This Thesis is my original work.
# ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>Bhilai Steel Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>The Communist Party of India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPIM</td>
<td>The Communist Party of India (Marxist)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMK</td>
<td>The Dravida Munnetra Kajhagam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JS</td>
<td>The Bharatiya Jana Sangh</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPTUC</td>
<td>The Madhya Pradesh Trade Union Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>The Praja Socialist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RR parties</td>
<td>Religious rightist parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>The Rashtria Swayamsevak Sangh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>The Samyuktha Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Utttar Pradesh</td>
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PREFACE

The research for this thesis was carried out in the course of a three-year scholarship at the Australian National University between 1968 and 1971.

The first six months of research for this thesis was spent by the writer in general reading, formulating the model, preparing the questionnaire and the inventory of data to be collected, and selecting towns for field survey in India. From April 1969 to November 1969 the writer made an extensive field trip to Delhi, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar to collect polling-booth maps and election statistics, and to carry out a field survey.

It had been intended to conduct the field-work in the district of Burdwan in West Bengal and the writer spent nearly two months there drawing the sample and training interviewers. But owing to the local political instability at that time -- those were the days of the CPIM-led united front government, when every researcher was branded as a CIA-agent -- he had to abandon this plan and go to Madhya Pradesh where he carried out the survey in Bhilainagar (referred to in the text as Bhilai) and Raipur. Survey work in both Bhilai and Raipur was a rewarding experience. The writer himself interviewed more than three hundred electors and dozens of leaders of political parties and voluntary associations. The aggregate data and survey material were coded by the writer, and the data were analysed on the IBM 360/50 computer at the Computer Centre, Australian National University.

It is impossible to thank all those who helped the writer in the course of the three years, but particular reference must be made to those persons and institutions whose assistance has been vital.

The writer owes a special debt to his brother Gutta Vidyasagar for the personal assistance and encouragement he provided in initiating the writer to a research career.

The writer pays a special tribute to the officers and staff of the Election Commission of India. By Western standards the Election Commission is one of the best-administered and most efficient organizations in India. Without its help this research project would not have been successful. Mr A.N. Sen, Secretary, Election Commission of India facilitated the work by issuing necessary official orders and introductory letters to the State Chief Electoral Officers and District Election Officers.
concerned. Messrs. A.K. Chatarjee, J.K. Sibbu, A.K. Bansal, T.D. Gupta and R.D. Sharma, all Research Officers with the Research and Reference Branch of the Commission treated the writer as a friend and were helpful beyond the call of duty. They took extra care and collected polling-booth data from different state headquarters. The writer expresses grateful thanks to them.

Mr A.N. Murthy and Mr P. Seshagiri Rao of the Department of Town Administration in Bhilai helped the writer by relaxing official rules and regulations and supplying detailed lists of residential units, streets and sectors, so facilitating drawing the sample in Bhilai.

Messrs. B.M. Rao, A.P. Ranga Rao, B.S. Chandel, N.A.S. Reddy and P. Vishnumurthy -- all interviewers -- did an excellent job in carrying out the field survey in Bhilai. The first three later joined the interviewing team in Raipur. The descriptive information collected by Mr Reddy along with his interviews was most useful in interpreting the survey material from Bhilai.

Professor R.N. Srivastava and Dr S.L. Sharma, both of the Department of Sociology, Ravishankar University, Raipur, assisted the writer in recruiting the interviewers for field survey in Raipur. Messrs. Anadkumar Chaubey, Ramesh Rothkar, and Prashant Kumar Thawait -- the Raipur interviewers -- were cooperative, and but for their assistance the survey work in Raipur would not have been completed in time. Mr Chaubey worked hard both as an interviewer in the field and as an interpreter for the writer. His knowledge of the ecological layout of Raipur, his initiative and drive in contacting the respondents and his familiarity with the local community leaders made survey work and leadership interviews in Raipur relatively easy. The writer expresses thanks to him.

Mr B. Madhusudhana Rao and his wife, Mrs B. Rajyalakshmi helped the writer in several ways. The writer enjoyed their friendship and hospitality for nearly five months. Mr Rao helped in recruiting the interviewers in Bhilai, himself worked as an interviewer and also devoted much of his time as an extremely patient interpreter for the writer in sun and rain and by day and night. The writer expresses special thanks to Mrs Rajyalakshmi for her forbearance.

The diagrams, maps, and charts were the creation of Mrs Lilian Wittig of the Visual Aids section of the Australian National University. Mrs Wittig spent much of her precious spare time and weekends in preparing
them. The writer expresses his thanks to her.

The writer would like to express his thanks to Mr R.S. Crago and to Mr M.W. Ray for their general assistance in computer programming and to his colleague Brian Embury for the assistance he provided in preparing programmes for regression models.

The writer would like to thank Dr Don Rawson for his helpful suggestions in interpreting the results of the regression models.

Professor V. Subramaniam of the University of Zambia took a keen interest in the project and made helpful suggestions during the course of this research project. The writer expresses his grateful thanks to him.

The writer owes a special debt to Dr Don Aitkin, his supervisor over the three years, whose enthusiasm for the project was accompanied by an unfailing patience with the writer. The writer is very grateful to Professor R.S. Parker, his second supervisor, who made many useful suggestions at different stages in the course of this project. Both Dr Aitkin and Professor Parker patiently read and criticized several drafts of the thesis. Their help, assistance and encouragement were a constant source of inspiration in successful completion of this thesis. The writer will cherish the memory of his association with both of them as an honour and privilege.

The writer would like to thank the members of his department, staff and students whose assistance and friendship have helped to make the preparation of this thesis a rewarding experience.

Finally, the writer owes special thanks to Miss B. Condon for having excellently typed the thesis.
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INTRODUCTION

PRE-INDEPENDENCE POLITICS

The Role of Western-Educated Middle-Class Elites

In India the western-educated urban professional elites (such as the lawyers, landed gentry, journalists, businessmen, and academics) who had implicit faith in British parliamentary democracy played an important role in forming, organizing, and supporting the nationalist movement mainly under the banner of the Indian National Congress (Ghosh 1960:11,12; Krishna 1966b). It was a small elite, homogeneous in social background and mainly upper caste, and it constituted almost a one-class ensemble. Sections of this class joined the British administrative structure and in a sense shared power with the British (Weiner 1968:38). According to Kothari, the new middle class created by English education and drawn by the concepts of liberty, democracy, and socialism, was indeed the greatest legacy of the British Raj. This class eventually inherited power from the British and declared itself a modern nation and a sovereign democratic republic (Kothari 1970d:40).

Area of Political Activity

The British-administered Indian provinces and the urban centres such as Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras were the principal centres of the political activities of these elites. For example, from its inception in 1885 up to 1947, the year of Indian independence, the Congress held its annual sessions ten times in Calcutta, seven times in Madras, six times in Bombay, four times in Lahore, three times each in Allahabad and Lucknow and twice each in Delhi, Karachi, and Ahmedabad -- all traditional cities in British-administered Indian provinces. The Congress rarely held its annual session in any of the native Indian princely states until after independence. In fact, in several princely states, and in some of the princely areas which made up Orissa,
Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Mysore, and Kerala, there was no Congress Party organization at the time of independence. Congress was first created in these areas after 1947 (Weiner 1967:13).

Aims and Objectives

For a long time these middle-class elites primarily sought social reforms, increased representation in the legislatures and responsive government (Crane 1959). The demand for self-government was an early political development, and it grew into a desire to built a national polity cutting across the loyalties of region, religion, caste and language. But until after the arrival of Gandhi on the political scene the freedom movement remained a preoccupation of the urban professional class, and for a long time the influence and appeal of this middle-class leadership was limited to the upper section of Indian society. Gandhi transformed the freedom movement into a mass movement; the ideas of freedom and political independence percolated into the lower sections of the society; and the Congress organization fast expanded into the countryside (Krishna 1966b).

Limited Franchise

Until some time after independence the leadership continued to be dominated by urban professional classes -- lawyers, journalists, academics, and traders who mostly belonged to the elite castes. There were two principal reasons. Before independence the franchise was limited to the wealthy, the educated, and those involved with civil service or special interest associations. Most of these people belonged to the middle or upper middle class, and lived in towns and cities. Secondly, the pre-independence election system was based on separate electorates for different communities such as Muslims, Christians and Sikhs and special interest groups such as chambers of commerce and planting communities; this added extra weight to the urban elites.
Early Reforms and Extension of Franchise

The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 heralded a new era in the development of the Indian political system by introducing the method of electing the representatives, though only indirectly. In the case of provincial legislative councils separate electorates were created for Muslims, zamindars, landholders, municipal corporations, universities, chambers of commerce, trades associations, planting communities, municipal councils, and taluk boards. The qualifications of property and membership in that particular interest group were imposed on candidates seeking election. The electors who were about 30,000 in total in India did not exceed a few hundred in any constituency.

The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 extended separate electorates in provincial legislative councils to Sikhs, Anglo-Indians, and Indian Christians. The system of direct election was introduced on the basis of a slightly liberalised franchise. Residence in the constituency, payment of municipal or income tax, ownership or occupation of a house, possession of agricultural land, military service, membership in a special interest association such as a chamber of commerce, entitled one to the right to vote. Any eligible voter 25 years of age and above could contest the election. Yet in 1920 out of a total of 242 million people only 5.3 millions (2.2%) were eligible to vote.

The Federal Act of 1935 further extended the principle of separate electorates to scheduled castes, backward areas and tribes, Europeans, women, and labour. Franchise qualifications were further liberalised but varied from state to state. In general, literacy, payment of certain taxes, land revenue, house rent, were the necessary qualifications of electors for the lower house. Women whose husbands had the right to vote were also enfranchised. Even then, only 14 per cent of the total population in British India was entitled to vote.

It was to this narrow social base that the Congress electoral machinery was geared before independence and it secured significant electoral victories (Krishna 1966b). In the elections
held in 1946 for the Constituent Assembly, the Congress won 205 out of a total of 296 seats allotted to the British Indian provinces.

Because the urban middle classes were the initial organizers and the earliest supporters of the nationalist movement, they also played a leading role in taking that movement and the Congress to the countryside. They built an organized network of communications and patronage across rural-urban boundaries. Rural elites were drawn into the nationalist movement and supplied local leaders in the 1930s. But leadership at the district and state levels remained in the hands of the urban elites. When adult franchise was adopted and country-wide direct elections were introduced for local community, state and federal legislatures immediately after independence, it was these urban leaders who had the power over pre-selection of candidates and decided the pattern of expansion of the party by winning over the local personalised power structures. It took many years for the rural elites to challenge the power of their urban political mentors.

POST-INDEPENDENCE POLITICS

Introduction of Adult Franchise

The Congress leaders were not, however, ignorant of the social and political consequences of the adoption of adult franchise. Since the 1920s political parties, especially the Congress, had been far too committed to the ideas of adult franchise, and direct and secret voting, to be able to modify their stand. In fact, the Constituent Assembly approved these principles unanimously and without much controversy.

In his final speech to the Constituent Assembly, Dr Rajendra Prasad, the President, said that in making the decision on adult franchise they had indeed taken 'a very big step'. He went on: 'I am not dismayed by it...I know the village people who will constitute the bulk of this vast electorate. In my opinion, our people possess intelligence and common sense. They also have a culture which the sophisticated may not appreciate but which is solid.... They are able to take measure of their own interest and
also of the interests of the country at large if things are explained to them' (quoted in Morris-Jones 1957).

**Impact of Adult Franchise on Voting**

Veteran statesman K.M. Pannikar, referring to the social implications of the adoption of adult franchise, said: 'Adult suffrage has social implications far beyond its political significance...many social groups previously unaware of their strength and barely touched by the political changes that had taken place, suddenly realised that they were in a position to wield power'.

But it is doubtful whether the leaders of the Congress Party or even political scientists in general were at that time fully aware that a new agriculture-based rural leadership would emerge and gradually move upward because of the adoption of adult franchise and the location of more than 80 per cent of the electors in rural areas.

Writing in 1970, Rajni Kothari said: 'The elections held in February 1952 took place under conditions of much suspense and anxiety. The politically alive public was as yet essentially urban where the challenge to the Congress appeared to be well articulated. No one was sure how the rural and illiterate would respond to this wholly new ceremony in the relationship between government and society' (Kothari 1970d:170).

Most of those who studied elections ignored the demographic implications of the adoption of adult franchise until almost a decade after the first general election. But they were prompt to discover that parties were cautious and took into account the religious and caste distributions of the electors when nominating candidates. The contributions and sacrifices made by a man to the cause of independence and the interest he evinced in social services were the most important considerations in nominating party candidates (Venkata Rao 1956) and this favoured candidates of urban origin.

a) Party fortunes

The contributors to the work edited by Kogekar and Park
on the first general election in 1952 (Kogekar and Park 1956) wrote at length about the lack of well-formulated political issues and the excessive importance of traditional social cleavages in the voting patterns. Only two contributors pointed out that the declining fortunes of the Congress were due to the adoption of adult franchise. Sharma commented: 'The huge majorities that the Congress won in 1946 have become a matter of the past, and the vacuum created by the Congress has not yet been filled by any other party' (Sharma 1956:201). The trend was more obvious in the state of Madras. Here, Nayar commented that 'adult franchise on the basis of which the general elections of 1951-1952 were held was indeed a powerful factor that was responsible for upsetting established party politics in the state. Congress which had 165 out of 215 (or 77%) seats in 1945 in the state legislative assembly under conditions of restricted franchise, was able to secure only 152 out of 375, or little over 40% of the seats' (Nayar 1956:108).

b) Socio-economic background of legislators

Morris-Jones put together all the available socio-economic and political background data about the central legislators and the state legislators of Bombay and Madras (just before and immediately after independence) and convincingly showed that adult franchise resulted in the broadening of lower educational and occupational categories among the legislators (Morris-Jones 1957:114-128). This trend was more visible in the lower houses than in the upper houses and at the state level than at the central level. The proportion of legislators elected without any previous parliamentary experience was higher at the state level than at the central level. Although Morris-Jones exercised restraint in drawing inferences and making generalizations, there is evidence in his tables that the power of the urban elites was being challenged from the first general election.

Morris-Jones' data revealed that from 1909 to 1916, 26 to 37 per cent of the central legislative councillors and 38 to 48 per cent of the provincial councillors were lawyers. If
separate communal and special interest electorates were excluded the proportion of lawyers was as high as 70 per cent.

Moreover, 78 per cent of the members of the provisional parliament, 71 per cent of the members of the first Lok Sabha, and 39 per cent of the members of the first Bombay legislative assembly had university education. Also 67 per cent of the members of the provisional parliament, 61 per cent members of the first Lok Sabha and 82 per cent of the members of the first Bombay legislative assembly had no previous parliamentary experience. It is a fair assumption that a majority of those who had no university education, no previous parliamentary experience at any level (local, state or central) must have come from the countryside. This was much more obvious with regard to the Madras legislative assembly (1952). Here only 36 per cent of the members had university education, while as many as 59 per cent claimed agriculture as their occupation, and 39 per cent belonged to backward or scheduled castes (Morris-Jones 1957:126). The change of leadership from urban to rural was quicker in Madras than elsewhere.

The Rise of Rural Elites

The shift of political leadership from urban to rural areas was not properly assessed in the early stages. The urban elites who played a dominant role in the freedom struggle were still at the helm of affairs and in some states the rural elites were dormant and docile. The relationship between the rural and urban elites at this time was not one of mutual opposition, nor of close alliance (Avasti 1956). For the poorly educated, economically strong rural elites who commanded the loyalties of numerically large groups it was a kind of political apprenticeship to work with state and central level representative institutions. In some states there were not yet any signs of the rise of rural elites. For example, of the 117 legislators who were elected to the Assam legislative assembly in 1952, 85 per cent had university education, 24 per cent were agriculturists, and 76 per cent had urban middle-class or professional occupations.
In fact, 33 per cent of the legislators were lawyers (Venkata Rao 1956). Such urban dominance coupled with high educational qualifications, and participation in the freedom movement was characteristic also of Travancore-Cochin (Pillay 1956:255).

a) Pre-occupation with the role of caste in politics

The excessive pre-occupation of social anthropologists and election researchers with the role of caste in Indian politics made them overlook the long-term implications of the change in the franchise. The discussion on the role of caste centred around two important points. Did caste loyalty play an important role in politics and particularly in elections? If it did, was it a hindrance or a help to democratic institutions? The answer to the first question was relatively settled. Despite wide variations and exceptions, in the behaviour of caste groups based on Jati subdivisions, economic status and factions, it was agreed by most of the researchers that caste played an important role, though not the only important one, in shaping voting patterns (Park and Tinker 1959; Kogekar and Park 1956). But a controversy centred on which was more important: the impact of caste and religion on electoral politics, or the impact of electoral politics on caste and religion. Some, like Srinivas and Harrison, viewed castes essentially as homogeneous groups with a high tendency to uniform behaviour, and characterized the cleavages in rural society essentially as a conflict between higher and lower, or between the numerically large and economically powerful castes (Srinivas 1962; Harrison 1960).

Referring to this situation Srinivas wrote: ‘...tensions between the upper castes and the Harijans are likely to increase in the near future. This conflict will overlap to some extent with the tensions brought about by development. All in all, I fear that we are in for a period of increasing unrest in our villages. This fear has been given an edge by the introduction of panchayat raj in some of the states. It has placed much power in the hands of the dominant castes, and there is no guarantee that they will not use it to oppress those who have trad-
itionally obeyed them but are now beginning to assert their inde­
pendence. Apart from this it will introduce a bitter, and perhaps
violent, scramble for power in the rural areas' (Srinivas 1962). 

b) Secularization of caste cleavages

Some political scientists thought on the other hand that
castes, communities and even caste associations participated in
politics not as traditional communal groups but as political groups.
In this process traditional social cleavages were politicised and
new identifications created. In this sense politics was 'the
great leveller of social distances and dominance positions found
in a peasant society' (Kothari, Shah 1965; Rudolph and Rudolph
1960, 1967; Weiner 1963:8; Kothari 1970c). In a non-politicised
society the influence of caste on politics is obvious. In the
transitional stage of politicisation caste performs both tradi­
tional and political functions (Goyal 1965). Where democratic
institutions are introduced into a highly traditional and hier­
archical society both of these functions may be discharged by a
single set of leaders who try to retain their traditional social
power through modern institutions (Lakshmana Rao 1964; Chaturvedi
1969). In a politicised society on the other hand, one would expect
the impact of politics on caste to be greater than the impact of
caste on politics (Goyal 1965).

Shift in Power from Urban to Rural Elites

By the early 1960s the lack of recognition of shift in
political power from urban to rural elites was partly remedied by
intensive research in state politics. The investigations carried
out by Weiner, Mayer, Bailey, Beteille and Kothari and his asso­
ciates in different parts of India proved beyond doubt that the
political participation of the rural masses had three important
consequences (Weiner 1959; Mayer 1961; Bailey 1963; Beteille
1963; Kothari and Shah 1965; Kothari and Sheth 1965). Firstly,
political power was percolating from urban trade-based traditional­
elite castes to rural agriculture-based intermediate-Hindu castes.
Secondly, the social groups which did not previously participate
in politics developed into effective pressure groups. They were not bold enough to claim a share of political power at the local level, owing to long-prevailing social relationships, but because of special reservations provided by the constitution they secured legislative (and often ministerial) representation proportional to their numerical strength in the population (Weiner 1968:39-40).

The situation was well summarized by Kothari in 1962. Writing on the eve of the third general election he said that 'Indian politics has entered a new phase in which the old, awe-inspiring, civil and urbanized leadership has come face to face with a new generation of leaders which has its roots in the rural side, which has its grip on local organizations, which is also fired by its own romanticism, a contempt for the westernised, a regard for strict order and discipline, a chronic inferiority complex, and a sense of certainty and conviction in what it is out to do. This rural elite is an entirely new force on the Indian political scene. It has begun to assert itself in not a few places. It will soon capture strategic positions in the establishment' (Kothari 1962a).

This interpretation was later supported by a number of studies in state politics. The main theme of these studies was that after independence and particularly after the reorganization of the Indian states on a linguistic basis, a significant shift occurred in political power. But this shift was characterized more as power-mobility across the caste boundaries than as an inevitable consequence of the skewed distribution of electors over the rural-urban continuum. In the Indian electoral system based on single-member constituencies, and first-past-the-post voting, numbers were very important. Because the society was highly stratified even relative majorities concentrated in particular regions, if they were combined with economic power and common occupational interests, could give a far-reaching electoral advantage to certain social groups. Castes such as the Kammas and Reddys in Andhra, the Vellalas, Mudaliars, Gounders, and the Nadars in Tamil Nadu, the Lingayats in Mysore, the Marathas in Maharashtra, and the Rajputs, Ahirs, and Jats in north
India possessed these qualifications. These castes happened to be resident in rural areas. By coalescing with some smaller groups and skilfully exploiting existing loyalties they acquired political power and reaped great benefits from it (Roy 1966a, 1967).

It should be stressed here that it was not the caste rivalry but the introduction of adult franchise and modern representative institutions that shifted political power from urban to rural elites. For example, strong movements launched against Brahmin social and political dominance were successful only in Madras Presidency before the introduction of adult franchise.

The situation was well described by Weiner when, referring to 'rising castes', he said: 'Among these groups it has been the rural gentry with massive electoral backing that has moved readily into politics, gradually displacing the more educated urban classes. The critical factor in this development is the growing importance of numbers in an open electoral system, particularly when the numerically large groups are also in the possession of some economic means. Thus neither the numerically large, poor castes nor the small, wealthy upper castes are now as important as the large and moderately prosperous middle castes' (Weiner 1968:39). I will explain in a moment how this development in itself is transitory and why the political interests of the rural rich and the urban wealthy sections are not similar.

a) Rural elites in local community government

The quantitative data available on the shift of political power from urban to rural elites indicate that it was not uniform over the local and federal political power continuum. Firstly, the participation of the rural elites was highest at the lowest level (panchayat raj institutions) and lowest at the highest level (Central ministry) of democratic institutions and the power hierarchy.

A study carried out by Ram Reddy (Reddy 1967) into the social composition and political background of panchayat raj executives in Andhra Pradesh revealed that 95 per cent of village
panchayat heads, 83 per cent of panchayat samithi heads, and 64 per cent of zilla parishad heads had agricultural occupations. It is reasonable to assume that almost all of them came from rural areas. Political power then up to the level of the district was very much the domain of agriculture-based rural elites.

According to Reddy's study only 4 per cent of village panchayat heads, 24 per cent of panchayat samithi heads, and 36 per cent of zilla parishad heads had university education. In other words, the higher the level of representative institution, the higher the educational attainments of the political executives.

Reddy also found that the domination of the rising castes was complete at all the levels of local self-government. Nearly two-thirds of the village panchayat and panchayat samithi heads and all zilla parishad heads were from the Kammas and the Reddys. Brahmins formed about 3 per cent of village panchayat heads, less than 1 per cent of panchayat samithi heads, and were not to be found at all among zilla parishad heads. A majority of the village panchayat heads (59%) and 17 to 18 per cent of panchayat samithi and zilla parishad heads had no previous experience with representative institutions. It is likely that the situation was not different in other south and west Indian states, though this kind of rural and agricultural predominance in local community governments became apparent only recently in north India, where nearly half of the population belonged to traditional elite castes such as Brahmins, Vaisyas and Kayastas. These new shifts were well described by Weiner in his case studies of the districts of Kaira (Gujarat), Guntur (Andhra Pradesh), Belguam (Mysore), and Madurai (Tamil Nadu) (Weiner 1967:111-117, 201-209, 298-302, 419-421).

b) Rural elites at the state level

Studies on socio-economic background of state legislators are few, and the available data indicate that by 1967 political power in most states passed into the hands of the rural landed gentry, who were often described as 'rising castes'. In the
south and west Indian states this process was already complete. For example, the ministry in Maharastra did not include a single Brahmin and the ministry in Tamil Nadu did not include more than one Brahmin for quite some time (Dastur 1967; Forrester 1970). In Andhra Pradesh and Mysore it was customary to include a lone Brahmin in the ministries, and most of the ministers came from villages and agricultural occupations. In the north the political power monopoly of the urban middle-class elites was broken only after the 1967 election (Dilip Mukherjee 1970, 1971a, 1971b).

A study carried out by Morris-Jones (Morris-Jones 1969) into the socio-economic and political background of Congress nomination seekers in Maharastra and Bihar in 1967 revealed that a majority of the nomination seekers and also those who secured the nominations (60 to 65%) were middle-aged; while about five in ten who secured nomination had university education. Of those who secured nomination, 73 per cent in Bihar and 64 per cent in Maharastra had no previous experience in representative institutions (Morris-Jones 1969:130-134). Most of these poorly-educated new entrants into electoral competition were from the rural gentry.

Interestingly an investigation being carried out by V. Subramaniam and the writer into the socio-economic and political background of the DMK nomination seekers in 1967 also confirmed the shift from urban to rural areas. Our preliminary tables of this analysis based on data drawn from the files of the DMK office in Madras showed that about eight in ten nomination seekers were residents of small towns and rural areas, about six in ten had agricultural occupations, and only a fifth had university education. Sitting members of the state assembly or federal parliament, political sufferers in party agitations and party leaders with long history usually secured nominations.

The situation in Himachal Pradesh was also in line with the general trend in the states at large. Here after the 1967 election more than half of the assembly members were agriculturists and only about a third had university education (Tyagi 1968).

But the situation was not the same in all states. In Assam, for example, more than 80 per cent of assembly candidates and about 70 per cent of parliamentary candidates in 1967 had university education, and only 25 per cent of assembly candidates and 18 per cent
of parliamentary candidates were agriculturists (Venkata Rao, 1968). The
trend was similar in the state of Haryana (Sinha 1968). Here for one
reason or another the urban professionals and traders continued to dominate
the state legislatures though the rural agricultural elites were making
sustained attempts to enter politics.

c) Rural elites at the centre

The trend at the federal level was clear though less impressive. Here from 1952 to 1967, the representation of agriculturists increased from 16 to 32 per cent, that of the lawyers decreased from 25 to 17 per cent, that of the professionals decreased from 13 to 3 per cent, and that of the 'political and social workers' increased from 12 to 21 per cent. It was customary for the agriculture-based rural political leaders to call themselves social and political workers as a status category; a majority of those so classed probably came from rural areas (Kochanek 1968:37). The proportion of Lok Sabha members with university education declined from 82 per cent in 1952 to 75 per cent in 1967; the urban membership of Lok Sabha was no doubt declining but very slowly. In fact it may take many more elections before the rural sectors are proportionately represented in the membership of Lok Sabha.

In terms of place of birth some 45 to 50 per cent of the members come from small towns (i.e. below 100,000 population); these probably retained their political influence in rural areas through personal and group networks. If so, it is more appropriate to describe this group as link-men between the rural and urban leaderships, because they have their roots in the rural areas though they mostly live and work in urban areas.

The predominance of urban elites continued unhindered among the central ministers, the top-most political executives in the country. Here, from 1952 to 1967, about nine in ten had university education, three in ten were lawyers, one in ten were professionals, 13 to 16 per cent were social workers, and only 14 to 18 per cent were agriculturists. Data were not available for the ministries formed after 1967, but as most of the previous ministers were retained in the successive ministries one can assume that the occupational and educational composition did not change significantly. An investigation of the socio-economic and political background of the members of the first, second and third Lok Sabhas classified 98 per cent of the members in each Lok Sabha as middle or upper middle class.
The conclusions that follow from the above discussion are obvious. Up to the district level the representative institutions were dominated by rural agricultural elites. At the state level, rural agricultural elites predominated; urban interests and educated sections were represented though they did not have an effective say in formulating policies or implementing them. At the federal level representatives were still drawn from educated sections mostly coming from towns and cities. But the representation of agriculturists was increasing slowly. At the central government level, most ministers had university education, were drawn from towns or cities, and belonged to the middle or upper middle class. On the other hand state governments were controlled by the rural agricultural interests. The chances of securing a party ticket and winning a seat in the Lok Sabha depended on the support that a candidate derived from and the loyalty that he owed to the state party organization. So rural and state-based political pressure was increasingly felt at the centre after the third general election and particularly after the death of Nehru (Brecher 1968; Lakshmana Rao 1969).

Policy Conflicts of Rural and Urban Elites

It was in this context that the persistent pressure from the bureaucracy (particularly from the Planning Commission) and the Union ministry to impose agriculture, income and wealth taxes and the stiff opposition from the state governments to such measures became meaningful (Rosen 1966:146-149). In fact to retain the support of the agriculturists and the state governments abolished land revenue and implemented the land reforms only half heartedly (Franda 1968; Brass 1968; Gray 1968; Shrader 1968). It was customary for the state governments to raise the issue of ceilings on urban income and wealth whenever the central government brought up the issues of agricultural income and wealth taxes. On such issues party differences were not significant in the behaviour of states (Weiner 1968:48-51).

The attitudes of Congress legislators on issues such as ceilings on land holdings, urban income, and cooperative farming
were closely related to their caste, occupation, major source of income, size of personal land holding, and place of residence (Kochanek 1968). The major opposition to land ceilings came from agriculturists while support came from social sections which were completely divorced from the land and from those whose land holdings were small. Opposition to ceilings on urban income came from urban resident and occupational groups. The rural landless labourers and tribal groups supported ceilings on both urban and agricultural incomes. It was precisely for this reason that the rural landed gentry and urban industrialists could not make common political cause in India. The central leadership was urban oriented and economic reforms such as abolition of feudal land relations, reduction in economic inequalities, and diverting rural economic resources for industrialization were usually initiated by this leadership. These aims and goals often directly threatened the economic interests of social sections from which the state party organizations drew their support. Consequently, taking the electoral realities into consideration, the central leadership had to yield to the pressures of rural and agriculture-oriented state leadership. The hesitation of the central government to impose agricultural wealth and income taxes and its reluctance to strongly press for the implementation of land reforms, illustrate this situation well.10

Future Power Patterns.

But what will happen in future? Will this aggregation and consolidation of rural-based political power continue? Or will it stabilize at the state level leaving the centre open to urban leadership but imposing certain constraints on its policies?

The answer to these questions would have been considered relatively easy after the death of Nehru and before the snap election called by Indira Gandhi in 1971. That was a period in which state leaders successfully exerted enormous pressure on the central leadership, actively participated twice in deciding the succession (first after the death of Nehru and later after the death of Shastri), and acquired commanding positions in the
central ministries and the party high command. In practice, though not by law, power devolved from the centre to the states (Morris-Jones 1966; Brecher 1966). Analysts who predicted continued Congress dominance on the eve of the 1967 election were surprised at the sudden decline of Congress power that followed, and concluded that the Indian political system had entered an era of coalitions and instability (Kothari 1967c, 1967d). The controversy over the presidential election after the death of President Zakir Hussain and the consequent split in the Congress further confirmed the trend toward a weakening of the centre and a strengthening of the power of the states. In parliament the government had to depend on support extended by regional parties that demanded state autonomy (Lakshmana Rao 1970).

But Indira Gandhi dramatically nationalised the banks, about one year later called for a snap election, approached the electorate with a promising socialist programme, and romped back into the parliament with increased percentage of votes and two-thirds of the seats. Indira Gandhi became as popular as her father. Many members of the new (fifth) Lok Sabha owed their success to her charisma and policies. So she had neither the need nor the desire to succumb to the pressure of state leaders. The ministry that Indira Gandhi formed while riding the new wave of popularity was much more urban and middle-class than any of its predecessors. At the state level, however, the old pattern continued.

POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFTS

It can be argued at length whether the rural based political interests could again challenge the centre when an opportunity arose. Irrespective of personalities, temporary political issues and electoral gains and losses, three things are quite obvious to a political demographer.
Rural to Urban Movement of Electors

When speaking of movement of electors from rural to urban areas in developing countries in general and in India in particular four points have to be kept in mind.

Firstly, in developing countries the proportion of population living in urban areas is small and the pace of urbanisation is yet slow. Past experience in the West showed that the pace of urbanization increases after picking up momentum. But research scholars who worked on urbanization in India suggest that there are no indications yet that the process of urbanization in India is following the pattern experienced by the Western countries (Bose 1970; Zachariach 1968). The level and pace of urbanization in the long run will depend on several 'urban pull' and 'rural push' factors such as pace of industrialization, creation of employment opportunities in urban areas, migration from rural to urban areas for education, trade and commerce, increasing labour pressure on scarce land, mechanization of agriculture (Iadejinsky 1969; Rudra 1969, 1971), and the movement of educated and trained rural youth into urban occupations.

Secondly, analysis of 1951 and 1961 census data shows that though the proportion of urban population is small (less than a fifth) about one fifth of the urban population in 1951 and about one-seventh of the urban population in 1961 represented net gains from rural areas. The sharp rise in the decennial growth rate of migrants from 9 per cent between 1941 and 1951 to 34 per cent between 1951 and 1961 was attributed to the rural push and urban pull factors mentioned above (Gupta and Sadasvuk 1968: 80-81). Several urban socio-economic surveys conducted in different parts of India in cities such as Madras, Kanpur, Bhopal, Lucknow and Jamshedpur clearly suggest that a majority of the migrants to these cities had come from rural areas (Balakrishna 1961; Majumdar 1960; Malhotra 1964; Makerjee and Singh 1961; Misra 1959). It has to be remembered, however, that the level and pace of urbanization were not uniform all over India, as was shown by the 1961 census. The proportion of urban population in India as a whole was then 18 per cent; in states such as Maharashtra, Madras, and Gujarat it was more than 25 per cent, while in states such as Orissa, Assam, and Bihar it was less than 10 per cent. The preliminary figures from the 1971 census indicate that the urban population in India was about 20 per cent of the total while in the states of Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, and Gujarat nearly a third of the population was living in urban areas.

Thirdly, as urbanization gathers momentum the present distribution of electors between rural and urban areas will gradually change. Even at the present pace of urbanization it is not unreasonable to assume that after five or six decades about half of the electors in states such as Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and Gujarat will be living in urban areas. This process will be accentuated by another factor. A majority of migrants to urban areas are young males of working age (20 to 45) so most of them are of voting age (21 and above).

Finally, the political consequences of rural to urban movement of electors could be studied at several different points on the rural-urban continuum. Depending on the rural push and urban pull pressures that operate people could migrate to nearby small and middle-size towns, to traditional cities which developed as centres of trade, commerce and administration, to old industrial cities such as Bombay, Calcutta, Kanpur, and Ahmedabad, or to new industrial towns which grew up around newly constructed heavy industrial plants. When industrialization and urbanization pick up momentum migrants from rural
areas would move primarily to industrial towns because they would be the main sources of employment opportunities.

This thesis is primarily concerned with the movement of population from rural areas to new industrial towns, with the consequences of occupational mobility, disintegration of old loyalties and the political resocialization of migrants. It is not concerned with the rate or optimum level of urbanization, but with the political consequences of a major demographic trend that is likely to occur in almost all developing countries. The selection of a new industrial town for field work was preferred for two reasons. Firstly, industrial towns provide clues to the future patterns of political resocialization of industrialization-fed rural-urban migrants. Secondly, migrants are available as groups in industrial towns. On the other hand, migrants constitute only a small proportion of the total population in traditional cities. It should also be remembered here that Bhilai was selected for field work primarily because it is a new heavy industrial town and is located close to the industrial belt of east India and not because a majority of the migrants in Bhilai were inter-state. For example, if the survey was done in Durgapur as planned originally the proportion of intra-state migrants would have constituted a majority (see page 55).

Resocialization

As urbanization increases and the rural people move into urban areas they find themselves in a new social and occupational environment. The occupations they seek in urban areas are not usually hereditary. The migrants may have a few friends who help them find jobs and settle down in the new area. But in the workplace, when commuting to the workplace, and in the residential neighbourhood, a migrant has to seek new friendships. According to his occupation he may have to join a labour union, a professional association or a traders' association. To satisfy his cultural interests he may have to join a state cultural association or a regional association on the basis of his mother tongue, and to pursue his hobbies he may join organizations such as sports clubs, dramatic associations and libraries. Most of the above associations cut across religious, caste and often state loyalties. Such associations may often be called upon to exert pressure on government in general and particularly on the political parties at election time, either to protect their own occupational and professional interests, or to meet some special need of the occupational or interest group concerned. The migrants themselves may change their political attitudes and allegiance as their occupational status moves up or down. It is in this process that their primordial loyalties will gradually disintegrate or become irrelevant, and they will re-align their political affiliations on the bases of secular interests and associations.

Political Implications

The social characteristics and places of origin of migrants may also have immediate political implications. In India as in most other developing countries a great majority of migrants to urban areas are young males, with higher educational attainments on the average than those of the population from which they are drawn (Zachariah 1964). Election studies in the past revealed that electors of this type had no definite political loyalties,
were highly emotional and easily swayed by temporary issues. A high proportion of these younger electors were thought to have been attracted to the non-Congress parties (Sheth 1970). This would suggest that rural to urban migration was likely to swell the non-Congress vote.

Between 1951 and 1961 'the pull of industrial and commercial magnets in urban areas' became increasingly important (Gupta and Sadasyak 1968: 82). States which were relatively industrially developed and states such as Madhya Pradesh, Mysore and Assam in which new industries were coming up fast were the net gainers in inter-state migration. On the other hand the states of Kerala and Andhra Pradesh where Communism was fairly influential, and the states of Tamil Nadu, Orissa and Punjab in which regional parties were fairly strong, and the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in which the Jana Sangh was popular, were the principal states of origin of these inter-state migrants (see MAP 1.1). Some scholars, such as Selig Harrison, have suggested that inter-state migrants of other language groups in Bombay worked as cliques within the leftist parties (Harrison 1960: 266). Others, like Norman Palmer, thought that these groups preferred to vote for a candidate of their own language or of their own region if one was available (Palmer 1963; Hart 1960). Such conclusions suggest that inter-state migration if it happens on a sufficiently large scale would be likely to modify local party structures and party systems in the states that attracted migrants.

RESEARCH METHOD

Once the theme of the research investigation was thus pinpointed there were two obvious methodological options. The 1961 census of India collected and tabulated a wide variety of socio-economic and demographic data for all administrative units down to taluk level and for all places recognized as urban. The Election Commission of India collected and published election
statistics at constituency level while polling-booth voting
details were available (up to 1969) at the district election
offices.

Some scholars made a joint analysis of these census
data and election statistics to make broad generalizations and
inferences and provide explanations of the emerging electoral
trends (Gopalkrishna 1964; Murthy and Rao 1968; Morris-Jones
and Gupta 1970; Zagoria 1971). The degree of freedom with
which a research worker can speak of individual voting prefer­
erences on the basis of aggregate voting trends is limited. Yet
such an investigation could be highly useful in explaining some
broad trends at the aggregate level, and help in generating some
hypotheses that might be tested through a field survey. In our
case such an analysis could be done for all new industrial towns
and traditional cities with ease.

In India there are 113 traditional cities (including
town-groups) with more than 100,000 population each and about 22
new industrial towns with more than 20,000 population each, spread
out all over the country. One could undertake a field survey of
some of these towns and collect primary data on socio-economic
and occupational mobility patterns, associational activities,
and political attitudes.

I decided to carry out an aggregate analysis for all
traditional cities and industrial towns, to explain some major
voting patterns and generate some hypotheses that could be tested
by a field survey in one industrial town and one traditional city.
Further interviews with the leaders in the towns surveyed would
be helpful in understanding the local situations. So the strategy
was to use a combination of both methods in the first project of
its kind in the study of Indian politics.

The quantitative analyses for this thesis were based
mostly on data derived from the census and election report,
polling-booth data, about 1200 cross-section interviews and dozens
of interviews with local leaders. In developing the theme of the
thesis and carrying on the discussion I had to be selective, and
relied mostly on quantitative studies in India, but I did not
ignore relevant material from other types of studies. What follows
in the later chapters are the findings of such an analysis.

The only native Indian princely states in which the Congress held its annual sessions before independence were Tripura in 1938 and Ramagarh in 1940. These calculations are based mainly on the information obtained from two volumes of Congress Presidential addresses published by G.A. Natesan and Company, Madras (1934 and 1935). The South Asia Historical Atlas Project is carrying out an investigation on similar lines on the presidents and places of meetings of the Congress.

An examination of the presidential addresses of the Congress at its annual sessions particularly during the early period (1885 to 1900) makes this point obvious. The twin points which most of the Congress Presidents emphasised were that the Congress was representative of all religions, communities and regions and that all these representatives were determined to forge a single nation out of India.

For an excellent summary of the pre-Independence constitutional system, its development and operation see W.H. Morris-Jones, *Parliament in India*. London: Longmans 1957. See especially his second chapter. The tables presented on pages 71 to 73 give a fairly clear picture of the composition of electorates in different periods.


As quoted in 'The Nature and Character of Representation in the Democratic System'. A mono-


9. Details on the socio-economic and political background of Union Ministers, their class origins and place of birth were obtained from S.N. Misras' work at Syracuse University.

10. Finally, when the Union Government made up its mind to impose agricultural wealth and income taxes it tried to persuade the state governments by a call for a ceiling on urban property and agricultural income and wealth taxes simultaneously. Presently such a proposal is being discussed both at the state and central levels. For a report of the Central Land Reforms Committee on ceilings on landholdings, see Times of India, 5 August 1971. The State Government of Bihar has already approved ordinances seeking ceilings on landholdings and urban property and at the same time assured that middle-size landholdings will not be affected by the bills. See Times of India, 31 July 1971.
Here one may agree with the argument of Kothari and his associates that in a country like India where eight in ten persons live in rural areas, it is the introduction of modern representative institutions, election politics, and voter participation that play a vital role in weakening the primordial loyalties of the rural society. On the other hand, for the same reasons one may argue perhaps more effectively, that so long as the social and occupational structures in the rural areas continue as they are today primordial loyalties will continue to be a key factor in politics in Indian rural areas. The working population in rural areas can be divided into three broad occupational categories: owner and tenant cultivators, agricultural labourers, and artisans. Petty government officials, school teachers and development officials are a distinct category of workers in rural areas but they are few. As primordial loyalties in rural areas are closely linked to agriculture based occupational interests and as occupations are unlikely to change as long as rural people remain in the rural areas, one can in fact speculate about an upper ceiling for the process of secularization of politics in rural areas. On the other hand, migration to urban areas will mean a complete change in the social and occupational situation of a person. For an interesting article on the distance between the political sophistication of different segments of Indian society see W.H. Morris-Jones, India's Political Idioms. In Philips (ed.), Politics and Society in India. London: George Allen and Unwin 1963.

AGGREGATE ANALYSIS

PRINCIPLES FOR PICKING TOWNS

In selecting an appropriate control set of cities for aggregate analysis, it was necessary to adopt different principles for the new industrial towns and for the old 'traditional' cities, though in both cases the principles were simple and straightforward.

Industrial Towns

The census of 1961 recognized for the first time as urban units a total of 483 new towns, with an aggregate population of 4.5 millions. A majority of these towns (340) had a population of fewer than 10,000; 31 of them, with a combined population of 1.1 millions, had more than 25,000 people each.

First, all towns with a population of 20,000 or less were eliminated from the sample. There were two reasons for this. Most of the smaller 'new towns' as listed in the census were in fact old settlements or outer suburbs of traditional towns with stable populations -- whereas this study is focused on migrants to the new industrial areas. In addition, in the smaller towns there would be insufficient scope for significant political activity among the different types of migrants. In a town with under 20,000 population and about 8,000 electors, the potential supporters of minority parties like the Communists or Socialists might number only a few hundred. In the Indian situation such numbers would be too small to organize a party branch or put up a candidate to contest an assembly election; they could only become minor pressure groups within the main parties or lose interest in politics altogether. They would not provide fruitful data for this study.

Second, towns in the vicinity of an older metropolis like Bombay or Calcutta were eliminated as their politics might be unduly influenced by those of the larger centres.

Third, two new state administrative capitals, Chandigarh (Punjab) and Bhubaneswar (Orissa) were eliminated as likely to be inhabited largely by confirmed city dwellers.

This left a sample of twenty-two towns -- three from south India, one from west India, nine each from north and east India -- a selection
which satisfactorily matched the distribution of industrial development in India. For example, the main industrial belt is usually thought to comprise eastern Madhya Pradesh, the Chota-Nagpur area in Bihar, and the Burdwan district of West Bengal. Eight of the selected industrial towns are located in this region, most of them with heavy industrial establishments such as steel or fertilizer factories.

Traditional Cities

According to the 1961 census, 113 traditional cities had a population of more than one hundred thousand. Of these, 17 traditional cities such as Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, and Madras were too big to be treated as single units and for election purposes all of them were divided into more than three state legislative assembly constituencies. On the other hand, to include towns with less than one hundred thousand population would have involved collecting polling-booth data from more than one hundred district headquarters. So it was considered advisable to include all traditional cities having more than one hundred thousand population which were divided into not more than two state legislative assembly constituencies. In cases where it was found that sizeable proportions of rural electors had been added to city constituencies, such cities were eliminated from the aggregate analysis. This left a sample of 88 cities (comprising 105 state legislative assembly constituencies), 28 from south India, 6 from east India, 15 from west India, and 39 from north India. Almost every state in India was represented by at least one city while the largest number of cities (15) came from the most populous state of Uttar Pradesh. Considering its level of industrial development and urbanization West Bengal, with only three traditional cities, was under-represented. But a number of population conglomerations presented by the 1961 census as independent cities were in reality parts of greater Calcutta, and had to be eliminated.

Matching Voting Statistics and Socio-economic Data

The matching of voting statistics to socio-economic data needs to be explained. The boundaries of traditional cities and of the assembly constituencies in which they were located usually coincided. But it was observed that the electors in industrial towns constituted only a small proportion of the total electorates of the assembly constituencies in which they were located. So polling booth data specially supplied by
the Election Commission of India were recast to match the boundaries of the industrial towns. As the general election of 1962 was the closest to the census of India 1961, the demographic data of the 1961 census and the state legislative assembly constituency voting data of 1962 were used for this aggregate analysis.

The variables selected as the likely determinants of voting behaviour fell into three principal categories; firstly, demographic variables, i.e. size of population, sex ratio (females per hundred males), and the region in which the town is located; secondly, socio-economic variables, i.e. literacy, sales tax per capita, and entertainment tax per capita; and thirdly, exposure to mass media, i.e. number of radios per thousand population. In the case of traditional cities, in addition to the above-mentioned variables, major economic function of the work force (manufacturing trade and commerce or service), percentage of migrants to total population, and the growth in population of the city from 1951 to 1961 were added. The selection of the above-mentioned indicators was based primarily on the significance and availability of data; it is not suggested here that these are the only variables that influence voting behaviour. If available, level of income, education, membership in voluntary associations and trade unions, newspaper circulation and consumption patterns would have proved useful.

In this chapter I first analyse the performance of different political parties (or groups of parties) in terms of votes secured and seats won and the distribution of votes and seats over the constituencies in industrial towns, traditional cities and India as a whole. Later I examine the effect of the selected independent variables on the electoral performances of different political parties in industrial towns and produce a multiple regression analysis of the selected independent variables and voting patterns in traditional cities. This in turn is followed by an explanation of the comparative voting patterns in different kinds of towns and cities and at the all-India level. Finally I develop hypotheses to be ultimately tested by our survey data, mostly on the basis of the present aggregate analysis but also liberally drawing upon the existing urban election literature.

