Sino-American Rapprochement of 1972

Sheng Li-jun

A sub-thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (International Relations) in the Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra

June 1988
To my parents
I certify that this sub-thesis is my own work and all sources used have been appropriately acknowledged.

Sheng Li-jun

Sheng Li-jun
I am thankful to Dr. Peter Van Ness, my supervisor, for his valuable advice and guidance in my writing of this sub-thesis, and for his prompt reading of my manuscript, which made it possible for me to finish this sub-thesis during my required stay in Australia.

I am thankful to Dr. Paul Keal for his co-ordinating the 1987-1988 MA course in International Relations from which I have benefited a lot, for his encouragement of my research into the field of Sino-American relations, and for his valuable advice and help in my writing of this sub-thesis.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Mr. Geoffrey Jukes, who made possible my study in ANU as an MA student of International Relations.

I also thank the Australia-China Council and Ford Foundation for their financial assistance.

The Australian National University
Canberra, Australia
June, 1988
## CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Introduction 1

Chapter I
   A Historical Background to Sino-American Relations 3

Chapter II
   China and the Rapprochement 14
   2-1. Chinese Domestic Politics 15
   2-2. Mao's Role 20
   2-3. International "Pushes" 39
   2-4. International "Pulls" 49
   2-5. Summary 55

Chapter III
   The United States and the Rapprochement 59
   3-1. Conceptions of Communist China 59
   3-2. Conceptions of the Balance of Power in East Asia 75
   3-3. The Vietnam War and U.S. Domestic Politics 85
   3-4. Summary 89

Notes 92

Bibliography 102
INTRODUCTION

"This was the week that changed the world",¹ said President Nixon during his first visit to the People's Republic of China (the PRC) in 1972. However, it took many weeks to achieve this one week symbolising the rapprochement between the United States and the PRC.

Given the more-than-twenty-year hostility between Beijing and Washington after the Second World War (WW II), the great difference between their ideologies and cultural values, and their historical experiences, such a historic breakthrough was the result of many factors; some of which were so urgent and important that both Beijing and Washington, separately but concurrently, decided to make such a sudden and fundamental change in their respective foreign policies that shocked the world.

It is the purpose of this sub-thesis to examine some major factors on both the Chinese and American sides which led to the rapprochement.

Chapter II analyses some of the major factors on the Chinese side. It gives greater weight to the analysis of factors other than strictly military considerations which tend to dominate many Western analyses. It includes the "international pushes" and "international pulls", on which there is a huge literature in Western writing, but focuses on the analysis of Chinese domestic politics or decision-making procedures,
especially Mao's role, in relation to this rapprochement. I first argue that domestic politics in China in the late 1960s had made Mao's role essential in the formation of all major policies in China. Then, my analysis proceeds to Mao's ideology, his personality, how he saw the world around him, and where he saw the major threat coming from in the particular circumstances of the Cultural Revolution, during which the rapprochement began to take its shape.

Chapter III analyses some major factors on the American side for the rapprochement. In this chapter, I examine the following three major factors as being crucial to Washington's decision to dramatically improve its relations with Beijing:

1. New conceptions of Communist China.
2. New conceptions of the balance of power in East Asia.

In order to get a better picture of why the United States did not seek to improve its relations with the PRC in the 1950s and finally did so in the late 1960s, I analyse and compare U.S. conceptions of Communist China, the balance of power in East Asia and U.S. domestic politics in different periods, and conclude that it was mainly these three factors, especially the new balance of power in East Asia, that gave a strong impetus to Washington to put aside, if not permanently, its ideological and historical hostility toward Communist China and to move toward this historic breakthrough.
Chapter 1

A Historical Background to Sino-American Relations

"The American role in China until the nineteenth century", as Harish Kapur says, "was essentially indirect and marginal."\(^2\) It was indirect in the sense that the role of individuals was more prominent than that of the state. It was marginal in the sense that the United States did not take the lead in the process of the Western colonial and imperial expansion and conquest that broke down the Qing's self-imposed isolation, compromised China's sovereignty, and helped to undermine the values and institutions of the traditional Chinese political and social systems.

In 1844, the United States "obtained, through a most-favoured-nation clause in the Sino-American Treaty of Wanghia, a guarantee that it would gain whatever treaty rights and privileges the Chinese gave to others with respect to trades, tariffs, residence rights, religious activity and so on".\(^3\) Thus when Great Britain and the other powers broadened their privileges in China, the United States was a beneficiary. For a time from the late 1890s to the early 1900s, American official policy was supportive of the Japanese aspirations in the area. This was changed fundamentally after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, when it appeared that Japanese ambitions might threaten the interests of both the United States and other
Western powers. The United States had by then stopped territorial expansion and perceived that its interests in East Asia would be best served by no one power dominating the region. Thus, Washington's Open Door Policy was "initially aimed less at protecting China's interests than at deterring Japan and Russia from taking action that could erode American commercial interests and other rights in China".4

When Chinese actions threatened the interests or special rights of foreigners in China, the United States usually joined the other foreign powers in efforts to protect their privileges. American troops, for example, participated in the international expeditionary force set to Beijing in 1900 to crush the Boxers Uprising.

At the Versailles Conference in 1919 when the United States acquiesced to Japanese takeover of German rights in Shandong, the Chinese clearly felt betrayed. The Versailles Treaty and the Japanese Twenty-one Demands provoked a popular nationalist movement in China - the May Fourth Movement in 1919. Western powers, including the United States, were also targets of this movement because of their acquiescence to the Japanese demands at Versailles. During the early 1920s, the United States did not support Chinese nationalism and chose to be essentially neutral between the Governments in Beijing and the provisional Republican regime in Nanjing. Only after Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition and the purge of the Chinese Communists in 1927 did Washington
"begin to consider recognizing the new regime, and finally did in 1928".5

The Chinese Communist Party (the CCP), which was founded on 1 July, 1921, had no formal contacts with the United States until toward the end of WW II. The Chinese Communists' ideological and political assumptions impelled them from the start to see imperialist powers, including the United States, as hostile to the Chinese revolution. Before the 1930s, there was no pressing need for the Communist leaders to formulate specific policies toward the United States, as the Party was small and fighting for its survival on the Long March. After the Communists' Long March to northwest China in 1935; the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937; and the mounting evidence for the imminence of possible war in Europe, the Communists saw more clearly than before the direct linkage between their own domestic struggle for power and the changing international situation. They started, therefore, to work more seriously at defining their policy toward particular foreign countries, including the major non-Communist countries. Even though they did not begin to have significant dealings with representatives of non-Communist countries until the later years of WW II, the origins of the Chinese Communists' foreign policy can be traced back to the late 1930s.

During the war years from 1937 to 1945, the CCP frequently reassessed the impact of the changing international
situation. Though it supported Moscow's views on crucial issues, it often made its own independent judgements. While it stressed the importance of general opposition to imperialism, it "began to make important distinctions between various imperialist nations, identifying the fascist states (Japan, Germany, Italy) as the main enemies and the capitalist democracies (in particular, the United States, Britain and France)" as temporary friends, thus they emphasized the need for a broad international united front including the United States. This accounts partly for their dealings with the Americans since the late years of the war to 1949.

The Americans claimed that their fundamental goal was "to win the war, the whole weight of American policy in China was directed at (a) encouraging the Kuomingtang [sic] and the CCP... to jointly mobilise their efforts against Japanese imperialism and (b) persuading the Soviet Union to enter the conflict in the Far East". But the Chinese Communists suspected the Washington's imperialist ambitions in China and the world, and were concerned over the danger of the United States colluding with the Kuomintang ruling class. If the United States was successful in obtaining a Soviet commitment to enter the Far Eastern conflict "two or three months after Germany [had] surrendered and the war in Europe [had] terminated", it had utterly failed in influencing the domestic politics in China as it was. This was partly due to their lack of knowledge of the oriental culture and their unrealistic efforts
to unite Kuomintang and the CCP in a coalition. Given the strong enmity and suspicion between Kuomintang and the CCP, their past histories and their conflicting objectives, there was little chance of uniting them. But the American failure can also be attributed to their own indecisiveness and mistakes in analysing these two forces; their own position in relation to the two contending forces; and their decision to rely on a Chiang Kai-shek-led China to maintain the balance of power in the Far East.

During and even after the war years, the CCP had shown considerable flexibility and openness toward the United States. It had agreed to invite a U.S. military observer group to be stationed in Yenan during the war, in 1944, and made efforts to establish close working relations with this group. It had accepted U.S. mediatory missions led by Patrick Hurley and George Marshall. It had furthermore agreed to the "placing of Chinese Communist troops under American command, acknowledged the importance of the American role in China's modernization after the war, and even proposed sending a high-powered delegation to Washington for an 'exploratory conference' with Roosevelt". Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai made clear that they would visit the United States if they were properly invited.

The CCP's attempt to maintain such a prudent and flexible posture can be attributed mainly to two reasons. Firstly, the CCP wished to be independent from both the Soviet
Union and the United States. Secondly, "the CCP wished to neutralise any future possibility of US intervention"\(^{10}\) in China on the Kuomintang side. However, "Whatever the possible reasons may have been given for such an attitude, one thing is certain: it never got off the ground."\(^{11}\) This was partly due to the resurgence of a strong anti-Communism in U.S. domestic politics, but principally due to the onset of the Cold War in the bipolar system and the American misconception of the nature of the CCP and its relations with the Soviet Union. Under this circumstances, Washington was either unwilling or unable to formally recognise the CCP.

This increasing globalisation of the Cold War and intensified anti-Communism at home had led Washington to move away from its earlier judgement in which it distinguished between the Chinese and the Soviet Communists. As a result it misjudged the CCP as being an integral part of a monolithic International Communist Movement under the Soviet control. American security interests were viewed globally and the American policy toward the Chinese Communists was perceived as a part of its overall strategy toward the "expansion" of the international Communist bloc as a whole.

Under this situation there was renewed debate within the CCP from 1945 over foreign policy issues and eventually the Party's ideological position hardened. This became clear at the Seventh National Congress of the CCP. From then on, relations between the United States and the CCP deteriorated
rapidly. The CCP more and more sharply accused Washington of meddling in the internal affairs of China by supporting Chiang Kai-shek to oppose the people's revolution, and leaned increasingly to the Soviet side.

At the same time, Washington proclaimed to remain disengaged in the Chinese civil war. One reason was that the risk of getting entangled in the civil war of a vast Asian country like China was estimated to be so inordinate and so incalculable that it should not be attempted. Consequently, on 5 January 1950, three months after the proclamation of the PRC, President Truman implied that the United States would not defend the island of Taiwan to which the remnant Nationalist forces had retreated. On 12 January, Secretary of State Dean Acheson defined the American defence perimeter so as to exclude Taiwan (and South Korea).

However this decision to disengage concerned only the Chinese sector and not the whole area, for Washington had become firmly attached to its containment policy and had publicly defined a defense perimeter in the Pacific to stop what it believed to be Communist expansion, from both Moscow and Beijing, into this area.

The policy of disengagement changed fundamentally as a result of the sudden outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. In the months that followed, Washington and Beijing made decisions that brought the two powers into direct military conflict with consequences that were to influence profoundly
the policies of both for years thereafter. Washington decided to intervene in Korea. Its troops pushed through into North Korea and bombarded the border area between the PRC and North Korea, even within the PRC borders. This served to convince Beijing of the U.S. intention to threaten the security of the new China. More important and even more threatening to China's security was the U.S. decision to once more intervene in the Chinese civil war. Reneging upon its previous policy of non-intervention, Washington decided to interpose the Seventh Fleet between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. At the same time, it challenged Beijing's claim to Taiwan by declaring that her future would have to "await the restoration of security in the Pacific or settlement with Japan or consideration by the United Nations".14

From 1950 until 1953, the PRC and United States fought a limited but a bitter war. Whatever chance might have existed for the two countries to normalize relations disappeared. It was replaced by an escalating pattern of mutual hostility, the most dramatic and virulent manifestation of which was the rapid growth of McCarthyism in the United States and the intensification of anti-Americanism in China.

The broad outlines of American policy toward the PRC were finally shaped during and immediately after the Korean War, which convinced Washington of its perception of the PRC as a territorial expansionist, and an ideological and integral part of the monolithic Communist bloc under the Soviet control.
Therefore, "The United States undertook practically everything short of war to contain and weaken her [the PRC]... These avowedly anti-PRC policies persisted without any change during the 1950s and 1960s."¹⁵

Hostility against the United States also persisted and intensified in the Chinese mainland, especially against "the U.S. occupation of Taiwan", which was considered by Beijing to be dangerous and provocative and an affront to the nationalist feelings of the Chinese people. The crises over Taiwan, which started in 1954-1955 and 1958, intensified the already tense state of relations between Beijing and Washington.

