SOCIALIST POPULATION POLITICS

THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE USSR, POLAND AND YUGOSLAVIA

A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Australian National University

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STATEMENT

I hereby declare that this thesis has not already been accepted in substance for any degree. It is the result of my own independent investigation, and all authorities and sources which have been consulted are acknowledged in the bibliography and the notes.

Signed: ................
This thesis was originally projected in seven chapters. A chapter surveying the politico-demographic scene in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Rumania has had to be omitted for practical reasons. While the text and to some extent the structure of the thesis have been altered accordingly, some impression may remain in certain places that the work has not been fully moulded into a unified whole.

In that connection, I would like to quote the following passage from the University's Rules for Ph.D. theses.

"the thesis... must be a connected piece of writing, but may comprise a series of papers on related topics, provided that these are accompanied by an adequate explanation of their relationship to each other and to the wider context of the subject."

(Rule 19, (3))

While it is my belief that the work in its present form does comprise a unified whole, a contrary view would not imply that some necessary requirement had not been met.
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ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to describe the main areas and the main ways in which population trends affect politics in the USSR, Poland and Yugoslavia. Discussion is concentrated on the domestic rather than the international aspects of the problems involved, and special attention is devoted to the fields of ethnic relations and population policy-making. While a loosely comparative framework has been adopted, each of the three main countries is treated as an individual case study. Special endeavours have been made to avoid the repetition and the lack of regional colour and authenticity that comparative studies are sometimes apt to fall into. While considerations of space have prevented extending the analysis to the remaining countries of Socialist Europe, comparative references to them are frequent; and the general chapters 2 & 6 are partly devoted to them. In this way, it is hoped that some of the contrasts and similarities between the three main countries in the study and the other countries in the area will be brought out.

A rather fuller statement of the problems tackled in the thesis can be found in the Introduction.
INTRODUCTION

During the 1960s, there was a dramatic decline in birthrates in the USSR and the European Socialist states. This decline brought in its train agonizing reappraisals of population policies and doctrines in virtually all the countries concerned. Albania alone has been spared the soul-searching. Elsewhere national birthrates have fallen so low that the high fertility once held to be an essential feature of socialism seems little more than a nostalgic memory. And like the sinister Malthusians portrayed in erstwhile Soviet critiques of Western demography, Soviet bloc observers are now apt at times to view rapid population growth and countries or peoples engaged in it with some reserve. From regarding domestic population development with total unconcern or untroubled confidence, the governments of Eastern Europe are now passing over to or towards an active involvement that borders at times on morbid preoccupation reminiscent of the introspective centipede who began analysing his own gait.

Much of the public anxiety is focused on the socio-economic problems presented by fluctuations, imbalances, shortages and local or temporary superfluities of manpower supply either currently experienced or seen as in prospect. Most of the rest is expended on the apocalyptic prospect that at some point in the future, this or that country, republic or region might pass into a phase of "narrowed reproduction" (i.e. population decline) of indefinite duration.
In this respect, the Eastern European countries seem to be experiencing something similar to the extinction scare associated with the intemperate extrapolation of trends in Net Reproduction Rates in Western Europe in the 1930s. That population decline or stagnation is disastrous both economically and in general tends to be taken as self-evident. On the other hand, at the international level, fertility decline has since the mid-1960s been accepted as a worthy objective for Third World Countries, if coupled with appropriate socio-economic policies in other directions. But for the Socialist countries themselves, the time when population might have to be restricted is not in sight.

While the spectre of depopulation is obviously a strong emotional stimulant in itself, one suspects that it frequently serves consciously or unconsciously as a symbolic surrogate for anxieties about potential transformations in relative ethnic or national strength. The emotion may not be wholly irrational. Existing trends of differential fertility seem to suggest that major transformations are indeed in the making.

This thesis is concerned with the political aspects of demographic trends in Socialist Europe over the last two decades or so. Any approach to these problems immediately encounters demarcation difficulties. The area of overlap between politics and population is vast. On broad definitions of both, one might well need to discuss a country's social and economic policies and politics in their fullest complexity to exhaust the subject. This study must inevitably be biased in certain thematic as well as
regional directions. The main emphasis will be placed on the political implications of the present size and growth tendencies and potential of national and ethnic populations and sub-populations. Such matters as, for example, internal and external migration, urbanization, changing educational and occupational structure, health and education administration, gerontology or environmental pressures - all of which might quite properly be regarded as falling within the purview of the politics of population or population policy - will only be dealt with insofar as they affect the issues directly connected with numerical aggregates. The range of issues actually touched on will vary from country to country. Thus, for example, emigration will be only of tangential interest in the case of the Soviet Union, whereas for Yugoslavia it will have to be given a special section to itself; the question of ethnic relations will be marginal for Poland, but central for both USSR and Yugoslavia. The reason for so defining the subject of study is partly pragmatic; considerations of manageability dictate that lines be drawn somewhere, and when, as in this case, the subject-matter is amorphous and rich in ramification, a certain arbitrariness may be unavoidable. But drawing the line where it has been drawn has the additional advantage of focusing attention on those concerns which most people would regard as being relevant to population policy rather than social policy. The central issue of pro- or anti-natalism is held in the foreground, and priority given to demographic rather than sociological, medical or ecological problems.

Also, as its title indicates, the emphasis
in this study is being placed on the political impact of demographic trends rather than the demographic impact of political decisions. The latter approach has already received a good deal of attention. But in any case the choice reflects the background and interests of the author in politics rather than demography.

And finally, greater stress will be laid on politics than policies: on dilemmas, differences and conflicts rather than on past or present measures taken by governments to affect the course of demographic events. Here the preponderance of literature in favour of the

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approach not adopted is overwhelming. Commentators from the socialist countries themselves naturally are at pains to avoid direct discussion of the politics of population issues. Many Western observers for whatever reasons, tend to pursue the same course. Hence a politics- rather than policy-oriented approach seems opportune.

Broadly speaking, from the vantage-point just outlined, the points of intersection between population and politics in Socialist Europe can be schematized as follows:

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1. Socio-economic Policies: the policy implications of variations in labour supply, consumer demands, educational requirements, etc.

2. Ethnic Relations: the influence of demographic changes (and prospective changes) on the relative strengths of ethnic populations within states.

3. International Relations: the influence of demographic changes (and prospective changes) on the relative power positions of the nations concerned.


3. Within this area, special attention will be devoted to the demographic aspects of labour supply as being the economic ramification of population trends which seems to engage the greatest degree of concern in official circles.

4. The question of international population policy (i.e. the attitude adopted by governments towards world population problems and attempts made by the UN and other international organizations to solve them) will be considered, where applicable, under the heading of "Ideology". In fact, the USSR and Yugoslavia appear to be the only two states which pursue sovereign policies in this regard.
5. Migration: the demographic changes caused and political issues raised by internal and international population movements.

6. Population policies: the issues raised by the attempts of governments (or interest groups) to influence population trends.

The relative weight accorded to these topics will, as was suggested earlier, vary from country to country as the data appear to dictate; and at times, one or another of them will be discussed only very cursorily or dismissed altogether. With these qualifications, the above schema will be applied to each of the three main countries being examined.

5 This very interesting subject will be largely excluded from direct discussion under separate heading. It is a vast topic and at the same time one concerning which data is perhaps unusually elusive. Moreover, in the case of international migration at least, it has usually been of limited relevance. An exception will be made for Yugoslavia in this latter respect.

6 The term "interest groups" should, of course, be understood here in the sense appropriate to the Socialist states. The whole question of group influences on the making of policy in the area of population problems is one worthy of more than the incidental treatment given it in this essentially topographical study. As the issues involved in population policy are usually seen officially as less than of the first importance, group participation tends to be more active and(or?) more visible than is usually the case. One is thus afforded a better glimpse than is customary of the policy-making process (cf. in this connection the unusually informative study of Soviet family reforms in the 1950s and 1960s by Peter Juviler in P. Juviler and H. Morton Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Communism in Transition).
A word or two should perhaps be said about the regional bias of this study. USSR, Poland and Yugoslavia have been singled out for more detailed consideration for a number of reasons. They are, to begin with, the three largest countries in Socialist Europe. And on the reckoning of most, they must also be accounted the most important politically. Moreover, they happen to be the three countries in which population policy remains to some extent an open issue. Elsewhere, while things are continuing to happen, the basic orientation of the governments concerned is uniformly pro-natalist, and the means for achieving these ends are being made increasingly explicit, thus reducing the domain of politics in favour of the domain of policies. Finally there are the pragmatic reasons. To avoid superficiality and ponderous repetition, a choice of some smaller number from among the nine possibilities seemed mandatory. That being so, one automatically chose the countries and the languages where one's competence was greatest. In the course of the thesis reference will be made frequently to the other European Socialist countries and to China. But no special section will be devoted to them. Although Albania will be referred to periodically, generalizations can usually be taken as not including it. Albania is an exceptional

Yugoslavia is actually slightly larger than Rumania in area, and currently (thanks to the respective population policies followed by the two countries) slightly smaller in population.
case, and one, moreover, concerning which neither the author, nor anybody else, the Albanians perhaps included, appears to know very much.  

Chapter 1 will provide a general introduction to the field of population politics and policies and the Soviet Marxist tradition on demographic questions. Chapter 2 will provide a cursory sketch of the main features of demographic development in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in recent decades. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 will attempt a detailed examination of each of the three main countries in turn. And finally, Chapter 6 will briefly summarize the main features of the demographico-political scene in Eastern Europe as a whole, seeking in the process to give some broad impression of where the three countries discussed in this thesis fit into the overall pattern.

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8 For a most interesting (and rare) glimpse of Albanian demographic developments, see E. Hofsten "Demographic Transition and Economic Development in Albania" European Demographic Information Bulletin VI (1975) no. 3, p. 147.
CHAPTER 1

POPULATION, POLITICS AND THE SOVIET MARXIST TRADITION

1. a Population and Political Studies. 1

The common ground between the study of politics and demography has not until very recently attracted more than passing interest from social scientists. This seems to have been particularly true in the case of political science. As of 1970, it was still possible for an American political scientist to assert that what he regarded as the two key problems of the remaining decades of the century, pollution and population growth, had not yet had a single article devoted to them in any major US political science journal, either national or regional. 2 According to one source, no more than two political scientists

1 The term "political studies" has been used here as one broad enough to embrace both Western social science and what is known in the Socialist countries as (the field of) "population policy" (Russian: politika narodonaseleniia; Polish: polityka ludnościowa; Serbo-Croat: populaciona politika).

could be said to have "made a professional commitment to population studies" before the mid-1960s. The first two courses on population and politics to be taught in political science departments were apparently instituted only in 1971. And it has been claimed of a book that was published in the 1972, that it was "the first book-length treatment of population questions by political scientists". A questionnaire conducted among representatives of seven social sciences in US universities to determine the extent of their professional interest in population studies evoked a weaker response from political scientists than from any other group with the exception of one. And in the introduction to a volume of the US Commission Report on Population and the American Future devoted to political aspects of the problem we find the admission: "It became quickly apparent to the Commission that political science had, by comparison with other social sciences - especially economics, demography, and


5 The claim was made of the Clinton, Flash and Godwin volume in Clinton and Godwin op. cit. p.2.

sociology - little to offer by way of policy-relevant research". 7

The other social sciences have not been over­precipitate in tackling these problems either. Bernard Berelson has estimated that over the 25 years 1946-1971 the entries catalogued under "Policies" in Population Index have not amounted to more than 2-4% of the total. 8 What is true of demography is undoubtedly true a fortiori of the social sciences less directly concerned with population matters. 9 As for the demographers, their interest has been overwhelmingly in Third World countries; 10 and in the central question of fertility control. They have usually (with the notable exception of the French) been less interested in domestic policy considerations. And while the neo-Malthusian concern of recent years has been making Western population growth something of a political issue also, the attitude of most demographers to this latter


10 At least by contrast with some of the more committed and radical advocates of Zero Population Growth and associated doctrines. For an angry reproach, see A.E. Keir Nash "Demographology in US Population Politics" in Clinton & Godwin op. cit., p. 71.
question has on the whole been more sceptical and detached. Relatively few appear to have been in the forefront of public controversy. Those that are more actively concerned with policy questions tend in the present climate to be more interested in fertility control than in fertility stimulation, which does not predispose them to taking an interest in events in the Socialist countries where exactly the reverse concerns are dominant.

Irrespective of whether their concern is primarily with Western or Third World population growth, Western neo-Malthusian movements seldom betray any interest in such collateral questions as whether or not the Third World countries might not object to such outside concern with their birth rates; whether or not there are good reasons for supposing that the Socialist countries will decisively alter their attitudes to world population questions and refrain from encouraging Third World resentments; whether or not anti-natalist population policies in the West should be concerted with a similar "demographic disarmament" in the East; and so on. For a discussion of the frustrations suffered by the "international population community" at the UN Population Conference held in Bucharest in 1974 (resulting to some extent from their neglect of some of these matters), see J. Finkle and B. Crane "The Politics of Bucharest: Population, Development and the New International Economic Order" Population and Development Review vol. 1 (1975) No. 1, p. 87. For two typical Neo-Malthusian pieces which almost wholly ignore the Socialist world while purporting to deal with world population problems, see S. Kaplan and R. McCormick Innovative Organization for Population Research Springfield, Illinois, 1971 (the index of which contains one reference to USSR and none to Karl Marx); and M. Endres On Defusing the Population Bomb New York 1975 (which does briefly discuss Marx's views, but does not appear to offer any advice on how to defuse Socialist opposition to defusing the population bomb).
Indeed were it not for the almost unique character of the various thorough-going governmental programs that have been adopted by the Socialist countries from time to time, the interest of Western scholars in the area would probably have been quite negligible. As things are, there is a strong tendency for professional demographic interest in Socialist population policies to limit itself to requests to colleagues in Socialist countries to provide the required information. Where the more sensitive areas of government policy are concerned (and "more sensitive" in the Socialist context needs of course to be broadly interpreted), it is somewhat naive to expect that Socialist colleagues will be able to speak frankly and fully about what they believe to be the moral or other shortcomings of their national demographic policies. Moreover, Western demographers tend naturally to be primarily interested in the policies themselves and their demographic effects and antecedents, rather than in the political context from which they have emerged and the political consequences they appear likely to entail.

The reasons for the recent surge of interest in the West in the political aspects of population are obvious enough: the Third World population explosion since World War II; the wave of neo-Malthusian alarm about Western population levels (and allied ecological concerns) in

12 Compare the works by Bodrova, Acsadi, Macura and Berelson cited in Introduction, footnote 2.
13 In some ways it is even harder for them to be fully candid when they are invited to contribute to international volumes, where willy-nilly they find themselves forced into the role of flying the national flag.
wide circles of public opinion; the emergence of a radical feminist movement; the contraception and abortion controversies, and so on. Similarly, in the Socialist case, one does not need to look far afield to find reasons for the increasing public and official concern of recent years: growing labour shortages; a revival of ethnic and national sensitivities; the dramatic decline in fertility and natural increase rates of the 1960s, etc. However, the reasons for the earlier almost complete lack of interest are rather more elusive, especially in the case of Western social science in general, and political science in particular.

Clinton and Godwin, two political scientists who have devoted a good deal of attention to this problem, have suggested variously: that in the post-war period, political scientists were too busy "adjusting to the Cold War conditions of the fatuous fifties"; \(^{14}\) that compartmentalization of knowledge and lack of interdisciplinary cross-fertilization hampered the acquisition of the necessary additional specialist knowledge; and that thereafter the behavioural revolution's drive towards quantification and value-free political science consumed the profession's intellectual energies and led them away from issues that raised normative issues (political demography being evidently assumed

\(^{14}\) Clinton and Godwin \textit{op.cit.}, p.2.
to be necessarily one of these). They also speak in terms of *Wissensoziologie* about the checks operating on the development of political demography within the profession itself:

"The serious aspect of the disciplinary parochialism we have been describing is that the reward structure of the profession is markedly skewed, and the resulting effect is a mobilization of bias which inhibits political science research in population studies."  

From the context it appears that what this passage refers to is that young academics building their careers find it harder to get jobs or publish articles if they specialize in subjects not yet firmly established and that devising and pushing through new university courses is time-consuming and otherwise fraught with difficulty.

Few of Clinton and Godwin's suggestions seem very persuasive. The Cold War might have been expected to heighten awareness of population statistics just as it heightened awareness of, for example, economic indicators; the lack of interdisciplinary cross-fertilization might equally well have prevented the behavioural revolution, and yet it did not; the mania for quantifying the unquantifiable flourished, while the tempting and much more manipulable (and meaningful) demographic data were

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left to their own devices; although there is no reason why demographic problems should not be treated normatively, there is equally no reason in logic why they must be; and the sociology of knowledge arguments seem equally applicable to any other "strangely neglected subjects". Why political demography has remained one of these until recently in Western political science remains for the present unclear. 16

In the Socialist countries, where there was a similar reticence about population policy until recently, the reasons, both for the reticence and the recent spread of interest, are a little more clear-cut and comprehensible. Soviet demography shared the fate of all social sciences under Stalin. For three decades or more it performed a residual and purely apologetic role as a neglected adjunct of government economic statistics. When it was not being

16 For another discussion of the reasons for the paucity of literature on political demography, see N. Choucri Population Dynamics and International Violence Lexington 1974, Chap. 1. Choucri points out that the visibility of population problems is relatively recent, and asserts, a little paradoxically, that the recent interest in ecological questions has tended to obscure "the less spectacular consequences of population dynamics". She also puts the more persuasive argument that the connection between population and politics having always been an emotionally-charged subject, it has tended to be abandoned to those espousing some sensationalist or apocalyptic approach to the subject, as a result of which "a curious division between apocalyptic and apolitical orientations has developed". (p. 3)
neglected, it was being manhandled. At least one census was suppressed and the results of another left largely unpublished during Stalin's reign; and there were (and still are) large gaps in even the most basic Soviet demographic statistics. The demographers themselves, of course, ran the usual heightened risks to life and career characteristic of all scientific endeavour in the 'thirties and 'forties. Official demographic doctrine was crudely oversimplified. Certain Marxist dicta as glossed by Stalinist interpretation became normative writ. When and insofar as the trend of facts did not square with them, the facts tended to be dispensed with before the theory. In these conditions it was difficult for any kind of demography to flourish, let alone that branch of it directly concerned with governmental decision-making. In addition, the Stalinist years saw a number of major demographic catastrophes befall the Soviet Union, so that considerations

of prestige and national security were added to the usual Stalinist intolerance of objective information. When demography began to re-emerge as a discipline in the early 1960s, it did so in the context of such spectacular

18 The policy of concealing population losses from the West was successful. "...while Western analysts in 1950 accepted the Soviet statement that the USSR's population was about 200,000,000 - the Soviet authorities had direct data showing the population to be only about 180,000,000". M. Roof "Soviet Population Trends" Survey No. 37 (July - September 1961) p. 35. For evidence of deliberate Soviet concealment, including an assertion by Stalin that the USSR had "lost" only 7 million people during the war, see M. Roof "The Russian Population Enigma Reconsidered" Population Studies XIV (1960-61) p.3.

19 To my knowledge there is no satisfactory account of the history of Soviet demography through the dark decades of the 30s, 40s and 50s. Soviet bloc scholars are naturally cautious of even drawing attention to the large gap in the history of their discipline. One article (E. Mashikhin and B. Miasoedov "O demograficheskoi literature" in D. Broner and I. Venskii Problemy demografii Moscow 1971) adopts the characteristic Soviet procedure of deliberately periodizing its material in such a way as to conceal the sharp edges. (See the tables at p. 205 and 207-8). Even so, the attempt to maintain an appearance of normal development fails. In the earlier Brezhnev years, some allusions could be made to past disasters. See for example G. Gerasimov "Demograficheskie neozhidannosti" Novy Mir 1967 No. 2, p. 267; B.Ts. Urlandis "The Problem of Demography and Planning" in E. Szabady (ed.) World Views of Population Problems Budapest 1968, at p. 349. Gerasimov quotes Oscar Wilde as having declared that if people don't speak of something, this must mean that the thing doesn't exist. "For a long time we didn't speak about demography," comments Gerasimov. "To many people it seemed that it didn't exist". Since Gerasimov's time the situation has changed in that now it would appear to be no longer possible to talk about the fact that it was once impossible to talk about demography.
fertility decline that policy-oriented discussion, either open or veiled, was bound to ensue.

In some of the other Socialist countries, particularly Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, demography and discussion of population questions reemerged from the Stalinist phase rather earlier. But there too, and for similar reasons, there has been a notable expansion in policy discussions in recent years.

Thus in both the non-Socialist and Socialist worlds, we are presently confronted by a rapid increase in the literature on population problems generally and population policies in particular. The already rising tide was given further impetus by the organization of the 1974 UN World Population Conference in Bucharest, which had a much stronger orientation both to international and domestic population policies than any similar gathering held previously. Large conferences devoted exclusively to population policy were held in Warsaw (international, largely Socialist) in 1972 and Belgrade (domestic Yugoslav population policy only) in 1973. Among the

20 By 1963, a year when Soviet publications on demographic themes were just beginning to appear systematically, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland all had flourishing demographic journals. Despite innumerable pleas from members of the demographic community, there is still no specialist demographic journal in the USSR.

21 The papers presented at the conference were published (with some omissions) in Polityka ludnościowa: współczesne problemy Warsaw 1973.

22 Savetovanje o izgradnji društvenih stavova o populacionoj politici u Jugoslaviji. Some of the papers presented at this conference were published in the Zagreb journal Naše teme No. 4, 1974.
numerous policy-oriented publications emerging from the Soviet Union in 1974 was one collective tome actually entitled "Demographic Policy". In recent years, the Socialist demographic journals have begun to reflect this same growing interest; articles on policy issues are starting to proliferate. Statements by party and state officials on population matters are also becoming more and more frequent, if still relatively rare in certain of the Socialist countries. And as in the West, advisory commissions on population are being either established or widely postulated as necessary. Meanwhile in the Western and Third Worlds, interest in population policy grows apace. A most notable event during World Population Year 1974 was the appearance of a large and comprehensive collective monograph volume on population policies in the developed countries. The leading Western demographic publications are devoting more and more space to the subject, both in relation to the "capitalist" and "Socialist" countries. And political scientists are beginning to contribute rather more to the field as well.

23 V. S. Steshenko & V. P. Piskunov Demograficheskaia politika Moscow 1974.


25 Within the United States, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, seem to be particularly committed to furthering political demography. See N. Choucri, op. cit., esp. the Preface; and R. Clinton Population and Politics, Foreword, Preface and About the Contributors.
governmental level, there is an increasing awareness that population growth is a legitimate or indeed a necessary sphere of state involvement.  

While politico-demographic writing is expanding rapidly in both the Socialist and non-Socialist worlds, with many parallel features and for many of the same reasons, there are also some important and fundamental differences between the two literatures.

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26 In 1959, the then President Eisenhower said: "I cannot imagine anything more emphatically a subject that is not a proper political or governmental activity or function or responsibility... as long as I am here this government will not have a positive political doctrine on birth control." In 1968, he said: "Once as President of the United States I thought and said that birth control was not the business of the Federal Government. The facts changed my mind...I have come to believe that the population explosion is the world's most critical problem." (Quoted in R. Symonds & M. Carder: The United Nations and the Population Question London 1973 p. 95, 133). In the Socialist countries (with the exception of Yugoslavia), a similar evolution has occurred, if for diametrically opposed reasons. Virtually all countries (with the notable exception of USSR, and also Yugoslavia) have some kind of central co-ordinating state body responsible for monitoring demographic development and proposing policies relevant to it. There has been a rapid multiplication of similar bodies in Western and developing nations as well. See Berelson Population Policy in Developed Countries pp. 775-777.

27 Here I am discussing the literature on domestic population policies, not that relating to world population problems and efforts towards their solution.
To begin with of course, there is no such field as political demography or population politics in the Socialist countries, and it is unlikely that one will be recognized in the foreseeable future. What they do have, on the other hand, is what is known in Russian as politika narodonaselenia, in the broader sense of the study or science of population policy. At least in relation to the Socialist countries, the main thrust of this discipline is not of course towards disclosing the political aspects of population development and policy, but rather towards mapping what is actually being done by Socialist governments to solve perceived problems and cautiously evaluating the merits of possible alternatives within the guidelines of currently established orthodoxy. As practised, the discipline has a fairly strong contemporary orientation; excursions into history have to be conducted with tact (owing to the strong distaste of Socialist authorities for being reminded of past volte-faces), and are in general avoided. There is a relative paucity of discussion of such normative questions as the permissible limits of state

28 The terms "political demography" and "population politics" are being used more or less interchangeably. I have a preference for the latter, despite its relative inelegance, since it seems to direct attention more to the political rather than the demographic regions of the borderlands between the two domains. The former term is sometimes preferred to include possible reference to Socialist writings on "population policy" in the sense explained below.

29 This does not prevent Socialist commentators from drawing attention to the political problems inherent in the demographic situations of non-Socialist countries. But clearly this type of analysis must remain covert or implicit in relation to the Socialist states themselves.
power, the ethics of coercing or otherwise inducing particular social or ethnic minorities to regulate their natural growth, women's rights in relation to the foetus etc., all of which play such a prominent and increasing part in Western discussions of population issues; though just beneath the surface one often senses a strong interest in these and other similar questions, and a frequent and strong desire to make empirical discussion serve normative ends. Another characteristic feature of the Socialist literature is the overwhelming dominance of pro-natalist values and preoccupations, something which is largely absent from Western demography at present and which therefore makes the Socialist framework of discussion of policy issues virtually non-comparable with the Western. And finally, note should be made of the technocratic and nationalist

Thus in a Czech text-book on demography, in a brief definitional passage on population policy, we find the following characterization: "Population policy is a collection of measures (mostly of a long-term character) intended to regulate population development according to the established state doctrine of the society in question. Population policy is usually pro-natalist." (V. Srb, M. Kučera and L. Růžička Demografie Prague 1971, p. 575, emphasis added). A recent Western source quotes a definition of population policy as policies of national governments "intended to decrease the birth rate or growth rate" (E. Driver, op. cit. p 7. quoting D. Nortman "Population and Family Planning Programs: A Fact-book" Reports on Population/Family Planning December 1969, p.12.) While it is clear in Nortman's original text that she is referring only to the developing countries, and framing a definition purely for the purposes of her own paper, Driver does not appear to be too troubled by the anti-natalist assumption in the definition, though he does suggest that it represents an over-narrow approach to the problem from other points of view.
style of Socialist writers on population policy: their concern is with their own countries and their objective to make their rulers understand what policies need to be adopted in the national interest. Though many of them seem to be concerned about the human aspect of the problems they are discussing, they will often go to considerable pains to conceal the fact and to present their case in the form of an empirical demonstration of the demographico-economic benefits that will surely flow from the course prescribed, or of the practical futility of policies in fact probably held in distaste for moral reasons.

Thus to sum up, while the Western and Eastern literatures on population policies are expanding equally rapidly, they are doing so in different directions. Socialist writers are, at the surface at least, pragmatic and technocratic rather than normative, policy- rather than politics-oriented, and nationalist and natalist rather than neo-Malthusian and international in their perspectives.
Little systematic work has yet been done to map the areas of overlap between population and politics.  

Since the relevant parts of this chapter were written a new book has reached me reflecting some more recent work on the politics of population in the United States from which it clearly emerges that many of the comments I have made on the state of the field are being rapidly overtaken by events. Population and Politics, edited by Richard L. Clinton and published towards the end of 1973, is a much more substantial collection of essays than either of the two volumes edited by Clinton et al. and published the previous year. Both qualitatively and quantitatively it is obvious that significant development is taking place. People working in the field are becoming more aware of one another's contributions and there are more signs of a felt need to interrelate conceptual proposals and build on what has already been done. The essays of McCoy, Choucri, Stetson, Kraft and others suggest that systematization of various approaches to the subject will not now be long in coming. For one of my own interests and prejudices, two or three shortcomings remain. Rather too much energy seems to be expended on attempts to dispel the political scientist's anxieties about the "scientific" status of himself and his "discipline". If political scientists could agree that what links them is a common concern for objective and systematic thinking about one of the most central facets of human life, and not some existing or emergent set of sectarian skills, they should all have a good deal more time and nervous energy available for more profitable pursuits. The other major deficiency I detect is the absence of any Soviet or capitalist Socialist perspective on the problems being discussed. There is a wider dispersal of views than in previous volumes (with, for example, Third World anti-Malthusianism ably if vicariously represented); but the models proposed are not always apposite to mercantilist authoritarian regimes, and there is little apparent awareness of the special theoretical and practical problems their existence raises both for their own peoples and the world. Another book which has reached me too late to be effectively discussed is N. Choucri: Population Dynamics and International Violence Lexington 1974. Cf. footnote 41, below.
The little that has been done has usually been tentative or ad hoc. And frequently it has been done by demographers with a primary interest in policy or even in some particular demographic objective, in terms of which they then couch their definitions.

One of the very few sustained conceptual discussions of the subject to have been carried out by a political scientist is Myron Weiner's essay "Political Demography: An Inquiry into the Political Consequences of Population Change". Weiner defines political demography as "the study of the size, composition, and distribution of population in relation to both government and politics". It is concerned, he writes, with the political consequences of population change and what he calls the political determinants of population change, among which he includes, as key instances, the political causes of migration, "the relationship of various population configurations to the structures and functions of government" and population policy. Then he adds, as though in a third category, the "knowledge and attitudes that people have toward population issues", though a few pages later, this


33 It appears to have been Weiner who popularized the term "political demography". It is significant in itself that the term was coined or at least launched into circulation as late as the 1970s. Another author has actually claimed prior use in 1968. See J. Dreijmanis "Political Demography and Population Policy" Population Review 1975, p. 101.

34 At p. 574.
same factor reappears in the more modest role of a point to be borne in mind (along with four others) when analysing the political effects of demographic changes. The classification into consequences and determinants is not without its difficulties either. Population policies and the politics of population policy-making may be equally well or indeed better regarded as consequent upon population change, as being a political response to demographic change rather than a cause of it; and the question whether and in what measure those policies in time become a determinant of demographic change seems more a question for technical demography than for political science to assess. Similarly the "relationships of various population configurations to the structures and functions of government" do not seem happily cast as political determinants of population change. And in general, the bifurcation between consequences and determinants seems to divide what is, from the vantage-point of political analysis, a mountain from a molehill. Perhaps it was for this reason that Weiner chose to go on to discuss only the consequences and not the determinants. The discussion itself is full of stimulating ideas, and the core of it sensibly structured into a five-fold division according to the nature of the demographic change being considered: a) changes in the age structure; b) changes in family size; c) changes in the size and density of a population; d) differential population growth rates among different social classes and ethnic groups; and e) migration. But there is nothing manifestly exhaustive or definitive about this scheme. Instead of focussing on the demographic causes of the political
consequences the discussion might instead have been organized in terms of some classification of the consequences themselves: by area of policy concern; by their impact on political institutions, processes and systems; by geographical relevance - international, national, regional, etc. - and so on. Weiner does not really discuss any of these possible classificatory alternatives. The choices he made in organizing his material were evidently made in a virtual vacuum.

Nash has presented another outline of what he calls the "potential fields" which "political-science-in-population-studies" should "at least" be concerned with: 1) the indirect political implications of demographic change; 2) the direct implications; 3) the political barriers to the adoption of particular population policies; 4) the implications for core political values; and 5) the politics of population policy-making. The instances he gives to explain 1) and 2) leave some doubt in the reader's mind as to what these categories contain, just how they are distinguished from one another and in what relationship they stand to categories 4) and 5). In general one gains the impression that they are as tentative and inchoate as Nash's hyphenated characterization of the field itself would suggest.

W.B. Vosloo, in undertaking an overall review of the political implications of rapid population growth in the world distinguishes two main categories of domestic and
international implications. The former he further sub-divides into a) demands on governments; b) urbanization; c) inter-group conflict and d) population policy.

International implications are subclassified into a) effects on national power; b) external effects, and c) global effects, each of which contains in turn two sub-groups.

Vosloo's paper is a brief one; and the logic of his breakdown is greater than merely quoting the sub-headings might suggest. But perhaps the most significant thing about the paper is that its author produced his classification without finding it necessary to refer to any existing received wisdom on the subject. And though the volume in which his paper was published appeared in 1972, this was no doubt for the excellent reason that no such received wisdom existed.

Volume IV of the research reports of the US Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, sub-titled Governance and Population; The Governmental Implications of Population Change, attempts to gather together a wide sampling of political science thinking on "the significant relationships, if any, between population growth and distribution, on the one hand, and the American governmental process, on the other". A fourfold sub-classification is made into 1.) population, federalism and democracy; 2.) population change and state and local government; 3.) population change and foreign policy; and 4.) population policy and the American political system.

Here, instead of taking demographic categories as the basic principle of organization as Weiner did, the political system and policy have been distinguished and each divided into two sub-sections. For the rest, the approach is probably similar enough: Weiner's consequences are replaced by "implications", and there is a slightly greater orientation to political institutions, perhaps reflecting the origins and terms of reference of the Commission itself. Again, however, there is no sign of any methodological self-awareness, or any interest in earlier overall approaches to the problem.

The international implications of population trends probably have received more attention in the past than the domestic ones. But that greater interest has not

38 A similar orientation forms the basis for an interesting little book by Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte: Size and Democracy, which attempts to review the state of theory and empirical research on the interconnections between a country's size (variously understood in terms of population, population density, area and to some extent, wealth) and democracy (in terms of citizen participation in political decision-making, and the effectiveness of the political system in maintaining and defending itself and pursuing its objectives). Perhaps the single most significant theme in the Dahl-Tufte volume from the present perspective is their repeated emphasis on the paucity or complete absence of data on the successive problems raised: "quagmire of unknowns" (p 46), "these scattered data are a fragile foundation" (p 51) "the evidence, though fragmentary" (p 55), etc.

39 Dahl and Tufte, in discussing the international problems faced by small states, remark: "This is one of the few areas of our inquiry for which an extensive literature has recently developed". Dahl and Tufte op.cit., p 118, note 1.
for the most part taken very systematic form. It seems to have been only recently that attempts have been made by political scientists to provide some theoretical framework for this large, diffuse and complex area of enquiry, or potential enquiry. The crucial questions appear to be basically three: 1. to what extent, in what ways and with what qualifications does population growth affect the power of individual nations to act in the international arena?
2. to what extent and in what ways can population growth tendencies affect the likelihood or nature of international conflict? and 3. to what extent and in what ways can population trends bring about problems that must ultimately be solved at an international as well as a national level (eg. pollution, mass poverty, starvation or other such chronic or acute catastrophes, large international migratory

One of the very earliest attempts at systematic analysis, at least within the literature of modern Anglo-Saxon political science, was K. & A.F. Organski's Population and World Power New York 1961. The Organskis appear not to have been aware of any direct predecessors. The style of the book is popular and the content seldom goes very much beyond the level of an accumulation of common sense views. For a critical review, see L.H. Day "Population Characteristics and World Power" Social Research vol 30 (1963) No. 3, p. 391. Another work similar in scope and style to that of the Organskis is P. Hauser (ed.) Population and World Politics Glencoe 1958 (see esp. Chapters 9 & 12 by Kingsley Davis and Quincy Wright).
flows, depletion of world resources, etc)? Each of these questions might be meaningfully discussed at very great length. In the present study, however, not even the most schematic outline of the main issues involved will be attempted. These are problems which have attracted even less explicit attention in the Socialist countries than in the West (where the reticence of political scientists has fortunately not been shared by observers from other spheres of interest). Moreover,

An excellent review of the literature on the linkages between population and international politics is to be found in N. Choucri Population Dynamics and International Violence Lexington 1974, pp3-85. (Though her discussion is focussed only on the second, and to a lesser extent, the first of the three general problem-areas I have distinguished.) Unfortunately, Choucri's book became available only after this chapter was effectively completed. For another more recent attempt to deal with the first problem, see A.F.K. Organski et al. "Effective population as a source of international power" in Barratt and Louw op. cit. pp 161-178; and "The Effective Population in International Politics" in Clinton, Flash and Godwin op. cit., pp 79-99. The notion of "effective population" represents an effort to reach a composite measure of human resources as an element in national power such that differing levels of economic development, political organization and social and psychological mobilization might be taken into account. Not all of these necessary modifications lend themselves readily to quantification however; and in any case even if they should one day be reducible to some kind of index, one might still ask the question whether "effective population" would be necessarily a better name for such an index than simply "national power" or something else. For a criticism of an earlier version of a similar index by Organski which actually was called an "index of national power", see S. Rosen "War, Power and the Willingness to Suffer" in Bruce M. Russett (ed.) Peace, War and Numbers Beverly Hills 1972, p. 170.
they take one away from the primary focus of interest of the present study, which is the domestic politics of the socialist countries, not their international relations with one another or the world. In the case of the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent, Yugoslavia, the international population factor impinges on the domestic scene to such an extent that it cannot be ignored. Elsewhere, given the apparent stability of power relations in the area for the short term at least, and given the inevitable reticence on the matter of indigenous commentators, the international factor tends to surface rather as a quasi-national one, exclusively in terms of an ostensibly inward-looking or wholly pacific patriotism. The discussion of the international aspects of the problem will accordingly tend on the whole to be somewhat foreshortened.

Rather more of a conceptual or morphological nature has been written on population policy. And while this literature is, as was noted earlier, slanted in the direction of demography and policy rather than politics, and often dominated by implicit or explicit anti-natalist preoccupations, some of it goes into the politics of policy-formation quite extensively. Perhaps the most promising classificatory proposal to emerge from this literature is Berelson's sixteen-fold division of what he calls the problem-area of population policy. He begins by distinguishing four demographic variables: size,
rates (birth, death, natural increase etc.), distribution (dispersal of existing populations and migratory trends) and composition (structure by age, sex, ethnic status and genetic character). These four demographic variables are then severally considered in relation to the four behavioural categories of economic, political, ecological-environmental and social, thus producing 16 problem-bundles. This scheme has the advantage of being simple, systematic and comprehensive at the same time. From the point of view of political analysis it may seem that the area specifically allocated to politics is too neatly restricted; after all, whatever relates to policy must in some sense be political. When enough people become conscious of a social, economic or ecological question, it becomes ipso facto a political one as well. With this modification, however, Berelson's scheme may well provide a useful starting-point for the systematic charting of the population politics area generally and not just that of population policy.

Turning then to the field of population policy (understood in some sense narrower than domestic population politics), it should be said at once, that though it has been more extensively and perhaps expertly discussed than political demography, no satisfactory definition or characterization of it has yet been devised in either East or West. The central problem is how to distinguish population policy from social policy, and following on from that, to determine whether or not unconscious or laisser-faire policies should be regarded as population policies at all. Leading Western authorities on population and social policies are not agreed as to where the dividing line between the two should
fall. As Driver has noted:

"Myrdal and Borrie regard population policy as inseparable from a more comprehensive social policy. Berelson, on the other hand, treats measures of social policy as segments of a general population policy. T.H. Marshall clearly separates the two types of policies, while Richard Titmuss examines social policies in terms of their demographic consequences." 43

But quite apart from this central and unresolved problem, little progress has yet been made towards developing a universally-accepted framework for discussion and evaluation of population policy from any point of view. Three recent conceptual proposals by a demographer, sociologist and political scientist, which we shall now briefly consider, are united more than in any other way by a common failure to address themselves to any existing body of literature, and a common aspiration to define terms ab initio.

Livi-Bacci, the demographer, 44 begins by accepting the broader notion of population policy which includes demographically-relevant policies which may have been adopted for other reasons, and proceeds to distinguish three categories of measures which he first classifies as

43 Driver op. cit., p. 133.
those relating to individual human rights (abortion, contraception, marriage law etc.); those designed to increase social justice (various egalitarian and welfare provisions); and those designed to encourage or discourage certain types of (demographic) behaviour (and here we are given a mixed bag of examples, some overlapping with those in category two, though not category one for some reason).

Thus we have a division into one category of deliberate population policies and two of social policies with demographic relevance. This classification, which is not without a certain appeal, he then tacitly abandons, (so quietly in fact, that one wonders whether he himself is fully conscious of what he has done) and substitutes a second tripartite scheme strongly similar to the preceding one in certain respects, but not identical with it and in fact reflecting different organizing principles: 1.) policies affecting procreation and fertility; 2.) policies affecting the economic and social welfare of the people; and 3.) policies affecting migration and mobility. The first of these, though renamed, substantially corresponds to the earlier individual rights category and is concerned with the same issues of abortion, contraception, marriage law and so on. The second category also closely corresponds to its predecessor (egalitarian and welfare measures) except that it is, as its new name suggests, more narrowly focussed on family welfare, and that rather much in terms of pro- and anti-natalism. Provisions relating to minorities, the old, the handicapped,
etc., which were mentioned as instances of the earlier category 2 are not now discussed. It might be asked whether in view of the bias of this revised second category, the designation of the revised first category (measures relating to procreation and fertility) is not a misnomer, since family welfare is clearly being considered above all from the point of view of marital fertility. The third category, of policies relating to migration and mobility, proves to be the previous category three, shorn of the examples relating to family policy.

If we regard population policy as being concerned with quantity and social policy as being concerned with quality, and if we accept the proposition that the two essential factors involved in quantitative changes are fertility and migration (on the grounds that welfare policies aimed at reducing mortality are really concerned with the quality of life rather than the number of lives or deaths as such), Livi-Bacci could be said to have opted for a classification into socio-demographic policies affecting fertility and socio-demographic policies affecting migration, with the former class being further sub-divided into two groups: policies relating to issues of individual freedoms, and likely to affect fertility; and policies relating to the family which are likely to affect fertility.
Livi-Bacci's purposes were purely pragmatic - to set a framework for a discussion of population policy in Western Europe. The sociologist, Driver, on the other hand, has attempted a conceptual analysis for its own sake. His approach, not surprisingly, is more systematic and sophisticated. He begins by distinguishing three aspects of population: size, distribution and composition. Viewed dynamically rather than statically, one can conceive further of positive or negative growth of the population unit as a whole, and changes in its spatial distribution and structural composition. Each of these properties of population is connected by reciprocally causative links to the demographic variables of fertility and mortality, and internal and international migration. And Driver points out that each of the population properties and demographic variables can be further analyzed.

The concept of policy is similarly analytically reduced. Driver distinguishes means and ends (or the purpose or philosophy of policy as he terms the latter) and to these two components adds a third which he calls policy evaluation, and which refers to the relations between the first two components. He then introduces a temporal perspective, differentiating between the origins and execution of policy or policy initiation and implementation, as he terms it. Policy means are next sub-divided into direct and indirect measures by both governmental and non-governmental institutions. Beyond policy goals or aims,

Driver perceives further layers of population values and general values. And in diagrams accompanying the text, he adumbrates a host of further distinctions and subject-headings within the general areas of policy means, initiation and implementation which he does not actually discuss in the text proper.

Though tentative and incomplete in its presentation, Driver's scheme, like Berelson's, appears to have considerable promise. Actually his proposal for the demographic side of things is not dissimilar to Berelson's: his three aspects (or "connotations" as he chooses to call them) of

Though surprisingly, it has been curtly dismissed by at least one reviewer. (T. Burch in Demography vol. 11 (1974) No. 1, p. 151) A second reviewer in the same symposium praises it as "eminently sane" (p. 157). Neither really elaborates on his praise or criticism, nor does either suggest any detailed alternative or supplementary approach. Burch simply states his preference for the proposals of Kingsley Davis and the head of his own organization, Bernard Berelson (whose proposal was reviewed above). This preference for Davis's discussion is somewhat surprising inasmuch that the article in question does not aspire to be a systematic structural outline of the subject-matter of population policy, but rather a discursive account of certain key aspects of population problems and policies over the last century or so, with a strong contemporary and anti-natalist focus. The definitional passage is a relatively small and less important segment of the article (K. Davis "The Nature and Purpose of Population Policy" in Kingsley Davis and Frederick G. Stykes California's Twenty Millions UCLA Population Monograph Series No. 10, Berkeley 1971). And in general both reviews of Driver's book, as well as Driver's reply, seem more concerned to make ad hominem debating points than to address themselves seriously to the problems involved.
population - size, distribution and composition - correspond to three of Berelson's four demographic factors; and his demographic variables of fertility, mortality, internal and international migration correspond roughly to Berelson's fourth demographic factor of rates. But then in place of Berelson's four behavioural categories of economic, political, ecological-environmental and social, Driver directs our attention to the means-ends and process (initiation-implementation) dimensions. Obviously these are aspects of the problem which ought not to be neglected, and there is no reason in fact why a more comprehensive topology of the field might not employ both approaches complementarily.

For practical purposes, at least, it might be argued that Driver's inclusion of indirect population policies (by which he appears to mean social and other policies of inadvertent demographic relevance) makes his framework too all-embracing and unwieldy. And certainly his discussion elsewhere in the same volume of prison visiting regulations would appear to most people a far cry from anything they would be prepared to use the term "population policy" about. However, from the viewpoint of demography if not from that of population politics, such matters are obviously of some importance, even if a better name for them would be "demographically-relevant social policies" or something of the sort.

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47 E. Driver op. cit., pp 82-88.
In his article "Population Policies and the American Political System" the political scientist, Theodore Lowi, offers a definition and discussion of population policy "from the point of view of the political scientist, rather than that of the demographer, the biologist, or the physician". (p.26) Whether for this or for some other reason, however, his contribution is the weakest structurally of the three here considered, and consists more of a series of discursive comments on what population policy is not, until he finally reaches the point of offering a classification of policies in terms of the amount and kind of coercion involved (this, he argues, being the element that is most likely to make them politically relevant). While some of his schemes and criteria may be of some utility, on the whole they suffer not only from being too narrowly oriented to political science, but also (as the title of his essay forewarns) too narrowly oriented to America. His theoretical discussion is couched in general terms, as though aspiring to be of general application. But in fact, its normative, anti-natalist and democratic bias makes it quite useless in a Socialist context, and of limited value generally to any overall consideration of the matters raised by political demography.

48 In Clinton, Flash and Godwin op.cit., p. 25, at pp. 26-33.

49 It may not be being too harsh to suggest that the Lowi essay suffers from a scrappiness and spur-of-the-moment provisionalness characteristic of the entire volume, and also, perhaps, of the state in which political demography then found itself. One reviewer described the essays (with one exception) as being "slight - if sometimes heavily pretentious - statements of the axiomatic." and declared brutally that "This conference should have been regarded as a dry run, not worth printing and certainly not worth anyone's ten dollars." (W. Petersen in Contemporary Sociology May 1973 p. 271).
One of the problems which constantly recurs in attempts to define the subject-matter of population policy is where to draw the line so as to incorporate all the relevant data without dragging the entire social sciences into consideration. Should population policy be taken to include both deliberate and inadvertent policy inputs? Should it include all policies which are demographically relevant even if they were conceived with other goals in mind, either principally or entirely? Should it include policies made by default? And should it include policies seeking to affect the quality of the population as well as the quantity, and if so in what sense or senses of the word "quality"?

These problems have also exercised the minds of Socialist demographers. And as is the case with Western writers (cf p.35 above), they are not fully in agreement about where the lines should be drawn. In their societies of course, the scope and intermesh of governmental (and therefore ex definitione political) activity is so great, that the amorphousness of population policy in its broader sense is even more troublesome. At times, notably in the work of the prominent Moscow University demographer, D.I. Valentei, population policy seems to be defined in a sense broad enough to incorporate most of what a Western observer might have called social policy and a good deal of economic
Valentei draws a distinction between what he calls "demographic policy" (demograficheskaia politika) and "population policy" (Politika narodonaseleniia). The second of the two in his interpretation is much broader than the first which, he declares: "...in our opinion refers only to the qualitative and quantitative reproduction of the population" (already a broad enough definition probably, in the opinion of many.) Among the matters Valentei lists as falling within the scope of politika narodonaseleniia, on the other hand, are working conditions broadly conceived: (length of working day, industrial safety and health regulations, etc.), technical education and vocational guidance, wages, services,

The following exposition of Valentei's ideas is based on his article "O sisteme demograficheskikh znanii" in Voprosy Ekonomiki 1973, No. 5, pp 74-84. Valentei has repeatedly developed the same theme in other places. Many of his articles seem to repeat themselves almost word for word and paragraph for paragraph. (Compare, for example, the third chapter of his Osnovy teorii narodonaseleniia Moscow 1973 with his contribution "Politika narodonaseleniia" to D. Broner and I. Venetskii Problemy demografi Moscow 1971). These recurring programmatic statements have a stately ex cathedra quality reflecting the fact that Valentei's authority is not so much, or at any rate, not merely academic. He was a crucial figure in reviving demography as a discipline in the 1960s and defending it against the attacks of its erstwhile sole custodians, the Main Statistical Office (whose mode of nurturing demography was to deny its existence), though his own academic works have not in general been very substantial or obviously trail-blazing (his two major monographs have been Bezrabotitsa - neizbezhny sputnik kapitalizma Moscow 1951 (Unemployment - The Inevitable Concomitant of Capitalism), and Reaktsionnye teorii narodonaseleniia perioda obshechevo krizisa kapitalizma Moscow 1963 (Reactionary Demographic Theories of the Period of General Crisis of Capitalism). Cf. footnote 181 to Chapter 3.

Voprosy Ekonomiki 1973, No. 5, p. 79.
housing, leisure pursuits, public health in the broadest sense, environmental preservation and social mobility.

While Valentei's broader definition may have some merits as indicating the range of phenomena that are not demographically irrelevant, many of these topics would seem to be best given their primary location elsewhere. In fact, as noted earlier, though Valentei has frequently repeated this and similar formulations in magisterial tone from rather august forums, most Soviet demographers seem to implicitly adopt something more like the narrower of his two definitions, while pointing out that any policy, to be effective, must take many other things into account and be itself taken into account by decision-makers in other policy fields. Another senior Soviet demographer, Boris Urlanis, has actually explicitly criticized Valentei's ideas in a recent publication: 52 Valentei, he writes,

"treats the notion of 'population policy' (politika narodonaseleniia) in a very broad sense (ves' ma rasshiritel'no), including in it the length of the working day, real wages, social mobility and so on."

Urlanis goes on to deny the need for any distinction between demographic policy and population policy. But there may be some value in retaining a distinction of roughly this type. There is an obvious need to distinguish conceptually between population policy in the narrow sense of measures seeking to affect the population growth rate and in the broader sense of policies serving whether deliberately or not, to affect any one

of the full range of demographic characteristics of a population. This, however, was not Valentei's intention and Urlanis was accordingly right in criticizing his version of the broader concept as being much too broad.

Regardless of its analytic merits, however, Valentei's definition is of considerable interest inasmuch that it may well foreshadow the approach to population policy that will be adopted by the Soviet administration in the future. If Valentei's contentions were indeed to be accepted, a veritable revolution would be wrought in Soviet social policy. Both the element of paternalistic benevolence and the tight web of social control and centralistic direction would be greatly strengthened. The net effects of such changes are not easily envisaged in advance.

Having briefly discussed the way in which the overlap between politics and population has been seen by some observers in both East and West, it remains to reconsider the chosen scope of this thesis in the light of that discussion.

The main point which ought to have emerged from the foregoing is that population politics and population policy are fields for which no very satisfactory sign-posting

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Valentei and Urlanis do not, of course, between them, exhaust the range of thinking on the subject that has been going on in the Socialist countries. For other discussions of the problem of definition, see, for example: V. Steshenko and V. Piskunov Demograficheskaiapolitika Moscow 1974, pp. 7-14 (Valentei), 15, 52 and ff., 69 & ff.; Polityka ludnościowa: współczesne problemy Warsaw 1973, p. 109 & ff., 430, 469, 480, 495; Šrb, Kučera and Růžička op. cit., pp. 575 & ff.; H. Švarcová Populace Prague 1966, p. 227 & ff.; A. Wertheimer-Baletić Demografija Zagreb 1973, pp. 359 & ff.
has yet been devised. Being one of predominantly empirical interests myself, I do not feel challenged to overcome this deficiency in the present work.

Basically what I have done is to select for closer discussion those areas of linkage between population and politics which Socialist writers themselves most frequently touch upon, or those areas which I suspect they would most like to touch on if it were politically possible to do so: in other words, I have tried to blend an objective with a subjective criterion of importance and interest. This seemed to be the only sensible way to approach the subject, the more so given the lack of any received schemes of analysis. Like Weiner, I have chosen to stress the consequences rather than the determinants of demographic change; but unlike him, I have adopted political rather than demographic categories as an organizing principle. Unlike the contributors to the US Population Commission Report, I have chosen to stress politics in the sense of conflicts and dilemmas, rather than governmental structure or political processes and institutions. The greater emphasis on dilemmas and conflicts involves a rather lesser degree of emphasis on simple description of established government policies. Of the foreign and domestic implications distinguished by both Vosloo and the US Commission volume, I am stressing the latter to a greater extent than the former. Of Berelson's four demographic categories of size, rates, distribution and composition, I am

54 Descriptions of government policies are in any case already largely available. (Cf. footnote 2 above).
stressing the first, second and one particular aspect of
the fourth (ethnic, rather than age- or class- structure).

Ideology, an element often overlooked in
standard definitions and typologies, fits uneasily into
Driver's sub-categories of "general value milieu" and
"population policy values", two parts of his broader
category of the philosophy (as opposed to the means) of
population policy. The presence of ideology as one of a
handful of categories in my pragmatic classification (like
the prominence of labour supply and labour policy) is a good
illustration of the extent to which standard Western
expositions of the subject-matter of political demography are
ill-fitting when applied to Socialist countries, where such
a radically different socio-economic system and ideological
and political tradition prevail.

It will now be appropriate to consider a little
more closely some of the key aspects of that tradition as
they bear on population problems.

1. c Population and the Marxist Classics.

(i) Marxism and Population Growth.

It seems that Marx and Engels might conceivably
have chosen to impart a strongly demographic slant to their
central theory of historical materialism. 55 Both in Marx's

55 For a discussion of this point see H. Kent
Geiger The Family in Soviet Russia Cambridge
Mass. 1968, p. 28 and ff.
German Ideology and later and more explicitly in Engels' The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, the suggestion is made that human reproduction forms part of the base, the underlying reality from which all other social phenomena ultimately take their rise. It would appear, in other words, that at different times, both inclined towards a demo-economic version of historical materialism rather than the more monistically economic one with which their names are now associated. Engels went so far as to say explicitly that the determining factor in history, the production and reproduction of the immediate essentials of life, is "of a twofold character. On the one hand, the production of the means of subsistence, of food, clothing and shelter, and the tools requisite therefore; on the other, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species". And added: "The social institutions under which the people of a definite historical epoch and a definite country live are conditioned by both kinds of production; by the stage of development of labour on the one hand and of the family on the other."  

At other times, however, they were content to regard the social configurations arising around procreation as being determined by the base, and not as some independent causative force.

The Origin appeared late in Engels' life and after Marx's death, but given Marx's plans to write something on Morgan's work (referred to by Engels only a few lines before the passage quoted above), it seems unlikely that Engels was thrusting an idea back onto Marx which Marx himself had wholly and consciously rejected somewhere between the first hints of it contained in German Ideology, and his death. Be that as it may, the fact is that few of the Marxist classics contain very much material that one could classify as demographic, and consequently it is difficult, generally speaking, to determine just what their attitudes to key population issues might have been. Moreover, most of what they do say on these subjects is said in the context of their recurring polemics with Malthus. The effect of this may have been to burden Marxism with a demographic doctrine which strictly speaking does not logically derive from the

57 F. Engels op. cit., pp. 5-6.

58 Scholars writing in the Soviet Marxist tradition have tended to blame Engels for this "aberration" insofar as they have acknowledged it at all. See Geiger op. cit., p. 31-2; M. Sawer The Question of the Asiatic Mode of Production: Towards a New Marxist Historiography unpublished Ph.D. thesis Australian National University 1974, p. 151 & ff., 252 & ff. Stalin personally intervened in this matter to deliver an authoritative judgement on at least one aspect of the problem: "Of course, growth of population does influence the development of society, does facilitate or retard the development of society, but it cannot be the chief force of development of society, and its influence on the development of society cannot be the determining influence..."History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course Moscow FLPH 1939, p. 119. For an apparent attempt to restore the demographic factor to a more important role in historical materialism, see A. Vishnevskii "Demograficheskaia revoliutsiia" Voprosy Filosofii 1973 no. 2, p. 53.
main body of Marxian thinking at all. For it seems clear that Marx and Engels were not objecting so much to Malthus's empirical demographic errors as to what they perceived to be his moral and political attitudes. Their response to Malthus has been aptly described as "apoplectic". Marx and Engels were much given to forceful polemical prose, a field in which they displayed no mean ability. Yet even judged by their own exacting standards, in Malthus's case they seem indeed to have excelled themselves: "The crudest, most barbarous theory that ever existed", "a sin against science", "immorality brought to its highest pitch", "shameless and mechanical plagiarism", "this revolting blasphemy against nature and mankind", "this libel on the human race", "shameless sycophant of the ruling classes", "schoolboyish", "superficial", "fundamental meanness of outlook", "the contemptible Malthus...who always steals (his premises)", "a very model of intellectual imbecility winding its way casuistically through its own inner confusion", "difficult and clumsy style", "absurd commonplace" - such were some of the expressions chosen by Marx and Engels to characterize their adversary and his theoretical work. Neither of the main recurring charges - plagiarism and conservatism - seems to have been fully apposite. As Malthus himself says in the first chapter of his Principle of Population:


For the following list of expletives and further instances of Marx and Engels' vigorous style in disputation with Malthus, see Ronald L. Meek (ed.) Marx and Engels on Malthus London 1953, pp 59-60 81, 83, 116-7, 118-9, 121, 123, 126, 138-9 and 158.
"The most important argument that I shall adduce is certainly not new." 61

He then proceeds to acknowledgements, pointing out that the argument may well have been stated by other writers he does not know. Moreover, on his own admission, Malthus's reading on population matters had been very modest to that point. His intention to represent the argument is modestly, even diffidently stated: "I should certainly therefore not think of advancing it again, though I mean to place it in a point of view in some degree different from any that I have hitherto seen, if it had ever been fairly and satisfactorily answered." 62

As to Malthus's alleged conservatism, it would seem that Marx and Engels were characterizing Malthus the symbol rather than Malthus the man. 63 For Malthus the man advocated among other things free universal education, free medical care for the poor, state assistance to emigrants, and direct relief to large families; and opposed child labour in factories, 64 something which Marx saw as being an essential


62 Ibid.


feature of the capitalist law of population. Malthus undoubtedly shared some of the moral blindness of his time and class; and no doubt too he expressed himself at times with a deliberate anti-sentimentality that may well have contributed both to his fame and his notoriety. But to regard him as the arch-apologist of the most reactionary sections of the monied classes as Marx and Engels consistently did, is at least an oversimplification. And as was suggested earlier, and will be further explained later, it is an oversimplification, which, in subsequent and even more oversimplified and ossified forms, has had and continues to exert a momentous influence.

Malthus's great and enduring merit was to dramatically call attention to the fact that either in the short term, or in the long term, growth of population would, unless checked, outstrip any possible growth in the resources available to support that population. The Marxist reply to the alleged short-term danger varied from occasion to occasion.

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65 See the passage from Capital reproduced in Meek op. cit., p. 98-99.

66 See the section headed "Ideology" in the chapter devoted to the Soviet Union. The traditional antagonism between Marxist and Malthusian approaches to population questions is a most regrettable historical millstone around humanity's neck, but one which has been and is very seldom regretted. For an interesting attempt to reconcile and conjoin the two, see H.E. Daly "A Marxian-Malthusian View of Poverty and Development" Population Studies 1971 No. 1, p. 25.
At times it was emphasized that population did not grow geometrically (Malthus had never said it did as a matter of empirical fact, merely that it would unless checked) and that Malthus had grossly overstated his case; at other times, that irrespective of how fast the population might be growing, productive capacity was growing faster, and that only the irrationalities of capitalist economic organization prevented this from being reflected in a steady growth of general well-being:

"But science increases at least as fast as population;" wrote Engels "the latter increases in proportion to the size of the previous generation, and science advances in proportion to the body of knowledge passed down to it by the previous generation, that is in the most normal conditions it also grows in geometrical progression - and what is impossible for science?" 67

As to the long-term prospects of absolute or global overpopulation, Marx and Engels tended to be

67 Engels Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy, quoted in Meek, op. cit., p. 63.
Their basic concern, despite their utopian visions, was with the present. Observing the onward march of the industrial revolution (as they were in better position to do than Malthus had been), they had no doubts about the ability of productivity to win the population-production race within any meaningful time-span. Over-population was for them a non-problem. They did not want to be bothered about vague hypothetical situations which might not arise at all, or if so, only at some future time after they would both be dead and buried.

At a stage when Kautsky was expressing the keenest concern about the impending problem of overpopulation, the most explicit comment that could be coaxed from either of the

Engels on one occasion declared roundly that "we are forever secure from the fear of overpopulation" (op. cit., p. 62). On another occasion he referred to the inexhaustible regions fertilised by nature herself in South-Eastern Europe and Western America and commented "If all these regions have been ploughed up and after that a shortage sets in, then will be the time to say caveat consules". (letter to Lange, March 29, 1865, quoted in Meek, op. cit., p. 82).

In fact, of course, given the nature of demographic dynamism, it would by then be much too late to sound any alarms. One makes this somewhat humourlessly pedantic observation since it is a common lay illusion that demographic processes can be reversed by five minutes of thought and ten minutes of evasive action; an illusion that was evidently shared by Engels, and more importantly, by many more directly influential figures who claim to be his intellectual legatees. In his reply to Kautsky, quoted in the text below, Engels comments on an extrapolation of population growth by saying that it is of no greater worth than an estimate of the compound interest yielded by a kreutzer invested in the year 1 A.D., which by the 19th century would amount to the equivalent of a lump of silver larger than the earth. (Letter to Kautsky, February 1, 1881, quoted in Meek op. cit., p. 108).
founding fathers was this:

"There is of course the abstract possibility that the number of people will become so great that limits will have to be set to their increase. But if at some stage communist society finds itself obliged to regulate the production of human beings, just as it has already come to regulate the production of things, it will be precisely this society, and this society alone, which can carry this out without difficulty. It does not seem to me that it would be at all difficult in such a society to achieve by planning a result which has already been produced spontaneously, without planning, in France and Lower Austria. At any rate, it is for the people in the communist society themselves to decide whether, when, and how this is to be done, and what means they wish to employ for the purpose. I do not feel called upon to make proposals or give them advice about it. These people, in any case, will surely not be any less intelligent than we are." 69

Elsewhere in this same letter, Engels refers to the massive growth of food production in America, remarks of the population there that it will take more than thirty years to double itself, and adds: "That doesn't scare me!" The whole tone of the letter is one of jocular and robust common sense self-consciously contrasted with the chimerical fears

69 Engels' letter to Kautsky of February 1, 1881, Meek, op. cit., p. 109.
of nervous intellectuals. As Petersen observes, "By such a comment, Engels avoided having to discuss in any detail either the economic significance of population growth or the moral system of the socialist society he was advocating." And in consequence, it might be added, contemporary Marxist theorists and policy-makers have virtually no political, economic or ethical guidelines within which to shape a specifically Socialist population policy.

Similar references to the untapped bounty of the New World (and the Old) can be found elsewhere in the classic Marxist texts. It is evident that the contemporary expansion of science and land-use both exerted a powerful impact on the founding fathers' minds - so powerful in fact that they seem to have experienced the greatest difficulty in conceiving of the earth's resources as in any sense finite. This extreme form of rationalist optimism was one of their

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70 W, Petersen "Notes on the Socialist Position on Birth Control" in Petersen, op. cit., p. 90.

71 The Engels quotation has, however, been put to very good use by liberal Socialist demographic commentators who have been seeking to break down Stalinist orthodoxy on population growth.

72 Engels once cited a work which argued that Great Britain's agriculture could be developed to produce corn for 6 times its then population within a decade, and added, apparently from himself, that 30 million acres were lying waste. (in the Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy, reproduced in Meek, op. cit., p. 58). See also note 68 above.
more sturdy legacies to Soviet Marxism. 73

Thus, briefly and colloquially, Marx and Engels pooh-poohed the short-term population/production dilemma (and in the days before population growth-rates of more than two per cent per annum had really established themselves may have been right to do so) and simply laughed off the long-term one. In doing so, however, they showed only a limited interest in demographic facts as such. To the Malthusian theory of an eternal conflict between inherently prolific reproduction and inherently less prolific production they counterposed the historical materialist doctrine that the laws of population growth depended on and derived from the nature of the socio-economic base, 74 so that in successive historical epochs, quite different patterns might obtain. This allocation of demography to the superstructure, however, was not developed very much more than the conflicting theoretical strand which tended to identify population as in some sense belonging to the base. Marx

73 This boundless confidence about the possibilities of nature as harnessed by man survived virtually unscathed in the Soviet period until well into the 1960s. As late as the Belgrade World Population Conference in 1965, some Soviet delegates were still making extravagant claims - as for example, that "our planet could provide the food for four million million people". For some instances of this kind of thinking, see Robert C. Cook "Soviet Population Theory from Marx to Kosygin" Population Bulletin XX111 (1967) No. 4, pp 91-2, 97-99.

74 The locus classicus on this point, much quoted and beloved by Socialist textbook writers, is "...every special historic mode of production has its own special laws of population, historically valid within its limits alone. An abstract law of population exists for plants and animals only, and only in so far as man has not interfered with them." from Das Kapital vol 1, in Meek op. cit., p.88.
and Engels do not seem ever to have displayed any systematic interest in the overall demographic development of earlier periods, or indeed in macro-demographic statistics of any sort. Even a Communist commentator has felt it necessary to make this point. Ronald Meek, the compiler of a most valuable compendium of Marxist *obiter dicta* on population questions, having noted that Marx and Engels maintained that every stage of historical development has its own law of population, goes on to comment:

"It was not enough, of course, merely to assert this - it had to be proved (Meek's emphasis). Marx and Engels do not seem to have made any direct attempt to formulate the laws of population appropriate to earlier forms of class society; had they done so, they would probably have framed these laws in terms of the particular form of pressure of the direct producers against the "means of employment" which was generated by each of these types of society". 75

Meek here puts his finger on another crucial feature of the Marxist writings on population. Not only were they not sufficiently interested to gather information about the demography of pre-capitalist societies, their interest in capitalist population problems was not strictly a demographic one either. The Marxist "law of capitalist population", if such it can indeed be called, was essentially

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a theory of employment under capitalism, a rider of the theory of the declining share of variable capital. The law says nothing about the actual movement of population as such — births, deaths, marriages, etc. And the comments made about these specifics by the masters en passant tend to be, from the theoretical point of view, unsystematic and rather elusive. 76 While the theory of the reserve army of the proletariat and the theory of growing immiseration (in some at least of their formulations) might be taken as suggesting that sooner or later population might be checked or indeed decline, their view appears to have been that the solid increase characteristic of the Western Europe and more particularly the Anglo-Saxon world of their time would continue. 77 It is not altogether clear why they thought so. Marx did note, along with many others, that the rich get richer and the poor get children, and even formulated the principle that "not only the number of births and deaths, but the absolute size of the families stand in inverse proportion to the height of wages". 78 But he does not appear to have made any systematic attempt to explain why this should be so, beyond suggesting that it reflected the greater employability of minors and the high mortality of labourers exhausted by their brutal exploitation, which in

76 See the passages from Das Kapital, translated in Meek op. cit., p. 85-105.

77 For a discussion of this point, see Petersen op. cit., p. 84.

78 Das Kapital vol 1, transl. in Meek, op. cit., p. 100.
combination created a social need for "rapid renewal of the generations of labourers", a need which the labourers obligingly met by marrying early. Early marriage, it is suggested, represents an attempt by the working classes "to conform to these circumstances", i.e. their own relatively high mortality. It is not clear whether Marx is here implying some kind of drive for species survival by the working classes or rather asserting that early marriage, "a necessary consequence of the conditions in which the labourers of modern industry live" 79 stems quite independently from the sociological patterns of working class life, the drunkenness and sexual excesses so vividly described by Engels in his *The Condition of the Working Class*. 80 The fragments of a theory that we find here are ingenious and suggestive. But apart from the obvious objection from hindsight (that class differentials in fertility and mortality alike have since flattened out without capitalism collapsing), it is also less than clear what is meant to be cause and what effect. Do the working classes reproduce to meet the requirements of the law of diminishing profits as Marx seems at times to be suggesting? If so, is it just an accident that their life patterns tend to favour the kind of reproduction that the capitalists require? Or are the requirements of the latter an independent causative factor? If so, in what relation to

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79  Ibid., p. 99.

one another do the two (or more than two) causative factors stand? 81

The fact is that the Marxist theory of population was never more than a sketch for a theory of population; and a sketch in which few of the elements were truly demographic. But what Marx and Engels did say was sufficient to establish a strong and surprisingly durable prejudice within the German Social Democratic tradition against Malthusianism or anything that might ever be taken or mistaken for it. 82 The view that Malthus was a scoundrel and a fraud to attribute all the ills of capitalism to population growth (itself an oversimplification) somewhere merged into the view that population growth in itself was a good thing and proletarian, and efforts to restrain it wrong and bourgeois or petty-bourgeois. Lenin seems to have absorbed this strand of the German Marxist tradition in its more virulent form (a point to which we shall recur a little later). Apart from that,

81 This is the kind of embarrassment of riches which teleological, historicist theories tend to fall into. On the one hand, the onward march of history or its agents requires something to happen, and therefore it happens; and on the other hand there are good positivist, factological reasons why that something should be so, which may indeed, be quite sturdy enough to maintain the full weight of causal explanation without any assistance from the historicist theory. And if the two levels of explanation seem in ill accord, the historicist is left saying a little lamely that History sometimes moves in mysterious ways its wonders to perform.

82 Petersen op. cit., pp. 91 & ff.
he does not appear to have added very much to Marxist
teachings on population, Socialist commentators notwithstanding. His principal writings on demographic matters are actually concerned with the Russian social structure of his time and migration, particularly internal migration. As this is not relevant to the central natalist concerns of this thesis, there is no point in discussing his contribution any further in the present context.

(ii) Marxism and Demographically-relevant Social Issues.

As has already been noted more than once, the list of social phenomena that might be regarded as demographically relevant is virtually endless. For present purposes, however, the discussion shall be limited to a few summary observations on three somewhat untidily overlapping topics: the institution of the family; the rights and role of women in socialist society; and the question of fertility control and the means to its achievement.

The classical Marxist writings on the place of the family in the socialist society of the future are

W. Przelaskowski "Problematyka demograficzna w pracach W. Lenina" Studia Demograficzne No. 24 (1970) pp. 3-31. This is a purely exegetical essay, which in fact concentrates on Lenin's writings on the social structure of pre-revolutionary Russia. Many demographers might feel there was virtually no demographic content in the article at all - merely a few pedestrian details of economic and social statistics. For a vain struggle to find something to say about Lenin's contribution to demographic theory (a struggle sustained over several pages), see D.I. Valentei (ed.) Marksistsko-leninskaia teoriia narodonaseleniia 2nd edition Moscow 1974, pp. 5 & ff.
ambiguous on certain key issues. Engels, the main contributor to the classical opus on this subject, was whether for personal, intellectual or other reasons, most ambivalent about marriage as an institution. His disdain for bourgeois marriage and his interest in primitive women-sharing arrangements seem at times to suggest that he might have gladly consigned marriage to the category of impermanent superstructural phenomena. 84 At other times, he betrays a romantic not to say ingenuous enthusiasm for the joyous potentialities of marriage if and when it were to be stripped of economic calculation and based on what he called individual sexual love. 85 On the whole, however, he leaned definitely towards radical revision of the institution. In particular he foresaw the disappearance of the indissolubility of marriage ties. "If only marriages that are based on love are moral, then also, only those are moral in which love continues. The duration of the urge of individual sex love differs very much according to the individual, particularly among men; and a definite cessation of affection, or its displacement by a new passionate love, makes separation a blessing for both parties as well as for society. People will only be spared the experience of wading through the useless mire of divorce proceedings." 86

Another feature of traditional marriage which

84 Engels The Origin, p. 71 & ff.
85 Ibid., p. 123 & ff.
86 Ibid., p. 134.
Engels felt sure would vanish was patriarchal male dominance. In the family, wrote Engels, the husband is the bourgeois, while the wife represents the proletariat. Whereas once "in the old communistic household" the woman's economic role had been a public one, with the advent of monogamy and the emergence of the family as an economic unit, her work ceased to be the concern of the society: "The wife became the first domestic servant, pushed out of participation in social production." While the diversification of the economy and employment opportunities brought by industrialization presented her with some opportunity for economic independence, this independence could only be seized by her if she were prepared to neglect her family duties. The solution to this dilemma lies in the recommunalization of the family as an economic and social unit:

"Private housekeeping is transformed into a social industry. The care and education of the children becomes a public matter. Society takes care of all children equally, irrespective of whether they are born in wedlock or not." The precise extent of the communalization of the

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87 But compare the somewhat different view he took earlier of situations in which the wife went out to work and the husband was reduced to the humiliating role of performing the housework. "Can anyone imagine a more insane state of things than that described in this letter? And yet this condition, which unsexes the man and takes from the woman all womanliness without being able to bestow upon the man true womanliness, or woman true manliness - this condition which degrades, in the most shameful way, both sexes, and through them, Humanity, is the last result of our much-praised civilization..." Engels The Condition of the Working Class in Marx and Engels on Britain, p.179.

88 Engels The Origin, p. 119.

89 Ibid., p. 123.
family as a social unit, however, was something that Engels left unclear. As if in trepidation before the changes he seemed to be endorsing, he chose at this point to add his celebrated excursus on the emergence of the higher value of individual sexual love, which he saw as being the basis of sexual, if not progenitive relations in the society of the future. What patterns might be expected to emerge from the application of these principles can only be a matter for conjecture. Would lovers live with one another, and if so, would their children live with them, and if so, to what age? Would all household functions be taken over by society, and if so who would perform them? If any disputes did emerge in the sphere of sexual or family relations, on what basis would they be resolved? Engels conceded that all that could be safely conjectured at that stage were improvements of a negative kind, then asked:

"But what will be added? That will be settled after a new generation has grown up ... Once such people appear they will not care a rap about what we today think they should do. They will establish their own practice..."\textsuperscript{90}

These were in the event prophetic words, perhaps the most prophetic of all Engels's comments on the family, if Soviet developments are to be taken as any test of their validity. For while the writings of the two founding fathers

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., p. 135. It will be noticed that here, as with the population question, Engels is eager to avoid commitment. One might be forgiven for suspecting that in both cases the difficulty of the social and moral questions raised was part of the reason why he was so reluctant to offer even a speculative view of how they might be solved.
were somewhat ambivalent, it is clear that their basic orientation was towards radical change. And this indeed was the path that Soviet policy-makers took at the outset. That they later retreated from this path cannot, however, be simply categorized as Thermidorian betrayal. For not only did Marx and Engels themselves shrink before condemning the institution of marriage outright; Lenin also spoke on the issue. And while it is not clear that his views directly affected the course of policy on these issues, they were sufficiently unequivocal for us to assume that they may have had some restraining force during his lifetime; and they were quite certainly very influential after his death.

It is probably true to say (as Geiger does) that Lenin was not greatly interested in problems of family policy. Indeed this must have been true, since the libertarian strand in Bolshevik policy during the first 15 years or so (which was later to be identified as the left-wing deviation on family matters) could scarcely have endured had Lenin regarded the issue as of first importance. He was certainly in favour of liberation of the woman within the family and her absorption into economic activity; and he certainly recognized that to this end far-reaching communalization of domestic labour would be necessary. But he was most impatient about any attempts to introduce radical new sexual notions into party policy. While he did pay lip-service to the

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91 Geiger *op. cit.*, p. 43.
traditional Engelsian doctrine on the subject, it seems fairly clear that he regarded the whole question as being one that should be rated as of marginal importance; and in so far as it was not, he seems tacitly to have felt classical doctrines to be rather an embarrassment. In non-public discussions with some of the sexual radicals among the female members of the Bolshevik movement, he made his impatience and his essentially conservative approach to these questions clear.

In two letters to Inessa Armand, 92 he characterized "women's demand for free love" as a bourgeois demand; indicated that he understood this slogan as at best excluding any question that there might be such a right as freedom from childbirth and freedom to commit adultery; and suggested that she ought to contrast the base and vile marriage without love of the bourgeois not with any fleeting poetic passions, but rather with "a proletarian civilian marriage with love". The line ought, in any case, to be subordinated to the political needs of the moment.

In his celebrated conversation with Klara Zetkin some five years later, 93 by which time he had become the

92 V.I. Lenin Polnoe sobranie sochinenii vol. 49 Moscow 1964, pp. 51-52 and 54-57.
93 Klara Zetkin Reminiscences of Lenin London 1929, excerpted in Women and Communism Lawrence and Wishart, London 1950. Though Lenin's remarks to Zetkin have acquired a good deal of posthumous fame, it needs of course to be borne in mind that neither they nor any similar airing of his views were published during his lifetime.
leader of a successful but still beleaguered revolution, this same approach was spelt out even more clearly. He deplored the interest shown by women comrades (and indeed the public in general) in sexual matters, dismissed Freudianism as typical of the kind of fashionable theory that "flourishes luxuriantly in the dirty soil of bourgeois society", admitted that the Russian youth movement was equally preoccupied with sexual matters and that he himself had been accused of philistinism in his attitude toward them, but made clear nonetheless that if this was modernity, he wanted none of it. Zetkin reports him as saying that "nothing could be more false than to preach monkish asceticism," then a moment later as characterizing himself as "Nothing but a gloomy ascetic". Kollontai's celebrated doctrine of the glass of water he rejects with the equally celebrated rejoinder that no normal person in normal circumstances will "lie down in the gutter and drink out of a puddle, or out of a glass with a rim greasy from many lips." Then he says:

"Drinking water is, of course, an individual affair. But in love two lives are concerned and a third, a new life arises. It is that which gives it its social interest..."

Having again protested that he has no intention of preaching asceticism, Lenin goes on in scoutmasterly

94 Women and Communism, p. 92.
95 Ibid., p. 96.
96 Ibid., p. 97.
fashion to recommend healthy sport and bodily exercises as a substitute for sexual excesses. All energy should be concentrated on the revolution. The revolution cannot tolerate orgiastic conditions. "Dissoluteness in sexual life is bourgeois, is a phenomenon of decay. The proletariat is a rising class. It doesn't need intoxication as a narcotic or a stimulus. Intoxication as little by sexual exaggeration as by alcohol." 97

Lenin's views on divorce were very much what one would expect. He did on one occasion assert that "one cannot be a democrat and a socialist without immediately demanding full freedom of divorce, for the absence of such freedom is an additional burden on the oppressed sex, woman"; however, he went on at once to add that "the recognition of the right of women to leave their husbands is not an invitation to all wives to do so!" 98 One is therefore led to wonder what might have been Lenin's reaction in a situation in which the "freedom" of divorce was seemingly being regarded as an invitation to divorce; a situation in which more and more young people were "reeling and staggering from one love affair to the next", 99 to the detriment of their revolutionary obligations.

While most of Lenin's observations on sex and the

97 Ibid., p. 98.
99 Women and Communism p. 97.
family were made in a context of intense political struggle, to the dictates of which many other matters had to be temporarily subordinated, it seems doubtful that he would have had any stomach for free love or any version of it even in more placid times. He seems indeed to have been the kind of person who feels uneasy when the subject of sex is raised. It is not necessary to agree with any of the more extravagant psychohistorical speculations that have been hazarded about his personal make-up to conclude that here he represented a view well to the right of the overall trend of party policy and thinking at this time. And if this discussion of his views has given them greater weight than his own estimate of them or his contemporary influence on the course of social policy might appear to warrant, this has been done consciously, and for two reasons; firstly, to indicate that in sexual and family matters the Marxist-Leninist tradition, if not the Marxist one, had a definitely conservative as well as a radical face; and secondly, because it would appear that his views were typical of the kind of thinking that was subsequently to become party orthodoxy in the High Stalinist phase of Soviet family and population policy.

Having briefly glanced at the views of the pioneers of Marxism-Leninism on women and the family in general terms, it remains to say a few words about their attitudes towards the most demographically-relevant question of all, namely fertility control and the means to its achievement.
While their attitude to Malthus and his views on overpopulation might suggest that Marx and Engels regarded birth control as unnecessary if not positively undesirable, it would seem that in actual fact they adopted a neutral position. Despite the fact that the neo-Malthusians were already very active (particularly in England) in the last decade of Marx's life (the celebrated Besant-Bradlaugh affair took place in 1876-77), neither Marx nor Engels seem to have ever explicitly commented on the movement. 100 Similarly, they appear to have maintained a discreet, Victorian silence on the technical aspects of the problem. Lenin's sparse observations accordingly represent the only scriptural authority on the subject. As was noted earlier, whatever the provenance of the anti-neo-Malthusianism 101 of the German Social-Democratic

100 W. Petersen "Notes on the Socialist Position on Birth Control" in Petersen op.cit., p. 90.

101 On first principles, of course, it seems quite inconceivable that Marx and Engels could have ever opposed the distribution of contraceptive devices (as some of their modern followers have done). Presumably Engels' reference to the "spontaneous" decline in fertility in France and Lower Austria (see note 69, above), despite the unfortunate use of the term "without planning" (by which, it is clear from the context, Engels meant "without planning by the state"), can be taken to indicate that he had no objection to any methods that might have been used to achieve such a state of affairs. As Petersen has pointed out, it is rather surprising, given Malthus's moral rejection of contraceptive practices, that the birth-control movement should ever have been identified with his name. The term neo-Malthusianism is in that sense a misnomer. But while some birth control advocates were in fact Malthusians in their social doctrines, there is no reason in logic why the use of contraceptive devices should necessarily be linked with Malthusian attitudes.
movement, it appears to have been something which Lenin accepted without question and injected into the Russian tradition. The classic text here is Lenin's article "The Working Class and Neo-Malthusianism". In it, Lenin makes a forceful assault on those who would justify legalized abortion in terms of preventing the suffering of the future offspring. The point he makes in the article is not so much the Marxian one that this kind of argument puts the blame for social evils on the wrong shoulders, but rather that this represents a miserable and petty-bourgeois pessimism which Lenin contrasts with the life-affirming vigour of the proletariat:

"...why not have children so that they may fight better ... than we against the living conditions which are deforming and destroying our generation. ... We are already laying the foundations of the new building and our children will finish its construction."

Having thus justified rapid demographic growth among the proletariat in terms of the heroic tasks awaiting them, Lenin goes on to say:

"That is why - and that is the only reason - we are unconditional enemies of neo-Malthusianism, which is a trend proper to the petty-bourgeois couple, hardened and egotistical ...

102 Published in Pravda June 16, 1913. V.I. Lenin Polnoe sobranie sochinenii vol. 23 Moscow 1961, p. 255-57. The quotations in the text follow the translation contained in Women and Communism pp. 81-2. (The semantic content of the original has been checked).
"It stands to reason that such an approach does not in any way prevent us from demanding the unconditional repeal of all laws persecuting abortion or laws against the distribution of medical works on contraceptive measures and so on. Such laws are simply the hypocrisy of the ruling classes. These laws do not cure the ills of capitalism but simply turn them into especially malignant and cruel diseases for the oppressed masses.

"The freedom of medical propaganda and the protection of the elementary democratic rights of men and women citizens is one matter. Quite another is the social doctrine of neo-Malthusianism."

While Lenin shows himself in this article to have been conscious of a distinction between the practice of advocacy of birth control and the theory that excess births are the root cause of all working-class misery; or, to paraphrase, between what he at one point calls "neo-Malthusianism (artificial measures to prevent conception)" and at another "reactionary and impoverished social neo-Malthusianism", the distinction seems to be in constant danger of disappearing. Small wonder that the literal-minded neophytes of later years failed to perceive any distinction

103. Cf. note 101 above.
104 "Most speakers ... raised the question of so-called Neo-Malthusianism (artificial measures seeking to prevent conception), and in the process touched on the social aspect of the matter as well." "It would be hard to find a more graphic illustration of the reactionariness and impoverishment of 'social Neo-Malthusianism'". Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, p. 255, 256, (author's translation).
whatever. People should be allowed the right to birth-control by various means, up to and including abortion (though Lenin made clear that he regarded a high incidence of abortion as a very bad thing); and this right should certainly be made available to the working classes, since the existing laws turn the already serious ills of capitalism into "especially malignant and cruel diseases". At the same time, Lenin enjoins the working classes not to make use of any such right, but rather to multiply and go forth to the construction of a new society, and leave birth control to the moribund classes. Given this strange and somewhat contradictory combination of attitudes, it is difficult to say what policy measures Lenin might have felt necessary were he to have survived at the helm of the Soviet state to the 1930s, when abortions in Moscow were outrunning live births by three to one. My own inclination is toward the belief that other things being equal he would have sided with the conservatives on population and related social-policy issues. And were he to have felt that the circumstances amounted to an emergency situation, it is all the more likely that he would have done so. As with divorce, there is just a hint that Lenin's approach to the problem is basically instrumentalist, that is to say that he was more concerned with what the party line should be from the point of view of his general political goals than the inherent rights and wrongs of the particular issue at hand: "It stands to reason that such an approach does not in any way prevent us from demanding ..." If Stalinism was indeed Leninism—when-the-chips-are-down writ large (and indelible), it could be argued that the subsequent development
of Soviet family and population policy represented a retreat from Engels, and presumably from Marx also; but not from Lenin.


In this section I shall present a schematic outline of the course of Soviet social policy in areas of direct demographic relevance from the time of the Revolution up to the mid-nineteen-fifties, then attempt to assess its significance from the point of view of numerical or quantitative population policy. Policies on population matters throughout the bloc were broadly uniform up to about 1956, and it is for this reason that one can regard everything done to that time in the USSR as forming in some sense part of a common tradition, of influence both in the USSR and elsewhere in the Socialist world.

Despite Lenin's relative conservatism on family policy, the period before and just after his death saw the passage of some of the most far-reaching if not the most far-reaching reform legislation that has ever been passed anywhere on these matters. This legislation seems all the more remarkable when it

105 For a recent Soviet exposition of the evolution of social policy in this general area, with citations of original legal sources, etc., see A.M. Beliakova and E.M. Vorozheikin Sovetskoe semeinoe pravo Moscow 1974 Ch. 3.
is borne in mind that Russian pre-revolutionary laws on family and related matters had been strongly conservative. Within weeks of the October Revolution, ecclesiastical control over civil status had been withdrawn, and within a year, a new codified family law was introduced providing for rigorous equality between the partners to a marriage, including the right to seek divorce.

At the same time, the status of illegitimate children was greatly improved. In 1920, abortion was legalized and the medical profession apparently enjoined to perform the operation for anyone wanting it. In 1926, a new Family Code was enacted for the RSFSR which among other things accorded de facto relationships equal rights with legally registered marriages, and made divorce dependent

106 For a description of this legislation, see Beliakova & Vorozheikin op.cit., pp. 63, & ff.
107 The law did not amount to an expression of enthusiastic support for the practice of abortion however. The preamble to the decree described abortion repeatedly as an evil. For an English text, see R. Schlesinger The Family in the USSR London 1949, p. 44. For comment on the decree and a description of its subsequent implementation, see Mark G. Field "The Re-Legalization of Abortion in Soviet Russia" New England Journal of Medicine vol. 255 No. 9, pp. 421 & ff.
simply upon one or other party registering a desire for it.\textsuperscript{108}

During this same period there were many other measures taken and statements made which clearly indicated an official determination to radically alter the institution of marriage and the family if not positively to abolish it. Thus bigamy, adultery and even incest ceased to be crimes, familial rights of inheritance were restricted, \textsuperscript{109} efforts were made to encourage women to enter into economic and political life on an equal footing with men, communal household services were established, and in the Komsomol and elsewhere, an ethos was allowed to develop, in which it became acceptable if not actually praiseworthy to do all one could to overturn the old norms of sexual and family life. Geiger has summarized the situation as follows:

"In the first decade or so after the Revolution it was rather generally though vaguely agreed that the

\textsuperscript{108} The most radical aspects of this legislation were not extended to the Central Asian republics: Schlesinger \textit{op.cit.}, p. 349. For a text of the Code, see \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 154-168.

\textsuperscript{109} See on these points V. Gsovski "Family and Inheritance in Soviet Law" \textit{The Russian Review} vol. 7 (1947) p. 71.
family was not worth much as an institution and would eventually disappear." 110

While Geiger's formulation may perhaps err slightly on the side of overstatement, broadly speaking it does capture the trend of official thinking, at least in the early years after the Revolution. Kollontai, the radical feminist associated with the so-called "glass of water" theory, has since been retrospectively identified as belonging to a left-wing deviation on this question also. Nonetheless, both she and another of Lenin's erstwhile adversaries on family policy, Inessa Armand, occupied for a time the position of secretary of the Women's Department of the Central Committee. 111 And Kollontai may well have continued in that position beyond 1920 had she not incurred the party leadership's displeasure by her left-wing activities on other and more crucial issues.

But though in terms of legislation, 1926 marks the high water-mark of radicalism, already by the mid-twenties, voices of caution and even downright dismay were beginning to

110 Geiger op.cit., p. 43.
make themselves heard. The 1926 legislation itself was passed against considerable if not very politically weighty opposition from speakers representing what might be schematically described as traditional views and rural and feminine interests. 112 But even before that, well-known party and state leaders had made attacks on certain consequences of the reforms, notably the alleged spread of abortions and sexual indulgence. 113

As the 'twenties wore on, there was a tendency for more conservative views to gain in official favour and currency. Thus in 1923, Lunarcharskii was defending the sphere of private relations not only from state interference, but also even from pressure of public opinion; and in 1927, the same Lunarcharskii was deploring sexual inconstancy and urging greater attention be paid to "that which until the present has been called private life". 114

112 See the lively discussion of the Code that took place in the RSFSR Central Executive Committee, in Schlesinger op.cit., pp. 81-153.

113 The critics included Trotsky, Bukharin and the Minister for Health, Semashko. See E.H. Carr Socialism in One Country vol. 1, London 1958, pp. 31-34.

114 See Geiger op.cit., p. 61, 62, 68.
Then, coinciding with the full blooming of Stalin's personal dictatorship in the mid-thirties (and presumably, therefore, in some measure reflecting his personal approach to these matters), there came a complete reorientation of official policy. After an extensive press campaign lasting for about two years, during which lax morals in sexual and family relations were pilloried in fairly traditional terms, legal innovations began to reflect the new approach. A 1934 law held parents responsible for their delinquent children. Then in 1935-6, legal fees were introduced for divorce to underline the official disapproval of marital instability. In 1936, abortion was made illegal, penalties for non-payment of alimony were increased, various forms of state aid to mothers were introduced or expanded, and a large program of crèche, kindergarten and maternity ward construction was foreshadowed. In 1941, a tax was introduced on the earnings

115 Significantly, no move was made contemporaneously to increase the availability of contraceptive devices, the distribution of which has never in fact received more than qualified official approval. See, for example, David and Vera Mace The Soviet Family London 1964, p. 224; W. Petersen "The Evolution of Soviet Family Policy" in Petersen op. cit., p. 106; H.P. David "Abortion and Family Planning in the Soviet Union: Public Policies and Private Behaviour" Journal of Biosocial Science vol. 6 (1974) at p. 424-5.
of single people and married couples without children. 116

And in 1944 there was further legislation substantially extending family allowances and similar benefits, introducing a string of honorific titles for fecund mothers, rendering divorce much more difficult and costly to obtain, increasing the taxes imposed on childless adults, and withdrawing the legal recognition of quasi-conjugal rights formerly accorded to de facto wives and single mothers. 117

Concurrently with these legislative developments there occurred a marked shift in the overall propaganda approach towards sex and family matters. The Bohemian experimentalism of the early post-revolutionary years was totally expunged and the Victorian decorum so attractive to many Western clergymen took its place. Sex became a taboo subject, and premarital or extramarital breaches of traditional monogamous morality were now frowned upon. 118.

117 For an English text of the 1944 Family Law, see Schlesinger op. cit., p. 367.
The simple family virtues were much extolled; children were exhorted to respect their parents, while the latter were entrusted in large measure with the ideological as well as the material welfare of their offspring. Though women were not encouraged to abandon their jobs for the home (a development which neither they themselves nor the state could afford), traditional sex roles within the family were by and large reasserted. The purpose of marriage was declared to be the creation of a "strong, many-childrened family", unmarred by the "obscenity" of bourgeois divorce; a family which was at once loyal to itself and loyal to the state. Sexual licence of any kind was a sign


120 S. Wolffson "Socialism and the Family" Pod znamenem marksizma 1936, tr. in Schlesinger op.cit., p. 302. Wolffson had once been a radical on family policy. The article cited was a desperate attempt by him to erase his own life's work. " Assertions that socialism leads to the extinction of the family," he now wrote "are profoundly mistaken and harmful...The family does not become extinct under socialism: it grows stronger." Then in a footnote, he added: "In my book, The Sociology of Marriage and the Family, published in 1929, the entirely erroneous thesis is developed that socialism entails the extinction of the family. Considering these ideas harmful I have completely disowned them". Ibid., p. 315.
of bourgeois corruption. Insofar as such phenomena continued
to exist in the Soviet Union, they were survivals of the
capitalist past. 121 In a word, the "revolutionary
sublimation" of Zalkind and the benevolent parental despotism
of Makarenko had become received - and mandatory - orthodoxy. 122

The 1944 legislation was probably the climactic
point in the Stalinist policy of restabilizing the family, at
least from the point of view of its demographic objectives.

In 1947, the generous family allowances of 1944 were halved,
and not thereafter increased. 123 In other respects however,

121 "The roots of any looseness of sex relations
must consequently be sought in the existence
of survivals of capitalism in family life, in
the tenacity of the old bourgeois attitude to
women..." V. Svetlov "Socialist Society and the
Family" Pod Znamenem Marksizma 1936, tr. in
Schlesinger op.cit., p. 343.

122 On Zalkind and Makarenko and their contribution
to the new ideological approach to the family,
see Geiger op.cit., pp. 84 & ff.

123 H.P. David estimates that for families having
a fifth child while the fourth was still eligible
for monthly payments, the total family allowance
in 1944 amounted to 51% of the average annual
wage, only 19% in 1948, and 12% in 1964. David
Abortion and Family Planning, p. 50. Leedy
has calculated that the average recipient of
family allowances (i.e. the average mother of 4
or more children) was by 1969 receiving a sum
equivalent to less than 10% of the average wage
or salary in the socialized sector of the economy.
F. Leedy "Demographic Trends in the USSR" in US
Congress Joint Economic Committee Soviet Economic
existing policies were maintained. In 1949, all remaining legal rights and duties arising from de facto marriage were annulled; and divorce was made a good deal harder to obtain by an authoritative Supreme Court interpretation of the law which directed lower courts in effect to be much less lenient than they had been prior to that date. 124.

Soon after Stalin's death, however, the authoritarian structure of his family legislation began to crumble. In early 1954, there was a public attack on the discriminatory aspects of the 1944 legislation whereby men were granted impunity from paternity and support suits. 125 Later in the same year, certain exemptions to the tax on the childless were introduced, 126 women were exonerated from criminal responsibility for abortions performed upon them, 127 and simultaneously a groundswell of more general criticism of the 1944 provisions on divorce and paternity began. 128 Then in 1955, abortion was abruptly

124 Dreijmanis op. cit., p. 21.
125 P. Juviler "Family Reforms on the Road to Communism" in Morton and Juviler op.cit., p. 33.
126 Dreijmanis loc. cit.
127 Field op. cit., p. 426.
128 Juviler op. cit., p. 36.
relegalized without prior public discussion or any accompanying official comment. 129 In 1956, the public debate on the Family Code blossomed into forthright criticism of many of its aspects by a number of well-known Soviet figures. After a number of vicissitudes, the divorce reformers were finally triumphant, partially in 1965, and more substantially, though not completely, in 1968. 130

During this post-Stalinist phase, a good deal of the earlier ideological ballast surrounding the family was jettisoned: there was less talk of the holiness and purity of Soviet marriage, rather less rigorous prudishness and repressiveness about matters relating to sex, a greater emphasis on women's rights and correspondingly lesser degree

129 Field loc. cit.
of tolerance of the old patriarchalism and double standards. Sound family life and concomitant values continued to be favoured, but without the politically-tinged fanaticism of the later Stalinist period.

At this point it will be appropriate to break off this sketch outline of the main historical trends in Soviet family and population policy, and to make some attempt at assessing the significance of those trends in terms of our central natalist point of reference.

The reforms introduced in the early years of Soviet rule represented the implementation of a platform that might have been realized by a number of other radical movements, not necessarily Communist or even Marxist, had they only succeeded in conquering state power as the Bolsheviks did. The thrust of the legislation was towards increasing the civil rights of the oppressed minorities of patriarchal class society, and in some measure, towards deliberately weakening the family as an institution. It seems clear that no populationist considerations of any kind entered into the
initial reckoning. The legalization of abortion and the tolerance extended to family planning activities (at a time when they were illegal in most of Europe) were certainly not intended to restrict population growth. Indeed in a certain sense, they appear to have been policies adopted without any very great inner conviction or commitment. Abortion was legalized in response to what was described as an epidemic emergency, and was never greatly encouraged thereafter. And observers seem to be agreed that the use of contraceptives was never actively fostered either. 131

If, however, natalist considerations were not prominent at the outset, they seem definitely to have become so subsequently, most probably in the early 1930s, as falling birth-rates and the demographic consequences of the Collectivization began to penetrate the official consciousness.