PARTY PERFORMANCE IN INDUSTRIAL TOWNS

Votes Secured and Seats Won

The aggregate analysis revealed some obvious voting patterns. Out of the 22 industrial-town assembly constituencies, the Congress
### TABLE II.1

Coefficient of Votes* Secured and Seats Won by Different Political Groups in Traditional Cities and Industrial Towns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Per cent of votes secured</th>
<th>Coefficient of votes secured</th>
<th>Per cent of seats won</th>
<th>Coefficient of seats won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All India</td>
<td>Traditional cities</td>
<td>Industrial towns</td>
<td>All India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INC</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Right</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The voting figures presented by the report of the Third General Election do not include the results of mid-term elections in 1960 in Kerala and 1961 in Orissa. In the above table, necessary adjustments are made, so the figures slightly vary from the ones given in the report. Total seats in 1962 (3008). Of the non-left parties 239 seats were won by national left and the rest (98) by regional left parties.

* The coefficient of votes secured in a simple index. It is the percentage of votes secured by a party in a particular category of towns as a proportion to the percentage of votes secured by that party at the national level. The same principle is applied in relation to coefficient of seats won.
contested all and won 17, the Communists contested 17 and won 3, and
the Swatantra Party contested 6 and won two.

Out of 105 traditional city assembly constituencies, the Congress
contested 103 and won 69, the Communists contested 46 and won 9, the religious
government parties' nominated 101 candidates in 81 constituencies and won 3
seats. The corresponding figures for the Praja Socialist Party (PSP) were
44 and 6. The regional parties' and non-party candidates (independent
candidates) won 9 seats each.

Coefficient of Votes and Seats

The coefficient of Congress vote (percentage of Congress vote as
a proportion of the percentage of its vote at the national level) was
slightly lower than unity in traditional cities and marginally higher in
industrial towns (TABLE II.1). In contrast, the coefficient of Communist
democratic vote was significantly higher in traditional cities (1.35) and very much
higher in industrial towns (2.36). In both these areas the vote secured
by other leftist parties and independent candidates was low. The Swatantra
Party fared poorly both in traditional and industrial towns. The coefficient
of Hindu religious vote was higher than for any other party in traditional
cities (1.86) and slightly lower in industrial towns (0.96).

In an election system based on plurality counting (first past the
post), there need not be any constant association between percentage of
votes secured and proportion of seats won. Given the fragmented party
system, until 1967 the election system was a boon to the Congress and a
source of frustration to the opposition. The Congress always won more than
two-thirds of seats by securing less than half the votes cast. The coeffi­
cient of seats won by the Congress was slightly higher than unity in trad­
tional cities (1.06) and considerably higher in industrial towns (1.25).
In the case of Communists the above trend was much accentuated. The
Swatantra Party, because of the concentration of its voting support in a
few pockets was able to win two seats in industrial towns but all other
parties failed to win any seats. In traditional cities the Swatantra Party
drew a blank, religious right parties did slightly better and non-Communist
left parties very much better. So, excluding the occasional victory of the
Swatantra Party the electoral influence in industrial towns was polarized
between the Congress and the Communists.

The Communists were cautious in nominating candidates in con­
stituencies where they had only fair chances of winning, while other
TABLE II.2
The Coefficient* of Votes Secured by Different Political Parties by Different Types of Industrial Towns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of industrial town</th>
<th>INC</th>
<th>CPI</th>
<th>SWA</th>
<th>Religious Rightist</th>
<th>Non-Communist Left</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Big</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High sex ratio</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low sex ratio</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High literacy</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low literacy</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High employment</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low employment</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High sales tax</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low sales tax</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High entertainment</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low entertainment</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High radio</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low radio</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern region</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other regions</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of votes secured

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INC</th>
<th>CPI</th>
<th>SWA</th>
<th>Religious Rightist</th>
<th>Non-Communist Left</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All industrial towns</td>
<td>46.77</td>
<td>23.09</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>12.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All traditional cities</td>
<td>43.01</td>
<td>13.17</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>12.29</td>
<td>15.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All India</td>
<td>44.38</td>
<td>8.59</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>6.99</td>
<td>17.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Independent candidates and other regional parties are not represented in the above table. They secured 8.59 per cent of votes in industrial towns, 12.97 per cent in traditional towns, and 15.52 per cent at the all India level.

* The coefficient of votes secured is a simple index. It is the percentage of votes secured by a party in a category of industrial towns as proportion of the percentage of votes secured by that party in all industrial towns.
parties, particularly the religious rightist parties, the PSP, the Samyuktha Socialist Party (SSP) liberally nominated candidates in as many constituencies as possible and forfeited a large proportion of deposits.

Religious Rightist Candidates in Traditional Cities

The strength of the religious rightist and independent candidates in traditional cities was not even all over the country. An analysis of the state figures indicated that the average number of religious rightist candidates contesting each traditional city seat decreased as one moved from north to south India -- their highest concentration being in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh (about 1.5 per seat) while in Kerala it was negligible (0.2). The trend was the same in the case of leftist parties other than Communists and non-party candidates. For example the number of independent candidates per seat was 3.6 in Rajasthan, 2.8 in Bihar, 2.6 in UP, 2.4 in Punjab, 2.0 in MP, 1.3 in Andhra Pradesh and Mysore, 0.9 in Tamil Nadu, and it was nil in Kerala. Hence it is clear that the splintering of vote in traditional cities characterized by a high frequency of religious rightist and independent candidates was considerable in north India. This leads us to the conclusion that voting preferences in south India occur within the framework of the national or state party system, and confirms the generalization that social groupings in south India found it more profitable to operate within the ranks of national and regional political parties rather than set up their own candidates. The enthusiasm of rising dominant castes such as Kammas, Reddys, Lingayats, Okkaligas, Nadars, Vellalas, Nayars and Thiyas to work inside political parties rather than outside helped this process of politicization and expansion of political parties.

Voting Support for Congress

The voting support for Congress was fairly high and evenly spread in all kinds of industrial towns (TABLE II.2). Further, the different regions showed only marginal variations in Congress voting. For example even in industrial towns in east India (in which region the total voting support of Congress was weak) Congress secured far more votes than any other party. Our multiple regression analysis of traditional cities that follows this section also indicated that the Congress vote was to a significant level positively associated with higher purchasing
power, workforces predominantly occupied in trade and commerce, and higher rates of literacy. But the electoral performance of various non-Congress parties in different kinds of industrial towns may also help to explain the even spread of Congress Party predominance.

Voting Support for Communists

Communist performance seemed better where there was economic backwardness and a low standard of living. Their performance was also fairly high in towns in east India, thereby indicating that industrial towns within the existing industrial belt or areas of strong Communist influence are more likely to vote Communist than towns situated elsewhere. The Communists also fared considerably better in small towns. According to two electoral analyses in Kerala and Tamil Nadu, Communists were popular in towns of 25,000 to 50,000 population where literacy and wage levels are low and a higher proportion of the workforce is employed in unmechanized industries and handicrafts (Murthy and Rao 1968). So it is possible that industrial workers on low salaries, and having low literacy rates may feel inclined to vote Communist wherever they exist.

Low percentage of the population at work and low number of females per hundred males in the context of this study have two implications. Metropolitan cities which are the hubs of regional and national elite activities nearly always reported very low percentages of working population. But the nascent industrial towns we are dealing with are not of that kind. These towns are based on a single industry, and are often located in backward and remote areas. So, in the beginning, only the workers moved to these areas, and the proportion of workers in their populations was very high. As dependents moved to join them or as bachelors got married and children were born to them, the working proportion of the population steadily decreased. This is a clear indication of economic and occupational security and peaceful settled life with a stake in the industry on which they depended for their livelihood. Normally, under Indian circumstances, such workers and their dependents with a secure life should exhibit a preference for the centre or right of centre parties that support the status quo. Surprisingly the Communists fared nearly as well in industrial towns with low employment and a low sex ratio as in the towns in the eastern region. In fact, a marginal trend in traditiona cities also indicated the same pattern.

However, the better performance of Communists in industrial
towns with low percentages of workers can be explained in a number of ways. It is possible that Communist trade union officials and party organization need time to establish contacts and cultivate support and that such contacts and support would be available only when the newly arrived workers feel a sense of job security and settle down to normal living. Further, as feelings of deprivation, frustration and alienation are based on comparison of one's own position with that of others, workers do not feel comparatively deprived until people in a town are more diversified. In the Indian industrial town this is particularly applicable because a majority of the semi-skilled and manual labourers move to industrial towns with a low level of occupational and economic aspiration. In the initial stages such people are likely to be content with modest achievements, though they may later support parties that advocate radical socio-economic measures. In other words, previous Communist sympathizers or contacts of migrants may offer the Communist organizers people ready and willing to establish their organization; while local job dissatisfaction and discontent if any exists may help the Communists to expand their activities and voting support.

Voting Support for Swatantra Party

The voting support of the Swatantra Party on the other hand was generally associated with the indicators of higher purchasing power and higher standard of living. A good performance in low literacy areas was exceptional. But we have to bear in mind three facts in relation to the performance of the Swatantra Party. Firstly, it contested only 6 of the 22 industrial town constituencies. Secondly, four of these six constituencies are located in east India (Bihar). Finally, the electoral strength of the Party in Bihar was highly dependent on the personal influence of the Raja of Ramagarh. One may however argue that voters in industrial towns are probably vulnerable to the surrounding political environment and personal influences and that the Swatantra Party was a beneficiary from this. How these personal influences are extended over the migrants and what channels of communication are most effective in this regard have to be examined through the survey data.

Voting Support for Religious Rightist Parties

The coefficient of religious rightist vote in relation to almost all the variables is consistent with previous findings. The
industrial towns which extended significantly higher support to the
rightist parties have all the attributes of old administrative towns.
The available literature on elections suggests that voting support
for the religious rightist parties is associated with the northern region,
with traditional administrative cities, with Hindu Muslim religious
tensions, and with the presence of the highly educated and urban-employed
elite castes (Baxter 1969:154; Morris-Jones and Gupta 1969). So the
voting pattern in relation to the religious rightist parties in industrial
towns may be interpreted in two ways. It may be that within the compara-
tively developed industrial towns, higher social and occupational classes
still retain their loyalty to traditional religious and caste values and
hence extend their support to the religious parties. Alternatively,
it is possible that a large number of hitherto widely scattered potential
religious rightist sympathizers find themselves in the new situation in
sufficiently large numbers to participate actively in parties of their
choice. Migrants to north Indian towns in general possess characteristics
of potential religious rightist sympathizers -- being displaced from
Pakistan, belonging to the Brahmin Vaisya castes, already being influenced
by the RSS, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Arya Samaj. One can also argue
that in industrial towns the large scale recruitment and upward mobility
of hitherto disabled social sections reduce the economic and occupational
distances between them and the traditional elite castes. The latter may
then support the Jana Sangh as a protective measure.

The category of other left parties in Table II.3 comprises the
Praja Socialist Party, the then Indian Socialist Party, Revolutionary
Socialist Party and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. As already pointed
out the support for these parties was widely scattered over all the
towns. The leftist parties fared better (1.11) in towns located in non-
eastern regions and in new towns (1.40). But in all other categories
the performance of the other leftist parties was in inverse ratio to
that of the Communists. This indicates that the non-Congress parties
could not affect the Congress vote significantly, and that the Communist
and non-Communist leftist parties were competing with each other.

REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF TRADITIONAL CITIES

In the case of traditional cities I carried out a multiple
regression analysis of the independent and real variables of sex ratio,
literacy, employment, per capita sales and entertainment taxes, number
of radios per thousand population, percentage of migrants, and the
decennial growth rate in population. In addition to these I created
two classes of dummy variables based on geographical location of the
city (region), whether the workforce in the city was engaged predomi­
antely in manufacturing, trade and commerce, or in the service sector
(function). In carrying out the regression analysis the independent
real variables were standardized and made comparable with the dummy
variables.

The reasons for creating the dummy variables based on geo­
graphical location and function of workforce are the following. The
electoral support of the non-Congress parties is limited to a few
states or regions. For example in the general election of 1967 the
opposition parties secured more than ten per cent of votes each only
in a few states -- the Jana Sangh in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,
Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir; the Communists in Kerala, Andhra,
and West Bengal; the Swatantra Party in Orissa, Rajasthan, and Gujarat;
the SSP in Bihar; and the PSP in Orissa. So the variable of geograph­
ical location of city will enable us to ascertain how a political party
is faring in the traditional cities of the region in which it is influ­
ential in relation to other states in which it is not so influential.
If a party's vote is high in the traditional cities in the regions in
which its electoral support is generally weak one may speculate that the
party may in future penetrate into small towns and rural areas.

The major function of workforce on the other hand gives us a
broad measure as to which of the traditional cities contain large numbers
of industrial workers and which of them contain workers in trade and
commerce and service sectors. An electoral study in Kerala suggested
that big towns with relatively large numbers of workers engaged in
service occupations voted for the Congress. On the other hand, towns
with unmechanized industries and comparatively large numbers of workers
engaged in handicrafts voted for the Communists. Though one cannot assert
that a good performance by a party in trade-oriented cities is essen­
tially due to the support of workers engaged in trade, or a good perfor­
mance of a party in cities with manufacturing industries is primarily
due to the support of industrial workers, it will provide us with a basis
for generating hypotheses. In general I expect that the parties which
gathered good electoral support in industrial towns would also gather
good support from manufacturing traditional cities because both contain
the same type of workers. On the other hand, a party like the Jana Sangh
which is said to be popular with workers engaged in petty trading may gather good electoral support from cities with workers engaged mostly in trade and commerce.

The Congress, the Communists, and the religious rightists were the only parties which contested a considerable number of traditional city assembly constituencies. So I preferred only the votes secured by these parties as dependent variables in the regression models. Further in the case of a party or a group of parties the analysis covered only those constituencies that it contested.

**Aims of Regression Analysis**

The reasons for choosing a multiple regression analysis are simple. With the exception of the studies carried out by Morris-Jones and Gupta, and Zagoria (Morris-Jones and Gupta 1969; Zagoria 1971), aggregate electoral studies in India were based mostly on two-way tables (Kothari and Sheth 1965; Krishna 1966a; Chandidas 1967; Murthy and Rao 1968). In such a method it is difficult to discern the relation between different independent variables and if the variables are related to one another it will be difficult to estimate the proportion of total variation explained by each or all of such variables put together. On the other hand, my aim here is to examine whether the independent variables are related to one another, and to see which of the independent variables influence the voting support of different parties. Later I will estimate the proportion of total variation explained by all the independent variables which significantly influenced the voting support of a party.

The reasons for undertaking regression analysis of traditional cities while confining ourselves to two-way tables in the case of industrial towns are as follows. Firstly, the total number of industrial towns was too small (22) to carry out a regression analysis. Only the Congress contested in all of these towns, the non-Congress parties contested only in a few, the Communists in 17, religious rightist parties in 12, PSP in 9, Swatantra Party in 6, and regional parties in only one. On the other hand there were 105 traditional city constituencies and each of the major parties contested in a sufficiently large number of constituencies; Congress in 103, the religious rightist parties in 81, and the Communists in 46. Secondly
### TABLE II.3

Regression Model:

Dependent Variable: Proportion of Total Votes Secured by the Congress in the Traditional City Seats it Contested

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>103</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant term</td>
<td>+0.438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient of determination, $R^2$</td>
<td>.141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Estimated coefficient</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literacy level</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>7.804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of migrants</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>8.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Tax</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>4.157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE II.4

Regression Model:

Dependent Variable: Proportion of Total Votes Secured by the Communists in the Seats They Contested

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>46</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant term</td>
<td>0.305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient of determination, $R^2$</td>
<td>.271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Estimated coefficient</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North India</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>4.695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita sales tax</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>3.603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex ratio</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>3.045</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
some data which were available for traditional cities were not available for industrial towns or were inapplicable in their case. For example function of workforce, decennial growth rate, and percentage of migrants were additional variables included in the analysis of traditional cities. So I decided to use these data in a critical analysis to make the comparison of voting patterns in industrial towns and traditional cities more reliable.

Method of Analysis

The analysis was done in two stages. In the first stage I examined the influence of all independent real and dummy variables separately on the vote secured by each party. In the second stage I deleted variables whose F statistic was below the 10 per cent level of significance and worked out the overall coefficient of determination of all the independent variables whose F statistic was significant enough to be included in the model.

The proportion of total variation accounted for by the independent variables was highest in relation to the religious rightist vote, next highest in relation to the Communist vote and least in relation to the Congress vote. Of all the independent variables included in the analysis, the class of dummy variables based on the geographical location of the city was associated most closely with the voting patterns.

Voting Support for Congress

In general the cities which had registered a high level of Congress vote were characterised by high literacy, low percentage of migrants, and high sales tax per capita. In general Congress was less popular in the traditional cities of north India than elsewhere. It may be observed in Table II.3 that the variables of literacy, percentage of migrants, and sales tax per capita accounted for 14.1 per cent of the variation in votes secured by the Congress. The dummy variables based on function of workforce, and geographical location of city did not affect the Congress vote in any way.

Voting Support for Communists

The results of the regression are much clearer in the case of the Communists. Of the ten independent variables, three -- northern region, sales tax per capita, and sex ratio -- produced F statistic above the ten per cent
**TABLE II.5**

Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Total Votes Secured by the Religious Rightist Parties in the Seats They Contested

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>= 81</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant term</td>
<td>= 0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient of determination</td>
<td>= 0.397</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>Computed P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North India</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>50.624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment Tax</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>9.982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of migrants</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>5.953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East India</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>5.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing Cities</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>3.398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
level of significance. The proportion of total variation in the communist vote accounted for by these three variables was as high as 27.1 per cent (TABLE II.4). The F statistic of none of the other variables was above the 10 per cent level of significance. But the inclusion of five such variables in the model improved the explanation by 2.6 per cent. One would expect that the cities in which industrial labour was numerically dominant in the workforce would vote more heavily for the Communists. But the addition of dummy variables based on function of workforce did not improve the coefficient of determination.

Voting Support for Religious Rightists

Of the eight independent variables, five — north India, entertainment tax per capita, percentage of migrants, east India and manufacturing cities — were significantly associated with the vote of the religious rightist parties. The proportion of total variation accounted for by all these variables was 39.7 per cent (TABLE II.5).

The traditional cities that extended greater support to religious rightist parties were located in north and east India. They were generally backward, their population characterised by lower purchasing power, low standard of living, low educational achievements but a higher proportion of migrant population. Also a majority of the workforce in the cities that extended relatively higher support for the Jana Sangh was engaged in manufacturing industries. Undoubtedly these are the typical characteristics of the north Indian traditional cities where the urban population has been greatly affected by the in and out migration of the refugee population owing to the partition of the country in 1947. Within the cities with the above aggregate characteristic one would, however, wonder whether the comparatively poor, uneducated, unemployed, and migrants or their counterparts had voted for the religious rightist parties. Further, when all the independent and real variables and all the classes of dummy variables were included in the model, the dummy variable of northern region emerged as the most effective variable in accounting for the variations in the religious rightist vote (TABLE II.5).

Past election literature in general suggests that occupational economic and cultural differences between different segments of the society, coupled with the effects of a high degree of in/out flow of refugees, aggravated the social and religious cleavages, thereby encouraging the refugees and religious loyalists to vote for the religious rightist parties. The success
of the PSP which was significantly associated with the Communist vote was negatively associated with religious rightist vote.

COMPARISON OF PARTY VOTE IN INDUSTRIAL AND TRADITIONAL CITIES

Comparison of Congress Vote in Industrial and Traditional Cities

A comparison of Congress voting support in the industrial towns and traditional cities makes the following differentials obvious. The voting support for the Congress was fairly high and evenly spread out in all kinds of industrial towns while it was significantly associated with some socio-economic variables in the case of traditional cities.

While industrial towns whose population solely comprised migrants extended good voting support to the Congress, in traditional cities the higher the proportion of migrants, the lower the proportion of the Congress vote. So it is possible to speculate that migrants in industrial towns and traditional cities may have different voting attitudes towards the Congress. What makes a migrant in an industrial town more likely to vote Congress and a migrant in a traditional city less likely to vote Congress perhaps depends on the pattern of migration and the characteristics of migrants rather than on migration itself.

It is surprising that the Congress which fared so well in new industrial towns (inhabited predominantly by industrial labourers) did not show any positive or negative association in its electoral performance with manufacturing traditional cities. It is possible to hypothesize that industrial workers in traditional cities and industrial towns vote differently and it may also mean that the sources of Congress voting support are essentially different in industrial towns and traditional cities.

Unlike its voting support in industrial towns, the Congress vote in traditional cities was significantly positively related to the variables of literacy, and sales tax per capita. It is however a debatable question whether the Congress was securing its votes from the highly literate and economically well off social sections or from economically weak and illiterate sections for some other reasons.
The effect of the variable region on Congress voting in industrial towns was only marginal while the proportion of total variation in Congress vote accounted for by region was considerable in traditional cities. For example, even in the industrial towns of east India (where the voting support for Congress was poor) the percentage of votes secured by the Congress was far higher than that of any other party. In other words industrial towns were comparatively immune from regional political influences, while traditional cities were not.

One would think that the population in industrial towns is more mobile, territorially and socially, than the population in traditional cities. So one may speculate that people who are more mobile may extend higher support to the Congress than the people who are relatively stable.

Comparison of Communist Vote in Industrial and Traditional Cities

A comparison of the Communist vote in industrial towns and traditional cities makes the following differences and similarities obvious.

The sources of the Communist vote in traditional cities and industrial towns appear to be different, because while a large proportion of the variation in the Communist vote in traditional cities was 'explained' by the indicators of social and economic development, such as higher purchasing power, even sex ratio and large number of radios per thousand population, in the case of industrial towns the trend was exactly the opposite.

In the case of industrial towns the region of east India accounted for a considerable proportion of the variation in the Communist vote while in the case of traditional cities the region of south India was responsible for that. Yet in both types of cities the performance of the communists was very poor in north and west India.

As might be expected of a party championing the cause of the industrial workers, the percentage of votes secured by the Communists in industrial towns (23%) was almost twice as high as its vote in traditional cities (13%), and three times as high as its vote at the all India level (9%). Yet it is surprising that the Communist vote did not show any sign of positive or negative association with traditional manufacturing cities. So, it is
possible that workers in manufacturing industries in traditional cities are probably not as vulnerable to Communist propaganda as workers in the new industrial towns.

In both industrial towns and traditional cities the percentage of votes secured by the Communists was highly sensitive to the level of votes secured by the other leftist parties. For example, the lower the vote of other leftist parties the higher the Communist vote in all kinds of industrial towns.

**Comparison of Religious Rightist Vote in Industrial and Traditional Cities**

A comparison of the religious rightist voting support in the industrial towns and the traditional cities justified the following observations:

The percentage of votes secured by the religious rightists in industrial towns (6%) was just equal to the vote they secured at the all India level (7%) and was just half of the vote they secured in traditional cities (12%). So one may speculate that industrial workers were less likely to vote for religious rightist parties than those employed in urban middle class occupations.

The electoral performance of the religious rightists was significantly high in industrial towns with high literacy, high per capita sales and entertainment taxes paid. In traditional cities also these variables had a significant effect on the religious rightist vote but in the negative direction. Is it possible that the socio-economic characteristics of the supporters of the religious rightist parties are essentially different in industrial towns and traditional cities?

It is surprising that the electoral performance of the religious rightist parties was so poor in industrial towns which consisted solely of migrants, while in the case of traditional cities quite a significant proportion of the total variation in the religious rightist vote was accounted for by the factor of migration. One may hypothesize that the places of origin, the socio-economic background and the political attitudes of the migrants in traditional cities and industrial towns were different.
As already pointed out, the vote secured by the religious rightists was poor in the industrial towns as a whole: on the other hand, the manufacturing traditional cities rather than the ones engaged in trade and service voted more strongly for the religious rightist parties.

EXPLANATION OF VOTING PATTERNS

Historical Role of Traditional Cities

There are many plausible explanations for the above trends and a majority of the election studies in India are in line with our findings. Traditional cities in India have played a unique historical and administrative role. For more than a century these cities have been district administrative and local self-government headquarters. These were the places where the first signs of urbanization, expansion of western education, trade, commerce, the nucleus of modern civil services, and industrialization first took root. On the economic front these cities remained, for a long time, wholesale trading centres, importing manufactured items from industrial centres like Bombay, Calcutta, and Ahmedabad and purchasing and exporting the surplus primary products from the rural hinterland. It was only after the second world war, and particularly after the country's independence, that these cities acquired an added significance with mushrooming small, medium scale and servicing industries, and an enormously expanding educational system and government bureaucracy. So the cities, by providing employment opportunities, served as stepping stones in territorial and upward social mobility. The predominance of service occupations in these cities has been a continuing feature. According to the census of 1961, in 54 out of a total of 105 traditional city assembly constituencies, a majority of the work force was engaged in trade and service occupations.

Social Composition of Traditional Cities

The social composition of traditional urban centres in British India and the gradual but periodical changes that occurred there always had far-reaching political implications. The social groups which first exchanged agricultural occupations and dependence on the rural economy for western education, the professions, trade, commerce and urban living were the Brahmans, the Vaisyas, the traditional money-lending Jains, and the northern Kayasthas who had manned the civil bureaucracy since the Mughal days. Many feudal and landed elements lived in cities but drew
financial support from their farms in rural areas. Artisans, other skilled and unskilled workers -- mostly lower Hindu castes and the Muslims -- were the other major social groups. The Brahmins in the cities of south India, Maharastra, the old Central Provinces, and Orissa, the Kayastas in Bengal, and the Banias and Brahmins in north India were the social and political elites (Subramaniam 1969b; Baker 1969): to these may be added the numerically small but economically quite enterprising and powerful Parsi community.

a) Role of elite castes

The earlier censuses from 1911 to 1931 threw a flood of light on the social composition of the traditional urban centres and they clearly indicate that by the 1920s a majority of the above mentioned elite castes already lived in such centres. Later, the adoption of western education and civil service jobs produced the last wave of the movement of these elite castes from rural areas to urban areas. So, by the late 1930s in most of the traditional urban centres in south, west and central India the above mentioned elite castes constituted a majority of the important occupational groups. The occupational and cultural tables of the census of 1931 provided irrefutable proof that the elite castes were in a majority among the professionals and workers in the secondary and tertiary sectors and quite excessively out of proportion to their numerical strength in the total population. Their literacy rates were high, a considerable proportion of them had English and they played a leading role in the freedom movement of the country. So they effectively combined in themselves higher ascriptive and achieved status and political influence. The immediate political consequences of all this was that the elite castes rose to power in urban community government (Bashiruddin Ahmed 1965; Maru 1965).

b) Changes in caste composition in towns

The numerical majority of the elite castes and their political predominance in urban areas were short lived for two principal reasons. Firstly, the anti-Brahmin movements launched in south and west India had an adverse effect on Brahmin influence. Secondly, the decades between 1941 and 1961 saw the first wave of migrants from rural areas seeking higher education, skilled and unskilled work and trade and commerce. Often these were the sons and daughters of parents with an agricultural background, usually from medium and lower caste groups. The protective
social legislation passed and implemented by the government, reserving government jobs and educational facilities at all levels for candidates of scheduled castes and tribes, facilitated their movement to urban areas. This gradually changed the majority of the elite castes into pluralities in urban areas. The immediate political consequence of this change in the social composition of traditional cities was the displacement of old elite castes from political power by the newly rising middle and agricultural castes. This development, however, was obvious earlier in south, west and east India where the traditional elite caste proportion of the population was only 2 to 6 per cent than in north India where the elite caste proportion of the population was as high as 35 per cent.

Election Studies in Urban Areas

Recent studies of urban elections in India provide valuable data about the role of personalized power structures and primordial groups in traditional cities. Religion and caste were important considerations in traditional towns in nominating candidates to local, state and federal elections (Venkatarangaiaya 1956). Local candidates were preferred to outsiders. In regions where religious minorities (Muslims, Christians) were particularly sparsely distributed, a majority were concentrated in urban areas and a majority usually voted for the Congress or a leftist party but certainly not for the Hindu-oriented parties (Sirsikar 1965a; Bashiruddin Ahmed 1965). This rule, however, did not hold good where they were territorially concentrated and numerous enough to elect significant numbers of their own candidates as in Kerala and Hyderabad city, and successfully press the government to protect their community interests (Navaneeth 1967).

Personal ambitions, group loyalties, status conflicts and caste divisions which were the major elements in the factional conflicts of the ruling party were a part of urban and particularly of traditional city politics. However, political party loyalties competed with considerable success with sectional caste and communal loyalties. Further, when traditional social groupings chose to operate within the framework of secular political parties because of political expediency or ethnic and economic compulsions, the existing loyalties and cleavages were radically politicized and in turn new loyalties and identifications were created on a secular basis (Kothari and Sheth 1965).

A number of impressionistic election studies in the states have
### TABLE II.6
Characteristics of Stable and Displaced Populations in India and Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total No. of persons in millions</th>
<th>Percentage living in urban areas</th>
<th>Percentage literate &amp; educated</th>
<th>Persons engaged in or dependent on agriculture</th>
<th>Persons engaged in or dependent on non-agricultural occupations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General population in India</td>
<td>34.95</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced persons from Pakistan to India</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General population in Pakistan</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced persons from India to Pakistan</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

suggested that initially the social base of the Jana Sangh was provided by the Brahmin, Bania castes and urban middle class trading communities who were strongly committed to traditional Hindu values (Weiner 1957:234; Maheshwari 1962; Gupta and Nevaneeth 1968; Singh 1971). In Maharasta, Andhra and Mysore whatever influence the Jana Sangh had was limited to urban areas and was probably derived from a section of the old elite castes.

a) Impact of refugee population

In the traditional cities of north India the above changes in social composition and political preferences were further complicated by a heavy in and out flow of refugees. The sheer enormity of the numbers of displaced persons, their socio-economic characteristics, and the pattern of their rehabilitation had far-reaching social and economic effects on the traditional cities of north India. Firstly, a vast majority of the persons who were forced to leave Pakistan in the wake of the partition of the Indian sub-continent had lost all their immovable and most of their movable properties and brought tragic memories of partition along with them. It can be observed from Table II.8 that when compared with the stationary population in each country, two or three times as many of those that moved across the borders now lived in urban areas, twice as many were literate and twice as many were engaged in trading, commercial or service occupations. Quantitative evidence from the censuses of India and Pakistan confirms that a majority of the people who migrated belonged to upper castes, and were economically better off. In fact, according to the Pakistan census of 1951, out of a total of 10 million Hindus who chose to stay in Pakistan (mostly in East Bengal), 56 per cent belonged to scheduled castes; the rest most probably belonged to the backward castes. The classic example of this was seen in the pattern of migration from Karachi to India. A comparison of the 1941 and 1951 populations of Karachi by caste shows that of 175,000 upper cast Hindus, 97.5 per cent had migrated to India while out of a total of 11,000 scheduled caste Hindus only 1.8 per cent had moved out (Census of Pakistan 1951, 1955:84).

As already indicated, the brunt of this dislocation was felt by the traditional cities of north India. The Census of India 1951 reveals that of 7.3 million people who moved from Pakistan to India, 4.3 millions settled down in north India, and of these nearly 2.5 millions streamed into the traditional urban areas. As against this only about 0.4 million
and 0.02 million refugees from Pakistan settled down (most of them in urban areas) in west and south India respectively. In other words the migrants that were received by the traditional cities of south and west India were essentially internal migrants in search of a living while in the north a considerable proportion were refugees from Pakistan or the children born to them.

b) Consequences of migration

Few studies have been made of the political consequences of migration to urban areas, or of the improved standards of living brought about by the economic development plans. Two studies of the traditional industrial city of Bombay indicated that the internal migrants were likely to work as power cliques and pressure groups within the ranks of trade unions and political parties that they patronised. Selig Harrison in his book, India: The Most Dangerous Decades, concluded that language and regional differences within the leadership of Indian political parties would ultimately lead to the disintegration of the country (Harrison 1960). Norman Palmer in his study of North Bombay parliamentary constituency, said that internal migrants preferred to vote for a candidate of their own language and region if an effective one was available (Palmer 1963; also see Hart 1960).

Myron Weiner, in his study of the distribution of refugees from Pakistan, internal migrants and the Congress vote among different wards of Calcutta, concluded that in three successive general elections (1952, 1957, 1962) the Congress vote was consistently low in areas where there were large concentrations of refugees and high where there were few refugees. Conversely, the Congress vote was higher in electorates with larger numbers of internal migrants and low in electorates with larger numbers of local residents. He found that among internal migrants to Calcutta there were lower expectations, more single member households, lower educational achievements, more inadequate accommodation, a determined struggle to improve one's own circumstances, and a higher degree of contact with the Congress organization in the places of their origin (mostly rural areas). Weiner concluded that since disaffection and frustration were higher among the more aspiring local residents and refugees from Pakistan than among the internal migrants, the former were more likely to vote against the Congress and for the Communist or Marxist left parties (Weiner 1967a:360-367). In other words, refugees from
Pakistan both in north and east India most probably voted against the Congress but in favour of the religious rightist parties in north India and the leftist parties in east India.

**Traditional Cities as Centres of Political Activity**

The comparative discomfiture suffered by the Congress in traditional cities can be examined from another angle. For a long time these cities were the nerve centres of the Indian freedom struggle and were the local community headquarters of the Congress. It was from these places that the Congress had reached out into rural areas and mobilised public support. The Congress always had an efficient organization and effective leadership in these cities. An analysis of the composition of the delegations of pre-independence annual Congress sessions revealed that these traditional cities were the main sources of Congress leaders.

This did not mean that other parties had no footing in traditional cities or that they were operating primarily from rural areas. In India the institutional arrangements of political parties have always tended to correspond with the administrative structure of the government. As most of the cities were the headquarters of districts, they served as the main centres of political activity for most of the political parties.

The growing numbers of industrial labourers provided a good base for the leftist parties. Thus the traditional cities in coastal Andhra, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and West Bengal have been for a long time the centres of Communist activity. The cities of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and UP were the centres of activity of the Hindu religious parties. But the political penetration of these non-Congress parties into different social groups was much more limited and often lopsided than that of the Congress which always maintained its pluralities. Further the Congress as a dominant party wielding power and with its interests spread out all over the country could ill afford to take up the cause of one region, religion, language or caste against another. On the other hand, some of the regionally based leftist parties and the religious rightist parties did so with considerable though temporary electoral success. The Jana Sangh for example pledged itself to the promotion of Bharatiya Sanskriti; it was vociferous in its criticism of religious and caste minorities, uncompromising in its stand on promoting Hindi as the national language, and pleaded for the protection and promotion of the interests of the business community (Upadhyaya 1963). In espousing the regional and language
causes of south and east India the Communists were second to none. It was no wonder that the variables of region and the percentage of migrants explained a significant proportion of the total variation in the votes of the major parties in traditional cities.

Though the Congress enjoyed the support of a cross-section of the society, it was always supported most strongly by the middle and rich peasants in the countryside and the high income professional groups and business sections. The reasons are fairly simple. The abolition of feudal land relations and later the abolition of the land revenue, the construction of irrigation projects and the incentives given to the development of agriculture by the Congress government benefited the cultivators directly. Compared to the hired agricultural labourers and rural artisans, cultivators are the wealthy sections of rural society and as already pointed out they have access to power both at local and state levels. In the urban areas the higher middle classes, including the business sections, benefited more than the working class from the policies of the Congress. These social sections had a stake in the government, and in its stability, but because of their high aspirations and political consciousness, they are much less satisfied with the Congress. On the other hand any change in the government that would result in drastic socio-economic measures would be highly to their disadvantage. So the Congress, the Swatantra Party or a religious rightist party is the choice of this section of the society.

Most of the election studies in India agree that the electoral support of the Congress is fairly evenly spread over different sections of the society but they do not agree on the sections of the society from which the Congress draws its highest support. It appears that the findings depend mostly on how the sample is drawn and the kind of aggregate data one is dealing with. A study in 1967 based on a nationwide sample (urban and rural) found that the Congress drew marginally higher support from groups with lower literacy, low income, low-caste status, and from religious minorities and old voters, than from others (Madsen 1970).

According to the report of the 1967 election survey prepared by Srinivasan and Subramaniam, within the traditional cities males, middle-aged persons, those who completed high school studies, religious minorities, and those with high socio-economic status voted slightly more strongly for the Congress than others. In the traditional cities
again the vote of the religious rightist parties was obtained mostly from the Hindus (Srinivasan and Subramaniam 1969b:11).

On the other hand an ecological analysis based on district data carried out by Morris-Jones and Gupta found that the areas of Congress support were those at the lower levels of development. Compared to the earlier elections the Congress lost more votes in 1967 in areas with high percentages of literacy, density of population, immigrants, hired attached labourers in agriculture, and low percentages of minorities and scheduled castes and tribes. At the same time when the districts were divided into four developmental blocks the share of the Congress vote was low in backward districts and high in developed districts (Morris-Jones and Gupta 1969). To help reduce this uncertainty, the survey analysis which will be discussed below aimed at investigating the structure of support for different political parties and the rationale of the support from different social sections for different parties.

Characteristics of Industrial Towns

Industrial towns are very different from traditional cities in their socio-economic and occupational composition. The population is wholly migrant, the workforce is dependent on a single industry, it is relatively multi-lingual, multi-regional in origins, mobile, better educated, and enterprising. The towns are well planned and living conditions are good, or at any rate better than in traditional cities. Primordial loyalties are now out of context and the institutions which catered to the migrants' need in rural areas or other places of origin are no longer available to them. In the work place, in the neighbourhood, in the market place and in the sports club they now have to live with a variety of people and seek new identifications, loyalties and associations. To protect their employment interests, depending on the level of their occupation, they have to join a trade union or a professional association or establish identity with a cultural group or association.

Studies by Paul Brass in Kanpur and by Wayne Wilcox in Indore showed that in industrial areas trade unions played a key role in selecting party candidates and rallying voters to parties of their choice. In general the labour unions organized by the Communists followed the advice of the party at the time of voting. The same thing
was not true with regard to the Congress-led unions. Election studies showed that the voting preferences of industrial labourers need not be similar in federal and state elections. Also, in industrial towns, a leftist political leader who constantly cultivated his constituency by being always accessible to the needy sections of the society, had every chance of securing the support of poorer and minority communities and also of drawing support away from other parties. The Congress drew its voting support both from the commercial and professional middle class and from industrial workers. But often there were rifts between the Congress labour union and the commercial and professional elites who supported the Congress in matters of organizing the party and candidate pre-selection. It resulted in the division of the Congress vote and the defeat of the Congress candidate. These two studies (Brass 1965b; Wilcox 1965) also indicated that the Communist vote came mainly from poorer and uneducated working communities while the Congress vote came from comparatively better-off sections.

The better performance of the Congress in industrial towns, despite tough competition from both rightist and leftist forces, was probably due to a variety of factors. Its success in building heavy industrial plants, earlier contacts of the migrants with the Congress organization in places of their origin, the creation of vast employment opportunities, an upward occupational and economic mobility, the swift establishment of its trade unions with wide membership and official recognition in all the industrial towns, might be mentioned as some of the most important factors.

It was observed that states such as Kerala, West Bengal, and Andhra in which Communists have been relatively powerful for a long time, had sent out large numbers of migrants to these industrial towns. Whether a large proportion of these migrants were Communist sympathizers who retained their old political preferences in new areas can be discovered only from the survey data.

Where the religious parties were strong it might be due to large concentrations of tradition-oriented high caste Hindus, or to the existence of social sections highly vulnerable to anti-Muslim propaganda. It is, however, reasonable to assume that owing to prolonged residence, common problems and goals, and the frictions developing for some decades between the traditional elite castes and the newly emerging castes, the solidarity of the traditional elite castes has been far higher in traditional cities than in industrial towns. On the basis of
## CHART II.1

**Profiles of Industrial Towns and Traditional Cities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Industrial Towns</th>
<th>Traditional Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Settlement pattern</strong></td>
<td>Recognised as urban in 1961 census</td>
<td>Old, urban for at least 50 to 60 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment pattern</strong></td>
<td>Mostly public sector, based on a single industry, mostly industrial workers</td>
<td>Mostly private sector, wide range of occupations, small proportion of industrial workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migration pattern</strong></td>
<td>Long distance, inter-regional, inter-lingual</td>
<td>Short distance, surrounding areas, same language, refugees from Pakistan (in east and north India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupational mobility opportunities</strong></td>
<td>Quite high, encouraged through reservation of jobs to scheduled castes and tribes</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Past political contacts</strong></td>
<td>Exposed to political influences in the places of origin</td>
<td>Exposed to only local party system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade union activity</strong></td>
<td>Quite high, most workers unionisable. Unions promoted by different parties</td>
<td>Low, few unionisable workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral choices available</strong></td>
<td>The Congress Party, most of the leftist parties, religious rightist parties</td>
<td>The Congress Party, parties popular in the region, non-party community leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sources of Congress support</strong></td>
<td>Cross-section white and blue collar workers; probably high salaried workers with past Congress contacts</td>
<td>West India, higher middle classes, religious, caste minorities, poor people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voting support for the Congress in IT, TC and AI</strong>*</td>
<td>Highest (47%)</td>
<td>Low (43%), not much lower than at all India level (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sources of Communist support</strong></td>
<td>East India, middle class leadership, low income, low literacy groups, industrial workers, migrants with previous Communist contacts</td>
<td>East India, South India, middle class leaders, rising caste groups, manual labourers, industrial workers, refugees from East Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communist voting support in IT, TC and AI</strong>*</td>
<td>Highest (23%)</td>
<td>Moderate (13%), higher than at national level (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sources of RR parties support</strong></td>
<td>North India, high income groups, low literacy groups</td>
<td>North India, tradition-minded caste Hindus, petty businessmen, refugees from Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voting support for RR parties in IT, TC and AI</strong>*</td>
<td>Lowest (6%), lower than at national level (7%)</td>
<td>Highest (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voting support for other leftist parties in IT, TC and AI</strong></td>
<td>Lowest (13%), also lower than in traditional cities (15%)</td>
<td>Moderate (15%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* IT stands for industrial towns, TC stands for traditional cities, and AI stands for All India
our aggregate analysis and the information from the existing literature we may draw a chart (CHART II.1) to help generate hypotheses.

HYPOTHESES

Migrants who have already absorbed some political information and ideas and developed certain political sympathies in the places of their origin are most likely to continue to hold the same opinions in the new areas.

If the above hypothesis is proved to be correct, the pattern of migration to industrial towns (in terms of region of origin, language and social composition) is most likely to influence the pattern of the birth and development of different trade unions and political parties.

Maintenance of constant contact with one's own native place is likely to result in continuation of past political attitudes, while complete severance of associations with one's native place may change political attitudes.

However, in a plural society with conflicting group interests, if a political party or a trade union associates itself very closely with a particular social or cultural group it is likely to be difficult for it to penetrate the rest of the society.

We also hypothesize that there would be at least a few individuals who try to resocialize the migrants in the new towns by stressing wider and non-traditional bonds of unity and common cultural, professional, or economic interests.

At the local level both in traditional cities and industrial towns upward socio-economic mobility is likely to muster support for centre (the Congress) or rightist political parties while a downward socio-economic mobility might result in support for leftist parties that advocate radical socio-economic reforms. It may be hypothesized that opportunities for such upward social mobility are likely to be higher in industrial towns than in traditional cities.

The electoral success of a political party in an industrial town is likely to be dependent on the amount of trade union work that the party puts in, while in traditional cities it is more likely to be dependent on successfully inducting into the party fold the community leaders (religious, caste or economic) who control the vote banks. On both these counts, the Congress (being a party in power) by distributing
favour to community leaders, and by organizing its own trade union -- often favoured, encouraged and recognised by the plant managements -- had an advantage over all the other parties.

It may be hypothesized that the higher level of Congress vote and its even distribution over different regional and social and economic groups in industrial towns were a token of appreciation of the economic and industrial development achieved by the Congress government. So it is most probable that the Congress has a wider social base than any other party. This may not, however, be true in traditional cities where social cleavages are acute and where the Congress is associated by choice or by force of circumstances with only some sections of the society.

Industrial towns in India represent areas of highly intensive economic activity and such places are usually noted for corruption, administrative inefficiency, and heavy financial losses. Migrants to these towns have a first hand knowledge of these failings. However, a higher and consistent preference by the migrants for the Congress suggests that the Congress rule on the whole is seen as more beneficial than detrimental to peoples' welfare.

The Communist Party secured its highest vote in industrial towns and most probably from the working class, but available information suggests that the Communist supporters are most likely to belong to specific regional and language groups among whom the party had already been popular in their areas of origin. In the industrial town we surveyed, we may hypothesize that a majority of the leftist supporters are migrants from east or south India.

A high proportion of the rightist vote (religious rightist vote and the vote secured by the Swatantra Party) both in traditional cities (79%) and industrial towns (72%) was secured by the religious rightist parties. It may be hypothesized that the sources of support of the religious rightist parties are the same social groups in both cities and towns. On the other hand, the support drawn by the Swatantra Party may be interpreted as a vote of disapproval of the concept of planning and governmental control in the economy. But our data indicate that we can expect only a small proportion of this kind of respondent.

Neither the aggregate analysis nor the existing literature on social mobility throws any light on a number of crucial aspects of the social life of the migrants.
Firstly, once a sufficiently large number of people from a non-local language group are present in an industrial town the formation of a cultural association of their own will naturally follow. We do not know the frequency and popularity of these groups, or whether some language groups are more active than others. We do not know the socio-economic background of their members nor whether these associations are exploited by trade unions and political parties to rally voting support.

Secondly, we do not know anything about the socio-economic background of the leaders of the trade unions, of contestants in the election or of political parties. It is logical to hypothesize that the socio-economic background of leaders in industrial towns would be different from that of the leaders in traditional cities. The methods of political integration of diverse social groups would also be different in industrial towns and traditional cities.

And finally, what is the political impact of these industrial towns on their surrounding areas? By bringing their former political sympathies the migrants may help some political parties in establishing new party branches in hitherto unpenetrated areas. But will this political process -- as more and more industrial towns are established -- expand and gradually change the regional political patterns, or will these migrant groups be assimilated into the regional party system? These are some of the hypotheses and questions which I will investigate in the following chapters.
In undertaking the aggregate analysis I am aware of the difficulties involved in interpreting ecological correlations. Under no circumstances can ecological correlations be substitutes for individual correlations and aggregate figures do not allow us complete freedom in making statements about the behaviour of particular groups of individuals. The ecological correlations in this chapter are interpreted cautiously to generate hypotheses bearing on the socio-economic and political situation in India. There is a vast amount of literature on this subject in Western countries. See W.S. Robinson, Ecological Correlations and the Behaviour of Individuals. American Sociological Review 15, 1950; Leo A. Goodman, Ecological Regressions and Behaviour of Individuals. American Sociological Review 18, 1953; Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Davis, An Alternative to Ecological Correlation. American Sociological Review 18, 1953; W. Phillips Shively, 'Ecological' Inference: The Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals. The American Political Science Review 63, 1969. For the problems involved in interpreting ecological correlations in the Indian situation, see W.H. Morris-Jones and Biplab Das Gupta, Fourth General Election in Madhya Pradesh. Economic and Political Weekly III, 1968.