However, within the general framework of this escalating pattern of Sino-American hostility, there was a brief peaceful interlude in the 1950s when the Chinese made some initiatives to re-establish contact with the Americans. The Sino-American ambassadorial talks formally began on 1 August 1955, first in Geneva and thereafter in Warsaw. But, given the American determination of non-recognition and diplomatically isolating the PRC, these talks were exercises in sheer futility as far as substantive issues were concerned. Throughout all these meetings (and there were one hundred and thirty four by 1969) only one agreement concerning the repatriation of civilians was reached.¹⁶ Thereafter, "They [the talks] slid into a stalemate. No agreement was concluded, not even on non-controversial issues."¹⁷

In the early 1960s, the Kennedy Administration made
Some attempts to improve its relationship with Beijing. However, due to the domestic pressure, it could not make substantial changes in its approach to Beijing. Nor could the Johnson Administration, which, in order to justify the Vietnam War and get support from both the Congress and American public, was unwilling to change the image of the PRC as an expansionist power. During the same period, China's interest in the United States had declined considerably. Radicals gradually gained the upperhand within the CCP and adopted a rigid line of opposing both the imperialist United States and the revisionist Soviet Union. But, by the late 1960s, things began to change. For various reasons which are discussed in Chapters II and III, both Beijing and Washington began to undertake basic foreign policy appraisals which led them to the rapprochement.

The process was initiated by the Chinese in November 1968 when a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman proposed resumption of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks which had been practically halted since 1964. Following this proposal, each side made discreet but persistent, careful but active efforts toward their rapprochement through various channels and gestures. In the process, China showed more prudence and hesitation which many China experts attribute to its domestic politics and factional struggles.

Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 obviously sped up the process of the rapprochement. After April 1971, when an American pingpong team was formally invited to visit China,
things moved rapidly. Henry Kissinger set out on his secret visit to China in July 1971, which led to the Presidential visit by Richard Nixon and the Shanghai Communique that "opened a new chapter in relations of the American and Chinese people".¹⁹
This sub-thesis agrees with the assumption, which has been prominent among Western analyses, that as China moved to improve its relations with the United States, its leaders were very concerned with the possibility of Soviet attack. However, this sub-thesis seeks to go beyond these "international pushes and pulls" (in this sub-thesis, Soviet pressures on China are referred to as "international pushes" while strategic and diplomatic benefits and opportunities resultant from the rapprochement are referred to as "international pulls" to China), and gives greater weight to the analysis of Chinese domestic politics. To understand why China sought or accepted the rapprochement, it is necessary to take account of Chinese domestic politics, the Cultural Revolution and especially Mao's views and role in the international environment of the late 1960s.

Consequently, this chapter examines the following aspects:

1. Chinese Domestic Politics.
2. Mao's Role.
3. International "Pushes".
4. International "Pulls".
2-1. Chinese Domestic Politics

Traditional Politics

The two thousand years of Chinese feudal history have influenced both traditional and contemporary Chinese politics. In order to have a good understanding of contemporary Chinese domestic politics, one should first look into traditional Chinese politics. Some relevant characteristics of traditional Chinese politics were:

Firstly, a high centralization of powers in the hands of the Emperor. Ancient China stressed not only territorial unity, but also the absolute power of the Emperor over his subjects. Unlike Western states, there was no legislature or judiciary to check this absolute power, and there were no elections to confer it with legitimacy. The power of the Emperor was believed to come to him from Heaven. In turn, he delegated power to his officials to carry out his will to rule every corner of the country. These officials were supposed to be loyal to the Emperor and responsible to him rather than to his subjects.

Secondly, in this feudal Chinese society, the bureaucracy, through which the Emperor ruled, was mainly made up of bureaucratic intellectuals who achieved their official rank through imperial examinations, and bureaucratic landlords who were first officials or army generals, then landlords. In other words, these officials obtained their wealth and lands largely through their privileges as officials or army
generals, not vice versa.

In such a society, a person's success in the bureaucracy would bring to him and his family wealth, power, social position, and especially the security in all of these while academic or commercial successes could not, if they did not lead to acquiring an official position. Losing official position, one would likely lose all he or his family had obtained through the privileges of this position. Therefore, power and the struggle to maintain or increase this power was a prominent feature of traditional Chinese politics.

Thirdly, in order to secure or increase bureaucratic power, factions were formed and conflict among the factions was persistent.

Fourthly, there was little "feedback" of policy impacts from the people, roughly for the following reasons: (a) the Emperor's obscurantist policy which intentionally kept the common people away from decision-making, either in the imperial court or in local administrations, by holding back information from them and discouraging them from being interested in state affairs; (b) a highly-centralized and super-stabilized government within which officials were responsible to the Emperor, not to the common people; (c) traditional culture made the common people blindly believe in and respect the Emperor, and question no imperial edicts from him. Therefore, the Emperor could move with much freedom to issue orders.
Contemporary Politics

Socialism has fundamentally changed the nature of the state system of China. However, the above-mentioned practices of traditional politics still affect contemporary politics to a certain degree in certain periods, for the following reasons:

(a) The state system of the feudal China is gone, but its culture of two thousand years lingers on;

(b) Capitalism has not had a sufficient time to fully develop in China. Western democracy, its ideas and institutions, though known to the Chinese people, have not been accepted by them as a whole, and its influence is rather superficial and limited;

(c) The Chinese Communists did not follow the model of Communist movements in Western Europe, but that of the Leninist Bolshevik revolution which put emphasis on relying upon a highly centralized and highly-disciplined group of persons committed to the Communist cause in order to win the revolution;

(d) The CCP did not have enough time, or perhaps did not even fully realize the need, to spend serious efforts on correcting the practices of traditional politics, on correcting feudalistic cultural values, and on improving inner-Party democracy;

(e) Many CCP members and leaders, who were originally peasants, are not free from the feudalistic peasantry mentality, such as personal loyalty or personality cult.
Domestic Politics During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)

A good understanding of the Cultural Revolution is very important, not only because in this environment the rapprochement took shape, but also because it provides a good chance to understand Mao himself. And through this understanding of both Mao and the domestic politics during the Cultural Revolution, one can have a better picture of why China sought or accepted the rapprochement. Therefore, I propose, first of all, to look at some relevant essential characteristics of domestic politics during the Cultural Revolution.

During the Cultural Revolution, the leftover practices of feudalistic Chinese politics were not done away with. On the contrary, some of them were used and intensified to an unbelievable degree for the convenience of contemporary politics:

Firstly, the previous limited democracy within the CCP, the former Party organizations, and the former state institutions were "smashed to pieces". The political powers and administrative powers of the states were highly centralized under "the unified leadership of the Party", which in turn was under the absolute authority of Mao. Mao successfully purged his opponents and handpicked his men for major leading positions within the Party in order to carry out his "proletarian revolutionary line" to "continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat".

Secondly, Mao's personality cult was so extreme that he
was respected and even worshiped, at least publicly, both inside and outside the Party almost like God is by the Christians. His words were taken as "supreme instructions" and his agreement was an essential requirement for the formation of any new major policies.

Thirdly, though factional struggles existed within the Party, under Mao's absolute authority, no faction could get its way without Mao's support. For example, even if Lin Biao was the one who preferred rapprochement with Moscow instead of Washington, as has been suggested by some Western analyses, he did not have the final say. He knew well enough that he had the position of "successor" to Mao largely because of his public loyalty to Mao, and that he would lose his position overnight if he openly challenged Mao's "revolutionary line in foreign affairs". So, Mao had great freedom within the Party to move toward the rapprochement with the United States when he wanted, and he also had the authority to "unify the understandings within the Party", i.e. to carry the Party with him.

Fourthly, no serious opposition could be expected to come from the common people, because Mao's extreme personality cult allowed no one to challenge his wisdom; and also because the lack of access to information and decision-making procedure made the common people unable to doubt or challenge him.

Therefore, to understand why China made the decision
2-2. Mao's Role

To understand why Mao favoured the rapprochement with the United States, one should look to how Mao perceived the world around him. In this section, I propose to examine the following aspects:

- Mao's personality
- Mao and his philosophy
- Mao and the national feeling
- Mao and Party building
- Mao and the Cultural Revolution

Mao's Personality

Like many other great men, Mao had a strong character of self-confidence and persistence. He also had a strong commitment to his own vision of what was the best for China and for the world. With a brief review of the history of the CCP, especially that of the major inner-Party "line struggles" or factional struggles, or the Sino-Soviet dispute, one may easily find that Mao never gave up what he thought was the correct and never gave in to high pressure. The Soviets also realised that "Mao was not the kind of man to take orders."21

It was entirely consistent with his character and his vision of the interests of both China and the world for Mao to
stand firm against what he saw as the American threat in the 1950s and early 1960s. Then in the late 1960s, when Mao had successfully increased his power within the CCP and rebuilt the Party according to his own ideal, it was also consistent with his character for him to stand firm against Soviet pressure from across the border. What is more, Mao had enough reason to believe that revisionist Moscow would not only threaten the interests of the Chinese people, but his very own position within the Party. Therefore, Soviet pressure did not "pull" China over to Moscow, but rather served to "push" the Chinese toward the rapprochement with the United States.

Mao was also a man of great contradiction. He seemed to be very idealistic but at the same time proved himself to be very pragmatic. He seemed to be committed to his ideology, his theory of "Continuing the Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", and opposed to both imperialist Washington and revisionist Moscow. However, at the same time, there was a wide gap between his hot rhetoric and cool actions as shown in his decision to make rapprochement with his former primary enemy, because he was a man of both persistence and flexibility.

Mao and His Philosophy

Mao inherited and developed the Marxist materialist dialectics which played an important role in his perception and analysis of the world around him. His work "On Contradictions", 
and his view that "one divides into two" best reflect his dialectics.

According to Mao's dialectics, the world was material and full of contradictions which were absolute and everywhere. Everything was made up of contradictions. Among a group of contradictions there must be a principal contradiction and the others were secondary. A contradiction could be divided into two aspects, the principal aspect and the secondary aspect. One must be good at finding out the principal contradiction or the principal aspect of a contradiction when facing a lot of complicated problems. If the principal contradiction was solved, the other problems or the rest of the problem would be much easier to solve.

Mao's commitment to this view was exemplified by his strategy in both WW II and the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949) and his works such as "On Policy", "On Coalition Government", "On Protracted War" and "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong".

Mao believed that all imperialists were enemies of the Communists. The contradiction between imperialists and reactionaries on the one hand, and the oppressed people and nations on the other was the principal contradiction which all the Communists should strive to solve. However, according to Mao's dialectics, contradictions were not static, they were developing: the principal contradiction could develop to become the secondary one and vice versa, according to objective rules
of development inherent in the things themselves. And in different periods, to different people, the principal contradiction could be different.

For example, during WW II and the Chinese Civil War, as far as the Chinese revolution was concerned, the Japanese invasion of China and the Kuomintang attack of the CCP became the principal contradictions respectively. Then the main effort should be directed to solve the principal contradiction by forming a united front to "unite all those that could be united". In other words, since the Japanese invasion was the principal contradiction for the Chinese revolution during WW II, other capitalist states such as the United States, France and Britain and even the Kuomintang regime could be united, though temporarily, into a united front. When the Japanese threat was gone, the contradiction between Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists became the principal one for the Chinese revolution. Therefore, the CCP proposed to unite even the national bourgeoisie and "left and middle factions" within Kuomintang to isolate and divide Kuomintang to solve the principal contradiction of the Chinese revolution at that time. A brief review of the CCP's strategies at different periods shows that the Party had a clear identification of major tasks in any given period at any time, which suggested the principal contradictions according to the Party's analyses.

What, then, was the principal contradiction for China in the late 1960s? This was clearly hinted at by the CCP in its
Ninth Party Congress in 1969 when "four major contradictions" were prominently listed in the Report to the Congress. They were

...the contradiction between the oppressed nations on the one hand and imperialism and social imperialism on the other; the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist and revisionist countries; the contradiction between imperialist and social imperialist countries and among the imperialist countries; and the contradiction between the socialist countries on the one hand and imperialism and social-imperialism on the other.22

What was of special significance in this Report was that unlike any formulation of major contradictions before 1969, the Soviet Union was placed on a par with imperialism in each of the four major contradictions. This clearly hinted at the CCP's, or to be exact mainly Mao's, perception of where the major threat came from and what the principal contradiction was.

