THE GREAT WHITE WALLS ARE BUILT
Restrictive immigration to North America and Australasia 1836-1888
Before the 1840s only a trickle of Cantonese ‘coolies and labourers’ had come to the Pacific region. But in the great goldrushes of 1848 to 1854 in California, Eastern Australia, New Zealand, and British Columbia the trickle became a flood. When gold began to peter out, the Chinese remained, enjoying a brief period of humanitarian liberalism. But in the 1870s renewed immigration aroused fear of slave labour and racist antipathy towards ‘inferior’ races.

One by one the four areas erected barriers against the Chinese, by severe restriction on immigration and harsh discriminatory control of the settlers. In describing their evolution and growth Dr Price distinguishes common sources for what seem purely local grievances, and shows how widespread everyday pressures gave rise to policies apparently baseless and unnecessary. These policies were ‘the great white walls’, analogous with China’s Great Wall built to keep out the barbarians.

This humane study looks at coloured migration from the point of its victims as well as from that of the dominant white society. It shows that the notorious ‘White Australia Policy’ is not unique but had its counterparts in the other regions of the Pacific. It adds a new dimension to understanding the political, social, economic, and moral forces that caused savage and widespread restrictions on coloured immigration.

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Restrictive immigration to North America and Australasia 1836-1888

Charles A. Price

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To Elizabeth
Preface

This book falls within the general field of race relations: the way peoples of different racial origins react and behave to one another. The most publicised race relations today are those between the dominant 'white' peoples of North America, the British Isles, South Africa and Australasia and their 'black' compatriots occupying subordinate positions in the political, economic and social system. Less publicised, but perhaps more important as numbers are so much greater, are the relationships between the various 'brown', 'yellow' and 'black' races of Afro-Asia: between the long established Indo-Malays of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines and more recent Chinese immigrants; between the older populations of Ceylon, Burma, Malaya and Fiji and more recent Indian arrivals; between the various tribal peoples of central Africa and later 'Arab' or Indian settlers; and so on.

In all these areas race relations involve much amicable co-operation and co-existence, in places friendly intermixture and intermarriage. But the most conspicuous features are prejudiced attitudes and discriminatory behaviour by one race against another, or by 'pure' races against 'mixed-bloods', leading to open clashes and sometimes genocide or wholesale expulsion. Only in one or two places, such as Hawaii or Brazil, have the various races perhaps reached such a degree of co-operation and intermixture that physical differences mean relatively little and that social behaviour carries on with little consciousness of 'colour'; and, even here, scholars point to some race friction and to the social prestige attached to lighter skin colour.1

These relationships concern peoples resident in the same country, subject to a common political and economic system. Other race relations concern whole countries. Some assert that the major world problem today is the economic relationship between the advanced industrialised 'white' countries of the world and less
advanced, relatively impoverished, ‘coloured’ countries; a somewhat
treacherous over-simplification that ignores both less industrialised
‘white’ countries such as Spain or Albania and also technologically
advanced ‘coloured’ countries such as Japan or China. A more
relevant instance is immigration restriction: the way in which the
various countries of the world use their sovereign control over
immigration to admit newcomers of acceptable races and prohibit
the entry, or severely restrict the inflow, of persons of other racial
origins. Such restriction, particularly when accompanied by dis­
criminatory laws and practices affecting occupations, housing, civil
status and citizenship, involves internal relations between the
dominant population and the small number of racially different
persons allowed in for settlement. But it also involves relationships
between sovereign states, between countries of origin demanding
freer entry rights and equal treatment for their citizens and countries
of settlement asserting the right to pick and choose whom they will,
and subject them to internal controls as they wish. At this point
immigration restriction becomes a problem in international rela­
tions, more so when the country of origin asserts the right to
‘protect’ the interests of its people abroad, even if this involves
interference with the legal and social system of the country of
settlement.

With this particular area of race and international relations
this book concerns itself. It does not attempt to treat all restrictive
and discriminatory immigration policies but concentrates on one of
the best known: the so-called ‘White Australia Policy’. It is
important to remember, however, that the White Australia Policy
does not exist alone. Similar policies began at much the same time in
places of much the same character: British Columbia, California,
Oregon, New Zealand and, more recently, the British Isles. Studies
of restriction in all these places have too often confined their atten­
tion to one country, have peered and pottered and wondered at
local minutiae, sometimes becoming lost in intricate and heated
debates about origins or procedures. A wider context, more com­
parison between countries, enables one to fit events into a larger
picture, to see that what at first sight appear to be local oddities are
actually particular manifestations of wider trends, to understand
that obscure origins are a complex but not unusual interplay of
forces at work everywhere. Australian scholars, for instance, might have spent less time arguing whether economic, nationalistic or racial motives were predominant in creating and maintaining the White Australia Policy had they concerned themselves not only with Australia’s egalitarian and pastoral origins but with why virtually identical policies emerged elsewhere at the same time. Likewise, the volume of material published on the restrictive procedures of the United States might have been of greater value had more authors cocked at least an occasional eye at restriction elsewhere, or taken more note of ‘white invasions’ elsewhere in the world, not excluding the large-scale movement of European Russians into Siberia.²

This book certainly feels the need for constant reference to events and policies outside Australia; which is why it refers so constantly to Canada, New Zealand, the United States and, later, to the United Kingdom. It does not, however, refer much to the restrictive and discriminatory policies of various countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia and continental Europe, partly because conditions are there somewhat different and partly because the number of policies and procedures is too great to examine and comprehend in one book. Nor does it refer to the restrictive policies of Pacific islands such as Hawaii or Fiji: though Asian immigration was important to both these archipelagos, the conditions were very different to those prevalent in Australia and raise complex issues of quite another kind. It is important to remember, however, that these other countries and migrations do exist and that, with the exception of South Africa, the severest restrictions are not those imposed by ‘white’ countries but by countries such as Uganda, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Ceylon.

There are several ways of tackling this matter of comparison. One can take a high moral line, assuming that all restriction and discrimination arise from evil ‘racist’ convictions that ‘superior’ races can exploit the labour of ‘inferior’ races and at the same time protect themselves against racial ‘contamination’ by refusing all social intermixture and intermarriage. The purpose of comparison here is to show that some countries are more ‘racist’ than others and that international bodies such as the United Nations, the International Labour Office or the World Council of Churches
should exert all the pressure they can to force such countries into more enlightened policies. Conversely, one may believe that separate races belong to the natural order, that attempts to mix them invariably produce race hostility, exploitation and discrimination, and that though a peaceful multi-racial society may be remotely possible it is wrong to invite decades or centuries of race friction on the slim chance of achieving it. The purpose of comparison here is to show that countries with consistently severe restrictions on immigration, such as Australia, have fewer race problems than countries with long periods of free migration. And so on.

Even academic authors cannot avoid making moral judgments or ethical assumptions, at least implicitly. I have simply tried to see my own presuppositions and keep them as far as possible out of my analysis. I must, however, record my antipathy to what I feel is muddled and inconsistent thinking. First are those who use the term ‘racist’ as an opprobrious epithet for those with whom they disagree, without proper attempt at definition and with the implication that any white person talking of ‘racial differences’ must be ‘racist’; this book avoids such emotionally charged and ill defined words. Second are those who in the same breath attack ‘racial discrimination’ against their own favoured racial group and yet demand special privileges for it; discrimination is discrimination whether it be hostile or favourable, and one cannot understand race relations adequately unless one comprehends why favourable discrimination so often exists alongside unfavourable. Third are those who use one argument to defend their position at one point and a diametrically opposed argument to defend it at another; as instance those politicians and officials who argue that it is all right for Australian or American couples to adopt orphaned or neglected children from Europe, on the grounds that the children will benefit from the move to a kindly well run home, but that it is wrong for such couples to adopt non-European children, on the grounds that children are better reared in the country of birth. In some ways it is easier to cope with straightforward statements of race superiority, such as the Nazi Herrenvolk theory or the doctrine of the Reformed Church of South Africa that the coloured descendants of Ham are fore-ordained by God to perpetual subordination. Though the
doctrines may be deplorable the thinking at least is reasonably clear and consistent.

Another purpose of comparison is theoretical: the working out of a classification or theory of race relations by comparing events in different places, or the demonstration of it by illustrating one point with an example from one country and another point with an example from another. This book, being primarily social history, concentrates on historical explanation and does not pretend to be an essay in race relations theory; such matters are better left to social anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists, provided they are sensible enough to realise that the precise hypothesis-testing approach of the experimental sciences is not always appropriate to the less controllable material of human society. Nevertheless it is useful to be aware of the main theories involved. Such awareness enables one to read historical documents with an eye not only for the natural historical patterns but also for the confirmation or refutation of current theoretical views, in this sense sharpening one's historical understanding.

Here I acknowledge my debt to many persons who have assisted my understanding and who have read and commented on the manuscript, particularly Weston Bate, L. Fitzhardinge, E. P. Hutchinson and my father, A. Grenfell Price. I also thank Lucy Couper, Loreley Jorgensen, Elizabeth Nurser and Elizabeth Price for some long and arduous checking of Parliamentary debates and other public records; also Margaret Schock for all the typing. I particularly thank the Australian Institute of International Affairs for sponsoring the project and for waiting so patiently for the manuscript.

This particular book goes only to 1888, the year by which the Canadians, Americans, Australians and New Zealanders, after much debate and many changes of mind, had at length thrashed out their feelings and attitudes to the Chinese and had decided to impose restrictions tantamount to complete exclusion from permanent settlement. It was then relatively easy to extend these restrictions to other peoples. These extensions and the consequent policing of restrictions, together with the gradual weakening and breakdown of the policies after World War II, occupy the next volume.
The metaphor of the title—the Great White Walls—derives from remarks made by several Australians at the end of the nineteenth century: just as Imperial China had defended itself against invasion by erecting the Great Wall of China so would Australia defend itself against unwanted invasion by erecting a great wall of restrictions around the whole continent.
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Abbreviations

A.D.B.  Australian Dictionary of Biography
C.O.  Great Britain, Colonial Office papers
     H. of R.  House of Representatives
     H.A.  House of Assembly
     H.R.A.  Historical Records of Australia
J.R.A.H.A.  Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Association
     L.A.  Legislative Assembly
     L.C.  Legislative Council
N.S.W.P.D.  New South Wales Parliamentary Debates
N.Z.P.D.  New Zealand Parliamentary Debates
P.P.  Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers
Q.P.D.  Queensland Parliamentary Debates
S.A.P.D.  South Australian Parliamentary Debates
     S.M.H.  Sydney Morning Herald
T.P.D.  Tasmanian Parliamentary Debates
V.P.D.  Victorian Parliamentary Debates
     V. & P.  Votes and Proceedings
W.A.P.D.  Western Australian Parliamentary Debates
The problem
and the peoples
Chapter 1

1 Theories of race relations

In recent years there have appeared numerous publications on the 'race' question, including many studies of racial minorities that have originated from international migration during the last 150 years. Large-scale migration to Britain from the Indian and Caribbean regions has accounted for some of these studies, while others derive from the stress which many developing nations lay on the 'evils of racism', and from the campaigns they have initiated to stamp such evils out. This section does not refer to all these publications, nor to the contribution they may or may not make to race relations theory. Rather it concentrates on those books and articles which seemed relevant when I began intensive work on the topic some years ago; these helped to form my ideas of what were the main factors involved and what attitudes and actions should be looked for in the vast amount of source material available. Publications of the last few years at times add useful information and concepts, and are helpful in assessment, but they were not available when I began the lengthy process of examining the sources. In any case, for the most part they seem to have added refinements to existing notions rather than producing entirely novel and revolutionary concepts and theories. I will, however, refer further to them in the concluding assessment of the second volume.

The principal theories involved in this section have been well set out by scholars such as Allport and Banton, or referred to and assessed in journals such as Race. First are psychological theories, exploring such phenomena as the way some persons, afraid to criticise dictatorial parents, bolster up their egos by expressing prejudice and discrimination against weak minority groups. Others analyse 'revulsion', the way some persons may be repelled not only by the scarred, spastic and dwarfed abnormals of their
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own race, but also by the normal members of races differing markedly from their own in skin colour, hair structure or shape of lips, eyes and nose. Psychological theories such as these may help explain the particular prejudices of a powerful leader such as Hitler, or the violently anti-Chinese feelings of some politicians in nineteenth century Australia and America, but they do not explain why so many persons with quite different personality characteristics adopted these prejudices so readily and firmly.

Other psychologists tackle this difficulty head on, as did Jung when saying that over the centuries the accumulated experience of one particular race becomes in each new generation a collective unconscious, enabling each person to view the world in terms of a common set of basic categories or 'archetypes'. The archetypal stranger is the collective unconscious holding out from itself persons of other races, often seeing them as the shadows of its own weaknesses, those things of which it is ashamed and wishes to be rid; hence the sometimes violent antagonism. Relevant here are psychological opinions on the way a group adopts a common opinion and policy: the selection and exaggeration of certain unpleasant characteristics amongst strangers, the attributing to those strangers other unpleasant characteristics they do not in fact possess, the rapid spread of hostile stories by rumour and sensation-mongers, the explosion of fear and anger in outbreaks of lynching, rioting and forcible expulsion from the locality. We may or may not think Jung’s archetypal stranger relevant to our story but we must bear in mind the processes of mob psychology when assessing stories of Chinese sexual immorality, gambling, drug addiction, and disease in nineteenth century Victoria, New South Wales, British Columbia, Oregon and California, and the outbreaks of murder and rioting sometimes associated with them.

These psychological considerations lead into more sociological theories, notably that which asserts that conditions of social frustration or economic malaise may force some stranger group out into the open as a ‘scapegoat’; on this group, whether it be racially distinct as with the West Indians in England or religiously distinct as with the Jews in Nazi Germany, may be heaped the blame for all social ills and vented the spite of extreme prejudice and discrimination. Another theory of social function holds that some
groups need prejudice and discrimination against outsiders to maintain their own internal unity or, if new young nations, to create a sense of national identity. During the nineteenth century, for instance, the Australian colonies lacked any major war—and wars are often the anvils whereon diverse groups are hammered together into a nation—and it has been argued that they needed common hostility against the Chinese to help them sort out their own identity and sense of nationhood.

Other theories emphasise socio-economic conflict, such as the Marxian view that racial prejudice and discrimination, like all prejudice and discrimination, are the weapons and results of capitalist exploitation; that the capitalist classes of industrialised imperialist countries encourage views of racial superiority and inferiority as a rationale for exploiting a low-paid labour force both at home and abroad. Or there is Park's view that in its early stages the race relations cycle involves a period of conflict when members of different races are competing for scarce jobs and housing and for scarce positions of power in the political and social system.

Other sociological theories concentrate on numbers. On the one side they stress the fact that several thousand persons of a particular racial minority in one area can support their own church, school, newspaper, clubs and sports, and also provide enough young men and women to make out-marriage unnecessary; i.e. the larger the concentration the less the need and desire to mix or assimilate with other racial groups. On the other side they stress the sudden surge of anger and fear by the established local population when large numbers of uninvited and unexpected immigrants of another race enter their territory, compete for local resources and make it plain to the locals that their traditional social values and customs, their notions of right and wrong, are under challenge; i.e. the larger and more rapid the immigration the more fearful and hostile the established population. When the newcomers are members of a vast population such as the Chinese, or of a powerful military nation such as the Japanese, both geographically quite near to some white countries of settlement, the local population has additional fears of being overwhelmed by sheer numbers or subdued by military invasion. All these feelings are apparent with Chinese
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and Japanese migrations to British Columbia, California and Australia in the nineteenth century.

In the same way a local population may react against a racial minority that has been resident for decades, in a subordinate position, but which then starts to attack its inferior position and clamour for equality; as with the Negroes of the United States or, to a lesser extent as numbers are so much less, with the Aborigines in Australia.

Also relevant here are certain conclusions of political science, notably those pointing to the tendency of demagogues, and even quite moderate politicians, to exploit the race question for political purposes, to down opponents and win elections by blowing embers of public unease and distaste into raging fires of fear and hostility. Those suggesting that Henry Parkes exploited the race question in some of the New South Wales elections of the 1880s may be exaggerating, but there is no doubt that some politicians in eastern Australia, as in California in the 1870s and in the United Kingdom in the 1960s, have taken advantage of the race question for political purposes and have greatly increased race tension and friction. Conversely, it can be argued that the somewhat unexpected move of some leading members of the Australian Labor Party, towards a more relaxed policy of restrictions against Asian immigration in the 1960s, springs very largely from a desire to make political capital out of the Liberal government's slowness in changing existing policy.

All these sociological and political explanations of race relations may explain why prejudice and discrimination are likely to appear, or be increased, in certain social circumstances, but they do not explain how they sometimes harden into fixed hostile attitudes of mind and into enduring habits of unfavourable discrimination. Historical explanations are helpful here, as instance the view that the lowly Negro position in the United States today stems from the original slave system and from the attempt of planters to break normal Negro family life and stifle any Negro efforts to realise the domestic and career ambitions of most white citizens. An explanation more relevant to the United Kingdom is Kenneth Little's 'colour-class' analysis: that for decades the coloured persons most in contact with the lower classes of British society were either low-wage seamen frequenting slummy pubs and lodging
houses or the ‘native’ populations over which British soldiers and junior civil servants had control when stationed in one of Britain’s numerous colonies overseas. The somewhat suspicious attitude of some Queenslanders to coloured immigration to Australia may, in like manner, derive partly from the nineteenth century custom of operating the sugar plantations of North Queensland with semi-servile labour from the Pacific Islands.

On the whole this book deals with historical explanations. It is well aware, however, that all explanations and theories may be relevant, whether they be historical, economic, anthropological, sociological or psychological. As Allport says when discussing prejudice generally: ‘Each [approach] has something to teach us. None possesses a monopoly of insight, nor is any one safe as a solitary guide. We may lay it down as a general law applying to all social phenomena that *multiple causation* is invariably at work and nowhere is the law more clearly applicable than to prejudice.’

At this point some definition may be useful. This book does not follow those who assert discriminatory behaviour is the inevitable accompaniment of prejudiced attitudes. Rather does it follow those who draw a distinction between ‘prejudice’ as an irrational and often hostile state of mind and ‘discrimination’ as behaviour that is often associated with prejudice but does not necessarily spring directly from it; as when a landlady refuses board to a coloured immigrant, not because she is personally opposed to having a coloured person in her house but because she knows her white boarders will leave if she admits him. Indeed, there may not necessarily be even an indirect association between discriminatory actions and irrational prejudice, as when American or Australian police quite reasonably examine the activities of immigrants from the Mafia towns of Sicily more closely than the activities of other Italians; or where a small people rationally decides that, if they wish to preserve their own way of life intact, they must impose discriminatory immigration laws against those populations likely to overwhelm it with large numbers of settlers of quite different values and customs; or where a dominant people conclude that, if some Stone Age tribe in the desert or jungle is to keep its traditional customs and life unchanged, it must be granted a ‘reservation’ protected against infiltration and exploitation.
2 Colour, race and ethnic group

The terms ‘race’, ‘colour’ and ‘ethnic’ are more difficult. The International Conference of 1949 aroused considerable criticism when it asserted that biological differences were minor and that modern biology ‘lends support to the ethic of universal brotherhood, for man is born with drives towards co-operation’. The Conference of 1951, however, while agreeing that ‘race’ was primarily a classificatory term dividing peoples with a preponderance of some physical characteristics from peoples with a preponderance of others, and that exact delineation was impossible, nevertheless disagreed on the importance of physical differences; some felt such differences did not affect the basic unity of Homo sapiens while others argued that ability to interbreed did not mean that physical differences were unimportant or that interbreeding was either eugenically advantageous or neutral. A detailed argument of the views is here irrelevant, but it needs to be said, first, that the evidence that differences in I.Q., stamina, initiative and so on are indissolubly linked with ‘race’ seems flimsy and, second, that given cultural and environmental similarities, the only clear differences are those that would arise were there long-term selective breeding within the same racial group. In short, the term ‘race’ is a convenient way of using certain predominant physical characteristics to mark off peoples who usually come from different geographical, political, cultural, religious and language systems and are, in all these senses, noticeably different from each other. Likewise, though the terms ‘white’, ‘coloured’, ‘black’, and ‘yellow’ are very loose and quite incapable of precise definition, they can be useful when talking generally about peoples from different parts of the world and with very different senses of identity.

The term ‘ethnic’ is also difficult. In the past it has carried a wide variety of meanings, ranging from a collection of human beings grouped together primarily by physical characteristics—height, size and shape of skull, colour of skin and eyes, and so on—to one grouped together primarily by cultural characteristics such as language, religion, social customs or political traditions. The term here is used in the broad sense to mean a collection of persons who, for physical, geographical, political, religious, linguistic or
other reasons feel themselves, or are felt by others, to constitute a separate people.

3 The coloured migrating peoples

In this sense one of the great migrating peoples discussed in this book—the Japanese—is clearly a distinct ethnic group. The Mongoloid majority has now almost completely absorbed other elements (the Caucasoid Ainu for instance) and has attained considerable racial homogeneity. Local dialects, sometimes mutually unintelligible, still survive but nearly everyone is fluent in standard Japanese, the dialect of Tokyo, and learns the one Japanese literature. Various religions co-exist, notably Shintoism as principal guardian of national and communal cults, Confucianism with its stress on ethical and moral principles, and Buddhism with its high spiritual and metaphysical content; though these retain their separate identity there has been much blending and overlap, many families visiting both Shinto and Buddhist shrines and holding moral standards much influenced by Confucianism. More militant and exclusive religions are either very small (Islam), or split into competing denominations (Christianity), or are partial compromises between Christianity and the older religions, as with some of the newer charismatic sects. Regional interests, to some extent consolidated during the centuries of Japanese 'feudalism', admittedly survive, but for many years a common culture and political organisation have overidden regional ties to produce a strong sense of belonging to the Japanese people and of loyalty to, and dependence on, the central government. This sense of ethnic identity and loyalty has greatly influenced both the course of Japanese migration and settlement in Korea, northern China, British Columbia, California, Hawaii and Brazil and the reaction of other governments to such settlement. It certainly had considerable effect on projects to permit Japanese migration to North Queensland in the 1890s and on the Australian government's decision in 1901 to prevent any further inflow.

In some ways the Chinese, the second principal migrating people here discussed, display similar characteristics; and here we
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are discussing the peoples of the mainland China, not as they may be since the Communist takeover, but as they were during the years of great emigration, 1820-1950. A mixture of various Mongoloid peoples, they now show, some think, a higher degree of racial homogeneity than the peoples of Europe. In religious terms the three main systems—Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism—have not necessarily been exclusive, families often adopting beliefs and practices from each. This arises partly because the systems have a high philosophical or ethical content that facilitates blending and partly because the overriding stress placed on the family, and on veneration of ancestors, has tended to play down religious differences and encourage tolerant compromise.

Even when Chinese adopt a more militant and exclusive faith, such as Islam or Christianity, they often retain their loyalty to traditional beliefs and, for the family's sake, undergo double marriage or other ceremonies. Similarly, for most Chinese, linguistic and regional differences have been of secondary importance, the great population centres of northern and central China speaking only slightly different versions of Mandarin, using the one literary script, and giving loyalty to the one central government for the greater part of many centuries.

Nevertheless, linguistic and regional distinctions do exist, especially in the southern areas from which the great majority of Chinese migrants derive. The two southern coastal provinces, Kwantung and Fukien, have a mountainous, broken terrain in which have flourished distinctive local languages: the Hakka dialects spoken by scattered groups of mountaineers who moved into parts of the south several centuries ago; the much older Yueh (Cantonese) dialects of southern and central Kwantung; and the Min dialects of northern Kwantung and Fukien (Teochiu speakers from Swatow and Ch’aochou in Kwantung, Hokkien speakers from Amoy in south Fukien, Hokchiu speakers from Foochow in north Fukien, Hailam speakers from Hainan Island off southern Kwantung, and so on). Many of these are mutually unintelligible, as are some of the Wu dialects spoken in the Shanghai and Soo-chew areas farther north along the coast. Kwantung and Fukien, moreover, have been notoriously rebellious provinces, resisting the Manchu dynasty for several centuries, sponsoring disturbances such
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as the great Taiping rebellion of the 1840s, and producing Sun Yat-sen and others who overthrew the Manchus and founded modern China.

Linguistic and regional distinctions such as these have played no small part in Chinese settlement abroad, often affecting the relationships between various groups of settlers and influencing the course of migration and assimilation. In Melbourne some two-thirds of the Chinese population derive from the Sze Yap, the ‘Four Districts’ south-west of Canton City, and the language commonly used is the Sze Yap dialect of Cantonese. In Brisbane, however, two-thirds derive from the Chungshan District, some distance south of Canton City, and Chungshan Cantonese tends to predominate there. In Sydney the Chinese population is more mixed, though families from Chungshan make up more than one-third the total. Likewise in Fiji over two-thirds of Chinese in Ba Province (including Lautoka) originated in Chungshan but well over half of those in Macauta Province derive from the Sze Yap; Suva, like Sydney, is more mixed. Similarly families from Chungshan, the Sze Yap or, in some cases, the Sam Yap (the ‘Three Districts’ near Canton City) predominate in the Chinatowns of Canada and the United States.

Cantonese speakers have been relatively less important elsewhere. Teochiu speakers from the Swatow region are the most important group in Thailand, with Hailam speakers from Hainan next. In Singapore, Penang and Malacca the Hokkien people predominate; in Sarawak the Hakka and Hokchiu; in Sabah the Hakka; in Java the Hokkien; in Sumatra the Hakka and Teochiu; in the Philippines the Hokkien. Cantonese speakers are in these areas also but in relatively smaller numbers, except in certain areas such as rural Malaya and Kuala Lumpur where they make up the largest group.

Though these regional and linguistic differences are important in many matters of migration and assimilation, they do not always override a sense of belonging to the general Chinese community; certainly in many places abroad the Chinese population works together for many purposes, even if through their regional language associations, and form Chinatowns containing most of the migrant groups. In this sense it is useful to think of the Chinese as a major ethnic division and the regional groups as ethnic sub-divisions.
The third great migrating people considered here, the Indians (here including all inhabitants of the sub-continent) are less homogeneous than the Chinese. Racially they are divided into Australoid, Dravidian, Indo-European and Mongoloid types, with various combinations. Linguistically they are divided into those speaking Indo-Aryan languages such as Hindi, Urdu, Pushtu, Punjabi, Gujarati, Marathi, Bengali or Assamese, those speaking Dravidian languages such as Tamil, Kannarese, Telugu or Malayalam, and those using various aboriginal tribal tongues; many of these being again sub-divided into numerous dialects (nearly 800 in all) which are often unintelligible to others. Religiously they are divided into Animists, Moslems, Christians, and Parsees as well as into the various branches of Hinduism with its three major dissenting offshoots, Buddhism, Sikhism and Jainism. Geographically they are split into regions and districts that have different political histories and a strong sense of local identity and loyalty. Socially, the Hindu majority is fragmented into mutually exclusive castes, often based on traditional occupations but also reflecting linguistic-regional origins. Across all these are the Eurasians, persons of mixed Indian and European origin (the term has been extended to cover all persons of mixed Asian and European stock). Usually offspring of a European father and Indian mother they may well, even if reared in their mother's ethnic groups, be not fully accepted by it or by the white community, often becoming a people apart with no definite culture or value system by which to live.

The whole complex tends to produce numerous quite distinct ethnic groups based on a combination of race, language, religion, area of origin and caste; who think of themselves as distinct groups and who tend to remain socially separated from other Indians, even when in a strange land. Indians in the United Kingdom, for instance, are principally Sikhs from the Jullundur and Hoshiapur Districts of the eastern Punjab, Moslems from the Punjabi Districts of Pakistan, Gujarati-speaking Hindus from the Surat and Charottar Districts north of Bombay, and Bengali-speaking Moslems from the Sylhet District of Bangla Desh. Though they mix and even eat together at work or elsewhere, they usually live with families from their own village or district, pass their leisure time with such families, arrange marriages within the group and, even when travel-
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ling about the United Kingdom, tend to spend their time with families of the same origin located in another town. The lesser numbers of professional and student Indians behave somewhat differently, being forced to mix far more with British people and often having less strict opinions about social mixture and inter-marriage.

Indians in Australia behave in much the same way, the most compact group being the Punjabi Sikhs from Jullundur engaged in banana farming at Woolgoolga in northern New South Wales. In earlier days the majority were Dhangars (Oraon), aboriginal tribesmen from the Chotu Nagpur Plateau in the west of what was the province of Bengal, now the south-west corner of Bihar Province. Of Dravidian race and a Mannarese-type language they have a primitive nature religion only slightly affected by Hinduism, Islam or Christianity.

The fourth group of peoples relevant to this work—those from the islands of South-east Asia and Oceania—is even more fragmented, though most speak languages belonging to the Malayo-Polynesian (or Austronesian) language family. In physical terms some major sub-divisions are discernible, though these are by no means homogeneous. First are the 'Oceanic Negroes', scattered over numerous islands and displaying Negro characteristics such as fuzzy hair, very dark skins and broad noses. The taller branch—the Papuan Melanesians—predominate in the Melanesian islands of Fiji, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, the Solomons, New Britain and New Ireland, and also in mainland New Guinea: the smaller Negrito branch survives in remote parts of Malaya, Sumatra, various Philippine islands, New Guinea and a few Melanesian islands, and predominates in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. In speech terms they are divided between various, for the most part mutually unintelligible, branches of Malayo-Polynesian though some, mainly in New Guinea but a few in New Britain and the Solomons, speak one of over 200 largely disconnected languages collectively known as 'Papuan'. Still mainly tribal or regional, they have not yet developed a strong sense of identity, either as a racial group or as citizens of Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines or whatever their sovereign state may be.

Australia is the principal country of immigration involved
with the Oceanic Negroes. The Queensland sugar plantations drew most of their 'kanaka' labour from New Guinea and Melanesia from 1863 until 1906, when survivors were repatriated though several small communities remained and still exist in north Queensland. Moreover the question of immigration to the continent from Australian territories in New Guinea and Melanesia is a problem as yet unresolved. Further, it has been suggested by various church bodies that Australia take a major responsibility for helping with overpopulation problems in nearby islands such as Fiji, if not by economic aid then by immigration.13

The second island race are the 'Malays' of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, the Cocos Islands and, somewhat remote from this story, Madagascar.14 Though predominantly Mongoloid they show a wide range of physical characteristics, partly owing to occasional mixing with Oceanic Negroes and with Australoid peoples already in the islands when they arrived. (A few Australoid groups—similar in many ways to the Australian Aborigines—still survive in Malaya, Sumatra, the Celebes and perhaps in parts of New Ireland and New Caledonia.) Linguistically they are most diverse, using twenty-five major languages and 250 dialects in Indonesia, seventy-five languages in the Philippines and a number of languages or dialects in Malaysia; the majority of these are Malayo-Polynesian in origin but a few are quite distinct and are classified as Papuan, as in Alor and Timor in the Timor islands and in Halmahera in the Moluccas. In terms of religion the Malays are also divided, ranging from varieties of Christianity in the Philippines to fervent Mahometism in Malaya, with occasional survivals of Hinduism in Bali and Lombok and of pagan religions amongst more isolated communities. Moreover, the political rearrangements of the last few decades, at any rate in Indonesia and Malaysia, mean that it is too early for a strong sense of national unity to have impressed itself on all groups.

With all this diversity it is wiser, especially when considering migration and assimilation, to think of the Malays in terms of ethnic sub-divisions based on particular regions, languages and, where relevant, religions. Up till now the practice of emigration seems confined to the more urbanised groups, and it may well be many years before the white countries of immigration have to
accept or reject the full variety of Malay peoples. So far, Filipinos from urban areas such as Manila (in the Tagalog area) have shown most ability to emigrate, mainly to the United States—and it is largely these classes that have expressed strong indignation at Australia’s restrictive policy.15

The third island sub-division comprises the Polynesian peoples of the central and southern Pacific. A mixture of various stocks, they are now usually large-framed with brown skins and black wavy hair. All speak dialects of Polynesian and can usually converse with one another after short contact. Nevertheless, island and district loyalties are strong amongst them—as is evident in Samoan and Cook island migration to New Zealand or Hawaiian migration to the United States—and it is often easier to think of the Polynesian people in terms of island ethnic groups.

Finally, in discussing ethnic divisions, we must remember that Australia and other countries have contained appreciable numbers of coloured peoples who either came in the early days before restriction and are part of the ‘old migration’ (the Negroes in America) or who migrated centuries or millenia before white settlers appeared—the Amerindians of Canada and the United States, the Polynesian Maoris of New Zealand and the Australoid Aborigines of Australia. Though these peoples do not directly belong to a story of restrictive immigration, they have been a major element in domestic race relations and in the formation of white attitudes to coloured migrants.

4 The white receiving peoples

We now turn to the white peoples responsible for applying the restrictive and discriminatory policies discussed in this book. They arrived in their lands of settlement—British Columbia, California, the various Australasian colonies—only a few years before the coloured peoples they restricted and in that sense are just as much immigrants as Asians and Papua-Melanesians. But because they were there first and, as colonists, controlled the machinery of local government, they could very largely determine who should be
admitted for permanent settlement and in what numbers, and were as much a receiving society as any long established population.

The ethnic composition of these white receiving populations was much the same: over four-fifths north-west European; over half British. In New Zealand British stock has been strongest, and still is. Throughout the nineteenth century, with some geographical variation between the ‘Scottish’ south, the ‘English’ centre and the ‘mixed’ north, and with some variation over time as Irish immigration waxed between the late 1840s and late 1880s, the percentages of ethnic composition were roughly: English 50, Scottish 22.5, Irish 21.0, Welsh 2.0, Others (mainly German, Scandinavian and Yugoslav) 4.5. Hence Scholefield’s somewhat self-satisfied remark when commenting on his calculation of 95.5 per cent British ethnic origin: ‘it is obvious, therefore, that the purity of the British race is being well conserved in New Zealand’. In Australia, until the large-scale non-British immigration after 1947, the position was much the same as in New Zealand, again with some geographical variation between colonies and some variation over time as Irish migration increased after 1848 and declined after the 1880s. Lyng’s estimate, by percentages, for the ‘white’ colonial total of 1891 was: English 53, Irish 23, Scottish 13, Welsh 1.5, German 5.2, Scandinavian 1.9, Other (mainly Italians and central European Jews) 2.4, i.e. a British total of 90.5.

In British Columbia, British stock was somewhat weaker, reflecting the larger non-British element in eastern and central Canada and the immigration from California during the gold-rushes of the late 1850s and 1860s. Later migration direct, or nearly direct, from the United Kingdom, however, kept the British element up to the 80 per cent level, the census statistics of 1881 giving the following rough percentages for the ethnic origin of the white population: English 41.5, Scottish 22.5, Irish 18.5, Other British 2.5 (total British 85.0), French 5.5, German 5.0, Scandinavian 1, Other European 3.5.