The Census of India 1961 defined all urban units (town or towngroup) with 100,000 or more population as cities, and all those with less than 100,000 population as towns.

An analysis of the state assembly electorates as contained in the 1967 election report reveals that their size may vary from about 27,000 (Jammu and Kashmir) to about 100,000 (Uttar Pradesh). In 12 out of 16 major states in India the average size of the electorate was more than 60,000. In Madhya Pradesh in 1967 it was 62,144. With growing population in the country the average size of electorates has been significantly increasing since the first general election.

The traditional cities excluded from aggregate analysis were Hyderabad, Patna, Ahmedabad, Cochin, Indore, Jabalpur, Madras, Bombay, Poona, Nagpur, Bangalore, Amritsar, Kanpur, Lucknow, Jaipur, Calcutta and Delhi.

According to the polling-booth data supplied by the Election Commission, on average there were about 19,000 electors in each industrial town in 1962. There were 19,023 electors in the industrial town of Bhilai in 1962.

The information relating to per capita sales and income taxes paid and number of radios per thousand population was collected from Thompson's Consumer Index of Towns. Bombay: Thompson and Co. 1963.

The classification of towns by the economic function of the workforce was done by Ashok Mitra, former Registrar-General of India. I used the information from a typed copy supplied by him. All the demographic data were obtained from the
General Population Tables and Social and Cultural Tables of different states.

8. There is an increasing number of aggregate analyses employing regression techniques. Most of these studies were based on district demographic data and election statistics. For an excellent analysis and cautious interpretation of this kind see W.H. Morris-Jones and B. Das Gupta, India's Political Areas: Interim Report on an Ecological Electoral Investigation, Asian Survey IX, 1969. Also see Zagoria, The Ecology of Peasant Communism in India. The American Political Science Review LXV, 1971. There were however no studies of urban areas on the same lines. For a state-wide analysis based on assembly constituency data see K.G. Krishna Murthy and G. Lakshmana Rao, Political Preferences in Kerala. New Delhi: Radhakrishna Prakashan 1968.

9. I classified the Jana Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Rama Rajya Parished as religious rightist parties. Among these the Jana Sangh contested the largest number of traditional city constituencies and obtained most of the votes secured by this group of parties. The Muslim League can be rightly classified as a religious rightist party but it did not contest any traditional city constituency in 1962.

10. I classified parties such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, the Akalidal, the Republican Party of India, the Peasants and Workers Party as regional parties.


12. The aggregate analysis of Tamil Nadu based on assembly constituency demographic data, election statistics and socio-economic background data of the DMK and the Congress nomination seekers is in progress. The analysis is being jointly done by V. Subramaniam and G. Lakshmana Rao. The preliminary computer runs confirm findings of the Kerala study.

13. The Swatantra Party secured one-fifth of the votes in Bihar in 1962, but could secure only about 2 per cent of the votes in 1967 after the Raja of Ramagarh and his followers defected from the party.

14. The degrees of freedom required for the estimation of the level of significance vary between 46 and 105 according to the party being considered, as the parties did not contest the same number of seats. However, this makes little difference with these data. The F statistics for all of the variables included met
the requirements of the ten per cent level of significance by a considerable margin.

15. Here again the results of the regression analysis based on aggregate data have to be treated with caution. Regression analyses based on aggregate data in general accounted for a higher proportion of variation in voting or party support than regression analyses based on survey data. The investigations carried out by Morris-Jones and Gupta, 1969; Zagoria, 1971; our present regression analysis in comparison to the investigation carried out by Madsen, 1970; and our own regression equations based on survey data contained in the fourth and fifth chapters prove this point beyond doubt.

16. For an excellent account of the demographic and social characteristics of cities of different regions in India see Qazi Ahmed, Indian Cities: Characteristics and Correlates. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965.

17. According to the 1961 census, 104 out of a total of 113 cities in India were either district or state capitals. The remainder were mostly trade, commercial or port cities.

18. The report of the Census of India 1911 reveals that six out of seven Parsees, one in three Jains, and one in five Christians were already urban residents. In comparison to these figures one in eight Muslims, one in eleven Hindus and ten per cent of the whole population were urban residents. The report also noted that among the Hindus, traditional elite castes had shown a greater predilection for moving to towns, and that the growth of new industries in towns was attracting an increasing number of low-caste migrants (Census of India 1911, 1913).

19. For an elaboration of this point see G. Lakshmana Rao, Caste and Class as Research Categories in India, a paper delivered at the 12th annual conference, Australian Political Studies Association, Canberra 1970.

20. The figures mentioned in this section are recomputations of data derived from Paper No. 4, Displaced Persons -- 1951 Census. See especially the introductory part of this paper.

21. The figures for Pakistan mentioned in this section are recomputations of data obtained from Census of Pakistan, 1951, Volume I: Pakistan: Report and Tables. Karachi: The Manager of Publications, Government of Pakistan. See especially pages 84, and 4 - 2 to 4 - 20, 19 - 5, 19 - 6, and 19 - 7.
MAP III.1

MAP OF MADHYA PRADESH
SHOWING ASSEMBLY CONSTITUENCIES 1967

BHILAI
RAIPUR
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

Selecting Towns for Survey

The 22 new industrial towns included in the aggregate analysis were located in 10 different states, eight different language-speaking areas and as far apart as 2,000 miles from north to south and east to west. The survey was intended to be only a case study but it was intended that the industrial town to be surveyed should be as representative as possible and that the traditional city to be surveyed for comparative purposes should be within a manageable distance but far enough away not to be influenced by the new town.

As many as 12 of the 22 new industrial towns are situated in east India, and of these 12, seven are dependent on heavy industries, two each on mining and medium scale industries. Hence it was considered best to select an industrial town based on heavy industry from this region. After a process of elimination the initial choice fell on Durgapur, a British-built steel town and Burdwan, a traditional city, both in the district of Burdwan, West Bengal. However, owing to the prevailing political situation and labour and student unrest, survey work was not found feasible in Durgapur. Ultimately the choice fell on Bhilai, a Russian-built steel plant town located in east Madhya Pradesh about 200 miles east of Nagpur. Bhilai is a heavy industry town and is located close to the industrial belt of east India. The population of Bhilai is known to have migrated from all parts of the country, and is highly cosmopolitan; it provides a good locale for a case study on trends in social mobility and political change. Lastly, the political situation in Madhya Pradesh was quiet. Once Bhilai was selected the nearby traditional city of Raipur was automatically selected.

Differences Between Bhilai and Raipur

Even to a casual observer Bhilai and Raipur present striking differences. By western standards Bhilai is a well planned, orderly and attractive town with modern houses, reticulated drinking water, underground drainage, paved roads at right angles, schools, parks, shops, playgrounds, and entertainment centres. Most houses have well tended lawns, flower patches and kitchen gardens surrounded by green hedges --
Note: Figures in the present and subsequent charts mentioned in the bars are percentages. Unless otherwise mentioned legend is common for both sides.
all symbols of private efforts and energies deplorably absent elsewhere in India. The residential quarters of manual and semi-skilled labourers were much less impressive though much better than the housing facilities available for labourers elsewhere.

On the other hand Raipur is an old city with narrow roads, open drains, dusty lanes, and closely packed houses of different descriptions and in bad repair. Roads and lanes are a jig-saw puzzle, and houses are irregularly numbered. The town has more than a dozen small man-made lakes -- almost every one of them thick with a layer of fungus floating on the surface. The great majority of the work force depends on trade and commerce in the city and agriculture in the surrounding fields. The industrial pursuits in the town are limited to one textile mill, a few rice and oil mills, and automobile repair shops. A majority of the rich traders, merchants and landlords are concentrated in the centre of the city, while most of the poorer sections live on the outskirts. Statistics produced by the state government show that the region is backward with high morbidity rates and low income and literacy levels.

**Socio-Economic Characteristics of Respondents in Bhilai**

The socio-economic characteristics of the respondents interviewed in Bhilai (see note on Sampling, Appendix V) indicated change, high educational and income levels, and a high proportion of employment in skilled and semi-skilled jobs, over-representation of religious minorities and among the Hindus over-representation of the Brahmin caste group.

The distribution of religions showed four times the national proportion of Christians and a far lower than average representation of Muslims (Diagram III.1). As only a few government employees are likely to have been compulsorily transferred to this town, while the vast majority of the inhabitants would be voluntary migrants, the distribution suggests differential levels of enterprise among the sects, and perhaps also as between regions, since most of the Christians came from Kerala in south India, and most of the Sikhs from the Punjab.

Among the Hindus in Bhilai, the Brahmins were over-represented as they are in traditional cities compared to the country as a whole (Diagram III.1). However, the proportion of Vaisyas in excess of the national average was far lower than in Raipur, the difference being made up by the caste Hindus. Three factors could have contributed to this
Note: Figures mentioned in the bars are percentages. Unless otherwise mentioned legend is common for both sides.
DIAGRAM III.3

OCCUPATIONAL AND INCOME BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS

Note: Figures mentioned in the bars are percentages. Unless otherwise mentioned legend is common for both sides.
Read occupational categories as:

Administrators 0
Professionals, Engineers 1
Businessmen 2
Lower Civil Servants 3
Skilled Workers 4
Semi-Skilled Workers 5
Cultivators 6
Manual Labourers 7
Others 8
difference:

Vaisyas are reluctant to take employment except in trade and commerce -- occupations of lower numerical importance in an industrial city; and/or

As the shopping centres in Bhilai, unlike those in traditional towns, catered primarily for the local residents only, they provided relatively limited business opportunities; and/or

A major part of the wholesale and retail trade was handled by consumer co-operative stores owned and operated by the employees themselves.

Educational levels were much higher in Bhilai than in Raipur. Up to 85 per cent of the respondents had been to school; about half of them had completed high school studies; and about 14 per cent had secured a technical diploma, degree, or postgraduate degree. More than half of the respondents also reported some on-the-job training (Diagram III.2).

Correspondingly, the proportions employed in engineering, skilled and semi-skilled occupations were relatively high, and those in clerical (16%) and manual (18%) work relatively low (Diagram III.3). There were three main differences in occupation structure between Bhilai and Raipur. In Bhilai all the respondents except for the 2 per cent engaged in private business were employed by the government; in Raipur a majority were self-employed or wage-workers in the private sector. A large majority of the workers in Bhilai were in technical and skilled occupations, whereas in Raipur the occupations were distributed over a wide range and a relative majority of respondents were employed in business and lower civil service jobs. A majority of the Bhilai respondents were specially trained for their jobs, but this did not apply to Raipur.

Compared to Raipur, present income disparities were low in Bhilai. Of the 621 respondents only two (0.3%) secured less than one hundred rupees a month. In relation to about nine in ten respondents the differences between the highest and lowest salaries was only five times (Diagram III.3). Of the 14 per cent of respondents who secured more than 500 rupees a month, only 3 per cent secured 1,000 to 1,800 rupees a month. As respondents in Bhilai were mostly salaried workers, their income returns were more accurate and reliable than the income statements of the respondents in Raipur who were mostly engaged in business or irregular self-employment.

In relation to other socio-economic characteristics the differ-
TABLE III.1
Type of Native Place, Education, Occupation and Monthly Income of Different Caste Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of native place</th>
<th>Bhilai</th>
<th>Raipur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Castes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>norm</td>
<td>group</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N-503)</td>
<td>(N-144)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vaisya</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N-299)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hindu</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N-60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>castes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>76</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Bhilai</th>
<th>Raipur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrators,</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professionals</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower civil</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than Rs100</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs101 to 300</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs301 to 500</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs500 +</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures mentioned in the table are percentages. In each set of characteristics they add to one hundred vertically.

* In each section of the Table the first figure is for Bhilai and the second figure in parenthesis is for Raipur.
ences between the respondents in Bhilai and Raipur were minimal. In general Bhilai families were small in size, in nine out of ten families the housewife was the only dependant, about six in ten families had one to four children, and about nine in ten respondents were either young or middle-aged (DIAGRAMS III.1 and III.2).

**Associations Between Caste, Occupation and Income**

There was a fairly high positive association between caste, literacy, occupation, income and type of residence in both Bhilai and Raipur, the differences being only of degree. The pattern observed in Bhilai particularly is indicative of the changes that are occurring in industrial areas. It may be observed from Table III.1 that a higher than average percentage (sample norm in Bhilai) of caste Hindus and persons belonging to the scheduled castes migrated from rural areas to Bhilai. About an average percentage of caste Hindus and twice the average percentage of respondents belonging to the scheduled castes, had not been to school. In Bhilai a higher than average percentage of respondents belonging to the traditional elite castes depended on the civil services, professions, and business. At the same time about an average percentage of the caste-Hindus and a two to three times higher than average percentage of scheduled-caste respondents depended on skilled and manual occupations. Here is an indication that despite the large scale movement of medium and lower sections of the Hindus from rural to industrial towns the predominance of traditional elite castes (particularly of Brahmins) in high status occupations continues. It is, however, possible that after a few generations of urban residence caste-Hindu and scheduled-caste persons who are now mostly employed in skilled and manual occupations will successfully compete with the traditional elite castes. Finally, income levels were far higher in Bhilai than in Raipur. At the same time an absolute majority of the respondents of traditional elite castes were either in middle or high income groups while a majority of the scheduled castes respondents were either in low or middle income groups both in Bhilai and Raipur.

**MIGRATION PATTERNS**

**Existing Literature**

The characteristics of the migrants to Indian cities and towns, as deduced from the existing studies, can be summarized as follows (Zachariah 1959, 1964, 1968). Migrants to Indian cities were predomi-
antly males (unmarried) and this predominance of males was higher among short distance migrants to small towns than among long distance migrants to big cities. In fact a majority of the migrants to big cities were long distance migrants. Just as observed in other countries, young adults were over-represented and the old were under-represented among the migrants. Migrants to large cities usually had higher average educational attainments than the population of the localities of their origin, but lower than those of the population of their destination. A majority of the migrants were engaged in the manufacturing and service industries. About one-fourth of all migration to urban areas was temporary.

It was noted in the first chapter that rural to urban migration was always higher than urban to urban migration. Migration from within the district and state to the city was always higher than from outside. Migration within the state and language area was always higher than across state and language boundaries. Inter-state and inter-linguistic migration was always higher to industrial towns than to traditional cities (Gupta and Sadasyak 1968:80-81; Mohsin 1964:30; B.R. Mistra 1959:26, 27). A relative majority of those who moved to urban areas were pushed out of rural areas because of unemployment at home, meagre income, and insufficient land to cultivate, and much fewer though significant numbers were pulled into the cities because of the help and assistance provided by their friends and relatives in securing employment for the migrants (Majumdar 1960:72, 73; Malhotra 1964:186-189; Balakrishna 1961:112-114).

Implications of Migration Patterns

From our point of view the implications of the above findings are two. Migrants to most of the traditional cities come mainly from the surrounding areas and share the local language and local culture. Hence they may be expected to have similar political attitudes to those of the non-migrant urban residents and be unlikely to introduce any new political ideas. At the same time, large-scale migration, upsetting the existing religious, caste, and income distribution patterns, may help to bring about a change in the local power structure. On the other hand, a considerable number of migrants to industrial towns are likely to come from far-off areas, and have higher educational attainments and technical training compared to those in the region to which they are migrating. Culturally they are different, economically and politically they are probably more
differentiated than locals.

Looked at from the above point of view, employment opportunities in Bhilai were certainly greater than in the metropolitan cities. All the respondents, of course, were migrants. About two in three migrated from rural areas. Of a total of 210 who migrated from urban areas to Bhilai, about two in three came from towns with more than 50,000 population. Less than a fifth of all the respondents came from the local state, less than half (47%) spoke the local language (Hindi) and three in four had moved from a distance of more than 600 kilometres. More than half (51%) had lived in at least one place besides Bhilai and their native place (Diagram III.2).

Factors Facilitating Inter-State Movement

Several factors favoured this high rate of inter-state movement of population to Bhilai. The steel plant at Bhilai, like all the other public sector steel plants, was financed and established by the Union Government. As it sought to eradicate regional imbalances by wide dispersal of the big industries, it gave preferential treatment to the local qualified unemployed people in matters of recruitment, but it could not impose any restriction on inter-state migrants. At the time the steel town was established in Bhilai there was not a single technical school or college worth mentioning in the Chhattisgarh region of Madhya Pradesh. So the big demand for technically trained personnel and skilled workers left no other option for the management in the matter of recruitment.

Once a few qualified and enterprising persons came in and secured employment, this encouraged the migration of their friends and relatives. For more than three in ten respondents in Bhilai, the first job contact was provided by friends or relatives. South Indian states in general have a tradition of sending out large numbers of migrants wherever job opportunities are available. In addition to this the steel plant needed skilled and trained workers on the operations side when it commenced production. Such specialised workers could be supplied only by traditional industrial centres such as West Bengal, Bihar, and Maharashtra. Indeed these states supplied large numbers of migrants to Bhilai. Consequently, the barriers of language, distance, and type of residence which were so effective in limiting the immigration opportunities for outsiders in the case of traditional cities proved to be ineffective in the case of Bhilai. For example the states of Rajasthan, Orissa and
Gujarat which have common borders with Madhya Pradesh, supplied fewer than 2 per cent each of the migrants to Bhilai, while the state of Kerala in the far south accounted for 15 per cent of the migrants, Punjab in the north-west accounted for 9 per cent, and West Bengal in the east accounted for nearly 8 per cent.

Implications of Location of Industries

In a country like India, the location of big industrial projects has two far-reaching implications. Firstly, it has always been (and remains) the backward regions that have clamoured for the location of big steel factories, oil refineries and shipbuilding yards in their states, to increase employment opportunities for local people. The government yielded on many occasions to these pressures (Weiner 1962:205; Gadgil 1961:XIV; Rosen 1966:152,153). It often declared that it would pursue a policy of reducing regional imbalances and made the future location of any big industrial project a political decision rather than a technical one (Roth 1970). On the other hand, backward regions have neither trained personnel nor individual initiative and enterprise to realise the full benefit of location of such big projects. The local people are usually employed on the lowest rungs of the occupational ladder. This leaves the field relatively open to inter-state migrants, who serve as islands of multi-cultural life, fertile soil for new political ideas.

For example, our survey data revealed that more than a third of the respondents in Bhilai moved from the states (Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and West Bengal) in which the Communists had been traditionally influential, about a fifth moved from the states of Tamil Nadu, Orissa, and Punjab in which the regional parties had been elected in 1967 to lead the governments, and about four in ten came from the states of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Rajasthan, in which the Jana Sangh has been fast expanding its influence. Our data on inter-generational and career mobility also clearly bear out this fact.

Characteristics of Migrants to Raipur

In line with the findings of the earlier studies the factors of language and distance appeared to be closely related to the pattern of migration to Raipur. More than half of the migrants were intra-state movers mostly from the surrounding rural areas (Diagram III.2). Inter-state migration was far higher from the close-by regions in the neighbour-
ing states of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh than from far off states. About three in four migrants spoke the language of the region -- Chattisgarhi dialect of Hindi. The principal reasons for migration to Raipur appear to be transfer of government employees and the increasing significance of the city as a commercial and educational centre.

Inter-state migration to Raipur was inhibited by a number of factors. Government jobs were almost solely reserved for the Hindi-speaking people. Local people were given preference in the admission of students to educational and professional institutions. The scope for secondary industry and employment opportunities for technically trained graduates were limited. Finally, it would have been difficult for a newcomer to launch a business enterprise without any roots in the local society. Of all the migrants to Raipur, refugees from West Pakistan were the only people who successfully established themselves, mostly as petty retail traders.

**Associations with Native Place**

Migrants in general in India have a tendency to maintain close associations with their native places. In Bhilai this was particularly facilitated by an annual government travelling allowance for the migrant and his family to visit the native place. Consequently about nine in ten paid regular visits to their native place, about two in three retained some property interests there, about eight in ten regularly wrote letters to their friends and relatives, and two in three sent money home at least occasionally. The degree of association with one's own native place was far higher in Bhilai than in Raipur. Further, continued interest in one's own native place in the form of discussions with friends, and subscriptions to native newspapers, was almost nil among the migrants in Raipur while it was almost universal among the migrants in Bhilai.

**INTER-GENERATIONAL MOBILITY**

**Existing Literature**

Studies of social mobility in India are few but they agree on some important patterns (Sovani 1956; Nijhavan 1969). Firstly, about three fourths of the workforce in India remain in the occupational grades of their fathers. Of the others a majority move into higher occupational grades. The movement occurs primarily from agricultural to non-agricul-
tural occupations. Those who move out from agricultural occupations usually move into unskilled, skilled, and lower civil service jobs. This indirectly suggests that persons of agricultural origin require two or three generations of consistent upward movement to reach topmost (professional) occupational grades. In this process variables such as caste-status, level of education, and monthly income are significantly positively associated with occupational mobility rates. These studies also suggest in an indirect way that the process of urbanization is gradual, and that in the initial stages most of the rural to urban migrants retain their links with their native places.

In an article based on the date drawn from his Poona study, Sovani concluded that about 43 per cent of the heads of households remained in the occupational grades of their own fathers, and of those who moved, seven in ten moved up and three in ten moved down (Sovani 1966:97,98). Going back another generation, about eight in ten fathers (of respondents) remained in the same occupational grades as the grandfathers (of respondents). Again, among those fathers who moved, eight in ten moved up and the rest moved down. Sovani also found that in general those who moved up from low grades spanned a larger social distance than those who moved up from intermediate or high occupational grades -- probably because the occupational system was wider and expanding in the middle ranges. For the same reason those who moved down from high occupational grades slid a larger social distance than those who moved down from low occupational grades. Summing up his arguments, Sovani concluded that 'urbanization would seem to bring about the transformation of unskilled manual workers into other types of skilled, highly skiller workers etc., even in centres like Poona, where the process of urbanization is not based on industrial development' (Sovani 1966:105).

Another study in the city of Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu, found that agriculture was the occupation of half of the grandfathers and of about a third of the fathers of the respondents (Bopegamage and Veeraraghavan 1967:128).

A recent study (Nijhavan 1969) based on a nationwide sample drawn from adult male voters (both rural and urban) confirmed in general the conclusions of Sovani. According to this study, inter-generational occupational mobility was higher from non-agricultural than from agricultural occupations. Of a total of 1593 respondents, compared with their fathers, about two thirds were immobile, about a fifth moved up
and about a seventh moved down. Significantly, owner-cultivators constituted the largest category among both fathers (54%) and sons (46%), and immobility between fathers and sons was the highest (78%) in this group. Yet of a total of 295 who moved up from all occupational grades, the sons of owner-cultivators constituted about 43 per cent. Inter-generational outward and upward movement of owner-cultivators occurred into a whole range of occupations; a fifth each moved into unskilled, skilled and business occupations, a quarter moved into white collar jobs, and about a sixth moved up into professions. The same pattern, with a difference in degree, was also obvious in relation to agricultural labourers. Another analysis of data from the same survey indicated that caste status, level of education and monthly income were significantly and positively associated with inter-generational occupational mobility (Nijhavan 1971).

In an agricultural country like India which is being industrialised though slowly, the above patterns are to be expected. Our data in general confirmed some of the above findings but there are sufficient reasons to assume that occupational mobility patterns in Bhilai would be different in several ways. Firstly, all our respondents in Bhilai were migrants, and a majority of them moved from rural areas. So one might expect that movement from agricultural to non-agricultural occupations was logical and inevitable in Bhilai. Secondly, most of the jobs in Bhilai are skilled, highly skilled and in engineering. So one could expect that those who moved from rural areas and agricultural occupations into Bhilai took over manual, semi-skilled, skilled and lower civil service jobs. Further, the occupational structure in Bhilai expanded considerably at all levels over a period of ten years. A great majority of the posts at the senior level were filled by internal promotion on the basis of experience. So unlike the situation elsewhere in India, the occupational range in new industrial towns, if the situation in Bhilai is any guide, is fairly open at the intermediate and top levels also. One can expect that there will be a high degree of both inter- and intra-generational mobility in Bhilai. Here we first analyse the patterns of movement into urban areas; we proceed to investigate the patterns of occupational mobility and then compare the situation in Bhilai with that in Raipur.

**Inter-Generational Movement to Urban Areas**

Our data in general confirmed the findings of earlier studies that urbanization is a gradual process over several generations, that a
vast majority of the migrants to urban areas prefer to stay there despite their active contacts with their former native places, and the net gain of migrants from rural areas is far higher in the case of industrial towns than of traditional cities. In Bailal both grandfathers and fathers of two in three respondents lived in rural areas, and those of a fifth lived in urban areas. In the case of about a tenth of the respondents their grandfathers lived in rural areas but fathers moved to urban areas. In other words about 77 per cent of the grandfathers and 65 per cent of the fathers lived in rural areas while all the respondents were working and living in Bailal at the time of the survey.

The real significance of the figures comes out only when we investigate the close association between residence, caste, education, occupation and income. While a close association between these variables has been generally recognised the monotonous regularity with which the patterns were repeated by our analysis is highly significant.

a) Parental residence and literacy

The level of literacy was very low among rural resident grandfathers and fathers and fairly high among urban residents. Among the grandfathers about a tenth of the rural residents and about half of the urban residents attended school, and among fathers four in ten rural residents and eight in ten urban residents attended school. These rural-urban differentials in literacy are not unexpected but the consistency with which they persisted among our respondents' generation is highly significant. About eight in ten respondents from a rural native place and nine in ten respondents from an urban native place had been to school. Further, the proportion of those who completed high school was always higher among those from an urban native place than among those from a rural native place.

b) Parental residence and occupation

Rural residence in the case of both grandfathers and fathers meant engaging in owner cultivation. Of a total of 480 rural resident grandfathers, 331 were owner cultivators. When the respondents were asked whether they would regard their grandfathers as 'rich', 'middle', or 'poor' seven in ten of these were named as 'rich' or 'middle', and three in ten were classified as 'poor'. The situation was similar in father's generation. Such a classification was, of course, highly subjective. What was regarded as 'rich' or 'middle' during grandfathers' and fathers' generation need not (in all probability did not) have the same connotation in respondents' time. Also the assessment of economic status as 'rich' or 'middle' by one respondent need not be identical with the assessment of another respondent. I, however, used this information for what it is worth to draw a line between the economically better off ('rich' and 'middle') and the economically worse off ('poor' cultivators and landless labourers) rural residents.

If the above division is a reasonable assumption it is not the sons and daughters of landless labourers and 'poor' cultivators but mostly the sons and daughters of 'rich' and 'middle' cultivators that migrate to new industrial towns in large numbers. A majority of the migrants from rural areas whose parents were not cultivators or landless labourers came from families of school teachers and petty government officials.
The above close association between type of residence, education and occupation of grandfathers and fathers appeared to have influenced the present occupational placement of the respondents. About eight in ten whose grandfathers and fathers were urban residents were presently engaged in civil services, professions, business or skilled work while seven in ten whose grandfathers and fathers were rural residents were presently engaged in semi-skilled or manual jobs.

c) Implications of differential movement patterns

The implications of the above differential movement patterns are obvious. The irregularly hired rural landless labourers who migrate to urban areas may be better off in the towns if they get regular work and a monthly salary, however small it may be. A large-scale migration of landless labourers from particular geographical regions to urban centres may also have far-reaching political consequences. For example, landless labourers in the states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and West Bengal have been the consistent supporters of the Communists, the DMK and the non-Communist left parties. In the north the strength of the SSP is said to be derived from social sections which combine low caste status, low level occupations, and low income. A large scale migration of these sections would certainly benefit the leftist parties to some extent. But in both Bhillai and Raipur their numbers were few. In addition, while most of the landless labourers in Raipur came from the surrounding areas, those in Bhillai came from other states such as Andhra Pradesh and Orissa.

The large-scale migration of the sons of 'rich' and 'middle' cultivators is not surprising. Traditionally the 'rich' and 'middle' cultivators enjoyed a relatively higher standard of living than 'poor' cultivators and landless labourers. Though a majority of them return themselves as cultivators for census purposes, they merely supervise agricultural operations and never soil their hands. Our data on the educational achievements of different communities clearly suggest that over generations these owner cultivators have fast improved their educational qualifications and professional training and prepared themselves to take up urban occupations and move over to the towns. It is already noted that these communities of 'rich' and 'middle' cultivators have appropriated for themselves political power and also the employment opportunities and the economic benefits that flow from it. No wonder that the sons of the cultivators are encouraged to move into the cities.

But here again there was a difference in the kinds of cultivators' sons migrating to Bhillai and Raipur. In the case of Bhillai it was the sons of the politically rising cultivator communities of the south that migrated and were more likely to contribute to new political ideas. In Raipur it was mostly cultivators from the surrounding areas who moved in. Further, the cultivators' sons migrating to Bhillai entered a relatively open employment market with opportunities (through on-the-job training, promotion by experience, etc.) for better jobs and higher incomes. We will see in the later chapters whether these are likely to become politically more moderate than the corresponding group in Raipur, who entered low and middle range occupations with only remote chances of improving their lot.

Inter-Generational Occupational Mobility

The classification and regrouping of occupations is a difficult task in the Indian situation. In a country where more than eight in ten of the workforce live in rural areas and depend on agricultural and allied activities,
INTERGENERATIONAL VARIATIONS IN EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS

Bhilai
- G.F.F. NO SCHOOLING: 24%
- G.F. F. SCHOoled: 64%
- G.F.F. SCHOoled: 15%
- TOTAL: 35%

Raiipur
- G.F.F. NO SCHOOLING: 42%
- G.F. F. SCHOoled: 56%
- G.F.F. SCHOoled: 5%
- TOTAL: 21%

INTERGENERATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY ACROSS DIVISION BOUNDARIES

Bhilai
- G.F.F. Division A: 25%
- G.F.F. Division B: 75%
- TOTAL: 45%

Raiipur
- G.F.F. Division A: 93%
- G.F.F. Division B: 7%
- TOTAL: 100%
Note: Figures in the parenthesis are total numbers

G.F. stands for grandfather and F. stands for father.

* In this category in Raipur there were seven respondents whose grandfather was schooled but not father.

** Cases in which the occupation of grandfather or father was unemployed were excluded from the diagram.
and where social hierarchy is determined by ritual status and ownership of land, Western class concepts are obviously inapplicable. Even in urban areas where occupational and living patterns are considerably diversified there is much incongruity between ritual status, social prestige, administrative hierarchical order, and income level of different occupations. There is no uniform way of ranking or regrouping occupations into major divisions suitable to all studies and acceptable to all research scholars. A perusal of the socio-economic and social mobility studies makes two things obvious. Firstly, some occupations which are represented prominently in some studies do not figure at all or are represented very poorly in others (Dutta 1969; Reddy 1969; Lok Sabha Secretariat 1957, 1962, 1967). Secondly, many studies did not attempt to rank occupations or to regroup them into major divisions for assessing mobility rates (Mohsin 1964; Majumdar 1960; Balakrishna 1961). These studies sidestepped this difficult task by classifying respondents in terms of the industry to which they were attached rather than assigning them to the precise occupation in which they were engaged. Subramaniam in his studies of India's administrators and India's managerial class attempted to rank occupations and combined civil servants, business owners, business executives, business employees, university and school teachers, doctors, half of all lawyers, half of those engaged in other learned occupations, and half of all cultivators and designated them as 'upper middle class', the argument being that about half of all lawyers, others in learned professions, and cultivators would be poor and so they have to be excluded from 'upper middle class' (Subramaniam 1970, 1971). A recent study on social mobility based on data derived from a cross-sectional election survey in 1967 regrouped all occupations into five non-agricultural and three agricultural 'classes' (Nijhavan 1969).

If one is primarily interested in inter-generational mobility of a changing society one can assess the movement from agricultural to non-agricultural occupations. But this will not be of much help when we are dealing with urban populations like those in Khilai and Raipur and when our primary interest is in intra-generational mobility. Our problem in Khilai however, is considerably simplified by the administrative hierarchy in which the respondents were placed. But here again there were some inconsistencies. For example, lower civil servants occupy higher positions in the administrative hierarchy but draw consistently lower salaries than skilled employees who work on the operational side. The situation was slightly different in Raipur. Here most of the respondents were self-employed or were employed by private firms. Employment hierarchical order was less clear here. I first classified occupations into nine groups keeping in view mainly administrative hierarchy, economic status, and life style of the respondent. In ranking these groups I placed high level administrators and decision makers at the top and manual labourers at the bottom. The ranking of some groups had to be, however, arbitrary. Except for some ambiguity regarding the ranking of skilled workers and lower civil servants this classification seemed to have worked well.

A quick glance at the inter-generational and intra-generational occupational mobility tables (TABLES A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6 and III.2) clearly indicates that occupational mobility over the generations and also within the respondent's career was mainly from cultivation, manual labour, and semi-skilled work to higher level occupations. So for assessing mobility on the occupational scale I again divided the above nine occupational groups into two major occupational divisions and designated them as division A, and division B. A majority of those in division A (civil servants, professionals, businessmen and skilled workers) correspond to those who are described as middle class and a majority
of those in division B (semi-skilled workers, cultivators, labourers and others) correspond to those who are described as working class in the West. I did not however use these terms because the concept of class does not fit well in the Indian situation.

When grandfathers, fathers and respondents were classified into two divisions A and B it was found that about three in four respondents whose grandfathers and fathers had division A occupations continued to be in the same division. And similarly, seven in ten respondents whose grandfathers and fathers had semi-skilled, agricultural or manual occupations continued to be in the same occupations (division B). In the case of about a fifth of the respondents, their grandfathers were mostly in division B and fathers and particularly themselves had division A occupations (Diagram III.4). In such a broad classification it should be remembered that there was considerable mobility within the boundaries of each division and that those who left the lower division usually moved into the lower groups of the higher division. As expected most of the movement was from the occupation of cultivation into a whole range of urban occupations.

Inter-generational Variations in Educational Achievements

The educational achievements of the respondents in Bhilai were closely associated with the educational achievements of their grandfathers and fathers. Of a total of 285 respondents whose grandfathers and fathers had not been to school three in ten themselves were unschooled, about five in ten had some schooling and about two in ten had completed high school studies. On the other hand, out of a total of 127 respondents whose grandfathers and fathers had been to school, fewer than one per cent had not been to school, about a seventh had some schooling, and as many as eight in ten had completed high school studies (Diagram III.4). With a difference of degree the same pattern could be observed in Raipur.

Situation in Raipur

The inter-generational mobility patterns in Raipur differ from those in Bhilai in a number of ways. In Raipur only a relative majority (41%) of the respondents were first-generation migrants from rural areas while in Bhilai they were in an absolute majority (65%). Migration from rural areas to Raipur was gradual while to Bhilai it was to be sudden and was achieved most probably within the past two or three generations. Type of residence of grandfathers and fathers was closely associated with education, occupation, and income of respondents in both Raipur and Bhilai but more so in the latter than in the former.

RESPONDENTS' CAREER MOBILITY

Occupational Mobility

Considered broadly the career mobility of the respondents across division boundaries was only marginally different in Bhilai from that in Raipur. Of a total of 621 respondents in Bhilai, 247 (40%) mentioned a division A occupation as their first job, and of these about eight in ten (85%) remained in the same division and the rest (15%) moved down into division B occupations. Of the 374 respondents who mentioned a division B occupation as their first job about eight in ten (81%) remained in the same division.9 The above classification does not, however, take into account intra-division movement, the prestige
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Lower civil servants</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>73</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>99</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Others</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>567</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Occupational categories at top (present occupation) should be read as indicated on the left side (first occupation). All figures in the above table are absolute numbers.
attached to different occupational groups in different localities, or the value orientations and considerations of the respondents willing to move upward or downward in the occupational scale. For example, when all the respondents were cross-classified into nine occupational groups by their first and present occupations it was found that about 60 per cent of them continued to cling to the same groups (in diagonal cells) about 29 per cent moved up either within their division or across division boundaries, and about 11 per cent moved downward. In some occupational groups the numbers were too small to draw any definite conclusions. Mobility in general was the highest from among the lower civil servants and manual labourers.

Reasons for Moving

It should be remembered here that within each occupational group there was ample room for upward mobility. For example, among engineers there were five to six grades with the salary varying from 450 to more than one thousand rupees; among lower civil servants there were several grades from lower division clerk to office head assistant. Promotions and salary increments within these limits were common in Bhilai and employees took these promotions for granted. At the same time it was my impression in the field that there were some status discrepancies between occupational and income structures. For example, the social prestige of the lower civil service jobs has been higher and they occupied higher positions in the administrative hierarchy than those of the skilled workers both in industrial towns and traditional cities but not their salaries, job security, or promotional opportunities (see Table A.10 for discrepancies in income). In fact in Bhilai both skilled and semi-skilled workers called lower civil servants 'officer log' (officer people) because lower civil servants prepared their pay cheques and took decisions on their travelling allowances and leave applications. Hence, of a total of 161 respondents who mentioned their first job as lower civil servant, as many as 57 (35%) moved into the skilled and semi-skilled occupations, with slightly lower occupational prestige but certainly with equal or higher salaries. So if we exclude the lower civil servants who technically moved down the occupational scale but actually opted for job security and higher salaries, the mobility of all the other respondents from all the other occupational groups was upward.

Interestingly, almost all the respondents who moved from lower civil service jobs to skilled work belonged to the intermediate castes (mostly from south India and West Bengal) and respondents of traditional elite castes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First monthly salary in rupees</th>
<th>Total (N)</th>
<th>Present monthly salary in rupees</th>
<th></th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rs100 or less</td>
<td>Rs101-200</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Bhilai</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs100 or less</td>
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<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs101 to 200</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs201 to 300</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs301+</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>621</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Raipur</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs100 or less</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs101 to 200</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs201 to 300</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs301+</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>567</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
showed no inclination to move down the prestige scale and opt for a higher salary and job security. The patterns of mobility from first jobs into the present occupational groups are presented in Table III.2.

Shifts in Income

The increase in income of respondents between their first and present jobs was considerable in Bhilai. The first monthly salary of nine in ten in Bhilai was less than two hundred rupees a month, for about one in ten it ranged from two to four hundred rupees, and for two per cent it was more than four hundred rupees a month. As against this at the time of the survey, only a seventh of the respondents drew less than two hundred rupees a month, about two in three drew two to four hundred rupees a month, and the rest drew more than four hundred rupees a month. Stated briefly, the salary of about six in ten doubled and in quite a few cases it increased by many more times. A major share of these benefits had undoubtedly gone to the lowest income group. For example of those who drew one hundred rupees or less a month as first salary, about half were now drawing two to three hundred and about three in ten were now drawing more than three hundred rupees a month. This vast increase in income of employees at all levels indirectly indicates the promotional opportunities and salary revisions in a fast expanding industrial town.

Comparison of Bhilai and Raipur

Occupational and income mobility in Raipur compared poorly with those in Bhilai. Among businessmen, lower civil servants, cultivators, and labourers mobility was significantly lower in Raipur than in Bhilai. While downward mobility was negligible in Bhilai it was considerable in most of the occupational groups in Raipur. Income mobility was low in Raipur. Compared to the first salary drawn by them about a quarter to a third in each group remained where they were before.

The consequences of such wide variations in inter-generational and career mobilities was well shown when the question, 'Would you say that your life is much better now, say, than ten years earlier?' was put to the respondents. About six in ten respondents in Bhilai replied that
it was better, about three in ten thought there was no change and only about one in seven thought that it had become worse. Compared to this about four in ten in Raipur thought it was better, two in ten thought there was no change, and as many as four in ten thought that it had become worse (Diagram III.3).

Interestingly, in Bhilai it was the high-salaried respondents who said that though their income had gone up, their standard of living had gone down while in Raipur it was the poorer sections of the society who, unable to make ends meet, thought that life had become worse.

**Job Security and Job Aspiration**

The sense of job security and the definite improvement in the standard of living made the respondents in Bhilai aspire to higher things while insecurity of employment and worsening standards of living made respondents in Raipur pessimistic, with low aspirations. In response to the question ‘Do you think your job is secure here?’ about nine in ten in Bhilai thought that their job was secure while only six in ten thought so in Raipur (Diagram III.3). To the question ‘If you had a free choice now, which job would you like to hold?’ about seven in ten in Bhilai unhesitatingly stated that they would like to have one or two promotions, while in Raipur only a seventh asked for a promotion and about half wanted to continue in the same job and said that they would in fact be happy if their present job could be made permanent (Diagram III.3). With employment and promotional opportunities so limited, it was not uncommon for the respondents in Raipur to say that they would like to take up any job with higher pay if only it was offered to them. In Bhilai the respondents more often mentioned specific higher jobs in their line of promotion for which they were properly trained.

**PROFILES OF BHILAI AND RAIPUR**

**Bhilai**

Bhilai is a heavy industry-based new industrial town established in the fifties and located in a backward region of a backward state. The city is well planned and provided with all modern amenities -- such as reticulated drinking water, electricity, underground drainage, good houses, good roads, modern shopping centres, sports grounds, recreation centres, educational institutions, and transport to the workplace. Most of the
workers in Bhilai were engaged in skilled and engineering jobs in the steel plant financed and managed by the Government of India.

Bhilai was cosmopolitan. Compared to the national average figures, the distribution of religions in Bhilai shows considerable over-representation of Christians and marginal under-representation of Muslims and Hindus. Most of the Christians in Bhilai were inter-state migrants from Kerala. Among the Hindus, Brahmins were over-represented just as they are in traditional cities. In Bhilai educational levels were quite high, most of the respondents were young or middle-aged, adult dependents were few, about half of the respondents had two or less children, about eight in ten were long distance and inter-state migrants, mostly from rural areas, more than half had lived in at least one place other than their native place and Bhilai, and about nine in ten had been living in Bhilai for more than five years. Such a high inter-state migration provided a fertile soil for new political ideas. Respondents in Bhilai in general maintained close contacts with their native places.

Inter-generational mobility patterns in Bhilai indicated a heavy migration from rural areas and a big switch from agricultural to non-agricultural occupations. Respondents with owner-cultivator parents were the major beneficiaries of this process. Type of parental residence, occupational, income, and educational status were closely related to each other and they all had influence on the occupations of the respondents.

Respondents' career mobility in Bhilai was mostly upward and their incomes had considerably improved. Respondents in Bhilai had a feeling of job security and stated that their life was better now than ten years earlier; they optimistically hoped for higher things.

Raipur

On the other hand, Raipur is a traditional city which has grown over a period of ten centuries. In Raipur civic amenities are poor and most of the workers were dependent on private sector. Most of the respondents in Raipur were locals; traditional elite caste groups constituted about half of the respondents; inter-state migration was low; respondents were of all age groups; occupational mobility was low and a good proportion of the mobility was downward. In Raipur incomes were low, most of the respondents felt that their jobs were insecure, and their aspirations were low.
III

FOOTNOTES

1. For details of difficulties encountered when fieldwork was attempted in Durgapur and Burdwan in West Bengal, see the note on fieldwork (Appendix II).

2. According to the 1961 census the religious break-up of the Indian population was Hindus 83.5 per cent, Muslims 10.7 per cent, Christians 2.4 per cent, Sikhs 1.8 per cent, and others 2.6 per cent. The comparative figures for Durg district (in which Bhilai is located) were Hindus 96.0 per cent, and others less than one per cent each (Census of India 1961, 1967b:3-5; Census of India 1961, 1964a:XIII, XIV).

3. A projection based on earlier censuses suggests that the present-day Hindu society consists of 8.7 per cent Brahmin castes, 7.4 per cent Kshtria castes, 3.5 per cent Vaisya castes, 55.8 per cent Sudra or agricultural castes, 17.3 per cent of scheduled castes (actual as of 1961 census), and 7.3 per cent of scheduled tribes (actual as of 1961 census). The distribution of Brahmins is not, however, even all over the country. The highest Brahmin proportion of population is found in Uttar Pradesh (about 30 per cent) and Bihar compared with 5 per cent in east India, about 6 per cent in west India, and about 4 per cent in south India. Generally the proportion of Brahmin population in any region seems to be in inverse ratio to its distance from the Gangetic plains. These figures, however, do not take into consideration the differential rates of territorial movement of caste groups.

4. According to the 1961 census Raipur had a total population of 139,792 of whom three in ten were classified as workers. The data presented in the Union Primary Census Abstract reveals that of a total of fifty thousand workers in Raipur a fifth were dependent on manufacturing industries, slightly more than a fifth were dependent on trade and commerce, a third were dependent on service occupations, and one in eight were dependent on transport and communication activities. In contrast to this the total population in Bhilai was 86,116, of which a half were classified as workers. Among a total of about 49,000 workers more than half were engaged in manufacturing industries, a fifth in construction and a fifth in transport and communications and other services. Here it should be remembered that the Bhilai Steel Project was still in the stage of construction at the time of 1961 census. Since then many temporary employees who were engaged in construction jobs had left the Plant (Census of India 1961, 1963c:383-387).

5. According to the 1961 census there were 96,298 inter-district or inter-state migrants in the urban areas of Durg district. Among these only about one in ten came from within the state of Madhya Pradesh. Separate statistics are not available for the industrial town of Bhilai. But it may be safely assumed that most of the inter-state migrants enumerated in Durg district were in Bhilai. These data also reveal that of a total of 88,400 inter-state migrants in the urban areas of Durg district,
about a fifth came from Maharashtra, about a sixth each came from Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, about one in twelve each came from Bihar, Orissa, Kerala, and Punjab (Census of India 1961, 1964a:143). These figures are not, however, comparable with our survey data because our sample was drawn only from adult males and that too nearly ten years after the 1961 census.

6. Nijhavan in his article did not analyse the volume and direction of occupational mobility. But recomputations of figures presented in his tables give us a fair picture of occupational mobility patterns.

7. Studies of socio-economic background of legislators, administrators, managers and businessmen in general suggest that parental residence, educational and income statuses, and occupation have a definite influence on the occupational and professional placement of their sons. We already took note of the socio-economic background studies of local elected representatives and of state and central legislators. For studies on other elite groups see V. Subramaniam, Social Background of India's Administrators. Delhi: The Manager of Publications 1971; The Managerial Class of India. New Delhi: All India Management Association 1970; Stanley A. Kochanek, Interest Groups and Interest Aggregation: Changing Patterns of Oligarchy in FICCI. Economic and Political Weekly V, 1970.

8. The term cultivator was very vaguely defined by the 1961 census. 'For purposes of the census a person is working as a cultivator if he or she is engaged either as an employer, single worker or family worker in (a) cultivation of land owned or held from government, and (b) cultivation of land or supervision or direction of cultivation of land held from private persons or institutions for payment in money, kind or share' (Census of India 1961, 1963a:35).

9. The division of occupational groups into 'working' and 'middle' was difficult in the situation of Bhilai. It is common in western societies to include skilled workers in the working class. But in Bhilai most of these skilled workers came from rich and middle peasant families that enjoy 'middle class status' in the rural areas. A majority of the skilled workers themselves had supervisory jobs, drew high salaries and considered themselves as 'middle class'. In this analysis I preferred to include skilled workers, lower civil servants, businessmen, professionals and administrators in the 'middle class' and manual labourers, cultivators, and semi-skilled workers in the 'working class'. I did not, however, stress this division or investigate inter-class mobility because the direction of mobility was regarded as more relevant for our investigation.
IV

IMPACT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON PARTY SUPPORT

The aggregate analysis in the second chapter showed that residents of industrial towns voted differently from those in traditional cities, and that some socio-economic groups were more likely to vote for particular parties than for others. On that basis I developed some hypotheses. The analysis of survey data in the third chapter revealed the differences in the socio-economic occupational characteristics and employment opportunities of Bhilai and Raipur and that these differences were associated with mobility patterns. In this chapter I first outline the voting patterns in Madhya Pradesh in general and Bhilai and Raipur in particular since the first general election and then examine the impact of the socio-economic variables on the voting differentials.

