Brazil's International Development Cooperation: Old and New Motivations*


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ABSTRACT:  
Brazil has entered the world of development assistance provision, but with its own twist. This paper looks at what Brazil is doing in the provision of development assistance provision, arguing that despite protestations to the contrary, Brazil does provide ODA. The paper also argues that Brazil is taking a cross-government policy coherent approach to ODA, which includes recruitment of business interests. Turning to the motivations for providing foreign aid, the argument is that there is a genuine and deep concern with global poverty alleviation in Brazil, but that this does not preclude Brazilian policy makers from using aid and development-related activities from advancing the national interest. The added quirk that sets Brazil apart from Northern counterparts is that provision of development assistance offers significant benefits in terms of building internal international bureaucratic experience and helping national firms internationalize their market penetration and activities.

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ABSTRACT:
Brazil has entered the world of development assistance provision, but with its own twist. This paper looks at what Brazil is doing in the provision of development assistance provision, arguing that despite protestations to the contrary, Brazil does provide ODA. The paper also argues that Brazil is taking a cross-government policy coherent approach to ODA, which includes recruitment of business interests. Turning to the motivations for providing foreign aid, the argument is that there is a genuine and deep concern with global poverty alleviation in Brazil, but that this does not preclude Brazilian policy makers from using aid and development-related activities from advancing the national interest. The added quirk that sets Brazil apart from Northern counterparts is that provision of development assistance offers significant benefits in terms of building internal international bureaucratic experience and helping national firms internationalize their market penetration and activities.

One of the quiet activities supporting Brazil’s emergence as an important global player is its growing tendency to engage in substantive South-South technical cooperation activities. For Brazilian diplomats these activities represent cooperative ventures with other developing countries undertaken in partnerships that offer benefits for both parties. Framed in a policy context familiar to members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Brazil’s accelerating South-South cooperation activities look a lot like the provision of official development assistance (ODA) because they do involve a direct transfer of resources from the Brazilian state to the partner government, although the transferred resources are not in the form of cash. This represents a quandary for many DAC-member development agencies because although Brazil is joining their game, it is not part of their club and not a donor signature to their ODA governance frameworks. Matters are further complicated when attention is turned
to how Brazilian ODA is delivered, which differs markedly both in terms of project selection and delivery.

For many governments and research institutions understanding what Brazil is doing in the field of development cooperation has become a priority, particularly when placed in the context of rising concern about the development assistance-like activities of China and increasingly India (Bräutigam, 2009; Chin and Quadir, 2013; Quadir, 2013; Rowlands, 2012; Saavedra, 2009, Samy, 2010; Shaw, Cooper and Chin, 2009; Stuenkel, 2010; Woods 2008). The result has been a series of studies outlining the scope and procedures of Brazilian ODA, with the survey by Brazil’s state-supported Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada standing as the most official Brazilian statement on budgetary questions (IPEA, 2010), although there are reports by other private and government research bodies (Cabral and Weinstock, 2010; Dauvergne and Farias, 2012; Inoue and Vaz, 2012; Milani and Carvalho, 2013; Pino, 2012; Pino and Leite, 2010; Stolte, 2012). Significantly less attention has been given to a serious examination of why the Brazilian government has increased the pace of its ODA provision and how it meshes with broader foreign policy and trade policy priorities (White, 2013; Burges, 2013).

On a theoretical level little attention has been given to what implications Brazilian motivations for providing development assistance might have for our understanding of why states, and in particular emerging power states, engage in development cooperation activities. As this paper will argue, the Brazilian case
presents a twist on the established understandings of why ODA is provided, which may provide useful insight into foreign policy shifts in a number of emerging economies in the Americas and elsewhere. The foreign policy logic underpinning Brazilian development assistance provision does track closely with that found in DAC-member countries. Brazil’s twist is an integration of development assistance provision into larger plans for long-term domestic development and the internationalization of national firms. Brazil’s rhetoric of providing development assistance because it is the right thing to do is genuine, but does not trump national interest considerations. The shift in Brazil is an approach to national economic and social development that is predicated on an expanding and dynamic pan-Southern market. Finally, the Brazilian case offers some practical lessons about the efficient use of funds and existing capacities for policy-makers in DAC-member agencies seeking to maintain programming in an era of fiscal restraint.

The paper begins with a brief outline of the institutional structures and procedures governing Brazilian development assistance provision as well as an indication of the scale and nature of these activities. Attention is then turned to an examination of Brazilian motivations for giving foreign aid, using Hans Morgenthau’s seminal essay ‘A Political Theory of Foreign Aid’ as a foil to guide the discussion. The paper concludes with a brief presentation of the implications that the Brazilian case holds for our understanding of why states provide foreign aid as well as lessons that aid bureaucrats might draw from an emerging power such as Brazil.
Research for this paper draws from a mixture of academic and policy papers, news reports, government documents and interviews with Brazilian government officials and international development and business officials in Brasília, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, New York, Washington, London, Ottawa, Canberra, and Maputo.

**What is Brazil doing and how is it doing it?**

The first point that must be clarified is one of terminology. Brazilian officials reject suggestions that they are providing official development assistance, preferring instead the term ‘technical cooperation’ and ‘South-South technical cooperation’. Terms such as aid, development assistance, and ODA are rejected because of their implicit notions of hierarchical relations. The importance of this distinction is not altogether surprising if we consider the yawning income gaps in Brazil between the extremely rich and the deeply impoverished. Moreover, the explicit and implicit discourse surrounding development assistance provision brings with it suggestions of (neo)colonialism and (neo)imperialism that neither fit with Brazil’s historical relations with other countries, nor match the official pattern of foreign relations being broadcast by the country’s foreign ministry, Itamaraty. These definitional niceties aside, the technical cooperation discussed in this paper does fall well within the bounds of DAC (2008) definitions of official development assistance and as will be further elaborated below, the procedures surrounding Brazil’s engagement with partner countries match important aspects of the development cooperation precepts espoused by the traditional donors.
The size and scale of what we might term Brazilian official development assistance is not large by DAC standards. An officially sponsored study into Brazilian resources directed towards development cooperation found a total expenditure of US$1.426 billion between 2005 and 2009. These funds were directed to four primary activities, with international organizations receiving US$1,082.2 million, scholarship programs US$138.8 million, humanitarian relief US$79.1 million and technical cooperation US$125.6 million. While all four of these areas fall within the DAC financial reporting definition of official development assistance, the one most commonly associated with ODA is technical cooperation. Significantly, this expenditure line had been growing quickly in Brazil, moving from US$11.4 million per annum in 2005 to US$48.9 million in 2009, and encompassing over 400 projects in 58 different countries (IPEA, 2010: 21). Officials in Itamaraty remarked during interviews in late 2012 that the ABC budget had experienced massive annual cuts during the first two years of the Dilma Rousseff presidency and that they were now having to refuse requests for technical cooperation assistance, particularly from the African countries that had been assiduously cultivated during the Lula presidency.