Accordingly, it could be assumed that Mao had by that time reached the conclusion that the social imperialism, i.e. the Soviet Union, had become, especially after its invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, a threat to world Communism just as the United States was. Therefore, Mao might have viewed imperialism and social-imperialism as the principal contradiction to the world revolution.
But to go further, according to Mao's dialectics of contradiction, every contradiction was divisible. One contradiction could be divided into two aspects, the principal aspect and the secondary one. Therefore, in the contradiction between "U.S. imperialism" and "Soviet social-imperialism", Soviet social-imperialism was clearly seen by Mao as the principal aspect, because the Soviet Union was increasingly seen by Beijing as on the offensive while the United States was defensive and declining. Therefore, Mao might have drawn the conclusion, as was later to become apparent in Beijing's foreign policy in the 1970s, that social imperialism was more dangerous than imperialism to the world revolution, and that the revolutionary people of the world should concentrate their efforts to deal with the principal aspect of the contradiction (i.e. Soviet social-imperialism) and make use of the conflict and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As for the Chinese revolution, which was part of but by no means equivalent to the world revolution, the Soviet threat was increasingly viewed by Mao as the major threat as the 1960s drew to a close. By the time of the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, Mao had every reason to believe that revisionist Soviet Union had replaced imperialist United States as the principal contradiction to the Chinese revolution. Thus, a new united front, which included capitalist states and even the United States, should be established. So the
rapprochement with the United States was, therefore, justified.

Mao and the National Feeling

Chinese people were and still are very proud of their culture, their history of civilization and their vast land under a unified authority with independence, dignity and honor. However, since 1840 when the "Middle Kingdom" was defeated by the "foreign barbarians", this pride in their past glory was greatly hurt and distorted. At first, China was stunned by the "fierce gunboats" of the "foreign barbarians", but nationalism gradually began to gather momentum, and the May Fourth Movement in 1919 marked the first massive outflow of this momentous nationalism against foreign domination.

Although Communism was its claimed objective, the CCP also represented this national feeling and saw itself not only as the pioneer of the proletariat toward Communism, but also as "the restorer of China's ancient glory and redresser of the wrong doings inflicted upon her by the West". Many of its members were first patriots or nationalists, then Communists. In other words, they joined the CCP because of their patriotic or nationalistic revulsion against the Japanese invasion and foreign domination. They then learned to accept Communism after rather than before they became members of the CCP. That was why Mao saw the imperialist Japan as a "negative teacher" who helped the CCP increase its strength.
This strong and persistent national feeling, and traditional national pride both within and without the Party, were significantly intensified by the Chinese victory against the Japanese invasion, the founding of the PRC, the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait crises, the Vietnam War and the Sino-Soviet conflict. They were important factors affecting decision-making by Mao and his colleagues, especially in foreign policies, because:

(a) Mao and many of his colleagues were both Communists and patriots at the same time. They never saw that the Communist principle of proletarian internationalism meant the complete denial of national interests;

(b) The strength of national feeling among the Chinese people would have seen any concessions to foreign pressure as "capitulating", which would have lowered not only the image of the PRC abroad, but also the image of the CCP at home. What was more important was that this could have damaged Mao's image and his personality cult;

(c) The strong national feeling within the CCP, especially among its leaders where the existence of factions was only natural, was a factor for Mao not to have shown any sign of weakness or "capitulation" in dealing with foreign powers. Any such sign would have given rise to suspicion of him not being a strong leader, and allowed his opponents to use such "weakness" in possible factional struggles within the Party. Because of this strong national feeling, standing firm
against foreign pressure would yield political advantages by increasing internal cohesion among both the people and the Party. Otherwise it would be divisive to both. This was another major reason that the Soviet pressure in the late 1960s did not succeed in neutralising Beijing or "pulling" it over. This pressure "pushed" instead.

The rapprochement with the United States was accepted by Beijing (though there were disagreements within the CCP as Mao said later on\(^24\)), partly because "U.S. imperialism" was seen by Mao to be a declining power on the defensive. Mao could interpret his decision as "using barbarians to deal with barbarians " or forming a united front against the major threat to solve the "principal contradiction". Hence, national feeling and pride would not be hurt. On the contrary, this strong national feeling could have been used by Mao, when facing increasing Soviet Military threat in the late 1960s, to persuade more people to support his rapprochement policies with the United States.

**Mao and the Party Building**

(1). **Party Building among the "Three Magic Weapons"**

In Mao's mind political power was essential. He thought that all revolutions were for the purpose of obtaining or strengthening political power. In order to obtain or strengthen political power, Mao stressed the importance of a strong Party
leadership. When summarizing the experience of the Chinese revolution, Mao attributed the CCP's victory to the "three magic weapons" and maintained that "a correct understanding of these three magic weapons and the relations among them [was] equivalent to a correct leadership of the whole Chinese revolution". These magic weapons were "a united front, the armed struggle and the Party building". The question then arises: What is a correct understanding of the relations among the three magic weapons or, in other words, which is the most important one among the three magic weapons?

Contemporary Chinese history showed that gun or armed struggle was important to the victory of the Chinese Communists, as vividly expressed by Mao in his saying, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." However, the gun had been placed in the full control of the CCP ever since Mao stepped into the top position in the Party at the Zunyi Conference in 1935, and Mao always stressed, "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party."

As for the relation between the united front and the Party building, it was clear that it was the Party that played the leading role in the united front, because it was the other forces that were united by the CCP into this front, not vice versa.

Thus, the Party was of great significance to Mao, because Mao understood well as he said, "The force at the core
leading our cause forward is the Chinese Communist Party.29 It was the Party that commanded the gun and led the united front.

(2). **Party Building and the Factions within the Party**

The importance of the Party was such that Mao would naturally take great care to maintain the Party's unity and its independence from foreign control. However, in Mao's mind, the danger to the Party not only came from "imperialism and Kuomintang reactionaries", it also came from the factions within the Party, especially after the Communist victory in 1949. This was because:

Firstly, Mao thought that though some people joined the CCP, they were not Marxists or true Marxists. They might oppose Mao's line. For instance, in the Cultural Revolution, Mao once said that the bourgeoisie were right within the CCP.

Secondly, in Mao's mind, uncontrolled factions within the Party would have caused great danger to his line and position, like Zhang Guotao's faction which controlled the Fourth Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in the Long March (1934-1935), and Liu Shaoqi's faction before the Cultural Revolution.

Thirdly, Mao believed that revisionist Soviet Union would certainly use these factions within the CCP. Given his experiences in dealing with Moscow and the Communist International (Comintern), Mao had more than enough reason to
believe that Moscow posed more threat to his position, to the Party's unity and to the nation's security and interests, than any possible threat from the United States. The concern of a possible invasion from the United States could have been used to increase the internal cohesion within the Party and the nation as was shown in the time of the Korean War. But the Soviet Union was deceitful and divisive in the sense that it might have convinced some leaders within the CCP that they were true Marxists and might have won them over. Therefore, the Soviet Union was more dangerous. Rapprochement with Moscow would have been almost equivalent to a confession that the CCP was wrong in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute of the early 1960s. This would have brought disaster to the unity of the Party and the nation, especially to Mao's image, his personality cult and his position. In contrast, rapprochement with Washington would not; instead it would bring strategic and diplomatic benefits and opportunities as will be discussed later.

(3). Moscow and the Factions within the CCP

The Party was so important that Mao certainly would not have allowed any other factions to seize the top position in the Party to harm the Party's interests, national interests, or his own personal interests. For the same reason, he would not have allowed Moscow to interfere with and control the CCP. As early as 1936, Mao made his famous declaration in his talk
with Edgar Snow, "We are certainly not fighting for an emancipated China in order to turn the country over to Moscow."30

Unlike the Communist parties in the Eastern Europe, the CCP enjoyed more independence from Moscow's control. China was not "liberated" by the Soviet Red Army as most Eastern European countries had been. Mao was certainly not put at the top of the Party by Moscow. Mao was elected to the chairmanship of the CCP at the Zunyi Conference in 1935. What was interesting about this election was that unlike the usual case before, this election was held without the agreement from the Comintern. Wang Ming, Moscow's favourite, who had come back from Moscow to control the CCP, was absent from the conference and his strategy was criticised to be "Left" adventurerist at the conference.31

Stalin had to accept Mao's leadership in the CCP as a fact, but he had strong suspicions about Mao and the Chinese revolution. Liu Xiao, former Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union, recalled in 1987 that, for a long time, Moscow had held reservations about the Chinese revolution and disagreed with the CCP on such major issues as perceptions of the international situation and the situation of the Chinese revolution.32

Mao also recalled this at the Chengdu Conference in 1958:
The Chinese revolution succeeded against the wishes of Stalin's... According to Wang Ming's and Stalin's methods, the Chinese revolution could never succeed. After the revolution was successful, Stalin still said it was not genuine. We did not dispute the issue, but after we had fought in Korea against the United States, he decided it was genuine.  

However, whether before or after Moscow concluded the Chinese revolution was genuine, the Soviet Union did not cease its effort to influence and control the CCP. "Before 1949, their interference was blatant... Soviet leaders in particular have on many occasions tried to support certain Chinese leaders against others." Wang Ming and Li Li-san were two obvious examples. They came back from Moscow with the strong support from the Comintern. For a time, they controlled the Political Bureau of the CCP carrying out "the Comintern Line" and purged many other leaders in the CCP. Through good tactics, Mao was successful in resisting interference from Moscow. Mao had no reason to let down his guard even after the Chinese revolution was accepted as a "genuine" Communist movement by Stalin after the Korean War. Mao Zedong Thought, which was claimed by the CCP as "an application of the universal truth of Marxism in the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution", was looked upon with suspicion in Moscow. "Mao's personal relations with key Soviet leaders were generally unsatisfactory, to him and to them."  

Moscow on several occasions made hints about their
desire for a change in the leadership of the CCP. In 1964 when
Premier Zhou Enlai led a delegation to Moscow, Soviet defence
minister Marshal Malinovski said to the Chinese general Wu
Xiuquan (a member of the visiting Chinese delegation), "We have
already ousted Khrushchev, you should follow our example and
topple Mao."36 Mao never forgave this. His suspicion of Soviet
intentions were not only confirmed but increased. This partly
led to the launching of the Cultural Revolution, which made it
almost impossible to have a rapprochement with the Soviet
Union. Given the subtlety of personal factors and the
importance of power to one's personal interests in Chinese
domestic politics as outlined previously, Mao's conviction of
such a Soviet intention to topple him by exploiting the factions
within the CCP, might have made it easier to convince Mao, at
least in the late 1960s, that the United States was the lesser
of the two evils than the Soviet Union. To be cynical,
Washington would not pose a specific and direct challenge to
Mao's personal position within the CCP.

Mao and the Cultural Revolution

Mao once wrote, in a letter to his wife Jiang Qing, that
he had done only two great things in his life; one was the
founding of the PRC and the other was the launching of the
Cultural Revolution. Mao even went so far as to support those
radicals in the Cultural Revolution who denied any
achievements in the seventeen years from 1949 (when the PRC
was founded) to 1966 (when the Cultural Revolution started). Those radicals claimed that in these seventeen years Mao's revolutionary line had basically not been carried out.

(1). Some Reasons for the Cultural Revolution

Different reasons may be given by different people to explain the necessity for the Cultural Revolution. However, a careful reading of Mao's letter to his wife Jiang Qing, who was also the first deputy head of the Leading Group of the Central Committee of the CCP for the Guidance of the Cultural Revolution, in 8 July, 1966, one month after the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, and a review of Mao's talks with Edgar Snow in 1965 and 1970 may provide another interesting perspective:

The letter reads:

I have become a Zhongkui\textsuperscript{37} within the CCP in the sixth decade of the twentieth century...There are more than one hundred [Communist] parties in the world, most of them no longer believe in Marxism-Leninism. Marx and Lenin have been crushed to pieces by them, let alone us?\textsuperscript{38}

This letter reflected Mao's situation before 1966: Internationally, Mao had failed to win over enough other Communist parties in his ideological dispute with Moscow to raise his prestige or position in the International Communist Movement. Therefore, he thought these Communist parties "no
longer [believed] in Marxism-Leninism". At home, with the failure of the Great Leap Forward (1958) and three subsequent years of economic setbacks (1959-1961), Mao had to retreat into "the second line" in the leadership within the CCP and let Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping stand out on "the front line" to take charge of the daily work of the Party. This may be why Mao felt that he had become a Zhongkui in the CCP, having only a nominal status, but no real power. This situation was confirmed by Mao himself in his talk with Edgar Snow in 1970, when he told Snow that at the time of their last talk in 1965 he had lost much power, and many provincial and local Party committees, especially the Party Committee of Beijing Municipality, were beyond his control.\(^39\)

By 1965, Mao might have felt that there was no immediate danger from either the Soviet Union or the United States, as Mao told Edgar Snow that "domestic pressures would soon precipitate an American withdrawal [from Vietnam].\(^40\) Then, he might have decided it was time for him to regain his lost power from Liu Shaoqi through launching the Cultural Revolution. As Gao Gao says in *Ten Years of the Cultural Revolution*, "In January 25, 1965, Mao Zedong decided that Liu Shaoqi must be thrown out of power."\(^41\) This was confirmed later on by many high-ranking Chinese leaders in their talk with Edgar Snow.\(^42\)
(2). The Cultural Revolution by 1969

By 1969, as Mao wished, the Cultural Revolution had removed Liu Shaoqi from power, broken to pieces the former administrative institutions and established new administrative bodies (the Revolutionary Committees) all over the country. These were under Mao's complete control. The Ninth National Congress of the CCP marked this achievement. The Cultural Revolution changed Chinese politics dramatically. The seventeen years since the founding of the PRC to the beginning the Cultural Revolution was criticized as basically not carrying out Mao's revolutionary line. Then what was Mao's revolutionary line which was different from the one which was followed during the previous seventeen years?