ELECTORAL HISTORY OF THE REGION

Political History

The region of Chattisgarh, in which Bhilai and Raipur are located is the southernmost part of the Hindi-speaking north, with the Oria-speaking Orissa on the eastern borders and the Marathi-speaking Maharashtra on the west. Both Chattisgarh and the surrounding hilly and forest regions contain much tribal population and for that reason about one-third of the state legislative assembly seats are allocated to candidates of the scheduled tribes and castes. The history of the region is not well researched and politically the area was unintegrated until it came under the direct control of the British. Local historians usually refer to the period of the Gupta dynasty as the golden age of the region then known as Dakshina Kosala (south Kosala). Later it was successively under the control of the Haihayas, the Muslims and the Marathas. The Marathas destroyed and plundered the region hand in glove with the Pindaries (highway robbers). The Marathas claimed that they liberated the area from the Muslims but the local people detested them as plunderers and welcomed the rule of the British, who enforced law and order and introduced land ownership rights (Census of India 1961, 1964a:xliii-xliv). The people are of mixed origin and the distribution of the local elite castes in the population suggests that a majority of them probably moved down from the north in the distant past (Baker 1969:4). During the British era the region of Chattisgarh was a part of the bi-lingual old Central Province and Berar.
The research investigation carried out by Baker on the bi-lingual politics of Central Province and Berar threw some light on the politics of the region of Chattisgarh. Baker argues that by 1919 both economic and political activity in the Hindi region in general and in the region of Chattisgarh in particular had fallen to a low level. Towns in the region were few and those that existed served merely as administrative centres. There was no secondary industry whatsoever to generate urban employment (Baker 1969:7). The region did not have a single daily vernacular newspaper or a college, and in fact the district of Durg (in which Bhilai is located) did not have even a high school. The urban doctors, lawyers, traders, and resident landlords formed the social and political elites, and they were usually disinclined to participate in politics (Baker 1969:11). In fact they loyally supported the state government for having conferred land ownership rights. The politics of the region between 1919 and 1938 centred on a struggle between the Responsivists who cooperated with and participated in the government, and those who launched the Gandhian non-cooperation movements. From about 1928 the leaders of the Chattisgarh region acquired commanding positions in the province but the region continued to be economically and industrially backward. The first sign of industrialization in the state was the establishment of the steel plant at Bhilai in the late 'fifties.

Voting Shifts in Madhya Pradesh

The present state of Madhya Pradesh of which Chattisgarh is a region was created in 1956, and included part of old Central Province and Berar, the states of Vindhya Pradesh, Bhopal, and parts of Madhya Bharat and Rajasthan. An analysis of the election results in the above areas since 1952 reveals some significant changes in the party choices that should be kept in mind while interpreting our secondary and survey data on Raipur and Bhilai.

In terms of both votes and seats the strength of the Congress in Madhya Pradesh steadily declined from about 50 per cent of votes and 79 per cent of seats in 1952 to about 41 per cent of votes and 56 per cent of seats in 1967. During the same period the strength of the Socialist parties (the SSP and the PSP) registered a steeper decline than that of the Congress. The voting strength of the Communists was always negligible in Madhya Pradesh. From 1952 to 1967 it remained more or less static, below 2 per cent.
The Ramarajya Parishad, and the Hindumaha Sabha -- both Hindu religious parties -- which secured about 10 per cent of votes in 1952 had all but disappeared from the state electoral scene by 1967. The Jana Sangh which appeared on the Indian and Madhya Pradesh political scene just on the eve of the first general election was the major beneficiary of the electoral reverses suffered by all other political parties. It secured about 6 per cent of votes and one per cent of seats in 1952, but it steadily improved its electoral performance thereafter, and secured about a quarter of the votes and seats in 1967. Studies of elections in Madhya Pradesh indicated that the Jana Sangh had considerably benefited from its close association with the feudal elements (Chandidas 1967; Purohit 1967-1968). Any variations in the voting trends in Bhilai or Raipur from these general patterns have to be explained in terms of the local situational variables.

Past Elections in Bhilai

Until 1957 there was no assembly constituency named after Bhilai and even in 1957 it was part of a two-member constituency. Eventually when the two-member constituency was split into two single member constituencies in 1962 the constituency of Bhilai was reserved for the scheduled tribes candidates. The Ramarajya Parishad and the PSP were the most prominent non-Congress parties in the area. The Ramarajya Parishad completely disappeared from the local electoral scene. The PSP which was very popular and had earlier given a stiff fight to the Congress in the area, secured about one in every four votes in Bhilai in 1962, but five years later was reduced to less than one in twelve (TABLE IV.1). On the other hand, the Jana Sangh and the Communists who entered the electoral scene in Bhilai only in 1962, secured about 8 per cent and 11 per cent respectively and improved their position to 18 per cent and 22 per cent respectively in 1967. Out of a total of 9 contestants in the election of 1967, three were independent candidates. Ideological rifts among the leftist parties were obvious from secondary data. The Communist Party of India put up a single candidate in 1962, but after its split into the CPI and the CPIM in 1965, the two wings put up separate candidates in 1967 in Bhilai. The vote secured by the Congress declined considerably from 1962 (54%) to 1967 (46%).

Past Elections in Raipur

Since 1952 the population of Raipur has been large enough for it to constitute an independent assembly constituency. Since that time the electorate in Raipur expanded by 36 per cent and the voter turnout increased
## TABLE IV.1


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Raipur</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1952 %</td>
<td>1952* %</td>
<td>1957 %</td>
<td>1962 %</td>
<td>1967 %</td>
<td>1962 %</td>
<td>1967 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This table is based on the constituency data published by the Chief Election Officer, Madhya Pradesh (Chief Electoral Officer, Madhya Pradesh 1969:40,41, 48,49).

* By-election
by 50 per cent (see Appendix Table A.11). The analysis of election results brings out some interesting features (TABLE IV.1). The fortunes of the Congress in Raipur were highly dependent on the whims of personalities rather than on the vitality of the party organization. The Congress secured about a fifth of the votes and came out as a poor second in 1952. But since then, under the leadership of S.C. Tiwari, an enterprising and skilful community leader, the voting support of the Congress steadily increased from about 41 per cent in the by-election of 1952 to about 71 per cent of the votes secured by both the factions of the Congress in 1967.

The strength of the PSP declined from a maximum of 51 per cent in 1952 to a minimum of 7 per cent of the votes in 1967.

The percentage of votes secured by the Jana Sangh steadily increased by about three times between 1952 and 1967. Still the Jana Sangh vote was much lower in Raipur (13%) then in the state as a whole (28%).

Local community leaders played a decisive role in the election contests of Raipur. Inter-party defections of party leaders were common. Bulakilal Pujari, a wealthy local lawyer, contested the 1952 election on the Socialist ticket and the 1967 election on the Congress ticket. Until after independence, S.C. Tiwari was not a member of the Congress. In the by-election of 1952 he stood on the Congress ticket and improved the Congress vote though he was defeated. In 1957 and 1962 he again stood on the Congress ticket and won with big leads over his nearest opponents. In 1967 he broke away from the Congress, contested the election on the Jana Congress (a short-lived splinter Congress group in Madhya Pradesh) ticket but rejoined the Congress within two years.

The dependence of the Communist Party on a single leader was unmistakeable. Sudhir Mukerji, a lower middle class lawyer, contested four successive elections from 1952 to 1962 and improved his vote from about one per cent in 1952 to about 13 per cent in 1962. The Communist Party in Raipur is popularly known as Sudhir Mukerji’s Party. The Jana Sangh was the only one which did not depend on personalized power structures at the time of elections. At every election the Jana Sangh put up a new candidate and still raised the level of its vote.

After 1957, an increasing number of non-party candidates contested the elections in Raipur. Their number increased from one candidate in 1957 to 5 in 1962 and 9 in 1967. The chances of electoral victory of a large number of these candidates were remote. They probably wanted to
### Table IV.2

Voter Turnout in 1957, 1962 and 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Bhilai (N-621)</th>
<th></th>
<th>Raipur (N-567)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voted here</td>
<td>Voted elsewhere</td>
<td>Did not vote</td>
<td>Too young to vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
exploit the opportunity presented by the election to integrate their respective occupational or social sections and make them aware of their special interests. I will return to a detailed analysis of this aspect again in the seventh chapter.

It is obvious even from the last names of the candidates that traditional elite castes continued to play a dominant role in the electoral politics of Raipur. The nominees of the Congress, the Communist Party, and the Jana Sangh were always Brahmins.

SURVEY ANALYSIS

Limitations of Survey

The survey was carried out in the middle of 1969 about two years after the most recent election to the state assembly. It is reasonable to assume that in the interval there must have been considerable out-flow of electors who were thus beyond the range of the survey. This out-flow was probably much larger from Raipur than from Bhilai, where promotion opportunities and living conditions were far better. So the survey data are not wholly comparable with the constituency data.

The CPI and the CPIM each nominated its own candidate in Bhilai in the general election of 1967. The respondents, particularly those who opposed the Communists did not recognize any difference between the two parties. Those who supported the Communists considered the CPI as moderate and pro-Soviet and the CPIM as extremist and pro-Chinese. A few of those who voted Communist in 1967 could not precisely recall which of the two Communist candidates they had voted for. Hence, I decided to treat the Communist vote as a single block for the analysis. S.C. Tiwari contested and won the Raipur constituency in 1967 on the Jana Congress ticket but later joined the Congress. Those who voted for Tiwari, and also those who voted for the official Congress candidate (Bulakilal Pujari) considered that they voted Congress. So I decided to treat those who voted for Tiwari and also those who voted for Pujari as a single block for the analysis.

The 1967 general election being the closest to the time of the survey was more appropriate for voting analysis. I will, however, utilize the 1957 and 1962 voting data for what they are worth. Only 34 out of a total of 621 respondents reported voting in Bhilai in 1957; the rest voted elsewhere, did not vote, or were too young to vote (TABLE IV.2). So in the case of Bhilai changes in the voting patterns would be limited to an
### Table IV.3

**Party Choice in 1957, 1962 and 1967**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Bhilai</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Raipur</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total voters (N)</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>JS</td>
<td>Com.</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>JS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Those who did not reply to the question on party choice and those who did not vote are excluded from the table.
In relation to political preferences, the survey provided information on the parties supported and opposed by the respondents and the party choices of those who voted in 1957, 1962 and 1967 (TABLE IV.3). The information on support and opposition for political parties was elicited indirectly. After the questions 'What do you think are the most important local problems that concern people like you?' and 'What do you yourself think should be done to solve these problems?' each respondent was asked to name the party that 'is most likely to improve conditions of employees like you' and the party that 'is least likely to improve conditions of employees like you'. Interpreted into colloquial Hindi, these questions sound like 'Which party do you think is best (or worst) from your point of view?' The party named by a respondent as the most likely one to improve his conditions is interpreted as the party supported by him and the party named by him as 'the least likely' one to improve his conditions is interpreted as the party opposed by him.

Respondents found these questions relevant and easy to answer. Responses varied from an 'unqualified' admiration of some parties to outright condemnation of others. A few respondents equated and condemned all political parties and emphasized the need for a military dictatorship to save the country from political chaos and economic troubles. The principal complaint against every party and particularly against the leadership was that they served personal and sectional demands rather than community and national interests. In general, the supporters of each political party were loyal to it at the time of elections. It may be observed in Table IV.4 that more than eight in ten voted for the parties that they supported. Every party suffered some defections but also gained some voters from other parties.

The influence of socio-economic and occupational characteristics of respondents on their political attitudes can be examined in three different ways. We can use voting choice or party supported or a combination of both these items as a dependent political variable in the analysis. In combining voting choice and party supported as a single variable we can divide the respondents into four meaningful categories, according to their degree of partisanship. Those who supported and voted for the same party are 'strong partisans'. Those who supported a particular party but did not go to the poll for one reason or other are 'weak partisans'. Those who supported a particular party but voted some other party are 'defectors',
**TABLE IV.4**

Party Choice in 1967 by Party Supported by Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party supported</th>
<th>Total (N)</th>
<th>Party choice in 1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>JS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhilai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>(467)</strong></td>
<td><strong>51%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raipur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>(398)</strong></td>
<td><strong>63%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Respondents who did not report the party that they supported and those who reported the party that they supported but did not go to the pollis in 1967 are eliminated from the above table. Figures in parenthesis are total voters.
and those who did not support any political party and did not vote for any party are 'non-partisans'. I have not in fact used such a classification in this analysis.

I preferred to use the party supported as the most appropriate dependent political variable for the following reasons. While about nine in ten respondents named the party that they supported only about six to seven in ten actually voted in 1967. So if voting choice was taken as a dependent variable a considerable proportion of respondents whose party identifications are known would be eliminated from the analysis and valuable information would be lost. Further, respondents whose parties did not contest elections had no opportunity of going to the polls and voting for the parties of their choice. For example, the Communists did not contest the election in Raipur in 1967. Finally, we are more interested in investigating the sources of social support of different political parties rather than the general strength of partisanship. I have however utilized voting data where it can be put to better use than the data on party support.

Questions Asked

In what follows, we shall use our analysis of party supporters to answer two important questions. Firstly, from which socio-economic and demographic strata do different political parties draw their supporters? Secondly, is the support structure of a political party differentiated and heterogeneous or is it more concentrated in certain segments of the electorate? These questions are particularly relevant in relation to the immediate and future electoral prospects of political parties and inter-party electoral shifts in a country like India where the demographic and occupational structures are undergoing vast changes.

A party with its support structure concentrated in certain segments of the society or geographical regions is likely to alienate other sections of the society and other geographical regions. It is already noted that the Jana Sangh for example draws its support primarily from north India and it is suggested that its strength is mostly derived from traditional elite castes, feudal elements and people in urban areas. If this is true and if this results in the alienation of religious minorities, low caste Hindus and people from other regions, the electoral prospects of Jana Sangh will be bleak because the social sections supporting it are only a small portion of the Hindu society in a particular region.
Further, in a country with increasing industrialization, urbanization, and rural to urban migration, a political party, if its support is limited primarily to rural areas and the agricultural community, is likely to decline gradually in strength and relevance. The future prospects of the Australian Country Party provide an excellent example of this. With decreasing demand for wool and wheat, declining marginal returns from small and medium agricultural farms and increasing migration of farmers to urban areas, the electoral support of the Country Party is likely to shrink. Unless the government insists on electoral boundaries on the basis of territory rather than population, the Country Party's share of the seats will inevitably go down. The only other way the party can save itself is by reorganization as an urban party.

Further, a party which is unable to communicate its ideology to the younger generation, or a party that is unable to readjust successfully to the occupational changes, new group interests and rising issues of the electorate will lose its political relevance. Parties like the Justice Party of Madras, and more than a dozen of the present-day Socialist parties in India, are excellent examples. On the other hand a party with heterogeneous social support and an ability to adapt itself to new situations will continue to enjoy electoral support.

Existing Literature

Examined in the light of the above discussion, findings of studies in Indian elections become meaningful. It is already noted that immediately before and after independence, western educated urban middle class and traditional elite castes played active roles in Indian politics. With the introduction of adult franchise, party politics and electoral competition, the leadership of every political party was forced to widen territorially (from urban to rural areas) and deepen socially (from higher to lower castes and tribes) its support structure. Parties found it easier to achieve this aim by appealing to the existing primordial group loyalties and personalized power structures. As time passed, hitherto socially under-privileged and politically non-participant groups were drawn into party politics, and were given an increasing share of power in party organizations, legislatures, and ministries. In this process traditional social cleavages were increasingly politicized and political parties provided associational bases for nation-wide identifications. By 1967, it was suggested that traditional channels of vote mobilization like caste influence
and personalized power structures had given place to modernizing influences such as youth, literacy, urbanization, exposure to campaigning, issue positions, and perceptions of one's own economic and social wellbeing.

After their 'Baroda East' election study in 1962, Kothari and his associates repeatedly stressed the above point. And their election surveys in 1967 and 1969 further confirmed their earlier generalizations. On the other hand, there was a large body of opinion that party choice was still highly dependent on considerations such as religion, caste, region, language and feudal influences.

The national election surveys carried out so far have made two things amply clear. Only the Congress has been able to penetrate into all sections of the society and draw support from heterogeneous socio-economic and occupational groups while the support of almost all the other parties has remained concentrated in certain socio-economic groups or regions (Eldersveld 1970; Madsen 1970). Political activists such as those who had taken specific issue positions, and those who perceived that their social or economic standing was worsening, were critical of the government and opposed the Congress more than others. But the Congress was able to make up these losses by gaining new voters and winning over defectors from other parties (Eldersveld 1970; Kothari 1971a). Our survey in general confirms these findings and provides additional information from interviews with political leaders and respondents' perception of the sources of social support of different political parties.

Voter Turnout

Respondent's age, place of origin, religion, caste, income, occupation, literacy, and participation in voluntary associations have all produced consistent patterns of voter turnout and party support. Only a few systematic studies have attempted to relate voter turnout to party choice at elections (Eldersveld 1970). It is, however, noted that voter turnout in India went up from about 45 per cent in 1952 to about 60 per cent in 1967. During the same period the vote secured by the Congress decreased marginally and the vote of the non-Congress parties increased accordingly. But which social sections participate in higher proportions than others in elections? Three major election surveys have indicated that in general voter turnout was higher in urban than in rural areas. Voter turnout was also higher
among males, literate, professional, high caste, high income, and religious minority groups than among their alternatives (Srinivasan and Subramaniam 1969:62,63; Kothari 1971a).

An examination of the tables presented in the above studies indicates that in general the Congress fared poorly among social and economic sections which had a high voter turnout. Earlier the aggregate analyses carried out by Morris-Jones and Gupta, and Gopal Krishna also concluded that the Congress vote was in general lower in districts with higher voter turnout than among others (Morris-Jones and Gupta 1969; Gopal Krishna 1966).

Contrary to the findings of earlier studies, in Bilai high caste, high income, high literacy, and high occupational groups showed a lower turnout than their counterparts.

Further, voter turnout was higher among trade union members than among the members of cultural associations. In Raipur, however, the patterns of voter turnout were generally in accordance with the findings of the earlier election studies in India (see Tables A.13 and A.14 in Appendix).

The voter turnout patterns are not surprising when we investigate the degree of interest taken in and the amount of participation of different social and economic sections in politics in Bilai.

It has already been pointed out in the third chapter that there was a high degree of association in Bilai between type of residence, caste, literacy, occupation, and income. So naturally the pattern caused by one variable was consistently repeated in relation to most of the other variables. As everywhere else in India the management in Bilai required that employees in officer cadres should not join trade unions. On the other hand lower civil servants demonstrated more enthusiasm in language and regional cultural associations than in trade unions, which were joined mostly by industrial workers. All these tendencies created a gap between the blue collar and white collar employees. Soon after the first round of interviews it was obvious to me that high income officers more than low income respondents were indifferent to politics, and to elections in particular. Their line of argument usually was that politics was the pre-occupation of trade unions, and trade unions were the domain of labourers and low grade employees. Some of the top level officers were critical of trade unions and union leaders and said that workers were most undisci-
plined and that no labourer could be punished because of the protection offered by the unions. It was because of this apathy that groups of high socio-economic status did not turn up at the polls. On the other hand, trade unions inducted most of the labourers, skilled workers and some clerical staff into their fold, emphasized the importance of voting in protecting the rights of workers and promoting the cause of the trade unions, and worked hard to rally their followers to the polling booths.

In Raipur on the other hand the interest and reference groups were highly involved in politics, had the will to participate, and encouraged others to participate in elections.

**Expansion of the Electorate**

The generalizations that young voters of the post-independence generation were less likely to appreciate the role played by the Congress in the independence movement, that they were more likely to be guided by current economic and political problems, and that they were less likely to vote Congress than the older electors, appear to be true in the case of our survey also. About half of the respondents in Bhilai were already on the electoral roll by 1957, about four in ten came of voting age and were enrolled by 1962 and only 4 respondents (less than 17%) reported that they were too young to vote even in 1967.

The impact of this sudden enrolment of the young respondents as electors was disadvantageous to the Congress and beneficial to the other parties and particularly to the Jana Sangh. Of those who reported that they voted in 1957 in Bhilai or elsewhere about eight in ten voted Congress, while one in ten each voted for the Communist and other parties. By 1967, when 99 per cent of the respondents were on the electoral roll and voted mostly in Bhilai, the Congress vote was reduced to 50 per cent, the vote of the Jana Sangh increased ten-fold and that of the Communists increased two-fold (TABLE IV.3).

There could be two reasons for the above trends. A majority of the young respondents might have already been politicized and developed certain political sympathies according to which they voted after they arrived in Bhilai. Or the employment conditions and the social circumstances in Bhilai might have provided ideal opportunities for the establishment and expansion of the extreme religious rightist and leftist parties. A detailed analysis suggests that both of the above factors operated sim-
### Table IV.5

**Party Support by Age, Type of Native Place, Religion, Caste and Monthly Income**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic category of respondents</th>
<th>Bhilai</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Raipur</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>R²*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>Party supported</td>
<td></td>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>Party supported</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Congress %</td>
<td>JS %</td>
<td>Com. %</td>
<td>Others %</td>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>Congress %</td>
<td>JS %</td>
<td>Com. %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 30 years</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 to 40 years</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 years +</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural area</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban area</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religions</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmin, Vaisy</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caste-Hindu</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled castes</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs200 or less</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs201 to 400</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs401+</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Respondents who did not report the party that they supported are eliminated from the above table.

* In each section of the Table the first figure is for Bhilai and the second figure in parenthesis is for Raipur.
ultaneously, in varying degrees.

In Raipur the inflow of migrants and the expansion of the electorate were all gradual. The rates of decline of the Congress vote and of the expansion of the Jana Sangh vote were much lower in Raipur than in Bhilai.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND PARTY SUPPORT

Age and Party Support

The earlier inference that the Congress was more popular with older respondents than with the younger respondents proved to be correct both in Bhilai and Raipur. The higher the age of respondents, the higher the proportion of support offered for the Congress. The pattern is not difficult to explain. Older people obviously were familiar with the freedom movement launched and conducted in the Gandhian days. In fact, a few of the older respondents, though now associated with the non-Congress parties, replied with pride that they themselves or their parents responded to Gandhi's call and joined the freedom movement by giving up studies and participating in the satyagraha or non-cooperation movement. The impact of age on the support for the Communists and the Jana Sangh was less clear. For no obvious reasons, a higher percentage of middle aged than younger and older groups supported the Jana Sangh, and in the case of the Communists middle aged group gave less support than other groups. In Raipur, the lower the age of the respondents, the higher the support of the Jana Sangh and other parties. While opposition of the younger generation to the party in power is just as much a nation-wide phenomenon in India as in many other countries, the ideological commitments of the young are no similar in Bhilai and Raipur.

Religion, Caste and Party Support

It may be observed in Table IV.5 that in relation to religion and caste, the patterns of party support were similar and consistent in Bhilai and Raipur, the differences being only of degree. In both Bhilai and Raipur the lower the status of caste the higher the support for the Congress and the Communists, and the lower the support for the Jana Sangh. The support for the Jana Sangh was nil among the Muslims, and the support for it among Brahmans and Vaisyas was about four times higher than among scheduled castes. Among the respondents of 'other religions the support
for the Jana Sangh appeared to come mainly from Jains whose status is more or less equal to that of Vaisyas.

The predicament into which the Jana Sangh launched itself on the religious front was highly beneficial to the Congress and the Communists. To the question, 'Which political party is least likely to improve conditions of employees like you?' 53 per cent of the Muslims mentioned the Jana Sangh. Or to put it in a different way, more than 95 per cent of those who supported the Jana Sangh were the Hindus (mostly high or intermediate caste Hindus) while the corresponding figure for the Congress and the Communists was about 77 per cent.

The call of the Jana Sangh for the revival of Bharatiya Sanskriti or the Vedic way of life appealed more to elite castes, less to caste-Hindus, and least to the scheduled castes because it is essentially the Sanskritic culture and Brahminic way of life. Within the elite castes again the southern Brahmin regards the Northern Brahminic way of life as half Islamised (Subramaniam 1969). Consequently, the appeal of the Jana Sangh is only to some sections of the Hindus in some regions. Further, the Muslims are very much aware that they are a minority and that in north and west India their bona fides are suspect, and that the Jana Sangh is the most anti-Muslim party. They regard religious solidarity as essential for their survival. They are aware that the Congress which has been in power since independence has been trying to protect their interests as far as it could. So their support is mostly for the Congress or for the Communists or for the democratic leftist parties. The Muslim respondents were vocal in their support for the Congress but a few of them were hesitant to name the Jana Sangh as the party they opposed.

The Christians just like the Muslims support the Congress and fear the Jana Sangh as a threat to the survival of minorities. But they regard the atheistic Communists as worse than the Jana Sangh. In Bhilai, however, a few of the Christian respondents I interviewed argued that the Christian religion and Communism were not incompatible.

Consequently, in a country with adult franchise, and a first past the post election system, the Jana Sangh restricted for itself the area of social manoeuvre and in fact forced the religious and caste minorities to seek protection mostly in the ruling Congress.

The data presented in Table IV.5 have another implication. In the second chapter I hypothesized that religious and caste considerations are less likely to play an important role in industrial towns than in
the traditional towns. But a marginally higher percentage of the Brahmin and Vaisya respondents in Bhilai (27%) than in Raipur (26%) supported the Jana Sangh, thus indicating an equal if not higher influence of caste considerations in voting. Loyalty to religious parties and commitment to traditional values need not necessarily be the result of low education, low income and low occupation. In Bhilai it was the high literacy and high income elite castes rather than the lower ones that extended stronger support to the Jana Sangh. The prevailing social cleavages then are more important than the mere caste and religious distributions. In Bhilai the differences between high and low occupations appeared to have encouraged the elite castes to support the Jana Sangh.

**Income and Party Support**

In relation to the variable of income, in Bhilai the higher the income the lower the support for the Congress. Support for the Communists was higher among the middle income respondents. On the other hand, the vote of the Jana Sangh was higher among the low and high income groups and marginally lower among the middle income group. The patterns in Raipur were slightly different. Here respondents in the lowest income group supported the Congress most strongly (68%) and the higher the income the higher the support for the Jana Sangh.

The variations in the above patterns of party support can be explained. The respondents in the highest income group in Bhilai are high level officers. Though a majority of them have always supported the Congress, they are not in any way involved in the power structure of the Congress. They have no interests that need to be protected through the Congress organization and few favours that they can seek from the local Congress party. On the other hand, in Raipur respondents in the high income group are mostly big businessmen: they have day to day favours to seek from the government through the party in power and are closely involved in the affairs of the party. During the survey I found that a majority of these high income respondents in Raipur knew S.C. Tiwari on personal terms, and made generous financial contributions to his election campaign. The pattern of political preferences of this section were made clear when a grain merchant in Raipur said bluntly, 'Jana Sangh is a good party, but what is the use? It is not in power. I know Tiwari personally and he gets things done for us. So we have got to support him.' In Bhilai
### TABLE IV.6

*Party Supported by Occupation, Education and Associational Membership*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic category of respondents</th>
<th>Bhilai</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Raipur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>Party supported</td>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>Party supported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Congress %</td>
<td>JS %</td>
<td>Com. %</td>
<td>Others %</td>
<td>Total %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators, Prof. Engineers</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower civil</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivators</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual labourers</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No schooling</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some schooling</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school completed</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade union</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cul. Association</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No membership</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages are not worked out for any group with a membership of less than 50. Respondents who did not report the party that they supported are eliminated from the above table.

* In each section of the Table the first figure is for Bhilai and the second figure in parenthesis is for Raipur
on the other hand I came across only one high level officer (manager of the picture halls owned by the steel plant) who stated that he was on quite friendly terms with Dharmapal Gupta the local Congress Member of the State Legislative Assembly. Other high level officers did not even mention the name of Dharmapal Gupta.

Occupation and Party Support

It may be observed in Table IV.6 that the percentage of support secured by the Congress was the highest (68%) among the manual labourers and next highest (59%) among the professionals. On the other hand, the support for the Jana Sangh was higher among the high civil servants and the professionals than among skilled workers and manual labourers. The Communists fared comparatively better among the skilled workers and lower civil servants than among manual labourers and professionals.

In Raipur there was not a single higher civil servant or cultivator who supported the Jana Sangh. Yet the support for the Jana Sangh was fairly high among businessmen and lower civil servants and strikingly low among skilled workers and manual labourers. The situation with the Communists was just the reverse. While the explanations given for the variations in party support in relation to income hold good here also there are differences to be noted between Bhilai and Raipur.

To begin with, the monthly income of each occupational group, businessmen aside, was far higher in Bhilai than in Raipur. Moreover, the higher civil servants in Raipur were directly involved in day to day administration and were in close contact with the people. Not only were their actions closely watched by political leaders, particularly by the leaders of the party in power, but also they were forced to work in accordance with the local leaders. So it was natural that a majority of them supported the Congress. In Bhilai the higher civil servants were not subjected to the pressures of local politics and they supported the parties that they pleased without any risk. Further, in Bhilai even those officers who supported the Congress did so despite their criticism of it for the lack of any better alternative.

Literacy and Party Support

Of all the independent variables, the level of education produced the most consistent patterns in relation to the support for different
political parties. In Bhilai, the higher the educational level the lower
the support for the Congress, and the higher the support for the Jana Sangh.
The Communists fared marginally better among those who did not attend school
and those who had completed their high school studies. The trends in
Raipur were similar. In both Bhilai and Raipur the support for the Congress
among those who completed high school studies was much lower (53% in
Bhilai, 56% in Raipur) than the average percentage of support for it in the
respective towns. Further, in Bhilai the percentage of support for the
Jana Sangh among those who completed high school studies was twice as high
as the percentage of support for it among those who had not been to school.
In Raipur it was four times as high.

**Associational Membership and Party Support**

It has been noted that most of the poorly educated and low
income employees were inducted into the trade unions. In Bhilai, the
Indian National Trade Union Congress, the labour wing of the Congress,
was the recognized trade union, and most of the labourers belonged to it,
to the disadvantage of the Communist and Jana Sangh trade unions. The
Communists and the Jana Sangh on the other hand successfully exploited the
regional cultural associations and the religious organizations for building
support bases for themselves. A detailed analysis of this aspect will
follow in the chapter on voluntary associations. It may be noted that
the support extended to the Congress was highest among the respondents
who were not members of any association, and among the members of trade
unions, while the support extended to the Communists was considerably higher
among the members of cultural associations and trade unions than among
others (TABLE IV.6). In the case of Raipur the Jana Sangh secured its
highest support from among the trade union members.

There was however a difference between the trade unions in Bhilai
and Raipur. In Bhilai, trade union membership was drawn mostly from skilled
workers and manual labourers among whom membership was almost universal.
Every trade union set up an office and cultivated the workers actively, and
the management looked favourably on the INTUC.

In Raipur skilled workers and manual labourers were employed mostly
by private enterprise and that too only in small numbers. Consequently,
there was virtually no trade union activity among them. In fact, the only
trade unions of skilled workers of which I heard during the survey in Raipur
### TABLE IV.7

Sources of Social Support of the Congress as Perceived by the Supporters of Different Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partisans of</th>
<th>Total mentions</th>
<th>Social groups supporting Congress</th>
<th>Rich</th>
<th>All sections</th>
<th>Cultivators</th>
<th>Poor people</th>
<th>Middle class</th>
<th>Small businessmen</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bhilai</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>541</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>153</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>193</td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1032</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Raipur</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>626</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1038</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Those who did not report the party they supported but mentioned the social groups supporting the Congress and the supporters of other parties are excluded from the above table. They are however included in the total.
were the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Employees' Union and the Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Workers' Union. These unions were small and inactive and the members, though not much disciplined, were highly discontented. As already seen, the Jana Sangh drew a high percentage of support from lower civil servants. So it was no surprise Jana Sangh fared particularly well among the trade union members in Raipur. The cultural associations reported in Raipur belonged mostly to minority religious groups such as Parsees, Sindhis, Sikhs and the Christians. An overwhelming majority of them (77%) supported the Congress. The amount of opposition to the Jana Sangh expressed by the respondents from minority groups in the course of or after interviews can hardly be over-emphasized. It is clear that because of occupational and income differences the patterns of political support of trade union members in industrial towns and traditional towns were different.

Irrespective of socio-economic and occupational statuses the relative betterment of life of the respondents over the past ten years gained political support for the Congress. On the other hand the support for the Jana Sangh and the Communists was better among those who thought that there was no change in their standard of living or that it had declined over the decade.

This suggests that upward occupational and income mobility had the consequence of increased support for the Congress and downward mobility had the consequence of increased support for the Jana Sangh and Communists.

Profiles of Party Support

Now we can draw together all the findings in this section and give a total picture of the profiles of party support in Bhilai and Raipur. About six in ten respondents in Bhilai supported the Congress. The support for the Congress came from heterogeneous socio-economic groups and it was fairly evenly spread. More than half of the respondents in every socio-economic and occupational group supported the Congress. However, support for the Congress was marginally higher among old, non-Hindu, low caste, low income, low income, low occupation, and low literacy groups than among others. It was also higher among those who had no associational membership than among members of trade unions and cultural associations.

On the other hand only a fifth of the respondents in Bhilai supported the Communists. Support for the Communists was fairly evenly
### TABLE IV.8

**Sources of Social Support of the Communists as Perceived by the Supporters of Different Political Parties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partisans of</th>
<th>Total mentions</th>
<th>Social groups supporting Communists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ind. workers, Agri. labourers %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bhilai</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Raipur</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Those who did not report the party they supported but mentioned the social groups supporting the Communists and the supporters of other parties are not separately represented in the above table. They are, however, included in the total.
spread, but was somewhat higher among religious groups other than Hindus and Muslims, scheduled castes, skilled workers, and members of cultural associations than among others.

The support for the Jana Sangh was low. Only about one in six respondents in Bhilai supported the Jana Sangh, and this support was fairly concentrated in certain socio-economic and occupational groups, namely urban natives, Hindus, Jains, traditional elite castes, high income groups, professionals and those who had completed high school studies. Support for the Jana Sangh among Muslims and Christians was nil; among scheduled castes, the older generation and manual labourers it was very low.

**Sources of Social Support of Political Parties as Interpreted by Partisans**

Respondents in Bhilai had a fairly good idea as to which social groups supported different political parties. There were subtle but meaningful differences in the idioms used by the supporters and opponents of each political party to describe the socio-economic and occupational groups that supported it.

The sympathizers of each party used the most respectable terms possible to describe the socio-economic and occupational groups that supported their party. The sympathizers of each party made a definite attempt to attribute these sources of social support to the noble aims and objectives of that particular party, and did not hesitate to use a derogatory or insinuating vocabulary to describe the supporters of other parties. Further, the opinions of a majority of the respondents were unmistakably influenced by the images they had of different political parties in the places of their origin. Finally, respondents in general were less critical in describing the sources of social support of the Congress than of any other party.

**Supporters of the Jana Sangh**

For example, the sympathizers of the Jana Sangh preferred to describe its Hindu supporters as those who believe in the 'Hindu way of life', 'the preservation and propagation of Vedic dharma', and 'the unity and integration of Bharatiya culture'. But Communist sympathizers preferred to describe them as 'Hindu religious fanatics', 'Hindu religious reactionaries', 'tradition-minded Hindus' and 'Hindus suspicious of minorities'.
TABLE IV.9

Sources of Social Support of the Jana Sangh as Perceived by the Supporters of Different Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partisans of</th>
<th>Total mentions</th>
<th>Social groups supporting Jana Sangh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hindu fanatics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhilai</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raipur</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Those who did not report the party they supported but mentioned the social groups supporting the Jana Sangh and the supporters of other parties are not separately represented in the above table but they are included in the total.
Here again the impressions carried by the migrants from the regions of their origin were obvious. In the region of Punjab and Haryana the Jana Sangh has been strongly supported by the Arya Samajists. So a migrant from that region more often mentioned the Arya Samajists as the first group of supporters of the Jana Sangh. The Jana Sangh and the RSS have been strongly supported by the Brahmins in Maharashtra. So a migrant from Maharashtra, particularly a Maratha respondent more often mentioned 'Maharastrian Brahmins' as the first group of supporters of the Jana Sangh. The south Indians often used terms such as 'Brahmins and Bania', 'north Indians', and 'Hindi speakers' to describe the supporters of the Jana Sangh.

Supporters of the Communists

In the same way, the supporters of the Communists preferred to describe the social groups supporting their Party as 'those who have faith in revolution', 'those who believe in economic equality', and those 'who want a change in the society'. On the other hand the sympathizers of the Jana Sangh would freely use terms such as 'goondas', 'hoodlums', 'traitors inspired by foreign powers', and those 'who believe in violence'. Here again one could easily detect the impressions carried by the respondents from the places of their origin. A migrant from UP coming from an area where the Communists have been strongly supported by the Muslims would more often mention Muslims as the first group of supporters of that Party. A migrant coming from Kerala or Andhra Pradesh where Communists have been strongly supported by the agricultural labourers or poor and middle size peasants was more likely to mention these groups as the supporters of the Communists.

These impressions carried by the respondents from their places of origin were supplemented by their perception of the situation in Bhilai. The identification of inter-state and linguistic migrants such as Bengalis, south Indians, north Indians as separate and homogeneous groups was the result of such a perception, though an inaccurate one. For example, migrants from north India would call all the migrants from south India 'Madrasis' or 'south Indians'. But migrants coming from the south would clearly distinguish between different southern language groups (Keralites, Tamils, Telugus, Kannadigas).

The use of a derogatory vocabulary and value-loaded idiom to describe the supporters of the parties that respondents disliked was,
however, subject to three conditions. Firstly, the use of such subtle language was limited to respondents with average and above average political consciousness and particularly to those who were strongly committed to the extreme rightist and leftist parties. Secondly, respondents with low education, occupation, and income were mostly uncritical of the parties that they did not sympathize with. Thirdly, the sympathizers of both the rightist and leftist parties subjected the supporters of the Congress to much less criticism.

Tables IV.7, 8 and 9 show what the supporters of each political party thought were the sources of social support of their party and what the supporters of other parties thought were the sources of social support of that particular party. Every respondent was asked to mention the kinds of people that support each political party. In case the respondent did not understand the meaning of 'kinds of people', the interviewer was instructed to describe some social, economic and occupational groups as examples. In relation to each party three responses were recorded. A quick glance at these tables makes it obvious that there were variations in the frequency of social support groups mentioned by the sympathizers of a particular party and the sympathizers of other parties.

Supporters of the Congress

The sympathizers of the Congress agreed that their party was supported by rich people and big businessmen, but in the same breath stated that it was supported by both rich and poor, or by 'all sections of the society'. But the sympathizers of the Communists and the Jana Sangh emphasized that the Congress was primarily a party supported by the rich or the big businessmen. In Raipur a relative majority of the Congress sympathizers thought that the Congress was supported by all sections of the society. Further, groups such as cultivators, poor people, and the middle income group were predominently mentioned as supporters of the Congress in Raipur.

The above pattern of responses is also evident in relation to the social groups interpreted to be supporting the Communists and the Jana Sangh. Respondents in general agreed that labourers and poor people were the principal supporters of the Communist Party. But in Bilal a higher proportion of the supporters of the Congress and the Jana Sangh than of the Communist Party cited south Indians and Bengalis as supporters of the Communists. On the other hand, a larger percentage (10%) of the
supporters of the Communist than of the Congress and the Jana Sangh mentioned the middle class as supporters of the Communists.

In Raipur opinions regarding the socio-economic groups that supported different political parties were closely related to local realities. Here, for example, the Communist Party was popular mostly among sweepers and among irregularly hired workers. Consequently, very few Communist supporters in Raipur mentioned the middle income group as supporters of the Communists. Further, in Raipur only a few communist supporters thought that their party was supported by south Indians and Bengalis. On the other hand, it was common knowledge in Raipur that the Jana Sangh derived most of its financial support and human resources for the election campaign (display of flags, distribution of election literature, etc.) from small businessmen such as retail cloth merchants, owners of groceries and 'pan shops'. So the sympathizers of the Jana Sangh as well as of other parties mentioned small businessmen as the most prominent group that supported the Jana Sangh.

A much larger proportion of the supporters of the Congress and the Communists than of the Jana Sangh thought that the Jana Sangh was supported by Hindu fanatics, small businessmen and the migrants who came from north India. The supporters of the Jana Sangh conceded that their party was supported by Hindus and small businessmen but they used a different idiom to describe them and also emphasized the support they drew from the middle income group.

The sympathizers of every party tried to describe the support structure of their party as being as broad-based socially as possible, while their opponents attempted to paint it as a sectional party. This truth was well brought out by a high level engineer, an ex-RSS activist and a strong Jana Sangh supporter, who unhesitatingly stated: 'Ours is a middle class Hindu Party; for propaganda purposes we do say that our party is non-communal and emphasize that we do have Muslims in our party'.

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS

When arranged in two-way tables several socio-economic categories had produced some consistent patterns in party support, and I sought to explain these patterns by keeping in mind the socio-economic and political situation in urban India. But which of these socio-economic categories had significant effects on party support and what was the proportion of total variation in the support of each party accounted for by these variables? The multiple regression analysis attempted here is intended to answer these questions.

The method of analysis followed was simple. First, each of the variables of age, education, type of place of origin, religion, caste, occupation, monthly income, and membership in associations was divided into two or three dummy variables. Normally
TABLE IV.10

Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Support for the Congress (Bhilai)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dummy variables</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No membership in associations</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>12.318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle income*</td>
<td>-0.122</td>
<td>5.904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>7.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual labourers</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>3.229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>-0.233</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Rs 3-4 hundred salary a month

TABLE IV.11

Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Support for the Congress (Raipur)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dummy variables</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>-0.215</td>
<td>24.768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No membership in associations</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>9.982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
income could be treated as an independent and real variable and it is reasonable to assume linear correlation between level of income and party support. But our two-way tables based on income and party support clearly indicated that the relationship between income and the party support of the Jana Sangh and that of the Communists was curvilinear. It will be explained a little later how both high and low income groups voted relatively higher than the middle income group for the Jana Sangh. So I decided that income categories as dummy variables would measure the amount of association between income and party support more accurately than income as a real variable. For computational purposes one dummy variable was excluded from each class and the rest were included in the model as independent variables. The party supported by the respondent was the dependent variable. For example, if support for the Congress was considered as a dependent variable each respondent who supported Congress was given a score of one and all others zero. In the first stage of the analysis the effect of all the dummy variables (after excluding one from each class) was examined. Later all the dummy variables whose $F$ statistic was below 10 per cent significance level were excluded from the model and the proportion of total variation in party support accounted for by all the dummy variables which remained was estimated. The results are presented in Tables IV.10 to IV.15.

Though many of the variables included in these regression models produced $F$ statistics above the ten per cent level of significance the $R^2$'s obtained in some of these regression models are small. There could be two principal reasons for such small $R^2$'s. Our analysis here is primarily concerned with socio-economic status and occupational and territorial mobility variables. Firstly, it is possible that political attitudinal variables play an equally important role in predicting party support. For example, a regression analysis based on the 1967 cross sectional election survey in India found that the proportion of total variation in Congress support accounted for by socio-economic variables was only 4.7 per cent. On the other hand the proportion of total variation accounted for by the variables of 'comparative imagery on Congress' was as high as 16.5 per cent (Madsen 1970). Secondly, it is possible that some of these variables cover only a fraction of our sample and that though they are significantly related to the support of a particular party the proportion of total variation in that party's support accounted for by them could be only small. For example, of a total of ten businessmen in Bilai seven supported the Jana Sangh but they constituted less than eight per cent of all those who supported the Jana Sangh in Bilai (7 out of 89).

**Congress**

In relation to the support for the Congress the dummy variables 'Non-membership in associations', 'Muslims', and 'Manual labourers' had positive and significant effects and the dummy variable 'Middle-income group' had a negative and significant effect. The effect of the dummy variable 'Businessmen' was nearly significant and hence was retained in the model. The proportion of total variation accounted for by all these variables was only 4.8 per cent. Nevertheless, these patterns confirm
### TABLE IV.12

Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Support for the Jana Sangh (Bhilai)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dummy variable</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>19.950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmin Bania castes</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>10.853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>-0.126</td>
<td>4.950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle aged</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>3.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low income*</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>3.315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>2.650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Rs2-3 hundred salary a month

### TABLE IV.13

Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Support for the Jana Sangh (Raipur)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dummy variable</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brahmin Bania castes</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>12.443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>6.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income*</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>3.680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>3.643</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Rs4-5 hundred salary a month
our earlier generalizations. For example the conditional probability of a Muslim supporting the Congress in Bhilai was as high as .738 and the conditional probability of businessmen supporting the Congress was as low as .295 (TABLE IV.10).

In Raipur on the other hand, the only dummy variables above the 10 per cent significance level were 'Non-membership in associations' and 'Youth' — the former in the positive and the latter in the negative direction.

**Jana Sangh**

In relation to the support for the Jana Sangh in Bhilai, the dummy variables 'Businessmen', 'Brahmin-Bania castes', and 'Middle aged' had positive and significant effects. On the other hand the effects of the dummy variables 'Muslims', 'Low income group', and 'Skilled workers' were negative and significant. The proportion of total variation in the support for the Jana Sangh accounted for by all these dummy variables was 8.1 per cent. The conditional probability of support of the Jana Sangh by businessmen was as high as .637, by Brahmin-Bania castes .257, and by Muslims it was as low as .011 (TABLE IV.12).

In general, those in Raipur who support the Jana Sangh appear to come from Brahmin-Bania castes, business occupations and high income groups. The conditional probability of a Muslim supporting the Jana Sangh in Raipur was nil (TABLE IV.13). These figures certainly confirm our earlier conclusions that support for the Jana Sangh was concentrated in certain socio-economic groups. It was more so in Bhilai than in Raipur because — one may imagine — those who respected traditional values supported the Jana Sangh as a protective measure.

**Communists**

In relation to support for the Communists, the dummy variables 'Members of culture associations', and 'Members of trade unions', had positive and significant effect. The effect of the dummy variable 'Skilled workers' was nearly significant and hence retained in the model (TABLE IV.14). But the proportion of total variation in the support for the Communists accounted for by all these dummy variables was only 1.6 per cent.

On the other hand in Raipur skilled workers, migrants from rural areas and persons of other than middle-age group appeared to have supported the Communists. The effects of membership in cultural associations and trade unions was significantly related to Communist support in Bhilai while the were not at all significant in Raipur. Further, religion and caste had no impact on Communist support either in Bhilai or Raipur.

