THE POLITICS OF UPWARD MOBILITY

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Sociology at the Australian National University.

This thesis is my own work and all the sources used in its composition have been acknowledged.
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Chapter 1
SOME PRELIMINARIES

Introduction

Voting studies in many countries have shown that middle class individuals typically vote for parties favourable to business interests, while members of the working class tend to vote for parties more nearly representative of the interests of labour. It seems that a man's class position has a significant effect on his political preference.

In the light of this situation it is interesting to consider the case of individuals who, while of working class parentage, are themselves in important respects members of the middle class. I shall refer to such individuals as the upwardly mobile. We might speculate that the voting behaviour of these people will reflect the influences of both their class of origin and class of destination.

The purpose of this study is to examine just what the political consequences of upward mobility are, and to consider in detail one theory which has been put forward to account for these consequences.

I have spoken of the upwardly mobile as members of the middle class "in important respects". In subsequent chapters I shall take this to mean that they are members of the middle class as far as their occupation is concerned. Specifically, I shall treat upward mobility as movement from manual to nonmanual occupations. Such a convention needs justification and the rest of this chapter is devoted to that end. What is needed is an analysis of the relationship of class to the manual-nonmanual dichotomy. I must begin therefore with a discussion of the concept of class,
which so far has not been defined.

The Definition of Class

For many purposes, the most appropriate terminology is that originally suggested by Weber [1946: 180-195], and more recently advocated by Runciman [1968: 25-61]. Weber saw society as stratified along three dimensions, those of class, status and power, class being for him the purely economic dimension. This framework has the advantage of analytic precision, but it also has the following limitation. A class in the Weberian sense may simply be a statistical aggregate of individuals with no conception of themselves as members of that class and no interests in common other than the purely economic. In other words, in Weber's scheme of things classes are analytic constructs and not empirical phenomena.

But such a usage is inappropriate in the present context.

In talking of the relationship between party and class we do not wish to restrict attention to the correlation between party and narrow economic interest, as would be necessary if we accepted the Weberian definition of class. We know that the worker, for example, is influenced in his voting behaviour not only by his economic interests but also by the working class subculture, that is, by the norms and values of the social group to which he belongs [Parkin, 1967]. Therefore, to encompass the total relationship between party and class a suitable definition of class must isolate actual social groupings.

A second approach is to treat class in terms of men's subjective class identifications. (For example, Butler and Stokes make this choice in their study of the relationship of
class to party in Britain [1969: 66].) Like the Weberian approach this procedure has the advantage of definitional precision: a man's class is what he says it is. But again there are disadvantages. As Reissman points out, the fact that a man identifies with a certain class does not necessarily mean that he is conscious of that class as a social group to which he belongs [1960: 39]. He may be quite unrealistic in his class identification. In any case, for some groups class may have little significance and the class identification of such people can have little meaning. In short, classes defined in terms of self-identification may be artificial groupings.

The problem with both the Weberian and 'subjective class' approaches is that they achieve definitional precision by sacrificing any conception of classes as empirical phenomena. In contrast, I should like to make use of an empirical approach which bypasses the need for an abstract definition of class.

Our aim, it will be recalled, is to analyse the relationship of the manual-nonmanual dichotomy to the class structure. If we can demonstrate empirically that our occupational dichotomy coincides with a number of other sociological dichotomies then we shall have identified a division of society into two natural groupings; natural in the sense that members of one group have in common with each other a number of characteristics which they do not share with members of the other group. Further, since nonmanual occupations are generally better paid and more highly regarded than manual jobs, these groupings will bear a hierarchical relationship to each other, exercising unequal control over the resources of society. Thus we shall be able
to regard our occupational dichotomy as an index of a division of society into two basic social strata. Finally, if, in accordance with the class identifications of many of the members of these two groups, we label the upper stratum the middle class and the lower stratum, the working class, the manual-nonmanual criterion becomes an index of class differences.

The procedure I am advocating bypasses the need to define class in general and defines instead two particular classes. However, it must be noted that even these two groupings are imperfectly specified. Although there is no difficulty in placing the 'typical' individual in one of the two classes, there are many other marginal individuals who, in terms of some characteristics are middle class and, in terms of others, are working class. Such imprecision is often unavoidable when dealing with empirical phenomena, but it is not necessarily a bad thing, for at least it avoids what Kaplan calls the "premature closure of our ideas" [1964: 70]. Let me quote Kaplan a little further on this point:

The demand for exactness of meaning and for precise definition of terms can easily have a pernicious effect, as I believe it often has had in behavioural science ... There is a certain kind of behavioural scientist who, at the least threat of an exposed ambiguity, scurries for cover like a hermit crab into the nearest abandoned logical shell. But there is no ground for panic. That a cognitive situation is not as well structured as we would like does not imply that no inquiry made in that situation is really scientific. On the contrary, ... the scientist is in no hurry for closure. Tolerance of ambiguity is as important for creativity in science as it is anywhere else [1964: 70-71].
Occupation as an Index of Class

I must now demonstrate that the manual-nonmanual dichotomy is in fact an index of a division of society into middle and working classes. But before I do, two exceptions must be noted. First, in the case of women, the manual-nonmanual criterion is a misleading index of class position. This is because manual jobs for women are very limited and consequently many women who, by all other criteria are members of the working class, nevertheless find employment in lowly, but nonmanual positions. For this reason they will be excluded from this and subsequent discussion.

Again, in the case of farmers, the manual-nonmanual dichotomy is a dubious index of class divisions, and in any case in most countries farmers exhibit patterns of political allegiance which are somewhat unrelated to the urban-industrial class structure. Therefore farmers (and farmers' sons) will also be excluded from this study.

Having noted these exclusions we may now discuss the relationship of the manual-nonmanual dichotomy to a number of other sociological variables. The first variable I shall consider is subjective social class.

Surveys have shown that belief in the existence of classes is widespread and that the great majority of people identify with either the middle or the working class [Broom et al., 1968: 218; Butler and Stokes, 1969: 66; Centers, 1949: 77]. Let us look at precisely how this subjective class dichotomy relates to the manual-nonmanual distinction. If we group occupations into six or seven categories according to their relative prestige, then
we find, not surprisingly, that as we move up the occupational scale the proportion of each occupational group which identifies with the middle class increases. But, in the Australian and American cases, there are two very much more important aspects of this relationship. First, every occupational grouping above the manual-nonmanual line consists predominantly of middle class identifiers while every group below the line consists predominantly of working class identifiers. Secondly, the proportion of middle class identifiers does not rise steadily as we move up the occupational scale, but rather a very much sharper rise occurs as we move across the manual-nonmanual line than at any other point on the scale [Broom et al., 1968: 225; Centers, 1949: 96]. In short, in both these countries a man's subjective class identification is more closely related to the manual-nonmanual dichotomy than to any other occupational dichotomy.

However, it is not possible to assert this conclusion generally, since the recent British survey by Butler and Stokes produced slightly different results. They found that, unlike the Australian and American cases, in Britain the lowest nonmanual group consists predominantly of working class identifiers. They found further that the proportion of middle class identifiers in Britain jumps sharply at two points on the occupational scale: first at the manual-nonmanual line, but secondly, even more dramatically, at the dividing line between the lowest nonmanual group and the group immediately above it [1969: 70]. Their interpretation of these findings was that in seeking to relate occupation to
dichotomous subjective class, the manual-nonmanual distinction must be discarded and instead the occupational scale must be dichotomized so as to include the lowest nonmanual group with the manual workers.

