Sino-Soviet Relations
The first phase 1917-1920
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This study seeks to shed light on one of the mysteries of modern Chinese history—that of the Karakhan Manifesto. This remarkable document—addressed to the Chinese by the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in 1919—pledged the new Soviet Government to restore to China the rights and privileges forcibly extracted by Tsarism. Shortly afterwards the Chinese were told that the text they had received, containing a promise to restore unconditionally to China the Chinese Eastern Railway and other Russian possessions in Manchuria, was not authentic and another version was forwarded. This monograph discusses the problems of the different versions and the Chinese Government’s apparent ignoring of the manifesto. The author’s conclusions on this intriguing problem will interest scholars of Soviet policy, both foreign and domestic, Sino-Soviet relations, and modern Chinese history.
Leong Sow-Theng, who received his doctorate from Harvard University for his work in modern Chinese history, has several times visited Taiwan to consult the archives of the Chinese Foreign Ministry on which this study is based. He has recently joined the Department of Far Eastern History at the Australian National University as a Research Fellow, having written this paper while Assistant Professor of History at the International Christian University in Tokyo.
General Editor Stephen FitzGerald
In 1919 the Soviet government, over the signature of its Deputy Foreign Minister Leo Karakhan, pledged to restore to China all the rights and privileges, including the valuable Chinese Eastern Railway, which had been forcibly extorted by Tsarism. This offer was part of a vigorous Soviet initiative designed to undercut the existing structure of power politics in the Far East. It served to advertise the ignominy of the Versailles Powers, posed a damaging challenge to the Washington Powers, and, in general, contributed substantially to the surge of Chinese nationalism which rapidly developed a pro-Soviet orientation for much of the 1920s.

Almost two decades ago, Allen S. Whiting thoroughly investigated the significance of the Soviet offer of 1919 as well as the early phase of Sino-Soviet relations within the confines of Western language sources. The recently accessible archives of the Chinese Foreign Ministry make it possible to re-examine this early phase. The present study is limited to the period 1917 to 1920 and sets forth what can be learned from the Chinese official documents about (a) the 'mystery' of the Karakhan Manifesto of July 25, 1919, and (b) how the Chinese government in Peking responded to it.

In regard to the first question, Chinese documentation amply shows that the text of the Karakhan Manifesto communicated to the Chinese government in March 1920 was the intended one. The government received the same text from at least three separate sources and at least one Soviet envoy vouched for its authenticity.

The second question raised here is why the Chinese government, so recently frustrated by the Versailles Powers, did not rush immediately to take advantage of the Soviet offer. The general belief has been that the Peking government ignored
the Soviet overture altogether. The reason usually given for Peking's inaction is that it was then dominated by the Anfu clique warlords, who were affiliated to Japanese militarism and opposed any dealings between Peking and the revolutionary régime in Moscow.

It will be shown that although the Chinese government made no official response, it did try to take advantage of the Soviet offer by a number of unofficial and informal responses, backed by considerable discussion inside the government. The alleged blind following of Japanese policy direction is also questioned. It will be seen that the so-called Japanese 'protégés', the Anfu military politicians, were perfectly capable of acting counter to Japanese interests by advocating intercourse with the Soviet government. Their motivations were highly complex but in part had to do with their desire to mend their fences before the nationalistic public. The policy of the Chinese government was conditioned rather by the whole semi-colonial status in which China found herself vis-à-vis the Versailles Powers.

**Sino-Soviet contacts prior to the Karakhan Manifesto**

Before turning to the Karakhan Manifesto, we shall examine the content of Soviet policy toward China as well as some of the significant contacts prior to it. As early as November 18, 1917, the Soviet government approached the Chinese and eight other governments about the possibility of re-opening diplomatic relations, but the government of China, along with the others, ignored the overture. Peking's initial policy toward the Bolsheviks was wholly in line with that of the Allies, who at this time were united in withholding official recognition from the new régime. However, this did not rule out informal contacts through which the Allies sought to restore an eastern front in the war against the Central Powers. Within such limits some significant talks were held between the Narkomindel (People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs) and the Chinese Legation in Petrograd.

The first Sino-Soviet contacts resulted from events in North Manchuria where in December 1917 the local Bolsheviks attempted to establish an organ of power at Harbin over the Russian population in the Chinese Eastern Railway Zone. The crushing of the Harbin Soviet by Chinese troops led the Narkomindel to take up matters with the Chinese Legation. By an official note on January 18, 1918, the Narkomindel informed the Chinese that Prince Kudashev, Russian Minister at Peking, and General Horvath, Manager-Director of the Chinese Eastern Railway, had been dismissed by the Soviet government and asked that a joint Sino-Soviet committee be set up to settle the Chinese Eastern question.

On January 19 Voznesensky, Chief of the Eastern Department of the Narkomindel, called at the Legation to announce that he had been made Soviet representative to China and to request permission to proceed to Peking directly. He promised that upon arrival there he would renounce extraterritorial rights and return to
Chinese jurisdiction all Russian-administered territories in China. The secretary of the Legation, Li Shih-chung (李世中), who received him, replied that such matters must wait upon official recognition. Voznesensky nevertheless insisted that Horvath be removed and his duties assumed by himself or someone else delegated by the Chinese government. He was again told that the question would be negotiable only after official recognition. As a temporary solution, Voznesensky offered to obtain Narkomindel approval to have the Chinese government administer the railroad for the time being.¹⁰

On January 24, Voznesensky returned with Polivanov, Deputy Commissar of the Narkomindel, and a more comprehensive exchange of views was held. As quid pro quo for Chinese recognition, Polivanov indicated that the Soviet government was willing to renounce extraterritoriality and return all Russian-administered territories. (The Boxer indemnity payments had already been renounced.¹¹) In regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Soviet government was prepared to sell it to China without waiting for the stipulated term of thirty-six years. However, if China lacked the necessary funds, then there was left only the alternative of joint Sino-Soviet administration. As far as Outer Mongolia was concerned, Polivanov candidly stated that the Mongols there were still culturally too backward to establish a viable independent state and that he personally favoured continued Chinese tutelage over them.¹²

These preliminary contacts ceased after the Chinese Legation departed from Petrograd along with other Allied missions at the end of February 1918. The Narkomindel offers are interesting in that they anticipate the Karakhan Manifesto by one and a half years. However, there is one significant exception: unlike the dramatic offer made in the Manifesto to return the Chinese Eastern Railway 'without compensation of any kind', the Narkomindel at this time offered only either Chinese redemption of the railroad or its administration jointly by Soviet Russia and China. This position was restated by Chicherin, Commissar of the Narkomindel, in his report to the Fifth Congress of Soviets in July 1918:

We have notified China that we renounce the conquests of the Tsarist government in Manchuria and we restore the sovereign rights of China in this territory in which lies the principal trade artery, the Chinese Eastern Railway, property of the Chinese and Russian people. More than this, we consider that if part of the money invested in the construction of this railway by the Russian people were repaid by China, the latter might buy it back without waiting for the term in the agreement violently imposed on her... We agree to renounce all land rights of our citizens in China. We are ready to renounce all indemnities.¹³

The Karakhan Manifesto of July 25, 1919
It is clear from the content of the unofficial talks at Petrograd and Chicherin's re-

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port to the Fifth Soviet Congress that, until the drafting of the Karakhan Manifesto, the Narkomindel had no intention whatsoever of relinquishing, without compensation, 'the Chinese Eastern Railway and all mining concessions, forestry, and gold mines'. That the clause did exist in one original version of the manifesto has been pointed out by Whiting. Chinese official documents not only confirm this but, more, there was no error at all in the text transmitted to the Chinese. That is, as will be shown presently, the text that was received by the Chinese in March 1920 was the intended text.

It should be noted that the Karakhan Manifesto, minus the clause, contains little new from what had been offered to the Chinese in earlier talks, except the point about Outer Mongolia which will be noted presently. Why a different version of it was released in the Soviet press is one question that cannot be answered without further Soviet documents. It may be significant to point out that the Karakhan Manifesto appeared in the Soviet press at a time when all contacts with the Chinese had broken off. In view of the Soviet effort to bring to submission the Russian Whites involved in the administration of the railway and also in view of the known designs of the Japanese on the line, it would have seemed most unwise for the Soviet government publicly to renounce its title.

Before going further, one might pause to speculate on the motivations behind the departure in Soviet policy at the time when the manifesto was drafted. That the generous offer was prompted by the rising tide of Chinese nationalism aroused by the Versailles Peace Conference can be seen in Vilensky's pamphlet, *Kitai i Sovetskaia Rossiia*. Soviet historians have admitted that Vilensky did indeed participate in the drafting of the document. He also happened to be the man who was designated by the Narkomindel to contact the Chinese, and who transmitted the manifesto to the Chinese officials in Vladivostok in March 1920. It is most important, therefore, that we know some of the thinking of the man who might well have been the principal author of the Karakhan Manifesto.

