TRANSMIGRATION AND ITS CENTRE-REGIONAL CONTEXT: THE CASE OF RIAU AND SOUTH KALIMANTAN PROVINCES, INDONESIA

by

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at The Australian National University

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The analyses in this thesis represent original research I conducted between December 1986 and February 1990 in the Department of Demography, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University.

Riwanto Tirtosudarmo

(March 1990)
The Indonesian government is strongly committed to the transmigration program. It would be pointless, even if it were sound, to recommend that it be abandoned.

Heinz Arndt (1984: 49)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is the outcome of a rather long engagement during which I have incurred many debts to individuals and institutions in Indonesia and Australia. The origin of the topic dates from 1984 when, after completing a Master's degree in Demography from ANU, I was involved in a research project under the auspices of the institute where I worked at the time (Leknas-LIPI). It was a one-year project to explore the social impact of economic development in the provinces of North Sulawesi, particularly in Kabupaten Minahasa, and Nusa Tenggara Barat, particularly in Kabupaten Lombok Barat. An interesting part of the project were several field trips during which data were collected through interviews and observation. The most interesting finding of this project to me was the strong central government domination over the whole question of development in the regions. Since then, I have been intrigued by the question of central and regional relations in Indonesia.

In 1986 my institute began a five-year research project funded by UNFPA on the relationship between transmigration and regional development in the provinces of Riau and South Kalimantan. Coincidentally, at the same time I was informed by ANU that my application to become a Ph.D. research student was accepted in the Department of Demography, Research School of Social Sciences. As a research associate
in the LIPI-UNFPA project, my task was to visit Riau and South Kalimantan to familiarize myself with the areas, the authorities and the research problem. In mid-1986 as part of the LIPI's team I visited Riau and South Kalimantan, spending three weeks in each place. Instead of talking only with government officials, we visited several transmigration areas and interviewed transmigrants as well as local people on a range of issues. It was at this time that my interest in the question of centre and regional relations began to intermingle with the issue of transmigration. During the second field trip to Riau and South Kalimantan at the end of 1986 (also of three weeks duration in each place), in addition to conducting research for my institution, I also collected information for personal interest.

Back in Jakarta, I continued to explore the issue, among other means through discussion with several people who had specialized knowledge on the topic and by gathering relevant secondary data. During these early stages, several people were influential in the formation of my thinking on the central-regional contexts of transmigration. Those persons were Dr. Suharso, the director of Leknas-LIPI, Dr. Lorraine Corner, our institute's consultant, and Dr. Gavin Jones, who was then working as a consultant in the State Ministry of Population and Environment. On this occasion I would like to thank them for their encouragement and stimulating suggestions in focusing my research interest.
It is said that knowledge is a cumulative process. This has been my experience in working on this thesis. By the time I started my Ph.D. course in December 1986, I was rather familiar with the topic that I would be working with. From early December 1987 until the end of February 1988 I had the opportunity to visit Riau and South Kalimantan for the third time. Since I had previous experience in the area and on the topic, I was able to concentrate more intensely on the research question for my thesis. During my time as a research student at ANU, I have been supervised by Dr. Paul Meyer and Dr. Gavin Jones, both from the Demography Department. Working with my supervisors, I found being a Ph.D. student quite a grateful experience. I think this was primarily because of the understanding and collegial relationship, as well as the constant guidance and supervision, that I enjoyed with my supervisors. To both of my supervisors, I certainly owe a major debt, and, in return, I can only sincerely thank them. My three years as a research student at ANU have been perhaps the best opportunity I have ever had to devote myself to uninterrupted research.

Since transmigration is a public policy to reshape the distribution of the Indonesian population, particularly from Java to the other islands, politics is undoubtedly a significant dimension. In this regard I am very grateful to
have had Dr. Thomas Smith from the Department of Politics in the Faculty of Arts, ANU, as my adviser. During the first year of my Ph.D. course my understanding of the political aspects of the topic was greatly enlarged through discussion and readings given by Dr. Smith. Although in November 1987 my adviser moved to the National University of Singapore, he has continued to send comments on my drafts. To Dr. Smith, I would like to express my sincere thanks for the advice he has given and for his constant interest in my work. With the arrival of Dr. Geoffrey McNicoll to the Department of Demography in early 1988, I was again fortunate in gaining an adviser. To Dr. McNicoll I would also like to express my thanks for his critical comments and encouragement.

During the course of writing this thesis, I have been fortunate in obtaining useful comments and suggestions from several people. In particular, I would like to thank Dr. Terry Hull, a long-standing member of the demography community at ANU who joined the Department of Political and Social Change in 1986, has provided me with a combination of moral support and access to his vast knowledge of the intricacies of this topic. In ANU, I would like to thank Marian May and Merlyne Paunlagui. Marian provided not only excellent guidance in my struggles with the English language but also her personal interest in my work and her friendship. Merlyne, one of my Ph.D. colleagues, has always been helpful whenever I encountered difficulties in using
the computer. In the Department of Demography I would specifically thank Ms. D. Wood, A. Dharmalingam and Dr. Kim Streatfield, who provided me with a very important support during the final stage of preparing this thesis. I am also very grateful to Roland Aronsen from the Instructional Resources Unit (IRU), ANU, who has drawn clear maps for me.

This thesis would never have been completed without the help of many institutions and individuals in Jakarta, Riau, South Kalimantan and Canberra. In Jakarta I would like to thank my institute, the Centre for Population and Manpower Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (PPT-LIPI, formerly Leknas) and its director Dr. Edi Masinambouw, Dr. Kartomo Wirosuhardjo at the University of Indonesia and Ir. Rofiq Ahmad in the Department of Transmigration. In Riau, I would like to thank Dr. Muchtar Ahmad and Drs. U.U. Hamidy at the University of Riau and Drs. Abuzar in the Transmigration Regional Office. In South Kalimantan, I would like to thank Dr. Marliani Djohansyah and Dr. Ismet Ahmad at the University of Lambung Mangkurat and Drs. Sam'any in the Regional Development Planning Board. I should also thank government officers in the various offices in Jakarta, Riau or South Kalimantan, who have provided me with information regarding transmigration. To the transmigrants and local people in various places in Riau and South Kalimantan: regrettably I am unable directly to help in your struggle for survival; I can only say thank you very much for your
willingness to share your opinions and feelings with me. In
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My wife, Indira, deserves special recognition for the
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spent on this work. To my daughters Anggariti and
Larassanti, I owe an immense debt of gratitude, especially
for the sacrifice of the time which I might have spent with
them and, instead, devoted to this work.

In this acknowledgement, it has not been possible to
mention all those whose stimulus, moral and intellectual,
has helped make this thesis possible. To all of them I owe
thanks. But while they share with me whatever credit may be
accorded to this work, it should be clear that whatever
blame there is falls on me alone.

ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses transmigration policy in Indonesia within the context of centre and regional relationships. The evidence from Riau and South Kalimantan suggests that as a consequence of the unequal relationship between the centre and the regions, the implementation of transmigration policy has suffered from a lack of both coordination and feedback that could enhance an appropriate policy.

At the regional level, the ambiguous national goals of transmigration policy have been simply translated into physical and quantifiable targets, which, in turn, have resulted in the neglect of transmigration policy as an integrated and complementary effort between the different sectors and ministries. The prevailing problems of implementation, such as the unsuitability of land for agricultural settlements, the various forms of mismanagement within the implementing agencies, and the hidden conflicts with the local population, have only had limited feedback effect on the policy making process in the central government. After the budget was drastically cut back in the mid-1980s, however, transmigration policy started to confront new dimensions of these problems.

At this time, the implementation of transmigration policy was forced to change direction toward, among other things, maintaining the existing settlements and bolstering the cash-crops scheme. The spontaneous transmigration scheme, which became government rhetoric during the previous period, seems also to be receiving serious attention by the government. Yet, as the prevailing economic and political structure of the country is unchanged, the myth of transmigration policy as a panacea is unlikely to vanish.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I : INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II : POPULATION DISTRIBUTION POLICIES IN THE THIRD WORLD AND TRANSMIGRATION IN INDONESIA</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Population Distribution Policies in the Third World</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. The Context of Policy Processes in the Third World</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Policy Implementation Analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. Transmigration Policy in Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5. The Significance of the Centre-Regional Context in Transmigration Policy Analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III: FROM EMIGRATIE TO TRANSMIGRASI: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN MIGRATION POLICIES</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. The Formation of An Emigration Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. Transmigration: Migration Policies after Independence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3. Regional Responses to Sukarno's Transmigration Policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4. Summary and Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV : TRANSMIGRATION POLICY OVER FOUR PLANNING CYCLES (1969-1988)</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1. National Development Policy: An Overview</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2. The Role of Regional Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3. Transmigration Policy in Repelita I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4. Transmigration Policy in Repelita II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5. Transmigration Policy in Repelita III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6. Transmigration Policy in Repelita IV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7. Repelita I-IV: Target Achievement and Its Demographic Impacts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8. Summary and Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter V : RIAU AND SOUTH KALIMANTAN: TWO REGIONS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 152

5.1. Geographic Setting
5.2. Socio-demographic Aspects
5.3. Economic and Political Factors
5.4. Central Government Policy in Riau and South Kalimantan
5.5. Summary and Conclusion

Chapter VI : TRANSMIGRATION IN RIAU AND SOUTH KALIMANTAN: THE EVIDENCE OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 189

6.1. Transmigration in Riau and South Kalimantan
6.2. Central Government Decisions and their Regional Implementation
6.3. Regional Responses to the Central Plan Formulation
6.4. Co-ordination: An Unresolved Problem
6.5. Conclusion

Chapter VII: THE CENTRE-REGIONAL CONTEXT OF TRANSMIGRATION IMPLEMENTATION: AN ASSESSMENT 231

7.1. The Policy Making Process
7.2. The Idealized Policy
7.3. The Target Group
7.4. The Implementing Organization
7.5. The Environment
7.6. Conclusion

Chapter VIII: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT 256

REFERENCES 271
APPENDICES 293
LIST OF TABLES

2.1 Population Growth in Java and Madura 36
2.2 Number of Migrant Families Resettled under Colonization and Transmigration Programs (1905-1989) 38
4.1 Realization of the Transmigration Program during Repelita III (Families) 124
4.2 Repelita I-IV: Transmigration Families Moved by Province of Origin 137
4.3 Repelita I-IV: General Transmigrant Families Moved by Province of Destination 141
4.4 Repelita I-IV: Average Annual Number of General Transmigrants Moved as Percentage of Annual Population Increase in Selected Sending Areas (In Thousands) 142
4.5 Repelita I-IV: Average Annual Number of General Transmigrants Resettled as Percentage of Annual Population Increase in Selected Receiving Areas (In Thousands) 142
5.2 Life Time In-Migration to, and Life Time Out-Migration from the Province of Riau, 1980 162
5.3 Recent In-Migration to, and Recent Out-Migration from the Province of Riau, 1980 164
5.5 Life Time In-Migration to, and Life Time Out-Migration from the Province of South Kalimantan, 1980 169
5.6 Recent In-Migration to, and Recent Out-Migration from the Province of South Kalimantan, 1980 170
5.8  Riau: Percentage Distribution of Regional Gross Domestic Product by Sector (Current Prices), 1983, 1985  
5.9  South Kalimantan: Employment Structure 1971, 1980 and 1985  
5.10 South Kalimantan: Percentage Distribution of Regional Gross Domestic Product by Sectors (Current Prices) 1983, 1985  
5.11 Riau and South Kalimantan: Sectoral Budget Allocation (1984/85, 1985/86, 1986/87) - (billions of Rupiah)  
6.1  The Chronology of the Transmigration Program in Riau  
6.2  The Chronology of the Transmigration Program in South Kalimantan
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Indonesia: Population Density, 1985</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Model of Policy Implementation Analysis</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Government Organization in Indonesia</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Transmigration</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Riau Province</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>South Kalimantan Province</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>(Asal Bapak Senang) So long as the boss is pleased</td>
</tr>
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<td>adat</td>
<td>customs and traditions</td>
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<tr>
<td>APPDT</td>
<td>(Alokasi Pemukiman Penduduk Daerah Transmigrasi) Settlement Allocation for People of the Transmigration Area</td>
</tr>
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<td>alang-alang</td>
<td>Imperata cylindrica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APBD</td>
<td>(Anggaran Pembangunan Belanja Daerah) Regional Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APBN</td>
<td>(Anggaran Pembangunan Belanja Nasional) National Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babinsa</td>
<td>(Bintara Pembina Desa) - military officer, usually with the rank of sergeant, who is responsible for the village level political security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAPPEDA</td>
<td>(Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah) Provincial Level Development Planning Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAPPENAS</td>
<td>(Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional) National Development Planning Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPPAT</td>
<td>(Biro Penampungan Bekas Anggota Tentara) Bureau for the Resettlement of Ex-military Members</td>
</tr>
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<td>BRN</td>
<td>(Biro Rekonstruksi Nasional) National Reconstruction Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) People Representative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRD</td>
<td>(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) Provincial People Representative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinas</td>
<td>District Technical Offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIP</td>
<td>(Daftar Isian Proyek) Specified Working Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DITADA</td>
<td>(Direktorat Tata Kota dan Tata Daerah) Directorate of City and Regional Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>(Daftar Usulan Proyek) Register of Project Proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamelan</td>
<td>Traditional Javanese Orchestra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GBHN (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara) The Broad Outlines of State Policy

HKTI (Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia) Indonesian Farmer's Association

Kakandep (Perwakilan Kantor Departemen) Department's District Level Offices

Kanwil (Kantor Wilayah) Department's Provincial Level Offices

KLH (Kependudukan dan Lingkungan Hidup) State Ministry for Population and Environment

Leknas (Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasyarakatan Nasional) National Institute of Economic and Social Research

Lemhanas (Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional) National Defense Institute

MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) People Consultative Assembly

pasang-surut tidal

PANKIM (Persiapan dan Pemukiman) Settlement Preparation

PAYP Plan As You Proceed

Permesta (Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam) Universal Struggle Charter

PIR (Perkebunan Inti Rakyat) Nucleus Estate Holder Scheme

PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) Indonesian Communist Party

PPT-LIPI (Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Penduduk dan Tenaga Kerja - Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia) The Centre for Population and Manpower Studies - Indonesian Institute of Sciences

PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia) Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia

PTP (Perseroan Terbatas Perkebunan) Limited Liability Estate Companies

RAHBIN (Pengerahan dan Pembinaan) Mobilisation and Development
Redecon Research and Development Consultant

Repelita: (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun) Five-Year Development Plan.

- Repelita I First Five-Year Development Plan, 1969/7-1973/4
- Repelita II Second Five-Year Development Plan, 1974/75-1978/9
- Repelita III Third Five-Year Development Plan, 1979/80-1983/4
- Repelita IV Fourth Five-Year Development Plan, 1984/5-1988/89

SISHANKAMRATA (Sistim Pertahanan dan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta) Popular Defense and Security System

tegalan dry land cultivation

transmigrasi: transmigration

- bedol desa moving the entire village community to the transmigration settlement area
- lokal local residents participating in transmigration settlements
- spontan as for swakarsa, including persons who migrate independently of the official programme
- swakarsa partially assisted or unassisted transmigrants
- umum general, or fully supported transmigrants

WPP (Wilayah Pengembangan Partial) Partial Area Development
Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

For researchers in universities or other institutions who have not been directly involved in the process of policy making during the Repelita periods, studying the complexity of transmigration has been a challenge. The question they face is whether or not to seek narrow views or through extending the existing terms of reference on the basis that the solution is most likely to be found within a wider perspective (Sayogyo, 1985: 42-43).

The United Nations' surveys among developing countries indicated that the most widely perceived population problems were population distribution and internal migration, and, surprisingly, not population growth as had been widely suggested by most population experts, international organizations and many leaders in Western industrialized countries.¹ The explanation of this contradiction lies within different perceptions of the population problem. The survey results showed clearly that internal migration and population distribution were more frequently perceived as problems requiring intervention than was the case with either fertility or mortality. Unfortunately, the survey did not further investigate why most developing countries considered

¹ In the 1979 survey, among the 116 developing countries only six reported the over-all spatial distribution of their population as entirely acceptable. Of the remaining 110 countries, 42 regarded the spatial distribution of their populations as unacceptable to some extent and 68 found it to be highly unacceptable (United Nations, 1980: 40-50).
population distribution and internal migration to be their primary population problems.

Myron Weiner, a political scientist who has written widely in the area of population, argued that:

Many governments believe that some of the problems intensified by rapid population growth can be eased by policies directed at the dispersal of populations - partly because they consider population distribution more easily influenced by government policies than fertility, and partly because they may advocate population increases for the country as a whole and view a redistribution policy as a means of reducing some of the costs (Weiner, 1975: 66).

As with other population-related issues, population distribution policy has become an area that increasingly involves scholars from different disciplines. As a result, the literature on population distribution reflects a variety of interests and different approaches and perspectives. As noted by Richardson:

From the point of view of population policy, there are grounds for suggesting that population distribution is the main current and future population issue. There is a substantial degree of argument about what should be done to reduce fertility and mortality, and there have been some notable successes. With respect to population distribution policy, however, there is no consensus and there are no unambiguous successes. The field is riddled with extreme value judgements, ideological stances, and unsubstantiated assertions, many of them myths (1984: 263).

The view of population policy described by Richardson closely approximates the reality in Indonesia. Compared to family planning policy, which has almost no
historical precedent, transmigration policies dealing with sponsored population movement from Java to other islands have been in existence for almost a century. Yet, the relative outcomes of the two policies confirm Richardson's judgement. The success story of family planning in Indonesia has been almost without rival in the context of Third World countries. By contrast, transmigration policy is admitted to be less successful population policy, confronted by formidable problems of implementation.²

A general aim of this study is to assess why transmigration policy formulation and implementation have experienced such difficulties and failures. The factors that have led transmigration policy to its current state will be identified and discussed, and the policy implications and prospects considered. In comparison with other Indonesian development programs, transmigration has been given high priority, receives a significant allocation in the national budget and is directed towards ambitious and multi-focused goals. As stated by President

² President Suharto in December 1988 was honoured by the Population Council as the first national leader to receive its "Population Award". In June 1989 he also received a World Population Award from the United Nations for Indonesia's achievement in reducing population growth through the family planning program. By contrast, the failure of the transmigration program reached a climax when Martono, Minister for Transmigration, declared 16,000 houses that had been built for transmigrants to be uninhabitable (see Kompas, 25 November 1987). (Unofficial sources reported that the actual number was about 40,000). This large number of inhabitable houses reflects the failure of the department of Transmigration in recruiting and resettling transmigrants according to their planning schedules.
Suharto in an interview with Hopper (c.1987: 26),

Transmigration is one of the absolute necessities if we are to achieve our national goals - a higher living standard for our people, economic growth and national stability.

Yet, a comprehensive analysis of transmigration policy is long overdue. As Babcock observed:

Indeed, so entrenched, even 'sacred', a part of national policy and consciousness is transmigration that it has rarely been subject to probing criticism. The media, as well as various research reports, do indeed criticise certain aspects of the programme, and more commonly the failure of particular projects, but they attempt no overall evaluation (1986: 160).

In Indonesia, development policy has always been influenced by the dynamic relations between the centre (Java or Jakarta) and the periphery (the regions or Outer Islands). This is partly because Indonesia is a fragmented nation of islands, with Java the most populous, and because it is characterized by marked cultural diversity. In addition to their larger numbers, the Javanese have always been the dominant cultural group and the most influential ethnic group; consequently, as noted by Bruner (1974: 252), 'most other Indonesians see themselves as engaged in a more or less continual struggle to keep from being Javanized'. 
FIGURE 1.1 INDONESIA: POPULATION DENSITY, 1985

Source: Adapted from Hardjono (1977: 2).
Since Independence in 1945, Indonesia's development has been full of conflict and consensus between the interests of the region (non-Javanese peoples) and the centre (mostly dominated by the Javanese). Transmigration policy has thus been conditioned to a very large extent by the dynamic relations between central and regional governments and between Java and the Outer Islands. Jones (1979: 220) argued that the implementation of the transmigration program had been affected by the state of centre-regional relationships within the country:

The degree to which people in the outer islands will be willing to accept the continued organized influx of rural Javans will no doubt depend largely on the broader political situation, the extent to which the programme is perceived as benefiting Java or Indonesia, and the sensitivity with which the transmigration program is administered.

In this study, transmigration policy will be analysed within the context of the centre-regional relationships that have to a certain extent shaped the Indonesian identity. In particular, this study will focus on two aspects: first, the policy formulation and changes that have taken place at the national level from the First Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita I) in 1969 to the end of the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita IV) in 1989; and second, the implications of policy formulation and changes at the national level for policy implementation in transmigration receiving areas. Case studies on transmigration implementation in Riau and South Kalimantan will be presented to explore these
issues at the regional level. Riau and South Kalimantan have been selected, partly because they have similar physical and geographical characteristics, yet display many differences of economy and culture. As this study shows, both similarities and differences have characterized the implementation of transmigration policy in these two provinces.

More specifically, the objectives of the study are as follows:

1. To describe the demographic and socio-historical contexts that have shaped transmigration policy.

2. To analyse in detail the policy processes related to transmigration during the New Order period, specifically from Repelita I to IV (1969-1989).

3. To assess the implementation of the transmigration program in the province of Riau and South Kalimantan within the context of centre-regional relationships.

In order to achieve those objectives, two levels of analysis have been conducted. The first is an analysis of transmigration policy within the framework of policy cycles at the national level. The nature of transmigration policy, particularly during the New Order, has been analysed, taking into consideration the socio-demographic and politico-historical backgrounds that have

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3 The term 'region' in this study is equivalent to a province, the first level of the Indonesian administrative structure. Except where stated otherwise, this meaning will be used throughout this thesis.

4 In this study the terms 'policy' and 'program', especially in connection with transmigration, are often used interchangeably. This is in line with common usage in Indonesia.
formed the context of transmigration policy in Indonesia. The second is an analysis of the implementation of the transmigration program in Riau and South Kalimantan, in order to understand the processes and institutional context of policy implementation in more detail.

It should be made clear at the outset that there are several categories of transmigrant, as well as different policies dealing with each category. In the past, according to Hardjono (1977: 28-30), it was customary to classify transmigration undertakings and migrants according to the organization responsible for implementing the program and the type of financing provided. The major category has always been General Transmigration (Transmigrasi Umum), which comprises fully sponsored migrants and is undertaken by the government transmigration agency, using its own funds and facilities. The second category in the past was Special Transmigration (Transmigrasi Khusus), which involved the movement of people for some special purpose or reason, such as transmigration undertaken by Department of Social Welfare for the victims of natural disasters, the squatters and unemployed people from urban areas, as well as private transmigration sponsored by non-government bodies. The third category was Local Transmigration or Transmigrasi Lokal, which involved the resettlement of people within the same island or, more commonly, within the same province, under government guidance. In a sense, these migrants were not "transmigrants" since they did
not move "across" from Java or Bali, but because in their new settlement they were treated similarly as general transmigrants they were basically can be seen as transmigrants. The fourth category of Independent Transmigration (Transmigrasi Spontan) includes two completely different kinds of migrants: those who are described as spontan dengan bantuan biaya (Spontan D.B.B.), which means that some financial assistance is given in the form of transportation and housing materials; and those who are described as spontan tanpa bantuan biaya (Spontan T.B.B.), which means that nothing is given other than uncleared land in the transmigration project. People who moved in this way, either with or without assistance but theoretically under the sponsorship of the transmigration agency, are counted in government statistics as independent or spontan migrants.

In the New Order period, the above mentioned transmigrant categories are basically retained with only a few additional changes. Transmigran Lokal or Local Transmigrant, for example, has been given more attention and renamed APPDT (Alokasi Pemukiman Penduduk Daerah Transmigrasi or Settlement Allocation for People of the Transmigration Area) Transmigrant; also, Transmigran Spontan has been officially renamed Transmigran Swakarsa, which literally means transmigrants under their own initiative. A slightly new category was introduced: Transmigran Sisipan, which means the migrants who "slipped in" to the existing settlement, usually because
Some transmigrants left the settlement and their places therefore could be filled by this type of migrants. In many cases these migrants are actually spontaneous transmigrants, and therefore often confused the official statistics on spontaneous transmigrants. The important new category of transmigrants was the PIR-Trans or transmigrants who are employed as plantation labourers in the PIR (Perkebunan Inti Rakyat or Nucleus Estate Holder Scheme) projects. These migrants could be the indigenous people, usually the previous owners of land which was designated by the government for the project, or migrants who were recruited by transmigration offices in Java or Bali. The PIR-Trans projects are implemented by PTP (Perseroan Terbatas Perkebunan) a state enterprise on plantation and Dinas Perkebunan (District Technical Office on Plantation), whereas the Transmigration Department only provides the migrants.

However, since this study essentially examines the government policy on transmigration, it is logical that the discussion and analysis will inevitably concentrate on the implementation of General or Umum Transmigration which receives full support from the government, whereas other types of transmigration and the migrant itself will be discussed mainly in relation to General Transmigration.

The data used to accomplish these objectives are of two types: primary and secondary data. The primary data
for this study have been collected intermittently during field work in 1986, 1987 and 1988 in Jakarta, Riau and South Kalimantan. These data mainly consist of information about the processes of policy formulation and implementation at the national and regional levels. Interviews were conducted with the various government officers who were dealing with transmigration implementation, including officers in the Departments of Transmigration, Home Affairs and Public Works, and the National and Regional Planning Boards. Other interviews were also conducted with academics in universities, and with transmigrants and the indigenous people in Riau and South Kalimantan. The secondary data for this study are mainly demographic information from censuses and surveys, statistics on transmigration from central and regional government offices, and other social and economic information related to transmigration.

The primary data are of a qualitative nature and share many of the limitations of other qualitative data. One limitation of the data collected through interviews during field work resulted partly from the use of unstructured interviews. During interviews, particularly

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5 In 1986 field work was conducted twice, each time for approximately three weeks each in Riau and in South Kalimantan. This field work was conducted in conjunction with an Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) project on the relationships between transmigration and regional development in those provinces, funded by UNFPA. From early December 1987 to the end of February 1988, field work was funded by AIDAB, although for practical reasons (for instance, to obtain an official research permit) field work continued to operate under the name of the LIPI-UNFPA project.
those with government officials, the main questions were often asked in an indirect manner in order to avoid rejection. This was necessary because the subject was sometimes considered to be sensitive or confidential. In some instances, taking notes or tape recording was not desirable. As a consequence, the information could only be recorded afterward. In these circumstances, the researcher's memory and personal views could, to some extent, have distorted the information.

Another limitation is related to the question of representativeness. This issue is particularly relevant for information that was collected from interviews with transmigrants or local people. The transmigrants and local people interviewed cannot be regarded as representative of all transmigrants or indigenous people. They were drawn from different locations, social and economic classes, as well as ethnic backgrounds, and (in the case of transmigrants) had resided in the area for different periods. In this analysis, the information obtained from interviews with transmigrants and local people is therefore treated primarily as supplementary, rather than primary data. In the case of government officials who had been interviewed, the selection was based on their involvement in a particular aspect of the transmigration program. In these circumstances, their views are treated as a representation of the facts or realities regarding the practices or policy processes of which those officials were aware, or in many instances in
which they were personally involved.  

The structure of this thesis is straight-forward. Chapter II locates this study within the existing theoretical and empirical literature on population distribution policy in the Third World. The historical contexts of transmigration policy are presented in chapter III. Chapter IV focuses on the New Order period and elaborates the process of national development policy-making during that time. Transmigration is examined closely as a government population distribution policy, although it is explicitly recognized that it also has other objectives. In Chapter V a description of the setting of Riau and South Kalimantan provinces is presented, with special reference to their relationships with the central government. Chapter VI then investigates the process of transmigration policy implementation in the two provinces. Chapter VII elaborates the analyses of transmigration policy within the context of centre and regional relationships. Finally, a summary and conclusion as well as the prospect of transmigration policy are presented in chapter VIII.

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6 In a case of conflicting views between different informants, or a view considered as unclear or vague, rechecking was conducted by asking a third or fourth informant the same question. Another very important source of information used in this study is press reports, which complement material from interviews. In the references, the full title of the report is presented to give the reader a gist of the information.
Chapter II

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION POLICIES IN THE THIRD WORLD AND
TRANSMIGRATION IN INDONESIA

This chapter consists of two interrelated parts. The first is a review of the literature on population distribution policies in the Third World, based on the principle that population policies can be properly understood only if placed in Third World political contexts. The second part examines transmigration policy in Indonesia as a unique case for such analysis. It suggests that a centre-regional context provides an appropriate perspective from which to view transmigration policy.

2.1. Population Distribution Policies in the Third World

Since the Bucharest Population Conference in 1974, in which population distribution began to be considered as a major population problem in the Third World, studies on population distribution policy have flourished. Yet, systematic reviews of this topic have remained few and exploratory in character (Fuchs and Demko, 1981: 70). Jones and Richter (1981: 2) noted that, despite the concern and, indeed, obsession of Third World leaders with problems of population distribution, the state of regional development and migration theory is unsatisfactory. There are no clear guide-lines even
regarding the appropriateness of many widely-accepted goals. Part of the problem is the plethora of frameworks of analysis, many of which are primarily descriptive rather than policy-directed. Another limitation of existing studies is the fact that, given the specificity of each country's experience, generalizations or a 'cookbook approach', is of no great help and could be a dangerous undertaking (Whitney, 1980; Desbarats, 1988). The most substantial limitation of existing studies on population distribution policies, however, is their isolation from Third World political contexts, as correctly identified by Migdal:

Analyses of policies in the Third World, in particular, have often ignored the political context within which policies are formulated and put into action (1977: 242).

Although several studies have shown the need to incorporate socio-political factors into the analysis of population distribution policy, few have been conducted on an empirical basis. Among the studies that analyse population distribution policy within country specific political contexts are studies by Chambers (1969) on settlement schemes in Tropical Africa, Farmer (1974) on agricultural colonization in India, Bunker (1979) and Sawyer (1981) on colonization and frontier expansion in Brazil, and Dunham (1982) on land settlement in Sri

1 Pryor is among the few population distribution policy analysts who have suggested an analysis that is more country-specific (See his contribution in United Nations, Population Distribution Policy and Development Planning in Developing Countries, 1981).
Langka. The lack of analyses that place population distribution policy in a Third World political context has resulted in a growing distance between the accumulation of existing knowledge on the subject and realistic interpretation of that knowledge.

An approach that is able to disentangle the complexities of population distribution policy from its implementation in a specific country context is needed. Population distribution policy is essentially an outcome of a policy-making process that operates within the political realm, especially in the Third World. An analytical attitude towards development issues, which has been described by Goldsworthy (1988: 507) as 'political mindedness', is perhaps a good starting point for such an endeavour:

In essence, political-mindedness means a sensitivity to the phenomena of values, interests and power in human affairs,...

Furthermore,

One of the attributes of political-mindedness, then, is a concern to elucidate the relationships between values and policy preferences in terms like these. To grasp these relationships is to be better able to uncover unspoken assumptions and to see through pretensions of value neutrality...(as claimed for example by development technocrats). (Goldsworthy, 1988: 509).

Population policy has been variously defined by many, but few have agreed on its precise meaning or constituent parts. Recent statements have identified many
of the difficulties of defining and identifying policy as it relates to population issues (Jones and Richter, 1981; Fuchs, 1983; Desbarats, 1988). In its most inclusive sense, population policy is a set of actions - stated or unstated, intended or unintended - by a national government or local government, organization or interest group that affects population size, growth rate, composition or distribution.

In addition to the recent attention given to population distribution issues, little agreement has emerged so far concerning the specific aims of redistribution policies. Attempts to define goals with operational precision have commonly floundered on value judgements, ideological biases, and unsubstantiated assertions (Desbarats, 1988: 2). However, three major objectives have been identified as dominating population distribution policies adopted among the Asia-Pacific countries (Fuchs, 1983): the deceleration or reversal of rural-to-urban migration trends; alteration of rural population distribution, in many cases through colonization or resettlement schemes; and alteration of urban configuration, usually through controls on primate city growth and development of small and intermediate-size cities.

Desbarats (1988: 3) argued that population distribution policies should not be viewed for their own sake but as a means to achieve broader goals. In other
words, they cannot be considered in isolation. Fuchs (1983), among others, broadly distinguished two categories of government policies on population distribution: explicit and implicit policies. Explicit policies are those that have explicit intentions to distribute or direct population movements. Such actions are intended and deliberate, whereas implicit population distribution policies are any policies which have an indirect impact on population distribution within the country. Pryor (1976: 22), on the other hand, viewed population distribution policy somewhat more narrowly as:

responding to the effects of a population distribution which is viewed as undesirable on some specified or unspecified criteria, or as positively influencing the choice of destination of migrants...

A broad review of studies on population distribution policies in developing countries shows that most have been based on secondary data. Most studies include detailed descriptions of migration patterns, typologies of population distribution, discussions of the constraints faced by such policies and, finally, suggestions for improving or overcoming problems caused by, or resulting from, population distribution in developing countries. Usually, options have been provided to Third World planners to enhance their capacity to integrate population distribution and internal migration with national development. Further data needed for this purpose have been identified and future research areas also recommended. Many studies, although comprehensive in
their approach, attempt to cover very wide areas; some even cover all developing countries (Findley, 1977; UN, 1981; Oberai, 1983; Fuchs, 1983; van der Wijst, 1984). Analysis has typically become too general and its applicability can be questioned, given the uniqueness of each developing country. The recommendations that flow from the analysis have usually been too abstract and difficult to implement.

Population distribution policy analysts have failed to adequately understand policies in developing countries, among other reasons because they have, either intentionally or unintentionally, attempted to apply a 'developed-nations' conceptual framework when analysing the problems of Third World countries. With such a bias, population distribution policies in developing countries will always be viewed as imperfect or failing to reach the objectives.

Fuchs (1983: 6) provided a typical example of such views:

The vagueness of population distribution policy goals within national development plans is often matched by a failure to make explicit the connections between those goals and other aspects of the development plan.

Fuchs elaborated:
Vertical linkages 'upward' to development goals and 'downward' to programs and projects are not clearly specified, nor are the horizontal linkages with economic, welfare, political, or other goals. Population distribution and redistribution objectives sometimes appear to have been prepared in isolation from other parts of the development plan and therefore seem abstract and unintegrated (1983: 6).

This suggests that everything seems to go wrong in developing countries' population distribution policies. Although from some perspectives the criticisms may be accurate, the analysis does not offer any clues as to why population distribution policy in developing countries has taken this form and what should be done about it. Why do most population distribution policies in developing countries display such characteristics? It is essential to answer this question if we want to devise alternative ways to solve population distribution problems in Third World countries.

2.2. The Context of Policy Processes in the Third World

If we consider population distribution policy in Third World countries from the point of view of public policy, we must place it within the context of policy processes in Third World nations. Since the early 1970s, such processes have been recognized as different from those in the developed or first world nations. This recognition, arises partly because the process of development or modernization which has flourished and has
been adopted by many Third World leaders since the early 1960s has largely failed to achieve its objectives. Modernization theory in general, and political development theory in particular, have been criticized for their ideological and ethnocentric character. Higgot (1988: 31) wrote:

Modernization theory came to be characterized as ideologically tainted, methodologically inadequate, and perhaps most important, ineffective as a policy tool.

Public policy analysts have found that in many cases, even though a policy has been neatly formulated at the national or central level, it cannot be easily implemented (Riggs, 1964; Smith, 1973a; 1973b and 1985; Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974; Grindle, 1980; Rondinelli, 1983; Higgot, 1988). Quick, for example, argued that public policies often do not get implemented at all, and those that do manage to get through the tortuous process of implementation often look very different from what their framers originally intended. He explained that:

Policy implementation in the Third World bears little resemblance to the classical understanding of implementation as a process of rationally linking broad goals to specific programatic decisions (1980: 40).

On the assumption that policy processes in Third World countries are different from those in developed nations, appropriate methods for evaluating development activities in the Third World must also be different from those that have been developed to evaluate government
public policies in developed nations. However, just as the ideas of development or modernisation have been largely imported from developed nations, so the approach to policy evaluation also has been based essentially on the experience of developed countries. It assumes, for example, that interest groups and political parties are well-established institutions. In the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as argued by Grindle (1980: 15), to a much greater extent than in the political systems of the United States and Western Europe, the process of implementing public policies is a focus of political participation and competition. This arises from the characteristics of the political systems themselves, such as the remoteness and inaccessibility of the policy-making process from most individuals, and the extensive competition engendered by widespread need and very scarce resources.