Reference was made earlier to the difficulty that is often experienced in disentangling demographic from social

131 Cf. notes 107 and 115 above.
considerations in the analysis of motives underlying particular policies. There is probably a universal tendency for governments to downplay any quantitative as opposed to qualitative demographic ambitions they may have. Be that as it may, it is certainly true that the Soviet authorities have often been less than fully explicit about their populationist motives. There is a good deal of evidence to support the view that these were a major influence, if not the major influence on several of the key policy decisions taken or not taken in the 1930s and afterwards. In relation to the 1936 and 1944 legislation, Juvaler cites several official statements in support of the view that, as he says, these edicts "marked an extension of Stalin's social engineering for a strong family, and, especially, for a higher birth rate". But much of Soviet comment on these issues has tended to be evasive, preferring to stress that the main concern of the Soviet state is to care for the interests of

132 Juvaler op. cit., p. 32.
its citizens. The family planning expert, Dr. Abraham Stone, has said that whenever he asked Soviet officials to explain the reasons for this or that shift in abortion policy, the reply was always the same irrespective of the direction of the shift: "For the benefit of our Soviet women". Wolffson, the erstwhile liberal on family matters explained in an article published in 1936 that the birth-rate was rising in the USSR, but in virtually the same breath justified the prohibition of abortion on the grounds that this practice had been "depriving the country of its posterity". Another commentator on the 1936 legislation, Svetlov, referred to an alleged rise in the Soviet birth-rate (itself a falsehood or at best, a distortion), arguing that this was a clear sign that abortion had come to be felt to be unnecessary under Soviet conditions, and accordingly could be safely abolished. Juviler also cites a number of instances of reluctance on the part of those debating family law reform in the 'fifties and

133 D. & V. Mace op. cit., p. 224. The Maces are charitable enough to be inclined to accept this versatile explanation.
134 Schlesinger op. cit., p. 310-11.
'sixties to refer to natalist considerations in public, though these were evidently very prominent in discussion behind the scenes and between the lines. 136

Both the 1936 and 1944 parcels of measures were introduced after dramatic and simultaneous declines in natality and increases in mortality. 137 It would be naive in the extreme to regard this circumstance as accidental. Given the great brutality of the measures that were being taken against the population contemporaneously, and given the relatively low priority social welfare enjoyed under Stalin's rule 138 it would again be naive in the extreme to accept the official Soviet claim that the principle purposes of that legislation were humanitarian. Western commentators have usually inferred that the population issue was paramount.

138 For an account of the evolution of family welfare legislation and activities in the Soviet Union, see Bernice Q. Madison Social Welfare in the Soviet Union Stanford 1968, Chs. 3-5. On the humanism of Stalinist family welfare policy, see also note 142 below.
Significantly, this was the view taken by the well-informed Western Communist observer, Rudolph Schlesinger, who, in introducing his collection of documents on Soviet family policy declared his overall approach to the subject in the following terms:

"We shall concentrate most of our attention upon the original issue, the emancipation of women and the overcoming of the traditional institutional framework which prevents that emancipation, and on the modifications of the attitude taken on this issue in connection with the growing preponderance of the population question."139

While the population factor does indeed appear to have been paramount, it should be emphasized that other important issues and problems were involved. The radical family legislation of the 1920s had evoked considerable discontent among wide segments of the population which had not (and indeed have not yet) accepted the new sexual morality which most of the original Bolsheviks advocated. If that

139 R. Schlesinger Introduction to op. cit., p. 7 (emphasis added).
morality were not "bourgeois" in the doctrinaire sense apparently intended by Lenin, it was certainly urban and non-proletarian, inasmuch that workers and peasants usually either rejected it (especially if they were female) or naively abused it. And among those that abused it, there was wide-spread recourse to rationalization in terms of traditional male double standards. Their perception of the new freedoms was that these were the old illicit freedoms now sanctioned by official approval. Their misinterpretation was naturally widely resented by victims and deplored by moralists; and not only by those still under the influence of the church. Nor was abuse of the new laws confined to men, and resentment confined to women. Many women took advantage of the new and generous provisions for alimony to father their children on the nearest and best-off males with whom they could claim to have been in some fleeting union. Moreover, there had been in the early years, a marked

140 See, for example, the Central Executive Committee discussion of 1926 referred to earlier, in Schlesinger op. cit., pp. 81-153; and Geiger op. cit., Chaps. 3 & 4.
tendency for the authorities to distrust the family as an
institution and to seek to set children against their parents.
This "Morozovism" was no doubt universally resented by the
adult population, irrespective of sex. Thus as Stalin's
plans for gigantic destruction and reconstruction developed
in the 1930s, together with the massive resentments they
must have unleashed, he may well have deemed it discreet to
adopt a policy which would tend to diminish discontent in
areas of life less relevant to his main economic and political
purposes.

But more important than that was the need to
bring stability to the basic social unit of society. If it
were not to be or could not be reconstructed along with
everything else, it was better to strengthen it and make
of it a prop for the regime, the moreso as it was now unlikely
that the family would nurture opposition to the new order in
quite the same degree as it was believed to have done just
after the Revolution. As things stood, the loosened family
ties were bringing the authorities nothing but trouble. Already
in the twenties, there were numerous social problems that
were the direct result of, or had been severely aggravated
by the new legislation. An article published in 1926
referred to the courts as being "buried under alimony cases".\textsuperscript{141}

War, the abolition of the institution of adoption and the
spread of evanescent liaisons were producing armies of
\textit{besprizorniki}, or vagrant children.\textsuperscript{142} The public facilities
like canteens, laundries, orphanages and daily child-care

\textsuperscript{141} Quoted in Geiger \textit{op. cit.}, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{142} Krupskaiia reported in 1923 that there were
seven million children on the official register
of the homeless. The institutions entrusted
with caring for these children had, at their
peak in 1922, an accommodation capacity of
600,000. (Madison \textit{op. cit.}, p. 39, 41).

Improvements were claimed in the late 1920s
and early 1930s, but given the public and
private chaos of the period, this seems scarcely
credible. In any case, qualitatively, if not
quantitatively, the problem evidently became a
critical one again by the early 1930s, leading
to the decree of 1935 rendering children of 12
years of age and older criminally responsible
in full degree and subject to all measures of
punishment. (For the text of the decree,
see James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera \textit{Materials
for the Study of the Soviet System} Ann Arbor 1953,
pp. 219-20) Rauch comments on the results of this
decree in the following way: "Some landed up in
prisons and camps, and the rest were accommodated
in reformatory colonies. From the age of twelve
on children could also be condemned to capital
punishment. Die 'Besprizornye' verschwanden damit
aus der Öffentlichkeit." G. von Rauch \textit{Geschichte
institutions that were supposed to be making the old-style family economy obsolete were in fact hopelessly inadequate in numbers and quality; and their oft-projected massive expansion was for the foreseeable future economically unfeasible, particularly given the magnitude of the tasks accorded priority by the leadership. Easy divorce encouraged irresponsibility not only towards one's family but also towards one's work: the husband skipping about the country to avoid his obligations towards his family or families was obviously a less reliable and conscientious worker than one tied to one spot, and with mouths other than his own to feed from the proceeds of his struggle with the norms. The best guarantee of a disciplined and reasonably healthy labour force was to have a sound family structure in which both parents and children would find social security and strong motivation to endeavour.

Thus the restabilization of the family served

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143 Geiger op. cit., pp. 57-60 contains an account of some of the shortcomings of the domestic services sector of that period.
important objectives of social and economic policy as well
as purely demographic policy in the narrower, numerical
sense. But the protestations of some Soviet sources
notwithstanding, it was probably the latter element that
was decisive.

It may be helpful now to make some brief
assessment of the overall significance of the Soviet
population policy tradition. It might appear at first
sight that it has now described a more or less complete
circle from radically liberal beginnings through a phase of
Victorian conservatism back to something more akin to the
starting point, where society is left to order its sexual
and family life with only a modest degree of state regulation.
This appearance may yet prove to have been illusory. The
official mood of the 'fifties and 'sixties on these matters
has nothing of the ideological strain of social laissez-
faire-ism of the early years of the revolution. At a time
when official and unofficial attitudes on sex and the family
are undergoing extensive liberalization throughout the world,
the trends in Soviet official opinion represent something less than an avalanche. The most recent reforms to family law were introduced after a long hard struggle against tough opposition. The attitude towards contraception remains cautious and unenthusiastic. Abortion has been relegalized, but the official view of it has always tended to be that it is basically a regrettable and temporary necessity. For the rest, official policy on sexual matters remains conservative. The chances of a reversion to the Stalinist approach seem to be diminishing, but slowly and not very surely. One wonders whether the slender element of principled liberalism within it might not again be eclipsed some day by raison d'État. This having been said, it remains true that since the demise of Morozovism, sexual and family relations have always represented an important pocket of autonomy within the Soviet system. And after Stalin's death, the reintroduction of "Leninist norms" into the relevant area of social legislation has resulted in the significant further expansion of that area of autonomy. Rigby speaks of "an
acknowledged personal-family-domestic sphere, to which the system concedes a major influence over such societally important matters as quantitative and qualitative changes in the population, child-rearing, personal consumption and leisure activities." In the light of the far-reaching claims made on the individual at the height of the Stalinist period, the truly noteworthy thing is perhaps that these claims were not extended to complete control of human reproduction (as they were, for instance in the otherwise less totalitarian or mono-organizational - to use Rigby's term - Nazi Germany); that the claims that actually were

144 Though the problems of eugenic controls and genetic engineering will not be systematically discussed in this thesis, their inherent importance and their relevance to any consideration of what Driver calls the "philosophy" of population policy are obviously great. See the Note on Eugenics below, p. 101.


146 On the population policy of the Third Reich, see for example, H.P. Bleuel: Sex and Society in Nazi Germany Philadelphia 1973, Ch. 5, and passim; Richard Grunberger A Social History of the Third Reich Penguin 1974, Chaps. 15-17 and passim; David V. Glass Population Policies and Movements in Europe London 1967 Chap. 6, (for domestic policy in the period before 1939); and Robert L. Koehl RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy 1939-1945 Cambridge Mass. 1957 (for the colonial and genocidal aspects of the later phase).
made at the height of the Stalinist phase have since been withdrawn, or at least have become markedly less obtrusive; and that both in the tradition of Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of the Soviet state, there is strong authority with which this sphere of personal autonomy can be defended.
A Note on Eugenics in the USSR

Contrary to the beliefs of many who tend to identify totalitarianism automatically with bold biological experimentation and regimentation in the manner of *Brave New World* and *1984*, the successive Soviet leaderships have never shown any inclination to accept any form of eugenic doctrine or practice. As in the case of numerical population controls, Kautsky, the one-time Social Darwinist, seems to have been the only prominent Marxist theorist to have devoted much thought to the subject. In the early years of the Soviet regime (about the first decade or so), a qualified tolerance was granted to various schools of eugenic theorizing, and both a Russian Eugenics Society and a Russian Eugenics Journal existed, as well as a bureau within the USSR Academy of Sciences\(^1\). However the movement was burdened with tactlessly and naively elitist advocates who made its inherent drawbacks (in the context of the anti-elitist and anti-biologizing traditions of Bolshevism) even more crippling\(^2\). For a time the eugenists seemed to enjoy the qualified support of the first Soviet Commissar for Health,

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1 For an excellent short account of the rise and fall of Soviet eugenics in the 1920s and 1930s, see David Joravsky *The Lysenko Affair* Cambridge Mass. 1970, pp. 253-270.

2 Russian eugenists were particularly prone to the Eastern European assumption that the worth of any nation is concentrated in its intelligentsia. One prominent eugenist even attributed the presence of positive genetic endowment among the lower orders to the fact that men like Pushkin and Tolstoy were known to have fathered illegitimate children on peasant girls. Joravsky *op. cit.*, pp. 259-60.
Semashko, but by the end of the 1920s it was evident that the movement had little future in the Soviet Union. Then in the 1930s, the spread of Lysenkoism and the negative example of Nazi experiments with sterilization, euthanasia and so on completed the work of discrediting all eugenic thinking in the eyes of official Soviet ideologists. Thus in a Societ encyclopaedia published in 1943, we find eugenics defined as a "pseudo-scientific direction in biology" of which "the most repulsive form" is racist theory. Eugenists are accused of trying to prove the lesser worth of the proletariat with a view to justifying their exploitation. Soviet scholars, we are told, conduct a determined struggle with such ideas. In the Cold War phase, there was a marked tendency for eugenics and Malthusianism to be tossed together into the same polemical bag (though in reality, however surprisingly, there had never been much more than tangential contact between the two movements). One of the advantages of this approach was that it became possible to establish a direct link between the crimes of Nazism generally and the legislation on eugenic sterilization and marriage restriction passed in many states of the U.S.A. In fact, whatever the evils of that legislation, it had never embraced euthanasia, nor

3 Kratkaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia Moscow 1943 "Evgenika"

4 See, for example V.M. Romanenko "Bor'ba L.I. Mechnikova protiv mal'tuzianstva, sotsial-darvinizma i rasizma" (The Struggle of L.I. Mechnikov against Malthusianism, Social-Darwinism and Racism) Voprosy Filosofii 1956 No. 5, p. 100.
explicitly sanctioned racism. From the date of passage of the first state legislation on sterilization in 1907 up to the year 1958, fewer sterilizations had been performed in the United States than in Germany in the one year of 1935. Apart from the factor of polemical convenience, it seems likely that the post-war Soviet attacks on Malthusian and other sterilizers were a quite genuine response not only to Nazi atrocities in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but also to an apprehension as to what might be the results were the confident reforming ardour of left-wing Western biologists like H.J. Müller coupled with the arbitrary might of the Stalinist state. It is indeed a daunting


6 Müller's ardour seems to have only been slightly dampened by his stay in the Soviet Union in the 1930s (where one might have expected proximity to the awesome power of the Soviet police machine to finally turn him against genetic engineering, even if the arguments of Lysenkoism ascendant could not). See his "Genetic Progress by Voluntarily Conducted Germinal Choice" in Gordon Wolstenholme (ed.) Man and his Future London 1963 pp. 247-262. Despite the commitment to free choice enshrined in the title of the paper, there are several signs in it of the old root-and-branch utopian. "Man as a whole must rise to become worthy of his own best achievements." (p. 255) "Most eugenists of the old school believed they could educate the population so as to lead the better endowed to have larger than average families and the poorly endowed to have smaller ones. However, people are notoriously unrealistic in assessing themselves and their spouses." (256) Müller concludes by looking forward to bold new experiments by artificial insemination, semen banks, storage of eggs and clonal reproduction. Müller's contribution was viewed with scepticism by some other participants in this particular conference. P.B. Medawar and M. Klein drew attention to the fact that he was now proposing rather different donors than he had once done. Klein recalled that he had in an earlier work asked rhetorically what woman would not be eager and proud to have in her womb a product of Lenin or Darwin (p. 280) On the subject of Soviet apprehensions about state interference in the private sex lives of citizens, compare footnote 145, above, and footnote 159 to Chapter 3.
thought. The defective ideological heredity of eugenics (so to speak) might not have been sufficient in itself to permanently preclude adoption of strong eugenic measures by the Soviet government. And had the Nazis restricted their eugenic fantasies to domestic policy and not extended them to justify their behaviour in occupied territories, Soviet abhorrence might never have become so great for imitation to be forestalled. Other aspects of Stalin's population policy, notably the glorification of prolific mothers and the wholesale award of state decorations for their exploits, seem to reflect a German influence. In general, Stalin seems to have felt at times a good deal of disinterested admiration for the Hitler régime.

This being so, it is perhaps the more significant and a cause for considerable relief that no version of eugenics ever gained any official support or even toleration in the Stalinist period. Also, perhaps, that the rehabilitation accorded to various fields of social and biological science in the post-Stalinist period has been extended to eugenics only partially and with the greatest reserve. An attempt by a Soviet developmental biologist to present genetic engineering as something which capitalism would inevitably give rise

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7 The article "evgenika" in Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar' (B.A. Vvedenskii editor-in-chief) published in the last year of Stalin's reign (1953) contains denunciations which are only marginally less emphatic than those in the wartime source cited above in note 3.
to and which by implication should therefore be given prior attention in the Soviet Union was condemned by a commentator as "elitist". The present official view of these things seems to be the very understandable one that they are best shelved. As a word and concept, however, eugenics has been accorded a partial rehabilitation, particularly since the fall of Lysenko in 1964 and the revival in the study of genetics that ensued. A 1967 textbook on genetics contains a small section entitled "The Significance of Eugenics", in which an attempt is made to clear eugenics of its earlier racist associations:

"Certain cardinal errors were committed in the study of eugenics and the very term itself became discredited. We, however, regard it as essential that this branch of science should have its rights restored to it, its pseudo-scientific trappings having been stripped from it."  

Having said that the task of eugenics is to study ways of relieving mankind of unfavourable hereditary characteristics, Lobashev continues:

"Since experiments to multiply man are impossible, it becomes necessary to seek other ways of controlling human evolution."  

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9 M.E. Lobashev Genetika Leningrad 1967, p. 716. This work is described on the fly-leaf as an approved text-book.

10 Ibid., p. 717.
The possible measures which he then enumerates are mild enough and not elaborated in very great detail. Emphasis is placed on the importance of social control and forced selection (nasilstvennyi podbor) is again rejected.

The E volume of the third edition of the Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia which appeared in 1972 contains an entry on eugenics quite unlike similar lexical entries for decades past. It adopts basically the same approach as the genetics textbook quoted above; and indeed the author of that textbook is one of the article's signatories. Eugenics is again distinguished from the reactionary theories with which it had been identified in the past, though it is conceded that even the term itself remains controversial. The question of possible ways of improving the human race by deliberate intervention is also said to be one on which there exist various points of view (and here, as before, there is an apparent implication that these differences also exist within the Soviet Union itself). The distinction is drawn between preventative measures (the only instances of which that are mentioned being consanguinity limitations on marriage and pre-marital medical consultations) and positive measures which seek to increase the numbers of people with superior attributes by various forms of selective breeding like artificial insemination, semen banks, etc. These, says the article, are "as a rule regarded as a matter for the future" (obrashcheny v budushchee), and comments:

"These kinds of methods of improving the human race have often been criticized and have not been recognized
or disseminated."\(^{11}\)

Again the implication is that resistance to them is continuing in the Soviet Union and that their possible application is not imminent. Thus in summary, what appears to have happened is that with the revival of genetics in the Soviet Union, some limited degree of rehabilitation has been accorded to eugenics as well, which for the present, however, falls short of conceding to it any important influence on the making of social policies.

In the last two or three years, there have been quite a number of articles in the Soviet periodical press dealing with ethico-biological problems. Most of them have appeared in *Voprosy Filosofii*, whose editor-in-chief, I.T. Frolov, a "resolute opponent of Lysenko",\(^{12}\) has a particular interest in the philosophy of science, and has done a good deal to popularize various contemporary issues like world trends in population, resources, pollution, etc., most of which had been greatly neglected in the USSR.\(^{13}\)

\(^{11}\) Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia Moscow 1972 "Evgenika" p. 1739-40.


\(^{13}\) See the round table discussions: "Chelovek i sreda evo obitaniia" Voprosy Filosofii 1972, no. 11 and 1973, no. 1; "Sotsialno-filosofskie problemy demografii" Voprosy Filosofii 1974, nos. 9 & 11, and 1975, no. 1; and also Frolov's own two-part article on the social implications of genetic advances "Perspektivy cheloveka" Voprosy Filosofii 1975, nos. 7 & 8, where other works on the same theme published by Frolov's journal are cited. Of these, see in particular the articles by Turbin 1974, no. 2 and 1975, no. 1; Timakov and Bochkov 1973, no. 6; and Dubinin 1973, no. 4.
Basically, this discussion has reaffirmed the traditional Soviet view that eugenics is a harmful and reactionary doctrine. As Frolov wrote:

"It is clear, however, that Marxists cannot accept the notion of neo-eugenics even in its "ennobled" form. And not only because it has compromised itself in the past. The Marxist-Leninist doctrines on man and the paths of his development have no need of any such 'supplement'.

Frolov indicates that among other reasons for the rejection of eugenics, the fact that it endangers such human values as "love, parental feelings, etc." occupies a prominent position. While he does conceive that medical genetics opens up the possibility, that in the "distant future", some real opportunity may emerge for man to improve his biological nature, he seems glad that this is not a practical proposition for the time being.

The discussion in Soviet journals was to some extent evoked by the events surrounding the XIII International Genetics Congress held at Berkeley in 1973, before and during which some of the participants sought to draw public attention to the dangers which current biological research raises and the problems of achieving international control over such

14 Frolov "Perspektivy cheloveka" Voprosy Filosofii 1975, no. 7, p. 94.
15 Ibid., p. 95.
research to reduce the risks of its misuse for aggressive political or criminal purposes. The attitude of the Soviet scholars seems to betray some concern about this prospect, and it is, of course, highly probable that intimately many of them wonder whether their own government can be trusted with the full potential of the new knowledge. While there are traces in what they say of a desire to form some kind of solidary links with their overseas colleagues to further the cause of international controls, the effects of their ideological knee-jerks on a Western reader are rather disconcerting. Thus Turbin, the leader of the Soviet delegation to the Berkeley Congress writes that the achievements of molecular science, while opening up possibilities for great positive advances, also contain the danger that they might be used

"only for increasing the wealth and power of a few representatives of the exploitative ruling class, and that simply for malevolent, criminal purposes. Everything depends on in whose hands the power and

16 For a recent review of the problems of political misuse of genetic research, see F. Ausubel, J. Beckwith and K. Janssen "The Politics of Genetic Engineering: Who decides who's defective" Psychology Today June 1974, pp. 30-42. The authors draw attention to the fact that there has been something of a resurgence of radical eugenic thinking in the last 10 or 15 years after its temporary eclipse following on public exposure of Nazi crimes. The article concentrates on developments in America, which is perhaps not unnatural given that the authors and the journal are all American, and given the vigorous and somewhat dubious traditions of American eugenics. However, it is perhaps characteristic of contemporary American social dissent that the problems of controlling abuse in authoritarian states are not discussed, but merely mentioned in passing as though no such states yet existed. (p. 30).
material resources are to be found."\(^{17}\)

Frolov declares, even more explicitly, that:

"... these abuses may continue for as long as we live in a politico-economic system which depends on a small number of people, who exploit the rest of the population and surrounding environment in the interests of their own maximum comfort. Only with the destruction of capitalist ideology can we hope for the creation of a society in which every human being will be equally valued and receive his fair share of all benefits."\(^{18}\)

And:

"In socialism, where social (obshchestvennyi) control over scientific experiments, including genetic experiments, is genuinely ensured in various forms - both by the state and by society (obshchestvennost'), the study of human genetic problems is advancing on a broad front, [i.e.] the study of medical genetics, with as its objective the curing and preventing of hereditary diseases. The network of genetic consultation clinics is being expanded, and experiments in genetic engineering are being conducted, with a view naturally to their possible application to man. Here, however, the aims of the research and means of its realization are pro-
foundly humanist in their nature, and subordinated to the higher purpose of socialism, to its main social objective, the well-being of mankind and his free and multi-faceted development.\textsuperscript{19}

Even making allowance for the exigencies of public discussion in the Soviet Union,\textsuperscript{20} remarks like these scarcely augur well for international controls in this new potential Armageddon battle-field.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 137.

\textsuperscript{20} There are frequent moments of ambiguity in Soviet writings on these matters. Thus Frolov, for example, writes that "Many scholars believe that on the basis of published work one can already conclude that there have been an enormous number of violations of socio-ethical norms in experimentation on human beings. How many such instances remain unknown, since many such experiments are not reported in the press?" (Voprosy Filosofii 1975 no. 7, p. 87). Turbin comments on an article by the Soviet scholars Baev and Engelhardt that the information they present about proposals for a moratorium on certain types of genetic experiments "evoked significant interest in the problem among broad circles of Soviet society (obshchestvennost')." These proposals, it should be said, emanated from the West, in particular the United States, and were not directed specifically towards the USSR. Turbin then goes on to say that the purpose of his article is to "attract the attention of Soviet philosophers, particularly specialists in the field of ethics, towards the discussion of the very pressing and by no means easy socio-ethical problems associated with genetic engineering". (Voprosy Filosofii 1975 no. 1, p. 47-8) Timakov and Bochkov, while also making the assertion that the problems involved can only be solved in the most advanced social systems (peredovoi obshchestvennyi stroi), conclude their article with the following grim caveat: "It is well-known that catastrophes can be brought about by primitive interference with the environment; but an even greater catastrophe could be unleashed if unjustified activities are carried out on human heredity". "Social responsibility", they say "requires of every scientist that he should constantly strive to preserve man's heredity and struggle decisively against any ignorant attempts at interference with it." And in this context, the recurring phrases about socialism's innate superiority are missing. (Voprosy Filosofii 1973 no. 6, p. 64, 69).
CHAPTER 2

POPULATION TRENDS IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

2.a The Soviet Union before 1945

The Soviet Union is a vast country of great ethno-cultural, and hence, demographic diversity, which its

Political uniformism has not eliminated, but rather, if anything, enhanced. It is also a country which has seen more demographic disturbances and disasters in this century than almost any other in the world. These two circumstances make generalization difficult. But the overall figures for the USSR, though they are misleading as regards the non-European peoples, do nonetheless give some picture of the developments that have taken place in the numerically dominant European populations.

Just before World War I, both birth and death rates in Russia were very high, oscillating around 46 and 28 per thousand respectively, and having been at even higher levels only a decade or so earlier. In recent years, these same two measures for the USSR as a whole have been hovering around 17 and 8 per thousand. Imperfect as they are statistically, these figures speak for themselves. East Slav fertility was undoubtedly higher than was known anywhere in Western Europe. Now, it ranks among the lowest in West or East Europe. A good deal of this decline had already occurred by the outbreak of World War II, though

1 (cont.) Rozmieszczenie ludności Polski w XX wieku, vol. I (Warsaw, 1967); E. Rosset, Demografia Polski, 2 vols, (Warsaw, 1975); J. Svetoň and Z. Vávra, Reprodukcja obyvatel'stva Československa po druhej svetovej vojne (Bratislava, 1965); A. Maryański, Problemy ludnościowe krajów socjalistycznych (Warsaw, 1974). See also the respective demographic journals of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia: Studia Demograficzne (Warsaw), Demografie (Prague), Demográfia (Budapest) and Stanovništva (Belgrade).

2 The gap between the vital rates prevailing in different parts of the Soviet Union has increased in recent decades. Rapid centrally-directed modernization has had the effect, broadly speaking, of greatly lowering birth rates in the European areas and greatly lowering the death rates in the Asian areas. The centralization of social policy-making, in turn, has been an obstacle to the adoption of differentiated population policies which might have counteracted these trends.
this was to some extent masked by the temporary fertility revival achieved by the restoration of restrictive abortion legislation in 1936. The birth and death rates per thousand for 1935, the only ones available for the years just preceding the policy change, were 28.6 and 16.3. Fertility appears to have been declining in this period faster than mortality, so that before the pro-natalist measures of 1936, natural increase must have been diminishing. Far more important than fertility trends, however, were the effects of the World Wars, the Civil War, the Collectivization campaign and famine and the Great Purge. No even approximate figures are of course, available, but statistical inferences suggest staggering total losses, particularly if allowance is made for temporary declines in birth rates. Petersen has estimated the total population deficit 'correct to the nearest 10 million' at 80 million. Even if we assume that half of the 'non-births' and extraordinary infant mortality he includes in his total were later effectively 'replaced' (which is very unlikely), and that his lower margin of error is the correct one, we are left with losses amounting to substantially more than the present population of Great Britain, and equivalent to about one-half the number of Russians at present living in the USSR. Though certain of the nationalities suffered particularly heavily from aberrant Stalinist policies, it would probably be safe to assume that a disproportionately high percentage

3 See Petersen, op.cit., pp.660-64.

4 The estimate of Michael Roof, another leading expert on Soviet demography (for the period 1913-59 and including net emigration) is '70 to 80 million'. See Robert C. Cook, 'Soviet Population Theory from Marx to Kosygin' in Population Bulletin XXIII, no.4 (October 1967), p.93.
of the total came if not from the Russian, then at least from the European population.

2.b Eastern Europe before 1945

It is customary to emphasize the social, cultural and economic diversity of the East European countries when lumping them together for political analysis. The usual warning is no less apposite in the demographic context. Before World War II, the Czech lands and the region now known as East Germany were, demographically as in many other respects, similar to the countries of Northern and North-Western Europe, with low birth and death rates, and relatively small natural increase. Hungary occupied intermediate positions while Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, at least at the outset of the inter-war period, had only just embarked on the process of demographic transition from high to low birth and death rates. By the end of the inter-war period, however, they too had changed considerably, with crude birth rates below 30 per thousand, and in the case of Bulgaria, nearer 20 per thousand. Yugoslavia then, as now, encompassed virtually the entire range of demographic phenomena observed throughout the area, whilst Albania appears to have been following a pattern of high fertility and relatively high mortality, with natural increase substantially less than it has since become.

The economic effects of the Great Depression (which were felt longer and more sharply in the area than in Western Europe) accelerated the secular trend towards fertility decline, and by 1938, natural increase rates were everywhere (Albania excepted) of the order of 1% per annum or less, a modest enough rate, though roughly twice the average for the countries of Northern and Western Europe at that same time.
The War produced enormous loss of life and touched off major migratory movements in Eastern Europe. Civilian losses amounted to four times the European average (even excluding the murder of the Jews). With some notable exceptions (Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary), birth rates also declined during the war years. The immediate post-war migrations also tended, in general, to involve net population losses. The peace negotiations resulted in considerable territorial revisions. It is impossible to recapitulate even the broad outlines of these developments here. Perhaps their most important feature was to greatly increase the national homogeneity of the countries of the region, which before the war had with few exceptions been plagued by apparently insoluble ethno-political problems. Until recently, observers of the area were sometimes apt to think that the combination of mass migration and centralist policies and controls had gone a long way towards solving these problems. More recently it has been forced on our attention that this may not be the case. And as shall be indicated elsewhere, current demographic trends are not, in general, conducive to their solution.

2.c Population trends in the USSR and East Europe since the War

I Fertility and natural increase

As elsewhere in Europe, the post-war years saw birth rates in general higher than those prevailing in the 1930s. In Poland, which had suffered the greatest losses

5 See Paul F. Myers, op.cit., p.71.

6 For a discussion, see Kosiński, op.cit.
in total population of any country in the region, there was a spectacular baby-boom which persisted for a full decade before subsiding. In the Soviet Union too, the drastic post-war shortage of young males was more than compensated for by extremely high male fertility. 7

By the mid-fifties, however, this wave had all but exhausted itself, and the secular trend towards fertility decline apparent throughout the area before the war had set in again. This trend seemed to be sharply accelerated by the liberalized abortion legislation introduced first in the Soviet Union, in 1955, and adopted by almost all the other Warsaw Pact countries - Bulgaria characteristically leading the way - before the end of 1957. East Germany, in catastrophic demographic plight owing to the heavy outmigration of young men via West Berlin, did not liberalize its abortion arrangements till 1972 (by which time many of its neighbours were reverting to restrictive regulations). Presumably thanks in some measure to this, its age-specific fertility rates remained steady and for a time even improved slightly. Yugoslavia liberalized its abortion laws decisively in 1960. 8 Albania, stubbornly independent in all things, did not alter its legislation; and it too - though probably not mainly for this reason - has maintained very high and stable fertility levels almost to the present.


8 David, op.cit., p.232.
The areas occupied by Moslem peoples in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia apart, a spectacular slump in birth rates now ensued, matched in the opposite direction by burgeoning abortion rates. The prevalence of abortion differed substantially from country to country, but the upward trend till well into the sixties at least was everywhere the same.\(^9\) Hungary had and has the highest recorded abortion rate, which for some years was running well in excess of its birth rate. In Rumania and the Soviet Union, though no adequate statistics have been published, the rates must be (in the case of Rumania must have been)\(^10\) very much higher. Elsewhere abortion rates were more moderate, but the same tendency towards increase in its incidence and the same decline in fertility were apparent.

By the mid-sixties, the Socialist countries were starting to break world records for low birth and natural increase rates. Hungary recorded an average of 13 births per thousand population over the years 1962-65, and in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Rumania, crude rates also fell below 15 per thousand in at least one year. More recently, the Soviet Union has been saved from indignities of the kind only by the fecundity of its ethnic minorities. Similarly low natality has been confidently predicted for Poland by many of its demographic experts for the not too distant future. And comparable rates have for some time now been a common-place in the relatively more developed republics of Yugoslavia.

\(^9\) Ibid., p.20.

\(^10\) The Rumanian government greatly restricted their abortion legislation in 1966. Since the introduction of more restricted indications for legal abortion in 1974, Hungary's abortion rate appears to have fallen below its birth rate.
To some extent the declining crude birth rates reflected reductions in the proportion of women in the main fertile age-groups (as the relatively depleted cohorts of the depression period of the thirties and in some countries of the war years entered the child bearing age-groups. And as age-structures began to improve in the late 1960s, a certain steadying of the crude rates became perceptible. Alarmed by the drastic deterioration of the situation, some states initiated pro-natalist measures, which have contributed to checking fertility declines and in some cases may even be bringing about substantial recoveries, at least in the short term.\footnote{11} But in large areas of the bloc, net reproduction rates remain around or below unity; and in several cases (Hungary, Bulgaria and parts of Yugoslavia and the USSR) have probably been hovering in that area for a number of years.\footnote{12}

The fertility decline, dramatic in the more developed areas, has not affected all regions of the bloc. In many of the traditionally Moslem areas of settlement, fertility has actually increased since the post-war years, and is only now beginning to show signs of falling from its very high levels. This is most notably true of Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus region, parts of Yugoslavia and Albania. In these same areas, the application of public health measures and improved medical and hospital facilities

\footnote{11} Substantial increases in the birth rate have been achieved in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in particular.

have brought a simultaneous reduction of mortality levels down to those prevailing in the more advanced regions. Thus in the bloc as a whole and in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union individually, one is confronted in effect with something approaching the full gamut of vital rates existing in the Eurasian land mass today.

From what has already been said, it will be clear that there must be large discrepancies in natural increase rates between the different countries, regions and peoples of the bloc. Thus in 1972, the range within the Warsaw Pact countries was from -2 per 1,000 in East Germany through 9.6 per 1,000 in Rumania to 27.8 per 1,000 in Albania. The range within the Soviet Union in 1972 by individual republics (and be it remembered that virtually all of them have a substantial Russian minority which will serve to damp down extremes) was 3.2 per 1,000 in Latvia through 6.3 per 1,000 in the RSFSR (which comprises over half the total population and contains four-fifths of all ethnic Russians) to 29.0 per 1,000 in Tadzhikistan; all this within a deceptive national figure of 9.3 per 1,000. In Yugoslavia, the spread is no less extreme, from 2.1 in the Autonomous Province of the Vojvodina, through 4.6 and 5.5 in the Republic of Croatia and inner Serbia respectively.

13 The Rumanian figure is from Anuarul demografic al Republicii Socialiste România 1974, p.133, and the East German and Albanian ones from Rocznik demograficzny 1973 (Warsaw, 1973), p.421. The Albanian statistic refers to 1969 actually, but more recent evidence from Kosovo (see footnote 15 below) would suggest little has changed in the intervening period.

to 27.4 per 1,000 in the heavily Albanian Kosovo Autonomous Province. It should be noted that both the Vojvodina and Kosovo provinces are a good deal more populous than one of the six constituent Yugoslav republics and comparable with two others, so that no locally-concentrated freak effect is involved. Moreover, Kosovo has a large (c.18%) and much less fertile Serbian minority, which again tends to derogate from the contrast that is really involved.

It may bring out the magnitude of the differentials better to consider changes in the population of the principal national groups within individual republics/provinces of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as between the last two censuses of 1961 and 1971 and 1959 and 1970 respectively. Thus whereas the Russians increased by 13% in the USSR as a whole (the Russians being especially prone to outmigration from the RSFSR, to take the figure for their 'own' republic would be slightly misleading), the numbers of each of the five major Central Asian republican nations increased within their respective republics by almost 50% or more. The Serbs increased by 4.3% and the Croats by 5.4%, whereas the Albanians increased by 43.1%.

15 Statistical Pocket-Book of Yugoslavia 1974, p.34.
18 'National Structure of the Yugoslav Population', Yugoslav Survey, XIV, no.1, p.13. The percentage increase of the Serbs is somewhat deflated by changed self-identification of Bosnian Moslems (who at the 1961 census had declared themselves as Serbs).
A word or two should perhaps be added to the above remarks on the fertility decline in the socialist countries to put them in some kind of overall European perspective. In the early and mid-sixties, as mentioned earlier, all the low birth rate records were going to the socialist countries, and the overall post-war fertility recovery in the Western world seemed only just beginning to falter slightly. Since then, while crude rates, and in some measure, actual fertility has steadied or shown tentative signs of recovery in many of the low-fertility Socialist countries, there have been spectacular fertility plunges in many Western countries, with crude birth rates frequently slumping despite age-structure changes that would lead one to expect a demographic echo of the post-war baby boom. Two of the most spectacular drops have been recorded in Finland (where crude rates have gone from 28 to 12.2 per thousand between 1947 and 1973) and West Germany, which has recently wrested the world record from Hungary's grasp and seems bent on disappearing off the graph paper. Things have come to such


a pass in fact that France oh paradox! has reaped the rewards of pro-natalist virtue to an extent it could never have dreamed possible. As M. Jean Bourgeois-Pichat exclaimed exultantly in a recent issue of *Population*, 'Mis à part l'Espagne et le Portugal, pays nettement moins industrialisés que les autres, la France arrive en tête...' - adding, a little ominously, 'Entre la France et la République fédérale d'Allemagne, l'écart est considérable'.22

France in fact is one of the few countries in which there has not been a considerable decline in fertility in the last six or seven years. The steep and general downturn in Western birth rates ought to be of some consolation to the Socialist countries. After their giddy burst of overtaking the West in the early and mid-sixties they must be cheered to find so many capitalist nations rejoining them on the slippery slope down to demographic perdition.

II Other population trends

For present purposes, less needs to be said about trends in other demographic indicators. Mortality rates are low throughout the area, and given normal circumstances, are unlikely to vary much in the future. Infant mortality rates remain high enough in Albania and Kosovo Province in Yugoslavia, for further major improvement to be possible. This would temporarily dilute the effect of inherent fertility declines (assuming that they come) on natural increase rates. In the more developed countries, particularly East Germany with its aged population and its middle generations depleted during the pre-Wall era, mortality is

relatively high in absolute terms, though not according to age-specific rates. The general tendency in the area as a whole is towards moderate increase in crude mortality rates. In recent years this same tendency has extended to age-specific rates for males in the older age-groups, suggesting that the socialist countries are entering the phase of affluent mortality patterns. Up till the early sixties much was made for propaganda purposes of the Soviet Union's (then) unusually low death-rate, which was felt to indicate, like vigorous natural growth, the beneficent operation of the 'socialist law of population'. Since then, with a general ageing of the society and (perhaps) improved death registration in some republics - so that more dead souls actually enter and bulk out the statistics - Soviet death rates have ceased to be in any way remarkable. Echoes of the old pride in longevity are still sometimes to be heard in population pronouncements, but less frequently than at one time; and the ring of assertive confidence now seems to lack real conviction.

The ageing process has been proceeding everywhere except in the countries and regions of continuing high fertility. So far, the growing numbers of pensioners have been compensated as it were by declining cohorts in the younger age groups, so that dependency ratios have on the whole deteriorated little. There is a general tendency to ageing within the labour force, though not in every case.

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23 See Leedy, op.cit., p.444, and Myers, op.cit., p.82.

In East Germany there has even been a marked improvement in the age-structure of the able-bodied section of the population latterly, as the pre-Wall migrating generation approaches middle age.\textsuperscript{25}

The abnormalities produced in the sex-structure of certain of the populations (notably the USSR, East Germany and Poland) are also of course working themselves out. The massive post-war Soviet deficit of twenty million or so males is gradually diminishing, and passing up the pyramid to age-groups where it is economically, militarily, reproductively and perhaps generally less keenly relevant. Thus while the Soviet Union's able-bodied age structure, for example, has been in continuous and major decline in recent years, this has been counteracted to some extent by improvements in the sex ratio of the work-force.

With forced-draft industrialization programs being implemented throughout the area, and collectivization introduced everywhere (though discontinued and largely disbanded in Yugoslavia and Poland), there have been massive flows of population from country to town and extensive urban development. The proportions of urban and rural population have been drastically altered everywhere in very short time.\textsuperscript{26} Despite the simultaneous feminization of the rural work-force, female employment ratios in the socialized non-agricultural (i.e. urban) sectors are running high and tending to increase further. Intolerable strains

\textsuperscript{25} See UNECE, \textit{op.cit.}, p.209.

\textsuperscript{26} See A. Elias, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.196-200; and P.F. Myers, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.101-08.
have been placed on urban housing stocks; severe housing shortages are endemic to Eastern Europe. All these factors have an impact on the demographic situation. As to housing, recent enquiries into planned numbers of children in various of the countries come up unfailingly with the conclusion that housing conditions are a major subjective factor involved in family limitation. High female labour force participation rates are also contributing to fertility decline, the more so as domestic services to aid the housewife (from crèches to supermarkets) are uniformly unsatisfactory. One urban study carried out in Bucharest in the 1960s, for example, revealed an average number of wanted children of 1.3, and 0.7 for women with higher education. 27 Such remarkable results almost invite paraphrase of Lenin's celebrated aphorism about voting with the feet. Small wonder, perhaps, that Ceausescu shortly afterwards embarked upon the Great Demographic Leap Forward of 1966. Turning to collectivization, it is perhaps 'not accidental' that Poland and Yugoslavia, the two non-collectivized countries, have had higher levels of fertility than the other countries. And while Yugoslavia's position in this respect undoubtedly owes something to its partial membership of the Moslem world, this is not true of Poland, where for a decade or more rural fertility has been supporting overall rates hindered by very low urban indices. 28


28 The rural Net Reproduction Ratio has been some 70 to 75% higher than the urban one for the last decade or so. See Rocznik Demograficzny 1974, p.107.
Since the massive population movements following on World War II to which reference has already been made, not a great deal of external migration has occurred in the area. East Germany's flooding outmigration has now been staunched to a trickle (nonetheless, East Germany is not expected to regain its post-war level of population in this century). There have been some spasmodic flows of deportations and exchanges, or permitted emigration of ethnic groups: Turks from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Jews from Rumania, Poland, Bulgaria, and more recently, the Soviet Union; Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland; a substantial inflow of Poles repatriated from the Soviet Union in the late fifties. All of these movements were so to speak exceptional. No state in the area (apart from Yugoslavia) has extended toleration to emigration as such. And apart from inflows of ethnic groups identifying with the metropolitan nation concerned, none has any problem with immigration. Thus paradoxically, during a period when intra-European migration movements reached a level of unprecedented intensity, with labour moving across state frontiers almost as freely as goods, Soviet bloc rigidity continued to box up relative labour shortages and surpluses in autarkic national cells.29 There is now some official realization of the benefits of international movements of labour, and the first cautious beginnings have been made. But like non-swimmers at the water's edge, the Social governments have confined a large proportion

29 In the fifties, of course, an analogous situation prevailed throughout the national economies of the Socialist countries. Autarky seems to be one of the more tenacious features of international communist economics.
of their experiments to daily commuting between border-
towns. It seems quite conceivable that by the time any
bolder plans are approved, the general and growing labour
shortages throughout the area will smother them at or
soon after birth. 30

30 For some details of existing international mobility
in the bloc from a Socialist source, see, e.g., G. Halmai,
'The Passport: Working Hands', Esti Hirlap, 18 August
1973 (tr. in Radio Free Europe, Hungarian Press Survey
2270). For an instance of cautious advocacy of greater
movement of labour among the Socialist countries, see
I.G. Ushkalov, 'Nekotorye predposylyki vozrastaniia
mobilnosti trudovykh resursov v ramkakh SEV', Vestnik
MGU Geografiia 1973, no.6, p.97. Recently there has
been markedly greater freedom in discussing these
matters, but the watchword for policy remains caution
and there is a clear resolve, for whatever reason, to
avoid letting large numbers of nationals of any country
run loose in another. 'For the time being, as for the
forseeable future, priority is given to those forms
of coordinated utilization of labour resources in the
Comecon countries which do not involve their inter­
national movement.' (T. Vais 'Sotrudnichestvo stran
SEV v ispol'zovании trudovykh resursov', Voprosy
Ekonomiki 1975, no.9, p.106.) One of the problems
involved is, of course, that there is a strong ideological
presupposition that any socialist country can find
rational and productive employment for all its citizens
and that the bad old days of economic emigration are
over. Another is the fact that fewer and fewer countries
have labour surpluses to dispose of. The one exception,
Yugoslavia, is reluctant to participate fully for
political reasons (and in any case, it is difficult to
conceive Yugoslav workers who have seen Paris or Stockholm
being content with Pilsen or Katowice). The Rumanians,
reportedly, have refused to join in (Economist, 18 January
1975). See also, e.g., K.I. Mikulskii, Trudovye resursy
i nauchno-tekhnicheskaya revolutsiia; T. Vais and L.
Degtiar' 'Sotrudnichestvo stran SEV v ispol'zovании
trudovykh resursov', Planovoe Khoziaistvo 1973, no.12,
p.95 (tr. in Osteuropa 1975, no.2, with commentary);
M. Kabaj, 'Integracja a zatrudnienie', Zycie Gospodarcze,
22 September 1974. There is a good review of the
problem in J.L. Kerr 'Gastarbeiter in Eastern Europe' (cont.)
If not, however, the demographic and political consequences of such a development could be no less momentous than the economic. On this particular issue, bureaucratic rigidity may be masking sober pragmatism, as the Yugoslav case illustrates.

Here, as in so many other things, Yugoslav events help us to imagine what could conceivably happen elsewhere in the bloc if circumstances or policies were to change. The Yugoslav economic emigration has in a very short time assumed massive proportions. Estimates vary, but it is clear that there are at present about a million Yugoslavs 'temporarily' (as official documents have always maintained) employed outside the country. The economic and political strains caused continued for long to be outweighed by the very tangible benefits reaped in the form of hard-currency capital inflow (remittances in 1973 totalled nearly one and a half billion US dollars) and mitigated (rather than reduced) domestic unemployment. Only recently has there been some change in official policy towards emigration. These matters will be discussed more thoroughly later. For the moment, however, by way of briefly illustrating the kind of demographico-political problems that can be unleashed by free emigration from a Socialist country,

30 (cont.) Radio Free Europe RAD Background Report 169, 4 December 1975; and an unfortunately rather poor one marred by elementary errors in International Migration XIII (1975), no.4, p.190. Radio Free Europe Situation Reports for the different East European countries regularly contain a mine of current information on these matters.

perhaps it might be mentioned that before the change of policy (or perhaps more relevantly, before the recent downturn in Western economy and the consequent decline in the demand for labour in the Common Market countries), the annual outflow from Yugoslavia was of dimensions comparable with those of the country's natural increase; that Yugoslav observers are highly sceptical as to how many of these emigrants will return; that the overwhelming majority of them are in the fertile age-groups; that the national composition of the emigrants does not reflect that of the population as a whole (although the margins in this respect have evidently been narrowing more recently); and that the recent measures to increase domestic employment and reduce the outflow of workers have been less than wholly successful.32

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32 These matters will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 3

POPULATION POLITICS IN THE SOVIET UNION

The discussion will be divided into the following five sub-headings:
1. labour force
2. ethnic relations
3. international politics
4. ideology
5. population policies: issues and dilemmas

Particular attention will be devoted to the second of these items.

3.a The Labour Force

While it was once held that socialism virtually automatically assured that everyone could work and work productively, Soviet bloc countries now admit to both labour shortages and surpluses. Labour shortages have actually become endemic to the whole bloc in some form or other. Soviet-type economy is notoriously profligate with labour resources for systemic reasons. There are also strong ideological pressures militating against dismissal of redundant workers, which reinforce the inbuilt tendency to hoard labour. Various measures undertaken with the aim of releasing labour power for use where it is most

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1 For a discussion by a Socialist economist of the reasons for this, see M. Kabaj, *Elementy pełnego i racjonalnego zatrudnienia w gospodarce socjalistycznej* (Warsaw, 1972), Ch.6.
needed do not seem to have yet produced radical improvement; nor has automation. The secular tendency appears to be for the problem to become more rather than less acute. The declining birth rates in the late 'fifties and 'sixties may bring this problem to near crisis point by around 1980, as annual increments to the work force drastically diminish. Planners are becoming increasingly aware of the need to budget carefully for what they have always previously regarded as virtually a free good. One gains the impression that

2 The Shchokino experiment has been given little chance to spread its wings and has not, accordingly, obviated pressures on managers to maintain excessive levels of manpower. See M. Feshbach and S. Rapawy, 'Labour Constraints in the Five-Year Plan' in US Congress Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies (Washington, 1973), p.489.

3 See Appendix Table

4 In recent years there has been a flood of articles in Soviet economic journals dealing with the growing problem of labour shortage and proposing means of overcoming it (better utilization of existing reserves, activation of pensioners and invalids, increasing the birth rate, etc.). See, for example, K.A. Novikov in Kommunist, 1969, no.13; V. Guseinov and V. Korchagin, 'Voprosy trudovykh resursov', Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1971, no.2, p.45; R. Ivanova, 'O razvitiia vostochnykh raionov i obespechenii ich rabochii siloi', Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1973, no.1, p.40; R. Galetskaia, 'Demograficheskii situatsiia i trudovye resursy SSSR', Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1973, no.10, p.155; V. Kostakov, 'Zanatost', naselenia v usloviakh intensifikatsii proizvodstva', Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1974, no.4, p.36; N. Novitskii and M. Babkina, 'Rezerv uvelicheniiia trudovykh resursov', Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1975, no.8, p.57. For a recent Western review of manpower problems in the USSR, see Feshbach and Rapawy, op.cit.; see also Feshbach's 'Manpower management' in Problems of Communism XXIII (1974), no.6, p.25.
it was pressure from this group above all that provided the necessary political context for public calls for pro-natalist policies in the Soviet Union and Poland and their adoption elsewhere. It may seem an illogical response to a present labour shortage to lay plans for increased numbers of work-force entrants 20 years or so hence. But this time-lag and other elementary demographic calculations are often overlooked. And in any case, the influence involved need not have been one of tightly logical cause and effect; the apparent 'disappearance' of manpower (itself often not due to past fertility decline but rather to long-term policies of extensive rather than intensive development) may simply have oriented policy-makers more towards demographic concerns.

5 Throughout Socialist Eastern Europe (with the exception of Yugoslavia), discussions of demographic trends are closely tied up with discussions of economic policy and strategy, in particular, with questions of labour supply. (See, for example, the titles of the books cited in note 6 below). Most pro-natalist advocates argue in terms of economic, especially manpower, factors. Prominent pro-natalists include among their number such men as Kasimovskii (Head of the Labour Resources Research Laboratory of the RSFSR Gosplan - see, for example, his article in Ekonomiki i Organizatsii Promyshlennogo Proizvodstva, 1972, no.1, p.74) and Kazimierz Dzienio, the head of a unit responsible for manpower planning in the Polish Planning Commission, who has become a noted authority on population policy matters both within Poland and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. East Germany refrained from adopting abortion reforms at a time when it was the only European Socialist country with a labour shortage. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria all adopted pro-natalist policies as labour shortages began to affect them in the 1960s. It may be significant that in Poland and the Soviet Union, the two main countries where strong pro-natalist policies have not yet been adopted, the latter half of the 1960s saw a large inflow of manpower on to the labour market as their large respective post-war 'baby booms' reached school-leaving age.
The quantities and distribution of the Soviet labour force is a vast and intricate subject. The general picture is, briefly, that the Soviet Union is threatened by a demographically-accentuated overall labour shortage, acute in some regions, and tempered by looming unemployment in others. The problem of labour scarcity is particularly pronounced in the Baltic states (where natural increase has been very low for decades), certain urban and rural parts of European Russia (where there has been heavy outmigration of the young and where population stagnation or decline has set in) and virtually all of Siberia and the Far East (where migration policies have foundered on

6 In addition to the literature previously cited, see, for example, P.P. Litviakov (ed.) Demograficheskie problemy zaniatosti (Moscow, 1969); Osnovnye problemy ratsional'no gogo ispol'zovania trudovykh resursov v SSSR (Moscow, 1971); Naselenie, trudovye resursy SSSR (Moscow, 1971); Narodonaselenie; Naselenie i trudovye resursy (Moscow, 1973). Numerous monographs have also been published on the labour reserves of particular regions of the USSR. The Western literature on the subject is also considerable. In addition to the works previously cited, see, for example, K-E Wädekin, 'Manpower in Soviet Agriculture', Soviet Studies, XX (1969), p.281; S. Prociuk, 'The Manpower Problem in Siberia', Soviet Studies (1967), p.190; M. Feshbach, 'Manpower in the USSR: A Survey of Recent Trends and Prospects' in US Congress Joint Economic Committee, New Directions in the Soviet Economy (Washington, 1966), p.704; B. Lewytzkyj, 'Einige Probleme der Arbeitskräfteversorgung im laufenden Sowjetischen Fünfjahrplan', Österreichische Osthefte XI, p.335; M. Destefanis, 'La population active soviétique: structure et évolution', Population, 1971, no.2, p.241. On the development of research on labour supply in the USSR, see Lewytzkyj, op.cit., and also 'Die Schwerpunkte der Sowjetischen Arbeitsreservenpolitik', Österreichische Osthefte, vol.5, p.109.
the reluctance of Europeans to travel there, or having done so, to remain there). 7

The labour shortages are associated with a number of other chronic labour problems in a relationship of dialectical aggravation. The Soviet press expresses regular concern about excess labour turnover and poor labour discipline. Efforts to curb these phenomena tend to be frustrated by the eagerness of industrial managers to take on new workers irrespective of their performance in earlier jobs or their reasons for having left them. Similarly 'elemental' migration movements in (centrally) undesired directions are facilitated by labour shortages. It is difficult to police measures aimed at holding workers in a labour shortage area when there will be no lack of employers elsewhere quite ready to turn a blind eye to irregularities. 8 And of course, even in areas where labour resources are plentiful, as in Central Asia, there may nonetheless be an effective shortage of industrial labour, of workers with the right skills and dispositions. 9

7 See, for example, Literaturnaia Gazeta, 8 August 1973, p.10. There is, in fact, a vast literature in both West and East on this subject. See Prociuk, op.cit.; and Paul Dibb, Siberia and the Pacific (New York, 1972), Chs 8 and 9.

8 For some candid reporting on evasion of migration and labour controls, see the article by D. Ivanov and V. Trifonov in Krokodil, 16 June 1971, p.2.

9 The Soviet economist L. Chizhova has said of the indigenous populations of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and the Caucasus area that 'Practice has shown that some of them still adapt badly to industrial labour'. 'Regional'nye aspekty ispol'zovaniia trudovykh resursov' in D. Valentei (ed.) Narodonaselenie: Naselenie i ekonomika (Moscow, 1973), p.25.
The authorities have responded to the growing shortages by a variety of measures aimed at increased utilization of existing labour reserves, in particular of housewives and old-age and invalid pensioners. While it is still hoped to further exploit reserves of this kind, work-force participation rates have already reached such high levels in most of the country, that little further increase would seem feasible. Meanwhile the systematic siphoning of the younger age-groups from rural areas has so drastically altered the age-sex structure of the agricultural work force, that that source too is virtually exhausted in most areas. Thus it would seem that the only future possibility for augmenting the labour force will be natural increase. But the last of the more numerous post-war birth cohorts are now entering the work force, and it can be expected that after about 1975, the annual increments from this source will begin to drastically diminish. To make matters worse, the proportion of these increments concentrated in Central Asia will grow spectacularly. Pressures seem to be mounting on the labour market from all sides more or less simultaneously.


11 According to A. Kvasha in Literaturnaia Gazeta, 22 March 1972, p.10, the work-force participation rate had increased from 78% in 1959 to 92% 'now'.

12 According to computations presented in Fesbach and Rapawy, op.cit., p.492, by the quinquennium 1986-90, Central Asia and Kazakhstan will be providing annual labour force increments greater than the net national figure.
In Soviet writings, the word unemployment remains taboo; however the subtly different concept of 'surplus labour' has been gaining acceptance and its presence in various areas commented on. Though some of the Western border regions of the Soviet Union (notably Moldavia, Western Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania) continue to have some rural overpopulation, the main concentrations of underemployment are in the Caucasus and Central Asian areas, both of which have high rates of population increase and at least until recently substantial net immigration balances. In fact in the 1960s trends in migration worked towards enhancing the demographic imbalances that differential fertility and the distribution of natural resources were creating in Siberia and Central Asia. Siberia, where Soviet plans required an enormous accession of manpower, was by and large an area of emigration, whilst Central Asia and the North Caucasus, where apart from in Kazakhstan there was already a manpower surplus (at least in agriculture), were registering a net inflow. Meanwhile, as noted earlier, the numbers of able-bodied in Central Asia have been increasing very much more rapidly than elsewhere and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

13 See, for example, D.I. Valentei, Osnovy teorii narodonaseleniia (Moscow, 1973), p.65.

14 See table of interregional migratory flows 1959-70 in V. Perevedentsev, 'Population Distribution and Migration' tr. in Soviet Law and Government XIII (1974), no.2, p.88. However, the 1970 Census results indicate that by the end of the decade, the net trend had been reversed in the case of the Central Asian and Northern Caucasus areas, from which there were net outflows (of European returnees presumably). See Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1970 goda vol.7 (Moscow, 1974), p.6-7.
The numbers actually seeking employment there could increase even faster if hitherto reluctant rural-dwellers and housewives begin to join the urban work-force at increased rates. Given the growing pressure on what are for the most part scarce fertile land resources in the area, and also the Soviet emphasis on liberating women from 'feudal survivals', both developments seem bound to transpire sooner or later. For the moment, however, there have been and are, paradoxically, shortages of industrial labour in various parts of Central Asia, and even - in some parts of Kazakhstan - of rural labour. These shortages have in the past been filled by Europeans, for a combination of political and economic reasons. The first realizations are dawning or at least being made public that this policy may be unwise and that it would be better to recruit local people into urban jobs, and improve their qualifications as necessary. It should be emphasized that the Central Asian peoples have the worst command of Russian of any of the major national minorities. This no doubt increases their reluctance and inability to enter the urban work-force. Outside the northern regions of Kazakhstan, however, they are in a majority overall, a majority, which, as we shall see, is increasing with dramatic speed. It is possible,

15 See, for example, the article by T. Arbuzova and L. Evdokimova in Voprosy Ekonomiki (1972), no.6, p.156; L. Chizhova, 'Nekotorye voprosy planirovaniia trudovykh resursov', in Planovoe Khoziaistvo (1971), no.4, p.37; see also V. Zorza in The Guardian, 7 January 1970.

16 See the table in Naselenie SSSR: Spravochnik, p.84-8. The term 'Central Asian' is used here in the narrow sense, excluding the Kazakhs. Generally, throughout this thesis, 'Central Asians' and 'Central Asia' are used in the wider sense including Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs.
that as this and other demographic and sociological trends deepen, the indigenous peoples may come to see the present terms of their acceptance into the work-force as onerous.

Most of the problems created by manpower shortages and maldistribution can be tackled in either of two ways: in Soviet parlance, by economic or administrative methods. The essential difference between them is of course that the first method seeks to manipulate economic values and indicators so as to make sufficient numbers of people perceive as being in their own best interests the kind of behaviour the government wishes to encourage; whereas the second castigates undesired patterns of economic behaviour as harmful or even wrong, selfish, philistine, etc., and proposes legal penalties for them. Soviet commentators on social and demographic policy frequently distinguish a third approach, namely moral exhortation. However given the by all accounts declining impact of purely moral exhortation on Soviet citizens, and bearing in mind that moral exhortation is not infrequently combined with or apt to merge into 'administrative measures', we can probably safely pass it over in this brief discussion.)

While there is no logical reason to assume that government measures would adhere to one of these approaches to the exclusion of the other, it is obviously a matter of the greatest moment for the future of Soviet society which of them will tend to become predominant in the years that lie ahead.

17 See, for example, A.Kvasha, 'Demograficheskaia politika v sotsialisticheskom obshchestve' in D. Valentei, Osnovy teorii narodenaseleniia (Moscow, 1973), p.295.
At first glance it might seem that the present situation of serious and growing labour shortages favours the proponents of economic measures and the emergence of some measure of de facto or even de jure employees' sovereignty. If the manpower is simply not there, production increase can only be achieved by increasing productivity. And in turn, productivity can only be increased in a sophisticated economy by essentially economic stimuli. Any orientation towards raising productivity and efficiency, it has often been claimed, must lead to decentralization of economic decision-making and hence to a general liberalization of economic and social arrangements. Be that as it may, if labour is a scarce commodity, its value is bound in some sense to rise, and the bargaining power of the labourer to increase. And indeed, it could be argued that this enhanced bargaining power is already evident in the official tolerance (however reluctant) of the flitting, weak industrial discipline and 'anarchical' migratory flows which mark the scene at present.

On the other hand it is evident that every 'economic' or 'liberal' solution to a problem has a potential administrative or illiberal counterpart. In place of pay-loadings to attract or retain workers in labour-scarcity areas, one can employ central job allocation of school-leavers and a labour-book system; and if the latter already exist but are not achieving satisfactory results, one can simply sharpen their teeth. One can raise kolhoznik wages, or one can write restrictive clauses into the collective-farm charter. One can offer long-service benefits; or one can attempt to penalize both the worker defecting from his place of work and any subsequent employer he manages to find.
Perhaps on balance the indications are at present that the Soviet leadership have chosen or have been driven to adopt a basically more economic approach. But the possibility cannot be excluded that in the future the choice may fall on a thorough-going and detailed system of labour-control with computerized record-keeping, centralized allocation of manpower and an elaborate network of sanctions. The Leningrad-Kaluga experiment may yet make a comeback.

3.b(i) Some theoretical considerations

A very large literature has developed on the sociology of plural societies and ethnic politics. Despite this, unity of conceptual approach, or indeed, of basic terminological usage has not yet been achieved. The term 'ethnic relations' is variously applied. Some use it to denote an area separate from and complementary to that of racial relations within the broader field of communal

18 The experimental system of labour controls introduced in Leningrad, Moscow, Ufa and Kaluga (see Feshbach and Rapawy, *op.cit.* , p.541-43 for a description) may have seemed to herald a return towards Stalinist norms of labour law. However, these agencies have apparently been effectively shorn of their powers. See A. Tenson, 'The Curtailment of the Powers of Public Employment Agencies', *Radio Liberty Research* 210/73, 9 July 1973. Compare the discussion in Chapter 4, p.284 and footnote 52.

19 The terms 'plural', 'pluralism' and 'pluralist' are themselves a good illustration of this. For discussion of the ambiguities in their use and the conflicting traditions from which they have emerged, see L. Kuper and M.G. Smith, *Pluralism in Africa* (Berkeley, 1969), Ch.1; and R.A. Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations* (New York, 1970), Ch.4.
relations: others use it in a more generic sense to refer to all of what followers of the first definition would identify as 'racial and ethnic relations', i.e. relations between communities within a state that are conscious of belonging to different racial or national groups; and others again use it in a still broader generic sense to refer to almost any social group within a state or community that is not defined in terms of age, sex or non-ascriptive socio-economic function or status (thereby including, for example, caste groups, tribes and confessional communities). In this thesis, the term is being used in the second of these three senses (i.e., the less sweeping of the two more generic usages). Accordingly, no attempt will be made, for example, to examine the extent or importance of religious, regional or residual tribal affiliations in the Socialist countries. Discussion will be restricted to and largely

20 A.H. Richmond, for example, explicitly identifies caste as an ethnic division. See his Readings in Race and Ethnic Relations (Oxford, 1972), p.16. Some definitions are couched in such sweeping terms that even class, status and occupational groups are not effectively excluded, e.g.: 'An ethnic group is a distinct category of the population in a larger society whose culture is usually different from its own.' (emphasis added) H.S. Morris, 'Ethnic Groups' in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1968), vol.5, p.167. Even overlooking the self-defeating caution in the use of the word 'usually', one still feels impelled to ask questions like 'Is the English working class not a distinct category of the English population with its own distinct culture?' In fairness, it should be said that in this area, definitions are a good deal easier to criticize than to formulate. In choosing the narrower of the two more generic definitions of 'ethnic' for my own purposes, I am making a purely pragmatic and not substantive decision.
framed in terms of the 'nations' and 'nationalities' recognized by the regimes in question.21

Another shortcoming of the literature on the political sociology of ethnicity from the point of view of present concerns is that it has not hitherto devoted a great deal of attention to systematic treatment of the demographic factor. Observations made on the matter tend to be brief and axiomatic. Among writers that do make reference to the demographic factor, there is a tendency to dismiss it as of lesser importance. It is often pointed out that small minorities can dominate a polity, and that therefore no very strong correlation between demographic and political strength can be established. One well-known authority on plural societies (M.G. Smith) even suggests that demographic expansion is more likely to reflect the pattern of inter-ethnic accommodation than to independently influence it.22

Obviously the demographic ratios of ethnic groups within a state are not likely to correspond precisely to

21 Partial exceptions will be made in the case of Soviet Moslems and Eastern European Gipsies. Because of their strong cultural and linguistic links (and also because of the attempts made in the past - and yet to be made in the future? (cf. footnote 48 below) - to bring about their unification), the Soviet Moslems and the 'Central Asians' - Uzbeks, Kirgiz, Karakalpaks, Tadzhiks, Turkmen and Kazakhs - are for certain purposes treated as entities. This procedure, however, could be justified on 'ethnic' as well as on religious grounds. In the case of the Gipsies, who tend not to be treated as an ethnic minority for national statistical purposes by East European states, a conscious decision has been taken to reject the official classification.

22 Kuper and Smith, op.cit., p.139-40.
their relative political strength. But perhaps there is a
tendency in the existing literature to overemphasize the
lack of correspondence between the two. Most of the
instances of domination by a tiny majority are drawn from
societies which have not yet been touched by the world-wide
rise of ethnic awareness, or in which the ethnic groups in
question represent quite different levels of socio-economic
organization. The ongoing process of modernization and
the to some extent independent ethno-nationalist revolution
seem likely to make such power structures obsolete.\(^{23}\)
The confidence felt by outsiders that in South Africa's white
supremacy may well continue indefinitely\(^{24}\) is not widely
shared by the South Africans themselves, who tend, moreover,
to be keenly aware of the discrepancy between white and

\(^{23}\) For an excellent historical perspective on the spread
of 'ethnonationalism', see Walker Connor, 'The
Politics of Ethnonationalism', Journal of International

\(^{24}\) N. Choucri, Population Dynamics and International
Violence (Lexington, 1974), p.76. The above observation
was written some months before the Soweto riots of 1976.
coloured numerical strength. And Smith's suggestion that demographic patterns only repeat and reinforce power relations previously established, whatever its empirical validity outside pre-modern African situations, seems to overlook the point that power reinforced is effectively new power acquired.

As no established typology of ethnic politics systematically incorporating the demographic factor has yet

25 A South African clergyman named M. Steyn was reported in Die Zeit (1 June 1973, p.2) as proposing that the pill be banned to the white population and given to the blacks (whose morals were in any case so low that even the pill could do them no further damage). And a Dr Van Rensburg has been reported (Canberra Times, 1 January 1975) as warning a South African sociological conference of 'annihilating chaos' unless a birth control campaign for blacks were introduced. For an account of South African population policy which, while seeking to maintain that the government is moved by purely humane concerns, nonetheless between the lines clearly betrays the extent of official anxiety about the possible political impact of differential fertility, see the chapter entitled 'South Africa' in B. Berelson, Population Policy in Developed Countries (New York, 1974), pp.385-402. In its disingenuousness, the South African contribution to this volume rivals that of the Soviet Union. Compare the following, unequivocal conclusion of two specialist analysts of multi-ethnic polities: 'In the case of the dominant minority situation, one consideration especially stands out: the overriding fear held by the minority, whether rightly or wrongly, that they stand to be overwhelmed by a vastly larger majority.' A. Rabushka and K.A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus, Ohio, 1972), p.158.
emerged, the discussion that follows here and in later chapters will not pursue any precise, pre-determined contours, but rather attempt to describe those features of the topology which seem most striking to the unaided eye. Obviously, the term ethnic relations, even in the slightly restricted sense indicated above, covers some fairly disparate phenomena. I shall not attempt to draw clear-cut boundaries for the concept, which is quite remarkably resistant to definition. But I shall make a distinction within this general category

26 One of the relatively few proposals made so far is to be found in Rabushka and Shepsle (*op.cit.*., pp.88-91). They divide plural societies into four 'configurations' with reference to 'relative community size' (apparently defined in terms of a head-count): 1. balanced competition; 2. dominant majority; 3. dominant minority, and 4. fragmentation. While this scheme is not without its attractions, it is clearly in need of a good deal of further elaboration, particularly in relation to marginal cases. If the Russian percentage of the Soviet population does decline below 50% in the decades that lie ahead, when will it cease to become a dominant majority and start to become a dominant minority? Does a majority mean an absolute majority or a strong first-past-the-post lead? How does one account for, and where does one locate, cases like Czechoslovakia, where despite the firm socio-economic and demographic dominance of the majority (the Czechs), the relative strength of the minority (the Slovaks) is continually on the increase? Can not fragmentation be an important element in situations other than the fourth configuration, enabling, let us say, a strong minority to dominate the remainder? And, of course, allowance must be made for the effects of differential levels of socio-economic development, regional resource patterns, historically inherited patterns of power, and so on. It is symptomatic that in outlining their scheme, Rabushka and Shepsle refer to only one prior work, Clifford Geertz's classic essay 'The Integrative Revolution' (*in Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States* (New York, 1963)), where a roughly similar classification is proposed.
between potential or actual nationality conflicts and racial ones. Such a distinction, though often made in the specialist literature (and nearly always made in the less specialist literature), is not an easy one to maintain with a high degree of precision and consistency. In addition to the

27 Pierre van den Berghe, for example, having identified race as 'a group of people who in a given society are socially defined as different from other groups by virtue of certain or putative physical differences' distinguishes other groups for whom the relevant criteria are cultural and to which he applies the term ethnic (corresponding roughly to what I am calling 'national' or 'non-racial ethnic'). The distinction between multi-racial and multi-ethnic societies, declares van den Berghe, is an important one, for all that they have much in common. (P.L. van den Berghe, Race and Ethnicity (New York, 1970), p.10.) Many writers who do not draw the distinction explicitly nonetheless show that they implicitly accept it by using expressions like 'ethnic and racial' or 'ethnic or racial' over and over again. Other writers, while preferring to adopt a broad and inclusive definition of 'racial' or 'ethnic' relations, nonetheless go on to recognize a distinction of sorts into two categories. Thus G. Franklin Edwards defines 'race relations' as the interaction of people with varied physical and cultural characteristics, but shortly afterwards uses the phrase 'Minorities are ethnic or racial groups...' ('Race Relations', International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1968), vol.13, p.269). And Ernest Krausz, who prefers the term 'ethnic' for the more generic function, says 'Whilst I adopt a broad definition for "ethnic minority", I fully recognize that some characteristics, such as the racial factor, may lead to special situations.' (Ethnic Minorities in Britain (London, 1972).) One gains the impression at times, that the distinction between racial and non-racial would have even more adherents were it not for the disrepute that all forms of 'racialism' have fallen into in the intellectual community in recent decades, and the desire felt by representatives of problem-solving social science to define some part of their problem out of existence. Contrast note 39, below.
difficulty of defining the outer limits of ethnic, as opposed to other inter-group tensions, one has the further problem of the word 'racial'. Like 'ethnic', 'racial' tends to be used in a variety of senses. Sometimes it is used co-terminously with what I have chosen to call 'ethnic'; sometimes it is used to refer almost exclusively to black-white situations; sometimes in a scientific sense to refer to biologically-identifiable human types; and sometimes to refer only to those situations in which one at least of the contending groups consciously and explicitly uses pseudo-scientific 'racial' arguments to justify its attitude towards the other or others. Here the term will be used to refer to that sub-group of ethnic relations in which in- and out-groups are recognized on the basis of certain perceived physical characteristics (as opposed to cultural characteristics, in the case of 'national' distinctions). Racial conflicts, it is suggested, have a number of features which tend to differentiate them from other kinds of ethnic conflict. Where nationality conflicts tend to derive from rational (if mistaken) apprehensions concerning the sharing of power, wealth or prestige within a community, racial conflicts characteristically involve an element (on at least one side) of disinterested revulsion. Where racial feelings are involved, there tends to be

28 As, for example, by Edwards. Cf. note 27, above.

of an in-group may see certain positive or at least respectworthy human qualities in an out-group perceived as being of the same race, in racial antagonisms, one side at least is likely to view the other as almost totally without human virtues. Indeed, in racial conflicts it is common for one

30 Cf. Fanon, quoting Mannoni: 'It is no exaggeration to say that the majority of South Africans feel an almost physical revulsion against anything that puts a native or a person of colour on their level.' (Frantz Fanon, Black Skin White Masks (London, 1970), p.62.) Obviously the physical revulsion does not occur at all times and for all purposes. Van den Berghe suggests that most racial situations pass through a phase in which social rather than spatial segregation is the organizing principle (van den Berghe, op.cit., Ch.1). As long as 'the nigger knows his place', it would seem, physical contacts of various, even intimate kinds can occur without inducing revulsion. Revulsion only appears to arise individually and collectively when the symbiotic superiority-inferiority nexus or the physical or social apartheid system breaks down.

31 Sexual prowess may be an exception here. Calvin C. Hernton's Sex and Racism (London, 1970, passim), for example, confirms the familiar proposition that whatever patterns of inherent moral, social, economic, intellectual or other superiority and inferiority may be maintained by the received myths of any racially-organized society, sexual curiosity about the outgroup is likely to be enhanced by the taboo, producing a paradoxical readiness to impute superiority in this one rather specialized field. In the case of members of the lower-status race feeling greater sexual desire for members of the upper-status race, this may seem less surprising, though Hernton also cites numerous cases of well-educated and belligerently 'proud' blacks who have a strong covert ambition to bed or indeed marry a white. This may well indicate enduring inferiority anxieties. But the point is that in racial situations infected with the competitive bacillus, such anxieties are endemic, and tend to be felt by members of both the 'superior' and 'inferior' 'race'. If sexual prowess is indeed an exception to the proposition stated, however, it should be remembered that for most societies, sensual skills are seen as morally dubious at best, and a sign of intimacy with the devil at worst.
side at least to question the very humanity of the other. 32
In non-racial conflicts, competition is the predominant
mode of interaction, whereas in racial ones, there tends
to be a clear demarcation between superior and inferior,
recognized either positively or negatively by both sides. 33
Racial conflicts tend to have their origins more typically
in a history of colonial subjugation or slavery, rather
than autonomous migratory movements; hence the genealogy
of conflict tends to be rather more embittered. Racially
plural communities are more likely to be composed of large
majority and small minority rather than roughly equal
numbers. Owing to the high visibility of physical, racial
differences, as opposed to cultural ones, there is a tendency

32 Cf. the well-known Hitlerian propaganda likening
Jews to vermin, aimed both at influencing public
opinion and strengthening the resolve of trained
murderers. Nor was it merely manipulative, as a reading
of Hitler's own outpourings on Jews readily demonstrates.
This is a widespread form of socio-psychopathology,
and there is no a priori reason to suppose Soviet
peoples to be above it. In this connection it is
interesting that John Barron, in his book on the KGB
of Soviet employees in Middle Eastern countries describing
Arabs variously as 'yellows' and 'blackbums' (chernozhopy)
and declaring them to be 'subhuman'. Barron rather
undermines his own credibility as a witness by elsewhere
in the book describing FBI agents in terms of a comic-
strip lyricism, but the passages referred to have a
strong flavour of authenticity nonetheless.

33 'Positively' in the sense of acceptance, or 'negatively'
in the sense of resentment. While relations remain
harmonious, the superior-inferior relationship is often
perceived as legitimate by both sides. When as a result
of socio-economic changes or fresh exogenous influences
the stereotypes are challenged, conflict tends to
develop.
for group perceptions in racial situations to be sharper and more strongly and more frequently reinforced by experience. And despite the potentially blurring effects of miscegenation, those differences and perceptions of them tend to be less mutable over time. Finally, I believe it can be laid down as a general proposition that racial relations are often marked by a greater degree of hostility than ethnic relations. 34

But paradoxical as it may seem, while racial tensions may tend to involve a greater degree of hostility, they do not necessarily lead to a greater amount of hostilities. 35 Whether and in what conditions ethnic or other inter-group tensions reach the stage of violent conflict is another extremely complex question in itself. Without going into the matter too deeply, from the point of view of the demographic aspects of inter-ethnic relations, one point should be made. That is that while in the case of nationality tensions, the development of rivalry or conflict will be related to the relative power positions of the groups concerned,

34 Cf. Krausz, op.cit., p.10: 'Two Government White Papers in 1964 emphasized that in the case of Commonwealth immigrants "the evidence laid more stress on the hostility towards [them] stemming directly from colour prejudice"'; and (p.58) 'The amount of discrimination and prejudice immigrants have to endure seems to vary even by the shade of their skin colour.' (evidence cited).

35 If, that is, hostility can in this case be taken as referring to the negative affect attaching to a taboo. Thus, you might go to bloody war with another people, and yet, ten years later, you might already be a bigot not to countenance marriage between your child and a member of that particular outgroup. But with racial outgroups, you would not let your daughter 'marry one', whichever side he (or they) had fought on.
and therefore to some extent to the demographic ratio between them (and in particular, to large or decisive changes in that ratio), in the case of racial tensions, no real objective threat need yet be presented to the dominant partner for the situation to ignite. While in the first case, we have basically a '50-50' problem, in the second any increase in numbers (or even an apparent increase in numbers created by a change in migratory and settlement patterns) may be

36 By a 50-50 situation, I mean one in which the relative demographic and/or political strengths of two peoples within a state are fairly evenly balanced, and the question thus arises kto kogo (who is to (dominate) whom), whether by war, the ballot box or other process of decision (cf. R. Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations (New York, 1970), p.144-5). The 50-50 should not be taken too literally. Depending on the degree of socio-economic difference between the two communities, a demographic balance of 35-65 might equally well raise a 50-50 type problem. And, of course, the regional sub-distribution of a population may lead to what is overall a majority-minority situation acquiring 50-50 dimensions in particular areas. Thus, for example, in the context of Soviet Central Asia (a case to be discussed at some length below), we have a dominant Russian minority at the regional level, a dominant Russian majority in most larger urban areas, and a 50-50 situation maturing in the city of Tashkent.
The types of extreme violence that occur in the two cases also tend to differ: on the one hand civil

Thus, the growing urban visibility of Jews in many parts of Europe led to the great waves of anti-Semitism of the 19th and 20th centuries, even though there were few regions where Jews threatened to present anything approaching even a localized 50-50 problem (unless, of course, one takes the analysis to the level of urban district or occupational group). In several countries of European culture, the proportions of Catholics in the community have risen to, or towards, the 50-50 area without provoking much more than Masonic mutterings. And before too much is made of the spectacular counter-example of Northern Ireland, it ought to be remembered that despite the fact that men of demonstrably Irish cultural stigmata have been living among the British and in numerous well-publicized cases blowing up the British for many years (reports of bombing phone-warnings almost invariably mention the Irish accent of the caller), migration from Ireland to Great Britain is still completely unrestricted, and indeed, completely uncontrolled. Given the status of Northern Ireland, restrictions would be difficult to introduce, but in other tricky cases, like the Asian British of East Africa, British ingenuity has been resourcefully applied to the task at all levels from government to grass roots (See D. Humphrey and M. Ward, Passports and Politics, Penguin, 1974). Meanwhile, as the bombs go up, Enoch Powell ponders before a police audience on the links between the growing coloured community in Britain and the incidence of mugging (The Times, 10 April 1976).
war, on the other the lynching or the pogrom. However the damage done to the fabric of society may be equally great in both types of cases. Scapegoating of despised minorities seems to be closely associated with (whether causally or epiphenomenally) destruction of the rule of law and the spread of police state methods and the underlying social patterns that support them. Insofar as differential fertility can easily lead to the greatly increased visibility of a pariah or scapegoat group, the importance of demographic factors in racial conflicts may be even greater than in the case of non-racial ones.

The distinction between racial and non-racial ethnic conflicts, though widely recognized and employed,

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38 This follows logically from the earlier proposition that multi-racial states tend more typically to consist of communities of widely differing size. Evenly balanced multi-racial societies are probably rarer because they are more unstable than other kinds. And most multi-racial mixes have arisen from partial European settlement of non-European areas, complete European overrunning of areas of non-European settlement, or the import of non-European slave labour. Both pogroms and lynching are only really practicable where there is a strong overall strategic majority, or an effectively concentrated local one. The aggression involved is bullying rather than defiant or competitive. While the majority group may be beginning to fear rather than despise the minority involved, the fear is coupled with a realistic certainty that the aggression will achieve its objectives. Civil wars are a more 'valorous' undertaking. Cf. Pettigrew and Cramer's interesting finding that in the Southern States of the US, the incidence of lynching is inversely related to the relative size of the Negro population. Thomas F. Pettigrew and M. Richard Cramer, 'The Demography of Desegregation', *Journal of Social Issues*, 1959, no.4, p.62-3.
is not one that appeals to all students of these matters. And it must be acknowledged that it is indeed not without its difficulties. It would appear, for example, that one is not dealing here with some kind of clear dichotomy, but rather with a dispersed bi-polar distribution, or even perhaps some kind of spread along a continuum. In any one case, all the potential elements of ethnic distinction (both physical and cultural) may work to reinforce one another; or they may tend on the whole to cancel one another out. Alternatively, they may be reinforced by socio-economic cleavages, or cross-cut and thereby attenuated by those cleavages. Racial differences may also vary both in their objective, physical and in their subjective, psychological, salience. There is, moreover, the usual difficulty of neatly categorizing the incidence of irrational subjectivity.

For the ultimate definition of 'racial' (like that of 'national' or 'ethnic') must be in terms of 'racial is as

39 For a contrary view, see, for example, D. Horowitz, 'Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics', World Politics vol.23 (1971), no.2, p.232; J. Rex, 'The Concept of Race in Sociological Theory' in S. Zubaïda (ed.), op.cit.; and N. Choucri, op.cit., p.77. Marxists are reluctant to accept that any kind of ethnic stratification can be of 'decisive' importance anywhere; a fortiori that there might be a sub-category of ethnic divisions that are even more important again. For a remorseless critique of the fragilities of Marxist theory in the face of ethnic facts, see L. Kuper, 'Race, Class and Power: Some Comments on Revolutionary Change' in Comparative Studies in Society and History vol.14 (1972), p.400. (Though he maintains a terminological distinction between 'racial' and 'national' or 'ethnic' throughout, Kuper does not, unfortunately, develop the distinction analytically.) There is a rather less than lethal riposte to Kuper's article in D. Lane, 'Ethnic and Class Stratification in Soviet Kazakhstan 1917-1939', in Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol.17 (1975), p.165.
racial does'. Individuals may believe they are Napoleon; and social groups moved by analogous 'pathological' thought disturbances may, despite the absence of any distinguishing physical stigmata, nonetheless believe themselves to be racially different from and superior to some among their neighbours; and in such an event, cultural stigmata may be perceived and responded to as though they were physical. Such a development is particularly likely to take place under the pressure of socio-economic collapse or an ongoing ethnic conflict which acquires a momentum and escalating

40 Cf. Hitler discussing the origins of his own anti-Semitism: 'one day, when passing through the Inner City, I suddenly encountered a phenomenon in a long caftan and wearing black sidelocks...'. Since Germans often have dark hair (the possibly part-Jewish Hitler among them), it is evident that Hitler was here being struck by a cultural rather than a biological difference from what he conceived to be a decent norm. A. Hitler, Mein Kampf (London, 1939), quoted in A. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (Pelican, 1962), p.39.
ferocity of its own. Thus, the division between racial and ethnic is not clear-cut either theoretically or empirically; and particular situations may be hard to allocate unequivocally to either type. But while some cases, like that of Serbs and Albanians, or Ukrainians and Jews, may contain some elements of both, there is an obvious and basic difference

41 Some writers, struck by the example of Hitler's Germany, and understandably and quite rightly reluctant to exclude it from the purview of 'racism', conclude that racism can arise in cases where the observable differences are purely cultural (Rex, op.cit., p.37, 39). While this formulation may on the one hand underestimate the extent to which the Jewish community in German lands was biologically recognizable in the early 20th century, it is also open to criticism inasmuch that anti-Semitism of the kind one would want to call 'racial' continues to exist even when and where the Jewish communities cease to be as culturally 'visible' as they once were, and indeed after they have become largely indistinguishable on any criteria. Then it may become necessary to conduct genealogical enquiries and pin Stars of David to the breast of the 'vermin' for them not to cunningly escape one's notice. Sometimes, in fact, the ethnic bigot explicitly denounces the perfidy of an outgroup that is adroitly making itself invisible or upsetting the bigot's stereotypes. Cf. the comments by Jeleński on Polish anti-Semitism before World War II: 'Poles did not attack Jews "because they were Jews", but because they were dirty, greedy, lying, wore their hair in corkscrew curls, talked patois and didn't want to assimilate, and also because they were assimilating, ceasing to talk patois, dressed well and wanted to be Poles. Because they were uncouth, and also because they were very cultured. Because they were superstitious, backward and benighted, and also because they were devilishly able, progressive and ambitious. Because they had long hooked noses, and also because often you couldn't tell them apart from "pure Poles"...'. Konstanty Jeleński, "Hańba" czy wstyd?, Kultura 1968, no.5 (247), p.52. Perhaps a good term for this type of racially-intense ethnic distinction based largely or exclusively on cultural stigmata (particularly in phases when those stigmata are rapidly being erased) would be 'quasi-racial'?
between, for example, the relations between Czechs and Slovaks, Croats and Serbs or Flemings and Walloons on the one hand, and that between Slovaks and Gipsies, Russians and Central Asians or White and Black Americans on the other.

If one accepts the general division between racial and non-racial types of ethnic antagonism, and some broad categorization of the two types along the lines suggested here, it remains to be considered where the patterns of interaction formed by the main ethnic constituents of the Soviet Union should be located. Are ethnic tensions likely to be more or less racial in type? And what circumstances are likely to mitigate or exacerbate their intensity?

It is often emphasized that Russians were never racially prejudiced in anything like the manner that other European colonizers were. And sometimes, also, that whatever the vices of the Tsarist regime in this respect, the policies and structural reforms that have been carried into effect by the Soviet regime have so radically altered the situation that ethnic tensions have ceased to be a significant problem in the Soviet Union. The latter of these two views is most prevalent among fundamentalist pro-Moscow Communists, the uninformed, and those whose principal concerns are not with Soviet affairs. However, it is undoubtedly true that the pattern of development of inter-ethnic relations in Russia and the USSR is almost without parallel outside the Soviet bloc (and without exact parallels within it).

If we compare the situation in Tsarist Russia with our model of a racial situation, we find that Russo-Turkestan relations seem to be something of a borderline case. In some of the northern areas of what is now Kazakhstan, where Russians appeared as early as the 16th century, intermarriage became common and the peasants there of Russian
stock could scarcely be distinguished from the indigenous steppe-dwellers. Even later after Russian conquest of the area, the Russian attitude seems generally agreed to have been less overbearing and superior than that taken by other European colonists elsewhere. And while the degree of intermingling that occurred in most of the area in the late Tsarist period (as since) was minimal, this was not so much a consequence of Russian as of Moslem attitudes. Tsarist administrators, like their Soviet successors, were eager to promote sblizhenie (ethnic rapprochement), but the autochthonous peoples resisted it. The rare cases of intermarriage did not necessarily lead to Christianization and Europeanization: Russian women tended to adopt the Islam of their husbands. Russian peasant settlers were not always noticeably better off than Central Asians; and sometimes they were worse off. Economic exploitation of the indigenous peoples tended to take the form of selective dispossession rather than serfdom, slavery, or complete expulsion. And Tsarist administrators seem, in some periods at least, to have displayed a degree of genuine tolerance towards the Moslem religion. Moreover, the physical differentiation between Slavs and Central Asians is less marked than that observable in other racial and colonial


contexts. Thus, all in all, there are reasons for expecting the Central Asian racial context to be less volatile than many others. This having been said, it should nonetheless be emphasized that certain other features of the situation point in a different direction. The distinguishable and relatively unchanging physical stigmata are there, and so is the recent history of colonial subjugation and administration. And despite the efforts of the Russians and the partial exception mentioned above of the Kazakh steppe-lands, spatial and social segregation existed in the past and, as we shall see, persist into the present. 46 There is, moreover, a history of recurring violence between Europeans and Central Asians, during the period of annexation in the 19th century, during the Basmachi revolt of 1916, and again during the collectivization period and the purges of the 1920s and 1930s.

Similar considerations probably apply, if in lesser measure, to the Azeri and the other Moslem peoples of the Caucasian and Transcaucasian regions. In the case of the Armenians and Georgians, it can probably be maintained that the ethnic tensions involved, being mitigated by common cultural traditions, are less racial than national in character (however intense). With two exceptions, the remaining major nationalities seem best classified as identifiably 'European' and therefore only nationally, and not racially, distinct. The two exceptions are the Tatars


47 Cf. the racially-tinged dictum of the Tsarist General Skobelev: 'I hold it a principle that in Asia [emphasis added] the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict on the enemy.' Quoted in O. Caroe, Soviet Empire (London, 1967), p.79.
and the Jews. It is quite possible that the Tatars (particularly the Crimean Tatars) may again turn their undoubted political skills to some Soviet variant of pan-Turkic, or pan-Islamic, activity. Moreover, the hostility of some of the Tatar communities to Soviet Russia is well documented, and not likely to abate. All in all, it seems that the Tatar communities can generally speaking be classed with the Central Asians, with the proviso that some at least of them have, like the Kazakhs, traditionally displayed a relatively greater readiness to intermingle with Russians and assimilate to Russiandom. To that extent, of course, we may be nearer the border-line area between racial and ethnic differences. The Jews, on the other hand, must be classified as being in very large measure a racial

48 For an account of the Tatar role in the Muslim revival in Tsarist Russia, see Hans Bräker, 'The Muslim Revival in Russia' in G. Katkov, E. Oberländer, N. Poppe and G. von Rauch (eds), Russia Enters the Twentieth Century 1894-1917 (London, 1971). 'Pan-Islamic' activity need not be taken in the strictly religious sense, though in this context it is interesting that Bräker cites a Soviet source according to which religion has more adherents in the 'Eastern' republics than elsewhere in the Soviet Union (p.182). If there is to be some fresh pan-Moslem or Pan-Turkic movement in the USSR, the role of the astoundingly resolute and solidary Crimean Tatars could again become crucial, just as it was in the pre-Revolutionary Moslem revival. In this connection see the extremely interesting Crimean Tatar samizdat documents translated in Osteuropa XXV (1976), no.1, pp.A10-31. Despite the emphatic (though at times somewhat pro-Peking) Marxism-Leninism that the Crimean Tatar protesters profess, it is noticeable that they do not hesitate to speak of the Moslem peoples of the USSR as forming an emergent national group (p.A22), or to accuse their adversaries explicitly of 'racism' (e.g., p.A30-31).

49 The majority of Tatar dialects are to greater or lesser degree mutually comprehensible with the Turkic languages of Central Asia.
or quasi-racial minority in the Soviet context, despite their greatly diminished physical visibility as such.

Thus, while the Russians may be less prone to racial (if not national) animosities than Anglo-German or even Latin peoples have been, there are excellent reasons to believe that they are not free from these widespread human failings. And there is ample evidence that the USSR is not the emergent paradise of ethnic harmony and integration that it has at times been presented as approaching. Any attempt at more precise evaluation of Soviet propensities in this regard is difficult or even pointless given the almost complete blotting out of information on the subject after the 1920s. Some evidence bearing on these matters has been collected again in recent years by Soviet scholars. Reference will be made to some of that evidence in the pages ahead. However, in general it will be simply assumed that the peoples

There is a popular belief that the French in Africa and the Spanish and Portuguese in America were more 'liberal' or at least less rigidly racialist than other West European colonists were. One authority at least believes that these differences have been overstated; that the relatively better racial relations of South America do not reflect any greater humanity or racial tolerance on the part of the original colonizers; and that there is a good deal of evidence of racialism in some contemporary Latin American societies (P. van den Berghe, op.cit., Chs 4 and 6).

There is relatively little evidence on the state of ethnic relations in Russian Central Asia before the revolution. Wheeler remarks 'It is difficult to describe the relationship subsisting between the Russians and their subject Asian people on the eve of Revolution with any degree of precision.' G. Wheeler, Racial Problems, p.8. For a sanguine view of the course of events after 1917 in one part of our area, see David Lane, 'Ethnic and Class Stratification in Soviet Kazakhstan 1917-1939'.

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of the Soviet Union share some of the ethnocentric vices of humanity, with those probable modifications to the general pattern that have been outlined in the preceding discussion; and that although these vices may not always find overt expression, they can nonetheless be reasonably assumed to be present where other evidence would suggest it. In what follows, attention is focussed rather on the demographic aspects of ethno-demographic problems in the Soviet Union; here, at least, some relatively plausible and precise-looking information is available. In the subsequent course of the discussion, however, due consideration shall be given to the possibility that in the future severe national or racial conflicts may arise, worsen or emerge in the Soviet Union, aggravated by demographic developments which in themselves are already, within a certain margin of error, safely predictable.

3.b(ii) Ethnic relations in the USSR: the demographic factor

Partly, perhaps because of their once very high birth and natural increase rates, the Russians tend to have been thought of in the past as a people of virtually unlimited demographic capacity. And though their settling of Siberia

52 This image seems to have been shared by the Russians themselves. Cf. Blok:

Mil'ony - vas. Nas - t'my, i t'my, i t'my.
Poprobuite, srazites' s nami!
Da, skify - my! Da, aziaty - my, -
S raskosymi i zhadnymi ochami!

It has been suggested to the author by a Soviet bloc demographer that the cliché motion 'Nas mnogo' embedded in the Soviet Russian consciousness has been a considerable obstacle to efforts to achieve a more active pro-natalist policy in the USSR in recent years.
has actually always proceeded at rather a slow pace, they have indeed applied first military and then demographic force majeure to a considerable number of peoples and extensive areas in the east of their empire. As late as the early 1960s, the trend still seemed to be all in one direction, with the Russians further increasing their advantage all the time, and all the other peoples apparently doomed to cultural extinction, or sblizhenie (convergence) and then sliianie (merging), to use the Soviet formulation that held sway in the later Khrushchov years. Then between the censuses of 1959 and 1970, it became apparent that the earlier picture of universally advancing Russification was

by no means the whole truth. Demographic trends which had earlier seemed capable only of slowing down the process, now threatened to halt or reverse it. Russia's manifest destiny suddenly began to seem less manifest. I shall now discuss some of the salient features of those trends.

The declining USSR fertility has been largely declining Russian and Slav fertility. The population of the Russian Republic, the RSFSR (which contains 83.5% of all Russians) has declined from being 56.3% of the population in 1959 to 53.8% in 1970 and 53.0% in 1974. There is no reason to suppose that this trend will be reversed; on the contrary it seems more likely that it will intensify.

By 1990, the RSFSR will probably contain less than half of the total Soviet population. The immediate result of this milestone being passed will doubtless not be the automatic issuance of a constitutional charter for the nationalities. But that this prospect has political significance is borne out by the fact that the simple statistic relating to 1970 given above was not included in any of the volumes of the official 1970 Census results.

The proportion of Russians within the USSR as a whole has also declined, from 54.7 in 1959 to 53.4 in 1970, another detail which was not found worthy of inclusion in

the 1970 Census Results. Setting aside for a moment the question of whether or not there might be any tendency to over-count Russians in censuses conducted under present Soviet conditions, there are two points which should be made. Firstly, that the total of Russians evidently includes some proportion of assimilation gains. And secondly, that Russian increase rates in the first years of the 1959-1970 period were relatively high and unlikely to be reattained. It follows from this that we can expect the Russian decline over this decade to be greater barring an increase in assimilation gains (which is possible) or the application of Soviet experience in conducting elections to census procedures. To my knowledge, no Soviet projections of population by republic (much less by nationality) have

55 Before the census results were published there was speculation in the Western press that the Russians might emerge as a minority. In an article entitled 'Census shows [sic] Russians soon will be minority', the Herald Tribune International of 30 May 1969, reported that the Lithuanian Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities, Justas Paleckis, had publicly reminded Western journalists that the old Tsarist empire had been less than 50% Russian and that for this reason (emphasis added - JB) Lenin had proposed a multinational structure for the young Soviet state. The writer of the Herald Tribune article described Paleckis's statement as 'a hint that the country is being prepared for a changing population balance'. This would seem to be an instance of the totalitarian fallacy at work. Given Soviet discretion about these statistics since the census, it is surely more plausible to argue that Paleckis was simply betraying a leaning towards what might be called the minorities-autonomist extreme of the currently permissible range of expression.