In his pamphlet Vilensky argued for a generous policy toward China, particularly in regard to those demands which China had presented but failed to obtain from her Allies at the Versailles Peace Conference, a conference from which Soviet Russia had been excluded. A summary of the Chinese demands appears in the pamphlet and comparing these with the manifesto, it becomes apparent at once that the manifesto simply incorporated those that applied to Russia. Among them were (a) the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway to China and (b) the revision of unequal treaties. Referring to these two items Vilensky wrote:

Soviet Russia can resolve these questions with a light heart in China's favour and thereby secure China's alliance for herself. The creation of Soviet Russia's alliance with revolutionary China is one of our foremost tasks, for the attainment of which we should apply all the energy and resources at our disposal.
It is clear that Soviet policy sought to exploit the bitter anti-imperialist resentment of the Chinese. The existence of this resentment is of course an undisputed fact but the phrase ‘revolutionary China’ nevertheless betrays that Vilensky held a vastly exaggerated image of the prospective ally. Viewing events in China from an obfuscating distance and being engrossed in their own revolutionary undertaking, the Bolsheviks could hardly make such observations without gross distortion. For example, the August 1918 siege of southern Fukien by the troops of General Ch'en Chiung-ming, who was associated with Sun Yat-sen, was seen in Moscow as the beginning of a soviet revolution in South China. Liu Shao-chou (劉紹周), President of the 50,000 strong Union of Chinese Workers in Russia, a man to whom Soviet leaders occasionally turned for information about China, told an audience of Chinese workers at Petrograd he had learnt that ‘in South China a revolution is gaining strength and they wish to establish soviet power and follow Bolshevism’.16 The same event prompted Commissar of Nationalities Joseph Stalin to observe that ‘soviet of deputies’ were being organised in China.17

The May Fourth incident was similarly misinterpreted. Voznesensky saw in the protests, occasioned by the Versailles Peace Conference, ‘a rising tide of Bolshevism’.18 In some quarters, these protests were even hailed as ‘an armed insurrection of the Chinese Communists’.19 Around this time Vilensky wrote elsewhere that in China, especially in the south, ‘a revolutionary struggle has been going on for many years, growing over into a revolutionary class struggle’.20 This kind of misunderstanding about conditions existing in China on the part of Narkomindel policy-makers probably played a significant part in the policy they adopted in the second half of 1919. If things were what they were imagined to be, then an alliance with ‘revolutionary China’ was worth any price, including the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway gratis. Conversely, a more accurate appraisal of the Chinese scene together with protracted failures in diplomacy with the Chinese would influence a switch to a realistic policy.

The transmission of the Karakhan Manifesto

Aside from the press release on August 26, 1919, the Narkomindel made no attempt to transmit the document to Peking immediately.21 This can be explained by the fact that Bolshevik strength, though pressing relentlessly eastwards, had reached only as far as western Siberia in the last months of 1919.

In the early months of 1920, a different situation prevailed. Local Bolshevik partisans in eastern Siberia had successfully demonstrated their strength against the Russian Whites while the Red Army swept its way to Lake Baikal. Irkutsk fell into Red hands on January 21, Blagoveshchensk on February 6, Verkhne Udinsk (now Ulan Ude) on March 9, and Vladivostok was more or less under Bolshevik influence from January—all of this occurring while the area as a whole was occupied.
by Japanese interventionist troops. The time had come for the Narkomindel to
contact the Chinese government. A special delegation consisting of Vilensky,
Y. D. Yanson, and a certain Rudoi, arrived at Irkutsk on February 14 and immediate­ly set out to contact Chinese officials, while seeking to negotiate a ceasefire with
the Japanese. 22

On March 2, Yanson sent the Karakhan Manifesto to the Chinese Consulate in
Irkutsk with an accompanying note in which he requested that the document be
transmitted to Peking and proposed an immediate opening of negotiations on matters
mentioned in the document. 23 Yanson's communication for some reason was not
relayed to the Wai-chiao-pu (Chinese Foreign Ministry) immediately and so did
not reach Peking until April 9 when Consul Wei Po (魏 sdl) brought it back in
person. 24 Receiving no reply, Yanson decided to wire the manifesto to Peking
himself on March 26. 25 A few days prior to this, another Soviet official by the name
of I. G. Kushnarev, identified in one source as an emissary of the Central Com­mittee of the Russian Communist Party, contacted Major General Chang Ssu­lin (張斯謙) at Harbin and handed him a copy of the document. 26 Then on March
31, Vilensky, too, handed an official version of it to the Chinese Consul-General
at Vladivostok, Shao Heng-chün (邵恒濬). 27

Meantime, the Chinese public also learned about the Karakhan Manifesto from
the newspapers. Vilensky had released it at Vladivostok to the Krasnoe Znamiia,
an organ of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Russian Communist Party, on March 19.
From here it was radioed to the pro-Bolshevik paper in Shanghai, Shankhaiskaia
zhizn', which published it on March 25. 28 The next day it was picked up by the
Chinese and foreign press.

It should be noted that the texts of the Karakhan Manifesto transmitted by
Yanson, Kushnarev, and Vilensky, as well as those released to the press, without
exception included the controversial clause. More evidence will presently be
brought forth to show that this particular version was that which the Soviet govern­ment intended to convey to the Chinese.

**Peking's response to the Karakhan Manifesto**

Contrary to the general impression, the Chinese government did not simply ignore
the document. It is true that there was no formal reply but that was the result of
careful deliberations and unofficial measures were taken. The Wai-chiao-pu
learned about the Soviet offer for the first time on March 24 from Shao Heng­
chün's March 22 wire which summarised the gist of the Krasnoe Znamiia report. 29
Shao's wire was introduced at a Cabinet meeting on March 26 where it was decided
that Shao should 'find out whether the declaration is authentic and enter upon un­
official contact as opportunity arises'. No action was taken pending Shao's further
report. 30
The Wai-chiao-pu instructed Shao accordingly and simultaneously alerted the Chinese Legation in Copenhagen where Soviet representative Litvinov reportedly was carrying on talks with the representatives of other governments.31 The question of the authenticity of the declaration was settled at a meeting between Shao and Vilensky on March 31. Vilensky handed Shao a copy of the document with the official stamp and told the latter as follows:

In view of the geographical proximity of China and Russia, the similarity of their situation and their external problems, the Soviet government regards it a primary objective to seek a close relationship with China with the view that the two countries should stand together as allies. For this purpose, we are willing to return to China all those rights that were seized by the Tsarist government, including the Chinese Eastern Railway. As an expression of sincerity, we are willing to revise all the unequal treaties. All that we ask from China is a word of response, an exchange of views, and that China enter into negotiations on these matters.

Vilensky went on to observe candidly that one of the things that exercised the Soviet government most was the congregation of Russian Whites, such as Horvath, Semenov, and other civil and military officials of the former régime, in the Chinese Eastern Railway Zone. The removal of these persons by the Chinese government, Vilensky disclosed, would be the basis for the Karakhan Manifesto, any exchange of views, or any agreement on general principles. Asked if he could guarantee all the items in the Karakhan Manifesto, Vilensky gave the assurance that the offers had been made by his government with sincerity.32

On April 3, on the instruction of the Premier, the Wai-chiao-pu brought forward a concrete statement of views on the Karakhan Manifesto for Cabinet discussion.33 This document unfortunately is not found in the archives but its content can easily be reconstructed from other documents. The Wai-chiao-pu showed strong reservations about both the format and the content of the Soviet proposals. It felt that the Karakhan Manifesto was 'not an official communication' in the usual sense. For one thing, it was addressed not only to the Peking government but also to the rival Canton government and to the Chinese people in general. For another, while communicating the document to Chinese officials, the Bolsheviks had simultaneously publicised it, which caused the Wai-chiao-pu to be suspicious about Soviet motives.34

The Wai-chiao-pu summarised the document under six items:

The Soviet government:
1 renounces all aggressive acquisitions of the Tsarist government in Manchuria and other regions; the people in these areas should be free to decide to be part of another state or select their own form of government;
2 unconditionally returns the Chinese Eastern Railway as well as all mining concessions, forestry, and gold mines;
3 renounces the Boxer indemnity, on condition that it is not paid to the Russian Legation in Peking;
4 abolishes all special privileges and leaseholds of Russian merchants; Russian officials and clergy are subject to Chinese justice and not to be allowed to interfere with Chinese affairs;
5 wishes to hold discussions with the Chinese people and cease all acts of coercion and injustice committed in regard to China by the Tsarist government jointly with Japan and the Allies;
6 hopes that the Chinese people will unite with the Red Army in the struggle for liberation.35

As the Wai-chiao-pu saw it, of these proposals only item 2 was clear and unproblematic. The wording of item 1 was 'ambiguous'; the Wai-chiao-pu found it 'particularly difficult to understand' why Manchuria, a Chinese territory, should be listed among the rights renounced by the Soviet government. The clause in question in the original is as follows:

The Soviet Government has renounced the conquests made by the Tsarist government which deprived China of Manchuria and other areas. Let the peoples living in those areas themselves decide within the frontiers of which State they wish to dwell, and what form of government they wish to establish in their own countries.