Grindle further explained that:

Thus, while in the United States and Western Europe much political activity is focused on the input stage of the policy process, in the Third World a large portion of individual and collective demand making, the representation of interests, and the emergence and resolution of conflict occurs at the output stage (1980: 15).

Hoole also argued that in Third World countries:
Development activities frequently take place in an unstable and highly political setting. This will result in changing programs and priorities and in problems in implementing and evaluating development activities. Factors such as high turnover of office holders and bureaucrats, domestic conflict and strife, an inflationary economy, uncertain findings for the budget, changes in the international economic order, famines, and unemployment may mean that development planning is not meaningful, that development activities are not implemented as planned, that changes are made as the activity is implemented, or that the activity never occurs (1978: 126).

Smith (1985: 142), reviewing the literature on development policy evaluation in Third World Countries, suggested that the type of evaluation that best fits the Third World context would be one that is able to identify problems in the nature of the policy and in the program execution process. That form of evaluation, according to Smith, is implementation analysis. The implementation of policy is the crucial phase of the policy process in most Third World Countries. According to Smith:

When a Western political system makes a policy, it is assumed that the policy will be implemented and the results will be somewhere near those expected. This is not the case in many non-Western nations for two reasons. First, there tends to be a great deal of symbolic policy making. Governments formulate policies that are never fully implemented or may not be intended for implementation. Just because a developing nation makes a 'policy' is not an indication that it is a policy in the Western sense of concept. As Fred Riggs points out, in developing nations it is wise to distinguished between goals (which are not usually implemented) and policies (which the government will try to implement). Secondly, even if a government decides to implement a policy with some degree of vigour, the end results of the policy often are not very satisfactory in terms of the goals of the policy (1973a: 246).
Given the concentration of political elements on the implementation process, it is likely that policies and programs will be even more difficult to manage and predict and even more subject to alteration in the Third World than elsewhere. This means that the implementation process may be the major arena in which individuals and groups are able to pursue conflicting interests and compete for access to scarce resources. It may even be the principal nexus of the interaction between the government and the citizenry, between public officials and their constituents. Moreover, the outcome of this competition and interaction can determine both the content and the impact of programs established by governments elites, and thus influence the course of a country's development.

In the population policy literature, implementation analysis is essentially in accordance with the so-called 'comprehensive country-specific' analysis introduced by Korten (1975). Like other policy analysts with extensive Third World experience, Korten aimed to fill the gaps and deficiencies encountered by most studies in their attempt to understand population policies in developing countries. He argued that to comprehend a population policy within a Third World context required an insight into three crucial elements of the policy process: first, the process through which political support or acquiescence is developed for population policies;
second, the dynamic decision making processes through which specific policy choices are made and their programmes designed; and third, the contextual aspects of the implementation processes that are central to the success or failure of a given policy.

Hugo (1985: 6) noted that government policy on population distribution must take full account of the nature of the state in which the policy is to be initiated:

It is not just the contemporary politico-economic context that should be considered but also the historical context. For example, it should be borne in mind that most of the Third World countries we are dealing with here have been subjected for much of their recent history to fundamentally exploitative colonial system designed to expedite the extraction of raw materials and control the local population in the most cost efficient way.

Similarly, Weiner argued that neither can migration policies be considered without recognizing the variety of political interest groups that are affected and the politically charged atmosphere within which policy decisions are often made. He also argued that migration policies can best be understood in the context of the political process:

To consider policy choices only in the context of the quest for more accelerated development, a more satisfactory dispersal of population, or greater equity or any one of a number of desirable objectives is to overlook the hard realities of politics (Weiner, 1975: 69).
According to Korten (1975: 146), one of the great values of intensive observation and analysis of policy processes on a country specific basis is the opportunity to work from the policy maker's perspective and to study the policy in context, exploring in all their rich variety the broad range of variables that may influence the policy outcome. Analysing policy choices and processes in a specific country context can demonstrate the implications of the diverse range of situations in which actions must be undertaken (Korten, 1975: 140). Through the study of actual decisions, it becomes possible to identify the types of choices open to consideration and the wide range of contextual issues to be addressed. These include, among others, relevant political pressures and, relative to the state, the readiness of the politically-relevant public, unique considerations of objectives and strategy, the strength and weaknesses of the local institutional infrastructure, and other specific situational requirements relating to such factors as culture, local politics or religion.

2.3. Policy Implementation Analysis

The policy process is complex and implementation is but one part of this process. Implementation is inextricably related to, and interdependent with, the other parts. Thus, a conceptual overview of the entire policy process is required in order to provide an
adequate understanding. Smith (1973b) sees policy implementation as a tension-generating process in society. Implementation, in this context, is the creation and management of tensions and the use of power and resources to achieve policy ends. Policy formulation and implementation take place within a social, economic and political environment that is in a state of constant change. Discrepancies and tensions are a normal part of implementation, as they are the essence of politics, and implementation of public policies is merely an extension of politics into a different arena. Once public policies are regarded as tension-generating forces in society, it is necessary to consider the context of the implementation of policies - the policy relevant components that form the tension-generating matrix. Smith (1973b: 202) identifies four such components that are important in the policy implementation process: (1) the idealized policy, (2) the implementing organization, (3) the target group, and (4) environmental factors.

In order to analyse dynamic policy processes, Smith (1973b: 203) developed the framework shown schematically in Figure 1.1:
The components of the model are as follows:

1. **The Policy-Making Process**

   The policy making process is defined as a process through which a particular policy or program has been formulated. Several important elements to be considered in analysing the policy-making process are:

   a. **Consultation:** Were there any consultations with and active participation during the policy formulation from both the target groups affected by the policy and from the implementing organization? Was participation encouraged or blocked?
b. **Time:** Was the policy formed in a time of crisis and thus done quickly, or was the policy developed in a slow and deliberative process?

c. **Source of the policy:** Was the policy an indigenously-derived and funded endeavour or were its origins well outside the community or country of its application?

d. **Expediency or Analysis:** Was there analysis of the problem and consideration of alternatives when the policy was formulated. Or, was the policy formed to pacify group interest or for other expedient reasons?

2. **The Idealized Policy**

   The idealized policy is defined as the idealized patterns of interaction that the policy makers are attempting to induce. There are four relevant categories of variables of idealized policy:

   a. **The Formal Policy:** This is the formal decisional statement, law, or program that the government is attempting to implement. In short, what form does the policy take?

   b. **The Type of Policy.** There can be three types of policy. First, policies may be complex or they may be simple in nature. This distinction is similar to that between broad, non-incremental policies and small-scale incremental ones. Second, policies may be categorized as organizational or non-organizational. An organizational
policy requires the modification, or the establishment, of a formal organization. Non-organizational policies, by contrast, call for the establishment of patterns of interaction outside the formal organizational context. Third, policies also may be classified as distributive (to provide services, such as housing and welfare), redistributive (to re-allocate the resources within a society), regulatory (to coordinate individuals and groups in order to achieve objectives), or emotive-symbolic (statement of very desirable goals but never expected to be implemented, such as "land to the landless" or "universal literacy") (Smith, c.1987, unpub.).

c. **The Program.** There are three aspects of the policy program. First, intensity of support, which is the degree to which the government is committed to the implementation of the policy. Second, the source of the policy: is the policy required to satisfy needs and demands in the society or was it formulated with little demand or support? Third, the scope of the policy: is the policy broad in nature and universal in scope or is it a concentration upon a small geographic or subject area?

d. **Images of the Policy.** It is essential to consider the images that a policy evokes in the society. The images of those affected by the policy and those who implement the policy are most important.
3. The Target Group

The target group is defined as those who are required to adapt to the new patterns of interaction created by the policy. They are the people within organizations or groups who are most affected by the policy. They may be recipients, beneficiaries, clients or even victims of the policy. Included within the target group are the 'interested others', who have a stake in the outcome of the policy and who join the implementation process either in support or in opposition to the target group or the policy. It is they who must change to meet the demands of the policy. Several factors are relevant here:

a. The degree of organization or institutionalization of the target group.

b. The leadership of the target group: leadership can be aligned for or against the policy, or it may be indifferent to the policy. The nature of the leadership is also important.

c. The prior policy experience of the target group: has the group been affected by governmental policies in the past? What has been their experience and response to governmental policy? Are they compliant, rebellious or indifferent?
4. The Implementing Organization

The implementing organization is responsible for the implementation of the policy. In most instances, the organization is a unit of the government bureaucracy. Of all the aspects of implementation, it is the implementing organization that has attracted most attention from implementation analysts. This may be due to the well-entrenched view that the bureaucrats are behind policy implementation failures and an understanding of, and ability to change, their behaviour is paramount to improving the standard of implementation.

Three key variables should be considered in the implementation of policy:

a. The structure and personnel: The stability of the structure and the qualifications of the personnel who must implement the policy are important to understanding implementation. An unstable administrative organization and unqualified personnel may reduce the capacity to implement.

b. The leadership of the administrative organization: This variable, like the leadership of the target group, refers to the style and nature of the leadership.

c. The implementing program capacity: The program and capacity of the implementing organization refers to the intensity of and care taken in organizing for the implementation and to the general capacity of the
organization to meet the objectives of program implementation.

5. The Environment

Environmental factors are the social, political, technological and natural context of society that impact upon government policy, either directly or through rapid change. Environmental factors can be thought of as a sort of constraining corridor, through which the implementation of policy must be forced. For differing kinds of policy, differing cultural, social, political and economic conditions may prevail. For example, in policies related to local self-government in Third World nations, the basic cultural and social life-styles at the village level may be an environmental constraint of great magnitude.

According to Smith (1973b), components 2 to 5 in his model of policy implementation analysis represent the 'tension-generating matrix'. It is the interaction between them that is the essence of implementation. Each component may be composed of actors or groups, ideas or perceptions. From this 'matrix', patterns of action emerge that are called transactions. These can be, for example, target groups refusing to comply with the conditions of the policy, implementers exercising discretion that distorts the policy's intentions, the changing goals of a policy, or the changing nature of
top-level support for the policy. Some of these transaction patterns become crystallized into institutions. Once transaction patterns emerge or institutionalization occurs, they can serve as tension-generating entities that can, though do not always, provide feedback to either the policy-making process or to the implementing organization and environmental factors. Smith (1973b: 209) argued that, with the feedback process built into the model, it becomes difficult to speak of the 'end product' of a policy implementation process. The feedback phase is an important part of the model because it clearly indicates that the policy process is an on-going, continuous process that may never have a final and definite end. (The utilization of Smith's framework in analysing transmigration policy is specifically presented in Chapter VII)

2.4. Transmigration Policy in Indonesia

In Indonesia, the government has explicitly considered the transmigration program to be an instrument of population distribution policy (Department of Manpower and Transmigration, 1979, Appendix 3: 4). Transmigration has been defined as a government program that involves the clearing and opening of land that was previously uncultivated or only sporadically or illegally cultivated, and the deliberate movement and resettlement of people. The idea of population transfer from Java to
other sparsely populated islands is far from new. This policy has been in force since the beginning of the twentieth century.

Java, at the start of the twentieth century, was beginning 'phenomenal' demographic and economic changes. These were in part a result of the rapid growth of population dating from the beginning of the 19th century, which coincided with increasing problems of poverty among Java's population. While the precise pace and primary causes of this rapid population growth are still a matter of academic debate, there is little doubt about the sad plight of the Javanese and the low level of their welfare. As shown in Table 2.1 the population in Java increased rapidly during the 'culture system' period (1830-1870). Wertheim (1959a: 93), summarised the main causes as follows:

The increase in population was largely the result of Western administrative measures reducing mortality: the construction of roads, vaccination against the much-dreaded smallpox, greater security, provisions to meet the threat of famines.

However, the claim about the improvement of health and welfare of the Javanese in general as the result of Dutch policies was rejected by Nitisastro (1961: 39-40) as lacking evidence. Other author, for example, Geertz, (1971: 79-80) also tended to emphasise other causes,

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2 See the polemic on the cause of rapid population growth during this period between White (1973 and 1974), van de Walle (1973) and Geertz (1974). For a more recent and most comprehensive treatment on this issue, see Hugo, Hull, Hull and Jones (1987: Chapter II).
especially the peace imposed by the Dutch authorities which prevented the failure of crops resulting in famines.

Table 2.1

Population Growth in Java and Madura: 1815-1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population Size ('000)</th>
<th>Rate of Growth (Per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>4,499</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>9,374</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>12,514</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>16,233</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>19,541</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>21,191</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>23,609</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>25,371</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>28,386</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>29,978</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>34,429</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>41,718</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>48,416</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1901, a Calvinist-Catholic coalition came to power in the Netherlands and announced a new approach to colonial management (Penders, 1977: 61). A new colonial policy, usually called the Ethical Policy, was introduced. The outstanding feature of this policy was the official abandonment of exploitation and the introduction of direct state intervention in the economic sphere in order to improve the economic position of the Javanese population. The seriousness of the situation among the people of Java had been highlighted in a number of government-sponsored reports; for example, the Mindere
Welvaart Rapporten (Declining Welfare Inquiries) 1904-1905 reported that the rural poor in Java should be provided with more food and clothing, better health facilities and schooling in order to increase their general standard of living (Tjondronegoro, 1983:41). Three main programs were launched under the New Ethical Policy: namely, irrigation, emigration (colonization) and education. 'Colonization', the term that was used to refer to the assisted migration of Javanese farmers to other islands, was just one of the Dutch government's attempts to solve the problem of population pressure and to improve the welfare of the people.³

Mohamad Hatta, the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia, in his speech at the Economic Conference on February 3, 1946 in Yogyakarta, first used the term transmigrasi (Swasono and Singarimbun, 1985: vii). Since then, 'transmigration' has replaced the word 'colonization' and has become an important element of government policy in Indonesia.⁴ The transmigration program gained considerable momentum when the New Order government received a windfall from the oil price increases during the 1970s. In addition, funding from international, multinational and bilateral sources, such

³ A detailed historical account of the colonization policy has been given by, among others, Pelzer (1945), Sjamsu (1960), Swasono (1969) and Heeren (1979). In this study, the historical context of transmigration policy will be discuss in Chapter III.

⁴ There were only a few studies that focused on the implementation of transmigration program after Independence until 1965; for example: Sjamsu (1960), Wertheim (1959b), Hardjosudarmo (1965), Heeren (1979) and Utomo (1975).
as the World Bank, USAID, UNDP, FAO and ADB poured into
the program. During this period, a huge allocation of
funds was made to assist an impressive number of families
to move from Java to Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and
Irian Jaya.

Table 2.2

Number of Migrant Families Resettled under
Colonization and Transmigration Programs (1905-1989)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>No.of families</th>
<th>Average no.of families per year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905 - 1941</td>
<td>144,000&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 - 1959</td>
<td>54,567&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 - 1968</td>
<td>44,216&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70-1973/4 (Repelita I)</td>
<td>45,169&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/5-1978/9 (Repelita II)</td>
<td>56,272&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>11,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979/80-1983/4 (Repelita III)</td>
<td>535,474&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>107,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/5-1988/9 (Repelita IV)</td>
<td>750,150&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>150,030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
<sup>a</sup> Swasono, 1985: 82.
<sup>b</sup> Oey, 1982: 34
<sup>c</sup> Oey, 1982: 32
<sup>d</sup> Hardjono, 1986: 29. The figure includes 169,497 families (32 per cent of the total) of spontaneous transmigrants.
<sup>e</sup> As stated in the Presidential Address, August 16, 1989 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1989: XII/695). This number includes 521,728 families (70 per cent of the total) of spontaneous transmigrants.
As shown in Table 2.2 the average number of families per year resettled under the transmigration policy increased dramatically between the period 1969-1978 (Repelita I and II) and the period after 1978 (Repelita III and IV). However, the seemingly successful achievements during Repelita III and IV, as several studies have shown, was accompanied by formidable problems of implementation (Jones, 1979; Hanson, 1981; Arndt, 1983 and 1984; Hardjono, 1986; World Bank, 1988).

Studies on transmigration or colonization can be classified into three broad categories. The first includes those that described the program in terms of demographic and socio-economic characteristics (Pelzer, 1945; Sjamsu, 1960; Hardjono, 1977). The second includes those that analyse the social and economic impacts of the program (Guinness, 1977; Oey and Astika, 1978; Arndt, 1984; Hardjono, 1986; Babcock, 1986). The third category comprises critical studies that challenge the assumptions and implications of the program (Arndt and Sundrum, 1977; Suratman and Guinness, 1977; Hardjono, 1978a; Perez-Sainz, 1983; Budiardjo, 1986; Otten, 1986). Previous studies on transmigration have paid very little attention to the policy implementation processes of the program. Moreover, transmigration has usually been viewed as an isolated phenomenon, rarely related to broader social and political developments in Indonesia. The lack of studies analysing the policy process and its relation to wider
contexts has resulted in an incomplete understanding of transmigration policy in general, an inadequate grasp of the problems of management and co-ordination among the implementing organizations, and, inevitably, the fragmented remedies for the pressing problems of the transmigration program.

The island of Java has become renowned as one of the most densely populated areas in the world. The problem of population, particularly its high growth rate and its large size, has become more pressing as it has coincided with the problem of poverty among a large part of the population. From the beginning, transmigration (and before it, colonization) has been perceived as a policy to solve simultaneously the population problems, and the welfare problem of the population of Java. Observing the demographic dimension alone, it is clear that transmigration policy has had little impact on the reduction of population in Java. Assuming, for example, that the government target to resettle 150,000 families a year had been realized, and assuming that every family consisted of 5 persons (2 parents and 3 children), only 750,000 persons a year would have been moved. This number, taking the 1980 annual growth rate of 2 per cent, and the size of population of Java and Bali as approximately 100 million, suggests that a successful transmigration policy could only remove just over one-third of Java's annual growth rate and would not prevent the total population from continuing to increase. It also
is evident that the unbalanced population distribution between Java and the other islands could only be marginally altered by transmigration. As indicated by Arndt (1983: 51):

"The population imbalance in Indonesia is an irremediable fact of life. The question is only whether whatever economic or other disadvantages it may entail can be remedied within Java.

While in the long term transmigration has only had a marginal effect on population growth in Java and little influence on population distribution in the archipelago, it has had a tremendous demographic impact on the receiving areas. Lampung and South Sumatra have been classic examples of the remarkable contribution of transmigration in accelerating regional population growth. In other provinces, although the overall demographic impact of transmigration has been less remarkable by comparison, it has been very significant for some regencies. In 1985, for example, 25 per cent of the population in the regency of Kampar in the province of Riau, were transmigrants. In the regency of Kotabaru in the province of South Kalimantan, more than 40 per cent of the population were transmigrants (World Bank, 1988: 211).

In the early 1980s, the results of the 1980 population census apparently boosted the belief among policy makers that transmigration was needed to solve a deteriorating population problem. The census revealed an
annual rate of population growth between 1971-1980 of 2.34 per cent. This was considered 'still high', especially since the government had made an extensive effort to control population growth through family planning policy after 1970. The press coverage on the failure of government policies dealing with population problems, in particular family planning and transmigration, was another factor that stimulated the debate about population issues at that time.\(^5\)

From the policy makers' point of view, the wide publicity received by population issues in the mass-media had stimulated the perception that population problems in Java had become more alarming. Extensive documentation from the period after 1980 indicates that various means were used by the government to speed-up the implementation of the transmigration program (Arndt, 1983 and 1984; Hardjono, 1986; World Bank, 1988). For example, the Department of Public Works, which was responsible for transmigration site preparation, accelerated its activities by adopting the so-called 'plan as you proceed' (PAYP) approach. This approach, as many studies and press reports have shown, resulted in the selection of large areas of unsuitable land for agricultural settlement. However, the fact that extensive problems of implementation were encountered during the realization of

\(^5\) Tempo magazine in its 24 January 1981 issue, for example, widely reported the controversies surrounding the failures of family planning and transmigration programs with the cover story provocatively entitled: 'KB Gagal? Transmigrasi Gagal?' (Family Planning Failed? Transmigration Failed?).
the Repelita III target, apparently had little impact on the continuing demographic orientation of the policy makers. In 1983, for instance, a more ambitious target of 750,000 families was set for Repelita IV.6

From previous studies, there seems little doubt that demographic considerations, particularly in response to increased population pressure in Java, became the basic underlying drive for the transmigration policy. Population growth which resulted in increasing population pressure in Java, therefore, has always been a justification of the program, even though other implicit or explicit aims, such as regional development and national integration, have also been given priority in specific periods.

2.5. The Significance of the Centre-Regional Context in Analysing Transmigration Policy

Since Independence, the relationship between the central and regional governments has been a crucial aspect of national integration and development (Maryanov, 1958; Legge, 1961; Nawawi, 1968; Bachtiar, 1974; Mackie, 1980; Morfit, 1984, MacAndrews, 1986a; Achmad, 1984).

6 Realization of the transmigration target, especially during Repelita IV, deserves critical analysis because, as shown in Table 2.2, the actual number of families that resettled under the full support of the transmigration program comprised only 30 per cent of the realized target, while 70 per cent moved as spontaneous transmigrants. Hardjono (1986: 29) reported that, in many cases, spontaneous transmigrants (transmigran swakarsa) moved without any government assistance.
Since the New Order, the Indonesian state can be described as strongly centralist in character. For example, nearly 80 per cent of total public expenditure is planned and disbursed through the national budget, with only approximately 20 per cent controlled by regional governments. The power of the central government tends to be unlimited, whereas regional governments are less autonomous.

Mackie (1980: 667) has indicated several important changes since about 1970 that have greatly enhanced the central government's capacity to exercise control over the regions. First, the tightening of central authority within the army has significantly reduced the power of regional commanders over their territories. Second, the process of depoliticization has eliminated the possibility of a political party stirring up mass grievances against the central government. Finally, the improvement of inter-island shipping and airline services, as well as the telecommunications, commercial and banking networks, have played an important role in integrating the regions into a single national economy. Social and political, as well as economic and structural changes since the New Order have contributed to the strengthening of the centralist character of the Indonesian government. This, in turn, has become a crucial factor in the implementation of government policies in the regions.
Compared with other development issues, transmigration is perhaps the government policy that most reflects the strength of the central government in Indonesia in determining affairs in the regions. The transmigration program has been almost totally formulated by the central government in Jakarta. The regional governments, whose lands were designated as receiving areas for settlers from Java and Bali, were merely passive participant in the process.

Following Smith's (1973b) implementation analysis framework, 'the policy' revealed by 'the policy making process' will inevitably enter the 'implementation process' matrix. It is within this implementation process matrix that the various components, such as the implementation organization, 'target group', 'idealized policy' and 'environmental factors', will interact. In the case of transmigration, the process of policy implementation has certainly occurred in circumstances whereby central decisions will confront regional responses. Through 'tensions', the outcomes of this process will form what Smith has called a 'transaction'. These transactions, which are the result of the policy implementation process, will eventually form either a feedback to policy makers in the central government or to components in the implementation process, such as the implementing organization or the target groups. Another form of 'transaction' might be institutionalised to produce 'institutions'. In turn, such 'institutions'
would also provide feedback to the policy-making or policy-implementation process (see Figure 2.1).

Examination of the implementation process in general, and in regard to particular policies, provides insights to and explanations about public processes and problem resolution. Only by understanding these processes can effective solutions be formulated to improve the policy or implementation processes, and to address the problem to be resolved (Smith, c. 1987, unpub.). In examining what happened during implementation, the key problems involved and how they influenced the impact of the policies, an analyst should not be myopic and see only the particular policy at hand. For example, the general environment and policy-making process may be such that any policies or programs would experience difficulties. Without this overall view, it would be easy to be excessively critical of any failures that do occur and perhaps overlook the successes and achievements, however small. With a focus upon goal attainment, the analyst must be aware of changing goals and objectives of policies as they are being implemented - and certainly take into account any divergence in views among actors about policy objectives. Smith (c. 1987, unpub.) argued that the question of how implementation can be improved is the difficult one to answer, for some parameters are not amenable to change or improvement except in the very long term.
As correctly argued by Korten (1975: 140), it is in dealing with the contextual richness of the policy processes that country-specific analysis can make a unique and important contribution to an understanding of population policy in the Third World. This kind of analysis offers the opportunity to draw together quantitative data, where it is available, with more informal data and observation where it is not or where the variables themselves do not readily yield to quantification.

2.6. Conclusion

As has been argued, population distribution policy will be properly understood only if placed in the political context of the individual country. Particularly in Third World countries, in which development activities often take place in an unstable and highly political setting, an adequate knowledge of the political contexts is therefore vital for the analysis of population distribution policy. A review of literature on population distribution policy in the Third World has suggested that the studies have mostly resulted in broad generalisations, and tended to overlook the political context of the country.

In the Third World, population distribution policy, like other public policies, is an outcome of policy-making processes that occur with only limited
participation or 'inputs' from the society. By contrast, the process of policy implementation has become a major arena in which various components, such as the target group, the implementing agencies and the environment, have interacted and influenced the implementation of government policy.

Transmigration policy in Indonesia has been the subject of many studies. Yet, an adequate review of transmigration as a population distribution policy is still lacking. It is argued that this is mainly because existing studies have viewed transmigration in isolation from policy processes in Indonesia. It is suggested that policy implementation analysis would be a useful approach for an examination of transmigration policy in Indonesia. The centre-regional relationship has always been a crucial factor in the country's development, particularly during the New Order period. Transmigration policy, which has involved the central government sponsored population movement from the 'Inner' to the 'Outer' Islands, is inevitably conditioned by the degree and character of central and regional relationships in Indonesia.
Chapter III

FROM EMIGRATIE TO TRANSMIGRASI: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN MIGRATION POLICIES

This chapter provides an historical account of transmigration policy in Indonesia. The aim is to analyse significant continuities and changes occurring between the turn of the century and the mid 1960s, just prior to the New Order, in the government's migration policy. To what extent have events of the colonial period influenced, or even been replicated in, transmigration policy after Independence? Was the idea of 'inner' and 'outer' Indonesia a prominent issue during the Dutch period and before the New Order period? Which period has been more significant in forming the role of transmigration as a vehicle for, on the one hand, centralisation and on the other, regional development? Were there significant international influences before the New Order period? Who were the proponents of the policy during the Dutch period and who took up the case for transmigration after Independence?

As several scholars have written in detail of the history of colonisation and transmigration (Pelzer, 1945; Sjamsu, 1960; Hardjosudarmo, 1965; Hardjono, 1977; Heeren, 1979), this chapter will not emphasize the chronology of events but, rather, draw on existing studies to focus on the various forces and factors that
led to the development of emigration and transmigration policies. This appraisal will concentrate on the formative periods and periods when significant policy changes occurred.

3.1. The Formation of An Emigration Policy

The end of the nineteenth century, and the beginning of the twentieth, was marked by several important social changes, the impact of which significantly altered the course of history in Indonesia. Although each can be considered as a single event, they can be more usefully regarded as complexes of interconnected events.

Ten years after the Dutch had recovered from the Diponegoro War (1825-1830), they began to pay attention to territories outside Java (the Outer Islands). From about 1840 onwards, Dutch involvement expanded throughout the Outer Islands. According to Ricklefs (1981: 125), there were many reasons for this expansion; however, two general considerations applied everywhere:
First, to protect the security of areas they already held, the Dutch felt compelled to subdue other regions which might support or inspire resistance movements. Second, as the European scramble for colonies reached its height in the later nineteenth century, the Dutch felt obliged to establish their claims to the outer islands of the archipelago in order to prevent some other Western power from intervening there, even where the Dutch initially had no great interest themselves.

Ricklefs (1981: 138) noted further:

By about 1910, the boundaries of the present state of Indonesia had been roughly drawn by colonial armed forces, at a great cost of lives, money, devastation, social cohesion and human dignity and freedom.

At the dawn of the twentieth century, Dutch colonial policy showed a significant change in direction. Its jurisdiction was expanding as the invasion of the entire archipelago neared completion. It also took on a new mission: the direct exploitation of Indonesia which culminated during the Culture System (1830-1870) began to weaken as the main motivation for Dutch rule, and was replaced by concern for the welfare of Indonesians. One important element of the new policy was the introduction of a native welfare program, the nature of which is well illustrated by the slogan of the prominent colonial reformer van Deventer: 'irrigation, emigration and education' (Penders, 1969: 27). This policy has become well-known as the 'Ethical Policy'.
The genesis of the Ethical Policy, as elucidated by Ricklefs (1981: 143), was an outcome of the simultaneous social, political and economic transformation experienced by Dutch society in the Netherlands:

The Ethical policy had roots both in humanitarian concern and economic advantage. The denunciation of Dutch rule presented in the novel *Max Havelaar* (1860) and in other exposes began to bear fruit. Voices were raised in favour of relief for the oppressed peoples of Java, and by the late nineteenth century new colonial administrators were on their way to Indonesia with *Max Havelaar* in their baggage and its message in their minds. During the 'liberal' period (c.1870-1900) private capitalism came to exert a preponderant influence upon colonial policy. Dutch industry began to see Indonesia as a potential market, which required a rising of living standards there. Capital, both Dutch and international, sought new opportunities for investment and extraction of raw materials, especially in the outer islands. A need for Indonesian labour in modern enterprises was felt. Business interests therefore supported more intensive colonial involvement in the causes of peace, justice, modernity and welfare. The humanitarians justified what the businessmen expected to be profitable, and the Ethical Policy was born.

Java's rapid population growth after the middle of the nineteenth century was one of the dominant facts of the colonial age. Java, especially in its central and eastern parts, was becoming seriously over-populated, while in the Outer Islands there were still vast areas of unpopulated or underpopulated land. Java's growing population was considered by the Dutch government to be the underlying cause of the decline of its people's welfare. The Dutch, however, had no policy that could
directly solve the problem of population growth. The only answer they offered was emigration from Java to the outer islands. As Ricklefs (1981: 154) correctly argued:

There was no real attack on population growth. The nation's wealth was used for the interests of foreign enterprises and indigenous industries were not developed. The main economic development took place in the outer islands, while the main welfare problems grew in Java. Education was to be the key to a new age, but the number of school places provided was small when set against the size of the population.

In a similar vein, van der Kroef (1956: 743) noted that the schemes devised by the colonial government to cope with the dangerous economic effects of population pressure, curiously enough, rarely concerned themselves with the structural transformation of agricultural production:

Many officials of the colonial and the present national government as well as some scholars have based their hopes on emigration as a solution of the problem. Professor Pelzer has even gone so far as to maintain that emigration from Java to less densely populated islands will be able to take care of the population increase for many decades, and that emigration rather than industrialisation will provide the necessary relief.

From a different perspective, Kartodirdjo (1973) perceived that the rural history of Java in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked by sporadic movements of peasant unrest. Many of these climaxed in more or less violent clashes with the colonial authorities. Although a direct link between
social unrest in rural Java and the initiation of the emigration policy cannot be established, it is not implausible to posit a cause-effect relationship. A major complicating feature of agrarian unrest in Java, according to Kartodirdjo (1973: 1), has been its correlation with social change in general and with the colonial impact in particular. He explained that:

The social movements had as their background, the rapid penetration of a colonial economy whose impact on rural Java reached a climax during the course of the nineteenth century. The colonial rulers introduced a new legal and social relationship covering agrarian and labour matters. Excessive demands for services and the levying of new taxes exacerbated popular discontent. The turning over of some land to sugar cultivation and the exaction of a compulsory contribution of paddy had a direct bearing on some of the instances of social unrest.

According to Penders (1969: 28) the Ethical Policy of indigenous economic development was almost entirely concerned with raising agricultural productivity and the Dutch apparently had no serious intention to introduce drastic changes in the colonial economic structure by such means as large scale industrialisation. As Legge also argued, the measures taken by 'Ethical' colonial governments to improve the living standards of the indigenous population were:

...in the nature of palliatives. They provided some alleviation of particular areas of hardship, but they did not achieve - and they did not attempt to achieve - any thoroughgoing technological changes...(Legge, 1964: 91 cited in Penders, 1969: 28).
Penders (1969:28) also noted that the importance of large scale industrialisation was actually stressed by a number of Ethical reformers, but until the world wide economic depression of the 1930s the various plans that were suggested were not implemented. The Calvinist Prime Minister Kuyper (cited in Penders, 1969: 29) even stressed in 1901 that the only way to develop the Indies was:

...to lift the people of the Indies from the agricultural to the industrial state...

According to Penders (1969: 28), the Minister of Colonies, Idenburg, in fact strongly supported Kuyper and envisaged the establishment of indigenous industries owned by indigenous capital. On another occasion, the socialist van Kol dismissed van Deventer's view, and stated that:

The expectations of van Deventer that emigration is the proper means to create a balance between production and consumption are delusive and will never come true. I believe that his plan for salvation which indicated by the trilogy: 'education, irrigation and emigration'...is inadequate because the distress has taken on too vast proportions. He believes that in particular indigenous education will have an enormous impact on the well-being of the Javanese. I am of the opinion that this is an illusion which is completely out of touch with reality. The only solution is a more intensified production and this is only possible with industry, preferably large-scale indigenous industry...(cited in Penders, 1969: 29)

Van Oorschot (cited in Penders, 1969: 29) mentioned the following reasons for the lack of
interest of the Dutch in industrialisation: first, the interior freight rates were too high; second, a widespread distribution apparatus was missing; and third, import duties on industrial goods were too low to afford sufficient protection. Penders (1969: 29-30) argues, however, that Van Oorschot does not mention - or at least does not spell out fully - the fundamental reasons for the failure of the attempts at industrialisation:

One most important cause of this failure was the strong opposition of the politically powerful plantation combines. Large scale industrialisation would have tended to increase the demand for labour and therefore the price of labour. This would have been damaging to the plantation concern which - as was pointed above - were largely dependent for their profits on low wages. But also Dutch industrialists as well as Dutch labour were unwilling to be priced out of the Indonesian market which was one of the most important outlets for Dutch industrial produce. In the final analysis then the industrialisation of Indonesia militated against the interests of the imperial economy as a whole (Penders, 1969: 29-30).

In serving the interest of plantation companies to control their labour, in 1880 the Netherlands Indies' government issued the first Coolie Ordinance to regulate labour relations, particularly in East Sumatra. This ordinance was later expanded to other regions in the Outer Islands. It protected the interests of plantation companies in retaining the workers for the duration of the contract period. A 'penal sanction' was imposed on workers who violated their labour contracts. The first Coolie Ordinance was
followed by other ordinances in 1884 and 1893 which provided employers with effective legal control over their indentured workers. In addition to the penal sanction, employers resorted to other means to keep their workers. One favourite way was to provide gambling opportunities for the workers on pay day. Often workers become so deeply indebted that they had no other choice but to sign a new contract with their employers (Thee, 1969: 7-12)

According to Thompson (1947: 134), until 1909 the recruiting of Javanese estate labour likewise remained in the hands of professional agents, but in that year planters were encouraged by law to appoint their own agents who were often aided by worker-recruiters. The Deli Planters' Association, for example, led the way by setting up its own agency in Semarang, and direct recruiting by employers gradually became widespread. In 1930, it was found that 84 per cent of the labour employed in plantations on the Outer Islands was Javanese. Of the remaining, 13 per cent was Chinese and 3 per cent local people (Thompson, 1947: 134).

Following previous writers, such as Pelzer (1945), Heeren (1979:10-15) divided Dutch resettlement policy (1905-1941) into three broad phases. First, there was the Experimental Phase (1905-1911). The assumption adopted during this phase was that new settlements should, as far as possible, resemble villages in Java.
Up to 1911, only about 4,818 Javanese had been moved to Lampung.

Second, came the period of the Credit Bank of Lampung (1911-1928). The government established a Credit Bank of Lampung in March 1911 to provide 22.5 gulden as a migration premium to every migrant family, in addition to a maximum of 300 gulden, given as credit. This amount had to be repaid by the migrants after three years with 9 per cent per annum interest. Migrants could borrow additional money for the purchase of, for example, livestock, agricultural equipment or building materials. Since the majority of the migrants did not have any experience of banks, problems of repayment were inevitable. Many used the money for unproductive purposes, such as for clothing or festivities (slametan), or even for alcohol or drugs (candu). Another problem during this phase was internal mismanagement and corruption within the Bank. In 1926 the bank was heavily in debt, and by 1928 the government had decided to close it.

