

**Patterns of Political Party Competition, Dominance and
Institutionalism:
The Case of Timor-Leste**

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of The Australian National University

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I certify that this thesis is my own original work. It contains no material which has been accepted for the award of a degree or diploma in any university and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

signed:

Evan Douglas Hynd

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on CNRT's displacement of FRETILIN as the dominant political player in Timor-Leste in 2007. CNRT, which led the coalition governments of 2007 and 2012, ended the political pre-eminence FRETILIN had won in 2001 on the basis of its prominence in the independence struggle. This thesis addresses three key questions with regard to the dynamics of political party interactions in Timor-Leste. First, what factors explain both change and stability in the party system? Second, why did FRETILIN's political fortunes decline while those of CNRT rose? And third, what factors explain the strength and longevity of individual parties in Timor-Leste?

Drawing on a variety of sources, including data obtained during fieldwork in Timor-Leste in both 2012 and 2013, this thesis argues that three main factors explain changes in the party system: absence or presence of charismatic leadership, the identity of the nation-building and state-building project and the operation of networks of distributive politics and patronage. These three factors were crucial in causing FRETILIN's decline and facilitating CNRT's near fulfillment of achieving the status of a dominant party. On the matter of party longevity, this thesis argues that while FRETILIN is positioned to carry on coherently into the future, the foundations of the other parties are shaky and their future durability looks precarious.

The significance of this thesis is two-fold. First, it fills a gap in existing literature on Timor-Leste by providing a formal and contemporary analysis of political parties and the country's party system. Second, this thesis throws light on the character and fate of dominant parties in the context of newly independent countries.

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Chapter One. Introduction

Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN) or Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor played a key role in the struggle for national independence in Timor-Leste. It began its life as a formal political party as a dominant political force after the country's first national elections in 2001. In that poll it won 57.37 per cent of the popular vote. This outcome in itself is not surprising given that many parties which have emerged from successful independence movements in Africa and Asia have gone on to dominate their respective political environments for extended periods of time. The African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) or Mozambique Liberation Front in Mozambique, the Zimbabwe African National Union — Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe, the Indian National Congress (INC) party in India and the *Barisan Nasional* (BN) or National Front in Malaysia are examples.

The voting public of Timor-Leste, however, denied FRETILIN on two subsequent occasions in 2007 and 2012 the chance to govern the country again. Despite being the largest political beneficiary of independence, FRETILIN quickly lost its grip on power and has since been largely marginalised politically. This phenomenon raises important questions about the dynamics of political parties in Timor-Leste, particularly given the country's status as a young and emergent democracy in contrast to the tendency of vanguard revolutionary parties in such countries to capture political power after the revolution and then to hold on to it, in some cases using violent means, for many years after.

Accordingly three primary research questions frame this study:

- 1) How can we account for both change and continuity in the patterns of political party competition in Timor-Leste?
- 2) Why has FRETILIN struggled and the political party *Congresso Nacional da Reconstrucao Timorese* (CNRT) or National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction come to be so politically dominant since 2007?
- 3) How can we assess the degree of institutionalisation of individual political parties in Timor-Leste, and what does this assessment convey to us about the likely future structure of inter-party dynamics?

I develop three core arguments in response to these questions:

First, three specific factors within FRETILIN's first term of government caused an opening of the structure of competition and change in the pattern of party competition from one that closely resembled a *predominant party system* in 2001 to one of *moderate pluralism* in 2007: the absence of charismatic leadership, the alienating nature of the nation-building and state-building project, and the limited opportunities for networks of patronage and distributive politics to take effect. In essence, FRETILIN failed to build on its initial position of governmental strength in 2001 and establish itself as a dominant national party. A proliferation of parties representing various social cleavages and political personalities then emerged to fill in the political space made available in 2007.

Second, the continuation of the pattern of party competition I have characterised as *moderate pluralism* between 2007 and 2012 also featured the growing stature of CNRT as a *proto-dominant* party. Central to the continuation in this pattern of party competition, and CNRT's expanded popularity and governmental governance, was CNRT drawing on the charismatic appeal of Xanana Gusmão, a more inclusive nation and state building project, and the operation of well-funded networks of patronage and distributive politics.

Third, while the institutionalisation of political parties is normally regarded as a source of stability and continuity in the political system, the degree of institutionalisation of Timor-Leste's current *individual* political parties is quite uneven; most parties are weakly institutionalised, with the exception, paradoxically, of FRETILIN. Indeed, FRETILIN is the only party that constitutes a properly institutionalised organisation. Of the other major parties in the parliament, CNRT's organisation and electoral appeal is intimately tied to that of its charismatic president, Xanana Gusmão, which threatens its organisational capacity to survive a leadership transition. In the case of PD, there is a better balance between personalised leadership and organisational strength, but because its base of support is small, albeit stable, its future structural coherence is limited.

1.1. Significance of the Research

These primary research questions and arguments are of significance for several reasons. First, to this point in time, research on Timor-Leste studies has paid limited critical attention to issues of party systems and party institutionalism. This study addresses this lacunae by providing

a comparative analytical framework to interpret events in the early phase of political life subsequent to the achievement of independence, and by offering a critical analysis on more contemporary empirical data collected during the 2012 electoral season and in a subsequent fieldwork trip the following year.

Second, the dynamics of political party competition in Timor-Leste challenge conventional understandings of the relationship between institutionalisation and the stability of the party system. While all of the political parties besides FRETILIN are weakly institutionalised, which is to be expected given how young they are, what is intriguing is that the most strongly institutionalised party, FRETILIN, has struggled in vain to achieve political dominance. Indeed, given its essential and historical role in the resistance to the Indonesian occupation and the attainment of independence, its displacement as the preeminent ruler of the country by a party that was formed two months before a national election is noteworthy and deserves close academic interrogation.

The case of Timor-Leste is especially intriguing because it does not fit the typical pattern of revolutionary or independence movements dominating the early political environment after independence is achieved in post-conflict or post-occupation settings. Some parties in such circumstances developed in the direction of one-party authoritarian states or military dictatorships. For example, FRELIMO was formed in 1962 as a national liberation movement in the Portuguese colony of what would become Mozambique, which achieved formal independence in June 1975. FRELIMO has politically dominated the country since

independence, initially heading a one-party state until 1990, when a new constitution was promulgated that brought in a multi-party political system. Since the first democratic elections of 1994, FRELIMO has won a majority of seats in the parliament.

The ANC has competed in democratic elections in South Africa since 1994 and has dominated them ever since. The roots of the ANC are found in the early 20th century in the struggle for the rights of the black population of South Africa. The ANC was founded in 1923 and, along with its military wing (the Spear of the Nation), conceived and presented itself as a national liberation movement to end apartheid and fight for racial equality. Under the charismatic leadership of Nelson Mandela, the ANC won the first post-apartheid national elections held in South Africa in 1994. Even after Mandela stepped down from the leadership of the party before the second post-apartheid elections in 1999, the ANC has formed the majority party in the parliament until this day.

The ZANU-PF has dominated Zimbabwe since the country achieved independence in 1980. The political and military precursor movements of the ZANU-PF were involved in the war that began in 1976, against white minority rule in the territory then known as Rhodesia. With the exception of the governing coalition arrangement arising from the 2008 election, the ZANU-PF has won a majority of seats in the parliament.

There is also the case of India. The Indian National Congress (INC) party played a critical role in bringing about the creation of an independent state in 1947 and has won a clear parliamentary majority six times, and led a coalition government arrangement four times, out of 15 general elections since then.

Finally, the multi-party coalition known as BN, and its direct organisational predecessor, the Alliance Party, has ruled Malaysia since the country achieved independence from the United Kingdom in 1957. The Alliance Party played a critical role in the realisation of independence, and the BN has subsequently enjoyed political success stemming from its association with its predecessor.

In consideration of examples such as these, the case of FRETILIN in Timor-Leste warrants academic attention because it is a rare case where a popular and capable national liberation movement failed to translate its political dominance of the independence struggle into long-term political dominance. Accordingly, this thesis analyses the ebbs and flows of political party competition for access to government, diagnoses and critiques the emergence (and decline) of dominant parties, and assesses the crucial factors that determine the institutional strength, and long-term viability, of political parties in Timor-Leste. In addition, the research also identifies some of the possible longer-term political directions and governmental trends in Timor-Leste. In achieving these objectives, this research illuminates more general lessons or themes that speak to the nature and dynamics of political parties in other recently emerged democracies, particularly where an armed struggle for national independence was involved.

1.2. Literature and Theory

1.2.1. The Literature on Politics and Political Parties in Timor-Leste

There has been a dearth of systematic academic attention paid to the matter of political party institutionalism in Timor-Leste. Authors who have touched on this topic have typically done so in a limited manner within broader analyses of political dynamics in Timor-Leste. One example is Dennis Shoemsmith's chapter, 'Political Parties', in Michael Leach and Damien Kingsbury's 2013 edited book entitled *The Politics of Timor-Leste*. Shoemsmith's chapter, among its other virtues, provides a broad historical background on the political parties, the main leadership figures, and the formal and informal nature of politics. But on party structures and rootedness in society, there is one sentence in the conclusion that directly address and summarises the author's thoughts on the topic: "The degree of rule stability and organizational discipline within parties is less certain, perhaps with the exception of FRETILIN."¹ This argument is arrived at without conducting any specific analysis designed to test or assess particular theoretical questions or models concerning either the party's role in government or their internal organisation.

In a similar fashion, Damien Kingsbury's 2014 article, 'Democratic Consolidation in Timor-Leste: Achievements, Problems and Prospects', dedicates three paragraphs to matters of party structure, fragmentation and leadership without reference to any specific theoretical approach. Analogously to Shoemsmith, the conclusion Kingsbury reaches is that FRETILIN is an

¹ Shoemsmith, Dennis. 2013. "Political Parties." In *The Politics of Timor-Leste*, edited by Michael Leach and Damien Kingsbury, 121-143. Ithaca, New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications p.142

island of party strength in a sea of general party weakness, “with a heavy reliance on charismatic leadership and low levels of institutional capacity.”² Thus far, Shoesmith and Kingsbury have come to similar conclusions based on general observations and analysis after the conclusion of the 2012 elections.

An earlier work on the topic, a 2008 evaluation report compiled by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), develops conclusions based on a more detailed, systematic approach to the topic of party institutionalism in Timor-Leste. As part of this evaluation report, the International Republican Institute (IRI) reported back on its activities, which aimed to “strengthen political parties’ institutional capacity”³, with the objective being the “development of stable, grassroots oriented, well-organized and idea-based political parties committed to democracy and pluralism.”⁴ IRI began its work with parties in the lead up to the 2001 Constituent Assembly elections, and its post-elections analysis revealed ‘excessive weakness’ in parties. IRI has continued training political parties since then, and the 2008 report represented IRI’s opinion on the then state of political party strength:

Parties are still predominately personality-based although some are starting to become more diversified, better organized with more sophisticated platforms... In 2002 some party organisations were based on shadow government structures and

² Kingsbury, Damien. 2014. “Democratic Consolidation in Timor-Leste: Achievements, Problems and Prospects.” *Asian Journal of Political Science* 2014:1-24, p.14

³ USAID. 2008. “Elections and Political Processes Program in Timor-Leste.” *USAID/Timor-Leste*, February 2008. Retrieved 29 September 2015 from http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacl911.pdf, p.16

⁴ *Ibid*, p.16

now they are more party-like with positions in critical areas such as communications, membership recruitment, fundraising and outreach.⁵

While some progress had been made in pursuit of IRI's objectives, the general consensus is that party weakness, underpinned by minimum levels of party institutionalisation, pervades Timor-Leste. One of the common key symptoms of party weakness is that parties are organised around highly personalised structures and, sometimes, charismatic leaders. Parties organised around personalities tend to be reliant on the popularity of their leaders, and suffer from weak structures and a dearth of ideology and policy platforms. In such a case, if the leader should pass away or step down, the ability of the party to survive becomes a real question. In the case of the *Associação Social-Democrata Timorense* (ASDT) or Social-Democratic Association of Timor, as I point out in Chapter Five, the party collapsed after its charismatic leader, Francisco Xavier do Amaral (Avo Xavier), died.

The challenge of party development in a manner that is not contingent on the fate of a party's leader, and the transition to a new cadre of party leaders, is an important aspect of party institutionalism and is taken up by Cillian Nolan in his 2014 report on the question of what may happen when Xanana Gusmão is no longer the prime minister. Nolan agrees with the previous authors surveyed that Timor-Leste suffers from the dominance of personalised leadership, but that the eventual end of Gusmão's rule "could signal a healthy move away from highly

⁵ *Ibid*, pp.16-17

personalised governance to greater institutional development.”⁶ Across the three major parties in parliament, Nolan argues that FRETILIN enjoys an advantage over its opponents with “the broadest cast of younger, charismatic leaders, many of who have their own support bases and experience serving as ministers in the first government.”⁷ Up until now, this younger group has not broken through to the upper echelons of FRETILIN’s leadership. This state of affairs for FRETILIN confirms their greater institutional strength compared to its main opponents, CNRT and *Partido Democratico* (PD) or Democratic Party.

Nolan expresses concerns that CNRT has very limited options in finding a suitable and effective replacement for its president, Xanana Gusmão. In some ways echoing ASDT’s investment in its leader, Avo Xavier, CNRT has banked its political fortunes in Gusmão for its political successes. Moreover, as I argue in Chapters Four and Five, Gusmão has been a unifying political figure, able to bring together a large range of social, economic and political actors into CNRT’s ‘big tent’. I agree with Nolan that this arrangement is a tenuous one: in the post-Gusmão world, CNRT will face a real challenge in keeping together all of those disparate, and in some cases, competing individuals, groups and interests from jumping ship.⁸

In reviewing the possibilities for younger politicians in PD to engage in and influence political life in Timor-Leste, Nolan alludes to the significance of the resistance background of

⁶ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC). 2014. “Timor-Leste after Xanana Gusmão.” *IPAC Report* No.12, 16 July 2014, retrieved on 25 August from <http://www.understandingconflict.org/conflict/read/29/Timor-Leste-After-Xanana-Gusmo>, p.1

⁷ *Ibid*, p.10

⁸ *Ibid*, p.10

the party and its leaders. The origins of PD are principally located in the student activist movement in Java and Bali during the occupation. Some of those activists now lead the party. Fernando ‘Lasama’ de Araujo was the president of the party until he passed away in 2015, and Mariano Sabino is general-secretary of PD. The party campaigned heavily on the image and reputation of these leaders as resistance activists in the 2012 elections, as noted in Chapter Five.

This initial review of the state of research into formal party systems and party institutionalism in Timor-Leste demonstrates that there has been little in the way of rigorous, in-depth research into these topics. The existing literature has touched on some important themes but I argue there is abundant space to interrogate further the underlying, structural dynamics of individual parties, and party systems. With this thesis, I aim to make a substantive contribution to the literature by systematically analysing some unique empirical material and bringing it into an original argument.

1.2.2. The Literature on Party System Classification and Change

An understanding of the Timorese party system, and how it has shifted, relates to the first of my primary research questions. Thus, it is necessary to begin by providing a definition of a party system. Fundamentally, a party system is constituted by the *structure of interactions* (including competition) between its component parts (namely, political parties). As Giovanni Sartori describes it, “the system in question bears on the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function (in the mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts

competitively or otherwise, to the other parties.”⁹ One immediate conceptual corollary of this definition is that it does not recognise political arrangements where only one party is allowed to function as a party system as such. A party system, by implication, must contain at least two parties that compete for the right to govern.

Counting parties, therefore, is essential for arriving at some initial taxonomy of party systems. Counting parties, in fact, has been the long-standing approach used to distinguish between different types of party systems, going back to Maurice Duverger’s classic work on political parties published in 1951 (original French version). The orthodox distinction, as promulgated by Duverger, simply identified two models: a two-party system and a multi-party system.¹⁰ The normative judgements embedded in these two models privileged the two-party over the multi-party system; the former were seen as stable and consensual democracies, while the latter were associated with unstable and fractured democracies.

In the 1960s, other researchers proposed more nuanced and sophisticated classifications of party systems to expand on Duverger’s rudimentary framework. In 1966, for example, Yale University’s distinguished professor of political science, Robert Dahl, published an alternative taxonomy that considered not only how many parties participated in elections, but how opposition parties formulated strategies to compete against their rivals.¹¹ Dahl conceived of a

⁹ Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis – Volume I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.44

¹⁰ Duverger, Maurice. 1959. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State [Les Partis Politiques]*. Translated by Barbara North and Robert North, 2nd ed. London: Methuen, pp.206-280

¹¹ Dahl, Robert A. 1966. “Patterns of Opposition.” In *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, edited by Robert A. Dahl, 332-347. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University, pp.336-346

four-fold typology in the context of two-party and multi-party arrangements by examining how parties operated in both electoral and parliamentary contexts, and whether they carried out competitive, co-operative, or coalescent strategies. While counting the number of competing parties remained part of Dahl's analysis, he recognised the need to approach the subject matter in a qualitative fashion as well by factoring in the behaviour of parties. Missing from his analysis, however, was an assessment of the relative size of, and ideological distance between, the parties and how those factors affected the dynamics between them in the overall party system.

In a similar vein to Dahl, but in a more incisive fashion, Jean Blondel made an important contribution to the literature in a 1968 article.¹² In addition to counting parties, Blondel weighed up their relative size in the party system, and also factored in the location of parties on the ideological spectrum into his four-fold typology: a two-party system, a two-and-a-half-party system, a multi-party system with a dominant party, and a multi-party system without a dominant party. The significance of Blondel's contribution includes its breaking down of a crowded multi-party type into more precise categories, and its consideration of the behaviour and ideology of the parties which comprise the party system under scrutiny.

Of all the major efforts to theorise the notion of a party system, however, Sartori's critical contribution in 1976 is particularly useful for my purposes and helps guide the analytical narrative developed over the course of this thesis that assesses the character of party interactions in Timor-Leste. Indeed, this assessment is the primary focus of Chapters Three, Four and Five

¹² Blondel, Jean. 1968. "Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 2(1):180-203

and will offer explanations for the changing (and unchanging) patterns and structures of party competition over the last three national elections (2001, 2007, and 2012).

1.2.3. A Typology of Party Systems: Sartori

Sartori offers a comprehensive and practical typology of party systems that can be used to compare different *classes* and *types* of party systems across different countries and historical periods. This typology rests on two primary variables: firstly, the number of *relevant* parties and, secondly, the degree of *ideological distance* between the most extreme of these parties.

The first of Sartori's variables focuses on the number of relevant political parties in a system so the initial task is to enumerate them. Sartori sets up very clear guidelines as to how to count parties. In particular, they have to fulfil one of two specific criteria if they are to be considered a relevant party in his taxonomy: a party must have either 'coalition' or 'blackmail' potential. By coalition potential, Sartori means that a party must be able to play a role in the formation of a coalition government. The actual number of seats a party holds is immaterial as long as "...it finds itself in a position to determine over time, and at some point in time, at least one of the possible governmental majorities."¹³ By contrast, a party is effectively redundant if "...it is never needed or put to use for any feasible coalition majority."¹⁴ A caveat to these criteria is that "coalition potential" only applies to parties if they have governmental intent, and are also ideologically commensurate to other prospective coalition parties.¹⁵

¹³ Sartori. 1976. "Parties and party systems." *op. cit.*, p.122

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.122

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p.122

Sartori also argues that a political party can attain political relevance through realising its blackmail potential. This might happen, for example, when “...its existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of party competition and particularly when it alters the direction of the competition — by determining a switch from centripetal to centrifugal competition either leftward, rightward, or in both directions — of the governing-oriented parties.”¹⁶ Casaba Nikolenyi comments usefully that the essential purpose of the blackmail category is to acknowledge and account for parties large enough to play some role in the broader architecture of party relations, even though participants of such parties are not members of the government.¹⁷

Sartori classifies the party systems based on counting the number of relevant parties and so ascertaining political party fragmentation. This step generates an initial seven-fold classification of party system *classes*.¹⁸ In the first two such classes of party systems, one party monopolises political life and does not allow the existence of other parties. These non-competitive classes are designated as ‘one-party’ (high ideological intensity) and ‘hegemonic-party’ (low ideological intensity) systems. Three additional classes of party systems accept the legitimacy of more than one party competing for political power and thus constitute competitive systems. If there are two relevant parties, the system is a ‘two-party format.’ If there are three to five relevant parties, the system is a form of ‘limited pluralism’; if there are six or more relevant parties, the system is a form of ‘extreme pluralism’.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p.123

¹⁷ Nikolenyi, Casaba. 1998. “The New Indian Party System: What Kind of a Model?.” *Party Politics* 4(3):367-380, p.369

¹⁸ Sartori. 1976. “Parties and party systems.” *op. cit.*, pp.125-129

The final two classes Sartori initially identifies are ‘predominant’ and ‘atomised’ party systems. Sartori, however, goes on to qualify this classification and defines predominant party systems as a *type* — rather than a class — of party system.¹⁹ I address this distinction shortly when I discuss typologies of party systems. An atomised system occurs when there are so many parties that counting becomes a redundant task.²⁰ There is no *system* as such because *none* of the parties themselves are of any real consequence.

The second step in Sartori’s analysis focuses on the second of his variables, the degree of ‘ideological distance’ in a system. For Sartori, the degree of ideological distance refers to the gap between the most polarised relevant parties in the system “...that is, the overall spread of the ideological spectrum of any given polity” from high to low.²¹ This second analytical step allows us to later identify *types* of party systems within the varying *classes* of party systems. In the case of the non-competitive systems, the distinction between classes is determined by calculating the specific intensity (for Sartori, there are five degrees) of the regime’s ideological penetration into the country. In regard to competitive systems, ideological distance is measured on a scale of high/large (polarised) to low/small (moderate).²² The effect of segmentation will be accounted for in the upcoming section on the types of competitive party systems.

The final step in elucidating Sartori’s taxonomy concerns specific *types* of party systems. Sartori achieves this by further breaking down his original classification system into a more detailed and precise typology by combining the two principal criteria (party fragmentation and

¹⁹ *Ibid*, pp.199-200

²⁰ *Ibid*, pp.125-126

²¹ *Ibid*, p.126

²² Mair, 2002. “Comparing Party Systems.” *op.cit.*, p.91

ideological distance) and examining the dynamic between them. The focus here is to appreciate how the mechanical predispositions of the interaction of parties (depending on how many there are) could affect the degree of ideological polarisation and the competition for power.²³

According to Sartori, there are five types of *non-competitive party systems*, ranked from high to low in degree of ideological intensity in this order: (i) ‘one-party totalitarian’; (ii) ‘hegemonic ideological’; (iii) ‘one-party authoritarian’; (iv) ‘one-party pragmatic’; and (v) ‘hegemonic pragmatic’.²⁴ These one party systems are depicted below in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1: Non-Competitive Party Systems

Number of Parties	Ideological distance	Classification	Typology
One party	High	One-party	one-party totalitarian hegemonic ideological
	Low	Hegemonic party	one-party authoritarian one-party pragmatic hegemonic pragmatic

Source: Sartori. 1976. “Parties and party systems.” *op. cit.*, pp.288-289

There are also four types of *competitive party systems*: (1) two-parties; (2) moderate pluralism; (3) polarised pluralism; and (4) predominant party systems. These competitive party systems are depicted below in Table 1.2.

²³ *Ibid.* p.91

²⁴ Sartori. 1976. “Parties and party systems.” *op. cit.*, pp.288-289

Table 1.2: Competitive Party Systems

Number of Parties	Ideological distance	Classification	Typology
Two parties	Low	Two party (format)	Two partism (mechanics)
Three to Five parties	Medium	Limited pluralism	Moderate pluralism
Five or more parties	High	Extreme pluralism	Polarised pluralism

Source: Sartori. 1976. "Parties and party systems." *op. cit.*, pp.288-289

It is important to bear in mind, as Steven Wolinetz points out "...the direction and character of competition"²⁵ when considering the formulation of these party system types. In two-party systems, competition is typically restricted to two major — and relevant — parties, which struggle for a majority of seats to form government. A small ideological distance is also the norm in such systems with both major parties competing for the political centre and avoiding appeals to their bases on the traditional left-right spectrum (by making more moderate appeals), thus narrowing the ideological gap. The United States, Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) are examples of countries that feature, or have featured, two-party systems.²⁶

²⁵ Wolinetz, Steven. 2006. "Party Systems and Party System Types." In *Handbook of Party Politics*, edited by Richard S. Katz and William Crotty, 51-63. SAGE Publications, retrieved 3 July, 2013 from http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/hdbk_partypol/SAGE.xml, p.57

²⁶ Mair, Peter. 2006. "Party System Change." In *Handbook of Party Politics*, edited by Richard S. Katz and William Crotty, 63-74. SAGE Publications, retrieved 3 July, 2013 from http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/hdbk_partypol/SAGE.xml, p.91

'Moderate pluralism' is a system that is characterised by limited party fragmentation, involving three to five parties (or six in some cases). In such systems, parties have little or no chance of forming government on their own and are forced to form government with other parties. This pattern tends to produce a parliament with two (bipolar) coalitional arrangements. There is similarly limited (bipolar) ideological polarisation and competition is centripetal in nature as seen in the two-party system.²⁷ At the time of writing in 1976, Sartori suggested Denmark, Belgium, and Ireland were good (Western) examples of this party system in operation.²⁸

'Polarised pluralism' is a system that features moderate to large scale party fragmentation; Sartori suggests systems that feature six (or in some cases five) or more parties fit this category. Similarly to the case of moderate pluralism, parties will also need to form government in a coalition arrangement. This system is characterised by high degrees of ideological distance between the parties so competition is of a centrifugal nature.²⁹ Anti-system political actors and entrenched opposition parties with extreme ideological predispositions are not uncommon in this context. The cases that informed this type of party system were the 1920s Weimar Republic in Germany, the French Fourth Republic, Chile (until the 1973 Coup), and Italy (1976).³⁰

²⁷ Wolinetz. 2006. "Party Systems and Party System Types." *op. cit.*, p.57

²⁸ Sartori. 1976. "Parties and party systems." *op. cit.*, p.173

²⁹ Wolinetz. 2006. "Party Systems and Party System Types.", *op. cit.*, p.57

³⁰ Sartori. 1976. "Parties and party systems." *op. cit.*, p.197

There are two conceptual categories derived from Sartori's work that I particularly rely on in this thesis – the notion of party systems, and the concept of dominant parties. I discuss the first immediately below and the second in section 1.2.5.

Sartori defines a party system as dominant to the extent that the governing party consistently wins a majority of the seats.³¹ Some of the most commonly referred to historical examples of dominant parties in academic literature include Japan, India, Italy and Israel³², while more contemporary debates focus on cases such as South Africa, Turkey and Russia.³³ I cover the literature on dominant parties in more detail shortly by tracing its intellectual antecedents and how it applies in the contemporaneous case of Timor-Leste.

Party systems generally take time to be become established, institutionalised and stable. Sartori argues that, in the case of predominant party systems, for example, “[t]hree consecutive absolute majorities” are “a sufficient indication”³⁴ that the system has become solidified. I will base my approach to assessing party systems in Timor-Leste on this standard. Accordingly, we need to see three consecutive election results that produce a consistent party system type before

³¹ *Ibid*, pp.288-289

³² For example: Kothari, Rajni. 1964. “The Congress ‘System’ in India.” *Asian Survey* 4(12):1161-1173, Pempel, T. J. 1990. “Introduction. Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes.” In *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, edited by T. J. Pempel, 1-32. Ithaca, New York; London: Cornell University Press and Arian, Alan and Samuel H. Barnes. 1974. “The Dominant Party System: A Neglected Model of Democratic Stability.” *The Journal of Politics* 36:592-614

³³ For example: Reuter, Ora John and Thomas F. Remington. 2009. “Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem: The Case of United Russia.” *Comparative Political Studies* 42(4):501-526, Muftuler-Bac, Meltem and E. Fuat Keyman. 2012. “The Era of Dominant-Party Politics.” *Journal of Democracy* 23(1):85-99 and Brooks, Heidi. 2004. “The Dominant Party System: Challenges for South Africa’s Second Decade of Democracy.” *EISA Occasional Paper*, Number 24, October 2004:1-24

³⁴ Sartori. 1976. “Parties and party systems.” *op. cit.*, p.199

we can judge that a bona fide party system has been established. Because we have not seen this occur in Timor-Leste, I will refer to what we see there in less institutionalised terms. I will continue to depend on Sartori's framework for defining party system types, but I will refer to these types, as suggested by Wolinetz, as *patterns of party competition* instead of party systems.³⁵ In this way, I am still able to deploy Sartori's comprehensive taxonomy to describe what is occurring in Timor-Leste without implying or arguing that it has become cemented into an institutionalised system.

1.2.4. Developments in the post-1976 literature

It has been almost 40 years since the formulation of Sartori's taxonomy and changes have occurred in the nature of party systems across the world that challenge its applicability. The *polarised pluralism* category has fragmented and thinned out. Countries where extreme parties (or anti-system party actors) on the left and right were common, as in France and Italy, can no longer be considered examples of polarised pluralism. The extreme parties in these countries have lost their radical edge, died out, or become, in some cases, legitimate actors in government.³⁶ Even in cases where there are anti-system actors, they tend to be of the extreme right only. Without an accompanying party of the extreme left to plant the second pole necessary to establish a situation of extreme ideological polarisation, polarised pluralism has become rare. A second major change is that the *moderate pluralism* category has been flooded with many new cases, partly due to the shrinking of the polarised pluralism category.

³⁵ Wolinetz. 2006. "Party Systems and Party System Types." *op. cit.*, p.58

³⁶ *Ibid*, p.93

One major advantage in drawing on Sartori is that he invites qualitative analysis to enter into the reckoning. Take, for example, the counting of parties, a process ascertained by evaluating a party's blackmail potential. Similarly, assessing the ideological distance between parties also asks analysts to render a verdict based on their informed, critical judgement. Sartori's approach, while imperfect, offers the flexibility that is needed to acknowledge variations that can occur in party systems throughout the world, allowing the analyst room to intellectually manoeuvre when necessary and not be locked into rigid, pre-determined categories.

I recognise the challenge of finding a way to filter the more crowded moderate pluralism category of Sartori's framework into more precise terms so as to maintain its discriminatory power and the legitimacy of Sartori's typology of party systems. In pursuit of this objective, Mair's (2002) work is especially helpful, given his emphasis on the importance of the dynamics of parties within a system, particularly the structure of competition for political power.³⁷ The analytical value of this approach is that it helps us to identify more precisely details of how party systems operate — a necessary task given the previously identified caveats to Sartori's typology.

Mair's approach focuses on identifying three criteria to establish a more precise characterisation of the party system. The first criteria concerns the prevailing mode of governmental alternation: is it wholesale, partial or non-existent in nature? The second criteria focuses on the pattern of government formation: is the approach to government formation generally innovative or predictable? The third criteria looks at the identities of the parties

³⁷ Mair, Peter. 2006. "Party System Change." In *Handbook of Party Politics*, edited by Richard S. Katz and William Crotty, 63-74. SAGE Publications, retrieved 3 July, 2013 from http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/hdbk_partypol/SAGE.xml, p.91

participating in government: is it the same old faces (exclusive), or do new parties get involved (inclusive)?³⁸ If the responses to these criteria tend to fall on the former answer, the more ‘open’ and innovative is the system; the more the response falls on the latter answer, the more ‘closed’ and predictable is the system. For example, an open system would generally see complete or partial alternation of government, innovative formulae in the formation of government and space for new parties to join the governing group.³⁹ In later chapters, I argue that the structure of competition in Timor-Leste has shifted from an open system in 2007 to one that more closely resembles a closed system in the wake of the 2012 national elections.

In short, in the midst of a plethora of theories of party systems, Sartori created an approach that went beyond merely counting parties.⁴⁰ First, he argued that the parties must be relevant. Second, he suggested that the ideological distance between the extreme parties matters. By bringing these two variables together, Sartori offered a precise typology of party systems that could be tested across the world. And in the face of concerns about its contemporary usefulness, Mair’s approach focuses on the structure of competition and maintains the legitimacy of Sartori’s typology by gaining further insight into the categories he created.

1.2.5. The Literature on Dominant Parties

The concept of dominant parties, what they are, how they operate and what effect they have on the dynamics of the broader political environment, is integral to the first and second of

³⁸ *Ibid*, pp.93-101

³⁹ Rakner, Lise and Lars SvAsand. 2004. “From Dominant to Competitive Party System: The Zambian Experience 1991-2001.” *Party Politics* 10(1):49-68, p.58

⁴⁰ Sartori. 1976. “*Parties and party systems.*” *op. cit.*, p.120

my primary research questions. The concept's relevance to Timor-Leste is two-fold as it pertains to both FRETILIN and CNRT. As I articulated at the beginning of this chapter, in the aftermath of Indonesia's brutal occupation of the territory of Timor-Leste in 1999, the organisation which fought for independence from the beginning, FRETILIN, commanded a strong political position after the first elections in 2001. This position of political superiority, however, disintegrated in 2007. One of the central contentions of this thesis is that FRETILIN failed to strengthen and consolidate its dominant position of political power, and that this resulted in the opening up of the structure of competition. The more unpredictable nature of the structure of competition then facilitated a transformation in the nature of the party system from 2001 to 2007. From 2007 onwards, CNRT has grown stronger and is in a position to achieve the status of a fully-fledged dominant party in the 2017 national parliamentary elections.

To properly explicate the notion of dominant party, the work of T.J. Pempel (1990) is especially useful.⁴¹ A great advantage of his account is that it will help locate the case of FRETILIN in Chapter Three, and CNRT in Chapters Four and Five, in a broader, comparative, analytical framework. By doing so, we can learn more about the emergence, consolidation, and collapse of embryonic dominant parties in Timor-Leste. In addition, by applying this theoretical framework in the Timorese context, this thesis will make an original contribution to the field of studies concerned with party systems and dominant political parties.

⁴¹ Pempel. 1990. "Introduction." *op. cit.* and Pempel, T. J. 1990. "Conclusion. One-Party Dominance and the Creation of Regimes." In *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, edited by T. J. Pempel, 333-360. Ithaca, New York; London: Cornell University Press

Before looking at Pempel's theoretical model of dominant parties, I first briefly provide some background on the literature on dominant parties. I begin with reference to Duverger's theorising on political parties. While Duverger's 'Les Partis Politiques' (1951) offers a limited description of what constitutes a dominant party, it is commonly recognised as the first formal effort to conceptualise the notion.⁴² The rudimentary criteria Duverger outlines defines a dominant party as one that is consistently the largest over a long period of time. The second feature the author identifies is a more abstract one: the identity, ideology and performance of a dominant party informs and reflects the *epoch* of when it is in power. This form of dominance concerns its ability to shape the thoughts and beliefs of its citizens, regardless of whether they support the party or not. As the author frames it: "[e]ven the enemies of the dominant party, even citizens who refuse to give it their vote acknowledge its superior status and its influence; they deplore it but admit it."⁴³ This definition, while broad and short on specifics, touches on two themes that will feed into the larger debate on dominant parties later. The first theme is a rather obvious material one: what is the numerical criteria for a party to be considered dominant? The second theme reflects the symbiotic, cultural relationship between the identity of a party and the political regime in which it operates.

Alan Arian and Samuel H. Barnes made the next significant contribution in 1974. Arian and Barnes examined the cases of Italy and Israel in reference to a broader theoretical discussion of dominant parties and predominant party systems.⁴⁴ The authors provide a more thorough

⁴² Duverger. 1959. "Political Parties." *op. cit.*, p.308

⁴³ *Ibid*, pp.308-309

⁴⁴ Arian and Barnes. 1974. "The Dominant Party System." *op. cit.*

definition than Duverger of what constitutes a dominant party. The authors mildly extend Duverger's narrow definition of a party requiring a majority in parliament to be considered dominant, and accept that a party should also be considered dominant if it leads a governing coalition in a preponderant fashion.⁴⁵ Missing again in this analysis, however, is a more detailed set of criteria for establishing what constitutes a dominant party. No clear time frames are offered for how many consecutive elections must be won, for example, or how long the dominant party must be in power.

Arian and Barnes also refer to, and develop, the second key theme of Duverger's work: the close association between dominant parties and the "constitutional and political order that they came to dominate."⁴⁶ The authors cite the constitution of young institutions, the staffing of bureaucracies, the public perception of the party with a crisis or critical juncture in the nation's history, and an informed and experienced leadership as crucial elements of a party achieving a dominant political status.⁴⁷

Arian and Barnes also offer real substance on the strategies and tactics that dominant parties employ to stay in power, a topic barely referred to by Duverger. The authors argue that the dominant party is in a very strong position given it can typically deploy impressive material and ideological resources in political contests against its opponents. Dominant parties are able to

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p.593 and p.598

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p.595

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, p.595

not only call upon the financial and organisational resources of the state to support their electoral prospects, but they can also employ ideological weaponry, usually sourced from their association with a successful independence movement, to shape a favourable legitimising discourse.⁴⁸ Flexibility and adaptation, for the authors, are crucial to the survival of a dominant party. Boundaries on behaviour, established by revolutionary ideological purity for example, can be cast away without being fatal to the dominant party if it is able to find alternative ways to attract and maintain support. Patronage and other reward systems, for example, can displace previous commitments to previously inviolable political principles.

Arian and Barnes also signal a normative judgement on dominant parties and dominant party-systems throughout their article, identifying the strengths and virtues of such political arrangements. Such an arrangement, they argue, provides political stability and predictability, which are generally considered important and positive characteristics.⁴⁹ This is especially the case with developing, fledgling democracies, which come out of independence struggles or civil war. The authors generally feel positive about dominant party regimes, arguing that they provide much needed stability while allowing democracy to continue to function. Their strength of belief in the stability of such systems is bolstered by their position that political opposition faces real difficulties against the dominant parties, which can call upon vast material resources and impressive legitimising narratives.⁵⁰ I argue that this enthusiasm does not pay due recognition of the dangers of such a system. The absence of a functioning opposition, particularly in young

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p.597

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p.593

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p.593

countries that typically suffer from weakly institutionalised parties, leaves the door open for corruption and authoritarian encroachments on democracy.

I now shift my literature review to focus on Pempel, who developed his definition of a dominant party based on the phenomenon of a single party governing in its own right, or being an ongoing and central partner in a governing coalition, for long periods of time.⁵¹ While Pempel included Israel and Italy as case studies for his research, as Arian and Barnes did, he also expanded the reach of his analysis by incorporating the cases of Sweden and Japan. Pempel's definition of a dominant party goes beyond the rather terse description of previous models by outlining more detailed and precise criteria. There are four characteristics or elements that mark out a party as a dominant one:⁵²

- 1) *Dominant in number*: the party must hold a plurality of seats in the parliament, but not necessarily a majority of them.
- 2) *Dominant bargaining position*: in order for the party to consistently stay in power, it must be able to take a commanding, strategic position within the party system so that it can dictate the makeup of the government. This capacity is of particular significance if the dominant party does not hold a majority of the seats in parliament; it must be able to represent or locate itself as an indispensable partner in any governing coalition.

⁵¹ Pempel. 1990. "Introduction." *op. cit.*, pp.1-2

⁵² *Ibid*, pp.3-4

- 3) *Dominant chronologically*: the party must be centrally involved in the government for a sustained period of time, not just a matter of several years.
- 4) *Dominant governmentally*: given that the party is central to everything the government does over a long, sustained period, the party embarks upon the implementation of a ‘historic project’, which means “...a series of interrelated and mutually supportive public policies that give particular shape to the national political agenda.”⁵³

The key to a party turning a successful election result, like FRETILIN in 2001, into becoming a dominant party is to play the game of politics in a particular fashion: with the requisite opportunities, knowledge, and skills, a party with regular access to the corridors of power needs to, over time, continually enact policies and programs that reward and expand its base of support. This process needs to be mutually supportive, however — the base of support needs to reinforce the electoral support for the party at elections. Pempel argues, for example, that “[i]f it [the dominant party] plays this complex game particularly cleverly, it may unleash a “virtuous cycle” that will propel it into semi-permanent governance.”⁵⁴

I now want to briefly highlight the three commonalities of one-party dominance that Pempel argues Israel, Sweden, Italy, and Japan shared despite all their differences in order to identify what commonalities Timor-Leste shares with these countries.

⁵³ *Ibid*, pp.3-4

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p.16

(1) The first commonality is that Israel, Sweden, Italy and Japan all employed a variety of proportional representation, or another electoral system that encouraged multipartism. Pempel argues that a precondition for the emergence of a dominant party is an electoral system that fosters the production of multipartism.⁵⁵ This is because a party, in this context, does not necessarily require a majority of the seats in parliament to run the show; a party with *just* a plurality of parliamentary seats may also have a sufficiently strong bargaining position — in relation to the other parties — to dictate the shape of the new government. Pempel suggests a figure of 35 per cent as the benchmark for a party to gain pre-eminence in post-election negotiations. There is no cast iron guarantee the party that wins the most seats in parliament, however, will *always* have a presence in the new government. And, of course, electoral systems that encourage multipartism do not necessarily cause the rise of dominant parties.

Conversely, a first-past-the-post or majoritarian electoral system makes it difficult for a party to establish dominance over a long period of time. This is because such systems are mechanically predisposed against large numbers of parties being present in the parliament; they usually produce two-party system arrangements. A party that wins 35 per cent of parliamentary seats, for example, would usually be in a very weak position. For a party to remain dominant in this context, it typically would need to attain 50 per cent of parliamentary seats election after election for decades. For any party in a democratic setting, the maintenance of such a large constituency is a much tougher assignment than that of only regularly gaining the support of one-third of the electorate.

⁵⁵ Pempel. 1990. "Conclusion." *op. cit.*, pp.336-337

(2) The second commonality is a clear ‘historical cycle of dominance’ in the cases of Israel, Sweden, Italy and Japan. There are four elements to this cycle:⁵⁶

(2.i) The first element is that the origins of dominance stem from a single event, or a series of events, which are the catalyst to what may be termed a ‘mobilisation crisis’ or ‘mobilisational’ opportunity. A mobilisational opportunity typically comes in the form of a revolution or major transformation in the socio-economic and political affairs of a people or nation. It is within such a scenario that a party can emerge in a preponderant position of power. For example, in the case of South Africa, the ending of the apartheid regime broke down the racially discriminatory established order of social affairs and political authority and opened space for new political actors to engage in elections. The ANC took full advantage of this mobilisational opportunity and, with the charismatic leader Nelson Mandela leading the party, went on to win the first post-apartheid elections. Ever since, the ANC has not relinquished its dominant grip on political power.

(2.ii) The second element is that there are regular electoral opportunities for the dominant party to mobilise its supporters according to the major, country-specific, historic blocs, and the dominant party.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, pp.340-341

(2.iii) The third element is that political opposition to the dominant party continues to sustain the distance between itself and the dominant party along ideological lines. Sustaining ideological distance is of importance because it mitigates against shifts away from the initial political alignment in favour of the dominant party towards possible oppositional coalitions.

(2.iv) Finally, the fourth element required for the maintenance of dominance is a degree of both flexibility and rigidity on the part of the dominant party in the manner in which it governs. This relates to matters such as leadership, wisdom, cunning, and skill, for example. In the face of socio-economic and political challenges arising in the country it rules, the dominant party will need to draw on such resources, displaying both flexibility and rigidity, to head off or handle future crises. If it fails, the end of a dominant party is an entirely plausible outcome.

(3) The third — and most striking — commonality of sustained rule by the dominant party is that it is able to frame and shift the identity and content of the nation it rules according to its own preferences:

Long-term rule by a single party allows the party and its core elements to shape a nation's politics through public policy changes and to move the country along a trajectory different from that which might have occurred had its opponents been in power.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p.352

This recognition of the symbiotic relationship that evolves between the identity of the dominant party and the country it governs also harks back to both Duverger, and Arian and Barnes. Dominant parties typically find regular opportunities to reinforce their long-term viability, creating what was already referred to as a self-reinforcing, 'virtuous cycle' of dominance. Once in power, a dominant party will tend to reward its friends, and punish its enemies; patronage networks are established to secure and possibly expand the electoral base of support, for instance, while opponents miss out on such largesse. At an ideological level, the dominant party will fashion narratives that serve to legitimise and perpetuate its rule, while denigrating its opponents. The behaviour and rhetoric of the dominant party is thus central to its program of perpetuating its rule. As Pempel points out:

To the extent that it does so in ways that are tactically wise and politically without major backlash, these actions can bolster and expand the base of the ruling party. At the same time, they can reconstruct the major outlines of the nation's society, politics, and economy to accord with the party's political agenda. Over time, this process shifts the ideological axis of the country and the terms of political debate.⁵⁸

Pempel argues that these conditions of dominance are not, at an individual level, causal factors in the emergence of dominant parties. These commonalities, however, when they operate together in the same environment, are positive contributing factors to the longevity of individual parties ruling their respective roosts.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p.352

1.2.6. Party System and Individual Party Institutionalisation

The notion of party strength and durability, or institutionalism, is at the heart of my third primary research question that concerns the current status and future prospects of parties in Timor-Leste. In providing a definition of what is meant by the term institutionalisation, I begin by referring to Samuel Huntington's classic definition from 1968. He defined institutionalisation as "...the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability."⁵⁹ Huntington then proceeded to identify four important dimensions of this process: adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence within organizations and procedures. In the academic literature on democratic consolidation, particularly in new democracies, the institutionalisation of the party-system, and the parties that constitute this system, is normatively considered as a crucial element in the overall project of establishing stable, responsive and accountable democratic regimes.⁶⁰

There is generally little consensus, however, on how to measure the degree of institutionalisation of individual parties and party systems. As Vicky Randall and Lars Svasand note, academic debates tend to rely on Huntington's classic 1968 definition or Angelo Panebianco's 1988 definition.⁶¹ Panebianco is of particular interest because he deals specifically with the matter of individual political party institutionalisation. He understands

⁵⁹ Huntington, Samuel. 1968. "Political Order in Changing Societies." New Haven, CT, Yale University Press p.12

⁶⁰ For example, see Diamond, Larry. 1989. "Introduction: Persistence, Erosion, Breakdown and Renewal." pp.1-52 in Diamond, Larry et al. (eds.) *Democracy in Developing Countries. Vol. 3 Asia*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner, Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party- Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press and Randall, Vicky and Lars Svasand. 2002. "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies." *Party Politics* 8(5):5-29

⁶¹ Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. "Political Parties: Organization and Power." Cambridge, Cambridge: University Press

institutionalisation as the process by which organisations become consolidated or ‘solidified.’ Organisations become institutionalised as they evolve from initially being mere instruments to achieve ends and turn into ends in themselves: they acquire value. There are two criteria for determining the level of institutionalisation: the degree of a party’s organisational autonomy in relation to its environment, and the degree of internal ‘systemness’ or interaction and contingency of various groupings within an organisation.⁶² However, in relation to the specific matter of party system institutionalisation, Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully,⁶³ on the basis of their work in Latin America, established four criteria for determining the degree of institutionalism: “regularity of party competition; whether parties have ‘stable roots in society’; the extent to which the major players accept election results as ‘determining who governs’; and the level of organisation of parties.”⁶⁴

If we apply these latter criteria to the Timorese political context, the following conclusions can be drawn. In terms of regular party competition (the first criteria) there have been elections held at the national level and below since 2001. This thesis has focused almost exclusively on national parliamentary and presidential elections, held in 2001, 2002, 2007 and 2012, but there have also been elections to determine the makeup of *suco* or local councils. This latter group of elections were held in 2004-2005 and again in 2009.⁶⁵

⁶² Randall and Svasand. 2002. “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies.” *op. cit.*

⁶³ Mainwaring and Scully. 1995. “Building Democratic Institutions.” *op. cit.*

⁶⁴ Rich. 2008. “Analysing and Categorising Political Parties in the Pacific Islands.” *op. cit.* p.8

⁶⁵ Shoemith. 2013. “Political Parties.” *op. cit.*, pp.128-129

Jumping ahead to the third criteria that concerns whether or not the major political actors accept election results as legitimate in defining who rules, the general answer in Timor-Leste must be a yes, with one minor qualification. In all three national elections, whether parliamentary or presidential, all of the major political players have accepted the result with the exception of FRETILIN in 2007. As covered in Chapter Four, FRETILIN never formally accepted the legitimacy of the CNRT led AMP government fundamentally because it felt that it was entitled to govern due to it winning the most seats in the parliament (despite it not being able to form a majority itself). However, after initially boycotting the parliament and encouraging a campaign of civil disobedience, which included some violent protests in the east of the country, FRETILIN eventually returned to take up its role as the main opposition in the parliament. Although it continued to refer to the AMP government as a ‘de facto’ government, in practice it recognised and accepted the election.

Despite FRETILIN’s recalcitrance between 2007 and 2012, it still operated as a functioning opposition in the parliament, while the AMP government itself also functioned throughout that period. Admittedly, FRETILIN did not find it easy to accept the shift from dominating government exclusively on its own terms to being in opposition. This turnover, however, did not ultimately result in the unwinding of democracy and the pattern of party relations in Timor-Leste. Indeed, it could be argued that Timor-Leste passed the first half of Huntington’s ‘two-turnover test’ in 2007.⁶⁶ This particular test of democratic consolidation requires two things to happen: first, winners of a founding election (FRETILIN) lose a

⁶⁶ Huntington, Samuel. 1991. “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.” Norman: University of Oklahoma Press

subsequent election, and second, the new winners (CNRT) oversee the handover of power to a different party on another occasion.⁶⁷

In the wake of the 2012 polls, some political maturation in the attitudes of party leaders, and specifically those in the FRETILIN Central Committee, appears to have occurred. Despite coming second in the national parliamentary elections for the first time in 2012, and again not being part of the government, FRETILIN stoically accepted the outcome without any of the melodrama that accompanied the 2007 elections. For this two-turnover test to be completed, CNRT will have to lose a future, subsequent election and accept the transition of power to a different party.

While there are positive signs of consolidation in the party system thus far, it is difficult to assess Timor-Leste in regard to the second and fourth criteria of Mainwaring and Scully as there is limited data available on the degree to which individual parties have stable roots in society and are internally coherent and organised. To acquire data in relation to these criteria, I embarked upon two periods of ethnographic fieldwork, the first in early 2012 and the second in late 2013.

1.3. Fieldwork Methodology

In the first phase of fieldwork, I conducted six months of preliminary research from February until August 2012, based at The Asia Foundation in Dili. During this period, I regularly

⁶⁷ Bratton, Michael. 1998. "Second Elections in Africa." *Journal of Democracy* 9(3):51-66, p.66

attended campaign rallies for both the presidential and parliamentary elections for a wide variety of candidates and parties. At these events, I took the opportunity to chat with people and collect campaign material for analysis.

For the second phase of fieldwork, I began in the second week of August 2013 and established residence in the suburb of Bairo Pite, Dili. I chose to locate my base of operations in Dili primarily because it is the capital city and the central hive of political activity in the country. Dili is also perfectly located in geographical terms for conducting research in the other districts. I planned to do several trips into some of the surrounding districts in order to gather a wider range of interview data from subjects, rather than just interview subjects in Dili. I felt much of the academic literature focuses almost exclusively on politics in Dili, treating it as if it spoke for the entire country. As such, I wanted to listen to — and collect — the voices and narratives of interview subjects involved in political parties from districts in the east, centre and west in addition to those in Dili.

With five months to complete my fieldwork, I organised a schedule to fit in one long eastern trip to three of the districts east of Dili, incorporating Manatuto, Baucau, and Lautem. This trip lasted almost two weeks (15 to 25 September) and I visited the main towns in each of these districts; Manatuto town (Mantuto), the city of Baucau (Baucau), and the town of Los Palos (Lautem) respectively. I conducted three further trips to districts in the centre/west of the country, Liquica and Ermera. I chose them primarily because of their proximity to Dili, which made the logistics of organising the trip straightforward and practical. Similarly to my eastern trip, I visited the district capitals or main towns of both of these districts: Liquica town and

Maubara (Liquica, 7 to 8 and 26 October), and Ermera town (Ermera, 26 to 31 October). In between these trips, I conducted further interviews and research in Dili. I conducted most of my interviews in Indonesian and Tetum, but I organised a number of local research assistants to help me arrange meetings with interview subjects, and assist with the interview itself in some cases.

Initially, I intended to interview subjects from a wide-range of parties in order to collect as broad and complete a picture of the status of political parties as possible. Meeting representatives of parties outside of the four which were in parliament proved difficult and I decided to make the most of my limited resources by focusing on the representatives of the main political parties: FRETILIN, CNRT, PD, and FM. In total, I conducted 34 individual interviews. I collected interview data from seven subjects during my eastern trip, 18 in Dili, and nine in the districts of Liquica and Ermera. I also interviewed ten Timorese students in Dili with a written set of open-ended questions that they completed by hand. I met these students through contacts I had established at *Universidade Nacional Timor-Leste* (the National University of Timor-Leste or UNTL).

I began each of the interviews, in alignment with my ethics protocols, with the interview subject giving oral consent to participate according to the conditions I laid out. In Tetum, I asked questions I had prepared earlier based on the core themes and issues related to the theoretical model I previously outlined in this chapter. I thus designed and worded the questions to encourage responses that would touch on and speak to the question of party institutionalism I sought to answer. I organised the interviews in a semi-structured manner; I adhered to the open-ended questions I had prepared, but I also took the opportunity, if it arose, to take the

conversation off in a different direction if the interview subject discussed something I had not anticipated and I thought was worth pursuing.

My research assistants helped me prepare for interviews by accurately translating my questions into correct Tetum and occasionally intervening during interview if there was some confusion over what I had asked. I recorded all of the interviews with a digital recorder, and organised the subsequent transcription of each of these interviews into written form for later appraisal. I have subsequently gone through all of this written data, translated it, and analysed it for the purposes of completing this thesis.