Postscript: Paleckis was criticized in 1975 for bourgeois nationalism expressed in his memoirs 'V dvukh mirakh' (Moscow Politizdat 1974). See Kommunist, October 1975, pp.75-86. See also Radio Liberty Research, 24 March 1976. 'High Lithuanian Official Reprimanded for Ideological Deviator
been published, which is itself suggestive. 56

A further basic point to note is the decline in the relative strength of the Slav population within the Union as a whole, from a total of 77.1 in 1959 to 74.6 in 1970. 57 This trend too is likely to accelerate, and is less likely to be padded by assimilation, since the great bulk of the assimilation going on in the Soviet Union at present is occurring among the Slavic population. This statistic is scarcely explosive as yet, but if present trends are maintained or even enhanced, it could begin to be so within a couple of decades, given the recent extreme dominance of Slavs in the Soviet political leadership.

It may seem to some that the 'if present trends are maintained' is an extremely problematical 'if'. It is much less so than it may appear. High fertility societies in contemporary medico-demographic conditions have a kind of inbuilt spring mechanism which, barring natural or other catastrophes makes further dynamic natural increase in the short term inevitable. Even if inherent fertility rates were to decline rapidly over the next two

56 Reticence on matters of this kind is not confined to the Soviet Union. The Report of the US Commission on Population Growth and the American Future also seems to avoid passing on any information about the likely future proportions of Black Americans and other minorities within the total population. The statistics that actually are presented seem designed more to reassure than to enlighten. See Population and the American Future (Washington, 1972), p.71-2.

57 Cf. A. Bohmann, 'Russen und Russisch in der UdSSR', Aussenpolitik, 1971, p.757. Bohmann's figures include Poles, Bulgarians, Czechs and Slovaks as well as the larger Slavic groups.
decades in the high-fertility areas of the USSR (and the indications are rather that the decline will be gradual), the present age-structure of those populations will ensure that rapid increase will continue and last decades longer than the fertility-mortality pattern which originally set it in motion. Central Asians have been exposed to contraception and abortion for some time now, and also to propaganda aimed against early marriage and other socio-cultural factors tending to maximize fertility. The results to date have been only modest, and there is no very good reason for supposing that a dramatic transformation is about to occur. Moreover, Soviet population policy seems for the present to be hamstrung on the nationalities issue. But even if the government were to adopt and press with reckless abandon a differential fertility policy aimed at reversing the existing trends, by the time their policy began to bite (assuming that it was successful) the pattern up to the year 2000 (and indeed beyond) would largely have been set anyway. The time for the Soviet government to have acted in this matter was a decade and a half ago, if not earlier.

The pattern of development in the individual republics is often more striking than that in the country as a whole. Between the 1926 and 1959 Censuses, the proportion of Russians in the different union republics (including the RSFSR itself) increased universally; and over the same period, there was a dramatic accession of new Russian settlers into the newly acquired republics of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Moldavia. In many republics, the increases were very steep. This was particularly true of Latvia, Estonia, Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, where the proportion of Russians between the mid-thirties and 1959 increased from 12% to 26% (Latvia), 7% to 22% (Estonia), 20% to 43% (Kazakhstan), and 12.0% to 39% (Kirgiz).
The increases were substantial also in the Ukraine (9% to 18%), Turkmenia (8% to 17%), Tadzhikistan (from an insignificant percentage to 13%), Uzbekistan (6% to 14%) and the RSFSR itself (73% to 83%); whilst the Moldavians and Lithuanians suddenly found themselves with 10.2% and 8.5% of Russians respectively. Only in Belorussia and the Caucasian republics were the changes of modest dimensions. 58

Since 1959, the pattern has been radically transformed at a number of points. The Russian proportion of the population has, it is true, increased in all the Western republics, i.e. in the Baltic states, Belorussia, Moldavia and the Ukraine. But in every case except Belorussia (where the earlier rate of increase had been very small), the rate of further relative increase of Russians has been greatly reduced; 59 and while the respective periods involved are not strictly comparable, the drop in the rate of increase is too sharp not to reflect a trend. Several different factors are involved here. A key one is the declining numbers of underemployed Russians physically available for colonial settlement or transfer as urban workers. In the case of Estonia and Latvia it would appear that some caution may have been exercised for a time in deference to the national

58 All the earlier percentages refer to 1926 except for Lithuania and Moldavia (both 1936), Latvia (1935) and Estonia (1941). The figures have been taken from F. Lorimer, op.cit., p.63-64 and B. Lewickyj, 'Sowiecka polityka narodowościowa', Kultura (Paris, 1960), no.152, p.80-2.

59 Pravda, 17 April 1971.
sensibilities of the peoples concerned. In Lithuania, the indigenous population has staged a considerable demographic recovery after the ravages of war and successive occupations. And in Moldavia, a rate of natural increase well above the USSR average makes it difficult for the inflow of Russians to make very much impression on the overall percentages. As for the Ukraine, the statistics do not bear out any picture of galloping Russification enveloping pockets of intelligentsia and rural resistance. The numbers of Russians and more particularly Russian-speakers are going up substantially - much faster than in the RSFSR itself; but the percentage of people choosing to identify themselves as Ukrainians for census purposes declined only from 76.8% to 74.9%. And in this case, unlike in the case of changes of similar magnitude mentioned earlier, it is by no means certain that the trend will continue.

In the Caucasian republics, where Russian demographic inroads have always been relatively modest, there have been declines in the proportion of Russians in every case. In Armenia, the proportion has dropped to 2.7% and is still falling; this seems scarcely enough even as a flag-showing mission. In Georgia, the proportion of Russians is even declining in the capital, Tbilisi, as the Georgians reported

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60 There was a report in Iunost, 1967, no.10, p.90, to the effect that mass immigration into the Baltic states had grown so intense that the authorities had been forced to close the borders. This may have been a concession from the post-Khrushchov leadership. If so, it has evidently been since withdrawn. Immigration into Estonia at least rose dramatically again in 1969 and 1970. See T. Parming, 'Soziale Konsequenzen der Bevölkerungsveränderungen in Estland seit 1939' in Acta Baltica XI (1971), p.21.
in their republican newspaper in 1971 (though there was no need to do so). This is indeed a noteworthy development though not as exceptional as earlier trends towards Russianization of the Republican capitals might have suggested.

In Azerbaidzhan, the percentage drop was the largest in the Caucasus - from 13.6% back to 10%. The absolute total of Russians in the three Caucasian republics as a whole has stagnated, which would suggest that the policy there is not to strive for ultimate demographic domination as would seem to be the case in Latvia and Estonia. There are obvious geo-political reasons why this should be so.

61 The initial census results published in the various republican newspapers in April, May, June and July of 1971 contained interesting differences in the amount of detail presented on national composition. Where the trends favoured the indigenous nationality (as in Georgia and Kazakhstan for example) more information was made available. Where the trends were less favourable, a policy of least said soonest mended was followed; thus the only republican paper not to provide nationality structure data in percentage form for its own republic for 1959 and 1970 was Sovetskaia Estoniia (18 May 1971). Those reports which included ethnic breakdowns for the capital city in 1959 and 1970 were invariably able to record a relative improvement in the position of the republican nationality. This group, a surprisingly large nine (of the fifteen) includes Kiev, but does not include Tallin, Riga (where there is now a Russian majority), Kishinev, Dushanbe or Frunze.

62 Given the pattern of interwoven settlement and keen ethnic hostility between the main nations in the area (and on the other side of the Soviet border), it ought not to tax the diplomatic skills of the Soviet leadership too greatly to maintain their dominant control there by traditional imperial methods. In Central Asia, by contrast, the peoples involved, whatever their differences, have much stronger linguistic and cultural ties, and a much more formidable extra-mural ally in China.
In the Central Asian republics where Russiandom registered some of its most spectacular advances before 1959, there has also been a decline in the proportion of Russians in every case. For the time being, the continuing flow of immigration into the area plus the relatively high natality of the still young, but ageing immigrant population are succeeding in keeping the figures respectable. But there seems little prospect that this position can be maintained for very much longer. With the exception of some of the northern and eastern oblasti of Kazakhstan, the Russian hold in the area is tenuous, and confined to the cities. Whether Russian social and economic (as distinct from political) dominance of the area can be maintained when the major influx of indigenous people into the cities gets under way seems dubious. Any any attempt to detach the region of demographic conquest in the north will not be a simple undertaking.

Writing just after the 1959 Census, Boris Lewytzkyj said:

The Central Asian republics are in the worst situation. The Kazakh Republic is now Kazakh only by name...whilst the Kirgiz are on the way to becoming a national minority in their own republic.63

This statement undoubtedly reflected the general trend of opinion at the time. And yet even in Kazakhstan, where the inflow of Russians and Ukrainians (who assimilate to Russiandom very quickly away from the Ukraine) after the 1959 census was probably more intensive than anywhere else, the proportion of Russians and Ukrainians together has declined from 50.9 to 49.6, whilst the Kazakh figure

63 Lewickyj, op.cit., p.82.
has gone up from 30.0 to 32.6. By the 1980s, barring untoward developments, these two statistics can be expected to be racing in opposite directions. The Kazakhs have evidently recovered from their colossal losses during the collectivization era (there was an absolute decline of nearly one quarter in the Kazakh population between 1926 and 1939), and are now engaged on a peaceful reacquisition of their own land in accordance with the best traditions of Stalinist population doctrine; for which they can scarcely be subjected to open censure.

Elsewhere the picture is similar. In Kirgizia, the Kirgiz have increased from 40.5 in 1959 to 43.8% of the population in 1970, while the Russians and Ukrainians have together declined from a total of 36.8 to 33.3%. The Tazhiks in Tadzhikistan have gone up from 53.1 to 56.2%, whilst the Russian and Ukrainian combined total is down from 14.7 to 13%. In Turkmenistan, the titular nationality has increased from 60.9% in 1959 to 65.6% in 1970, whilst the Russians' and Ukrainians' combined proportion declined from 18.7 to 16.1%. And in Uzbekistan, the Uzbeks have increased from 62.1 to 65.5% of the total, while the Russians and Ukrainians are down from 14.6 to 13.4%. It should be reemphasized that these developments have taken place despite the fact that the total number of Russians in Central Asia as a whole increased by 36.9%, a figure which is of course far and away higher than the overall Russian

65 This and the immediately following statistics are taken from *Pravda*, 4 April 1971.
66 Szporluk, *op.cit.*, p.98.
increase of 13.1% for the same period. Thus Russiandom has been committing more forces to the battle as it were than it can really afford to lose, without being able to turn the tide. All the massive Russian influx into Central Asia is likely to achieve in the long-term is a growing aggravation of the employment problem (as local demographic pressure on the job market builds) and probably, increasing resentment among the indigenous peoples. Only in northern Kazakhstan have the foundations been laid for a Karelian-type annexation. And there it may be more prudent to be forbearing.  

In some ways, perhaps, the most surprising decline of all, though modest in dimensions, is the diminution of the percentage of Russians within the RSFSR from 83.3 to 82.8%. For here the Russians might be expected to make their largest gains from assimilation. Moreover, with one or two exceptions, they are not confronted in their own republic by any strong national groups with large net

67 Despite the acquisition of substantial tracts of Finland in the intervening period, the total number of both Karelians and Finns declined between the 1926 and 1970 censuses from 248,000 to 146,000 and from 139,000 to 85,000 respectively. (Cf. Lorimer, op.cit., p.139 and Itogi vol.IV, p.11). The Karelian SSR which was established in 1940 was demoted to ASSR status in 1956, presumably partly in consequence of the small and diminishing proportion of representatives of the titular nationality. In six of the seventeen oblasti of Kazakhstan, the Kazakhs form less than 20% of the population (in 1959, the Karelians formed 13.1% of the population of the Karelian ASSS). But nowhere are they in significant further decline. (Cf. Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 9 June 1971). Moreover, a Karelian solution for the northern oblasti would obviously severely strain the situation in the south. For these reasons, it does not appear likely.

68 Pravda, 4 April 1971.
increase rates. If observers were once ready enough to dismiss the chances of Central Asian peoples surviving as anything other than half-assimilated rump minorities in their own homelands, their attitude towards the future of the ethnic groups in the RSFSR was even more peremptory. And yet even this does not seem to be being borne out by events. Of the 16 autonomous republics of the RSFSR, the proportion of Russians declined in all but five.\(^69\) In two of those five, the increase was marginal. In the remaining three, with the arguable exception of the Yakut Autonomous Republic, Russian demographic, as well as political domination of the area was not really in doubt anyway. In some potentially not unimportant areas on the Volga and in the North Caucasus area, the indigenous peoples have made significant gains. I shall enlarge on this point later.

Two other general statistical perspectives may be worth reviewing at this stage. In the period before the Stalinist *Gleichschaltung* of the nationalities, and during it, considerable concern was expressed about pan-Moslem and pan-Turanian tendencies. As the nations which are now staging rapid demographic advances almost all belong to one or other or both of the Moslem and Turkic families, it may be valuable to consider the collective magnitudes involved in each case. Some people are inclined to assume that as religion has been suppressed for so long in Soviet Asia, the old cultural and potentially political affinities have been or soon will be permanently obliterated. This seems a rash assumption. Concerning pan-Turanianism, suffice it to note, in justification of the exercise, that a Soviet

\(^{69}\) *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 20 May 1970, p.3.
linguist has seen fit to claim that nearly all the Turkic speakers of the USSR can understand each other; and, also, that there have been some moves towards undoing some of the cellularization of the Turkic languages that was wrought in the Stalin period.

Between the 1959 and 1970 Censuses, the total number of those belonging to the Moslem nations, according to my reckoning, increased from 24,785,000 to 35,004,000, whilst that of the combined Turkic peoples rose from 23,050,000 to 32,108,000, of which all but 2,504,000 also belonged to the Moslem community. As the two groups do overlap to a large extent, it will be economical to consider the demographic prospects vis-a-vis the European population of just one of them, the Moslems.

70 N. Baskakov in Iazyki narodov SSSR Vol.II. Tiurkskie iazyki, reviewed by G.K. Dulling in Central Asian Review, Vol.XV (1967), p.160. Dulling expresses some scepticism about this claim. The more dubious it is linguistically, however, the more significant it is from other points of view. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay (op.cit., p.207) assert that 'Linguistic kinship is still very much alive - an Uzbek has little difficulty in understanding a Kazakh, a Turkmen or an Azeri.' A leading world authority on Turkic languages, Professor S. Wurm of the Australian National University, suggests that in fact there are significant differences of degree of mutual comprehensibility, Turkmen, Azeri and Turkish, for example, being very close, and Kazakh and Kirghiz a good deal closer to one another than either is to Uzbek or Turkmen. An Uzbek would have relatively little difficulty in understanding a Turkmen, but much greater difficulty in communicating with a Kazakh, or more especially, an Azeri - Turkmen constituting a kind of link between the Turkmen-Azeri-Turkish group and the one to which Uzbek belongs. (personal communication)

As was mentioned earlier, no Soviet projections of population by republic or nationality are apparently available. What might be done, however, is to improvise a single simplified projection for the Moslem population to the year 2000 just to ascertain roughly what order of magnitude is involved.

The increase from the 1959 to the 1970 Census (35.0 million - 24.8 million = 10.2 million) implies an average annual increase of 3.16% per annum. Taking this figure as the starting point and assuming that natural increase will have declined linearly to 1.0% per annum by 2000 (which is a rather strong assumption, and one which should more than compensate for any tendency to overstate the 1970 natural increase level by taking the average for the previous decade when rates were probably declining slightly), estimated Moslem population in the year 2000 will be about 65 million. Baldwin's 1973C series projection of the total Soviet population for 2000 is 307 million. The roughness of the procedures adopted to assess future Moslem population should not be contrasted with any mysterious prescience.

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72 Feshbach and Rapawy, op.cit., p.492, refer to unpublished estimates and projections prepared by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division of the US Bureau of Commerce for the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, but it is not clear how detailed these are. Moreover, they relate to the able-bodied population and seem to be based on simplifying assumptions that would make them unsuitable for other purposes.

imputed to the Census Bureau's projections. The major
defect of the whole operation consists in a tendency to
understate probabilities on the Moslem side and slightly
overstate them on the overall Soviet side. What has been
done in effect is to assume a very modest decline in the
fertility of A plus B, whilst assuming a very solid decline
in the fertility of B. Given that B (i.e. the Moslem part
of the Soviet population) is probably contributing a good
two-fifths of total Soviet annual population increase at
present, this could easily cause significant underestimation
of relative Moslem strength by 2000. I am following this
procedure in order to forestall any impression that might
otherwise be created that the case is being overstated.

Taking these very cautious rough estimates for
what they are worth, we can now compare the proportion of
members of the Moslem peoples within the total Soviet
population for 1970 and 2000: for 1970, the percentage
is 14.5; and for 2000 it is 21.3. And be it emphasized
once more; these figures are so cautious as to be almost
foolhardy.

The Russian increase of 13.05% between the 1959
and 1970 Censuses was one of the lowest of any major people
within the Soviet population, despite their presumable
assimilation gains. Even that figure was achieved largely
thanks to the relatively high natality of the early sixties
before the fertility decline really took full effect. Future
increases are not likely to be relatively as great, not
even in the present decade, despite the fact that the
age-structure is at present particularly propitious. But
even assuming that the Russian element were to cling tenaciously
to its present 53% of the total Soviet population to the
year 2000 (a quite unreal assumption on present indications),
that would give it a total of some 163 million in our hypothetical population of 309 million.

There is a tendency for observers to juxtapose the likely Russian and Moslem or Central Asian figures and conclude that the Russians may not be expanding very fast, but that nonetheless they have the numbers and are not likely to be overrun. Thus Mr Geoffrey Jukes, for example, writes:

...even if the present trends should continue, a drastic change in the balance between races will not occur. Should the present differential rates of increase continue for the rest of the century, the Soviet population would rise to about 320 million of which Central Asians (a smaller group than 'Moslem peoples' - J.F.B.) would constitute about 63 million, while there would be about 170 million Russians. It is therefore unlikely that the Soviet leaders have yet begun to have nightmares over the prospect of being swamped by their internal segment of the 'teeming masses' of Asia.\(^{74}\)

Mr Jukes indicates by his use of the word 'even' that he feels that the trends are bound to tilt back towards the Russians before 2000. While I suspect that his calculation is at least as likely to overestimate future Russian numbers as future Central Asian numbers, it is the political evaluation he makes of those magnitudes which seems least convincing.

To begin with, it implies a false juxtaposition of 170 million Russians and 63 million Central Asians. In fact the juxtaposition will be of 63 million or whatever

Central Asians and 11 or 12 million Russians in the relevant area. It is not necessary to postulate any Central Asian march on Moscow. It will be sufficient if they march (metaphorically) on Tashkent, the 'capital of Central Asia' as a Kirgiz (n.b. not an Uzbek) poet recently apostrophized. The confrontation is likely to be worked out in a local context. French numerical superiority on the mainland was not sufficient to maintain the position of the colons in Algeria. The Russians have the advantages of contiguous borders and an efficient central control system; but the capacity of the latter to contain racially-tinged socio-economic confrontations of the type which seem to be maturing in Central Asia is yet to be demonstrated.

75 It might be objected that the use of generic notions like 'Moslems' and 'Central Asians' is an indefensibly loose procedure. However, for the most part, the propositions being made in collective form about their demographic behaviour and ethno-political attitudes are equally valid for each individual nation. And, in addition, it is reasonable to assume that some such collective self-identification is made by many representatives of those peoples themselves (cf. notes 48 above, and 76, below). It is not being suggested that the 'Moslems' or 'Central Asians' are bound to form a tightly-knit bloc in all matters of socio-political relevance. But there is a good deal more basis in language, history, culture and current political experience for some kind of Moslem 'négritude' concept to take hold in the USSR (implicitly or explicitly) than there is in Africa itself.

76 'Greetings to you, my Uzbek, our thoughts and reveries are one, you are the closest kin, the right hand of a Kirgiz, and Tashkent is the capital of Central Asia.' Baydilda Sarnogoev, 'Salat saga', in Ala Too no.2, 1970, quoted in A. Procyk, 'The Search for a Heritage and the Nationality Question in Central Asia' in E. Allworth (ed.), The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia (New York, 1973), p.130.
The relative quietism of the Central Asian educated classes in the recent past ought not to be presumed a permanent feature. The Russian domination of the urban work force, and with it, the key sectors of social and economic life is likely to be challenged in the next decade or two, particularly as the increasingly massive indigenous birth cohorts of 1950 onwards come onto the labour market. 77

Moreover, the number of educated Central Asians is increasing even more explosively than the population as a whole, and will continue to do so. 78 Arutjunian's much commented-on

77 Cf. van den Berghe: 'In the competitive case, prejudice against groups seems to build up to a point of dangerous tension in response to such conditions as rapid influx of lower-caste migrants or rising unemployment'. P. van den Berghe, op.cit., p.30.

78 Education of less privileged minorities of any kind tends to be politically destabilizing. A sophisticated Soviet rejoinder might be that if education is coupled with opportunities for social mobility as in Soviet Central Asia, there should be no problem. Quite apart from the specific questions of (a) to what extent the Central Asian peoples have really been fully admitted to all fields of socio-economic endeavour and (b) whether Soviet planning will be able to provide adequate employment for the enormous bulge in the labour force that is currently developing, it is not clear as a general proposition whether or not social mobility does in fact tend to reduce ethnic resentments. Cf. L. Kuper '...mobility may have very different consequences... In a racially structured society...appreciable upward mobility may in fact stimulate revolutionary change.' 'Race class and power', p.414 (Kuper was not using the term 'racially' in a restrictive sense here.) Where social mobility is blocked, of course, the situation is likely to be worse again. For some sober reflections on the benefits modernization has brought to the Central Asians, see Robert A. Lewis et al. 'Modernization, Population Change and Nationality', Canadian Slavonic Papers 1975, nos 2-3, p.286. The authors point out that the levels of urbanization achieved by the Central Asians according to the 1970 Census are only comparable with those of such countries as Liberia, Zambia, Paraguay and West Malaysia; and that in certain respects, the educational gap between the Russians in Central Asia and the Central Asians themselves is widening (pp.294-98).
finding that the Tatar intelligentsia of the Tatar ASSR is more prone to chauvinism than the working class is likely to be equally applicable to Central Asia. And here, as in so many other things, the reasonable expectation surely is that the numbers of chauvinists are going to grow.

The problem is unlikely to be relieved by outmigration of the Central Asians in large numbers. For one thing, they seem the least inclined of all the Soviet national groups to leave their homelands. It is similarly unlikely to be relieved by assimilation. The Central Asians have hitherto also been the least assimilable of all the nationalities. Their level of proficiency in Russian remains


80 Soviet writers usually maintain of course that 'bourgeois nationalism' is diminishing and destined to ultimately disappear. Experience elsewhere, however, would seem to suggest that as societies grow more socially and economically sophisticated, far from abating, ethnic tensions and chauvinist excesses actually tend to increase: Belgium, Yugoslavia, Uganda, Ireland, Canada - to name a few instances almost at random. Nor would these phenomena appear to be confined to any particular type of socio-economic system. The efficient Soviet control system may keep such stresses in check or even wholly out of sight; but they may still exert a concealed influence in normal times, or flare into overt prominence when circumstances change. For most illuminating discussions of instances of the latter type occurring in the Socialist bloc, see Grey Hodnett and Peter Potichnyj, The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis (Canberra, 1970), and Robert R. King, Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States (Harvard U.P., 1973), esp. Chs 4 and 6.

81 See, for example, V. Perevedentsev, 'O vliianii etnicheskikh faktorov na territorialnoe pereraspredelenie naselenia' in Izvestiia Akademii Nauk Seria Geografia IV (1965).
very low. Other than among the Kazakhs very few advance Russian as their native language or as a competently spoken second language. And statistics on mixed marriages confirm that most of the Moslem peoples are more likely to intermarry among themselves than to marry Europeans. 82

Perhaps the most difficult and singular feature of the Central Asian situation however is that there trends seem to point to an inevitable future change in the dominant national group. In the cities of the Western Republics (with the partial exceptions of Ukraine and more recently, Latvia), the Russians have been at most politically and not demographically in the ascendant. In Central Asia, on the other hand, they have formed an overwhelming majority in the cities. Demographically this pattern is bound sooner or later to change radically. While the Soviet government may or may not deem it expedient to reduce the numbers of Russians and Russian-speakers in Riga or Tallin at some time in the future, they will not be outnumbered there as a result of future trends in fertility or migration among the Baltic populations. In the cities of Ukraine and Belorussia, even if their demographic presence were to be weakened (which does not seem imminent), their assimilatory gains could quite possibly continue to offset any losses. In the Caucasian republics they have never seemed likely to outnumber the indigenous populations. But in Central Asia they will have to resign themselves to rapidly becoming a minority in urban areas which in some instances must once have seemed as Russian as Novgorod or Vologda. The social position of the Kirgiz in Kirgizian cities is clearly not the same as that of the Georgians in Georgian cities. But as the

82 For a closer discussion of these problems, see 3.b(iii) below.
Kirgiz begin to move into their cities in greater numbers, they are bound sooner or later to aspire to such a status, and then a destabilizing transformational phase must inevitably ensue. Irrespective of whether any implicit or explicit challenge is issued to central authority, a great many economic, administrative, and most important of all, psychological adjustments will have to occur on both sides. In analogous situations elsewhere in the world, the European element has politically and often demographically withdrawn completely. This last-resort defusing technique would not seem a realistic possibility in the Soviet case for the present. But it could be argued that something analogous has been happening in the Kosovo province of Yugoslavia in recent years. There would seem to be, therefore, no inherent reason why similar developments could not occur in the USSR as well at some time in the future.

Currently the internal political konjunktura in the USSR favours the Great Russian element. This seems likely to continue for the foreseeable future. But should the demographic or the political situation change sufficiently, and in particular should some future leadership opt for a substantial degree of decentralization, the relative strength of the Central Asian factor could greatly increase as developments in Yugoslavia after the decline of the 'Great
Serbian chauvinist Ranković suggest. The international political situation may also work increasingly to the benefit of the Central Asians. Indeed, it has already done so. The Sino-Soviet conflict has unleashed propaganda campaigns on both sides aimed at the Central Asian and Sinkiang minorities of the respective adversaries. Third World pressures (oil-powered?) on behalf of the Central Asians could also emerge as a factor, particularly if the Sino-Soviet rivalry in this domain were to intensify. For demographic reasons, the Soviet Union is likely to become more and not less vulnerable on this point.

Similar considerations apply to the Turkic peoples as have been expounded in the context of the Moslems. Only the Finno-Ugrian family seems to be supplying a steady flow

83 Cf. note 26 above. While one would not wish to argue that the Serbs lost the position of dominant (large) minority-cum-near-majority which they held in pre-war Yugoslavia (and to a lesser extent up to 1965 in Socialist Yugoslavia) due to their relative demographic decline (they claimed to form over 50% of the population after the 1931 census, were 42.1% according to the 1961 census, and only 39.7% according to the 1971 census), it is probably true that their demographic behaviour is making it difficult for them to hope to achieve hegemony in the future; and also that the Russians are stronger in the USSR than the Serbs are in Yugoslavia partly because the Russians were and still are a real majority, whereas the Serbs were at best a phoney majority. In fact, the Serbs' relative decline at censuses reflects their growing political weakness rather more than their declining fertility. But the longer the relative demographic decline of the Russians lasts, the more conceivable it becomes that political decentralization will emerge as a serious possibility. Should such a decentralization occur, of course, we may well learn after the event that Russian demographic strength had also been exaggerated by previous censuses, just as Serbian numbers were. See Ch. 5, below.
of assimilated Russians to the point where its own (probably higher) fertility does not represent any kind of local threat. Though there again, it is interesting, and perhaps significant that most of these ethnic groups are now showing net gains rather than losses. The Finno-Ugrians remain substantial and in some cases rapidly increasing communities which could yet experience a renaissance of national identity.

To date, although there have been guarded hints from demographers and journalists, including some apparently writing with official sanction, that there is a need for a differential population policy that would counteract some of the 'unfavourable' trends that have been described above, nothing very much seems to have happened. An important part of the problem is of course that official ideology at the present stage of its development does not permit expressly nationalist justifications for policy. Nor can it be admitted that ethnic relations in the Soviet Union can by their very nature be anything but harmonious. Thus while tacit deviations from this norm can of course be practised or tolerated, it is difficult to launch full-scale propaganda and administrative campaigns that fly directly in the face of it. While policymakers hesitate, events move inexorably onward. They have in any case gone too far for major future changes to be averted. In this situation, the leadership seems to have placed its money (with what conviction can only be conjectured) on the only wager available, namely linguistic and cultural assimilation. The results of the 1970 census and official

84 A study has revealed that Komi women at least are more fertile than Russian women (including those resident in the Komi ASSR). The standardized fertility index of the Komi women was 58% above the RSFSR average (cf. 29.4% in the case of Russian women resident in the Komi ASSR). Zdravookhranenie Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1972, no.2, p.7.
pronouncements on population developments contain innumerable indications of the official hope that while the number of Russians may decline, that of Russian-speakers will increase. This seems a forlorn prospect. The number of Russian-speakers is increasing at a more satisfactory rate. But the difference for the time being is marginal, and not enough to indicate a trend. The number of Russians, as was mentioned earlier, dropped from 54.6% to 53.4% between 1959 and 1970. The number giving Russian as their native tongue also dropped in the same period, from 59.5% to 58.7%. The fact that this decline is smaller than the other, and that the number of non-Russians giving Russian as their native language showed a solid absolute increase seems scarcely sufficient to warrant optimism. And in conditions where the great Russian language is being ceaselessly extolled, it may well be that this modest increase is more indicative of a stiffening of national resistances than anything else. 85 In any case, the nationalist speaking the colonial language is a sociological cliché. 86 Official Soviet pronouncements on numerical population developments

85 For a different view on this and related issues, see Rein Taagepera, 'The 1970 Soviet Census: Fusion or Crystallization of Nationalities?' in Soviet Studies XXIII (1971) no.2, p.216. For another analysis, see R. Szporluk, op.cit.

86 Cf. Walker Connor; 'Care must be taken not to confuse assimilation regarding overt characteristics, such as language and dress, with psychological assimilation; advances in the former need not be accompanied by advances in the latter.' 'The Politics of Ethnonationalism', p.20. Warnings against overestimating overt compliance with assimilatory norms seem particularly apposite to the Soviet case. It is, of course, also true that spreading Russian may have the paradoxical result of further facilitating contact among speakers of Turkic languages who might otherwise have found communication slightly more difficult.
show in fact a considerable degree of bemusement, and a strong tendency to evade issues, by seeking refuge in what are really sociological rather than demographic statistics (i.e. the number of doctors and hospital beds per head of population, the number with higher education in this year and that year and so on);

The present situation confronting Soviet Russian policy-makers in the nationalities sphere is rather like that of a thrifty woman seeking to patch holes in a patchy pair of trousers using patches drawn from those trousers themselves. To prevent exposure at one point involves the necessity of exposure at another. In such a situation, it is evident that there must be an allocation of priorities. The behaviour of the Soviet government to date, however, seems to suggest that it has not fully grasped this fundamental truth; or, alternatively, that population policy considerations are still given low priority. They have made onerous population investments (to avoid the already pre-empted term 'demographic investments') in areas where the interest rate is negative, and where the only final net yield is likely to be trouble. It is true that they have shown themselves eager to populate their crucial western and far eastern border areas as well. But whilst in the west they are forced to proceed with some caution because of the keen resentment felt by the autochthonous Baltic populations, in Siberia and the Far East, where the demographic and political threat is more external than internal, their policies have misfired, and sponsored immigration has been rendered virtually nugatory by spontaneous emigration. To the external observer, it would seem that they are also confronted by a danger that a band of continuous non-European (and largely Moslem) settlement might redevelop right across from the North
Caucasus area to the Turkestan-Sinkiang border. With the impending re-Kalmuckization of the Kalmuck ASSR on the north coast of the Caspian, only Astrakhan oblast, with its solid Russian majority is left holding the lines. Developments in the Turkic (both Moslem - Tatar and Bashkir and non-Moslem - Chuvash) and Finno-Ugrian autonomous republics in the Volga-Urals area are not wholly without their dangers either. This area is only separated from the north of Kazakhstan by a narrow neck of territory formed by Orenburg and Chelyabinsk oblasti where there are modest but by no means negligible non-Russian minorities. 'Elemental' migratory tendencies in the area would need to be kept under control. Presumably this much is being done.

Perhaps the most remarkable thing about current demographic trends in the context of the nationalities issue is the way in which certain Asian peoples vanquished long since, are now staging a revival, and by virtue of economic advance coupled with demographic dynamism reasserting a claim to some part at least of the lands in which they were once the masters, regaining thanks to the pax sovietica what they once had been forced to cede in military defeat.

87 See the national composition by republic, ASSR and oblast of the relevant regions in Itogi, vol.IV.

88 Sovetskaia Rossiia, 20 May 1971. Between 1959 and 1970, thanks in substantial measure to the return of Kalmucks from Central Asia following their rehabilitation, the Kalmuck percentage of the Republic's population rose from 35 to 41% while the Russian component fell from 56 to 46%. Even if few of the remaining 27,000 Kalmucks outside the Kalmuck ASSR were to succeed in returning, the greater demographic dynamism of those already there should make them a simple majority at least by the early 1980s.
Where previously the demographic strength of economically weaker peoples tended to be held in check by warfare and other Malthusian checks stemming from conditions imposed on the losers, currently the reverse applies. Political and economic strength no longer imply demographic strength; quite the contrary. In the context of multi-ethnic states this may lead to curious results. In the international arena a similar development is being observed, but there national military, economic and strategic considerations may, at least in the short term, prevent the growing populations of Latin America or Asia from generating any corresponding increase in political weight. But not all these considerations need be relevant in the case of multi-ethnic states. If the non-white component in the US population were to rise from its present 12% to 25% or 30%, say, and its incidence to be largely reconcentrated in a relatively few states, would this, politically, be a matter of indifference? Obviously the American system is more conducive to minority politicking in many ways. But the American system does not as a matter of principle seek the relatively more rapid social and cultural development of

The example has been chosen because of its capacity to stimulate the imagination. The conditions stated are quite unreal. Fertility differentials between white and coloured in the USA are actually much less than those between European and Moslem in the USSR, and on present indications appear likely to diminish further. See 'Family Size and the Black American', Population Bulletin, vol.30, no.4.
the minority peoples in the way that the Soviet system does. Moreover, it deprives ethnic minorities of their language with an alacrity and lack of effort that must excite the keenest envy in Moscow.

It would seem that the importance of the problem of the nationalities in the Soviet Union will grow at a speed at least commensurate with their demographic advance; and that the major problem area in the future will be Soviet Central Asia. It is ironic that this should be so, when, numerous brutal episodes notwithstanding, the record of Tsarist and Soviet administration has been better there than in most other places. And it is, of course, thanks to the relative Soviet tolerance of linguistic and cultural heterogeneity and their efforts at least partially to bridge the gap in development between different parts of the country, that the necessary bases for Central Asian 'nationalism of a new type' exist. A relatively good record, however, has

90 There has been a tendency recently for per capita GNP differentials between the republics to increase; and less emphasis is placed in official statements on equalization, and more on rational utilization of productive forces. Nonetheless capital redistribution continues on the whole to favour the poorer republics and were it not for their more rapid population growth and lower productivity, this would find greater reflection in relative per capita growth rates. For further discussion of these problems see H.-J. Wagener, 'Die RSFSR und die nichtrussischen Republiken: Ein ökonomischer Vergleich' in Osteuropa Wirtschaft II (1969), p.113; V. Bandera and Z. Melnyk, The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective (New York, 1973), esp. Chap.7, 'Regional Differences in Incomes and Levels of Living in the USSR' by Gertrude E. Schroeder; P. Wiles, 'Recent Data on Soviet Income Distribution', Survey, vol.21, no.3, pp.36-7; V. Holubnychy, 'Some Economic Aspects of Relations among the Soviet Republics' in E. Goldhagen, op.cit., pp.50-120.
not yet been an effective guarantee for any colonial power. As pressures build up in the Central Asian demographic cauldron, several things might conceivably happen. As the indigenous element in the cities grows and competition for jobs (with competence in Russian one of the factors) grows with it, Russian re-emigration from the area may set in amid harsh feeling all around (as has happened in Kosovo in recent years, where the Serbian population, originally in significant measure a political immigration, has been stagnating in the last decade because of net migration losses). Apart from the local impact of any such dénouement, which can readily be imagined, it may have the effect of sharpening Russian distaste for 'Asians', already reported to be running

91 Compare the following dictum of Shibutani and Kwan: 'In many cases subjugated peoples have enjoyed material advantages as a result of the contact, but they have invariably dwelled upon the indignities'. T. Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan, Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach, quoted in Robert A. Lewis et al. 'Modernization, Population Change and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan', Canadian Slavonic Papers 1975, nos 2-3, p.300.

92 Competition for jobs (particularly in industry) and discrimination against Central Asians on linguistic or other grounds have already been frequently commented on. See the evidence cited, for example, in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan (Baltimore, 1970), pp.286-88; and V. Holubnychy, 'Spatial Efficiency in the Soviet Economy', in Bandera and Melnyk, op.cit., p.6. Rywkin has challenged this view, emphasizing that Central Asians are often in fact given preferential treatment to maintain nationality quotas in particular spheres of activity. This practice, however, does not appear to apply to industrial labour; nor probably does it benefit the vast proportion of Central Asians who do not know Russian. M. Rywkin, 'Religion, Nationalism and Political Power', Canadian Slavonic Papers 1975, nos 2-3, pp.278-79. See also footnote 9, above.
high in the wake of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the rather heady propaganda that has sometimes been circulated in connection with it. This in turn might be expected to have a strong impact on the Soviet Russian view of the world in general, leading quite possibly to some measure of reorientation towards Europe and the West. Perhaps we are already witnessing something of the sort in détente (if for different reasons). Moscow might also respond by effecting a closing of ranks among the European or possibly the Slav or simply Russian element in the population, as during

Instances are quoted, for example, by P. Berton in 'The Border Issue: China and the Soviet Union', Studies in Comparative Communism, July–October 1969, p.137. The Chinese appear to have been the first to set this particular fuse alight: cf. H. Brahm, 'Pekings Spiel mit der Rassenfrage' in Osteuropa XV (1965), p.813. See also H. Salisbury, The Coming War between Russia and China (London, 1969), passim. It would appear that the blanket definition of 'Asian' to include Soviet Central Asian peoples as well as Chinese is something with which Soviet Asians are prepared to identify. Shafarevich writes: 'More than once - and it has happened to more people than me - I have had occasion in our Central Asian cities to hear the cry "Just wait till the Chinese come - they'll show you!"'. I. Shafarevich, 'Obosoblenie ili sblizhenie?' in A.I. Solzhenitsyn et al. Iz-pod glyb (Paris, 1974), p.97. Shafarevich goes on to remark that the kind of people who say it are usually 'not totally uncultured' people, the kind who ought to know what would happen to them should they ever have to suffer the rigours of Chinese nationalities policy. They know, and yet it makes no difference to them, just as it made no difference to those Ukrainian nationalists and others who collaborated with the Nazis against the Soviet Union and were later themselves arrested en masse. He also refers to samizdat proposals to solve the national question by extensive deportations, and ponders why history has taught people so little. Unfortunately the remainder of his essay suggests (like his use of the term 'our Central Asian cities') that history has not taught him all it might either.
World War II, perhaps too, with some of the same religious and traditionalist concessions. This, one suspects, if coupled with an appropriately reformulated 'Soviet' traditionalism could appeal much more strongly to the Russian population than the rather watery ideology they are being offered at present.

Alternatively, if the Europeans on the whole were to stay, and the Central Asians were to be forced to seek work in European USSR (something which they have been extremely reluctant to do voluntarily), their eventual appearance in rather large numbers in the cities of European USSR might lead to tensions of a different sort. Soviet Europeans are not likely to love them very much more than the Swiss, for example, love their economic immigrants. The result might be similar to that triggered by the arrival of coloured Commonwealth immigrants to liberal, tolerant England. An 'unshakable brotherhood' line would surely be maintained at first, but if popular resentment of the newcomers rose to high enough levels, it might well find tacit approval in the same way that popular anti-Semitism does now. The overall result might be much the same as in the paradigm described earlier in which the Central Asians stayed at home and the Russians returned: growing indigenous socio-economic strength in Central Asia and growing European resentment of the Central Asian peoples both there and elsewhere.

Even if five to 10 million Central Asian workers were to make their appearance in the European parts of the USSR by

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94 Given the growing demographic pressures on arable land and the labour market in the area, it is of course quite possible that indigenous outmigration could occur in the future irrespective of what the European settlers should choose to do.
the 1990s, their numerical preponderance in their homelands would not be materially altered. Such a situation— with large but demographically not dominant settlements of colonizers in the colonies, and large minorities of the colonials in the (still-ascendant) metropolitan country— would probably be without precedent in the history of European colonialism. Elsewhere, in Britain, France and Holland, for example, the main influx of racially distinct colonials began flowing into the metropolitan country only after the sensitive issue of national independence had been resolved. Thus if the Central Asians do migrate in substantial numbers to the European parts of the USSR, we will have, so to speak, a potentially Wolverhampton situation at home, and a Salisbury situation abroad, simultaneously. What the cumulative impact of such a combination might be can only be a matter of speculation at this stage. It may be that race relations in the USSR are inherently better than elsewhere (though I doubt it); perhaps they lack some of the key stigmata of racial, as opposed to ethnic tensions (though again I doubt it); and the Soviet Union may conceivably display superior political wisdom or a greater degree of efficient ruthlessness in handling the situation. But the situation itself will be structurally unique. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that in this matter discretion would be the better part of wisdom: that the Soviet authorities should at least ensure that only limited numbers and selected sociological samplings of Central Asians ever arrive in European USSR. In respect of this objective, at least, the regime is as well-equipped as any that has ever existed. But it may prove beyond them to hold the Central Asians in their own republics through the 1980s and 1990s without accepting widespread unemployment there.
In general, few viable policies seem obviously available to help forestall the dangers implicit in the present differential ethnic growth rates. The current line—avoiding wholly overt Russian chauvinism while pursuing mildly repressive policies in respect of nationalist threats as they arise, furthering intermingling in the hope of thereby spreading assimilationist trends, imposing the use of Russian wherever possible in schools, journalism, science and public life, maintaining and within demographic limitations increasing the Russian physical presence in all the Union Republics (outside the Caucasus), making the means of family limitation available and hoping the Central Asians will sooner or later come round to using them, speaking meanwhile loudly and often of fraternal relations, Soviet patriotism, and, hopefully, of an emergent Soviet people in the singular—though it may be the product of inertia, bemusement, stalemate or lack of imagination or concern, may not nonetheless be the worst alternative. More pessimistic and more optimistic prognoses of future trends in Soviet policy both suggest themselves as plausible up to a point.

Perhaps the greatest danger inherent in the situation is the possibility of further radical deterioration of the Soviet polity. Soviet constitutionalism is a tender plant, but the cautious re-Stalinization of recent years

95 Furthering intermingling between the different ethnic groups—though often proposed as a palliative or cure for racial tensions—seems at best a hazardous treatment. If it succeeds, it of course succeeds; but if it does not succeed, it must inevitably make things worse. Cf. Connor, 'Intergroup contacts are at least as apt to lead to increased discord as they are to mutual understanding: a review of ethnopolitical history strongly suggests discord is the more likely'. 'The Politics of Ethnonationalism', p.20.
notwithstanding, it would probably be true to say that for the first time in Soviet history, established ways of doing things are starting to emerge, group interests of a kind to be regularly affirmed, and the place of experts (including social scientists) recognized. The present de facto Soviet constitution seems to debar riding too rough-shod over the interests of any one major nationality, for instance. It also debars Russification that is both brutal and overt, repression on purely racialist or nationalist lines without ostensibly non-racialist or non-nationalist justification, or the preservation or fostering of economic inequality between nations and republics. This fragile rule of law wears very thin at certain points and is sometimes openly flouted with institutional authority, as the World University Games excesses of 1973 illustrate. And in general, the case of Soviet Jewry would seem to suggest that the society is currently generating both elite and popular needs for a convenient and ethnically more or less visible scapegoat. If and when Central Asian industrial workers come to live cheek by jowl with Slavs and others in European cities of the USSR, and not in their traditional quarters in the cities of Central Asia they may well assume certain of the Jews'...

96 According to reports (Newsweek, 3 September 1973, p.24), the sweat-suited vigilantes who threw their weight around at the Israel-Cuba basketball match were supplied by the army. Cf. also M. Agurskii, 'Neonatsistskaia opasnost' v Sovetskom Soiuze', Samizdat article published in Novy Zhurnal no.118 (March 1975), p.199.

social functions, particularly if large numbers of the latter were to emigrate. As both the intense idealism and the intense hostility towards the capitalist enemy seem to have largely disappeared from Soviet communism, it is in need of psychological and emotional fuel to recharge its batteries and restore some of its earlier dynamism. Once resident in European USSR in sufficient numbers, whilst presumably pressing for more voice in their own homelands, the Central Asians could be the kind of part-scapegoat, part-real-but-manageable-enemy that could encapsulate and serve as a convenient focus for anti-Chinese sentiments and anxieties.

The liberal alternative in anything seems unlikely in the Soviet Union at present. But this may be only a transient perspective. In any event, at least as far as the Central Asians are concerned, relative liberalism may make pragmatic good sense in the context of foreign policy. Reference was made earlier to the propaganda war that has been raging across the Sino-Soviet border with both sides aiming at influencing the national minorities of the other. While this does not affect all the peoples involved equally, as long as the two sides continue to be adversaries, certain limits are placed on their conduct of nationality policy

98 It should be remembered, however, that scapegoating requires a consciousness of overwhelming superiority. This is more likely to be felt by the popular masses than their rulers in the kind of situation that has been adumbrated. Any Soviet government, however chauvinist, would remain aware that bad ethnic relations at the centre would strain the political situation at the periphery (where the hypothetical metropolitan minority would, of course, be a solid majority). For this reason, they would be fearful of applying Black Hundreds methods to the 'Asians'; would be, that is, as long as political modes remained more or less rational.
in the vicinity of their common border. The Soviets have shown particular tenderness towards the small community of Moslem Uighurs (most of the 179,000 of whom are recent refugees from China), even allowing them to publish large amounts of various kinds of literature in their Arabic script, a most significant, and, one would have thought, risky deviation from their usual linguistic policy in Central Asia. 99 The Chinese, meanwhile, are proceeding to Latinize their Uighurs as a countermeasure. 100 Though the Chinese have shown considerable sensitivity about the members of their minority groups having been, as they always allege, abducted across the border by the Soviets, demographic reasons at least would suggest that on the whole, this is an area of policy in which the Soviet Union has the lesser freedom of manoeuvre. The Chinese minorities only amount to some 5% of the total population of the CPR; and the relative overall proportions are likely if anything to change in favour of the Han Chinese. The latter, moreover, are having and will have little difficulty in demographically swamping the minority areas adjoining on the Soviet Union. The Russians have pursued similar resettlement policies, but if one of their purposes in doing so has been to achieve demographic


dominance in Central Asia, they will manifestly not succeed. In this situation they may perceive that it is in their interest to make a virtue of necessity by keeping their nationalities positively happy as well as fostering disaffection among the minorities on the other side of the border. If so, they may then find it expedient to give the Central Asians more say in their own affairs; they might also decide to refrain from hindering tendencies towards national consolidation among the Turkic peoples of the area, possibly even sponsoring a little more international and internal Moslem religious activity than has hitherto been permitted.

The Soviet leadership seems to be aware that the most dangerous time for any government is when it begins to improve. However they may formulate this adage in their own minds they are unlikely to forget its wisdom completely within a generation or so of 1956. If they do opt for liberalism in their nationalities policy, it is likely to be restricted geographically to the areas of greatest need. And of course, the three alternatives of continued immobility, liberalism and neo-nationalist radicalism, are only three cardinal points within a multitude of possibilities. Actual future policies may well prove to be a hybrid of them or of others I have failed to anticipate. All I have been concerned to do was sketch some possibilities which seem to be inherent in the present situation, in order to bring out the full importance of contemporary demographic trends.
3.b(iii) A note on ethnic assimilation in the Soviet Union

At several points in earlier discussions, I have made reference to assimilation tendencies within the Soviet Union without systematically elaborating. This, of course, is another enormous subject in itself, but perhaps it would be useful to briefly summarize some of its main features as they affect, or are likely to affect, the relative numerical strength of the peoples of the USSR.

It has been pointed out earlier that the regime does in fact pin a good deal of hope on the beneficent workings of assimilation processes. It has also been indicated that the main sources of Russian 'converts' are the Ukrainians and Belorussians, and in lesser measure, various other mainly European national groups, notably the Finno-Ugrian peoples. It was noted that the proportion of people identifying Russian as their native language was declining more slowly than the proportion of people identifying themselves as Russians. Russian is being pressed on the national minorities to an increasing degree. Particularly determined attempts are being made to expand Russian-teaching especially as a second language, but also, de facto, as a first language at


points where resentment and resistance is weakest or most fissiparated (in Dagestan schools, for example, where the multitude of local languages provides reinforcing practical reasons for the move). Census materials are always presented in such a way as to underscore the importance and popularity of Russian as the (a) language of international communication in the Soviet Union and beyond, as the language of science and culture, and also as an adopted language.

Much sociological research on nationalities problems is now being organized, within which a good deal of attention is devoted to the subject of mixed marriages, whose incidence, it is always emphasized, is increasing greatly. No less a person than Brezhnev himself has commented on the importance of this beneficent development.

103 Sovetskaiia pedagogika no.6, 1972, p.40-6.

104 Istoriia SSR, no.1, 1970, p.222, reported the creation of a Scientific Council for Nationality Problems within the USSR Academy of Sciences. The new Council's stated areas of research interest betray a clear policy orientation. In general, the quantity and quality of sociological writing on nationality questions advanced considerably in the late 'sixties and early 'seventies.

105 Most of the mixed marriage studies and statistics that have been published relate to Caucasian or Central Asian areas, where high indices are bound to be recorded. While there are obviously good scientific reasons why this should be so, the strong official interest in the subject makes one wonder whether it is entirely accidental. See, for example, Trud, 22 October 1965; Sovetskaia Etnografiia 1971 no.4, p.80; and no.6, p.112; Izvestiia AN Turkmenskoi SSR Seria Obshchestvennikh nauk 1969, no.5, p.16; Sovetskaia Etnografiia 1967, no.4, p.137.

106 In a speech in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the USSR - Kommunist 1972, no.18 (December) p.15.
There is a very large degree of wishful thinking or displaced anxiety in the confident assertiveness shown in Soviet press comment on this subject. In fact assimilation trends hitherto have not been particularly favourable to the Russians, certainly not when one considers their dominant position in the Soviet Union as a whole. The Ukrainians and Belorussians have always been a good source of additional Russian increase. It may well be that they are now 'defecting' in smaller numbers than they did in the 1920s and 1930s (between the 1926 and 1939 Censuses, the number of Belorussians increased much more slowly than that of the Russians, and the Ukrainians registered a 10% decline; some of this difference may have been due to the greater damage inflicted there by the collectivization and subsequent upheavals; but much of it may also have been due to assimilation). The decline in the proportion of Belorussians and Ukrainians who gave their national language as their native language between the 1959 and 1970 Censuses is significant (from 84.2 to 80.5% and 87.7 to 85.7% respectively), but the absolute numbers of native-speakers continue to show a solid increase and in the case of the Belorussians, the rate of increase of Belorussian-speaking Belorussians is only slightly slower than the overall increase (including assimilation gains) of Russians. Neither nation is showing any signs of disappearing as is not infrequently suggested, although both are obviously exposed to great pressure and a real, if long-term, threat.

Few other major nationalities have registered similar declines of native speaker proportions within their ethnic group totals over the same period. Of the 22 nationalities numbering over one million, the only other such exceptions are the Germans, the Jews and the Poles. The Germans, it should be remembered, are exposed to particularly repressive cultural conditions as well as physical dispersal, and may well feel, moreover, that not to give Russian as their native language would be unusually imprudent. The Poles form a bizarre exception among the major national groups in that they tend to give as their native language the language of their host nationality rather than Russian or Polish: in the Ukraine, more than four times as many give Ukrainian as either Russian or Polish, whilst in Belorussia, the corresponding figure is roughly six times as many. As for the Jews, they are, of course, the classic illustration of how fallacious it can be to mechanically identify language with ethnic identity. Over four-fifths are now self-declared native-speakers of Russian with results in terms of ethnic identification that we read about daily in our newspapers.

In Central Asia, the chances of large-scale assimilation seem virtually zero. The native peoples' command of Russian is (outside parts of Kazakhstan) worse than anywhere else in the Soviet Union, and their devotion to their own language as measured in the proportion of people giving their own national language as their native language, higher. Though much is made of the allegedly high incidence of mixed marriage in the area, there is good reason to suppose that

109 Itogi, vol.IV, p.152-53, p.192-93. See the discussion of the Soviet Polish minority in Ch. 4.e.
the great bulk of it is between European and European or non-European and non-European. Cross-cultural intermarriage is certainly increasing, but from such low levels as to be virtually negligible outside a few urban centres - where it is minor. Rather significantly, the great bulk of the cross-cultural marriages are between indigenous men and European women. There is evidence that the offspring of these marriages more frequently identify themselves as indigenes than as Europeans. There tends to be a large measure of informal apartheid in Central Asian cities (the only place where assimilation has any chance at all),

110 For an excellent discussion of the whole problem, see Ethel and Stephen P. Dunn, 'Ethnic Intermarriage as an Indicator of Cultural Convergence' in Soviet Central Asia', in E. Allworth, op.cit., p.45.

111 887 Turkmenian men married non-Turkmen women in Ashkhabad in the period 1950-62, but only 162 Turkmenian women married non-Turkmenian men. Izvestiia AN Turkmenskoi SSR Seriia obshch. nauk, no.5, 1969, p.16. Not surprisingly this same pattern is repeated in all parts of Moslem USSR where analogous statistics are available.

112 A study in Dushanbe revealed that 82% of adolescents in families with a Tadzhik father and Russian mother adopted the father's nationality. A.V. Kozenko and L.F. Monogarova, 'Statisticheskoe izuchenie pokazatelei odnonatsionalnoi i smeshannoi brachnosti v Dushanbe', Sovetskaia Etnografiia, no.6, 1971, p.112.

113 Cf. note 97 above. See also Wheeler, Racial Problems, Ch.6. Ethnic mingling has not, of course, taken place on a very significant scale in rural areas either, a fortiori (as the rural figures for knowledge of Russian among indigenes and similar statistics bear out). The earlier frontier mingling of Russians and steppe-dwellers seems to have no modern equivalent. See Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, op.cit., pp.197 and ff.
dating from Tsarist times, when the tendency was to build separate cities for the European settlers away from the existing ones. The Russians seem to have the usual European knack of not endearing themselves to non-Europeans. It seems unlikely that floods of mutual passion will suddenly be undammed by exhortatory Kazakhstanskaia Pravda editorials. The most that could reasonably be hoped for in the distant future, one would have thought, would be decorous relations marked by a kind of some-of-my-best-friends tolerance. Had the cultural repressions of the 1920s and 1930s been directed more towards language and had they been followed up by resettlement programmes, the regime might have achieved a better distribution of Russian-speakers among the Central Asians (as it has done, for example, with the displaced Koreans of Central Asia); but this would not necessarily mean assimilation. Very probably the racial factor introduces additional barriers whose surmounting cannot be measured by linguistic affiliation anyway. If the Central Asians are to be viewed by the Europeans as an inferior people, i.e., if tensions are to be more racial than national, intermarriage will always produce more Central Asians no matter what language the progeny speak. 

114 Well over one third of the Koreans in Kazakhstan gave Russian as their native language (and only a negligible proportion Kazakh) at the 1970 Census. Itogi vol.IV, p.223.

115 'The powerful fictions invented through application of a descent principle are further demonstrated by the treatment of children of mixed marriages. Regardless of phenotype, such children are affiliated with the racial group of the lower-ranking parent.' Marvin Harris, 'Race', International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, vol.13 (New York, 1968). Harris is speaking of the United States. The Soviet Central Asian situation may develop differently, but this remains to be proved. Compare also Walker Connor's conclusion that 'The progeny of ethnically mixed marriages do not necessarily exhibit less national consciousness than do either of their parents; they often exhibit more.' 'The Politics of Ethnonationalism', p.21.
Even in the Baltic states, where Russification seems to be making great inroads, and where the racial factor is absent, assimilation trends are not all in the one direction. Taking all three republics together, we find 36,192 self-identified members of the respective titular nationalities giving Russian as their native language, whilst 18,671 Russians give one or other of the Baltic languages as their native language. These figures are difficult to interpret with confidence. But they are consistent with substantial degrees of assimilation away from Russiandom as well as to it. And whatever their precise meaning, they diverge sharply from the equivalent pattern in Belorussia or Moldavia. It may be, in other words, that if Russia is to dominate the Baltic states, it cannot rely on assimilation processes to do the work for it unaided.

Among the numerous minor (less than one million) ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, the degree of linguistic tenacity displayed in recent years is no less surprising than their demographic expansion. Few apart from the Finno-Ugrian groups have shown declines of more than a few decimal places in the proportions giving the national language as their native one in 1959 and 1970. In many cases, that proportion has actually increased. Here, too, on present indications, the sources of potential Russians are small as a proportion of the whole, and almost negligible in absolute terms.

The spread of fluency in Russian to wider sections of the Soviet population and the growth of ethnic inter-marriage

116 Itogi, vol.IV, p.273, 280 and 317; the arithmetic is mine.
may bring certain benefits including perhaps greater cultural
tolerance and stability to the Soviet Union. There is little
reason at present to expect that they will set up a landslide
of assimilation that could counteract the demographic
landslide in the opposite direction. And they are least
likely to precisely in those regions where counteraction,
from a Russian point of view, is most required.
Now it is true that international migration is not an important factor for the Soviet Union, though it has been so at times for Tsarist Russia. (...) But there can hardly be any doubt that migration would help to solve some of China's economic problems, and if directed towards the Soviet Union it might also help in the development of that country's Far Eastern areas.

In proceeding on the assumption that differing rates of population growth may be relevant to the relative power positions of the nations concerned, I should perhaps emphasize that I am not thereby attributing any very definite importance

In the following discussion I have for the most part avoided reference to the existing literature on the connections between population and international politics. Thus far this literature has been limited in large measure to occasional essays and reflections and has perhaps for this reason accumulated relatively few undisputed maxims, other than those that were in any case largely familiar to most thoughtful students of international politics. (For some typical essayistic contributions, see, for example, the chapters by Quincy Wright and Kingsley Davis in P. Hauser (ed.), Population and World Politics (Glencoe, 1958), and Hauser's own 'Demographic Dimensions of World Politics', in L. Mudd et al. (eds) The Population Crisis and the Use of World Resources (The Hague, 1964). The significant new work that has been done in this area (see the discussion in Ch.1,b, and in notes 40 and 41 to Ch.1) has not yet, I believe, reached the point of producing new truths and maxims of universal applicability.

to military manpower as such. In the age of mutual assured destruction, mere numbers may be of limited value, if not obsolescent. Insofar as they are not, the Soviet bloc seems to have them for all relevant purposes. For much of the 1950s and 1960s the tendency seems to have been to reduce numbers in the Soviet armed forces. While this undoubtedly reflected Khrushchov's personal views as well as extreme shortages of young manpower as the depleted World War II birth cohorts entered workforce and military age, it was surely of some significance that the decision was taken to prefer economic to military use of the available manpower reserves. And when the need seemed to arise, in the late 1960s, the Soviet Union was able to quickly raise its forces (including manpower) on the Eastern border to such effect that the Chinese shortly thereafter felt constrained to seek new and powerful friends. In any case, projections indicate (rather surprisingly) that Soviet prime-age military manpower will go on increasing until 1984, by which time manpower as such may be even less important in the military context; whereas in the case of the economy, Western experience seems to suggest that technological advance as such does not necessarily reduce the demand for labour.

119 Compare the table presented in Feshbach and Rapawy, op.cit., p.520-21.

The military-strategic aspects of population growth are both highly technical and problematical. For both reasons I would prefer to couch the discussion in more general terms. In an age of mutual deterrence, margins of overkill may not be of inherent strategic importance; but because of their psychological impact, it is often argued, they may seem so, and therefore become so. Similarly, though it may be difficult to foresee in what way differential densities, magnitudes or rates of growth of population might affect the outcome of any armed conflict between, say, USSR and China, it is clear, that they are likely to be felt to be of importance, if the numbers involved are large.

Extremes in population growth may also cause or contribute to changes in relative economic potential if trends are maintained over a period of time. While rapid population growth is held to be an obstacle to economic development, it is evident, for example, that if, say, by 2025, 

121 I am assured by competent experts on strategic studies generally, and on Soviet strategic thinking in particular, that very little advanced theorizing exists on the connections between national population size and military capability in the nuclear age. It is significant, perhaps, that the most thorough discussion of linkages between population and international conflict (Choucri's Population Dynamics and International Violence) devotes relatively little attention to this point, and appears not to cite any military opinions. The Australian National Population Inquiry devoted just one paragraph and one footnote to security implications in its official Report released in 1975, despite the fact that Australia's exposed position as an 'underpopulated' continent is almost proverbial. The Australian Defence Department did not, apparently, present any submission to the Inquiry. See Canberra Times, 15 March 1975, p.2.
East Germany is still languishing at its 1946 level of 18 million while Poland has increased its population from 23 million to 50 million, there is likely to have been a shift in their relative economic weight in favour of the latter that is at least partly due to the manpower factor.

The size of a country's population is, in any case, an important element in determining relative prestige. And this is an element which makes itself clearly felt in demographic writing at all levels throughout the Socialist bloc. Where other forms of national expression are inhibited, Olympic Gold Medals or census results may acquire an even greater significance. And though the Soviet Union (or, if one prefers, Soviet Russia) has relatively greater outlets for nationalism, it too is susceptible to the prestige aspect of population growth.

Finally, in the case of the relationship between the Soviet Union and China (if not Japan), there is the question of whether population pressures building up in one country are not bound sooner or later to 'spill over' into another, thereby unleashing political or military conflict. Here again we are dealing with what are ultimately still

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122 A ZPG advocate might say a more appropriate word than 'languishing' would be 'flourishing'. Here as elsewhere in this essay, however, I would prefer to avoid discussion or criticism in terms of the possible effects of population growth of current East European dimensions on pollution, resource exhaustion etc. I am doing so partly because these arguments remain for the present somewhat problematical; and partly because they are virtually never raised by Socialist economic or political demography.
imponderables, though ones about which a great deal has been and no doubt will be written. 123

Having drawn these blurry guidelines, it remains to consider the Soviet Union's position in terms of them. It seems clear, to begin with, that population trends as between the Soviet Union and either Eastern Europe or the West are unlikely to exert much influence on the course of events in the immediate future. The demographic strength of the Moldavians is obviously not irrelevant to the future of Rumanian-Soviet relations. Some Poles may feel an important moment has been reached if and when they overtake (numerically) the Ukrainians. As the number of home-born Poles grows in the Western Territories, the hopes of German revanche grow, perhaps, ever slimmer. The brief period in which the US population seemed to be overtaking the Soviet one raised

123 See, for example, E. Stuart Kirby, The Soviet Far East (London, 1971), p.ixv: 'Still deeper, more primitive or primary motivations underlie the matter. 800 million Chinese, rising soon to over 1,000 million, are in dire need of Lebensraum; in the direct sense of more land for settlement of huge numbers, or the less direct sense of access to natural resources which would sustain China's industrialization. One of the simplest and most immediate directions in which the Chinese may look...is the whole area called Siberia, largely unpopulated and with huge untapped resources.' It is not a disqualification of this kind of view to demonstrate that the density of China's population is less than that of Europe, or that migration, as a solution to overcrowding, is likely to be economically more expensive and demographically less effective than domestic birth control measures (cf. N. Keyfitz, 'Migration as a Means of Population Control', Population Studies, vol.XXV (1971), p.63). For it is sufficient that either the Chinese or the Russian leaderships be deceived by such a 'great illusion' for it to become an effective influence on the course of events.
something of a flutter in the breasts of some US demographers and their Soviet counterparts no doubt. But basically, taking the USSR, the USA and East and West Europe as blocs, their relative positions of strength seem destined to remain the same insofar as demographic factors can influence the outcome. The fertility decline in the USSR has been matched by that in East Europe (and, after a pause, by that in West Europe and the USA as well). If the Soviet Union can no longer place itself at the top of developed countries population increase league-tables as it still could when the 1959 Census results were published, this is a prestige item of predominantly domestic significance.

To the south of the Soviet border, demographic trends seem more or less matched on the Soviet side, and the Russian core of the USSR (i.e. the RSFSR) is not in any case exposed. Moreover, there are no major political threats stemming from that quarter. One can conceive of a Persian Pan-Iranianism aspiring to expanded relations with Soviet Tadzhikistan or a Pan-Turanianism reaching out from Turkey

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125 Итоги всесоюзной переписи населения 1959 года: сводный том СССР (Moscow, 1962), p.280, contains a league table of curiously heterogeneous composition, with USSR and the major capitalist countries arranged in descending order according to their natural increase rates per thousand in 1961. The USSR heads the list. It has evidently been found possible to dispense with this table in publishing the 1970 Census results.
to Yakutia which might be more than mere nuisance value in the future.\textsuperscript{126} But neither is likely to be created by extra-Soviet demographic trends alone, nor perhaps even exacerbated by them. To be effective, they would depend heavily on demographic and other domestic developments within Soviet Central Asia itself. If the latter were not conducive, external pressures from the South would probably not amount to much. In any case, the Soviet Union would not be wholly bereft of possible counter-measures.

This leaves Siberia and the Far East. Here one has on the one hand the USSR struggling to get its numbers up but in vain; and on the other China straining intermittently to keep its numbers down, but also experiencing difficulties.\textsuperscript{127} Then there is Japan, a country with a relative surplus of population and capital, and by tradition eager to find a home for both if the conditions are right. The similarities between the Soviet situation and that which has produced the Australian psychological syndrome of 'the vast unpopulated

\textsuperscript{126} Some observers believe that there is a possibility that a unified Turko-Iranian Moslem state might emerge in Soviet Central Asia were circumstances propitious. This argument is based on the fact of extensive bilingualism among the Iranian speakers in the area, and the common historical and cultural traditions which the two groups of peoples share. See O. Caroe, \textit{Soviet Empire}, p.xxii.

\textsuperscript{127} Cf. note 132, below. Of course, China is not eager to reduce her numbers in the area bordering on the Soviet Union, where, reportedly, the latest anti-natalist rigours are not applied, and where in any case the Chinese government is bent on greatly increasing the Han Chinese component by fostering in-migration. (On this latter point, see M. Freeberne, 'Demographic and Economic Changes in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region', \textit{Population Studies}, vol. XX (1966-67), p.103.)
north' and 'populate or perish' are very striking. Australia, however, does not have 60 million of its potential adversaries living adjacent to an exposed strip of strategic territory.\textsuperscript{128}

The vital question here is whether or not population pressures are bound to or likely to issue forth into political conflict. And secondly, if so, whether relative manpower strengths are likely to affect the outcome of any future conflict. In other words, once the Chinese have achieved the level of nuclear deterrent sufficient to constrain the USSR from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against them, will their relative manpower superiority be a crucial factor? There are far too many issues involved in these questions for even a sketch summary to be worth attempting. In any case they exceed this writer's competence. Perhaps it is enough to say that the USSR feels it to be of the greatest importance to build up and populate its border areas with China. A Council of Ministers decree of May 1973 offered special financial and other inducements (including the promise of motor vehicles specially suited to primitive border terrain) for settlers prepared to go and live along the Chinese border.\textsuperscript{129}

If anything like population parity throughout the area is aspired to, however, official hopes must be doomed to frustration.

\textsuperscript{128} It is interesting and perhaps symptomatic that Soviet scholars are apparently not unaware of certain parallels between Australia and Siberia. cf. Jukes, \textit{op.cit.}, Foreword.

\textsuperscript{129} For the text of the decree see \textit{Sobranie postanovlenii} no.13,1973.
It could perhaps be achieved locally in some of the less habitable parts of the Asian hinterland, but certainly not in the Far East section of the border. There, and in general, the demographic trends in favour of the Chinese are so colossal as to paralyse the imagination. This may be worth bringing out with a few rough statistics relating to overall population (in the absence of official regional breakdowns for China). They cannot be anything other than rough, since most people, including Chinese politicians, tend to be a few years out of date with their Chinese population estimates; and those estimates themselves are unlikely to be very precise.

The entire Russian (i.e. not Soviet) increase between 1959 and 1970 (which, it will be remembered, probably includes a solid element of assimilation) is, on a fairly cautious estimate, only about the same as the current annual

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130 Until very recently, the figure of 700 million has still been in official use though all observers agree that the real figure must be least in the vicinity of 800 million if not more. Huang Shu-tse, China's chief delegate at the UN Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974, asserted that the Chinese population had increased from 1949 by 60% 'to nearly 800 million' in 1974. If earlier official statistics were correct, however, a 60% increase would have made the Chinese population about 880 million by 1974. See Current Scene XII (1974) no.10, p.19. This is only the latest of a long series of outdated or misleading statements made by high-level Chinese spokesmen. See, for example, John S. Aird, 'Population Policy and Demographic Prospects in the People's Republic of China' in US Congress Joint Economic Committee: People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment (Washington, 1972), pp.238, 276, 288 and passim. A member of the Press party which toured China with the Australian Prime Minister in 1976 reports that the figure of 900 million was often used by Chinese spokesmen as an estimate of national population. John Shaw, formerly Time correspondent in Moscow (personal communication).
increase in China; and unlike the latter, it is positively known to be declining fast.  

The Russian increase 1959-70 was just under 15 million. To give an estimate of annual increase for China's population is a hazardous undertaking. Two of the leading authorities on the subject, Leo Orleans and John Aird, suggest widely disparate figures for 1974, Orleans proposing a rate of 1.4% (Current Scene XII, no.3, p.15), and Aird 2.2% (Aird, op.cit., p.326); Aird's base figure, moreover, would be much higher. Orleans arrives at a net annual increase of about 11.2 million, whereas all of Aird's four variants are in excess of 20 million. Orleans' reasoning seems slightly more engaged than Aird's and one suspects it may reflect in some measure either his own optimism or that of the Chinese officials he spoke to. In any case, a compromise figure of 15 or 16 million seems not unreasonable for the purposes of the exercises which are about to follow. See also P. Paillot and A. Sauvy, 'La Population de la Chine', Population, May-June 1974, p.535.

It is curious the extent to which all kinds of people are inclined to credit the Chinese with spectacular successes in fertility control. The Chinese themselves seem more cautious about their own claims, as is illustrated by their extraordinary action in trying to suppress all data relating to their population in the UN publications prepared for the Bucharest World Population Conference. Many of the assertions that have been made by local Chinese spokesmen are plainly nonsense (e.g. birth rates of 5 per thousand mentioned by J. Parsons in Planet, 22 August 1974; Planet was the unofficial Conference newspaper at Bucharest) and cast doubt on the validity of all the others. One would have thought the only statement about Chinese population that can be made confidently and exactly is that very little is known. For two comprehensive accounts of the evidence available, see Aird, op.cit., and Leo Orleans, Every Fifth Child (London, 1972). For a shorter general survey, see, for example, 'China: Population in the People's Republic', Population Bulletin XXVII (1971) no.6. Recently there have been reports of new and more stringent population control measures in China (Sydney Morning Herald, 20 September 1973, p.4). Even if the reports are reliable, however, and the measures successful in their object (enforcing the two-child family on all parents, willing and unwilling), this will not dramatically affect relative rates of natural increase much before the end of the century, as China's demographic dynamism is largely a function of its youthful age-structure. Again, the drasticness of these measures would seem to suggest that the successes claimed thus far in reducing fertility were exaggerated. For an up-to-date review of the vexed question of China's population size and the reliability of estimates concerning it, see Leo Orleans, 'Chinese Population Figures: Can the Contradictions be Resolved?' Studies in Family Planning, vol.7, no.2 (February 1976), p.52.
The total population of West and East Siberia and the Far East (some 25 million in 1970) could probably be exceeded by the Chinese in natural increase in about a year and a half, give or take a month or two.

The Chinese could accumulate a natural increase equal to the entire Russian population in less than a decade even if we assume a large decrease in estimated current levels of natural increase between now and the end of the decade, and take the Russian figures for the end of it rather than the beginning.

It should be noted that there is nothing known to demographic science that would enable the Russians to materially alter this situation in the foreseeable future; though the trend could well become or be later proved to have been more unfavourable. Even if the Soviet government were to adopt a pro-natalist policy of Rumanian severity, and even if we were to assume that it would be equally successful (and there are reasons for doubting this), it would thereby only elevate its fertility to a level which would probably still be well below current Chinese crude birth rates. After the initial surprise effect had worn off, there would probably be a rapid decline back to about half the present Chinese levels (within five years or so), and the prospect of further decline.

Little is definitely known about the Chinese population other than that it is very big, and probably
increasing rather fast. There has been no census since 1953, and official statements tend to be conflicting, non-technical and sometimes inherently implausible. Estimates attempted by outside sources for 1970 range between 753 million and 871 million. For 1980 preferred projections by these same sources range between 887 and 1,060 million.\textsuperscript{133} It seems to me obvious that these figures at least must be disturbing to the Soviet leaders. While their precise political or military meaning is extremely difficult

\textsuperscript{133} See the juxtaposition in \textit{Population Bulletin} XXVII (1971), no.6, p.23.
to assess, the probable Soviet attitude towards them can be more readily conjectured. They have been quoted here because they form a crucial part of the Soviet geo-political

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134 One's hesitancy on precise evaluation of the population factor in Sino-Soviet relations is not shared by all observers: 'In extensive but preliminary statistical analyses of Chinese and Soviet Russian reactions to each other's capabilities and power over the past 20 years, we found that Soviet conflict behaviour toward the People's Republic (defined in terms of actions and events and measured systematically over time) is associated first and foremost with the size of the Chinese population rather than with indicators of technological growth and economic development. The correlation between Russia's actions toward China and the size of the Chinese population is .71... At the same time China's behaviour toward the Soviet Union is strongly associated with the Chinese population size. The correlation is .86.' '...The correlation between China's violence behaviour toward the Soviet Union and the size of the Russian population is .89...' (Robert C. North and Nazli Choucri, 'Population and the International System: Some Implications for United States Policy and Planning' in Governance and Population, vol. IV of the Report of the US Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, p.266.) If 'preliminary analyses' are capable of producing such impressive precision of judgement about what some might have regarded as imponderables, then the non-computerized among us can presumably only join the Russians in quaking before the inevitable. However, queries do suggest themselves. What counts as evidence of Soviet awareness of Chinese population size and increase rates and vice versa? Is the course of the Sino-Soviet split related to the (virtually non-existent) Chinese demographic statistics available at that period, and if so, in what way? Tantalizingly we are offered no details of how these and other problems were overcome. A footnote (no.82) tells us that further details on the matter will be published in North's The Foreign Relations of China (Belmont, 1972). But a perusal of that work, as of several other publications by Choucri and North has not yielded any explanations.
context, if one that is usually left implicit. It is surprising that the military have not yet apparently made any very great public contribution to the demographic debate. A passage in a recent book by Boris Urlanis might even be read as a reproach to the military, or at least as an attempt to secure their support for an active population policy.

All this indicates that neither at present nor, it would seem, over the next decades, will human resources cease to be an essential element in the military potential of a country. Indeed, as technology develops and becomes more complex, the role of the fighting man will increase still further.

From the foregoing it follows that defence interests cannot remain indifferent to the flow

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135 For more detailed surveys of that context, see E. Stuart Kirby, *op.cit.*, and W.A. Douglas Jackson, *Russo-Chinese Borderlands* (New York, 1962) (a work the more remarkable in that it antedates clear evidence of the Split).

136 The point that 'other things being equal, a country's position in the world is determined by the size of its population' has been made explicitly by the forceful Soviet demographic commentator, V.I. Perevedentsev, 'Prodolzhenie spora', *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, no.12, 1968. Perevedentsev calculates that if existing growth rates are maintained, the USSR, from constituting 8.6% of the world's population in 1940, will have declined to 5% by the beginning of the 21st century. Ia. Guzevaty, 'Population and World Politics', *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn*, October 1967, translated in *Studies in Family Planning* No.49, January 1970, at p.6. Is even more candid, referring to the 'senseless territorial claims of the present leaders of the Chinese People's Republic' in the context of 'the notorious living space theory earlier adopted as an ideological weapon by the German, Italian and Japanese fascists'. Usually the naméki are a little more oblique than that.
of demographic processes (интересы обороны не могут стоять в стороне от течения демографических процессов).137

Perhaps when the Russo-Ukrainian Soviet officer corps begins to be confronted by recruit detachments, a good quarter of which are comprised of representatives of the Moslem peoples, they will become more energetic in their

137 B. Urlanis, Problemy dinamiki naseleniia SSSR (Moscow, 1974), p.27. The slightly stilted Russian no doubt reflects the delicacy of the subject matter. A rare contribution to the demographic debate by someone identified with the armed forces (a staff-member of the Lenin Military Academy, in Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo 1975, no.1, pp.34-5) makes no reference to either the question of military manpower or the inter-ethnic balance. Of course, it may well be that these matters are adjudged so delicate that all reference to them in the military context is either avoided or suppressed. In this connection, a remark made by the sociologist Levada in a sociological house journal is of particular interest: 'When the Supreme Soviet passed the new military law (воennyi zakon), Marshal Grechko, in explaining the reasons for the change in call-up age, said that it ensured that young 20-year-olds would return to civilian life which would in turn have a favourable effect on family relations. This factor, as we can see, is also taken into account, and it is natural that specialists, in particular military specialists, are interested in the normal development of the population'. Iu. A. Levada, 'Lektsii po sotsiologii' in Informatsionnyi Biulleten, no.2 (Moscow, 1969), p.123-4. Cf. footnotes 108 and 268 to Ch.5, below.
The data on age-structure by nationalities given in *Itogi*, vol.IV, make calculation of future military contingents by national group rather difficult. Data are not given for the lesser nationalities except by republic. Also the use of a break-down for 0-10 rather than 0-4 and 5-9 (as is used in vol.II) makes it more difficult to compare the depleted Slavic cohorts of the later 1960s with those of the Moslem peoples. The section giving age-structure by nationality in vol.IV is arranged chiefly with a view to demonstrating that the younger members of the various nationality groups display a greater proficiency in Russian than their elders. No doubt all of this is accidental. So to resort again to more primitive calculations: the Moslem peoples, it was said earlier, numbered some 35 million in 1970. Their natural increase in the intercensal period had been of the order of 3.1 to 3.2% per annum. Assuming that this increase rate was declining towards the end of that period, let us take it that by 1970, their natural increase rate was roughly 26 per thousand. This implies an average annual birth rate of some 33 per thousand. For a total population of 35 million, this would give a Moslem birth cohort in 1970 of just over one million. The total number of live births in the USSR in 1970 was 4.225 million. These calculations probably err on the side of caution. And as the absolute size of the Moslem populations increases, of course, unless there is a sharp fall in the birth rate (not to be excluded; it has already occurred in Azerbaidzhan), the Moslem/non-Moslem proportions in annual birth cohorts would be further swayed in the Moslems' favour.
3.d **Ideology**

Actual population trends since World War II have wrought havoc with the Stalinist version of the Marxist 'laws' of population. Marx's original pronouncements on the subject were sporadic, unsystematic and conveniently flexible. Basically, he had held that population movements were dependent on the underlying socio-economic reality: that different patterns might therefore be expected to prevail in different socio-economic systems; that overpopulation was a purely relative thing; that, in the capitalist context, overpopulation was no more than an ideologically-distorted apprehension of the reserve army of the unemployed; and that with the demise of capitalism, the 'problem' of overpopulation would disappear. Though he declared that different laws of population were applicable to different systems, Marx in fact confined his attention to capitalism. He seems to have been inclined to assume that the numerical growth of the 19th century was likely to persist, but he wisely refrained from dogmatic commitment.¹³⁹

Not so his Soviet successors.¹⁴⁰ In the 1930s as the capitalist countries experienced sharp declines in

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¹³⁹ For fuller discussion of Marx and Engels' views on demographic matters, see Ch. l.c., above, and the literature cited therein.

¹⁴⁰ For further discussion of the evolution of Soviet ideological attitudes on population matters, see Ch.1.d., above.
birthrates, they drew the inference that higher rates of growth must be one of the essential features of socialist population development. And finding Marx's polemical outbursts against Malthus strangely congenial, they petrified their slightly obsessive accusations into base dogma: that there could never be any absolute overpopulation; and that fertility control was unnecessary and to enjoin it upon people 'barbaric', and 'cannibalistic'.

Whatever plausibility the Stalinist 'law of population' may have had in the 1930s, it was decisively rebutted by the course of vital events after 1945 as (a) Western birth rates rose substantially in most countries; (b) Soviet bloc birth rates, after initial resurgences, fell; and (c) Third World natural increase rates slid inexorably upward from high to higher, and future world population estimates began to resemble science fiction.

The Soviet ideological response to all this was a Pauline immobility till about the mid-sixties; then in late 1965 a sudden switch to a more flexible line was

141 A Soviet delegate to the UN Population Commission in 1947 used this term in the course of asserting that 'with an adequate social organization, it is possible to face any increase in population'. Quoted by Petersen, Population, p.635.

142 The word is Khrushchov's. Pravda, 8 January 1955.

143 'Sudden' here should be understood in a relative sense of the term (if that is semantically possible). Articles and even official statements cautiously hinting at the existence of a world population problem had appeared before. The American UN diplomat, Richard N. Gardner, commenting on the course of the debate in the General Assembly in December 1962 on the 'Population Growth and
negotiated. 144 Ideological statements on the subject since

143 (cont.) Economic Development' resolution, makes the following observation: 'This Communist line [needless to say: anti-Malthusian, J.F.B.] was poorly received by the Assembly. At least one representative of a less developed country chided the Soviets for favouring planning in all sectors of economic life except the human sector - the one most important in its implications for economic and social growth. [This 'planning' argument is now often used by Soviet demographers for various purposes, J.F.B.] The negative Soviet statement in the population debate was followed by a significant shift in the Communist line. When it came time to vote, the Soviet bloc did not oppose, but merely abstained on the General Assembly resolution. What is even more surprising, the Soviet representative at the recent meeting of the Economic and Social Council commended the United Nations for its work in the population field, agreed that population growth is an urgent problem for less developed countries, and announced the willingness of the Soviet Union to provide technical assistance in the demographic field.' Gardner goes on to suggest, rather surprisingly, that this change in line may have been connected with Khrushchov's alleged personal interest in the dangers of overpopulation. As of 1961, Khrushchov had still been an emphatic anti-Malthusian (see the statement attributed to him in Filosofskaia Entsiklopediia 1964, vol.III, p.549). Gardner does not cite any source on Khrushchov's change of heart, but he may of course be right. Gardner's comments are contained in an essay entitled 'The Politics of Population' published in L. Mudd et al., The Population Crisis and the Use of World Resources (The Hague, 1964), p.355. For other evidence of waverings and second thoughts before 1965, see, e.g., P. Mouches, Démographie (Paris, 1964), p.208; D. Morison, 'Recent Soviet Interest in Population Problems of the Developing Countries', Mizan, vol.9 (1967), pp.183-4; and footnote 146, below. Nonetheless, it would seem that the decisive breakthrough came only at the time indicated (late 1965 to early 1966, when efforts began to be made by official sources to publicize the new trend in official thinking, and a consistent pattern in UN voting emerged (on this, see J. Brackett 'The Evolution of Marxist Theories of Population: Marxism recognizes the Population Problem', Demography, vol.V (1968), no.1, p.167 and 171-2).

144 The shift emerged clearly in a series of articles on world population problems published in Literaturnaiia Gazeta (cont.)
then have been rather more pragmatic, though strong traces of the old myths persist, and have evidently not entirely lost official favour. To what extent they continue to bedevil constructive thought at the policy-making level is not clear.

It is fascinating to speculate on which factors were most decisive in bringing about the change of line. Many were undoubtedly involved. As already noted, theory and reality had been split far asunder. But this in itself was unlikely to have forced a change. One element clearly involved was the belated recognition that Third World countries increasingly preferred to receive assistance from the UN or elsewhere to keep down their populations rather than be reassured that they had no problem and that all they

144 (cont.) nos 133, 139, 142 and 152 for 1965; and nos. 23, 27, 62 and 68 for 1966. The change of line was widely commented on in the West. See, for example, the articles by Brackett and Morison cited in note 143. See also Robert C. Cook, 'Soviet Population Theory from Marx to Kosygin: A Demographic Turning Point?' in Population Bulletin XXIII (1967), no.4. S. Krašovec, 'Stihijnost ili kontrola kretanja stanovništva', Stanovništvo VIII (1970), p.5, provides an interesting Yugoslav view.

145 See, for example, 'Nas 250 millionov', Sovety Deputatov 1973, no.9, p.20-1, for an interview with the Deputy Director of the Central Statistical Agency, L.M. Volodarskii, in which Volodarskii suggests that the Soviet population ('we') is growing rapidly, and refers contemptuously to attempts in 'bourgeois' countries to 'frighten' people with the prospect of overpopulation and starvation. The Central Statistical Agency has in fact been the stronghold of demographic conservatism in the USSR throughout recent decades. In this connection it is perhaps significant that Volodarskii headed the Soviet delegation to the World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974.
need be on their guard against were scheming Malthusian sterilizers. Soviet-type social reforms had by then been urged on them for at least a decade as a remedy for all ills (including population pressures) with only partial success. More and more Third World countries, meanwhile, were going over to the Malthusian enemy. It was high time to hedge bets and cut losses. In this connection, it is most interesting, and probably significant, that the


147 See B. Ia. Smulevich, 'Demografiia i politika' in A.G. Volkov (ed.), Voprosy demografiii (Moscow, 1970), pp.29-31. Having characterized the earlier Soviet posture on population matters and the advice Soviet commentators traditionally gave to Third World countries, namely to forget about population policies and concentrate all their efforts on social and economic reforms, Smulevich says bluntly: 'This incorrect and inflexible position often harms us politically.' Though it is clear from the context that Smulevich is thinking principally about the international arena, it is significant that he should also have found it necessary to remind his readers in this same context that the traditional line, in citing Soviet experience as a model for emulation, ignored 'the inappropriateness of using average data for the Soviet Union as a whole', - a delicate allusion to the political damage being done within the Soviet Union by differential rates of population growth.

Another hint that the pressure to revise policy came from those concerned with or about relations with Third World countries can be seen in the fact that one of the first Soviet spokesmen to sound a liberal note on population issues at the UN was a Soviet diplomat stationed in New Delhi and seconded to a UN Population Conference held there in December 1963. See Symonds and Carder op.cit., p.136-7.
break came just after the Belgrade World Population Conference of 1965, to which the Soviet Union sent a large delegation. While the fact that the USSR sent a delegation of 27 (compared with one of 3 at the previous World Conference in Rome in 1954) might be taken as suggesting that a change of line was already in the process of taking place, it seems likely that those who were present were impressed by the pressure of international and Third World opinion and later fulfilled an at least catalytic role in bringing about the politico-ideological reorientation. It must have been becoming increasingly embarrassing to the Soviet authorities on such occasions that they were rubbing shoulders almost exclusively with Spains and Portugals, and finding even Latin American spokesmen moving to their left. 148

Another event at the Congress which might conceivably have made an impact on the Soviet delegation was a paper presented by Roderich von Ungern-Sternberg on the consequences of future population growth in (among other places) China. According to the published abstract of his paper, he argued that:

...Thus the people of China will continue to suffer heavy population pressure, and, in times of poor harvests, shortage of food.

History demonstrates that such conditions can

148 It should be borne in mind, of course, that although the USA has been one of the strongholds of neo-Malthusianism, governmental attitudes took a very long time to evolve in the same direction. It is possible that the US Government's entry onto the scene of financial aid for population programs and the positive response to these initiatives by many Third World countries was another factor forcing the USSR to revise its dog-in-the-manager stance. For the evolution of official US policy, see Symonds and Carder, op.cit., esp. pp.92-6 and Chs 10-12.
easily degenerate, causing an explosive exodus towards countries offering attractions to space-starved and hungry people. Such a movement may take place...peacefully if access to suitable countries is open to them. But it can also degenerate into a military migration. 149

What the Soviet delegation thought of this paper is not, to my knowledge, recorded. But it is very possible that similar thoughts had been occurring to the Soviet political leadership for some time past. In the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the ideological shift again came at a significant time. The first fully public airings of dissension had occurred not long before, in 1963. Then with Brezhnev's accession in 1964, there was a brief period in which it seemed that some kind of accommodation was being sought, after which, however, the Chinese reaffirmed their attitude towards 'Khrushchovism without Khrushchov'. It was shortly after this again that the Soviet government let it be known unequivocally that it was no longer necessarily opposed to fertility control campaigns in underdeveloped countries. It is not being suggested, of course, that the Soviet Union may have varied its position in the hope of somehow affecting the course of demographic events in China; merely that political and population developments in China in combination exerted some influence on their overall frame of mind. Soviet ideology had always been basically optimistic about general economic and social trends in world development. China's joining the Socialist bloc made all kinds of international statistics seem like dramatic confirmation of the spread of Socialism. (Even today, Soviet reluctance

to abandon hope for Chinese socialism is nowhere more evident than in statistics). Two articles which appeared in Literaturnaia Gazeta early and late in 1965 (before and after the ideological shift) neatly illustrate the change that seems to have occurred in official thinking somewhere in the interim. The first was ostensibly a comment on a typically neo-Malthusian piece that had appeared in Readers' Digest. The author of the comment, one Cheprakov, conceded that in some parts of the world population growth was a serious problem at present. But with social and economic reforms, he assured his readers, the 'unlimited' capacities of science and technology would speedily solve it. The article contained strong denunciations of capitalist Malthusians and bore the splendidly characteristic title 'A Threat - but for Whom?' Equally characteristic were the author's limited interest and uncertain competence in basic demography; and his special field of academic concern, which was described in an editorial introduction as contemporary monopoly capitalism. The second article, by the demographer Boris Urlanis, was in effect a not very muted polemic against the first. It treated the population problem at length and with considerable seriousness, mentioning China as having the highest absolute annual increase of population in the world, and supplying illustrative statistics. From the article, the impression emerged that

150 See, for example, Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1972 g., p.84.

151 'Ugroza! No komu?' Literaturnaia Gazeta, 13 March 1965; and 'Sushchestvuiut li problemy narodonaselenia?', Literaturnaia Gazeta, 23 November 1965.
Urlanis agreed that there was a threat but was agnostic as to whom it could most affect. The note of strident self-confidence and pugnacity that radiated from Cheprakov's article was wholly absent from Urlanis's.

Another element which was maturing in the situation during the 1960s, of course, was the population pressure within the Soviet Union itself. Rapid, though declining Russian increase had always tended to reduce the visibility of Central Asian and Caucasian fertility (between 1926 and 1939, in fact, only four peoples exceeding 100,000 in number - of which, at the time there were 35 - registered population increase rates higher than that of the Russians). Apart from that, the growth of the Asian nationalities of the USSR actually began to further increase after about 1950. As was mentioned earlier, it seems to have been only in the 1960s that the full scope (if not the implications) of this development began to be noticed either in the Soviet Union or outside it. There is no clear evidence known to me that the turn-about in Soviet population doctrine affecting the Third World stemmed from any arrière-pensée as to its own domestic explosion. But it does seem inherently likely. And it is significant, that some of the demographers associated with the overturn of the Stalinist dogma on population in 1965-66 have also been among those who have cautiously raised their voices in favour of a differentiated population increase rates higher than that of the Russians).

152 The Azerbaidzhanis, the Armenians, the Ossetians and the Dagestani peoples (the latter regarded for convenience as one ethnic unit). See the table in Lorimer, op.cit., p.138-39. It will be recalled that by contrast, between 1959 and 1970, of the 23 most numerous nationalities, only six registered smaller increases than the Russians.
population policy to damp down the present inter-ethnic extremes in fertility. And no less significant perhaps, that the head of the Census division of the Central Statistical Agency (the main centre of opposition to the new doctrinal tendency), P.G. Pod'iachikh, has argued most forcefully against any differential population policy.

One other important development connected with the change of line was the re-emergence in the mid-1960s of a thriving school of Soviet demography, after a recess of some three decades. Though the demographers remain scattered through various ad hoc subsections of other departments, and though their long campaigns for a specialist demographic

153 See, for example, B.Ts. Urlanis, Problemy dinamiki naseleniia (Moscow, 1974), p.302-3; D. Valentei, Teoriia i politika narodonaseleniia (Moscow, 1967), p.163-4.

154 P.G. Pod'iachikh, 'Statistika naseleniia, nauka o narodonaselenii i nauka demografiia (o novyh popytkakh likviatsii statistiki, kak obshchestvennoi nauki)' (Moscow, 1969), mimeograph. In this tract aimed at the re-emergent demographic profession in general, and D.I. Valentei and his associates in particular, Pod'iachikh makes this trenchant attack on proposals for a differentiated population policy: 'This would mean that large families in Central Asia where the standard of living is still lower than in the Baltic states would not receive as high allowances, whilst in the Baltic states, where the standard of living is higher, families would receive high allowances. It is easy to see that this arrangement places the peoples of the Baltic states and those of Central Asia in an unequal position, and is not in accord with the existing policy of raising the welfare of all members of socialist society.' (p.25). Whatever Pod'iachikh's motives in putting this argument, it certainly is one that is difficult to refute in Soviet conditions.
journal and a central demographic institute have not yet been rewarded with success, their general level of activity since the mid-sixties has been impressive. Khrushchov personally seems to have been an unreconstructed vulgar anti-Malthusian, and it is unlikely that the relevant party authorities could have been readily persuaded of the need for the radical expansion of academic demography during his time. It seems probable, therefore, that it was his political demise that created the kind of open situation which permitted the atomized demographic fraternity to close ranks and apply effective sectional pressure.

Since the watershed year of 1965, the Soviet ideological stance on population matters has been more flexible, but it has remained ambivalent. Generally it is held that the world population problem can only basically

155 Cf. note 183 below.

156 Though compare the suggestion made by Gardner that Khrushchov may have been converted to a concern about rapid population growth (population growth where? one wonders) late in life: footnote 143, above.

157 For a brief but evocative description of the development of sociology under the new post-Khrushchov leadership, see L. Churchward, *The Soviet Intelligentsia* (London, 1973), pp.119-21. Churchward's account suggests that the period of flux in which new alliances and lines of influence were being formed lent itself to sectional pressure by those eager to institutionalize the new discipline. The re-emergence of demography in the 1960s very probably described a similar course. The new leaders seem also to have initially had a slightly more receptive attitude towards social science than that of their predecessors (cf. the Central Committee resolution of 14 August 1967, 'On Measures for the Further Development of the Social Sciences and Increasing their Role in Socialist Construction').
be solved by thorough-going economic and social reforms, but that appropriate demographic policies can make some contribution. Accusations of Malthusian cannibalism have disappeared, but less drastic hard-line versions continue to make their appearance, if less frequently.

Thus, for example, a report on the 1972 ECAFE population conference held in Tokyo expresses great distaste for the emphasis on birth control introduced into the proceedings by US and Western European delegations. No family planning programs could 'seriously' affect the level of fertility:

When the imperialists were forced to clear out of their former colonies they left behind them nothing but the poverty and deprivation of the masses. And now they are trying everything to hinder the economic and cultural development of these countries, intimidating them with talk about 'the demographic explosion' and seeking to persuade them that their poverty stems from excessive population growth.158

This small sampling contains several typical features of the old Stalinist line: the suggestion that imperialism is solely responsible for the present-day poverty throughout the Third World; the denial that any such thing as a 'population explosion' exists; the attribution of bad faith and devious cunning to all advocates of family planning; the use of the opprobrious term 'birth control' to describe it (which in Russian suggests bureaucrats or

indeed policemen stationed by the bedroom door); and the failure to mention DDT or penicillin as having played or as playing any role whatever. While versions quite as crude as this one are rare, it would probably be true to say that Soviet participation in recent international population politics has been less 'liberal' (for want of a better word) than the development in the mid-sixties might have led one to expect. One important reason for this is probably the somewhat opportunistic and demagogic stance adopted by China, which, while introducing Malthusian rigours at home, continues to take the most vigorous 'anti-imperialist' line internationally, a line which has shown itself to be popular with some Third World countries at least, particularly in Africa and Latin America. The Soviets may feel obliged in this situation to maintain a 'radical' position.

