hadith and Consensus of the Companions (*Ijma'*).¹⁴ This is because numerous *shari'a* duties, such as the upholding of Islamic rules, the implementation of the penal code and guarding the frontiers of the state rely on the presence of a caliph. To advance his cause, An-Nabhani included in his book a detailed state constitution describing its political, social and economic systems, as well as educational and foreign policies.¹⁵

Hizbut Tahrir is radical in terms of its political ideas but emphasizes peaceful means to achieve its goal by emulating the Prophet's model of *da'wa*. HT is radical in so far as it favors fundamental political change through the replacement of the existing nation-states and the creation of a new Islamic state

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹² Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, 266.

¹³ Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest*, 77.

¹⁴ Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, *Daulah Islam* (Jakarta: HTI Press, 2007) 276.

¹⁵ See the constitution in An-Nabhani, *Peraturan Hidup dalam Islam* (Jakarta: HTI Press, 2008) 139-195.

under one central ruler.¹⁶ Differing from the Muslim Brotherhood, HT opposes gradualism (*tadarruj*) as it suggests a weakness and impracticality in Islam. Although HT claims itself to be anti-violent, the movement was involved in masterminding two attempted coups by sections of the armed forces of Jordan during 1968 and 1969.¹⁷ Moreover, there have been several arrests of HT members allegedly involved in violent actions in Central Asia. However, in the Indonesian case, no evidence has been found to suggest links to violence or terrorism. One should refer to HT's ideology to understand its activism and possible connection with any *jihadi* action. Referring to the experience of the creation of an Islamic state in the period of the Prophet Muhammad, HT has envisaged three stages of political struggle:

1. **The Stage of Culturing:** “Finding and cultivating individuals who are convinced by the thought and method of the party. This is necessary in order to formulate and establish a group capable of carrying the party's ideas.”
2. **The Stage of Interaction with the *Umma*,** in order to encourage the *umma* to embrace Islam, so that it works to establish Islam in life, state and society.”
3. **The Stage of Taking Over Government:** “Establishing an Islamic state, implementing Islam generally and comprehensively and carrying its message to the world.”¹⁸

These are the three steps of action to be used by HT to lead the *umma* to the establishment of an Islamic state. It is implied that the struggle should be started from below, using a bottom-up approach. It is therefore understandable why this transnational movement is very active in recruitment, culturing processes and spreading its ideas through media, pamphlets, seminars and rallies as part of undertaking the first and second stages.

Since its inception, HT leaders and members have faced challenges and crackdowns and this has created a world diaspora of its members. An-Nabhani himself experienced harsh repression by the Jordanian government; he was

¹⁶ Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, “Hizbut Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group That Remains Non-violent”, in *Terrorism and Political Violence* 58 (2006) 318.

¹⁷ Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest*, 27 and 168.

¹⁸ Hizb ut-Tahrir, *The Methodology of Hizbut Tahrir for Change* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1999) 32.

arrested on charges of subversion after submitting an application to register Hizbut Tahrir as a political organization.¹⁹ This led him to live into exile in Jerusalem, Syria and Lebanon while disseminating his ideas and building HT chapters. An-Nabhani passed away in Beirut in 1977 and was succeeded as supreme leader by Abdul Qadeem Zallum, which position was then occupied by Ata Abu Rashta in 2003.²⁰ Like An-Nabhani, many of his followers have faced repression from the authorities of Middle Eastern countries which has forced many of them to flee to Western countries. Since the early 1990s, Hizbut Tahrir has expanded quickly into Central Asia, North Africa, Turkey, Europe and Southeast Asia.²¹ While Jordan probably serves as the central base, the UK has been regarded by many as the new HT headquarters and base of operations. HT itself has claimed to have branches (*wilayah*) in forty countries, making it a global movement with a strong world-wide network.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Beginnings, Socio-Political Context and Development

Origins of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

The coming of HT to Indonesia is linked to the HT community in Australia in the early 1980s. Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi and Mama Abdullah Nuh were two figures who played an important role in the expansion of HT in Indonesia in its earliest development.²² Al-Baghdadi was an HT activist from Lebanon who had migrated to Australia in the early 1960s to escape persecution. It is reported that he had joined the armed struggle against Israel.²³ The latter figure, Abdullah bin Nuh, was head of the *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school)

¹⁹ Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia", 154.

²⁰ *Hizbut Tahrir*, "Profile: Ameer of *Hizbut Tahrir*", *Hizbut Tahrir Media Office (Official Website)*, <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/info/english.php/contents_en/entry_299> accessed 5 March 2009.

²¹ Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia", 154.

²² For a detailed account of the earlier history of HTI, see Agus Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004): Its Political Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilization, and Collective Action Frames*, Unpublished MA Thesis (Jakarta: Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, 2005).

²³ Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia", 155.

of Al-Ghazali in Bogor, West Java. He was also a popular preacher and a Muslim scholar with expertise in Arabic literature, holding a chair in the Faculty of Arts, The University of Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta. His acquaintance with HT began while on a visit to his son, who was studying in Sydney. As Australia was one of destinations of HT migrants from the Middle East, it was among them that Abdullah bin Nuh met the charismatic young teacher, Al-Baghdadi. Engaging in dialogue and intensive discussions with al-Baghdadi, Bin Nuh was impressed by his advanced knowledge of Islam at his young age. Abdullah Nuh invited Al-Baghdadi to visit Bogor in order to help him to develop his *pesantren*.²⁴ It was from here then Al-Baghdadi began to disseminate the HT ideas in Indonesia.

Al-Baghdadi arrived in Indonesia in 1982 and spread HT teachings through Abdullah bin Nuh's *pesantren*. In this *da'wa* activity he interacted with Muslim student activists of the campus mosque Al-Ghifari of the Bogor Agricultural Institute (*Institut Pertanian Bogor*, IPB) and used the opportunity to introduce HT ideas to the students.²⁵ Since many students were attracted to his *da'wa*, he and bin Nuh began organizing recruitment and systematic education through training and *halqa*, the study circles.²⁶ IPB's mosque had become the base of HT recruitment in the earliest stage and this was later expanded into 'secular' campuses in Java and Jakarta, still later reaching beyond Java through the Campus Preaching Institute (*Lembaga Dakwah Kampus*, LDK). However, Al-Baghdadi and bin Nuh did not openly use the name of Hizbut Tahrir in their first *da'wa* because of the suspicion of the state towards expressions of political Islam in the early New Order era.

Although HTI grew in strength since its arrival in the 1980s, it only emerged into public view in 2000 when it hosted the first International Caliphate Conference in Jakarta. HTI's emergence was in line with the proliferation of

²⁴ See Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, 39-40. See also Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia", 154-155.

²⁵ Dwi Hardianto, "Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Dakwah Masjid yang Menggurita", in *Sabili* 9:11 (2003) 142.

²⁶ Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia", 155.

Islamic radical groups after the end of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. The following discussion therefore will briefly delineate the dynamic development of HT from the New Order era to the post-New Order era.

The Campus *Da'wa* Movement and HTI in New Order Era Indonesia

The emergence of HTI should be seen in the broader context of the emergence of preaching movements on Indonesian campuses in the 1980s. This was part of an Islamic resurgence among the younger Muslim generation since the late 1970s, marked by a growing number of young people attending the mosques, not only to pray but also to learn about and discuss Islam. Moreover, there were many Islamic activities organized by students at secular campuses and many female students, from senior high school to university, started to wear the veil (*jilbab*).²⁷ In the 1980s in particular, various Islamic groups espousing a transnational ideology, known as *harakah* (the movement), began to take shape under the various campus Islamic preaching institutions (LDK) and the public mosques.²⁸ In contrast to the larger established traditionalist and modernist streams, these groups lacked a social and cultural base within Indonesia and were more concerned with international issues. Because of their global orientation, one writer recently termed them 'global santri'.²⁹

The emergence of campus preaching movements and the attraction of Islam to young Muslim students was generated by multiple factors. Firstly, the rebirth of Islamic revivalism marked by the 1979 Iranian revolution had a profound impact on Islamic movements across the world, including those in Indonesia. The event opened the eyes of young Muslims in Indonesia and elsewhere to the possibility that Islam could serve as a counter to the Western ideologies which dominated the Muslim world. The influence of the revolution could be seen in the early 1980s when many female students began to wear a new kind of

²⁷ Rifki Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence Movement among the Youth in Bandung, Indonesia* (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 1995) 4; Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1999) 174.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Yon Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party* (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2008) 42-43.

Islamic clothing called *jilbab*, adopting its style from Iran.³⁰ Translations of books of Iranian Shi'i radical thinkers such as Ali Shari'ati and Imam Khomeini became available.³¹ Indonesian Muslims, although Sunni in majority, viewed the Iranian revolution as a triumph of Islam, looking at its universal spirit, regardless of theological differences. This phenomenon also contributed to the appeal of the preaching movements in campuses.

Secondly, the New Order state marginalized political Islam and suppressed student activism on the campuses. The relationship between Islam and the state, especially in the early 1980s, was antipathetic. The experience of Muslim rebellions in the 1950s, which had involved leaders of the Islamic party Masyumi, led Soeharto to consistently opposed any aspirations or expressions related to the idea of an Islamic state. The Soeharto government was inclined rather to support cultural Islam, championed by the public intellectual Nurcholish Madjid in the 1970s, with his famous slogan "Islam Yes, Islamic Party No!", while suppressing what Liddle calls 'scripturalist Islam'.³² In this respect, Soeharto appeared to emulate the old Dutch colonial policy by "emasculating political Islam while outwardly promoting its spiritual health".³³ This was reflected in Soeharto's policies such as eliminating Islamic symbols from political activism, eliminating Islamic-based parties and forcing Muslim politicians away from the political arena. The de-politicisation of Islam reached its climax when Soeharto mandated that all Islamic parties combine to form the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, PPP) in 1973. In addition, in 1983 Soeharto also regulated that all parties and associations had to accept Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation.³⁴ This regulation affected

³⁰ For more information about this issue See Suzanne Brenner, "Reconstructing Self and Identity: Javanese Muslim Women and the 'Veil'," in *American Ethnologist* 23:4 (1996) 673-697.

³¹ Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, 22.

³² See R. William Liddle, "Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia", in *Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Development in Indonesian Islamic Thought* (Arizona: Arizona State, 1996).

³³ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998) 120.

³⁴ M. Din Syamsuddin, *Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Logos, 2000) 66-67.

Islamic student organisations such HMI, PMII, IMM, PII, which were forced to change their stated ideological basis from Islam to Pancasila.³⁵

While suppressing political Islam, the government also restricted student political activism. In 1977, for example, the Ministry of Education banned all student involvement in politics. This step was followed by the dissolution of Student Governments (*Dewan Mahasiswa, Dema*) in 1978.³⁶ On 19 April 1978, the Ministry of Education released the policy of Normalisation of Campuses (*Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus, NKK*) and on 17 May 1978 it released the concept of Coordinating Campus Board (*Badan Koordinasi Kampus, BKK*).³⁷ This policy led the campus bureaucracy under the rectors and deans to control student activities on the campuses. As a result, students became inactive and no longer openly engaged with the social and political problems of the nation. According to Rosyad, “their ideal intellectual and spiritual dimensions disappeared”.³⁸ Facing these restricted conditions, Muslim students attempted to find outlets through which they could express their ideas. It was at this point that the university mosques became the centre of student activities.³⁹ Vatikiotis cites Jalaluddin Rakhmat as saying, “the mosque became a sanctuary for the expression of political dissatisfaction and frustration.”⁴⁰ This trend was particularly visible on the ITB campus.⁴¹ In the mosques, Muslim students could freely discuss and express their ideas about Islam and politics outside the control of the state.

Thirdly, the emergence of Islamic movements in the early phase was facilitated by informal study clubs emulating the methods of the Muslim Brotherhood.

³⁵ Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, 13.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2000) 58-59.

³⁸ Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, 13.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴⁰ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998) 129.

⁴¹ Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1999) 174. For a detailed account of religious activities organized in Salman Mosque at ITB campus, see Abdul Aziz *et.al.*, *Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1989) 207-287.

These informal study clubs were initially facilitated by ITB lecturer Imaduddin Abdul Rahim (known as Bang Imad) who was concerned with Islamic teaching for students. The role of the Indonesian Islamic Predication Council (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*, DDII) was crucial in supporting intensive training courses in the campuses by providing preachers and funds.⁴² Bang Imad regularly held Islamic training activities which he called LMD (*Latihan Manajemen Dakwah*, Preaching Management Training) which later evolved into the LDK.⁴³ LMD was a type of training in which students studied for about seven days without contact with the outside world. The students learned essential Islamic teachings, such as the sources of Islamic values, the Qur'an and Sunnah (Prophetic Tradition) and the Islamic faith (*Aqidah Islam*).⁴⁴ Attracted to this kind of training, students from various universities in Bandung, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Medan and other areas came to the Salman Mosque of ITB. When these students returned to their home universities, they developed similar activities in their own universities.⁴⁵ It was from these groups that the emergence of the Tarbiyah Movement, the Salafi group and Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia began.

Given the repressive nature of the authoritarian state toward the expression of political Islam, the HTI movement operated clandestinely. To avoid suspicion from the security services, HTI figures did not use HT in their publication and training courses, yet disseminated the idea of the need for the total implementation of *shari'a* and a caliphate.⁴⁶ According to Ismail Yusanto, the government at that time never succeeded in uncovering the existence of HT in Indonesia because its members kept a low profile in society.⁴⁷ In the Soeharto period, HTI's attention was focused on cultivating membership through *halqa* and expanding their network among Muslim student activists in Indonesia. HTI

⁴² Anthoni Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia* (Australia: Lowy Institute, 2005) 60.

⁴³ Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, 25.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia", 155.

⁴⁷ Jamhari *et.al.*, "Menuju Khilafah Islamiyah: Gerakan Hizbuttahrir di Indonesia", in Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds.), *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2004) 174.

was in the culturing stage (*tatsqif*) of the three methods of *da'wa*. HTI operated as an underground organization led by Abdullah bin Nuh until his death in 1987, later succeeded by Muhammad Al-Khaththath.⁴⁸

Since its inception, HTI was developed through LDK, along with other Islamic movements. This was due to the fact that HT arrived in Indonesia together with the coming of other *harakah* such as the Tarbiyah movement, Jama'ah Tabligh, and the Salafi group.⁴⁹ Initially, there was no separation between the movements; the cadre trainings were held together with the same subjects and tutors. However, from 1988 there was division among the movements due to sharpening ideological differences between them.⁵⁰ HTI used the LDK network as a channel for recruitment. In fact, the idea of establishing the LDK network was pioneered by leaders of HTI.⁵¹ An LDK network on the IPB campus in Bogor called *Badan Kerohanian Islam Mahasiswa* (BKIM, Student Association for Islamic Propagation) served as an important site for the earliest recruitment and dissemination of HT ideas. BKIM activists attended public sermons delivered by Abdullah bin Nuh and later joined the Pondok Pesantren Al-Ghazali to learn from him and Al-Bahgdadi on a regular basis.⁵² Having dominated LDK in IPB Bogor, HTI activists then spread their wings by recruiting new members outside Bogor through the LDK network, such as LDK in the University of Padjajaran, Bandung, IKIP Malang, the University of Airlangga, Surabaya, the University of Hasanuddin, Makassar and the University of Gajah Mada, Yogyakarta.⁵³ After its split from other movements in LDK in 1994, HTI began to arrange its *da'wa* activities for the public without using the name of Hizbut Tahrir, while maintaining its network in the campuses. In this respect, HTI activists created “undercover organizations and activities like seminars, weekly learning circles and the publication of books

⁴⁸ Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, 131. After al-Khaththath, the HTI leader is now occupied by Hafidz Abdurrahman.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 133.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Elizabeth Fuller Collins, “Dakwah and Democracy: The Significance of Partai Keadilan and Hizbut Tahrir”, Unpublished paper presented at an International Seminar on Islamic Militant Movement in Southeast Asia, Jakarta 22-23 July 2003, 9.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ See *Ibid.* and Hardianto, “Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia”, 142.

and pamphlets”.⁵⁴ However, all of the activities of HTI in this period were limited to the level of the dissemination of ideas and recruitment, without moving further into mobilizing action in the street.