The second half of the clause is actually a restatement of revolutionary self-determination mentioned earlier in the text as follows:

Every people, whether great or small, wherever it dwelt, whether up to then it had lived an independent life or was included against its will as a constituent part of another state, should be free in its internal life, and no Government was to keep it by force within its frontiers.

The ambiguity of item 1 was probably due to haste in the drafting of the document and for the moment the Wai-chiao-pu failed to see that the idea of revolutionary self-determination referred not to Manchuria but to Outer Mongolia. The meaning of this part of the manifesto becomes quite clear if we look at another manifesto addressed to the Mongols in August 1919 which contains the following:

The Russian people have renounced all treaties with the Japanese and the Chinese governments which deal with Mongolia. Mongolia is henceforth a free country. . . In repudiation of the agreement of 1915, Mongolia now becomes an independent country and has the right to contact independently all other peoples without any guardianship whatsoever on the part of Peking or Petrograd.36

The third proposal, renouncing the Russian share of the Boxer indemnity, was aimed at the Russian Legation which, with the strong support of some Powers, had forced the Chinese government to make payments to it since 1917. The Legation's interests were being protected vigorously by the French and the proposal could
not be safely accepted without getting into trouble with France and other Powers as well.

The fourth proposal renouncing extraterritoriality ‘contains much that is just’ but was valueless since Soviet power was not for the time being extended over the Russians in Chinese territory. The Wai-chiao-pu took offence at the fifth and the sixth items which, in its view, had the intention of inciting the Chinese people against their government as well as the Allies, a gesture which could not be viewed as friendly.

At the April 3 Cabinet meeting, these points were taken into careful consideration while the Cabinet deliberated on the problem of response. The Acting Foreign Minister, Ch’en Lu (陳鑒), could not have failed also to report to members of the Cabinet the reaction of other governments to the Soviet document. On March 26, Prince Kudashev had sent a strong note reminding the Wai-chiao-pu of the existing treaties governing the railroad and other Russian rights and privileges. The next day, Japanese Minister Obata Yukichi (小野鶴吉) and French Minister Auguste Boppé had called to warn that the Soviet proposals could not be treated as exclusively Sino-Soviet issues. The proposal concerning the railroad was especially unacceptable to their governments.37 American and British officials, too, anxiously inquired about China’s attitude toward the Soviet proposals. Among other things, they were worried that the abolition of extraterritoriality for the Russians would signal the collapse of the entire legal structure on which the presence of all foreign nationals in China was based.38

The outcome of the discussion was that two decisions were taken. One was that the Soviet proposals were ‘linked to China’s relations with other countries’ and therefore the government ‘cannot conveniently make a response alone’. That is to say, a formal response was out of the question. However, the manifesto could not simply be ignored since this would ‘hurt Soviet feelings’ and hence it was decided to send an emissary to Vladivostok to meet secretly with Vilensky, to convey the message verbally that ‘in future, when other countries formally recognise the Soviet government, China will do likewise and will take the first four proposals as the basis for negotiation’. Meantime, the Chinese government would appreciate Soviet protection of Chinese nationals and respect for Chinese territorial sovereignty.39

Peking’s attitude has often been explained as a function of Sino-Japanese relations but this view is an oversimplification. Japanese influence was, of course, important but it has to be put in correct proportion. The whole question boils down to whether the Chinese government at this time was ready to recognise the Soviet régime as the legal government in Russia ahead of the Versailles Powers. The answer is found in China’s position vis-à-vis these Powers and their attitude toward the Soviet régime.
Having been a member of the Allies of both the European war and the Siberian Intervention, the Chinese government felt bound to be guided by Allied policy on the Russian question. The Peking government had adopted this policy at the time when the Bolshevik régime was established, reaffirmed it in December 1919, and continued to be guided by it. As of April 1920, the Allies were still united in a common policy of withholding *de jure* recognition. To enter into official relations with the Soviet government, therefore, would definitely have put China outside the Allied camp with drastic consequences. Here lay a source of frustration for both the Chinese government and Chinese society for, as was evident in the Versailles Peace Conference, uniting with the Allies did not necessarily lead to rights recovery.

The Soviet initiative was, of course, designed precisely to exploit these frustrations, to goad China into a rupture with the imperialist Powers. The Chinese government did not succumb, however attractive the offers. To do so it would have had to forfeit whatever restraining influence these Powers might have been able to exert on Japan, whatever foreign loans were badly needed, etc. Recognising Soviet Russia at this time might well have led to a Japanese intervention of similar proportions to that in Siberia, which China could no better afford than Russia. The Chinese government was thus squeezed into a tight corner and its Russian policy had perforce to be cautious.

Caution, however, is not synonymous with inaction. There were too many compelling reasons why the Chinese government would wish an early resumption of official relations with Russia. There was first of all the fear that the Russian civil war might spill over the long common frontier, parts of which were still poorly defined. Chinese nationals in Russia had suffered enormous losses in the midst of revolution and civil war and were begging for help. The cessation of Sino-Russian trade, especially the border trade, was affecting the livelihood of another large group of Chinese. Furthermore, Soviet power had established its *de facto* existence over most of Russia and China could ill afford to antagonise her neighbour. Besides, the latter had made numerous friendly overtures, the Karakhan Manifesto being only the latest, offering to put China's relations with her on a radically new footing. If materialised, this would conceivably lend great momentum to the movement of rights recovery. Finally, the official thinking also took account of the possibility that in the event of Soviet power being re-established in the Far East, it might serve as a counterweight to Japan.

Clearly, the problem before the Chinese government was to devise a policy that would not incur the wrath of the Great Powers, but which would serve Chinese national interests. The degree of hostility toward the Bolshevik régime varied from government to government, the Japanese and the French occupying one end of the spectrum, the American and the British the other. It was best in China's interest to follow the lead of those least hostile and most predisposed to
deal with the Bolsheviks; it was least in China's interest to follow Japan since it was a foregone conclusion that a Soviet-Japanese rapprochement inevitably would be at China's expense. In the course of the next five years, no matter which clique of warlords dominated the government, the Wai-chiao-pu would follow the British. Thus, when the Anglo-Soviet treaty was concluded in February 1924, the first between a major Power and the Soviet government, the Sino-Soviet treaty followed almost immediately.

**Further talks at Copenhagen and Vladivostok**

While the Cabinet deliberated on the Russian question, the Chinese Legation in Copenhagen entered into contact with Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet envoy there. Litvinov called on the Legation Secretary, Ts'ao Yin-hsiang (曹雲祥), on April 2, intimated that British, French, Italian, and Japanese representatives had been in secret conference with him, and urged the Chinese government likewise to alter its attitude toward Soviet Russia. He underlined his government's great concern about the situation in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, hotbeds of Russian counter-revolution. His government had no territorial ambitions whatsoever in China, he declared, only the desire to secure its frontiers and promote trade. The Soviet government was anxious to get talks started on these matters and the Chinese government was welcome to bring up other matters for negotiation. Ts'ao was persuaded by Litvinov's appeal and promptly wired the Wai-chiao-pu, urging it to seize the opportunity 'so as not to fall behind other governments'.

The meeting of Ts'ao Yin-hsiang with Litvinov at Copenhagen opened up a channel of Sino-Soviet contact in addition to that at Vladivostok. Copenhagen was more advantageous than Vladivostok in that secret talks there would be far from the earshot of the Japanese and less likely to invite Japanese interference. Furthermore, the fact that representatives of other governments were conferring with Litvinov provided precisely the lead which Peking had been waiting for. For these reasons, the Cabinet felt encouraged to go a step further than its April 3 decision. It was resolved that the Wai-chiao-pu should draw up a basis for negotiation to be reviewed later by the Cabinet.

At that stage, a telegram arrived from Vladivostok sent by the Chinese High Commissioner in Siberia, Li Chia-ao (李家鎭), and casting doubt on the Karakhan Manifesto. Thereupon, the Cabinet retracted from its new initiative.

Before introducing Li's telegram, some background information must first be sketched. As was true in many parts of eastern Siberia at this time, the government found in Vladivostok was a coalition of Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and Socialist Revolutionaries. Called the Provisional Government of the Maritime Province, it based itself on local elected self-governing councils (zemstva). The Bolsheviks here had to share power with other radical elements partly because of insufficient
strength but also partly because this fitted into the idea of a buffer state in the Russian Far East which the Soviet government had designed to avoid an armed confrontation with the Japanese. The Provisional Government had come into existence at Vladivostok on January 31, after forcing out the Russian Whites. Its president was the right wing Socialist Revolutionary, A. S. Medvedev. The question thus arose as to what extent the policy decided upon by the Narkomindel in Moscow vis-à-vis China was accepted by the non-Bolshevik part of the Coalition.