Despite this result it is clear that even in Britain the manual-nonmanual distinction is a reliable predictor of subjective class and that given the Australian and American data we are justified in accepting this division of the occupational scale as the most natural one in the context of class identification.

Further support for the significance of the manual-nonmanual distinction comes from its relation to political preference. Many studies have shown that manual workers are more inclined than nonmanual workers to vote for radical parties. But, ironically, for evidence of the precise correspondence of our occupational dichotomy with the radical-conservative dichotomy we must return to the survey conducted by Butler and Stokes. They found that, similarly to their findings on class identification, the proportion of each occupational group voting for the Conservatives increases as we move up the occupational scale, but that, in contrast with those findings, the sharpest increase occurs at the manual-nonmanual line. Furthermore, again in contrast with their findings on class identification, all groups above the manual-nonmanual line vote predominantly for the Conservatives while all those below vote predominantly for the Labour Party [1969: 77]. Thus the British findings on political preference further justify the particular occupational dichotomy chosen.
There is another item of information supporting this choice in the Australian context. Anderson and Western have shown that, using a six-point occupational scale, the children of men in each group above the manual-nonmanual line are over-represented in certain professional faculties of Australian universities while the children of men in all groups below the line are under-represented [1970].

A more general reason for our choice is that the work situations of the two occupational groups differ significantly. Nonmanual workers are typically involved in an occupational structure which offers them regular promotion and a lifelong career, while manual workers, early in their working lives, reach a level beyond which they cannot progress [Runciman, 1969: 58]. Furthermore this difference in work situation is associated with ideological differences. Nonmanual workers, seeing before them an occupational ladder, stress the value of individual effort, while manual workers, conscious that opportunities for individual achievement are not available to them, emphasise collective action as the only way of bettering their lot [Runciman, 1969: 61].

Finally, we may cite the important differences between the life styles of manual and nonmanual workers. For example, the nonmanual worker is more inclined to invite people to his home, go visiting with his wife, join clubs and to value education than his manual counterpart [Goldthorpe et al., 1969, Chaps. 4 and 5; Runciman, 1969: 57-62; Willmott and Young, 1960].

In the light of the many differences I have mentioned it seems reasonable to conclude that the manual-nonmanual
distinction is in fact an index of a division of society into two basic social strata - the middle and the working classes. Consequently we can with some justification regard movement across this line as a suitable index of mobility. (Of course it must be conceded that as well as this theoretical justification there is a practical consideration. Most other students of mobility have chosen to work with the manual-nonmanual dichotomy and therefore, in the interests of comparability, I must do likewise.)
The purpose of this chapter is to bring together prior findings on how the upwardly mobile vote and, at chapter's end, to introduce some new Australian results. However, the bulk of the chapter will be concerned with interpreting the somewhat ambiguous American data.

Surveys in many European countries and in the United States all show that the upwardly mobile are more conservative than fellow countrymen in manual occupations. It seems that upward mobility is universally accompanied by an increase in political conservatism [Butler and Stokes, 1969: 98; Lipset and Zetterberg, 1964: 457; Lipset and Zetterberg, 1959: 67; Iopreato, 1967: 587].

At the same time the data indicate that in Europe the upwardly mobile remain, statistically speaking, significantly more radical than those born into the middle class, adopting a political stance somewhere between their classes of origin and destination. The European results are summarized in Table 1. (The British data, presented by Butler and Stokes, are not included in the table since they are not strictly comparable. Nevertheless they conform to the same pattern.)
TABLE 1
Percentages of Urban European Men Voting Left, by Mobility+

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Party Choice</th>
<th>Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manual Immobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (Socialist, Soc. Dem., Communist)</td>
<td>71(189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (Socialist, Soc. Dem.)</td>
<td>64(357)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (Communist, Soc. Dem.)++</td>
<td>81(1017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway (Communist, Labour)</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (Soc. Dem.)</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Sources are quoted in the text. People not expressing a party choice are eliminated from this table. N's are given in brackets in this and subsequent tables.

* Incomplete data.

++ The two Lipset and Zetterberg sources differ in the number of upwardly mobile sampled in the Finnish survey. I have chosen the later published figure for use in this table.

Unlike the European case, the political position of the upwardly mobile in America is very similar to that of the middle-class immobile. In fact, according to Lipset and Zetterberg, "the American data ...indicate that successfully upwardly mobile sons of workers are even more conservative in party choice than those middle class individuals whose fathers held occupations comparable to their own" [1964: 456]. Indeed Iopreato, who endorses this claim, has developed a theory explaining why upwardly mobile Americans 'over-conform' to the political norms of the middle class. His theory runs as follows: in America success is the supreme goal, to which all
can and must aspire; as a result, upward mobility gives the achiever enormous satisfaction, and a sense of relief at having 'made it'; this is likely to give rise to a 'cult of gratitude', an attitude of deep-seated appreciation towards the social order for making the present pleasures possible; "(s)uch gratitude is then expressed through an 'overconformity' to the prescribed behaviour of the middle class, specifically, by voting for (the Republican party)" [1967: 592].

But such theorizing is, I believe, premature, for the data which, according to Lipset, Zetterberg and Lopreato, demonstrate the political overconformity of upwardly mobile Americans, are equivocal at best. To prove this I must undertake a systematic review of the evidence and the following sections are devoted to this task.

The Michigan Surveys

The principal evidence cited by the three authors was collected by the Michigan Survey Research Centre. It is presented in Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left Voting of Urban American Middle Class Men, by Mobility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent voting Democratic in...</th>
<th>Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upwardly Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>35(72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>22(67)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The trends in this table are certainly in the direction sought by Iopreato, Lipset and Zetterberg and were interpreted by them as evidence of political overconformity. But in fact the table provides us with no reason to reject the null hypothesis that in America the upwardly mobile are politically similar to the middle class immobile. If $x^2$ is calculated for these figures we get values of .24 for the 1948 election and 1.18 for the 1952 election, indicating that in both cases the difference between the upwardly mobile and the middle class immobile is very far from being statistically significant.

Maccoby's Study of Cambridge Youth

A second piece of evidence, cited by Lipset and Zetterberg, is the study by E.E. Maccoby of the political attitudes of youth in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1952 [1954: 23-39]. According to Lipset and Zetterberg, "Maccoby found that upward mobile youth in Cambridge were more Republican than non-mobiles in the class to which the upward mobile moved" [1964: 460]. The evidence actually presented by Maccoby is contained in Tables 3 and 4.

### TABLE 3
**Party Preference of Middle Class Cambridge Youth, by Mobility**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent who are (have) ⋯</th>
<th>Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upwardly Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican definitely</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican leanings</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic leanings</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic definitely</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(82)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 4
Presidential Choice of Middle Class Cambridge Youth, by Mobility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobility</th>
<th>Upwardly Mobile</th>
<th>Nonmanual Immobile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevenson</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(82)</td>
<td>(72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let us first examine Table 3 for evidence of the Lipset-Zetterberg claim. To facilitate the discussion let us collapse Table 3 to form Table 5.

TABLE 5
Party Preference of Middle Class Cambridge Youth, by Mobility (Collapsed version).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobility</th>
<th>Upwardly Mobile</th>
<th>Nonmanual Immobile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(82)</td>
<td>(72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first line of Table 5 suggests that, in apparent conformity with the claim made by Lipset and Zetterberg for Maccoby's findings, the upwardly mobile are more inclined than the nonmanual immobile to prefer the Republicans. However the value of \( \chi^2 \) for the difference is a mere .16. In other words, if the Lipset-Zetterberg claim is based on these data, it is based on
a difference which, statistically speaking, is totally insignificant.