There are four analytical elements to the theoretical framework I used to develop my argument in response to the third of my primary research questions: structure and attitude both inside and outside political parties. Randall and Svasand developed a matrix that considers all four of the analytical permutations derived from these elements:

1. *Internal/Structural (Systemness)*: Focuses on the scope, density and regularity of interactions that constitute the party as a structure. Typically, organisational development is associated with greater degrees of institutionalisation. In my interviews, I asked questions relating to:
 - a. The origins of the party and how it has developed over time;
 - b. How the party accesses resources and funding to operate and campaign in elections;
 - c. Patronage or distributive politics within the party;

- d. The role and dynamics of leaders and decision making in the party; and
 - e. The role of factions within the party.
2. *Internal/Attitudinal (Value Infusion)*: Is concerned with how closely party actors identify with the culture of the party. For a party, normatively, success can be measured by the extent to which party actors align with its “culture or value system.”⁶⁸ I also pursued lines of questioning in my interviews regarding:
- a. The popular base of the party;
 - b. What social movements are associated with the party, and how they influence it; and
 - c. The motivation of people joining the party, are they true believers or joiners looking for some material benefit.
3. *External/Structural (Decisional Autonomy)*: Looks at the degree of autonomy between the party and sponsoring organisations. The more a party can exercise decisional autonomy, or “freedom from interference in determining its own policies and strategies”⁶⁹, the more institutionalised it is. I asked further questions on whether:
- a. Are any external agencies (whether local or foreign) sponsor or connected with the parties; and
 - b. Nature, purpose and impact of this relationship.
4. *External/Attitudinal (Reification)*: Considers how, and to what degree, the existence and identity of the party is established in the mind of the public. The

⁶⁸ Randall and Svasand. 2002. “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies.” *op. cit.*, p.13

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p.14

greater the extent that these perceptions are ingrained in the public imaginary, the greater the degree of the party is institutionalised. My final questions addressed:

- a. Thoughts on the identity and values for example, of political parties and leaders; and
- b. Comparison of public perceptions of parties with what people in the parties say themselves.

The fundamental logic underlying this research methodology is that the questions asked in the interviews searched and probed for answers in line with one or more themes relevant to the theoretical framework concerning party institutionalism. I then read and analysed the interview responses, looking for interesting and surprising responses, as well as patterns of commonality, and contradiction. Finally, I developed three thematic sections in Chapter Six of this thesis that offer an accompanying argument about the interview data as it pertains to the third primary research question of this thesis; how can we assess the degree of institutionalisation of individual political parties and the contribution they make to political stability in the country? These three sections concern: the origins and development of the party, party leadership and patronage (financial resources and motivation).

The circumstances surrounding the founding and subsequent development of political parties are an informative starting point to understanding a party's institutional strength. Panebianco developed two important concepts to assess the party-building process; 'penetration'

and ‘diffusion’.⁷⁰ ‘Penetration’ refers to a process by which a party’s territorial and organisational growth began from a centralised location and expands (penetrates) outwards. In contrast, ‘diffusion’ refers to a more diffuse journey, where a party may develop more organically and spontaneously in more than one location. Panebianco takes the position that, in general, the degree of party institutionalisation will be stronger the greater amount of penetration has occurred.⁷¹ I agree with this position as a centrally organised movement is more likely to have clearer identity, coherent leadership and structure, and organised agenda than a movement which has arisen in a more diffuse manner. The presence of diffusion in the party-building process, however, is not necessarily in itself a negative trait; having a combination of both diffusion and penetration is desirable for the institutionalisation of parties.

The significance of leadership in relation to the question of party institutionalisation concerns the degree to which ‘charisma’ played a role in the founding and formation of each respective party. The presence of charisma in this process is not unusual, particularly in circumstances where a hero of the resistance transitions to the leadership of the new political order after independence is achieved, such as the one in Timor-Leste. The challenge to the institutionalisation of a party is located in whether such a party can transform into something more than just a vehicle for a charismatic leader to pursue their goals.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p.17

⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.17

At its core, the ‘routinisation’ of charisma’, as conceptualised by Weber, argues that social and political authority based on the charismatic leadership of an individual is fragile given it relies on the personal relationship between the leader and his followers, and that an organisation that relies on such authority is unlikely to survive once the leader departs. To avoid this situation, and in line with the subject of the institutionalisation of political parties, leadership must transition from one reliant on charisma to one based on traditional or legal (rational) grounds for it to be stable and sustainable into the future.⁷²

I explore two issues in the section on patronage as they relate to party institutionalism, the financial and material matters associated with the operation of the party and the motivations of people involved in the party. The methods by which parties find resources, particularly financial resources, to build and operate their organisation is a useful indicator of how institutionalised they are. One obvious source of party funding is membership dues. Funding from membership dues enables parties to function on a day-to-day basis, compete in elections, and be more self-sufficient. The greater degree of autonomy to make decisions in the interests of party members, rather than the interests of rich benefactors, whether inside or outside the party, plays a positive role in the structural consolidation of parties.⁷³

What then of patronage and its impact on the party-building project? Patronage can negatively impact the party if party leaders and politicians utilise the party as a vehicle to pursue

⁷² Weber, Max. 1947. “The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.” New York, Oxford University Press

⁷³ Randall and Svasand. 2002 “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies.” *op. cit.*, p.18

their own ends rather than the interests of the party. Such an outcome results in the undermining of ‘rules and regularised procedures, reducing the party constitution if there be one to a meaningless sham. It constrains the possibilities for concerted party leadership or programme-making.’⁷⁴

On the other hand, one positive benefit of patronage is that rich benefactors can pump resources into the party and establish it as an electoral force. But these are not the only positions one might adopt on this debate. Randall and Svasand, for example, argue that there is an intermediate zone, an arrangement of patronage relations that is orientated towards the party organisation. In this instance, a party that has access to state resources organises a network of distributive political relations with a wide range of people, whether supporters or potential supporters, in the electorate. In a situation like this, Randall and Svasand argue that patronage represents a reduced threat to the structural integrity of the party.⁷⁵

The second theme relevant to the section on patronage concerns the motivation of people who are involved in political parties. The analytical focus on this question seeks to identify those who participate in party political activities, on the one hand, primarily for instrumental or pragmatic reasons, or, on the other hand, primarily because their participation is based on long-lasting identification and loyalty with a party. Theoretically speaking, we would expect that if party support is conditional on the expectation of tangible benefits to the individual or

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* p.20

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* p.18

community, party institutionalism would be weaker. These two approaches, however, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. If party identification is established independently by ties between the party or a charismatic leader and the community or social movements, patronage can reinforce this dynamic and strengthen ties between people and parties.

1.4. Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into seven substantive chapters, including this introduction and a conclusion. Chapter Two provides a brief historical background to the development of Timorese political parties, followed by a classification of the patterns of party competition that have emerged since the first national elections in 2001. Chapter Three analyses the change in the pattern of party competition from 2001 to 2007, with a specific focus on FRETILIN's failure to consolidate its early political dominance. Chapters Four and Five examines the similar pattern of party competition produced by the 2012 national parliamentary elections, when compared to the results of the 2007 polls, and investigates the emergence and role of CNRT under the leadership of Xanana Gusmão in the political life of the country. Chapter Four focuses on the CNRT-led period of governance between 2007 and 2012, while Chapter Five exclusively deals with the 2012 national parliamentary elections as a case study in its own right. Chapter Six addresses the subject of political party institutionalism in Timor-Leste by examining three important thematic aspects of political parties: 'origins and development', 'leadership' and 'patronage'. Chapter Seven concludes the dissertation by discussing some of the more general issues raised in this research, particularly as they relate to the trajectory and nature of political party dynamics in Timor-Leste.

Chapter Two. Patterns and Structures of Party Interaction

A few days from now (30 August 1999), the people of East Timor will cast their vote in the Popular Consultation, organised by the United Nations, to democratically choose their destiny. A long chapter in the history of our people's struggle for the affirmation of its culture and firm determination to choose its own future is reaching its conclusion. The patriotic engagement of thousands of freedom fighters and anonymous citizens in this glorious struggle for the independence of our country is the expression of our ancestors' fighting spirit over centuries. The blood of the Timorese nation is made of heroic deeds and the abnegation of all those who have given their lives in the names of freedom. It has been a difficult process, a source of mourning, destruction of families, [which] marked generations.¹

Jose 'Kay Rala Xanana' Gusmão in his Jakarta prison, late August 1999

Indonesia's occupation of Timor-Leste (1975 to 1999) never properly subdued the resistance movement in the territory. Indeed, the harder the Indonesian authorities disciplined those who resisted the occupation, the more determined the resistance movement became to realize independence. The combined efforts of those committed to achieve this goal bore fruit with the holding of the Autonomy Ballot (or Popular Consultation) on 30 August 1999 when 78.5 per cent of voters supported independence.² This result triggered a campaign of violence

¹ Gusmão, Jose 'Kay Rala Xanana'. 2000. "Reconciliation, unity and national development in the framework of the transition towards independence." In *Guns and ballot boxes: East Timor's vote for independence*, edited by Damien Kingsbury, 1-9. Melbourne, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, p.1

² Gorjao, Paulo. 2002. "The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24(2):313-336, p.315

orchestrated by pro-Indonesian militias against the local people and social infrastructure.³ This campaign — designated Operation Clean Sweep⁴ (*Operasi Sapu Rata*) — devastated the territory but failed, ultimately, to sabotage the end result. With the occupation over, the next challenge was to transform the country into a functioning democracy.

The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) held effective sovereignty over Timor-Leste until 20 May 2002. UNTAET then handed over the reins of power to a government — after a national election — exclusively in the hands of one political party, the *Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente* (FRETILIN) or the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor. FRETILIN, which had formed out of one of the core resistance organisations, garnered over half of the vote at the first national elections held in 2001 and, consequently, dominated the national parliament and cabinet.⁵ The social upheaval in the years that followed, however, undermined the legitimacy of FRETILIN's rule and its dominance of the nascent party system. The 2007 national elections produced a transformation of the emerging party system and structure of party competition; Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, a charismatic resistance leader, formed his own political party, the *Congresso Nacional de Reconstrução de Timor-Leste* (CNRT) or the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction, and rearranged the political landscape with an impressive election result. CNRT won the second largest number of seats in the parliament and formed a coalition government with a plethora of smaller parties,

³ For example, it is estimated that at least 2000 people were killed, between 250,000-300,000 people were forcibly removed and relocated in Indonesian West Timor, and 70 per cent of the physical infrastructure of the territory was destroyed. Chopra, Jarat (2002) *Building State Failure in East Timor*, pp.979-1000 in *Development and Change* 33(5) p.983 and Molnar, Andrea (2010) *Timor Leste: politics, history, and culture*, Routledge, London p.59

⁴ Chopra, Jarat. 2002. "Building State Failure in East Timor." *Development and Change* 33(5):979-1000, p.983

⁵ Molnar, Andrea. 2010. "Timor Leste: politics, history, and culture." London: Routledge pp.321-322

leaving FRETILIN out in the cold. A similar pattern of party interaction occurred in the next round of national elections in 2012 when CNRT enhanced its position within the new coalition government, while continuing to keep FRETILIN in the political wilderness.

There have been, then, noticeable changes in the character of how parties in Timor-Leste have interacted in a system, and competed for power over the last three national elections. These changes, and the system of power they reveal, are pivotal to understanding the political and institutional history of Timor-Leste and are important aspects of this thesis. In particular, I have chosen national elections as the focal point of analysis for three main reasons; firstly, there have been only limited and sporadic elections held at lower echelons throughout the country (namely the 2004 to 2005 and 2009 village-level elections); secondly, national elections arguably provide the best context to evaluate the national character and discourses of political life; and, thirdly, they supply a solid set of comparable data over a reasonable period of time. The two fundamental issues I address in this chapter focus on the nature of these party systems and the structures of party competition within them. I locate my arguments that account for these changes in theoretical terms in Chapters Three and Four.

In this chapter, I make an initial attempt to characterise Timor-Leste's party system. To do this, I deploy Sartori's categorisation schema, which I outlined in Chapter One.⁶ Sartori offers a comprehensive schema that delineates both classes and types of party systems within both competitive and non-competitive party systems. A theoretical caveat, however, needs to be noted here. The term party system suggests an institutionalised pattern of party interactions that has

⁶ Sartori. 1976. "Parties and party systems." *op. cit.*, pp.51-63 and pp.273-323

remained relatively steady over a reasonable period of time and become regularised. Sartori argues that there needs to be at least three elections for this term to legitimately apply to any given pattern of party interactions.⁷ At the time of writing, Timor-Leste has held three national elections, but I argue that a party system as described above has still not been cemented. This is because, by drawing on Sartori's categorisation schema, the second and third rounds of these elections produced a different dynamic of party interactions compared to the first. Despite this shift, I believe we can still evaluate the pattern of party interactions against Sartori's taxonomy if we carefully bear in mind that Timor-Leste has not yet produced a fully consolidated system.

In applying Sartori's framework in post-independence Timor-Leste, I argue, in line with Wolinetz, that we can describe what we see as patterns of party competition.⁸ In other words, while the dynamics of parties on the surface appear to fit Sartori's taxonomy, they have not yet had enough time to be solidified into a system. With this qualification in mind, I define the patterns of party competition as constituting a *predominant party* pattern in 2001 and one of *moderate pluralism* in both 2007 and 2012. In addition, I draw on Mair's conceptual framework of the structure of party competition, to gain even more insight into the character of the pattern of party competition. A deeper examination into the historical dynamics of party interaction reveals a shift from an open system in 2007 to a more closed system in the wake of the 2012 national elections.

This chapter begins by briefly delving into the past. I provide a historical background of Timor-Leste, with particular emphasis on the development of political parties and the structures

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.199-200 and Wolinetz. 2006. "Party Systems and Party System Types." *op. cit.*, p.58

⁸ Wolinetz. 2006. "Party Systems and Party System Types." *op. cit.*, p.58

of the resistance in the context of the Indonesian occupation and the period leading up to the Popular Consultation. The subsequent section draws on the theoretical framework identified in Chapter One concerned with categorising party systems (Sartori) and the structure of competition (Mair) in order to develop my argument about the character of political life in Timor-Leste. I apply these theoretical approaches to three case studies: the national elections in 2001, 2007, and 2012, and assess the process of government formation that occurred after each of these elections. In doing so, I come to some initial conclusions about the shifting character of the patterns and structures of political competition.

2.1. Historical Background

In the pre-colonial period, the island of Timor was broken up into kingdoms, known as *rais* or *reinos*. These territories came under the authority of a leadership caste referred to as *liurai*. Alliances between *liurai* were constructed through marriage and other rituals of exchange.⁹ This structure of rule was further devolved into smaller regions, *rais* consisted of a number of *sucos* or tribal groups, and these were divided again into *ahi matan* or clans.¹⁰ There is a plethora of ethno-linguistic groups, but they can almost all be sourced back to one of the two dominant language families: the Malayo-Polynesian, or Austronesian family and the Papuan

⁹ Niner, Sara. 2007. "Martyrs, heroes and warriors: the leadership of East Timor." In *East Timor: Beyond Independence*, edited by Damien Kingsbury and Michael Leach, 113-128. Caulfield East, Victoria: Monash University Press, p.113

¹⁰ Dunn, James. 2003. "East Timor: a rough passage to independence." Double Bay, NSW: Longueville Books, p.5

(Trans-New Guinea), or non-Austronesian family.¹¹ This dichotomy reflects the central location Timor occupies, “between the Malay world and the Melanesian world.”¹²

The first recorded presence of the Portuguese in the waters around Timor was in the early sixteenth century. The Portuguese incorporated Timor into a larger settlement on the island of Solor about fifty years later, where both sandalwood trade and Catholic missionary activities were undertaken. The island eventually became part of the colonial empire in 1701.¹³ The presence of the Dutch and their commercial interests in the region led to a series of intensive territorial disputes with the Portuguese, beginning in 1816, over the status of the island.¹⁴ Eventually, both colonial powers signed a partition treaty on 20 April 1859¹⁵, with the Dutch taking effective control of the west of the island, except for the small territorial enclave of Oecussi, which the Portuguese governed along with the east of the island. The success of the revolution in the territories of the Dutch East Indies in 1949 resulted in the western half of Timor becoming part of the Republic of Indonesia. The eastern half of Timor, and the enclave of Oecussi in the western part of the island were retained by the Portuguese until the Carnation Revolution (*Revolução dos Cravos Vermelhos*) in 1974.

¹¹ Fox, James J. 2003. “Tracing the path, recounting the past: historical perspectives on Timor.” In *Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor*, edited by James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo-Soares, 1-27. Canberra: ANU E Press, p.3 and Dunn. 2003. “East Timor.” *op. cit.*, p.5

¹² Niner. 2007. “Martyrs, heroes and warriors.” *op. cit.*, p.113

¹³ Fox. 2003. “Tracing the path, recounting the past.” *op. cit.*, p.10

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.13

¹⁵ Krieger, Heike (ed.) 1997. “East Timor and the International Community: Basic Documents.” Cambridge; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p.xix

On April 25, 1974, left-wing military officers overthrew the Salazar regime in Lisbon, Portugal.¹⁶ The movement was called *Movimento das Forças Armadas* (MAF) or the Movement of the Armed Forces.¹⁷ One aspect of their agenda was to pursue a program of decolonisation of Portuguese colonial outposts in Asia and Africa. The right of self-determination for Portuguese colonies was affirmed by changes to Portuguese constitutional law in July, 1974.¹⁸ A FRETILIN Coordinator in the sub-district of Maubara, whom I interviewed about this period, Felis da Costa Anin Buras, put it in these terms:

There was the carnation revolution in Portugal in April in 1974, which liberated the colonial provinces. At that moment FRETILIN came to life, along with other parties like UDT and Apodeti. The objective of the party [FRETILIN] was to bring independence.¹⁹

Many in the leadership of the new parties of Timor-Leste had close relationships to one another, being of a similar age and having worked or studied together through the revamped Portuguese education system, introduced in the 1960s.²⁰ The pattern of social relations in Timor-Leste also blurred the lines between the personal and political, as Dunn notes:

¹⁶ Hill, Helen. 2002. "Stirrings of nationalism in East Timor: FRETILIN 1974-1978: the origins, ideologies and strategies of a nationalist movement." Otford, NSW: Otford Press, p.59

¹⁷ Subroto, Hendro. 1997. "Eyewitness to integration of East Timor (Saksi mata perjuangan integrasi Timor Timur)." Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, pp.16-17

¹⁸ Krieger (ed.). 1997. "East Timor and the International Community." *op. cit.*, p.xix

¹⁹ Interviewee 17, Felis da Costa Anin Buras, 8 October 2013

²⁰ Hill. 2002. "Stirrings of nationalism in East Timor." *op. cit.*, p.68

...personal relationships and kinships cut across party alliances, sometimes with great complexity. Most of the Timorese leaders had close relatives among the leading supporters of at least one of the other two parties.²¹

They also shared many common beliefs, opposing racial discrimination, corruption, and freedom of expression and religion, for example. It is within this context that political actors and groups mobilised into six political parties.

2.1.1. The Original 'Historic' Parties

The Uniao Democratica Timorese (UDT) or Democratic Union of East Timor was the first party to be created. It was also the largest in the early days of political life.²² Established on 11 May 1974, it began with 23 members. Its leadership included the founder Mario Carrascalao, and his brother, Joao Carrascalao (the Carrascalao brothers came from a wealthy family which owned coffee plantations).²³ The party primarily represented the interests of former colonial administrators, the landowning class and many of the *Liurai*. As such, it subscribed to a fairly conservative political outlook that ultimately never rejected the values and ideology of the Portuguese colonial regime.²⁴ Concerning the post-colonial identity of Timor-Leste, UDT was initially of the view that the best choice was “progressive autonomy” within a “pluri-continental and multi-racial Portuguese community” to be achieved “by an increasing participation of Timorese in all sectors of public administration at all levels...but always under the Portuguese

²¹ Dunn. 2003 “East Timor: a rough passage to independence.” *op. cit.*, pp.62-63

²² Walsh, Pat. 2001. “East Timor's Political Parties and Groupings.” Retrieved 24 August 2011, from <http://members.pcug.org.au/~wildwood/01apracfoa2.htm#walsh>

²³ Niner. 2007. “Martyrs, heroes and warriors.” *op. cit.*, p.115 and Dunn. 2003. “East Timor: a rough passage to independence.” *op. cit.*, pp.48-49

²⁴ Hill. 2002. “Stirrings of nationalism in East Timor.” *op. cit.*, p.69

flag.”²⁵ During the course of 1974 to 1975, UDT shifted its position a number of times, from support for independence in a coalition with FRETILIN, to consent to integration with Indonesia.

The second party was the *Associação Social-Democrata Timorense* (ASDT) or Social-Democratic Association of Timor, formed 20 May 1974. ASDT reconstituted itself into FRETILIN in September of that year. A FRETILIN member whom I interviewed, Grigoriu Dos Santos, FRETILIN Second Vice-Assistant Secretary in Liquica, described the events of this period in this way:

It [FRETILIN] came from ASDT and transformed into FRETILIN. This happened because at that time there was a struggle involving ordinary people, and no involvement of the government or Catholic Church. They did not support us during the struggle at that moment. That’s when FRETILIN arose, it emerged with a clandestine movement in the country. Later, FRETILIN entered the campaign with the people, transformed from ASDT to FRETILIN. At that time there were five political parties, and the two biggest were FRETILIN and UDT.²⁶

In less than six months, ASDT shifted from a position of supporting independence after an interim period of ten years, to a position that called for immediate independence in its later incarnation as FRETILIN.²⁷ The struggle for justice and equality against the colonial regime, was an integral aspect of the philosophical commitment of those who formed ASDT. This is attested to, for example, in the first manifesto of ASDT, promulgated on 22 May 1974, which called for:

The right to independence: the rejection of Colonialism and the immediate participation of Timorese elements in the administration and in local government;

²⁵ Dunn. 2003. “East Timor: a rough passage to independence.” *op. cit.*, p.49

²⁶ Interviewee 19, Grigoriu dos Santos, 8 October 2013

²⁷ Niner. 2007. “Martyrs, heroes and warriors.” *op. cit.*, p.116

no racial discrimination; a struggle against corruption and a policy of good neighbourliness and of cooperation with the countries of the geographical area in which Timor is situated.²⁸

When, on 12 September 1974, ASDT leaders reconstituted ASDT as FRETILIN, they developed a more radical ideological outlook and policy program. There was a big emphasis on issues like Timorese nationalism and culture, land redistribution, cooperatives and education. Marxism, to a certain extent, informed FRETILIN's ideas and policies, but it was not a dominant force and actually faced resistance from many in the organisation.²⁹ It accurate to assess its influence as tending to ebb and flow throughout the course of the life of ASDT and FRETILIN according to particular historical circumstances.

The third major party was the *Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor* (Apodeti) or the Popular Democratic Association of Timor, established on 27 May 1974.³⁰ A pessimistic outlook about the economic and political viability of an independent Timor informed Apodeti's decision to support integration with Indonesia.³¹ Apodeti never enjoyed much support from the general populace, though it did receive support from some of the *liurai* in the western border areas of the territory and the Indonesian government. The *liurai* saw Apodeti as a vehicle to protect their interests, which came under increasing pressure as both FRETILIN and UDT sought to weaken the *liurai's* traditional authority. At the same time, the Indonesian government believed they could advance their interests in the territory by supporting Apodeti.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p.60

²⁹ Dunn. 2003. "East Timor: a rough passage to independence." *op. cit.*, p.57

³⁰ *Ibid*, p.57

³¹ Dunn. 2003. "East Timor: a rough passage to independence." *op. cit.*, p.57

The party *Klibur Oan Timor Asuawin* (KOTA) or Sons of the Mountain Warriors/Association of Timorese Heroes consisted of *liurais* and represented the interests and authority of this class in society.³² Due to its narrow focus on adhering to tradition and limiting political change, it can appropriately be designated a conservative party that had a very small level of support. The *Partido Trabalhista* or Labour Party was another small party; the majority of its dozen or so members actually came from the same family.³³ Finally, the *Associacao Democratica Integracai Timor-Leste Australia* (Aditla Party) or Democratic Association for the Integration of East Timor into Australia began its short life in late 1974. Its goal of integration with Australia was shot down in March 1975, when the Australian government dismissed such a notion.³⁴

Momentum behind the project of establishing Timor-Leste's independence received a boost when, on September 1974, UDT officially shifted its position to support independence after a period of association with Portugal. At this juncture, UDT also initiated close cooperation with FRETILIN. The extent to which the fear of an Indonesian intervention influenced this collaboration should not be underestimated. Early in 1975, both parties saw Apodeti as a common enemy, representing as it did Indonesian interests in the territory. This shared concern prompted UDT and FRETILIN to form a coalition on 21 February 1975.³⁵ In a joint communiqué issued on 18 March 1975, they declared that they were:

³² de Sousa, Lurdes S.-C. 2001. "Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor Constituent Assembly Election." *Lusotopie* 8:299-311, p.310

³³ Dunn. 2003. "East Timor: a rough passage to independence." *op. cit.*, p.62

³⁴ *Ibid*, p.62

³⁵ *Ibid*, pp.120-121

...the legitimate representatives of the people of East Timor, because of our intransigent defence of the right of the people to national independence... FRETILIN and UDT are interpreting the will of the overwhelming majority of the People of East Timor for National Independence, thus we reject strongly any other form of domination and our position is – INDEPENDENCE OR DEATH!³⁶

The strength of this partnership was formidable; the Portuguese authorities estimated this coalition enjoyed support from around 90 per cent of the population.³⁷ Independently of its coalition partner, FRETILIN worked very hard to develop strong networks among its leaders, members and the population generally, particularly in rural areas. FRETILIN's decision to embark on this grassroots campaign reflected its concerns about addressing the cultural gap between the urbanised elite of FRETILIN and ordinary villagers, and also counteract accusations that FRETILIN did not represent the interests of all Timorese. FRETILIN members accordingly became involved in various work and education campaigns that served to familiarise people with FRETILIN for electoral purposes, both in the short and long term. Finally, for some of the FRETILIN leadership, this campaign also served as a useful mechanism to build links in anticipation of a possible Indonesian invasion when the towns would be occupied and the resistance would need to rely on the population in the rural and mountainous regions as a base of operations.³⁸

Some Western nations, particularly the United States and Australia, encouraged Indonesia to annex the territory, driven in part by their fear of Marxist-Leninist elements within FRETILIN.

³⁶ Krieger. (ed.). 1997. "East Timor and the International Community." *op. cit.*, p.37

³⁷ Dunn. 2003. "East Timor: a rough passage to independence." *op. cit.*, p.120

³⁸ Hill. 2002. "Stirrings of nationalism in East Timor." *op. cit.*, pp.131-132

Indonesia initiated a campaign of destabilisation against FRETILIN, seeking to undermine its authority. In the early months of 1975, Indonesia placed pressure on UDT to abrogate its coalition with FRETILIN and establish an anti-Communist front with Apodeti. Increasing tensions between UDT and FRETILIN led to the dissolution of the coalition on 27 May, with UDT accusing FRETILIN of not abiding by the principles of the arrangement and creating a climate of social-political instability.³⁹

Discussions and negotiations held by the Portuguese in Macau concerning the future of the territory, held from 26 to 28 June 1975, included UDT and Apodeti but not FRETILIN as it chose not to attend.⁴⁰ The communiqué issued at the end of the meeting affirmed Timor-Leste's right to self-determination. UDT's confidence in this measure was undercut, however, when Indonesia stepped up its campaign against FRETILIN in June 1975 when President Suharto declared that Timor "...could not become independent because it lacked the conditions for economic viability."⁴¹ Seeking clarity in the matter, UDT officials held a further meeting with Indonesian officials on 25 July. At this meeting the Indonesian officials informed the UDT leadership that they had evidence that FRETILIN was planning to seize power on 15 August 1975. If this occurred, UDT was warned, Indonesia's hand would be forced. Four days before FRETILIN's alleged seizure of power was supposed to occur, the leadership of UDT launched a coup against FRETILIN.⁴² While many FRETILIN members were arrested, the leadership was able to escape and plan a counterattack.

³⁹ *Ibid*, p.131

⁴⁰ Krieger. (ed.). 1997. "East Timor and the International Community." *op. cit.*, p.37

⁴¹ Dunn. 2003. "East Timor: a rough passage to independence." *op. cit.*, p.140

⁴² Niner. 2007. "Martyrs, heroes and warriors." *op. cit.*, p.117

With the support of many Timorese soldiers who left their barracks with their weapons, FRETILIN had a clear military advantage over UDT.⁴³ Within two weeks, FRETILIN had forced UDT forces out of Dili. Soon afterwards, UDT forces and sympathisers fled across the border with the leadership and supporters of the other parties, Apodeti, KOTA and Partido Trabalhista. FRETILIN quickly filled the power vacuum that UDT's departure created, although it recognised the limits of its ability to govern — given its complete inexperience in running a government — and called for the return of the Portuguese administration to continue the decolonisation process.⁴⁴ Besides requiring assistance in administrative affairs, FRETILIN's leadership hoped that the presence of the Portuguese would dissuade the Indonesians from invading.

An important feature of the period of rule before the Indonesian invasion was the integration of a large section of the former colonial armed forces into FRETILIN. These armed forces were reconstituted into a regular military force called *Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste* (FALINTIL) or the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor.⁴⁵ FALINTIL played a crucial role in securing Timor-Leste internally after the coup, and in responding to Indonesian military incursions that began in September 1975. By the end of the month, President Suharto had decided to launch a full-scale invasion.⁴⁶

Under increasing military pressure from Indonesian forces, FRETILIN declared independence on 28 November 1975. FRETILIN's declaration was the reversal of its policy of

⁴³ Dunn. 2003. "East Timor: a rough passage to independence." *op. cit.*, p.149

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, pp.176-177 and Hill. 2002. "Stirrings of nationalism in East Timor." *op. cit.*, p.156

⁴⁵ Hill. 2002. "Stirrings of nationalism in East Timor." *op. cit.*, p.150

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p.156, Dunn. 2003. "East Timor: a rough passage to independence." *op. cit.*, p.188, and Niner, Sara. 2009. "Xanana: Leader of the Struggle for Independent Timor-Leste." North Melbourne, Victoria: Australian Scholarly Publishing, p.28

awaiting the return of the Portuguese, which it had held for the first two months of its rule. Further contributing factors to declaring independence included the failure to establish reliable contact with the Portuguese, and Australia's apparent disinterest, despite the murder of three of its citizens who were reporting from the town of Balibo on 16 October 1975.⁴⁷ This lack of outside support in the face of Indonesian aggression led to "...a general hardening of attitudes throughout the Central Committee"⁴⁸ and the desire to fight the war that was coming as an independent country.

In reaction to FRETILIN's declaration of independence, Apodeti, UDT, KOTA and the Partido Trabalhista issued a joint proclamation on 30 November 1975. In essence, this proclamation disputed the legitimacy of FRETILIN's declaration and enunciated a vision and objective of integration into the Republic of Indonesia, which it claimed, "...is in accordance with the real wishes of the entire people of Portuguese Timor."⁴⁹

2.1.2. Invasion, Occupation and Resistance

Indonesia initiated the major thrust of its military campaign on 7 December 1975.⁵⁰ FRETILIN's attempts to resist the invasion via conventional methods were, after three years of fighting, no match for the Indonesian forces. The annihilation campaign that began in late 1978 was devastating, but the resistance was able to hold out in the east, sustaining a guerrilla campaign that Indonesia was never able to nullify. Another important aspect of the resistance

⁴⁷ Hill. 2002. "Stirrings of nationalism in East Timor." *op. cit.*, p.164 and Dunn. 2003. "East Timor: a rough passage to independence." *op. cit.*, pp.197-204

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p.168

⁴⁹ Krieger (ed.). 1997. "East Timor and the International Community." *op. cit.*, p.40

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p.42

movement was the formation of a broader clandestine network across the territory in rural and urban areas and overseas, involving students and groups of younger people.⁵¹ Finally, there were concerted efforts by representatives of the independence movement in the diplomatic sphere, best exemplified by Jose Ramos-Horta and Mari Alkatiri.

FRETILIN operated as the primary organisation resisting the Indonesian forces in the early years of the occupation. FRETILIN underwent a hard left (Marxist-Leninist) turn in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which meant that it was never able to properly unify all of the anti-occupation forces under its banner.⁵² FRETILIN had formally adopted a Marxist-Leninist platform in 1977, and reorganised itself under the name *Conselho Revolucionario da Resistencia* (CRRN) or the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance.

Xanana Gusmão, one of the few high-ranking leaders of the resistance to survive into the early 1980s, gradually moved away from FRETILIN's narrowly conceived organisational strategy and ideological dogmatism, which were informed by its adherence to Marxism-Leninism.⁵³ By mid-1980, Gusmão argued it was necessary for the independence movement to be as ideologically and organisationally broad and inclusive as possible if it was to achieve national independence. This shift led to a bitter schism and split between some of the old guard of FRETILIN and Gusmão; in 1983 several of these political and military leaders attempted a

⁵¹ Saldanha, Joao M. 2008. "Anatomy of Political Parties in Timor-Leste." In *Political Parties in the Pacific Islands*, edited by Roland Rich, Luke Hambly and Michael G. Morgan, 69-81. Canberra: ANU E Press Pandanus and Hohe, Tanja. 2002. "Totem Polls: Indigenous Concepts and 'Free and Fair' Elections in East Timor." *International Peacekeeping* 9(4):69-88, pp.72-73

⁵² Walsh. 2001. "East Timor's Political Parties and Groupings." *op. cit.*

⁵³ Niner. 2007. "Martyrs, heroes and warriors." *op. cit.*, pp.119-120

coup to bypass Gusmão's authority. The coup ultimately failed, but the discontent and bad blood created then between Gusmão and FRETILIN fermented throughout the remainder of the occupation and carried over into the future and affected political affairs after independence was achieved.⁵⁴ Indeed, Gusmão leveraged his role as president of the country from 2002 to 2007 to continue his battle with FRETILIN when they led the country as the government.

In an attempt to unify all the disparate elements of the resistance, Xanana Gusmão formed the *Concelho Nacional da Resistancia Maubere* (CNRM) or National Council of Maubere Resistance in 1987. FALINTIL continued to operate as the armed wing of the resistance as a non-partisan, national movement.⁵⁵ Xanana Gusmão maintained his position as leader of the CNRM, even after the Indonesian authorities captured him in 1992. Further changes to the structure and branding of CNRM occurred in 1998 when it became the *Concelho Nacional da Resistancia Timorese* (CNRT) or National Council of Timorese Resistance in 1998. The explicit *raison d'être* of this reformulation was to construct a non-partisan umbrella organisation that would consolidate all of the nationalist forces in one movement.⁵⁶

The fall of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998 breathed new life into the independence movement. In 1998, CNRT held a conference that included representation from political groups of all stripes in Peniche, Portugal, in order to prepare a plan for the future development of an

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, pp.119-120

⁵⁵ Babo-Soares, Dionisio. 2003. "Political developments leading to the referendum." In *Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor*, edited by James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo-Soares, 53-73. Canberra: ANU E Press, pp.57-58

⁵⁶ Niner, Sarah. 2001. "A Long Journey of Resistance: The Origins and Struggle of CNRT." In *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community*, edited by Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R. Shalom, 15-29. Sydney, Australia: Pluto Press Australia, pp.23-24

independent Timor-Leste; This conference produced a document, the ‘Magna Carta’, which covered a plethora of “...long-term goals and strategies for development across major sectors (public administration and infrastructure, economy, agriculture and environment, health, education, governance, judicial and legal systems, and mass communication) and the establishment of the necessary institutions and programs that would be required to achieve these results.”⁵⁷ This document is significant given how it would later inform the policy parameters and identity of the future nation of Timor-Leste.

Under substantial international pressure, the president of Indonesia, B.J. Habibie, signed an agreement on 5 May 1999, along with Portugal and the United Nations (UN), which included the holding of a referendum that would allow the people of Timor-Leste to decide on their future.⁵⁸ They had a choice between special autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia or independence. The self-determination ballot was held on 30 August 1999. Some 78.5 per cent of East-Timorese voters supported the option of becoming an independent country. Under the stewardship of UNTAET, Timor-Leste held its first free and democratic elections at the national level on 30 August 2001, with sixteen parties vying for power.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p.24

⁵⁸ Martin, Ian. 2003. “The popular consultation and the United Nations mission in East Timor – first reflections.” In *Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor*, edited by James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo-Soares, 126-140. Canberra: ANU E Press and Ingram, Sue. 2012. “Building the Wrong Peace: Re-viewing the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor Through a Political Settlement Lens.” *SSGM Discussion Paper* 2012/4, retrieved 19 March 2014 from https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/9854/1/Ingram_BuildingWrong2012.pdf p.3

2.2. 2001 to 2007: A Period of Predominance

This section addresses the period of governance from 2001 to 2007 to determine the original pattern of party competition in newly independent Timor-Leste, according to Sartori's typology. I examine the two main criteria in play — the number of relevant parties and ideological distance — and argue that the pattern of party competition during this period fits the predominant party system type.

On 30 August 2001, UNTAET took responsibility for organising and holding the elections for the Constituent Assembly, a body which would be charged with responsibility for passing the new Constitution. The Constituent Assembly then converted into the new parliament on 20 May 2002. There were 88 members in total; 13 were elected based on a plurality vote in each of the districts, while the 75 remaining members were elected on a nation-wide proportional representation (PR) system.⁵⁹ According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), the objective of PR is the “conscious translation of a party's share of the votes into a corresponding proportion of seats in the legislature.”⁶⁰ PR is generally associated with multiparty systems that typically produce more inclusive, coalition governments made up of a number of sometimes quite diverse parties which are representative of different interest groups.⁶¹ Another important feature of the electoral system of Timor-Leste is the employment of a closed-party list. In such an instance, parties determine the numerical position

⁵⁹ de Sousa. 2001. “Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor Constituent Assembly Election.” *op. cit.*, p.307

⁶⁰ Reynolds, Andrew, Ben Reilly, and Andrew Ellis. 2008. *Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook*. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, p.57

⁶¹ Duverger. 1959. “Political Parties.” *op. cit.*, p.217 and p.245, and Lijphart, Arend. 1991. “Constitutional Choices for New Democracies.” *Journal of Democracy* 2(1):72-84, pp.72-73

of the candidates they are putting forward. When people turn out to the ballot box, they only vote for the party they prefer and have no personal discretion as to which individuals from the party they select make it to parliament.

In the lead-up to these elections, the various organisations associated with the CNRT umbrella broke away from it. The process began with FRETILIN in August 2000, which reconfigured itself into a formal political party of the same name.⁶² Many others followed and CNRT officially disbanded in June 2001. In total, 16 political parties (and five independent candidates) participated in the elections.⁶³ Each eligible person voted once in the district elections and once for the nation-wide ballot. Of the 384,248 voters (more than 91 per cent of the electorate) who lodged a ballot form in the election, 363,501 were valid (94.6 per cent of votes cast).

FRETILIN won 57.37 per cent of the nation-wide vote, allowing it to take 43 out of the 75 seats available. It also won 12 of the 13 district seats, with the outstanding district seat won by an independent, which gave it effectively 55 out of 88 seats in the assembly.⁶⁴ Three other parties received a noticeable share of the vote: *Partido Democratico* (PD) or Democratic Party with 8.72 per cent (seven seats), *Partido Social Democrata* (PSD) or Social Democratic Party with 8.18 per cent (six seats), and *Associacao Social-Democrata Timorese* (ASDT) or Social-Democratic

⁶² Chopra. 2002. "Building State Failure in East Timor." *op. cit.*, p.998

⁶³ Smith, Anthony L. 2004. "East Timor: Elections in the World's Newest Nation." *Journal of Democracy* 15(2):145-159, p.150 and King, Dwight. Y. 2003. "East Timor's Founding Elections and Emerging Party System." *Asian Survey* 43(5):745-757, p.747

⁶⁴ de Sousa. 2001. "Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor Constituent Assembly Election." *op. cit.*, p.309

Association of Timor with 7.84 per cent (six seats). Table 2.1 indicates how the 75 seats were distributed.

Table 2.1: Parties, Votes and Seats in 2001

Political Party/Independent Candidate	% Valid Vote	Seats Won
Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN)	57.37	43
Partido Democratico (PD)	8.72	7
Partido Social Democrata (PSD)	8.18	6
Associação Social-Democrata Timorese (ASDT)	7.84	6
União Democrática Timorese (UDT)	2.36	2
Partido Nacionalista Timorese (PNT)	2.21	2
Klibur Oan Timor Asuwain (KOTA)	2.13	2
Partido do Povo de Timor (PPT)	2.01	2
Partido Democrata Cristão (PDC)	1.98	2
Partido Socialista de Timor (PST)	1.78	1
Partai Liberal (PL)	1.1	1
Partido Democrata-Cristão de Timor (UDC-PDC)	0.66	1
Associação Popular Democrática de Timor (Apodeti Pro Ref.)	0.6	0
Partido Trabalhista Timorese (PTT)	0.56	0
Partido República Nacional Timor Leste (PARENTIL)	0.54	0
Partido Demokratik Maubere (PDM)	0.49	0
Domingos Alves (Independent)	0.41	0
Daniel da Silva Ramalho (Independent)	0.39	0
Maria Domingas Fernandes (Independent)	0.26	0
Olandina Caeiro (Independent)	0.21	0
Teresa Maria de Carvalho (Independent)	0.20	0

Source: de Sousa. 2001. "Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor Constituent Assembly Election." *op. cit.*, p.309

FRETILIN did not have enough seats to pass the Constitution unilaterally; 60 seats were required. To achieve this, it formed an alliance with ASDT.⁶⁵ The new Constitution of Timor-

⁶⁵ Saldanha. 2008. "Anatomy of Political Parties in Timor-Leste." *op. cit.*, p.76 and Smith. 2004. "East Timor: Elections in the World's Newest Nation." *op. cit.*, p.151

Leste, promulgated on March 22, 2012, was based on the Portuguese model and “...defines the state as composed of four sovereign organs: the president, the parliament, the government and the Supreme Court.”⁶⁶ The Constitution centralises executive power in the ministerial cabinet (Council of Ministers), in general and in the office of prime minister, in particular. The president’s greatest authority arguably lay in the emblematic power of the office as the: “...[t]he symbol and guarantor of national independence and unity of the State and of the smooth functioning of the democratic institutions”.⁶⁷

Formally, the president possesses little in the way of legislative powers, although the office still retains important practical responsibilities — the president is the head of the armed forces, enjoys a fixed five year mandate, can veto statutes for up to ninety days after their passage, check the constitutionality of legislation by petitioning the Supreme Court, put forward specified matters to the electorate in a referendum, and can:

...convene extraordinary sessions of the national parliament and dissolve the parliament in case of a serious institutional crisis preventing the formation of a government or the approval of the State Budget.⁶⁸

The Constitution also provides a mechanism for the parliament, with a two-thirds majority, to check the power of the president through initiating criminal proceedings in the Supreme Court. UNTAET ran the first presidential election on 14 April 2002 and Xanana

⁶⁶ Matsuno, Akihisa. 2008. “The UN Transitional Administration and Democracy Building in Timor-Leste.” In *Democratic governance in Timor-Leste: reconciling the local and the national*, edited by David Mearns, 52-70. Darwin: Charles Darwin University Press, p.64

⁶⁷ Shoemith, Dennis. 2003. “Divided Leadership in a Semi-Presidential System.” *Asian Survey* 43(2):231-252, p.244

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p.244

Gusmão was elected with an impressive 82.69 per cent of the vote against the only other candidate, Francisco Xavier do Amaral.⁶⁹


2.2.1. Number of Relevant Parties

The strength of FRETILIN in the Constituent Assembly was carried over into the new parliament when the First Constitutional Government of Timor-Leste was formed (it was sworn in on the first day of official independence, 20 May 2002) because there were no numerical changes to party representation from the 2001 elections.⁷⁰ According to Sartori's formulae for counting parties, FRETILIN was the only party that could be counted as a *relevant* party due to its clear majority (55 seats out of 88) in the parliament. None of the remaining parties, even those with more than a few seats, namely PD (seven), PSD (six), and ASDT (six), possessed either coalitional or blackmail potential because FRETILIN could pass legislation (requiring 50 per cent plus one) unilaterally, and control the powers of the executive organ of the state outside of the remit of the president. Chart 2.1 depicts the percentage of seats controlled by the major parties.

⁶⁹ Matsuno. 2008. "The UN Transitional Administration and Democracy Building in Timor-Leste." *op. cit.*, p.63

⁷⁰ Government of Timor-Leste. "II UNTAET Transitional Government." *Historical Archive*, retrieved 16 July 2013 from <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=135&lang=en>

Chart 2.1: Percentage of Seats Controlled in Parliament in 2001



Source: de Sousa. 2001. "Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor Constituent Assembly Election." *op. cit.*, p.309

FRETILIN's General Secretary, Mari Alkatiri, became prime minister. FRETILIN also took the most important positions — six of the ten ministerial posts — in the Council of Ministers (the cabinet), including the portfolios of Foreign Affairs and Finance.⁷¹ The remaining, less pertinent seats in the cabinet were handed to independents, providing some superficial appearance of pluralism to the government. The one practical constraint to FRETILIN's position was the need to cooperate with ASDT in order to pass the Constitution. Once this was done, however, FRETILIN was able to discard its coalition with ASDT and effectively rule on its own terms. Shoesmith described the situation in this manner:

⁷¹ Ingram. 2012. "Building the Wrong Peace." *op. cit.*, p.6

FRETILIN's expectation that it alone should govern was realized... [and] Prime Minister Alkatiri exhibited little tolerance for the political opposition... FRETILIN members of the National Parliament tended to be contemptuous of the opposition parties, dismissing them as "irrelevant."⁷²

In short, the pattern of party competition was that of a predominant party system. However, severe internal social disruptions and violence, throughout FRETILIN's term in office, culminating in the '2006 Crisis', challenged this pattern of dominance. The details of this tumultuous period will be examined in Chapter Three. Suffice to say here that the pressure was so strong that it resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister (PM) Mari Alkatiri, head of the First Constitutional Government, on 26 June 2006. José Ramos-Horta replaced him as prime minister and took charge of the Second Constitutional Government on 18 July 2006. The term of the Second Constitutional Government expired on 17 May 2007 when Ramos-Horta was elected as president. Estanislau da Silva, prime minister, headed the Third Constitutional Government from 18 May until a new government was brought in after the 2007 national elections.⁷³

2.2.2. Ideological Distance

On the face of it, it would seem to be redundant to evaluate the ideological distance of the parties in Timor-Leste between the years 2001 and 2007 because there was only one relevant party: FRETILIN. Despite this, I believe it is a worthwhile task for two main reasons. First, doing so outlines some essential facts about the major party actors that were active at the time

⁷² Shoesmith. 2013. "Political Parties." *op. cit.*, p.125

⁷³ Government of Timor-Leste. "III Constitutional Government." *Historical Archive*, retrieved 19 July 2013 from <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=132&lang=en>

and, second, it foreshadows details of relevance to the discussion of the patterns of party competition from 2007 onwards.

In addition to FRETILIN, the parties I examine are PD, PSD, and ASDT because of their relative popularity in the 2001 elections. But before proceeding with this analysis, it is necessary to provide some context to the emergence and operation of these parties. In the early days of multi-party democracy in Timor-Leste, King described the parties as ‘quite rudimentary’.⁷⁴ For many parties, there was not much time to develop a coherent party program. For example, PD was formed only two months before the polls and had few resources with which to campaign.⁷⁵ Major ideological and policy cleavages were hard to spot and the politics of personality and regionalism quite prevalent. Leach suggests that this situation may be partly explained as “a product of broad ideological consensus among East Timorese political parties”, made manifest in their agreement of the Magna Carta at the CNRT conference in 1999. This consensus on the “...broad social democratic and human rights goals”⁷⁶, of a future independent Timor-Leste significantly informed FRETILIN’s legislative program while it was in office.

Before evaluating the ideological positions of FRETILIN, PD, PSD, and ASDT, I want to address a theoretical concern about the limited ideological distance separating the parties around the time of the 2001 national elections. Indeed, if we scan ahead to the sections of this chapter that address the 2007 and 2012 national elections, we will see that the ideological distance between the parties under examination — those considered *relevant* — remained small. Given

⁷⁴ King. 2003. “East Timor's Founding Elections and Emerging Party System.” *op. cit.*, p.756

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p.755

⁷⁶ Leach, Michael. 2009. “The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste.” pp.219-232 in Australian Journal of Politics and History 55(2) p.230

this, how appropriate then is Sartori's theoretical framework given the small ideological difference between the parties? In addition, we might also consider whether other factors that differentiate parties, like social cleavages — might well be more salient.

Despite these considerations, I remain convinced that Sartori's theoretical framework remains useful and appropriate. It is an approach and taxonomy that can be deployed to great, if not perfect, effect across the various political arrangements we find across the world. Sartori's emphasis on ideology is integral to his framework, and I believe it is an important element to consider when studying politics in general; even more so when we are studying political parties. Acknowledging the small ideological distance between parties from independence until today, for example, tells us about the nature and dynamics of the party system at certain temporal junctures. It reflects, for example, the aforementioned broad nationalist consensus amongst the various pro-independence movements that developed in the late 1990s. Moreover, society and politics may, and tend to, change over time; we need to accept the *possibility* that ideological differences could emerge in the future. Drawing on this framework prepares us theoretically to recognise if the ideological distance between the major political actors widens, and be able to engage with that scenario appropriately.

I also note here briefly what elements or characteristics do assist us in the formation of an analysis of the parties in Timor-Leste. Running a differential on the parties, I argue, reveals that regionalism, historically formed social cleavages and the role of personalities are useful categories to consider. For example, in the case of FRETILIN, the party has a strong association with the eastern regions of the country (namely the districts of Lautem, Viqueque and Baucau)

due to the relationship that was formed between the two during the Indonesian occupation. In contrast, the other parties, particularly CNRT and PD, are more closely associated with the centre and west of the country. The situation, however, is more a product of the non-eastern regions' antipathy towards FRETILIN, caused by FRETILIN's perceived discrimination in favour of the east of the country during its term of governance, rather than the non-eastern regions' intrinsic love of the other parties.

Political personalities and charismatic leaders also play important but differing roles in the parties. Charismatic leadership has been integral to CNRT's identity (and success), and to a lesser extent, to that of the other parties. Veterans represent an important social group in Timor-Leste, although they are far from homogenous. Veterans come from across the country and are made up of individuals who served varying lengths of service in the struggle for independence. Veterans of the armed struggle are closer to FRETILIN and CNRT, while diplomats, students and young people, who were involved in either the clandestine or diplomatic resistance movements, tend to be more closely associated with PD or FM. This brief outline of categories of differentiation in parties is just a starting point, and I will spend more time addressing this topic throughout the rest of the thesis as appropriate.

Returning to the 2001 national elections, at this temporal juncture in the early political life of the four parties of interest, I can measure the narrow ideological distance between them by locating them on a preliminary Left-Right political spectrum:

At two conferences (in 1998 and 2000) the FRETILIN movement reconstituted itself as a political party, rather than as a front, which would participate in the 2001 elections.⁷⁷ In its original guise as a pro-independence movement, FRETILIN initially adopted left wing policies derived from both the social-democratic tradition as well as from Marxism-Leninism.⁷⁸ In an interview, one anonymous source (third anonymous source), who was active in the clandestine resistance movement and is a long-time observer of Timorese politics, confirmed the presence of Marxist-Leninists within FRETILIN from its inception, and acknowledged the connections it had with parties, like FRELIMO, that shared a similar outlook.⁷⁹ Two years after the Indonesian invasion (1977), however, FRETILIN emphatically embraced Marxism-Leninism, rebadged itself as CRRN, and expelled or executed members who did not tow the party line.⁸⁰

The national Vice-President of FRETILIN and member of the Central Committee, Arsenio Bano, also acknowledged in an interview the Marxist-Leninist orientation of the party in its early days, but he also stated that FRETILIN's ideology had changed over time and that it could now be defined as having a socialist ideology that encourages the participation of the people.⁸¹ Even as early as 2001, FRETILIN had showed increasing signs of moderation and pragmatism. For example, its 2001 political manifesto spoke of adhering to orthodox liberal

⁷⁷ de Sousa. 2001. "Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor Constituent Assembly Election." *op. cit.*, pp.302-303

⁷⁸ Taylor, John G. 1999. "East Timor: The Price of Freedom." London and New York: Zed Books

⁷⁹ Interviewee 15, Anonymous, 19 November 2013

⁸⁰ Walsh. 2001. "East Timor's Political Parties and Groupings." *op. cit.* and Niner. 2007. "Martyrs, heroes and warriors." *op. cit.*, pp.119-120

⁸¹ Interviewee 13, Arsenio Bano, 24 October 2013

economics and liberal democracy.⁸² Another anonymous interviewee (second anonymous source), who has been involved in political activism since independence and ran for election in 2012, described FRETILIN in this way: “In general, FRETILIN has an orientation for economic justice, regardless of small tactical changes from year to year. It still has a socialist orientation, but is now more like a social democrat.”⁸³ On reflection of the available evidence, I comfortably place FRETILIN, in ideological terms, on the Left of the political spectrum.

Shoesmith argues that PD occupied space on the Centre-Left, while Saldanha placed this party around the Centre/Centre-Left.⁸⁴ The original membership of PD was made up of mainly university students, young political activists, intellectuals, some ex-FRETILIN members and others involved in the urban clandestine resistance movement. Interviews with members of PD indicate some varied opinions on the best way to classify the party: one interviewee, Jitu Antonio, PD First Vice-Coordinator in Liquica, was quick to deny the party was ‘socialist’ or ‘liberal’⁸⁵, while the other (a senior PD official in Dili who wished to remain anonymous) described the party as Centre-Left.⁸⁶ While these opinions are not necessarily contradictory, what the two interviewees stated in common about PD was that it is a party orientated towards encouraging democratic participation from the bottom up. As such, I am in agreement with Saldanha that PD should be defined ideologically as sitting in the Centre/Centre-Left.