It so happened that at the same time that the Karakhan Manifesto was communicated to the Chinese, Medvedev was taking up with Li Chia-ao a number of questions relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway and its zone. The Provisional Government was understandably concerned about the way in which the Russian Whites were using that area as a sanctuary and a launching pad for counter-revolution. Organisational activity had been going on in the zone with the aim of eliminating the White authority over the railroad and the zone and substituting that of the Provisional Government. Thus, on January 27, 1920, the United Conference of Russian trade unions, left-wing political parties, and popular organisations in the zone made its appearance. On March 12, it served General Horvath with an ultimatum demanding that he either relinquish his authority to the Vladivostok government or else face a general political strike. Upon Horvath's refusal, the railroad's mechanics went on strike, and were immediately joined by others. The Chinese authority there in the person of General Pao Kuei-ch'ing, Governor of Kirin Province, viewed the situation not without satisfaction. At an appropriate moment, he publicly 'requested' Horvath to relinquish all political authority in the zone and, then, in a lightning move disarmed the Russian railway guards, and the police, and took possession of their headquarters. Formerly for nearly two decades a virtual Tsarist governor of a Russian colony, Horvath was now reduced to a mere chief executive of the Chinese Eastern Railway. He therefore retired to Peking in disgust, leaving the railroad affairs in the hands of subordinates.

Shortly after these events, Medvedev called on Li Chia-ao with a set of proposals to deal with the new situation of a vacuum left by General Horvath. He asked that China (a) accept a certain person by the name of K'o (N. I. Gorchakovsky, chairman of the strike committee?) as Manager-Director of the railroad, (b) give police powers to the United Conference, and (c) entrust legal jurisdiction over the Russians to the Russian consul-general who would be supervised by six elected socialists. Li held off by explaining that a Chinese would temporarily fill Horvath's post, that the second proposal involved Chinese sovereign rights, and that the third was governed by existing treaties.

On April 1, Medvedev returned for another talk, and warned that the strikers would not be satisfied unless the Russian Whites in the zone were completely eliminated. He again asked that K'o be accepted as Horvath's substitute (in accord-
ance with the original railroad contract which required that the post be filled by a Russian) so as to avoid a Japanese seizure of the line. Li then told Medvedev that his proposals were contrary to the Karakhan Manifesto. Li’s point was well taken because Medvedev’s demands could not be reconciled with Karakhan’s offer to transfer the railroad to China, to respect Chinese sovereignty in the zone, and to abolish extraterritoriality. Medvedev replied as follows:

I have read about the Karakhan Manifesto in the newspapers and I have also personally questioned Vilensky about it. According to him, he is the only representative of Lenin and he has not heard of anyone else being sent to the east to make contacts. He fears this is an extremely dangerous act on the part of someone to deceive the Chinese.44

Li Chia-ao wired Medvedev’s statements to the Wai-chiao-pu which at once grasped the implication, namely, the lack of internal unity of views among the Russians. It was decided that this was evidently not a good time to begin talks. Instead, the Wai-chiao-pu recommended the following motion to the Cabinet:

Regarding the Karakhan Manifesto, as reported in Li Chia-ao’s telegram, it has been repudiated by Medvedev. This shows disagreements among the Russians. Furthermore, in view of China’s relations with other governments and the inconvenience to China if she were independently to express her attitude toward the document, it seems premature to respond to Litvinov’s request for an agenda for talks.

The motion therefore recommended a return to the April 3 position of the Cabinet. In view of the doubts cast on the manifesto by Medvedev’s statements, Ts’ao Yun-hsiang should be instructed informally to solicit from Litvinov a memorandum spelling out in unambiguous terms the proposals embodied in the document.45

The Cabinet adopted the motion and the Wai-chiao-pu advised Ts’ao accordingly of the Cabinet decision on April 13. Ts’ao saw Litvinov again on April 19 and asked for a memorandum. Litvinov agreed to provide one once he had received a copy of the manifesto from the Narkomindel.46 It turned out, however, that this promise was never fulfilled.

Meantime, in Vladivostok, Shao Heng-chiin had another talk with Vilensky on April 21. Disappointed that no word had arrived from Peking concerning the Soviet proposals, Vilensky took the opportunity to dispel the doubts that the Chinese government might have concerning them. His government’s overriding concern, he disclosed, was with Japanese ambition. Russia was faced with the impossibility of both peacefully sharing a common frontier with the Japanese and at the same time having to offset the Japanese threat. Hence, Russia must seek friendship with China. It appeared to him to be the Japanese design to expand westwards from the Maritime Province along the Amur River, place themselves between China and Russia by occupying Manchuria and Mongolia. The success of this design would spell disaster for both countries.
Concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway and other proposals stated in the Karakhan Manifesto, Vilensky observed that the original concessions had been unjustly imposed upon China by the Tsarist government, and it was doubtful what Russia had gained by them. 'So, weighing the advantages of consolidating frontiers, promoting Sino-Soviet friendship, and thwarting the ambitions of a common enemy, the Soviet government willingly returns them all.' However, the Chinese had to be willing to make a response, to begin talks. 'China's failure to respond will be most regrettable as there will then be no way to begin.' He intimated to Shao that other countries were vying to begin trade talks with Russia and asked to know the real attitude of the Chinese government, promising to keep any information confidential.

Shao replied that the Chinese government was not as free as others to speak or act. Every word or act was being closely watched. Since he had had no instructions from Peking he could not describe his government's basic position. However, were the Chinese government to agree to talks, what procedure must it take before the Soviet government would consider that talks could begin? Vilensky expressed sympathy for China's position and gave his word that all negotiations would be kept secret. As to the format of the response, the Chinese government must send an 'official statement', signed by its representative, which he could then transmit to Moscow as firm evidence. The negotiation could begin with the revision of the old treaties but if China feared the watchful eye of others these talks could be camouflaged by talks concerning either trade or the distress of Chinese nationals in Russia. As a further concession, any agreement reached need not be publicised until the Soviet government had won recognition from other governments.

The conversation then turned to the Chinese Eastern question. Once again Vilensky stressed the need to have the Russian Whites removed from the leased zone. In closing he squeezed in a caveat: the Karakhan Manifesto had already met with strong Japanese opposition. What worried him most was what would happen if China continued to hesitate to respond while the Soviet government was being subject to Japanese coercion and blandishments. He therefore feared a change of situation but he reassured Shao that until he had heard from Peking the Soviet government would not lightly come to any agreement with Japan. 'Unless there is absolutely no other possible course of action, the Soviet policy will not be altered.'

We shall pause here only to take note of two points arising from the above exchange. First, although on paper the Chinese Eastern Railway was offered to China 'without compensation of any kind' it is clear that the offer was in fact conditional upon China's removal of the Russian Whites. The condition meant that the Chinese government would have to abandon its neutrality in the Russian civil war, an unlikely change of policy so long as Japanese troops remained in Siberia. In any case, the Chinese government would have to deal with 200,000 Russian nationals in North Manchuria, half of whom were in the railroad service.
Secondly, we might also note the extent to which Soviet policy at this time was motivated by a preoccupation with the Japanese problem. Vilensky's warning at the end of the conversation foreshadowed what was to become a salient tactic in Soviet diplomacy in the Far East of playing China and Japan against each other.

Consul Fan Chi-kuang of Harbin (范其光), the emissary designated by the Cabinet to convey the government's reaction to the Karakhan Manifesto to Vilensky, arrived at Vladivostok on May 15. Under the watchful eye of the Japanese, he did not feel safe to call on Vilensky along with Shao Heng-chün until May 22. The Chinese government, he told Vilensky, greatly appreciated the 'gesture of goodwill'. However, the proposals involved not only China, the Soviet and various Siberian governments, but also other governments as well. In addition, the political situation in Russia appeared to be still in flux, as was evident in the formation of separate governments in eastern Siberia. The Chinese government must take all this into consideration. Having thus politely told Vilensky that the latter was not to expect a formal reply, Fan asked about the nature of the buffer governments in Vladivostok and Verkhne Udinsk, whether these governments were bound to follow the policies laid down in Moscow.

Vilensky explained that these buffer governments were only a formality to satisfy Japanese demands. Although they were not bound to obey the Soviet government, 'still, they will abide by any agreement reached between the Chinese and Soviet governments'. He went on to express his disappointment over the Chinese government's attitude and, in a more bitter note, made veiled accusations about Chinese favouring the Whites, citing the continuing recognition of the Russian Legation in Peking as an example.