In general, both in Bhilai and Raipur the variables of loyalty to religion, caste, and traditionalism had significant effects only on the support for the Jana Sangh and the proportion of total variation in party support accounted by these variables was the highest in relation to the Jana Sangh (7.2%). It was almost negligible in relation to the Congress,
TABLE IV.14
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Support for the Communists (Bhilai)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dummy variable</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural association member</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>6.918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade union member</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>5.878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle aged</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>2.795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>2.394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE IV.15
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Support for the Communists (Raipur)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dummy variable</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>15.655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural native</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>10.353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle aged</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>4.062</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and it was nil in relation to the Communists. The inclusion of the dummy variable 'Muslims' into the model accounted for only 1.2 per cent of variation in the support for the Congress. On the other hand variables of membership in cultural associations, membership in trade unions, and type of place of origin, all of which may rightly be regarded as indicators of modernization and territorial movement, had significant effects on the support for the Communists. However, only a small proportion of the variation in support for the Communists was accounted for by these variables.

HYPOTHESES TESTED

A comparison of the findings in this chapter with some of the hypotheses suggested in the earlier chapters justify the following conclusions.

The hypothesis -- that the electoral success of a political party in an industrial town is likely to be dependent on the amount of trade union work that the party puts in -- is proved. The popularity of the Congress in Bhilai is traced mostly to the trade union work it had put in.

The hypothesis that in traditional cities the support for a political party is more likely to be dependent on successfully inducting into the party fold community leaders who control vote banks, is proved. The electoral success of the Congress in Raipur was attributable clearly to the induction of a leader like S.C. Tiwari into the party.

The hypothesis that workers in industrial towns on the whole might see the Congress rule as more beneficial than detrimental to peoples' welfare is proved. A majority of the respondents in Bhilai (59%) mentioned the Congress as 'the most likely party to improve conditions'.

The hypothesis that the Communists secured their highest support in industrial towns from the working class is only partly confirmed. In Bhilai about 58 per cent of Communist supporters were either semi-skilled or un-skilled workers. On the other hand, this was true of only about 30 per cent of Communist supporters in Raipur. It may be also noted that members of trade unions, members of cultural associations and skilled workers all showed a greater tendency to support the Communists than did the manual labourers (TABLE V.6).
The hypothesis that the sources of support of religious parties are the same social groups in both industrial towns and traditional cities is proved. A higher proportion of high caste Hindu groups, Jains, high salareid people and migrants from urban areas than of other categories supported the Jana Sangh in Bhilai. The social solidarity of the higher caste and income groups was higher in Bhilai than in Raipur. Consequently, the Jana Sangh could make headway in gathering electoral support.

The hypothesis is proved that in a plural society with conflicting group interests, if a political party associates itself very closely with particular social or cultural groups it is likely to be most difficult for it to penetrate the rest of the society. In Bhilai the Jana Sangh was highly associated with Hindu religion, high castes and hostility to religious minorities.

The hypothesis that the rightist vote in industrial towns is essentially a religious vote is only partly confirmed. In Bhilai the Jana Sangh was the only rightist party which fielded a candidate. But the Jana Sangh combined in itself both religious traditionalism and support of a free enterprise economy.
FOOTNOTES

1. The term Chattisgarh in Hindi means 36 forts. The region in the middle ages was said to have been ruled from 36 fortified places of which the present Raipur was one. Presently the districts of Bastar, Raipur, Durg, and Bilaspur comprise the region of Chattisgarh.

2. The known history of Raipur city can be traced back to the 10th century A.D.

3. According to the Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order issued in 1966, 26 out of a total of 65 assembly constituencies in the region of Chattisgarh were reserved scheduled castes (9) and scheduled tribes (16) candidates (Election Commission India 1967a:152-156).


5. The information for this section was obtained from the Handbook on the General Elections in Madhya Pradesh: Election Results from 1952 to 1967 issued by the Chief Electoral Officer, Madhya Pradesh (1967:40,41).

6. In 1964 the Communist Party of India (CPI) broke into two almost equal divisions. The rightist faction, officially recognized by the Election Commission as the CPI has since then been loyal to the Soviet Union, unequivocally committed to parliamentary democracy, and actively cooperated with Indira Gandhi's Congress Party. It is popularly known as the pro-Moscow group. The leftist faction, officially recognized by the Election Commission as the Communist Party of India (Marxist) is alleged to be pro-Peking and has openly declared its faith in extra-parliamentary methods of gaining power. But the New China News Agency has disowned the CPIM and subjected its leadership to sharp ideological attacks. In this study unless I refer to CPI or CPIM, the term 'Communist' refers to both these parties. For further divisions among the Communists of India see Marcus Franda, India's Third Communist Party. Asian Survey 9, 1969. Also see Harry Gleman, The Communist Party of India: Sino-Soviet Battleground. In A. Doak Barnett, (ed) Communist Strategies in Southeast Asia. New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1963.

7. Sudhir Mukherji in the meantime organized the pro-Communist trade union in Bhilai and stood on the CPI ticket in Bhilai in 1967. Now he is more popular in Bhilai than in Raipur.

Here I am referring to Rajni Kothari, Gopal Krishna, Dirubhai Sheth, Rameshray Roy, Bashiruddin Ahmed, and Ashish Nandy who are working at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies. For details of the model advanced by these scholars see particularly the articles of Kothari and Rameshray Roy (Kothari and Sheth 1965; Kothari and Shah 1965; Kothari 1967b, 1970c; Rameshray Roy 1966a, 1968).

Until now three national election surveys have been carried out all around 1967 in India. Two of these surveys were carried out by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in cooperation with S.J. Eldersveld, University of Michigan, and D. Marvick of the University of California. For several articles based on these surveys see the annual numbers for 1970 and 1971 of Economic and Political Weekly and the November issue of Asian Survey 1970. Another study -- a three-wave survey with the sample drawn from west, north, and east India -- was sponsored by the Research Programmes Committee of the Planning Commission in 1967. The all-India report of this study prepared by N. Srinivasan and V. Subramaniam was submitted to the Planning Commission in 1969 and is not yet published.

In a regression model based on survey data in India in 1967, the dummy variables based on type of native place, age, literacy, income, and caste accounted for less than 5 per cent variation in Congress voting. See Douglas Madsen, Solid Congress Support in 1967: A Statistical Inquiry. Asian Survey X, 1970.
MOBILITY AND PARTY SUPPORT

MOBILITY AND VOTING

In the fourth chapter we sought to explain differences in the voting of people in similar socio-economic categories as between Bhilai and Raipur. In this chapter we turn our attention to the influence of fathers' political loyalty, social, geographical and occupational mobility on the changing patterns of party support in India and especially in our study areas.

Loss of Congress Voting Support

We have already seen that from 1952 to 1967 the Congress steadily lost voting support. In 1967 it also lost its majority in several state assemblies when challenged by strong non-Congress alliances, although its net loss of votes exceeded 5 per cent only in a few north Indian states. The main challenging groups, the Communists, the Jana Sangh, the Swatantra Party, and the regional parties such as the Dravida Munnetra Kajhagam, retained their own voting support in the states where they were respectively the strongest, and were able to mobilize it in the interests of the electoral alliances they formed.

This change was the subject of both impressionistic and aggregate statistical analyses around the time of the 1967 election. The explanations offered mentioned many factors such as caste, religion, feudal influences, high prices, and language tensions. However, none of these studies attempted quantitative estimates of the proportions of the variation in Congress votes that could be attributed to these factors, either individually or as a whole. Moreover, they neglected altogether the influence of social mobility on the shifts in party support.

Social Mobility in Western Society

European and American studies of social mobility suggest that its primary significance for political behaviour lies in the consciousness of status discrepancy. Every society comprises a number of separate hierarchies (social, economic, educational, occupational, ethnic and so on) each of which has its own status structure and its own conditions for the
attainment of a position of prestige. There may be discrepancies between
the different positions a person occupies in the different hierarchies at
a given time. Mobility up or down within only one or some of these hier-
archies widens the status discrepancy between them and the others (Lipset
and Bendix 1964:64,65). The perception of the discrepancies leads to
attempts to redress the balance, especially by trying to improve one's
status in those hierarchies where it is relatively low. This may be
tried directly or through political affiliations that promise such improve-
ments, or by seeking alternative status satisfactions in some new hierarchy
such as that of a political party.

A number of factors have been found to influence the political
orientation of upwardly mobile persons, in comparison with those in a
static situation. According to comparisons of political preferences as
between the United States on the one hand, and northern European countries
on the other, two of the most important are the openness of the occupational
structure and the need to adjust to the life-style of the class into which
one moves or among whom one lives. Taking occupational mobility as the
independent variable, a number of studies indicate that where this is
relatively easy, and adjustment to the life-style of the higher class is
correspondingly easy, the upwardly mobile trend to become more conservative
than they were — indeed more conservative than most established members of
the class into which they move. On the other hand, compared with their
counterparts in the United States, Britain and Australia, those who have
moved up into skilled manual occupations in northern Europe have had a
greater struggle both to move and to be received into their new milieu,
and this is thought to explain the fact that they become politically more
radical than semi-skilled and unskilled.²

Social Mobility in India

But the two western models of inherited party loyalties and the
reformulation of political sympathies in conformity with the general party
choices of the class into which one moved will be inadequate to explain
the inter- or intra-generational shifts in the party choices of the Indian
electorate. Parties in the Western countries developed along the dimensions
of class and religion and more or less the same parties have been in exist-
ence for at least half a century (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:50,51). So it is
easy to compare inter- or intra-generational mobility patterns and shifts
in party choice.
The party system in India, however, did not develop on class lines. Though the initial leadership of all political parties has come from western-educated middle-class elites, popular support has come from diverse socio-economic and occupational groups. It is therefore difficult to characterize any particular party as labour or middle class.

Although the Congress Party has been on the Indian political scene for more than eighty years, it was less a political party than a freedom movement before Independence, while most of the other parties were formed after Independence -- many of them over the past decade. So the party choices were not available for the electorate over the generations or even throughout a single generation. Further, about eight in ten adults had no vote before Independence.

Another difficulty is that although the Congress is organized nationally and contested both parliamentary and state legislative elections of the other parties are confined in each case to a limited number of states. Hence geographical movement of respondents -- in which we are particularly interested -- faces the mobile voter in a different state with a new range of party choices, and the options available are not comparable across the state boundaries.

INTER-PARTY SHIFTS

Party Choice

Party choice was examined by using the recall of three successive elections (1957, 1962, and 1967). Most of the respondents replied to these questions without much difficulty and the information appeared to be reliable. We have already noted that some respondents found it difficult to recall for which of the two Communist candidates (in Bhilai) and for which of the two Congress candidates (in Raipur) they had voted in 1967. This problem was solved by treating the Congress and the Communist votes as single blocks. For the purpose of this analysis I divided the voters into three major categories.

All those who voted for a particular party in at least two most recent elections (1962 and 1967) I defined as regular voters of that particular party. Regular voters of a party, one can argue, are politically involved. They are committed to a political party on a long term basis and to a broad spectrum of the party's leadership, ideology, and policies. They are not usually swayed by temporary issues and usually stand by the party in times of political crisis.

All those who voted for a particular party at one or two elections and later shifted their choice to another party in the later elections I defined as swingers. Those who voted for a particular party in 1957, shifted to some other party in 1962 but returned in 1967 to the fold of the party for which
**TABLE V.1**

Voting History of Those Who Voted Congress, Jana Sangh and Communist in 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Party choice in 1967</th>
<th>Total (N)</th>
<th>Voting history</th>
<th>Voting history</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regulars* %</td>
<td>Swingers** %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhilai</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raipur</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 80.496

R² = 52.985

* All those who voted for a particular party in at least two most recent elections.

** All those who voted for a particular party at one or two elections and later shifted their choice to another party, and also those who voted for a particular party in 1957, shifted to some other party in 1962 but returned in 1967 to the fold of the party for which they voted in 1957.

*** All those who voted for the first time in 1967.
they voted in 1957 were also defined as swingers. Election literature in
the West suggest that swinging voters are usually politically the least
informed and the least interested in politics. Their knowledge of political
parties, of candidates who contest elections, and of sitting legislative
members is low (Butler and Stokes 1969; Macarrus 1971; Converse 1967). The
preliminary analysis of the Australian election survey carried out by Aitkin
and Kahan confirms these generalizations.

Survey researchers in India however, had concluded differently. In a
study of the recall data of three elections based on two election surveys
in 1967 and 1969 Sheth concluded that the shifters, 'like the partisan voters,
are politically involved voters who vote regularly and are aware of their
preferences ... Often they are guided by more discriminating political
considerations which prevent them from tagging themselves blindly and
indefinitely to one party' (Sheth 1970). Sheth gave two arguments in support
of such a conclusion. Firstly, seven in ten shifters in his sample offered
specific reasons for withdrawing their support from a particular party and
secondly six in ten of the shifters in his sample expressed the intention to
stick to the same party in the next election. So Sheth interpreted this as
a pattern of permanent shift in party allegiance of voters rather than a
lack of political identification among them. Our survey, however, did not
provide any conclusive material in this regard. But it will be explained a
little later how some respondents changed their voting preferences after
having had some experience in Bhilai (see page 110).

Finally, all those who voted for the first time in 1967 were defined as
new voters of the party for which they had voted. This category again included
all those whose names were included on the roll for the first time in 1967
and also those whose names were already on the roll but did not cast their
votes in the past for one reason or another. The 1967 study just referred
to found that about seven in ten new voters were under thirty years of age.
Owing to their short political experience, it is suggested that new voters
are more likely to be swayed by temporary issues than to be guided by strong
political loyalties (Sheth 1970). This is said to be especially true of new
voters in India because political identification in India begins to form
during early adulthood and particularly in the course of electoral parti-
cipation (Roy 1971). Let us now examine the inter-party shifts in Bhilai.

Inter-Party Shifts in Bhilai

We can begin by considering three different voting histories: those
who voted in all three elections (1957, 1962 and 1967), those who voted for
different parties in 1967, and those who voted for Congress in 1957 and 1962.
Those who voted for non-Congress parties in 1957 and 1962 were few and we
might as well ignore them. Tables V.1 and V.2 show that long-term party
loyalty was characteristic of the Congress voters. The Jana Sangh and the
Communists expanded their voting base by recruiting inter-party defectors
(mostly from Congress) and new voters.

Of a total of 106 who voted in all three elections in Bhilai two in
three regularly voted for the same party and of these partisans nine in ten
voted Congress.
### TABLE V.2
Voting History of Those Who Voted Congress in 1957 and 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voted Congress</th>
<th>Total (N)</th>
<th>Voting history 1962, 1967</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Congress 1962</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Congress 1962, No reply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not voted 1967</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Congress 1962, Other parties 1967</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other parties, didn't vote 1962</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Congress 1967</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilai 1957</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilai 1962</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raipur 1957</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raipur 1962</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The number of respondents who voted for non-Congress parties was small in 1957 and 1962. Hence they are not included in the above table.
The Congress did not have the same lead among those who had gone to the polls in and after 1962 (TABLE V.1). Of a total of 236 who voted Congress in Bhilai in 1967 some six in ten were its regular voters and about two in ten each were new and swinging voters. Of 16 per cent swinging voters, 13 per cent were attracted from across party lines and 3 per cent voted Congress in 1957 and 1967 but for some other party in 1962.

On the other hand, of those who voted for the Jana Sangh and the Communists in 1967 about four to five in ten were swinging voters (mostly from the Congress) and about three in ten were new voters. Further, about a third of the Communist voters and a tenth of the Jana Sangh voters were regulars.

Finally, of those who voted Congress in 1957 and 1962 about one in ten did not turn up at the polls in 1967, and about a quarter voted for non-Congress parties in 1967 (TABLE V.2).

The above findings make it clear that although the net losses suffered by the Congress in India as a whole from 1952 to 1967 were less than 5 per cent, there may have been considerable movement of voters into and out of the Congress, if Bhilai and Raipur are a guide.

The Congress party made up the losses it suffered from defections, partly by attracting voters from other parties and partly by attracting new voters. But among the new voters, the vote for the Congress was marginally lower than its average vote in Bhilai, and for the Jana Sangh and the Communists it was marginally higher than their average figures.

These inter-party shifts are not surprising. Because Congress is the oldest political organization, long term party loyalty was essentially a characteristic of Congress voters. Most of the non-Congress parties were in essence breakaways from Congress and appealed first to discontented Congress supporters.

Implications

The above inter-party shifts have two major implications. The voting support of the Congress has been on the decline. This decline is higher among the new voters than among those who have been on the roll for a long time. Secondly, the Jana Sangh and the Communists are developing into stable parties with expanding electoral bases. Whether the Jana Sangh or the Communists can expand their electoral bases sufficiently to
defeat the Congress candidate in Bhilai will depend on the spread of its voting support over different social sections.

Workers in Bhilai have very high rates of inter- and intra-generational occupational and income mobility. It is of considerable electoral importance whether a party's voting support is concentrated in narrowing or expanding social and cultural bases. For example, how different are the respondents who voted regularly for a particular party compared with swinging and new voters drawn to it? What made some respondents vote regularly for a particular party and others to change their choice of party from election to election? Are these voting shifts related in any way to the territorial relocation of the respondents or status discrepancies caused by upward or downward mobility?

CHOICE OF A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The influence of indicators of mobility on political attitudes of respondents can be assessed in several different ways. We already noted in Chapter IV that respondents' choice of party in different elections or party supported by the respondents at the time of survey or a combination of both these factors can be used as a dependent variable. Of these three options, respondents' choice of party in elections will be the most appropriate and logical to be used as a dependent variable. The voters can be divided into partisans, swinging voters, and new voters and the impact of indicators of mobility can be examined by two-way and three-way tables and multiple regression analysis. But I did not pursue such a method of investigation for the following reasons.

Such a method will automatically exclude a large number of respondents from our analysis. Most of the respondents in Bhilai were either too young to vote or were fresh migrants and had no vote in Bhilai in 1957 and 1962. Only a fifth voted in 1957, only a third voted in 1962 and only a sixth voted in all three elections. In 1967 swinging voters were few -- only 37 of those who voted Congress, 50 of those who voted Jana Sangh and 40 of those who voted for the Communists were swinging voters. Combining all the swingers into a single category would be meaningless because the shifts were in different ideological directions. Hence, in this chapter again I preferred to use party support as the dependent variable.

I will first examine the impact of different mobility variables such as father's political loyalty, political complexion of state of origin, occupational mobility, perception of one's own living over the past ten
TABLE V.3
Party Popularity by Parental Party Loyalty in Bhilai and Raipur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parental political support</th>
<th>Total (N)</th>
<th>Party supported by respondent</th>
<th>Party opposed by respondent</th>
<th>Index of party popularity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Jana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress, freedom movement</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Congress parties</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non partisans</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1188</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: As parental support for non-Congress parties was low I collapsed the respondents of Bhilai and Raipur into a single table. Out of 101 parents who supported non-Congress parties, 70 supported leftist parties and 31 supported religious parties. The index of party popularity was arrived at by subtracting the percentage of respondents opposed to a party from the percentage of respondents supporting that party.

\[ R^2 = 117.941 \]
\[ R^2 = 109.046 \]
years, and aspirations of life on party support. In carrying forward the analysis I shall employ the technique of multiple regression which will enable us to find out the proportion of total variation in party support accounted for by all the variables included in the model.

**FATHERS' PARTY LOYALTY AND RESPONDENTS' PARTY SUPPORT**

**Limitations**

We noted that when the fathers of most of our respondents reached adulthood many non-Congress parties did not exist or were relatively unknown. Further, some respondents considered their fathers to be Congress sympathizers even though they had different ideological persuasions — because they had worked within the Congress for a long time. Consequently when respondents were asked: 'During this period -- when you were 14 or 15 -- which party did your family think worth supporting?' many replied, 'During those days everybody participated in the freedom movement', or 'During those days everybody supported the Congress'. It was understandable that about two in three who gave information on this aspect mentioned the Congress as the party supported by their fathers. There were in addition good reasons why some respondents had no parental loyalties to inherit: those whose fathers were in government service and did not profess any overt political sympathies, and those whose fathers died while respondents were young children, and those whose fathers lived in rural areas where there was no political activity. Wherever I refer to fathers' political support, it is only meant to be the party supported by the fathers when our respondents were 14 or 15 years old. It is not meant to be the fathers' political loyalty at the time of the survey.

Our data support the general finding that sons are likely to sympathize with the parties supported by their parents. An absolute majority of those who claimed to know their parental political loyalties supported the same parties themselves. Parental support for non-Congress parties was low. Only 101 respondents (in Bhilai and Raipur) reported that their fathers supported leftist or rightist parties. Hence I collapsed respondents whose parents supported non-Congress parties into a single category and respondents in Bhilai and Raipur into a single table (TABLE V.3).

Fathers' support for the leftist parties in Bhilai was essentially for the Communists and in Raipur it was mostly for the Praja Socialist Party. In both Bhilai and Raipur the Hindu Mahasabha, the Arya Samaj, and the Rashtria Swayamsevak Sangh were mentioned prominently as the organ-
izations supported by the parents. It was for this reason that respondents whose fathers supported non-Congress parties, themselves supported Jana Sangh, Communist and other parties in equal proportions. Just about an average percentage of respondents with non-partisan fathers and about six in ten respondents with Congress-supporting parents themselves supported Congress.

Patterns of Shifts

The patterns of inter-generational shifts in party support can be described better by utilizing leadership interviews and the material provided by some respondents who spoke at length after the interviews than by limiting ourselves to the statistical relationships brought out by the tables. On the basis of the shifts in party support we can divide the respondents into six categories.

Some respondents, just like their parents, continued to support the Congress. This was not simply a sentimental attachment passed on from fathers to sons. Quite a few of these were certain that under the existing circumstances no other party could rival the Congress in maintaining reasonable standards of administration. These respondents rationalized their support for Congress by citing the miserable performance of several different united front governments that were formed and defeated in the states of Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, and Kerala soon after the 1967 election.

Some respondents whose parents were supporters of the Congress, came under the influence of the Communist and other leftist parties when they were young, and started voting for those parties when they came of voting age. 'My father supported the Congress, you know; during those days all freedom fighters were in the Congress. But I was a member of the Students' Federation' was a typical answer of this kind of respondent. But a few of these changed their opinions after coming to Bhilai. I will explain a little later how the variable of region operated in relation to this type of respondent.

Some respondents whose fathers were supporters of religious parties, themselves actively participated in the activities of the Rashtria Swayamsevak Sangh and now extended strong support to the Jana Sangh. The intellectual and organizational content of the Jana Sangh in Bhilai were provided by this type of respondent. The variable of region is important in understanding the party support of this type of respondent also.
Respondents whose parents were non-partisan could be divided into two sub-types. The first contained respondents whose parents were agricultural labourers or poor peasants or belonged to the scheduled castes, tribes and artisan castes in rural areas or were manual labourers in urban areas. In most cases they did not participate in any kind of political activity, and had no sentimental or ideological attachments to any party. The educational achievements and occupational status of this kind of respondent were low. Their aspirations were limited and their appreciation for all that was done by the Congress was high. These respondents measured the benefits secured by voting in innocent and practical terms: 'Over the past two elections I voted for the Communist candidate. He did not do anything for us. This time the Congress candidate promised to arrange the supply of drinking water. In fact, it was done on the eve of the election. So I voted Congress'; or 'Previously we voted Congress, but when a dispute arose between us [sweepers] and the hospital administration the Congress did not come to our rescue. On the other hand, the leader of the Jana Sangh went on fast and fought for our interests, so we all voted for him', were two typical explanations from these respondents. The second sub-type were the respondents whose parents were government servants and hence remained non-partisan; these respondents developed sympathies for the Congress or the Jana Sangh.

Finally, some respondents were highly politically conscious though not necessarily inspired by parents or influenced by the situations in their regions. Their political horizons were much wider and their ideological convictions were deep, and they usually hailed from educated middle-income families (both rural and urban). They assessed and reassessed the ideological and issue positions of political parties. In Bhilai at any rate this type of respondent provided the initial organizational support and voting base for the ideology-based splinter parties. They supported the SSP, the Forward Bloc, and the CPIM.

Support for the Congress in an industrial town -- if Bhilai is any guide -- is a reward for its stable administration and its industrial development plans. This was more so among low paid manual labourers and industrial workers than among high paid engineers and officers. The organizational support for opposition parties such as the Jana Sangh and the Communists is provided by political activists who developed sympathies for these parties during their youth. Later these parties expanded their support structure by penetrating into politically conscious and socially
and economically discontented sections among whom the Congress was popular in the past. To put it briefly inter-generational shifts in party support in Bhilai were based on differential rates of efficacy of different political parties in securing the interests of workers.

THE POLITICS OF GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY

Existing Literature

The effects of status discrepancy take somewhat different forms among migrant voters. In the second chapter we cited studies indicating that inter-state migrants tended to work as power cliques and pressure groups within the trade unions and political parties they joined in their new homes, and to vote for a candidate from their own region or language group if an effective one was available. Migrant workers from states with strong Communist movements usually joined Communist or other leftist trade unions and supported their candidates at parliamentary elections (Harrison 1960; Palmer 1963). It has been shown that in Calcutta the Congress vote was consistently low in areas with large concentrations of residents of local origin and of refugees from Pakistan, and relatively higher where there were few refugees but a larger number of migrants from within India. These differences were attributed to the lower educational achievements and expectations, and the past Congress contacts, of internal migrants, compared with the frustrations and higher aspirations of local residents and refugees from Pakistan (Weiner 1967:360-367).

The above findings appear to be equally applicable elsewhere with some limitations. The political effects of migration are limited by the choice of parties available and the numerical strength of migrants supporting a particular party. If there are no political parties of migrants' choice or the migrants supporting a particular party are few in numbers in their new homes there will be hardly any political consequences of migration.

In a place like Bhilai such a political party or trade union, if newly formed, should have a national and non-parochial outlook to appeal to a cosmopolitan population. For example, even when the number of supporters of regional parties (such as the Dravida Munnetra Kajhagam of Tamil Nadu, and the Bangla Congress of West Bengal) are sufficiently large in number in a place like Bhilai to form branches of their own parties their growth will be limited and politically they will be ineffective.
### TABLE V.4
Party Support by State of Origin (Bhilai)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political complexion of the state of origin</th>
<th>Total (N)</th>
<th>Party supported by respondent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Congress %</td>
<td>Jana Sangh %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Communist</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Jana Sangh</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other States</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Respondents who did not report the party they supported are excluded from the above table. As the number of migrants from 'strong-Communist' and 'other' states to Raipur was small, the data of Raipur are not presented in the above table.

### TABLE V.5
Supporters of Political Parties by Political Complexion of State of Origin (Bhilai)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party supported by respondents</th>
<th>(N)</th>
<th>Political complexion of state of origin</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strong Communist %</td>
<td>Strong Jana Sangh %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Respondents who did not report the party they supported and those who supported 'other' parties are excluded from the above table. As the number of migrants from 'strong Communist' and 'other' states to Raipur was low, the data of Raipur are not presented in the above table.
Further, such parochial parties, because they are formed by inter-state migrants, might alienate other sections and create tensions on language and state lines.

Large scale inter-state migration can minimize the number and importance of small regional parties and may in fact promote the growth of national parties in yet another way. The migrants who supported small political parties of their native states are likely to be few in a place like Bhilai. And such migrants may have no other choice except supporting one of the existing parties in their new homes. For example for a migrant from Kerala the choice of parties such as the Muslim League, the Kerala Congress, and the Revolutionary Socialist Party which is available back at home is not available in a place like Bhilai. Under such circumstances a migrant may feel inclined to support the political party closest to his ideological persuasions or a party which in his opinion can secure his professional interests.

Considered from this point of view, in Bhilai there were sufficiently large numbers of migrants from different language groups and states of strong Jana Sangh and Communist influence. The Praja Socialist Party and the Hindu Mahasabha, the two prominent non-Congress parties in the region, gradually declined in strength after the steel plant was erected in Bhilai. In their place the Communists and the Jana Sangh rose to prominence. So one may hypothesize that the strength of the Jana Sangh and the Communists was secured mostly from migrants who had already identified themselves with these parties.

Classification of States

The classification of states in this analysis into 'strong-Communist' or 'strong-Jana Sangh' is only relative. In all of these states Congress always maintained its pluralities of votes and often won majorities of seats in the legislatures. I use these terms only to distinguish those states in which the Communists and the Jana Sangh were conspicuously successful. All the states not included in these two categories I have classified as 'Others'. The information for this variable was derived from the replies to the questions: 'What is your native place? In which state is it?'

Of a total of 621 respondents in Bhilai about a third migrated from 'strong-Communist' states, about half from 'strong-Jana Sangh' states
and the rest from 'other' states.

Impact of State of Origin

The political complexion of state of origin had definite political consequences especially in Bhilai. We already noted that the support for the Communists and the Jana Sangh was in general lower than that for the Congress. In general the migrants from 'strong-Communist' states were more likely to support the Communists and oppose the Jana Sangh than were migrants from elsewhere. And migrants from 'strong-Jana Sangh' states were more likely to support the Jana Sangh and oppose the Communists than were migrants from elsewhere. Migrants from 'other' states were few and we cannot make any generalizations in relation to them.

Of those who replied to the question on party support, an absolute majority from the 'strong-Jana Sangh' and 'other' states and less than half from the 'strong-Communist' states supported the Congress. On the other hand, about four in ten from 'strong-Communist' states and one in ten from all other states supported the Communists (TABLE V.4). Or to put it in a different way, about seven in ten Communist supporters came from 'strong-Communist' states, about six in ten Congress and Jana Sangh supporters came from 'strong Jana Sangh' states (TABLE V.5).

The opposition to each party was in reverse order to the above patterns. When measured in terms of a simple party-popularity index constructed by subtracting the percentage of respondents opposing a particular party from the percentage of respondents supporting it, the Congress obtained a plus popularity score in all the three types of states, but it was the lowest among migrants from 'strong-Communist' states (+19) (TABLE V.6). On the other hand, the Communists secured a plus score (+20) only among the migrants from 'strong-Communist' states. The Jana Sangh secured a negative score in all the three types of states but did worst of all among the migrants from 'strong-Communist' states (-27). In Raipur the number of migrants from 'strong-Communist' and 'other' states was small but here also the direction of general association was similar to that in Bhilai.

Party Support in States and Bhilai

A comparison of voting in states in 1967 and party support patterns in Bhilai as brought out by our analysis raises some important questions.
TABLE V.6

Party Popularity Score by Political Complexion of State of Origin (Bhilai)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political complexion of state of origin</th>
<th>Total (N)</th>
<th>Party popularity score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Strong-Communist' states</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>+19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Strong-Jana Sangh' states</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>+55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other states</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>+36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sample</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>+39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Party popularity score is a simple index constructed by subtracting the percentage of respondents opposing a particular party from the percentage of respondents supporting that particular party. The number of migrants from 'strong-Communist' and 'other' states was small in Raipur and these are not represented in the above table.
Only a fifth of the votes in the 'strong-Communist' states went to the Communists in 1967, while about four in ten migrants from 'strong-Communist' states supported the Communists in Bhilai. So the question arises, were the Communist sympathizers more likely than others to migrate from these states to industrial towns? Or were the migrants from 'strong-Communist' states more likely than others to develop Communist sympathies after arriving in Bhilai?

Similarly, of a total of 33 million votes cast in the 'strong-Communist' states in 1967, less than 2 per cent had voted for the Jana Sangh, whereas about a tenth of the migrants from 'strong-Communist' states supported the Jana Sangh in Bhilai. The same questions asked in relation to the Communists are equally applicable in relation to the Jana Sangh.

Of a total of 68 million votes cast in the 'strong-Jana Sangh' states in 1967 only five per cent went to the Communists, whereas a tenth of the migrants from these states to Bhilai supported the Communists. Is it an indication that the Communists in Bhilai were more efficient in attracting supporters from these than from other states?

Only four in ten in the 'strong-Jana Sangh' states voted for the Congress in 1967 whereas seven in ten migrants from these states to Bhilai supported the Congress. How did the Congress attract such a large proportion of supporters? Did the Congress achieve this support by impressing the migrants with its industrial development plans?

Finally, among the migrants from 'strong-Communist' states support for the Jana Sangh was low and opposition was quite high. Then how was it that the Jana Sangh attracted a large number of defectors from among the migrants from these states? Did the Jana Sangh adopt any specific strategy to penetrate into social sections which did not come under its influence in the past?

**Explanation**

A study of the interview schedules of the migrants from 'strong-Communist' states reveals that several factors operating simultaneously helped the Communists and the Jana Sangh to improve their position in Bhilai. The differential rates of migration of the people of various regions and social sections, the activities of the trade unions among these migrants, and the disappearance of small regional parties might be mentioned as the most important factors.
a) Areas of party influence

Within the 'strong-Communist' states it was from the areas of the highest Communist influence that most of these migrants came. For example, the Communists had been traditionally strong in the coastal districts of Andhra Pradesh, central and north Kerala and in the industrial centres in the West Bengal. An overwhelming majority of the migrants from the 'pro-Communist' states came from these areas. The proportions of migrants from the Telangana and Rayalasima regions, regions of Andhra Pradesh and the northern region of West Bengal -- areas where Communist influence was weak -- were negligible.

b) Migration of certain social groups

From within these regions, certain social groups among whom the Communist Party was popular, moved in larger numbers than other communities. A majority of the migrants from Andhra Pradesh came from Kamma, Naidu, Agnikula Kshtriya (fishermen), Setti Balija and Harijan communities. Only a few of the migrants belonged to the Reddy community -- numerically the largest caste in Andhra Pradesh and one with whom the Communists were not particularly popular. A majority of the migrants from Kerala came from the Nair or Eizhava communities from whom the Communists drew a high proportion of their strength. The rest of the migrants from Kerala were Christians. Muslims constituted about one third of the population in north Kerala and mostly supported the Muslim League, but only a negligible number of Muslims from that area migrated to Bhilai. A majority of the migrants from West Bengal came from the communities of Kayasta, Baidya and Namsudra. Excepting the Kayastas and Baidyas from West Bengal and the Brahmins in general, all the other respondents from these states were mostly the sons of middle and low income agriculturists, or agricultural labourers, the occupational groups that strongly supported the Communists.

c) Trade union activity

The relatively better performance of the Jana Sangh among the migrants in Bhilai than in the states of their origin can be attributed primarily to two factors. The Jana Sangh was actively involved in trade union work among the manual labourers from 'strong-Communist' states. These labourers belonged to the low income group (less than Rs200 per month) and came from untouchable or service castes, and previously had no connections whatsoever with the Jana Sangh; indeed some of them had been Communist sympathizers. On the eve of the 1967 election when there was a dispute
between the hospital management and these labourers, Sadhu, the Jana Sangh trade union leader, who contested the election on the Jana Sangh ticket, began a fast in protest and won their support. Most of the defectors from the Communists to the Jana Sangh from among the migrants from 'strong-Communist' states came from this section. It is, however, interesting to note that whereas the basis for supporting the Jana Sangh was essentially the attachment to traditional values in the case of high caste or high income groups, in the case of low income and low caste labourers it was a reward for the leader who offered to protect their employment rights.

d) Past political contacts

Among the respondents from 'strong-Jana Sangh' states, those with the RSS or the Hindu Mahasabha background from Maharastra and the Arya Samajists from Haryana invariably supported Jana Sangh and actively participated in the local RSS and Jana Sangh activities.

On the other hand regional and social group considerations did not operate in relation to the support extended to the Communists. The Communist support among these respondents came essentially from two sources. Firstly, there were a few educated people who developed faith in the ideology of Communism. For example, a couple of technical teachers who visited Russia on a training programme were so impressed with the industrial development in that country that they recommended a kind of 'Stalinist' regime for India. Secondly, there were a few skilled and semi-skilled workers who were previously employed in the steel factories or mining industries in Bihar or West Bengal. These had been members of the Communist trade unions there and continued to be so in Bhilai; they regularly voted for the Communists and extended strong support to them in Bhilai. With regard to the Congress it will be explained a little later how relative improvements in the standard of living led to increased support for the Congress among the migrants from 'strong-Jana Sangh' states.

OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY AND PARTY SUPPORT

Existing Literature

We have seen in chapter one how the castes of peasant proprietors have been inheriting the power of the upper castes who were the dominant local political influence in pre-independence India. The ability of the peasant proprietors to control and mobilize the rural electorate, the political power they acquired in the panchayat raj, cooperative institutions
and state politics, and the increasing pressure they extended on the federal centre, all combined to force the political parties to use these men as their main medium of contact and communication with the masses of the population. Further, their control over local politics has secured to them most of the gains from the abolition of the zamindari system, from new tenancy laws, from irrigation and drainage schemes, from rising prices for agricultural products, and from the green revolution and rural economic development generally. These factors have cumulatively enhanced the wealth, power and prestige of the peasant proprietors. By contrast, the conditions of life for the vast majority of the share croppers and agricultural labourers have failed to improve or even worsen, and the same has applied to the displaced traditional elites, and to the under-employed intelligentsia in the towns.

Many social scientists (Rudra 1969, 1971; Ladejinsky 1969; Kothari 1971b; Joshi 1971) have seen in this the fuel for an explosive political situation, of which the first signs lay in the polarization of support for the political parties, with the peasant proprietors bolstering the Congress or other ruling parties and the disaffected groups being increasingly organized by the opposition parties. The sociologists (Srinivas 1962; Beteille 1970) tended to view it as a caste struggle and the political scientists such as Kothari as a class conflict but having a similar effect.

The elections of 1962 and 1967 provided some evidence to confirm these expectations. Between 1962 and 1967 many voters changed parties. Only about a quarter of the electorate voted for Congress in both elections; it won few supporters from other parties while about one third of those who voted for non-Congress parties in 1967 were defectors from the Congress. On the surface these voting patterns seemed to reflect current election issues and party images. However, Kothari noted that Congress had retained the allegiance of a higher proportion of the prosperous voters and those who were satisfied with their well-being than of those whose economic condition had deteriorated; a greater proportion of the latter had transferred their support to the other parties. From this Kothari inferred that the Indian party system was likely to be further fragmented into pockets of right reaction and left militancy, each drawing some support from a growing lower middle class suffering from a sense of economic insecurity and general discontent (Kothari 1970b).
A study carried out in 1967 found that occupational mobility was significantly positively associated with factors such as urban residence, caste, literacy, income, and lack of cultivable land. Further, a higher proportion of mobile than non-mobile respondents took interest in politics and public affairs, themselves were engaged in election campaign activity, and were aware of the importance of elections and political parties as crucial instruments for influencing the government. Also a higher proportion of mobile than non-mobile respondents were members in voluntary associations and favoured greater government control (Nijhawan 1971).

So one can argue that because of differential access to economic and educational resources and ascriptive status certain social segments experience greater occupational mobility than others. Consequently, the initial stages of economic development are usually characterized by unequal distribution of economic benefits, in many cases, leading to greater economic inequalities and feelings of relative deprivation. In developing agricultural societies like India economic inequalities may grow both in rural and urban areas simultaneously because of modernization of agriculture and an expanding industrial sector. The middle classes play an important role in channelling occupational frustrations into political discontent. In this process opposition parties (particularly radical leftist parties) become increasingly popular with those whose economic welfare has deteriorated, while those who are happy with their general welfare are likely to support centre or right of centre parties. The cleavage in such a situation can be broadly described as that between those who want change and those who are happy with the status quo.

While the above findings and generalizations appear to be rational and may be true in some geographical regions and economic sectors, they are not true in the case of Bhilai. In fact if the situation in Bhilai is any guide for other industrial towns in India, economic and industrial development in these areas are accompanied by very high rates of occupational and income mobility and low income disparities.

Mobility Patterns in Bhilai

We have seen in the third chapter that for most of the migrants from rural areas their jobs in Bhilai represented an inter-generational mobility from agriculture or agriculture-allied to urban occupations. In most cases these migrants occupied manual, skilled, and lower civil service
### TABLE V.7

**Party Support by Occupational Mobility**
*(Bhilai, Raipur)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational mobility pattern of respondents</th>
<th>Total (N)</th>
<th>Party supported by respondent</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Congress %</td>
<td>Jana Sangh %</td>
<td>Communists %</td>
<td>Others %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhilai</td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved up</td>
<td>165</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved down</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raipur</td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved up</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved down</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Respondents who did not report the party they supported are excluded from the above table.

\[ x^2 = 9.3 \]

\[ x^2 = 5.45 \]
jobs. Even those who moved from rural to urban manual occupations had
jobs in Bhilai with higher job security and regular increments and
promotions. The salary difference between the highest and lowest
categories of employees was only seven to eight times in Bhilai, while it
was 60 to 70 times in Raipur.

The mobility considered here is intra-generational mobility --
the movement, if any, between the first and present jobs of the respondents.
But within each occupational category, particularly in Bhilai, there was
considerable scope for both occupational and income mobility. Promotions
from a lower to an immediately higher grade were offered as a matter of course
and double and triple promotions were not unheard of (see pages 121, 122, 123)
So the category of stable respondents in Bhilai represents relatively lower
rates of mobility rather than occupational or income immobility. In the
absence of any comparable data on intra-generational mobility it is
difficult to compare the situation in Bhilai with the situation in India
in general.

However, during interviewing it was my clear impression that the
respondents in Bhilai were aware that in Bhilai compared with many towns,
especially traditional towns, the opportunity structure was open and
promotional possibilities were great.

For the above-mentioned reasons it is reasonable to assume that
occupational mobility patterns in Bhilai will result in a lower degree
of social frustrations than in places of very high economic disparities
and limited employment opportunities. On the other hand, it is equally
possible that social sections which enjoyed high ascribed status and
privileges in the past but are now disaffected by the urban pattern of
life may seek new associational forms through which they can re-establish
the social distance between themselves and the old under-privileged
social sections. The political expression of this aspect could be that the
disaffected sections will support political parties that have respect
for the status quo or political parties through which they can still
retain their leadership roles. On the other hand, social sections who have
already experienced some change and some improvement in their economic
condition will ask for more and rapid change and support the parties that
promise it.

For these reasons it is reasonable to assume that occupational mobi-
licity patterns will cause a lower degree of differential in political support
and whatever relationships are found will have to be treated with caution.
Also as occupational mobility in Bhilai concealed a great amount of income
mobility and high aspirations I propose to utilize information on the
type of action suggested by respondents to solve their local problems,
to find out the patterns of political support.

Mobility and Party Support in Bhilai

Our data on Bhilai did not suggest any definite relationship
between occupational mobility and party support. It may be observed in
Table V.7 that the application of the Chi Square test did not confirm our
hypothesis that occupational mobility patterns and party support patterns
were likely to be interdependent. The data however, brought out some
interesting suggestive patterns. Though the Congress was supported
by more than 50 per cent in each category support for it was relatively
higher among those who were stable (61%) and among those who moved up
(58%) than among those who moved down (52%). On the other hand the
proportion of support for the Jana Sangh was the highest (20%) among
those who moved up, next highest among those who were stable (14%) and
lowest among those who moved down (11%). The support pattern in
relation to the Communists was just the reverse.

An examination of the basic data also reveals that among those
who moved up the Jana Sangh vote increased from 7 per cent in 1962 to
25 per cent in 1967, and the Congress vote steeply declined from 70 per
cent in 1962 to 49 per cent in 1967. The major gains of the Communists
came from among those who moved down (from 17 to 33%). We have however to
treat these patterns with great caution because our occupational mobility
data were based on a comparison between the first and the present jobs of
the respondents and the shifts in party choice were between 1962 and 1967.
We do not precisely know the occupational mobility patterns of respondents
between 1962 and 1967. In addition not all respondents voted in 1962
and 1967.

One's Own Welfare and Party Support

The above patterns of party support were further confirmed in
relation to solutions suggested by respondents to solve local problems.
In general both in Bhilai and Raipur those who were contented, those who
thought that there was nothing that they could do to solve the local
problems were more likely than others to support the Congress
(TABLE V.8). On the other hand, those who were discontented and
## TABLE V.8

**Party Supported by Solutions Suggested to Local Problems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solution suggested by respondent to local problems</th>
<th>Total (N)</th>
<th>Party supported by respondent</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Congress (%)</td>
<td>Jana Sangh (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhilai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resignation, no problem</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass action</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raipur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resignation, no problem</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass action</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 34.8 \]

\[ \chi^2 = 19.8 \]

Note: Respondents who did not report the party they supported are excluded from the above table.
advocated mass action to solve local problems and to protect workers' interests were more likely than others to support the Communists. In other words those who wanted to pressure the government for rapid socio-economic changes tended to support the Communists. The variations in support for Jana Sangh in relation to the above variables were only marginal.

**Explanation for Variations in Party Support**

The patterns of party support appear to have been based on two considerations. The first was the actual mobility achieved by the respondents in their careers and their perception whether their welfare had been improving, getting worse or was the same over the past decade. This perception and the consequent feeling of deprivation or fulfilment in their turn were dependent on the frame of reference and level of expectations of respondents. Secondly, the image of a particular party as an agent of change or ensurer of status quo or as a middle party was directly related to the patterns of party support.

a) Expectations of the middle class

The expectations of the middle class occupational groups were high. Quite a few of them believed that the opportunities for upward mobility were low or that their rightful share (promotion, increment, etc.) was denied because of favouritism and nepotism. They were highly critical of the government administration and blamed the working class for low productivity.

"Both politicians and administrators are faction-oriented on the basis of language, region and caste. There are no uniform rules and regulations. Tell me the name of the officer then I will state the rules and regulations applicable in practice. For example, my juniors who were less qualified were promoted over my head. Nobody works sincerely. I honestly feel that our country needs a dictator who can impose some sort of discipline, organization and devotion to work" (Manager of Safety Engineering Department).

"We discuss other countries also. We always hear about people going abroad to Canada and the USA. We hear the opportunities available there and how much salary they get there. Among the engineers, 'going abroad' is a common topic of discussion" (A Senior Design Engineer).

"The government should thoroughly reorganize the administration
of the public undertakings to give each man a fair deal. I know that this is the worry of many people. When a person feels secure with regard to his job and line of promotion, he can put his mind to work' (General Foreman in Charge, Roll Turning and Repairs Shop).

The three respondents who made the above comments started their employment career in Bhilai with a salary of about 250 rupees a month about 10 to 12 years ago. All three of them secured a minimum of four promotions and were drawing about 1400 to 1800 rupees a month at the time of the survey. Their criticism of the government was typical of the high level officials. Being high level officials they had first hand knowledge of corruption, favouritism and nepotism. And they unhesitatingly attributed the inefficiency to the party in power. But at the same time they were critical of the Communists who advocated radical economic and administrative changes.

Some of these officers who had experience in the private sector also made objective comparisons between the two. 'I am not much informed about the political developments in the country. I can only narrate my experiences in the workshop. The plant is overstaffed and under-worked... having worked in a private sector factory I was taught to be a disciplinarian. I insist on extracting full work from employees. I attend my workshop punctually and insist that all my subordinates should do the same. They do not like this. Everybody wants me to sign overtime which they had not done. Workers do not do their duties and management cannot impose discipline. How can we achieve targets?' said a foreman in the mechanical maintenance section.