If, on the other hand, their claim is made on the basis of Table 4 it is again ill-founded, since \( \chi^2 \) for that difference is only 1.58. Whichever the case the Lipset-Zetterberg interpretation of Maccoby's findings must be rejected.

It is worth observing that Table 5 can be interpreted in quite another way. Scrutinizing the third line of the table enables us to make the following claim: "Maccoby found that upward mobile youth in Cambridge were more Democratic than non-mobiles in the class to which the upward mobile moved." Furthermore this difference is statistically significant, being supported by a \( \chi^2 \) of 4.99.

Thus the overall conclusion from Maccoby's study is that amongst Cambridge youth the upwardly mobile are significantly more Democratic and not significantly more Republican than the nonmanual immobile. It seems that Lipset and Zetterberg have misinterpreted her results. Here indeed is strong evidence against the assumed political overconformity of upwardly mobile Americans.

The M.I.T. Study

A third piece of evidence cited by the proponents of the overconformity thesis is a study by the M.I.T. Centre for International Studies in 1955, involving 1,000 randomly selected American business executives. According to Lipset and Zetterberg, "these data show that only 5 per cent of the children of manual workers are Democrats as compared with 10 per cent Democratic among the executive sons of middle or upper-class
fathers" [1964: 460]. Unfortunately, since these data are apparently unpublished, it has not been possible to check the details. However Lipset and Zetterberg admit elsewhere that "the differences are too small to be significant" [1959: 67].

West's Study of College Graduates

In a forthcoming book, Iopreato cites further evidence of the overconformity of upwardly mobile Americans in the work of Patricia West [1954: 465-480]. As part of her study West looked at American college graduates who, at the time of her survey in 1947, had made progress in their chosen careers and were financially well-off (earning more than $7,500 a year). She singled out two groups of such men: those who had worked their way through college, earning more than half their college expenses, and those who had earned none of their college expenses, having been supported by their parents. These she termed the self-made and the privileged men respectively.

Clearly the former, starting from a relatively impoverished situation, may be regarded as upwardly mobile while the latter are, in some sense, the middle class immobile. Of course there is not an exact correspondence between West's two groups and the two occupationally defined groups I have been using, but then it must be remembered that occupation is only an index of class differences. In the present context, West's definitions provide an alternative index with which to approach the study of upward mobility.

In her article West was concerned to see whether, for college graduates, the economic status they attain in later life is a better indicator of their political attitudes than is their
economic origin. She therefore compared her two groups of men on the politically relevant question of whether or not they favoured laissez-faire government. Her results are presented in Table 6.

TABLE 6
Proportions of Self-made and Privileged Men Opposed to Government Planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per cent favouring...</th>
<th>Earned half to all college expenses</th>
<th>Earned none of college expenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laissez-faire</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(484)</td>
<td>(338)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that the difference suggested in Table 6 is statistically insignificant ($\chi^2 = .37$). Therefore, given West's concern, we might have expected her to conclude from these data that self-made men were "just as opposed to government planning as the originally privileged group". Instead she actually wrote that they were "if anything, more opposed to government planning than the originally privileged group" (emphasis in original) [1954: 479]. Whether or not the former were really more opposed than the latter is irrelevant to her concern and she can be forgiven the statistical licence she takes in making this assertion.

However, Lopreato quotes this observation by West as evidence of the political overconformity of upwardly mobile Americans. In doing so he takes the statement from a context
in which the statistical inaccuracy is unimportant to a context in which it is critical. West's statement is simply unacceptable as evidence of political overconformity.

Interestingly enough, there is in West's article some good evidence that upwardly mobile Americans are not as conservative as the immobile middle class. She presents data on the party affiliations of self-made and privileged men, analysed by age. In the context of the overconformity thesis West's age analysis is irrelevant and so we may amalgamate her age groupings. Doing so yields the information presented in Table 7.

**TABLE 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Affiliations of Self-made and Privileged Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per cent Preferring...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 enables us to conclude that the privileged men are significantly more Republican than the self-made men ($x^2 = 3.89$). Thus, far from supporting Lopreato's viewpoint, West's data provide significant evidence that the upwardly mobile in America are less conservative than the middle class immobile.

**The Work of Richard Centers**

The last piece of evidence which is relevant to the question of political overconformity comes from the work of Richard
Centers [1949: 180]. On the basis of a battery of questions he divided respondents in a 1945-1947 survey into radical, intermediate and conservative categories. By relating this to mobility he obtained the results presented in Table 8.

**TABLE 8**

Political Stance of American Middle Class Men, by Mobility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per cent who were...</th>
<th>Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upwardly Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(103)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although this table reveals a trend to radicalism on the part of the upwardly mobile, it is not statistically significant (for conservatives, \( \chi^2 = .46 \)). Nevertheless, Centers' results are inconsistent with the overconformity thesis, a fact which Lopreato acknowledges in his forthcoming book.

**Political Overconformity: The Verdict**

In reviewing the data cited by Lopreato and Lipset and Zetterberg not one piece of statistically significant evidence has been found to support the proposition that in America the upwardly mobile are more conservative than the middle class immobile. On the other hand two items of statistically significant evidence (West and Maccoby) have been found to support the proposition that in America the upwardly mobile are more radical than the middle class immobile. Clearly therefore, on
present evidence, the political overconformity thesis must be rejected. But clearly also, in the light of all the evidence, we cannot confidently assert that the upwardly mobile are actually more radical than the middle class immobile. Until further studies are done it is safest to conclude that upwardly mobile Americans are politically indistinguishable from their immobile middle class compatriots.

The Australian Case

While not all the claims made about the politics of the upwardly mobile in America are true, there is no doubt that the European and American experiences differ markedly. In the former case the upwardly mobile adopt a political stance somewhere between their classes of origin and destination, while in the latter they vote the same way as those born into the middle class. In the light of this difference it is interesting to examine the Australian case, presented in Table 9.

TABLE 9
Mobility and the Vote in Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per cent Voting for...</th>
<th>Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manual Immobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.I.P.</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.C.P.</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(474)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For A.I.P., voters all differences are significant except that between the upwardly and downwardly mobile.
These data were collected in a nationwide survey of the Australian electorate conducted in 1967 by the Political Science Department of the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University (for an account of the sampling procedure see Kahan and Aitkin, 1968). The data in Table 9 are for male household heads. Farmers and sons of farmers are excluded.

It should be noted that the category "other" in the table consists mainly of people whose voting preference was not determined. The percentages in this group are rather larger than might be expected, because the data were gathered either by asking directly, if the respondent himself was the household head, or, if the respondent was the head's wife, by asking her about her spouse. In the first case the following question was used: "If a Federal election were held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?" In the second case the respondent was asked first whether her husband preferred any political party, and then, if he did, which it was. Predictably, the second, indirect approach did not elicit party preference as readily as the more normal direct approach. Hence the relatively large proportions in the category "other".

The actual division of household heads into manual and nonmanual workers is that used by Broom and Jones [1969(b):651]. It is based on the A.N.U. occupation code [Broom et al., 1965].

Mainly for reasons of symmetry Table 9 contains data on both the upwardly and the downwardly mobile.

The data indicate that in Australia, while the upwardly
are more conservative than the manual immobile, they are at the same time considerably more radical than the immobile middle class. Thus the Australian experience conforms to the European and not the American pattern.