HTI in the Post-Authoritarian Regime: Towards Engaging with the *Umma*

The fall of the Soeharto regime on 21 May 1998 paved the way for political relaxation and democratization in Indonesia. A newly expanded public sphere provided an opportunity for political Islam to emerge. While the growing trend of political Islam was evinced by the proliferation of Islamic parties, there also emerged a number of Muslim paramilitary groups and Islamic radical movements. According to Effendy, the birth of these groups was not an immediate response to Indonesian’s new democracy but rather more a reaction to the socio-religious and political situation in the period of transition, which for these groups did not reflect Muslim aspirations.⁵⁵ This included the weakness of the state in dealing with socio-religious conflicts, in law enforcement of gambling and prostitution and the regulation of alcoholic beverages. All of the groups appeared to aspire for the implementation of *shari'a* as the alternative.

While many radical Islamic groups had risen to public view in 1998, HTI emerged on May 2000, when it convened the international conference on the Islamic caliphate at the Tennis Indoor Stadium, Senayan, Jakarta. This was the first public activity conducted under the banner of Hizbut Tahrir, openly introducing its ideas, programs and leaders.⁵⁶ The conference was attended by 5,000 HTI supporters and attracted extensive media coverage. The speakers invited were HT leaders from local and overseas branches such as Dr. Muhammad Utsman and Muhammad al-Khaththath (Indonesia), Ismail al-Wahwah (Australia) and Syarifuddin M. Zain (Malaysia).⁵⁷ The main issue

⁵⁴ See Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, 137-142.

⁵⁵ Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003) 217-218.

⁵⁶ Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, 145.

⁵⁷ Herry Mohammad and Kholis Bahtiar Bakri, “Khilafah Islamiyah: Ibarat Pelari Maraton,” in *Gatra*, 30: IV (10 June 2000) 21.

discussed was the importance of reviving the Islamic caliphate as a response to Muslim problems. Since 2000, HTI's public development has been noticeable in terms of membership, media and operations. The movement has now moved from the level of education to the level of interaction with the *umma*.

Organizing Rallies and Demonstrations

The most striking visibility of HTI is its protest movement in the street, in the form of rallies and demonstrations. Indeed, since the early 2000s, HTI has appeared as the most active Islamist movement in Indonesia to express its aspirations and demands in the street. In most cases, the HTI rallies have been systematically organized, at both the national and provincial level in response to national and international issues alike. In 2002, for example, HTI mobilized an estimated 12,000 members to stage a long march in Jakarta from the National Monument to Senayan stadium, demanding the implementation of *shari'a* law through the re-insertion of the Jakarta Charter into the constitution.⁵⁸ This was a domestic response to the annual session of the MPR (Parliament), then deliberating on this amendment to the 1945 Constitution. In relation to global issues, in 2003 HTI organized rallies in front of the embassies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, UK, the People's Republic of China and France to protest against US involvement in Afghanistan.⁵⁹ HTI also utilizes Islamic celebrations to hold rallies in big cities about similar issues. Recently, on 4 January 2009, while commemorating the Islamic New Year, HTI simultaneously conducted rallies in several big cities in Indonesia condemning the Israel's aggression on Gaza. In most of its rallies, HTI puts forth messages of blame against the capitalist system and Western ideas as the source of the world's problems and makes the call to Muslims to re-establish the caliphate as the only alternative.

⁵⁸ Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, *Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir: Partai Politik Islam Ideologis* (Jakarta: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2004) iv.

⁵⁹ Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, 45.

Organizing Public Seminars

The intellectual activity of HTI finds its expression through seminars and publications. This is one strategy to disseminate HTI ideas and to win support from the educated segment of Indonesian society. Seminars are energetically convened at international, national, provincial or regional levels in response to global, national and local issues. Two international caliphate conferences, for instance, have been held in Jakarta in 2000 and 2007. The latter conference was attended by around 80,000 supporters and was considered to be the largest international HT conference in the world. More recently, since mid- 2008, HTI has regularly convened monthly seminars at the provincial and national level which they call '*Halqa Islam dan Peradaban*' (Seminars on Islam and Civilization), addressing various current issues. On such occasions, HTI usually invites speakers from among intellectuals, Muslim scholars and representatives of government, with speakers from HTI itself. However, most of the speakers invited present an Islamist point of view or are sympathizers with HTI's views. Moreover, the issues raised and the discussions which follow tend to be directed to supporting the HTI agenda. In most of its seminars, HTI contacts media groups in order to raise its voice and profile within the Indonesian public sphere.

Creating Media

The use of the media and publishing is another intellectual means by which HTI gets its messages out to a public audience. It also serves as a means of maintaining communication and unity of thought among the members. HTI media take the form of pamphlets, bulletins, magazines, tabloids, booklets, books, DVDs and websites. HTI has published a weekly pamphlet, *Buletin al-Islam* (Bulletin of Islam) since 1994. However, its circulation was initially limited to HTI activists. Salim notes that the pamphlet became "their intra-group communication channel".⁶⁰ It had been published under a disguised

⁶⁰ Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, 140-144.

identification until early 2000, when it began using the name of *Syabab Hizbut Tahrir* (Hizbut Tahrir Youth). Since then, the bulletin, which comprises a four-page pamphlet, began to be distributed to the public through the mosques at the Friday prayers every week.⁶¹ Another important publication for HTI is *al-Wa'ie* (Awareness, Consciousness) a monthly magazine with glossy covers, running to about 15,000 copies per edition.⁶² More recently, since late 2008, HTI began publishing a 32 page monthly tabloid of good quality called *Media Umat* (Media for the Muslim Community).

Translations of HT books and accounts of HTI leaders, especially the founder, Taqiuddin An-Nabhani, are also important. HTI publishers include al-Izzah in Bangil, East Java, Pustaka Thariqul Izzah and Mahabbah Cipta Insani in Bogor, West Java, and more recently, HTI Press in Jakarta. The latter publisher has been publishing specifically official and standard books of HTI (*mutabannat*) with updated revisions from the HT central board. The *mutabannat* books refer to the most salient works of An-Nabhani, which are used in *halqa*. It is important however to note that HTI books and magazines are not publicly sold in book stores; they have their own outlets, which suggests that the primary targeted consumers are HTI members themselves. Like branches of HT overseas, HTI also has its own website, dating from 2004 (www.hizbut-tahrir.or.id) allowing members to follow up to date information on HTI activities. The website facilitates a mailing list, online HT books and weekly pamphlets which can be accessed freely.

HTI in South Sulawesi

The emergence of HTI in South Sulawesi cannot be isolated from the role of the LDK network during the 1990s. Makassar, the capital city of South Sulawesi, has long been the destination of study for people in Eastern Indonesia, as it provides a range of universities such as University Hasanuddin (UNHAS), the State University of Makassar (UNM), the Alauddin State

⁶¹ Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia", 158.

⁶² *Ibid.*

Islamic University (UIN), The University of Indonesian Muslims (UMI) and the University of '45 (Universitas '45), to mention a few. As discussed above, university campuses provide the base for Islamic movements developed through LDK. In Makassar, UMI and UNHAS campuses established LDK in the early 1990s within LDK's network, a move initiated by LDK activists in West Java. However, in its earliest phase of development LDK was a loose institution which accommodated students from any stream of Islamic organizations. According to Hasanuddin Rasyid, it was the LDK activists of UMI campus who played a key role in bringing HTI ideas and developing HTI in Makassar.⁶³ This was due to intensive interaction between LDK activists in UMI and those in Java, and Rasyid recalls that in the early 1990s he and his friends from UMI's LDK joined the Institute of Qur'anic Memorization (*Lembaga Tahfidzul Qur'an*), a campus Islamization program initiated by the rector of UMI, Prof. Dr. Abdurrahman Basalamah. As a part of the program, the students received the information from the LDK of IKIP in Malang, East Java that a month-long course in Arabic language was being offered. Interested in studying Islam and Arabic, 15 LDK activists, including Rasyid went to Malang to attend the course, during which they were introduced to the ideas of various Islamic movements, including those of Hizbut Tahrir.⁶⁴ When returning to Makassar, they founded a forum on Islam in 1995, due to their interest in HT thought. They developed the discussion of HT ideas, such as Islamic faith (*aqidah Islam*), principles of *shari'a*, world ideologies, the system of government in Islam, Islamic economy, and so forth.⁶⁵ This was the embryo for the emergence of HTI in Makassar and South Sulawesi. At first, HTI activists restricted participation in their discussion groups to students on the campuses. Then, realizing that HT's struggle is concerned with the establishment of an Islamic society and an Islamic state, the LDK activists began to propagate HT ideas outside the campuses. As noted by Badruzzaman, there were three pioneer activists in the establishment of the HTI branch in

⁶³ Hasanuddin Rasyid, Interview, 13 December 2008.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Badruzzaman, "Gerakan Keagamaan 'Hizbut Tahrir' dan Lektur Rujukannya", <<http://bz69elzam.blogspot.com/2008/07/gerakan-keagamaan-hisbut-tahrir-dan.html>> accessed 1 April 2009.

Makassar: they were Ir. Hijrah Dahlan, Ir. Alimuddin, and Ir. Hasanuddin Rasyid.⁶⁶

The launching of a branch of HTI in Makassar was initiated by a seminar on the caliphate held at UNHAS campus in 2000. This followed the emergence of HTI into public view with its International Caliphate Conference in May 2000 in Senayan Stadium, Jakarta.⁶⁷ The HTI seminar in Makassar was attended by around 1,000 people, including students and various segments of society.⁶⁸ The speakers in the seminar were the Prof. Dr. H. Abdurrahman Basalamah (Rector of UMI), Prof. Dr. Mattulada (historian of UNHAS) and Dr. Utsman (HTI activist from Surabaya).⁶⁹ Since then, HTI has operated in public in Makassar, organizing various activities in order to disseminate its ideas and attract public support.

As I have already established, from its emergence in Indonesia up to the present, HTI's base of recruitment and education has been the university campuses, especially through the LDK and study clubs. As I observed on fieldwork in Makassar, each university campus has a branch, or what recently have been called 'HTI chapters'. There are pamphlets displayed on campus information boards under the name of each HTI chapter or its study clubs under different names. It seems that HTI activists have dominated LDK campus activities in Makassar and therefore, as one HTI activist said, LDK tends to be synonymous with HTI in her campus, UMI.⁷⁰ Moreover, there is a network of LDK called BKLDK (*Badan Koordinasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus*, LDK Coordinating Board) which is dominated by HTI activists. LDK and the study clubs run by HTI usually host seminars and discussions of current issues as the first step in attracting students to join them. From there, the participants will be introduced to HT ideas and later be directed to become HTI members through set stages of education. *Gerakan Mahasiswa*

⁶⁶ This activist now has become the spokesperson (*Humas*) of DPD 1 HTI in South Sulawesi.

⁶⁷ Hasanuddin Rasyid, Interview, 13 December 2008.

⁶⁸ Badruzzaman, "Gerakan Keagamaan 'Hizbut Tahrir' dan Lektur Rujukannya", n.d.

⁶⁹ Hasanuddin Rasyid, Interview, 13 December 2008.

⁷⁰ Rahmawati, Interview, 9 January 2009.

Pembebasan (the Student Liberation Movement) is an HTI wing for expansion in the university campuses, dealing with political issues preferred by students. However, as several activists said, since late 2008 *GEMA Pembebasan* has been dissolved into an HTI chapter following a stipulation from DPP HTI in Jakarta, the board of the HTI chapter taking responsibility for expanding *da'wa* on campus.

Besides LDK and the HTI chapter, Islamic study clubs also play an important role in recruitment. Each campus has its own name for such study clubs. The study club on the UNM campus, for instance, is called *Fosdik al-Umdah* (*Forum Studi Islam Kontemporer 'al-Umdah'*, Contemporary Islamic Study Forum of Basic Issues), while at UMI campus it is called FOSIDI (*Forum Studi Islam Ideologis*, Islamic Ideological Study Forum). The activities of the forums comprise conducting discussions and seminars on contemporary politics and Islamic issues and producing bulletins and pamphlets which disseminate HT ideas to the students. Those who join the discussions in the forums and show interest in the issues canvassed will be targeted to participate in HTI training and further *halqa*.

As a branch of HTI in Indonesia, South Sulawesi has committees at the provincial level called *Dewan Pimpinan Daerah I* (Provincial Executive Committee, DPD I) and at the district level, called DPD II and *Dewan Pimpinan Cabang* (Executive Committee for Sub-district, DPC) at the sub-district level. The structure of DPD I consists of the head, spokesperson, and five departments which include: *Lajnah Tsaqafiyah* (Department of Culture), *Lajnah Siyasiyyah* (Department of Politics), *Lajnah Maslahiyah* (Department of Welfare), *Lajnah Fa'aliyyah* (Department of Administration) and *Lajnah I'lamiyyah* (Department of Information).⁷¹ The head of DPD I is Sabran, while the spokesperson (Public Relation, HUMAS DPD I) is Ir. Hasanuddin Rasyid, yet the latter's position is more dominant in representing HTI in public and media coverage. This also applies for HT at the state and International levels. It

⁷¹ See Sukma, *Hizbut Tahrir Daerah Sulawesi Selatan*, Skripsi (Honour thesis) at the Faculty of Social and Political Science (Makassar: University of Hasanuddin, 2008).

is difficult for researchers to interview the head of DPD I and the chair of each department because the only channel for getting information is through the spokesperson, either at DPD I or DPD II. Rasyid stated that HTI has DPD II in almost all districts in South Sulawesi except the Christian based districts such as Tana Toraja and Toraja Utara.⁷² It appears that HTI in South Sulawesi has gradually expanded its foothold from the capital city Makassar to outlying districts and villages. Despite the growing membership of HTI in South Sulawesi, the number of its members is still a tiny compared to the Muslim majority of Indonesia. Based on my observation of a large rally conducted in Makassar, its size is around 5,000 to 10,000 actual members.