This state of affairs was nicely summed up by the Deputy Chief Engineer when he said during the interview: 'People are dissatisfied here because they have never seen the outside world in this country. They earned promotions which they did not deserve. I recruited engineers before they passed out of their colleges. They earned four promotions within ten years. This is the highest rate of mobility in this country. They should be grateful for what they have got. Their rate of promotion made them over-estimate themselves. Now the pace of promotion is slow because all the posts are already filled up. Hence they are disgruntled'. Irrespective of the value judgments involved in the above assessment, the ground for anti-government and anti-Congress attitudes is obvious enough.
b) Expectations of working class

The situation was altogether different with regard to the occupational groups in the working class. The expectations of the labourers were low. Their main demands were food, shelter, clothing, and children's education at reasonable prices. Their frame of reference was highly related to the local opportunity structure. 'Those who joined along with me were given advance increments I was not given', 'the management should allot me better accommodation', 'we should have more drinking water facilities', 'we should have an elementary school for our children in our mother tongue' were the typical responses of this category of respondents. The labourers, in fact, were more appreciative of their improved position. A majority of these were previously irregularly employed hired labourers living in dilapidated thatched huts, with no reticulated water and electricity facilities. I can recall dozens of respondents whom I interviewed personally and who were proud of their regular pay packet, single room flat, reticulated drinking water and electricity facilities compared to the miserable standard of living they had back at home. In terms of social service done and votes secured the input and output ratio was quite high for the Congress among these sections.

Those who were stable within their groups in the middle class occupations or those who moved upward supported the Jana Sangh equally, not because the party was highly regarded as an agent of change but as a measure to protect the religious and traditional values while those who moved downwards voted for the Communist party which preached radical socio-economic changes.

Support for the Jana Sangh in Raipur

In Raipur the support secured by the Jana Sangh among those stable within the middle class occupational groups was high for slightly different reasons. Here the middle class stable respondents were mostly businessmen. They opted for the Jana Sangh both for religious and secular reasons. The Jana Sangh, apart from appealing to the Hindu sentiments strongly pleaded for protection of the interests of small businessmen. But the image of the party was not the same in all social sections. In the business community it was recognized as the party with high regard for traditional values.
Among the labourers who supported the Congress or the Communists the Jana Sangh earned the reputation of being a party of businessmen. Further, in the minds of labourers, businessmen were invariably associated with black marketing, high prices, and big profits. This image of the Jana Sangh was well described when a rickshaw puller I interviewed said, 'It is a party of businessmen. They were the people who hoisted Jana Sangh flags at every election. They never sold us things at fair prices'.

On the other hand, in the intermediate social groups and lower civil servants, the Jana Sangh was also recognized as an agent of change. The selfless and disciplined workers and the well-knit organization of the Jana Sangh appealed particularly to these sections who saw the party as an effective challenger to the Congress, which in their opinion misruled the country.

The conclusions can be summarized as follows. In both Bhilai and Raipur occupationally stable respondents gave higher than average support to the Congress. Here again stable middle class respondents gave less than average support and stable working class respondents gave more than average support to the Congress. Upwardly mobile respondents gave considerably more than average support to the Jana Sangh and the Congress and those who moved down tended to support the Communists. But what was the proportion of total variation in the support of different parties accounted for by the variables of mobility?

REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Regression Analysis -- Bhilai

The proportion of total variation in party support accounted for by the variables of territorial movement and occupational mobility was the highest in relation to the support for the Communists and the lowest in relation to the support for the Jana Sangh. Of the three classes of independent dummy variables based on political complexion of the state of origin, perception of whether one's own life was getting better or worse over the past ten years, and occupational mobility, the first class of dummy variables emerged as the most effective one. The effects of perception of one's own life and occupational mobility were nearly significant but the proportion of total variation in party support accounted for by them was little. The findings of the regression analysis were consistent with the observations made earlier from two-way and three-way tables.
### TABLE V.9

Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support for the Congress (Bhilai)

Number of cases = 569
Constant term = + 0.581
Coefficient of determination \((R^2) = 0.042\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Strong-Communist' state</td>
<td>-0.119</td>
<td>3.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Strong-Jana Sangh' state</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>2.683</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE V.10

Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support for the Jana Sangh (Bhilai)

Number of cases = 569
Constant term = + 0.177
Coefficient of determination \((R^2) = 0.023\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Strong-Communist' state</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>10.812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupationally upward mobile</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>3.039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
a) Congress

In relation to the support for the Congress the dummy variables of 'strong-Communist' and 'strong-Jana Sangh' states of origin produced F values above the ten per cent significance level. The direction of association of the former was negative and of the latter positive. The proportion of total variation accounted for by these two dummy variables was only 4.2 per cent. Yet the conditional probability of a migrant from a 'strong-Jana Sangh' state supporting the Congress was as high as .684, while that from a 'strong-Communist' state was as low as .462 (TABLE V.9). In a separate model the dummy variables of occupational stability and upward occupational mobility had only marginal positive effects on the support for the Congress. The F values of both these dummy variables were not statistically significant. The proportion of total variation accounted for by these dummy variables was less than one per cent. The same pattern was also observed in relation to the class of dummy variables based on perception of one's own life.

b) Jana Sangh

In relation to the support for the Jana Sangh the dummy variables of 'strong-Communist' state of origin and upward occupational mobility produced F values above the 10 per cent significance level. Of the above two dummy variables, the direction of association of the former was negative and that of the latter was positive. The proportion of total variation accounted for by these two dummy variables was only 2.3 per cent. But it is interesting that the conditional probability of a migrant from 'strong-Communist' states supporting the Jana Sangh was as low as .074, while that of those who moved occupationally upward was .235 and of those who migrated from 'strong-Communist' states and also moved occupationally upward was .132 (TABLE V.10). Other variables did not show any significant effect on the support for the Jana Sangh.

c) Communists

In relation to the party support for the Communists, the dummy variable of 'strong-Communist' state of origin emerged as the most effective and statistically significant independent variable and the proportion of total variation accounted for by it alone was 10.1 per cent (TABLE V.11). One would imagine that the dummy variable of 'strong-Jana Sangh' state of origin would show significant negative effect on the support for the Communists. But when this dummy variable was included
**TABLE V.11**

Regression Model:

Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support for the Communists (Bhilai)

Number of cases = 569  
Constant term = +0.106  
Coefficient of determination $(R^2)$ = 0.101

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Strong Communist' state</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>63.837</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE V.12**

Regression Model:

Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support for the Communists (Raipur)

Number of cases = 502  
Constant term = 0.097  
Coefficient of determination $(R^2)$ = 0.080

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Strong-Communist' state</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>34.946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life no change</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>8.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupationally stable</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>2.894</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in the regression model it showed only marginal negative effect. The conditional probability of a migrant from a 'strong Communist' state of origin supporting Communists in Bhilai was as high as .372 while that of a migrant from a 'strong Jana Sangh' state was as low as .099.

In other words the variable of state of origin was significantly related to the support of all political parties in Bhilai (TABLES V.9 V.10 and V.11) while the variable of occupational mobility was significantly related only to the support for the Jana Sangh and that too only in Raipur.

Regression Analysis -- Raipur

In relation to support for the Congress only the dummy variable of those who said there was no change in their life over the past ten years produced an F value above the 10 per cent significance level and the proportion of total variation in the support for the Congress accounted for by it was less than one per cent.

In relation to the support of the Jana Sangh the dummy variable of 'strong-Jana Sangh' state of origin produced an F value above the level of 10 per cent significance but the proportion of variation in Jana Sangh support accounted for by it was only about one per cent.

In relation to the support for the Communists, the dummy variables of 'strong-Communist' state of origin, the dummy variable of those who stated that there was no change in their life over the past ten years, and the dummy variable of occupational stability all produced an F value above the 10 per cent level of significance. Also the proportion of total variation accounted for by the above three dummy variables was eight per cent (TABLE V.12)

Joint Analysis of Socio-Economic and Mobility Variables

The inclusion of socio-economic and mobility variables in a single regression model had considerably improved the amount of total variation accounted for in each party's support in each town. The coefficient of determination ($R^2$) varied from 6.7 per cent for the Congress in Bhilai to 11.7 per cent for the Communists in Raipur. The results of this regression analysis are presented in Tables V.13 to V.18.

In relation to the support for the Congress in Bhilai, and in relation to the support for the Communists in Bhilai and Raipur, 'strong Communist' state of origin emerged as the most significant predictor of party support. In relation to the support for the Jana Sangh in Bhilai 'strong Communist' state of origin was significantly negatively associated, and in Raipur 'strong Jana Sangh' state of origin was significantly positively associated.
TABLE V.13

Regression Model:

Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support for the Congress (Bhilai). Independent Variables: Socio-economic and Mobility Dummy Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>569</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant term</td>
<td>+0.602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient of determination ( R^2 )</td>
<td>.067</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Strong Communist' state</td>
<td>-0.178</td>
<td>17.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-membership in associations</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>10.423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium income</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
<td>4.794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>-0.289</td>
<td>3.589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>3.964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>3.123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE V.14

Regression Model:

Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support for the Congress (Raipur). Independent Variables: Socio-economic and Mobility Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>502</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant term</td>
<td>+0.644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient of determination ( R^2 )</td>
<td>.068</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>-0.214</td>
<td>24.769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No membership in associations</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>9.982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE V.15
Regression Model:

Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support for the Jana Sangh (Bhilai). Independent Variables: Socio-economic and Mobility Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>569</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant term</td>
<td>+0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient of determination ($R^2$)</td>
<td>.088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>0.503</td>
<td>20.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmin-Bania</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>9.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Strong Communist' state</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
<td>8.723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>7.610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle age</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>3.175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE V.16
Regression Model:

Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support for the Jana Sangh (Raipur). Independent Variables: Socio-economic and Mobility Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>502</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant term</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient of determination ($R^2$)</td>
<td>.065</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brahmin-Bania</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>13.537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Strong Jana Sangh' state</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>6.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>5.808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
<td>3.715</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE V.17

Regression Model:

Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support for the Communists (Bhilai). Independent Variables: Socio-economic and Mobility Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>569</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant term</td>
<td>+0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient of determination ($R^2$)</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Strong Communist' state</td>
<td>0.261</td>
<td>61.604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member in cultural association</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>4.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade union member</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>4.194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE V.18

Regression Model:

Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support for the Communists (Raipur). Independent Variables: Socio-economic and Mobility Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>502</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant term</td>
<td>+0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient of determination ($R^2$)</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Regression coefficient</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Strong Communist' state</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>32.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly skilled</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>15.589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural native</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>8.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Change in life</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>6.736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle age</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>3.058</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In such a joint analysis the F statistic of the dummy variables based on occupational mobility was found to be less than ten per cent level of significance in relation to the support of all parties. Hence the dummy variables based on occupational mobility were deleted from these regression models. (TABLES V.13 to V.18).

In Bhilai membership in cultural associations and trade unions turned out to be significant predictors of support for the Communists while non-membership in such associations emerged as the second most significant variable in relation to the support for the Congress (TABLES V.13 and V.15).

The socio-economic groups from whom the Jana Sangh derived its support appeared to be same in both Bhilai and Raipur. Brahmin-Bania businessmen extended significant support to the Jana Sangh while Muslims turned away from it in both Bhilai and Raipur (TABLES V.15 and V.16).

CONCLUSIONS

The information contained in this chapter is relevant to the following hypotheses.

Firstly, it lends weight to the theory that shifts in party support in industrial towns were primarily related to issues and problems. The ability of a party to help secure workers' interests was assessed before supporting a party. The demands made on political parties varied from one social section to another.

Secondly, despite the defections that occurred among those respondents whose parents supported the Congress, a majority of the respondents continued to support and to vote for the parties that were supported by their parents.

Thirdly, it is proved that a migrant from a 'strong Communist' state was more likely to support Communists than a migrant from other states, and a migrant from a 'strong Jana Sangh' state was more likely to support Jana Sangh than a migrant from a 'strong Communist' state.

Fourthly, Congress and the Jana Sangh derived relatively higher support from occupationally stable and upwardly mobile respondents than from others. Our analysis also suggested that both in Bhilai and Raipur the Communists derived relatively higher support from respondents who moved down than from respondents who were occupationally stable or those who were upwardly mobile.

Fifthly, a comparison of the findings in Bhilai in the present and previous chapters reveals that the effect of the dummy variables based on socio-economic attributes and the dummy variables based on respondents' state of origin, and occupational mobility, was not similar on all
political parties.

The support for the Communists in Bhilai accounted for by the dummy variables based on territorial movement was much higher (10.1%) than the variation in Communist support accounted for (1.6%) by the dummy variables based on socio-economic attributes and involvement with voluntary associations. When the socio-economic and mobility variables were included in a single regression model, 'strong Communist' state of origin emerged as the most significant variable in accounting for the variation in Communist support.

The proportion of total variation in the support for the Jana Sangh in Bhilai accounted for by the dummy variables based on socio-economic attributes was far higher (8.1%) than the proportion of the total variation accounted for by the dummy variables based on territorial movement and occupational mobility (2.3%). When socio-economic and mobility variables were included in a single regression model, the occupational and social variables of businessmen, and Brahmin-Banias in Bhilai and Brahmin-Banias in Raipur emerged as the most significant variables in accounting for the variation in Jana Sangh Support.

On the other hand, in relation to the Congress in Bhilai, the proportion of total variation accounted for by the dummy variables based on socio-economic attributes and the dummy variables based on respondents' state of origin, was more or less the same (about 4%).
MOBILITY AND PARTY SUPPORT

1. For articles which highlighted these points see the special number on the Fourth General Elections in India, Political Science Review 6, 1967-1968; Election Outcome, Seminar 94, 1967; Power Patterns, Seminar 95, 1967.

2. For an excellent summary of the studies of political consequences of social mobility done in America and Europe, see S.M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1964. See especially the second chapter.

3. Though this question was asked in general terms about the political loyalty of the family, the respondents invariably took it to mean the political loyalty of their fathers. So 'parental political loyalty' and 'father's political loyalty' were used in the same sense in this chapter.

4. The Students' Federation was a pro-Communist students' organization which was very active in the early fifties; its influence is only nominal now. For an account of the student movement in India see Myron Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity. Bombay: Asia Publishing House 1963. See especially his seventh chapter, on students.

5. As per this classification, I included the states of Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and West Bengal in the category of 'strong-Communist' states; the states of MP, UP, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Bihar and the union territory of Delhi in the category of 'strong Jana Sangh' states, and all other states in the category of 'other states'. The inclusion of the state of Punjab in one of these groups posed a problem. The state of Punjab was divided into Punjab and Haryana only in 1966. The respondents who were born in these areas did not mention their state of origin clearly. The Jana Sangh is very strong in the state of Haryana and the Akalidal is very strong in the new Punjab state. So I included the states of both Punjab and Haryana in the category of other states. But it appears from the basic data that large numbers of the respondents from both these states supported the Jana Sangh. We can only infer on this basis that most of the migrants from the areas of old Punjab state came from urban areas in which the Jana Sangh and the Arya Samaj were strong.

6. These allegations were heard only from respondents engaged in high occupational grades. Semi-skilled and manual labourers did not mention any difficulties of this kind.

7. The dummy variables based on the political complexion of the state of origin were 'strong-Communists', 'strong-Jana Sangh', and 'other states'. The dummy variables based on the perception of one's own life whether it was getting better or worse over the past ten years were, 'life better', 'life no change', and 'life now worse'. The dummy variables based on occupational mobility were 'occupationally moved upward', 'occupationally stable' and 'occupationally moved downward'. In the regression models one
dummy variable from each class was excluded from the model. In relation to each party I first ascertained the effect of all the variables but later excluded the dummy variables whose F value was below the 10 per cent level of significance.
VI
STATE CULTURAL ASSOCIATIONS AND TRADE UNIONS

VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS IN THE WEST

A voluntary association may be defined as a formally organized group of people with a certain interest in common, who agree to meet and to act together in order to try to satisfy that interest or achieve that purpose. As social structures, voluntary associations have distinct features such as formal leadership, specific aims and objectives, rules and electoral procedures for operating, place and time of meeting (Rose 1968:390, 391). Some voluntary associations such as recreational and sports associations, the social and hobby clubs and the professional societies act only to express or satisfy the interests of their members. Hence they are called expressive groups. Other associations are directed outward; they wish to achieve some condition or change in some segment of the society and are called 'social influence' or 'instrumental' groups (Jacoby and Babchuk 1963).

Participation

Recent investigations in Europe and north America reveal that less than half of urban males do not participate in any voluntary association1 whatever. Associational membership is considerably lower in the rural counties and in rural farm segments of metropolitan counties. Participation in voluntary associations varies as between central city, suburb, and fringe areas. In general, middle and upper status males have higher participation rates and they join a wider range of associations than lower status males. Associational membership is also closely related to stability of residence. Younger migrants have higher participation rates than older migrants. Migrants from rural areas have considerably lower participation rates than migrants from urban areas. Participation rates are closely related to educational, occupational, religious and racial differences and social attitudes. For example, trade union membership is likely to be higher among low-income groups than among the high-income groups.

Leaders

Investigations in Europe and north America also reveal that leaders of voluntary associations tend to be better educated than the
general population. They usually hold professional and managerial positions, feel themselves to be members of the upper or upper-middle class, and participate in larger numbers of associations. Only a small proportion of the population is very active in associations though a large proportion join associations (Rose 1962).

Functions

Voluntary associations perform diverse functions. Some like manufacturers' and traders' associations and farmers' organizations can act as pressure groups and lobbies and distribute power to their members. Others, like labour unions and professional associations may keep their members informed on matters that affect their aims and interests and take collective action if necessary. While most voluntary associations act as agents of social change some associations may block social change. In a mass society where the individual feels anonymous, membership in voluntary associations gives him a feeling of identification with some smaller group that he can comprehend and influence. Again, membership in some exclusive voluntary associations such as 'Rotary' and 'Kiwanis' is a status symbol.²

In the light of the above discussion, in a new town like Bhilai the significance of voluntary associations as agents of integration and sources of new identifications can hardly be overstressed. Whether organized on the basis of state, language, occupation, profession, or even religion, all these are institutions to which the migrants can transfer their loyalties in their new place of residence.

VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS IN INDIA

Existing Literature

It would be dangerous to apply the findings of investigations in Europe and north America uncritically to India. The socio-economic surveys sponsored by the Research Programmes Committee and others already referred to tell little about the frequency of and participation in voluntary associations. Existing studies are also silent about the role of voluntary associations in moulding urban community life, particularly in resocializing the life of migrants to urban areas.

A survey conducted by N.V. Sovani in the city of Kolhapur (Maharastra) revealed only 63 voluntary associations including ten western
style clubs in a population of about a hundred thousand and their membership covered less than four per cent of the population (Sovani 1951:38,39). Sovani also observed that far fewer associations existed in Bangalore, the capital city of Mysore state than in Kolhapur. On the other hand a survey conducted by Irawati Karve and Ranadive in Phaltan (a town of about 20,000 population in the state of Maharashtra) did not mention any significant voluntary association but reported that an unusually high percentage of respondents (25%) were members of political parties and 20 per cent were members of trade unions (Karve and Ranadive 1965:95,96). Some writers suggest that most of the artisan castes and some religious sects are inclined to organize themselves into caste and religious councils with a well defined sphere of action and membership (Gadgil 1952). This is more noticeable in urban than in rural areas. Irawati Karve and Ranadive in their study of Phaltan (Karve and Ranadive 1965:95) and N.V. Sovani in his studies on Kolhapur and Poona (Sovani 1952:212-243) wrote at length about the activity of these urban caste associations. A study by V.S. D'souza on Chandigarh, the newly built capital city of Punjab state, mentioned 151 voluntary associations (D'souza 1968:384-387). It was stated that about 11 per cent of the heads of households were members of one voluntary association and slightly more than 2 per cent were members of two or more voluntary associations. Of those who were members of voluntary associations, about 26 per cent were said to be active participants as office bearers. Membership in voluntary associations was highest in the highest occupational group. There was, however, no significant association between the prestige level of the occupational grade and the percentage of office bearers among members of voluntary associations (D'souza 1968:199).

State Cultural Associations

A. Bopegamage in his study of urban sociology in Delhi did not directly investigate voluntary associations but mentioned more than 20 clubs and associations under the heading of 'semi-public recreational agencies'. Of these, ten were western style cosmopolitan clubs such as 'Rotary' and 'Lions'. He did not specify the membership of these associations but indicated that most of the western style clubs were popular among upper and upper-middle income groups. Under the heading of 'community clubs' he mentioned state cultural associations such as 'Maharastra Club', 'Kerala Club', 'Bengali Club', 'South Indian Club' and 'Anglo-Indian Club'. These associations cut across sub-regional, religious, caste and income divisions. According to him the Kerala Club was one of the biggest community
CHART VI.1
Activities of Voluntary Associations

March 1, 1971

Today In Delhi

- ISU Baldev Krishna Kalyan Mahakarun.- Sherborne, Raynham Road, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m.
- Shri Varunacharya.- Jai Bhawan, 5-20 p.m.
- goat, Bharatiya Kala Kendra—Dahdhi Ekadashi Purnima and Bhojan. 7-15 p.m.
- Lalit Kala Akademi.- Artistic Colours, 10 a.m. to 5 p.m.
- Mahatma Gandhi Smriti.- Film show, 5-45 p.m.
- Yoga Prasad Samiti.- Mr R. S. Shorrosh to speak, Yoga Prasad Samiti, 7-15 p.m.

March 2, 1971

Today In Delhi

- ISU Baldev Krishna Kalyan Mahakarun.- Sherborne, Raynham Road, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m.
- Shri Varunacharya.- Jai Bhawan, 5-20 p.m.
- goat, Bharatiya Kala Kendra—Dahdhi Ekadashi Purnima and Bhojan. 7-15 p.m.
- Lalit Kala Akademi.- Artistic Colours, 10 a.m. to 5 p.m.
- Mahatma Gandhi Smriti.- Film show, 5-45 p.m.
- Yoga Prasad Samiti.- Mr R. S. Shorrosh to speak, Yoga Prasad Samiti, 7-15 p.m.

March 4, 1971

Today In Delhi

- India International Centre.—Film evening, American movies from India, 7.30 p.m.
- ISU Baldev Krishna Kalyan Mahakarun.- Sherborne, Raynham Road, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m.
- Shri Varunacharya.- Jai Bhawan, 5-20 p.m.
- goat, Bharatiya Kala Kendra—Dahdhi Ekadashi Purnima and Bhojan. 7-15 p.m.
- Lalit Kala Akademi.- Artistic Colours, 10 a.m. to 5 p.m.
- Mahatma Gandhi Smriti.- Film show, 5-45 p.m.
- Yoga Prasad Samiti.- Mr R. S. Shorrosh to speak, Yoga Prasad Samiti, 7-15 p.m.

March 5, 1971

Today In Delhi

- ISU Baldev Krishna Kalyan Mahakarun.- Sherborne, Raynham Road, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m.
- Shri Varunacharya.- Jai Bhawan, 5-20 p.m.
- goat, Bharatiya Kala Kendra—Dahdhi Ekadashi Purnima and Bhojan. 7-15 p.m.
- Lalit Kala Akademi.- Artistic Colours, 10 a.m. to 5 p.m.
- Mahatma Gandhi Smriti.- Film show, 5-45 p.m.
- Yoga Prasad Samiti.- Mr R. S. Shorrosh to speak, Yoga Prasad Samiti, 7-15 p.m.

March 7, 1971

Today In Delhi

- ISU Baldev Krishna Kalyan Mahakarun.- Sherborne, Raynham Road, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m.
- Shri Varunacharya.- Jai Bhawan, 5-20 p.m.
- goat, Bharatiya Kala Kendra—Dahdhi Ekadashi Purnima and Bhojan. 7-15 p.m.
- Lalit Kala Akademi.- Artistic Colours, 10 a.m. to 5 p.m.
- Mahatma Gandhi Smriti.- Film show, 5-45 p.m.
- Yoga Prasad Samiti.- Mr R. S. Shorrosh to speak, Yoga Prasad Samiti, 7-15 p.m.

Source: The Statesman, 1 March to 7 March 1971.
clubs in the city. It had a large number of active members. Its main object was to promote social intercourse among its members and to undertake all such activities as might be necessary for the promotion of Kerala culture and the interests of the Kerala community. It provided facilities for different types of indoor and outdoor games and organized variety entertainments on special occasions. Its members belonged to high and low income groups and the membership fee was fixed by reference to each member's monthly income (Bopegamage 1957:153). However, there is evidence to indicate that active voluntary associations are far more numerous in Delhi than is suggested by Bopegamage. An analysis of the 'days' engagements' published over a period of one week in The Statesman from New Delhi indicated that more than 50 different voluntary associations arranged cultural programmes, discussions or discourses open to the public. In addition, several exhibitions were arranged by other associations (CHART VI.1).

Political Role of State Associations

But what is the precise role played by the regional associations in the social and political fields? Literature on Indian urban communities does not throw much light on this aspect. A study carried out by Meillassoux in an African urban community made some generalizations which seem to be equally applicable to the Indian situation (Meillassoux 1968). After investigating 30 regional associations in the town of Bamako in Mali, constituted by migrants from a particular town, circle or canton, Meillassoux concluded that regional associations cut across tribal and occupational boundaries. Most of the migrants belonged to one association or another. The aims and objectives of these associations were simple, the most important being regional solidarity to face the difficulties of the new urban environment, financial help and mutual assistance on occasions of baptism, circumcision, marriage, illness, death, and sometimes merely misfortune, and occasional entertainment and cultural programmes. Of the 30 regional associations only two had political and educational objectives. Of a total of 245 officials of these 30 regional associations, as many as 225 were from middle class occupations and only 20 were described as traditional or skilled workers (Meillassoux 1968:61-63). As a majority of the migrants in Bhilai were interstate migrants and about two-thirds of all the respondents moved across their language and cultural boundaries, we could expect a high degree of participation in state cultural associations.
Trade Unions

The birth of the organized trade union movement in India can be traced to the 1920s. Since then the movement has expanded enormously. The total number of registered unions increased from 29 in 1927-28 to 13,023 in 1965 (Shamlal 1969:120). During the same period the total membership returned by the registered unions increased from 0.1 to about 4.5 millions. One scholar estimated that from 1952 to 1961 the labour force that could be potentially unionized increased by 4.7 millions while the trade union membership increased only by 2.2 millions (Johri 1967:32). The growth, however, was not even as between different sectors, geographical regions, trade union federations, or unions of different size.

The degree of unionization (proportion of union members to total eligible employees) was high in industries such as leather products (96%), mining and quarrying (52%), basic metals and textiles (49%), while it was low in such industries as gins and presses (2%) and was negligible in the primary sector (quoted in Johri 1967: 42,43).

Because the trade union movement was limited to large scale mining and manufacturing industry there was a close association between the degree of industrialization and the degree of unionization of the labour force in a particular state. For example in 1968 the states of West Bengal, Kerala, Maharastra, Madras, and Uttar Pradesh contained about half of the registeres trade unions and more than half of the trade union members in the country. On the other hand, the number of trade unions was low in the states of Rajasthan, Assam, and Orissa where industrialization has barely begun (Shamlal 1969:120).

Trade unions in India are organized under four officially recognized national federations of different ideological persuasions. These are the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC: pro-Congress), the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC: pro-Communist), the Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS: pro-Socialist), and the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC: pro-Revolutionary Socialist Party). Of these trade union federations, the first was formed in 1920 and the others in 1947-48. But despite the preferential treatment given by the government to the INTUC in the matters of recognition and consultation, it has grown more slowly than other federations. For example, from 1952 to 1968 the total membership of the INTUC increased by 111 per cent, that of the HMS increased by 100 per cent and that of the UTUC increased by 54 per cent. During the same period the total membership of the AITUC increased by 650 per cent. During the
same period the proportion of INTUC membership in the total union membership in the country considerably declined while that of the AITUC nearly tripled and those of the HMS and UTUC both steeply declined. That is to say, the proportion of pro-Communist trade union membership greatly increased at the expense of the Congress and non-Communist leftist unions. 7

Many trade unions in India are very small. Some scholars rightly argue that such a fragmentation of unions, caused by inter-union rivalry in the same bargaining territory and the creation of independent plant unions, has weakened the trade union movement in the country (Johri 1967: 60, 61).

As unionization is very high in the heavy industrial sector and public sector undertakings one can infer that unionization is higher in manufacturing towns than in trade and commercial towns. Surveys in new industrial towns clearly indicate that a considerable proportion of factory labourers are members of registered unions (Mohsin 1964).

All trade unions in India are organized primarily on a class basis to fight for workers' interests but they differ among themselves over the means by which to carry out the fight. Exploitation of sectional loyalties is negligible in organizing the unions. But workers' immediate interests are subordinated to ultimate trade union goals, and in their turn the ultimate unions goals are subordinated to the objectives of different political parties (Subramanian 1967: 195-196). Consequently, unions are forced to remain largely non-sectional.

Trade union leadership in India has been dominated throughout by middle class political leaders outside the working class, a finding by two restricted surveys on the socio-economic and political background of trade union leadership. 8 A majority of the leaders were outsiders (72%) or ex-employees (16%). By occupation they were lawyers, teachers, priests or ex-government employees. There was considerable overlap between the membership of a trade union and that of the political party that promoted it, between the power structure of the union and the power structure of the party. Also a majority of the trade union leaders retained their power over a long period of time (Subramanian 1967: 194; Mathur and Mathur 1957: 250-255; Punekar and Madhuri 1965).

Hypotheses

On the basis of the existing literature one can suggest the following hypotheses. The number of voluntary associations and the level
of popular participation in them are proportionately lower in India than in western countries. Trade union activity in India is mostly limited to urban areas and manufacturing industry. Within urban areas participation in trade unions is likely to be higher in industrial towns based on heavy industries than in traditional cities based on service occupations.

State cultural associations are likely to be more developed in big cities and industrial towns than in small towns. The reasons are simple. In big cities and industrial towns migrants from across the language and state boundaries are likely to be found in sufficiently large numbers to form such associations, while in small towns and traditional cities like Raipur most of the migrants are likely to come from nearby areas. Inter-state migrants and those from different language areas are more likely to form associations than migrants from nearby areas. Such migrants usually belong to different castes, religions, occupations, and income groups. Only wider loyalties which are common to all members can bring them together and create new identities. Such common bonds are language, culture, regional customs, and traditions. Once a sufficiently large number of migrants from a state is present in a town the formation of a cultural group is a natural consequence. On the other hand, local residents are familiar to one another in the locality. Hence they are more likely to develop community and locality loyalties than uprooted migrants.

Occupationally, membership of trade unions is likely to be highest among the industrial workers and membership of state cultural associations is likely to be highest among the middle and upper middle income groups. The leaders of both trade unions and state cultural associations are likely to be highly educated and belong to middle class occupations including the professions.

One can also infer than initially, the activities of all voluntary associations will be aimed at social integration by cutting across the boundaries of primordial groups. For example, outside the circle of their family and friends the trade union as an interest group is likely to unite the industrial labourers, while state cultural associations are likely to unite those in middle class occupations as a cultural or ethnic group. Depending on their aims and objectives voluntary associations will function as integrative agents up to some level and thereafter some may function as divisive (though not on purpose) and others may continue as integrative forces. As most of the trade unions in India have developed
sympathies towards particular political parties, the participation of respondents in trade unions has direct political consequences. On the other hand, state associations may not always have direct political or voting consequences. If one wants to classify the associations on the basis of their involvement in politics and elections, there are the political parties and the trade unions at one end of the spectrum and non-political religious or cultural associations at the other end.

One can, however, also hypothesize that the extent to which a particular association is exploited for political ends depends on the value dispositions of its members and the ability of a particular political party to penetrate the membership of that particular association. For example, the RSS is a voluntary cultural association which was established long before the Jana Sangh came into being. But now there is considerable ideological affinity and overlap of membership between the two and they work hand in glove at the time of election, yet continue as separate bodies.

In the context of the present study in Bhilai, therefore, I would expect the existence of rival trade unions (the INTUC playing a major role), several state cultural associations and at least some religious and caste bodies. I also hypothesize that both religious and secular associations function as integrative forces up to the level of secondary group relations on the basis of common occupational interest or common language, culture, place of birth, caste or religion. Such activity is likely to be higher in Bhilai than in Raipur.

**Associations in Bhilai**

At the time of the survey, excluding the agricultural and consumer cooperative societies and cooperative farming societies, there were 27 trade union, cultural and religious organizations in Bhilai. These can be meaningfully dichotomized on several criteria such as religious or secular, national or parochial, expressive or action-oriented, interest or culture-based, and active or passive. The dividing lines were of course thin and there was considerable overlapping of functions, aims, objectives, and membership of different associations. Yet all these associations could be legitimately classified as voluntary associations for the following reasons. All were formally organized and many registered. They had a core of active participants, many fund contributors, an eager audience, and they held regular meetings. Some of them were also affiliated to their counterpart regional and national organizations.
In what follows, I analyse the survey data and the interviews with the leaders of different associations and trade unions (for details of leadership interviews see Appendix III and IV), to determine the characteristics and the social and political roles of these associations. I deal with them under three different headings, viz. cultural, trade union and religious organizations.

STATE CULTURAL ASSOCIATIONS IN BHILAI

Characteristics

Of the 13 state cultural associations in Bhilai the (seven) non-Hindi state cultural bodies of Tamil Nadu, Kerala (two), Andhra, Mysore, Maharastra and West Bengal were the most active and they shared some characteristics.

Firstly, each had about a dozen office-bearers. A majority of the office-bearers of these (president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, etc.) had university education and came from high occupational groups and their present salary was three to ten times higher than their first salary.

Secondly, each of the associations had regularly subscribing members (300 in Andhra Sahitya Samithi, 100 in Maharastra Mandal, 400 in Malayala Grandha Sala, 200 in Kerala Kala Kendram and 350 in Bangiya Krishti Parishad). Most of the members came from middle class occupational and income groups but they were distributed among all sub-regions, religions and castes. Non-natives of the state concerned also made generous financial contributions on special occasions and attended the cultural functions.

Aims and Objectives

The principal objectives of each of these associations were the retention of regional identity, the propagation of the region's culture, and the service of those community interests that were otherwise uncared for by the government or plant administration. A library with books in the regional language, educational facilities for children in the regional language, the construction of a common meeting hall, the erection of a temple for the regional deity, and the arrangement of occasional cultural programmes were some of the stated aims and objectives. In other words, outside the circle of family and friends the state association provided a reference group with which the respondent could feel culturally at home.
and on which he can fall back in times of difficulty. For example, the Andhra Sahitya Samithi (Andhra literary council) was planning for a marriage hall at the time of the survey. The Gujarathi Samaj (Gujarat state society) had a regular fund to help friends in times of difficulties or to arrange funerals for the less fortunate.\textsuperscript{12}

The organizational and cultural activities of these associations were cautious. They worked in a spirit of mutual cooperation rather than competition. They tried to be as acceptable as possible to the society at large, and to minimize their parochial focus their membership was open to anybody who wanted to join, irrespective of region, religion, caste or class (Bhilai Tamil Manram 1965:6). Of all the state cultural associations, only the Maharastra Mandal (Maharastrian council) restricted its membership -- to Marathi speakers.\textsuperscript{13} Migrants to Bilai contributed to and attended the cultural and even religious functions of other language groups.

\textbf{Common Bonds and Religious Symbols}

Each association sought and successfully exploited some commonly accepted regional, religious and even political symbols to rally the local community under a single social banner. Thus the Maharastra Mandal observed Ganesh chaturdhi, Dassarah and Sankranthi -- all popular Hindu festivals in Maharastra state. It celebrated Shivaji Jayanti -- the birthday of the mediaeval Maharastrian hero, and Tilak Jayanti -- the birthday of a popular Maharastrian political leader of national prominence early in this century. It got up drama performances and concerts -- both arts which were very well developed in the state of Maharastra. For all these functions steel plant officials usually of other language groups were invited as chief guests.

The Bangiya Krishti Parishad (Bengal cultural council) celebrated Durga punja (worship of the goddess Durga) with full fanfare and was supported and financed by all Bengalis irrespective of their political affiliations. It also celebrated the birthdays of Ramakrishna Paramahamsa and Vivekananda, both Bengali-born Hindu religious saints of national importance; of Netaji Subash Chandra Bose, the founder of the Indian National Army during the second world war; and also that of Ravindranath Tagore -- Nobel prize winner and author of India's national anthem.

The Kerala Kala Kendrum (Kerala cultural centre) was more active and enterprising. It celebrated 'Onam' festival and Kerala-Day,\textsuperscript{14} and
organized music concerts, drama performances and sports events for children. It also conducted Malayalam language classes for all those who were prepared to learn.

The Andhra Sahitya Samithi, the Bhilai Tamil Manram (Bhilai Tamil club) and the Bhilai Kannada Sangha (Bhilai Kannada society) were run more or less on the same lines but the latter two were far more systematically organized and financially sound than the first.

Securing a plot of land from the project authorities, building a temple, a library and a common purpose hall were among the most ambitious aims of every one of these organizations. All the associations had run elaborate fund-collecting campaigns for these purposes. For example, the Bhilai Tamil Manram had already built a temporary Vinayaka temple on the site allotted to it and set a collection target of half a million rupees to construct a permanent temple-library complex. The Andhra Sahitya Samithi aimed at collecting 200,000 rupees for a similar purpose though on a much more moderate scale.

Why did the cultural associations that sharply cut across all other primordial loyalties emphasize religion so much? This was at first puzzling because there were already several temples in the town presided over by different Hindu deities. The question was quite convincingly answered by K.C. Pillay, President of Kerala Kala Kendram. When I asked him why the people of each state wanted to have their own temple he said: 'I do not think any of the organizers of these associations are so deeply god-minded. For constructing temples there are two reasons. Firstly, BSP (Bhilai Steel Project) is allotting us land only on a temporary basis and that too on lease. Legally it can take the land back whenever it wants. But if we construct a temple on the site the area becomes a religious property and the BSP cannot take it back. Secondly, almost all these associations have plans for expensive construction projects. Our primary aims are a school, a library and a cultural centre. We add a temple to this complex only to induce the people to make generous financial contributions. I think this is true of all other associations'. Later this interpretation was corroborated by the leaders of most other associations. So the construction of a temple was a device to gain permanent ownership rights over the piece of land allotted by the plant, and also a symbol to integrate the people of that particular state and to raise funds for secular ends. The leaders of all state associations were highly educated, their main aims were secular but they were aware that people would contribute more willingly if a religious cause was also included in their aims.
Religious Minorities

It was, however, surprising that none of these state associations showed any inclination to exploit Muslim or Christian religious symbols to encourage the participation of their adherents in the social life of the community. None of the state associations attempted even to celebrate Christmas or Easter, Id or Ramjan. Yet the Muslims and the Christians, particularly those who hailed from the south Indian states, were members of and eagerly participated in the cultural functions organized by their state associations. And the Hindus hailing from the same regions did not have much hesitation in sharing food and drink with their Muslim or Christian friends and neighbours. Yet the Muslims and the Christians had to depend on their masjid or church to celebrate their functions. The strategy of state cultural associations obviously was to draw maximum cooperation and minimum opposition from within their own ranks.

Agents of Integration

To what extent did these state associations succeed in integrating the migrants from their respective regions? A categorical answer to this question is difficult. A large number of those who joined the associations belonged to middle class occupations, showing that the ability of an association to integrate the migrants from its region depended to some extent on the occupational homogeneity of those migrants. For example, most of the migrants from the state of Mysore were engineers, senior civil servants or skilled supervisors, and membership of and participation in the Kannada Sangha was universal. Most of the migrants from Tamil Nadu had middle class occupations and most of them were members of Tamil Manram. On the other hand, migrants from Kerala were distributed over a whole range of occupations from top to bottom and membership in the Kerala state clubs was almost universal. The Bengali and Telugu associations were exclusively middle class affairs. Labourers from these states were not usually involved in the cultural functions of their associations. One could detect cultural variations in the patterns of integration. Contacts between the high and low occupational groups were more frequent among the Keralites and Tamils than among the Telugus and Bengalis.

The ability of a state association to integrate the migrants from its areas was also limited by the social and cultural needs of the community. The state cultural associations of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh existed only in name. They had no regular subscribers, they did
not organize any cultural programmes and had no plans of any kind to build libraries or cultural centres. Bhilai is located in a Hindi-speaking state, so that those migrants from Hindi-speaking states were still living within their cultural and language area. Socially they had a feeling of security. When asked about this complacency, B.N. Singh, president of the Uttar Pradesh association said: 'People of all other states are constructing their own temples and cultural centres. We do not want any. People from our region are already organized under Sanathan Dharma Sabha (an orthodox Hindu society). It has already constructed temples in different parts of the town. We already have Hindi medium school here. We do not have any problem'.

Political Role

The political consequences of the integrative functions of these associations were not clear. To my question: 'Do you think that people carreid political attitudes from their native places to this town? Do the participants in your association indulge in any political activities?' B.L. Majumdar, Secretary of the Bangiya Krishti Parishad, said: 'I think I say yes to this. Once a person is politically-minded and has absorbed the ideology of a party it is difficult for him to come out of it. A few Bengalis here did try to use both Kali Bari and Bangiya Krishti Parishad as leftist political platforms. But they did not succeed in their attempts. People who already had some political sympathies not only continue to hold them here also but try to propagate them if it is possible.' K.C. Pillay of the Kerala Kala Kendram had a slightly different opinion: 'It is difficult to say. While the hard core of every party is likely to continue to have the same political attitudes moderate sympathizers may change their opinions after seeing the progress in the country at large. You can take my own example. Once I voted only for the Communist Party but now I give one vote to the Congress and one vote to the Communists. Whenever we organize a function most of the Keralites do attend but I don't think that all of them stand under the same banner. There is, however, no ban on informal political discussions.' Replying to the same questions, B.S. Joshi, of Maharastra Mandal, said: 'Yes, in fact most of the members of our association are also members or sympathizers of the Jana Sangh. Our Vice-President is one of the office-bearers of the Jana Sangh.'

We have observed already that a relative majority of the migrants from Kerala, Andhra, and West Bengal supported Communists and most of them
were members of the state associations, while the migrants from Maharastra played a vital role in organizing the RSS and Jana Sangh. The state associations did not appear to have been directly involved in any political activities. Some active members and office-bearers of these associations also played an active role in organizing political parties. Perhaps some meetings of the associations were utilized for unofficial discussion on politics and elections.

The Bhilai Mahila Samaj (Bhilai ladies' society) was in a class by itself and an excellent modern interest group. It drew its leadership primarily from the wives of officers with high incomes. With more than a thousand regular members mostly from the middle income groups but of all regions, languages and states, it opened branches in every sector of the town. Its primary aims were to provide recreation for all housewives and to explore spare time employment opportunities particularly for lower middle class housewives. It succeeded in these objectives by organizing tailoring classes and taking contract work to stitch uniforms for security forces. The organization until the time of the survey was certainly non-political. But answering my question whether members of her association had any particular political preferences, Mrs Chopra, Vice-president of the Samaj, said: 'Yes, we are all proud of what Indira Gandhi has been doing. She has nationalized the banks, won the presidential election and is fighting the old-guard Congress leaders single-handed. As women of this country we all think it is our duty to support her. I think the general opinion is in favour of the Congress'. Her opinion was significant in the then prevailing political atmosphere, though one can wonder how far housewives act independently of their husbands. The election survey report prepared by Srinivasan and Subramaniam brought out that more women than men voted for religious rightist parties (Srinivasan and Subramaniam 1969a: 88).

RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS

There were altogether seven organizations which could be called truly religious and in terms of community solidarity they fell into two categories. Firstly, Shri Gurusingh Sabha (Sikh), the Masjid Committee (Muslim), the Catholic Church, and the Jain Milan (Jainist) all represented important minority communities in India and possessed a very high sense of solidarity. Secondly, the Sanathan Dharma Sabha, the Arya Samaj and Kali Bari represented different sects within the Hindu fold and only a small
fraction of the Hindus supported them.

**Muslims and Christians**

In the first category the solidarity of Muslims and Christians was high and their political preferences were unambiguous. According to the information supplied by Rashid Khan, Secretary of the Masjid Committee there were about 2,000 Muslim families in Bhilai. They came from different states such as Kerala, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh and belonged to different income groups and sub-sects. Yet almost all of them were members of the Committee. They made regular financial contributions for the construction of a masjid and a school and attended weekly prayers at the masjid. Muslims were quite vocal in their support for the Congress. Barring a few individuals who preferred the Communist party, all had supported the Congress previously, and they continued to do so in Bhilai. If anything, Muslim solidarity and its support for Congress had been strengthened by the activities of the local RSS and the Jana Sangh and by the general consensus in the Muslim community that only Congress could protect them. 'We feel this solidarity is highly essential for our survival. A majority of us certainly feel that only the Congress can protect us', said Mir Ali Nady, an active participant in the Masjid Committee. Our survey data clearly confirmed this opinion. There was not a single Muslim who voted Jana Sangh and in fact a big majority of Muslims opposed the Jana Sangh.

The situation was more or less the same with regard to Christians. They also came from different states such as Kerala, Goa, Mysore, Maharashtra, West Bengal, and Madhya Pradesh, they numbered slightly more than the Muslims and their community solidarity and support for Congress and their opposition to the Jana Sangh were equally zealous. Of the others the Jains were few in numbers and most were migrants from Gujarat; and their sympathies were divided between the Jana Sangh and the Congress.

**Sikhs**

Shri Gurusingh Sabha (Gurusingh conference) was a Sikh religious organization. Membership in the Sabha was universal among the Sikhs irrespective of caste, occupation and income. They had regularly attended the gurudwara at weekends and distributed sweets and cool drinks on religious occasions to the population at large all over the town. Sikh migrants were
hard working, industrious and enterprising, and were in fact the only respondents who took up a second job during their spare time. In the absence of the Akali Dal, the Sikh religious party in Punjab, the preference of most Sikhs in Bhilai was for the Congress and of the next largest group for the Jana Sangh. A few Sikhs were openly critical of the Communists. 'I have a few Communist colleagues in the workshop. They do less work and make more noise and want to argue with everybody in the workshop', said a Sikh respondent.

Sanathan Dharma Sabha and Arya Samaj

The Sanathan Dharma Sabha and the Arya Samaj are poles apart in their religious outlook. The first stands for orthodox Hindu principles and Vedic life including the caste system. The second is a reformatory sect encouraging reconversion of converts to the Islamic and Christian faiths back into the Hindu fold. The membership of the Sabha came from migrants from north Indian states, particularly those from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh. The Sabha had only 150 subscribing members but was very enterprising in raising funds through donations and lucky prize schemes. It had already constructed three temples, one dispensary, and one marriage hall. At the time of the survey the Sabha had drawn up a plan to raise half a million rupees to construct a big Lakshminarayan temple. Srikrishna Janmashtami (Krishna's birthday) and Shivaratri (Shiva's night) were the most important functions that the Sabha celebrated. According to Narendra Prasad Sinha, the General Secretary, the Sabha was a purely religious and non-partisan organization. Only two respondents in the survey were members of the Sabha and both thought that the Congress was most likely to improve conditions of employees like themselves. Yet they had clear sympathy for the Jana Sangh and were very critical of the alien ideology of the Communists. 'The Jana Sangh is good but it is a long way before they can come to power. So what is the immediate benefit in supporting it?' was the general attitude. The Arya Samajists on the other hand came mostly from Punjab and Haryana where the Samaj is very popular. In Bhilai the Samaj was dormant as an organization. The impressive Prārthāna Mandir (worship hall) that it constructed in the town was the product of the generosity of an Arya Samajist contractor. Like the RSS workers the Arya Samajists were strong supporters of the Jana Sangh. But their number was negligible.
Agents of Integration or Division?