**Upward Mobility and Political Apathy**

It should be observed that this study is concerned with the increased political conservatism of the upwardly mobile. Nothing has been said about the possibility that the upwardly mobile might be at the same time less likely than immobile groups to nominate a political preference. Lipset has, in fact, suggested a theory of 'cross pressures' which predicts greater political apathy on the part of the upwardly mobile. The idea is that this group will be subject to pulls from different political directions and will react to this conflict by withdrawal from involvement [Lipset et al., 1954: 1133-34]. Lipset cites some evidence of this phenomenon, but Lopreato's Italian data, which I cited earlier but did not present in full, and the Australian data presented here do not support the thesis. In any case the two processes - increased political apathy and increased political conservatism - may be studied quite independently, and it is the latter process which is the concern of this study.
Chapter 3

A THEORY OF CLASS DISCRIMINATION

As demonstrated in the last chapter, the political behaviour of upwardly mobile Americans is somewhat different from that of their European counterparts. Two American sociologists, Lipset and Zetterberg [1964: 64-66], have offered an explanation of this difference in terms of varying degrees of class discrimination. In this chapter I shall discuss their theory and its development by Lopreato [1967: 586-92], and in the next, I shall attempt to extend it to the Australian case.

The theory is as follows. When a person moves up in the economic hierarchy his life style, which is an important component of his social class, may lag behind. The greater the discrepancies between the middle and working class life styles, the greater will be the difficulty experienced by an upwardly mobile person in adjusting himself to the style of his new class, and the more likely he is to feel discriminated against. Advancing this argument in the context of the trans-Atlantic comparison Lipset writes:

Given the much wider discrepancy in consumption styles between the European and American middle and working class, one would expect the upwardly mobile European of working class origin to have somewhat greater difficulties in adjusting to his higher status, and to feel more discriminated against than his American counterpart, much like the successfully upwardly mobile Negro or other minority ethnic member in America comparing himself with a native-born Protestant white [1960: 254-255].
Normally, the argument continues, the "pervasive influence of contact with superior status on attitudes and behaviour" [Lipset, 1960: 258] leads the upwardly mobile to emulate the voting habits of their former social superiors. But when the newcomer to the middle class feels discriminated against, his tendency to emulate middle class voting behaviour is weakened. Hence in Europe the upwardly mobile are less inclined to change their vote than are their American counterparts.

Lipset and Zetterberg do not develop this theory at length; nor do they offer any evidence for it. It was left to Lopreato to continue where they left off. But before looking at Lopreato's contribution three fairly extensive comments on the theory should be made.

1. Political Resocialization

There are really two distinct features of the findings covered by this theory. The first is the fact that upward mobility is universally accompanied by increased conservatism; the second, the fact that this process is more marked in America than in Europe. Of course these facts are inter-dependent and so it is not surprising that in seeking to explain the second, which they do in terms of class discrimination, Lipset and Zetterberg unavoidably offer at the same time an explanation of the first, in terms of the emulation of social superiors. But it must be borne in mind that the Lipset-Zetterberg theory was put forward as an explanation of trans-Atlantic differences. It must therefore be judged on its ability to account for these differences and not on the adequacy of the explanation it offers of the increased
conservatism of the upwardly mobile.

But having conceded this, we may observe that to explain the increased conservatism of the upwardly mobile in terms of the "pervasive influence of contact with superior status on attitudes and behaviour" is not entirely satisfactory. The phrase suggests that the upwardly mobile individual simply copies those around him with no thought for where his own interests lie. However, it seems more realistic to suggest that the upwardly mobile person votes in accordance with what he sees his interests to be, although, of course, in deciding what his interests are he may simply adopt the views of the longer established middle class individuals with whom he associates.

Therefore, since the reasons for the upwardly mobile's increased conservatism are debatable, and since the whole issue is relatively unimportant in the explanation of international differences, in subsequent discussion I shall describe the process, in more general terms, as one of 'political re-socialization'. (Incidentally, Lopreato uses this phrase to describe the process to which the downwardly mobile are subject [1970: 450].)

2. Class Discrimination

It should be noted that while the indented quotation above refers to 'feelings of discrimination', I have talked of actual discrimination. This needs justification.

In the first place, Lipset indicates that felt and actual discrimination are closely linked in his mind when he uses the situation of the negro to illustrate his meaning. There is no
doubt that the negro feels discriminated against because he is discriminated against.

Moreover, class discrimination does not necessarily refer to a policy consciously adopted by one class against another; it can be of a more insidious nature. Middle class individuals may be quite unaware of their tendency to select friends from amongst their own class. Furthermore, the subtle sanctions they apply against those who fail to conform to the middle class life style may be seen as directed not at the working class but simply at bad manners and bad taste. However, although this subtle form of class discrimination may pass unrecognised by those who practice it, it is still class discrimination, and its effects are felt by those at whom it is directed. Once this is understood it is clear that feelings of discrimination can be equated legitimately with the actual presence of class discrimination.

3. Status Inconsistency

The third comment is really only a digression. It concerns a possible confusion of the Lipset-Zetterberg theory with Lenski's theory of status inconsistency [1954: 405-413]. Lenski suggested that the inconsistency between an individual's positions on various status scales might contribute to his likelihood of voting left, quite independently of the contribution made by his position on any one of those scales. The idea was that an individual who expected to be treated in accordance with his high position on one scale (say high income), but who was in fact treated in accordance with his low position on another (say low education), would feel frustrated, and would give vent to
this frustration by voting for a party which promised some change in the social order and therefore, hopefully, of his situation.

There is no doubt that the upwardly mobile individual is a status inconsistent in Lenski's terms, for he is high on the economic scale and low in terms of class of origin. Furthermore, this is an inconsistency between an achieved status (economic situation) and an ascribed status (class of origin) - the type of inconsistency which is most likely to affect political preference [Jackson, 1962: 476]. Thus it might appear that the effect hypothesized by Lipset and Zetterberg is simply a special case of the effect hypothesized by Lenski. But in reality the two effect are quite distinct. The basic assumption of the Lenski model is that, in the absence of inconsistency effects, the status inconsistent's political preference is determined by taking some kind of weighted average of his positions on the various status scales. But the basic assumption of the Lipset-Zetterberg theory is that in the absence of 'inconsistency effects' (feelings of discrimination) the vote of the upwardly mobile individual will be determined exclusively by his economic status. To put it another way: suppose the probability that a mobile individual will vote left is found to be a simple average of the middle and working class probabilities of voting left. Then, in Lenski's terms there is no inconsistency effect, while in terms of the Lipset-Zetterberg hypothesis, class discrimination is operative. Thus the effects hypothesized by Lenski are not those hypothesized by Lipset and Zetterberg. Consequently,
although on the surface the two theories appear to be closely related they are in fact quite distinct.

Lopreato's Contribution

We can now turn to Lopreato's contribution. He has concentrated on two separate aspects of the Lipset-Zetterberg theory. First he points out that it fails to account for the hypothesized political overconformity of upwardly mobile Americans, and he attempts to remedy this deficiency by combining the Lipset-Zetterberg theory with the 'cult of gratitude' theory mentioned in the last chapter. However, since the political overconformity of upwardly mobile Americans is yet to be demonstrated, this aspect of Lopreato's work need not detain us.

The second aspect of his work is his attempt to determine whether the mechanism of class discrimination does in fact operate as hypothesized. He isolates two elements of the process postulated by Lipset and Zetterberg:

I. discrepancies in consumption styles, and
II. feelings of discrimination,

and he sets out to study these elements in Italy, a country where the political resocialization of the upwardly mobile is far from complete.

I. Consumption Patterns

Lopreato's expectation in relation to consumption patterns is that when the upwardly mobile succeed in adjusting their consumption styles to that of the old-time middle class, they will also become politically similar. He thus formulates two hypotheses:
I(1) Newcomers to the middle class have a lower consumption style than old-timers:

I(2) As the newcomers attain the consumption style of the old-timers they become comparable to them in political orientation.