This new line, or Mao's revolutionary line, in domestic affairs became clear enough by 1969. However, "Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs" was not clear enough by that time.

If Mao had a new line in foreign affairs, then, from 1969 it was high time to carry it out: Before 1966, Mao might have felt that he did not have enough power. From 1966 to 1969, due to domestic struggles, Mao did not have enough time or opportunity to carry out this new line. But in 1969, Mao had by then the power and time to carry out his new line in foreign affairs, and the changed international situation gave him a chance and urged him to do something to get China out from its previous international isolation.
What is more, not only was Mao the kind of man who desired high prestige both at home and abroad, but the new regime (the Revolutionary Committees and new Central Committee of the CCP, which had successfully established power at home but lacked corresponding international position), naturally desired a high international profile.

In view of the international environment in the late 1960s, there were increasingly strong international "pushes and pulls" which made Beijing feel more and more keenly the urgency of formulating a new strategy. In such an international environment, where the Soviet Union was increasing its military pressure on China, a rapprochement with Moscow, for the reasons given above, was obviously the last thing Mao desired. What is more, the rationale of Mao's Cultural Revolution was to "prevent and combat revisionism". Liu Shaoqi was thrown out of power as "a Chinese Khrushchev within the CCP " who carried out a pro-Soviet revisionist line; and the new generation of leaders were supposed to be "staunch anti-revisionist fighters". Mao's former purges of other factions or leaders (such as Gao Gang, Peng Dehuai, Wang Ming and Li Li-san), seemed mostly to be an anti-Soviet move. Given this situation, a rapprochement with Moscow would have meant that Mao had not only been wrong in launching the Cultural Revolution but also wrong in his former purges and in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. Thus Mao's position within the CCP would have been seriously threatened. Even a limited
rapprochement would have encouraged potential factions within the Party (those "healthy forces" as Moscow called them), to split the Party. Such a rapprochement with Moscow would have lowered rather than raised Mao's prestige in the International Communist Movement as Mao intended, at least partly, in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

So, in such an environment, while the choices of remaining in diplomatic isolation and making rapprochement with the Soviet Union seemed undesirable, the choice of having rapprochement with the United States seemed easier to accept. In fact, the Ninth National Congress of the CCP already hinted at a change in China's foreign policy by putting forward some new theoretical perspectives: (a) The Soviet Union was taken as a major threat by being put for the first time on a par with the United States in each of the four major contradictions in the world; (b) The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which Beijing used to guide relations among states of different political systems, were reaffirmed; (c) The necessity for a united front was stressed; (d) The Congress put greater stress on states relations than on the people's revolution movements; (e) It was recognised that capitalism would not die immediately. These new theoretical perspectives helped to pave the way toward the rapprochement with the United States.

2-3. International "Pushes"

The changes in Chinese domestic politics took place at
a time when the international environment put greater pressure (as is called "international pushes" in this sub-thesis) for China to make the rapprochement.

As the 1960s drew to a close, there were two major international trends of concern to China. They were the rapid expansion of Soviet power and influence in Asia, and the increasing Soviet-American detente which was assuming definite aspects of a joint condominium in Asia for the containment of China.

By the late 1960s, it was an obvious fact that Soviet power was expanding rapidly. "[Its] missile and naval construction programs begun in the early 1960s were beginning to come on line. The Soviet Union was rapidly acquiring nuclear parity with the United States and a high-seas capability which would project Soviet power into regions far from Soviet borders."44 In the late 1960s, Soviet Asia policy entered a vigorous and expansive stage. Moscow began unfolding a program designed to expand and improve its relations with Asian countries so as to draw those countries into arrangements, such as the Asian Collective Security System, designed to minimize Beijing's influence, and to increase Moscow's influence in Asia. At the same time the powers which had dominated Asia since 1945, the United States and Great Britain, were beginning to retrench their positions in Asia.

According to John W. Garver, in 1968 Moscow began unfolding a multifaceted program designed to expand the Soviet
influence in Asia and to contain China. This program contained the following elements:

1. Anathematize the CCP within the International Communist Movement and foster anti-China attitudes among the governments of socialist countries;
2. Establish a position of overwhelming military superiority along the Soviet Union's and the People's Republic of Mongolia's borders with China;
3. Expand Soviet naval power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the adjacent seas;
4. Increase aid to North Vietnam in an attempt to win Hanoi over to Moscow's side in the Sino-Soviet dispute;
5. Foster regional economic cooperation among the countries of South and Southeast Asia, and link those groupings to the socialist bloc, through various types of economic aid and cooperation.
6. Foster friendly ties between the Soviet Union and Japan, and also with the other countries of Asia, and draw these countries into cooperation with Moscow in containing China;
7. Establish a system of collective security among Asian countries, including the Soviet Union;
8. Develop detente with the United States and with the West generally.45

Such a multifaceted program pushed China over and over to the rapprochement with the United States.
Soviet Containment of China

One of the international "pushes" came from the increased Soviet efforts in the 1960s to woo China's Asian neighbours in an attempt to contain China. Beijing was particularly concerned over these Soviet moves especially after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Zhen Bao conflict, which convinced Beijing of the Soviet imperialist ambitions and capability of invasion. These Soviet moves for the containment of China not only served to increase the traditional Chinese fear of invasion or attack by the neighbouring countries, especially those to its north, but also reminded their bitter memory of tsarist Russia's invasion of China during the last century.

First of all, Vietnam was an issue that drew Beijing's close attention to, and concern about increasing Soviet influence. Since new Soviet leaders stepped into power at the end of 1964, Moscow dramatically increased its aid to North Vietnam. Between 1966-1969 Soviet aid to Hanoi averaged US$210 million per year, well above China's average of US$85 million per year. In 1968, Hanoi decided to negotiate with Washington, a decision about which Hanoi apparently did not consult with Beijing (a departure from Hanoi's previous practice). This shocked and angered Beijing, largely because this decision seemed, from Beijing's perspective, to be predicated on a superpowers' collaboration on Vietnam, especially in the light of the Soviet Union strongly supporting
the peace talks and acting as go-between in helping arrange these talks.48

In another new bid to contain China, Moscow officially launched a proposal for an Asian collective security system at the World Conference of Communist Parties held in Moscow in June 1969.49 The purpose of the proposal "was in large part directed at isolating and containing China"50 as was generally agreed by analysts of the Soviet proposal. In May 1969, Soviet President Podgorny visited the People's Republic of Mongolia and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea in a effort to push through the proposal for the creation of a system of collective security in Asia.51 In late 1968 and early 1969, Moscow began making strenuous efforts to improve Soviet ties with the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia. These efforts were seen by Beijing as aimed at China's containment. What was especially upsetting to Beijing was Moscow's new drive toward Taiwan. In October 1968, Victor Louis, Soviet correspondent for the London Evening News and "unofficial' Soviet plenipotentiary and reputed KGB operative, made the first visit by a Soviet citizen to Taiwan since 1949".52 While in Taiwan, Louis met with Chiang Ching-kuo, and reportedly "discussed the possibility of improving Soviet-Taiwan relations".53

Beijing was also worried about India's receptive attitude toward the Soviet collective security system proposal, and about the Soviet attempt to improve its relations with
Japan and work toward Japan's entry into the proposed Asian collective security system. Beijing said Moscow hoped to have Japan join hands with both Washington and Moscow in forming a ring of encirclement around China.  

**Soviet Military Pressures**

These Soviet efforts to contain or encircle China seemed more alarming to Beijing in the light of increasing Soviet military buildup along its shared borders. After relations between Beijing and Moscow openly deteriorated in 1964, the Soviet Union began to increase its military forces near the border. As Robert Sutter says, "...beginning around 1966 Moscow instigated an active program aimed at bringing its forces stationed in the Far East to a higher state of readiness, equipping them with better and larger amounts of weaponry and augmenting their numbers."55 Many people noticed that during the late 1960s, "Soviet forces in the Far East received surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads. Furthermore, the Soviet Union signed a new defense agreement with Mongolia in January 1966, which Moscow implied gave it the right to station troops and maintain bases in that country".56 By 1967, the Soviet Union had apparently increased its troop strengths in the border regions by around twenty thousand men, and began to station sizable contingents of troops there.57 As the Cultural Revolution was going on, Moscow hinted repeatedly that "it might interfere in China in
support of the anti-Maoist "healthy forces".\textsuperscript{58}

It was against this background that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies occupied Czechoslovakia in August 1968, and began to promulgate the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty. According to this doctrine, whenever the forces of "counter-revolution" within a socialist country threatened to dismantle the elements of "socialism", the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were bound by the obligation of proletarian internationalism to intervene in support of the "revolutionary forces".

The increased Soviet military deployments along the border and in Mongolia were alarming enough even if they had not coincided with the announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1968. But the possibility of a more general application of the Brezhnev Doctrine further alarmed Beijing, for the Soviet disapproval of China's model of socialism was even more pronounced than it had been for the liberal Czech reforms.

These Soviet pressures on Beijing were obviously intensified after the Zhen Bao bloodshed in March 1969. Thereafter, the Soviets began serious preparations for a military preemptive attack against China. "In May, late-model Soviet aircraft were transferred from Eastern Europe to newly enlarged airfields in Outer Mongolia within easy reach of China. By June, the Soviets seemed to have completed planning for conventional air strikes against the Chinese nuclear production facility at Lanchow."\textsuperscript{59} By the end of 1969, Soviet troops near
the border had increased to 30-35 divisions from 20-30 divisions at the end of 1968. "[They] included large concentrations of armour, mechanised infantry, artillery and nuclear armed rockets, which were positioned for a blitzkrieg assault into [China]." As American experts realized, "These preparations had to be known to the Chinese." By July 1969, "reports were coming from sources in East European capitals that the Soviet Union was sounding out its allies about the possibility of a preemptive surgical strike against China's nuclear facilities".

Beijing clearly felt this pressure: Many air-raid shelters were built in big cities against Soviet attacks, armies were disengaging themselves from civil administration with which they had been deeply involved since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. China began serious efforts to upgrade its military capability, especially to increase troops in regions along the Sino-Soviet border. "Armed forces previously used to protect southern and eastern China against an attack from the United States were transferred northward to positions for defence against [the Soviet Union]." There was no doubt that the Soviet Union had now replaced the United States as the principal enemy from the perspective of Beijing. As Zhou Enlai put it to Ross Terrill, "John Foster Dulles had found a successor in Moscow."
Soviet-American Collusion

As China's relations with Moscow progressively deteriorated in the late 1950s and 1960s, Soviet-American detente advanced step by step. Beijing was extremely sensitive to U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the containment of China, especially in the area of nuclear weaponry. Moscow's 1959 decision to renege on its 1957 promise to help China develop nuclear weapons was instrumental in persuading Beijing that Moscow agreed with Washington that China should be denied a nuclear retaliatory capability and kept vulnerable to nuclear attack.65 The conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet-British Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in August 1963 was seen in Beijing as a further proof of Soviet collusion with the United States for "a nuclear monoply and nuclear blackmail". This "collusion" advanced another step in 1967 when Beijing believed that at the meeting between Lyndon Johnson and Alexi Kosygin at Glassboro, Massachusetts in late June, the two superpowers reached an agreement that China was their common number one enemy.66 As Garver points out, "More ominous yet were the U.S. and Soviet decisions in 1967 to build 'thin', i.e. anti-China, anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems."67 When explaining the U.S. decision to build such a "thin" ABM system, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said, "It was necessary to defend the nation against the type of nuclear attack that Communist China could be capable of launching within the next ten years."68
Beijing believed that Washington's decision to begin development of such a "thin" ABM system was made after consultations with Soviet Premier Kosygin during the Glassboro summit in June 1967. During the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Beijing saw the restrained nature of the U.S. reaction to the Soviet move as a "further proof of Soviet-American collusion to divide the world into spheres of influence".

At the beginning of 1969, the new U.S. Administration still made clear, at least in public, its decision to continue with the deployment of an anti-China ABM system, and Beijing saw it as an indication that the United States "[intended] to have closer collaboration with the Soviet revisionism in keeping up their nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail against the people of the world, and the Chinese people in particular".