At the national level, the notion that there is a specifically socialist law of population is usually still clung to, but its actual content tends to be reduced to a few general propositions illustrating growth in popular

159 Cf. G. Gerasimov's most interesting observations on this perhaps very important semantic detail in Literaturnaia Gazeta no.27, 1966. Anyone who spent any part of his post-pubertal years in Stalin's Russia might be forgiven for harbouring great suspicion of "kontrol' nad rozhdаемост' iy".

well-being, the spread of education, high levels of employment and so on. Despite the very low birth rates prevailing in the RSFSR and the other European republics, attempts are sometimes still made to present the USSR as a land of flourishing fecundity.\footnote{161} It should be emphasized, however, that much of Soviet demography is free of this kind of equivocation and claptrap, and addresses itself in a straightforward manner to real problems, not hesitating at many points to implicitly challenge official policy and suggest modifications. Though the reemergence of Soviet demography came well after similar developments in the East European countries, and although its practitioners have to practice verbal genuflexion to a bureaucratic Marxism rather more often perhaps than their bloc colleagues, the science is now flourishing vigorously.

Thus the picture here, as elsewhere in post-Stalinist ideology, is one of disarray, with a mingling of official pragmatism and dogmatism uneasily poured over strong currents of potentially competitive professionalism that are alternately dammed and released, and at times channeled into use with watchful caution.

\footnote{161} See almost any of the numerous articles published in the Soviet press in August and September of 1973 in honour of the arrival of the 250 millionth Soviet citizen. From a reading of these articles it emerges clearly that the topic was made the subject of a mandatory recommendation to editors and that certain lines of approach to it were fairly clearly mapped out for them.
3.e. **Population Policy: issues and dilemmas**

For present purposes, population policy is being taken to mean those measures adopted by a government (or, where appropriate, party) aimed at affecting the numbers, distribution and ethnic composition of the population. Obviously, as was pointed out in Ch.1, many social policies might influence population developments without that having been the intention; and many observers include social policies with incidental demographic impact under population policy. Here, however, I shall be speaking about population policy in the narrower sense of deliberate and conscious pursuit of demographic ends. And given the absence of any clear-cut governmental policy line in the USSR at present, the discussion will focus on problems and debates concerning policy formulation.

As the power of the state to increase life expectancy is limited in normal circumstances and is in any case not usually exercised for demographic reasons or objectives,

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population policy may be said to boil down to two issues:

(i) pro- versus anti-natalism; and

(ii) migration policy, both external and internal.

Of these, the second, though briefly referred to in some sections of this study, has not been made a central theme and accordingly attention will be concentrated on the first.

A distinction is now always drawn, though it should be, between Soviet population theory or doctrine and population policy. As they correspond roughly to theory and practice, it should be evident that they may diverge; and, in fact, in the Soviet case, they have very frequently done so. Thus in the 'thirties, while averring at the ideological or doctrinal level that Socialism was conducive to high fertility, the Soviet Government introduced measures designed to prop up fertility which had already begun to sag. And without dethroning the Leninist pronouncements that it was a mother's right to decide how many children she should have, or the numerous earlier expressions of concern for the damage done by illegal abortion, the authorities nonetheless proceeded to promote fertility by abolishing legal abortion. Similarly, the mid-'sixties shift in doctrine discussed in the previous section did not, or at least has not yet led to any reformulation of domestic population policy. In the international sphere, the USSR has withdrawn from its previous alliance with the Roman Catholic Church, and now gives some, if limited, support to UN initiatives in the population field. But the approach to the key domestic issue - to be or not to be pro-natalist, and if so by what means, to what extent, and in what parts of the country - remains cautious and apparently irresolute, though a variety of opinions and suggestions are being permitted to be heard.
It would probably be true to say that it is only recently that the concept of 'population policy' as a distinct and autonomous sphere of public concern has gained acceptance in the socialist bloc. Whilst in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser extent, Bulgaria, the notion has been freely in use for well over a decade, and politicians are prone to speak in terms of it, elsewhere there is caution. Though Soviet demographers frequently use the phrase, Soviet politicians do not.  

While the term may be of uncertain status, and the practice ambiguous and inconsistent for the time being, there can be no doubt that the Soviet Union has followed very vigorous and unequivocal population policies in the past. After the collectivization disasters of the 1930s, as noted in Ch.1.d, the Soviet government abolished legal abortion and introduced unmistakeably pro-natalist measures, which were further strengthened in the wake of the drastic human losses and fertility decline of the 1941-44 period by a combination of moral and material incentives strangely reminiscent of Stakhanovism. After the war had ended and the birth rate evidently (no birth rates were published until 1950) been restored to acceptable levels, the financial inducements were reduced and later left unchanged as average wages rose, and thus allowed to decline into relative insignificance as a proportion of family income.

163 Nor, in general, do their colleagues in Poland and Yugoslavia. Thus a recent usage by the Polish premier Jaroszewicz, for example, subsumes it under social policy and conveys the impression that the speaker has suffered it to be added to his baggage without being convinced of its utility. Trybuna Ludu, 6 June 1972, quoted in Studia Demograficzne, no.31 (1973). For more detailed discussions, see Chs 4, 5 and 6. There may now be some movement towards more explicit discussion of population policy by political figures in Poland, Yugoslavia and USSR. See note 189, below, and the discussion in Chs 4.g and 5.g.
The official attitude towards birth control measures has usually been divorced, at least ostensibly, from national population considerations. That this is at least sometimes disingenuous is clearly demonstrated by the circumstances of the abortion restrictions of 1936 and the legislation on the family that accompanied them. But the fact remains that there is a strong tradition in Soviet social policy, supported by unequivocal and well-known statements by Lenin, that it is a woman's right to decide whether she will or will not have a baby, and that this is probably one of the factors militating against the present pressures for a more active pro-natalism.

There are other and stronger obstacles to decisive action on population policy, however. One is that any effort to increase fertility involves present sacrifices. Either the mothers are to be given financial support sufficient to make them want to spend more time raising families than working and earning money; or the network of crèches and kindergartens and other auxiliary services must be extended radically so that child-bearing need not interfere with the mother's work for more than a few months, and she will feel more able to combine the two. Either solution is bound to be costly; and if in the short term the first of the two is less expensive in that heavy capital outlays are not involved, and easier to apply instantaneously, it must also be remembered that it involves a greater drain on the female labour force if successful. As labour shortages are already acute, it is difficult to reach a decision to

164 Cf. Ch. 1 d., pp. 90-92, footnotes 134 to 139.
plan for more plentiful supplies in the relatively remote future by accepting aggravation of the shortages of the present. If planners and economic administrators have somehow contributed to the climate of pro-natalist agitation that has been much in evidence in recent years, they probably also include in their ranks formidable opponents of any solutions involving the expenditure of much money, or the removal from the work-force of large numbers of young women.

A crucial, if not the crucial, factor inhibiting decisive action appears to be the nationality issue. Economic, social and political reasons would all prompt the Moscow leadership to wish to restrain fertility in Central Asia and the Caucasus while promoting it almost everywhere else. Ideally, of course, they would like to reduce non-European numbers while stimulating larger European families wherever they might be resident. This second variant is scarcely practicable. But even the first seems to have run up against political objections. The issue has certainly been referred to in public, but so far it would appear that

165 It is interesting to note that in Hungary, where generous child-care allowances were introduced leading to the withdrawal from the work-force of 80% of those eligible to receive it, pressure from industry has led to further measures meant to encourage the women to return to work. See Radio Free Europe Hungarian Situation Report 1976/no.2, pp.9-10. In such a situation, of course, where a concession has already been given, the only politically and economically acceptable way to right the damage is to make a further concession; and this appears to have been the course the Hungarian government took - giving women the added incentive of working for wages and receiving the allowance.

166 Cf. the discussion in 3.b. above, pp.186 and ff.
no such proposals have been made by ranking politicians, as opposed to academics and publicists. And as was noted earlier, there is evidence of explicit opposition to any such proposals in official circles. A recent Kommunist article celebrating the passing of the 250 million mark steers a precarious tight-rope course between various possible views of the situation and commends all in turn, apparently contradicting itself more than once in the process. Though the writer refers only to 'differences of opinion' among demographers, one can probably assume, given his gymnastics, that the differences of opinion are to be found at higher levels as well. The compromise Boldyrev's diplomatic equivocation seems to point to on balance is a mildly pro-natalist policy, oriented in some way that is not made clear towards the low-fertility areas of the country. However, the only measures that actually have been taken lately (of which more in a moment) do not point in that direction. And in any case, after so many years of unsuccessful agitation, it is to be expected that any new initiatives wrung at last from the reluctant allocators of finances will be too parsimonious to have any decisive effect.

A further factor involved may be demographic ignorance in leading decision-making circles, or putting essentially the same point another way, the inability of the demographic lobby to succeed in making the leadership sufficiently aware of the seriousness of the demographic situation. How many Soviet policy-makers are aware of even

167 Cf. note 153, above.

the current state of crude demographic indices by republic? And how many are able to grasp the difference between net population increase and more analytic measures of fertility? Conversations with Soviet bloc demographers suggest that ignorance is in fact still widespread.

But a lot of what may look like ignorance could of course equally well be bemusement before the complexity of the dilemma, coupled with a desire to keep the matter quiet. Certainly not the least important aspect of current Soviet population policy is the evident official determination to keep the unfavourable trends of overall and differential fertility away from the public's notice. To some extent we are dealing here with the Cheshire cat's smile of the old ideological tenet, now half-abandoned, that socialism is conducive to fertility and that Socialist populations develop

169 Even official spokesmen on demographic matters sometimes convey the impression that they have a less than vivid perception of the existing demographic situation in the USSR. See, for example, the discussion in Voprosy Filosofii 1974, no.11, and in particular, the remarks of the prominent Central Statistical Administration official (and Pravda commentator on demographic matters) Boldyrev. Boldyrev's grasp of demographic realities seem at best to be one that might be termed 'bureaucratic commonsensism'. The reasons he gives there against adopting a pro-natalist policy probably represent a good deal of prevailing official orthodoxy. Interestingly, he seems to be under the impression that America is officially anti-natalist (an evident misreading of the politics of the setting up of the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future), and believes this to reflect official concern about finding jobs for the postwar baby boom. 'This,' he concludes, 'is evidently the reason for the population stabilization program currently being pursued in the USA.' Boldyrev implies that what is good enough for the mighty USA should be good enough for the USSR. The ways of détente are many and bizarre.
according to their own immanent and beneficent laws.

In popular articles by government or Central Statistical Office spokesmen, statistics are presented to the general reader with the manifest intention of misleading him if possible. Whether this is a measure of the concern felt or merely force of habit is difficult to say. But the tendency to gloss over probably does again suggest that no very decisive new policy steps are to be expected for the time being.

The measures that have been actually taken in the area of population policy recently have the same apparent tendency to avoid the most crucial issues. The two main

170 Examples of this could be multiplied almost at will. In the interview article 'Nas - 250,000,000!' in Sotsialisticheskaia Industriia, 8 August 1973, p.4, the Deputy Director of the Central Statistical Agency was asked what the explanation was for the different rates of growth in different regions. The reply ran as follows:

'The areas with the highest birth-rates are the industrial centres in the East of the country. This is the result of the rapid growth of industry and the large influx of young people into these regions. Or take another instance. During the period when the Virgin Lands were being developed, many workers from all Republics in the Union went to live in Kazakhstan. There too new cities sprang up and hundreds of settlements were constructed. This too affected the birth-rate.'

'One ought not to forget the consequences of the war either. [which, he explains, particularly affected the population in the contested areas, i.e. the European areas.] In 1942-5 many fewer children were born than before the war. That means that the people of that generation will also have fewer children. And another serious consequence - the imbalance between males and females...' etc.

Nearly all the positive assertions are inaccurate or inapposite. And in addition the ethnic factor is not so much as hinted at. Elsewhere in the article, the 1973 population is compared with the 1922 one (despite the incomparability of the borders) and the reader given to understand that the difference (increase of 80%) is very large; the increase is attributed to high fertility and low mortality. Elsewhere again, it is implied that the (cont.)
ones - the extension of full maternity leave entitlements to kolkhoz women irrespective of length of employment, and the introduction of child allowances for families whose total income amounts to less than 50 roubles a head both appear to be egalitarian measures of social policy rather than population policy as such. Insofar as either of them should have a pro-natalist effect (which was probably not specifically intended), that effect will tend to be greater in those areas of the country where fertility is already relatively high. The Central Asian and Caucasian areas are both strongly rural and relatively less well-off (particularly in terms of family income per head since dependency ratios there are much less favourable). It seems unlikely that advocates of a planned and differentiated policy will be pleased by this development. To them it must seem like a dissipation of scarce funds where they are least needed.

Given the evident official reluctance to spend too much money on population policy measures, the question

170 (cont.) Soviet Union is teeming with 'Heroine-Mothers' in undiminished profusion, though in fact their numbers are declining sharply and disproportionately concentrated in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

171 Sobranie postanovlenii, no.18, 1973, item 102.

172 Sobranie postanovlenii, 1974, no.21, item 121. For a detailed commentary on this legislation (which, incidentally describes and evaluates it purely in terms of social, and not demographic policy), see V.A. Acharkan, 'Sotsialno-pravovaia priroda posobia na detei maloobespechennym sem'iam', Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo, 1975, no.10, p.34.

173 Significantly, the new child allowance is only for children under the age of eight. Ibid., p.39.
arises whether or not more economical and necessarily therefore coercive measures might not be resorted to. For the time being, Soviet policy remains liberal: divorce and abortion rates exceed and probably exceed (respectively) those prevailing anywhere else in the Socialist bloc; and while both are not infrequently deplored, there do not seem to be any campaigns which would presage their prohibition as in Rumania in 1966.\textsuperscript{174} Nor has one heard any reports of withdrawal of contraceptive devices from sale, though their use continues to be rare by Western standards.\textsuperscript{175}

\textsuperscript{174} Another declaration of principle (not necessarily highly official) to the effect that the government would not interfere with abortion legislation appeared recently in Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo 1975, no.8 (V.S. Tadevosian, 'Demograficheskai politika i pravo', at p.24): 'The legal norm banning abortions, issued without profound study of the demographic situation and without due consideration being given to the natural causes of natality decline in that period [Tadevosian is referring to the 1936 legislation, J.F.B.] could not have been sufficiently effective (quite apart from the question of principle involved), and accordingly was revoked in 1955. In changing the law, the legislator correctly pointed out that reduction in the number of abortions could better be ensured by further expansion of state measures supporting motherhood... From the foregoing it can be concluded that in such matters of demographic policy, it is essential to apply not prohibitions, but rather measures designed to encourage a particular pattern of behaviour on the part of citizens by improving the nation's living conditions; this follows directly from the CPSU's directives that are consistently carried out in our country.'

And while there has been some stalling on the pill, the stated reasons at least were ones of medical caution.  

On the other hand, the overall trend within the bloc seems to be quite clearly towards more decisive measures, particularly in the sphere of abortion legislation. While the extreme Rumanian solution may be felt to have misfired (or even backfired), the Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Bulgarian governments have successively introduced more moderate restrictions on the availability of abortion; and at least in the case of the first two, it would seem that these measures may be succeeding where others have been at best

176 See the statements made by B. Petrovskii, the Soviet Minister of Health, and representatives of the pharmaceutical industries in Literaturnaia Gazeta 1968 no.50 (11 December), p.10. The real reasons, of course, may be different. Contraceptives are likely to strike Soviet planners as being almost as far removed from virtuous heavy-industrial producer goods as anything could be. And there may well also be some apprehension as to what the consequences might be for the sagging birth rate if even further methods of averting births were to be made available. Scepticism about the sincerity of medical objections to the pill and other contraceptives is surely justified given the known deleterious effects of abortion, particularly when it reaches epidemic forms as in the USSR. Such scepticism has in fact found its way into official Soviet publications: 'The problem of an effective, reliable and absolutely harmless contraceptive has not yet been solved anywhere in the world. But it would appear nonetheless to have been solved a great deal more effectively than one might suppose judging by the quantity, quality and assortment of contraceptives that are available for sale in our pharmacies.' A.G. Vishnevskii, 'Demograficheskie protsessy v SSSR', Voprosy Filosofii, 1973, no.9, p.115, at p.125.
palliative or inconclusive. And while we have the rather surprising counter-example of East Germany which has finally legalized abortion despite its very low fertility and acute labour shortage, and Poland, where agitation for the repeal of liberal abortion legislation seems to have been (temporarily at least) defeated, the overall climate of opinion does seem to be shifting towards robust solutions.

Most demographers and commentators generally seem to agree on the need to forestall any attempts to apply

177 It may still be too early for precision on this point, but it is noteworthy that Czechoslovak fertility (both crude and age-specific rates) apparently increased rapidly in the three years (1972-74) as abortion was progressively more restricted. (see, e.g., 'Začínáme mládnout', Rude Pravo, 21 May 1974). Czech commentators at least frequently assert (admit?) that the two are linked. (e.g., K. Zajiček: 'Changes in Regulations Concerning Interruptions' in Demosta VI (1973) no.2, p.57. More recently again, since 1974, Hungarian crude and age-specific rates have shown a marked improvement (and abortion rates a marked drop) after the introduction of restrictions on the availability of abortion. And Rumanian birth-rates, though falling, have not yet returned to the low point of 1965 (14.3 per thousand) or anything very close to it.

178 In the first two years after abortion was legalized, the birth rate in NRD fell from 13.8 to 10.6 per thousand (1973) Rocznik Demograficzny 1974 (Warsaw, 1974), p.353.

179 Despite wide press support for revision of abortion legislation, the Sejm committee for Health and Physical Culture nonetheless decided to reconfirm and endorse the existing regulations in 1973. (Biuletyn Sejmowy, 27 March 1973) A more recent article in the Party newspaper defending existing practice would seem to indicate that opposition to free abortion continues, but that the official view has not changed. S. Klonowicz, 'Sztuczne poronienia', Trybuna Ludu, 15 June 1974, p.3. For more detailed discussion, see Ch.4.g.(iii) below.
'administrativnye mery' (administrative measures - a standard Soviet euphemism for repressive policies), which, they emphasize, are counter-productive. They proclaim loudly and prophylactically the Soviet Union's allegedly steadfast policy of always leaving decisions about family size to the parents. It may also be, that in adopting a parcel of administrative measures, the Rumanians (who ideologically speaking have been sent about half-way to Coventry just at present) have made their wholesale adoption elsewhere in the bloc just that little bit less likely. Certainly the response of Socialist demographic opinion elsewhere to the Rumanian solution has been cool. Perhaps on balance the most likely thing is that policy will continue to muddle along in its present inconclusive style for some time to come.

'Demographic policy in the socialist state is based on observance of the principle of 'family sovereignty'. This means that the fullest freedom is extended to citizens in deciding matters relating to family formation, the freedom in other words, for parents to decide on the number of children they will have. It follows from that that all children should be born wanted children in families and to mothers who await them with joy.'


One possible development which could decisively influence the course of events would be the accession to power in Moscow of more or less overt Russian chauvinists. In this connection it is interesting to note that the editor of the right-wing Samizdat journal, Veche, Vladimir Osipov, in an interview given to some American correspondents (who apparently did not get it published), declared that the Russian people might die both morally and physically; the latter, because the contemporary Russian woman is having only one or at most two children. Osipov added that in his view, 'the problem of human rights is less important than the problem of the dying Russian people'. See A. Kruczek, 'W sowieckiej prasie' (cont.)
Another line of advocacy which unites virtually all demographers is the call for (i) the creation of a central demographic institute along the lines of the government commissions existing now virtually throughout Eastern Europe, which would co-ordinate demographic research and make policy recommendations to the authorities; (ii) the establishment of a regular demographic journal; and (iii) extensive funding of a broad program of demographic research, without which, as it is usually emphasized, policy decisions cannot but be ill-founded. While demographic research is indeed expanding

181 (cont.) in Kultura (Paris) no.7-8, 1973, p.122. If, as Kruczek suggests, Osipov's views reflect those of a growing faction within top party circles, we could witness a dramatic change of line on demographic no less than other issues. Osipov himself has since been arrested and sentenced to eight years imprisonment. But a Samizdat article by Agurskii would suggest that this may have been because Osipov and the other Christians attached to Veche refused to let themselves be used by what Agurskii identifies as the neo-Nazi faction within the regime. See M. Agurskii, 'Neonatsistskaia opasnost' v Sovetskom Soiuze', Novy Zhurnal, no.118 (March 1975), p.199 at pp.202-3.

182 V. Bodrova, in a discussion printed in Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo 1975, no.1, p.31, remarks that such commissions now exist in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic. At the time when she spoke, in fact, a commission of the same type had also been created in Poland. And although only a lower-level equivalent exists in Hungary, events there in the last decade and a half indicate eloquently that there is a great deal of official concern about demographic trends and that systematic endeavours are going on to find appropriate policies. This makes the USSR appear something of an outsider in its own bloc of nations.
rapidly, the first two postulates have still not been satisfied. Whatever response the Soviet government may finally opt for, it is clear that it will be faced with a difficult and intractable problem if the fertility scissors do not begin to close more rapidly in the near future. If the situation in the high-fertility areas were indeed to develop in the direction of confrontation, it is difficult to conceive of anyone other than perhaps China benefiting therefrom. Past fertility trends have in effect already assured the Central Asian peoples of future demographic dominance within their own homelands. Continued high fertility in the future will bring them small additional social and political advantage and a great deal of economic hardship. While it was suggested earlier that the current population policy may not necessarily be the worst of the available alternatives (on the let sleeping dogs lie principle), it does seem nonetheless that

183 This despite repeated invocations over a long period of time. A recent source suggests that Valentei's Centre for the Study of Population Problems within the Economics Faculty of Moscow University 'in accordance with a decision of Gosplan, the State Committee of the Council of Ministers for Science and Technology and the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences performs the role of the main organization responsible for working out the socio-economic bases and methods of managing and regulating the development of the population' (Sovetskoie Gosudarstvo i Pravo 1975, no.1, p.28). Valentei's institute and Valentei himself have for some time exuded an air of primus inter pares. But it should be noted that they have rather less than a royal charter (neither the Central Committee nor the Council of Ministers are referred to as having endorsed the decision to give them special status). Their formal and their real position do not seem to be comparable with that of the government population commissions of East Europe.
some kind of differential approach could and should be applied. For such a policy to be implemented without giving rise to additional tensions, it would probably be necessary (and would be in any case wise), to accept some modest degree of devolution in social policy decision-making, with republics receiving central allocations of budgetary funds which they might then dispose according to their own judgement. The rather wealthier and less fertile republics could afford to disburse more on child endowments if they so desired, whilst the high-fertility republics might find it in their own best interests to adopt policies aimed rather at restricting population growth. Proposals along these lines have actually appeared in print in the Soviet Union. Reporting a lecture on Yugoslav demographic problems given by the well-known

184 Scholars and publicists have been openly and repeatedly advocating a differentiated policy for many years, but without success. Thus a book published in 1967, for example, draws attention to differential fertility trends and calls for 'differentiated demographic legislation' to meet the situation, 'since what is appropriate, for example, in the Ukraine or the Baltic region, has turned out to be quite inappropriate in Central Asia or Azerbaidzhan. The decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 8 July 1944 has in certain respects become outdated.' D.I. Valentei, Teoriia i politika narodonaseleniia (Moscow, 1967), p.163. See also, e.g., the recommendations of a symposium held to discuss 'Women in Productive Work and the Family' in Minsk in June 1969 (reproduced in Soviet Sociology, vol.XII (1973), no.2, p.84, at p.93; G.P. Kiseleva, 'K voprosu o raionnykh razlichiiakh urovnia rozhdaemosti v SSSR' in D. Valentei and E. Burmashev (eds) Voprosy teorii i politiki narodonaseleniia (Moscow, 1970), p.141, esp. at pp.152-3; R. Kallistratova, 'Rozhdaemost i pravo', Sovetskaiia Iustitsiia 1971, no.2 p.14, esp. at p.16; K. Vermishev, 'Stimulirovanie rosta naseleniia', Planovoe Khoziaistvo, 1972, no.12, p.102, esp. p.105; 'Demograficheskaia politika: eë napravleniia. Problemy narodonaseleniia', Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1975, no.8, pp.148-152. The list could be extended almost indefinitely.
Yugoslav demographer Miloš Macura at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, R. Galetskaia brings out the many parallels between the Soviet and Yugoslav demographic situations. Noting that Yugoslav child-endowment was formerly paid only to the poorer (maloobespechenim) families (the decision to do the same in the USSR having been already clearly foreshadowed at the time of writing), Galetskaia continues:

Since 1969, child allowances have been decentralized; every republic or autonomous province independently determines how many families will receive allowances and how much they will be. In those republics where the birth rate is very low, the allowance is higher and received by a larger number of families. Thus these payments will have not only a social but also a demographic significance.185

Given the traditional Soviet reluctance to accept dispersal of decision-making, it seems unlikely that this recommendation will be heeded.

185 'Vstrecha s Iugoslavskim uchenym', Voprosy Ekonomiki 1973, no.5, p.159. A distinction should be drawn, of course, between proposals for a differentiated policy and those for a decentralized policy. Many of the advocates of a differentiated policy appear to be Russian nationalist technocrats who instinctively accept the existing centralized bureaucratic structures for determining policy. Some of the decentralizers may also be Russian (or 'European') nationalists who simply believe that a decentralization of policy-making would permit the Russian or European interest to be more effectively pursued. But the two policy proposals are radically different from one another in their political implications, whatever the motives of their advocates. For other decentralizing proposals, see R. Kallistratova, op.cit.; and G.A. Zlobin, Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo 1975, no.1, p.33. Kallistratova and Zlobin do not develop their thinking at great length, and in particular do not draw the highly significant Yugoslav parallel. It is accordingly impossible to be sure to what extent they are favouring a genuine decentralization as opposed to a centrally-manipulated one (which in Soviet conditions might not be too hard to carry through).
Hitherto the discussion has been conducted in terms of the prospects for active pro-natalism. The reason for this is that the chances of a swing towards anti-natalism seem to be effectively ruled out. While it is now recognized that fertility-limitation policies may be of some value to developing countries, it is virtually never suggested that the Soviet Union itself should limit its population growth. The same taboo is observed elsewhere in the bloc as well, which would suggest that ZPG is ideologically out of bounds. The official attitude on this point seems for the most part to be quite genuinely held by the demographers also. While often heterodox on other matters, they nearly always share

186 There are undoubtedly pockets of anti-natalist thinking and sentiment among Soviet demographic observers and officialdom, but they seldom come out into the open. Boldyrev's implicit commendation of what he believed to be Nixonian anti-natalism (see note 167, above) is a rare example of its kind. Some demographers emphasize that they are not in favour of rapid population increase (particularly when they are discussing Central Asia), but I know of none who would advocate stationary reproduction (i.e. holding fertility at replacement rates), much less ZPG (net population growth of nil) at the earliest possible juncture. It was suggested to me by a Soviet demographer that certain members of the Ukrainian demographic community are anti-natalists, but if they are, they seem to maintain a discreet silence about it. In fact, they appear to be more given to the Strumlinist line of the abolition of motherhood and its replacement by production-line institutional education and upbringing, which they evidently believe will solve the declining fertility problem together with a host of others. For a sampling of their somewhat disconcerting, steely-eyed approach, see V.P. Piskunov and V.S. Steshenko, 'О демографической политике с entrenis-icheskogo obshchestva' and P.S. Il'initskii 'Rol' razvitiia obschestvennykh form potrebleniia v aktivizatsii demograficheskoi politiki' in V.S. Steshenko and V.P. Piskunov, Demograficheskaia Politika (Moscow, 1974).
their governments' belief in the inherent and self-evident justice of national demographic expansion.\textsuperscript{187}

Given its 'vast unpeopled spaces', its labour shortages, it disrupted internal ethnic balance and its fertile and not always friendly neighbours, Soviet Russia must vie with Australia as being the industrial country least likely to be susceptible to ZPG-type arguments. And as long as the Soviet attitude remains what it is, the similar stands taken in Prague Budapest and elsewhere are unlikely to alter. At a time when many serious observers believe that a halt must be called to population and economic growth, it is perhaps a matter of concern that the USSR and the other Comecon countries are proceeding so unreflectingly along the path of demographic mercantilism. So far there are few signs\textsuperscript{188} indeed of the

\textsuperscript{187} 'The Soviet society has a vested interest in (zainteresovano v) increased fertility, normal population growth, reduced mortality.' V.S. Tadevosian in Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo 1975, no.8, p.22. The linking in apposition of these three very different notions as though they were virtually synonymous is characteristic.

\textsuperscript{188} In a round-table discussion of 'Man and his Environment' published in Voprosy Filosofii 1972 no.11, and 1973, no.1, population actually was mentioned by one or two of the contributors as a relevant factor. The amount of space devoted to it, however, was markedly less than would be the case in any comparable Western discussion. Urlanis, the only demographer among the 34 or so participants, criticized the way in which these matters had been neglected in the Soviet Union: 'We ought not to avoid these problems either. As Academician Kapitsa said, we live not in a separate flat but in a communal one...(and) this flat is already extremely densely populated.' 'There is no need to dramatize the situation, but it is essential that population problems should be studied. It is most regrettable that we should somehow be standing aside from these most pressing contemporary problems.' Significantly, however, Urlanis goes on to hedge his bets (cont.)
emergence within the Soviet Union of a global perspective on Soviet population problems rather than a Soviet perspective on global population problems. If ZPG is to be our salvation, it will probably have to come without intentional Soviet-bloc participation.  

188 (cont.) adding that while it is important that the whole world should appreciate the difficulty and complexity of population matters: 'The question arises in various forms; in some places natality needs to be diminished; in other places it needs to be increased.' (Voprosy Filosofii 1973, no.2, p.46).  

189 The proceedings at the 25th Party Congress in February 1976 do not suggest that population policy has achieved a pre-eminent position in the thoughts of key policy-makers. While it is true and no doubt a sign of the times that Brezhnev's report contained a fleeting reference to the need to develop an effective demographic policy as being one of the tasks of social science, this allusion found no reflection in the section of the Five-Year Plan guidelines devoted to 'the development of science'; and the measures actually foreshadowed for improving the working mother's lot seem both vague and modest, and unlikely to amount in practice to any radical departure from the existing drift of policy. Population policy is still being treated as something for future decision (an attitude on the part of the authorities which is actually fostered by the demographic community's eagerness to get its research programs funded and its voice heard before policy is decided). (For Brezhnev's speech, see Pravda, 28 February 1976, p.8; for the Plan Guidelines, see Izvestiia, 7 March 1976, p.7.
CHAPTER 4 POPULATION POLITICS IN POLAND

This chapter is divided into the following seven sub-sections:
(a) demographic background; (b) evolution of policies on population matters\(^1\); (c) economic policies; (d) ethnic relations;
(e) international politics; (f) ideology; and (g) current population policies: debates and dilemmas.

a. Demographic Background\(^2\)

In the post-war period, Poland's population development has followed a path basically similar to those traced out by many other of

\(^1\) A special section is being set aside for this because of the special interest of Poland's Malthusian phase in the late 1950s.

\(^2\) See the two-volume work by the doyen of Polish demographers, Edward Rosset, Demografia Polski, two vols., Warsaw 1975. See also K. Dziewoński and L. Kosiński, Rozwój i rozmieszczenie ludności Polski w XX wieku, for a more geographic approach. A good short account of post-war developments is to be found in Z. Smoliński, "Procesy demograficzne w XXX-leciu PRL", in Aktualne problemy demograficzne kraju, Warsaw 1974. On the war-time and post-war demographic upheavals, see K. Kersten, Repatriacja ludności polskiej po II wojnie światowej, Wrocław 1974. The Polish demographic journal Studia Demograficzne, which has been coming out since 1962 (over four issues have now appeared) contains a good deal of material on Poland (with English summaries). Detailed statistical information is made available in the annual Rocznik Demograficzny. There is an excellent bibliographical guide to Polish demographic literature in Bibliografia polskiego piśmiennictwa statystycznego 1944-1969, Warsaw 1972, pp. 14-19 and 126-235. A guide to the Main Statistical Office's demographic publications (not contained in the work just cited) will be found in Studia Demograficzne No. 28 (1972) p. 43, & ff.
the rather less developed European countries, both Socialist and non-Socialist: an initial increase in the birth-rate, followed by steady and at times rapid decline with an uncertain stabilization emerging only recently; initial rapid decline in general mortality rates, followed by stabilization at low levels, then stagnation and slight increases in both general mortality and age-specific mortality for older age-groups (particularly males), with infant mortality, however, continuing its decline from rather high initial levels; a sharp initial increase in net population growth followed by decline and a shaky stabilization roughly parallel to that occurring in the birth rate; increasing nuptiality but also increasing divorce; massive migration from the villages to the towns (including a vast statistically "concealed" component in the form of daily-commuting worker-peasants); sharp increase in the urban work-force and a particularly sharp increase in the level of qualifications and employment rates of young married women.

External influences on population development in socialist countries tend to be limited. With the notable and to some extent temporary  

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3 After a decade or more in which emigration was more or less encouraged, the Yugoslav authorities are now deploring this outflow and seeking to reverse it. This question will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
exception of Yugoslavia, all frown on emigration, and none has yet been confronted by the problem of alien immigration (as the Catholic writer Stefan Kisielewski once pointed out with characteristic

4 During the thaw period in Poland, voices were sometimes raised proposing emigration as a means of dealing with the country's manpower surplus. See "2 x 2 = 4", Po prostu 8/1957, J. Obodowski; "O emigracji zarobkowej" Życie Gospodarcze (hereinafter ŻG)7/7/1957, M. Kabaj "Próba terapii" ŻG 23/3/1958 Obodowski attempts to justify an earlier suggestion he had made along these lines, and defensively stresses that the emigration should be directed exclusively to Socialist countries. (He is now a Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Labour, Wages and Social Affairs). By the time Kabaj was writing, the matter had evidently become more sensitive, since he refers obliquely to the future necessity of "internal migration and not only internal". Another contributor to this debate (A. Brzeski, ŻG 11/8/1957) disputed Obodowski's restriction of emigration to the Socialist bloc. It may be economically more rational for workers to go, for example, to France or Belgium. In these matters, declared Brzeski, "business is business" (English in the original). He also advanced the argument of individual freedom in favour of his cause, and quoted this time the Latin tag civitas non est carcer. Having indicated a complete readiness to accept the heresy of economic emigration, Brzeski then proceeded to avoid it by embracing the even greater heresy of advocating the import of capital. To the best of my knowledge, Brzeski has not since become a Deputy Minister. See also footnote 43.
audacity. Once the immense upheavals occasioned by the war and the westward displacement of Poland's borders were finally smoothed out, Poland settled down to the usual Socialist pattern of nugatory immigration and a thin persistent leak of emigration, which, during liberal phases, broadens to a stream. In the late 1950s, there was a brief period of repatriation of Poles from the Soviet Union to blur the pattern; and more recently there has been a tendency for elderly Westerners of Polish origin to return to their homeland to spend their later years and their warmly welcomed hard-currency pension cheques.

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The attitude to immigration as opposed to repatriation appears to be that it is inherently slightly reprehensible. Thus a Trybuna Ludu (hereinafter TL) article "Polityka społeczna i demografia" (TL 2-3/8/75) says in this connection even of Sweden (a country maintaining very good relations with Poland and quite unusually solicitous about its economic immigrants) that it "formally opposes pro-natalist policies, but in reality makes extensive use of (korzysta szeroko z) migrants to improve its population balance ..." References to immigration with Poland figuring as the host-country are rare and usually confine themselves to discussing the subject of temporary visitors from other Socialist countries. A conference participant discussing the labour shortage in Poland's cities recently observed that the problem could scarcely be solved by immigration, unless it were to be from the Arab or African countries. "Since we cannot and probably do not want to postulate such a procedure", he said, Poland must needs rely on domestic population policies to solve the problem. The sequence of words and ideas is interesting and probably revealing. See Aktualne problemy demograficzne kraju, p. 310-11.
During the Gierek years there has been an increase in emigration generally and some outflow of Germans to the Federal Republic. But neither development is viewed with favour, and the numbers involved have not to date been enormously significant.\(^6\)

Given its special relevance to numerical concerns, the pattern of natural increase in post-war Poland may be worth a few additional comments. These will focus on fertility since it is fluctuation in the level of fertility rather than mortality that determines natural increase rates in more developed societies. Poland's natural increase in the first fifteen years or so after the War was exceptional, both in relation to its own pre-war experience, and to the levels prevailing in other European countries of comparable development. Natality remained extremely high till about the mid-fifties, and natural increase until about 1960, when the natality decline began to accelerate, and declining mortality reached a point where further improvement was impossible. Up to that point, however, Poland's natural increase had been comparable with that of many Third World countries. The decline, when it came, was all the more drastic. In 12 years the crude birth rate fell from 29.1\(^7\) (in 1955) to 16.3\(^7\) (in 1967), and natural increase fell from 19.5\(^7\) to 8.5\(^7\). The Net Reproduction Rate, 1.52 in 1955, slipped to 1.01 (i.e. only just above the replacement level) by 1969.\(^8\) The General Fertility Rate (i.e. number of births per thousand women in the population aged 15-49) fell from 98 in 1955 (the second highest in Europe) to 58 in 1965 (the fifth lowest in Europe).\(^9\)

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\(^6\) See the discussion in parts (d) and (e) below.

\(^7\) Rocznik Demograficzny 1974, Warsaw 1974, p. xxi.

\(^8\) Ibid., p. 107.

extent the decline in the crude birth rate was due to changes in the age-structure of the population, as the less numerous cohorts of the depression and war years reached the most fertile age-groups. But as the declines in the GFR and NRR indicate, other factors were also at work. Among them, one might mention the rapid growth of industrialization and urbanization (in Poland in recent years, there has been a very large gap between rural and urban fertility: See Table 2 in Appendix B) the spread of education and the aspirations and attitudes it engenders, the sustained urban housing crisis, expanded employment of young married women in urban areas, the legalization of abortion and increased availability of contraceptives, and the later and more explicitly antinatalist measures adopted by the government after 1959. Since the late 1960s there has been a slight increase in the crude birth rate, and stabilization in certain more analytical measures of fertility. The most frequent view among Polish demographers, however, has been that this stabilization will be only temporary, and that further decline is to be expected. As the NRR for the country as a whole currently stands at 1.05 (1973), this would mean that the population would soon be no longer reproducing itself, though owing to the present age-structure of the population, and depending on the speed of the further decline postulated, there would, of course, continue to be a surplus of births over deaths for some time to come.

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10 A view based on obvious assumptions about growing urbanization and increasing educational standards (given the very strong correlation of both with lower fertility in Poland, etc., and also on investigations of intended family size which show planned fertility as steadily declining by cohort. See, e.g., Z Smoliński, "Perspektywy dzietności", ŻG 3/11/1974.
One of the consequences of Poland's erratic fertility fluctuations since the war has been that the abnormalities created in the population's age-structure by past catastrophes have been further accentuated. The plunge in age-specific fertility rates occurred when the very small World War II birth cohorts were reaching the child-bearing age-groups; whilst the post-war baby boom and the present stabilization of inherent fertility have both occurred at a time when the size of the main child-bearing cohorts would have ensured a large birth rate in any case. The consequent differences between the birth rates for different years not far removed from one another are very great. (Thus 782,000 children were born in 1957, but only 599,000 were born in 1962, and 520,000 in 1967.\textsuperscript{11} This is the characteristic "undulatory effect" (falowanie) much commented on and deplored by Polish observers. In the age-pyramid, this phenomenon takes the form of dramatic bulges interspersed with deep indentations. The succession of these demographic "highs" and "lows" (wyże : niże) as they are known, has most disruptive effects on economic and social life.

\textbf{b. Evolution of Policies on Population Questions}

At the end of World War II, a Poland emerged which differed drastically from its predecessor state territorially, politically and demographically. Its population had been reduced from over 35 million to 23.6 million,\textsuperscript{12} and its very large ethnic minorities (amounting to roughly one third of the population in the 1930s) had been virtually eliminated by the combined effects of war, genocide, territorial and

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Rocznik Demograficzny} 1974, p. XX.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Rocznik Statystyczny} 1971, p. 68.
population shifts and deportation. The population of Polish stock had also been decimated by a similar catalogue of disasters and upheavals. Though the total extent of the Polish state had been reduced, population density had been reduced also. There were, moreover, large expanses of formerly German territory in the west, where the autochthonous Polish population was either of modest or negligible dimensions, which now had to be settled and thereby consolidated as Polish. In these circumstances, with a threat of national extinction (to be understood quite literally) having been narrowly averted, and a future threat from German revanche needing to be forestalled, it was perhaps inevitable that a strongly pronatalist mood should emerge in both the nation and its new rulers. The burgeoning birth rate was greeted with great popular and official enthusiasm and approval. It was indeed one of the few issues on which complete unanimity of views could be attained. The government's attitude was expressed more in the form of rhetoric, propaganda, and a general policy orientation; no systematic and explicit pro-natalist program was ever enunciated. But the overall economic policies of the time were certainly calculated to reinforce the natural demographic revival that usually occurs after a war, as postponed marriages are concluded and postponed progeny hastily brought into the world. The revival of economic activity in the cities (including trade, services and some private enterprise in the early years) and the redistribution of old land and the subdivision and allocation to eager peasants of vast tracts of new land were also conducive to the formation of a pro-natalist climate. The introduction of social services

on a larger scale no doubt exerted a similar influence. The years of reconstruction before the forced-draft industrialization phase began were years of relative prosperity and must have done a lot to give apparent substance to the optimism fostered by the regime in demographic as in other matters. The means of family limitation were not in any case readily available and little publicity was given to them. Abortion was prohibited for all but exceptional cases. And government policies in housing and other matters favoured people with larger families to an extent that came ultimately to be keenly resented by many members of the less fecund urban intelligentsia.

Then with the general liberalization of life in most parts of the Soviet bloc that took place in the mid-1950s, abortion legislation was liberalized in the Soviet Union and it became easier for advocates of a similar step in Poland (as elsewhere in the bloc) to put their case publicly and make representations in the appropriate quarters. In 1956, after a lengthy campaign of press articles depicting the evils of barn and back-street abortions, making good use of the claim that the church

14 For a review of the more important ones from the point of view of population policy, see M. Latuch, "Elementy polityki ludnościowej w Polsce" in Polityka ludnościowa: współczesne problemy, (hereinafter Polityka ludnościowa) Warsaw 11973, p. 106, esp. pp. 116-124.

15 The legislation on abortion was taken over directly from pre-war Poland. It would appear that by the mid-fifties, however, evasion of the restriction had become widespread and prosecution infrequent. (See M. Parzyńska, "Po dyskusji - projekt ustawy" in Życie Warszawy (hereinafter ŻW) 13/4/1956.

16 This development was reported (a full week after it happened) by TL and ŻW simultaneously on December 1, 1955.
was the main adversary and surprisingly little overt use of the fact that similar legislation had been passed in the USSR (surely a most remarkable sign of the times), the reformers won. At the same time, efforts were

17 For the text of the new abortion legislation, see Dziennik Ustaw May 8, 1956. The important provision in it was that "difficult conditions of life" (trudne warunki życiowe) might be accepted as grounds for abortion. However the preamble contained no reference to the right of a woman to decide in these matters (as did the Soviet legislation). And indeed for some years afterwards (up to 1959), it remained unclear and hotly disputed just how broadly the social indication was to be interpreted; and by whom it was to be interpreted (i.e. by the woman or by the medical authorities). These facts bear out the observation sometimes made in the press at the time that the passage of the law had been "controversial" and the result of a "compromise". While most other East European regimes brought in reformed legislation at the same time, there was no uniformity about it and it would be a mistake to assume that the issue in Poland was in any sense pre-determined. Neither East Germany nor Albania (then still an overtly obedient satellite) altered their restrictive legislation.

Reading the main newspapers at the time, one gets the impression that a group of reformists centred around the Warsaw daily Życie Warszawy led the struggle, and that the official party newspaper Trybuna Ludu maintained a certain distance from events. The PAX (pro-regime Catholic) press was strongly opposed (more emphatically so then than it has been since) and the official Church also condemned the proposed reforms. It was the Catholics and the Catholics almost exclusively who raised the population issue and accused their opponents of being Malthusians. These were of course still good tactics in 1956. The reformers denied that they had any dark designs on Poland's high birth rate, and there is no really hard evidence that many of them were inspired by any such motives at that stage. Their arguments were couched purely in terms of relieving the
made (largely by the same people) to place family planning on an official footing with government approval and financial support. In 1957, the Family Planning Association (then the Association for Conscious Motherhood) was formed and permitted to develop links with western "neo-Malthusian" organizations and activists. Contraceptives began to be produced in meaningful quantities, and a press campaign for their acceptance was launched.

suffering of overburdened women and reducing the casualties currently being claimed by back-street abortionists. It was only later in 1957-58, and more particularly in 1959 and 1960 that the anti-natalist demographic argument began to be used by defenders of the abortion reforms. This point is often overlooked by commentators both within and outside Poland, who tend to erroneously extrapolate the government's anti-natalist policy back to the time of the abortion reform. They may be right, but the written evidence certainly does not bear them out; on the contrary.

The leaders here were again Życie Warszawy and their social affairs commentator Mirosława Parzyńska.

See, e.g., TL July 19, 1959, for an interview complete with photograph of Dr Hermann Knaus, co-author of the Ogino-Knaus rhythm method. Radio Warsaw June 17, 1959, reported that the "outstanding American scholar Dr Abraham Stone" had expressed his surprise and gratification at the achievements of the Polish family planners. Dr Stone was once described in a Soviet anti-Malthusian article as a "specialist in sterilization" engaged on some very dubious field-work in South-East Asia. Literaturnaia Gazeta May 10, 1952, quoted in W. Petersen, The Politics of Population, London 1965, p. 114-5.

See "Rok działalności Towarzystwa Świadomego Macierzyństwa", TL No. 12, 1958.
At this stage (1957-58), however, the official support was less enthusiastic than it was later to become. The press still conveys the impression that a group of family planners have gained the support or active tolerance of the government rather than that the latter itself is setting the pace. Moreover, the link between family planning and an anti-natalist population policy, while urged occasionally in some quarters, had not yet received any obvious official imprimatur.

The first articles deploring Poland's high fertility, pointing out its economic disadvantages, and proposing counter-action, made their appearance in economic journals and the popular press during the course of 1957.\(^2\) Whatever the disclaimers of their authors, in the context of

\(^2\) W. Bieda "Uwagi o niektórych ekonomicznych stronach zjawisk ludnościowych", *Myśl Gospodarcza* No. 5, 1957; S. Wyrobisz "Fatalizm populacyjny czy interwencja" MG No. 8, 1957; J. Czarkowski "Przyrost ludności a stopa życiowa", MG No. 9, 1957; A. Józefowicz "Ekonomika i ludność" ŻG No. 17, 1957. These articles developed the idea that rapid population growth was economically disadvantageous, placing as it did excessive strain on both current consumption and current and future investment. The existing cake had to be divided among more all the time, whilst the expectation of excess labour supply in the future forced additional investment in the present to prepare the necessary jobs for them. High population growth rates were particularly inimical to growth in living standards, especially in the fields of food production and housing. While these authors were fully aware of, and indeed emphasized the unfamiliar and taboo nature of their subject-matter, they tried to some extent to avoid being identified as Malthusians. Certain journalists of similar views, on the other hand, were much less cautious. A Szypulski, writing in the Democratic Party weekly *Tygodnik Demokratyczny* (May 7, 1957, "Przyrost naturalny a środki spożycia") urged radical and anti-egalitarian measures to check population growth which
the Soviet tradition in these matters they can only be described as Malthusian. While some of the more scholarly contributors to the discussion sought to evade this label, none of them really tried to relate themselves to the Stalinist doctrines on population; no doubt any attempt on their part to have done so would have been futile. Yet despite their Malthusianism, they were ultimately to win the day. After a lengthy period of public discussion, the authorities were finally won over more or less unequivocally to the anti-natalist side. In 1959, faced with one of Poland's recurrent meat shortages, Gomułka hit upon, or more probably was led to the idea that if he had fewer subjects to cater for, his economic problems, among others the tasks of maintaining food supplies and providing jobs for the demographic high that would be

policy he described as the only way out of the clutches of poverty "Let us cry out 'People! for God's sake: you're not rabbits!' If we don't, we'll be sorry" (Inaczej będzie źle). Another journalist (ZW June 22, 1957) "To nie przyczyna lecz skutek" drew the following striking parallel: "A man who wants to have a party or invite guests for the summer always calculates his financial and accommodation capacity very carefully ..." (The parallel, of course, is with the notorious "nature's banquet" of Malthus). For another early example see Głos Pracy (hereinafter GP) July 10, 1957 "Czy lekkoślność i zaczynanie", which quotes with approval a second press article boldly entitled "Czy Malthus miał rację" (Was Malthus Right?).
"invading" the labour market in the latter part of the sixties, would be much more manageable. And accordingly, at a Central Committee plenum devoted to the meat crisis, he pronounced categorically that Poland's population growth rate was excessive. It was in these circumstances then, that Poland embarked on its heretical anti-natalist policy. The abortion legislation was further liberalized and Catholic and other dissenting doctors were prevented from imposing their views on reluctant mothers. The activities and views of the family planners were given

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22 TL October 18, 1959. Having compared Polish natural increase with that prevailing in other European countries, Gomułka continued: "And yet there are still people in Poland who belly-ache (psioczą) against socialism because of the lack of meat on the market. If capitalist England had the same natural increase as Poland does, its standard of living would be falling constantly". Gomułka then made perfunctory mention of "our young nation" and "our optimistic future", but in the same context hastened to emphasize that "our numerous children" placed "considerable burdens and difficult obligations on us, their fathers". "The natural increase of population prevailing in Poland at present", concluded Gomułka, "is a serious obstacle to the growth of the nation's living standards". After the events of 1970 and the reported disturbances of early 1975, the time would appear to be ripe for someone to undertake a special study of the historiopoetic role of the meat-shop in post-war Poland.

23 "Zmiany w sposobie udzielania orzeczeń o przerywaniu ciąży", TL Jan 12, 1960.
enhanced support. And simultaneously, the flow of anti-natalist articles in the press became freer, more emphatic and more authoritative in tone. An intensive campaign against the "wave of brats flooding Poland" (zalewająca Polskę fala bachórów) was maintained thereafter for some months.

The reorientation of policies that occurred in 1957-59 seemed to produce spectacular results. The birth rate had already begun to decline from its high point in the mid-fifties; but by the late 'fifties and early 'sixties, it was fairly plummeting down. To what extent the new policies accentuated or prolonged the fertility decline involved in this trend is difficult to determine, but certainly there was a marked change in public attitudes, both official and unofficial. Aspirations concerning family-size changed dramatically, as did the popular attitude towards large families, which

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24 A report in ZW November 10, 1959 mentioned that the Association for Conscious Motherhood had been permitted to conduct its work in factories. Trybuna Ludu ("Zbyt długo trwają kłopoty produkcyjne", TL March 20, 1960) first complained that contraceptive production was inadequate, then a little later was able to report considerable increases in production during 1960 over 1959 (TL August 27, 1960).
now became harshly censorious. With the exception of anti-Germanism, there can have been few other propaganda lines which were quite so successful with the population. Many Catholics who would not accept other anti-church views nonetheless accepted this one, and did so despite the most outspoken and sustained condemnation of government policy by Church spokesmen headed by the redoubtable Cardinal Wyszyński.

Successive slumps in the birth rate were greeted with small, but unmistakably gratified communiqués from the Main Statistical Office. As the birth rate fell further and further, the matter ceased to be

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25Biographical sketches of women in the Polish press frequently refer to an atmosphere of contempt having surrounded anyone with any more than about three children. See, for example, TL July 26-7, 1975, p.3, where a peasant from Bydgoszcz wojewódstwo remarks "I even feel ashamed these days (Az wstyd się dzisiaj przyznać) that I come from a family of eleven children". One legacy of the Gomułka anti-natalist phase to the Polish language is the contemptuous neologism "dziecioporob" (roughly: "Kidmaker"), which immediately suggests associations with the word "brakorob", meaning "poor workman", "producer of worthless goods"; in other words one of the perennial villain figures in the exhortatory industrial literature of socialism. A public opinion poll taken in 1960 already suggested considerable internalization of the new policies. See Społeczeństwo Polskie w badaniach ankietowych Warsaw 1966, p.70.

26See note 79 below.

27e.g. TL August 1, 1961. Even in 1964, by which time Poland's age-specific fertility was already drawing close to replacement levels and was well below it in the cities, the latest reported decline in the birth rate was greeted as representing a tendency "which is naturally advantageous". ZG August 2, 1964. The same tone was maintained till late into the 1960s. The Main Statistical Office's communiqués have never actually reached the point of sounding slightly alarmed, for which they have been strongly criticised by one observer (BIGS XV (1972) No. 3-4, p.53).
treated as one of great urgency, but the basic official line remained unaltered to the end of Gomułka's ascendancy. Despite the abruptness of the fall in the birth rate, and despite the fact that urban reproduction rates had dropped well below replacement levels, there was relatively little critical discussion of the matter in the press in the second half of the 1960s, apart from in the publications of the PAX (pro-regime Catholic) organization.

PAX was able to publish articles by several well-known "non-Catholic" (in the official sense) demographers like J. Holzer and Z. Smoliński (Kierunki Jan. 5 and Feb. 9, 1969). This in itself would suggest that professional concern about demographic trends was growing and finding it difficult to make itself heard. Some non-Catholic papers of the less official type lent a degree of support to a cautious pro-natalist sounding out, but Trybuna Ludu remained impassive (see, e.g. the articles by M. Kowalewski and the then head of the Main Statistical Office, Wincenty Kawalec, in TL May 25, 1969, and TL No. 248, 1969), It is interesting however, that very late in Gomułka's reign, an article by the pro-natalist demographer Latuch appeared in Trybuna Ludu ("Dylematy polityki ludnościowej TL October 31, 1970) itself. While its advocacy was cautious and not alarmist, the remarkable thing about the article was that it appeared at all. One may well wonder whether this was not another small symptom of Gomułka's loosening grip. This documentary evidence tends to support rumours that Gomułka personally torpedoed recommendations coming from both the Church and representatives of the medical profession in favour of restrictions on abortion. E. Smith of UPI reported on March 28, 1971, that Wyszyński had mentioned in a sermon delivered to a medical congregation that in June 1970, the Polish Episcopate had submitted a memorandum to the government about the "biological threat to the nation". An AFP report the same day said that the 1970 memorandum had not received a reply from the Gomułka regime. The UPI report noted, however, that the matter had been taken up by the new leadership, and that Wyszyński had...
It was in fact only after the fall of Gomułka in 1970, that this, like so many other of his policies, came up for serious review. In recent years, particularly during 1972, the issue of pro- and anti-natalism has been intensively discussed in the popular press and scientific publications. The overall attitude of the Gierek regime in the early 1970s has been one of relatively weak interest in population policy as such, and mild pro-natalism, mitigated by financial caution and a commitment to egalitarianism in social policy. More will be said about this in 4.g.

Thus having been initially pro-natalist like all good Stalinist regimes, Poland became the only Socialist state in Europe to espouse Malthusianism (and unlike China in the 1970s, without the smokescreen of vigorous anti-Malthusianism on the international arena). Now, together with Yugoslavia and the USSR, it is one of the relatively few not to be pursuing an emphatically, not to say desperately pro-natalist policy.

c. Economic Policies

The central problem posed for economic planning and policy by demographic developments in Poland has been the disruption occasioned by the successive waves of demographic "highs" and "lows", which lead to alternate phases of excess strain and under-utilization in a number of different fields: the labour force, the educational system, social services and so on. Thus as the post-war baby boom began to reach school age, it was felt necessary to organize a patriotic school-building campaign financed by public subscription. By the late 1960s, however, the high was already said that he had received "authoritative assurances" that certain conclusions had already been drawn, in part from the church's memorandum.

This policy of course also reflected Gomułka's distaste for allocating budgetary finance to "non-productive" investments. For a retrospective criticism of this feature of Gomułka's educational policy, see J. Kluczyński "Prognozy rozwoju oświaty w Polsce" in Rozwój społeczny Polski w pracach prognoistycznych, Warsaw 1971, p. 93.
being replaced by a low, and some schools were even being closed down for lack of pupils. The baby boom had meanwhile passed on to adulthood and in consequence, Poland's lagging housing industry was beginning to be further taxed by the exceptionally large generation of young people now making their presence felt in the marriage statistics. And most spectacularly of all, in 1959, as we have seen, Gomułka had been precipitated by a shortage of meat on the domestic market to decide that the Poles' excessive propensity to consume was related to an excessive propensity to reproduce and that to curb the former it was essential to curb the latter.

However it is in the sphere of manpower planning and labour policy that the most crucial demographico-economic disturbances are seen as occurring. Gomułka came to power during a period of alarms about unemployment, and throughout his period in office, this same problem was

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31 See footnote 97 below.


33 See Rajkiewicz, op. cit., p. 135-36.
continually threatening to recur. Though the causes of the unemployment of 1956 were not directly demographic, it had become apparent to economists by the later 1950s, that the arrival of the post-war baby boom on the job market would pose a considerable strain on the Polish economy's capacity to absorb them. Gomułka's concern to restrain consumption reflected an awareness on the part of the leadership that jobs would have to be created for the large cohorts of school-leavers expected in the later 'sixties. To create the jobs, it was felt, large investments would be required; and given Gomułka's ideological predilection for heavy and extractive industries, i.e. for the capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive sectors of the economy, to create those jobs did indeed require very heavy investments.

The high presented another major problem to economic planners. Poland, like the other socialist countries, had (and indeed still has) a marked tendency to use labour inefficiently. Intermittently throughout the Gomułka

34 A. Józefowicz suggests ("Z zagadnień dynamiki ludnościowej w Polsce" Nowe Drogi (hereinafter ND) 1959, No. 2, p. 56) that the period of 1950-1956 had been one in which demographic considerations were accorded little attention by planners, and that work on the long-term plan (plan perspektywiczny) for 1960-1975 was associated with a considerably enhanced degree of emphasis on the demographic factor. He also mentions that as of early 1959, it was felt that no clear-cut population policy could be formulated given the limitations of existing knowledge. This view of the Demographic Commission of the body responsible for preparing the long-term plan was effectively overruled later in the year.

35 The jednostki inicjujące entrusted with the experimental introduction of the watered-down Gierek reforms have in fact been increasing their employment levels appreciably faster than other sectors of the economy and thereby making a disproportionate contribution to the growing labour shortage of recent years. See the article by B. Fick in ŻG December 15, 1974, and the comment on it by W. Laskowski in ŻG June 8, 1975.
period, campaigns were conducted to reduce so-called surplus employment. (prerosty zatrudnienia)\textsuperscript{36}. At times, particularly during the late 1950s, these campaigns were given greater impetus by shortages of urban labour, shortages which were to some extent demographically-conditioned. At other times, as in the late 1960s, the policy of restricting employment was adopted in order to prevent large increases in labour supply from creating their own kind of \textit{fait accompli} of inflated employment and reduced productivity. It always seemed to be either that the only way to escape the Scylla of over-employment was via the Charybdis of unemployment, or that the only way to escape the Scylla of the impending labour surplus, was to rush into the embrace of the Charybdis of overemployment. Over-employment, lest anyone should think it obviously the lesser of the two evils, was associated in Polish conditions (as in Socialist conditions generally) with gross inefficiency, low and stagnant productivity.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{36}In 1958, 1963 and again in the late 1960s. See Rajkiewicz, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 139 and ff, 229 and ff; see also Ratyński, \textit{op. cit.}, Ch. V, in which Gomułka's policy of attempting to force up productivity by forcing down employment increments is severely criticized. Ratyński's book was published by the Trade Union (CRZZ) publishing house, and his approach to the problem of employment seems to reflect a kind of pragmatic grassroots concern with keeping the constituents on the job.

and stagnant wage levels, absenteeism, lack of industrial discipline, inflationary pressures and, in the opinion of some, such symptoms of disorganization and demoralization as drinking on the job, industrial accidents and smouldering worker discontent (a potent factor to be reckoned with in Poland).

Faced with these unattractive alternatives, the Gomułka regime finally decided in the late 1960s to strive for greater efficiency even at the cost of accepting a certain measure of planned unemployment in the 1970s. They might conceivably have succeeded in escaping with this heresy as well had they convinced the working class that some substantial number of their members might benefit from this new dispensation, but Gomułka,

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38 This obviously applies only to the pre-Gierek period. See Olgęzki, op.cit., p. 264, 309. See also Zacher, op.cit., p. 133-34.
40 See, eg., M. Kabaj "Bariera zatrudnienia" ŻG October 12, 1975.
41 Ibid. See also Olgęzki, op.cit., p. 112.
42 For unusually candid airings of this line of argument, see the contributions by K. Toeplitz, J. Bocheński, W. Górnicki and A. Micewski to the collective volume Polski problem Nr 1, Warsaw 1972. Cf. some similar reasoning from an earlier lucid moment in M. Kabaj "Groźne zjawiska i konflikty" ŻG Jan. 19, 1958.
43 See Ratynski op.cit., p. 10, 76; Dzienio and Gołacka op.cit., p. 108. H. Król, the prominent labour economist revealed in an article in TL Feb. 15, 1971, that the Gomułka version of the 1971-75 plan was contemplating an unemployment figure of 200,000 by 1975, and this on the
who was in any case no diplomat, was not even aware that there was any need to negotiate. In the event he was not removed by higher ecclesiastical authority, but hoist with his own petard of 1956 - a near revolution.

In this, as in many other aspects of economic policy, Gierek reversed Gomułka's approach, and acted swiftly to avert the looming unemployment that his predecessors' plans had accepted. Under Gierek, employment has

basis of certain quite unreal premises about female and peasant employment. Król's estimate was that the figure unemployed by 1975 would in fact have been about half a million. He also asserts that influential party economists were urging these on the basis that the demographic situation demanded it. If this is not an oversimplification or distortion of their position, it would certainly seem, as Król suggests, that these people timed the introduction of their measures very badly, given the enormous increases in the work-force in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see Appendix B. Król also revealed that the old suggestion of economic emigration had again been raised, presumably in camera.

The negative aspects of the Gomułka package were much more evident to the worker than their positive ones. The price rises, and the threat of wage penalties and unemployment were far more palpable than any possible future benefits. Gomułka must have been one of the few people in Poland in 1970 unaware of the groundswell of popular feeling even before his disastrous price-hike in December.

burgeoned to such an extent that even the massive labour force increments of 1966-70 and 1971-75 have been fully absorbed; indeed, there has been a good deal of talk about labour shortages in the last two years, and Gierek has had to regress to the widely-criticised Gomulka expedient of imposing a succession of administrative limits on permissible employment levels.\textsuperscript{46}

In the near future it will be the turn of the demographic low of the 1960s to begin to make its own kind of impression on the labour market. What form the already existing labour shortages will assume then is still a matter for conjecture. Polish economic demographers, like their counterparts elsewhere, plead for demographic considerations to be taken fully into account in the formulation of policy; and there is probably a growing awareness of these matters now among the Polish leadership. But a solution of the problem may require more drastic economic measures than the present government will wish to hazard. There is less talk of radical economic reform now than ever.\textsuperscript{47} Immigration of Arab or other Gastarbeiter scarcely seems likely\textsuperscript{48} - that proposition is

\textsuperscript{46}For statistics showing the state of employment as measured by state employment agencies (and here Rajkiewicz's caveat of 1957 - ŹG March 3, 1957 - that "No-one believes the official data not even the state agency that gathers them" may still be of some relevance), see Appendix Table 5. For instances of administrative restrictions on employment levels, see, eg., ŹG Feb 10, June 23 and Dec 15, 1974, and June 8, 1975, all at page 15, and TL November 28, 1974.

\textsuperscript{47}The use of the word "reforma" fairly quickly became taboo after Gierek's accession, and the form "udoskonalanie (udoskonalenie) systemu zarządzania gospodarką narodową" or similar became mandatory.

\textsuperscript{48}See note 5 above.
in any case as ideologically unsound as the suggestions referred to earlier that Poland's labour surplus might be exported temporarily or permanently, as before the war. Poland does supply a certain amount of labour power to its neighbours mainly on a cross-border commuting basis, but the abolition of this and similar arrangements would scarcely make much difference to its situation even in the short run. In any case the outflow of German "autochthons" now seems likely to increase and therefore to cancel out any such gains. The labour power of women and pensioners is relatively less exploited in Poland than in the Soviet Union or the G.D.R., but there are strong influences militating against their further mobilization. Female work-force participation rates have already been emphatically denounced by Polish commentators as too high both for social and natalist reasons; Gierek himself, moreover, has repeatedly pledged a new deal for women, part of which is said to be the chance of getting part-time rather than full-time employment. And the Party is committed to lowering rather than maintaining, 


50 Current trends would seem to suggest however, that given the dynamism of Poland's economic growth in its present phase, the ceiling that is ultimately reached by women's employment will be biological rather than social. At present women's employment in the socialized sector is increasing at the spectacular rate of 6% per annum, and women now constitute 42% of the socialized labour force and 46% of the total labour force. Part-time work for women, though increasing quite sharply, is not in fact keeping pace with the overall increase in women's employment. See ZW March 3, 1975 p. 3, and TL August 1, 1975, p. 8.
much less increasing the pension age, a commitment which it in fact has already begun to honour.\textsuperscript{51}

In all the circumstances, it is possible that the forthcoming demographically-determined decline in labour supply could play the role of midwife to Poland's long-canvassed and repeatedly shelved, decentralizing economic reform. But other solutions - attempting to impose greater industrial discipline by administrative fiat, for example, as in Czechoslovakia,\textsuperscript{52} or in the USSR in the 1940s and 1950s, or simply struggling through with a minimum of structural alterations and a maximum of central "parameter" manipulation and ad hoc administrative campaigns - seem rather more likely.

d. Ethnic Relations

Before the war, Poland suffered from one of the most intractable complexes of ethno-political problems of any country in Europe. There

\textsuperscript{51}See Gierek's speech to the VI Congress, \textit{VI Zjazd PZPR Stenogram} Warsaw 1972, pp. 156-57; \textit{Polityka} March 15, 1975, p. 2. The policy favouring earlier retirement was adopted partly for its potential benefits in removing some of the demographic pressure from the labour market. Now that that consideration is no longer applicable, they are nonetheless stuck with it, and will have to induce pensioners to return to the labour market of their own free will. This, in fact, is already being done: see \textit{Polityka} December 22, 1973, p. 2 "W kraju". For a sign of the growing awareness of the importance of pensioner manpower, see "Starsi ludzie i praca" TL June 16, 1975.

\textsuperscript{52}See A. Elias, \textit{Manpower trends in Czechoslovakia} Washington 1972, p. 5. For an interesting and less than approbatory Polish glimpse of these measures, see W. Grochola "Jak polubić dzieci" in \textit{Polityka} Jan 5, 1974, p. 11.
were, among others, large Ukrainian Belorussian, German and Jewish minorities, amounting in total to about one third of the total population. The Ukrainians and Germans were particularly militant, and represented, moreover, explicit irredentist claims supported with varying degrees of overttness by two of Poland's former partitioners. In many of the cities, the Jewish element was large and increasing much faster than it was assimilating, whilst at the same time, its presence in certain very visible professions and activities was growing faster again. After the slaughter, famine, murder, and deportations of and after World War II, Poland finally emerged with what is officially said to be about 99% ethnic homogeneity. While this claim is certainly exaggerated (it implies a negligible number of Germans, an assessment which is based on political rather than ethnic or linguistic grounds), it is true that the only major ethnic issues in Polish politics have been largely of the regime's own manufacture.

Little information is available on Poland's remaining ethnic minorities; and what information there is is approximate, out-of-date and somewhat dubious. Questions concerning nationality are not asked at census enquiries. According to one estimate made in 1963 there


54 In 1968 a trial run for the 1970 census was held, the questionnaires for which included a question about nationality. Ostensibly for reasons of economy, this question was dropped from the 1970 census papers. "Cechy demograficzne ludności" ŻG Sept. 6, 1970. The author of this article noted, however, that the question had proved a very "sensitive" (drażliwe) one. See also A. Kwilecki "National Minorities in Poland" Polish Round Table Yearbook 1968 p.146.

55 ZW December 12, 1963. The 31,000 Jews have since declined to 10,000 to 15,000 in the wake of the "events" of 1968 and the resulting emigration.
were 180,000 Ukrainians, 165,000 Belorussians, 31,000 Jews, 3,000 Germans (sic) and a number of other small groups. The White Russian minority in what was formerly the Białystok voivodship in the north-east is of sufficient size and compactness to provide some pretext for incorporation of part at least, if not all of the area in, say, an extended Soviet Belorussia (if other circumstances were propitious), and to that extent is a potential internal-cum-external problem. The Ukrainians are, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say have been more scattered, and while Ukrainian nationalists have claimed parts of what is now south-east Poland on partially ethnic grounds, they too seem unlikely to cause much domestic trouble without outside intervention or encouragement. The East Slav minorities have been apparently blue-printed for cultural extinction by assimilation and press comments noting with apparent satisfaction first signs of this development have appeared. This probably reflects a vague feeling among both official

(Ne‌w York Times Magazine April 15, 1973). The German figure of 3,000 was evidently something of an underestimate since Olszowski, the Polish Foreign Minister has stated that 65,000 Polish citizens left for Germany in 1971-75 alone, and an agreement has since been signed which provides for the emigration of a further 120,000 to 125,000 in the next four years. (The Australian October 11, 1975). See also section e., p.289 below).

The Zw article previously cited mentions euphemistically that two thirds of the Ukrainians had "settled" in the West and North. Dziewoński and Kosiński cite two different estimates of the numbers of Ukrainians thus resettled: 120,000 and 150,000. The lower of the two estimates also includes an estimate of 80,000 for the number of Ukrainians resettled under "Action W", an operation explicitly designed to disperse people suspected of collaborating with "nationalist bands". Dziewoński and Kosiński op cit. p. 82

For a sampling of the tone of official comment on the East Slav nationalities see the article by B. Porowski in Argumenty Sept. 14, 1969, (translated in Osteuropa 1971, No. 1, p. A41.)
and unofficial Polish circles that having lost so much territory and
can in the East, the least that should be done is to forestall
any further possible inroads, and that the best way to achieve this is
by a policy of assimilation. The Polish concessions to the traditional
Leninist doctrines of "national in form, socialist in content" are minimal.

The German and Jewish minorities represent complex political problems,
but at this stage those problems too are more likely to be external than
domestic. So few Jews remain now that one feels that even the demagogic
skills of the Partisan faction would be taxed by the task of reconverting
them into the bogey they were made to represent in 1968. The Germans have
never played any role as a national group in post-war Poland, and it seems
unlikely that they will start to do so now. Their only political ambition
in People's Poland seems to be to emigrate. Were they to be frustrated in
this, and should they then seek to vigorously prosecute their claims they
might become significant actors on the political scene. But if the present
climate of Polish-German relations is maintained for some time, the situation
is likely to be peaceably defused.

Thus, insofar as demographic developments in the minority communities
can be assessed given the absence of reliable data, they seem to be working
towards diminution of any internal political problem these ethnic groups
might represent. The Ukrainians and Belorussians are probably diminishing
as a result of assimilation and the Jews and Germans are certainly
diminishing as a result of emigration.

e. International Politics

In the previous section it was suggested that Poland's ethnic
minorities (and Polish ethnic minorities abroad) were of greater international
than domestic political significance; and that for them to become the source
of domestic political pressures external interference or intervention would
be necessary. It was suggested, in particular, that at some future stage,
a Soviet government might wish to exploit the Belorussian or Ukrainian minorities for purposes of its own, to help bring a recalcitrant Polish government to heel, or, more drastically, to perform further surgery on Poland so as to permanently alter its borders and/or its position in the Socialist commonwealth of nations. If this were to happen, the Poles might have cause to regret their policies towards their East Slav minorities. But the direction of influence might easily be the reverse one, either with or without active Polish connivance. Restiveness in the Western republics of the USSR (especially, Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania) might be aggravated by activity among the corresponding minorities in Poland. It is conceivable that some Polish government might one day consciously foster such activity. But far more likely at least in the foreseeable future, is some kind of largely involuntary embroilment on the pattern of the Czechoslovak Ukrainian minority's swelling and subversive influence on the Soviet Ukraine in the days of Dubček: a liberal Polish government promising a new deal for various groups within its own society might find its Belorussians and Ukrainians developing excessively close relations with their fellow countrymen across the Soviet border. 58

None of these possibilities seems imminently likely. And with the further decline of the numbers involved, they will probably become less likely, rather than more so.

58 For some appreciation of the remarkable inflammatory capacity of sparks of liberalism near totalitarian tinder, see the excellent discussion of the role of the Ukrainian minority in Czechoslovakia in the period circa 1968 in G. Hodnett and P. Potichny The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis Canberra 1970 (Occasional Paper No. 6 of The Department of Political Science, R.S.S.S., Australian National University).
The international problem presented by the German community, on the other hand, has been (and may remain) a very real one. Ever since Brandt's historic visit to Warsaw in 1970, arguments have been raging back and forth about how many Germans there are, how many should be allowed to emigrate ever or at any one stage, and (under various polite and euphemistic verbal smokescreens) how much the West German government should pay for them. The outflow of Germans from Poland that began in 1971 meanwhile grew slower and slower. Then on August 7th, 1975, following on a meeting in Helsinki between Gierek and the West German Chancellor Schmidt, an agreement was signed to which was appended a protocol declaring that 120,000 to 125,000 Polish citizens would be permitted to leave Poland in the next four years. Since then the emigration rate has again accelerated. While the Poles, after much evident reluctance, have now agreed to specify a more or less precise figure of emigrants, should the agreement fail to be ratified or should further obstacles appear in Polish-German relations, implementation of the protocol may well be halted. The figure of 120,000 is in any case a compromise. In 1973, the Red Cross reported that it had received 283,000 emigration applications. German and Polish estimates in the past have varied wildly at both extremes from virtually zero to over a million. That being so, both sides are likely to feel aggrieved whatever the outcome; and even after implementation of the agreement, some discontented would-be Germans may remain in Poland. How many Germans there really are in Poland, and how many among those that ultimately leave will have been more German than Polish are ultimately metaphysical questions, though ones that doubtless will continue to be debated between the presses of the two countries. But basically, the more that go, the smaller the problem, either domestic or international, that remains.


60For a full review of the claims and counterclaims made on both sides, with extensive citation of press and other source material, see Radio Free Europe Research, Polish Situation Reports 24 and 47 for 1971, 16 and 42
The Polish diaspora in Western countries poses a number of interesting questions that are not without their political aspects. However the subject is too diffuse and remote from present concerns to warrant even brief discussion here. There remains the question of the Polish minorities in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The Poles in Czechoslovakia have been the cause or at least the occasion of a good deal of conflict in the past. However they are a small and numerically stagnant group, and it seems most unlikely that Polish nationalism, for all its capacity for suicidal unwisdom, will ever again work itself up into the fine careless rage of 1939, when it joined in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, ostensibly for demographic-irredentist reasons.

Recently, however, we have been reminded, if reminders were necessary, that the Polish minority in the USSR is by no means a dead issue. And here, paradoxically, it would appear likely that it is in part the rapid demographic decline reported in the Polish community there that is the cause of the trouble. The Soviet and Polish governments seem, over the years to have had a tacit agreement to assimilate and absorb those of each other's nationals as are still resident on the wrong side of the border. The number of people identifying as Poles in Soviet censuses has declined rapidly, and the number for 1972, 16, 31, 37 and 42 for 1973, 5, 9 and 40 for 1974, and 24, 33 and 37 for 1975.

Their numbers declined from about 110,000 in 1921 to 72,000 in 1950 (V. Srb "Obyvatelstvo Československa v letech 1918-1968" in Demografie X (1968) No. 4, p. 302) and 67,000 in the 1970 Census. A sudden increase of 4,000 or so reported since may be accounted for by the presence of Polish workers temporarily employed in Czechoslovakia. The numbers of Polish school pupils are, significantly, reported as being in decline. Tvorba Feb 2, 1972, abstracted in ABSEES II No. 4, p. 155.
claiming Polish as a native language has declined even faster. The real number of Poles in the Soviet Union is no doubt also in some measure an irreducibly abstract question; in any case it is an extremely complex one. But while some of the Poles identified at earlier censuses may have been Catholic Belorussians or Uniate Ukrainians, and others may have been Soviet citizens who knew some Polish, wanted to emigrate from the Soviet Union, and saw their opportunity to do so in the repatriation of Poles organized in the late 1950s, there can be little doubt that the figures are likely to greatly underestimate the number of people who would identify as Poles in an open situation, and have quite a good deal of justification for doing so. And there can be little doubt, either, that the Poles are subjected to conditions as nationally and culturally repressive as those suffered by any other major ethnic group in the Soviet Union. Late in 1974, a number of extremely prominent Polish intellectuals called upon the authorities to take a greater interest in defending the cultural rights of the Polish community in the Soviet Union. This issue is potentially an explosive

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62 W. Sworakowski is of the view that the true number of Poles in the USSR is three times the official Census figure. He writes that "hundreds of Poles who managed to escape from the Soviet Union to Poland reported that during the censuses the native language question in the census forms had been filled out by the census takers without regard to the declaration of the interviewed person". This sounds inherently plausible, though there are one or two points that need clarification. Are the "hundreds of Poles" repatriants of 1957-59 vintage? And which censuses were they referring to? Unfortunately too, Sworakowski does not make very clear how he arrived at his estimate of the true number of Poles in the USSR. See W. Sworakowski "The Poles in the Soviet Union" in Polish Review XIX (1974) No. 3-4, p. 143, 145.

one and must be acutely embarrassing to the Gierek regime. Further
reported declines in the size of the Polish community in the Soviet Union
might conceivably have the effect of making the problem worse. Whatever
course future Polish agitation (and possible government representations
to the Soviet leadership in private) might take, the Soviet side will not
be without weapons to use in its own defence, quite apart from its usual
ones of diplomatic force majeure. They could, for example, ostensibly and
ostentatiously hand the whole problem over to the republican leaderships in
Kiev and Minsk and leave them to handle relations with the Poles. Polish-
Ukrainian amity in particular would almost certainly not prove robust enough
to bear the strain.

Let us now consider the possible effects of Poland's demographic
development as a nation on her position on the international scene. Since
the war, Poland's population has in fact increased faster than that of
almost any other European country. Between 1950 and 1968, Poland alone
accounted for 55% of the total Eastern European population increase, while
accounting for only about 31% of the total population even at the end of
that period. Already it has become twice as populous as East Germany
though it was only some 25% larger just after the war. Its position
relative to the Czechoslovakia has also improved over the same period (not
to compare it with the pre-war Czechoslovakia, whose large German ballast
was more a source of weakness than strength). Given that its GNP has also

64 The population in the productive age groups in Poland increased by 25%
over the period 1951-1970 (and has increased much further since), whilst
that of East Germany declined over the same period by 18%. W. Iskra
Czynnik ludzki w rozwoju gospodarczym krajów socjalistycznych Warsaw
increased at a more rapid rate than that of its two neighbours, it is evident that the demographic factor has contributed to strengthening its relative power position without itself having given rise to any obvious countervailing factors that might have cancelled out that effect. Poland's relative demographic strength vis-a-vis both East (and West) Germany seems destined to go on increasing for the immediate future; and depending on the durability of the current Czech demographic revival, it may well also do so vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia. These two countries have been Poland's closest partners (apart from the Soviet Union) in recent years. Gomułka seems to have striven for some kind of special relationship with them; and there have been signs of a similar orientation on Gierek's part as well.

If Poland were able to maintain its present birth rate or increase it, it is likely that barring eco-disasters this would contribute to its further enhancing its relative weight within this triangular sub-group in the future.

By 7.2% per annum 1951-73, cf. 6.9% (East Germany) and 5.9% (Czechoslovakia).

The figure for East Germany is inflated to some extent by its 13.1% per annum increase in 1951-55, which represented a delayed recovery factor after the devastation of war and post-war Soviet reparations. The current trends are much more in Poland's favour than the above figures suggest, and this is partly due to a demographic factor, namely that the post-war baby boom is now bearing fruit in the form of an industrial boom based to some extent on extensive labour inputs. cf. M. Kabaj "Integracja a zatrudnienia" ŻG September 22, 1974.

Few truly Polish hearts can fail to beat faster at the thought that at present the difference between the population of Poland and that of the two Germanies combined is being reduced annually by roughly half a million.
Polish crude birth rates have largely risen and fallen with those prevailing in the USSR as a whole in the post-war period. However RSFSR statistics would suggest that Polish birth and natural increase rates are probably now above those prevailing in the Russian population.\(^{67}\) Were Net Reproduction Ratios available for the ethnic Russian population, they would almost certainly have been below those of the Polish population in recent years. These facts and assumptions are unlikely to be unknown to participants in Polish demographic debates or wholly absent from their calculations, however unrelated these might be to the practical politics of the near future. The Polish gains vis-a-vis the Ukrainians since the war may also have been a source of satisfaction to some.

The latent geo-politics of Eastern Europe (i.e. what might be expected to happen in the event of some shrinking of the Soviet or Russian role, for example, or some expansion of the German one) is an inviting field for speculation. But demographic developments in Eastern Europe itself (i.e. excluding the Soviet Union for the moment) are not apparently working towards such a transformation, and so any elaborate consideration of future contingencies would not be germane to the present discussion.

Nonetheless, in considering population debates in Poland or any of the other East European countries, it is essential to keep this "make-believe" dimension in mind as that is certainly what most of the actual participants are doing. It is this factor, I believe, that gives those debates much of their peculiar piquancy, their ability to rouse the greatest fervour, attract the widest public attention, and to evoke anxieties and national neuroses which might otherwise seem wholly inexplicable to the outside observer.

\(^{67}\) Compare the respective tables (for the RSFSR) in Naselenie SSSR 1973: statisticheskii sbornik Moscow 1975, p. 70, and for Poland in Rocznik plemograficzny 1974, p. XXI.
"How can we feel sure of our frontiers and of peace in Europe, when there are 198 Germans to the square kilometre and only 88 Poles?" cried Cardinal Wyszyński, the Catholic primate of Poland in a sermon delivered in 1959. "If we want a strong Poland, we need a further 25 million people. Not 30 but 50 million Poles can find living-space in our country. That is Poland's raison d'état. Only then will we be a nation which by its numbers, it work and its diligence earns everyone's respect ..." Though he did not, of course, mention them by name, there can be little doubt that Wyszyński also had the Russians at the back of his mind when he spoke these words.

f. Ideology

Since 1956, Poland has treated a number of tenets of Soviet Marxist theory and practice in cavalier fashion: decollectivizing and postponing resocialization from year to year; tolerating the church within relatively liberal repressive limits; permitting a far broader spectrum of foreign information and ideas to circulate within the country than is permitted by

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68Wyszyński's sermon is quoted in H.J. Stehle, The Independent Satellite, London 1963, p. 121. It is noticeable that most Polish demographic commentators who allude to the "national future" argument in this kind of way fail to locate Poland's place as being necessarily within the Socialist bloc (something which is often emphasized in other contexts). Thus an article entitled "Niepokojący sygnał" (Disturbing Signal) in SP Feb 14, 1973, speaks of "Poland's future place in the great family of nations of the world". See also the similar formulations in the following articles: "Ile dzieci" Kultura October 22, 1972; "Zaproszenie do myślenia" Kultura November 12, 1972; "Lata 1973-78 zadecydują o przyszłości Polski" Kierunki December 10, 1972; "Nowość 'Polityki' - rachunek kasztanowy" Kierunki December 3, 1972.
any of its neighbours, (with the obvious exception of Czechoslovakia circa 1967-69), and so on. While Gomułka retreated from some of his 1956 program, this was in large measure because he had not written that program in the first place. His subsequent withdrawal from it was as much dictated by personal prejudice as by intra-party or external pressures. But in certain matters he continued to dissent from the Soviet model with the same tenacity he had shown in 1949.

This stubborn adherence to heretical ideas and policies was also apparent in the Gomułka regime's attitude towards population issues. Though other East European regimes also permitted or fostered considerable revivals of demographic research before the final rehabilitation of the science in the Soviet Union in the early and mid nineteen-sixties, and did not prevent them from at times treading on potentially dangerous ideological ground, no other country flew quite so boldly in the face of approved doctrine as Poland did. While certain decencies continued to be observed, in the form, for example, of demographic articles devoted to Marx's demographic views and the socialist law of population, the general tone of scholarship, and, more particularly of journalism and official pronounce-

70 ments was one at times stridently Malthusian pragmatism. Rapid population growth was a social and economic bugbear, reflecting primitive mores and

69 See footnote 21 above.

To take one among many examples, one writer (M. Parzyńska, ZW September 7, 1957) coined the term "sexological hooliganism" to characterize the situation. And as the birth rate subsequently declined, it was pointed out that this was characteristic of "developed nations".
leading to a lowering in the standard of living, and unreasonable burdens on the state budget. The world generally, and the underdeveloped countries in particular, were faced by a serious demographic crisis. In respect of population growth Poland was in effect an underdeveloped country. The birth rate was no longer held to be anything to be proud of; on the contrary it was something to be ashamed of individually and struggled with nationally. In that struggle, "subjective" and superstructural factors like propaganda and the spread of contraception had an important role to play. The fact that Poland was a socialist country was of limited relevance; the nature of the problem remained basically the same.

And so the Polish public was regaled with the horrors of the population bomb exploding both within and beyond the nation's borders. Following on

The theme of "unreasonable burdens" on the state budget was one of the standard features of Gomułkaist journalism. It was particularly prominent in the official justifications given for the ill-fated price rises of December 1970. The implied suggestion, of course, was that the state had its own pockets and its own worthy objectives to which the citizen made small contribution; he should therefore not expect the state to offer him too much charity. For a sampling of this style of journalism in the neo-Malthusian context, see "W odpowiedzi matkom-Polkom" TL August 25, 1958.

An article in Życie Warszawy ("Niepokojący rekord" ŻW April 26, 1958) asked its readers whether they did not feel a "thrill of anxiety" (dreszcz niepokoju) at the demographic projection that there would be almost 6 billion people in the world by the year 2000. Having thus set the context of global concern, the writer then went on to deplore the Polish birth rate and the records it was setting. "It's really a melancholy record. And one that should inspire not pride, but serious reflection."
the slump in the domestic birth rate, this theme died away in the latter part of the Gomuška period, and to that extent a partial return to orthodoxy occurred. However, many traces of heretical thought have survived. Thus, for example, an anti-natalist contribution to the domestic population debate in 1972 bore the title "Who wants to live standing up?" And at the international level, while Polish discussions of world population problems now tend to follow the more liberal version of the current Soviet line, they do at times deviate quite dramatically from it.

Though the flow of neo-Malthusian propaganda dried up, there was no return to the classical anti-Malthusianism of the early 1950s. (For a sample of which, see A. Lewandowski "Kto winien: przyroda czy kapitalizm?" GP December 9, 1953). At the level of domestic social policy, on the other hand, Gomuška refused to alter his basic anti-natalist orientation.

A rather startling deviation from the usual current version is to be found in, of all places, a Soviet collective volume including contributions from the bloc countries. Edward Rosset expresses his conviction that stationary population is both a near prospect and a necessary and desirable objective. "Since the population of the earth cannot continue to grow to infinity, since population growth must come to an end somewhere, I would favour some solution which would not require that humanity should be bathed in a sea of blood". V.S. Steshenko and V.P. Piskunov


Demograficheskaia politika Moscow 1974, p. 63. Rosset does not go on to make any assertion to the effect that Western warmongers favour such a solution, and from the context it is clear that he believes international efforts to reduce population are essential to avert severe conflict. The official Soviet line, of course, either eschews such catastrophic visions altogether or attributes them to scheming adversaries, whilst in general
While Polish Malthusianism was softening, so too was the pristine rigour of Soviet anti-Malthusianism. After the mid-sixties, the two sides tended to move closer together. But for some years before that, while Moscow was maintaining that the world had no population problems, only social and political ones, Warsaw had been claiming that the world was threatened by a population explosion. It had, moreover, permitted its Society for Responsible Motherhood to affiliate with the International Family Planning Federation, a notoriously "Malthusian" organization, and to cultivate other similar international links. And while the Soviet Union was rejoicing in its last years of high natural increase and asserting that this was not a problem, but a natural and desirable state of affairs for a socialist state, in Poland the official view was that high natural increase was a basically pathological condition and one that had to be cured at all costs.

playing down the demographic factor as an independent variable in Third World development or world politics, and asserting that solutions to the socio-political problems of the Third World (i.e. their adoption of an approved brand of socialism) will also serve to solve the population problem, insofar as there is any such thing. For an exposition of the Polish version of orthodoxy, see the chapter contributed by the head of the Polish delegation to the World Population Conference in Bucharest 1974, Józef Pajestka, to Demografia Społeczna, pp. 13-32; and for a cautious and partial dissent from it, the succeeding chapter by A. Jagielski, esp. at pp. 71-73 and ff., and pp. 82-3. See also A. Lubowski: Widmo przeludnienia krąży nad światem (The Spectre of Overpopulation is Haunting the World) ŻG November 3, 1974. The contents of this article are neo-Malthusian. The use of the phrase from the Communist Manifesto is deliberate. Lubowski is either unaware of or unconcerned by the fact that Soviet orthodoxy would regard his use of a Marxian tag in this context as virtually sacrilegious.
It should not be thought that this was a particularly contentious issue as between the Soviet and Polish leaderships, or even between their ideologists. The Polish authorities simply went their own way and avoided issuing challenges on the matter. The heresy in their position was more evident in propaganda for domestic consumption than at loftier theoretical levels, where at times attempts were made to distinguish between Polish anti-natalism and Malthusianism. But preservation of the pure Soviet orthodoxy prevailing up to the mid-sixties would have been quite impossible. To do so would have entailed arguing that high population growth was a feature of socialism and therefore must be a good thing despite the fact that the Polish government had said that for Polish purposes it was not. Then in subsequent years it would have been necessary to go on maintaining that the high population growth actually still existed, despite the fact that in Poland where there was an anti-natalist policy, and in all the other socialist countries, where there was not, fertility and population growth were declining dramatically. It was actually this turn of events, more than any other, that ultimately led to the doctrinal revision in the Soviet Union itself. Already by the mid-nineteen-sixties, in fact, relatively few Soviet bloc demographers were still prepared to defend the cruder aspects of the old official line.76

It remains to consider what forces pushed the Gomułka regime into heresy on this particular question. The economic reasons have already been briefly mentioned, and they were undoubtedly important. But similar rates of natural increase had occurred in the Soviet Union, for example, without producing any such ideological volte-face. The relative freedom of Polish intellectual life in the late fifties was probably another important element in the situation, since it was thanks to that that the neo-Malthusian

76 For polemics by bloc demographers with the old Stalinist approach, see eg. Materiały międzynarodowego sympozjum demograficznego w Zakopanem 1964, Warsaw 1966, esp. pp. 13-60, and 252 ff. Most of the more stubborn demographic hardliners were from the USSR. See, eg. I. Pisarev. Naselenie i trud v SSSR Moscow 1966, p. 7, 149 and passim.
current of thought was able to develop among Poland's economists to the point where it was able to affect the thinking of those closest to the leadership. But perhaps the most crucial single factor involved was the determined opposition of the Church to this particular aspect of government policy. As was noted earlier, the Catholics made use of the anti-Malthusian card in their opposition to the abortion reform in 1956. They thereby pre-empted the position of Soviet orthodoxy for themselves, thus to some extent discrediting it, so to speak, and giving the regime an added incentive to countenance ideological revision on the population question.

77 Cf. footnote 17 above. In the debate on the original abortion reform legislation in 1956, one deputy said that the bill might be interpreted as a sign of embarrassed incapacity (zakłopotanie) in the face of the nation's vigorous fertility. "We criticise the Americans for their incorrect neo-Malthusian doctrines", but now we propose to follow them. The bill, declared the speaker, is a "relic of the bourgeois order". The Catholic writer Dobracyński cunningly criticized the bill as being a demonstration of scepticism (akt niewary) about the effectiveness of the state's social welfare system. The Minister of Health deplored the use of the anti-Malthusian argument describing it as a "rather low trick" (chwyt niezupełnie elegancki). He does not appear to have attempted to answer the charge, however. TL April 28, 1956, p. 3. Trybuna Ludu's commentary deplored Dobracyński's attack on the social indication and described his "demonstration of scepticism" argument as "embellishment" (lakiernicza teza). Though they were thus able to find a Soviet jargon phrase with which to condemn Dobracyński, the situation was certainly paradoxical. The Catholic opposition was criticizing the State for underestimating its own achievements, whilst the State was criticizing the Church for overestimating those achievements.
As relations between Church and State deteriorated in the years after 1956, Gomułka no doubt became less and less inclined to see eye to eye with the Church on this matter; and their outspoken and continued opposition must have enraged him. The change in the policies on abortion and contraception of late 1959 were accompanied by a sharp and

That opposition also took organized form, with the Church seeking to directly influence the medical profession to frustrate the new legislation (SP December 24-6, 1956; for an anti-Catholic account of some of these activities, see, eg., "W obronie życia" Polityka August 8, 1959). Wyszynski, a man well-known for forthright speech, has over the years been particularly forthright about these matters. Reuter August 11, 1968, reported him as attributing the birth of "dwarfs, imbeciles and deformed beings" to official family planning policies; on August 7, 1966, as describing legal abortion as "the murder of future Poles, the greatest crime that can happen in the history of a nation"; on March 15, 1964, as comparing the government's policies with the genocidal measures of the Nazi administration during the war. The New York Herald-Tribune of January 1, 1963, reported a similar statement, together with an estimate that the losses to the Polish population were already greater than those sustained during the War. Jean Wetz, reporting in Le Monde January 16, 1960, said of the Cardinal that he "ne manque pas une occasion de s'élèver contre ce qu'il appelle 'la transformation des maternités en ossuaires'". Gomułka, whose intolerance of opposing views was at least as celebrated as Wyszyński's forceful eloquence, must have found such a doughty adversary particularly infuriating.
concentrated campaign against the Church, which suggests that they had perhaps become more of a thorn in the authorities' side by that stage than even the "situation on the meat market". The authorities' option for a fairly explicit neo-Malthusianism is not really surprising given the logic of Church-State politics in People's Poland. Indeed, were the Orthodox Church in the USSR as powerful and pro-natalist as the Catholic Church in Poland, one can well imagine that the Soviet leadership might at some point have been converted to Malthusianism also.

g. Population Policy: Debates and Dilemmas

As was mentioned earlier there has been a considerable quickening of discussion on population issues in Poland in recent years. To some extent


80 The best general source on this subject is the volume Polityka ludnościowa: współczesne problemy Warsaw 1973, which is a selection from the proceedings of a conference on population policy held near Warsaw in March 1972. The remaining papers are mostly published in the BIGS XVI (1973) No. 1; and the discussions in BIGS (1973), Nos. 3-4. See also Socjalne i prawne środki ochrony macierzyństwa Warsaw 1973 (also the proceedings of a conference on social and population policy); Aktualne problemy demograficzne kraju Warsaw 1974. For a well-balanced and critical survey of the whole area of population policy in Poland written in English by a Polish scholar, see J. Ziolkowski's chapter in B. Berelson (ed.) Population Policy in Developed Countries, New York 1974
this reflects the growing interest in the subject in the Soviet bloc as a whole, following on the spectacular fertility decline of the 1960s, and to some extent, the growing interest throughout the world. It is also in some measure the result of the ideological relaxation of the earlier Gierek years, 1971-73, during which quite forthright debate was possible on a number of issues that had previously been partly or wholly taboo. Candid as it sometimes has been, the population debate in Poland has not of course explicitly broached all the matters raised in the discussion so far, which was aimed at mapping the politico-demographic context with special attention to those features of it to which the protagonists themselves make least explicit reference. For convenience of exposition, I will divide the themes that actually are broached into the economic, the social and the political. All stem ultimately from the one central complex of dilemmas; whether or not Poland should adopt a pro-natalist policy (there are no anti-natalists any more it seems, only at most anti-pro-natalists); for what reasons it should or should not do so; how and on what basis such a policy should be formulated; and by what means it should be implemented.

g.(i) Economic Issues

The rationale of Gomułka's anti-natalist policy had been that the rapid population growth of the time was placing too great a strain on the country's capacity to invest, and thereby reducing its capacity to comfortably consume. The slower the population grew, the sooner it would become possible to supply everyone with the necessary ingredients of the good life; excess expenditure on demographic investments and investments to provide jobs for outsize cohorts of school-leavers were holding back living standards.
When the rapid decline in fertility in the 1960s brought no very dramatic improvement in living standards, the plausibility of this argument was greatly weakened. While people were obviously and by definition adopting it at the micro-economic level, there was a growing feeling that the chronic weaknesses of the Polish economy, particularly in its consumer sectors, had more to do with incompetent management and misconceived priorities than with demographic or any other pressures. As a 1972 commentator put it, trenchant after the event: "The attempt was made to explain the weakness of the economy in terms of an excess of children ... That of course was sheer lies" (wierutne kłamstwo).