In California the population varied during the nineteenth century, Spanish-Americans looming large in the 1850s and then declining, the Irish reaching their peak as the largest foreign-born group in the 1870s, the Germans displacing them in the 1890s. Native Americans, three-quarters or so of the total population for
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much of the century, were mainly from the north Atlantic states of New England, New York and Pennsylvania, a lesser stream from the mid-west states of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, and a few from the southern slave states (including a small number of Negroes). Though the different groups rapidly intermingled, the percentage ethnic origins appeared to have been much the same as in other parts of the United States, that is, very roughly: British 60, German 20, Scandinavian 5, Other north-west Europe 5, Others 10 (with Spanish-American stock stronger in the south of the state).\textsuperscript{18}

The official origin of British Columbia, New Zealand and Australia as British colonies, together with their high proportion of British stock, meant that English was from the beginning the language dominating both official and popular usage. In fact, the scarcity of large non-British group settlements restricted the local use of other languages to a few places only—the German farming settlements of the Barossa Valley of South Australia, for instance. Likewise in California, the fact that most early settlers came, and mixed, as gold-diggers rather than settling in solid agricultural communities (as happened with the Germans in Pennsylvania and the mid-west and the Scandinavians of Wisconsin and Minnesota) meant that English rapidly became the principal language for local use, as well as the official language after the United States acquired California from Mexico in 1848. Unlike the Asian peoples pressing for entry the white host populations showed remarkable linguistic uniformity.

In religion there was less uniformity. Though in all places under review Christianity claimed over 90 per cent of the population for most of the nineteenth century, many persons beset by difficult pioneering conditions, or affected by nationalist dislike of organised religion, had little to do with formal church life. Moreover the actively Christian population was split into several denominations, at times strongly disagreeing on questions of education and morals and making war on each other by fierce evangelistic offensives or by defensive campaigns of bigoted distortion and social bars against intermixture and intermarriage. In New Zealand, where the Anglican church claimed over 40 per cent of the population and the Presbyterian about 25 per cent, with the Roman Catholic only 15 per cent or so, religious rivalry was more a continuation of
the religious struggles of Cromwell's day. In the Australian colonies, where the Irish Catholic element was usually between a fifth and a quarter and Scottish Presbyterianism seldom much over 10 per cent, rivalry more often took the form of a struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism, especially in the battle for a separate Catholic schooling system. In British Columbia the Protestant-Catholic relationship was also important, Roman Catholicism having won an early influence through French-Canadian fur-traders and priests and having declined only towards the end of the century with the rapid increase of Methodism and Presbyterianism; by 1891 the last two churches claimed nearly 20 per cent each of the white population, and the Catholic and Anglican churches just over 25 per cent each of the non-pagan population. There exist no reliable religious statistics for California but it appears that the Anglican (Episcopalian) church was very small and that the Christian population was divided mainly between the Roman Catholic churches of the Irish and Spanish-Americans and the collectively stronger Baptists, Congregationalists, Presbyterians and other Protestants.

These religious differences and tensions, however, had little effect on the question of coloured immigration. Whites of diverse Christian denominations joined in thundering against the immigration of the 'pagan' Chinese and Japanese; the latter obtaining support from a white minority, drawn from many Christian churches, who felt that discrimination and restriction was anti-Christian and inhuman.

Much more could be said here about ethnic characteristics and background of both coloured migrating and white receiving peoples. These are, however, better left till later, coming in where relevant to the narrative.

5 The sources

It is important to bear in mind the source material used. Treatment of the sources here varies considerably from country to country for two main reasons. First, the secondary material available—published books and articles of more recent times—is very
uneven. It is quite good for California and the United States, in terms both of general surveys and of special studies of particular groups or episodes. It is less adequate for British Columbia and Canada, and even less so for Australia and New Zealand. A few good books are available on Australian immigration policy, but they cover only part of the field, touching very little on certain discriminatory attitudes and practices which are very relevant to a wider assessment. They also contain relatively little on the immigrants themselves, their reasons for migrating, their expectations in Australia, their complex patterns of settlement and adjustment, their cultural background and customs; in short they concentrate on the receiving societies and their policies and spend relatively little time on the migrants, the other half of the story. To get the whole story straight, therefore, or as straight as can be, it is necessary to work much more on Australasian primary sources than on American.

The second reason is that this work is largely concerned with the White Australia Policy, and to a lesser extent with its paler reflection in New Zealand. This, in itself, means more work on Australasian than on American or Canadian material, and a much closer examination of Australasian primary sources such as parliamentary debates, parliamentary and administrative reports, newspapers, pamphlets, and contemporary books.

As the period of the whole work is lengthy, nearly 150 years, it has obviously been impossible to cover all the primary sources in detail, embracing as they do in Australasia some seven colonies in the nineteenth century and two dominions with six states in the twentieth. For instance, it has been quite impossible systematically to examine Australasian newspapers, periodicals, local government records and institutional proceedings for the whole period. The procedure adopted has been to use legislation, administrative reports and statements, and contemporary books and pamphlets as the basis of the narrative and to use parliamentary debates, both colonial and dominion, as the main source for attitudes, opinions and feelings, at any rate up to World War I; at particular times these have been reinforced with material from newspapers, periodicals, trade union and other institutional records, and other relevant documents. Hostile opinions and irrational
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prejudice may be more luridly and violently expressed in newspapers and broadsheets, but the things which in fact most affected non-European immigrants were those discriminatory measures not threatened in the press but actually enacted by parliaments and enforced by governments and their administrators.

The attitudes and opinions of politicians and officials, then, and the reasons they gave for doing what they did, form a not unreasonable basis for assessing the main attitudes and feelings involved and the changes occurring in these over time. Certainly there is plenty of material available—restrictive and discriminatory measures against non-Europeans made an almost permanent issue in every parliament except that of Tasmania from the 1850s to the 1920s; by which time the main principles were all settled and the restrictive and discriminatory laws all in operation. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that parliamentary debates concealed the true reasons for restriction and discrimination; on the contrary, such policies were so widely supported and so important politically, especially at election time, that most politicians made a point of stating their opinions at length, sometimes with as little restraint as the popular press. It is with the few opponents of restriction that one has to be careful, to ensure that one really has their basic opinions as these tend to be damped down in their somewhat guarded statements. Even here, however, one can usually identify their attitudes and feelings. In short, parliamentary proceedings give a reasonable coverage of the issues, opinions and policies involved in Australasian restrictive and discriminatory practices, and are supplemented only on special occasions.

After World War I the situation changed somewhat. First, from the early 1920s onwards, the states decided that there was little further need for discriminatory measures against non-Europeans in their domain; such matters tended to fade into the background and rarely provoked much discussion. Second, after federation in 1901 in Australia the central parliament took over all matters of immigration restriction from the states, leaving only the Australian and New Zealand parliaments in the field. All this meant that in the 1920s and 1930s parliamentary proceedings are less useful as source material for attitudes and feelings, though they are very
useful in showing that the main issues were generally agreed upon and that most Australasians accepted restrictive entry policies as a matter of course. To increase coverage, however, somewhat more use is made of newspapers and other material.

After World War II, with the revival of the old liberal-humanitarian opposition to overmuch restriction and discrimination, the matter again becomes prominent in the parliamentary realm; again parliamentary debates and questions, and ministerial statements, give a useful glimpse of attitudes and feelings. But, because by this time most important policy changes were being implemented by cabinet and ministerial decision rather than by statute there is relatively less in parliament than in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; other sources, notably newspapers, therefore, remain important and have been used more often.

All this relates to the receiving nations and states, and the way the peoples decided upon and enforced restrictive and discriminatory measures. The way these affected the immigrants themselves is another matter. Apart from a few pamphlets, and a few invaluable reports by royal commissions and parliamentary committees, there is relatively little published Australasian material here, except on the Pacific Island labourers of Queensland. There exist, however, some excellent theses on the Chinese of Australia and New Zealand, and some valuable papers on the Japanese in Australia by David Sissons. There are also occasional glimpses of the Afghan camel-drivers, but very little on the Malayan, Indonesian, Filipino, Indian, Cingalese, Mauritian and other smaller immigrant groups.

Part of the gap has been filled by a special survey covering all non-Europeans in eastern Australia, based on immigration and naturalisation records deposited with the Commonwealth Archives in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria. A summary of this survey will appear in the second volume but the findings are referred to throughout both volumes. Briefly, it involved taking a sample of every second non-European recorded in the older Commonwealth Archives and still alive in Australia in the early 1940s, extracting the demographic information contained on the index cards, and following up the detail contained in some of the older files. This
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last procedure, carried out mainly in New South Wales, threw much light on non-European residents, their particular areas of origin, their periodic trips home, their farming, local trading and mercantile enterprises, their efforts to bring out families and assistants, and so on. This filled out the census material on ages, areas of origin, years of arrival, occupations, areas of concentration, and family patterns. The results appear mainly as statistical tables but occasionally, with older records, particular cases are cited, especially if there is newspaper and parliamentary material also available.

This kind of survey, less detailed than the special surveys of sociologists, is valuable in giving the main characteristics of the immigrant population under review. It also helps with background: knowing the main towns, districts or islands of origin one can go to secondary sources for information about these places, find out what kind of people were there, what were the prevalent values and customs they were bringing to Australia, and what was their status in the eyes of their home government.

Though the information acquired thus is by no means exhaustive, leaving much to be done on Australasia’s non-European immigrants and communities, it nevertheless gives some glimpse of the other side of the story and some answers to questions arising therefrom: who were the non-European peoples who managed to pass through the restrictive barriers, or who had arrived before the barriers were erected; what were the values and customs they brought with them and how did these affect their life in Australasia, and the way they adapted themselves to the dominant British-European population; to what extent did the British-Europeans realistically understand and assess these values and customs, and comprehend how far non-Europeans were in fact adopting new ways and attitudes; and how far did such understanding and assessment influence restrictive and discriminatory policy? At this point we turn again to the North American material and review Canada, the United States, New Zealand and Australia all together, not excluding the part played by international negotiations and relationships between these countries of settlement and the non-European countries of origin.
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6 Outline

Though much research remains to be done, there has gradually been emerging the outline of a coherent and consistent story. Preliminary contacts between the young European populations of California, British Columbia, New Zealand and eastern Australia and a few Chinese, Indian and Pacific Island labourers took place during the 1830s and 1840s; not enough to produce restrictions on immigration but enough to raise worries about a new kind of semi-slavery and about relationships between industrially advanced European peoples in the Pacific borderlands and immigrants from industrially backward and 'inferior' societies. Then in the 1850s came the great waves of Cantonese gold-diggers, flooding into California, then eastern Australia, then New Zealand and finally British Columbia: these waves did arouse strong fears and antipathies amongst the white colonists, leading to restrictions on entry and discriminatory measures to keep Chinese out of certain areas, occupations and civil liberties. A dwindling of gold discoveries, and a consequent decline of further Chinese interest in the young white countries, led to some softening of fear and hostility and to some easing of restriction and discrimination; on the whole the mid-1860s were a quieter and more liberal period. Then with the late 1860s and 1870s, and with renewed Chinese immigration, came another and more sustained outburst of fear and hostility, finally to result in all countries by 1888 in severe restrictions on Chinese immigration and severe discriminatory controls on Chinese already settled. Though economic, political and strategic fears were involved there was also prevalent a strong dislike of the strange and different and a deep antipathy to racial intermixture and interbreeding.

With the Chinese 'problem' more or less resolved these young white nations of the Pacific gradually realised that there had been entering their domains other non-Europeans, notably Indians and Japanese. By this time fears and feelings about 'non-Europeans' had become much more fixed and institutionalised. It was therefore easy and natural for anti-Chinese arguments and attitudes to be extended to all other non-Europeans and, by the early 1920s, in Canada, the United States, New Zealand and Australia there were heavy restrictions on new entry and severe discrimination on the
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activities of those already settled. The Great White Walls of the Pacific, in short, were solid, high and guarded.

The 1920s and 1930s are, on the whole, a rather dull period, concerned more with implementing principles already decided, administering existing statutes, watching for stowaways, deserters or those entering on false papers. Occasionally an interesting legal point might arise, or international questions be asked about a certain deportation, but on the whole this is the period of guarding the battlements against occasional marauders or scally-wags, not of building or holding defences against dangerous and powerful enemies.

With World War II the situation started to change, quite dramatically. Partly because non-European allies such as China were politically important during hostilities, partly because many non-Europeans became quite 'western' in their attitudes and standards of living, partly because notions of race purity began to seem less important, and partly for other complex reasons, the white countries of the Pacific slowly began to open the gates and dismantle some of the fortifications. By 1952 New Zealand had drastically modified her restrictive entry policy; by 1962 Canada, by 1965 the United States, and by 1966 Australia had all done the same.

By the mid-1960s, too, these four countries had repealed most of their discriminatory legislation on occupations, naturalisation and civil status. (Paradoxically, Great Britain, who had often tried to soften the restrictions and discriminations imposed by her wayward colonies, felt compelled to impose severe restrictions on the entry of British nationals from India, Pakistan and the West Indies.)

Despite the general easing of restriction and discrimination, however, various problems remain, particularly for Australia. As long as this country retains a relatively much larger total immigration than her former comrades in restriction she finds it harder to abolish racial discrimination altogether. The United States, with restrictions on total immigration such that net annual intake is only 0.2 per cent or so of total population, can abolish racial discrimination in its admission categories and still find that annual intake of non-European settlers is not so great as to produce rapid
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changes in the ethnic composition of her population. Australia, having had an annual target relatively five times that of the United States, is in a somewhat different position; abolition of racial discrimination could produce much more marked effects on the ethnic composition of the population and give rise to more social strain and ethnic hostility. Additionally, Australia is in a more exposed geographical position than North America, at any rate so far as Asia is concerned, and also has the complication of a relatively populous former dependent territory just to the north inhabited almost entirely by non-Europeans. Australia's present relations with Papua New Guinea and, to a lesser extent with Pacific Islands such as Fiji and the Solomons, have introduced a somewhat new dimension into immigration policy.

A general assessment of all these relationships and trends, and of the change in historic attitudes and fears that is still continuing, comprises the last part of the study. The international relationships involved, particularly as Japan becomes more important economically to both North America and Australasia, are basically simple though sometimes complex in expression and practice. They are, however, under constant pressure and change and it is not always easy to predict the way they may balance out in the next few decades. Suffice it to say that policies and attitudes, for the four white countries of the Pacific considered in this work, are now much nearer those of the 1830s than those of the 1890s or 1920s. The Great White Walls, in short have been allowed to crumble away until only bits and pieces remain above the ground; and even these may vanish quite soon. The foundations, however, are still intact and in good condition, quite capable of bearing the weight of rapid rebuilding should public opinion or world events suddenly change.

With this brief outline, then, we can now return to the advent of Indian, Chinese and Pacific Island labourers into Australia in the 1830s and 1840s, and the great irruption of Chinese gold-diggers into California, British Columbia, Australia and New Zealand in the 1850s. First, however, it is necessary to give a clearer picture of the somewhat turbulent pioneering conditions into which these early immigrants arrived.
The first confrontation, 1836-71
Chapter 2

1 The setting: Australia, New Zealand, British Columbia, California

In the mid-nineteenth century British Columbia, California, New Zealand and the Australian colonies were pioneering areas in an early stage of development. In eastern Australia the colonies had started life, under various names and with diverse degrees of government control, partly as strategic ports against French colonisation but mainly as penal settlements to take the overflow of Britain's convict population—New South Wales in 1788, Tasmania in 1803, Queensland in 1825, Victoria in 1835. Further west they began as free settlements for trade or land colonisation—the Northern Territory in 1824, Western Australia in 1829 (resorting to convict labour, 1850-67), and South Australia in 1836. The main centres of population were in the east, in 1821 totalling some 35,000 whites, of whom well over half had arrived as convicts. From the mid-1820s there was much more encouragement of free settlement (partly to provide labour for the rapidly expanding sheep industry) and the use of public money to assist intending settlers with passage costs. By 1851 the colonies totalled over 430,000 white persons, fewer than 15 per cent of whom had arrived as convicts.¹

The growth of free settlement inevitably produced a prolonged agitation against convict transportation, partly on the grounds it was demoralising and inefficient and partly on the grounds that it stood in the way of self-government and dragged down the status and wages of free labourers, for many convicts were assigned as low-cost domestics and labourers to pastoralists, farmers, officials and merchants. Despite the resistance of some pastoralists, farmers and merchants, transportation ceased to the eastern colonies in 1840 (Tasmania in 1853), and occasional attempts to revive it called forth public protest and demonstrations. The
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strength of anti-convict feeling, entangled as it was with hostility to cheap labour, was a major factor in Australian reaction to Asian immigration. By the same token, the periodic attempts of pastoralists, cotton growers and sugar planters to find a substitute for convict labour kept the issue alive for most of the century.²

Alongside hostility to cheap convict labour was hostility to cheap slave labour, and to anything resembling it. The prolonged campaign in Britain to abolish slavery throughout the British Empire met at last with success in 1833, and left its marks on many officials, missionaries, professionals and artisans then migrating to Australia. Any proposal to introduce coloured labour, unless clearly and demonstrably free of all taint of slavery or semi-slavery, was bound to arouse much antagonism both in Britain and in the colonies. Hence much of the suspicion aroused by early proposals to introduce Indian and Chinese coolies.

Much the same phenomenon appeared in New Zealand, especially among missionaries and others worried lest Maori natives be forced into semi-slavery. As a white colony New Zealand began a little later than Australia. Again, strategic desires to block French colonisation were involved, but the strongest impetus came from the British government's willingness to work with private enterprise in sponsoring free colonies as an outlet for Britain's 'surplus' capital and labour; and from its desire to exercise some control over individual traders, adventurers and escaped Australian convicts who were upsetting missionary activities amongst the Maoris. Settlements were established between 1840 and 1851 at Auckland, Wellington, New Plymouth, Nelson, Otago and Canterbury and, after somewhat uneasy beginnings, developed more rapidly during the 1850s when the gold-rushes to Australia produced an enormous demand for foodstuffs that New Zealand farmers and pastoralists were well placed to meet. By 1861 the white population totalled nearly 100,000.

American or Upper California began colonial life somewhat earlier, in the 1760s, when the Spanish government became alarmed that Russian and British exploration in the eastern Pacific might produce settlements endangering Spanish Mexico. Governed from the central town of Monterey the area developed slowly, at first as a series of Roman Catholic missions encouraging pastoral activities
and then, after Mexico assumed direct responsibility in 1822 and later secularised the missions, as a number of private ranches or haciendas. Fur trading and other commercial activities by Russians, British and Americans began in northern California in the early nineteenth century, leading to the development of trading centres at San Francisco and elsewhere, and then to overland migration from the mid-west of the United States in the early 1840s. In 1848, at the end of the American-Mexican war, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ceded Upper California to the United States.

Nine days before the Treaty a certain James Marshall discovered gold near Coloma, on the American River, starting a rush that brought thousands from all over the world to a region in northern California about 300 miles long and 50-100 miles wide. The total white and part-white population, in 1848 some 10,000 Spanish-Mexican-Indians and 1000 Europeans, rose dramatically, by 1850 reaching 100,000, by 1860 nearly 350,000 and by 1870 over 500,000.

In many ways, as Carey McWilliams and others point out, the gold-rush was somewhat unusual. Not only did it populate the state almost overnight but it coincided with a revolution in Atlantic and American transport and communication which enabled folk of all degrees of wealth and status to take advantage of the wild unsettled country, and of the newness and smallness of the American administration, to remove easily won gold without licence or royalty, and without conflict with established proprietors, except possibly those native Indians who were killed or driven away. Moreover, in the absence of a well established system of land ownership and administration it forced the miners into developing their own code. Their mining rules, current until the Federal law of 1873 and the gradual replacement of easy surface mining by expensive deep quartz mining, based mining rights on discovery and use and emphasised the small mines claim system of 'one miner one claim'. Their local code, even if enforced by unofficial courts, vigilance committees and lynch laws, stressed the right of individual 'small' men collectively to maintain order and decency as they saw it and to protect their own interests by force. Finally the rushes produced a strong sense of the dignity of labour: the fact that wielding pick and shovel alongside each other were agricultural labourers, hunters, merchants, clerks, lawyers and
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artisans meant, as Bayard Taylor put it, that mining had made labour respectable in California.\(^4\)

In these circumstances it is not surprising that California decided so quickly and firmly the great issue that for so long troubled the eastern states: the slave-labour system. Admittedly arguments took place in Congress in the late 1840s as to whether the Mason-Dixon Line should be extended west to divide California into a free north and slave south, and continued in both Washington and California into the 1860s. The mining population, however, including those from the eastern slave states, decided the issue for themselves: slavery, being inconsistent with the newly found dignity of labour, was barred from mining areas and, after the miner-dominated Convention of late 1849, from the whole territory. This lively realisation of the economic dangers of slavery, and the widespread determination to have none of it in California, were major factors in deciding Californian reaction to Asian immigrants. As with the anti-convict men in Australia, most Californians would tolerate no slave or semi-slave class competing with the labour of free men.

British Columbia had an early history not unlike that of California, though much less spectacular. Originating in the early nineteenth century as a fur-trading area for the Hudson Bay and North-West Companies, it grew with the efforts of Dr McLaughlin (an energetic Director of the Hudson Bay Company’s activities on Vancouver Island) in encouraging American settlers and with the discovery of coal at Nanaimo in 1851. Population increased more quickly following the discovery of gold in the Fraser River in 1858, which attracted a number of miners from California and changed Victoria town from a small trading post to a busy little commercial port. Overland migration from Ontario began in the early 1860s, facilitated by the construction of the Cariboo road by the Royal Engineers. Though some miners later departed many new arrivals remained to develop the colony; by 1881 the white population was nearly 25,000.

British Columbia, as a British colony of nineteenth century vintage, did not experience the turmoil of the slave issue. Nevertheless, the large migration from the American Pacific territories, and the similarity of mining conditions with those further south,
led to much the same attitudes about the status of labour as in California. The local inhabitants were as determined as anyone to preserve their status against the threat of cheap labour, of whatever kind or colour.

This mining attitude also entered the Australian colonies with the discovery of gold in both New South Wales and Victoria in 1851. Though the population increase was not as dramatic as in California—there being a larger white population already settled and an existing practice of sponsored immigration—it was nevertheless substantial; the total in fact exceeded that involved in the rush to California. In the decade 1851-61 immigration totalled approximately 601,000 while the white population increased from some 185,000 to 325,000 in New South Wales, 75,000 to 530,000 in Victoria, and 433,000 to 1,130,000 in Australia as a whole.

The Australian diggings, though similar to the Californian in their remoteness and wildness, and in their predominantly male camping life, were different in one important respect: there existed well established governments and mining laws requiring miners to register claims and pay a licence fee of £1 or more a month; enforcement lay with a Commissioner who was usually resident in the gold-field and often assisted by police in the habit of inflicting on those forgetting or mislaying their licences, as well as on the real scally-wags, punishments such as chaining them to a log for half a day. The police tactics, plus the anger of unluckier miners at having to pay licence fees, aroused much ill feeling, and eventually produced demands for the abolition of licences, reform of the police and universal manhood suffrage. Finally dissatisfaction in the Ballarat gold-fields of Victoria led to an armed clash between miners and police troops at Eureka in 1854, after which many of the grievances were rectified in Victoria, 1855, and in New South Wales, 1857. The important point here is that, in these disputes with the government and police, the miners developed a spirit of camaraderie, a sense of group identification, and a readiness to use force when necessary; all ready to be directed against miners such as the Chinese who chose to remain socially aloof and politically uncommitted in the struggle.

Gold-fever did not infect New Zealand until 1861, with discoveries in Otago and, later, in the West Coast region of the South
Island and the Auckland region of the North. The new fields at once attracted persons from other parts of New Zealand, and then numbers of Australian and Californian miners who were finding surface gold less easy to come by and had neither the capital nor inclination to move into expensive deep quartz mining. Within a year the white population of Otago rose from 12,000 to 30,000 while, over the decade 1861-71, the total white population rose from nearly 100,000 to 256,000; though immigration here was for land settlement as well as mining. These New Zealand 'rushes' were neither as large nor as spectacular as those in Australia or California but they produced, in muted tones, the same sentiments and opinions; especially with the influx of diggers experienced in Eureka and other miners' rights campaigns.

If the problems and opinions of gold-diggers were common to the four areas under review, so too was another aspect of the labour situation. The 1830s and 1840s were periods of great economic and social unrest in most countries of Europe, with famine, collapse of various cottage and artisan industries, and much 'chartist' or 'liberal' agitation for adult suffrage, responsible government, and the like. Many of those migrating hoped to find or found new worlds where established propertied classes were non-existent or powerless, and where bosses could be forced to give 'decent' wages, hours and conditions of work. Whatever successes or failures the rick burners, machine smashers and other dissident groups might achieve in the Old World, the wage earning classes of the new Pacific world quickly found that in general conditions of labour scarcity they had considerable power, especially when organised to withhold their labour. Indeed, some writers suggest that labour organisations were almost as old as the areas themselves, as instance Lucille Eaves when saying, 'one is tempted to believe that the craftsmen met each other on the way to California and agreed to unite'. Certainly the carpenters and joiners of San Francisco struck as early as 1849 (when employers refused to increase wages from $10 to $16 a day), the sailors in 1850 and the shore workers in 1853. In Sydney, one newspaper struck in 1829 while by the 1840s there were organisations of carpenters and joiners, of unemployed men, and occasionally of the whole labour force, as with the successful petition of 1840 against the penalties of the
Masters and Servants Act. Labour organisations were not much later in the other Australian colonies, British Columbia, and New Zealand. As most of these wage-earning groups were in strong sympathy with the miners (many of them had been digging themselves) they quickly supported miners' efforts to restrict or drive out Chinese immigrants.

Thus, while the four areas had much in common, in other ways they were very different, notably in government. Until federation in 1901 the Australian colonies remained separate political entities, responsible to Westminster for foreign and imperial affairs, but able to control most domestic affairs through constitutions based on the New South Wales one of 1842 (a Legislative Council with an elected majority) but modified in the 1850s under powers given them by the Australian Colonies Government Act, 1850. (In general these later constitutions were of British type, with Lower Houses or Assemblies elected on a small property qualification or universal suffrage, and Upper Houses or Councils either nominated or else elected on a relatively high property qualification.) Before 1850 the Australian colonies were greatly influenced by the Colonial Office at Westminster—hence the importance of the reactions of Lord Glenelg, Lord Grey, and James Stephen to suggestions of introducing coolies into Australia in the 1830s and 1840s—but by the time Chinese immigrants arrived in large numbers in the 1850s they were comparatively free to introduce laws restricting coloured immigration or discriminating against coloured residents, as long as these did not too drastically cut across Britain's notions of humane behaviour, of proper relations between the white and coloured parts of the empire, and of the proper interpretation of treaties made with China, Japan or other Asian countries (especially those containing clauses about rights of mutual trade). But it was the colonial governments based on Sydney, Melbourne or Brisbane that had to act: local governments in the counties or shires had no power to restrict immigration, control occupations, or even determine their own electoral procedure. Mining communities, or other areas hostile to coloured immigration, had therefore to carry a majority in the two Houses of the colonial parliament before obtaining favourable laws.

New Zealand was in much the same position. Though there
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the provincial governments (set up by the Constitution Act of 1852 and based on the original centres of settlement) had more power than did local governments in Australia, they also were debarred from legislating on matters such as shipping, currency or customs, and, more important to this story, on matters relating to the native Maoris, the administration of justice and marriage, and immigration. This meant that when diggers in Otago or Westland reacted against Chinese miners they had to carry the central government in distant Auckland before obtaining favourable legislation. The situation improved when central government was shifted to Wellington, less than 500 miles away, and, though the intervening terrain was mountainous, easily accessible by sea. Even closer were the Bathurst fields to Sydney, about 140 miles, and the Ballarat and Bendigo fields to Melbourne, less than 100; the terrain, moreover, was relatively low and easy for travel. Unrest in the gold-fields, therefore, communicated itself quickly to the legislative centres which, in their turn, did not feel the gold areas to be remote and unimportant.

Very different was the situation in British Columbia and California. From the moment of her entry to the United States as a territory in 1848 and a fully fledged state in 1850, California was bound to the United States constitution; this gave the central government in Washington supreme power over commerce, immigration, naturalisation and foreign affairs and, after the fourteenth amendment of 1868 and the Civil Rights Act of 1870, ordained that American-born residents, of whatever colour, should have full citizen rights and that even aliens should have equal treatment before the law. Likewise British Columbia, though it retained the right to decide which of its residents, Canadian-born and other, had the right to vote, was subject to Ottawa's control over immigration and treaties once it entered the Canadian federation in 1871. Moreover both British Columbia and California were a long way from their Federal capitals—over 2000 miles as the crow flies, nearly one-third formidable mountain ranges, and over 6000 miles by sea via central America, or 15,000 around Cape Horn. Communications became easier with the telegraph and the railway (to San Francisco 1869 and Vancouver 1886), but it was quite late in the century before the weight of population in the
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east, and the law-makers there ensconced, began to take much practical notice of the feelings and demands of their remote Pacific compatriots. True, some easterners expressed anti-Chinese feelings at an early date, but, except on the 'coolie' question, Federal powers to restrict Chinese immigration remained unused for several decades. Refusal or slowness by Ottawa or Washington in introducing laws restricting Chinese or Japanese immigration, together with their fears of a 'yellow' invasion unforeseen and unheeded by the east, simply aggravated the isolation and neglect felt by Californians and British Columbians, so driving them more and more to use what limited powers they had to make life for unwanted Asian residents as difficult as possible, by passing discriminatory laws about occupations, ownership of property, living conditions and education. Thus this book places emphasis on discriminatory legislation against Asian residents in California and British Columbia as distinct from the emphasis on laws restricting the entry of intending Asian settlers in Australian and New Zealand colonies.

If British Columbia and California felt isolated and neglected by their trans-mountain brethren to the east, they often had feelings of comradely sympathy with their white counterparts in Australia and New Zealand; feelings initiated and strengthened by the early development of trans-Pacific trade and communications. Back in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, American as well as British whalers and sealers roamed the South Pacific, working in one month on the Australian and New Zealand coasts and in another off the American; these made much use of Sydney Harbour after 1788. Moreover, the early Australian settlements were dependent on American traders for many of their food and liquor supplies and, though the Navigation Acts interrupted these activities for a time, they picked up again during the gold-rushes; Australians moved to California in 1849-50, Californians to Victoria in the early 1850s, some of each going on to British Columbia and then back to New Zealand in the 1860s. Later other peoples continued the movement. Wanderers from the Dalmatian Islands, for instance, moved about the Pacific from the sugar areas of northeastern Australia to the gum-diggings of northern New Zealand, to the phosphate mines of Chile, then to the horticultural parts of the
Santa Clara and Santa Cruz Counties in California, or to the fisheries of San Diego and Seattle. Here and there settlements came into being, making it easier for relatives and friends to move from one settlement to another and back again.8

This movement meant that the white settler communities of the Pacific early developed some interest in one another’s problems and opinions. Certainly they knew what the others felt about the Asian immigration question and the various proposals for dealing with it. Thus, Australians were looking at events in California in the 1850s and 1870s, British Columbians and New Zealanders were quoting the Australian experience in the 1860s, New Zealanders well aware of Californian and Australian activities in the 1870s, and so on. Though the problem of coloured immigration appeared somewhat differently in the different circumstances of each area this easy communication and exchange of views was an important element in a common reaction.

Here then were the white settlers of the Pacific, in relatively close touch with one another, of a similar ethnic, linguistic and cultural background. Though a number of pastoralists, farmers, merchants, and industrialists were anxious for cheap labour, the majority of settlers were determined to uphold their newly found dignity and keep the settlement free from cheap labour—whether convict, slave or semi-slave.

2 Coolies and kanakas in eastern Australia, 1836-54

The first move to import cheap coloured labour came from eastern Australia. Though there had been earlier suggestions that Australia develop its resources by tapping the vast reservoir of labour in Asia—notably by Sir Joseph Banks in the 1780s and by Edward Gibbon Wakefield from his London prison in the 1820s9—nothing concrete had been done; just as nothing had been done about the original suggestion that New South Wales be colonised by American Loyalists with their Negro slaves, or that the first Governor send ships to the nearby Pacific Islands to bring back native women for the British convicts. In the late 1830s, however, a more definite proposal appeared. At this time the convict system, under severe
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challenge, seemed doomed to an early demise while the inflow of free labour, even with government assistance towards passage costs, was not increasing fast enough to meet the demands of Australia's rapidly expanding wool-growing industry; in any case the wages demanded by such labourers were higher than many pastoralists, then facing a fall in wool prices, felt they could profitably pay. Finally the Australian Aborigines—strange, wild, nomadic and scattered—offered little hope of providing indigenous labour of the kind and quantity wanted; some pastoralists used them as bark-cutters, sheep-washers, bullock-drivers and such, but only sporadically, as most Aborigines found it difficult to settle to regular work, or even work for a whole day, after being reared in centuries of nomadic life.

A former Indian planter called John Mackay, then with trading and pastoral interests in New South Wales, therefore proposed that the colony follow the example of Mauritius and import Indian coolies, preferably Dhangars or 'hill-coolies' from the plateau country of western Bengal—a hardy industrious race of men, free from the various religious castes in India. A Committee of the Legislative Council in 1837 were somewhat hesitant about the proposal as they were very conscious of 'the many objections that may be raised as to the paganism, habits, colour, etc. etc. of these people, and they would not be inclined to recommend their being introduced into this Colony, or at any rate that the public should bear any part of the expense of their importation, were not the demand for early relief so very urgent, and the present distress of the settlers so great'. They therefore recommended a small experiment of 300-500 hill-coolies whereby, in return for a passage bounty of £6 a head, pastoralists would provide passage costs both ways plus food, clothing and accommodation, all for a fixed contract period of six years.