Several generalizations can be made about the integrating or divisive effect and the political implications of the religious associations in Bhilai. Firstly, participation in an association was almost universal among the religious minorities while it was very low in the case of the sectarian Hindu organizations. Secondly, the cementing force in the state associations was language or culture while in the case of the religious associations it was religious persuasion. Thirdly, in the case of the state associations, it was the loyalties of religion, caste, and sub-region that were weakened while in the case of religious associations it was the loyalties of state and sub-sect that were weakened. In both cases the transfer of allegiance from a small to a new and bigger group was obvious. But in the case of Sanathan Dharma Sabha and the Arya Samaj, although members might have come from different states they belonged to the same language group (Hindi). In the case of the Sikhs they came mostly from the Punjab and Punjabi was their mother tongue.

It is, however, wrong to conclude that the solidarity of the Muslims and the Christians was purely religious and non-political. For example, the Muslims in Bhilai considered that a vote against the Jana Sangh and in favour of the Congress or a leftist party was as essential for their survival as their religious solidarity. In fact one gets the impression that but for the constant and intensive anti-Muslim and anti-Christian campaign carried on by the Jana Sangh and the RSS, the minorities would have been less zealous about religious solidarity. Furthermore, in the case of the orthodox Hindu groups, loyalty to the Jana Sangh was a vote of approval of its ideology while in the case of the religious minorities religious solidarity and a vote for the Congress were protective measures.

TRADE UNIONS

Participation in Unions

There were four trade unions in Bhilai at the time of the survey, organized as labour wings of the Congress (INTUC), Communists (AITUC), Jana Sangh (BMS) and Samyuktha Socialist (HMP) parties respectively. The INTUC was the biggest and indeed the only recognized trade union in the steel plant. Consequently an overwhelming majority of the workers, including some of those who had faith in the leftist political parties, joined the INTUC as a matter of expediency. Only those who had strong ideological
convictions or whose interests were actively defended by the union leaders had joined the leftist or rightist trade unions. Of a total of 621 respondents in Bhilai 195 (31%) were members of one trade union or another, and 24 (4%) were once members but had discontinued their membership at the time of the survey. Of a total of 195 trade union members, 145 (74%) reported membership in the INTUC, 28 (14%) reported membership in the AITUC, 14 (7%) reported membership in the pro-Socialist Hind Mazdoor Panchayat, and 8 (4%) reported membership in the pro-Jana Sangh Bharatia Mazdoor Sangh. Only about 3 per cent of the trade union members were also members of the state associations. Membership of trade unions in Bhilai was affected by two important factors. Firstly, officers were officially discouraged from joining the unions. Secondly, some of the respondents preferred not to join any union, allegedly because of dissensions in and ineffectiveness of unions. Otherwise membership in trade unions was almost universal particularly among the manual, semi-skilled and skilled workers, and certainly cut across caste, religion, region and language. The reasons cited by a vast section of the respondents for joining the trade unions were either that 'it will help me and protect my professional interests', or that 'I can approach them whenever there is a dispute in regard to my job'. The help solicited from trade unions was of different kinds. It could be securing employment for somebody, getting temporary employment made permanent, securing housing accommodation, arranging for drinking water or electricity connections, and getting timely increments or a promotion.

Associations Between Parties and Unions

There was an almost indivisible association between the political parties and the trade unions promoted by them. The candidates nominated by different political parties for the 1967 election in the Bhilai assembly constituency were all leaders of trade unions promoted by their parties. All the candidates had university education, and came from urban, upper caste, middle or upper middle income Hindu families. Territorially all were highly mobile and had lived in at least two cities other than Bhilai and their native place. The leftist trade union leaders (3) were Bengalis and had their initiation into politics in Calcutta. The fathers of most of these leaders were active participants in the Congress party and two of them courted imprisonment during the British rule and were later elected to the local legislatures. All the present trade union leaders were active participants in politics during their school and college days. The
leaders of all trade unions developed sympathies for their respective political parties during their student days. All of them were deputed to Bhilai by their parties with the specific aim of organizing trade unions.

They did not in fact make much distinction between the political parties that they supported and the unions that they organized. Words such as 'my union' or 'my party' had the same meaning and the same emphasis. It was however difficult to assess the personal influence of the trade union leaders, particularly those of the leftist trade unions. If a leader wanted to defect to some other party could he carry all his trade union following with him? On the face of it one would be inclined to say yes. For example, the trade union of the Jana Sangh was known among the respondents as 'Sadhu Union' by the name of the leader, and the union of the Communist Party was also known as 'Sudhir Mukherji's Union', by the name of the leader. But this did not mean that a leader had complete personal control over the members of his union. After a split in the Communist Party in 1964, Sudhir Mukherji, the leader of the Communist union chose to support the moderate wing (pro-Russian) of the party and contested the 1967 election on its nomination. But he secured fewer votes (9%) than his Marxist rival (13%). In much the same way the leader of the Congress trade union defected from the Ruling Congress group to the Organization Congress group and stood on its ticket in the 1970 election but was subjected to an ignominious defeat. There were also sufficient reasons to believe that the ideologically educated and organizationally trained following of the Jana Sangh would be left intact even if its trade union leader was to defect. A section of the labourers, however, appeared to be vulnerable in this regard. For example, the labourers who supported the Jana Sangh purely because of the trade union work put in by the Jana Sangh leader would most probably have followed him if he had to defect to some other party. But as the review of the literature on trade unions suggested, the loyalty of the trade union leaders was first to the parties that had promoted them and only then to the trade unions.

The leaders of all the non-Congress trade unions were non-employees. The leaders of the Jana Sangh and Socialist trade unions were ex-employees and stated that they were victimized by the plant administration for their trade union activities. All the leaders were highly articulate and talked only in terms of secular ideologies, but conceded that primordial loyalties and secular considerations intereacted with each
other. Everyone emphasized that block voting was not possible on the basis of caste or religious considerations, and claimed that his union members were loyal voters.

Yet trade unions did not hesitate to take advantage of organizational or voting support when it came from language or caste groups. For example, when the Communist Party broke into two the organizational and voting support for the Marxist candidate was provided by the Bengali youths, and the Marxist candidate accepted this fact without any hesitation or embarrassment.

Secular Role

The characteristics of and the role played by the trade unions are then obvious. Trade unions did cut across caste, religion, state and language barriers. But some unions drew a higher proportion of their supporters from particular regions than others. Among the trade union members, support for a particular trade union or political party was based primarily on secular considerations. Further, there was a very high correlation between belonging to a particular trade union and voting for the particular political party that had promoted the union. Almost all the respondents who were members of the pro-Jana Sangh, pro-Socialist, and pro-Communist trade unions voted for their respective political parties. In other words, trade unions were created and exploited by political parties only as front organizations to expand their electoral support.

Support Structure of Unions

Under these circumstances, it was understandable that every candidate tried to draw an impeccable, secular, national, and patriotic image of his own party and of his own trade union while branding all other trade unions and political parties as sectarian and reactionary. In India, support from the lower middle class, educated people or peasants, is usually regarded as politically moral while support from rich people, businessmen, and particular religious and caste groups is usually regarded as politically unethical and reactionary. Among the political parties only the Communists and the Socialists are openly committed to the working class.

The opinions expressed by the candidates regarding the social sources of support for different political parties were interesting. For example, while all the other candidates thought that the Jana Sangh was supported by groups such as businessmen, upper middle class Hindus, religious fanatics, chauvinists, and government servants, the Jana Sangh candidate insisted that his party was supported 'especially by middle classes and educated people'.

The Swatantra Party had never fielded a candidate in Bhilai but all the candidates in Bhilai were unanimous that the Swatantra Party was supported by rajahs, maharajahs, big industrialists, and landlords. There was also some unanimity of opinion about the social groups that supported the Congress. All the candidates agreed that the Congress drew support from all social sections but the non-Congress candidates thought that it drew more support from richer sections and minority religious groups than from others.

The candidates of the Communist and Marxist parties thought that their parties were supported by all except rich people but they agreed that the bulk of their support came from the working class. Also there was a unanimity of opinion that the Communist and Marxist parties were actively supported by regional groups such as Bengalis, Keralites, and Andhras.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings of this chapter may now be summarized. As expected, there were a large number of voluntary associations in Bhilai. Among these, cooperatives, state cultural associations and trade unions were more active than religious associations. These were the institutions to which the migrants eagerly transferred their loyalties.

Participation in consumer cooperatives and cooperative farming societies and cafeterias was universal and members had specific economic benefits from them. Most of these were organized on the basis of common workplace and common area of residence. Hence membership in these had clearly cut across state, language, caste, and religious boundaries.

Of all the cultural associations, those formed by the migrants from non-Hindi states were most active. They functioned as successful forces of integration on the basis of mother tongue, state of birth, and culture but had cut across caste, religious, and sub-regional loyalties (i.e. those within the state). The political role played by the state cultural associations was not clear but a higher proportion of the members of the state cultural associations than of others supported Communists.

There were two Hindu religious associations in Bhilai -- one a reformist sect and another an advocate of traditional practices -- and each of these associations had only a few members. Participation in associations formed by religious minorities such as Muslims and Christians was universal among their adherents. Muslims and Christians exhibited a high degree of political solidarity and voted for Congress as an expression of faith in it
as the protector of minority communities. At the same time members of the religious minority communities eagerly participated in the activities organized by state cultural associations.

As expected there were rival trade unions in Bhilai each organized by the Congress, the Jana Sangh, the Communists, and the Socialists. The trade union organized by the Congress was the biggest one and was officially recognized by the plant administration. There was an almost indivisible association between the political parties and the trade unions promoted by them. Unions were organized on occupational and secular lines and had cut across religious, caste, and state boundaries.

As expected, trade union leaders in Bhilai were sent from outside by their political parties. They belonged to politicized middle class families and were highly educated and articulate. They had their political education during their student days and had put in considerable political work before they were sent over to Bhilai. Their loyalty was first to their political parties and only then to their trade unions. The organization of trade unions on a secular and ideological basis prevented the growth of personalized power structures in Bhilai.
1. I am referring here to associations such as sports or hobby clubs, war veterans' organizations, occupational groups, labour unions, trades and professional associations.

2. There is a vast amount of literature on voluntary associations in Western Societies. For an excellent summary of these investigations see Chapter 10 of A.M. Rose, *Sociology: The Study of Human Relations*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1968.

3. Sovani, in his study on Kolhapur conducted a thorough census of voluntary associations but did not investigate the role of these associations as agents of social integration. He was completely silent about the role played by these associations in the political field. Of a total of 585 organizations which he classified as 'social institutions', 243 were temples and 119 were educational institutions.

4. One of the interesting findings of Karve and Ranadive was that caste panchayats were much more numerous in the town of Phaltan than in the surrounding villages. The authors concluded that the town of Phaltan was the centre of caste panchayats for the minority castes in the surrounding areas.

5. This analysis was done by me with the data collected from the engagements columns of the *Statesman* from 1 March 1971 to 7 March 1971.


7. The figures quoted in this section are based on a comparison and recomputation of figures quoted by Johri and the *Times of India Directory and Year-Book 1970* (Johri 1967:52,53; Shyamlal 1970: 299).

8. For an account of the reasons for the popularity of labour leaders drawn from outside the ranks of labour see Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity*. Bombay: Asia Publishing House 1963. His chapter on trade unions gives an accurate picture of the close involvement of political parties in the affairs of trade unions.

9. According to the information specially supplied by the plant administration, there are a total of 81 voluntary associations recognized by the administration. Of these, 30 are consumer cooperatives, 11 are cooperative farming societies, 15 are cooperative cafeterias, 23 are state cultural or religious associations and one is a pro-Congress trade union. In addition to these there is an officers' club and three unrecognized trade unions.
10. The plant administration offered every state cultural association and religious organization in Bilai free office accommodation at the Nehru House of Culture. An open air theatre also was kept at the disposal of these associations on a nominal rent for celebrating functions and meetings.

11. An excellent account of the aims and objectives of these associations can be gained from the memorandum of association issued by each one. For example, see Memorandum and Articles of Association issued by Bilai Tamil Manram (Tamil Manram 1965:5,6) and Draft Memorandum of the Association of the Maharastra Mandal, Bilai (Thakur 1969:3-6).

12. See the Sectorwise list of members and the receipts and payment account for the year 1968-1969 (mimeographed) issued by Shri Gujarati Samaj Bilainagar. At the time of the survey the Samaj had a cash balance of more than Rs5,000. Celebration of Gujarati religious festivals, contribution to Gujarat flood relief fund and expenses of funerals for the less fortunate were the main items of expenditure incurred by the Samaj.

13. The Maharastra Mandal in fact restricted its membership to Marathi speakers and among them too only to those 'who had good moral character and behaviour' (Thakur 1969:4). On the other hand, membership of Tamil Manram, Kerala Kala Kendram and Kannada Sangha was thrown open to all adults without any restrictions whatsoever.

14. While working on the field survey in Raipur I had the opportunity to go and attend the Kerala-Day celebration organized by the Kerala Kala Kendram. I observed that while people from all regions and language groups attended this function a majority of them were from south India.

15. Though the organization of Kali Bari was commonly known as a Kali worshipping body, several of its members insisted that it was essentially a non-religious Bengali cultural group.
LIFE IN VILLAGES AND TOWNS

Life in Villages

In villages, and sometimes even in traditional cities like Raipur, residential quarters are segregated on a caste basis. A person lives, eats and associates usually with members of his own community or of other communities of equal status. Within the traditional occupational and economic structures he is usually a party to a patron-client, master-servant relationship depending on his own ritual and economic status. More often than not hereditary occupation, the joint family system, obedience to some religious or caste customs and traditions (rules of the caste panchayat if one exists) set the pattern of living (Srinivas 1962a). In times of difficulty and rejoicing a person looks to the support of and the cooperation from his caste, friends, and neighbours. Membership in such groups is informal, and perhaps obligatory and in most cases it cannot be acquired and relinquished at will. To take up his traditional occupation or trade, a person does not have to pass any formal examinations or attend interviews, or retire at a particular age. Membership in such groups usually cuts across income-group boundaries. In villages and also in localities of traditional cities usually every person is known to everybody else.

Movement to Towns

The decision of a person with such a background to take up employment in a place like Bhilai requires many changes of life-style and has far-reaching consequences. Formerly a self-employed person or hired worker, he must now be psychologically prepared to work in a big bureaucracy or technocratic organization. Formerly having inherited a job (occupation) from his father as a matter of course, he must now secure employment on the basis of his educational qualifications, technical knowledge and skills. (The initial information about the job may, however, have been provided by his friends or relatives.) In the Indian situation of employment scarcity, a person must be prepared to work for a long time where he first secured a job but be ready to move out if a better job is available. To secure such employment he may have to move across caste, sub-regional, state and language boundaries. So he must be willing to live away from his rural
home and family ties, and the informal or formal assistance provided by his native community. Having been uprooted from his own culture, the person must be prepared to acclimatize in a new culture i.e., to live in a nuclear family with neighbours of diverse cultures, to create a new friendship circle, to acquire membership and assistance of new institutions (unions, parties, associations, etc.), perhaps to acquire a working knowledge of a new language and to face the possibility of his children being brought up in a new culture and most probably with a new set of values.

Not every migrant, of course, will face all of these new demands. Those from nearby areas may be relatively unaffected while inter-state migrants and particularly those who move across language boundaries may have to face a great many. Rural-born migrants who were never involved in traditional occupations or have lived for some time in urban areas will be better prepared for the changeover than those who come straight from the village. With the exception of three groups -- those who had lived in the same town since their birth, those who had lived in joint families, and those who lived in urban areas but had agricultural interests in the adjoining countryside -- all urban to urban migrants in the sample were already used to the pattern of living in the new towns.

PATTERNS OF ADAPTATION IN BHILAI

In the light of the above discussion how different was the social, religious and political life of the migrant in Bhilai from that in his native village or old town? To what extent were older patterns of loyalties and organizations destroyed or weakened? What were the links that the migrant in Bhilai still maintained with his native place? How close was his attachment to the new institutions or styles of life in the industrial town? What was his perception of the local power structure? How did he try to influence it to secure his interests? These are the main questions in this chapter.

Initiative and Determination

The situation in Bhilai was almost a paradigm of the migration experience. Very few respondents in Bhilai were self-employed, and all the rest worked in the steel plant either on the administrative or the operational side. Save for some semi-skilled manual workers and civil servants, the occupations of all respondents were different from those of
their fathers and they had all been entered on the basis of the migrants' qualifications and skills. A large proportion of the migrants had already demonstrated a high degree of initiative and were prepared to face hardships before and after they secured employment in Bhilai. Chowdary's study revealed that only about four in ten applied for their jobs in response to press advertisements, while the rest came straight to Bhilai and secured work through the local employment exchange. Only about two in ten were able to secure residential accommodation from the plant and the rest had to fend for themselves. This they did by staying with their friends or relatives or renting houses in the nearby villages or by constructing huts of their own (Chowdary 1967:39).

Although we do not have any data on the turnover of employees at the plant, the information obtained from our respondents suggested that most had a long-term commitment to their jobs. Of a total of 621 respondents about one-third had been in Bhilai for more than ten years, and about two in three for more than five years; almost all said they were likely to continue in their jobs in Bhilai unless they were offered higher remuneration elsewhere. They were not the type of worker who disappears from the factory at every harvest period, religious festival or village wedding.

About eight in ten of our respondents had moved across state or language boundaries or both, generally from a long distance; they had demonstrated an ability to live away from their homes. They could not expect any help from the rural primary groups in their native places in the day-to-day problems that arose in Bhilai.

Language Orientation

We can discuss the ability demonstrated by the migrants to become acclimatized in the new situation at the individual and at group level.

About half of the respondents had migrated from non-Hindi-speaking states and had a different mother tongue. But all of them had a working knowledge of Hindi by the time of the survey. Chowdary's study found that all respondents had a working knowledge of Hindi and that about half had learned a language other than their mother tongue after arriving in Bhilai (Chowdary 1967:27). The medium of instruction in the local schools and colleges was Hindi, although students were given the choice of selecting
the English medium as well. However, most of the migrants had no hesi-
tation in sending their children to the local schools having Hindi as the
medium of instruction. At the same time, migrants were anxious that their
children should be able to read and write in their regional languages and
this they ensured through private tuition.

Residence

Residential accommodation in Bhilai was allotted on the basis
of job-status and income. Consequently, migrants from different states,
languages, religions, and castes were mixed and widely distributed over
all residential sectors. For example, B.M. Rao with whom I stayed in
Bhilai was a migrant from coastal Andhra, his next door neighbour on the
east was a Bengali, on the north was a Punjabi, on the west was a migrant
from Andhra but from Telangana region and on the south was a migrant from
Delhi city. Rao had friendly relations with all of them though not in a
close way. On the occasion of religious festivals or family functions they
distributed sweets to one another and made financial contributions to each
other's regional functions.

Because of a strong correlation between high caste and high
occupation on the one hand, and low caste and low occupation on the other,
there was some concentration of high castes and of low castes within each
residential sector. But even in such cases residents belonged to different
state and language groups. Residents used Hindi more than English for con-
versation with strangers, and their mother tongue within their own group.

Work-Mates and Cooperatives

To ensure his job security, increments, promotions and even over-
time work the migrant maintained good relations with his colleagues and
superiors at the office. Here again the colleagues and officers belonged
to different states, languages and castes. Colleagues of the same status
at work often visited each other and shared food and drink, and helped
each other in tending the kitchen garden or pruning the hedge.

Employees in the same workshop usually joined the same trade
union as a matter of expediency, and the same cooperative farming society
because of the restrictions imposed by the plant administration. Employees
living in the same sector also joined the same consumers' cooperative
society because of the limitations imposed by the administration, and also
for geographical convenience. In other words in his work-place and in his neighbourhood the migrant was forced to function collectively with people of diverse cultures. In none of the above individual or group spheres of life could caste, religion, or language be called a determinant even in a remote way.

The Circle of Friends

Most of the closest friends of a migrant usually came from within his own language group but from all castes and sub-regions, and some from across religious boundaries. The migrant would discuss most of his personal problems with them and seek their advice or help if they were in a position to offer any. Mutual financial assistance, participation in chit-fund companies, exchanging books in the regional language, paying a collective visit to the temple, collectively watching a motion picture in the regional language, occasional visits to one another's homes, and occasional lunch or dinner parties, were the preoccupations of a friends' circle. Here, it was my distinct impression that caste and sub-region were completely ignored. For example my host friend Rao was Kamma by caste and came from central coastal Andhra. Among eight of his closest friends from Andhra, one was a Raju and two were Naidus from north Andhra (Visakhapatnam and Srikakulam districts), two were Reddys from south Andhra (Nellore district), one was a Muslim from his own district (Krishna), one was a Brahmin from his own region but a different district (Rajahmundry) and only one was from his own district and belonged to his own caste.

Chowdary, in his study of Telugu-speaking people in Bhilai, found that more than half of his respondents made friends with persons of other language groups such as Hindustanis, Malayalis, Bengalis, Maharastrians and Tamilians (Chowdary 1967:62).

Religion and Caste

Was there, then, any room left for the influence of religion or caste? Religious divisions were clear in the sense that only Muslims frequented the Masjid, only Christians attended the weekend mass, and only the Hindus visited the temples. But here again not all the people were equally devout in their religious observance, even among those who were deeply religious. For example, there was very little talk about religion among the scheduled and lower castes. Among the middle class occupational groups some were outspokenly atheistic. Other groups were
religious-minded but caste distinctions were completely ignored. For example, the 'Mitra Mandali' (friends' council), a common prayer group of middle-income south Indians, included persons of all regions and castes, but only Hindus. The practice of restricting temple entry to clean Hindu castes was not observed in Bhilai. The temples were open to one and all who wished to worship the deity. Even among the members of the 'Sanathan Dharma Sabha' which is usually considered to be a highly tradition-conscious Hindu society, the observance of caste distinctions was relaxed partly because of local realities and working conditions in an industrial plant. For example, Narendra Prasad Sinha, General Secretary of the Sanathan Dharma Sabha, after giving me a long and helpful interview, extended a lunch invitation and insisted on my accepting it. Both Sinha and his wife are highly religious and religious pictures were hung all around their house. They did not enquire about my religious or caste background and served a sumptuous meal. In fact, in terms of religiosity, Sinha appeared to be much less rigid than some of the politicized Arya Samajists and the RSS workers.

Caste as such did not serve any purpose in Bhilai. Excepting the Brahmans and the Vaisyas the number of persons from each caste was so small that they could not function as an effective social organization. Within the Brahmans and the Vaisyas again there were state and language distinctions. Most of the other castes including the untouchable castes were not comparable across the state and language boundaries. So caste could not serve as an integrating agent. Had anyone attempted to form a caste organization, occupational and status distinctions would have made it impossible for the project to succeed. The only caste association of which I heard (whose office-bearers I interviewed) was the 'Settibalija Sangham' (Settibalija Society). It was an association formed by south Indians and had a total membership of 93. Its objectives were primarily educational and financial. It provided financial assistance to members facing any difficulties. It had no caste 'panchayat' (caste council) and there were no caste rules or regulations to which its members had to adhere.

At the same time marriage alliances across caste or language boundaries were infrequent. During my stay in Bhilai I heard of engineers who had married Russian girls when they were sent to Russia for technical training, and a few higher civil servants who had married European girls during their studies in western countries, but these cases were quite unusual. Reddy in his study of problems of cross-cultural marriages con-
**TABLE VII.1**

**Newspaper Circulation in Bhilai Classified according to Language and Place of Publication**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language of newspaper</th>
<th>Circulation in Bhilai %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vernacular</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100 (N = 8191)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of publication of English dailies</th>
<th>Circulation in Bhilai %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calcutta</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagpur</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhopal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vijayawada</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100 (N = 3101)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of publication of Hindi dailies</th>
<th>Circulation in Bhilai %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raipur</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100 (N = 2652)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Information regarding newspaper circulation was collected from all the newspaper agents in Bhilai. Hence the figures are actuals.
cluded that most of these had worked well (Reddy 1968). Chowdary found than about nine in ten of his respondents disapproved of marriage alliances across caste and language boundaries (Chowdary 1967:63).

With respect to the role played by caste and religion at group level we must return to our previous conclusions. Religious solidarity was a question of survival for the minorities and block voting was an expression of their belief in the role played by Congress as the protector of minorities. In the case of scheduled castes voting was on secular lines. Congress was the only party which had been in power for long and it was the only party that could help the poor through its control of government. Members of scheduled castes wished that something more could be done to improve their living conditions. But securing their immediate needs by voting leftist opposition parties into power had only a remote chance of success. So a majority of them preferred to bargain with and vote for Congress. Only in the case of the RSS workers and the Arya Samajists were caste and ideological convictions closely related. But these two groups made up only a fraction of the Hindus. A relative majority of the upper caste respondents definitely supported the Jana Sangh on a caste basis; but it was difficult to determine whether any others voted on a caste basis.

LINKS RETAINED WITH NATIVE PLACE

Letters and Visits

Then what were the links that the migrants still retained with their native places?

Many migrants still retained their share of ancestral properties, and maintained communications by regularly writing letters, by paying annual visits, and in some cases by sending money back home. In addition to his attachment to his own parents and family estate, a migrant also kept up his interest in the political affairs and culture of his native state. This was clearly brought out by the analysis of newspapers circulated and films screened in Bhilai.

Subscriptions to Native-State Newspapers

The tables presented in this chapter show that people belonging to different language groups preferred to subscribe to newspapers published from their own state and in their own language, even though these papers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of publication</th>
<th>Percent of total copies circulated in Bhilai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poona</td>
<td>1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calicut</td>
<td>17 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quilon</td>
<td>2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trivendrum</td>
<td>16 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kottayam</td>
<td>16 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>52 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calcutta</td>
<td>28 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vijayawada</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (all vernacular newspapers)</td>
<td>100 % (N = 2438)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE VII.3

Newspaper Circulation in Bhilai Classified
According to Languages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language of newspaper</th>
<th>Circulation in Bhilai</th>
<th>Circulation in India*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malayalam</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marathi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(others 0.25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 5090)</td>
<td>(N = 7041 000's)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For details see Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Press in India, Delhi: The Manager of Publications 1969. See especially the third chapter.
arrived up to three days late. Of a total of about eight thousand copies of newspapers sold in Bhilai, about four in ten were English newspapers and three in ten each were Hindi and regional language papers (TABLE VII.1). Bombay, Calcutta, and Delhi, and different centres in Kerala were the most important places of publication (TABLE VII.2). Hindi-speaking people constituted about 47 per cent of the population in Bhilai but the circulation of the Hindi newspapers covered only about 32 per cent. Most of the circulation (86%) of Hindi newspapers was accounted for by those published from Raipur. Among the non-Hindi language groups Keralites, Bengalis and Tamils overwhelmingly preferred to read newspapers of their own states and in their own languages. Of the non-Hindi language groups Telugus appeared to be very poor newspaper readers. The Telugus made up about 15 per cent of the Bhilai population, but while Telugu newspaper circulation was about three per cent of the Indian total, it was only about one per cent of that in Bhilai (TABLE VII.3).

Films in Native Languages

While every language group preferred an occasional film in its own language and all of them equally favoured English-language films, Telugus seemed particularly devoted to films in their own language. On average about one in five film-screenings in Bhilai were in the Telugu language (TABLE VII.4). Furthermore, it was common for migrants to listen to music and news bulletins broadcast by radio stations in their own states.

THE NEW GENERATION IN BHILAI

At the same time, it was possible to see a distinct new generation emerging at the time of the survey. These were the migrants' children, who had no sentimental attachments whatever to their parental cultures. These children spoke in their mother tongue at home and in Hindi to their friends and neighbours. Srinivasulu, the six-year-old son of my host friend Rao, spoke excellent Hindi with friends and neighbours but Telugu with an admixture of Hindi words at home. The children of the migrants attended Hindi medium schools. They wore uniforms and shoes supplied free by the plant and at the mid-day meals freely served by the school sat side by side without observing any religious, caste or language distinctions. They were also trained to present mass drills and community singing (Chowdary 1967:42,43). The children accompanied their parents to social functions of different regional groups. They knew very little about the customs and traditions of the caste atmosphere in which their
### TABLE VII.4

**Film Screenings in Bhilai Classified According to Language of Picture**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language of picture</th>
<th>Screenings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malayalam</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marathi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N = 551)

Note: The above analysis is based on 551 film screenings in all the picture halls in Bhilai during the month of May 1969.
parents were brought up and they had little knowledge of the pattern of rural life. Their only contact with the native place of their parents was a short and occasional visit. I was certain that by the time these children came of employment age the barriers of state and language which their parents had to encounter would have completely disappeared, the more so if they were to seek employment within the Hindi-speaking region. Caste and perhaps religion would be further weakened. Or as they were now coming into contact with different regional cultures and different versions of Hindu traditions, they would be more likely to adopt a wider view of caste and religion.

SITUATION IN RAIPUR

State Associations

How does the situation in Raipur compare with that in Bhilai? Inter-state migrants were few and they had only one major state association. It was formed by the Maharastrian migrants from the nearby state. Its activities were limited to common prayers in the Maharastrian temple and celebrating the Ganesh festival (festival of the Hindu god with an elephant head). According to local opinion a majority of its members supported the Jana Sangh. But it was not an organization in the strict sense: it was not registered, and had no regular members, but derived informal support from most of the Maharastrians and provided them with a common meeting place. There were also small associations such as the 'Sindhi Panchayat' constituted by the Sindhi migrants from West Pakistan, and the Parsee Panchayat constituted by the local Parsee residents.

Religion and Caste

Religious, caste and in some cases occupational segregation of residential areas were obvious in the old parts of Raipur. Names of municipal divisions such as 'Brahman Para' (Brahmin part), 'Satnami Para' (scheduled castes' part), 'Civil Lines' (government servants' part), 'Bhangi Colony' (Scavengers' part) bore witness to this practice. Most of the Muslims, Vaisya businessmen, potters, and Maharastrian Brahmins were concentrated in particular parts of the city. It is important to note, however, that this did not apply to the new housing colonies being developed by the town administration or the state government. While informal caste traditions, customs, and collective behaviour were apparent there were no
registered organizations, with definite parliamentary procedures, regular members, and fund contributors. On special religious occasions residents in the neighbourhood arranged collective functions such as Ganesh Puja. Here again, such festivals were conspicuously absent in the residential areas of the scheduled castes.

POLITICAL STYLES IN BHILAI

What was the political role played by the migrant at the local level in Bhilai? How different was it from the role he would have played in his native place if he had not moved to Bhilai?

We did not collect information directly on the second question. But several studies in the past have indicated that membership of political parties is very low in rural India (Srinivasan and Subramaniam 1969a; Bashiruddin Ahmed 1971). Neither the farmers nor the agricultural labourers who constitute about two-thirds of the Indian workforce, form professional organizations or trade unions. Their social and political behaviour is guided usually by informal group loyalties. This situation has been changing, but not radically.

Involvement with Institutions

It will be clear that in Bhilai grass roots politics was very different from this. Caste and religious loyalties were weak, and their political relevance was small. Social relationships and political processes were highly institutionalized. In rural India a person does not have to be a member of a political party to be counted as its sympathizer. In Bhilai, most of the industrial workers were members of party-sponsored trade unions. In fact, a worker had to first pay his membership fee and become a member of a union before he could present his grievances through it to the higher authorities. Of course in some cases a union might first fight for the rights of the workers and then appeal to them to join it. The Jana Sangh had done precisely this in relation to the workers in Bhilai Hospital.

Moreover, there were no link-men who controlled vote banks. There were influential leaders in Bhilai. The prominent leaders of all trade unions worked hard in building up a following for their unions. But this was done mainly on the basis of the social and economic policies of their
unions and parties. What they built were institutions rather than person­
alized power structures. For example, the pro-Communist trade union in
Bhilai was formed, built up, and led by Sudhir Mukherji. When the Communist
Party of India broke into moderate and extreme wings, Mukherji joined the
moderate wing (CPI) but a majority of his following supported and voted for
the CPIM.

Local Politics

Ordinary civic amenities in Bhilai were provided by the plant. Any complaints regarding the supply of electricity, drinking water, drainage, and repairs to residential units were well attended to by the department of Town Administration. The town was governed by the plant itself and there was no popularly-elected municipal council. So the only interest groups or political organizations with which the migrants were familiar and involved were the trade unions, which were also the only organizations through which the parties could make contact with the electorate. Splits in parties and trade unions occurred but they were based on ideological considerations. For example, when the Congress Party broke into two, the trade union promoted by the Congress also broke into two. One of the Congress trade union leaders joined the Organization Congress led by Nijalingappa but an overwhelming majority of the union members and leadership remained with the Ruling Congress group led by Indira Gandhi. The involvement and attachment of the migrants to new institutions can therefore hardly be overstressed. A migrant was most likely to be a member of a trade union, cultural association, or library. He was likely to be a member of one of the consumer cooperatives in his residential sector, and of the agricultural farming society in his workshop. In rural India and even in traditional cities such multiple membership in associations is rare. This was, for the main part, why primordial loyalties were weakened in Bhilai.

POLITICAL STYLES IN RAIPUR

Religion and Caste

Raipur provided an excellent case study of political factions, defections, dominance of leaders of higher castes, and splinter vote tactics.

Of the 12 candidates interviewed (of a total of 14), six were Brahmin or Vaisya men nominated by the major parties, four belonged to
the newly rising agricultural castes, one was newly converted Buddhist, and one was a Muslim. There was not a single candidate representing the lower, artisan and scheduled castes or tribes. At the time of the 1967 election, the Jana Congress (a short-lived splinter group from the Congress), the Congress, and the Jana Sangh were the most important contending parties and all three nominated Brahmin or Vaisya candidates. The election winner and the candidate who secured the second highest vote were both Brahmins.

**Defections of Leaders**

In contrast to the situation in Bhilai, inter-party defections and electoral alliances of convenience appeared to be common in Raipur. For example Bulakilal Pujari, a wealthy lawyer, stood on a Socialist ticket in 1952 and on a Congress ticket in 1967. Sharada Charan Tiwari, an enterprising country cigar manufacturer, actively helped the war effort of the British during the second world war and was not even a member of the Congress until after independence. He stood on a Congress ticket in a 1952 by-election and in the 1957 and 1962 general elections, and won in the latter two elections. In 1967 he broke away from the Congress and contested and won the election on the ticket of the Jana Congress; he served as a minister for some time but returned to the Congress fold after the election. At the time of the survey, both Pujari and Tiwari were in the Congress but heading two different factions.

Since 1952 the Communists have nominated a candidate at every election save that of 1967, when the party concluded an alliance to support the candidature of Sharada Charan Tiwari against the official Congress candidate. It was alleged by Devarajsingh Surana, the Jana Sangh candidate, that his candidature had been proposed and actively canvassed by Sharada Charan Tiwari. But Tiwari was said to have changed his mind, concluded an alliance with the Communists and the Republican Party, and decided to contest the election himself. This version was later confirmed by Sudhir Mukherji the leader of the CPI, and Narvani, the candidate of the Samyuktha Socialist Party. Soon after the PSP candidate withdrew from politics and accepted membership of the Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission offered by the government. This it was alleged by some candidates was a part of the shady bargain for Thakur's unofficial support of the official Congress candidate (Pujari). After interviewing the candidates I found it difficult to predict who would stand on which ticket in the next election. There was certainly a demand for the Congress ticket.
But some candidates were simply in search of party labels and they would stand even if no party ticket was available. The money offered by the major candidates in return for the withdrawal of a candidature or voting support was one of the factors that prompted some minor candidates to file their nominations. For example, Lakshman Rao Asram the candidate of the Republican Party alleged that Tiwari and Pujari each offered him 5000 rupees to withdraw from the election contest and canvass in his favour. This state of affairs indicated the poor discipline and organizational abilities of political parties.

Aims of Candidates in Filing Nominations

The aims of the candidates in filing their nominations were typical of the electoral tactics and group loyalties in a traditional city. Some candidates were nominated by their parties. But the ideological convictions of candidates (except the Jana Sangh and Communist candidates) were not deep and their party affiliations were lightly held. Some candidates were encouraged to contest the election to split votes on a communal and neighbourhood basis and thus reduce the chances of success of one candidate to promote those of another. For example, Azizuddin, a Muslim, and Duryodhansingh Ramsingh, a Hindu Kshatri by caste, both contested as independents. But both confessed that they had personally voted and canvassed for the Congress candidate. Both of them had faith in the efficacy of the Congress and always voted for it previously. Then why did they contest as independent candidates? Their answer to this question was evasive. 'All my friends and well-wishers encouraged me to contest and voted for me. But myself and my family always voted for the Congress, and did so in the recent election', was a typical answer. The facts were, however, made known when Devarajsingh Surana, the Jana Sangh candidate, said that four independent candidates including Azizuddin and Ramsingh were set up by the Bulakilal Pujari to split the votes of Sharadacharan Tiwari. 'All the independent candidates other than I were set up by rival Congress candidates', claimed Gajjulal Sharma. Bulakilal Pujari, the official Congress candidate, was evasive on this point. 'Some independent candidates said that they and their families voted for you. Do you think it was true? What do you think was the reason for their doing so?' In reply Pujari said: 'Those independent candidates who said that they had voted for me might be my friends. They might have told you the truth. I can only say that all Congress men and
my friends voted for me'.

Some candidates were deeply committed to promoting the interests of certain occupations or professions and contested the elections with the purpose of educating the public. They knew well that they stood little chance of victory in the election. Govardhandas Bagdi, President of the Chamber of Commerce, who stood as an independent candidate, and Gajjulal Sharma, an ex-government employee now a teacher, who stood with the support of the government employees' union, were of this kind. Bagdi spoke at length about the difficulties of small businessmen and pleaded for their unity of action. The election in his opinion was the best opportunity to exert pressure on the government. But his plea to the business community went unheeded and he drew only a couple of hundred votes. Gajjulal Sharma alleged that he was victimized by the government for his union activities. 'If only the government employees are united we can successfully pressure the government. But not all the employees voted for me. Only my friends and relatives did', Sharma said. The conclusion that the election was fought on other than ideological considerations is obvious.

It was surprising that practically every independent candidate said that the Congress was more likely to help improve things than any other political party. Reasons for voting were different in Raipur and Bhilai. Friends, relatives, people of the locality, co-businessmen, caste people, customers were the most important categories of supporters mentioned by all the independent candidates. In this pattern of replies one could also detect that co-religionists and co-caste people were implied in replies such as 'people of the locality', 'friends', and 'relatives'.

Personalized Power Structures

The personal influence of Sharada Charan Tiwari in Raipur was an excellent example of how personalized power structures are created and sustained in India. Not only did a majority of the respondents mention the candidate by name but also a significant proportion of them, particularly in the high income and business groups were on personal friendship terms with Sharada Charan Tiwari. In fact people in almost all social sections had something to say to the credit of Tiwari. Some of them gratefully mentioned the personal favours he had one them. Such favours ranged from preventing the government from evicting the poor squatters from
government waste land, to securing a small job for the son of a middle class employee, helping food grain dealers out of difficulties, and collecting funds for educational institutions in the region. I met Tiwari for the first time in the district collector's office where he was moving from officer to officer with a band of civilians who sought his help in expediting their files. No other candidate in Raipur had put in such intensive work in the constituency as a whole.

Replying to the question, 'What do you think is the reason for your repeated successes?', Tiwari said, 'I stand for the voters whenever they have problems, and they stand for me whenever there is an election'. Replying to the question, 'What kinds of people generally support the Congress Party?', he said, 'The party is only nominal. People vote for me on the basis of my personal contacts'. The reply could not be any more simple or blunt. I doubt whether any candidate in Bhilai would be courageous enough to put things so bluntly.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings in this chapter may be summarized as follows.

By learning a new language and by active social intercourse with other regional, religious, and caste groups the migrants demonstrated an ability to readjust to a new style of life.

By educating their children in a language other than their mother tongue and by freely exposing them to the influences of the cultures of different regions, the migrants permitted them to shed primordial loyalties and become true urban citizens with a modern outlook.

As expected, in residence, eating and social intercourse, caste and religion were considerably weakened. True, marriage alliances were favoured only within language and caste boundaries, but it might be expected that the younger generation would adopt more liberal views than their parents in this sphere also. Further, the role of caste and religion in politics was highly reduced.

It was brought out that primordial groups could not be formed and would not be useful in a modern town like Bhilai. The migrants in Bhilai instead actively participated in several voluntary associations to fulfil their professional, economic, and cultural needs. Trade unions, regional cultural associations, and farming and consumer cooperative
societies were the most important among these.

It was noted that the migrants maintained regular contacts with their parents and relatives in their native places and took a keen interest in the politics and cultures of their native states. But it might be expected that the younger generation would have much less interest in these matters.

As could be expected, electoral politics in Bhilai were based on ideological considerations. Trade unions played a vital role and personalized power structures were non-existent in shaping the party-support patterns. On the other hand, electoral politics in Raipur had all the features more generally characteristic of the Indian political system and voting behaviour. Party splits, inter-party defections, formation of new parties, opportunistic electoral alliances, personalized power structures, bribery of candidates, vote splitting tactics, and collective bargaining on the basis of caste and religion were all features of electoral politics in Raipur.
FOOTNOTES

1. The information contained in this chapter is based on the observations of the writer during his stay in Bhilai and Raipur in 1969, on the interview he had with the candidates who contested the 1967 general election in Bhilai and Raipur, and on the interviews he had with the officers of different state-cultural and religious associations in Bhilai. For details of leaders interviewed see Appendices III and IV.


3. For an excellent study on the impact of modernization and industrialization on social structure in India see Michael M. Ames, Modernization and Social Structure: Family, Caste and Class in Jamshedpur. Economic and Political Weekly IV, 1969.

4. Chowdary's study, Thesis on Problems of Adjustment of Telugu Speaking People of Bhilai Nagar, was based on a small sample drawn from a single residential sector (Sector VII). But his findings are useful and in all probability the problems of readjustment of all non-Hindi speaking people were similar to that of Telugu-speaking migrants.

5. Reddy's study, Thesis on Problems of Cross Cultural Marriages in Bhilai, investigated mainly the families of Indian employees (most of them engineers) who married Russian girls. In total he interviewed 33 couples (both husbands and wives).

6. For a general background to the split in the Congress, see G. Lakshmana Rao, The Background to the Recent Crisis in the Indian Congress Party. The Australian Quarterly 42, 1970.

7. In 1952, soon after the general election, there was a by-election, owing to the death of the sitting member of the state legislative assembly from Raipur.

8. Devarajsingh Surana, the Jana Sangh candidate, alleged that Asram had in fact accepted money from Sharada Charan Tiwari and withdrew in his favour. When I questioned Asram again, about this, his answer was evasive: 'I don't remember', he said.
Now we can pull together the threads of our findings, draw some conclusions and put forward some recommendations for further research.

In the first chapter I observed that the introduction of adult franchise to India and the location of 80 per cent of the electors in rural areas enabled the rural agricultural elites to rise to positions of power. By the middle of the 1960s the representative institutions up to the district level were a monopoly of the rural elites. At the state level, rural agricultural elites predominated; urban and non-agricultural interests were represented though they did not have an effective say in formulating or implementing policies. At the federal level the representation of rural elites was increasing, though slowly. At the central government level most ministers were still of urban origin, had university education, and belonged to the middle or upper-middle class. Particularly after the death of Nehru, the pressure of rural elites was increasingly felt at the centre. In practice, though not by law, power devolved from the centre to the states.

I argued that the predominance of rural power and its extension to higher levels of government is only a passing phase -- perhaps lasting a few decades -- in the Indian political system. As industrialization and urbanization pick up momentum the distribution of electors between rural and urban areas will change and, probably within a few decades, the electors in urban areas will constitute a majority of the total electorate in the country. In that event the rural elites can play only a secondary role at the centre, in the states, and perhaps in the districts as well.

As rural people move into urban areas they find themselves in a new occupational, social, and political environment. Depending on his occupational interests and cultural needs a migrant is likely to join voluntary associations such as trade unions, traders' associations, state cultural associations, or sports clubs. Often these associations cut across religious, caste, and state loyalties and may be called upon to exert pressure on political parties at election time, either to protect the employment interests of their members or to meet some special need of the community concerned. It is in this process that the primordial loyalties which the migrants had in their native places will gradually disintegrate or become irrelevant and the migrants will have to realign their political affiliations on the basis of
secular interests and associational involvement.

On the other hand in such a changed situation political parties may have to take electoral realities into consideration and re-orient their policies on the basis of new interest groups. Alternatively, entirely new political parties may be established to protect the interests of the urban workers; or parties which already exist may penetrate into new areas by appealing to the political attitudes of the migrants. So I suggest that the patterns of political resocialization of those who have moved from rural to urban areas and particularly to industrial towns will give some clues to future changes in the Indian political system.

Aggregate Analysis

A joint analysis of socio-economic and demographic data and election statistics of 88 traditional cities and 22 new industrial towns helped generate more specific hypotheses. A field survey and leadership interviews in one new industrial town (Bhilai) and one traditional market town (Raipur) provided data to test the hypotheses. The new industrial town surveyed is located in a backward region of a backward state. As expected, the survey data showed that there was a heavy inter-state migration from rural areas to Bhilai. Among the respondents in Bhilai about two in three had migrated from rural areas, eight in ten came from states other than Madhya Pradesh, less than half spoke the local language, three in four had moved from a distance of more than 600 kilometres, and about half had lived in at least one place other than Bhilai and their native place. On the other hand, in Raipur most of the migrants came from surrounding rural areas or nearby states.

The lack of technically trained people in the region, the initiative taken by the inter-state migrants in exploring employment opportunities, and inter-personal communication networks were the most important factors contributing to the high rate of inter-state movement.

Religious and caste groups such as Christians, Brahmins and Jains were over-represented in Bhilai. In general, educational levels were high and income disparities were low. As expected, most of the respondents in Bhilai were engaged in engineering, skilled, or semi-skilled jobs. Among the respondents, there were fairly high positive associations between caste, literacy, occupation, income and type of native place.

Our data in Bhilai confirmed that the pace of industrialization is fast in the respondents' generation. About two in ten grandfathers, four in
ten fathers, and all the respondents lived in urban areas. Over the generations there was a close positive association between type of residence, caste, education, occupation, and income and this had a definite impact on the present occupational placement of the respondents. Most of those who moved from rural areas to Bhilai were the sons of rich or middle peasants. On the other hand the movement from rural areas to Raipur was gradual.

In general occupational and income mobility were high in Bhilai. Promotions and salary increments were common and they were taken for granted by the respondents. Consequently an overwhelming majority of the respondents thought that their jobs were secure and hopefully aspired to higher things. Occupational mobility and job aspirations were low in Raipur.

Before the establishment of the steel factory in Bhilai, the Congress, the Praja Socialist Party and the Ramarajya Parishad were the most prominent political parties in the region. There was no Jana Sangh or Communist Party there. Now about one in five in Bhilai supported the Communists and one in six supported the Jana Sangh. The Congress had been able to retain the state assembly seat though with reduced support.