In the second phase, the problems were also caused by the selection system which was based on a target system: the lurah (Village Head) was required to meet a designated target number of migrants each year. As a consequence, many migrants did not meet formal selection criteria; some were selected by the lurah merely because he wanted to remove them (for example,
the old, the sick or landless labourers) from the village. The emigration policy during this period was also challenged by the plantation interests, particularly from the agency responsible for recruiting contract labour from Java. They spread rumours to discredit the settlement in Gedong Tataan, in order to attract migrants to work in their plantations, mostly in Deli (North Sumatra). Despite these many problems, a second settlement area, Wonosobo, was opened in Lampung in 1921 and by 1924 this village had a population of 5,927. The population in Gedong Tataan had risen to 25,000 by 1928.

According to Heeren (1979: 12), by the end of the 'twenties the numerous problems that had been experienced caused the whole idea of the emigration policy to be questioned. Conditions in the settlements were considered by many observers as far from satisfactory. In addition, the impact of the 1930s economic depression reduced the availability of financial resources for the program. The thousands of returned migrants who were formerly employed in the plantations were seen to aggravate the already alarming population problem in Java.¹ Thus, migration on a large scale to the Outer Islands was again favoured by the government (Perez-Sainz, 1983: 194).

¹ Thousands of migrants returned to Java as many plantations had to reduce their production after the world economic crisis in 1930.
In the mid-1930s, the plantation companies, most of which were located in East Sumatra, were experiencing many difficulties in recruiting labour, mainly because as a result of many pressures the government had abolished the penal sanction. With the abolition of the penal sanction, many Javanese workers who were dissatisfied with their jobs in the plantations had returned to Java. Thus, the gradual success of the agricultural colonies of Javanese settlers in the Outer Islands was seen by the planters to constitute an increasingly important source of labour (Thee, 1969: 78). The government's need to reduce the population growth in Java was compatible with the interest of the planters in recruiting cheap labour. Thompson (1947: 135) has argued that the official agricultural colonization program in the Outer Islands was designed primarily to help solve the labour shortage.

The government commenced the third phase of the emigration policy, known as the Bawon system. The Bawon system, was initially devised to meet the need of migrants in Lampung for labour to harvest their rice. Under the Bawon system, the government only provided land for the migrants. They were to pay their own fares within two or three years of settlement. The government usually moved them into Lampung from Java during harvest time, around February-March, so that they could be hired immediately by previous migrants. Their wages
were paid in kind, in the form of rice. In Java their share of the harvest typically was one-tenth; in Lampung, they could earn as much as one-seventh or one-fifth of the harvest. From this they paid their debts and started a new life as colonists in Lampung.

The Bawon system was considered the most successful emigration program of the Dutch period, moving large numbers at relatively low cost. In addition to those settled under the Bawon System, between 1935 and 1940 the government also sent people to new settlements in other areas of Sumatra outside Lampung as well as to Kalimantan.\(^2\) As also noted by Nitisastro (1970: 90), after 1931 the government migration policy experienced a number of changes. In 1937 a special commission in charge of the migration policy was established. According to Nitisastro (1970: 90) after those policy improvements the annual number of migrants increased to 14,700 in 1935 and 52,800 in 1940.

The Dutch’s government migration policy (emigratie), as one of the trilogy of Ethical Policy

\(^2\)From 1933 to 1941, 222,586 migrants were resettled in Lampung and South Sumatra (Heeren, 1979: 14), and almost 2,500 migrants in Kalimantan (Pelzer, 1945: 223–225). During the Japanese occupation, the government’s migration policy was practically halted. The economic situation in Indonesia also deteriorated. Population continued to increase but the rate of increase in economic productivity fell seriously behind that of population, owing to the destruction of the economic apparatus during the Japanese occupation and the revolution.
objectives, was essentially formulated and maintained as a result of a combination of forces. First, were the political changes in the Netherlands which allowed the Calvinist-Catholic Coalition to come to power in 1901. The outstanding feature of the policy outcomes from this new coalition was the official abandonment of the goal of economic exploitation and the introduction of direct intervention in the economic sphere in order to improve the position of the indigenous population. The second factor was economic opportunity, particularly as seen by the Dutch capitalists after the Dutch had successfully conquered the whole archipelago. The vast land areas in the Outer Islands attracted private companies to open plantations. Given the scarcity of labour, Javanese were recruited as cheap labour for new economic activities. The third factor was social and political unrest in many parts of rural Java, resulting from simultaneous economic exploitation and population pressures. These in turn encouraged the colonial policy to attempt to deal with social unrest through population movement to Outer Islands. Emigration policy, as developed by the Dutch, was a useful instrument to serve many goals and interests.

3.2. Transmigration: Migration Policies after Independence

Among the new national leaders, Hatta (1954:169–170) argued most forcefully that emigration should be
continued after Independence. However, the idea of 'transmigration' as proposed by Hatta was somewhat different from the colonisation policy implemented by the Dutch. Transmigration was to be implemented in conjunction with the industrialisation of the Outer Islands. Hatta's ideas on transmigration were not surprising. The superiority of industrialisation over transmigration was an old idea among socialists in the Netherlands, who had strongly influenced his thinking. Hatta's political and economic ideas crystalised during his period as a student in the Netherlands, at a time when socialism was strong in Europe. The socialist politicians in the Netherlands, demanded a genuine process of industrialisation to improve the economic conditions of the indigenous people, rather than merely the emigration of Javanese to the Outer Islands:

Without industrialisation, transmigration will never solve the problems. Transmigration will only postpone the problems, that eventually will return sometime in the future. Transmigration settlements, therefore, should be formed simultaneously with industrial locations. (Hatta, 1954: 169, author's translation).

Hatta strongly criticised the colonial policy which had, basically, only shifted landless farmers from Java to become farmers in the Outer Islands. He argued that:
Transmigration, which had been conducted by the Dutch, only resulted in shifting peasants to be peasants. In new settlements, those peasants established their villages based on traditions in Java. Even their house construction is also a replication of their customs. Everything is done primitively. Their spirit is static. In their former villages their conditions were very bad; in the new villages, they continue their backward way of living. This way of life, which does not bring any progress, will continue in the new settlement. There is no fresh spirit. Their lives have only postponed the coming problems, until the time when their families are grown-up. Therefore, wherever they go they will be caught up by the misery which they left behind. (Hatta, 1954: 170, author's translation).

Hatta (1954: 171) also suggested that:

'Emigratie' or 'transmigrasi' will achieve its goal in opening up prosperity if the people are given guidance and technical assistance in their new environment. If they are ignored and neglected, their life will never change. So far, all efforts have been made with a very narrow mind. Therefore, sooner or later, they will be people 'who eat land'. Their family members will grow up and the village, therefore, will need to be extended, and it is not surprising that they will encroach on every available piece of land (author's translation).

After Independence, the so-called Panitia Siasat Ekonomi (Committee for Economic Strategies), of which Hatta was one of the masterminds, formulated a plan in which industrialisation and population resettlement were the two major components.\(^3\) Thompson (1947: 179) who observed the first Indonesian government plan,

\(^3\) The fact that industrialization and transmigration became an important part of the government plan immediately after Independence was, according to some observers, rather strange. Newly independent Indonesia had been born of a rhetoric that called for the rapid destruction of colonial and economic institutions (Paauw, 1963: 155).
noted that:

The resettlement program, too, is an amplification of a prewar project - with certain essential differences. Sumatra, and eventually others of the underpopulated Outer Islands, is to receive immigrants from Java. Individuals, not entire villages, will be selected for their youthful vigor and initiative and will be transported in conjunction with the industrialisation schemes for the Outer Islands.

However, the idea of industrialisation as the backbone of Hatta's transmigration policy proved unattainable. As Wertheim observed in 1956, the difference between the Dutch and the Indonesian resettlement policy had nothing to do with industrialization:

Before the war Dutch resettlement policy was directed towards the creation of typical Javanese enclaves in a purely Sumatran environment. As the willingness to move to 'the land beyond' had not yet developed very greatly at that time, the Dutch tried to make the settlements attractive, by reshaping conditions as nearly as possible to resemble those in the homeland... After independence, the Indonesian government adopted a different view. The strict separation of Javanese and Lampongers was deemed out of date, as a relic of colonial policy. Such a system would not fit into the new ideology of Indonesia as a unitary state. Javanese and Sumatrans were equally Indonesians, who had to live together and mix on an equal footing. Both population groups would have to develop into modern Indonesians, and work together in building a new society in the melting pot of Sumatra, the Land of Promise (Wertheim, 1959b: 149).

It is striking that the office in charge of implementing resettlement policy after Independence has itself constantly 'migrated' from one ministry to
another. The unsettled political climate following Independence, as the Dutch attempted to regain their former colony, as well as an unpreparedness of the Indonesian leaders to lead the country, were contributing factors in the failure to establish a single solid implementing agency for transmigration.\textsuperscript{4}

The first transmigration office came under the Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs. In 1948 it was shifted to the Ministry for Development and Youth Affairs. Later in that year the ministry was abolished, and transmigration was transferred to the Ministry of Interior. In January 1950 the government established a separate office for transmigration (Kantor Transmigrasi), which in October was placed under the Ministry of Social Affairs. It was under the auspices of this ministry that the first group of transmigrants was resettled in Lampung.

In 1951, the Head of the Transmigration Office, Ir. A. H. O. Tamboenan, formulated a plan to resettle 10,000 families in each year to South Sumatra and Sulawesi. Because of financial stringency, only 653 families were moved, and most of these were resettled in areas adjacent to the former Dutch colonisation sites (Sjamsu, 1960: 80). Approximately 26 families were resettled in Sulawesi, also close to a former area of colonisation. These transmigrants had come from the

\textsuperscript{4} Although the government established an office to implement transmigration policy in 1947, the first group of transmigrants (about 23 families) was only resettled in 1950 in Lampung (Hardjosudarmo, 1965: 127)
regencies of Purworejo, Kebumen, Banyumas and Probolinggo, in Central Java. The Transmigration Office also resettled 114 families of refugees from East Priangan to Banten, West Java during this time. They were evacuated because their villages had often been terrorised and ransacked by an Islamic rebel group (Darul Islam) operating in the region.

Under the Ministry of Social Affairs, the stated goal of transmigration was to improve the prosperity and welfare of the population, through the development of the economy in various sectors (Hardjosudarmo, 1965: 128). In 1952, Tamboenan proposed an ambitious fifteen-year plan for transmigration. According to the plan, within one year the government would open 30,000 hectares of land in Sukadana in South Sumatra. In conjunction with the clearing of this land, the government planned to send 1,000 families to be employed there. Moreover, the government also established a land clearing agency called Japeta (Jajasan Pembukaan Tanah). In the end, however, this plan achieved little. Only 3,855 hectares of land was cleared and 3,851 families were moved, mostly to South Sumatra. The so-called Tamboenan plan slowly disappeared.

In the 'fifties, in addition to so-called 'general transmigrants' (transmigrasi umum) there were four other types of government-sponsored transmigrants. They
were: 'S. O. B.' prisoners, Surinam repatriates, ex-guerilla fighters and ex-army members. The 'S. O. B.' prisoners were people who were suspected by the government of being involved in the Islamic rebel group in West Java during the early 'fifties. Based on Presidential Instruction No. 54, 1954 (Sjamsu, 1960: 64), such people and their families were sent to transmigration settlements in Sumatra and Kalimantan. In 1954, approximately 500 families were resettled in Pangkalan Susu in North Sumatra, and another 242 families in Samboja in East Kalimantan. In 1955 a further 326 families were sent to those two regions (Sjamsu, 1960: 94).

When the war with the Dutch was over, many ex-guerilla fighters who had lived in the various stronghold areas to fight the Dutch were confronted by serious problems of adjustment when they returned to their former homes. In February 1951, the government established a National Reconstruction Office (BRN) under the Ministry of Interior to assist them:

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5 'S. O. B' means 'dangerous areas' (daerah bahaya).
6 In 1954, the Transmigration Office resettled almost 300 families, mainly of Javanese origin, who had just returned from Surinam, another Dutch colony in South America. They were Indonesians who had been recruited by the Dutch to work as labourers in Dutch sugar plantations in Surinam. The government resettled these people in Tongar in the regency of Pasaman Barat, West Sumatra.
The government feels that job opportunities have to be created for various groups of ex-guerilla fighters. The aims are, first, to assist them in the adjustment to the normal society; and second, to utilise their potential to rebuild the nation, in ways that are economically justifiable. (Government Decree No. 12/1951, cited in Heeren, 1979: 68, author's translation).

From the early 1950s, agricultural activities were considered the best solution to 're-socialise' ex-army personnel and ex-guerilla fighters. Given that further land for agricultural extension was not available in most parts of Java, resettlement in the Outer Islands was seen as an appropriate strategy. Another benefit from this scheme was the removal of ex-guerilla fighters from 'an unhealthy environment' in the capital city. Around ten per cent of the ex-guerilla fighters who became transmigrants had been born in Jakarta (Heeren, 1979: 71). Another reason for this scheme was to protect such people from being attracted to Islamic rebel groups in West Java. 7 Most of the projects under this scheme were implemented during 1951 and 1952. By 1957, there were almost 22,000 migrants in the new settlement areas, mostly in South Sumatra. During this period, the government also introduced and promoted various kinds of agricultural experimentation through cooperative and collective systems.

7 This fear was realistic. More than seventy per cent of the ex-guerilla fighters who resettled in South Sumatra originally came from West Java, mostly from places around Jakarta, like Bogor, Bekasi and Krawang (See Heeren, 1979: 71-72).
The resettlement scheme for ex-soldiers was similar to that for ex-guerilla fighters. Ex-soldiers also experienced adjustment problems when they returned to civilian life. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense, a government agency called Bureau for the Resettlement of Ex-military Members (BPBAT) was established to open up land for plantations and agriculture and provide better economic opportunities for ex-army transmigrants. From 1950 to 1955, the government successfully resettled more than 6,000 ex-soldiers, mostly in Lampung.8

In the period 1956-1960, the government formulated, for the first time, a Five-Year Development Plan, in which transmigration was described as an instrument to: reduce population pressure in Java; provide labour in the sparsely populated provinces; and support military strategy, as well as to accelerate the process of assimilation (Hardjosudarmo, 1965: 128-129). The most significant change in transmigration policy in the plan was the explicit reference to a strategic military goal. This was apparently due to increased political unrest in some regions, particularly as a result of disappointment with central government leadership.

8 According to Sjamsu (1960: 88), it is difficult to measure the statistical achievement of the transmigration policy in South Sumatra. The transmigrants mixed with previous settlers, and many migrants who moved to South Sumatra, either came voluntarily or under various other government schemes. One thing was certain, however, as many observers had argued: Lampung was becoming another Java.
The important strategic role of transmigration was further emphasized in 1962, as a result of the change in the national constitution (Hardjosudarmo, 1965: 130). The new constitution was declared by President Sukarno to be a 'Guided Democracy', which replaced the 'Liberal or Parliamentary Democracy' that he considered to have been a failure. The establishment of an autocratic 'Guided Democracy' and 'Guided Economy' under Sukarno, according to Kuntjorojakti (1978: 138-139), was always with the support of the central military leadership. The political role of the military increased considerably after they had successfully destroyed the regional rebellions between 1956 and 1958 in West Sumatra, North and South Sulawesi. As Feith and Lev (1963: 37) argue:

After the end of the PRRI rebellion, through the removal of the regionalists from the political and military scene, the rebellion cleared the way for the emergence of a new set of power relationships. Of the three main political forces of 1957 (the President, the central army leadership and the regionalists) only the first two remained by mid 1958, and these continued to be markedly distinct and in many ways competitive with one another. But they also had many goals and interests in common.

The course of the regional rebellions had caused the government to adopt more centre-oriented attitudes in policy. According to Kuntjorojakti (1978: 139):
At the national level, several Presidential edicts on regional matters were issued around 1959-1960. These decrees treated the regions as mere administrative units within the framework of a highly centralized national bureaucracy, totally subservient to the will of the central regime. This fitted very well with Sukarno's idea of a monolithic Unitary State, which was redefined as a political instrument to be utilised in a comprehensively planned leap to create "a just and prosperous society of Indonesian socialism".

Furthermore Kuntjorojakti (1978: 141-142) states that:

The resemblance of the Guided Democracy central-regional system to the highly centralized and autocratic structure of the colonial regime was extremely close. Both started from the same premise of strengthening central political control over the regions and both pursued almost the same strategy of arranging the organic relation between the higher and lower local authorities and in deciding the method by which the centre delegated specified authorities or functions to the lower level.

The change in the national political constellation since 'Guided Democracy' in which the military had taken a decisive role in directing government policy, has significantly influenced the subsequent course of transmigration policy. The ultimate goal of transmigration was stated to be increased security and improved welfare, through the attainment of three intermediate goals: first, the opening-up of new areas of natural resources and land in a proper manner; second, moving the population from densely populated areas to empty areas; third, developing strategic regions in order to achieve greater national resilience under a just and prosperous Indonesian socialist
In 1961, another ambitious transmigration plan was presented as part of the so-called Eight-Year Development Plan (1961-1968) formulated by the historian, poet and politician, Professor Muhammad Yamin. In the plan, the transmigration goal was described as being 'to move at least 250,000 transmigrants to the agricultural sectors in the Outer-Islands' (Heeren, 1979: 23). According to Heeren (1979: 23) there is confusion among some sources about whether the target number of the plan refers to persons or families. On the plan itself, Heeren (1979: 24) also commented:

It is obvious that Yamin in fact gives little attention to transmigration. In the plan, transmigration policy, for example, was mentioned under the rubric of Government and Police! The budget for transmigration is only 1.5 per cent of the total government budget.

The government intention to link transmigration policy with 'Government and Police', however, is not surprising, since the military played a very important role in the ruling elite of the time, as well as within the bureaucracy which formulated the plan. As might have been expected, the actual number of transmigrants

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Muhammad Yamin was described by Anderson (1972: 288) as: "Indonesia's best known political eccentric as long as he lived. It was said of him, not altogether unkindly, that he was like a horse: if you were in front of him, you were likely to get nipped; if you were behind him, to get kicked; and if under him, to get trampled on. But if you were on top of him, with reins in your hands, he would carry you fast and far".
moved during the Yamin Plan was very much less than the target. Between 1961 and 1965, only 92,473 transmigrants were moved. One of the receiving areas during this period was the District of Siabu in Riau province. A later study showed that strategic reasons had been partly responsible for this resettlement, in order to support military operations during the confrontation with Malaysia (Hamidy and Ahmad, 1984: 10).

In 1964, an evaluation of the Yamin Plan, and a review of transmigration problems led, in January 1965, to a policy called Transmigrasi Gaya Baru (the New Transmigration Model). It was announced directly by President Sukarno, who stated:

No, Indonesia does not need birth control, Indonesia can feed at least 250 million people. 250 million people, if they are properly distributed, if their energies are utilised adequately...10

Under the new plan, the government aimed to move 100,000 families every year. The record shows that in the first semester of 1965 the government successfully moved almost 25,000 transmigrants (Heeren, 1979: 21). As a result of the political turmoil after the abortive coup of October 1965, however, the implementation of transmigration was significantly impeded.

10 Quoted from Sukarno's speech in the general meeting on National Movement for Transmigration on 28 December 1964, entitled: Soal Transmigrasi adalah soal mati-hidup bangsa Indonesia (Transmigration is a matter of life or death for Indonesia) (Departemen Penerangan RI, c.1964: 13)
Transmigration policy as practiced by the Indonesian government to solve the population and related problems of Java was described by Wertheim as not only impractical, but also illogical:

Why repeat a pattern which has produced in Java a scarcely enviable situation? Why should a solution of the population problems of the outer islands be exclusively sought in the agrarian sector, which inevitably leads to increasing competition for land? Why not try, in this early stage of development, an industrial development which would attract workers both from Java and Sumatra with appreciably less friction (Wertheim, 1959b: 196).

Jaspan (1960: 3-4, cited in Hardjosudarmo, 1956: 122) argued that transmigration as practiced by the Indonesian government was only 'old stuffing with new cloth', and merely a 'dead end' (jalan buntu). He also wondered why the emigration policy, which essentially served the capitalists' interests and which was characterised by its exploitative character, was continued by the Indonesian government whose ideology, 'Pancasila', was obviously opposed to such exploitation (cited in Hardjosudarmo, 1965: 124).

3.3. Regional Responses to Sukarno's Transmigration Policies

The resentment of the indigenous population of the settlement areas toward the central government's
implementation of the transmigration policy in the 1950s and 1960s was not a new phenomenon. The sources of resentment and dissatisfaction were mostly related to land disputes. Problems arose partly because the concept of land ownership in the Outer Islands was based on customary (adat) law, in which all land belonged to the marga or clan. The reluctance of indigenous people in Lampung, where most population resettlement was implemented, to grant their land for colonisation in the Dutch period, according to Heeren (1979: 47), had resulted in the formation of Javanese enclaves separate from the indigenous settlements. When the local people refused to give up their homeland for colonisation, the Dutch used perintah halus (gentle commands) to gain permission to use land outside marga jurisdiction. The areas for colonisation, therefore, were usually located outside the local settlements.

Nitisastro (1955: 125, cited in Heeren, 1979: 17) from a somewhat nationalist stance, criticised the Dutch assumption that had led to 'enclave politics'. According to Nitisastro, the result of the typical Dutchman's conservative politics is blockage of the assimilation process among ethnic communities in the colonization areas. Furthermore, Nitisastro argued that enclave politics is obviously in contradiction with the primary goal of Indonesian independence, that is, to build one Indonesian nation.
Assimilation of the Javanese within indigenous populations in the Outer Islands, which was expected to bolster the unification of Indonesia, was not as easy as the government or the 'nationalists' like Nitisastro, had anticipated. Wertheim (1959b: 196), based on his observations in Lampung in 1956, noted that:

Assimilation of Javanese migrants is proceeding, neither to a Sumatran nor to a general Indonesian society, but to a Javanese society somewhat modified by a Sumatran environment. This situation leads to an increasing resistance of Sumatrans to the way in which resettlement has been carried on. Such resistance may seriously hamper further transmigration efforts. Thus it can be stated that the absorptive capacity of the outer islands is not only restricted by spatial and technical but by social factors as well.

In 1950, when the government of the Republic of Indonesia in Jakarta began to implement the transmigration policy in the Outer Islands, the local administration system was also experiencing rapid change. One consequence was that under central government pressure, the land ownership system based on adat law was slowly being transformed into new arrangements. Changes in the system of national administration deliberately reduced the role of the interests and views of indigenous populations in the Outer Islands. A reorganisation of regional government

Wertheim's prediction on the probability of social conflict in Lampung has apparently been realized in the 'Lampung Affair' which broke out recently (See Tempo, 18 February 1989. See also an interesting personal account from Wertheim (1989: 20-21) on this affair in Inside Indonesia, July 1989.
structure and hierarchy was introduced, and a new autonomous regional government unit called *negeri* replaced the *marga* system. According to this new arrangement, a *negeri* could be formed from one or more *margas* and include the Javanese population living in this area. According to the central government, the organisation of a *negeri* was to be based on democratic principles. The council and the head of a *negeri* were to be democratically elected. This new rule was needed to supersede the *adat* law, which failed to grant the right to vote (*hak pilih*) to Javanese migrants. Through the new election system, *negeri* could be dominated by the Javanese migrants in those areas where Javanese outnumbered the indigenous population. This situation understandably created further disappointments with central government in the eyes of local people. Since they could not refuse the imposition of *negeri*, they tried to have separate *negeri* in which they could still practise their *adat* laws. Although in the end they failed, they frequently sent resolutions (*resolusi*) and motions (*mosi*) to the central government through their organisations in Lampung, pressing for more tradition-based reforms (Heeren, 1979: 47-48).

A further change in local administration was introduced by the central government in 1959, in conjunction with the declaration of Guided Democracy by President Sukarno. Liberal Democracy was considered inappropriate for Indonesian conditions. Under the new
system, the marga and negeri were abolished. Regional authority was held by the regent (bupati). Under the regent, the camat (asisten wedana) was the most powerful authority in the regions. Both bupati and camat were appointed by the higher authorities. Such structural arrangements, in turn, contributed to the circumstances in which neither the local people nor the migrants had opportunities to influence the course of regional government.

The centre-regional relations are indeed a crucial issue in Indonesia. As Kahin (1963: 674) observed in the early 'sixties:

Regionalism is still an important force in Indonesia - scotched, but not eliminated, by the suppression of the 1958-1961 rebellion and having today considerable potential strength. The course of the rebellion and its overwhelming defeat demonstrated the strength of Indonesian nationalism to be greater, or at least more enduring, than most outside observers had assumed. But many of the conditions which led to the rebellion remain. The provinces' discontent with Jakarta's paternalism is still profound. Local dissatisfaction with the central government and the belief that decentralization of administrative authority and fiscal power would permit the regions to promote their own welfare more effectively remain strong...

A specific issue that stimulated strong criticism from the indigenous people, according to Heeren (1979: 48), focused on the government budget, which allocated more to transmigration settlements and less to other areas. Road construction, schools, agricultural offices, health and many other facilities were usually
concentrated in the transmigration areas, with smaller allocations to other places. However, regional disappointment with central domination had a much broader base, as argued by Paauw (1963: 156):

Resistance among the peoples of the outlying islands to the President's new program for Indonesia's development reflects fear of centralization of authority as well as more moderate attitudes toward capitalism and foreign enterprise. Behind these attitudes we find both ethnic considerations and significant differences in historical experience. The contribution of foreign enterprise to local welfare was more real and obvious than on Java, the burden of colonial control less onerous, and the desire to maintain local autonomy more respected. Individualism in economic activity is more highly valued in many of the outlying islands than on Java, producing conflicts over the degree of economic centralization to be promoted by political decision.

In such circumstances, transmigration policy, which was basically aimed at resettling population from Java to the other islands, has further exacerbated the discontent among local people toward the central government. Local discontent with transmigration policy among the indigenous population in South Sumatra was clearly articulated at an Adat Congress, firstly in Palembang in January 1957, and later in Bukittinggi in March 1957. The following is the full text of a resolution which resulted from the last congress in Bukittinggi. This resolution appeared in Indonesia Raya daily newspaper, March 20, 1957.
All transmigration (policy) to Sumatra should be temporarily stopped. The reason is the fact that the number of transmigrants has reached 40 per cent of Lampung's population. To avoid further disappointments among the indigenous population, transmigrants should be treated equally with other people in Lampung; for example, they should have to follow the customary law wherever they settle. The central government should give attention to the important sectors of the indigenous people which are lagging behind the facilities for transmigrants. The areas that are still unoccupied by transmigrants have to be allocated for the local people who move as local transmigrants. The central government has to implement local transmigration as well as general transmigration, and the budget should be provided for it. The general rules for transmigration policy have to be re-evaluated, and the new rules should be based on the interests of the regions. The areas for transmigration also have to be selected based on regional opinions. The decision to move transmigrants, as well as the number of transmigrants selected, should be agreed to by the regions. The regions also have the right to determine the requirements needed for transmigrants who will be sent to them. The transmigration officials in the receiving areas should be people from the region, or at least appointed by agreement with the local people (Heeren, 1979: 49-50, author's translation).

Heeren (1979: 50) also noted that the abandonment of transmigration policy was one of the main demands from the PRRI rebel groups (Dewan Banteng in West Sumatra and Dewan Garuda in Palembang) to the central government between 1956 and 1958. The implementation of transmigration was suspended during these rebellious years, but resumed in April 1958 immediately after the PRRI was crushed.
3.4. Summary and Conclusion

The Ethical Policy of the turn of the century set a pattern in Indonesia for the rest of the twentieth century. One of the enduring results was the migration policy, which relied on sponsored population movement from the 'Inner' to the 'Outer' islands. This policy, surprisingly, has remained on the government agenda for eight decades. In a much broader sense, the dichotomy between Java and the Outer Islands as conceived by the colonial government, has also persisted. This dichotomy resulted from the perception of the Outer Islands as "empty land" and the main sources of economic revenue, and Java, as the centre of political power, plagued by a population surplus. The 'population movement' solution, rather than the industrialisation proposed originally by Dutch socialists, and taken up by Hatta, reflects the persistence of dominant interests within the central government, which serves the elite of the day. Migration policies are merely palliative in nature, and consciously avoided any fundamental solutions that demanded redistribution of productive land or capital.

Although the early years of Independence produced an enthusiasm that transmigration would be integrated with industrialisation, such hopes were soon thwarted. This was partly due to the unsettled political situation and the unstable bureaucracy, as well as to
the very limited government funds. National leaders were mostly absorbed by the struggle to gain and hold national sovereignty, particularly against the former colonial power, as well as to unite the country in the face of the centrifugal power of the regions. Within such countervailing pressures, particularly between the regions and the centre, the old outer-inner dichotomy became the dominant issue of the first two decades of Independence. It is within those centre-regional contexts that transmigration policy maintained its instrumental value.

The colonial legacy of 'emigratie' as a tool of welfare policy dominated the course of transmigration policy during the first decade of Independence. It promised the government a solution to population and related problems in Java. These included relief of poverty and landlessness and also help for the victims of Islamic rebellion in West Java, repatriates from Surinam, and ex-soldiers and guerilla fighters. The resentment of indigenous people in the Outer Islands, such as in Lampung, towards the central government policy on transmigration mostly originated from a different conception of land ownership. The people in many parts of the Outer Islands still regarded their lands as being inalienably owned by their customary groups (marga), whereas the central government considered that the national interest should prevail over regional interests. The regional disappointments
with transmigration were openly articulated whenever there was a channel to do so. The regional rebellions against the central government between 1956 and 1958 provided the most dramatic occasions on which local people in the Outer Islands expressed their resentment toward the transmigration policy. Strong resentments among people in the Outer Islands suggests that the aim of providing a 'melting pot' for Javanese and non-Javanese through transmigration was not without great risk.

Partly as the result of regional rebellions in West Sumatra and South and North Sulawesi during the period 1956-58, transmigration gained a new aim as a strategic instrument to strengthen national integration and security. The increasing role of military leaders in the government bureaucracy played an important role in establishing the strategic aims of transmigration. Up to the time of the attempted coup of 1965, although the total number of people who were moved under these schemes was very small, some resettlement areas were designed to bolster the national defence, particularly during the dispute with Malaysia. In the 1950s and 1960s transmigration was always ambitiously planned, but its implementation was consistently poor. Expertise and funds were chronically limited. However, the long-lasting perceptions that have valued transmigration as a multi-purpose instrument may also have mystified transmigration as a 'panacea', a cure for many
diseases. In the New Order period that began after 1965 such perceptions have apparently been maintained. This helps to explain many controversies about the implementation of transmigration policy during the New Order. The next chapter will consider some issues that were revealed in the 1950s and 1960s for the analysis of transmigration policy during the New Order period.
Chapter IV

TRANSMIGRATION POLICY OVER FOUR PLANNING CYCLES
(1969 - 1988)

While the policy maker may not make the values or interests underlying his policies explicit- indeed, it may be in his interests not to - it is the task of the policy analyst to do so.

(Myron Weiner, 1975:76)

This chapter analyses the notion of transmigration as a population distribution policy and its place within national development, particularly since the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan (Repelita I) in 1969. National development will be examined in order to understand the policy cycle of the central and regional governments, and in turn, this overview will form the context within which transmigration is analysed. Transmigration will be examined with particular regard to the process of formulating goals and targets, and the nature of the implementing organization and its bureaucratic mechanisms. The New Order period has been chosen primarily because during this era transmigration has received increasing attention and legitimation and has been formally integrated into national development plans.
4.1 National Development Policy: An Overview

During the New Order, economic development has become a major concern of the ruling elites in Indonesia. The emergence of a group of economists dedicated to the promotion of economic growth has been clearly reflected in the establishment of national and regional Five-Year Development Plans. These stress rational economic calculation as the primary consideration in promoting economic growth. Population is regarded as only one component of the economic system.

The conventional view among these economist-technocrats is that the rate of population growth is a significant determinant of the success of a country's economic development efforts. The importance of the population factor in economic thinking is clearly demonstrated by the use of average annual per capita income as a measurement of development. The effect of population growth on economic development has been explained, among others by Coale and Hoover (1958: 19), who argue that a higher rate of population growth implies a higher level of needed investment to achieve a given per capita output, while there is nothing about faster growth that generates a greater supply of investible resources. As a consequence of such an economic preoccupation, the reduction of population growth is often considered to be a necessary precondition for economic development.
Despite this, the legacy of colonial policies, as well as the population policies of the 'old order' (which were basically pro-natalist and viewed uneven distribution of population as the main population problem), could not be easily eliminated from the thinking of the ruling elites. An illustration of how these elites, particularly the military, have persistently regarded transmigration as an important undertaking is shown by a request from General Suharto to the US ambassador in Indonesia, Marshall Green, at their first meeting on 29 May 1966. Suharto asked for US$500 million in grants or soft loans to assist the transmigration program.¹

Compared with the problem of rapid population growth, which at the beginning of the New Order was accorded high priority, the problem of uneven population distribution between Java and Outer Islands has not been generally regarded as an issue of urgency by the economist-technocrats. Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, widely known as the architect of the New Order's economic development policies, strongly argued that what was needed to overcome the population problem in Indonesia was:

...a massive development effort to create expanding employment opportunities accompanied by a rapid spread of fertility control (1970: 238).

¹ A letter from Marshall Green to Dr. Terry Hull at ANU, 18 March 1988.
Yet, curiously enough, the problem of uneven population
distribution and the role of transmigration as a means to
overcome it has long been a focus of government thinking,
and became a very important policy within the national
development plans during the New Order.

The real motive of President Suharto for the
continuation of transmigration is difficult to identify.
The explanation might be sought in the idea of 'harmony'
among the Javanese, which in the Indonesian political
context can be translated into the concept of 'national
unity' or 'national integration', and which, as suggested
by Koentjaraningrat (Visser, 1988: 75), is strongly
represented by the President and the military. In this
context, transmigration has been perceived as an
instrument to accelerate the process of national
integration.2 Government policies to move people from
overcrowded Java to the other islands have also been
considered as an alternative to land-reform. Land reform,
which was aggressively promoted by the Communist Party
(PKI) prior to the 1965 abortive coup, was identified by
the New Order as a 'communist' policy. Wertheim (1984:
10) noted that:

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2 In more recent times, Martono, then Minister of
Transmigration, stated clearly that the ultimate goal of
transmigration was a new society resulting from the
amalgamation of different ethnic groups (Hopper, c.1987b:
197).
Under the Suharto regime, "land reform" has become, for over one-and-a-half decades, a forbidden topic because it has the "bad" smell of "Marxism" and "Communism".

Tjondronegoro (1972: 12-13) noted that the shift in the balance of political power to the military after 1966 resulted in a significant policy change from land redistribution within Java to population redistribution across the archipelago. Tjondronegoro (1984: 79) explained that:

Since 1967 the government has given higher priority to economic production and technological improvement, carefully avoiding policies which could have brought about effective social reforms. The Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 which is a potential instrument to initiate structural changes in the rural areas, has not been effectively enforced since the Coup of 1965. Since then, perhaps, the only occasion on which the government did implement this Law with regard to rural structural change, was when it had to set the land allocations for the migrants in the Outer Islands.

These seemingly ambiguous perceptions among the Indonesian elites of the nature of population problems are not unique. Weiner (1975: 66) has suggested that many governments assume that some of the problems exemplified by rapid population growth can be alleviated by policies aimed at the dispersal of populations. He also noted that migration policies are frequently embraced for a variety of purposes, but almost never for exclusively demographic reasons. In addition, transmigration as a form of land settlement scheme can be a supreme rhetorical device for
the government and its ruling elites. Hulme (1987: 413) observed that:

As a panacea for economic and social problems settlement schemes are a strategy almost without rival. If the popular expectation is that those in power should 'do something', then schemes are a most effective means of being seen to 'do something'.