Government circles were even more dubious, as was the 1841 Committee on Immigration, which recommended firmly against such proposals on two grounds: first, that cheap coolie labour (Indian coolies cost the pastoralist £20 a year against £50 a year for European labourers) would inevitably pull down the level of white wages, if not to the coolie level at least to a point mid-way between; second, that it would destroy racial and social homogeneity

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in that it meant ‘establishing here in perpetuity a race of different origin, colour and habits from the European and necessarily doomed to occupy a station of inferiority . . . Whatever defects may be chargeable upon the state of society here, it is at present so unmixed in its composition as to promise to supply materials for the fabrication of a social and political state corresponding to that of the country from which it derives its origin’.13

With such views the Colonial Office at Westminster, during those years under anti-slavery evangelicals such as Lord Glenelg and James Stephen, still fresh from their 1833 victory in having slavery abolished throughout the British Empire, were in complete accord; Glenelg adding that coolie labour would bring rural work in the colony into disrepute and slow up the flow of labourers he was hoping to encourage from the distressed agricultural areas of the United Kingdom.14 For his part James Stephen, now in the influential position of permanent head of the Colonial Office, consistently opposed all such proposals; in 1841 he stated that Australia should be a land ‘where the English race shall be spread from sea to sea unmixed with any lower caste. As we now regret the folly of our ancestors in colonising North America from Africa, so should our posterity have to censure if we should colonise Australia from India’; likewise in 1843 he opposed the proposal to use public funds to assist Indian coolies to New South Wales on the grounds that they would ‘debase by their intermixture the noble European race . . . introduce caste with all its evils . . . bring with them the idolatry and debasing habits of their country . . . beat down the wages of the poor labouring Europeans . . . [and] cut off the resource for many of our own distressed people’.15

Outside circles supported the government in this. Anti-slavery men attacked the proposal as an alternative form of slavery that would curse Australia with the permanent problem of a racially distinct subordinate minority.16 Anti-convict men saw it as a roundabout way of replacing cheap convict labour; as instance the remark of Henry Parkes that pastoralists have ‘been accustomed to having convicts toil for nothing and they cannot bring their minds to paying for that of the free men’.17 Working men saw it as a threat to their independence and living standards; hence the 1843
petition to the Governor by 4129 persons 'principally of the working classes' denouncing the coolie scheme on the grounds that it was an attempt to lower the general level of wages, was 'unjust to those immigrants who have been induced to leave their Native Country' by representations about high wages, would discourage further immigration from Britain, would degenerate into slavery because of the attitudes developed in employers by their use of convicts, and would, by reducing wages generally, reduce the Australian market for British manufacturers.\(^{18}\)

Pastoralists and others argued hard against these views, forming a Coolie Association under the influential William Charles Wentworth to foster their cause. In particular they claimed that coolies were not as adverse to pastoral work as Europeans, were sober and honest, would become civilised and Christian in Australia, were quite capable of looking after their own interests and preventing themselves being pushed down into conditions of slavery; in any case they would be protected by written agreements. The weight of public and official opinion, however, was too much against them: the colonial government refused to make any official approaches to the government of India, or to pay immigration bounties to persons importing coolies on their own account.\(^{19}\)

Some pastoralists, however, were prepared to act on their own. But they had only a short time in which to do so. Sugar planters in Mauritius and British Guiana, hitherto dependent on Negro slave labour, quickly moved to replace emancipated slaves with Indian coolies (Mauritius from 1834, from British Guiana 1838). At first officials in England and India considered the contracts reasonable in that planters promised to provide passage costs, food, clothing and accommodation, and to return those who wished to India after five years. Abuses in conditions of both transport and work (hours of work lasting from sunrise to sunset seven days a week, etc.), together with the deep suspicion held by anti-slavery organisations, then led the imperial government to instruct India to prohibit emigration until abuses were corrected and the experiments properly assessed. The ban, imposed in 1839, was lifted for Mauritius in 1842 and the West Indies in 1844, but only after the sugar colonies agreed, first, to appoint a Protector of immigrants to check conditions on the plantations and, second, to pay the
expenses of officials in India who could supervise contracts and transport conditions at ports of embarkation.\textsuperscript{20}

Before the ban John Mackay and other Australians managed to recruit a number of Dhangars via Calcutta, two ship-loads of maybe nearly 300 going to New South Wales in 1837 (including those northern districts later to become the colony of Queensland), and then a few to South Australia and Western Australia.\textsuperscript{21} More than 1200 were ordered in 1838 but few arrived before the ban,\textsuperscript{22} the Glenmore Distillery managing to get forty of them.\textsuperscript{23} Later, when Westminster and India were ready to permit controlled coolie emigration, the colonial governments of Australia, though not feeling sufficiently antagonistic to prohibit the private importation of coolies, were certainly not sufficiently in favour to make the complicated arrangements India required, including the payment of Protectors. Nevertheless, in 1844 in the midst of the 1842-5 depression, Captain Robert Towns, a New South Wales magistrate, ship-owner and pastoralist, introduced for himself and his friends 100 or so more Indians, this time as domestic servants in order to avoid Indian regulations. During the acute labour shortage of 1853-4, when local labourers were rushing to the gold-diggings, Towns sent four more ships to Calcutta and Madras but, finding Indian regulations still inflexible, and the New South Wales government still unwilling to make the necessary official arrangements, sent them on to China.

Little is known of these hill-coolies arriving in Australia 1837-44, mainly because they were not sufficiently dissatisfied with their contracts and conditions to provoke any public inquiry. Some returned to India after their five-year contracts, with small savings of £5 or more each, but others stayed on as pastoral and general labourers; a few, indeed, by 1854 had become independent farmers or carriers.\textsuperscript{24} Those who stayed apparently mixed very little with European-Australians, and intermarried not at all—the eight known to have had wives with them by 1854 had brought them from India.\textsuperscript{25} On the whole pastoralists and other employers were satisfied with their work, describing them as ‘tractable and harmless’ and easier to manage than Chinese coolies, but unanimous that they were ‘clearly inferior to Europeans both as respects their physical and mental capacity; that is, they are unequal to such
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Employments as require great personal strength or endurance, or demand the exercise of higher intellectual powers.26

Somewhat different remarks were made about the few Eurasians who arrived in New South Wales 1852-4. William Burton, who had moved from his judgship in Sydney to one in Madras, there formed an East Indian Emigration Society partly to help unemployed or inadequately employed offspring of British fathers and Indian mothers make a new life in Australia as shepherds, servants and skilled tradesmen. He interested the Colonial Office and persuaded the government in Sydney to set aside sufficient of the colonial Land Fund to cover the passage costs of 200 Eurasians, providing they were under twenty-five and included 100 females.27 Sixty arrived in 1852 (before arrangements were complete and therefore with passage costs paid by a loan from the Emigration Society) and another 101 in 1854, these latter being accompanied by twenty-five Eurasian compositors imported by Henry Parkes at his own expense to work in his printery; that is, 186 in all. Apparently they were under contract for two to four years, starting at wages about one-quarter that of European mechanics, but although some trained carpenters, wheelwrights and others found jobs easily the others—some virtually schoolboys and others musicians and teachers—had more trouble finding employment.28

In short, these Eurasians were badly selected to find immediate employment, so strengthening the hand of Browne, the Immigration Agent, who had been very lukewarm about the scheme on the grounds that his contacts in India thought Eurasians lacked 'energy, perseverance, and disregard for hardships' and were 'idle and indolent in their habits . . . wanting in physical strength and moral courage'.29 After a few months observation in Sydney he told the Committee on Asiatic Labor, 1854, that 'they have been brought up to a state of idleness in their youth and they are not fitted for any laborious employment from want of physical strength'. Moreover, 'having been educated in schools as a better class of people in India, they are disappointed when they are placed on a level with the working class in this Colony'.30 His views, and those of Parkes as Chairman, led the Committee to conclude that, though the Eurasians were educated, intelligent and respectable, they were 'from physical weakness and habits of effeminancy unsuited to the
wants of the colony’, and that no further public money be spent on such migration.³¹

Very little is known about the later history of these Eurasian settlers, the first group of Asian race to migrate to Australia under a government assisted passage scheme. Some may well have been still in Sydney in the 1860s, part of the small population of Indian origin there recorded in the Census of 1861. In all, persons of Indian race in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland in 1861 totalled about 400 males and forty females, some fifty in Sydney, thirty in Melbourne, 150 in the mining districts and 200 or more scattered through the rural township and pastoral districts, mainly of New South Wales and south Queensland.³² These represent the survivors of the coolie migration of 1837-44, the Eurasian migration of 1852-4, and a number of later arrivals attracted to the colonies as individuals by the gold-diggings and the associated expansion of trade.

The next attempt to import cheap coloured labour came in 1847, after the severe economic recession of the early 1840s was over and pastoralists were clamouring for station hands. Benjamin Boyd, a colourful banker, shipping merchant, pastoralist and whaler, who had founded a whaling base at Twofold Bay on the far south of the New South Wales coast and had successfully used Pacific Islanders as members of his crews, decided to recruit island labour for his sheep stations on the inland plains of the Riverina. His ships left early in 1847, returning at various times with some 185 men and seven women from small Melanesian islands such as Uvea and Lifu (Loyalty group), Tana and Aneityum (southern New Hebrides), and the Polynesian island of Rotuma (between Fiji and the Ellice group); the men under agreement to work as shepherds, labourers or seamen for five years at £1.6.0 a year with food, clothing and bedding (white shepherds at that time were earning about £25 a year).

The scheme won support from some pastoralists and merchants, and also from a short-lived Sydney paper called Heads of the People, which decided it was not only ‘a disposition of Providence that the labour required by this vast continent should be taken from the over-peopled islands’ but was also ‘the surest means of Christianizing them’ and for ever abolishing ‘the dreadful crimes
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of cannibalism and infanticide'.33 Others were less enthusiastic, accusing Boyd, if not of removing them by force (which some thought he had), of deceiving islanders 'sunk in a state of worse than childish imbecility' and quite unable to understand employment agreements.34 The rumours about kidnapping were dismissed by an inquiry by the Attorney General of New South Wales, though partially substantiated by a naval inquiry at Rotuma initiated by Sir George Grey, Governor of New Zealand.35 The matter of contract was settled by the Legislative Council passing an amendment to the colonial Masters and Servants Act, excluding from the provisions of that Act 'the Natives of any Savage or uncivilized tribe inhabiting any Island or Country in the Pacific Ocean or elsewhere'.36 The matter of general policy was assessed by the Committee on Immigration of 1847, reporting unfavourably on 'a state of things by which the boundless regions of the Australian continent, capable of containing millions of our fellow-subjects, may thus be pre-occupied by a semi-barbarous or even savage race'.37

Boyd later stated that the amendment to the Masters and Servants Act had wrecked his project by allowing the islanders to pass beyond his protection and control. The truth seems to be that, despite his instructions that they be sent through the coastal mountains to the warmer inland plains, and that they be treated kindly and without force, some islanders either stayed on the mountain stations suffering severely from the winter cold, or could not get accustomed to the great stretches of plateau and plain, and returned to Twofold Bay asking for transport home. By the end of 1847 Boyd had, according to the Governor, removed most of them from the colony and only sixty or so remained.38 In these circumstances no other pastoralist felt tempted to follow Boyd's example; nor did the Governor feel any need to take special steps to implement Westminster's request that he 'exercise a vigilant superintendence over the treatment of any Native of these Islands who may be brought into New South Wales, in order effectually to prevent . . . approach to a condition of slavery'.39

The final attempt to introduce cheap coloured labour at this time was that of various planters and merchants to divert to Australia some of the Chinese coolies trickling under contract to Mauritius (1843), Bourbon Isle (1845), Cuba (1847), Peru (1849), the
British West Indies (1852) and California (1854). The principal port of recruitment was Amoy, in the Hokkien speech area of Fukien province, though others embarked from the Teochui port of Swatow and the new Cantonese port of Hongkong. The first ship-load arrived in Sydney from Amoy in 1848, at a time when Westminster was worrying about methods of recruitment in China and conditions aboard the transports; the Governor in New South Wales therefore received a despatch asking him to end the traffic if possible, though no imperial or colonial laws against it in fact existed. During the years 1849-52 a few more ship-loads arrived, including eight organised by Robert Towns with about 2500 coolies, some to work on the sheep stations of himself and colleagues, some to act as wharf-labourers servicing his vessels, others to work for companies such as the Australian Agricultural Company and the Colonial Gold Company. Most were contracted for five years at £12 a year, rising to £24 for good workers—nearly the normal wage for a white labourer or shepherd. Though no definite records exist apparently more than 3000 arrived during the years 1848-52, including a few hundred recruited for Victoria and South Australia, the majority from Amoy.

Many coolies proved unsatisfactory to their employers, angry that their unscrupulous compatriot brokers had misled them in the first place and absconding, or forcing new contracts, when they discovered they could obtain higher wages elsewhere. Others, though less submissive than Indian coolies, became competent shepherds and labourers. George Sandeman, for example, already noted for his experiments with Indian labour at Moreton Bay, employed as many as forty Chinese at a time, having 600 or more pass through his hands by 1854. The Australian Agricultural Company, though having trouble training them as shepherds, found them amenable and useful as general labourers.

As with the Indians and Pacific Islanders many colonists were strongly opposed to the scheme. Andrew Shortrede, who had lived in south China for some years and seen the coolie trade at that end, concluded that the system of recruiting through Chinese brokers resulted in practices of deceit and kidnapping than which 'there is nothing worse in the slave trade'. Working men and others protested vigorously against the threat to white wages, and
against the 'growing insolence and grasping propensities of our lordly landed interest' which had caused it.46 Others spoke of the danger of novel oriental diseases and 'disgusting vice', a euphemism for homosexual practices sometimes found in predominantly male migrant communities.47 The Committee on Asiatic Labor, 1854, which arose partly from Henry Parkes's worry about disease and lack of protection of coolie interests, concluded that the coolies needed a Chinese-speaking protector to safeguard their interests but found little evidence of vice and, though questioning witnesses closely about poor sanitation and inadequate medical facilities on vessels such as the General Palmer, little definite about infectious diseases except those to be found on any unhygienic migrant ship. They made no recommendation on the trade itself, certainly no recommendation that the trade be prohibited or, contrariwise, that importers be subsidised from public funds.48

Faced with all these conflicting opinions, government officials were perhaps relieved when coolie immigration decreased after 1852, partly because of a general decline of contract emigration from China following riots and demonstrations in Amoy in 1852, and partly because of Westminster's temporary suspension of the British Emigration Agency in Amoy in 1854. Moreover with the increased flow of assisted British migrants, the likelihood of pastoralists continuing to import Chinese coolies at their own expense seemed slight.

Little is known yet of the fate of these predominantly Hokkien-speaking coolies from southern China. Some undoubtedly returned to China quite quickly, maybe even before the end of their original five-year period, but some were still in Australia in the later fifties. The New South Wales census of 1856 returned 1800 males and eight females born in China, very few of whom could have been of European origin at this early stage of Chinese-European contact. Sydney contained 134, including coolies who had absconded there from pastoral properties, some eventually to start market gardening, but also including a few early Chinese merchants. Over 500 were in areas soon to become the new colony of Queensland, relics of those imported by Towns, Sandeman and other Moreton Bay pastoralists. Another 500 were in New South Wales pastoral districts, presumably still as shepherds, station-hands and cooks but
nearly 100 were in rural towns and farming areas such as Parramatta, Liverpool, Wollongong, Goulburn, Maitland and Yass, apparently as farm-hands, bush-clearers and market gardeners. Another 600 were in gold areas, probably not all as diggers, though some of these may well have been Cantonese gold-diggers migrating later under the credit-ticket system as individuals. It is impossible to say how many had moved south to Victoria, as the few early Chinese there were soon overwhelmed by over 25,000 Chinese gold-diggers; the 1857 census of Victoria, however, did return nearly 1500 Chinese in rural areas away from the diggings, as well as 350 in coastal towns, and some of these were apparently survivors of the original coolie migration.49

The 1861 censuses tell much the same story: 189 Chinese-born persons in Sydney, 600 in the pastoral and farming areas of New South Wales remote from new mining developments, just over 500 in Queensland, mainly in the southern pastoral and farming districts. In other words, some Chinese coolies stayed in Australia for at least ten years, some considerably longer. What is clear, however, is that Hokkien coolies from Amoy never founded the kind of communities that Cantonese gold-diggers were to found, communities where, when a Cantonese returned to China, he sometimes sent a son or relative to replace him, so maintaining a continuous if restricted migration to Australia. Hokkien coolies returned to China or died without replacement, or married into the white population; which explains why in 1965 there were only fifty or so Hokkien Chinese in eastern Australia, most of these arriving after World War II. Teochiu coolies from Swatow may have done more; there are about 300 Teochius now settled in eastern Australia and, though most of these are recent arrivals, some may have connections with the small Teochiu element in the original coolie immigration. The Cantonese story is here quite different, but must await discussion of the Cantonese gold-diggers now flocking in their thousands to California and then to Australia.

At this point it is convenient to pause and take stock. Though the story has not progressed very far it is plain that, with Australia at least, many of the main elements in race relations are already engaged. The first element is economic: on the one hand the need of pastoralists and others for more labourers than assisted migra-
tion from Britain could supply; on the other the determination
of the working class, just shaking free from the competition of
cheap convict labour, to prevent the immigration of an alternative
form of cheap labour that might threaten their own wages and
living standards.

The second element is humanitarian: the horror which many
British families, both in Britain and Australia, felt at the slave
system and slave trade, and their fear lest it reappear in another
form. Hence the concern in Westminster and Sydney at the condi­
tions of coolie contract and recruitment, and at the possibility of
Boyd’s taking Pacific Islanders against their will, and the deter­
mination of many not to permit the establishment of a servile or
semi-servile class in Australia. Allied with this was a dislike of the
Indian caste system—whereby many families were kept permanently
as ‘untouchables’, in the lowest strata of society, without hope of
amelioration or intermixture. Hence the reluctance of Stephen and
others to allow caste-organised Indians into eastern Australia and
the suggestion of Mackay that the Dhangar hill-coolies, relatively
free of the caste system, be the ones to be recruited as coolies. Con­
versely, there is already that humanitarian feeling that the empty
lands of Australia should make some contribution of the ‘over­
population’ problems of Asian and Oceanian countries: Burton’s
East Indian Emigration Society obviously felt this, as may have the
Editor of the *Heads of the People* when commenting on ‘over­
peopled’ Pacific islands and Boyd’s brilliant scheme to help them.
If humanitarian horror of slavery has died away with the gradual
decline of slavery, humanitarian feelings about Australia’s duty to
help overpopulated Pacific Islands still exist.\(^5\)

The third element is religious: the feeling of so many Euro­
peans of the day that Christianity was manifestly superior to any
other religion and that they should beware of allowing too many
‘pagans’ into Christian Australia; hence the remarks of the 1837 Com­
mittee on Immigration. The editor of the *Heads of the People* may
have been sincere in thinking that Pacific Islanders could be converted
to Christianity and their fearsome habits of cannibalism and infanti­
cide removed more easily in Australia than in the islands; but most
missionaries much preferred to work amongst pagans in their natural
state, unaffected by European ambitions and vices.
The great white walls are built

The fourth element is desire for social homogeneity: the conviction that society operates best if it contains families and groups that are not too different from one another in history, attitudes, values and habits; hence the reaction of Stephen to the 1836 coolie proposal and the fears of the 1841 Committee about establishing a ‘race of different origin, colour and habits’. In Australia’s case this all pointed to British homogeneity, as in the mother country, and the importance of fashioning ‘a social and political state corresponding to that of the country from which it derives its origin’. Here in this 1841 Report are discernible signs of the infant colony’s attempt to clarify its identity. Confrontation with Asian and Melanesian immigration, even if on a small scale, aided Australian colonists in their unconscious search for an Australian future and identity. The full notion of an ‘independent Australian’, as distinct from that of a ‘transplanted Briton’, came later after much struggle, and is still being worked out. But this early contrast with Indians, Eurasians, Chinese and Oceanic Negroes helped make it clear to colonists what kind of society they did not want: a multi-racial society quite unlike that of the mother country.

The fifth element is purely racial—antipathy to persons of different colour and other physical characteristics, and to the customs and values associated with them. This is obvious in such remarks as that of the 1837 Committee on ‘colour’, and in the frequent talk about ‘inferior races’. But it is important that this notion of inferiority be properly understood. At this time it did not necessarily mean that races, as purely physical categories, were ranked in some immutable biological hierarchy. Rather did Britons of the day tend to think of inferiority and superiority in terms of distance along the road to ‘civilisation’; then interpreted as a combination of the Christian religion and social ethic, west European law and order, British industrial skills and living standards, and European pioneering energy and hardiness. These thoughts were in the mind of James Stephen, that strong Christian Evangelical and devoted British common lawyer, when speaking of the ‘noble European race . . . unmixed with any lower caste’, and in that of Robert Lowe when attacking Boyd’s Melanesian scheme on the grounds that it, like slavery involved a ‘superior nation against an inferior one’; which he then interpreted as a nation ‘further
advanced in civilization' and superior in 'its social system and organization'. Even the remarks of pastoralists and industrialists about coolie inferiority to European labour were in terms of inferiority of physical capacity to carry heavy loads or spend long hours clearing the bush, or of mental capacity to understand mechanical processes or undertake skilled work. This is also true of Browne's remarks about the Eurasians quoted earlier.

Whether there lay embedded here feelings of innate racial superiority is difficult to say. Undoubtedly those speaking of coolie inferiority paid little heed to the effects of history and background, to the fact that European station-hands were among the stronger and hardier of the colonial population and that, given adequate time and diet, Asians might achieve the same level of hardiness and mechanical skill. Nor did Browne stop to consider very fully the unsettled background of many Eurasian children and what influence this had on their 'indolence' and 'lack of moral courage'. But early colonial Australia was a tough society and employers and officials had neither the time nor inclination to consider remote causes or long-term remedial programs. Immigrants, whether arriving from Britain, Europe, Asia or Melanesia, either arrived reasonably fit for their designated tasks or else were no use and should be discouraged from coming. Present capacity, not long-term potential, was the standard of judgment; and here many non-European labourers were less suitable than trained British-Australian workers.

In one respect, however, non-Europeans were considered immediately, and without training, much superior to Europeans—in their capacity to do hard field labour in tropical areas. In the light of the experience of British soldiers, merchants and settlers in tropical dependencies, and particularly of the failure of the experimental settlements in the Northern Territory of Australia at Melville Island (1842-9), Raffles Bay (1827-9) and Port Essington (1838-49), few persons of the day thought tropical Australia could be colonised by a purely European population. So the 1837 Committee concluded that 'in the event of a settlement being formed to the northward, where the heat of the climate might be too oppressive for the European labourer, and where the culture of sugar, cotton, coffee and tobacco might be prosecuted with advantage . . . the
introduction of Indian labourers would be conducive to the general benefit of the Colony’.53 Similarly the 1854 Committee on Asiatic Labor thought Chinese and Indian coolies might be necessary in the north since ‘the inter-tropical heat is too intense for the European constitution’.54

Such opinions were not put to the test at this time. Admittedly Westminster agreed, in an effort to save the Port Essington experiment in 1843, to encourage Asian settlers in the North. But the scheme aroused little interest amongst Malays or Chinese in Southeast Asia and nothing eventuated. Australia had to wait until Pacific island labourers entered tropical Queensland in the 1860s, and Chinese labourers entered the Northern Territory in the 1870s, before testing the proposition that coloured persons would be essential to northern development.55

The last race relations element visible in Australia at this time is the scapegoat one, the tendency to project upon another people—strange, feared and mistrusted—the blame for weaknesses in one’s own social system. Hence the references in the 1854 inquiry on Asiatic Labor to dangerous diseases and disgusting vice; both were present amongst the convict and free immigrants from Britain and, although regretted and criticised, were seldom regarded with the same hostility as when attributed to the coolies.

Still absent from the story, however, are other important elements in race relations, notably confrontation with large members of a conspicuously different people. Only three of Boyd’s Melanesians came direct to Sydney, the rest were landed at Twofold Bay and thence distributed over Boyd’s vast pastoral empire. Likewise, some of the Indian and Chinese coolies were taken direct to Moreton Bay, and other small ports remote from Sydney, and there widely distributed. Labourers and mechanics in Sydney might protest when hearing of their arrival but—apart from the few Eurasians—saw few Chinese or Indian labourers face to face. The scattered body of European station and farm hands might have taken some action, but were not organised at this time for any effective protest; in any case many seemed quite happy to accept their new position as overseers of coolie work. Direct confrontation of any significance had to await the Cantonese gold-diggers; this was now very near at hand.
Chapter 3

1 Cantonese gold-diggers: origins and background

The Cantonese part of Kwantung Province, broken by relatively barren granite hills on the coast and by rugged sandstone ranges further inland, has little more than 29 per cent of its terrain under cultivation. The majority of its people, now about twenty-five million (excluding the four million or so in Hongkong) have always been concentrated in the tropical lower valleys of the main rivers, most of which drain into the Pearl River and its associated estuaries south of Canton City. In practice, emigrants to America and Australasia, as well as to South-east Asia, have rarely come from anywhere but the districts (administratively known as hsien) around these estuaries; the more important appear in the endpaper map.

Sometimes these districts present considerable uniformity. Inhabitants of the Sze Yap or Four Districts—Hoiping (K'ai-p'ing), Sunwei (Hsin-Hui), Toishan (T'ai-shan), and Yanping (En-p'ing)—often regard themselves as one unit, speak much the same version of Cantonese and tend to keep together abroad. Likewise people of the Sam Yap or Three Districts—Namhoi (Nan-hai, Foshan), Punyui (Pan-yu) and Shuntak (Shun-te) often speak of themselves as one, use a dialect very similar to that of Canton City (which is geographically part of Punyui District), and form single societies when overseas. Families from Chungshan (Hsiang-shan, formerly Shekki) District are more distinct, as are those from the districts of Tungkoon (Tung-kuan) and Kao-yao (Ko-yiu or Gow Yow or Chao—Ch'ing-Chou). Different again are old established families of the two foreign ports: the Portuguese port of Macao, settled in 1557 but not officially carved out of Chungshan District until 1886; and the British industrial port of Hongkong, progressively cut out of Pao-an (Hsin-an) District in 1842, 1861 and 1898.

In the early nineteenth century most of the population was
rural, engaged with the aid of a well distributed rainfall of 60 inches a year in intensively farming two rice crops and one dry crop a year, together with fruit, vegetables and mulberries for silkworms. A number were skilled carpenters, metal-workers, masons, tailors and the like, or were engaged in local trade. A still smaller number, drawn from larger and wealthier landed families and resident in the larger administrative centres and market towns (hsiang), provided the government officials and scholars. Growing in number and importance were merchant families, and their assistants and labourers, resident in the coastal ports.

All these, high and low, were normally organised, to adopt Freedman’s terminology, in a hierarchy of elementary families (parents and children, called stem families if grandparents were also present), joint families (where married brothers, with or without parents, shared the same household), local lineages (corporate groups of male relatives living in one settlement or cluster of settlements), higher order lineages (local lineages which, though living some distance apart, possessed a common ancestral hall or other piece of lineage property), and clans (those, sharing the same surname, reputed to be descended from a common ancestor). At times, especially when away from local organisations, clan ties were important but lineage ties, related to some effective religious practice and use of property, meant much more. Even overseas, when persons of the same clan felt more incentive for co-operation, lineage ties were usually stronger, influencing which members of the lineage should emigrate and to what extent they should form family and lineage partnerships in the new land.

Ideally, patriarchal authority prevailed everywhere, sons deferring to their father’s authority, brothers to their elder brother, these in turn to the senior members of the lineage, and so right up to the emperor, the father of the whole Chinese people. In practice things were somewhat different. Admittedly there was much family and lineage co-operation, especially over ancestor worship, education, marriage making and sometimes over agricultural and business enterprise, members of the family or lineage at times working land or business in common as a profit-sharing partnership. There were, however, frequent tension and conflict, especially when population pressed heavily against limited local resources: brothers, though
entitled to equal shares in the family property (save for the eldest son's extra share in relation to the ancestor cult)² sometimes fought hard to protect or enlarge their own interests; joint families strove to enlarge their shares of lineage property and power; distantly or unrelated lineages, especially when sharing villages with other lineages, resorted to arms or geomancy to protect their land or seize that of others.³ Families or lineages losing the struggle found themselves handing over land to their rivals, perhaps being permitted to go on working it as semi-servile tenants, perhaps being forced to move on and settle somewhere else.⁴

In this situation marriage and children were exceedingly important. Wealthy men, able to support several wives and numerous children, were better placed to survive family struggles, their sons eventually inheriting the claims of poorer relatives unable to marry. Likewise lineages producing numerous offspring better survived the rigours of disease, poverty and war. Moreover, rich families and lineages, even when comparatively barren, could build up numbers by adopting, provided the adopted son charged with continuing the line of succession in the ancestor cult was of the correct agnatic and generation status.⁵ Multiple marriage was thus common amongst wealthier families, the sons of the first or official wife being entitled to a greater share of family property than other sons.⁶

Multiple marriage could arise for other reasons. Since most girls married, and since wives were drawn from unrelated lineages and eventually lost nearly all connection with their own families, parents relied not on their daughters but on their sons' wives for domestic help as they grew older. Hence a father might insist that the eldest son marry at an early age a young girl of their choice, who could come and housekeep for them; the son might later, when his parents were dead and he somewhat better off, find a girl more to his liking and take her as his second wife.⁷

Whatever the motive for marriage it was important that the wife and children stay at home, to minister to the parents, to maintain the property rights of that particular family unit, to keep up numbers against lineage war. This is one major reason why Chinese emigrants in the nineteenth century, unlike Indian and Japanese, seldom took women with them. As Skinner says of Chinese emigrating to Thailand before 1890: 'lineage councils in
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the emigrant areas of south China never permitted wives to accompany their husbands abroad for fear of losing the family entirely.8 If women did go abroad they were likely to be young girls abducted, or 'sold' by impoverished families, into prostitution; hence the numerous reference to Chinese prostitutes in Thailand, Australasia and America.

Little objection was made to young men emigrating. If they were members of an impoverished or defeated lineage no one felt moved to keep them. If they were members of more powerful, or even struggling, families and lineages, their earnings abroad returned home either as remittances or on periodic visits and were valuable additions to the family's ability to purchase land, survive famine, erect ancestral halls for prestige reasons, and so on. They might also assist the lineage to set up a lineage school, or send talented youngsters to one of the official schools, so producing government officials who could greatly further family interests and add to its power and prestige.9 If the emigrant was married he was encouraged to adopt a commuting system, spending several years abroad, then home for one or two years, then abroad again, and so on, maintaining his overseas earnings but raising up children to continue his family's interest at home.10

Over against this family-lineage system existed three other systems of social organisation and control. Central government flowed from the Emperor down through officials controlling, in descending order, provinces (sheng), prefectures (fu), departments (chu), and districts or counties (hsien). To these last were attached various magistrates, military officers, directors of police, controllers of education, and a whole range of soldiers, clerks, runners, and the like, some stationed with the hsien magistrate in his district headquarters, others situated in the market towns (hsiang). Provided villagers paid taxes regularly these public servants had little to do, disputes normally being settled by lineage or village councils. At times the various offices became little more than public sinecures, bought by members of wealthy lineages to gain official protection and status.11 Certainly the central government was, in the nineteenth century, very much weaker than some decades earlier, far too weak to pay much attention to emigration. It could forbid it—as the Manchu dynasty did—but it could neither prevent
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it nor protect Chinese citizens in other countries; here being in marked contrast to the Japanese government and its use of consuls and ambassadors to protect Japanese overseas.

The second system was that of unofficial local government, the agreement (yeuk) between various local lineages and villages to operate as one marketing and defensive unit, sometimes setting up market premises as a common estate with the purpose of improving their position against rival lineages and villages; these being naturally excluded from the pact. Where one or two local lineages dominated a whole area, the local yeuk tended to embrace the whole township area and be controlled by the dominant clan. At times these organisations worked with the central government, as when organising militia against the British attack on Canton in 1842. It is possible that these traditions of local alliance had much to do with the organisation of Chinese abroad, members of different lineages and societies appointing representatives to control the affairs of a ‘Chinatown’ or a Chinese ‘village’ on a gold-field.

The third system, probably connected closely with the second, was the system of secret societies, or Tongs. Some were little more than trading guilds or mutual benefit societies. Others were much more political, such as the Hung society, and its associated White Lotus society, which was founded as an ancient Buddhist organisation, with elaborate ritual and ceremonial, and which took over political activities in the seventeenth century when endeavouring to over-throw the Manchu intruders and restore the Ming dynasty. Such societies appeared amongst the Chinese in Thailand as early as the seventeenth century and later spread to other Chinese settlements overseas. Their objectives abroad were to secure protection and economic advantage for their members, including the provision of adequate supplies of labour, to control opium smoking, gambling and prostitution, to arrange proper burial of members and the eventual transport of their bones back to China for final burial in the ancestral graveyard, and so on. In many places the societies were organised along speech-group or district lines, though sometimes rival societies bid for district loyalties, as in San Francisco where three of the six Tongs claimed to represent migrants from the Sze Yap.

This work on trading guilds and societies brings us back to
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the complex matter of Chinese traders and merchants. Officially of low status, in Confucian terms well below that of landed gentry, scholars and officials, they were nevertheless steadily growing in importance. Originally centred on administrative, market and coastal trading towns—these last being usually sited some distance up river as protection against storms and pirates—they increased in wealth and power with the expansion of the Chinese junk trade to South-east Asia in the eighteenth century. Canton itself, as the one south China port normally permitted to receive foreign vessels, was also a centre of Arab, Malay, Siamese and European shipping and commerce. Later, with the opening of Hongkong as a British port in 1842 and the declaration of Amoy, Canton, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai as treaty ports for European trade in 1842 (and Swatow 1858), and with the advent of square-rigged ships and then steam-ships the smaller river ports declined in importance as their activities were transferred to the rapidly growing deep-sea ports.15

This growth of overseas trade led to a rapid increase of merchant houses and their employees: clerks, accountants, artisans, porters, dock-workers and the like, drawn originally from the agricultural villages and market towns nearby and constituting a pool of potential migrants capable of establishing trading businesses abroad. It was this urban trading life in Kwantung and Fukien provinces, particularly in the Cantonese area, that gave the south coast of China its somewhat different character. It certainly helps explain why this part of China was so much earlier in emigration than elsewhere, and why there were merchant houses and brokers able to organise emigrant shipping and advance passage money to peasant or urban labourers wishing to try their luck abroad. This last became known as the 'credit-ticket' system: merchants or brokers advanced passage costs in exchange for an agreement requiring the emigrant to work for a low fixed wage or to make regular agreed repayments of both loan and interest; all this on the security of the emigrant's title to village land or of the persons of his wife and children. Only when the loan and interest were repaid could the emigrant start sending his entire savings back to the family.

These merchants, however, were still Chinese, moved by kin-oriented goals and motives. Families making their money in trade could hire tutors so that their children could gain entry to the
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scholarly-official world or, if unable to win their way by merit, be bought official positions; or they could buy more ritual land for the lineage or clan, build new ancestral halls, and generally add to lineage prestige and power. Moreover, if short of sons, they could afford to adopt sons to help with their business enterprises and take over the duties of furthering family interests; hence the practice of some merchants of adopting sons who could be sent abroad to supervise trading expeditions or organise business posts overseas. Finally, the family-lineage system was that to which merchants naturally turned when organising permanent establishments abroad: the family partnership, the bringing out of younger relatives to work as junior clerks, shop assistants or waiters, the inviting of a son or nephew to come out and take over the business when the founder wished finally to return to China and live his last days at home. The same held for many of those establishing farms and market gardens abroad.

It was the family lineage system, likewise, that provided so many of the 'headmen' who organised early expeditions to the gold-fields. A merchant in Canton who arranged to send fifty or more labourers and artisans to the Californian or Victorian gold-fields, and advanced their passage money, naturally wished to have some reliable man in charge of the party, both on the voyage and when at work. If the party were all from one local area it might have its own headman; otherwise the merchant might provide a man of his own. In any case, such parties needed a headman or spokesman: the patriarchal system of south China required some leadership abroad, some person or persons who could take the place of the family and lineage elders at home.

One thing all these persons had in common—farmer and trader, headman or labourer—was a consciousness that only a very narrow margin lay between them and disaster. As Skinner says: 'the south Chinese peasant lived in a grimly Malthusian setting where thrift and industry were essential for survival . . . [He] had every practical reason for frugality and thrift: consumption had to be limited in the present in hopes of assuring future survival; enjoyment had to be sacrificed for work . . . [But] his primary goal was not individual salvation but lineage survival and advancement. Protracted labor and extreme thrift were the means to these strongly
sanctioned ends'. When to this historic thrift and industry is added the incentive to pay back passage costs to the merchant broker as swiftly as possible, so freeing family property lodged as surety, it is not surprising to see how quickly Chinese gold-diggers obtained a reputation for hard work and very low living standards. Against the much more happy-go-lucky European miner, with his greater tendency to celebrate lucky finds in lavish outbreaks of drinking and hospitality, to live hard for the day and hope cheerfully and rashly for the future, this disciplined Chinese sobriety and industry stood out in conspicuous and often unpopular contrast.