Fan's meeting with Vilensky thus came as an anti-climax. Meanwhile in Copenhagen, Ts'ao Yün-hsiang had a final talk with Litvinov on May 28, shortly before the latter departed for London as a member of the Soviet trade mission. The Soviet envoy made a last effort to persuade the Chinese government to begin talks. The Siberian governments were united behind Moscow in the area of foreign policy, he told Ts'ao. If an agreement could be reached quickly, China could expect to recover the rights on the Chinese Eastern Railway. This agreement could be kept secret and need only be made public when other governments had recognised the Soviet government. Would Ts'ao not find out from the Wai-chiao-pu whether it was willing to agree to decide on a place for a secret conference? The place could be Peking, Irkutsk, or even Copenhagen. Ts'ao agreed to report and to find out.

However, the mind of the Wai-chiao-pu was made up. The risks involved were too great, notwithstanding the promise of secrecy. By the middle of June, hearing nothing further, Vilensky also gave up. He turned up at Shao's office to ask for a tourist visa to visit China 'to study Chinese industrial and commercial conditions' as a preparatory step for future Sino-Soviet trade. The Wai-chiao-pu
approved the request on condition that he travelled as a private individual. Vilensky subsequently visited North Manchuria and travelled as far south as Shanghai. Vilensky’s departure from Vladivostok marked the end of the Soviet initiative. A week after his departure, President Medvedev of the Provisional Government, in an official proclamation at Vladivostok, declared that his government ‘is not bound by the Soviet government’s declaration renouncing the old treaties and does not hold itself responsible for the various offers made by the Soviet government in the telegram of March 26, 1920’.51

The Chang Ssu-lin Mission to Russia
The question as to whether Peking’s response toward the Karakhan Manifesto would have been significantly different had there been a more vigorous leadership at the Wai-chiao-pu belongs purely to the realm of speculation. Given the limits of China’s unequal foreign relations, it seems doubtful that the Wai-chiao-pu under any leadership at this time would have been capable of pursuing a course independently of the major Powers. In any event, the Wai-chiao-pu, like other ministries, was in an abnormal state. Between February and August, the post of foreign minister was vacant because of Lu Cheng-hsiang’s unwillingness to take responsibility for China’s difficult foreign affairs. The post was temporarily filled by his deputy, Ch’en Lu.

Among certain high officials not directly involved in handling China’s foreign relations there seems to have been a feeling that the Wai-chiao-pu could have been more energetic and assertive. These officials included those in the Bureau of Frontier Defence Affairs (Tu-pan pien-fang shih-wu ch’u 督辦邊防事務處, abbreviated hereafter as Pien-fang ch’u.) The bureau was headed by Tuan Ch’i-jui and theoretically came under the Office of the President. The bureau had under it the Frontier Defence Army (Pien-fang chün 邊防軍) and the commander-in-chief was another Anfu clique leader, General Hsü Shu-tseng.52

As the Power most hostile to Bolshevism in the Far East, the Japanese did all they could to restrain the Peking government from a rapprochement with the Soviet government. Yet we find that their so-called Anfu ‘protégés’ were the very people who advocated intercourse with the Bolsheviks. Thus, when Ts’ao Yün-hsiang’s wire of April 2 reporting that other governments were conferring with Litvinov was received in Peking, the Pien-fang ch’u put it to the Wai-chiao-pu bluntly: ‘Why does not China seize the opportunity and likewise send a representative?’53

Part of the rationale behind the creation of the Pien-fang ch’u in 1919 was that the bureau with its troops would defend Chinese frontiers against Bolshevik encroachments.54 Among the many functions assumed by the bureau were included the investigation of the political situation in Siberia, contacts with Russian Reds and Whites, and lending assistance and protection to Chinese nationals in distress.
In the early months of 1920 several delegations for these purposes were sent to Siberia by the Pien-fang ch’u.

The most important of these missions was that led by Major General Chang Ssu-lin, whose receipt of the Karakhan Manifesto from Kushnarev has been mentioned earlier. Chang’s mission attracted considerable international attention at the time and has been a subject of confused speculation since. With the information in Chinese official documents we can now settle a number of controversial points— who sent the mission, for what purpose, and with what powers.

Chang had had much experience in Russia, having served, for example, as military attaché from April to September 1919 at Omsk where Kolchak’s Siberian government was then located. After Kolchak’s collapse he had urged Peking to change its policy toward the Bolsheviks from one of hostility to one of de facto intercourse. He became even more ardent in advocating friendly relations when he received the Karakhan Manifesto. In reporting it to his superiors in the Pien-fang ch’u, he described the document as ‘the first step toward official intercourse and the herald of future Sino-Soviet friendship’. According to Chang, his superiors shared his enthusiasm, saw in the declaration ‘the best opportunity for the recovery of rights’ and authorised him in April to proceed to Irkutsk as a military representative (chün-shih tai-piao 軍事代表). His orders were to examine the situation of the Chinese nationals there and ‘to enter into secret contact with the Red party and exchange views informally’.

The Japanese army officers got wind of Chang’s mission and made preparations at Chita to detain him even before his train crossed the front line of the battling Red and White forces further east. However, by the importunate explanation that his mission was concerned only with taking relief to Chinese nationals in distress, he finally overcame the obstacle and entered Bolshevik-held territory.

Chang’s special train finally made it to Verkhne Udinsk on June 27. Immediately, he entered into a series of talks with Krasnoshchekov, Foreign Minister of the Far Eastern Republic. They talked over such matters as the buffer state’s political program, its relationship with Moscow, and the expatriation of Chinese nationals. From his talks with the foreign minister Chang reached the conclusion that the authority of the buffer state was still too limited, that a solution of the problem of the Chinese nationals had to be sought in Moscow. However, zeal and self-importance must also have played a part in his decision.

Soon after reaching Verkhne Udinsk, he had wired Lenin and Chicherin for permission to enter Soviet territory. The purpose of his mission, he gave the Soviet government to understand, was ‘to establish commercial and diplomatic relations’. He was definitely exceeding his orders.

After receiving word of welcome from Moscow, Chang then wired his superiors at the Pien-fang ch’u for fresh instructions. He also seemed to have realised that
what he hoped to accomplish in Moscow properly fell under the purview of the Wai-chiao-pu which until now had been completely dissociated from his mission. He managed to talk Consul General Chu Shao-yang (朱紹陽), then en route to Irkutsk in Chang’s train to his post, into accompanying him to Moscow. In the telegram, he asked that the Wai-chiao-pu be notified.

On July 23, the Pien-fang ch’u instructed Chang as follows:

The mission’s journey to the west was intended originally to bring relief to Chinese nationals in Russia as well as study the conditions existing in that country. Since the Soviet government has expressed welcome, the mission should proceed west at once and carry out on-the-spot investigations. Whenever possible, it may enter into unofficial contacts. The study of Russian conditions is a necessary preparation for future intercourse.

Only after instructing Chang did the Pien-fang ch’u then notify the Cabinet and the Wai-chiao-pu, and ask what items the government might wish to entrust the mission to negotiate with the Soviet government. There is no evidence whatsoever that the Wai-chiao-pu took any action. The reasons are not far to seek. First, it could not have failed to resent the Pien-fang ch’u’s intrusion into matters which properly belonged to itself. Secondly, before Chang reached Moscow, his mission had attracted international attention, given rise to all sorts of rumours. Japanese Minister Obata had rushed in to make inquiries. Even more embarrassing, Chicherin had wired on July 8 asking whether Chang’s mission was truly representative of the Chinese government and if it possessed proper powers. ‘If so,’ continued the Commissar, ‘we will be glad to receive it and in return send a similar mission to Peking’. A mission from the Red Capital was definitely more than the Wai-chiao-pu could handle. The telegram was therefore ignored.

To compound matters further, the Anfu-Chihli war had begun in the early part of July and by the end of the month was being decided in the Chihli clique’s favour. On July 28, only five days after the Pien-fang ch’u had instructed Chang to proceed to Moscow, Tuan Chu-jui formally ‘resigned’ from the directorship of the Pien-fang ch’u and the office then went out of existence.