Analysing transmigration policy within the context of national development plans requires it to be assessed, in addition to the demographic perspective, on the basis of two other influential considerations: first, economic considerations, as proposed by the economist-technocrat group and the World Bank; and second, non-economic considerations as advocated by the military, among others, particularly the social and political aspects of national integration. Alternating states of conflict and consensus between the groups promoting these two perspectives have played a decisive role behind the scenes in the formulation of transmigration policy and, more importantly, during its implementation.

Preceding the launch of the First Five-Year Plan in April 1969, the government, under the supervision of the economists, successfully reduced the inflation rate from a high of more than 600 per cent in 1966 to around 10 per cent in 1969. This achievement indicated the important role of the economist-technocrats in effectively controlling government expenditure and the money supply. In contrast to the situation under the Old Order, after
1967 the government's budget had to be submitted to Parliament before the start of each new fiscal year. By 1968 it had become obvious that the central government had regained control of the economic situation. This was considered a suitable time to draft the First Five-Year Development Plan. As explained by one of the New Order's leading economists, the First Five-Year Plan was not an exhaustive plan of expenditure and was not grounded on any particular macroeconomic model (Mangkusuwondo, 1970).

Mangkusuwondo (1970: 17-18) explained that:

It does not start with aggregate targets such as the level of GNP, total consumption, investments, exports, imports, etc. It does mention a target rate of growth of total income of five percent per annum but that figure is nothing more than a guess about the rate of growth of income as a consequence of investments in several areas of the economy, since neither the level of income nor total investment is known with a reasonable degree of confidence.

On the basis of their knowledge of conditions in the Indonesian economy prior to the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan, the designers decided that it was more realistic to frame a sectoral plan, rather than a comprehensive one. The major emphasis was placed on the agricultural sector, notably rice and other food production, and on the export sector. Other sectors, such as social overheads and manufacturing industries, were emphasized only insofar as they contributed to development in the food and export producing sectors or led to foreign exchange savings.
Since the First Plan, a sectoral framework has always been used by the government as a basis for national development programs. During the preparation of Repelita I, the Indonesian government received a great deal of financial as well as expert assistance from the World Bank, particularly in the formulation of its economic policies and programs. According to Thompson and Manning (1974: 56), the involvement of the World Bank in Indonesia began in 1968 when Robert McNamara visited Indonesia as President of the Bank. Up to 1968, the role of the World Bank had been minimal. Although Indonesia had become a Bank member in April 1954, because of the political situation during the mid 50s the World Bank did not consider it economically feasible for the Indonesian government to borrow Bank money. A report based on the World Bank first field mission to Indonesia in mid-1955 suggested that:

The Bank should take no decisions on further operations in Indonesia until the political situation is clarified and the ability of any future Government to tackle some of the critical and financial problems can be more clearly assessed (IBRD, 1956 cited in Thompson and Manning, 1974: 57).

At the beginning of the New Order period, the World Bank staff worked directly with the National Development Planning Board (Bappenas), the Ministries of Trade and Finance and the Foreign Investment Board (Thompson and Manning, 1974: 59-60). The central position of Bappenas

3 It is interesting that the original framework is still being used by Bappenas, even though the data to develop more comprehensive plans are readily available.
within the national policy was explain by Rudner (1976: 255):

As a central planning institution Bappenas had substantive responsibility for the formulation of development strategies expressed in its sectoral and overall plans, consistent, of course, with politically - determined modernization goals. In the event, Bappenas also acquired a pivotal functions in current development policy decisions. It was responsible for getting annual departmental budgetary proposals, and in close collaboration with the Finance Ministry, reducing aggregating these into the state development budget. Foreign project aid, as well, was disbursed through Bappenas. The Planning Board co-ordinated project aid finance and even conducted the negotiations with foreign governments and multilateral and international organizations.

At the end of the First Five-Year Development Plan, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the highest constitutional power in Indonesia, promulgated, for the first time, a policy guidance document called 'The Broad Outlines of State Policy' (GBHN). Based on the GBHN, which provided the basic strategy for the national development policy, the subsequent Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita II) was formulated. In theory, each Repelita is an operationalisation of the GBHN.

According to Emil Salim, one of the New Order's economists (1970: 1, quoted in Djamin, 1984: 23):
Repelita is merely an indicative plan, which shows the direction in which available resources will be focused. It provides information about factors that could hinder the dynamics and the speed of the development process. In addition, Repelita also reflects a style and system of economy that has been adopted by the government (author's translation).

Thus, the statement of a numerical target (for example, the number of transmigrants that were to be moved, the number of schools to be built, or the number of family planning acceptors to be achieved) in the Repelita documents was only an indicative goal. The actual numerical target was proposed by the planners on the basis of each department's projected budget, as well as the expected capacity of the bureaucracy, which played a crucial role in the implementation of the plan. Consequently, the numerical target for transmigration has rarely been calculated in relation to other demographic indicators, such as the rate of population growth or the rate of interprovincial migration.4

The Five-Year Development Plan is further elaborated in an annual plan that shows, among other things, the priority of each sector, the budget ceiling and the sources of finance for each sector. The annual plan is contained in the National Budget (APBN). A new

4 The current Minister for Transmigration, Soegiarto, in interviews with the press, stated clearly that the Repelita target number for transmigration was merely prepared for bureaucratic reasons, particularly in association with the proposed budget allocation (See Suara Pembaharuan, 25 April 1988, also Editor, 7 May 1988).
rationalised budgetary process, based on a fiscal year extending from April to March of the following year, was initiated at the beginning of the first plan. Mas’oed (1983: 239) noted that in the preparation of the APBN at the national level the Finance Minister and the Head of Bappenas have acted as the 'Guardians of the Public Treasury' and the other departments and agencies as the 'Spending Advocates'. The planning process has been summarised by Mas’oed (1983: 239-241) as follows:

1. The process starts when each individual unit or department within the government prepares a register of project proposals (DUP) that must be completed between June and August every year. The DUP is sent to the 'Guardians' to be evaluated.

2. Between September and October, the 'Guardians' evaluate the project proposals and meet with officers from the various departments. During these meetings, the non-departmental agencies are represented by the State Secretariat. Included in the evaluation are considerations of each year's investment priorities as stipulated in the Five-Year Development Plan and an estimation of revenue.

3. Armed with projections of the level of development investment required, the government begins its aid diplomacy with the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia), a group of developed countries that have sponsored economic development in Indonesia since 1967.
Based on the IGGI members' commitment and estimated government savings and revenues, the Finance Minister and the Head of Bappenas set the budget ceiling and order departments and agencies to prepare their specific budgets according to ceilings set for each.

4. In January, the President submits the proposed budget as a bill to the parliament. This document is usually accepted without significant changes. When the President signs the accepted bill, it becomes law.

5. The implementation stage of spending the development budget begins with the submission of a specified working program (DIP) by the departments and agencies to the 'Guardians', on the basis of the accepted DUP. The acceptance of the DIP by the 'Guardians' represents the government's commitment to invest its money in the nominated projects through the various departments and agencies.

6. Finally the departments, through competitive bidding, employ contractors to carry out the projects. These contractors could be either government-owned or privately-owned companies.

The national policy-making process under the New Order has been described by some observers as predominantly technocratic-bureaucratic in nature (Kuntjorojakti, 1978; Mas'ood, 1983). It is bureaucratic because it always originates in, and is implemented by, the bureaucracy. The parliament functions mainly to
ratify the plans, and debate on the matter is not encouraged. It is technocratic because the main criteria used in the process are technocratic values, such as 'rationality' and 'efficiency': the economists are anxious to implement such criteria in evaluating project proposals and carrying out feasibility studies. In a similar vein, Hugo, Hull, Hull and Jones (1987: 300) argued that the politico-planning structure in Indonesia can be summarized in three words: 'authoritarian', 'centralized', and 'technocratic'. Glassburner (1978: 29) views the planning process and the role of economist-technocrats in a slightly different way:

Although Bappenas is the centre of activity at the time of writing of the Five Year Plans, the agency itself is not set up for highly sophisticated central management of the economic system. Its primary function is to consider petitions from government agencies at various levels for investment funds channelled through the budget. I believe it is much more accurate to view this process as a manifestation of aristocratic benevolence than as an Indonesian version of Gosplan [Soviet Central Planning Office].

4.2 The Role of Provincial Government

Social, political and economic structural changes since the end of the 1960s have contributed to the development of the centralised character of the Indonesian government. In 1974, for example, the New Order government established Law No. 5, which established the legal framework for the role and authority of the
provincial governments (Handajaningrat and Hindratmo, 1986: 5). According to this law, the provincial government authorities exercise only those powers that have been granted to them by the central government. The national government is primarily represented by the Department of Home Affairs, whose minister is granted extensive authority under the law. With the establishment of this authority, the Minister of Home Affairs, acting through the Governors, has acquired responsibility for supervising and supporting all development activities carried out in the Provinces. However, in practice there seems to be a dualism of authority at the provincial level, since most regional development programs have been implemented by the national sectoral line agencies (Departments and Boards). The role of the departmental regional offices (Kanwil), as representatives of the national government departments, is not clearly distinguished from the role of the District Technical Offices (Dinas), which fall directly under the control of the governor or the district head (Bupati). The fact that most of the development budget is channelled through Kanwil offices for sectoral programs inevitably means that national-priority programs tend to take precedence over regional ones.

Development activities at the provincial level, based on Law No. 5. of 1974, can be classified into three broad categories. First are the development activities and programs implemented by the sectoral line agencies in
the regions. In this category, planning, implementation, control and financial support are mainly the responsibility of the central government. The transmigration program is an example of such an activity. Second are the development activities funded and implemented by the District Technical Offices (Dinas). Third are the development activities that should be the responsibility of a provincial government, but which, because the financial ability of the provincial government is limited, usually become the responsibility of the central government. An example of such activities is the Inpres projects that are implemented by the provincial government agencies under the strict control of the central government, particularly the Ministry of Home Affairs.\(^5\) (See Figure 4.1)

In 1976, the government created Regional Development Planning Boards (Bappeda) to strengthen the regional government in planning and co-ordinating development programs. In theory, there are a number of functions that should be performed by Bappeda: developing the basic pattern for regional development; preparing the regional five-year development plan; proposing annual programs such for the implementation of the five-year development plan; coordinating planning between the various Dinas and offices under the provincial government as well as

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\(^5\) Inpres stands for Instruksi President or Presidential Instruction. At present, there are eight different types of Inpres grants, one for provinces, one for regencies, one for villages and the remainder for specific purposes such as health, primary education, roads and markets.
sectoral agencies; proposing the regional budget; conducting research, and monitoring the implementation of regional development. The structure of Bappeda consists of the head, vice head, secretariat and four divisions, namely: research, economy, material and infrastructure, and statistics and reporting.

In practice, however, these bodies have had very limited control over development programs in their regions. Morfit (1984: 61) noted that, although the Bappeda, as planning institutions, are required to produce Regional Five-Year Development Plans (Repelita Daerah), these often are little more than a compilation of data about a given region. The weakness of Bappeda is typified in their lack of ability to influence development budgets, which are largely controlled by sectoral agencies.6

6 Several attempts, initiated by the economist-technocrat group in Bappenas and Home Affairs department have been made to strengthen the role of Bappeda as the provincial planning institution. For instance, before the preparation of the annual budget for the provincial level, Bappenas has conducted national level workshops in which all the Bappeda representatives participated. On these occasions, the Bappeda staff were briefed and guided to prepare their own annual regional budgets. Through Bappenas a number of studies, sometimes initiated by government departments and very often involving foreign experts, have also been conducted to assess the possibilities in strengthening the planning capacity and roles of Bappeda in regional development (MacAndrews, Fisher and Sibero, 1982; van den Ham, 1989).
Figure 4.1: Government Organization in Indonesia

Source: Adapted from MacAndrews (1986: 22 & 24)
Given that sectoral line agencies in the provinces are directly controlled by their national offices in Jakarta, the governor has a duty to back the decisions of sectoral line agencies for the region. Bappeda, which in theory has the authority to evaluate the implementation of all projects in the region, is in reality entirely peripheral, since it is subservient to the governor. The total dependence of the governor on central-government decisions was noted by Major General Eddy Sabara, a former Inspector General of the Department of Home Affairs, the agency in charge of selecting new governors. Sabara (Editor, 26 September 1987) explained that, at the provincial level, the selection of the governor was nominally under the control of the regional military command. Thus, the nominee for governor must be a candidate who is considered politically acceptable by the local military command. However, they would ultimately refer the matter to their superiors in Jakarta. Santoso (1986: 51) also noted that:

He [the governor] is more a central government organ in the region than a representative of the region itself.

The circumstances in which the governor and the governor's office apparatus function solely as an instrument of the central government has undoubtedly contributed to the 'top-down' and 'centrally-planned' regional development approach.

Between the political upheaval of 1965, and the commencement of the first plan, the government paid very little attention to transmigration. At the dawn of the New Order, McNicoll (1968: 69), even predicted that the program would no longer occupy a significant role in government policy. Heeren (1979: 171) after studying the various forms of migration schemes, argued in 1967 that the future trend of migration in Indonesia would be toward voluntary internal migration. These predictions were based partly on an assessment that the economic and political environment did not favour such a policy. The economic and political situation, although under government control, was still considered unstable and very fragile. In the first plan, therefore, stabilization and rehabilitation became the immediate targets. The technocrats, who were mostly economists from the University of Indonesia with backing from the military, formulated a relatively modest plan with emphasis first on increasing food production, and second, on rehabilitating the physical infrastructure, such as roads and ports. Although the economist-technocrats seemed to dominate the field of advice and expertise, various centres of economic power were essentially controlled by military personnel. Glassburner (1978: 34) observed that:
The problem of economic-policy making and implementation is a major problem of social engineering in a pluralistic milieu. The FEUI [Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia] economists are thus forced to rely on their expertise and their persuasiveness, as well as their ability to appeal to national interest. Even within the ministries they head they must share power and responsibility in important instances.

The dominant role of the military in the formulation of policy was described as follows by Rudner (1976: 250):

The new development strategy sought to improve the performance of the laggard Indonesian economy not merely for its own sake, but as a means of securing the military elite's political aims of social modernization with stability, and national resilience. As the vanguard of the New Order, the ABRI, and particularly its army component, was to play a critical role in the formulation and implementation of the First Five Year Development Plan (Repelita I), introduced in March 1969.

Prior to the initiation of the first plan, the Directorate General of Transmigration was converted into the Department of Transmigration and Cooperatives as a result of a merger between the Directorate General of Transmigration (under the old Department of Transmigration and Veterans Affairs), and the Directorate General of Cooperatives (formerly under the Department of Home Affairs). In March 1969, Brigadier General Soebiantoro was appointed Director General of Transmigration, replacing Brigadier General Boesiri. The appointment of military officers within the government bureaucracy, although very common under the New Order,
had a special significance in the transmigration program because it provided an avenue for the armed forces to pursue their strategic and political interests in various aspects of the program.

In Repelita I, the government's policy on transmigration was stated in only two-and-one-half pages (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1969: 537-539). Although the problem of population redistribution was mentioned, it was not elaborated upon. The need to meet labour requirements for development in the regions outside Java, although stated as a secondary goal, was given more detailed attention in the plan. It seems that the economist-technocratic views that considered transmigration primarily an instrument to support the immediate objectives of stabilization and rehabilitation strongly influenced the formulation of the plan. The transmigration program was considered as an important source of labour to serve these broader goals. In addition, the transmigration program was expected to increase food production in the Outer Islands.

In the First Plan no numerical targets for transmigration were set. This was probably because of difficulties in obtaining reliable aggregate data, a major problem for the planners who prepared that document. In addition, the focus of transmigration seemed to be more on regional development than on solving the problem of uneven population distribution between Java
and the other islands. Among the economist-technocrats group, the view that transmigration policy should be directed toward regional development rather than to solve the demographic problem in Java was not a surprise. In 1963, for example, Sadli (1963: 22) argued that:

...transmigration has to be seen more as a way of providing manpower for economic development in the outer regions.

In commenting on this new perception of transmigration, Arndt (1984: 6) noted that:

As rational economic policy-making again became possible after the 1965-66 change of government, interest in transmigration revived, but with a different perspective. It came to be recognized that transmigration could not solve, or even substantially alleviate, the problem of "population imbalance" between Java-Bali and the other islands, if indeed that was the problem. Transmigration was now seen primarily as having a welfare objective, to raise the living standards of the migrants and that of their home villages in Java. It was also hoped that transmigration could serve as a strategy for regional economic development in the outer islands.

The declining role of transmigration policy as a solution to population problems was also noted by Schultz (1972: 117):

The (First) Five Year Plan, for the first time in Indonesian history, not only establishes population control as a legitimate objective of development planning but also makes the realistic assessment that transmigration, or the transporting of Javanese and Balinese to the Outer Islands, is not an effective means of population control.
The actual course of transmigration, however, was neither as predicted by many observers nor as stated in the plan documents. In 1970, under the patronage of Brigadier General Soebiantoro, a national seminar on transmigration was held in Cipayung to discuss the role of transmigration in national development. The seminar, which was attended by scholars and policy makers, was a landmark because it restored transmigration to a position of national importance and formulated a positive basis for the transmigration program within the framework of national development policy. The document, published as a seminar report, shows that uneven population distribution was considered to be detrimental to many aspects of national development and, more crucially, to the achievement of national integration and security (Seminar Transmigrasi, 1970). The seminar report reflected a strong perception within the government elite, as well as among scholars, that once the demographic goals of transmigration were realised, that is a balanced population distribution, other goals, such as economic, social and national integration, would be automatically fulfil.

The issues of 'national integration' and 'national unity' in fact had been discussed from the early years of Independence, and their importance reached new heights during the 1956-58 regional rebellions. The decisive role of the military in ending the rebellions was a major factor in reshaping the role that military leadership has
played in the national political scene since that time (Feith and Lev, 1963: 37). In addition, 'national integration' has become the key issue and prime concern for the military leaders, whose power was further entrenched by the political chaos of 1965. The conceptual links between transmigration policy and national integration were explained by Brigadier General Edi Sugardo (1987) of the National Defense Institute (Lemhanas), the 'think tank' of the Department of Defense, in the following terms:

From the 'geo-politic' and 'geo-strategic' point of view, transmigration policy is an effort, method, and means to achieve 'geographic integration', which is a basic condition for the unity of the nation, to improve the people's welfare and awareness, and provide an opportunity to utilise natural resources. Achievement of geographic integration, on the one hand, will protect the nation from centrifugal tendencies, and on the other hand, strengthen centripetal forces. Geographic integration is also a medium to build understanding, friendship and co-operation with other countries. From the point of view of national defence, transmigration is supportive of the 'Popular Defense and Security System' (SISHANKAMRATA), in order to resist the threat of subversion, infiltration and invasion from abroad, particularly through the provision of human resources (Sugardo, 1987: 4-5; author's translation).

Thus in the view of the military, geographic integration, in which transmigration policy plays an important role by providing human resources, is a necessary condition for the attainment of national integration. Another important element of this military thinking is the concept of 'basic defence'. The basic defense of the Indonesian armed forces, according to
Crouch (1986: 3), was essentially based on the doctrine of 'Territorial Warfare':

This doctrine required that the defense forces, especially the army, be organised principally along "territorial" rather than "functional" lines. The whole nation was divided into territorial commands more or less parallel to the civilian administration. In terms of defense doctrine, a major function of the territorial commands was to maintain contact with the local people so that they could be mobilized quickly to support guerrilla operations whenever necessary. It may be added, of course, that this territorial structure has also been very convenient for the purpose of political control.

The role of transmigration in the concept of 'basic defence' was to populate the empty regions in order to support the territorial commands.

In 1971 an international-level workshop on transmigration was conducted in which there was active participation by foreign experts. The following year, in 1972, the President established a law on transmigration which provided the basic legislation for the transmigration policy (Department of Manpower and Transmigration, 1979, Appendix 3: 4). According to this law, Indonesian transmigration policy has seven goals:

1. Improvements in living standards
2. Regional development
3. A balanced population distribution
4. Equitably distributed development throughout Indonesia
5. Utilization of natural and human resources
6. National union and unity
7. Strengthening of national defense and security

The numerous goals set down for transmigration reflected
the complexity of the role of the program. These goals also suggested that transmigration tended to be seen by policy makers as a universal panacea, a cure for a wide range of social and economic weaknesses.

During 1973, two further seminars were held involving several foreign agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Food Programme (WFP), that were interested in providing financial assistance for the transmigration program. In Repelita I, FAO consultants in particular, worked closely within the Directorate General of Transmigration and played an important role in conceptualising the linkage between the transmigration program and regional development, especially through the expansion of agriculture. The active role of the FAO during the First Plan was not surprising given the fact that increasing food production was one of the stated national goals at this time. In one of the published seminar reports, for instance, an FAO consultant, van der Goot, suggested that in able to embark on a substantial change in the transmigration program, which at the time was planned to take place in 1980:

The Indonesian government has to establish and demonstrate its ability to integrate large-scale transmigration and regional development initiatives into a viable and long-term programme (van der Goot: 1974: 50-51).

In the course of time, however, the actual influence of
the FAO in transmigration policy formulation seemed to decline, whereas the role of other foreign donor agencies, particularly the World Bank, was later to become very significant in reshaping transmigration policy.

4.4 Transmigration Policy during Repelita II (1974/5-1978/9)

During the Second Five-Year Plan, the transmigration program became part of the Department of Manpower, Transmigration and Cooperatives. Professor Subroto, an economist from the University of Indonesia, was appointed minister. Soebiantoro, who had been promoted to the rank of Major-General, continued as Director General. In this plan, the transmigration program gained more attention than previously. The increase in government revenues from the oil boom provided funds to support the program on a much larger scale than previously possible. For the first time, it was stated clearly that transmigration was considered to be an important means for strengthening national integration. By contrast, the demographic rationale that had regarded transmigration as a tool for population redistribution was mentioned only implicitly (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1974: 451-458).

The Second Five-Year Development Plan criticised the implementation of the transmigration program during the
First Plan period. The problems identified as hindering effective policy implementation were those relating to settlement preparation in the receiving regions, the choice of location, the provision of equipment, and coordination with the regional government, as well as with other agencies. Prior to the Second Plan, there was some hope, particularly among economic observers, that the plan would be prepared in a more systematic way, based on research and the cooperation of a large number of economic experts. But, as Glassburner (1978: 167) argued, as a result of the rice crisis and the radical impact of changing oil prices meant that Professor Widjojo, the head of Bappenas, and his subordinates could not prepare a comprehensive plan. The plan, according to Glassburner (1978: 167), was 'no more than a statement of qualitative objectives'.

Although the demographic rationale for transmigration was only implicitly stated in the plan, a numerical target was explicitly mentioned. The target was to move 250,000 families within five years. The Minister of Manpower and Transmigration, Subroto (1974: 28) argued that the resettlement of large numbers of people from Java, Bali and Lombok would make a positive contribution to regional development in the Outer Islands. In selecting the sending areas, priority was to be given to regions that were considered 'critical', such as areas prone to flooding, and to rural places with population densities of more than 1,000 persons per square
kilometre. South Sumatra, South and East Kalimantan, and South, Central and Southeast Sulawesi were designated as the main receiving areas for transmigration settlement (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1974: 456).

In 1976 a significant development in the transmigration program was begun by the approval of the first World Bank-assisted transmigration project. The World Bank project consisted of two pilot schemes in southern Sumatra. The first was the rehabilitation of an existing settlement in Way Abung and initiation of a new settlement in Baturaja, and the second was to conduct research on cropping systems and long-term monitoring and evaluation. In the first project, new settlers in Baturaja were provided with 5.0 hectares farms, which included 1.25 hectares cleared for food crops and 1.0 hectares of rubber trees established for the smallholders by a public sector estate (PTP X). These benefits were provided to the settlers as a grant. To promote food crop development, farmers were given cattle for draft power, and free agricultural inputs (seed, fertilizer and pesticides) for three years. Transmigrants also received a house and one year of subsistence supplies. The project was implemented by a Project Management Unit (PMU) with considerable financial autonomy, and both domestic and foreign technical assistance was provided to support the PMU. The first project was considered by the World Bank (1988: 161) to have been successful.
The second Bank-assisted transmigration project, approved in 1979, was intended to resettle 30,000 families along the new Trans-Sumatra highway, particularly in Jambi province. The project was also promoted as a model for the Repelita III (World Bank, 1988: 161). The World Bank (1988: 159) reported that bank-supported projects had introduced a number of innovative features into the transmigration policy in Indonesia. These included improvements in site screening and evaluation, support for and evaluation of the major farm models, assistance for program management, and development of procedures for utilizing timber from transmigration sites. In addition, the World Bank also admitted that a number of problems had been encountered during their involvement in the program. Some of these problems were common to all projects in Indonesia, among them: land allocation, co-ordination between the implementing agencies, and the problem of quality control (World Bank, 1988: 159). However, the Bank discovered that some problems resulted from difficulties inherent in programming and implementing a complex sequence of events and from ambitious program targets that had strained the capacity of the implementing agency.

By the end of Repelita II, it had become clear that the achievement was far below the target (see Table 4.2). Only 55,083 families had been resettled, compared with the target of 250,000 families. One study indicated that the failure was largely due to the lack of co-ordination
between the various central, provincial and district offices of the Transmigration Department assigned to carry out the program (Guinness, 1977: 11). Another problem was the limited capacity of transmigration implementing agencies to actually spend the budget. A special report on 'Transmigration Budgetary and Accounting Procedures' by Beddoes (1976 cited in Guinness, 1977: 11-12) showed that, in the first year of Repelita II, 24 per cent of the transmigration budget had not been spent. In the second year, 34 per cent and by the second half of the third year, 96 per cent of the budget remained. These represented very large sums, since the transmigration budget had increased from Rp. 800 million in 1969/70 to Rp. 6,652 million in 1974/75 and Rp. 14,936 million in 1975/76.


During Repelita III, the Directorate General of Transmigration became part of the Department of Manpower and Transmigration, while the Directorate General of Cooperatives was transferred to the Department of Trade. Harun Zain, an economist from the University of Indonesia and a former governor of West Sumatra, was appointed Minister of the new department. In addition, a new post of Junior Minister for Transmigration was established, reporting directly to the President but attached to the department. The appointment of Harun Zain, a civilian, as
head of the department directly responsible for the transmigration program, can be seen as indicating the interest of the technocrat group in incorporating transmigration into regional economic development. Harun Zain, with his experience as governor in one of the receiving provinces, was expected to play an important role in achieving this goal. However, the appointment to the position of Junior Minister for Transmigration of Martono, who was described by Harun Zain as 'a political man' close to the President, was also an indication that the President did not want to completely hand over policy control to the technocrats.\(^7\)

The division of responsibility between the Director General, who reported directly to the Minister, and the Junior Minister for Transmigration, who was directly responsible to the President, seemed unclear. Perhaps partly due to this situation but also as a consequence of the very rapid expansion in the size of the transmigration program since the beginning of Repelita II, several special decrees were promulgated, particularly Presidential Decree No. 26/1978, in which the organizational responsibilities for the transmigration program were laid down. A series of special bodies were created to coordinate policies, implementation and administration. These were:

\(^7\) The statement describing Martono as 'a political man' was made by Harun Zain during an interview with the author, January 1988.
1. Bakoptrans (Badan Koordinasi Penyelenggaraan Transmigrasi or the Co-ordinating Body for Implementation of Transmigration), composed of Ministers and chaired by the Minister of Manpower and Transmigration.

2. Satdaltrans (Satuan Pengendali Transmigrasi or the Control Unit for Transmigration), composed of the Directors-General and chaired by the Junior Minister of Transmigration.

3. Satbintrans (Satuan Pembinaan Transmigrasi or Transmigration Guidance Unit) I, composed of provincial-level staff and chaired by the governor of each province.

4. Satbintrans II, composed of district-level staff and chaired by the district-head (Bupati) in each district.

Although the numerical achievement of the Second Plan was far below the target, the Third Plan continued to plan for a further substantial increase in the target to 500,000 households (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1978: 304-337). The reason for increasing the target, apart from the general euphoria occasioned by the second oil boom, was the economist-technocrats' feeling that the implementation of the program would be improved by the increased support being given by many foreign donor agencies.

The second World Bank-assisted transmigration project started in 1979, concentrating on the resettlement of transmigrants in dry-land areas along the new Trans-Sumatra highway. Technical assistance was also provided to the Junior Minister for Transmigration to aid in co-ordination of the overall program. Such assistance was important, given that lack of co-ordination was considered to have been the major problem in the
implementation of transmigration under Repelita II. The focus of the second round of World Bank projects on dryland and food-crop transmigration schemes, also reflects an important new development. It was a significant departure from the Bank's successful first project on tree-crop transmigration schemes. The change constituted an important development in the evolution of World Bank involvement on transmigration for at least for two reasons. First, the World Bank had failed to influence the policy makers in directing transmigration policy into more market-oriented types of population settlements. Second, although the economist-technocrat group had played a larger role in reshaping transmigration policy into the so-called 'integrated regional development' mode, the ambitious targets of Repelita III mirrored the influence of strong forces that continued to view transmigration as a population policy aimed at relieving population pressures in Java through the development of agricultural settlement in the Outer Islands. ⁸

The beginning of Repelita III, therefore, indicated an important change in transmigration policies. The change could be interpreted, on the one hand, as a revitalisation of the non-economic forces, particularly those represented by the military elite and the

⁸ The central government obsession with promoting population resettlement based on food crop agricultural systems as practiced in Java, according to Dove (1985: 32), is essentially a manifestation of the agroecological mythology of the Javanese that has developed on Java and strongly influenced the thinking of many policy makers in the central government.
government bureaucratic apparatus, and, on the other, as an expression of the difficulties and declining roles of the economic views represented, in particular, by the economist-technocrats and the World Bank. The fact that the World Bank also tolerated the more demographic orientation of transmigration policy suggests that the Bank and, in particular, its bureaucratic elements had adopted a rather pragmatic approach. This, aside from its bureaucratic interest in keeping the project going, also reflected the fact that it had become politically impractical for the Bank to withdraw from its extensive involvement in the Indonesian transmigration program.9

Another factor that also raised the hopes of the government was the success of what it called Bedol Desa transmigration. This type of transmigration was carried out in conjunction with the evacuation of an entire population following a government decision to use an area for the construction of a dam or some other large project. The first and apparently the largest project was the relocation of people from some districts in Wonogiri in Central Java to Sitiung in West Sumatra. The success of the Wonogiri-Sitiung project within the Bedol Desa program increased confidence among the transmigration planners that the country was capable of carrying out similar settlement projects in the future. Wonogiri also happened to be the area of the President's childhood

9 I am particularly indebted here to Dr. McNicoll, my adviser, for raising some points which I developed further for this argument.
home. According to Gondowarsito's study of Bedol Desa transmigration (1986: 89-90), because of this privileged status, the utmost involvement and cooperation on the part of various government agencies, namely the Departments of Manpower and Transmigration, Public Works, Communication, and Agriculture, were enlisted.

Population distribution and regional development, which had alternately dominated as goals of the First and Second Plans, received equal emphasis in this Third Plan. Given the government's focus on equal distribution of welfare, under a policy called 'The Eight Paths of Equity' (Delapan Jalur Pemerataan), transmigration also became an important vehicle for the achievement of this new goal. The plan also stated that priority would be given to the poorest sending areas, where the problem of landlessness was most acute, and noted that the selection and preparation of receiving areas also needed more careful attention.

In the Third Plan, the government anticipated resettling transmigrants not only in dry-land areas, but also on pasang-surut (tidal) areas. The increased numbers to be settled led to difficulties in providing sufficient suitable land in the receiving areas. Compared to the First and Second plans, the Third Plan described in great detail the facilities and equipment to be provided to transmigrants. The plan seems to have been more seriously and professionally prepared than its predecessors. Co-
ordination among the implementing agencies, which was always at the centre of the program's problems, was also given more attention.

With the establishment of Bakoptrans, the responsibilities of the various departments involved were more clearly defined. For example, the Department of Public Works was responsible for the selection and planning of sites, for land clearing and for construction of infrastructure; the Department of Home Affairs was to conduct land-use planning and deal with the legal status of land; the Department of Agriculture was responsible for planning and implementing agricultural development; and, finally, the Department of Manpower, Co-operatives and Transmigration was in charge of the recruitment, transportation, and resettlement of transmigrants, as well as providing them with five years of economic and social guidance at each site. Under this highly bureaucratic and hierarchical organizational structure, each department was expected to plan its activities and budget in consultation with the Junior Minister. However, the authority, budget and staff of the Junior Minister's office were far too limited for efficient co-ordination. Furthermore, co-ordination proved impossible because each department continued to work independently. In addition, since the Junior Minister of Transmigration reported directly to the President, a hidden rivalry was unavoidable between the Minister and the Junior
Minister. Under the new arrangement, which was implemented in 1978, the Junior Minister was given more authority to control the foreign assistance than the Minister. This authority considerably reduced the power of the Minister to effectively implement the program.

At the end of the Third Plan, 535,474 families were reported to have been moved (Table 4.1), although the target of 500,000 was met only by defining 169,947 spontaneous migrants as transmigrants, with or without government assistance. According to Hardjono (1986: 29), to say that the Repelita III target was reached gives a slightly exaggerated picture of the extent to which people were moved from Java and Bali at government expense:

In fact, only 365,977 families were moved by the government transmigration agency as fully supported or general (umum) transmigrants. Furthermore, this figure includes local people who moved into transmigration projects and families that had to be resettled within the same province for some reasons. The remaining 169,497 families, representing 32% of the total, were swakarsa (literally, 'self initiative') transmigrants who moved with limited, or in many cases, no government assistance (Hardjono, 1986: 29).

Another observer, Babcock (1986: 182), formerly working as a consultant in the Public Works department, even described the government's claim that the Third Plan had achieved its target as a manipulation to justify the overly-ambitious target.

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10 A personal communication with a senior member of staff in the Department of Transmigration, December 1987.
Table 4.1

Realization of the Transmigration Program during Repelita III (Families)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>World Bank</th>
<th>Hardjono</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979-1980</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>23,078</td>
<td>49,772</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1,985)</td>
<td>(24,298)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1981</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>76,562</td>
<td>108,081</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3,359)</td>
<td>(34,428)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1982</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>93,437</td>
<td>123,846</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8,961)</td>
<td>(35,780)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1983</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>125,269</td>
<td>167,477</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(32,445)</td>
<td>(47,124)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1984</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>217,128</td>
<td>86,298</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(122,747)</td>
<td>(24,867)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>535,474</td>
<td>535,474</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(169,497)</td>
<td>(169,497)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The number in parentheses represents unassisted or partly-assisted transmigrants.
2. The percentage figures is calculated from Hardjono's column.

Sources: World Bank (1988: 11)
          Hardjono (1986: 29)

Widespread scepticism has been expressed about the statistical manipulation involved in determining program achievements during Repelita III. There are quite remarkable statistical inconsistencies among the several sources that have presented the transmigration realization statistics for Repelita III. For example, the figure reported by the World Bank (1988: 11) is obviously different from that presented by Hardjono (1986: 29) (Table 4.1). Although, the total number of resettled migrants is similar, their annual distributions,
especially the number of spontaneous migrants, are remarkably dissimilar. While both Hardjono and the World Bank described their sources as the Department of Transmigration, the salient differences in their figures raise serious doubts as to the accuracy of the information. With regard to the distribution of spontaneous transmigrants, although the accuracy of both columns must be suspect, the figures in Hardjono's column seem more logical than those of the World Bank. The distribution of spontaneous transmigrants, who were mostly concentrated in the last budget year in the World Bank data, are unlikely to reflect the actual pattern of movement. That is more likely to have been more evenly distributed throughout the plan period, as in Hardjono's figures. The World Bank concentration of spontaneous transmigrants in the last budget year probably reflects hasty decisions by the Department of Transmigration due to pressure at the end of the plan period to document a public image that program targets had been successfully achieved. The method chosen was apparently through manipulation of statistics on spontaneous transmigrants.\footnote{Such statistical manipulation was recognized by the World Bank, which noted in one of its reports (1988: 134) that:

Although some spontaneous families were settled in existing areas, no program of partially assisted movement or of support for spontaneous migration was developed in Repelita III. However, the Repelita III target of 500,000 families was eventually achieved by including 169,500 "spontaneous" families in the total moved. Of these, about 30,000 families were moved with partial assistance and the remaining 140,000 moved without assistance, but were identified in sending or receiving areas. It is}
4.6 Transmigration Policy during Repelita IV (1984/5-1988/9)

Under Presidential Decree No. 45/M/1983, for the first time in the history of the transmigration program, a separate Department of Transmigration was established. Martono was appointed Minister. This ended the previous rivalries between the Minister controlling the Directorate General of Transmigration, and the Junior Minister of Transmigration. It was hoped that an independent department could solve the problem of co-ordination, which had been so serious during the implementation of the Third Plan. The President also established a State Minister for Population and Environment (KLH), who was responsible for the formulation, management and co-ordination of national population policies. Professor Emil Salim, a Minangkabau and one of the New Order's leading economists, was appointed as minister.