Technical cooperation provided by Brazil is coordinated through the Agência de Cooperação Brasileira (ABC – Brazilian Cooperation Agency), the same agency that managed inward flows of development assistance from the DAC members. While legally part of Itamaraty and thus embedded within its budget, ABC has a
subtle degree of bureaucratic separation from its ministerial master. It is housed in a building that is within direct sight, but physically separate from the Itamaraty Palace complex. This measure of symbolic separation is emblematic of ABC’s relationship to the hierarchical and disciplined Itamaraty, leaving the Agency space to move at its own pace and inclination provided it does not contradict the goals of Brazilian foreign policy. Alignment is insured by having the Agency headed by a mid-career diplomat who must still report through the Itamaraty hierarchy for major decisions and return back to the ministry for future career advancement and postings.

During the Lula presidency (2003-2010) ABC was headed by Marco Farani, then a diplomat of ‘ministro’ rank. Farani played a critical role not only in enlarging the size and budget of ABC, but also in increasing its international profile. His title ‘ministro’ was often taken literally by DAC-member agencies, who received Farani as a Brazilian government minister and sought to use ABC to build bilateral relations. In part the DAC-member agencies were enticed by Farani’s vision for ABC: a more formalized institutional existence, creation of a ‘development officer’ career stream and an expansion of staffing and budget to look more like DAC counterparts. Dilma-era budget cuts and Farani’s subsequent posting as consul-general in Tokyo both point to a slowing of ABC’s activities. An additional restraint on the potential autonomy of ABC are the Agency’s staffing procedures, which consist of a handful of diplomats and over 100 contracted officials. A substantial number of the staff at ABC are paid through a
circular movement of funds to the UNDP, which then hires contractors for ABC on terminal contracts to work around the Brazilian state’s employment regulations. The result is a quiet restraint on policy-setting autonomy at ABC and a careful retention of the Agency within the administrative bounds of the foreign ministry. The associated churn in staff retards institutional memory and the Agency’s capacity to develop an advanced policy planning capacity for its own activities and the sorts of country strategy frameworks found in DAC agencies.

The staffing, budgetary and policy restraints placed upon ABC are reflective of the manner in which the Brazilian government conducts its development cooperation activities. Brazil purports to be completely responsive with its development cooperation provision, addressing specific requests from partners rather than proposing activities. Moreover, the responsive nature of ABC-coordinated activities mean that ODA provision remains on an isolated project basis, not the larger program basis that DAC members use to align multiple projects towards a defined goal. Any sense that multiple Brazilian technical cooperation projects might be tied together is further diluted by how development cooperation is delivered. Rather than hiring outside consultants, the ABC mandate is to find agencies and departments within the Brazilian state that have the requested expertise and then coordinate the terms of reference for and delivery of a project. One of the objections expressed by officials in some DAC agencies is that this amounts to a form of tied aid because ABC does not tender its projects for public bidding. While there is definitely merit to this critique, and it is an issue
being addressed by NGO groupings in Brazil such as Articulação Sul, there is a
critical difference between the Brazilian government and its Northern
counterparts.

In Brazil issues such as poverty reduction, microeconomic growth, education
reform, public health expansion, and agrarian development are the central public
policy problems preoccupying government, not questions for an often
marginalized development agency struggling to maintain its budget and political
position. Unlike the situation in Northern governments, the relevant and proven
development expertise exists within the Brazilian state and its various agencies.
Where Northern development agencies focus on devising and proposing ideas that
might work, the approach found through ABC is an attempt to translate policies
and programs that have worked in Brazil to a different political, economic and
cultural context. This is reflected in the attitude of countries seeking assistance
through ABC. As El Salvador’s vice minister of foreign affairs observed,
‘Brazil’s programs work and therefore offer valuable lessons for other developing
countries’ (Garcia, 2012).

The use of Brazilian government employees for South-South technical
cooperation programming creates a major disjuncture between ABC’s reported
budget and the actual impact generated by its spending. The ABC covers the
administrative costs of projects such as airfares and per diems, but the salary for
an assigned Brazilian expert is absorbed by the individual’s home agency. The
cost of employing scientific and managerial staff to set up the series of experimental farms in Senegal and Mali was thus absorbed by the directing Brazilian agency EMPRAPA, not ABC. This approach of internal salary absorption by Brazilian state agencies when delivering ODA combines with the Agency’s limited evaluation and reporting systems to radically drive down the costs of providing programming. This suggests that the official estimate of 0.02% of GDP expenditure on development cooperation by Brazil is highly misrepresentative and the effective figure closer to at least 0.10%-0.15%.