Besides running intensive education programs for members, activists of HTI in South Sulawesi have orchestrated various activities in order to win the support of society at large. Their formal activities range from peaceful demonstrations or rallies on the street to intellectual activities, such as hosting seminars, discussions and workshops. *Bulletin al-Islam*, which is distributed by HTI activists on every Friday at many mosques in South Sulawesi, especially in Makassar, is the most important media to propagate their *da'wa* more broadly. The last page of the bulletin often contains information of HTI's coming activities, which openly invite people to attend. HTI of South Sulawesi even has organized the public prayers of two high holydays (*Idul Fitri and Idul Adha*) providing one of their members as the *khatib*, or preacher. They also cooperate with several local radio broadcasts in Makassar such as al-Ikhwan, Barata, Mercurius, Smart FM, and Suara Celebes to deliver Islamic sermons.⁷³ Moreover, many of the HTI student activists write their opinions and publish them in the local newspapers.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the origins, emergence and the dynamic development of one transnational Islamic movement in Indonesia. Exploring

⁷² Hasanuddin Rasyid, Interview, 13 December 2008. When organizing a big rally in Makassar, DPD I HTI always puts in contact persons for its members in several districts through pamphlets and billboards. I once found 14 of 20 districts have local contacts in pamphlets.

⁷³ Hasanuddin Rasyid, Interview, 6 January 2009.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, both in the political authoritarian and reform eras, it suggests that its emergence and development has been shaped by the shifting nature of the Indonesian state. The emergence of HTI together with other Islamist movements through Islamic study clubs (*halqa*) on tertiary campuses was related to Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s, spurred on by several factors: firstly, the global factor of the Iranian revolution of 1979, which inspired the revival of Islam as a social, political and cultural force in Muslim countries. Secondly, the authoritarian nature of the New Order regime as it took repressive measures towards political Islam and banned political student activities on the campuses. Students therefore found Islam to be an alternative, focusing their activities on campus mosques where they learned and discussed Islam through mental training and Islamic study circles.

The religious activities were facilitated by Imaduddin Abdul Rahim who emulated the teaching method of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was against this backdrop that HTI was introduced to Indonesia by Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi, an HTI activist who was invited by Abdullah bin Nuh to develop his Pesantren in Bogor. Interacting with Muslim student activists of LDK-IPB, they transferred HTI ideas and organized *halqa*.

HTI in the New Order era did not openly use its name, but rather operated underground, maintaining a low profile and focusing on recruitment and education as well as establishing a network of LDK across university campuses in Indonesia. After the fall of Soeharto, HTI emerged in 2000 with its International Caliphate Conference in Senayan Stadium, Jakarta. Since then, HTI has advanced its cause by establishing an HTI central board and expanding branches into several provinces, producing high quality media, organizing seminars and public discussions and conducting rallies in response to both national and international issues. Benefiting from the newly democratic political sphere, HTI has managed to win the support of ordinary Indonesian people by engaging with national and local issues in order to achieve its agenda of establishing *shari'a* and a global caliphate.

CHAPTER THREE

DA'WA AND RECRUITMENT

Introduction

While numerous studies of Islamic radical movements in post-New Order Indonesia have been written, only a few have dealt with the question of recruitment. Most studies are preoccupied with the resurgence of such movements by relating them to changes in the immediate socio-political context or wider global factors.¹ However, socio-political and global factors alone cannot provide an explanation of why people join one particular movement and not others. In fact, each transnational Islamist movement has its own ideology and recruitment strategies which influence its appeal and the extent of its acceptance by Indonesian society. It is, therefore, important to undertake this case study on the particular Islamic movement, of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in order to grasp the internal dynamics of recruitment and expansion.

So in general, political, economic and socio-psychological analyses have been employed in order to comprehend the participation of Muslims in radical Islamic groups. These analyses were used to explain the rising phenomenon of Islamic revivalism in Muslim countries, especially in the Middle East in the 1970s and 1980s. The failure of Muslim states in implementing modernization and development resulted in uneven development, rapid urbanization and spreading social alienation.² As development was concentrated in the urban areas, many people from rural areas migrated to the cities seeking work and a better life. Facing hard lives in the cities and being shocked by “modern urban life and its Westernized culture” which diminished their traditional values and family ties,

¹ See for example, Giora Eliraz, *Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism and the Middle East Dimension* (Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2004); Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002); Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds.), *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2004); M Zaki Mubarak, *Genealogi Islam Radikal di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2008).

² Valerie J. Hoffman, “Muslim Fundamentalists: Psychological Profiles”, in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, Vol. 5 (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995) 199-230.

the newly urbanized experienced individual alienation and a crisis of identity.³ This situation led them to reassert their Islamic identity, in part by joining Islamic movements. Although analysis in this vein is important, it is limited to the interaction between the state, prevailing social conditions and the community and thus underplays the active role of Islamic movements in undertaking propagation and recruitment.

Having researched HTI through participant observation and interviews with the rank-and-file members, I will argue in this chapter that to explain people's participation in HTI, we need to consider the active recruitment undertaken by the movement which is crucial in increasing its membership. It is important to do so for two reasons. Firstly, HTI is a global Islamic movement which places major emphasis on *da'wa* as its rationale in recruiting members. Secondly, the individual's decision to join HTI is in part determined by the performance of the movement and its presentation of itself to the public.

This chapter discusses the nature of HTI as a global *da'wa* movement which calls upon young Muslims to join the organization. Drawing on the body of theory about new religious movements, it analyses the processes of conversion which draw recruits into becoming dedicated members. I will argue that individual persuasion through pre-existing interpersonal networks is essential in attracting people to join HTI. Moreover, socialization processes within new social networks established among HTI members serves to maintain their commitment. Based on the experiences of several *hizbiyyin* in Makassar, this chapter underlines several processes by which people are inducted into participation in HTI.

The first part of this chapter discusses HTI's views on *da'wa* and its methods of preaching, which emulate the experience of the Prophet Muhammad as the

³ See John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 16. For a good account of the social-psychological bases of Islamic Revivalism in the Middle East see R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1985) 25-36.

doctrinal basis of recruitment. The second part examines HTI recruitment strategies as undertaken in Makassar, South Sulawesi, while the final section analyses three processes which are employed to draw individuals into participating in HTI.

HTI as a Radical *Da'wa* Movement: *Da'wa* Methods and Recruitment

The rapid expansion of Hizbut Tahrir in a number of parts of the world is due in no small part to its missionary activity. In this regard, HT, like other Islamist transnational movements, focuses not on converting non-Muslims to Islam but rather propagating its messages to Muslims all over the world and calling on them to support and participate in its agenda. Indeed, HT views itself as the representative of the *umma* and strives to shape Muslim mentality in order to revive the past glory of Islam. The recruitment strategy of HT is closely related to its ideology and its view of *da'wa*. Therefore, in order to understand the recruitment activities of HTI in Indonesia, one needs to comprehend HT's founding ideology and its views of *da'wa*.

As already discussed in the previous chapter, Hizbut Tahrir views itself as a political party based on Islamic ideology and its major goal is to re-establish the caliphate and implement Islamic *shari'a*. Although the establishment of HT was An-Nabhani's response to the situation in the Middle East in the 1950s, many official HT books state that it was established as a response to one Qur'anic verse, Al-Imran: 104. "Be a community that calls for what is good, urges what is right, and forbids what is wrong: those who do this are the successful ones".⁴ HT interprets this verse as commanding Muslims to establish a community, or *jama'ah* in the form of a political party to undertake *da'wa*, or the calling of others to Islam. The rationale for this, in HT's view, is that *da'wa* activities are substantially concerned with politics, since an important element of *da'wa* is calling on the government to do what is right (*amar ma'ruf*) and to forbid what

⁴ Abdel Haleem, *A New Translation of the Qur'an* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 42.

is wrong (*nahy munkar*) according to Islamic *shari'a*.⁵ HT aims to “revive Muslims from the existing decline, liberate them from *kufur*, or infidel ideas, systems of rule and laws, and liberate them from the domination of *kufur* states”.⁶

In an attempt to revive the *umma* from its lamentable position, HT begins by analysing the factors which have led to its decline. It views the *umma*'s weakness as deriving from its failure to understand and implement Islam comprehensively. According to An-Nabhani, Islamic movements have failed to revive the *umma* for three reasons: first, there has been a lack of understanding of *fikrah Islamiyyah* (Islamic ideas) among Muslims; second, there has been no clear description of a *tariqah Islamiyah* (Islamic method) for carrying out the *fikrah*; and third, no effort has been undertaken to combine *fikrah* and *tariqah* as a solid and inseparable combination.⁷ In HT sources, *fikrah* refers to ideas solely derived from Islamic sources while *tariqah* refers to methods to realize Islamic ideals by referring to the Prophet's experience. In order to revive the *umma*, HT seeks to change the ideas and perceptions prevalent within the *umma* and to propagate what they see as the true understanding of Islam, which has clear *fikrah* and *tariqah*. In this way, HT activists are directed to carry out Islamic *da'wa* by transforming what they see as a ‘broken’ society into an Islamic one, so that Islam becomes the basis of public thinking.⁸

According to An-Nabhani, HT's *da'wa* methods are based on the historical example of the Prophet Muhammad when he was propagating Islam among the unbelievers of Mecca and Medina, that is, from secretive to open *da'wa*. HT points out that the current condition of Muslims is comparable to the historical condition of people in Mecca when the Prophet first began his *da'wa* among them. This is because, for HT, Muslims today are living in *Darul Kufur*, or the House of Unbelief, whose systems of law are not based on God's revelations. HT classifies the *da'wah* experiences of the Prophet into three stages:

⁵ Anonymous, *Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir*, 2-4.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁷ An-Nabhani, *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir*, 6.

⁸ Anonymous, *Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir*, 23.

1. **The stage of culturing:** “Finding and cultivating individuals who are convinced by the thought and method of the party. This is necessary in order to formulate and establish a group capable of carrying the party's ideas.”
2. **The stage of interaction with the *umma*:** “in order to encourage the *umma* to embrace Islam, so that it works to establish Islam in life, state, and society.”
3. **The stage of taking over the government:** “Establishing an Islamic state, implementing Islam generally and comprehensively, and carrying its message to the world.”⁹

The last stage constitutes the final goal of HT, culminating in the establishment of an Islamic state. HT argues that this cannot be achieved without first passing through the previous stages: culturing and interaction. HT activists believe that *da'wa* is both an obligation and a major responsibility in life and that it should be balanced with other activities.¹⁰ This doctrine motivates HT members to carry out active recruitment. New recruits will be educated to adopt strictly (*tabanni*) and carry out fully the HT teachings. The education methods used in HT are quite different from those of the Muslim Brotherhood, the other best known rapidly expanding transnational movement. HT names its educating method *tatsqif* (culturing) to indicate that it is not only a matter of a transfer of knowledge (*tarbiyah*) but also a practical matter, in so far as HT educates its members to put into practice what they have learned in *halqa* in their everyday lives.¹¹

HT proceeds to the second stage only if it has recruited a significant number of members who have internalized HT ideology and can begin the struggle of the party. In the Indonesian case, HTI began the recruiting and culturing process in the early 1980s on state university campuses, moving into the second stage by appearing in full public view in 2000, when political conditions were relaxed after the fall of Soeharto in 1998. For HT, interaction with the *umma* does not mean to mobilise Muslims around them, but rather to educate and implant in

⁹ Hizb ut-Tahrir, *The Methodology of Hizbut Tahrir for Change* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1999) 32.

¹⁰ This is based on HTI members' opinions.

¹¹ An-Nabhani, *At-Takattul al-Hizbiy* (1953), translated into Indonesian: *Pembentukan Partai Politik Islam* (Jakarta: HTI-Press, 2007) 52-53.

them the ideology of the party so that, once properly disseminated, it becomes the ideology of the *umma*.¹² In undertaking education and *da'wah* within society, HT outlines several programs to be followed:¹³

1. *Thaqafah Murakkazah* (Intensive Culturing). This is achieved through *halqa* for individuals who will in time become full HT members. By this intensive education, HT can build its cadres, shape their understanding of Islam based on HT ideology and prepare them to carry out *da'wa*.

2. *Thaqafah Jama'iyah* (Collective Culturing). This sort of education is addressed to Muslims collectively by propagating the ideas and Islamic laws adopted by HT. It is held through public religious studies (*pengajian umum*) and seminars in mosques and public places as well as through mass media, books and pamphlets in order to raise the consciousness of the *umma*.

3. *Sira'ul Fikr* (War of Ideas). This refers to activities for countering and challenging other ideologies, rules and thoughts perceived as '*kufur*' or deviant. By means of this activity, HT seeks to oppose other ideas by undermining their arguments and exposing their weaknesses.

4. *Kifahus Siyasi* (Political Struggle). The struggle takes two forms. First, by fighting against imperialist states which rule and dominate Muslim countries. HT maintains its position against any form of colonialism - by military, ideological, political or economic means. Second, by challenging rulers in the Arab and other Muslim countries, in the form of advice and criticism, when they ignore the aspirations of Muslims and deviate from the laws of Islam. Within this framework, HT also organizes activities to remove wrongful rules and to exchange them with a system based on Islamic law.

5. Adopting the benefit (*maslahat*) for the *umma* based on Islamic law. This sort of activity means that HT guides people to gain *maslahat* in three ways:

¹² *Ibid.*, 63.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 35-37.

first, by correcting erroneous policies of the government; second, by offering Islamic solutions to the people; and third, by returning the people's rights. In the Indonesian case, HTI has criticized the government's policy of increasing the price of fuel, of accepting foreign intervention in Indonesian affairs and of maintaining an expensive education system.¹⁴

These programs underlie HT activities in every sphere, ranging from the intensive education of recruits to organising public rallies. The impetus for conducting *da'wa* and recruitment is regarded as an obligation upon members. Those who have undergone intensive *halqa* and show loyalty to HT will in turn become new agents of recruitment. The HT activities in every country seem to share these patterns.

HTI Recruitment in Makassar

The HT concept of *da'wa* presented above forms the religious rationale for programs of recruitment and mobilisation. Based on my observations and interviews, the recruitment strategies of HTI in Makassar strictly follow the HT ideology and methods and, to this extent, they show no significant difference from HT activities elsewhere in Indonesia or in other countries. Furthermore, HTI in the region focuses more on raising interest in national and global issues rather than local ones. Analysing the HT view of *da'wa* and its activities in the field, it is apparent that all activities conducted by HT should be put in the frame of calling people to join, or at least to give support, to their agenda. However, despite these various activities of HTI, individual persuasion through existing social networks is still the most effective way of attracting individuals to join HTI.

¹⁴ This program is not much elaborated in HT official literature. However, I found an explanation of it in the *Al-Wa'ie* Magazine. See MR Kurnia, "Tabanni Mashalih al-Ummah", *Al-Wa'ie Magazine* 54: Tahun V (February 2005) 43-46.