An integrated national population policy had been long overdue. Given the number of economists in the central government, including economist-demographer Professor Widjojo, the lack of integration between

important to emphasize that these families were identified to round out official targets, and the data collected from sending provinces is not a good indicator of the number of people who actually move.
population policy and national development policy seemed 'paradoxical' at least to outside observers (Hugo, Hull, Hull and Jones, 1987: 315). The paradox, however, is hardly surprising given the very different perceptions of the 'population factors' held by the President and his military elite and the economist-technocrats. The difficulties that had been experienced by the economist-technocrat group in dealing with the military were confirmed by one of the Deputy Ministers for Population and Environment. The political position of the economist-technocrats, as explained by Glassburner (1978: 32-33), was almost entirely dependent on their ability to convince the military leadership, and the President in particular, that their expertise was essential. In a similar vein, Rudner (1976: 255) argued that:

Having no political base other than military patronage, technocrat ministers and planners were ultimately dependent upon the confidence of the military elite in general, and the President in particular. Whatever their formal functions in economic policy-making, the decisions of economist-technocrats became operative only when, and to the extent that they acquired executive support from military leaders and local commanders. In the last analysis, the authority of the economist-technocrats went only so far as their economics proved amenable to the ABRI's own conception of national modernization.

In the Fourth Plan, therefore, it was likely that transmigration would remain largely beyond the influence of the Minister of Population and Environment, Emil Salim, an economist-technocrat, because Transmigration had also become an independent department with a minister.

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12 Personal communication with the author, January 1988.
who was close to the President.

Following the decision to make Transmigration an independent department, two Directorates of the Department of Public Works were absorbed into the Department of Transmigration. Some sections of the former Directorate of City and Regional Planning (DITADA) of the Directorate General Cipta Karya, which had been responsible for transmigration site selection and physical planning, became the Directorate of Programme Development (Bina Program) in the newly formed Directorate General of Settlement Preparation (PANKIM). The Directorate of Land Preparation was moved to that directorate general, from the Directorate General of Highways in the Department of Public Works. The former Directorate General of Transmigration became the Directorate General for Mobilisation and Development (RAHBIN). The budgets of some agencies, such as health and education, were also incorporated into the Department of Transmigration, while other agencies such as Agrarian Affairs and the directorates in agriculture, retained control over their own funds. Under the new department, the staff and functions of the Inspector General and the Secretary General were expanded in order to improve financial and administrative control (see Figure 4.2)
Figure 4.2: Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Transmigration

Source: Adapted from World Bank (1988)
There is no doubt that Repelita IV reflected the increasing role of the transmigration program within the national development policy. The target number to be resettled was increased to 750,000 households. The claimed successful outcomes of the Third Plan had apparently provided a strong argument for the government to increase the target to this level. In the Fourth Plan, foreign financial support to the transmigration program, particularly from the World Bank, also increased dramatically. However, the appointment of Martono as the minister suggested that the technocrats were losing control of the program. Furthermore, instead of demographic and regional development arguments, national defense and security were highlighted as important goals of transmigration (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1983: 371-372).

The important role of transmigration for national defense and security was emphasized by the Chief of Armed Forces, General Benny Moerdani, when he delivered a keynote address at the seminar in the National Defense Institute (Lemhanas). According to Moerdani, transmigration policy was the only policy within the economic development framework which had a direct linkage with national security and defense. He argued that it was necessary for the military to be involved in site selection, primarily because transmigration location had a strong relation with the concept of territorial management (Kompas, 8 March 1985). An obvious attempt
from the military to influence the transmigration policy, among others, was shown by the appointment of Major General C. I. Santoso, a former regional commander in Irian Jaya (1978-1982), as the general secretary of the Department of Transmigration in 1983.13

In the plan documents, transmigration was discussed in a fairly substantial separate chapter of 58 pages. According to Sjahrir (1987: 193), economist from the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), the Fourth Plan showed considerable technical improvement over previous plans, specifically in the utilization of more sophisticated econometrics.14 However, there were inconsistencies in the numerical targets between sectors and sub-sectors. Sjahrir has argued (1987: 193), that these inconsistencies may have been due to the strong influence of the non-economic considerations in the plan's formulation.

The hopes that had emerged at the beginning of the Fourth Plan, however, were soon confronted with some hard realities and problems. These problems can be broadly categorized as internal and external problems. The internal problems related to departmental management,

13 According to Anderson (1985: 140), a long-standing scholar of Indonesian politics, this appointment should be read as General Murdani's move to take full control of the 'explosive mass-transmigration program in West-Irian'.
14 The Centre for Policy Studies is a non-government research institute. Among the senior staff is Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, the 'guru' of the New Order's economist-technocrat group.
particularly the problem of the unspent budget that reflected the inefficiency of plan implementation. This problem was exacerbated by the gloomy prospects for world oil prices. These internal problems were first felt, according to the Minister, around the second year of Repelita IV. The external problems mostly related to criticisms from abroad, particularly on issues concerning the destruction of tropical forests and unfair treatment of the indigenous populations whose lands were allocated for transmigration.

Approaching the end of 1984, the Minister of Transmigration asked Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo to act as an adviser to the Minister on matters related to program planning and internal management. Among the key persons working for Sumitro was Harun Zain, the former Minister for Manpower and Transmigration. One of the elements of advice requested by the Minister related to the problem of unspent budgets. A series of meetings and interviews were conducted with several ministers who were directly linked with the transmigration program, such as Public Works, Interior, Population and Environment, Forestry, and Food Production, the Governor of West Kalimantan, and several Directors General. The report was completed in April 1985 and submitted to the Minister. It was considered 'a reconnaissance phase', and mainly focused on the internal management of the transmigration

15 A source close to Professor Sumitro told the author (January 1988) that the request to employ Sumitro as an adviser on transmigration had come from President Suharto.
program (Redecon, 1985). The 'technocratic' nature of this report and its avoidance of more controversial issues, such as the influence of the strategic military interests on the policy, can be seen as major limitations to the value of the report as a basis for program improvement.

The external problems of transmigration implementation soared rapidly especially after the government decided to shift the geographic focus of the transmigration receiving areas to the eastern part of Indonesia, particularly to the border between Irian Jaya and PNG. Such a decision, for example, resulted in many technical, as well as social and political problems (Manning and Rumbiak, 1987: 71-82). Due to issues such as environmental degradation and the displacement of the indigenous population, international criticisms began to be heard against the transmigration policy in Indonesia. The World Bank, which for almost fifteen years had supported transmigration policy, also became the target of international criticism.16

In January 1985 a research team from Gajah Mada University headed by Professor Mubyarto was asked by Minister Martono to observe and report on transmigration in Irian Jaya. Their observations were presented at a seminar held at the Centre for Rural and Regional

16 For example, The Ecologist (No. 2/3, 1986) in collaboration with Survival International and Tapol, published a special issue which strongly criticised the transmigration program in Indonesia
Studies, one of the research centres at Gajah Mada University. Among the issues raised during the seminar and subsequently highlighted by the press, was the need to revise and reschedule the transmigration target for Irian Jaya (Kompas, 8 February 1985). In addition to the potential social and political conflicts, the original transmigration target in Irian Jaya was considered to be economically unrealistic. However, in an apparent response to this criticism, after immediate consultation with the President, Minister Martono strongly emphasised that:

The transmigration target for Irian Jaya will not be reduced but will even be increased (Kompas, 26 February 1985).

Some observers felt, that:

Transmigration has become such a fetish with the President that cabinet members dare not try to persuade him to approve drastic changes to it. The premises and goals are non-negotiable. (Osborne, 1985: 25).

However, the program was drastically hit as oil prices collapsed in 1985-86. As a result, the government subsequently reduced the budget for transmigration by 44 per cent in the 1986/87, and a further 65 per cent in the 1987/88 fiscal years (Tempo, 16 January 1988). With the budget cut, the transmigration target seemed likely to be reduced considerably. This drastic reduction was described by Professor Mubyarto 'as the will of God'.

17 This description was made by Professor Mubyarto at the 'Conference on Regional Economy in Indonesia' at ANU, Canberra, February 1987, at which the author was one of the participants.
The substantial cuts in the government budget for the transmigration program had significantly reduced the government's capacity to continue the program. This was mainly because the cost per transmigrant family in the recent period had become very high. In 1983-84, for example, the cost per transmigrant family was approaching US$6,500, whereas at the beginning of Repelita I (1969-70) the cost per transmigrant family was only US$577 (Arndt, 1983: 66).

As extensively reported in the press, since the budget cuts, many transmigration projects have had to be abandoned. On 24 November 1987 the Minister of Transmigration announced that 16,000 houses built for transmigration had been declared unusable, because the government had no money to send transmigrants (Kompas, 25 November 1987). This set-back attracted many comments and criticisms. Some critics suggested that the transmigration program should be overhauled or the department downgraded to its original status as a directorate general. However, rumours surrounding the future of transmigration were dispelled when, in mid-March 1988, the President appointed Major General Soegiarto, a former Head of Social and Political Affairs in the Defense Department, as the Minister of Transmigration.

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18 An unofficial source informed the author that the actual number was over 40,000 houses.
19 See: Tempo, 5 December 1987 ('Interview with Minister for Transmigration, Martono'), also, Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 October 1987 ('Indonesia: Resettlement rethink, the government overhauls its transmigration scheme').
Transmigration. This appointment was further evidence that the economist-technocrat group had become less influential in the program, but it was also an indication that transmigration would retain an important role in the national scene for many years to come.

4.7. Repelita I to IV: Target Achievement and Its Demographic Impact

During the four planning periods (Repelita I to IV) the central government substantially increased the transmigration target from less than 50,000 families in Repelita I to 750,000 families in Repelita IV. The sharpest increase occurred at the beginning of Repelita III in 1978/79, when 500,000 families were targeted to be resettled.

Soegiarto, according to Anderson (1985: 142), was one of the 'stars' among the A.M.N. (Military Academy) Class of 1960. Recognition of Soegiarto as one among of the few 'brilliant' generals was acknowledged by Goenawan Mohamad, editor in chief of Tempo magazine, in a personal communication to the author, 23 March 1988.
Table 4.2
Repelita I-IV: Transmigrant Families Moved by Province of Origin

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Per Cent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Per Cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,405</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>4,941</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7,230</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>10,966</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20,148</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>5,260</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5,150</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>12,044</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15,390</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java</td>
<td>33,961</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>50,323</td>
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<td>Bali</td>
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<td>Nusa Tenggara Barat</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nusa Tenggara Timur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPDT</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,284</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettlement</td>
<td>42,414</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocation</td>
<td>5,857</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmigrants</td>
<td>39,436</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>55,083</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unassisted/Partly Assisted Transmigrants</td>
<td>7,281</td>
<td></td>
<td>169,497</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39,436</td>
<td></td>
<td>62,364</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly.

**Sources:**
- As stated in the Presidential Address, 16 August 1985 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1985: XII/48-50).
Throughout the four plan periods (Table 4.2) the provinces of Central and East Java have always been the major sending areas for transmigration, followed by West Java and Yogyakarta. The share of transmigrants moving from the provinces of Yogyakarta, East Java and Bali declined steadily, while in the later years there was a sharp increase in the share of APPDT (Settlement Allocation for People of the Transmigration Area) and transmigrants under 'resettlement' schemes. The proportion of transmigrants categorised as APPDT or 'resettlement' had been increased from about 20 per cent in the period of Repelita III to more than 30 per cent in Repelita IV period.

Beginning from Repelita III, both APPDT and 'resettlement' have become important sources of general transmigrants. The central government has paid more attention to the local population as a source of general transmigrants partly because transmigration settlements often create resentments among the local population. In the eyes of the local population, the government has provided more facilities to the transmigrants than for the indigenous population. The APPDT scheme therefore

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21 The 'resettlement' scheme was introduced at the beginning of Repelita III, initially to resettle the shifting cultivators who are mostly members of isolated tribes (suku terasing). The unstated reason behind this policy, according to Sayogyo (1989: 24) was to allow private companies holding timber concessions to exploit timber in areas where isolated tribes resided. In the government statistics, however, other types of transmigrants were often included under this category. For instance, in Repelita III a number of general transmigrants who moved from unsuitable locations were counted in this category (Hardjono, 1986: 30).
aimed to contain local resentment that might encourage larger regional dissatisfaction against the central government. Another consideration was economic: under strong pressure to meet the ambitious targets of Repelita III, the lower cost of recruiting of local people was attractive.

In Repelita IV, even though the number was small (787 families), Lampung began to be counted as a sending area for the transmigration program. This clearly proved that population pressure was a problem in Lampung. The earlier remarks of several scholars that Lampung had become 'another Java' are no longer just speculation.\footnote{Masri Singarimbun commented on this development through his witty column entitled 'Kisah Lampung' ('The Story of Lampung') in Tempo, 20 December 1986.} Another notable development (Table 4.2) was the substantial contribution, starting in Repelita III, of unassisted/partly assisted transmigrants to the realised transmigration figure. In Repelita III, as shown in Table 4.2, 169,497 families or 37 per cent of the total transmigrants were categorised as unassisted or partly assisted transmigrants. In Repelita IV, this proportion increased dramatically to 521,728 families, or 70 per cent of the total number of transmigrants moved in this period. Only 30 per cent (228,422 families) of the realised target were classified as general transmigrants. However, this low proportion of general transmigrants was not surprising because the transmigration program had experienced a drastic budget cut after 1986. In addition,
from the last years of *Repelita III*, formidable implementation problems had been encountered largely due to the selection of unsuitable land for settlement sites. In many cases this had led to the abandonment of settlements by transmigrants. In this context, and bearing in mind the great pressures to indicate that the transmigration targets had been reached, considerable doubt must be attached to the accuracy of the unassisted/partly assisted transmigrant figures.

From the beginning of *Repelita III* it had been suggested that the western part of the archipelago, particularly Sumatra, was no longer a major destination for general transmigrants. However, the empirical evidence (Table 4.3) strongly suggests that such opinions were not correct. Over the four periods, Sumatra - and even Lampung - continued to absorb the major proportion of transmigrant families resettled under the fully supported transmigration program. From *Repelita I* to *IV*, the major change that occurred was the shift from Sulawesi to Kalimantan. While Sulawesi's role as a destination area declined from 28 per cent to 11 per cent, the proportion of transmigrants resettled in Kalimantan increased steadily from 14 per cent to 30 per cent.
Table 4.3

Repelita I-IV: General Transmigrant Families Moved, by Province of Destination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,771</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7,084</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sumatra</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8,006</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,651</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Sumatra</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,603</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9,185</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riau</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37,522</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27,300</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jambi</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16,682</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19,737</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sumatra</td>
<td>6,254</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>91,340</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24,446</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkulu</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12,187</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,076</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>11,397</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42,876</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17,893</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatra</td>
<td>22,551</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>227,047</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>118,372</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15,141</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19,684</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kalimantan</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28,221</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17,907</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kalimantan</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,734</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13,922</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kalimantan</td>
<td>1,775</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,018</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11,878</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15,179</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan</td>
<td>5,470</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10,972</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>70,614</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>66,692</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Sulawesi</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4,154</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,811</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sulawesi</td>
<td>3,452</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15,740</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10,441</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>4,441</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3,607</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,325</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Sulawesi</td>
<td>2,012</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19,225</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7,002</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulawesi</td>
<td>10,965</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13,200</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42,726</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25,579</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maluku</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,635</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,270</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irian Jaya</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>16,616</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12,598</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nusa Tenggara Barat</td>
<td>1,289</td>
<td></td>
<td>977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>934</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39,436</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>55,083</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>365,977</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>228,422</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly.

Sources: As stated in the Presidential Address, 16 August 1985 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1985: XII/49).
As stated in the Presidential Address, 16 August 1989 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1989: XII/693).
Table 4.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>Java</th>
<th>Central Java</th>
<th>East Java</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repellta I</td>
<td>1969/70-1973/4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repellta II</td>
<td>1974/5-1978/9</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repellta III</td>
<td>1979/80-1983/4</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>1,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repellta IV</td>
<td>1984/5-1988/9</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>1,720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Average Annual no. of transmigrants is calculated from table 4.2 assuming that every transmigrant families consist of five persons (two parents and three children).

Table 4.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>Sumatra</th>
<th>Kalimantan</th>
<th>Sulawesi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repellta I</td>
<td>1969/70-1973/4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repellta II</td>
<td>1974/5-1978/9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repellta III</td>
<td>1979/80-1983/4</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repellta IV</td>
<td>1984/5-1988/9</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: As for table 4.4.
The geographic shift of transmigration policy to Eastern Indonesia, especially to Irian Jaya, although the centre of international attention at the beginning of Repelita IV, was no longer an empirical issue by the end of the plan. The original plan in the beginning of Repelita IV to resettle 167,739 transmigrant families to Irian Jaya over five years (Hugo, Hull, Hull and Jones, 1987: 184), had only been minimally realised.

The demographic impact of the transmigration program, particularly in the receiving areas has been estimated, among others by the World Bank (1989) based on the population projections proposed by Gardiner (1985). The World Bank estimation, however, is limited only to the receiving provinces and covers a rather long period of time (1971-1985). Tables 4.4 and 4.5 propose an alternative estimation of the demographic impact of the program in selected sending and receiving areas.

The alternative estimation is based on Tables 4.2 and 4.3, particularly on the number of general transmigrant families achieved by the program during the four planning periods (Repelita I to Repelita IV). This is a crude estimation, particularly because only the fully sponsored or general transmigrants are included. Other transmigrants (that is, swakarsa transmigrants) are disregarded. The numbers of transmigrants in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 assume that each transmigrant family consists of 5 persons (2 parents and 3 children). The average annual
number of transmigrants in each Repelita is obtained by dividing the total number of transmigrants into five. The average annual population increases in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 are derived from Table 4.2 in Hugo, Hull, Hull and Jones (1987: 42-43), on the assumption that the annual population growth rate for the period of Repelita I and II (1969-1978) is similar to that between 1971 and 1980. The annual population growth rate between 1980-1985 is used for Repelita III and IV (1979-1988). The annual population growth rate during those two periods is obtained from Hugo, Hull, Hull and Jones (1987, Table 4.2: 42-43). This does not take into account the discounted effect of net migration on population growth.

The contribution of the transmigration program in reducing the average annual population growth rates in the sending areas was very limited (mostly below 10 per cent), except for the Repelita III period (Table 4.4). During Repelita III, the transmigration program contributed a 17 per cent reduction to the average annual population increase in all of Java. In the same period, the impact was greater, however, in Central Java, where transmigration reduced the average annual population increase by almost one-third, and by over a quarter in East Java. However, as argued by Douglass in Jones and Visaria (eds.), forthcoming, although the hundreds of thousands of people who were sent to the Outer Islands each year did not reduce the absolute size of the population of Java, in many sending areas of Java the
program was seen as a viable alternative to the prospects of landlessness and near-landlessness under increasing demographic pressure and further concentration of land ownership.

The contribution of the transmigration program to population growth in the receiving areas was less obvious during the first two Repelita periods. However, the program contribution increased drastically in Repelita III, especially in Sumatra where three-quarters of the average annual population increase came from the transmigration program. This also occurred to a lesser extent in Kalimantan and Sulawesi. During Repelita IV, as had been predicted, among other reasons because of the implementation problems, transmigration's contribution to population growth in the receiving areas was reduced by almost half from the previous period.

The real difficulty in estimating the true demographic impacts of the transmigration program stems from the lack of accurate data on the unassisted/partly assisted or swakarsa transmigrants. Although the central government claimed that 70 per cent of the realised target in Repelita IV was made up of unassisted/partly assisted transmigrants, detailed information is lacking on which part of Java (or Bali) they came from, and where they were resettled in the Outer Islands.
This lack of information on the place of destination, as well as the precise numbers of the unassisted or partly assisted transmigrants, is hardly surprising. As noted by the World Bank (1988: 9):

Figures on unassisted movement are based mainly on information provided by sending provinces. It is uncertain whether all families who registered to move from those provinces actually did move or whether most families who moved also registered.

The World Bank (1988: 9), among others, was almost certain that the number quoted by the government sources underestimated the amount of spontaneous migration. The question, however, is whether those migrants can then be classified as transmigrants, unassisted or partly assisted. Such a question becomes significant because the government never formulated any policies specifically designed to deal with unassisted or swakarsa transmigrants. In 1978, for instance, Hardjono (1978b: 60) stated that:

The government has given no elucidation of its expectation or hopes in the field of swakarsa transmigration beyond the statement that it should be teratur ("regulated") and besar-besaran ("on a large scale").

Apparently a decade after Hardjono made this comment, the policy on swakarsa transmigration has not shown any substantial changes.23

23 The lack of a clear and detailed policy on swakarsa transmigration, surprisingly, was frankly admitted by the new Minister for Transmigration, Soegiarto, (Kompas, 28 March 1988). One result of the lack of policy on swakarsa transmigration is the uncertainty of land status in their
4.8. Summary and Conclusion

Even though the economist-technocrat group has played a significant role in rationalising the process of national development during the New Order, since the actual political power is largely controlled by the President and military elite, the policy outcomes have suffered from many inefficiencies and irrationalities. A close examination of the notion of transmigration from the beginning of the New Order until the end of the Fourth Plan shows that, although this policy was formally designed to redistribute the people from Java and Bali to other islands, this 'conventional' notion has been constantly changing due to circumstances as well as the ruling elites' perception and interest in the policy. The demographic motive for transmigration will remain, whatever the circumstances, primarily because uneven population distribution is self-evident and provides an immediate justification for the government. Yet, to analyse transmigration policy as if it were solely a demographic or economic endeavour would be naive and misleading.

new settlements. As reported by Kompas (7 December 1989) in Lampung, for example, around 3,500 swakarsa transmigrant families, some of whom had been there since 1973, were being threatened with evacuation because the government planned to allocate the areas for plantations companies own privately by people in Jakarta.
Since the beginning of the New Order, transmigration has become the target for various interest groups, particularly the military, which has perceived transmigration as a vehicle for strategic goals such as national defense and security, and the economist-technocrats who have considered transmigration as a tool to promote the development of remote areas as well as to alleviate poverty in Java. However, the principal actor has been President Suharto himself. It was Suharto who in 1966 saw the program as an important policy to solve the population problems of Java.

At the beginning of the New Order development policy, population distribution was regarded by the economist-technocrats, such as Widjojo, as a low priority. The fact that the President himself paid personal attention to the matter made it impossible for rational technocrats to remove the program from the national development policy. It therefore became an obligation for the economist-technocrats to develop arguments to legitimate the program. They found this in the notion of regional development. From the First through the Fourth Five-Year Development Plans, transmigration was described as a government policy to resolve the problem of population distribution and to enhance the regional development of the Outer Islands. The strategic goal of transmigration for national integration and security, hardly surprisingly, was not always fully articulated.
Transmigration policy was revitalized when revenue rapidly increased as a result of the oil boom and further flourished as foreign donor agencies, particularly the World Bank, became deeply involved in assisting the program. Plan documents show that the program has become an important strategy for the achievement of a wide range of development goals. However, the declaration of explicit targets in plan documents primarily reflects bureaucratic procedures in relation to the projected availability of resources and budgets. Numerical targets were not based on any specific economic or demographic considerations. The elusive and multifaceted goals of the policy and the constant changes in implementing agencies were strong indications that the program had never been carefully monitored and evaluated. Furthermore, the unavoidable rivalry and conflicts between the economist-technocrats who viewed the program mainly as an element in regional development, and the political bureaucrats, such as Martono, who were close to the military with its strategic interests, have undoubtedly distorted plan formulation as well as implementation. In this situation, the World Bank, which in the beginning saw transmigration as a means to promote commercial tree-crop cultivation, could not avoid the pressure to use transmigration policy as a primary tool for distributing people from Java and Bali to the other islands. The crisis in transmigration since the middle of the Fourth Plan, although mainly a direct result of the drastic budget cutback, has also
been a consequence of overly-ambitious target setting and the heavily political element in the program's formulation.

Observing particularly the realization of plan target numbers from Repelita I to IV, the number of families resettled under transmigration policy was drastically increased since the beginning of Repelita III. However, the number of families resettled with full support from the government declined substantially during Repelita IV period. Interestingly, the government has claimed that the target number was realized. A large proportion of the resettled families, however, were classified as spontaneous transmigrants, though the statistics are doubtful. On the question of the geographical destination of transmigration policy, throughout the period of the four Repelita, Sumatra and to a smaller extent Kalimantan and Sulawesi, were still dominants as the transmigration receiving areas. The demographic impact of transmigration particularly in reducing the growth of population in Java was almost negligible, except in Repelita III when the budget for the program was abundant. Transmigration had significant demographic impact on the receiving areas, especially during Repelita III, particularly in Sumatra and to a lesser extent Kalimantan and Sulawesi. The government intention to shift the geographic focus of transmigration policy to the eastern islands, in particular to Irian Jaya, has largely failed as the transmigration policy has
been confronted with severe financial difficulties since 1985-86.

Since transmigration inevitably has a bearing on a broad range of regional interests, the role of the regional governments in shaping program performance presumably should have been considerable, especially in the areas designated by the central government as receiving areas. In the next chapters the implementation of transmigration policy in the provinces of Riau and South Kalimantan will be examined.
Chapter V

RIAU AND SOUTH KALIMANTAN: TWO REGIONS
AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

This chapter provides a description of the geographic and socio-demographic settings as well as the economic and political aspects of the provinces of Riau and South Kalimantan. The aim of this chapter is to show the relationship of Riau and South Kalimantan with the Central Government in Jakarta.

5.1. Geographic Setting

Riau

Riau is a huge province (see Figure 5.1). In terms of land area it is the sixth largest province in Indonesia (nearly 95,000 square kilometres). Its size is increased by the expanse of littoral sea which lies between the eastern-central coast of Sumatra and the western coast of Kalimantan. This sea covers some 235,300 square kilometres and contains more than 3,200 islands. Riau is commonly divided into two regions: mainland Riau (Riau daratan), the land mass belonging to Sumatra including its off-shore islands, and island Riau (Riau kepulauan), the sea area with its numerous islands. A prominent physical feature of Riau is the predominance of rivers.
FIGURE 5.1 RIAU PROVINCE

Source: Adapted from Kato (1984)
Most rivers originate from the Bukit Barisan mountain range in central Sumatra, and flow eastward to the coast. Among the dozens of rivers intersecting Riau, four are most important. They are, from north to south, the Rokan, Siak, Kampar and Kuantan-Indragiri rivers. In mainland Riau, the population lives mainly along the rivers, whereas in island Riau the population is concentrated along the coast.

The geographic position of Riau which is located on the boundary with other countries (Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam), as well as its archipelagic nature, has made this province vulnerable to outside influences. In this context, transmigration settlements, particularly in the Natuna Islands was intended by the central government to form 'a security belt' in strengthening national defense. From the strategic and military point of view, Riau province, has therefore become an important region.
FIGURE 5.2 SOUTH KALIMANTAN PROVINCE

Source: Adopted from Potter and Hasymi (1987)
South Kalimantan

South Kalimantan, on the other hand, is one of the smaller provinces (37,000 square kilometres) and by far the smallest of the four provinces into which Kalimantan, the largest island in Indonesia, is now divided (see Figure 5.2). Its topography is almost entirely flat, with only a small area of mountainous and hilly country in the eastern part of the province. The flatness is such that the Barito river, the largest river, is navigable 100 kilometres upstream, rising only 0.5 metres over that distance. The Barito with its tributaries, connects the south and north of the province. Banjarmasin, the capital, is at sea level and the high tide regularly floods part of the city and surrounding country. More than half of the area of one million hectares under swamps and lakes is influenced by tide water.

South Kalimantan may conveniently be divided into three regions: the western lowlands; a central region of foothills and mountain country; and the eastern lowlands. The western lowlands comprises the lower reaches of the Barito river and its southern tributary, the Martapura, and the floodplain of another tributary, the Negara. Bordering the western foothills of the Meratus mountains is a strip of alluvial soil which comprises the most fertile area for rice production, and is thus the most heavily populated rural district. It contains the important towns of Barabai and Kandangan, in the district
of Hulu Sungai Tengah and Hulu Sungai Selatan, and Rantau in the district of Tapin. The western foothills region has been exploited, mainly by shifting cultivation methods, for over a century. Parts of the foothills have long been under smallholder rubber in the northern district of Tabalong and Hulu Sungai Utara. In the most southern district of Tanah Laut, where grassland is most extensive, much scope exists for livestock development. Along the southern and eastern edges of the mountains, human occupation has been more recent. The eastern lowlands, occupied by one district, Kota Baru, constitute South Kalimantan's 'frontier zone'.

5.2. Socio-demographic Aspects

Riau

In 1985 the population of Riau was over 2.6 million, an increase of almost half a million from the 1980 figure (Table 5.1). The rate of population growth in Riau increased from 3.1 per cent in the period 1971-1980, to 3.9 per cent in 1980-1985. The rate of growth during the period of 1971-1980 was considerably above the national level (2.3 per cent). The most rapid population growth since 1971 has occurred in the regencies which were the main recipients of transmigrants. Kampar district has drastically increased from 3.8 per cent (1971-1980) to 7.8 per cent (1980-1985). Bengkalis has also steadily increased from 3.2 per cent (1971-1980) to 4.5 per cent.
(1980-1985). While the rate of population growth in Indragiri Hulu has risen remarkably from only 1.7 per cent (1971-1980) to 5.5 per cent (1980-1985), Indragiri Hilir, on the other hand, has dropped from 3.7 per cent (1971-1980) to 1.4 per cent (1980-1985). This rapid drop was probably due to the shift in transmigration policy since the early '80s, from low land (pasang-surut) such as Indragiri, to dry-land like Indragiri Hulu and Kampar. The rate of population growth of Pekanbaru, the provincial capital of Riau, over the periods, interestingly, was much lower than some of these more rural regencies.

Table 5.1


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population ('000)</th>
<th>Growth Rate (Per Cent)</th>
<th>Persons per sq km</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pekanbaru</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampar</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkalis</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indragiri Hilir</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indragiri Hulu</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kepulauan Riau</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,642</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,169</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,623</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Harlen (1986: 17).
Kantor Statistik Riau (1986: 64 & 68).
In terms of population composition, Riau is a mosaic of ethnic groups. This is somewhat unusual among Indonesian provinces, where a particular cultural identity tends to be closely associated with each region. For Riau, no single cultural identification is possible, except for a loose application of the term Melayu (Kato, 1984). Over its history, Riau has been exposed to successive waves of population movement. Being situated in the centre of Sumatra, along the straits of Malacca, the area has long been a meeting place for different cultures and relatively receptive to outside influences.

The most important distinct immigrant ethnic group in Riau is the Minangkabau, who have migrated from West Sumatra over several centuries. Early Minangkabau migrants settled mainly on the eastern flank of the Bukit Barisan mountain range (Naim, 1979). Recent Minangkabau migrants mostly reside in urban areas. More recent migrants from North Sumatra include Christian Bataks as well as Moslem Tapanuli Mandailings. They have also generally settled in urban centres. Banjarese from South Kalimantan and Buginese from South Sulawesi have been in contact with island Riau for centuries, but it was mainly after the late nineteenth century that they began to establish communities of their own and to put down roots in mainland Riau. Pioneers in this development were the Banjarese, who settled in the present district of Indragiri Hilir. According to Hamidy (1981: 2-6), about
45 per cent of the population in this district are Banjarese. In some districts, such as Tembilahan and Kuala Indragiri, the Banjarese account for almost 70 per cent of the population. Buginese migrants have also established some villages in Indragiri Hilir and there are Buginese living in island Riau as seafarers.

Riau has the largest number of so-called suku terasing (isolated tribes) in Sumatra. These include the Sakai, Talang Mamak, Bonai, Akit, Hutan and Laut. According to government estimates, in 1985 their total number was 32,058 persons in 7,140 households (Kantor Statistik Riau, 1986). Another ethnic group is the Chinese, who are concentrated in cities and large towns of both mainland and island Riau. However, it is not unusual in island Riau for Chinese to live in villages, where they sometimes form a majority of inhabitants. The Javanese who now live in Riau arrived in several waves. Many came to work as labourers on European estates during the Dutch period. Later, during the Japanese occupation, many were brought over as romusha or forced labourers to work on Japanese military construction projects. Recent Javanese settlers have come to Riau on government sponsored transmigration programs as transmigrants. Despite the diversity of ethnic groups who live in Riau, if there are any cultural elements that give some coherence to the society, they are religion and, to a lesser extent, language (Kato, 1984). Except for most of the Chinese, Christian Bataks and isolated tribes, almost
all the inhabitants of Riau are Moslems. As for language, the Melayu Riau, from which the national language, Bahasa Indonesia, is derived, is the lingua franca of Riau.

Unfortunately, recent population censuses do not provide information on ethnicity so it is impossible to obtain precise data on the ethnic composition of Riau. Nevertheless, the information on place of birth or previous place of residence can be used as a rough proxy for ethnic identification if it is assumed that the place of birth or previous place of residence indicates an individual's ethnic group. For example, a person who was born or resided in West Sumatra can be assumed to be a Minangkabau, and a person who was born or previously last resided in Java can be assumed to be a Javanese.

In the 1980 population census two definitions of migrants are used: 'lifetime migrants' and 'recent migrants'. Lifetime migrants were those persons whose places of residence in 1980 were different from their places of birth. Thus, persons residing in Riau in 1980, but whose place of birth was not Riau, are defined as lifetime in-migrants to the province. Conversely, those whose place of birth was Riau, but whose place of residence in 1980 was another province, are defined as a lifetime out-migrants from Riau. Recent in-migrants to Riau were defined as persons whose residence in 1980 was Riau but whose places of residence five years before the census was a province other than Riau, whereas recent
out-migrants were persons whose place of residence five years before the time of the census was Riau, but whose place of residence at the census was another province.