The understating of the impact of Brazilian development cooperation activities extends beyond measurement of the financial value of what the country does and the savings that are accrued from a much smaller coordinating agency. Brazilian activities in four other areas also make an important contribution to international development and in some respects are remarkably consistent with the ideas of a coherent whole-of-government approach to development captured by the Centre for Global Development’s Commitment to Development Index.¹ The first measure is use of export financing from the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES – National Bank for Economic and Social Development). Although required by its articles of incorporation to disburse only

¹ The Centre for Global Development’s Commitment to Development Index gives seven areas of government policy equal weight and then comparatively ranks DAC-member countries on the extent to which their overall governmental policy is conducive to facilitating international development. The seven policy areas are aid, trade, investment, migration, environment, technology and security. More detail on the CDI can be found at: http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/.
funds that directly benefit Brazilian firms and citizens, the previous understanding that this meant only spending money in Brazil has been broadened by arguing that the export of professional services and the financing of outward Brazilian FDI is consonant with the Bank’s mandate. The BNDES has consequently become an important source of financing for infrastructure projects in Latin America and increasingly in Africa, offering interest rates and terms not available to partner governments otherwise forced to use global financial markets. Although announced sums are often impressive, funds actually dispersed are much smaller (Hochstetler and Montero, forthcoming).

While not satisfying the DAC rules on concessional financing and thus not eligible for consideration as ODA, BNDES financing nevertheless represents a significant savings for the recipient and sometimes allows the pursuit of infrastructure projects that would otherwise be impossible. For Lula the logic was quite simple, captured in his quip that ‘Brazil cannot deport itself as a small country.’ The BNDES responded with financing lines to reduce regional asymmetries and boost the physical integration links between Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay (Leo, 2007). What Brazil did not entirely bargain for was potential blowback due to lacunae in planning and approval processes as well as commercial disputes between foreign governments and Brazilian contractors. For example, in 2011 serious indigenous protests erupted in Bolivia over attempts to build a BNDES-financed road through a remote border area (Murakawa, 2011). There were also disputes in Ecuador and Peru revolving around disagreements
with contractors and planning process that enmeshed Brazilian-provided financing in internal and commercial disputes. While sometimes rowdy, there does seem to be a distinction between the financing and the actual source of the conflict. Indeed, one of the most problematic cases involving BNDES-financed infrastructure, the San Francisco dam project in Ecuador (Marcelino, 2008), did not prevent president Rafael Correa willingly looking to Brazil for additional financing in 2012 (Marcelino, 2012).

The second element is a process called competitive import substitution, which sees the Brazilian state encouraging a redirection of trade to bring comparable products in from other developing countries rather than from the North. An additional stream of this policy directly tackles the horrific conditions experienced by migrant Bolivian textile workers stuck in São Paulo sweatshops, encouraging production to be relocated to the neighbouring country. While both initiatives remain in the process of being fully implemented, each draws on some of the strategic political imperatives set out during the Cardoso presidency and further advanced during the Lula years through the idea of a new economic geography. Established precedents for this program can be found in the decision in the late 1980s to reorient energy sourcing towards South America to belay the deleterious political impact of consistent regional trade surpluses. In its wider contemporary manifestation the idea is to draw on the Brazilian government’s detailed line-item database of imports to act as matchmaker between firms in Brazil and potential alternate suppliers in countries such as Bolivia, Peru or Ecuador.
This idea of relocating production sites and competitive import substitution is reinforced by the third and fourth elements of Brazil’s cross-government pro-development policies. In the third element deliberate use is made of the large Brazilian multinational corporations that the state either directly controls through a substantial ownership stake such as Vale, Petrobras and Eletrobras, or is able to heavily influence by controlling access to the more affordably priced financing of the BNDES, i.e., Eike Battista’s EBX group or the construction and engineering empreiteiras such as Odebrecht, Quiroz Galvão, Camargo Correa and Andrade Gutierrez. While not able to impose investments decisions that run counter to good business sense, government pressure has resulted in strategic reorientations that have prompted entry into markets in Latin America and Africa that might otherwise have been ignored. In this vein Brazilian exports to Africa climbed from US$2.3 billion in 2002 to US$12.2 billion by 2011. Imports followed a similar trajectory, going from US$2.7 billion in 2002 to US$15.4 billion in 2011 (INTAL, 2012). These new ventures are further bolstered by political support as a door opener (Chade, 2006; Saraiva, 2012; Dávila, 2010), which can also include the use of Brazilian culture and ODA as fertilizer to create a fertile investment climate. Brazilian-led groupings such as the Community of Portuguese Speaking Nations (CPLP) have been used in this manner to set the stage for major investment actions such as Vale’s US$6 billion Moatize coalmine expansion in Mozambique and Petrobras oil investment in Guinea Bissau (Flak, 2011; Macauhub.com.mo, 2006). More recently Brazilian construction companies have
toured Lula through Africa and Latin America to help with access to upcoming infrastructure tenders (Carneiro de Mendonça, 2012; Scherer, 2012).

The fourth element reinforces this, with Brazilian efforts to contribute to new international efforts such as the IBSA Fund for development through the UNDP (Vieira, 2013), the Banco do Sul, and the mooted BRIC Bank alternative to the World Bank (Quadir, 2013). While modest in scale – the IBSA fund receives only a million dollars in capital from India, Brazil and South Africa each year – these nascent institutions do demonstrate a conscious effort to create alternate frameworks to encourage development across the South. The IBSA fund is explicit that it seeks to multiply the impact of its programming by creating capacity and a legacy of sustainable outcomes. The Banco do Sul, or Bank of the South, started as a Hugo Chávez idea that gradually was pushed by Brazil’s finance ministry from being an almost ideologically-oriented anti-capitalist project to a more orthodox institution that if fully established could help with balance of payments issues and the funding of regional infrastructure projects. The notional BRIC bank fits into a similar frame as the Banco do Sul, bringing together Brazil, Russia, India and China to create a development-financing alternative to the World Bank group and thus not dominated by the US and Europe (Webber and Mander, 2011; Economic Times, 2012; Ranganathan, 2012). Moreover, the BRIC bank would open financing for infrastructure projects in Africa that currently cannot be pursued under existing World Bank and IMF conditionalities. In both instances the idea behind the banks may prove more
important than their eventual potential to manage balance of payment crises or finance development. Each points to active involvement in an approach deeply questioning of established Bretton Woods Institution power relations and a willingness to search out alternatives that will provide Brazil with an entry point to emerging market areas that have previously been almost exclusively occupied by the North.