HTI trainings and seminars as a medium for recruitment

Most of HTI's recruitment takes place in the universities of Indonesia. The most important means of recruitment is by organizing training programs and seminars on the campuses. The HTI campus activists do not usually directly identify their activities as 'Hizbut Tahrir' but instead arrange events under the banner of LDK (*Lembaga Da'wa Kampus*, The Student Preaching Movement), Student Liberation Movement (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Pembebasan*) and disguised study clubs. This is in contrast with the formal committees of HTI such as of DPP, DPD I, DPD II, DPC and the HTI Chapter which openly use the HT name in organizing their activities. Some members refer to their undercover study clubs as '*organisasi mantel*' or 'mantle organisations'. This means that HTI activists deliberately disguise their recruitment wings on the campuses and HTI can be said to be using deception in its recruitment. This is a part of HTI's strategy of 'soft recruitment' through religious and intellectual means, so that students do not directly identify it as a radical Islamic movement seeking members.¹⁵ In this respect, whatever the medium, what is important for the HTI activists is how to deliver their message to students effectively and how to make them engage in HTI activities as the way of guiding them to becoming *hizbiyyin*.

In Makassar there are various HTI study clubs on the campuses, such as LDK FOSDIK *al-Umdah* (*Forum Studi Islam Kontemporer 'al-Umdah'*), Contemporary Islamic Study Forum of 'al-Umdah' at UNM, FOSIDI (*Forum Studi Islam Ideologis*, Ideological Islamic Study Forum) at UMI and Humaniora at UNHAS, to name a few. Targeting students, the study clubs actively organize discussions and distribute *da'wa* bulletins and pamphlets. In several campuses, I saw pamphlets of the study clubs hanging on student bulletin boards which contained information on HTI activities and messages calling on Muslims to denounce capitalism and return to the caliphate. With regard to training

¹⁵ The strategy of disguising the movement has been used by HT activists in Britain. According to the testimony of the former member of HT, Ed Husain, *hizbiyyin* in Britain disguise HT under the name of 'the Muslim Unity Organization' when undertaking local demonstrations in order to avoid media interest in exposing its homophobic and anti-Jewish statements. See Ed Husain, *The Islamist: Why I joined radical Islam in Britain, what I saw inside and why I left* (London: Penguin Books, 2007) 113.

activities, I found several pamphlets advertising ‘Liberation Training 1’ (*Training Pembebasan 1*) held on the UNM campus by the Student Liberation Movement of UNM, under the title of ‘Creating Alternative Students with Islamic Personality’. In other campuses such as UMI, the training is organized by LDK and aimed at targeting new students. The training usually consists of a group of ten to twenty people and lasts for two days, from morning to afternoon. On the surface, this looks like general Islamic training, but the materials discussed are those of Hizbut Tahrir. They include an introduction to the Islamic faith (*aqidah*), a basic understanding of *shari’a* and *da’wa* (*mafahim syariah dan mafahim da’wah*), comparative ideologies and an introduction to Hizbut Tahrir itself.¹⁶ Some informants acknowledged that they did not know that the training was held by HTI until they received material introducing HT. Students who show an interest in HT ideas will be invited to join intensive *halqa*. However, their initial participation in the *halqa* does not of itself make them full members.



Caption: A pamphlet at UIN Alauddin Makassar advertising HTI training organized by the Student Liberation Movement of UNM

It is interesting to note that some activists have already become acquainted with HT through a study of its texts in informal Islamic study clubs as early as senior

¹⁶ Interview with Hadijah, Makassar, 11 January 2008.

high school. These activists come from several districts outside of Makassar, such as Soppeng (South Sulawesi) and Ternate (Maluku), indicating that HTI has expanded its recruitment through its study clubs in senior high school not only in the capital cities but also in several districts in the province and in Eastern Indonesia. One of my informants, Ishak, recalled that in his school he had regularly attended HT Islamic study sessions (*pengajian*) four times a week and had read some of An-Nabhani's works. Therefore, when going to Makassar to pursue his studies he was already clear about which Islamic organization he wanted to join on campus. When taking part in the new *halqa* in Makassar he could begin at a more advanced level, studying further works of An-Nabhani with senior HTI members.¹⁷

The HTI of South Sulawesi (DPD I) utilizes public discussions as a medium of disseminating HT ideas to society at large. Within HT terminology, this program is called 'public culturing' (*tatsqif jama'i*). In contrast to the training held on the campuses, the public discussions do not aim to introduce the basic teachings of the movement. The public seminars usually deal with concrete, everyday issues, mostly contemporary politics, and HTI uses them as an opportunity to promote ideas based on HT ideology to the people and to gain sympathy and support from them. In order to attract audiences, HTI often raises issues aimed to connect with common aspirations. One of HTI activists explained the strategy of attracting people through public discussions:

What we do is to unveil the facts of the damaging impact of capitalism by relating it to people's lives. When there are many housewives worried about finding oil and gas (*elpiji*), we tell them the fact that the scarcity of oil and gas is due to actors who control the government. They are the capitalists. We explain to the people the problems which lie at the root of the existing system. In the student context, for instance, we raise the current question of expensive education. We tell them why education becomes so expensive and who is to blame. Again, we explain the roots of the problem. In this way, we show them the facts that are close to them. When they become aware we invite them to join, and if they don't, it is no problem for us.¹⁸

¹⁷ Interview with Ishak, Makassar, 10 January 2009.

¹⁸ Interview with Hernawati, Makassar, 29 December 2008.

The issues raised in the public seminars sometimes give the impression that HTI is concerned with the public good and supportive of the unity of the nation. I attended a national seminar entitled “Save the wealth of Eastern Indonesia, avoid disintegration and build a great nation with the *khilafah*”. At the beginning of the seminar, there was performance of traditional dances of Makassar, evidence that HTI uses local culture to advance its cause. Using power point presentations, the speakers explored the facts of the wealth of natural resources in Eastern Indonesia, such as in Sulawesi and Papua, and examined the causes of their massive exploitation which have led to unequal distribution among the people of Indonesia. The root of the problem, the speakers concluded, is the capitalist system, imposed by the West, which gives the opportunity to ‘foreigners’ (*bangsa asing*) to exploit the resources and impoverish the Indonesian people. The answer to this situation, they proposed, is the restoration of the caliphal system. Such issues related to the public good are attractive to local people and many attend the HTI seminars. The local HTI often invite representatives of local government and various Islamic organizations to the seminars, either as speakers or as participants. This is a part of HTI strategy to gain support and sympathy from local government and the people in South Sulawesi.



Caption: HTI's National Muslimah Seminar on 16 December 2008 in Makassar

The role of media is also important in HTI's *da'wa* and recruitment. HTI has utilized media ranging from books, booklets, magazines, bulletins, radios and pamphlets, to a website, yet during activities such as seminars and rallies, the media that they use in public audiences is *Buletin Al-Islam*. I once joined a rally of HTI Muslimah in Makassar and saw HTI activists handing out *Buletin Al-Islam* and stickers to people they met in the street. This bulletin is regularly distributed at many mosques in Makassar at the Friday prayers. For adolescents, the local HTI of Makassar also produces special bulletins for distribution in senior high schools. Aside from spreading the HTI messages in society, the bulletins contain information of HTI's public activities in the city, providing opportunities for people to attend. In this regard, media enable people to be introduced to HTI messages and to come and participate in its activities.

Recruitment Through Interpersonal Bonds

A major part of the process of recruitment to HTI takes place through interpersonal relations between *hizbiyyin* and prospective members. Some insights into this process can be gained from studies of new religious movements in America in the 1960s. Several studies reveal that recruitment to religious cults and sects indeed occurs mainly through “pre-existing social networks and interpersonal bonds”.¹⁹ To borrow Lorne L. Dawson's words, “friends recruit friends, family members recruit each other and neighbours recruit neighbours.”²⁰ A study conducted on the followers of Sun Myung Moon (the 'Moonies') by John Lofland and Rodney Stark, for instance, have suggested that conversion is largely determined by the role of affective ties between the

¹⁹John Lofland and Rodney Stark, “Becoming a World-Saver: a Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective, in *American Sociological Review* 30:6 (December 1965) 871-872; Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, “Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds and Recruitment to Cults and Sects”, in *The American Journal of Sociology* 85: 6 (May, 1980) 1376-1395; Lawrence R. Iannacone, “Why Strict Churches Are Strong”, *American Journal of Sociology* 99: 5 (March 1994) 1200-1201; Lorne L. Dawson, “Who Joins New Religious Movements and Why: Twenty Years of Research and What have We Learned?”, in Lorne L. Dawson (ed.), *Cults and New Religious Movements: A Reader* (USA, UK and Australia: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) 119.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

group's members with potential recruits.²¹ Lofland and Stark found that the conversion of people to a religious cult was not due so much to its ideological appeal as because they saw their friends and families in the group. Although some recruits may find a group problematic, their attachment with new friends and members can lead them to accept the ideas of the group.²² The similar finding on the importance of social networks in recruitment was confirmed by Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge who carried out quantitative research on three other sects: Domsday, the Ananda Commune and the Mormons.²³

Like other religious cults and sects, most of HTI's recruitment takes place through individual persuasion and using pre-existing social networks. In fact, the invitation to people or students to attend HTI activities is very effective through personal contact. Most of my informants said that their initial participation in HTI training, public seminars and *halqa* was on their friends', families' or seniors' invitation. However, many did not know that the activities were run by Hizbut Tahrir. At this stage, the recruiters call on their friends and families to join the HTI trainings and discussions under the guise of learning about Islam (*mengaji* or *belajar agama*), or simply to enhance their existing knowledge of Islamic teachings.

Hizbiyyin are active in finding new recruits, following the HT doctrine which states that carrying out *da'wa* is a life-time obligation for every Muslim. They view *da'wa* as a pivotal activity in their lives (*poros hidup*). Some members told me that every week, their supervisor asks about their *da'wa* activity, meaning the question of how many people they had approached that week. As most HTI members are students, they have to balance their time between academic study, following the *halqa* meetings, disseminating HT ideas and finding new recruits. Every HTI member is required to form a cell consisting of about five new members who will be educated under a supervisor called the *mushrif* (male) or

²¹ Lofland and Stark, "Becoming a World-Saver", 871-872.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, "Networks of Faith", 1376-1395.

the *mushrifah* (female). In *halqa*, recruits and members make an intensive study of key texts of Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani under the guidance of this supervisor. If a recruit has become a full member and fulfilled certain requirements, he or she will be asked to become a supervisor in turn. The formation of cells in HTI is quite similar to that of Multi Level Marketing (MLM) or 'pyramid-selling' systems. Each member in a cell is required to find five new members and later he or she will educate them or find a senior member to be their supervisor. When these new recruits are inducted as formal members, again each of them will be assigned to find other new five members, and so on.

The HTI activists are similar to evangelists in Christianity in seeking converts by building new social relationships.²⁴ They are encouraged to be open and active in making acquaintances for recruitment. Once they find a new friend, they will keep in close contact and guide the person towards HTI activities. In building and maintaining social relationships, communication through mobile phones is useful to send on HTI information, *da'wa* messages and invitations to members and prospective members. One *hizbiyyin* recalled her experience of being contacted by phone by her senior at UNM inviting her to attend a religious study club, which she later realized to be a *halqa* of HTI.²⁵ I myself, when making personal contact with HTI activists in Makassar, often received short messages from anonymous *hizbiyyin* containing information of the coming HTI activities, the critical response of HTI to national and global political events and *da'wa* messages such as the call to leave capitalism and democracy and the need to return to *shari'a* and the caliphate. Likewise, a friend of mine who helped me to gain access to *hizbiyyin* complained to me about their persistent approaches to her with short *da'wa* messages. If someone expresses an interest in HTI ideas, the activist will cultivate a closer relationship with the person in a bid to recruit them to higher level activities. One of my informants said that the first time after attending a discussion she was not so sure about joining HTI, but she was

²⁴ For a good account of various methods of recruitment of 'the New Evangelists', see Peter Clarke (ed.), *The New Evangelists: Recruitment Methods and Aims of New Religious Movements* (London: Ethnographica, 1987).

²⁵ Interview with Khairunnisa, Makassar, 29 December 2008.

impressed by the fact that HTI activists seemed attentive and caring and continued to approach her until she joined.²⁶ In persuading prospective members to join, the HTI activists, however, do not try to engage them on spiritual matters but try to focus on intellectual and emotional topics, especially by emphasising utopian promises. For instance, they present information on the 'Muslim decline' and the 'Indonesian crisis', blaming Western capitalism and arguing that Islam, through *shari'a* and the caliphate, is the only solution for both regaining the glory of Islam and creating a better world. Those who are convinced by such HTI arguments are likely to join the movement. My interaction with HTI members suggests that they use current political and economic events, whether local, national or international, to drive home their arguments about the predatory Western capitalist system. Each member is urged to follow current developments carefully in order to back up or illustrate the broader ideological persuasion.

The Joining Process in HTI

Having discussed the recruitment strategy of HTI in Makassar, this section deals with the processes through which new recruits must pass. While recruitment involves all the approaches made by HTI in persuading people to engage in activities such as training and seminars, the joining process in this section is concerned with a socio-psychological interpretation of the conversion, from initial interaction with HTI ideas to induction as full members. Participation in HTI activities does not automatically lead to recruits becoming members. Those who want membership have to follow a formal process. For my analysis, I borrow from the sociological model of conversion advanced by John Lofland and Rodney Stark²⁷, as well as the writings of Quintan Wiktorowicz on joining radical Islamic movements.²⁸ The former model was the result of an influential study of early American followers of Sun Myung Moon. Lofland and Stark summarize that for conversion to a cult a person must:

²⁶ Interview with Farah, Makassar, 23 December 2008.

²⁷ Lofland and Stark, "Becoming a World-Saver", 862-875.

²⁸ Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam", available at <<http://www.yale.edu/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/papers/wiktorowicz-paper.pdf>> accessed 7 February 2009.

“1) experience enduring, acutely felt *tensions*, 2) within a *religious problem-solving perspective*, 3) which leads him to define himself as a *religious seeker*, 4) encountering the D.P. (cult) at a *turning point* in his life, 5) wherein an *affective bond* is formed (or pre-exists) with one or more converts, 6) where *extra-cult attachments* are absent or neutralized, 7) and where, if he is to become a deployable agent, he is exposed to *intensive interaction*.”²⁹

Wiktorowicz studied the radical Islamic group Al-Muhajiroun in Britain, while also drawing on some aspects of Lofland and Stark's work. He identifies four key processes which draw people to a radical Islamic group: 1) cognitive opening, 2) religious seeking, 3) frame alignment and 4) socialization.³⁰ My research confirms these findings that ‘socialization’ or what Lofland and Stark call an ‘affective bond’ and ‘intensive interaction’ is essential in drawing people in to join and become committed to HTI. Considering the different characteristics of religious movements, there are, however, stages which do not apply to HTI. Borrowing from both models, I underline three processes which lead people to become HTI members: cognitive opening, religious seeking, and socialization.

Cognitive Opening

Cognitive opening refers to situations which lead an individual to be “receptive to the possibility of alternative views and perspectives”.³¹ According to Wiktorowicz cognitive opening could result from a crisis which weakens the individual’s certainty in the old beliefs.³² ‘Crisis’ in this regard is associated with tension, strain, frustration, deprivation and grievance generated by political, social or economic situations. The young Muslim immigrants in Britain, for instance, are prone to join global Islamic movements as an outlet for their frustration over the racial discrimination they have experienced. Lofland and

²⁹ Lofland and Stark, “Becoming a World-Saver”, 874.

