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R. S. PARKER AND P. N. TROY
Editors

The Politics
of Urban Growth

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The aim of this book is to explore some of the ways in which politics and government have influenced the growth and shape of cities; to show how urban growth affects economic and social welfare and the administration of all kinds of public services; and to discuss the possibilities for ordinary city dwellers, in their various political capacities, to have some say in the nature and direction of future growth.

To simplify our picture of the politics of urban growth in practice, we have taken Sydney, the largest Australian metropolis, as a case study, while recognising that other cities have their distinctive advantages and difficulties. However, Sydney is as rich in problems as cities of comparable size in other western countries, and it is the city where urban politics in Australia has so far been best documented. Moreover, both in the Sydney studies themselves, and particularly in the more general chapters, we have discussed broader issues, such as the relations between planning, politics and popular participation, which are matters of common concern throughout the modern world.

The book tries to increase understanding, rather than to preach or prescribe. This is not because we think that to propose reform is academically improper, but because sound nostrums need sound knowledge, and there is so much still to learn about government and city growth that there is ample room for explorations of this kind. As distinct from studies in physical planning, economics and economic history, and of the social character of suburbs and slums, serious writing on metropolitan government in Australia is still rare. Some is to be found in the work of F. A. Bland (e.g. Bland 1929, 1933, 1939, 1943); of J. R. Johns on Perth and Fremantle (Johns 1950); of Alan Davies on Victorian local government (Davies 1951); of Greenwood and Laverty on the history of Brisbane (Greenwood 1959); and of Ruth Atkins on local government in New South Wales (e.g. Atkins 1958). Professor Atkins contributed a paper on 'Cities and Politics' to an Australian Institute of Political Science Summer School (Wilkes 1966), and there have been a number of short and necessarily speculative inquiries and essays on how Canberra might be governed
if it ever achieved a government of its own. There is a good deal of politics in the latest and liveliest book in the field, Hugh Stretton's *Ideas for Australian Cities* (Stretton 1970)—a secular sermon of the best kind. But extended, detailed research on the realities of politics in our large cities has scarcely begun: some is now developing in the Urban Research Unit of the Australian National University.

The chapters of this book were prepared as background papers for the Seventh Urbanisation Seminar, held at the Australian National University in December 1971. The Urbanisation Seminars have been organised by the University's Research School of Social Sciences since 1965. The object of the seminars is to focus attention on various aspects of the growth and administration of Australian cities. By bringing together people from government, private enterprise and various academic disciplines the seminars also help to improve the level of communication between the diverse actors involved in the urban development process. The papers have been revised in the light of the discussions at the Seminar, to which the authors are much indebted, but of course they accept full responsibility for the texts as they stand.

The present book is only an introduction to a large, important and topical subject: it is neither comprehensive nor definitive. For example, while it mentions in passing the respective contributions of government and private capital to the development of Australian cities, it does not examine the nature of the political interactions between private business groups and government, nor the political implications of the increasing scale of corporate activity in urban development. It touches only in passing on the impact of urban growth on style and quality of life, and the problems of social equity which it raises. Nor does it speculate on the politics of radical alternatives to metropolitan growth, such as the multiplication of new Canberras in the countryside.

We hope these studies will draw attention to some of the specific issues on which more knowledge is needed, while offering the student and the general reader some insights into how urban growth is inevitably infused with politics, and why urban problems cannot be met except by political action.

*Research School of Social Sciences*  
*Australian National University*  
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1 Growth of an Australian Metropolis

E. C. Fry

Sydney began as the command post for a jail. When Governor Phillip of the Royal Navy landed there in 1788 he controlled a thousand convicts and marines—criminals and their guards. He was seeking a safe harbour for the settlement because it would be supplied by sea, and needed fresh water and land that could be tilled. He found them in Port Jackson, landing at a small snug bay on the southern side, Sydney Cove, with a fresh water stream, later called the Tank Stream, and a deep anchorage. Soon a wharf was built, a governor's house and barracks for the marines, whilst tents and later wooden huts straggled haphazardly amongst the rocks and trees.

Colonisation from Britain is the starting point in the history of Australian cities. These centres did not congeal out of the life of the countryside as points where rural dwellers came together to answer their advancing needs. In mankind's progress from savagery to civilisation the creation of villages and towns as urban nuclei was a vital step over a long period of time, so important that it can be described as the urban revolution. When Europeans came to Australia in the late eighteenth century they possessed all this background and their first settlements were artificially planted outposts on the shores of the continent, dependent on the motherland. The aborigines were pushed aside. Australia was an under-developed, indeed undeveloped, country so all the Australian colonies were for a long time peopled, financed and equipped from outside. Then Australia continued to be a distant part of the British, European and western world economic system. Australian cities did not have to be grown from local resources, nor did their people have to discover the idea of a city.

Most of the colonists, including the convicts, had experience of city life in Britain and even the Irish, who were often an exception as peasants, came from a people accustomed to migrate to the city as a last resort. The same applies to the free migrants through to the present: they either were, or were prepared to become town dwellers. This city origin of the settlers is much more pronounced in Australia than in earlier colonies of
European settlement, and has undoubtedly facilitated the growth of cities in Australia.

Since the colony was intended to become self-sufficient, the rural economy was expected to become the main support of the community. This did not happen, because the land and climate made farming difficult, few had the skills or will for it, and convict labour could not be used efficiently in rural work. Settlement spread slowly whilst everyone looked to Sydney for comfort or profit. Profits were to be made there in private trade, at first by a ring of officers and then by a wider group of merchants who bought ships' cargoes and resold them in the colony. This trade was limited by the lack of exports, despite the ventures in seal skins, whale oil and timber, until wool filled the need for a staple in the 1830s. But the imports were indispensable, so Sydney became a port of call with its nerve centre at the harbourside, a port before it was a city, as was every other Australian capital until Canberra.

From the beginning Sydney was the seat of one function of cities, that of government. Although New South Wales was still only an outpost subject to orders from home, there could be no doubt where political power was located within the colony. That was in the town, whether the authority was exercised by despotic governors, mutinous military officers or, later, by elected assemblies. This centralisation of government in the town as capital was a feature of all Australian colonies, no matter what the circumstances of their foundation. The political domination of each colonial capital over its countryside, never seriously shaken, continued as a powerful force for urbanisation. Later, when the capital became a metropolis, it was an obstacle to separate metropolitan government.

The colony was ruled from Sydney without any distinction between the government of the colony and the capital. Governor Macquarie gave Sydney his particular attention. When he arrived in 1810 he found it a straggling town of 6,000 people, over half the population of New South Wales. When he handed over his office in 1821 he pointed with pride to a city of about 12,000 inhabitants, still almost half the population of mainland New South Wales despite the opening of new lands. Under Macquarie the town had been largely rebuilt, for the first time to a plan. Phillip had conceived a plan of imperial grandeur, with spacious streets and ample allotments laid on the empty land, a plan as palatial as that which Major L'Enfant was preparing for Washington. Nothing came of this: the town grew haphazard until Macquarie applied to it his passion for order and authority, which he believed could create civilisation in a wilderness and a moral community from criminals.

Macquarie laid out and named the streets of central Sydney, accepting the tracks which had grown up along the contours of the land by common usage, but widening them, aligning their houses and dignifying them by
the names of important personages in Britain who might recognise the compliment. Village habits gave way to town life as the depositing of rubbish in the streets and the keeping of pigs were prohibited. Large barracks were built and new roads, stores, offices, courts, hospitals and forts. In his massive building program Macquarie had the services of a talented convict architect, Francis Greenway, who recreated in Sydney sandstone and local brick the solidity and proportion of the Georgian style.

By 1821 the pre-history of Sydney as a city was ended. It was no longer merely the command post of a jail. The old High Street, renamed George Street, was the main thoroughfare running south from the harbour to become the Parramatta Road. At its northern end were the wharves of Sydney Cove and the warehouses of the importers and merchants. Here too were the fashionable shops and adjacent the congested waterfront area known as the Rocks and already notorious for its taverns, crime and vice, a miniature of a port slum. On the heights of the peninsula to the west of Sydney Cove and George Street stood respectable houses, churches and military barracks. The higher ground to the east was taken up by the Government Domain and Hyde Park. Along the dip of the Tank Stream the streets were lined with the cottages of the middling sort whilst the high land of Woollloomooloo further east and Surry Hills to the south was crowned by the mansions of the wealthy. The diversity of dwellings and people and the purposeful activity showed that Sydney was indeed a little city, although the bays of the harbour, the wooded headlands and the open space beyond it preserved the natural setting.

In the next thirty years the known area of Australia expanded greatly. The settlers now ranged over all the habitable lands of the eastern and southern parts of the continent, bursting out of the confined penal posts to take over every part that could support sheep or cattle. Transportation of convicts had ended, free migrants were taking their place, British investors were placing some of their money in Australia and self-government was on the way. The key to this transformation, from the Australian end, was the discovery that Australia could produce the wool that Britain needed.

At last a primary product had been found which could sell profitably in vast quantities. Yet the pastoral age confirmed the domination of Sydney over its hinterland. The squatter required few men, preferably unencumbered by families, the wool wanted no processing before carriage. All that was needed was plentiful land to permit a shifting occupation of light grazing on natural grasses. In 1851 New South Wales supported 7 million sheep and 200,000 people of whom over 50,000 lived in Sydney. Here the wool was received into store, sorted and repacked, assembled to make up cargoes. The handling, dealing and financing were carried out at the port by merchants, brokers, bankers, clerks, carters, storemen and labourers distant from the point of production. All roads led to Sydney, which was
indeed their starting point. Here the would-be squatter began by arranging his loan, buying his stores and hiring his servants. Here he came for pleasure when times were good, or sought a wife, or did his business. Here the laws were made which might give him land or take it away.

Sydney was confirmed as the financial centre of the colony. Whereas in Britain and Europe the proceeds of improved agriculture had helped to finance trade, industry and the building of towns, in Australia the primary industries were launched by overseas capital, channelled through the city. Similarly Sydney became the centre of most of the manufacturing undertaken in the colony because the markets and the skills for it were there. This manufacturing was small in scale, consisting principally of processing local primary products and supplying everyday needs so far as British competition could be met with the aid of the natural protection given by distance and cost of transport. The town promoted industry, industry did not create the town.

When Joseph Fowles made his drawings of Sydney, block by block, at the end of the 1840s he displayed 'the beautiful and commodious Buildings raised by piety and industry for the use of Religion' (Fowles 1848: preface). A grand new Government House had been occupied by Gipps in 1845, although it was plain that political power lay rather in the less pretentious Legislative Council building where the leading voices were those of the pastoral interests guarding their estates. Fowles noted the impressive edifices of many banks, both British and colonial, the busy wool stores and warehouses, the sumptuous shops. Now that a return cargo of wool was available many ships turned to the Australian run and the colonists could afford to purchase from Britain. To cope with this trade the port had been rebuilt by reclaiming the head of Sydney Cove to form the 'Semi-Circular Quay', with wharves to accommodate thirty merchantmen of the day. The harbour was as much as ever the nerve centre of the seaboard city which now looked two ways, to the interior as well as overseas.

**SYDNEY'S VICTORIAN AGE**

The gold discoveries of the 1850s caused a great acceleration of Australian development and some changes in its direction. These changes were most pronounced in the new colony of Victoria, scene of the richest finds. One result there, important in urban history, was to precipitate Melbourne overnight from a small town into a metropolitan centre which outshone Sydney. New South Wales, though, was also greatly stimulated by the volume of new-found wealth which flowed through the colonies, by the influx of gold seekers and by the glamour of a new Eldorado which now attached to Australia.
After ten years gold no longer dominated the Australian economy and the first heady excitement that had dislocated Sydney life had passed. So too had the old urban society marked by the scars of a jail, the harshness of exile and the vindictiveness of men who had fought to survive. Australia was launched on a long period of prosperity which despite variations from colony to colony and fluctuations from time to time continued until the beginning of the 1890s.

The roots of this long prosperity lay in Australia's place in the expanding British world economy. Australia received British migrants and plentiful British capital, found a buoyant British market for its exports, especially wool, and flourished under the Pax Britannica as the resources of a new continent were brought into production. Modern Australia began to take shape, a shape that persevered in the main until World War II. The 1860s to the 1880s were the first great period of city building in Australia; the second dates from the 1950s.

City building and city life were central to Australia's history.

By 1891 two-thirds of the Australian population lived in cities and towns, a fraction matched by the United States only by 1920 and by Canada not until 1950. Most of Australian capital equipment went into growing towns, most of the expanding work force was employed in urban occupations and the greater part of gross product came from urban activity. Most important, manufacturing and commercial activity were two of the largest and most rapidly growing sectors of gross product... The process of urbanisation is the central feature of Australian history, overshadowing rural economic development and creating a fundamental contrast with the economic development of other 'new' countries. (Butlin 1964: 6)

So all the old reasons for the growth of Sydney continued, strengthened by powerful new ones. Sydney was the commercial and financial centre of its colony, the service point for a vast hinterland which it joined to the outside world. It was the port of arrival for the migrants who swelled the population and the place of disposal for British capital. It was the largest market and the reservoir of labour for all secondary industries, the only place where education, religion and culture could reach some heights or sophisticated pleasures could be found. It was the seat of government and its population was an important part of the electorate, even in an incomplete democracy.

By 1891 New South Wales had built over 2,000 miles of railway, a trunk system radiating from Sydney towards the boundaries of the colony, designed to stave off encroachments from Victoria and South Australia and to concentrate into the capital all the trade of its hinterland (Butlin 1964: 323). This railway pattern was decided by settled policies, both political and economic, which reflected Sydney's dominance in New South Wales and etched that dominance permanently on the map.

Sydney grew from 54,000 inhabitants in 1851 to 383,000 in 1891—a
third of the population of New South Wales. This was a transformation that went beyond mere numbers. Sydney in 1891 was a metropolis by world standards and proud of it, accepting only London as its superior. The city’s Georgian past was overshadowed by its high Victorian age, in which the watchwords were progress and development, measured in material things, the tone was one of confidence and complacency, the prized possessions unblushingly ostentatious. Such surety and show were not to prevail again until the 1950s and 1960s.

What was the shape of this city? Vastly different from that of old world cities, even though the colonists imitated the motherland when they could. In Australia they lacked at first the materials, the skills and the accumulated surplus to do much solid building. Moreover, they did not need to construct compact towns, for there was ample space—the city was only a tiny island in a vast sea of land. So from the beginning the Australian village, town, then city straggled out over the plentiful countryside, using the English country cottage as its model dwelling, creating suburbs before their significance was realised.

The suburb grew naturally in Australia. A Frenchman who arrived in Sydney in 1824 noted that:

Sydney to-day is nearly 1½ miles long although it is supposed to have only ten thousand inhabitants. This is easily accounted for by the fact that each house consists of a ground floor only, and has a flower garden next to the street and a bigger garden at the back. They are indeed the genuine ‘cottages’ which the English love so much and call their ‘Sweet Homes’. (Beiers 1948: 13)

In a new land the bulk of a city could be suburbs, could indeed be little else. And most of the growth of cities in this new land took place after the nineteenth-century revolution in transport which suburbanised even old world cities. In Australia the suburb started on a clean slate.

In the process by which Sydney grew the commercial and administrative centre expanded, pushing the inner working-class inhabitants into the previously fashionable surrounds. The wealthy moved far away or retreated to elite enclaves, whilst the middle class pioneered each outskirt suburb, then in turn moved on. So there was a framework of moving concentric zones, of the kind which American sociologists first discerned in Chicago—another new and dynamic city. In practice, though, the circular model was much complicated by the geography of the jagged harbour and the hilly topography; by location of industry; by long-standing decisions of policy; by fashion and the promotions of land subdividers. Then the suburban railways pierced the boundaries with ribbon development, tramways and omnibuses began to fill in the interstices. So the final picture is variegated, although concentric zoning is one force behind it.

By 1891 the central business district of Sydney filled the trough of the
Growth of an Australian Metropolis

Tank Stream to Brickfield Hill with private offices, banks, fashionable shops and public buildings. The public buildings and open spaces mostly survived from earlier days; the commercial premises had already been rebuilt several times in a process of urban renewal. The Rocks was set as a slum. From it the inner zone of working-class housing was strung around Darling Harbour to Pyrmont, Camperdown, Redfern, Surry Hills, Paddington and Woolloomooloo, all of which had known better days. Now this inner ring provided much of the labour for the working of the port, for the associated docks, shipyards and engineering works, for the railway termini at Darling Harbour goods yard and Central Station, and for the industries which had taken root on the outskirts of the central business district. The peninsulas of Glebe and Balmain were being brought into this thickly populated zone.

Ringing these inner suburbs were less crowded ones—Leichhardt, Petersham, Marrickville, St Peters, Alexandria and Waterloo. The western railway stretched this zone to Ashfield and Burwood, the Illawarra line beyond St Peters towards Rockdale. These were better wage earners’ areas, with their local employment, as in the boot factories of Marrickville or Bourke Street, and their transport to the city. St Peters, Alexandria and Waterloo also supplied workmen for Botany, to which noxious trades had been banished.

Those who could travel further might live in greater comfort at Drummoyn, Fivedock, Strathfield or Canterbury to the west, or south on the Illawarra line, or at Randwick or Waverley to the east. The eastern side of the city did not have any shipping or industry beyond Woolloomooloo, so the peninsulas and bays to the South Head remained scattered residential areas of the wealthy. On the north side of the harbour Hunter’s Hill was at an exclusive distance, North Sydney carried some population, but the North Shore railway was approaching the harbour from Hornsby and having only reached St Leonards had not given rise to the usual suburban development.

Thus there was a definite zoning of residential areas by 1891, west and south from Sydney Cove, pulled further in these directions by the two railway lines but stopping sharply to the east. Transport to work was still the limiting factor, although most wage earners were no longer restricted to walking distance—they could certainly live in railway suburbs. Harbour transport by steam ferries was important, common enough for wharf labourers to live at Balmain or North Sydney and commuters to travel from Hunter’s Hill, Drummoyn or Woollahra. What Sydney lacked in railways it made up by the widespread use of steam trams. The first, a double decker, ran from Redfern railway to Hunter Street in 1879. By an Act of 1880 the Commissioner of Railways was empowered to construct tram lines. Early ones were built to Woollahra, Waverley, Randwick, Waterloo,
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**Colour Scale**

Shewing Density of Population per acre in the various Municipalities and Electorates as proclaimed and defined at date of each Census by a series of tints graduated in intensity accordingly.

**Municipalities & Electorates**

- having a population per acre of less than 0.1 persons
- 0.1 and less than 0.5
- 0.5 and less than 1
- 1 and less than 2
- 2 and less than 3
- 3 and less than 5
- 5 and less than 10
- 10 and less than 25
- 25 and upwards

Newtown, Marrickville and Glebe, with the result that the eastern suburbs (and the beaches) for the first time became accessible and elsewhere the spaces between the railways were being filled by cheap public transport. The age of steam power in public transport was forming the anatomy which would shape the city for the next fifty years. On the one hand this sharpened the segregation of the rich and the poor, zoning them around an impersonal city; on the other it meant that the ordinary citizen could outdistance the wealthy in a carriage and choose from a wider range of places to live. It made the suburbs the body of the city.

These were suburbs of separate dwellings. In a pioneering land the materials for huts were close at hand and free for labour—bark sheets, wattle and daub, pisé, split logs. So was the land to build them on. In the outback and on the fringes of settlement rough huts persisted, without much problem of finding a site. As towns grew, building materials progressed to weatherboard, brick and stone, the primitive one or two rooms gave way to three, four or more. Each house was still separate from its neighbours, constructed on its own block of land. The detached cottage became the unit of the suburb, reproduced in tens of thousands as Sydney grew. A suburb came into being as subdividers edged into the paddocks, carving them into allotments on which separate houses began to arise.

The transplanted colonists from urban Britain showed by their preference for this kind of housing that they counted it superior to what they had known at home. Indeed its basic advantages of privacy and space are strong enough for it to be sought by most modern city dwellers who can afford it. The native-born Australians regarded it as the natural way to live. The disadvantages were the thinness of population which could support few communal facilities, hence the distance to travel to work or shops or school or pub. During the 1880s railways and tramways overcame these limitations so that Sydney grew in area much more than it grew in population.

Land was always cheaper on the outskirts than in the inner suburbs. Here, near the city core, the detached cottage was for the first time challenged as the standard type of housing. Investors began to make more profitable use of the land by building semi-detached dwellings and then row houses—tenements or terraces on narrow frontages of 20 feet or less. From the 1870s, blocks of single storey terrace houses were being erected in the inner suburbs of Sydney; during the 1880s two-storeyed ones appeared. This kind of higher density dwelling was replacing the detached cottage in the central zones whilst the cottage was filling wide new areas on the outskirts. The tenement evoked old world slums and it often became a slum. It was housing for the poor, hence frequently overcrowded, it was poor housing built in drab replica for an investor's profit. The tenement
dweller would rarely own his own home and that too marked him off from many cottage dwellers.

At first many Australians owned their own homes because the house and the land it stood on were of little value. Often they had built the house themselves, this being the cheapest or the only way of getting it. The housing of a population which leapt ahead by migration and natural increase was a great call on Australian resources and much of this demand was to be met by owner occupiers who bought or built houses for themselves. The continuing housing shortage, which was not overtaken until the boom of the 1880s, and the consequent high rents, provided the incentive to get a house of one's own. Steady employment and high wages provided the means (Butlin 1964: 259 and passim). The picture of the thrifty artisan paying off his comfortable home was a favourite one with politicians and publicists and seems to have been accepted by the populace at large. As one eulogist put it in 1873:

a very considerable proportion of the population live in their own houses; and any labouring man, artisan, clerk or shopman can, by paying a small sum weekly, equivalent to (say) 25 per cent of his earnings, into one or other of the Building Societies, become his own landlord in the course of eight or ten years. If a man does not choose to buy his house in this way he will have to make a deduction of 20 per cent from his wages for rent. (Robinson 1873: 89)

The figures are near enough to be a reasonably true guide; the narrow margin of cost between renting and buying is striking and so too is the high proportion of wages which must be spent on housing—a proportion which could be accepted only on good wages and the expectation that they would continue and increase.

Home ownership was possible, although it was far from universal. The census of 1911, the first to provide this information, showed that half of all housing was owner occupied, and in 1891 the proportion was probably much higher. However, home ownership was much less usual in the city than in the country, a recent study indicating that only about one-third of dwellings in metropolitan Sydney were owner occupied in 1891. The proportion was still less in inner (and poor) suburbs, greater in outer (and well-to-do) suburbs. Why then has home ownership always been central to the economics and politics of urban growth in Australia? (Jackson 1970: 142).

Originally there was the contrast with Britain, for one in three occupiers possessing the legal title of their house was a much higher proportion than the migrants were accustomed to. It was a particularly high proportion for a population predominantly wage and salary earners. By 1891 about 70 per cent of Australian breadwinners were wage or salary earners, falling into the economic category of employees whose increase is a concomitant of the growth of modern cities. Home ownership in Australia extended so
widely that most workers could see it as a goal even if they could not immediately realise it. It was not beyond the hopes of even the unskilled labourer in times of prosperity.

In a developing country with a general shortage of labour, wages were high and food was cheap. Most wage earners could save, and saving through house purchase gave the immediate satisfaction of better living conditions as well as the apparent security of owning the home. The means were at hand in the building societies and Torrens title made land a commodity stripped of its old world encumbrances. The quick growth of Australian cities caused land and houses to increase in value constantly, sometimes rapidly, producing a capital gain. So there was an element of investment, the hope for some wealth from property. That gain could be realised only on sale and sale was usually for the purpose of acquiring a better home. In the expanding cities of this land of opportunity social mobility habitually took the form of geographical mobility: young couples paid the deposit on the block which would take them upwards as well as outwards from their parents' locality, meantime expecting that they would later move on again. They could not leap the broad class boundaries but they could advance within them, whilst in an improving society all grades saw themselves moving forward without having to change their status. In their own home they could express their individuality even though their choices came from a builder's catalogue. The wage earner who closed the gate of his suburban block behind him felt the security of a man of property and the pride of a full citizen. He had made good.

So home ownership was even more important as an aspiration than it was as a fact. It increased in periods of prosperity, particularly the forty years from the mid-nineteenth century and the twenty-five years since the end of World War II. It fell back in hard times when foreclosures and the loss of an equity which had been won by sacrifices turned a knife in the heart of quiet families. It epitomised a standard of life which was within the reach of many and the hopes of most. For most people the frontiers of opportunity were not in the romanticised mining camps or outback but in the suburbs where a working man could aspire to some of the comforts and standing of the middle classes.

Home ownership, both as cause and effect, is a central fact in the means by which Australian cities were built. The detached cottage was well adapted to the resources of the country and in evaluating it we need to remember that for a hundred years city-dwelling Australians believed themselves, with reason, to be better housed than their counterparts elsewhere. The citizen could hope for a house of his own. He had no reason to deplore the suburbs or the city pattern which is now producing problems. This atomistic growth strangled planning at birth without any outcry and bogged city governments in a morass of conflicting and vociferous interests.

Sydney was built by a partnership of public and private enterprise in
which the public authorities provided the essential services and private business did the residential, commercial and industrial building. The government of New South Wales had always been intimately concerned with the economy, which it commanded in the days of the penal colony and fostered thereafter. Governments which were responsible for populating and developing a new country, which owned the country's greatest asset in the land, which were large employers of labour and borrowers of capital, always intervened actively in the economy. New South Wales knew no age of *laissez-faire* despite lip service to free trade. This state intervention was not colonial socialism; its purpose was to create the conditions in which private enterprise could flourish.

Public wharves and roads had to be built from the beginning. The expense of the roads was met as far as possible by tolls administered by Trusts which later were empowered to levy land rates as well. Railways were the main investment of the New South Wales government from the 1860s, but not much of this expenditure was laid out in Sydney even when the tramways were added. The supply of water, first from the Tank Stream, then the Botany Swamps and after 1887 from the Upper Nepean dam system, was the responsibility of the government or semi-government authorities. During the 1880s a start was made with an underground sewerage system which by the end of the decade had replaced pans and cesspits for about a quarter of Sydney's dwellings.

This infrastructure was essential for Sydney's growth without being a large part of the cost of growth. Here, as in other Australian cities, 'the government contribution of assets in urban areas was so slight, relatively to private activity, and the social facilities of the towns so primitive, even at the end of the century, that the story of investment in urbanisation can, with justice, be told as an almost completely private process' (Butlin 1964: 52). Governments made it possible, private enterprise did it. That is the way Australian cities were built.

Residential investment was the leading field of private investment during the second half of the nineteenth century, operating on a scale made possible, at least indirectly, by the flow of British capital. It gave rise to a building materials industry as one of the largest in local manufacture. It involved high finance and small business—'over six hundred builders and a hundred architects were operating in Sydney alone in 1888' (Boyd 1952: 50)—careful craftsmen and unscrupulous promoters, and the heartfelt hopes of ordinary people.

**LOCAL GOVERNMENT**

Although Sydney's population was approaching 400,000 by 1891 the city had no effective metropolitan government. The gap between local govern-
ment and the government of the colony remained despite attempts over sixty years to fill it.\textsuperscript{1}

In the penal colony the autocratic governors naturally ruled the town outside their door. As the convict era ended, as the free citizens increased and the colony produced some wealth, governors sought to delegate the management of the town to its inhabitants. The time seemed ripe for these moves when a limited Legislative Council was set up in 1823 and more so when its powers were increased and it was partly elected in 1842. Local government in New South Wales was no native growth but was thrust on the reluctant inhabitants as a matter of policy by governors acting in accordance with British instructions. That policy had two mainsprings—that the colony should pay its own way and that experience in municipal affairs would be a foundation for eventual self-government. It envisaged deep-rooted communities of boroughs and shires as a natural heritage of Englishmen and hence as the way in which British emigrants would learn to manage local affairs and adapt their needs to their means within a broad imperial framework. These attempts were abortive, for they were artificial in a colony where power was from the first centralised.

An ambitious scheme of district councils for the colony provided in the 1842 Act came to nothing. In that year Governor Gipps was finally able to pass the Sydney Corporation Act, accepting that the government would subsidise the new city council, which would look after streets and water supply and raise rates. This quite inexperienced body began its work at the time of the colony's first economic depression. Its revenues were inadequate, its visible achievements so few that it was severely criticised in several inquiries before it was dissolved and replaced by three appointed commissioners in 1853. They too came under constant criticism for mismanagement, loose contracts and extravagance before they were removed in favour of a new council in 1857.

By 1856 New South Wales had responsible and fairly representative government under a new constitution which removed direct imperial control of domestic affairs. The Legislative Assembly, on taking over from the governors, immediately showed the same desire to shed the care of municipal affairs and to be rid of the claims on it for local works. Local government still came from above. The Municipalities Act of 1858 encouraged the formation of municipalities which would provide roads, water supply, sewerage and hospitals from the proceeds of rates and a government subsidy. Their legal powers were in doubt until confirmed by a further act of 1867, after which many municipalities were formed, both in country districts and city suburbs. They were often weak and poor, reluctant to raise

\textsuperscript{1}The following account of Sydney's government is based on Larcombe 1961 and Maiden 1966.
their rates, serving a small population in country areas or pockets of suburbs—quite parochial.

The corporation of the city of Sydney covered only the city proper and the inner suburbs, divided into wards for the election of aldermen by ratepayers. The aldermen chose one of their number as mayor. This constitution of the council was little changed for seventy years until the council was again dismissed and replaced by a commission in 1927. Among its duties the council saw to the streets and lit them by gas, endeavoured to extend the water supply and supervise public health, always handicapped by lack of money. Its lasting monument was the Town Hall, completed in 1889, embodying every flamboyance that appealed to the taste of the Victorian age.

The council had already lost its opportunity to be a metropolitan government. In 1880 the Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board was constituted to take over these services from the council. The suburban municipalities were dissatisfied with the slow extension of the water supply, over which they had no control. The city council lacked the means for a large new scheme; so the New South Wales government had to undertake this, setting up the Water Board composed of government appointees and local representatives to administer it.

Earlier, in 1873, the licensing of public vehicles for hire was given to a Board of Transit Commissioners. In 1884 the Metropolitan Fire Brigades Board was constituted to take over from insurance and volunteer brigades. In 1900 the Sydney Harbour Trust, a wholly appointed body, took control of the port. The rise of the statutory authority reflected and confirmed the weakness of local government in New South Wales, particularly the inability of city council and suburban municipalities to provide metropolitan services. The process has continued. In Chapters 3 and 4, the powers of present day statutory authorities are shown to curtail sharply the authority of local government bodies and to remove many vital parts of urban planning one step further from direct citizen control.

In any case little was expected from the city council or the suburban municipalities in the prosperity and expansion of the second half of the nineteenth century. They had only to go along with the visible progress, in which the government's railways, tramways and schools and the private enterprise of building were much more important than anything councils did. Ratepayers saw no need to increase their taxes or to engage in metropolitan government when Sydney was already a source of pride to them and their lives would continue to improve.

DEPRESSION AND WAR

A new era began with the depression of the 1890s. For some years export prices had been slipping, Australian governments and private businesses
were having difficulty in earning interest on their previous borrowings, then new loans from the London money market dried up. The lavish investments in railways, pastoral properties and urban land had produced an imbalance in the Australian economy which went deeper than the spectacular collapses of speculative companies. As profits fell businesses were closed and wages forced down despite bitter defensive strikes. Unemployment continued for ten years and more. When the façade collapsed it revealed ill-founded hopes, government ineptitude and private fraud. Expectations had been deep-seated and unlimited, so the psychological impact of the crash was great.

For the next twenty years Australia lived in the shadow of the depression of the 1890s. The old days of easy expansion had gone, for indeed the British world economy of which Australia was a favoured part was constricted by competitors who had overtaken it technologically and carved out rival empires. Australians had to adapt to reduced circumstances, to settle for making the best of what they had by turning inward to re-examine their own society.

The old values were shaken in every field, the old politics were discredited. As in literature or national aspirations, so in politics new goals were set. These were epitomised in the Labor Party, born at this time, with a program of social reform. The reforms sought were full political democracy, government action to improve the lot of the wage earner, to provide elementary social services and greater equality of opportunity. Some of these policies had been implemented by 1914 and they continued to set the tone of politics until the 1950s, for in the pattern of two-party politics which emerged the non-Labor parties also gradually accepted the principle of minimum welfare and active state intervention to secure a fair and reasonable standard for all sections of the community. Between the 1890s and 1914 Australia gained its reputation, somewhat exaggerated, as a country of advanced social legislation. Certainly the powers of the governments, now Commonwealth as well as State, were used to guide and direct the economy and to take part in many other spheres of life.

The early Labor Party programs gave some attention to local government. By 1896 the New South Wales Political Labor League was calling for local government bodies elected by adult franchise, with the power to conduct any business or institution, raising their revenue by a tax on the unimproved capital value of land (Ebbels 1960: 218). The last accorded with their desire to divert the unearned increment of privately owned land to community revenue. But local government was a minor political issue, just as it was of small concern to most voters.

In this new political atmosphere more systematic local government acts were passed in New South Wales by 1907 but they made no fundamental changes. The Labor government on its election in 1910 proposed wider
municipal powers, including trading powers, and adult franchise instead of ratepayer franchise. The franchise was to prove the stumbling block which would prevent such bills from passing the Legislative Council where Labor was in a minority.

From this period too date the first moves for a Greater Sydney. There was an example in mind, the London County Council, set up in 1888 and by the turn of the century the forum in which progressives and Fabians such as Sidney Webb advocated a strong metropolitan government, democratically elected and promoting municipal services which would evolve into socialism. There were also the simple disadvantages of divided control, which have not been overcome since a suburban alderman described them in 1898:

There is no municipal control of traffic, gas companies and Government Departments tear up streets at their pleasure, parks are controlled by irresponsible trustees, boards control water and fire extinction services, the Government runs the tramways and abattoirs. (Maiden 1966: 220)

At that time Sydney was split between the city council and forty municipalities with almost five hundred aldermen.

The attempts to create a Greater Sydney are recounted in Chapter 4, through to the Cumberland County Council of 1945 and its demise with the creation of the State Planning Authority in 1963. The early moves epitomised all that happened later. They showed that supporters of Greater Sydney were divided between those who wanted a single authority and those who would accept a metropolitan council which controlled major services whilst municipalities continued to look after local matters. They showed too the underlying opposition to the whole concept of reducing local powers. A Select Committee in 1902 was followed by a Royal Commission in 1908, the idea of an elected convention to break the impasse was canvassed, another Royal Commission in 1912 urged a single comprehensive body. The Greater Sydney Bill of 1915 was the high-water mark of these moves—a Labor plan for an eventual single authority which would take over even the Water Board and have wide powers over building, subdivision and housing schemes. It failed in the face of strong opposition from municipal councils, and in any case the Legislative Council would never have accepted the Labor principle of adult suffrage. Local government was not central to the Labor platform, but the principle of ‘one man, one vote’ was, so Labor would not abandon adult suffrage, nor their opponents accept it. Centralisation was a natural Labor approach, apart from the political advantages of controlling the proposed Greater Sydney body, for Labor aldermen were already a force on the city council. The Labor solution to the problem of citizen participation was a central body answerable to a mass electorate; that of the conservatives, local control by property owners who chose to take part.
By this time the Labor Party was reaching the end of its reforming program, and showing divisions which were accentuated by the conditions of World War I and brought to a head in the split over conscription. Its next serious attempt was the McKell bill of 1931 which lapsed when the Lang government was defeated. Greater Sydney had become a symbol of political differences rather than a solution to the problems of local government. The concept had its justification in the growth and organic unity of the metropolis which was, as it always had been, one and indivisible despite its spread. Yet if it were to govern itself effectively it would diminish the power of the state government, which would not be acceptable to country and conservative interests, nor indeed to most inhabitants of New South Wales. A system of sovereign states in a federation gave no encouragement to independent metropolitan government. Meanwhile the fragmentation of Sydney’s municipalities did not bear heavily on its inhabitants. The existing pattern sufficed.

Sydney continued to grow. Its population increased by a quarter even in the depressed years between 1891 and 1901; by more than 30 per cent between 1901 and 1911 when economic conditions improved; by more than 40 per cent between 1911 and 1921, showing that the unsettlement and displacement of World War I had brought more people to the city. By now the ‘drift to the city’ was being noted and deplored. The increase continued during the 1920s when overseas borrowing, migration and export markets renewed for a time the old bases of Australian prosperity. The depression of the 1930s slowed the trend as jobs and homes in the city were lost and building halted. Nor could it resume during World War II when almost a million people were enlisted into the armed services and all resources were marshalled for the war effort (Official Year Book of N.S.W. 1969: 60). The pent-up city surged onwards again from the 1950s in the period of expansion which continues.