While most economically-oriented participants in the population debate stress that they do not advocate a return to the earlier fertility pattern even if such a thing were possible, they do argue that the economic optimum is a "moderate" rate of increase (umiarkowany wzrost). They also emphasize the importance of maintaining an even flow in the birth rate and avoiding the convulsive and economically disruptive fluctuations that have characterized the post-war period. They draw attention to the impending labour shortage in Poland and the impossibility of solving it demographically except in the long term. This, they say is the consequence of the anti-natalist population policy followed by the government in the 1960s, at the very time when they should have been doing all they could to keep fertility as high as possible so as to prevent the stunted birth cohorts of the war period from "echoing" and thereby perpetuating the imbalance in Poland's demographic structure. For similar reasons, it is often argued that Poland should refrain from pursuing a strongly pro-natalist policy now in the 1970s when the most fertile cohorts are much more numerous, as this, if successful, would only produce in turn an enhanced echo of the baby boom and a

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81 J. Rolicki in Kultura October 1, 1972.
repetition of all the successive problems that it caused. Poland should wait till the boom passes before introducing its pro-natalist program.  

(It was indeed a remarkable feature of Gomułka's population policy that it was pursued through the very period when it was least necessary. There was a joke circulating in Poland in the 'sixties to the effect that Gomułka, who was celebrated for both his austerity and his stubborn and misplaced intellectual overconfidence, had decreed that after his death a simple grave was to be erected to his memory bearing the words: "Władysław Gomułka, economist". The epitaph "Władysław Gomułka, demographer" would have been equally appropriate.)

In addition to the dangers of exaggerated fluctuations in labour supply in the long term, and severe overall shortages in the short term, the economic effects of changes in the age-structure of the population are often greatly stressed. Low fertility sustained over a number of years reduces the proportion of younger people within the population and correspondingly increases the proportion of the aged. This pattern of

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82 See, eg., S. Klonowicz "Dwunasty model reprodukcji" Polityka January 1, 1973. This in fact appears to be the reasoning that has won official acceptance.

83 Cf. footnote 28 above. For retrospective criticisms of the Gomułka regime's "voluntaristic" refusal to accept demographic advice, see "Ku czemu zmierzamy" Polityka November 6, 1971, and (less emphatically and more obliquely) "Międzynarodowa dyskusja demografów" TL March 17, 1972.
demographic "ageing" is actually characteristic of all developed societies, and judged by European standards, the Polish population remains comparatively young. Nonetheless, many Polish demographic commentators, particularly those of a more economic orientation, often present these trends as being rather threatening. The dependency ratio (i.e. the ratio of dependent age-groups to the active population), they point out, will decline, and the economic burden on wage-earners will increase, the more so as increasing numbers of young people are kept out of the labour force until they are well into their twenties by expanded post-secondary education. Moreover, with the break-down of the old three-generational family, the state will be required to disburse increasing amounts on the upkeep of the old. Apart from that, there will be a tendency for the work-force itself to age, as its younger cohorts become proportionately weaker. And in an age of unprecedented technological change, it is important that the work-force should be supplemented by large cohorts of highly-trained young people able to successively transform the permanently obsolescent economy they inherit.


Z. Smoliński has declared baldly (Kultura October 22, 1972) that an economy not based in the long term on expanding labour resources is "sick" (chora). See also A. Wielowieyski, Przed trzecim przyspieszeniem Cracow 1968, pp. 242 and ff. Wielowieyski is a prominent lay Catholic who explicitly dissociates himself from the kind of thinking I have characterized as "econocentric"; nonetheless, he veers towards econocentric reasoning in his endeavours to have some influence on the course of events.
Though economic arguments of this type are often put in conjunction with others, social, "national" or even overtly political, it is difficult to escape the impression that there is an excessive amount of econocentrism in Polish demographic thinking, as indeed there is throughout the Socialist world. In Gomułka's policies, the primacy accorded economic over human concerns at times reached caricatural proportions. But one suspects that while those policies have now been sharply criticized from a social no less than an eco-demographic viewpoint, among the reasons operating at the official level towards a review of policy, concern about future difficulties in finding the necessary human fuel for sustaining policies of economic growth occupied a dominant position. The post-growth mentality has scarcely begun to affect the socialist world. Even in Poland, despite its neo-Malthusian traditions, thinking of the ZPG type has only recently begun

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85 This econocentrism probably derives from Polish demography's predominant associations, (especially in the past) with government statistics and planning procedures, and with economics generally rather than sociology. It should be said, however, that this bias is considerably less evident in Polish than in Soviet demographic writing. The tendency to treat man as an object rather than an objective is often explicitly challenged. Thus one discussant at the March 1972 conference on population policy said: "It seems to me to be rather dangerous to regulate human reproduction from above as though the population of a country were only an economic factor that can be subordinated to production and consumption and the rhythm of economic development" (BIGS 1972, 3-4, p. 57). Writers sometimes take pains to emphasize that they are not treating human beings as instruments (even when they are).
to be mentioned in print, often with a kind of breathless and shocked disapproval. Relatively few writers betray awareness of what a Yugoslav demographer has referred to as the "truism" that in the long term, the only acceptable rate of population growth must be around zero. It is not clear for how long their "moderately increasing" population, allegedly so essential for maximal economic growth, will have to go on increasing. Nor is it clear how the problem of "ageing" of the population will ultimately be tackled if and when that so fervently desired "moderate increase" ever smooths out to nothing. Few seem worried, either, about what will happen if and when, as Soviet ideologists have long foreshadowed, the limits of life expectancy are radically extended: how will the economically optimal age-structure of the population be maintained when

One of the few serious articles on the question of ZPG to have appeared so far is S. Borowski "O zerowym wzroście ludności" Studia Demograficzne No. 37, p. 3. Despite the title, this is in fact a review of The Limits of Growth. The tone is calm, but betrays a tendency towards the use of derivatives of the word Malthus as arguments in themselves. The English and Russian summaries (presumably authorized by Borowski himself) say, for example: "The authors of the Report seem to be modernized Malthusianists, and consequently, pessimists". For another approach to these matters, however, see the article by A. Jagielski cited in footnote 75.

M. Macura "Komponente populacione politike saobražne sadašnjim i budućim potrebama Jugoslavije" in Naše teme 1974, No. 4, p. 568. Macura comments that in "the scientific and ideological confusion prevailing we seem disinclined to remember this". It is not entirely clear from the context who the "we" are. My own feeling is that the truism is in fact accorded rather greater respect in Yugoslavia than elsewhere in the Socialist world.
all men can become centenarians?\(^8^8\) The economic justification for the
labour-force arguments is in any case seldom given empirical form: how
the economies of such low-fertility countries as Sweden or Belgium sur­
vived the pre-Gastarbeiter age is not explained. The idea that the upper
working-age limit could be somehow raised or alternatively, not lowered,
is relatively seldom explored.\(^8^9\) Few advance the counter-proposition that

\(^8^8\) One exception to this among demographers is Edward Rosset, who has a
special academic (and by now a strong personal) interest in the question
of the proper utilization of the skills of the old. Citing the Soviet
demographer Piskunov in support, he writes that it is "quite possible
that at some stage in the future, there will occur a sharp reduction in
the incidence of death and disease in the older age groups, which will be
a further powerful factor inducing deepening of the ageing process of the
population. 'For this reason', says V.P. Piskunov, 'from the long-term
view-point, the argument that natality should be increased in order to
check the ageing process is not very convincing'". Demograficheskaia
politika, pp. 59-60.

\(^8^9\) There may be good political reasons for the reticence on this point given
the Party's commitment to earlier retirement and the unpopularity of any
suggestion that a promised social reform might be withdrawn. It should
also be noted that the normal retirement age in Poland has been higher
than in most other bloc countries (basically 65 for men and 60 for women,
cf. the usual 60 for men and 55 for women). Differences of view on this
problem surfaced at a demographic conference held in Warsaw in 1967 (see
According to one commentator writing at the same time (H. Chądżyński in
ZW November 10, 1967), the debate on the question of the retirement age
had become "very bitter" (bardzo zawzięty): "The thesis that the retirement
age should be lowered is encountering quite energetic opposition". The
the economy should be adapted to the human resources available rather than vice versa; and those that do are usually not economists. In economic pro-natalist advocacy, there is, in short, something of a tendency towards a technocratic steamrolling of human values, for all that the ultimate objective is ostensibly the prosperity and well-being of all.90

g.(ii) Social Issues

The economic issues arouse relatively few debates that are themselves inherently economic. The economically-oriented are fairly much agreed that a pro-natal policy is a necessity; their only disagreement is likely to be as to details of strategy, timing or feasibility. Those who are sceptical of their approach tend to counter it with what are essentially social or political arguments. And in general, it is at the level of social and political issues that a greater complexity and differentiation of views appears.

opposition is likely to have come more from those of sociological orientation like Rajkiewicz, than from the economic and demographic pro-natalists. (Cf. the discussion of polityka ludnościowa and polityka społeczna below). The opposition to earlier retirement continues. See, eg., E. Rosset ŻW July 21-2, 1974, where a call is made for the removal of all restrictions on the employment of pensioners, and confidence expressed that the government would see the good sense of doing so in the present situation of diminishing labour reserves. Rosset's confidence that the authorities would now see things his way is probably well-placed: cf. footnote 51 above.

90 For an interesting critique of the economic pro-natalist position, see S. Klonowicz Zdolność do pracy a wiek człowieka pp. 411 and ff.
In the context of policy debates, the distinction between the social and the political is apt to become a little more blurred at the edges than usual. The discussion here will be in terms of three interrelated problems or groups of problems: the role of women in society; the family; and living standards. (The position of women, in other words, has not yet become a fully-fledged political issue in Poland. The vexed question of living standards, while obviously being also economic and, at times, highly political, is nonetheless so closely connected with the other two problems that it is impossible to separate them).

Those that raised the alarm about impending depopulation often sounded a concurrent alarm about the decline of the family and family life in general: the affective, procreative and social functions of the family, it was said, were following its economic functions into extinction; the family itself was breaking up, there was nothing to replace it, and the end product would be chaos; traditional sexual roles were in disarray; the divorce rate was growing and so were the numbers of failed and moribund marriages; children with growing frequency were returning to empty houses; juvenile hooliganism and problem behaviour were becoming commonplace; childless and one-child families were leading to egotistical and unsocialist attitudes; materialism and a mini-affluence (mała stabilizacja) were becoming the order of the day; there was a decline in respect for parents and virtually none for the old who were being cut adrift and left to float to miserable and irrelevant deaths in complete isolation from their erstwhile families and the community; and numerous other evils like alcoholism,

91 "A short resumé: family bonds are disintegrating, more and more marriages are ending in divorce, more and more are admitting to conflicts, many are childless, and one third of all families have only one child". A. Kantowicz "Polska rodzinna" in Kultura March 12, 1972.
mental disorders and anti-social attitudes were to be seen as the consequences of the weakening of the family and the moral fibre which it had once transmitted from generation to generation.  

Views of this kind were naturally particularly prevalent among Catholic publicists, but by no means confined to them. Poland, like the Soviet Union before it, had once flirted with radical reappraisals

92 For a selection of views of this kind, see, eg., the round-table discussion "Rodzina współczesna - tendencje, perspektywy" Argumenty April 16, 1972.

93 The pro-regime PAX organization and its press were very active in the campaign to restore the standing of the family as were the ecclesiastically-authorized Catholic publications. SP October 5, 1972, contains a report of a conference organized by PAX's Propaganda Division devoted to the "strengthening of the spiritual (psychiczne) and moral health of the family".

94 The discussion mentioned in footnote 92 was published in a weekly put out by the official atheist organization. Another weekly closely associated with the campaign on behalf of the family, Kultura, is generally regarded as having close links with officialdom. Its editor-in-chief, Janusz Wilhelmi, who actively associated himself with the campaign both for the strengthening of the family and for raising the birth-rate by means including restrictions on abortion, was elected a member of the party's Central Auditing Commission at the VI Party Congress in 1971. The Gierek leadership has in fact repeatedly affirmed its support for the family. On March 6, 1975, Gierek declared: "There can be no socialist society unless the family is strong, stable (trwała) and spiritually (duchowo) healthy. We reject the theories arising in capitalist countries about the allegedly inevitable crisis of family ties". TL March 7, 1975, p. 3.
of the family, but had then lapsed back into verbal support of the institution coupled with a practical indifference. This indifference was particularly evident in Gomułka's time, when, together with the creation of a markedly anti-natalist climate (which was obviously not pro-family in its implications), numerous other policies were followed whose implicit message was that the family was really rather a nuisance. Despite the planned absorption of large numbers of women into the work-force, the situation in regard to child-care institutions in Poland remained worse throughout the 1960s than in virtually any other Comecon country.

95 Kantowicz comments "The past years have not been the happiest for family life. The main reason for that was the semi-official theory of the fifties that many families were bastions of political and social reaction". Kultura March 12, 1972.

96 The tables for crèches (p. 550) and kindergartens (p. 469) in Rocznik Statystyczny 1971 suggest virtual stagnation for both after about 1955. (Gomułka, it will be recalled, came to power in 1956). This was not due to any decline in demand consequent on the decline that occurred over this period in the birth rate. K. Dzienio: The Methods of Steering the Pro-natalistic Population Policy within certain European Socialist Countries (typescript in English, Warsaw 1974) p. 24, contains a table which shows clearly that the proportion of children in child-care institutions in Poland over the years 1960 to 1970 was lower than in any other Soviet-bloc country with the exception of Rumania in 1970 (and here demographic factors were undoubtedly relevant). The relative improvement which Dzienio's tables show to have occurred in Poland over the period, coupled with the Rocznik Statystyczny 1971 data referred to earlier, would suggest that the achievement was more one of getting the number of children down nearer the number of child-care places than vice versa; and that insofar as there was an improvement, that improvement was achieved largely by overcrowding. This supposition tends to be borne out by articles like, e.g.,
expansion of the housing program was very slow in relation to needs, and
towards the end of the decade, an actual decline in the rate of housing
construction was recorded, at the very time when large numbers of post-war
babies were reaching marriageable age. Moreover, large numbers of very

"Przedszkole w podwójnej roli" ŻG October 19, 1975. In fact, of course,
despite the decline in the numbers of children over the period, growing
urbanization and growing feminization of the work force would have made
for much greater demand for child-care services, not less.

97 On the housing plight of young marrieds under the Gomułka administration,
see, e.g., the chapter by A. Andrzejewski and W. Czeczerda in Polityka
ludnościowa, p. 140 and briefly, but pithily, the contribution of J. Dangel
in BIGS 1973, No. 3-4, pp. 89-93. The number of new dwellings built to 1000
marriages contracted declined from 853 in 1965 to 693 in 1970. The
absolute number of new dwellings declined in both 1970 and 1971.
Despite an over 25% increase by 1974, the number of households per 100
dwellings has remained virtually the same as it was before Gierek's
accession, and waiting lists for housing have actually increased (See
Table 6, Appendix B. This is due inter alia to the continuing marriage
boom, the decline in the average size of households, and to the enormous
pressure of latent demands waiting beyond the rim of the statistical data.
In fact, the housing shortage is much worse than the statistics indicate
because of the colossal numbers of daily commuters who would gladly take
up urban dwellings if they were eligible for them. For an interesting
collection of documents on recent developments see the translated articles
included in "Wohnungsbau und Wohnungsversorgung in Polen" Osteuropa 1975 no. 6
pp. A339-A352. For a pessimistic assessment of the chances infrastructural
development (particularly run-down under Gomułka) has of overtaking the
needs of the now expanding housing construction industry despite the
enormously increased investment in it, see J. Dzieciołowski "Plama na
wizji" ŻG November 10, 1974. See also the same author's article in ŻG
November 24, 1974, and that of Andrzejewski and Czeczerda in
small flats were built to sub-standard specifications in urban settings that were often most uncongenial to family life. Again these were common Socialist failings, but they were ones in which the Gomułka administration tended to outfail its rivals.

ŽG July 27, 1975. For somewhat more optimistic and official assessments, see P. Król "Próba bilansu" ŽG September 9, 1975; the articles by W. Nieciuński and M. Wawrzeniuk in ND 1974, No. 9; and the article by S. Kukuryka ND 1975, No. 6. One of the most conspicuous changes in housing policy under Gierek's administration has been the greatly increased prominence given to this problem both in official policy statements and the media. It is a field where "loyal opposition" seems still permitted to flourish.

The size of new flats was actually smaller in 1970 than in 1960 (when they were not, it can safely be said, large). In addition, economy measures involving a lowering of standards were encouraged (eg., the installation of windowless kitchens). As one scholar concerned with housing matters put it: "We were building flats that were on average very small, unfunctional and not infrequently equipped with only primitive conveniences and installations". J. Dangel in BIGS 1973, No. 3-4, p. 91. See also the same author's contribution to Demografia społeczna pp.251-285.

This fact emerges to some extent from the tables given in the statistical volume Kraje RWPG: ludność, gospodarka, kultura, pp. 88-90, despite the evidence of cosmetic presentation (the figures given there for the numbers of kindergartens in Poland seem strangely at variance with those mentioned earlier from Rocznik Statystyczny 1971). See note 96 above.
The minute Gomułka and his government fell, these and similar aspects of everyday family existence and basic living conditions came in for the most withering criticism. (There had of course been some more cautious criticism earlier as well, but without any unequivocal allocation of political responsibility). Much of it was directly related in due course to the population issue. How could one possibly expect the Polish family to flourish and to reproduce itself when it was forced to live in such wretched conditions, with all hope of perceptible improvement postponed to the remote future, and the only chance of partial escape in the short term consisting in restricting family size to the barest minimum? Critiques of Gomułka's population policy and his general living standard policy became so closely interwoven, that it was often difficult to see what the main motivation of any given critic was. Was he using the issue of population policy to push more effectively for socio-economic reforms, or was he advocating an energetic boosting of living standards to promote the greater demographic glory of the fatherland? The fertility decline seemed a most dramatic vindication of all the unfortunate urban dweller's resentments. And he was no doubt right in sensing that the stagnant consumer economy (coupled with rising expectations) was a major factor in producing the slump in the birth rate. And if he was right, the only way to solve the demographic problem was to first solve the problems of the standard of living. The two issues dovetailed most pleasingly. Similarly the advocates of a revival of family life, even the least materialistic among

100 One sometimes gets the feeling that an argument is almost being presented in the form of "we (or "they", depending on the writer's perspective) will stop our Geburtenstreik if you (or "we") build us (or them) more flats." This kind of approach was detectable both among pro-natalists (Build more flats so that the birth rate will rise) and anti-pro-natalists (Build more flats or the birth rate certainly won't rise).
them, usually felt that some greater concern for the family's material well-being would not be amiss. If having children were not such a major inroad into the parents' resources of time, energy and money, the chances were greater that they would venture having a second and a third. As the Catholic economic commentator Andrzej Wielowieyski argued: In Poland even to have one child is a terrible shock for young working parents, and so it is not surprising that many stop there. Yet a family of three, two parents and one child, is not a real family; correct upbringing is impossible where there are no brothers or sisters. Accordingly the moral health of the family is dependent in some degree on the prior success of a pro-natalist policy. 101

Of all the hapless consumers of Gomułka's Poland, it was the young mother who had most to complain about. While Soviet socialism has brought a kind of professional and social liberation to women that has been much more rapid and far-reaching than any equivalent development in the West, it

101 See Kultura October 1, 1972. The following schema has been outlined many times. A young couple are both working (the overwhelmingly typical case) and earning 3000 zloties each. Their first child is born. No crêche place is available (there are far fewer places in crêches than in kindergartens), so the wife stops working. The family income falls from 6000 divided among two to 3000 divided among three. Per capita income in the family falls to virtually a third of its former level. Social services and subsidies for children's goods (in Poland, as opposed to certain other Socialist countries) make up little of the difference.
is also true in another sense that socialism has replaced the exploitation of man by man by the exploitation of woman by man. As elsewhere, women in Poland have been driven onto the labour market more by economic duress than incentive. And simultaneously they have been left (for sociological rather than political reasons) with an only slightly diminished share of the usual domestic burdens of running a household. To further aggravate the situation, the state of basic trades and services in Poland in the 1960s (and 1970s) was probably as bad as anywhere else in the Soviet bloc; and it is everywhere bad, as is often admitted. In these circumstances the Polish woman, like so many of her sisters elsewhere in Socialist East Europe, cast her vote at the abortion clinic, or the private gynaecologist’s surgery.

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102 L. Sobczak *Rynek pracy w Polsce Ludowej*, p. 192-3. Though it would appear that once they have joined the work-force they are in fact reluctant to leave it. Cf. note 107 below.

103 Although many male Communists since Lenin have echoed his injunctions to the men of Socialist societies to give their wives more assistance in the home, progress has been slow, and most wives are effectively "na dwóch etatach" (have two full-time jobs). Trybuna Ludu in its regular family rubric periodically calls on men to be more helpful, but one does not gain the impression that this matter is widely regarded as top priority among the all-male upper echelons of the party-state apparatus.

104 "Family life is burdened by the nightmare of everyday life (koszmar codzienności), in other words by the lamentable state (opłakany stan) of the service industries in the country". A. Kantowicz loc. cit. This area is another that has been given great prominence since Gierek's accession, and great improvements have been promised. But progress is slow, and again one wonders where this item figures in the de facto pecking order. See, e.g., "Dla czego w usługach niewiele sie zmienia" (Why little is changing in the service industries) TL November 3, 1975.
A great deal of the Polish population debate has turned on the question of how to make the woman's role more tolerable. Many of the contributors were women. Radical feminists in the West would probably find their attitude unenlightened, since their criticism though often vigorous, was less than revolutionary. Open declarations of sexual war would in any case probably not be allowed by the censorship (irrespective of its sex in the given instance, though it would probably be male; in listings of the many feminized professions in Poland, no one, to my knowledge, has ever mentioned the censorship or the police). But there were few detectable signs in the press (as there were few detectable to the naked eye of a resident) that any women saw their struggle in such bellicose terms. They did condemn men for their indolence in the house, but far more vigorously for the attempts that were sometimes made

105 The occasional items in the Polish press on Western Women's Liberation tend to be jocularly deprecating. An interview-article with Germaine Greer published in the (usually) sophisticated weekly *Polityka* concluded with the interviewer confiding to the reader reflections that occurred to her as she drove with Ms. Greer in the vicinity of Stratford at the conclusion of their talk: "Who had cast such a spell on Titania as to leave her so angry"; and "would she one day find her Oberin?" A. Osiecka "Rozmowy z Tytanią" *Polityka* November 11, 1972.
(and made I think invariably by men) to reassign them a place in the kitchen, or otherwise to put the burden of the nation's future disproportionately on them. The defenders of the family included among their ranks several who believed that a restoration of the patriarchal family was essential both to the health of the family and the health of the national birth rate. The women who responded to these suggestions with indignant rebuttals (in which they were joined by several male commentators also) may well have had "middle class minds" and interesting intelligentsia jobs, but they were probably fairly representative.

106 For examples of Polish-style male chauvinists, see M. Czerwiński in Argumenty April 16, 1972, and J. Wilhelmi Kultura November 12, 1972. One woman reacted sarcastically to the Kultura journalists' formulation "strengthening the country's demographic potential" by enquiring whether the term "potential" referred both to women of fertile age-groups "capable of giving the country workers, soldiers and journalists" and also to old people requiring care and attention. W. Grochola "Boże broni przed obrańcami" (Protect us, Lord, from our protectors) Polityka October 10, 1972. Another woman, contributing to a conference on population policy matters, objected most forcefully to proposals calling for a reduction in female employment rates for demographic reasons. "When the arguments about women's lower productivity and poor work discipline were disproven in practice, when the theme of their inferior qualifications had to be abandoned, and when finally the presuppositions about a future labour surplus lost their validity (all of them reasons advanced by the authorities for restricting female employment in the past - J.B.) - now we find demographic matters and high considerations of population policy being thrust forward instead". M. Jakubowska in Socjalne i prawne środki ochrony macierzyństwa i rodziny Vol. II, p. 173.
of all working women nonetheless. Survey results suggest that it is male Polish industrial workers who are in favour of their wives not working, not the wives themselves.  

Elsewhere in the socialist camp in recent years, pro-natalism has sometimes been accompanied by a return to older conceptions of the family, complete with sentimental rhetoric about the joys of motherhood, due emphasis on traditional male and female roles in and out of the house, reduced employment of young women in the most fertile age-groups and an elaborate cult of babies. While the Gierek leadership has greatly stressed its intention of strengthening the family morally and materially, it has not so far adopted any kind of Kinder Küche Partei approach.

g.(iii) Political Issues

The population issue which raises perhaps the greatest passion is abortion. Gomułka's adoption of an explicit and emphatic anti-natalist policy was, it was suggested earlier, partly caused by Church opposition to the abortion legislation of 1956. Throughout the Gomułka era, Wyszyński and lesser Catholic representatives, including some from the otherwise pro-regime PAX organization, maintained a barrage of criticism of government policy in this area (largely unpublished in the case of the official Church spokesmen). Abortion was denounced as being literally murder. It was held to be a grave threat to the morality of the young. And it was said to endanger the health and reproductive capacity of the mother, and thereby, of the nation. This latter argument, vigorously stated even before the decline in the birth rate had gone very far, naturally became more frequent as events seemed to be offering their support.  

107 See B. Dobodzińska Rodzina w Polsce Warsaw 1974, p. 91 and ff.

108 See notes 28 and 78, above.
After the fall of Gomułka, the Catholic publicists were joined by other critics of the abortion legislation, who adduced very similar arguments to attack it. From this the inference seems clear that there was a party ban on raising the issue of abortion in Gomułka's time, and that this ban was lifted after his removal. The anti-abortionists showed themselves to be quite a formidable alliance of national, religious, medical and aesthetic objectors. But after a lively debate, and despite the trend towards partial or complete restriction of abortion in other East European countries (where it had similarly been legal since about 1956-7) the counter-reformers were defeated. The main ripostes against them,  

The anti-abortionists were for the most part concentrated in and around the journal Kultura (of which something has already been said in note 94). The fact that Wilhelmi, the editor-in-chief personally identified himself with this view of abortion as well as giving column-space to other opponents of the existing legislation would suggest that some highly-placed people other than Wilhelmi himself felt that the indications for legal abortion should be restricted. (cf. footnote 94) It was noticeable that Wilhelmi was eager not to be tarred with the Catholic brush. As Stefan Kisielewski put it in his feuilleton of December 3, 1972 in Tygodnik Powszechny (one week after he had praised Wilhelmi for his stand on the matter): "Even Janusz Wilhelmi, in defending the just cause in the matter of our demographic attitudes, shies away from any kind of oneness with the Church on the subject like the Devil from holy water".

Defeat came at a sitting of the Health and Physical Culture Commission of the Sejm in March 1973. The discussion at this session (summarized in the Biuletyn Wydziału prasowego Sejmu No. 243/VI Kad., March 27, 1973), though interesting and reflecting some of the views that had been expressed during the public debate on population and abortion policy, nonetheless suggests that the matter had been authoritatively decided at some prior stage. It was significant that the only expert opinion
however, did not obviously emanate directly from the government, which may conceivably be sitting on the fence to some extent, while giving its support in the meantime to the defenders of liberal abortion. The latter, it should be said, did not usually defend abortion as such, but saw it rather as a regrettable phenomenon that they hoped would soon diminish. However they did challenge the propriety of state interference in what they held to be a sphere of individual freedom. And they frequently asserted that such interference, insofar as it was aimed at achieving spectacular pro-natalist successes as in Romania, would be unsuccessful. The language at times was tapped in and for the discussion was medical. Demographers were not represented, and though some of the participants did make demographic assertions, notably the doctors (who like doctors elsewhere betrayed a tendency to see themselves as possessing a natural untrained flair for demography), the views of the pro-natalist anti-abortionists were wholly unrepresented. The only concession which the Commission's sub-committee report made to anti-abortionist views was to declare that the view advanced by many gynaecologists that a ban should be placed on abortions in the case of first pregnancies should be given careful consideration. (Thus while this recommendation was not in fact adopted on this occasion, its possible future acceptance may have been foreshadowed). One extract from the sub-committee's report may be worth quoting as an apparently authoritative statement of the current official position on population policy:

"The number of artificial terminations of pregnancy being performed is showing latterly a tendency to decline and is not significantly correlated with the birth rate. The spread of contraceptives and effective family planning will mean that artificial termination of pregnancy will cease to perform any social role, much less any demographic one. A proper pro-natalist policy is identical with a social and economic policy ensuring systematic increase in the population's standard of living." (p. 6).
rather forceful, which may indicate strong personal feelings, but may also indicate that there was continuing high-level opposition to any change in the law. As one prominent demographer wrote bluntly:

"Population policy cannot be conducted with the aid of administrative rigours (i.e. repressive measures), and accordingly the views heard calling for withdrawal of the legislation legalizing termination of pregnancies must be regarded as ill-advised."\(^{111}\)

This particular commentator was as much a pro-natalist as many of the anti-abortionists. Virtually all the demographers are pro-natalists, but virtually all, too, are firmly opposed to any form of "administrative measures" being applied to the problem. Thus, while the economic bias of the demographic profession does lead some of them towards the technocratic econocentrism referred to earlier, it can also be said that in this matter they place a very firm stress on the rights of the individual.

The solution favoured by the demographers, as indeed, by most other contributors to the discussion, is to remove some at least of the economic disincentives to having children. Most favour generous child allowances, preferably graduated fairly steeply by birth order, and a variety of other social services and economic policies aimed at lightening the load of the young mother. Many such measures have been adopted or foreshadowed by the government, but not usually in the amount or form that the pro-natalists would have liked, and the satisfaction they express about them seems at times to be mingled with a trace of reserve.\(^{112}\)

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111 M. Latuch "Elementy polityki ludnościowej w Polsce" in Polityka ludnościowa, P. 139

112 "The adoption of an active and effective population policy has become an urgent necessity. Lately we have observed certain symptoms of such a policy; these must be turned into a complex program". M. Latuch op. cit., p. 137.
in the economic pro-natalists' program is that they do not seem to have any contingency plans for the event that their policies should be applied without success. Would the devotion of some to individual rights then waver?  

If many pro-natalists were ready to defend individual rights on the abortion issue, and family planning generally, few seemed to question the state's ultimate right to make all the macro-decisions and to decide what the birth rate should be; though they did frequently emphasize that those decisions should be taken after careful research and due consultation with experts. And few participants in the debate on either side seemed to question the state's right to unleash another barrage of propaganda (as in the sixties but this time pro-natalist), to achieve that rate. But there were

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111 Czechoslovakia's success in increasing its fertility after (among other measures) certain restrictions on the availability of abortion had been introduced may also contribute to producing some waverers. K. Romaniuk in TL February 21, 1971, declared "It can be said with complete certainty that decisions of an administrative character have produced meagre and in general short-term effects ..." and described parental decisions in these matters as their "personal concern", and the state's role as limited; in his contribution to the volume Demografia społeczna in 1974, the same author, a keen pro-natalist, said: "The experience of countries .. like Czechoslovakia or Hungary (Hungary also introduced restrictions on abortion some months before the publication of Demografia społeczna) suggests that both economic and legal-administrative measures are necessary ..." (p. 249). A little earlier in the same passage Romaniuk had specified regulations concerning abortion and the production and sale of contraceptives as being examples of such administrative measures at the disposal of governments wishing to influence the birth rate.
a few sceptics. One journalist commentator spoke of the need to create a pro-natalist climate in the population by manipulating media and cultural output, but at the same time deplored the stupidity of mass propaganda, suggesting that it was counter-productive anyway. Another journalist, Ernest Skalski, went rather further, speaking with the greatest distaste of any attempts to make people "feel ashamed" of having only one child, as an earlier discussant had proposed. This he described as "arrogant social pedagogy", a description which, of course, sounds very like a condemnation of all propaganda campaigns aimed at adults (and be it noted, in passing, that in this domain, Gierek's regime has probably outshone its predecessor). Attacking another debater who had declared that "citizens are obliged to think about the (needs of the) state in broader categories" (i.e. to be aware that they should have more children than they really want if the state sees it as necessary), Skalski described this kind of thinking as a "perversion" and went on

"The conviction still cannot establish itself in our journalistic writing that man is first and foremost a value unto himself and not an instrument of policies; policies are meant to serve him and not vice versa."

Skalski's article, which bore the sarcastic title "I suggest you have three children", adhered to the usual stylistic convention of suggesting that it is journalists (or economists, demographers, historians, doctors, lawyers, etc.) who are to blame for the ills of Socialist society, and not the system, the government, or particular politicians (other than displaced

114 "I'm not calling for the papers and television to be filled with hurrah-family (hurra-rodzinne) items, and stupid ones at that, as is usually the case with mass propaganda occasions." (w masówce) J. Rolicki in Kultura October 1, 1972.
ones of course, who may be mentioned in season); but it was none the less a very spirited and noteworthy defence of private values.  

From time to time, an interesting trace of class attitudes intruded itself into the debate. Most if not all of the contributors were, of course, members of the intelligentsia, whatever their more remote social origins. Not only was this quite often evident, it was even at times made unabashedly explicit. The fertility of the intelligentsia in Poland, as elsewhere in the Socialist world, is markedly below that of other social classes and groups, unlike the position in Western Europe, where equivalent groups like the urban better-to-do and the professionals have tended to increase their fertility in recent decades to the level of or above that of the urban proletariat. Many members of the Polish intelligentsia feel that they are, objectively speaking, the salt of the earth. This feeling sometimes reached the surface of the

115 "Proponuję państwu troje dzieci" Kultura October 8, 1972

116 See, eg., M. Klimczyk "Przynależność do grup społeczno-zawodowych a dzietność biologiczna kobiet w Polsce" in Polityka ludnościowa p. 250.


118 This implicit assumption is everywhere apparent but only rarely explicitly defended. There is an example of such a defence in Mikołaj Kozakiewicz's contribution to the Argumenty debate cited earlier (April 16, 1972). Having first protested his support for the then prevailing educational policies giving preference to the children of workers and peasants (which were in fact widely resented by the intelligentsia, including those more recently recruited to it), Kozakiewicz says: "In a dynastic intelligentsia, or "elite" there are virtues as well as defects ... such a dynastic intelligentsia makes a very important contribution to progress."
population debate in the form of a conviction that it was vital to the nation's interests above all to raise the intelligentsia's birth rate. Concern was often expressed too about the high birth rates rife among what in Polish is referred to as the "social margin", (margines społeczny) and which we would call the lumpenproletariat. Here too they felt that what was required was a selective and differential population policy to

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119 See, e.g., Smoliński in BIGS 1972 No. 3-4, p. 114; A. Rajkiewicz in Socjalne i prawne środki vol. II p. 16-7 (where he suggests that rather than follow a generally pro-natalist policy, attention should be concentrated on "certain groups", in particular "women with higher education"); J. Wilhelmi in Kultura November 12, 1972. As befits a member of the Central Auditing Commission, Wilhelmi puts his case with great political dexterity, arguing in effect, that it is unfair that middle-class anti-natalists like Wiesława Grochola and the like should have small families and expect the poverty-stricken peasants with less material and cultural resources to save the nation from depopulation.

120 This theme has been broached many times since the abortion debates of 1956, and examples could be cited at great length. "In the present phase we should oppose elemental reproduction (żywiolowa rozrodczość) in groups belonging to the social margin and in pathological milieus, or at least not adopt measures which might have a stimulating effect on them". (BIGS 1973 No. 3-4, p. 82). Indeed the association between large families and demoralized families tends to be made almost automatically. Thus one writer, discussing problem and handicapped children, declares that most of them come from "broken and large families" (z rodzin rozbitych i wielodzietnych) "Arytmetyka i odpowiedzialność" GP November 25-6, 1972. Another finds it necessary to make a denial in the following form: "It doesn't seem to me, moreover, that the large family milieu (środowisko wielodzietne) is demoralized to a significant extent" (BIGS 1972 No. 3-4, p. 121).
encourage the fit and discourage the unfit. This note of social eugenics was struck with a considerable degree of caution. Other more medically eugenic proposals have also been aired at times, again, for the most part, very cautiously.\textsuperscript{121} The caution no doubt reflects some measure of concern both about the possible consequences to the society and the possible consequences to the proposer.

\textsuperscript{121} Calls for such measures as compulsory pre-marital medical tests (with or without the corollary of legal bans on marriage between particular categories of candidates) were made, for example, at the conference reported in \textit{Socjalne i prawne środki}. The proposers seem frequently to have been people nearer the grass roots of social work. One discussant, recalling that the pre-marital examinations had been proposed but not included in the Family Code passed ten years earlier, reproposes them and suggests they be given some kind of legal sanction for certain cases in the form of prohibition of marriage without special judicial permission. She expresses some reserve about this method, but feels that the seriousness of the situation (reported increases in the incidence of handicapped children) justify it (vol. I, p. 337). The Party Central Committee representative at the meeting, while not commenting on this particular point, declared the party's opposition in principle to administrative measures in all aspects of social legislation, mentioning divorce, abortion and alcoholism as specific examples. Wincenty Kawalec, the then Minister for Wages, Labour and Social Affairs (whose ministry had organised the conference), alluded to these matters in his review of the conference in the Poznan journal \textit{Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny}, 1973 No. 4, p. 41. "Consideration was given to possible measures aimed at restricting fertility in demoralized milieus" (p. 48). Kawalec saw the lawyer participants as being mainly concerned with preventing infringements on human rights, whereas social workers, grappling with the problems daily, were more inclined to advocate decisive measures. Kawalec himself appeared eager to avoid commitment one way or the other.
From the foregoing it should already have been evident that several major definable interest groups were involved in the population debate: the Church and Catholic laity, disinterested demographic nationalists, the demographers, the economic planners, women's righters, the intelligentsia, doctors, the party-state leadership and so on. Here again we are obviously dealing with blurry and overlapping edges: the demographers are often nationalists and sometimes Catholics; the economic planners may feel strongly conscious of their allegiance to the intelligentsia, or their loyalty to the party-state leadership, etc. And within the recognizable groups, a considerable shading of opinion was often noticeable. Thus within the Catholic contingent, there was a very wide variation between the principled intransigence and strong language of Cardinal Wyszyński at one extreme, and the mild claims and conciliatory tone of Sejm deputy Hagmajer (PAX) at the other. Some demographers were economic pro-natalists; others evoked nationalist arguments; others again seemed to regard maintaining population growth as an "axiomatic thesis not requiring any particular proof"; while still others gently queried the pro-natalist enthusiasms of their colleagues without quite dissociating themselves from them. The medical group is a particularly


123 In the words of a critic. BIGS 1973 No. 3-4, p. 96.

124 See the contribution by A. Józefowicz to Polityka ludnościowa, p. 88 and ff.
heterogeneous one, whose vested interests and orientations have tended, moreover, to shift over time. In the late 1950s there was often said to be a faction which was interested in maintaining abortion in an illegal or at best semi-legal state in order to profit therefrom. Other doctors both then and now are undoubtedly irritated by the strain legal abortion places on the scarce public resources they are required to administer. Many are undoubtedly concerned about the medical aspects of legal abortion believing it to be harmful; and among these, the more devoutly Catholic are likely, of course, to see the medical dangers even more clearly than their colleagues.\footnote{125} And now, after years of respectable and quite legal private abortion practice, a great many gynaecologists would undoubtedly feel threatened by any severe restrictions on the availability of abortion. While the profession on the whole was clearly against legal abortion when it first came in, their position now is more difficult to assess in any generalized terms. One journalist writing against abortion in the non-Catholic \textit{Kultura} has asserted that the views of the medical profession on the harm done by legal abortion are "shocking" (wstrząśające).\footnote{126} Yet the attitude of those associated with the Ministry of Health and the medical powers-that-be (insofar as that attitude is independent and can be safely inferred from the Sejm committee hearings mentioned earlier)\footnote{127} is rather that the legislation has been medically successful.

\footnote{125}{Doctors are specially concerned about first pregnancies (cf.note 110). For an earlier instance of medical opposition, see the report of a meeting of the Warsaw branch of the Polish Society for Forensic Medicine and Criminology in TL February 11, 1960 "W świetle ustawy i faktów".}

\footnote{126}{J. Rolicki in \textit{Kultura} October 1, 1972.}

\footnote{127}{See note 111 above.}
One particularly interesting division which emerged during the 1970s debate was that between the pro-natalist demographic lobby and a group of academics concerned with a sub-discipline or field known in Polish as polityka społeczna, i.e. social policy. This field, which not surprisingly has had a rather chequered history in People's Poland, concerns itself with the sociological analysis of existing social policies and the consideration and cautious advocacy of improvements. It has now been joined by a sub-discipline of demography which calls itself polityka ludnościowa (literally: population policy), and which aspires to provide a similar service to the government in its own field. The practitioners of both profess a basically technocratic-loyalist view of their society: the existing structures can be accepted, but should be made more rational; and the way for them to become more rational is for the politicians to listen to our advice. 

128 Two prominent and forceful representatives of this discipline and its characteristic orientation are Antoni Rajkiewicz and Jan Rosner: see, e.g., their contributions in BIGS 1973, No. 3-4. Generally speaking, the contributors to the main demographic conferences can be divided into pro-natalists (usually demographers) and anti-pro-natalists (usually concerned with the theory or practice of polityka społeczna). On polityka społeczna as science and as a vocation, see, e.g., A. Rajkiewicz (ed.) Polityka Społeczna Warsaw 1972; and the two interesting articles in ŻG January 27, 1974, p. 10.

129 The 1963 version of Jerzy Holzer's text-book on demography (Podstawy analizy demograficznej) does not contain a section on population policy. The 1970 version (Demografia), whose structure is otherwise very similar does contain one. Mikołaj Latuch, writing in TL March 17, 1972, reports the formation of a Section for Population Policy within the Academy of Sciences' Committee for Demographic Sciences.
Thus we have the familiar spectacle of two groups with elitist aspirations competing for the ear of the powers-that-be. As the two spheres of demographic and social policy are inextricably interwoven, it follows that the potential spheres of influence of the two groups are also inextricably interwoven. The points at issue between them were not trivial. To characterize them in very abridged form: the demographers argued that the nation's economic and national future was at stake; the social politicians, if the neologism may be permitted, that Poland's resources were modest and the needs of her underprivileged great, and therefore that any diversion of funds from social services towards the probably in any case chimerical objective of raising the national birth rate would be a most culpable squandering of scarce government money. In the event it appears that the social politicians have for the moment prevailed. Nearly all of the Gierek government's moves in social legislation so far have been aimed at redistribution of wealth and the relief of hardship rather than pro-natalist objectives per se.130

The different tendencies within the debate could be traced in some cases to organizational strongholds as well. The official Catholic and PAX papers naturally supported a pro-natalist policy with restrictions on abortion. Kultura, a weekly widely believed to have close relations with high authority, gave considerable prominence and support to the pro-natalists and anti-abortionists,131 whilst also opening its columns

130 Of the first of the two increases in child endowment under the Gierek administration, for example, Latuch declares flatly: "The essential thing is that this last increase was based on social and not demographic considerations". Polityka ludnościowa, p. 133.

131 Cf. notes 94 and 109 above.
to their adversaries. *Życie Literackie*, another prominent cultural weekly, was anti-pro-natalist, as was, even more markedly and militantly the liberal Party weekly *Polityka*. The Trade Union daily *Głos Pracy* represented a kind of down-to-earth version of the *polityka społeczna* line. The popular Warsaw daily *Życie Warszawy*, which had been closely identified with the change of policy on abortion and the campaign against the high birth rate in the 1950s now adopted a low profile. *Trybuna Ludu*, the party daily, was non-committal or judiciously and moderately pro-natalist, but without countenancing repeal of the abortion legislation.

Similarly, among government and academic institutions certain identifiable cleavages occurred. Most pro-natalist demographers favoured creation of a central organization co-ordinating research and making policy recommendations. But as between representatives of the Main Statistical Office (GUS), the Polish Academy of Sciences Committee on Demographic Sciences, the Planning Commission, and the Ministry of Wages, Labour and Social Affairs, there was some difference of opinion about where this might be located. And within the group of participants in the debate oriented in some way towards the Planning Commission, there appeared to be further signs of rivalry between those concerned with establishing a

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132 In addition to publishing the fire-eating anti-pro-natalism of Urban ("Who wants to live standing up" September 9, 1971) and Grochola (October 10, 1972 and January 5, 1974), *Polityka* also published an item with a title and style strongly reminiscent of the anti-natalist campaign of 1960: "Łatwiej płodzić niż myśleć", (the pungency of which is rather inadequately rendered by "Impregnation is easier than cogitation") *Polityka* November 11, 1972.

133 See, eg., BIGS 1973, No. 3-4, p. 76, 111.
Department of Social Planning and those who found the need for a Government Population Commission attached to (przy) the Planning Commission more urgent (this division reflected that mentioned above between polityka ludnościowa and polityka społeczna). 134

The role of the middle and upper echelons of the Party/State apparatus during the debate seems to have taken the form of straddling and reconciling conflicting pressures coming from below. During the Gomułka era, there was a period after 1959 when the authorities had seen population as a clear-cut issue and had maintained a fairly explicit line on the matter. While this line became less emphatic in the later 1960s it was not formally altered. The Gierek leadership, on its accession, planned to make major changes in social policy generally. These plans do not appear to have had a specifically demographic component at the outset. However the climate was suitable for a public debate and rethink of population policy to proceed, and official permission for same was presumably granted.

Having thus sought out public and professional opinion on the matter, the authorities seem to have avoided favouring any one faction in the ensuing dispute. When the public discussion was finally reined in, the government's attitude continued to betray signs of ambiguity and compromise. While the social policy orientation seemed to be dominant for the time being, the pro-natalists were given not only the satisfaction of expecting incidental demographic spin-offs from the new social legislation, but also the hope that more specifically and explicitly pro-natalist programs might be adopted later. Speaking at the VII Trade Union Congress in November 1972, Gierek said:

134 Characteristically, the authorities solved the problem by permitting both bodies to be established.
"We should create in this country the kind of socio-economic conditions and moral and psychological climate that will favour the development and optimal sizing of the family. That is our obligation to the future."\footnote{Radio Warsaw II, November 13, 1972.}

But though representatives of the Polish leadership have thus begun hesitatingly to use the language of population policy (something which their colleagues in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and elsewhere - but not in the Soviet Union - have been doing for a decade or more), it is still debatable whether they could be said as of 1975 to have a population policy at all. In these matters it is easy to lose oneself in semantic trivia; but if one regards a population policy as being a policy aimed specifically at affecting the numerical demographic development of the country in question, a case could certainly be made out for the proposition that apart from a vague and pious hope that the population might continue to increase satisfactorily, and that certain of their social welfare policies, adopted for egalitarian or other reasons, might also serve to achieve this, they have no clear-cut demographic policies at this stage whatsoever. A recent semi-official exposition of Poland's population policy includes the remark that:

"I doubt that Polish population policy can be summarily defined as pro-natalist."\footnote{M. Kozakiewicz "Population Policy" in \textit{Polish Perspectives} (in English) 1975, No. 4, p. 13.}

Many might doubt whether it can yet be described as pro-natalist at all. The anti-natalism of the Gomułka days has been buried, and social and economic policies are infinitely more oriented to family and consumer needs. This seems to have had a positive impact (if slight to date) on
age-specific fertility in Poland. But it seems likely that Gierek, Jaroszewicz and their colleagues are much more concerned with preventing a renewed outbreak of the troubles in the shipyards in 1970 than of the gloom and inactivity in the maternity clinics in the 1960s. Child endowment has been increased, but it is weighted to favour the poor rather than the fecund as such; paid maternity leave has been extended, and optional post-maternity leave has been greatly extended, but without reinforcing it by a generous pension allowance as has been done in the more pro-natalist neighbouring states. And although young marrieds

137 The increases bring the monthly amounts paid to 160, 250, 340 and 360 zł. for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th children, with 360 for each subsequent child; however only families with an income of less than 1400 zloties per head monthly are eligible, and the graduation is in any case a good deal less steep than that prevailing in Hungary, Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia. The average monthly wage in the socialized sector in 1974 was 3185 zloties. For a full description of the benefits, see M. Piątkowski Zasiłki rodzinne Warsaw 1974.

138 For an official catalogue of the new benefits granted to women under the Gieręk administration, see, eg., J. Solecki "Problemy rodziny" TL March 3, 1975. Characteristically, the article strikes no pro-natalist notes. For a recent summary of pro-natalist measures taken elsewhere in the bloc, see R. McIntyre "Pro-natalist programmes in Eastern Europe" in Soviet Studies July 1975.
have been given some credit concessions for furnishing their flats,\textsuperscript{139} their most crucial problem remains to get into one in the first place.\textsuperscript{140} 

But if indeed there is a sense in which the Polish authorities do not yet have a definite population policy, it does seem very likely that they will have one in the near future. It was mentioned earlier that many people urged that Poland should adopt a pro-natalist program in earnest only towards the end of the 1970s, when the first depleted cohorts of the demographic low of the early 1960s would begin reaching marriageable age. And despite their other differences, almost all demographers agreed that intensive and extensive research must be funded and reported before any effective population policy could be devised. (The convergence theory seems particularly apposite to academic haute politique). The government was also warned that any population policy to be successful, would have to

\textsuperscript{139}For an account of these measures see TL March 8–9 1975 and March 12, 1975 (J. Sieradziński "Dla młodych małżeństw"). The second of these items suggests that the credit concessions have a population policy significance. However an item in ŹW April 23, 1975 mentions them rather as being a form of help for the young, i.e. as a consumerist measure. The credits carry an interest rate of 6\%, which is substantial and points up the contrast between this measure and the much more generous ones in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, where the debts are also partly or wholly remitted according to the number of children the young couple produce.

\textsuperscript{140}Cf. footnote 97 above. The principles determining priority of allocation in housing do not appear to have been altered in favour of young marrieds. The "productive sectors" continue to enjoy preferential housing allocations; insofar as social factors are taken into account the needs of the young and expanding family are not favoured. See T. Žarski "Jak budować i dzielić" TL May 7, 1975 and A. Melich "Od projektu do przydziału" TL April 2, 1975.
be carried out in a complex manner, in many different spheres of life simultaneously. The devising of such a policy, as well as its subsequent implementation, would require a permanent government body, partly scientific, partly administrative, to co-ordinate research, advise on policy and later check on how the policies once decided on were being administered. For a long time, these demands seemed to fall on deaf ears, but at last, in May 1974, the constitution of such a Government Population Commission was announced (the equivalent organization in Czechoslovakia, the State Population Commission, gives the impression of wielding great influence; in the USSR, pro-natalist demographers have been calling for such an organization for years, but so far in vain). If and when the Polish organization achieves the eminence of its Czechoslovakian counterpart, the evidence of unequivocal government involvement will no doubt begin to gather.

Perhaps the most significant sign of this impending development in the period before the VII Congress of the PUWP was a speech made by Gierek on the occasion of Women's Day in March 1975, in the course of which he mentioned the figure of 40 million people for the year 2000 as a minimal objective, for the achievement of which, as he added a little inaccurately, "the natural increase rate must become greater". While we have not always had to pursue an active (i.e. pro-natalist) demographic policy, said Gierek, "today it has proved to be a necessity. For this reason it is essential that a broad program be developed which would prescribe forms of assistance

141 For a brief account of this development together with the text of the Premier's decree establishing the organization, see BIGS 1974, No. 2, pp. 89-97. For a (not enormously illuminating) description of the new body's functions and responsibilities by its Chairman, see K. Secomski "Polityka ludnościowa na dziś i jutro" ŻW June 7, 1974.
for families rearing children, and in particular for large families (wielodzietnych). We shall present that program in a few months time at the VII Congress.\textsuperscript{142}

To what extent this program would go beyond the social-policy orientation of moves taken thus far was not easy to foresee. Certainly, no press campaign for a higher birth rate followed Gierek's statement. The Catholic weekly \textit{Tygodnik Powszechny}\textsuperscript{143} gave the statement considerable prominence, but none of the other main weeklies did, and there was no follow-up or comment in \textit{Trybuna Ludu} itself or \textit{Życie Warszawy}.\textsuperscript{144} Gierek did not refer to the matter on Mothers' Day, nor does the Politburo or Government appear to have discussed the matter of population policy at any time during 1975 (though they have repeatedly discussed housing policy, for example, in the last year or two). A \textit{Trybuna Ludu} article\textsuperscript{145} about the second phase of the child endowment increases taking effect on August 1st, spoke only of "improved living conditions" and made no reference to encouraging larger families. Insofar as any change has, therefore, been clearly foreshadowed, it seems likely to be along the lines of more of the

\textsuperscript{142}TL March 7, 1975.

\textsuperscript{143}\textit{Tygodnik Powszechny} March 16, 1975, p. 1, "Obraz tygodnia".

\textsuperscript{144}See the account of Gierek and Jaroszewicz's meeting with a selected group of women to mark the occasion in \textit{ŻW} May 27, 1975. The tone of that report was rather that women are glad to make sacrifices for their country, and that in fact the party and government had already succeeded in making their lives much easier.

\textsuperscript{145}TL July 26-7, 1975, p. 1.
same: increased economic benefits to offset the costs of raising children; positive inducements, in other words, rather than repressive measures, with a strong flavour of Gierekist consumerism and social welfare egalitarianism to them.

In some respects this is perhaps the most significant aspect of current Polish population policies. While elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, a clear trend seems to be establishing itself in favour of restrictions on the availability of abortion and in some cases, contraceptives, in Poland pressures of this kind have apparently been resisted. It might not be being overparadoxical to say that this is partly because in Poland, unlike the other socialist countries, there would be a good deal of popular support for such measures. But it would also appear that in addition to

146 An article by Z. Smoliński in TL January 18-9, 1975 ("Świadome macierzyństwo" mentions that "only a small (nie{}wielki) percentage of women" in a large fertility survey sample "regarded abortion as morally proper" (słuszne moralnie). (Hypocrisy on this point, however, is often conscious: 37% of the sample said that they might agree to the operation in concrete situations). Here again we are dealing with an instance of the church/state dialectic in Polish political life. Abortion should not be restricted, nor a pro-natalist policy followed because to do so would be to admit that the Church had been right all along. As the Deputy Minister of Wages, Labour and Social Affairs, H. Białczyński said in his introductory paper at the conference organized by the Ministry in 1973: "I think the degree of social maturity of the Polish community is still too low for a pro-natalist policy to be proclaimed". (Socjalne i prawne środki vol. I, p. 3). On the same occasion, the demographer Mikołaj Latuch, who unlike Białczyński, does favour a pro-natalist policy, emphasized that "The realization of one system of values (demographic growth) must not be achieved at the cost of any other system of values (secular culture, elimination of social and cultural inequalities)". Ibid., p. 171.(emphasis added).
not wanting to agree with the Church, the present authorities have some positive commitment to a secular and, in this particular respect, liberal vision of family life. One of the most regular contributors to Trybuna Ludu on demographic and family matters is the educationist and sexologist, Mikołaj Kozakiewicz, who is personally not an eager pro-natalist and is certainly opposed to repressive measures; on more than one occasion recently Kozakiewicz has been able to declare from official platforms that this is also the attitude of the authorities. In 1974 an article appeared in Trybuna Ludu which dealt specifically with the subject of abortion and its

147 See his "Population Policy" in Polish Perspectives 1975, No. 4. "... we are interested in demographic growth but not to the point of forcing it on people against their will ..." (p. 15) "Our attitude to the problem of abortion and contraception is also very significant ... some quarters (mainly the church)" ... (have called for) "severer restrictions.. Demographic policy, however, has not given way to these pressures". (p. 16). See also his article in TL August 2-3, 1975. Trybuna Ludu's reluctance to avoid commending abortion restrictions is sometimes taken to considerable lengths. An article on the recent upturn in the Hungarian birth rate ("Prawidłowy rozwój demograficzny" TL April 1, 1975) asserts that this development is not due primarily to the restrictions imposed on abortion in 1973. There is no time to discuss this issue here, but suffice it to say that in this writer's judgement, given the history of Hungarian endeavours to raise the birth rate by economic incentives, TL's assessment seems more normative than empirical. A Kozakiewicz article on the Rumanian family (part of a regular rubric) manages, unlike all others in the series, to wholly avoid reference to demographic matters (Rumania has a population policy marked by draconian administrative measures): TL January 18-19, 1975.
legal suppression, declaring boldly that such an approach was
characteristic of right-wing and clerical regimes like Spain, etc.\textsuperscript{148}
One can only wonder what the reaction to this article must have been
in the Rumanian, Czechoslovakian, Hungarian and Bulgarian embassies,
given the fact that in recent years all four countries have (for more
or less overtly demographic reasons) reintroduced restrictions on the
availability of abortion.

\textsuperscript{148}"Sztuczne poronienia" TL June 15, 1974.
CHAPTER 5

POPULATION POLITICS IN YUGOSLAVIA

The demographico-political situation in Yugoslavia bears strong resemblance to that in the USSR. In each case we have a numerically strong and politically dominant 'post-Christian' Slavic element which is in greater or lesser measure divided against itself, and substantial ethnic minorities largely of Moslem culture whose loyalty to the existing status quo is questionable. In each case there are dramatic divergences in demographic behaviour between the main national groups. And in each case it appears that demographic trends are bound to aggravate if not indeed to precipitate severe socio-economic stresses and conflicts. The relative success of the Soviet and Yugoslav regimes in resolving or containing these conflicts will be a most interesting test of the respective viability of two polities, which, in many respects, represent the antithetical extremes of modern European Communism.

5.a Yugoslavia: The Demographic Background

During the 20th century, various parts of Yugoslavia have been successfully affected by the social metamorphosis known as the demographic transition, in which, typically,

1 Perhaps because of the great diversity of Yugoslavia's sub-populations, there are relatively few general works covering broad areas of its demographic development. The quarterly Stanovništvo (appearing somewhat irregularly of late) has published many scholarly articles on Yugoslavian demography since its first appearance in 1963, but most are synchronic studies, and regionally or thematically specialized. Monographs, particularly those of a general character, have not been plentiful. See Centar za demografska istraživanja, Razvitak stanovništva Jugoslavije u posleratnom periodu (Belgrade, 1974); D. Breznik, Demografski metodi i modeli (Belgrade, 1972), Ch. 8 and prilog 1; V. Simeunović, Stanovništvo Jugoslavije i socijalističkih republika 1921-1961 (Belgrade, 1964); (cont.
first death and then birth rates fall from high to much lower levels, giving rise to a period of accelerated natural increase in the process. The more developed regions of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia and parts of Serbia, began this phase in the last century, and all had effectively completed it by the mid-1960s. In Bosnia and Hercegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, the transition began later and is only now approaching its completion. In Kosovo, death rates started falling some decades ago, but birth rates did not begin to follow them until very recently. The pattern throughout the world has been, roughly, that the later a country or region embarked upon the demographic transition, the more rapid the decline in its death rate was likely to be. In consequence, more or less sustained periods of low mortality and continued high natality have ensued, giving rise to the Third World phenomenon popularly identified as the Population Explosion. Yugoslavia, like the USSR, has its own Third World, and its own domestic Population Explosion. As a result of it, and of ethnic differentials in demographic behaviour, certain less prominent national communities notably the Bosnian Moslems (a Serbo-Croat-speaking

1 (cont.) Centar za demografska istraživanja, Fertilitet stanovništva u Jugoslaviji (Belgrade, 1972) and Migracije stanovništva Jugoslavije (Belgrade, 1971); M. Rašević, Determinante fertiliteta stanovništva u Jugoslaviji (Belgrade, 1971). The publications of the Savezni zavod za statistiku (Federal Institute for Statistics), in particular the demographic annual, Demografska statistika also contain some retrospective data. The English-language journal, Yugoslav Survey, regularly carries demographic articles of good quality.

2 Razvitak stanovništva u posleratnom periodu, p. 5.

3 For vital rates by republics, see Simeunović, op.cit., p. 43, 46, and Savezni zavod za statistiku, Demografska statistika 1972 (Belgrade, 1974), p.34-36.
group now officially recognized as a constituent nation of the Yugoslav Federation) and the Shiptars, or Albanians, have greatly increased their relative numerical strength in Yugoslavia overall, and, even more significantly, within their respective territorial units. Other national groups have remained numerically stagnant, or shown only weak increase during recent decades. An extreme example may bring out the magnitude of the relative changes that this kind of development can involve: the Hungarians at the 1921 Yugoslav Census outnumbered the Albanians by 468,000 to 440,000. Yet in the year 1972, according to the official Yugoslav demographic yearbook, there were roughly ten times as many Albanians born in Yugoslavia as Hungarians.  

With such regional and ethnic differentiation as this, it makes little sense for the most part to speak of overall trends in the Yugoslav population. Nation-wide demographic indicators indicate little, and in fact serve rather to conceal the nature of trends in particular regions. The material presented in the Appendix has accordingly been chosen with a view to illuminating the disparate paths taken by the main sub-populations in the post-war period. As generalizing comment is so difficult and so deceptive, these introductory remarks will strive where possible to draw attention to the most politically relevant regional deviations from the overall Yugoslav norm.

Natality in Yugoslavia fell from the relatively high (by the European standards of the time) 36.7 per thousand in 1921, to 25.9 in 1939, rose again to 30.3 in 1950 (the peak year of the post-war baby boom) and fell rapidly thereafter

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4 The 1921 census figure for Hungarians and Albanians (based on linguistic affiliation) is from S. Clissold (ed.), A Short History of Yugoslavia (Cambridge, 1966), p.165. In 1972 in Yugoslavia, there were 54,334 and 5,717 live births to Albanian and Hungarian mothers respectively. Demografska statistika 1972, p.146.
to 18.3 per thousand in 1972 (still relatively high by European standards).\textsuperscript{5} The decline in mortality has been more steady, and as a result, the post-war years saw the period of most rapid natural increase in Yugoslavia's history. Since then, natural increase has also fallen away rapidly, dropping to less than ten per thousand in 1969 for the first time since the Yugoslav state was established.\textsuperscript{6} These magnitudes do have, I believe, some national political relevance, whatever their imperfections as demographic measures in the pure sense. The post-war baby boom (a phenomenon common to all regions) arrived on the labour market in the early and mid-1960s, at a time when Yugoslavia was already struggling with growing unemployment (a problem to be discussed in greater detail in the next section). The period of rapid national population growth of the late 1940s and early 1950s probably also served to reinforce in the minds of the Communist leadership the traditional Stalinist doctrine that high rates of natural increase are a sign of national vigour inherent to Socialism; and to postpone the time when any of them could perceive that lagging population growth might conceivably be a problem either at the national or the republican level. National indicators tend to deceive politicians in the USSR and Yugoslavia, just as they do the casual external observer of demographic statistics. However, the rapidity of the recent overall decline in natural increase has been so great that decision-makers can probably no longer simply dismiss the issue as being the invention of chauvinist trouble-makers.

It will be observed from the tables in Appendix C, that in recent decades, the regional differentials in natural population growth have actually been increasing, despite the

\textsuperscript{5} Demografska statistika 1972, p.30.

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
almost universal trend towards decline in birth rates. Thus in 1950-54, Macedonia's natural increase was twice that of Croatia, whereas in 1970-73 (despite the rapid intervening decline in Macedonian fertility), the difference was nearly fourfold. In 1950-54 Kosovo's natural increase was less than $2\frac{1}{2}$ times that of Vojvodina. By 1970-73, it was ten times as great. Such comparisons as these are demographically crude and to some extent misleading. In the emotionally charged atmosphere of Yugoslav nationality politics, however, demographic oversimplifications are not uncommon. And in any case, more discriminating statistics, when they are available, frequently suggest almost equally alarming inferences.

The post-war baby boom in the more developed republics tends to divert attention from the fact that already by the early 1950s, very large discrepancies existed between the inherent fertility levels of the different national groups. In the Census year of 1953, the General Fertility Rates of the different national groups ranged from 72.5 (Hungarian), 83.1 (Slovenian), 91.0 (Croat) and 101.8 (Serbian) to 170.5 (Yugoslav, undetermined - i.e., Bosnian Moslem) and 228.2 (Albanian). By 1961, an even greater gap had opened up, as the fertility rates of the more developed nations had fallen quite sharply, whilst those of the two main Moslem groups had remained relatively stable: 59.5 (Hungarian), 70.9 (Slovenian), 74.8 (Serbian) and 80.6 (Croatian); 164.3 (Yugoslav, undetermined) and 223.9 (Albanian). Since that time, the divergence between Albanian on the one hand and Serb, Croat and Slovenian fertility on the other has undoubtedly been maintained. At the same time, the potentially very

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7 See Table 3, Appendix C.
9 Ibid.
10 See Table 4, Appendix C.
significant gap between Macedonian and Albanian fertility has dramatically widened. In 1953, the GFR for the ethnic Macedonian population in Yugoslavia was 143.0 (cf. Albanian 228.2); by 1961, the Macedonian rate had dropped to 99.0 (cf. Albanian 223.9). I have not yet seen any Yugoslav computation of GFRs by nationality for the census year 1971. But it appears that proportionately, the gap between Macedonian and Albanian fertility has widened still further since: that while both have declined, the Macedonian decline has been a good deal steeper. My own (not strictly comparable) calculation of the GFRs for the two national groups within the Macedonian republic as of 1970 gives a figure of 69 for the Macedonians and 183 for the Albanians. Since 1961, on the other hand, Bosnian Moslem fertility seems to have fallen quite sharply (though statistics may exaggerate the steepness of the decline - see note 12, below), and the gap between Moslems,

11 The figure I have given is not strictly comparable with those cited for 1953 and 1961, primarily because the 1953 and 1961 statistics refer to the total Albanian and Macedonian populations in Yugoslavia, not to those in Macedonia alone (where the overwhelming majority of Macedonians, but only a minority of Albanians, are resident). Though it is not actually indicated in the Yugoslav source, the GFR was evidently calculated for women aged 15-49 (not 15-44). My own calculations are also for women aged 15-49. They are based on the official Census results for population in Macedonia by age, sex and nationality (as of 31 March 1971), and total births by nationality of mother in Macedonia during 1970. No allowance was made for the slight time discrepancy, as the main objective was simply to render an impression of the current state of differential fertility in the Republic. See Savezni zavod za statistiku, Popis stanovništva i stanova 1971, vol.I (Belgrade, 1974), p.28; and Savezni savod za statistiku, Demografska statistika 1970 (Belgrade, 1973), p.144. A Yugoslav source provides the following GFR statistics for Macedonians and Albanians within Macedonia in the census years 1953 and 1961: Macedonians - 144 and 100; Albanians - 251 and 223. Thus the Albanian rate in Macedonia, from having been rather less than twice that of the Macedonians, was by 1970 nearly three times as great. Fertilitet ženskog stanovništva 1950-1967, p.22.
Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina is consequently closing. But even so it remains significant, at least for the two major groups, the Moslems and the Serbs. Again according to my own calculations, the respective GFRs for Moslems and Serbs within Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1970 were 96 and 63. Before the gap closes completely (assuming that it does), further significant changes in their relative demographic strength can be expected. Outside Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, the momentum and direction of change in relative ethnic fertility levels can be gauged reasonably well from the statistics on Net Reproduction Ratios by republic and province presented in Table 4 of Appendix C. The political implications of these trends will be discussed in greater detail in 5.d and 5.f, below.

The procedure adopted was the same as that for the Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia, and utilized the same statistical sources: Popis stanovništva i stanova 1971, vol.I, p.16; and Demografska statistika 1970, p.143. The Serbs can derive little comfort from the GFR for Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1970, which by the same procedures I calculate to be 81. The GFRs for the three national groups within the republic in the census years 1953 and 1961 were respectively as follows: undetermined Yugoslavs (i.e. Bosnian Moslems) 180 and 172; Serbs 138 and 105; and Croats 124 and 127. Fertilitet ženskog stanovništva 1950-1967, p.22. Here the discrepancy in computation procedures between the Yugoslav source and myself is probably negligible, though there are problems with ethnic self-identification, particularly in the case of the Moslems. There is reason to believe that there was a substantial undercount of Moslems in 1953 and 1961 because of the pressure on them to identify themselves as 'Yugoslavs'. As the GFRs were based on this Census undercount on the one hand, and vital statistics, on the other, they may have the effect of inflating Moslem fertility in the earlier years. Moslem women in childbirth seem less likely to have been identified as 'Yugoslavs' or even Serbs or Croats, than households being visited by officials at the time of a national undertaking like a census.

The Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Montegrins are all sufficiently concentrated and dominant in their own republics (in the case of the Serbs, in Serbia Proper) for the republican NRRs to be a fair guide to ethnic fertility trends. The figures for Kosovo are also a reasonable indicator of Albanian trends (though the presence of a substantial Serbian minority of lower and, in recent years, sharply falling fertility would cause some slight downward distortion.
The reasons for the sharp postwar fertility decline in Yugoslavia are no doubt very similar to those operating elsewhere in Eastern Europe: rapid industrialization and urbanization, increasing educational levels, growth of female employment in the towns, the chronic urban housing crisis, the total inadequacy of child-minding facilities, the secularization of life-styles and the decline of clerical influences, the progressive liberalization of abortion legislation, changes in family structures and values, etc. Most of the factors involved are closely related to one another; and many form part of the general socio-economic modernization that has been proceeding in Yugoslavia since 1945. Before 1939, some 75% of the Yugoslav population lived from the land. By the 1971 Census, only 38% were still dependent on agriculture.

14 Cf. Ch.1, p.4, footnote 1, above.

15 It has been calculated (on the basis of 1971 Census data) that for the female cohorts of 50-54 years of age, employed urban women had an average of 1.70 children, and unemployed urban women an average of 3.55. In the same cohorts, women without education had an average of 4.46 children, women with completed basic schooling an average of 2.43 children, and women with higher education 1.04 children. Razvitak stanovništva Jugoslavije u posleratnom periodu, p.17. In 1961, the General Fertility Rate for the urban population of Yugoslavia was 73.3, and for the rural population 98.1. Fertilitet stanovništva u Jugoslaviji, p.95.

16 The Yugoslav Statistical Yearbook does not appear to supply any information on the numbers or proportions of children in preschool child-care institutions, but from fragmentary data for parts of the country appearing in the press, it is clear that the coverage is a good deal weaker than in any of the European Socialist countries. These matters are discussed further in 5.g, below.

17 The causes of changes in fertility are notoriously difficult to isolate and disentangle from one another. The influence of abortion legislation is particularly difficult to assess, in that it appears to be a contingent cause, one which only exerts its effect after other developments have created the necessary preconditions. Yugoslav demographers, like their counterparts elsewhere in Eastern Europe, are inclined at times to play down (cont.)
for their support. Urbanization has not gone ahead at quite the same speed: like many other countries at a similar level of development, Yugoslavia has a massive army of some 1.4 million 'peasant-workers' commuting to the cities daily to work in factories and returning to their farms at night or at week-ends. Nonetheless, the rate of rural-urban migration in recent decades has been very substantial.

17 (cont.) the demographic importance of abortion legislation in the hope that they will thereby dissuade legislators from seeking to pursue pro-natalist objectives by 'administrative measures'. Nonetheless, even they are prepared to concede that liberalized abortion probably accelerates the rate of decline in fertility and may enable lower levels to be reached than would otherwise be the case. See D. Breznik, 'Problemi demografskog razvitka stanovništva Jugoslavije', paper presented to the Belgrade Conference on Population Policy held in 1973 (Savetovanje o izgradnji društvenih stavova o populacionoj politici u Jugoslaviji), mimeograph, p.20. Having asserted and cited opinion to the effect that without liberalization of the abortion laws in Yugoslavia, the fertility decline would have occurred anyway, Breznik goes on to say that 'this does not mean the complete negation of the influence of abortion legislation on the fertility of the population - particularly as regards the duration of the process of fertility decline and the minimal levels that might be reached by particular populations.'

18 Razvitak stanovništva Jugoslavije u posleratnom periodu, pp.1, 41.

19 Puljiz estimates that together with their households, the peasant-workers make up about 3 million, i.e. more than one seventh of the total Yugoslav population. Vlado Puljiz, 'Oblici i posljedice deagrarizacije u Jugoslaviji', paper presented to the Belgrade Conference on Population Policy, 1973, mimeograph, p.16.

20 It is estimated that in the period from 1948 to 1953, an average of 203,000 left the land annually; between 1953 and 1961, an average of 229,000, and from 1961 to 1971, an average of 217,000. Razvitak stanovništva Jugoslavije u posleratnom periodu, p.42.
Under the impact of the declining birth rate of recent years, the Yugoslav population has begun to 'age', with the proportion of pensioners in the total population increasing, and the proportion of children decreasing. One region in which this trend has scarcely begun as yet, however, is Kosovo, where the extremely high fertility of the Albanian population is keeping the age pyramid very broad at the base, and economic dependency ratios unfavourable. As with fertility, regional differences in age-structure are striking, and of considerable socio-economic and political significance.

The educational and occupational composition of the population as a whole has altered considerably in the post-war period, as might be expected, with levels of schooling and vocational training increasing substantially overall, and the

\[\text{21} \quad \text{Unlike in other Socialist countries, where the ageing of the population is a recurring theme in press and periodical articles, it is unusual to find any comment on this problem in Yugoslav sources, except in the specific context of agriculture (where the ageing of the work-force is particularly marked). Demographers occasionally discuss the matter in specialist publications, but the daily and periodical press virtually never does. For a rare exception, see M. Nikolić, 'Fenomen starenja aktivnog stanovništva u nas', }\text{ Borba, 14 July 1974.}\]

\[\text{22} \quad \text{Thus 53% of Kosovo's population is under the age of 20, and only 7% over 60, whereas the corresponding figures for Serbia proper are 31% and 14%, and for the Vojvodina 30% and 15%. Such dramatic differences in dependency ratios as these figures imply naturally contribute considerably to maintaining and extending the differences in national income per head between the various regions. See Tables 7 and 8, Appendix C.}\]
proportions employed in secondary and tertiary activities advancing at the expense of farming. Again there are the usual regional differentiations, with the less developed areas continuing to lag behind. The more rapid population growth of these areas has led to rural overpopulation actually being accentuated, despite the draining off of manpower to the cities. In this connection, it is worth noting that Kosovo, much of which is mountainous terrain unsuitable to agriculture, is now by far the most densely populated of the eight republics and regions (it was one of the least densely populated in 1921). Given existing trends in fertility and migration, its relative disadvantage in this respect seems bound to worsen.

The regional distribution of population in Yugoslavia has shifted considerably in this century as a result of war and migration. There is no time to discuss either of these topics in satisfactory detail. Suffice it to say concerning

23 Cf. footnote 20, above. Unlike commentators in other Socialist countries, Yugoslav writers are relatively uninhibited about identifying underemployment and even placing bold figures upon it. B. Mujović, in 'O problemu nezaposlenosti i realnim mogućnostima za njegovo rješenje', Naše teme 1973, no.4, p.745 at p.758, declares that 'in recent years', it has been assumed that the surplus labour force in the countryside amounted to about 1.3 million. However, Mujović says, it is increasing, and some observers are now apparently prepared to put it at two million. An estimate for Kosovo in 1970 places the labour surplus at 180,000, 120,000 of it rural. These reserves together with the continuing population growth in the province were said to have 'created an army of unemployed' which, given the limited possibilities for urban employment, must either increase unemployment on the farms or be siphoned abroad. M. Karan, 'Zapošljavanje radnika sa Kosova u inostranstvo', Socijalna politika, 1971, no. 1-2, p.13.

24 Z. Aničić, 'Population changes in Yugoslavia', Yugoslav Survey, vol.XII (1971), no.3, p.1 at p.4. By 1971, Kosovo's population density was 114/sq. km. (cf. 70/sq. km. in Albania and 80/sq. km. in Yugoslavia as a whole).
the first that Serbia (and Montenegro) lost one-fifth of their total population during the First World War alone; and that during the Second World War (in which Yugoslavia sustained an extremely high casualty rate), the burden of mortality was again unevenly distributed, though less so, no doubt, than in 1912-1919.

A few cursory observations should also be made about inter-regional migration within Yugoslavia. Until the last couple of decades, internal migration tended to favour Serbia proper and Vojvodina exclusively, all other regions recording net outflows. Since the mid-1950s, Slovenia and Croatia have also been showing a positive internal migration balance. The main patterns of inter-regional movement have, of course, been from the less developed south to the north. Serbs from all regions, but particularly from Bosnia

25 I.e. not including the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. See Clissold, op.cit., p.159. This devastating loss effectively put paid to Serbian imperial aspirations, though not all Serbs have yet realized it.

26 Total Yugoslav casualties are usually put at 1.7 million, or 11% of the then population. As can be seen from Table 1, the casualties were concentrated in Croatia (whose population actually declined between 1931 and 1948), Bosnia and Hercegovina and Montenegro. (The stagnation of Vojvodina's population over the same period was due rather to migratory factors.) Croatian commentators sometimes draw attention to their particularly heavy losses in World War II, though without detailing how they came to pass. See, e.g., A. Wertheimer-Baletić, Stanovništvo SR Hrvatske (Zagreb, 1971), p.25, where a figure of 661,500 is cited for Croatia's war dead.

27 Razvitak stanovništva Jugoslavije u posleratnom periodu, p.11.
and Hercegovina, and latterly from Kosovo, have tended to gravitate to Serbia proper and Vojvodina, as have Montenegrins, and, though in much lesser measure, representatives of other ethnic groups. Croats from Bosnia and Hercegovina have also tended to emigrate to Croatia, thereby leaving the Moslems in the region (who have no metropolitan area outside the republic to attract them) in a relatively stronger position.

The Macedonians, perhaps because of their ethnic and linguistic distinctness, have maintained an even balance between immigration and emigration.

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28 For an overall picture of inter-regional migratory trends, see Table 5, Appendix C. At the 1971 Census, Serbia proper and the Vojvodina had a net inflow of Serb residents from Kosovo of 48,935; and a net inflow of Montenegrins from Montenegro and Kosovo of 23,041 and 6,147 respectively. These figures, it should be emphasized, do not convey the full demographic effects of the migratory patterns in question, since they fail to record past immigrants deceased at the time of the 1971 Census, and, of course, those children of immigrants who are born in the new area of settlement. The figures are probably further affected by changes in ethnic identification from Montenegrin to Serb after settlement in Serbia. And finally it needs to be remembered that the criterion of permanent residence employed in Censuses (cf. note 31, below) may also lead to underregistration of southern migrants (notably Albanians) in the northern regions. The figures have been computed from Popis stanovništva i stanova 1971, p.76, 78, 82 and 84. The net inflow of Serbs from Bosnia and Hercegovina to Serbia as of 1971 was 161,052 (again by my computation). Op.cit., p.76, 82.

29 The 1971 Census reveals a net inflow of 94,455 Croats from Bosnia and Hercegovina into Croatia. The same strictures apply to this result as to the computations presented in the previous footnote. A calculation of net migratory flows in and out of Bosnia and Hercegovina by nationality based on the 1961 Census results showed that of a total deficit of 211,000 for the republic as a whole, 132,000 were Serbs, and 66,000 Croats. The total deficit for Moslems and Yugoslavs (undetermined) was only 4,000. Again, it must be stressed that these figures do not near adequately render the demographic consequences of inter-regional migratory flows in recent decades. See Migracije stanovništva Jugoslavije, Table 28, p.210-11.
It should be stressed that Yugoslav statistics on inter-regional migration over recent decades are incomplete, and depend heavily on indirect and in some cases misleading census data. Since the war, Yugoslav censuses have applied the criterion of permanent rather than present residence. As a result, the growing numbers of intra-Yugoslav 'Gastarbeiter' in the more developed regions (particularly Slovenia) are systematically overlooked, though many of them may regard themselves as permanent settlers. No reliable estimates have been published of the numbers or ethnic composition of those involved in these supposedly temporary movements; and it seems quite probable that none exist. This fact needs to be borne in mind when considering Table 5 in Appendix C.

30 Yugoslav migration statistics are all based on cumbersome, indirect and incomplete computations like those exemplified in the previous two footnotes. Data on pre-war and war-time migratory movements are apparently scanty and the very important cumulative effects the latter have had on the present distribution of settlement in Yugoslavia will probably never be known. Partly because of Yugoslavia's relaxed (by Socialist standards) internal administration, direct monitoring of population shifts has not been systematically carried out. Slovenia is alone among the republics in keeping adequate records of current migratory movements. See Migracije stanovništva Jugoslavije, pp.5-9, 328-30.


32 The only figures I have seen are for Slovenia, where estimates range between 100,000 and 150,000. Occasionally fragmentary data are published for other republics or regions, but even they are said to be unreliable. 'Statistical registration of these movements is inadequate... Permanent migration is much greater than that which is officially recorded, and is often spontaneous (stihije) and unorganized.' M. Bekić, a member of the Federal Committee for Labour, quoted in VUS, 1 May 1976, p.18.
Another area in which official statistics are inadequate and conceded to be so (or accused of being so) by many Yugoslav commentators is external emigration. There has at times been hot dispute about the total numbers and ethno-regional affiliations of the emigrants. In the early stages of the mass emigration that followed the economic reforms of 1965, Croatia, Slovenia and parts of Bosnia and Hercegovina were particularly affected, and Croatia's share of the diaspora is undoubtedly still disproportionately high. Official estimates of the total numbers involved are approximate and at times conflicting. But at its highest point, in 1974, the Yugoslav economic emigration evidently amounted to some 1.1 million workers, the vast majority of them between the ages of 20 and 45. 33 A semi-official estimate given recently after the effects of the West European economic slump had made themselves felt (through reduced employment in general and discriminatory measures against immigrant workers in particular) put the figure at about 950,000. 34 The Yugoslav Gastarbeiter phenomenon is, of course, one without parallel in the Socialist world. Its demographico-political significance will be outlined in greater detail in a separate section (5.c., below).

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33 One estimate (among many) gives the figure of 1,122,000 workers abroad (including overseas countries) as of late 1974. M. Mišović, 'Sedma republika', NIN, 19 October 1975, p.10. Neither this nor the estimate in the following footnote includes non-employed dependants residing abroad.

34 Svetozar Pepovski (the President of the Federal Committee for Labour), in Politika, 6 February 1976, p.10.
Strange as it may seem, those responsible for Yugoslavia's first Five-Year Plan apparently took no account of population growth whatsoever. It was only with the 1957-61 Plan that the demographic factor began to be systematically represented in planning documents. But while it was thus formally taken cognisance of, key decisions about economic strategy continued to be reached without much regard to natural fluctuations in labour supply. In 1965, Yugoslavia embarked on a radical economic reform, one of the main purposes of which was to restrict employment in the socialized sector in order to facilitate increase in productivity.

Partly at

36 M. Macura, 'Komponente populacione politike saobrazne sadašnjim i budućim potrebama Jugoslavije', Naše teme 1974, no.4, p.554 at p.555.
37 One Yugoslav economist has remarked that the 1966-70 Plan devoted a particularly long passage to employment problems, without, however, taking anything like effective account of them at the strategic level. T. Mulina, 'Tretman stanovništva i radne snage u kontekstu privrednog razvoja Jugoslavije', paper presented at the 1973 Population Policy Conference in Belgrade, mimeograph, p.10. The prominent economist and sociologist (and, at times, forthright critic of official policies), Branko Horvat, has been quoted (by Z. Antić in Radio Free Europe Research RAD Background Report 54 (Yugoslavia), 20 March 1975, p.3) as saying that 'in the reform plans of 1965, there was not a single word about employment'. Horvat was evidently referring to other documents. The spirit of the two criticisms is in any case identical.

38 For comprehensive critiques of the 1965 economic reforms from the viewpoint of manpower problems, see, e.g., T. Mulina, 'Nezaposlenost, uzroci i karakteristike u sadašnjoj fazi razvoja privrede', Ekonomski Institut, Belgrade, Studije i saopštěna (Belgrade, n.d.); and M. Knežević, 'Neki socijalno-politički i ekonomski problemi zapošljavanja naših radnika u inostranstvu', Ekonska misao 1968, no.2, p.331.
least as a result of these policies, employment stagnated and there was virtually no increase in the numbers of employed for four years. In the meantime, the mass exodus from the farms set irrevocably in motion by post-war modernization continued to spill rural school-leavers and others into the towns. And given its youthful age structure, the existing workforce was not being depleted by natural wastage at a very high rate. Moreover, the middle 'sixties saw the entry into the able-bodied age-group of the first of the large cohorts

39 Between 1945 and 1964, employment in the non-rural Yugoslav economy had expanded at an annual average rate of 10%. The numbers of employed in 1968, however, were actually lower than in 1964 (3,579,000 compared with 3,608,000). See Ivo Vinski, 'Privredna reforma i zaposlenost', Pregled, 6 June 1969, tr. in Osteuropa, vol.XIX (1969), p.A347.

40 Cf. footnote 20, above, from which it is quite clear that no diminution of the pressures of urbanization occurred during the period.

of school-leavers born during the post-war baby boom. During the late 1950s, and early 1960s, when the depleted war-time cohorts had been reaching working age, annual increases in employment had been very high. Now, at the precise time when demographic considerations favoured a strategy of extensive rather than intensive (i.e. labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive or productivity-oriented) economic growth, the choice was made to severely limit new employment and to favour policies leading to the drastic paring down of existing employment. Industries and whole sectors of the economy that had been favoured by

42 One Yugoslav observer found that the timing of the Reform was 'reasonably well-timed', since the rate of growth in the total population between 20 and 60 was at its lowest point in 1965 and 1966. Miodrag Nikolić, 'Planiranje investicija kao sredstvo za suzbijanje nezaposlenosti', Ekonomska misao 1968, no.2, p.301, at p.303. However, even on Nikolić's reckoning, the annual increase by 1967-68 was much greater than could be comfortably handled by a labour-tight economy. The assumption that 20 (rather than 16-17) represents the outset of adult working life in Yugoslav conditions was in any case an unreal one, and positively misleading in the given instance. The weight of Yugoslav opinion, as well as of logic, is against Nikolić. Virtually all other analysts take 15 as the lower limit of working age, and place the work-force echo of the post-war baby boom in the mid-sixties. See, e.g., D. Breznik and M. Sentić, 'Radni kontingent stanovništva i formiranje radne snage u Jugoslaviji do 1970 godine', Ekonomska misao 1968, no.1, p.151 at p.161; V. Simeunović, 'Population of Working Age', Yugoslav Survey 1966, p.3717, footnote 1. See also footnote 46, below.

43 While the reform did not of course aim at the total stagnation of employment in the years after 1964, the planned level of employment increase was very modest, just 2.3% per annum, less than half of that prevailing in 1953-61. See A. Wertheimer-Baletic, 'Regionalne demografske implikacije zapošljavanja u inozemstvu', Ekonomski Pregled 1969, nos 7-8, p.703.
'political' investment now fell on hard times as sterner economic criteria were applied. Mass redundancies often occurred among the higher categories of the work-force as well as among the semi-skilled and unskilled. Grads and school-leavers were particularly hard hit. Thus it was that the regime manufactured for itself a new stratum of underemployed, over-educated youth, a stratum that was to occasion the leadership a good deal of anxiety in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Skilled planners and technocrats must have had their reservations about the timing, if not the substance of the 1965 reforms. Demographers and economists were certainly quick to point to the unfortunate link between lowered employment opportunities and increased labour supplies.

44 The proportion of qualified workers among registered unemployed in 1964 was one-sixth of the total; by 1968 it comprised one-third (in absolute numbers, an increase from 32,000 to 95,000). I. Vinski, op.cit., p.A349.

45 The student disturbances at Yugoslav universities in the northern summer of 1968 (particularly those at Belgrade university) caused a mini-crisis requiring the personal intervention of President Tito. The ideology of the Belgrade movement had a marked New Left flavouring, which probably reflected among other things the growing professional insecurity of young graduates at the time. Again in the Croatian crisis of 1971, the role of university students was critical.

46 In 1966, a Yugoslav demographer wrote: 'The economic reform, rationalization and the shift to a more intensive system of production have lessened the need for new labour, and that at precisely the moment when the sources of labour supply had grown quite exceptionally'. D. Vogelnik, 'Demografski procesi i stabilizacija', Ekonomist, vol. XIX (1966), nos 1-4, p.375 at p.385. In March 1968, the Serbian Economic Association (Savez ekonomista Srbije) organized a conference on employment problems, at which the causes and consequences of the employment crisis were forthrightly analysed by a number of specialist observers. For a review of the conference, see 'Savetovanje o problemima zaposlenosti', Stanovnistvo, vol.VI (1968), nos 1-2, p.90; for the proceedings, see Ekonomска misao, 1968, nos 1 and 2.
The decision was, of course, a political one, the outcome of a complex struggle in which various ideological and ethno-regional orientations were heavily engaged. It can at least be asserted with confidence that on this occasion the top leadership showed scant regard, or possibly no regard at all for the demographic context and demographic ramifications of their decisions. They evidently felt the problem could be solved by opening the flood-gates a little wider and allowing the surplus manpower to seep out of the country. What in fact followed was a torrent. This mass emigration did not solve the problem of unemployment within the country, however. Numbers registered as seeking jobs continued to increase, even when the employing capacity of the economy began to recover, after 1968. Since the defeat of the

47 For a discussion of some of these aspects of the politics of the reforms, see P. Shoup, *Communism and the National Question* (New York, 1968), Ch. 6.

48 'Statistics indicate that at the end of 1965 there were 236,000 registered unemployed, 40% of whom were seeking employment for the first time. Though the number of unemployed is up by 11% over December 1964, a comparison will show that nothing exceptional is taking place in this field. Three years ago, at the end of 1962, there were precisely as many unemployed, i.e. 236,000. And then the situation was relatively more difficult, for total employment was lower.' *Leto 1965 v luči statistike*, Delo, 5 January 1966. The above excerpt from the Slovenian party daily is a good example of the insouciant style of post-reform official thinking on employment problems. As Mulina commented: 'The full seriousness of the current unemployment has begun to be comprehended only after a significant delay.' T. Mulina, *Nezaposlenost, uzroci i karakteristike*, p. 34.

49 See Table 12, Appendix C.
'liberal Westernizers' (for want of a better term) in 1971-72, there has been some reversion to labour-intensive growth, and annual employment increments have picked up, at the expense of productivity and real wages. By now, the annual increase in the 15-60 age-group is diminishing, and can be expected to go on doing so, thus raising the possibility that in the future some of the pressure will ease on the labour market. For this to happen, it will be necessary for large numbers of the Yugoslav workers 'temporarily abroad' to remain abroad. At present, however, it is official policy to 'bring' them all back. More significantly, it has become official policy throughout Western Europe to favour indigenous workers over Gastarbeiter, and to deport those of the latter who are unable to find work. The demographic strains on

50 For a general survey of trends in industrial productivity, see Miodrag Nikolic, 'Labour Productivity in Industry, 1952-1973', Yugoslav Survey 1975, no.1, p.119. Between 1965 and 1971, productivity increase was greater than that of employment. Since then the trends have been reversed (see Nikolic, op. cit., Table 1, at p.120). The planned annual increase in productivity (in the socialized sector) over the 1971-75 period was 4.9%; the rate actually achieved was 2.5%. The planned rate of increase in employment in the socialized sector was 2.7%; the actual rate was 4.3%. The year 1975 saw the highest increase in employment (5.4%), and the lowest increase in industrial productivity (0.9%) of the five-year period. (The above data are drawn from D.J.I. Matko, 'The Fulfilment of the Yugoslav Five-Year Plan for 1971-75', ABSEES, vol.VII, no.2 (April 1976), Special Section II, p.xvi). The increase in real wages over the period 1971-75 was the lowest for 20 years. (Politika, 20 February 1976, p.7.) In the first two months of 1976, the number employed in industry was up by 3.7% over the same period in 1975, whilst the physical output of industry had increased by only 2.1% (Politika, 5 May 1976, p.8).

51 These matters will be discussed and documented in greater detail in 5.c, below.
employment policy are thus likely to remain for some time yet.

In the official approach to employment problems, as intimated earlier, there has been a certain regression towards expanding employment even at the risk of thereby lowering productivity and wages, and adding to the inflationary and liquidity problems that have been dogging the economy since well before the post-1973 recession in Western Europe. But in labour policy, as in many other fields of government action, there are clear signs of a compromise between irreconcilable opposites, of gaping chasms thinly papered over. Though the 'liberal Westernizers' have suffered something of an eclipse since 1972, their 'technocratic' orientation continues to be influential. At the same time, the 'Partisan' element, while re-emerging strongly over the

52 Labels like 'Westernizers', 'technocrats' or 'Partisans' are obviously unable to totally encapsulate the truth, though they contain an important element of it. Their use does not imply a belief that they explain everything. In the sphere of labour policy, for example, it is interesting to note that the Trade Unions favour 'technocratic' policies: i.e., would prefer to see productivity and real wages increasing more rapidly than employment. Speaking at the VII Trade Union Congress in December 1974, the former Yugoslav Premier and current President of the Yugoslav Trade Union Federation, Mika Spiljak, said that 'the trade unions cannot support a policy of higher employment at all costs, particularly not if this would have the effect of slowing down growth in productivity and wages'. (Kommunist, 23 December 1974, p.12) See also VUS, 20 March 1976, p.9. For a Polish contrast, cf. Ch.4, footnote 36, above.
same period, has not achieved a fully dominant position. In employment policy, the uneasy balance between these two conflicting tendencies seems to take the form of an incongruous mingling of sober 'technocratic' employment plans with either swashbuckling 'Partisan' rhetoric or plain obfuscation. The plans are set at modest and realizable levels, but extravagant claims are sometimes made about the capacity of the economy (and indeed, of those modest plans) to absorb Yugoslavia's various accumulations of surplus labour power. And there is evidence that many enterprises are subjected to extra-economic pressures to take on more workers than they can effectively utilize.

53 Conventional as the term 'Partisan' may be in some measure, any scrutiny of biographical sketches of new appointees to official positions bears out its strong empirical content. I have not seen a detailed analysis of partisan representation before and after 1971, but the impression of growing Partisan strength (at a time when demographic factors might lead one rather to expect a weakening) seems to be a general one among observers. See, for example, the remarks by F. Singleton in Soviet Studies, vol.XVIII, no.3 (July 1976), p.463.

54 The martial terminology of the post-war years has been greatly revived since 1972, and is applied, among other places, on the employment 'front'. See, e.g., 'Bitka za zaposljavanje mladih' (Battle for the Employment of the Young), Borba, 20 September 1974.

55 Examples could be cited at length. One particularly egregious instance is to be found in an article produced for external consumption which speaks throughout of Yugoslavia's deep-seated and secularly worsening unemployment as 'temporary' unemployment. 'Employment and Temporary Unemployment', Yugoslav Survey, 1974, no.2, p.1.

56 Thereby, of course, contributing to swelling employment above the planned levels. See, e.g., Politika, 20 February 1976, p.7.
The current five-year plan to 1980 (srednjoročni plan) envisages an increase in employment in the non-rural sector of almost one million, with an annual increase of employment in the socialized sector of 3.5%, or about 180,000. Given that the annual increments in 1974 and 1975 have been well above that, this seems a reasonable objective and one which may possible not prove beyond the economy's capacity to absorb without generating inefficiency. But ostensibly the authorities believe that magnitudes like these will be sufficient to reduce existing unemployment, provide work for large numbers of workers returning from abroad, soak up the continuing inflow of peasants into the towns, and also absorb the natural increase in the work-age population.

This seems to be a case either of misty and wishful thinking or disingenuous propaganda. To begin with, the


58 For examples of apparently quite unrealistic optimism, see 'Značajni izgledi za zapošljavanje povratnika', Politika, 7 August 1976; 'Employment and Temporary Unemployment', Yugoslav Survey, 1974, no.2, p.1, at p.21. The Politika article claims to foresee jobs being available for 400,000 returnees by 1980. Among other confusions, it appears to assume that natural wastage creates a store of new jobs (rather than being outweighed by a greater influx of school-leavers). An article on the Croatian draft five-year plan to 1980 in Borba, 4 January 1975 claims that 180,000 new jobs will be created by 1980 in the republic, and that this will suffice to halve unemployment (then 54,000), and also employ 100,000 returnees. This calculation would leave 53,000 jobs spread over five years to absorb natural increase and increased numbers of women and peasants seeking urban employment.
Yugoslav economy has a pool of over 600,000 domestic unemployed that has to be drained off. As was remarked earlier, this total has been growing in recent years, despite the high employment increments. While this may be due in part to statistical anomalies, the trend cannot be reassuring; nor are there any obvious reasons why it should suddenly be reversed. Then there is the pool of exported unemployment, the privremeno zaposleni u inostranstvu (temporarily employed abroad), now becoming more familiar by their new name of povratnici (returnees). While there is evidence that only a surprisingly small proportion of the returnees are at present seeking employment in the socialized sector, this seems likely to change. Given the high unemployment and (for them) the relatively low wages prevailing in their homeland, the possible prejudice against

59 The trend is still continuing. A recent report gave the figure of registered unemployed as 650,000. VUS, 5 June 1976, p.15. See also 'Više zaposlenih, ali i onih koji traže posao', Politika, 5 May 1976.

60 Politika, 16 May 1976, p.7, reports a Dimitrovgrad survey which found that of 1,189 registered unemployed in that area, only 160 were 'really' out of work. NIN, 22 December 1974, p.10, refers to a proportion of the registered unemployed who 'pray to God not to give them work'. The article cited in the preceding footnote (VUS, 5 June 1976) concedes that unemployment statistics may be a little inflated, but rejects suggestions that categories like housewives, students, owners of property, specialists reluctant to move to another town, etc., should be automatically removed from the registers.

61 NIN, 28 December 1975, p.8, reports an estimate that two-thirds of the returnees are not seeking work in the socialized sector of the economy.
them on the part of employers, and their natural desire to enjoy a period of leisure financed by their savings abroad, it is quite likely that some returnees will choose to make a pause before seeking work in Yugoslavia. There may be a delayed deluge awaiting Yugoslav employment offices.