³⁰ Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause”.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

³² *Ibid.*

Stark emphasize the ‘stage of tension’ as the first process in their conversion model and it serves as the facilitating factor.

From my interaction with HTI members in Makassar I gained the impression that many of them did not experience a crisis before joining HTI. Rather, it was the movement which propounded a sense of crisis in them. In this regard, the religious movement fosters cognitive opening through ‘outreach activism’, which means that activists “use current social networks or make new acquaintances to germinate a sense of crisis among contacts through discussions and subtle interactions”.³³ This appears to be precisely the case for the most part with HTI members in Makassar. As part of the recruitment strategy, HTI activists actively amplify a sense of crisis among their acquaintances in existing social networks, new contacts and audiences, then emphasize that a return to religion is the best response.

HTI activists usually undertake ‘framing’ or construction, by developing “a new diagnosis and remedy for existing forms of suffering” in order to generate a sense of grievance toward injustice.³⁴ For instance, HTI stresses the ‘multi-dimensional crisis’ and problems in Indonesia and the Muslim world and attributes these problems to the dominance of the secular capitalist system and the absence of a protecting caliphate. Whatever the issue raised, at the end of the discussion, Islam will be cast as the all-encompassing solution. At a monthly HTI seminar in Makassar, called ‘*Halqah Peradaban*’ (*Halqah* of Civilization) the spokesperson of HTI DPD I, Hasanuddin Rasyid, read an HTI official statement on ‘reflections on the end of 2008’ which outlined the crises faced by Indonesia during 2008 in the spheres of economy, politics, society and religion. He concluded:

³³ *Ibid.*, 8.

³⁴ Barrington More, *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1978) 88. Quoted in Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 122-123.

Examining the problems which have emerged in 2008, it can be concluded that there are two main causes, i.e. the system and human factors. The crises of global finance, dismissals (PHK), unemployment, poverty, criminality and other social problems, foreign intervention, Islamo-phobia and all other forms of tyranny (*kezaliman*) have been happening due to human choice in managing aspects of life. The leader with no integrity (*amanah*), a bad system (i.e. capitalism and secularism) and the decline of morality have become the root causes of the aforementioned problems. Therefore, if we really want to be freed from the problems above, we have to choose a better system and an integrated leadership. The better system comes only from God, namely Islamic *shari'a*, and the integrated leader is one who submits to the better system.³⁵

Recruits new to HTI recorded various impressions of their initial interaction with HTI ideas. Some members recalled that when attending HTI seminars they were fascinated by the HTI speakers who presented deep, assertive and logical explanations of politics and Islam, using contemporary facts to support their arguments. Some other members, who had previously joined the Tarbiyah Movement expressed their interest in moving to HTI because of its ideological component (Islam as ideology) after attending HTI training sessions. They also felt that HTI's religious teaching was more comprehensive than that of the Tarbiyah Movement. The HTI frames are not only appealing to prospective members but also make good sense to them. This in turn leads people to want to know more about the religious ideas of the organisation and finally guides them to join it in a full capacity.

Religious Seeking

The self-presentation of HTI as an alternative movement which promises Islamic remedies for current problems provides the explanation for prospective recruits, especially university students, that religion not only relates to ritual and spiritual things but can solve socio-political problems as well. In various ways, HTI activists try to convince their recruits through discussion and debate that

³⁵ Kantor Juru Bicara HTI, *Refleksi Akhir Tahun 2008 Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia; Selamatkan Indonesia dengan Syariah – Menuju Indonesia Lebih Baik*, Leaflet No. 147/PU/E/12/08, Jakarta, 18 December 2008.

Muslims can regain their greatness and dominate the world as long as they return to the ‘true’ understanding of Islam, namely Islam which has genuine *fikrah* and *tariqah*. Given this new insight, the recruits have it confirmed in their minds that religion is of a practical importance to their lives. Therefore, those who are persuaded will regard HTI as a true representative among Islamic movements and tend to see local religious organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, as well as the Muslim student organizations such as HMI and PMII, as inadequate in overcoming the problems of the *umma*. In this process, as Lofland and Stark noted, the recruits come to define themselves as religious seekers, namely persons “searching for some satisfactory system of religious meanings to interpret and resolve their discontent”.³⁶ In HTI, this process will then lead on naturally into the process of socialization through intensive education and interaction with the members.

The tendency towards religious seeking among prospective members is not always linked with previously strong religious backgrounds, as noted by Lofland and Stark. In fact, most HTI members I have met come from non-*santri* families and secular educational backgrounds; only a few have come through *pesantren*, or Islamic senior high schools. Most are university students from the fields of science and engineering or young professionals. HTI DPD I leaders such as Hasanuddin Rasyid, the Spokesperson and Asriani, the Chair of Muslimah have degrees in engineering from UMI. It seems that the recruits from non-arts and non-social science backgrounds are the most active in seeking meaning through radical Islamic movements. These potential members were persuaded and guided by HTI to ‘shop around’ for their religious ideas. Some of them did in fact make comparisons and experimentation by participating in various movements before finally deciding on their commitment to HTI.

Socialization

‘Socialization’ is a critical process which determines the membership and commitment of individuals to a movement. It provides a conducive environment

³⁶ Lofland and Stark, “Becoming a World-Saver”, 868.

for them to experience a movement's ideology and tenets through intensive education, interaction among members and participation in the movement's activities. The socialization process, as Wiktorowicz noted, "is intended to alter the values of the individual so that self-interest is defined in accordance with the goals and beliefs of the movement's ideology".³⁷ Moreover, the movement constructs a new identity for recruits and tightens new social bonds among them so that they keep learning and continue to be dedicated to the movement.³⁸ If the recruits pass this process in HTI, they will become full members and new agents of *da'wa*.

Once exposed to HTI's radical ideas and frames and becoming, in effect, 'religious seekers', individuals will be guided to join the *halqa*. *Halqa* is an intensive type of education, taking the form of a weekly study club comprising five members under a supervisor. It serves as the most important medium of indoctrination for the recruits, in which they are taught to learn and internalize the ideology of HT as presented in the works of An-Nabhani. The venue for *halqa* depends on the members' choice, but is usually in a mosque, a public space on campus or in one of the members' houses. Beside their participation in *halqa*, the recruits are invited to engage in HTI activities such as demonstrations, rallies, seminars and so forth. However, it should be noted that their initial participation in such activities does not guarantee formal membership of the movement. Before being inducted as members, recruits have to complete the study of at least three books by An-Nabhani and demonstrate unswerving loyalty to HTI. The three books include *Nizam al-Islam (Peraturan Hidup dalam Islam, the System of Islam)*, *at-Takattul al-Hizbiy (Pembentukan Partai Politik Islam, the Party Structure)*, and *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir (Pemahaman Hizbut Tahrir, the Concepts of Hizbut Tahrir)*. Although they deal with theological and political discussions and use many Arabic terms, they are not too sophisticated to understand. However, HT requires its members to study them, paragraph by paragraph, under the guidance of a supervisor in order to avoid different understandings of HT ideology arising. Recruits can take two to

³⁷ Wiktorowicz, "Joining the Cause", 3.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

five years to become full members, depending on their zeal in attending *halqa* and their capacities of comprehension. In this process, recruits who have completed studying the basic books of An-Nabhani and show dedication and a willingness to sacrifice other aspects of their lives for HTI will be asked whether they want to 'continue studying'. Those who wish to continue will be sworn in through a special oath (*qasm*) while those who do not go on will become sympathizers of the movement.³⁹

Interaction with other members helps the recruits to develop social ties and strengthens their commitment to HTI. While *halqa* serves as the main focus for maintaining ideological awareness and conformity among members, intensive interaction helps to tighten their solidarity and deepen their understanding and commitment to HTI in the practical aspects of their lives. So *halqa* serves as a control mechanism among the members, especially between a supervisor and his or her cell's members. The supervisor is responsible for making sure that his or her members, in both thought and behavior, are in accord with HTI ideology. In this way, self-discipline and self-awareness are implanted among members. If a recruit is seen by others breaking HTI rules, such as failing to perform the obligatory prayers or fraternizing with people of the opposite sex who are not relatives, then they will be warned and could possibly be dismissed from the organization. In spite of this mutual control, most members I interviewed felt under no pressure in so far as they believe it is the responsibility of every Muslim to advise and warn every other of the danger of possible sinful acts. Besides, they view this system of mutual support and control as something that is good for them as individuals. Strong solidarity among members then helps to keep them in HTI. The socialization process will in the end lead individuals to experience a transformation in their lives and become full converts, as well as new agents of HTI.

³⁹ This information is based on interviews with several *hizbiyyin*.

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the important role which recruitment plays in HTI. It has discussed the relationship between HTI *da'wa* doctrines, recruitment strategy and the joining process of HTI members in Makassar. It concludes that HTI's activities in recruitment are strongly related to its concept of *da'wa*, namely the progression from individual to public *da'wa*, emulating the experience of the Prophet in Mecca and Medina. Through *da'wa*, HTI intends to spread its perceived 'true' understanding of Islam, an Islam which has clear *fikrah* and *tariqah*, in order to restore its glory. HTI conducts various activities ranging from the intensive education of the *halqa* sessions to public activities such seminars, rallies and long marches. Although the public activities and messages of HTI may have wide appeal to people at large, this chapter argues that interpersonal bonds through the pre-existing social networks – such as student groups on the university campuses – are more essential. These new social networks established among HTI members lead on to further commitment to the movement.

Borrowing from analyses by Lofland and Stark and Wiktorowicz, the chapter has demonstrated three processes in conversion to HTI: cognitive opening, religious seeking and socialization. First, individuals are exposed to HTI messages which are appealing and make sense to them. HTI magnifies a sense of the crisis and decline which beset Indonesia and the wider Muslim world and calls people to return to Islam through *shari'a* and the caliphate. Second, in response to these radical messages, individuals become attracted to learn more about Islam. They move into a socialization process by joining *halqa* and various activities of HTI as well as interacting with HTI members. Some prospective members might make their own comparisons and experimentation at this stage. Third, intensive education and interaction among members lead the recruits to accept, understand and internalize the HT ideology. Eventually, prospective members who have completed their study of basic books of An-Nabhani, proved their dedication and made sacrifices of time and effort will be offered full membership of HTI.

CHAPTER FOUR

INDOCTRINATING *HIZBIYYIN*: SEEKING CERTAINTY THROUGH AN-NABHANISM

Introduction

In Indonesian today, it is no longer an unusual public scene to see long lines of *hizbiyyin* marching along major roads, demanding the restoration of the caliphate and denouncing world capitalism and western democracy. Walking several kilometers at a time, HTI activists enthusiastically raise and swing the distinctive black and white Hizbut Tahrir flags (*liwa' and raya*) while shouting the *takbir* of 'Allahu Akbar' ('God is Most Great'). While some activists hold the banners, others are busy distributing leaflets and stickers to people at the side of the roads. Revolutionary Islamic jargon colours the HTI rhetoric. The *hizbiyyin* seem sincere and dedicated in carrying out their *da'wa* for awakening the *umma*. Moreover, they appear confident and eloquent when talking about the crisis of capitalism and the urgent need to adopt Islam as the solution. The scene raises the question for us of why these young Muslims are so critical of Western concepts and so enthusiastic in joining rallies and demonstrations. Indeed, what makes *hizbiyyin* become so committed and dedicated to the HTI movement?

The discussion of commitment and dedication to a radical movement cannot be isolated from an examination of the indoctrination process which enables members to grasp and internalize its ideology and tenets. To date, there has been no study of indoctrination by scholars of transnational Islamist movements, especially of those in Indonesia. HTI provides an interesting case in which the members show strong influence of indoctrination in their thought and behavior. In this chapter I suggest that intensive indoctrination in HTI is crucial in shaping the thinking of *hizbiyyin* and serves to maintain ideological uniformity and commitment to the movement.

The term 'indoctrination' sounds pejorative to many, as it tends to be associated with terms such as brainwashing, deprogramming, mind manipulation and mind control through coercion. The negative associations of the term are due to the development of the democratic notion in education which regards indoctrination as a coercive educational method of totalitarian regimes.¹ In this chapter, however, I use indoctrination as a neutral concept which refers to a classical method of teaching. To follow the definition by William Heard Kilpatrick, indoctrination refers to "the implanting of *doctrines* which are to be held uncritically."² The doctrines in this regard are commonly related to political, moral and religious beliefs.³ As I will show, indoctrination in HTI does not involve coercion, yet it guides people to understand and internalize Islam under the closed system of interpretation of its founder, Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani. The indoctrination process in HTI is conducted through intensive *halqa* and socialization which aim to maintain ideological cohesion among the members. While recruitment serves to attract people to join, indoctrination is essential to produce dedicated *hizbiyyin*. Through intensive *halqa*, young Muslims can find certainty and a new identity, as well as maintaining their dedication to the movement.

The first part of this chapter analyses the process and method of indoctrination through *halqa* in HTI. The next part deals with young members of HTI and their susceptibility to HT ideology and doctrines. The last part analyses the commonly repeated narratives of *hizbiyyin* and their relation to the effects of indoctrination.

Indoctrinating An-Nabhanism Through *Halqa*

In various printed works of Hizbut Tahrir, it is always emphasized that Islam is the ideology of the party which is superior to all other ideologies. Islam, in HT's

¹ I. A. Snook, *Indoctrination and Education* (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 17.

² Snook (ed.), *Concepts of Indoctrination: Philosophical Essays* (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 4.

³ Richard H. Gatchel, "The Evolution of the Concept" in *Ibid.*, 19.

perspective, however, refers to the interpretations of Islam provided by its founder, Taqiuddin An-Nabhani. Due to this strict adherence to An-Nabhani's thoughts, I call HT's ideology 'An-Nabhanism'. Conceiving of itself as a political party, HT intends that individuals embrace the ideological platform of the party and carry out its programs. One of HT's methods in guarding ideological uniformity among the *hizbiyyin* is the process of adopting canonical ideas (*tabanni*).⁴ HT has both an 'adopted canon' (*thaqafa mutabannah*) and an 'un-adopted canon' (*thaqafa ghayr mutabannah*).⁵ According to Taji-Farouki, the former canon consists of texts addressed to the party and its members in order to direct their conduct, while the latter canon is addressed both to HT and Muslims in general. It is obligatory for each member to embrace the former and deviation from it could lead to disciplinary measures.⁶ Both canons contain selected ideas, opinions and laws related to various aspects which are believed to be wholly derived from Islam. The works include:

1. *Nizamul Islam* (The System of Islam)
2. *Nizamul Hukmi fil Islam* (The Ruling System of Islam)
3. *Nizamul Iqtisadi fil Islam* (The Economic System of Islam)
4. *Nizamul Ijtima'iy fil Islam* (The Social System of Islam)
5. *At-Takattul al-Hizbiy* (The Party Structure)
6. *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir* (The Concepts of Hizbut Tahrir)
7. *Daulatul Islamiyah* (The Islamic State)
8. *Syakhsiyah Islamiyah* (The Islamic Personality), in 3 volumes
9. *Mafahim Siyasiyah li Hizbit Tahrir* (The Political Concepts of HT)
10. *Nadharat Siyasiyah li Hizbit Tahrir* (The Political Views of Hizbut Tahrir)
11. *Muqaddimah ad-Dustur* (Introduction to the Constitution)
12. *Al-Khilafah* (The Caliphate)
13. *Kaifa Hudimatil Khilafah* (How the Caliphate was Destroyed)
14. *Nizamul 'Uqubat* (The Penal Code)
15. *Ahkamul Bayyinat* (The Rules of Evidence)
16. *Naqdul Ishtirakiyat al-Marksiyah* (Refutation of Marxist Communism)
17. *At-Tafkir* (Thought)
18. *Sur'atul Badiihah* (Presence of Mind)
19. *Al-Fikrul Islamiy* (Islamic Thought)
20. *Naqdu Nazariyatil Iltizami fil Qawanini al-Garbiyah* (Refutation of the Theory of Liability in Western Law)
21. *Nida Har* (A Warm Call)
22. *Siyasatul Iqtisadiyatul Mutsala* (The Ideal Economic Policy)

⁴ Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest*, 135.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Anonymous, *Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir*, 12-13.