**Why Provide ODA?**

The question that remains unanswered is why Brazil is now engaging in the provision of ODA and whether the rationale is any different than that of the existing donors. On one level the larger questions of why countries give foreign assistance are as applicable to the Brazilian case as to members of the DAC. Ruttan (1989) echoes and condenses Mason’s (1964) earlier work by categorizing the various motivations for ODA provision into two broad sets of arguments: those based on the economic and security self-interests of the donor country; and those based on the moral and ethical responsibility of the donor country. As will be set out, both apply to the Brazilian case, with Lula administration officials going so far as to build elements of their country’s foreign policy and international identity around a responsibility to ensure that the rest of the global South progresses with Brazil, albeit as much for market growth reasons as genuine concerns with human development. The blending of these two motivations, which Ruttan acknowledges, points to an additional element of foreign aid as an attractive policy tool, which is that it is relatively benign and
flexible, relying heavily on public relations as well as the strengthening of diplomatic relations (Grant and Nijman, 1998). For Brazil this is particularly attractive and fits with its self-image of a non-interventionist country dedicated to finding positive outcomes to international challenges. An added attraction is the high symbolic importance that a relatively small commitment can have for decision-makers in the recipient country.

In order to give a more detailed explanation of why a state might give foreign aid, Black (1968) sets out four broad policy categories. The first three correspond directly to the interest-driven aspects of foreign policy by focusing on defense, economic and political reasons. Arguably, his fourth rationale – humanitarianism – overarches these three if we turn our attention to the impact that mass tragedy can have on regional political economies. As a classificatory system these four criteria allow us to make quick attributions of why ODA is given, but they do not provide much avenue for explaining the activity in more detail. To do this it is more useful to turn to Morgenthau’s 1962 article ‘A Political Theory of Foreign Aid’, where he sets out six types of foreign aid:

1) **Humanitarian foreign aid** – an ostensibly non-political form of aid that is designed to provide immediate relief to a country finding itself in a state of crisis that threatens immediate and widespread tragedy for the population. The goal is to prevent the breakdown of order and the rise of situations resembling a failed state.
2) **Subsistence foreign aid** – foreign aid extended to governments that do not possess the resources necessary to maintain a minimal level of public services. Again, the ambition is to ensure that societal order does not breakdown and lead to a failed state. Unlike humanitarian aid, which can be blind to the regime in power in a given country, subsistence foreign aid has an explicit element of maintaining the status quo.

3) **Military aid** – the dominant form of foreign aid in the 1950s, and arguably a critical part of US foreign aid provision to parts of the Middle East and Latin America (especially Colombia), it traditionally involves the direct transfer of military capacity in the form of materials and training to buttress alliances.

4) **Bribery** – foreign aid is provided as a device for securing the compliance from another government and ensuring that it backs the donor’s initiatives and priorities. Morgenthau is clear that this is not a particularly new idea in international politics, but that the repackaging of it in the guise of providing humanistic assistance is an evolution new to the post-World War Two era.

5) **Prestige** – The objective is to provide a symbolic sign that the receiving country has achieved a higher level of development as manifest through the unprofitable steel mill or shiny new sports stadia that the donor has funded. Efforts are focused very much on advancing
the prestige of the recipient government in order to secure linkages between its ruling elite to the donor government.

6) **Foreign aid for economic development** – resources are transferred to the recipient state with the explicit goal of inciting economic growth and diversification in a sustainable manner that will in turn promote higher levels of human development and fuller integration into the global system.

Clearly, the thinking underpinning the global development assistance system has moved significantly since Morgenthau’s political theory of foreign aid was published in 1962. Approaches to development have shifted comprehensively away from his focus on economic growth to the more holistic and all-encompassing notion of human development, which places as much emphasis on capacity building and governance as it does on economic growth and physical infrastructure. Nevertheless, the six ‘types’ of aid presented by Morgenthau continue to resonate with the underpinning logic of ODA today. Humanitarian and subsistence aid remain important for crisis-torn areas recovering from traumas such as natural disaster and civil war. Although military aid is explicitly excluded by DAC reporting regulations from calculations of a country’s ODA contributions, the provision or withholding of military aid remains a powerful foreign policy tool for countries such as the US, Russia and China, and latterly even Brazil (Monteiro, 2008). The language around the bribery aspect of ODA provision may have softened further from that seen in the 1960s and moved away
from alliance and allegiance towards broad systemic questions such as market economics and democratization as set out in some of the critical ODA literature, but it still remains a powerful factor in attempts to discipline the actions of recalcitrant developing countries (Peet, 2003). Prestige aid has arguably been foresworn by much of the DAC membership beyond the act of sending assistance, but remains a central device for major emerging donors such as China, India and the Gulf States that continue to engage in big projects like constructing stadium and congress buildings. The final category, aid for economic development, is the major concern of the traditional donors even if the raw focus on the economy has expanded to include critical supporting areas such as health, human capital and governance.

The resonance that Morgenthau’s work retains for the provision of ODA is largely predicated on a common set of interest preoccupations shared by the DAC members. While there is a genuine concern with advancing human development, this is not as dominant as the altruistic might hope. Indeed, there is a substantial body of work that suggests that the preoccupation with aid is itself a problem for development (Easterly, 2006; Moyo 2009). In part this is because development is only one part of the decision-making calculation, with the other variables being considerations such as the opening of emerging markets, the securing of access to raw materials, the cementing of political allegiances, and the spread of a global ideology and governance framework conducive to continued economic expansion of the North. All of these drivers come from economies that are already in a
position of internationalized, advanced socio-economic development. By turning
to the Brazilian case we can ask what changes if we look at the provision of ODA
from the perspective of a country that is still working through the challenges of
development. Phrased another way, the question is: how does the provision of
ODA advance the domestic development of the providing state? As will be argued
in the next section, questions of national interest remain preeminent in Brazil’s
decision-making matrix, but the underlying domestic issues that need to be
addressed create different motivations for providing development assistance and
different reactions from the partner countries.