It was against this background that the Zhen Bao conflict broke out. China was naturally very suspicious of Moscow's intention to win U.S. agreement or support in its preparation of a "surgical attack" against China. This suspicion was indicated in the Chinese media. On 18 March 1969, Xinhua news agency reported on Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin's talks with the U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers. Dobrynin was said to have given Rogers a detailed account of the incident at Zhen Bao Island and to have requested further secret meetings with President Nixon and
Secretary Rogers. Xinhua was also very suspicious when Soviet Vice Defence Minister Vasily Chuikov came to Washington in April 1969 to attend the funeral of former President Dwight Eisenhower.

Beijing certainly would not believe in a complete "collusion" between Moscow and Washington without any "contention". But Beijing might be justified in her suspicion and fear of a tacit and limited agreement or compromise between the two superpowers on either possible Soviet military actions along the border or Soviet filling up the Asian vacuum left by the Western withdrawal in exchange for Soviet compromises in other areas; all at China's expense.

2-4. International "Pulls"

One of the major international trends in the late 1960s was the decline and retreat of Western powers from Asia. Realization of this, taken together with the predictable emergence of a new Asian structure of power thereafter and the possibility of a return as a recognized strong power to the world community, created strong "pulls" for Beijing.

Decline and Retreat of Western Powers

In January 1968, Britain, which had long been one of the dominant military powers in Asia, announced its intention to "withdraw all British military forces from the region east of the Suez by the end of 1971". Although some exceptions
were made, "the British forces in Malaysia, Singapore, Bahrein, and Sharjah (in the Persian Gulf), and the British navy's aircraft carrier task force in Indian Ocean, were to be withdrawn". After the British announcement, the U.S. State Department made known its "regrets" about the British decision, but said that the United States had no plan to move in where Britain withdrew.

This U.S. desire of not filling the vacuum thus left might be sincere given the situation Washington was facing at the end of the 1960s. The United States would not and could not afford another massive military involvement in Asia like that in Vietnam. Washington had by then perceived new changes in the balance of power in East Asia and its own relative decline of strength. The Soviet Union had roughly caught up with the United States in strategic nuclear capability, and the Vietnamese Tet Offensive made Washington see more clearly that both the American economy and public opinion could no longer afford such a sustained and costly war. On the other hand, the United States was encountering economic problems as a result of its rivalry with Western Europe and especially Japan.

Not only was this U.S. desire of non-involvement sincere, Washington was even engineering a change, a big one, in its strategy in Asia. Immediately after he assumed the presidency in 1969, Richard Nixon began engineering the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. In 1969, on his way to the
Philippines, Nixon stopped in Guam where he delivered what came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine, which held that the United States would not be enticed into future wars like Vietnam. No longer would the United States act as a "global policeman". Rather, Asian nations were to be called upon to defend themselves with the United States supplying materials support only, not troops. In future, the United States would reduce its military presence throughout Asia.78 This Nixon Doctrine, which clearly foreshadowed a large-scaled reduction of U.S. military presence in Asia, especially in Vietnam, and the British intention to withdraw, would certainly have been studied in Beijing.

As early as in January 1965, Mao told Edgar Snow that "the domestic pressure would soon precipitate an American withdrawal" from Vietnam.79 Beijing believed that Washington could not engage itself in a such a costly war for long. Beijing only knew too well from its own experience what a people's war or a protracted war would cost its enemy. In 1968, the Chinese clearly implied that the Tet Offensive was "a major indication of diminished American capability to win the war and the American response to the offensive [reflected] their diminished willingness to fight".80

Though Beijing was understandably on guard against the "double-dealings" of the Nixon Doctrine, it apparently drew from the hesitant American handling of the Laotian crisis of February-March 1971, and especially from the non-involvement
of American ground forces, the conclusion that the United States was sincere in seeking a relaxation of tension in Asia. What is more, the Nixon Administration tried, after the withdrawal of American ground forces at the end of 1970, to convince Beijing of the sincerity of its desire for better Sino-American relations by sending private messages to Beijing through a variety of intermediaries from third countries. In fact, as early as 1970 when Edgar Snow interviewed Mao, Beijing had already concluded, as Snow quoted, "Nixon is getting out of Vietnam." Henry Kissinger said, after his various contacts with the Chinese, that "Understanding of the direction of our Vietnam policy seems to have been greater in Tien An Men Square than in Harvard Square."

The U.S. Messages to China

As the 1960s drew to a close, Washington made more and more clear its intention to improve its relations with Beijing through various channels.

When speaking with the French President Charles de Gaulle in March 1969, Nixon took the opportunity to state that the United States wanted to expand its communications with the PRC. The next month Secretary of State William Rogers expressed the U.S. hope that more normal relations could be established with Communist China. Similar expressions of U.S. intentions became frequent during 1969 and 1970. These
verbal expressions were supported by substantive moves designed to indicate U.S. willingness for rapprochement with China. In July 1969, the restrictions on travel by U.S. citizens to China and the purchase of Chinese goods by U.S. citizens were eased. In November the Seventh Fleet patrols of the Taiwan Strait were suspended. In July 1970, the United States rejected a Soviet proposal, presented formally at the first round of the SALT negotiations, requesting Washington to "take joint steps to prevent... 'provocative' actions or an attack by the third nuclear power... or if too late to prevent such provocative actions, [the United States and the Soviet Union] would undertake joint retaliatory measures to punish the guilty party".

Many similar American approaches and overtures were sent through Pakistan and Romania. According to Edgar Snow's interview with Mao, the Chinese had taken notice of all the unilateral American steps and they were considering a Presidential visit as early as in 1970.

**Emerging Asian Structure of Power**

The trends of Soviet expansion, and the United States and Great Britain withdrawal from Asia caused concern among Asian countries. In his State of the Nation message to the Philippine Congress in 1969, President Marcos said that it had become obvious that the United States would withdraw
militarily from Asia. The Philippines' Foreign Minister Romulo also addressed the changing Asian situation in January 1969 when he said that the Philippines should conclude mutual security pacts with its neighbours because of the declining U.S. presence in Asia. In May, Singapore's President Lee Kuan-yew worried that a hasty U.S. military withdrawal from Vietnam would have an adverse impact on Southeast Asia. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Conference held in December 1969 expressed concern that the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the British withdrawal from east of Suez would result in increased interference in Southeast Asia by outside powers. These concerns over outside powers especially over the Soviet Union, filling up the vacuum left by the Western powers, were certainly shared by Beijing which had clearly seen a predictable emergence of a new balance of power in East Asia and even in the world as well. This view was expressed in Beijing's summarisation of the general trends of world situation that the world was in "great upheavals, great disintegrating, and great reorganizing".

Beijing had reason to worry, at least before the 1970s, that the U.S. withdrawal would help the rise of Japanese militarization to fill up the vacuum. In the late 1960s, Japan moved toward a more independent and influential international role and adopted a more "self-reliant" defence policy. These moves, taken together with the American decision to return Okinawa to Tokyo's control and the Nixon-Sato communique,
must have raised fears in Beijing of American collusion with a re-arming Japan.

Beijing might also have had fears, which were not without a certain logic, of Washington "colluding" with Moscow to work out a new division of their respective spheres of influence in Asia and in the rest of the world. America's Asian policy had long been predicated on the containment of China, an objective which was increasingly shared by Soviet Asian policy. At the time when the United States was retrenching its position in Asia, it was possible to "collude" with Moscow again to divide up spheres of influence in Asia, as they did in Europe during WW II, in order not to leave any vacuum for China to expand into.

2-5. Summary

As said in the Introduction, it is the intention of this sub-thesis to analyse some of the major factors which led to the Sino-American rapprochement of 1972 and, when analysing the Chinese decision for this rapprochement, this work tries to give more weight to analysis of factors other than strictly military considerations.

Chinese leaders must have been aware of the utility of such a rapprochement in helping to deter a Soviet attack against China. However, the fear of a Soviet attack, which unfortunately is often overemphasized, should not deny the role of other factors.
By the end of the 1960s, the situation of Chinese domestic politics was such as to make the rapprochement possible: The initial chaos of the Cultural Revolution was halted, at least temporarily. Mao and the new Central Committee of the CCP needed, and could by then afford, to expend more efforts to break out of the previous diplomatic isolation. Mao and the Ninth National Congress of the CCP of 1969 were convinced that the Soviet Union had degenerated into social imperialism after its invasion of Czechoslovakia, and that it had replaced the United States as the principal threat to the Chinese revolution. Therefore, a broad international united front including the United States against the Soviet danger was not only necessary but also justified according to Mao's materialist dialectics.

Mao, for the reasons analysed in this chapter, surely would not accept rapprochement with the Soviet Union. According to various sources, he was the most uncompromising among the Chinese leaders and often took measures which would intensify hostility with Moscow. From Mao's perspective, Moscow posed more of a threat than Washington did: Moscow's pseudo-Marxism and pseudo-socialism were "deceitful", therefore more likely to "divide the unity" of Mao's Party.

China's decision for the rapprochement was facilitated by many "international pushes and pulls". Soviet military pressure only served as a strong push, which was likely to be used by Mao to convince the whole Party (as in the Ninth Party
Congress) of the Soviet Union being a major threat to China, thus making the rapprochement with the United States more acceptable. What is more, the rapprochement was not only a way for the Chinese to deal with the Soviet threat alone. Peter Van Ness points out, "It would also demolish... the US-led anti-China alliance of Asian states in place since the Korean War."91 It would not only prevent a U.S.-Soviet collusion to encircle China, but also make it hard for such hostile powers as the Soviet Union and a re-emerging Japanese militarism to fill up any possible vacuum left by retreating Western powers in East Asia.

Moreover, rapprochement with Washington meant, again in Peter Van Ness' words, that "Washington would no longer attempt to deny the legitimacy of the People's Republic and stand in the way of China taking its rightful place in international institutions and establishing formal diplomatic relations with countries around the world".92 The rapprochement with the United States had opened the door for China to participate in established international institutions. China had thus gained "access to a powerful and legitimate role in the United Nations and other international organizations that would prevent the United States at any subsequent time from being able to deny China legitimacy and label it 'outlaw', and that would make it immensely difficult for the United States to rebuild the kind of hostile constellation of states to threaten the security of China as the United States had for the previous
twenty years". 93
Chapter III

The United States and the Rapprochement

To understand why the United States did not seek to establish relations with Beijing at an earlier date and why President Nixon decided to seek improvement in Sino-American relations, one must look largely to changes both in American conceptions of Communist China and in their views of the evolving balance of power in East Asia and the world, and U.S. domestic politics in which the above changes took place.

Therefore, I propose to examine the following aspects in this chapter:

1. Conceptions of Communist China
2. Conceptions of the Balance of Power in East Asia
3. The Vietnam War and U.S. Domestic Politics

3-1. Conceptions of Communist China

The American conception of China has been a very important factor in formulating Washington's China policy. In this section, American conceptions of China and Chinese Communism in the following periods will be examined:

Before 1949
During the Cold War
During the Korean War
Before 1949

For various reasons, the Americans at large did not fully understand China, its culture, its politics and how the society operated. Therefore, they failed to see exactly how Chinese Communism came about, and were puzzled and even furious as to why the "ungrateful Chinese" did not perceive "the traditional American friendliness" toward them and killed American boys in Korea. Here, misconceptions were obvious.

In American views, at least before the 1950s, the "historic policy of the United States" toward China had been one of "friendship and aid toward the people of China" as Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated in transmitting the U.S. White Paper on China to the President in 1949. This official view was broadly shared by ordinary Americans for quite a long period though it was increasingly questioned both at home and in other Western countries.

According to this view, the United States had friendly relations with China before the Communist takeover, on the basis of mutuality of the interests of both countries. Unlike the major European colonial powers, such as Great Britain, Russia and Japan, the United States did not seize significant portions of Chinese territory, or demand direct control of major territorial concessions. From the turn of the century, the
United States pursued its Open Door policy to vocally defend China's territorial and administrative integrity, and repeatedly protested against the attempts of other powers, especially those of Russia and Japan, to compromise it. Washington protested against almost all foreign encroachments against China. It opposed Russian expansionist policies in Manchuria in 1902-1903, appealed for respect for China's neutrality and integrity at the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, proposed neutralization of the railways in Manchuria in 1908 to try to prevent foreign domination of that area. During World War I, Washington opposed both Japan's attempt to control China through its notorious Twenty-One Demands and its desire to take over all German territory and rights in China. In 1922, the United States attempted to codify the Open Door principles in the Nine-Power Treaty formulated at the Washington Conference.

After Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, the United States informed Japan that it would not recognize agreements or acts impairing U.S. treaty rights in China, including those relating to China's territorial and administrative integrity. After Japan invaded China on a large scale in 1937, the United States issued many protests against Japanese aggressive actions. During and immediately after the war, the United States continued to give aid to China. Hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of economic aid was sent, and American forces helped transport Kuomintang forces to take over key areas from
However, these views have been increasingly questioned by historians. People see not only that there was a large gap between what was said by American policy and what was done in fact, they also realize this "traditional" friendship was unequal, promised on the basis that American interests should be served first. For instance, as stated in the Introduction, the Open Door policy was aimed less at protecting China's interests than at deterring Japan and Russia from eroding American interests and other rights in China, and when Chinese actions threatened the interests or special rights of foreigners in China, the United States usually joined other powers to protect their privileges at China's expense. Furthermore, the United States supported China against Russian and Japanese ambitions largely from the consideration that American interests in East Asia could be best served by a balance of power and any other power capable of dominating the area would jeopardize American interests, rather than from the consideration of its "traditional" friendship with China. That was why they supported British efforts in China in the late nineteenth century and supported the Japanese against the Russians at the beginning of this century.

This long tradition of friendliness which Washington believed it had with China was certainly not shared by the Chinese Communists and the ordinary Chinese people, because this friendliness, if it existed, stopped at the elite of
Kuomintang, and did not filter down to the ordinary Chinese people as a whole. Not only was this "traditional American friendliness" not conveyed to the ordinary Chinese people, but neither was their traditional perception of China. Therefore, Washington did not and could not fully realize why the Nationalist government was overthrown by the people it governed and why the people accepted communism. Americans thought communism was "'alien' to 'Chinese character'. It would pass, leaving the traditional friendship between China and America to reassert itself".96

This was not merely political propaganda. On 29 December, 1950, in a statement for the Voice of America, Dean Rusk, the then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, was reported to "have drawn as all American officials [had] done consistently... a distinction between the Chinese people, for whom the United States [had] a long tradition of friendliness, and their Communist rulers".97 This American illusion was clear to see. A headline in *New York Herald Tribune* proclaimed "Declaration of State of War against Mao's Faction Urged".98 The illusion was that the Chinese people had a traditional friendship with the Americans, only "Mao's faction" hated the United States. This faction became the "oppressor" of the Chinese people through "tricks of international communism". Therefore, Washington believed that Chinese Communism was only a "passing" phenomenon. China was lost because of U.S. "softness" in its China policy and
"traitors" in the Department of State, not because Mao's Communism received popular support.

As John King Fairbank points out, "Our thinking, in conservative America, could not keep pace with China's revolution. The first reaction of many Americans, suddenly confronted by a China strong, chauvinist and anti-Western (instead of weak and pro-American) was to seize upon international communism as the explanation and attribute our reverse to Kremlin plots and State Department treachery."99 He continues, "The Chinese Communist rise to power in 1949 called into question our own view of ourselves and our place in the world process... If the Chinese people willingly chose communism, it could be concluded that a majority of mankind was not going our way - at least, not for the present."100 So, he concludes, "One consolation in this crisis, therefore, was to think that the new Chinese Communist dictatorship did not represent the interests of a large enough proportion of the Chinese people, that it maintained itself only by force and manipulation, that, in fine, it was too evil to last, and in any case must be opposed as a matter of principle and duty."101 These misconceptions of Communist China continued for quite a long time without significant changes and adversely affected the relations between the United States and the PRC.
During the Cold War

The background to the Communist takeover in China was the emergence of the Cold War in Europe and elsewhere which made it even harder for Washington to accept a more reasonable view of Chinese Communism.

By 1947, when the cooperative wartime relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union had disintegrated, anti-Communism had become a major force in shaping overall U.S. foreign policy. The United States and other non-Communist nations in the West claimed to have felt a growing threat from the Soviet Union and international Communism. In response to this "Soviet threat" (its control throughout Eastern Europe, its pressures on Iran and Turkey, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Communist-led insurrection in Greece, the outbreak of Communist rebellions in several Asian countries and, finally, the Berlin crisis of 1948), the United states, backed by the major Western European nations, evolved a variety of new policies (including the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) to contain what was claimed to be an alarming worldwide Communist threat which, under Stalin, appeared to be not only monolithic and centrally controlled, but increasingly aggressive and expansionist.

As for the situation in East Asia, the Americans saw "Soviet interest in Manchuria and the rise of Chinese Communist power as a copy of the situation in Europe".\textsuperscript{102}
The rise to power of a Communist government in China not only meant that one fourth of mankind was not going the way the United States desired, but it would probably bring with it a nightmare of domino-like consequences, i.e. the Communist takeover in China would bring its neighbouring states, especially the states in Southeast Asia, under Communist control. This concern was expressed, for example, by a key document, drawn up by the National Security Council in June 1949:

The extension of communist authority in China represents a grievous political defeat of us...If Southeast Asia is also swept by communism, we shall have suffered a major political rout, the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and in a then critically exposed Australia.\textsuperscript{103}

The source of the Communist threat was seen to be Moscow, acting by proxy through China. Therefore the immediate objective of the United States was "to contain and where feasible to reduce the powers and influence of the USSR in Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union was not capable of threatening the security of the United States from that area..."\textsuperscript{104}

The atmosphere in the world in the late 1940s was so dominated and poisoned by the Cold War that countries tended to see the world in two camps and to see other countries as
either on "our side" or on "their side". This left hardly any other option or a third road to choose. Moreover, most American officials neither understood nor believed that Communist strength in China was the product of local conditions. They concluded that "China had become an instrument of international Communism, a 'Slavic Manchukuo' to be opposed no less vigorously than the Soviet Union".105

During the Korean War

However, the American prejudice toward the Chinese Communists, and their broad outline of China policy, had not finally shaped until the Korean War. Before that, there had been a brief time of flexible U.S. approach to China. This was largely because President Harry S. Truman and his Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, believed that any further military and economic aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime would be ineffective and run the risk of gradually pulling the United States into military involvement in this vast Asian continent. This risk was estimated to be inordinate and incalculable. Therefore they were determined that under no circumstances would American forces be used in China. Another reason was that the Administration wanted to encourage "Chinese nationalism" or Chinese "Titoism" to keep China away from Moscow. Even prior to 1950, the Truman Administration demonstrated some flexibility in its attitude toward Communist China. Although in August 1949 Acheson asserted in the letter of transmittal to
the famous White Paper on China that "the Communist leaders [had] forsworn their Chinese heritage and [had] publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power", uncertainty remained in Washington as to the nature of the relationship between Beijing and Moscow and the degree to which the United States could influence that relationship. On 17 November 1949, Acheson "proposed to the president a policy aimed at detaching Peking from Moscow's orbit". "Less than two months later, in a major statement on U.S. policy toward Asia, Acheson argued against any American action in defense of Chiang Kai-shek that might distract the new regime's attention from Soviet domination of the four northern provinces of China." However, after the outbreak of the Korean War and the Sino-American military engagement in the peninsula, and the subsequently intensified anti-Communist fervor in American domestic politics, the United States scrapped the flexible policy and solidified its perception that Communist China was not only an integral part of the monolithic Communist bloc under the Soviet control, but also was expansionist. For instance, General Marshall, testifying at the Senate hearings that followed General MacArthur's dismissal in April 1951, asserted that China was acting "literally under the direction of the Soviet Union". When asked if, in effect, China had been conquered by the Soviet Union, Marshall replied, "I think that is generally a fact." Hence, especially after the Korean War,
more and more people came to view international relations "as a zero sum game with each Communist victory constituting a proportionate setback to the 'Free World'".\textsuperscript{111} It was these misconceptions that were to dominate American China policy until the 1960s.

**Before the Late 1960s**

From the early 1950s on, American misconceptions of the PRC helped make Washington fail to perceive the significance of the PRC overtures in the mid-1950s, because it was inconceivable to Washington that Beijing would "follow a policy that was basically more in the interests of the United States than of the Soviet Union".\textsuperscript{112} Washington had lost sight of the fact that the interests of the PRC might lead Beijing to an independent posture vis-à-vis Moscow, which in turn might be compatible with American interests in Asia. Washington did not completely put aside its misconceptions until the late 1960s, when "fundamental shifts in the international and East Asian balance of forces constrained the U.S. leadership to reassess its policy in China, resulting in the Nixon administration's initiatives toward the Peoples [sic] Republic of China".\textsuperscript{113}

At the same time from the 1950s on, a strong and almost unreasonable anti-Communist fervor in U.S. domestic politics made it politically very risky for any person to publicly express their desire to improve relations with
Communist China. Joseph McCarthy's witchhunt in the early 1950s helped raise anti-Communist fervor to a high pitch: any critic of this unreasonable anti-Communism, especially within the government, was "vulnerable to charges of being unpatriotic or worse". Furthermore, as A. Doak Barnett says, "The majority of the Congress, the most powerful journalistic institutions in the country, and a large majority of the American public strongly supported a crusading anticommunist policy toward China."\textsuperscript{115}

One result was that the people who used the "loss of China" to attack their opponents all too often found themselves prisoners of their own handiwork. They were unable to change direction even if they saw its desirability, for fear of losing public support and of conservative attacks. For instance, in the 1952 election campaign, "the Republicans accused the Democrats of having 'lost' China because they were 'soft on Communism'".\textsuperscript{116} However, in 1954, "[when] President Eisenhower declined to intervene militarily in Indochina, the Democrats accused the Republicans of 'appeasement'".\textsuperscript{117}

For President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, both U.S. domestic politics and their personal feelings of animosity toward Communist China, made them eager to enforce the policy of containment of China. President John F. Kennedy did not share those views on Beijing and had a certain vision to add some flexibility to American foreign policy by seeking some sort of diplomatic contact with
Beijing. But he could not make any significant changes, because, as Morton H. Halperin notices, "Kennedy quickly recognized the strong domestic pressures against any such move...and felt vulnerable to right-wing pressures". Nor was the Johnson Administration able to make big changes in its China policy because of both bureaucratic pressures and the Vietnam War. In other words, as Halperin continues, "Only if China could be shown to be an expansionist and an aggressor nation could the war in Indochina be justified to the American people". Thus, until the late 1960s, Washington's China policy remained largely unchanged.

In the Late 1960s

Toward the end of the 1960s, there were changes in American misconceptions of China which helped to lead to a growing recognition in the United States of the desirability of attempting both to reduce the level of hostility in relations with the PRC and to work toward improved relations. These changes directly challenged the assumptions on which the rationale of American containment policy of China was based, i.e. Communism was a "passing" phenomenon in China, Communist China was expansionist, the CCP was an instrument and a puppet of Moscow. Firstly, with time, the political passions that shaped American attitudes toward Communist China in the 1950s had cooled. More and more Americans had come to see that Chinese Communism was a product of local
conditions rather than a result of "tricks of international communism". The CCP was clearly not a "passing" phenomenon; the government enjoyed at least a certain measure of popular support and had been in power for more than two decades, and there was no sign of its immediate downfall.

Secondly, among China experts both inside and outside the U.S. government, there appeared a fairly broad consensus that China's behavior and doctrine over the previous two decades did not support the assumption that China was committed to territorial expansion without regard for possible consequences. Instead, there was a broad agreement that China was not committed to broad territorial expansionism.120

A careful examination of China's military border conflicts in the previous two decades suggested that China's military actions, such as in the Korean War, the India-China border conflict and China's support for Vietnam, resulted largely from a fear of external threat under those international environments, rather than territorial aggression. China appeared to be predisposed to keep Chinese military forces within its borders, except in cases where it felt Chinese security was seriously threatened as in the Korean War. Even in such cases, China withdrew its forces quickly as in both the Korean War and the India-China border conflict. It was concerned in having a buffer zone rather than seeking territorial expansion. Recovery of what it considered to be lost territories, such as Taiwan, was certainly one of China's
national goals, but even in regard to these territories, its inclination was to pursue long term, low-cost and low risk policies. While it encouraged and supported revolutionary struggles in other countries, it opposed the use of Chinese forces to fight other revolutionaries' battles for them. Even Maoist doctrine insists that all revolutionaries must be self-reliant. In crisis situations, it tended to act with considerable prudence and caution, and repeatedly it moved to check escalation. When there appeared to be a serious risk of major conflict, it placed a high priority on the desirability of avoiding large-scale war with major powers. In its attempt to expand its influence in the world and to combat its adversaries, the Chinese government stressed strategies that relied principally on ideological, political and psychological rather than military means.

Thirdly, many noticed that China's primary stress in both the structure of its conventional military forces and the doctrine governing their use was on defence rather than on offence. Its strength was still limited, and was then heavily preoccupied with numerous problems, internal and external, that severely restricted its capacity to project its power and influence abroad.