It is not clear when Chang was apprised of this but in accordance with the new orders he and Chu Shao-yang set out from Irkutsk in late August and arrived in Moscow on September 5. The two misty-eyed Chinese lost no time in visiting the Narkomindel. On September 18, they wired the Wai-chiao-pu to the effect that they had been to the Narkomindel twice. The Soviet government had shown great eagerness for close relations with China. They were impressed and pleased by the many manifestations of good disposition toward their persons. Karakhan had asked whether the Chinese government was willing to sign a preliminary treaty to resume relations. If so, it should invest Chang with full powers. Chang therefore asked whether the Wai-chiao-pu could give him the necessary powers. The new
Cabinet which was formed in early August after the Anfu-Chihli war reviewed the telegram on September 20 and then referred it to the Wai-chiao-pu.68 Chang's mission had started out in April as a fact-finding mission to Irkutsk, it had then gone on to Moscow without Cabinet approval, and now it was asking for negotiating powers. The new foreign minister, Yen Hui-ch'ing, decided that the matter had gone far enough. A cable was sent to Chang and Chu, ordering them to return to China at once.69 Crestfallen, Chang informed Chicherin and Karakhan of his sudden recall. The latter expressed disappointment and urged Chang to stay a little longer as he would shortly be handed 'an important declaration' to be transmitted to the Chinese government. Chang agreed to wait and on October 2, Karakhan handed him the communiqué. This document has come to be known as the Second Karakhan Manifesto. In the note appended to it, Karakhan urged the Wai-chiao-pu to allow the promising discussions to continue and to empower Chang to sign an agreement.70 Chang then wired the substance of the declaration to Peking on October 3 and, disregarding his recall, stayed on for further talks with the Narkomindel.71 Brooking Chang's insubordination no further, the Wai-chiao-pu wired the Chinese Minister in London on October 12 to have the Soviet envoy there, Krasin, relay to the Narkomindel the message that Chang had gone to Moscow 'without the instructions of the government,' that he possessed no authority to negotiate, and that he had been recalled.72 Krasin's message brought the talks in Moscow to a halt. Chang reluctantly departed for home, arriving toward the end of November.

In spite of all the unhappy complications, the Chang Ssu-lin Mission should be credited with bringing back the Second Karakhan Manifesto, precisely the sort of document that the Wai-chiao-pu had sought from Litvinov but which had not been forthcoming at that time. The substance of the document is as follows:

1 The Soviet government to nullify all previous treaties with China, renounce all annexed territories, all Concessions, and return 'without compensation and forever' all that has been extorted by Tsarist Russia.
2 China and Russia to establish regular commercial relations immediately.
3 The Chinese government to undertake (a) not to assist anti-Bolsheviks or tolerate their activities inside China; (b) to disarm and deliver over to the Soviet government all White Guard forces together with their arms and property.
4 Russia to abolish extraterritoriality for Russian nationals in China.
5 The Chinese government to discontinue recognition of the Russian Legation, deport its personnel to Russia, and hand over all Russian property and archives.
6 The Soviet government to renounce the Boxer indemnity 'on condition that it be not paid to Russian consulates and Russian organizations'.
7 China and Russia to exchange diplomatic and consular representatives.
"The Russian and the Chinese government to agree to conclude a special treaty with respect to the rules and regulations governing the use of the Chinese Eastern Railway for the needs of Soviet Russia. In the making of the said treaty, the Far Eastern Republic shall also participate."73

Compared with the First Karakhan Manifesto, which was more in the nature of a statement of principles, the Second Karakhan Manifesto spelled out a series of concrete proposals which could serve as a basis for negotiation. The second document was drafted within six months of the communication of the first to the Chinese Government but the change in the Soviet position on the Chinese Eastern question is noteworthy. The railway was no longer offered to the Chinese 'without compensation of any kind'. In this way, the offer on paper finally caught up with the actual negotiating position that the transfer was in fact conditional. In addition to Vilensky's insistence upon Chinese suppression of the Russian Whites as a precondition, the Second Karakhan Manifesto now injected other demands. The Chinese Eastern question was to be subject to tripartite negotiation, the objective of which was a special agreement which would guarantee Russia's privileged use of the railroad.

The manner in which Karakhan stated to Chang Ssu-lin the Soviet position is interesting. According to Chang's recollections two years later, Karakhan observed that in principle, the railroad being inside Chinese territory should be administered and protected by the Chinese. The Soviet government was prepared to leave it up to the Chinese as to when the transfer should take place. But, Karakhan surmised, China was probably unprepared to take over the railroad immediately for fear of a Japanese seizure. In any case, all that Soviet Russia desired was convenient passage to Vladivostok at lower tariffs than those paid by other countries. He justified this on the grounds that although the railroad was built by an imperialist government, the funds had come from the Russian masses.74

As of September 1920, it seems clear that the Soviet government was still prepared to transfer the railroad title to the Chinese on the above conditions; nothing was said about financial compensation, evidently a matter left open for negotiation. In time, however, fresh conditions and demands would be added until it became clear that the Soviet government had no intention whatsoever of relinquishing ownership of the strategically and economically valuable railroad.

Conclusion
The objective of this paper has been twofold. First, with the help of Chinese foreign ministry documents, I have sought to shed new light on the first Karakhan Manifesto, the mystery of which was left only partially solved by Allen S. Whiting some twenty years ago. Thanks to Vilensky's 1919 official pamphlet and Whiting's research, it is generally known that the controversial clause concerning the Chinese
Eastern Railway was, in fact, included in at least one version of the original declaration. The question as to why a modified version of it, without the clause, should be released in the Soviet official press barely one month after the drafting cannot be answered definitely. The existence of alternate versions of the document seems to reflect a divergence among the Narkomindel policymakers in their perceptions of Soviet interest and Chinese political realities which resulted in differing policy positions vis-à-vis China. On the one hand, there were those, enthralled by the May Fourth incident, who favoured a dramatic gesture to woo the Chinese. These observers, who saw an exaggerated significance in the Chinese reactions to the Versailles terms, were apparently dissatisfied with the continuation of the policy as outlined by Voznesensky and Polivanov to the Chinese Legation in January, and reaffirmed by Georgi Chicherin in July 1918. Specifically it was insisted that the Chinese Eastern Railway, one of the Chinese demands at Versailles, be turned over to China 'without compensation of any kind,' a dramatic renunciation of the most concrete symbol of Tsarist aggression. To these observers, such a gesture would help propel Chinese social revolution along lines desired by the Soviet state and secure a Sino-Soviet alliance against Japanese imperialism on the Asiatic continent.

Against these idealists were those who saw things in China more realistically, who preferred a more cautious handling of the strategically and economically valuable railroad. These realists were therefore in favour of adhering to a policy decided upon in the early days of the Soviet régime, viz the Soviet government should renounce the Boxer indemnity payments, extraterritorial rights, and Russian-administered concessions, but not the Chinese Eastern Railway which should be subject to negotiations with the aim of retaining title to it or, alternately, of obtaining adequate compensation for relinquishing it. I am therefore unable to agree with the view that the omission of the clause in the press release signified the shift in Soviet policy from a new, revolutionary diplomacy of self-denial to a traditional, nationalistic diplomacy of self-interest. The policy position of the Soviet government vis-à-vis the Chinese Eastern Railway between the Bolshevik coup and the drafting of the Karakhan Manifesto was anything but revolutionary. Indeed, until July 25, 1919, the Soviet régime had no intention whatsoever of relinquishing the railroad to the Chinese without any compensation of any kind. In the words of one historian of Soviet foreign policy: 'Conceived in internationalism, the Soviet revolution was nevertheless a national act with a national purpose.' At the very birth of the Soviet régime, its policymakers were much preoccupied with Russian national interest. The dramatic offer of the railroad to the Chinese on July 25, 1919, insisted upon by one segment of Narkomindel policymakers, was motivated by the need for a Sino-Soviet alliance to offset Japanese militarism,
just as Chicherin’s offer to sell to Japan the Harbin-Ch’ang-ch’un section, long
desired by Japan, was designed to appease it.77

The evidence presented above also casts doubt on the prevalent view that the
railroad clause was left in by mistake when the text was conveyed to the Chinese
in March 1920. It is difficult to believe that Vilensky, who personally took part
in the policymaking and was probably the author of the version appended to his
pamphlet, made the mistake of disseminating this particular text, unmindful of the
debate that had occurred in higher quarters. In his conversation with Consul Shao
Heng-chün at Vladivostok on March 31, he handed the latter a text (inclusive of
the clause) with the official seal, pledged its authenticity, and also explicitly stated
that the Soviet government was prepared to hand over the Chinese Eastern Railway.
The evidence thus points to what seems to have been the ultimate decision reached
by the Narkomindel, viz. that of adopting both positions and of maneuvering
between them with flexibility. If the Chinese government would indeed succumb
to the offer as the idealists believed it would, then the gains—China’s de jure recogni-
tion of the Soviet régime, her assertion of independence from the imperialist Powers,
and her alliance with the Soviets against Japan—would be worth the price. On the
other hand, if the gamble was lost, then the Narkomindel could fall back on the
more realistic position. Whatever embarrassments might arise from the failure of
the first course could be handled later somehow. It was probably with all this in
mind that the Narkomindel gave Vilensky the signal to go ahead and sound out
the Chinese. Meantime, the less dramatic version of the declaration was released
in the official press as it would seem most unwise, for reasons already noted, for
the Soviet government to announce independently that it no longer wanted the
railroad and other assets.