The expansion of Sydney in the early twentieth century was made possible by improvements in public transport. From 1899 steam trams were rapidly replaced by electric trams, which were faster, more comfortable and more economical to run. The tramway network covered the older suburbs more closely and extended to new ones, as far north as Narrabeen, outpacing the suburban railways. The completion of Central Station in 1906 had provided a transport centre for the southern part of the inner city, but the suburban railways did not proceed any further until the 1920s, when money was again available and confidence to spend it. In the mid-twenties the electrification of the suburban railways began and the first stage of the city underground, from Central to Museum and St James, was opened. The last suburban lines, to East Hills and Cronulla, were put under way. The final link of the city railway system was completed with the opening of the Harbour Bridge in 1932. The bridge brought the north side of the harbour
into full suburban development and its building was a source of great pride to Sydney dwellers who saw it as crowning their city.

Not everyone shared this comfort or content. The social pattern of the city had stabilised since the 1890s, with the lines drawn between the modest, aspiring or prosperous outer suburbs and the inner ones where the poor lived. They lived in tenements instead of detached cottages, they neither owned their homes nor enjoyed open space nor earned good wages. There the criminals, the weak and the helpless struggled with life, the adolescents formed larrikin gangs and the police were the natural enemy. Those who could sought to escape from their environment or to change it. For many years East Sydney was represented in the Commonwealth Parliament by Eddie Ward, who was its authentic voice even when he became a minister of the Crown. He had grown to early manhood in the tough, drab years before 1914, getting his education in elementary schools, on the streets selling newspapers, learning to use his fists, hunting jobs. He joined the Surry Hills branch of the Labor Party at the age of sixteen, refused to do his military service, was dismissed from the railways for his part in the strike of 1917 and was mostly unemployed for seven years until he found security of a kind as a tramway labourer. When he became a city alderman in 1930 he had to resign from the tramways so he was unemployed again when he was elected to the federal parliament as a Lang supporter in a dramatic contest in 1931. There he became a political leader, tireless for his constituents, pouring out invective from his heart against the class enemy on the government benches (Spratt 1965). Ward’s Sydney was a long way from the trimmed lawns of pleasant suburban bungalows.

The city was a political battleground because it concentrated social divisions and sharpened consciousness of them. In private board rooms and exclusive clubs the men of power formed the dominant network of the establishment whilst radicals gathered their supporters in the Domain on Sundays and harangued the passers-by from street corners on Friday nights. The political parties, the newspapers, the churches, contended for the allegiance of labourer, white collar worker, shopkeeper and professional. The struggle of interests and ideologies permeated every question of what Sydney should be and how it should be governed.

In the depression of the 1930s the majority of Australian electors accepted the conservative answer of sacrifices and loyalty in the hope of better times. The battle lines, whether at the ballot box or with the New Guard in the streets, had followed the suburban zones and certainly with their votes the great blocks of middling suburbs turned to the non-Labor parties. Yet this traumatic period, when one in three was unemployed, had shaken faith in the beliefs of the past, so that minorities demanded the overthrow of the whole social order and many more wondered whether
indeed it had not failed, throughout the world as in Australia. Out of this time of division grew the conviction that governments must act to prevent depressions and remove social injustices. They must plan to maximise welfare, directing the economy rather than being handmaiden to private enterprise. Henceforth social planning, to greater or less degree, was incorporated into politics.

It fell to Labor governments, Commonwealth and State, to put planning into effect during the 1940s, first to organise the war effort and then to prepare for a post-war reconstruction which would provide a better world for all. The experiences of the 1930s and the hopes of 1945 are the background to the new proposals for the government of Sydney made in the immediate post-war years.

THE LAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

In 1945 Sydney looked as it had done for twenty or thirty years. It had grown in population, but fairly steadily in the established pattern, to accommodate about one and a half million people in a wide metropolitan region. Then a great change came as wartime conditions cleared by the 1950s. By 1967 another million people had been added to the County of Cumberland, which contained well over half the inhabitants of New South Wales, and the rate of increase continued to accelerate (Chapter 4). The sheer scale of metropolitan growth is the first reason why the politics of urban growth have begun to force themselves into public consciousness. The second is the new form of the city, or its shapelessness, for the old framework which prescribed its anatomy has now become quite flexible as a result of private car ownership.

The motor car, which had been a curiosity before 1914, had improved greatly during World War I and been accepted in Australia in the 1920s. The conditions and the people in Australia were particularly receptive to it, as they were to the wireless and the aeroplane, so that in motor transport Australia began to emulate the United States rather than Britain or Europe. Motor omnibuses ran in Sydney from 1921 whilst motor trucks began to move freight in the city as well as the country. The buses remained as feeder services and the motor car was still a luxury during the 1920s, not much less so in the hard times of the 1930s. Then during World War II private cars were unobtainable. Even in 1950 there were only about half a million motor vehicles registered in New South Wales. By 1965 the number had risen to a million and a half, equivalent to about one vehicle to each family.

By that time Sydney’s trams had been completely replaced by buses which made the routes of public transport much less rigid. The private car,
cheap enough to be used to travel to work or shopping, or to a public transport point, gave free rein to the spread of new suburbs. The automobile industry became one of the largest in the country, the car came to symbolise the Australian way of life, to which it was indispensable for recreation or earning a living. Governments, including local governments, tried to keep up with road building and parking space; vainly, for every improvement called forth a greater increase in traffic. So Sydney in its second great period of building from about 1950 to the present spread in all directions, the suburbs flowing freely wherever land was available to a developer. Industry began to disperse, often to get closer to its labour supply; suburban shopping centres began to rival city stores. Even the central business district, now rebuilt in international style office blocks, was losing some of its domination to other centres.

Map 4:1 (p. 84) shows the urban zoning of the Sydney region in 1951, the extensions up to 1968, and the urban areas proposed for the future. The submergence of the old city is demonstrated in Map 3:1 (pp. 46-7)—the present metropolitan area.

This great expansion of the city coincided with and contributed to a new epoch in the history of Australia which can be dated roughly from 1949 when the form of the post-war world began to solidify. In that year the Commonwealth Labor government was defeated, after eight years in office, by a revived Liberal Party. The Labor Party which had swept to leadership in the crisis of the war had marshalled the country for national defence, in this cause bringing about full employment, some measure of social welfare and at least a degree of equity in sacrifice. Thus in World War II the consequences of the depression were overcome. But what then? The national dilemma was reflected in the party: as its program of immediate reforms was completed the labour movement divided about its goals and the party could only propose continued controls, such as bank nationalisation. From the left militant unions struck for a greater share of the national product, from the right business demanded an open go, abroad the world split into the two camps of the cold war which left no room for independent powers. In the year of the coal strike and the Berlin blockade the slogans of ending rationing, crushing communism and putting value back into the pound won a Liberal victory.

The political events were symptomatic of the pent-up hunger for material things and a freer life which was to be worked out in the next twenty years' prosperity. Once again Australia flourished, benefiting from a plentiful supply of overseas capital, a stream of migrants and favourable trading conditions. Although governments had a larger role in the economy public investment lagged behind private investment, private enterprise was accepted as the driving force, still almost as much the architect of Sydney's second great expansion as it had been before. In this period too, as from
Growth of an Australian Metropolis

1860 to 1890, the values of the day were complacent, the future seemed assured, the tenor of politics was conservative and the business of government was the preservation of the status quo by good management.

In these circumstances the professional planners were frustrated. The story is told in Chapter 4. The great hopes for the Cumberland County Council were disappointed, the Green Belt proved a paper barrier against the suburban sprawl, government authorities—let alone private ones—were never commanded for positive action. The problems of planning and politics which are discussed in Chapter 2 were exemplified as state and local governments settled for adjustment to what was happening rather than determining what should be done. Typically, their chief instrument was land use zoning, a power of veto leaving the initiative to private enterprise, helpful to bring in new areas in an orderly way, certainly affecting the market in land, but confined to the simplest physical elements. Citizen participation in urban planning was quite unrepresentative, as shown in Chapter 6, and local government languished to the extent that the abolition and reforming of the Sydney City Council for political purposes excited little interest.

Yet the problems which any era sets itself to solve are those bequeathed by the past, and the years since World War II have been successful for most Australians, after depression hardship and war-time denial. In the general prosperity, marked enough to be called affluence, most city dwellers have been able to satisfy wants: for a home of their own, a home for each family; a home which one owns, or is buying; a detached house or alternatives for the interested minority; in a better suburb; with a car, comforts, the job that provides these and the hope of improvement. Only as these wants are satisfied do their costs in urban living become apparent, and only then do large numbers of people turn to the new problems created by the modern urban conglomeration.

Those who suffer most are likely to have the least say. The examination of social status in Chapter 5 shows that the areas of Sydney are still stratified, only differently arranged. The inner city suburbs still contain many of the poor and the social deviants. They have also provided quarters for non-British migrants who fill the lowest jobs and in the original generation accept their position as inferiors. A variant group are upper middle class, young and sophisticated, who prefer urban living to suburbia. They provide the force for preservation societies trying to keep inner suburbs as dwelling areas and prevent them being disrupted by redevelopment. Meanwhile the great bulk of the traditional working class has made its move upwards and outwards to the west and south-west, where the raw suburbs, underprovided with every facility, merge in miles of weatherboard and fibro cottages.

The city continues to grow, not only because rural production requires
less labour, because migrants stay in the city, because secondary and service industries are centred there. Urbanisation is a frame of mind as well as a physical location and virtually all Australians see city life as superior to any other. It is their habitat, whilst country dwellers want the advantages of city life to be brought to them. In the nineteenth century the powerful forces for urbanisation were regarded with disquiet, the city was still seen as an artificial and parasitic growth, its image carried a shadow of decadence and its enjoyment was tinged with guilt. In popular legend, which did not correspond with reality, the true Australia was the outback. Now a people long urbanised physically have become urbanised mentally. They begin to recognise that the city is the natural abode of modern man. Hence the politics of urban growth intertwines with the politics of the nation.

Australian government centres on the Commonwealth parliament and its executive. The process by which the federal government has gained strength at the expense of the states has been inexorable since 1901. The original federal powers, including defence, currency and the tariff, have become more important. Social services, immigration and industrial relations have come under Commonwealth leadership. Commonwealth control of public finance—of grants to the states since 1910, of borrowing since 1928, of all important taxes since 1942—is obvious. The Commonwealth budget not only raises and disburses much of the national finances, but lays down the guide lines for the whole economy. Every crisis of war and depression has strengthened Commonwealth powers, every period of stability has seen them maintained and accepted. This is not peculiar to Australia, for the central government of every modern nation state wields similar or greater powers and is seen by its citizens as the supreme authority. In Australia the realities of government are veiled by a federal system in which the states are constitutionally charged with more than they can do whilst the Commonwealth is absolved from much of what it could do. The states are financially clients of the Commonwealth, at the same time being left with responsibility for most everyday services. Any government of New South Wales would be too poor to remodel Sydney if it wished to do so. Even local government must look to the Commonwealth if it is to have adequate means. The reshaping of a metropolis would require the decisive leadership of the Commonwealth government, which has not been forthcoming in the absence of a widespread demand.

Only recently have many people become critical of their urban living. In part this change shows that the practices and beliefs of the last twenty years have run their course and no longer offer certitude, at home or abroad. In this the generation gap has some force, for the achievements of their elders are commonplace and inadequate to those young enough to take them as given. In part it is because Australia has lost its isolation and the mass cities of the western world which appear on the television screens
are not attractive pictures of the future. But the immediate reason is that the Australian metropolis has followed its own laws of growth to the stage where its diseconomies and disadvantages are making themselves felt, yet urbanisation cannot be turned back. So the question arises of who pays and who benefits.

Since the twentieth-century city is the locale for most of the life of modern societies any transformation of the city will involve the transformation of society. Cities will not be changed unless property relations and politics, profound beliefs and everyday habits are also changed. The politics of urban growth have been weak in Australia, but that situation is likely to change. They will, whilst having their special content, be part of total politics in which groups and classes contend for power to shape their lives.
The preceding chapter has brought out some of the main themes in the
growth of the Australian metropolis to date, and indicated some of the
ways in which this growth has been intertwined with politics. From now on
we focus attention on a particular theme: the way in which political struc­
tures and processes are involved in the direction and control of metro­
politan growth—that is, in urban planning.

THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL PLANNING

'Planning is, in the final analysis, simply the effort to infuse activity with
consistency and conscious purpose' (Altshuler 1965: 409). In the abstract,
'planning' refers to those aspects of rational behaviour in which the pattern
of current actions is related to analyses of the past and projections of the
future, and all relevant actions are brought into pre-determined relation­
ships with one another. 'Conscious purpose' implies that these processes are
all directed to the achievement of chosen goals, objectives or values, having
regard to available resources. The notion also implies a distinction between
the process of 'planning' (systematic forethought) and of 'operations'
(carrying out the plan). This in turn suggests the inevitable tension between
the static requirement to keep operations in accord with the plan until the
objectives are reached, and the dynamic pressure to adjust operations to
changing circumstances. Adjustment may be of two radically different kinds.
The messages from 'feedback' may call merely for operational adjustments
to ensure fulfilment of the original plan despite minor changes in the en­
vironment, or in available resources, and so on. Alternatively, they may
report changes important enough to call for adjustments to the original plan
itself. As they multiply in number and frequency, such adjustments raise
the question whether any plan remains at all.

The notion of 'flexible' or 'continuous' planning is thus an equivocal one.
When, for example, some writers say that 'planning' can be no more than a
continuous, open-ended process of decision-making, systematic only in the
sense that particular current decisions are taken with a full awareness of
their future consequences, they are acknowledging the speed of change in modern social values, objectives and environmental conditions, and the political rigidities and complexities discussed later in this chapter. But, in doing so, they not only deprive the word 'planning' of any distinctive meaning, but forget that many social activities (including important aspects of urban growth) are in fact 'planned' in the sense that relatively stable targets are set, organisational structures established, and systems of control and co-ordination imposed for a definite future period. There are 20-year plans for water supply and reticulation; 7-year economic plans; 3-year plans for the development of universities; and annual financial plans ('budgets') for every kind of government and business enterprise. All of these mean 'blueprints' intended to shape the future to a premeditated design. The fact that targets need (periodically not continuously) to be revised or re-set, or that elements of the design must be adjusted to unforeseen change, does not alter the distinction between 'planning' and 'orderly decision-making'.

If this is the logic of the planning process, it takes the following shape in terms of social action whenever planning is applied to general social or economic goals. First, there must be an authoritative determination of the objectives or values toward which planning is to be directed. Whether this determination is made autocratically or democratically is one of the vital political aspects of planning, but however the choice is made, planning without clear goals is meaningless. Second, planning requires an objective assessment of what factors in the situation are relevant to the plan, and of the means most likely to attain the desired objectives. This calls for expertise in the techniques of planning, and thus for a body of specialists—the planners—who in theory at least can take an objective and comprehensive view of needs and appropriate measures. Third, the implementation of plans assumes some form of centralised control over those engaged in relevant activities, whether they are directly administering the programs or doing other things which could affect it. Because social and economic policies involve many people acting separately, co-ordination is an essential element in carrying out plans. Fourth and last, the administration of plans affects people who are not necessarily directly engaged in it: its beneficiaries and perhaps its victims. Both groups react to the planning process and provide feedback, whether this is deliberately planned or not.

As this analysis at once reminds us, a number of groupings of people are in different ways functionally associated with any social planning process. There are the political representatives, some of whom make important decisions, either about the goals of planning or the means of attaining them. As representatives, they may provide channels for feedback. There are the professional planners, who play a major part in the choosing of goals and the specification of means. There are public and private bureaucracies of various kinds and at different levels: local and national public
servants, public utility corporations, specialised plan-operating authorities, private entrepreneurs and business firms. Any of these may claim a say in the setting of goals. A number will have plans of their own and may try to take part in or veto the framing of larger social plans. Some will be required to co-ordinate or otherwise administer the larger plans, others to comply with them. Some may carry on autonomously regardless of relevant plans, or campaign to defeat them. Finally, there are individual citizens for whom particular plans may be a boon or a burden, an object of organised support or opposition. It will be clear that the roles of these different groups do not correspond in any necessary way with, and are not defined by, the several elements of the planning process previously identified. Just what roles they do play in relation to those different elements is largely a function of politics.

Politics, in the most general sense, is the process whereby people, singly or in groups, try to influence the choice of social ends and means and the distribution of valued social goods, material and intangible. Political influence may be exerted by naked power, by bargaining and persuasion, and by the offer or withholding of valued resources. Political activity stems from the clash of different people's aims and interests, the degree of incompatibility between one man's social values and another's. It follows that 'planning becomes "political" . . . when the efforts of some men and organisations to plan come into conflict with those of others' (Altshuler 1965: 409). Such conflicts arise among different efforts at comprehensive planning in the same social field. They also pit the macro-plans against the particular plans of producers, traders, workers and consumers. In fact, politics is inherent in all social planning. By bringing different people's actions into pre-determined relations with one another, it is bound to change some of the relations, and therefore some of the activities, that would have prevailed in its absence. This must produce some clash between the aims and interests of those who want the changes and those who do not. In short, to plan is itself a political act and provokes political reactions.

THE EVOLUTION OF PLANNING GOALS AND VALUES

Planning has a long history in cities of the old world and the new (Mumford 1961). In pre-industrial times, however, it rarely approximated to the model outlined above. The goals of formal planning were relatively limited in scope: to provide for defence against external enemies, as in the Roman and medieval walled city; to help rulers to contain internal com­motions through effective deployment of security forces; to facilitate trade and commerce, as in Venice and other trading ports; to glorify the gods or their ministers on earth with temples and cathedral squares; to satisfy a ruler's aesthetic taste or ostentatious vanity; and to provide amenities such
as gardens and pleasure grounds, usually for the more privileged classes. Urban growth was comparatively leisurely, so that it was not too difficult to cope with mundane needs for basic services in keeping with the modest standards and technical limitations of the day. Few were in a position to quarrel about the choice of planning goals, and fewer still to interfere with their consummation. Planning was not greatly complicated by politics in the sense here defined.

While modern urban planning has absorbed and adapted some of these traditional goals, it has been primarily shaped by quite different forces: reaction against the impact of the industrial revolution upon urban growth, and the rise of new classes to political influence and power. The industrial revolution herded ever increasing proportions of the rapidly rising population into cities. Their growth was accelerated by the concentration of industry, commerce, and ancillary services. Autocracy, municipal pride, aristocratic taste and conspicuous display gave way to productivity and profit as the main determinants of land use, building styles, and communication networks. Railways, airports and then freeways enhanced individual mobility while strangling urban neighbourhoods. The automobile, product and symbol of industrial civilisation, choked streets that traced the tracks of stage coaches or bullock drays. Cities constantly outgrew the governmental structures of the towns and villages that they swamped, while basic municipal services fell behind as suburbia spread and the standards demanded rose.

Thus the free play of the market, which built the modern city to serve the ends of capitalistic production and distribution, gave rise to new economic costs and material discomforts. This is not to say that industrial-age cities are necessarily devoid of plan. Some planning is present in all deliberate activity—especially in the building of industrial enterprises and in the provision of the communication systems and public utility services on which they depend. The alternative is never 'plan or no plan?', but rather: 'many plans or one?' In urban affairs as in other fields, laissez-faire minimised any concern for the system considered as a whole. It was supposed to look after itself. Experience undermined this belief, as it became obvious that the unregulated activities of individuals and organisations pursuing their own self-interest brought collective costs which those responsible did not bear proportionately, if at all. Broader-scale planning gained acceptance as a necessary intervention from without to try to reduce these collectively-borne costs, or at least to work for a more equitable re-allocation of the costs and benefits of urban growth. This is why planning in our sense is inherently systemic.

The human costs of industrial urbanisation appeared early but took much longer than the economic to begin to be understood: even for their existence to be publicly acknowledged, it was necessary for their victims to
secure effectual political representation. This only became possible towards the end of the nineteenth century. Early in that century, middle-class philanthropists recognised the first signs of the costs of 'progress'. Academic social scientists are still exploring the dimensions of the problem: they see them variously as restrictions imposed by poverty upon health, housing, educational opportunity and occupational mobility; as a hopelessness inherited from generations of slum-dwelling; as a sense of isolation and anomic common to both suburb and slum; as threats to physical health from pollution and congestion, and to mental health from ugliness and squalor; as delinquency, vandalism, crime and violence fostered by the industrial metropolis.

It is by no means axiomatic that urban planning can cure any or all of these ills, but it seems clear, as already suggested, that the modern planning movement has been largely shaped by reaction against them. This can be deduced from the general course of its development. The middle-class reformers and professionals—doctors, engineers and administrators—who first influenced nineteenth-century planning were concerned to plug the obvious gaps and poultice the worst social wounds in the hastily thrown-up industrial towns. The Poor Law in Britain was, for all its effects, an early attempt at social planning. In the last decades of Victoria's reign, the beginnings of urban drainage, sanitation, lighting, public transport, libraries, baths, and housing were among the first fruits of the substitution of elective local government for 'the patriarchal rule of the Justices of the Peace' (see Trevelyan 1952: 115-19). Then a new generation of planners—with the architects to the fore—began to react to the physical and aesthetic degradation of the industrial city, nostalgically contrasting it with the harmony of the medieval town or the splendours of the Renaissance and the Baroque. Hence a vocabulary—influential through the first half of the twentieth century—that stressed harmony, beauty, the dignity of spatial relationships, tree-lined streets and verdant parks, and access to nature and the countryside. Alongside these ideas, however, and at least as potent, were the reactions against the economic cost and inconvenience of unplanned urban development. They led to notions such as the zoning of land use; the rationalisation of communication networks (leading to freeways, separation of cars and pedestrians, and rapid transit systems); the regulation of building heights and then of floor-area ratios; the widening and realignment of streets; control of parking and then provision of parking space. It is daily becoming clearer that this stream of planning activity creates as many problems as it solves, from the point of view of those concerned to conserve or improve the 'amenity' of city life.

It is equally clear that none of these versions of planning was often—or could often be expected to be—'comprehensive' in practice. They generally contributed piecemeal alleviations of the more obvious stresses of urban
growth. All were based essentially on the regulation of land use, and of the physical structures on or under the ground. All were politically possible to the extent that they were consistent with the interests of the property-owning and rate-paying classes, and of the government instrumentalities that also have vested interests of various kinds in urban land disposal and use. Traffic and passenger transport planning was geared primarily to the commercial and administrative needs of the central business district: expensive freeways served commuters from the wealthier suburbs while less favoured areas went without adequate schools or sewers. Masterful plans for urban renewal or 'green belt' conservation were crippled by the political power of the property owner, the land speculator and, as Harrison's chapter exemplifies, by the hostility or apathy of government departments and corporations and of elected local bodies themselves. Comprehensiveness was more feasible, of course, where governments could manage urban growth from the beginning—in a British 'new town', or a Canberra. There were also fewer constraints on planning for the future growth of existing cities—for example, to determine directions of growth, preserve natural features, assure adequate water and power supplies. Such planning is easier mainly because it confronts fewer and less powerful vested interests—in other words, is less political.

All these approaches to planning were confined to the physical environment. They did not necessarily alleviate social inequality and sometimes exacerbated it. To the social reformer, defining planning as 'a means . . . for the enrichment of human life' (see p. 37), the control of land use and building was inadequate unless accompanied by redistribution of income, improvement of social services and efforts to close the gaps between privileged and underprivileged areas.

Planning to mitigate the social costs of the modern metropolis is a different matter again. The symptoms are obvious enough, but the real nature of the underlying ills is much more elusive, and whether they can be alleviated by any of the received forms of urban planning is quite problematical. Do slum dwellers really benefit from resettlement in outer suburbia? Are crime and delinquency functions of poor housing, bad education, impoverished family life or the permissive society? Is the suburban sprawl socially preferable to the city tenement? Are anomie and alienation due to urban living, the economic system or the decay of religion? What do metropolitan citizens themselves think, and what do they really want? How far are the planners' worries on their behalf merely middle-class intellectual and aesthetic prejudices? (How to evaluate the human results of urban planning is one of the large questions not pursued in this book.) At any rate, those who apparently stand to suffer most from metropolitan growth seem to be the least articulate of urban groups and the most deficient in political influence. Can planners be, by default, the only effective spokesmen for
their interests? This is the point which the debate on the politics of urban planning has now taken up, and it is examined in detail in Chapter 6. We shall return to it here in the context of the relation between planning and the structure of politics and government.

Meanwhile it is necessary to recognise that the content of urban planning (and hence the concept of the professional planner) has expanded with the perceived dimensions of the task and the fashioning of new tools:

First, there has been the injection of mathematical techniques of modelling growth and change in city regions. Then, there has been the extension of economic techniques in evaluating plans. More recently, there has been a move to shift the focus away from physical design and towards social policies. And, related to this, the advent of programming, planning and budgeting systems in local authorities has led to a call for a new sort of corporate planning for social ends. (New Society, 14 Oct. 1971)

THE POLITICAL DILEMMA OF THE PLANNER'S ROLE

It is now time to re-examine the 'logic of planning', as set out at the beginning of this chapter, in the light of political realities. According to this logic, the first element of planning was 'an authoritative determination of objectives or values'. The phrase conceives planning in purely rational terms, and the logic has been associated with a professional ethic which sets planning apart from politics. In this model, which has certainly influenced much of modern planning organisation, the central proposition is that the basic aims and values of any particular urban plan are best defined in advance by the professional planner.

The proposition rests on a number of assumptions. The first is that the planner is an expert staff adviser to the decision makers at the centre of government (whatever the relevant level of government may be). As such, he is best qualified to compile the facts about the existing situation, from statistics, government records, interview surveys, traffic counts, and the like. He is also best qualified to determine the most appropriate means for executing planning decisions (even if, as a staff officer, he is not directly responsible for applying them). To quote a typical formulation:

The decision maker considers all the alternative courses of action which lead to the ends he seeks to attain within the limits of the possible, he evaluates the consequences of each course of action, and selects the course of action which will maximise the ends valued most . . . he applies a scientific method to the solution of problems. (Daland and Parker 1962: 190-1)

The next assumption is that his staff role and professional expertise combine to place the planner outside the battle of vested interests, and enable him to speak with more authority than any of them. In this situation, he can take a more comprehensive, long-term view than, say, the politician, who must respond to particular short-term demands. The planner is thus
cast in the role of the *deus ex machina* who tries to reduce or re-allocate more 'fairly' the total costs of unplanned urban growth by injecting into it an overall systemic element of co-ordination. An apposite example of this assumption was the view that the Cumberland County Council was given 'the task . . . of guiding a number of senior authorities (and indeed, local authorities) in a co-ordinated and harmonious scheme of operations' (Winston 1957).

Finally there is the notion that the planner, as a disinterested scientific analyst, is better able to determine and guard 'the public interest' than the mass of private individuals and firms, the operating public agency or the politician who has special interests and constituencies to serve. As the New South Wales Minister for Local Government, Mr Cahill, said at the inaugural meeting of the same Sydney planning body: 'Particular care should be taken to show that the scheme is a considered measure for the welfare of the community as a whole and not a collection of arbitrary prohibitions and restrictions' (Cumberland County Council 1948: xvii). An implicit assumption here is that either the needs and values relevant to the particular plan are self-evident, or public opinion in these matters is incoherent until faced with a set of specific proposals which can then be laid open to discussion.

This model has been criticised as unrealised in practice and unrealisable in principle (Bolan 1967: 234 refers to much of the literature; see also Altshuler 1965: 2-6, 299-311; Pranger 1968: 496-8; Bellush and Haus-knecht 1967: 285-6; Böllens and Schmandt 1965: 306). The fact is that of all areas of social control, urban planning is perhaps the most peculiarly subject to political complexities and resistances, both in the setting of goals and in the implementation of plans. Some of these are characteristic of urban planning anywhere; some are especially intractable in Australian cities.

To begin with, if the urban planner is indeed a professional staff adviser, then by definition he does not make autonomous decisions about the ultimate values and aims which are to inform his plans. Yet if he is charged by his professional ethic or by legislation to be guardian of the system as a whole, he must work with some conception of a general public interest. Where is he to look for this? Planning cannot be confined to those situations where the community has already established agreed ends, or where there are no important conflicts of interest. To take a simple example, it is equally arguable that the public interest calls for commercial development of the central business district and that it requires preservation of residential space and cultural activities in the city centre; but if pursued to the limit, the two policies are incompatible. Neither the planner's expertise nor any other can tell him what is the right mix of the two. The components of the public interest do not present themselves to the planner as given. As often
as not, they are in conflict, and such conflicts cannot be solved by scientific means. In other words, the public interest is not an objective fact or pattern but the resultant of the political interaction, on equitable terms, of special interests. The problem is that political interaction is uniquely complex and sluggish, and generally inequitable, so far as it concerns the development of the modern metropolitan city.

At first sight, it is plausible to argue that the planner’s dilemma can best be resolved by decisions of governments. To furnish the planner with the definitions of the public interest that he needs is an integral part of the wider responsibilities of governments. They must provide the infrastructure for development. They must make the regulations and enforce the sanctions on the observance of planning decisions. They must supply the necessary housekeeping and social services for the urban population, and most of the public utilities. Moreover, governments are expected to act as the focus for the political interaction of particular interests.

However, government structures that are relevant to metropolitan development are very complicated, particularly in Australia, as the next chapter will demonstrate in more detail. Our main cities are also the state capitals, and the nation’s population is, by world standards, heavily concentrated in these cities. Hence a large part of the activities of all levels of government are absorbed in serving the needs of city dwellers, and government agencies at all levels are shaping metropolitan development in their own separate ways. ‘All levels’ means the federal and state ministerial departments, federal and state statutory authorities (some appointed by government and some indirectly elected from the local government bodies), and, in all cities except Brisbane, a large number of elected local authorities. Among the various units of government there is often a striking imbalance of powers and responsibilities, of needs and resources.

Furthermore, apart from Brisbane no Australian metropolitan city has any elected general-purpose government authority whose jurisdiction is co-terminous with the metropolitan area. That is to say, there is no single strategic focal point of political leverage or support for a staff agency specifically concerned with comprehensive planning for the metropolis. Even if there were ‘greater metropolitan governments’ in more of the state capitals, it is unlikely that they would have control of all the major public utility corporations. The politics of metropolitan planning would still have to be played out partly at the state and federal government levels. Some would say that the planning of metropolitan growth, if it is to happen at all, is too important to be left to any form of local government. These are, broadly, the institutional limitations upon the capacity of governments to give the planner his marching instructions.

Even these limitations, however, might not be fatal to planning if the national political parties were more willing to commit themselves in action
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(not merely in words) to serious programs of urban development. A minor factor in this situation is that urban planning is still largely a matter for local governments. Only the Labor Party takes any overt interest in politics at the local government level—and that interest appears so far to have been directed rather to the opportunities it provides for apprenticeship for parliamentary careers (and in some cases for profitable patronage and jobbery) than to the real problems of urban growth. But the main reasons for the timidity of the political parties seem to be more deeply rooted in the nature of party competition and the structure of urban interests in this country.

The domestic issues and policies which attract the attention of the national parties are naturally those calculated to mobilise and maintain mass voting support with a minimum of administrative and technical exertion. From this point of view, policies for the skilled manipulation of the physical environment (as in town and country planning) or for the direct amelioration of human misfortune (as in the personal social and welfare services increasingly needed in the large cities) are often more trouble than they are worth politically. On the other hand, it is relatively easy to sponsor measures which can take the form of legislative regulation or routine cash payments (as in the fields of tariffs and trade, money and credit, subsidies and tax concessions to industry, state aid to private schools, and the monetary social services). Policies of this kind, moreover, can readily be identified with the common interests of a reasonably homogeneous nationwide group, such as wheatfarmers, pensioners, wage-earners or manufacturers (though even among these it is sometimes hard enough to achieve a consensus). Such platforms can attract substantial numbers of like-minded voters across the state or nation. And the political parties also find them more manageable because the groups concerned are usually organised into associations which can articulate their interests and bargain reliably on their behalf, while providing a medium of communication through which government or party can influence the views of their mass memberships.

By contrast, the metropolitan urban community is not amenable to political management in any of these ways. A fundamental peculiarity of the city, as a political entity, lies in the essentially physical character and tangled distribution of the interests that are entrenched in it. These interests, whether of private entrepreneurs or of government institutions, are almost entirely based on real property in one form or another: land, buildings, streets, and pipes and wires above ground and below. Hardly any of these property rights extend over a large proportion of the metropolitan area; in physical terms they are inextricably intertwined; in political terms they are heterogeneous. Just as there is no institutional vantage point for political leverage, so there is no key variable through which government action, or action upon government, could influence a broad complex of
urban activities in a desired direction, as for example a tariff or a bounty can influence the development of a whole industry. On urban, as distinct, say, from class or national issues, the interests are almost impossible to unscramble into effective, homogeneous blocks of political support, for the purposes of an electoral system based on large geographical divisions. And since the planning problems of each city are peculiar to itself, there is no way of mobilising political pressure on a national scale behind specific planning proposals. The metropolis is not a national political market, like farming, commerce or labour.

On the other hand, property rights and property values are highly susceptible to government action of many kinds, especially physical planning action. Almost any action, in this closely-knit and interdependent complex, tends to favour some interests and prejudice others. Planning action means dealing with a multitude of separate vested interests including those of powerful public as well as private corporations: it is administratively awkward, expensive, and protracted. When applied to a limited field—for example to remove danger spots in the street layout or anticipate the need for more schools in a developing area—planning may offer some net pay-off to a political party in the form of votes or patronage. Major planning schemes affecting a variety of interests risk losing as many votes as they gain.

The politicians' reluctance to take up urban issues seems to be supported by the fact that initiatives for improved city planning rarely come from any weighty groups of voters. Political activists are not organised along metropolitan lines. Furthermore, the strength and articulateness of urban private interests are inversely proportional to their need for radical innovation in planning. Those who are best informed on its possibilities—the property-owners, the developers and the public bureaucracies—are the most anxious to keep their freedom of action, the most likely to succeed in this, and best able to satisfy their own needs within (or by escaping from) the metropolitan environment. The urban poor, however, must look to government for the supply of their most basic wants, beginning with cheaper land and better housing, cheap transport, more adequate education, vocational re-training to cope with technological change, welfare and remedial services, and more liveable surroundings. In so far as these needs can be met by uniform action on a national scale, the political parties will take them up. What they shrink from is the definition of long-term, comprehensive goals in and for a particular metropolis, with all its administrative hurdles and political hazards.

CONCLUSION

I have tried to show why urban planning cannot escape the dilemma between the search for 'objectivity' and 'comprehensiveness' and the fact that
planning decisions are inevitably political choices. I have also tried to account for the peculiar difficulties of eliciting significant political choices in this field. I have suggested that the problems of urban growth are social and cultural as well as economic and spatial, and that this both complicates and makes more urgent the question of getting significant political decisions.

The difficulties and complications are obviously formidable. Both as presented here in general terms, and as exemplified in the case studies that follow, they show why (as noted early in this chapter) some writers are inclined to reject the ambitious implications of the 'planning' concept for the more modest notion of 'informed decision-making', at least when contemplating the overall control of urban growth. But this is in part a question of degree. Urban growth may take many forms. Politics and planning are most intractable where growth is choking the built-up areas of established cities, with their burden of fixed investment, entrenched and intertwining interests, competition for the use of precious land, and multiplicity of governmental authorities. They are less so where cities are expanding at the periphery, and the demands of new settlement can be foreseen and forestalled. To the extent that urban growth can be diverted into separate new cities (though this has its own political problems) it is possible, as Canberra has shown, to move much closer to the model of 'planning' or, as some now prefer to call it, of 'civic design'. At all events, the experience reported in this book suggests that Australian urban dwellers, like others the world over, are faced with the choice of more plan or more pain.

In part, resolution of the conflict between politics and planning is a question of bringing about changes in the institutions and attitudes which at present shape the conflict itself—and that requires political action. As the stresses and contradictions of metropolitan living become more intense, the political parties may be forced to take a more direct interest in urban problems, and even to move the issue to the level of federal government. There were some signs of this before the end of 1971, in speeches by the federal Opposition leader and in the new policy-formulating committees of the Government party. Without federal intervention or at least the influence of federal finance, more radical approaches to the planning of urban growth seem unlikely. More effective approaches, radical or not, will call for reform in the present haphazard distribution of responsibilities for metropolitan administration. Notable examples of this maldistribution can be seen in the current pattern of social services, but here again there are moves toward more comprehensive planning, as the interdependence of living conditions, crime rates, health levels, income distribution and similar variables becomes more obvious and a piecemeal approach less tolerable. Finally, if vexation supplies the stimulus to more controlled and conscious change, political action is needed to bring it about. There are more equitable and sophisticated means of representing relevant interests in decisions
about urban growth than generally prevail in the Australian metropolis or in the polity at large. Of course, fuller participation by itself does not ensure either the wisdom or the justice of decisions. What it can do, at the least, is to acquaint decision-makers with a wider range of wants and personal experience than they would otherwise be aware of, and to ensure that potential influence on decisions is less arbitrarily skewed in favour of wealth and power than it is at present. There is some promise of more political action on urban growth, not only in the awakening interest of the major parties at the national and state levels, but also in the recent emergence of organised citizen groups to take up controversial issues of urban development (such as pollution of all kinds, protection of foreshores and open space, and high-density residential building) at the state and local government levels.