23. *Amwal fi Daulat al-Khilafah* (The Treasury in the Caliphal State)⁷

HTI literature does not specifically divide the books according to each canon. However, some members cited examples of the ‘adopted canon’ as *Nizamul Islam*, *At-Takattul al-Hizbiy*, *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir* and *Daulatul Islamiyah*, while the ‘unadopted canon’ included *Nizamul Iqtisadi fil Islam*, *Al-Fikrul Islamiy* and *Nizamul ‘Uqubat*. The books appear as curriculum for new recruits, or *daris* and *hizbiyyin* proper and each member, whether junior or senior, is required to join a weekly *halqa* in order to study the listed works. Absence from the *halqa* meeting without good reason could lead to dismissal from HTI.

***Halqa* and the Indoctrination Process**

Thus the *halqa*, or study-circle plays the most important role as the medium of indoctrination in HT. Farouki describes it as “a small unit of party members and new recruits formed for the intensive study of the party ideology under the supervision of an experienced member”.⁸ Meetings consist of five individuals gathering around a supervisor and usually last for two hours per session. Membership to HT is conditional upon the candidate’s participation in intensive *halqa*. HTI members call this education through *halqa* the ‘culturing process’ (*tathqif*) to distinguish it from that of schools and universities. This is because the *halqa* regimen for HTI aims not only to educate members but also to develop what they have learned into their everyday behaviour. In this regard, *halqa* serves to inculcate HT ideology to the new recruits and members both in mind and in their everyday behaviour.

The HT supervisor, *mushrif (m.)* or *mushrifah (f.)* has the important duty of maintaining the members’ understanding in accordance with the approved HT interpretations. Instead of encouraging critical thinking among members, the supervisor, acting as the mouthpiece of An-Nabhanism, directs them to follow his or her perspectives.

⁷ Anonymous, *Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir 2*, 27-29.

⁸ Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest*, 125.

The indoctrination process of *halqa* uses the traditional method of Islamic education in which the teacher holds the authority to transfer knowledge to his or her students without encouraging criticism or debate. The process of learning begins with each member having to read out a passage of the book under study; the supervisor then invites members to raise questions related to the passage and its relevance to contemporary developments, and later he or she will answer them. For female activists, the process takes more time to complete a book than for fellow male activists, as they use the Arabic version while the latter use Indonesian translations. In the process, each member has to read out the Arabic passage and translate it into Indonesian before moving on into the question and answer session.⁹ As a comparison, the male group may take one year to complete studying the book *Nizam al-Islam*, while the female group may take two years.¹⁰ At each *halqa* meeting, HTI members usually study two or three paragraphs of set text, depending on the capability of the members to comprehend them.

The supervisors are responsible for the indoctrination and behavioural development of their members. They are full *hizbiyyin* who regard this supervision as an obligation for developing *da'wa*. Indeed, as HT requires, each full member will be assigned to become a supervisor. Their task is not only related to *halqa* supervision, but they also help members to enhance their basic knowledge of Islam and religious practices (*ibada*) such as prayer, fasting and reciting the Qur'an correctly. They also monitor the daily behaviour of members away from the *halqa* cells. In this way, they become religious mentors for those members who might have problems in lives. Self-awareness and self-discipline are implanted, especially in the new recruits; for example, any who come more than 15 minutes late after the *halqa* begins will not be allowed to join in the session.¹¹ Thus the presence of the supervisors is crucial in directing, implanting

⁹ Information gained from interviews with several HTI members in Makassar.

¹⁰ Interview with Hernawati, 29 December 2008.

¹¹ Interview with Maryam, Makassar, 9 January 2009.

and maintaining the ideological, political and religious beliefs of HT in new recruits and members alike.

Apart from running the intensive *halqa*, supervisors also suggest additional learning for their members which they call ‘individual learning’ (*Dirasah Fardiyyah, DF*) and ‘additional insight’ (*Tsaqafah Tambahan*).¹² This is aimed at broadening the ideological comprehension of the members and training them to analyse social and political events based on the HT perspectives which they have acquired. In relation to individual learning, the supervisors ask their cell members to read at home a particular book or item of information from the media on some actual issue. In response to the global financial crisis, for instance, members were encouraged to read an Islamic economic text under the guidance of their supervisor. The following week, they meet their supervisor to present the results of their reading. On such occasions, the supervisor also uses the session to test members’ understanding of HT ideology as gained from intensive *halqa*, as well to check their political insight (*Wawasan Politik, WASPOL*).¹³

As part of ideological indoctrination, the supervisor will guide the members to produce answers and analyses in accord with HT ideology. This presentation and examination meeting is called the ‘weekly following activity’ (*Mutataba'at Usbu'iyah, MU*). On the other hand, ‘additional culture’ sessions are held at special times, different from *halqa* and MU. The texts chosen for study are taken from the ‘unadopted canon’, which are not used in the intensive *halqa*. According to HTI female members, the first book used is entitled *Min Muqawwimat an-Nafsiyah al-Islamiyah* (Pillars of the Islamic Personality), author anonymous, published under HTI imprimatur. It contains a range of Qur’anic verses and Hadith under various themes of Islamic personality building. It is interesting to note that female *hizbiyyin* customarily use familiar abbreviations to refer to their activities and books, such as MU (*Mutataba'at*

¹² It seems that this additional learning process is applied only to female *hizbiyyin* as I did not gain any information related to this from male *hizbiyyin*.

¹³ Interview with Mujahidah and Farah, Makassar, 23 December 2009.

Usbu'iyah), DF (*Dirasah Rardiyah*), Waspol (*Wawasan Politik*) and MM (*Min Muqawwimat*). Given all these various learning activities, the *hizbiyyin* are kept busy, attending three sessions a week, which include *halqa*, MU and *Tsaqafah Tambahan*.

Texts as a Basis for Indoctrination

As we have seen, initial indoctrination through intensive *halqa* seems essential to mould the minds of the new recruits, the *daris* and to familiarise introductory HT doctrines. *Halqa*, in the first place, may attract them to keep participating and eventually lead them on to become actual members. Most of the *hizbiyyin* I met deny that they have been indoctrinated, arguing that membership to HTI is contingent upon the choice of the individual. They emphasize that their decision to participate in HTI is due to a ‘process of thinking’ (*proses berfikir*). These members apparently do not realize that they have been indoctrinated through the weekly *halqa*. In fact, the adoption of HT ideology through ‘the process of thinking’, as they stress, is part of an indoctrination in the initial phase, because of the material they receive in the first book of *halqa*, namely *Nizam al-Islam* (the System of Islam).

While there have been various explanations of the differences between indoctrination and instruction, scholars of education suggest that indoctrination can be distinguished from instruction in terms of intention, method and content.¹⁴ According to John Wilson, indoctrination is being carried out when it is intended that the student arrive at a certain belief.¹⁵ In the case of HT, indoctrination is to be identified, at least judging from the intention of *halqa* to implant ideology in individuals and the method of education which directs members to adopt An-Nabhanism without critical inquiry. Indeed, HTI activists themselves prefer to name their form of learning ‘*tatsqif*’ (culturing) rather than ‘*ta’lim*’ (teaching) or ‘*tarbiyyah*’ (education). What is more, the limiting of

¹⁴ Snook, *Concepts of Indoctrination*, 2.

¹⁵ John Wilson, “Indoctrination and Rationality” in Snook, (ed.), *Concepts of Indoctrination*, 18-19.

references for study to those written only by An-Nabhani and other HT authors indicates that indoctrination is the method of education in HT.

There are three books studied by new recruits before they progress to actual membership: *Nizam al-Islam* (The System of Islam), *At-Takattul al-Hizbiy* (The Party Structure) and *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir* (The Concepts of Hizbut Tahrir). The systematic order of presenting material indicates that HT employs a series of subtle and sophisticated stages of indoctrination for novices: the three basic books serve to equip the minds of novices with HT principal doctrines before receiving further doctrines on more detailed topics such as politics, economy and society in Islam. Interestingly, the first two books do not mention HT on any page; only the third presents HT concepts. The impact of the basic books upon HTI members appears to be strong; I heard many terms and concepts derived from the books voiced in the interviews that I conducted. Therefore, I find it important to give a brief description of the works as follows:

1. *Nizam al-Islam* (*Peraturan Hidup dalam Islam*, The System of Islam)

This book briefly addresses broad and various topics in Islam, such as faith (*iman*), the Islamic system, Islamic civilization, Islamic law (*shari'a*), Traditions of the Life of the Prophet (*As-Sunna*), Islamic ethics (*akhlak*) and so forth. It also contains the draft constitution of the Islamic caliphal state formulated by An-Nabhani. Using theological arguments, it enjoins Muslims to use their thinking (*mafahim*) based on Islamic faith (*iman*) and to hold totally to the laws of God. The power of the book lies in its philosophical, theological and historical elaboration for arguing that Islam is the most true and rational ideology (*mabda'*) compared to other ideologies, such as capitalism and socialism.

2. *At-Takattul al-Hizbiy* (The Party Structure)

Drawing on the ideological competition between Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism in the Middle East during the 1950s, this book explains the weaknesses and failures of movements based on Islam, nationalism and communism in dealing with the *umma*. These it regards as movements without a

correct ideology. The book underlines the significance of having a party rather than a social-spiritual organization to struggle for Islam. It describes the several stages, with relevant strategies, in which a party can establish an Islamic state, namely from culturing, interaction with the *umma*, to the taking over of political power with the support of the *umma*. As well, it notes possible barriers in undertaking this *da'wa* and practical measures to adopt in the struggle.

3. *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir* (The Concepts of Hizbut Tahrir)

This book describes the concepts adopted by HT. It urges Muslims to revive Islam's glory by returning to a true understanding of the faith, namely an Islam which has both clear thought (*fikrah*) and method (*tariqa*). It proposes HT as the only party which struggles for such an Islam, with the aim of re-establishing Islamic life all over the world under the caliphate. Various discussions of the principles of *shari'a* (*ushul fiqh*) and method of *da'wa* are provided to support HT's struggle. At the end of the book, there is a two page profile of HT.

Youth and Susceptibility to HTI Indoctrination

One of the characteristics shared by transnational Islamist movements active in Indonesia, especially HTI and the Tarbiyah Movement is in terms of their demographics. Most members of the movements belong to the younger generation, particularly university students in the 'secular' campuses of big cities. Moreover, the interaction with transnational Islamist ideas mostly takes place on campuses through personal student contact, public discussions and training sessions organized by the Da'wa Preaching Institute (LDK) or disguised study clubs of the movements. Recruitment and indoctrination, as we have discussed, seem essential to gain adherents among these young students. It is important therefore to address the issue of why the youth are susceptible to global Islamist ideology and indoctrination. I suggest that the explanation lies in the nature of the youth themselves, who are seeking an identity on the one hand and the appeal of HT ideology through indoctrination, which provides a sense of certainty to the youth on the other hand.

Seeking Social Bonds and Relief from Frustration

Several scholarly works have argued that youth are prone to join mass movements and new religious movements. As HTI members mostly become acquainted with and join the movement during the period of their university studies, it can be estimated that their age in early participation is around 18 to 22. According to Lois Flaherty, for young adults in their early 20s, this is the time when they consolidate their identity and seek commitment.¹⁶ She points out that during this period “many young people are still unsettled, trying to work out their relationship to the world. They are determined to make a difference, through changing themselves or the outside world.”¹⁷ In this context, religious movements are one of the institutions which serve to provide and construct a total identity to young people, through what Castells has called ‘the process of individuation and internalization’.¹⁸

With regard to HTI members in Makassar, most come from rural areas in South Sulawesi, or from several other provinces in South Sulawesi, as well as from Eastern Indonesian areas such as Kalimantan, Ambon and Nusa Tenggara. Many young people in Eastern Indonesia have traveled to Makassar in order to gain better education and employment. Being away from their homes, they become urbanised, interacting with the results of rapid development and modernization and living independently. For some young people, this condition can create a sense of alienation due to a lack of social ties in the city. In addition, the loosening of traditional religious structures due to the impact of massive globalization can lead them to feel confused and under siege. By engaging with a religious community like HTI, they can overcome these feelings, establishing new social bonds and enjoying the strong solidarity among members. One activist said:

I am from Ternate, Maluku... I feel secure with my membership in HTI.
I am the only daughter in my family. My family trusts me to pursue my

¹⁶ Lois T. Flaherty, “Youth, Ideology, and Terrorism”, in Lois T. Flaherty (ed.), *Adolescent Psychiatry* (London: Career and Technical Education, 2003) 46.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Manuel Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Vol. II, *The Power of Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) 7.

studies here (in Makassar). I have no family here. Because of the ‘sister solidarity’ (*ikatan ukhuwah*) in HTI, my family believes that I can take care of myself and maintain my right behaviour. Besides, the social interaction (*pergaulan*) in HTI is also good.¹⁹

In the HTI community, young people form new and strong social relationships. Brotherhood and sisterhood is not only established among members of one campus but also with those on other campuses, who further widen their networks and friendships. The members often emphasize that what unites them in HTI is one belief (*aqidah*) and ideology, regardless of background, nation, ethnic community or occupation. This interaction among members with different backgrounds is enabled when they organize or participate in HTI's various activities in Makassar. The strength of brotherhood and sisterhood can be seen from their way of addressing each other as ‘*akhi*’ (brother) for fellow male activists and ‘*ukhti*’ (sister) for fellow female ones. Reducing differences among members, it seems that this new shelter provides a sense of egalitarianism and self-esteem among them as they share the concern to spread *da’wa* among the *umma*.