The Brazil End – What has stayed the same?
Brazil does subscribe to some of the established patterns of development
assistance provision, most obviously in the realm of humanitarian assistance.
During the 2005-2009 period Brazil provided R$155.3 million in direct
humanitarian assistance (IPEA, 2010: 22). The earthquake in Haiti prompted a
rapid acceleration in humanitarian activities, with Brazil quickly announcing
US$15 million in assistance shortly after the disaster and then moving the sum up
to a total of US$28.9 million for the island in 2010, mostly delivered through
various UN organizations. This concentration of aid flows through international
organizations fits the trend in Brazilian giving, which has multilateralized its
contributions rather than engaging in bilateral assistance. Most grants have been
in the US$200,000-300,000 range. Of more direct bearing on the subject of this
paper is the official line from Itamaraty on humanitarian assistance: ‘the increase
in resources destined for international humanitarian assistance happened, in part, through a determination by president Lula that Brazil must assume its international responsibilities for the guarantee of human rights, including humanitarian assistance’ (Amato, 2010). Engaging in humanitarian assistance thus becomes important not only for the prestige reason of showing that Brazil is not an impoverished country, but also for the larger foreign policy reason of staking a direct claim to a seat at major global governance tables (Burges, 2013).

Brazil’s major engagement with Haiti is a particularly important example of humanitarian assistance supporting foreign policy priorities. Taking charge of the Minustah mission in Haiti offered Brazil an opportunity to tangibly demonstrate its commitment to international security and the advancement of global governance structures, all of which gave credence to the larger political imperative of Brazilian ambitions for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. An additional element was a desire to build Brazilian legitimacy as a regional manager that could nudge the US and Canada out of Latin American and Caribbean affairs. These competing priorities – provision of humanitarian assistance and the advancement of foreign policy goals – created an important contradiction in the delivery and management of assistance to Haiti. Tensions were clear in the North-South dimension of Brazil’s Minustah leadership, with one ranking Brazilian official writing of the conflict between Northern desires for decisive military interventions versus the slower ‘hearts and mind’ approach implemented by Brazil (Braga, 2010). Celso Amorim (2011) was even more
direct, titling the Haiti chapter of his memoires as foreign minister: ‘The Brazilian armed forces do not fire on the people.’

Where it might be expected that Brazil had an interest in concretely advancing effective multilateralized South-South cooperation to help the island nation, progress seemed haulting as contesting approaches to development from Argentina, Brazil and Chile clashed. This is not to say that results were not achieved, but rather that the South-South option in Haiti proved no better than the previous North-South approach. Feldman, et al. (2011) offer four main reasons for this disappointment. First, the Minustah countries – Argentina, Brazil and Chile – have different philosophical approaches to development, which impacts how they conceptualize. Second, historical rivalries amongst the ABC countries crept through in the form of a competitive spirit in Haiti. Third, the three countries had different interests on the ground, particularly with respect to how their role in Minustah impacted their country’s global position. Finally, national conceptions of and commitments to peace building and its relation to larger ODA governance frameworks differed; Chile is an OECD member whereas Argentina and Brazil are not.

Less prominent and poorly quantified has been the provision of subsistence foreign aid. Beyond assistance provided through organizations such as the World Food Program and Food and Agriculture Organization, activities in this area are far more localized to Brazilian territory than the post-earthquake Haiti case.
suggests. A major part of Brazilian assistance in this area is quietly implicit, with the government deliberately turning a blind eye to the use of its education and health care services by foreign nationals in communities along Brazil’s borders. Foreign policy priorities still have an important role in this approach. There is a significant security imperative at play because these border regions are marked by a fluid movement of people across the frontier, which also brings the threat of transnationalized health issues and criminality. While not massive in scale, allowing ‘leakage’ of Brazilian services in these regions helps provide some stability by providing social services that may not otherwise be available to residents in the frontier regions of Paraguay, Bolivia, Guyana or Suriname.

Military and prestige aid in the traditional sense are less apparent in the panoply of Brazilian South-South cooperation. The quantity and nature of the resources available to Brazil simply do not allow for the expansive, prestige projects that formerly marked DAC aid and remain a high profile part of development assistance coming from China and India. Similar restrictions are found in the realm of military aid, with direct material assistance being very much the exception, although there is an active program of advanced officer training, including training the Namibian navy to the point that it operates in Portuguese, and increasing cooperation on policing operations. Although still nascent in form, the provisions found within Brazil’s 2008 Política de Defesa Nacional clearly set out a plan for a pan-South American security framework that would de facto be driven by Brazil and include a degree of interoperability that would seem to
require active direct support from Brazilian forces. Nevertheless, there are clear signs that Brazil has been seeking to increase the military assistance and arms sales it provides to sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the Bay of Guinea where there might be important oil opportunities for Petrobras (Coelho, 2010).

For the most part the clear focus in Brazil’s South-South technical cooperation has been on what Morgenthau termed ‘foreign aid for economic growth’, which might usefully be translated into contemporary parlance as ‘assistance for human development’. What sets Brazil apart in this area is a very soft power focus on knowledge and capacity transfer in response to specific requests instead of the parachuting in of individual projects that may not be reflective of recipient desires or needs. The focus is very much on the temporary transfer of government personnel to directly share technical knowledge held within the Brazilian state based on existing and effective programs. Outside contractors and consultants are not hired. The focus on state capacity for the delivery of this work is evident in the areas where ABC has been most active, with 22% of assistance going to agricultural programming, 16.6% to health projects, 12.6% to education, 11.8% to public administration and security and 7.5% to environmental issues (Cabral and Weinstock, 2010: 6). To advance projects in these policy areas ABC draws on the specific expertise of state-run organizations such as EMBRAPA (agriculture), IBAMA (environment), Fiocruz (health), and Senai and Senalc (employment training and administration).
One thing that is immediately apparent after a deeper examination of Brazil-provided ODA is that it tightly subscribes to the interest-advancing imperatives that often mark DAC assistance provision. Just as Australia engaged in a mammoth expansion of ODA to underwrite its efforts to win a UNSC seat in 2010, the Brazilian government has not shied away from the use of South-South technical cooperation to underwrite its foreign policy and foreign economic agenda, particularly to retain African support within the UN system. This is immediately apparent if we look at the distribution of Brazilian assistance, with South America receiving 23%, Central America and the Caribbean 12% and Africa 50%, focused tightly on the Lusophone countries. These regional distributions align almost exactly with the travels of Lula, who made twelve trips to Africa and visited 21 countries as well as hosting a series of summits in Brazil. The clear impetus for Lula was to give Africa a more central place in Brazil’s international political and economic engagement both to support the rise of Brazilian global leadership and open new opportunities for the country’s firms (White, 2010). Similar concerns drove engagement with South and Latin America, where Lula’s foreign policy team was working to entrench Brazil’s quiet leadership and preeminence in the region (Burges, 2009: chapter six).