⁸² Saldanha. 2008. “Anatomy of Political Parties in Timor-Leste.” *op. cit.*, p.71 and Smith. 2004. “East Timor: Elections in the World’s Newest Nation.” *op. cit.*, p.152

⁸³ Interviewee 14, Anonymous, 6 November 2013

⁸⁴ Shoesmith. 2013. “Political Parties.” *op. cit.*, p.127 and Saldanha. 2008. “Anatomy of Political Parties in Timor-Leste.” *op. cit.*, pp.73-75

⁸⁵ Interviewee 18, Jitu Antonio, 8 October 2013

⁸⁶ Interviewee 9, Anonymous, 23 October 2013

I identify PSD as a Centre-Right party.⁸⁷ Mario Carrascalao, who established PSD, was originally a member of UDT in 1974 to 1975. He later became the governor of the province of Timor-Leste during the Indonesian occupation (1982 to 1992). Much of PSD's original membership was drawn from the older generation, including members of both FRETILIN and UDT. Philosophically, PSD supported political pluralism, individual equality, and human rights, but was generally sceptical about the role of the state in national affairs, except in areas like economic management, protection of the environment and the provision of essential social services.⁸⁸

Francisco Xavier do Amaral resurrected ASDT as a political party to compete in the 2001 polls.⁸⁹ The party was based essentially on the movement bearing the same name that originally emerged in 1974. ASDT was traditionally identified strongly with the Mambai-speaking populace in the centre of the country and attracted the hard line support of disaffected guerrilla fighters who felt sidelined by FRETILIN.⁹⁰ Saldanha argues that it moved to the right from its original social democratic origins, by supporting liberal politics and orthodox economics, for example. Despite this ideological shift, ASDT still occupied what is Centre-Left territory due to its concern with social justice, particularly for veterans of the independence struggle.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Walsh states that PSD describes itself as a Centrist party, while Shoesmith and Saldanha describe it as a Centre-Right party. Walsh. 2001. "East Timor's Political Parties and Groupings." *op. cit.*, Shoesmith. 2013. "Political Parties." *op. cit.*, p.127 and Saldanha. 2008. "Anatomy of Political Parties in Timor-Leste." *op. cit.*, pp.73-75

⁸⁸ Walsh. 2001. "East Timor's Political Parties and Groupings." *op. cit.*

⁸⁹ Shoesmith. 2013. "Political Parties." *op. cit.*, p.127

⁹⁰ Smith, Anthony L. 2004. "Timor-Leste: Strong Government, Weak State." *Southeast Asian Affairs* 2004:279-294, p.152

⁹¹ Saldanha. 2008. "Anatomy of Political Parties in Timor-Leste." *op. cit.*, pp.73-74

This survey of the ideological dispositions of FRETILIN and the three other parties that gained reasonable electoral support, yet failed to achieve the status of relevancy, indicates that there is not a large degree of ideological distance separating Timor-Leste's political parties. The most generous interpretation of these results would suggest PSD (Centre-Right) and FRETILIN (Left) represent the broadest spread of polarisation. And this is putting aside the fact that this polarisation is not of huge significance in this instance given that FRETILIN could form government without needing to bring in coalition partners. In summary, through the deployment of Sartori's typology, I established that the pattern of party competition at the time of the 2001 election was one of FRETILIN dominance and that there were no serious extremes of ideological differentiation.

2.3. 2007 to 2012: Disintegration and a New Alignment

An account of the critical political events that occurred between 2001 and 2007, including the 2006 crisis and the resignation of the prime minister, will be covered in detail in Chapter Three. The express purpose of this section, in contrast, will be to determine the pattern of party competition and the degree of flexibility within the structure of competition from 2007 to 2012. To achieve these goals, I will again scrutinise the number of relevant parties and ideological distance between the most polarised parties. I will then compare the 2001 and 2007 national results in order to gain insight into this formative nature of inter-party competition. I propose that the pattern of party competition during this period most closely resembles that of Sartori's moderate pluralism, while the early indications suggest that the structure of competition was quite open.

Between 2001 and the 2007 elections, a number of important changes were made to the electoral system.⁹² The government reduced the size of the parliamentary chamber from 88 to 65 seats; in addition, it abolished the 13 district seats. The government also instituted a threshold requiring parties or coalitions of parties attain three per cent or more of the total valid vote to be eligible to obtain seats. In addition, the d'Hondt method was employed to supplement the nationwide proportional representation model, which continued to be used. The d'Hondt method, involving the adoption of the highest average method, tends to favour larger parties in multimember districts with small numbers of seats. This structural discrimination is somewhat mitigated in the case of Timor-Leste because of the large number of seats available across the country's single, nationwide, electoral district.⁹³

The operation of a closed party list system in a single national electorate produces further important consequences that are worth identifying here. The role of party leaders is crucial, and their power is significant, as they determine the numerical position of the candidates up for election. This situation has flow-on effects in terms of how political parties recruit members too. Allegiance to individual party leaders has a strong bearing on the recruitment of new members. As such, the strength and popularity of party leaders, reflected in the number of supporters they have sponsored representing the party in the parliament, has an important impact on the dynamic between parliamentary parties and the executive branch. As the prime minister and the other members of the council of ministers do not necessarily come from any political party, their authority and position are heavily dependent on party leaders.

⁹² Leach. 2009. "The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste." *op. cit.*, pp.220-221

⁹³ *Ibid*, p.220

The number of parties that contested the 2007 elections (16) remained the same as in 2001, but featured six new faces. Twelve parties ran independently, while the others formed two coalitions of two parties. According to official figures, 426,210 people exercised their right to vote (80.5 per cent of the electoral roll), and 415,604 of them cast valid votes (97.51 per cent).⁹⁴ FRETILIN suffered a massive drop in support, receiving only 29.02 per cent (down from 57.37 per cent) of the vote and 21 seats, while CNRT attracted 24.10 per cent of the vote and 18 seats. Five other parties received enough of the vote to be eligible to receive seats: the ASDT-PSD coalition with 15.73 per cent and 11 seats (ASDT took six, PSD took five); PD with 11.30 per cent and eight seats; *Partido Unidada Nacional* (PUN) or the National Unity Party with 4.55 per cent and three seats; *Alianca Democratica* KOTA/PPT (AD KOTA-PPT) or The Democratic Alliance of KOTA-PPT with 3.20 per cent and 2 seats (KOTA and PPT shared the two seats); and *Unidade Nacional Democratica da Resistencia* (UNDERTIM) or the National Democratic Unity of Timorese Resistance with 3.19 per cent and two seats.⁹⁵ Table 2.2 provides a more comprehensive breakdown on the elections results:

Table 2.2: Parties, Votes and Seats in 2007

Party/Coalition	% Valid Vote	Seats Won
FRETILIN	29.02	21
Congresso Nacional de Reconstrução de Timor-Leste (CNRT)	24.1	18
Coligacao ASDT-PSD	15.73	11

⁹⁴ Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (CNE). 2007. "National Provisional Results from the 30 June 2007 Parliamentary Elections." *East Timor Action Network*, retrieved 19 July 2013 from http://www.etan.org/etanpdf/2007/aviso_publico_final%252009-07-07-ENGLISH.pdf, p.3

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p.6

Partido Democratico (PD)	11.3	8
Partido Unidade Nacional (PUN)	4.55	3
Alianca Democratica KOTA-PPT	3.2	2
Partido Unidade Nacional Democrática da Resistência Timorese (UNDERTIM)	3.19	2
Partido Nacionalista Timor (PNT)	2.42	0
Partidu Demokrata Republika Timor (PDRT)	1.86	0
Partidu Republikanu (PR)	1.06	0
Partido Democrata Cristao (PDC)	1.03	0
Partidu Sosialista Timorese (PST)	0.96	0
Uniao Democratica Timorese (UDT)	0.9	0
Partido Milenium Demokratiku (PMD)	0.69	0


Source: Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (CNE). 2007. "National Provisional Results from the 30 June 2007 Parliamentary Elections." *op. cit.*, p.3

2.3.1. Number of Relevant Parties

The collapse of FRETILIN's vote by almost 50 per cent ended its dominance in the legislature and executive. The end of this predominant pattern of competition resulted in the opening up of political space in the parliament that was filled by eight other parties (four individual parties and two coalitions of two parties). According to Sartori's typology, however, we cannot blithely assume that all of these parties can be counted as relevant just because they won seats. Relevant parties are those that possess the ability to either participate in, or undermine the shape of, the coalition government. In my assessment, there were only five parties of relevance in the parliament formed at this juncture: FRETILIN, CNRT, PD, ASDT, and PSD. Therefore, the most accurate way to describe this degree of party fragmentation, according to Sartori's classification system, is limited pluralism. Chart 2.2 illustrates how much of the

parliament, as a percentage, each of the major parties held. There was a marked shift from the elections of 2001, as depicted in Chart 2.1 (page 70).

Chart 2.2: Percentage of Seats Controlled in Parliament in 2007



Source: Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (CNE). 2007. "National Provisional Results from the 30 June 2007 Parliamentary Elections." *op. cit.*, p.3

FRETILIN secured 21 seats while Xanana Gusmão's new party took 18. These parties, theoretically, could have been the only relevant parties had they formed a coalition government together. Indeed, such a coalition would have had a clear majority in the parliament with 39 of the 65 seats. President Jose Ramos-Horta, who was sworn in on 20 May 2007, suggested putting together a government of national unity incorporating all of the major parties. Both FRETILIN and CNRT rejected such an arrangement, with FRETILIN declaring it would prefer to go into

opposition.⁹⁶ As previously mentioned, for parties to be considered possessing coalition potential, they must be commensurate, ideologically or otherwise, to other potential coalition partners. The mutual acrimony between FRETILIN and CNRT was largely due to differences over styles of governance and historical claims to ownership of the resistance. One illuminating example of this can be found in a statement by the General-Secretary of CNRT, Dionisio Babo-Soares, who said on 25 June 2007:

For five years the people of East Timor have suffered under the arrogant mentality of the FRETILIN leadership that has ignored the needs and desires of the people, deeming their attitude ‘dependent’... We have watched FRETILIN demonstrate their ‘right to rule’ mentality in the international media, labelling decentralization as ‘wasteful and a recipe for corruption’. We have seen FRETILIN paint an unrealistic and undocumented picture of the state of our nation to suit their claims. CNRT will not follow suit... FRETILIN obviously lacks the courage and conviction to establish a free democracy and decentralize the power to the people. CNRT is committed to establishing an inclusive government based on the philosophy of national unity. This is similar to the philosophy the original CNRT employed during our struggle for independence; the power came from the people to free the country.⁹⁷

Instead, FRETILIN and CNRT sought out the necessary coalition partners to form and lead the next government. FRETILIN and CNRT thus became the two potential governing pivots around which all the remaining parties would have to align themselves. There was no other

⁹⁶ Leach. 2009. “The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste.” *op. cit.*, p.227

⁹⁷ Babo-Soares, Dionisio. 2007. “CNRT Campaigns on Solid Policy for the Reconstruction of East Timor.” *East Timor Students’ Association blog*. Retrieved 20 July 2013 from <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ETSA/message/7110>

option because even if all of the remaining parties united into one coalition bloc, they would not have held enough seats to command a majority in the parliament.

Only PD, ASDT, and PSD can be counted as relevant for two main reasons. Firstly, they were all united at the time in complete opposition to FRETILIN returning to government; FRETILIN had burnt a lot of bridges with its unilateral approach to governance and its handling of the 2006 crisis (explained in detail in Chapter Four).⁹⁸ Try as it might, FRETILIN's attempts to negotiate the formation of a coalition government with other parties only attracted the support of AD KOTA-PPT.⁹⁹ As a consequence, PD, ASDT and PSD had few options available to them besides joining in a CNRT led governing coalition.¹⁰⁰ Secondly, because they were the next most successful parties at the polls after FRETILIN and CNRT, they were in the strongest positions to argue for a place in a governing coalition. Added together, the total number of seats they held would be enough to form a coalition with CNRT (37), without needing to add another partner. As long as they kept the coalition together, they could shut out the remaining four small parties (PUN, UNDERTIM, PPT, and KOTA), rendering them irrelevant.

Following protocol, President Ramos-Horta invited FRETILIN to form a government because it received the most seats in the parliament. As outlined before, FRETILIN was unable to collect the support necessary to do so and, after the possibility of a grand coalition fell apart,

⁹⁸ Kingsbury, Damien. 2009. "East Timor: The Price of Liberty." New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, pp.181-182 and Hughes, Caroline. 2009. "Dependent Communities: Aid and Politics in Cambodia and East Timor." Ithaca, N.Y: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, p.195

⁹⁹ Leach, Michael. 2009. "The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste." *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 55(2):219-232, *op. cit.*, p.227 Guterres, Jose Cornelio. 2008. "Timor-Leste: A Year of Democratic Elections." *Southeast Asian Affairs* 359-372, p.363

¹⁰⁰ Shoesmith. 2013. "Political Parties." *op. cit.*, p.131

Ramos-Horta then invited CNRT to form government. CNRT was able to do so in concert with PD and the ASDT-PSD coalition.¹⁰¹ On August 8 2007, Xanana Gusmão was sworn in as prime minister to lead the *Aliança para Maioria Parlamentar* (AMP) or Parliamentary Majority Alliance in the Fourth Constitutional Government of Timor-Leste.

UNDERTIM joined the governing coalition later in the life of the AMP Government. The two seats it brought along may appear at a glance to have no material impact on the balance of power in the parliament (39 seats), but Prime Minister Gusmão's decision to accept UNDERTIM into the governing alliance helped shore up the coalition, which at times looked unstable. Problems with PSD and ASDT arose as early as 2008, and continued to simmer throughout the life of the AMP Government.¹⁰² Bringing in UNDERTIM and its two seats meant that the AMP Government could survive the withdrawal of either PSD or ASDT. Even if we consider UNDERTIM a relevant party because of the role it played, the degree of party fragmentation (six parties) still arguably lies within the criteria Sartori established for limited pluralism.

2.3.2. Ideological Distance

There were five relevant parties in the parliament of 2007 to 2012 and two of them were new entrants into the pattern of party competition. I have already identified the ideological dispositions of the four that featured in the 2001 elections: FRETILIN (Left), PD and ASDT (Centre-Left), and PSD (Centre-Right). Even if we add the two new parties, CNRT and UNDERTIM, to my interpretative schema we will see that the degree of ideological polarisation

¹⁰¹ Guterres. 2008. "Timor-Leste." *op. cit.*, p.366

¹⁰² Shoesmith, Dennis. 2012. "Is Small Beautiful? Multiparty Politics and Democratic Consolidation in Timor-Leste." *Asian Politics & Policy* 4(1):33-51, p.45 and Shoesmith. 2013. "Political Parties." *op. cit.*, pp.131-135

remained limited and had only been stretched marginally in response to the inclusion of UNDERTIM into the governing coalition later in the life of the Fourth Constitutional Government.

Xanana Gusmão established the political party CNRT in early 2007. By naming his party in such a fashion, he conspicuously drew on the acronym of the umbrella resistance organisation CNRT (*Concelho Nacional da Resistancia Timorese*). As Josh Trindade, a CNRT member in Dili, put it to me: “Establishing a party called CNRT was simple and effective, it touched on the previous CNRT organisation he created during the occupation.”¹⁰³ The branding of his party in this way is of particular historical significance given CNRT’s strong association to the resistance and successful campaign for national independence.¹⁰⁴

The formation of this party reflected Gusmão’s central objective of leading the country as its prime minister, and gaining ascendancy over his rivals in FRETILIN. This desire to politically defeat FRETILIN stems from the split that occurred between them in the 1980s and carried over into the period of independence, when Gusmao became President in 2002. CNRT identifies itself as a Centre-Left party and campaigned on a broad platform that focused on state intervention and public spending in order to restore stability and develop the economy.¹⁰⁵ My second anonymous interviewee confirmed the accuracy of this ideological positioning by describing CNRT as social

¹⁰³ Interviewee 11, Josh Trindade, 2 October 2013

¹⁰⁴ Kingsbury. 2009. “East Timor.” *op. cit.*, p.163

¹⁰⁵ Shoesmith, Dennis. 2011. “Political Parties and Groupings of Timor-Leste.” *Australian Labor International*, 3rd ed. October 2011, pp.21-23

democrat in nature, with an emphasis on public payments and social welfare.¹⁰⁶ A survey of three members of CNRT also reveals that the party's orientation is indeed focused on state-driven development and nation building to improve the lives of the people.¹⁰⁷ Although none of the interviewees specifically defined the ideology of the party in classic Left-Right terms, the policies and programmes of CNRT speak to a Centre-Left ideological disposition.

The leader of UNDERTIM was a prominent former FALINTIL guerrilla commander, Cornelio Gama, AKA Elle-Sette (L7). In post-independence Timor, he led a movement called *Sagrada Familia* (Sacred Family), which Shoesmith described as, "...a secretive, quasi-religious movement of resistance veterans that combined Catholic rituals with animistic practices."¹⁰⁸ UNDERTIM was a faction in FRETILIN in the early period of independence, but Cornelio Gama and his followers fell out with FRETILIN over their policies and style of governance, and led demonstrations against the government in 2004, demanding jobs and financial help for war veterans. They eventually left FRETILIN and formed UNDERTIM as a party in August of 2005.

UNDERTIM drew support from some former FALINTIL veterans, and members from *Sagrada Familia* and *Conselho Popular pela Defese de Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste* (CPD-RDTL) or Committee for the Popular Defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.¹⁰⁹ Leach has described the latter two of these organisations as anti-system actors because

¹⁰⁶ Interviewee 14, Anonymous, 6 November 2013 *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁷ Interviewee 7, Joao Cabral, 21 September 2013, Interviewee 11, Josh Trindade, 2 October 2013 *op. cit.*, and Interviewee 20, Jose Goncalves, 26 October 2013

¹⁰⁸ Shoesmith. 2011. "Political Parties and Groupings of Timor-Leste." *op. cit.*, pp.72-73

¹⁰⁹ Ryan, Gavin. 2007. "Political Parties and Groupings of Timor-Leste." *ALP International Projects*, 2nd ed. March 2007, retrieved 26 February, 2014, from <http://dili->

they did not recognise the post-independence state as a legitimate “...expression of the independence struggle, and had hitherto refused to recognise the 2002 Constitution or the legitimacy of the UN presence.”¹¹⁰ The influence of these two organisations within UNDERTIM is hard to discern, but the fact that UNDERTIM entered the parliament and, later on, the government, serves to indicate that UNDERTIM had not maintained an extreme ideological position. Indeed, an examination of its policies does not suggest it was a radical ideological party. Its policies focused on social justice issues, particularly for veterans, for example: universal food security, housing, employment, poverty eradication and health care.¹¹¹

The degree of ideological polarisation between the most distant relevant parties elected into the parliament in 2007 was FRETILIN on the Left and PSD on the Centre-Right. This was only a moderate gap. The addition of CNRT as a Centre-Left party and UNDERTIM, although it had support from some small extreme groups, did not stretch the ideological distance to an extreme degree because it cooperated with the governing coalition. In determining the pattern of party competition, we can bring together our two criteria: limited pluralism (party fragmentation) and limited ideological distance. The party system type that this suggests is one of moderate pluralism. A coalition arrangement was formed with four other parties joining CNRT in government. CNRT and its allies on one side, and FRETILIN and the remaining parties on the other represented the bipolar and centripetal nature of the parliament and ideological debate, common in cases of moderate pluralism.

[gence.wombathole.com/timor_lesle_political_parties_and_groupings_2nd_edition.pdf](http://www.wombathole.com/timor_lesle_political_parties_and_groupings_2nd_edition.pdf), pp.45-46 and Leach. 2009. “The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste.” *op. cit.*, p.225

¹¹⁰ Leach. 2009. “The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste.” *op. cit.*, p.225

¹¹¹ Ryan. 2007. “Political Parties and Groupings of Timor-Leste.” *op. cit.*, pp.45-46

2.3.3. Structure of Competition

As outlined earlier in Chapter One, Mair argues that we need to interrogate the structure of party interaction, especially as it relates to the competition for political power, to gain greater understanding of inter-party dynamics within Sartori's typology. Viewed in terms of the three criteria Mair established, it is appropriate to characterise the structure of competition in Timor-Leste in 2007 as open. The first criteria concerns the prevailing mode of alternation in government. There was wholesale governmental alternation between 2001 and 2007: FRETILIN's dominance of the parliament and government was replaced entirely by a coalition government consisting of different parties. The second criteria addresses the degree of predictability in the formation of government, in other words, "...whether or not the party or combination of parties has governed before in that particular format."¹¹² This was certainly not the case. The combination of CNRT, PD, ASDT, PSD, and UNDERTIM had never been in office before in that format; it was an innovative arrangement. The third criteria deals with how inclusive the system is in allowing new parties to enter government. In this regard, the parties CNRT, PD, ASDT, PSD, and UNDERTIM that entered government were completely new as none had previously governed.

Based on these responses, the structure of competition at this juncture was unequivocally open, which is crucial in understanding in more detail the pattern of political competition, particularly in regards to how it changed. The dominance of FRETILIN was obliterated and a limited range of relevant parties representing different social cleavages and the aspirations of particular individual leaders filled in the space it vacated. The ideological distance, however, did

¹¹² Mair. 2002. "Comparing Party Systems." *op. cit.*, p.96

not stretch to the extremes in either direction; the AMP government was a centrist coalition. CNRT formed the primary pivot around which the other relevant parties, which were united in opposition to FRETILIN returning to government, coalesced. In contrast, FRETILIN still won the most seats in the election and was still a potent force in what was, effectively, a bipolar political environment. Answers to the question of why the pattern of competition changed from one of dominance to moderate pluralism will be provided in Chapter Three. The final section of this chapter will establish the pattern and structure of party competition following the 2012 Parliamentary Elections.

2.4. 2012: Concentration and Consolidation of Power

This section addresses the results of the 2012 parliamentary elections and the following period until the end of 2014. Analytically, my two key objectives are, first, to settle on which of Sartori's typologies best matches the pattern of party competition and ascertain the degree of openness in the structure of competition. My key conclusion is that the pattern of party competition after 2012 remains effectively the same as 2007, that of moderate pluralism. However, the previously open structure of competition has narrowed substantially.

The electoral system for the 2012 polls largely remained untouched, although voters were now required to vote in their home village rather than their immediate place of residence. Voters had the option to register in a new place, though it appears many ended up having to travel (sometimes large distances) to vote in the polls. Twenty-one political parties and coalitions of political parties (there were three groupings of two each), contested the 2012 polls. In total,

482,792 of 645,624 registered voters (74.78 per cent) cast their ballots and 471,478 of these were valid (97.65 per cent).¹¹³

Only four of the 21 parties received enough votes to pass the three per cent threshold: CNRT increased its share of the vote from 24.1 per cent in 2007 to 36.68 per cent, and also its share of seats, up from 18 to 30; FRETILIN improved on its 2007 result (29.02 per cent of the vote and obtaining 21 seats) by attaining 29.89 per cent of the vote and winning 25 seats; PD more or less held its vote with 10.30 per cent and took eight seats; and *FRENTI-Mudanca* (FM) or the Front for Change scraped over the line with 3.11 per cent and won two seats.¹¹⁴ These four parties attracted close to 80 per cent of the vote, but because of the vagaries of the electoral system, they collected all 65 seats in the parliament. Table 2.3 provides a complete breakdown on the election results.

Table 2.3: Parties, Votes and Seats in 2012

Party/Coalition	% Valid Vote	Seats Won
CNRT	36.68	30
FRETILIN	29.89	25
Partido Democratico (PD)	10.30	8
Frente de Reconstrução Nacional de Timor-Leste – MUDANÇA (FRENTI-MUDANÇA)	3.11	2
Partidu Kmanek Haburas Unidade Nasional Timor Oan (P.Khunto)	2.97	0
Partido Socialista de Timor (PST)	2.41	0
Partido Social Democrata (PSD)	2.15	0

¹¹³ Feijo, Rui Graca. 2012. "Elections, Independence, Democracy: The 2012 Timorese Electoral Cycle in Context." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 31(3):29-57, pp.49-50

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, pp.49-50

Partido Desenvolvimento Nacional (PDN)	1.99	0
Associação Social-Democrata Timorense (ASDT)	1.8	0
Unidade Nacional Democrática da Resistência Timorense (UNDERTIM)	1.49	0
União Democrática Timorense (UDT)	1.13	0
Partido Republicanu (PR)	0.91	0
Partido Liberta Povo Aileba/Partido Democratika Republica de Timor (Coligação PLPA/PDRT)	0.85	0
Associação Popular Monarquia Timorense (APMT)	0.84	0
Partido Unidade Nacional (PUN)	0.68	0
Bloku Proklamador: Partido Milineum Democrático/Partido Republika Nacional Timor Leste (BP PMD/PARENTIL)	0.66	0
Aliança Democrática Klibur Oan Timor Asuwain- Partido Trabalhista Timorense (AD KOTA- Trabalhista)	0.56	0
Partido Timorense Democrático (PTD)	0.54	0
Partido Democrático Liberal (PDL)	0.47	0
Partido Desenvolvimento Popular (PDP)	0.4	0
Partido Democrata Cristão (PDC)	0.19	0

Source: Feijo. 2012. "Elections, Independence, Democracy." *op. cit.*, pp.49-50


2.4.1. Number of Relevant Parties

Despite enjoying an increase in the level of electoral support and presence in the parliament, CNRT did not win a majority, falling short by only three seats. Although CNRT could not govern in its own right, it was in the strongest position to negotiate a coalition government.¹¹⁵ Given their strength in parliament, it is a straightforward exercise to designate

¹¹⁵ Leach, Michael (2012) *Post-election Timor-Leste: the parties enter negotiations*. *Inside Story*, 10 July 2012, retrieved on 17 July 2013 from <http://inside.org.au/post-election-timor-leste-the-parties-enter-negotiations/>

CNRT, FRETILIN and PD as relevant parties. Any combination of two of these parties would be enough for such a coalition to form a functioning government with the confidence of the legislature: CNRT and FRETILIN would have had 55 seats, CNRT and PD would have had 38 seats and FRETILIN and PD would have had 33 seats. Chart 2.3 depicts the distribution of seats (and power) to the four parties that entered the parliament.

Chart 2.3: Percentage of Seats Controlled in Parliament in 2012



Source: Rui Graca. 2012. "Elections, Independence, Democracy." *op. cit.*, pp.49-50

The likelihood of the first or third of these scenarios playing out, however, was quite small given the historical and personality-based tensions between FRETILIN and the other parties (and the constituencies they represented). According to a 2013 International Crisis Group (ICG) report, which I concur with based on spending six months during the campaign from February to July 2012, the general feeling throughout the parliamentary campaign period was

that PD would ultimately enter into a coalition arrangement with CNRT, despite its leaders occasionally making noises to the contrary.¹¹⁶ The same report stated that the furthest negotiations got regarding the incorporation of FRETILIN into a coalition government centred on including a small number of FRETILIN representatives into “...a CNRT-led cabinet, on condition they joined as unaffiliated independents. This was unacceptable to the FRETILIN leadership.”¹¹⁷ In the end, CNRT, PD and FM came together to establish the Fifth Constitutional Government of Timor-Leste, the *Bloku Governu Koligasaun* (BGK) or Government Coalition Bloc. Again, FRETILIN was excluded from the government and, this time, was left as the sole party representing the opposition in parliament.

In addition, I do note that in February 2015 a new government, which incorporated FRETILIN, was formed after the resignation of Xanana Gusmão as PM. This accommodation of FRETILIN into a government of national unity, while facilitating FRETILIN having a greater say in the affairs of state, did not change its numbers in parliament and has not structurally changed the pattern of party competition. The pattern of competition is determined by counting the number of relevant parties and measuring the distance between the two most ideological extreme parties. In short, FRETILIN has maintained its status as a relevant party and moderate pluralism continues — regardless of whether or not FRETILIN is part of the government.

FM in this context cannot be considered a relevant party because it had neither coalitional nor blackmail potential; its tally of two seats did not alter the balance of play in the parliament.

¹¹⁶ International Crisis Group. 2013. “Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost?” *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No.246, 8 May 2013, Brussels, Belgium, retrieved 13 August 2014 from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/timor-leste.aspx>, p.11

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, p.12

On its own, FM could not have put any of the other parties into government if it had aligned itself with them. The most it could have done was to push a possible CNRT and FM coalition to holding 32 seats, one short of a majority. In the final analysis, only three parties elected to the parliament, CNRT, FRETILIN and PD, can be considered relevant. In reference to Sartori's typology, we see a continuation of the scale of party fragmentation, namely limited pluralism, which was produced five years earlier.

2.4.2. Ideological Distance

The degree of ideological distance between CNRT, FRETILIN, and PD remained minimal with these parties located around the Left and Centre-Left. Even amongst the other parties and coalitions, the narratives of the campaign I witnessed were largely homogenised, again indicating the centripetal nature of party competition. The narratives focused on very similar matters, such as the resistance credentials of individual politicians and how to develop the country, and it is hard to discern any significant ideological distance between them. Election observers from the International Republican Institute (IRI), for example, reported that based on the campaign events they attended, political parties rarely engaged with serious, policy issues; there was little to separate the parties according to their policy platforms.¹¹⁸ As another experienced observer of East-Timorese politics, Rui Feijo, summarised the 2012 elections:

Apart from a few dissenting ideological proclamations... broad consensus seems to have marked the debates. Unsurprisingly, all political parties defended extensive public spending, taking advantage of the positive conditions provided by the growth of the Timorese oil fund, in order to address the crying needs of the

¹¹⁸ International Republican Institute (IRI). 2013. "Timor-Leste Parliamentary Elections: July 7, 2012." *IRI Timor-Leste*. Retrieved 29 September 2014 from <http://www.iri.org/countries-and-programs/asia/timor-leste>, p.19

country's population... More open confrontation was based on personality histories, many opting to revert to images of individual leader in military fatigues reminiscent of Resistance times, stressing the role of 'suffering' and active combat against the invaders as their main form of political legitimization.¹¹⁹

By addressing our two variables together, limited pluralism (party fragmentation) and a limited ideological distance, we can see a familiar format in the pattern of party competition. The party system type, as in 2007, remained that of moderate pluralism: a coalition government was formed with three parties (only two of which were relevant), while the other relevant party was in opposition. The bipolar and centripetal nature of the parliament and ideological debate from 2007 was effectively carried over to the 2012 parliament with CNRT and its allies on one side and FRETILIN on the other.

2.4.3. Structure of Competition

The open structure of competition in 2007 had changed to a substantively more closed structure after the 2012 parliamentary elections. The prevailing mode of alternation in government changed from wholesale to one of almost complete non-alternation, consistent with Mair's first criteria. CNRT and PD remained in government — with the addition of one new, small coalition partner — while shedding the participation of three other parties from 2007. From the perspective of the second criteria, the degree of predictability in the formation of government, the new government was not nearly as innovative compared to 2007. The formula for constituting the new government lacked any real surprises with CNRT and PD again forming the core of the governing coalition in parliament. The final criteria, how inclusive the system is

¹¹⁹ Feijo. 2012. "Elections, Independence, Democracy." *op. cit.*, p.48

in allowing new parties to enter government, does not tell us much because there was only one new party that could theoretically enter the government. While the fact that FM did partner CNRT and PD in the government does indicate some openness to new parties getting involved, I believe the results of the election do not test the third criteria sufficiently to pay it much attention.

The character of the new governing alliance (the BGK) was similar to the preceding one, indicating a shift to a much more closed and predictable system, despite the reduction of the number of parties involved in the coalition arrangement, down from five to three. CNRT again formed the nucleus of the government with its seemingly dependable ally PD signing up for another five years. It is interesting that FM was incorporated into the government despite its seats being effectively redundant to the coalition. This inclusion is partially explained by the close personal relationship between Xanana Gusmão and the leader of FM, Jose Luis Guterres (LuGu), who was vice-prime minister of the Fourth Constitutional Government. There was also clear consistency in the pattern of party competition from the one that emerged five years earlier, that of moderate pluralism; the degree of party fragmentation had remained the same while the ideological distance between parties, if anything, had narrowed further with the removal of PSD from power.

Conclusion

While acknowledging there have been fluctuations in the character of political arrangements in the last forty or so years since Sartori developed his typology of party systems, this typology provides a useful framework to investigate and compare contemporary case studies

like Timor-Leste. The initial period of FRETILIN governance was a clear cut case of a party enjoying dominance in its political environment. FRETILIN was unable to sustain this position after the elections in 2007 with a plethora of parties forming around CNRT and its charismatic leader, Xanana Gusmão. The degree of party fragmentation and ideological polarisation, however, was never high and this pattern of competition continued in the wake of the elections in 2012.

We can dig further, and learn more, about the dynamics of party interaction by looking at how open or closed the structure of competition was from election to election. The opening up of political space in 2007 saw many new social agents and actors access governmental power, along with a significant shift in the character and style of governance when compared to 2001. The consistency in the pattern of competition from 2007 to 2012 also reflected a narrowing of the political space. The identities of the major players who could enter government were markedly reduced and the formula by which the government was finally formed was not surprising.

The question that begs our attention the most from this analysis is why we saw both change and continuity in the pattern of party competition throughout the last ten or so years of elections. This matter will be explored in more depth in the next two chapters. The answer partly relates to the matter of how much, if any, change there is to the structure of competition. An open structure suggests there is greater room for new parties to enter the political fray and force changes to the dynamics of party interaction, as was seen in the fall of the FRETILIN government in 2007. Chapter Three will look at the FRETILIN period of governance (2001 to 2007) and offer answers to the question of why FRETILIN's predominance was not sustained.

Chapter Three. The Vicissitudes of FRETILIN Rule

Scholars, journalists, and political analysts observing East Timor for the past 20 to 30 years and visiting East Timor in 2005 comment that things seem to have become more “disheartening”: the local people are more angry towards the malae (foreigners), more disillusioned with the government, the political elite, emerging Timorese capitalists; members of civil societies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are more worried about the narrowing of spaces for pluralistic visions, opposition, and dissent; ex-Falintil veterans are feeling more betrayed by the lack of acknowledgement of their contributions to the independence resistance struggle; armed forces soldiers have abandoned their barracks in Metinaro claiming discrimination and inequality; and citizens genuinely are concerned that the path to nation-building and democratization is increasingly signalling an authoritarian Mozambique-style suppression of opposition and freedom of speech.¹

Jacqueline Siapno in Dili, 2005

For some Timorese, life during the occupation entailed waging guerrilla warfare, for others, it involved running clandestine meetings. For most, it involved keeping out of the way of the authorities. Whatever their activities, for most Timorese, it was a time of struggle, suffering, and sacrifice. This reality ended near the end of 1999, and the euphoria brought about by the achievement of independence bewitched the population. Once the celebrations were over, however, the stark reality of the challenges ahead hit home: constructing a modern nation-state required a lot of work. With a strong historical legitimising narrative, base of support, organisational structure, and technically trained leaders, FRETILIN dominated the first national

¹ Siapno, Jacqueline. 2006. “Timor Leste: On a Path of Authoritarianism?.” *Southeast Asian Affairs* 2006:325-342, p.325

elections and took responsibility for governing the country. Despite these advantages, the FRETILIN government failed to respond adequately to a series of challenges that arose during its term in government. FRETILIN's failures contributed significantly to its routing at the following national parliamentary elections. In FRETILIN's place arose an entirely different arrangement of political parties and political leaders that sought to take the country forward in a different way.

Where did it all go wrong for FRETILIN? It was not the oldest of the political parties, but it possessed a persuasive historical claim to rule; unlike UDT, FRETILIN had campaigned for independence since its inception. FRETILIN also claimed responsibility for the independence proclamation and the formation of the first government of an independent Timor-Leste in 1975. Moreover, it had been the primary organisation that had resisted the Indonesian invasion during the early years of the occupation. Arriving back in Timor in 1999, the leadership of FRETILIN possessed the technical knowledge necessary to manage a country. Further, some of its leaders had had the opportunity to access high levels of education and technical training overseas during the occupation. The opportunity to put their skills and knowledge to work came with a decisive electoral victory in 2001.

As I described in Chapter Two, the overwhelming success of FRETILIN in 2001 produced a pattern of political party competition best defined as predominant. By virtue of this success, FRETILIN controlled the most important organs of state power. From this standpoint, it is intriguing to then observe how, after six years, FRETILIN managed to lose power so spectacularly. As I suggested in Chapter Two, the results of the 2007 national elections produced

a pattern of political party competition — one of moderate pluralism — very different from the one produced in 2001. A coalition of parties, not including FRETILIN, but including a new party, CNRT, formed the new government in 2007. The essential question I address here, in Chapter Three, is how to account for this change.

I begin by emphasising how the results of the 2007 national elections altered the structure of competition in accordance with Mair's three criteria. Firstly, the identity of the government changed completely. Secondly, the structure changed from one party forming the government to a coalition arrangement. And finally, a new party gained the second most seats in the parliament and became the lead party in the coalition government. The structure of competition had opened up and the pattern of competition had shifted from FRETILIN dominance to one of moderate pluralism.

My argument in this chapter is that FRETILIN's collapse was critical to the change in both the structure and pattern of competition and is specifically explained by the absence of charismatic leadership, the alienating identity of the nation and state-building project, and the inadequate chances available for networks of patronage and distributive politics to work in their favour. A plethora of parties representing different social cleavages and the aspirations of particular individual leaders then competed in the 2007 national elections and filled in much of the political space FRETILIN had once dominated.

This chapter is made up of three substantive sections. It begins with an analysis of the 2001 national elections, while the second section examines how the FRETILIN Government functioned between 2002 and 2007. I frame this examination in reference to the dominant party criteria previously outlined in Chapter One. These sections will look at thematic issues like state capacity, nation building, and style of governance and leadership, with particular reference to two crises: (1) the 2005 confrontation with the Catholic Church, and (2) the social upheaval and near disintegration of the state in 2006. The final section offers a breakdown of the 2007 national elections, and how they compare with the results from the 2001 national elections. This section includes a detailed portrayal of how voters expressed their political preferences in both elections, with particular reference to the nation-wide decline in support for FRETILIN.

3.1. The Changing Pattern of Party Competition 2001 to 2007

In total, as described in Chapter Two, 16 political parties (and five independents) contested the 2001 elections.² As will be recalled from Chapter Two, in Table 2.1 (page 67) 384,248 voters, 363,501 of them cast valid ballots (94.6 per cent). This table also gives a detailed rundown of all of the political parties (and independents) that contested the elections, their percentage of the national vote, and the number of seats they collected³.

The results of the election confirmed the political primacy of FRETILIN in the country with almost 58 per cent of the vote. Further to this, no other single party was able to achieve

² Smith. 2004. "East Timor." *op. cit.*, p.150 and King. 2003. "East Timor's Founding Elections and Emerging Party System." *op. cit.*, p.747

³ King. 2003. "East Timor's Founding Elections and Emerging Party System." *op. cit.*, p.748

even 10 per cent.⁴ The next three parties with the most seats, PD, PSD, and ASDT, only took 24.74 per cent between them, while the influence of smaller parties and independents was practically negligible. Their combined total vote only constituted 17.89 per cent of the overall vote.

Existing explanations for this victory mostly state that people voted for FRETILIN in such numbers because of its historic role in the struggle for independence, although there is no way to forensically quantify and establish how much this factor benefitted FRETILIN electorally.⁵ In a nutshell, as Saldanha explains “[a]necdotal evidence suggests that people thought FRETILIN should be rewarded for this position.”⁶ FRETILIN also enjoyed an institutional advantage over its opponents, in addition to the powerful brand it could campaign on. FRETILIN had built up its network and organisational capacity since 1974, whereas its opponents had little in the way of organisational experience and brand recognition. PD only established itself, for example, two months before the elections in 2001. Chart 3.1 unambiguously demonstrates FRETILIN’s strength in relation to its share of the overall (valid) national vote.

⁴ Smith. 2004. “East Timor: Elections in the World’s Newest Nation.” *op. cit.*, p.151

⁵ Niner. 2007. “Martyrs, heroes and warriors.” *op. cit.*, p.122, Saldanha. 2008. “Anatomy of Political Parties in Timor-Leste.” *op. cit.*, p.76 and de Sousa. 2001. “Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor Constituent Assembly Election.” *op. cit.*, p.309

⁶ Saldanha. 2008. “*Anatomy of Political Parties in Timor-Leste.*” *op. cit.*, p.76

Chart 3.1: National Vote in 2001

Source: de Sousa. 2001. "Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor Constituent Assembly Election." *op. cit.*, pp.307-308 and Smith. 2004. "East Timor: Elections in the World's Newest Nation." *op. cit.*, p.151

As demonstrated in Table 3.1, FRETILIN's support was geographically uneven. FRETILIN performed far better in the three most eastern districts of the country (Lautem, Baucau, and Viqueque) compared to the rest of the country. According to district-by-district voting statistics for the four main parties, a clear pattern emerged of high levels of support for FRETILIN in the east. The average vote for FRETILIN in the east was 73.23 per cent, while in the ten non-eastern districts it was 47.87 per cent. More broadly, FRETILIN took a larger share of the vote than any of its competitors in all but one of the districts. ASDT received just over 50 per cent in Aileu. Although the emphatic nature of FRETILIN's overall, nation-wide victory can be further demonstrated by highlighting the fact that it received a majority of the vote in eight of the thirteen districts, the results in the districts of Lautem, Baucau, and Viqueque need to be emphasised. These districts historically constituted the strongest geographical bases of support for FRETILIN during the occupation. The closer networks and relationship between the people

of these three districts and the FRETILIN organisation produced a greater degree of political support for FRETILIN when it became a political party and contested the elections. This will be borne out when we come to the results of later elections when FRETILIN consistently scored reasonably high levels of electoral support in the east while suffering heavily across the rest of the country.

Table 3.1: National Vote for Parties in 2001 (District-by-District)

Districts:	% Valid National Vote	FRETILIN	ASDT	PD	PSD
<i>Eastern</i>					
Baucau	12.30	81.98	0.36	2.44	3.56
Lautem	6.4	62.76	0.30	10.41	10.11
Viqueque	7.8	74.95	0.56	3.93	3.46
<i>Western/Central</i>					
Aileu	3.9	21.15	52.31	5.24	1.49
Ainaro	5.4	27.56	15.16	8.37	6.24
Bobonaro	8.5	57.42	4.37	12.69	11.15
Covalima	5.9	61.42	4.62	18.64	6.10
Dili	18.4	66.05	10.73	5.88	4.76
Ermera	10.4	31.94	4.38	20.72	19.99
Liquica	5.7	72.44	2.57	3.94	4.94
Manatuto	4.4	47.57	11.69	11.02	11.69
Manufahi	4.6	54.56	21.91	4.65	3.54
Oecussi	6.3	38.60	1.80	7.03	23.46

Source: de Sousa. 2001. "Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor Constituent Assembly Election." *op. cit.*, pp.307-308 and Smith. 2004. "East Timor: Elections in the World's Newest Nation." *op. cit.*, p.151

FRETILIN's dominance in the early period of independence can be further appreciated by taking a look at the results of the district seat elections. FRETILIN won twelve of the thirteen seats available while the other seat went to an independent in the district of Oecussi.⁷ It should be

⁷ de Sousa. 2001. "Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor Constituent Assembly Election." *op. cit.*, p.308

noted that this candidate actually had the support of FRETILIN, which did not contest this particular seat.⁸ In almost completely sweeping the district seat elections, FRETILIN also won a majority of the vote in ten of the twelve districts it contested, as surmised in Table 3.2:

Table 3.2: District Seat Elections in 2001

Districts:	Winner	% Valid Vote
<i>Eastern</i>		
Baucau	FRETILIN	85.97
Lautem	FRETILIN	54.93
Viqueque	FRETILIN	81.62
<i>Western/Central</i>		
Aileu	FRETILIN	57.47
Ainaro	FRETILIN	34.63
Bobonaro	FRETILIN	60.34
Covalima	FRETILIN	65.74
Dili	FRETILIN	72.49
Ermera	FRETILIN	39.79
Liquica	FRETILIN	78.43
Manatuto	FRETILIN	55.04
Manufahi	FRETILIN	75.12
Oecussi	Independent Candidate	36.06

Source: de Sousa. 2001. "Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor Constituent Assembly Election." *op. cit.*, p.308

These variations should not distract us from the point that at the *very least* one in two people still voted for FRETILIN in both polls (national and district seat) in the east. FRETILIN also won a majority of the vote in seven of the ten non-eastern district seat elections, showing only marginally reduced levels of support (an average of 66.37 per cent) to those in the east (an average of 74.17 per cent). Overall, the non-eastern district seat election average for FRETILIN

⁸ *Ibid*, p.309

was 57.51 per cent. These levels of support across the country, however, did not stand the test of time: the parliamentary elections of 2007 and 2012 saw FRETILIN lose noticeable degrees of sympathy in districts like Dili, Liquica, and Covalima, but continue to perform consistently well in Baucau, Lautem, and Viqueque, as we explore below. In total, FRETILIN took 55 of the 88 available seats in the Constituent Assembly, which later became the first parliament of Timor-Leste. Chart 2.1 in Chapter Two (page 70) unambiguously illustrates FRETILIN's dominant position in relation to other parties.

FRETILIN needed the support of ASDT to pass the Constitution because it fell short of the required two-thirds majority to do so on its own terms. Once Timor-Leste officially became independent on 20 May 2002, there were no further direct parliamentary challenges to FRETILIN pursuing its political agenda; it formed the First Constitutional Government of Timor-Leste on this date and dictated the makeup of the cabinet.

3.2. From Dominance to Crisis and Collapse: FRETILIN in Government

FRETILIN was placed in a very advantageous position after the 2001 elections, and it had the *potential* to become a dominant party akin to the model I discussed in Chapter One. FRETILIN certainly possessed a plurality (and a majority) of parliamentary seats and a near unchallengeable bargaining position in relation to all of its parliamentary opponents. FRETILIN's governance, however, only lasted one term of five years and, as discussed in Chapter Two, during that time there were three FRETILIN governments; the First, Second, and Third Constitutional Governments of Timor-Leste. As such, in relation to the third defining

characteristic of a dominant party as set out by Pempel, FRETILIN obviously does not fit the necessary requirement to have been in power over a long period of time. And lastly, given that FRETILIN governed for such a short period of time, there was little time for it to implement its historic project. Despite this caveat, I believe we can gauge a sense of this project from the programmes that FRETILIN initiated in those five years of government.

We can still draw on the concept of dominant parties and, with some qualifications, conceptualise FRETILIN as a proto-dominant party. FRETILIN's near stranglehold of government and state power, with the exception of President Gusmão being a thorn in its side, gave it the potential to become dominant. The available literature at this early juncture of political life in Timor-Leste suggests that FRETILIN certainly intended to institutionalise its dominance.⁹ In 2004, for example, Anthony Smith wrote that:

...the government benches remain the domain of the FRETILIN Party. During 2003 FRETILIN consolidated its political hold and openly boasts that it will be in power for the foreseeable future. In contrast to the unstable coalitional arrangements of many newly democratizing countries, FRETILIN can govern by itself. The FRETILIN hegemony of the political executive has frustrated the main opposition parties, who routinely accuse the government of "single-party rule" and "authoritarianism".¹⁰

⁹ See, for example, Smith. 2004. "East Timor." *op. cit.*, Siapno. 2006. "Timor Leste." *op. cit.*, and Simonsen, Sven Gunnar. 2006. "The Authoritarian Temptation: Nationbuilding and the Need for Inclusive Governance." *Asian Survey* 46(4):575-596

¹⁰ Smith. 2004. "East Timor." *op. cit.*, p.280

Shoesmith's analysis of that period also confirms that FRETILIN expected to permanently govern the country as the dominant political force into the future; he believed FRETILIN was confident that people would continue to reward it electorally because of its role in bringing about independence.¹¹ FRETILIN maintained the view that it was the true, legitimate, representative of the people.

There are some further important parallels with Pempel's analysis of common characteristics shared by dominant parties when we consider the case of Timor-Leste. To begin with, a variant of proportional representation is employed in Timor-Leste, which Pempel argues is a precondition for the emergence of a dominant party.¹² Proportional representation, which encourages the production of multipartism, can facilitate the rise of a dominant party in such a context because a party with a healthy plurality of parliamentary seats is typically in the strongest position to negotiate the profile of any new government. Secondly, concerning the historical cycle of dominance, the Indonesian invasion, occupation, and withdrawal from the territory (1975 to 1999) — and the accompanying violence and destruction — constituted a series of events aptly definable as mobilisational crises or opportunities. There have also been regular elections since 2001, which provide opportunities for parties to mobilise their supporters.

However, FRETILIN did not show the requisite flexibility and rigidity to face the challenges that arose during its period of rule; while it faced some problems that were outside of

¹¹ Shoesmith. 2012. "Is Small Beautiful?" *op. cit.*, p.37

¹² Pempel. 1990. "Introduction." *op. cit.* and Pempel. 1990. "Conclusion." *op. cit.*

its control, the way it chose to respond to such problems, and its policies and style of governance more generally, severely undermined its chances to return to power. FRETILIN did not electorally survive the backlash from these crises, scuttling its hopes to establish long-term governmental domination. This being the case, the structure of competition opened up for new parties and leaders to engage in politics, producing a change in the pattern of party competition, from one of a predominant party system, to one of moderate pluralism.

3.2.1. Weak State Capacity

The new state of the Republic of Timor-Leste had very limited capacity and resources to draw on in order to function, which made FRETILIN's task of making good on the promises it had made during the election difficult to achieve. Before shifting into a discussion of the economic challenges Timor-Leste faced, I want to briefly identify another vulnerability to place this discussion into a broader context: the risk of violence breaking out again. Studies into state-building in low-income countries have shown that the risk of violence in such countries, if they have emerged from post-conflict situations is substantial, and Timor-Leste certainly fit this category.¹³ Paul Collier argues that for countries in this category:

Typically there is a 39 per cent risk that a peace will collapse within the first five years, and a 32 per cent risk that it will collapse in the next five years. These risks are much higher than for the typical low-income country with a history of peace – the five year risk is 'only' around 14 per cent.¹⁴

¹³ Collier, Paul. 2006 (April). "Post-Conflict Economic Recovery." *A paper for the International Peace Academy*. Department of Economics, Oxford University.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

The higher degree of risk is explained by a range of factors. The legacy of the violence itself engenders resentment, a desire for revenge and political animosities. Further to this, there is the problem of poverty and unemployment, ethnic dominance and the challenge of exploiting and developing natural resources to the betterment of the country. From this perspective, Timor-Leste was in a vulnerable state early on as the scorched earth policy of the retreating Indonesian backed forces severely undermined infrastructural capacity for immediate economic growth. Estimates place the damage at approximately 70 per cent of all physical infrastructure was laid waste or left inoperable, leaving subsistence farming as the only major (non-oil) economic activity in the country.¹⁵

All figures in this thesis, I note, are in United States (US) dollars unless otherwise stated. Timor-Leste's only agricultural export of note was coffee, the value of which was \$6 million in 2003.¹⁶ In the first few years of its life, the government mainly drew on foreign aid and oil receipts to pay for its activities. The sole oil and gas site in production in the early years, the Elang-Kakatua field, pumped out 32 million barrels of oil during its lifespan (1998 to 2007).¹⁷ Early estimates of the contribution petroleum revenue made to the overall revenue base of the state are depicted in Table 3.3.

¹⁵ Hughes. 2009. "Dependent Communities." *op. cit.*, p.141

¹⁶ Smith. 2004. "East Timor." *op. cit.*, p.291

¹⁷ Rasiah, Rajah, Jebamalai Vinanchiarachi and Padmanand Vadakkepat. 2014. "Catching-Up from Way Behind: How Timor-Leste Can Avoid the Dutch Disease?." *Institutions and Economics* 6(1):119-148, p.121

Table 3.3: Timor-Leste Government Revenue, 2003/04 to 2005/06

Financial Year	Petroleum Revenue	Total Revenue	Petroleum Revenue as a % of Total Revenue
2003/04 ¹⁸	\$31m	\$57m	54
2004/05 ¹⁹	\$243m	\$306m	79
2005/06 ²⁰	\$418m	\$465m	90
2006/07 ²¹	\$993m	\$1046m	95

Sources: Multiple, see footnotes.

The government lacked the opportunity to quickly develop and immediately derive revenue from more viable and profitable sites, namely Bayu-Undan and Greater Sunrise, in the early days of its rule due to legal wrangling with Australia over the distribution of revenue from these sites in the Timor Sea. ConocoPhillips and the governments of Australia and Timor-Leste made an arrangement to develop the Bayu-Undan field, which opened in 2004, but the financial proceeds of this venture took years to flow into the state coffers of Timor-Leste.²² It was not until very late into FRETILIN's term of government — in the 2006/2007 State Budget — that total

¹⁸ Ministry of Planning and Finance. 2004. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Combined Sources Budget 2004-05 (Budget Paper Number 1)." Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance, *Budget Documents*. Retrieved 8 May 2014 from <https://www.mof.gov.tl/category/documents-and-forms/budget-documents/?lang=en>, p.10

¹⁹ Ministry of Planning and Finance. 2005. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste General Budget of the State 2005-06 (Budget Paper Number 1)." Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance, *Budget Documents*. Retrieved 8 May 2014 from <https://www.mof.gov.tl/category/documents-and-forms/budget-documents/?lang=en>, p.8

²⁰ Ministry of Planning and Finance. 2006. "Petroleum Fund Annual Report – Financial Year 2005-2006." Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance, *Petroleum Fund Annual Reports*. Retrieved 4 August 2014 from <https://www.mof.gov.tl/category/documents-and-forms/petroleum-fund-documents/petroleum-fund-annual-reports/?lang=en>, p.7

²¹ Ministry of Finance. 2008. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Budget Review July 2008 (Budget Document)." Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance. *Budget Documents*. Retrieved 8 May 2014 from <https://www.mof.gov.tl/category/documents-and-forms/budget-documents/?lang=en>, p.16

²² Rasiah, Vinanchiarachi and Vadakkepat. 2014. "Catching-Up from Way Behind." *op. cit.*, p.121

revenue went beyond the one billion US dollar mark. I address the issue of oil and gas revenue in more detail in Chapter Four when it *really* made its presence felt in the overall development of the Timorese economy from 2008 onwards.

PM Alkatiri made it a matter of policy not to take on foreign loans or go into debt to fund policies and development programs, even in the face of ebbing donor support.²³ Table 3.4 provides a snapshot of FRETILIN's modest expenditure of state monies each financial year according to official budget publications.