Table 5.2

Life Time In-Migration to, and Life Time Out-Migration from the Province of Riau, 1980.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>In</th>
<th>Out</th>
<th>Net-migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>3,766</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>2,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sumatra</td>
<td>42,346</td>
<td>12,576</td>
<td>29,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Sumatra</td>
<td>117,200</td>
<td>24,988</td>
<td>92,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jambi</td>
<td>4,541</td>
<td>11,931</td>
<td>-7,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sumatra</td>
<td>6,538</td>
<td>3,606</td>
<td>2,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkulu</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>-189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>-470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>5,657</td>
<td>14,662</td>
<td>-9,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>9,361</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>41,921</td>
<td>3,370</td>
<td>38,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>1,792</td>
<td>1,409</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>47,091</td>
<td>2,759</td>
<td>44,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>-53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>1,451</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>1,181</td>
<td>-336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kalimantan</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kalimantan</td>
<td>3,689</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>3,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kalimantan</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sulawesi</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sulawesi</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>51,739</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>51,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Sulawesi</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maluku</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irian Jaya</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>10,170</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>3,078</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 356,272 85,540 269,723

Percentage of Total Population 16 4 12

Source: Harlen (1986: 50)
Table 5.2 shows that the largest proportion (33 per cent) of total life-time in-migrants to Riau were born in West Sumatra, followed by those born in South Sulawesi (15 per cent), East Java (13 per cent), North Sumatra (12 per cent), and Central Java (12 per cent). If it is assumed that the province of birth is an indicator of ethnicity, then the Minangkabau are the dominant migrant ethnic group in Riau, followed by the Javanese, Buginese and Bataks. Table 5.3 shows that recent in-migrants were also dominated by migrants from West Sumatra (34 per cent), followed by North Sumatra (19 per cent), East Java (12 per cent) and Central Java (8 per cent). Most of the recent Javanese in-migrants, who constituted almost 25 per cent of the total, were probably transmigrants, since the transmigration target for Riau at the beginning of Repelita III (1978/79) had been drastically increased to 50,000 families, more than ten times the target of the previous period.
Table 5.3

Recent In-Migration to, and Recent Out-Migration from the Province of Riau, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>In</th>
<th>Out</th>
<th>Net-migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sumatra</td>
<td>18,699</td>
<td>6,663</td>
<td>12,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Sumatra</td>
<td>33,786</td>
<td>21,819</td>
<td>11,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jambi</td>
<td>3,227</td>
<td>5,897</td>
<td>-2,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sumatra</td>
<td>2,011</td>
<td>1,873</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkulu</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>-437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>4,947</td>
<td>6,249</td>
<td>-1,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>3,524</td>
<td>2,718</td>
<td>806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>7,627</td>
<td>1,915</td>
<td>5,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>-154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>11,754</td>
<td>2,241</td>
<td>9,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>-154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kalimantan</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kalimantan</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kalimantan</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sulawesi</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sulawesi</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>5,277</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>4,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Sulawesi</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maluku</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irian Jaya</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>4,443</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>98,652</td>
<td>53,757</td>
<td>44,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total Population</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

South Kalimantan

In 1986 the population of South Kalimantan was over 2.3 million, a rise of about 600,000 over the 1980 census figure (Table 5.4). Average growth rates have been moderate, around 2 per cent a year over the period, considerably below those of the neighbouring provinces and Kalimantan as a whole. The 1980 census figures covering the previous five years reveal a small negative net-migration balance overall, but a slight positive flow to rural areas, which would include most transmigrants. At the district level, there was considerable variation in the rate of population growth during 1971-1986 period. A remarkable population increase was experienced in the District of Kotabaru, from 3.2 per cent (1971-1980) to 6.6 per cent (1980-1986). The reason for such a dramatic increase was no doubt that this region had become the focus of transmigration settlements. During Repelita III in South Kalimantan province around 17,000 transmigrants families had been resettled, and the target was increased to 50,000 for Repelita IV. The rate of population growth in Tanah Laut, which was the highest in South Kalimantan during 1971-1980 (5.2 per cent) declined slightly during the period 1980-1986 (4.4 per cent). Constant low rates of population growth occurred in the 'inner regions' such as Hulu Sungai Selatan, Hulu Sungai Tengah, Hulu Sungai Utara, and Tabalong. The low rate of population growth in those regencies was probably due to out-migration, in many cases outside the province.
Table 5.4


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population ('000)</th>
<th>Growth Rate (Per Cent)</th>
<th>Persons per sq km</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banjarmasin</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanah Laut</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kotabaru</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banjar</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barito Kuala</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapin</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hulu Sungai Selatan</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hulu Sungai Tengah</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hulu Sungai Utara</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabalong</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,473</td>
<td>1,699</td>
<td>2,364</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The dominant ethnic group in South Kalimantan is the Banjarese. South Kalimantan is sometimes referred to as the Banjarese heartland. The Banjarese are in fact a mixture of the indigenous population (the Dayaks), refugee Malays, who migrated after the downfall of Melaka, and the Javanese, who fled Demak after the attack of Sultan Agung of Mataram (Saleh, 1962: 17). The manifestation of such a mixture is also seen in the Banjarese language which is a patois of Malay, Javanese
and indigenous languages. The penetration of Javanese into the Banjarese culture can also be seen from the Banjarese aristocratic status and associated language patterns, organizational arrangements, food, dances and costumes (Saleh, 1962:62).

The Banjarese, like the Minangkabau and the Bugis, have a high propensity to move. Traditionally they have migrated to Sumatra, Malaysia, Java and Maluku. In the 1930 census about 13 per cent of the Banjarese were counted outside South Kalimantan, most of these in Sumatra (9.6 per cent) and the Malay peninsula (2.5 per cent) (Basri, 1988). Naim (1979), based on the 1930 census and his own survey, argued that, in contrast with the Minangkabaus, the volume of Banjarese out-migration has been gradually declining.

Basri (1988) argued that Banjarese migrants are economically conservative because the majority of them continue to work in agriculture, as in their homeland. The majority of Banjarese migrants in North Sumatra, Riau, Jambi and Malaysia are padi (rice) farmers and rubber or coconut plantation owners, with only a few working as labourers. A large number of the Banjarese who migrated to Sumatra originated from the regencies of Hulu Sungai, Kandangan, Barabai and Tanjung (Basri, 1988: 48). The first waves of Banjarese who migrated from South Kalimantan were motivated by political considerations
after their defeat by the Dutch. However, their success in opening new lands attracted more movement and formed chains of migration which persist today.

The Dayaks are concentrated in the regencies of Hulu Sungai Utara, Tabalong and Barito Kuala, whereas the Bugis migrants from South Sulawesi have formed communities in the district of Kotabaru. The Javanese and Madurese, who mostly migrated under government assistance, are settled in a variety of small transmigration areas, particularly in the Regencies of Barito Kuala, Tanah Laut and Kotabaru. Tribal groups (suku terasing) are scattered in remote areas, such as in the Regencies of Tanah Laut, Tapin, Hulu Sungai Selatan and Tabalong. Most of them still practice shifting cultivation (ladang berpindah), as well as hunting and gathering. The government estimated their number in 1983 at almost 30,000 persons. Apart from tribal groups and the Chinese, the majority of the population in South Kalimantan are Moslem. According to Saleh (1962), Islam was brought and spread through traders and Islamic leaders from Demak on the north shore of Central Java.
Table 5.5

Life Time In-Migration to, and Life Time Out-Migration from the Province of South Kalimantan, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>In</th>
<th>Out</th>
<th>Net-migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sumatra</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Sumatra</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riau</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>3,689</td>
<td>-3,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jambi</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>2,541</td>
<td>-2,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sumatra</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>1,421</td>
<td>-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkulu</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1,229</td>
<td>-1,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>1,863</td>
<td>10,981</td>
<td>-9,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>11,714</td>
<td>4,905</td>
<td>6,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>30,807</td>
<td>4,229</td>
<td>26,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>3,289</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>2,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>59,528</td>
<td>12,986</td>
<td>46,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>1,167</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>-210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kalimantan</td>
<td>12,046</td>
<td>78,536</td>
<td>-66,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kalimantan</td>
<td>4,676</td>
<td>39,932</td>
<td>-35,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sulawesi</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sulawesi</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>9,271</td>
<td>1,973</td>
<td>7,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Sulawesi</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maluku</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>-222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irian Jaya</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>-146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total                  | 142,576| 169,561| -26,985
Percentage of Total Population | 6.9    | 8.2   | -1.3

Source: Djohansyah (1986: 60)

Net migration for South Kalimantan has been negative in recent censuses. In 1971, 66,119 persons were lifetime in-migrants, comprising 4 per cent of the population. The lifetime out-migrants based on 1971 census were 84,257 persons or 5 per cent of the population born in South Kalimantan. By 1980, lifetime in-migration had increased.
to almost 7 per cent, and lifetime out-migration to 8.2 per cent. The main destinations for lifetime out-migrants from South Kalimantan, in 1971 and 1980, were Central and East Kalimantan, followed at a considerable distance by East Java and Jakarta (Table 5.5).

Table 5.6

Recent In-Migration to, and Recent Out-Migration from the Province of South Kalimantan, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>In</th>
<th>Out</th>
<th>Net-migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sumatra</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Sumatra</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riau</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>-167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jambi</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sumatra</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkulu</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>-719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>2,018</td>
<td>3,173</td>
<td>-1,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>8,753</td>
<td>1,216</td>
<td>7,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>11,815</td>
<td>1,761</td>
<td>10,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>2,083</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>1,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>20,597</td>
<td>4,246</td>
<td>16,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kalimantan</td>
<td>6,752</td>
<td>17,871</td>
<td>-11,119</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Kalimantan</td>
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<td>13,324</td>
<td>-10,448</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Sulawesi</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Sulawesi</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>116</td>
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<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>1,818</td>
<td>1,181</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southeast Sulawesi</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>-122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maluku</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irian Jaya</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59,669</td>
<td>46,061</td>
<td>13,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total Population</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Djohansyah (1986: 66)
The main reason for out migration from South Kalimantan is economic. East Kalimantan in particular has offered many employment opportunities in logging as well as in oil exploration activities since the early 1970s. A large proportion of migrants to Central Kalimantan probably moved as a result of the government decision in 1957 to separate that area from South Kalimantan to form a new province (Djohansyah, 1986: 61). As a consequence of this decision, many public servants had to move to new offices in Central Kalimantan. The three Hulu Sungai and Tabalong Regencies were traditionally the main source areas for migrants, partly because these areas offered very limited employment and income-earning opportunities. The relatively high population densities in those areas had strained employment opportunities in the agricultural sector. A Bappeda Kalimantan Selatan (1984: 62-63) report, moreover, indicated that only limited amounts of capital had been invested in industries in these regencies.

The main sources of lifetime migrants to South Kalimantan - East Java, Central Java and South Sulawesi - remained unchanged between 1971 and 1980. Migrants from East and Central Java were mostly transmigrants. In 1980, 3.4 per cent of the population were recent in-migrants, whereas recent out-migrants comprised 2.6 per cent. The majority of recent in-migrants to South Kalimantan came from East Java and Central Java, most of them apparently residing in rural areas as transmigrants. Most recent
out-migrants from South Kalimantan mainly went to Central and East Kalimantan (Table 5.6).

5.3. Economic and Political Factors

Riau

The economy of Riau, in general, can be divided into three broad categories (Table 5.7). The first is the rural or traditional sector, in which more than 60 per cent of the labour force in Riau is engaged, and where agriculture is the main activity. Even though Riau has set self-sufficiency in food as a goal, since most of the land is unsuitable for rice, self-sufficiency is likely to be achieved only in the distant future (Rice, 1987: 3-4). The second category is the urban or modern sector, in which around 30 per cent of the labour force in Riau is primarily involved, in such activities as trading, manufacturing, and services. The third category is an 'enclave' centred on the oil industry and located around Dumai and Duri. Even though only a small proportion of the labour force (10 per cent) is employed in this enclave, more than 75 per cent of the Gross Domestic Regional Product (GDRP) of Riau is generated from this sector (Table 5.8). Most revenues from the enclave sector are collected directly by the central government, which controls exploitation of mineral resources.
Table 5.7


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>687</td>
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<td>950</td>
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<td>53</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>173</td>
<td>140</td>
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<td></td>
<td>520</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>140</td>
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<td>173</td>
<td>140</td>
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<td>Trade</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly.

**Sources:** Harlen (1986: 62)
Biro Pusat Statistik (1986)
Table 5.8

Riau: Percentage Distribution of Regional Gross Domestic Product by Sector (Current Prices), 1983, 1985

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plantation Crops</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>Livestock</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fishery</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; Quarrying</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industry/Manufact.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, Gas &amp; Water Supply</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, Hotel &amp; Restaurants</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Hotel</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation &amp; Communication</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Road Transport.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sea Transport.</td>
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<td>Banking &amp; Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing (Rent)</td>
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<td>Admin. &amp; Defence</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Services</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP Per Capita (Rp'000)</strong></td>
<td><strong>403</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,129</strong></td>
<td><strong>505</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,658</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly.

**Source:** Kantor Statistik Riau (1987).
The ethnic diversity of Riau's population, along with its fragmented economy, has resulted in a fragile social and political cohesiveness. The Malays, who considered themselves to be the indigenous population and the 'owners' of the region, have felt disadvantaged in relation to the in-migrants, in particular the Minangkabau. The influx of Javanese transmigrants since the New Order has increased their frustration. The position of governor has always been held by a non-Malay, usually a Javanese military general, during the New Order. The strategic position of Riau has been one of the reasons for this central government choice.

In 1985, however, the central government candidate, Lieutenant General Imam Munandar, a Javanese, was defeated by Ismail Suko, a local born Malay, in the DPRD (Provincial People's Representative Council) election for governor. Although in the end Ismail Suko withdrew his name and the President appointed Imam Munandar, this event reflected the undercurrent of regional resentment toward the overwhelming central government domination. Local discontent, which seemed more prominent among Malay intellectuals, was also exacerbated by the fact that the wealth of Riau's natural resources, particularly oil, had been 'sucked-up' by the central government.¹

¹ Interview with a senior lecturer at University of Riau, December 1987.
According to a *Kompas* correspondent in Pekanbaru, the governor of Riau, Imam Munandar, knew very little about the situation inside the provincial government office. It was suggested that he probably did not even know the names of his Section Heads. In Indonesia it is usually necessary to have personal contact in order to conduct business with the governor. The ultimate approval of sectoral projects in Riau would be very much determined by whether or not the Head of Regional Offices (*Kanwil*) had a close personal relationship with the governor. Where sectoral projects had been personally approved by the governor, sectoral agencies would be able to implement and control them without consulting *Bappeda.* The impression that *Bappeda* in Riau had been neglected by the sectoral line agencies was expressed by one of the Dean in the University of Riau in Pekanbaru.

**South Kalimantan**

In contrast with Riau (and other 'boom' provinces, such as East Kalimantan), South Kalimantan is a non-oil economy. This has a beneficial side, in that South Kalimantan has not experienced any of the extreme fluctuations that have hit the oil-rich areas. A recent survey on the regional economy of Indonesia classified South Kalimantan as one of the 'Settled Outer Island Provinces' (Hill, 1989: 4). The traditional sectors, particularly agriculture, continue to dominate the

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2 Interview, December 1987.  
3 Interview, December 1987.
economy. Although, from the early 1970s, the proportion of the labour force employed in agriculture has been decreasing, during the 1980s around 60 per cent of the labour force has remained primarily involved in this sector (Table 5.9). The proportion of the labour force engaged in the secondary and tertiary sectors, particularly in industry and manufacturing, increased slightly during the 1970s and 1980s. Since the mid 1980s, as the world oil price has declined, the Central Government has strongly encouraged non-oil exports. A major part of this effort has involved the export of plywood, which is mainly produced in South Kalimantan. Agriculture and trade have also contributed significantly to the economy of South Kalimantan, providing 31 and 26 per cent respectively of the total Gross Domestic Regional Product (GDRP) in 1985 (Table 5.10). A further breakdown of the agricultural sector shows that food-crops contributed about 17 per cent of the total GDRP, while manufacturing contributed about 9 per cent.
### Table 5.9


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>1980</td>
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<table>
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<tbody>
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<td>Trade</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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**Note:** Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly.

**Sources:** Djohansyah (1986: 83), Biro Pusat Statistik (1986)
Table 5.10
South Kalimantan: Percentage Distribution of Regional Gross Domestic Product by Sectors (Current Prices) 1983, 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Crops</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantation Crops</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishery</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; Quarrying</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry/Manufacturing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, Gas &amp; Water Supply</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, Hotel &amp; Restaurants</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; Communications</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Transportation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Transportation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transportation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking &amp; Finance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing (Rent)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration &amp; Defence</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per-capita (Rp'0000)</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly.

The position of the Banjarese in South Kalimantan appears to be different from the position of the Malays in Riau. If the Malays as the indigenous population of Riau have perceived themselves as being neglected and losing their influential roles in the regional government, the Banjarese, by contrast, seem to have been able to maintain their domination in South Kalimantan. The current governor of South Kalimantan, Mohamad Said, a civil engineer who graduated from the Bandung Institute of Technology, is a Banjarese. This, perhaps, reflects the supremacy of the Banjarese in their own region. Another political manifestation of Banjarese success is the local newspaper, the Banjarmasin Post. This daily, owned and run by Banjarese, is regarded as the best local newspaper outside Java. For local people, the Banjarmasin Post has become an important avenue for articulating indigenous concerns. The regional university, Universitas Lambung Mangkurat, is also an important source of the Banjarese educated elite, a number of whom are actively involved in directing regional development of South Kalimantan.

5.4. Central Government Policy in Riau and South Kalimantan

Central government policy has greatly affected regional development in Riau, as well as in South Kalimantan. A major factor has been the Central
Government's strong commitment to promoting development through its national budget. With the sharp increase in the export price of oil in 1973, and further in the late 1970s, total Indonesian Government revenues increased. This led to increases in regional development budgets, especially for improvements in infrastructure, education and health. However, since the beginning of Repelita III period, the transmigration program has probably been the single most important generator of regional development in the two provinces (Table 5.11). The strong central government commitment to the transmigration program derives partly from the priority given under Repelita III to the location of transmigration settlements in such areas as: along the Sumatran highway and the road linking South and East Kalimantan; the east coast of Sumatra and the west and south coasts of Kalimantan; and the border areas of Kalimantan (Departemen Transmigrasi, 1983). Through the transmigration program, the Central Government has made large investments in social overhead capital such as irrigation systems, swamp drainage, schools, health clinics and roads. Perhaps most important in terms of its impact on the local inhabitants, has been investment in transportation facilities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Riau 1984/85</th>
<th>Riau 1985/86</th>
<th>South Kalimantan 1985/86</th>
<th>South Kalimantan 1986/87</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>8,603</td>
<td>7,025</td>
<td>5,010</td>
<td>2,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>11,811</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>13,997</td>
<td>17,062</td>
<td>3,846</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade &amp; Coop.</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>1,087</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower &amp;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmigration</td>
<td>26,013</td>
<td>26,437</td>
<td>12,530</td>
<td>6,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>1,498</td>
<td>1,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>11,005</td>
<td>10,138</td>
<td>11,762</td>
<td>6,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Social</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>2,983</td>
<td>3,005</td>
<td>3,946</td>
<td>2,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>1,299</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>2,117</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information &amp;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science &amp;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Employees</td>
<td>2,123</td>
<td>3,980</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n.a = not available.

Sources: Kantor Statistik Riau (1986: 352)
          Bappeda Kalimantan Selatan (1987: 17-18)

The drastic increases in the transmigration targets in the Provinces of Riau and South Kalimantan led the Central Government to build air-strips in Pasir Pangarayan for Riau province and in Batulicin for South Kalimantan. Apart from directly transporting transmigrants by air from Java to their destination, the construction of air strips could provide fast
transportation for the transmigrants' agricultural products, which often faced marketing problems due to the remoteness of the locations. However, these two air strips have been underutilised because, on completion of construction, the government encountered severe budget problems. The air strip in Pasir Pangarayan was only used during the President's visit in 1985.4

Before Repelita III, South Kalimantan was divided into two development areas (Wilayah Pembangunan). Development Area I, with Banjarmasin as the centre, consisted of nine regencies, and Development Area II, with Kota Baru as the centre, consisted of two regencies. Partly because Development Area I covered a very wide region, the provincial government decided to split Development Area I and formed Development Area II with Kandangan as the centre, consisting of five regencies. Former Development Area II has been renamed as Development Area III. Because the central government concentrated development efforts in the southern and eastern parts of the province, especially with the accelerated construction of an asphalt road linking Banjarmasin, Batulicin and Tanah Grogot in East Kalimantan, little attention has been paid to the northern part of the province in which the Hulu Sungai regencies are located. The Hulu Sungai regencies are the

4 The local Bappeda officials were critical of the plan to build an air strip at Batulicin, but, since the central government pushed the implementation of this plan, the local officials' views were ignored (interview with the Head of Bappeda Research Division, January 1988).
most densely populated areas and are experiencing net out-migration. Previously the area was known as the rice bowl of South Kalimantan. The Hulu Sungai region forms a core area for South Kalimantan, and the majority of the indigenous population live there. However, the central government has directed its development efforts to the frontier areas in the southern regions, so only a few projects were allocated to these most densely populated regions.

The frontier areas of South Kalimantan are located in the regencies of Tanah Laut and Kota Baru. These sparsely populated areas are where the majority of the Javanese have been resettled under the transmigration program. A demographer in the University of Lambung Mangkurat, Dr. Marliani Djohansyah, contended that the future of South Kalimantan would be clouded if poor and landless Javanese farmers eventually dominated the region, both because of their numbers and because many Banjarese migrated to other places. She argued that this migration of indigenous people to other places reflected the government's failure to create job opportunities for the local people, resulting in a strong push factor. She feared that, as a transmigration receiving area, South Kalimantan might become a dumping place (tempat pembuangan) for the poorest Javanese. As the majority of the transmigrants were unskilled, their productivity would also be low. This would, in turn, result in only a

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5 Interview, February 1988.
marginal contribution from the transmigrants to regional economic growth in South Kalimantan. Swasono, an economist from University of Indonesia who has carried out an extensive study on transmigration, also claimed that:

The Outer Islands in fact are being structured into areas of low comparative advantage and low economic opportunity through transmigration policy.⁶

In the province of Riau, starting from the beginning of the Third Plan, the central government has concentrated the transmigration settlements into the areas along the border with the provinces of North Sumatra, West Sumatra, and Jambi, proximate to the Trans-Sumatran Highway. In addition to locating settlers in underpopulated areas, central government planners also planned to link the development of transport facilities, particularly the Sumatran Highway, with the growth of transmigration settlements. They hoped that markets would be stimulated if transmigration areas raised the level of agricultural production and attracted traders from other places. Another central government decision that shows the priority given to transmigration is an 'instruction' that, for Repelita IV, the development of Inpres projects, such as school buildings, health clinics and markets, should be directed to transmigration settlement areas.⁷ As argued by MacAndrews (1986b: 52), the

⁶ Interview, November 1986.
⁷ Interview with Drs. Samrony, the Head of Inpres Projects in the Governor Office in Banjarmasin, February 1988.
Indonesian transmigration program (that by the early 1980s had moved between 3 million and 4 million people, both under the government-sponsored program and through spontaneous movement) had become a major force in developing new areas in the Outer Islands.

5.5. Conclusion

Probably because of its natural resource richness and also its geographically strategic position, Riau is accorded high priority by the central government. South Kalimantan, on the other hand, is relatively less attractive, due to its relative poverty in terms of resources, and lack of geographic importance. Although this situation has somewhat changed in recent years due to the increasing role of non-oil exports such as plywood, which is produced in large quantities in South Kalimantan, nonetheless the province has been subjected to relatively little central government pressure and therefore has had more room to articulate its own regional interests. Its indigenous people, the Banjarese, unlike the Malay in Riau, are more cohesive and have been able to maintain their domination of the regional government.

Perhaps their cultural similarity to the Javanese also makes the Banjarese more acceptable to a central government strongly influenced by Javanese culture. The
current governor of South Kalimantan, a Banjarese civilian, has also shown an ability to maintain the interest of local people without creating conflict with the central government. In Riau, on the other hand, the central government has almost always installed a Javanese general as governor, which undoubtedly has exacerbated the latent resentment of the local population, particularly the Malays, towards the central administration.

Particularly during Repelita III and IV, through the transmigration program, both Riau and South Kalimantan received a substantial increase in their budget allocation from the central government. The provinces were able to expand regional development, such as health, education and other infrastructure, through transmigration. However, since the mid-1980s, government revenue from oil has been declining, and the budget for the transmigration program has also been severely cut. This has affected project implementation in many regions, but specifically where the transmigration settlements were concentrated.

Although the transmigration program has benefited Riau and South Kalimantan, particularly in the provision of infrastructure, it has not always been welcomed by the indigenous segment of the population. Resentment against the program has been mostly articulated by the indigenous intellectuals. Among other things, they perceive
transmigration as not benefiting the region, particularly in the long run because transmigrants are mostly poor and unskilled, thus contributing only a small economic return to the province.
Chapter VI

TRANSMIGRATION IN THE PROVINCE OF RIAU AND SOUTH KALIMANTAN: THE EVIDENCE OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

...it remains clear that for many years transmigration has been a most visible manifestation of the Indonesian centre into the landscape of the major islands of the periphery.

Babcock (1986: 157)

This chapter reviews the process of transmigration policy implementation in Riau and South Kalimantan. Its purpose is to investigate how and why the transmigration policies evolved as they did and how and why they were implemented as they were in Riau and South Kalimantan during the New Order. The analysis will concentrate on Repelita III and IV during which the program experienced periods of boom and bust. The dynamic interaction between the central government - which formulated the assumptions, objectives and targets - and the regional level governments - which implemented the programs - will be explored. An historical account of transmigration in Riau and South Kalimantan will be provided in the first part of the chapter.
6.1. Transmigration in Riau and South Kalimantan

Riau

Riau was formally designated as a transmigration receiving area in 1975 by Presidential Decree No. 29. However, the first group of transmigrants was actually resettled in 1962 in Siabu, Bangkinang sub-district, Kampar District. This group consisted of 58 families (275 persons). A second group of 42 families (212 persons) arrived in 1963 in the same area. According to a study by Hamidy and Ahmad (1984: 10), the government resettled transmigrants in Riau during that period for security reasons, due to political tensions between Indonesia and Malaysia. Transmigrants were sent to the border regions that were considered by the central government to be under-populated, in order to bolster territorial defense in the 'confrontation' against Malaysia. However, Hamidy and Ahmad (1984) reported that the development of those settlements was unsatisfactory, partly due to poor planning and hasty implementation.

At the beginning of the New Order period, Riau played only a small role as a receiving area for transmigration. The first group of transmigrants in that period, consisting of 98 families (459 persons), were resettled in 1968 at Simandolak in Kuantan-Tengah sub-district, Indragiri Hulu District. In 1969, 200 families (866 persons) were sent to the same destination. However, the transmigration settlement in Simandolak was also
considered unsuccessful. Hamidy and Ahmad (1984: 11) noted that, just two years after they were resettled, some of the transmigrants had to sell their belongings to local people in order to obtain money to buy food. Some were even described as paupers. For the local population, the hardship of the transmigrants' life in Simandolak provided a very bad image of the Javanese transmigrants in Riau. A journalist reported that in the first year of Repelita III about half of the transmigrants in this area left the settlement (Kompas, 25 March 1980).

Table 6.1

The Chronology of the Transmigration Program in Riau

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Arrival</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No.of families</th>
<th>Year/Transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>Siabu</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>Simandolak</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-75</td>
<td>Tidal areas</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-79</td>
<td>Tidal areas</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1982-85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coastal areas</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-81</td>
<td>Up land regions</td>
<td>19,417</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-83</td>
<td>Up land regions</td>
<td>15,772</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-87</td>
<td>Up land regions</td>
<td>17,509</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

1. The figure for transmigrant families in this table should be used with caution because it was taken at the beginning of the resettlement. In the course of time, some transmigrants probably left and new migrants arrived and resettled.
2. In January 1988 (at the time of fieldwork) settlements which opened after 1978 were mostly still under the responsibility of Department of Transmigration.
3. For more detail information on the area of transmigration settlements in Riau see Appendix 1.

Source: Kanwil Transmigrasi Riau (1987)
The central government began to pay more attention to the province of Riau as a potential area for transmigration in 1971. This was partly because the central government decided to open tidal swamps for a transmigration project to cultivate rice, due to the need to increase rice production. During Repelita I, the government reclaimed 12,830 hectare of tidal swamp land in South and Central Kalimantan, 2,730 hectare in West Kalimantan, 9,830 hectare in South Sumatra, 6,800 ha in Jambi and 900 hectare in Riau (Collier, 1979). This undertaking was one of the world's major experiments in marginal land utilization and a classic example of a resource-creation strategy (Hanson and Koesoebiono, 1977). In Riau, the first transmigration settlement in the tidal swamp area was in Teluk Kiambang, Tempuling sub-district, in the District of Indragiri Hilir, where 150 families (735 persons) were resettled, followed by another 150 families (732 persons) in 1973/74 (Figure 5.1).

In 1974 President Suharto instructed the Department of Public Works to open up another one million hectares of tidal swamp. A substantial portion of this was to be used for transmigration settlements. The transmigration program was one of several methods being promoted to expand the agricultural base in the Outer Islands in order to increase food production. As stated in the First Five-Year Plan document, increasing food production was one of the major targets in Repelita I. The government
decision to use tidal swamp was partly because the best lands in the upland areas were already under cultivation by local residents. In many areas customary (adat) law gave land management rights to contiguously spaced local units known as marga or clans. In many areas where these rights had been exercised, particularly by shifting cultivators, the problem of alienating sufficient land for transmigration was more serious. Thus, in general, the upland areas of Sumatra presented difficult land-rights situations for new settlements.

Since the beginning of the Second Plan, regional development and the establishment of growth poles outside Java have become a major preoccupation of Indonesian planners. Regional development has become the fundamental justification for the transmigration program. Hanson (1981) considered the tidal swamp development effort to be supportive of both agricultural sectoral goals and regional development goals. Another element in regional development was the improvement of security and avoidance of disturbances in sensitive areas. According to Hanson (1981: 224), the central government was anxious to settle transmigrants in such areas in order to reduce opportunities for illegal activities, such as smuggling. In coastal Riau, particularly at isolated outposts and along the network of swampland channels or rivers, there were ample opportunities for many kinds of smuggling. These considerations have been factors in the emphasis on coastal development. During the Repelita II period
(1974/75-1978/79), 3,100 families (12,395 persons) were resettled in Riau, the majority of them in the coastal areas (Figure 5.1).

The transmigration target for Riau was increased significantly from the beginning of Repelita III (1978/79-1983/84). The increase was due to the rapid increase in the target at the national level, and the judgement that Riau was one of the provinces with the greatest potential for resettling transmigrants. In Repelita III, the national target was 500,000 families, of which Riau was to receive 50,000. However, the planned expansion of the transmigration target confronted an immediate problem: the availability of suitable land for resettlement. By the end of Repelita III, it was evident that resettlement in tidal swamps had created many problems. As a result, it was recommended that this type of project should be de-emphasized in the future. Since then, the central government has decided to shift transmigration settlement into non-irrigated areas in the up-land regions (Figure 5.1). Since fertile land in the upper regions mostly has been occupied by the local population, the new settlements for transmigration were resettled in the areas with poor soil conditions. In addition to food crops, since the beginning of the Third Development Plan the central government introduced the tree crops type of transmigration. In Riau an oil palm plantation was established in Tandun and Sei Tapung in the District of Kampar. It was follow by a rubber tree
plantation in Air Molek in the District of Indragiri Hulu.

The province of Riau was given special attention by the central government partly because of national security as Riau has an open border with other countries in the north, including Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. In 1981, the government moved 350 families (1,627 persons) to the Natuna Islands, and in 1982 another 600 families (2,425 persons). The government explicitly stated that the aim of this resettlement was to provide 'a security belt' against foreign intruders. One researcher from the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB), who had conducted field research in transmigration settlements in Natuna, gained a strong impression that living conditions among these transmigrants were very poor indeed, particularly due to the very low agricultural productivity. He considered the government's expectation that the transmigrants could act as a security belt when they had to live under such conditions was merely wishful thinking.¹

South Kalimantan

Whereas Riau has become a transmigration receiving area only recently, South Kalimantan has a longer history of population resettlement. It was in the early 'thirties that the Dutch government decided to extend their

colonisation schemes from Sumatra to Kalimantan. In Kalimantan, the Dutch government experimented with two kinds of landscape, tidal swamp lands and the alang-alang covered uplands. For the tidal swamp lands they selected an area to the south of Banjarmasin which later was called Purwosari, and for the alang-alang covered uplands, an area in the north-east of Banjarmasin was chosen, which later was called Madurejo.

According to Pelzer (1945: 223-225), in July 1938 the first group of 95 families was placed near the village (kampung) of Kertakhanyar to cultivate 100 bouws of swamp sawah that had been leased from the local population. The experiment was successful, and the Dutch Government felt sufficiently encouraged to send a second group of 106 families in 1939. This group came early enough to help with the harvest, and the settlers of 1938 were then transferred across the Barito river and settled on their own land south of the Serapat Canal and southwest of the town of Banjarmasin. The colony, given the name of Purwosari, comprised an area of 34,000 hectares. The second group was brought to a local village on the banks of the Lauk River to learn the new technique before they joined the settlers of Purwosari. In May 1940, the third year, a third group of 198 families was added to the Purwosari project. The planners of this

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2 Sjamsu (1960: 59) noted that, in 1920, the Dutch sent 250 families from Central Java to a location near Barabai. After two years this settlement was abandoned as a large numbers of colonists left the area or died due to malaria.
colony estimated that 15 per cent of the land would be occupied by villages, canals and roads, leaving 28,900 hectares of swamp lands for the cultivation of rice.

The other scheme, Madurejo, also differed fundamentally from the colonies in Sumatra. In Madurejo, dryland was cultivated exclusively, and Madurese villagers were chosen to be the settlers. The colony, located near Pengaron in the Meratus Mountains, included 16,000 hectares of cultivable land, none of which could be irrigated. This was no drawback in the eyes of the Madurese settlers, since the peasants of Madura surpass all other Indonesians in the tilling of tegalan (dry land). The Madurese are excellent stock breeders. The goal in Madurejo was to establish a system of mixed farming. The colony was started in 1938 with 100 families, and these were joined in 1939 by 194 additional families.

Today, the population settlements in Purwosari (1937) and Madurejo (1938) are regarded by some observers as an example of successful resettlement. Collier (1980 cited in Potter and Hasymi, 1987: 16) strongly argued that the success of 'colonisation' in Purwosari was because the Javanese followed the type of cropping system devised for the tidal swamps by spontaneous Banjarese settlers, who had earlier opened sections of the swamps for the production of rice and tree crops in a system which he described as productive and self-sustaining.
However, an interview by the author in February 1988 with some former colonists in Purwosari gave the strong impression that the tight control by the Dutch over the lives and agricultural practices among the settlers was perhaps the primary factor in making the settlements sustainable. For example, for two years after their arrival in the area, the Dutch officers did not permit the settlers to move freely from the settlement areas. In addition, the agricultural activities that could be practiced by the settlers, such as the crops to be grown, were also strictly selected and defined by the Dutch. One ex-colonist said, 'It was like living in prison'.

To judge the success of the colonisation policy in terms of the current situation is also misleading for two reasons. First, the original settlers currently alive are the remnant of colonists who survived after almost 50 years of hardship and whose human and social costs are impossible to calculate. Second, the settlements have attracted considerable numbers of new migrants, many of whom have brought capital from their place of origin.

3 Dr. Lesley Potter of Adelaide University who was conducting research on population mobility in South Kalimantan, among other things found a Javanese settlement at Guntung Ujung, Kecamatan (Sub-District) Gambut, about 12 km south of the main Banjarmasin-Martapura road. According to Dr. Potter, there were about 40 households, some of them descendants of a group who fled from the colonisation at Purwosari during the Japanese occupation of the 1940s. They left the settlement because they found life in Purwosari too difficult (A personal communication with Dr. Potter, December 1989)
Table 6.2

The Chronology of the Transmigration Program in South Kalimantan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Arrival</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No.of Families</th>
<th>Year/Transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938-40</td>
<td>Purwosari</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maduredjo</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Takisung</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-67</td>
<td>Up land regions</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1970s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-74</td>
<td>Tidal areas</td>
<td>1,859</td>
<td>1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-78</td>
<td>Up land regions</td>
<td>6,631</td>
<td>1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-81</td>
<td>Up land regions</td>
<td>11,096</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-88</td>
<td>Up land regions</td>
<td>5,332</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

1. The figure for the number of the transmigrants in this table should be seen with caution since the figure was taken at the beginning of the resettlement. The actual figures could be different as some transmigrants probably had abandoned their settlements or some spontaneous migrants resettled in those areas.
2. As also happened in Riau, by the time the author was conducting field work (February 1988) the majority of settlements which were opened after 1978 were still in the hand of the Department of Transmigration.
3. The detail information on the area of transmigration settlements in South Kalimantan see Appendix 2.

Sources: Pelzer (1945: 224-264).
Bappeda Kalimantan Selatan (1985: 2).
Djohansyah (1986: 11-13).