The intra-governmental critique of the expansion of Brazil’s foreign aid stems from its totally responsive nature, which in turn means that it is not guided by an overarching strategy or sense of program or policy priorities. In interviews in Brasília some diplomats and officials in other internationally oriented ministries
observed that their country’s foreign aid projects were almost being given as
greeting gifts during Lula’s travels throughout Africa or when the president
received visiting presidents and ranking officials. This sort of observation is
supported by a survey of the projects catalogued in the ABC publication *A Cooperação Técnica do Brasil para a África*, which outlines a long succession of
very specific projects such as the transfers of conditional cash transfer
methodology (Benin), survey missions to development technical cooperation
projects (Burkina-Faso), cacao management programs (Cameroon), capacity
building advice for agronomists (Nigeria), or assistance with the expansion of
Eucalyptus plantations (Tunisia) (ABC, n.d.). Where a country is small and of
relatively minor trade, investment, or political importance to Brazil, the listing of
works underway or planned is also small. The number of planned and
implemented projects mushrooms and grows in complexity – creation of
experimental farm systems (Ghana, Cameroon, Mozambique), reform of national
health systems (Namibia, Angola), educational systems (Angola, Mozambique),
and anti-HIV programming (Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria) – when the recipient
country is either a member of the CPLP or of potentially major economic and
political significance such as Nigeria or Ghana.

Although in keeping with Morgenthau’s arguments that ODA ties the recipient to
the donor, the scale of Brazil’s aid requires a more nuanced reading. Rather than
creating a near-dependency link, Brazil’s South-South technical cooperation
works more as an important door opener and gesture of goodwill to give rapid
substance to the country’s South-South foreign policy. More to the point, the nature of the assistance provided by Brazil differs markedly from that coming from the DAC members or other emerging donors such as China, focusing squarely on the transfer of proven administrative and technical approaches to shared developmental problems. Both the smaller scale and the actual operating nature drawing from live programs in Brazil that formed the core of the assistance delivered through ABC thus carried greater resonance and pointed more firmly towards the idea of partnership than some competing approaches. For countries such as El Salvador the horizontal nature of South-South technical cooperation and the fact of Brazil’s successes in addressing poverty make Brazilian programming highly attractive. The emphasis on skills transfer as opposed to financial assistance is seen as providing a new dimension in development assistance that is perceived as carrying a new and potentially greater potential for achieving lasting developmental results (Garcia, 2012).

The focus on a more subtle process of building lasting relationships predicated on local capacity development is echoed in the approach that Brazilian firms are taking in Africa; in some countries regulations limiting expat employment create additional motivation. Brazilian firms appear to be committed to using local labour and at least attempting to develop local managerial skill with a view to a long-term in-country investment. For example, the general manager of corporate affairs for Vale Mozambique is a Mozambican national; in a similar context managers at Odebrecht, which employs over 20,000 in Angola and thousands more in Mozambique, talk of the challenges they face in retaining ambitious
junior staff leaving to start their own businesses. Conversely, there are frequent
complains around Vale’s Moatize mine in Mozambique that not enough good jobs
are being created for locals. Nevertheless, the approach of Brazilian firms stands
in sharp distinction to practices often attributed to countries like China or the
DAC-members, which are accused of what amounts to strip mining of resources
and leaving little positive legacy (Kermeliotis, 2012).

The challenge facing Brazilian firms professing a long view is that the human
capital and domestic supply chains that they need may not exist (Peres, 2013).
While it is a stretch to suggest that Brazilian ODA is directly driven by companies
such as Vale or Odebrecht, the technical assistance coordinated by ABC helps
create the conditions they need to pursue their in-country strategy. One example is
Embrapa’s ProSavana program Mozambique. Beginning with the observation that
the climate and soil in Mozambique are similar to Brazil, Embrapa has been
exploring how integrated agro-industrial systems might be set up. For Odebrecht
this represents an opportunity to diversify activities beyond civil engineering.
Vale has taken an interest in the project as a parallel development hub around its
Moatize mine, looking to ProSavana as avenue for the locally-sourcing food
supplies and expanding its long-term development impact on region.

While not designed to be exclusive to Brazilian investors – ProSavana is a
trilateral project with Japan – the underlying reality is that the initiative is pursued
and presented in Portuguese. The importance of language as a source of relational
power should not be underestimated for the Brazilian-interest advancing aspects of ODA activities in Lusophone Africa. As Mozambique’s minister for natural resources observed: ‘Brazil has an advantage by speaking Portuguese, but its firms face the same conditions as any other company’ (Bias, 2013). This filters through into other areas of ODA-like activities that support Brazilian firms. Capacity building, particularly the provision of advanced professional and technical training in Brazil is held up by Mozambique’s foreign minister as an important contributor to development human capital development (Baloi, 2013). While these factors all combine to create a positive disposition towards Brazil, officials in the Finance Ministry are clear that in the end Brazil is seen as any other external actor such as China, Spain or South Africa. The two factors that set Brazil apart from other countries seeking entry into Mozambique and other Lusophone countries in Africa are the ease with which Brazilian firms operate due to their native fluency in Portuguese and Lusophone cultural norms, and the quiet colonization of the national elites through scholarship programs that bears a striking resemblance to the soft power of programs such as the British Council’s Chevenning scholarship program or the US Fullbright scheme. As Odebrecht’s Mozambique managing director explains, he turns to Brazilian programming because that is what he knows, a tendency which Brazil’s quiet ODA activity spreads through the national elite in the partner country.