Table 3.4: Timor-Leste Government Expenditures, 2003/04 to 2006/07

Financial Year:	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07
Total government expenditure:	\$60m	\$70m	\$70m	\$93m	\$170m
Expenditure as a percentage of total government revenue:		122	23	20	16

Source: Ministry of Finance. 2011. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2011 – Budget Overview Book 1." Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance, *Budget Documents*. Retrieved 2 August 2014 from <https://www.mof.gov.tl/category/documents-and-forms/budget-documents/?lang=en>, p.28

Although this approach received approval from donors and international financial institutions, it is doubtful that the local Timorese population, who desperately looked to the government to address their plight, viewed such fiscal responsibility so favourably. Areas of critical societal concern included health, with life expectancy at a low 55.5 years in 2004,

²³ Hughes. 2009. "Dependent Communities." *op. cit.*, p.144

education, with adult literacy at 50.1 per cent, and food insecurity, with 64 per cent of the population suffering from food insecurity. Electricity was also very limited in rural areas, with only 10 per cent of rural households in the grid, compared to 92 per cent in the major urban locales of Dili and Baucau.²⁴ An early assessment of 2001 levels of poverty in Timor-Leste, published in a 2005 World Bank Report, stated that it was one of the poorest nations in the world with (nominal) per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at \$405, 20 per cent of the population living on less than one dollar per day, and 40 per cent living on less than \$0.55 per day — the national poverty line.²⁵ Poverty was more pronounced in rural areas with almost one-in-two people (46 per cent) under the poverty line, with the number closer to one-in-four in urban areas.²⁶

Even in the face of such conditions, and a downward trend in economic growth, tracked at 15 per cent in 2001 but dropping to 3.4 per cent in 2004, the FRETILIN government kept the purse strings drawn quite tight.²⁷ This policy continued even when the budgetary capacity of the state improved with petroleum revenue starting to flow in at an increased rate. The 2006/2007 Budget estimated that petroleum revenue constituted almost 90 per cent of the 2004/2005 fiscal

²⁴ United Nations Development Programme. 2006. “The Path out of Poverty – Integrated rural development.” *UNDP, Human Development Reports*, retrieved 4 August 2014 from <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/path-out-poverty>, pp.1-2

²⁵ International Monetary Fund. 2005. “Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper - Joint Staff Advisory Note.” *IMF Country Report No. 05/246*. Retrieved 5 August 2014 from <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=18428.0>, p.4

²⁶ United Nations Development Programme. 2006. “The Path out of Poverty.” *op. cit.*, p.2

²⁷ Siapno. 2006. “Timor Leste.” *op. cit.*, p.333-334

year's total revenue of \$465.8 million, for example, but the government's planned expenditure was only \$123.6 million.²⁸

FRETILIN's early budgetary situation made its overall task of government demanding and precarious. The frugal approach of the government to spending the budget made its job of implementing its policies even harder. The government maintained the highly centralised model employed by the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET), which was staffed by inexperienced public servants. The government, as such, experienced delays and obstacles in delivering many goods and services to the public.²⁹ One of the more politically sensitive of these services concerned the distribution of financial aid and pensions to the 1,950 ex-Falintil veterans, who had emerged from the cantonments after the 1999 referendum. The new armed forces, *Falintil — Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste* (F-FDTL) or the Timor-Leste Defence Force — Falintil, employed less than half of these veterans (650).³⁰ The FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Programme (FRAP) provided support to most, but not all, of the remaining veterans. This program:

[r]an throughout 2001 and provided transport to their communities, a 5-month transitional safety net of \$100 per month, a small livelihood or income-generation project worth approximately \$500 per beneficiary, training and medical referrals.³¹

²⁸ Ministry of Planning and Finance. 2006. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste General Budget of the State 2006-07." *op. cit.*, p.7

²⁹ Hughes. 2009. "Dependent Communities." *op. cit.*, pp.149-150

³⁰ Wallis, Joanne. 2013. "Victors, Villains and Victims: Capitalizing on Memory in Timor-Leste." *Ethnopolitics* 12(1):133-160, p.140

³¹ *Ibid*, p.140

Joanne Wallis argues that many veterans felt disappointed with what they received because their expectations of finding employment in the public sector, and so working for their country, did not materialise.³² The fact that they lacked the necessary skills and experience — many of them had fought in the forests for a substantial period of their lives — made it difficult to find public service jobs for them. The difficulties that many veterans experienced finding employment bred resentment and fuelled a sense that they had been betrayed by the government.

There were also broader demands on the government to deliver jobs throughout the country. The ‘Timor Leste Human Development Report 2006’ estimated that 14,000 young people (15 to 24 years old) were entering the labour market every year, adding to the pre-existing levels of youth unemployment, which was at 15 per cent across the country in 2001, and at 43 per cent in the two major population centers of Dili and Baucau.³³ Three years later, the youth unemployment figure was at 23 per cent, while the level of overall unemployment was 8.9 per cent. The 2004 Census indicated that 88 per cent of the total working population of 293,348 people were either self-employed or involved in subsistence farming. There was a noticeable process of urbanisation occurring, with an average of 800 young people a year leaving the rural areas hoping for more gainful employment, although those who were generally getting jobs, particularly in Dili, were foreigners. The state carried on its UN predecessor’s habit to rely on mainly foreign experts to get the business of government achieved. As a consequence, from a

³² *Ibid*, p.140

³³ United Nations Development Programme. 2006. “The Path out of Poverty.” *op. cit.*, p.8

human resources perspective, there was little in the way of developing significant local capacity for most of the Timorese population.³⁴

3.2.2. Constituting an Alien Identity

The legal framework of the country, the new Constitution of the Republic of Timor-Leste, articulated how FRETILIN envisaged itself at the center of the nation. FRETILIN determined the character of its national historic project by shaping the identity of the country in a way that emphasised its role in the past, present, and future. In doing so, the FRETILIN leadership excluded or marginalised the significant contributions made by others not associated with FRETILIN, particularly younger people and those involved in the clandestine movement. Given its strength in the Constituent Assembly, FRETILIN had the strongest say in the content of the Constitution, while the fragmented nature of the other parties meant they struggled to make any substantive contributions to the final version that was finally passed in early 2002.

It is important to specifically highlight and analyse two important features of the Constitution. Firstly, the Constitution established the official historical narrative of the nation by linking together the resistance to both the Portuguese and Indonesian occupying forces, treating them as part of the broader struggle to achieve national liberation for the Timorese people. This narrative, however, prioritised the independence struggle against the Indonesian occupation, with a particular emphasis on the role of FRETILIN and its leadership group in achieving national liberation. FRETILIN went even further in its campaign to frame, for perpetuity, the identity of

³⁴ Siapno. 2006. "Timor Leste." *op. cit.*, p.334

Timor-Leste in its own image by fashioning “...the national flag, name of the state, date of independence and national anthem”³⁵ in ways that reflected an association with FRETILIN.

The decision to select the red, black, white, and yellow of FRETILIN’s flag over the blue, white and green of CNRT³⁶ and FALINTIL, for example, was a symbolic prioritisation of the specific historical role of the former organisation over the latter two in the campaign for independence.³⁷ In regard to the national anthem, it was composed in Portuguese. As will be discussed, only a small percentage of the Timorese population understood Portuguese at the time. Those who did tended to be of the older generation, many of whom had some association with FRETILIN. As a result, most of the population performed their national anthem in a language that is foreign to them and does not connect to their lives. As Wallis argues, such discourses and practices neglected and marginalised the role of the younger generation and those who were educated under the Indonesian regime, some of whom lived and studied in Indonesia and had typically been involved in the clandestine movement and the independence campaign.³⁸

A second aspect of the Constitution concerned the choice of national language(s). As Benedict Anderson famously theorised in 1983, the nation is an ‘imagined political community’

³⁵ Wallis. 2013. “*Victors, Villains and Victims.*” *op. cit.*, p.136

³⁶ The *Concelho Nacional da Resistancia Timorense* was the inclusive umbrella movement for national independence *formed and led* Xanana Gusmão in 1998.

³⁷ Leach, Michael. 2002. “Valorising the resistance: national identity and collective memory in East Timor’s Constitution.” pp.43-47 in *Social Alternatives* 21(3) p.45

³⁸ Wallis. 2013. “*Victors, Villains and Victims.*” *op. cit.*, p.136

and one of the key elements of its imagining is the operation of a national language.³⁹ A national language plays a crucial role in discursively producing a sense of commonality and destiny across people in a specific territory who have never met each other. The success or otherwise of building an imagined political community is thus partly contingent on a national language that is able to reach throughout the ‘nation’, uniting otherwise disparate individuals and groups. Between 1998 and 2000, the original CNRT developed a position to designate Portuguese as the official language, with Tetum defined as a ‘national’ language to be developed over 5 to 10 years before becoming an official language.⁴⁰ FRETILIN refined this position into the Constitution, which the Constituent Assembly passed on 9 February, 2002. The Constitution designated Portuguese, alongside Tetum (the *lingua franca*), as the official languages of Timor-Leste, while Indonesian and English were considered ‘working languages’ to be used on an official basis as long as deemed required.⁴¹ The adoption of Portuguese privileged a set of skills and national identity more associated with the political elite of older educated Timorese, particularly those in FRETILIN, than that of the population more generally.

A survey in 2001 indicated noticeable differences in language proficiency, particularly along generational lines.⁴² Tetum was the most widely comprehended language, with 91 per cent of the population understanding it, and 58 per cent being able to read and write it, although only

³⁹ Anderson, Benedict. 1991. “Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.” London; New York: Verso

⁴⁰ Wallis. 2013. “Victors, Villains and Victims.” *op. cit.*, p.137

⁴¹ Leach. 2002. “Valorising the resistance.” *op. cit.*, p.43 and p.45

⁴² The Asia Foundation - Timor-Leste. 2001. “East Timor National Survey of Voter Knowledge (Preliminary Findings).” *The Asia Foundation*, 1 May 2001, retrieved 21 April 2014 from <http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/389>, p.69

43 per cent of the population nominated it as their mother tongue, the others selected one of the other 16 or so indigenous languages in the country. Of the male population, 21 per cent spoke Portuguese, while 19 per cent read it. In contrast, of the female population, 12 per cent spoke Portuguese and 8 per cent read it. For those Timorese with little or no formal education, 82 per cent spoke Tetum, while only 6 per cent possessed some Portuguese language skills. Finally, to emphasise the significance of the generational language divide, of those under the age of 25, 96 per cent could speak Tetum, and 83 per cent could speak Indonesian, while for those over 50, the numbers were reduced, down to 77 per cent and 27 per cent respectively. Additionally, just over a quarter of those between 35 and 50 could speak Portuguese, while only 11 per cent of those under 25 were able to do so.

Through the medium of the Constitution, the leadership of FRETILIN left an indelible mark on the character and identity of the country because of this leadership's close relationship with Portuguese culture and language. The older generation of the resistance leadership, especially those in FRETILIN, spoke Portuguese in the jungles of Timor-Leste, or had lived in exile in Portugal or one of the former Portuguese colonies such as Mozambique.⁴³ The FRETILIN leadership, and the older generation more generally, wanted to frame Timor-Leste's identity according to their own experiences. For them, attachment to Portuguese culture and language was paramount. The decision to pick Portuguese, according to Jose Ramos Horta, "had to do with preserving East Timor's national identity... the concept of the 'people of East Timor' doesn't make sense except in the context of Portuguese colonialism".⁴⁴ The branding of Timor-

⁴³ Simonsen. 2006. "The Authoritarian Temptation." *op. cit.*, p.585

⁴⁴ Hughes. 2009. "Dependent Communities." *op. cit.*, pp.182-183

Leste as a Lusophone country was affirmed with the government's decision to become a member of the *Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa* (CPLP) or the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries.

In contrast, for most Timorese, Portuguese was in many senses alien to them. The teaching of Portuguese during the colonial period was extremely limited; very few of the older generation were exposed to it.⁴⁵ Tetum was spoken far more widely throughout the population during the resistance; it was the language of both the clandestine movement and the Catholic Church, for example. The political elite's construction of this particular national identity was quite foreign to the lives and experiences of most of the population. In particular, the decision to pick Portuguese risked quarantining the access of the younger generation to the "symbolic sources of power and cultural identity."⁴⁶

The significance of choosing national languages also has broader and more practical implications. As Wallis notes, identification and proficiency with language can directly impact on how people access the realms of political and economic power.⁴⁷ An example is the requirement that all applicants for government service jobs must understand Portuguese. This decision disenfranchised a large section of the population, particularly younger people, who were

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p.183-184

⁴⁶ Leach. 2002. "Valorising the resistance." *op. cit.*

⁴⁷ Wallis. 2013. "Victors, Villains and Victims." *op. cit.*, p.137

only literate in Indonesian.⁴⁸ Recruitment for public service jobs after FRETILIN came to power also heavily favored FRETILIN supporters and members, producing a bureaucracy that became closely associated with the government. My second anonymous source, who has been involved in political activism since independence and ran for election in 2012, described the situation to me in this way: “look at the formation of government, most of the public servants, at the mid-level positions [were] appointed during the first government, under FRETILIN.”⁴⁹ In this context, it is not surprising that for many of the younger generation who had opposed the Indonesian occupation, their cultural connection to the identity of Timor-Leste was minimal. The resulting fermentation of resentment among some of the youth towards FRETILIN expressed itself in a shift to involvement in support for opposition political parties.

The decision to designate Portuguese as an official national language, despite the eventual recognition of Tetum in the Constitution, acted as a divisive force in the broader historic project of forming a sense of common identity and national unity. The Portuguese language played a prominent role in the discourse of the nation in official and public settings, like in parliament and the legal system, because at the time Tetum was undeveloped and could not be used widely. And although Tetum is generally used in parliamentary debates, for example, legislation is written in Portuguese. This results in a situation where some parliamentarians are unable to read the law they are passing given their limited or non-existent Portuguese language skills.

⁴⁸ Garrison, Randall. 2005. “The Role of Constitution-building Processes in Democratization: Case Study, East Timor.” *International IDEA*, Stockholm, p.24

⁴⁹ Interviewee 14, Anonymous, 6 November 2013 *op. cit.*

The use of Portuguese in the judicial system also caused difficulties because most of the lawyers themselves had been trained in Indonesian and spoke no Portuguese. The training of these lawyers in Portuguese, and the use of Portuguese in court, caused confusion because multiple translators were often needed to communicate between the various parties involved. Many ordinary Timorese faced court not understanding their case or the language being spoken around them; they were effectively foreigners, alienated from the language of power subjecting them to trial.⁵⁰ In this context, the vast majority of the population was at a severe disadvantage, being demarcated away from the central discourses of power national identity.⁵¹ According to a research report published in 2012 by the Centre of Studies for Peace and Development (CEPAD), a Timorese run Non-Government Organisation (NGO) in Dili:

Divisions based on language (Tetum, Portuguese, English and Bahasa Indonesia), and the perceived effect this has on access to political power and information, further exacerbate tensions between the political elite and the majority, where the great extent of Government-based information and legislation is disseminated and approved in Portuguese; a language which, while being one of Timor-Leste's official state languages, remains spoken by comparatively few Timorese. This in turn has the potential to polarise groups within society based on language and the role that individuals or groups played in the independence process, and as a result, further deepen the divisiveness between the political elite and its constituents amid widespread poverty and social inequality.⁵²

⁵⁰ Hughes. 2009. "Dependent Communities." *op. cit.*, pp.184-188

⁵¹ Wallis. 2013. "Victors, Villains and Victims." *op. cit.*, p.137

⁵² This National Working Group Report is a product of ten months of research and consultation on the topic of the '*promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest*'. People that represented a broad cross section of social groupings in Timor-Leste, like political parties, the Catholic Church and Islamic community, young people, women, and the security sector, participated so as to ensure social inclusiveness in the consultation process. The National Working Group passed on their proposals for broader debate through district Focus Group Discussions. Participants across all of Timor-Leste's 13 districts were involved in this latter group. In total, over 400 people were

The government had not been in place a year when the first serious demonstration occurred on 4 December 2002. Initially, a group of 500 students led demonstrations that targeted alleged police brutality.⁵³ Groups of unemployed youth, and former militia members and policemen, wishing to express their frustration at the government's failure to address their demands, hijacked the demonstration and it escalated into a series of violent attacks on property, foreigners, and even the homes of the PM and his immediate family. Commenting on this incident, Smith expressed his concern about how easy it seemingly was for a protest this size to congregate, the apparent catalyst being resentment and frustration with the government, police, and foreign businesses.⁵⁴

3.2.3. Church versus State: the 2005 Catholic Church Demonstrations

A confrontation between the Catholic Church and the large-scale popular support it received, and the FRETILIN government in February and March 2005, further illustrates the gap between FRETILIN and many Timorese citizens. The catalyst for this confrontation was the government's decision to abolish compulsory religious studies in the education system. Many Timorese viewed this as an affront to the status of the Catholic Church, which they valued because of the important historical role it played in helping and protecting the population during the Portuguese colonial regime, the Indonesian occupation, and the final campaign for independence.

involved in this project. Centre of Studies for Peace and Development (CEPAD). 2012. "National Working Group Report – Individual and Party Interests over the National Interest." *CEPAD and Interpeace*, Dili, p.19

⁵³ Wallis. 2013. "Victors, Villains and Victims." *op. cit.*, p.141

⁵⁴ Smith. 2004. "East Timor." *op. cit.*, p.279 and Molnar. 2010. "Timor Leste." *op. cit.*, p.115

Throughout the colonial period, the Church had a very close relationship with the people because of its efforts to educate the local population and provide a locus for community activities.⁵⁵ The Church also strove to provide protection for many Timorese during the occupation, and at an international level, the Vatican never recognised Indonesia's incorporation of Timor-Leste. Indonesia's official policy of promoting religion also enlarged membership in the Church. By the time of the referendum ballot, Catholicism had become an important source of identity and affection for the majority of the population, with the number of Catholics increasing from 20 per cent of a population (of 688,000 people) in 1974, to 90 per cent of a population (of between 750,000 to 800,000 people) in 1999.⁵⁶ The Church took on a very active role around the time of the referendum ballot in 1999. In the midst of the violence the Indonesian backed militia unleashed against the pro-independence movement, for example, the Church offered shelter and protection to people fleeing the carnage. Moreover, the Vatican drew international attention to the situation and called for armed peacekeepers to intervene.⁵⁷

The confrontation began in February 2005 when the FRETILIN Government proposed to abolish obligatory religious education in public schools, although it would still be available on a voluntary basis. This proposal was intended to enforce the constitutional separation of Church and state. Several Church leaders perceived this proposal as an affront to the Church and called

⁵⁵ Kohen, Arnold S. 2001. "The Catholic Church and the Independence of East Timor." In *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community*, edited by Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R. Shalom, 43-51. Sydney: Pluto Press Australia, p.44

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, pp.46 and 49

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, pp.46 and 50

for demonstrations on 18 March.⁵⁸ These demonstrations continued for three weeks and involved at least 7,000, although some accounts had the numbers as high as 12,000, people.⁵⁹ Caroline Hughes writes that many people she spoke to at these demonstrations felt that the government was disconnected from the people and that it did not appreciate the relationship between the Church and the people because many FRETILIN leaders had been out of the country during the occupation.⁶⁰ Both sides employed harsh rhetoric throughout the confrontation, which indicated the seriousness of the situation. One priest, Domingus Soares Maubere, according to newspaper reports, instructed people not to support FRETILIN, labelling the party communist and saying its intentions were to wipe out priests and nuns in the country.⁶¹ PM Alkatiri ratcheted up the confrontational rhetoric by accusing the Church of operating effectively as a political party.⁶²

In addition to support for the teaching of religion in state schools, the Church also tapped into other sources of popular frustration by expressing opposition to the government's decision not to pursue trials for those allegedly responsible for the violence and deaths throughout 1999.⁶³ The Church in Timor-Leste argued that the government was out of touch with the wishes of the people, as evidenced by the numbers of protestors, and even called for the resignation of the

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p.47

⁵⁹ Molnar. 2010. "Timor Leste." *op. cit.*, pp.99 and 119

⁶⁰ Hughes. 2009. "Dependent Communities." *op. cit.*, p.196

⁶¹ Siapno. 2006. "Timor Leste." *op. cit.*, p.338

⁶² Molnar. 2010. "Timor Leste." *op. cit.*, p.119 and Lyon, Alynna J. 2011. "The Activist Catholic Church in Independent East Timor: 'The Church is not a Political Institution.'" Paper prepared for the *World International Studies Committee*, Annual Conference, Porto, Portugal. August 17, 2011, retrieved 25 February, 2014 from http://www.wiscnetwork.org/porto2011/papers/WISC_2011-721.pdf, p.12

⁶³ Lyon. 2011. "The Activist Catholic Church in Independent East Timor." *op. cit.*, p.13

prime minister. The Church rode these waves of anti-government fervour to pursue objectives beyond religious education; it also sought the outlawing of abortion and prostitution.

Although the FRETILIN government threatened to use force against the demonstrators, it never did so, perhaps aware of how the situation could quickly escalate. Instead, FRETILIN sought a political settlement. On 7 May 2005, PM Alkatiri and two Bishops signed a declaration, with President Gusmão in attendance, which resolved the immediate confrontation between the Church and the government, though arguably plenty of damage had already been done to FRETILIN. The declaration was a victory for the Church, producing a plan to formalise religious education in state schools, and the criminalisation of both abortion (even if the mother's life was in danger) and prostitution.⁶⁴

Another challenge the FRETILIN government faced came in the form of large numbers of veterans who had missed out on employment within the new armed forces or elsewhere in the state. Many of them, despite receiving some assistance to readjust to civilian life, still felt a sense of disillusionment with the state of affairs after independence. Part of this disillusionment stemmed from dissatisfaction with their immediate material conditions, while some of it related to a more underlying lack of respect for, and recognition of, the new governing authorities. Many veterans, as early 2001, began forming veterans' associations, training as irregular forces, and

⁶⁴ Molnar. 2010. "Timor Leste." *op. cit.*, pp.100-101 and Silva, Kelly [Translated by Cesarino, Leticia Maria Costa da Nóbrega]. 2008. "The Bible as Constitution or the Constitution as Bible? Nation-State Building Projects in East Timor." *Horizontes Antropológicos* 4(se). Retrieved 25 February 2013 from http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?pid=S0104-71832008000100003&script=sci_arttext

holding parades in major population centres.⁶⁵ Some associations had arisen during the occupation, and were now given a new lease of life by disaffected veterans, while some emerged only after independence. The most prominent were *Colimau 2000*, CPD-RDTL, and *Sagrada Familia*.⁶⁶

In May 2004, the extension of the UN mission — the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) — for another year until May 2005 signalled the UN's reservations about FRETILIN's governance of the country. The extension came about as a response to requests from the government itself over deteriorating security conditions: crime had broken out throughout the districts and more and more people had lost faith that the government could deliver on any of its promises.⁶⁷

By 2005, resentment and frustration among veterans towards the FRETILIN government expressed itself in the formation of a new political party. As described in Chapter Two, a former ex-Falintil veteran leader, Cornelio Gama, AKA Elle-Sette (L7), established and led UNDERTIM, which purported to represent the interests of veterans.⁶⁸ Elle-Sette commanded respect throughout the country having operated his own guerrilla unit — *Sagrada Familia* — during the occupation, which to some extent was independent of the broader national

⁶⁵ Wallis. 2013. "Victors, Villains and Victims." *op. cit.*, p.140

⁶⁶ Smith. 2004. "East Timor." *op. cit.*, p.286 and Molnar (2010) *Timor Leste*, *op. cit.*, p.113

⁶⁷ Molnar. 2010. "Timor Leste." *op. cit.*, p.117

⁶⁸ Siapno. 2006. "Timor Leste." *op. cit.*, p.338

independence movement, and the leadership of Gusmão.⁶⁹ Elle-Sette's criticisms of the FRETILIN government now went beyond the immediate material conditions of veterans, and pointed to a deficiency in terms of the political legitimacy of many in the FRETILIN leadership: "They went away and did nothing for this country. In the end Falintil struggled on its own."⁷⁰ The underlying narrative expressed here is one of contempt for those FRETILIN leaders who fled Timor-Leste when Indonesia invaded, lived in the Timorese diaspora during the occupation and therefore did not fight or suffer with the people, but when the nationalist goal of independence became a reality, they flew back, took charge of the country, and materially benefitted after independence while those who suffered missed out on the fruits of independence.

Veterans involved in CPD-RDTL, another veterans' association led by a former veteran, Antonio Aitahan Matak, also did not recognise the legitimacy of the FRETILIN government. This organisation rejected the 2001 elections, the current political structure, and the UN presence and aspired to a return to the original (1975) Constitution of Timor-Leste.⁷¹ Negotiations between the government and some of the veteran's groups proved fruitless and tension and suspicion remained.⁷²

⁶⁹ Smith. 2004. "East Timor." *op. cit.*, p.285

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p.285

⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.286

⁷² *Ibid*, p.286

3.2.4. The party is over: the 2006 crisis

The inability of FRETILIN to find a permanent and effective resolution to veterans' concerns played a role in the broader, and bloody, melodrama of the 2006 Crisis. This crisis began as a strike and ended with riots, the resignation of the prime minister, and the arrival of a UN peacekeeping force. An examination of the events that constituted this crisis illustrates further the weaknesses of the FRETILIN Government and the nature of the historic project it had embarked upon. Some background on the initial constitution of the F-FDTL and National Police of Timor-Leste (*Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste* or PNTL) is, however, necessary to properly understand the dynamics of what happened.

The national army, the F-FDTL, was formed in February 2001, and by May the following year, was 1500 soldiers strong, and divided into two battalions. Battalion I absorbed 650 FALINTIL veterans and was located in the east of the country, first in Los Palos, then Baucau. This battalion enlisted more Timorese of an older age from the eastern districts of Lautem, Viqueque, and Baucau, than the remaining districts; 56 per cent were easterners and this fact, according to one UN paper, drew widespread public criticism in central and western districts.⁷³

Battalion II was located in Metinaro, not far from Dili. Most of its recruits were younger and from non-eastern districts, reflecting an official effort to rebalance the regional bias in the F-

⁷³ Wallis. 2013. "Victors, Villains and Victims." *op. cit.*, p.140 and International Crisis Group. 2006. "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis." *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No.120, 10 October 2006, Dili; Brussels, retrieved 13 August 2014 from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/timor-leste.aspx>, pp.5-6

FDTL.⁷⁴ The recruitment strategy to only employ Timorese under the age of 22 with high school certificates achieved this goal, but it effectively excluded veterans, most of whom were too old, had no formal education, and also happened to be from the east. Besides regional and generational divides, there was also a factional divide between the two battalions going back to the schism amongst the resistance movement in the 1980s and 1990s, between those who supported Xanana Gusmão, and those who supported FRETILIN.⁷⁵

The PNTL was established in August 2001. Its recruitment policy also proved controversial with 340 of its new recruits former police who served the Indonesian regime during the occupation. By the end of 2002, resentment had built towards them internally in the PNTL because they had their recruitment fast tracked compared to other new recruits with no experience, and externally, because many unemployed veterans had applied for jobs but could not meet the entry requirements.⁷⁶ Leading up to 2006, tensions were rising within the security sector with many complaints about discrimination being practised in both the F-FDTL and the PNTL.

It was in this context that 159 soldiers from Battalion II, who became known as the ‘Petitioners’, wrote a letter to President Gusmão on 9 January 2006, complaining about discrimination against westerners in terms of hiring, conditions, pay, and promotions. In essence,

⁷⁴ Wallis. 2013. “Victors, Villains and Victims.” *op. cit.*, p.140

⁷⁵ Molnar. 2010. “Timor Leste.” *op. cit.*, p.120

⁷⁶ Simonsen, Sven Gunnar. 2009. “The role of East Timor’s security institutions in national integration – and disintegration.” *The Pacific Review* 22(5):575-596, pp.579-580

they felt they were considered untrustworthy and undeserving of their position. The ICG regarded their complaints as something which could have been handled simply, there and then, but it seems a personal grudge between the defence force commander Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak (TMR), and the leader of the Petitioners prevented this occurring.⁷⁷

According to President Xanana Gusmão, the defence forces chief of staff, Colonel Lere Anan Timor, dismissed the Petitioners' claims of discrimination, and charged that some political parties were stirring trouble.⁷⁸ President Gusmão promised the Petitioners an investigation into their complaints, but when it came to attending the investigation, some Petitioners refused because three of the investigators themselves were people they had complained about, while some other Petitioners refused because they alleged they were being harassed. Col. Lere told them they had to participate in the commissions or they would face dismissal. He also hinted that political parties were placing pressure on him to enact these policies. On 16 March, with 593 of the Petitioners refusing to return to their barracks, Matan Ruak officially dismissed them. PM Alkatiri supported this decision, President Gusmão did not; he delivered a critical and divisive speech on 23 March, which attacked the decision and backed the claims of discrimination against westerners. The ICG argued that President Gusmão's speech may have encouraged petitioner attacks on easterners in Dili; by 27 March, 17 homes had been burned, and easterners were evacuating the capital.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ International Crisis Group. 2006. "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis." *op. cit.*, p.6

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p.7

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, pp.7-8

Peaceful demonstrations in Dili throughout 24 to 28 April 2006 deteriorated on the final day when gangs of youths and a group of the recently dismissed soldiers joined in the protests. Five people died when the protests escalated into violence and government property and vehicles were destroyed.⁸⁰ This violence prompted Alkatiri to call in the F-FDTL to support the PNTL in handling the upheaval. From this point onwards, the situation spiralled out of control; violence and destruction of property and houses continued and by early May, the F-FDTL and PNTL had begun to fracture. On 3 May, Military Police Chief Major Alfredo Reinado left his barracks and recruited both military police and PNTL officers to his cause.⁸¹ Although his true intentions were not clear, it was symptomatic of the collapse of discipline and coherence in the police and armed forces.

The security situation by late May 2006 had completely disintegrated, with gangs, paramilitary units and rogue police officers and soldiers operating throughout the country, pursuing their own agendas, political or otherwise.⁸² The armed groups and gangs were organised around allegiances to particular regional cleavages, such as easterners versus westerners, or to particular political personalities, such as the Minister for the Interior, Rogerio Lobato, who armed his own personal unit of paramilitaries. With armed conflict between PNTL and F-FDTL members continuing, and the number of fatalities increasing, enough pressure had mounted to force PM Alkatiri to resign on 26 June 2006. This resignation coincided with the arrival of 3,200 armed

⁸⁰ Molnar. 2010. "Timor Leste." *op. cit.*, p.122

⁸¹ International Crisis Group. 2006. "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis." *op. cit.*, pp.9-10

⁸² Simonsen. 2009. "The role of East Timor's security institutions in national integration – and disintegration." *op. cit.*, p.581

UN peacekeepers into Dili.⁸³ The fallout had also claimed the political scalps of two of FRETILIN's ministers: Minister for the Interior, Rogerio Lobato, and the Minister for Defence, Roque Rodrigues. On 10 July, Jose Ramos Horta became the new prime minister of the still FRETILIN-led Second Constitutional Government of Timor-Leste and on 25 August, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) established a new mission. In total, estimates put the number of deaths at 37, and the number of internally displaced people at 155,000.⁸⁴

From a FRETILIN perspective, the 2006 Crisis was a political and governing catastrophe. Two ministers, and the prime minister, resigned from their positions, the institutions of security imploded, armed gangs ran amok, people were killed and internally displaced, and a foreign peacekeeping force had to be called in to stabilise the country. The UN Commission of Inquiry (COI), in its comprehensive account and assessment of the 2006 Crisis, found that responsibility for the crisis lays at the feet, to varying degrees, of the FRETILIN Government, the F-FDTL, the PNTL, President Gusmão, and the UN mission at time, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL).⁸⁵ The report is particularly damning in its assessment of FRETILIN's overall management of both the F-FDTL and the PNTL. It stated that the government bore some responsibility along with "...those in operational command and the relevant ministers", for the institutional problems that arose between and within the F-FDTL and the PNTL.⁸⁶

⁸³ *Ibid*, pp.580-581

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p.581

⁸⁵ United Nations. 2006. "Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste." *United Nations*, 2 October 2006, Geneva, pp.53-64

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p.61

The COI did praise the government, and the leadership of PM Alkatiri, for taking some initiatives to find solutions to the petitioner problem, like establishing committees and holding security meetings to develop cooperation between PNTL and F-FDTL. In its final analysis, however, the COI "...concludes that the Government was insufficiently proactive."⁸⁷ The COI identified the following matters as key failures on the part of the FRETILIN Government:

- PM Alkatiri was criticised for failing to take appropriate disciplinary action against the improper behaviour of the Minister for the Interior, Rogerio Lobato, despite being regularly warned about his activities over a number of years.
- The government did not do enough to reduce the growing tensions between the PNTL and the F-FDTL and failed to develop an official national security policy.
- The Council of Ministers did not debate the dismissal of the Petitioners; PM Alkatiri only gave his support to Matan Ruak when he gave that order.
- The government did not follow the appropriate legal procedures when it ordered the F-FDTL to support the PNTL in responding to demonstrations. PM Alkatiri comes in for serious criticism for his particular role in this affair.
- PM Alkatiri was also criticised for not acting resolutely enough to denounce the transfer of weapons to civilians that occurred throughout the crisis, or to take any other measures to address the matter.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p.61

In addition, Hughes argues that there were underlying economic and political causes to the crisis as well. In particular, both UNTAET and FRETILIN failed to manage the population's expectations about what life was really going to be like after independence. Unrealisable expectations, caused by the government's tight fiscal policies and inability to provide the desired goods and services to the public, contributed to social unrest and discontent as well.⁸⁸

The events of 2006 were the most traumatic episode of FRETILIN's period of rule. Clearly, many in the country felt that FRETILIN failed to handle the crisis adequately, a conclusion reflected in the results of the 2007 national parliamentary elections. These election results indicate a large part of the voting public — 50 per cent of those who had supported it in 2001 — had lost faith in its governance of the country. As Kingsbury put it:

The reasons for FRETILIN's rout could be traced directly to the problems that triggered the destructive internal conflict in 2006. Perhaps the main complaint, summarising all others, was that the government appeared unconcerned about the plight of the people. Despite some sound policies, its style under Mari Alkatiri was needlessly confrontational and divisive.⁸⁹

It is worth also noting the significance of Mari Alkatiri's leadership, in his position as prime minister, and that of President Gusmão. Many Timorese considered Alkatiri an outsider because he had a different ethnic (Yemeni) and religious (Islam) background to most of the population. As I outlined in Chapter Two, the vast majority of the population were of Malayo-

⁸⁸ Hughes. 2009. "Dependent Communities." *op. cit.*, p.155

⁸⁹ Kingsbury. 2009. "East Timor." *op. cit.*, p.182

Polynesian or Papuan (Trans-New Guinea) derivation and adhered to Roman Catholicism. Alkatiri also had had the privilege of attending primary and high school in Dili before going overseas to graduate as a surveyor at the Angolan School of Geography.⁹⁰ Alkatiri was not known for his warm personality and charisma and, perhaps most importantly, had not been in the country during the Indonesian occupation.

Alkatiri is best described as a technocrat and machine politician; very intelligent and well educated, he played an important role in the overseas movement that pursued the cause of Timorese independence. As a founding member of FRETILIN, he also was central to its development for those Timorese located overseas during the occupation. His distance from the resistance on the ground in Timor-Leste, however, did leave him disconnected to the terrible struggle the Timorese faced until Indonesia departed. In short, Alkatiri's style of governance, which certainly lacked any sense of charisma, arguably reflected the degree to which he was disconnected from the vast majority of the people he governed. In response, it seems many ordinary Timorese citizens found it hard to relate to him, and came to see him as a leader who did not understand *the people* — he was not perceived as being one of them.

In contrast, Xanana Gusmão had attributes and a background that many Timorese found easier to relate to. He was a 'native' Timorese, and had a Catholic background. Indeed, he had

⁹⁰ Shoesmith. 2003. "Divided Leadership in a Semi-Presidential System." *op. cit.*, p.236

studied at a Jesuit seminary before working in the colonial civil service.⁹¹ He had also fought and suffered with the people and guerrillas during the occupation, and then went on to actually lead the primary organisation responsible for the independence struggle by the mid-1980s. Even a member of FRETILIN, who wished to remain anonymous, agreed that the people in his district of Ermera supported Gusmão because they had seen him living together with them during the occupation.⁹² The Indonesian forces ultimately caught Gusmão in 1992 and incarcerated him in prison for most of the 1990s, where he was still able to lead the struggle. Finally, he also possessed charm, gravitas, an enthusiastic personality and able to motivate, unite and lead people, sometimes in the most trying of circumstances.⁹³ Such were his powers of persuasion that his speech on 23 March 2006, described as '27 minutes of incendiary words', has been identified as making the situation worse by legitimising the grievances of the Petitioners and westerners, which may have incited attacks on easterners.⁹⁴

The power and magnetism of Xanana Gusmão's leadership must also be remembered when we look at the results of the 2007 elections. While FRETILIN was certainly facing an electoral backlash over its handling of events in 2006, and its other failings up to that point, the fact that Gusmão was able to form a new political party in a matter of two months before the election and come second, is an extraordinary achievement by any measure. The leadership and

⁹¹ *Ibid*, p.236

⁹² Interviewee 22, Anonymous, 29 October 2013

⁹³ Niner, Sara. 2005. "President Xanana Gusmão: A transforming leadership." In *Development Bulletin - Cooperating with Timor-Leste: Options for good development practice*, 39-41. Development Studies Network, No.68 October, p.39-41

⁹⁴ International Crisis Group. 2006. "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis." *op. cit.*, p.8


personality of Gusmão thus contributed to the decline of FRETILIN and the rise of CNRT in the 2007 election.

3.3. 2007 National Election Results

Sixteen parties contested the elections; twelve parties ran independently, while the others formed two coalitions of two parties. Table 2.2 in Chapter Two (page 80) provides a detailed breakdown of the parties that contested the 2007 polls, how much of the valid vote they received, and the number of seats that they won in the parliament.⁹⁵ Two things stand out. The first is the decline in FRETILIN's share of the vote; down from 57.37 per cent in 2001 to 29.02 per cent in 2007 (a loss of 28.35 per cent). The other is the presence of a new party, CNRT, and its impressive result of 24.10 per cent of the vote. To get a better perspective on the massive electoral shift that occurred in 2007, I will turn to a visual comparison of voting trends in 2001 and 2007 (see Chart 3.2):

⁹⁵ Leach. 2009. "The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste." *op. cit.*, pp.225-227

Chart 3.2: National Vote Comparison, 2001 and 2007



Source: de Sousa. 2001. "Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor Constituent Assembly Election." *op. cit.*, pp.307-308 and Leach. 2009. "The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste." *op. cit.*, pp.225-227

FRETILIN lost almost half its vote while a new party, CNRT, which had only been founded a matter of months before the 2007 poll, took almost a quarter of the national vote. A massive electoral backlash against FRETILIN had taken place and many voters had shifted their allegiance to CNRT and placed their faith in its president, the leader of the resistance movement, Xanana Gusmão. Turning to other parties, PD increased its share of the vote slightly, while PSD and ASDT, which had run in a coalition arrangement, more or less maintained their level of support. Of the other smaller parties that had acquired seats in the 2001 polls, all but two of them failed to get beyond the 3 per cent threshold required to obtain seats in the 2007 parliament.

KOTA and PPT, which had run in a coalition arrangement, barely crossed the threshold with 3.20 per cent. Overall, six small parties were purged from the 2007 parliament, while two new smaller parties made their debut, PUN with 4.55 per cent and UNDERTIM by the skin of its teeth with 3.19 per cent.

The next point is the district-by-district analysis of the election. As explained previously, FRETILIN performed better than any other party in all but one of the districts in 2001, while taking a majority in eight. I also drew particular attention to the three eastern districts of Baucau, Lautem, and Viqueque because of their unique, long-standing relationship with FRETILIN. The 2007 results indicate that, outside of the district of Covalima, FRETILIN only won a plurality in those three eastern districts. A range of other parties or coalitions won the remaining districts, the results of which are outlined in Table 3.7:⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (CNE). 2007. "National Provisional Results from the 30 June 2007 Parliamentary Elections." *op. cit.*

Table 3.5: National Vote for Parties in 2007 (District-by-District)


Districts:	Winner	% Valid Vote	Runner Up	% Valid Vote
<i>Eastern</i>				
Baucau	FRETILIN	62.44	CNRT	13.42
Lautem	FRETILIN	45.53	CNRT	14.61
Viqueque	FRETILIN	59.84	CNRT	12.62
<i>Western/Central</i>				
Aileu	ASDT-PSD	47.30	CNRT	20.46
Ainaro	ASDT-PSD	29.13	KOTA-PPT	18.69
Bobonaro	CNRT	20.56	PD	19.31
Covalima	FRETILIN	28.58	PD	20.70
Dili	CNRT	45.23	FRETILIN	22.38
Ermera	PD	21.97	PUN	19.67
Liquica	CNRT	38.96	ASDT-PSD	19.82
Manatuto	CNRT	33.18	FRETILIN	17.57
Manufahi	ASDT-PSD	26.79	FRETILIN	25.43
Oecussi	CNRT	34.68	FRETILIN	27.53

Source: Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (CNE). 2007. "Preliminary District Results." *East Timor Action Network*, retrieved 19 July 2013 from http://www.etan.org/etan/obproject/2007elect.htm#Parliamentary_

Across the board, FRETILIN had lost a significant amount of support; it won a majority of the vote in only two districts, Baucau (down to 62.44 per cent from 81.98 per cent; a loss of 19.54 per cent) and Viqueque (down to 59.84 per cent from 74.95; a loss of 15.11 per cent), compared to eight in the previous election. FRETILIN's overall losses in the east were certainly significant, averaging around 17 per cent. They were dwarfed, however, by its losses elsewhere, especially in the five districts where it had won a majority six years earlier. Bobonaro dropped to 16.09 per cent from 57.42 per cent (a loss of 41.33 per cent) Covalima dropped to 28.58 per cent from 61.42 per cent (a loss of 32.84 per cent), Dili dropped to 22.38 per cent from 66.05 per cent (a loss of 43.67 per cent), Liquica dramatically dropped to 12.00 per cent from 72.44 per cent (a

loss of 60.44 per cent), and Manufahi dropped to 25.43 per cent from 54.56 per cent (a loss of 29.13 per cent). In these five non-eastern districts, FRETILIN suffered an average loss of around 41 per cent. Maps 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the winner (party or coalition with the highest share of the vote) and runner up (party or coalition with the second highest share of the vote) in each of the thirteen districts for both the 2001 and 2007 elections:

Map 3.1: National Vote District-by-District in 2001 (Winning Party)



Source: de Sousa. 2001. "Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor Constituent Assembly Election." *op. cit.*, pp.307 308 and Smith. 2004. "East Timor: Elections in the World's Newest Nation." *op. cit.*, p.151

Map 3.2: National Vote District-by-District in 2007 (Winning Party)



Source: Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (CNE). 2007. “Preliminary District Results.” *op. cit.*

Map 3.1 produced from the 2001 results is almost blanketed in red — ASDT (light blue) won Aileu — demonstrating FRETILIN’s preponderance at that juncture. Map 3.2 clearly illustrates the collapse of FRETILIN’s stranglehold on power in this district-by-district level analysis. As previously discussed, FRETILIN held onto the three eastern districts, plus Covalima in the West (with only 28.58 per cent), but lost its primacy in the remaining eight districts it won in 2001. The parties that stand out here are CNRT, which claimed victory in five districts, and the ASDT-PSD coalition, which won three districts.

A comparison of the 2001 and 2007 runner up electoral maps, Maps 3.3 and 3.4 indicate that while FRETILIN still retained some political loyalty in the country, the political space had opened up and a variety of different parties had a louder voice in political life.

Map 3.3: National Vote District-by-District in 2001 (Runner Up)



Source: de Sousa. 2001. "Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor Constituent Assembly Election." *op. cit.*, pp.307-308 and Smith. 2004. "East Timor: Elections in the World's Newest Nation." *op. cit.*, p.151


Map 3.4: National Vote District-by-District in 2007 (Runner Up)



Source: Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (CNE). 2007. "Preliminary District Results." *op. cit.*

FRETILIN managed to come in second in only four of the remaining nine districts in 2007: Oecussi, Manufahi, Manatuto, and Dili. The five others went to PD, PUN, ASDT-PSD, and KOTA-PPT. The main point I emphasise here is that FRETILIN failed to come runner up in districts, namely Liquica (fourth), Bobonaro (fourth), and Ainaro (fifth), where it had won six years earlier. And even in Dili, Manatuto, and Manufahi, where FRETILIN was able to manage runner up positions in 2007, it still suffered big losses when assessed against the 2001 elections; a decline of 43.67 per cent, 30 per cent, and 29.13 per cent respectively (see Chart 3.4).

Chart 3.3: Distribution of Seats in Parliament Comparison, 2001 and 2007



Sources: de Sousa. 2001. "Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor Constituent Assembly Election." *op. cit.*, pp.307-308 and Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (CNE). 2007. "National Provisional Results from the 30 June 2007 Parliamentary Elections." *op. cit.*

FRETILIN lost more than half of its seats, down to 21 from 43. This does *not* factor in the seats it won in the district seat elections of 2001. PD (8 seats), PSD (5 seats), and ASDT (6

seats) held onto the same number of seats, more or less, while six of the parties that were in the parliament elected in 2001 no longer had a presence in the 2007 parliament. KOTA and PPT, which ran in a coalition arrangement, shared the two seats they won. CNRT, came in second with 18 seats.

As depicted in Chapter Two with Chart 2.1 (page 70) and Chart 2.2 (page 82), FRETILIN's influence in the parliament in 2001, assessed as a percentage of the number of seats held by all of the relevant parties, was severely reduced, by almost half, after the 2007 elections. Although FRETILIN won a plurality of seats in the parliament, FRETILIN failed to put together a coalition of parties to form the Fourth Constitutional Government of Timor-Leste. As an indication of how politically toxic FRETILIN was at the time, it was CNRT, which had won three fewer seats in the parliament that formed the nucleus of the next government along with PD, PSD, ASDT, and, later, UNDERTIM. In reference to the concept of structure of competition as it applies to the 2001 and 2007 elections, the structure can only be described as open: the identity of the government changed because a coalition of different parties replaced FRETILIN's exclusive control of it; a multitude of parties replaced a single party, transforming the structure of government; and a new party, one that had made its debut in the 2007 elections, became the lead party in the coalition government.

Conclusion

This chapter documented the political rise and fall of FRETILIN, beginning with its ascension in 2001, and its decline in 2007. Having formed the First Constitutional Government of the Republic of Timor-Leste in 2002, FRETILIN possessed an ideal starting point to strengthen and consolidate its status as a proto-dominant party. While it did face a number of structural challenges, particularly in the economy, which certainly made it difficult to govern the country, the FRETILIN government adhered to fiscal administrative policies that severely restricted its ability to deliver goods and services to the population. The limited material benefits of independence disappointed and frustrated many, including veterans, who felt they deserved better given their efforts to attain independence. Veterans also felt that many of FRETILIN's political leaders lacked legitimacy because of their absence during the occupation.

FRETILIN also played a significant role in the construction of a national identity in Timor-Leste, as expressed in the Constitution, which was quite alien to most Timorese. The elitist imagining of Timor-Leste, represented it as a Portuguese speaking country that celebrated FRETILIN's contribution to the independence campaign, prioritising it above all other actors. This downplayed the importance of the clandestine movement, amongst other groups, whose members were generally more familiar with Tetum and Indonesian. This alienation of FRETILIN from so many in the country represented a failure to conceptualise and implement a historic project that would attract electoral support in the future. The confrontation with the Catholic Church in 2005 was one example of a failure to understand the sentiments and lives of the population. There were many causal factors that were involved in the social conflagration of

2006, but the FRETILIN government's response to it was criticised widely, and it suffered for it at the national parliamentary elections in the following year.

The damage done to FRETILIN in 2007 left open considerable political space for new actors and parties to get involved in the political life of the country. It was in this space that the former guerrilla leader, and President of Timor-Leste, Xanana Gusmão, made his presence felt. He founded his own party, CNRT, and instigated a change in the structure of competition, and as a result, the pattern of party competition. This was a remarkable achievement given the short period of time he had to achieve this outcome. Over the first term of leading the governing coalition between 2007, CNRT did well enough to convince the voting public to allow them another five years of governing Timor-Leste at the 2012 national parliamentary elections; this time, with an increased number of seats in parliament. This result indicates some consolidation of the existing pattern of party competition (moderate pluralism), and a more closed structure of competition. I will address the reasons for this outcome in Chapter Four, which I shall turn to now.

Chapter Four. Phoenix from the Ashes: Xanana Gusmão and CNRT

In outlining his economic policy for East Timor ahead of the 2007 elections, Xanana Gusmão told an allegory of a dying man and his family in a traditional East Timorese setting. The man was sick and his family was unable to help as medicine was expensive and all they had was some cows. Had they sold some cows, the family would have had enough cash to afford the medicine the man needed and he would have lived. But in East Timor, one never sells one's cows. So, the cows were not sold, the medicine was not bought and the man died. Then the family killed the cows to hold a feast to mark the man's death. Gusmão then explained that it was better to invest in the present, to feed hungry people and to eradicate the uneducated, than to wait for a time that might not come. By investing in the present, he said, East Timor would build a base for the future...¹

Damien Kingsbury (2009)

The social upheaval and violence witnessed throughout the country in 2006 were undoubtedly fresh in the minds of many voters as they cast their ballots for president in April and May of 2007, and the new national parliament in June the same year. The fact that over 400,000 people turned out to vote, approximately 80 per cent of those registered to vote, stands as a testament to the determination of the Timorese population to find a way to rebuild their country and take it forward through democratic means. After the election, and headed by the new prime minister, Xanana Gusmão, CNRT took centre stage in leading the governing coalition of parties, the AMP, and ruled Timor-Leste for five years. Although they could not govern without the agreement of their political allies in the parliament, PM Gusmão and CNRT were clearly in control of the affairs of state.

¹ Kingsbury. 2009. "East Timor." *op. cit.*, pp.199-200

On 7 July 2012, the Timorese voting population rewarded CNRT with an increased presence in the parliament. CNRT received an additional 12 parliamentary seats, taking its tally to 30. FRETILIN increased its presence from 21 to 25 seats and PD held steady with eight seats. As explained in Chapters Two and Three, CNRT, FRETILIN and PD were the only parties that remained from the previous parliament. All of the other parties, including those in the former AMP governing coalition failed to win a single seat. FRENTI-Mudanca (FM), which competed in its first elections in 2012, won two seats by virtue of scraping over the 3 per cent threshold (3.11 per cent to be precise). Although the number of *relevant* parties in the parliament dropped from five to three, there was no essential change to the pattern of political party competition between 2007 and 2012. The party system dynamic remained, in terms of Sartori's framework, as one of moderate pluralism. In this chapter, I will address the key questions of why and how this this dynamic of competition persisted.

I begin to answer this question by referring to Mair's concept of the open and closed nature of the structure of party competition. The more closed structure of political competition that manifested in the wake of the 2012 elections can be elucidated in the following three ways. First, there was almost no alteration in the prevailing mode of government, with CNRT and PD remaining in power. Second, there was no innovation in the actual formation of government; CNRT continued to lead the new government with PD supporting it. And third, the only surprise of note was the inclusion of FM into the governing coalition. Inclusivity stopped there; CNRT did not invite FRETILIN to join in a 'government of national unity' that was mooted before the elections. The narrowing of the structure of competition demonstrates some early signs of

consolidation, but certainly not full institutionalisation, of ‘moderate pluralism’. I note again that the maturation (or consolidation) from an embryonic pattern of political party competition to an institutionalised party system generally takes some time; as mentioned in Chapter One, Sartori, for example, saw the consolidation of a party system requiring three election cycles.

Looking at the structure of competition, however, only tells us so much. The structure of competition is fundamentally contingent on election results. Even a cursory review of the 2012 results reveals CNRT improved markedly on its vote of five years earlier, and was almost in a position to form government on its own terms. Indeed, it fell short of a clear majority by just three seats. The continuation of moderate pluralism between 2007 and 2012 incorporates CNRT’s growing prominence in the political life of Timor-Leste. As such, I argue in this chapter that CNRT is a proto-dominant party, the existence of which has driven the narrowing of the structure of competition and the reproduction of a pattern of moderate pluralism. CNRT’s status as a proto-dominant party has been substantively premised and developed around the charismatic appeal of Xanana Gusmão, a more inclusive nation and state building project, and the operation of well-funded networks of patronage networks and distributive politics.

I have organised the demonstration of this argument into two chapters, Chapters Four and Five. In this chapter, I explore CNRT’s success by locating my argument within the theoretical framework of dominant parties in a similar fashion to how I analysed FRETILIN in Chapter Three. CNRT began laying down the foundations for dominance as the lead party of the coalition government of 2007 to 2012. It was in this context that CNRT initiated a governmental

strategy of public spending, based on a form of redistributive politics and patronage networks, which strengthened its political future. In Chapter Five, I address the 2012 national parliamentary elections as a case study of how CNRT drew on a plethora of material and ideational resources to augment its popularity amongst voters and provide greater leverage over other political parties in negotiations over determining the shape of future governments.

The focal point of attention in this chapter, however, is the period of CNRT-led government between 2007 and 2012. This period represents a stage in the life of Timorese politics that saw CNRT lay down the early foundations of its strategy of governmental dominance. The chapter is divided into two parts.

First, the chapter explores the formation of the AMP governing compact after the 2007 national parliamentary elections. The importance of this alliance is that it focuses our attention on how Xanana Gusmão sought to institute a new philosophy and practice of inclusivity by bringing individuals and groups, many of whom were alienated or marginalised by FRETILIN, into a new national political vision, identity, and settlement for the country. This section explores the details of how the government, particularly through the agency of CNRT in general, and Xanana Gusmão in particular, envisioned and implemented its policies to achieve these goals. I do this primarily by outlining how, with the aid of substantial state revenues — principally thanks to the flow of money from the oil and gas resource sectors — the government funded its policies.

Second, the chapter addresses further details of the CNRT-Gusmão historic project through an examination of three matters. The first is how CNRT, through the AMP Government, engineered increasingly close relations between itself and other actors and groups, namely veterans and the more vulnerable members of society, by way of the implementation of massive public spending projects to stabilise the country in the wake of the 2006 crisis. The second is the early growth of networks of patronage and distributive politics linked to official mechanisms for pursuing economic development. In particular, CNRT helped strengthen its material resources and organisational capacity by establishing mutually beneficial, reciprocal relations with certain business people and companies. And third, throughout this analysis I attend to the role Xanana Gusmão's leadership played in the development of CNRT's nation building project. In summary, over the course of the chapter I demonstrate how, during the first period of CNRT-led governance, its behaviour mimicked in some important ways that of a dominant party, which established the conditions for augmenting its power in the aftermath of the 2012 election.