Here then lie the origins and character of Cantonese emigration to the gold-fields; as, indeed, of south Chinese emigration generally: the pressure of population in fertile river valleys occupying only 20 per cent of the terrain; the ceaseless pressure to expand the lineage or clan and force others into positions of subordination or out into other areas; competition between whole speech-groups, especially when intermingled, as were Hakkas and Cantonese or Hakkas and Teochiu in western Kwantung (the conflict between Hakkas and Cantonese in 1864-6 is said to have cost over 100,000 lives). On a larger scale were the anti-Manchu conflicts, sponsored by the secret societies and occasionally erupting into civil war of the magnitude of the great Taiping rebellion 1848-65, and the less drastic wars against Europeans such as the Opium war of 1838-42 and the second British-Chinese War 1856-8. All these were exceedingly disruptive of social order, undermining central authority and encouraging bandits and war-lords. As they coincided with the rapid growth of Chinese and foreign shipping running relatively cheap passages abroad, and with the business arrangements between Chinese and European merchants to foster the emigration of Chinese coolies to plantation colonies, it is not surprising to find numerous Cantonese able and willing to take advantage of gold discoveries around the Pacific.

2 Cantonese in California, 1848-62

The news that gold had been discovered in California early in 1848 reached Hongkong and Canton in the spring and aroused
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considerable interest; in subsequent months came news of further discoveries and of the severe shortage of labour caused by large-scale moves to the diggings. Chinese response, however, was slow as merchants were still concentrating on the coolie trade with South America and the Caribbean while those who had drifted into California earlier were too few to attract many others. Fewer than fifty arrivals were reported by the spring of 1850. Later in the year immigration increased, now responding to the ravages of the Taiping rebellion and the willingness of merchants to advance passage money, organise emigrant parties, and make arrangements with Californian business men. Nearly 1000 had arrived by the end of 1850, another 6000 or more landed in 1851 and some 20,000 in 1852. The census of 1852 estimated there were some 25,000 in the state—one tenth of the total population—working mainly in the gold areas, but with an appreciable number in San Francisco itself.

The first reactions were mixed. Some were favourable, particularly employers engaging them to replace labourers vanished to the diggings. Others were neutral, as instance the San Francisco paper, Daily Alta. Others were hostile, notably the miners who, as part of a general campaign against Chileans, Mexicans, Australians (some ex-convicts), Chinese and other digger groups felt to be unsavoury, unsuitable or extracting gold simply to send it abroad, persuaded the state legislature to pass a discriminatory law in 1850 requiring all alien miners to take out a mining licence at $20.00 a month. Because of technical difficulties this was repealed the following year.

Increasing numbers in 1851 led to increased hostility first in the mining areas, where the Chinese were showing that by hard work, long hours and low living costs they could not only keep themselves alive but start paying off their passage debts, and second in San Francisco, where 2000 or so Chinese residents entered the laundry and restaurant business, by the spring of 1852 gaining complete control over those occupations. Hostility came to a head in March 1852 when Senator Tingley, representing employers anxious to obtain a regular supply of labour, moved a Bill to legalise contracts binding Chinese labourers for ten years at fixed wages (at this time labour was so scarce miners could
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command $6.00 a day and general labourers $5.00). A similar Bill passed the Assembly, both Bills arousing intense indignation, cries of 'cheap coolie labour', 'serf labour', 'inferior populations', 'degraded Asiatics', 'overwhelming numbers' and so on. The Bills were shelved or withdrawn in April and replaced by an Act imposing a new tax of $3.00 a month on alien miners (later raised to $4.00) and another Act requiring masters of vessels to pay a fee of $5.00 for each alien passenger; this, as far as Chinese were concerned, being ultimately paid by the merchant financing the migrant and added to the debt. Though these two Acts affected all aliens, Chinese immigrants produced a very large proportion of the revenue.25

Soon afterwards, so soon that one historian considers the legislative debates and public reaction acted as a trigger,26 came a series of moves to expel Chinese from mining areas. A typical example is that of miners at Columbia in Tuolumne County who, in May 1852, passed resolutions which referred to the Tingley debates, attacked the cheap-labour activities of 'certain ship-owners, capitalists and merchants', asserted that state and federal legislatures were incapable of taking adequate action, concluded that 'it is the duty of the miners to take the matter into their own hands', and appointed a Vigilance Committee to ensure the exclusion of all Asiatics from the mines.27 In the same month similar actions were taken at Rough and Ready, Wood's Creek, Foster's Bar, Mormon Bar, Yuba River and other diggings. Despite these forcible expulsions the Chinese remained digging, now frequently concentrating in areas abandoned by white diggers as worked-out or too difficult; others remained in the areas as cooks or launderers. Though this withdrawal from direct competition reduced tension somewhat,28 hostility often continued, with occasional outbreaks of rioting; even as late as 1859 an anti-Chinese riot in Shasta County required a special police expedition to subdue.29

This hostility expressed itself in further legislation, now more openly anti-Chinese. In 1855, after a miners' convention in Shasta County had asserted that Chinese were usurping all placer diggings and that bloodshed was inevitable, the State Assembly declared:

the American laborer claims the exclusive privilege and right of occupying and working the immense placers of our State. . . . If this
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class of foreigners are excluded from the mines, our own laboring classes will be for a long series of years have the advantage of capitalists. Our laborers wish to keep up the value of their toil to a fair standard of competition amongst themselves, but you allow capitalists to import Chinese labor upon them, and the equilibrium is destroyed, capital is triumphant, and the laboring poor of America must submit to the unholy sacrifice.30

A Committee then recommended that all those ineligible for naturalisation be prohibited from mining (under the United States Naturalization Law of 1790 only 'free white persons' were eligible for naturalisation and in California, though not always in the east until a High Court decision in 1878 confirmed Californian opinion, Asiatics were from the beginning regarded as non-white). The recommendation was then changed, at the behest of merchants engaged in the China trade and of mining counties dependent on licence fees for their income, to a renewal of the $4.00 monthly tax on alien miners, with a proviso exempting all those eligible for naturalisation and declaring their intention of becoming naturalised, i.e. nearly all white miners.

Meanwhile anti-Chinese feeling had spread to San Francisco. The mining recession of 1854 brought to the town many miners who had been engaged in anti-Chinese activities in the diggings and who now found themselves competing for jobs with Chinese labourers in the city. They became associated with the local version of the anti-alien Know-Nothing movement and under that influence became so troublesome, particularly to the Chinese, that a city Vigilance Committee became necessary in 1856. Partly as a result of this agitation legislation was proposed in 1854 forbidding Chinese to testify against whites. This was dropped when the Chief Justice (the notorious Hugh C. Murray, a member of the Know-Nothing movement and described by the historian Bancroft as 'immoral, venal and thoroughly corrupt')31 decided that the existing law declaring that 'no Black, or Mulatto person, or Indian, shall be allowed to give evidence in favor of, or against a white man' applied to Chinese as they were of the same Mongolian type as the American Indian;32 this made it easy for white hooligans and ne'er-do-wells to attack Chinese persons and property with impunity.
In 1855 the legislature went further with its restrictive entry policy, making a passenger vessel or its agent responsible for paying a $50.00 landing tax on each person ineligible for naturalisation; the state court declared this unconstitutional, 1855, as encroaching on the federal government's exclusive powers in matters of commerce and immigration. The legislature then in 1858 passed an Act prohibiting any Chinese or Mongolian from entering the state, but this too the state court declared invalid (1862), on the same grounds. (The original law of 1852, levying a $5.00 tax on every alien passenger was not challenged and voided till 1872.)

Though these laws restricting immigration were declared invalid, state laws discriminating against Chinese residents remained in force until challenged after the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) and Civil Rights Act (1870): first, the $4.00 a month tax on miners not eligible for naturalisation; second, laws designed to keep Chinese from fishing, begun in 1860 with a $4.00 monthly tax on Chinese fishermen and replaced after 1864 with a prohibition against fishing by anyone incapable of becoming an elector of the state (i.e. ineligible for naturalisation); third, a 'police tax' of $2.50 a month on every Chinese not already paying a licence fee and not 'usefully' engaged in producing sugar, tea, coffee or rice—this 1862 law was designed to make things difficult not only for Chinese in the laundry and restaurant business but also for those moving into textiles, cabinet making, market and poultry farming, domestic service and general labouring.

So far we have been concentrating on California itself and ignoring events and opinions elsewhere in the U.S.A. Some historians have criticised this approach, saying that the Chinese question as assessed by Mary Coolidge, Elmer Sandmeyer and others has given far too much emphasis to California and not nearly enough to those anti-Chinese opinions and sentiments in the eastern states that had been slowly forming under the influence of American merchants and seamen visiting China since 1785, of American diplomats who had been trying to establish American-Chinese relations since the end of the eighteenth century, of American Protestant missionaries disgusted with Chinese pagan customs and their own failure to make much impact on them, of
newspaper attacks on China during and after the Opium War of 1840-2, and of the growing fears of anti-slavery groups in the east that Chinese coolies were entering California under duress, or under unreasonable contracts, and would soon become another slave class.38

In a sense this criticism is valid, particularly in relation to the Act of 1882. But the fact remains that in this first confrontation period, despite Californian agitation for federal action, the only thing done by easterners dominating Congress was to pass in 1862 an Act (12 Stat 340) prohibiting United States vessels from participating in the ‘coolie’ trade and requiring that each Chinese immigrant carry a document from an American official at the port of embarkation certifying that he was a voluntary migrant in full understanding of his contract, if any. But this was not designed to help California so much as to appease anti-slavery forces in the east and, to some degree, to emulate the British anti-coolie legislation of 1855 and earlier. The Act certainly had minimal effect in California as the great bulk of Chinese immigrants were voluntary arrivals under the credit-ticket system. In this sense California was still without any effective restrictions on immigration, still angry with a Congress in distant Washington that could so neglect it, and still forced to rely on its own powers to pass discriminatory laws against unwanted intruders.

By the early 1860s, then, the Californian position was as follows: a federal law prohibiting the ‘coolie’ trade existed but had almost no effect; the more stringent state restrictive entry laws had all been declared invalid but the milder one of 1852 requiring a $5.00 landing fee was still in force; discriminatory laws designed to make life difficult for Chinese residents were in operation, in the form of special taxes on all Chinese workers except those ‘usefully’ engaged in producing sugar, coffee, tea and rice; a discriminatory section of the constitution denied Chinese the opportunity to become naturalised while a discriminatory legal interpretation denied them the right to give evidence for or against white settlers; illegal moves forcibly to expel Chinese miners from the diggings had succeeded in various areas but had not prevented the Chinese from working abandoned diggings, from operating in better areas where white diggers were few and scattered, and from
employing themselves for wages with large mining companies. Statistics of 1860 suggest that of the 35,000 Chinese then in the state some 28,000 were in the fifteen principal mining counties, nearly 3000 were in San Francisco and the rest scattered in various jobs through the state.39

How effective were these measures in discouraging Chinese from staying in California, or new and former migrants from entering? Statistics, based on those collected by the San Francisco Customs House, at which port almost all Chinese landed, give the following picture of Chinese arrivals 1852-70; earlier figures are estimates based on other reports of arrivals.40

Chinese Arrivals in California 1849-70

| Year | Estimate (e) | 1853 | 1854 | 1855 | 1856 | 1857 | 1858 | 1859 | 1860 | 1861 | 1862 | 1863 | 1864 | 1865 | 1866 | 1867 | 1868 | 1869 | 1870 | 1870 Total |
|------|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|----------|
| 1849 | 50e         | 4300 | 16100| 3300 | 4800 | 5900 | 5400 | 3200 | 7300 | 8400 | 8200 | 6400 | 2700 | 3100 | 2200 | 4300 | 11100 | 15000 | 11000 |
| 1850 | 950e        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |
| 1851 | 6000e       |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |
| 1852 | 20000       |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |
| Total| 27000       |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |
| Census| 25000e     |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |
| 1852 |            |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |
| Total| 50300       |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |
| Census| 34900      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |
| Loss (e) | 36000    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |
| Census| 49200      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |
| Loss (e) | 50000    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |

\(e = \) Estimate. 'Loss' is an estimate obtained by adding intercensal arrivals to the first census total, deducting the second census total and further deducting estimated deaths.

The sharp drop in immigration in 1853 is clearly related to the hostility displayed in 1852 in the mining areas and the state legislature; numbers of Chinese expelled from the diggings returned to China while merchants in San Francisco warned their fellow countrymen in China not to organise further migration till events were more propitious.41 After things quietened in 1853 immigration recovered—hence the increased intake of 1854—but the 1854
troubles in San Francisco and the mining areas again affected the immigration of 1855-6. The fall here, however, was due not only to Californian hostility but to the mining recession of 1854 and the growing pull of the Victorian gold-fields; (Victoria received some 10,000 in 1854, 15,000 in 1855, and between 10,000 and 15,000 in 1856). Immigration picked up again in the early 1860s, in a sense provoking the fishing and police taxes. The immigration decline of the mid-1860s, however, was caused less by these than by the upheavals of the Civil War (1861-5). Because of this decline, but also because of the distractions of the Civil War, the labour demands of the Union Pacific railway now cutting its way across the Rocky Mountains and Sierra Nevada, and the gradual replacement of small mining by larger companies, white hostility quietened down considerably. As in Australia it was a time of relative peace.

All through these years, however, Chinese re-migration was considerable. No exact statistics exist but it is clear from a comparison of immigration and census statistics that the loss of Chinese by deaths and departures was high: between 1848 and 1860 there were approximately 77,000 Chinese arrivals but only 34,900 were counted at the 1860 Census. Clearly the combination of hostile outbreaks in California, and the desire of Chinese men periodically or finally to return to their villages, kept the Chinese population from growing more rapidly. (On-migration to Oregon at this time was slight, perhaps 3000 all told.) Moreover, there were few American-born Chinese to swell the local Chinese population. In this respect California closely resembled Victoria and New South Wales, the two main areas of Cantonese settlement across the Pacific.

3 Cantonese gold-diggers in Victoria, 1854-65

As the Chinese were slower than other peoples to respond to the Californian gold discoveries so were they to respond to the Australian ones. Edward Hargraves, a New South Wales settler who had left his family in Australia to join the rush to California in 1849, became convinced that there was gold in the back country of New South Wales and returned there early in 1851 to find it. His discoveries and methods drew men from nearby pastoral districts.
The great white walls are built

and Sydney in May, and from Victoria and South Australia in June. Then, from August onwards, came publication of more spectacular discoveries in various parts of Victoria—Ballarat, Mt Alexander (Castlemaine), Bendigo (Sandhurst)—which reversed the movement to New South Wales and caused many persons in Europe, and some in America, to embark for Australia, the first major ship-loads arriving late in 1852.

Though the news had reached Hongkong by the beginning of 1852 only a few Chinese, perhaps 500 in all, embarked for Australia in that year and the next. Indeed it was not till 1854, when much of the initial splendour was over and mining was becoming a more difficult business, that Cantonese diggers arrived in any number. Government officials estimated that nearly 8000 landed in the first six months of 1854, a further 7000 by the end of the year, and another 8000 or so by late June 1855; over 18,000 in all.

This influx was as massive as that to California in the first eighteen months of Chinese immigration (15,000 or so from December 1850 to June 1852) and evoked a similar response. Even in June 1854, when there were only 3500 Chinese in Victoria, the miners acted against them, in this case in the Bendigo fields where some 2000 Chinese were digging in an area containing some 15,000 adult males in all. In the general context of slightly declining gold yields, and of white diggers' irritation that the Chinese were using a lot of water andrewashing old areas, which diggers regarded as their reserve areas if new finds petered out, anti-Chinese sentiment grew rapidly. The trouble-seeking Dr James Wall (a Bendigo surgeon who was prominent in the anti-licence agitation and later developed a feud with local police) encouraged that volatile, egalitarian, America-conscious, Scottish teacher, digger and spiritualist, William Campbell Denovan, to announce that 'a general and unanimous uprising should take place in the various gullies of Bendigo the 4th of July next ensuing, for the purpose of driving the Chinese population off the Bendigo gold-fields'. This choice of America's Independence Day, while in keeping with the anti-establishment feelings or Californian experience of some of the miners (Denovan later used phrases from both the Declaration of Independence and the Rights of Man when addressing the Gold Fields Commission) was felt by American diggers to
be an unsuitable form of celebration. They therefore had the demonstration postponed to 8 July, so giving the Gold Fields Commissioner time to warn Denovan, obtain fifty police reinforcements and prevent a disturbance. Other forces working for peace were the willingness of settlers at nearby Castlemaine to assist the police, and the Commissioner’s promise to warn Chinese miners against encroachment and waste of water. Denovan did, however, persuade the postponed meeting to demand restrictions on Chinese immigration.

Despite the ‘good sense of the community’ which, using the Governor’s words, ‘suffocated the schemes of a few discontented and factious individuals’, anti-Chinese feeling remained. The Royal Commissioners appointed to examine miners’ grievances after the Eureka troubles of December 1854 were so impressed with it, and with the continual increase in Chinese numbers, that they recommended a Californian-type landing tax to ‘check and diminish this influx’. Governor and Legislative Council agreed, not only because of increased numbers but also because some feared an outbreak of the kind of fighting seen recently in Java between Chinese and Malays, and because they thought that Chinese merchants advancing passage costs were indulging in ‘something very closely approaching to traffic in slaves’. The few voices raised against restriction included those of Fellowes (conservative) and Snodgrass and Forlonger (liberal pastoralists), who all thought the Chinese were peaceful valuable colonists and that there was insufficient evidence of political or social danger to justify action against them.

When discussing modes of control some demanded complete exclusion but most favoured reduction of numbers, not only by implementing the proposed entry tax but also by borrowing that part of the Passengers’ Act which, in the interests of health and safety, restricted the number of passengers carried to a fixed proportion of ship’s tonnage. Herein lies the origin of the Act ‘to make provision for certain immigrants’ (No. 39 of June 1855) which limited the landing of immigrants who were adult male natives of China, or born of Chinese parents, to one for every 10 tons of ship’s burthen, and imposed on all such persons, including those arriving overland, an entry tax of £10. The Act further required that the tax revenue be used to finance an administrative machinery.
to supervise the Chinese and empowered the government, if such revenue were inadequate, to levy an additional poll tax on every adult Chinese resident.

The system of supervision was based on salaried Protectors whose job it was to organise the Chinese into segregated 'mining villages', control hygiene and use of water, and settle petty domestic disputes by reference to Chinese custom. Helping them were interpreters, at first Chinese, and a headman for each mining village whose task was to keep the Protector informed of Chinese wishes and opinions and to explain to Chinese miners what the Victorian government required. Seven villages were set up in the Bendigo area in 1855, and twelve in the Ballarat area, and others elsewhere later. The scheme not only reduced friction between Chinese and Europeans but fitted in very well with the Chinese practice of working in groups drawn from the same district, usually led by a headman appointed by the merchant broker to supervise repayments of the passage loan. When inhabitants of different mining villages derived from the same Chinese district there was much movement to and fro, and a tendency to form general associations for the major Cantonese areas represented—the Sze Yap (Four Districts), Sam Yap (Three Districts), and Chungshan—and for the few Teochiu and Hokkien speakers present. An association for the Sze Yap, the great majority, early set up a headquarters in Melbourne (1854) and drew up rules designed to ensure peaceable behaviour, regular repayment of passage loans, and avoidance of actions that would offend European settlers and miners.

When reporting all this to Westminster the Governor had in mind the Legislative Council's wonder whether the Act would breach imperial law, and their determination to put Victoria's interests before those of the Empire if it did so. He therefore argued that the Act did not breach the commercial treaty of 1842 between Britain and China as it neither prohibited Chinese from landing nor denied them full liberty and protection; which, he pointed out, was more than the government of China did for British merchants in Canton, Amoy or Shanghai. With this argument officials in Westminster agreed, one of them minuting that the Chinese inflow was formidable enough to necessitate the measure.

In practice the system of Protectors and mining villages worked
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quite well but the Act, as a means of restricting entry, failed dismally. Ship masters and owners simply re-routed their vessels to Twofold Bay and other ports in southern New South Wales, or more often to Guichen Bay (Robe) just over the Victorian border in South Australia; many thousands arrived this way, 15,000 alone from Guichen Bay in the first six months of 1857, and walked for several weeks through the bush to the diggings. The new conservative government under Haines (formed under the Constitution Act of 1856 whereby the Council became the upper House and a new Assembly became a lower House) was moved less by the sufferings of Chinese on the long march, and by Chinese petitions against the Act, than by the anger of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce that South Australian merchants should reap the profits of providing Chinese overlanders with supplies, tools and transport. Late in 1856 they decided to repeal the Act as ineffective.

When the government admitted it had no alternative proposals for control a storm of fury arose which completely drowned all economic arguments for repeal; it also drowned the pleas of Embling (liberal non-conformist) that Anglo-Saxons show leniency to a race weaker than themselves, especially as the Chinese had an equal right to be in Australia and, with any encouragement, would bring out wives and become permanent colonists. Eventually the government was forced to negotiate with South Australia and New South Wales for restricting the overland movement, and to heed proposals for an additional residence tax. Popular feeling was still further aroused by news of fighting between British and Chinese at Canton, and by continued Chinese immigration—some said there were 60,000 in the colony, i.e. half the mining population. (In June 1857 the true total was some 40,000 or one-sixth the adult male population.) Moreover, mining conditions were again difficult and serious clashes occurred, notably that near Ararat when Chinese overlanders discovered the rich ‘Canton lode’ and were forcibly driven away by white miners in May 1857. The Legislative Council therefore rejected the tonnage repeal measure in June. Instead, they decided to follow that strange, passionate anti-Catholic, anti-Celtic, anti-Californian son of an ex-convict, John Pascoe Fawkner, who had worked his way up as farmer, publican and newspaper-owner to become a member of the Legislative
The great white walls are built

Council and Goldfields Commission. While serving on the Commission, Fawkner had become very alarmed at the scale of Chinese immigration; and also impressed by a remark of a Chinese merchant from Canton city that the main body of immigrants, from the Sze Yap, were undesirable 'Tartars' whereas the much smaller number from the Sam Yap, near Canton city, were true Chinamen, much fairer than the Tartars and much less prone to gambling and other vices. The Council at last heeded Fawkner's requests and appointed a Select Committee under his leadership, to investigate the whole matter and frame legislation that 'would effectually prevent the Gold Fields of Australia Felix from becoming the property of the Emperor of China and of the Mongolian and Tartar hordes of Asia'.

Before the Committee had progressed very far news reached Melbourne of a clash between Chinese and Europeans at Daylesford on the 23rd June 1857 and, more important, of the forcible expulsion of 2000 Chinese miners at Buckland River in the Victorian Alps by some 500 white miners. Here the whites, with only two policemen in the area, decided on something very like a Californian Vigilance Committee, met on the symbolic 4 July, declaimed against the 'gross and beastly practices' of the Chinese and of their 'robbing us of our gold fields', and formed an Anti-Chinese Association to move the Chinese 'peaceably' away. A hundred or so fiery and excited men, however, decided on immediate action and marched down the valley burning the Chinese tents and joss-house, maltreating and robbing the fleeing owners, and throwing all the bedding and gear in the river. Police reinforcements quickly restored order and eventually persuaded the Chinese that it was safe to return from hiding in the bush, but local juries acquitted all but four of the white men arrested, on the grounds that the miners' feelings were understandable and that Chinese evidence and Chinese interpreters were notoriously unreliable.

These events, together with further vociferous petitions from the gold-fields, compelled the government to hasten its steps and introduce a Bill 'to regulate the residence of Chinese population' (No. 41 of November 1857). This in effect required that all male Chinese aliens, and sons of same over twelve years of age, resident in Victoria should produce a receipt for their entry tax and pur-
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chase an additional residence licence for £1 every two months. Fawkner's Select Committee, which in November brought in a strong anti-Chinese report somewhat inconsistent with the quite favourable evidence given by most witnesses, thought the Bill would be ineffective through lack of penalties for non-payment; the Committee, though it rejected Fawkner's suggestion that persons of 'the Mongolian breed or family' be forbidden the gold-fields, therefore decided to ask the government to insert clauses subjecting any Chinese found without a licence or receipt to three months penal servitude and putting on anyone accused of being a Chinaman the onus of proving that he was not. The Haines government, however, rejected these suggestions and contented itself with a clause denying a Chinaman without a licence power to take legal action for recovery of land, mining claims, property or damages—so giving Europeans virtual immunity when forcing unlicensed Chinese miners from their claims or when defaulting against unlicensed Chinese merchants.

Nevertheless, the Act remained largely ineffective as only a few hundred Chinese purchased licences. That numbers did not increase as rapidly as before was due partly to South Australia's willingness to pass a restrictive Act in 1857, which effectively stopped immigration through Guichen Bay; some 9000, however, entered in 1858 from New South Wales—where the Council had rejected a restrictive Bill—so raising the Chinese population of Victoria to a peak of 42,000 or so. It was not till early 1859, after the change of government had brought the democrats and Catholics into power under O'Shanassy, that a new Victorian Act (No. 80 of February 1859) was passed consolidating the 1855 and 1857 Acts and imposing heavy fines or imprisonment for non-payment of entry tax and residence licence. By way of a sop O'Shanassy reduced the residence tax, and the entry tax for Chinese coming overland, to £4. Despite Chinese petitions and protests the Act was rigidly enforced; by early 1860 some 4000 Chinese had been fined and 2000 imprisoned for non-payment of fines.

Partly because of this, partly because many had been long enough in Australia to return home with substantial savings, and partly because the expanding New South Wales gold-fields were offering greater and unrestricted opportunities, numbers in Vic-
The great white walls are built

Victoria started to decline. Nearly 10,000 returned to China 1857-9 (some with nearly £100) while another 10,000 or so moved north to New South Wales, leaving some 25,000 in the colony at the census of April 1861: 23,700 in the mining areas, nearly 600 in Melbourne, and the rest scattered through the pastoral areas. The combination of restrictions on numbers entering, plus discriminatory taxation on Chinese residents, was at last taking effect.\textsuperscript{71}

When numbers continued to decline after 1861 public fears declined also. Mercantile and humanitarian pressure for removal of restrictions now had more chance of success and, using arguments of British traditions and the injustice of discrimination, obtained abolition of the residence tax in March 1862 (No. 132), a two-year suspension of the entry tax in June 1863 (No. 270), and final repeal of that and tonnage restriction in May 1865 (No. 259). At this point debates were almost formal, though the old guard of restrictionists, still led by Fawkner and the democrats, unsuccessfully put up all the old arguments when opposing suspension in 1863. It is noteworthy, however, that one discrimination remained: the clause introduced in 1862 as a sop to those opposing repeal of the residence tax, that denied Chinese miners the right to vote for members of local Mining Boards. Having won their objective, removal of restrictions affecting Chinese trade and shipping, mercantile interests were not prepared to fight white miners and their representatives on the much more abstract issue of voting rights for Chinese miners.

4 South Australian restrictions, 1857-61

In abolishing restrictions Victoria was slower than South Australia. That colony had fewer than fifty Chinese in the mid-1850s and was somewhat frightened by the appearance of over 20,000 at Guichen Bay in 1856-7, even though the various parties moved fairly quickly on to the Victorian diggings. The fears of local farmers and pastoralists, aggravated by their 200-mile distance from the colonial capital at Adelaide, were calmed by a special contingent of troops. Some unease remained, however, both there and in Adelaide; which goes far to explain South Australia's willingness to heed Vic-

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Victoria's request for restriction at a time when feeling between the two colonies was exacerbated by friction over the Murray River trade. The Chief Secretary, in moving a Bill virtually identical with the Victorian restrictive Act of 1855, spoke of Chinese arriving in 'such numbers as to affect alarmingly the British and foreign proportions of the population... the irruptions of the Chinese resembled that of the barbarians in the time of the Lower Empire and when their number increased, as it must if their influx was not to be checked, the mastery of the country might be attempted by them'. The Bill passed both Houses with little discussion, except an amendment in the Council applying restrictions to all Chinese and not just male adults, and because law in November 1857 (No. 3 of 19/11/57).

By May 1861 business and humanitarian interests in Adelaide had changed their minds. G. M. Waterhouse, connected with both the Wesleyan Mission and the Moonta copper mines, moved a Repeal Bill in the Legislative Council, arguing that South Australia had been over-precipitately pushed into restriction by the incompetent citizens of Victoria who had been envious of Chinese industry and in desperate need of additional tax revenue; the Chinese were now clearly seen to be sober, industrious and orderly, were not anxious to come in vast numbers, and were being penalised by a law that was contrary to the spirit of the Anglo-Chinese treaties and a plain disgrace to the statute book. Other business and pastoral men in Council supported him, including Ayers and Scott, the liberal-minded J. H. Solomon (favouring, as so many Jewish businessmen have done, liberal treatment of minority groups), and the influential George Fife Angas who had brought numerous German religious refugees to the colony; though he was a little worried lest the Chinese obtain the vote and influence parliamentary proceedings. The only voice in clear opposition was that of Anthony Forster, an ultra-conservative businessman and keen Methodist, who often found occasion to take a non-conformist line and this time singled out Chinese failure to bring out women-folk as reason for maintaining restrictions against them.

The Legislative Assembly was much more divided. Some business and professional men—Milne, Finniss and Blyth—favoured repeal on the grounds that the Chinese were quiet and industrious...
and no worse than other immigrants. Strong opposition to repeal, however, came from that strange, intensely religious sectarian miller, William Magarey, who represented a working class area (West Torrens) and attacked the Chinese for being a crowd of unhygienic, immoral, leprous liars and pilferers who would always remain an unsatisfactory minority, a 'nation within a nation'. He received support from his close friend Santo, and also from McEllister, representing the working class area of Yatala, and from Grundy, representing the small farmers of Barossa and congenitally opposed to the policies of G. F. Angas, the dominant landlord of that area. McEllister described the Chinese as 'filthy, diseased and useless' while Grundy was fearful of being 'overrun by hordes of ugly moon-faced Chinese'.

In the end the Bill was just carried—by the Speaker's casting vote—and by September 1861 South Australia was again without restriction or discrimination.

5 Chinese gold-diggers in New South Wales, 1856-67

Events in New South Wales took a somewhat different course. The elder colony, founded nearly fifty years before Victoria or South Australia, had a longer established population, a more experienced body of administrators and councillors, and—forged in the furnace of campaigns against convicts and autocratic government—a longer tradition of political manoeuvring and public debate. Indeed, some of the New South Wales legislators—Parkes, Cowper, Robertson, Martin, W. Forster—were powerful speakers and fine minds, capable of arguing the Chinese question with considerable subtlety and clear appeal to basic principles of racial equality or national homogeneity. Hence restrictive measures in New South Wales, whether in fact inspired by materialist motives or not, gave much less appearance of hasty ad hoc legislation than of policy decisions reached by deliberate and considered appeal to basic principles. Moreover, some men—as instance Deas Thomson, the Colonial Secretary—had been grappling with the problem of Asian immigration since the 1836 proposals to import Indian labourers, and could see matters in a longer and cooler perspective. Finally,
Chinese immigration was slower and less intense in New South Wales; whereas in Victoria the Chinese population grew from a few hundred in 1853 to some 42,000 in 1858, about 15 per cent of the male population, in New South Wales it increased from just under 2000 (mainly coolies) in 1856 to a maximum of 15,000 or so in 1862, about 7 per cent of the male population.

Against this air of calm deliberation stood an element of uncertainty arising, first, from the somewhat rapid succession of governments (at this time based on 'factions' rather than parties) and, second, from the opposition of many older members of the Legislative Council to measures initiated by the new 'democratic', and therefore 'dangerous and unreliable', Legislative Assembly. The exact relationship between Council and Assembly goes far to explain the fate of anti-Chinese legislation at any given moment.

The first move against Chinese miners came when there were still more Chinese coolies than miners, and before the creation of the Assembly. W. C. Wentworth, continuing his role as staunch British patriot on the one hand and leading member of the labour-hungry squattocracy on the other, introduced to the Council two amendments to the Gold Fields Management Bill in 1852. The second, proposing that miners' licences be withheld from Chinese until they proved themselves properly discharged from contract with their original employer, was lost; other Councillors felt this would simply encourage pastoralists to introduce yet more contract Chinese and these could all abscond without difficulty to the Victorian diggings. The second, introduced via the Select Committee, proposed that New South Wales adopt the 1850 Californian practice of discriminating against all alien miners, in this case by charging a double licence fee; this was passed, over the heads of those crying ‘injustice’ and ‘unworthy’, on the grounds that California had successfully used the device to slow down the intake of undesirable aliens (including former-convict Australians) and that numbers of aliens (including Californians with revolvers, bowie knives and mob rule) had already proved a nuisance in Victoria and should be discouraged from entering New South Wales.

For some time things remained quiet, mainly because Chinese miners preferred the richer fields of Victoria; by the census of March 1856 there were fewer than 700 scattered through the gold
areas, mainly in the western and northern districts. In mid-1856 another 596 arrived by sea, nearly half moving north to the Rocky River field near Armidale. White miners there reacted quickly. In early September a turbulent band led by 'Captain x', a notorious trouble-maker recently arrived from Victoria, took advantage of the presence of only two troopers to attack a group of Chinese, wounding a few so severely that they later died. With order restored, and only 327 more Chinese arriving by sea, matters quietened down until late in 1857 when Cantonese refugees from Buckland River came north to the newly discovered, and scantily policed, Adelong fields in southern New South Wales. They were 'very unceremoniously and expeditiously driven off by the diggers, who eschew the Tartar company' but the two Chinese already there were left alone, although reputed to have the richest claims. Apparently the 300 white miners objected not to the few established Chinese but to the considerable influx of Victorian Chinese into their own improperly explored and controlled area.

Meanwhile unrest continued at Rocky River and this, together with the Adelong troubles and Victoria's request for supplementary New South Wales legislation, led R. T. Jamison, a pastoralist with properties near Rocky River, to move in the new Legislative Assembly a Bill modelled on the Victorian Act of 1855. It received some support from a few professional men and pastoralists but was withdrawn when Jamison realised that influential members such as Robert Campbell felt numbers were insufficient to warrant such measures, and that humanitarian persons such as W. Forster felt the Bill was not only quite unjust but arose from greatly exaggerated stories of Chinese vice and crime.