Impact of Socio-economic Variables

In general, the impact of socio-economic variables is different on different political parties. The support for the Congress was fairly high and came from heterogeneous socio-economic and occupational groups. However, it was marginally higher among non-Hindu, low caste, low income, low occupation, and low literacy groups than among others. There was a significant tendency for respondents among other religions, scheduled castes, skilled workers, and members of cultural associations to support the Communists. Support for the Jana Sangh was fairly concentrated in certain socio-economic groups. A significantly high percentage of urban natives, Hindus, Jains, traditional elite castes, professionals, well-educated people and members of the pro-Jana Sangh trade union supported the Jana Sangh. Among Muslims and Christians, support for the Jana Sangh was nil, among scheduled castes, the older generation and manual labourers it was very low.

While such clear patterns of party support can be discerned from two-way tables the proportion of total variation in Congress support accounted for by these variables was less than five per cent. In relation to the Communist support it was almost negligible. The proportion of total variation in Jana Sangh support accounted for by the socio-economic variables was about eight per cent. This pattern in fact confirms the findings of earlier studies that the proportion of total variation in party support accounted for by socio-economic variables is limited.
In Bhilai, variation in support for the Communists accounted for by the dummy variables based on territorial movement was much higher (10.1%) than the variation accounted for by the dummy variables based on socio-economic attributes (1.6%). When both socio-economic and mobility variables were included in a single regression model 'strong Communist' state of origin emerged as the most significant predictor of Communist support. The proportion of total variation in the support for the Jana Sangh accounted for by the dummy variables based on socio-economic attributes was far higher (8.1%) than the proportion of total variation accounted for by the dummy variables based on territorial movement and occupational mobility (2.3%). When both socio-economic and mobility variables were included in a single regression model the variables of Businessmen and Brahmin-Banias emerged as the most significant predictors of Jana Sangh support. On the other hand, in relation to Congress the proportion of total variation accounted for by the dummy variables based on socio-economic attributes and the dummy variables based on respondents' state of origin and occupational mobility was more or less equal (about 4%). So in general our analysis confirmed that territorial movement helped in the establishment and the growth particularly of the Communists in Bhilai.

The Role of Voluntary Associations

As expected, there were a large number of voluntary associations in Bhilai. Among these, cooperatives, state cultural associations and trade unions were more active than religious associations. These were the institutions to which the migrants eagerly transferred their loyalties.

Participation in consumer cooperatives and cooperative farming societies and cafeterias was universal and members gained specific economic benefits from them. Most of the institutions were organised on the basis of common workplace and common areas of residence. Hence membership cut across state, language, caste, and religious boundaries.

Of all the cultural associations, those formed by the migrants from non-Hindi states were the most active. They functioned as successful forces of integration on the basis of mother tongue, state of birth, and culture but cut across caste, religious, and sub-regional loyalties (i.e. those within the state). The political role played by the state cultural associations was not clear but a higher proportion of the members of the state cultural associations than of others supported the Communists.

There were two Hindi religious associations in Bhilai -- one a reformist sect and another an advocate of traditional practices -- and each of these associations had only a few members. Participation in associations
formed by religious minorities such as Muslims and Christians was universal among their adherents. Muslims and Christians exhibited a higher degree of political solidarity and voted for Congress as an expression of faith in it as the protector of minority communities. At the same time members of the religious minority communities eagerly participated in the activities organized by state cultural associations.

As expected there were rival trade unions in Bhilai organized by the Congress, the Jana Sangh, the Communists, and the Socialists. The trade union organized by the Congress was the biggest and was officially recognized by the plant administration. Trade unions were very closely integrated with the political parties which promoted them. Unions were organized on occupational and secular lines and cut across religious, caste, and state boundaries.

As expected, trade union leaders in Bhilai were sent from outside by their political parties. They belonged to politicized middle class families and were highly educated and articulate. They had their political education during their student days and had put in considerable political work before they were sent to Bhilai. Their loyalty was first to their political parties and only then to their trade unions. The organization of trade unions on a secular and ideological basis prevented the growth of personalized power structures in Bhilai.

**New Patterns of Life**

By learning a new language and by active social intercourse with other regional, religious, and caste groups the migrants in Bhilai demonstrated an ability to readjust to a new style of life.

By educating their children in a language (Hindi) other than their mother tongue and by freely exposing them to the influences of the cultures of different regions, the migrants permitted them to shed primordial loyalties and become true urban citizens with a modern outlook.

As expected, patterns of residence, eating, and social intercourse, showed a considerable weakening of caste and religious influences. True, marriage alliances were favoured only within language and caste boundaries, but it may be expected that the younger generation will adopt more liberal views than their parents in this sphere also. Further, the role of caste and religion in politics was much reduced.
Local Politics

As expected, electoral politics in Bhilai were based on ideological considerations. Trade unions played a vital role and personalized power structures were non-existent in shaping the patterns of party support. On the other hand, electoral politics in Raipur had all the features generally characteristic of the Indian political system and voting behaviour including party splits, inter-party defections, formation of new parties, opportunistic election alliances, personalized power structures, bribery of candidates, vote-splitting tactics, and collective bargaining on the basis of caste and religion.

Impact of Bhilai

The impact of Bhilai on the surrounding areas is limited. As Bhilai is almost a self-contained town with its own shipping, entertainment, sports centres, educational institutions and transport, there was no need for the residents to maintain contact with the surrounding areas. Residents pay only occasional visits to the nearby town of Durg and the nearby city of Raipur. Bhilai however, serves as a market for the agricultural produce of the surrounding areas. The Jana Sangh and the Communists had chosen Bhilai as the centre for organizing their trade union activities in the state of Madhya Pradesh, but their organizations are still small. Only the establishment of many steel factories such as those in Bhilai and further heavy inter-state migration can help them to expand their unions on a large scale and so to affect the state party system. This is more true in the case of the Communists who are very weak in Madhya Pradesh than of the Jana Sangh which has considerable strength in the state.

The most significant organizational ties between the workers in Bhilai and the state party organizations are provided by the local trade unions. While cultural exchanges between different language groups were common within Bhilai they were almost non-existent between the inter-state social groups in Bhilai and the people in the surrounding areas. We do not have any information on whether some of the workers who are employed in the plant but reside in the surrounding villages, and those agriculturists and dairy and poultry farmers who live and work in the surrounding areas but regularly sell their products in Bhilai, take back any new social or political ideas to their villages. If there is any impact of this kind it is not yet visible.
Will the patterns of political re-socialization in Bhilai be typical of changes in the industrial centres in India? A categorical answer to this question is difficult. It has to be borne in mind that our analysis is based on data from a single industrial town in a particular region. One can, however, speculate that the social and political situation in any other new industrial town may not be much different from that in Bhilai. But if an industrial town is established in a region which can readily supply technically trained and skilled personnel the rate of inter-state migration to such a town is likely to be much lower than in Bhilai. In such a case the number of state cultural associations and their membership will be limited. Or if the number of inter-state migrants with political sympathies for non-regional parties is too small, such migrants may be absorbed by the local political parties. But in any industrial town trade unions and professional associations will be important and they are the organizations to which the migrants will develop new loyalties.

In the Indian context the above question has also demographic implications. In India there is an upper ceiling on the number of electorates of the lower house of federal parliament (525) and on the number of state assembly electorates (500) in each state. If the population continues to grow at the present rate, in a few decades an industrial town of the size of Bhilai may not constitute even half of the state assembly constituency in which it is located. In such a case its impact will be limited.

If the pace of industrialization is too slow, the impact of migration and the change in occupational structure will also be gradual and it will give ample time for political parties to re-orient their policies. On the other hand, the political impact of the new industrial towns will be greater if a large number of them are located in a single region than if they are widely distributed in different regions.

Recommendations for Further Research

Firstly, studies in other regions similar to that in Bhilai will provide data for broad generalizations on the nation as a whole. Secondly, this is only a case study of one aspect of the demographic changes that are coming about in the developing countries. Using the same research model, other areas can be investigated on the rural-urban continuum to show the effects of migration and occupational mobility. It would also be worthwhile to investigate occupational mobility within rural areas, particularly from agricultural to non-agricultural occupations; the movement of people to
to smaller towns; the social and political feed-back effects on the villages that supply these educated and skilled workers to urban areas; the social and political effects of the industrial towns on the surrounding areas; and last but not least the formation of the political attitudes of the children of the rural to urban migrants who are now growing up in the urban areas. Also of value would be a panel study of the political attitudes of rural to urban migrants at different points of time over a long period, and the political consequences of economic prosperity caused by new industrial estate plans.
Good morning Sir,

I am helping a research scholar who is working with the Department of Political Science, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. This research survey is intended to help produce his Ph.D. thesis, and information collected from you will be kept confidential and used solely for research purposes.

1. About how long have you been living in this town?
   [Length of residence in years] ____________________________
   your age _____________________

2. What is the highest educational level you have reached?
   1. Illiterate
   2. Literate without any educational level
   3. Primary or junior basic
   4. Some high school
   5. High school completed
   6. Some university or higher
   8. No reply
   [Mention any degree or diploma obtained by the respondent]

3. What is your native place?
   (Name) Is it a village or town? In which State is it? (Name) About how far is it from this town? [Distance in kilometres]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is your native place? (Name)</th>
<th>Is it a village or town?</th>
<th>In which State is it? (Name)</th>
<th>About how far is it from this town? [Distance in kilometres]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4. Could you name the places where you have lived -- I mean for two to three years at a time -- since you were born, and the reasons for living there?

   Name of Place [Circle V or T for each place]
   [V=Village, T=Town]
   V T __________________________
   V T __________________________
   R's Reason for Residence
5. What is your religion?
   1. Hindu
   2. Muslim
   3. Christian
   4. Sikh
   5. Buddhist or Jain
   6. Other
   8. No reply

6. [If Hindu] What is your caste or tribe? ________________

7. Are you married?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   8. No reply

8a. [If married] How many children do you have? [Write number in box] ______

8b. Who are the other members of the family that usually live here?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship to R</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

9. What was your first job? [Obtain as much detail as possible]
   First job/occupation ______________________________

10. How much did you earn monthly [or annually]?
    Monthly salary _____________ Annual income _________

11. What is your present job? [Obtain as much detail as possible]
    Present job/occupation ______________________________

12. How much do you earn monthly [or annually]?
    Monthly salary _____________ Annual income _________

13. Do you have any other source of income?

14. [if yes] What is the total annual income from it?
    In rupees ___________________
Repeat questions in the boxes with regard to father and grandfather. Ask all questions about R's father before asking about grandfather.

15. | What is/was the occupation of your (father)? | Do you regard him as rich/middle class or poor? | What is his educational qualification? | Is he mostly a native of a town or a village? |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternal Grandfather</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. What kind of interests do you still retain in your native place? (Circle all the codes mentioned by the respondent)
1. Landed property or house
2. Business interests
3. Children
4. Parents, brothers & sisters
5. Close relatives
6. Friends
7. None
8. No reply

17. How often do you go back there?
1. Thrice or more than thrice in a year
2. Twice in a year
3. Once in a year
4. Once in two or three years
5. Occasionally
6. Rarely
7. Never
8. No reply

18. How frequently do you write to your relatives and friends in your native place?
1. Once in a week
2. Once in a fortnight
3. Once in a month
4. Once in two or three months
5. Once in six months
6. Occasionally
7. Rarely
8. No reply
9. Never

19. How often do you send back money to your parents or relatives in your native place?
1. Regularly
2. Occasionally
3. Used to, but not for a long time
4. Never
5. Other
8. No reply

20. When you were young -- I mean when you were 14 or 15 years old -- did you follow political developments in the country?
1. Yes
2. No
8. No reply

21. During this period -- when you were 14 or 15 -- which party did your family think worth supporting?
Name of party ________________________________

22. How did you get a job here?
1. Just applied and got the job
2. Came to know of it from friends here
3. On deputation from government
4. Got it through employment exchange
5. Other
8. No reply

23. What kind of friends have you made since coming here?
1. People from my native place
2. Colleagues at work
3. Neighbours
4. People whose political views are similar to mine
5. Others
8. No reply

24. Do you read newspapers daily?
1. Yes
2. No
8. No reply
25. [If yes] Which newspapers are they?

____________________________________________________________________

(Names of newspapers)

26. What items in them interest you most?

(Items that interest the respondent) _________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

27. Do you listen to the radio regularly?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   8. No reply

28. [If yes] What items in it interest you most?

(Items that interest the respondent) _________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

29. What do you usually discuss when you meet your friends?
   [Circle all the codes mentioned by the respondent]
   1. About our native place or State
   2. Service problems (Salary, increment, etc.)
   3. Local politics, trade union affairs
   4. State or national politics
   5. Neighbourhood problems
   6. Other matters
   8. No reply

30a. Are you at present a member of any association, such as a trade union, or N.G.O.'s association?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   8. No reply
   [If yes obtain such name or names]

____________________________________________________________________

30b. Why did you join that particular trade union?
31. What do you think are the most important local problems here that concern people like you?

32. What do you yourself think should be done to solve these problems?
1. There is nothing we can do
2. Individuals should work hard and help themselves
3. Employees should unite and organize collective actions such as 'work to rule', 'go slow tactics', strike, 'bundh', etc.
4. People should elect a government which will take measures in favour of employees
5. Revolution is the only alternative
8. No reply

33. Which political party do you think is most likely to improve the conditions of employees like you?

34. Which political party do you think is least likely to improve the conditions of employees like you?

35. Would you say that your life is much better now, say, than ten years earlier?
1. Yes, very much better
2. Yes, (slightly) better
3. I don't think there is any change
4. Now it is worse
5. Now it is far worse
6. Cannot say
7. No reply
36. (Repeat the questions in the following box with regard to every election.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Which party did you vote? (TY if too young to vote)</th>
<th>In which constituency did you vote?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you remember which party you voted for in the Assembly Election in 1957, etc.?</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37. Could you tell me what kinds of people generally support the following parties?

- CPI(M)
- Bharatiya Jana Sangh
- Congress Party
- Swatantra Party
- CPI
- SSP

38. If you had a free choice now, which job would you like to hold? ______________________

39. Do you think your job is secure here? ______________________

40. Lastly, what do you think Government should do to improve your conditions?

__________________________

__________________________
APPENDIX II

Report on Fieldwork in India

The fieldwork in India was to supplement primary data on socio-economic and demographic mobility and political preferences of people that live in new industrial towns and cross-check the conclusions drawn on the basis of aggregative analysis.

Collection of Assembly constituency maps, polling-booth data and any other published material such as the socio-economic background of legislators, and a sample survey of one new industrial town and one traditional town, were the tasks set for fieldwork in India.

Selection of Industrial Town

The selection of an industrial town for field survey is not an easy task in the Indian context. There are altogether 22 industrial towns located in 10 different states, 8 different language speaking areas and as far apart as 2,000 miles from north to south or east to west. The survey was intended to be only a case study that could provoke further theoretical and empirical interest in the field. However, it was considered better that the town to be surveyed should be as representative as possible of the new industrial towns.

Considered from this point of view, as many as 13 out of the 22 new industrial towns are situated in east India (7 in West Bengal, 1 in Assam, 3 in Bihar, 1 in east Madhya Pradesh and 1 in Orissa). Of these 13 towns, seven are dependent on heavy industries, two each on mining and medium scale industries. Hence it was considered best to select a heavy industry-based town in the state of West Bengal. Of the seven towns located in West Bengal, four are based on medium scale industry and are too close to metropolitan Calcutta, hence these were eliminated. Of the other three towns, one is a private sector steel town (Burnpur) one is a public sector railway engine manufacturing town (Chittaranjan -- on which a socio-economic survey had already been done) and the last (Durgapur) is a public sector steel town. So the choice fell on Durgapur, a British-built steel township, and Burdwan, a traditional town about 50 miles from Durgapur.
Polling-Booth Data

My first task as soon as I arrived in Delhi in April 1969, was to contact the Election Commission of India to seek their help to collect polling-booth data for the general elections of 1962 and 1967. My personal acquaintance with the officers concerned over a period of five years made the task easier. The initial reaction of Mr A.N. Sen, Secretary, Election Commission of India, was rather sceptical. He was not sure whether data relating to the 1962 general election were still kept with the district election officers since the data are supposed to be destroyed after three years. Mr Sen was quite friendly, amiable, informal and was always ready to help and relax the bureaucratic rules if possible. He immediately issued letters to all the state chief election officers concerned to collect and send the necessary polling-booth data for 1967 to New Delhi. He also gave me letters of introduction to the district collectors in different states. I made arrangements to secure all the necessary assembly constituency maps through informal sources.

Visit to Durgapur

I arrived in Durgapur on 16 April; met Mrs Gita Ghosh, Principal of the local multipurpose girls' high school; contacted a few graduates to be interviewed and recruited by my supervisor, Mr Michael Kahan, later; held brief discussions with Mr S.N. Roy the local subdivisional officer; collected electoral rolls and assembly constituency maps of Durgapur and Burdwan and returned to New Delhi on 19 April. Incidentally, in Burdwan I discovered in the district election office, the polling-booth data on all the general elections safely kept. 'Officially speaking, the data may be destroyed three years after the election. But you never know who wants these and when. So we play safe and keep all records', said the officer concerned. When this situation was explained, Mr Sen immediately issued letters to chief election officers of the states concerned to collect and send polling-booth data of the 1962 election as well.

Mr Kahan arrived in New Delhi on 26 April, and on 27th we had a busy day. We met Mr Sen of the Election Commission, Professor N.G. Ranga, Chairman of the Swatantra Party, and Professor D. Anand of the Lady Hardinge Medical College (Dr Anand had done extensive research in sociology and population) and visited a few places of tourist interest.
We arrived in Durgapur on 29 April. Mr Kahan interviewed the investigators and felt satisfied. Later we met the local Sub-divisional Officer, and Chief Executive Officer officer of Durgapur Development Authority. To suit the convenience of all the research investigators, it was decided to start the survey on 15 May 1969. That evening we finalized the sampling design on the basis of the latest electoral lists.

We arrived in Calcutta by 4 p.m. on 31 April. It was my first visit to Calcutta. As soon as we got out of the train we were in the midst of unending streams of population flowing in and out of the railway station. Population pressure is quite high in Indian cities but Calcutta has no parallel in this regard. The whole city looks old, neglected and in bad repair. Traffic is unregulated and pedestrians, cyclists, cycle rickshaws, motor cycles, cars and animal-drawn vehicles all move on the same road at a slow pace. Street hawkers peddle all kinds of merchandise from vegetables to ready made clothes. Pavement book stalls freely sell Chinese and Vietnamese literature (in other parts of India these are proscribed). A peep into any shop or office or book stall will reveal a prominent display of photographs of state political leaders, poets, and religious teachers and pictures of the goddess Kali. After visiting a few interesting places Kahan left Calcutta on 1 May. That evening (in the May Day celebration) I had the opportunity of witnessing a political battle with sticks, stones and crackers between the extreme and moderate elements of Communists in the heart of Calcutta city. The police were just helpless onlookers (Communists were in power in West Bengal). I flew back to Delhi on 2 May. Until 14 May I was scanning the literature on socio-economic studies and census data. I had the questionnaire translated into Bengali and drew the sample on the lines suggested by Mr Kahan.

**Experience in Durgapur**

I went back to Durgapur on 17 May 1969. The political situation in Durgapur was already tense. Extreme Communists (pro-Maoists) and their student leaders were organizing strikes and processions. However, I thought that my survey would not be hindered. The training of the interviewers went on well and the field survey would not be hindered. The training of the interviewers went on well and the field survey was about to be started. Then Communist opposition came like a bolt from the blue.
My first encounter with the Communists was at a public meeting they organized for industrial workers, agricultural labourers and students. I had prior permission from the trade union leaders to attend the meeting and take a few photographs if I liked. But the student and youth leaders vehemently opposed my attempts to take photographs and made it clear that they were opposed to the survey itself. They forced me to destroy the film already exposed. My discussion with the local Communist and trade union leaders did not improve the situation. Mr Dilip Majumdar, the local MLA, expressed his inability to control his student and youth leaders. Instead he said: 'Try to persuade them, if they agree you can pursue your survey.' I had the feeling that the leaders were pretending to be polite while actually encouraging the younger elements at the lowest level to oppose the study. The local Sub-divisional Officer and Chief Executive Officer had no assistance to offer. In view of the lack of alternatives I felt that the study should be abandoned. Dr Gita Ghosh had come to the same conclusion. Interviewers felt disappointed.

I left Durgapur on 30 May. On the next day the political situation, which was already at boiling point, blew up. A big student riot was followed by extensive police shooting, the closure of the whole steel plant, and the spreading of the disturbances to the surrounding towns and ultimately to Calcutta. The situation in Bengal was thus highly explosive.

Selection of Bhilai

When acquainted with the circumstances, both of my supervisors agreed that work in West Bengal should be abandoned and that the study be transferred to Bhilai, Madhya Pradesh. Three reasons prompted the selection of Bhilai. Firstly it is a new steel town which is also located in the industrial belt of east India. Secondly, the population has migrated there from all parts of the country, and is highly cosmopolitan; it provides a good locale for a case study of patterns of social mobility and political change. Lastly, the political situation in Madhya Pradesh is quiet. Once Bhilai was selected the nearby traditional town of Raipur automatically selected itself.

I reached Bhilai on 14 June and started work all over again. Even by western standards Bhilai undoubtedly is a well-planned, orderly, and picturesque town with good houses, paved roads at right angles, schools, parks and shopping and entertainment centres. Even a casual
glance across the town indicates that the residents have a feeling of security and a sense of attachment to the town. Most of the houses have well tended lawns, flower patches and kitchen gardens surrounded by green hedges -- all symbols of the private efforts and energies of the residents (this is deplorably absent elsewhere in India). The city also looked clean and prosperous.

My initial contact in Bhilai was an old boyhood friend, Mr B.M. Rao, a graduate who is working on the operation side inside the plant. We first contacted the city administrative authority and obtained a blue print of all the sectors, roads and houses and number of residential units. Initial talks with officers of both the town and plant administrations revealed that social life in Bhilai is quite harmonious, and religious, language and state groups have become reconciled to a kind of cooperative life of mutual coexistence. The level of political and trade union activity is low and it is peaceful. Officers proudly stated that there had never been a strike in the Bhilai steel plant. But for caution's sake they advised me to approach the respondents on my own rather than taking an introductory letter from the project administration which might bias the responses.

Training of Interviewers

The recruitment and training of interviewers was an easy affair. Bhilai abounds in graduates and postgraduates. B.M. Rao immediately contacted four local employees who are postgraduates in sociology. Every one of them was experienced, having already produced a Master's thesis. So work was started soon after the residential units were selected. I accompanied every investigator into the field for two or three days in the beginning and was satisfied with their performance. Also, I did a good part of the interviewing myself with the help of my friend to locate the streets and houses.

Both the level and the quality of the responses were good. Firstly, as a student attached to a foreign university, I was welcomed. The reason probably was that a large proportion of the employees themselves had been sent abroad for tertiary training. On the whole only a few respondents had to be persuaded. Work went on slowly but efficiently and satisfactorily without a hitch. Out of all the respondents contacted, only two Bengalis rejected interviews outright and alleged that the study was illicitly motivated. A few Keralites hesitated in
the beginning but they cooperated after a brief explanation. Political leaders and office bearers of different cultural and regional organizations cooperated well, talked at length about every issue and were pleased to be photographed. The survey in Bhilai was completed by the middle of August.

Survey Work in Raipur

In the meantime I visited Raipur, contacted Dr Shrivastav, Head of the Department of Sociology, Ravishankar University, Raipur, to seek his help in recruiting and training a few interviewers with a good knowledge of the layout of the town, and had a discussion with the district collector. After a brief visit to New Delhi to assess the progress of the collection of polling-booth data, fieldwork in Raipur was started in the middle of August. Three of the interviewers who had worked in Bhilai continued with the survey and three more unemployed graduates proposed by Dr Shrivastav joined the team.

Raipur is an old administrative town in the region of Chattisgarh -- comparatively a backward region within a backward state. Even by Indian standards, it is a dirty and uncleanly city -- particularly in the rainy season. The city has a high density of population, and very narrow and badly paved roads. Some of the bylanes are no more than two feet wide. Drinking water and draining facilities are poor. As many as half of the houses have mud walls and a mud or tile roof. The city undoubtedly has a mediaeval look. It has about a dozen rain-fed lakes which are used for washing clothes and cattle, human bathing and even for the supply of drinking water.

By the time I started my survey Raipur was experiencing very heavy rains and this proved to be a blessing in disguise, enabling us to find most of the respondents at home. Again work in Raipur was slow but smooth. Only a few of the respondents entertained doubts and rejected interviews despite our explanations. Houses are built like a big honeycomb and locating the selected houses was rather difficult; we could interview only 573 respondents out of 675 selected. However, both the level and quality of the interviews with the community leaders and candidates were good. Leaders gave long interviews and felt pleased to be photographed. Only the Congress candidate in the general election of 1967 (Mr Bulakilal Pujari), though giving a long interview, objected to being photographed. The district collector of Raipur, Mr Acharya,
was cooperative and helpful in having his office dig out election data from old files.

After completing all the survey work in Raipur and thanking all the fieldworkers and officials who helped me I went back to New Delhi in the first week of October. By that time the Election Commission had been able to collect most of the data needed. I stored all the survey material, polling-booth data, constituency maps, newspaper clippings and some published socio-economic studies and went on leave to visit my home. In the second week of November, however, on the advice of the Election Commission, I had again to visit Dhanbad (Bihar) and Calcutta (West Bengal), to collect polling-booth data from the centres which failed to respond to the circulars of the Election Commission. This last bit of work was not an easy job for I myself had to search for the data in the dusty old record rooms. But it was gratifying that ultimately I was able to secure all that I wanted.

Questionnaire

With a few exceptions questions were well received by the respondents. Introducing personal socio-economic data in the first part of the questionnaire was useful. Enquiring about a person's job, his father and grandfather, is a part of enquiring about his welfare, in India. So the questions on personal data helped to establish rapport between the respondent and the interviewer. In some cases interviewers were given freedom to explain the questions or put the questions in a format that could be grasped by the respondent. The following questions need special mention.

The first part of question 3, 'What is your native place?' (name) worked very well in Raipur but in Bhilai 'What is your home town or village?' proved to be easier and effective. In Bhilai the employees are granted annual travelling allowances (by rail) to visit their hometown or village. Hence the term 'home-town' is easily understood by the respondent and as employees have filled their travelling allowance bills many times, they remember the distance between Bhilai and their home town.

With a vast majority of the respondents, question 6 worked very well. Along with caste affiliation, information on the traditional occupation of that particular caste was also collected. A few respondents
who objected to be classified in a particular caste or religion mentioned their caste and religion after a bit of persuasion as 'ancestral caste and religion'.

When collecting responses to question 8, particulars regarding the total number of persons living with the respondent, their age and occupation were also collected.

Questions 9 to 14 worked well, but in reply to question 15 a few respondents stated that they did not remember the educational qualification of their grandfather. Again responses to questions 16 to 19 were straightforward and smooth.

Questions 20 and 21 were eagerly answered but a few respondents, particularly on the lower rungs of the society, interpreted the terms 'follow' in question 20, and 'supporting' in question 21 to mean 'participate' and 'participating' respectively and tended to say 'no' instantly. As soon as this tendency was discovered I left instructions with the interviewers to change the format of the questions to:

20. When you were young -- I mean when you were 14 or 15 years old -- were you aware of the political developments in the country?
21. During this period, when you were 14 or 15, which party did your family think worth sympathizing with?

These questions worked well, formulated in this way.

Question 23 needed some explanation. It was found that the term 'kind of friends' could not be easily translated into Hindi. An average respondent tended to respond at first by saying: 'What do you mean by 'kind of friends'. All my friends are good.' So I instructed the interviewers to read a few categories of answers to the respondent. At any rate, people from their own native place, colleagues at work and neighbours turned out to be the most important friends of most of the respondents.

Question 32 is treated as a closed-end question and respondents were asked to choose one among the five categories of answers given. To compensate for this closed-end question, question 40 is made an open-ended question to enable us to know what the respondent precisely wants from the Government and the methods that he approves to extract these privileges from the Government.
Questions 33 and 34 were very successful. Respondents poured out all their pent-up feelings. Responses varied from 'unqualified' admiration for some parties to outright condemnation of other parties. A few respondents equated and condemned all Indian political parties and emphasized the need for a military government to save the country from political anarchy and economic troubles. In Raipur, a number of respondents stated that the British Raj was far more efficient and effective than the independent government.

Again in question 37, the phrase 'kinds of people' was not easily understood by the respondents. So the interviewers were authorised to name different caste, religious, occupational and language groups to the respondent. This question also worked quite well.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Office/Residence, Sector</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 August 1969</td>
<td>Office, Bazar, RAIPUR</td>
<td>Employees Union Class III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 August 1969</td>
<td>Office, RAIPUR</td>
<td>C.O.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 September 1969</td>
<td>Residence, RAIPUR</td>
<td>C.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 September 1969</td>
<td>Residence, Sector VII, RAIPUR</td>
<td>Secretary, Hind Mazdoor Panchayat, RAIPUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 August 1969</td>
<td>Residence, Bazar, RAIPUR</td>
<td>Committee, RAIPUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 August 1969</td>
<td>Area Studio, RAIPUR</td>
<td>General Secretary of RPI, RAIPUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 August 1969</td>
<td>Residence, Buddha Para, RAIPUR</td>
<td>Municipal Councilor, RAIPUR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Official position held: Official position held by candidates interviewed

Name of candidates interviewed: Appendix III

(contd.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place of Interviewed</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 September 1969</td>
<td>Bhitar, Phaltan</td>
<td>His medical clinic in sector VI</td>
<td>Opposition from CPI(M)</td>
<td>Yadu B. P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 August 1969</td>
<td>Shyam Talke, Ratpur</td>
<td>Member of Congress (now)</td>
<td>Group Report, Ratpur</td>
<td>Timwarl, Shereda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 September 1969</td>
<td>Shyam Talke, Ratpur</td>
<td>Member of Congress, Hansa Sangh</td>
<td>Ratpur</td>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1969</td>
<td>Bhitar, Phaltan</td>
<td>Mahatma Gandhi Memorial, Secretary of the State</td>
<td>Ratpur</td>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 October 1969</td>
<td>Handi Hotel, Ratpur</td>
<td>Member, Sindhi Association</td>
<td>Independent, Ratpur</td>
<td>Singh, Maisya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 August 1969</td>
<td>Residency, Kanakapura, Ratpur</td>
<td>Union of Employees, Residency, Kanakapura, Ratpur</td>
<td>Independent, Ratpur</td>
<td>Sharmk, Gajendrul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 August 1969</td>
<td>Handi Hotel, Ratpur</td>
<td>Member, Kharat Samad (a case association)</td>
<td>Independent, Ratpur</td>
<td>Ramkush, Duboydian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1969</td>
<td>Residency, Sharda Chowk, Ratpur</td>
<td>Member of the Congress</td>
<td>Indian National Congress, Ratpur</td>
<td>Pujaat, Balatkul</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX III**

**Candidates Interviewed (contd.):**

- No official position held.
- Any held.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Postion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 August 1969</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Catholic Association Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Khan, Rashid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maharashta Mandal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 July 1969</td>
<td>Active Member</td>
<td>Gujarath Samaj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jain, S.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 August 1969</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Madhya Pradesh Kala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jain, S.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 August 1969</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
<td>Bharat Mahila Samaj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chawara, Mrs. V.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 August 1969</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Andhra Sahitya Samiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Appareo, C.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 August 1969</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Masjid Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ali, Mir Nady</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Place & Date Interviewed

Appendix IV

Leaders of Associations Interviewed
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place &amp; Date Interviewed</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization Represented</th>
<th>Name of Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13 August 1969</td>
<td>Residence, Sector X, Hissar</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Uttar Pradesh Association</td>
<td>Singh, B.N.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 June 1969</td>
<td>Residence, Sector VIII, Hissar</td>
<td>Strike Organizer</td>
<td>Sintering Plant</td>
<td>Reddy, N. Ramamohan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June 1969</td>
<td>Sales Dept, Sector VI, Hissar</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Sector VI BSN Consumers Co-op. Stores</td>
<td>Rao, A.V. Kurna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 August 1969</td>
<td>Residence, Sector V, Hissar</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Himachal Pradesh Association</td>
<td>Rana, A.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 July 1969</td>
<td>Residence, Sector VI, Hissar</td>
<td>Joint Secretary</td>
<td>Bhilai Tamlui Narlam</td>
<td>Ramamooti, S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 August 1969</td>
<td>Residence, Sector X, Hissar</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Kerala Kala Kendram</td>
<td>Pillai, C. C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1969</td>
<td>Residence, Sector VIII, Hissar</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Mitra Mandalai</td>
<td>Mutti, C. lakshman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 June 1969</td>
<td>Residence, Sector IX, Hissar</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>Town Administrator</td>
<td>Murthy, A.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 August 1969</td>
<td>Residence, Sector IX, Hissar</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Banjeta Krishna Parishad</td>
<td>Mudden, B.L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Place of Interviewed</td>
<td>Post</td>
<td>Association Represented</td>
<td>Teachers' Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
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<td>----------------------</td>
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<td>20 September 1969</td>
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<td>20 June 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 October 1969</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX IV : Leaders of Associations Interviewed (contd.)
APPENDIX V

Sampling

The different ecological layouts and residential patterns in Bhilai and Raipur made it essential to adopt different sampling procedures. In India most of the workers are males and social mobility political awareness and involvement are essentially male preoccupations. Moreover, political preferences of females are assumed not to be much different from those of males. According to the Census of India 1961 about one in six workers in Raipur and one in sixteen workers in Bhilai were females. But the census does not give us an accurate picture of the proportion of females in the workforce because females engaged in household activities were included in the category of 'workers' in 1961. So it was considered better to interview males of working age. Electoral lists were the only source from which such a sample could be drawn.

Our survey was being conducted about three years after the most recent election and electoral lists were out of date. This problem had to be tackled differently in Bhilai and in Raipur. According to the information supplied by the Department of Town Administration in Bhilai there were 22,884 temporary or permanent residential units, each allotted to an employee and regularly numbered and divided into streets and sectors. We divided the sample size (675) into the total number of residential units (22,884) and got an answer of approximately 34. We then chose a number at random between 1 and 34 as our first sample unit and then took every 34th residential unit after that, thus obtaining a sample of 675 residential units. The male employees in the selected units were interviewed; in almost every case there was only one such employee per unit. In a few cases in which the unit had been allocated to a female employee she was interviewed. In the whole sample there were only three such cases. The aim was to interview as many as possible out of the 675 selected employees but it was hoped that we would be able to interview at least 600. This it was considered would give a more reliable and up-to-date sample than picking the male electors from the three years old electoral roll. The steel plant works in three shifts -- morning, evening and mid-night -- and two in three workers engaged on the operation side were available at
home during day time. As identification of the selected homes and contacting the respondents was relatively easy in Bhilai we were able to obtain complete interviews with 621 respondents, or ninety-two per cent of the sample.

On the other hand in Raipur the numbering of residential units was inadequate. Houses were large and were often divided into several households and families were large and complex. Some new houses were not numbered at all and on some houses new numbers were affixed along with old numbers and this led to confusion. Fortunately an up-to-date draft electoral roll by the local municipal council for the forthcoming municipal election was made available by the Secretary of the municipal council. Out of a total of 46,077 male electors in Raipur city area, 675 were selected by following the same method as in Bhilai. Here again the aim was to interview as many as possible. In practice, however, it was found that locating respondents was much more difficult in Raipur than in Bhilai. Despite strenuous efforts we were able to complete only 567 interviews.
### Table A.1

Occupational Distribution of Population to Rural and Urban Areas (Classified by Their Territorial Province)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Urban Population</th>
<th>Total Rural Population</th>
<th>Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Areas</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner-District Municipalities</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer-District Municipalities</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Rural Population</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Computed from Census of India, 1961, Volume I, Table II-C (12), Occupation Tables, pp. 4, 5 to 11, 16, and 17.
### TABLE A.2

**Migrants to Indian Cities Classified by Broad Age-Groups, and Male Migrants as Percentage of Total Migrants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Migrants in thousands</th>
<th>Age-Groups</th>
<th></th>
<th>Males as percentage of total migrants</th>
<th>Females per 100 males in total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0-14 %</td>
<td>15-34 %</td>
<td>35-39 %</td>
<td>60+ %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater-Bombay</td>
<td>2667</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calcutta-City</td>
<td>1542</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Delhi</td>
<td>1306</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahmedabad</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangalore</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanpur</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>All other cities</td>
<td>8630</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Computed from *Census of India 1961, Volume 1, India, Part II-C (iii), Migration Tables*, pp. 190, 206, 224, 242, 258, 274, 290, 306, 322-548, and 566.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grandfather's Occupation</th>
<th>Father's Occupation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admin. Professionals</td>
<td>Admin. Professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof.</td>
<td>Bus.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultivators</td>
<td>Skilled</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>Others</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>282</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>621</td>
<td>266</td>
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</table>

Note: Figures in the table are absolute numbers (survey data).

TABLE A.3: Occupational Mobility from Grandfathers to Fathers (Bhilai)
Note: Figures in the table are absolute numbers (survey data).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>621</th>
<th>113</th>
<th>226</th>
<th>101</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>55</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>others</td>
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<td>Semi-Skilled</td>
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<td>Occupations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parent's occupation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respondent's present occupation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE A.4** Occupational Mobility from Fathers to Respondents (Bhilai)
Notes: Figures in the table are absolute numbers (survey data).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grandfather’s occupation</th>
<th>Father’s occupation</th>
<th>Toeal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Businessmen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lower Civil servants</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual laborers</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE A.5

Occupational Mobility from Grandfathers to Fathers (Raipur)
Table A.6: Occupational Mobility from Fathers to Respondents (Raipur)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's Occupation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupational Mobility from Fathers to Respondents (Raipur)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's Occupation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's Present Occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>567</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>60</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures in the table are absolute numbers (survey data).
### TABLE A.7

**Inter-Generational Income Mobility Between Grandfather, Fathers and Respondents (Bhilai and Raipur)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic status of grandfather and father</th>
<th>Respondent’s monthly income in rupees</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rs200 or less</td>
<td>Rs201-400</td>
<td>Rs401+</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bhilai</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.F., F. rich</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.F., F. middle</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.F., F. poor</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.F., rich, F. middle or poor</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.F., poor, F. middle or rich</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>94</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Raipur</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.F., F. rich</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.F., F. middle</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.F., F. poor</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.F., rich, F. middle or poor</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.F. poor, F. middle or rich</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>272</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This table is based solely on the subjective assessment by the respondents of the economic status of their grandfathers and fathers in classifying them as 'rich', 'middle' or 'poor'. All figures in the table are absolute numbers.

G.F. stands for 'grandfather' and F. stands for 'father'.

---

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### TABLE A.8

Present Occupation of Respondents by their First Occupation (Bhilai and Raipur)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Occupation</th>
<th>Present occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhilai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Administrators</td>
<td>1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Professionals</td>
<td>2 31 -- 1 1 -- -- -- 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Businessmen</td>
<td>-- -- 5 2 2 1 -- -- 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Lower civil servants</td>
<td>11 7 4 82 23 34 -- -- 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Skilled workers</td>
<td>1 9 1 1 27 1 -- -- 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Semi-skilled workers</td>
<td>1 7 -- 3 42 117 -- 1 171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Cultivators</td>
<td>-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Manual labourers</td>
<td>1 1 10 6 73 -- 112 -- 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Others</td>
<td>-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Total</td>
<td>16 55 11 99 101 226 -- 113 -- 621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raipur</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Administrators</td>
<td>4 1 1 -- -- -- -- -- 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Professionals</td>
<td>1 19 1 1 1 -- -- -- 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Businessmen</td>
<td>1 -- 81 4 -- 3 2 1 3 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Lower civil servants</td>
<td>3 6 19 120 11 2 1 3 14 179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Skilled workers</td>
<td>2 4 -- -- -- -- -- 1 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Semi-skilled workers</td>
<td>-- -- 11 4 7 40 -- 3 2 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Cultivators</td>
<td>-- -- 2 2 -- 1 23 6 -- 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Manual labourers</td>
<td>-- -- 11 5 4 15 2 90 3 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Others</td>
<td>-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Total</td>
<td>9 28 130 136 34 61 28 103 38 567</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Occupational categories at top (present occupation) should be read as indicated on the left side (first occupation). All figures in the table are absolute numbers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First income per month</th>
<th>Present monthly income in rupees</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bhilai</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Rs100 or less</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Rs101 to 200</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rs201 to 300</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rs301 to 400</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Rs401 to 500</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Rs501 +</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>621</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Rs100 or less</td>
<td></td>
<td>114</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>367</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rs201 to 300</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rs301 to 400</td>
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<td>--</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Rs401 to 500</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Rs501 +</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>123</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>567</td>
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</table>

**Note:** Income categories at the top (Present income) should be read as indicated on the left side (First income).

All figures in the table are absolute numbers.
TABLE A.10
Present Monthly Income of Respondents by Their Present Occupation (Bhilai & Raipur)

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<th>Present occupation</th>
<th>Present monthly income in rupees</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bhilai</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrators &amp; professionals</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower civil servants</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled workers</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual labourers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raipur</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators &amp; Professionals</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
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<td>Lower civil servants</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled workers</td>
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<td>Cultivators</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual labourers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</table>

Note: All figures in the table are absolute numbers.
<table>
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<th>Bilaspur</th>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1957</th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>2.1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<td>Communists</td>
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<td>8.2</td>
<td>45.3</td>
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<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>45.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<td>Congress Party</td>
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<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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</table>

TABLE A.12
Expansion of Electorate and Place Where Voted

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<th>Election</th>
<th>Voted here</th>
<th>Voted elsewhere</th>
<th>Total voters</th>
<th>Too young to vote</th>
<th>Did not vote</th>
<th>Total non-voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bhilai (N-621)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
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<td>1962</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raipur (N-567)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All figures in the table are absolute numbers.
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TABLE A . 13

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Party Choice in 1967 by Age,

Percentages of those who did not reply to the question on party choice in 1967 and those who
did not vote in 1967 are worked out against total number of respondents in each category.
Percentages for the voters of each party are worked out against the total number of voters
in that category.

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TABLE A.14
Party Choice in 1967 by Occupation, Literacy, Associational Membership, and Perception of One's Own Welfare

| Characteristic of Respondents | Bhilai | | | Raipur | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|                               | Total | No reply | Party choice in 1967 | Total | No reply | Party choice in 1967 | |
|                               | (N)   |          | Congress | Jana Sangh | Communist | Others | (N)   |          | Congress | Jana Sangh | Others | |
| Occupation                    |       |          |          |          |          |       |       |          |          |          |       |       |
| Administrators & professionals| 71    | 41       | 32      | 31      | 7        | 10    | 37    | 24      | 61      | 18       | 21    |       |
| Businessmen                   | 11    | 27       | 12      | 76      | --       | 12    | 130   | 21      | 57      | 27       | 16    |       |
| Lower civil servants          | 99    | 19       | 55      | 19      | 22       | 4     | 126   | 36      | 61      | 24       | 15    |       |
| Skilled                       | 101   | 30       | 42      | 13      | 31       | 14    | 34    | 32      | 61      | 17       | 22    |       |
| Semi-skilled                  | 226   | 24       | 46      | 19      | 22       | 13    | 61    | 33      | 63      | 10       | 27    |       |
| Cultivators                   | --    | --       | --      | --      | --       | --    | 28    | 21      | 64      | --       | 35    |       |
| Manual labourers              | 113   | 17       | 63      | 17      | 17       | 3     | 103   | 27      | 73      | 8        | 19    |       |
| Others                        | --    | --       | --      | --      | --       | --    | 38    | 50      | 63      | 26       | 11    |       |
| Literacy                      |       |          |          |          |          |       |       |          |          |          |       |       |
| No schooling                  | 95    | 12       | 60      | 14      | 20       | 6     | 92    | 22      | 64      | 10       | 26    |       |
| Some schooling                | 217   | 23       | 55      | 17      | 17       | 11    | 222   | 50      | 68      | 15       | 17    |       |
| High school completed         | 309   | 30       | 44      | 23      | 24       | 9     | 226   | 34      | 56      | 27       | 17    |       |
| Associational membership      |       |          |          |          |          |       |       |          |          |          |       |       |
| Trade union member            | 201   | 17       | 50      | 20      | 22       | 8     | 133   | 32      | 50      | 32       | 18    |       |
| Cultural associ­ation member  | 165   | 30       | 39      | 22      | 28       | 11    | 67    | 28      | 77      | 13       | 10    |       |
| Non-member                    | 255   | 27       | 58      | 18      | 15       | 9     | 367   | 31      | 65      | 14       | 21    |       |
| Is life better?               |       |          |          |          |          |       |       |          |          |          |       |       |
| Yes, better                   | 362   | 28       | 55      | 18      | 16       | 11    | 222   | 31      | 64      | 18       | 18    |       |
| No change, now worse          | 259   | 21       | 45      | 22      | 26       | 7     | 345   | 29      | 62      | 18       | 20    |       |
| Total                         | 621   | 25       | 51      | 19      | 21       | 9     | 567   | 30      | 63      | 18       | 19    |       |

Note: Percentages of those who did not reply to the question on party choice in 1967 and of those who did not vote in 1967 are worked out against total number of respondents in each category. Percentages for the voters of each party are worked out against the total number of voters in that category.
TABLE A.15

Party Opposed by Party Supported

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party supported</th>
<th>No reply</th>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Jana Sangh</th>
<th>Communists</th>
<th>Other parties</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bhilai</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All figures in the table are absolute numbers.
TABLE A.16

Party Choice in 1967 by Party Supported

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party supported</th>
<th>Party choice in 1967</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhilai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raipur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All figures in the table are absolute numbers.
In the table are absolute numbers. Figures refer to the question on party choice are not represented in the above table. All figures represent 154 respondents in 1957 and 1967 respondents in Katpar who did not vote in 1967 or did not vote at all.

|                | Other Parties | Communist | Jan A Sangh | Congress | Other Parties | Communist | Jan A Sangh | Congress | Other Parties | Communist | Jan A Sangh | Congress | 
|----------------|---------------|-----------|-------------|----------|---------------|-----------|-------------|----------|---------------|-----------|-------------|----------|----------|
| **1957, 1962** | 25            | 13        | 75          | 73       | 15            | 5         | 43          | 26       | 14            | 2         | 1           | 14       | 1        |
| **1957**       | 5             | 2         | 8           | 2        | 1             | 2         | 1           | 1        | 8             | 1         | 8           | 2        | 1        |
| **1962**       | 2             | 3         | 8           | 5        | 2             | 2         | 3           | 2        | 1             | 1         | 6           | 3        | 1        |


Table A.17
Note: Those who did not reply to the question on party support are not represented in the table.

The table shows solutions suggested to local problems by party supported in the following categories:

- Communists
- Jana Sangh
- Congress
- Others

The table is divided into columns representing different years (1966, 1967, 1968, 1969) and rows representing different groups (Communists, Jana Sangh, Congress, Others).

**Table A.18**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Communist</th>
<th>Jana Sangh</th>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>98</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Supported to Local Problems by Party Supported</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No solution</td>
<td>% action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rapport</td>
<td>Bilial</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>AHMED, Bashiruddin</td>
<td>1965</td>
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<td>ANAND, K</td>
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