Some of the main subjects canvassed here—the complications of urban planning, the complex structure of metropolitan administration, the patchy provision of social services in the city, and the possibilities of broader participation in the planning process—are explored in turn in the remaining chapters.
Almost forty years ago the National Resources Board of the United States defined planning thus:

Planning consists in the systematic, continuous, forward-looking application of the best intelligence available to programs of common affairs in the public field . . . Planning is a continuous process, and necessitates the constant re-examination of trends, tendencies, policies, in order to adapt and adjust governmental policies with the least possible friction and loss . . . Planning is not an end, but a means, a means for better use for what we have, a means for emancipation of millions of personalities now fettered, for the enrichment of human life. . . . (quoted in Millett 1947: 2-3; omissions by Millett)

As Parker observes in the preceding chapter, all deliberate activity involves some planning, and the affairs of great cities such as Sydney, just because they bring together so many millions vulnerable to the fettering of personality which unsatisfactory urban life may impose, should be particularly appropriate as a field for planning. Each of the four major urban functions, dwelling, work, transport, and recreation, can be amenable to the planning process, yet in Australia—to follow Parker again—their individual patterns and their interrelationships have hitherto been determined primarily by the market and by the accidents of history.

The political institutions of the country may be classed among the accidents of history here, for even when it would seem that the design of institutions was a calculated and deliberate activity, as in the drafting of the Commonwealth constitution, the appropriateness of the design for regulating the phenomenon of large urban centres was neither considered nor achieved by inadvertence. Writing recently Sir Geoffrey Vickers warned:

Two doubts seem to shadow the future working of our political institutions. One concerns the institutions needed to make any policy appropriate in scale to the needs of our situation; the other concerns the institutions needed to implement any such policy. Both stem from the increasing complexity of our situation, the increasing speed and unpredictability of its changes and the increasing time-lag needed to make any effective response. Both are enhanced, as well as relieved, by the increasing refinement of the tools which
we are evolving to meet our needs. These seem to be blurring the division of function traditionally drawn between policy-making and planning by magnifying functions which fall between the two. (Vickers 1970: 110)

The political institutions to which he refers are British, but the material he uses to elaborate the point is easily transferred to the present context. He instances a passage in the Buchanan report on traffic in towns which relates to the striking of a balance between the conflicting demands of accessibility and the various elements of environment, and the amount of resources to be made available to achieve them, and points out that these questions are the responsibility of the policy-maker rather than the planner. But until the policy-maker has 'restructured' his problem he cannot instruct the planner. In the following pages we have to consider both the various levels of government which prevail in Sydney, and the distinction between policy-making and planning, blurred and muddled though that distinction undoubtedly is. The distinction is made, for example, in the Sydney Region Outline Plan when, after declaring that a much higher level of public investment must be faced in the future, the State Planning Authority continues:

This report accepts that our society, which is one of the most affluent in the world, has the ability to pay for the things discussed. The questions to be answered are ones related to priorities and to methods. Some of the issues involved in answering these questions have been briefly discussed, but no firm proposals have been advanced. These are primarily matters for consideration and determination by Governments. (State Planning Authority 1968b: 103)

Some further difficulty is occasioned by the fact that the talismanic word 'planning' can be used, and may have to be used, in three rather different spheres. One, the widest, is economic planning, embracing both the use and the development of resources widely defined. Putting aside the idea of indicative economic planning as practised by the British N.E.D.C. and the French Commissariat au Plan, the Vernon Committee said, rather anxiously:

We would not, however, suggest anything in the nature of a national economic plan involving individual industry targets for Australia, as this would require elaborate machinery and, in all probability, a considerably higher degree of government intervention in the economy than would be acceptable in this country. Moreover, it would not be practicable for the Commonwealth Government to announce detailed industrial targets which might imply a commitment on the Government's part to ensure that they were reached. (Vernon Committee 1965: I, 450)

As it was, even their modest proposal for a body that would advise and consult was rejected by the then Prime Minister as usurping the proper responsibilities of elected government, but the passage points to three lions in the planner's path. Effective machinery may well be elaborate, and
it is certain to require numbers of public servants of new and unfamiliar breeds; the national ethos is anti-bureaucratic even if Alan Davies is right that the characteristic talent of Australians is for bureaucracy (Davies 1958: 3). Further, planning may well involve substantial controls over individuals who would much prefer to be left uncontrolled and unplanned. Finally, acceptance of power to control through planning may well entail acceptance of responsibility for the outcome of the planning process, indeed it should. This can involve both the odium of unpopular measures in the short term during which very few benefits will be apparent, and the danger of something going badly wrong in the long term.

The second sphere for planning is land use which historically has been the exemplar of planning in urban areas. For Sydney the record is set out in Chapter 4 and need not be told here. The set of land-use controls, which include those relating to health and safety and more recently to amenity, controls over subdivision, density, building height, and the like, run back into the colonial era of the nineteenth century. Whether because of their antiquity or because of the directness with which they impinge on the individual land-owner, they are probably the manifestation of planning most readily thought of by the average citizen.

The third sphere of planning is the provision of implementing services, 'infrastructure' to use a trendy word, bracketing both the physical services like roads, electricity, water, sewerage, public transport and communications, and the provision of social services of education, health and welfare. These are almost entirely provided by governmental agencies, although there are conspicuous partial exceptions. Private enterprise may provide transport (see map in State Planning Authority 1967b: 45) and the churches may provide welfare and education, although the burden of expansion into new urban areas is proving too much for their static resources (Sydney Morning Herald 19 Jan. 1968). But when there are such exceptions they are likely to be regulated by government, and partly assisted in their revenues by government either through subventions or by the grant of monopoly, so that the pattern of their availability will be part of a government-made design. Much of this design, or at least the dynamic element unfolding over the next twelve months, will be embodied in a budget, principally the state budget for reasons which will appear, and as has been pointed out (Campbell 1954: 30-1) the budget is a plan, forecasting the revenues expected and projecting both the sources from which those revenues are to be raised and the purposes on which they will be expended.

Four different levels of government operate in Sydney, and together they form a complex constellation with interactions of varying degrees of frequency and intensity between the different parts and levels. Nearly all aspects of city growth are interrelated, and in a rational world interrelated processes should be planned together. But it has been a common complaint
the world over that the territorial administration of great cities is exces­sively fragmented, and while Sydney does not match the numbers of auth­orities with power to raise and spend money found in comparable American cities—876 in Philadelphia, 704 in Pittsburgh, 474 in St Louis—a detailed account of the machinery of government of Sydney would quickly escape the limits of this chapter. Broad strokes will have to do.

First in order of time and of direct importance must be the state govern­ment, successor to the colonial government which created and set the style of both Sydney and New South Wales:

the first permanent building was a Government building, the first wharf and warehouse was a Government wharf and warehouse, the first food eaten was Government rations, and when the first wheat from the Government farm was ready for milling, it went to the Government mill . . . And so a tradition was established of great consequence for the future development of the County—the Government became a dominant influence in everyday life: it was often disliked and sometimes feared, but it was looked to in every emergency, in floods and droughts, famines and plagues—as indeed it still is. (Winston 1957: 9; also Larcombe 1961: 1)

The significance of this tradition is greater outside the metropolitan areas than it is within them, in part because the urban community has conquered the hostile environment that distance, lack of water, and dependence on the vagaries of world trade still impose on the rural community. But reliance on the government coupled with the secondary tradition of preferment for rural areas remains a major factor in determining the claims of urban growth for scarce resources because the rural areas and their representatives are more experienced and more adept at securing assistance, and more compact as interest groups.

Moreover, the early combination of strong colonial government based on the capital and the harsh environment prevented the development of local government to a level of effectiveness and popular acceptance comparable to that which prevailed in England and much of the United States at the end of the nineteenth century. In the Sydney metropolitan area the number of local authorities and the magnitude of certain of their tasks led to a num­ber of functions being assigned to special or regional state instrumentalities. In July 1971 the state government announced that it would be dividing the state into nine regions which would be progressively recognised by all government departments, but the development is too new to have had a measurable impact on the structure of government. These, then, namely state, special or regional, and local authorities, are three of the four levels of government in Sydney. The fourth, the federal or national government, is the most recent arrival on the scene, at once the most remote because of the circumscription of its legal powers and yet potentially the most important level because it alone possesses financial resources adequate to cope with the tasks in hand.
The Role of Government

We can characterise this constellation of governments, but only in a tentative and preliminary way. Almost six years ago Ruth Atkins said at another symposium on this topic:

We have a rough general picture and a lot of impressions. We can see a picture of councils' boundaries, we can discover the rules by which councils work, the powers they have, the sources of their funds and so on because all these are settled by State Acts and ordinances. But we are not yet provided with the particular and detailed studies of individual councils and their memberships, the issues that divide these councils, the details of local campaigns, the varying patterns of leadership that develop . . . and a host of other things. Local government seems familiar, but it needs exploring in depth and time.

(Wilkes 1966: 118, omission marks in original)

It still does. Nor for that matter do we have the administrative histories of departments and policies which could give appropriate insights into the influence of particular persons and pressure groups on metropolitan affairs. The first major aspect, however, as Atkins noted, can be dealt with relatively simply—the constitutional and legal powers of each level. The Commonwealth constitution gave to the federal government a set of specific powers, at least two of which introduced a substantial federal presence into the territorial confines of the metropolis: posts and telegraphs by s. 51(v) and defence by s. 51(vi). The telephone is a service almost as common as water and electricity, and its wires contribute proportionately to the urban ugliness; the neighbourhood post office is found in most shopping centres and acts as an agency for some other federal services. Defence uses account for over 50,000 acres in the Sydney region, slightly larger than Camden on the map, and repatriation hospitals form a significant part of medical service provision. S. 51(xxvii) made immigration a federal responsibility, and while there is no physical presence of immigration services apart from the occasional immigration reception camp, the impact of the Commonwealth's immigration program on urban growth since 1949 is a major part of the story. Technological developments since the constitution was drawn up have created new demands for urban space: airports under federal control occupy substantial areas and add to noise and air pollution of the environment, while radio and television broadcasting facilities also require largish blocks of land and affect the skyline.

Without explaining the abstruse doctrine of the immunity of instrumentalities under the federal system, it can be said that in general the Commonwealth is not subject to state law, although it may choose on occasion to behave as if it were. Thus in 1961 the War Service Homes Division received 114 acres at Baulkham Hills, an Army rifle range no longer required, and resolved to dedicate 39 acres to the state for parks and recreation and build houses on the rest. The area had been zoned as open space under the Baulkham Hills planning scheme, and the Division's Director wrote subsequently:
Although the proposal was supported by the Baulkham Hills Shire Council and accepted by the National Trust of Australia, the State authorities have so far declined to give their approval to the project.

The Division is not bound to obtain the approval of the State authorities to its building proposals but it has always been the practice to comply with State planning requirements as far as possible. (Report of the Director of War Service Homes, 1963-64: 8)

Eventually the State Planning Authority and state government relented and released the land from planning restraints (Sydney Morning Herald 23 Feb. 1966), but in other matters such as the erection of defence and other buildings on the Sydney waterfront the Commonwealth has not been so self-denying. In addition to the general exemption from state law, s. 114 of the Commonwealth constitution specifically provides that the states may not, without the Commonwealth's consent, 'impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to the Commonwealth' and vice versa. The matter is of some moment to the local authorities in respect of rate-free Commonwealth realty in their areas; thus the Local Government and Shires Associations in their evidence to the Else-Mitchell commission estimated that in 1966 they were losing through non-payment of rates for Commonwealth property some $242,000 in the City of Sydney and $728,000 in the other authorities of the region (Else-Mitchell et al. 1967: 121).

Once allowance is made for the extent of the Commonwealth's powers, the state parliament is supreme and sovereign over the residue. The two inferior levels of government, regional and local, are its creations and creatures, deriving their powers and responsibilities from its legal authority. Again non-payment of rates is the most constant irritating manifestation of the local authorities' subordination. In the evidence just cited, it was estimated that the City of Sydney lost $2,388,000 and other metropolitan local authorities $1,433,000 in respect of state-owned realty. (Certain state government instrumentalities already made contributions in lieu of rates; thus the State Brickworks, the State Dockyard (located in Newcastle) and the Electricity Commission paid $292,742 in 1967-8, although it is not known what proportion went to Sydney local authorities.) In 1968 the state government chose to offer all its local authorities a fund of at least $4 million to be distributed in lieu of rates by a local authority grants commission on which the authorities themselves would be represented. By 1970-1 the sum had grown to $5·2 million; three-quarters usually go in general grants, one-quarter only to specific projects. Under the Local Government Act, 1919, an extensive system of controls is imposed on local authorities, including the ultimate sanctions of legislating to abolish the authority or, with the assistance of a standing boundaries commission, tampering with its territorial integrity, and of dissolving the elected council and replacing it with an administrator or set of commissioners. The one substantial territorial alteration since the consolidations of 1948 was brought about neither
by the wish of the local authority concerned nor by its neighbours, nor by the application of any apparent principles of good government other than dubious arguments about separating dormitory suburbs from commercial core lest they stifle its growth and undoing what may well have been a partisan decision twenty years earlier. A Melbourne newspaper recognised the party-political end: 'In a nutshell, the Liberal-Country Party Government wants to kick the powerful Labor city council down the town hall steps and make sure it never gets back' (*Age* 19 Sept. 1967). The objective was achieved by removing slightly more than half the area and the population from the City of Sydney, together with one-fifth of its unimproved capital value, partly by small transfers to contiguous local authorities but principally to a new municipality set up for the purpose, South Sydney (originally named Northcott), which restored the City of Sydney to its pre-1949 borders.

Such a cataclysm is unique; much more typical is minor tinkering with boundaries in the interest of better provision of services, although there have been some major proposals made: for example for a new municipality based on Epping with a projected population of 27,000 drawn from Hornsby, Ryde and Parramatta (*Sydney Morning Herald* 30 Dec. 1966), rejected by the Local Government Boundaries Commission after a public inquiry; for either the absorption of Manly by Warringah or else the transfer of a riding of Warringah to Manly depending on which authority's commissioned report one read (*Sydney Morning Herald* 31 Mar. 1967); and for the excision of new municipalities or shires like Ingleburn out of Campbelltown or Pittwater out of Warringah. Thus despite the state's unquestioned power to deal with the local authorities, the political dangers of direct intervention are so great that the state has employed the characteristic Australian device of quasi-judicialising the matter and referring it to a tribunal for resolution of the conflict. Another instance would be the resolution of quasi-contractual dealings between local authorities: thus when Blacktown failed to enter into an agreement with Penrith for the construction of a bridge, the Minister for Local Government under s. 654 of the Local Government Act, 1919, first appointed a commissioner to hold an inquiry and report, then ordered that Penrith build the bridge and Blacktown pay half the cost (*Report of the Department of Local Government, 1968*: 23). Finally, it should be noted that even though the legal authority of the state (and the Commonwealth in its sphere) is supreme, there may be loopholes, or occasions on which the threat of legal proceedings may be a successful political tactic: to pick three at random, the Mayor of Randwick was reported to have instructed the Council's solicitor to seek an injunction to prevent the Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board from connecting any additional sewers coming from outside the municipality to the Malabar ocean outfall system which was polluting Maroubra
beach (*Sydney Morning Herald* 13 April 1966); Leichhardt Municipal Council was reported to be considering prosecuting 'the State Government' in respect of lavatory facilities at a local school (*Sydney Morning Herald* 27 July 1967); and the Mayor of North Sydney was reported to be seeking his Council's approval to obtain counsel's opinion on seeking an injunction against the Commonwealth over its construction of an unauthorised Customs building (*Sydney Morning Herald* 10 Sept. 1966).

The second aspect of the constellation of governments to be considered is their resources. If we begin at the bottom with the local authorities, with forty to handle it would be helpful if some consolidating typology could be devised. The legal tripartite division into cities (Campbelltown, Liverpool, Parramatta, Penrith and Sydney), shires (Baulkham Hills, Hornsby, Sutherland and Warringah) and municipalities (the rest) tells us little save about the state of opinion concerning local government in 1906. Employing six measures of resources—area, population (estimated at 30 June 1968), unimproved capital value (1967-8), unimproved capital value per head of population calculated from the two previous statistics, ordinary services expenditure (1967-8) and ordinary services expenditure per head of population—we have ranked the forty authorities in descending order on each. Thus in Table 3:1, where the results appear, the City of Sydney is 28th in area, 17th in population, but 1st in unimproved capital value, unimproved capital value per head of population, ordinary services expenditure, and 3rd in ordinary services expenditure per head of population. Such unlike measures cannot be summed to produce a single index of resources, but it will be observed that there is a fairly close association between population, unimproved capital value and ordinary services expenditure so that over one-half of the authorities are in the same quartile on each of those three measures. When one introduces the measure of unimproved capital value per head, however, there is much greater spread, and we have used this statistic to characterise authorities as 'well-endowed' and 'not-so-well-endowed', euphemisms perhaps for the starker 'rich' and 'poor'. The dichotomy is probably too sharp, and a third category for authorities in the middle might have been helpful; it was rejected as proliferating the groups too much. A word of warning is necessary: because of the rolling nature of the valuation procedure, the data on unimproved capital value are out of date to varying degrees and are thus imperfect measures of the land-taxable resources of any particular authority and of the forty authorities collectively. They are, however, the best data available.

The discrete data for each quartile of each measure help fill in the picture. For area, the quartiles descend 126,720-36,250 acres, 23,789-7,260 acres, 6,120-3,012 acres, and 2,674-1,416 acres, or, to indicate the extremes in a different measurement, there are seven authorities larger than 100 square miles and twelve smaller than 5 square miles. Some authorities
are swollen in area by large parks, but these would still be in the large category without their parkland. For population, the quartiles run 162,800-92,300, 88,400-62,250, 54,650-33,700, and 32,060-9,450; eight with more than 100,000 population, eight with fewer than 30,000. For unimproved capital value, the first quartile is distorted by the City of Sydney at $549 million; Sutherland is next at $264 million, and then the quartile goes down to $144 million. The second quartile ranges $140-102 million, the third $100-66 million, and the fourth $64-11 million. Similarly for expenditure on ordinary services, the top quartile begins with the City of Sydney's $18,601,000, then drops sharply to Bankstown's $5,444,000, and ends at $3,394,000. The second expenditure quartile ranges $2,936,000-2,059,000, the third $1,967,000-1,217,000 and the fourth $1,212,000-396,000. The association between population and unimproved capital value already mentioned restricts the range of figures when unimproved capital value per head of population is calculated. As would be expected, the top quartile begins with the City of Sydney's $7,922, drops to Lane Cove with $2,791 and finishes at $2,147. The second, third and fourth quartiles run respectively $2,050-1,681, $1,672-1,254, and $1,219-755. The quartile ranges are still further compressed when ordinary services expenditure per head of population is calculated. Then the four quartiles go $56-41, $39-35, $34-32, and $32-26. To sum up the disparities between local authorities in the Sydney area, the largest or wealthiest is to the smallest or poorest 90:1 in area, 51:1 in unimproved capital value and 47:1 in ordinary services expenditure, but only 11:1 in population, 10:1 in unimproved capital value per head of population and 2:1 in ordinary services expenditure per head.

Comparison with census data from 1947 shows that, with the exception of Randwick and Canterbury, all of the largest authorities have experienced massive population growth over the two decades between 1947 and 1968: Sutherland gained 113,000, Warringah 103,000, Bankstown 120,000, Blacktown 109,000, Hornsby 56,000, Ku-ring-gai 53,000, Parramatta 47,000, and Fairfield 82,000. Ryde with 43,000 could be added to the list. Only Parramatta among these authorities failed to double its population, and in the more outlying the growth was three- and fourfold. Thus the 'large' authorities are getting larger, and six other authorities along the western fringe of the Sydney area are moving up to join them. Whereas in the past the complaint was that metropolitan local authorities were too small for any worthwhile responsibilities, the urbanisation of the outlying shires, municipalities and cities so-called is opening up the possibility of a new group of super-authorities which will command substantial resources—although they will also have substantial burdens with their populations. The Sydney Region Outline Plan projections for 2000 envisage five of these authorities with populations in excess of 200,000, including Blacktown at 385,000 and Campbelltown at 320,000, while Wyong and Gosford with
MAP 3:1 The Sydney area
## TABLE 3:1 Ranking of local authorities by area and by measures of respective resources, Sydney Statistical District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Unimproved Capital Value&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>U.C.V. per head&lt;sup&gt;a,b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Ordinary Services Expenditure&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>O.S.E. per head&lt;sup&gt;a,b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<td><strong>Large, well-endowed, industrial</strong></td>
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<sup>a</sup> Estimated 30 June 1968.

<sup>b</sup> Year ending 30 June 1968.

<sup>c</sup> 'Industrial' local authorities have a ratio of factory employment to total population greater than 1:5.

**Note:** Numbers indicate rank order.
250,000 and 320,000 respectively extend the urbanised region in the direction of Newcastle.

At the next level of government, the regional authorities undertake a number of functions which elsewhere would be handled by local authorities and by being in the main unifunctional avoid the distractions which a range of duties could impose. Among them the leviathan is the Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board which dates from the 1880s. Exceptionally among regional authorities it extends southward past Sutherland to include Shellharbour and Greater Wollongong; its area is some 4,000 square miles, plus the additional river catchment areas with which it is concerned. Its title sets out its three interrelated functions; at 30 June 1968 it supplied an estimated 2,851,000 people with water and 2,135,000 with sewerage. In recent years its capital expenditure ran at $45-50 million a year, rather more than half going on sewerage works. Testifying before the Senate select committee on water pollution, the Board's principal medical officer warned that total capital outlay should rise to $80 million a year over the next decade if the backlog in sewerage provision, mainly in the western part of Sydney region, was to be overcome. The Sydney Region Outline Plan spoke of an annual outlay of nearly $70 million to this end and most recently a program costing $79 million was announced for 1971-2, together with a 10-year expenditure of $800 million to do as much in the next decade as had been done in the preceding twenty-five years (Sydney Morning Herald 29 April 1971). Like other governmental bodies in the Sydney region, the Board is planning for a population of 5 millions in 2000, an increase of almost 100 per cent in population and 150 per cent in water consumption. So huge is the scale of the Board's operations that while in 1967-8 it received over $2,600,000 from land developers and subdividers by way of compulsory contribution, that same year it spent $2,300,000 merely re-laying defective watermains. Immediately the Board's problems are beach pollution from the principal ocean outfalls and, ironically, the need to provide expensive inland treatment works as settlement moves westwards away from the ocean outfalls. In the long run its greatest problem is the volume of capital required:

The Board is, of course, conscious of the substantial requirements of other authorities and of the many competing demands being made on the State Government for the limited capital funds available to it. It recognizes, too, the role played by the Federal Government in relation to the allocation of national resources, and expresses the hope that full regard will be had to the problems of urban development when decisions affecting financial and resource allocation are being taken. (Report of the Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board, 1967: 2)

The Board itself is composed of a president and vice-president appointed by the state government, the responsible minister being the Premier and
Treasurer, and five members elected by the aldermen and councillors of the constituent authorities grouped in five constituencies.

Two other functions which might ordinarily be left in the hands of local authorities are electricity and public transport. In New South Wales there are two state-wide bodies, the Electricity Authority which is the regulatory and co-ordinating body and the Electricity Commission, which is responsible for generation and transmission, and a large number of suppliers, including local authorities and thirty-four county councils including five in the Sydney area. Three are relatively small: St George, established in 1920, which comprises Hurstville, Kogarah and Rockdale; Mackellar, 1951, of Manly and Warringah; and Nepean River, 1954, Camden and Campbelltown plus Wollondilly Shire which is occasionally associated with the Sydney region. There is one rather larger County Council, Prospect, formed in 1956, which includes part of Parramatta, and Penrith, Liverpool, Blacktown, Fairfield, Holroyd, Windsor, Baulkham Hills, and Colo Shire, another occasional member of the Sydney region. The fifth County Council, Sydney, is by far the largest with a population of 1.6 millions. Here again the stake was sufficiently high to attract political action, and the state government legislated to regroup the constituencies; the desired objective was achieved when twenty years of Labor control ended. As most of the expensive capital outlay is made by the Electricity Commission which is dealing with the whole state, there has been little public concern about the pressure on the five County Councils from urban growth. The Sydney Region Outline Plan estimates current capital expenditure on electricity and gas at $23 million per year, half the water and sewerage figure. The Commissioner for Government Transport has to meet quite a different sort of problem. His area of operation includes Newcastle as well as Sydney, but the accounts of the two are easily distinguished. The provision of capital for buses is relatively small, but their operation produces a swingeing annual deficit which had accumulated to more than $43 million by 1968.

As a transition from the regional level to the state, there is the State Planning Authority, whose history is set out in Chapter 4. The composition of the Authority is a full-time chairman and deputy chairman named by the government, the responsible minister being the Minister for Local Government, and ten part-time members, four state government officials (the Commissioner for Main Roads, the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Transport, the Assistant Under-Secretary of the Department of Local Government and the Vice-President of the Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board), a nominee chosen from a panel supplied by the architects', engineers', planners' and surveyors' institutes and five representatives from local government (two from the Sydney area and three from elsewhere in the state), thereby securing, it has been argued (Else-Mitchell et al. 1967: 144), considerable influence on the Authority for the local govern-
The Role of Government

ment point of view. The inevitability of this mixture is suggested by comparison with the composition of the Perth Metropolitan Region Planning Authority which also has five state government representatives (the Town Planning Commissioner, the Commissioner for Main Roads, the Chief Engineer of the Metropolitan Water Supply, Sewerage and Drainage Board, the Director-General of Transport and the Surveyor-General) and five local government representatives (one from the Perth City Council and four from the district planning committees), plus one member to represent business interests. Representation does not guarantee co-ordination: thus in New South Wales the Department of Main Roads has not considered itself bound by decisions of the State Planning Authority on which its Commissioner sits.

The interlocking of metropolitan and state levels is further displayed in two recent creations, the State Pollution Control Commission which has the president of the Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board as an *ex officio* member, while he will also sit on the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority with two representatives of industry and two from Sydney local authorities as the other part-time members. Then there are the state instrumentalities which have a regional organisation which corresponds with the Sydney metropolitan area: for example Public Works which has a Metropolitan District that adds Wyong, Gosford, Colo and Blue Mountains to the forty authorities usually included in the metropolitan area. Most state departments which have a substantial commitment to what are essentially urban affairs divide the metropolitan area into several districts. Main Roads has two divisions, the Metropolitan which runs from Warringah to Sutherland, and Parramatta covering the western parts of the city plus Gosford and Colo. The Department of Education has four directorates, North Sydney (including Gosford and Wyong), Metropolitan West (with Colo, Wollondilly and Blue Mountains), Central Metropolitan and St George. The Hospitals Commission has three regions defined as Northern and Central based on the teaching hospitals of the University of Sydney, Southern based on the teaching hospitals of the University of New South Wales, and Western 'comprising the public hospitals situated in the western part of the Sydney-Metropolitan Area, where the expanding population has caused serious difficulties in the provision of adequate, well placed hospital facilities' (*Report of the Hospitals Commission of New South Wales, 1968*: 6). The Department of Public Health has a Western Metropolitan Health District based on Parramatta covering the western area, and the Metropolitan Health District for the rest of the city. A comment on the creation of the Western Metropolitan Health District sums up the case for sub-regional divisions within Sydney:

The population of this area is in the region of 550,000 with a rapid growth rate—6 per cent per annum over the last 5 years—and many health prob-
lems, environmental and personal. There is no doubt that the establishment of this district, and the resultant less remote relationship between central government health authority and local community organisations, statutory and voluntary, will constitute a significant feature of the development of these suburbs. (*Report of the Director-General of Public Health, 1967*: 128)

Still other state agencies maintain local offices without going over to a regionalised administrative structure; the Housing Commission maintains a District Office at Parramatta and Local Offices at Penrith and Campbelltown.

The list could be continued at the state level, and then extended to the federal level, but the conclusion should be obvious by now: the machinery of government in Sydney is indeed complex. There are two factors producing this complexity. One is the complexity of the subject matter with which the machinery must grapple, the other is confusion of understanding or intention on the part of those devising the machinery, and it is not always certain whether one is recording complexity or confusion. There is one point to be made before changing the subject: unlike the United States federal government (see Sundquist 1969: 17-25, 242-5, 272-3), the Commonwealth has neither pressed the cities to improve and consolidate their administrative structures the better to handle the resources the federal government is prepared to pump in, nor has it set up field administration regions of its own which help shape the development of new and more effective administrative systems. What has happened at all levels of government, and between levels, has been *ad hoc* co-ordination. Now co-ordination can be a simple technical procedure when the items are equal in value or measurable on the same scale of values—co-ordinating bus and ferry connections, say. But co-ordination can also involve strikingly different sets of values, when one authority seeks to preserve open spaces and another to reduce inflationary pressure on land stocks, and then no satisfactory technical procedures are available save the more ambitious types of cost-benefit analysis such as the Roskill commission on London’s third airport attempted. We have returned to the distinction between the planner and the policy-maker.

It is a platitude that cabinet is the keystone of the political arch, whatever that may be, and therefore a suitable place to start looking for policymaker-level co-ordination. Sol Encel argued a decade ago that ‘not only has much of the responsibility for policy-making shifted from cabinet to the controllers of the large public corporations and the various regulatory commissions, but there is little in the way of an apparatus of control or co-ordination at the ministerial level to enable Cabinet—and *a fortiori* the individual minister—to enforce changes in policy’ (Encel 1962: 311). In some cabinet systems it is difficult to say how cabinet works and, in particular, virtually impossible to say anything about the use of cabinet
The Role of Government

sub-committees because their existence, necessary though it may be, derogates from the authority of cabinet as a whole. In New South Wales there is no hesitation: the appointment and composition of cabinet sub-committees, often some details of the state of decision-making within them, are made public, and we can suspect that their employment goes part of the way to counter the tendency Encel reported. A cabinet sub-committee deals with a major project: for the Eastern Suburbs Railway composed of the Minister for Transport, the Advisory Minister for Transport (a curiosity attributed to a need to secure expertise which the bicameral system had placed outside the main arena of the lower house) and the Minister for Local Government. A cabinet sub-committee considers progress of a major project: The Rocks redevelopment scheme required the Minister for Local Government, the Advisory Minister for Transport, the Minister for Public Works, and the Minister for Justice. A cabinet sub-committee studies policy reports: the Else-Mitchell report on local government finance went to the Ministers for Local Government, Public Works, and Health; and so on.

Below the cabinet level the co-ordinating committee is even more popular. Thus the field of transport produced a positive swarm of committees in the closing days of the Renshaw government and the early months of the Askin government. In September 1964 the Traffic Advisory Committee was created to deal with traffic congestion; it has concentrated on particular trouble spots with the provision of subways and footbridges, and on easing the traffic flow in congested areas. In April 1965 the County of Cumberland Passenger Transport Advisory Committee was introduced to ‘make recommendations and report . . . on all types of passenger movement, both public and private, in the County of Cumberland and to deal with such matters as land use, staggering of hours and co-ordination of existing and future transport services’ (Report of the Commissioner for Government Transport, 1968: 27). Its early work was in the field of co-ordination of different services, car parking at suburban railway stations, bus/rail transfer terminals, and the like. In November 1965 there appeared the Sydney Harbour Ferries Inter-Departmental Committee which looked into combined bus/ferry tickets and better co-ordination of services. There were already in the field a number of Advisory Parking Committees, the oldest dealing with the City of Sydney dating from the mid-1950s, and six others, more recent, for Burwood, Manly, North Sydney, Strathfield, Waverley and Woollahra. Their immediate responsibility is the allocation of kerb space, and parking emergencies such as bus strikes although even this field is not without controversy, as evidenced by the dispute the City of Sydney Committee had with the old City of Sydney Council over inner city parking stations; in such disputes the Council is bound by the advice of the committee, but may appeal to the Minister for Local Government. Their volume
of business varies greatly as might be expected. Sydney's committee met thirteen times in 1967-8, and its technical sub-committee met 187 times and produced sixty reports, while out at Burwood the committee and the technical sub-committee each met only once during that year. Some overlap of personnel in these committees is inevitable; the extent is shown in Table 3:2.

TABLE 3:2 Composition of transport committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>County of Cumberland</th>
<th>Sydney Harbour</th>
<th>Sydney Inter-deptl</th>
<th>Other Advisory Parking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport Advisory</td>
<td>Transport Advisory</td>
<td>Ferries Advisory</td>
<td>Parking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Transport</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Transport</td>
<td>X^a</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Roads</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>X^a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Planning Authority</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td>X^a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Services Board</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local authority</td>
<td>O^b</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: X head of department
O other officer
^a chairman
^b may be co-opted

At the official level as well as at the cabinet level, committees are used for a wide variety of purposes: for example to supervise an inquiry being conducted by consultants. When in 1967 W. D. Scott and Co. Pty Ltd were investigating re-location of the city markets, they were assisted by a steering committee composed of the Under-Secretary of the Department of Local Government, the Director-General of the Department of Agriculture and the Chief of the Division of Marketing and Agricultural Economics of his department, and the chairman of the State Planning Authority; W. D. Scott's investigation was into the implications of a report made in 1964 by a committee composed of the chief town planner of the Department of Local Government (who by 1967 had become chairman of the State Planning Authority), the superintendent of markets for Sydney City Council and the principal planning officer of that Council, the Chief of the Division of Marketing and Agricultural Economics again, and the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. Finally, the last example, an investigation into the gross pollution of Shea's Creek which flows into Cook's River and
thence to Botany Bay required an inter-departmental committee comprising representatives of the Departments of Public Health and Public Works, the Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board and the Maritime Services Board, and the two local municipalities, South Sydney and Marrickville.

Planning inevitably involves co-ordination:

The Authority continued to act as a co-ordinating body with other Government authorities concerned with planning and allied matters. The Authority was represented on a number of Inter-Departmental committees and liaison with private enterprise was effected through sub-committees with representatives of various interests, such as real estate and development organisations.

(State Planning Authority 1970: 5)

An earlier report listed some of the bodies: the Council of the National Trust, the Geographical Names Board, the Georges River Valley Extractive Industries Committee, the Inter-Departmental Committee on Containerisation, another on co-ordinated port and industrial development on Botany Bay and a third on the future development of the Kurnell Peninsula, the University of Sydney Planning Research Centre; and instanced meetings with representatives of real estate interests on development matters, with oil companies on the siting of service stations, and with the Housing Commission on public housing. Under its Act, the State Planning Authority itself undertakes certain local activities through co-ordinating committees. Early in 1970 the Campbelltown Development Committee was constituted to guide the Authority on the new city for Campbelltown-Camden; its chairman was the Authority's deputy chairman, and the other six members represented the Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board, the Treasury, the Department of Main Roads, private industry, and the two local authorities concerned. Another committee to prepare a report on bus/rail interchange at Bondi Junction was composed of representatives of the State Planning Authority, three transport departments (Government Transport, Main Roads and Railways) and two local authorities, while a steering committee was to oversee consultants preparing a plan for Chatswood shopping centre, this time representatives of the Authority, four transport departments (Government Transport, Motor Transport, Main Roads and Railways), the police and the local authority. So far we have mentioned co-ordination of state, regional and local authority levels by committees, but there is sometimes a federal presence in such committees. The Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport Noise Abatement Committee is one well-known example, although other aviation disputes seem to have developed without benefit of committee, for example the federal government's rejection of a second airport site at Towra Point and the protracted case of the small aerodrome to be built at Terrey Hills (see Sydney Morning Herald 8 Feb. 1968). A recent move into the field of urban redevelopment
in a small but vital part of the metropolitan area created the Sydney Cove Redevelopment Authority in 1968. The six members of the Authority are a chairman and a director nominated by the Minister for Local Government, two other members nominated by the Minister to have special knowledge or experience in town planning or building development, an officer of the Public Works Department, and one officer of the City of Sydney Council.

Despite this luxuriant growth of co-ordinating machinery through committees, most decisions have to be taken within a single local authority, regional body or state ministerial department. Very often the individual citizen has to collect decisions from a variety of agencies. Sometimes this can be done smoothly, as the Chief Medical Officer of the Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board reported to the Senate select committee on water pollution:

No factory site is selected by the Department of Industrial Development and Decentralisation without reference to the State Planning Authority and my own Board. If I may give an example, some years ago the Board had this very excellent system that we have now and I was able in four days to get 13 Government departments to approve the establishment of a proposed factory costing £4m at Penrith. That involved water supply, sewerage and potential pollution control. (Senate Select Committee on Water Pollution: Evidence 1970: 1526)

More typical, perhaps, are the views reported in the Sydney Strategic Plan as to the state of planning co-ordination in the City of Sydney:

Those respondents who have any experience of it are unanimous in their pleading that something be done to reduce the delays, confusion and duplication caused by so many different authorities, often with conflicting opinions, handling each Application for Development Consent.