In 1858 Chinese immigration sharply increased, and though most moved overland to Victoria (about 9000 out of 12,000) those remaining were enough to cause considerable outcry. White miners in the western field of Tambaroora, raising indignant voices against the 'leprous Tartars' wasting scarce water, stealing moveable gear and encroaching on their claims, in March 1858 drove the 'Celestials' back to the main camps; they were there stopped by the Sub-Commissioner for the Gold Fields who, with a few troopers, 'came forward like a lion crying he would stand to be shot before he would allow a Chinaman to be touched.'
The recently established government, under the liberal coalition of Cowper and Robertson, thereupon introduced another Bill modelled on the Victorian Act but with an extra clause, apparently based on Californian practice and the petitions of several miners, denying Chinese the right of naturalisation. This time the Bill received support from the radical Deniehy, from Henry Parkes and his paper *The Empire*, and from various pastoral, professional and business members now impressed with the rapid increase of immigrants from 'that swarming hive of the human race' (E. C. Weekes) and with the story that Chinese in Sarawak had 'massacred all before them' (G. MacLeay). Opposition came only from a few pastoralists appreciative of the Chinese as shepherds and servants (Hay, Hodgson, Lee, Suttor) and from W. Forster, still arguing that the Chinese were not arriving in overwhelming numbers but were an industrious and civilised people who could go 'hand in hand' with the Anglo-Saxons in developing the colony.82

Despite continued agitation in the gold-fields,83 and demands for restriction by meetings of Sydney labourers and artisans,84 and despite the nervousness of some members about growth of numbers and the ill effects of intermarriage, a majority of the Legislative Council decided to postpone the Assembly's Bill until a Select Committee of their own had investigated the matter further. Doubtless they were partly moved by hostility to the Assembly, especially the latter's attempt to introduce an elected Council, but there was a definite feeling amongst some professional members that stories of Chinese vice and crime were greatly exaggerated (Dr Dickson) and that the Bill transgressed natural law and British practice (Wise, Thompson).85

The Committee, having taken evidence on numbers arriving, on the peaceful and law-abiding behaviour of the Chinese (and on the initiation of violence by white miners), and on disease and overcrowding of immigrant ships, recommended compulsory vaccination, stricter control over ship hygiene, regulations for the control of Chinese in the gold areas on the lines of those prevailing in Victoria, and a modified Bill which would lighten penalties against vessels illegally landing Chinese and restore Chinese eligibility for naturalisation; which means they did not advocate abolishing the clauses imposing a tonnage restriction and landing tax.86
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The government, however, decided against the Committee’s alterations and forced their original Bill to the vote. The Council majority, somewhat piqued at this and well aware of the Committee’s evidence, decided that the Chinese were as yet harmless and that it was ‘inexpedient, impolitic and inhuman’ to impose discriminatory taxes on anyone. They rejected the unmodified Bill, and hence the whole proposal for restriction.87

As a consequence Chinese continued to enter the Colony, 3022 by sea in 1859 and another 6958 in 1860, together with another 10,000 or so overland from Victoria following the penal legislation there of 1859, giving a total of some 17,500 immigrants since the census count of 1800 early in 1856. As in California and Victoria, however, several hundred returned to China each year (over 1000 in 1860) leaving a recorded total of 12,988 at the census of March 1861.

As in other mining areas, some Chinese were Hakka, Hokkien or Teochiu speakers, but the great majority were Cantonese.88 Unlike Victoria, however, there were relatively fewer Cantonese from the Four Districts (Sze Yap) and relatively more from Chungshan and Kao Yao ( Gow Yow) districts. But they behaved in much the same way, some arriving under their own resources but most in groups led by an agent appointed by the financier advancing the passage money.89 Once in Australia they either stayed in these immigrant groups or else joined persons of the same lineage or district and, where leadership was unclear, themselves chose a headman or spokesman. As the New South Wales gold-fields were much more widespread than the Victorian (600 miles by 150 compared with 250 miles by 120), and as the Chinese population was less than half that of Victoria, district or other societies developed more slowly; though the Sydney lodging houses catering for new arrivals, for those ‘in town’ from the gold-fields, or for those carpenters, shoemakers and tailors working for Sydney merchants and retailers, acted as small social centres or rudimentary societies with similar functions to those in Victoria.

The great majority of Chinese, however, were out in the country: at the 1861 census 169 were recorded in Sydney, 626 in pastoral and farming areas (about 150 being in small country towns) and 12,191 in mining districts. The latter were very mobile, moving
from field to field, or prospecting new country, with great rapidity.90 They travelled in gangs of 20-200, carrying their gear on bamboo poles slung over the shoulder, neither walking nor running but moving with a short trot timed to the swing of the load, their loose shoes slapping against the soles of their feet or dragging along the ground with a harsh grating noise that provided a continuous accompaniment to their high sing-song voices. For clothing they wore full coloured trousers, loose jackets, pig-tails and large umbrella-like rattan hats sometimes six feet wide; even when adopting Australian dress—digger’s hat and jacket, moleskin trousers and heavy boots—their trot came down to ‘slow dragging pace’ that, with their oriental features and pig-tails, still distinguished them clearly from the European population.91

Thus distinguished in appearance and language they were also distinguished in mode of settling and mining. When on a gold-field they pitched tents, stacked with strange looking cooking utensils on the outside and coloured prints on the inside, in orderly ‘villages’ well apart from the Europeans; larger villages contained their own Chinese stores, butcheries, restaurants and occasionally banks, often displaying posters carrying Chinese characters in bright red and black. On the whole their mining was co-operative on a larger scale than European mining—the large group as distinct from small groups of diggers and ‘mates’. In particular they worked together to dig long channels across the flats, or around the sides of hills, to bring water for washing out the gold.92

Though to Europeans the Chinese seemed similar in appearance and behaviour, differences and hostility between the various speech, district and lineage groups sometimes became obvious; as in court proceedings when an interpreter speaking Cantonese could not help with Hokkien or Teochiu,93 or in occasional pistol and knife fights, such as those between Cantonese coming north from Sydney and Victoria to Rocky River gold-field and some Hokkien speakers moving there, probably former coolies from Amoy coming to Rocky River from the nearby pastoral runs of northern New South Wales and southern Queensland.94

Hygiene and health also forced themselves on European notice. Three cases of leprosy were reported on the western gold-field of Turon in mid-1858,95 and many others rumoured elsewhere.96 Like-
wise complaints of Chinese wasting scarce mining water were reinforced with furious assertions that Chinese were filling up dry water-holes and channels with refuse, so increasing health hazards and threatening future drinking and washing supplies.97

These differences and frictions, allied with racial prejudice and steady increase of numbers, inevitably produced further acts of hostility and discrimination, and further moves for restriction. In May 1860 John Lucas, a carpenter-builder of Sydney who had spent some time prospecting and mining and had identified himself with those white miners hostile to the Chinese, introduced to the Assembly a restrictive Bill similar to that of 1858; delayed by procedural difficulties he had by October got no further than getting the Assembly to agree that a Bill was desirable. Meanwhile numerous miners, including a few rogues and trouble-makers, disappointed with the promising Kiandra field opened late in 1859, were moving 200 miles north to the newly discovered fields at Burrangong near Young, notably that of Lambing Flat. By September 1860 Chinese were entering the area in numbers but, as at Tambaroora and Adelong, were soon driven away (500 in late November) by white diggers annoyed at the delays to Lucas's Bill and willing to take advantage of the fact that the area had not yet been proclaimed a gold-field or received a resident Commissioner and troops. A few Chinese then returned, only to be driven away again (December 12th), this time with more cruelty and forcible removal of pig-tails. Again the Chinese returned, this time after the arrival of a Commissioner, but again were driven off (1500 on January 27th) when the unruly element realised the Commissioner had insufficient forces to intervene. After further unrest, and the creation of a noisy and active Miners' Protection League, adequate police reinforcements arrived; also present, 5-9 March, was the colonial Premier, Charles Cowper, who promised to introduce adequate controls, but only when order was restored and legitimate Chinese claims recognised.

Meanwhile Lucas had been pushing his Bill again, finally initiating a second reading during Cowper's absence in March and carrying it successfully through the Assembly in April, after Cowper's return.98 Cowper then introduced his own attempt to control disturbances—the Gold Fields Management Amendment
Bill—empowering the Executive to restrict alien miners, under penalty of heavy fine, to certain gold-fields specified by proclamation; this to keep Chinese, Germans, Americans and other alien miners felt to be the active or passive cause of mining unrest away from gold-fields where their presence might cause trouble. (Cowper himself was as concerned with the Germans, 'notorious' as leaders in disturbances at Ballarat and Burrangong, as with the Chinese.89) The debates on these Bills, and the later one in October, give a very good picture of responsible colonial thinking at the time.

Almost unanimous in their opposition to the Chinese were persons of mining, artisan and small business background, in a sense representing the mining and working classes.1 They claimed that the Chinese influx was a 'deep-laid' scheme of pastoralists and others to grow rich at the 'expense of the industry of the working-classes',2 and virtually demanded complete prohibition against further entry on the grounds that the Chinese were 'cruel' and 'dishonest', were guilty of 'secret societies' and 'atrocities', spread leprosy and other diseases, and were of a 'different color' and of 'most immoral, filthy and treacherous habits'.4 The main exception was Charles Kemp, former carpenter and builder, who had been working his way up as a publican, landowner, newspaper proprietor and company director and argued, in the Council, that though the Chinese were not altogether desirable as immigrants they showed no more vice and barbarity than would Europeans in similar circumstances; the campaign against them was purely a 'labor cry' and quite hypocritical.5

Somewhat more subtle were the views of Henry Parkes, still feeling his labouring and Chartist origins but now a prominent publicist and politician. He did not heatedly attack the Chinese character or habits but regarded them as a 'sober, steady industrious, and powerful people', the most populous in the world, who 'cherished fondly the belief that eventually this country would be theirs'; they constituted a large alien element in a small young colony and, if permitted further entry, would inevitably produce 'future discord, anarchy and civil war', or at least a separate slave class; here he opposed Cowper's attempt to segregate the Chinese into separate gold-fields lest this develop a permanently separated alien group.9 In marked contrast were the views of William Pid-
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dington, a bookseller, who strongly attacked the Bills on the grounds that Chinese made good colonists and that their opponents were highly prejudiced and hypocritical.7

Those in the professional and official world were divided. Some, mainly Councillors suspicious of a hostile Assembly, attacked the Lucas Bill for bad drafting and overhasty exaggeration of the Chinese danger.8 Others, the experienced Deas Thomson for instance, opposed restriction on immigration but favoured Cowper’s proposals to separate Chinese from unruly Europeans in the gold-fields.9 Yet others, mainly in the Assembly, favoured restriction either on grounds of Chinese filth and immorality or of the Chinese undermining the British character of the colony.10 William Redman, a solicitor representing Queanbeyan, though favouring restriction on further immigration, strongly attacked all moves to discriminate against Chinese already in the colony, that is Lucas’s discriminatory licence fees and Cowper’s move to keep Chinese off selected gold-fields; this last a reward for ‘incipient rebellion’.11

The larger pastoral, commercial and industrial men were even more divided. Charles Cowper and John Robertson, prominent pastoralists, leaders in the earlier campaigns on transportation and responsible government, and now heading a government heavily involved in land reform, both strongly favoured strict controls: Robertson was worried about political dangers, the nearness of China and its vast population; Cowper, especially after his trip to the gold-fields, was more concerned with reducing local unrest and avoiding that ‘war’ that seemed natural when Europeans and Chinese came together.12 Here they were supported by colleagues in both Assembly and Council, all arguing quietly and moderately for restrictions;13 except for W. Russell, who spoke strongly in the Council about the dangers of Chinese vice, disease and dirtiness, and deplored the possibility of a ‘mongrel’ population arising from the immigration of an inferior people.14

Other pastoralists and business men opposed restriction, some on the grounds of economic expediency—that the Chinese were sober and industrious and made good servants, miners, station-hands or fishermen.15 Others attacked restriction on grounds of principle, Morris and O’Brien asserting that the Chinese were not
immoral and vicious but honest and peaceful, and that the cam­
paigns against them arose entirely from the class prejudice of labourers and miners and the disorderly behaviour of unruly ne'er-
do-wells. Hay, Dickson and Rotton went further, arguing that the restrictions were a denial of natural justice, unworthy of any civilised people and involved unfair retrospective measures against Chinese already admitted. William Forster was momentarily silent.18

In early May the balance of forces was such that while the substantive parts of Cowper’s Bill were accepted by both Houses the Lucas Restrictive Entry Bill was rejected outright by the Coun­cil.17 Further troubles at once broke out in the gold-fields, a serious clash taking place at Native Dog Creek on 22 May. This, with other events drawing police elsewhere, reduced the force at Lambing Flat from 300 to twenty, leaving the Commissioners there power­less to deal with major outbreaks on 30 June and 14 July, when mobs of up to 3000 miners, stirred up by the leaders of the Miners Protection League, drove the Chinese into the bush, burnt their tents and shops, destroyed their tools, stores and equipment and, after the small police force had arrested a few ringleaders, attacked the police so determinedly that the latter withdrew over 30 miles to Yass. It was not till 31 July, when a considerable detachment of troops, sailors and artillery reached the Flat, that police authority was restored, Chinese reinstated and culprits arrested; only one of these was eventually convicted.18

In other gold-fields and in Sydney these disturbances had pro­found effects. The Empire and other radical papers supported the miners, as did numerous labourers, artisans and others who organised demonstrations and submitted petitions to Parliament. (These completely outweighed counter-petitions by Chinese for damages and protection, though the government eventually appointed W. Campbell to investigate claims and, on his report in May 1862, paid £4000 damages to nearly 400 approved claimants.18) On 18 September Cowper introduced the Chinese Immigrants Regulation and Restriction Act (No. 3 of 22/11/61) which closely followed the Victorian Act in controlling adult male Chinese by restricting landing to one for every ten tons ship burthen, requiring a £10 fee for entry by sea or land, and levying an annual resi-
The Assembly dealt quickly with the Bill, those formerly in opposition now admitting the need for controls since the popular voice had spoken so clearly (Dickson, Morris), or keeping quiet (O'Brien, Rotton, Suttor), or expressing dissatisfaction by pointing out technical flaws and prophesying failure in practice (Allen, Forster, Hay, Piddington); in addition Hay and Redman repeated their dislike of discrimination against Chinese legitimately resident in New South Wales, even if restrictions were placed on further entry. After further attacks by the press on this last group the Bill was passed, September 25th, with only three votes against and several abstentions. In Council the opposition fought harder, especially the lawyers Darvall and Manning and the former carpenter Kemp. The last two were particularly hostile to the clause denying naturalisation, on the grounds that it was 'contrary to the comity of nations' and involved treating the Chinese as an inferior race.20 Darvall fought the whole basis of the Bill, challenging stories of Chinese vice and uselessness, denying that numbers were large enough to be dangerous, and pointing out that both South Australia and Victoria were repealing or modifying their restrictive laws. Others, while still dissatisfied, decided to accept the arguments of government and feelings of public: The Bill was passed, October 23rd 1861, without a division.

The most interesting opinions on this occasion were Forster's. When attacked by the press for opposing the Bill he made a long, somewhat ironic, speech defending his stand, and incidentally revealing his great erudition and wide literary, historical and philosophical interests, including, it seems, an acquaintance with Darwin's recently published *Origin of Species.*21 He did not, he told the Assembly, regard the Chinese as equal to the Anglo-Saxons, the latter being morally superior to all others, 'the very highest development, both physically and intellectually, of which manhood is capable'. It was the Anglo-Saxon duty to 'spread itself over the globe' and 'disseminate that civilization', spreading themselves 'amongst the barbarous nations of the earth and gradually blotting them out' as modern plants blot out older, less progressive plants. 'It is a law that wherever our race comes in contact with
an "inferior" the latter must necessarily be exterminated.' Therefore Anglo-Saxons in Australia need have no fear of being overwhelmed by Chinese immigrants but should welcome their labour in developing the colony. There was certainly no danger of amalgamation as 'there is no chemical affinity between the two races'; only a few degraded white women would ever co-habit with Chinese men. But this natural law of extermination imposed a duty on the superior race: to treat Chinese settlers with Christian consideration and kindness while they were in course of disappearance. If the Anglo-Saxons, driven by momentary impulse, perpetrated 'an act of national injustice' they would 'bring down a certain retribution on their heads and on the heads of their children'; not manifest, perhaps, but in the habits and manners of the people. Demoralization would then proceed not from the Chinese but from the Anglo-Saxons themselves. Hence his opposition both to restriction on immigration and unjust discrimination against Chinese residents.

The Colonial Office in Westminster took a somewhat different view. While feeling that anti-Chinese legislation was 'highly objectionable in principle' and most inopportune in practice (in view of the recent Convention of Peking, 1860, guaranteeing reciprocity of rights for subjects of the British and Chinese Empire), Her Majesty's government could not 'shut their eyes to the exceptional nature of Chinese immigration and the vast moral evil which accompanies it': entire absence of women, the peculiar vices so arising, paganism, and idolatrous habits. Could not the colony encourage the immigration of Chinese women? In the circumstances, however, it was better to 'prevent the arrival of the immigrants than to discourage or harass them after they are arrived'; here denial of naturalisation was 'unnecessary and impolitic' and should be reconsidered. Notwithstanding this Westminster would not disallow the Act.

The provisions of the Act were soon felt, Chinese merchants in Sydney quickly informing contacts in Canton and Hongkong and reducing their own requests for immigrants. Arrivals by sea fell from 2574 in 1861 to 1030 in 1862 and thence to an average of 140 a year 1863-70. Departures, however, remained higher, averaging 1090 a year in 1861-2 and 730 a year in 1863-70. By 1871 the census count was 7220, compared with the nearly 13,000 of 1861.
Moreover, those remaining concentrated less on mining: some stayed near the gold-fields as vegetable gardeners, supplying both diggings and country towns, usually working their gardens in partnership with relatives or friends from the same district; a few moved to Lake Macquarie as successful fishermen; others, notably those who had started Chinese stores on the gold-fields, opened up general retail stores in various country towns; yet others scattered as domestic servants and cooks over the pastoral and farming areas, or stayed with their local groups and headman, moving about clearing the bush for new pastoral properties.

These last, together with occasional gangs acting as rural freight trains, were the nearest the Cantonese came to the great Chinese labour gangs engaged by American railway companies (Australian rail development, only 120 miles laid by 1872, was much slower than in the United States and stayed mainly in the hands of colonial governments who did not readily risk political trouble by employing conspicuous gangs of the low-wage Chinese.) In 1871 there were 5765 Chinese in the gold-fields, 590 in pastoral and farming areas, 529 in the larger country towns, and 336 in Sydney and its suburbs, 7220 in all.

In sum, as the Cantonese population of New South Wales decreased it became more widespread and less conspicuous. With this, anti-Chinese feeling became less vocal and the terms 'Mongolian' and 'Tartar' dropped out of newspaper reporting; interracial conflict declined, though on two occasions—at Napoleon’s Reef near Bathurst in March 1866 and at American Yard diggings near Gundagai in June 1868—Cantonese miners successfully resisted white efforts to drive them away. Moreover, their value to the colony became clearer, as witness the petition of certain bankers, merchants, storekeepers and tradesmen of the cities of Young and Sydney in December 1868, asking the government to facilitate the return of the Chinese to the almost deserted Burrangong gold-fields and revitalise the area’s stagnant life.

In this less heated atmosphere the opponents of anti-Chinese legislation set to work for repeal. They enlisted the support of the ardent Presbyterian missionary, social reformer and public speaker, John Dunmore Lang, who agreed to present a petition to the Assembly in March 1866 and a Bill repealing the Restriction
Act in August. When this just failed (eleven votes to eighteen) Lang tried again next year, carrying the Repeal Act (No. 30 of 1867) with eleven votes in opposition in the Assembly and one in the Council. Moreover the Martin-Parkes government, when introducing a new Gold Fields Bill late in 1866, removed all clauses discriminating against alien gold-miners (No. 8 of 1866).

There is no need to review in detail the arguments on these Bills: they were almost identical with those put forward in 1858 and early 1861, before the great popular outcry and pressure of mid 1861. ‘Working class’ representatives again expressed strong hostility to the ‘moral contagion’ and ‘degradation’ inevitable from the entry of a leprous, obnoxious and inferior race brought out to be slaves. Against them were Forster and Piddington, still strongly objecting to laws that singled out the Chinese for special discrimination, now reinforced by Forlonger, a liberal pastoralist from Victoria who had opposed restrictions there, and by J. D. Lang; the last asserted that he, like others, had voted for the 1861 restrictions when fearful of a great influx of Chinese similar to those who had committed atrocities in the Philippines, but that he had since met many quiet peaceful Cantonese settlers and had himself married to Chinese a number of British girls who told him later they had better and more considerate husbands than many of their friends with European husbands.

The main swing in opinion came from Parkes, now heading the government with Martin; he at first opposed repeal, with even more stress on the importance of keeping New South Wales a British colony with a British character, but later relented on the grounds the government could always reimpose restrictions if numbers increased. Robertson, carrying with him a number of pastoralists and business men, also changed his mind, admitting that numbers had not increased as he had feared and that the other colonies, all without restrictions, had not experienced any marked increase in immigration. One important question, not followed up at the time, came from R. Stewart when asking repealers why they were so sympathetic to the Chinese but so unsympathetic to, or uninterested in, the Australian Aborigines; the question remained virtually unanswered until after World War II.
Chapter 4

1 Queensland, Tasmania, Western Australia, 1859-67

By late 1867, then, New South Wales had joined Victoria and South Australia in removing all discriminatory and restrictive laws against Chinese immigrants. Tasmania and Western Australia did not at this time ever start the process; numbers were small and, though occasional references were made to the undesirability of Chinese immigration, nothing definite occurred.

Queensland was somewhat different. Constituting the northern districts of New South Wales until separation in June 1859, inhabitants of the Moreton Bay, Ipswich, Darling Downs and Maryborough districts had been as much aware of the Chinese problem as persons in other outlying parts of New South Wales; more so, in fact, as Chinese coolies had been in these areas since Robert Towns and others had introduced them in 1849 (see chapter 2, section 2 above). Awareness sharpened considerably when residents of these districts were drawn into the Rocky River, Hanging Rock and other nearby gold-fields in the early 1850s and into the anti-Chinese disturbances breaking out there in 1856. Others tried their luck further south, in the gold-fields of Victoria and southern New South Wales, so becoming involved in the Chinese problem before settling in Queensland in the late 1850s. Moreover, representatives of these districts sat in the New South Wales Legislative Assembly and Council before separation and were involved in the debates on the Jamison and Cowper Bills of 1857-8; as instance Arthur Hodgson, a squatter representing the Darling Downs and later Premier of Queensland, who strongly opposed Cowper's Bill as it discriminated against a people he had found efficient and orderly as pastoral labourers. Though urban elements were relatively weaker in these northern districts than in New South
The first confrontation, 1836-71

Wales proper, it is not surprising to hear of anti-Chinese feeling in Brisbane and Ipswich in the late 1850s. After separation such feelings dwindled somewhat, partly because the new colony had no gold-fields in production. They revived again in 1861-2 when the new colonial government issued regulations, and later a statute, enabling pastoralists and intending cotton planters to import coolie labour (see pp 3/26 chap. 7, section 1 below). Then, in the middle of these arguments about coolies, the local Courier announced that the Lord Lyndhurst had arrived in Morton Bay on 8 June 1862 from Hongkong with 260 Chinese immigrants, that 'the disgusting filth are to be shot out at Raff's Wharf, there to permeate through the length and breadth of Queensland', and that a public meeting was to be held forthwith to 'avert this calamity'.

Some thousand persons attended the meeting, chaired by R. S. Warry, member of the Legislative Assembly for East Moreton. After remarks about the 'refuse' of the Chinese empire (Warry), the evils of the wholesale introduction of a degraded alien race for purposes of cheap labour (Brookes), and the futility of trying to 'form a new nation' if some people wished 'on the foundations of the superstructure to throw a cartload of rubbish' (Spence), the meeting drew up a petition that Parliament prevent the immigration.

In the Assembly Robert Herbert, who had arrived two years before as secretary to Governor Bowen and had become Colonial Secretary at the age of twenty-nine, argued that these Chinese were not coolies, but 'men of good position in their own country' who had paid their own passages and were only passing through Queensland on their way to the New South Wales gold-fields. Some then asserted that Queensland should support the restrictive policies of other colonies (O'Sullivan, Challinor) but were outspoken by those denying Queensland should 'consult the interests of New South Wales', by those anxious that local traders should sell Chinese overlanders provisions on their way south (Taylor), and by liberal-minded persons arguing that restriction was against the 'spirit of our laws' (Jones). Similar arguments appeared a few days later when four members from the Brisbane-Ipswich area (Blakeney, Challinor, Edmonstone, O'Sullivan) moved a resolution for a tax on all Chinese arrivals. After hearing Herbert say that he had written to New
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South Wales about it but that that colony thought the matter of too little consequence to reply, other members voted firmly against it.6 As no further ship-loads arrived this ended all attempts in Queensland at this time to impose restrictions on Chinese immigration.

Though Queenslanders rejected proposals for restricting entry they did not reject a proposal for discrimination. Early in the first Parliament Charles Lilley, later a leading politician and educationist, asked the new government to make naturalisation rapid and easy so that Germans attracted to Queensland by offers of free land could obtain title quickly instead of being held up by regulations restricting alien ownership of real property. The government, anxious to promote large-scale immigration, and closer settlement of Queensland's huge empty areas, readily supported most of Lilley's Aliens Bill of May 1861, but 'doubted the propriety of extending the same privileges to orientals such as Chinese or Malay immigrants'.7 Here Herbert and Bowen were not thinking that non-Europeans could never be worthy of full citizenship as did New South Wales legislators in 1858 and 1861, but that citizenship should be confined to permanent settlers; also they knew of Westminster's dislike of Indian and Chinese labourers being encouraged to emigrate with insufficient numbers of women. In Committee, therefore, Lilley agreed to insert a clause (4) preventing the naturalisation of any Asiatic or African alien unless he had resided for three years in the colony and had his wife resident with him. This curious clause, discriminating against unmarried Asians or those with wives in Asia, was retained in the consolidating legislation of 1867 and remained on the statute book until 1965. Otherwise Queensland took no action to discriminate against Asian settlers.

2 Cantonese gold-diggers in New Zealand, 1857-71

Events in New Zealand took a somewhat different course from those in eastern Australia and California. Though rewards for gold discoveries were offered as early as 1852, resulting in a few minor finds, the first significant discovery was in 1857 in the rough country near Nelson, in the north-west of South Island; this
The first confrontation, 1836-71

attracted a few hundred diggers early in the year and led the central government to pass the Goldfields Act (1858), based largely on Victoria’s law and with provisions for gold-fields commissioners and police.8

In mid-1857 a rumour that some Victorian Chinese were on the way aroused an immediate reaction from townsfolk and miners, some of whom had recently arrived from Victoria and were still receiving Victorian newspapers with anti-Chinese articles. With much talk of ‘Mongolian filth’ and of the ‘many abominations’ practised by the Chinese, a Vigilantes Committee was formed in August to prevent the Chinese landing; as one member said, they had no intention of abiding by English law with all its ‘crooked and crabbed technicalities’ and would consider law and order only after the ‘pestilent cloud of infamy and abomination had ceased to hang over our horizon’.9 In the event not a single Chinese arrived and unrest gradually disappeared. The incident is important in being one of the first recorded cases when anti-Asian agitation sprang up, simply from fear and suspicion of what might be, and without a single Chinese present.

The first large New Zealand gold-rush occurred further south, in Otago Province, when a reward offered by the provincial Council tempted Gabriel Read, a Tasmanian settler with experience in California and Victoria, to cross the Tasman Sea and make major finds in the Tuapeka district, May 1861. By August the town of Dunedin had lost most of its male population, by October 2000 miners a week were arriving from Victoria, and by mid-1862 the gold-fields administrative machinery was in operation, the police being organised by a commissioner imported from Victoria. Immigration thereafter fluctuated with new finds, cold winters and disappointing claims; but by mid-1863 the gold-fields population totalled some 24,000, about half from Victoria, and the provincial government felt able to borrow money for roads and other public works. Yields then declined, just as new finds were being made on the West Coast areas of Canterbury Province; 7000 miners left Otago in 1864 and more in 1865.10

In these somewhat gloomy conditions the Otago Provincial Council had trouble repaying loans and was forced to retrench; moreover many councillors were members of the Dunedin Cham-
ber of Commerce and found themselves suffering from sudden decline in business activity. In 1865, therefore, both Council and Chamber decided to examine the possibility of sponsoring an immigration of Victorian Chinese gold-diggers and invited a Victorian merchant—Ho Ah Mee—to Dunedin in October to investigate the situation, particularly the effectiveness of the gold-fields administration in maintaining law and order. Satisfied here, despite protest meetings at Tuapeka and Mt Ida fields, he returned to Melbourne to send an advance party of twelve in February 1866. By late 1867 there were 1270 Chinese, predominantly Cantonese, scattered through the Otago fields and, by late 1869, over 2000.11

As in California and Australia, the Cantonese preferred to work and live in their own gangs and villages, often on diggings abandoned by Europeans; which tended to reduce friction except when the Europeans, discovering that ‘bonanzas’ elsewhere were short-lived or exaggerated, wanted to return to their holdings. Partly because the rough broken terrain made it difficult to muster large gatherings at short notice as had been possible at Buckland River and Lambing Flat, but largely because of effective gold-fields administration, there were few outbreaks of open conflict. There were certainly no large-scale expulsions or clashes with police, such as to make the provincial government at Dunedin, now benefiting from increased economic activity, or the central parliament at Wellington—at this time little more than meetings of provincial notables anxious to leave matters to the provinces wherever possible—feel they need take notice of sporadic demands for restriction.

Nor was there much trouble elsewhere. Few Chinese at this time went to the West Coast fields. One group landing there, at Hokitika in February 1867, unexpectedly and innocently provoked a sudden demonstration on the wharf, a number of meetings asserting that ‘when Chinamen come into a country it is time for white men to leave it’, and memorials to the Canterbury government against the ‘pernicious and injurious results arising from the influx of a Chinese population’, notably their ‘proverbial thieving propensities and well-known depravity’.12 This party, as it happened, were en route for Otago and, as few others even appeared (only 200 or so by 1871), hostility gradually died away.

In Otago the situation became less easy with the economic
recession of 1869-70, and less easy still in 1871 when Chinese immigration suddenly increased—over 1000 arriving in July—and the total Chinese population of the Otago-Southland fields reached nearly 4000. Unrest amongst European miners increased, with cries of Chinese immorality and disease and a speech by the President of the Arrowtown Miners Association saying: 'we are free men—they are slaves: we are christians—they are heathens; we are Britons—they are Mongolians'. At the same time there was much agitation in Dunedin and Invercargill—in which many unemployed participated—and several meetings of protest in July and August.

Despite this agitation the Provincial Council, controlled by business men and others either well satisfied with the Chinese economic contribution or opposed to discrimination on principle, refused to consider discriminatory or restrictive measures; in fact, when C. E. Haughton, the miners representative, moved that the introduction of Chinese was detrimental and should be restricted, his opponents light-heartedly moved that the introduction of lawyers and Scotsmen (Otago was a Scottish-Presbyterian colony) was very detrimental to the colony and should be reduced. Haughton thereupon raised the question in the central parliament in Wellington in August, asking the government if it intended to take action on the continued Chinese influx to Otago. Sir William Fox, a merchant-barrister from Nelson, now leading the central government, replied that although he had read bits about it in newspapers he had heard nothing official from Otago and could therefore do nothing. Haughton then asked the House of Representatives to refer the matter to the Goldfields Committee, but later agreed to a Select Committee, on the grounds that the Goldfields Committee had a very full program and might be biased as it consisted largely of gold-fields interests.

The Select Committee contained two miners' representatives, Haughton and T. E. Shephard, but the other eleven were either Otago business men (MacAndrew and Thomson), professional men determined on an impartial inquiry (Fox, Fitzherbert), or persons from provinces with no Chinese problem of their own. The Committee made careful inquiries, contacting commissioners, police and others in the fields, receiving petitions from the miners, and interviewing certain merchants and officials, including one Chinese. The
majority decided unequivocally that the Chinese were industrious, thrifty and orderly, were well adapted for mining, domestic, mechanical and agricultural work, were not dangerous in terms of disease, morals and security, were unlikely to stay in numbers, and, as they mined poor ground unlikely to pay a European, were not depriving European miners of a livelihood. The House accepted their recommendation that no action be taken.17

As numbers did not, in fact, increase much beyond 4800 (1871), and as many Chinese either returned to China or moved to market gardening and laundries, miner hostility in Otago gradually dwindled away. Indeed, during the 1870s, both there and on the west coast, there are instances of Europeans accepting Chinese invitations to New Year celebrations or of aiding Chinese in distress.18

In sum, though New Zealand miners often resented the Chinese presence, and sometimes agitated against it, they did not break out in conspicuous breaches of law and order, or mount political campaigns sufficient to move the provincial and central governments to action. In contrast to California, Victoria and New South Wales, New Zealand handled its Chinese digger problem with dignity and restraint, and without any legislation restricting entry or discriminating against those already resident.

3 Cantonese gold-diggers in British Columbia, 1858-71

With British Columbia we revert to the North American situation, though here again many had been in Australia before coming to the Rockies.19 How many of these were Chinese is unknown, though it is clear that by 1860, not long after Californian Chinese began to move north to the Fraser River gold-fields, other Chinese were landing at Port Victoria on Vancouver Island from trans-Pacific ships, many direct from China but some apparently from Australia. By 1863 there were some 2500 Chinese, predominantly Cantonese, distributed through British Columbia, most mining in the Cariboo and other districts on or near the upper Fraser but others running eating houses, laundries and shops in the townships, and a few building up large commercial businesses on Vancouver Island.20
By 1871 they totalled about 3000, making up nearly 20 per cent of the total non-Indian population.21

As in California first reactions were mixed. A correspondent, apparently reflecting commercial opinion in the colony, informed the London Times, 1860, that 'the great bulk of the population is very glad to see them coming into the country; fears for the result are the phantoms of a few nervous and ill-informed persons'.22 Others were frightened by the numbers—in the Yale and some other mining areas Chinese outnumbered Europeans by 1860—while white miners were soon accusing them of depravity and dishonesty, and of avoiding mining licence fees by working abandoned claims and then telling officials that the ground was so unproductive they could not pay the fees. But the enforcement of mining regulations (copied from Victoria) and the administration of law and order in the gold-fields under the vigorous Justice Begbie,23 seemed more efficient in British Columbia than in California, Victoria and New South Wales. Certainly there are no stories of wholesale expulsions and violence and it is significant that travellers such as Cheadle, while constantly commenting on murders and robberies amongst whites, made no mention of violence between Europeans and Chinese. Hence the Chinese address of loyalty to the Governor of British Columbia in 1864 saying: 'the Chinese are sincerely devoted to Queen Victoria for the protection and even-handed justice of His Excellency the former Governor, Sir James Douglas, so contrary to the laws of California as applied to its Chinese population'.24

The first definite proposals to discourage Chinese immigration came in 1864, with a move to impose a Californian-type miners' licence fee, specifically discriminating against Chinese. Mining interests were too weak to carry the proposals through the assembly, though Chinese merchants felt sufficiently worried to protest against them and pray the government that 'the policy of the people of California will not prejudice you against us to our sorrow'.25 In 1864 there was more unrest on the upper Fraser when stories spread that the Chinese had offered to work on the new mountain roads for low wages; hence the motion introduced by Dennes, one of the elected representatives in the assembly, that the colony introduce a Victorian-type poll tax. He won very little support, being the only one to vote for it.
Though anti-Chinese sentiment remained, and indeed increased somewhat during the recession of 1866, it did not break out in large-scale violence. The Cantonese, moreover, began to distribute themselves more widely, in market gardening, domestic service, laundering and commerce. When British Columbia entered the Canadian federation in 1871 there were no laws discriminating against Chinese residents and no restrictions on Chinese immigration. Had local residents realised at the time that they were so effectively transferring control of immigration to distant unsympathetic Ottawa they might well have passed a law enabling the British Columbian government to impose regulations on Chinese immigration, if it thought fit, before finally entering federation.
Chapter 5

Cantonese gold-diggers: assessment

Having reviewed the impact of Chinese gold-diggers on the white countries of the Pacific we can now assess the various elements in this first great confrontation. The size and rapidity of the Chinese influx is clearly important, especially in California and Victoria (nearly 50,000 arrivals in California 1851-4 and some 45,000 in Victoria 1854-8); there, despite numerous departures returning home or moving on to other countries, the Chinese soon reached 15 per cent or so of the total male population. Likewise in British Columbia, though numbers were smaller (about 5000 arrivals 1858-71) they rapidly became an important part of the non-Indian population, nearly 20 per cent in 1871. In South Australia the influx was sudden and large—20,000 in 1856-7—though it did not give rise to long-term settlement as most Chinese moved quickly on to Victoria. In New South Wales the immigration was smaller and slower—20,000 or so 1856-71—reaching 7 per cent of the male population; in New Zealand the 5000 or so Chinese arrivals never made up more than 3.5 per cent of the non-Maori male population; in Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia numbers rarely exceeded a few hundred. All in all, there is no doubt that these proportions and rates of immigration partly explain why California, Victoria and South Australia reacted so quickly with restrictive measures, why New South Wales took so much longer to impose restrictions and why New Zealand, Queensland and other Australian colonies refrained from restriction altogether. British Columbia was late in starting anti-Chinese agitation, partly because of the slow growth of a permanent European labouring population, but once started kept going with unflagging energy.