Annual increments in the population of working age, while starting to diminish, are still quite high. Official estimates of the increase in the work force in the forthcoming period are, in the light of this, surprisingly low, and may be an underestimate. Moreover, given that

Given the difficulties on the labour market, it would be understandable if unemployed resident Yugoslavs were to resent the returnees, and harassed firms were to resist pressures on them to take on returnees on any kind of quota basis. Such resentments sometimes find reflection in Federal Assembly debates and seem very likely to affect grass-roots decision-making. See Politika, 10 October 1975, p.7, and 22 April 1976, p.8.

The draft long-term plan (dugoročni plan) for the ten-year period to 1985 speaks of a growth in the work-age population of 0.9% per annum, and in the economically active population of 0.6% per annum, or a total in absolute terms of 660,000. (Borba, 26 October 1974, supplement page XIV). An analysis published in 1969 (when most of the relevant demographic magnitudes were already definitely known) suggested an increase in the economically active population over the same period of 865,000 (even assuming a decline in the work-force participation rate). D. Breznik, 'Demografski i drugi aspekti formiranja radne snage u Jugoslaviji za narednih 20 godina', Ekonomist, 1969, no.1, p.131 at pp.139-40. Breznik expected the total increase in work-age population between 1976 and 1981 to be 866,000, and in the economically-active population over the same period to be 460,000. Current estimates of a 300,000 increase in the numbers of economically active over the five-year period 1976-80 (Politika, 7 August 1976) therefore seem wishfully modest, particularly given the apparent conservatism of Breznik's assumptions about work-force participation. These calculations do not, in any case, give any very clear advance insight into what may happen on urban labour markets, where trends in peasant agriculture and urban female employment are crucial.
the proportion of females in the urban labour force in Yugoslavia is still a good deal lower than in other Socialist countries, and given that the existing trend is towards increase and that official policy endorses this trend, one can expect further pressures to come from this source also. Estimate of the labour surplus in Yugoslav agriculture vary. A semi-official figure of 1.3 million was mentioned earlier for 1973 (together with the opinion that it was by then already too low). Another estimate, based on different and more demanding criteria, puts it at 5.5 million. In any event, it is clear that with 38% of the active population still engaged in agriculture, the pressure of peasants on the urban labour market is not going to diminish for some decades yet. Puljiz has estimated that the agricultural population is 'deruralizing' at the rate of a

64 In 1961, women comprised 26.4% of all (non-rural) employees; by 1971, they made up 31.7%. In this respect, Slovenia and Croatia may serve as indicators of future trends in Yugoslavia as a whole. In 1971, 42.4% of all employees in Slovenia and 36.2% of all employees in Croatia were women (and the percentages were still rising). 'Employment and Temporary Unemployment', Yugoslav Survey 1974, no.2, p.1 at pp.13-14.

65 The Resolutions of the Tenth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (published as a supplement to Komunist, 3 June 1974) emphasize that equal work opportunities must be guaranteed. Discrimination on the basis of sex is evidently not uncommon, but official publications always deplore the practice. See 'Posao za Žene', Borba, 18 January 1975.

66 B. Jovetić, 'Šta s mladima na selu', Kommunist, 25 December 1969, tr. in Osteuropa, 1970, no.11, p.A816 at A817. Jovetić's estimate was made 'from the point of view of modern agriculture'.
quarter of a million a year. Even if only half of these people were seeking urban employment, that would be sufficient, together with the natural increase in work-age population, to fully dispose of the planned increase in employment in the socialized sector to 1980. What then of the existing unemployed and the returnees? Or the existing labour surpluses in some enterprises?

From these considerations it emerges clearly, that official hopes notwithstanding, the next years will


68 Half seems a conservative estimate given overall activity rates and the fact that most such peasants are young adults. Politika, 7 August 1976, cites a figure of 'about 300,000' peasants who will seek urban employment in the five-year period to 1980, whilst VUS, 20 March 1976, p.9, suggests it may be 'about 400,000'. Both of these estimates seem well below the kind of figure Puljiz's data would lead one to expect. From this it is evident that official hopes rest also on certain optimistic assumptions about developments in agriculture.

69 Politika, 20 February 1976, p.7, reported a statement by a delegate to the Federal Assembly to the effect that 'there are not a few enterprises where there are up to 20% more workers than is necessary'.

70 It should be emphasized that not all spokesmen are determinedly optimistic. The nearer they are to the government (the Federal Executive Council) the more sober they are. Replying to a Macedonian criticism of the Federal Executive Council's employment plans for 1976 as being too modest, a Council spokesman said that he was not sure how the economy would survive even a 2.5% increase in employment, which, he said, was itself not economically justified in present conditions. Politika, 10 October 1975, p.7.
not bring any significant reduction in the Yugoslav reserve armies of unemployed - unless of course the orientation figures of the plan are tacitly ignored and an all-out attempt is made to extend employment at the cost of all else. Not only will unemployment not decline, it seems likely, in fact, that it will continue to increase, quite possibly alongside and despite above-plan employment increments. With the employment bubble of the mid-1960s returning to plague them, Yugoslav policy-makers have limited freedom of manoeuvre. The only way open to them to solve the unemployment problem comprehensively is to abolish it, or at least, to radically redefine it. There are signs that some moves in that direction may be being longingly contemplated. Other more substantive measures are also under consideration. As many of these latter closely relate to the position of the 'returnees' in Yugoslav society, I shall defer fuller discussion of them to the next section.

71 Like the trend towards excessive unemployment (cf. footnote 59 above), the trend towards excessive employment seems to be still moving inexorably forward. In the first quarter of 1976, despite the Federal Executive Council's plans (cf. previous footnote), employment increased by 4.7% over the first three months of 1975. 'Preko plana - i zaposlenih i nezaposlenih', Borba, 5 May 1976, p.6.

72 The burden of maintaining unemployment benefits is naturally felt to be greater in the less developed republics. Kosovo appears to solve its problem by simply not providing the benefits. Of the 32,879 registered unemployed in Kosovo in 1970, only 6% were receiving cash unemployment benefits, and only 20.5% were covered by health insurance. M. Karan, op.cit., p.13. In Macedonia it is proposed to remove certain categories of unemployed from the registers, as not all qualify as 'really unemployed' and some have other sources of income or support. (Politika, 9 March 1976, p.9). Slovenia and Croatia can better afford a liberal approach to these problems. Cf. footnote 60, above.
The Yugoslav authorities are in an unenviable position. Their labour force embarrassment must be an important factor in orienting them towards seeking some kind of trading accommodation with the Comecon/Warsaw Pact countries: for investment funds to finance labour-soaking projects at home; for secure markets for the products of their less viable industries and future extensive growth (which products are difficult to dispose of on competitive Western markets); and possibly even as alternative homes for Yugoslavia's inhospitably treated 'guest workers'.

73 During the period of Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement in 1972, the USSR undertook to supply nearly 1,000 million dollars in credits. Difficulties arose subsequently over the implementation of this agreement, however. One outside observer recently assessed that 'very little indeed' of the credits had actually been realized. S. Stanković, 'Yugoslav Foreign Minister Visiting Moscow', Radio Free Europe Research RAD Background Report 1171 (Yugoslavia), 8 December 1975.

74 There are some 8,000 Yugoslav workers employed in Czechoslovakia. For the moment all are employed by Yugoslav firms. Negotiations to enable Yugoslavs to be engaged by Czech firms have been dragging on since 1972. VUS za naše gradjane u svijetu, 13 August 1975, p.21, reported that an agreement was about to be signed, but it appears to have been held up since. In the meantime, complaints have been expressed in the Yugoslav press about the manner in which Yugoslav workers in Czechoslovakia have been treated when 'hired out' to Czech firms (Politika, 13 July 1976, p.8). Large-scale employment of Yugoslav workers by Soviet-bloc firms does not seem imminent, though prospects for Yugoslav firms to take contracts in Comecon countries and import their own workers with them may be a little better. (See the two articles subtitled 'Migracije u Istočnoj Europi' in VUS za naše gradjane u svijetu, 5 and 12 March 1975). The marked cooling of relations with Moscow since late 1975 will certainly not help to overcome the serious obstacles that stand in the path of increased co-operation in this field.
The labour surplus must also tend to favour reconciliation with the forces of state socialism at the domestic level. All the other European Socialist states, whatever periodic misgivings they may have about Soviet-style extensive development, with its high employment and low efficiency, are at least spared the worry of high overt unemployment. Indeed, all are now afflicted in some measure or other by labour shortages. Yugoslavia is unlikely to reach this luxurious stage for decades yet. Before they do, they are bound to feel at least an occasional twinge of ambivalence about their neighbours' labour policies. During the reform period, from 1965 to 1971, their rejection of the state Socialist model was unequivocal. Even critics of the government's employment policies did not go so far as to laud the Soviet alternative. Economic rationalism is still perhaps the dominant accent in the official position, despite the resurgence of political employment in the last two or three years. But the ambivalence is clearly detectable; and the reasons for it not difficult to understand.

75 There are of course local labour shortages in Yugoslavia, and shortages of particular skills. Slovenia, however, is the only republic which has been experiencing an overall labour shortage. See 'Pomanjkanje radne snage', VUS za naše građane u svijetu, 3 April 1974. Cf. footnote 88, below.

76 A. Milojević and V. Sultanović in 'Zaposljavanje u inostranstvu ', Pregled, 1972, no.1, p.33, for example, refer to the 'inherent political and economic weaknesses' of state socialism, and suggest that if there were to be a liberalization of its economic system, 'very powerful migratory movements' might be unleashed, which would bring with them 'very deep political and economic implications' (p.35).

77 Cf. footnote 70, above.
For Yugoslavia's labour surplus is more than just a dilemma of economic management. It is a continuing threat to the stability, and indeed to the very survival of the regime. Now that Western Europe has decisively closed its doors to new immigrant workers and is even seeking to rid itself of many of those it has already accepted, Yugoslavia must solve the problem (made the worse by having been temporarily and partially shelved) with its own resources. There will be at least a nervous decade or two in which those resources are quite simply unequal to the task. This would be a testing time for any polity. But for the Yugoslav regime, fighting to maintain its independence between indifference and hostility, striving to placate the fissiparous passions of its turbulent nationalisms, and at the same time endeavouring to implement various ambitious social experiments, the task will be incomparably more difficult.

Reconciliation with Moscow and a relapse into state socialism would obviously be a defeat. But it would be a defeat which would bring relief from external pressure and an opportunity to soak up (or more efficiently repress) pockets of unemployed discontent at home. Perhaps, some Yugoslavs might argue, the defeat could be negotiated rather than imposed, in a way that would permit at least symbolic retention of national pride and independence, and avoid any threat of imposed territorial revision. Such considerations as these may seem a far cry from a choice between annual employment increments of 2½% and 5%. But the Yugoslav political economy is preeminently a system where tout se tient.

For the moment, Yugoslavia is pursuing its usual policy of walking on both legs, placing less weight on the Western leg than in 1965-72, but favouring it nonetheless. While 'struggling' to absorb its rationally unabsorbables, and seeking, at the same time, to extend its trading contacts with the Comecon countries, it is also continuing its efforts to integrate its economy into the tougher league of non-Socialist trade. To do this, Yugoslavia must maintain high standards of efficiency; neither its labour force, nor its markets, nor
its currency are shielded by the protectionism of the Comecon system. The Soviet vices of 'levelling' (uravnilovka), slackness (nerad), low wages and low productivity make it more difficult for Yugoslavia to find a place in the international division of labour (uključiti se u medjunarodnu podelu rada). Unfortunately, however, not all Yugoslav industries and not all Yugoslav regions are ready for sharp international competition. Many could feel drawn by the relative tranquility and assured exchange of Comecon. Some might prefer the relative comfort there as a long-term proposition. Among other things, it could provide them with a way of easing the growing burden of their labour surpluses.

Here, as in so many other respects, Yugoslavia is split asunder by a dilemma stemming ultimately from the fact that some parts of the country belong to the developed European West, while others belong more naturally to the European East, and others again to the Third World. Though the discussion thus far has been couched in overall, national terms, in fact the regional aspect of the manpower problem is one of the most sensitive and the most crucial; and one which is likely to linger on when, in the developed areas, the employment bubble caused by the high fertility of the post-war years

78 There seems to have been over the years a long-term trend towards greater uravnilovka in wages. In 1955, unskilled and semi-skilled workers received 50% of the average wage, whereas by 1974, they received 75%. (Politika, 11 October 1975, p.9). During the reform period 1965-71, some attempt was made to counteract levelling tendencies. It was not evidently very successful. Though the post-1971 official mood has been again more egalitarian, articles deploring uravnilovka are still appearing regularly in the press. See, e.g., 'Jednakost sa više lica', NIN, 7 March 1976, p.14. Komunist, 29 April 1974, has an article deploring uravnilovka on one page and a second article on another page calling for the establishment of 'worker majorities' in Leage of Communists organizations. Here, too, authority speaks with two voices.

79 'Nerad na udaru', NIN, 26 October 1975, p.7.
has become no more than a distant memory. Slovenia, as we have said, is the only republic which, taken as a whole, can complain of a labour shortage. Elsewhere there is a surplus, though in the case of Croatia, Vojvodina and Serbia proper, it is an accumulated surplus of rural overpopulation and urban unemployment (both hidden and overt, resident and exported), not one which is being actively increased all the time by natural increase in the work force. In that sense it can be said that the urban economies of those regions are starting to gain on their objectives of full and rational employment, though the aggravation of returning economic emigrants may effectively conceal this for a good decade or more yet. In the less developed areas, however, natural increase is continuing to nullify the gains made by urban employment. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and parts of Macedonia, some improvement in this respect can be expected, but in the Albanian areas of Kosovo and Western Macedonia, no significant easing of the demographic pressures can be expected for at least two decades. And in all the less developed regions, the accumulated gap between employment aspirations and possibilities is very serious. Very rapid expansion of urban job opportunities is necessary if rural underemployment and massive and overt urban unemployment

80 In 1972, the Croatian and inner Serbian socialized economies employed the equivalent of 3½ and 5 annual natural increments in the work force. M. Milenović, 'Neke karakteristike zaposlenosti i zapošljavanja u 1972 godini', Socijalna politika, 1973, no.4, p.17.

81 For the years 1971-76, Breznik calculated that Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo, which comprise 32.4% of the total population would contribute over two-thirds of the natural growth in the economically active population. D. Breznik, 'Demografska komponenta razvojne politike' at p.422. The vulgar fractions have been added to Breznik's computations. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, in 1972, employment increments in the non-rural economy of 4.7 and 7.5% respectively were still not equivalent to the natural increase in the economically active population (to say nothing of technological and accumulated labour surpluses of various kinds). M. Milenović, loc.cit.
are to be relieved. The only alternative to this would be to facilitate mass emigration from the less developed areas to the developed north of Yugoslavia or beyond.

While there has been some international emigration from the less developed republics, the outflow from the more developed regions, particularly in the earlier years, was proportionately much greater. The Albanians and Bosnian Moslems (like the Moslem peoples of Soviet Central Asia) seemed particularly reluctant to leave their homelands. Just as this unfavourable regional distribution of emigration began to alter in the early 1970s, external restraints were imposed on the process, first freezing it at a less than optimal stage in its evolution, and then reversing it. Since Western European countries are seeking on the whole to shed their

82 On rural underemployment, see notes 23 and 66 above. The urban unemployment rates of the less developed republics are naturally higher than elsewhere, not only because of the greater demographic pressures, but also because of the modest dimensions of their non-rural economies, whose slender absorptive capacities can be the more easily overwhelmed. Thus in Albania and Macedonia, registered unemployment comprises roughly 30% of the total number of employed in the non-rural economy (see Table 2, since when the situation has surely deteriorated). Even these figures may underestimate the real dimensions of urban unemployment. Cf. footnote 72, above.

83 A Croatian estimate made in 1968 put the joint Croatian and Slovenian contribution to the emigration at 69% (cf. 30.3% of the total population as of 1971), and the combined Moslem-'Yugoslav'-Albanian contribution at 4.1% (cf. the 14.8% of the population constituted by Albanians and Moslems in 1971). All Yugoslav emigration data are unsatisfactory, and the estimates circulating in the 1960s were perhaps particularly so, but there clearly was a major disproportion in the ethnic composition of that earlier emigration. See Z. Komarica, Jugoslavija u suvremenim evropskim migracijama (Zagreb, 1970), p.20.

84 The 1971 Census data on Yugoslav workers abroad (see Table 6) suggest a marked rectification of the ethnic distribution of emigrants had occurred by that time. It should be remembered, however, that the Census figures are of limited reliability. They may well understate the older emigration (which was heavily Croatian).
more recent and less skilled immigrant workers it is likely that the less developed regions will bear a disproportionate burden of the return flow. Their slender economies, which needed the relief of emigration more in the first place, are correspondingly less able to deal with the remigration.\textsuperscript{85}

In the case of inter-regional migration within Yugoslavia, the barriers are less formal, but not necessarily less formidable. The Yugoslav Constitution guarantees the right of all Yugoslav citizens to settle in any part of the country they wish.\textsuperscript{86} And while, until recently, there appears not to have been an explicit policy on internal migration, the one that is emerging at the federal level favours movement of workers from labour surplus to labour deficit areas within the country.\textsuperscript{87} There are in any case no

\textsuperscript{85} A report on a Federal Assembly debate on the returnees in Politika, 1 April 1976, p.6, says that: 'Yesterday's discussion again showed that the problem of people returning from working abroad is bearing down on the undeveloped regions particularly severely.'

\textsuperscript{86} Article 183 of the 1974 Constitution prescribes that the citizen's freedom of movement and settlement anywhere in Yugoslavia can be limited only in criminal cases, epidemic emergencies, and 'in order to protect public order or in the interests of national defence'. Ustav Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (Belgrade, 1974).

\textsuperscript{87} A conference on internal migration policy was held in Priština in 1972 (for a report, see M. Ranžič, 'Problemi usmeravanja radne snage', Stanovništvo X (1972), no. 1-2, p.115). At this stage it was evident that a federal policy on the matter was only in the process of being worked out. It is likely to be a controversial issue. Should migration from less developed to more developed regions be encouraged, or would it be better to increase the flow of capital to the less developed regions? What should be the relationship between migration policy and other population policies? By what means can migratory flows be legitimately and efficaciously controlled and directed? Whatever federal policies are adopted, republican resistance or the pressure of events may in any case subvert them. Unfortunately, considerations of space preclude further discussion of this interesting theme. For what is probably a fairly official, federal, view, see M. Jeličić, 'Neki aktuelni problemi unutrašnje migracije radnika', Socijalna politika, 1973, no.1, p.18. See also Migracije stanovništva Jugoslavije, Ch.VII.
regulations in Yugoslavia resembling the internal passport and restricted urban residence systems that have been maintained in the Soviet bloc countries. Despite all this, however, there are strong countervailing pressures against complete freedom of movement within Yugoslavia. Given that unemployment is endemic to the whole country, no republican or lower-level authorities will want to import other people's problems to compound their own. Ethnic resentments may operate to deter outsiders at every level, from administrative and enterprise decision-making to inter-personal relations. In the case of immigrants to Slovenia or emigrants from Kosovo, there may be linguistic problems. Published literature contains clear evidence of reluctance on the part of the more developed republics to receive large numbers of workers from less developed areas (where skills and general cultural levels are much lower); and of resentment on the part of the authorities in high-fertility areas at the less than generous cooperation they receive from the better-off regions.

88 See, e.g., A. Wertheimer-Baletic, 'Populaciona politika i politika radne snage', NaMe teme, 1974, no.4, p.578. In this article, as elsewhere, the author develops the argument that the low birth rate in Croatia over recent years will bring about a serious labour shortage in the near future, and that the way to correct this is to increase the Croatian birth rate as quickly as possible. There is here an implicit premise that such labour shortages could not, or should not, be replaced by surplus labour from elsewhere in the country (for which premise the author was gently rebuked by Macura, who pointed out that she was overlooking the internal migration factor. M. Macura, 'Komponente populacione politike', p.563. See also J. Lojk, 'Postojeća struktura rada u SR Sloveniji ograničavajuće deluje na medjuprepubličko zapošljavanje' (The existing structure of labour in Slovenia limits the possibilities of inter-republican employment), Socijalna politika, 1973, no.1, p.21, in which the author deplores the excessive rates of increase in employment in Slovenia in 1971 and 1972 as leading to extensive and inefficient development. In Slovenia, write Lojk, 'where for some time now there have been periodic labour shortages, employment policy cannot be conducted extensively.' The implication is, of course, that Slovenia cannot accept the labour surpluses of other republics.
in their attempts to find work for their swelling labour forces. Reliable sources suggest that behind the scenes, the Constitutional provisions about freedom of movement and settlement are apt at times to be sidestepped.

It may be just as well from the regime's own point of view that they are. For while this may mean that labour surpluses get bottled up in the least developed regions, leading to accentuated urban unemployment, rural overpopulation, a widening in the development gap between the regions, and possibly to acute local unrest - in other words, to a typical complex of Third World problems - any solution which sought to enforce mingling between peoples of such sharply divergent standards and traditions might well lead to a marked worsening of ethnic relations.

The development problem facing the less developed regions of Yugoslavia is a daunting, if familiar one. Their rapid population growth is, of course, a crucial factor impeding their efforts, forcing them to sprint desperately after an ever-receding target. In the areas where population growth has fallen away, by contrast, improvements in terms of per capita economic indicators are much more easily attained. Despite very considerable politically-motivated

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89 See, e.g., the account in Komunist, 7 July 1975, p.11, of a meeting of the Kosovo Presidium of the Socialist Alliance, which says that 'a large proportion' of Kosovo's unemployed will not be able to find work in the province, and reports that 'it is thought that more could be done in this country to provide work for people from Kosovo in other republics'.

90 A reliable source indicated to the author that would-be immigrants from the less developed regions of Yugoslavia arriving in Slovenia without guarantees of employment are given a meal and a bed for the night, and are then sent home again.
capital flows from the more developed to the less developed regions in the post-war period, the development gap per capita has not narrowed, but widened.\textsuperscript{91} It is a situation in which everyone tends to feel resentful: the poorer regions because they are falling behind; and the richer regions because they are required to pour money down a sink of low productivity, where advances are in any case nullified by excess population growth.\textsuperscript{92}

The demogenic problems of Yugoslav labour, migration and development policies have a certain similarity to those confronting the Soviet Union; and even to those confronting Poland in the 1960s and 1970s with its high work-force increments and its occasional agonizing between the apparent alternatives of full or rational employment. But the strategic approach that the Yugoslav regime has taken has meant that the problems present themselves in a much more overt, and politically, perhaps, more acute form. The Yugoslav strategy

\textsuperscript{91} The Yugoslav press frequently discusses and/or deplores the growing development gap between the different regions of Yugoslavia, and data relating to it (unlike in the USSR) are not scarce. Between 1947 and 1972, the ratio between highest and lowest income per head increased from 3.14:1 to 5.71:1 (in absolute terms from 1,986 dinars to 10,288 dinars). It was the four less developed regions, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro which recorded the slowest per capita growth rates over that period. 'Regionalni razvoj i diferencijacije', \textit{Borba}, 29 September 1974.

\textsuperscript{92} Cf. footnotes 165, 263, below. While spokesmen from the wealthier and poorer regions agree that the development gap is regrettable and ought to be struggled with, their diagnoses and recommended therapies differ. Ethno-regional disputes over such issues seem to have survived the crack-down on nationalist extremisms of 1971-72. Both the 1976 plan and the 1976-80 plan ran into major difficulties because of differences between the republics and provinces. See, e.g., \textit{Politika}, 26 December 1975, p.1; and 11, 12, 16 and 18 March 1976.
makes it unlikely that a stage will be reached in the near future in which a pro-natalist policy will seem to many an economic necessity. Nor is it likely that through systemic and systematic squandering labour will become such a scarce resource that the temptation will be felt to bind it to its tasks by increasingly severe labour laws. Thus in Yugoslavia, the two main threats to private autonomy posed by the politico-demographic dilemmas of state socialism simply do not obtain. Slovenia is the only area of Yugoslavia in which such problems seem at all relevant. And Slovenia (as subsequent discussion will illustrate) seems immune to the dangers.

5.c Emigration

Yugoslavia is unique among Socialist states in tolerating emigration. Indeed, for a number of years, it not only tolerated emigration, but fostered it; and planned its socio-economic development on the implicit assumption that for the foreseeable future, the outflow of surplus labour might continue. Even before the economic reforms of the mid-1960s the Yugoslav regime was relatively relaxed about admitting to some domestic unemployment and did not strain to sop it up by paternalistic employment policies. It also tolerated, though it did not actively encourage, a certain amount of economic emigration. The vehemence of the

93 There was some legal non-economic emigration of national minorities (especially Turks), in the 1950s and early 1960s: between 1953 and 1961 (inclusive), a total of just under 300,000 people were officially recorded as leaving Yugoslavia. Since that time, official emigration has only topped 10,000 in one year, and in recent years the registered numbers have been derisory. (See Demografska statistika 1972, p.29). Even before 1965, however, the official external migration figures were falling short of reality. One source cites an annual figure of 6,600 for unofficial economic emigration from Slovenia alone between 1953 and 1961 (Franci Stare, 'Nekateri pogledi na problematiko zaposlovanja naših delavcev v tujini', Ekonomska revija 1969, no.1, p.81 at p.82). An estimate for Yugoslavia as a whole gives the shortfall between official and actual net emigration between 1953 and 1961 as averaging somewhere between 12 and 17 thousand yearly (Migracije stanovništva Jugoslavije, p.86, footnote 19).
exodus after 1965 appears to have taken the leadership by surprise, however. It had little in the way of a prepared policy to deal with the problem when it arose. The initial attitude seems to have been one of passive connivance coupled with a slight, lingering disapproval of those who left. In the first years no attempt was made to gather adequate statistics (and they are still not good). Similarly, little effort was expended on maintaining contact with the emigrants and seeking to influence their behaviour in the interests of their former country. It was only after the phenomenon had already attained massive proportions that official complaisance was disturbed. Even then, the response was lethargic, despite the energetic campaigns of alarm conducted by scholars and publicists, often moved by fears for the survival of their own ethnic communities.

94 At the beginning of 1965, the year after legal economic emigration began, Yugoslavia had still not signed agreements with any recipient countries concerning the legal status and social security of its citizens. (M. Begtić, 'Yugoslav Nationals Temporarily Working Abroad', Yugoslav Survey, 1972, no.1, p.17, note 1). Supplementary schooling for migrant children abroad was not organized until 1970 (Politika, 19 December 1975, p.9). Only two fortnightly publications were being produced for the emigrants as of 1969 (Franci Stare, op.cit., p.94). Improvement since has been only relative. Cf. notes 96, 110 and 156, below.

95 See, e.g., Z. Komarica, Jugoslavija u suvremenim evropskim migracijama, pp.103-04.

96 Cf. note 94, above. Komarica, writing in 1970, drew attention to the enormous disparity between the tiny number of official Yugoslav social centres for migrants and those provided by international religious agencies for the (Catholic) Croats alone. Komarica, op.cit., p.111.
The most emphatic public criticism came from the Croats (and in lesser measure, the Slovenes). At first Croatian concern was thinly veiled in the form of a disinterested concern about Croatia's capacity to contribute to overall Yugoslav development. Later, in the climactic years 1970-71 it became more and more openly nationalistic. It should be emphasized that there was a great deal of foundation for the Croats' anxiety. The statistics on emigration were and are, as mentioned, quite inadequate. But it was clear that Croatia's and the Croats' contribution to the outflow was disproportionate. While forming little more than one-fifth of the Yugoslav population, the Croats were thought to constitute somewhere between 40% and 65% of the emigrants. Moreover, the

97 The Slovenes' share of the earlier emigration was also markedly disproportionate (running at between one-third and one-fifth of the total in 1964 to 1967), Franci Stare, op.cit., p.83. See also P. Kožul, 'Po kateri poti', Naši razgledi, 1970, no.17 (11 September), p.499; and K. Boh, 'Populacijski problemi v osebnih izobražencev in družbenih delavcev', paper presented to the 1974 Slovenian Demographic Symposium.

98 Nearly all the serious work on economic emigration being done in the late 1960s and early 1970s was Croatian. See, e.g., V. Komarica, op.cit.; V. Holjevac, Hrvati izvan domovine (Zagreb, 1968); I. Baučić and Z. Maravić, Vraćanje i zapošljavanje vanjskih migranata iz SR Hrvatske (Zagreb, 1971); and Stanovništvo: emigracija i zaposlenost u Hrvatskoj (Zagreb, 1971). By 1970-71, the popular Croatian press was spelling out the message of Croatian demographers and economists in clear and forceful terms. See, e.g., 'Biološkom osiromašivanju pridonijela je i ekonomska emigracija' (Economic Emigration has also Contributed to our Biological Impoverishment), VUS, 18 February, 1970; and 'Sve o popisu', Vjesnik, 27 March 1971. Croatian researchers into emigration evidently received little sympathy or support from federal statistical authorities. (See '800 tisuća ili milijun radnika u inozemstvu?', VUS, 10 March 1971.)

99 Komarica cites one study done in 1966 which suggested that 63% of the migrants might be ethnic Croats (while himself placing the figure at 54%). Komarica, op.cit., p.19, 20. The 1971 Census result implied that only 39% of the emigrant were Croats. The Census figure, however, was certainly an understatemntof emigration in general, and Croatian emigration in particular (either in the sense of emigration of ethnic Croats or emigration from the Croatian Republic). Cf. footnotes 83 and 104.
great bulk of the emigrants were under the age of 45, so that the demographic effects of their departure, assuming that many of them would never return, would be twofold. The loss of the workers themselves might be compounded by the loss of their progeny or their reproductive capacity. And this was occurring at a time when Croatia's fertility had already dropped well below replacement levels.

Altogether, as initial research revealed, the emigration was producing a host of unexpected consequences. Not only were too many leaving; it was the wrong people who were doing so. The more developed republics were, on the whole, supplying most of the emigrants. And increasingly workers were leaving posts in Yugoslavia to seek higher pay and better

100 92%, insofar as the Census results can be taken as a guide. M. Begtić, op.cit., Table III, p.20


102 Cf. Table 4, Appendix C.

103 The emigration reached a crescendo in 1970-71 (simultaneously, in other words, with the crescendo in strident nationalism), in which two years, 375,000 workers left the country. (M. Mišović, 'Sedma republika', NIN, 19 October 1975, p.10). By that time, the emigration was ceasing to have any direct connection with employment levels within Yugoslavia. In 1966-68, when the number employed in the socialist sector had declined by 96,000, the number of departures for work abroad (as measured by the 1971 Census, admittedly an underestimate) was 110,000. In 1969-71, while employment increased by 460,000, the number of departures shot up to 535,000. Miloje Nikolić, 'Some Basic Features of Yugoslav External Migration', Yugoslav Survey, 1972, no.1, p.1.

104 Cf. Table 6, Appendix C (which undoubtedly underestimates this factor), and footnote 83, above. Croatian estimates of emigration from the Croatian republic itself usually ranged between about 40% and 50%. The Census results made it difficult to go on citing such estimates, though their validity was not thereby really undermined.
Skilled workers and specialists with higher education in deficit professions formed a growing proportion of those departing. Among those leaving directly from rural areas, many were abandoning good agricultural land and thereby placing a strain on Yugoslavia's capacity to feed itself. Few seemed to be returning, and those who did seldom brought any new skills home with them, or put their accumulated funds to productive use in Yugoslavia. On the other hand, hard-currency remissions from those abroad, after modest beginnings, were forming a valuable and growing item in Yugoslavia's strained balance of payments; and those who were abroad were at least not swelling domestic unemployment still further. There were, in other words, tangible economic benefits to offset the loss of young and expensively trained domestic manpower. But the demographic,

105 One survey suggested that 77% of all emigrants had been employed in Yugoslavia before they left. M. Nikolić, op.cit., p.8. According to another enquiry, 60% of the emigrants were motivated principally by a desire for higher wages. Politika, 19 December 1976, p.9.

106 Over half the emigrants who left rural occupations to go abroad came from agriculturally developed areas rather than backward and overpopulated regions. M. Nikolić, op.cit., p.8. Local agricultural labour shortages were so great that workers were even brought in from across the Rumanian border to work farms in the rich agricultural province of Vojvodina. (Politika, 27 June 1973, cited in S. Stanković, 'Yugoslav Agricultural Plan Adopted', RFE Research Yugoslavia, 5 July 1973.

107 Few emigrants appear to have gone abroad with the intention of acquiring new qualifications. M. Nikolić, op.cit., p.9.

108 As of 1966, Yugoslav hard-currency remissions averaged 200-250 dollars per worker, less than the corresponding figure for all the other major migrant nations, and only half that for Italians, Spaniards or Turks (Franci Stare, op.cit., p.95). By 1975, the average Yugoslav worker was remitting $1,900 a year. The annual total increased from 35 million in 1964 to 1,600 million in 1974. Between 1968 and 1974, a total of 3,600 million dollars were sent back to Yugoslavia. (S. Letica, 'Mit ili realnost', VUS, 1 October, 1975).
social, ideological and political implications of the emigration seemed to be almost uniformly disastrous. Demographically, some parts of the country were being denuded. Owing to the separation of families, divorce was widespread among emigrants, and children were frequently neglected. On the ideological plane, the whole rationale of socialist self-management seemed called into question, if not positively mocked by such an explicit and sincere acknowledgement of the superiority of other systems. Two decades of socialist education and upbringing were being abandoned to an onslaught of hostile ideological and political influences. And large numbers of the nation's potential defenders were being lost to the armed forces. Anywhere else in Socialist Europe, any one of these considerations might have been regarded as a decisive argument against further toleration of the emigration. The remarkable thing is that the Yugoslav authorities remained unmoved by them for so long. Though there was some expansion of governmental activity among the migrants through the

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109 See, e.g., VUS za naše gradjane u svijetu, 17 October 1973, p.62; Politika, 12 April 1976, p.9. Very little is known about the fate of children of emigrant parents, according to the Politika article, which comments: '... perhaps more care was given to the children who went abroad with their parents (though there, too, not enough, of course) than to those who remained in the country'. For a study of the effects on children left behind by their parents, see O. Burić, 'Porodice čiji su hranioci otišli na rad u inozemstvo', Jugoslovensko udruženje za sociologiju & Slovensko sociološko društvo Drustveni konflikti i socijalistički razvoj Jugoslavije (1972 Portorož conference), vol.II, p.165.
While the emigration continued to be described as 'temporary', the leadership did not seem eager to precipitate any return flow. As late as 1971, President Tito was still defending the policy of organized emigration in terms which suggested he saw no prospects of its imminent revision. Shortly thereafter, however, the line began to change, apparently under strong pressure from (among other sources) military opinion; and spokesmen began making statements to the effect that despite the serious employment situation at home, Yugoslavia should be making preparations to encourage its absentee work-force to return. Given that there was no apparent way in which any such program could be carried out,

110 'The Federal Statistical Institute does not have the most basic information about changes occurring among our citizens abroad', M. Mišović, 'Ko se brine o njima', NIN, 11 January 1976, at p.17. Consulate services for the emigrants were evidently established on the basis of a 1969 estimate of needs and have not been updated since. M. Mišović, 'Sedma republika', NIN, 19 October 1975, p.10 at p.13.


112 Croatia at least had already formulated a program for accelerating the return of economic emigrants in 1972. 'Programi i ulaganja - više radnih mjesta', VUS za naše gradjane u svijetu, 14 February 1976.

113 In the Gnjilano speech cited earlier, Tito had not found it necessary to regret the absence of young men of military age. In December 1972, however, he expressed grave concern that the equivalent of 'three big armies' were abroad (Borba, 9 December 1972), and generally deplored the emigration. In the meantime, the Croatian crisis had come to a head and the disarray in the Yugoslav party and state had been brought to order by Tito and a minority of senior associates, supported by the only truly federal institution in Yugoslavia, the army, and the organization of Partisan veterans. The inference seems clear that military opinion was strongly influential also in effecting the change in emigration policy that ensued (rather than, say, Croatian
or the returnees provided with jobs, the statements seemed more rhetorical than anything. However, towards the end of 1973, Yugoslavia's resolve in the matter was given an unexpected jog by the slump in the Western European economy. Prompted by the oil crisis, successive Western European governments began introducing limitations on the inflow of foreign workers into their countries. In time, as the recession deepened, they began to take measures to reduce the number of **Gastarbeiter** they already had. Thus without

113 (cont.) nationalist sentiment, which during the same period was being subjected to public obloquy). The army subsequently effected further changes in emigration policy to ensure that young men of military age did not evade service by going abroad. (See S. Stanković, 'Impact of Yugoslavs Working Abroad on National Defense and the Economy', Radio Free Europe Research Yugoslavia, 4 February 1974; and 'Yugoslavia's Manpower Export: An Analysis', RFE Research Yugoslavia, 9 July 1973.

114 A reproach evidently made in or near official circles. See M. Begtić, 'Vračanje Jugoslovenskih gradjana s rada u inostranstvu kao element politike zapošljavanja u inostranstvu', Socijalna politika 1973, no.4, p.10.

115 The West Germans (where roughly half of all the Yugoslav emigrants were employed) were the first to ban further intakes, on 23 November 1973. Most other European countries had adopted similar restrictions by the end of 1974. S. Letica, loc.cit.; VUS za naše gradjane u svijetu, 27 November 1974, p.25.

116 Many of the restrictive measures that followed were a response to scapegoating ethnic hostilities expressed by autochthonous populations of Western Europe. See, for example, the discussion of the decisions by West German Land governments to limit settlement by non-EEC citizens in many of the major German cities in "Rasterećenje" gradova', VUS za naše gradjane u svijetu, 12 February 1975. See also 'Povika na "gastarbajtere"', Politika, 25 March 1976.
warning (and indeed without even so much as prior consultation) the Yugoslav government found itself suddenly confronted by a small flood of unemployed 'returnees' (povratnici). Judging by the desperately reassuring tone of press articles at the time, the alarm felt by both the government and the workers themselves must have been acute. Because of their rash earlier endorsement of a policy of 'bringing back' the migrants, the authorities were even suspected by the workers in some instances of having themselves engineered the deportations. Since the turn of 1974, thanks to the recession, the return flow of workers has far outweighed new employment abroad. It is difficult to say precisely how great the net inflow is. The Yugoslavs themselves do not know, and the estimates given tend to vary. Whatever the number, it is certainly greater than even the accelerated

117 See, for example, the article 'Masovnog otpuštanja neće biti' (There'll be no Mass Dismissals), VUS, 26 December 1973, whose two sub-titles were 'false dilemmas' and 'limited consequences', and whose first sentence read: 'The oil crisis has not lessened Western Europe's dependence on foreign labour, but on the contrary has increased it'. The article went on to develop the curious argument that since there was an energy crisis, Western countries would want to retain all sources of energy they had, including human energy. In a subsequent article, a Yugoslav official attempted to maintain that the authorities had foreseen the recession and the employment slump all along. VUS za naše gradjane u svijetu, 1 October 1975, p.23.


119 Cf. notes 38 and 39, above, which suggest there was a net return of 150,000 workers between early 1974 and early 1976. This is the usual estimate given for that period, though higher ones are sometimes cited. Mišović, for example, uses estimates of 200,000 and 300,000 at different points in the same article. 'Ko se brine o njima', p.17, 18. Not many of the returnees are yet seeking work in the non-rural sector, however. (Cf. note 61, above, and accompanying text.)
expansion of employment of recent years can comfortably accommodate.

The initial remigration policy outlines formulated in 1972-73 were predicated on the assumption that there was no desperate urgency to the task. It was also hoped at that time that the Western governments involved could be induced to cooperate in the enterprise. Basically the intention was to lessen the outflow (and reduce the skill levels) of new emigrants, and at the same time increase the inflow of returnees, in particular those with qualifications that were in short supply at home, thereby replacing what was essentially a one-way movement with a 'circular flow' of migration. Apart from the additional difficulties this policy would have created on the strained labour market (had it been successful), it is hard to imagine that Western governments and employers would have ever given the scheme their blessing.

In the event, however, the recession rendered all these plans totally irrelevant. Once the restrictions had been abruptly and unilaterally imposed, the Yugoslav government was placed in the position of having to redeem its somewhat expansive promises according to a time-table imposed from without. They had now to find work for a potential total of returnees amounting to nearly one quarter of existing

120 See M. Begtić, 'Vraćanje jugoslovenskih gradjana s rada u inostranstvu kao element politike zapošljavanja u inostranstvu'.

121 'We were]...getting rather carried away by the illusion that the countries where most of our citizens were employed would accept our formula of a "circular flow" ...', Mišović, Sedma republika', p.11.
extra-rural employment within the country. And they have virtually no control over the rate at which those returnees may be propelled back into the country to reclaim their constitutional right to work.\textsuperscript{122} So far the remigration has been uncomfortably intense, without reaching the torrential proportions of the earlier emigration peak. But it may at any moment intensify. The Yugoslav authorities must be watching Western economic barometers with quite as much anxiety as any of their Western counterparts.

However, the policy response to the emergency situation created by the recession has been surprisingly sluggish. Certain fairly obvious measures that have been proposed over and over again since the 1960s\textsuperscript{123} have still not been implemented. The reassertion of Party supremacy after 1972 notwithstanding, Yugoslavia remains much less monolithic than may sometimes appear to be the case. The struggle between various ethno-regional and ideo-political interests seems to be going on more or less continually, prolonging and sometimes even paralysing the decision-making process. Policy regarding the returnees is one of the many areas of decision-making which has suffered in despatch and coherence as a result. The constitutional upheavals of recent years have undoubtedly made their contribution to this same result. There is, in addition, the difficulty that some of the most effective means available to alleviate

\begin{itemize}
\item[122] The new Yugoslav Constitution, like its predecessors, rashly guarantees Yugoslav citizens the right to work: \textit{Ustav Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, Član 159, p.93.}
\item[123] As of 1970, many of the proposals that are still struggling to get off the ground in 1976 were already not new. See \textit{VUS}, 21 October 1970, p.6.
\end{itemize}
the returnee problem involve rather serious compromises with hard-line principle, and that at a time when hard-liners have been enjoying something of a renaissance.

The verbal efforts that are being made to absorb the returnees are (and have been for some years) extremely strenuous. But some organizational steps have also now been taken. Yugoslav enterprises are subjected to pressures to take on set quotas of returnees. Some customs and fiscal concessions are being offered to encourage emigrants to mechanize their agricultural holdings or set up trademen's establishments. In some cases, emigrants from particular areas have been encouraged to invest through Yugoslav banks.

124 Letica mentions that at the Federal level alone, there had been produced the equivalent of 60 densely covered pages of resolutions on returnee policy between 1971 and 1974. S. Letica, 'Mit ili realnost'.

125 On 1 September 1976, a new customs law came into effect in Yugoslavia which exempts returnees absent for at least two years from paying duty on household goods or tradesmen's equipment up to 15,000 or 25,000 dinars in value respectively. See Politika, 25 August 1976, p.7.

126 Hitherto, taxation concessions have been largely left to the initiative of local authorities. (For instances of local action in this direction, see Politika, 30 December 1975, p.7, and 6 January 1976, p.8.) Attempts to achieve national co-ordination of communal policies on taxation of private enterprise have evidently been going on for years, and at last report were still in progress. See Politika, 19 April 1976, p.5.
in the setting up of new enterprises in their home communes.\footnote{127}
In exchange they are guaranteed interest on their capital upon its maturing after a certain period, and in the meantime are offered work in the enterprise their funds have helped to create. It is also hoped that concessions to agriculture may induce more people to remain in that sector, and returnees to go back to it rather than seek work in the towns.\footnote{128}
It is frequently suggested that Yugoslavia's industrial capacity should be utilized more effectively, in particular, that the shift co-efficient be raised to provide jobs without additional investment.\footnote{129}
Proposals have also been voiced that the compulsory retirement age be lowered, and the

\footnote{127 One of the most widely publicized instances of this occurred in the Dalmatian commune of Imotski, which has a particularly high emigration rate. The Imotski model has received an imprimatur from the party weekly, Komunist (see 13 January 1975, p.10). Other such enterprises have been established in Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. See, e.g., VUS za naše gradjane u svijetu, 12 February 1975; NIN, 28 December 1975, p.12. Resistance is continuing, however. Two apparent supporters of such undertakings emphasize that they are still no more than 'isolated' instances and have yet to prove themselves. See VUS, 25 December 1974, p.8; and NIN, 11 January 1976, p.18.}

\footnote{128 Thus, for example, a Croatian official emphasizes that investment credits and the introduction of a system of social security for private farmers in that Republic are meant to encourage employment there and thus reduce the pressure of returnees on the urban labour market. VUS za naše gradjane u svijetu, 14 February 1976.}

\footnote{129 It is pointed out on such occasions that Yugoslavia's productive capacities are poorly utilized (less than 70%, compared with 80 to 85% in Western European countries). Politika, 26 December 1975, p.12. One observer sees the possibility of creating 150,000 new jobs by increasing second and third shifts by only 10%. Komunist, 4 February 1974, p.4.}
widespread practice of part-time work for supplementary income be curbed. And there have been attempts made to expand the export of labour to the East and the Third World.\footnote{Cf. footnote 74, above. Labour exports to the Third World are associated with capital construction projects there.}

Many of these measures or proposals seem to be at best problematical. Stopping the drift to the cities is difficult in any rapidly developing country, and not less so in Socialist countries where rural incomes and living standards are well below those of the towns. Calls to increase the utilization of Yugoslavia's industrial capacity never explain why such an obvious step has not already been taken many times over.\footnote{The calls themselves are a recurring ritual, often performed at the highest levels, without, however, producing any effect. See Mišović, 'Ko se brine o njima', p.18.} Part-time work is an endemic feature of Socialist economies. In the Yugoslav case it is a mass phenomenon with its own deeply entrenched vested interests (which, no doubt, have grown in symbiosis with the equally entrenched uravnilovka); its overnight abolition scarcely seems practical.\footnote{It has been estimated that 3 million of the 5 million people employed in the Yugoslav (extra-rural) economy take on part-time work to boost their incomes. 'Mesto u domovini', Politika, 19 December 1975.} And of the proposal to lower the retirement age it has been well said that it would only lead to a different form of concealed unemployment.\footnote{'Skracenje staža i zapošljavanje', Politika, 18 May 1976.}

Unfortunately the more promising of the policies for economically absorbing the emigrants seem to be the very ones that have evoked the greatest controversy and ideological or other resistance. The tendency to disapprove of emigrants has never been quite expunged from the psyches of Yugoslav
decision-makers; and there is continuing resistance to the idea that they should be given anything that might resemble preferential treatment. To the ideological hard-liner, or the self-made-man who has climbed the bureaucratic ladder to success, it must seem particularly repugnant that 'deserters' to capitalism should return with hoards of accumulated wealth and become 'rentiers' in their Socialist homelands. And some employers and rank and file workers may feel similar resentments.

These natural human jealousies and animosities are reinforced and legitimized by the circumstance that all proposals to utilize the wealth of the povratnici raise serious problems for the theory and practice of socialist self-management. If small business undertakings are delivered increasingly into private hands, individual farming extended and strengthened, and such alien institutions as capital

134 One Yugoslav questionnaire showed that 38% of all emigrants were hoping to use their earnings to solve their housing problem. NIN, 21 September 1975, p.11. Accordingly it would seem sensible to use this factor as a means of drawing their funds back into the Yugoslav economy and providing employment in the construction industry. Yet housing construction continues to flag and plans to create special opportunities for emigrants to spend their money on housing run into political difficulties. See Politika, 22 April 1976, p.8. Or consider, for example, the proposals made in the Federal Assembly to discriminate in employment policy against returnees who had jobs before leaving Yugoslavia. This kind of retrospectively punitive action would, of course, be a very good way of ensuring that most of the best people remained abroad. Politika, 10 October 1975, p.7.

135 For some allusions to these matters, see 'Program povratka', Politika, 21 May 1976.
markets, private investment, etc. tolerated, is there not a danger that all this, together with the continuing inflow of major Western credits, will create a strong basis for the reemergence of capitalism? It is no doubt considerations such as these that have helped to block the large-scale replication of the Imotski experiment.

The new law on customs has at last been passed, but only after prolonged resistance, it would seem. The Basic Law on Associated Labour (the so-called 'Workers' Constitution'), soon to be promulgated, contains provision for the use of private funds in self-managing enterprises; but it remains to be seen to what extent it will succeed in drawing the


137 Cf. note 127, above.

138 Despite innumerable proposals (for special concessions for returnees), the old Customs Law, which dated from 1965, the year when the main flow of emigration began, had been altered little before it was finally superseded in 1976, Politika, 2 March 1976, p.5. The reforms were foreshadowed for a long time before they were actually introduced. See VUS za naše gradjane u svijetu, 14 February 1976, p.67.

139 It has been claimed that intending returnees in West Germany have expressed their satisfaction with the proposed new law on Associated Labour, and in particular with its provisions for using private funds in both private and self-managing enterprises. Politika, 14 April 1976, p.10.
capital of returnees and other private citizens into expanding the Yugoslav economy's employing capacity.

Thus, while official policy is veering towards further exploitation of private initiative and private funds to overcome its medium-term employment difficulties, there appears to be strong and continuing opposition to such a strategy. The current five-year plan envisages an increase of 100,000 in employment in the private sector. This seems a utopianly optimistic assessment, recent and proposed reforms notwithstanding. Whatever formal legal provisions and government resolutions may say, for private enterprise to flourish, the mentality which has resisted the reforms for so long must be overcome. The Yugoslav press, however, contains innumerable proofs of its tenacity. Actual employment trends in the private sector over recent years do not inspire confidence either. In 1971, 90,000 were employed there, in 1973, 93,000 and in 1974, 91,000. This seems scarcely the springboard for a leap forward of over 100% in the next five years. In any case, even if such dramatic improvement is achieved, it will not be enough

140 Thus, for example, a recent article in the Belgrade daily, Politika (15 June 1976, p.5) describes some of the discriminatory measures that have been taken against tradesmen in recent years. VUS for 21 February 1976, p.15, declares that 'small-scale production (mala privreda), despite declaratory support, is not given a chance in this country'. Another item speaks of the strange 'inertia' that refuses to respond to the many proposals that have been made to facilitate opportunities in mala privreda for returnees (Politika, 26 November 1975, p.7).

141 Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije 1975, p.110.
to avoid severe unemployment developing in at least some areas. A recent press item quotes an expert opinion that in Bosnia and Hercegovina employment needs to go ahead at a rate of 4 to $4^{1/2}\%$ per annum, especially in view of the republic's large pool of potential returnees; but that 'not even half of that number will be able to find employment unless small-scale production (*mala privreda*) comes to our aid.'

The irony of the situation is that (as elsewhere in the Socialist world) the much deplored stagnation of private trades and services is coupled with an acutely-felt need for just such trades and services.

Much of the emigrants' savings continue to stay out of the country in foreign banks. It is vital to Yugoslavia's chances of employing those emigrants at home that incentives be offered to draw their funds back into profitable investment within the country. But the incentives

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143 See, e.g., 'Zanatstvo u zapečku' and 'Talas dopunskih zarada' in *Politika*, 9 and 10 January 1976.

144 As of early 1972, Yugoslav workers were estimated by West German sources to be holding some 4,000 million DM in West German banks alone. *VUS*, 26 January 1972 cited in Z. Antić, 'Yugoslavia Curbs Labour Exports to Western Countries', Radio Free Europe Research *Yugoslavia*, 7 February 1973, p.3. Another West German source has suggested that the Yugoslav government made efforts to gain access to these funds 'behind the backs' of the workers. *Münchner Merkur*, 2 February 1974, cited in S. Stanković, 'Impact of Yugoslavs Working Abroad on National Defense and the Economy', p.2. One infers that any such efforts must have been largely unsuccessful, given the present drift of policy towards positive inducements.
must not only be offered; they must also be accepted and believed in by the emigrants themselves. Changes of political climate or economic strategy would have a disastrous effect on 'business confidence'. The emigrants thus have a kind of independent bargaining position, a potential pull over their Socialist masters, that is greater, perhaps, than any enjoyed by a non-elite group anywhere else in Eastern Europe. It would not be surprising if many Yugoslav politicians felt in these circumstances that it would be better if they simply washed their hands of the emigrants. Such sentiments are particularly likely to be felt in those regions which, under the new decentralized arrangements, are least likely to benefit from the influx of either hard currency or manpower.

In addition to expanding the Socialist sector by policies of extensive growth and encouraging various forms of private initiative and finance, two other strategies for absorbing the returnees are sometimes advanced: increasing internal mobility of labour between the less and more developed regions of Yugoslavia; and encouraging further

145 Komarica cites an instance of taxation regulations being changed in Imotski commune (in the period before it decided to import Gastarbeiter capital) to the detriment of returnee tradesmen working in the private sector. Komarica comments: 'They all feel cheated and maintain that they will keep their money in their pockets until they get a guarantee that their investments will not be wiped out by future changes in regulations.' Komarica, op.cit., p.99. Imotski commune evidently drew certain conclusions from this experience, but what of other communes in Yugoslavia?

146 This appears to be the Federal line on internal migration generally (cf. note 87, above); and it is often urged in the specific context of the returnee problem. See, for example, the statements by the Croatian Undersecretary for Labour in VUS, 20 August 1975, p.3.
foreign investment (by which is usually meant investment from Western sources, in particular, West Germany). 147
Both of these may be sound policies in the long term. But in the short term neither can be much more than palliative. And in each case there are serious political problems. Internal migration tends to be resisted by republican and local authorities, and may aggravate inter-ethnic tensions. 148 And any further increase in the volume of Western credits could endanger the policy of non-alignment, lead to excessive dependence on Western governments and agencies, or lead to a worsening of relations with the Soviet bloc countries. Despite the difficulties, it appears that the leadership will persist with both of these policies. There is increasing talk of responding to the growing Western European inclination to take capital to the workers rather than bring the workers to the capital. 149 It might be

147 Cf. note 131, above. During President Tito's visit to West Germany in 1974, he and West German Chancellor Schmidt reportedly agreed that it would be mutually advantageous if West German-Yugoslav economic links were expanded, and, in particular, if West German investments were directed increasingly to the emigration regions of Yugoslavia. VUS za naše građane u svijetu, 24 July 1974. Hitherto, very little of West German investment has gone to the countries from where its Gastarbeiter stem. Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia provide two-thirds of all the migrants, but received only 1% of all West German foreign investments in the decade before 1974. 'Pouke jedne recesije', NIN, 2 February 1975, at p.36.

148 Cf. notes 88-94 above (and corresponding text), and also the discussion in 5.d., below.

149 'Ne kao stari pečalbar', Politika, 18 January 1976.
sensible if similar thinking were to be applied within Yugoslavia itself, and capital were to be encouraged to flow to the areas where the returnees have the most aggravating effect on the labour market, rather than redirecting workers en masse to the more developed regions of the country. While it appears to be felt that Kosovo must be treated as a special case in which outmigration is mandatory, there are signs that official policy may come in time to prefer flows of capital rather than manpower within Yugoslavia as well as in Europe.

150 Since 1972, Kosovo has been given formal priority in emigration opportunities as a matter of policy (Miloje Nikolić, op. cit., p.12). This relative advantage was quickly cancelled, however, by the closing of the West European labour market. In the first nine months of 1975, only 250 left Kosovo for abroad, whilst 3,000 workers returned, a figure equivalent to more than one-third of the (itself very high) employment increment for that same period. Komunist, 20 October 1975, p.20. Kosovo is also seeking special treatment in internal migration policy (see the remarks by a Kosovo delegate in a Federal Assembly debate on returnee policy, Politika, 1 April 1976, p.6). Here, too, there is some disposition at the Federal level to meet their demands. (See the remarks of the President of the Federal Employment Council in Socijalna politika 1973 no.1, p.19). But, again, compare note 148, above.

151 It is now possible for enterprises to invest directly in enterprises in other republics and thereby contribute to discharging the quota obligations of its home republic towards the Federal Fund for the Undeveloped Republics and Provinces. The Slovenian Chamber of Commerce has set up a permanent delegation in Kosovo to facilitate such dealings. In an article commenting on this event, it was pointed out that Slovenia had run into a developmental limit in the form of a shortage of human resources. 'In large organizations one hears increasingly of intentions to take investments to areas where there are more people than jobs.' VUS, 28 May 1975, p.8.
It is not possible to produce either a current assessment of, or future projections for, the demographic impact of the emigration. It is still in a very volatile stage where economic movements in the West might yet precipitate further landslides in at least one, if not either, direction. For the moment, the Western European countries (especially Germany and Austria), the two most important from Yugoslavia's point of view, are planning to further diminish their migrant worker totals over the next few years. If, on the other hand, Western economic recovery ever does take place, fresh openings may appear, either there, or elsewhere. Despite its proclaimed policy of bringing its people back, the Yugoslav government would surely welcome a further period of respite.

But a more serious obstacle to demographic assessment of the emigration is the fact that emigration statistics have always been and continue to be extremely sketchy. The authorities do not know how many went; nor do they know how many have returned. No one can know how many

152 Austria reduced its migrant worker total by 40,000 in 1975 and plans a further reduction of 30,000 for 1976. Over 130,000 of Austria's 177,000 Gastarbeiter as of late 1975 were Yugoslavs. (Politika, 22 January 1976, p.4). West Germany reportedly plans reducing its 2 million or so migrant workers to 1 1/2 million by 1980. A Yugoslav press article puts the total number of Yugoslavs in West Germany as of early 1976 at just under 400,000 workers together with 250,000 dependant family members. (No West German source is cited, however). 'Povika na "gastarbajtere"', Politika, 25 March 1976. Cf. note 157, below.
will return: existing data on emigrant plans to return are conflicting. And there is not much reliable information regarding the present demographic structure of the emigration. Very little seems to be known about the assimilatory processes to which Yugoslavs abroad are subject. Vital statistics relating to Yugoslav families in emigration are not collected. How many of them have contracted mixed marriages is not known. Nor do there seem to be any statistics about knowledge of their native language among the children of the emigrants.

153 Before the Western European countries adopted their discriminatory measures, actual rates of return were very low. (Begtić, 'Yugoslav Nationals Working Temporarily Abroad', p.22). Komarica cites questionnaires which found, variously, that 87%, 92% and 13% of respondents planned to return. (Komarica, op.cit., p.100). The more optimistic results seem slightly the less plausible of the three. While official statements have always maintained that the emigration was 'temporary', less official statements are more sceptical.

154 The overworked Yugoslav consular network would find gathering the emigration's vital statistics a difficult task, but until very recently in fact it was not required to do so at all. Nor, apparently, did the Federal Institute for Statistics do anything to fill the gap. Mišović, 'Ko se brine o njima', p.17.

155 In West Germany alone, between 1960 and 1970, there were 14,000 mixed marriages registered in which one party was a Yugoslav. NIN, 21 September 1975, p.11.

156 There is, on the other hand, no shortage of newspaper articles deploiring emigrant children's very weak or non-existent grasp of their native tongue. See, e.g., VUS za naše gradjane u svijetu, 30 January 1974, p.34, and 29 May 1974, p.30. It was noted earlier that supplementary schooling for Yugoslav children did not begin to be organized until 1970 (footnote 94). It was not, apparently, until 1975 that a text-book for use in such schools was definitively projected, and an inter-republican agreement on these matters reached (after (cont.)
With such a profusion of unknowns to deter him, it would be a rash observer who attempted any overall judgements about the future ethno-demographic reverberations of the Yugoslav emigration. Two general comments can and should be made, however. The first point to note is, paradoxically, that the diaspora may still be growing.

For as against the returnees, there are also those dependant family members who are going abroad to join their bread-earners. While tightening regulations regarding workers, Western countries have often made attempts to guarantee better living conditions for those of their migrants that they have been prepared to accept. And there has been a secular trend for some years towards increase in the numbers of family dependants joining migrant workers at their place of work.\(^{157}\) To this factor must be added that of the ongoing fertility of the increasingly reunited migrant families. In West Germany, as elsewhere in Western Europe, migrant fertility now makes

\(^{156}\) (cont.) two years of negotiations). (Politika, 19 and 25 December 1975). As of 1976, it is claimed that 50% of the 50,000 children of school-age are covered by supplementary schooling (VUS za naše gradjane u svijetu, 6 March 1976, p.67). The figure of 50,000 school-children could be an underestimate. On these matters, see also 'Kuda druga generacija?', Politika, 13 June 1976.

\(^{157}\) Between late 1973 and late 1974, despite the restrictions that had been placed on foreign workers in the meantime, the registered number of Yugoslavs in West Germany increased from 673,300 to 707,800. In late 1972, the figure had been 594,300. See Statistisches Bundesamt Statistisches Jahrbuch 1975, p.65 and the corresponding tables in the 1974 and 1973 volumes. However, compare footnote 152, above.
a major contribution to the national birth-rate. Given the age-structure of the Yugoslav diaspora as revealed by the 1971 Census, it is inevitable that large and growing numbers of children must be being born to Yugoslavs abroad. Given the trend towards assimilation of migrant children so often deplored in the Yugoslav press, it is quite likely that the growing numbers of children abroad may in time deepen the alienation of the parents, and strengthen their inclination to remain in their adopted countries.

Secondly, it seems likely that despite the tendency towards a more even ethnic distribution of the emigrants in the later years of the emigration, the national composition of the diaspora will never reflect the national composition of Yugoslavia; in other words, some Yugoslav nations will be demographically weakened by the emigration, and others (relatively) strengthened. Since 1972, the Yugoslav press

158 'Four years ago, only one in ten children born in the Federal Republic was of foreign extraction; now it is one in six or even one in five.' Der Spiegel, 24 March 1975, p.41. Spiegel estimated that by 1976, the number of foreign children born in Stuttgart might be greater than the number of Germans.

159 Between late 1973 and late 1974, the number of Yugoslav citizens under the age of six in West Germany increased from 37,800 to 48,000. The 48,000 aged 0-5 in 1974 compared with 17,400 in the group 6-10. This comparison also seems to suggest, among other things, that the number of Yugoslav children being born and raised in West Germany has been increasing. Compare Statistisches Jahrbuch 1975, p.65 and the corresponding table in the 1974 volume. It will be interesting to see how the latest discriminatory measures affect these trends. Cf. footnotes 116 and 152 above.
has been careful to avoid reference to the ethnic structure of the emigration. To my knowledge, no official estimates of the position in this regard have appeared since the 1971 Census figures were published. Their accuracy then was questionable (and questioned). Since that time, the ethnic disproportions may have increased. For, as suggested earlier, the returnees, being rejects from sophisticated Western economies, are likely to contain large numbers of the least skilled. Also, residence permits and visas for family members are more readily given to the older, more established immigrants. Again, it is the older migrants who are more likely to be living in family units abroad (with or without Yugoslav spouses). Conversely, it should be remembered that the Albanians and other less developed ethnic groups had a particularly low rate of female emigration, and therefore, presumably, of family formation abroad. All these factors will tend to reinstate or reinforce the earlier trends of ethnic differentiation within the diaspora.

Given the inadequacies of the data, it is hard to make even rough predictions about the future of the Yugoslav economic emigration. But it does seem inevitable

160 'Izgubljene duše, Delo, 13 July 1971. This article in the Slovenian party daily declared that the census had missed 'half' of the Croats abroad. Cf. notes 83, 99 and 104, above.


162 Judging on the basis of the 1971 Census results, only 4% of the emigrant workers from Kosovo were women (cf. 18% from Macedonia, 37% from Croatia and 40% from Slovenia). Begtić, 'Yugoslav Nationals Temporarily Working Abroad', p.20.
that it will leave a permanent (and recurring) indentation in the Yugoslav age-pyramid; that the contributions of the various ethnic groups to that indentation will be generally speaking in inverse proportion to their employment rates within Yugoslavia; and that differential emigration will aggravate the impact of differential fertility on Yugoslavia's ethnic structure.

5.d Ethnic Relations

The following discussion will be based on two premises: firstly, that ethnic numbers in Yugoslav conditions can be to a significant extent converted into political power; and secondly, that ethnic harmony is unlikely to be achieved in the near or middle future by any process of homogenization or reconciliation. These propositions may need some prior elaboration.

Traditionally, Leninist Socialism\(^{163}\) has recognized that ethnic groups not only have a right to exist, but also to a position of equality in the state. While this principle is sometimes honoured in the breach,\(^{164}\) it is never flatly disavowed. Efforts are usually made to solve the problem

\(^{163}\) The Yugoslavs have, of course, rejected Stalin, but not Lenin.

\(^{164}\) Both historically, and in recent years, Soviet policy on the nationalities has equivocated between Great Russian chauvinism thinly disguised and greater or lesser measures of ethnic pluralism. But Bulgaria and Rumania have been perhaps even more given to unitaristic assimilationism at times than their Soviet mentors. On Rumania's assimilationist phase (and the strategic reasons for their partial retreat from it), see R. King, *Minorities under Communism*, Ch.7; see also (cont.)
of ethnic antagonisms by removing their socio-economic causes; that is to say by attempting to iron out the inequalities of economic development or socio-economic status that are believed to underlie them. Here again, while the socio-economic equality may not always be in fact achieved, or even honestly striven for, it is nearly always legitimate for an underprivileged ethnic minority to demand action in that direction.

European Socialist states and societies are generally speaking organized in accordance with, among other principles, the 'national key'. Most party and government bodies on public display are given an elaborate balance of representatives of different ethnic groups. Great efforts are made to achieve proportionate representation in education, publishing, the professions, the arts, etc. The 'Socialist' content of the particular activity may betray the interests of the national group in question, but the form is national nonetheless.

Moreover, Socialist control systems, effective for most purposes, are nonetheless ill-equipped to deal with the pervasive, subtle and extraordinarily tenacious sentiment of ethnic affinity. Georgian or Albanian nationalists may be condemned, but Georgians and Albanians

164 (cont.) 'Ceausescus Nationalitättenpolitik', Osteuropa 1975, no.5, p.A282. Bulgaria's Staatsvolk nationalism seems to be growing unchecked at present. Presumably this is a sign of Moscow's special favour. See the discussion of the Macedonian question in 5.d., below; and 'Migration of Turkish Minority and the Status of Bulgarian Moslems', RFE Research Bulgarian Situation Report/13, 28 April 1976, p.5. On the other hand, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia have all treated their national minorities remarkably well in at least some respects. Even an ethnically almost homogeneous state like East Germany observes certain decencies in relation to its tiny Lusatian Sorb minority. (See K.J. Dippmann, 'The Legal Position of the Lusatian Sorbs since the Second World War', Slavonic and East European Review, vol.LIII, no.130 (January 1975), p.62.
cannot be abolished. Private farmers, craftsmen, traders or liberal democrats can be prevented from organizing, or even permanently erased from the scene; and they can certainly be excluded from joining the party ipso facto. But Georgians and Albanians cannot. Albanianism in itself is not a crime. (Nor even is Jewishness, though it may verge on it at times). Thus, socialism positively facilitates a degree of ethnic cohesion on the one hand, and is powerless to eliminate it on the other.

In Yugoslavia, these factors are particularly relevant. Unlike the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav regime has sought to give genuine content to Marxist-Leninist traditions on nationality policy. Even before 1965, and certainly since, there has been no one dominant ethnic group which can succeed in bending the principles of nationalities policy to its own perceived advantage. The political significance of ethnic numbers in the USSR may well grow in the future; and it may be underestimated in the present. In Yugoslavia, that significance has already become overwhelmingly evident. If economic equality (at least in per capita terms) has remained elusive, political equality has been gaining in reality almost continuously. The main ethnic groups are now accorded almost a veto power over the activities of the

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165 It may be argued and is argued, that were it not for the demographic factor, redistribution of wealth within Yugoslavia's different regions might well have been considerably advanced by now. 'Calculations show that Kosmet's falling behind Slovenia in economic growth is two-thirds due to its faster population growth, and only one-third due to its slower economic growth'. Janez Škerjanec, 'Mednacionalni ekonomski odnosi v Jugoslaviji', Teorija in praksa 1969, no.1, p.26 at p.31. The economic factors (low capital efficiency and capital accumulation, lower investments levels per head, etc.) were themselves often partially demographic as well. Cf. notes 91 and 92 above, and note 263, below.
federal political organs - at least in theory. And the 'national key' (nacionalni ključ) is being progressively applied to more and more spheres of life. The control system aspires to check only the more extreme chauvinist elements. But it does this in relation to all ethnic groups. Ethnic patriotism and consistent struggle for causes which are Socialist in form and ethnic in content has been virtually legitimized through the federal system.

The Yugoslav leadership has evidently arrived at the view that the only way to eliminate the perils of nationalist sentiment is to legitimize it and build it deep into the country's political structure. Perhaps, indeed, that 'view' is not a conscious decision by a transcendant ethnically unaffiliated elite, but rather the resultant of

166 On the theory, see 'Deveto rešenje', 'Formule odgovornosti' and 'Život ispravlja greške' in NIN, 23 March 1975, 18 May 1975 and 2 May 1976, respectively. On the practice, compare note 92, above.

167 It appears that republican and provincial controls over cadre policy, for example, are being extended down from the top party and state bodies to lower levels. Republics and provinces have their own cadre lists and expect 'their' cadres to act within federal agencies in accordance with their instructions. For two somewhat Aesopian articles on these developments, see VUS, 22 May 1976, pp.12-13; and NIN, 7 March 1976, pp.8-9. In Kosovo, efforts are being made in the party and state organs and in higher educational institutions to ensure that the proportion of Albanians is equivalent to their percentage of the population (which, incidentally, given the age structure of the Albanians, would lead to their adults being effectively overrepresented). An article on Priština University reports that 'to date, there have been rather fewer Albanian students (65%) than the percentage of Albanians in Kosovo (over 70%), but that structure is more favourable this year, and in future years, the relationship between the two will be finally evened out.' NIN, 16 February 1975, pp.12-13. For notes on the efforts to achieve full implementation of the 'national key' in Kosovo party organizations, see Politika, 21 October 1975, p.6, and 11 December 1975, p.6. There too, it appears that the objective is a percentage identical with that of the ethnic break-down of the province's population at the last Census, despite the fact that this would overrepresent Albanian adults.
conflicting ethnic forces within the ruling party. Whatever the long-term success of such a strategy may prove to be, in the short and medium term, it can scarcely be expected to work miracles. For the Yugoslav regime is encumbered with a burdensome legacy of ethnic strife. Inter-ethnic relations began on a sour note when the Yugoslav state was created after the First World War, and have been in a state of deterioration most of the time since. The Communist Party is virtually the only Yugoslav political party which has ever attracted anything like a nation-wide and genuinely multi-ethnic following. To it too must go the credit for achieving the only period of relative ethnic tranquility in modern Yugoslav history, namely the first twenty years or so after the war - though even that interlude may have owed more to repression than to reconciliation. Be that as it may, in the last decade it has become clear that Yugoslavia has expunged none of its ethnic antagonisms; and that when Tito goes, or the Russians come, the League of Communists may be hard put to it to repeat its remarkable unificatory feat of the Second World War.

Unfortunately, demographic trends seem likely to inflame the general atmosphere of intolerance and suspicion still further, as well as leading to objectively destabilizing transformations in a number of specific directions. Reconciliation, if it comes at all, is unlikely to forestall the aggravation that demographic trends (together with other developments) are already producing.

Reconciliation is at least a possibility, if a long-term one. Homogenization, on the other hand, seems to be totally out of the question. Curiously, the leadership (unlike its Soviet counterpart) has set its face against developing any kind of supraethnic national identity. The reason for this difference in approach seems to be that the Russians are a dominant (if perilously maintained) majority, whereas the Serbs are not. While the non-Russian ethnic group in the USSR may see 'Soviet man' and 'the Soviet people'
as Russian notions, there is not a great deal they can do to actively dethrone them. In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, the non-Serbs reached an agreement in effect to resist the notion of 'Yugoslav' as being a Serbian imposition. And they have succeeded very largely in officially discrediting it. Thus pressures towards homogenization of that kind have become largely a thing of the past. Ethnic particularisms are flourishing in Yugoslavia, and given existing conditions are likely to go on doing so for a long time to come. They are increasing rather than diminishing.

This should not be taken as meaning that contacts between the ethnic groups are necessarily diminishing or hostility between them increasing. The contacts are increasing, and the hostility may not at the present moment be worsening. But while inter-marriage has become a relatively more common phenomenon, intra-ethnic social interaction remains the norm; and the gulf between Christian and Moslem in particular remains very wide. 168 Quite apart from the possibility that greater

168 R. Petrović 'Ethnically Mixed Marriages in Yugoslavia', Sociologija: Selected Articles 1959-1969 (Belgrade, 1970), p.185, esp. p.198, note.14. As in the Soviet Union, people of Moslem faith are less likely to contract ethnically mixed marriages, especially the women. And when they do, it is usually with other Moslems, if the latter are territorially speaking, 'available'. Thus in 1972, in Macedonia, of the 2,587 Albanian women who married, 2,486 married Albanians, 76 married Turks (who comprise 6.6% of the republican population) and 15 married Macedonians (69% of the population). Demografska statistika 1972, pp.232-33. (Some of the 15 Macedonians may also have been of the Moslem faith, incidentally.) Bosnian Moslems are a little more prone to inter-marriage, though even they are markedly less so than either Serbs or Croats within Bosnia and Hercegovina. By contrast, inter-marriage between Serbs and Croats, though still infrequent, is rather more common, both in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and elsewhere. A thorough examination of this question would have to allow for geographical dispersion and other factors. However, the overall pattern is probably clear enough without detailed statistical analysis.
social contacts may aggravate rather than relieve tension at a certain stage in development, such contacts as exist are still and will long remain quite insufficient to bring about that ideal state identified by Soviet ideologists as sblizhenie. And in any case, though inter-ethnic mingling is commended by official policy, sblizhenie is not a declared objective.

With these premises and considerations in mind, let us turn to briefly survey Yugoslavia's internal ethno-demographic landscape.

There is a pleasing symmetry about the vital statistics of the Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats in recent years. So evenly are they matched, a religiously-inclined observer might see in it an oecumenical intervention by extra-terrestrial authority. The sceptic might say, on the other hand, that it would take more than absolute parity to satisfy the Serbs and the Croats, and he would, up to a point, be right. The nationalist solipsisms and the mutual antagonism are so deep-rooted, that his own nation's low fertility seems far more important to the chauvinist than

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169 On this point, compare footnote 95 to Ch.3, p.196, above.

170 'Ten years ago, 12.4% of all marriages contracted were ethnically mixed, and the percentage is increasing all the time, which is something of exceptional significance.' NIN, 25 May 1975, p.28. Yugoslavs place less stress on inter-marriage than Soviet ideologists, however, and do not now appear to harbour any implicit hope that it will bring about the linguistic or cultural homogenization of the country.

171 For a rough guide, see tables 3 and 4, Appendix C. See also notes 8, 9, 12 and 13 (and the corresponding text), above.
the fact that his adversaries are identically placed (even if he bothers to apprise himself of the latter circumstance - which he may not). Many Croat demographic commentators in the heyday of nationalist demography (or demagography as one might call it) argued that Croatia's demographic problems were the result of machinations by 'bureaucratic', 'centralist', 'statist' or 'firm-handite' (HrvstorukaKke) forces (for all of which, read: Serbian). There were at least two reasons why Croatian demographic comment up to 1971 tended to be more nationalistic than that of the Serbs. Firstly, because their republican party authorities were supporting or at least

172 For a fairly extreme example of pre-1972 Croatian demography, see Š. Djodan, 'Prilog raspravi o regionalnom razvoju SFRJ', Kolo 1969, no.3; see also the rebuttal by S. Šuvar, 'Društveni razvoj i medjunacionalni odnosi u tumačenju dra Šime Djodana' and 'Da li je Hrvatska eksplota tirana' in Naše teme 1969 nos 6 and 12. Djodan has suffered political persecution since 1971, whilst Šuvar has become an even more successful young party official and ideologist. Djodan's views border at times on national paranoia. For less paranoic, but equally forceful nationalist demographic commentary, see the articles by the subsequently disgraced VUS journalist Neda Krmpotić, 'Nametnuti plebescit' and 'Veliko prebrojavanje' in VUS, 10 February and 31 March 1971. Instances of strongly partisan thinking flash in and out of more scholarly analyses by Croatian demographers and economists also.

173 The Croatian writer Zvonimir Komarica paraphrased the approach of 'bureaucratic optimists', (i.e. Serb centralists) to emigration in these terms: 'the wave of demographic explosion from Kosovo is spattering the western republics, so it is natural that workers from those republics migrate to Europe, for Europeans are also migrating to Canada, USA and Australia. Apart from that, the western republics have a tradition of emigration, so it's natural that they form a majority. In any case, "now, everyone's going", and we're all Yugoslavs, so there's no problem, since the average Yugoslav rate of emigration is too small to be a cause for concern. Attitudes like these regard any discussion of the causes of migration, or of the occupational, republican or ethnic structure of the emigrants as superfluous. They also regard it as unnecessary to talk about the hard currency income the migrants send back /Komarica has in mind which republic should get how much of it/, about the organization of cultural and informational activities among the migrants, of clubs, etc....', Komarica op.cit., p.105.
tolerating spirited nationalistic utterances, whereas the Serbian party leadership were trying to hold their hotheads down. And secondly, because the Croats in some cases really did have a point. Though Serbian fertility had actually declined faster than Croatian to reach comparable levels, the Croatian emigration rate was much heavier.\(^{174}\) Thus it seemed to Croats that their situation was much worse, and that if existing emigration patterns persisted, the Croatian population would be decimated, firstly by the direct loss of the emigrants themselves, and secondarily, by the loss of their actual or potential progeny. As mentioned earlier, the 1971 Census came up with an official figure of 672 thousand for the number of Yugoslavs 'temporarily' working abroad. But all contemporary estimates from other sources suggested the real figure was nearer a million. The Census procedures for enumerating the emigrants and the resident population were severely and cogently critized in Croatia.\(^{175}\) The Census estimate of 261 thousand ethnic Croats abroad was almost certainly an underestimate. Before the Census result was published, the Croatian media had been making free use of an estimate of half a million Croats abroad. If this were so, the number of Croats living and working abroad was approaching half the total number of people employed in the non-rural

\(^{174}\) Cf. notes 98, 99 and 194, and the corresponding text, above.

\(^{175}\) Cf. note 98, the articles by Krmpotić cited in note 172, and also: 'Popis obaviti na znastvenoj osnovi', Novi list (Rijeka), 4 February 1971; 'Zapaljiva popisnica', VUS, 10 February 1971; 'Regionalci', VUS, 3 February 1971, and the discussion about some of these articles published in VUS, 10 March 1971. In addition to criticizing the procedures for recording workers abroad, Croatian commentators expressed strong opposition to proposals to permit regional identification to pass as ethnic identification. This they saw as a centralist (i.e. Serbian) plot to diminish the number of Croats by siphoning some off as Dalmatians or similar. In the end, the procedures for registering regional identification were decentralized and regulated at the republican level. (See 'Rubrika: nacionalnost', VUS, 7 June 1972.)
economy of the Croatian republic. It was at best uncertain whether very many of them would ever return. As the Croatian media often pointed out in 1969-71, Croatia had the highest emigration rate of any country in Europe (in those heady times it was normal to speak of Croatia as if it were the same kind of entity as Greece or Portugal). Given its traditionally heavy emigration losses, and the stagnation in its population over the 1930s-1940s period, this further blow to national strength, pride and prestige must indeed have seemed almost intolerable. And the indifference of Belgrade statistical and other authorities to this haemorrhaging of the national life-blood must have seemed too gross to be without malice. The emigration rate from Serbia was until the late 1960s, one of the lowest of any region in the country. Had it been as high as Croatia's, it seems unlikely that the policy of fostered emigration would have lasted as long as it did. When in fact the policy was reversed, Serbia's annual emigration rate had probably almost overtaken that of Croatia.

The Croats' main anxieties focus on their traditional adversaries, the Serbs. Their relations with the other two main groups with whom they live in geographical contact, the Moslems and the Slovenians, are rather better. Both have been in some measure allies against the 'centralists' of Belgrade, and neither seems to be perceived as a major threat to Croatian interests. There were signs that the pre-1972 Croatian leadership supported the position of the ethnic Moslems who, demographically at least if not also politically, have now become the dominant ethnic group in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

176 Cf. Table 11, Appendix C.

177 See, e.g., 'Izmedju umiranja i 'eksplozije'', VUS, 12 March 1969.

178 Komarica, op.cit., p.25, estimated that (as of 1968) only 0.42% of the population of Serbia was abroad, compared with 3.30% from Slovenia and 4.21% from Croatia.
thereby supplanting the Serbs. 179

An outside observer might suppose that Croat nationalists should be content to accept their own external migration on the basis that they could compensate for it economically and ethno-demographically by accepting migrants in turn from other parts of Yugoslavia and turning them into Croats. While there were strong assimilatory demands being made in Croatia during the height of the nationalist phase, it seems that most Croats would prefer to retain their own people rather than import substitutes. 180 Their attitude is the more understandable inasmuch that Yugoslav official policy stipulates that all minorities within Yugoslavia should be entitled to special cultural and educational facilities. Thus in time immigrant communities might become a permanent and alien fixture within the Croatian Republic. Though Croatian strength within the Croatian Republic as measured by official statistics had remained unchanged at just on 4/5 of the total in recent decades, the 1971 Census assessment is to some extent fictional, since it includes all Croats living 'temporarily' abroad who could be traced by the census clerks, and does not include people from other republics 'temporarily' resident in Croatia. If Croatian emigrants were to be replaced in a continuous process by peoples from the less developed regions, and if these latter peoples were guaranteed the necessary facilities for maintaining their national identity,

179 Croats and Moslems in Bosnia and Hercegovina have both had a good deal of experience of pressures to become either Serbs or 'Yugoslavs'. See Esad Ćimić, 'Mednacionalni odnosi na razpotju', Teorija in praksa 1969, no.10, p.1479, especially at 1484-85. Pressures against the Moslems seem to still come more from the side of the Serbs. (See 'Streit um die Anerkennung der bosnisch-herzegowinischen Mohammedaner als Nation', Osteuropa 1975, no.4, p.A236.)

180 Cf. note 88, above. Compare, too, the following comments by Šuvar: 'As we know, there is among the Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian communities a certain distaste for the "rapid multiplication of the Shiptars"'; and: 'I know that Djodan and people who think like him secretly do not wish that let's say half a million Albanians should settle in Croatia'. S. Šuvar, 'Da li je Hrvatska eksploatirana', pp.2055, 2062.
the Croatian grasp on Croatia could be rapidly weakened, the more rapidly inasmuch as the Croatian birth rate would be far below that of its immigrant communities. In these circumstances, any Croatian republican authorities are likely to wish to maintain close control on migratory movements in and out of their territory.

The Slovenians lack the keen anti-Serbian feelings or the tendency to grandiose nationalist illusions that are common among the Croats. They do not live in close contiguity with any other Yugoslav peoples apart from the Croats, with whom they share the Catholic religion and an Austrian past, and with whom, also, their relations have traditionally been tolerably good. Their tenacious retention of a separate ethnic identity through long centuries of Germanic rule, however, seems to have enhanced their national anxieties as well as their national pride. In any case, despite the fact that their age-specific fertility has been substantially higher than Serb or Croat fertility in recent years, they too have engaged latterly in considerable quantities of ethno-demographic soul-searching. Newspaper stories with titles like 'Are we Slovenians dying out?' have been common, suggesting that there is a widespread fear that they may be. Though the Slovenians do not have

181 Cf. Table 4, Appendix C, and notes 8 and 9 (and the corresponding discussion), above.

any particular *bête noire* among the other Yugoslav nations, they do not particularly like any of them either; and for reasons that would be apparent to any Western traveller who took a quick sampling of each of the Yugoslav regions, they regard themselves as culturally superior to all of them. Autonomist and separatist sentiments are widespread in Slovenia, and what most of them would probably prefer would be to have as little to do with the rest of Yugoslavia as possible.

Slovenian emigration to Europe, though not as heavy as the Croatian, was nonetheless substantial, particularly in the earlier years after 1964. It was natural that the emigration should 'begin' from Slovenia, given its greater geographical and cultural proximity to Central Europe. However, like the low natural increase rates which conceal a relatively healthy fertility, this trend was probably imperfectly understood by most Slovenians, and, coupled with the very visible arrivals of migrant workers from other and less developed regions, must have contributed to growing fears that Slovenia would be denuded of its own people and settled by the great unwashed from the remote and primitive hinterlands of Yugoslavia. Though 'temporary' emigration from Slovenia was given as 48,000 by the 1971 Census, the real figure, as in Croatia, was probably much higher. An estimate in 1974 placed it in excess of 80,000. Simultaneously, there are somewhere between 120 and 150 thousand migrants from elsewhere.

183 During the period of acute inter-republican tension before 1972, these sentiments found considerable overt expression. See, e.g., 'Hoče li slovenci u vojsku?' *NIN*, 31 October 1971 (for a Slovenian initiative to create separate republican armies).

184 Cf. note 97, above.

185 *VUS za naše gradjane u svijetu*, 3 April 1974. *Politika*, 26 July 1976, gives the figure of 64,000 plus 3,000 day workers in the Italian and Austrian border regions.
in Yugoslavia and the number is certainly growing.186 None of this finds reflection in official Yugoslav demographic statistics. Even the Slovenian authorities themselves, despite their efficient population registers, do not appear to know exactly how many domestic Gastarbeiter they are sheltering.187 And as with Yugoslav workers abroad, it is not known how many of these immigrants want to stay or will stay permanently in Slovenia. It seems likely, however, that a large proportion of them will, if they can.188 This being so, it is quite possible that Slovenia's ostensibly homogeneous ethnic structure (cf. Table 10) will be significantly altered: by Slovenians staying abroad; by Shiptars, Macedonians and others remaining in Slovenia; and by second generation

186 'It is not known precisely how many workers from other republics there are in Slovenia at present: from political sources we were informed that there are about 100 thousand, but the Institute for Sociology put forward an estimate of 120 to 140 thousand.' P. Stojanović, 'Senke visokog standarda', NIN, 4 August 1974, pp.12-13. Another 1974 estimate put it at 150,000. (VUS za naše gradjane u svijetu, 3 April 1974 ) This same source mentioned that 6,000 new places were expected to be made available for workers from other republics in 1974. One in four employed workers in Slovenia is not Slovenian. ("Torkljo v slovenski grb!", I.T.D., 15 January 1974). If one were to regard Slovenia as an independent country, this proportion would give it far and away the highest percentage of Gastarbeiter in Europe.

187 As was noted earlier, Census statistics locate people at their 'permanent' residence, not their work residence. In 1972, 26.6 thousand of the 28.7 thousand babies born in Slovenia were reported as being born to Slovenian mothers (Demografska statistika 1972, p.148). This suggests that very few indeed of the migrant workers have their families with them. As there are controls on workers entering Slovenia (cf. note 90, above), it is possible that there are a significant number of 'illegal' workers there, not even registered as 'temporarily resident' with the local authorities. This would explain the discrepancy between the estimates given in note 186, above.

188 'Prekalbari bez pasova', VUS, 1 May 1976, p.16 at p.18.
effects in both cases. 189 While it would appear that most of
the migrants in Slovenia are for the present single men or
men whose families have remained at home, this pattern seems
bound to alter in future. For social, ethical and perhaps
political reasons, it is desirable that it should. 190 Large
numbers of single men of visibly different cultural standards
are a threat to ethnic harmony anywhere. But admitting them
to fuller socio-economic status in Slovenia will offend the
prejudiced, and also have quite palpable effects on the
ethnic composition of the republic's birth-rate.

The present state of the Slovenian immigrant community
is already a source of grave concern to many native Slovenians.
No data have been published, to my knowledge, about the ethnic
structure of the immigrants. But it would seem that many of
them are Albanians, who form in many respects - demographically,

189 Cf. the earlier discussion of the same dilemma in the
Croatian case. Once granted minority rights, the
immigrants could form permanent and unassimilable
communities. One reason why official statistics are not
reorganized to give a realistic picture of the residential
ethnic structure of Slovenia may be that if this were done,
it could become difficult to resist demands for the
rigorous application of the nacionalni ključ in the Republic.

190 The prominent Slovenian sociologist, Stane Saksida, is
quoted in P. Stojanović, op. cit., as comparing the
Slovenian immigrants with European Gastarbeiter and
saying that 'the work force from the south of our country
is not offered adequate living conditions in Slovenia'.
The article goes on to comment unfavourably on the
'alienation' to which the migrants are subject, and
mentions that Slovenian political authorities have been
concerning themselves with the problem.
economically, culturally - a diametrical antithesis to the Slovenians. Meanwhile, Slovenian ladies are locking themselves nervously into their flats, and Slovenian economic analysts are stressing that Slovenia's capacity to take surplus labour from other regions is considerably less than it might appear.

Much of the immigration in the past appears to have been 'elemental' and unorganized. Now that the elements of a nationally co-ordinated internal migration policy are becoming visible, it is possible that Slovenia will be able to secure some restraints on further inflows. But official policy does appear to favour some degree of greater internal mobility at least. Moreover, Slovenia has a continuing and acute labour shortage.

I was assured by reliable sources that the Albanian community is substantial.

'It is clear that she is nationally oriented toward Slovenia, but without any special sharpness toward the 'south'; but the thought of danger from workers from the south is more compelling. That's why she mostly stays home in the evening... She is much more interested in locking the doors than in changes in the federation, so she does not know who the commune president is, but she is greatly disturbed about the question of construction near her home.' The above is extracted from a Yugoslav sociologist's composite portrait (based on survey results) of a type of person who has withdrawn from active political life. It is quoted by Sharon Zukin in her Beyond Marx and Tito (London, 1975), p.121. Perhaps the only comment that needs to be added to this eloquent pen-sketch is that in Slovenia, migrant workers from other republics form 42.4% of all employed in the construction industry. (VUS, 1 May 1976, p.19)

Cf. note 88, above.

According to Politika, 5 December 1975, p.14, Slovenia has a labour deficit of 80,000 and is prepared to accept 10,000 workers a year from other republics. When compared with the figure of 6,000 cited for 1974 in note 186, above, this suggests that recruitment of external labour is not diminishing, despite the pressures to reduce it. The above report related to a visit to Kosovo by a Slovenian Trade Union delegation. The Slovenian Chamber of Commerce, it will be recalled (cf. note 151, above), expressed itself in favour of exporting capital rather than importing manpower. This seems to be another instance of bifurcated, or at least bivocal, policy. Cf. also notes 89, 90 and 150, above.
conditions it is not always easy to control movements within the country. It is fortunate for the Slovenians that the word 'elemental' is the pejorative antonym of 'planned' in the Socialist vocabulary and Weltanschauung. This may enable them to devise some means of maintaining a degree of ethnic balance within their republic, and to defend the means by which they achieve it.  

The other key ethno-demographic problems emerging in Yugoslavia all concern the Moslems or the Shiptars. Accordingly, it will be useful to briefly consider the recent demographic development and future prospects of these two peoples.

Demographic statistics by nationality are very imperfect in Yugoslavia and always have been, particularly so in the case of the main Moslem groups. Census counts, both before and after World War II, have often striven or at least tended to conceal or diminish the presence of these groups, and as a result, it is difficult, if not impossible, to get any clear impression of their development over time.

The best approach available to Slovenia would probably be to adopt the Western European line of limiting further intake of workers on the grounds that better provision should first be made for those that are already there. Politika, 9 February 1976, p. 8, reports a social compact (društveni dogovor) between the Slovenian trade unions, chamber of commerce and the republican government guaranteeing a legal minimum of decent living conditions for all workers 'at the time of their employment'. This would obviously have the effect of making migrant labour more expensive and discouraging the inflow of the less skilled. It was evidently felt necessary to 'stress particularly that this compact will not lead to Slovenia's closing in on itself'.

The pre-war censuses (of 1921 and 1931) deliberately obfuscated national affiliation for political reasons. In each of the four post-war censuses, the Moslems have been recorded by radically different methodologies. As a result, the data are not comparable. There was also extensive movement between the categories 'Albanian' and 'Turk' in at least the first two post-war censuses, which, in combination with the substantial emigration of Turks, and in some cases 'Turks', to Turkey in the period up to 1965, makes the statistics for both these groups rather unsatisfactory. For an account of the methodological procedures employed in recording nationality at Yugoslav censuses, see Popis stanovništva i stanova 1971, vol.1, p.XIV-XVI.
however, was probably less imperfect than any of its predecessors in this respect. Indeed, it was probably the nearest thing to a free election that the Yugoslav peoples have experienced since the 1920s. Many Moslems who had previously felt it necessary to hide their ethnic affiliations behind one or other of the fig-leaves that had been thrust upon them in the past, now felt able to display themselves. In the result, the Moslem nation suddenly emerged as the strongest single ethnic community in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Their registered numbers also showed a sharp increase in Montenegro, and may have done so in Macedonia, were it not for local political pressure against them to identify as anything other than Macedonians. How much of their registered increase in Bosnia and Hercegovina in the post-war period has been due to a change in self-identification, and how much to their more favourable fertility and migration patterns would be impossible to assess with precision. However, it can be asserted with confidence that the relative gains of the Moslems have been a real trend and not a purely statistical artifice. Though the Moslem birth rate is now declining fairly rapidly, it is still substantially higher than that of either the Serbs or the Croats in Bosnia and Hercegovina, so that the

197 It was repeatedly emphasized by the highest political authorities in Bosnia and Hercegovina that Moslems were to feel absolutely free to so identify themselves. See, e.g., the article by the Bosnian party secretary, Hamdija Pozderac, in Komunist, 4 March 1971.

198 Cf. Table 10, Appendix C.

199 In the 1948 census, 37,000 Slavonic Macedonians identified their religion as Islam. These people have not emerged (or been permitted to emerge) as Moslems at subsequent censuses, as might have been expected by analogy with the situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina. For an account of their ethnic make-up and some of the pressures to which they have been subjected, see Mustafa Imamović 'Nesporazumi oko Muslimana', Gledišta, 1971, no.2, p.247. For the Macedonian view, see Nova Makedonija, 21 January and 14 February 1971.
relative advantage of the Moslems is bound to go on increasing in the future.\textsuperscript{200} It is also, of course, quite likely that more of them remain concealed as 'Yugoslavs', or even as Serbs, and that these people too may one day feel emboldened to declare themselves. Very large numbers of Serbs and Croats have left Bosnia and Hercegovina to settle in Serbia and Vojvodina and Croatia respectively in this century.\textsuperscript{201} The indications are that this trend is continuing, and that the relative strength of Serbs and Croats will be further diminished as a result. Moreover, while being the largest of the three main ethnic groups, the Moslems made the smallest contribution both to inter-republican and external emigration from Bosnia and Hercegovina.\textsuperscript{202} Given the combined effects of all these factors, it seems quite conceivable that at some stage in the future the Moslems will advance from their present 40% of the republic's population to becoming an absolute majority. In modern times, the Serbs have tended to assume that they were the majority nation in Bosnia and Hercegovina. It is possible that this assumption contributed to the decision to colonize Vojvodina with (among other people) Bosnian Serbs after World War II. If so, a serious strategic

\textsuperscript{200} Cf. footnote 12, above.

\textsuperscript{201} The numbers involved could not be quantified with any worthwhile degree of precision, but certainly run into the hundreds of thousands (without the recurring echo effects of transferred fertility). Cf. notes 28 to 30, above.

\textsuperscript{202} At least until 1961, the net outflow of Moslems from Bosnia and Hercegovina seems to have been negligible (cf. note 29, above). The 1971 Census results still suggest very modest net migratory outflows of Moslems from Bosnia and Hercegovina to Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, but it is possible that their numbers are now growing and are simply not adequately registered owing to the 'permanent residence' criterion. One estimate in 1970 put the total number of Moslems living in Slovenia and Croatia at 100,000 (VUS, 22 July 1970, p.22). A letter-writer to Vjesnik (7 May 1971) claimed there were over 100,000 Moslems in Croatia alone. According to the Census results, there were only 18,457 in Croatia and 3,231 in Slovenia. (Popis stanovništva i stanova 1971, vol.1, pp.24, 32.)
miscalculation was involved. The hold on Vojvodina was strengthened, but at the cost of demographic dominance in Bosnia. Like the Russians, the Serbs do not seem to have the numbers or the demographic or cultural dynamism to cement an empire. It really would appear that the republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina presents a case in which ethnically differentiated trends of fertility and migration have laid the foundations for a transfer of power from one ethnic group to another. Whether that transfer will take place remains of course to be seen. Certainly the one-time dominance of the Serb element in the republican party organization has been and is being greatly weakened; and presumably this process may go further yet, as the Serbs are still overrepresented in the party as a whole.

The position of Bosnia and Hercegovina in the Yugoslav state is crucial. Any partition of Yugoslavia, or division of the country into Western 'Catholic' and Eastern 'Orthodox' (or 'capitalist' and 'communist') spheres of influence, whether carried out by internal or external agents, would have to find some way of solving the problem of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Both of the main antagonists, the Croats and the Serbs, would probably claim it all, and any division of the spoils would leave both sides aggrieved. Both the

203 Shoup gives the following figures for the numbers of Serbs and 'Yugoslavs' in the 1948, 1954, 1959 and 1963 Bosnia and Hercegovina Central Committees: 31 and 5; 46 and 6; 49 and 7; 52 and 5. There were, in addition, 1,3,6 and 8 Moslems who gave their nationality as 'Serbian' in those same successive Central Committees. P. Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, pp.277-78. A name-count by the author of the 1974 Bosnia and Hercegovina Central Committee suggests that over one-third (a possible 35 out of 93) are Moslems (see the list in Komunist, 1 April 1974, p.11).