Internally, the decade of the 1950s in China was, in general, a period of unity, self-confidence and rapid growth. In contrast, the decade of the 1960s was a period of division and economic setbacks. The failure of the Great Leap Forward in
the late 1950s and the resulting economic depression in China in the early 1960s crippled the country's economic development efforts for many years. After a period of recovery, the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s resulted in further political division and economic setbacks. The leadership in China, which maintained a remarkable unity during the first decade after the Communist takeover, was beset by growing internal tensions and disputes in the 1960s. The military forces, like the political leaders, were deeply involved in local politics in the Cultural Revolution and did not have the capacity for territorial expansion, especially in the light of the new constraints imposed on China by the Soviet pressures from the north and by continuing problems at home.\textsuperscript{122}

Therefore, Washington might have concluded that the Chinese threat to American interests in Asia, which was highly exaggerated when the Cold War set in, had been considerably reduced, and that the main threats to American interests might be instead from Moscow expanding into the vacuum left by the American and British withdrawal from Asia, and local Communist insurrections.

Fourthly, by the late 1960s, most Americans had dropped another misconception that China was an instrument and puppet of Moscow, and were prepared to accept the permanence of the People's Republic as "an independent nationalist regime... hostile to Russian influence".\textsuperscript{123} But before that, even after the Sino-Soviet dispute had become
open in the early 1960s, the conservatives in Washington still held doggedly to their conviction that the Sino-Soviet bloc was real. Only in 1969 did the military finally accept the reality of the split when the bloodshed in Zhen Bao Island made the hostility between China and the Soviet Union no longer possible to deny.124

3-2. Conceptions of the Balance of Power in East Asia

Increased understanding of China was a very important factor leading to a re-examination of U.S. policy toward China. However, the experience also demonstrates clearly that the evolving balance of power in the world, especially in East Asia, has always played a crucial role in formulating U.S. policies and also in leading to the Sino-American rapprochement of 1972. Robert G. Sutter points out, "Although the ideologies, historical experiences and different cultures of the two sides have tended to keep them apart, the developing East Asian balance has forced them to put aside such negative factors and has prompted both sides to see that their vital national interests in the area are compatible and provide the basis for mutual understanding."125

Therefore, in this section, I will analyse and compare different U.S. conceptions of the balance of power in East Asia126 in the following periods:

Before the Cold War
During the Cold War
In the late 1960s

Before the Cold war

As stated previously, by the early twentieth century, the United States had stopped territorial expansion and had become actively involved in Pacific affairs. Since then, the United States has judged that its interests in this area would be best served by having a balance of power in which no power should be allowed to become strong enough to dominate the area, for such a power, as Sutter puts it, "would soon pose a serious security threat to American territorial interests in the Pacific islands, including Hawaii. [The United States] has also held that such a power would gravely endanger longstanding US trade, business, missionary and other activities in the region. Washington has thus striven to ensure that a balance of power favourable to these interests is maintained".127

Therefore, Washington has consistently followed policies designed to prevent any individual state from dominating the area. In China, Washington supported British efforts in the nineteenth and early twentieth century to ensure that no power gained a dominant position. At first, the United States supported Japan at the beginning of the century to counter-balance Russia's growing predominance, then it resisted Japan in the Pacific War in part because it judged that Japan's hegemony over East Asia would ultimately upset the local balance of power, thus threatening American interests in
this region. For the same reason, it supported a Chiang Kai-shek-led China to keep the balance of power in East Asia after WW II.

**During the Cold War**

Before WW II came to a close, Washington foresaw a vacuum in East Asia with a defeated Japan. To maintain a favourable balance of power in East Asia, Washington had to back Chiang Kai-shek in China though some people in the State Department doubted the wisdom of this policy. In a certain sense, as many scholars of international relations point out, Washington's backing of such a unstable and corrupt regime was in effect largely relying on Moscow's "good will" in exchange for the U.S. acquiescence in Soviet control of Eastern Europe.

The unexpectedly swift Communist upsurge in China posed a sudden challenge to American strategy. For a time Washington seemed to be at a loss what to do. This was obviously a period, if not the only one in the history of American strategy, when the United States seemed to be in great hesitation and in a dilemma: on the one hand, Washington found no power strong enough to keep the power balance in East Asia by checking a possibly future Communist China except itself; on the other hand, for the reasons as stated in the previous section, American planners were unwilling to take the risk of getting involved in this vast Asian country.
The Communist takeover in China in 1949 and the Korean War in the early 1950s ended this period of hesitation. The U.S policy of containment of Communist China became firm and clear. This was in part because of the U.S. conception of the nature of Communist China (elaborated in the previous section), but more importantly, this was due to Washington's conception of the balance of power in the world, especially in East Asia, i.e. a war-defeated Japan and a disintegrated Southeast Asia could not hold back the Sino-Soviet Communist expansion. This Communist expansion would surely tilt the balance of power in East Asia at the expense of U.S. interests, if it was not contained.

In the Late 1960s

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, more and more people in Washington had come to accept the fact that the following fundamental changes had taken place in the balance of power in East Asia, which changed from that of bipolarity in the 1940s and 1950s to multipolarity in the 1960s.

Firstly, by the late 1960s, especially after the Zhen Bao conflict, Sino-Soviet hostility was no longer possible to deny. So, Kissinger had every reason to say, "We no longer considered the Soviet Union and the People's Republic a single adversary. Henceforth, our war planning would be based on the assumption that joint Sino-Soviet aggression against us had ceased to be an immediate contingency. We would deal with each country
separately on the basis of its conduct toward us.\textsuperscript{128} Then, whatever their earlier doubts and fears concerning Communist China, Washington had now come to acknowledge that the Sino-Soviet split was real and Beijing faced a serious Soviet threat. In light of this fact, Washington reasoned that China might be willing to make concessions to the United States in order to reduce tensions and to be able to marshal its limited strength against Moscow. Therefore by conceding to China a greater role in Asia and the world, the United States might be able to gain increased leverage over a nervous Soviet Union. A tense Sino-Soviet border might engage a large number of Soviet troops which could otherwise be used in Europe or elsewhere. Washington might reasonably hope that China would help to offset Soviet influence in Asia and elsewhere.

Secondly, as discussed in detail in Chapter II, by the late 1960s, the Soviet Union had begun a systematic and serious penetration into Asia through, for instance, its consistent naval buildup and its efforts to push the proposal for an Asian collective security system. It had drawn abreast of the United States in strategic weapons. Washington felt that Asian security was increasingly threatened by the Soviet strategic and naval buildup, particularly when domestic support for U.S. military expenditure was declining. Moreover, "Washington believed that Moscow had made dangerous advances in influence in Egypt and India for which it must compensate".\textsuperscript{129} "It was roughly for these reasons," Harold
Hinton quotes in *The Bear at the Gate*, "that the President told news commentator Howard K. Smith on July 1, 1970 that he favoured an improvement of relations with China and he [the President] added that the tension on the Sino-Soviet border constituted a 'weakness' in the Soviet position."

Thirdly, U.S. military involvement in Korea and Indochina was partly due to the fact that a war-weakened Japan could not be used to check the Communist expansion in Asia. But, by the late 1960s, Japan had re-emerged as a major influence on the Asian scene, and had begun to exert a constantly growing economic and political influence through the region. It had not only made remarkable economic progress, which had made it "the third strongest economy in the world... [it had also] gradually developed a new sense of national confidence, identity, and independence". There seemed no doubt that Japan had become another independent power affecting the balance of power in East Asia, where Japan's influence would increase, and it would play the role of a major power. It was hoped that Japan, whose importance and influence in the region had already been recognized by President Nixon, could be used as a major power to fill up whatever vacuum might be created by a lowering of the American profile.

On the other hand, as a fundamental principle of American strategy in the Pacific, the United States did not want to see any other power trying to dominate the region.
Though there had been little said in public, it was only natural that the United States, though glad to have Japan play a constructive role in keeping the balance of power in East Asia, might at the same time have considered what an increasingly strong Japan would mean to American interests in East Asia in the future if there should be no other local power to counterbalance it. China would have been a desirable candidate to help check both the Soviet threat at that time and the potential Japanese threat in East Asia in the future.

Fourthly, in the two decades immediately after WW II, the United States had enjoyed strategic superiority, economic superiority and relative world dominance. This allowed it to go all out to pursue a campaign against international communism and support the Free World, though sometimes in an unrealistic way as to neglect the limits of its strength in its idealistic pursuit of dominance of Western democracy. However, by the late 1960s, rapid growth in Western Europe, Japan and the Soviet Union made the United States appear to be relatively declining in its ability to influence other nations, especially those in East Asia. The cost and futility of massive U.S. military involvement in Vietnam especially after the Tet Offensive in 1968 had not only vividly demonstrated the limitation of U.S. power, but had also virtually torn apart the nation’s public opinion, its sense of morality and national cohesion. This relative decline of U.S. strength was well realized by Washington, as Kissinger puts it in The White House
Years, "Gone were the days when we enjoyed the luxury of choosing the moment to involve ourselves in world affairs...[Now] we had to take account of other power centers and strive for an equilibrium among them."\textsuperscript{133}

**Implications of the New Balance of Power**

The implications of the above-mentioned four changes or trends, demonstrated vividly to Washington a new configuration of power in East Asia, i.e. a new multipolarity had replaced the previous bipolarity. Such a multipolar world was, as Michael Schaller noticed, also envisioned by Nixon and Kissinger as one in which "the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan and Western Europe would each enjoy a sphere of interest".\textsuperscript{134} "This was an aspect of detente, an accommodation to the fact that the powerful, established nations of the world must co-exist peacefully or risk nuclear destruction."\textsuperscript{135}

This new balance of power in East Asia compelled the United States to reassess their strategy, and Washington gradually realized that the United States could no longer afford a policy of simultaneous confrontation with Moscow and Beijing. Neither Washington nor Beijing could afford to be exclusively and overwhelmingly preoccupied as in the past with the presumed threats posed by the other, because such a multi-polar system as was emerging in Asia put a high premium on flexibility, on freedom of manoeuvre and on the maximization of options. The Americans, like the Chinese,
must have realized that, in such a situation, being locked in a relationship of rigid ideological hostility as they had been for the previous twenty years was going to be a very serious handicap, which would allow neither side to act in the new situation as effectively as they would like, and which would be exploited by the "third intruder", such as the Soviet Union, to the benefits of neither side.

Hence, Kissinger indicates in *The White House Years*, "We needed China to enhance the flexibility of our diplomacy." He continues, "History suggested that it was usually more advantageous to align oneself with the weaker of two antagonistic partners, because this acted as a restraint on the stronger." For the United States, China was the weaker, and Washington did not forget for a moment that the Soviet Union was still its principal adversary and posed a serious security threat. Therefore, the lessening of tensions with China could provide a restraining counterweight to the Soviet Union in its Asian rear. With the sharp tension in Sino-Soviet relations, Washington began to see Beijing as its major weapon in the diplomatic game of exploiting the tension to gain leverage on Moscow. So, here was a piece of leverage that simply could not be overlooked. Washington would certainly use it. That's the name of the game: Realpolitik.

By contrast, a policy of seeming collusion with Moscow to further encircle and contain China, would give Moscow a free hand to deal with and perhaps to try to dominate China. This
would put Moscow in a good position to manoeuvre the Sino-Soviet-American big triangle and keep American forces further extended in East Asia instead of a reduced military presence as the Nixon Doctrine intended.

Furthermore, improved relations with China promised another four benefits for Washington:

Firstly, it could exploit the Sino-Soviet split to play off the two against each other, thus obtaining a favourable position in the big triangle and ensuring a favourable and even better balance of power in East Asia after Washington reduced its military presence.

Secondly, Moscow might be more willing to reach certain political and arms limitations agreements with the United States to prevent a possible Sino-American alliance. Kissinger believed that Sino-American rapprochement did cause the Soviet Union to speed up efforts to reach agreements on SALT I. ¹³⁸

Thirdly, Beijing might be willing to persuade Hanoi to agree to a settlement of the Vietnam War, thus facilitating U.S. military withdrawal from Vietnam to reduce U.S. domestic pressure.

Finally, the United States would be in a more flexible position in the future to use China to counterweight the potential danger of a strong Japan seeking to dominate the area.

These considerations, taken together with the new balance of power in East Asia, must have given the Nixon
Administration a strong impetus to seek rapprochement with China.

3-3. The Vietnam War and U.S. Domestic Politics

The Vietnam War and U.S. domestic politics in the late 1960s were obviously another two major reasons which pushed Nixon to seek rapprochement with China and enabled him to move with more freedom at home to take initiatives.

The Vietnam War in U.S. Domestic Politics

The Vietnam War was another U.S. crusade against international communism. However, few people had foreseen at its beginning how much it would cost the Americans.

At least before 1967 or early 1968, the Johnson Administration operated on the assumption that "the American economy and American public opinion would bear whatever burdern might be imposed by the administration's perception of what needed to be done about Vietnam". This assumption helped render out of the question any significant progress toward better relations with Beijing. However, as Hinton says, "The psychological impact of the North Vietnamese Tet offensive of 1968 completed the process of making... [this] assumption false, or at least obsolete."