Developers point out that they are not told and cannot ascertain the policies or criteria which govern acceptance or rejection of a proposal. They complain that even when Council has granted a development consent subject to conditions, Council’s decision will be contradicted by any one or more of a number of State authorities or committees. (Sydney City Council 1971: 13)

Wherever decisions are taken, they will be affected by three constraints, the physical resources available—expressed mainly in money terms, the manpower resources available and particularly the scarce skills of the new environmental control professions, and the intelligence resources available. We have already touched on the substantial capital sums required to meet the needs of a Sydney swollen to five million people and the Sydney Region Outline Plan speaks of $20,000 million for housing over the next thirty years, $1,850 million for water and sewerage, $2,600 million for expressways, and similar astronomical sums. There is another way in which financial restrictions apply, the relative stickiness of budgetary allocations which maintain spending patterns once they are established. Table 3:3 shows the pattern of expenditure by local authorities over the past fifteen years.
### TABLE 3:3 Local authority expenditure, Sydney Statistical District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>City of Sydney</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads, bridges &amp; drainage</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City of Others</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to Main Roads</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Street lighting</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation &amp; garbage</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health services*</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libraries</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town planning</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ($m)</strong></td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>City of Sydney</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads, bridges &amp; drainage</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>City of Others</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to Main Roads</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Street lighting</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<td>4.1</td>
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<td>Sanitation &amp; garbage</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health services*</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libraries</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town planning</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total ($m)</strong></td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>100.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including baby health centres.

b New boundaries.

One might have supposed that the wave of development sweeping outwards from the centre of the Sydney region would have impacted local authorities for a time, distorted their expenditure pattern, and then allowed them to resume previous patterns or else settle on a new pattern reflecting their enlarged commitments. In fact such a tidy model does not fit geographical realities: north of the areas already developed by the end of World War II, the local authorities are pie-slice shaped so that the development crest passes slowly along their length, while south of the old developed area the massive Shire of Sutherland has absorbed all post-war growth in that sector. Only westwards, along the railway line to Penrith and south of it, can one see any sign of the model operating. As Ruth Atkins argues, it will only be by detailed studies of individual local authorities (and we would add regional bodies and state ministerial departments) that the influences on expenditure patterns can be determined. Thus, to give one simple and obvious example, expenditure on town planning in, say, 1957 and 1967, could be a useful measure of response to urban growth. Overall this is so: with two exceptions (Mosman and Rockdale) all the authorities whose town planning expenditure increased by more than 400 per cent were outer areas. A number of the largest and most impacted authorities had much the same growth rate: Bankstown, Blacktown, Sutherland and
Warringah all increased threefold. But in Hornsby the increase was almost eightfold, while in next-door Kur-ring-gai it did not even double, the immediate explanation being Ku-ring-gai's relatively high figure in 1957 and Hornsby's extremely low figure. In another apparently similar pair of authorities, Manly doubled its expenditure while Mosman's rose fivefold.

Another field of local authority expenditure which would repay close study for a test of stresses on the system would be that small field of social service provision these authorities now occupy. This provision has been subject to some criticism, for example from P. D. Hills (a former Lord Mayor of Sydney and Minister for Local Government) who called on the state government to fix rates income for local authorities so that:

They must concentrate on their basic functions of providing the essential services, such as roads, kerbing and guttering, drainage, garbage disposal and other priority matters. First things must come first, then, if funds are available within prudent financing, the refinements of social services and amenities. (*Sydney Morning Herald* 23 Dec. 1968)

The strength of feeling on the matter, and degree of misperception of the scale of the problem, is indicated by a meeting called at the Panania School of Arts by the local branch of the Amalgamated Engineering Union which asked the federal government to make available 10 per cent of taxation to meet the cost of social service provision by local authorities. The deputy mayor of Bankstown had previously warned the meeting that the burden of social services, which should have been met by the state and federal governments, had caused rates to spiral upwards to the point where they were taxing home owners out of existence (*Sydney Morning Herald* 19 Mar. 1966).

Should governmental authorities take a broad or a narrow view of their responsibilities? Is planning a matter of matching limited resources with a closed list of functions, and policy-making the determination of resources and functions? Juxtapose two statements reflecting a broad and a narrow conception of responsibilities. First the State Planning Authority, speaking of its intentions for Mount Druitt, sought to

provide a planned town of reasonably varied character, with comprehensive services and facilities for the inhabitants of the area, rather than to build merely a 'dormitory' suburb. It was realized that, in the public interest, the development ought to be planned to achieve, as far as could be done in the circumstances, a high quality of layout and environment incorporating a design for a town centre which would provide an attractive and effective focal-point for the town. (*State Planning Authority 1967b:* 22)

Compare the very modest goals of the Housing Commission:

It is not practicable, nor consistent with its role, for the Commission to adopt, to any greater extent than it does, the more costly trends and amenities evident in dwellings for private ownership. While there is no physical problem in building more expensive dwellings, those provided by the Commission
are for people for whom no other organization will cater or service in this important matter of housing and who are unable to have their reasonable requirements met on a rental or purchase basis through the private sector. It is important always that regard be had to the social welfare nature of the Commission's activities, which must have a bearing on the type of dwellings provided in its ordinary programmes. (Report of the Housing Commission 1968: 11)

Throughout the Sydney region, 'government' housing, of which the Housing Commission would provide the greater part, constitutes less than 14 per cent of the total built (1961-2 to 1968-9), but there are particular authorities in which the proportion rises to a quarter (Blacktown), almost half (Windsor) and more than two-thirds (Liverpool), and then the Commission's restricted responsibilities raise more difficulties:

Generally estates are planned so that all requirements for modern living are catered for and facilities which it is accepted are the responsibility of the Government and its instrumentalities are provided. However, people living in Government housing estates do not have advantage in the sense that special financial provision is made for other requirements of a social, or cultural and like nature on a basis which would not be available to serve their interests as members of the community obtaining their housing in new residential developments through the private sector. Many of the latter are as distant from the previous environment of residents, or from the city, as the Commission's projects. (Report of the Housing Commission 1968: 18)

But if Housing Commission tenants and house-purchasers are those unlikely to be able to secure housing from the private sector, then their capacity to provide such facilities through voluntary organisations and payment of rates to the local council must be suspect. Moreover, the Commission does take some wider considerations into its calculations, for example, because of the greater availability of private sector housing 'and to discourage people looking to Sydney for housing in preference to the country' (Report of the Housing Commission 1968: 14), emphasis is placed on a country program which entails waiting times in Sydney being considerably longer than in country areas.

There is a strong case for regarding the politics of urban growth as one side of a coin, and the politics of decentralisation the other. Thus the Minister for Development and Decentralisation:

Government decentralisation policy in three years has thus removed the need for country population equal to that of the city of Dubbo to add itself to Sydney. We must multiply this success by five if we are going to check Sydney's growth to a proportion that will be physically and financially manageable. (Sydney Morning Herald 10 May 1968)

Two months earlier the State Planning Authority had not been so certain:

The concept of decentralisation has long been built in to thoughts on State development, but the nature and level of action hitherto has clearly not made
a very significant difference to the strong drift of population to the Sydney Region . . . Such movement is a world-wide phenomenon. This is also true of the congestion problems which have arisen in the metropolis concurrently with population growth, but these have been caused more by an unsatisfactory distribution of activities within the Region and by insufficient public investment in services and communications than by population growth as such. There is no evidence before the Authority to warrant any assumption that the solutions to these internal problems depend on diverting urban growth elsewhere. (State Planning Authority 1968b: 19)

At this point we have returned to the doubts expressed by Sir Geoffrey Vickers with which the chapter began. Are there in existence in New South Wales and Australia institutions appropriate in scale to the resolution of this conflict? And are there institutions which can implement such policies as are formulated for this purpose? Optimism is easier about the second question than about the first, for reasons which appear in the next chapter, but Vickers went on to raise a third doubt:

Let us suppose that our policy-making institutions are or become such that they can generate policies equal to our needs . . . What kind of electorate, what kind of party system would make it possible for any government to come to power on a programme made of such long-term and presently expensive policies; or for any series of governments to carry them out? (Vickers 1970: 121)

It has been said that a policy of decentralisation will require fifteen years to take hold. In Australian terms that means a span of five federal elections and five state elections. What electorate would have such staying power? Perhaps only an electorate involved in the planning process by participation?
The design of political institutions in Australia, as France and Hughes point out in the preceding chapter, has never been appropriate for regulating the phenomenon of large urban centres. Governments at all levels, through their various agencies, have each been responding to the demands generated by metropolitan growth in their own way and, as Parker observes in Chapter 2, there is often a striking imbalance of powers and resources.

From the beginning of this century New South Wales governments have been concerned to establish some form of urban administration for a 'Greater Sydney' and local government has from time to time discussed ideas for a second-tier institution for the metropolis. The early and wholly unsuccessful efforts by the state were directed towards divesting the state government of many of its responsibilities for metropolitan affairs. The idea of planning, originally seen as one of the responsibilities of a metropolitan government, came to be regarded as a means by which many of the purposes of such a government could be fulfilled. It held the promise that the responsibility for metropolitan affairs in the state capital would not devolve upon a government which could in some respects become a political rival to the state government itself. This chapter describes the emergence of statutory land use planning as a means of regulating growth and change in the metropolitan region, a responsibility which is currently shared in an uneasy alliance between the state government, its agencies and local government.

The first move for a Greater Sydney came from local councils in the Sydney area at a conference in 1898 but dissension arose over the issue of a federation as opposed to the unification of local bodies. A Parliamentary Select Committee was set up in 1902 and heard a diversity of opinion without making any recommendation. A Royal Commission on the Improvement of the City of Sydney and its Suburbs in 1909 heard evidence in support of a Greater Sydney but its recommendations were clearly in favour of each of the municipalities having wider powers over housing, slum clearance and the town planning of new areas.
The second Royal Commission for Greater Sydney, set up in 1912, produced a report which formed the basis for the Greater Sydney bill of 1915. The City of Sydney and twenty-four local government areas with a population of 563,000 were to be replaced by a new council, and progressively the entire metropolitan area embracing fifty-three municipalities and a population of 813,000 was to be included. The council was to be empowered to take over all the private power and gas supply companies and eventually the Metropolitan Board of Water Supply and Sewerage. With the exception of suburban rail and tramways and the Sydney Harbour Trust the state was not only seeking to reduce its participation in metropolitan affairs but to pay municipal rates on all state properties except schools. The new council was expected to attend to all matters of metropolitan concern including the need for a bridge over Sydney Harbour.

The most controversial provision was for adult suffrage. Mr Arthur Griffith (Labor) in his second reading speech pointed out that in the twenty-four municipalities involved in the first stage of the Greater Sydney proposal: 'there are on the municipal rolls 143,000 electors. There are in the same area on the parliamentary rolls 386,000, so that in the area where 386,000 parliamentary electors live 243,000 of them are denied civic franchise ... The greatest danger of municipal corruption is apathy on the part of citizens. The way to cure that apathy is to give them full citizen rights to vote or to be a candidate for the government of the metropolitan area.' This provision, described by Griffith as 'the only matter in this great measure which can fairly be regarded as a party question', would most certainly never have survived a passage through the upper house.

Not the least of the new measures proposed in the bill was the provision for a 'civic planning commission', a board of experts consisting of the mayor and six members, three appointed by council and three appointed by the government, a 'very independent body ... appointed solely on the ground of special qualifications'. Mr Griffith explained: 'We could not expect a number of aldermen drawn together by the ordinary electoral methods to contain a sufficient number of experts in the matter of planning' (New South Wales Parliamentary Debate [NSWPD] 7 Oct. 1915).

Other bills for a Greater Sydney were introduced in 1918 and 1927 and town planning bills in 1919 and 1922. In 1931, W. J. McKell, Minister for Local Government, submitted the fourth Greater Sydney bill. In the second reading speech in the Legislative Council the Vice-President of the Executive Council, J. M. Concannon, traced the history of the efforts towards metropolitan government and said: 'This bill is based on the recommendations of Royal Commissions over many years past and it represents the culmination of very complete investigation'. It was presented, like its predecessors, as a non-party measure.

Unlike the earlier attempts to establish metropolitan government, the
intention was to reduce the number of municipalities from sixty-nine to twenty-eight for the purpose of providing local services, but to charge the Greater Sydney council with the responsibilities for metropolitan services throughout the County of Cumberland, an area of 1,750 square miles with a population of 1.5 millions. The powers and responsibilities of the Sydney Harbour Trust, the Sydney Water Board, the Fire Brigades Board, the Main Roads Board and the Metropolitan Transport Trust were to be taken over by the Greater Sydney council.

The new council was also to be responsible for 'town and regional planning' and was to prepare, within three years, an outline scheme for the County of Cumberland. In his speech Concannon told the Legislative Council that 'the work does not require any board or committee of experts, as any experienced town-planner employed by the council would most effectively complete it comfortably in half the time specified' (NSWPD 21 July 1931).

The bill was heavily amended in the Legislative Council. It was clear that most of the local councils were opposed to amalgamation and the direct election of the aldermen. The amalgamation provisions were removed and the election of members to the proposed council was made the responsibility of the local councils. McKell's bill lapsed when the Lang government was defeated at the 1932 elections.

While all parties had, since 1915, acknowledged the need for some form of metropolitan government, Labor had made the stronger efforts towards reform although non-Labor governments introduced town planning bills in 1919 and 1936. The failure of the Greater Sydney bills can be attributed to the resistance of the local councils to amalgamation and the fear that the direct election of aldermen from state electorates rather than local government wards would favour the Labor Party candidates at municipal elections. The New South Wales Labor Party has always regarded municipal government as a legitimate area of activity and a training ground for party members; the non-Labor parties have always remained officially aloof from municipal politics.

The reforms proposed in the Greater Sydney bills were too far-reaching to survive a passage in the Legislative Council. When Labor returned to office in 1941 with McKell as premier the McKell plan of 1931 was not revived but in 1945 a Royal Commission was appointed to recommend a rationalisation of local government areas in the County of Cumberland. The three members of the Royal Commission each submitted independent recommendations for the amalgamation of the sixty-seven areas in the County of Cumberland. The recommendation for consolidation into eight 'cities' was adopted but aroused so much opposition from the local councils and the Local Government Association that the number of areas was increased from eight to fourteen and then to sixteen. While the bill was before
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the Legislative Council a select committee was appointed and recommended a consolidation of the sixty-seven local areas into thirty-nine. The Local Government (Areas) Act of 1948 embodied these recommendations including the enlargement of the City of Sydney boundaries and the repeal of the City of Sydney Corporation Act. The City of Sydney lost its charter and became subject to the Local Government Act. Its enlarged boundaries, embracing a number of inner suburbs, ensured that the City Council would have a majority of Labor aldermen. The amalgamations fell far short of the earlier ambitions for 'eight cities' and were scarcely significant as a move towards metropolitan government.

THE CUMBERLAND COUNTY COUNCIL

The introduction by the McKell government in 1945 of the Local Government (Town and Country Planning) Amendment Bill had already indicated a retreat from the Greater Sydney idea, at least as a form of local government for the metropolis. Although the bill was concerned with enabling local governments throughout New South Wales to prepare statutory schemes for 'regulating and controlling the use of land' the central purpose of the legislation was the preparation of a statutory land use plan for the County of Cumberland. The county plan was to provide a framework to guide the sixty-seven councils of 'Greater Sydney' in the preparation of their local planning schemes; its preparation was to be guided by a town and country planning advisory committee, set up under the legislation, with the assistance of a town planning branch of the Department of Local Government.

Although J. J. Cahill, the Minister for Local Government, presented the bill 'in the firm belief that it must receive the warm support of all hon. members' (NSWPD 13 Feb. 1945) many aspects of the bill aroused opposition. Most of the objections were concerned with the wide powers given to the Minister. The outline planning scheme proposed for the County of Cumberland was to be a direct responsibility of the Minister. The preparation and administration of all local planning schemes was to be the responsibility of local government but at each step, from the resolution to prepare a planning scheme through to the presentation of the planning ordinance to Parliament, the Minister retained complete control. 'The Minister is to be the poobah; not only the Minister in authority; the Minister in initiation; the Minister in direction and the Minister who receives appeals but also the whole box of tricks' (R. W. D. Weaver: NSWPD 6 Mar. 1945). Amendments to the bill made provision for an objection by a local council to be

1 Labor control of the Sydney City Council was maintained until 1967 when the Askin (non-Labor) government appointed commissioners to replace the council pending a redefinition of the city boundaries to approximate those of 1948. The council (with a non-Labor majority) was restored in 1969.
heard by a public inquiry but the powers of the Minister remained un­changed; he could amend, suspend or reject any planning proposals.

In the debate the Minister placed some stress on the role of the planning advisory committee which would report to the Minister on all matters requiring his decision, but it was the committee's role as the principal author of the Cumberland County plan which aroused the defenders of local government. The Local Government Association pressed for the establishment of a second-tier local government body to prepare the outline plan for Sydney. This was the most significant amendment to the bill. The creation of the Cumberland County Council of ten members, one representing the Sydney City Council and nine elected by constituencies of from five to twelve local councils, demonstrated the influence that local government was able to exert in the Legislative Council.

Part of the price for the government's acceptance of the amendment to the bill was the requirement that the Cumberland County Council should be financed by a rate collected by the local councils. The Act allowed three years for the preparation of the county plan with provision for an extension at the discretion of the Minister. The Cumberland County District was promulgated on 27 July 1945, the councillors were elected on 20 September and had their first meeting on 13 November. Ordinance 104, gazetted on 9 November 1945, prescribed the matters to be provided for in the planning scheme to be 'prepared for the County as a whole' and submitted by 27 July 1948. While only a shadow of the ideas for a Greater Sydney administration it did give some promise of the first comprehensive consideration of the metropolis and its physical development.

The Council's task was the production of a plan 'regulating and controlling the use of land' throughout the County which, if implemented, would have had the important result of bringing a measure of co-ordination to the work of a number of public authorities, all of which had been accustomed to pursuing their own works programs, and as a corollary, exercising controls over development by the private sector. For the most part the public authorities regarded the Council as a 3-year wonder. Professional vigour within the County Council was generally able to overcome the weakness inherent in a council which had mushroomed from the grassroots of the local authorities and was often reluctant or perhaps unable to look at metropolitan problems from anything but a parochial level. The presentation of the County Plan to the Minister on the due date in July 1948, after public exhibition (and the receipt of objections, some 3,500 in all) was in itself an achievement for local government. It seems fairly cer-

2 The Town and Country Planning Advisory Committee consisted of an architect, an engineer, and a surveyor, each nominated by his professional institute, an officer of the Department of Local Government, an alderman nominated by the Local Government Association and two members nominated by the Minister.
tain that neither the local councils at whose behest it was created nor the
government itself had any clear idea of the nature of the plan that would
be produced. Local councils had begun to see it as an infringement of their
rights and responsibilities; the County Council came to be regarded as an
agency of the state rather than as a representative of local interests.

The response by local councils to the opportunities for local planning
provided by the 1945 Act had been much less enthusiastic than expected.
The County Plan was intended to provide a framework for, and eventually
to be superseded by, the statutory detailed plans of local councils but the
councils proved reluctant to embark on their own schemes. The Minister
was apparently sufficiently impressed by the County Plan to attempt to
ensure that it should be carried to the more detailed stage by local councils.
To this end the Local Government (Areas) Act of 1948 included a
requirement that all councils in the county were to prepare local planning
schemes.

In a move which could have been a form of retaliation several councils
called into question the need to retain the Cumberland County Council
beyond the 3-year period required to prepare and submit the County Plan. On legal advice, payment of the levy for financing the Council was refused
by a number of councils and it was not until April 1950 that the legalities
of maintaining the local councils' contributions for the continued existence
of the County Council up to the end of 1951 were established. The Local
Government Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act 1950 also
required the Council to prepare a 'supplementary scheme'.

The County Scheme as submitted in 1948 was considered by the Town
and Country Planning Advisory Committee which in its report to the
Minister recommended some increase in the areas of land zoned for urban
purposes. It also pointed to the necessity for retaining the County Council
as the authority responsible for the more important features of the scheme.

But the government was uncertain about the consequences of continuing
hostility from the local councils and doubtful about financing the imple-
mentation of the scheme. The cost of acquiring the proposed open spaces
and the routes for new roads was estimated at £15.7 million. Assistance
was sought from the Commonwealth on the basis that the cost should be
shared by local, state and federal government. The Commonwealth had,
under the Chifley government in 1943, set up a Commonwealth Housing
Commission to inquire into the housing requirements of Australia. The
recommendations in the Commission's final report of 1944 formed the basis

3 The mayor of Mosman, Alderman R. S. Luke, announced on 12 August 1949
that the Mosman Council would suspend payment on the grounds that the government
should bear the costs of the County Council until a decision was made about the
county scheme (Powell 1968).
of the Commonwealth and State Housing Agreement Act 1945 which required that:

Each State shall ensure that adequate legislation exists . . . to enable it at all times to control throughout the State
(a) rental housing projects . . .
(b) slum clearance; and
(c) town planning.

The Commission had also recommended that: ‘the Commonwealth Government should subsidise any approved local government authority, group of authorities or regional council in a replanning scheme . . .’ But the Menzies government in December 1950 refused assistance on the grounds that it was not a matter of Commonwealth concern. The County scheme proposals were further modified to eliminate from the reservations marked for acquisition for open spaces and county roads the land which was occupied by buildings, reducing the estimated costs of these parts of the scheme.

THE CUMBERLAND PLAN

The Cumberland County Planning Scheme Ordinance was finally assented to as part of the Local Government (Amendment) Act in June 1951. The Act established the County Council as the ‘responsible authority’ for implementing particular aspects of the planning scheme including the power to acquire land. Costs of maintaining the Council were to be borne by the constituent councils and the Cumberland Council was empowered to levy a rate (0·1d. in the £) to finance half the costs of the land acquisitions required to implement the scheme, the other half to be provided by the government.

Three years had elapsed since the scheme had been submitted to the Minister, a period of uncertainty which has been described by Winston (1957) as a disaster. Developments occurring in this period, although nominally subject to the interim control powers of the County Council, more often than not had to be allowed to go ahead; there were no funds to pay compensation nor any certainty that there ever would be. In many parts the scheme as adopted was no longer feasible.

The Council itself had been through a demoralising period; except for a handful of senior professionals most of the experienced staff had left and had not been replaced. The years of uncertainty had diminished whatever modest status the council had enjoyed in the hierarchy of public authorities concerned with metropolitan affairs; the council’s charter had been restored and extended but the optimism of the early years was never recovered.
The promulgation of the Planning Scheme Ordinance by the government was the most definitive expression of a public policy on the form and content of an Australian metropolitan area ever attempted. The more important features of the plan were:

1. The encircling green belt which defined the limits of the continuous suburban spread by a general prohibition against building on sites less than 5 acres in area. A major concern of the council was the proliferation of premature subdivisions and the widespread scatter of housing around the rural-urban fringe.

2. The general prohibition of new buildings on the lands designated for open space and county roads. Some $16 million was spent on the acquisition of these lands over the period 1951-68 but the areas of open space were much reduced from those proposed in the 1948 plan. Many local councils resented being saddled with the responsibility for these open spaces and their loss as rateable lands.

3. The zoning of land for manufacturing industry in the middle and outer suburbs as well as the confirmation of the existing predominantly industrialised localities in the inner areas. This was a conscious attempt to reserve new areas for industrial growth in suitable locations with regard to the needs of industry and the future residential distribution of factory workers. Suburban dispersal of manufacturing plants would have occurred in any event, but would certainly have been hampered by the lack of suitable available sites. Many local councils resisted these zoning proposals and the size and location of the areas that were held for factories were not always ideal.

4. As a corollary to (3) many of the older inner housing areas, regarded by realtors as future commercial or industrial areas, were zoned as living areas which protected them from further industrial penetration and no doubt encouraged their later rehabilitation and renewal. Although some of these localities were labelled as due for 're-housing within twenty-five years' in the post-war enthusiasm for a better world, spontaneous rehabilitation by owner-occupants of what was then predominantly rental housing has left very few areas which today could be regarded as deserving of large-scale renewal.

These four aspects of the County Plan were probably the weightiest influences on the patterns of urban growth and change although the Plan had wider aspirations. Sixteen of the suburban centres were zoned as district centres with the intention that they would assume more important roles as central places and relieve the central city of some of the increase in activities arising from an increased metropolitan population. None has in fact acquired the level of importance that was vaguely hoped for, although several have gone some distance towards the role that was envisaged,
assisted in great measure by the suburban growth of city-based retail houses. Other centres have missed out completely and remain virtually unchanged.

Other aims of the County Plan, such as the preservation of historic buildings, the aesthetic protection of foreshores and the control of ribbon development on highways have met with varying degrees of success but cannot be regarded as having had much influence on the course of events in terms of metropolitan growth.

The zoning of land for urban purposes in the County Plan allowed a wide measure of discretion to be exercised by the local councils. The living areas, calculated to provide for an increase in population in the metropolitan area from 1.7 to 2.4 millions up to 1972, allowed for a variety of non-residential uses to be approved at the discretion of the councils. The City of Sydney area, labelled as the County Centre on the plan, remained the responsibility of the City Council subject to discretionary controls pending the adoption of the City of Sydney planning scheme.

The Cumberland County Council was the 'responsible authority' for the administration of the green belt zone and the reservations for county roads and open spaces. It was also responsible for the 'granting of consent' for public buildings of the Crown and of public utility undertakings. The County Council occupied a unique position in the apparatus of government.

The local councils had always resented the additional rates required to run the Council and became even more restive when called upon to bear half the cost of implementing the County Plan. Only the City Council, the largest contributor with expectations of the least direct benefit, remained quiescent. The adoption of the amended County Plan and the continuance of the Council as the implementing authority for some of the more important features of the plan can probably be attributed to the paternal influence of the Premier, J. J. Cahill, who as Minister for Local Government had introduced the bill in 1945 and steered the scheme through parliament in 1951.

The Council's relationships with other departments and authorities concerned with metropolitan development were never easy. Their attitudes to this upstart organisation varied from indifference to hostility. Only the Sydney Water Board which had a massive backlog of works was silently grateful for the restraint imposed on continuing scatter by the green belt zoning. During the ten years from 1951 when the green belt remained more or less intact the Board was straining its resources to build the $70 million Warragamba dam. Over this period the Board managed to extend water and sewer to about 150,000 extra lots and the number of vacant lots supplied with water in the Board's area was reduced from 75,000 to 43,000; vacant sewered lots from 14,000 to 9,000.
But most of the other authorities found reasons for resentment. The New South Wales Housing Commission had already found it necessary to cut across the 1948 plan to meet its demands for tracts of land for its housing estates; the Department of Main Roads (DMR) found that the Council's activities in protecting the routes of the county roads were sometimes of doubtful benefit. Thousands of anxious property owners sought information about the routes but it was not always possible to decide how their properties were likely to be affected because the design work by the DMR for many parts of the network could not be completed for many years. The Department of Railways virtually ignored the Council and its plan, and on questions such as the eastern suburbs railways proposal dealt directly with cabinet. Other departments such as Government Transport, Lands, Industrial Development and the Maritime Services Board consulted or ignored the council as they saw fit. Major issues were determined by cabinet where the County Council's views, if they emerged at all, came from the Minister for Local Government after filtering through the channels of his own department and consultation with the Town and Country Planning Advisory Committee.

Two decisions in 1953 made it clear that the Council was not the final authority on developments within the County. The decision to allow the Caltex Oil refinery to establish on Kurnell peninsula, an area zoned as open space, was made by cabinet. Although the County Council reported against the proposal and argued for other locations the Minister exercised his prerogative in 'suspending' this part of the County Plan and granting permission, with the support of his Town and Country Planning Advisory Committee, for the use of the Crown lands involved.

The second decision was in response to pressure from the Housing Commission for the release of some green belt lands. The need to revise the green belt boundary, which had become moth-eaten in parts (largely as a result of the uncertainties about the future of the plan in the period of hiatus, 1948-51), was reluctantly accepted by the Council. This was interpreted as a relaxation of policy by the local councils in the growth areas affected by the green belt zoning and noted by those in the business of land trading and subdivision. The green belt, the feature of the County Plan which up to that time had been regarded as sacrosanct and which enjoyed a wide though vague measure of popular esteem, began to lose its charisma.

The County Council never became part of 'the ring' of departments and authorities where the workings of the apparatus of government, whether in conflict or in co-operation, are dealt with by unwritten understandings and personal or official relationships acquired over time. Its staff was not recruited from the public service and remained outside it; in this and all other respects it was 'a loner'. What strength it had stemmed from its role as custodian of the important elements of the statutory county plan, the
provisions of which the Minister had the power, if he chose, to suspend and, in the last resort, change.

The Council's relationships with the local councils were at best ambiguous. Although the Local Government Association gave formal support to the County Council and objected to the Liberal-Country Party coalition policy speeches in the elections of 1953 and 1956 promising abolition of the Council (Powell 1968), the local councils themselves had varying views. Although unwilling to depart from the stand that metropolitan affairs should be a matter for local government, they resented the loading on the local rates required to maintain the Council and their contribution to the costs of acquiring the lands reserved for open space and county roads in the plan. Most were reluctant to complete local planning schemes despite the direction of the government embodied in the Areas Act of 1948, but all were pleased to take advantage of the discretionary control over private developments which were conferred by the County Planning Scheme Ordinance.

Few councils employed competent professional planners and even those that did were not always prepared to act on their recommendations. The power to grant or refuse applications for development, or to grant approvals subject to conditions, was not always used responsibly. Consultation with the County Council before arriving at a decision, even when this was legally required, was not always practised. But an approval by a local council, even when made in defiance or neglect of the proper procedures, remained valid and neither the County Council nor the Minister could exercise effective sanctions against the abuse of such authority.

Appeals against a refusal, or the imposition of conditions on an approval, could be made to the Land and Valuation Court. The time and cost involved in this procedure prevented many appeals being lodged against refusals by councils but some hundreds of cases were brought before the Court, both with and without the support of the Cumberland County Council. The judgments of the Land and Valuation Court provide a valuable body of case law which, in some important respects, has clarified some of the obscurities of the legislation but the wisdom imparted by the court judgments and the support these have given for the wise use of planning controls have not improved the behaviour of local councils. Successful defence of a refusal of a development application does not bind a council in the event of a second application being lodged. Not infrequently a council has chosen to allow a development to proceed after successfully defending a refusal in the court.

One of the earliest judgments, in Baker v. Cumberland County Council 1956, established that no compensation was payable for diminution of development rights consequent upon the imposition of a green belt zone requiring a minimum lot area of 5 acres.
The Department of Local Government was preparing in 1955 to restrain the erratic behaviour of the local councils by making the Cumberland Council responsible for the control of development on county road frontages ('ribbon development') and proposals for all hotels, theatres, larger factories and retail premises, a move which would have further reduced the responsibilities of the councils, but was modified to an arrangement for joint consultation on these matters. It was not until 1962 that local councils were required to secure the concurrence of the County Council to developments on main roads, a responsibility which was inherited by the State Planning Authority in 1964.

The relationships between Cumberland and the local councils were further complicated by the handful of local councils preparing local planning schemes which were often at variance with the provisions of the County Scheme. The County Council had no responsibility for the scrutiny of these schemes; they were submitted to the Minister and dealt with by the Town Planning Branch and the Advisory Committee of the Department of Local Government. The public exhibition of these planning schemes which would, if adopted, supersede the County Plan, gave rise to a good deal of confusion.

One of the earliest of the 'local' schemes to be prepared was that for the City of Sydney. Although since 1948, when the city came under the control of Labor aldermen, the principal interest of the council was the residential areas which became part of the City in that year, the draft City scheme dealt with the blank area labelled 'County Centre' on the County Plan. The draft City scheme was publicly exhibited in 1952 and included proposals for the zoning of the central business district and the imposition of a 'floor space index' on city buildings. This was intended to limit the density of building and was calculated to allow a 33 per cent increase in building accommodation, roughly equatable to the increase in the metropolitan population allowed for in the County Plan up to 1972.

The exhibition of these proposals brought strong reactions. The Pitt Street Property Owners' Defence League was formed and pamphlets were circulated. *Is Planning Stifling Development?*, a booklet by S. E. Wilson of the Retailers' Association, made a most devastating attack:

> Has any section of the community a right to interfere with and damage other people's property causing great capital loss without even a suggestion for compensation? Such a proposal is utterly immoral . . . It is wrong to cut down the city to make it comply with obsolete and inadequate services.

All proposals for control of density of city buildings were deleted from the Council's draft planning scheme when it was submitted for the Minister's examination in 1959. The scheme was amended by the Minister and exhibited again in 1964-5. This time it included proposals for floor space ratios drawn up by the State Planning Authority. Following public hearings
of objections to the scheme it was again exhibited in 1968 and attracted further objections on the issue of floor space densities. The scheme was promulgated in August 1971 without establishing controls on floor space.

Other local planning schemes were prepared but seldom got beyond the draft stage. From 1948, when the Areas Act directed that all councils in the County prepare schemes, local councils were vested with discretionary powers over development which would be more closely circumscribed on the adoption of a statutory plan. Most of the councils preferred to retain the flexibility of not having a statutory plan. By 1963, at the time of the dissolution of the County Council, three local planning schemes had been prescribed, the others remained 'in course of preparation'.

It is difficult to assess how the members of the County Council saw the role of the Council. Apart from the adherence to the principle of local government as the appropriate authority for metropolitan planning it is doubtful whether the body of councillors had any synoptic views of their functions individually or collectively. For the most part they were probably persuaded by the arguments presented by the Council's professional staff rather than any personal convictions about metropolitan planning. Their role as representatives of local councils was diffuse and many local issues were taken directly to the Minister, often by the local member of parliament.

The only areas of responsibility for metropolitan administration which remained clearly in the hands of the County Council were the control of development in the green belt and the acquisition of the vacant lands in the open space and county road reservations. The Council was nominally responsible for exercising control over the building development proposals of public authorities although it was specifically excluded from intervening in the programs of public works. The Town and Country Planning Advisory Committee in its Report on the County Scheme discussed the proposal that the council should be empowered to co-ordinate the programs of public works which were the responsibility of the Sydney Water Board and state departments such as Main Roads and Railways, but the committee concluded that such authority might be resented and felt confident that the necessary co-operation would be achieved voluntarily.

The pattern of county roads incorporated in the County Plan was substantially in accord with the recommendations of the Department of Main Roads but the priorities for implementation were determined by the Department without reference to the Council. The Water Board was struggling with a backlog of requirements for both head works and reticulation of water supply and sewerage services of such dimensions that priorities were determined by financial and technical expediency rather than any other considerations.

The cost and difficulty of providing network services to scattered de-
velopment in the extensive fringe areas of the suburbs and the uneconomic use made of the services which were provided were regarded by the County Council as among the major problems which the County Plan should help to correct. The green belt was seen as fulfilling complementary needs: permanently delimiting the continuous spread of the suburbs and preserving the rural surrounds. Although initially great weight was attached to the protection of primary production this came to be recognised as of less importance; positive support for the preservation of the green belt was largely based on aesthetic considerations with the longer term view that it would also provide sites for institutional and other ex-urban uses requiring broad acres free of urban development.

The 1954 census showed that the rate of population growth in the County was about twice that forecast in 1948. The Council had always recognised that growth beyond the 2.4 million mark would have to be accommodated in new and expanded towns in the rural areas of the County beyond the encircling green belt, and in the early years at least it was assumed that the state policies of decentralisation would divert some of the pressure of population growth to other parts of New South Wales.

By 1957 there were few tracts of unsubdivided land available within the living areas zoned in the County Plan. The New South Wales Housing Commission reported difficulty in acquiring 'in the existing Living Areas, lands for future programming particularly in parcels suitable in use . . .' and announced a proposal to build a new town for 50,000 people at Minto in the rural areas beyond the green belt south of Liverpool (NSW Housing Commission Annual Report 1957). The County Council opposed this proposal on the grounds that there was an estimated total of 100,000 vacant lots within the living area zones. The Commission claimed that there were fewer than 5,000 lots suitable for its housing program and fewer than 1,000 of these were available.