4.1. Foundations of Dominance: CNRT Takes the Reins of Power

Because no political party won a majority in the parliament in the 2007 national parliamentary elections (held on 30 June), both FRETILIN and CNRT embarked upon negotiations with the other parties about establishing a governing coalition. With a plurality (21) of the total parliamentary seats (65), FRETILIN argued that it constitutionally had the right to form government. Section 106 of the Constitution states that the party with the most seats or an alliance of parties with a parliamentary majority is to name the prime minister and thus

determine the makeup of the government.² FRETILIN did not find enough willing coalition parties to form a government without CNRT, and these two parties could not form a ruling coalition together, primarily because of disagreements of the identity of the prime minister and the composition of the cabinet.³

The opening of the parliament and swearing in of its members took place on 30 July 2007. It soon became clear that CNRT had managed to pull together a coalition of enough parties (PD, PSD, and ASDT) to form government (with 37 of 65 seats). FRETILIN's candidate for president of the parliament lost to the leader of PD, Lasama (21 votes to 44), who had the backing of CNRT and the other parties.⁴ President Ramos-Horta swore in Xanana Gusmão as prime minister and the AMP coalition as the Fourth Constitutional Government of the Republic of Timor-Leste.

The formation of the AMP Government met with protests from the FRETILIN party and some of its supporters. FRETILIN took the position that the entire manoeuvre was unconstitutional because it had won the most seats in parliament so it had the right to govern. FRETILIN subsequently announced it would boycott the parliament and participate in a campaign of civil disobedience that would challenge the legitimacy of the AMP government

² Leach. 2009. "The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste." *op. cit.*, p.228

³ *Ibid*, p.227

⁴ Shoesmith. 2013. "Political Parties." *op. cit.*, p.130

through ‘people power’.⁵ Violent protests broke out in the FRETILIN strongholds in the east of the country, which featured the burning of hundreds of houses, and attacks on a convent and a UN convoy. The violence eventually subsided and FRETILIN returned to work as the main opposition party in the parliament, even though it continued to claim that the AMP government was illegitimate.

PM Gusmão distributed the ministries and other posts within the government, 38 in total, in a fashion that gave something to everyone.⁶ CNRT, PD, ASDT and PSD shared most of the ministries, vice-ministries and secretaries of state, although some went to non-party affiliated individuals, such as Emilia Pires (Minister of Finance), and to members of other parties not represented in the parliament, such as Avelino Coelho (founder and leader of PST).⁷ Other appointees included the leader of the former FRETILIN reform group *Mudanca* (ousted from FRETILIN in 2006), Jose Luis Guterres, who became deputy prime minister. UNDERTIM joined the AMP later in the life of the government, but it did not receive any senior posts in the government.

This amalgamation of political parties, however, was not immune from internal strife and discord. Shoesmith, for example, described the AMP as an ‘unstable coalition’, which regularly

⁵ Leach. 2009. “The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste.” *op. cit.*, p.228 and Kingsbury. 2009. “East Timor.” *op. cit.*, p.186

⁶ Leach. 2009. “The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste.” *op. cit.*, p.228

⁷ Government of Timor-Leste. “IV Constitutional Government.” *Historical Archive*, retrieved 19 July 2013 from <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=7526&lang=en>

frustrated Gusmão because he had to deal with so many coalition partners. Gusmão ultimately preferred to govern on his own terms as much as possible.⁸ This style of leadership produced tense and sometimes spiteful relations between Gusmão and some of the leaders in the AMP coalition. Some of these personal rivalries were also rooted in the history of the occupation and among the generation of leaders who founded the original political parties in 1975, while others arose because of Gusmão's highly personalised style of leadership and minimal tolerance for resistance from his coalition partners. Examples of such rivalries can be identified throughout the life of the AMP government, including Gusmão's clashes with the leader of ASDT, Francisco Xavier do Amaral, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Zacarias da Costa, of PSD, and Mario Carrascalao, the founder of PSD.

The relationship between CNRT and ASDT, and that of its leadership, deteriorated after Amaral made accusations of corruption against the governing coalition and announced that ASDT would only consider a governing alliance with FRETILIN in the 2012 elections.⁹ As it transpired, however, ASDT did not leave the AMP government and continued to show confidence in the coalition government until it dissolved itself before the 2012 polls.

Similarly, Gusmão's decision to override the authority of da Costa in 2010 in relation to the recalling of ambassadors to Dili for a Development Partners meeting engendered a crisis that

⁸ Shoemith. 2013. "Political Parties." *op. cit.*, pp.131-135

⁹ *Ibid*, p.132

threatened to bring down the AMP government.¹⁰ In response to Gusmão's decision, da Costa threatened to resign and his PSD colleagues threatened to pull out of the ruling coalition. Gusmão called their bluff and launched a blistering personal attack against da Costa in a meeting attended by journalists. To complete the humiliation of da Costa, the whole embarrassing episode was later uploaded to the internet.

Finally, Mario Carrascalao, the founder of PSD and second deputy prime minister for state administration with purview over anti-corruption activities, clashed with Gusmão over a contract for road construction. Carrascalao alleged that US\$3 million had gone missing.¹¹ In response, the Council of Ministers relieved Carrascalao of his responsibility for overseeing procurement in August 2010. A month later, the Secretary of State for the Council of Ministers criticised him for making such allegations public. The coup de grace came when Gusmão himself launched a personal tirade against Carrascalao, declaring him stupid, a liar, ignorant of the procurement system and a profiteer of the Indonesian occupation regime who had blood on his hands. Carrascalao resigned shortly afterwards in September 2010, and in his resignation letter protested that Gusmão had not properly consulted with him over his concerns. He also reiterated his allegations of corruption and instances of bad governance; he provided 29 examples of such behaviour. Yet ultimately, PSD also chose to remain in the government until the elections in 2012, when its leaders said they would reconsider their alliance options.¹²

¹⁰ *Ibid*, pp.131-132

¹¹ *Ibid*, p.133-134

¹² *Ibid*, p.133-134

Operating this coalition government — while frustrating at times for Gusmão — certainly also had its advantages. This governing arrangement facilitated Gusmão to pursue his own objectives. Gusmão formed CNRT as a political vehicle to lead the country in response to not only the crisis that engulfed Timor-Leste in 2006, but to broader social challenges, with the goal being to “liberate the people from all of their problems, from misery, poverty”¹³, as he put it in an interview with *The Monthly* in 2006. Gusmão’s plan for Timor-Leste was to realise for every citizen: “A decent house, with all services nearby. Education, health, hygiene, [and] water in the house, healthy conditions. The right to learn with schools right there, not walking five kilometres to go to school.”¹⁴ To achieve such objectives, Gusmão needed to bring together enough support from across the political spectrum to take hold of government. In doing so, he simultaneously bound together a range of social and political actors that represented many of those individuals and groups alienated by the FRETILIN government between 2001 and 2007. Indeed, as the ‘Programme of the IV Constitutional Government’ made clear:

Notwithstanding its parliamentary majority, it is the Government’s intention to govern in a dialogue with the political parties; with economic actors; with civil society, the Church, NGOs and other associations. The Government invites all these entities to constructively contribute to the well-being of Timor-Leste.

The present Government Programme reflects a convergence of the electoral programmes of the four political parties. It was drafted with significant

¹³ Aarons, Mark. 2007. “Timor’s Future: Xanana Gusmão and Jose Ramos-Horta.” pp.22-28 in *The Monthly*, August, p.24

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.25

contributions from citizens with no political party allegiances and coming from different sectors of Timorese society.¹⁵

This philosophy of inclusivity controversially extended out to embrace some individuals, for example Mario Carrascalao, who had collaborated with the Indonesian occupation and supported autonomy rather than independence in the 1999 referendum. Gusmão's style of leadership arguably fits with that of a 'middle-way' leader, someone who aims to bring disputing parties together, resolve conflict, and forge a path forward on a consensual basis, as defined by political psychologist Graham Little.¹⁶ Little defined middle way politics as transcending the standard restraints of politics:

...new and... future orientated, not to say Utopian; smart and inventive rather than traditional or institutional; and heavily committed to the idea of higher public ethics. Intellectually, the new middle way rests on paradox (we can have both, rather than make do with either/or, on synergy, creativity and reasoning (instead of violence), ultimately on imagining new ("transforming") solutions instead of the old ("transactional") deals between interested parties.¹⁷

¹⁵ Government of Timor-Leste. "Program of the IV Constitutional Government." *Government - Program*. Retrieved 5 August 2014 from <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?cat=39&lang=en&bl=16>

¹⁶ Little, Graham. 2009. "Middle Way Leaders." pp.111-128 in *International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies* 6(2)

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p.113

Sara Niner's evaluation of Gusmão's style of leadership, described as one based on charisma, extroversion, a preparedness to compromise and concern for the future, also fits Little's middle way leadership concept.¹⁸

Even in the face of disputes with leaders of the other parties in the coalition, Gusmão continued to hold the AMP Government together and pursue its policy agenda until the next round of elections in 2012. In essence, the AMP government was a politically expedient marriage of convenience that serviced the interests of the parties involved, particularly their leaders. For those involved, being a part of the government provided opportunities to access the benefits of office. The country had just gone through a period of traumatic social upheaval and forming a government that represented some of the various political cleavages in society was also a mechanism through which national unity could be advanced. Gusmão and CNRT constructed this broad political alignment, a new political compact, to rebuild the country and lead it into the future. The Second Vice-Coordinator of CNRT in the district of Baucau, Joao Cabral, explained:

The first goal is to build stability in order to build the country. Without stability, there is no development. Gusmão is an important leader is developing and leading the country. Ideology is about reconstruction, fundamentally. It's an ideology that brings all people together, for the sake of national unity.¹⁹

¹⁸ Niner. 2005. "*President Xanana Gusmão.*" *op. cit.* p.40

¹⁹ Interviewee 7, Joao Cabral, 21 September 2013 *op. cit.*

In implementing this project, CNRT also engendered an unofficial, symbolic reorientation of Timor-Leste's national identity. The AMP Government under the leadership of CNRT and Gusmão implicitly challenged FRETILIN's position as the central reference point of national identity. As I discussed in Chapter Three, the architects of the Constitution had given primacy to the role of FRETILIN in the Constitution and, more broadly, other symbols of state power, including the flag and the national language. It is true that CNRT did not attempt to formally change the Constitution, or those other aspects of state power that reflected an exclusive version of national identity focused on FRETILIN. The formation of the AMP government, however, represented the involvement and empowerment of a broad range of social and political forces that FRETILIN had marginalised during its term in government. CNRT member Josh Trindade touched on this point by arguing that:

In the recruitment of party members, FRETILIN exclusively defined themselves as resistance fighters and excluded ordinary Timorese, who did not have anything to do with that side of the resistance, and nothing to do with politics or were not FRETILIN before. This included other party members like Apodei and UDT. FRETILIN exclusivity limited them and their appeal [and] CNRT took advantage of it. [It] Brought everyone in, together. In a short period, two months, they campaigned and came second in the parliamentary elections. Part of the explanation concerns Gusmão's leadership, and his ability to pull everyone together. If you are not hard core FRETILIN, it is hard to relate to FRETILIN's leadership. CNRT is far more attractive.²⁰

²⁰ Interviewee 11, Josh Trindade, 2 October 2013 *op. cit.*

Gusmão's push for greater political and social inclusion pushed the unofficial, more informal contours of national identity to reflect, and give greater recognition to, groups such as veterans (Cornelio Gama of UNDERTIM), the 'younger generation' and clandestine movement (Lasama and Mariano Sabino of PD), former collaborators with the Indonesian occupation regime (Mario Carrascalao) and pro-autonomists, and others involved in a variety of different political parties. The symbolism of CNRT acting as the lead party in the ruling coalition, with Gusmão at its head, was also very significant. CNRT explicitly drew on the name of the umbrella resistance organisation *Concelho Nacional da Resistancia Timorese* (CNRT). As described in Chapter Two, this version of CNRT had developed out of the central organising body that Gusmão founded, and took charge of, in 1987 to fight for national independence. The *Concelho Nacional da Resistancia Maubere* (CNRM) continued the struggle until 1998, when the National Timorese Convention in Portugal reconstituted it as the *Concelho Nacional da Resistancia Timorese*. As Xanana Gusmão communicated to this convention:

The aim of this convention is...to design a political project that can bring all East Timorese together in such a way as to be able to coordinate their actions...It has taken us far too long to acknowledge the just principles of our struggle. It has taken us far too long to realise that we must not continue to swim against the tide of challenges that have constantly confronted us, to realise that we must unite so as to be able to face up to these challenges, to achieve more tangible and worthwhile results. It has taken us far too long to realise that we were riding in different compartments of a single train, running along the same track, harbouring the same desires, the same determination to win.²¹

²¹ Gusmão, Xanana. 2000. "To Resist is to Win!: the autobiography of Xanana Gusmão with selected letters & speeches." Richmond, Victoria: Aurora Books with David Lovell Publishing, pp.213-214

The CNRT of 1998 reflected a movement designed to incorporate all of the elements of the resistance to the occupation and forge them together to achieve their goal of national self-determination. The victory of Gusmão and the new CNRT in 2007 in some ways represented the fulfilment of a historical promise made long ago. CNRT member Joao Cabral, reflected on his journey that began in the resistance movement and FRETILIN and ended up in CNRT. His story has parallels with Gusmão's trajectory in the project of Timorese resistance, independence and development:

I was originally a member of FRETILIN and the resistance between 1975 and 1999. Afterwards, when I got involved in the project of development, I felt I needed to join CNRT as the best way to develop the country, and participate in a multiparty democracy. Initially I joined FRETILIN because they brought liberty to the country. However, in order to solve the problems of the country, we needed a figure like Gusmão to carry this country forward. People are now cooperating in this project, and Gusmão makes this possible. I first joined Fretili-Mudanca, and then joined with CNRT in 2007.²²

Once in power, CNRT began implementing a political project that laid the foundation for its political success in 2012. To explain this success, we must first attend to the material resources and the strategy that CNRT developed to utilise them as part of its historic project.

²² Interviewee 7, Joao Cabral, 21 September 2013 *op. cit.*

4.1.1. An Emboldened State: Resources, Capacity, and Approach

The advent of the CNRT-led AMP government conveniently coincided with the arrival of large amounts of petroleum revenues, which began to make their financial presence felt in 2008. In 2008 petroleum revenue contributed \$2400 million to an overall revenue intake of \$2469 million²³ (that is, 97.18 per cent).²⁴ Placing this economic development into historical perspective, in the early days of independence oil receipts had yet to significantly make their mark on the budget and, as such, the FRETILIN government operated with a relatively low revenue base (see Table 4.1).

²³ Ministry of Finance. 2010. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2010 State Budget - Book 1." Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance. *Budget Documents*. Retrieved 2 August 2014 from <https://www.mof.gov.tl/category/documents-and-forms/budget-documents/?lang=en>, p.34 and p.38

²⁴ Ministry of Finance. 2011. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2011." *op. cit.*, p.28

Table 4.1: Timor-Leste Government Revenue, 2003/04 to 2006/07

Financial Year	Petroleum Revenue	Total Revenue	Petroleum Revenue as a percentage of Total Revenue
2003/04 ²⁵	\$31m	\$57m	54%
2004/05 ²⁶	\$243m	\$306m	79%
2005/06 ²⁷	\$418m	\$465m	90%
2006/07 ²⁸	\$993m	\$1 046m	95%

Sources: Multiple, see footnotes.

FRETILIN, generally reluctant to borrow or go into debt to fund its programmes, spent only a small fraction of the revenues it did receive during its five years of governance. Further details on this can be found in Chapter Three with Table 3.4 (page 113).

As the AMP government took the reins of power in August 2007, the flow of petroleum revenue increased dramatically, despite the Elang-Kakatua field having run dry in 2007. The inundation of petroleum revenue, and the concomitant increase in government spending, occurred thanks to the contribution that two other oilfields made to the revenue stream: the

²⁵ Ministry of Planning and Finance. 2004. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Combined Sources Budget 2004-05." *op. cit.*, p.10

²⁶ Ministry of Planning and Finance. 2005. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste General Budget of the State 2005-06." *op. cit.*, p.8

²⁷ Ministry of Planning and Finance. 2006. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste General Budget of the State 2006-07." *op. cit.*, p.7

²⁸ Ministry of Finance. 2008. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Budget Review July 2008." *op. cit.*, p.16

Bayu-Undan field, the largest in operation (since 2004) and the Kitan field.²⁹ In the AMP Government's formulation of its first budget, for 2008, it estimated that petroleum revenue would almost hit the two billion US dollar mark.³⁰ Over the lifespan of the AMP Government, as calculated in the 2011 Budget, petroleum revenue contributed substantial amounts to the overall revenue base of the state (see Table 4.2).

²⁹ Narasimhan, Madhu. 2014. "The World's Youngest Failed State." *Foreign Affairs*, 12 August 2014, retrieved on 28 August 2014 from <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/the-worlds-youngest-failed-state> and Rasiah, Vinanchiarachi, and Vadakkepat. 2014. "Catching-Up from Way Behind." *op. cit.*, p.121

³⁰ Ministry of Finance. 2008. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Budget Review July 2008." *op. cit.*, p.16

Table 4.2: Timor-Leste Petroleum Revenues, 2008 to 2012

Financial Year	Petroleum Revenue	Total Revenue	Petroleum Revenue as a percentage of Total Revenue
2008 ³¹	\$2400m	\$2469m	97%
2009 ³²	\$1827m	\$1918m	95%
2010 ³³	\$2117m	\$2213m	95%
2011 ³⁴	\$3240m	\$3348m	96%
2012 ³⁵	\$3559m	\$3696m	96%

Source: Multiple, see footnotes.

Importantly, these massive receipts of oil funds did not go directly into the state's coffers. Instead, the revenues went into a long-term investment fund known as the Petroleum Fund (PF). The FRETILIN government legislated the establishment of the PF in 2005, its purpose being:

...to contribute to a wise management of Timor-Leste's petroleum resource for the benefit of both current and future generations. The fund is a tool that contributes to

³¹ Ministry of Finance. 2010. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2010 State Budget - Book 1." p.38

³² Ministry of Finance. 2011. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2011." *op. cit.*, p.43

³³ Ministry of Finance. 2012. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2012 – Budget Overview Book 1." Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance, *Budget Documents*. Retrieved 2 August 2014 from <https://www.mof.gov.tl/category/documents-and-forms/budget-documents/?lang=en> p.39

³⁴ Ministry of Finance. 2013. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2013 – Budget Overview Book 1." Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance, *Budget Documents*. Retrieved 2 August 2014 from <https://www.mof.gov.tl/category/documents-and-forms/budget-documents/?lang=en> p.52

³⁵ Ministry of Finance. 2014. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2014 – Budget Overview Book 1." Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance, *Budget Documents*. Retrieved 2 August 2014 from <https://www.mof.gov.tl/category/documents-and-forms/budget-documents/?lang=en> p.50

sound fiscal policy, where appropriate consideration and weight is given to the long-term interest of Timor-Leste's citizens.³⁶

Two primary concerns informed the decision to establish the PF. The first was that spending the amount of petroleum revenue as it came in would seriously destabilise the economy. The second concern was that there would be nothing left for future generations once the oil and gas fields emptied. The government instead decided that the PF should be invested in international financial assets with the aim being to earn a 3 per cent return annually. According to official PF documents, this 3 per cent return on the capital was designated to contribute to the overall budget. In order to access capital from the PF, the government would first have to gain the approval of parliament. The first capital transfers to the PF on 9 September 2005 totalled US\$204.6m, and by the end of the 2005/06 FY, the PF had reached a figure of \$649.8m thanks to further taxes, petroleum revenue deposits, and interest on the investment. Interest from the PF contributed small amounts early in its life, but steadily grew as more and more petroleum revenue flowed into the PF (see Table 4.3).

³⁶ Ministry of Planning and Finance. 2006. "Petroleum Fund Annual Report – Financial Year 2005-2006." Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance, *Petroleum Fund Annual Reports*. Retrieved 4 August 2014 from <https://www.mof.gov.tl/category/documents-and-forms/petroleum-fund-documents/petroleum-fund-annual-reports/?lang=en>

Table 4.3: Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund Interest, 2007 to 2012

Year:	2007 (July-December) ³⁷	2008 ³⁸	2009 ³⁹	2010 ⁴⁰	2011 ⁴¹	2012 ⁴²
PF Interest:	\$32m	\$116m	\$167m	\$221m	\$221m	\$400m

Sources: Multiple, see footnotes.

During the period of the AMP Government, the overall value of the PF skyrocketed from \$2086m in 2007 to \$11.775b in 2012.⁴³ The greater financial resources available to the state, compared to what was available to FRETILIN during its term in power (as displayed in Table 4.1), placed the AMP government in a much stronger position to address the wide-ranging material challenges that the country confronted. The most striking of these challenges in 2007, according to data published by the United Nations Development Programme, included a life expectancy of 60.7 years; an adult literacy rate (percentage aged 15 years and above) of 50.1 per cent; GDP per capita (PPP) of US\$717; infants under-weight for age of 46 per cent; proportion of the population living on US\$1.25 or less a day at 52.9 per cent and 77.5 per cent living on US\$2 a day or less. Based on figures such as these, the 2009 United Nations Human Development

³⁷ Ministry of Finance. 2008. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Budget Review July 2008." *op. cit.*, p.16

³⁸ Ministry of Finance. 2010. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2010 State Budget - Book 1." *op. cit.*, p.45

³⁹ Ministry of Finance. 2011. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2011." *op. cit.*, p.46

⁴⁰ Ministry of Finance. 2012. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2012 – Budget Overview Book 1." *op. cit.*, p.42

⁴¹ Ministry of Finance. 2013. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2013 – Budget Overview Book 1." *op. cit.*, p.57

⁴² Ministry of Finance. 2014. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2014 – Budget Overview Book 1." *op. cit.*, p.41

⁴³ Ministry of Finance. 2012. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2012 – Budget Overview Book 1." *op. cit.*, p.42

Report designated Timor-Leste as a country of 'Low Human Development', ranking it 162 of the 182 countries assessed, and assigning it a Human Development Index value of 0.489.⁴⁴

The AMP Government formulated and clarified its strategy to address these enormous, long-term socio-economic challenges in its official Programme of the IV Constitutional Government. There were two essential planks to this programme. The first priority, as already noted, was to achieve national stability and unity, an unsurprising goal given the social upheaval and violence experienced in 2006. The most obvious and immediate manifestations of this upheaval were the presence of 100,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) camped in Dili, and the large numbers of politically mobilised, disgruntled veterans throughout the country. The second priority, contingent on the achievement of stability and peace, was public investment in the economy and other sectors of society to promote overall national development and encourage the spread of prosperity across the country:

The economic policy that this Government intends to implement shall be focused on the living conditions of the Timorese and will aim at improving such conditions... An effective fight against poverty is required, through enhanced economic growth brought about by public investments, growing investments by the private sector, a greater food availability resulting from increased productivity and crop diversity... Public resources shall be used in pro-poor policies and in setting up a social security net for the most vulnerable groups, as well in the prevention of humanitarian crises... Reducing social inequalities and promoting the integration of the unemployed in the national productive fabric shall be a major concern of this

⁴⁴ United Nations Development Programme. 2009. "Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development." *UNDP, Human Development Reports*. Retrieved 5 August 2014 from <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-2009>, pp.171-179

Government... The payment of pensions to combatants of national liberation and their rightful heirs shall be an imperative of this legislature, for it isn't just a moral duty but also a legal requirement. The elderly and the widows that contributed to liberating the nation shall also benefit from specific projects aimed at ensuring their protection.⁴⁵

The programme also foreshadowed the AMP Government's intention to bring about an updated, long-term, national development plan, entitled the 'National Strategic Development Plan' (*Plano de Desenvolvimento Estratégico Nacional* or PEDN), which I investigate in more detail below. The main point I want to highlight here, however, is the big spending, fiscally liberal approach the AMP Government subscribed to in order to implement its programme.⁴⁶ An overview of the AMP government's increasingly striking expenditure of state revenue over its five years of power can be viewed in Table 4.4.

⁴⁵ Government of Timor-Leste. "Program of the IV Constitutional Government." *op. cit.*

⁴⁶ Anderson, Tim. 2013. "Development Strategy." In *The Politics of Timor-Leste*, edited by Michael Leach and Damien Kingsbury, 215-238. Ithaca, New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, p.229

Table 4.4: Timor-Leste Government Expenditures, 2008 to 2012

Financial Year:	2008 ⁴⁷	2009 ⁴⁸	2010 ⁴⁹	2011 ⁵⁰	2012 ⁵¹
Total government expenditure:	\$483m	\$603m	\$1022m	\$1379m	\$1451m
Expenditure as a percentage of total government revenue	19%	31%	46%	30%	36%

Sources: Multiple, see footnotes.

The philosophy guiding the increasingly high expenditure of state resources of the AMP government was far removed from the more modest approach of the former FRETILIN Government. As the AMP Government programme phrased it:

This Government rejects the idea of “having a poor country and a people living in hardship, but being proud of keeping large sums of money in bank accounts in rich countries”. Thus, this Government intends to use the wealth of its natural and mineral resources in a controlled and efficient way with a view to improving the plight of communities and investing in the building of the nation.⁵²

The AMP government argued that it had a responsibility to respond as soon as it could to the many challenges the population of Timor-Leste faced. Achieving this goal necessitated

⁴⁷ Ministry of Finance. 2011. “The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2011.” *op. cit.*, p.28

⁴⁸ Ministry of Finance. 2011. “The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2011.” *op. cit.*, p.28

⁴⁹ Ministry of Finance. 2012. “The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2012.” *op. cit.*, p.17

⁵⁰ Ministry of Finance. 2013. “The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2013.” *op. cit.*, p.42

⁵¹ Ministry of Finance. 2014. “The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2014.” *op. cit.*, p.4

⁵² Government of Timor-Leste. “Program of the IV Constitutional Government.” Government – Program, *op. cit.*

drawing on the petroleum resources that were available. It is in this context that I move to examine how CNRT, through the medium of the state, took advantage of its lead position in the AMP government to begin to lay down the foundations for its electoral success in 2012.

4.2. Xanana Gusmão: Political and Economic Leader

The remainder of this chapter explains the origins of CNRT's political rise in 2012 in the following manner. I first outline the concepts of *patronage networks* and *distributive politics*, both of which inform my analysis of the behaviour of CNRT in general, and Xanana Gusmão in particular. I then shift attention to Gusmão's efforts, via his effective control of governmental power, to stabilise, unify, and develop the country and in so doing to enhance and secure CNRT's political future above all other parties, including those in the ruling coalition. I discuss these policies in two sections. The first deals with the early period of the AMP Government when it pursued a programme to stabilise the country in the wake of the 2006 Crisis. The second section addresses governmental policies aimed at bringing development to the country.

Patronage networks and Xanana Gusmão's leadership have played a critical role in cementing and expanding CNRT's popularity since the inception of the AMP Government in 2007. For the purposes of this thesis, I understand a patronage network as a system that links political parties (patrons) to voters (clients) based on a transactional relationship in which clients furnish electoral support to the patrons or political parties in exchange for the allocation of

goods, services and other benefits for clients.⁵³ Patronage networks can incorporate structures varying from the small and humble to the large and intricate. A simple model, for instance, resembles a pyramid with the patron at the top and two clients below. James C. Scott refers to such an arrangement as a patron-client cluster, which includes all of the people in an immediate 'clientelistic' relationship with the patron. Further layers of clientelistic relations can be added to the cluster structure (pyramid), both horizontally and vertically.⁵⁴ The patronage structure can also work through other distinctions and social groupings, such as ethnicity, religion, caste, and class.

Critically, my argument concerning CNRT's evolution into its post-2012 election status as a proto-dominant party relies, in part, on paying attention to the networks of patronage and distributive politics the party relies upon. CNRT's distribution of lucrative government contracts to certain businesses or individual business men and women, who in turn reciprocate by providing substantial financial support, via official party fund-raising efforts, to CNRT, constitutes a clearly recognisable pattern of patronage relations.

The concept of distributive politics, as defined by Susan Stokes, defines a set of mutually beneficial relations between political parties and their constituents that is distinct, but not far

⁵³ Kitschelt, Herbert and Steven I. Wilkinson. 2007. "Citizen-politician linkages: an introduction." In *Patrons, clients, and policies: patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*, edited by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, 1-49. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, p.92

⁵⁴ Scott, James C. 1972. "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia." pp.91-113 in *The American Political Science Review* 66(1) p.96

removed from, patronage networks.⁵⁵ The implicit *quid pro quo* nature of patronage relations between patron and client is the essential element of patronage that is often missing when political parties target specific groups or constituencies for the distribution of materially beneficial policies. While the obligation to support the political party or parties responsible for the tactical distribution of government largesse is absent, the concept of distributive politics recognises how targeted government politics can strengthen ties and allegiances between the beneficiaries of such policies, and their political benefactors. In the case of Timor-Leste, CNRT was naturally at the forefront of associating itself with the implementation of various development projects and social welfare programs undertaken by the government between 2007 and 2012. As such, CNRT is most closely identified with the material benefits that flowed from these policies, and I argue that it profited the most from the goodwill these policies engendered.

4.2.1. Stabilising the Country

Once in power, the AMP Government acted quickly to address a food security crisis that existed throughout the country. The implementation of the Economic Stabilization Fund (ESF) in the 2008 budget review in particular focused on providing essential goods, especially rice, at more affordable prices. Research conducted by Kammen and two separate investigative bodies of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (the *7.30 Report* and Radio National) reported that a number of large procurement contracts for importing rice were tendered to companies which had as their directors, or in one case as a major shareholder, people closely linked to Xanana Gusmão

⁵⁵ Stokes, Susan C. 2009. "Pork, by Any Other Name...Building a Conceptual Scheme of Distributive Politics." APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. Retrieved 31 August 2015 from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1449057, pp.7-11

or CNRT.⁵⁶ The first example comes from some of the rice contracts distributed in 2007 that went to individuals with close relationships to some people in the government. The total value of all of these contracts added up to a little over US\$6 million.⁵⁷ Oriental Food, run by Germano da Silva, won a contract worth around \$840,000 to procure rice for the benefit of almost 17,000 public servants. Germano da Silva was not only a key player of Tres Amigos (Three Amigos), but was also a member of CNRT.⁵⁸ Further procurement contracts were handed out to the People Food Company, headed by Julio Alfaro and Kathleen Goncalves, which received a contract for around \$1.6 million. At the time, Kathleen Goncalves' husband, João Gonçalves, was the Minister of Economy and Development, and Julio Alfaro was the godfather to one of Gusmão's children.⁵⁹

Further examples of early clientelistic behavior also concern rice contracts. Food shortages continued to plague Timor-Leste into 2008 and the government again acted to supplement dwindling national rice reserves by opening up a selective tendering process for companies to procure up to 16,000 tons of rice in total. Documents relating to, and further investigations into, these deals indicate some major contracts went to companies whose directors or shareholders had close connections to people in the government. Tres Amigos, which won a

⁵⁶ Kammen, Douglas. 2008. "Rice and Circus in East Timor." *Counterpunch*, retrieved on 1 September 2014 from <http://www.counterpunch.org/2008/08/11/rice-and-circus-in-east-timor/>, The 7.30 Report. 2009. "Gusmão to face calls of corruption." *The 7.30 Report*, 30 June 2009, retrieved on 9 September 2014 from <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2009/s2612267.htm>, and Radio Australia. 2009. "East Timor PM accused of corruption." *Radio Australia*, 26 June 2009, retrieved on 9 September 2014 from <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights/east-timor-pm-accused-of-corruption>

⁵⁷ Kammen. 2008. "Rice and Circus in East Timor." *op. cit.*

⁵⁸ Kingsbury. 2009. "East Timor." *op. cit.*, p.206

⁵⁹ Kammen. 2008. "Rice and Circus in East Timor." *op. cit.*

tender to acquire 800 tons valued in the vicinity of \$12 to 14 million, is a company headed up by some familiar names: Germano da Silva of CNRT and Oriental Food, and Kathleen Goncalves of People Food Company.⁶⁰ FRETILIN and some in the media criticised the tendering process, suggesting that corruption may have been involved. In response, Gusmão claimed that of the seven companies that tendered bids for this contract, only Tres Amigos satisfied the necessary criteria for the purchase and storage of the rice.⁶¹

Throughout the course of 2008, the AMP Government distributed rice procurement contracts worth up to \$56 million to sixteen companies with funds that came from the Economic Stabilisation Fund (ESF).⁶² Several contracts in particular caught the attention of the Australian media: Prima Food won a contract in 2008 equal to almost \$3.5 million. Zenilda Gusmão, the daughter of Xanana Gusmão, was listed as a shareholder in this company according to Timor-Leste's 2008 business registry. Radio Australia reported that a government spokesperson confirmed that Zenilda Gusmão was listed as a shareholder at the time the contract was tendered to Prima Food, although according to other sources, she had resigned before she won the contract.⁶³ The Australian Broadcasting Corporation's (ABC) *7.30 Report* broadcast a piece on Carminda Carlota, Xanana Gusmão's daughter-in-law, who also benefited from government contacts to procure rice in 2008.⁶⁴ Carminda Carlota directed and held shares in Olifante, a

⁶⁰ Kingsbury. 2009. *East Timor*, *op. cit.*, p.206 and Kammen. 2008. "Rice and Circus in East Timor." *op. cit.*

⁶¹ Kingsbury. 2009. *East Timor*, *op. cit.*, p.206 and Kammen. 2008. "Rice and Circus in East Timor." *op. cit.*

⁶² Radio Australia. 2009. "*East Timor PM accused of corruption.*" *op. cit.*

⁶³ Sahin, Selver B. (2010) *Timor-Leste in 2009: Marking Ten Years of Independence or Dependence on International "Assistance"?*. pp.344-364 in *Southeast Asian Affairs 2010* p.358

⁶⁴ The 7.30 Report. 2009. "Gusmão to face calls of corruption." *op. cit.*

company which received \$3.5 million to import rice. Besides Tres Amigos, Kathleen Goncalves has further associations with two other companies which acquired multi-million dollar government contracts: United Foods Lda and Belun Feto Lda (Fon Ha Tchang). In total, these three companies collected government contracts valued over \$11 million.

While this is merely an initial survey of patterns of patronage in the early life of the AMP Government, it is clear that members of Gusmão's family and people with political connections to Gusmão had already begun to benefit from the distribution of government contracts for the procurement of rice. These rice contracts, however, were just the beginning; far more substantial contracts were still to come. More details, particularly in relation to how companies reciprocated their receipt of government contracts, will be addressed later in this section.

4.2.2. A Major threat to stability

Before work could really begin on implementing the National Recovery Strategy (NRS), however, the new government had to manage a resolution to the underlying security threat posed by former Military Police Chief Major Reinado. A principal actor in the turmoil of 2006, Reinado had escaped Dili and laid low in the mountains until his return and subsequent detention in July 2007. He escaped with some of his fellow inmates (50 or so Petitioners) one month later. So concerned were the authorities over this development that Australian special-forces were sent in to re-capture him. The operation failed and Reinado evaded the Timorese police and military

until he appeared on his own volition in Dili in February 2008. In the intervening period between Reinado's escape and eventual re-emergence in Dili, the president had been in unofficial communication with Reinado in an attempt to convince him to surrender to the authorities.

On the morning of 11 February 2008, President Ramos-Horta was shot at his residence, but not fatally, while PM Gusmão evaded gunfire near his residence. Reinado had initially appeared at the gate of Ramos-Horta's residence with a group of armed men. According to some reports, Reinado had received a message inviting him to meet the president on the morning of 11 February. Shortly after Reinado and his group arrived at the president's residence, violence broke out between Reinado's group and the president's security forces. Reinado and another of his close associates, Leopoldino Exposto, were killed in the firefight. Ramos-Horta, who received treatment in Darwin, barely survived his wound. Shortly afterwards, a band of Petitioners launched the ultimately unsuccessful attack on Gusmão.⁶⁵

The death of Reinado and some of his *companheiros* (company) represented the end of the threat to stability that he and his followers posed, which allowed the government to proceed with the implementation of the NRS. The essential elements of the NRS included a broad range of government initiated and funded programmes for the relocation and provision of assistance to IDPs and the remaining Petitioners who had surrendered. In addition, within the NRS there were pensions for the elderly, disabled and other vulnerable members of society, a separate pension

⁶⁵ Jolliffe, Jill. 2011. "Postcolonial Blues: East Timor's Lost Generation." *The Monthly*, March 2011, retrieved on 8 August 2014 from <http://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2011/march/1301812693/jill-jolliffe/postcolonial-blues>

system and public recognition of veterans and their families, and reforms of the security sector, which had suffered so much during the 2006 crisis.⁶⁶ The implementation of the NRS represented a significant intervention by the AMP in the social affairs and conditions of many in the general population, which also stood in marked contrast to the limited programmes of the previous FRETILIN Government.

4.3. The National Recovery Strategy

The project to address the presence of approximately 15,000 IDP families in Dili in 2008 included finding permanent housing solutions for these people, providing social welfare programs, and assistance with finding work. The government encouraged families to return to their original locales and, because many houses had been destroyed or damaged, facilitated payments of between \$1500 and \$4500 to help each family resettle. In total, the value of these payments exceeded \$37.8 million.⁶⁷ Mediation to assist the resettlement process, and further ‘compensation’ packages of \$500 for lost, damaged, and destroyed property were also disseminated to each family. In regard to the Petitioners, the government decided that demobilisation and reintegration into society, rather than confrontation, was the prudent course given that further conflict could risk unravelling the precarious peace that had just been achieved. Remuneration packages came in the order of \$8000 per demobilised soldier.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ The World Bank. 2009. “Interim Strategy Note for the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste FY2010-2011.” *Timor-Leste Country Management Unit - East Asia and Pacific Region*, August 12 2009, retrieved 8 August 2014 from <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/08/11012534/timor-leste-interim-strategy-note-period-fy2010-2011>, p.3

⁶⁷ Wallis. 2013. “Victors, Villains and Victims.” *op. cit.*, p.144

⁶⁸ International Crisis Group. 2013. “Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost?” *op. cit.*, p.3

The deployment of these cash payment schemes, a form of state welfare or safety net, to close the camps in Dili or handle the remaining Petitioners, established a pattern of behaviour the government would regularly call on to resolve other social, political, and economic challenges within the framework of the NRS. PM Gusmão explained that pensions for veterans, widows of veterans, elderly persons, orphans, and other vulnerable members of society would not only mitigate against poverty, but also assist in the effort to stabilise the country.⁶⁹ Over the course of its life, the AMP Government increased the amount allocated to social welfare payments to approximately 15 per cent of non-oil GDP; one of the highest percentages outlaid for such purposes by *any* country in the world.⁷⁰

These social welfare payment schemes marked a more interventionist approach to addressing poverty, and economic development more broadly, compared to the policies of the previous government. In particular, the disbursement of such payments encouraged closer ties between the population and government in both a material and emotional sense, something that was missing in the previous government. CNRT, especially, as the lead party of the ruling coalition, positioned itself best to gain the most political capital out of this situation by taking primary responsibility for initiating and managing such payments. My second anonymous source, who has been involved in political activism since independence and ran for election in 2012, described it to me like this:

⁶⁹ Ministry of Finance. 2009. "General Budget of the State and State Plan 2009." Ministry of Finance. *Budget Documents*. Retrieved 26 September 2014 from <https://www.mof.gov.tl/category/documents-and-forms/budget-documents/?lang=en>, pp.9-10

⁷⁰ Dale, Pamela, Lena Lepuschuetz and Nithin Umaphathi. 2014. "Peace, Prosperity and Safety Nets in Timor-Leste: Competing Priorities or Complementary Investments?" *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies* 1(2):287-296, p.288

Look at the last year of government (2011 to 2012) and how much support was given to the community – look at money and policies, a form of vote buying through the government program. Development programs like road building and hand tractors in the mountains [are] a form of reciprocation, patron-client relations.⁷¹

The political flipside of this arrangement was the implicit threat of cessation of these payments if CNRT was not returned to power in the next election. The operation of a network of distributive politics was thus established that stimulated connections, a contract of sorts, between people (voters) and the government (CNRT). Shortly, I will look at how the AMP Government designed the architecture of the payment schemes, while I examine how voters responded to them in the context of the 2012 election campaign in Chapter Five.

4.3.1. Distributive politics in action

In his speech introducing the mid-year budget review for 2008, PM Gusmão conveyed his great shock upon viewing the conditions in which *Combatentes de Libertacao Nacional* (Combatants for the National Liberation) lived from day-to-day. He condemned the FRETILIN government for failing to publically recognise their contribution to independence, or to redress the poverty they experienced. Beyond this, he also castigated FRETILIN for not providing financial assistance to the elderly. Without these groups and the sacrifices they had made, there

⁷¹ Interviewee 14, Anonymous, 6 November 2013 *op. cit.*

would not have been a State Budget to debate at all.⁷² In response to these perceived failures, in 2008 the AMP Government organised an initial range of social welfare payments to cover several groups.

First, the elderly and people with disabilities became eligible for a pension worth \$20 per month in 2008. In this year, 29,363 people received this allowance with a budget of \$16.8 million. The monthly allowance increased to \$30 per month in 2010, costing \$21.7 million in that year to cover its 83,000 beneficiaries.⁷³ By the time the 2012 Budget came around, the final one presented by the AMP Government, 89,000 Timorese citizens over the age of 60 received pensions, the total value of which hit \$32 million that year.⁷⁴

Second, cash grants were provided to children in vulnerable households, *Bolsa da Mae* (Mother's Purse) became available for expenses related to the feeding and schooling of children.⁷⁵ Monthly assistance began at \$5 for primary school children, rising to \$10 for junior secondary school, \$20 for senior secondary school, \$25 for a Timorese university, and \$30 for an overseas university. Early figures indicated that in 2008 there were 7,051 recipients, costing a total of \$600,000 per year, while the number of recipients in 2010 increased to 11,000, costing

⁷² Ministry of Finance. 2008. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Budget Review July 2008 (Budget Document)." Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance. *Budget Documents*. Retrieved 8 May 2014 from <https://www.mof.gov.tl/category/documents-and-forms/budget-documents/?lang=en>, p.6

⁷³ Wallis. 2013. "Victors, Villains and Victims." *op. cit.*, p.144

⁷⁴ Ministry of Finance. 2012. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2012." *op. cit.*, p.12

⁷⁵ Dale, Lepuschuetz, and Umapathi. 2014. "Peace, Prosperity and Safety Nets in Timor-Leste." *op. cit.*, p.288

the programme over \$800,000 per year.⁷⁶ In the 2012 Budget, there were over 15,000 beneficiaries receiving the Mother's Purse.⁷⁷

4.3.2. Government relations with former combatants

The payment of pensions for veterans began in April 2008. Although they were not technically a part of the NRS, one of the immediate objectives of the pensions was to pacify veterans as a powerful social force that could either support or undermine social stability. By improving their immediate material conditions, and officially recognising their contribution to independence, a gesture which many felt had not occurred under the previous FRETILIN government, the AMP government effectively bought the peace.⁷⁸ Financial payments to veterans also gave the new government the chance to lay the groundwork for rebuilding trust between the state and citizens, and to strengthen the community as a whole as well. Since the original law came into force in 2008, subsequent revisions have made four pension schemes available to veterans:⁷⁹

1. A one-off payment of \$1380, equal to the annual salary of a junior civil servant in 2011, for veterans who served between four and seven years in the resistance.

⁷⁶ Wallis. 2013. "Victors, Villains and Victims." *op. cit.*, p.144

⁷⁷ Ministry of Finance. 2012. "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2012." *op. cit.*, p.7

International Crisis Group. 2011. "Timor-Leste's Veterans: An Unfinished Struggle?" *International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No.129*, 18 November 2011, Dili; Jakarta; Brussels, retrieved 13 August 2014 from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/timor-leste.aspx>, p.1

⁷⁹ International Crisis Group. 2011. "Timor-Leste's Veterans." *op. cit.*, p.7 and Wallis. 2013. "Victors, Villains and Victims." *op. cit.*, p.143

2. A Special Subsistence Pension for veterans involved for eight years or longer, or for those who suffered disabilities caused by their involvement in the resistance and are unable to work. The value of this life time pension (\$276 to \$345 per month) depends on the rank of the veteran.
3. A Special Retirement Pension for those who served 15 years or longer. The value of this life time pension (\$345 to \$575 per month) depends on the rank of the veteran. The value of this pension can be higher (\$750) if the veteran in question is regarded as a 'prominent figure' of the resistance.
4. A Survivor Pension is a life time pension (\$230 to \$287.50 per month) available to relatives (spouses, orphans, parents or siblings) of veterans killed during the occupation, or relatives of veterans who had received either the Special Subsistence Pension or Special Retirement Pension and subsequently passed away.

The registration and verification process took time, so numbers of recipients early in the programme were low, but by 2011 to 2012 200,000 applicants had sought pensions.⁸⁰ In 2008 and 2009, almost 4,000 people received a pension. This figure increased over the next two years

⁸⁰ International Crisis Group. 2011. "Timor-Leste's Veterans." *op. cit.*, p.6

to 8,989 recipients in 2010⁸¹ and 10,911 in 2011.⁸² The value of pension payments started modestly at \$18.8 million in 2008 but exploded to over \$100 million by 2012.⁸³

I also identify the operation of a network of patronage in the emerging set of relations between CNRT and specific veterans. A 2010 article in *Tempo Semanal*, a Timorese newspaper, reported that PM Gusmão ordered that 30 veteran-owned companies be granted contracts for the importation of rice.⁸⁴ As the deal transpired, veteran-owned companies had to share the contracts with others owned by politically connected families. One source, as reported in a 2011 ICG Report, confided that each veteran-owned company stood to gain between \$15,000 and \$20,000 with only minimal effort required: ‘You want to hear the rice has arrived at the port and then go to Mandiri [bank] and pick up the cash’.⁸⁵ Veteran owned companies have also won electricity contracts at the local level, despite very few of them having any experience in this line of business. Three veteran commanders in particular, Lito Rambo, Rai Los, and Susar, were incorporated into this mutually beneficial network not because of what they could offer to the advantage of CNRT, but rather, to neutralise the potential threat they could pose to stability in the country.⁸⁶

⁸¹ Wallis. 2013. “Victors, Villains and Victims.” *op. cit.*, p.143

⁸² Dale, Lepuschuetz, and Umapathi. 2014. “Peace, Prosperity and Safety Nets in Timor-Leste.” *op. cit.*, p.292

⁸³ International Crisis Group. 2013. “Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost?” *op. cit.*, p.3 and Wallis. 2013. “Victors, Villains and Victims.” *op. cit.*, p.143

⁸⁴ International Crisis Group. 2011. “Timor-Leste’s Veterans” *op. cit.*, p.14

⁸⁵ International Crisis Group. 2011. “Timor-Leste’s Veterans” *op. cit.*, pp.14-15

⁸⁶ International Crisis Group. 2013. “Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost?” *op. cit.*, p.6

Lito Rambo is a former guerrilla and gang leader who was located in one of the more violent suburbs in Dili during the 2006 crisis. He became a contractor who benefitted out of construction and road drainage projects. At the time of writing, Rai Los was chairman of the Liquica chamber of commerce and also personally contributed \$5000 to CNRT's fundraiser in 2012. Although in 2009 he was convicted for leading a hit squad during the 2006 crisis, he was later released after his sentence was commuted. Susar was a contractor who was convicted, and later pardoned, for his involvement with the Petitioners in the 2008 attack on the president. He also evaded charges of alleged participation in a fire-fight that occurred between the PNTL and F-FDTL on 23 May 2006. Inviting such opportunistic types into formal arrangements with the government provided incentives for them to keep the peace because they then profited from it materially. The inherent risk with such an approach was that it depended on the flow of government contracts to continue, which itself is contingent on continued state expenditure fuelled by a finite resource: petroleum.

Both clientelistic relations and distributive politics thus feature heavily in the interaction between the many veterans of the struggle for independence and the government, particularly CNRT and PM Gusmão. My third anonymous source, who was active in the clandestine resistance movement and is a long-time observer of Timorese politics, described the situation in these terms:

The system set in place to handle veterans has become a vehicle for certain individuals. It has become a trap rather than an opportunity for the country to go forward in development. Groups of veterans...have become an exclusive group of individuals, a special category in Timorese society. Lots of privileges and money

around for them, kids have rights to scholarships, regardless of merit. [Children of veterans are] entitled to privileges other kids are not. Veterans [are] entitled to huge projects that don't go through the proper procurement procedure. It doesn't help the veterans, regardless of what they did or didn't do during the struggle, to give them those rights, to be who they are in the post-independence period...[they are] a special class.⁸⁷

The conversion of former combatants and others capable of disrupting the peace — such as former gang leaders and paramilitaries — into businesspeople after the resolution of a conflict is a phenomenon that has occurred in several other countries. In the case of Aceh, for example, Edward Aspinall described how former members of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) took up prominent roles in business, particularly in the construction sector, and the role this played in consolidating peace.⁸⁸ Large-scale building projects had been undertaken in the wake of the December 2004 tsunami that devastated Aceh, and with the formal resolution of the 30-year conflict between GAM and the Indonesian authorities in 2005, former GAM combatants took up roles as business entrepreneurs. Aspinall argues that this new class of businessperson would be patently unqualified for the job if the criteria rested on relevant experience and capacity. However, their political influence and ability to create a violent situation and disturb the peace were sufficient qualifications.

⁸⁷ Interviewee 15, Anonymous, 19 November 2013 *op. cit.*

⁸⁸ Aspinall, Edward. 2009. "Combatants to Contractors: The Political Economy of Peace in Aceh." *Indonesia* 87:1-34, pp.2-4

The long-term effect that the involvement of politically-connected, potentially trouble-making, unqualified veterans in the reconstruction of a country has on stability, peace and development is a matter of debate. One school of thought argues that this arrangement can have profound negative effects on the rebuilding and development of the country, impede the delivery of the benefits of peace to the broader population and, ultimately, undermine peace.⁸⁹ Others argue that corruption, at least in the short-term, can have a positive effect on consolidating peace by providing social stability in what was previously a zone of conflict. In the opinion of Aspinall, corruption in Aceh has proven to be important in securing peace, at least in the short-term.⁹⁰ In the case of Timor-Leste, the nexus between politics, veterans and business is still new but the impact it has had up to this point has been positive. After the trauma of the 2006 crisis, the government's integration of veterans into the political economy of the country has consolidated peace and engendered a strong degree of social, political and economic stability, at least in the short-term.

The final aspect of the NRS I discuss is the reforms made to the security sector. The collapse of the forces that comprised the security sector, the national police and the military, during the 2006 crisis presented a large challenge to the incoming AMP Government. The violence that broke out between these two forces, causing many injuries and some fatalities, engendered residual tension and distrust and necessitated the active intervention of PM Gusmão to help resolve it. In this instance, his unique leadership skills and charisma acted as an essential circuit breaker to take both institutions of the security sector forward. Once in power in 2007,

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p.3

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p.3

PM Gusmão merged the defence and interior ministries into a single overarching ministry, the Ministry of Defence and Security, and included it as part of his portfolio.⁹¹ Over time, he succeeded in diffusing inter-service conflict and rivalries based on his claim of overarching authority as the former leader of FALINTIL and he restored stability to a broken security sector, thus allowing breathing space for reforms to take place.⁹²

4.4. Goodbye Conflict, Welcome Development

PM Gusmão introduced ‘Goodbye conflict, welcome Development’, as the motto of the AMP Government in the 2010 budget. This phrase expressed in simple terms the government’s philosophy for running the country: the trauma of the past would be put behind it through implementing policies that would bring economic development and social wellbeing. As PM Gusmão stated in his 2010 budget speech: “this is a budget that seeks to support our country’s transformation from a post-conflict environment to a situation of long term sustainable development with a strong and growing economy.”⁹³ The ESF had already attended to the immediate material demands of many Timorese since 2008, and following that year, the government implemented a series of new programs, of various scales, to pursue its development objectives.

⁹¹ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict. 2014. “Timor-Leste after Xanana Gusmão.” *op. cit.*, p.1

⁹² International Crisis Group. 2013. “Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost?” *op. cit.*, p.18

⁹³ Ministry of Finance. 2010. “The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2010 State Budget - Book 1.” *op. cit.*, p.6

First, in 2009, the government initiated the *Pakote Referendum* (Referendum Package) in what became known as the Year of Infrastructure. This programme allocated \$75 million in contracts to support small-scale public construction projects.⁹⁴ These contracts were valued in the region of \$150,000 to \$200,000. Second, similar though more expansive programmes followed in the guise of supporting construction at a more local level. The *Programa de Desenvolvimento Descentralizado* (PDD or Decentralised Development Program) funded companies with up to \$500,000 registered at the district level.⁹⁵

Finally, the PEDN outlined a long term, strategic vision for the future shape of Timor-Leste. PM Gusmão worked closely with Indonesian company PT DSI Makmur Sejahtera to conceptualise and write this document.⁹⁶ It set out a comprehensive, 20-year plan to develop the country. The report comprises three main sections: (i) social capital, (ii) infrastructure development, and (iii) economic development. The stated goal was to transform Timor-Leste into an, ‘upper middle income country’ by 2030.⁹⁷

These initiatives created expansive opportunities to build on the early patronage networks established between CNRT and a number of companies, business consortiums, and individual contractors that would reciprocate by providing material support for CNRT’s election

⁹⁴ International Crisis Group. 2013. “Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost?” *op. cit.*, p.5

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p.5

⁹⁶ Government of Timor-Leste. 2011. “Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan 2011 – 2030.” Lao Hamutuk, *RDTL Strategic Development Plan 2011 – 2030*. Retrieved 13 August 2014 from <http://www.laohamutuk.org/econ/SDP/10SDPindex.htm>

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p.196

campaign.⁹⁸ My second anonymous source confirmed that donations from business had a big influence on which companies get contracts, and directly referred to a CNRT fundraising list from 2012, which I analyse below, as an example of this clientelistic behaviour in action.⁹⁹ My third anonymous source went further by declaring the patron-client relationship between CNRT and business constituted corruption, with bribes necessary for businesses to access state resources and procurement contracts.¹⁰⁰

4.4.1. Nascent Patronage Networks

Between 2007 and 2012, the PM wielded a large degree of discretion over the awarding of contracts for various development projects. Despite some devolution of procurement procedures to line ministries after the notoriously tight and centralised system under FRETILIN, the prime minister still exercised much responsibility for the distribution of large-scale contracts. In particular, the PEDN necessitated the creation of two bodies to identify and oversee major national infrastructure projects, valued at \$1 million and above: the National Development Agency (ADN) and the National Procurement Commission (NPC). Both bodies reported to the prime minister's office. As a consequence, in 2012, PM Gusmão had effective discretion over roughly \$800 million in spending — close to half of the 2012 Budget.