One of the forces converting awareness of rapid Chinese numerical increase into campaigns for restriction was fear that
Chinese would eventually swamp the new young states, or at least encourage the Chinese Empire to take some political interest; and here white settlers were not thinking of the Chinese Empire's somewhat flagging might at the time but of what the Empire had been in the days of Kubla Khan, or—more frightening still—of what the Mongol Empire had been under Genghis Khan. The fears of Fawkner in Victoria, and Chief Secretary Finniss in South Australia, with their anxiety that Australian colonies might become the 'property' of the Emperor of China or be brought under the control of Mongolian and Tartar hordes, were here probably quite genuine. Political leaders in New South Wales were certainly convinced on this point: Robertson argued that, though he had every sympathy with Chinese wanting to leave their overcrowded country, he feared both their 'vast numbers' and their nearness, only one week away by steamer; Weekes was afraid that, without restriction, the Chinese population in Australia would soon outnumber the British because of the 'proximity of that swarming hive of the human race' and the attractiveness of the Australian gold-fields; Parkes concluded that Chinese immigrants would quickly see that 'they could change the character of these colonies without taking scarcely a drop from the well' of the population of China. Fears across the Pacific were less acute but nevertheless present, as when Governor Burnett asserted that 'nothing is more probable than that China within the next century will fully learn and use her mighty power', and when Governor Stanford stated that 'Asia, with her numberless millions, sends to our shores the dregs of her population... and unless we do something early to check their immigration the question, which of the two tides of immigration meeting upon the shores of the Pacific shall be turned back, will be forced upon our consideration when far more difficult than now of disposal'. Later British Columbia also heard talk of measures necessary to 'prevent this Province being overrun with a Chinese population'. Perhaps because Chinese numbers and proportions were less in New Zealand than elsewhere, fears of being overwhelmed were at this time relatively quiescent.

Another political fear was that the Chinese gold-diggers might start behaving in America and Australasia as they were said to be behaving in Java, Sarawak, Singapore and the Philippines; here
critics were referring not only to fights between rival Chinese but to trouble between Chinese and native Indo-Malays. Though an occasional voice claimed that the Chinese were driven to fighting in self-defence against constant Indo-Malay attacks, most attributed these outbreaks of violence to a Chinese habit of using force once they were as strong and as numerous as their neighbours. Moreover, it was not only anti-Chinese extremists who belaboured the point—Fawkner in Victoria and Lucas in New South Wales—but also persons who were usually quite restrained, such as the Governor and Colonial Secretary of Victoria in the mid-1850s. Though such views seem less common in North America they were not unimportant, especially when the Chinese organisations of San Francisco showed no hesitation in using violence against their own people.

Total numbers and the fears associated with them, while important when assessing the reactions of the colony as a whole, are much less relevant to the reactions of particular localities. Admittedly in some places the Chinese rapidly became a large element, as in Klameth, Mariposa and Trinity Counties, California, where in the 1860s they were about one-third of the total population (in some sub-districts well over half); or at Smythe's Creek, Forest Creek, Mt Ararat and Buckland River gold-fields in Victoria and at Braidwood, Carcoar, Mudgee and Tambaroora gold-fields in New South Wales, where they were often a large majority. But there is no apparent correlation between numbers or proportions and local reaction. In some cases a majority of white miners expelled a Chinese minority, as at Rocky River, or at Lambing Flat where 3000 white miners ousted about 1200 Chinese. In other cases a minority of white miners drove away a Chinese majority, as at Buckland River when some 500 white miners expelled 1200 Chinese, or at Adelong where some 300 whites drove away about 1000 Chinese. Similar differences occurred, it seems, on the numerous occasions when white miners, or their Vigilante Committees, expelled Chinese from various Californian diggings (see chapter 3, section 2).

Some scholars are puzzled at this; apparently they feel the pattern should be expulsion only when whites are in a majority. It seems clear, however, that mass violence and expulsion occurred
only when gold-fields were badly underpoliced, so giving lawless elements the chance to crystallise anti-Chinese sentiments into violent action; as at Buckland River, Adelong, Lambing Flat and many of the Californian diggings. Violence against the Chinese is easier to understand after reading accounts of the robberies and assaults by white rogues against more peaceable whites in underpoliced districts, or the pleas of local commissioners for extra police on the grounds that daylight robberies and assaults near government offices had led to the formation of Vigilance Committees or that 'such is the rapid accession of bad characters from Victoria that I cannot answer for what turn crime may take'. This all contrasts with the quieter conditions of the relatively well policed gold-fields in New Zealand and British Columbia.

The next element in the confrontation is the clear and obvious difference between the behaviour, customs, appearance and values of Europeans and of Chinese in the gold-fields. At some points the Chinese characteristics had, or could easily have had, deleterious effects on the white population: opium smoking, crowded living quarters, unhygienic use of water supplies, occasional bearing of leprosy, inability to communicate in English, use of strange and unknown oaths in court proceedings; these were noticed and criticised in all areas. Other peculiarities had no direct effect on the white population: diet, dress, pig-tails, concubines, joss-houses, burial customs, gambling, segregation into separate villages. Yet these also were disliked and criticised, partly because they presented non-conformist behaviour to Anglo-Saxons with little experience of plural societies and with strong predilections for that particular variety of the Christian moral code current, if not always observed, in mid-nineteenth century Europe.

These cultural differences were, in a sense, more conspicuous and important than economic differences. On the gold-fields—widely scattered and with sections constantly coming into use or going out of use—direct economic conflict between Chinese and Europeans was relatively slight. By working abandoned ground, or moving to new areas, the Chinese often managed to avoid economic competition in particular localities; this tended to occur only when mining elsewhere petered out and European miners returned to their former claims. Though anti-Chinese feeling undoubtedly increased
at such times the more violent outbreaks, as at Buckland River and Lambing Flat, occurred without much connection with economic difficulties. Furthermore, the fact that Chinese gold-diggers so clearly intended to return to China, though it superficially annoyed those desirous of permanent settlers, also made things somewhat different from the 1830s and 1840s when many were thinking in terms of a permanent coolie immigration. For most of the 1850s and 1860s labour interests could argue only in general terms about the possible danger of cheap Chinese labour; the occasions when European and Chinese labour were in direct competition for jobs, as in San Francisco in the 1854 recession, were comparatively rare.

The religious motif is also less conspicuous than before. The evangelical enthusiasm of the 1830s and 1840s seems weaker in the 1850s and 1860s, certainly amongst those controlling colonial affairs. A few were anxious to convert Buddhist-Confucian immigrants to Christianity; in California the Rev. William Speer and others made some efforts, as did the Revs. John Dunmore Lang (Presbyterian) and William Colley (Primitive Methodist) and others in Australia; moreover a few politicians spoke of 'our duty to Christianize the Chinese' or of the need to 'infuse into our benighted neighbors the blessings of that higher and purer civilization'. But the great majority referred to Chinese religious customs in non-evangelical terms, simply as another incompatible difference between Chinese and Europeans, another mark on the score-sheet against them. As a Sydney news correspondent asked: would the 'introduction of bands of idolaters be beneficial to the people of a Christian land'? Or, as Horace Greeley asserted as early as 1854 in the *New York Tribune*, only 'Christian races' were welcome as settlers and Californians should be congratulated on their readiness to restrict this 'flood of ignorant filthy idolators'.

In like manner, humanitarian warmth to the Chinese seems less than before. One senses from speeches, articles and letters that the tide of humanitarian fervour, conspicuous in eastern Australia in the 1830s when abolition of slavery was so near, ebbed somewhat during the gold-rushes. Some traces undoubtedly exist, as in the worry of some officials that the Chinese merchants operating the credit-ticket system were—through their extortionate rates of
interest, harsh contracts and deplorable ship-board conditions—treat ing Chinese diggers much as slave-masters had treated African slaves. Far more remarks, however, were directed to the general and long-term dangers of a permanent servile population, forced into low-level jobs and undermining the living standards of European settlers. Hence the constant refrain of 'slaves', 'serfs', 'servile labour' by spokesmen of the miners and wage-earners in all countries; also by statesmen such as Parkes, who were fearful that an unrestricted influx would eventually turn into the slave system of the southern states of America, with some inhabitants permanently denied freedom and equality. It was on this point that Parkes disagreed with the whole notion of segregation and separate Chinese villages, and with Cowper's insistence that the gold-fields legislation enable the Executive to keep Chinese, and other aliens, on separate fields if it thought fit (see chapter 3, section 5). Naturally, fears of a new slave class were particularly acute in California and other parts of the United States, then moving towards the civil war, and the theme is clear even in quiet New Zealand.

In the earlier period, humanitarian feelings against slavery were associated with feelings of duty to help 'backward' peoples to attain the blessings of western European civilisation. Though this thought is present in the gold-rush era it is somewhat quieter, partly because citizens of the Chinese Empire, heirs of an ancient civilisation and culture, were not thought of in quite the same way, even if illiterate peasants, as African or Melanesian tribesmen; nor were they coming as victims of white men's cupidity and of unreasonable labour contracts but on their own account, or on that of their families or Chinese merchant sponsors, intending to return with local gold or, occasionally, to remain as prosperous merchants. Those defending the Chinese rarely did so in terms of weak, exploitable backward peoples; they usually argued that the Chinese were peaceful, sober and industrious, and that restriction or discrimination was a denial of natural justice and a clear breach of British or American traditions and international agreements.

In one sense this matter of principle, of natural justice and British traditions, was a basic dividing line. Radicals and liberals were fighting for universal suffrage and more democratic forms of
government, for more equitable land laws, for control of police powers, for the ending of transportation and contract labour: in their eyes, opened wide by the Declaration of Independence and the Rights of Man, all men had certain inalienable social and political rights. But these radicals and liberals often had very restricted notions about 'all men'. Just as in contemporary Europe many liberals and radicals, prominent in the political outbreaks of the 1830s and 1840s, allowed their liberalism to become distorted by nationalism (German liberals claimed political rights for themselves but denied those rights to Polish and Czech minorities within the German empire; Hungarian liberals claimed political rights against the Hapsburg monarchy but denied those rights to Croats and Slovaks) so the liberals and radicals of the white Pacific countries claimed political rights for themselves but denied them to Asians.

William Campbell Denovan was one of the few forced to face up to this contradiction, by William Westgarth when chairing the Victorian Gold Fields Commission 1854-5 (see chapter 3, section 3). When asked to give his opinions on miners' grievances, with particular reference to political representation, Denovan grandly replied: 'I hold that as all men are born with free and equal rights, they are all entitled to the exercise and enjoyment of those rights.' Westgarth then reminded him of his anti-Chinese sentiments saying, 'your universal rights of mankind are knocked on the head immediately'. Denovan replied, 'I mean a civilized community', to which Westgarth retorted, 'Who is to be the judge? Do not the Chinese imagine they are highly civilized?'. Here Denovan could do no more than appeal to his own cultural background and viewpoint saying, 'I think the whole of European history, and the history of parts of Asia, has shown us as to what is civilization.'

This mental state, this confining of Man and his Rights to one's own nation or civilisation, was widespread. Relatively few were as clear-headed as Westgarth, though he in fact favoured some restriction on numbers. Embling, with his somewhat unusual views on things in general, and his assertion that the Chinese had as much right to be in Australia as the British, was one of the few Victorians to think in terms of complete equality. J. H. Solomon, with his liberal Jewish background, was one of the few in South Aus-
The great white walls are built

tralia. In New South Wales this humanitarian group were more numerous—Piddington, Forster, Hay, Dickson, Rotton and sometimes the editors of the *Sydney Morning Herald*—but their views suffered defeat in 1861, though they were on the winning side, temporarily, with repeal in 1867. In New Zealand and Queensland the humanitarian group, in alliance with strong business interests and with only a working class labour opposition, remained triumphant throughout. In California, the alliance of humanitarian and business interests was successful only occasionally, as in the Report of the Select Committee of 1862, which commented favourably on Chinese immigrants and recommended against further restriction; this suffered speedy eclipse in the Assembly and further discriminatory legislation followed.

Failure by radicals and liberals to see the Chinese as true human beings is closely connected with increasing desire for social and national homogeneity. This desire, already clear in the 1830s and 1840s, quickened during the gold-rushes with the development of self-government and the appearance of large numbers of conspicuously different Chinese diggers. Talk of homogeneity, of the refusal or incapacity of the Chinese to assimilate into the European communities of the Pacific, became more common in California and British Columbia, though not as widespread as in the 1870s. In Australia, though mentioned by Griffith and others in Victoria, and by Magarey in South Australia with his ‘nation within a nation’ it was strongest in New South Wales. Martin, advocating restriction in 1858, argued that the colony needed a population whose members had similar language and ideas and who could understand constitutional government; the Chinese had no ideas in common with the rest of the inhabitants ‘except the mere physical animal enjoyment common to all mankind’. For Parkes this issue was paramount: the government had no right to permit the irruption of tens of thousands of Chinese who would be an alien element in a young country, an element that would effectively prevent the population from founding a British colony with a British character.

Two things in particular worried European settlers in this issue. First, the Chinese came from an autocratic patriarchal society and state and would take decades to understand democratic insti-
The first confrontation, 1836-71

tutions, if, indeed, they ever could. Second, the new countries above all things needed development, and the immigration of persons prepared to stay permanently: quite clearly most of the Chinese gold-diggers did not intend this. The whole Cantonese family and lineage system, with its insistence that young men going abroad to work (except those belonging to defeated or decaying lineages) should bring back their earnings and profits to help lineage power and prestige, and that women and children should stay at home to maintain lineage strength and family claims to property, was at this time set against the emigration of women and the foundation of permanent colonies abroad (see chapter 3, section 1 above). Thus by 1870-1, twenty years after emigrating to California and fifteen years after emigrating to Australia, Chinese totals were approximately as shown in the table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of first main arrival</th>
<th>Census date</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>1851</td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>44 711</td>
<td>4 566</td>
<td>49 277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>1854</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>17 826</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17 857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Australia</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>197e</td>
<td>9e</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.S.W.</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>7 208</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Columbia</td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>3 000e</td>
<td>60e</td>
<td>3 060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1865</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>2 641</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>1849</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>3 303</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3 305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_e = Estimate.

This failure to bring many women was not only a conspicuous difference between Europeans and Chinese in the new states but was seen by Europeans as a prime cause of Chinese 'vice' and 'immorality'. In 1860, in California, the 1700 or so Chinese females were largely prostitutes sent out by merchants associated with the Chinese Tongs then growing in San Francisco; the girls, often from broken or feeble lineages, contracted to work four to five years as prostitutes in exchange for their steamer fare. The first large-scale importation was in 1854, when 600 arrived at once and attracted rival gangs of Chinese men who eventually disembarked the girls by force; later, a market was established in San Francisco.
The great white walls are built

wherein women were sold as prostitutes, concubines or wives.\(^{27}\) Intermarriage with white women was rare.

In Australasia, with so few Chinese women (perhaps because the Chinatowns of Sydney and Melbourne were so much smaller than that of San Francisco and offered less scope for lucrative prostitution) European denunciation was less against the prostitution of Chinese girls and more against the evils arising from the scarcity of women. In Victoria Fawkner and his followers thundered against 'horrible and unnatural crimes', or the association of Chinese men with the lowest class of white prostitute.\(^{28}\) In New South Wales and Queensland men saw the problem more clearly. On one side were those appalled by 'unnatural vice', or dismayed at European girls 'induced to sacrifice themselves (in marriage or prostitution) for the sake of money',\(^{29}\) or annoyed at the lack of colonising spirit amongst the Chinese; some of these wanted to encourage the immigration of women, as did Jamison with his proposal to waive the landing tax if a Chinese brought his wife with him,\(^{30}\) or Herbert with the Queensland law confining naturalisation to Chinese accompanied by wives. On the other side were those fearful of a Chinese population—alien and servile—growing up in Australia by natural increase; hence the opposition of Robertson and Parkes to the clause admitting Chinese females without tax.\(^{31}\)

In this argument Westminster sided with the former group, feeling that the social evils arising from shortage of females outweighed the evils of an Australian-born Chinese population. Though the restrictive laws of Australian colonies did not prohibit the permanent entry of Chinese women—as the Commonwealth regulations later did—they did not facilitate or encourage it, except perhaps in Queensland with its denial of naturalisation to Chinese without wives. This contrast between Australia and the United Kingdom has continued until quite recently, the restrictive legislation of the United Kingdom of the 1960s cutting down the number of males entering, but permitting free entry of wives and children.

Relevant here are colonial views on intermarriage. A few persons such as J. D. Lang favoured and promoted it, while gold-fields officials gave favourable opinions about marriages between Chinese men and Scottish or Irish girls.\(^{32}\) Others bitterly opposed it, on the grounds that intermarriage would produce a degenerate
hybrid stock. In Victoria Fawkner and the radical Grant thundered against a 'mongrel race' while in New South Wales solicitor Norton and others inveighed against the possibility of a mixed Mongolian people, 'a most hybrid and obnoxious type of the whole race'.

Such fears, it seems, arose partly from men's inability to see where persons of mixed descent would fit into society. Pure Chinese they might dislike and wish to exclude, but these at least could be put into a clear-cut and well understood category: mixed-bloods were anomalies. But such fears also arose from racial antipathy, from strengthening opinions about race distinctions and race superiority. In the 1850s and 1860s the term 'inferior race' still had, as in the 1840s, the sense of a people further back along the road to modern European civilisation. This seems to be its meaning when used by some Californians, as instance the San Francisco Herald when suggesting that Mongolians, being an inferior race, could not enjoy full social and political rights, or by Hinton Helper when asserting that Chinese, Negroes, Irish and other inferior races of men were bound to become subordinate to the Anglo-Americans; this is also the meaning when used by Governor Barkley and others in Victoria, and by Martin and others in New South Wales. Even Lucas, with his ardent representation of miners' interest in New South Wales and consequent hostility to the Chinese, suggested that it was not the Chinese as such but their 'immoral' and 'unhygienic' customs that offended him and led him to speak of them as 'inferior'; the 'people of New South Wales did not object to foreigners from other countries coming here (as their habits were similar to the British), nor would they object to Chinese-men if they were the same as the rest of the human race'.

With these older views, however, were glimpses of a true race superiority doctrine—that some races were biologically superior to others and would suffer deterioration from biological intermixture. That learned New South Wales barrister, Plunkett, showed signs of this when attacking intermarriage between Europeans and Chinese on the grounds that 'only an inferior breed' could result; while Aaron, a Sydney Health Officer, described the Chinese as 'an inferior species of the genus homo'. Forster's likening the races of man to varieties of plants—the more advanced destined to exterminate the more primitive—was doubtless tinged with irony but
The great white walls are built

reflects the same mode of thought. Such views, though less common than the older view that 'inferior' equalled 'uncivilised', were nevertheless sufficiently at large for the *Sydney Morning Herald* to remark that 'the remote danger of physical deterioration are really too childish to be argued. It is quite a moot question as to what type of the human race may challenge the highest attributes. We all naturally prefer our own'.

These opinions reflect the beginnings of modern biological discussion in Europe and America about Man and his nature: whether the varieties or races of men had a separate or common origin; whether, if of separate origin, some races were incapable of rising to the same levels as others or, if of common origin, some races had so degenerated or stayed behind that they had irretrievably lost all capacity for advance; whether the advanced races had reached the front by Divine Will, by accident, or some process such as natural selection and the survival of the fittest. Important books and articles by Charles Darwin and others appeared on these matters during the 1850s and 1860s and, though the real strength of the biological superiority doctrine came later in the century, quickly began to influence the thinkers and policy-makers of the white lands of the Pacific. The democrat Blair, in Victoria, could say as early as 1857 that the doctrine of inferior races was well known to all physiologists.

The chief argument in the Pacific countries was whether inferior races could be controlled and used by superior races or whether the association would cause the superior race to degenerate; this question was important whether one held that races were unequal by origin or degeneracy, or whether one thought of 'superior' as biological capacity or level of civilisation. Most white settlers, it seems, felt that intermixture could cause degeneration. Hence Governor Stanford's remarks in California that 'the presence among us of numbers of degraded and distinct people must exercise a deleterious effect upon the superior race'. Similarly in Victoria Governor Barkly approved restrictive measures, to prevent 'the great moral detriment which the presence in large numbers of an inferior race is sure sooner or later to bring with it', while in New South Wales the radical Deniehy asserted that too many Chinese would give the colony a 'barbarous aspect'. Very few openly took Forster's
line—that the British might be so superior that they could not become degenerated by contact with inferior peoples—though pastoralists wanting Chinese labour took this line in practice. The general verdict was clear: most white settlers in Pacific countries felt that they were unquestionably superior to the Chinese but were not sufficiently sure of their superiority to permit overmuch contact.

On the question of race inferiority the views of Henry Parkes are interesting and important, not least because they were inconsistent. In the first debate of 1858 he contended that the Chinese should be kept out, partly because they were ‘an inferior and degraded race’; later he argued that they should be excluded because they were a sober, industrious and powerful people who would take over the colony and submerge the British.\textsuperscript{44} This contrast, between arguments for excluding Asians on grounds of their inferiority and arguments for excluding them on grounds of their power and efficiency, continued in all white Pacific countries for nearly a century, becoming of paramount importance at the end of the nineteenth century with the industrial and military rise of Japan. It has ceased only in recent years, with the general decline of doctrines of race inferiority.

Parkes was by no means the only one to be inconsistent. In Victoria, Denovan’s inconsistent views on the Rights of Man have already been noted. Others, as the sardonic Piddington joyfully commented in New South Wales, combined attacks on the Chinese for unnatural vice with attempts to stop them bringing in women, and charges of infanticide with charges of having no women to bear children.\textsuperscript{45} Yet others, indeed most, argued vehemently about the dangers and degradation that could follow Chinese immigration but made no mention of Kanakas, Africans or other Asians. The liberal pastoralist, Hay, a steady supporter of the Chinese, was quick to point this out: if the Assembly was ‘determined to maintain that purity of race so much insisted upon’ then it should confine admission and naturalisation to European Christians; yet it was prepared to accept the admission and naturalisation of ‘any of the South Sea islanders, or Negro races, however low in the scale of humanity and civilization. Why then should they refuse naturalization to a comparatively civilized and intelligent race?’\textsuperscript{46}
Inconsistent thinking sometimes derives from an inefficient mind: more often it arises from a feeling or conviction sufficiently strong to seize on any or every argument that might justify or support it, even if the arguments are quite contradictory. Another symptom of the same condition may be constant exaggeration of objectionable characteristics or behaviour. Those favouring restriction frequently exaggerated numbers, as when speaking of 30,000 Chinese coming to South Australia instead of 20,000, or 60,000 being in Victoria instead of 40,000, or 20,000 residing in New South Wales instead of 10,000. The extent of leprosy, immorality, slavery, violence, crime, and so on, also suffered exaggeration, as was revealed by expert witnesses before various committees of inquiry. In California the Joint Select Committee of the Legislature in 1862 found no evidence to support widespread stories of Chinese slavery or coolieism. In Victoria, witnesses before the Council's Select Committee produced no evidence to support charges that Chinese started interracial fighting, indulged in large-scale robbery, lived in abnormally dirty conditions, and constantly practised unnatural vice; the evidence did, however, confirm widespread gambling, opium smoking and use of white prostitutes. (It is noticeable that under Fawkner's chairmanship the Committee's Report still made much of Chinese crime and immorality.) Likewise in New South Wales, the Council's Select Committee of 1858 spoke of Chinese peacefulness and blamed Europeans for interracial fighting, denied stories of anything objectionable about Chinese burials, and asserted there was little unnatural vice of contagious disease.

Exaggeration on all these matters was one of the charges levelled against anti-Chinese extremists by those looking at matters more quietly and objectively: Forster remarked in 1857 that bad actions attributed to the Chinese in New South Wales were never or rarely proved; Gordon and Forlonger severely criticised those exaggerating Chinese crime and vice. It is noticeable, however, that quieter voices demanding accurate facts and figures were rarely heeded unless anti-Chinese feelings were only slightly aroused, as in New Zealand, or had died down, as in Victoria and New South Wales at the time of repeal.

Connected with exaggeration and rumour is the 'scapegoat'
tendency, earlier at work in New South Wales with the coolies. During the gold-rushes there was considerable unease at the extent of crime on the diggings, of banditry and bush-ranging in wilder country, of dubious actions by local Vigilance groups; in fact at the frequent inadequacy of law and order in California, Victoria and New South Wales. It may well be that the persistent exaggeration of Chinese robbery and violence, the constant blaming of Chinese for interracial strife and fighting, derived in part from the social need to find a scapegoat for inadequate law and order. Again, the general unease at the prevalence of prostitution and homosexuality on the diggings—where wives and families of any race were relatively scarce—may partly explain the persistent tendency to exaggerate homosexuality amongst Chinese and to lift hands in horror when Chinese were discovered with white prostitutes.

Another symptom of irrational conviction and emotional thinking is the easy use of invective and vituperation, of derogatory catchwords and stereotypes. Mining, working class and small business leaders are conspicuous here. In California it was white launderers who launched attacks on their 'elliptical-eyed long-tailed' rivals (1852) and white labourers who protested against oriental 'pollution' of the country (1870). In Victoria it was the Democrats who attacked the 'hordes of immoral barbarians' or spoke of their mixed-blood children as being 'more like orang-outangs than human beings'. In South Australia it was those representing working class or small farming constituencies who talked of 'filthy and useless subjects' or of being 'overrun by hordes of ugly moon-faced Chinese'. In New South Wales it was the mining and labour leaders who called the Chinese immoral, filthy, obnoxious, and treacherous, who feared 'moral contagion' from them worse than that of 'infected animals', who felt it 'positively disgusting to compare Europeans and British subjects with Mongolian pagans', as the latter 'poisoned our social and political life'. In New Zealand it was labour and mining interests who spoke of 'Mongolian filth' and a 'pestilent cloud of infamy and abomination'. The radical press, and petitions from gold-fields, contain similar phrases and expressions.

Why such persons felt impelled to use such language is as much a problem for political psychologists today as it was for con-
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...then; as instance the pained objections, to vituperative language used of the Chinese, raised in the South Australian legislature.\textsuperscript{57} The consistent use of such language by mining and working class leaders, however, suggests that the explanation lies less in the psychological makeup of those concerned than in group background and mores—habitual use of terms in vogue amongst constituents, desire to show their followers, by forceful picturesque language, that leaders were fighting for group interests, and so on. Political psychologists with interests in history could doubtless clarify things here.

With other persons using vituperative language other explanations are necessary. First are those, of artisan or small business background, who held some strong moral or religious conviction about the basic evil of the Chinese: here one senses the Old Testament prophetic strain of denunciation against the Godless heathen, and against those of the chosen people who had dealings with them. William Magarey in South Australia with his regular withdrawals to meditate on the Word of God and his lead in establishing the Plymouth Brethren and Churches of Christ in Adelaide, inveighed against the 'immoral, leprous liars', asking 'what father of a family would desire this place as a residence if they were to have hordes of these Chinese settled here'.\textsuperscript{58} In Victoria, John Pascoe Fawkner, with his unusual Protestant background conveyed much the same atmosphere: from him the Council heard several powerful denunciations of the treacherous, perfidious blood-thirsty Chinese with their horrible and unnatural crimes, so deeply sunk in debauchery and exercising so evil an influence.\textsuperscript{59} Psychologists might well be happy to avoid the prophetic analogy and apply to Magarey and Fawkner some of the modern psychological explanations of prejudice, as instance that which attributes such authoritarian personalities to dependent or broken childhood.

Another group using invective and vituperation contains a few well educated professional men, usually associated with the higher official or wealthy business sections of society. John Plunkett, a barrister who arrived in New South Wales to be Solicitor-General and later Attorney-General, President of the Legislative Council and Vice-Chancellor of Sydney University, supported anti-Chinese measures on the grounds that his experience with Chinese miners
and pastoral labourers when on circuit led him to believe they were ‘the most ferocious and blood-thirsty race he had ever seen’; he was strongly opposed to their increase and ‘the inferior breed’ that would result from intermixture.\textsuperscript{60} James Norton, a solicitor and LL.D., was afraid of the obnoxious hybrid results of intermarriage and derided the efforts of those ‘wandering among Chinese savages and barbarians seeking to teach them’.\textsuperscript{61} In California Justice Hugh C. Murray is another such case, with strong anti-alien sentiments and approval of the Know-Nothing movement, and combining Chinese with American Indians as an inferior Mongolian species debarred from testifying for or against white residents. Professional experience may well have encouraged anti-Chinese sentiments but why these lawyers should use such emotionally loaded phrases, or display such revulsion from intermarriage, is beyond the scope of this book.

Other persons favouring restrictions against the Chinese expressed themselves more moderately. Again taking New South Wales as illustration, Martin, Robertson, Cowper, Parkes and most of their supporters expressed their opinions firmly, forcefully and sometimes colourfully on the political dangers of a vast Chinese immigration, on the importance of maintaining internal order and on the British character of the colony. But their language was moderate, an appeal to reason rather than an attempt to stir up emotions by exaggeration, stereotypes and invective. The same phenomenon is visible in other parts of Australasia and North America.

At this time the more moderate approach was stronger than later in the century, when the Asiatic question had become such an issue that demagogues were able to exploit it politically; that is, play on popular prejudice and stir up feeling against the Chinese for their own political benefit, though they themselves had no strong personal conviction or sectional interest for doing so. In the 1850s and 1860s demagogic exploitation of the Asiatic issue was not strong. Admittedly there are possibilities of it in California. When seeking re-election in 1852, Governor Bigler announced he would introduce measures to ‘check this tide of Asiatic immigration, and to prevent the exportation by them of the precious metals which they dig up from our soil without charge, and without
assuming any of the obligations imposed upon citizens', and won. Some historians argue Bigler had no strong views himself on the Chinese question, was only stirring up the anti-alien anti-Asiatic feelings of white labourers and miners for political gain, thus bringing on organised antagonism to Chinese immigration. There is no firm evidence here; considering the rapid increase in Chinese immigration then starting, and the strong views of miners already expressed against aliens, it is unlikely that anti-Chinese activities and policies would have been long postponed. Similarly there is no firm evidence to support the contention that two years later the leaders of the Know-Nothing movement exploited anti-Chinese for demagogic purposes; many members of this movement, with their intense nativist and Protestant dislike of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants, were apparently quite sincere in their opinions and policies. More work, however, is needed on this issue on the lines pursued by S. C. Miller for the eastern United States.

In Australasia the situation was somewhat different. With new constitutions, with the mechanisms of political manoeuvre still being created or discovered, with the representatives of the miners and labourers still a little unsure of their political role, the methods and purposes of demagogic exploitation seemed obscure. Moreover in New Zealand, with the balance swinging waywardly between central and provincial governments, and with so few voters interested in the scattered Chinese diggers of distant Otago Province, there was little political gain to be had. There are no clear signs that any Australasian politician or leader exploited the Chinese issue for political purposes: rather does it seem that such leaders spoke and acted as they genuinely felt in terms of their own personal understanding and their class-sectional interests.

It is now possible to tackle the question of whether restrictive immigration policies originated solely as part of the class struggle, as a battle between pastoralists, planters and business men seeking cheap Asiatic labour, and labourers, artisans and small business men determined to maintain standards of living by excluding such labour. A superficial glance at events might suggest this was so; certainly Sandmeyer's treatment of the Chinese question in California lays great stress on the cheap labour issue, while in Australia several historians have argued that here lies the origin of the White
Australia Policy. The evidence presented above, however, shows that the story is far more complex than this, that economic interests were only one element in a complicated situation which, like most historical situations, can only be understood in terms of multiple causation: humanitarian and religious fears at a new kind of slavery and slave trade; fears of being swamped politically and socially by vast numbers of Chinese settlers; the struggles of new young countries to find some identity and social homogeneity; antipathy to strangers of such conspicuously different customs and culture; worries about maintaining law and order; fears about mixing with peoples of a 'lower' civilisation or of 'inferior' biological stock; the individual characters of sundry local leaders; the desire of Cantonese themselves to come, not as cheap labour at the behest of white capitalists, but to dig gold for themselves and their families. All these elements are involved besides that of class interest, which is why it is so difficult to apply any class division that makes sense. In Victoria, for instance, only a handful opposed restriction in 1855—a few conservative and liberal pastoralists—because the increase of numbers seemed so great, and the problem so urgent, that most concerned, including numerous pastoralists and business men, felt restriction to be the only sensible thing. Likewise in South Australia, the sudden advent of numerous Chinese at Guichen Bay led both Houses to adopt the restrictive measure of 1857, with no debate on principle and only a few technical queries on administration. In New South Wales, with numbers increasing more slowly, there was more time for basic discussion and for an opposition to develop. Even here the division was not along class lines (chapter 3, section 5). Admittedly mining and working class interests were, excepting oddities such as Charles Kemp, united in favour of restriction and discrimination; but the professional, business and pastoral interests were completely divided, many following Robertson, Cowper and Parkes in urging restriction to maintain order, reduce the danger of Chinese political domination and foster the British character of the colony.