Surging bilateral trade with the South has been supported by government financing programs, including Africa-specific export-import credit lines with the
BNDES (OESP, 2012), which aligns with the Dilma government’s decision to maintain a focus on building engagement with the continent (Leo, 2011) even if it is now to be lead by the corporate sector and not the government (Peres, 2013). The feedback from some of the Brazilian empreiteiras working in Africa is that their more locally inclusive approach to project management and execution helps them win business away from international competitors. More to the point, these same Brazilian firms are increasingly finding themselves courted by Chinese companies looking to rebuild reputations or gain new contracts, particularly in the infrastructure development sectors. These construction companies do not overplay the importance of Brazilian ODA or BNDES financing for their presence in the region, pointing instead to the entry of long-term partners like Vale and Petrobras. Where the BNDES financing becomes significant for state-driven infrastructure projects. Here the firm works closely with the tendering government to complete the finance application for a BNDES project loan. A construction bonanza is restrained by the commercial status that these loans are given by the IMF and World Bank, and thus subject to commercial debt limits under IFI conditionalities. But when a bid is arranged, ODA and the legacy of Lula’s turn to the South is used to gain access and close deals (Carneiro de Mendonça, 2012; Scherer, 2012). Security considerations are one factor that is almost totally absent from the existing literature on Brazil’s growing ODA portfolio. On an immediate basis this makes sense. War in South America is very unlikely and developmental levels are not radically different if we take issues of national inequality throughout the region into account. For senior Brazilian policy makers the worry is what will
happen in the future, particularly if Brazil continues to grow steadily and outpace human development improvements in neighbouring countries such as Paraguay, Bolivia, Guyana and Suriname. As they argue, if disparate levels of national economic development create a push-factor on illicit migration flows, imagine the challenges Brazil will face if it has to patrol illegal people trafficking along its vast, forested land-borders? In some respects this very problem has already arrived in the shape of a substantial group of Bolivians working as illegal textile workers in São Paulo and the rising flows of illicit Haitian immigration. Efforts are being made to relocate these textile productions centres to Bolivia through the competitive import-substitution program. The worry for policy planners is that Brazil will be seen as a new ‘USA’, with plenty of opportunity for undocumented workers, which is partially what is driving the flow of Haitians slipping into the state of Acre after transiting through Bolivia (Carvalho, 2012).

The Brazil End – What has changed?

Brazil’s different domestic context for the provision of development assistance suggest that there could be a number of factors at play in the decision to provide South-South technical cooperation that are not captured by the current thinking on why states give aid. On a foreign policy level the very factors that prompt many DAC members to give aid as a moral responsibility are working on Brazil to draw it into the game as a sign it belongs at the top global governance tables. This involves a twist on the ‘prestige’ rationale set out by Morgenthau, with Brazil providing foreign aid as a sign that it is no longer a developing country, but an
emerging power (Muggah and Hamann, 2012: 4). There is also a conscious desire to build soft power by showing the world how successful Brazil has been at combating poverty and export these programs to the rest of the world as an example to be followed. This is particularly the case with Brazilian social programs beyond the conditional cash transfer program *Bolsa Familia*, including other initiatives such as the National Food Acquisition Program (Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos) and the National School Meals Program (Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar) (Itamaraty, n.d.).

Ambitions to export Brazilian approaches to public policy problems bears an uncomfortable similarity to the sorts of expansionist and dependence-creating logic that helped support the rise of ODA programming in many DAC-member countries. The difference in Brazil is that combatting poverty is the prime public policy problem, not an activity pursued because it also offers important collateral political gains at home and abroad. This logic appeared repeatedly throughout the Lula years. Indeed, Lula’s personal political rise and success rested to a large extent on his real commitment to and success in ‘fighting hunger’ in Brazil. This was reflected on an international level by his donation of the 2003 Prince of Asturias prize award to the UN Hunger Fund that Brazil helped establish and which emerged as an important foundation stone for the rise of Brazilian development assistance provision. The pattern continued through the inclusion of the UNDP-administered IBSA Fund as a symbolically rich element of the new pattern of South-South cooperation found in the India-Brazil-South Africa
Dialogue Forum (Vieira, 2013). More recent efforts to direct the Banco do Sul in South America and the floating of the BRIC Bank parallel to the World Bank point to an effort to create new development institutions based in and financed by the South with Brazil at the lead. Beyond shifting the global development discourse to the South lies a particular commercial imperative for Brazil, which would see funds from the BRIC Bank and the Banco do Sul used to contract Brazilian construction firms for infrastructure.

The prestige element of these activities is captured in the idea of global social citizenship that is a founding ideological strut of Brazil’s South-South foreign policy. Underpinning this is a very real self-interested economic agenda; the turn to the South and a new international economic geography has resulted in a cornucopia of new opportunities for Brazilian economic actors (White, 2013) even if the project is supported by a rhetoric of ensuring that the South develops as a unit. Still, on a straightforward economic interest level this makes some sense for Brazil given that its value-added exports primarily go to the South and not the North. Latin America and the Caribbean is a critical export market for Brazil’s value addeds, absorbing US$33.5 billion of sales from Brazil in 2012, up from US$27.8 billion in 2008. The situation in Africa is similar, but more marked by agricultural exports. Value added exports peaked at US$3.674 billion in 2009, but retreated to US$2.627 billion by 2012, bringing this category down from 36.5 percent of Brazil’s exports to Africa to 21.5%. But, this decline was paralleled by a surge in agricultural exports, which rose from US$2.979 billion in 2008 to
US$7.681 billion in 2012. In this context ODA provision takes on an important element of the market development process essential for a Brazilian domestic growth strategy predicated on continued expansion of other Southern economies.