Measuring consumption style by the number of consumer durables owned he found support for the first but not the second hypothesis.

It is not surprising that hypothesis I(2) was unsupported. Although possibly the case in America, in most other countries style of consumption is not identical with scale of consumption.

To try to measure consumption style by the number of items owned is quite unacceptable.

But this criticism should be carried a step further. Lopreato singles out 'discrepancies in consumption style' for discussion, and although this phrase was used by Lipset, above, he was clearly referring to discrepancies in 'living style'.

(Indeed this latter phrase was used elsewhere by Lipset and Zetterberg [1959: 66].) The sort of discrepancies which are most likely to give rise to feelings of discrimination are not simply matters of consumption, but cultural intangibles such as table manners, taste and speech. According to Melvin Tumin:

(often), when status-mobiles, with full credentials in hand, knock upon the doors of elite membership groups, demanding acceptance and recognition, ... (they are) denied the final bestowals of grace on grounds quite irrelevant to those which presumably determine one's right to such recognition. Even though sufficient income, education, occupational rank, commodiousness of residence, and auxiliary criteria have been met, the occupants of the top statuses invoke other criteria, such as kinship, ethnic origin, table and bar manners, and coldness
of emotional toning, in order to justify the denial to the status-mobiles of access to intimacy with them in their own highly-ranked associations [1957: 33].

The class (as opposed to racial) discrimination recognised here is more a matter of life style than style of consumption.

In the light of these various comments it seems reasonable to conclude on a priori grounds that no index of material consumption can be a useful indicator of whether the upwardly mobile have been accepted into the middle class. (In fairness to Lopreato it should be pointed out that he advances these criticisms himself in discussing his findings.)

II. Feelings of Discrimination

Lopreato's data on 'feelings of discrimination' came from the following question: "In your opinion, do those who belong to a given social class tend to restrict their relations with persons belonging to other social classes?" In order to ensure that answers to this question were relevant to the theory he had to assume that "the perceptions produced by the question reflect personal experiences" [1967: 590]. In other words, he had to assume that those who claimed that inter-class relations were restricted did so because they had personal experience of these restrictions. With this in mind, Lopreato was able to predict, on the basis of the theory, that:

II(1) Newcomers to the middle class are more likely than the old-timers to perceive restrictions on inter-class relations.

II(2) Among the newcomers, those who perceive obstructions to inter-class relations are politically more leftist than those who do not perceive such restrictions.
Finally, those who do not perceive impediments to inter-class relations are politically alike—whether old-timers or upwardly mobile.

Lopreato found support for all three hypotheses. But before we take this as evidence for the theory of class discrimination, a few comments on interpretation are necessary.

First, the interpretation of II(1) is somewhat ambiguous. We have assumed that respondents answer Lopreato's question on the basis of personal experience. But in the case of an old-time member of the middle class, precisely what experience he draws on is not clear. Possibly in answering the question he considers whether he has experienced discrimination at the hands of the working class. If this is the case, II(1) involves the issue of working class discrimination against the middle class and hence is not relevant to a theory of middle class discrimination.

However, old-time members of the middle class are unlikely to conceive of the possibility of working class discrimination against themselves. Let us therefore accept the more likely alternative that the old-timer answers Lopreato's question on the basis of whether or not he perceives his own middle class closing ranks against working class intruders.

Similarly, and Lopreato makes this point [1967: 590], the upwardly mobile are more likely to answer the question on the basis of perceived discrimination by their social superiors, the old-time middle class, than on the basis of discrimination by the working class.

These points conceded, II(1) involves a comparison of newcomers with old-timers on the extent to which each is aware
of discrimination by the middle class. This comparison is relevant to the theory, for if middle class discrimination exists we would expect those who suffer it to be more sensitive to its existence than those who practice it. Therefore, since Lopreato found support for II(1) we can accept this as evidence for the existence of middle class discrimination.

Lopreato's hypothesis II(2) is quite straightforward, but his II(3) might have been better formulated. The theory predicts that those amongst the upwardly mobile who experience no discrimination will be politically similar to the whole of the immobile middle class. However Lopreato compares the former group not with the latter, but with only those amongst the immobile middle class who perceive no restrictions on inter-class relations. This is unnecessarily restrictive but it does not detract from the relevance of the result.

In summary, these three hypotheses provide convincing evidence for the theory of class discrimination, always assuming that respondents answer the question on the basis of personal experience. But it is this assumption I should like to call into question in what follows.

An Alternative Interpretation of Lopreato's Evidence

Lopreato's assumption about the way respondents answered his question was essentially unsupported. Often, such assumptions pass unnoticed, or are deemed 'reasonable', until an alternative assumption is produced. In the present context an alternative is at hand, and I should like to discuss it at some length in order to highlight the critical
n the nature of Lopreato's assumption.

In order to introduce my alternative I must begin with a brief discussion of the middle class and traditional working class social perspectives. Goldthorpe and associates have described these two perspectives as follows:

(The traditional working class) conception of the social order is a dichotomous one: society is divided into 'us' and 'them'. 'They' are persons in positions in which they can exercise power and authority over 'us'. The division between 'us' and 'them' is seen as a virtually unbridgeable one; people are born on one side of the line or the other and very largely remain there...

(On the other hand, the typical middle class) conception of the social order is a hierarchical one: society is seen as divided into a series of levels or strata differentiated in terms of life styles and associated prestige of their members. The structure is, however, seen as a relatively 'open' one: given ability and the appropriate moral qualities - determination, perseverance, etc. - individuals can, and do, move up in the hierarchy [1969: 118-120].

Goldthorpe acknowledges that these two perspectives are ideal types, but he argues, citing evidence, that, at least in Britain, the two types have some empirical foundation.

Clearly, if these ideal-typical perspectives prevail in Italy, they will influence the answers to Lopreato's question. Members of the working class will be predisposed to believe that inter-class relations are restricted while members of the middle class will be predisposed to believe that they are not.

The alternative to Lopreato's assumption can now be stated: it is that respondents answer the question on the basis of the class perspectives described by Goldthorpe and not on the basis of personal experience.
If this assumption is to be regarded as a serious alternative, then I must show that it yields a satisfactory explanation of the relationships which Lopreato found, since if those relationships 'make sense' only on the basis of Lopreato's assumption, then we will have reason to prefer that assumption to the alternative. Let us therefore consider the implications of our alternative assumption.

Since opinion on the closure of class relations is, we are assuming, simply a class-determined belief, the general process of class resocialization to which the upwardly mobile are subject will operate to change that opinion. Thus we may expect the upwardly mobile to become less inclined than the immobile working class but to remain more inclined than the immobile middle class, to assert that inter-class relations are restricted. Observe that Lopreato's II(1) is consistent with this expectation.

Furthermore, political resocialization is another aspect of general resocialization process referred to above. Therefore, for any particular upwardly mobile person, the more advanced the general resocialization process, the more inclined he will be both to vote conservatively and to deny that classes close ranks against outsiders. In other words, amongst the upwardly mobile we expect a correlation between left voting and asserting the existence of restrictions on inter-class relations, a correlation which Lopreato demonstrated in his II(2).

Finally, in view of this correlation, we expect that in those cases where resocialization with respect to opinion on inter-class restrictions is complete, political resocialization
will also be complete. Again, Lopreato's II(3) is consistent with this expectation.

Thus, the assumption that respondents answer on the basis of the class perspectives described by Goldthorpe allows us to 'make sense' of Lopreato's findings in a way which is quite unrelated to the theory of class discrimination. To put it another way, while Lopreato claims that his data support the theory of class discrimination, we might just as validly claim that they do nothing of the sort, but rather demonstrate that the upwardly mobile are subject to a general process of class resocialization.