⁹⁸ International Crisis Group. 2013. "Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost?" *op. cit.*, p.6

⁹⁹ Interviewee 14, Anonymous, 6 November 2013 *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁰ Interviewee 15, Anonymous, 19 November 2013 *op. cit.*

And there was money to burn. As I pointed out earlier in this chapter, the size of the budget grew each year between 2007 and 2012, with spending exceeding the one billion dollar mark in 2010. This provided the fuel for funding the large spending projects necessary to realise the AMP government's development vision and to buy political support. The desire to increase the government's capacity to spend saw changes passed in 2010 — 2011 that allowed withdrawals from the PF to rise to 5 per cent of the principal annually, up from 3 per cent. PM Gusmão justified these additional withdrawals based on what he described as:

...the long term interests of Timor-Leste and its citizens...investing in our agricultural and rural sectors, developing our human resources base, establishing operation systems that encourage the development of private sector, developing an integrated infrastructure plan...that includes the supply of power throughout the entire country in the mid-term, the improvement of telecommunications, and the development of our ports, airports, roads, sewage and drinkable water distribution systems.¹⁰¹

In addition, further amendments allowed withdrawals to occur without parliamentary approval.¹⁰² The greater autonomy to allocate larger amounts of funding to development projects strengthened PM Gusmão's hand to distribute lucrative contracts as he saw appropriate. He faced few barriers to act in this manner given his highly personalised, somewhat autocratic style of political leadership in CNRT specifically, and the AMP Government more generally.¹⁰³ Opposition parties in the parliament, too, were helpless to intervene given they were in the minority.

¹⁰¹ Ministry of Finance. 2009. "General Budget of the State and State Plan 2009." *op. cit.*, p.14

¹⁰² Shoesmith. 2013. "Political Parties." *op. cit.*, p.139

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, pp.131-140

4.4.2. Political donations and government contracts

To get a clear picture on the operation of clientelistic relations between CNRT and business between 2007 and 2012, I need to first jump forward in time to May 2012, in the lead up to the parliamentary elections. The newspaper *Independente* ran an article on its front page entitled *CNRT “‘Ra’ut’ Osan \$2 Millaun ba Eleisaun Parlamentar”* (CNRT Gathers \$2 Million for the Parliamentary Election) on 15 May.¹⁰⁴ The article concerned a recent fundraiser held for the future electoral campaign of CNRT. In this meeting, 74 contributors, including leading representatives from Timorese businesses, pledged financial assistance to CNRT in the order of \$2.5 million or so. A representative of the fundraising committee for CNRT, Fransisco Calbuady (or Kalbuady) Lay, confirmed that funds would be used for the electoral campaign. Further, he stated that such contributions were not obligatory and that the businesses gave what they could. The article also reported that PM Gusmão was present at the meeting and quoted him as thanking those who had made a contribution, saying that it gave CNRT confidence to fight what would be a difficult campaign. He also stated that CNRT would not forget this contribution, and that the donor's contribution would not be wasted.

The article concluded by publishing a list detailing the contributors and how much they had pledged to CNRT.¹⁰⁵ Approximately 32 companies or individuals, which owned or managed companies, made contributions, and I focus on those featured in Table 4.5 in my analysis.

¹⁰⁴ CNRT ‘Ra’ut’ Osan \$2 Millaun ba Eleisaun Parlamentar. *Independente*, 1-2, 15 May 2012, pp.1-2

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p.2 See Appendix B: List of Contributors to CNRT

Table 4.5: List of Contributors to CNRT

Identity of benefactor	Amount pledged
Aitula Fuel and Dani star	\$100,000
Black Stiff	\$100,000
Carya Timor Leste (BTK)	\$250,000
CNI22	\$100,000
CSI	\$10,000
ETO (owned by Nilton Gusmão)	\$25,000
Hidayat owned by Ahmad Alkatiri	\$10,000
Jaime dos Santos (Timor Food Company)	\$50,000
Jonize Lda	\$250,000
Marabia Lda	\$250,000
Montana Diak	\$200,000
PT. Gunung Mas	\$8000
Puri Akaraya	\$200,000
Raul Lemos (Atramor Sucseco Lda.)	\$50,000
Romante	\$8000
Star King (Lay Sui Hing)	\$15,000
Suai Indah Lda owned by Americo Ferrajota Simao	\$25,000
THT	\$100,000
Tinolina	\$200,000

Source: CNRT 'Ra'ut' Osan \$2 Millaun ba Eleisaun Parlamentar. *Independente*, 1-2, 15 May 2012, pp.1-2

I begin the analysis by examining the links between CNRT and directors or owners of companies who were members of the *Consortio Nacional Timor-Leste* (CNT or the National

Consortium of Timor-Leste). CNT is a consortium that represents Timorese businesspeople, and the companies they operate. Since taking office in 2007, PM Gusmão has shown a determination to support the growth of Timor-Leste's capacity to take responsibility for its own development projects wherever possible, particularly in the areas of construction and fuel delivery, and to reduce dependency on foreign companies. The CNT represented a useful vehicle through which these objectives could be achieved because most of the companies involved in it were engaged in both of these fields. A network has thus emerged between CNRT and companies involved in CNT since 2008 that has served the interests of both: CNRT, drawing on state resources, has regularly awarded government contracts (some of them extremely lucrative) for development projects to members of CNT. In return, these members reciprocated by providing financial assistance to CNRT for its election campaign in 2012.

All of the information regarding the distribution of government contracts is available on the Timor-Leste eProcurement Portal, an official government-operated website designed to ensure transparency in the tendering of procurement contracts.¹⁰⁶ The period of time for which I examined the distribution of government contracts begins in 2008 and ends in the middle of September 2015. At the time of writing, I am aware of eight members of CNT that provided funds to CNRT:

- The chairman of CNT, Jorge Serrano, operator of Marabia Lda, contributed \$250,000.

Serrano has political ties to both CNRT and PD, and a very close personal relationship to PM Gusmão; they know each other as far back as the occupation when Serrano ferried

¹⁰⁶ Government of Timor-Leste. "Timor-Leste eProcurement Portal." *Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance*, retrieved 22 September 2014 from <http://www.eprocurement.gov.tl/public/indexeprt!/?&lang=en>

Gusmão around Dili. Marabia Lda. received three contracts worth approximately \$5 million in 2010, the most notable being a \$4.2 million contract for the ‘Rehabilitation of Weleu to Tilomar Roads’, awarded on 19 November 2010.

- I Jen Filipe runs Jonize Lda, which contributed \$250,000. Between 2010 and 2014, Jonize Lda won 17 contracts worth approximately \$15.3 million in total.
- Lay Fu Seng heads up Montana Diak Lda, which contributed \$200,000. Montana Diak Lda. has procured 19 contracts valued at approximately \$10.2 million overall.
- Agostinho Gomes operates Tinolina Lda, which contributed \$200,000. The government has awarded eight contracts worth approximately \$6.5 million to Tinolina Lda.
- Nilton Gusmão owns G & S Lda. and ETO, which contributed \$25,000. G & S Lda. has won six contracts worth \$7.5 million, while ETO, a fuel procurement contractor, has enjoyed being the recipient of over 130 contracts. The total value of these contracts for ETO comes to \$212 million. A number of these stand out: (1) a \$27 million contract awarded on 1 March 2011 to supply high speed diesel to the national electricity provider *Electricidade de Timor-Leste* (EDTL); (2) two contracts awarded on 25 August and 24 October in 2012 to supply fuel for the Hera power plant worth \$45.5 million and \$50.5 million respectively and; (3) a further contract, awarded on 25 October 2013, to supply high speed diesel fuel for the Hera power plant worth \$40.2 million.
- Raul Lemos, who contributed \$50,000, directs Atramor Sucseco Lda. Atramor Sucseco Lda. has received six contracts valued at approximately \$6.8 million.

- Ahmad Alkatiri operates Hidayat Lda, which contributed \$10,000. Ahmad is the brother of Mari Alkatiri, the General-Secretary of FRETILIN. Ahmad apparently hedged his bets by donating to both FRETILIN and CNRT. Hidayat Lda. has won eight contracts worth approximately \$6.8 million.
- Americo Ferrajota Simao heads up Suai Indah Lda, which contributed \$25,000. Suai Indah Lda. has received six contracts valued at approximately \$4.9 million.
- In addition, CNT as a whole has also acquired two construction related contracts; a \$29.8 million contract awarded on 13 April 2012 for road reconstruction and bridge construction in Dili, and a \$2.75 million contract awarded on 14 March 2014 for further road reconstruction in the capital.

I also identified eight non-CNT associated companies that donated to CNRT and have been awarded government contracts. Several of these contracts were of a substantial amount and indicate the operation of a mutually beneficial patronage network:

- Carya Timor Leste (aka BTK), which contributed \$250,000, is owned by Frans Holiwono and has procured 40 contracts worth approximately \$124 million between 2010 and 2014. The most eye-catching of these contracts is one of the largest ever construction contracts tendered in Timor-Leste. The government awarded Carya Timor Leste with an \$86 million contract to construct 11,140 new houses as part of Timor-Leste's Millennium Development Goals Project. Frans Holiwono was also involved in the lucrative Tres Amigos rice contract deal of 2008.

- Puri Akaraya, which contributed \$200,000, hit the jackpot with its successful procurement on 15 September 2010 of the \$406 million contract for the construction of the Hera and Betano power plant. It has subsequently acquired three further contracts valued at approximately \$6.75 million in total.
- CNI22 (China Nuclear Industry 22nd Construction Co. Ltd.) contributed \$100,000. On 21 December 2009, the government awarded CNI22 a \$298 million contract for the construction of the nationwide electrical power grid and power plant, followed by the award on 28 December 2013 of a \$1.6 million contract for school renovations, and a \$25.6 million contract in December 2014 for the construction of a nationwide electrical power grid.
- CSI contributed \$10,000 and has acquired seven contracts valued at approximately \$33.6 million in total. The most eye catching of these was the award on 23 December 2010 of a \$30.9 million contract for the engineering, design, supply and installation of the extension of the Comoro diesel generating power station.
- Aitula Fuel contributed \$100,000 and has won 304 contracts valued at approximately \$12 million.
- PT. Gunung Mas contributed \$8000 and has procured ten contracts between 2011 and 2014 worth approximately \$3.2 million in total.
- Romante contributed \$8000 and has procured 24 contracts valued in the region of \$6 million.

- Star King, headed by Lay Sui Hing, contributed \$15,000 and has won six contracts worth \$468,325 between 2009 and 2013. He was also the recipient of a rice contract worth around \$1.5 million in 2007.

The government has additionally awarded a number of big contracts to joint operations or ventures between some of the aforementioned companies. Some of these are the largest construction contracts ever procured in Timor-Leste:

- Carya Timor Leste and Jonize Lda. won a \$104 million contract awarded on 1 October 2012 for the construction of social community houses, and a \$13 million contract awarded on 1 April 2014 for the construction of Millennium Development Goal social housing.
- CNT and WIKA have procured four contracts worth a total of \$18.8 million. Among these contracts were an \$8.8 million project awarded on 6 August 2012 for the construction and supervision of the revitalization of national roads and the Comoro Bridge, Dili, and a \$7.6 million contract awarded on 5 March 2014 to demolish and reconstruct Comoro Bridge, Dili.
- Tinolina Lda. & King Construction Lda. acquired two contracts worth over one million dollars awarded on the same day, 17 December 2013; \$5.4 million for the rehabilitation of the Aituto to Same road and \$4.7 million for the rehabilitation of the Same Vila road.

From a business perspective, being incorporated into a patron-client relationship with CNRT has proven very profitable. According to the eProcurement Portal, the government has tendered seven of the ten most expensive contracts to companies that were in the donation list.

1. Puri Akaraya: \$406 million awarded on 15 September 2010 for the construction of the Hera and Betano power plant.
2. CNI22: \$298 million awarded on 21 December 2009 for the construction of the nationwide electrical power grid, power plant and its facilities.
3. Carya Timor Leste and Jonize Lda.: \$104 million awarded on 1 October 2012 for the construction of social community houses.
4. Carya Timor Leste: \$86 million awarded on 5 October 2011 to construct 11,140 new houses.
5. Sacom Energia Lda.: \$72 million awarded on 31 May 2014 to supply light fuel oil for EDTL.
6. ETO: \$50 million awarded on 24 October 2012 to supply fuel for the Hera power plant.
7. Sacom Energia Lda.: \$48.5 awarded on 26 May 2015 to supply light fuel oil.
8. Sacom Energia Lda.: \$48.5 awarded on 26 May 2015 to supply light fuel oil.
9. ETO: \$45 million awarded on 25 August 2012 to supply fuel for the Hera power plant.
10. ETO: \$40 million awarded on 25 October 2013 to supply high-speed diesel fuel for the Hera power plant.

It is important to note there have been so many projects that it is likely that a multitude of companies have won tenders for government development projects despite not being intertwined in patron-client relations with CNRT. The government certainly could not distribute all of its projects to such a small network as those that contributed to CNRT's 2012 electoral campaign. The volume of work would overwhelm them. While some of the companies that contributed have not done noticeably better than comparable companies that did not make donations, this observation holds only for medium sized contracts. The government has tendered most of the large, and all of the grand scale contracts, to companies that subsequently provided donations to it. Close relations with PM Gusmão, furthermore, whether it be through familial ties (for example Nilton Gusmão), a tight friendship (for example Frans Holiwono), or involvement in CNT, have proved rewarding for companies like ETO, Carya Timor Leste, and Jonize Lda.

By way of comparison, some businesses also provide financial resources to FRETILIN, but not to the same degree as CNRT. Three FRETILIN sources confirmed this to me in interviews.¹⁰⁷ I quote one of them, Justino Valentim, a FRETILIN District Secretary Commissioner in the district of Lautem, at length to place his comments in context:

As a large organisation, the FRETILIN party in this district, in Timor-Leste and Lautem, we put on big events like large meetings or visits. We have a plan to present our ideas and have national support, we receive money, the party gets money through the government and receive support through others, like

¹⁰⁷ Interviewee 22, Anonymous, 29 October 2013 *op. cit.*, Interviewee 13, Arsenio Bano, 24 October 2013 *op. cit.*, and Interviewee 8, Justino Valentim, 23 September 2013

FRETILIN business people, they help with materials and money and transport. This is what always happens in Lautem.¹⁰⁸

However, based on my observations and impressions of the 2012 parliamentary campaigns, and the other limited available evidence, it is clear to me that FRETILIN struggles to compete with CNRT financially.

Conclusion

The main issue this chapter addressed concerned stability in the pattern of political party competition (moderate pluralism), which was engendered after the 2012 elections. This continuity in the pattern of competition was caused essentially by the ascent of CNRT to political power. This chapter tracked in narrative form how CNRT went about laying down the foundations for political expansion and dominance into the future. While CNRT's accommodation of other parties was necessary in order to form government, it also represented but one element of a broader shift to incorporate a broad range of actors into the governing arrangements. The inclusion of people and groups that had been marginalised or ignored by FRETILIN also expanded the unofficial terms of national identity. PM Gusmão's personalised approach to leadership, which also benefitted immensely from his status as former commander of the resistance, however, translated into CNRT dominating the character and direction of government programmes for the most part. Unlike FRETILIN, which had limited resources to call upon to implement policies, the CNRT led AMP Government accessed, and spent, enormous

¹⁰⁸ Interviewee 8, Justino Valentim, 23 September 2013

amounts of revenue in its efforts to stabilise the country and improve the lives of its citizens through various development projects.

Some projects sought to provide official public recognition and financial support to a range of social groups that the AMP government felt they deserved but had yet to receive. Through such programmes, the government enticed such groups, which included veterans, the elderly and other vulnerable members of the community, into closer relations with the government, and by association, with CNRT. I also considered in this chapter the emerging patronage network connecting CNRT and a range of contractors and businesses, which includes family members of PM Gusmão and leaders of veteran movements. This development has enhanced CNRT's overall capacity to operate and spread its message, which undoubtedly helped during its successful 2012 parliamentary election campaign. I now turn to this campaign in Chapter Five, in which I will demonstrate how CNRT took advantage of the position it had created for itself in the last years to evolve into a proto-dominant party.

Chapter Five. Electioneering Dominance: CNRT on the 2012 Campaign Trail

CNRT political party is the only one [that] will restore the national unity that pulls apart every time in this post conflict country and secure the life under safety, peace and love.¹

Ozorio Leque, member of CNRT campaign team of region 4, May 2012, Dili

When I arrived in Dili to begin my first phase of fieldwork in February 2012 I observed, above all else, that little stood in the way of Xanana Gusmão. The magnitude of his presence and influence cast a shadow over almost all domestic affairs; he was everywhere, on the television and radio, in the paper and parliament. Xanana Gusmão is like a product brand, put his name on it, and it is successful and popular. There is even a Xanana Gusmão sports centre and library. In the case of CNRT, it would not have existed without him, and its future seemingly depends on him and his reputation. The power he wielded seemed to extend to all aspects of life, informing to a great extent the identity of the country, and determining its social, economic and political fate. Throughout the 2012 parliamentary campaign, the election itself, and the subsequent formation of the new government, Gusmão played the role of the central protagonist.

The core question I raised in the previous chapter, Chapter Four, concerned why the 2012 parliamentary election produced a continuation in the pattern of political party competition,

¹ Leque, Ozorio. 2012. "Why voted for CNRT? CNRT material prepared by member of campaign team of region 4." May 2012, Point 23

moderate pluralism, which had begun in 2007. I first noted CNRT's growth into a proto-dominant party and the contraction of the structure of competition in 2012, and along with it, the concomitant reproduction of moderate pluralism. In addition, I argued that central to CNRT's development into a proto-dominant party has been the charismatic appeal of Xanana Gusmão, a more inclusive nation-and state-building project, and the operation of well-funded networks of patronage and distributive politics. I further pointed out that the persistence of moderate pluralism does not necessarily confirm the proper consolidation of a regularised party system at this stage; at least one further election, scheduled for 2017, is required before we can come to any firm conclusions on this topic.

I divided the structure of this argument into two chapters. In the previous chapter, Chapter Four, I established the process by which CNRT, under the leadership of PM Gusmão, enacted policies in government between 2007 and 2012 that aimed to stabilise, unify, and advance the country in the wake of the turmoil and violence of 2006. In demonstrating how these objectives were achieved, I argued that Gusmão had invested in, and deployed, important material and ideational resources that laid the foundation for the future political strength and popularity of CNRT throughout the country. This chapter offers further evidence to support my argument about the rise of CNRT as a proto-dominant party and the concomitant reproduction of moderate pluralism as the pattern of party competition.

I have organised the structure of my argument in the following manner: I begin by providing some background to the election through a perusal of the months leading to the

parliamentary election campaign, which includes the presidential election and the fragmentation of several of CNRT's opponents. I demonstrate in this section how conditions at the time secured a favourable environment for CNRT.

The subsequent section attends to the parliamentary electoral campaign itself and, by providing detailed ethnographic depth and flavour to the larger argument, analyses how CNRT deployed powerful material and ideational resources to its electoral advantage. I argue that four factors were critical to CNRT's success at the election and its development into a proto-dominant party: first, the CNRT-led coalition government's distribution of material and financial incentives to key constituencies; second, CNRT's access to large amounts of material resources that enabled it to campaign harder and more effectively than its competitors; third, a campaign narrative that strongly linked the election of CNRT to future development and prosperity of the country; and fourth, another campaign narrative that valorised the resistance and privileged Gusmão's historical relationship with it.

I then provide a breakdown of the election results that document in more detail CNRT's increasing electoral dominance in both absolute and relative terms. This point will be developed in more concrete terms in my account of how CNRT determined the shape of the governing alliance, the *Bloku Governu Koalisaun* (BGK or the Government Coalition Bloc). Finally, I briefly survey developments in political affairs in Timor-Leste after the election, especially the resignation of Xanana Gusmão as prime minister and the arrival of a new government and prime minister.

5.1. 2012 National Election: Background to the Campaign

The first round of the presidential election was held on 17 March 2012, and the second was held on 16 April. Although no presidential candidate was supposed to be formally affiliated with a particular political party, party politics permeated the presidential election. Parties supported candidates both to curry favour with the future presidents of the country, or to test or demonstrate their electoral strength. In terms of the larger parties, FRETILIN, for example, endorsed its party president, Francisco Guterres ‘Lu Olo’ as a candidate, while PD also endorsed its party president, Fernando Lasama de Araujo. For most of the campaign for the first round ballot, CNRT did not endorse a candidate for president.

Shortly before the election itself, however, Gusmão accompanied, and campaigned in support of, Taur Matan Ruak (TMR). I believe Gusmão chose to support TMR for three main reasons: the first was to defeat FRETILIN’s candidate Lu Olo, the second was to have some influence over TMR if he won office and, finally, to boost his profile, and that of CNRT, throughout the country in preparation for the upcoming parliamentary elections. Some candidates, including TMR and Jose Ramos-Horta, claimed they were ‘independent’ candidates, free from any affiliation with political parties. Almost 490,000 people exercised their right to vote in the first round of the presidential election. In addition to 136,570 abstentions, there were 6,484 blank votes and 18,788 invalid votes. The results are on display in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: 2012 Presidential Election, First Round, 17 March

Candidate	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Vote
Francisco Guterres 'Lu Olo'	133,635	28.76
Taur Matan Ruak (TMR)	119,462	25.71
Jose Ramos-Horta	81,231	17.48
Fernando 'Lasama' de Araujo	80,381	17.30
Rogério Lobato	16,219	3.49
Jose Luis Guterres	9,235	1.99
Manuel Tilman	7,226	1.56
Abilio de Araujo	6,294	1.35
Lucas da Costa	3,862	0.83
Francisco Gomes	3,531	0.76
Maria do Ceu Lopes da Silva	1,843	0.40
Angelita Pires	1,742	0.37

Source: Feijo, Rui Graca. 2014. "Timor-Leste in 2013: Marching on Its Own Feet." *Asian Survey* 54(1) January/February:83-88, p.43

The two candidates who had won the highest percentage of the vote, Lu Olo and TMR, went through to a second round because no candidate had won a majority. It is impossible to quantify with absolute precision what impact Gusmão's support for TMR had on the outcome of the presidential ballots given no reliable pre-polling data exists. It seems reasonable to suggest, however, that his support helped TMR secure a respectable, second place in the first ballot and, ultimately, victory in the second ballot. Based on my observations and analysis during my six-

months of fieldwork in 2012, I concur with Nolan’s argument — in a 2013 Report for the International Crisis Group (ICG) — that Gusmão was publicly perceived as a kingmaker in the political life of the country.² This argument is partly premised on Gusmão’s outstanding victory in the presidential ballot of 2002 when he acquired 83 per cent of the vote and more generally on his leadership of the resistance. Gusmão’s role as kingmaker was also secured by his performance as prime minister from 2007 to 2012, particularly in the manner in which the government he led distributed financial and material support throughout the country, as I outlined in detail in Chapter Four.

Fewer people turned out to vote in the second round with close to 459,000 citizens heading to the ballot boxes, a turnout of 73.12 per cent. The final results are outlined in Table 5.2:

Table 5.2: 2012 Presidential Election, Second Round, 16 April

Candidate	Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Vote
Taur Matan Ruak (TMR)	275,471	59.66
Francisco Guterres ‘Lu Olo’	174,408	38.39

Source: Feijo. 2014. “Timor-Leste in 2013.” *op. cit.*, p.46

TMR’s political appeal included many veterans, who supported their former commander in very visible, unabashed fashion.³ A similar pattern of behaviour was identifiable in the 2012 parliamentary election because Gusmão, alone among the leaders of the three biggest parties,

² International Crisis Group. 2013. “Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost?” *op. cit.*, p.8

³ *Ibid*, p.9

possessed qualities and characteristics comparable to those of TMR: first and foremost, both were former guerrillas and commanders of the armed forces. Although Gusmão was a more partisan and divisive figure in comparison, given his leadership of the political party CNRT, he was still able to rely on a range of veterans to support CNRT's parliamentary campaign. CNRT, in fact, took advantage of some of the veterans' organisations mobilised for TMR's presidential campaign.⁴ I will expand on this matter in the section dealing specifically with the campaign.

5.1.1. Party Proliferation and Fragmentation

There are important structural and circumstantial considerations that favoured the electoral prospects of CNRT at the 2012 polls. First, rather than encouraging the production of a diverse multiparty parliament, the increase in the number of political parties and coalitions of parties that registered to compete in 2012 actually established favourable conditions for the larger, established parties to squeeze out the competition. As I identified in Chapter Two, the electoral system used in Timor-Leste, nationwide Proportional Representation (PR) that employs a 3 per cent threshold, structurally encourages large numbers of parties to compete in elections because winning parliamentary seats requires what appears to be a relatively small proportion of the vote. The possibility of acquiring a remunerated position as a Member of Parliament (MP), also incentivises people to engage in electoral politics.⁵ Based on an assessment of the literature on PR, a casual observer of the upcoming election in Timor-Leste presumably would have predicted that the election would produce another parliament consisting of a large number of

⁴ European Union. 2012. "Timor-Leste: Final Report – Parliamentary Election 2012, EU Election Observation Mission to Timor-Leste 2012." *Reports*, retrieved on 13 August 2014 from http://eeas.europa.eu/eucom/missions/2012/timor-leste/reports_en.htm, p.15

⁵ Feijo. 2014. "Timor-Leste in 2013." *op. cit.*, p.47

parties, similar to the previous two elections in 2001 and 2007.⁶ The fact, however, that so many parties registered to compete in the election actually made the task more difficult for smaller, particularly newer, parties to win seats in the parliament.

Moreover, the larger, established parties, such as CNRT and FRETILIN, were best placed to expand their presence. Even though the threshold of 3 per cent is considered a relatively low cut-off point by international standards, casting a ballot for one of the smaller, newer parties would still have appeared to be a risky venture to voters. All votes that fall under the 3 per cent threshold are functionally worthless. Indeed, this is certainly an issue that significantly impacts on the outcomes of elections, as was seen in the parliamentary election of 2007, almost one-in-ten votes, 37,096 of 471,478 valid ballots (8.92 per cent), were wasted on seven parties that did not exceed the 3 per cent threshold.

The larger, more established parties possessed an advantage over their competitors, especially those that had only recently formed to compete in the 2012 polls, because they had a greater period of time in which to increase their institutional strength. Becoming more institutionalised allowed the larger, more established parties to obtain greater brand recognition amongst the electorate, more access to more financial resources and develop a more disciplined internal party structure. Such advantages especially favoured the parties that had previously held seats in the parliament or been in the ruling AMP Government. Parties with seats in parliament

⁶ Duverger. 1959. "Political Parties." *op. cit.*, p.217 and p.245 and Lijphart. 1991. "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies." *op. cit.*, pp.72-73

received annual subsidies, whose total value reached \$3 million in 2012; 50 per cent of the allocated amount was distributed amongst all of the parties in parliament equally, while the remaining 50 per cent was distributed in proportion to the percentage of seats parties held in parliament. Public subsidies for those parties competing in the 2012 parliamentary election amounted to \$20,000 for individual parties, and \$35,000 for coalitions of parties according to the European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission Final Report.⁷

In total, of the 24 parties contesting the 2012 polls, ten had been involved in electoral politics since 2001 and five had been involved since 2007; the remaining nine parties were new on the electoral scene.⁸ While all parties in 2012 received state subsidies for their campaigns, only CNRT, FRETILIN, PD, ASDT, PSD, PUN, UNDERTIM, KOTA had collected the bonus annual subsidies for holding seats in parliament. FRETILIN (21 seats) and CNRT (18) did especially well out of this system in comparison to the other parties due to their larger presence in parliament. Overall, in terms of financial muscle, the playing field was tilted against the nine new parties, plus the two (PMD and PR) from the group of parties that had formed in 2007 but failed to enter parliament.

In terms of other sources of funding, there were laws and regulations governing the financing of political parties specifically, and electoral campaigns in general. The relevant

⁷ European Union. 2012. "Timor-Leste: Final Report." *op. cit.*, p.16

⁸ The parties involved since 2001 include: FRETILIN, PD, PSD, ASDT, PST, UDT, PARENTIL, KOTA, PTT, and PDC; parties involved since 2007 include: CNRT, PUN, UNDERTIM, PMD, and PR; and those involved since 2012 are: FM, P. Khunto, PDN, PLPA, PDRT, PTD, APMT, PDP, and PDL.

sections of the legislation covering party financing were in Law No. 3/2004 and Law 6/2008, while the relevant section on campaign financing was in Regulation/03/STAE/2001.⁹ Parties could raise funds through their own sources (membership fees, fundraising, and loans), private funding (individual donations), and public subsidies.

Of the other established parties, PD, ASDT, and PSD would have also been in a good position to sustain their presence and wield influence in the parliament in these circumstances if it were not for the considerable damage they sustained (largely self-inflicted) in the lead up to the 2012 polls. The repercussions of Lasama's failed bid for the position of president adversely affected the cohesion and effectiveness of PD, which had endorsed his candidacy. Despite polling third in a very competitive race, finishing ahead of the previous incumbent (Jose Ramos-Horta), Lasama's inability to reach a second round ballot almost destroyed PD.¹⁰ PD split into two camps over who to support in the second round: Lasama and others supported FRETILIN's candidate Lu Olo, while the General-Secretary of the party, Mariano Sabino, supported the CNRT-backed candidacy of TMR. The divisiveness of this split posed such a threat to the stability of the party that PD ultimately did not endorse a candidate at all. Rather, it allowed its supporters and members to vote according to their own personal preference.

⁹ European Union. 2012. "Timor-Leste: Final Report." *op. cit.*, p.16

¹⁰ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict. 2014. "Timor-Leste after Xanana Gusmão." *op. cit.*, p.10

Photo 5.1: This PD banner located in Dili features its President, Fernando de Araújo (aka ‘Lasama’) [left], its General-Secretary, Mariano Sabino Lopes (aka Assanami) [right], and José Ramos-Horta.



Weakness in the unity, direction and messaging of PD continued to be on display when Ramos-Horta endorsed the party’s campaign for the parliamentary election (see Photo 5.1, for example). However, the General-Secretary of PD, Mariano Sabino, never expressed public support for Ramos-Horta’s alliance with PD.¹¹ Internal rumblings and reflections in the aftermath of the election reveal that PD pursued a self-defeating strategy. Nolan discusses how a ‘senior PD personality’ felt that the general public perceived that PD would end up aligning with CNRT in a coalition arrangement, regardless of the mixed messaging that was emanating from PD itself.¹² As such, many voters sympathetic to PD ended up cutting out the middleman and

¹¹ International Crisis Group. 2013. “Timor-Leste.” *op. cit.*, p.11

¹² *Ibid*, p.11

voted for CNRT. This PD personality further elaborated on the performance of PD by suggesting that the alliance with Ramos-Horta damaged its electoral appeal due to the former president's strident criticism of Xanana Gusmão's performance as prime minister.

In contrast to PD, which managed to stay together despite the internal upheaval it experienced, ASDT almost completely collapsed, splintering into three factions, as a result of the death of its leader. Its president, Francisco Xavier do Amaral (Avo Xavier), passed away on 7 March 2012 shortly before the presidential election campaign began on 29 March.¹³ Avo Xavier held a particularly important place in the history of Timor-Leste because of his central role in declaring independence in 1975. He founded ASDT in 2001 as a political party that explicitly drew on the acronym of the historical organisation *Associação Social-Democrata Timorense* (ASDT or the Social-Democratic Association of Timor), which preceded FRETILIN and was formed in 1974 to struggle for independence. The importance of his leadership in attracting support and unifying the various personalities involved in the party became clear after his death. Two major factions, and one minor faction, emerged to contest the leadership of ASDT, and none of the contending leadership figures managed to take command of a unified and stable party.

The then Minister for Tourism and Commerce, Gil Alves, who was reportedly closely aligned to Xanana Gusmão and CNRT, led one of the major factions. The former ASDT party secretary general, Joao Correia, headed up the other main faction. Arlindo Marcal led a small

¹³ Proklamador Avo Xavier Fila Hikas Ba Aman Maromak. *Diario*, 1, 7 March 2012, p.1

faction that supported its own claim to the leadership of ASDT. Internal wrangling led to various legal appeals and eventually a ruling that supported Joao Correia's claim to be the legitimate heir of Avo Xavier. Gil Alves, with his supporters, defected to CNRT; Alves gained a place on the CNRT list of parliamentary candidates. Marcal also split from ASDT and worked in a coalition arrangement called *Bloku Proklamador* (BP or the Proclaimer Bloc).¹⁴ The loss of its talismanic president was undoubtedly a blow to ASDT's future campaign, but the damage ASDT did to its own structure, base of support, identity, and reputation through its virtual implosion was remarkable.

The contribution of PSD in creating more amenable conditions for CNRT and FRETILIN to politically flourish came down to the behaviour of one of its senior members, Lucia Lobato. PM Gusmão appointed Lobato as the Minister for Justice in 2007, but she later became embroiled in allegations of corruption in the period leading to the 2012 parliamentary election. The allegations concerned the tendering of construction contracts in 2009 worth over \$1 million.¹⁵ In March 2012, the parliament voted to suspend Lobato from her duties, allowing her to be prosecuted on charges of corruption and abuse of power. The issue remained in the media right up until her trial, with the court handing down a guilty verdict, and a five-year jail sentence, for one of the four charges against her (misadministration of funds) in the second week of June,

¹⁴ The two political parties in BP were *Partido Milineum Democratico* (PMD or the Democratic Millennium Party) and *Partido Republika Nacional Timor Leste* (PARENTIL or the National Republican Party of Timor Leste).

¹⁵ Radio Australia. 2012. "East Timor suspends justice minister." *Radio Australia*, 21 March 2012, retrieved on 22 October 2014 from <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2012-03-21/473058>

three weeks before the polls.¹⁶ Although Lobato subsequently appealed against the verdict, the court had effectively performed a political coup de grace on PSD's reputation in the early stages of the campaign for the parliamentary election.

5.2. 2012 National Election: Campaign Review

Members of both the AMP government, and the parliament more generally, took advantage of their incumbency to assist their political party's campaign and further its electoral appeal. During the campaign, members made use of state resources, including vehicles and public buildings, for campaign purposes.¹⁷ People in the districts of Ainaro, Baucau, Lautem, Manatuto, and Viqueque, for instance, reported to IRI observers that government vehicles were used by party members and officials for campaigning. Campaign staff removed the government-issued license plates to prevent CNE staff catching them in the act.¹⁸ In addition, CNRT campaign staff engaged in officially sanctioned government activities in which generous material benefits were handed out to particular groups just before or during the election campaign. The two following cases suggest CNRT deliberately enacted policies that circulated money with the expectation that the recipients of such largesse would reciprocate by supporting CNRT at the ballot box.

¹⁶ Radio Australia. 2012. "Former East Timor Justice Minister sentenced to jail." *Radio Australia*, 12 June 2012, retrieved on 22 October 2014 from <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/asia-pacific/former-east-timorese-justice-minister-sentenced-to-jail/957980>

¹⁷ European Union. 2012. "Timor-Leste: Final Report." *op. cit.*, pp.16-17

¹⁸ International Republican Institute (IRI). 2013. "Timor-Leste Parliamentary Elections." *op. cit.*, p.21

The first case occurred on 30 May, about a week before the campaign kicked off, when the Secretary of State for Vocational Training and Employment, Bendito Freitas, announced a month-long \$3 per day work programme.¹⁹ Freitas was on CNRT's National Directive Council, and was Deputy General Coordinator for CNRT's election campaign. The budget for the programme equalled \$20 million, and focused on improving roads and drain maintenance in every *suco* nationwide. Similar programmes had operated in previous years but not with such levels of funding (\$895,000 in 2010, for example), and they usually occurred later in the year. The timing is significant because it coincided with the harvest of existing crops, and EU observers reported that people received money from the programme without actually doing any of the work.²⁰

The second case was on 6 June, the second day of campaigning. Secretary of State for Veterans Affairs, Marito Reis, announced the government would begin the payment of pensions to 27,000 veterans and their families on 15 June, three weeks before the poll.²¹ Payments were backdated to the start of the previous year, 2011. The government disbursed the \$46.7 million in three payments over three months. It was not only the timing of the payments, but also the fact the registration and verification process for recipients had yet to be completed when the decision was made, which strongly indicated that CNRT had a political motivation to distribute large amounts of cash to veterans, a core electoral constituency of the party.

¹⁹ International Crisis Group. 2013. "Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost?" *op. cit.*, p.10

²⁰ European Union. 2012. "Timor-Leste: Final Report." *op. cit.*, p.17

²¹ *Ibid*, p.17

5.2.1. Financial muscle

The key to CNRT's ability to campaign and disseminate its message throughout the country was its financial capacity. As I pointed out in Chapter Four, CNRT received public pledges of financial support in the region of \$2.5 million from a range of contributors, both individuals and companies, in the lead up to the campaign. In its final report on the parliamentary election, the European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission suggests that more financial support was pledged, but such commitments were made privately.²² Unfortunately, information about the financial strength of the other parties is not available, but the size and intensity of CNRT's campaign indicates it easily overshadowed its rivals, indicating the paucity of resources available to CNRT's opponents.

Rallies were a common feature of the 2012 electoral campaign, and if an assessment of a political party's physical presence in the guise of rallies serves as a useful indicator of financial power of the party in question, there is little doubt that CNRT was the best funded party.²³ CNRT held more rallies and campaign events than any other party, regularly displaying its appeal on a mass scale across the country. However, its members spent little time in comparison on smaller scale election events, such as door-to-door campaigning.²⁴ Holding large-scale events, which I will describe below shortly, was a more effective and visible way of campaigning to as many people as possible.

²² *Ibid*, p.16

²³ *Ibid*, p.4


²⁴ International Republican Institute (IRI). 2013. "Timor-Leste Parliamentary Elections." *op. cit.*, p.20 and International Crisis Group. 2013. "Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost?" *op. cit.*, p.10

When it came to exposure in the media, newspaper coverage favoured CNRT over its opponents precisely because its primary focus was on large-scale rallies.²⁵ CNE media monitors assessed the coverage of all 21 parties across newspapers, public radio and television, and private TV, and found that media coverage was balanced and proportionate with the exception of newspapers. Supporting this assessment, based on its research of the four main newspapers in circulation during the campaign, the EU Observation Mission reported that CNRT, FRETILIN, and PD received the most coverage, with particular, disproportionate, attention paid to CNRT and Xanana Gusmão.²⁶ The influence of newspapers to get a message across in the context of the broader media landscape, I do note, is limited. The distribution of newspapers is almost exclusively limited to the capital, Dili. Charts 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 depict how much space the four main newspapers' dedicated to each of the main parties, showing that CNRT enjoyed far more attention in newspapers than its opponents.

²⁵ International Crisis Group. 2013. "Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost?" *op. cit.*, p.10


²⁶ European Union. 2012. "Timor-Leste: Final Report." *op. cit.*, p.5

Chart 5.1: Newspaper Coverage of Political Parties (Jornal Nacional Diario)




Source: European Union. 2012. “Timor-Leste: Final Report.” *op. cit.*, p.5

Chart 5.2: Newspaper Coverage of Political Parties (Timor Post)




Source: European Union. 2012. “Timor-Leste: Final Report.” *op. cit.*, p.5

Chart 5.3: Newspaper Coverage of Political Parties (Independente)



Source: European Union. 2012. “Timor-Leste: Final Report.” *op. cit.*, p.5

Chart 5.4: Newspaper Coverage of Political Parties (Suara Timor Leste)



Source: European Union. 2012. “Timor-Leste: Final Report.” *op. cit.*, p.5

The limited financial muscle of CNRT's competitors severely restricted their ability to hold large-scale events. Most commonly, these political parties instead held community dialogues and door-to-door campaigns to reach out to voters.²⁷ Community consultations involved candidates and parties travelling around the country and organising meetings with groups of local communities (often at the *suco* or *aldeia* level). The idea was that these community members would take up the opportunity to ask questions directly to representatives of political parties and inform them of what they thought were important issues for parties to address. It was a tactic that required representatives of political parties to meet face to face, often one on one, with their constituents.

Door-to-door meetings operated in a similar fashion. Elvis Maubere da Cruz, a FRETILIN student activist in the district of Ermera, described to me how he and a group of university students formed a volunteer brigade who campaigned door-to-door, handing out pamphlets to people from house to house.²⁸ FRETILIN focused its grassroots campaigning particularly in its strongholds in the east of the country, looking to consolidate its position there.²⁹ Four respondents to the surveys I handed out to students also identified door-to-door campaigning as a common tactic that parties employed to reach potential voters, disseminate party propaganda and build up relationships with the community.³⁰

²⁷ International Republican Institute (IRI). 2013. "Timor-Leste Parliamentary Elections." *op. cit.*, p.20

²⁸ Interviewee 23, Elvis Maubere da Cruz, 30 October 2013

²⁹ International Republican Institute (IRI). 2013. "Timor-Leste Parliamentary Elections." *op. cit.*, p.20

³⁰ Student 9, Fernando Dokergo, Student 4, Manuel Madeira, and Student 7, Antonito Cuis da Silva Alves

CNRT did employ small-scale tactics like door-to-door campaigning, as confirmed by two CNRT members in interviews in 2013, in the lead up to the poll. As Jose Goncalves, a CNRT administrator from the district of Liquica, described it:

[Regarding] mobilisation, we make announcements to attract the attention and confident of militantes, primarily through the campaign. Another mechanism we use is door-to-door campaigning, from house to house, to get the party closer to the people... [T]o mobilise them, we talk about all the programs we have completed.³¹

In the rallies I attended, campaign organisers mobilised large groups of supporters from outlying areas, numbering in the thousands, in the same area. Political parties assisted the mobilisation of their members and supporters to attend their events, typically with large trucks to ferry people. Some political parties provided subsidies for petrol expenses, food, water, and even vehicles to move people to events. FRETILIN was famous for bringing a large section of its big support base in a convoy from the east across into the capital of Dili for campaigning, as can be seen in Photo 5.2.

³¹ Interviewee 20, Jose Goncalves, 26 October 2013 *op. cit.*

Photo 5.2: FRETILIN rallying its supporters in Dili, 14 March 2012.



At one CNRT political rally I attended on 14 June in Metinaro, I witnessed the arrival of a four-wheel drive vehicle carrying supplies in the back. The vehicle stopped and large numbers of people from the crowd who had been waiting around the stage went over to the vehicle. The people driving the vehicle began distributing packages to the crowd (Photo 5.3). One of my contacts, who works at an international NGO and has a lot of experience with politics in Timor-Leste (first anonymous source), later told me that the packages contained food and the distribution of such packages by political parties is common at election campaign rallies across the country.³² As CNRT had access to the largest amount of financial and other material

³² Interviewee 1, Anonymous, 2012 and 2013

resources in comparison to its opponents, it was in the strongest position to distribute largesse to people at rallies and bring them into the CNRT political fold.

Photo 5.3: Food packages being distributed to people in attendance at a CNRT parliamentary campaign rally in Metinaro, 14 June 2012.



Rallies typically took on the appearance of a rock concert with a number of warm up acts, some of them musical or artistic, followed by the arrival of the main act, usually the leader of the party or some other highly ranked party official, who would then exhort those in attendance to vote for their party.

Photo 5.4: The warm-up act for a CNRT rally in Dili, 1 July 2012.



Photo 5.5: The warm-up act for a CNRT rally in Metinaro, 14 June 2012.



5.2.2. Campaign narratives of the future and the past

Xanana Gusmão focused primarily on two major themes in the speeches he delivered at the campaign events I attended: *dezevolvimento* (development) and the resistance to the Indonesian occupation. Undoubtedly, Gusmão, in the general course of the election campaign, spent so much attention on these two themes because of their resonance with people's memories of the past, present-day lives and struggles, and hopes for the future. Gusmão was able to craft and articulate a political message that drew on these themes and integrate them into a broader argument for providing electoral support for CNRT at the coming election. As examples, I have quoted at length portions of two speeches Gusmão delivered at rallies that I attended. The first comes from a rally held in Dili on 1 July 2012 (see Photo 5.4).

We cannot forget those who are not here with us today because they gave their blood and lives for independence. I ask that we show our respect for the dead by holding a minute's silence. Every five years you listen to political parties and their programmes for the coming five years, and CNRT respects the other parties as part of our democracy. The money is needed to fix and improve the lives of the people, needs to happen as they cannot wait longer. This needs to happen because the lives of the elderly are bad and they suffer. The party programme of the CNRT party will open the door for the development of the country, will open the door for belief and hope to reach the *sucos*, sub-districts and districts to look after themselves. This is important for CNRT.³³

³³ Gusmão, Xanana. 2012. "Campaign speech at CNRT rally in Dili." 1 July 2012

The second quotation comes from a rally held in Metinaro on 14 June 2012 (Photos 5.5 and 5.6).

We must show our respect to people from other parties but I say to you, vote for CNRT... CNRT returned in 2007, having first liberated the country, dying and suffering for independence. Now we have returned to raise people out of poverty and hard times. In 2010, I travelled through the district carrying with me the strategic development plan, showing it to the people. It is through this that in 20 years the country will grow and be better. The party programme of CNRT is to implement the strategic development plan in the next 20 years. Within the five years that the AMP government operated, the five parties within it, we achieved a lot of good things. Some bad things and good things. We reformed public administration, reformed the institutions of the state and guaranteed that the state would not collapse.³⁴

Xanana Gusmão and CNRT identified the *Plano de Desenvolvimento Estratégico Nacional* (PEDN or the National Strategic Development Plan) as central to their policy platform regarding development. The PEDN paints a portrait of Timor-Leste becoming a modern, prosperous nation by the year 2030, with the expenditure of monies from the petroleum fund integral to financing this plan. A two-page campaign leaflet, authored by a campaign official, Ozorio Leque, entitled, ‘Why voted for CNRT’, provides some insights into how CNRT linked Gusmão’s continued leadership of the country with its future prosperous development³⁵ The author’s translation into English is not perfect so I have paraphrased the points that are made in the document. Leque’s CNRT campaign material argued that ‘CNRT has demonstrated the

³⁴ Gusmão, Xanana. 2012. “Campaign speech at CNRT rally in Metinaro.” 14 June 2012

³⁵ Leque. 2012. “Why voted for CNRT? CNRT material prepared by member of campaign team of region 4.” *op. cit.*

ability to institute great development through infrastructure, in areas such as streets, electricity, schools, bridges and medical facilities, amongst other things'³⁶, and that ,‘it is the only party able to maintain the sustainability of the development of the country in the long term.’³⁷

The PEDN has effective cross party support, although there are some differences of opinion on how money should be spent to implement it. Arsenio Bano, Vice-President of FRETILIN, stated that the major differences on development policy focus on education, culture and health, issues that FRETILIN prioritise over others. He also expressed concern that money in the budget was being spent too quickly and that the health and educations sectors were suffering from this.³⁸ The underlying message that parties adhered to was support for progress for the country and for an overall improvement in the life of the country and of its citizens. Although there were not significant differences between the major parties’ policies regarding development, CNRT’s claimed primary ownership and responsibility for the PEDN. As another extract from Leque’s CNRT campaign material argued, ‘CNRT is the only party in the country comparable to other parties across the world in terms of thinking, dreaming and concretely planning a strategic plan (the PEDN). It is relevant to the lives of the Timorese people.’³⁹

³⁶ *Ibid*, Point 6: ‘CNRT political party shows the great development on infrastructure in the areas such as streets, electricity, schools, bridges, and medical facilities etc.’

³⁷ *Ibid*, Point 7: ‘CNRT political party is the one maintaining the sustainability of the development from now on up to longer term.’

³⁸ Interviewee 13, Arsenio Bano, 24 October 2013 *op. cit.*

³⁹ Leque. 2012. “Why voted for CNRT?” *op. cit.*, Point 18: ‘CNRT party is the party that can compete with other party from other country in term of thinking, dream and concrete plans as stated on strategic plan for Timor Leste 2011 – 2030. It’s relevant to the Timorese people’s life.’

Photo 5.6: Xanana Gusmão, speaks at a rally in Metinaro, 14 June 2012.



CNRT, aware of the electoral significance of its leader, relied heavily on the charismatic persona and history of Gusmão (see Photo 5.6) in its campaign and that was crucial to its success. Gusmão's strong association with the resistance to the Indonesian occupation and the campaign for independence translates very favourably in electoral terms. Ever since the 2001 national elections, the themes of independence, sacrifice and resistance have been central to electoral campaigns in Timor-Leste. In 2001, FRETILIN likened electoral support for itself to a way of showing respect and deference to the fallen from the past by invoking the names of those killed during the occupation.⁴⁰ In response, Xanana Gusmão turned out in support for other

⁴⁰ Hohe. 2002. "Totem Polls." *op. cit.*, p.76

political parties and challenged FRETILIN's status within the resistance movement, and its belief that it represented the people and should by default lead the country.⁴¹

The political importance of the resistance movement in elections became very clear six years later. The strategic trend of emphasising discourses of suffering during the occupation, and that of political and social recognition and reciprocity in the era of independence, continued in the 2007 election campaign. Candidates often deployed language of pain (*terus*) and suffering (*susar*) during the campaign.⁴² By expressing their own stories of suffering, the candidates fashioned an emotional connection to the audience by relating to their own personal historical experiences of pain and sacrifice. The greater the sacrifice the candidate had made, the more worthy they were of the trust of the people and deserving of their vote.⁴³ Candidates had to demonstrate not only that they suffered, but that they also recognised the sacrifices of the people if trust was to develop between themselves and voters. Silva described this behaviour and discourse as creating a sense of political community between leaders and the people.⁴⁴

5.2.3. Leadership of the resistance movement

Shifting back to the 2012 campaign, an example of the nexus between leaders, voters and the creation of a political community can be found in Leque's campaign leaflet that explicitly extolled the virtues and importance of Gusmão's personality and leadership. For instance:

⁴¹ Niner. 2007. "Martyrs, heroes and warriors." *op. cit.*, p.123

⁴² McWilliam, Andrew and Angie Bexley. 2008. "Performing Politics: The 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Timor Leste." *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 9(1):66-82, pp.73-74

⁴³ Silva, Kelly. 2008. "Reciprocity, recognition and suffering: Political mobilizers in Independent East Timor." *Vibrant* 5(2):156-178, p.169

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* pp.161-162

CNRT, under the leadership of supreme leader Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, liberated the people through the popular consultation in 1999, made our dreams come true, and modernised Timorese politics.⁴⁵

CNRT, under the leadership of Xanana Gusmão, developed and strengthened democracy, is responsible for allowing our country to come into existence, and it is not ethical to stand against him.⁴⁶

CNRT, under the leadership of Xanana Gusmão, has liberated the people from poverty, and will continue to do so. We are with him today because he has been with us.⁴⁷

Many CNRT banners and other advertising material featured pictures of Gusmão wearing his military uniform. Likewise, FRETILIN relied on a historically-based legitimising narrative that focused on the activities and sacrifices of the FRETILIN movement during the occupation. Accordingly, FRETILIN highlighted the participation of some of its leading members in the independence struggle, like Francisco Guterres Lu-Olo, pictured in photo 5.10. Similarly, PD owed much of its original base of strength and identity to the role some of its members, particularly its leaders Fernando Lasama Araujo and Mariano Sabino, played in the clandestine resistance movement. The campaign discourse remained focused largely on who did what during

⁴⁵ Leque. 2012. “Why voted for CNRT?” *op. cit.*, Point 1: ‘CNRT was the one liberated people through popular consultation in 1999, makes dreams come to reality and transform Timorese classical politics into modern under the supreme leader of Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão.’

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, Point 24: ‘CNRT political party under the leadership of Xanana Gusmão develop and strengthening democracy in our country and allow us to be existed but after all these we stand against him with no ethics.’

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, Point 24: ‘CNRT political party under the leadership of Xanana Gusmão has and will continue liberated people of poverty. Today we are with him because he has been with us.’

the occupation. As observers for the International Republican Institution (IRI) reported, across all campaign events, both small and large, party representatives commonly recounted:

...the party's resistance credentials. Older parties took credit for the country's liberation in an attempt to distinguish themselves. For example, FRETILIN made statements during rallies that it solely won independence for Timor-Leste at a time when all other political factions during the 1970s to 1990s favoured integration with Portugal or Indonesia. CNRT similarly claimed that Gusmão was the true guarantor of independence. Almost all parties employed this type of language, imploring voters to go to the polls to vote for their freedom as citizens, just as they voted for the nation's independence in the 1999 referendum.⁴⁸

The importance of claims to the leadership of the resistance in general, and use of FRETILIN symbols in particular, to attaining political legitimacy, arose early on in the campaign with the dispute caused by arrival of an organisation called FRETILIN Resistencia (Photo 5.7). One of the founders of this organisation, Agostinho de Vasconcelos, explained at length in an interview about how it came into being and why it supported Gusmão and CNRT to rule the country.

It can be said that FRETILIN Resistencia is a group that was formulated in similar ways to a political party. It arose during a campaign, linked to both the presidential and parliamentary campaigns. Firstly it accompanied TMR throughout his campaign for president... It is a very inclusive group, and includes Senhor Antonio Cardoso (from FRETILIN). After TMR's success in winning the presidential election, we begin to look at what possibilities there were for us to do further actions...

⁴⁸ International Republican Institute (IRI). 2013. "Timor-Leste Parliamentary Elections." *op. cit.*, p.19

We took the decision that we must give support to the figure of Gusmão, we need to support him to govern... So we announce that FR supports the candidature of Gusmão, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, so that he can become prime minister, when he wins... We can see that the structure of CNRT is not very influential, but it is the figure of Gusmão that carries them...