In January 1969, when Nixon assumed the presidency, few Americans still voiced enthusiasm for the Vietnam War which was proving to be too costly and unwinnable. Most
"hawks" and "doves" agreed that the Asia policy of the United States was a shambles, Washington seemed unable either to destroy the Vietcong or to silence the growing peace movement at home. Richard Nixon recalled that when he took office on 20 January, "[the] war was tearing American society apart".\textsuperscript{141} "The nation was bitterly divided. Lyndon Johnson had literally been driven from office by antiwar activists."\textsuperscript{142} Peter Van Ness points out, "Richard Nixon had been elected on the vague promise that, as journalists put it, he had a 'secret plan' for resolving the war in Vietnam."\textsuperscript{143}

As Dr. Peter Van Ness depicts the U.S. domestic situation at that time:

\begin{quote}
Political differences over the Vietnam War had pushed the country to polar extremes - ending the war was at the top of everyone's political agenda - while throughout the Third World, the U.S. intervention in Indochina had become the paramount symbol of imperialism - undermining the ethical claims of the post war Pax Americana.\textsuperscript{144}
\end{quote}

So, when President Nixon took office in 1969, the Vietnam War was inevitably in the forefront of his mind. Somehow a way had to be found to extricate the United States from Vietnam without the appearance of defeat. In Nixon's terms, the United States must achieve "peace with honor" for the sake of both reducing domestic pressures and adjusting to a new balance of power in East Asia.
To both Nixon and Kissinger, it seemed, as Van Ness says, "Chinese pressure on Hanoi was the key to success. The Soviets had been willing to give some assistance to the United States in its effort to achieve a negotiated conclusion to the war, but without China's cooperation, the war might go on forever". So, Nixon's answer was to make initiatives to both China and the Soviet Union to bring pressure on Hanoi to agree to a negotiated peace without victory.

Kissinger also understood it well. He says in *The White House Years*, "The mere fact of the meeting and the subsequent summit was bound massively to demoralize Hanoi... [and] undercut Hanoi's campaign to exhaust us psychologically and undermine our public support." He continues, "The trip [to Beijing] enabled us to dominate events rather than await them passively."

While Washington saw the necessity of withdrawal from Vietnam, it must have realized that this withdrawal would surely or very possibly be followed by a Communist victory in Vietnam after perhaps "a decent interval of time". This was apparent to many but understandably denied by Nixon. Then, by improving relations with Beijing, in terms of Realpolitik, the possible Communist victory in Indochina would make no real meaningful difference to balance of power in the area or the world. On the contrary, Communist victory in Vietnam might even be "a benefit to the United States in terms of the new American policy of playing communists against
communists".148

If so, Washington might have felt that this result was some compensation for the declining U.S. military presence in Asia and diminishing U.S. public support for overseas commitments in the face of increasing Soviet power.

President Nixon and U.S. Domestic Politics

As explained earlier, U.S. domestic politics in the 1950s and early 1960s made it too risky for any president to improve relations with Communist China. But when President Nixon took office, the domestic political situation had changed to make it easier for him to act on the China issue. Apart from the upsurge in anti-war feelings, American public opinion toward Communist China had already changed as elaborated above. For instance, by 1966 when proposals for a change in China policy were articulated in Congressional hearings, it was evident that "many Americans were receptive to the idea of establishing relations with Peking".149 Even while the Johnson Administration was expanding the Vietnam War after 1965, as Schaller recalls, "An impressive number of American opinion leaders - journalists, scholars and members of Congress - began to question the conventional wisdom which sanctioned unremitting hostility toward China and communism in Asia."150

President Nixon seemed to understand the changed mood of the American people and their conciliatory attitude toward Communist China. In Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek lived on, but in
the United States his friends were dying off. "A generation of new voters existed who had no recollection of Chiang as a wartime hero but rather saw him and the Republic of China as obstacles to a rapprochement with Peking... and saw rapprochement with Peking as essential to the avoidance of future Vietnams and further Vietnam War." Many political leaders, the media and a large majority of the public, seemed ready to accept a change.

Apart from the changed public mood in America, another factor was the President himself. Washington's moves toward Beijing were made easier in part by Nixon himself who, as many scholars find, had a tremendous advantage over all his predecessors. He was the first President since 1949 who did not have to fear being attacked for being soft on Communism. "His anticommunist credentials were clean. The reception he found both in America and among Chinese leaders encouraged Nixon to proceed with more formal contacts." Moreover, the coming re-election campaign in 1972 and his desire to go down in American history as the President who accomplished such a historic mission, provided strong impetus for the President.

3-4. Summary

To understand why President Nixon sought an improvement in Sino-American relations, one should look back to see why the United States did not seek to establish relations with Beijing at an earlier date. A comparison as done in this
chapter shows that the changes in (a) U.S. conceptions of Communist China; (b) the balance of power in East Asia; and (c) American domestic politics, have simultaneously played important roles in changing Washington's China policy.

The evolving balance of power in East Asia played the crucial and fundamental role in leading to the Sino-American rapprochement. The fundamental shifts from bipolarity to multipolarity in the balance of power in East Asia in the 1960s constrained the U.S. leadership to reassess its policy toward China and put aside such negative factors as ideological hostility, historical experiences, and different cultural values.

Changes in American domestic politics, and the changed American mood and conception of Communist China greatly facilitated President Nixon's determination and confidence in making initiatives toward Beijing.

Among various factors, the Sino-Soviet military clashes in 1969, the Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968 and its subsequent effects on U.S. domestic politics, were of immediate and great significance: they helped to end the long slow process of hesitation in finalizing a new American policy toward the changed balance of power in East Asia, and China. The significance of the gunshots in Zhen Bao Island was not merely that they convinced almost every American that the Sino-Soviet split was real and that China was hostile to the Soviet expansion, but that they gave a further strong impetus to Washington to fully exploit the gunshots for various benefits.
as described in this chapter. The Tet Offensive intensified U.S. domestic pressure to push President Nixon on the way to Beijing to find one way or another to end the Vietnam War and to avoid future Vietnams.

It is not the intention of this sub-thesis to give an answer as to which side benefitted more from this rapprochement, but it seems certain that both sides believed the benefits of the rapprochement would outweigh any immediate and potential costs. It was this mutuality of benefits and compatibility of their vital national interests, even if temporary, that brought about this marriage of convenience.
NOTES


4. Ibid., p.158.


8. See the Yalta Agreement.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.


13. Ibid., pp.2317-2318.


16. Ibid., p.76.
17. Ibid.


20. The CCP launched many movements. The purposes of these movements were largely political rather than to simply deal with feudalistic cultural values, such as the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and the Anti-Right struggle (1957).


26. Ibid.


28. Ibid., p.102.

29. Ibid., p.1.


35. Ibid., p.63.
37. Zhongkui is a Door-God in a Chinese fair tale, whose picture was often pasted on the front door of a house in old China as a talisman to scare away devils. Here, Mao meant by this that he was publicly respected but not given real power.
42. Ibid.
43. For these new theoretical perspectives of the CCP in 1969, please confer Lin Biao, *Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, chap.VII.
45. Ibid., p.7.
46. Leo Tansky, "Chinese Foreign Aid", in *People's Republic of

47. People's Daily, 27 November, 1979, p.5.


50. Garver, China's Decision, p.12.

51. Ibid., p.10.


53. Garver, China's Decision, p.10.

54. Ibid., chap. I.


56. Ibid.


58. Thomas W. Gottlieb, Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle quoted in Garver, China's Decision, p.53.


60. Garver, China's Decision, p.61.

61. Hersh, Price of Power, p.357.
64. Wilson (ed.), *China and the World Community*, p.126.
68. Ibid.
70. Garver, *China's Decision*, p.34.
71. Ibid.
73. Ibid., 4384, p.30.
74. Ibid., 4436, p.20.
75. Garver, China's Decision, pp.28-29.
76. Ibid.
80. Greg O'Leary, *The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy*
(Australian National University, Canberra, 1980), p.145.


84. Ibid.


86. Garver, China's Decision, pp.36-37.


90. Ibid., 21 December 1969, p.27.


92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.


95. For these American views, see Barnett, China and the Major
Powers in East Asia, chap. III.

96. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness, pp.59-60.
98. Ibid., 6 December 1950.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
119. Ibid., p.6.
121. For details of these American conceptions, see, for instance, Barnett, *A New U.S. Policy*; and Gittings, *The World and China 1922-1972*. For Beijing's compromise to Soviet pressure after the Zhen Bao conflict in 1969, see Garver, *China's Decision*, chaps II, III and V.
124. Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power* (Pantheon


126. In this sub-thesis, balance of power in East Asia also includes Southeast Asia.


135. Ibid.


137. Ibid., p.1787.

138. Ibid., pp.766-769.


140. Ibid.


142. Ibid., p.101.
144. Ibid., p.240.
145. Ibid.
147. Ibid., p.757.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Monographs

Allison, Graham *Essence of Decision* (Little, Brown & Company, Boston, 1971)
Astafyev, G.V. *From Anti-Imperialism to Anti-Socialism: The Evolution of Peking's Foreign Policy* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974)

Chiu, Hung-ta *Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of China: Problems, Analysis and Documents* (School of Law, University of Maryland, Baltimore, 1978)


Dennett, Tyler, *Americans in Eastern Asia* (Barnes & Noble, Inc., New York, 1941)


Gao, Gao and Yan, Jiaqi *Ten Years of the Cultural Revolution*  
(People's Press, Tianjing, 1986)

Garver, John W. *China's Decision for Rapprochement with the*  
*United States, 1968-71* (Westview Press, Boulder,  
Colorado, 1982)

Ginneken, Jaap Van *The Rise and Fall of Lin Biao* (Avon Books,  
New York, 1972)

Gittings, John, *The World and China, 1922-1972* (Eyre Methuen,  
London, 1974)

Gottlieb, Thomas W. *Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and*  
*the Origins of the Strategic Triangle* (Rand Corps,  
California, 1977)

Griffith, William E. *Peking, Moscow, and Beyond: the Sino-Soviet-American Triangle* (Georgetown University,  
Washington, 1973)

Henson, Curtis T. *Commissioners and Commodores* (The  
University of Alabama Press, Alabama, 1982)

Hersh, Seymour *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the White House* (Faber & Faber, London, 1983)

California, 1976)

_____ *The Bear at the Gate: Chinese Policymaking Under Soviet Pressure* (Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, 1971)


Jo, Yung-hwan (ed.) *Taiwan's Future* (Union Research Institute for Arizona State University, Hong Kong, 1974)

Kalb, Marvin and Kalb, Bernard *Kissinger* (Hutchinson, London, 1974)


Khrushchev, Nikita *Khrushchev Remembers* (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1970)

Kissinger, Henry *The White House Years* (Hodder and Stoughton, Sydney, 1979)


Lin, Biao *Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China* (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1969)

MacFarquhar, Roderick *Sino-American Relations 1949-1971*
Mao, Zedong *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung* (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1966)

_____ *Selected Works of Mao Zedong* (People's Press, Beijing, 1969)


_____ *No More Vietnams* (Arbor House, New York, 1985)

O'Leary, Greg *The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Australian National University, Canberra, 1980)


Radvanyi, Janos *Delusion and Reality, Gambit, Hoaxes and Diplomatic Oneupsmanship in Vietnam* (Gateways Press, South Bend, 1978)

Schaller, Michael *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1978)


Segal, Gerald *The China Factor* (Holmes and Meier Publishers, New York, 1982)
Service, John S. *The Amerasia Papers* (Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkley, 1971)


Stoessinger, John G. *Nations in Darkness: China, Russia and America* (Random House, New York, 1971)


Topping, Seymour *Journey Between Two Worlds* (Harper and Row, New York, 1972)


Tuchman, Barbara W. *Notes from China* (Collier Books, New York, 1972)

Van Ness, Peter "Richard Nixon, the Vietnam War and the American Accommodation with China: A Review Article", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Volume 8, No.3, December
1986.

______Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support
For Wars of National Liberation (University of California
Press, Berkeley, 1970)

Whiting, Allen S. China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter
the Korean War (Macmillan, New York, 1960)

Wilson, Ian (ed.) China and the World Community (Angus and
Robertson Publishers, Australia, 1973)

Young, Kenneth Todd Negotiating with the Chinese Communists:
for the Council of Foreign Relations, New York, 1968)

Newspapers and Journals

Asian Survey
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars
China Quarterly
Facts on File
Far Eastern Economic Review
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Policy
New York Herald Tribune
New York Times
Pacific Affairs
Peking Review
People's Daily (in Chinese)
Survey of the China Mainland Press
United States Department of State Bulletin
Washington Post
World Affairs (in Chinese)
World Politics