It should be emphasised here that the alternative interpretation I have offered of Lopreato's data is not an alternative explanation of international differences in the political behaviour of the upwardly mobile, because it does not isolate a variable capable of predicting those differences. Its sole purpose is to demonstrate, as convincingly as possible, that Lopreato's failure to justify his assumption leaves his data ambiguously relevant to the theory of class discrimination.

Interestingly enough there is one way in which Lopreato might have justified his assumption. It will be recalled that the theory of class discrimination postulates that the middle class discriminates against the working class and that the upwardly mobile, whose paths are blocked by this discrimination, will be peculiarly aware of it. In particular, we expect the upwardly mobile to be more aware of middle class discrimination than are the immobile members of the working class, who have less contact with the middle class and therefore less chance of
experiencing social rejection. Thus Lopreato might have formulated the following hypothesis as a companion to II(1):

Newcomers to the middle class are more likely than the working class immobile to perceive restrictions on inter-class relations.

The importance of this hypothesis is that it is inconsistent with our alternative assumption, on the basis of which we predicted that newcomers to the middle class would be less likely than the immobile working class to assert the closure of class relations. In short, if true, this hypothesis would eliminate our alternative assumption, thereby strengthening confidence in the 'personal experience' assumption.

It is indeed unfortunate that Lopreato did not test this hypothesis. As it is we must conclude that the relevance of his evidence to the theory of class discrimination depends on the acceptance of a possibly justifiable, but nevertheless unjustified, assumption.

I have discussed Lopreato's work at length because it provides a technique with which to test the theory of class discrimination in the Australian setting. In applying the technique I hope to take account of the criticism I have made. But this is the subject of the next chapter.
The Lipset-Zetterberg theory, presented in the preceding chapter, was advanced as an explanation of trans-Atlantic differences. In the present chapter I shall see whether it accounts for the incomplete political resocialization of the upwardly mobile in Australia. In order to do this we can reformulate the theory as follows:

1. Upward mobility is a cause of political resocialization. However,

2. when such mobility occurs, life style lags behind, giving rise to discrepancies between the life style of the mobile individual and that of his new class. Furthermore,

3. life style discrepancy is a source of class discrimination, and

4. this discrimination retards political resocialization.

Corollary: Since there is a much wider difference between the life styles of the European middle and working classes than there is between those of the American middle and working classes, the upwardly mobile are much less inclined to change their vote in Europe than they are in America.

Formulating the theory in this way enables it to be scrutinized and tested quite independently of the specific trans-Atlantic comparison in which it originated. Clearly, to test the theory in the Australian context, I must consider in turn the validity of each of the four propositions.
Proposition 1

Table 9 showed that in Australia the upwardly mobile are more conservative than the immobile working class. Such findings in other countries have been taken to indicate that upward mobility causes political resocialization. However, as Butler and Stokes point out, it is also possible that "(c)onservative partisanship is one of a cluster of ideas and values within the childhood family that predispose an individual to move upwards" [1969: 99]; that is, it is possible that upward mobility is a consequence of a prior conservative outlook. If Proposition 1 is to be properly tested we must show that upward mobility does in fact cause political resocialization.

It is conceivable that both the above processes are at work, and it is as well to look at each separately. Let us first establish whether upward mobility is in part a cause of political conservatism. It might appear that this can be done by demonstrating that the upwardly mobile are more conservative than their fathers. However, such a procedure is not satisfactory, for the following reason. If the respondents' generation is, as a whole, more conservative than the previous generation, then any group of respondents, and in particular the upwardly mobile, might be expected to be more conservative than their fathers. Fortunately, we can avoid this difficulty and still demonstrate the political effects of upward mobility by formulating and testing the following hypothesis:
H(1) Amongst respondents whose fathers voted Labor when their sons were growing up, the upwardly mobile will be more conservative than the manual immobile.

Table 10 confirms this hypothesis.

**TABLE 10**

Political Preference of the Upwardly Mobile and the Nonmanual Immobile whose Fathers voted Labor when their Sons were Growing up.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Manual Immobile</th>
<th>Upwardly Mobile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per cent voting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for A.L.P.</td>
<td>82 (192)</td>
<td>61 (81)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Only respondents whose political preference is known to be for the A.L.P. or the L.C.P. are included in this table.

Note: the difference is significant ($x^2 = 13.9$).

To test whether mobility is in part a consequence of a prior conservative outlook we might hypothesize that:

H(2) The fathers of the upwardly mobile are more likely than the fathers of the manual immobile to have voted conservatively when their sons were growing up.

This hypothesis is tested and disconfirmed by Table 11.

**TABLE 11**

Father's Vote when Son was Growing up, by Son's Mobility*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Manual Immobile</th>
<th>Upwardly Mobile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Fathers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>who voted A.L.P.</td>
<td>81 (258)</td>
<td>80 (123)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Only fathers whose political preference was known to be for the A.L.P. or the L.C.P. are included in this table.

Note: the difference is not significant, even using a one-tailed test ($x^2 = .09$).
Thus we may conclude that in Australia upward mobility is a cause and not a consequence of conservatism. Proposition 1 is therefore established.

**Proposition 2**

The second proposition asserts that when upward mobility occurs, lifestyle lags behind, giving rise to discrepancies between the lifestyle of the mobile individual and that of his new class. I have no data with which to test this proposition, and in any case, as pointed out in the discussion of Lopreato's first set of hypotheses, lifestyle differences are very difficult to measure. However, I think we may regard the proposition as a truism, since it is clearly difficult if not impossible for the upwardly mobile to eliminate all traces of their class of origin and to become entirely assimilated into the middle class.

**Proposition 3**

The third proposition asserts that lifestyle discrepancies are a source of class discrimination. Now we may note that a man who is indistinguishable from members of the immobile middle class in all respects save that his father was a manual worker would be discriminated against only in a society which placed great importance on ascribed status. Australia is probably not such a society. Hence we may argue that if a mobile individual in this country succeeded in adjusting his lifestyle to the point where it became indistinguishable from that of the old-timers in the middle class, he would not be subject to class discrimination. In other words, in Australia it is the discrepancy between the lifestyle of the upwardly mobile
and their new class which makes discrimination against them possible. Therefore, to demonstrate the proposition all we need do is establish that the upwardly mobile are actually subject to class discrimination.

The only information I have on the question of class discrimination comes from the nation-wide survey cited earlier, in which the following question was asked: "How difficult would you say it is for people to move from one class to another?" Unfortunately the question does not ask directly about experience of class discrimination and so we are faced at the outset with the ambiguity inherent in Lopreato's question: possibly respondents answer on the basis of personal experience, but possibly they answer on some other basis. The most important alternative (if I am to avoid the criticisms I levelled at Lopreato) is that they answer on the basis of the middle class and traditional working class perspectives described earlier. Let us see if we can eliminate this possibility.

Clearly, on the basis of those types, we can make the following prediction:

H(3) The immobile working class will be more likely than the immobile middle class to assert the difficulty of changing class.

This prediction is tested in Table 12.

However none of the differences between the two immobile groups in Table 12 is significant, even using a one-tailed testing procedure. In other words, the hypothesis is not confirmed, and we may conclude that respondents are not answering on the basis of the class perspectives described by
Goldthorpe.