The Minto new town proposal was set aside for unspecified reasons but the question of the Housing Commission's needs for land was referred by the Minister to the Town and Country Planning Advisory Committee. The Committee directed its attention to a close scrutiny of the green belt while the Cumberland County Council undertook a series of studies of the economics of urban expansion which, when published, was 'presented as a challenge to sprawl and scatter and to the concept that increasing the scope for land sub-division is a solution to Sydney's housing problem' (Cumberland County Council 1958). The study argued that significant economies could be achieved in works, services and transportation with more compact urban patterns despite the higher costs in land and buildings that would follow. Convincing enough in economic terms, the study did not show how the required consolidation could be achieved other than by maintaining rigid restraint on suburban spread.
The claims by the Housing Commission were reinforced by pressures from private developers who had acquired interests in areas of green belt land in the expectation of a retraction of its boundaries, and local councils had scant sympathy for the green belt in their areas other than as a reservoir of land for urban expansion.

In March 1959 the Cumberland County Council was preparing to release some 5,000 acres of the green belt for residential and industrial use with a second stage release of another 7,000 acres, and proposed to exhibit the amendments for public comment before submitting them to the Minister for approval. The changes were described by the Chief County Planner as having 'the effect of protecting the Green Belt against further encroachment' (Fraser 1959a). At the same time the Council resolved to 'examine the problems of establishing Campbelltown as a large satellite town' although it was not considered to be an urgent need as there was 'a substantial reserve of land available for development in existing zones' which, with the proposed green belt releases, was considered adequate to accommodate growth for many years (Fraser 1959b).

The Premier at the time was J. J. Cahill, who, as Minister for Local Government, had introduced the planning legislation in 1945 and saved the Council from extinction in 1951. He died on 22 October 1959. P. D. Hills, a former Lord Mayor of Sydney, became Minister for Local Government in the new ministry. His response to pressures from the Housing Commission, the councils and the private interests was immediate. He appointed a sub-committee of his Town and Country Planning Advisory Committee to investigate and report on the need to extend the urban zoning. On 22 December 1959 he announced that 46 square miles of green belt were 'suspended' under his authority and would become available for urban development. This was more than twice as much as the area recommended by the Council, and virtually eliminated the green belt.

Both press and popular reactions to this decision were markedly and unexpectedly hostile. The new Minister was apparently oblivious of the wide measure of quiet support that the Council had built up for the green belt idea and was probably unprepared for the agitation which his decision aroused. The New South Wales Chapter of the Royal Australian Institute of Architects held a public meeting and asked the Minister for a copy of the Advisory Committee's report on which he claimed his decision was based. This was refused.

The Council made the most of the Minister's embarrassment and obtained agreement that the areas released should become available for development only after detailed planning schemes for each of the areas had been prepared to make proper provision for schools, parks, through routes and institutional requirements. The Council also pressed for the financial responsibility for water and sewer reticulation and at least a share of the
trunk services for the new areas to be undertaken by the subdivider/developer.

Officials of the Department of Local Government at the time were less than enthusiastic about this form of 'creeping socialism' and the Water Board itself, which stood to benefit most, offered only tacit support. In a prolonged series of negotiations with the interested developers, in which representatives of the Board played only a passive role, the principle of the 'developer's contribution' for water and sewerage became accepted. From these meetings convened by the Cumberland Council in the early 1960s there emerged a new organisation, what is now the Institute of Real Estate Development, which maintains a lively liaison as a polite pressure group with the State Planning Authority and the Sydney Water Board.

The Cumberland Council had succeeded in establishing two significant changes in metropolitan land development policy, the pre-planning of urban extensions with proper provision for public land requirements and the imposition on the land developer of the responsibility for water and sewerage services.

THE DEMISE OF THE COUNTY COUNCIL

Although the downfall of the Cumberland Council is generally attributed to the green belt issue it is more than probable that the full explanation lies in the fact that it was not susceptible to the kind of direction that a Minister or a government seeks to wield. Its meetings were open and most of its documents were available to the public. It publicised its aims and intentions and, when the occasion demanded, its disagreement with the Minister. All the Minister could do to influence the Council was to suspend or amend its plan by overt public action; he could not direct the Council to do anything. The Council appealed directly to public opinion through the press and aroused a good deal of popular support. To a Minister accustomed to directing a department it must have been particularly galling to find his decisions attacked by the chairman of the Council in feature articles in the daily press. The agitation went on for some years and the Minister was forced to proclaim as late as April 1964: 'I have said quite clearly and decisively that while ever I remain Minister there would be no further alteration of the Green Belt zone . . . not by a square foot while I am Minister' (*Sydney Morning Herald* 25 April 1964).

But the Minister's intervention had seriously diminished whatever status the County Council had retained as an authority with powers over metropolitan development. Support for the green belt was neither organised nor specific, while those who sought changes had at least plausible arguments, not so much against the green belt as an idea, but against its retention in particular areas.

The County Council's activities in the acquisition of vacant land for open
space and county roads had done nothing to enhance its reputation. Thousands of property owners resented the acquisition of their land. The transactions were made by negotiation, avoiding the use of compulsory powers, but there were delays sometimes extending over many years owing to lack of funds, which became publicly embarrassing. The value and benefits of these activities were not immediately apparent but the disadvantages were.

Although much more restricted than that envisaged in the County Plan, the program of open space acquisitions sought to correct the mistakes or neglect of the past. Some 200 acres of foreshore lands around the harbour were acquired and in the western suburbs, where the less well-endowed councils had allowed subdivisions to proliferate with scant regard for the future needs for parklands, many significant tracts were recovered. The operation was not generally popular with these councils which resented the loss of rateable land and the prospect of meeting the costs of development and maintenance of the parklands.

The prospects of suburban extensions following the green belt releases and the increasing demands for transport that would arise were noted by the Town and Country Planning Advisory Committee. Although the Committee had assumed in 1949 that the co-operation of the various departments and authorities would be forthcoming, apart from the cautious co-operation of the Water Board there was little evidence of effective liaison. The Committee concluded that the planning machinery was inadequate to ensure that the plans of authorities such as the departments of Railways and Government Transport became part of the metropolitan planning operation. In July 1961 the Committee reported to the Minister that 'there was need for some method of co-ordinated planning in the County of Cumberland from the State level through to the local level, with a view to formulating concrete suggestions for the provision of essential services'. Further consideration led to a recommendation to the Minister early in 1962 that 'a State Planning Authority should be established with the power to actively assist in the implementation of planning proposals having a major significance in the economic development of the State'.

The Sydney Division of the Australian Planning Institute had already submitted recommendations to the Minister to the effect that the autonomy of the government departments and instrumentalities must be discarded and a 'three-tier' system of planning should be established. It recommended the handing down of state powers to a strong central state authority, the establishment of regional councils (including a regional council for Cumberland) and the retention of defined local powers by local authorities. The only handing down of powers which immediately ensued was the removal of much of what remained of the County Council's authority for the administration of development control which was handed down to local councils by an amendment to the County Scheme Ordinance in 1962.
The Premier's election policy speech of March 1962 foreshadowed the end of the Cumberland Council:

Provision will be made for the establishment of a State Planning Authority to plan and co-ordinate the development of the use of land and provision of essential services... Provision will also be made for the acquisition of land for the establishment of industrial estates where land and all essential services will be readily available to industrialists seeking to establish or expand their activities in this State.

The State Planning Authority Act came into effect in December 1963. The Act abolished the Cumberland County Council, and both the Town and Country Planning Branch and the Town and Country Planning Advisory Committee of the Department of Local Government. The Act made no provision for regional councils as recommended by the Planning Institute but made provision for regional committees of an advisory nature only. It designated the Cumberland Development Area and retained the pattern of local government contributions from each of the councils in Cumberland and Northumberland. The state government itself contributes to the running expenses of the Authority.

The constitution of the Authority put an end to any lingering notions of a Greater Sydney organisation. As originally contemplated by the Advisory Committee the Authority was to consist of five commissioners assisted by committees representing public works and other authorities. The bill provided for an Authority consisting of a chairman and deputy chairman (one or the other to be a professional planner) and four part-time members representing the Ministry of Transport, Department of Main Roads, Department of Local Government and one of the public utility authorities. The Local Government and Shires Association submitted that there should be representatives of metropolitan and country local government and during the passage through parliament the membership of the Authority was enlarged by five members to include local government representation. The professional content was strengthened by the inclusion of a representative of the institutes of engineers, surveyors, architects and planners making a total of twelve members. The original idea of a technical/professional authority had been somewhat diluted by the representations of the local government lobby.

Although under notice of abolition the Cumberland Council carried on as conscientiously as ever. In August 1963 it published the last of a series of booklets describing aspects of its work. *Sydney's Green Belt* restated the intentions of this feature of the County Plan and said: 'The encroachment should be understood as a modification of detail and not as the scrapping of a principle'.

The last annual report of the chairman of the Council (Cumberland County Council 1963) described the Council's work for the year. The pro-
gram for open space included proposals for freehold acquisitions for the establishment of the Nepean national park and additions to the Lane Cove national park as well as continued progress in purchase of the numerous open space areas designated in the 1951 plan.

In discharge of its responsibilities for the protection of historic buildings the Council had acquired its third colonial building, Elizabeth Bay House. The chairman also reported on the Council’s efforts in controlling ribbon development on highways, one of the few areas of development control which had been retained in the county ordinance amendments of 1962. This control included advertising signs and moves were afoot to formulate a code for outdoor advertising.

The planning procedures adopted for the green belt releases, the development area plans, and the implementation of the policy for the developer’s contribution to services were encountering some administrative difficulties because of the ‘multiple ownership pattern’ within the development areas.

The chairman’s report went on to observe, without further comment, that according to a survey by the Council there was a ‘total reserve of vacant residential land . . . equivalent to about 130,000 lots’ in the County in January 1963.

The valedictory report described the new State Planning Authority Act as ‘a complex piece of legislation’ and sounded only one dissident note about the impending dissolution of the Council:

It is a matter of regret to the Council that in their debates on the new legislation neither its opponents nor its supporters gave the Council full credit for the role that it has played in pioneering town planning in the Commonwealth and for the solid foundation that its work over the years will provide for the new authority to build upon. The County Council, as a newly-constituted body endeavouring to enforce new legislation which infringed upon the vested powers and responsibilities of existing statutory bodies and adversely affected the financial interests of many citizens, as it was bound to do, could hardly have expected to do its job properly and still be popular; its resolute adherence to the interests of the County as a whole often resulted in a clash with other interests, but it always tried to live up to its proud motto ‘Be Just and Fear Not’. This, as the trend of events has clearly demonstrated, is not the way to earn popularity.

The new Authority will be faced with the same problem of discharging its responsibilities effectively whilst endeavouring to retain the good will of those bodies and persons whose interests it must override; this is the dilemma which confronts all planning authorities which have to implement their plans, and it is to be hoped that the authority solves the dilemma more successfully than the County Council did or it may share the same fate.

THE STATE PLANNING AUTHORITY

The membership of the State Planning Authority was notified on 2 March 1964. The chairman and deputy chairman were, respectively, the former
chief town planner and chief clerk of the Department of Local Government. The part-time ‘official’ members were the Commissioner for Main Roads, the Under-Secretary of the Transport Department, the Assistant Under-Secretary of the Department of Local Government and the member ‘having special knowledge of public utility undertakings’ was the secretary of the Sydney Water Board. The local government members were the Lord Mayor of Sydney, two nominees of the Local Government Association and two nominees of the Shires Association. The representative of the professional institutes was selected from a panel of four submitted by the Royal Australian Institute of Architects, the Institution of Engineers, the Institution of Surveyors and the Australian Planning Institute. The members were appointed for seven years.

The Authority assumed its full responsibilities in June 1964. The current and accumulated work of the three bodies, the Town Planning Branch of the Department of Local Government and the Cumberland and Northumberland councils and the absorption of the staffs of these organisations presented some difficulties. The four most senior planners from the County Council resigned within four years and the post of chief planner to the authority was not filled until May 1965. The Annual Report of 1969-70 says: ‘Recruitment of qualified and experienced staff remains as one of the Authority’s major problems . . . Of twenty-nine vacancies [in an establishment of 297] fifteen are for qualified planners . . .’

Describing the role of the new authority the Minister for Local Government promised that the ‘multiplicity of media’ and lack of co-ordination would be replaced by ‘integration on the local, regional and State levels’. The Authority would:

- co-ordinate plans for use and development of land including Crown land owned by statutory bodies representing the Crown; co-ordinate public and private land uses with the provision of utility services, transport facilities and other requirements for urban and non-urban land development. (Hills 1964)

The Minister described involvement in detailed local planning as a ‘principal defect of the Cumberland County Council’ and said that under the new legislation local councils, particularly in the Cumberland and Northumberland County Districts, would have greater planning authority. In fact the legislative and administrative arrangements for local statutory planning schemes remained essentially the same. The Authority inherited from the Town Planning Branch of the Department of Local Government the responsibility for the central supervision of the planning activities of some two hundred shires and municipalities throughout non-metropolitan New South Wales as well as those in the counties of Cumberland and Northumberland, a time-consuming task making heavy demands on limited staff resources.
The Authority's first publication, *Guide to the Functions of the State Planning Authority of New South Wales*, pointed out that in addition to the Authority's supervisory role in statutory planning throughout the local government areas of New South Wales it also had another function, one of quite dramatic and significant potential, namely, to give effect to planning by the acquisition of land and by carrying out such works on the land as to render it fit for use for the planned purpose. This is a function without precedent in the State sphere.

The *Guide* predicted that the Authority would use this power for the development of industrial estates and suggested 'An even greater project might be a "new town", either as a satellite to an existing metropolis or as a provincial centre...'. This promise is currently being fulfilled by the Authority's activities at Campbelltown, mentioned later.

The *Guide* also referred to 'advisory' planning which would concern matters 'coming into the State or regional sphere and to quite some extent will be "back-room" planning not ripe for general public knowledge. *The need for this planning is a principal reason for constitution of the Authority.*' The greatest emphasis of the *Guide* was, however, laid on the Authority's role in the field of statutory planning, its powers and responsibilities in respect of local planning schemes. No further mention was made of its regional planning function.

Although the State Planning Authority was constituted as a body corporate, with perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to sue or be sued, Section 4 of the State Planning Authority Act says: 'The Authority... shall in all respects be subject to the control and direction of the Minister'. This subservient role is not what was intended in the recommendations of the Australian Planning Institute for the handing down of state powers to a 'strong central state authority'. Nor does the Act provide for the regional councils that were recommended, but for regional planning committees as advisory bodies to the Authority. Only one such body, the Hunter Regional Planning Committee, has been set up, its principal task being the preparation of a strategic plan for the region. No such committee has been set up for the County of Cumberland but it is at least doubtful whether an advisory body for metropolitan Sydney would be worth the additional administrative effort it would demand. Such strength as the Cumberland County Council possessed stemmed from its professional staff rather than the body of councillors.

The State Planning Authority is thus markedly different from the three-tier arrangement recommended by the Australian Planning Institute. There is no regional council for metropolitan Sydney; the autonomy of the government departments and state instrumentalities remains essentially unaffected, although the arrangements established by the County Council with the Water Board were written into the Authority's Act with a corresponding
amendment to the Board's Act. This is the only statutory evidence of the Authority's intended role in the co-ordination of land use planning and public works.

Unlike those of the County Council, the Authority's meetings are not open to the public and the reports of the chief planner are not public documents. It is not possible to judge the degree of success that the Authority has achieved in co-ordination by persuasion but on the evidence available it is doubtful whether it is any better placed than the Cumberland County Council to ensure co-ordination. Representation on the authority of the departments of Main Roads, Transport and Local Government in no way binds these authorities; much less does local government representation have any influence on the wayward behaviour of local councils in the exercise of their powers over land use and development.

The Authority is itself represented on more than twenty committees and boards of various kinds. The Chairman of the Authority is the Chairman of the Height of Buildings Advisory Committee and the Ribbon Development Standing Committee; the Authority is represented on the County of Cumberland Passenger Transport Advisory Committee, the Traffic Advisory Committee, the National Trust (NSW) and a variety of other bodies. The growth of the machinery of co-ordination has been discussed in Chapter 3 where France and Hughes point out that most decisions have to be taken and implemented by a single authority. The State Planning Authority is frequently saddled with much of the staff work required by these committees but does not itself have the executive authority which is usually the responsibility of others.

Whatever may have been the intentions for the Authority in the area of state and regional development, the Department of Decentralisation and Development and the Development Corporation of New South Wales, established in 1966, seem to have effectively usurped any initiating role the Authority might have assumed. A promise by the Liberal and Country parties at the 1965 elections was fulfilled, when the Askin government took office, by the passage of the State Development and Country Industries Assistance Act 1966. The Act established the Minister as a 'corporation sole' and set up the Development Corporation of New South Wales, a body of state officials and private businessmen appointed by nomination, with the duty to 'prepare and submit a plan or scheme for the promotion of the economic or industrial development of the State or any part of the State'.

Assistance to country industries since 1945 had been implemented by Labor governments through the Decentralisation and Development Division of the Premier's Department. The Act setting up the new department equipped it with generous powers and finance to assist industry and local government and the authority to acquire and develop land and construct buildings. It was accepted by the Labor opposition without demur.
The first issue of the Department's publication *New South Wales Horizons*, Sept./Oct. 1971, was able to announce that 'Over the past six years $32.5 million in loans and grants made through the Department have assisted 566 industries to establish or expand in 150 country locations throughout the State'. Although the Department's powers do not extend to the metropolitan area of Sydney nor to Newcastle and Wollongong, an amendment to the Act has been foreshadowed which will embrace these areas. The Deputy Director of Decentralisation and Development has described the charter of the Department as 'double-barrelled': 'We are out to increase the efficiency of private enterprise and remove inhibitions upon industrial expansion and development generally . . . Decentralisation can only succeed if we have a sound basis of development here in the metropolitan centre. Sydney can put on a few more millions . . . .' (Day 1971).

The Development Corporation, its members appointed on the recommendation of the Minister for Decentralisation and Development, consists of people with manufacturing, commercial, industrial and academic interests and two Treasury officers. The State Planning Authority is represented by one of the part-time local government members. The Corporation has been described as 'a state think-tank' (*Sydney Morning Herald* July 1971) and its *Report on Selective Decentralisation* (1969) is one of a number of studies which have enabled the government to inform and measure reaction without identifying itself or any department with particular doctrines.

The Department also took over from the Premier's Department the responsibility for regional planning, largely concerned with encouraging the work of nineteen regional development committees which had been set up in 1944. In each region, except Sydney, a regional development committee consisting of representatives of local government and state departments with other co-opted members had, during the 1950s, each produced, with varying degrees of success, a regional survey of resources. The new ministry of Decentralisation and Development injected some new life into the committees which had, for most purposes, been quiescent. The most recent move was the adoption by the state cabinet in July 1971 of a plan to divide New South Wales into nine regions. An advisory council is to be set up for each and it is intended that state departments will adopt the regions as administrative units. It remains to be seen whether the recommendations of the Development Corporation for the selection of growth centres within these regions will be adopted, but it is clear that the role of the State Planning Authority in these and in subsequent developments will continue to be secondary to the executive role of the Minister for Decentralisation and his department. How or whether the newly-defined regions will be adopted for the regional planning committees provided for in the Authority's Act is uncertain.

Essentially the State Planning Authority has not moved far beyond the
MAP 4:1 Expansion of Sydney region since 1951
MAP 4:2 The 'Principles Diagram' of the Sydney Region Outline Plan indicates the extension of the urban areas beyond the County of Cumberland.
scope of the activities which it took over from the Department of Local Government and the Cumberland County Council. Its major work has been in picking up where the Cumberland Council left off. *The Sydney Region Outline Plan* (State Planning Authority 1968b) and the participatory role being assumed in the implementation of parts of this plan are the Authority's most significant innovations.

THE SYDNEY REGION OUTLINE PLAN

It was not until more than three years after assuming office that the State Planning Authority gave notice that it was considering a revision of the Cumberland Plan. The problems of metropolitan Sydney were discussed in some detail in a handsome report, *Sydney Region: Growth and Change, Prelude to a Plan* (State Planning Authority 1967b). The chairman's foreword explained that the report was intended 'to provide a background against which effective consultations may take place before planning proposals are determined'.

The *Sydney Region Outline Plan* report was published in August 1968. The preamble pointed out:

> Throughout the world the trends for growth are encouraging the further development of large cities and international ports. Sydney in particular has added another million to its population in the last twenty years, and a further growth of about two and three-quarter millions is expected over the next thirty years... A new strategic plan is needed.

Although acknowledgment was made to the 'many constructive suggestions and advice' received as a result of the publication of *Growth and Change, Prelude to a Plan*, it is more than probable that this was a polite fiction. Representations are rarely made about any issue of metropolitan growth until specific proposals are put forward and even then they are almost invariably the protests of special-interest groups who cannot be expected to take a synoptic view.

Unlike the Cumberland County Plan which in 1948 foresaw a need to accommodate an additional population of 700,000 over a period of twenty-five years and provided for this in a statutory scheme of land-use zoning and reservations, the 1968 Outline Plan indicates only the broad areas of urbanisation and the probable staging of their development. Of the additional 2.75 million people to be provided for it assumes that half a million will be in decentralised locations outside the Sydney Region. The Sydney Region as defined for the purposes of the Outline Plan extends beyond the County of Cumberland to include Gosford and Wyong to the north, the Blue Mountains to the west and crosses the County boundary to include the town of Camden to the south-west. Critics have pointed out that Greater Wollongong might have been included in the Sydney
Region but as this sub-region already has a population of about 200,000 and its growth promises to be self-sustaining, it does not offer much scope for accommodating the expansion of Sydney.

Within the Sydney Region an additional 1.75 millions are provided for within the County of Cumberland and a further half-million in the coastal areas of Gosford and Wyong to the north. The Outline Plan places most emphasis on discussion of the growth areas within the County of Cumberland where the two main corridors of urbanisation follow the railways west to Penrith and south-west to Campbelltown and Camden. These two corridors will accommodate half of the additional 1.75 millions; the other half is provided for by expansion around the existing urban areas, eliminating what remains of the green belt zone. Other areas are indicated as ‘Future Urban (in principle)’ and ‘Possible Urban (for investigation)’.

The pattern of urban expansion and the probable sequence of new development within the County of Cumberland over thirty years are the principal specifics of the Outline Plan. The location of additional new airports, the expressway proposals, the delineation of regional open spaces, and special use zones within and around the urban areas are all indicated diagrammatically and discussed in more tentative terms.

The ‘general objectives’ as set out in the Report are cautiously expressed in optimistic generalities:

1. The development of Sydney should be inter-related with that of the State as a whole.
2. Sydney should remain Australia’s greatest city, commercial centre and port.
3. Sydney-Newcastle-Wollongong should be regarded as a closely related urban complex.
4. Ample well located industrial land should be available.
5. High quality in urban design and landscape should be established.
6. Comprehensive replanning of the metropolitan city centre is needed.
7. A much greater level of investment in communications and public utilities is needed, coupled with the best use of existing facilities.
8. A wider and more balanced distribution of commercial activity should be established so that over-concentration of employment in the metropolitan centre can be avoided.
9. Flexibility is necessary.
10. Long-term growth must be allowed for.

The inadequacies of statutory land use planning as a means of implementing these or most other objectives should be obvious. The ‘control and regulation of the use of land’ of itself can restrain but not promote either public or private investment. The only clearly defined objective of the Outline Plan is the direction of the lava-flow of suburban expansion within the County of Cumberland; the unstated but most logical guide lines for this are
the existing electrified rail routes capable of handling commuter traffic and
the practicalities of providing services, in particular piped sewerage, to the
new areas. The process of conversion from rural to urban uses in stages will
be subject to the same kind of planning control as that established by the
Cumberland Council for the green belt releases.

The Report emphasises the public expenditure required to meet the needs
of the expanded metropolis but the figures quoted are not comprehensive.
Only the Sydney Water Board supplied authoritative estimates which
assessed the costs of expanded water and sewerage services within the
County of Cumberland at $1,850 million, almost three times the recorded
value of the Board's capital assets in 1967. Some $600 million of the
additional expenditure is expected to be recovered as contributions from
the developers of new subdivisions. The figure quoted for new and im-
proved highways, $2,600 million, is the Authority's own tentative estimate.
The Report freely admits that no figures are available to measure the
additional investment in railways, public transport or port facilities and
makes no mention at all of the other public capital expenditure which will
be required. The criticism that, apart from the Water Board, the Report
shows very little evidence of co-operation and co-ordination with other
public authorities is one which the Report could well have been intended
to invite.

The Sydney Water Board has a strong interest in the Outline Plan. The
President of the Board has said:

If land releases are not controlled and programmed . . . if development is
allowed instead to proceed in a piecemeal and haphazard fashion—then what
is a major, and on present resources almost a frightening problem, would be
a completely impossible one. . . . (Walder 1968)

For the other state authorities whose works are less closely tied to specific
areas of demand it may well be that a commitment to a 30-year plan is too
much to expect, that the nature of their needs for land reservations, which
is all that the Outline Plan can offer, is too difficult to predict, for both
political and financial exigencies and technological change make prediction
uncertain and commitment impossible. The Department of Main Roads, for
example, would find it difficult to establish design alignments for the addi-
tional routes indicated on the principles diagram of the Outline Plan Report
for expressways which may not be built for twenty or thirty years. Any
identifiable routes would bring thousands of inquiries and arouse anxiety
about alignments which may be nowhere near the mark when the time
comes for design. The expressway proposals shown clearly on the Outline
Plan are almost entirely confined to those which first appeared as route
reservations on the County Plan of 1951. Most of the land has been
acquired but only a few miles of expressway have been built.

For similar reasons the only extension to the suburban rail system shown
on the plan, a 4-mile link from the southern line near Liverpool to the East Hills commuter line, involved no undertaking by the Railways Department.

Although the Report was necessarily less than precise about the total public costs involved in metropolitan growth the indications of the order of annual investments by the Sydney Water Board and the Department of Main Roads were alone sufficient support to the statement that: 'In the continued absence of any indication of the availability of funds from Federal sources being substantially increased the State will have little alternative to . . . the opening up of new sources of revenue'. The Report pointed out that 'land owners will, under present practice, receive a financial benefit from the zoning of land in the Outline Plan for urban purposes, totalling about $1,000 million or more'. A charge on this increment in value of 'raw' land was seen as offering 'a potential contribution of considerable size to augment the public investment programmes needed for Sydney's growth'.

The announcement of the first-stage release of 20,000 acres of the rural lands proposed for urban development was made with the publication of the Outline Plan. An explanatory leaflet warned that 'all subdivisions and developers of the areas to be released for urban development will be required to make contributions . . . towards the cost of extending and reticulating water and sewerage facilities' and that land owners and developers should bear in mind the possibility of the levying of a charge on the increment in value of raw land consequent upon development approval for urban purposes in the event of the government agreeing to the Authority's recommendations.

After this kite had flown for some months the Minister announced the government's intention to introduce a development charge of 30 per cent of the increase in land values arising from the change from rural to urban zoning. The Minister in the second reading of the Land Development Contribution Bill explained that the recovery of betterment as provided for in the 1945 legislation had been omitted from the County of Cumberland and all later schemes because it had been judged to be impractical. But in respect of rural land brought into urban use, where revised estimates indicated than an increase in value of $3,000 million could be expected, the government believed it to be 'not unreasonable that part of the increment in value which arises primarily from the expenditure of public and private funds on essential services should be made available to meet the cost of such services'. The alternative, 'to rezone thousands of acres of land and let the provision of utility services take care of itself . . . would result in chaos and is completely unacceptable to the Government'.

The Minister pointed out that there were '70,000 home sites not built on in the Sydney area . . . as the current need for home sites is 16,000 per
annum, this represents four years' supply'; and went on to say that additional lands would be released every eighteen months, but to ensure that the rezoned land was made available for development as quickly as possible the government would, if necessary, negotiate for the acquisition of the lands held by reluctant owners (Morton: *NSWPD* 12 Mar. 1970). More recently the Minister announced that a total of 7,725 acres had been released to provide 85,000 home sites and industrial lands as part of a program aimed at providing 24,000 home sites a year (*Sydney Morning Herald* 16 July 1971).

The Land Development Contribution Act 1970 and the supplementary legislation provides for the collection of 30 per cent of the increase in value of land arising from urban zoning calculated from a base date of August 1969 and applies to all non-urban land in the Sydney Region. The radical nature of the Act, some of the difficulties in its administration and its likely influence on the price of land have been discussed by J. M. Pullen (1971). It is sufficient here to note the novelty of the development contribution and the fact that its assessment and collection will be the responsibility of the State Planning Authority. The funds are to be applied to public purposes related to the non-urban Sydney Region by the Treasurer after considering recommendations by the Authority.

A less controversial but equally innovative activity of the Authority is its role as a land developer. The promise of the previous government, that the Authority would have the power to give effect to planning by the acquisition of land and the development of industrial estates has been at least partly fulfilled. Although the Askin government gave the Minister for Decentralisation the executive authority for government participation in the promotion of industrial growth throughout the country areas of New South Wales in the Act of 1966, effectively usurping a major part of the role intended for the State Planning Authority, the long-contemplated promotion of satellite growth in the County of Cumberland is now being pursued to some effect.

A town centre site for Mt Druitt, where development by the New South Wales Housing Commission and others is creating an urban district of 170,000 population, has been acquired by the Authority and leases have been granted for part of the 136-acre site for the building of a commercial centre. The assumption of the role of entrepreneur by the Authority was seen as 'the only practicable means of satisfactorily establishing the centre' and required the resumption of thirty-two properties (State Planning Authority 1969).

Government support for such direct public participation in the process of commercial development, wholly directed towards achieving the planned rather than the piecemeal growth of a town centre, is without precedent in New South Wales and represents a significant advance, all the more remark-
able for the fact that it was supported by a non-Labor government. It demonstrates that the statutory form of land use planning has been judged to be ineffective as a means of ensuring coherent development of a town centre, that public ownership is a necessary precedent to dealing with the complexities involved in achieving a worthwhile result. The Authority's role does not, however, seem to enjoy the support of the local council. The delegates representing Blacktown Council at the Local Government Association's 1971 conference unsuccessfully moved for the abolition of the State Planning Authority describing it as 'unjust and authoritarian' (Sydney Morning Herald 18 September 1971).

The most significant move towards ensuring the fulfilment of the Outline Plan is the Authority's role in the development of Campbelltown-Camden, the terminal area of the south-western growth corridor. The early notions of the Cumberland County Council that Campbelltown might become a satellite town beyond the green belt have been submerged in a large-scale proposal for an urban district of some half a million population centred on Campbelltown. The Authority has acquired land for the new town centre, industrial areas, residential estates for the New South Wales Housing Commission and sites for tertiary education, a hospital and other public purposes (Wickham: Sydney Morning Herald 1 May 1971). Described as 'key areas', the total extent and value of the Authority's land acquisitions have not been publicised but it appears that some 10,000 acres have been acquired at a cost of the order of $10 million. Freehold lands are being released 'within the context of a broad plan and strategy for Campbelltown's growth'. A Campbelltown Development Committee, under the chairmanship of the associate chairman of the Authority, has representatives of the Department of Main Roads, the Water Board and Treasury as well as the mayors of Campbelltown and Camden. Supported by a technical liaison committee, the Development Committee has the task of co-ordinating a massive program of public works and services by various agencies but without real executive authority and, with the State Planning Authority, administering statutory planning control over the private sector. The project is an experiment in the administration of planned urban growth of dimensions beyond anything previously contemplated but without the powers and command of the purse-strings which such an undertaking would normally require. Its success will depend on sustained political support and administrative agility of a high order.

PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE REGION OUTLINE PLAN

The Outline Plan, as the Report was careful to point out, is not a statutory land use plan like its predecessor the Cumberland Plan, but an expression of 'principles, policies and broad strategies'. Essentially it prescribes the
extensions to the urban areas within the County of Cumberland and gives a broad timetable for their release over thirty years. Each sector proposed for urbanisation is intended to be the subject of development plans prepared by local councils on the basis of planning briefs provided by the Authority.

The most frequent criticism of this proposed urban pattern is the inclusion of the western corridor which will house some 360,000 people on the less attractive terrain of the Cumberland Plain, while the Warringah Plateau, estimated to have a population capacity of 120,000, remains designated as 'Possible Urban (for investigation)'. The Report explains that the terrain of the Plateau would require inordinately high levels of public investment in roads and hydraulic services, new transportation routes and, possibly, a second harbour bridge amounting in all to a public investment of perhaps $400 million, or $50,000 per acre for the 8,000 acres of developable land.

The President of the Institute of Real Estate Development referred to this when he said: 'I firmly believe that the SPA and the Water Board will be forced to give consideration to the opening up of areas to the north ... if we joined forces many of us here today could force this issue by putting a strong case to get services into certain areas' (Charody 1969a). The Department of Main Roads announced in May 1970 its decision to go ahead with the extension of the Warringah Expressway across Middle Harbour into Warringah Shire, an $80 million project.

Most of the adverse criticism of the 1968 Outline Plan is concerned with its omissions; in particular the lack of transportation proposals, insufficient provision for regional open space, the inadequacy of local government to undertake detailed development planning of new urban areas, and the undue influence of sewerage service as a determinant of urban areas. The President of the Institute of Real Estate Development commenting on this last point said: 'It is the Water Board ... which is rightly in my opinion today termed to be the real planners of development in this State, and the crucial authority which decides what should take place and where, and I for one am not necessarily taking issue with it' (Charody 1969b).

The Australian Planning Institute's comment on the Outline Plan judged it as providing 'reasonable guide lines for development in the long term' but drew attention to the need, acknowledged in the Plan Report, for transportation studies and clearer ideas about a variety of other aspects. It observed that '... the Authority obviously must have greatly increased resources of technical staff and consultants to pursue these considerations ...' and questioned whether the Authority could achieve the necessary co-ordination.

Whilst it is not clear from the Outline Plan Report whether the Authority has or will achieve [sic] the necessary integration with the work of government
departments and other statutory authorities it is apparent that the success of the Plan will depend upon the co-operation of such bodies. (Australian Planning Institute Journal 7 (1969), 87-8)

Similar sentiments were expressed in rather more forceful terms by the New South Wales Chapter of the Royal Australian Institute of Architects. In a lengthy catalogue of the inadequacies and inconsistencies of the Outline Plan Report the Institute claimed the Authority had not enjoyed the whole-hearted support of the government: 'The shortcomings of the plan are, in effect, shortcomings in the system of the government' (see Australian Planning Institute Journal 7 (1969), 89-93).

The National Trust of Australia (NSW) published its response in a booklet, Sydney 2000: requirements for conservation of natural areas (Sydney 1968), which expressed concern at the prospect of Sydney growing to a population of 5 million and urged decentralisation measures.

Support for the historic idea of a metropolitan organisation was revived in several quarters. Professor Denis Winston, head of the Department of Town and Country Planning at Sydney University, in endorsing the Outline Plan urged 'the establishment of a powerful metropolitan authority to plan for Sydney as a whole'. He described the State Planning Authority as having an impossible task of co-ordination (Sydney Morning Herald 6 Aug. 1969). The Institute of Real Estate Developers made a similar submission in favour of 'a Sydney Development Corporation to effectively guide and implement the Sydney Region Outline Plan . . . as we feel that the functions of the SPA are too wide and diverse' (The Developer Aug. 1970). The President of the Real Estate Institute, writing in support of efforts by professional bodies to review the machinery of urban administration, has said:

It is widely felt that the State Planning Authority, which nominally has overall control of planning in NSW, needs more real power, particularly in co-ordinating activity between departments and agencies such as the Lands Department, Mines Department and Main Roads Department. (Sydney Morning Herald 19 July 1971)

The Local Government Association has for some time had a committee conducting a study for the establishment of a metropolitan government to take control of the responsibilities of the Sydney Water Board, the State Planning Authority and other authorities, although history shows that the Association has had difficulties in securing the adherence of its members to any moves which threatened the limited sovereignty of local councils. The Association at its annual conference in November 1970 adopted a motion by delegates representing Sutherland Shire Council: 'That the basic concept of the Sydney Outline Plan that the population of Sydney is to be allowed to reach five million by the year 2000 is totally rejected . . . The slowing down of the growth of Sydney must be brought into effect'. It is
unlikely that any member councils of the Association in metropolitan Sydney would, in practice, accept any permanent restraint on the growth of their areas.

It was Sutherland Shire Council which, in its formal representations to the Authority on the Outline Plan, had drawn attention to what it held to be administrative inconsistencies in allowing the conversion of Crown leases to private freehold. Numerous Crown leaseholds, typically 20 acres in area, have been granted in rural areas around the metropolis as 'suburban holdings' which, at the absolute discretion of the Minister for Lands, may be purchased in fee simple by the lessee. Many of these 'suburban holdings' lying in the areas scheduled for urban expansion have been sold to the lessees and bought up within months by development companies at greatly enhanced prices. The Sutherland Council pointed to 'the Authority's purchase of land at Campbelltown, while the Crown with equal vigour is disposing of land in this area', and expressed its alarm at 'the conversion of Crown land by the original lessee and its transfer to land speculation companies' within its own Shire; 'At the present time the provisions of [the Crown Lands Act] are being ignored' (Sutherland Shire Council, 'Sydney Region Outline Plan: Submissions and Objections' n.d.). The Shire Council, in pursuing an active program of land acquisition and planned development, was particularly chagrined at having to purchase rural land at great profit to the owner, land which a few months before was in Crown ownership.