The arrival of the Japanese in the Indonesian archipelago in 1942 put an end to all colonisation projects. Most of the settlements already established suffered considerably during the three years of occupation; in many cases farmers were taken from colonisation villages to provide labour for Japanese war projects (romusha). After Independence, the Government of Indonesia resumed the program. The first group of transmigrants was sent to South Kalimantan in 1953 to
Takisung sub-district, Tanah Laut District. They comprised 724 families (2,595 persons) (Bappeda Kalimantan Selatan, 1985: 2). After Takisung, the government began to open tidal-irrigation projects (*proyek pasang surut*), the first at Tamban in 1957, followed by two more tidal projects at Marabahan in 1959 and Balandean in 1961. All of these projects are located in the District of Barito Kuala. Two other projects were established in the District of Kota Baru: first in Berangas in 1960 and second in Sebelimbingan in 1961. From 1962 until 1967 the government moved only around 250 families to South Kalimantan. A survey of the regional economy (Partadiredja, 1970: 51) reported that, by 1968, only two-thirds of transmigrants arriving after independence still resided in the transmigration areas. The others had left for other places to find employment. The report also found that, out of five areas designated as transmigration areas since 1959, only one was officially regarded as developed and four as 'backward'.

South Kalimantan was formally designated as a destination for transmigration in 1972 by Presidential Decree no. 2 (Department of Manpower and Transmigration, 1979, Appendix: 1). During *Repelita I*, about 8,000 persons were resettled in seven transmigration areas. Around half were located in Barambai in the District of Barito Kuala in 1969, and the other half were located in 1973 in Tambarangan, Hatungun, Sidodadi, Miawa, Parandakan and Ayunan Papan in the Tapin District.
According to a study by a team from Gajah Mada University, the transmigration settlement in Barambai was relatively more developed than the other settlements (Guinness, 1977).

In Repelita II, the government moved around 28,000 persons into the dry land areas in the District of Kota Baru. The majority were located in Tajau Pecah in 1975 and in Sebamban I in 1978. The others were located in Suato, Hatungun, Batu Tungku, Masingai and Belawan. In Sebamban I, in which around eight thousand persons were located, an agro-economic survey showed that a large number of transmigrants were engaged in non-farm employment, such as logging and the informal sector (ORSTOM, 1984 cited in Widayatun, 1989: 16). During Repelita III, 77,000 sponsored and around 9,000 spontaneous transmigrants were resettled in South Kalimantan. In addition to the transmigration program based on food-crops, after 1981 a tree-crops transmigration scheme, mainly rubber, began to be introduced in South Kalimantan. These projects were located in Batulicin, Pamukan, Paringin and Muara Uya. At the beginning of Repelita IV (1984-1985), a transmigration area associated with a sugar plantation was established in Pelaihari in the District of Tanah Laut.
6.2. Central Government Decisions and Their Regional Implementation

In Riau and South Kalimantan, the transmigration program has been implemented since the First Five-Year Development Plan of the New Order period. However, the momentum of the program increased markedly from the beginning of the Third Five-Year Development Plan (1978/1979). At the national level, this marked change was reflected through at least three important developments. The first was the commitment from the World Bank to financially support and assist the transmigration program on a substantial scale. This dates from 1979, when the government and the World Bank agreed to a second Bank assisted project that was to be a model for transmigration in the Repelita III (World Bank, 1988: 161). Second, a total of 500,000 families were targeted to move in the Repelita III. Third, a Junior Minister for Transmigration was appointed to assist the Minister for Manpower and Transmigration but directly reported to the President. In addition, a co-ordinating body (Bakoptrans) was set-up to co-ordinate the implementing agencies for transmigration.4

Based on their study in South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi, Guinness (1977: 137) noted that, although the government had established a co-ordinating body at the

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4 Co-ordination between the many departments involved in transmigration has long been a concern of the central government.
national and regional levels, this body was not able to reduce the tensions and conflicts between the implementing agencies. The only experience of workable co-ordination, according to this study, was shown during the preparation of the Wonogiri-Sitiung Project in 1976. However, from another study (Gondowarsito, 1986) the seemingly better co-ordination among the implementing agencies in the Wonogiri-Sitiung Project was because the President had given his personal attention to the project, presumably because Wonogiri happened to be in the area of his childhood home. Because of this privileged status, the utmost involvement and cooperation on the part of various government agencies (namely, the Departments of Manpower and Transmigration, Public Works, Communications, and Agriculture) were enlisted (Gondowarsito, 1986: 89-90).

The main reason which eventually led the central government to rapidly increase the scale of the transmigration program was the increase of national revenue from oil, as well as the increasing confidence among the economist-technocrats in their ability to expand the development programs on a nationwide scale. The central government decision to resettle 500,000 families in the Third Five-Year Plan compelled the designated provinces to accept a larger number of transmigrants than had ever been experienced before. This obligation in turn created a heavy burden and many problems for the regional governments.
In Riau, prior to the commencement of the Third Plan, the regional government had planned for 50,000 transmigrant families to be accepted for the next five years, and had already allocated areas for transmigration settlement. Suddenly, and without any consultations with the regional government, the new Minister for Public Works, Ir. Poernomosidi, increased the target to an unprecedented 100,000 families. The central government, through their vertical line agencies in the region, particularly Public Works, began to select settlement areas, clear the land and construct roads. The Transmigration Regional Office then started to build the houses and social facilities, such as markets and mosques. During the project's development, almost all consultations were carried out directly between the central government's implementing agencies and the governor's office, largely by-passing Bappeda, which was supposed to co-ordinate all development projects in the region.5

The bureaucratic elites in South Kalimantan, especially the planners, have realised that partly because of the soil conditions their province could not receive large number of transmigrants from Java. According to Drs. Sam'ani, the Head of Research Section in the Bappeda office, the findings of the Third Plan evaluation strongly indicated that for the Fourth Plan

5 Interview with the Vice Head of the Bappeda of Riau, January 1989.
South Kalimantan should receive no more than the target in Repelita III, which was about 17,000 families. He argued that even to realise such number would be a difficult task, requiring considerable effort. It was therefore beyond the regional capacities to accept a bigger target number. For the Fourth Plan, therefore, Bappeda planned for only 17,000 families. Unfortunately, before it was officially publicised, one senior official from the Department of Transmigration in Jakarta detected this plan during his visit to South Kalimantan. He claimed that the figure was too low and could be interpreted as indicating that South Kalimantan did not support the national policy on transmigration. As a result, in the Development Plan book 50,000 families was listed as the province's target for the Fourth Plan. However, by February 1988 only about 13.5 per cent of this target was realised.6

The government approach to transmigration during the Third Plan period was known as 'Plan As You Proceed' (PAYP). At the time the transmigration program was reorganised in 1978, the responsibility for the selection and evaluation of large sites was assigned to the Directorate of City and Regional Planning (DITADA) within the Department of Public Works.7 Plan As You Proceed, initially promoted by World Bank consultants, denotes an approach that was adopted especially by the planners in

6 Interview, February 1988.
7 DITADA apparently had no previous experience in agricultural planning and implementation.
DITADA to accelerate the completion of land clearing. In the PAYP, site investigation and land development proceeded simultaneously. This approach was adopted partly because the government had been forced to realise a very ambitious target for the Repelita III. Under this approach, site selection was made without prior detailed feasibility studies. The sites were selected mainly based on topographic maps of land slopes. Based on those considerations the contractors were assigned to land clearing and construction of the main roads. It was then the responsibility of the Transmigration Regional Offices to construct houses and other public facilities for the transmigrants. A Kompas correspondent in Pekanbaru noted that the contractors who won the projects from Kanwil Transmigrasi often ignored the existence of the district government or its subordinates during project implementation. All jobs were directly negotiated with the provincial level government. However, in the event of a dispute or conflict with the local population, for example as a result of unfair land compensation, the contractors eventually turned to the district or village level government for help or advice.

Co-ordination between DITADA, which was under the

8 The information regarding the role of the World Bank as the promoter of PAYP was obtained through a personal communication from Mr. Wong Tai Chee, a consultant with a Malaysian firm in charge of land development for transmigration in Riau, November 1988.
9 Interview with Abdul Muin Abbas B.A., a former field supervisor during the PAYP phase in South Kalimantan, February 1988.
10 Interview, December 1987.
Ministry of Public Works, and the Transmigration Regional Offices was not easily achieved. There was a strong tendency for DITADA to finish their job well before the Transmigration Offices were ready to follow it up. Among the planners in DITADA, such an acceleration of land development was known as 'saving' (menabung). It meant that land development was accelerated and continued without consideration for whether Transmigration Regional Offices had been prepared to construct the houses and other facilities (Hamzah, 1980: 5). As a result of the delays in the settlement preparation, for example, Hendra Sasmita, the Head of the Transmigration Regional Office in Riau, admitted that only twenty per cent of the target of 9,500 families for the first year of the Third Plan was realised (Kompas, 11 March 1980).

According to the Deputy Head of Bappeda, Riau, as a result of the PAYP approach, a considerable proportion of the sites proved to be inappropriate for transmigration settlements. The soils in many areas proved unsuited for agricultural cultivation due to the abandonment of the detailed soil structure studies. In 1982, a daily newspaper reported that 1,836 transmigrant families from fourteen settlements in Riau were in critical conditions resulting from floods in their lands (Sinar Harapan, 7 October 1982). According to one staff member of the Mobilisation and Development Division (RAHBIN) in the Transmigration Regional Office in Pekanbaru, it was no accident that the majority of the settlers had left the
transmigration settlement in Belilas area because of floods. In fact, before the area was opened for transmigration the Head of the Transmigration Regional Office had already recognized that the area was not feasible for resettlement. However, the Head of Kanwil at the time insisted that the project be 'coercively' implemented (dihajar, literally meaning 'to crush') because there was an order from the centre under the so-called 'crash program' to achieve the transmigration target by all means.  

Another problem resulting from the PAYP and target-oriented approach was disputes over the land required for transmigration among the different government sectoral agencies. The land sites that had been claimed for transmigration settlements and were being cleared had often been originally planned for other purposes, for example as forest conservation areas. In Riau, land clearing for WPP (Partial Development Areas) X in Bangkinang District had to be suspended as the Forestry Technical Office (Dinas Kehutanan) in Riau claimed that the area was already reserved for conservation. At the end of the dispute, which was handled by Bappeda, the claim of the Forestry Office was approved (Kompas, 30 November 1982). In South Kalimantan when the transmigration program was implemented under the PAYP approach, land disputes commonly occurred with the Forestry Offices. Abdul Muin Abbas explained that, as a

11 Interview, December 1987.
field supervisor, he required a tough character because a quick decision and sometimes even physical pressure was needed to win the dispute with other agencies.  

According to Muin Abbas, because of frequent disputes between agencies, the Regional Government in conjunction with other agencies which used land, such as Public Works, Agriculture and Transmigration, began to construct a kind of land use map to mark the forest boundary according to its functions. The map was latter known as 'Map of Forestry Agreement' (Peta Hutan Kesepakatan). At the bottom of the map was the signature of the head of each agency involved. However, because the map was prepared only to provide a broad guide-line, particularly during the PAYP approach, in practice disputes between agencies still occurred. Part of the reason was that the Central Government, particularly Public Works, often intervened directly through their sectoral agencies in the province without any consultation with the Bappeda or other sectoral agencies.  

The problems of land unsuitability for transmigration settlements, which continued during the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan, were unavoidable because the land that had been allocated for settlements in Repelita III was mostly poorly selected and hastily studied during the Repelita III period, particularly when the PAYP approach was adopted.  

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12 Interview, February 1988.
14 In the case of South Kalimantan, the Department of
planning and hasty implementation of the transmigration programs in Riau and South Kalimantan is readily apparent from two indicators: first, the extent to which the target was realized, and second, the very low number of villages that have been transferred from the transmigration department to the regional government (See Appendices 1 and 2). In 1988, for example, no transmigration villages that were opened since the beginning of Repelita III were transferred to the regional government.

6.3. Regional Responses to the Central Plan Formulation

Regional development, which on paper is the responsibility of the Regional Development Planning Board (Bappeda), in reality has been firmly controlled by each sectoral agency (Kanwil). The regional plan for sectoral agencies in fact is largely decided by the national level planning board in Jakarta (Bappenas). If the regional level agencies have any opportunity to formulate a regional plan, it is necessary that this be in accordance with priorities at the national level. In the words of one planner in South Kalimantan:

Transmigration, funded by the World Bank, had employed a British Consulting Firm to conduct a detailed land survey in South and East Kalimantan. The report of this survey was unfortunately released only in May 1987. The findings from this survey have never been used, since many of the transmigration projects were being implemented from around the early '80s.
We should know what musical instrument is being played in Jakarta. For example if Jakarta plays the *gamelan*, we in the region also have to play the *gamelan*.15

The bureaucrats in Pekanbaru or Banjarmasin are well aware of the dominant role played by the central government, either by the ministerial offices or the National Planning Board in Jakarta. This is reflected in their attitudes and responses in attempts to influence the decision making process regarding development in their regions. Among the factors that they perceive as crucial to development in their regions is the allocation of the development budget. As noted earlier, the central government allocates 70 to 80 per cent of the Regional Development Budget (APBD) in all provinces in Indonesia. Since the allocation of the development budget will be determined according to the priorities of the Five-Year Development Plan, it is very important for each regional government to make sure that as many as possible of their regional development priorities are mentioned in that document.

There are at least two opportunities for the regional government to influence the decision-making process in the Central Government. The first is at the time when the central government is preparing the draft of *Repelita*. This event usually commences around the end of the fourth year of the current development plan. The

15 Interview with Dr. Ismet Ahmad, the Dean of Agriculture Faculty, University of Lambung Mangkurat (also the Head of Governor's Task Force), February 1988.
second is around January and February in each year when the budget for the following financial year is being prepared. The approach used by the regional governments in their attempt to influence the plan formulation in the Central Government is popularly known as 'lobbying the centre'.

The Deputy Chairman of *Bappeda* in Riau explained that his agency's major attempt to influence central government decisions was by inviting experts from the Faculty of Economics of the University of Indonesia in Jakarta to conduct an evaluation of the implementation of the Fourth Plan and at the same time to prepare a plan for *Repelita V*. The Deputy Chairman (himself an economist who graduated from the University of Indonesia) apparently knows very well that by inviting economists from this university he will be able to bring Riau's economic issues to the inner circle of decision makers in Jakarta, which is dominated by economists from the University of Indonesia, some of whom are ministers who meet regularly at the University to discuss the latest economic development issues.

Another reason for inviting economists from Jakarta is because they are more likely to be listened to when speaking about the problem in Riau than are the people from Riau.\(^{16}\) The issue of revenue from oil, which only

\(^{16}\) The evaluation and planning of the previous *Repelita* usually was carried out by local economists from the University of Riau, Pekanbaru.
brings a small economic return to Riau, is an example of an issue that would be regarded as very sensitive if it was raised by local people. Through the economists from the centre it was hoped that the decision makers in Jakarta would be more willing to accept the fact that Riau needs a larger share of the national revenue.\(^{17}\)

The bureaucrats in South Kalimantan used a different approach in lobbying the central government to pay more attention to development in their province.\(^{18}\) According to Dr. Marliani Djohansyah, in 1986 the Governor had decided to form a Task Force consisting of academics and intellectuals concerned with local problems. Their main task was to advise the governor on development matters. Such a role should be played by the Bappeda, but the Governor initiated this Task Force because he considered that Bappeda was often too slow in responding to his requests. Another duty given to the Task Force was to lobby the central government to direct more attention to development in South Kalimantan.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{17}\) From a conversation with one researcher from the University of Riau (December 1987) it was known that the principal researchers who conducted the study on Riau were Dr. Dorodjatun Kuntjorojakti, Director of the Institute of Economic and Social Research, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia, and Dr. Iwan Jaya Azis, a researcher and regional economic expert, who strongly supported the idea of decentralisation of regional development in Indonesia.

\(^{18}\) The information regarding this issue was gathered from separate interviews with Dr. Ismet Ahmad and Dr. Ali Hasymi from University of Lambung Mangkurat, and Drs. Sam'ani from Bappeda. They were all the members of the Governor's Task Force.

\(^{19}\) Interview, February 1988.
In a manner rather different from what happened in Riau, South Kalimantan preferred to send its messages to Jakarta through contact persons or close friends who held key positions, for example in Bappenas, the Ministry of Finance or the State Secretariat. On January 1988, when the author was in the field, the central government had begun to prepare the Fifth Development Plan. The lobbyists from South Kalimantan had therefore started visiting Jakarta seeking to ensure that South Kalimantan would be given priority within the forthcoming Repelita V. South Kalimantan was seeking a larger budget allocation for development. According to one member of the Task Force, to attain this goal, the payment of 'a greasing fee' (uang pelicin) to central government officials was a common practice. He said that:

If you want to reach destination faster, you should used the toll road. It means that you must pay.

6.4. Co-ordination: An Unresolved Problem

Dr. Marliani Djohansyah, who conducted a study in several transmigration settlements in the District of Kota Baru, stated that a major problem in transmigration

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20 Interview with Drs. Sam'ani on February 1988 provides information that on 25 January 1988 Dr. Ali Hasym and Drs. Asnawi, and on 28 January 1988 Dr. Ismet Ahmad and Drs. Sam'ani went to Jakarta in an effort to lobby the decision makers in Jakarta.

21 Interview, February 1988.
program implementation in South Kalimantan was that the government officers at the district level could not change the policy during implementation. Everything had been rigidly decided by the higher level offices in the centre (in this case either in Banjarmasin or Jakarta). The Head of Bappeda at the district level even said that:

I think everybody in Kota Baru knows that the areas which have been chosen for transmigration are not suitable for cultivation. But I couldn't change anything since it has been decided from above.  

In Sebamban, Batulicin, where transmigrants had been resettled for almost five years, the co-ordination between agencies, such as those responsible for co-operatives, health and transmigration, occurred only in the form of formal meetings, in which agencies informed each other about their plans. Since most of the funds were controlled by the Transmigration Office the other agencies could only follow what they were told by the transmigration officials. As described by Dr. Marliani Djohansyah, other agencies working in transmigration areas usually followed the lead of the transmigration officials. Any resentment towards, or dissatisfaction with, the transmigration officials was usually not openly articulated, although on one occasion an open protest was made by some young medical doctors ('dokter Inpres'). They protested that funds allocated to purchase medicines had been misused by transmigration officials. As a result

As told by Dr. Marliani Djohansyah to the author during interview, February 1988.
of this protest the official who apparently misused the money was transferred to another location. Another example of very rigid and centralised program implementation was the provision of salted fish to the transmigrants. The central government determined that this had to be imported from Surabaya. As a result, the cost of the salted fish was three times higher than if it had been purchased in the local markets, which had an abundant supply.23

Any observers who visits transmigration settlements in Sebamban in the District of Kotabaru, which during Repelita III and IV periods became the focus of transmigration activities in South Kalimantan, will immediately be aware of the noticeable failure of transmigration implementation. The settlements, although they have been inhabited by migrants from Java since 1980, have shown very little progress. In February 1988 (at the time the author visited the areas) these transmigration villages were still under the Department of Transmigration with no indication when they were likely to be transferred to the provincial government. Since the mid 1980s the press has continuously reported the plight and difficult lives of the transmigrants in these areas. For example, press reports documented many people who abandoned their settlements, most of whom returned to their places of origin in Java. In March 1986 a press report showed that hundreds of transmigrant

23 Interview, February 1988.
families who resettled in Sebamban II project since 1980 were in serious difficulties. Their agricultural lands could not produce anything except cassava, and many of them even had to sell the tin from their roofs and wood from the walls of their houses just to buy rice (Kompas, 8 April 1986). An interview by the author with an apparently successful transmigrant trader in Sebamban II in February 1988 provided information about common happenings in transmigration areas. According to him, to survive in an environment such as Sebamban, transmigrants have to find jobs outside their settlements in off-farm activities, for example working as labourers in logging activities or taking a risk, with two or three friends working under contract with their "boss" to collect sandal-woods (kayu gaharu) in the forest. The problem, he said, was that productive jobs were very limited and so many people was looking for work. As a result the employers or the "boss" have often paid them a very low wages, but of course there was no alternative for these people other than to accept this low payment. This informant also stated what has become a public knowledge in these areas, that some wives of transmigrants were engaging in prostitution, again organised by a "boss" in the nearby town, to earn some money for their families to survive.

Problems of co-ordination were experienced, not only between implementing agencies from different departments but also within the Department of Transmigration itself.
For the implementing agencies in the region, the problem arose whenever there was a conflict or confusion about central office decisions, for example, between instructions from the Minister and the General Secretary. This happened in Riau with regard to arrangements for transporting rice for transmigrants. Initially an instruction letter signed by the Minister stated that transportation should be arranged by the central office. Before this instruction could be implemented, the region received another instruction from the General Secretary which said that the regional office was responsible for transport arrangements. It took some months before the confusion could be resolved. In the meantime, the transmigrants who had been waiting for their rice ration suffered.24

According to an agricultural engineer who worked as a staff member of the Program Development Division (Bina Program) in the Transmigration Regional Office in Pekanbaru, the accuracy of transmigration statistics in many government reports was questionable. This was partly because statistics sent from the district to the provincial office were not seriously checked. Statistical reports were essentially just outcomes of formal and routine tasks. Interestingly, whatever the quality of information or data that were sent to the central government, they had never been refused or queried.

24 Interview with Drs. Anwar Rahman, the Head of Social and Cultural Section of Bappeda in Pekanbaru, January 1988.
Everything sent to the central office are always accepted (laku), although the statistics have been collected hastily (ngawur) and the reports were inappropriately completed.25

Another problem in implementation was related to the long delay of the budget approved by the central government. This took about two years after the submission of the budget proposal to the Ministry of Finance. The delay severely restricted the amount of time available for the project leader to complete projects in the region and often led to hasty project implementation. In South Kalimantan, another problem resulting from delayed budget approval was that more than two billion rupiah of the 1984 budget for the Department of Transmigration could not be spent. The Governor of South Kalimantan explained that this was partly caused by the interdependencies between the sectoral agencies in implementing the program. In such a situation, although the budget for the Department of Transmigration had been approved, they could not, for example, build houses for the transmigrants, because the Office of Land Use in the province was still waiting for their budget approval in order to be able to survey the land for transmigration (Kompas, 4 March 1985).

Problems of implementation during the Third Plan resulted mostly from the separation of DITADA - which was

25 Interview, December 1987. The problems of inaccuracies and inconsistencies of government statistics are unavoidable for anyone studying transmigration. In this thesis, this issue is discussed in Chapter IV Section 4.6.
in charge of the selection and planning of sites, land clearing and construction of infrastructure - from the Directorate General of Transmigration, which was responsible for housing construction, recruitment of transmigrants at the place of origin, and their transportation, resettlement and provision with five years of economic and social support. DITADA was concerned only with the completion of land and resettlement preparation and reported directly to the Ministry of Public Works. Its tasks were mainly related to the physical works, such as land clearing and infrastructure construction, and were relatively less complicated than those of the Directorate General of Transmigration, which mostly dealt with people. As a result of task distinctions between DITADA and the Directorate General of Transmigration, preparation of the physical settlement often was completed but the transmigrants failed to arrive on schedule.

The perception and view of transmigrants toward the implementation of transmigration policy certainly varied according to their personal experiences. Pak Didik Mulyadi, a transmigrant leader who was appointed an acting village head in Pasir Pangarayan, Bengkalis District, told the author that transmigrants most likely will survive in their new settlements if at the time they arrive the land is in the condition of "siap-tanam" (ready to be planted). According to him, the span of time in which the land is in this condition is indeed very...
crucial, because if the transmigrants arrived either before or after this period they would probably encounter problems, for example weeds growing wild in their land. He remembered when he first arrived in 1980 the land was relatively in a good condition and ready to be planted. At that time, there were 510 families from Java and 60 families of APPDT. After arrival they received food rations (jadup = jatah hidup) for two years, but since their land still had not produced sufficiently, they received additional food from WFP (World Food Program). About 10 families left the village just after the food ration from the Transmigration Department finished, but then around 30 families arrived and resettled as spontaneous transmigrants.26

In Riau, Pasir Pangarayan has been considered by many people, for example bureaucrats, academics or others with whom the author held discussions, as a relatively successful transmigration settlement. Each transmigrant family, beside their home-lot of 0.25 hectares in a ready-to-plant condition and a fully constructed house, received 1.0 hectares of land (referred to as Lahan I or Land One) from which vegetation had been completely removed. In addition, each transmigrant family in theory should also receive 0.75 hectares (known as Lahan II or Land Two) of uncleared land. According to Pak Didik, in his village, among transmigrants who have received Lahan II, the distance from the village to that land varies,

26 Interview, 10 August 1986.
for example, some are only 1 km but some are about 13 km away. About 60 families however have not received Lahan II land that was supposed to be provided for them. There was a rumour that those lands were still in dispute because the local people claimed the land as their own.

Problems with local people with regard to acquiring land for transmigration settlement are relatively rare, either in Riau or South Kalimantan. This is not surprising since much land in these provinces is unfertile and therefore not being used by the indigenous people. In many cases disputes with local people over land are related to the land allocation for PIR-Trans projects, - in which the Transmigration Department only deals with the recruitment of transmigrants, whereas the process of land acquisition from the locals is directly handled by PTP and Dinas Perkebunan. An example of such a dispute occurred in the District of Kampar in Riau which 550 family heads from several villages in Siakhulu sub-district complained that they had been pressed by the PTP to give up their land for PIR areas without any compensation. They brought this case to the DPRD (Provincial People Representative Council) but they failed in an attempt to talk with the governor. According to the bupati of Kampar, he has explained to the people that they would not receive compensation in the form of money since as the land owners they would be given priority to be PIR-transmigrants (Kompas, 23 February 1985). It was also reported that some local people
rejected the offer to become PIR-Transmigrants because they must wait for at least five years before the rubber can be tapped. "In the mean time, how shall we make a living?", asked one of these local people. A similar situation was also experienced by local people in Dusun Tengah sub-district, Barito Selatan District in South Kalimantan. Only 27 out of 299 families whose lands were taken to be cleared for PIR-Trans projects decided to join the program. The majority of these indigenous Dayak people refused to join the program or to reside in the houses which had been provided for them. Similar to the local people in Riau, these Dayaks also considered that their economic situation would be worse off if they engaged in a PIR-Trans project (Kompas, 27 December 1987).

The Kompas correspondent in Riau, in a conversation with the author (28 February 1988), observed that in many cases, development projects such as the PIR-Trans schemes more often disadvantaged the local populations rather than improved their economic life. For example, a local man who owned six hectares "rubber plantation" (karet rakyat) could employ around 10 workers. Therefore, in addition to earning an adequate income from his land, socially he also enjoyed a certain status as owner and employer. If he joined the PIR-Trans, although he would receive two hectares of land he would have to give up his six hectares, and his status as employer would drop to the status of labourer for the PIR company. More
importantly, his economic condition would also be unsure for several years to come because while his own plantation had been cleared away, he would have to wait until the rubber plantation began producing for the first time. An informal local leader in Taluk Kuantan, during an interview with the author, also argued that even though the local people have been given their share in PIR-Trans scheme, they usually were not consulted in advance about the use of their areas by the government for such projects. He observed that in many cases the government ignored or did not pay attention to the local interests or local aspirations. In other words, the local people were treated merely as objects rather than as human beings. It is therefore no surprise that indigenous people often refused the government plan and as a result conflict occurred. In such situations the government blamed the local people as being opposed to regional development. But what was actually happening, he explained, was that the government basically adopted "a wrong approach" in relation to the local people.\textsuperscript{27}

Institutionally, the difficulties and problems of implementing the central government plan for transmigration, were noted by Tjokroamidjojo (1979: 80) in his Way Abung study:

\textsuperscript{27} Interview, 28 December 1987.
While problems of implementation thus stemmed to a certain degree from the weakness of coordination, they also resulted from other causes, some of which are indicated here. In planning, more emphasis had been placed on the relief of demographic pressures in Java than on regional development and social improvement in Sumatra. Delays in the processing of government financial aid and disbursements contributed to a lowered capacity of the program to absorb transmigrant in destination areas. Government clearance and land, lagged behind the need for allocation of plots to newly arrived settlers, and the latter did not have the necessary equipment to clear the land themselves. In addition, official administration of land titles was unduly cumbersome.

For the Fourth Plan period, the government decided to establish a new Department of Transmigration. It was essentially a merger of the former DITADA of Public Works and the Directorate General of Transmigration. Following the decision to establish a separate department, the personnel of some sections in DITADA were moved to the Directorate General of Preparation and Settlement (PANKIM) and personnel of Directorate General of Transmigration joined the Directorate General of Mobilisation and Development (RAHBIN) of the new Department of Transmigration. Although the implementation problems that resulted from the physical separation between DITADA and the Directorate General of Transmigration seemed to have been solved with this unification, the different experiences of the personnel of PANKIM and RAHBIN could not be easily co-ordinated.

The personnel of the former DITADA, which had been dominated by planners, mostly from engineering
backgrounds, continued to operate in their own style, and tended to complete their tasks faster than their counterparts from RAHBIN. Partly because their tasks mostly dealt with physical activities involving heavy equipment, PANKIM used to obtain a larger budget from the central government compared with RAHBIN. Partly because of its abundant financial resources was that PANKIM was able to achieve its target for physical settlement preparation, particularly during Repelita III and Repelita IV periods. Preparation of the settlements had to be completed before the RAHBIN staff could commence their work. This situation, according to a senior staff in the Department of Transmigration, was the major cause of the large number of unoccupied houses in the project areas, a problem that was given wide publicity by the press in November 1987 and known as the puso issue.28

Due to the serious problems that the transmigration program had experienced during implementation, the President on 16 October 1985 promulgated an instruction (Keppres No. 59) that the governors in each receiving province should be responsible for co-ordination of the

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28 Puso is a term which is used to denote food-crops that failed to produce, usually as a result of insect attack or natural disaster. In the context of transmigration, puso was used to denote the unused houses. These houses which mostly needed reconstruction had been completed by PANKIM before RAHBIN had begun to recruit, transport and resettle transmigrants and just at the time when the budget was experiencing a severe cutback, according to an interview with a senior staff member in the Department of Transmigration, December 1987. The current Minister for Transmigration, Soegiarto, gave a similar reason in his explanation to the press on the issue of puso (Kompas, 28 February 1989).
transmigration program in their area. However, this move failed to solve the problem, mainly because frequent interventions from ministerial offices in Jakarta had more direct influence on program implementation than did the governor. The formal authority of the governor was not strong enough to overcome this direct intervention from Jakarta. Governors have directed their attention to transmigration implementation problems in their provinces but the effects have often been somewhat token. For example, partly due to strong pressure from the central government, as well as national press coverage on program delays, the Governor of Riau immediately visited several transmigration projects and ordered the contractors to speed up their work (Kompas, 23 January 1980).

The Governor has less power than the ministerial office in Jakarta in relation to the transmigration program because transmigration has national priority and is considered as a strategic program. The Minister who has direct command over the program's resources and manpower has more power to deal with it and is located in Jakarta, close to the centre of power. President Suharto himself has given strong personal attention to transmigration. This, explains why the latter was so influential, and by the same token, the seemingly lesser power of the governors during program implementation. One former director of the Department of Transmigration reported that, in his personal experience, because transmigration had been considered a strategic program,
it had been very easy for government agencies working for the program to request budget funds, no matter how much they needed (Gunawan, 1986: 5).

6.5. Summary and Conclusion

Many of the problems experienced in the implementation of the transmigration program were basically a result of the joint connection of a top-down and centralised approach among the implementing agencies at the centre, and a strong, centrally-imposed target orientation among the implementing agencies in the regions.

In the boom periods, starting from the beginning of Repelita III until the middle of Repelita IV, as the transmigration program became an important vehicle for developing the regions, the implementation of the program become an arena in which each agency attempted to achieve their own physical target. This was especially the case for the implementing agencies under the Ministry of Public Works. However, integration with other agencies was often neglected. Co-ordination, particularly in the Repelita III period, was essential due to the many different departments that dealt with transmigration. However, effective co-ordination was rarely achieved. In the regions, disputes among the implementing agencies
involved with the transmigration program were almost unavoidable because each agency, including Public Works, Agriculture or Transmigration, acted on the directions of its office in Jakarta.

In the Fourth Development Plan, partly because the co-ordination between agencies had created many problems during the implementation of the Third Plan, the President decided to establish a separate department that mainly dealt with transmigration. The new department was essentially a merger of DITADA of Department of Public Works and the former Directorate General of Transmigration. As a merger of two different departments, adaptation and consolidation were required. These proved difficult. Although transmigration was to be carried out by a single department, co-ordination remained a serious problem, in particular between the two major directorate generals of Settlement Preparation (PANKIM) and Mobilisation and Development (RAHBIN). The two directorates, in practice, have continued to act independently partly due to their different backgrounds and previous experiences.

The Governors, since the end of 1986, have been given formal authority to co-ordinate the transmigration program, but in reality have little power and are not influential. Within the government structure in Indonesia, the governor and his administration are just another sectoral agency in the region, subordinated to
the Ministry of Home Affairs. With regard to transmigration, the governor's problem is even more difficult since transmigration is a national priority in which President Suharto himself take an active personal interest. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that transmigration had become a sacred program, an article of faith, that no one dared to oppose. In such circumstances, as precisely argued by Arndt (1984: 49) to recommend the abandonment of the transmigration policy, however sound the arguments might be, would be pointless.

Another major problem during program implementation was related to the availability of funds. Since the transmigration program is almost totally dependent on the central government budget, a major cutback since 1986 has drastically affected the program implementation, both in Riau and South Kalimantan.
This chapter will assess the transmigration policy as it was formulated and implemented during the New Order (1969-1988). The assessment is based on two assumptions. The first assumption is that population policy analysis can only be meaningful if it is placed in the specific country context. As argued by Korten (1975: 139) a comprehensive country-specific analysis is required to provide insights into three crucial aspects of the policy process: first, the process through which political will or acquiescence is developed for population policies; second, the dynamic decision processes through which specific policy choices are made and programs are designed; and third, the contextual aspect of the implementation processes that are central to the success or failure of a given policy.

Korten (1975) provided only a general approach to the analysis of population policy. A more workable approach is offered by the framework of implementation analysis proposed by Smith (1973b). While Korten's approach is useful in identifying the broad, general aspects of the policy process, Smith's approach provides a more detailed framework in which to locate and analyse such factors as the process of policy making and the
roles of implementing organisations, target groups, and environments in a dynamic-interaction processes. (See Smith's framework, above, p. 28.)

The second assumption underlying this assessment is that transmigration, given its function of redistributing population from 'inner' to 'outer' Indonesia, has always been influenced by the dynamic relations between the centre, in this case Java or Jakarta, and the periphery, that is, the regions or the outer islands. The provinces of Riau and South Kalimantan were selected to provide case studies in which to explore the context of transmigration policy implementation. This chapter will assess transmigration policy implementation under the New Order, adopting the policy implementation framework proposed by Smith, supported by evidence from the Riau and South Kalimantan case studies.

7.1. The Policy-Making Process

The policy-making process is defined as a process in which a particular policy or program is formulated. There are several important elements to be considered in analysing policy-making. These are: consultation, time, the source of the policy, and lastly, expediency or analysis that are used to support or to accomplish the policy-making process.
Consultation. The questions that should be asked here are as follows: Are there consultations with, or active participation during policy formulation by the target groups affected by the policy or implementing organizations? Is participation encouraged or blocked?

Transmigration policy has been formulated solely by the planners at the central government in Jakarta. The potential transmigrants, who are mostly rural people in Java and Bali, in the view of transmigration planners, are primarily seen as 'objects' rather than 'subjects' to be consulted or to participate in policy formulation. In Indonesia, the notion of consultation in a western-democratic sense is irrelevant, given the Indonesian, or more precisely the Javanese, concept of government which is essentially paternalistic and autocratic. Consultation with the target group, that is the potential transmigrants, therefore, has never been considered by Indonesian policy makers in formulating transmigration policy.

During the New Order period, formally, the principal planners of transmigration policy were the economist-technocrat group, which was institutionally represented in the National Development Planning Board (Bappenas) in Jakarta. In formulating the plan Bappenas was responsible for co-ordinating the several ministries dealing with transmigration policy, including Transmigration, Home Affairs, Public Works and Finance, as well as the
Regional Development Planning Boards (Bappeda). As argued by Glassburner (1978: 29), although Bappenas is the centre of activity at the time of writing the plan, this agency is not granted a real central management system which would allow it to control and operationalise the formulated plan. During the implementation of the plan, changing policy directions without any consultation with Bappenas could easily take place, mainly because the actual power holders are beyond the control of Bappenas. In the case of transmigration, the President or the Ministers are often more influential in directing the policy implementation.