### TABLE 12
Claimed Difficulty of Mobility, by Mobility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per cent claiming mobility is...</th>
<th>Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manual Immobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Difficult</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly Difficult</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very Difficult</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(268)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This conclusion lends support to the 'personal experience' assumption but it does not constitute direct evidence for it, because it is possible that respondents answer on the basis of other class perspectives. One that comes to mind is the perspective of the privatized worker, a further type identified by Goldthorpe. The privatized worker is not involved in the solidarity communal relationships of the traditional working class, his social interaction being principally with his family [1969: 50]. Unlike the traditional worker, he conceives of society in terms of a 'money' model, consisting of several classes differentiated primarily by wealth [1969: 149]. Goldthorpe sees the privatized worker as the type towards which the traditional British worker is evolving [1969: 163-165], and we might well speculate that the class perspective of the Australian worker is rather more privatized than traditional.
However, the privatized worker believes that it is rarely possible to move up from one class to another [1969: 151]. Thus, even if working class respondents answer the mobility question on the basis of a privatized rather than a traditional working class perspective we should still make prediction H(3). Therefore, since H(3) was disconfirmed, this second alternative must be discarded along with the first. Again, this does not prove that respondents answer on the basis of personal experience, but the fact that two possible alternatives have had to be discarded certainly supports the proposition. Consequently, I propose to accept it.

The argument of the last paragraphs may seem rather indirect, and it will be recalled that at the end of the last chapter a technique was suggested for demonstrating more directly that respondents answer on the basis of personal experience. Unfortunately the technique cannot be applied here and it is as well to see why, before we return to the task of this section, namely, the testing of Proposition 3.

The technique I refer to involved comparing the answers of the immobile working class and the upwardly mobile. The idea was that the upwardly mobile had more contact with the immobile middle class than did immobile members of the working class. They were therefore more likely to encounter class discrimination than were the working class immobile. Thus, the assumption that answers were based on personal experience gave rise to the prediction that the upwardly mobile would be more likely than the working class immobile to assert the
closure of class relations.

But, in the present context, as soon as we assume that respondents answer on the basis of personal experience a further ambiguity arises which prevents comparisons between groups with different mobility experiences and hence prevents a test of the assumption. The problem is that a respondent who claims, on the basis of experience, that it is difficult to change class does not necessarily mean that he has experienced class discrimination. This is so because there are two rather different aspects of class; the distributive aspect and the relational aspect. (This distinction is made by Beteille [1969: 17].) The distributive aspect refers to the fact that class differences correspond to differences in the distribution of wealth, occupational status, prestige and power. The relational aspect refers to the way in which members of different classes relate to each other. It is only if the respondent has in mind the relational aspect of class when answering the mobility question that his answers will be relevant to the issue of class discrimination. Therefore, before comparing groups of respondents we must be confident that they are answering the question on this basis. Let us look at how particular respondents might answer the question.

The upwardly mobile individual, who has successfully changed class as far as the distributive aspects are concerned, is probably reflecting experience of class discrimination when he asserts the difficulty of changing class. On the other hand, the immobile manual worker is less in contact with his
social superiors than is the upwardly mobile individual and is consequently probably less aware of any class discrimination. When he asserts the difficulty of changing class he is more likely to be asserting the difficulty of raising his income and occupation to middle class levels; that is, he is probably making a statement about the distributive rather than the relational aspects of class. As far as members of the immobile middle class are concerned, there seems to be no way of deciding which aspect of class they are likely to be more sensitive to when answering the mobility question.

In summary, though we assume that respondents all answer on the basis of personal experience, they are likely to be drawing on different kinds of experience, making comparisons of the responses of the above three groups meaningless: it is only the upwardly mobile themselves who are likely to answer on the basis of whether or not they have experienced class discrimination. Thus, the comparison between the immobile working class and the upwardly mobile cannot be used to test the assumption that respondents answer on the basis of personal experience. Nevertheless, I have already chosen to accept this assumption and, in the absence of further evidence, I shall stand by that choice.

With these various points in mind we can now return to Proposition 3. It will be recalled that we aim to establish that the upwardly mobile are subject to class discrimination. Lopreato established this by comparing the upwardly mobile with the middle class immobile, but as I have just argued, such a comparison is not possible in the present context,
However, given that they are influenced primarily by the relational aspect of class, any claim by the upwardly mobile that it is difficult to change class is likely to reflect experience of class discrimination. Thus Table 12 indicates that indeed a considerable proportion of the upwardly mobile have experienced class discrimination and so provide support for Proposition 3.

**Proposition 4.**

We consider next the fourth proposition which asserts that class discrimination retards political resocialization. This is really the crux of the theory. The proposition gives rise to the following hypothesis:

\[ H(4) \quad \text{Amongst the upwardly mobile, those who come in contact with class discrimination will be more inclined than those who don't to vote Labor.} \]

Now amongst the upwardly mobile, variations in answers to the mobility question will reflect variations in experience of class discrimination. Hence the data of Table 13 are relevant to our hypothesis.

**TABLE 13**

Political Preference of the Upwardly Mobile, by Claimed Difficulty of Mobility*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claimed Difficulty of Mobility</th>
<th>Very Difficult</th>
<th>Fairly Difficult</th>
<th>Not very Difficult</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting A.L.P.</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Only those whose political preference is known to be for the A.L.P. or the L.C.P. are included in this table.*
However none of the differences in Table 13 is significant and therefore \( H(4) \) is not confirmed. Of course the trend is as predicted and it is possible that with larger numbers the hypothesised difference would have been confirmed. But with the present data the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. In other words present evidence does not support the proposition that class discrimination retards the political resocialization of the upwardly mobile.

But more conclusive evidence against the theory is at hand. If the mechanism of class discrimination is to serve as the explanation of why the political resocialization of the upwardly mobile remains incomplete, then we must show that, in the absence of class discrimination, political resocialization is complete. We therefore expect that:

\[ H(5) \] The upwardly mobile who experience no class discrimination will be politically similar to the immobile middle class.

But Table 14 reveals that this is not the case.

**TABLE 14**

Comparison of the Votes of the Nonmanual Immobile and the Upwardly Mobile who claim that Mobility is not very Difficult.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Upwardly Mobile (claiming that Mobility is not very Difficult)</th>
<th>Nonmanual Immobile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per cent voting for ALP</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>(219)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Only those whose political preference is known to be for the ALP or the LCP are included in this table.

Note: the difference is significant. \( x^2 = 6.86 \).
Thus the theory of class discrimination does not explain the voting behaviour of the upwardly mobile in Australia. Or, to put it another way, some factor other than class discrimination is responsible for retarding the upwardly mobile's change of vote in Australia.

**Recapitulation**

In this chapter I have demonstrated that upward mobility is a cause of political conservatism. Furthermore, on the assumption that respondents answer the mobility question on the basis of personal experience I have demonstrated that the theory of class discrimination does not account for the incomplete political resocialization of the upwardly mobile in this country. In addition, I have offered some argument in justification of my assumption about the way respondents answer.
A Further Argument

Quite apart from the evidence presented in the last two chapters there is an independent reason for doubting the value of the theory of class discrimination. It will be recalled that the theory explained trans-Atlantic differences in the politics of the upwardly mobile in terms of differing discrepancies between middle and working class life styles.

We are now in a position to make a similar comparison between Australia and the United States.