204 As of the first half of 1973, there were 75,515 Serbs, 43,709 Moslems and 15,716 Croats in the total membership of 143,577 (ibid). In 1971, Moslems formed 39.6%, Serbs 37.2% and Croats 20.6% of the Republican population. See Table 10, Appendix C.
Croat and Serb populations of the republic are concentrated to a large extent far away from the heartlands of the metropolitan republic. Bosnia and Hercegovina is inoperable. The emergence of the Moslems as the dominant ethno-demographic group in the area represents a great threat to Serb and Croat chauvinists alike. However, for all that it will place a severe strain on inter-ethnic relations in the Republic itself, it does paradoxically at the same time represent a ray of hope for the Yugoslav Federation. Serb and Croat nationalists would never agree about Bosnia and Hercegovina and would be (and are) dissatisfied by any arrangement that is struck. With the Moslems the largest single community there, and possibly one day to become an absolute majority, both are thwarted, and their claims to hegemony seem a little less justified and justifiable. Either side might, moreover, find it easier to reconcile itself to a common misfortune than one inflicted on it by the main adversary. Thus a Moslem majority in Bosnia and Hercegovina may strengthen the hand of moderate Serbs and Croats in the Republic. And in a post-Tito setting, the role of the Moslems as compromise custodians of positions of power at the Federal level may also become more significant, as the Moslem Bijedić’s lengthy tenure of the Premiership possibly suggests.

Outside Bosnia and Hercegovina (apart from the Macedonian communities) the main concentrations of Moslems are in the Sandžak area of Serbia and the adjoining communes over the border in Montenegro, where, until the last Census, their relative strength had been almost totally suppressed by official statistics. In several communes they are in a majority, and their overall strength is probably still greater than the most recent data suggest. Draža Mihajlović, the Četnik leader, was apparently planning to somehow dispose of this pocket of Moslem strength; and its strategic significance

205 On Mihajlović’s plans, see M. Hadžijahić, ‘Krivo svedočanstvo’ VUS, 26 August 1970. During the Second World War, the Sandžak area was the centre of particularly confused and violent exchanges between various armies and local bands of ethnic militants. Četnik and Moslem detachments were particularly heavily involved in communal reprisals in the area. See S. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia (London, 1971), Ch. 3.
has probably, for demographic reasons, increased since his time. The once ostensibly homogeneous Montenegrin republic, with its large and growing Moslem and Albanian minorities, and its own considerable exodus of Montenegrins (despite their relatively high — though declining — fertility, the absolute number of Montenegrins actually decreased within Montenegro between the last two censuses, mainly due to changes in ethnic self-identification, but also due to differential fertility and emigration to Serbia) now seems much less of an impenetrable fortress than it did formerly. And any renewed elaboration of what might be described as the Belgrade-Bar connection within Yugoslav politics could not rejoice at having in its intestines a wide band of territory that was largely peopled by an official Yugoslav nation with a republican stronghold of its own, and no particular sympathy for Serbo-Montenegrin interests. If the Moslems did acquire a controlling interest in Bosnia and Hercegovina, in the event of an ugly crisis threatening to lead to Yugoslavia's disintegration, a humane population exchange might then be possible that would inter alia achieve Mihajlović's objectives. It is a remote possibility, and one may hope that the contingency should not arise; but it would be even more remote were a Moslem Bosnia and Hercegovina never to crystallize.

Albanian fertility is now beginning to fall, but is still very high. For some time now, the differential population growth rates between Shiptar and non-Shiptar populations have been enormous. The Albanians' share of the total population of Yugoslavia is increasing rapidly and will continue to do so. In 1971, a group of researchers published a remarkable set of population projections by republic (province) and

206 They were 383,988 (81.4% of the total) in 1961, and only 355,608 (67.1%) in 1971. 'Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama', Statistički bilten 727, April 1972, p.8.

207 See Table 4, Appendix C, and notes 8 to 11, above.
nationality to the year 2030. According to these projections, by 2030, the Albanians would constitute 16% of the total population (compared with 4.9% in 1961); and according to one variant of their republican projections, the Kosovo Autonomous Province would number 6,769,000 in 2030 compared with 964,000 in 1961. As Kosovo is already the most densely populated region, the pressures that would result from anything even remotely approaching such a build-up would obviously be enormous. As the authors commented in their accompanying text: 'What repercussions all this will have had on earlier ethnic and republican borders, on the living standards of individual ethnic groups, and on relations between those groups, the future will reveal'.

The increase in the Moslem population projected by the group was an unwitting underestimate. Even so, they anticipated that the combined strength of Moslems and (the largely Mohammedan) Albanians by 2030 would be 25%. Clearly Yugoslav politics would be transformed by such a development.

The methodology of the group was faulty; and tendentious (no one in the group appeared to be either an Albanian or a Moslem). The effect of their methodological procedures was undoubtedly to inflate the estimated future number of Shiptars. The scientific wisdom of taking any


209 Žarković et al., op.cit., p.83.

210 They derived their figure for the Moslems from the 1961 Census results which, as later became apparent, greatly underestimated their real numbers. In consequence their projection for the Moslems for the year 2000 was only slightly higher than the figure revealed by the 1971 Census. But they continued extrapolating very rapid (and almost certainly unrealistic) increase rates for them to 2030. Ibid., p.81.
demographic projections more than 30 years into the future is in any case extremely dubious. Nonetheless, the projections do serve to bring out the seriousness of the changes that are taking place: both their objective seriousness, and the degree of anxiety felt about them by members of the 'declining' ethnic groups.

Even without extending projections too far into the future, and even allowing for further and fairly rapid decline in Albanian fertility, it is certain that some major shifts will occur. In Yugoslavia as a whole, for example, it is obvious that the Albanians will overhaul the Slovenians (as the Moslems have already done) and distance their particular rivals, the Macedonians. These developments can be confidently expected within a decade. Let us, therefore, concentrate our attention on that closer perspective, and consider the Albanian problem in its concrete regional setting.

First of all, the Albanian hold on the medieval centre of Serbian civilization, Kosovo, has now been strengthened to the point where it can no longer really be in doubt. The Serbs have probably never been a majority there in modern times, despite the efforts to colonize the area in this century. And now the fertility scissors and the high emigration of

211 The projections by nationality were based on crude assumptions about future trends in natural increase rates, and assume that even in 2030, Albanian and Moslem natural increase rates will be much higher (17% and 11%) than those of the other ethnic groups. Their republican projections assumed no decline in the fertility of the more fertile after the year 2000 on the strange logic that as this decline could not be foreseen so far in advance, it would be better not to make any assumptions about it. And while they refer to their estimates as projections, they speak about them constantly as though they were ineluctable certainties which could only be forestalled by vigorous policy interventions. See especially pp 20 and ff., 79.
Serbs from the area are ensuring that Albanian dominance will go on increasing by leaps and bounds. At the 1961 Census, the Albanians were 69% and the Serbs 24% of the population. By 1971, their respective proportions had become 74% and 18% respectively. The absolute Serbian numbers are stagnating, despite a Serbian birth rate in Kosovo that is well in excess of the Serbian national average. In May 1968 the prominent Serbian author, Dobrica Ćosić, and the historian, Jovan Marjanović, were summarily removed from the Serbian Central Committee for attempting to raise, among other matters, the question of the Serbian exodus from Kosovo. Both had prior 'records' as Serbian nationalists, and it is possible that their expulsion was effectively for an accumulation of offences, and not just for that particular episode. However, it is easy to see their point of view in some measure; and hard to see, on the other hand, how a situation could have been long maintained in which the nationalist concerns of the largest national group were a grounds for excommunication, whilst elsewhere the party organs of the smaller republics were in some cases consecrating nationalist arguments as party orthodoxy.

The Serbian decline in Kosovo seems bound to continue until their proportion of the population falls below 10%. Not long ago they were a disproportionately influential one.

212 The complete stagnation of the Serbian population in Kosovo (227,000 in 1961, 228,000 in 1971), in combination with the relatively higher fertility of the Serbs in the area (GFR 130 in 1961, cf. 75 for Yugoslavia as a whole in the same year, (Fertilitet ženskog stanovništva 1950-1967, p.22) suggests either high emigration, or changes in ethnic self-identification, or both. The 1971 Census recorded a net migratory balance of 49,000 Serbs from Kosovo (plus 6,000 Montenegrins from Kosovo), cf. note 28, above. See also 'Uzroci migracije stanovništva', Politika, 22 June 1971, transl. in Osteuropa, vol.XXII (1972), no.3, p.A196-97.

213 Borba, 30 May 1968.
quarter, with much higher representation than that in the party and all other important spheres of life. Now the hold of ethnic Albanians over the local party organization is secure, and likely to strengthen further with time.  

This remarkable transformation raises the question of how long Kosovo can be held down to its present status of Autonomous Province within the Republic of Serbia, and the Albanians to their status of narodnost (as opposed to narod), in the face of local pressures for recognition as a Republic and greater autonomy. The reasons for denying them that status are being stripped of their plausibility all the time by the Shiptar's great demographic dynamism. Soon they will be the fourth most numerous ethnic group in Yugoslavia and their province the fourth most populous territorial unit. In this context, it is relevant to ask what may be the long-term consequences of the Kosovo authorities' rapprochement with Tirana. It is also highly apposite to the Kosovo question that the Albanians are making similar silent conquests in the adjoining Republic of Macedonia. Let us turn to review the situation there.

In 1953, Serbs and Albanians made up 38.5% and 46.8% of Kosovo's party membership respectively. In 1968, the figures had become 31.4% and 54.9%, and in 1973, 26.51% and 61.49%. The Albanian component in central party organs in Kosovo in 1974 ranged between 2/3 and 3/4. Between 1968 and 1972, party membership in the province actually dropped from 50,316 to 43,916. Presumably Serbs made up a large proportion of the drop-outs and expellees. See Shoup, op.cit., p.272; and Komunist, 1 April 1974. See also note 167, above.

On the development of republican and autonomist aspirations, see R. King, Minorities under Communism, esp. p.137 and ff.; and L. Zanga, 'Jugoslawische Nationalitätenpolitik im Fall Kosovo', Osteuropa, XXV (1975), p.503. The 1974 Constitution goes some of the way towards granting Kosovo republican status. Meanwhile autonomist pressures continue, e.g., for further increasing the status of the Albanian language within the province, and for preventing any discrimination against people who do not know Serbo-Croatian. See Politika, 6 March 1976, p.6.

These aspects of the problem will be further discussed in section 5.f, below.
In 1961, the Albanians formed 13% of the Macedonian republic's population, whilst their total numbers in Yugoslavia as a whole were below that of the Macedonians. By 1971, there were 1,310,000 Albanians in Yugoslavia as compared with 1,195,000 Macedonians, and their percentage of the Macedonian Republic's population had increased to 17%, while the Macedonians had declined from 71% to 69%. In the immediate post-war period, Macedonian fertility was also very high, but it has now fallen very rapidly to something little above replacement level. Albanian fertility meanwhile remains high and a period of sharply differential ethnic growth has thus been set in motion. This raises a particularly disturbing prospect in the western communes, including the area around the capital of Skopje. In some of these communes, the Albanians form a large majority. Their areas of settlement form a kind of pincer formation threatening Skopje, in which city they already have a substantial minority. The Turks of Macedonia, despite considerable emigration to Turkey up until the most recent period, are also displaying great demographic resilience.

217 Cf. footnote 11, above. In 1972, there were less than twice as many Macedonians born in Macedonia as Albanians: 20,751 Macedonians, and 11,323 Albanians (Demografska statistika 1972, p.147). By contrast, the 1971 Census revealed for the age-group 20-24, that there were more than five times as many Macedonians as Albanians in the Republic (110,746 as against 21,674), Popis stanovništva i stanova 1971, vol.1, p.28. Thus within a generation, a cohort ratio of more than 5 to 1 will be replaced by one of less than 2 to 1 in schools, on the labour market, etc.

218 The Turks' absolute numbers declined substantially during the inter-censal period 1961-71, but it is likely that their total was overstated in 1961, as a result of Albanians giving their nationality as Turkish in order to facilitate emigration to Turkey. It is not clear how much emigration to Turkey is still going on. In the period after 1965, Turks from Macedonia would have been more likely to emigrate to Western Europe. In any case, over 57,000 of their total of 108,552 in Macedonia are under the age of 20, which is suggestive of a continuing demographic vigour. Cf. note 220, below. There may also be a large (and rapidly growing) number of Gipsies in Macedonia who would welcome recognition as a distinct ethnic group. Cf. note 385, below.
It seems quite likely that more of them could ultimately be assimilated by the Albanians than by the Macedonians, since they share with the former their Moslem faith and a similar socio-economic pattern, as well as being concentrated geographically in the same areas. The Macedonians are thus faced with a serious and (literally) growing national minority problem, one that is complicated by the fact that the 'minority' is really an overwhelming majority in the area adjacent to the potentially irredentist country, Albania. Threatened by Bulgarian ambitions under possible Soviet sponsorship from one side, the Macedonians are exposed to an equal or possibly even greater potential pressure from the Albanians in the West. Albania has a somewhat comic-opera standing in the eyes of most students of world affairs. It should, therefore, be recalled, perhaps, that the total population of Albanians in the Balkans is now well in excess of 4 million: that that population is neatly concentrated in and just adjacent to the borders of the Albanian state; and that it can be confidently anticipated that by the end of this century, the total numbers of Albanians will be approaching the present numbers of Bulgarians, Greeks or Serbs. Other factors may limit its strategic capacity; but the demographic factor seems to be laying the foundation for Albania's ultimate emergence on the Balkan scene as a country of a significance more comparable with that of its neighbours. Both Serbia (or Serbo-Montenegro) and Macedonia are threatened by this foreshadowed development. The Serbs will probably have to accept defeat in Kosovo, indeed perhaps have already done so, up to a point. But the Macedonians can scarcely afford any such magnanimity. It is not accidental, to borrow a phrase, that the most resolutely and unapologetically Malthusian demographic commentators in Yugoslavia today are Macedonians.

218a Cf. note 168, above.
219 Cf. note 266, below.
Macedonia's tenuous grasp on statehood is under growing pressure. The distribution of the Albanian minority within the republic makes border adjustments an extremely painful prospect, and one that any Macedonian politicians will probably always reject. With their own demographic resources they will be unable to counter the Albanian advance. Even an effective differential population policy starting to work well immediately would not do more than mitigate the problem, and resettlement schemes could scarcely achieve more. Emigration of the remaining Turks might help slightly, but the numbers of Macedonians available for settlement in their place are necessarily limited. If, in this situation, Albanian agitation within the Yugoslav Federation for a readjustment of boundaries in favour of Kosovo were ever to gather strength, the Macedonians might conceivably feel pushed in the direction of a flirtation with the Bulgarians, who have a similar problem with Moslem minorities and a similar attitude towards them. Moreover, the Bulgarians have some spare Macedonians (though they are at present pretending not to have), and could in any case serve to provide a powerful counterweight to the Albanians. The only danger, from a

220 Between 1960 and 1966 (inclusive) 42,607 of the registered total of 73,291 official emigrants were headed for Turkey. The largest single number (14,528) left for Turkey in 1960 (Migracije stanovništva Jugoslavije, p.89). Presumably emigration to Turkey would continue to be included in 'official' emigration statistics. (In any case, Turkey is not listed as a recipient of 'temporary' emigrants from Yugoslavia in the 1971 Census results). That being so, it may be relevant to note that official emigration has tailed off to virtually nothing since 1969 (514 in 1971, 262 in 1972, Demografska statistika 1972, p.29). The Turkish government is in any case unlikely to welcome immigrants from any source at present, as they have their own severe 'returnee' problem, and are already accepting some Turks from Bulgaria (about whom they seem to have some political and economic reservations). See RFE Research Bulgaria/28, 16 October 1969, and Bulgarian Situation Report/13, 28 April 1976, p.5.
Macedonian point of view, would be whether such a counterweight might not be positively crushing. Here again, we are looking rather a long way ahead. But that may be what some Macedonians are doing.

Meanwhile the Macedonians, in striking contrast to the seven times more numerous Serbs, have been rather stern with their national minorities. Before the 1971 Census, they announced firmly and repeatedly that none of their Macedonian-speaking Moslems felt any kinship with the newly emergent nation of Yugoslav Moslems; meanwhile, the party line in Bosnia and Hercegovina was affirming that absolutely no restrictions were to be placed on the right of those of Moslem ethno-cultural origins to so identify themselves. The numbers of Macedonian Slavonic Moslems who would wish separate ethnic identity for themselves may not be very great. But their repression by the Macedonian authorities

221 Compare the discussion in 5.f, below.

222 The Macedonians were opposed to the emergence of a Moslem nation in Bosnia and Hercegovina and Yugoslavia, presumably because it would diminish their relative standing in the federation, as well as complicating their internal policy towards Slavonic (and possibly other) Moslems in Macedonia itself. Cf. note 199, above. See also, Borba, 12 September 1970, Nova Makedonia, 24 December 1970, and 'Muslimani: nacija ili vera?', NIN, 7 February 1971.

223 Supposing that the 1948 Census figure of 37,000 Slavonic Moslems in Macedonia represented something like a full count, and supposing that some thousands emigrated to Turkey (as suggested by Imanović in 'Nesporazumi oko Muslimana', cited in note 199, above), their numbers might now be somewhere around 50,000. Some may not be identifying themselves for Census purposes as Macedonians. But few are in any case stating that they are ethnic Moslems: 3,002 in 1961, 1,248 in 1971 (Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama', p.9). These figures in fact seem scarcely sufficient to account for Bosnian or Sandžak Moslems who have migrated to Macedonia. (The 1971 Census results indicate that of Macedonia's 1,248 Moslems, 987 are immigrants to the republic (Popis stanovništva i stanova 1971, vol.1, p.80). Until a census without political pressures is conducted in Macedonia, the 'true' number of Moslems will remain something of an enigma.
is at least symptomatic of the latter's ethno-demographic anxieties.\textsuperscript{224}

Thus recapitulating the overall picture, we have the Slovenians and Croats with low fertility and severe migratory imbalances, and a consequent anxiety about national survival and the future ethnic composition of their republics; bloodless transformations in Bosnia and Hercegovina and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, both at the expense of the largest Yugoslav nationality, the Serbs; the stirings of what may some day become a more severe problem in Montenegro; and a crisis situation building up in Macedonia. Serbia proper and the Province of the Vojvodina are the only areas in which demographic change - though acutely alarming to many Serbs (and Hungarians) is not obviously a serious destabilizing influence on the tenuous local calm of ethnic relations.

At the level of the Federation also, serious adjustments will be necessary if conflict is to be avoided in the future. Several of the regional ethno-demographic problems have international implications of great potential gravity.\textsuperscript{225} And it seems obvious that as time goes on, either the Moslems and Albanians will be accepted into progressively more equal partnership with the Slavonic 'Christians', or trouble will brew. Should the Serbs (with or without Montenegrin co-operation) or the Croats ever choose

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{224} It is also possible that the Macedonians are eager to forestall any claim to ethnic separateness by Moslem Macedonians in Bulgaria. Just after the war, the Bulgarian authorities published data suggesting that there were 32,399 Macedonian, 3,184 Bulgarian, 3,735 Mohammedan-Macedonian, and 385 Turkish children attending school in the area of Bulgaria known as Pirin Macedonia. These figures would seem to imply that some 10\% of the Bulgarian Macedonians were Moslems. The proportion may well have increased since. 'Na silu Bugari', \textit{NIN}, 28 December 1975, p.38 at p.39.
\item \textsuperscript{225} Compare the discussion in 5.f., below.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
to defend their threatened ethno-national interests by political or other coercion, the ultimate consequences for Yugoslavia and the world would indeed be difficult to foresee.

5.e Ideology

In the initial post-war years, Yugoslavia took over the entire Soviet ideological corpus with virtually no modification. Even after the break with Stalin in 1948, the Yugoslavs strove for some time to be more doctrinally pure than their excommunicators. The subsequent growth of self-management, non-alignment and other heresies in the 1950s, however, does not seem to have initially affected the official approach to population questions, which remained orthodoxy Stalinist. Thus, in the late 1950s, we still find newspaper articles with titles like 'We're living six years longer',226, 'A land of young people',227 or 'The dynamism of the contemporary Yugoslav; our population growing more strongly all the time'.228

Data from the field of vital statistics are encouraging, for they prove that the post-war development and growth of our population are marked by a progressive upsurge...Yugoslavia belongs to a group of countries of exceptionally high natality, occupying in this respect second place in Europe.229

In fact, in the year in which these words were written, three of Yugoslavia's eight republics and provinces already had Net Reproduction Ratios below replacement level

226 'Živimo šest godina duže', Vjesnik, 3 June 1957.
227 'Zemlja mladih ljudi', Vjesnik, 18 August 1957.
228 'Dinamizam savremenog Jugoslovena: sve jače kretanje našeg stanovništva', Oslobodjenje, 12 July 1959.
229 Vjesnik, 18 August 1957.
But even when pockets of the 'white plague' were perceived and acknowledged to exist, it was held nonetheless that there 'diminution of natality and depopulation have remained as a grave legacy (težko nasledje) of the past'.

By the early 1960s, however, an awareness was beginning to grow that the old verities were of limited cognitive and practical value. Concern about demographic problems increased. In 1962, an Institute for Demographic Research was established in Belgrade, and early in 1963 there appeared the first issue of a quarterly demographic journal, Stanovništvo. Both of these developments were explained in terms of 'the seriousness and complexity of the present demographic situation'. As the old beliefs faded, a more down-to-earth and empirical approach took their place. Similar developments occurred at about the same time in some other European Socialist countries, and later, to a considerable extent, in the Soviet Union itself. But the Yugoslavs are probably justified in claiming that 'while the dogmatic approach to problems of population and employment did not bypass our country either, we did free ourselves of it


231 Oslobodjenje, 12 July 1959.

232 From an editorial note appended to the first issue of Stanovništvo, in which the reasons for its formation were outlined. An item in the same issue gave a similar explanation for the decision to establish the Centre for Demographic Research, mentioning both 'inherited' and 'new' demographic problems that Yugoslavia was confronted with, and emphasizing, among other things, the regrettable divergences in demographic behaviour arising in different regions of the country. See Stanovništvo, vol.I, no.1, p.134.
more quickly and radically than the other socialist countries'.

This proposition needs to be qualified, however. A distinction has to be drawn between the official approach to domestic and international population problems. Domestically, very little remains of the old mercantilist and anti-Malthusian attitudes. For international consumption, however, after a phase of neo-Malthusianism, the Yugoslav line is again Marxist and anti-Malthusian. Accordingly our discussion of Yugoslav demographic ideology shall differentiate between these two planes.

Domestically, since the repudiation of the Stalinist law of population under Socialism, it has been accepted that rapid population growth is neither inevitable in Socialist countries in general, nor in fact actually happening in the Yugoslav case. It is no longer maintained or implied that there are any important and inherent differences between demographic processes in socialist and non-socialist countries. Insofar as pockets of high natural increase still exist in Yugoslavia, or insofar as the echoes of past natality booms continue to plague the labour market, it is conceded that this is not an advantage. Socialism is not held to automatically ensure full and efficient employment; and the potential

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233 T. Mulina, 'Tretman stanovništva i radne snage u kontekstu privrednog razvoja Jugoslavije', Belgrade Population Policy Conference 1973, mimeographed paper, p.2. As Mulina himself has pointed out, however, having freed themselves of Stalinist dogma on employment, the Yugoslav authorities succumbed to an antithetical tendency to blithely ignore the social consequences of imposing tighter criteria for labour productivity on a country with surplus labour power and a demographic boom of school-leavers. Cf. the discussion in 5.b., above.

234 In 1964, the party daily Borba devoted a lengthy round-table discussion to the declining birth rate. See 'Zašto opada natalitet', Borba, 2 and 3 February 1964.
conflict between high employment and low efficiency is an issue that is always more or less squarely faced. The old mercantilist hostility to emigration has largely vanished, though traces of it do appear at times in the officially-sponsored campaign to draw the economic emigrants of the last decade back into the fold of Yugoslav society. Stupendous or exceptional advances in life expectancy are no longer claimed or expected, and public attention is just as likely to be focussed on increases in mortality in certain male age-groups, or on the relatively high rates of infant mortality that still persist in some parts of the country. In a word, myths have been supplanted by pragmatic good sense.\textsuperscript{235}

Official interest in population theory at the domestic level remains low, however. The Stalinist doctrine on population has not been succeeded by anything either as primitive or as coherent. And while some demographers seem prepared to explore the void that has been left,\textsuperscript{236} it would not appear that leading Party figures or theorists have any such ambitions. Rather than an official theory of population, we now have official theories about various matters pertaining to population. Received views on such questions as the family, abortion and contraception, sex education, the role of women in society and the home or the administration of social policy have all undergone considerable change in recent years, but in no case does it appear that

\textsuperscript{235} Here, of course, one is speaking of non-specialist comment in the media. As the 1960s advanced, its celebratory, propagandist content declined, and the terse, sober judgements of technical demographers became more and more prominent.

\textsuperscript{236} See, e.g., J. Klaزهر, 'Jedan aspekt ocjenjivanja potrebe za populacionom politikom u Jugoslaviji', \textit{Stanovni\v{s}tvo}, vol.VI (1968), nos 1-2, p.5 at pp.7-8.
numerical demographic concerns were a decisive factor in
determining the direction of change.  

As in the case of the Soviet Union, it is intriguing
to speculate on whether this relative reticence is due rather
to a lack of demographic interest or understanding on the
part of the authorities (and a relegation of demographic
matters to a relatively low level of priority), or to their
sense that these issues are so potentially divisive that it
were better to keep them out of ideological discussions and
decision-making as far as possible. While demographic trends
and indeed a rubric known as 'population policy' now figure
prominently in Yugoslav planning documents, the demographic
element has been largely absent from current political debates
and press reporting on economic problems, regional development
and differentiation, etc. - at least since 1972.  

Given the

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237 Here, emigration and employment policies constitute
a partial exception. The reversal on emigration policy
after 1972 was to some extent motivated by demographic
concerns - the anxieties of particular republics and
ethnic groups about their shrinking substance, and of the
military about their declining manpower. Similarly,
employment policy in recent years has been more closely
g geared to soaking up some of the labour surplus. But
in both cases such action was overdue and politically
imperative. No particular demographic insight or
viewpoint was required on the part of the decision­
makers. Nor were their actions justified in terms of any
notions about 'socialist' population trends or values.

238 The draft Long-term Development Plan of Yugoslavia to
1985 (published as a supplement to Borba, 26 October 1974)
contains a section entitled 'Population and Employment',
and a sub-section within that entitled 'The Basis of
Population Policy'.

239 For a dramatic illustration of the change in tone that
occurred in the press after 1971, compare, for example,
the article 'Rubrika: nacionalnost' (VUS, 7 June 1972)
with almost any article on demographic themes published
in the same weekly over the period 1970-71. From one or
two hints contained in the later article it emerges
clearly that inflammatory nationalist writing about
Croatian demographic problems had in the meantime been
simply banned. Some academic observers on the other hand
have continued after 1971 to stress the demographic element
in economic problems. See footnotes 263, 264 and 266,
below.
density and passion of the demographic reporting in 1971 (the year both of the nationalities crisis focused in Croatia and the last census), this seems to confirm that enforced self-restraint on these issues is at least an implicit element in the compact struck between regional interests in the aftermath of Tito's letter of September 1972. It is particularly significant that in recent years the party daily and weekly, Borba and Kommunist, have contained very few feature articles on demographic problems. Thus the vagueness and implicit nature of domestic population doctrine probably indicates above all a desire by the authorities to maintain an ideological stance broad enough to straddle all Yugoslavia's competing ethnic and regional particularisms. This conclusion is reinforced by a consideration of the official approach to global population problems, as we shall now see.  

At the international level, official doctrines on population have been rather more explicit and clear-cut. By the 1960s, Yugoslavia was following policies that were clearly divergent from those of Soviet bloc countries and rather more attuned to prevailing sentiment in the leading non-aligned nations, notably Egypt and India. While not

240 This same conclusion is also supported by a consideration of trends in domestic population policies at the federal and republican levels. See 5.g., below.

241 For a Yugoslav perspective on the development of international co-operation (and conflict) in the population sphere, see Hristina Pop-Antoska, 'Razvoj pogleda na populacionu politiku sa osvrtom na planiranje porodice u Ujedinjenim Nacijama' (sic), Naše teme, 1974, no.4, p.603.

242 Tito cultivated particularly close relations with Nehru and Nasser, together with whom he formed at one time a kind of Big Three of the non-aligned world. As both Egypt and India were particularly plagued by population pressures, and among the first Third World countries to recognize the fact, it seems likely that Tito and Yugoslavia's conversion to neo-Malthusianism in the 1960s stemmed partly from their influence.
sharing their neo-Malthusian alarms for domestic purposes, the Yugoslav government, and President Tito personally, became involved with Third World countries and leaders engaged in efforts to make the family planning movement fully respectable, and to secure international financial and technical assistance for it. Tito was an original signatory (and the only Socialist signatory) of the Statement by Heads of State on Population issued by the UN Secretary U Thant on 10 December 1966.

This document, prepared at the initiative of Mr John D. Rockefeller of the Population Council, and also signed by, among others, Mrs Ghandi and President Nasser, was markedly neo-Malthusian in vocabulary and sentiment. After first briefly characterizing the unique character of the modern population explosion, the Statement declared firstly, that population problems must be treated as 'a principal element' in economic management; secondly, that the right to decide on numbers and spacing of children was a 'basic human right'; thirdly, that international peace depended on a solution being found to 'the challenge of population growth'; and fourthly, that the objective of family planning was the enrichment of human life, not its restriction.

By the time of the 3rd UN World Population Conference held in Bucharest in 1974, however, the official Yugoslav position had been transformed. In official statements made in connection with the Conference, the neo-Malthusian concern and emphasis on international co-operation of the 1966 Statement

243 It is not to be excluded that Yugoslavia's international neo-Malthusian contacts (coupled with the urban labour surplus making itself felt at about the same time, in the mid-1960s) did give a considerable fillip to the Yugoslav family planning movement, which established itself during this period as the pressure group most influential in determining the direction of Yugoslav domestic population policies. Cf. 5.g., below.

244 For a complete text of the Statement, see Studies in Family Planning no.16 (January 1967).
are replaced by anti-Malthusianism and a clear orientation towards the more radical and confrontationist Third World countries. Family planning, while still held to be an inalienable human right, is no longer regarded as having a 'principal' role to play in economic development. The central problem, it is maintained, is to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth within the international community. Population is scarcely mentioned at all, and then only in later paragraphs, in a fading, deprecating inflection. It is suggested that population problems will only be solved when 'the root of all evil', the neo-colonial system, is radically transformed. There is even a slight tendency to treat the Third World population explosion as a kind of bargaining counter.

The reasons for this marked change of line are, of course, political rather than intellectual. At the time of the 1966 Statement, relations between Western neo-Malthusians and Third World governments concerned about domestic population growth rates were just beginning to flourish. Governments and international agencies everywhere seemed to be overcoming their past resistance to the idea of world-wide fertility control campaigns. Since that time, however, the climate

245 See, for example, President Tito's message to the Bucharest Conference (UN World Population Conference Press Release POP/CONF/10 August 19, 1974); the report on the head of the Yugoslav delegation, Deputy Premier Anton Vratuša's address to the Conference in Borba, 22 August 1974; and the interview with Vratuša, 'Sve nas je više, ali izlaz postoji', VUS, 11 September 1974.

246 'The developing countries...feel more clearly all the time that there can be no solution and no way out within the framework imposed by the capitalist socio-economic system and the present order of international economic relations. Logically and naturally, it is sought to begin solving the population problem 'at the root of all evil', at the level of the system itself, which has fallen into a profound crisis and must be changed.' Anton Vratuša, in VUS, 11 September 1974.

247 For an account of these developments, see Symonds and Carder, op.cit., Chs 12-14.
has changed markedly. The Soviet bloc countries, for example, after initially softening their traditional anti-Malthusian stance in the mid-1960s, have tended to revert again towards their hard-line position of the 1950s. China, despite its domestic anti-natalism of recent years, vigorously opposes international initiatives in the area of fertility control. And many of the more radical non-aligned Third World countries, including some who are domestically strongly anti-natalist, have come increasingly to resent what they see as excessive Western concentration on this issue. These countries prefer to direct their efforts in the international arena towards securing a reordering of priorities away from population programs. Exploiting their growing voting strength in international forums, they have organized the campaign towards the establishment of the New Economic Order, to which all other issues are increasingly subordinated. By the time of the Bucharest Population Conference in 1974, many Third World countries were maintaining that the population issue was a red herring, a minor irrelevancy, and should be so regarded even at a conference expressly devoted to population.\(^\text{248}\)

A Yugoslav source suggests that the reason for the growing discord on international population problems after 1967 lay in changes of policy on the Western side - the increasing insistence by the US and the World Bank on the pre-eminent importance of fertility control.\(^\text{249}\) Certainly Third World resistance to international initiatives in this area seems to have increased in direct proportion to growing governmental commitment to them in the West. And the attitude of the World Bank and its president, Robert Macnamara, was at least the occasion for the sharp debates on the subject

\(^{248}\) See J. Finkle and B. Crane, \textit{op.cit.}

\(^{249}\) Pop-Antoska, \textit{op.cit.}, p.617.
in the UN in 1970. But given the relatively small proportion of international aid made available in the form of population programs, and given the strongly Malthusian attitudes taken by many of the resisting governments domestically, it would appear that for the international fraternity of 'anti-Malthusians', as for Yugoslavia, the decisive argument against expanding international population programs is not scepticism as to their efficacy, but rather an emotional reaction to 'genocidal' pressures, coupled with the shrewd insight that the issue is one that can be converted into political capital, and therefore, perhaps, into even greater economic benefit than the most elaborate family planning programs could ever bring.

250 Symons and Carder, op.cit., pp.181-83.

251 Though the proportion of all aid going to population programs worldwide increased rapidly during the late 1960s and early 1970s, it had not reached much more than 2½% of the whole at the time of the Bucharest Conference. See United Nations World Population Conference 1974, E/CONF.60/CBP/24, The Role of International Assistance in the Population Fields, Annex Table 1. It has been estimated that in 1971, the major international donors contributed no more than one-tenth of the cost of the fertility control programs then in operation in developing countries (and these are widely held to be modest enough in scope). See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Population Policies and Economic Development (Baltimore, 1974), pp.80-81.

252 W. Parker Mauldin et al., in their 'Report on Bucharest' identify Yugoslavia, together with the domestically anti-natalist India and Egypt, as belonging to a group of countries consistently opposing references in the draft World Population Plan of Action to population problems and population policies, substituting instead references to the need for social and economic development and a new international economic order. This group evidently also emphasized the need to avoid any kind of coercion at either the national or international levels - a piquant detail in view of India's recent draconian steps in national population policy. See Mauldin et al., op.cit., pp.371-72.
Thus it seems very likely that Yugoslavia, long a pillar of the non-aligned movement and always eager to play a leading role in it, was tugged along by the trend of opinion among its Third World associates. And indeed, the interview with the head of the Yugoslav delegation to Bucharest cited above makes it clear that political rather than substantive considerations were paramount. Vratusa speaks with satisfaction of the prestige accruing to Yugoslavia from its participation in the conference and points out that thanks to skilled organization and caucusing, the non-aligned countries were able to 'impose' their will on the developed nations. The intellectual disingenuousness of the official line emerged rather clearly in two articles published on the occasion of the Bucharest Conference in the party daily, Borba. The first of them, significantly entitled 'Population - a Worry for the World' reproduced a number of statistics on world population growth, food production, etc., and while not neglecting the injustices of the international economic order altogether, emphasized the sui generis nature of the population problem and the gravity of its implications.

253 'With such prestige all doors were open to us; all delegations were ready to co-operate with us and sought our co-operation. We took, if I may say so, full advantage of this.' VUS, 11 September 1974.

254 'At this conference we witnessed the transition of militant opposition into an active posture, and I think that this is an important result of the Bucharest Conference. The developing countries succeeded in imposing their view because they were organized and united in their activities and submissions.' Ibid. It should be noted that the word 'impose' (nametnuti) used by Vratauša on this occasion is a very negative one in Yugoslav political vocabulary, being usually used to describe the hegemonist activities of East or West. World population problems are evidently now seen essentially in terms of Lenin's kto kogo.

The second of them, which appeared just a fortnight later, during the conference, was entitled, equally significantly, 'A Battle between Rich and Poor', and presented the population problem as being basically a minor aspect and byproduct of the unjust international economic order. The tone and vocabulary of the article were martial; the content was oversimplified, political, sloganizing, and quite bereft of any demographic content whatsoever. 256

It might appear from the foregoing that the Yugoslav ideological position on international population problems has edged back very close to that of the Soviet Union. 257 This is in a sense true. While this trend may reflect in some degree the general shift towards Moscow in the year or two after 1972 (a movement since arrested), it should be emphasized that differences between the Yugoslav and Soviet views on world population problems remain. Yugoslav spokesmen tend to be more moderate in their formulations, more insistent on family planning as a basic human right, and more prepared to give qualified support to international fertility control programs. 258


257 For an example of anti-Malthusianism worthy of the best the Soviet Union could offer, see Željka Zalar, 'Maltuzianizam i ekologija', Naše teme 1973, no.4, p.886. This piece is actually a review of an article which appeared in the Paris journal, La pensée. But the reviewer clearly endorses the original, which declares, for example, that the Club of Rome's Malthusian recipes are actually intended 'to worsen the living conditions of the working classes'. Their machinations need to be 'unmasked'. Only socialism can etc. This kind of crude propaganda is rare in Naše teme, a serious journal, and is in fact well to the left of the official Yugoslav line in its most recent hard-line version.

258 Yugoslavia has also maintained a distinct stance politically, caucusing and voting with its non-aligned allies, and not with the Soviet bloc. See Mauldin et al., op.cit., pp.363, 372.
Notwithstanding the gulf that has grown up between their domestic and international ideological attitudes to population problems, one feels reluctant to castigate the Yugoslavs for their opportunism. Given their special political circumstances, cast adrift between the mercies of the Brezhnev and Sonnenfeldt doctrines, they can scarcely be reproached for seeking to maintain those of their international links which seem to offer them some measure of security. Moreover, there is a level at which their domestic and international doctrines are in unity. Both at home and abroad, they maintain that it is the obligation of the more developed to further the growth of the less developed. The New International Economic Order has its domestic counterpart in the ideological principle of solidarity, and the practice of redirecting funds towards the backward regions of the country. At home, as well as abroad, the Yugoslavs proclaim family planning and the knowledge and means essential to its implementation to be basic human rights. And most important of all, both internationally and domestically they consistently adhere to the principle that no pressure should be put on countries or republics (or provinces) with high population growth rates to reduce their natality as a precondition for receiving aid from those better off. This, of course, is a principle which reflects credit on their political prudence as well as on their generosity of spirit. If the Federal authorities in Yugoslavia were to put pressure on the Kosovo leadership to slow down the Albanian birth-rate or forfeit aid from the Fund for Undeveloped Republics and Regions, the most likely result would be a tidal wave of irredentism quite possibly reaching even the high land of the province's central party organs. But whatever their motives, the Yugoslav counsel of respecting sovereignty, supplying generous development funds, and also supplying the means to fertility control without obtrusive advice on whether, why, or how to use it, may still be the wisest available, both for their own purposes and for the world beyond.
Insofar as Yugoslav population doctrines are schizophrenic, they are in any case a faithful reflection of the national make-up. Yugoslavia, as the clichés always have it, is a bridge between East and West, between state socialism and democracy, between Europe and Asia, between Christendom and Islam, between developed and undeveloped, between rich and poor, between the haves and have-nots. These contrasts have their embodiment within Yugoslavia in the form of sharp regional differentiation. They also find reflection within the loose orthodoxy of the ruling League of Communists, and even, at times, within the minds of individual Yugoslav theorists and activists. It is not in the least surprising, that while on the one hand struggling to gain admission to the affluent economic elite of Western Europe and North America, Yugoslavia also feels a strong bond of sympathy with the downtrodden and dispossessed of the world. The summary manner in which, for example, Yugoslavia's vital exports of anything ranging from meat to manpower are abruptly curtailed by Western European nations whose economies and polities are infinitely stronger, would be quite sufficient explanation on its own for any inconsistencies of self-identification on her part. The needs and problems of the non-aligned and Third World countries seem to make little enough impression on the Western powers. Accordingly when something arises which does seem to seize their imaginations and make them anxious - namely the population explosion - it is not surprising that the exploders rejoice in the fact, even if the negative consequences of the detonation will be mainly theirs to bear. In this respect, one sometimes has the feeling that Yugoslav commentators are almost sorry they do not themselves have a population explosion large enough
to excite the apprehension of their more opulent neighbours to the West.\textsuperscript{259}

This brief review of Yugoslav ideological pronouncements and attitudes on population questions would be incomplete without some reference to less official strands of thought that obtrude from time to time. It was said earlier that official thinking, particularly at the domestic level, is unsystematic, less than fully coherent, and given only limited prominence in official pronouncements and the media. In any case, despite the greater restrictions of recent years, Yugoslavia is, of course, far more tolerant of heterodoxy than any of the Soviet bloc countries.

The usual theoretical framework of demographic writing in Yugoslavia is vaguely Marxist. But sometimes the Marxist element is totally lacking;\textsuperscript{260} and at other times it is a critical Marxism which displays little patience

\textsuperscript{259} The attitude of some Third World governments to their population explosions resembles at times that of a peasant farmer who is troubled by a marauding rogue elephant which threatens his crops and his very life: when the peasant perceives that his landlord is also alarmed by the elephant and believes it to be subject in some way to the peasant's control, he is overjoyed that he has at last found something that inspires fear and a kind of respect in the heart of his oppressor. Compare the following phrase from a Yugoslav commentary on world population problems: 'to diminish the "explosion" of which, it seems, it is only the developed nations who are afraid' (NIN, 18 August 1974, p.34).

\textsuperscript{260} Yugoslav commentators not fully alerted to the correct 'line' on world population are apt to take a common-sense view of it, identifying it as a severe and pressing problem without any particular political colouration. This is presumably the explanation for the contradictory pair of articles in Borba at the time of the Bucharest Conference. Specialists are naturally particularly prone to neglect ideological niceties. Accounts of the recent demographic history of the world and of the Third World population explosion nearly always read as though they might have been written by any member of the international scholarly community. See, e.g., (cont.)
with such of the old orthodoxies as still linger in the Soviet bloc, and is equally severe about the inadequacies of official Yugoslav thinking.

But more significantly, there are periodic manifestations of an at times virulent Malthusianism. Since 1972, these outbursts have been relatively infrequent in the popular press, but they are still to be found quite often in scholarly comment and conference proceedings. Predictably, they seem to be concentrated in areas where a dominant ethnic group feels its place threatened by a more fecund minority.


261 See, e.g., S. Krašovec, 'Razvitak marksističkog pristupa teorii i politici populacije', Naše teme 1974, no.4, p.536, esp. p.551; and the same author's Človeštvo kruh in lakota (Ljubljana, 1970); R. Njegiće and L. Radović, 'Novi pogledi sovjetskih autora na zakon razvitka stanovništva u socializmu', Ekonomski Analiz no.35 (June 1972), p.44; R. Supek, Ova jedina zemlja (Zagreb, 1973).

262 See the instances cited by Macura (of such inadequacies and of such criticism) in 'Komponente populacione politike', Naše teme 1974, no.4, p.554, esp. pp.554-58.

263 'The causes of unemployment and underemployment are known. They should be sought simultaneously in inadequate investment and in demographic expansion. In this country, however, a one-sided approach is common, which seeks the cause exclusively in either inadequate investment or demographic expansion, depending on whether the researcher comes from our developed or insufficiently developed regions.' K. Miljovski, 'Kretanje stanovništva, ekonomski razvoj i nedovoljno razvijena područja', paper presented to the Belgrade Conference on Population Policy 1973. Despite the sober moderation of this formulation Miljovski himself (as becomes a Macedonian) is somewhat Malthusian in his approach when compared with current official doctrine intended for export.
The most elaborate and thorough-going Malthusian analysis I have encountered comes from the pen of a Serb from Bosnia and Hercegovina, where the erstwhile Serb majority has recently melted away. A Slovenian Malthusian, writing in the party newspaper, draws explicit comparisons between the perils of the world population explosion and the situation in Yugoslavia, and issues a transparent warning that diligent and tidy peoples with small families cannot be expected to go on paying for the 'irresponsibility' of the over-fecund. But perhaps the most consistently Malthusian of all are the Macedonians, threatened by the demographic and national upsurge of their large Albanian minority. Few Macedonian contributors

264 G. Žarković, 'Smanjivanje prirodnog priraštaja stanovništva i ekonomski i socijalni razvoj', paper presented to the Belgrade Conference on Population Policy 1973. Žarković, a former Partisan and a professor of medicine at Sarajevo University, is no doubt more exposed to the hazards of ideological error by virtue of his medical background, and perhaps more able to get away with it by virtue of his former high status as a government official.

265 I. Popit, 'Povprečje zdaj: dva otroka', Delo, 9 September 1972. Since that time Delo articles on demographic themes have become much more tactful. For an instance of fully 'official' Malthusian thinking by a Macedonian, see the Macedonian Central Committee member Aleksandar Donev's article, 'Kako da presahnu izvori nezaposlenosti' in Komunist, 7 January 1974, p.11.

266 Virtually all of the Macedonian contributors to the Belgrade Conference on Population Policy in 1973 placed great stress on the desirability of checking fertility in order to promote the economic growth of their republic. They seemed to believe that great strides could be taken by educational and propaganda campaigns (contrary to the hard-line Marxist doctrine that development is a pre-requisite for fertility control, and that the role of 'subjective' factors like family planning programs can only be at most ancillary). One contributor, for example, wrote that: 'Factor analysis has shown that in most cases, natality is independent of the majority of factors associated with social development. This suggests the conclusion that natality is mainly affected by habits, customs and traditions... Communes with the highest and lowest natality can have the same socio-economic conditions...' N. Stojkov, 'Determinante visokog i niskog nataliteta u Jugoslaviji'. See also V. Starova, 'Vlijaneto na zdravstvenata zaštita na demografskite dviženja', and K. Miljovski, op.cit.
to demographic discussions fail to make the point in some form or other that high natality is a severe economic burden, and one which can and must be reduced by a vigorous program of enlightenment in the field of fertility control.

Some of the most contentious and divisive issues in the global population debate are reproduced almost exactly within the Yugoslav microcosm. This being so, the task of maintaining some kind of unity of theory and practice is a formidable one. So far the regime is still maintaining its footing on the ideological tight-rope.

5.f. International Politics

It has been demonstrated in earlier sections, that the demographic factor is for the most part working to aggravate rather than alleviate Yugoslavia's domestic security problems. Unemployment is continuing to grow and seems likely to go on doing so. Substantial numbers of emigrants are now returning from Western Europe to their homeland, where they may significantly swell the numbers of the unemployed. They may also be returning with some form of political contamination acquired abroad, whilst beyond the reach and influence of the Yugoslav media and control mechanisms. Above all, the criss-crossing ethnic antagonisms that have bedevilled Yugoslavia's short history are almost all being accentuated or likely to be accentuated by demographic trends.

267 A recent Komunist article (26 August 1974, p.17) on the 'education' (obrazovanje) of workers abroad remarks that adoption by workers of foreign ways draws them away from their homeland, and threatens them 'either with assimilation or other negative influences'. The article goes on to say that studies of 'temporary' emigrants point 'more than clearly' to widespread 'temporary' assimilation. Cf. notes 89, 91 and 151, above.
Yugoslavia's internal security problems are closely bound up with its external problems. In consequence, any discussion of the influence of demographic factors on Yugoslavia's foreign relations is bound to seem rather like a reprise of her domestic population difficulties seen from a slightly different perspective. This is all the more difficult to avoid inasmuch that Yugoslavia's relations with other countries, though often bad, have seldom been quite as bad as her relations with herself. However, the two perspectives are vital complements to one another. The perilous and intractable complexity of Yugoslavia's politico-demographic problems only emerges fully when the two are juxtaposed.

At the most general level, Yugoslavia's overall economic and political strength might not seem threatened by the course of its demographic development in recent decades. For many years after the War, it had one of the highest natural increase rates in Europe, and despite the very low fertility prevailing in some regions of the country, it still belongs to the upper bracket. With the exception of Albania, most of its neighbours are growing more slowly, or at any rate no faster. Rumania, a country of comparable size, has in recent years overtaken Yugoslavia in population, and thanks to its pro-natalist exertions and restrictions on emigration, is now forging steadily ahead; but Rumania is perhaps Yugoslavia's strongest ally in the region, and it is unlikely that many Yugoslavs would give the matter a second thought.

Economically, Yugoslavia has firmly renounced Soviet employment policies with their depressed wages and productivity, and there seems little likelihood that they will return to them in the foreseeable future (though some concessions in the direction of 'excessive' employment may be made during the present phase of acute unemployment). Its economic performance (unlike that of many of the other Socialist countries) has not depended crucially on incremental labour inputs for more than a decade past. Given this economic development strategy and the problems which it entails, the slump in fertility
in most parts of the country after the early 1950s must be seen more as a blessing than a bugbear. In any case, it is unlikely to affect Yugoslavia's economic strength vis-a-vis its neighbours.

The massive outflow of young emigrants in the 1960s and 1970s, on the other hand, must have at least temporarily weakened the country's defence capabilities. Yet for many years there seems to have been remarkably little public concern about the matter, not even among the defence forces. When the military did press the issue, in the early 1970s, their wishes were acceded to, and restrictions were introduced on young men leaving the country. Now the recession in Western Europe has eliminated any element of policy option in the matter. Presumably, with time (if they are given it), the Yugoslav defence forces will be able to progressively repair the numerical indentations they must have suffered through emigration; though as they do so, they will be slightly harassed by diminishing cohorts of 18-20 year-olds.

It seems curious that the drain of emigration on the country's defence potential was tolerated for so long. It is all the more curious, given the Yugoslav strategic doctrine

Independent critics of government policy sometimes referred to the military disadvantages of the emigration (Franci Stare, op.cit., pp.83, 86; Komarica, op.cit., p.108; Knežević, op.cit., pp.333, 335, 338), but usually only fleetingly, or to complain that no serious study had yet been made of the problem from that point of view (Stare, p.86). The military may have been making representations privately, but in public they seem to have been remarkably poker-faced until after 1972. Thus, for example, a 1971 article on the Census by an army colonel scrupulously avoids commenting on either the emigration or the sharp decline in the birth rate that had been occurring in the years before. S. Vidaković, 'Popis stanovništva i mogućnost korišćenja rezultata za potrebe narodne odbrane', Vojno-ekonomski pregled, vol.17 (1971), no.4, p.484.

Cf. note 108, above.
This doctrine, which seeks to apply updated lessons from the successful Partisan resistance of the Second World War to contemporary conditions, postulates that the broadest possible strata of the population should be drawn into active defence operations. This being so, it is all the more desirable that not only those of prime military age, but also all adults up to the age of 40 or 45 should be on hand and in training ready for an emergency. Yet it was precisely these groups which were most depleted by the emigration.

270 Press expositions of the doctrine by senior officers are quite common. See, for example, the interview with General Pejnović (Head of the Centre for Strategic Research of the General Staff) in VUS, 24 December 1975. For a very good short account by a Western observer, see A. Ross Johnson, 'Yugoslav Total National Defence', Survival, vol.XV (1973), no.1, p.54.

271 And also into counter-espionage and counter-subversion through so-called samozaštita (literally 'self-defence'), the self-managing version of internal security, or, perhaps, of the Soviet bditel'nost'. Calls for intensified samozaštita activities have been particularly frequent since late 1975, when the renewed wave of 'cominformism' was first publicly acknowledged. See 'Samozaštita, Šta je to?', Politika, 11 January 1976, p.7.

272 According to the 1971 Census results, 92% of all workers abroad were under 45, and 53% were under 30. Sixty-nine percent were men. The Census undoubtedly underestimates the numbers of older emigrants, but suppose nonetheless we were to take the figures 90% and 50% for under 45 and under 30 respectively, and apply them to the estimated maximum number of 'temporary' emigrants of 1.1 million. We then get 990,000 under 45 and 550,000 under 30, of whom some 685,000 and 380,000 respectively would have been men. In 1971, there were 1,950,000 and 4,250,000 men in the age groups 18-29 and 18-44 respectively in Yugoslavia (including those emigrants who were recorded by the Census). On this very rough reckoning, as of circa 1973 over one-seventh of all potential soldiers under 45 and over one-sixth of all those under 30 must have been out of the country. In the light of this estimate, Tito's comments about 'three big armies' (note 108, above), seem to be very restrained. The above calculations are based on the figures supplied by Begtić, 'Yugoslav Nationals Temporarily Working Abroad', at p.20, and Popis stanovništva i stanova 1971, vol.I, p.2.
Granted also the stress of opštstenarodna odbrana on the most extensive mobilization of civilian population in organized and co-ordinated sabotage activities against the invader, it is clearly of the greatest importance that the dangers of fifth column operations should be kept to a minimum. If the Yugoslavs really believe their own intermittent suggestions that aggressive initiatives are to be expected from a Western power, then it is all the stranger that they displayed such equanimity to vast numbers of their citizens being exposed to moral and political danger in West Germany and elsewhere. While their potential ideological backsliders in the West could succumb to political views of either a left- or right-wing type, it is of course possible that both left-wingers and right-wingers and ethnic partisans of all descriptions could be organized to participate in a plan directed from one centre. This is a possibility of which the Yugoslavs are very conscious, and to which it will be necessary to revert a little later.

Having made these general observations about the demographic factor in Yugoslavia's external relations, let us now look more closely at some of the specific national minority questions involving Yugoslavia and her different neighbours, beginning with the three non-Socialist states among them.

Though there has been a long history of dispute between Yugoslavia and Italy over ethnodemographic issues in

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273 Cf. note 271, above. The importance of morale is all the greater, given the prominent role assigned by opšttenarodna odbrana to territorial defence units manned by non-regular personnel, and subject in the first instance to communal and republican political authority. The territorial defence forces, whose institution was a response to republican demands as well as to national strategic considerations, have been assessed by some sceptical outside observers as being a way of equipping the country for future civil war (Johnson, op.cit., p.58). The task of reabsorbing the returnees into these defence arrangements must certainly be a delicate one.
the past, most notably and most recently over the question of Trieste, the issue seems for the time being to have been effectively buried. In any case, the ethnic minorities remaining on either side are already small and are continuing to decline rapidly thanks to emigration and assimilation. Though Slovenians betray at times a sense of regret about the might-have-beens of the Trieste area, the question seems headed for oblivion, and Slovenian interests are unlikely to persuade future Belgrade governments that it ought to be pursued all out for its own sake. Relations with Greece are also good; and despite the assimilationist policies conducted against the Slav-speaking Greek Macedonians, Belgrade seems acquiescent and without ambitions. In Austria, on the other hand, the very fact of the apparent decline in the number of self-identifying Slovenes and Croats has been in recent years, and is still, a very live issue. The Austrians are currently proposing to conduct a special census of their Slav minorities, apparently in the hope, or possibly, as the Yugoslavs assert, with the intention, of then declaring them abolished, and refusing to provide any further cultural facilities for them, or equal rights for the use of their languages in the areas where they are concentrated. Given that the numbers of Slovenes and Croats involved are not

274 The signing of the 1975 agreement between the two states seems to be genuinely expected by the Yugoslav side to solve the very long-standing dispute over Trieste (see VUS, 19 November 1975). Given that the matter had been the subject of sharp polemics not long before (see, e.g., Komunist, 22 July 1974, pp.20-21), some residual scepticism may still be in order.

275 For a Slovenian study giving data on the declining numbers identifying as Slovenians in Italy (and apparently accepting this trend as inevitable), see J. Jeri, 'Etnična, gospodarsko-socialna in kulturno-prosvetna struktura slovenske narodnostne skupnosti v Italiji', paper presented to the 1974 Slovenian Demographic Symposium.

276 'Manevri znani kao"poseban popis"', Borba, 26 February 1975.
great, and given that genuine assimilation processes might well have been going on there, the extreme sensitivity of the Yugoslavs to this issue seems disproportionate. A surface reading of the Yugoslav press would suggest that it is the breach of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty involved, and the prominence of extreme Germanic emotion that is evoking such a keen response. But perhaps a better clue to understanding the situation was provided by a recent front-page story in the Belgrade daily Politika, which reported on an obscure and unofficial UN committee meeting in New York, at which there were signs of co-operation, not to say collusion, between the Austrian, Bulgarian and Soviet representatives. The Austrian problem is in any case not more than a quasi-demographic one. The numbers involved and the apparent direction of demographic trends must tend to diminish it as time goes on.

Yugoslavia's relations with her Socialist neighbours vary from sharp hostility in the case of Bulgaria, through deteriorating rapprochement (Albania) and deteriorating tepidity (Hungary) to fairly cordial co-operation (Rumania). The two main factors involved in each case are ethnic entanglements and the relationship with Moscow.

According to the 1971 Austrian Census, there were 22,000 Slovenians (in Carinthia) and 25,000 Croats (in Burgenland). The Yugoslav press, however, has been recalling that in 1846 there were 103,000 Slovenians and in 1910 some 44,000 Croats ("Čemu služe bečki "popisi", Politika, 25 May 1976). Even allowing for a certain amount of Austrian repression, however, neither community could now be called vast.

For the official Yugoslav view of the Treaty, see 'Nezadovoljena prava nacionalnih manjina', Komunist 27 January 1975. On Germanic nationalist excesses, see, e.g., Politika, 12 August 1976, p.4.

Politika, 5 August 1976. The UN committee meeting in question was concerned with the implementation of the Covenant on Racial Discrimination. The Austrian and Bulgarian delegates supported one another as against Yugoslavia. The Soviet delegate agreed with them both that conducting a census is an internal matter.
In the case of Yugoslav-Rumanian relations, the respective minorities on each side are small (about 0.2 or 0.3% of the population in each case) and stagnant or declining, and quite insufficient to form an adequate basis for serious dispute. But in any case, this and other potential causes of tension are submerged beneath the common fear of Soviet intervention. Rumania is developing its own strategy of total national defence, and co-operation between her and Yugoslavia will probably continue to grow, at least while the Ceausescu leadership remains in control.

Hungary, despite the keen nationalist and revisionist sentiments of its population, maintains for the most part an outwardly modest demeanour in regard to nationality problems, both within its borders and beyond them. This is true also of the official Hungarian attitude to the large Magyar population in the Yugoslav Vojvodina. A Hungarian census taken during World War II while part of the Vojvodina was under the Horthy regime's administration still managed to suggest that the Hungarians were the largest single ethnic group in the Vojvodina as a whole.\textsuperscript{280} Since then Hungarian strength has slipped badly on paper (Yugoslav paper), and undoubtedly has done so also in fact. The large Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia and Rumania have also, relatively speaking, lost ground since before the war.\textsuperscript{281} The current Budapest

\textsuperscript{280} Clissold, \textit{op.cit.}, p.122. The Vojvodina referred to there does not correspond precisely to the present province of that name.

\textsuperscript{281} Hungarians formed 25.8% of the population of Vojvodina in 1948, but only 21.7% in 1971 ('Nacionalni sastav stanovnistva po opstinama', p.11). They were 10% of the Rumanian population according to the 1930 Census, but only 8.5% by 1966 (the percentage of Rumanians having increased in that time from 77.9% to 87.7%): Anarul demografic al Republicii Socialiste Romania 1974, pp.106–07. There were 658,000 Hungarians recorded by the 1921 Czechoslovak Census, 597,000 in 1930, and 578,000 in 1971. As a percentage they had fallen from 5.1% in 1921 to 4% in 1971, while the Czechs and Slovaks combined had increased from 67.6% in 1921 to 94.3% in 1971. (Demografie X (1968), no.4, p.302, and XIV (1972), p.183.) The data are not strictly comparable, and not, perhaps, wholly reliable either. Moreover, in recent years, the Hungarian population has been increasing modestly. But the long-term trend has been clearly towards relative decline.
policy is to accept these discouraging trends in its neighbour states with such overt good grace as it can muster. But there are reasons for supposing that this policy may change in the case of Yugoslavia. It has been noticeable in the past that Moscow sometimes permits Hungary a good deal of leeway in relation to the Hungarian minority in Rumania. A similar right may be extended to them in the case of Yugoslavia as well, should Moscow's interests so dictate. A recent Western report indicated that Cominformists on trial in Yugoslavia had been accused of maintaining contacts with émigrés in 'Moscow, Kiev and Budapest'. The Hungarian media have at times been apparently entrusted with special missions that may well be anti-Yugoslav in their implications. And a Belgrade paper has expressed certain reservations and suspicious about the activities of some of its Soviet-bloc neighbours (including Hungary) in recruiting students for higher education among the Yugoslav nationalities, often at bargain rates.

282 King, op.cit., pp.163 and ff.
284 Hungarian news media were given a curiously monopolistic role in reporting certain recent perturbations in Sino-Albanian relations. See L. Zanga, 'Whither Albania', RFE Research RAD Background Report/112 (Albania), 18 May 1976, esp. pp.3, 9. Zanga seems puzzled why among the Warsaw Pact countries Hungary alone should be so fascinated by these developments. Two possible reasons suggest themselves: firstly, that Moscow wishes someone else to fly its kites for it (as is often the case); and secondly, that Hungary may itself have an interest in seeing a more pro-Moscow group replace the Hoxha leadership in Tirana. Compare the discussion on Albania, below.
285 'Privatni kanali', NIN, 7 July 1974, p.20.
But for the most part, Hungary (unlike Bulgaria) still seems committed to a policy of maintaining its links with its potential irredenta by cultivating a conspicuously correct nationalities policy in relation to its own minorities, and seeking reciprocity from its neighbours. Given the steady relative decline of the Hungarian population in the Vojvodina (marked, like Hungarian populations elsewhere, by low fertility, and also inclined to assimilatory losses), it seems likely that the Vojvodinian problem will continue to diminish naturally. Demographic trends on their own are unlikely to aggravate the situation on either side.

This leaves the two most difficult external ethno-demographic problems facing the Yugoslav government: the Macedonians and Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations; and the Shiptars and Yugoslav-Albanian relations.

The Macedonian problem is not demonstrably demographic inasmuch that there is no way of knowing whether population trends in the area are ripening the apple of discord or not. But it does assume quasi-demographic forms and interlocks with adjacent problems which are strongly demographic in character.

Basically, the conflict rests on the fact that the Bulgarians maintain that the Macedonians in Yugoslavia are really Bulgarians, whereas the Yugoslavs assert the contrary and claim that there may be anything between 200,000 and 500,000 people in Bulgaria who would want to identify themselves as Macedonians also.\textsuperscript{286} Even the closest outside observers of these matters feel reluctant to give unequivocal judgements on

\textsuperscript{286} The Macedonians made their last significant Census appearance in Bulgaria in 1956, when 178,000 of them were registered. According to Komunist, 8 December 1975, p.7., the Sofia party daily Rabotnicesko Delo once estimated that there were 500,000 Macedonians in Bulgaria.
the inherent justice of these two positions. The Bulgarian view at least must be regarded as overstated, however. The Macedonian Republic has been in existence for thirty years, has developed its own literary language distinct from Bulgarian (in which language Macedonian nationalists once wrote), and has presumably succeeded therefore in greatly strengthening such distinct identification as existed before. Power structures develop their own raison d'être and ideological accretions at the worst of times. There is already a small army of people in the Macedonian Republic who are in a sense committed and professional Macedonians, and who would find life difficult and no doubt hazardous in any Bulgarian Macedonia. There are undoubtedly, at the same time, some Macedonians who still feel a loyalty to a broader identification with Bulgaria as well as Macedonia. However, even these people are scarcely likely to be greatly enamoured of Bulgaria's current policy towards its Macedonians. In the immediate post-war period, the new Bulgarian communist regime initially recognized a Macedonian national minority within its borders (at a time when they believed long term co-operation if not indeed a federal merger with Yugoslavia was a realistic future possibility). After relations with Yugoslavia deteriorated, however, they came to regret this decision, and have over the past two decades sought progressively to undo their mistake. This is in line with their general policy towards their other

287 The Macedonian dispute has been long and acrimonious and has passed through numerous phases. A considerable literature has developed on the subject. See, e.g., P. Shoup, op.cit., Ch.4; R. King, Minorities under Communism, Ch.10; Stephen E. Palmer, Jr, and Robert R. King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question (Hamden, Conn. 1971); S. Stankovic, 'The Divisive Issue of Macedonia: Yugoslav Attitudes and Suspicions', RFE Research RAD Background Report/99 (Yugoslavia), 6 June 1975; R. King, 'The Macedonian Question and Bulgaria's Relations with Yugoslavia', RFE Research RAD Background Report/98 (Bulgaria), 6 June 1975.
main national minorities (the Turks and the Pomaks, or Bulgarian Moslems), which in recent years has become increasingly oppressive and assimilationist. The assimilationist policy towards the nationalities has been accompanied by an increasingly pro-natalist population policy (oriented towards favouring the low-fertility 'post-Orthodox' Bulgarians over their more fertile Moslem minorities). Bulgarian population and nationality policies thus seem at present to be dictated by a combination of mercantilist nationalism and repressive authoritarianism. Eager to increase their numbers, they are apparently prepared to adopt strong measures to achieve their aim. None of this is likely to recommend itself to more than a minority of Yugoslav Macedonians. The vigour and rigour of Bulgarian policies seem to suggest that they are heedless of whether or not Yugoslav Macedonians will be alienated by their actions. Presumably, therefore, they believe it will be possible one day to take over the Yugoslav Macedonians and convert the stubborn among them into Bulgarians in the same way as they are attempting to deal with their own recalcitrant Macedonians. The only possible scenario that seems to make sense of such a policy is a disintegration or partition of Yugoslavia in which Macedonia were divided


289 All Bulgarian social service benefits become more generous to the third child, then fall away sharply thereafter. See I. Stefanov and N. Naumov, 'Bulgaria' in B. Berelson (ed.), Population Policy in Developed Countries, p.149, esp. at p.165.

290 Contraceptives are not readily available in Bulgaria except on prescription. And in recent years there has been a growing tendency to restrict the availability of legal abortion. See Kirk, Livi Bacci and Szabady (eds), Law and Fertility in Europe, vol.1, p.157. There is opposition in Bulgaria to this growing illiberal trend. See, e.g., E. Khristova, 'Da vdignem barierata pred razdaemostta!', Trud, 11 October 1974, p.2. (Despite the hurrah pro-natalism of the title, the article is in fact at pains to emphasize that policy must respect the fullest parental sovereignty.)
between Bulgaria and a Greater Serbia or other such rump state. This would evidently have to be under Soviet sponsorship and adjudication. In this context, it is interesting that a recent Skopje article referred explicitly to talk in Bulgaria about the forthcoming 'falling apart' of Yugoslavia, linking these assertions directly with Bulgaria's Macedonian policy. It seems likely that there is a Serbian political underground which would welcome such a resolution, as the Kekec incident, perhaps, illustrates. After the illegal pro-Soviet Yugoslav Communist Party held its countercongress in late 1975, there was a spate of articles in the Yugoslav press hinting very strongly that an 'Informbureaucrat' underground existed within the party in many areas of the country, and that too great a liberalism had been displayed towards it in the past. These strictures were certainly applicable to, among others, Montenegro and Serbia.

While the Macedonian question is a demographic one in the sense that successive Bulgarian censuses are an important factor in ostensibly 'solving' it from the Bulgarian point of view, while simultaneously aggravating it from the Yugoslav (and no doubt the Bulgarian Macedonian) point of view, there is no way of determining in what measure demographic trends

291 The favourite theme of the present-day agitpropites is the "falling apart" of Yugoslavia! There is never a political meeting in Pirin Macedonia, it seems, where there isn't some well-paid agitator to devote a good deal of attention to that theme.' Šta se krije iza popisa u Bugarskoj', VUS, 26 November 1975, p.6. (trs. from an article in Nova Makedonia).

292 In 1973, the Belgrade children's magazine 'Kekec' published a linguistic map which depicted a large part of Macedonia (including Skopje and also some regions of strongly Albanian settlement) as falling within the area in which the Ekavian dialect of Serbo-Croatian is spoken. See Borba, 23 November 1973, where the episode was described as a 'political manoeuvre' (but only after the Macedonian Public Prosecutor had demanded that a ban be placed on that issue of the publication). 'Kekec' and Borba are published by the same enterprise.

293 See, e.g., 'Šta hoće', NIN, 9 November 1975.
in the area are tending to alleviate or exacerbate the conflict. The Bulgarian authorities are evidently seeking to disperse as well as forcibly assimilate those of their citizens who refuse to renounce their Macedonian identity. What success they are having is something that can only be guessed at; though it is perhaps significant that the Yugoslav media have been claiming that numerous arrests of Macedonian patriots are still being made in the Pirin Macedonia area.\footnote{294} Measures like these suggest that the Bulgarians have a considerable problem on their hands, and that in the event of a conflict, the Yugoslavs would be capable of taking effective subversive countermeasures behind the Bulgarian lines, if time permitted.

Though the demographic factor in the Macedonian question is of uncertain status, there is no mistaking the crucial importance of demographic trends in the area of Albanian settlement in and beyond Albania's borders. Relations between Shiptars and Serbs and Shiptars and Macedonians are like a time-bomb placed at the central point of gravity in the Yugoslav structure. If differential fertility trends do indeed light the fuse, the destruction is almost bound to spread to other parts of the building.

If, for example, the Albanians were to determinedly seek full republic status (as they have already evinced a desire to do), thus converting the Serbs into a mere ethnic minority in their historic heartlands, or if they were to seek to alter further the balance of linguistic privilege in their area (as they are also showing signs of wanting to do),\footnote{295} According to one Yugoslav source, the latest wave of arrests began in late 1973, suggesting that it was part of a systematic build-up towards attaining a 'good' result in the 1975 Census. 'Zvanīčno nestali', NIN, 5 January 1975, p.47.

\footnote{294} Cf. note 215, above.
Serb resistance both within and beyond the province might create acute tension, if not open conflict. It is an issue which would serve eminently to fully unite the Serbs with the Montenegrins. Any such crisis would greatly favour the plans of an aggressor or aggressors from the East. Given the growing numerical strength of Albanians in all walks of life in their own province, however, such conflicts seem difficult to avoid. Kosovo Albanian politicians must maintain their credibility with their constituents, and so they must to some degree reflect the pressure for further change that the steeply mounting cohorts of young educated Albanians are bound to exert on language policy, cadre policy, university admissions policy, etc., etc.

Simultaneously, the Albanians are entering into a parallel stage of development in Western Macedonia. But there they do not yet have any such position of power as they enjoy in Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians may realize that they do not have the strength within the Yugoslav Federation to represent too actively the interests of the Macedonian Albanians. But given the imbalance between demographic and other forms of strength in Western Macedonia, an imbalance which must be resolved by some form of compromise or growing repression in the future, it may not be easy for the Kosovo Albanians (including ranking politicians) to avoid their 'responsibilities' in the area. If they were to be involved, the crisis would worsen markedly, as the Serbs and Montenegrins would then almost inevitably be implicated as well. The Federal Yugoslav authorities could not afford to offend any of the key participants in such a dispute. They need to maintain Macedonian loyalties because of the Bulgarian threat

296 Though Albanians and Turks formed some 24% of the Macedonian population in 1971, only 3 of the 21 members of the republican party presidium were apparently Moslems. In the Central Committee, the relationship was even more unfavourable for the Moslem ethnic groups - only 9 of a total membership of 84. Albanians and Turks combined form less than 10% of the total Macedonian party membership. These disparities should be contrasted with the rapidly changing situation in Kosovo (see note 214, above).
(though the Bulgarians' hard-line tactics may give them some leeway there). At the same time, they need to maintain the loyalty of the Yugoslav Albanians, particularly so in view of the recent signs of a possible Soviet-Albanian rapprochement. And finally, of course, they cannot afford to alienate the sympathies of their largest national group, the Serbs, or the Serbs' better fifteenth, the Montenegrins. Here again, the Yugoslav regime is balanced on a tight-rope, a tight-rope that is being tugged at from all directions, in some cases deliberately and maliciously. If the Federal authorities support one group they must antagonize the others. Their general policy is, of course, to support the republican or provincial majorities while seeking to safeguard the interests of the minorities. But how is this policy to be applied to a situation like that in Western Macedonia, where the minority is a local majority of rapidly increasing dimensions, with potential revisionist support both from another unit within Yugoslavia and also from beyond its borders? If the Yugoslavs were to try to appease their Albanian minority by making border

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297 Since 1974, there has been a sustained purge going on at the highest levels in Albania. In early May 1976, Hoxha announced that a clique of pro-Soviet elements had been uncovered. Among their other crimes, this clique were said to have been plotting to undermine the alliance with China ('Smenjivanja u vrhu', NIN, 9 May 1976). Since that time, the signs of deteriorating relations with China have multiplied; Albania did not, for example, congratulate Hua Kuo-feng (The Age, 27 October 1976) which seems to suggest either that the deposed plotters were remarkably successful, or that they were being blamed for something that was not their fault, or, most probably of all, that the Hoxha pro-Peking line is under an increasingly heavy cloud, and that many elements in the Albanian party would like to re-establish closer links with Moscow. Albanian relations with Yugoslavia, meanwhile, after a period of improvement, are again deteriorating, despite efforts by the Yugoslavs to improve them. (on this point, see Louis Zanga, 'Kosovo: An Important Element in Yugoslav-Albanian Rapprochement' RFE Research RAD Background Report/91, Albania, 2 June 1975;
adjustments between Kosovo and Macedonia, this would have the effect of greatly embittering the Macedonians (not to put it any more strongly), and extending the border-area between Yugoslavia and Albania that was not only under heavily Albanian settlement, but also under (Yugoslav) Albanian control. Given the perhaps alarming degree of rapport that already exists between Priština and Tirana, Macedonians could hardly fail to see any such adjustments as being the thin edge of the wedge. Having seen the way successive concessions to the Albanians had led to the decline of Serbo-Montenegrin influence in Kosovo, they would be all the more reluctant to contemplate any in their own domain.

The closeness of the rapport between Priština and Tirana is reflected in and illustrated by the fact that Kosovo Albanian is being standardized to norms based on southern dialects. This involves considerable difficulties for the northern Albanians of Kosovo. It also involves elimination of many Turkish and Serbian words in northern usage, something which the Kosovo authorities are evidently only too happy to endorse. Rilindja, (the Priština Albanian-language party daily), 24 February 1976, abstracted in ABSEES, vol.VII, no.3 (July 1976), p.245. See also 'Sprache und Politik in Albanien', Osteuropa, XXIII (1973), no.8, p.A582.
this would seem like an invitation to irredentism.\footnote{300}

The present Yugoslav policy of minimal change in external forms, coupled with flexibility in matters of national rights and local autonomy, is possibly the best available. One wonders whether it can hold out in a situation where demographic and related socio-economic forces seem likely to make fundamental change almost inevitable.

In all the circumstances, it seems that Yugoslavia has a vested interest in maintaining bad relations with Bulgaria and especially good relations with Albania. Their efforts in this latter direction, however, have not seemed to achieve very much in the past. To many Serbs and Montenegrins, the hard-line alternative of national repression of the Albanians must seem more attractive, both emotionally and politically, even if it does logically involve better relations with Bulgaria and the USSR.

The Yugoslav nightmare is, of course, diplomatic equivocations notwithstanding, that the Soviet Union will coordinate a three- or four-pronged\footnote{301} attack on her national

\footnote{300} In 1975-76 there have been repeated references in the Yugoslav press to the activities of Albanian 'irredentists'. Politika, 5 December 1975, p.7, reports the Federal Public Prosecutor as saying that 33 irredentists had been proceeded against in Kosovo during that year. See also Politika, 16 January 1976, p.8, and 24 April 1976, p.8. For an account of a trial of 18 Albanian 'irredentists' (all of them apparently with some higher education), see Politika, 8 February 1976, p.9. From these sources, it emerges that the present wave of irredentists are identified as collaborating with 'Cominformist' and Stalinist elements, i.e. with Moscow. See also L. Zanga, 'The Meaning of the Latest Demonstrations in Kosovo', RFE Research RAD Background Report/15 (Yugoslavia), 3 February 1975.

\footnote{301} Four-pronged in the event that a (post-Ceausescu?) Rumanian leadership were induced to participate in the adventure. Rumania, like Albania, though to a lesser extent, has been betraying signs of internal dissension in recent years.
integrity, utilizing Hungarian, Bulgarian and Albanian territorial revisionism in the process, and rewarding them all in some way with the spoils. To do this, it seems to be accepted, some internal crisis in Yugoslavia would have to be precipitated. Unfortunately, the potential causes of such a crisis are present in abundance. In this observer's view, the destabilizing demographic growth of the Albanians may be the spark which sets the bonfire ablaze. Since late 1975, Yugoslav anxieties about Kosovo have been particularly apparent. The various enemies of the Yugoslav state and their co-ordinators may have felt that the movement was propitious: Tito's advanced years, the recent nationalities crisis in Yugoslavia and its precarious solution, the peculiar course of détente, the exceptional dithering of a presidential election year, the signs of Western complaisance intimated in the so-called Sonnenfeldt doctrine, etc. Perhaps they are right. Western policy, which seems wedded to defending

302 'There does not seem to be much doubt that the Soviets will not send troops into Yugoslavia while Tito is alive; there is serious doubt that they will do so even after his passing, unless internal disorders should break out.' J. Walkin, 'Yugoslavia after the Tenth Party Congress', Survey, vol.22 (1976), no.1, p.55, at p.69. Walkin spent some time as a US diplomat in Belgrade.

303 Cf. notes 297 and 300, above. Tito's two-day visit to Kosovo in April 1975 was a demonstration of the leadership's concern both about internal security in the province and the state of Yugoslavia's relations with Albania.

304 The Yugoslavs interpret the Sonnenfeldt affair as a deliberate signal from the U.S.A. to the U.S.S.R. that any settlement they wish to make of the Yugoslav problem will be satisfactory provided that the American sphere of interest is not threatened. See, e.g., 'Prazan rulet', NIN, 18 April 1976, p.423. It seems fairly clear that if the Soviet Union attempts overt aggression against Yugoslavia at some appropriate moment, the American response will be restrained (cf. note 302). This at least appears to have been Kissinger's approach. President Ford's celebrated campaign gaffe about there being 'no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe', (The Australian, 9 October 1976) may well betray the essence of a (cont.)
the indefensible until its indefensibility is proven beyond all doubt, and to repeatedly selling the last scraps of independence of countries that really could benefit from its aid for an undisclosed, but apparently modest figure, is unlikely to play any very imposing role in future dénouements; though it may seek to preserve the Adriatic littoral or part of it for its own purposes. These being, apparently, the facts of life, it will be up to Yugoslavia itself to prove its stability and viability under great external and internal pressures.

5.g Population Policies

I Development of population policies at the Federal level

It is only in the last fifteen years or so that 'population policy' has slowly begun to make its appearance on the Yugoslav scene as an independent area of government concern. The course of development of social and economic

304 (cont.) Kissinger briefing. With Carter's accession to the presidency, one wonders whether the shift to the south in America will be paralleled by a shift from Central to Eastern Europe in the State Department. Perhaps the Sonnenfeldt doctrine will be replaced by a Brzezinski doctrine?

305 For a comprehensive discussion of many aspects of Yugoslav population policy, see (if possible) the mimeographed proceedings of the 1973 Belgrade Conference on Population Policy, Savetovanje o izgradnji društvenih stavova o populacionoj politici u Jugoslaviji. Several key contributions to this conference were published in Naše teme 1974, no.4, including the admirable summary by Miloš Macura, 'Komponente populacione politike saobrazne sadašnjim i budućim potrebama Jugoslavije'. Important republican conferences have been held in Croatia and Slovenia see Stanovništvo, emigracija i zaposlenost u Hrvatskoj (Zagreb, 1971); and Raziskovalni Center Ekonomsko Fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani, Slovenski demografski simpozij (Ljubljana, 1974), mimeograph. There is a good (cont.)
policy in the earlier period was often of great relevance to demographic development. But demographic considerations do not appear to have been prominent among the decision-makers' motives.

Indeed in the first decade and a half of Socialist Yugoslavia, the régime seems to have paid little or no attention to demographic questions. It was mentioned earlier that the factor of population increase was apparently completely overlooked or ignored by the drafters of the first Five-Year Plan in 1948; and that it was only in 1957 that demographic considerations began to be systematically taken account of by planners. For many years the general attitude of authority seems to have been one of blithe confidence that socialism produced high natality, low mortality, and rapid natural increase, that this was a good thing, and that a Socialist state could certainly cope with any temporary difficulties that might arise as a result. And the remnants of that attitude seem to be dying hard.

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306 Cf. notes 35 and 36, above.

307 Compare the discussion in 5.e., above.
Some Yugoslav commentators still maintain that Yugoslavia does not have a population policy or policies as such. Accordingly, in what follows we shall often be considering trends in demographically relevant social policy, irrespective to some extent of whether or not the decisions in question were taken with explicitly demographic objectives in view.

Though the post-war baby boom in Yugoslavia was basically the result of a concentration in time of long-delayed nuptiality and natality, it seems very likely that the social and economic reforms introduced by the new Communist authorities made some contribution to it. Post-war reconstruction and the orchestrated euphoria surrounding it, rising employment, land redistribution and resettlement, the provision of basic social welfare benefits - policies such as these were bound to enhance the pro-natalist atmosphere, just as they did elsewhere in Eastern Europe. If, however, Socialist socio-economic programs tended at first to stimulate fertility, their long-term effect seems to have been, in Yugoslavia as elsewhere, to produce fertility decline of a rapidity and scope unequalled in the demographic history of Europe. The summary list of causes of fertility decline in Yugoslavia given in 5.a., above, contains several

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308 This view is particularly common among family planning activists, who are always at pains to disassociate their movement from any connection with or responsibility for the demographic situation in Yugoslavia. But it is not confined to them. See, e.g., Breznik and Rašević, op. cit., p. 6.

309 Family allowances in particular seem to have had a significant pro-natalist impact in the post-war years, when they were quite large in relation to the incomes of the time. Ibid., p. 8.
items peculiar to the European Socialist countries, or at least particularly marked in their case; and the effect of these seems to have been far greater in the long term than the pro-natalist impact of welfare legislation or the increasingly empty and celebratory anti-Malthusianism of the first two decades or so.

In fact, if actions rather than words are made the basis of one's assessment, it could be argued that by the late 1950s or early 1960s, the régime was beginning to display some anti-natalist leanings. After the first post-War years, family welfare benefits stagnated in relation to incomes^310 and were graded regressively by birth-order. Programs for building child-care centres were allowed to lapse. In 1952, the first liberalization of the abortion laws took place, and liberalization of practice followed, culminating in 1960 in further legislative reforms. In the 1950s,


311 As of the mid-1960s, Yugoslavia was the only country in Europe with a degressive scale of payments for family allowances. See M. Bešter, 'Nekateri vidiki politike reprodukcije prebivalstva', Ekonomski revija XVI (1965), no.2, p.113 at p.127.

312 For English texts of the 1952 and 1960 decrees with citations of the original sources, see H.P. David, Abortion and Family Planning in Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe, pp.216, 219. For accounts of the reform movement that made them possible, see A. Milojković et al., 'Historijat liberalizacije pobačaja u Jugoslaviji' and F. Novak et al., 'Prikaz razvoja odnosa do celokupne problematike planiranja porodice u medicinskim krugovima', papers presented to the 1973 Belgrade Conference on Population Policy (mimeograph). See also the paper by Petrić cited in note 318.
efforts to popularize contraception began to win official
toleration, and by the early 1960s, that toleration was
starting to grow into approval. The usual view of
Yugoslav commentators is that these developments occurred
for basically non-demographic reasons. However, presumably
by that time the pro-natalist ideological predispositions
of the authorities must at least have weakened for such things
to have been possible.

With the exception of the abortion reforms, it
is unlikely that any of these trends exerted a very major
influence on fertility. Most of the fertility decline was
concentrated in the 1950s, and was due rather more to the
overall socio-economic modernization that Yugoslav society
was undergoing, the demographic effects of which were
sharply silhouetted by the sudden exhaustion of the post-war
compensatory phase. After the 1950s, though some fertility
indicators continued to show a decline, the trend was markedly
slower and more differentiated by region. In fact, by the
time the fertility decline began to be generally noticed, it
had already almost, if temporarily, arrested itself. It
was not until the early 1960s that alarms began to be publicly

313 See Novak et al., op.cit.

314 See, e.g., S. Krašovec, 'Stihijnost ili kontrola kretanja
stanovništva', p.36; Breznik and Rašević, op.cit.,
pp.6-7; Klauzer, op.cit., p.8.

315 No doubt attitudes of many kinds were changing. Before
the War, both abortion and contraceptives had been
totally banned in Yugoslavia, and the initial post-war
official attitudes undoubtedly owed a good deal to general
conservative inertia on sexual questions, as well as
to Marxist doctrines on population.
expressed about the demographic situation; and even then, most came from non-official or only semi-official sources. The first explicit demand that the government should adopt a population policy seem not to have been made until the early 1960s. Many of those who made these demands were particularly concerned about trends in differential fertility and sought action from the authorities that would even these differences out.

During the 1960s, the concern of ethnic nationalists about demographic trends grew rapidly. The group which had the greatest impact on the course of official policy, however, were the family planners. These were the people who had


317 In addition to the two articles cited in note 316, see Macura's contribution to the round-table discussion, 'Zasto opada natalitet?' in Borba, 2 and 3 February 1964; and M. Bešter, op.cit. (in note 311). It should be emphasized, however, that with the possible exception of the Bešter article, none of these early calls for a differentiated population policy had any of the strong nationalist colouring with which this demand later became associated.

318 The group I have chosen to identify as 'family planners' was of course made up of disparate elements. Most prominent among them, perhaps, were the party feminists, the reforming minority of the medical profession and a variety of other social policy liberals. For an account of their successful campaign to secure official support written by one of their number, see N. Petrić, 'Društveno-politički aspekt razvoja planiranja porodice u Jugoslaviji', paper presented to the 1973 Belgrade Conference on Population Policy (mimeograph).
secured the reforms of the abortion legislation and the initiation of contraceptive services in the 1950s. In 1963, a Co-ordinating Committee for Family Planning was set up within the official Yugoslav women's organization. The rising influence of this body soon became apparent. In 1966, as mentioned earlier in another context, President Tito signed the Declaration of Heads of State on world population.319 This document asserted that family planning was a basic human right. As suggested earlier, Tito may have been pushed in this direction by his association with Nehru and Nasser and other Third World leaders concerned about population programs. He was undoubtedly under considerable pressure in the same direction domestically. In 1967, the Co-ordinating Committee for Family Planning became the Federal Council for Family Planning, with participation from bodies outside the women's movement. And in 1968, a public debate was initiated on the role of family planning in Yugoslav society. The outcome of the debate, which became at times quite acrimonious, was a victory for the family planners.320 In 1969, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly enacted a new law on abortion, reconfirming the liberal stance taken by the 1960 legislation.322 At the same time, it passed a Resolution on Family Planning,322

319 See note 244, above.
320 See F. Novak et al., op.cit.
321 Službeni list SFRJ 1969 no.20.
322 The Resolution and the new Abortion Law were dealt with and passed together, and obviously were regarded by the regime as a parcel of measures. For an English text of the Resolution, see Yugoslav Survey 1969, no.3, pp.103-06. The Resolution was evidently passed in the teeth of stiff opposition, and that not only from ecclesiastical or dissident nationalist sources apparently. A 1974 press article described the Resolution as a 'brave' decision. S. Stanić, "Pobuna" ginekologa', NIN, 8 December 1974.
which completed the legitimization of the movement, and the liberal, humanist philosophy which it espoused.

The Resolution reaffirmed the proposition put forward in the 1966 Statement that it is a basic human right to be able to plan the size of one's family and the spacing between births. It went on to declare that 'society should make it possible for married couples to get information about modern methods of birth control and provide them with adequate means to plan their families'. Abortion, though deplored, was given a place in the scheme of things as a method of last resort. And in fact, it was suggested that abortion administration procedures should be made simpler and more humane. The Resolution also stressed the importance of proper sex education for the young.

With the swelling emigration of the late 1960s and early 1970s, concern about demographic trends grew even greater, particularly among nationalists anxious about the future of their own peoples. In early 1971, in response to these developments, a Croatian conference on emigration, employment and population was held in Zagreb, which was described by a reviewer as the first of its kind to have taken place in Yugoslavia. In 1973, a much larger, national conference was held in Belgrade, whose express purpose was said to be to contribute towards the 'building of views' about population policy at the Federal level.

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323 'Federal Assembly Resolution on Family Planning', Yugoslav Survey 1969, no.3, p.103.
325 'Savetovanje o izgradnji društvenih stavova o populacionoj politici u Jugoslaviji'.
A second major republican conference was held in Slovenia in 1974, and there have been latterly a number of other meetings of a similar kind dealing with a variety of demographically-related topics.

Since 1969, the Federal authorities have altered their position on emigration policy, and begun to formulate an approach to internal migration policy. They have also given increasing prominence to demographic considerations in official planning documents, whilst maintaining, as it would seem, some restraints on public and parliamentary discussions of population problems. The basic orientation set by the 1969 Resolution on Family Planning, however, has so far not been altered. In 1973, at the initiative of the Federal Council for Family Planning, the Federal Assembly considered the implementation of the 1969 Resolution, and reaffirmed its general principles, while at the same time calling upon all parties involved to improve their performance.

In 1974, the family planners scored another triumph, when the new Federal Constitution and all the Republican Constitutions incorporated a guarantee that 'it is a human right to freely

326 For citations for all three conferences, see note 305, above.

327 Cf. note 238, above. This, apparently, was the first time a rubric specifically devoted to population policy had made its appearance in a planning document. See 'Bolj žilješko, bolj razumno', Delo, 22 June 1974.

328 For an account of the preparations for and course of these Assembly proceedings (an account which demonstrates very clearly the influence of the Federal Council for Family Planning on policy formation), see B. Vesić, 'Ostvarivanje načela i ciljeva Rezolucije Savezne Skupštine o planiranju porodice', Socijalna politika 1974, no.4, p.17.
decide about the birth of children'. 329 While the final formulation was less detailed and explicit than some family planners may have hoped 330 (and does contain a proviso about limitations in the interest of health), it seems to be clear confirmation that in this area, an official about-face is not imminent.

In recent years, responsibility for most health and social welfare policies of demographic relevance has passed to the republics and provinces, and more recently even lower to the communes and other local agencies. It remains to be seen what patterns of development will evolve at these levels in the future. The Federal authorities, however, will continue to lay down general principles in most areas of governmental responsibility. On present indications, it seems likely that republican practice will vary in a multitude of minor ways, but that sharp divergences on matters of principle will somehow be prevented. Accordingly, it may be helpful at this point to spell out in slightly greater detail the Federal approach to population policy, as it has emerged since the 1960s.

329 Ustav Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, p.99, article 191. Identical formulations were entered in all the republican and provincial constitutions as well. The Slovenian Constitution also contains an additional guarantee of the right to information and appropriate social security in family planning. "Pobuna" ginekologa', NIN, 8 December 1974.

II Federal Population Policy: The Present Official View

Despite the use of a singular connoting the existence of a unified and coherent policy, it is still questionable whether Yugoslavia has a population policy at all. The 1973 Belgrade Conference, it will be recalled, was devoted explicitly to the creation of such a policy, and many of the contributors commented on the fact of its continuing absence. And while the Draft Long-term Plan published in 1974 spoke of 'population policy' as of a known and established policy-area, the Tenth Congress of the League of Communists held in the same year did not devote any of its resolutions or documents to such an entity. In fact the author was told by a reliable source that an attempt at the Congress to establish a party body concerned specifically with population problems had failed. Nor is there any government population commission like the ones now in existence almost throughout Eastern Europe. Nonetheless I feel that enough official statements of one kind and another have accumulated for the use of the singular 'policy' to be justified, if only to characterize a certain kind of approach to matters of demographic relevance.

The first point to make about Yugoslav population policy at the Federal level is that unlike those of all other European Socialist governments, it is not pro-natalist. In fact it is explicitly not concerned with the quantitative, but rather with the qualitative aspects of human reproduction and demographic development. The central aim of population policy is said to be the humanization of all aspects of reproductive processes. Responsibility for decisions about

331 See the instances cited by Macura in 'Komponente populacione politike', pp.554-55.
new life is firmly vested in the parents. In some interpretations, even propaganda aimed at encouraging families of a particular size is seen as improper.\textsuperscript{332} And quite emphatically, there must be no limitation placed on the availability of any reasonably safe means of family limitation, including abortion, though abuse of the latter must be reduced. Moreover, every effort should be made to ensure not only that the means of fertility control are made available, but also that the population is fully informed about all the possibilities that exist. Contraception should be propagated, and fully incorporated into the socialized health system.

While the family should be accorded the fullest freedom to make its own procreative decisions, it should also receive assistance and support from society. Society itself, in any case, has a vital interest in the matter. While laws and regulations providing benefits for the family are latterly a matter for republican and local authorities to determine, the lead given by Federal authorities is

332 Vida Tomšič, 'Planiranje porodice i populaciona politika', paper presented to the 1974 Slovenian Demographic Symposium (mimeograph), esp. p.16. Tomšič, who was one of the first to press the issue of liberalizing family planning (in 1940; see N. Petrić, \textit{op.cit.}, p.2), is President of the Federal Council for Family Planning, a member of the LCY Central Committee, and a frequent spokeswoman for Yugoslavia at international conferences on demographically relevant topics. Given her high political standing and the Federal Council's overwhelming influence on policy-making in this area, her views (though described as 'theses') can be safely regarded as at least semi-official.
towards favouring their increase, though again without any apparent demographic motivation. 333

But while society should provide optimal conditions for family life, it has no right to force people to live together against their wills, either for demographic or any other reasons. Unlike Rumania in other words, Yugoslavia is moving towards further liberalization of its divorce laws. This again is a republican/provincial responsibility, but while there has been significant regional variation in recent family legislation, 334 is does not seem to be open to any republic or province to formulate restrictive divorce criteria in the hope thereby of encouraging fertility.

Federal documents invariably emphasize the principle of the equality of the sexes. Women are entitled to the fullest participation in social, economic and political life, and social and population policy must be designed to implement and further their rights. Society must strive to equalize the roles of the sexes, and also to humanize the relations between them. Patriarchal dominance and exploitation must

333 The Resolution passed by the Tenth Party Congress (published as a supplement to Komunist, 3 June 1974) contains nothing on population policy as such, but pledges party support for women and the family, child welfare, etc. See the section entitled 'Zadaci SKJ u socijalnoj politici', pp.43-47. See also Tito's support for child-care services expressed in an important press interview first published in the Zagreb daily, Vjesnik, and reproduced in Komunist, 2 February 1976. The emphasis is always on solving social problems not demographic ones. See, e.g., 'Kažnjene majke', Borba, 25 October 1974, and 'Socijalna karta za celu porodicu', Borba, 23 February 1975.

be eliminated both in the home and at work. To this end, children should be educated to an acceptance of their roles in the new egalitarian family. They should also be given adequate sexual education in school to be able to conduct themselves with decency and responsibility in adult life.

It will have been noticed that all of the principles outlined so far are not in a sense principles of population policy at all. They might rather be termed 'metapriniclples', normative principles or parameters within the limits of which population policy objectives must be pursued. 335 As far as demographic objectives in the narrower sense are concerned, Federal policy is rather more reticent. It is conceded that very high and very low fertility are not desirable, and that the sharp regional differences that exist at present are not desirable either. The confidence is usually expressed that these differences will be ironed out in due course. No sense of urgency about the matter is ever betrayed, however. This is a development which is to be expected in the next 'decades'. 336 It is in any case not a matter over which the Federal authorities claim direct jurisdiction. Just as decisions concerning family size are left to the parents, decisions about what economic or other measures might be

335 Macura draws a similar distinction between 'principles' (načela) and objectives (ciljevi) of population policy. 'Komponente populacione politike', p.566.

taken to affect demographic indices are left to the republics and lower-level authorities. Population policy, like social policy, generally, is very largely decentralized — within the limits, of course, of the general ethical and organizational principles laid down by the Federation.

The Federation's organizational prescriptions have actually passed through a major upheaval recently with the latest constitutional reforms, the effect of which is to extend the process of decentralization beyond the republics to the commune, the 'interest community', the enterprise, and even the Basic Organization of Associated Labour (BOAL). In essence the new system purports to increase the role of the individual worker in all aspects of social life affecting him. Elaborate representative structures known as interesne zajednice have been established to administer social policy. Most fields of demographic relevance — health, social security, pre-school education, housing and so on — fall under this new system. What the de facto power relations between these new structures and the existing Federal, republican and local party and administrative authorities will prove to be remains unclear. However, the earliest indications seem to suggest that as far as efficiency is concerned, they have not wrought an instantaneous revolution, as some at least of the areas in question continue to suffer relative neglect. It seems also that some of the

337 For the constitutional position of the new 'interest communities', see Ustav Socijalističke Federativne Jugoslavije, articles 51-59, and 110-13. For an interesting general discussion, see S. Nikšić, 'Kraj znači početak', NIN, 22 December 1974.