The concern of most of the groups seeking reform arises more from the deficiencies of development administration than from the lack of coherent metropolitan development policies, although all would claim that they are of equal concern. The vision of an all-wise, all-embracing metropolitan organisation dealing efficiently with the growth and change of the physical fabric, maintaining effective working relationships with the state government while allowing local government an appropriately wide measure of self-determination and ensuring as well that the day-to-day operations of the authorities—such as public transport—are properly co-ordinated still, despite the hard realities, entices the imagination of many.

Ministers of the New South Wales government have joined in the expressions of concern about Sydney and its growth but it seems less than likely that they would welcome any moves that would require them to relinquish the political purchase which can be exercised in the metropolitan electorates. The Minister for Decentralisation and Development has declared that 'Sydney is getting too large' and that it is 'too big for good government' (Australian 16 Sept. 1970) while his colleague, the Minister for Transport, blamed the spreading suburbs as the cause of public transport deficits. 'If satellite centres are to be built miles from the city ... they should be provided with industries for people to work in. Green-belt land is released,
people move in because the land is cheap and my administration gets the backwash . . . ' (Sydney Morning Herald 29 June 1971). The Sydney Morning Herald in a follow-up editorial (30 June) asked: ‘Whose fault is that? His answer to a questioner suggests that [the Minister] had the State Planning Authority in his sights as a convenient target. But the Authority is only the tool of its political masters.' Two weeks later the Minister for Local Government in reply to claims by the Leader of the Opposition that the state government was 'contributing to spiralling land prices' announced that the land releases over two years had provided for 85,000 home sites and would continue at the rate of 25,000 each year against an annual demand for 15,000. Further releases at Penrith (34 miles from the city centre) and elsewhere were pending (Sydney Morning Herald 16 July 1971).

The State Planning Authority in the Outline Plan Report questions how far employment concentration in the Central Business District can be ‘permitted to go’; the peak journey-to-work movements are seen as the ‘biggest single planning problem in metropolitan Sydney’. The choice lies between ‘permitting an already critical congestion problem to become worse, or attempting to steer a considerable part of the future growth of office employment to other commercial centres’; ‘appropriate steps . . . to build-up a limited number of major commercial centres . . . at Parramatta, Campbelltown and in certain new urban areas’ are proposed.

Growth in the central area of Sydney, where over 20 per cent of the metropolitan work force and more than half of the clerical workers are employed, exhibits much the same momentum and inevitability as the spread of the suburbs. The office-building boom has been widely acclaimed as tangible evidence of metropolitan progress; the Lord Mayor has proudly claimed that Sydney is ‘growing faster than any other city in the world’, a phenomenon which the Premier described as ‘exhilarating’ (Sun-Herald 8 Nov. 1970).

Some of the consequences of the central city growth are discussed in the City of Sydney Strategic Plan (Sydney City Council 1971) which forecasts an increase in central area employment from 225,000 in 1966 to between 360,000 and 400,000 in 2000. Of the additional workers some 70,000 are expected to be drawn from the extended urban areas of the Outline Plan, including Gosford-Wyong, 30-50 miles distant.

SOME ENDURING DILEMMAS

It has become popular to deplore the increasing size of the metropolis and to urge the decentralisation of urban growth, but any action which limits the development rights attaching to land sooner or later comes under an unrelenting state of siege. The control of land use exercised by statutory
planning attempts to deal with the consequences of population growth and economic expansion, manifested in buildings and works, private and public. It cannot touch the causes of growth, it can influence only the forms and direction of that growth.

The disposition of suburban expansion and ex-urban growth indicated by the Outline Plan is calculated to provide, with development and re-development within existing areas, for a population approaching 4 millions within the County of Cumberland over thirty years, somewhat less than the 5 millions forecast for 2000, but theoretically adequate for the growth demands over twenty years or more. There is, however, strong pressure for an acceleration of the release program for both housing and industrial areas, pressure to which the Minister for Local Government has responded in an attempt to allay the concern about increasing land prices.

Prescription of the new urban areas, essential to the forward planning of the Water Board and other authorities, carries an assurance that development will follow within a reasonable period and provides what has been described as 'a punter's guide to real estate speculation'. Land developers have not been deterred by the 30 per cent development contribution. Land is being acquired in advance of need and the prices paid reflect the promises implicit in the Outline Plan. Each release includes land already held by development companies and newspaper headlines make much of the fact ('Big developers bring off $10m land coup', Sunday Australian 12 Sept. 1971).

The upward pressure in prices within the zoned areas will almost certainly lead to efforts being made to obtain zoning changes in the areas lying outside the proposed urban zones. The possibility that the history of the green belt will be repeated is not remote. Although the Outline Plan has not been formally adopted by the government it has a wide measure of support, particularly from authorities such as the Water Board, and is less likely to be swept aside. A continuing program of participation in the implementation of the Plan by the State Planning Authority, similar to that already undertaken in Campbelltown, seems to be essential if needs such as those of the Housing Commission are to be met.

For the time being at least, urban spread is conforming to plan and the demands for public works and services are reasonably predictable. Redevelopment activities within the existing urbanised areas are much less predictable. These, for the most part, are the responsibility of the local councils administering planning schemes either gazetted or in draft form. In either case a council has wide scope for the exercise of discretionary powers. In most planning schemes the ordinance requires that development approval is required for all development except single-family houses within residential areas; most other types of development require permission which allows the council to exercise discretion and, if it chooses, to refuse the
application or to make the approval subject to conditions. An appeal against a council’s decision is to the Land and Valuation Court but, as the Court has observed with regret, such appeals do not permit interested or aggrieved third parties to make or be heard at appeals. Public disquiet has arisen in various localities about the approval of flat buildings in areas of single-family dwellings and a recent amendment to the Local Government Act requires that in considering an application for a residential flat building council shall notify adjoining property owners and take account of objections before a decision is made. Apart from this cautionary requirement a council’s responsibility is not impeded.

Statutory planning schemes may be varied by a ‘suspension’ of the scheme in a particular area either by the Minister acting unilaterally or by a council acting with Ministerial approval. Changing circumstances, most usually arising from development proposals which a council or the Minister wishes to allow but which are prohibited under the provisions of a scheme, are catered for by suspension procedures. Development applications in areas suspended are dealt with under interim development powers which are almost entirely discretionary. Appeals against interim development decisions, unlike those made under a statutory scheme, are to the State Planning Authority and either party may ask for the appeal to be heard by a person appointed by the Authority for the purpose.

The publication of a statutory planning scheme does not give clear guidance to the development rights attaching to land even when newly promulgated, and can become wildly misleading when, as is frequently the case, the plan becomes peppered with suspensions. The machinery for ‘regulating and controlling the use of land’ has become a palimpsest of ordinances, orders and discretionary authorities of formidable complexity. The New South Wales Chapter of the Royal Australian Institute of Architects has written to the Minister that

the whole statutory planning system still appears to be slow, cumbersome, inflexible and remote. Planning is a tedious bureaucratic activity full of red tape, delays and inexplicable jargon. The Chapter believes that this should not be so, and views with concern the popular image which is attached to what should really be an exciting and challenging communal operation . . . the present law no longer provides appropriate tools for planning . . . there is inconsistency in the use of the tools that do exist . . . (President’s letter to Minister for Local Government, 14 Dec. 1970)

The Minister replied that he would be glad to have constructive suggestions.

Except for the protection of the county road routes and open spaces of the 1951 County Plan as amended, and the influence that the State Planning Authority is able to exert on behalf of the Minister, local councils exercise development control with scant regard for the metropolitan impli-
cations of their decisions. Development, unless judged beyond all possible doubt to be detrimental to the locality (and not always then) is usually regarded with favour by aldermen, although the granting of a consent may not be automatic. The discretion available under statutory planning carries with it the possibility of patronage, to be granted, delayed or withheld for a variety of good or bad reasons. With a few notable exceptions, the local councils are ill-equipped to exercise these powers. Unlike most other decisions by local government, development consents, once implemented, are for all practical purposes irreversible. Councils can change in personnel and opinion but mistakes in bricks and concrete are permanent. The Institute of Architects in its advice to the Minister has suggested that 'the standard of local planning will be enhanced by education of Council members in the principles of planning'.

It is in the existing urban areas that the greater part of development expenditure occurs; the growth in building accommodation, in employment and other activities and the transport and other service demands generated by this growth are as important to metropolitan welfare as the ordering of suburban extensions which the Outline Plan has thoughtfully prescribed. The State Planning Authority is no better armed than the Cumberland County Council to restrain or promote development within the existing urban fabric except to the limited extent that, in its scrutiny of local planning schemes on behalf of the Minister, it can seek changes. The Minister on the other hand can and does exert his prerogative to intervene in particular areas or particular cases by suspending a scheme or requiring that applications be referred to him for decision.

The flexibilities built into the system of statutory land use planning are such that the plans are of considerably less importance than the flexibility of those who have the final responsibility for their administration. Despite the elaborate forms and procedures of the statutory planning process, the plans themselves have, with the important exceptions where public acquisition of land has been undertaken, had only a marginal influence on the content and direction of metropolitan growth. The process of metropolitan development is still the result of a multiplicity of individual development decisions but it can be claimed that these are now subject to some control by local and state governments. It is impossible to measure the costs and benefits of this control if only because the consequences of those developments which have been prevented, modified or diverted cannot be known. It is fairly clear, however, that overall metropolitan growth has not been impeded nor does it seem likely to be.

The 7-year terms of the members of the State Planning Authority were due to expire in March 1971. All were reappointed for a further twelve months 'to allow the Government to fulfil its State election undertaking to overhaul the legislation under which the authority functions' (Sydney Morn-
ing Herald 1 Mar. 1971). There is little to indicate the lines that the reforms might take but wider representation of instrumentalities with responsibilities for metropolitan works and services seems likely and would enhance its consultative role as a co-ordinating body of reference. Strengthening of its role as an executive authority seems less likely. Neither Ministers nor the departments for which they are responsible are likely to forgo their freedom to respond to exigencies by deferring to the State Planning Authority or to the prescriptions of statutory plans. The reconstituted Authority will probably remain firmly constrained by the direction and control of the Minister for Local Government from above and local government insistence on self-determination from below.
... the social services are not an unproductive frill tacked on to the economy as a charitable afterthought, but an integral and (in some form or other) a necessary part of our economic and social system—a form of collective provision required to meet the needs of an expanding industrial society and to provide a market for its products. They are developed, differentiated, and developed again, in accordance with the changing aspirations of those who work in them and those whom they serve. (Donnison 1965: 23)

PATTERNS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Sydney has been 'home' for rapidly increasing numbers of people. The city's first major strategic plan for physical development, completed in 1948 and designed to extend up to about 1972 (see Chapter 4), proved wildly astray in its population estimates. The population increase has been two-and-a-half times greater than was forecast, most of it coming from immigration from outside New South Wales and from natural increase, the rest (about one person in six) from the state's country areas. The State Planning Authority Report in 1967 defined a new enlarged planning area, the Sydney Region, which extends north to Wyong, west to Colo shire and the city of the Blue Mountains, and south to Wollondilly and Camden shires. In both 1947 and 1966, this Region contained about 23 per cent of Australia's total population; 1.7 millions and 58.9 per cent of the New South Wales population in 1947, and 2.6 millions and 62.4 per cent of the state population in 1966 (State Planning Authority 1967b: 9, 13-15, 68). The Authority's subsequent Report on a Sydney Region Outline Plan (see Chapter 4) envisaged continuing strong population growth and estimated that by the year 2000 about 5½ million people would be living in the Region, 6-7 millions in the 'closely integrated, linear, urban complex of the Sydney-Newcastle-Wollongong Area' (State Planning Authority 1968b: 8-9, 18). The Outline Plan Report does recommend steps to divert about half a million people to other areas in the state, and also suggests the same number for an urban development to the north of the Sydney Region in the Gosford-Wyong area. However, there would still be about 1.75 million
more people in the rest of the Sydney Region by the year 2000 (State Planning Authority 1968b: 19-20).

**Population movements**

As Sydney’s post-war population has grown, changes with considerable significance for social welfare have been taking place. In 1947, 13 per cent (214,000) of Sydney’s people resided in the City of Sydney, giving a residential density of 19,117 persons per square mile; and a further 34 per cent (582,000) lived in an inner ring of local government areas,¹ at a density of 11,424 persons per square mile. In 1966 the City of Sydney accounted for only 7 per cent (159,000) of Sydney’s people, and its residential density had fallen to 14,230 persons per square mile. The inner ring of local government areas had lost some population and now contained only 22 per cent (545,000) of Sydney’s total, at a density of 10,673 persons per square mile. From providing residence for almost half of Sydney’s population in 1947, the City and the inner local government areas now provided residence for only 29 per cent. These areas were still, however, far more congested than the middle and outer areas of metropolitan Sydney, particularly since within them people were crowding on areas of residential land which were shrinking because of alternative land use for commercial and industrial enterprises and transport systems.

In 1947, a middle ring of local government areas² accounted for 37 per cent (635,000) of Sydneysiders, at a density of 4,277 per square mile; the outer ring³ for only 15 per cent (262,000), at a density of a mere 200 per square mile. In 1966, the middle ring still accommodated 37 per cent (924,000) of the total, at the increased density of 6,132 persons per square mile, but the outer ring had changed dramatically. It was now ‘home’ for 36 per cent (899,000) of the total—almost the same numerical size and proportion of the whole as was the middle ring, although its residential density was still only 687 persons per square mile (Neutze 1971: 66).

The post-war population histories of each of the local government areas within these inner, middle and outer rings of settlement reveal widely differing situations—at different times and over periods of time. Table 5:1 relates

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¹ Mosman (5 miles from Sydney G.P.O.), North Sydney (2¼), Leichhardt (4), Drummoyne (4), Ashfield (6), Marrickville (5), Botany (4½), Woollahra (3), Waverley (4), Randwick (4½).

² Manly (9½ miles from Sydney G.P.O.), Willoughby (6¼), Lane Cove (5½), Hunter’s Hill (6), Ryde (8¼), Parramatta (15), Auburn (12½), Concord (8½), Strathfield (8½), Burwood (8), Bankstown (12), Canterbury (8), Rockdale (8), Kogarah (8½), Hurstville (10½).

³ Warringah (11 miles from Sydney G.P.O.), Ku-ring-gai (10), Hornsby (15½), Baulkham Hills (18½), Blacktown (22½), Windsor (35½), Penrith (33½), Holroyd (15½), Fairfield (18½), Liverpool (20½), Camden (38), Campbelltown (33), Sutherland (17).
### TABLE 5: Local Government Areas in Sydney Statistical Division, ranked according to size of population at censuses of 30 June 1947, 1954, 1961, and 1966, and estimated at 30 June 1970

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1947 '000s</th>
<th>1954 '000s</th>
<th>1961 '000s</th>
<th>1966 '000s</th>
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Total: 1,698, 1,938, 2,303, 2,541, 2,780

1 Inner Ring, M Middle Ring, O Outer Ring
2 On the basis of boundaries as delimited at 30 June 1966.

Source: Commonwealth Statistician's publications.
local government areas to each other in terms of their population size at different times since the war.

It can be seen that there are and have been great disparities in the numbers of people served by each local government authority. These have serious implications for such matters as economies of scale, range of services, quality of political representation, the quality of local government staff, and the possibility of sectional interests having influence. The table also shows how particular authorities have felt the impact of Sydney's population growth at times when the populations of other authorities were relatively stable or even declining.

Discussing the growth of Sydney's new suburbs, Jeans and Logan (1961) asserted:

It is desirable on social grounds that provision of basic services should not vary greatly from area to area. Because of the heavy initial expenses of establishing new communities, only a low level of provision of basic services exists in most outer municipalities where the need is often greater.

They pointed out, however, that the financial circumstances of the populations of these outer areas varied considerably. For example, with respect to unimproved capital value of land, on which local government rates were levied, Ku-ring-gai residents were three times as wealthy per head as Fairfield residents. Most outer municipalities were below the metropolitan average for this sort of wealth, but by means of high rates managed to raise a larger per capita revenue than the average metropolitan municipality. Hornsby and especially Blacktown were exceptions, settling for low rates and low levels of service, while Ku-ring-gai and Warringah achieved above average per capita revenues with relatively low rates.

Jeans and Logan recommended rating levels in the new suburbs which "would more accurately reflect the cost of establishing [them]", and thought there would be agreement that these costs should be known and borne by the incoming people who created them. They admitted, however, that already there was great difficulty in collecting rates, even at the existing levels (Jeans and Logan 1961: 39-42).

It is, of course, by no means obvious that people settling new suburbs in outlying areas ought (in a moral sense) to bear all the costs, especially when they tend to be less affluent than the rest of the community and rate revenue is raised by a flat rate tax, not a progressive one. Further, the traditional practice of using land as the local government tax base is inequitable. Nevertheless, the report of the Else-Mitchell commission to the state government in 1967 re-affirmed a rate on land as still the most appropriate method of financing local government services, although it prescribed supplementation from other sources (Else-Mitchell et al. 1961: 161).

Because local government authorities are varied—in population, history of settlement, financial capacity, governing machinery, the demand for their
services, and their willingness to provide services—the local government services a person will have received have depended a great deal on where 'home' is in Sydney. Is this inequitable? Those who emphasise pluralism, local democracy, and 'self-help' for each local region, irrespective of its comparative needs, demands and resources, might regard this unevenness as reasonable. Others would emphasise the interdependence of modern urban systems and the need for everyone, particularly more vulnerable citizens, to be assured by government of a basic range of services, and regard the present situation as unjust—a further confirmation of an increasingly socially stratified society, in contrast to Australian egalitarian ideology.

Social status of suburbs

Congalton's work on the social status of Sydney's suburbs found 'clear evidence that each suburb carried a well defined social status which reflected a remarkable consistency of opinion in the community' (Congalton 1969: xiv). Table 5:2 lists local government areas, again roughly by distance from the City, and shows the number of Congalton's A, B, C, and D grade suburbs in each area.

This is only a rough guide to the social prestige of each local government area in 1969, because suburbs varied greatly in size and there are some omissions in Congalton's list. In addition, Congalton found that his A grade suburbs were not peopled entirely by people with class A jobs; neither were any of the other grades of suburbs peopled exclusively by people from a comparable occupational level, although there was a clear and positive relationship between the two measures (Congalton 1969: 132). In writing about Australian cities in general, Peter Scott has claimed:

residential contrasts in socio-economic status are not as pronounced as those in Britain or North America, and most residential districts display considerable heterogeneity. (Scott 1968: 22)

Subject to the foregoing qualifications, Table 5:2 indicates that the inner ring local government areas had almost a monopoly of the lowest grade suburbs. These are the old partly decaying suburbs which contain a high proportion of the city's poor, its non-British migrants, its unattached youth, its childless adults, and its social deviants (see Rose 1967: 26). The more these suburbs are 'redeveloped', either for commercial or for residential purposes, the more these people are forced to seek accommodation elsewhere. This is a help to local government authorities anxious to 'improve' their area, especially its rating base. But what happens to the people displaced, many of whom will have lived in the area for much of their lives? Alternative accommodation in the inner ring of suburbs at a manageable price is increasingly difficult to find. The 'solution' is often moving to an outer suburb with all the social and economic costs involved.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City of Sydney</th>
<th>Grade of Suburbs</th>
<th>Middle Ring</th>
<th>Grade of Suburbs</th>
<th>Outer Ring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Ring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosman</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sydney</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leichhardt</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drummoyne</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashfield</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marrickville</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botany</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sydney</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woollahra</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waverley</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randwick</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from 'social prestige' ratings in Congalton 1969: 136-42.
Table 5:2 indicates also the developing degree of social segregation in the city's spread to the west and south-west. The local government areas of Canterbury, Hurstville, Bankstown, Auburn, Parramatta, Blacktown, Holroyd, Fairfield, and Liverpool form a huge, continuous wedge, its edges fanning to the south-west and to the north-west, its point meeting Sydney airport about 6 miles south of the City. In this area, housing almost a million people, every single suburb is classified as C grade. According to the 1968 Outline Plan, it is within this wedge and beyond it, on comparatively poor and unattractive land, that the bulk of the next 1½ millions are to be housed by the year 2000.

Hugh Stretton has strongly criticised the extension of Sydney's increasing social segregation, but because of the city's topography he accepts it as virtually inevitable—that is, if Sydney must continue to grow. For him, Sydney is already almost beyond redemption, a place increasingly to avoid if you enjoy a civilised and creative way of life, or are concerned with social justice. Only a massive 'new towns' policy, replacing the present tinkering decentralisation policy, could hope to divert new population away from Sydney. For such a policy to become politically acceptable and technically feasible will take time, if it happens at all, and Sydney is already out of time (Stretton 1970: 256-68).

Age distributions

At the 1966 census, the proportion of 'adolescent' population (15-20 years of age) in each local government area was remarkably even, ranging only between 9·3 and 12·4 per cent, except for the Blue Mountains (7·7) and Windsor (13·6). In the near future, however, this pattern was likely to change because of high proportions in the 0-14 age groups in many areas. Table 5:3 shows local government areas ranked according to the proportions of their populations in the age groups 0-14 and 65 and over. People at each end of the age scale tend to be the least mobile members of society and therefore most dependent on their locality to meet their needs; their needs for community services are distinctive; and, as the table shows, these groups form varying proportions of the population in different parts of Sydney.

Not unexpectedly, outer ring local government areas had a high proportion of children and a low proportion of elderly people. Liverpool, Blacktown and Fairfield (all solidly C grade in social status, it will be remembered) are striking examples of this pattern, which calls for rapid establishment of relevant educational, health, recreational and other social welfare services, to offset the disadvantages of distance from the City with its range of central facilities, from the sea, and from the children's grandparents.

The higher proportions of older people in the inner and middle ring of local government authorities mean a greater majority of women. In 1966,
### TABLE 5.3

Local Government Areas in the Sydney Statistical Division ranked according to proportion of their population in (a) 0-14 age group, and (b) 65+ age group, at Census of 30 June 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Population 0-14 Years of Age</th>
<th>% Population 65+ Years of Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool (O) 43·1</td>
<td>1. Mosman (I) 16·1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacktown (O) 38·9</td>
<td>2. Woollahra (I) 15·3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penrith (O) 36·6</td>
<td>3. Burwood (M) 15·2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbelltown (O) 35·6</td>
<td>4. North Sydney (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairfield (O) 35·0</td>
<td>5. Manly (M) 14·8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baulkham Hills (O) 34·2</td>
<td>6. Concord (M) 14·5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camden (O) 33·7</td>
<td>7. Ashfield (I) 14·3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutherland (O) 32·3</td>
<td>8. Willoughby (M) 13·9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Mts (part) (O) 31·7</td>
<td>9. Drummoyne (I) 13·5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holroyd (O) 31·3</td>
<td>10. Strathfield (M) 13·2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hornsby (O) 31·2</td>
<td>11. Hunter's Hill (M) 12·9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bankstown (M) 31·0</td>
<td>12. Waverley (I) 12·8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windsor (O) 30·8</td>
<td>13. Lane Cove (M) 12·3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warringah (O) 30·0</td>
<td>14. Rockdale (M) 12·0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ku-ring-gai (M) 29·0</td>
<td>15. Blue Mts (part) (O) 11·4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryde (M) 28·2</td>
<td>16. Kogarah (M) 11·2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parramatta (M) 27·7</td>
<td>17. Leichhardt (I) 11·1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurstville (M) 26·2</td>
<td>18. Marrickville (I) 11·0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury (M) 22·9</td>
<td>19. Randwick (I) 11·0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auburn (M) 22·7</td>
<td>20. City of Sydney 10·9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botany (I) 22·3</td>
<td>21. Auburn (M) 10·8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lane Cove (M) 22·2</td>
<td>22. Canterbury (M) 10·4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kogarah (M) 21·6</td>
<td>23. Ku-ring-gai (O) 9·7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leichhardt (I) 21·3</td>
<td>24. Botany (I) 8·4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter's Hill (M) 21·0</td>
<td>25. Ryde (M) 8·2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strathfield (M) 20·9</td>
<td>26. Warringah (O) 7·9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockdale (M) 20·4</td>
<td>27. Hurstville (M) 7·9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manly (M) 20·4</td>
<td>28. Hornsby (O) 7·8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willoughby (M) 20·3</td>
<td>29. Parramatta (M) 7·7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marrickville (I) 20·2</td>
<td>30. Camden (O) 6·9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randwick (I) 20·1</td>
<td>31. Sutherland (O) 5·8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drummoyne (I) 19·2</td>
<td>32. Windsor (O) 5·6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concord (M) 18·7</td>
<td>33. Campbelltown (O) 5·4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burwood (M) 17·8</td>
<td>34. Baulkham Hills (O) 5·2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashfield (I) 17·5</td>
<td>35. Holroyd (O) 5·1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Sydney 17·1</td>
<td>36. Bankstown (M) 4·7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosman (I) 16·8</td>
<td>37. Penrith (O) 4·5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waverley (I) 16·1</td>
<td>38. Fairfield (O) 3·8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woolahra (I) 16·0</td>
<td>39. Blacktown (O) 3·3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sydney (I) 13·1</td>
<td>40. Liverpool (O) 2·9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I = Inner Ring,  M = Middle Ring,  O = Outer Ring.

Source: Commonwealth Statistician.
only 3½ per cent of Sydney's total population were men 65 years or more in age, compared with 5½ per cent who were women in the same age group, a difference of 53,000 people. The total figure of about 9 per cent aged 65 or more would in fact have been higher but for post-war immigration. In 1881, the New South Wales figure had stood at a mere 2½ per cent.

*Migrant settlement*

As indicated in Chapter 1, a significant part of Sydney's population growth in the post-war period has come from overseas migrants. At the 1966 census, 21·9 per cent of Sydney's people had been born overseas, and about 6 per cent of the total had arrived in Australia within the previous four years; 8·6 per cent of all Sydneysiders were of British birth, while 13·3 per cent had come from other European countries, with Italy, Greece, Germany, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, and Malta the most prominent. Characteristic of the immigrant population as a whole has been an imbalance between the sexes. In New South Wales in 1966 397,000 males had been born outside Australia, compared with 337,000 females.

Immigration, especially from non-British sources, must have had important effects on Sydney's social structure.

Where have the immigrants been making their permanent or temporary 'home'? Table 5:4 summarises the situation, again at the time of the 1966 census. It confirms that non-British migrants tend to live in the City and an inner ring of suburbs, crowding into the cheaper and often deteriorating accommodation—Congalton's D class, or at best, C class suburbs. Redevelopment in these suburbs must affect migrant welfare in particular. British migrants, however, were not more heavily represented in these suburbs than elsewhere. They tended to be spread across the geographic and social spectrums. But the non-British migrants were also spread widely—in spite of their greater concentration in and close to the City. In no local government area was less than 12 per cent of the population foreign-born, and none had less than 5 per cent in either the British or the non-British categories. A pattern of relatively high proportions of non-British migrants in the outer suburbs—already evident in places like Fairfield, Blacktown and Holroyd—is likely to be reinforced as living close to the City becomes too expensive for the poorer migrant groups.

Special services and help in integration are particularly important to migrants in the first few years. Table 5:4 shows that in no local government area were more than about 13 per cent of the population migrants who had arrived in Australia within the previous four years. For three-quarters of the areas, the proportion varied from 2 to 7 per cent, suggesting that the tasks of service and integration were manageable if recognised and accepted locally. The table also shows that generally the areas with the highest proportions of newcomers to the country are also areas with high proportions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Government Area</th>
<th>% Overseas-born Population</th>
<th>% Overseas-born Population</th>
<th>Other Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Marrickville</td>
<td>(I) 34·3 (13·0)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>(I) 13·0</td>
<td>1. Marrickville (I) 27·9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. City of Sydney</td>
<td>(I) 34·0 (12·0)</td>
<td>(M) 12·9</td>
<td>2. City of Sydney (M) 26·8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Waverley</td>
<td>(J) 31·1 (8·6)</td>
<td>(J) 12·3</td>
<td>3. Leichhardt (I) 21·6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fairfield</td>
<td>(J) 30·5 (8·1)</td>
<td>(O) 11·3</td>
<td>4. Waverley (I) 20·7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Woollahra</td>
<td>(J) 29·9 (7·0)</td>
<td>(J) 12·2</td>
<td>5. Fairfield (O) 20·4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Leichhardt</td>
<td>(I) 28·8 (8·6)</td>
<td>(O) 11·1</td>
<td>6. Ashfield (I) 19·9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ashfield</td>
<td>(J) 28·2 (8·7)</td>
<td>(O) 10·7</td>
<td>7. Woollahra (I) 19·9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Botany</td>
<td>(I) 27·3 (9·5)</td>
<td>(O) 10·4</td>
<td>8. Botany (I) 19·2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. North Sydney</td>
<td>(I) 27·2 (9·4)</td>
<td>(O) 10·1</td>
<td>9. Burwood (M) 16·8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Burwood</td>
<td>(M) 26·4 (8·4)</td>
<td>(I) 10·0</td>
<td>10. Drummoine (I) 16·8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Drummoine</td>
<td>(I) 25·2 (6·1)</td>
<td>(I) 10·0</td>
<td>11. Randwick (I) 16·1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Randwick</td>
<td>(J) 25·1 (8·0)</td>
<td>(O) 10·0</td>
<td>12. Blacktown (M) 14·2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Liverpool</td>
<td>(O) 23·5 (6·4)</td>
<td>(I) 10·4</td>
<td>13. North Sydney (M) 14·2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Mosman</td>
<td>(J) 23·1 (7·2)</td>
<td>(M) 9·4</td>
<td>14. Concord (M) 13·7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Concord</td>
<td>(M) 21·9 (5·4)</td>
<td>(O) 9·2</td>
<td>15. Holroyd (O) 13·5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Penrith</td>
<td>(O) 21·6 (4·7)</td>
<td>(I) 9·0</td>
<td>16. Canterbury (M) 12·4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Blacktown</td>
<td>(O) 21·5 (4·0)</td>
<td>(O) 8·8</td>
<td>17. Strathfield (M) 12·4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Campbelltown</td>
<td>(O) 21·1 (5·0)</td>
<td>(M) 8·7</td>
<td>18. Liverpool (O) 12·2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Manly</td>
<td>(M) 20·3 (6·4)</td>
<td>(O) 8·7</td>
<td>19. Willoughby (M) 12·8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Willoughby</td>
<td>(M) 20·9 (5·5)</td>
<td>(M) 8·5</td>
<td>20. Auburn (M) 11·9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Holroyd</td>
<td>(O) 21·0 (4·4)</td>
<td>(I) 8·4</td>
<td>21. Penrith (O) 11·6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Canterbury</td>
<td>(M) 19·9 (5·1)</td>
<td>(O) 8·3</td>
<td>22. Mosman (O) 10·8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Auburn</td>
<td>(M) 19·8 (4·4)</td>
<td>(O) 8·3</td>
<td>23. Manly (M) 10·6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Lane Cove</td>
<td>(M) 19·7 (4·7)</td>
<td>(O) 8·2</td>
<td>24. Rockdale (M) 10·3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Strathfield</td>
<td>(M) 19·7 (4·4)</td>
<td>(M) 7·9</td>
<td>25. Lane Cove (O) 9·7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Warringah</td>
<td>(O) 19·7 (4·9)</td>
<td>(M) 7·9</td>
<td>26. Camden (O) 9·7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Hunter's Hill</td>
<td>(M) 18·8 (3·4)</td>
<td>(O) 7·9</td>
<td>27. Hunter's Hill (O) 9·0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Rockdale</td>
<td>(M) 18·8 (4·8)</td>
<td>(O) 7·9</td>
<td>28. Warringah (O) 9·0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Camden</td>
<td>(O) 18·4 (3·1)</td>
<td>(M) 7·8</td>
<td>29. Campbelltown (O) 8·9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Bankstown</td>
<td>(M) 18·2 (3·9)</td>
<td>(O) 7·7</td>
<td>30. Ku-ring-gai (O) 8·2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Ku-ring-gai</td>
<td>(O) 17·5 (5·0)</td>
<td>(O) 7·7</td>
<td>31. Parramatta (M) 7·9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Blue Mts (part)</td>
<td>(O) 16·7 (2·8)</td>
<td>(O) 7·5</td>
<td>32. Ryde (M) 7·9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Parramatta</td>
<td>(M) 16·0 (3·8)</td>
<td>(O) 7·3</td>
<td>33. Windsor (M) 7·4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Ryde</td>
<td>(M) 15·6 (3·1)</td>
<td>(M) 7·3</td>
<td>34. Baulkham Hills (O) 7·4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Baulkham Hills</td>
<td>(O) 15·5 (2·2)</td>
<td>(O) 7·3</td>
<td>35. Manly (O) 7·4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Kogarah</td>
<td>(M) 14·9 (3·0)</td>
<td>(O) 7·2</td>
<td>36. Hornsby (O) 6·8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Hornsby</td>
<td>(O) 14·7 (3·1)</td>
<td>(I) 7·2</td>
<td>37. Kogarah (M) 6·4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Sutherland</td>
<td>(O) 14·5 (3·6)</td>
<td>(O) 6·6</td>
<td>38. Sutherland (O) 5·7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Windsor</td>
<td>(O) 13·2 (2·9)</td>
<td>(O) 6·4</td>
<td>39. Blue Mts (part) (O) 5·6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Hurstville</td>
<td>(M) 12·1 (2·0)</td>
<td>(I) 5·5</td>
<td>40. Hurstville (M) 5·2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Including Republic of Ireland.  <sup>b</sup> This column shows % of total population resident in Australia under 5 years. This is slightly understated because of incomplete data.

*Source: Commonwealth Statistician.*
The Politics of Urban Growth

of long-established migrants, who could be, and often are, of substantial assistance to the newcomers, especially through ethnic societies.

Public transport

For large numbers of Sydneysiders work is not close to home. In 1945, 55 per cent (345,000) of jobs were located in the City of Sydney, 19 per cent in the inner ring of local government areas, 20 per cent in the middle ring, and 6 per cent in the outer ring. By 1966, these figures were 37 per cent (386,000 jobs), 18 per cent, 30 per cent and 15 per cent respectively (Neutze 1971: 67). This points to some decentralisation of jobs, especially in manufacturing and retailing, which has partly accompanied the spread of population. Yet the City was still growing as a work place, and these broad work-place figures taken in conjunction with the residence figures cited earlier (pp. 101-2) indicate that large numbers of people have to journey to work, in many cases for long distances. The impact of these regular journeys on public and private transport systems, air pollution, personal and family finance, family structure and family life, health, traffic accidents, hospital services, job choices, friendship patterns, local versus metropolitan identification, and personal use of time, call for urgent study.

In January 1971, the state government appointed Dr R. S. Nielsen to direct ‘an all-embracing survey of Sydney’s transport needs’ (Sydney Morning Herald 2 July 1971). Presumably in this 3-year study, all mobility needs will be considered, not just mobility for purposes of work. Obviously highly complicated technical factors will need to be taken into account—in all fields including the social and economic. This means a range of technical experts is indispensable, but their prescriptions will inevitably be political as well as technical in nature. What and whose values will predominate?

In mid-1971, a sudden steep rise in fares—50 per cent for buses and trains, 33 per cent for ferries—prompted newspaper articles on the state of Sydney’s public transport systems (e.g. Sydney Morning Herald 2 July 1971, Australian 30 June 1971). They were seen as inefficient, unco-ordinated, expensive and dirty, continually losing custom. The President of the New South Wales Division of the Royal Australian Planning Institute, in a letter to the Sydney Morning Herald (22 June 1971), complained of the hardship the large rise in fares would impose on some sections of the community, and claimed:

many people will now decide that it is just as cheap for them to drive their cars to work as to travel by public transport. More cars on the roads in peak hours will further increase the already intolerable level of congestion, and increased congestion will lead to demands for more road widening and expressways. Yet, while public transport is supposed to pay for itself, the phenomenally high cost of road construction is fully paid for by the Government.
(This last statement was not entirely accurate for, even under the new fares, the state government was subsidising bus, train and ferry travellers to the extent of $31m a year (Sydney Morning Herald 18 June 1971).)

Paul Fitzwarryne of the School of Traffic Engineering of the University of New South Wales pointed out in a press article (Sydney Morning Herald 3 July 1971) that despite the much publicised long-term fall in the public’s use of public transport, peak-hour commuter traffic by bus and rail had substantially increased, and only an estimated 12 per cent of all central Sydney workers travelled to work by car. He argued that the public transport commuters, especially the poorer ones in the outlying suburbs, were being asked to bear the economic burden of two major defects in Sydney planning philosophy:

First, the Sydney City Commissioners and later the City Council have authorised a rapid expansion of the central business district for no apparent reason other than to stay ahead of Melbourne . . . Second, the State Planning Authority, in the Regional Plan, encourages the rapid geographical spread of the city with low-density housing.