CNRT entirely depends on Gusmão ... and mobilising people to vote for Gusmão is easy, no joke. It's so simple because during the TMR campaign, in many places Gusmão came along to campaign with TMR and us. Gusmão campaign participated in the campaign. And his party gave support to TMR because he gave support for TMR's programme.⁴⁹

Photo 5.7: Prime Minister Gusmão (centre) speaking at a FRETILIN Resistencia campaign event in Dili, 3 June 2012.



⁴⁹ Interviewee 12, Agostinho de Vasconcelos, 15 October 2013

The formation of FRETILIN Resistencia posed a challenge to FRETILIN's claim to be the legitimate modern representative of the resistance movement. One of the key figures behind FRETILIN Resistencia was António Cardoso, a former member of the FRETILIN Central Committee. He helped establish this movement and threw his support behind Gusmão and CNRT in the parliamentary campaign, arguing that Gusmão was the right person to lead the country given his historical contribution to opposing the occupation and the forming of an independent Timor-Leste. In Cardoso's own words:

We recognize only the maximal leader Xanana as the one who knows best the history of FRETILIN; not a FRETILIN that was built after independence by those who had just arrived from abroad.⁵⁰

FRETILIN, unsurprisingly, strongly contested this argument, arguing that the current President of FRETILIN, Francisco Guterres Lu-Olo, was the rightful leader instead.⁵¹ FRETILIN complained to the *Comissão Nacional de Eleicoes* (National Election Commission or CNE) that representatives of FRETILIN Resistencia carried FRETILIN flags and symbols at CNRT rallies. The CNE ultimately deemed these acts as breaching the electoral rules so the practice eventually stopped.⁵²

⁵⁰ International Crisis Group. 2013. "Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost?" *op. cit.*, p.10

⁵¹ Lu-Olo Lidera FRETILIN Rezistencia. *Timor Post*, 1, 5 June 2012, p.1

⁵² International Republican Institute (IRI). 2013. "Timor-Leste Parliamentary Elections." *op. cit.*, p.21

Photo 5.8: Some participants at this CNRT rally in Dili (1 July 2012) advertised FRETILIN Resistencia's support for Xanana Gusmão and CNRT.



5.2.4. Campaign banners and images

Images of the leaders of the parties also featured heavily on the banners that dominated the visual environment in Dili, and also more sporadically throughout the rest of the country. These banners varied in size, from the small to the very large, reflecting the respective economic clout of the parties that put them up. CNRT's ability to dedicate large amounts of financial resources to project its message and vision to a larger audience was obvious for the much larger size of the banners on display. Banners typically featured pictures of at least one prominent person from the relevant party; these individuals were almost always men dressed in suits, military garb, or clothing worn by traditional figures of authority. I conducted a survey of

political banners in the capital Dili during the middle of the 2012 parliamentary election campaign, on 26 June (See Photos 5.9 through to 5.15). While certainly not a systematic appraisal of all of the banners displayed, it does provide a sense of the greater resources available to CNRT, in relation to the size of the banner, in comparison to their political competitors.

Photo 5.9: Various banners in Dili



Photo 5.10: PD banner in Dili



Photo 5.11: ASDT banners in Dili



Photo 5.12: FM banner in Dili



Photo 5.13: PR banner in Dili



Photo 5.14: PST banner in Dili



Flags featured prominently in the 2012 election campaign (and previous elections) because illiteracy among villagers is very high and the colours and symbols used in the flags make it easy for the parties to be recognised.⁵³ Flags are also of particular symbolic significance in Timor-Leste because they embody and legitimise local notions of authority and power, particularly as ancestral heirlooms. Besides colours and symbols, photos of prominent individuals — Gusmão and TMR dressed in military attire, see Photo 5.15 for example — commonly featured centrally on flags and banners.

⁵³ McWilliam and Bexley. 2008. “Performing Politics.” *op. cit.*, pp.70-71

Photo 5.15: This banner features both Xanana Gusmão and TMR in military garb. (Dili, 10 April 2012).



The representation of these figures together in their military garb speaks again to notions of political legitimacy in Timor-Leste being firmly grounded in the resistance to the Indonesian occupation, particularly in its military guise. The prominent role both these actors played in the armed resistance — at different times throughout the occupation they were the commander of the armed forces — was repeatedly signalled during the election campaign. CNRT placed images of Gusmão at the centre of its campaign, usually dressed in military garb. CNRT went as far as to superimpose an image of Gusmão’s face, wearing a military beret, onto its flag as the symbol of CNRT on the electoral ballot (see Photo 5.16).⁵⁴

⁵⁴ International Republican Institute (IRI). 2013. “Timor-Leste Parliamentary Elections.” *op. cit.*, pp.19-20 and International Crisis Group. 2013. “Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost?” *op. cit.*, p.10

Photo 5.16: The image in the top right hand corner was CNRT's symbol on the electoral ballot.⁵⁵



Matters pertaining to the history of the resistance were also visible in the form of flags from non-party political groups that were present at specific rallies when their members decided to back a specific party. A good example of this was the group *FITUN* (Star), which attended both rallies for TMR's presidential campaign, and CNRT's parliamentary campaign (see Photo 5.17). *FITUN* was a clandestine resistance movement, composed mainly of students and young people, which was active during the Indonesian occupation. *FITUN* took an active political role during the election throughout 2012, seeking to lend legitimacy to those candidates and parties it supported.

⁵⁵ Lei Eleitoral Bandu Tau Fotografia. *Timor Post*, 1, 15 May 2012

Photo 5.17: Some participants at this CNRT parliamentary campaign rally in Dili (1 July 2012) carried FITUN flags (pictured left).



Another student group active in the clandestine movement during the occupation; *Organizasaun Rezistencia Nasional Estudante Timorese* (RENETIL or the National Resistance Organisation of Timorese Students) also announced that it would walk with, and work for, Xanana Gusmão and CNRT during the election campaign.⁵⁶ CNRT also depended on other constituencies linked to various resistance organisations to mobilise support. Leque's CNRT campaign material alluded to the importance of linkages between CNRT and veterans when it stated that 'CNRT is the party that implemented a negotiated settlement of the populace, with a particular emphasis placed on financial assistance to veterans, clandestine groups, elders and

⁵⁶ RENETIL sei La husik Xanana La'o Mesak. *Independente*, 22 June 2012

local companies, creating conditions to engender self-sufficiency.⁵⁷ Indeed, both the IRI and EU Observation mission argued that such movements, particularly veterans' networks, were integral to CNRT's ultimate success.⁵⁸

5.3. 2012 National Election: Reflecting on the Aftermath

Twenty-one political parties and coalitions of political parties contested the 2012 polls. Overall, 482,792 of 645,624 registered voters (74.78 per cent) cast their ballot and 471,478 of these were valid (97.65 per cent). Table 2.3 in Chapter Two (page 91) provides a detailed breakdown of the parties that contested the 2012 polls, the proportion of the valid vote they received, and the number of seats they won in the parliament.


Only four parties attained enough votes to breach the 3 per cent threshold for obtaining seats in parliament. This was a noticeable reduction in comparison to 2007, when seven parties and coalitions of parties crossed the threshold. Of the six parties that lost their presence in the 2012 parliament, three of them — PUN, UNDERTIM and PPT — were relative newcomers to politics. The other three, KOTA, one of the historic parties of Timor-Leste, and PSD and ASDT, had had a presence in both the Constituent Assembly/Parliament of 2001/2002 and the Parliament of 2007.

⁵⁷ Leque. 2012. "Why voted for CNRT?" *op. cit.*, Point 6: 'CNRT political party shows the great development on infrastructure in the areas such as streets, electricity, schools, bridges, and medical facilities etc.'

⁵⁸ International Republican Institute (IRI). 2013. "Timor-Leste Parliamentary Elections: July 7, 2012." *op. cit.*, p.20 and European Union. 2012. "Timor-Leste: Final Report." *op. cit.*, p.15

In addition, I have highlighted the presence of FM as a new party in the parliament. FM scraped over the line with 3.11 per cent of the vote, thanks to a strong result in the district of Oecussi. In Chart 5.5 below, I compare the electoral fortunes of parties in the 2007 and 2012 parliamentary polls:

Chart 5.5: National Vote Comparison, 2007 and 2012



Source: Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (CNE). 2007. "National Provisional Results from the 30 June 2007 Parliamentary Elections." *op. cit.*, p.3 and Feijo. 2012. "Elections, Independence, Democracy." *op. cit.*, pp.49-50

There is a considerable jump in support for CNRT, which went from around 24 per cent to almost 37 per cent nationally. This represents a significance expansion of its base of electoral support. Both FRETILIN and PD essentially maintained their levels of support from five years

earlier. FRETILIN increased its vote, and PD saw a decrease in its vote, by a similarly small margin — around 1 per cent. For FRETILIN, this result was a mixed blessing; it did not experience further haemorrhaging of support as it had five years earlier, but neither did it make progress. The figure of around 29-30 per cent nationally constitutes a baseline vote for the party. Similar results for the first round of voting for FRETILIN's candidate for president in 2007 (27.89 per cent) and 2012 (28.76 per cent) suggest a consolidation of FRETILIN's core constituency around this figure. Over the last three national elections, PD has also held a steady level of support, which may indicate the true limits of its political appeal throughout the country. It is far too early to properly assess the significance and potential long-term viability of FM. The next election in 2017 will tell us more about its status in the country.

I now shift the discussion over to a district-by-district analysis of the election to provide an indication of the geographic distribution of electoral support to the various parties. Table 5.4 depicts both the winner and runner up, and the percentage of the vote they collected, in each of the districts in 2012.

Table 5.3: National Vote for Parties in 2012 (District-by-District)

Districts:	Winner	Percentage of Valid Vote	Runner Up	Percentage of Valid Vote
<i>Eastern</i>				
Baucau	FRETILIN	51.38	CNRT	23.05
Lautem	FRETILIN	43.86	PD	20.64
Viqueque	FRETILIN	59.52	CNRT	16.29
<i>Western/Central</i>				
Aileu	CNRT	52.54	FRETILIN	14.94
Ainaro	CNRT	37.19	PD	15.05
Bobonaro	CNRT	37.65	FRETILIN	17.77
Covalima	CNRT	31.83	FRETILIN	26.42
Dili	CNRT	49.54	FRETILIN	28.4
Ermera	CNRT	40.67	FRETILIN	19.92
Liquica	CNRT	41.99	FRETILIN	23.79
Manatuto	CNRT	45.39	FRETILIN	20.52
Manufahi	FRETILIN	31.86	CNRT	31.37
Oecussi	CNRT	38.98	FRETILIN	18.6

Source: Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral (STAE). 2012. "2012 National Parliamentary Election Results by District." STAE. Retrieved March 2013 from <http://www.stae.tl/>

The expansion of CNRT's electoral support in 2012 can be placed in context by comparing it to the 2007 district-by-district results viewable in Table 3.5 in Chapter Three (page 142). Looking at the eastern districts, we can see that CNRT increased its share of electoral support marginally across all three of them: Baucau by 9.63 per cent, Lautem by 5.63 per cent, and Viqueque by 3.67 per cent. This represented an average increase of 6.31 per cent. Although these are not large numbers, given the east has been, historically, FRETILIN's strongest base of electoral support, any shifts are worth mentioning. These results pale in comparison to the increase of CNRT's share of the vote in many other districts. Overall, CNRT averaged an increase of 15.93 per cent across the west and centre of the country. Taking a more precise lens to the district results, some of the more remarkable outcomes, from a CNRT perspective, include: Aileu (up 32.08 per cent), Ainaro (up 25.39 per cent), Covalima (up 16.4 per cent), and Ermera (27.02 per cent). What makes the cases of the latter three districts even more remarkable is that in 2007, CNRT did not register as either the winner or runner-up in any of these districts. Five years later, they displaced their rivals to win each of them.

Another productive way to depict and appreciate the dominative effect the popularity of CNRT has had on the national political landscape is to view its transformative power on a political map, district-by-district, in Maps 5.1 and 5.2. A review of the same maps produced in the wake of the 2007 polls, which I produced in Chapter Three with Map 3.2 (page 144) and Map 3.4 (page 145), provide a useful point of comparison in tracking the growth of CNRT's popularity in the country.

Maps 3.2 and 3.4 depict a rainbow assortment of political divisions in the country. Four different parties or coalitions of parties won districts, while six placed second. Five years later, the maps look very different; the winner's map demonstrates the ascendancy of CNRT, and FRETILIN to a lesser degree, blanketing the map mainly green, and some red. The runner's up map tells a similar tale. It is almost an inversion of the winner's map, with CNRT and FRETILIN trading 'winners' and 'runners up' positions in all but two of the districts. The blue of PD provides some relief to the near hegemony of green and red.

Map 5.1: National Vote District-by-District in 2012 (Winning Party)



Source: Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral (STAE). 2012. “2012 National Parliamentary Election Results by District.”

Map 5.2: National Vote District-by-District in 2012 (Runner Up)



Source: Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral (STAE). 2012. “2012 National Parliamentary Election Results by District.”

In the east, FRETILIN remained the winning party in Baucau, Lautem, and Viqueque. It effectively held its level of support in Lautem and Viqueque, but lost about 10 per cent in Baucau, although it still garnered a majority of the vote there. CNRT held its position of runner up, and increased its share of the vote, in Baucau and Viqueque, but lost its position to PD in Lautem. FRETILIN averaged 51.58 per cent of the vote across the three eastern districts, well above its nearest rival, CNRT, which averaged 19.86 per cent in the east. The most impressive aspect of CNRT’s performance, indicative of its increasing penetration and prevalence throughout the rest of the country, were its results in the western and central districts. In all of these districts, with the exception of Manufahi — where it was runner up to FRETILIN by less than .50 per cent — CNRT won more votes than any other party. In these western and central districts, it averaged 40.76 per cent of the vote, which exceeded its nearest competitor, FRETILIN, which averaged 21.55 per cent in these ten districts.

Chart 5.6: Distribution of Seats in Parliament Comparison, 2007 and 2012

Source: Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (CNE). 2007. “National Provisional Results from the 30 June 2007 Parliamentary Elections.” *op. cit* and Feijo. 2012. “Elections, Independence, Democracy.” *op. cit.*, pp.49-50

The mechanics of the electoral system — nation-wide proportional representation with a 3 per cent threshold, and the seat distribution mechanism that accompanies it (the d’Hondt method, otherwise known as the highest average method) — make a strict and clear comparison with the 2007 distribution of seats, depicted in Chart 5.6, problematic. The process by which seats are assigned according to the proportion of the total *eligible* vote an *eligible* party receives causes the difficulty. In this system, after the initial count of votes is conducted, all of the votes that fall under the 3 per cent threshold are discarded. The votes that belong to the parties that exceed the threshold form a new pool of *eligible* votes that determine the final distribution of seats; parties usually receive approximately the number of seats proportionate to their share of

this new pool of eligible votes. The mathematical distribution of seats in 2007 — where there were seven eligible parties and coalitions of parties — differed from the distribution of seats to the four eligible parties in 2012. I will compare the outcomes of the 2012 and 2007 polls to illustrate this point.

In 2012, CNRT received almost 36.68 per cent of the original tally, but as a percentage of the eligible pool of votes, it took almost 45.86 per cent (172,908 of 377,039 eligible votes). FRETILIN attained a very similar amount in 2007 (around 29 to 30 per cent), but in similar fashion to CNRT, FRETILIN took a significantly greater share — 37.37 per cent — of the pool of eligible votes (140,904 of 377,039 eligible votes) compared to its share of the original tally. PD acquired 10.30 per cent of the original tally and about 12.88 per cent of the eligible votes (48,579 of 377,039 eligible votes), while FM received 3.11 per cent and 3.88 per cent respectively (14,648 of 377,039 eligible votes).

As I mentioned in Chapter Two, the d'Hondt method of allocating seats mechanically tends to advantage parties that acquire larger amounts of the vote. In 2012, the precise translation of eligible votes into seats transpired in the following way: CNRT accrued 30 parliamentary seats (46.15 per cent of actual seats in the parliament), 12 more than the previous election. FRETILIN, although its original share of the national vote did not change markedly from 2007, was able to collect four more parliamentary seats (38.46 per cent). PD garnered eight seats (12.30 per cent), for the third election in a row, while FM attained two seats (3.07 per cent). I refer back to these results as presented in Chart 2.3 in Chapter Two (page 93).

The significant discrepancy between CNRT and FRETILIN's original tallies of votes and pools of eligible votes is primarily explained by the fact that so many parties and coalitions of parties, 17 in total, failed to breach the 3 per cent threshold. This rendered all of those ballots, around 94,500 of them (or 20 per cent of all valid ballots) meaningless. Additionally, it is important to remember that there were only four parties eligible for seats. As a corollary, CNRT and FRETILIN, the parties with noticeably larger shares of the original tally (about 36.68 per cent and 29.89 per cent respectively), took a greater, disproportionately large share (45.86 per cent and 37.37 per cent respectively) of the impressively diminished pool of eligible seats (down from 471,478 to 377,039) in comparison with the smaller increases of PD (up from 10.30 per cent to 12.88 per cent) and FM (up from 3.11 per cent to 3.88 per cent).

In comparison with the outcome of the 2007 parliamentary elections, depicted in Chart 2.2 in Chapter Two (page 82), there were far fewer votes than in 2012 (around 37,096 or 8.92 per cent of all valid votes) wasted on the seven parties that failed to get beyond the 3 per cent threshold. There were also seven parties and coalitions of parties that were eligible for seats competing for a larger number (compared to 2012) of eligible votes; down from 415,604 to only 378,508. This resulted in only a mild increase in the proportion of eligible votes held by FRETILIN and CNRT against the total pool of eligible votes. FRETILIN received 29.02 per cent of the original tally of votes, but as a proportion of the total pool of eligible votes it won 31.85 per cent; CNRT took 24.10 per cent of the original tally and 26.46 per cent of the eligible votes; and PD obtained 11.30 per cent of the original tally and 12.40 per cent of the eligible votes. The

percentage of seats these three parties received proceeded as follows: FRETILIN with 21 seats (32.30 per cent), CNRT with 18 seats (27.69 per cent), and PD with 8 seats (12.30 per cent).

The problematic nature of comparing the number and percentage of parliamentary seats held by political parties does not make the time spent exploring the changes between 2007 and 2012 redundant. First, analysing these aspects of the election results provides a comparative framework through which we can appreciate the changes in support for political parties across time. Furthermore, a clear understanding of how proportional representation works in Timor-Leste is important because of its intrinsic relationship with the theory of dominant parties I am drawing on in this thesis.

As outlined in Chapter One, Pempel argues that an electoral model that encourages multipartism, usually in the form of proportional representation, is an indispensable precondition for a dominant party to form.⁵⁹ A party does not need to control a majority of parliamentary seats in order to dominate the political realm; a plurality of seats, usually around 35 per cent of the national vote, is often enough to place the party in question in a dominant bargaining and governing position. This framework is relevant to the case of Timor-Leste because the electoral system sets the conditions up perfectly for large parties, namely CNRT and FRETILIN, to lay down the groundwork for dominance.

⁵⁹ Pempel. 1990. "Introduction." *op. cit.* and Pempel. 1990. "Conclusion." *op. cit.*

In 2007, CNRT only won the second greatest number of seats in the parliament, and was dependent on its four coalition partners to run the country. Five years later, however, CNRT won almost 37 per cent — exceeding Pempel's figure of 35 per cent. CNRT's vote in 2012 inflated to almost 46 per cent of the eligible vote. CNRT received a clear plurality of the vote and seats in parliament and thus possessed a very strong bargaining position in relation to the other parties. This dominance was important for the negotiations that led to the formation of a new government. CNRT thus fulfilled Pempel's first and second criteria for dominance: first, dominant numerically and, second, having a dominant bargaining position. I shall shortly provide an account of the formation of the new governing alliance, which demonstrates the latter of these two criteria.

Finally, CNRT is also well placed to consolidate and advance its power in the country between 2012 and 2017 by pursuing its governmental agenda (namely the PEDN) or historic project throughout the country, thus fulfilling Pempel's fourth criteria of dominant governmentally. The third criteria, dominant chronologically, has not yet been fulfilled, but CNRT will be in a position to achieve such dominance if it enjoys a similar position of governmental strength after the 2017 national parliamentary election. If it achieves this target it may graduate from a proto-dominant party to a dominant party proper. Some dangers lay ahead, however, which will be identified and discussed later in this chapter, and in Chapter Six.

5.4. The Formation of the New Governing Alliance

On Sunday 15 July 2012, CNRT held a conference in Dili to determine the formation of the new governing coalition. This conference occurred barely a week after the election on Saturday 7 July. It was the prerogative of CNRT, with a plurality of seats in the parliament, to form government. CNRT held a lively debate, broadcast nationally on television, which drew on the opinions of party members in attendance about their prospective coalition partners. The final resolution of the debate was to invite PD and FM to join in a new governing coalition, leaving FRETILIN out of power. In the process of deliberating the advantages and disadvantages of FRETILIN being a part of the government, CNRT conference attendees — according to FRETILIN — were highly critical and insulting of FRETILIN.⁶⁰ The language they used was of such a provocative nature that it led to a relatively brief, but violent, period of tension and clashes between government security forces and some very angry FRETILIN demonstrators in Dili and the district of Viqueque, one of FRETILIN's strongholds in the east of the country. This situation continued for approximately one week, and resulted in the death of one young FRETILIN supporter. Reflecting on what happened during this chaotic period, my second anonymous source, who has been involved in political activism since independence and ran for election in 2012, downplayed the level of violence that occurred and emphasised the important role the leadership of FRETILIN played in preventing the situation getting out of control:

At the CNRT convention to decide who will form government with it, people used the media to criticise [each] other, [specifically] their opponents (FRETILIN)... The response from FRETILIN, [was] not really violent. The

⁶⁰ Leach, Michael. 2013. "Timor-Leste in 2012: Beyond International Statebuilding?." *Asian Survey* 53(1):156-161 p.159

FRETILIN party works hard not to react violently. Problems could have started but party leadership controls it. Could have been a lot worse had FRETILIN not worked on this and stopped things going too far. Especially in Viqueque.⁶¹

Once the situation had returned to one of relative calm, CNRT carried on with its prerogative to establish a new government. On the surface, the inclusion of FM into the government was a strange choice by CNRT. With 30 seats, CNRT could not form a majority with FM alone, they would only control 32 of the 65 seats in the parliament. CNRT still required PD's eight seats, which would give them 40 seats, to obtain the majority it required to govern.

The explanation for CNRT's inclusion of FM in the ruling coalition, even though it could have formed a government with merely PD (which would have given them 38 out of 65 seats) comes down to two factors. In part, the answer lies in the realm of personal relationships. Gusmão's relationship with the President of FM, Jose Luis Guterres, went back to the days of the resistance when Guterres was a central leadership figure in the clandestine student movement in Indonesia. Other relationships have developed more recently and relate to more material concerns, such as Jorge da Conceição Teme, a senior FM office-bearer, who was also a successful businessman from the district of Oecussi.⁶²

⁶¹ Interviewee 14, Anonymous, 6 November 2013 *op. cit.*

⁶² Interviewee 1, Anonymous 2012 and 2013 *op. cit.*

In addition, as reported in Chapter Four, Gusmão implemented a new governmental philosophy and strategy when he became PM and formed the AMP government in 2007. He constructed a broad political tent that included many whom FRETILIN had excluded and marginalised in the preceding six years. He intended to get as many of the key players, and leaders of important groups, to buy into a new political compact in an effort to take the country forward in a unified fashion. For political, economic, and business reasons, Gusmão saw the actors involved in FM as important to achieving this objective. As such, Gusmão invited FM into the government because not only did it represent a natural extension of his project of governance, but he considered its leaders very close friends and political allies: FM was a coalition partner that could be relied upon.

CNRT's formation of a 40-seat governing coalition with PD and FM, which established the 5th Constitutional Government of the Republic of Timor-Leste, demonstrated continuity in Gusmão's approach to governance. The government, with 55 ministries, vice-ministries, and secretaries⁶³, was noticeably larger than the 38 posts of the previous government. There were 17 ministries and CNRT, unsurprisingly, took up the lion's share with eight of them.⁶⁴ The spoils of

⁶³ Government of Timor-Leste. "V Constitutional Government." *Structure of the V Constitutional Government*, retrieved 29 July 2014 from <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=13&lang=en>

⁶⁴ CNRT had responsibility for the offices of Prime Minister (Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão), Minister of State and of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Agio Pereira), Minister of Defence and Security (Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão), Minister of Justice (Dionísio Babo Soares), Minister of Health (Sérgio Lobo), Minister of Education (Bendito Freitas), Minister of Transport and Communications (Pedro Lay), and Minister of Tourism (Francisco Kalbuadi Lay).

victory were shared with its BGK coalition partners PD, which controlled four ministries⁶⁵, and FM with two ministries.⁶⁶ Non-party affiliated individuals took up the remainder of the ministries.⁶⁷ The remaining posts of vice-ministries and secretaries of state were distributed broadly to a range of other actors, some of whom were associated with the parties of the BGK, and some who were involved in other parties or other social groupings allied to Gusmão.

Many of those with governmental posts represented important social groupings or had links to other important institutional bodies or businesses. For example, the former Director of the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration, (Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral or STAE), Tomás Cabral, left his position after the 2012 parliamentary election and became the Secretary of State for Administrative Decentralization. In addition, according to my third anonymous informant (who has a long history of involvement in Timorese politics going back to the 1980s), several members of the government, including one minister, were close collaborators with the Indonesian regime during the occupation.⁶⁸ These kinds of appointments represented the continuation of Gusmão's policy to incorporate people of various backgrounds into the government.

⁶⁵ PD had responsibility for the offices of Vice Prime Minister and Coordinator of Social Affairs (Fernando La Sama de Araújo), Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (Mariano Assanami Sabino), Minister of Commerce, Industry and Environment (António da Conceição), Minister of Public Works (Gastão Francisco de Sousa)

⁶⁶ FM had responsibility for the offices of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (José Luís Guterres), and Minister of State Administration (Jorge Teme). Sister of Lugu, Isabel Guterres independent

⁶⁷ Included in this group were: Emília Pires (Minister of Finance), Isabel Guterres (Minister of Social Solidarity and sister of Jose Luis Guterres of FM), and Alfredo Pires (Petroleum and Mineral Resources and brother of the Minister of Finance).

⁶⁸ Interviewee 1, Anonymous 2012 and 2013 *op. cit.*

5.4.1. Resignation of Gusmão

A dramatic development in the political life of the country occurred when Dr Rui Maria de Araujo, a member of FRETILIN, took the oath as PM, and the 6th Constitutional Government came into being, on 16 February 2015 after Gusmão resigned as PM. This resignation also forced the dissolution of the 5th Constitutional Government.⁶⁹ Gusmão still maintains an active presence in the new government as Minister of Planning and Strategic Investment, one of 38 ministers and vice-ministers. Gusmão's decision to select Dr de Araujo as PM was an interesting and controversial one, as was the appointment of four other members of FRETILIN to the new administration, given that he has been a member of FRETILIN since 2010, and a member of its Central Committee since 2011. A dramatic realignment in Timorese politics has occurred, specifically a rapprochement between CNRT and FRETILIN.⁷⁰

An important aspect of this rapprochement is represented by the political coming together of Xanana Gusmão and Mari Alkatiri. Domestic political rivals since the inception of independence in 2002, these two leaders reached a peace, pathed with an offering from Gusmão to Alkatiri of stewardship of a development project in the district of Oecussi. Alkatiri accepted responsibility of this development project and, despite the differences between FRETILIN and the three other parties in the parliament, FRETILIN was incorporated into a government of national unity.

⁶⁹ Government of Timor-Leste. 2015. "Biography – H.E. Dr. Rui Maria de Araujo." *Prime Minister - Biography*, retrieved on 20 September 2015 from <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=11229&lang=en>

⁷⁰ Peake, Gordon. 2015. "Timor-Leste: New prime minister, new approach." *The Lowy Interpreter*, 16 February 2015, retrieved on 20 September 2015 from: <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/02/16/Timor-Leste-New-Prime-Minister-new-approach.aspx>

This situation marks a greater accommodation and cooperation between the four parties in the parliament. As the new PM stated in his welcome message on the official government website: “The leaders of this nation made a selfless decision to put the interests of The People above all else and this is the reason why the VI Constitutional Government is a Government of Unity.”⁷¹ The effective end of a formal opposition in the parliament raises the question of the nature of power sharing amongst the political elite of the country, particularly as to the impact it has on disconnecting political parties from the social constituencies they supposedly represent.

This situation resembles, in a more embryonic fashion, the system of cartelisation of parties that has arisen in Indonesia according to Dan Slater.⁷² In the context of the democratic opening up of Indonesia after the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, there was an expectation that the emerging political parties competing in elections from 1999 onwards would be concrete expressions of the social constituencies they represented. Slater notes, however, that this expectation was not met with “novel and marked disarticulation between political parties and their presumptive social constituencies.”⁷³ This disconnect occurred because parties have undertaken a policy of “promiscuous power sharing”, in which all or most parties represented in parliament take part in cabinet and discarded their commitment to their respective social constituencies.

⁷¹ Government of Timor-Leste. 2015. “Message from his Excellency, Prime Minister Dr. Rui Maria de Araujo.” *Prime Minister - Message*, retrieved on 20 September 2015 from <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=11226&lang=en>

⁷² Slater, Dan. 2014. “Unbuilding Blocs.” *Critical Asian Studies* 46(2):287-315

⁷³ *Ibid*, pp.289-290

More precisely, Slater defines promiscuous power sharing as “an especially flexible coalition-building practice in which parties express or reveal a willingness to share executive power with any and all other significant parties after an election takes place, even across a country’s most important political cleavages.”⁷⁴ In the case of Timor-Leste, the move towards a model of greater power sharing amongst the parties’ representatives in parliament was framed by PM Dr Araujo as being for the greater good of the country. In his speech marking the swearing-in of the 6th Constitutional Government, PM Dr Araujo stated that:

Despite their own political convictions, the members of the Sixth Government will put the interest of the people above any other partisan interests. It is my duty to also thank the President of CNRT, the national political commission of CNRT and the party as a whole as well as the leadership of the two parties of the coalition block. It honours me also to thank the party I belong [to], the historic and glorious FRETILIN that has always known how to sacrifice itself for the common interests of the Maubere homeland. Without the trust of CNRT as well its two-coalition partner and without the acceptance of FRETILIN we would not have made history today.⁷⁵

It is very early days in the life of this new political paradigm and more time is needed to come to any certain conclusions of the nature of this arrangement between CNRT and FRETILIN, parties that since 2007 had been fierce rivals. It is likely though, despite recent

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p.290

⁷⁵ Government of Timor-Leste. 2015. “Speech by his Excellency the Prime Minister Dr Rui de Araujo on the Occasion of the Swearing-in of the Sixth Constitutional Government.” *Speeches*, retrieved 20 September 2015 from: <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?cat=27&lang=en&page=4>

political developments that CNRT remains a proto-dominant party and this new arrangement does not signal the end of this position. Indeed, the incorporation of FRETILIN into the ruling coalition and the appointment of a FRETILIN member as PM signals the strength and confidence of CNRT, as the largest party in the parliament. There was no immediate practical requirement for Gusmão to bring FRETILIN into the government, and in doing so I speculate that he was looking to strategically consolidate the political arrangements for the next election.

Instead of operating with multiple partners, it is possible that Gusmão hopes to squeeze out or eliminate the small parties in the parliament and establish a two-party system that is managed by the two big parties, CNRT and FRETILIN. If the relationship between these two parties is good, they can rule the country in effective partnership with no real challenge to them. National elections are due in the second half of 2017 and what transpires during the electoral campaign and the results of the polls themselves will inform us with greater clarity and certainty about the nature of the party system in Timor-Leste.

The entry of a new political party into the mix for the elections in 2017 is not surprising, and I am sure there will be many of them. But the emergence of Partidu Libertasaun Popular (PLP), however, represents something worth noting. The first thing to highlight is the identity of its incoming leader, the current president of Timor-Leste, Taur Matan Ruak (TMR). TMR will not be able to formally take up the position of president of PLP, however, until his tenure as president of Timor-Leste is complete. TMR's leadership of PLP will bring it a huge amount of publicity and credibility, given his various roles as resistance leader during the occupation, head

of the armed forces, and president of the country. Given the dominant discourses of previous elections have centred on credentials earned from activities during the occupation, and on the future development of the country, TMR and PLP stand to perform well in the next election. TMR's reputation as a resistance fighter and leader is powerful, and as president of the country he has shown great concern about the developmental concerns Timor-Leste faces. The core question is, will it be able to challenge the political space that CNRT and FRETILIN have historically performed so well in? Perhaps, if the living conditions of the population do not improve enough under CNRT and FRETILIN. It is also possible PLP may create their own narrative that appeals to people, if the conditions on the ground suit it. Whatever happens, the entry of PLP is looking like it will shake things up, so watch this space.

Conclusion

The primary task of this chapter was to conclude my response, which I began in Chapter Four, to the question of explaining the continuation of the pattern of party competition (moderate pluralism) between the 2007 and 2012 parliamentary elections. I argued in both Chapter Four and this chapter that since 2007, CNRT has evolved into a proto-dominant party, and that this phenomenon has caused a tightening of the structure of competition, which has ultimately resulted in the reproduction of moderate pluralism. I demonstrated this argument by examining how conditions favoured the electoral prospects of the two largest parties, but especially those of CNRT.

I then shifted to an analytical reflection of the electoral campaign itself, emphasising some of its key characteristics and how they signalled the electoral strengths of CNRT over its rivals. The figure of Gusmão stood large in the campaign, while CNRT drew on greater material resources in order to hold large numbers of rallies nationwide, whereas their opponents had to settle for far more modest campaign events. Finally, CNRT took full advantage of its incumbency of the state, as leader of the AMP Government, to distribute government programmes to some key constituencies (veterans, among others) at auspicious moments; the rise of distributive politics is well and truly confirmed in this development.

I followed that analysis with a review of the 2012 election result, breaking down the numbers at both the national and district level. A clear concentration of the vote favouring FRETILIN and CNRT had taken place, producing a parliament that left CNRT merely three seats short of a clear majority. There was a shrinking of the number of parties that passed the threshold and entered parliament; some of the more established and experienced parties, like PSD and ASDT, failed to win a single seat. I then catalogued the formation of the new government, with CNRT inviting PD and FM as its formal coalition partners, and including a broad range of other political and social actors into the cabinet.

The viability of the current arrangement, with CNRT appearing to have cemented its position of governmental dominance in particular, however, is predicated on a number of crucial elements that are by no means immutable. As will be explored in Chapter Six, the stability of the current pattern of competition is contingent on the parties that constitute it, and the future shape

and resilience of these parties can be assessed against certain key criteria. As such, I propose to test the degree of institutionalisation of the political parties in Timor-Leste that have a presence in the parliament, concluding the thesis with some tentative prognoses on the future political dynamics of the country.

Chapter Six. Political Party Institutionalism in Timor-Leste

The current leaders have their own individual qualities. The leaders of FRETILIN are historic leaders, and have technical and political skills. For CNRT, it is about the leadership of Gusmão. For PD, it is because of the structure of RENETIL. For the small parties it is difficult because they do not have access to parliament because they are weak, weak leaders and political programs. Some of these leaders are only involved to get access to the state's finances.¹

Manuel Madeira

According to each of the leaders, they always have the interest of leading the country into the future. They are very dedicated, and have clear plans. And their thoughts of independence were not a dream but they obtained it through death and the shedding of blood to just gain independence. When there is a change of leadership, when the younger generation needs to change the older generation, they must have a strong sense of nationalism in order to lead.²

Nelvio Lucas Soares

In Chapter One, I outlined the conditions under which a pattern of competition between political parties can promote consolidation into a regularised party system. In particular, I noted Sartori's position that three consecutive elections that produced the same pattern are necessary before consolidation could be said to have occurred. In reference to the case of Timor-Leste, I have documented the shift from a predominant pattern of competition, which arose in 2001, to one of moderate pluralism in 2007. This pattern was repeated in the wake of the 2012 national

¹ Student 4, Manuel Madeira *op. cit.*

² Student 6, Nelvio Lucas Soares

parliamentary elections; one election short of the necessary three in a row. It is also, however, important to inquire into the character of individual political parties, particularly as such questions pertain to their longevity, and the longevity of the party system as a whole. The matter of party strength has gained impetus and relevance with the resignation of Xanana Gusmão as prime minister in February 2015. His resignation raises questions of how long he will remain as president of CNRT and what effect his eventual departure from that position will have on the party.

In initiating an investigation into the institutional strength of individual parties, I need to first briefly review some theoretical matters to place this investigation into context. I proposed in Chapter One, and documented throughout the course of this thesis, that after three elections there are signs of consolidation in the pattern of party competition. In reference to the first and third criteria of Mainwaring and Scully's theoretical model of party system institutionalism — outlined in Chapter One — I argued that there has been 'regularity of party competition' and that 'the major players have generally accepted election results as 'determining who governs', respectively.³ In contrast, the results for Timor-Leste against the second and fourth criteria are less impressive with concerns about whether parties have 'stable roots in society' and about 'the level of party organisation'.⁴ These two criteria essentially revolve around the question of party institutionalism and, as I outlined in Chapter One, there is a presently a limited amount of literature on this topic. I intend in this chapter to make a unique and substantive contribution to this body of literature.

³ Mainwaring and Scully. 1995. "Building Democratic Institutions." *op. cit.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

I now briefly revisit the theoretical inspiration guiding my research before developing my larger argument. I participated in four months of ethnographic fieldwork in Timor-Leste from August to December 2013. In total, I interviewed 34 individual subjects, 19 of whom were involved inside political parties. Due to limited time and resources, I decided to focus on the representatives of the main political parties: FRETILIN, CNRT, PD, and FM. As I noted in Chapter One, meeting interview subjects from parties outside of this quartet was very difficult so I felt the most productive way of researching this topic was to examine the main parties. The fieldwork questions I focused on were originally inspired from a theoretical model developed by Randall and Svasand in 2002, which is outlined in detail in Chapter One, on how to interrogate and analyse party institutionalism in developing countries.

The key features of Randall and Svasand's model are as follows. The four aspects of their theoretical matrix concern *both* structural and attitudinal issues inside *and* outside political parties. Interactions that constitute the party as a structure cover matters such as the origins, development, leadership, political economy and structure of the party, for example, while cultural questions concerning the degree to which party actors identify with their party and their motivations for joining it, are also considered. Further questions addressed the degree of autonomy the party had in relation to sponsoring organisations and, finally, to what degree the existence and identity of the party is established in the mind of the public. I developed my fieldwork questions around these themes and issues to facilitate an investigation into the matter of party institutionalism in Timor-Leste, which would be largely informed by the narratives and experiences of the Timorese themselves, both inside and outside the party.

The position I arrived at after analysing my interviews and other relevant material, and the general argument I have put forward here in this dissertation, is that individual political parties are weakly institutionalised in Timor-Leste. The notable exception is FRETILIN; it is the only party that is recognisably institutionalised. In contrast, CNRT's existence and appeal has been highly contingent on the charismatic leadership of its president, Xanana Gusmão, which raises serious doubts about its organisational capacity to withstand a change of leadership in the future. While PD has also depended on the personalised appeal of its leadership based on their resistance credentials, it has had a strong, albeit relatively small, base of support, and is reasonably coherent in organisational terms. It is too early to make any concrete judgements about FM, but it faces an uphill battle to survive given their size and organisational capacity.

This chapter is structured in line with the three most pertinent thematic issues pertaining to the question of party institutionalism raised in the interviews I conducted. I have categorised these themes as: 'origins and development', 'leadership', and 'patronage'. Methodologically, my analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the political parties in the Timorese parliament relies on responses from interview subjects both inside and outside the parties, which lends a greater degree of depth to my research. The analysis of the empirical evidence gathered in the field will substantiate my position that the institutional strength of FRETILIN stands in marked contrast to the comparative institutional weakness of the other parties.

6.1. Origins (and Development) of Parties

Understanding the origins and development of political parties can make a useful contribution to a broader analysis of party institutionalism. According to Panebianco, the party-building process can be conceptualised as involving varying degrees of penetration and diffusion. Stated simply, territorial and organisational penetration refers to the process by which a party originates in a centralised location and expands outwards. Diffusion, in contrast, refers to a party-building process that entails a party growing more organically and spontaneously in more than one location. As a general rule, the greater degree that penetration plays in the origins and development of a party, the greater degree the party is institutionalised.

After assessing the interview transcripts of respondents from FRETILIN, CNRT, PD, and FM on this subject, along with other pertinent material, I argue that in the case of FRETILIN, penetration has been more significant than diffusion in its party-building process. In part thanks to the length of its existence (since 1974), FRETILIN has had more time and opportunity to penetrate both organisationally and territorially throughout the country. In contrast, penetration plays a less significant role in the case of the other three parties, with diffusion having a more pronounced effect on their development.

The emergence of FRETILIN occurred within the broader historical context of the decolonisation of Portugal's colonies after the Carnation Revolution that began on 25 April 1974. FRETILIN formally came into being in September of 1974, having originally developed

out of ASDT, formed on the 20 May 1974. The territorial and organisational origins of ASDT can be pinpointed at the urban centre of Dili. The centralised nature of these origins is explained by the fact that its leaders had had access to a relatively privileged upbringing within the colonial apparatus and were considered members of the Timorese urban elite.⁵

The colonial regime employed many members of ASDT as officials in the government and as teachers in Dili, and they met in a clandestine fashion in the years leading up to the Carnation Revolution at the houses of Francisco Xavier do Amaral and Nicolau Lobato, in the guise of a discussion group.⁶ The participants of this discussion group created the Committee for the Defence of Labour, which formed the nucleus of the movement that would initially be called ASDT, and later, FRETILIN.

The most accurate way to generally characterise ASDT/FRETILIN's development is in terms of both territorial and organisational penetration, and not diffusion. Once ASDT had transformed into FRETILIN in September of 1974, which reflected its more revolutionary character, it worked hard to expand its networks and organisation throughout the general population of the country, especially in rural areas. FRETILIN implemented a grassroots campaign to engage and politicise ordinary Timorese to support independence and to prepare them for a possible Indonesian invasion.

⁵ Niner, 2001. "A Long Journey of Resistance." *op. cit.*, p.16

⁶ Hoadley, Stephen. 1976. "East Timor: Civil War – Causes and Consequences." *Southeast Asian Affairs* 3:411-419, p.413

Justino Valentim, a FRETILIN member from Lautem, briefly referred to this period when he was a young man, during our interview.

The history of FRETILIN at the time of the resistance... the party was responsible for politicising the people in order that they can comprehend what was an exploration into the politics of independence, of self-determination. This is what FRETILIN was about. I was also involved internally in the party in the preparation of the politicisation of the people so they could understand their right to self-determination, right to independence.⁷

FRETILIN's penetration of the territory included taking the reins of government after it had successfully defeated the attempted coup by UDT in August of 1975. FRETILIN also expanded to include a large section of the armed forces, known as FALINTIL. The Indonesian invasion devastated the formal armed resistance to it, and FRETILIN retreated and consolidated to the east of the country, away from where Indonesia concentrated its occupation. Some of the leadership of FRETILIN entered into exile overseas and carried on its activities, striving for international support to end the occupation and restore independence to Timor-Leste.

It was only after the success of the self-determination ballot and UN led military intervention that FRETILIN as a whole, both the overseas and local organisation, was able to reunite and reorganise as a political party to compete in post-independence elections. FRETILIN performed impressively in the 2001 Constituent Assembly elections, and although it has suffered electoral setbacks since 2007, it has still maintained consistently strong support in the east of the country. FRETILIN's strength in this regard is substantiated by the fact that it has won a

⁷ Interviewee 8, Justino Valentim, 23 September 2013 *op. cit.*

plurality of the vote in each of the three eastern districts (Baucau, Lautem and Viqueque) in every national election since independence. The organisational strength and attraction of FRETILIN, especially in the east, speaks to the historical influence it has had since it expanded from the centre of the country and penetrated to its periphery.

In comparison, diffusion has played a much more influential role in the origins and party-building process in the case of CNRT, which suggests its structural foundations and organisational capacity lags behind that of FRETILIN. The origins of CNRT are rooted in the social and political turmoil of 2006 and the popular response it engendered. I recounted the events of the 2006 crisis in detailed fashion in Chapter Three, but it is worthwhile providing a summary of what happened to contextualise the emergence of CNRT. The FRETILIN Government's sacking of a group of soldiers in March 2006, who had deserted their barracks amid claims they were being discriminated against catalysed broader protests in the general population that eventually converged on the capital, Dili. Gangs and paramilitaries of veterans emerged in this socially and politically unstable period, and violence broke out, notably between the police and military. Armed UN peacekeepers arrived in late May and, under considerable domestic and foreign pressure, Prime Minister Alkatiri resigned in June and a new government was subsequently formed.

The palpable social and political discontent with the FRETILIN government, engendered by the 2006 crisis, found a political vehicle to attach itself to when Xanana Gusmão established CNRT only months before the 2007 national parliamentary elections of 30 June. As CNRT is

primarily centred (and dependent) on the imagery and personality of Gusmão, CNRT has grown organically in territorial terms, most clearly and powerfully in the west and centre of the country, in response to popular support for Gusmão. My third anonymous source, who was active in the clandestine resistance movement and is a long-time observer of Timorese politics, expressed the origins of CNRT and its symbiotic relationship with Gusmão in this way:

CNRT and Xanana Gusmão... was a spontaneous development and charismatic leadership was important too. Success of CNRT must be placed into context... During the occupation, individual identities and personalities became more important than political parties per se... CNRT benefitted from emphasis on personalities, not because people knew it as a party. XG is associated with CNRT.⁸

The expression of discontent with FRETILIN, coupled with the emergence of Gusmão and CNRT, translated — in electoral terms — with FRETILIN ceding the dominant position it achieved in the 2001 national elections to CNRT in the subsequent two national elections in 2007 and 2012. While FRETILIN won a plurality of the vote in 12 of the 13 districts in 2001, it only achieved the same result in four of the districts in 2007. CNRT, in contrast, won a plurality in five of the districts in 2007. And in 2012, CNRT expanded its grip on the western and central districts of the country by obtaining a plurality in nine of the 13 districts.

CNRT's origins and early popularity were thus more organic, diffuse and spontaneous in nature when compared to FRETILIN, which the product of a concerted effort that began from a

⁸ Interviewee 15, Anonymous, 19 November 2013 *op. cit.*

central location and moved outwards. Shifting to the case of PD, there are elements of both penetration and diffusion that characterise its origins and development, although its story more closely resembles that of FRETILIN than CNRT. PD began in Dili and penetrated out to the rest of the country, where it was able to instantly connect with, and build upon, an existing base of support in the west and centre that it had historical links with.

The leadership and some of the membership of PD locate their origins in the clandestine resistance movements in Indonesia during the occupation. Amaro Ximenes, president of the Baucau Branch of PD, described the formation of the party in this way:

PD came to life through the youth and student organisation RENETIL⁹, which was created in Indonesia. Based in Bali and Java, [and] designed to be a clandestine movement. We ran protests and demonstrations about Timorese independence, and then in 1999 we returned to Timor and joined the original CNRT movement.¹⁰

With the arrival of independence, and in the lead up to the 2001 Constituent Assembly elections, the national umbrella movement that represented various pro-independence groups, *Concelho Nacional da Resistancia Timorese*¹¹ (CNRT), disbanded. In this context, some of the prominent members of the clandestine movement, including its former president Fernando

⁹ Resistencia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor Leste (The National Student Resistance of Timor-Leste)

¹⁰ Interviewee 6, Amaro Ximenes, 20 September 2013

¹¹ National Council of Timorese Resistance

Lasama de Araujo, and its General-Secretary, Mariano Sabino, decided to form their own party.

According to Amaro Ximenes:

...when CNRT was shut down, some of us talked with Lasama and Sabino and a comrade called Felicidade, and we talked about forming a new party... At the time I was a coordinator in Baucau, for a student forum. I was involved in the origins of building PD, but we had no money. We needed money to campaign, so Gusmão said to us, if you have no money, I will give you some so you can do this... Gusmão had the money in Lahene, and he gave us some money. Ten million rupiah, maybe four thousand Australian dollars, for us to do activities and establish the party.¹²

PD formed in 2001 and has contested elections since 2001. The leaders and founders of PD, while finding a natural base of support in some of its former clandestine network, were responsible for creating the party in a centralised manner. The party has since penetrated and developed territorially and organisationally, thanks in part, to its former clandestine activists, but also because of centralised efforts from Dili to build the party.

The development of FM, which was founded in 2012, has so far been a process of penetration on a very limited level. The nucleus of FM can be discerned in the politically febrile atmosphere of 2006, as Custodio de Jesus Freitas, a Coordinating Secretary for FRENTI-Mudanca in the district of Baucau, recounted to me:

FRENTI-Mudanca came together because of the 2006 crisis, and also because of the FRETILIN Government. My colleagues and I were in FRETILIN and tried to

¹² Interviewee 6, Amaro Ximenes, 20 September 2013 *op. cit.*

defend FRETILIN from people within it who were damaging it. We were like a resistance group within it who were trying to save it, repair it. So we formed a group and left FRETILIN, and we aligned ourselves with CNRT, with Gusmão. They see us as part of their family, their step-children. Without CNRT, there would be no FM. We campaigned with CNRT during the 2007 election campaign, along with Gusmão.¹³

In its initial guise, and well before forming into a formal political party, the people involved in what would later become FM represented a reformist group that had splintered from FRETILIN. This group first tied its colors to the mast of CNRT and Gusmão, but as Custodio de Jesus Freitas makes clear, things did not go as he wished:

But when the AMP Government is formed, CNRT did not initially show the recognition to the former members of the resistance that they deserved... Gusmão said to us that it would be better if we were separate, so we formed our own party... We became an official party and competed in the 2012 national parliamentary election and got...two seats in parliament.¹⁴

FM has a noticeable pocket of electoral support in one district, Oecussi, where one of its senior office-bearers, Jorge da Conceição Teme, comes from. However, allegations of FM promising money in exchange for votes in Oecussi cast real doubt on how much support they really have there. According to Bano, who hails from Oecussi and spends much of his time working there, FM promised \$100 dollars for each vote. At the time of the interview on 24

¹³ Interviewee 4, Custodio de Jesus Freitas, 19 September 2013

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

October 2013, FM had not yet paid the promised monies to voters, which was causing consternation throughout the district.¹⁵ It is very early days and it will take another election to see if it can grow territorially, develop organisationally, and make gains on its current status of two parliamentary seats.

6.2. Leadership of Parties

The essential question over leadership of parties to be considered in the Timorese context relates to the extent to which parties have been built around, “a pre-existing organizational base and established identity”¹⁶, compared to the degree they have been constructed around charismatic leadership. The general test Panebianco sets for assessing party strength in this regard is that the greater degree parties rely on charisma alone to operate, the more short-lived their existence tends to be in the political realm.¹⁷

I argue that the basis of FRETILIN’s authority is not one of charismatic leadership as it is currently organised, but rather, that FRETILIN’s legitimacy depends substantively on a strong pre-existing organisational base and established identity, which was founded in 1974 and continued to develop during the occupation. The organisational networks of FRETILIN, which emerged out of the anti-colonial movement in the early 1970s in Dili, laid the foundation of the

¹⁵ Interviewee 13, Arsenio Bano, 24 October 2013 *op. cit.*

¹⁶ Randall and Svasand. 2002. “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies.” *op. cit.*, p.17

¹⁷ Panebianco. 1988. “Political Parties.” *op. cit.*, p.53

FRETILIN movement that would continue through to independence, despite the organisation taking a severe battering militarily during the occupation. The greatest damage was wrought in the centre and west of the country, and FRETILIN was able to survive and consolidate its forces and influence in the east. In doing so, it forged especially close linkages with the population there, which cemented the organisational foundations for its political identity as the movement that supported independence from the very beginning and fought for it during the darkest days of the struggle in the late 1970s, thus keeping the dream alive for the future.