Let us first observe that class differences in life style are no greater in Australia than they are in America. This is essentially a subjective assessment, but at least one piece of evidence supports it. Broom and Jones, in their international comparison of intergenerational mobility, define circulation mobility as the mobility which takes place over and above that caused by the expanding proportion of nonmanual jobs [1969(a)]. They report that circulation mobility is higher in Australia than in the United States. In other words, discounting the effects of the structural demand for mobility, the occupational system is more open in this country than in America. Since an open occupational system is not conducive to the maintenance of pronounced class distinctions we might conclude that life style discrepancies between the two classes are unlikely to be greater here than in the United States.
If we accept the proposition that life style discrepancies between the middle and working classes are no greater in Australia than they are in America then the theory of class discrimination predicts that the political resocialization of the upwardly mobile should be no more retarded here than it is in the States. However, as we have already seen empirically, in the United States the political resocialization of the upwardly mobile is complete, while in this country it is not. Thus the prediction of the theory is not borne out and on this ground alone the theory becomes suspect.

Of course it is logically possible that the mechanism of class discrimination is operating in both countries and that the difference between the political behaviour of the upwardly mobile in Australia and the United States is a consequence of some other factor. For example, it might be that the success ideology, operating as Lopreato hypothesised in his explanation of the alleged political overconformity of upwardly mobile Americans, counteracts the effects of class discrimination in America but not in Australia. However in this case it is the variation in this factor and not in class discrimination which accounts for the difference, and the theory of class discrimination becomes irrelevant.

Whatever the case, the failure of the theory to account for the difference between the Australian and American experiences detracts from its value as an explanation of international differences.
The theory of class discrimination was put forward as an explanation of the political differences between the European and American upwardly mobile. However, even if true, its explanatory power, as we have just seen, is strictly limited, for it does not account for the difference between the Australian and American experiences.

But in any case there is reason to doubt that the class discrimination mechanism operates as hypothesised at all. Although Lopreato claimed to have demonstrated the operation of this mechanism, we might just as validly claim that he did nothing of the sort, but rather demonstrated the existence of a process of general class resocialization. Certainly his evidence is at best ambiguous. Furthermore, we can say more in Australia definitely that the postulated class discrimination mechanism does not account for the incomplete political resocialization of the upwardly mobile. In short, the process on which the theory of class discrimination depends does not operate in Australia and is as yet improperly tested in Italy.

International Differences: A Theory of Class Ideology

The theory of class discrimination, advanced in the context of a trans-Atlantic comparison, has been shown not to account for the differences between Australia and the United States. Clearly, a satisfactory theory of the political consequences of upward mobility must account for both trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific differences. In this last section I should like, very sketchily, to suggest an explanation which accounts for these differences in terms of variation in the strength of
working class ideology. The theory is as follows:

1. Left voting is one of the correlates of working class membership.
2. If the working class is the bearer of a strong class ideology, then the commitment to left voting will be deeply ingrained in those brought up in working class families.
3. Therefore, an upwardly mobile individual whose early environment was permeated by a strong working class ideology will be less likely to change his vote than one whose early environment was not so permeated.
4. Thus, we predict that in countries with a more developed working class ideology the upwardly mobile will be more resistant to changing their voting preference.

Let us see how this new theory accounts for the differences under consideration. First, the trans-Atlantic comparison. In most European countries the major parties of the left cater explicitly for the interests of the working class and espouse ideological perspectives which owe much to Marx. In America, on the other hand, although the working class votes preferentially for the Democrats, that party cannot be as clearly identified with the working class. The fact that a more strongly ideological party of the left has not emerged in the United States suggests that a working class ideology is not as well developed there as in Europe. Hence our theory predicts, in accordance with the facts, that the upwardly mobile in Europe will be more resistant to changing their vote than will the upwardly mobile in America.

Next, we consider the Australian-American comparison. We may observe, first, that owing to its origins in and continued association with the trade union movement, the A.L.P. is much more of a workers' party than is the Democratic party in the United States. The success of a specifically working class party in Australia suggests that workers here are more strongly
committed to working class viewpoints than are their American counterparts.

This suggestion is strengthened by the observation that while conditions in Australia in the 19th century gave rise to a collectivist ethos, consistent with the development of a working class ideology, conditions in the United States were conducive to a spirit of individualism which might be expected to hinder the emergence of a working class ideology [Alford, 1963: 173-174].

These observations support the view that a working class ideology is more fully developed here than in America. Thus, invoking the theory under discussion, this difference accounts for the difference in the political behaviour of the upwardly mobile in the two countries.

So, unlike the theory of class discrimination, this theory of class ideology accounts for both trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific differences. Of course, at this stage the theory is little more than speculation since the foregoing reasoning is certainly not conclusive. A more adequate treatment depends on the development of some satisfactory way of measuring the relative strengths of the class ideologies to which the upwardly mobile are subject in youth. However, it seems to me that this theory is potentially more likely than the theory of class discrimination to provide a satisfactory explanation of the politics of the upwardly mobile.
FOOTNOTES

1. For a similar statement, plus citation of some of the evidence, see Alford [1963: 36]. For Australian data see Broom and Hill [1965: 98].

2. In a forthcoming article, Ray offers yet more evidence of the "meaningfulness" of the manual-nonmanual distinction in the Australian context.

3. Throughout this study the level of significance used is 5%. Furthermore, all statistical tests are two-tailed unless otherwise specified.

4. This claim is in striking contrast with that made by Lipset and Zetterberg. But, because of the disproportionate tendency of the nonmanual immobile to prefer Independents, the two are not actually contradictory. In principle both claims could be true simultaneously.

5. At this point a word about statistical procedure is necessary. The $\chi^2$ test, in its application to contingency tables, is essentially a test of whether or not two nominal scales are independent. Although it may reveal that a relationship exists, in general it does not reveal the nature of the relationship. The only exception is in its application to 2 by 2 contingency tables. In this case it is possible specifically to test for the existence of a linear relationship. Therefore, in applying the simple $\chi^2$ test to the rival claims presented in the text it is necessary to reduce Table 5 to a 2 by 2 table. In the case of the first claim this is achieved by grouping the Democrats and the Independents, in the second, the
Independents and the Republicans. In so doing, what was originally a five-point ordinal scale is reduced to a dichotomy, and in the process a lot of information is lost. Clearly, a method which did not require the grouping of the categories of party preference would be preferable. Such a method is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov significance test [see Blalock, 1960: 203-206]. Using this test the Lipset-Zetterberg claim is supported by a $\chi^2$ of .11 and the alternative claim, by a $\chi^2$ of 4.8. It should be noted that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test involves two degrees of freedom and thus the value 4.8 falls short of the 5.99 necessary for significance at the .05 level. However, according to Blalock, the test is a conservative one, and the probability of a type I error is somewhat less than that indicated by the $\chi^2$ value of 4.8. There is thus little reason to modify the conclusions arrived at in the text, namely that upward mobiles are significantly more Democratic and not significantly more Republican than the middle class immobile.

6. This conclusion is based on a simple chi-square test. It will be noticed that the row variable of Table 7 is essentially a three-point ordinal scale and it might be thought that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, discussed in note 5 above, is more suitable than the chi-square test in this context. However, in the case of a three-point scale the method of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test makes no better use of the data than does the simple chi-square procedure.
7. The most striking feature of Table 7 is the disproportionate support which the upwardly mobile give to Independents at the expense of both Democrats and Republicans. This suggests that Independent candidates offer the upwardly mobile a political 'half-way house'. Alford argues that the D.L.P. performs this function for upwardly mobile Catholics in Australia [1963: 218].

8. Since the political overconformity thesis predicts not only that a difference exists between the upwardly mobile and the middle class immobile, but also the direction of the difference, a case can be made for using a one-tailed rather than a two-tailed statistical testing procedure. Such a procedure is more likely to reject the null hypothesis, that is, it is more favourable to the over-conformity thesis. However, it turns out that using a one-tailed test does not alter any of the conclusions about political overconformity reached in the text.
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