The state government was concentrating its transport investments in road projects, partly encouraged by the Commonwealth government providing interest-free grants for road construction ‘regardless of whether the money could be better spent on other transport modes’.

Clearly there is an emerging awareness of the need to examine the costs and benefits, and the inequities of alternative transport arrangements. ‘Progress’ and ‘development’ do not necessarily mean bigger and better expressways, especially when they cut a path through established residential areas, dispossessing people of their homes and tearing the social fabric of their lives.

THE SOCIAL WELFARE RESPONSE

People meet their daily needs through a variety of social arrangements—national, state and local government services, voluntary services, and private enterprise. In addition, primary groups of family, neighbours and friends can still be important sources of service. The social welfare services under government and voluntary auspices may be seen as having special and direct responsibilities for human well-being. The ‘end values’ which social welfare services seek to foster include: life and health; sense of dignity, worth, and purpose; aspiration to achieve; freedom to make choices; role and status; food; housing; clothing; family relationships; home management; education and training; employment; legal protection; group and community participation; leisure and opportunity for its use; aesthetic enjoyment; religion; and promise of decent burial (Howard 1969: 61).

Distinctions between welfare and other types of social institutions are not clear-cut, and beside the stated objectives of a social welfare organisation,
closer analysis reveals a variety of personal objectives being pursued through the organisation by legislators or board members, and by agency employees—to say nothing of the customers (Lawrence 1968: 57-8). The social services form an integral part of the social and economic order, and are no longer seen merely as individually motivated ‘good works’, or as redistribution of wealth from the ‘haves’ to the ‘have-nots’ (Donnison et al. 1965: 15-30).

I want now to give some examples of how the social welfare services have responded to the changes in the nature and distribution of Sydney’s population outlined in previous sections. All of the services have been under strain. Education, one of the most important, is admitted by educationists, teachers, state education ministers, and journalists alike to be in a state of crisis. Since it has, as a result, been exposed to prolonged public debate, I shall take my main example from a field that has received little public discussion.

An illustration: public health

During the 1960s the health authorities began to talk about ‘community health’, ‘community medicine’, and ‘community psychiatry’, and to act in line with these concepts. With a few outstanding exceptions, however, there is little evidence that the people concerned have an understanding of the social welfare enterprise as a whole, let alone many other important aspects of ‘the community’.

In 1963, after an overseas study tour, Dr H. Selle, Chairman of the Hospitals Commission of New South Wales, recommended rationalisation and regionalisation of the state’s public hospital services ‘to provide improved service to the community as a whole, at a reasonable cost’ (Selle 1963). In December 1963, state cabinet approved the appointment of a Hospital Services Committee to consider such matters. In inviting people to join the Committee, the Minister for Health, W. F. Sheahan, expressed concern at the rapidly mounting costs of hospitals, accentuated not only by advances in medical practice and administration but also by the teaching needs of Sydney’s second Medical School (at the University of New South Wales). The Minister also referred to a trend which had become apparent in recent years:

the development of competition and intense local pride, which has led to local hospital boards becoming powerful pressure groups, and to undesirable competition between the various boards for developments within their hospitals which are not always related to their local community needs. (Hospital Services Committee 1965: 6)

This first ‘Starr’ Committee reported to the present Minister for Health, A. H. Jago, in October 1965.

Shortly after taking office in 1965, Mr Jago discussed with the Chairman
of the Public Service Board the fact that no evaluation of the organisation and provision of health services generally had ever been undertaken. The outcome was the Eglington Report, produced in the Board's Consultant and Research Division, and submitted to the Minister in January 1968. In April, the Minister announced the appointment of an expert committee to consider the Eglington Report, whose suggested changes were seen as 'radical'. He stated:

[The Committee] includes men prominent in those sections of the community which will be most affected—hospitals, the medical profession and the university medical schools—as well as senior officials from the Treasury and Department of Health. Everyone concerned with health activities will be given an opportunity to express their views to this committee, and I think many people will wish to do so. (Starr Committee 1969: 39)

The second Starr Committee reported to the Minister in November 1969, and on 28 July 1970 the state cabinet approved its recommendations in principle.

In a press release the Premier, Mr Askin, said:

At the present time there are three main arms of the health and hospital services, each independent of the other and each responsible to the Minister for Health . . .

the Department of Public Health, which is responsible for the provision of the traditional and contemporary public health and personal health services and administers the special hospitals and allied community services relating to psychiatry, mental retardation, tuberculosis and geriatrics; [see N.S.W. Health Department 1969]

the Hospitals Commission which is concerned with the oversight and inspection of the administration and management of some 260 hospitals; and

the New South Wales Ambulance Service Board, which is the agency providing for and controlling the ambulance services of the State, through the medium of 56 district committees.

These organisations employed more than 50,000 people, and 1969-70 expenditure exceeded $116 million from consolidated revenue and $24 million from loan funds.

The Premier briefly described the main changes to be adopted: 1. A new amalgamated administration (under a New South Wales Health Commission) would ensure that the health, hospital and ambulance services were treated as a totality for planning, development and administration purposes. 2. For better administration, a significant measure of decentralisation, both functional and geographic, was essential. 3. The role and functions of Hospital Boards, now to be called Boards of Trustees, would be redefined. 4. The views and experience of the professional and community groups would be brought to bear upon the administration and delivery of
these services. (The Premier did not mention the Starr Committee's strong assertion that there was 'an urgent need for a complete re-examination of the Commonwealth-State roles in the provision of health services' (Starr Committee 1969: 37).)

A Steering Committee and Working Party within the Department of Public Health is currently engaged in planning to set up the new Health Commission. Some preliminary work had already been done by the Department's Division of Research and Planning established in the late 1960s and headed by the former New South Wales Director of Geriatrics, Dr Sidney Sax. The Minister has recently approved a proposal to divide the metropolitan area into four regions—Northern Metropolitan, Inner Metropolitan, South Eastern Metropolitan, and Western Metropolitan, and at least in the future Western Metropolitan Health Region various interested parties have been meeting informally since early in 1970. Over 300 people attended a conference called by this group at Lidcombe Hospital on 29 April 1971 to discuss 'Shaping the Future Western Health Region'. (The Region covers the local government areas of Parramatta, Auburn, Blacktown, Holroyd, Fairfield, Liverpool, Camden, Campbelltown, Penrith, and Windsor.) This conference revealed considerable confusion and apprehension, and made plain a need for community work and planning skills which as yet are in short supply. The Steering Committee and Working Party's task is also complicated by the conflicting views and interests of the various parts of the medical profession and of a large number of other professional and technical groups (see Lawrence 1971).

Sydney social workers have been slow to realise the social welfare implications of this planning and re-organisation of the health sector. However, early in 1971 representatives of the New South Wales Branch of the Australian Association of Social Workers, partly mindful of the British Seebohm Report (Seebohm Committee 1969), told the Steering Committee and Working Party that the 1969 Starr Committee Report had not tackled fundamental questions about the relationship between health services and other social welfare services. They said:

It is ironic that this should occur in a Report supposedly on community health services. Unless these questions are now belatedly tackled in this more detailed planning stage, the new health service organisation could do considerable damage to the future overall community service pattern... Unilateral action by the health sector, out of relationship with the other social service sectors, just does not make sense from a citizens' point of view. Nor should it make sense to a government concerned with making the most effective community use of limited manpower and financial resources... The strength of powerful vested interests in this health sector makes its reorganisation a difficult enough task, without the broader social welfare involvement. Yet the broader involvement will help to get the reorganisation and the vested interests into a community and citizen perspective. The
broader involvement does, however, require servicing by professionals with relevant knowledge of 'the community' and its social service structures, and with community work skills. (Letter to the Steering Committee and Working Party, May 1971)

Recently the Under-Secretary of the Department of Health has suggested to government departments, universities, and other interested bodies, a meeting to consider the establishment of a Sydney Region Study Group, to share information and plans.

Reporting to the Hospitals Commission in January 1969, a Survey Group found the developing peripheral areas of the city were poorly supplied with hospital beds in comparison with the older established inner city suburbs.

It is apparent . . . that there are sufficient public hospital beds in the Sydney Metropolitan Area; but due to changes in urban development and the outward spread of residential suburbs, the hospital accommodation is largely provided where people used to live. In the growing edges of population new hospitals have been developed as demands have arisen. In general these are small and because of their size and the shortage of specialized medical and technical staff they lack the ability to serve other than as 'community' hospitals. In addition they rely heavily on the inner city teaching hospitals to provide supporting services of a more specialized nature. These services, both diagnostic and therapeutic, are of very high standard and it is apparent that most, if not all, of the patients in these areas get appropriate specialist treatment. The unfortunate part of this situation is the inconvenience to patients and expense involved in travelling to and from centres up to 25 miles away for diagnosis and, after hospitalisation, causing visitors to travel say from St. Mary's to Little Bay to see the patient in hospital.

Public acceptance of this situation is poor and is reflected through the local practitioners who bear the brunt of complaints from patients and their relatives afterwards.

Conversely there is not always universal delight amongst local doctors to learn of the proposal to establish large public hospitals in the vicinity of their practices, because of the influx of specialists into what they regard as their own local territory and the consequent risk of highly competitive medical services in the area. (Metropolitan Hospitals Survey 1969: 16)

The Survey Group drew special attention to the shortage of obstetric accommodation in the outer suburbs, and spoke of a pressing need for a regional teaching hospital for the Western Region. (Plans are now well advanced for a 1,000-bed teaching hospital of the University of Sydney, to be built at Westmead on the site of the Parramatta Showground.)

Table 5:5 shows the uneven distribution of acute illness and obstetric hospital beds. It also gives metropolitan totals of beds in the other main categories. The acute illness 'theoretical bed requirements' in the table have been calculated using the formulae of the Study Group, which they adopted from the earlier Hospital Services Committee (3·3 medical and surgical beds per 1,000 of population and 0·7 obstetric beds per 1,000 of population). The calculations do not take into account the different age compo-
TABLE 5.5 Hospital beds in the Sydney metropolitan area in 1966

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<th>L.G.A.</th>
<th>Population '000s</th>
<th>Hospitals</th>
<th>Beds (acute and obstetrics)</th>
<th>L.G.A.</th>
<th>Population '000s</th>
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Source: Compiled from Metropolitan Hospitals Survey 1969, Tables 17-21.
The heavy concentration of acute illness and obstetric hospital beds in the inner city is striking. The City of Sydney (old boundaries), with about 6 per cent of the metropolitan population as delineated in the table, had 36 per cent of Sydney's total beds in these categories. Also striking is the gap between the 1966 situation and the Survey Group's proposal that in future there should be only two sizes of general hospital—teaching hospitals of 900-1,300 beds, and district hospitals of 400-600 beds (Metropolitan Hospitals Survey 1969: 29).

In 1966 the metropolitan area's psychiatric hospitals contained 5,748 beds. Apart from North Ryde Psychiatric Centre (503 beds), which lay two and a half miles to the north of Gladesville, all the rest—Callan Park Hospital (1,553), Broughton Hall (193), Gladesville Hospital (1,200), Rydalmere Hospital (1,049), and Parramatta Psychiatric Centre (1,250)—were located along Parramatta River. While there has been considerable diversification and spread of psychiatric facilities in the 1960s, the psychiatric hospital was still being described in 1969 as 'the cornerstone of psychiatric care' (N.S.W. Health Department 1969: 126). Its remoteness from large numbers of modern Sydney's population is inconvenient for both patients and their relatives. For admission purposes under the Mental Health Act, metropolitan Sydney is divided into six zones, each served by one of the psychiatric hospitals. Each hospital is on the fringe of its zone; none is in the centre of the area it is intended to serve.

Income security

A completely different approach to social needs is represented by the national income security system. Throughout the post-war period this has provided Sydneysiders, wherever they have lived, with some basic financial protection against the hazards of old age, invalidity, widowhood, unemployment and sickness (see Kewley 1965). In an earlier generation relieving financial poverty was the main concern of social welfare. Australia's income security system has not been submitted to a full-scale public inquiry since World War II. If such an inquiry were to take place in the near future it would not be informed by any Sydney equivalent of the Melbourne poverty survey (Henderson et al. 1970). The elimination by the federal cabinet of proposed new income questions in the 1971 census has maintained a basic ignorance of our poorer citizens. The politics and morality of getting, disclosing and using information are important topics. The various social inequities that have been commented upon in this chapter are likely to hurt most the lowest income groups, but much of this has to be guesswork (and therefore can be easily dismissed) because relevant data are not collected by government or anyone else.
Considerable numbers of people receive Commonwealth social service payments. For example, at 13 September 1971, Sydney contained almost 170,000 people receiving an age pension, almost 25,000 an invalid pension, 3,400 a wife's allowance connected with these pensions, and 19,500 a widow's pension—altogether some 218,000 people. Thus about one in every thirteen of Sydney's population depends for his or her continuing economic security on these long-term social service payments. Because each type of payment is means-tested, the more affluent local government areas tend to be under-represented, and of course the age pension figures will be heavily influenced by the proportion of women over 60 and men over 65 in any area. Table 5:6 compares local government areas by numbers of residents in the different pension categories. Student endowment, which is a benefit not means-tested, is also included for comparative purposes. The geographic distribution of beneficiaries revealed in the table has profound significance for planning other relevant services for these categories of population.

It is perhaps important to mention that the widow pension category includes a variety of sub-categories of women living without their husbands. For example, of Blacktown's 1,419 'widows', 113 were divorced, 23 were widows who had had a de facto husband, 488 were deserted wives, 5 had their husbands in a mental hospital, and 22 had husbands in prison.

**Crime**

This last sub-category reminds us that the Prisons Department has now changed its name to Department of Corrective Services, and is under increasing pressure to reform, both from its minister and its permanent head, as well as from a small but influential minority of the public. Urban growth and crime are usually claimed to be closely associated, but serious study of criminal behaviour in Sydney only began to emerge in the later 1960s, partly stimulated by the University of Sydney's Institute of Criminology.

Data produced in June 1971 by the Bureau of Census and Statistics are of some interest. Each local government area is shown in terms of the number of its residents convicted by higher criminal courts in 1970, per 1,000 of its general population. The figures range from 3.65 in the City of Sydney to 0.08 in Ku-ring-gai and 0.06 in the Blue Mountains (*Statistics of Higher Criminal Courts 1970*: 17). Careful interpretation of these figures requires taking account of factors like the age and sex composition of the different areas, Sydney's detection and court procedures, and so on, but there remain striking disparities between different areas. The five areas with the highest incidence were all inner city areas, the next three were in the far west. If you lived in Ku-ring-gai, your chance of having a fellow resident convicted of a serious offence was \( \frac{1}{45} \) of the chance in the City of Sydney, and \( \frac{1}{15} \) of the chance in Penrith.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Rank Order, LGA</th>
<th>Student Endowment Rank Order</th>
<th>Wives' Allowances Rank Order</th>
<th>Invalid Pensions Rank Order</th>
<th>Wages' Pensions Rank Order</th>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>3. Sutherland</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>890</td>
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|          | 169,811  | 24,850  | 3,391  | 19,553  | 217,605  |

* Because postcode areas, used by the Department, do not coincide exactly with LGAs, some very small error is likely.

* Ranked by population at 30 June 1970: see Table 5:1.

Source: Commonwealth Department of Social Services.
On his return from the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, held in Kyoto in 1970, the Minister for Justice, Mr Maddison, prepared a report on ‘Social Defence Policies and Planning for Development’. The incidence of crime was seen as a collective responsibility with relevance for virtually all departments of government but with special relevance in the development planning of local government, decentralisation and development, housing, health, education, social welfare, and lands. Research and interdisciplinary collaboration were essential. ‘If planning fails to take account of criminogenic factors, then ultimately the problem of crime will be as devastating and as expensive to solve as that of pollution.’

The need for co-ordination

The recognition by the Under-Secretary for Public Health and the Minister for Justice of the need for greater sharing of knowledge and cooperation between the various components of Sydney’s social welfare services is one sign that a new emphasis on co-ordination is emerging. For example in May 1970 the state cabinet appointed an Inter-Departmental Committee on Essential Community Services in Rapidly Developing Housing Areas. Its terms of reference are:

(a) to examine the needs of rapidly developing housing areas, with priority being given to the making of suggestions for palliative measures to assist in overcoming some of the immediate problems faced by families moving into large scale housing developments; and

(b) to give priority to discussing the above in relation to the current situation in Mount Druitt.


It is probable that the state government was trying to avoid a repetition of the widespread criticism over the development of Green Valley, a housing estate built by the New South Wales Housing Commission, mainly between 1961 and 1965, housing about 25,000 people. The Commission saw itself merely as a housing authority for low-income people, without broader responsibility or mandate (New Town Forum 1971: 14-15; see Chapter 3, pp. 58-9). For three years members of the Department of Social Work of the University of Sydney studied the growth and development of Green Valley. This culminated in a ‘New Town Forum’ in September 1970. According to its chairman, Tom Brennan, the forum’s purpose was:

- to explore together the problems of Green Valley as a case study from which to learn for the ‘Green Valleys’ of the future. Other countries have, of
course, built new housing estates and have apparently found that whether specifically designated as New Towns or not, specially designed machinery is necessary for their successful planning, development and evaluation. Australia has been slow to recognise this need and to develop the appropriate machinery. In the case of Green Valley, many of the responsible senior officials who had been working for years on what ought to have been a co-ordinated co-operative venture met each other for the first time at the meetings which preceded this seminar. (New Town Forum 1: 1; see also Brennan 1970; and McLelland 1968)

Chapter 4 has mentioned the machinery that has now been established to plan Campbelltown's development into a city of half a million people (p. 55). The Inter-Departmental Committee concerned primarily with social welfare planning has turned its attention to this area. Its 'palliative' brief does not suggest, however, that it is part of the basic planning machinery, and in any case it is scarcely representative of the social welfare 'industry', for both the Commonwealth government and the voluntary sectors are absent. The 'real planning', to the extent that it is being undertaken, apparently remains in the hands of the land use planners and the public utilities. What Stretton calls 'the civilized spenders from whom any social thought can be expected—education, welfare, health, police', are not directly represented on the Campbelltown Development Committee, nor upon the State Planning Authority itself. The Authority has little apparent expertise in social welfare matters, since traditionally these have not been associated with 'planning' (see Broady 1968).

It has fallen to the lot of an engineer-planner employed by Lend Lease Corporation, which has major investments in the Campbelltown district, to propose many-sided integrated planning based on the functional needs and values of the people of the area. He asserts that there are sixteen basic human needs which 'must be woven into the whole fabric of community planning and development': a balanced community; employment; dwellings; physical sustenance; intellectual sustenance; a satisfying environment; water; energy; recreation; mobility; human relationships; disposal of waste; health, welfare and safety; communications; privacy; and freedom of body, mind and spirit. 'Neglect of any [of these], which has happened so often in the past, inevitably leads to social trouble and distress' (McLeod: Lend Lease Corporation 1970). The list is at least comprehensive, but lists of course are not enough.

In Sydney, as elsewhere, social welfare organisations have arisen in a piecemeal, largely haphazard fashion. By definition they are all concerned with the personal well-being of individual Sydneysiders—but which ones, in what locality, in what aspects of their lives, with what skill, and under whose sponsorship? Obviously every organisation is specialised and limited in its social welfare interest and scope. Whose responsibility might it be, then, to co-ordinate the work of these organisations so that from the points
of view of individual citizens and the community at large their efforts are most productive? If people answer: ‘the democratically elected government’, which level of government and which authorities within the government? Earlier chapters have already pointed out the complexities of the systems of government dealing with the people of Sydney and the fact that a metropolitan-wide government has not been established. In any case, would and should government intervention be tolerated by Sydney's non-government sector of social welfare? Structurally the situation is greatly complicated by the possibility of co-ordination according to any of the specialised bases on which the organisations are built—clientele, location, program, and auspices (Lawrence 1966).

**The Council of Social Service**

Councils of social service, which now exist in every Australian state and at the national level, attempt to provide a framework within which these co-ordination problems can be tackled. Copied from models in North America and Britain, they are specialised only in terms of broad locality and general social welfare purpose. The first of such councils, the Council of Social Service of New South Wales, was founded in Sydney in 1936.

Despite its name the Council's membership and activities have been overwhelmingly focused on Sydney—although from the mid-1960s a small number of non-metropolitan organisations have begun to join. (At June 1971 there were seventeen of these, nine having joined in the previous twelve months.)

Remembering Sydney's population growth from 1.7 millions in 1947 to 2.78 millions in 1970, how far has this general social welfare co-ordinating body grown? Table 5:7 summarises the situation.

**TABLE 5:7 Total membership of the Council of Social Service of New South Wales, 1947-71**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year at 30 June</th>
<th>Type of membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
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<td>84</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* Mainly professional bodies.
* Interested individuals.

*Source: CSS of NSW Annual Reports.*
During the twenty years 1951-71, a total of 284 organisations have been in the Council's membership, 53 maintaining a continuous link. Throughout the post-war period it claims to have included 'most of the more important welfare bodies in Sydney' (from 1968, 'in the State'). Since 1959, eleven local governments have joined, eight of them metropolitan (Marrickville, Ku-ring-gai, Rockdale, Willoughby, Manly, Sutherland, Waverley, and Baulkham Hills)—a small but increasingly significant government participation. However, not one of the major state and federal government social welfare departments has yet chosen to take up membership, although for most of the post-war period the Commonwealth Department of Social Services and the state Department of Child Welfare and Social Welfare have been represented on the Council's Executive Committee.

The failure of the Council of Social Service of New South Wales to gain more than a superficial participation by government departments and a consequent tendency to identify the Council with the non-government sector of social welfare have greatly hampered the pursuit of its objectives. In the post-war period until the late 1950s, these were:

1. To promote co-operation between all social service agencies in achieving high standards of social service and the efficient and economical use of community resources.
2. To study social conditions, problems and community facilities.
3. To encourage the interchange and dissemination of ideas, arouse interest and develop an informed public opinion, with the object of stimulating community action and influencing social legislation.

The objects were then revised, at least partly to make contributions to the Council clearly tax deductible. The price paid was a 'new' set of objectives with a decidedly nineteenth-century flavour—reference being made to relieving and alleviating poverty, distress, suffering, destitution, and helplessness, through charitable and benevolent action.

The idea of a general social welfare co-ordinating body has appealed to many of Sydney's professionally qualified social workers. Some have given their free services to the Council, its executive officer almost from the beginning has been a social worker, and many organisations have joined at the initiative of their social work staff. Yet social work education until recently has not concentrated upon community work or social policy matters.

Despite the large contribution of unpaid time by a wide variety of professional and lay people to the Council's work, it has been and remains understaffed for the functions it attempts to perform. Its annual reports avoid precise reference to its staffing position, but in the financial year 1970/71 only about $13,000 was being spent on salaries and superannuation. In addition the state government was providing $6,000 towards the
salary and other costs associated with the work of the Council's recently appointed Community Services Consultant. A further $11,000 came from grants from the state government and the Council of the City of Sydney. These government grants formed 'the backbone of the Council's revenue'.

In the 1965-6 Annual Report the Council's chairman, Bruce Hinchcliffe, said:

It is well known that whilst a few voluntary agencies enjoy comparative freedom from financial worry, the overwhelming majority, including this Council, are engaged upon a never-ending battle to exist within limited budgets which preclude expansion of services so urgently needed. To meet this crisis, increasing interest is being taken in the establishment of a suitable annual public appeal on behalf of the maximum number of charities.

This 'increasing interest' has still not led to the establishment in Sydney of any extensive schemes for federated financing for voluntary social welfare agencies. Judging by American experience such schemes can greatly strengthen a council of social service, because the council will usually have some formal part in the budgeting of funds (Johns and DeMarche 1951: 119). Perhaps that is a major reason why such schemes have not yet been introduced in Sydney. A relatively weak Council suits social welfare agencies which do not wish to see their autonomy breached in any way, but which may be willing to pay lip-service to 'co-ordination' and community-wide perspectives. It may also be the case that large numbers of agencies are not sufficiently secure in their work to allow themselves to be exposed to external scrutiny.

When you compare the size of Sydney's social welfare industry and the resources devoted to co-ordinating and avowed community planning activities, it is apparent how much 'tokenism' (see Howard 1969: 52) is operating. In 1957, the general social welfare co-ordinating body in Detroit, a city roughly comparable in size with Sydney, employed twenty-five professionals (exclusive of top administrators), and this has been criticised as a staff inadequate to the co-ordination task (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 264).

Towards the end of the 1960s, the emergence in Sydney of local welfare co-ordinating bodies (by June 1971—in Baulkham Hills, Manly-Warringah, Mosman, and Sutherland) was a new development, long evident on the North American scene (see Johns and DeMarche 1951: 106-10). The functions of such district community councils in the United States have been summarised as: (1) co-ordination of health and welfare services at the neighbourhood level; (2) helping people to become articulate about their needs and enlisting their participation in meeting them; (3) serving as a medium for the interchange of ideas among rank and file professionals; (4) serving as a medium for joint planning and action by agencies and civic groups; (5) providing a means for communicating to the city-wide
level the neighbourhood view of problems (see Lawrence 1962). A growth throughout the metropolitan area of such district co-ordinating councils could greatly strengthen the Council of Social Service of New South Wales, provided the Council had the staff to service the relationship.

Co-ordination at other levels

These new local welfare co-ordinating bodies are part of a more general movement towards local services. After a well attended seminar on ‘Welfare Services and the Local Community’ in October 1966, the Council of Social Service of New South Wales eventually established a standing committee because developments in this field were ‘so rapid and so important’. The committee’s chairman is N. T. G. Miles, Secretary of the Local Government Association of New South Wales; its terms of reference:

1. To examine the scope and range of local welfare services operated by different agencies, statutory, local government, church and other, and as far as possible to establish general principles of co-operation between such agencies and the co-ordination of their services at the local level;

2. To give information and assistance regarding local community services to Municipal and Shire Councils and any other community groups;

3. To provide and suggest programmes for training and advise on the running of educational programmes for voluntary workers.

A ‘Community Services Map of the Sydney Metropolitan Area’ published by the Council in August 1968 showed seven places where local welfare surveys (see, e.g., Vinson and Cullen 1968) had been conducted—Pen­nant Hills, Lane Cove, Canterbury, Blacktown, Mt Druitt, Green Valley, and Sutherland. The map indicated where there was ‘evidence of concern for co-ordinated local care’, and where four types of ‘official established services’ were available. Table 5:8 summarises the data from that map.

The New South Wales Council’s standing committee on local community services reported in June 1968 that many of the voluntary community groups which had emerged with a concern for co-ordinated local service in their areas were ‘looking towards the local government councils for support and the possible provision of a professional social worker to co-ordinate service and guide their activities’. In 1971, only eight of Sydney’s local government authorities employed any social work staff—Baulkham Hills, Ku-ring-gai, Marrickville, South Sydney, Sutherland, City of Sydney, Waverley, and Willoughby. However, in June 1971 the standing committee commented:

The next few years should see an increase in the pace of local developments in community services as a result of references by both the Premier and Deputy Premier to the provision of subsidies for the employment of social workers in local government. Mention was also made of the provision of initial grants to assist in the establishment of approved community aid centres and of the development of suitable training programmes, under the
The Politics of Urban Growth

TABLE 5:8 Locally available community services in the Sydney metropolitan area, August 1968

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Official established services
2. Child Health Centres (Health Department).

Evidence of concern for co-ordinated local care
5. Aid Centres established.
7. Local Councils and/or individual Councillors involved.
8. Citizens’ Groups, Welfare Meetings held, etc.
9. Citizens or Local Council Representatives attending CSS Conferences or other contact.

Source: CSS of NSW, ‘Community Services Map of the Sydney Metropolitan Area’.
auspices of the Welfare Services Training Council, for such groups as volun-
teers in community aid programmes, and welfare officers not requiring pro-
fessional social work qualifications.

There has been considerable wrangling over the respective roles of
Commonwealth, state and local governments in this development of local
services and over whether it should be primarily focused on the aged sec-
tion of the population (see Henderson 1970: 182-3). The Commonwealth
government's State Grants (Home Care) Act, 1969, and Delivered Meals
Subsidy Act, 1970, concentrate upon home and local services for the aged,
and this legislation is partly based upon work done earlier in the 1960s by
the Old People's Welfare Council of New South Wales (see Old People's

The problem highlights the competition for scarce resources, and com-
munity and government attention, between various parts of the social wel-
fare industry. The New South Wales Council on the Ageing (as it was called
after 1968) has played a considerable part in stimulating local services for
the aged—especially after the injection of Commonwealth government
funds, beginning in 1966, through the Australian Council on the Ageing. In
1963, New South Wales had 11 meals on wheels services, 15 home nursing
services, and 64 senior citizens' clubs or centres. By 1970 these figures had
climbed to 120, 78 and 251 respectively.

By 1971 a variety of co-ordinating bodies more specialised than the
Council of Social Service of New South Wales had come into existence and,
like the Council, these are often directly linked with a co-ordinating body
at the national level. Some of the state co-ordinating bodies—the council on
the ageing, the association for mental health, the association of sheltered
workshops—were helped into existence by the Council of Social Service
and maintain links with it. Others like the Good Neighbour Council have
not joined the Council of Social Service on the rather spurious ground that
colloidating bodies cannot join other co-ordinating bodies!

In the last few years Sydney's social service infrastructure has been
undergoing substantial growth and change. It now includes a series of state
government consultative councils or committees—for the physically handi-
capped, the mentally handicapped (a field where the change, strongly
pushed by parent groups, has been recent but dramatic), and the aged.
One of the greatest services to co-ordination of social welfare in Sydney
has been rendered by the directory of social service agencies, periodically
published by the Council of Social Service of New South Wales. There have
been seven post-war editions—the first running to 201 pages, the last to
almost 600. Entries are brief, but in some fields, for example mental handi-
cap, more detailed directories have been produced. No one has as yet writ-
ten even a descriptive book on Sydney's social welfare industry.

As the industry grows and becomes more diverse, the recruitment and
deployment of its manpower, especially its more expensive and more highly educated manpower, become critical. The most extensive specialisation and development of professional and technical functions have occurred in the health sector, but the same processes are increasingly observable in other sectors. In the late 1960s the Australian Institute of Welfare Officers was established in Sydney specifically to cater for the interests, functions and training of non-professionals in social welfare activities. The Institute has been a prime mover in the development of a welfare officers' certificate course, carefully differentiated from the professional social work courses run by the universities. The New South Wales Department of Technical Education plans to introduce the certificate in 1972.

CONCLUSION

The 'quality of life' slogan currently tends to be monopolised by people concerned about clean air and water, the elimination of excessive noise, and the preservation of native flora and fauna. These are seen as commonly held 'goods' increasingly placed in jeopardy by industrial and urban growth. This chapter, in its concern with social welfare aspects of Sydney's growth, has drawn attention to many other 'goods' also at stake and with which politics and planning need to come to terms. A systematic social welfare concern would include the conditions of life for all Sydneysiders, throughout their lives and in comparison with each other. As yet such a broad concern is without an organisational or political base.
Citizen Participation in Urban Planning

Peter Loveday

City politics in Australia is increasingly concerned with urban planning, and this has recently provoked demands from a variety of people for citizen participation in the planning process. The advocates of participation have included planners, cabinet ministers, aldermen, trade unionists, academics; associations, usually of citizens in old established areas undergoing redevelopment, have demanded it; one or two of the parties at the level of state politics have mentioned it in their platforms and some councils and planning authorities—in Sydney and Perth, for example—have tried consulting citizens about their plans. But so far we have had no comprehensive official consideration of participation in urban planning, much less a recommendation of it, of the kind provided in the report of the British Skeffington Committee (Skeffington 1969) nor experiments in planning with public participation of the kinds that have been tried, sometimes only after considerable turmoil, in Britain, America and Europe. If overseas experience is any guide, we can expect the demands for participation to gather strength here. We have a similar democratic political system and similar expectations that decisions will take account of demands; our major cities are large and growing rapidly; they present governments with problems similar to those found in cities overseas; and our governments have already indicated that they think these problems might be dealt with by some kind of urban planning.

The question whether citizens can be given a voice in planning is important not merely because it is a subject of contemporary discussion and agitation and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future but because it is an example of a fundamental dilemma of democratic politics. Citizens have come to expect that governments will intervene in economic and social life to meet demands made upon them through democratic processes; it is also accepted that the intervention must be planned in some sense to be effective and the dilemma then is to decide how the intervention may be carried out to satisfy substantive democratic demands without damage to the procedural forms of democracy. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the
dilemma arises because the general opinion is that planning and politics cannot be combined without harm to the planning process.

The conventional resolution of this dilemma is to establish the planning authorities within the administrative structure of government and to rely upon the political parties, as bodies of elected representatives, to find out what the public wants and to convey it to governments that depend on them for support and from them to the planning authorities. If the system does not operate in this manner the planners will have little or nothing to guide them unless they draw on their own notions of what is good for the people or go directly to the people themselves, bypassing the representative and governmental machinery, to find out what the demands of the public are. This, it seems, is beginning to happen, and it is because the parties and governments have both failed to provide either the information or the steady support that are indispensable for effective policies to be developed in urban affairs. Their failure is one reason for the growing demand for citizen participation. The demand is based on the conviction that information and support can be generated and transmitted to the planning process only by arousing the normally unorganised and unconsulted citizen whose vote is his only political act and bringing him into close and continuous consultation in the planning process. The demand is for creating new and more direct paths of representation alongside those normally provided by parties, pressure groups and elected members of local councils.

Citizen participation therefore spells politics in planning and usually radical politics at that (on participation see Milbrath 1965; Verba 1967; Thompson 1970; Pateman 1970). The arguments already used here in favour of it make this plain. They may be summarised under four main headings that indicate the general tendencies in them; the practical representationist argument; the anti-bureaucratic; the democratic; and the social therapeutic. Much of the criticism of the way urban growth and redevelopment have so far been handled has been to the effect that the mistakes and shortcomings of planning would be avoided if more democratic procedures were adopted. The argument is usually extended to include local government as well as planning authorities if only because it is intimately involved in the formulation and implementation of policies for the management of urban growth whether it is publicly planned or left to private enterprise. The arguments all imply that the opportunities which are at present provided for citizens to participate in planning and local government are quite inadequate and should be greatly enlarged.¹

¹ These arguments have been summarised from the press of the capital cities of the last three years and from other publications such as Atkins 1961; Wilkes 1966; Bentley 1962; Roseth 1966; Troy 1967; Metropolitan Region Planning Authority 1968; Ritter 1968; Australian Institute of Urban Studies 1968, 1969; Committee for Urban Action 1969; Chamber of Commerce 1969; Town Planning Research Group, Melbourne 1970; Canberra Forum 1970; Uren 1971.
THE ARGUMENTS

The four arguments all have a distinctive character even though they are connected. In the practical representationist argument the emphasis falls on the desirability of representing the interests affected by a policy in the processes by which it is formulated. The second argument is built around distrust of bureaucratic authoritarianism; in the third the emphasis is on the value of democratic procedures not only for their practical advantages, but in themselves; and those who adopt the fourth argument see participation as a means for remedying some of the discontents and dislocations of social life in cities.

The first argument is a familiar one in the Australian context and it comes in a variety of forms. The costs of urban growth fall disproportionately on those least able to bear them; the benefits are also unequally distributed, not by any deliberate policy but simply because that is how urban growth is working out. The policies adopted, apparently very reasonable and generally well-intentioned, have benefited those who already have a stake or position in society: not only the property holders, developers and the like but ordinary middle and lower middle class citizens. Other sections of the urban community, especially pensioners, the aged, the poor, the young, the minority groups, none of them represented in the policy making, not only get less than their share but often suffer loss from the change to a new planned environment. What is more, as people in agencies concerned with the problems of these sections point out, the planning of urban growth offers opportunities, at present altogether neglected, for developing reformist social policies to help people unable to help themselves to overcome the disadvantageous circumstances in which they are placed generally through no fault of their own. Others point out that planners frequently lack the local or special knowledge that is necessary if the finer adjustments that people expect are to be made to overall designs, or that they have failed to take account of the changing economic and social circumstances of the populations their operations affect and of the opinion of those who do protest. As a result their work provokes avoidable resistance and discontent.

The comment is also made, although often only in regard to trivial points, that planners are prepared to impose their conception of the ideal city and ultimately their values on the people whom they work for although the decisions are hardly trivial if they result in decentralised cities when that is not what people want. The implication of all these detailed points is that planning and local government would be more subtle, would provide for a more equitable distribution of costs and benefits and would result in greater satisfaction of interests and individuals if there were more citizen participation in it. And they get much of their force not from abstract theoretical considerations, but from the fact that interest representation in
policy making is a familiar feature of Australian politics.