338 Thus in the field of housing, for example, where progress throughout most of the country has been inadequate for years, a new crisis appears to be setting in. See 'Novca ima – stanova nema', VUS, 22 May 1976; and 'Nema lokacija, nema ni stanova' and 'Ima para, nema stanova', Politika, 22 and 28 June 1976.
decentralization will be partially neutralized by the reaching (doubtless under centralized party or governmental direction in many cases) of 'social compacts' on unified policy guidelines. Nonetheless, decentralization, local diversity, and fissiparation of policy will undoubtedly continue to mark the Yugoslav social policy scene, just as they did before the creation of the interest communities. And they could become even more prominent.

Lest it should have been inadvertently suggested by the above exposition of the theoretical position that Yugoslavia is a humanist paradise, a few additional words should be said about the practice of population policy. Despite the lengthening history and considerable political influence of the family planning movement in Yugoslavia, fertility control services are in fact still generally on a very low level, particularly in the less developed republics. Knowledge about contraceptive procedures is weak; apart from coitus interruptus, they are generally

not used at all. And the overall level of what the Yugoslavs call 'sexual culture' is in most regions rather low. There is an excessive dependence on abortion, especially in the areas of Serbian settlement. Despite the relative ease with which legal abortion is made available, illegal abortion remains widespread, and substantial numbers of deaths from abortions have been reported. Propaganda of less damaging means of fertility control has been quite inadequate, especially in those areas of the country where it is most needed. It was only after the 1969 Resolution on Family Planning, that contraceptives were formally

340 Of 8,000 women in a 1970 survey, only 25% had heard of IUDs, 32% of condoms and 36% of the rhythm method. In Slovenia and Croatia 88% employed some kind of contraceptive method, whereas in Kosovo only 44% did. In Ljubljana 27% used the pill, but generally speaking the vast majority (70% of the total national sample) relied basically on coitus interruptus. Žarković et al., 'Znanje, stavovi i praksa', pp.13-14.

341 Data concerning abortions in Yugoslavia are not published regularly. For a lengthy, though slightly dated discussion, see Breznik et al., Fertilitet stanovništva u Jugoslaviji, pp.305-41. A recent estimate put the annual total of abortions in the country at about 300,000, of which 120,000 occurred in Serbia proper and 45,000 (cf. 19,000 live births in 1973) in Belgrade. These are registered abortions ('Pismo nerodjenom detetu', NIN, 8 February 1976). The total figure (including illegal abortions) may be higher by 100,000 (B. Vesić, op.cit., p.19).

342 There were 146 deaths consequent on abortion in 1966 (Fertilitet stanovništva u Jugoslaviji, p.329). Reportedly, all cases of death from abortion since 1963 have resulted from illegal abortions. Krajnc-Simoneti, et al., op.cit., p.677.

343 Žarković et al. speak of 'the regrettable fact that least work is being done on family planning in the areas of highest fertility'. 'Djelatnost zdravstvenih ustanova', p.3.
incorporated into public health programs (though they had been introduced in fact in some regions earlier), and even after the legal requirement was passed, practice often lagged far behind. The medical profession has frequently taken a negative, conservative attitude to fertility control; they almost invariably have no training in the field, and are often hostile to it, making the experience of women seeking abortion, for example, so unpleasant that many still prefer the lethal attentions of illegal practitioners.

In other spheres of demographically relevant social policy, outside Slovenia at least, the record of the Yugoslav system is not very much more favourable. The housing problems of the country, for example, are in many ways like those of Poland or Czechoslovakia: a chronically acute shortage of urban housing; ineffective deployment of funds that are made available; underfulfilment of housing plans; slow construction.

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344 Though the principle that contraceptives should be covered by health insurance had then been accepted for some years, Žarković et al. found that social insurance funds in fact covered less than half the total sum required for actual current expenditure on contraception, and less than 1% of what might be regarded as a satisfactory program. Ibid., pp.2-3.

345 See, e.g., F. Novak et al., op.cit.; 'Pismo nerodjenom detetu', NIN, 8 February 1976.

346 In recent years, more money has been available for housing, but construction continues to lag. See the articles cited in note 338 above, two of which could be translated as 'The money's there, but the flats aren't'.

347 See, e.g., 'Zašto kasne stanovi', NIN, 14 April 1974; and 'Korakom puža', Komunist, 22 September 1975, p.15. Yugoslav construction rates are among the very slowest in Europe. On underfulfilment of plans, see e.g., 'Stan naš nasušni', Komunist, 14 April 1975. The economic reforms seem to have particularly affected housing construction. The 1966 figure for dwellings completed was not surpassed till 1972. Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije 1975, p.210.
long waiting lists; widespread incidence of one-room sub-tenancies; irrational rent and allocation policies in the 'socialized' sector; innumerable bureaucratic restrictions on any self-help initiatives in the area; and so on. In addition, Yugoslavia has some rather distinctive problems of its own, including spiralling costs and prices in the housing industry, colossal price variations from commune to commune, and illegal and often sub-standard housing in outer city suburbs.

Pre-school child-care institutions are also totally inadequate despite female work-force participation rates that are higher than most in Western Europe (if not as high as in the West).
as some in Eastern Europe). For a long time, this area was entirely neglected. Since the late 1960s, some fresh initiatives are again being taken. But the starting point is very low, and progress, seemingly, not always satisfactory. Sexual education has been introduced in schools in several republics, but in the largest, Serbia, resistance is evidently continuing.

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355 As President Tito has put it: 'We'd started well after the war. Then suddenly money took over and everything was looked at purely in terms of the dinar (sve se samo kroz dinar gledalo). The few kindergartens there were were disbanded...' Komunist, 2 February 1976, p.8.

356 See K. Ankucic, 'Realizacija društvene zaštite dece, ciljeva vaspitanja i obrazovanja kao faktor populacione politike u SFRJ', paper presented to the 1973 Belgrade Population Policy Conference (mimeograph). As the author indicates, not only were child-care centres greatly neglected in Yugoslavia up till the late 1960s, but also the criteria for admission to them (mainly financial) were prejudicial to the less well-off.

357 See, e.g., 'Kad se zakida na deci', Politika, 20 April 1976; 'Djeca su žrtve, a tko su krivci?' VUS, 19 February 1975.

358 See NIN, 29 June 1975, for an article on the dismantling of an apparently well respected sexual education program in a Belgrade school. In this respect Serbia is lagging far behind Croatia, Slovenia and Vojvodina (NIN, 15 February 1976, p.27). In general, Serbia appears to be markedly less liberal on most matters of this kind: in respect of abortion, divorce and homosexuality (NIN, 30 November 1975, p.10), there are similar signs of a greater conservatism on the part of the Serbs than their northern neighbours.
related social service benefits have been increased in recent years, but they are certainly not on anything like the level that is being maintained in some of the more emphatically pro-natalist countries of Europe.

It was only relatively recently, however, that Yugoslavia definitively charted its new course in social and population policy; and it is possible that the next decade or so will see practice and theory brought far closer together. Moreover, Yugoslavia's economic means are still relatively limited. In the wealthier republic of Slovenia, considerable progress has already been achieved. If the Slovenian model is emulated elsewhere in the country, and if the interesne zajednice prove to be a success, Yugoslavia will have a population policy that is at once humane, liberal and organizationally unique.

Yugoslavia's approach to population policy differs sharply from that of other Socialist countries in several respects. Poland and the Soviet Union, though markedly less pro-natalist than the other Socialist countries, at least declare themselves to be pro-natalist, and are becoming gradually more so. Even by contrast with them, Yugoslavia is emphatically not pro-natalist or mercantilist. There is far less of what I have termed 'econocentrism' in Yugoslav population policy than elsewhere in Socialist Europe. The unequivocal emphasis on human rights and freedom from administrative restrictions or oppressive propaganda campaigns about 'proper' family models also mark Yugoslavia off from counterpart regimes elsewhere. And the decentralization of population policy-making is, of course, a feature quite unique among Socialist states.

360 Compare the discussion at pp.254-55, above.
While the relative liberalism of Soviet population policy seems curious given the attitude of the present Soviet leadership to other matters, and seems thereby to suggest that no clear parallel need necessarily obtain between the overall orientation of a Socialist regime and its population policy, the Yugoslav case, on the other hand (like the Hungarian, Rumanian and Polish cases) seems to confirm that such a parallel indeed does exist; and that the exceptional liberalism of Yugoslav population policy is a reflection of the exceptional liberalism of the regime itself (when judged by Socialist standards). Its sustained tolerance of emigration and legal abortion despite their apparent threat both to the national interest and to powerful ethnic interests within the country seem to point to a high degree of principled devotion to man-centred ends and means. In population policy, Yugoslav protestations of anti-etatism seem genuinely borne out by the facts on record.

But there are other influences at work, not all of which may be quite so lofty. First and foremost, it is undoubtedly the case that the Federal authorities are bound to be resistant to pro-natalist and mercantilist arguments as long as they are confronted by labour surpluses and a severe unemployment problem. Though the logical connection between the two policy-areas may not be very close, the leadership is likely to react instinctively along the lines of: 'We don't want more people - we've got more than we can handle already'. 361 Moreover, it seems probable

361 The draft Long-term Plan speaks with satisfaction of the projected decline in the rate of population growth over the next decade, saying that it will bring Yugoslav reproduction closer to the type prevailing in 'developed countries'. The passage in question betrays no sensitivity to the fact that, judged by (cont.)
(as in the Soviet Union) that top-level interest in and understanding of Yugoslavia's true demographic situation are still not very great. Highly-placed politicians do not speak about demographic indicators or show any keen awareness of population trends, unlike their colleagues in Hungary, Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia, for example. And again as in the Soviet case, it seems more than likely that the leadership is ham-strung by the nationalities issue: even if the 'Christian' element could agree on the need for vigorous pro-natalism (and Serbs and Croats would be likely to suspect one another's motives) they would not wish to exacerbate the already very delicate inter-republican and inter-ethnic relations in the party and the country by taking any strongly centralist and strongly quantitative population policy line. Liberalism and decentralization are, in a sense, the line of least resistance, the only resolution of otherwise irreconcilable contending interests.

The exceptional vigour and strength of the Yugoslav family planning movement may be in large measure a consequence of some of the factors already mentioned. But it seems that it should also be accorded the status of an independent

361 (cont.) more analytical measures, Croatia and Serbia had already far outdone 'developed countries' in fertility limitation by the end of the 1950s. The plan goes on to declare that this 'calming down' (smirenje) of population growth would favour economic and social development. Osnova zajedničke politike dugoročnog razvoja, p.XIV.

362 Or even perhaps those in Poland and the USSR. Cf. pp.340-41, and p.258, note 189. Gierek and Brezhnev have now at least used the phrase 'population policy' or similar. To my knowledge, Tito still has not.
influence on events. Most of the successive developments in official policy have occurred in response to initiatives stemming from the family planners. Among the latter, in turn, there has been a strong feminist influence. Population policy is quite often regarded as being in large measure a feminine preserve; and this is true in the Yugoslav case as well. Feminine pressures everywhere in the Socialist world (and outside it) tend to be in the direction of humanizing reproduction rather than increasing it. In this context, it may be of relevance that the social and political standing of women in Yugoslavia is rather higher than elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

363 'The initiative did not flow from governmental or planning bodies, whom the complexity of demographico-socio-economic trends completely eluded.... Nor were socio-political organizations [i.e., the party, the Socialist Alliance, the Trade Unions, etc.] ready to take up the initiative to seek political solutions for existing demographic problems. In this respect, the activities of the Conference for Social Action among Women formed an exception. They made a major contribution to bringing about abortion reform and the attainment of a political attitude to family planning'. Macura, 'Komponente populacione politike', p.558.

364 This generalization is undoubtedly less applicable to the less developed southern regions of the country. But official population policy seems to reflect northern liberalism (rather than northern chauvinism) in large measure. Perhaps at the grass roots, the position of women in the north is not much better than it is elsewhere in Socialist Europe either. Certainly press reports of inequality between the sexes and weak participation in social and political life by women are frequent. But at the top, at least, women have been relatively prominent in recent years. Two women have been successively President of the (cont.)
It has been suggested that the Yugoslav theory of population policy is both liberally humane, and ingeniously well adapted to the country's very difficult politico-demographic situation. But quite apart from the deficiencies of practice, there are some serious lacunae and ill-concealed dilemmas in the policy itself. They may be inevitable, but they are there.

To begin with, there is the crucial question of whether and how decentralization of demographic goal-fixing will achieve the reduction of regional differences to which Federal policy is committed. The Federation has effectively delegated responsibility for this task to the lower tiers of government, whilst at the same time placing limits on the means they might use to set about it. It has not, on the other hand, proposed any system for co-ordinating emergent republican and provincial policies to achieve the harmonious results sought. What if the regions with rapidly growing populations, for example, made no effort to reduce their fertility? What if they were to decide for nationalist reasons to pursue pro-natalist policies? And how should the Federation respond if all the regional authorities do

364 (cont.) League of Communists of Croatia (Savka Dabčević-Kučar and Milka Planinc); and a woman was for some time Secretary of the Serbian party (Latinka Perović). In this connection, it is worth recalling that Perović participated in the 1964 Borba round-table debate on population policy, taking a strongly feminist and 'anti-pro-natalist' line (Borba, 2 and 3 February 1964). The case of Vida Tomšič of Slovenia is also significant (cf. note 332, above). Women's publications in Yugoslavia sometimes attain what Western feminists might concede to be a considerable degree of sophistication. (See, for example, the Zagreb journal Žena). Compare the discussion at pp.63-76, 97-99, 241-43 and 318-21, above.
adopt appropriate population policies, but the fertility scissors still do not close? Federal policy has set a leisurely timetable for achieving 'moderately low' growth everywhere. But with or without regional co-operation, they may find they have a problem on their hands that seems to require adjudication imperatively and without delay.

In addition to being forced to reconcile conflicting regional trends or conflicting regional policies, the Federation may also find itself confronted with the cognate task of reconciling its own or republican perceptions of the country's socio-economic and political needs with wayward macrotrends in parental decision-making. If, for example, parental sovereignty results in further aggravation of ethnic imbalances, will the Federation continue to defend complete freedom of choice? Alternatively, if overall fertility were to fall to a level where it is held to be manifestly too low to sustain further economic development or the most elementary national defence, should the Federation then intervene? Yugoslav theorists have proposed at least two solutions to dilemmas of this kind. One suggestion emphasizes the 'happy circumstance' that, as fertility surveys have shown, parents in high-fertility areas wish to have fewer children than they in fact have, whereas those in low-fertility areas wish to have more. But it is an unstable theoretical structure that rests on a 'happy circumstance'. What if patterns of parental preference were to alter in directions adjudged unsuitable by the authorities? In any case, Macura's happy circumstance is not entirely felicitous since there remain considerable

differences between notions of ideal family size in different regions and among different ethnic groups. 366 Another suggestion that has been made is that any potential conflict between national needs and individual decisions will be averted by the fullest development of self-management. The individual citizen will be drawn fully into the making of population policy through local authorities and 'interest communities', and will thereby be enabled to see how private and public responsibilities should be matched. In this version, the right to family planning should also be seen as a duty. 367 It is not explained, however, how all individual citizens will gain such a grasp of economic and macrodemographic trends as to be able to judiciously blend their procreatory aspirations with the needs and possibilities of the nation in any given epoch. What if the economic and educational measures sanctioned prove unequal to the task of guiding the individual's conscience? This is, or will be, everywhere a difficult moral problem. In Yugoslavia it is even more difficult than elsewhere because of the ethnic complication. The glosses of Macura and Tomšić do not really provide a solution. But given the problem's quite exceptional delicacy in Yugoslav conditions, it is understandable that official and even semi-official thinking should hold back from trying to solve it until the last possible moment.

366 According to a major fertility survey conducted in 1970, the ideal number of children varied by republic and province between 2.3 in Serbia proper and 3.8 in Kosovo; the number actually desired varied between 2.0 in Serbia proper and 3.6 in Kosovo. G. Todorović, 'Idealni i željeni broj dece', Stanovništvo IX (1971), no. 3-4, p.297, at p.301 and 305.

It has been suggested that one of the reasons why Federal population policy assumed its present liberal form in Yugoslavia was that this made it possible to at least shelve if not solve certain intractable domestic political problems. It will, however, be a continuing problem for Federal population policy to contain the different cross-currents that threaten it. Ethno-regional particularisms are the most prominent among them. But there are others. The debate over legal abortion is evidently continuing, and

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368 Perhaps it should be emphasized once more that Yugoslavs are intensely conscious of (though not necessarily well-informed about) ethno-demographic trends. For a sense of the keen expectancy with which the provisional and final Census results by nationality were awaited in 1971-72, see the two articles entitled 'Nacije u popisu', in NIN, 4 July 1971 and 28 May 1972. The articles also convey something of the eagerness felt by defenders of official policy to play down the whole event. The first article assured its readers that 'practically' there could be no 'overtaking' on the population league tables, since the differences between the various ethnic groups were too great. The second article had to admit, however, that the Macedonians had fallen back two places, whilst the Moslems and Albanians had advanced two and one respectively. The article quoted the Director of the Federal Statistical Institute as claiming that there had been no surprises, but went on to declare, nonetheless, that there had been both surprises and 'fundamental shifts'.

seems unlikely to subside in the near future. Obviously it would be impractical as well as undesirable to have sharply different criteria in different republics, as women reluctant to avail themselves of the services of non-professionals could simply travel to another region. Reversal of the present liberal policy in all areas might also fail in its purpose, if that purpose were to strengthen the relative position of the less fertile majority. Eastern European experience suggests that in the early phase of fertility limitation, if abortion is available, it will be preferred to other methods. Accordingly, reversal of the abortion legislation might have only slight effects in the north, whilst seriously checking a growing trend towards family planning in the less developed regions. Despite the problematicality of abortion reform and counter-reform as population policy, pressures of that kind are probably 369 The Catholic Church in Slovenia and Croatia launched a fierce campaign against legal abortion just as the legislation confirming it was being considered. (David, Abortion and Family Planning, p.201.) Opposition is not confined to the Church, however. For an instance of Serbian opposition, see B. Stambolović, 'Planiranje porodice i demografska situacija u opštinama Srbije', Srpski arhiv za celokupno lekarstvo 1971, no.7-8, p.475. Stambolović, a doctor, speaks with the greatest anxiety about the threat posed by abortion to the biological future of the nation (by which he means the Serbs), and repeatedly compares a woman's moral and civic obligation to bear children with a man's duty to serve in the army. The article is also enlivened by some comical demographic logic. For an instance of Macedonian opposition, see A. Kjurčijev 'Niektóre aspekty polityki ludnościowej w Jugosławii', paper presented to the 1972 Warsaw Conference on Population Policy (mimeograph), pp.12-14. Kjurčijev believes abortion laws should be made an instrument of differentiated population policy.
not easily contained. There is also an ongoing struggle between defenders of the official orientation which sees population policy as firmly integrated in social policy and principles, and those who would like to make it an independent and autonomous area of policy with its own objectives and priorities. 370 Finally, mention might be made of those who favour migration as a solution to population pressures and those who believe family planning should be made the answer; 371 and, relatedly, the Malthusians and the anti-Malthusians. All of these (and other) issues of principle tend to become tangled up with the existing ethno-regional lines of division so that each reinforces the other. None of them have really been permanently solved by the present Federal policy.

III Population Policy below the Federal Level

While the Federal authorities have to some extent simplified the task of republican authorities in the field of population policy by laying down guidelines that remove certain elements of agonizing choice, they have not solved all their problems for them. As the administration of social and population policy is now decentralized virtually to the level of the BOAL, republican authorities may well encounter many of the problems of co-ordination and reconciliation that have previously been outlined as facing the Federation, the moreso since most of the republics, like the Federation


371 Cf. note 265, above. This debate has been going on in that form for some time. See Migracije stanovništva Jugoslavije, p.339.
itself, are torn by their own internal regional and ethnic divisions. Moreover, in fobbing the more strictly demographic aspects of policy-formation off onto the lower levels, the Federation has freed itself of the difficult task of finding population policies that will be capable of achieving numerical aims. At the same time, of course, it has restricted the lower authorities' range of choice. The republics which would like to increase their fertility are virtually limited to offering various kinds of economic inducements to achieve their objective. While they may approve of the kinds of policies involved as a matter of principle (generous child endowment, maternity leave and benefits, extensive networks of child-care centres, etc.), it may not be within their economic means to provide all these things within the foreseeable future. Slovenia is the only republic that is relatively well enough placed to

372 As in the case of Yugoslavia as a whole, there is generally a strong correlation between regional, ethnic and developmental factors within the republics. All the republics now have their own regional policies aimed at reducing the economic gap between their more and less developed communes. The problems are perhaps particularly acute in Serbia proper, Montenegro and Macedonia. See Politika, 20 November 1975, p.10 (Macedonia); Politika, 12 December 1975, p.9 and 10 June 1976, p.8 (Montenegro); and NIN, 9 and 16 February 1975 (Serbia proper). Leading party officials in Serbia and Montenegro who are quoted in these articles describe the regional development question as 'politically very sensitive' and 'very complex and sensitive' respectively. From the context, it is clear that each had in mind the strongly Moslem Sandžak area which spans the Serbo-Montenegrin border. Cf. note 205, above.
afford extensive programs of this kind; and its fertility is in fact well above that of Serbia or Croatia, and has been for many years. Serbs and Croats may, therefore, feel that the ethical guidelines laid down by the Federation discriminate against them.

Numerous policy problems and dilemmas await the republican authorities, some of them strongly ethno-regional in colouration, and some of them more universal. For example, should child-care centres be built to enable mothers to participate fully in public life, or is it economically, socially and educationally preferable that women should rear their children themselves for at least the first years of their life? If pro-natalist inducements are offered for higher-order children, how steeply progressive should they be? Should a means test be applied for family benefits, and if so from what level? Should special efforts be made to encourage the fertility of any particular categories of the population (say, those whose fertility is lowest, or those whose rearing performance seems best)? It will not be possible to go into all of these questions here. Rather, I shall restrict myself to saying something about the pattern of republican and provincial differentiation of policy, as seen from our central natalist vantage-point.

Decentralization of child endowment payments has been in force in Yugoslavia since 1967 in the case of republics, and in 1969 in the case of the autonomous provinces. In the time that has elapsed since, there has emerged a definite tendency towards the payment of higher benefits in the wealthier and less fertile regions and lower benefits in

373 M. Mladenović, Društvena zaštit porodice i dece (Belgrade, 1973), pp.178-79.
the poorer and more fertile regions. However, the differences are still not spectacular, and may reflect relative capacities to pay more than differences in degree of pro-natalist ambition. Moreover, a means test is applied and payments are graduated by parental income as well as by birth-order. Income-tax concessions for dependant family members are also granted in varying amounts by the different republican and provincial authorities (and may be varied by communal authorities as well). But again it would seem that differences by republic are not very great and do not reflect any obvious division between pro- and anti-natalist

374 See Table 15, Appendix C.

375 There is a tendency for family benefit increases to follow inflation in a fairly automatic fashion in one republic after another. There are signs also of central policy direction in this area. See, e.g., Komunist, 12 August 1974, pp.1-2. Increases are not always more modest in the more fertile and less prosperous regions. Thus Politika, 4 February 1976, p.9, reported a 30% increase in family allowances in Kosovo (higher than equivalent rates of increase elsewhere, and higher than the increase in the cost of living in Kosovo over the relevant period).

376 All of this suggests that the orientation is more to social policy than to pro-natalist population policy. This impression is probably borne out by the language of the sparse press reports on the subject, which never contain pro-natalist accents. See, e.g., Borba, 26 July 1974 (Montenegro); VUS za naše gradjane u svijetu, 8 January 1975, p.32, Politika, 27 December 1975, p.8, and 16 April 1976 (Croatia); and Politika, 2 August 1974, p.7 (Serbia proper). On Slovenia, see A. Radovan, 'Zakonodaja o varstvu žena s področja dela in socijalne varnosti ter o otroškem varstvu', paper presented to the 1974 Slovenian Demographic Symposium (mimeograph), pp.20-21. The pattern of degressive gradation of benefits after the first three children also seems to be fairly standard.
regional authorities. In any case, only a relatively small proportion of income-earners are involved, since the taxable minimum even before concessions are allowed for dependants is customarily twice the average annual income for that republic or province. The more basic income tax (or 'contribution' - doprinos - as the jargon of self-management euphemistically terms it) paid by Yugoslav wage-earners is now fissiparated into a multitude of republican, communal and other local or special deductions, which vary in bewildering fashion from one commune to another, and even from one enterprise to another. It is these deductions which finance the various spheres of social activity and

377 See 'Čije su makaze oštrije', NIN, 1 December 1974; and 'Različiti aršini', Politika, 5 December 1975. Slovenia seems a little more inclined to treat income tax as a natalist device. See also 'Bodo davčne olajšave privabile štorklje?' (Will Tax Concessions Entice the Storks?), Tedenska tribuna (Ljubljana), 21 February 1973.

378 Thus, for example, in Titovo Užice, workers pay 26 (sic) different 'contributions', in Belgrade 24, in Zagreb 16 and Skopje 13 ('Moja zarada', NIN, 13 June 1976). See also 'Kolikb nam je socijalna politika socijalistička', VUS, 21 February 1976.

379 Enterprises are usually bound by higher authority to observe certain principles when determining their own allocatory procedures in such matters. Reports of evasion are not infrequent, however. Thus, for example, a Belgrade enterprise was said to have introduced a system of housing allocation that would have required an Albanian worker with the firm to have either 800 children, or alternatively only 224 children but 100 years' service, to qualify for a flat (VUS, 4 June 1975). One can well imagine the ribald jocITIES that might have been exchanged as these rules were being framed. Family allowances may also vary from enterprise to enterprise. See, e.g., 'Pomoć radnicima s više dece', Borba, 7 October 1974.
social security that are potentially of the greatest demographic relevance: housing, health, child-care, social security, etc. As mentioned earlier, the actual politics of these allocations under the new constitutional arrangements are still somewhat obscure. But given the immense local variation that exists, it would probably be safe to say that there are as yet few signs of clearly and systematically elaborated republican policies of any kind emerging, much less of programs of action aimed at achieving palpable, numerical demographic goals. A close study of press reports on these matters in recent years suggests in any case, that here too demographic motivations are extremely seldom in the foreground of the decision-makers' minds. Advocates of vigorous republican population policies, though less prominent than in the period before 1972, still make their voices heard from time to time in the press. But for the most part they seem to be back in the political wilderness. As at the Federal level, the family planners and the social policy lobby seem to have relatively better access to authority.

And again as at the Federal level, this is probably due to some extent to continuing non-comprehension of demographic facts by political elites, and a reluctance to grasp sharp ethnic nettles. It may also have something to do with disapproval by the centre of vociferously nationalist population policies being pursued by the republics or provinces.

By making family planning a national dogma and by specifying that abortion is to be regarded as a legitimate (if highly undesirable) form of fertility control, the Federal authorities have, as noted earlier, largely precluded the republics and provinces from manipulating either as tools of population policy. There are some variations in
the republican abortion laws that have been drafted since the constitutional amendments made this an area of exclusive republican responsibility. However these are limited in scope and do not appear to have any demographic significance. Levels of contraceptive practice differ greatly from republic to republic, and there is some room therefore for the less developed regions to apply anti-natalist policies by vigorously pursuing family planning campaigns. Calls for such action have certainly been made, notably in Macedonia.

380 The Slovenians plan to reduce the period in which abortions can be performed on social grounds from 12 to 10 weeks, but are doing so for medical reasons. Otherwise, the draft of the new Slovenian abortion law was more liberal than its predecessors. "Zakon o prekinitvi nosečnosti (osnutek)", documentation reproduced for the 1974 Slovenian Demographic Symposium. The Croatian draft law on abortion is reportedly the only one in Yugoslavia that also explicitly deals with contraception and sex education. ('Pobačaj (ne) planira obitelj', VUS 2 October 1974). A later report on the Croatian draft law suggests that the commissions which formerly had to approve all abortions will no longer be so empowered in the case of early abortions (Politika, 20 February 1976, p.9). In abortion legislation, as in the case of family allowances, there seems to be a tendency for new measures to be taken up by one republic after another, starting usually from Slovenia. See "'Pobuna" ginekologa', NIN, 8 December 1974; and 'Strah od pobacaja', NIN, 8 June 1975.

381 Cf. note 340, above.

382 K. Miljovski, 'Kretanje stanovništva, ekonomski razvoj i nerazvijena područja', paper presented to the 1973 Belgrade Population Policy Conference. Another Macedonian contribution to the same Conference argued for a differential population policy on the quite explicit grounds that such a policy was necessary to preserve ethnic harmony between Macedonians and Albanians. I. Josifovski, 'Problemi populacione politike sa stanovništva razvoja etničkih grupa i njihovih medjutničkih odnosa na jednom užem području u SR Makedoniji', Naše teme 1974, no.4, p.590. Similar demands were voiced at the same conference in respect of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo.
and there is evidence that differentiated republican family planning policies may now be beginning to be applied. Of course, some Republican authorities would wish to pursue anti-natalist policies in some parts of their territory, and pro-natalist policies elsewhere. The decentralization of the Yugoslav system seems to give them a way of doing so. However, to achieve this, they might have to secure the co-operation of the local populations concerned, or alternatively, succeed in manipulating ostensibly autonomous self-managing decisions by local agencies. Neither course of action would be without its difficulties. All the major national groups have centres of power either within Yugoslavia or beyond its borders. Virtually the only significant minority group that could be proceeded against with relative impunity in such matters would be the Gipsies.


384 Montenegro and Macedonia, for example, Miljovski (op.cit.) calls for a 'subtly differentiated policy', and Kjurčijev (op.cit.) for a policy differentiated by region (not just by republic or province). A Montenegrin contributor to the 1973 Belgrade Conference, having deplored the lack of any official support for family planning in his republic, went on to speak of the need for determining a population policy in Montenegro, 'especially in the less developed regions'. These, of course, are the strongly Moslem communes of the Sandžak (cf. note 372, above). M. Djurić, 'Problemi planiranja porodice u SR Crnoj Gori' (mimeograph), pp.1, 2.

385 Der Spiegel, 16 April 1973, p.153, reported that Yugoslav officials had been attempting to get rid of Gipsies as Gastarbeiter to Western Europe, especially to Austria. In the Bosnian commune of Kakanj, according to this report, some 30 Gypsy families had been given financial inducements by the authorities to go abroad. (cont.)
The development of republican and provincial population policies has been little studied either in or outside of Yugoslavia to date. To do so would be a formidable task, given the complexity, obscurity and at times inscrutability of the material. I have not made any systematic attempt to do so myself. It may, however, be worth offering one's impressions of how policy trends are shaping in the

385 (cont.) It is characteristic that the 1971 Yugoslav Census reported a total of 12 Gipsies in the whole of Kakanj. ('Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama', p.14.) The Gipsy population in Yugoslavia may in actual fact be very large. One (Gipsy) estimate gives their numbers at 650,000, 200,000 of them allegedly in Macedonia. (Gratton Puxon, Rom: Europe's Gipsies, Minority Rights Group Report No.14 (London, 1973).) The 1961 Yugoslav census found 150,000 Romany speakers. Most Yugoslav Gipsies are evidently identifying as Serbs or Macedonians. Should the Gipsies emerge as an independent ethnic group in Yugoslavia, the demo-political consequences might be quite significant, especially in Macedonia. See also R. Petrović, 'Demografski razvitak i biološka reprodukcija etničkih grupa u Jugoslaviji', Sociologija, 1970, no.3-4, p.355, esp. 360, 362-63; 'Nikada se nismo pomirili s politikom diskriminacije drugih nacionalnosti', Politika, 25 June 1971, tr. in 'Das schwierige Zusammenleben der Völker im Kosovo-Gebiet', Osteuropa, XXII (1972), no.3, p.A197 (for comment on attempts by Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo to use local Gipsies for their own political purposes in the 1971 Census); and NIN, 13 April 1975, p.11 (for a curious little article abridged from a Vojvodina Hungarian-language paper describing the activities of Yugoslav Gipsies in international Romany organizations: the President of the World Romany Congress, Slobodan Berberski of Belgrade, is quoted as deploring discrimination against Gipsies in Europe and in Yugoslavia, and as referring to a proposal that a Gipsy national state, Romanistan, be created. The article does not mention any proposed location for such a state.)
different units, simply on the basis of the evidence that is more or less readily available. 

Slovenia and Croatia seem to be talking most about the need for a pro-natalist policy and also taking the most vigorous steps towards implementing one. Croatia was the first republic to introduce the extended maternity leave for working mothers, for example, and Slovenia is paying more generous family allowances than any other republic. While in both republics there are Catholics and nationalists who would be only too happy to adopt

386 The task is all the more difficult in that at the republican, as at the Federal level, 'Yugoslav legislation...has been consistently neutral towards demographic phenomena. No direct population policy, either pro-natalist, or anti-natalist, has so far been made explicit in law or statutory regulations.' Krajnc-Simoneti et al. op.cit., p.693.

387 For some Slovenian talk see, e.g., 'Vzroki premajhnega števila rojstev v Sloveniji', (The Causes of the Excessively Low Birth-rate in Slovenia), Komunist (Ljubljana edition), 24 November 1972; 'Kakšno populacijsko politiko potrebujemo?', Tovariš, 8 October 1973; 'Štorkljo v slovenski grb!'; and 'Bodo davčne olajšave privabile štorklje?' The Croats talk rather less about population policy since 1971, but see, for example, 'Korak ka društvu razvijenih', Politika, 30 March 1975; 'Skupi stanovi - mali natalitet', Borba, 17 August 1974.

388 Slovenia may be doing more as well as talking more about population problems. Croatian crèche programs, for example, are languishing badly. Towards the end of the last five-year planning period, it was expected that the plan for crèche construction would be only 40% fulfilled (Komunist, 17 February 1975, p.11). See also the articles on child-care centres in VUS, 16 January and 13 November 1974, and 19 February 1975.

389 Evidently for pro-natalist reasons, among others. See Krajnc-Simoneti et al. op.cit., p.680.
'administrative measures' to increase the birth-rate, the liberal, economic approach to population policy seems more securely established there than anywhere else.

Serbia, despite the fact that its ethno-demographic interests are as much threatened as either the Slovenians' or the Croatians', seems strangely sluggish in its response. Child welfare services in Serbia proper are not apparently advancing very rapidly, and the press virtually never reports on the need for an active population policy,

Serbia is well behind Slovenia and even Croatia in the provision of pre-school care centres. As of 1970, only 5.3% of children aged 3-6 in Serbia proper were in kindergartens, compared with 8.5% in Croatia, 15.2% in Slovenia and 24.7% in Vojvodina (Ankucić, op.cit., prilog 1). Since then there has been improvement, but probably not in relative terms. Of Serbia's 212 child-care institutions, 163 are in Belgrade; 30 communes have none at all (Politika, 7 and 21 October 1975, p.9 in each case). A press article in 1973 suggested that at that time, family allowances were in many cases simply not being paid in Serbia (Borba, 27 October 1973, p.6). And more recently, a rapporteur to the Serbian parliament declared that 'the average rate of taxation for child welfare [in Serbia] has been falling since 1971. Only last year a large number of communal child welfare communities in our republic reduced their rates...' The speaker went on to say that more would do so in 1976, and that plans for the next five years revealed a further expected relative decline. (Politika, 31 July 1976, p.11) See also Politika, 27 May 1976, p.5, for similar complaints about the neglect of child welfare in Serbia.

The only pro-natalist cris de coeur I have seen in the Belgrade daily Politika in recent years have not referred to Serbia. The issue for 4 April 1976 contained an article entitled 'The Contemporary French Family: Where is the Third Child?' French fertility has been much higher than Serbian for twenty years. The article contained no apparent allusions to the domestic Serbian situation.
despite the fact that Serbian fertility is the lowest in
the country. There are signs that the illiberal solution
has special appeal in Serbia, but since that is not at
present an available option, their inactivity in other
respects is all the more strange. There seem to be more
traces of pro-natalist thinking in official circles in the
Vojvodina than in Serbia proper. Among the less developed
regions there seems to be a general disposition to limit
expenditures that might have a pro-natalist impact, but with
the possible exception of Macedonia, no very vigorous anti-
natalist campaigns seem to be being conducted. It would be
interesting to know just exactly to what extent the Macedonian
authorities are seeking to implement the innumerable demands
made by ethnic Macedonians that a differentiated population
policy be put into effect within the republic. There is
some evidence to suggest that they are doing so, and that
the program is meeting with hostility on the part of the
Albanian population. The Kosovo authorities, to my

392 See 'Prazne zibelke', Delo, 15 February 1974 (a Slovenian
translation of an article that had appeared in the Novi
Sad paper, Dnevnik; and 'Kritična tačka za bebe',
NIN, 23 June 1974. Because of its age-structure,
Vojvodina's crude birth rate is markedly lower than
Serbia's (12.7 per thousand, cf. 15.1 per thousand in
1973). This may help to explain the greater alarms there.

393 An article about unwholesome nationalisms in Macedonia
mentions Macedonian nationalist fears that the high
birth rate of certain unidentified people or peoples
is an attempt to squeeze the Macedonians out of the
area, and condemns Macedonian nationalists who oppose
proportionate representation of ethnic minorities in
socio-political organizations, etc. Albanian nationalists
are also condemned, among other reasons because: 'They
interpret family planning in a special way, and in that
respect have a point in common (though from the opposite
side) with Macedonian nationalists'. 'Nacionalistički
pucnji u prazno', VUS, 8 October 1975 (reprinted from
Politika).
knowledge, are not vigorously pursuing anti-natalism. The most recent increase in the family allowance there was very generous (much more so than the concurrent increase in Bosnia and Hercegovina, for example). It is possible that the Kosovo leadership shares the belief of its compatriots in Tirana that vigorous population growth is essential to national (ethnic) security. The Montenegrins also need to conduct a differentiated policy, and it is possible that they are now trying to do so, though as of 1973, little was being done in the field of fertility control, at least.

But irrespective of the present or future direction of republican and provincial policies, the political problems, dilemmas and conflicts inherent in the Yugoslav demographic situation are unlikely to be rapidly alleviated in the decades that lie ahead. They will rather become worse.

394 The most recent increase in Kosovo was 30% (cf. note 375, above); the most recent increase in Bosnia and Hercegovina was only 16.8% (Politika, 24 February 1976, p.7).

395 Compare the report of a Swedish demographer after a visit to Albania: 'In addition, one often encounters the nationalistic argument in favour of a population larger than it is at present. The Albanians feel that they are surrounded by enemies and that if their population was larger it would be easier for them to resist possible attacks.' E. Hofsten, op.cit., p.156.

396 Cf. note 384, above. The decline in family allowance payments in Montenegro after 1970 (cf. Table 15, Appendix C) may conceivably reflect a punitive policy aimed against high fertility, but it seems unlikely. Like most other republics, Montenegro has a means test for family allowances, and pays higher sums to lower-income families (Borba, 26 July 1974). This would presumably favour the more fertile Albanians and Moslems in the less developed communes.
The efficacy of population policies in either increasing or reducing fertility is in itself open to question. Many observers take the view that they can achieve little. Some Eastern European countries, it is true, are currently claiming considerable success for their pro-natalist policies. In Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania, both natality and fertility have undoubtedly been raised. But it remains to be seen whether this is a long-term or a short-term effect. And in any case, they have been able to do so thanks to a combination of measures, most of which are not open to Yugoslav republican authorities. Thus Rumania, for example, abruptly delegalized abortion and banned the import and free sale of contraceptives. Czechoslovakia, being a relatively advanced economy, has been able to afford to introduce generous economic inducements to motherhood. And all are able to mount elaborate and orchestrated propaganda campaigns on behalf of the family model they deem nationally desirable. Virtually none of these approaches seem open to the Yugoslav republics at present.

In any case, even if Croatia, Serbia, Vojvodina and Slovenia were to institute successful pro-natalist policies, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Hercegovina appropriately differentiated programs, and Kosovo a family planning campaign of unprecedented intensity, it is unlikely that this in itself would avert the ethno-demographic confrontations that seem to be already in gestation. The age-structures of the different ethnic populations have been so sharply differentiated by their recent demographic histories that even if inherent fertility levels were to be relatively quickly brought to parity, differences in natural growth rates would persevere for some decades beyond that time. As in the case of the Soviet Union, the time when the dominant
ethnic groups could have sought by policy measures to significantly mitigate the trends we are now witnessing is buried well in the past. Present actions cannot undo present trends. They can only serve - perhaps - to alleviate future trends, and, more probably, to ease present neuroses. The only real solutions (short of political or other violence) lie in accommodation and compromise, acceptance of change and imaginative response to it.
CHAPTER 6

THE POLITICS OF POPULATION IN SOCIALIST EUROPE: SOME GENERALIZATIONS.

In some important respects, the cases of USSR, Poland and Yugoslavia deviate from the general pattern of demographic politics in Socialist Europe. They are, perhaps, if we exclude the anomalous Albania, the three least "typical" of all. The USSR and Yugoslavia are far more ethnically diverse than any other country in the group; Poland is now far less so. All three are markedly less pro-natalist than the others. Yugoslavia, with its labour surplus, its toleration of mass emigration, its decentralized social policy administration and its strong commitment to non-mercantilist values is altogether an exceptional case. While pragmatic considerations preclude even the most cursory of discussions of the politico-demographic problems of the other Socialist countries, an overall survey of the entire area may help to identify and locate the positions of our three case studies more precisely.

Generally speaking, in the present work, five main spheres of interaction between demographic trends and politics have been distinguished: (a) labour supply and economic policy; (b) ethnic relations; (c) ideology; (d) international politics; and (e) population policies and policy-making. More prominence has been accorded domestic than international implications, and particular attention has been devoted to (b) and (e) as being the areas of the greatest
inherent importance and keenest demographic relevance respectively. The treatment of the other three has been relatively terse, if not sketchy. That same pattern of emphasis will be repeated again in these concluding remarks.


In this field, the crucial problem raised (or apparently raised) by population trends is that of labour supply. Soviet-style economies are extremely profligate with resources, human resources included. Labour (like capital) has traditionally been cheap, and relatively speaking still is. There are also strong reasons inherent in the annual and five-year planning systems for hoarding materials, human materials again included. Enterprises thus have a vested interest in maintaining more people on their staff than they need. And since till recently there has always been an abundant supply of labour (based more on mobilization of women and peasants than on high birth rates in the preceding generation, but on the latter also, to some extent), there have been few pressures at the macro-economic level to strive for efficient and sparing use of labour. Now, suddenly, the situation has changed or is changing almost everywhere. Planners and governments are finding themselves having to apportion carefully what they have traditionally
tended to treat as one of nature's limitless bounties.  
Although the causes of this situation are not primarily 

demographic, the dramatic "disappearance" of labour reserves 
has the effect of concentrating the minds of the authorities 
on demographic issues. 

Although the overall trend is towards increasing 
scarcity of labour, there have also been periods and regions 
in which demographic fluctuations (as well as other causes) 

1. In East Germany and the Czech lands, labour 
reserves have been virtually exhausted for some 
time past. In both cases, earlier trends in 
natality and post-War migration played an important 
role in bringing this situation about. In the USSR 
and Poland, the stage of exhaustion has not yet 
quite been reached, but labour shortages are wide-
spread, and will become more so in the future. 

Hungary's labour reserves are apparently now on 
the verge of exhaustion. Even in less developed 
countries like Rumania and Bulgaria, concern about 
diminishing labour resources has become very 
marked, forcing the regime to adopt such expedients 
as thinning out white-collar personnel, imposing 
labour discipline on school-leavers and graduates, 
inducing pensioners to remain at work, etc. On 

Czechoslovakia, see A. Elias, op. cit.; on Poland 
and the USSR, compare the discussions in 3.a. and 
4.c., above; on Hungary, see, e.g., RFE Research 
Hungarian Situation Report January 11, 1972, June 
25, 1974, January 28, 1975, and January 13, 1976; 
on Rumania, see RFE Research Rumanian Situation 
Report July 26, 1974, and Rumanian Press Survey 
nos 943 (February 22, 1973), 968 and 992 (April 25, 
1975); and on Bulgaria, RFE Research Bulgarian 
Situation Report August 17, 1973, April 26, May 2, 
and August 14, 1974, March 13, May 9, and May 30, 
1975. The labour situation in agriculture is 
usually worse than that in industry. Though 
considerable proportions of the population are 
still engaged in agriculture in the less advanced 
countries (i.e. all other than East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia), in most cases the labour force is 
heavily feminized and ageing, and lacking in skills 
and modern equipment, so that it is often necessary 
to draft urban labour or the army during seasonal 
peaks. At the same time, many regimes are taking 
measures to limit further rural-urban migration.
have brought about a certain embarrassment of riches. Soviet ideology holds, it will be recalled, that unemployment is a purely capitalist phenomenon. Stalin abolished it by proclamation in the 1930s, and unlike some of his other victims, it has not yet been rehabilitated. But there are times when Socialist states could make good use of some respectable notion of unemployment. In Yugoslavia in the last decade and a half (particularly after the efficiency-oriented reforms of 1965), unemployment and permitted economic emigration have been rife simultaneously; and Stalinist employment doctrines have long since been jettisoned. Elsewhere, unemployment is denied to exist and often quite effectively concealed by inefficient production. But in the areas of rapid population growth, concealment is not always possible, and will become less so as ever larger cohorts of school-leavers of increasingly urban training and orientation add to the accumulated clogging of the labour market. This is particularly true of those parts of the USSR and Yugoslavia, where natural increase rates have been running at Third World levels over the last two or three decades.

The prominence of economic, and in particular labour-force considerations in demographic debate and policy-making reflects certain characteristic features of Socialist society: its econocentrism, its increasingly technocratic outlook and values, its similarity to a gigantic corporation (unfettered by company law), and its strong orientation to the objectives of physical economic growth. The significance of the growing labour shortages in the population policy
context is that pro-natalist views are thereby reinforced. As the labour shortages increase and are sharply aggravated by the fertility decline of the late fifties and early sixties, it is possible that they may become the catalyst of Eastern Europe's long-awaited and long-shelved or only partially implemented economic reforms, which, in some conceptions, are expected to lead to a decentralization of decision-making in Socialist societies generally, and a steady growth of structural pluralism and private, individual autonomy, with the worker becoming the focal point in economic processes, rather than a minor cog in the machinery. However, the alternative possibility also exists that the demographically-aggravated labour shortages will lead rather to increasingly mercantilist population policies, and to elaborate labour controls of the type introduced by Stalin in 1940 (but this time writ technologically large). At present, the latter possibility seems if anything the more likely.

In the case of the areas with demographically-aggravated labour surpluses, it is quite possible that serious local unrest may develop, not perhaps due so much to economic hardship consequent on unemployment (Socialist economies are

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2. Compare the discussion in 3.a., above. Obviously the role of demographic trends in such a case cannot be more than that of precipitating factor. Here again, some of the less developed countries with relatively recent histories of demographic transition are well to the forefront, suggesting that another important element involved is the strength of liberal political culture in the country concerned. For some Bulgarian and Rumanian essays into "administrative measures" in the field of labour policy, see RFE Research Bulgarian Situation Report April 23, 1970, October 22, 1971 and May 9, 1975; and Rumanian Situation Report March 14, 1975 and P. Gafton "Labour Organization and Labour Discipline in Rumania" RFE Research Rumania September 7, 1970.
quite efficient at swallowing labour surpluses - though in Yugoslavia the unemployment problem may well play a crucial role) as to the complications introduced into the situation by the ethnic factor, to a brief discussion of which I shall now turn.

6.b. Ethnic Relations.

Of the countries in the area, only Poland and East Germany can be said to be more or less free of ethnic problems, problems which, it will be recalled, bedevilled East European politics before the Second World War. Frequently, ethnic tensions remain key elements in national politics (for all that during periods of calm they may be kept largely hidden from view). And in many cases, demographic trends threaten to make ethnic relations more and not less volatile.

The Socialist countries can be divided according to their ethnodo-demographic structure into four groups: the first and most important group comprises the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Both have a large and dominant or formerly dominant group forming near to 50% of the total population, and considerable numbers of larger and smaller ethnic minorities, many of which present the regimes with serious political and social problems. The differential growth rates of the various ethnic populations range to wide extremes and are in some cases of great political significance.

Czechoslovakia forms a group on its own. Here we have a formerly overwhelmingly dominant majority which is gradually being overtaken demographically, economically and
politically by a substantial minority (the Slovaks now form close to 30% of the population; in 1921, they comprised scarcely more than 15%). This improvement in the relative position of the Slovaks owes more to the expulsion of the German minority after the war and the annexation of Ruthenia by the USSR, than to national birthrate trends. Nonetheless, the differentiation in fertility and natural increase (though not comparable with that prevailing in the USSR and Yugoslavia) has been and continues to be significant. In addition to the Czech-Slovak ethno-demographic problem, Czechoslovakia is also faced by the rapid growth of a highly fertile pariah

3. 15.1% in 1921 (Srb. op. cit., p. 302) and 29.2% in 1970 (Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1972, p. 103).

4. For general discussions of the Slovak-Czech relationship in recent years, see, e.g., H. Klocke "Das slowakische Problem - gestern, heute, morgen" Osteuropa 1971 no. 10, p. 773; M. Zaninovich and D. Brown "Political Integration in Czechoslovakia: The Implications of the Prague Spring and Soviet Intervention" Journal of International Affairs, 1973 no. 1, p. 66; Robert R. King Minorities under Communism Ch. 6; Hajek and Niznansky (sic) "Policies and Problems in Slovakia" RFE Research Czechoslovakia November 28, 1969. For some up-to-date data on Slovakia's relative progress vis-à-vis the Czech lands, see RFE Research Czechoslovakian Situation Report September 4, 1974 and December 10, 1975.
minority in its Gipsy community. There is also a substantial though demographically stagnant Hungarian minority (4% of the total population), and small and rapidly disappearing German and Jewish communities.

Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania all have significant ethnic minorities, but none of comparable weight to that of the Slovaks. Little is known about Albania's minorities, which will accordingly be excluded from the discussion. Rumania has a culturally and politically formidable minority in its Transylvanian Hungarians, who formed 8.5% of the population according to the 1966 census. (This may well be an under-estimate). There is also a significant German minority (2%), and a Gipsy population which is being progressively defined out of

existence. However, the natural increase of the minorities appears to be modest and they are in relative decline.

While this may be a fictional trend in the case of the Gipsies it is likely to represent reality in the case of the other ethnic groups. Thus population developments seem to be working for the assimilatory ambitions of the Rumanian regime (ambitions which have been to some extent softened recently, partly under pressure from Moscow). 6 Hungary has a number of minority groups which it treats with elaborate respect, apparently in the hope thereby of securing better conditions for its own large minorities in surrounding countries. Of these, the only one representing a serious demographically-political problem is the Gipsy minority, which, like that in Czechoslovakia, is increasing rapidly and likely to present

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severe social, if not also directly political problems in the future. Bulgaria too has a rapidly growing minority in its Turks, whose fertility appears to far outstrip that of the Bulgars themselves, and whose relative strength (currently about 10% of the total population) continues to be considerable and to increase, despite the effects of intermittent emigration. There are also substantial (2 to 3%) Macedonian and Bulgarian Moslem (Pomak) minorities, and a sizable Gipsy population. Thus in one country

7. On the Hungarian Gipsies, see the two Hungarian articles translated in "Zigeuner in Osteuropa" Osteuropa XXI (1971) no. 2, p. A115. Like other East European states, the Hungarians do not accord recognition to the Gipsies as a national group, and official statistics are not available. Puxon, op. cit., estimates the Hungarian Gipsy population at 480,000. Whatever their present numbers, as the articles referred to above make clear, they are growing very rapidly. On Hungarian policy towards its other minority groups (recently estimated to total 450,000, i.e. less than Puxon's estimate for the Gipsies), see the Hungarian articles translated in RFE Research Hungarian Press Survey January 7, June 2, and July 16, 1970, June 15, September 12 and September 26, 1973. See also Robert R. King Minorities under Communism Chs. 4 & 9; "Mehr Bewegungsräum für nationale Minderheiten in Ungarn" Osteuropa XXII (1972) no. 4, p. A262; and RFE Research Hungarian Situation Report December 11, 1973 and March 11, 1976.

8. Precise figures are not available. At their most recent census, in accordance with their new hard-line nationalities policy, the Bulgarians statistically abolished their ethnic minorities. (RFE Research Bulgarian Situation Report January 28, 1976). See the discussions in 5.d. and 5.f., above, and footnote 164 to Ch. 5. See also M. Costello "Emigration of Bulgarian Turks: Foreign and Domestic Considerations" RFE Research Bulgaria October 16, 1969; and Bulgarian Situation Report August 27, 1970, February 21, 1974, November 11, 1975, and March 17, May 14, and June 24, 1976.
within this group (Rumania) we have a very significant minority which is, however, in demographic decline; and two where the minorities are less formidable in political terms (and in demographic terms in the case of Hungary), but are on the other hand growing much faster than the host nation.

Finally we have East Germany, with its small and dwindling Lusatian Sorb communities, and Poland with its rather larger, but also dwindling East Slav, German and Jewish minorities. While some of the Polish minorities are extremely important politically, it is not their demographic strength or growth which makes them so.

Basically I would suggest that countries in the bloc are faced by ethno-demographic problems of two or perhaps three types: racial or quasi-racial and non-racial. By racial conflicts, I mean those in which ingroup and outgroup are socially identified on the basis of visible physical differences which are believed to be and in some measure actually are more or less immutable. Quasi-racial conflicts are those in which there is a strong subjective conviction of recognizable physical differences (believed to be more or less immutable), but in which this conviction is in fact demonstrably based rather on cultural stigmata (dress, hair arrangement, etc.). Non-racial ethnic tensions are those

9. Cf. note 164 to Ch. 5. above.
11. Compare the discussion in 3.b. (i), above.
based on cultural differences not lending themselves to immediate physical identification. Racial feelings, I would suggest, in addition to creating and maintaining greater inter-group distance, tend both to be more severe and more resistant to ameliorative social trends or policies than non-racial ethnic tensions. The different types are not, however, clearly distinguished and mutually exclusive: quasi-racial conflicts form a kind of extended and diffuse border area between the two poles of racial and non-racial. In the European Socialist countries, there are examples of all three: relations between Russians (and other Europeans) and the Moslem peoples of Central Asia, for example, or more debatably, between Eastern Europeans and their gipsy communities could, I believe, be classified as racial. Relations between certain Christian Slav groups in Yugoslavia and the Shiptars, or between the Russians and Ukrainians and Soviet Jews may represent instances of quasi-racialism. And relations between Czechs and Slovaks, Rumanians and Hungarians, and Russians and Ukrainians or Latvians seem typical instances of non-racial ethnic conflicts. It should perhaps be stressed, that no East European country appears to have racial divisions quite so sharp and intractable as those currently afflicting Britain or the USA. To say this, however, is not to say that ethnic harmony in the Socialist countries is any greater; merely that the physical bases for prejudice are not nearly so evident, and that therefore the prejudice itself may prove to be less deep-rooted.

From the demographico-political point of view, the
distinction between racial and non-racial, though somewhat furry and based in the twilight areas of transition on erratic, subjective and irrational social definitions of what "race" is, has a considerable significance. Whereas in the case of national or non-racial conflicts, the tension appears to stem from perceptions (however distorted) concerning the division of wealth, power and prestige in the community, in the case of racial tensions, while these factors may also be present, we are confronted, in addition, with a more volatile and unpredictable element of disinterested loathing and disgust. Whereas in the first case, there may be a certain mutual respect between the two communities (if not a great deal of love), in the second, tolerant contempt is the best that can be hoped for. In demographico-political terms one is in the first case dealing basically with a "fifty-fifty" problem; that is to say, only when one side's effective dominance is challenged by demographic trends, will violence be likely to be precipitated by those trends. In the case of racial conflicts, on the other hand, any demographic change may be regarded as intolerable, no matter how slight. It is sufficient for one black to move into the neighbourhood, for the local bigots to organize. In other words with racial tensions, a modest redistribution of numbers may be sufficient to touch off violence.

But there is a further reason why the demographic factor may accentuate the already greater volatility of racial tensions. For it is an empirical demographic fact that racial (and, to a lesser degree, quasi-racial) differences
are more frequently associated with sharp divergences in fertility levels than other kinds of ethnic differences. 12

If these judgements about the nature of ethnic tensions in the European Socialist countries are correct, it seems to follow that the USSR is exposed to a particularly dangerous situation. For there racial distance is more marked; and the racial tensions are between major population groups. Elsewhere, racial distance is physically less apparent, and may therefore prove more amenable to social or political management. Gipsy communities, like Jewish ones, could be sufficiently suffused into their surroundings by socio-economic development for the physical differences to lose all their subjective salience (though even that may not eliminate the incidence of "racialist" attitudes among the host populations). More importantly, however, it needs to be emphasized that the racial and quasi-racial tensions outside the USSR almost all involve overwhelming majorities and relatively modest (if rapidly expanding) minorities. In other words the problems that arise are likely to be social rather than political in the first instance; though they do perhaps contain the danger of scapegoating civil disorders, and social and political degeneration of the kind that has been observed in many other parts of the world. The one quasi-racial conflict that seems to involve two groups of

12. Consider, for example, the enormous divergence between European and Central Asian birth rates in the USSR, and between "Christian Slav" and Shiptar, and Magyar and Gipsy natality in Yugoslavia and Hungary respectively. Outside Socialist Europe (e.g. in Southern Africa), the same proposition usually holds also.
politically significant size is that between the Albanians and some of the Christian Slavic nations of Yugoslavia. Should social distance and conventions coupled with political hostility maintain subjective perceptions of "inherent" differences in this case (where the differentiating stigmata are very largely cultural in reality), an already extremely delicate problem may degenerate into something far worse.

It is, of course, quite possible that it will be non-racial ethnic tensions that prove to be politically the most troublesome in the area. There the demographic factor will be less relevant in objective terms, as differences in demographic behaviour between different "European" groups are no longer very great. But in some cases they are still of significance (Moldavians and Russians; Czechs and Slovaks; Moslem Serbo-Croat speakers and others). And in many others they may be felt to be of significance. In inter-ethnic relations, the wildest fantasies sometimes acquire a particularly virulent and destructive reification.

While differences of demographic behaviour are frequently inflated in the minds of their observers, one cannot help feeling also that in some cases the full implications of population trends in Socialist Europe have not yet been grasped by those most directly involved. As one contemplates the trends in socio-demographic development of the Shiptars and their neighbours, or the Soviet Central Asians and their neighbours, it is difficult to avoid feeling a kind of awe and dread at the magnitude of the forces at work and the violent and contradictory momenta
they are either creating or whipping on. The ethno-
demographic advance of some communities and the retreat
of others calls to mind the movement of large land masses
on plates headed in opposing directions. The existing socio-
political forms seem too rigid (especially in the Soviet case)
to permit these masses free movement, but at the same time
too brittle to withstand for ever the increasing pressures
that are building up. Without some skilled and timely
subterranean lubrication, major ruptures in the crust of
society seem inevitable.

6.c. Ideology.

The ideological impact of rapid population growth
in the world and rapid population decline within the Socialist
countries themselves has dealt a severe blow to anti-
Malthusian self-confidence at home, and slightly modified the
erstwhile rigour of anti-Malthusian doctrines abroad. The
Stalinist "law" of socialist population has been more or less
dethroned, the science of demography rehabilitated, and
tentative first steps towards a total ideological reappraisal
of the situation taken. It seems unlikely, however, that
demography will now be ever "reideologized". The regimes
have basically pragmatic and (with the exception of Yugoslavia)
mercantilist attitudes towards population. They want more
subjects, and they would like to solve demographic problems
as they become aware of them, on the basis of informed and
expert advice. Western analyses and techniques are not
necessarily eschewed because they are Western. Contacts
between Eastern and Western demographers are growing, and in many ways may be closer than those prevailing in any other social science. The anti-Malthusian tradition remains influential, but rather more as a normative than an empirical orientation for domestic purposes. Internationally, anti-Malthusianism, after a period of partial eclipse after 1965, seems to be growing in favour again, as the Soviet Union perceives a resurgence of anti-Malthusian attitudes among Third World countries (particularly those in Africa and Latin America) and seeks to capitalize upon it, or at least, to not be left behind by it. The Soviet Bloc countries naturally follow Moscow's lead (whatever views their demographers or other private citizens may have), and Rumania and Yugoslavia, while acting independently, are moved by analogous considerations.

In the other relevant sphere of Marxist-Leninist ideology, that concerning relations between the sexes, the family, and the role of women in the home and society, there has been a good deal of discussion recently in most of the Socialist countries, but little decisive deviation from the Soviet pattern described in l.d., above. In most of the countries, especially Yugoslavia, but also in East Germany, Poland, and elsewhere, there has been since the mid-fifties a certain revival of the sexual liberalism of traditional Marxism. But in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary, this revival has come under some threat in recent years because of the emergence of a new pro-natalist patriarchalism justified in terms of the "biological future of the nation".
And in Rumania in 1966, there was a total about-face on all such issues simultaneously, in a concerted attempt to revive the nation's drooping birth-rate. In this and other ways, there is a tendency for practical or extraneous policy considerations to dilute implementation of the ideological teachings of the classics on demographically relevant matters. Even where the position of women is rather more advanced at the verbal or theoretical level (as in Yugoslavia), it may well be worse in practical terms.

Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that the relative socio-economic strength and importance of women in Socialist society has undoubtedly grown in recent decades (as elsewhere in areas of European culture, and possibly a little faster); and that the liberal element in the Marxist-Leninist tradition on sexual and family matters has not been by any means wholly eliminated, despite the reverses it has suffered in Stalinist Russia and contemporary Rumania. The doctrinal tenets remain alive and available to be utilized by defenders of such causes as women's rights, the autonomy of family life, and freedom of choice in sexual matters.

6.d. International Politics

Given the stability, not to say the immobilism of international relations among the European Socialist countries since the war, the importance of any factors, the demographic included, seems slight when compared with the overwhelming diplomatic and military superiority of the
Soviet Union. The highly complex pattern of affinities and antagonisms that existed in Central and Eastern Europe before the Second World War has been largely obliterated by Soviet hegemony. As far as more global concerns go, it is perhaps worth noting that demographic trends on either side of the Warsaw Pact - NATO line more or less parallel one another, and that Soviet fertility decline is more than balanced by that occurring in Eastern Europe itself (so that its hegemony over the area is not being reduced by the demographic factor). Turning to consider what I have referred to as the latent geo-politics of the area, it is presumably not without significance that, for example, the Ukrainian population is growing only very slowly compared to that of Poland; that Poland, from being scarcely more than 30% larger than East Germany in population in 1946, is now almost twice as large; that the difference between the Polish and the combined East and West German populations is currently diminishing by about half a million a year; that the indigenous Moldavian population, owing to its higher fertility, is maintaining its relative ethnic superiority in the Moldavian Republic of the USSR, despite extensive and presumably not accidental Slav immigration. The true significance of such developments will probably only become apparent when Soviet Russian influence in the area declines. Nonetheless, despite the limited practical relevance of these trends for the present, they quite certainly engage the intellectual interest, and even more the emotions of demographic commentators in the area, whatever their overt political persuasion. Debates about national population
policy (of which I will say more in the next section) invariably raise the subject of what is usually referred to vaguely and euphemistically as "the national interest". It is clear that those who think in these terms are intimately looking forward to, or in any case not left irresolute and inconsolable by, the prospect of Soviet withdrawal from the area.

The two spheres in which demographic trends are of the keenest contemporary relevance are Sino-Soviet relations and Yugoslavia's relations with its Socialist neighbours, especially Albania. China's population is so vast and its absolute rate of increase so far in excess of that of the Soviet Union (and its European element in particular), that whatever view might be taken of the notion of demographic "lateral pressures", or of the strategic significance of manpower in the nuclear age, it seems clear that the Soviet Union at least must regard the trends with a good deal of apprehension.

The Yugoslav-Albanian case involves a different and rather less problematical kind of demographic factor. The Albanians in Albania are obviously not going to multiply to the point where they will thereby achieve some early ascendancy in terms of national military or economic power (though their growth may not be strategically irrelevant). The demographic triggering mechanism is located inside Yugoslavia itself, in its large and rapidly growing Shiptar minority, whose growing strength and ambitions seem likely sooner or later to precipitate some kind of structural
transformation. This the Yugoslav state may be hard put to accommodate, particularly if the internal mechanism touches off some kind of external intervention as well as a domestic crisis.

Despite the drastic slaughter, migrations and deportations of the World War II period, many of Eastern Europe's traditional ethnic entanglements have remained in dimensions sufficient to cause trouble. Many of these have an external aspect of some importance. In some cases that external aspect is quasi-demographic in the sense that disputes about censuses or population trends in the ethnic group in question seem to lie at the heart of the matter. But probably in no case, other than the two mentioned, will differential growth rates play a crucial role in igniting or seriously exacerbating conflict.

6.e. Population Policy and Policy-making. 13

Domestic population policies, it has been pointed out, are difficult to study inasmuch that many social policies may be adopted for non-demographic reasons and yet appear to have considerable impact on demographic development. Moreover, governments with populationist intentions have often chosen to conceal those intentions behind a smokescreen of more lofty humanist aspirations. In this work, I have in general used the term population policy in the sense of programs or measures aimed deliberately and consciously at

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13. For some general works on population policy in Eastern Europe, see footnote 2 to the Introduction, p. 5, above.
affecting population growth rates, though attention has also been devoted to certain demographically relevant social policies whose status as population policy would be difficult to establish.

The first point that needs to be made about the Socialist countries from this point of view is that most of them do have population policies in the sense of conscious and deliberate attitudes and actions. In the USSR, Poland, Yugoslavia and the GDR, governmental concern is perhaps less pronounced than elsewhere (though public concern in the first three at least, is very great). But in general throughout the European Socialist world, official interest in population issues is high and growing. Politicians in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria often refer to population statistics with the same kind of tender regard that company directors might devote to key items in their annual report. And in the USSR and Yugoslavia, it is possible that much more concern would be expressed were the issue not quite so politically sensitive.

The next general point to note is that throughout virtually the entire area, both in official and non-official circles, there is a strongly pro-natalist orientation which contrasts sharply with the influence of movements like Zero Population Growth in the West. There are probably several different reasons for this.

1. The continuing influence of the anti-Malthusian tradition, and the extreme rationalist optimism with which it has been associated ever since Marx and Engels' time.
2. The mercantilist attitude of Socialist governments to the accumulation of national wealth of all kinds. Socialist governments are composed of men who in a much more meaningful sense than their bourgeois counterparts in the West own their countries. Their power and their sphere of competence are much greater. And since the bureaucratic stabilization of the post-Stalin years, their tenure of (some) office is much more secure than that in virtually any other system anywhere else in the world. Accordingly, they have a natural and long-term interest in seeing their ranches expand.

3. Regimes which emphasize the glory or importance of the state, be they right-wing or left-wing, seem disposed to adopt pro-natalist policies. (Compare the well-known cases of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. This factor is doubtless related to point 2).

4. The prominence of economic planners and planning considerations in governmental decision-making. When planners encounter labour shortages (as they have been doing increasingly in the last decade or so), it is natural that they should feel an impulse to "solve" the problem by planning for higher production of labour power. These labour shortages are not necessarily related to past trends in the birth-rate, and the policy inference may be fallacious. But it seems to be often made. (Again this is a point related to point 2).

5. The sharp drop in fertility that occurred in the Socialist countries in the 1950s and 1960s, and the slightly delayed echo it has produced in the minds of many
Socialist politicians and publicists. While this has been undoubtedly an important subjective factor, it should be remembered that even sharper fertility declines have occurred in many Western countries in the later 1960s and early 1970s without so far giving rise to anything approaching the national anxieties felt by both governments (in many cases) and wide sections of the general public (in virtually all cases) in Eastern Europe. What we are probably dealing with here is thus a combination of sharp demographic stimulus and extreme nationalist sensitivity.

The European Socialist countries can be divided according to the degree of their pro-natalism, and also according to the methods by which they are pursuing their objectives.

In degree of pro-natalism, they can be sub-divided into three groups:

(i) the more emphatically pro-natalist, as judged both by the saliency of this issue in official statements and by the programs adopted: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania;

(ii) the more mildly pro-natalist, who declare themselves to be so oriented, but less often, and have a more modest program of positive and negative inducements to child-birth; East Germany, Poland and the USSR;
(iii) Yugoslavia, which is formally neutral, and declares that its population policy at the federal level at least is concerned with purely non-numerical values; and also that decisions as to the desirability of changing vital rates are best decentralized.

Socialist commentators on population policy usually distinguish three types of policies that can be used to further the state's objectives: (a) economic (by which they have in mind such measures as maternity and child-care leave, family benefits and maternity grants, child-care allowances, taxes on the single and childless, subsidies for children's goods, etc.); (b) moral (by which they mean propaganda campaigns in public entertainment and the media, mobilization of mass organizations, etc.); and (c) legal-administrative (by which they mean prohibiting or permitting abortion and contraceptives, raising or lowering the minimum age for marriage, administrative regulations affecting housing allocations, etc.).

It will be apparent that of these three categories, only the first and third are in any marked degree available to most Western governments; and in the case of the third, the idea of their being manipulated as a policy weapon in order to affect the birth-rate (especially in an upward direction) has begun to seem remote (though of course in some countries limitations on abortion and contraception still exist for "moral" reasons).
In Socialist Europe, however, all three types of measures are widely employed, and each can serve as a rough classificatory principle. In the four more pro-natalist states use is made of all three types though in varying degree. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary all make use of legal-administrative measures but in moderation, placing much greater emphasis on economic and "moral" inducements and penalties. In fact, there were periods in the late 1950s and the 1960s when none of them had recourse to restrictive legislation to increase the birth rate. Hungary in particular followed a markedly liberal policy in regard to both abortions and contraceptives. Czechoslovakia did


apply some mild demographically-oriented restrictions on the availability of abortion, if only intermittently, whilst in Bulgaria, it appears that contraceptives have never been made very widely accessible. Now all three have populationist restrictions on the availability of legal abortion. Rumania, after a period of tolerance towards divorce, abortion and contraception, suddenly greatly restricted all three in 1966 in an attempt to increase its birth rate. These restrictive measures have been


maintained to the present. However, the population has naturally developed methods of bypassing them, so that the 100% increase in the birth rate registered in the first year (200% in the first months) has since been dwindling away; moreover, illegal abortion is evidently rising, and so again is divorce. Rumania's relative stress on economic inducements is less than that of the other three states, though some were introduced at the same time as the illiberal package of 1966. While it is difficult to assess saturation levels of propaganda, it would probably be fair to say that of all the pro-natalist states, Czechoslovakia is maintaining the most elaborate, all-pervasive and obtrusive media campaign on behalf of fecundity.

East Germany in a certain sense forms a group on its own, inasmuch that it has a number of strongly pro-natalist measures on its books,¹⁸ and a very great, indeed a notorious need for a pro-natalist policy to make up for

its large emigratory losses in the pre-Wall era, and its spectacularly low birth rate (currently by far the lowest in Eastern Europe). Yet in fact, there appears to be no very emphatic propaganda campaign conducted there on behalf of motherhood; and recently (1972), legal abortion was made unconditionally available on demand. Earlier, East Germany had shared with Albania, and after 1966, Rumania, the position of being the only Socialist states with strongly restrictive legislation on abortion.

Albania also forms a group on its own. Abortion is illegal, and contraceptives largely unknown. The birth rate is by far the highest in Europe, and the official view is that this is an extremely good thing, and symptomatic of the vibrant life-affirming strength of the Albanian people.\(^1\) It is difficult to describe government policy as pro-natalist in the usual sense, however, since specifically pro-natalist inducements are entirely superfluous.

Yugoslavia is the only country among the nine which is not explicitly or ostensibly pro-natalist. Officially, Yugoslavia is committed to a purely social, humane and non-quantitative view of population policy. It is stated as an immutable constitutional principle that parents have the right to plan their families by any means they see fit,

\(^{19}\) Albanian fertility seems to be declining at last, and doing it faster than that of the Albanian population across the Yugoslav border. However, this is not evidently due to the spread of family planning services which remain primitive or non-existent. See Hosten op. cit. See also the journal of abstracts ABSEES for occasional notes on Albanian demographic trends and their official exegesis. (Cf. footnote 395 to ch. 5).
including abortion (which is, however, viewed officially as a dangerous and unsatisfactory means of fertility control). It is, moreover, held that parents have a right to information about all methods of family planning, and encouragement is given to organizations engaged on spreading knowledge about these matters. At the Republican level, and indeed at the communal level, policies of encouraging or discouraging population growth may be followed within these guidelines.

Poland and the USSR are in many ways similar to one another. Each maintains some economic inducements to having children. This, however, may be largely inspired by social motivations at this stage (whatever the original intention of the legislation - in the Soviet case, it was, at the outset, clearly pro-natalist). Each also maintains liberal legislation on abortion, contraception and divorce (despite the fact that there have been pressures within the regimes and within the respective populations for more "administrative" pro-natalist policies to be adopted - from Catholics and nationalists in Poland, and from Russian and other nationalists in the USSR). Neither has any more than a mild and relatively unobtrusive propaganda campaign in favour of motherhood (for a time in the late 1950s Poland actually had a very active campaign against the high birth rate that then still prevailed).

In the more decisively pro-natalist Socialist countries, debate over population policy issues has to some extent been narrowed. A definite policy line has been
adopted and it remains principally to implement and applaud (though criticism of implementation may sometimes create an opening for more normative evaluation of existing policy). Nonetheless when questions of demographically relevant social policy or population policy in general are broached in the Socialist countries, a wide variety of issues tend to rise to the surface. It is indeed remarkable with what candour and vehemence these issues have at times been discussed. This having been said, it needs to be added at once that the areas we have identified as ethnic relations and international politics are normally not alluded to in explicit form. It is considerations of that kind lurking in the background, however, which appear to give the whole subject-matter the special piquancy it has in the East European context. Where most serious political discussion is taboo, demographic commentary forms a splendid surrogate. But the emotional energy invested in demographic debate is not wholly misplaced or wholly symbolic. The differential trends in fertility in particular are not by any means always the figments of inflamed nationalist imaginations (though Eastern Europe has plenty of those); and it is not surprising that many Socialist observers are keenly if discreetly absorbed by them. Apart from ethnic and national rivalries, however, there are a number of important matters raised by population problems which Socialist demographic commentators do discuss quite explicitly. Particular prominent among them are such issues as: living standards and consumption priorities; public versus private expenditure; egalitarian versus demographic considerations; the role of population growth in long-term
economic development and planning; the place of women in
society and the home; the future of the family and of
relations between the sexes; sexual education for the young;
eugenics and the rights of the individual; abortion and
contraception; divorce; the mechanics of social and population
policy-making; the role of social scientists in the Socialist
policy; and so on. Within the confines of this brief summary,
it would be impossible to convey very much of the variety of
opinion that finds expression on any of these matters. Some­
thing of that variety can be gleaned from the discussion in
Ch. 4.g. of Poland's population debate of recent years. Many
of the Polish themes are prominent elsewhere; few are peculiar
to Poland alone.

Perhaps the most significant thing about the
Socialist population debate latterly has been the
persistent assertiveness with which non-official people of
one kind and another have sought to present their views.
Among them, those working in demography and related
disciplines have been particularly prominent. Whatever views
they espoused (and there has often been a good deal of unity
among them), they have almost invariably made an explicit or
implicit claim that on all matters (including the normative
and the political sensitive) they should at least be
consulted. At times, their claims are even carried to the
point of suggesting that demographic policy-making might
best be left in their hands more or less entirely. Most of
them (whether employed by government departments or
universities) seem to accept the principle of bureaucratic
decision-making in these as in other matters. But they
demand a say, and in some cases virtually imply that they should become the bureaucracy for these purposes. It ought not to be inferred from this, however, that these experts are necessarily illiberal or manipulatively technocratic in outlook. They are often, in fact, the main advocates of parental sovereignty and economic rather than "administrative" solutions. And if they sometimes declare a preference for the former over the latter on the stated grounds that economic solutions are more effective, it may well be that they are merely speaking to their superiors in a manner which they know will be more readily understood.

There has been a good deal of formalization of decision-making about population problems in recent years. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, East Germany and Poland have all established central government commissions that are charged with co-ordinating research into population problems and recommending possible solutions to their governments. The Czech Population Commission is particularly powerful. There is also a similar body located in a ministry in Hungary, and a recent report suggests that a prestigious demographic centre in Moscow University has been charged with similar responsibilities by the Soviet authorities. While this reflects to some extent a general trend throughout the world, one nonetheless gets the impression that in this, as in other respects, the concern of Socialist governments about population development runs well ahead of that of their Western counterparts.

Given the single-minded pro-natalism of the Socialist countries it might be asked whether this development
is wholly desirable. Despite the fact that the policies being adopted by Socialist governments are more or less liberal and the advice being tendered them is in general more liberal still, and despite the fact that eugenics has for four decades received an almost uniformly bad press in the Socialist countries, and that no eugenic experiments are, to my knowledge, being legislated for or otherwise permitted, one is still left with a slight feeling of unease that states with a tradition embracing the Gulag Archipelago and the Serbskii Institute are taking a keen and increasingly active interest in their subjects' reproductive behaviour. If all this is not to end in 1984 and Brave New World, what will stop it? Will the humanist ideals of would-be demographer-kings be sufficient? Would they themselves survive the temptations of Socialist bureaucratic power with those ideals intact if their claims to rule were recognized? How much of the original liberalism of Marx and Engels has survived to the present generation of Socialist bureaucratic decision-makers?

There is another rather disturbing aspect of the Socialist approach to population policy. At a time when the considered opinion of many experts is that population and economic growth must be halted and redirected if the world is to survive, it is not particularly reassuring that the Socialist countries (Yugoslavia excepted) are set determinedly on a course of pro-natalism at home and demagogic "anti-Malthusianism" abroad. If demographic disarmament is indeed to become an issue of world politics, Socialist attitudes
are likely to make the negotiations hard and protracted. Ehrlichites and Family Planners in the West might well take more careful note than they seem to have done so far that there is a large part of the world where their ideas are almost completely shut out.

* * * * * * *
TABLE 1

CRUDE BIRTH, DEATH AND NATURAL INCREASE RATES IN THE USSR 1926-1973 (%)

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CRUDE BIRTH, DEATH AND NATURAL INCREASE RATES BY REPUBLIC
IN SELECTED YEARS, 1940-1971 (o/oo).

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| RSFSR   | 33.0 20.6 12.4 26.9 10.1 16.8 23.2 7.4 15.8 15.7 7.6 8.1 15.1 8.7 6.4 54.3 |
| Ukr. SSR| 27.3 14.3 13.0 22.8 8.5 14.3 20.5 6.9 13.6 15.3 7.6 7.7 15.4 8.9 6.5 66.7 |
| Bel. SSR| 26.8 13.1 13.7 25.5 8.0 17.5 24.4 6.6 17.8 17.9 6.8 11.1 16.4 7.5 8.9 63.5 |
| Uzb. SSR| 33.8 13.2 20.6 30.8 8.7 22.1 39.8 6.0 33.8 34.7 5.9 28.8 34.5 5.4 29.1 108.4 |
| Kaz. SSR| 40.8 21.4 19.4 37.6 11.7 25.9 37.2 6.6 30.6 26.9 5.9 21.0 23.8 6.0 17.8 62.0 |
| Geo. SSR| 27.4 8.8 18.6 23.5 7.6 15.9 24.7 6.5 18.2 21.2 7.0 14.2 19.0 7.4 11.6 81.7 |
| Aze. SSR| 29.4 14.7 14.7 31.2 9.6 21.6 42.6 6.7 35.9 36.6 6.4 30.2 27.7 6.5 21.2 93.6 |
| Lit. SSR| 23.0 13.0 10.0 23.6 12.0 11.6 22.5 7.8 14.7 18.1 7.9 10.2 17.6 8.5 9.1 74.6 |
| Mol. SSR| 26.6 16.9 9.7 38.9 11.2 27.7 29.3 6.4 22.9 20.4 6.2 14.2 20.2 7.7 12.5 49.9 |
| Lat. SSR| 19.3 15.7 3.6 17.0 12.4 4.6 16.7 10.0 6.7 13.8 10.0 3.8 14.7 11.0 3.7 85.3 |
| Kir. SSR| 33.0 16.3 16.7 32.4 8.5 23.9 36.9 6.1 30.8 31.4 6.5 24.9 31.6 7.0 24.6 94.1 |
| Tad. SSR| 30.6 14.1 16.5 30.4 8.2 22.2 33.5 5.1 28.4 36.8 6.6 30.2 36.8 5.7 31.1 114.1 |
| Arm. SSR| 41.2 13.8 27.4 32.1 8.5 23.6 40.1 6.8 33.3 28.6 5.7 22.9 22.6 4.9 17.7 68.8 |
| Tur. SSR| 36.9 19.5 17.4 38.2 10.2 28.0 42.4 6.5 35.9 37.2 7.0 30.2 34.7 6.7 28.0 92.1 |
| Est. SSR| 16.1 17.0 -0.9 18.4 14.4 4.0 16.6 10.5 6.1 14.6 10.5 4.1 16.0 10.9 5.1 85.9 |

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<th>Georgian</th>
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<th>Kirgiz</th>
<th>Lithuanian</th>
<th>Latvian</th>
<th>Moldavian</th>
<th>RSFSR</th>
<th>Tadzhik</th>
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SOURCE: Dzienio, p. 29.
TABLE 5

NUMERICAL TRENDS IN SOVIET ETHNIC GROUPINGS

I. Nations Forming their own Republics

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<th>1970</th>
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II. Peoples Having Some Degree of Formal Autonomy

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<th>1959 as percent of</th>
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**SOURCE:** S.I. Bruk, "Population of the USSR - Changes in its Demographic, Social and Ethnic Structure", Geoforum, No. 9 (1972) pp. 16-17. (The author's name has been re-transliterated into the form that will be more familiar to readers of this kind of material. The stylings of the three sub-groups have also been altered in an attempt at greater clarity.)
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**DIFFERENTIAL GROWTH RATES BY NATIONALITY**

(AVERAGE PERCENTAGE INCREASES PER ANNUM) 1959-1970

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<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Azerbaidzhan</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussian</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Tadzhik</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavian</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Leedy, p. 450.
### I. ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS OF THE USSR POPULATION OF ABLE-BODIED AGES 1959-1990 (AS OF JAN.1, IN THOUSANDS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan Period</th>
<th>Total Increase (1)</th>
<th>Average Annual Increase (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959-65</td>
<td>5,173</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-70</td>
<td>7,970</td>
<td>1,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-75</td>
<td>12,849</td>
<td>2,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-80</td>
<td>10,728</td>
<td>2,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-85</td>
<td>2,944</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-90</td>
<td>3,039</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Males, 16 to 59 years of age; females 16 to 54 years of age.

### II. ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS OF THE POPULATIONS OF ABLE-BODIED AGES IN THE FIVE REPUBLICS OF CENTRAL ASIA (INCLUDING KAZAKHSTAN) 1971-1990 (AS OF JAN.1, IN THOUSANDS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan Period</th>
<th>Total Increase (1)</th>
<th>As a percent of national increase (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971-75</td>
<td>3,045</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-80</td>
<td>3,593</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-85</td>
<td>2,936</td>
<td>99.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-90</td>
<td>3,162</td>
<td>104.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 9

PROPORTION OF POPULATION IN ABLE-BODIED AGE-GROUPS

BY REPUBLIC IN 1970 (IN %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Able-Bodied Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavian</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussian SSR</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz SSR</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek SSR</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhik SSR</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh SSR</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian SSR</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian SSR</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen SSR</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidzhan SSR</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian SSR</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian SSR</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX B - POLISH POPULATION DATA

### TABLE 1. BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC RATES IN POST-WAR POLAND (per thousand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Marriages</th>
<th>Divorces</th>
<th>Live Births</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Natural Increase</th>
<th>Infantile Mortality*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>111.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Infantile mortality rates per 1,000 live births

Source: Rocznik Demograficzny 1974, p. XX-XXI

### TABLE 2. URBAN AND RURAL NET REPRODUCTION RATIOS IN POLAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1.491</td>
<td>1.300</td>
<td>1.610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1.519</td>
<td>1.366</td>
<td>1.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1.339</td>
<td>1.098</td>
<td>1.601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1.149</td>
<td>0.879</td>
<td>1.487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1.011</td>
<td>0.794</td>
<td>1.315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1.055</td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>1.449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rocznik Demograficzny 1974, p. 107

### TABLE 3. OFFICIALLY REGISTERED ABORTIONS* (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Abortions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*It is generally agreed that in Poland the official statistics on abortions are very incomplete. (Though there is some disagreement about how incomplete they are - see second source quoted below, at p. 101). The figures include abortions, presumably mostly illegal, that were begun outside hospitals.

Sources: Polityka ludnościowa: współczesne problemy, Warsaw 1973, p. 129
### TABLE 4. NET INCREASES IN WORKING-AGE POPULATION AND ABSOLUTE NUMBERS REACHING EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Net Increase (in thousands)</th>
<th>Numbers reaching 18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951-1955</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>2,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>0,660</td>
<td>2,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1965</td>
<td>0,790</td>
<td>2,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1970</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>3,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1975</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1980</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>3,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1985</td>
<td>0,750</td>
<td>2,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>0,350</td>
<td>2,650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 5. OFFICIAL LABOUR MARKET STATISTICS 1955-75*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Seeking Work (in thousands)</th>
<th>Vacancies</th>
<th>Number of vacancies per individual seeking work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>105.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures should not be taken as giving an accurate picture of unemployment in Poland (cf. footnote 46). However they do reflect certain general trends, eg., the unemployment among women in Gomułka's last year (1970) or the overemployment of men (despite the enormous cohorts of school-leavers coming onto the labour market) under Gierek.

Source: M. Kabaj "Bariera Zatrudnienia" ZG October 12, 1975. A misprint in the source has been corrected after reference to the original.
6. (i) Dwellings Completed (thousands)
   1960  142.1
   1965  170.5
   1969  197.0
   1970  194.2
   1971  190.6
   1974  249.8

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1975 p. XLVII

6. (ii) Number of newly-built dwellings per 1000 marriages

   1965  853    1970  693
   1966  779    1971  653
   1967  780    1972  668
   1968  733    1973  722
   1969  729    1974  782


6. (iii) Number of households per one hundred dwellings

   Overall  Urban  Rural
   1970    116   120   111
   1974    116   119   112

Statistical deficit of dwellings (Number of households minus number of dwellings)

   Overall  Urban  Rural
   1970    1295  883  412
   1974    1357  920  437

### TABLE 1.

**THE POPULATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 1921-1971**

**BY REPUBLIC AND PROVINCE (in thousands)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yugoslavia</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Slovenia (total)</th>
<th>Serbia (proper)</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>12544</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>3427</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>1288</td>
<td>4819</td>
<td>2843</td>
<td>1537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>14534</td>
<td>2324</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>3789</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>1386</td>
<td>5726</td>
<td>3550</td>
<td>1624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>15842</td>
<td>2564</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>3780</td>
<td>1153</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>6528</td>
<td>4154</td>
<td>1641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>16991</td>
<td>2843</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>3936</td>
<td>1305</td>
<td>1504</td>
<td>6979</td>
<td>4464</td>
<td>1699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>18549</td>
<td>3278</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>4160</td>
<td>1406</td>
<td>1592</td>
<td>7642</td>
<td>4823</td>
<td>1855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>20523</td>
<td>3746</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>4426</td>
<td>1647</td>
<td>1727</td>
<td>8447</td>
<td>5250</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indices for:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1921</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>163.6</td>
<td>198.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>170.4</td>
<td>129.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>129.2</td>
<td>203.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>134.1</td>
<td>175.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>184.7</td>
<td>127.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>283.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Razvitak stanovništva Jugoslavije u posleratnom periodu, p. 5. The data refer to the present-day territory of the various units.
TABLE 2.
REPUBLICAN AND PROVINCIAL POPULATIONS AS PERCENTAGE OF
YUGOSLAV TOTAL IN CENSUS YEARS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yugoslavia</th>
<th>Hercegovina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Serbia (total)</th>
<th>Serbia (proper)</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15,1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>27,3</td>
<td>6,4</td>
<td>10,3</td>
<td>38,4</td>
<td>22,7</td>
<td>12,4</td>
<td>3,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16,0</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>26,1</td>
<td>6,5</td>
<td>9,5</td>
<td>39,4</td>
<td>24,4</td>
<td>11,2</td>
<td>3,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16,2</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>23,9</td>
<td>7,2</td>
<td>9,1</td>
<td>41,2</td>
<td>26,2</td>
<td>10,4</td>
<td>4,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16,8</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>23,2</td>
<td>7,7</td>
<td>8,9</td>
<td>41,1</td>
<td>26,3</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>4,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17,7</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>22,4</td>
<td>7,6</td>
<td>8,6</td>
<td>41,1</td>
<td>26,0</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>5,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>18,3</td>
<td>2,6</td>
<td>21,6</td>
<td>8,0</td>
<td>8,4</td>
<td>41,2</td>
<td>25,6</td>
<td>9,5</td>
<td>6,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The computation for 1971 has been added. All data refer to the present-day area of the territorial units.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Republic of Serbia</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-54</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-59</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-64</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-69</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-73</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-79</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-84</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-89</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-94</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Births per 1,000 population | 38.2 | 27.2 | 38.4 | 22.8 | 27.4 |
| Natural increase rate per 1,000 population | 14.7 | 11.9 | 11.9 | 11.9 | 11.9 |

**SOURCE:** Razvitak stanovništva Jugoslavije u posleratnom periodu, p. 8.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Slovenia (total)</th>
<th>Serbia (proper)</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Balance (in thousands)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>-259</td>
<td>Migracije stanovništva Jugoslavije, p. 102.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>-75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>+358</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: This table, which is based on the results of the 1961 Census, should not be taken to be an accurate indicator of the precise net result of inter-republican migratory movements in the decades preceding 1961. Nor does it convey any impression of the indirect demographic effects of those movements.
TABLE 5B.
NET INTER-REGIONAL MIGRATION 1961-1971
(IN THOUSANDS).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Net Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Hercegovina</td>
<td>- 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>- 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>+ 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>- 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>+ 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia proper</td>
<td>+ 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>+ 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>- 47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: These calculations, though a more accurate measure than those in Table 5A (having a more limited time reference and being based on a more sophisticated methodology) also suffer from a serious drawback in that they do not take account of workers "temporarily" employed or resident in republics or regions outside that in which they have their permanent residence. Thus, for example, the Slovenian party newspaper Delo estimated in 1970 (issue for July 3-4) that there were 120,000 workers from other republics employed at that time in Slovenia.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yugoslavia</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Serbia (total)</th>
<th>Serbia (proper)</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>671 908</td>
<td>137 351</td>
<td>7 829</td>
<td>224 722</td>
<td>54 433</td>
<td>48 086</td>
<td>199 487</td>
<td>114 581</td>
<td>60 545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>5 260</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>3 278</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1 605</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>261 721</td>
<td>58 236</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>195 353</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1 101</td>
<td>6 833</td>
<td>1 189</td>
<td>5 501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>38 298</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>36 915</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1 092</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moslems</td>
<td>40 565</td>
<td>35 687</td>
<td>1 323</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2 655</td>
<td>2 088</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenians</td>
<td>46 856</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1 059</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45 066</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>191 342</td>
<td>40 921</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>19 048</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>129 931</td>
<td>101 374</td>
<td>24 733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>34 748</td>
<td>69 1 990</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>11 692</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20 927</td>
<td>1 932</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18 967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: These data were very severely criticized as inadequate at the time of their publication. Whatever their merit then, they have become unquestionably dated since. They are offered, faute de mieux, as official confirmation of some of the trends discussed in Ch. 5.c. and 5.d.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Serbia (total)</th>
<th>Serbia (proper)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-19</td>
<td>45,4</td>
<td>42,8</td>
<td>31,5</td>
<td>33,2</td>
<td>34,2</td>
<td>31,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-39</td>
<td>29,0</td>
<td>29,0</td>
<td>30,0</td>
<td>30,2</td>
<td>30,2</td>
<td>30,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-59</td>
<td>16,7</td>
<td>16,7</td>
<td>23,0</td>
<td>17,7</td>
<td>21,9</td>
<td>23,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and</td>
<td>7,7</td>
<td>11,0</td>
<td>14,9</td>
<td>8,8</td>
<td>14,8</td>
<td>12,9</td>
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<tr>
<td>over</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Razvitak stanovništva Jugoslavije u posleratnom periodu, P. 31.
**TABLE 8.**

PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE BY REPUBLIC/PROVINCE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Serbia (proper)</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Census Year 1948</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically active population</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Census Year 1953</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically active population</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Census Year 1961</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically active population</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>44.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Census Year 1971</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically active population</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>42.7</td>
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</table>

### TABLE 9.
NATIONAL STRUCTURE OF YUGOSLAVIA IN 1961 and 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In thousands</th>
<th>Percentage structure</th>
<th>% increase 1971 over 1961.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total respondents</td>
<td>18,549.2</td>
<td>20,522.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>who stated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>their nationality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>4,293.8</td>
<td>4,526.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>1,045.5</td>
<td>1,194.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>513.8</td>
<td>508.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moslems</td>
<td>972.9</td>
<td>1,729.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>7,806.1</td>
<td>8,143.2</td>
<td>42.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
<td>1,589.2</td>
<td>1,678.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>914.7</td>
<td>1,309.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<td>Montenegro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<td>Moslems</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<td>Albanians</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>69.3</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenians</td>
<td>95.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia (total)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moslems</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia proper.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>89.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moslems</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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</table>

**Source:** Savezni zavod za statistiku Statistički bilten Nr. 727 (plus Aneks uz Statistički Bilten 727) "Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama" Belgrade 1972.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Serbia (total)</th>
<th>Serbia (proper)</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3662</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>1373</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3561</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>1355</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3706</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>1430</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
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<td>1047</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>1614</td>
<td>1061</td>
<td>116</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4514</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>1723</td>
<td>1135</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 12.
REGISTERED UNEMPLOYED BY REPUBLIC AND PROVINCE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yugoslavia and Hercegovina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Serbia (total)</th>
<th>Serbia (proper)</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>266,901</td>
<td>26,998</td>
<td>4,932</td>
<td>64,096</td>
<td>47,078</td>
<td>13,252</td>
<td>110,545</td>
<td>64,952</td>
<td>23,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>291,530</td>
<td>32,408</td>
<td>5,863</td>
<td>66,375</td>
<td>51,644</td>
<td>19,044</td>
<td>116,196</td>
<td>66,746</td>
<td>24,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>315,572</td>
<td>35,290</td>
<td>6,464</td>
<td>52,824</td>
<td>57,573</td>
<td>17,570</td>
<td>145,851</td>
<td>89,642</td>
<td>26,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>333,544</td>
<td>41,175</td>
<td>7,179</td>
<td>50,083</td>
<td>64,595</td>
<td>12,561</td>
<td>157,951</td>
<td>99,535</td>
<td>26,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>478,460</td>
<td>69,769</td>
<td>15,367</td>
<td>59,415</td>
<td>86,070</td>
<td>9,462</td>
<td>238,377</td>
<td>155,106</td>
<td>35,977</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije 1975, p. 396.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Slovenia (total)</th>
<th>Serbia proper</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>23,236</td>
<td>4,523</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>4,662</td>
<td>2,053</td>
<td>1,876</td>
<td>9,492</td>
<td>5,645</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>25,653</td>
<td>5,258</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>4,829</td>
<td>2,413</td>
<td>2,015</td>
<td>10,414</td>
<td>5,830</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These projections are not to be confused with those cited in footnote 208 to Ch. 5.
### TABLE 14.

**FAMILY ALLOWANCES IN YUGOSLAVIA.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of recipients (in thousands)</td>
<td>1,412</td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>1,506</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children involved (in thousands)</td>
<td>2,862</td>
<td>2,961</td>
<td>2,976</td>
<td>2,304</td>
<td>1,933</td>
<td>1,910</td>
<td>1,779</td>
<td>1,702</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>1,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure on endowment (in millions)</td>
<td>1,042</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>1,205</td>
<td>1,822</td>
<td>2,321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije 1975, p. 310.  
It should be noted that the figures for expenditure are not standardized to allow for the steep inflation that has been occurring in Yugoslavia over the relevant period.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Serbia proper</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1970</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nr. of children (1000s)</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum expended (millions of dinars)</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1972</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nr. of children (1000s)</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum expended (millions of dinars)</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1973</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nr. of children (1000s)</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum expended (millions of dinars)</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije for 1971, 1974 and 1975 at p. 490, 526, and 521 respectively. Expenditures are given in current terms without allowance for inflation.
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