In the policy-making process, the roles of provincial level government apparatus, as well as the regional level implementing agencies (Kanwil Transmigrasi), were largely confined to the provision of the information needed by the planners and decision makers in the central government. Part of the reluctancy on the part of the central government to give power to the regional government, as it relates to the development planning activities, is pointed out by Hugo, Hull, Hull and Jones (1987: 299) as being:

...the belief that technocratic skills are weak at the provincial and kabupaten level, an (expressed) suspicion that corruption will be more rampant in a decentralized system, and perhaps an (unexpressed) aim to keep centralized control on larger resources for reasons of personal/departmental aggrandizement and/or financial gain.

Among the planners and bureaucratic elites in the
regions, the dominant position of the central government in the policy making process was fully recognized. In attempting to influence the decision making process of the central government, several strategies were adopted by the bureaucratic elites in the regions. As discussed in Chapter VI (Section 6.3), one such strategy was lobbying. Although they were unlikely to have been able to achieve major changes, the regions often made considerable efforts to influence the course of development in their areas.

The participation of the target groups in the formulation of the policy was insignificant, given the dominant position of the government in the policy-making process. Target groups, like other segments of civil society in Indonesia, are not granted avenues to articulate their demands or to participate in directing or formulating government policies. The ruling elites, which are dominated by the military, control the interests of the citizens through their domination over the selection of the people's representatives in parliament (DPR). In this political environment, the role of the people's representatives have been primarily to approve the development plans that have been formulated by the government.¹

¹ In the New Order, the political participation of the civil society has been strongly engineered by the military toward the so-called 'corporatist representatives' in which the public interests were controlled into various functional groups. In such social engineering, the potential transmigrants or the transmigrants were formally represented by the Indonesian Farmers' Association (Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia
Time. Was the policy formed in a time of crisis and thus formed quickly, or was the policy developed in a slow and deliberative process?

Since the New Order was established, the national transmigration policy has been prepared once every five years for the National Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita). Between 1969 and 1988, however, transmigration experienced several major policy changes. The first major changes occurred at the beginning of Repelita III, in 1978, when the government decided to set the program target at 500,000 families for the five years. The government also established a Junior Minister for Transmigration (Mr. Martono) to assist the Minister for Manpower and Transmigration (Professor Harun Zain). This change was mainly due to a sharp increase in the government budget as a result of increased revenues from oil. Another important factor was the commitment from the World Bank to assist the transmigration program. A second major policy change occurred at the beginning of Repelita IV, in 1983. Partly due to the government's claim that the target of Repelita III had been achieved, it decided to increase the target for Repelita IV to 750,000 families. It also established a separate ministry to

or HKTI) of which Mr. Martono had been the chairman for many years. Looking from this perspective, the appointment of Mr. Martono (he is not a technocrat nor a military leader) by President Suharto as the Junior Minister for Transmigration in 1978 and as the Minister for Transmigration in 1983 was not a surprise.
implement transmigration policy. Unfortunately, the world oil price collapse in 1985 and 1986 severely disrupted the implementation of this plan.

An abrupt policy change took place around 1986, mainly as a consequence of the restricted revenues and resulting severe financial problems facing the government at that time. In 1986/87 the government budget for transmigration was drastically reduced by 44 per cent, and by a further 65 per cent in the 1987/88 fiscal year. As a result, the original target had to be rescheduled. The World Bank subsequently pressured the government to redirect the policy to one of sustaining existing settlements, rather than moving people to new settlements. If new settlements were to be opened, the World Bank suggested that they should be based on more productive farming systems. This policy change, using

2 The need to establish a separate ministry for transmigration, in fact, had been a concern among some scholars before the government decision to set up the Department of Transmigration in 1983. Hardjono, the most informed scholar on transmigration, for example, argued in 1980:

Now, is perhaps the time to have a special department to implement the transmigration program, so that such a national task would receive adequate priority. The experiences of previous years have shown that it was useless to combine transmigration under the same minister with other affairs, such as veterans, co-operatives, or even with manpower (1982: 172, author's translation).

A similar argument was also stated in one of the UNDP's recommendations to the Indonesian government to set up an independent Department of Transmigration (PAE/RMI, 1983: 9).

3 As shown in the plan document for Repelita V the World Bank's suggestion was accepted by the government. The Fifth Plan targeted 550,000 families to be moved between
Smith's terminology, is an outcome of major 'tensions' (a soaring budget from 1978 to 1983) and 'transactions' (the need to increase the target, the World Bank commitment) that occurred during implementation of the plan which, in turn, generated and institutionalized feedback to the policy making process in the central government.

Source of policy. At the beginning of the New Order, transmigration policy was basically a continuation of the policies from the previous government. The policy gained an important new status in the country's national development program mainly because of its strong personal support from General Suharto, who assumed the presidency in 1967. Presidential support has played a critical role in promoting transmigration as a major national priority within the economic development framework formulated by the economist-technocrats. Since around the mid-'70s international agencies, particularly the World Bank, have given a commitment to financially assist the program. The direction of transmigration policy since then has sometimes been influenced by World Bank experts.

The role of the World Bank in transmigration began

1989/90 and 1993/4, of which only 180,000 were to be assisted, and the rest would be moving at their own expense (swakarsa). According to Booth (1989: 21-3), it was clear from the plan document that much greater emphasis would be given to non-foodcrop agriculture, industry and services. Mainly because the government budget was far more limited, the private sectors have been encouraged to invest their capital in the transmigration program, particularly in the tree-crop transmigration schemes (Kompas, 28 February 1989), although it was not mentioned in the Repelita V plan.
in 1976 when it conducted a pilot project in Batu Raja, South Sumatra. The aim of the project was to introduce a new type of transmigration scheme based on cash crops. The new scheme attempted to provide a new direction for transmigration policy, which had previously been dominated by food-crop agriculture. Although the World Bank's pilot project on tree crops was considered successful (World Bank, 1988: 161), such schemes never became widely implemented. The second World Bank project, started in 1979, surprisingly enough, returned to support for the traditional transmigration scheme based on food crops. This could be interpreted as failure on the part of the World Bank to influence policy makers in directing transmigration policy into more market-oriented settlements. After 1987, mainly as a result of the limited budget to open up new settlements, the World Bank's first interest in tree-crop transmigration scheme was somewhat revitalized.

Expediency and Analysis (The form of analysis or expediency which is used to accomplish and support the policy-making process). In transmigration, although analyses regarding problem identification and the search for alternative strategies and comparisons that are considered as part of the policy-making process were carried out, they often were ad hoc and fragmented. As a result, policy formulation has proceeded without a very clear or integrated long-term goal. Between the mid-'70s and the mid-'80s, at the time when the budget provision
for transmigration was abundant, numerous research projects were commissioned by the Ministry of Transmigration to various domestic, and international research agencies. University research institutes were among the most active in conducting transmigration research projects, ranging from soil surveys to social and cultural impact studies. Some large projects, such as aerial-photographic land mapping, funded by the World Bank, were conducted by international companies. Although some studies have produced policy recommendations, in many instances there were few avenues for the incorporation of research results into the policy-making process. This was partly because the actual policy-making process in Indonesia often took place within the elite circles beyond the formal structural institutions.

Another problem of the utilisation of research findings in the policy making process is also related to and conditioned by the role of science in the political context of the New Order. The role of science, and the social sciences in particular, has been conditioned by the fact that research funds were controlled by the government, and a large part of these were channelled through sectoral ministries. In such conditions, researchers or scientists who were commissioned by the government to conduct studies were compelled to follow the terms of reference formulated by the government apparatus. There is little doubt that those terms of reference were basically geared to the need of the
government to collect the primary data for planning purposes and more importantly to provide a kind of scientific legitimation to justify the existing policies.4

Transmigration policy in the New Order period essentially represented the views of different interest groups within the ruling elite. Two groups were most influential: the military elite and the economist-technocrats. Transmigration policy was often used by the military for strategic-political reasons. For example, transmigration was used to strengthen national defense in remote places like the Natuna Islands, and to weaken the separatist movement in Irian. There are also indications that the ruling elites have utilised the policy to minimize the possibility of social unrest resulting from the growing number of landless and very poor farmers. This motive was, for example, stated by the Junior Minister for Transmigration, Martono (1978: 74, cited in Hardjono, 1982: 170),

...transmigration can reduce the possibility of social unrest or social upheaval, which are the consequences of low standards of living and unemployment in the densely populated regions (author's translation).

By sending such poor and unemployed people to other islands, the population pressures that could create political and social tensions would be reduced.

4For a comprehensive observation on the role and position of social science research in the New Order, see Kleden (1987), particularly pp. 85-104.
For the economist-technocrats, transmigration policy has been seen as a way to develop remote areas in the Outer Islands. Through the transmigration program large amounts of capital have been channelled to the regions from the central government budget, mainly to open up new settlements, construct roads and other infrastructure, and to build social facilities. Above those two groups was President Suharto himself, who seemed to favour transmigration policy as a multi-purpose instrument to develop and rule the country.⁵

7.2. The Idealized Policy

The idealized policy is defined as the patterns of interaction that the policy-makers are attempting to induce. There are four relevant categories of variables of the idealised policy: the form of policy, the type of policy, the program, and the image of policy. In the case of transmigration, the policy takes the form of a formal program based on a national law on transmigration (National Law No. 2, 1972). Transmigration can be classified as a broad and complex policy with a large formal structure of organization. Since 1983 it has been

⁵ Other groups which benefited from the transmigration program and therefore are in favour of the continuation of this program are the international lending agencies (the World Bank in particular), business groups (domestic and international) and the government bureaucracy. For a schematic picture of the relationships of various groups dealt with transmigration program, see Aditjondro (1986).
an independent department. As a major part of transmigration policy involves the distribution of land, shelter and other facilities, it can be described as a distributive policy. However, the main characteristics of transmigration policy resemble the type of program that has been labelled 'ideological'.

According to Quick (1980: 42), there are three main characteristics of an ideological program. The first characteristic is that the program is expected to realize a multitude of goals at the same time. The program represents a working model of the new society, and is therefore expected to introduce changes in many aspects of existing social relationships. In addition to being numerous, the goals set for an ideological program are also ambiguous in that national elites rarely have a clearly worked out view of what is required to move from the existing state of affairs to the new one. A second characteristic is that the program has no hierarchy of goals, that is, no clear statement that goal A is more important than goal B, or at least that goal A should be achieved before embarking on goal B. The ambiguity of goals presents the implementing organization with the clear message that everything must be done at once and that there are no priorities that can be used to orient implementation. A third characteristic of the goal structure of ideological programs is the immeasurability of many of their objectives. The target population is expected to live differently, to act and think
differently, and to progress toward many of those goals, but such objectives cannot be measured with any precision. Agencies charged with implementing ideological programs thus have a goal structure that consists of a few measurable goals and many nonmeasurable ones.

Ideological programs are also affected by the high expectations of the national political elite. Such programs are endowed with a sense of urgency and vital importance, placing the implementing agency under extreme political pressure to produce results. So important is success in these programs that political appointees are selected to head the implementing agency, and resources are made available to this agency that are unavailable to other programs. The organizations charged with implementing ideological programs are also relatively immune from criticism, shrouded as they are by the national priority of their program. These, then, are the basic characteristics that define an 'ideological program': multiple, ambiguous, and nonmeasurable goals; high expectations; resource availability; politicised leadership of the implementing organization; and immunity from public criticism.6

6 The immunity of transmigration policy from 'independent' evaluation, has been admitted, for instance, by a Bappenas official on one occasion where a closed meeting was held between Bappenas and the Centre for Policy Implementation Studies (CPIS). CPIS is a 'semi-government' consulting agency, attached to the Ministry of Finance, and assisted by Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID). A major task of CPIS is to advise the Indonesian government, particularly through the Minister of Finance, on the implementation of various government projects. The advice was sought after an evaluation of a certain program was conducted by CPIS.
Transmigration policy, particularly since the New Order, has been given full political and financial support and strong commitment from the government, especially the President. The policy, however, was largely formulated without clear demands or support from the society. The scope of transmigration policy is national, in which all 27 provinces have participated, either as sending or receiving provinces.

In Indonesia, it is not easy to conduct a neutral and objective evaluation of the image of transmigration policy in society. A thorough investigation of transmigration policy is therefore lacking. If there were such an evaluation, any critical outcomes would unlikely be tolerated by the authorities. As transmigration policy has attained a high national priority, any negative images of the policy would tend to be restrained.

Several cases provide hints that the transmigration program has been only reluctantly accepted by the rural people in Java. A micro study by Singarimbun (1980) among the villagers in Krasak, Central Java, for example, showed that most of the respondents were very reluctant

In the meeting, the official from Bappenas warned the CPIS not to be involved in evaluating two government programs, transmigration and co-operatives. The reason was because, those two programs were considered as 'too political', and CPIS would face many problems when they attempted to evaluate those two departments. (This information was obtained from personal communication from a CPIS staff member in January 1988)
to join the transmigration program, even though their villages were considered at high risk of devastation from an eruption from the Merapi volcano. Another study by Suwarno (1979), showed that various groups of people in rural Java had resisted the transmigration program. In Surabaya, based on information from interviews with 343 squatters in several slum areas, Wibowo (1983: 151) reported that 36 per cent of his respondents 'strongly disagreed' and 25 per cent 'disagreed' with the statement that the transmigration program was an alternative course to obtain employment. Recent events in Kedung Ombo, Central Java, where many people who had been affected by a dam construction refused to be transmigrated by the government, suggest that transmigration was not a very attractive program to many rural people in Java (Tempo, 25 March 1989).

The image of transmigration among the people who have been affected by the policy, both the Javanese transmigrants and the local people in the receiving areas, has been varied, depending on their previous experience. Transmigrants who had been successfully settled in their new locations would generally have positive images of the transmigration policy, but those who were still struggling to survive or who had abandoned their settlements would tend to have a negative image. The image of transmigration amongst the local people whose land had been used for the program also depended on their experiences. Many local people in the receiving
areas, for instance, resented the transmigration because the government paid more attention to the transmigrants than to them. They also perceived the transmigration program in negative terms: for example, that the transmigrants were mostly poor and unskilled farmers who therefore would not bring any benefits to their areas. Many educated local people also thought that the transmigration program would have a negative impact on their regions in the long run. Among those people who implemented the policy, particularly in the receiving areas, transmigration was seen as something good. Such images were influenced by the role of the transmigration program in providing them with opportunities to obtain additional income through the government budget for transmigration projects. This was especially common during the boom period (1978-1985).

7.3. The Target Group

The target group is defined as those who are required to adapt to the new patterns of interactions which are imposed by the policy. Several relevant factors are: the degree of organization or institutionalization of the target group, the leadership of the target group, and the prior policy experience of the target group. As most potential transmigrants were rural landless people, their social, economic and political status was very low compared with other segments of society. For such people,
joining the transmigration program was perhaps the only available strategy to improve their standard of living. This had been noted by MacAndrews (1986b: 14):

One of the great attractions of the large and often controversial Indonesian transmigration program that moves peasant farmers from Java to the outer islands where living conditions are usually far from attractive is the fact that each families receives 2 hectares of land for cultivation and thus access to land that is denied them in Java.

On the other hand Hardjono (1977: 36) has argued that:

Too often those who agreed to move were the less enterprising and less resourceful people in the village.

The degree of organization or institutionalization among such people was low. Leadership among the transmigrants was also very weak. Their response to the transmigration policy was also influenced by their experiences, tending to be positive when they had reaped benefits from resettlement, or negative when they had not benefited. The transmigration program was generally supported by the transmigrants, mainly because transmigration did distribute many benefits, particularly in the form of land and shelter, as well as government support for about 18 months in the form of food. However, as one long-time observer of transmigration has argued, the support and guidance from a large number of government agencies usually were not sufficient to promote the development of farming agriculture of the
transmigrants (Sayogyo, 1985: 32-34).

7.4. The Implementing Organization

The organization responsible for the implementation of policy is in most instances a unit of the government bureaucracy. Smith (c.1987, unpub.) argued that bureaucracies are not machine-like entities that faithfully and diligently go about their tasks of policy implementation in a neutral, programmed, mechanistic manner. Bureaucratic agencies are controlled and staffed by individuals who have their own feelings, attitudes and behaviour patterns. Organizations, themselves, operate in an environment of overlapping responsibilities with other agencies and have their favoured clients and their friends, as well as enemies and adversaries. 'Bureaucratic politics' is a concept often used to describe organizational operations within this highly charged bureaucratic context. Three key variables of the implementing organization should be considered in the implementation of the policy. These are the structure and personnel of the organization, the leadership of the administrative organization, and the implementing program and capacity.

The structure and personnel of the transmigration implementing agency has not been very stable, since it was constantly shifting from one ministry to another for
each new Five-Year Development Plan. As a result of its changing location within the government bureaucracy, the structure of the organization was also subject to almost constant change. Although the personnel of the transmigration agency were mostly the same people, they experienced continual uncertainty as a result of the frequent changes of ministry.

Leadership in the agency implementing transmigration policy was influenced by the elite background of the leader. Under the New Order there were several changes in leadership style in transmigration, for example from the economist-technocrat, Harun Zain, to the politico-bureaucrat, Martono, and then to military leadership under Soegiarto.

The capacity of the implementing organization refers to the intensity and care taken to organize the implementation in meeting the policy objectives. In the case of transmigration, the capacity of its implementing agency, since the beginning of Repelita III, was quite large, particularly in terms of the budget allocated to the program. In addition, transmigration was also strongly supported by the President and had been established as a separate and independent department in 1983. However, since there are many competing factions within the ruling elites as well as among the different interests involved within the implementing agency, actualization of the capacity of the transmigration
program was often blocked and distorted. The large number of uninhabitable houses for transmigrants as had been reported in 1987, as well as the intensified social and political problems in Irian Jaya as the result of strategic-military considerations dominating the transmigration program, were examples of cases where the formulated goal had largely failed to be achieved.

7.5. The Environment

Environmental factors are those factors, such as the social, political, technological and natural context of society, that can influence or be influenced by policy implementation. The social and political environments during the New Order were relatively stable. However, since political stability basically was a result of the tight control by the military and bureaucracy over the civil society, the extent of genuine acceptance for the transmigration program within the society is questionable.

A political environment in which policy initiatives are dominated by the state apparatus is described by Grindle as a 'closed' system:
When the state apparatus itself monopolizes economic and social power in the society and retains full discretion over policy initiatives, the system can be labelled closed. Its policies generally respond to the institutional interests of the group that dominates the government machinery. Commonly in such systems, national elites conclude that their goals for the society, such as economic development or national security, are prejudiced by the social and economic patterns characterizing 'marginal populations' (Grindle, 1980:284).

In Indonesia, since there is no 'democratic' avenue for the civil society to express or to articulate its views, it is very difficult to judge whether or not a government policy is genuinely supported by the majority. In such an environment, the real problem is the lack of viable control and feedback from society. Transmigration implementing agencies and their bureaucrats at the operational level were mainly motivated by the urgency to achieve the physical and measurable targets, such as the number of houses to be built, the length of roads to be constructed or the number of families to be moved. In addition, the hierarchical structure of the transmigration implementing agencies created a bureaucratic attitude that is popularly known in Indonesia as 'so long as the boss is pleased' (ABS). This attitude was adopted by subordinates especially in relation to their direct superior in the office, in which they would perform or act first and foremost in order to fulfil the interests of their superiors. This kind of attitude, among others, often resulted at the operational level in neglect by the implementing agencies of the
needs of transmigrants or local people.

Observations and interviews in Riau and South Kalimantan suggested a certain level of rejection of the program among people in the region, in particular because it was strongly imposed by the central government and often ignored the real needs of the local people. Again, given the weak bargaining power of the local people in relation to the central government, their dissatisfaction was silently suppressed.

7.6. Conclusion

The transmigration policy-making process has been almost totally dominated by the central government and allows only a small role for the regional government. Within the structural organization of the Indonesian government, the role of the provincial level government is hierarchically subordinated to the central government. In the policy-making process, the regional government's primary task is to provide information to the planners and decision makers in the central government. In the implementation of the plan, the provincial level governments have played an important role, particularly in implementing the central plan and decisions. However, their activities were mostly contained within guide-lines determined by the central government.
The main characteristics of transmigration policy, such as its multiple, ambiguous, and non-measurable goals, resource availability, immunity from criticism, strong political support from the ruling elites, and high expectations, suggest that transmigration is an ideological policy. As an ideological policy, transmigration in itself produces formidable counter-productive forces. For example, its immunity to public criticism has created an implementing agency that lacks viable control and feedback. Such counter-productive forces have, in turn, hindered the implementation process.

The target groups, which consist of potential transmigrants, transmigrants and indigenous populations in the receiving areas, are people with only limited bargaining power and alternatives within the existing social, economic and political environment. Their powerless position within the implementation process has allowed the implementing agency to treat them as mere objects rather than subjects.

In the New Order period, one major 'tension' and 'transaction' that has generated and institutionalized feedback to the policy-making process occurred after the budget problem emerged in 1986 and 1987. A drastic reduction in the level of government funding inevitably forced the policy-makers to limit the original plan. However, although current trends in transmigration
policy, such as the new focus on existing settlements, and more economical approaches as suggested by the World Bank, seem to indicate new directions, it is too early at this stage to evaluate the results of this apparent policy change.
Chapter VIII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT.

This study has pursued three primary objectives: first, to explain the demographic and socio-historical contexts that have shaped transmigration policy; second, to analyse the transmigration policy processes during the New Order period, in particular since the beginning of Repelita I to the end of Repelita IV; and third, to examine transmigration policy implementation in Riau and South Kalimantan within the context of centre-regional relationships. In this summary and conclusion, the major findings of this study will be outlined and the prospects for transmigration policy will be considered.

Transmigration, as a government endeavour to redistribute the population from Java and Bali to other islands, is a policy with a long history. As a policy that persisted for many decades, transmigration therefore has proved its instrumental value in the perception and interest of various government elites. The demographic reasons behind the program, that is to reduce the population pressure in Java as well as to balance the uneven population distribution between Java and other islands, undoubtedly have become the primary
justification for the government in maintaining the program. In the course of history, however, the transmigration program has always been used by the government to achieve several other goals and never solely for demographic purposes.

The history of transmigration has shown that this policy, which in colonial times was known as colonization, besides aiming to solve the population problems in Java, was also used to provide cheap labour for plantation estates, particularly in Sumatra. After independence, especially during and after the PRRI-Permesta rebellion in 1956-58, transmigration had explicit strategic and military purposes, mainly to weaken the separatist movement by resettling the Javanese in the troubled areas in Sumatra and Sulawesi. In the New Order period, as well as having other goals, transmigration has been viewed as an instrument to bolster regional development in the remote areas in the Outer Islands. Up to the dawn of the New Order period, although the total number of people who were moved under transmigration programs was not substantial, the enduring perception which valued transmigration as a multi-purpose instrument had given the program a certain mystique as a 'panacea', a cure for many problems. Assessing transmigration policy during the New Order necessarily means to recognize and examine the implementation of an 'old' assumption, and perhaps its myths and fallacies within the changed political setting.
While this study is mainly concerned with the post-1965 period, some of the roots of current policy are to be found in the earlier years, even in the colonial period. Since the beginning of the New Order, the economist-technocrat group has played a significant role in rationalising the process of national development. However, given that actual political power is largely controlled by the President and his military elite, the policy outcomes have suffered from many inefficiencies and irrationalities. In these circumstances, transmigration policy has become a target for various interest groups, particularly the military and the economist-technocrats. The military basically perceived transmigration policy as a tool for strategic goals, such as national defense and security. The economist-technocrats, on the other hand, considered transmigration as a vehicle to promote regional development, especially in the Outer Islands. The principal actor in these competing interests in transmigration policy, though, appears to have been President Suharto himself. It was Suharto who revitalised transmigration policy and in the early years of the New Order saw transmigration as an important policy to solve the population problems of Java as well as for other development and security purposes.

The transmigration program as a public policy is mainly determined by the government or by the state. The input from the society, particularly during the
formulation of the policy, is almost negligible. The
government agencies, particularly the Department of
Transmigration and its regional offices, dominated the
whole process of implementation. As the entire policy
making process has been dominated by the central
government, the implementing agencies at the regional
level have not been able to make any changes or
alterations in whatever has been decided by the central
government. As a result, the problem of implementation,
such as lack of coordination between agencies during the
policy implementation, was unavoidable partly due to the
rigid and top-down hierarchical relationship between the
centre and the regional agencies.

In the New Order period, beginning in 1969, the
development plans have been regularly formulated every
five years. The primary indicator of the development goal
was the annual economic growth rate. This is no surprise,
given the dominant role of economist-technocrats in
formulating the plan. Another important feature of Five-
Year Development Plans was the use of a sectoral
framework as the basis for the national development
program. The primacy of the economist-technocrats in
formulating the development plan has resulted in a
condition where other goals have to be subordinated to
the achievement of economic growth. In the
implementation, however, there were occasions when
secondary or tertiary goals have been given national
priority, although from the economic point of view this
was not always justifiable. The transmigration program is an example of such an occasion. A plausible explanation of this 'irrational' situation is that transmigration in itself posits the characteristics of a so-called 'ideological' policy. Those characteristics are: strong political support from the president and the military leaders; resource availability; immunity from public criticism; high national priority; and multiple, ambiguous, and non measurable goals. President Suharto's strong support for transmigration was perhaps the most critical factor which institutionalized transmigration as an ideological policy. In Indonesia's New Order, the political environment that formed a pyramid of power with the President at the top became the basic explanation of the whole question of transmigration policy implementation.

The evidence from Riau and South Kalimantan suggests that the context of centre and regional relationships has played a crucial role in the implementation of transmigration policy. The position of the provincial-level government, as well as of the local society at large, were subordinated to the interests of the central government. They were thus structurally weak in relation to the central government. As a consequence of this unequal relationship, the implementation of transmigration policy has suffered from the lack of important controls and feedback mechanisms that could transform it into a viable and implementable policy.
Analysing transmigration policy within the wider context of centre and regional relationships indicates that transmigration policy clearly reflects the strength of centralisation in Indonesia's development.

The transmigrants, of whom the majority were Javanese, have been resettled and formed new communities in the lands of the Banjarese in South Kalimantan and the Malay in Riau. As transmigration is a national policy with strong political and economic support from the central government, any opposition, resentment or objections, however small, from the regions are not tolerable and could be easily labelled as provincialist, regionalist, or against the national interest. Within such unequal centre-regional relationships and hierarchical bureaucratic environments, the implementation of transmigration policy at the operational level becomes target oriented, and a 'so long as the boss is pleased' attitude is adopted.

At the operational level, as the case of implementation in Riau and South Kalimantan has shown, the ambiguous national goals of transmigration policy have been simply translated into physical and quantifiable targets, such as the number of families moved or the number of houses built. The preoccupation of the different sectors of implementing agencies with pursuing such physical and quantifiable targets has resulted in a failure to implement transmigration policy
as an integrated and complementary effort between the various sectors and ministries. The prevailing problems of implementation at the operational level—such as the unsuitability of land for agricultural settlements, the various forms of mismanagement within the implementing agencies, and the hidden conflicts with the local population—apparently have only limited effect on the policy-making process in the central government. This unhealthy situation has been tolerated mainly because financial resources have been abundant enough to cover-up the escalation of such problems. However, after the budget was drastically cut back as the revenue from oil collapsed, transmigration policy has started to confront new dimensions of these problems.

The period after 1986 has indicated that transmigration policy no longer enjoys the luxury of the previous boom period. After considering the limited financial resources for Repelita V (1989/90-1993/94) the government projected to move 550,000 families, of which only 180,000 are fully supported and the rest will be spontaneous transmigrants. The Repelita V plan document also showed the government to be in agreement with suggestions proposed by the World Bank, such as in bolstering cash-crop transmigration schemes and upgrading existing settlements. Only a few new transmigration settlements will be opened in the next five years. The new Minister for Transmigration, Major General Soegiarto, as far as can be observed from press
reports, has shown his awareness of the current problems and appears to be realistically directing the program towards more feasible goals.

At this stage there are two important factors that should be considered, particularly by planners and policy makers, to reevaluate the effectiveness of various government agencies responsible for implementing different aspects of transmigration policy. The first factor is the reality that the full political support and abundant financial resources enjoyed by the transmigration program in the last two Repelita were no guarantee of the satisfactory implementation of transmigration policy. The second factor concerns the financial crisis currently faced in implementing the policy, enabling only a limited number of transmigrants to be resettled with full government support. In such a situation, having a separate department responsible for implementing the transmigration program is wasteful. The amount of work that is currently carried out under the program could perhaps be more effectively conducted by an implementing agency at the level of Directorate General. Transmigration as basically a policy of moving people from provinces in Java and Bali to other islands would be more appropriately implemented under the Department of Home Affairs, which has relevant powers and experience to orchestrate the required activities between sending and receiving provincial governments. Yet, at present, a reorganisation of transmigration implementing agencies as
has been outlined above would confront the strong interests of the bureaucracy, particularly within the Department of Transmigration, to maintain control of the resources for transmigration program.

At the conceptual level a redefinition of the place and role of transmigration in national development should be initiated to provide a reasonable perception which can be used to formulate an adequate and sustainable policy in the future. Preceding a new definition, an updated national law on transmigration whereby transmigration policy would be given a proper function needs to be formulated. The existing national law on which transmigration policy is based (U.U. No. 2, 1972) has outlined very complex and ambitious functions and for that reason needs to be revised. Based on the existing national law, various aims of transmigration policy are not only complex and unmeasurable but often mutually contradictory. Furthermore, within the current framework, the program has been easily used to serve various interest groups within the ruling elite, and this has led to an unmanageable program. The setting of an ambitious target number in Repelita IV, for instance, reflected the balancing of various interests to obtain consensus. Such an ambitious target, however, led implementing agencies into immense problems and difficulties.

Unspecified goals under the current law have also been easily used to justify elusive motives, such as
regional development and national integration, the results of which are very difficult to measure. It is therefore urgent to revise the existing national law on transmigration to remove fallacies and misleading assumptions. A total review should be conducted to specify the function of transmigration policy in an appropriate way. In this new form, transmigration policy should be directed towards:

- more realistic assessment of those areas in Java that are considered to be experiencing acute population pressure. If transmigration from such areas is considered necessary then destination areas should be carefully selected in terms of whether or not they have the potential for such development.

- solving the problems created by natural catastrophes (erosion, drought, volcanic eruptions) or the need to evacuate population from areas being developed as artificial lakes, dams, reforestation areas, etc.

- in the Outer-Islands, transmigration should only be presented as one of the possibilities for regional development. In this case, however, the potentials of the region should be the measure used and not some abstract target-figure determined behind the desk with some other (disguised) motivations.

However, expecting that the current government will undertake the above suggestions in the near future is perhaps premature and overlooks the persistent interests of the present ruling elite in respect of the old assumptions. These persistent interests are in fact the most crucial factors in the process of redefining transmigration and the attainment of an adequate policy in the future.
This study has basically argued that there is a significant relationship between the current socio-political structure and the adoption of assumptions that perceive transmigration policy as a quick cure for many social problems. Within the existing social, economic and political structures the main factors and forces of the society have been formed and it has become the context within which current transmigration policy is justified. As far as the social and political structures are concerned, there are at least three important factors that can be identified which will significantly influence the course of transmigration policy in the near future.

The first factor is associated with the problem of "national integration" and centre-regional relationships. This problem has existed since the proclamation of independence, and remains as one of the major issues in the coming years. "National integration" has not only become the goal of the present government but also provides legitimation for other purposes. For example, the fact that in some places various groups of local people are still demanding autonomy or separation from the national government, such as in Irian Jaya, East Timor and Aceh, has justified the government view that national integration is still not fully achieved. In these cases, however, such centre-regional conflict has also reflected the deep resentment of the local people to the injustices performed by the national or central government. The current ruling elite, specifically the
military, have tended to hastily interpret such problems as threatening national integration and hence requiring efforts to prevent further problems. Among various ways of strengthening national integration, resettlement of Javanese into such areas under the guise of the transmigration program is likely to be one policy option.

The second important factor is the perception and belief among the authorities that economic and political problems are increasing as a consequence of population growth and population pressure in Java. Several critical consequences of such pressure as perceived by the authorities, such as poverty, landlessness, unemployment and social unrest, will obviously become the focus of government attention in the near future. The fact that such perceptions and beliefs are often not based on an accurate evaluation of the interlinking between social, economic and demographic changes in Java reflects the fallacies and misleading assumptions embraced by the ruling elites. In their view, there are not many policy options available to solve these problems; moving people to other islands therefore becomes a "rational" policy for the government. In such circumstances, for example, the relative success of the family planning program in lessening demographic pressures, particularly in levelling off the numbers of young people entering Java's labour force in the 1990s, is surprisingly not given much attention by the authorities. History has shown that some type of transmigration policy repeatedly crops up
whenever the authorities become nervous about Java's population problem. Another oil boom in the future would be a strong catalyst for a revival of this kind of policy.

The third major factor, which to some extent is linked with the second factor, is the preoccupation of economist-technocrats (supported by the World Bank) with a national macro-economic policy geared towards the attainment of economic growth. A logical consequence of "growth policy" is the tendency for the central government to concentrate on various industrial projects that are more capital intensive than on projects which could generate wide employment. As a result, economic policy needs to be adjusted to give greater emphasis to more labour intensive projects. Under the vague idea of regional development, transmigration is apparently considered a neat solution to the problem. This is evidently the case; even though the plan document for Repelita V has shown some changes in the direction of transmigration policy, the basic assumptions seem to be retained. Further government emphasis on PIR-Transmigration projects, as well as the plan to build a giant pulp mill in Irian Jaya in which the labour will be recruited from Java, could be seen in the light of this macro-economic scenario.

The emphasis of present transmigration policy is still essentially to reduce population problems in Java
through the movement, with or without government assistance, of poor, less educated, and unskilled rural Javanese to other islands. The central government, which formulated the transmigration policy, obviously ignored the already apparent facts that, while Java has developed into a 'modern industrial economy' and therefore has attracted more educated and skilled migrants from other places, many of the Outer Islands have been structured into stagnant or even regressing economies as transmigrants are settled in areas of relatively poor soils and natural resources are exhausted.¹

Viewed from this perspective, the prospect for transmigration policy, at least for the near future, does not seem very bright. Certain obvious factors, such as the limited areas in the Outer Islands suitable for agricultural settlements, will become major constraints for planners seeking to rebuild a large transmigration program, but, as demonstrated above, several other factors which currently dominate central government thinking will continue to underwrite the broad goals of transmigration policy. In the future, unless a

¹ After plummeting oil prices in the mid-'80s, the central government began to emphasize non-oil exports in national economic policy. Since then many regulations have been promulgated to create a more attractive climate and preconditions for foreign investment in Indonesia. The most recent regulation (Presidential Instruction No. 53/89) showed clearly that the government intended to develop many new industrial estates in Java rather than in the Outer Islands. The reasons, according to the Junior Minister for Industry, Tungky Aribowo, were mainly because infrastructure and labour are more readily accessible in Java than elsewhere (Tempo, 11 November 1989).
substantial change in the nature of the current military-
technocrats coalition occurs in which a more open and
democratic decision-making process is allowed,
transmigration policy is unlikely to move from its
current basic assumptions.
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Tjondronegoro, S. M. P.

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United Nations

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World Bank  
### APPENDICES:

**Appendix I. Riau: Transmigration Target and Realization (1961-1987)**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year Arrival</th>
<th>Location (Regency)</th>
<th>Target Families (families)</th>
<th>Realization Families</th>
<th>Realized Persons</th>
<th>Target (Per Cent)</th>
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**Note:** In February 1988 (at the time of field work) most of the settlements opened after 1978 were still under the Department of Transmigration.

**Source:** Kanwil Transmigrasi Riau, 1987.
Appendix 2, South Kalimantan: Transmigration (and Colonization) Target and Realization 1938–1988

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**Notes:**
2. In February 1988 (at the time of field work) most of the settlements opened after 1978 were still under the Department of Transmigration.

**Sources:**
- Pelzer (1945: 224, 225, 264)
- Bappeda Kalimantan Selatan (1985:2)
- Djohansyah (1986: 11-13)
- Kanwil Transmigrasi Kalimantan Selatan (1987:15)