In the second line of argument, the planning and developing authorities, especially the public ones, and the local councils have been attacked for being too bureaucratic. They are too secretive, too tied up in procedural red tape, too inclined to insist that the public must defer to expert opinion, too remote from the citizens whose lives are affected intimately by their work, too inflexible in applying general rules and designing plans, too defensive in the face of criticism, too inaccessible to all but insiders. The doctrine of responsibility to ministers and to parliament is employed to insulate them from legitimate criticism and pressure. What is more, rigid departmental separation of the various public agencies involved in planning and development, and the dispersal of developmental responsibilities to agencies which have other simpler functions and no means or incentives to co-ordinate their activities properly, prevent any one authority from seeing the problems of growth as a whole, a complex of interconnected parts, and deny to any institution, even the government itself, the authority necessary for drawing up and executing an integrated flexible policy. This, in the opinion of some critics, is why good intentions fail of effect and why opportunities are created that insiders can exploit to their own advantage, generally at the expense of the ordinary citizen and at the expense of the coherence of planning. The insiders tend to be those people or organisations—local councillors, developers, real estate firms, large property owners, business interests—who have political and economic power and whose co-operation is necessary for the success of any schemes for the regulation of urban growth. This argument leads to the conclusion that, whether the responsibility for planning and regulating growth remains dispersed or is gathered into one comprehensive and powerful institution, it ought to be much more open to the public than it now is, open not only to public observation but to public intervention.

The democratic argument has links with both of these. Some consider bureaucracy to be one of the most important threats to democracy in present society and argue that, if democracy is not to be reduced to an impotent formalistic set of rituals, the power of those in office, even if they are elected representatives, must be exposed to the criticism and authority of the public at large. And those who advance the first argument, that there ought to be equality as nearly as possible in the sharing of costs and benefits, the balance tilted in a reformist direction if it is to be tilted at all, are forced to add that substantive democracy must be backed up by procedural democracy. There is no calculus to determine equality in the sharing, no way of comparing the incommensurable, no way of weighing the demands and values of different sections to ensure a just distribution of resources. The best that can be done is to say that it will be approached the
more nearly, the more effective the representation in the decision-making process of all those groups, interests or individuals who might stand to gain or lose in the course of urban growth.

But the democratic argument is generally taken further than this. The ordinary citizen is most likely to be engaged by, to feel a commitment to policies affecting his own locality and it is on the growth of this commitment and the understanding of the democratic political process which it produces that the strength of the democratic polity rests. Others are more inclined to stress the practical consequences of local democracy than its effect on the dispositions and understanding of citizens. Local democracy is a recruiting and training ground from which people are drawn into politics and government at higher levels and it is desirable that the number of recruits in training should be kept as large as possible. This admittedly rather old fashioned argument is not entirely unheard now, and if it is unfashionable it is not because it is more inappropriate to the planning of urban growth than to local government but because recruitment into the class of politically active citizens takes place by other more important channels than those provided by the institutions for the management of local affairs (but see Davies 1964).

A somewhat different form of the democratic argument is put forward by the planners themselves. The more democratic the procedures by which their decisions are reached, they sometimes say, the less trouble they are likely to have when the bulldozers move in. They recognise, in short, that those in authority have to win consent for their policies in a system that is generally democratic.

Between them these three arguments all point to the desirability in the name of democracy of some level of participation greater than we now have. But this, as those who are disinclined to make changes in the way urban growth is now managed will say, is by no means so clear. They and their critics will, of course, disagree about what democracy 'really' is, but they can say that whatever it is, citizen participation is not the only important characteristic of it; that to be secure and peaceful democracy must have a constitutional and institutional framework and consequently that such things as the system of ministerial responsibility must be maintained and that much of the work must be organised on more or less bureaucratic lines and carried out with the help of experts, especially in large industrial nations with extensive welfare programs and economic regulation. They will agree that it would be foolish not to take the opinions of interested and experienced groups of people or individuals, but they will add that, until the public at large is capable of making much better judgments than it now makes, those in responsible positions must be free to ignore opinions that appear to them to be unsound, inexperienced and ignorant. They will insist
that some dislocation and distress are inseparable from rapid social change, and they can reasonably argue that some of the talk of participation is doctrinaire and visionary.

The fourth line of argument leads to what appears to be the same conclusion as the first three but if it is carried through thoroughly it has more radical implications. It depends on a contrast between life in modern cities and life in a true community, although this is often not made explicit. Those who use it are concerned with much more than the physical environment of the city, with more than its aesthetic effect, with more than the welfare of the poorer citizen. What they are concerned with is alienation, and by implication they see participation as a way of ending it and rebuilding communities, at least in some measure, as they are supposed to have existed in towns in the past. Although this argument has not been fully developed locally, the Victorian Branch of the Australian Labor Party touched on it recently in a state election campaign. Labor, it said, 'does not desire pseudo-participation but a living involvement' of citizens in matters affecting them. 'This sort of participation is an important counterbalance to the alienation factor so prevalent in modern western societies. People must have some real power over their own destinies and life style if feelings of social alienation are to be conquered' (Australian Labor Party 1970: 23; see also Whitlam 1969: 12-13). It has been spelled out more fully overseas: 'The physical planners . . . do not really know what they are doing to the social superstructure, to the invisible community. . . .' Social planning is a way of making people from objects into subjects again and it must be clearly based on participatory democracy. Only if people have a territorial interest and true grass-roots leadership structures of their own, 'giving participation in planning and its application, will we have communities again'. The task of administrators and specialists is to 'replace the previous organic forms' of urban life with new ones and, if they do not, they start 'to manipulate people and manipulated people are no longer able to look after themselves' (Hauser 1969; see also Catlin 1959: 132).

**The Citizen and Planning**

So far in Australia, citizens have been given very limited opportunities to voice their opinions about plans drawn up for urban development. The opportunities they have as a legal right are essentially those of objection, not participation, but some planning bodies such as councils take other action, beyond what they are legally obliged to take, to consult public opinion. Objections may be considered first. On this subject, the town planning acts of the states are generally similar. The New South Wales Act provides that 'any person who has an estate or interest in any land affected by the scheme and any Department, Statutory body or council may object
in the manner prescribed . . . The councils [proposing a plan] shall consider all objections to the scheme' (State Planning Authority 1964a: 8). Sometimes the term 'make representations' is used instead of 'object' in the other legislation, and in some states citizens generally and not only those with an estate or interest in land are allowed to make them (Kuzelka 1969). The general procedure envisaged in all the legislation is that plans, both general outline or regional plans and detailed local plans within the framework of the general ones, will be drawn up by a state, regional or metropolitan planning authority or by a local council or councils, reduced to maps and reports and then and only then exhibited for public inspection and objection. This general arrangement is, of course, varied in its details to meet the different types of planning procedure that have been adopted and the varying responsibilities of the planning authorities, but none of the schemes is without some provision of this kind. All of them allow too for appeals against the decisions made under interim development orders that are brought into effect to control development in the period between the decision to devise a plan for a given area and its completion; for appeals against decisions in such matters as compensation that arise when plans are put into effect; and for appeals against the decisions of councils administering planning schemes and regulations made under them. But these appeals procedures are not of particular interest in this discussion.

In general 'objections' must be lodged within a specified period; they are then considered, sometimes after hearings, by the appropriate planning authority, which then advises the minister for local government, in whose hands decision lies, whether to allow the objections or not. The hearings are carried out in different ways. The State Planning Authority in New South Wales appoints independent commissioners, 'mainly local government engineers and town planners', to hear objections and report to it (State Planning Authority 1969: 13). The Metropolitan Region Planning Authority in Perth has its hearings conducted by sub-committees which include representatives of government departments and local councils and, if industrial land is in question, of the Western Australian Chamber of Manufactures (Metropolitan Region Planning Authority 1966). The procedure is an administrative process, not always a public one, known only imperfectly and in the most general terms from annual reports or from answers to questions in parliament.

What little has been revealed about the objections themselves suggests that they are of the kind to be expected from such a process: namely overwhelmingly concerned with the effect of proposals for zoning, for roads and the like on property rights and values. Nothing substantial has been made public about the objections in cities like Perth and Sydney or of the way they were treated. In Perth 162 objections were lodged against the metropolitan plan in 1962, of which 97 were major ones, and, after hear-
The scheme was modified 'in some cases' as a result (Metropolitan Region Planning Authority 1963: 10). Fourteen hundred objections were initially lodged in Sydney in 1965 when the city plan was exhibited and another 2,500, most of them from Paddington, were lodged two years later when the plan, revised in the light of the original objections, was re-exhibited (State Planning Authority 1969: 13). Only a handful of the 184 objections made to the plan for Adelaide in 1962 concerned anything else but property rights and values (Town Planning Committee, Adelaide 1965).

A little more detail about the process can sometimes be gathered from the press. For example, protests in Paddington in January and February 1968 were extensively reported if only because they were an unusual occurrence. The protests were against the proposals of the Department of Main Roads, which were themselves evidently in the form of objections to the original city plan, to put major roads through an old area that had been rehabilitated largely by individual private citizens. Whatever the character of the individual protests that were lodged—and no doubt many if not most of them concerned property since 200-300 houses were marked for destruction—the protests of the Paddington Society itself, and of a number of individuals sympathetic to its views, took account of other matters as well, such as the 'amenity' of the area, its sense, rare enough in Australian suburbs, of its identity as a community, its pride in its often picturesque social variety and its concern for the sympathetic restoration of buildings of aesthetic qualities and some architectural and historical importance. The Balmain Association has recently made out a similar case to the local council for amendments to its planning scheme. The significance of the agitation the Paddington Society led and of the argument of the Balmain Association is that they show how difficult it is for values of these and similar general and immaterial kinds to get a hearing in the planning process by way of objections, especially when it is provided that these may be lodged only by departments and councils and those with an interest in property. In Paddington the Minister for Local Government intervened by appointing a special commissioner to inquire into the matter, but this was a quite exceptional occurrence. In Balmain, the council rejected not the proposed alterations but the case of the Association on the ground that it did not come from someone with an estate or interest in land (Bulletin 14 Nov. 1970 on the Paddington Society; and more generally Power 1969: 60, and Australian 13 Mar. 1971). The other point of some importance is that the accounts of the objection procedure make it impossible to assess the importance and character of objections from councils and government departments at this stage of planning; all that can be said is that they apparently do object and that the objections have not been noticeably imaginative.
Citizen Participation in Urban Planning

But even if the objection procedures were made more public this would do little to meet the criticism levelled at the planning process. None of the town planning legislation provides for public deliberations of the planning authorities or for the consultation of the public at large in the earliest stages of planning on the general character of plans and the values to be sought in them. A few councils have recently tried to consult the public only to discover that the public, lacking information and help in understanding the nature of town planning and urban problems, did not have any very clear and useful views and that they themselves had an imperfect view of what public participation might be, at what stage it should occur, and of what work and resources might be necessary to make it a useful adjunct to planning.

In Sydney, Willoughby Council appointed a select committee in 1966 to inquire into the future planning needs of the municipality and asked it to obtain the active involvement of all sections of the community in the planning. The committee, constrained by practical difficulties, decided not to issue a general invitation for submissions but to write to civic organisations in the municipality for submissions. It received thirty-four replies to 130 letters, and took oral submissions from representatives of thirteen of the organisations which replied. The committee was discouraged by what it found: 'the lack . . . of any evidence of concern for the future role of the Municipality . . . in the broad context of the North Shore as a whole' and 'the comparative narrowness of the attitude . . . towards the concept of town planning' (Willoughby 1968: 2, 5. See also Dougherty 1969; Clarke, Gazzard and Partners 1969). The Council of the City of Sydney has itself recently arranged for consultation of citizens about its latest strategic plan, again mostly by letter to about four or five hundred representative organisations (Australian 25 March 1971, 16 July 1971; Sydney City Council 1971; Australian Financial Review 3 July 1970). Similar processes of consultation have been tried in other areas of Sydney but not yet on a large scale—North Sydney, Sutherland and Woollahra (see, e.g., Clarke-Gazzard Planners 1970). In Perth, the Metropolitan Region Planning Authority has spoken in favour of public participation, but confused it with the objection process, and the attempts that were made at the time to inform and involve the public provoked the fear of councillors that the public would know about the plans before they should (Metropolitan Region Planning Authority 1968; Ritter 1968: 15-16).

This attitude can also be found elsewhere. The State Planning Authority of New South Wales has commented that its general advisory planning, as distinct from its statutory detailed planning, is 'to quite some extent' '“backroom” planning not ripe for general public knowledge'. It would be long-term broad planning, it said, 'generated by top-level policies', to be translated into statutory particular plans as implementation 'becomes prac-
ticable' (State Planning Authority 1964a: 3). The Minister has backed this up, using the ministerial responsibility argument. The greater part of the Authority's business, the Minister said in 1967, 'involves submitting reports and making recommendations on a variety of planning matters to the Minister. As these are necessarily of a confidential nature and involve the taking of decisions by the Minister, there is no justification for making the proceedings of the Authority dealing with such matters open to the public'. He went on to add that the open meetings of the Cumberland County Council, the State Planning Authority's predecessor, had enabled the press to publicise the recommendations of the Council before they had reached the Minister, causing 'considerable embarrassment to both the Council and the Minister' (NSWPD 4 November 1967).

This is not to say, however, that no sections of the public are heard at all in the initial stages of planning. The old Cumberland County Council consisted of members elected by local councils in its area, and of 'citizen members' as they were called, who included a representative from the Real Estate Institute, the Primary Producers' Union and Dairymen's Council, the National Roads and Motorists' Association, the N.S.W. Sports Federation, the Chamber of Manufactures of New South Wales and the National Trust: in other words, those thought to be the main organised groups interested in the planning of the area (Cumberland County Council 1959). The State Planning Authority is a body of twelve, ten of whom are representative—four from government departments and public undertakings, four from local councils, one from the Council of the City of Sydney, and one selected from a panel of four constituted by nomination by the institutes of architects, surveyors, engineers and the Sydney chapter of the Australian Planning Institute (State Planning Authority 1964b). In addition it has its own representatives on 'many important committees' and regards itself as 'widely representative' and closely in touch with local conditions (State Planning Authority 1967a: 2).

Somewhat similar representation of interests is to be found in planning bodies in other states, sometimes in the sub-committees or advisory bodies of the authorities (e.g. Hanna 1967: 73; Metropolitan Region Planning Authority 1962, 1966, 1969). In addition, interested groups and organisations have usually been consulted in the discussions that have preceded the initial decisions to plan (Town and Country Planning Board of Victoria 1967; Stephenson and Hepburn 1955: 4; Town Planning Committee, Adelaide 1962: 10). The organisations represented vary from state to state, but they generally include governmental instrumentalities, local government bodies, real estate, manufacturing, commerce and professional organisations. The general conclusion from this is what may be expected: those sections of the public which have established organisations, usually those carrying out well recognised activities in other spheres of politics as well,
are the ones represented most consistently in the politics of urban growth. How effective they are is another matter, but since planning authorities do solicit their opinions and ensure that they have representation in the process, it must be assumed that they are of some effect in it. Citizens who are now discovering that urban growth and planning affects them but who are not organised for other kinds of action are not represented to any significant extent in the process.

THE CITIZEN AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

And this is not the end of the matter. The local government councils are representative bodies and all the acts concerning town planning give them or their representatives an important part in the preparation and implementation of plans at both the general and the detailed levels. The first point to be made about this kind of representation of the public is that it is indirect, that is, an institution capable of managing its sources of information and its funds, of reaching its own decisions, stands between those who are being represented, the voters in council elections, and the process in which they are being represented—the planning of urban growth. And second, though it could be said, at least rhetorically, that the councils are given a place in it because they represent the people in their local government districts, in practice they are given a place because they have their own interests: in roads, parks, types of property development, making sure their budgets can meet demands made on them and so on.

But the rhetoric itself is worth examining too. Local government, according to one of its defenders, 'is the form of government closest to a true democracy' (Cox 1965: 105) and yet in all states there are complaints about it. Those which are most relevant to citizen participation and representation are complaints about the procedures of councils and the way their members are chosen. Party politics in council affairs is also complained of occasionally, chiefly by 'Citizens', that is anti-Labor organisations in Sydney and Brisbane where the Labor Party has managed to hold majorities in the city councils for long periods.

The criticism of party politics is along traditional lines and it is always directed at the Labor Party. The argument as it has been used in Brisbane in recent years is that Labor represents only a section of the community, that the party itself is so rigidly organised that a more or less self-perpetuating oligarchy is able to rule through the machine, suppressing dissent and criticism within it, ignoring opinions and interests outside it and denying citizens information about the management of their affairs. All of this is

2 There is evidence from Britain that keen interparty competition in local elections is the one thing that reduces the apathy which is often complained of here and there in local elections (Sharpe 1967: 319).
neatly summed up in the description of the Town Hall in Brisbane, under the control of the Labor lord mayor, Clem Jones, as the ‘Clemlin’ (**Sunday Mail** 8 June 1969). It is also part of this criticism that party has ‘corrupted’ the ‘community spirit’ of local government (**Daily Telegraph** 13 Sept. 1968), the implication being clear in the traditional pre-party ideology, that non-Labor politicians are uniquely capable of transcending particular or sectional interests, of representing the interests of the community as a whole and of providing good government for all. And, as might be expected, anti-Labor candidates have had problems reconciling the notion of independence prescribed by their ideology with the facts of their own political life. The most appropriate comment has come from one of them, a Civic Reform alderman in Sydney: the ‘call for independents is always attractive and they have their place in politics. But to suggest . . . that the City Council should in the main, consist of independents is about as sensible as suggesting that the Faculty of Medicine should be made up of students who faint at the sight of blood’ (**Sydney Morning Herald** 1 Sept. 1969, also 28 Aug. 1969 and 8 Sept. 1969).

If the attack on party politics—in the name of democracy—is strongly reminiscent of nineteenth-century attitudes, the electoral arrangements and practices at the local government level and the arguments used in defence of them are of the same vintage. The franchise is, with some exceptions, restricted to property owners, rate payers and occupiers, and attempts to widen it meet with thoroughly undemocratic responses from those who have it (e.g. **Adelaide Advertiser** 13 Aug. 1970). The electoral arrangements in one state or another include not only restrictions on the franchise and non-compulsory voting, but plural voting, multi-member constituencies with first-past-the-post counting (which favours well organised minorities), staggered terms of office and election, voluntary enrolment (which favours organisations confident of the votes of supporting sections of the population and able to get them enrolled and, with non-compulsory voting, able to get them into polling booths), and lax administration that has allowed the compulsory voting provisions to go generally unenforced where they have been in existence, and has allowed candidates’ organisations to collect absentee ballot papers without supervision. Finally, those in power have often been able to redraw electoral boundaries to give themselves an advantage.

There have been a few allegations, seldom proved but nonetheless

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3 Under unenforced compulsory voting in New South Wales about 70 per cent of those eligible usually voted (**Sydney Morning Herald** 6 Dec. 1968); under the subsequent non-compulsory system the turnout fell to about 45 per cent in a hotly contested election in Sydney (**Sydney Morning Herald** 29 Sept. 1969) and in cities elsewhere it has generally been lower than that (e.g. **Mercury** 9 Feb. 1970, **Advertiser** 6 July 1970). It should be added that turnout figures in local elections in Britain and the United States are also low as a rule.
damaging to the reputation of the system, of corrupt or doubtful practices in some places: personation, bribery, the forging of ballot papers, voting in the names of dead but still enrolled citizens, 'irregularities' in the postal votes and in the process of canvassing for absentee votes and conveying voters to the polls. But even without these practices, the system in existence is one which legally allows and in practice places a premium upon electoral tactics or manipulations designed to give disproportionate representation to those best equipped with money, inside information, experience, manpower and organisation to win it.4

What little we know about the results of this system suggests that those elected are drawn overwhelmingly from the same sections of the population that have access to the planning and management of urban growth by the representation given to their associations.5 In Melbourne, the Age (8 and 18 Aug. 1970) has attacked the Council as one of the city's more exclusive clubs: 'Since election campaigns are costly affairs, the council draws most of its members from the business world'. In Hobart, the Mercury (25 June 1969) has complained that reforms of the system have discouraged 'reputable successful businessmen of wide experience and administrative ability', and allowed in young men intent upon their own, not the city's advancement. And the aldermen of the Sydney City Council in 1971, divided into a Civic Reform Association majority and a Labor Party minority, may be classified by occupational and residential criteria as in Table 6:1.

Finally, there are the complaints about the secrecy of proceedings of councils. Since much of the work is done in sub-committees, or by the councils themselves going into committee, the public at large and the press have no opportunity of discovering the opinions of their aldermen, the pros and cons of issues before the councils, the decisions made and why. In Brisbane in particular it has been added that debate in council itself has been

4 In Sydney, for example, in 1969 it was reported (Sunday Telegraph 31 Aug. 1969) that the names of about 1,300 'tombstone' voters used by 'dummies' in the past had been removed from the rolls as a result of 'research' by the Civic Reform Association, which had taken care to ensure that property owners who lived outside the electorate for the city council were enrolled and able to vote by post. The Association's officials 'arranged' the postal voting, which was done by a rather complicated procedure, and were reported to be 'confident' that the Association would get almost all of the postal votes. In the event, about 9,000 postal votes were received and it was reported that they had had a 'vital effect' (Sydney Morning Herald 29 Sept. 1969). The total enrollment was a little over 45,000 and rather less than half of them voted, even though both sides used fleets of cars to get voters to the polling booths (Sydney Morning Herald 28 Sept. 1969). Allegations of fraud in the postal voting remained unproved, after investigations by the town clerk (Sydney Morning Herald 20 and 24 Sept. 1969).

5 For the argument, beyond the scope of this chapter, that the 'rulers' are always an elite group see, e.g., Polsby 1963 and D'Antonio and Ehrlich 1961. Even if the elite hypothesis were true in some non-tautological sense, participation could be discussed in terms of the limits to the rule of elites.
The Politics of Urban Growth

'suffled' and that aldermen have been denied information in the files (Courier Mail 31 July 1969, 15 Mar. 1970). The argument is that the public is being denied information it needs if it is to have an opinion on local affairs and the access to make an opinion known and effective when

TABLE 6:1 Occupational and residential characteristics of Sydney City Council aldermen, 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational</th>
<th>C.R.A.</th>
<th>A.L.P.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed, employer</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer/Self-employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In city area and at lower class address</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out of city area and at upper class address</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

it has one. As a result, there have been proposals for citizens' committees to 'advise' aldermen, for experiments in publishing official reports of council doings, for ombudsmen to inquire into citizens' complaints, for elective mayors, for public meetings at which aldermen report to the citizens in their wards, all of them designed on the assumption that councils are, or ought to be, more like little parliaments than they are. No one observes, unless he looks closely at Brisbane, that the consequence would be to strengthen the pressure towards the growth of an executive body of some kind in councils, giving ground for as much complaint as ever.

These observations show that the opinions of citizens in general are unlikely to reach the councils, to say nothing of the planning process itself, without selective omission and distortion. There is at present no opportunity for general public participation in the preparation of plans of any kind and participation by proxy, that is by representatives, is extremely limited in scope and is not enjoyed at all by many sections of the population, to judge by some of the complaints. The criticisms of the present ways of managing urban growth are therefore generally well founded: participation in one or another sense has scarcely been tried here yet.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR PARTICIPATION

How participation might be managed has been little discussed and those proposals that have been made sound quite adventurous when compared with the views of those who cling to the notion that 'the public has to put its trust in its representatives . . . [and] if they seem to be steering a wrong course, the answer is to make as much noise as possible or to elect somebody different next time' (Metropolitan Region Planning Authority 1968) or that the needs of the community, which must be the 'impelling force' behind planning, 'can best be expressed by the people themselves through these democratic institutions' (Brown, Sherrard and Shaw 1969: 8; see also Slaughter 1964: 3-4). Those who believe that these needs do not all reach the planning process through the existing tangle of partly representative arrangements usually argue that the views of the public can be discovered by some combination of committees, by public meetings and by surveys of opinion.6

The effectiveness of these proposals may be doubted. Even if it is simply a matter of consulting the citizens by surveys or through their representatives to discover their opinions, it is essential that the citizens know and understand what is going on in councils and planning authorities. This means that they must not only be told what decisions are being taken but helped to understand what the problems of large cities are and how they might be met by planning. Perhaps most of them know about the parks, gutters and baby health centres in their own areas, but few will understand, for example, how urban redevelopment creates problems of the kind dealt with in the preceding chapter.

If the public is to develop this knowledge and understanding, it must be given greater freedom to obtain what information it wants when it wants it. The timing of the supply of information is as important in this context as ensuring that independent organs such as the press, television

6 E.g. R. J. Hamer, Minister for Local Government in Victoria, emphasised the 'importance of obtaining information about public attitudes, desires, dislikes and so on . . . through research, through surveys, through contact with representative sources and groups of opinion makers . . .' (Australian Institute of Urban Studies 1969: 6). Ritter (1968: 5-6) emphasises the need to supply the public with information. Viney (Troy 1967: 135) urges 'dedicated bodies' like the Town and Country Planning Association to concentrate their efforts on politicians and thinks local councils, though unable to guide development, can be a forum for discussion and advice. The Liberal Party (Victoria) thought that research surveys, consultation with representative groups, and expert committees were ways of getting greater public participation (Age 23 May 1970). The ALP (Victoria) proposed that Local Renewal committees of people living in a renewal area would provide for participation provided the public was adequately informed. It also thought surveys were essential (Australian Labor Party 1970: 20, 23). The Citizens' Municipal Organisation (Brisbane) thought public discussions, publicity and discussions with professional groups and representative citizens' groups would improve the City plan (Courier Mail 1 Nov. 1969).
and non-official organisations can gather and disseminate it. If opinions are to be taken into account in planning, the public must have information well before decisions are taken and especially in the earliest stages of both local and general planning. It will follow, of course, that there will be more organisation, agitation and pressure on authorities than there now is, and demands for improved access to the decision-making process. But this is to be welcomed, not deplored by anyone advocating popular participation, and even assisted in some circumstances. Assisted because large numbers of ordinary citizens, often those most in need of representation in the process, have neither the experience nor the skills of organisation necessary for them to make their voice effective in competition with the opinions of those who are already organised (cf. Bellush and Hausknecht 1967: 279-80 and Wilson 1967: 293-7; Skeffington 1969). And welcomed because an opinion as a passive thing, of the kind that might be discovered in a survey, is of little value even to the planners themselves if its soundness and strength are not tested politically in controversy and agitation against other opinions. It is probably even more important that support of the kind needed in any political contest in the planning process cannot be built out of purely passive opinions or from committees and representatives who have no clear idea of what their constituents want.

This is coming to be recognised in Britain and the United States where participation and public intervention in urban planning have been the subject of experiment and much more searching discussion than here. The view that planning ought not to be political has been summarised as follows:

to many academics and professionals, and indeed to a fair proportion of laymen, planning can and should be conducted in a political vacuum. They are content to rely on a set of mildly humanitarian common sense objectives and to take their information on what people want and what they will put up with from sociological surveys. To them political motivation means the exploitation, distortion, perversion or suppression of technically excellent plans, by individuals or parties who are primarily seeking power for its own sake, or for even more sordid ends. Or it may be seen as the intrusion of some crudely generalised doctrinaire ideal, in place of a carefully studied scheme of relative advantage. In either case the politician is seen as an unwanted intruder. . . . (Sharman 1967: 277)

The planners’ problem then is to obtain information without becoming entangled in politics. Surveys and public relations appear to give them what they need, and by more ‘scientific’ means than any conceivable alternative such as representation, but they have been sharply criticised for being devices with a ‘fatal appeal for the technocrat’ (Grove and Procter 1966: 414).

Here and overseas both public relations and surveys have been confused with citizen participation, or defended on the ground that they help develop it. Some see public relations as a way of getting information to the people;
and surveys as a way of getting information back from them, especially from those predominantly in the lower classes of society, who do not form or join organisations to make their demands known (Crick and Green 1968: 334-5).

Public relations is not to be confused with, or even seen as an aid to public participation for two reasons: the information being supplied is under the control of the supplying authority and can usually be checked and analysed by others only with the greatest difficulty; that is, public relations is a one-way process; and secondly it is designed to sell a finished product, not to create discussion concerning possible alternatives or values to be preferred in choosing alternatives.

The careful press releases, colourful brochures, laudatory speeches, ingenious exhibitions, even the public meetings 'to encourage public discussion of the Council's proposals' merely serve to sugar the pill, for they generally occur after the decisions have been made . . . when the only remaining choices are to accept [them] or to object to [them]. . . . [The planner] may feel genuinely convinced that he has found the best and most human solution to a community problem and that only ignorance and obscurantism on the part of the public prevent them from sharing his enthusiasm for it; he will then be under great temptation to 'sell' his ideas. This is paternalistic planning . . . (Grove and Procter 1966: 414)

And surveys, although they have their uses, are not to be confused with participation either. Lapping points out that 'a civil service backed by surveys alone is liable to become even more forbidding and remote than it is already', that increased use of surveys will increase, not reduce, the discontent of those who feel alienated and want a say in making decisions affecting them and that, by themselves, surveys do not lead to policy decisions—some other input is needed beside information for decisions to be reached (Lapping 1968: 181-3). His conclusion is that more and more powerful pressure groups are needed to give demands for reform the necessary political push. The other point (Grove and Procter's) is that, apart from the technical questions about surveys, their defect is that they exclude the 'vital process of public discussion', that is, that the information obtained, the views expressed, if they come from people otherwise inactive politically, have not been subject to the pressures and criticism that might develop and refine them. And the final point is that it is all too easy for those using surveys to take the job of assessing both facts and opinions to themselves, to prevent others making that assessment in a more or less public and political arena and to claim, beyond challenge, that they alone have had the information necessary for seeing problems in the round, balancing all the demands and interests and arriving at the most equitable view of the public interest. And this in turn conceals and insulates from political resistance and modification the values that they themselves have and must use in any assessment and decision making. If that is how surveys
might be used, participation could provide independent means of ensuring that something important has not been overlooked in them, the information obtained in them not misinterpreted and that they have not been devised and analysed to suit a particular policy. (See also Burke 1968 and Arnstein 1969 for discussion of different kinds of arrangements to secure participation; and Levin 1971 on surveys.)

The notion that planning can and should be 'conducted in a political vacuum' has also been strongly criticised in overseas comments on urban growth. That notion depends on two things as a rule: on the assumption that planning is a scientific process while politics is not, and on the fact that planning is normally carried out in special units in the administrative system. The second of these things means that if planners and politicians, including ministers, want to protect planning activities from unwelcome political pressures that they cannot control, they can invoke doctrines of ministerial responsibility and administrative rationality, neutrality and subservience to justify their actions. This is not to say that those doctrines are indefensible, but the justification is in general much weakened by the fact that administration in Australia has not been free from direct political pressure and indeed in recent years, as administrators have themselves discovered the advantages of close contact with those their decisions affect, direct association between the two, much of it by-passing parliament, has become common.

Planners have made similar discoveries in practice but, like administrators, they do not easily give up the model of planning discussed in Chapter 2. Wherever the model survives, for instance in connection with urban planning, it leads to the conclusion that master planning, that is, the design and control of overall basic features of urban growth, is for the professional alone, and that politicians, citizens and interested organisations should be allowed their say only in the detailed working out of particular local schemes within the general framework. It lies hidden, for example, in the Skeffington report as one of its critics has pointed out, even though the committee accepted the force of many of the submissions made to it and recommended procedures designed to secure participation in planning. It noted that a number of common themes could be distinguished in the submissions made to it:

- a plea for more education in planning matters; for better access to and a wider distribution of information; for a statutory right of consultation by local amenity societies or for their representatives to be co-opted to the planning committee; for planning committees to be open to the press and for a closer link between physical planning and social welfare work.

It recognised that all sectors of the community had to be involved and not just the articulate organised groups, that there had to be a two-way exchange of ideas, and not just a 'one-way exercise in persuading the public' and
that it would cost time, money and expert staff. It emphasised that it is essential that information about the planning process, including the results of surveys, should be made public at all stages and that the public should be told whether their suggestions have been accepted and if not, why not, but the criticism, which is what concerns us here, is of two fundamental points. The report

fails . . . to make a proper distinction between . . . participation and public relations; and . . . to appreciate all the implications for public involvement of the difference between 'structure' and 'local' plans. (Senior 1970: 94)

The argument is that what the report describes as the 'main occasion of public participation' will occur only after the planners, having consulted the public by surveys and meetings and the like, have decided what proposals they favour. The 'main occasion' will, in Senior's opinion, be reduced to a public relations job of selling the favoured proposals to the public, and to the discovery of objections of a kind more appropriate to local than structure plans. The general point is that the recommendations do not give the public the opportunity to help define the values to be sought by the structure plan.

Elsewhere the attempt to leave the major decisions with the planners and to add to their legitimacy and information by tokens of participation and consultation has provoked trouble and conflict. In America,

the planning process for Model Cities was characterised by struggle for control over the program between city hall and neighbourhood residents, with the major city wide agencies waiting on the sidelines.

The result was that in city after city

the process by which the 'plan' was developed bore little resemblance to conventional models of the planning process. The conception of the planner as centrally engaged in setting goals, assessing means and resources, assigning priorities, and selecting courses of action simply did not hold up. All of these conventional 'planning' functions were performed, but they were performed in an essentially political process in which . . . the planners themselves were not in control or in any position to direct the process, [and] no other single decision-making entity that could be said to 'plan' was in central control of the process. (Warren 1969: 250, my italics. See also Silberman 1968; Hyman 1969; and Rein 1969, 1970)

The same has been reported from Sweden when planners, city authorities and citizens fell out. What finally emerged 'was not so much a “choice” as an “outcome” . . . not foreseen by any of the actors’ taking part in the process. ‘The goals . . . were developed in the process of bargaining itself’ (Anton 1969: 262).

The overseas experience all suggests that planning is bound to be political whether the citizens participate in it or not and that there is therefore no argument from the special nature of planning, or for that matter of adminis-
The control of the growth of cities is shared between a number of public authorities and with private enterprise, as it always is in any large modern city, policies will emerge and goals will be developed in the course of a constant struggle, open or concealed, for power and resources—money, the support of client groups, information, allies, expert staff and legitimacy and authority. But the situation in Australia differs from what it is overseas, at least in Britain. It is true that arguments for citizen participation here have been provoked by planning schemes, especially those at the local level, carried out by public authorities and not by the activities of private enterprise, but this is not to say that we already have too much urban planning, or that it is too comprehensive, rigid and long range. If anything we have had too little of it and in particular what we have had has been so narrow in its range, and so weak and tentative, especially in the face of vested interests of both public and private institutions, that there have been no policies at all in many areas of growing public concern. It is this, the absence of policy, rather than an excess of it, on such questions as the environmental intangibles and the social consequences of narrowly conceived physical planning that the advocates of participation, including many planners themselves, think it might remedy.

Citizen participation will not, of course, inaugurate a millennium; nor will it totally displace or transform the present politics of our cities, though the changes would be considerable as the report of the Skeffington committee clearly indicates. The implications of participation are that planning cannot be insulated from politics but must be subjected to continuous intervention, pressure and amendment; that information without pressure, though much sought by planners hoping to preserve their neutrality, is neither possible nor effective; that much of the intervention must be carried on outside the existing representative institutions—the parties, pressure groups and elected councils; and that people not hitherto engaged in politics to any significant extent must not only be given opportunities but encouraged and helped to participate. In sum, participation means more politics in our cities and politics of unorthodox kinds. If that prospect is disturbing we have to ask ourselves two questions: first whether the existing representative institutions appear likely to be able to meet the challenge of urban growth and, if not, whether we are content to have urban growth continue along its present lines.
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This book examines some of the ways in which politics and government have influenced the growth and shape of cities. It shows how urban growth affects economic and social welfare and the administration of all kinds of public services. It also asks how ordinary city dwellers can have more say in the way our cities grow in future.

The chapters on the relation between planning, politics and popular participation raise issues of wide interest throughout an increasingly urbanised world. The picture of city growth in practice is based on Australia's largest city — Sydney — its abortive experiments in comprehensive planning, and its halting attempts to make life more bearable for its citizens.

The assumption running through the book is that government has been responsible for the nature of the city's growth from the beginning, and that the management of future growth is unthinkable unless government — to the highest level — plays an increasingly responsible part. Some of the studies here show that the structure of government is quite unable to cope adequately with problems of growth. On the contrary, the situation is likely to get further out of hand unless there are changes in political attitudes and organisation, of which only faint signs can be seen at present.

The authors have approached urban development from the different standpoints of history, political science, town planning and social administration. They have collaborated closely to present a balanced introduction to a relatively neglected aspect of city growth — the politics of the process. Not only is this essential reading for students of government, town planning and related fields, but it must be of considerable interest to city dwellers everywhere.

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