Vilensky’s mission of course failed and embarrassments had to be faced. Instead
of simply telling the Chinese that the generous offer no longer stood, the Soviet
side chose to deny ever having issued such a document. It is interesting to note
that the denial was not made until the end of 1922. Neither I. L. Yurin, the Far
Eastern Republic envoy to Peking (June 1920 to October 1921) nor the Soviet
envoy A. K. Paikes (December 1921 to August 1922) ever attempted any correction
of the declaration. At the time of Yurin’s mission, the Soviet position on the Chinese
Eastern question was more or less that outlined in the Second Karakhan Manifesto,
which then rapidly shifted, at the time of Paikes’s mission, to the insistence upon
Sino-Soviet joint-administration of the railroad. It was not until late in 1922
when the Wai-chiao-pu asked Soviet envoy Adolph Joffe to make good the promise
that the matter of the authenticity of the declaration was raised. Much in line with
his generally truculent style of diplomacy, Joffe expressed doubt as to whether
the Chinese government deserved such an offer, denied that the offer had ever
been made, forwarded what he described as the ‘authentic’ version, and, more to
the point, reminded the Chinese that they never formally responded. A year later, Joffe's successor, Leo Karakhan, repeated the same exercise.

Neither Joffe nor Karakhan volunteered any explanation as to how the 'error' might have originated. In June, 1924, soon after the signing of the Sino-Soviet Agreement, which placed the railroad firmly in Soviet hands, V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko explained in an article that the original Karakhan Manifesto, without the clause, had been edited by a conference of Chinese workers in Moscow and was transmitted to China in the adulterated form.

Faced with Whiting's embarrassing discovery of Vilensky's appendix, Soviet writers found that Antonov-Ovseenko's explanation was no longer adequate although some of them (e.g. Kheifets) still cited it in their works. In 1958 M. S. Kapitsa, who seemed to be setting the line and tone for Soviet historians of Sino-Soviet relations, offered a new explanation, this time based on Soviet archives. According to him, at the drafting of the Karakhan Manifesto, 'There was in fact a rough draft in which there was a paragraph which read that the Soviet government transferred to China, without compensation of any kind, the Chinese Eastern Railway, all coal, timber, gold and other concessions seized by the Tsarist government, etc.' However, Kapitsa continues, this version 'was not submitted to the government for approval'. Vilensky published it 'by mistake' and the Chinese subsequently received this erroneous text. Vilensky is a convenient scapegoat since he was a friend of Trotsky and perished for it later.

As the second objective, I have sought to describe and analyse the response of the Chinese government to the Soviet overture. Here again, the Chinese official documentation does not substantiate the prevalent view. I have shown that the government in Peking did not ignore the Karakhan Manifesto. On the contrary, it provided the occasion for the government to review its Russian policy on the Cabinet level. The Chinese government found itself caught in the dilemma of, on the one hand, not wishing to offend the Soviet government and, on the other, not being willing to commit itself to a policy which would conflict with that of the Great Powers. It therefore decided against any formal response but, secretly, made informal ones.

Nor does it seem proper to assume that the Anfu militarists, out of consideration for their Japanese ally, had compelled the government into inaction. If anything, the Chang Ssu-lin mission to Moscow should belie such a view. To explain Peking's policy solely in terms of the Anfu militarists and the Japanese would overlook the larger phenomenon of China's semi-colonial status.
Notes

1 An abstract of this study was presented at the 28th International Orientalist Congress, held at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, on January 6–12, 1971. I am grateful to Professor Wang Gungwu of the Department of Far Eastern History, Australia National University, for his kind interest in publishing it, and to Dr Stephen A. FitzGerald for his editorial service. My deep gratitude also goes to the following scholars who gave me the benefit of their comments: Banno Masataka and Eto Shinkichi of the University of Tokyo, Hosoya Chihiro of Hitotsubashi University, and Beatrice Bartlett.


4 These materials are deposited in the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, in the Republic of China. More and more of them are being made available by the Institute in published form. Published volumes with the common title *Chung-O kuan-hsi shih-liao* 中俄關係史料 [Historical materials on Sino-Russian relations] are as follows: Li Yü-shu 李毓澍 (comp.), *Wai-Meng-ku 1917–1919* 外蒙古 [Outer Mongolia] (Taipei, 1959); Li Kuo-ch’ı 李國祁 (comp.), *Chung-tung t’ieh-lu 1917–1919*, 中東鐵路 [Chinese Eastern Railway], 2 vols. (Taipei, 1960); Wang Yü-chün 王聿均 (comp.), *O cheng-pien yü i-pan chiao-she 1917–1919*, 出兵西伯利亞 [Dispatch of troops to Siberia] (Taipei, 1962).

Those materials pertaining to 1920 are published as follows:
NOTES

T’ao Ying-hui 陶英惠 (comp.), O cheng-pien 1920 俄政變 [The Russian Revolution] (Taipei, 1968); T’ao Ying-hui (comp.), I-pan chiao-she 1920 一般交涉 [General intercourse] (Taipei, 1968). The latter volume consists of three parts, each with a separate title: Part 1, I-pan chiao-she, abbreviated in these notes as IPCS; Part 2, O tui-hua wai-chiao shih-t’an 俄對華外交試探 [Preliminary Soviet diplomatic soundings in China], abbreviated hereafter as WCST; Part 3, T’ing-chih O-shih-ling tai-yii 停止俄使領待遇 [Discontinuation of relations with the Russian Legation]. Finally, there is T’ao Ying-hui (comp.), Chung-tung-lu yü Tung-pei pien-fang 1920 中東路與東北邊防 [Chinese Eastern Railway and Manchurian border defence] (Taipei, 1969).

5 This paper is part of a larger study on Sino-Soviet relations from 1917 to 1925 soon to be completed.

6 In brief, Whiting discovered that the manifesto of July 25, 1919, originally contained a specific Russian offer to return the Chinese Eastern Railway to China without compensation of any kind. The original text was appended by V. D. Vilensky to his pamphlet Kitai i Sovetskaia Rossiia (Moscow, 1919). This clause was deleted in the text released in the Soviet official press Izvestiia and Pravda on August 26 which, Whiting argued, reflected second thinking in policy-making positions at the time. Then it was left in by mistake, so Whiting surmised, in a text officially communicated to Peking the following March. The authenticity of this text was vehemently denied by Soviet envoys subsequently and became a source of much dispute in the Sino-Soviet negotiations.

7 For a study on the impact of the Karakhan Manifesto on Chinese society at the time, see Fujii Shozo 藤井昇三, ‘Chugoku kakumei to dai-ichiji Karakhan sengen’ 中國革命與第一次喀瓦汗宣言, Ajia Keizai アジア経済 10:10 (1969), pp. 21–36.


The Chinese government did not remain long ignorant of the Karakhan Manifesto, however. The text as it appeared in the Soviet press on August 26 was soon picked up by the Japanese in Paris. Major General Tanaka, the Military Attaché of the Japanese embassy in London, then in Paris, forwarded a gist of the document to the Japanese military advisor Azuma Otohiko, who was attached to the Office of the Chinese President, on September 12. Tanaka advised that the Chinese government be apprised of the Soviet document along with the following warning: 'The Bolsheviks are paying special attention to China and seeking to draw China into the whirlpool of social disorders.' The Japanese recommended a strict investigation of Bolshevik subversive activities in China. The Chinese government accordingly instructed all provincial officials to be vigilant. Border officials were especially alerted and a thorough censor-
ship of postal and telegraphic communications was ordered. Tanaka's communication and the Cabinet decision can be found in Shun-t'ien shih-pao, October 5, 1919, p. 7. The Chinese government thus learned about the Karakhan Manifesto for the first time indirectly through the Japanese and reacted to it as pernicious propaganda. Such an attitude, however, was not adopted involuntarily under Japanese pressure. Indeed, the official Chinese image of Bolshevism was that of a tidal wave of lawlessness, and several months before numerous precautions had been undertaken to forestall Bolshevik inundation of China. See Shun-t'ien shih-pao, July passim.


24 WCST, p. 18, Doc. 34, 'Letter to Irkutsk Chinese consulate from Plenipotentiary of Siberia and Far East, brought back by Consul Wei Po,' received April 9, 1920.

25 The original telegram which I have seen is found with the following notation: File P. 2423/1125, 'Lao-nung cheng-fu hsüan-yen chi tui lao-nung cheng-fu chiao-she 勞農政府宣言及對勞農政府交涉 [Soviet government's declaration and negotiations with the Soviet government]', telegram from Acting Foreign Minister of the Soviet government, received March 26, 1920, from Irkutsk, Yanson 324, relayed from Kiakhta Northern.

26 For a summary of the document received by Chang, see WCST, pp. 15–16, Doc. 30, Cabinet to WCP, Apr. 2, received Apr. 6, 1920; see also WCST, p. 26, Doc. 47, Chang Ssu-lin to Pien-fang ch'u 邊防守 (hereafter PFC), enclosed in PFC to WCP, Apr. 17, received Apr. 24, 1920. Kushnarev is identified in M. A. Persits, Dal'ne-vostochnaia Respublika i Kitai (Moscow, 1962), p. 31.