The interesting point here is that the class-interest explanation was being used at the time, by mining and labour leaders who took all the credit for the restrictive policy and accused others of being part of a great plot to flood the colony with cheap labour. Forster
and Parkes at once denied this. Forster asserted that though he had pastoral interests he was not an employer of labour and had nothing to gain from Chinese immigration; his opposition to restriction and discrimination, he claimed, was purely on grounds of principle, of humanitarian dislike of discrimination and injustice, of fears that inequitable actions, even if done in temporary panic, would rebound on the heads of those responsible; or on the heads of their descendants.\textsuperscript{66} Parkes went further, asserting that 'the lower classes' were more inclined to 'make a jest' of the Chinese than to take them seriously and that the real opposition was coming from the 'thinking men of the colony, including men of wealth and substance'.\textsuperscript{67} Parkes may have understated the feelings of those Sydney labourers who attended meetings and signed petitions, let alone the feelings of many miners, but he was certainly correct in asserting that many leading professionals, pastoralists and business men were ardent supporters of restriction. They may not have argued their case with as much invective as representatives of the working classes, but they were the persons who in the end drafted the legislation and passed it through both Houses.\textsuperscript{68}

The same issues were involved in California. Miners and labourers were united against the Chinese but other groups were much divided. Opposition to Tingley's 1852 Bill permitting coolie contract labour was led by Phillip Roach, a well educated senator. In one part of his minority report Roach declared that free labour was the basis of California society and should be protected against cheap Asiatic labour: in another part he advocated cheap labour for certain enterprises and Chinese labour for draining swamps and cultivating tea, cotton, rice etc. He was quickly followed by Senator Hubbs, with a Bill against involuntary servitude and contract labour in the mines. Then Bigler, with his farmer-lawyer background, launched his anti-Chinese campaign while two years later came the Know-Nothing issue and then Judge Murray's famous decision. Likewise in the eastern states many of the leaders of anti-Chinese opinion were men of professional and business background.\textsuperscript{69}

The last element in the situation, relations between local and central government, or colonial and imperial government, was not, except in California, as important at this time as it had been in
New South Wales in the 1840s, and as it was to become later elsewhere. British Columbia and New Zealand, having decided against restriction or discrimination, presented no problem to Westminster. With the Australian colonies British governments realised that, much as they disliked restriction and discrimination against the subjects of an Empire with which they were negotiating reciprocal treaty arrangements, the scale of Chinese immigration was sufficiently great to justify some control. Moreover, the controls imposed did not place any brake on Chinese merchants (except the landing tax and poll tax which, though at a level affecting Chinese diggers, were not high enough to deter merchants) and it was the development of trade with which Britain was most concerned. The controls certainly did reduce the flow of Chinese diggers, with some loss of profit to British passenger vessels; though some colonials felt this would lead Westminster to disallow the colonial restrictions, the British government's distaste for anything that smacked of slave-ship conditions, or ship-board exploitation of coolie labour, here quite comfortably overrode considerations of profit. In short, the controls were not sufficiently objectionable from Westminster's viewpoint to warrant an unpleasant fight with the newly self-governing colonies. Hence the absence of any protest at the Victorian and South Australian Acts and the agreement to the New South Wales Act, despite distaste for the clause denying Chinese naturalisation.

The main trouble lay in California, growing steadily angrier at court decisions declaring that Californian laws restricting Chinese immigration were invalid, as trespassing upon matters constitutionally reserved for the federal government, and at Washington's refusal to use its powers effectively on California's behalf. True, discriminatory laws against Chinese residents—notably those prohibiting Chinese from fishing, and taxing all resident Chinese unless growing sugar, coffee, tea or rice—were in force till 1870 or so. But these were manifestly incapable of reducing immigration to acceptable levels; as instance the 8000 a year intake over 1860-2, and the 12,300 a year intake over 1868-70 after the civil war ended, and the growth of the Chinese population of California from 25,000 in 1852 to 50,000 in 1871. In Australia effective restrictions on entry were followed by a fall in immigration to a hundred or two a year
and a decline of the Chinese population from some 42,000 to 18,000 in Victoria over 1858-71, and from 13,000 to 7200 in New South Wales over 1861-71. Californians, well aware of this were all the more annoyed at the handicaps imposed on them by the federal government and constitution.

So far as the restriction-discrimination issue goes, it is clear that locals preferred the more effective restriction on entry to the less effective discrimination on residents. California had no alternative: it was discrimination or nothing. The Australian colonies used both restriction and discrimination, this latter in the form of a residence tax in Victoria and New South Wales, denial of the right of Chinese miners to vote for mining representatives in Victoria, and restrictions on naturalisation in New South Wales and Queensland. Victoria had some reason for its residence tax in that revenue went to finance the special system of Protectors and Interpreters. New South Wales notionally set its tax money aside for maintaining Chinese paupers, lunatics and criminals, as though the ordinary tax revenue could not deal with such matters. Indeed, the colony's approach to discrimination was highly ambivalent, as revealed by the naturalisation issue. Clearly some wished to follow Californian precedent in denying naturalisation to Chinese but thought it unfair incidentally to deny established Chinese merchants and farmers, as perpetual aliens, the right to own real property; their reluctance was overcome, however, by their point-blank refusal to conceive of a Chinaman associating with colonial leaders in Parliament, and by their knowledge that if all Chinese miners became naturalised and voted they could well return a Chinese miners' representative. Forster and others favouring Chinese naturalisation had no such worries.

Such divisions of opinion and standpoint amongst white settlers in the Pacific have emerged very clearly through this narrative and general assessment. The Chinese, on the other hand, have usually appeared as a single class—the coloured immigrant suffering at the hands of the white majority. It is important to remember, however, that this can be misleading, that the Chinese too were divided. Cantonese, Hakka, Hokkien and Teochiu dialect groups sometimes continued in the gold-fields their ancestral feuds and conflicts: merchants, artisans and miners continued abroad the
The first confrontation, 1836-71

economic clashes of the homeland. Likewise some Cantonese diggers were as unpleasant and criminal as were the blackguards and bush­
rangers of white society. John Plunkett, though undoubtedly exag­
gerating the extent and depravity of Chinese crime in New South Wales, did not invent it all. In this sense Chinese immigrants were much like any other immigrants: not universally virtuous or evil, but ordinary human beings revealing a normal range of faults and virtues. Some Europeans, those who came to know the Chinese well, saw this very clearly. Hence the understanding, and even affection, which some officials and agents on the diggings had for them; to say nothing of those Europeans ready to treat Cantonese immigrants as individuals when in need of help in times of sickness or poverty, or ready to join in Chinese celebrations in the New Year. John Dunmore Lang may justly have laid himself open to laughter when it became known he had married the same Chinaman to several European girls in turn, and had not realised it, but at least he was gradually getting to know the Chinese better during the 1860s and could, with a clear conscience and genuine human sympathy, change his mind about restrictions and discriminations and successfully fight for their repeal.
The gates close against the Chinese, 1871-88
1 Introduction, 1867-88

By the late 1860s, then, the position of the white countries of the Pacific was as follows. Four colonies—British Columbia, Tasmania, Western Australia and New Zealand—has resisted all moves officially to restrict the entry of Chinese immigrants, or to discriminate against them after arrival. Two colonies—South Australia and New South Wales—had introduced restrictive and discriminatory laws but subsequently abolished them. Two colonies had no restrictions on entry—Victoria because she had abolished them in 1865 and Queensland because she had never introduced them—but had retained minor discriminatory laws. Victoria's 1865 law retained the clause denying Chinese miners a vote for local Mining Boards, so ensuring that in gold-fields with a large Chinese population white miners kept control of local affairs. Queensland's Alien Act of 1861-7 prevented all Asian and African aliens from becoming naturalised until they had three years' residence and their wives with them; as the Cantonese social system discouraged the emigration of women in favour of the periodic return home of emigrant males, this virtually denied naturalisation to all but a few.

In California attempts to restrict Chinese immigration had all been voided by judicial decisions that state laws contravened the federal government's constitutional control over commerce and immigration (except the 1852 law levying a $5 tax on alien passengers, which was overlooked until challenged and voided in 1872) while discriminatory taxes or restrictions on entry into certain occupations, and judicial decisions denying Chinese the right to give evidence in proceedings involving white men, were in force from the mid-1850s until challenged under the fourteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act (1868, 70). As in Queensland, however, restrictions on naturalisation remained, the United States law of
1790 confining naturalisation to ‘free white persons’ and Californians holding that this excluded Asians and Africans.

In general the mid-1860s were easier times, partly because the wider political climate was less hostile. Stories of Chinese belligerence in south-east Asia were less conspicuous, while war between the Empire and western nations demanding entry to Chinese markets came to end with the surrender of Peking to British and French forces in 1859. The Conventions then signed, by opening further ports to western trade and giving reciprocal rights to Chinese and British traders wishing to operate in each other’s dominions, in general pleased colonial business men, both for encouraging the appearance of Chinese merchants willing to stimulate local commerce and the implied right of entry, if wanted, of themselves and their agents into China’s home market. American merchants, wanting similar rights, encouraged their government to negotiate a preliminary agreement in 1844, make a second agreement (Reed Treaty) in 1858, and finally to conclude in 1868 the Burlinghame Treaty. This was negotiated during a period when Washington was again concerned with the basic rights of man and when anti-Chinese opinions in the eastern states were temporarily quiescent under a short-lived hope that America would be the nation to lead the Chinese people into civilisation; hence the clause asserting the ‘inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration . . . for purposes of curiosity, of trade or as permanent residents’ (article 5). All this, while conferring reciprocal trading and migration rights, did not confer automatic naturalisation as article 7 specifically stated that ‘nothing herein contained shall be held to confer naturalisation upon citizens of the United States in China, nor upon the subjects of China in the United States’.

Though causing some rumblings these various agreements were at first accepted by the general population, partly because Chinese merchants in Australasia and America remained few and partly because the mid-1860s saw a lull in the migration of Chinese labourers. In New South Wales and Victoria, even after the abolition of restrictions, Chinese arrivals remained low (700 a year to Victoria 1865-70, 130 a year to New South Wales 1867-70) and, as remigration continued, resident numbers declined from 24,732 and
12,988 in 1861 to 17,857 and 7220 in 1871. Though immigration sometimes increased elsewhere, as in British Columbia, New Zealand and Queensland, it was not on a scale sufficient to provoke policies of restriction or discrimination. In California migration was higher (3100 a year 1864-7) but this was well under the 8000 a year of 1860-3; in any case many disappeared inland to build the mountain sections of the Pacific railway while the attention of most anti-Chinese persons was temporarily diverted by the Civil War.³

The late 1860s and 1870s usher in a very different era, characterised by a new wave of restrictive and discriminatory laws, until by the late 1880s Chinese immigration was severely restricted in all our areas, and Chinese residents often drastically discriminated against. Moreover, attention was slowly turning to peoples other than the Chinese, as they too began to emigrate and as feelings of white superiority spread and hardened.

2 California and the United States, 1867-88

The first signs of renewed hostility appeared in California at the end of the Civil War. With some increase in unemployment, labour groups became very concerned with the Chinese problem, noting the rise in immigration from 2200 in 1866, to 4300 in 1867, 11,100 in 1868, and 15,000 in 1869 (see p. 66 above). Attacking the railways for using cheap coolie labour, mass meetings in 1867 castigated 'every employer who substitutes Chinese labor for that of the citizen', and expressed fears that federal courts would declare Chinese eligible for naturalisation.⁴ Certain trades felt Chinese competition particularly keenly, notably the Knights of St Crispin, an organisation of shoemakers widespread throughout the country. Additionally the completion of the Union Pacific Railway in 1869 not only put Chinese unabsorbed by other railways on to the general labour market but made it easier for white labourers to move from the east to compete in the still relatively high-wage Californian market. Consequently protests mounted apace, culminating with campaigns in mid-1870 against 'servile labour', 'racial pollution', 'degradation of white women', etc., with a 'Workingmen's Convention' in August 1870 aimed specifically at the overthrow of the
Burlinghame Treaty and the expulsion of ‘Mongolians’ from the state, and with several mob attacks on Chinese areas, notably that in Los Angeles in 1871 when eighteen persons were killed, numerous buildings burnt and much property looted. All this was reflected in Californian politics, the earlier agitation helping to explain the Democrats’ victory in September 1867, after seven years in the political wilderness.

In the eastern states, too, anti-Chinese feeling became stronger, particularly with the massacre in China of French missionaries and Chinese Christians in 1869, the frequent harassment of foreign traders and missionaries, and the apparent failure of the Burlinghame Treaty to bring much improvement for American interests. The American press then passed through one of its most anti-Chinese phases, continually reporting Chinese atrocities and reaching a peak of indignation in 1874 when they heard Chinese mobs were destroying railways and telegraphs recently built by western companies.

Additionally Chinese were now spreading over the Rockies, becoming an apparent threat to working class interests in the east and visible to many more of the population as an unassimilated group of strangers. The legislature of Tennessee in 1869 squashed a plan of industrialists and planters to use Chinese labour in cotton fields and factories but the arrival in 1870 of Chinese cobblers in North Adams, Massachusetts (to break the power of the St Crispin fraternity) and of Chinese launderers in Bellevue, New Jersey, initiated a series of anti-Chinese demonstrations supported by many sections of society. Moreover, the press started to draw attention to the steady growth of Chinatowns in New York, Boston and Philadelphia, formed by the slow trickling eastwards of Chinese traders and artisans.

As a consequence of all this, politicians of both major parties began to realise that the Chinese issue was important in the east as well as in the west; also that, in view of the delicately balanced position of the parties, their stand one way or the other could well decide their electoral fate. The first result was the refusal of Congress to accept the 1870 proposals of Senators Sumner and Turnbull to permit the naturalisation of all non-white persons, including Chinese, though members were favourably disposed towards,
The gates close against the Chinese, 1871-88

and soon enacted, the naturalisation of Arabs and Negroes from Africa. The second result was that when, after a temporary decline to 7500 a year in 1871-2, Chinese immigration to California rose to more than 18,000 a year in 1873-6, Congress listened to Californian demands for restriction. First, it passed an Act (3/3/75) prohibiting the importation of women for purposes of prostitution, and increasing the penalties for importing oriental labourers without their consent or understanding. Second, it agreed to send a joint committee to California in 1876, which heard a little pro-Chinese evidence from a few business men and ministers and much anti-Chinese evidence from professional, commercial, artisan and unskilled labour groups. Itsel somewhat loaded with anti-Chinese members (a number of more tolerant members became ill or withdrew) the Committee found:

that there was danger of the white population in California becoming outnumbered by the Chinese; that they came here under contract, in other words as coolies or a servile class; that they were subject to the jurisdiction of organized companies which . . . had power of life and death, which they exercised by assassination; that Chinese cheap labor deprived white labor of employment, lowered wages, and kept white immigrants from coming to the state; that the Chinese were loathsome in their habits, and the filth of their dwellings endangered the health of the city; that they were vile in their morals, and spread prostitution, gambling and opium habits; that they did not assimilate with the whites, and never could become an integral and homogeneous part of the population.

The Committee then recommended that the Burlinghame Treaty be confined to trade and that Congress pass legislation prohibiting the immigration of Chinese labourers and artisans, so fulfilling its duty to 'the Pacific states and territories, which are suffering under a terrible scourge, but are patiently waiting for relief from Congress'.

The dispute over the Presidential election of 1876, however, diverted congressional attention from the Report. Feelings in California consequently mounted, being expressed not only by Denis Kearney and his bitterly anti-Chinese Workingmen's Party, but by many other citizens; as evidence the convention of September 1878 to draft the second Californian constitution which, declaring that 'the presence of foreigners ineligible to become citizens of the
The great white walls are built

United States is declared to be dangerous to the well-being of the State', inserted articles forbidding public and private corporations from employing any Chinese or Mongolian, empowering the legislature to impose conditions upon which 'aliens otherwise dangerous or detrimental to the well-being or peace of the State' could reside within the state and be removed for failure to keep such conditions, enabling the legislature to delegate to incorporated cities and towns powers to remove Chinese from within their boundaries or force them to reside within certain specified areas, and denying to Chinese the power to vote and to own and inherit property.14

(Within a year all these measures had been declared invalid by Federal Courts as being in breach of the Burlingham Treaty and the Fourteenth Amendment.)

In the east, too, press articles were now appearing about the danger of the United States becoming overwhelmed by 'the inevitable tide of an illimitable sea' and of the urgent need for restriction.15 In 1879, therefore, numbers of anti-Chinese congressmen (mainly from the western and southern states though some from the north-eastern) passed a Bill setting aside the migration clause of the Burlingham Treaty and, borrowing an Australian concept, limiting the number of Chinese arriving by any one ship to fifteen.

President Hayes at once vetoed the Bill, on the grounds that it infringed an existing treaty but later, to dampen the blast of Californian fury, agreed to send a commission to China to re-negotiate the Treaty. The Chinese commissioners proved unexpectedly tough, agreeing to a complete prohibition of the migration of criminals, prostitutes and diseased persons but declining to accept prohibition of artisan or labourer migration, except perhaps to California, on the grounds that other peoples entered the United States without let or hindrance. The Americans eventually agreed to replace the word 'prohibit' with the words 'limit' or 'suspend', but insisted on including artisans and miners in the general term 'laborer'. The new Treaty came into force in November 1880, after which Congress passed a Bill suspending the entry of Chinese 'laborers' for 20 years; subsequently reduced to 10 years when President Arthur rejected the 20-year period as being too long for a 'suspension' and hence a breach of Treaty.16

Though, on the surface, this first restrictive entry Act went a
long way to meet their demands, many Californians were still dis­satisfied. True the Act at once reduced immigration from nearly 40,000 in 1882 to 8000 in 1883 and 300 in 1884.17 But the struggle for restriction had taken some time—15 years since its revival in 1867—and during that time nearly 200,000 Chinese arrivals had passed through the San Francisco Customs House while the Chinese population of the state had grown, despite considerable on-migra­tion to other western states and remigration to China, from about 40,000 to 80,000. This number, many felt, was too large and too competitive; what they wanted was not just prevention of future immigration but expulsion of those already there.

Many Californians were also exceedingly angry at the fate of their discriminatory laws after the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act (1868, 70), especially of those designed to protect white artisans and labourers by discouraging Chinese from entering specified occupations. They were even angrier when further attempts to protect white businesses suffered a like fate. Thus San Francisco made three attempts to protect white laundries, first by the 1873 ordinance imposing a heavy additional tax on laundries not using horse-drawn vehicles (most Chinese laundries delivered by foot), second by prohibiting laundries in certain areas unless sponsored by twelve citizens (Chinese, unable to become citizens, had trouble finding sponsors), third by an 1880 ordinance prohibiting laundries in wooden buildings (where most Chinese laundries were); the courts rejected all these as unreasonable, oppressive and in breach of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Chinese-American Treaty. A similar fate met Acts prohibiting the employment of Mongolians in public works and corporations. (A similar Act of 1879 in Oregon state, where Chinese were moving in numbers, was also declared invalid.18)

Californians also resented the disallowance of laws they felt were necessary to protect their health and mode of life against dangerous or disagreeable Chinese habits. Thus San Francisco's Cubic Air ordinance of 1870, directed against the Chinese habit of living close packed in tenement houses, prohibited the lease of residential buildings with rooms giving less than 500 cubic feet of air per person; the courts rejected this as 'unjust discrimination'.19 Another ordinance, directed against Chinese theatres and prohibit-
The great white walls are built

ing theatrical performances between one and six in the morning, or any undue noise in connection with such theatres, apparently remained unchallenged.20 

With so many of their laws disallowed, and with Washington so slow to introduce restriction, some Californians became sufficiently bitter to introduce other kinds of discrimination. San Francisco's famous Queue Ordinance of 1873, declaring that every convict should have his hair cut short, was designed to deal a blow at Chinese ethnic pride by removing the pig-tails of all those convicted of breach of even minor city ordinances; the courts later invalidated this as being 'hostile and spiteful' and in breach of the Civil Rights Act.21 Other laws survived longer, including those keeping Chinese children from local schools (1870) and, when this was voided, requiring separate schools for Chinese children (1880).22 

Clearly Californians, and indeed by now most of the west coast, were not in the mood meekly to accept the 1882 restrictive Act as the answer to all their problems (by this time there were about 10,000 Chinese in Oregon State and about 5000 in Washington, Nevada and Idaho). In any case, as a measure of restriction, they thought it deficient. First, it was to operate for 10 years only. Second, it did not cover all Chinese labourers—those arriving from non-Chinese ports, for instance. Third, it made no attempt to stop the Chinese system of commuter migration, whereby men worked abroad for a few years, returned home for a year or so, then went abroad to work again for a while; such persons claimed residence in the United States though they maintained their homes in China. Fourth, westerners felt that the law was being administered by soft-hearted officials and judges. Fifth, they suspected that some Chinese coming in through the exempt categories—merchants, professional men, officials, students, and tourists—were not genuine or were entering on forged certificates. An amending Congressional Act (1884), blocking the entry of Chinese from ports outside China, and persons of Chinese descent but of some other citizenship, did little to appease them.23 

Suspicious of the Act and of those administering it, angry that no attempt was being made to expel Chinese residents, furious at the disallowance of their local laws, some Americans in the western states allowed their feelings to break out in the mid-1880s, at a time
when economic conditions were bad and industrial unrest and violence prevalent. In September 1885 a riot at Rock Springs, Wyoming, killed more than twenty Chinese and started a series of anti-Chinese outbreaks down the whole west coast. In Washington State, Tacoma burnt its Chinese quarter while Seattle and Olympia nearly destroyed theirs. In Oregon state, Portland, Oregon city and other towns saw demonstrations and violence. In California over thirty municipalities and townships demonstrated against their Chinese residents, sometimes burning the buildings and expelling the inhabitants.24 Things quietened in 1886 but by then both Washington and Peking had decided on further measures.

Peking moved first, offering strict control over Chinese emigration and remigration, 'in order that Chinese laborers may gradually be reduced in numbers and causes of dangers averted and lives preserved'. Washington responded and by March 1888 had reached an agreement authorising suspensions of immigration for 20 years, with extensions, but giving $276,600 compensation for damage and allowing the re-entry of Chinese labourers who had left a wife, child, parent or $1000 in the United States. Secretary Bayard justified this last on the grounds that 'considerations of humanity and justice require these exceptions to be made, for no law should overlook the ties of family, and the wages of labor are entitled to just protection'.25

The Senate, however, was unsure that this agreement adequately prevented commuter migration, so added a clause expressly forbidding the return to the United States of former migrant labourers (except those with close relatives or $1000) whether they held re-entry certificates under earlier Acts or not. As it was an election year Congress then proceeded to anticipate Chinese agreement to the proposed Treaty and passed a law embodying all these provisions (September 1888). Peking, however, queried various clauses, whereupon Congress passed another Bill (the Scott Act) basically enforcing the desired provisions but without any reference to a Treaty. President Cleveland, when it became clear that Peking would not give way and that west coast feelings were mounting, eventually agreed (October 1888). Later Acts soon followed, the most important being the Geary Act of 1892 which continued existing laws for another 10 years, denied Chinese bail
in habeas corpus proceedings, fixed heavy penalties for false certificates and, in a manner reminiscent of Victoria and New South Wales earlier, required all Chinese residents to carry certificates of identity, with the onus of proof that he was not a Chinese on the individual and not the State. Though various provisions of these Acts were challenged as breach of Treaty, the Supreme Court consistently upheld them on the grounds that Acts of Congress overrode Treaties. Eventually Peking recognised the inevitable and in the Treaty of 1894 agreed to all the American legislation.

Though in fact these Acts erected formidable barriers against Chinese immigration, they did not satisfy those Californians demanding expulsion; indeed it was in 1891 that California passed its most extreme law, later voided by the state supreme court, forbidding any Chinese except an authorised government official to enter the state. Eventually feelings subsided, especially when Californians saw that the Chinese population of the state was at last declining; from some 80,000 in 1882, to 72,500 in 1890 and 45,800 in 1900. This was largely due to the failure of the Chinese to bring their wives while they had the chance (in 1890 the sex ratio was some 2300 males for every one female) and the inability of labourers visiting their wives in China to come back to California. The United States, in short, had at long last imposed effective controls over Chinese immigration, even though it had had to break Treaty obligations to do so.

3 British Columbia and Canada, 1871-85

These developments in California had considerable influence in British Columbia. Not only were some of the inhabitants Californian diggers who had come north in the late 1850s but occasional new discoveries brought in more Americans, or Americanised Europeans, fresh with the anti-Chinese sentiments and slogans of California, Oregon and Washington. Additionally, the continued growth of Victoria town, finally selected as the colony's capital, and of Vancouver city as the deep-sea terminal of the Canadian Pacific Railway (1885), brought about an increase in the urban working class. At the same time the rapid development of the
The gates close against the Chinese, 1871-88

Nanaimo coal-fields north of Victoria greatly increased the number of coal-miners. All these groups were very suspicious of possible competition from Chinese labourers, were much influenced by the anti-Chinese campaigns of Kearney and other working class leaders in California, and watched Chinese immigration with some care; the Working Men's Protective Association, formed in 1879 and strong enough to field two candidates by 1886, made Chinese exclusion a major plank in its platform and maintained political pressure right through the 1880s. In this they often received support from certain radical politicians and journalists who were anxious to increase the power of the new legislature as against the provincial administration; notably John Robson, the fiery editor of the *British Columbian* and provincial representative for Nanaimo, and Amor de Cosmos, editor of the *British Colonist*, and later representative for Victoria in the federal parliament.

In fact, the Chinese population of British Columbia increased relatively little during the 1870s. Arrivals averaged 500 a year over 1876-80, but these were lean years economically and remigration remained high; in 1881 the Chinese population recorded in the census was 4350, compared with an estimate of some 3000 in 1871, that is, still just over 20 per cent of total non-Indian population. It was not until the 1880s that net migration showed substantial increase, mainly owing to the demand for coolie labour by the Canadian Pacific Railway. Some 15,700 Chinese entered the colony in 1881-4, the vanguard being two ship-loads of 1000 each imported in 1881 by Andrew Onderdonk, a major local contractor for the railway.

Nevertheless, it was during the 1870s that the anti-Chinese campaign got up momentum, partly because of stagnation in mining and developmental projects, and the resulting competition between white and Chinese labourers for scarce jobs. Soon after the anti-Chinese campaign in California, 1870-1, similar moves started in British Columbia. John Robson asserted that Chinese were competing with whites in the coal-mines and proposed that, in order to encourage the departure of those already resident as well as to discourage new arrivals, all Chinese residents should be required to pay a poll tax of $50 a year (1872). Defeated here he then proposed that no Chinese be permitted to work in provincial public
works.\textsuperscript{31} Again defeated by merchant-industrial interests, he then moved (1872, 74) that all Chinese be denied the franchise, not only adult male labourers and artisans otherwise eligible under the new law introducing manhood suffrage but also those Chinese merchants and property owners who already had the vote.\textsuperscript{32} As in Australia earlier, fear of giving political rights to large numbers of 'heathen Chinese' quite unused to democratic procedures, led the legislature this time to vote for the proposals.

In 1876 the provincial government decided to support the notion of restrictive entry and ask the federal government in Ottawa to take steps 'to prevent this Province being overrun with a Chinese population, to the injury of the settled population of the country'.\textsuperscript{33} Relations at this time between the two governments were very bad, the province becoming increasingly angry at the slowness of the federal administration to start building the western end of the railway, or to encourage other developmental projects, and the federal government growing increasingly annoyed at the impertunate demands of this newest and least populous Canadian province. Failing to persuade Ottawa to introduce restriction, British Columbia turned to internal discrimination. A move to tax all persons wearing pig-tails was declared \textit{ultra vires} by the Speaker (1878) but the Chinese Tax Act (1878), imposing an annual poll tax of $40 on every Chinese aged thirteen and over, was in force until declared invalid by the Supreme Court of British Columbia; on the grounds that it was 'not intended to collect revenue but to drive the Chinese from the country', and thus a usurpation of the federal power to control immigration and a breach of the Treaty of Peking.\textsuperscript{34}

Meanwhile the province maintained pressure on Ottawa. A provincial committee (1879) reported that there were at least 6000 Chinese in the province arousing much local hostility by their degraded moral and social conditions, their inability to assimilate, and their competition as servile coolies; it again asked for a federal poll tax. Petitions against the railway's employment of Chinese were also presented by indignant British Columbians in Ottawa. The federal government, led by John MacDonald, realising that Washington had at least agreed to a federal committee for California (1876), and that there might be substance in provincial
claims that Anglo-Chinese treaties need not prevent restrictive laws (as witness the restrictive laws of the Australian colonies), agreed to appoint a federal Royal Commission. When however this reported in 1879, agreeing in substance with British Columbian views (the majority of members were British Columbians), it so happened that railway building was beginning, prosperity smiled again, demand for all kinds of labour increased, and anti-Chinese agitation temporarily diminished.

Feeling surged up again during the recession of 1883-4, especially when some recent Chinese arrivals sought employment and charitable aid in Victoria city, and when the tougher element of the local Tongs entered Chinatown 'with intent to extort money from the gambling dens and houses of ill-fame and to endanger the safety of the public'. The provincial legislature and press, this time able to quote the recent anti-Chinese legislation in the Australian colonies and the United States, and the substantial increase of Chinese to an estimated 12,000, again tried to move Ottawa (1883). MacDonald, influenced more by the industrial-commercial interests backing the Canadian Pacific Railway and by liberal views somewhat more widespread in the eastern provinces, gave the simple reply that until the railway was complete the company needed Chinese labour, and that thereafter it had to maintain good relations with the Chinese empire in order to develop trade between the Chinese Empire and North America.

Again British Columbia turned to internal discrimination. The Chinese Regulation Act (1884) asserted that 'the [Chinese] population so introduced are fast becoming superior in number to our own race; are not disposed to be governed by our laws; are dissimilar in habits and occupation from our people; evade the payments of taxes justly due to government; are governed by pestilential habits; . . . habitually desecrate graveyards by the removal of bodies therefrom; and . . . are inclined to habits subversive of the comfort and well-being of the community'. It then imposed a poll tax of $10 a year on every Chinese aged thirteen and over, a fine of $50 on every Chinese immigrant and a fixed licence fee for Chinese miners at $15 a year as against $5 for others. The federal government approved the Act but the courts later disallowed it as invasion of federal immigration powers. Likewise the Municipal Act of
1885, giving local municipalities power to regulate laundries and other businesses favoured by the Chinese, and to tax such enterprises up to $150 a year, was declared invalid as invading the federal monopoly of indirect taxation; this attempt to empower local governments to expel or restrict Chinese traders fared no better in British Columbia than in California. The Land Act of 1884, prohibiting the sale of crown lands directly to Chinese, fared somewhat better; the courts declared that the disposal of crown lands was a matter entirely for the provincial legislature.38

This continuous pressure eventually led MacDonald to appoint another federal commission (J. A. Chapleau, Mr Justice Gray, 1884) which concluded that charges of Chinese crime and immorality were greatly exaggerated and that Chinese labour had been of great value to the Railway. They agreed, however, that the Chinese were unassimilable and that they were gaining complete control of certain industries and reducing wages therein; even 'the very best friends of the Chinese think that their immigration should be regulated'.39 As a result of their recommendations, and mounting British Columbian anger, the federal Parliament passed a restrictive Act with a distinctively Australian flavour: a restriction of one Chinese immigrant per 50 tons of ship's burthen and a $50 poll tax on each adult Chinese resident. In introducing it Chapleau repeated the importance of not damaging Canada's trade relations with China and persuaded the House to reject the much severer measures demanded by British Columbia representatives (complete exclusion or a poll tax of $100).40

This Act of 1885 at once reduced Chinese immigration from an average of more than 3000 a year (1881-5) to 700 a year (1886-9). The effects were not, however, apparent for some time as the cessation of railway building (1886) put many Chinese on to the local labour market. Though on-migration was minimal (the 1891 census showed only 200 or so Chinese in other Canadian provinces) remigration to China was substantial and numbers began to fall. Of the 25,000 or more Chinese to be in the province during the eighties (4350 already resident in 1881 and some 21,000 new arrivals in 1881-90) fewer than 9000 were resident there in 1891, that is, about 13 per cent of total non-Indian population. Anti-Chinese feeling eventually quietened for a time (though there were
occasional outbreaks of violence, as in Vancouver in 1887), not becoming a major political issue until the 1890s when it is better seen in the light of large-scale Japanese immigration and the general campaign against all orientals. In sum, though it was not nearly as severe as the anti-Chinese laws of the late 1880s in the United States and the Australian colonies, the 1885 Act did close the doors sufficiently to solve Canada's Chinese problem for the time being.

4 Chinese life in North America

Restrictions on the entry of Chinese, then, were less severe in Canada than in the United States, but internal controls and discrimination were much the same. From stringent discriminations, and the strenuous efforts of state or municipal governments to impose them, federal laws and constitutions protected Chinese residents in both countries. The main disabilities they suffered were, first, denial of the franchise (in British Columbia by direct prohibition and in the United States by indirect denial via the federal bar against naturalisation); their political position was therefore very weak as local politicians had no need to consider their votes. Second, both countries enforced certain minor discriminations that somehow escaped federal protection of alien rights; Californian requirements about segregated schooling and municipal control of theatres or British Columbian refusal to allow Chinese to purchase land direct from the crown. Third was the time-lag between promulgation of a discriminatory law by the local government and its invalidation by the courts; during such interval, varying from months to years, Chinese residents sometimes had to endure severe inconvenience. Finally was the frequent discrimination practised outside the law: hospitals falsely telling sick Chinese they were full; holiday resorts claiming they were booked out; professional associations quietly refusing to register Chinese applicants; and so on. Nevertheless, unpleasant as these discriminations were, they did not by and large prevent Chinese residents from following their chosen occupations, purchasing land and housing, and following their traditional way of life.

How, under all these conditions, did the Chinese communities
The great white walls are built

function, and what kind of life did they embody? First, in the Pacific states, the Chinese populations grew steadily during the 1870s and early 1880s but then, with the advent of restrictive entry laws, began to fall slowly away; the net result being, over 1870-90, an increase from 3000 to 9000 in British Columbia, 250 to 3300 in Washington State, 3300 to 9500 in Oregon, and 49,000 to 72,500 in California. In contrast, in the mountain states of Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, Idaho and Montana, there was a temporary upsurge during mining and railway construction days, reaching in all a peak of some 12,000 about 1880, and then a rapid decline. Further east, small Chinatowns appeared during the 1870s, by 1890 reaching 7000 in New York, nearly 2000 in Boston and Philadelphia, and a few hundred elsewhere, including Toronto and Montreal.

These populations were still overwhelmingly male as most labourers, and merchants and professionals, continued the earlier system of maintaining homes in China and commuting between the two countries. From this came two important results. First, the number of arrivals greatly exceeded the number of residents—about 4:1; that is, the populations contained a large transitory element with a small core of permanent settlers. Second, the sex ratio remained as heavily weighted against females as in the earlier period—on average about twenty-five males for every female, a little lower in San Francisco, Victoria and the larger cities and considerably higher in the mining and railway construction areas. Moreover, a large number of those women in America were still prostitutes.