Like its counterparts in the North, Brazil is engaging in ODA provision to advance its economic interests, but in a more amplified manner that points to the use of South-South cooperation as a major contributor to larger developmental patterns. One area which is not terribly divergent from that seen in the North is the use of ODA programming to encourage the implementation of technical standards that then become a global norm. Two areas where this is taking place are biofuel ethanol, which forms an important part of the agricultural and energy programming being advanced through ABC-coordinated projects. The other is in the realm of digital television, where Brazil is pushing for global adoption of the ISDB-T International (SBTVD) as the international standard for digital television in the face of competition from two other competing formats.

Another important developmental goal advanced in Brazil through ABC’s provision of ODA is the deepening of international expertise and experience within a number of state organizations. As has been noted by Daudelin in the Canadian context, international policy in a government’s line departments does

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2 Data from the Inter-American Development Bank’s DataIntal database. Searchers were at the one digit harmonized code level, with chapters 6-9 being aggregated to form the value added exports number and chapter 1 used for agricultural exports. [http://www.iadb.org/es/intal/estadisticas-de-comercio,7585.html]
not require direct involvement or even participation from the foreign ministry (Daudelin, 2005). This becomes even more the case as international bureaucratic interactions move into increasingly technical discussions that become very specific to a discrete policy area with little clear impact beyond the acting ministry, i.e., phytosanitary standards and monitoring in the export of frozen chicken pieces. In the Brazilian context this presents a bit of a challenge for many ministries because the inward concentration of the state means that most lack a cadre of officials and technocrats with cross-cultural or international experience. The Brazilian approach to ODA of sending state-agency experts overseas to engage in the direct provision of technical assistance helps build the pool of international experience. This in turn is expanding the policy areas and actors actively involved in foreign policy outside of the oversight of the foreign ministry (Pinheiro and Milani, 2012).

The provision of ODA thus offers Brazil an opportunity to develop its international capacity through a process of learning by doing. As was the case with Mercosur and the internationalization of Brazilian business, ABC-coordinated activities act as a sort of incubator that allows a measured insertion into international contexts in an environment where the stakes are not massive and the general attitude positive because it is directed towards mutual development. This aspect of mutual learning is doubly important because the expansion of experience gained by attempting to transfer elements of the Brazilian programs
abroad offers a valuable critical evaluation loop, requiring a questioning of how things are done as they are moved to another developing society context.

**Conclusions**

Although a genuine desire to contribute to global development does underpin Brazilian development assistance provision, it is far from a completely altruistic activity and thus free of Morgenthau’s idea of ‘aid as bribery’. The difference between Brazilian and DAC-member ODA is that Brazil ‘buys’ support more through the expression of solidarity and transfer of applied expertise than the provision or promise of substantive economic rents, which then opens space for new economic and political opportunities. In this respect Brazil has neatly avoided the trap of becoming over-committed or subject to exploitation for retained political support. Not only is the scale of the aid too small to make such manipulation worthwhile, the concentration on technical assistance in lieu of cash grants removes some of the space for aid-dependency. Indeed, the absence of direct cash transfers means that the technical assistance provided by Brazil remains remarkably free of the corruption problems that require significant oversight expenditure in OECD-DAC agencies. This reflects a real sense of partnership in the Brazilian development model, which is increasingly explicit that continued social and economic progress in Brazil will not be possible if neighbouring countries and the wider global South do not grow too. Brazil’s self-serving economic and political interests remain a primary motivator, but are cleverly expressed in a more inclusive and gentler manner.
The Brazilian case outlined here points to four areas for further research and consideration. First, the Brazilian case raises some difficult questions about how ODA is conceptualized and delivered, particularly with respect to DAC-member states widespread use of consultants and contractors. Part of the critique delivered by figures such as Moyo and Easterly is that ODA has become a multi-billion dollar business where the contractors are also the chief government lobbyists and critics. Brazil’s ODA practice raises the difficult question of where the relevant expertise can be found. Is a DAC-country consultant as well placed to deliver effective programming as a bureaucrat or social entrepreneur from a successful emerging market? Should a country like Brazil be making greater use of external consultants to provide ODA? If some of the most relevant expertise is to be found within developing countries, this in turn points to hard managerial questions about the management of trilateral programming, something that has proven difficult for almost all players involved due to the exigencies of internal accountability structures.

A second area for further research is an examination of the effectiveness of Brazilian programming. The belief often expressed in the receiving countries is that the sort of South-South technical cooperation provided by Brazil is in some ways more useful than traditional ODA because it represents a real training and learning program, not a simple transfer of a project and temporary relocation of expertise. An additional argument from the Brazilian side is that they are more
proficient at this sort of approach because of cultural similarities and a greater familiarity with environments where the informal norms can matter as much as the formal rules. This may be the case, but it remains to be tested through detailed case studies.

A third area calling for further research is the interplay between the activities and needs of Brazilian multinational corporations and the foreign policy and ODA initiatives of the Brazilian government. There is an emerging business studies and international political economy scholarship on state-firm relations in Brazil, but to date this has focused on the domestic side rather than specific investigations of how exactly Brazilian firms are being assisted with their outward expansion. As this paper argues, there appears to be substance to the claims that the Brazilian government and firms are taking a different approach to developing markets, but further research is needed to test how deep this commitment runs. The related question is the extent to which efforts are coordinated and how larger strategic engagement questions are managed. Focusing more on questions of development, the findings from an expansion of this research agenda might open new ways of approaching the policy coherent approach to development conundrum captured in the Commitment to Development Index.

The final question is the obvious, but often overlooked one of how deep does Brazil’s commitment to ODA provision run? Under Lula the push was strong, but early indications from Dilma are that presidential interest is flagging and that
attention is being refocused inwards at Brazil’s still significant challenges. With foreign policy questions drawing little political and public attention in Brazil, the driving question is what will continue to motivate Brazil to provide ODA, particularly with ABC firmly encased within Itamaraty as a questionable career option for ambitious diplomats. The answer to this question probably rests in a return to the third area raised in this conclusion, namely business-government relations and the outward expansion of the Brazilian economy. Ultimately, this suggests that while the rhetoric, form, and delivery of Brazilian ODA bears considerable differences from that of DAC-member states, the underlying motivations are still remarkably similar.

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