27 WCST, p. 11, Doc. 23, Shao to WCP, Apr. 1, received Apr. 2, 1920.


29 WCST, p. 3, Doc. 7, Shao to WCP, Mar. 22, received Mar. 24, 1920.
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30 WCST, pp. 7–8, Doc. 13, Cabinet to WCP, Mar. 26, received Mar. 27, 1920.


33 WCST, p. 14, Doc. 27, WCP to Cabinet secretariat, Apr. 3, 1920.

34 WCST, p. 27, Doc. 49, PFC to WCP, Apr. 19, received Apr. 21, 1920; WCST, p. 30, Doc. 51, WCP to PFC, Apr. 22, 1920; WCST, p. 34, Doc. 56, WCP to Cabinet secretariat, Apr. 27, 1920.

35 WCST, pp. 17–18, Doc. 33, WCP to Wellington Koo, Apr. 7, 1920; also WCST, pp. 18–19, Doc. 35, Cabinet to WCP, Apr. 8, 1920.

36 For the text of the Soviet manifesto to the Mongols, see Xenia Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia in the East 1920–1927: a documentary survey (Stanford, 1957), pp. 199–200, Doc. 52. If we recall Polivanov’s statement at the Chinese Legation in January 1918, it will be clear that the advocacy of revolutionary self-determination for the Mongols represents another departure in Soviet policy vis-à-vis China in the second half of 1919.

37 WCST, p. 7, Doc. 11, Obata-Ch’en Lu conversation, Mar. 27, 1920; WCST, p. 9, Doc. 20, Russian Legation to WCP, Mar. 26, 1920. The construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway had been financed by the Russian Treasury largely out of French loans. To top this, the Russo-Asian Bank which held the financial interest of the railroad had placed itself under the French flag. See WCST, pp. 17–18, Doc. 33, WCP to Koo, Apr. 7, 1920.

38 T’ing-chih O-shih-ling tai-yü, passim.


40 O cheng-pien, 1920, p. 190, Doc. 333, Ts’ao to WCP, Apr. 2, received Apr. 7, 1920.

41 WCST, pp. 20–1, Doc. 40, WCP to Ts’ao, Apr. 13, 1920.

42 M. Kolobov, ‘Bor’ba s Bolshevikami na Dal’nem Vostoke’, a manuscript in the Hoover Library (MS DK771 F2K81), chap.
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XXIII, pp. 3-4; Kheifets, *Sovetskaia Rossiia i sopredel'nye strany Vostoka*, pp. 378 ff.

43 *IPCS*, pp. 93-95, Doc. 139, Li to Pao Kuei-ch'ing, Mar. 24, 1920, enclosed in Hsü Nai-lin 徐鼐霖 to Cabinet, Apr. 19, 1920.

44 *WCST*, pp. 12-13, Doc. 25, Li to WCP, Apr. 1, received Apr. 3, 1920; *O cheng-pien*, 1920, p. 204, Doc. 359, PFC to WCP, received Apr. 12, 1920.

45 *WCST*, pp. 20-1, Doc. 40, WCP to Ts'ao, Apr. 13, 1920. It is interesting to note that the Chinese government made public Li Chia-ao's report but gave a totally different interpretation to it. Hollington Tong, a reporter for *Millard's Review* learned from the government that a circular message to the provinces had been issued to the following effect: 'According to a telegram from Li Chia-ao ... it has been learned by inquiry with the representatives of the Soviet Government that they had not issued such a note. It is, therefore, feared that the communication is a forgery.' See Hollington Tong, 'Russian Soviet Would Befriend China,' *Millard's Review*, XIII: 1 (June 5, 1920), pp. 24-6.

46 *IPCS*, p. 102, Doc. 149, Ts'ao to WCP, Apr. 19, received Apr. 24, 1920.

47 *WCST*, pp. 32-3, Doc. 54, Shao to WCP, Apr. 23, received Apr. 25, 1920.


49 *WCST*, pp. 44-5, Doc. 64, Ts'ao to WCP, May 29, received May 30, 1920.

50 *WCST*, p. 50, Doc. 70, Shao to WCP, June 16, 1920; *WCST*, p. 50, Doc. 71, WCP to Shao, June 19, 1920. Vilensky's idealistic image of 'revolutionary China' did not survive his visit of several weeks. For several years he was to be one of the Narkomindel's staunchest advocates of *realpolitik* in the Far East. Some years after his first visit to China he recalled for his friend Trotsky the vivid disappointment he experienced there. He found in Shanghai and elsewhere a group of Chinese professors such as Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao leading a big student movement, but 'there was not a single workers' cell' and hardly any proletarian movement to speak of. See Trotsky Archives (Houghton Library, Harvard University), Document
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T 1289, Vilensky to Trotsky, Apr. 8, 1928, p. 2.

51 WCST, pp. 58–9, Doc. 92, Provisional President Medvedev's proclamation, issued at Vladivostok on July 1, 1920.

52 The Bureau of Frontier Defence Affairs, as well as the Frontier Defence Army, were new names given to the previously existing Bureau of War Participation Affairs (Tu-pan ts'an-chan shih-wu ch'u 督辦參戰事務處) and the War Participation Army (Ts'an-chan chün 參戰軍), respectively. The entire background and reasons for the change of names, which occurred in July 1919, cannot be described here. Suffice it to say that in 1919 there was an American-led foreign effort to get the northern and southern Chinese to compose their differences at the conference table. The southerners demanded, among other things, the disbandment of the War Participation Army which the Anfu militarists had built up with large Japanese loans for the ostensible purpose of taking part in the war against the Central Powers but which, in fact, was employed to fight their domestic rivals. Unwilling to give up the backbone of their power, the Anfu militarists simply changed the designation of the army, assigning it to a different purpose. See Li Chien-nung, *The Political history of China, 1840–1928*, trans. Teng Ssu-yu and Jeremy Ingalls (New York, 1956), pp. 392–3.


57 WCST, pp. 25–6, Doc. 30, Cabinet to WCP, Apr. 6, 1920, relaying Chang's to PFC.


59 *O cheng-pien*, 1920, pp. 386–7, Doc. 611, PFC to WCP, June 9, 1920, relaying intercepted telegram from Lieutenant General
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Suzuki 鈴木 (Chita) to General Ooi 大井 (Vladivostok); also p. 451, Doc. 694, PFC to WCP, June 26, 1920, forwarding Chang's report.

60 *IPCS*, pp. 248–53, Doc. 406, Ts‘an-lu pan-kung ch‘u 參陸辦公處 to WCP, Sept. 21, received Sept. 24, 1920; see also Persits, *Dal’nevostochnaia Respublika i Kitai*, p. 108.

61 *WCST*, pp. 64–7, Doc. 105, PFC to WCP, July 24, received July 29, 1920, enclosure.

62 *WCST*, pp. 64–7, Doc. 105, PFC to WCP, July 24, received July 29, 1920.

63 Ibid.

64 *IPCS*, p. 178, Doc. 280, Ch‘en-Obata conversation, June 22, 1920; also pp. 178–9, Doc. 281, Ch‘en Obata conversation. June 22, 1920. Obata’s inquiries were prompted by a report from Japanese Minister Heki 日置 (Stockholm) to Foreign Minister Uchida 内田 to the effect that according to *Pravda* of May 4, 1920, a Chinese mission was on its way to Moscow. See Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, MT 25211/62 Heki to Uchida, May 26, 1920.

65 *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, III, Doc. 7.


67 *WCST*, p. 99, Doc. 158, Chang and Chu to WCP, Sept. 18, received Sept. 21, 1920.


69 *IPCS*, pp. 247–8, Doc. 405, WCP to Chu, Sept. 23, 1920, and draft of telegram to Chang.


72 *IPCS*, p. 271, Doc. 441, WCP to Sze, Oct. 12, 1920; see also p. 281, Doc. 460, Sze to WCP, Oct. 20, received Oct. 21, 1920.

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Russian text, see *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Sbornik Dokumentov* (Moscow, 1959), pp. 51–3, Doc. 15.


75 For an argument along this line, see Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China*, p. 32.


77 For Chicherin’s offer to Japan, see his speech before the Fifth Congress of Soviets on July 4, 1918, *Izvestiia*, July 5, 1918, p. 7.

78 WCP Archives, P2423/? Wellington Koo to Joffe, November 11, 1922; P2423/553 Joffe to Koo, Nov. 14, 1922; P 2423/? WCP to Joffe, Dec. 11, 1922; P2423/? Joffe to WCP, Dec. 21, 1922.


80 *Izvestiia*, June 12, 1924. For Whiting’s refutation, see his *Soviet Policies in China*, p. 31.

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