The electoral appeal of FRETILIN is based on historical identity and political program rather than the leadership of a particular leader, and as such is well placed to survive a change of leadership in the future. In an interview, Tony Ku who, while being a citizen of the town of Los Palos (in the eastern district of Lautem), spent most of his later life in Dili, emphasised that the organisational strength of FRETILIN would see it through a change of leadership away from its historical leaders, particularly its general secretary, Mari Alkatiri:

If Alkatiri left FRETILIN, it would not have as large [an] effect as XG leaving CNRT. Not so important. I agree that FRETILIN has a stronger policy, ideology, grassroots structure, identity, [and] can survive a leadership change. [FRETILIN] is stronger without Alkatiri. Many young people and FRETILIN militantes believe that.¹⁸

Justino Valentim argued that political programmes and principles were central to people's support for FRETILIN. FRETILIN's identity is well known and consistent, while also

¹⁸ Interviewee 10, Tony Ku, 2 October 2013 *op. cit.*

being free of a dependency on a particular individual establishing a relationship with voters:

The people, the militants of FRETILIN, support FRETILIN not because of any other reason other than their excellent political program and one political principle. This is the principle of why we support FRETILIN. Because of what is good, of good leaders, a solid program, and a good plan for the regeneration of the leadership.¹⁹

A change in the identity of who leads the party, and the process of leadership regeneration did not concern Valentim, or any other interviewee; they exuded confidence about FRETILIN's future based on people's connection to what it historically represents, particularly the sacrifices made in its name during the Indonesian occupation. My second anonymous source, who has been involved in political activism since independence and ran for election in 2012, phrased it this way, "[m]any supporters see FRETILIN as the part of the resistance... many people suffer and are victims because they are FRETILIN"²⁰, while Valentim also remarked upon the subject in similar terms in our interview:

Our, my family internally, completely are FRETILIN because I suffered during Indonesian times, striking me, treading on me because of the name of FRETILIN. We all know our history. They have a principle that their father originally suffered because of the name of FRETILIN. Afterwards, those militants see that I indeed really suffered. They know the history of FRETILIN.²¹

¹⁹ Interviewee 8, Justino Valentim, 23 September 2013 *op. cit.*

²⁰ Interviewee 14, Anonymous, 6 November 2013 *op. cit.*

²¹ Interviewee 8, Justino Valentim, 23 September 2013 *op. cit.*

Speaking on this matter, FRETILIN Vice-President Arsenio Bano expressed confidence that FRETILIN would continue into the future regardless of who the leader is:

FRETILIN has strong structures and procedures in place, and a clear identity not dependent on charismatic leadership or particular personalities, which would allow it to survive a change of leadership and continue to exist and operate. Changes and transitions are well organised.²²

Two further respondents confirmed their confidence in the ongoing electoral support for FRETILIN into the future, one based on their programme and history rather than personalities. The question of generational change in leadership positions did not shake the confidence of Elvis Maubere da Cruz, a FRETILIN student activist from the district of Ermera:

I see the leaders, now in Ermera, they are old, but there will be opportunities for these leaders to give time and changes to a new generation. So I believe that in the future, we in the new generation always struggle for FRETILIN and its programmes, which come from 1975, we will continue them.²³

And, finally, I take a quote from Grigoriu dos Santos, FRETILIN Second Vice-Assistant Secretary in Liquica, who expresses the identity and history of FRETILIN as the party of the resistance and independence. For him, in no uncertain terms, this identity and history provides the party the legitimising basis of their social and political authority, one that transcends individual leaders:

²² Interviewee 13, Arsenio Bano, 24 October 2013 *op. cit.*

²³ Interviewee 23, Elvis Maubere da Cruz, 30 October 2013 *op. cit.*

I think that leadership change can occur in FRETILIN, for example like now you all know that party president Lu-Olo and General-Secretary Mari Alkatiri is of a particular generation. An older generation, the first generation. The second generation, or new generation, can get involved in leadership positions. They can get new leaders in FRETILIN, and they will not lose. And I always believe that the people will support them because of the party's history.²⁴

With a clear identity and strong, historical organisation as a basis for its activities, FRETILIN is well placed in institutional terms to survive into the future, as my third anonymous interviewee stated, "FRETILIN is the only party that has traditional support. Given its history, the beliefs it stood for since its formation in 1975... No other parties have a real, traditional support base. Nothing like what FRETILIN has."²⁵ The same cannot be said of CNRT, as the same interviewee stated, "CNRT doesn't have that traditional base of support."²⁶

The founding and early organisation of CNRT was almost exclusively based on charisma. The role that the charismatic personality and leadership of former guerrilla leader Xanana Gusmão played was crucial to CNRT's identity, operation, and appeal. As such, the institutional strength of CNRT appears minimal. Tony Ku describes the basis of CNRT's legitimacy and authority as dependent on charismatic leadership, and on a relationship between Gusmão and CNRT's supporters.

²⁴ Interviewee 19, Grigoriu dos Santos, 8 October 2013 *op. cit.*

²⁵ Interviewee 15, Anonymous, 19 November 2013 *op. cit.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

CNRT's attraction in Dili is all about Xanana, his personality, not the party. Charisma is central to it. Timor is Xanana, Xanana is Timor. Amongst the grassroots population, this is what they really believe. He is a hero, who gave everyone heart. He planted in many people's heart hope that you don't need to vote for any other party in the next election as long as this guy is with the party. If Xanana moves to another party in the next election, or retire, things would change.²⁷

Charisma played a central role in the founding of CNRT. The social and political upheaval experienced in 2006 set the scene for the intervention of Gusmão to form and lead his own party, CNRT, to compete in the 2007 national parliamentary elections with only two months to get prepared. As my second anonymous source stated, “[f]or CNRT, the focus is just on one person, Xanana Gusmão's charismatic leadership and his legacy.”²⁸ While the emphasis on Gusmão has proved successful in the short-term for his party, the test comes further down the line when there is a change of leadership and the relationship between Gusmão and CNRT voters that has proved pivotal to CNRT's success will no longer be in operation. As the same anonymous interviewee stated, “[t]here are good people inside CNRT but it will be a rough transition of leadership. I expect some drop in support. CNRT is based heavily on charismatic leadership, and leadership change will be a big challenge.”²⁹ Gusmão has already stepped down as prime minister in February 2015 so to pursue this topic here is of real relevance. I now review the questions I posed to several CNRT members about what their party is doing to build the organisation and train other leaders for the future.

²⁷ Interviewee 10, Tony Ku, 2 October 2013 *op. cit.*

²⁸ Interviewee 14, Anonymous, 6 November 2013 *op. cit.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

While CNRT members recognise the challenge the party faces and are taking steps to address it, they remain concerned about the future popularity of their party once Gusmão departs. These concerns add further substance to my position that CNRT remains institutionally weak at present as far as the criteria of leadership is concerned. Joao Cabral, the Second Vice-Coordinator of CNRT in the district of Baucau, recognised that CNRT faced challenges on the issue of leadership renewal:

The party has a structure, we aim to take the party forward with leaders that work and study hard, and follow the ideology of the party. There is some concerns about the grassroots structure, and there are some concerns about who will take over and replace the old leaders. We need to find replacements for Gusmão, there will be problems if we can't replace him properly.³⁰

Jose Goncalves, a CNRT administrator from the district of Liquica, echoed similar concerns about generational renewal in CNRT:

The historic leaders, replacing them, finding new leaders is very difficult. It is a big problem in this party. Also, the strategy of how to promote the new generation as the new leaders, good leaders, for the future is part of the development process of the party. Future leadership, this is difficult.³¹

CNRT member Josh Trindade also recognised how closely associated CNRT was to Gusmão and that this posed a problem for the party in electoral and organisational terms in the

³⁰ Interviewee 7, Joao Cabral, 21 September 2013 *op. cit.*

³¹ Interviewee 20, Jose Goncalves, 26 October 2013 *op. cit.*

future. While Trindade emphasised that preparations were underway to develop new leaders, he indicated concerns that they may not be ready for the next election due in 2017:

There is a leadership training program for regeneration. There are preparations for a new generation of leaders, and there is pressure with Gusmão getting older. I fear the new generation won't be ready in time as Gusmão probably won't run in 2017. There is lots of work to be done to prepare for his exit. It is a hard task because he is so unique...New leaders aren't as charismatic as him. XG is closely tied to the identity of CNRT.³²

Whether or not a new leadership group is prepared to take on the task of running CNRT, there is no escaping the fact that CNRT cannot directly replace someone as unique as Gusmão. According to my third anonymous source, there is only one outcome, the “[c]ountry is being built on a sandy structure. Timor will collapse after Xanana Gusmão leaves. Buying off problems in the short term.”³³ The success of CNRT is a double-edged sword; the success that Gusmão's charismatic leadership has brought the party renders it, and perhaps the stability of the country, vulnerable after his eventual departure.

A clear pre-existing organisational base and identity can be attributed to PD, but so must the role of charismatic leadership in the guise of their former president, Lasama, and current General-Secretary, Mariano Sabino. In my assessment, there is a balance between the two elements, which indicates there is some degree of strength in the party organisation. A

³² Interviewee 11, Josh Trindade, 2 October 2013 *op. cit.*

³³ Interviewee 15, Anonymous, 19 November 2013 *op. cit.*

clandestine network of mainly students and young people established in Indonesia formed a natural base of support and identity for the political party PD, when the former leaders of the clandestine network founded that party in 2001. As Amaro Ximenes described it:

Leaders of PD, many were locked up in Indonesia and punished. PD's president, Lasama, was locked up with Gusmão in Cipinang. The party was quickly built around two main leaders, Lasama and Sabino, and I trust them.³⁴

Other similar clandestine networks that existed inside Timor-Leste during the occupation also had much in common with their overseas comrades. The institutional strength of PD, however, is balanced with some dependency on charisma. Their two main leaders are highly respected because of the reputation they gained being clandestine activists. In particular, Lasama's close relationship with Gusmão, which developed over the years they spent together in an Indonesian prison, accords Lasama special status as a member of the overseas resistance movement.

On the question of leadership renewal in the future, all of the respondents were confident that the party had mechanisms in place to do so and that they would continue to receive support from the electorate regardless of who is in charge of the party. Vice-President of the Democratic Youth Organisation in Manatuto, Vicente Soares, replied that:

If in the future we need to change leaders, we will be prepared through holding a national congress to change the leadership. Move from an older leader to a leader from the younger generation so we can implement our program.³⁵

³⁴ Interviewee 6, Amaro Ximenes, 20 September 2013 *op. cit.*

Finally, Amaro Ximenes felt that they had a strong base of support that would continue to support the party if new leaders came to the fore:

However, it is possible to change leadership, because we have a strong network, of veterans, former combatants and the clandestine movement, which support the party. Sabino is particularly young, and will continue into the future. He is important for us.³⁶

In my assessment, this confidence in the future viability of PD as a medium sized party is well founded. PD has a clear identity and pre-existing organisational base, and while charisma has played a role in its success, PD is not as dependent on this factor when compared to CNRT.

Finally, although it is too early to speak with much certainty about FM, we can make two comments about them on this question: Firstly, the close relationship between its leaders and Xanana Gusmão indicates its organisation depends partly on the appeal of its leaders and charisma. Secondly, its base of support and identity is rather narrow and its obtainment of two parliamentary seats may have been achieved through vote buying so FM is not an indication of organisational strength. Responses I received on this matter from interviews with FM members did not provide any data of any value so I did not address them.

³⁵ Interviewee 3, Vicente Soares, 17 September 2013

³⁶ Interviewee 6, Amaro Ximenes, 20 September 2013 *op. cit.*

6.3. Patronage

There are two relevant themes addressed in this section that relate to the broader topic of how patronage intersects with party institutionalism. The first concerns how parties secure financial and other resources to fund day-to-day operations. The second focuses on the motivations of party members: is their association based on aspirations for short-term material gains, or is it a long-term commitment based on identification with the values and objectives of the party?

6.3.1. Financial Resources

In Timor-Leste, resources play varying roles in each of the parties under examination, thereby underscoring variations in the degree of structural cohesion in the respective parties. FRETILIN has a large membership base, which according to the Vice-President of FRETILIN (Arsenio Bano) in 2013 was over 100,000, that makes an obligatory financial contribution in the form of membership dues. Outside of these dues, FRETILIN also receive some support from businesses but has far fewer financial resources to call upon than CNRT. FRETILIN relies on volunteers to conduct many of its activities. As such, it can be considered a structurally sound party.

Of the four parties under examination, FRETILIN is the only one that collects mandatory membership dues from its members. In my interviews with Grigoriu dos Santos and Arsenio

Bano, for example, they described how membership to the party costs one dollar per year.³⁷ They both also explained that FRETILIN MPs are obliged to contribute part of their salary, 10 per cent according to Bano, to the party. In the words of dos Santos:

We contribute to the party, there is a quota, which we contribute to the party. The quota from militantes, one dollar for membership. They contribute to the party materially, there is money which comes from FRETILIN MPs, members of the government, which goes to the party every month... It is for the work of the organisation, to conduct activities.³⁸

Other sources of funding include government subsidies and some donations from supporters in business. As Justino Valentim put it:

As a large organisation, the FRETILIN party in this district, in Timor-Leste and Lautem, we put on big events like large meetings or visits. We have a plan to present out ideas and have national support, we receive money, the party gets money through the government and receive support through others, like FRETILIN business people, they help with materials and money and transport.³⁹

And the anonymous FRETILIN interviewee from Ermera stated they collected financial resources:

³⁷ Interviewee 13, Arsenio Bano, 24 October 2013 *op. cit.* and Interviewee 19, Grigoriu dos Santos, 8 October 2013 *op. cit.*

³⁸ Interviewee 19, Grigoriu dos Santos, 8 October 2013 *op. cit.*

³⁹ Interviewee 8, Justino Valentim, 23 September 2013 *op. cit.*

Because we have a presence in the parliament, we receive government subsidies, and we also depend on some support from businesses that love FRETILIN, they voluntarily give us money. Members of parliament also [give] a percentage of their salary every month.⁴⁰

It is difficult to measure how much businesses financially contribute to FRETILIN, and the influence that buys them, due to a lack of solid data. However, it certainly does not appear to be at all comparable to the case of CNRT. Interviewees reiterated that FRETILIN had little or no money and could not compete financially with CNRT. In addition, the large degree to which volunteerism and cooperation play a critical role to how FRETILIN sustains itself and organise events indicates the significance of the membership base to its entire existence. As Arsenio Bano described it:

The party is based on, and relies upon, volunteerism. People just come to help. Any FRETILIN member can stay with any other members in any part of the country. A philosophy of mutual support and solidarity underlies the party. Unlike CNRT, FRETILIN can organise people for any meeting or ceremony easily. People just turn up. CNRT spends lots of money to do this.⁴¹

The spirit of volunteerism is a theme of relevance to issues of motivation that will be explored shortly. For now, I want to conclude this examination of the role of resources in FRETILIN by highlighting a personal account of his time as a FRETILIN party activist — Elvis

⁴⁰ Interviewee 22, Anonymous, 29 October 2013 *op. cit.*

⁴¹ Interviewee 13, Arsenio Bano, 24 October 2013 *op. cit.*

Maubere da Cruz — who summed up how FRETILIN as an organisation relies on the voluntarist spirit of its supporters, running on the smell of an oily (financial) rag:

We believe our students are sufficient for our human resources. And we don't have a budget, no money. The Nicolau Lobato Brigade was our own initiative, and there was no money. We only formed it in order to save and protect this nation. We formed it voluntarily... the volunteers shared equipment and visited 52 *sucos* in Ermera, to do door-to-door campaigning... During this period FRETILIN helped to do activities, sometimes they provided transport. For my transport they facilitated the distribution of petrol. We also used FRETILIN's vehicles for the campaign activities.⁴²

A spirit of volunteerism in CNRT was absent from the conversations I had with CNRT members. While CNRT has a formal membership base, there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure that members give money to the party. Instead, CNRT is more reliant on financial resources obtained from its relationships with businesses, a dependency that translates into reduced autonomy for CNRT to make decisions in its own interests and, as such, signifies a weakness in its institutional capacity. A caveat to this is that CNRT has also established a network of (political) distributive relations — in essence, mutually beneficial relations between political parties and their constituents — with much of the electorate that has wedded them in a fashion to the party, as discussed in detail in Chapter Four. Examples of these distributive networks include the provision of cash payments to IDPs in Dili and demobilised soldiers (the Petitioners), and pensions to the elderly and people with disabilities, both introduced in 2008. I argue, therefore, CNRT fits the intermediate zone model identified by Randall and Svasand and

⁴² Interviewee 23, Elvis Maubere da Cruz, 30 October 2013 *op. cit.*

outlined above, suggesting that it sustains a precarious but not fatally flawed existence institutionally speaking.

As I described in detail in Chapter Four, CNRT, has close connections with several companies and businesses that have made substantial financial donations to the party. My second anonymous source focused specifically on this subject in our interview:

Another source is contracts, donations from businesses etc. They have a big influence. Who is in the company, who are they related to. Take a look at the CNRT fundraising list from 2012.⁴³

The publicly disclosed list of donors to CNRT published in May 2012, as I discussed in Chapter Four, revealed the identities of both individuals and companies that contributed US\$2 million to the party in the lead up to the 2012 national parliamentary election. Many of the companies that made a contribution have received extremely lucrative government contracts for procurement or construction projects. By way of example, the three most expensive projects awarded so far have been distributed to Puri Akaraya (\$406 million for the construction of the Hera and Betano power plant), CNI22 (\$298 million for the construction of the nationwide electrical power grid, power plant and its facilities), and a joint project by Carya Timor Leste (BTK) and Jonize Lda (\$104 million for the construction of social community houses). These four companies contributed the following amounts to CNRT: Puri Akaraya \$200,000, CNI22 \$100,000, and both BTK and Jonize Lda \$250,000.

⁴³ Interviewee 14, Anonymous, 6 November 2013 *op. cit.*

Among all of the CNRT members questioned about the how CNRT accessed financial resources, Trindade was the only one who referred to CNRT's efforts to raise funds from the business community, with specific reference to the list of contributors mentioned above. Trindade admitted that CNRT fundraises, but the money came from individuals. He claimed some of the individuals happened to own or manage businesses, but they made these donations on an individual basis.⁴⁴

Even if it is true that people made a contribution as an individual, the fact remains they own or manage businesses that the government has awarded large contracts to and these individuals have an interest, or perhaps an obligation, to reciprocate by making a financial contribution to CNRT. My third anonymous source is firmly of the opinion that patron-client relations are clearly in operation between business and the government. They believe there is a high level of corruption and that bribes are necessary for procuring state resources and contracts.⁴⁵ Furthermore, seven of the student respondents mentioned that parties received money and resources from businesses and companies.⁴⁶

Interviewees who represented CNRT did not elaborate much on the topic of resources. Josh Trindade explained that party members and MPs give money to the party for its day-to-day

⁴⁴ Interviewee 11, Josh Trindade, 2 October 2013 *op. cit.*

⁴⁵ Interviewee 15, Anonymous, 19 November 2013 *op. cit.*

⁴⁶ Student 1, Angelina de Jesus, Student 2, Darios Goliveia Leite do Nascimento, Student 3, Agustinho Pereira Belo, Student 5, Salvador da Costa, Student 6, Nelvio Lucas Soares *op. cit.*, Student 7, Antonito Cuis da Silva Alves *op. cit.*, and Student 10, da Costa

operations, but he did not make it clear whether these contributions were obligatory or not.⁴⁷ My second anonymous source, in contrast, was confident that:

CNRT members of parliament and government make contributions to the party, part of their salary. There is a contract but members' donations are not always enforced.⁴⁸

Joao Cabral confirmed that people in the party give resources to CNRT, but on a volunteer basis. In return, he stated, the party provided resources to help its members and structure in the district and sub-district level to organise and run conferences. Government subsidies were another important aspect of how CNRT accesses funding to function:

We want to do things to help fix and strengthen CNRT, but we have to be patient to get subsidies from the government to the political parties. We can't guarantee any activities.⁴⁹

Finally, Domingus Lopes Lemos, CNRT District General-Secretary in the district of Ermera, confirmed this situation:

To campaign, we get resources or subsidies from the government, and we get a little bit from the party structure.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Interviewee 11, Josh Trindade, 2 October 2013 *op. cit.*

⁴⁸ Interviewee 14, Anonymous, 6 November 2013 *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ Interviewee 7, Joao Cabral, 21 September 2013 *op. cit.*

⁵⁰ Interviewee 24, Domingos Lopes Lemos, 30 October 2013

In contrast to FRETILIN and CNRT, PD does not have a formal membership base and therefore lacks regular income from membership dues. Instead, PD relies on government subsidies, volunteers, contributions from its MPs, and small-scale patron-client relations and (political) distributive networks. From a resources perspective it suffers from a number of deficiencies and cannot be considered an organisation functioning from strong foundations. For example, government subsidies are based on the number of seats a party has in parliament. With only eight seats to CNRT's 30 seats and FRETILIN's 25, PD is at an obvious financial disadvantage. As an anonymous PD official reflected on this issue:

In order to do activities in the districts, the party draws on volunteers, and the party does not have many functionaries to give resources. The parliament has also approved some state funds, which means the party receives some money to organise itself. This depends on how big the party is in the parliament. FRETILIN and CNRT have many more seats in the parliament so they get a lot more money from the state. The primary source of funds comes from the state.⁵¹

As this PD official indicated, the party calls upon the activism and volunteerism of its membership base, in grassroots fashion, to help it function. As the same interviewee commented:

The most important resource for us is a commitment of solidarity, volunteerism. Volunteers from the party organisation, from the bottom up.⁵²

⁵¹ Interviewee 9, Anonymous, 23 October 2013 *op. cit.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

Outside of such government subsidies, party members and leaders also financially contribute to PD, although there is no indication it is obligatory. As Jitu Antonio, PD First Vice-Coordinator in Liquica, explained:

Legally, we receive subsidies or funds from the government, and we also receive financial contributions from political leaders, who have money and give it to the party so it can do political activities. At the national level of PD, they contribute part of their own salary... order those who enter parliament to contribute ten per cent of their salary to the party.⁵³

Amaro Ximenes described it this way:

We in the party, who work, such as public servants, provide funds to the party to help it operate, to the militants as well. We ask for money, contributions from our people who are members of government, this is very important. Some of our supporters located overseas also help us and support our activities.⁵⁴

Continuing on with the subject of resources, patron-client relations and distributive politics also permeate the organisational links between PD, businesses and the community in general. In the district of Liquica, as Jitu Antonio explains, the party's links with these two groups are of a mutually beneficial nature to all involved:

Other resources in the district... some colleagues in the party are in charge of projects. After the project, they contribute to the party some of the money, or contribute cars or transport for the party, so they can campaign in the election.

⁵³ Interviewee 18, Jitu Antonio, 8 October 2013 *op. cit.*

⁵⁴ Interviewee 6, Amaro Ximenes, 20 September 2013 *op. cit.*

The party helps this community and we receive help from members of the government in order to do activities in the district, members of parliament in the party support us and provide help. In Timorese culture, if a person dies, some assistance is required. Sometimes we give rice... often through this we can help the population. Often they don't have the money to do things so we help them in these situations.⁵⁵

Amaro Ximenes also talked about the practice of PD helping out families of people who die, this time in the district of Baucau. On this matter, he admitted the political utility and benefit for the party interacting with the community in this way:

Our party supports families, for example, of people in PD who die in *sucos* or whatever. We ask for contributions to help. These contributions build a connection between people and the party, we are close. We campaign in *sucos* and districts to help socialise party ideology. Party leaders come and visit, they come to listen and talk, and work together.⁵⁶

While PD's involvement in patron-client relations or distributive politics does serve to strengthen its ties with businesses and the community to some extent, it cannot compete with the scale at which CNRT conducts similar activities. In addition, PD cannot hope to call upon the kind of financial resources from an organised, formal membership base — like FRETILIN can — for the simple fact that it does not have one, although it does require its MPs to make a contribution to the party. PD also has capacity to call upon a spirit of volunteerism in a similar

⁵⁵ Interviewee 18, Jitu Antonio, 8 October 2013 *op. cit.*

⁵⁶ Interviewee 6, Amaro Ximenes, 20 September 2013 *op. cit.*

way to FRETILIN, and it maintains decisional autonomy to the extent that it is not dependent on accessing financial resources from external business interests.

Finally, it is too early to come to any firm judgements regarding FM but it does not collect membership dues and receives little in the way of government subsidies due to its small size in the parliament. It does, however, receive some backing from supporters who own big businesses. Overall, it faces a tough road ahead to sustain and compete in the future. FM controls only two seats in the parliament and so only collects a relatively paltry amount of government subsidies compared to the other three parties. As the following two interviewees explain, whom I quote from at length, they rely on financial contributions from people inside the party and from supporters in business.

Regarding longer-term party-building and party cohesion, FM is structurally weak and dependent on external largesse and will need to develop further modes of collecting revenue to sustain itself and compete in the future. The first respondent, Custodio de Jesus Freitas, had this to say about resources:

We built this party ourselves, from our own money. Unlike other parties, our MPs don't give money to the party. Colleagues' money, people in the party, give what they can from their businesses to the party in order to mobilise people and help the party.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Interviewee 4, Custodio de Jesus Freitas, 19 September 2013 *op. cit.*

On 29 October 2013, in the district of Ermera, I interviewed a Coordinator for FM, Julio Soares Madeira. He related his knowledge and experience of how FM collected funding to me:

Regarding the preparations for the general election in 2012 in this district... there was no money. But FM at a national level has a group of friends or associates and they have money, they run companies, big ones, they have money and give it together to us. Later, the money is distributed and shared to the party in the districts because the last election we were not in the parliament of government so we have no money. The money came from the national structure, those groups contribute money to FM.⁵⁸

6.3.2. Motivation

Surveying the narratives of all of the interview respondents is one way to analyse party members' motivations for being a part of the party. The explanations that FRETILIN members I interviewed gave to articulate their motivation for participation indicates that FRETILIN is well established and placed institutionally into the future. Identification and loyalty to the party rests strongly on close personal and familial ties to FRETILIN as a historical agent that brought about independence.

I quote in extended fashion a section of my interview with Tony Ku. In this interview he expands on the close association people in the east of the country, where he was born, have with FRETILIN. The institutional strength of FRETILIN is touched upon through this narrative that emphasises the long enduring party identity and loyalty held by many easterners:

⁵⁸ Interviewee 21, Julio Soares Madeira, 29 October 2013

The experience of citizens there in the east, but especially Viqueque and Lautem, is heavily linked to the historical party, FRETILIN. [This is] also true for the story of liberation for this country. If my father is FRETILIN, that determines the orientation of the family. That attachment and identity will pass on... cultural attachment to the party in the east is very strong, in the community. The end result, what is actually done, is not so important. The attachment is caused by historical factors, [it is] less about policy and regulations, what they are going to do. Political education is not as important as showing support or solidarity. As something that has been passed down from one generation to another, it is a matter of family legacy. [It] also [has] to do with the past, history, and the party. My father said that this is what we fought for, in the struggle. [So we have a] close identification with FRETILIN, no other parties would be here without independence without FRETILIN. Yes, they have a view that FRETILIN represents the pure [essence], the origin of East Timor.⁵⁹

A perusal of the written student interviews reveals that four of the ten subjects are involved in political parties. Two of them identified as FRETILIN members, while the other two did not disclose details of their association. I end this thematic section on motivation by highlighting the responses from the FRETILIN respondents. They confirm that their alignment is based upon their personal identification with, and loyalty to, FRETILIN's history.

Manuel Madeira:

My participation since independence... I am in the historic party FRETILIN because for me it is the only party that is not taking the people's money. I support

⁵⁹ Interviewee 10, Tony Ku, 2 October 2013 *op. cit.*

them because during the journey lots of people died because of FRETILIN's objectives, its desire for independence.⁶⁰

Venasio Oliveira:

I have had both direct and indirect participation in the FRETILIN party. While they liberated the country, there is still a problem. The people have not yet been liberated. This is why I am involved.⁶¹

Likewise, interviews with FRETILIN activists indicate a clear synergy between FRETILIN, the history of the occupation, the attainment of independence, and identity formation. This synergy indicates that for these party members, their allegiance to FRETILIN is not premised on financial or material reward, but rather, on a long-lasting identification with, and loyalty to, the party itself:

Joao C. Ximenes:

My objective of being in FRETILIN is to liberate the people and raise them from poverty and hard times into better times, to improve their lives. I've been involved since I was small, my father was killed here, and I became involved immediately in 1975.⁶²

Valentim:

I have one principle for joining this party. This is a principle I've had since the beginning when I was a young person. I wanted to, at that stage, to enter the

⁶⁰ Student 4, Manuel Madeira *op. cit.*

⁶¹ Student 8, Venasio Oliveira

⁶² Interviewee 4, Joao C. Ximenes, 20 September 2013

FRETILIN party because of the ideology of helping the people of Timor-Leste... We were part of the resistance under the direction of FRETILIN until we achieved self-determination. This principle is the principle I followed continually to be part of the historic party of FRETILIN, as the party which supports the people, as the party which thought about leading the country, with people from the entire country, the poor, the people's determination of their future.⁶³

Bano:

I have been involved in politics for a long time. I began in the resistance movement as a student activist, and shifted to the formal political realm of party politics...I joined FRETILIN in 2003 as a member, then a few years later joined the Central Committee. I was an MP between 2007 and 2012 and I currently hold the position of Vice-President of FRETILIN... I chose FRETILIN because of its historical belief in, and support of, independence. This is the same reason most members give when asked the same question. Two central ideas have driven my support for FRETILIN: to liberate the people from both the occupation and poverty, to bring development to the country. Finally, I also chose FRETILIN because my father was one of the founders of FRETILIN in the district of Oecussi. In the district of Oecussi, many people support FRETILIN because their families supported FRETILIN during the occupation and they suffered, fought and died for this affiliation.⁶⁴

Abel Araujo Nunes:

My name is Abel Araujo Nunes and our party is FRETILIN. Other political parties arrive but we don't get involved with them because we began with the first

⁶³ Interviewee 8, Justino Valentim, 23 September 2013 *op. cit.*

⁶⁴ Interviewee 13, Arsenio Bano, 24 October 2013 *op. cit.*

one, FRETILIN... We joined immediately with FRETILIN, through to independence and we are always with FRETILIN... When FRETILIN won, they helped improve our lives through independence. Even if FRETILIN loses we will remain FRETILIN supporters, always, because of the history.⁶⁵

Elvis:

My position in FRETILIN is as a youth activist, and I am a coordinator of the student movement in the district of Ermera. I am in the FRETILIN university movement. I am involved because primarily FRETILIN is the historic party, and they took us through a long process to achieve independence. I'm involved because I know the history, I must be involved in the party. Until now, the dream of FRETILIN, of independence, has been achieved. But the people are not free, however. I'm involved to fulfil the aspiration of the youth of Ermera, of the people of Ermera, to all levels of the country.⁶⁶

CNRT respondents indicated, in contrast, that their motivations for joining the party were based on the leadership figure of Xanana Gusmão and a desire to bring development to the country. This leaves CNRT on much weaker ground due to its reliance on the charisma of its founder to draw supporters, while the desire to bring about positive change to the country rests on the assumption and belief that the party in question is capable of doing so. This situation, however, does provide a platform that could see CNRT grow and become more organisationally coherent with the material assistance of businesses that enjoy clientelistic relations with CNRT.

⁶⁵ Interviewee 16, Abel Araujo Nunes, 7 October 2013

⁶⁶ Interviewee 23, Elvis Maubere da Cruz, 30 October 2013 *op. cit.*

Anonymous CNRT respondent in the town of Manatuto, Manatuto district:

My first reason for being involved in CNRT is because of the vision and program of CNRT, which comes from the president of the party, Gusmão. My objective is to properly develop the country of Timor-Leste. This is why I join CNRT. I joined CNRT when it was established in 2007.⁶⁷

Cabral:

I was originally a member of FRETILIN and the resistance 1975 to 1999. Afterwards, when involved in the project of development, I felt I needed to join CNRT because it was the best way to develop the country, and participate in a multiparty democracy. Initially I joined FRETILIN because they brought liberty to the country. However, in order to solve the problems of the country, we needed a figure like Gusmão to carry this country forward.⁶⁸

Lemos:

From my point of view, my interest in joining the party is based on the principle of wanting to develop the country. I want to liberate the people and the land from poverty and hardship. That's why I joined. I have been involved since 2010.⁶⁹

In addition, my second anonymous respondent confirmed that the impetus driving people to support CNRT is the leadership of Gusmão, and the hope that he can facilitate national development and make life better in the country. While this underlying motivation for many of

⁶⁷ Interviewee 2, Anonymous, 17 September 2013 *op. cit.*

⁶⁸ Interviewee 7, Joao Cabral, 21 September 2013 *op. cit.*

⁶⁹ Interviewee 24, Domingos Lopes Lemos, 30 October 2013 *op. cit.*

those who join CNRT appears to be mainly altruistic, it is not one that will necessarily be sustainable once there is a change of leadership. There is also a concern that some are also joining CNRT to pursue their own objectives, to obtain benefits for themselves, their communities, or businesses:

So many people are joining CNRT, people from other parties. People join because they see XG there and they believe they can do something. Now is the time to join if you want to achieve something. XG can accomplish things. No guarantee that these people will stay when XG leaves. People in government are involved because now is an opportunity to get things done. Post XG, feeling that the chance will be gone. There is a risk that some people are joining for the wrong reasons.⁷⁰

Joining a party based on the leadership of its founder, as I have already established, provides a starting point for a party to develop, but it does leave them vulnerable to fragmentation once new leaders take over. The patronage networks between CNRT and some in the business community could, however, provide the material assistance CNRT requires to build on the shaky organisation it has so far built.

The motivation to bring positive change to the country, to help develop it, also permeates through the statements by respondents from both PD and FM. The strength of these parties thus appears to rest on the conviction of their members that their participation will help bring development to Timor-Leste. I believe this renders the institutional robustness of these parties quite precarious. The development of a poor, post-conflict nation is not an easy project and if

⁷⁰ Interviewee 14, Anonymous, 6 November 2013 *op. cit.*

things do not go well, frustration within the party could easily build and threaten its longevity. On the other hand, if participants are satisfied with the attainment of their objectives within the party, this will provide time and space for the party to develop and become more institutionalised. The respondents from both PD and FM identified that they were motivated to join their respective parties by a desire to build their country and improve the lives of their fellow citizens.

Ximenes (PD):

I believe in democracy and I joined PD because of its democratic values. It's the best way to solve problems, both domestically and internationally. It's also the best way to pursue development.⁷¹

Anonymous (PD):

I can explain about my reason for being involved. Firstly, I am one of the founders of the party. My objective was a way of continuing the struggle for national liberation, liberation of the people. The liberation of the land then leads to the development of the country and people, taking them away from hardship. This is a long struggle, to take the people to better times. This is why I established it.⁷²

Julio Soares Madeira (FM):

As students in 1999 we were involved in the campaign for the 1999 referendum. We wanted Indonesia to leave and were ready to work and serve the community

⁷¹ Interviewee 6, Amaro Ximenes, 20 September 2013 *op. cit.*

⁷² Interviewee 9, Anonymous, 23 October 2013 *op. cit.*

and the entire country... I began to think that political parties are integral to the process of development, they are involved in improving the lives of the people. But after ten years, what has happened? In these rural areas the sentiment is not good. The roads are bad. Corruption is also occurring so I have a strong motivation to get involved in a political party. I am now responsible for the party at the district level... I am involved directly in order that I can just inform and defend the people. The big people, the rich, shouldn't take advantage of ordinary people, or poor people. My commitment is that the party can share information from the national to the district or to the people wherever they are.⁷³

Good intentions are a useful starting point for people to get involved in political parties, but it stakes the future viability of the party on the fortunes of the nation-building project. If participants are able to maintain their enthusiasm in the party in the attainment of their goals, however, it will provide space and opportunity for the party to grow and consolidate organisationally. PD is in a reasonable position to do this because they have been in existence since 2001, and have participated in coalition governments since 2007. For FM, however, it is far too early to come to a position on this, but they face a battle to survive and grow given their small size and relative youth compared to the other parties in the parliament.

Conclusion

My analysis suggests that FRETILIN is the only party in Timor-Leste that can be recognised as institutionalised because of how well it performed against the three thematic criteria I deployed in this chapter. In this chapter I showed that FRETILIN has a long history and is closely tied to the lives of many Timorese people, particularly in the east of the country. It

⁷³ Interviewee 21, Julio Soares Madeira, 29 October 2013 *op. cit.*

does not depend on charismatic leadership to operate, but rather, functions mainly on the volunteerism and dedication of its members and sympathisers. These actors are the life blood of the party because they do not receive in comparable sums the money that people in CNRT receive.

The three other parties I considered in this analysis — CNRT, PD and FM — all show deficiencies in regards to forming into properly structured and coherent party organisations. Personalised, charismatic leadership plays a very important, even critical, role in the origins, organisation, and functioning of CNRT. Xanana Gusmão founded the party in 2007 and he is considered the pivotal driving force and source of attraction for the party. While this has contributed to CNRT's success in the short-term, I have serious reservations about its capacity to survive into the long term when there is a change of leadership.

PD and FM are broadly similar to CNRT. Both rely on government subsidies and contributions from benefactors to exist and function. The motivations of people who were involved in these two parties are also similar in that they all aspired to improve the lot of their country and felt being involved in their respective parties represented the best way to accomplish this goal. But as with CNRT, a party built on good intentions does not guarantee that the party will continue to develop into the future and become structurally coherent and stable.

PD is better placed than CNRT to survive, given it has a natural base of support that predates the construction of the party, but it also depends to some degree on the personalities of its leaders to function and attract support. PD is a reasonably stable party, however, since it has

existed since 2001 and has thus had time to develop institutionally. Indeed, it survived the 2012 national parliamentary elections, which saw the death of the other medium sized parties, ASDT and PSD, which had also been in operation since 2001. Finally, it is too early to judge FM in any definitive terms, but given it is a newly formed party with a small presence in parliament and close ties to Xanana Gusmão and CNRT, it will struggle to survive into the future as a coherent and organisationally sound party.

Chapter Seven. Conclusion

The principal objective of this thesis has been to explore how FRETILIN, which played a central role (especially in the early years) in the struggle for national liberation, quickly lost its dominant grip on political power after independence was achieved in Timor-Leste. When we look at other comparable cases, for example the ANC in South Africa, BN in Malaysia and INC in India, FRETILIN's collapse and the growth of a rival dominant party, CNRT, stands out as an intriguing anomaly. FRETILIN's outlier status is even more pronounced given its institutional strength and organisational capacity; FRETILIN's origins date back to 1974, while Xanana Gusmão founded CNRT only in 2007. Although there has been little in the way of academic research into the formal operation and dynamics of political parties in Timor-Leste, the situation is worthy of academic investigation and prompted me to ask three key research questions:

- 1). How can we account for both change and continuity in the patterns of political party competition in Timor-Leste?
- 2). Why has FRETILIN struggled and the political party *Congresso Nacional da Reconstrucao Timoreense* (CNRT) or National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction) come to be so politically dominant since 2007?
- 3). How can we assess the degree of institutionalisation of individual political parties in Timor-Leste, and what does this assessment convey to us about the likely future structure of inter-party dynamics?

7.1 Findings and Implications

In answering the first and second primary research questions, I have searched for explanations that would account for continuity and change in the patterns of political party competition (or the party system) in general and, more specifically, FRETILIN's downfall and CNRT's success. I first drew upon Sartori's theoretical framework of party systems to organise the dynamics of inter-party relations in Timor-Leste, and then made use of Pempel's definition of a dominant party to conceptualise the nature of both FRETILIN and CNRT as parties.

I argued that the shift in the structure of party competition from FRETILIN's dominant position in 2001 to one of moderate pluralism by 2007, with CNRT leading the coalition government, occurred because essential factors that contribute to the rise and consolidation of a dominant party were not present in FRETILIN's term of office (2001 to 2007). I identified these contributing factors as the absence of charismatic leadership, the alienating identity of the nation and state-building project, and the limited opportunities for networks of patronage and distributive politics to take effect.

I further argued that the continuation of moderate pluralism between the elections of 2007 and 2012 was contingent on CNRT's status as a proto-dominant party. CNRT consolidated and augmented this position by drawing on, and taking advantage of, the same three contributing factors that led to FRETILIN's collapse. These factors were the charismatic appeal of Xanana

Gusmão, a more inclusive nation and state building project, and the development and operation of well-funded networks of patronage networks and distributive politics.

The findings and arguments for the first and second of my primary research questions are significant. One theoretical implication is that an experienced, well organised and institutionalised political movement that was central to the struggle for, and attainment of, national independence, cannot be automatically assured of sustained political dominance in democratic elections. In part, the style of leadership must be factored into the analysis. In Mari Alkatiri, FRETILIN lacked a charismatic leadership figure who could inspire and unite the country. In contrast, I showed how CNRT's leader, Xanana Gusmão, was able to appeal to a far broader audience across the country, even in FRETILIN strongholds in the east. In addition to style, however, there needs to be real substance at a policy level. Indeed, the quite different nation- and state-building project undertaken by both FRETILIN and CNRT had substantial ramifications for their respective political trajectories.

FRETILIN imagined and constituted Timor-Leste's national character as one that closely and rather narrowly reflected its own identity. The choice of national language, style of flag, state symbols were associated with FRETILIN, and the role of FRETILIN in the attainment of independence was prioritised over others. The exclusivity of FRETILIN's approach, however, alienated many Timorese. Consequently, when CNRT arrived on the scene with a far more inclusive approach to the state and nation building process, it was able to attract larger numbers of Timorese from a broad range of constituencies. Although CNRT has had to make

compromises and share the spoils of office to some extent with its allies, it has enjoyed a great amount electoral support and political stability to sustain its dominance.

I also detailed the substantial value patronage networks and the operation of distributive politics has brought to CNRT. While FRETILIN can be considered unfortunate in that the massive petroleum revenue Timor-Leste has accumulated and spent was not available during its time in government, CNRT has made the most of its position as the leading party of the coalition government to deploy the state's financial resources in ways that benefit itself.

The theoretical implications of this are threefold. The first is that a party seeking dominance should seek to establish reciprocating, mutually beneficial relationships with businesses and business people to get them onside and in a position to make financial contributions to the party when it comes to electioneering. The second is that targeted government spending on public programmes plays an important role in winning specific, politically sensitive constituencies to a party seeking support. While distributive politics does not mandate the targeted constituencies to directly reciprocate through support at the ballot box, the more invested (or dependent) such constituencies are on government largesse, the more likely it is that they will tie their political fate to their political benefactors. The generosity of public spending, and where funds are targeted, are significant matters for a party to consider when looking to gather and consolidate electoral support. CNRT has been very successful at doing this, although the sustainability of its spending programs in the long-term will eventually put pressure on CNRT and force it to make hard decisions.

A third implication concerns the continuing relevance of Sartori's theoretical framework for classifying party systems. Although the framework is more than 40 years old, it has served as an effective tool for analysing the dynamics of political party interaction in Timor-Leste. Paying attention to the number of parties and ideological distance between these parties provides crucial information for any analysis of a pattern of political party competition. In addition, although the ideological distance between parties in Timor-Leste is minimal at the present moment, things can change quickly in politics. Having Sartori's framework available to draw on to account for potential ideological shifts in the future will be of academic relevance not only for Timor-Leste, but for other countries too.

However, the present study also indicates how we can bring more nuance to Sartori's classification and typology of party systems. Specifically, I have also shown that we can understand how changes occur in such patterns by taking into account how open or closed the structure of competition is by drawing on Mair's contribution to the debate. Taking into account the pattern of government alternation (wholesale, partial or non-existent), the continued presence of the same parties—or their absence and the presence of new parties—in the parliament and whether there are familiar or new parties involved in the government provide clear guidance into the degree of political fluctuation there is in a country.

The third and final primary research question I asked concerned the strength and longevity (or degree of institutionalisation) of the current (as of 2013) political parties. In asking this question, I sought to discern the weakness and strengths of the parties and indicate their

potential to survive into the future. Armed with questions inspired by Randall and Svasand's conceptual framework on how to assess party strength, I conducted fieldwork in Timor-Leste and interviewed 34 people involved both inside and outside political parties.

Based on an assessment of my interview data, and organising my material around the issues of the origins and development of parties, leadership and patronage (financial resources and motivation), I argued that the degree of party strength was uneven and that FRETILIN, and only FRETILIN, achieved institutionalisation, and did so quite early in Timor-Leste's political history. Of the other major parties, CNRT's dependency on the charisma of its president, Xanana Gusmão, undermined its organisational capacity to survive after he steps down as its leader. PD, being an older party with less reliance on charismatic leadership is better placed but its small base of support may limit its political influence into the future.

The theoretical implications of the topic of party strength, which ultimately has a flow-on effect into the stability of the party system, also lend further weight to the significance of these findings. In researching the question of party strength, I suggest the style of leadership in operation, specifically the presence or absence of charisma, is the most profitable area, followed by patronage (the political economy of how a party functions and the motivations of party members and supporters). As was demonstrated in the case of Timor-Leste, FRETILIN, despite possessing the institutional advantages of longevity and a political brand of particular historical resonance, lost out to CNRT after only one election in power.

The desperate political, social and economic conditions after the 2006 crisis certainly created a favourable environment for anti-FRETILIN parties to make substantial gains in the parliament and CNRT, as the lead party in the ruling coalition, laid down the foundations and networks of a political economy that would primarily benefit itself, both immediately and in the longer-term. As the influence of charismatic leadership fades in line with the passing away of certain members of the leadership from the resistance era, it is—broadly speaking—the political economy of the party and the motivations of its members and supporters that will go a long way in determining the fate of the parties, and the party system as a whole. As such, it is imperative that in the study of party strength, the topics of leadership and patronage take priority.

7.2. Future Research Directions

The final comments I want to make regarding this thesis concern the question of ‘where to from here’ in terms of future research directions. This thesis lays the foundation for further research in at least three directions. The first concerns the elections in Timor-Leste scheduled to be held in 2017 in which both the campaign and the outcome will be of interest. Of particular interest will be the behaviour of CNRT and whether or not it is able to cement itself as a fully-fledged dominant party, which is possible if it is able to again lead a coalition government, or form government in its own right. In either case, I expect that Xanana Gusmão will continue to play a major role in CNRT and the future government. Whatever the result, the factors that I argued are integral to the formation and operation of a successful dominant party, like charismatic leadership and patronage for example, are subjects that will demand attention in relation to CNRT.

The second area of potential future research is the longer-term fate of political parties. My assessment of the institutional strength of parties in Timor is that only FRETILIN is well placed to last into the future, and while it is worth keeping an eye on it, researchers might well pay more attention to the more weakly institutionalised parties like CNRT and PD, particularly as a new generation of leaders are poised to take over. The passing away of Lasama for PD, and question marks over the future role of Xanana Gusmão for CNRT, suggest these two parties will face challenges into the future once their charismatic leaders are no longer in control. How all three of the major parties cope with eventual leadership transitions will have a significant impact on the pattern of political competition in Timor-Leste.

An additional matter of interest for researchers that is associated with the fate of parties, but particularly the fate of CNRT, is the material and economic source of their ability to distribute patronage and generous social welfare payments to attract electoral support. The financial resources available to parties will come under strain as the available oil and gas fields gradually dry up. The petroleum fund, which sits at around the \$16 billion dollar mark, will not last forever and the last remaining field, Bayu-Undan, will stop producing by around 2022. With the Greater Sunrise gas field stalled and Timor-Leste facing many development challenges, parties will need to broaden the ways through which they appeal for the support of voters. Researchers could examine how parties adjust to leaner financial circumstances and aim to motivate support beyond the appeal of material and financial reward.

The third research direction relates to the opportunity to engage in comparative analysis on political systems and parties in recently emergent nations. Sartori's theoretical framework on party systems, for example, provides a useful approach to understanding both the dynamics and trajectory of the pattern of political party competition. I also draw attention to the factors that can support the rise and growth of a dominant party: charismatic leadership, the identity of the state and nation building project and the operation of well-funded networks of patronage and distributive politics. Identifying the operation of these factors in other countries will assist future researchers diagnose the potential emergence of other dominant parties. Finally, the theoretical and methodological approach I used to research party institutionalism in Timor-Leste represents a model that is more sensitive to the varied political conditions found in new, developing nations compared to models that were accustomed to analysing party institutionalism in established democracies. Consideration of issues regarding both structure and attitude inside and outside the party have revealed, in the case of Timor-Leste, that the origins and development of the party, the style of leadership and patronage are significant in telling us about the respective strength of CNRT, FRETILIN, PD and FM. As such, I recommend similar theoretical and methodological approaches be taken to examine the strength of parties in other recently emergent nations.

Appendix A: List of Interviewees

Fieldwork Interviews

Interviewee 1, Anonymous, 2013 – District of Baucau (First Anonymous Source)

Interviewee 2, Anonymous, 17 September 2013 – Anonymous CNRT official, District of Manatuto

Interviewee 3, Vicente Soares, 17 September 2013 – PD Democratic Youth Organisation, Vice President, District of Manatuto

Interviewee 4, Custodio de Jesus Freitas, 19 September 2013 – FM Coordinating Secretary, District of Baucau

Interviewee 5, Joao C. Ximenes, 20 September 2013 – FRETILIN Member of the National Central Committee, District of Baucau

Interviewee 6, Amaro Ximenes, 20 September 2013 – President of PD, District of Baucau

Interviewee 7, Joao Cabral, 21 September 2013 – CNRT Second Vice-President, District of Baucau

Interviewee 8, Justino Valentim, 23 September 2013 – FRETILIN District Secretary Commissioner, District of Lautem

Interviewee 9, Anonymous, 23 October 2013 – Anonymous PD official, District of Dili

Interviewee 10, Tony Ku, 2 October 2013 – Citizen, District of Dili

Interviewee 11, Josh Trindade, 2 October 2013 – CNRT member, District of Dili

Interviewee 12, Agostinho de Vasconcelos, 15 October 2013 – FRETILIN Resistencia official, District of Dili

Interviewee 13, Arsenio Bano, 24 October 2013 – FRETILIN National Vice-President, District of Dili

Interviewee 14, Anonymous, 6 November 2013 – Anonymous Citizen, District of Dili (Second Anonymous Source)

Interviewee 15, Anonymous, 19 November 2013 – Anonymous Citizen, District of Dili (Third Anonymous Source)

Interviewee 16, Abel Araujo Nunes, 7 October 2013 – FRETILIN Coordinator, Suco Maubara Lissa, District of Liquica

Interviewee 17, Felis da Costa Anin Buras, 8 October 2013 – FRETILIN Coordinator, Sub-District Maubara, District of Liquica

Interviewee 18, Jitu Antonio, 8 October 2013 – PD First Vice-Coordinator, District of Liquica

Interviewee 19, Grigoriu dos Santos, 8 October 2013 – FRETILIN Second Vice-Assistant Secretary, District of Liquica

Interviewee 20, Jose Goncalves, 26 October 2013 – CNRT Administrator, District of Liquica

Interviewee 21, Julio Soares Madeira, 29 October 2013 – FM Coordinator, District of Ermera

Interviewee 22, Anonymous, 29 October 2013 – FRETILIN Member, District of Ermera

Interviewee 23, Elvis Maubere da Cruz, 30 October 2013 – FRETILIN Member, District of Ermera

Interviewee 24, Domingos Lopes Lemos, 30 October 2013 – CNRT District General-Secretary Ermera, District of Ermera

Student Surveys

Student 1, Angelina de Jesus

Student 2, Darios Goliveia Leite do Nascimento

Student 3, Agustinho Pereira Belo

Student 4, Manuel Madeira

Student 5, Salvador da Costa

Student 6, Nelvio Lucas Soares

Student 7, Antonito Cuis da Silva Alves

Student 8, Venasio Oliveira

Student 9, Fernando Dokergo

Student 10, da Costa

Appendix B: List of Contributors to CNRT

halo programa ne'e la ho obrigasaun, katak obriga empre- jariau sira tau osan boot. prejariau sira fó apou ba zacia Maibé, nia hatutan, em- ba ida-idak nia kapasidade.

Tuir mai lista husi kompañia no pesoal balun ne'ebé fó apou ba CNRT. Iha lista ne'e jornal INDEPENDENTE la konsege indentifika naran balun;

1. TINOLINA \$200.000	38. Nelsi \$5000
2. JONIZE \$250.000	39. Jito Juventude CNRT \$5000
3. BTK GROUP \$ 250.000	40. Ariana Agency \$5000
4. MONTANA DIAK \$200.000	41. Champion Unip.Lda. \$5000
5. Marabian Lda \$250.000	42. Saraneru \$5000
6. Ahmad Hidayat \$10.000	43. Nelson Damião \$2000
7. Timor Plaza \$30.000	44. - \$50.000
8. CNI22\$ 100.000	45. Nelía Sarmento \$5000
9. Aitula Fuel & Dani star \$100.000	46. Vacutai \$ 5000
10. Puri Akaraya \$ 200.000	47. Delta Dian \$5000
11. East Timor Block \$30.000	48. Jose Martins \$5000
12. Nono Canelas \$ 20.000	49 PT. Gunung Mas \$8000
13. Lilis Lubis \$25.000	50. Costancio \$5000
14. ETO (Nilton Gusmão) \$25.000	51. Jenilda Gusmão \$15.000
15. Adi Kita (Hari Esok Cemerlang) \$63.000	52. - Kareta 2, Fos Sakas 8
16. Raul Lemos (ATRAMOR) \$50.000	53. Limitada \$5000
17. Vital do Santos \$10.000	54. - \$15.000
18. Romante \$8000	55. - \$7000
19. Ruvic Construction Lda (Rui Castro) \$10.000	56. Rai Loos \$5000
20. Black Stiff \$100.000	57. - \$3000
21. THT \$100.000	58. - \$5000
22. Electric Leste \$25.000	59. Francisco \$2000
23. Suai Indah \$25.000	60. Delima Carpintaria \$5000
24. Carla \$10.000	61. Rafision \$10.000
25. Star King \$15.000	62. Elvia \$2000
26. Jaime do Santos (Sta. Filomena Group) \$50.000	63. Rafael \$10.000
27. Wijaya \$10.000	64. Filomena \$150
28. Nuno \$20.000	65. - \$10.000
29. CSI \$10.000	66. - \$50.000
30. Purgawati \$10.000	67. - \$20.000
31. Buras Naroman \$10.000	68. - \$1000
32. Tais Milenium \$15.000	69. - \$5000
33. Xisto & Feliciano \$15.000	70. Francisco Kalbuady Lay \$11.000
34. Helder Vieira \$ 5000	71. Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão \$8000
35. Yanto \$50.000	72. Kirsty Sword Gusmão \$8000
36. - \$100.000	73. Alex Gusmão \$8.00
37. - \$250.000	74. Kay Olo Gusmão \$8.00

Husi paj. 1

Foos.....

iha PN, Segunda, (15/5). kalan p
Maski nune'e, deputadu labele
ne'e la espliká foos no batar lian nu
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orsamentu estadu hira mak deklar
gasta ba ida ne'e. da C

Deputadu Fretelin ne'e Marti
lamenta tebes ho attitude komu
governu, liuliu Ministériu sosa
Turismu Comersto no Indu- liu s
stria (MTCI), ne'ebé kontinua uza.
fa'an ba komunidadu maski
foos no batar ne'e aat tiha ona. kui
"Ha'u rona sira (MTCI) ter
fa'an foos aat ne'e iha tempu ne

Deskonfia.....

tada Partido Sosial Demokra- N
ta (PSD) ne'e informa, katak, r
foin lalais ne'e komunidadu s
sira iha sub-distritu Railaku fó s
fali informasaun dehan dala
barak ema deskoesidu sira
ho kilat bo'ot hala'o movi-
mentu iha area ne'e.
"Ha'u rasik baree ho
matan, kilat ne'e se la sala
merek- Z-tres (Z3)," deklar

Ospital.....

liuliu óspital Covali-
ma mak enfrenta divida
barak kuazé \$28 Mill liu.
"Iha kompañia rua ka tolu
mak óspital ne'e deve hanesan
kompañia Tara hamutuk \$17
Mill, no sira seluk balun \$11
Mill no seluk tan," deklar
Maria iha PN horischik.
Situasaun ne'e, tuir Mari
ministériu saude tenke respon
sabiliza no klarifika ba públi

Source: CNRT 'Ra'ut' Osan \$2 Millaun ba Eleisaun Parlamentar, Independente, 15 May 2012, p.1 and p.2

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