The HTI movement also serves as an outlet for young people to express their frustration. Facing the complexities of life in a big city with various choices of modernity could shake youthful identity. Moreover, the economic crisis since 1998, which has led to the rise of unemployment and economic hardship, might contribute to a greater uncertainty and fear for the future among students and graduates. On the one hand, their families hope for high achievement in their study, yet on the other hand, they have limited sources of funds and facilities. Based on my observations, most HTI members are city dwellers, educated and come from middle and lower income families. Few HTI members hold good professional positions as lecturers, doctors or government employees (*Pegawai Negeri Sipil, PNS*). Rather, many of them are students or unemployed graduates who engage in small business to survive while waiting for an opportunity to apply for government service. In relation to these economic factors, youth who lack direction, satisfactory achievement and meaning in their life are more likely

¹⁹ Interview with Hernawati, Makassar, 29 December 2008.

to join radical religious movements like HTI. Moreover, the HTI messages which provide ready-made answers to their problems appear appealing to such disaffected youths. At an HTI Muslimah rally in Makassar, I saw leaflets which stated:

... Muslimah HTI calls on Indonesian women to abandon capitalism. In reality, capitalism fails to guarantee the welfare and prosperity of the people and even makes them suffer. This is because capitalism only offers an economic system which is unjust, vulnerable to crisis and identical with new colonialism... Today, Indonesia becomes a milch cow of America and its allies. Indonesian resources are abundant but many of its people live in poverty. It is not fair for us to maintain the domination of the capitalist ideology in Indonesia. Therefore, Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia calls on Indonesian women to struggle for *shari'a* and the caliphate. With *shari'a*, we can have Islamic ideology, derived from God. It is an Islamic economic system, based on Islamic ideology, which can bring prosperity to the people and make a great, strong and leading country...²⁰

The messages of HTI are often framed in revolutionary language which accords with the psychology of the youth, who tend to be rebellious. Moreover, resistance in the form of street demonstrations has become a new trend for university students, following the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, due to the force of student demonstrations. Participating in HTI action, the youth can show themselves to be the representatives of the people against injustice and oppression, raising their self-esteem and confidence. At a glance, the messages in their pamphlets and banners sound like a socialist or leftist movement in terms of their radical rejection of capitalism and imperialism. These common messages state that Muslims and the Indonesian people are victims of un-Islamic ideologies implanted by the West in order to colonize the Muslim world. The jargon of liberation and resistance to capitalism and democracy has been raised: “Eliminate Capitalism, Revolution for the Caliphate!”, “Capitalism will End, the World Relies on Islam!”, “Leave Capitalism, Be alert about Democracy!”, “Caliphate Yes, Capitalism and Democracy No!” (written in English), “Save

²⁰ Juru Bicara Muslimah HTI, *Seruan Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia untuk Tinggalkan Kapitalisme, Tegakkan Syariah dan Khilafah menuju Indonesia Besar, Kuat, dan Terdepan*, (Jakarta: Kantor Juru Bicara Muslimah HTI, 10 Desember 2008).

Women from Capitalism and the Trap of Democracy!" and "Save Indonesia with the *Shari'a* and the Caliphate!".



Caption: HTI Muslimah rally in Makassar, 20 December 2008

Seeking Certainty

When negotiating identity in a confusing world, youth are susceptible to religious doctrines which promise certainty. Youth who lack a background in the traditional Islamic education of the *pesantren* and those from the science and engineering disciplines are more receptive to HTI indoctrination. In my observations, I found only a few *hizbiyyin* from the Alauddin State Islamic University (UIN Alauddin) in Makassar, while many more hail from the 'secular' majors of campuses such as UNM, UNHAS and UMI. When looking for HTI activists on the UNM campus to carry out interviews, some students suggested that I look in the Faculty of Natural Science and Mathematics (MIPA, Matematika dan Ilmu Pengetahuan Alam) rather in the Faculty of Arts and Language. My interaction with *hizbiyyin* confirmed that HTI has won more followers from Science and Engineering than from the disciplines of Religious Studies, Social Sciences and Arts. Having a new awareness to return to religion, these students with less Islamic education are more likely to seek 'right' and 'wrong' answers and so are prone to take for granted HTI ideas. Similarly, the students of Science and Engineering tend to employ the 'natural science' paradigm and so accept the doctrines of HTI as something fixed and final. In this respect, to borrow Shamsul's words for describing *da'wa*-oriented students

in Malaysia, “they see ‘Islamic knowledge’ and ‘Islamic theology’ in terms of rules, formulae, equations and right and wrong answers”.²¹ As a result, their understanding of Islam appears legalistic and black and white.

Thus the HTI doctrines, which appear clear, comprehensive and not speculative make sense to young adults who are in search of certainty. It is common that fundamentalist religious movements provide “a unifying philosophy of life” from which the followers can meet personal needs for meaning and coherence in their existence.²² In this regard, religious texts form the core from which fundamentalists justify their thought and action. HTI sees the sacred texts of the Qur'an and Hadith through the lens of An-Nabhani's commentary, claiming them to be fixed Islamic teachings which are infallible. An-Nabhani created an Islamic ideology which encompasses various aspects of life such as politics, economics, society, law and ethics, suggesting the comprehensiveness of Islam. Indeed, he authored various works covering myriad aspects which have become the manifesto and doctrinal sources of HTI followers. Through An-Nabhani's texts, the HTI members have found what Fealy calls ‘a total Islamic identity’²³ and feel no need to look at other religious interpretations. One of the *hizbiyyin* states:

I have interacted with friends from various Islamic movements in Makassar such as the Salafi and PKS groups. However, I found there is something different in HTI because it places Islam as a comprehensive religion. In HTI, we not only study religion as ritual worship (*ibadah ritual*) or a spiritual thing, but we see religion as ideology, cultural entity and a basis for developing civilization. I also feel that HTI is the most serious movement, with its ready concepts to implement Islam comprehensively. Many people only discuss Islam as academic discourse, for example the students at IAIN. They learn Islam theoretically, but only to become lecturers, academicians or writers and then halt their steps there. But as to how to implement Islam, they do not have any concepts of thought or movement.²⁴

²¹ Shamsul AB., “Inventing Certainties: the *Da'wa* Persona in Malaysia”, in Wendy James (ed.), *The Pursuit of Certainty* (London: Routledge, 1995) 130.

²² Ralph W. Hood, JR. *et.al*, *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 2005) 15-16.

²³ Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia", 151-217.

²⁴ Interview with Rahim, Makassar, 14 December 2008.

Indoctrinated Narratives: Becoming a Re-born Muslim

It can be said that amongst transnational Islamist movements, it is HT which has the most solid cadre building and organized form of mobilization. Although the members of HTI in Indonesia are small in number in comparison to the large organizations of Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) they show a deep grasp and internalization of An-Nabhani's thoughts. This is not surprising, since they have studied the three primary books of An-Nabhani under the supervision of their senior member mentors and have exhibited sacrifice and commitment to the movement. In the words of the spokesperson of HTI DPD I Sulsel, “members of HT are guided by a belief in HT ideology and comprehension of its *tsaqafah* (insight)”.²⁵ In this section, I examine the impact of intensive indoctrination upon *hizbiyyin* by analyzing their common narratives, which indicate that they have become re-born Muslims with a new perspective on life. Since there are various doctrines implanted in the HTI members, I underline the key doctrines which they repeatedly expressed during public rallies and my interviews with them.

Islam as a Total Ideology

One central doctrine which is adhered to by *hizbiyyin* is the view of Islam as a total ideology (*mabda'*). Many members acknowledged that this view was new for them at the first time they joined the *halqa* but that it grew in its appeal for recruits. It is initially introduced from An-Nabhani's first book, *Nizam al-Islam* (The Systems of Islam) where An-Nabhani encourages Muslims to adopt Islam as their ideology as it is based on God; he also denounces capitalism and socialism as human-made ideologies. For An-Nabhani, Islamic ideology comprises both *fikrah* (ideas) and *tariqah* (methods), i.e. that Islam provides a comprehensive set of ideas derived from God and methods to achieve them by following the Prophet's example.²⁶ Given this view, HTI members see Islam as

²⁵ Interview with Hasanuddin Rasyid, 6 January 2009.

²⁶ An-Nabhani, *Peraturan Hidup dalam Islam*, 42-45.

a clear and complete system and Muslims must need to follow the rules. One of the *hizbiyyin* explained:

Compared to other movements, I see that it is only HT which has clear *fikrah* and *tariqah*...it is not sufficient to regard Islam merely as religion, it is also ideology. For me, ideology is important because it is the most fundamental idea. If one wants to do something, he must base his or her action on ideology. In any action we have to observe the *shari'a* - from getting up from sleep, eating, building a family, politics, the economy, social and cultural activities, to the rule of state - everything has to be based on Islam. So, Islam is *kaffah* (total) and not only confined to ritual.²⁷

The Quest for *Shari'a* and the Caliphate

In HT's principles, it is obligatory for Muslims to uphold the *shari'a*. It has to be totally implemented through the authority of an Islamic state (*Daulah Islamiyah*) as experienced by the Prophet and the first Righteous Caliphs. HTI members view Indonesia, and Muslim countries in the Middle East, as not entirely Islamic since they apply *kufur*, or infidel systems. For the *hizbiyyin*, the caliphate is the only means to ensure the total implementation of *shari'a*. Based on this logic, they see that establishing a caliphate is also an obligation for Muslims. HTI members I met were well informed and eloquent about the caliphate, not only providing doctrinal and historical arguments for the institution, but they also described in detail the structure of the caliphal state, such as the requirements and methods of appointing a caliph, the function of *wali* (governors), administrative matters, the form of Islamic courts, and so forth. *Hizbiyyin* are well-informed about these details because they have grasped them during *halqa*. I found two HT books which discuss the details of the Islamic state and the caliphate, namely *Daulah Islam* (The Islamic State)²⁸ and *Struktur Negara Khalifah* (Structure of the Caliphal State).²⁹ Their contents are echoed in the narratives of *hizbiyyin*. Here is a typical example:

²⁷ Interview with Farah, Makassar, 23 December 2009.

²⁸ Taqiuddin An-Nabhani, *Daulah Islam* (Jakarta: HTI Press, 2007).

²⁹ Hizbut Tahrir, *Ajhzah ad-Dawlah al-Khilafah*, translated into Indonesian, *Struktur Negara Khalifah: Pemerintahan dan Administrasi* (Jakarta: HTI Press, 2007).

For me, what I understand from HT's struggle is the implementation of *shari'a*. Yet, we cannot implement *shari'a* without a state. We offer the benefits of *shari'a* to be implemented all over the world, but we have no institution which maintains and spreads *shari'a*. Therefore, establishing a caliphate is obligatory. *Shari'a* implementation cannot be won only in one country, it must have a great power guaranteeing the unity of the *umma* under one institution, namely the caliphate. It is the caliphate which guards and spreads faith (*akidah*) and God's *shari'a*. I believe that some day the caliphate will be established because God and the Prophet have promised us. It is funny if Muslims themselves do not believe, because even the US former president, Bush himself believes that there will be an Islamic institution which will take over the world. I am 100% sure that the caliphate will be established. We just need more effort and the readiness of the *umma*. Therefore, HT is struggling to enlighten the *umma*, to prepare them towards the caliphate.³⁰

Besides relying on doctrinal sources as formulated by An-Nabhani, the HTI members often use the historical glory of Islam to argue for the caliphate. They perceive that the condition of Islam in the past, when ruled by a caliph, was much better than the existing situation. One of the activists stated that in the world today one can see human killing and rape taking place every minute. He boasted that during Islam's rule for 13 centuries it could overcome criminality better than today, and this has been acknowledged by some Western Orientalists.³¹ Another informant told me of the greatness of the Islamic state in Madina where Muslims, Christians and Jews could co-exist in harmony. He also described how science, arts and literature were highly developed in the age of the Abbasid dynasty of Baghdad. It is worth noting that the narratives of *hizbiyyin* seem uncritical with regard to Islamic history. Like HT literature, what one hears from *hizbiyyin* narratives is, as Fealy rightly states, "an idealized and romanticized account of how the caliphate operated throughout history".³²

Resistance to Western Concepts: Against Capitalism and Democracy

As a part of their indoctrination, the quest for the caliphate and the implementation of *shari'a* leads *hizbiyyin* to denounce alien ideologies and

³⁰ Interview with Putri, Makassar, 14 January 2009.

³¹ Interview with Ansar, Makassar, 10 January

³² Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia", 163.

'isms', especially those coming from the West, such as capitalism, socialism, secularism and pluralism. Since socialism has been shown to have failed, the energies of HTI seem more concentrated towards undermining capitalism and democracy, to judge from the voices they raise in the media and their rallies. In any HTI rally and whatever the issue canvassed, one finds voices against capitalism and democracy. What is more, in the HT literature, capitalism and democracy are denounced as the systems of infidels (*sistem kufur*), the spawn of secularism, full of weaknesses, sources of evil and soft weapons of the West to weaken and colonize the Muslim countries. Rather than making self-criticism, HTI members usually blame these Western systems as the source of the problems facing Muslim countries in general. Following HT literature, one of the *hizbiyyin* narrated:

One cause of the decline of Muslims is the domination of the capitalist system with its democracy. In other words, capitalism is established while Islam is abandoned. That is why HT struggles to replace capitalism with an Islamic system. Capitalism only brings decline and bad effects. In reality, this system has failed to bring prosperity to the *umma*; for example, as we face now, the global financial and economic crisis. In Indonesia, we have seen the presidency has changed overtime, but has never brought any betterment: oil is still scarce, the health service is not optimal and other aspects of people's lives have not been improved. These are all the bad impacts of capitalism and thus they should be replaced with an Islamic system. It is an undeniable fact that, historically, Islam could bring prosperity to the *umma*. For instance, in the rule of the caliph Umar bin Abdul Azis, there was a time where people refused to be given alms (*zakat*) because they were all so prosperous.³³

Emphasizing the clash of civilizations, the *hizbiyyin* reject democracy; for them it is a secular concept which is more firmly based on the sovereignty of the people rather than on the rules of God. In their view, within a democratic system any issue whatsoever, whether *halal* (allowed) or *haram* (forbidden) might be brought under deliberation, while in Islam only issues which are *halal* can be discussed. Moreover, they emphasize that matters of Islamic law such as *jinayat* (criminality) and *qisas* (punishment) cannot be debated, but have to be strictly

³³ Interview with Hernawati, Makassar, 29 December 2008.

implemented. Quoting HTI ideologues, several members argue that democracy is *haram* from an Islamic perspective. Due to this rejection of democracy, as my informant explained, *hizbiyyin* in Indonesia do not participate in elections, though this is not publicly announced and there is no stipulation from HTI DPP in Jakarta regarding the issue.

Self-Transformation: Producing a New Identity

The intensive indoctrination of HTI not only results in shaping the minds of the *hizbiyyin* as described above, but also leads them to experience transformations in their lives. Viewed from the perspective of the sociology of religion, the change in belief and identity of these youths indicates that they have undergone a total conversion.³⁴ Adopting a complete Islamic identity, many members acknowledged that they have found direction in their lives. As they narrated:

After joining HTI, I personally found a goal in life which I really wanted. Before knowing Islam and HT, my goal in life was like what people generally want, such as achievement in my studies, getting a good job, getting married, having a family and kids and then entering heaven after death. But after knowing Islam through HTI, I now realize that *da'wa* is the axis of life (*poros hidup*). Thus, we have to provide a time for *da'wa*. Our obligation is not only to perform ritual worship, but also to spread *da'wa* for the good of the *umma*. Therefore, although I am busy with my studies I have to manage my time to include *da'wa*.³⁵

After learning Islam in HTI, I felt a change in my views. Previously, like other friends, I just thought about completing my studies, finding a job and then getting married, as well as making my parents happy. That's it. Now, after joining HTI, I do think there was something missing in my life. We should not only think about our individual interests, but we have to pay attention to the *umma* and struggle for Islam. We not only have to make sure our prayers are good, but also how to think about the problems of the *umma*, how to enlighten them to support Islamic *shari'a* so that together we can enjoy prosperity under Islam.³⁶

³⁴ David A. Snow and Richard Machalek, "The Sociology of Conversion", in *Annual Review of Sociology* 10 (1984), 167-190.

³⁵ Interview with Putri, Makassar, 14 January 2009.

³⁶ Interview with Mutiara, Makassar, 25 December 2008.

The stories make clear that the *hizbiyyin* have become re-born Muslims. Narratives like these are common in new religious movements. According to Margaret Thaler Singer, members of a new religious movement, when referring to their new social identity, speak of themselves as “transformed, reborn, enlightened, empowered, rebirthed, or cleared”.³⁷ In this respect, their change is reconstructed as demonstrating the emergence of the ‘new person’.³⁸ The *hizbiyyin* perceive themselves to be agents of God, having a new consciousness and commitment to spread *da’wa*, which they view as the major activity of life on earth. They have found a high responsibility to care and struggle for the global *umma* so that they can restore the glory of Islam under the caliphate.

Such personal change can also be seen from the appearance and behaviour of the *hizbiyyin*. While male activists do not adopt any particular change of appearance, the female activists, or *akhwat* tend to put on a different model of veil and a loose, long flowing robe, which appear more traditional than the general *jilbab* in Indonesia. They have learned in the religious doctrines of *halqa* that Islamic clothing consists of *jilbab* and *khimar*. The *jilbab* is a headscarf combined with a long robe, while *khimar* is the headscarf combined with separate items of clothing such as a shirt and skirt. This kind of *jilbab* has become the badge of the religious and social identity of the HT female activists. In terms of behaviour, they keep their actions in accordance with Islamic rules and ethics; for instance, except in the context of gaining education, they avoid interacting personally with males with whom they are potentially allowed to be married, *bukan muhrimnya*, or those outside the circle of the family with whom they may interact freely. This is due to the teaching that it is forbidden for a man and a woman to meet and interact in a private place without the presence of others, since it can lead to *zina*, or sexual acts outside of marriage. In my own experience, I had difficulty in interviewing any female activist unless she was accompanied by a female friend as chaperone. One of my informants even

³⁷ Margaret Thaler Singer, “The Process of Brainwashing, Psychological Coercion, and Thought Reform”, in Lorne L. Dawson (ed.), *Cults and New Religious Movements*, 158.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

cancelled an interview when her friend was not available to come and accompany her.

The *hizbiyyin* do not confine their ‘Islamicness’ to personal piety, as in other Islamist movements, but following HT doctrines, through real action as they are bound to the global *da’wa* mission. This may be interpreted as the success of HTI indoctrination which produces such a strong commitment in young Muslims. For them, commitment to HTI is no more than a commitment to Islam itself. The *da’wa* mission to establish *shari’a* and the caliphate is embodied deep in the minds and actions of the *hizbiyyin*. They are not reluctant to spread HTI messages to their family and the public. Some members gave me accounts of how they have struggled to Islamize their family and their social surroundings, receiving both resistance and acceptance in turn. Some of them are also active in writing their opinions in local daily newspapers on various national and local issues, always offering solutions from HT perspectives. While so seeking to Islamize their surroundings, the major activity of the *hizbiyyin* is in seeking recruits, attending and supervising *halqa* and actively organizing and participating in HT public activities such as seminars or discussions, demonstrations and rallies.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown the relationship between commitment, indoctrination and the vulnerability of youth in being attracted to the HTI movement. It finally concludes that intensive indoctrination through *halqa* plays a crucial role in moulding the minds and behaviour of these young Muslims, which in turn produces an Islamic identity and commitment to HTI. Indoctrination takes the form of traditional Islamic teaching, where a teacher is surrounded by five or six students in the *halqa*, following the systematic curriculum written by An-Nabhani. Rather than using any critical method, HTI aims to implant HT ideology in young Muslims under the supervision of senior *hizbiyyin*, so that members can adopt and carry out its teaching correctly.

For its certain, uncompromising and revolutionary messages, the HTI ideology is appealing to youth, especially to disaffected university students, who are at the stage of seeking personal empowerment and identity, social bonds and an avenue to vent their frustrations. The *hizbiyyin* thus emerge as re-born Muslims who adopt a total Islamic ideology and conceive of the *da'wa* for *shari'a* and the caliphate as their main undertaking in life.

CONCLUSION

The rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto regime has become an exemplary manifestation of the rapid expansion of transnational Islamist movements in Southeast Asia. After being an underground movement since the early 1980s due to repressive nature of the New Order regime, Hizbut Tahrir emerged to public view in 2000 and has gained a high profile since. In the past decade, HTI has dramatically increased its membership and energetically mobilized its followers on the streets. It has consistently campaigned for its global agenda, namely to restore caliphate and implement *shari'a*. This global movement has attracted particularly young Muslims, who display a deep comprehension of HT ideology and fervent commitment to it. In an attempt to understand the rapid development and growing popularity of HT in Indonesia, this sub-thesis has scrutinized the processes and appeals which entice people to join and become committed members to the movement. This study is different from others on HTI in that it focuses on the grassroots, investigating internal perspectives of HTI members in Makassar, South Sulawesi.

Many scholars have referred to the rise of HTI and other Islamist movements as a response to rapid socio-political and economic change. In this respect, uneven development, poverty, rapid urbanization, state failures, and identity crises are among the factors which lead people to express their grievances by engaging in Islamist movements. In Indonesia, the mushrooming of Islamist groups was notable in transition era from authoritarian to new democratic state. The failure of government to overcome instability due to economic crises, and its inability to ensure law and order as well as ethnic-religious conflicts are among explanations of the rise of Islamist groups during this time. In addition, the emergence of these groups is also seen as a reaction to the restrictions on political Islam during the authoritarian Soeharto regime.

I have argued in this study that while social-political factors, in effect external factors, are undeniable in explaining the emergence of HTI and the grievances of

its members, they cannot fully explain the reasons why individuals participate in HTI and not other radical groups. Therefore, I underscore the importance of internal factors, namely ideology, strategies, and activities of HTI in building membership through innovative recruitment and indoctrination techniques. In this regard, external and internal factors operate simultaneously. Emphasizing only one factor can lead to inadequate analysis.

My central argument in this study has been that recruitment and indoctrination techniques and processes play a pivotal role in HTI achieving high participation and commitment of its members. I have demonstrated that outreach is essential to persuade people to initially participate in HTI activities, such as seminars, trainings, and *halqa*, while indoctrination works to shape their thinking in order to make them dedicated members. In addition, intensive indoctrination and socialization among *hizbiyyin* serves to maintain their unity of thought and deepen their conviction as to the truth of HTI beliefs.

I also highlight the importance of social bonds in recruiting new members and maintaining their dedication to HTI. My investigation of *hizbiyyin* in South Sulawesi reveals that most of HTI's recruitment has been through interpersonal relations; inviting people with whom there is an existing trusting relationship to attend HTI activities. Many young Muslims have been recruited after being persuaded and urged by their families, friends, and seniors who were affiliated to HTI. This implies that HTI's ideology is not the sole or even primary factor drawing people into HTI. As Stark and Bainbridge noted, “rather being drawn to the group [religious sect] because of its ideology, people were drawn to the ideology because of their ties to the group”.¹ This confirms the finding of studies on Christian religious sects and cults in America, showing that effective recruitment through pre-existing social networks and interpersonal ties can also be applied to radical Islamist movement.

¹ Stark and Bainbridge, “Networks of Faith”, 1378-1379

What is more, the active recruitment of *hizbiyyin* has marked similarities to American evangelists in making acquaintances for conversion. In this regard, they make a close contact with new acquaintances by giving personal attention, support, and care with the objective of guiding them towards HTI. Once the new relationship is established, *hizbiyyin* will manage to keep contact with prospective recruits and intensely approach them using HTI *da'wa* messages through physical contacts and communication means. In this way, they also try to convince the prospective recruits by involving them in emotional and intellectual discussions showing that Islam is essential in dealing with human problems. When individuals become recruits, they are conditioned to form tight social bonds with other members, supporting and advising each other, which in turn can make them feel a sense of belonging to and dependence on the movement.

My observations in South Sulawesi indicate that HTI branches in local contexts use innovative approaches to win support from society. Although various issues raised in its public activities are more pre-occupied with actual international and national issues, HTI in the region incorporates local elements, such as presenting Makassarese cultural performance within its seminars or connecting events in Sulawesi to its global agenda. Furthermore, it attracts public to support its global agenda by framing issues in a way which gives the impression that HTI is loyal to the Indonesian nation-state and cares about people's suffering. This is the HTI strategy for gaining support by 'localizing' its global agenda in an Indonesian context.

This study also found that disguising HTI study clubs and their activities serves as an effective strategy for HTI recruitment, especially in campuses. I have observed that HTI has a number of 'undercover' study clubs using various names in several leading campuses in South Sulawesi. This cloaking pattern is similar with that of HT recruitment in universities in the UK where *hizbiyyin* create Muslims student society without referring to HT when organizing their seminars. To attract students, the HTI-affiliated study clubs raise intellectual or religious issues which accommodate students' interests. This masking strategy gives an impression of

non-partisanship and hides their radical agenda from students so that HTI ideas can be quietly inserted into discussions seemingly on purely religious or social topics.

The South Sulawesi case suggests that the vigorous recruitment of HTI members is not driven by political and economic motives, but by HTI ideology implanted to them. For the members, recruitment is seen as a *da'wa* or preaching activity which provides the theological basis upon which are erected elaborate programs. HTI indoctrinates its members in three stages of *da'wa* development: the stage of culturing, the stage of interaction with the *umma*, and the stage of taking over the government. The first stage forms the basis for individual recruitment and indoctrination, while the second one forms the basis for educating society. These *da'wa* doctrines, which are based on An-Nabhani's interpretations of Islamic texts and Prophetic example, are closely studied by members and provide the guidelines for them to seek recruits and propagate HTI messages to individuals and society. *Hizbiyyin* view *da'wa* as a religious obligation and main duty in life, which has similar position with obligatory worship in Islam. They also regard *da'wa* as inseparable from political activity.

Having indicated the importance of recruitment, this study however, does not discount the appeal of HTI's totalising ideology, its framings, and its utopian promises. Prospective members can see these features of HTI when reading its media, attending HTI public activities, or attending its training and indoctrination programs. Most of *hizbiyyin* maintain that HTI's teaching and struggle is more Islamic and comprehensive (*kaffah*) than those of other movements. None of them appear to discern weakness in HTI and critical thinking is not encouraged. HTI teaching for them is comprehensive because HTI views Islam not only as a religion and ritual thing but also as an ideology (*mabda'*) that provides complete rules for all aspects of Muslim lives. It is apparent that they are convinced by HTI arguments and framings, and find confirmation of its ideological correctness in political events. For them, the restoration of caliphate and implementation of *shari'a* becomes the sweeping solution for all the problems which beset Muslim countries, including Indonesia.

Nonetheless, participation of young Muslims in HTI is not a sudden process as becoming a full member requires long preparation. This lengthy process is important for several reasons. First, although HTI is active in recruitment, it only inducts recruits who intensely study HT ideology and show commitment to the movement. Second, HTI has a strong cadreship in which it implements strict discipline for prospective members, such as requiring them to adopt An-Nabhanism in thinking and daily practices, as a requirement for membership. Third, the lengthy period of study and interaction serves as socialization process for recruits to negotiate and develop their commitment to the movement. This socialization process also becomes a means for recruits to decide if they really want to become members.

Another main concern of this study is indoctrination process. It is the most important medium for determining membership and commitment to HTI. I have shown how indoctrination through weekly *halqa* can influence young Muslims to be dedicated followers. The recruits and members are not encouraged to question and criticize HTI doctrines as they are regarded as the fixed and infallible Islamic teaching. For HTI, what is needed from members is to understand and internalize HT ideology in their own thinking and behaviour rather than to exercise objective and critical analysis. In this regard, it is implanted in them that commitment to HTI means commitment to Islam. Bound by an-Nabhanism, the viewpoints of *hizbiyyin* in understanding Islam and world events become single-minded and narrow. It is apparent that the impact of intensive indoctrination to *hizbiyyin* is so strong that they articulate their thoughts about Islam as ideology, the need for *shari'a* and caliphate, and rejection to Western concepts using similar terms and phraseology, as if they have been programmed. Implanted by 'comprehensive' Islamic identity, *hizbiyyin* have been transformed into born-again Muslims who willingly dedicate their lives for Islam under the direction of HTI.

My study has shown that the receptiveness of recruits to HTI indoctrination is related to their social and personal backgrounds. Psychologically, young adults who are in the stage of seeking identity and empowerment are susceptible to HTI radical doctrines which are certain and fixed. I have demonstrated that this

identity seeking can be related to feelings of uncertainty and alienation due to economic instability and the rapid modernization and globalization. Those who come from science and engineering academic backgrounds and who lack Islamic education are receptive to HTI doctrines which offer certainty. Moreover, the newly urbanized young Muslims who lack social ties and religious hold due to rapid modernization and globalization are prone to join the movement. During indoctrination and engagement in the movement, young Muslims can gain a sense of safety, strong social ties, and an outlet for expressing their frustrations. Gaining these personal and social benefits, they continue to follow required activities of HTI which in process make them as committed *hizbiyyin*.

In future, HTI is likely to continue to gain followers from among young Muslims. Its various study clubs in campuses and the attraction of HTI to youth still make campuses as the main basis for recruitment, though there are some indications that HTI is beginning to recruit students from senior high schools either in the city or rural areas. This is also supported by the fact that the local Muslim student organizations such as HMI and PMII are deemed incapable to provide 'Islamic' appeal and credentials to students. Within society, HTI is likely to gain sympathy from local Muslims due to its peaceful activities and its numerous public events which show up its image as the defender of the *umma*. Nevertheless, given the moderate nature of Indonesia's Muslim majority, it is unlikely that this public sympathy mean that HTI will gain support to establish its global goals. The increasing number of HTI members and its rapid mobilization may have more potential to affect the government's policies in the future. However, the absence of HTI from electoral politics will not provide a political venue for the movement to achieve its agenda. More importantly, its global caliphal agenda is far too distant from moderate Muslim majority, let alone from the diverse groups of Indonesian population. Its expansion will also face barriers from moderate Muslim organisations which seek to resist losing members to HTI by promoting Islam and human rights, democracy, and pluralism.

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