The geographical and occupational distribution, however, was changing steadily. Whereas in 1860 nearly 30,000 of the 35,000 Californian Chinese were in mining counties only 20,000 were there in 1870 and 1880, despite an increase of the Chinese population to 75,000. Moreover, even in these counties, only two-thirds were actually mining, the remainder being labourers, cooks, servants, gardeners, merchants, restauranteurs, or lauderers.43 Outside the mining counties, other Chinese were employed as agricultural labourers, fruit growers, market gardeners, timber-cutters, ditch-diggers, construction labourers, or domestic servants; their number in California increased from some 2000 in 1860 to 10,000 in 1880. But the greatest shift was to the larger cities, from 5000 or so in
The gates close against the Chinese, 1871-88

1860 (2700 in San Francisco) to 40,000 or more in 1880 (22,000 in San Francisco). Here they were either employed in textile factories, distilleries, canneries, brick-works, cigar factories and private homes, or else worked for Chinese launderers, shoemakers, carpenters, restaurateurs and in the numerous businesses, shops, gambling houses and opium dens of Chinatown. Similarly in Oregon and Washington state, miners declined in number as the Chinatowns of Seattle, Tacoma, Portland and other cities developed.

In British Columbia the mining areas retained some attraction, especially after the development of the Kootenay fields as a rich source of gold, silver and copper. In 1870 there were some 2500 Chinese in the mining areas and about the same in 1881 and 1891. But whereas in 1870 they comprised 87 per cent of the Chinese total by 1891 they were less than 30 per cent of the 9000 total; of the rest about 23 per cent were in Victoria City, some 30 per cent in or near the adjacent cities of New Westminster and Vancouver, perhaps 10 per cent in the Nanaimo coal-fields and the rest scattered through the province. As in the states further south, they were employed as railway workers, domestic servants, market gardeners or factory workers, or else by the Chinese merchants, launderers and restauranteurs of Victoria’s Chinatown.

What kind of life prevailed in these various places? The later mining and railway camps were very reminiscent of mining camps earlier. Retaining their blue cotton blouses, floppy trousers, broad-brimmed hats and long black queues—surrendering only their wooden shoes for American boots—Chinese miners and railway-men packed themselves into small huts, with stools, tables, cooking utensils and bunks all huddled together in an indescribable confusion and obscured by dense clouds of smoke. Similar conditions prevailed in city Chinatowns, men packing themselves into tenement buildings, sometimes sleeping in dormitories, on the floor, like sardines tightly packed in a tin. Only domestic servants and others living in white establishments, or well-to-do merchant and professional families, lived in less crowded conditions.

In both camp and city long hours of work seven days a week were frequent, the burden lightened by the chatter of numerous work-mates pressing about and the occasional sip of tea or small forbidden pipe of tobacco. What little leisure there was went in
conversation, gambling, opium smoking or an occasional visit to the Chinese theatre or restaurant. In the more permanent camps and Chinatowns these, together with brothels and gambling dens, became important ethnic institutions, patronised by those on holiday from remoter places, on the move to a new job or on the way to or from China. Annual festivals provided a longer break, notably the several days of New Year celebrations, providing both camp and city with the continuous noise of fire-crackers and the excitement of periodic processions. 47

In all these activities, work and leisure, Chinese immigrants were under the supervision of their headmen, either the merchant-creditor (here using the term merchant to include bankers, accountants, factory owners, etc.) or his agent; his was the responsibility for providing daily labour for the railway gangs or mining teams and his the right of receiving the pay packet and extracting what labourers owed him for passage costs and other fees before handing out the remainder. Likewise, in the cities or rural areas the shop proprietor, launderer or market gardener often acted as headman to his employees, deducting loan repayment before issuing wages. Where the merchant-creditor was, as was usual, a prominent member of the lineage, clan or district society his authority received powerful reinforcement from traditional Chinese values.

In a very real sense these merchant-creditors were substitutes for the gentry and scholar-officials who controlled governmental organisation in China. The latter, with high status at home and unwilling to prejudice their future by emigrating against the wishes of the Manchu government, 48 rarely came to America, though sometimes one or two accepted invitations to become presidents of major Chinese-American societies. 49 But it took some time for the merchants, still quite low on the social scale by Confucian standards, to justify their claims to power and organise a stable social system. During the 1850s, when immigrants were beginning to form district associations or companies under merchant leadership (these usually embracing the lesser lineage and clan associations) there was much hostility and fighting between members of the Sam Yap (Three Districts), Sze Yap (Four Districts), Yeong Wo (Chungshan) and Yan Wo (Hakka) associations; sometimes these reached the level of formal battles, with due notice given and ample time to make
dragon banners and traditional weapons, and to practise traditional manoeuvres. Likewise there was considerable strife between groups of Sze Yap migrants when they, much the largest group in California, were splitting up, first in 1854 when many Toishan lineages and clans broke away from the Sze Yap association to found the Ning Yeong company, and later in 1862 when numbers of Hoiping, Toishan and Sunwui lineages withdrew to form the Hop Wo company. What was left of the old Sze Yap company then took the name of the Kong Chow company, so making six district associations altogether.

In the mid-1860s the merchant leaders, their position in their own clans and district associations now more secure, realised they would get further by co-operation. Fighting declined and a co-ordinating body, Chung Wah Kung Saw or Chinese Public Association, known loosely as the ‘Six Companies’, became dominant; for the rest of the century it controlled general relationships not only between the companies, and the lineage and clan interests therein, but also between professional organisations or guilds and between the Chinese population and white society. It was the six companies that made representations to Californian officials or arranged who should challenge Californian discriminatory legislation before the courts. The only challenge to its authority came from the more enterprising Chinese prostitutes—who were not at first recognised by any district company and who sometimes used American legal procedures to protect themselves against Chinese merchant control—and from the secret societies. These highly secret organisations, consisting of rebellious individuals or factions who introduced the old Chinese secret society system to America, challenged the companies’ control of gambling, prostitution and opium smoking, and unhesitatingly used ‘hatchet men’ to enforce their policies. It is significant of the new Chinese-America, however, that they also were led by merchant-creditors, some being quite important members of the district companies.

Eventually this system of companies, guilds and tongs spread all over Chinese America, from San Francisco to New York and from Victoria city to Los Angeles. With such a battery of societies surrounding them, all calling on traditional values and customs for
loyalty and obedience, it is small wonder that even the most transitory Chinese found their lives organised and controlled. True, the companies gave various benefits (medical and hospital services, education, burial, return of bones to the ancestral tomb in China), provided joss-houses and religious services, settled disputes or apprehended and punished thieves and robbers. But they also compelled membership, exacted heavy payment for most services, and rigorously enforced migrant loan agreements; their principal weapon being coercion, prevention of a migrant’s sailing to China until all debts were cleared (in this the companies gained the co-operation of American, British and other shipping lines), and taking up bonds on family land and persons in China should the debtor vanish into some remote part of America.

Tough though the system was, it did fit well with traditional Chinese values, provided leadership and security in a strange land and society, and enabled many Chinese to achieve their ambition of returning home with sufficient money to enhance the power and prestige of their own families or lineages (see chapter 3, section 1 above). It did not, however, make for much mixing between Chinese and Europeans in America. Merchants mixed for official and business purposes but their wives and children, such as had them in America, usually dwelt in the fastnesses of Chinatown and had few contacts with non-Chinese. The ones who might have mixed more—young single men who had jobs as cooks, domestic servants or gardeners on white properties in rural places—were still under company control, at any rate until their debts were cleared; in any case they enjoyed their visits to Chinatown and renewal there of ethnic friends and activities. Nevertheless it was here, and amongst students and professionals, that genuine social intermixture and intermarriage occurred. Against the general background, however, such events were rare. Chinese-America in the whole remained a world apart, by inclination of the Chinese as well as by discrimination on the part of the Europeans. The restrictive entry laws of the 1880s, in short, simply reduced the inflow of a people who not only were unwanted by the bulk of society at the time but who themselves, at any rate the great majority, had their hearts and permanent homes back in the family-lineage country of the Pearl River Delta.
Chapter 7

1 The Australian scene: the problem of the tropics

Though formal Federation did not come until 1901 it is easier, from the mid-1870s to the late 1880s, to treat the Australian colonies all together. During these years, on some issues at all events, many settlers were thinking as Australians rather than New South Welshmen, Victorians or Queenslanders, and were building up institutions and policies that overrode colonial boundaries. Thus the 1880s saw the transformation of several local Trade Unions into Australia-wide organisations (Amalgamated Miners Association, Federated Seamen’s Union, Amalgamated Shearers’ Union, etc.) and the regular calling of intercolonial Trade Union Congresses. Likewise employers’ organisations formed a federal body in 1888, the anti-Chinese leagues of the separate colonies began to work together, and even colonial governments sent delegates to various intercolonial conferences, and sometimes implemented the general principles there agreed to. Four colonies indeed (Tasmania, Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia) set up in 1885 a Federal Council of Australasia, which passed laws on pearl fishing and naturalisation and discussed many other common problems. Moreover, though there was much disagreement on financial and other matters, there was much intercolonial consultation, and sometimes considerable agreement, on the three main issues relevant to this story: Chinese immigration, the right of the colonies to determine their own population composition, even in the face of imperial objections, and the safeguarding of Australian interests in the south-west Pacific against encroachments by the German, French and Chinese Empires.

Queensland was the first to ask for Australia-wide support on the Chinese question—when the imperial government queried parts of her anti-Chinese legislation of 1876—and by 1888, when a special
intercolonial conference drafted severe restrictions against Chinese immigration, most colonies were agreed that the Chinese question was of Australia-wide importance and required reasonably uniform treatment. The Trade Union movement took even less time to reach agreement; from the first intercolonial congress in 1879 onwards the movement came out strongly for virtual prohibition of future Chinese immigration, or of any other labour that they feared employers could use to reduce wages and increase hours.

The wider problem of coloured labour in general was less easy, involving differences of interest and viewpoint that were of great underlying importance all during the seventies and eighties. Speaking generally there were three basic issues. First, that of coloured specialists useful to one or more of the colonies for developmental purposes, e.g. Afghan camel-drivers organising transport in the arid zones of the interior, or Malay and Japanese divers gaining pearls, pearl-shell and trepang fish (sea-slugs much in demand in China) from the Queensland coast north of Townsville to the Western Australian coast as far south as Shark Bay. Second, that of finding an unskilled or semi-skilled labour force to work in areas or occupations thought to be beyond the European physique, e.g. agricultural fieldwork in the tropics. Third, the earlier issue of acquiring labour for work which Europeans could physically manage but for which they were unavailable. These issues were all much more acute in Queensland, Western Australia and South Australia (the last having acquired the Northern Territory in 1863) than in south-eastern Australia: though geographically so much larger and covering 85 per cent of the continent, they were relatively backward economically, had benefited much less from the population influx of the gold-rushes, and were financially less able to sponsor large-scale immigration from Europe; furthermore they contained most of the pearling and arid regions where coloured specialists were useful; and finally they were the only colonies with tropical areas (Queensland 359,000 square miles, South Australia 426,000, and Western Australia 364,000). The views of many of their officials, farmers and business men on the need for coloured labour, therefore, were often very different from those of their colleagues in the south-east.

Conversely New South Wales and Victoria were being affected
by quite another problem, namely, the shift of their Chinese populations from rural to metropolitan areas and away from mining to other occupations. In New South Wales the population of Chinese residing in the metropolitan area rose from 4.7 per cent (336) in 1871 to 26.3 per cent in 1891 (3465) while in Victoria it rose from 3.4 per cent (614) to 30.4 per cent (2585).¹ Similarly, in New South Wales the proportion of Chinese breadwinners engaged in mining fell from over 70 per cent (about 5700) in 1871 to less than 15 per cent in 1891 (1947) and in Victoria from some 75 per cent (13,374) to some 25 per cent (2181). The major occupations favoured were market gardening, pastoral and agricultural labouring, domestic service and retail trading. A few became furniture-makers and launderers. (A similar shift in occupations later became important in Queensland.) Other non-Europeans were few in New South Wales and Victoria, by 1891 numbering a few hundred only.

Tasmania was in a somewhat different position. Containing only a few Chinese in the 1860s, she attracted nearly a thousand to the tin mines opened up in the 1870s, especially to those around Briseis in the north-east. During the 1880s relatively few of these drifted into Hobart or Launceston, or changed their occupations. Other non-Europeans were also scarce, no more than 500 by 1891.

These differences in population numbers and developmental possibilities became important relatively early. We may leave the story of non-European specialists till a later chapter, but attempts to recruit non-European labour for undeveloped tropical and semi-tropical areas are inextricably linked with the story of Chinese exclusion and require attention now.

Queensland was the first colony to move. Afire to justify their recent independence from New South Wales (1859), both government and capitalists agreed that, though some more coolies might be necessary to overcome labour shortages in the south and west, it was manifest that rapid development of the almost virgin centre and north, as by cotton, sugar and other tropical or semi-tropical crops, required 'the introduction of coolies, a race habituated to work at field labour under a tropical sun'.² Governor Bowen and Colonial Secretary Herbert, anxious to take advantage of the world shortage of cotton arising from troubles in the United States, hurriedly obtained Parliamentary agreement to them making
regulations for admitting Indian coolies (1861) and then, when Westminster protested at such unseemly haste and unsatisfactory proposals, drew up a Coolie Act and regulations sufficient to satisfy both Westminster and India that Indian coolies would be properly paid, cared for and protected. India's requirements, however, included government financial guarantees and payment of Protectors responsible direct to India; with British cotton interests refusing to cover the whole cost, with its own financial resources strained to assist British and European immigration, and with hostility to the whole scheme still simmering, the government eventually refused to meet these requirements and the scheme lapsed. The Act and Regulations, however, remained in force.

Meanwhile, would-be planters were looking elsewhere. Robert Towns, already noted for his part in introducing Indian and Chinese coolies to pastoral properties near Brisbane in the 1840s (pp. 42, 46 above), and who had since then developed considerable plantation and sandalwood interests in nearby Pacific islands, decided to follow Boyd's earlier example and introduce island labour to work his cotton plantation; at 10 shillings a month plus keep and free return at the end of periods ranging from 6 months to 3 years. Others quickly followed suit, including sugar planters developing land on the central and northern coast and pastoralists in the south and west looking for shepherds and servants. By March 1868 the colony contained some 1500 islanders, over 600 in the tropics, about 200 in central areas and the remainder in the south and west; about half were in agriculture (mainly cotton and sugar), several hundred on pastoral properties, and a hundred or so in the urban areas of the south as servants or discharged field labourers seeking urban employment.

Strenuous opposition, however, had been developing, not only from those worried about competition from cheap labour on pastoral properties but from missionary societies alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and forcible kidnapping of islanders by unscrupulous recruiting agents or 'black-birders'. The Presbyterian, Melanesian and London Missionary Societies, together with the Aborigines' Protection Society and the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, exerted considerable pressure both in Brisbane and Westminster; to which the Queensland government responded by
passing the Polynesian Labour Act of 1868 (No. 37) regulating conditions of employment and repatriation, licensing recruiting agents, registering islanders landed for labour and appointing inspectors to police the system. Though this Act, and subsequent regulations issued under it (e.g. those of 1870 requiring the appointment of government agents and lodging of bonds by prospective employers), did something to improve conditions in Queensland itself, they did little to prevent continued abuses in the recruiting process. Eventually the imperial government, troubled also by similar abuses in the sandalwood trade and in the growing sugar industry of islands such as Fiji, felt compelled in 1872 to pass the Pacific Islanders' Protection Act, engaging naval vessels for police work and commissioning courts for trying offenders.

The full story of this complex and sometimes tragic episode is well covered by others. It is relevant here simply as a factor in determining Australian attitudes to the employment of non-European labour on the continent. Queensland attitudes in the late 1860s are well summed up in the debates concerning the Polynesian Labour Act of 1868 and O'Doherty's attempt to repeal it in 1871-2. Those favouring island labour argued strongly that the development of tropical Queensland depended on it, as 'cotton and sugar could not be grown without labour of [this] description'. Their opponents argued that this was old-fashioned nonsense as Europeans successfully worked in the semi-tropical climates of New Orleans or Southern Europe, were doing quite well on some of the Queensland plantations, and that 'until it is distinctly proved that field operations cannot be carried on in the northern districts by white laborers they should not jump to the conclusion that it was necessary to import black laborers'. Others, more under missionary influence, raised the spectre of slavery, as instance the petition of 1869 rejoicing at Britain's earlier abolition of slavery and the civilising influence of missionaries in the islands, and deprecating the removal of so many islanders from that influence by this new 'development of the slave trade'. Yet others concentrated on the alleged damage done to white labourers in the south and west, particularly by pastoralists introducing 'an inferior and uncivilized race . . . to supplant British and European laborers'; this, they added, raised the further question of the place of such persons in
a democratic society, their introduction being 'totally subversive of the constitutional principles on which this colony has been founded', i.e. that all adult male settlers should eventually have the vote and take part in the processes of government.\textsuperscript{10}

As Westminster, and to some extent the missionary societies, had the strictly controlled migration of Indian coolies to Mauritius and the Caribbean as their standard, they were more concerned with control than prohibition. Planter interests were thus better placed to win the battle and persuade O'Doherty to withdraw his motion of repeal. Not unimportant in their victory, however, was the argument that, for the present at all events, the northern plantations would collapse without coloured labour and that if Pacific islanders were prohibited planters would have no alternative but to revert to the earlier precedent of recruiting Chinese. Thompson, Secretary for Public Lands, mentioned that Chinese might soon be coming in considerable numbers and could be available for tropical labour: 'I am certainly more in favour of introducing the Polynesians than the Chinese who, I am sure, are always a disturbing element in the country and cost it a great deal more . . . For my part, I would rather have the untutored savage than the refuse of the Chinese population'.\textsuperscript{11} Thompson was here playing on the 1861 outburst against Chinese coolies (chapter 4, section 1), the growing signs that Chinese gold-diggers were moving into Queensland from New South Wales to compete with white diggers in the newly discovered mines at Cape River, and the fact that some planters were having difficulty in getting sufficient island labour and were making inquiries about Chinese coolies.

Whatever the exact interplay of forces, Queensland for the time kept the system of Pacific Island labour. By 1881 the colony contained some 6000 male islanders and 400 females: over 3000 were in tropical districts, most on sugar plantations around Mackay; 2300 were in the sugar and agricultural districts of the central coast, mainly near Maryborough and Bundaberg; only a few hundred were in the pastoral and agricultural districts of the south and west, and another few hundred in the urbanised south-east in and near Brisbane.\textsuperscript{12} Clearly by 1881 there was less tendency for islanders to compete with white pastoral and urban labourers but a much greater dependence of sugar production on their presence.
Their number, however, did not stop all moves for other coloured labourers, especially at times when islanders were difficult or expensive to obtain. In 1874 some planters at Mackay formed an Association for the Employment and Protection of Aborigines, but most concluded that these nomadic hunting peoples were too averse to regular work, and not sufficiently robust, to make reliable plantation workers. In the same year some representatives asked the government to implement the Coolie Act of 1862 and import Indians; but again conditions imposed by India proved a major obstacle. The government agreed, however, to make inquiries about Chinese coolies from Amoy, only to become very cool to the scheme when it discovered that both British and Chinese governments would insist that such labour be supervised by agents paid by the Queensland administration. Some planters might well have decided to act on their own if their hands had not been suddenly tied by the 1875 outcry against the ‘invasion’ of Cantonese gold-diggers and the consequent legislation restricting Chinese immigration. Queensland planters, in short, remained heavily dependent on Pacific Islanders.

South Australia tackled her tropical problem somewhat differently. Acquiring her Northern Territory in 1863 on the grounds that she could develop it by pastoral expansion from the south, she ‘perpetrated an amazing volte face, and abandoned the back door and financial safety for the ostentatious but risky gateway to the Asiatic east, a gateway at which the British stations had already failed’. Furthermore, though some early authorities stressed that ‘proximity to the immense labour markets of the East . . . removes one of the greatest obstacles to successful cultivation (of cotton, sugar and the like)’, the Ayers government proceeded on the assumption that the humid coastal regions could be developed by white yeomen farmers and labourers working on relatively small blocks of land under a Wakefield system of land colonisation. Ten years later, after numerous casualties from tropical diseases and the departure of numbers of families unable to tolerate the humidity of the ‘wet’ season, and after considerable financial loss from inefficient planning and administration, the distant governments in Adelaide decided to follow Queensland’s example and develop the Territory by means of large plantations using
The great white walls are built

coloured labour. T. Reynolds, Commissioner for Crown Lands and Immigration, 1872-3, having concluded that 'in a climate truly tropical, Europeans cannot give the same amount of labour, nor work long in the open air during many months', made inquiries about Asiatic labour in Ceylon, Singapore and the East Indies; he finally recommended Javanese and Malays rather than Chinese because, although less robust and persevering, they were more docile and intelligent. 16 Meanwhile other members of the government were making inquiries about Indian coolies but, like Queensland earlier, were somewhat daunted by all the conditions required by the government of India. 17

In the end the government decided upon Chinese from Singapore, not because any planters were organised for development but because, after the discovery of gold at Pine Creek in 1871, several mining companies had been formed in Adelaide and were experiencing great difficulty in obtaining suitable white miners. Having assured itself that the companies would employ Chinese, the government commissioned Captain Bloomfield Douglas, formerly Resident in charge of the Territory, to obtain from Singapore 200 Chinese willing to stay for two years (before being repatriated at government expense). 18 Eventually 186 Chinese and ten Malays arrived, in August 1874, most taking employment on the mines, a few with private persons and the rest on public works. At the end of two years only twenty-one wished to return to Singapore, the rest preferring to work the gold-fields on their own account. 19

At this point, when they were losing even more money to the insatiable north, the now almost frantic government in Adelaide considered engaging creoles from Mauritius, Mennonite refugees from Russia, and agricultural labourers from Japan. These negotiations all came to naught, Japan firmly refusing to permit emigration, even at South Australian public expense, while she 'had colonizing schemes of her own'. 20 Maybe the Japanese government was, as Stephen Roberts suggests, then too concerned with the Satsuma Rebellion to respond, 21 but more likely is the fact that Japan was heavily involved in plans for resettling Japanese agriculturalists on its own island of Hokkaido. In any case, the Japanese government had abolished its centuries old ban on emigration only in 1866 (mainly for merchants, students and others capable of

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bringing back to Japan the knowledge and techniques of the western world) and had permitted only one emigration of agriculturalists, to Hawaii in 1868; this it had terminated very quickly on the grounds that conditions on the Hawaiian sugar plantations were akin to slavery.22 It was not until after 1885, when the government permitted large-scale emigration of agricultural labourers and encouraged the great Japanese emigration companies to undertake colonisation schemes as far afield as Brazil, that there was much likelihood of official Japanese interest in the Northern Territory. Had Japanese farmers indeed successfully established themselves at the time the story of White Australia might have been very different.

Then, in 1877, there arrived the first substantial ship-load of Cantonese gold-diggers, organised by Chinese merchants who had been sending miners to the Queensland diggings and were now finding the trade blocked by recent restrictive laws. As in Queensland this radically altered the coolie question. As in Queensland, too, government policy had not gone unchallenged. Patrick Boyle Coglin, member for Flinders, had been voicing the distaste of many Adelaide labourers and small traders for coloured labour in the north almost from the time the government announced its intention of spending public money on bringing Chinese from Singapore. South Australians wanted British and German immigrants, he announced, and needed all available public funds to assist them with the heavy passage costs from Europe to Australia; in any case 'we want white faces, something more like the angelic-featured people we meet from home, and not Chinese'.23 Distance, the constant heavy drain on the Adelaide Treasury, the clamour of persons with money invested in the Territory so far without return, however, all combined with the widespread view that white persons could not work well in the tropics to overwhelm Coglin and his friends. Though Coglin's views did not triumph until some years later he could derive some consolation from seeing how few coloured labourers the government's policy actually attracted.

Western Australia took quite another line. Desperately short of labour in the 1840s—the population totalled less than 4500 after 20 years of existence—and unable to attract much of the British stream setting to the eastern colonies, a few landowners imported
Indian and Chinese coolies in the late 1830s and 1840s, some with government subsidy; the first census, 1848, showed some ninety persons of Moslem or pagan faith. In 1849, however, the colony persuaded the British government to introduce a modified convict system for its special benefit—as much to obtain British finance for convict-built roads and buildings as for cheap labour—and received some 9700 convicts during the next two decades.

When convict transportation ceased in 1868 labour was still very scarce, in southern districts as well as in the tropical and arid areas, so a Select Committee on Immigration recommended the introduction of Chinese labourers from Singapore, if necessary with government subsidy. Indian coolie immigration was also investigated, but rejected on the grounds that the colony could not meet the conditions imposed by India. In 1874 the Legislative Council not only voted £1000 to subsidise the introduction of fifty or more Chinese and Javanese but also passed the first of the Imported Labour Registry Acts (No. 9, July 1874); this was designed to safeguard 'the welfare of natives of India, China, Africa and of the islands of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and Malayan Archipelago', who might be imported into Western Australia or employed therein, by requiring that vessels supply details of such labourers before landing them and that employers produce such labourers for inspection if requested. In 1878 the Council voted another £7000 to subsidise further immigration, and another £2000 in 1879. Numbers actually introduced, however, seem small; the 1881 count gave only 181 Chinese and 110 Indo-Malayans (then called Malaccans) though clearly there were also 500 or more Malays engaged in pearl fishing. Occupations of the Chinese are obscure; apparently half were engaged in fishing, agriculture or pastoral work in the northern districts, about one-quarter in similar work in the south-west and the remainder in various jobs in or near Perth.

Though numbers were small, government policy did not lack its critics. Members representing working class districts (Marmion and Higham of Fremantle, for example) raised the usual point that Chinese or Malay labourers were 'antagonistic to the introduction of immigrants from Britain', while residents of the south-western agricultural areas argued that Chinese pastoral and farm hands were often quite useless. Such voices, however, were overwhelmed
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by pastoralists and pearlers clamouring for more Asiatic labour, and by the widespread opinion that Chinese and other Asians were very suitable for the colony, 'more especially in the northern portion of the colony where the climate was prejudicial to the health and comfort of European labourers'.

This was the dominant view until workable gold was discovered, in the mid-1880s in the Kimberley Mountains of the far north, and Western Australia seemed about to experience a great influx of Cantonese gold-diggers. At that point other considerations came to the fore.

The position in Australia in the mid-1870s, then, was that Victoria and New South Wales were experiencing a gradual shift of their Chinese populations from mining to other occupations and from rural to metropolitan residence; Tasmania had very few Chinese, except in the newly discovered tin areas, and was not particularly concerned; the three 'tropical' colonies were all implementing labour recruitment policies based on the assumption that, quite apart from labour shortages in the south, any development of sugar, cotton, rice, coffee, rubber and other tropical crops required Asiatic, African or Pacific Island labour. All three had investigated the possibility of Indian coolie migration, and had been repelled by the very strict conditions enforced by the government of India. All three had thereupon turned to other supplies. Queensland, with some 6000 Pacific Islanders, was doing best, both in terms of recruitment and crop production. South Australia and Western Australia, with a few hundred Chinese and Malays from Singapore and elsewhere in the Indo-Malay archipelago (some introduced at government expense), were progressing more slowly. The less ambitious plans of Western Australia, however, based largely on the pastoral and pearl fishing industries, were achieving better results than the more grandiose South Australian scheme of turning the Northern Territory into a tropical garden almost overnight.

2 Cantonese gold-diggers in the Australian tropics

Into this somewhat complicated scene swept the second wave of Cantonese gold-diggers, Queensland first. The Cape River discoveries
of 1867 brought about 1500 Cantonese north from New South Wales and Victoria, increasing Queensland's Chinese population from just over 600 in January 1864, mainly scattered through the rural areas, to more than 2600 in March 1868, nearly 1700 being in mining areas. A few more arrived 1868–71 with further discoveries in the Mt Wyatt, Ravenswood, Gilbert and Etheridge areas; by September 1871 the Chinese numbered some 3300, again mostly in mining areas. The big rush, however, began in 1875 to the Palmer fields, located in the difficult mountainous country inland from Cairns and Cooktown. Gold had been discovered there in 1872, attracted perhaps 5000 European miners in 1873, failed to retain all but 2000 of them during the bad season of 1874, and instead drew a number of Cantonese diggers quite prepared to tackle fields Europeans had deserted as insufficiently productive. By the end of 1874 nearly 1500 Chinese diggers, mostly from other Queensland gold-fields, had moved on to the Palmer fields while the first Palmer gold had reached Hongkong and Canton, inspiring the credit-ticket merchants to start migration operations via Cooktown. By May 1876 some 8000 Chinese were in the Palmer Region, outnumbering Europeans at least 4:1. At this point public opinion forced the government into action.

On the whole relations between European and Chinese diggers had been relatively good since the move north in 1867–8. In November 1871 armed Chinese resisted an attempt to evict them from the Six Mile Diggings on the Gilbert field while a few weeks later, after the death of a white miner named Knox in a tavern brawl with Chinese on the Cape River field, a band of white diggers burnt down the publican's shanty and all the Chinese tents and shelters. The next few years, however, passed with little incident, mainly because the Queensland government had early set up efficient machinery for policing the gold areas, and also because new gold-fields drew white miners rapidly from place to place leaving the Chinese room to work by themselves. The arrival of ship-loads of Cantonese at Cooktown in 1875 produced some tension and threats against Chinamen caught in the vicinity of white miners, as instance the notice on a tree at Sandy Creek that 'any Chinaman found higher up this creek will be instantly seized and hanged until he is dead'. But there was relatively little disorder, the main
pressure of restriction coming from the south where the old anti-Chinese feelings of 1861-2, based on the earlier experiences of Victoria and New South Wales, quickly reasserted themselves.

As early as April 1875, soon after Cantonese began arriving in numbers direct from China, Henry King, now Minister for Mines and just as opposed to coloured labour as ever, moved that the Legislative Assembly consider amending the Gold Fields Act in order to restrict the entry of Asiatic and African aliens; the Assembly agreed but in the changes of government soon afterwards took no further action. Next year, with Chinese still increasing rapidly in numbers, the Thorn government introduced the Gold Fields Amendment Bill (August 1876) requiring Asiatic and African aliens to stay away from new gold-fields for two years and to pay much higher fees for mining or trading on older fields (£3 a year for a miner's licence and £10 a year for a trading licence, compared with the general fees of 10 shillings and £4). The government, and the preamble of the Bill, stated that the objective was to make such aliens contribute their proper share to the cost of supervising the gold-fields (Thorn asserted that in 1875 Chinese had contributed £4500 by way of licence fees but had cost £16,000 in police protection) but the whole colony knew that the real objective was to restrict the number of Chinese diggers entering the colony and to keep them off new gold-fields until white miners had taken their fill of the easier ore and moved on elsewhere. The phrase ‘Asiatic and African alien’ was used rather than ‘Chinese’, not so much because there was any worry about coloured immigrants other than Chinese but because this had been the phrase used in the Aliens Act of 1861 (when restricting easy naturalisation to European aliens, (see chapter 4, section 1, above) and had been accepted without demur by Westminster.

The Legislative Council knocked out the two-year clause, as the planter element felt it would discourage unnecessarily a people who might be useful in tropical agriculture, but permitted a three-year ban later, in 1878, when Chinese numbers had grown considerably. The Governor then referred the remainder of the Bill to Westminster, on the grounds that he and others felt that the discriminatory fee charges might be a breach of Anglo-Chinese Treaties, that the machinery clauses would in practice act not only
against alien Chinese miners and traders but also against British Chinese and against alien Chinese on the gold-fields as servants or market gardeners. Westminster agreed with these objections and disallowed the Bill in the form presented.

The majority of Queenslanders reacted with extreme indignation against this 'imperial meddling' in the internal affairs of a self-governing colony and appealed for support to the other colonies; on the grounds that Westminster had not blocked the New South Wales law of 1861, though that was after the convention of Peking, and that Queensland feared that 'both our rights [of self-government] and our civilization may be compromised, and that our social and political system may be imperilled if on any plea whatever a Chinese immigration is forced upon us against our wishes and against our interests'.[37] Victoria, under the radical Premier Berry, supported Queensland to the hilt; New South Wales under the maturing but still somewhat unpredictable Henry Parkes, replied that while it sympathised with Queensland's predicament it felt that Westminster would react favourably to less aggressively framed legislation; South Australia, then in the midst of seeking Asiatic labour for the Northern Territory, refused to comment until she received more details about the nature of the discriminations proposed; Tasmania merely acknowledged the letter; Western Australia, not then being a self-governing colony, had nothing to contribute.

In mid-1877 a still grumbling Queensland government, feeling somewhat aggrieved at the reaction of every other colony save Victoria, introduced a revised Bill. This left the discriminatory fees as before but safeguarded the rights of British Chinese, and Chinese servants and market gardeners, and stated openly that one of its objects was 'to discourage the immigration of such aliens and their employment in gold mining'. To make matters still more certain, and to remind Westminster of earlier legislation, the government also introduced a Chinese Immigration Regulation Bill, repeating earlier Victorian and New South Wales laws by charging an entry tax of £10 a head and forbidding any vessel to arrive with more than one Chinese immigrant for every 10 tons of ship's tonnage. With colonial tempers inflamed against 'imperial interference', and with another 10,000 Chinese now in the north (making some 17,000
Chinese : 1500 whites) both Bills passed rapidly through Parliament. This time Westminster gave its approval.

It is important to understand the main issues in Queensland at the time. On the one hand planter and other interests set on rapid development of the north were glad to see the entry of a people who, coming at no expense to themselves and with some possibility of later leaving mining for agriculture, seemed a valuable addition to the 'northern portion of the colony where the climate was such as to make it unfit for white men'. This was the group who, with a few liberal-humanitarians, strenuously denied allegations of Chinese degradation, vice and uselessness, and argued that Chinese paid for their protection not only via licence fees but also by customs duties and purchase of Australian goods; they also pointedly asked why 'Asiatic and African aliens should be treated differently from all other aliens' so breaking basic principles of international law and equity.

On the other hand were professional, industrial and small-trade Liberals, led by Samuel Griffith, John Douglas and George Thorn, who were now developing strong opinions against all coloured labour, Pacific islanders included. With them were various pastoralists and industrialists genuinely concerned about the rapid influx of Cantonese miners; by mid-1877 there were far more in Queensland than there were in New South Wales in 1861 when that colony introduced its restrictive laws (17,000 : 12,000). Though various working class leaders raised at meetings and in the press the matter of cheap labour competition, this in fact was not a major issue and was effectively mentioned only once in the legislature. Nor were Chinese degradation, vice and disease major issues, though sometimes used in debate. Nor was the slavery issue at all important, though with missionary and other groups currently railing against the 'slave-trade' in Pacific islanders it was bound to be mentioned. But with Cantonese miners roaming freely about the north, with almost no contact with European employers, traditional arguments against slavery were replaced with half-hearted talk about Chinese immigrants being too much under the control of headmen and secret societies, and in that sense 'slaves' to 'brutal Chinese masters'.

The decisive factor undoubtedly was the rapidity of the Chinese 'invasion'—about 17,000 in two and a half years—and its arousal
of four quite distinct fears. First was the fear that the Chinese imperial giant was at last stirring its sluggish limbs, was about to adopt the imperial expansionist policies of the leading European nations, and had designs on the remote and sparsely populated areas of northern Queensland. As C. S. Mein said when introducing the Gold Fields Amendment Bill to the Council in 1876: ‘unless Parliament is prepared to hand over to the Emperor of China the whole of our Northern Territory it must do something at once’; or as W. H. Bailey said when castigating those trying to base an anti-Chinese campaign on the highly dubious grounds of Chinese degradation and disease, ‘the plain fact is that we are in fear of a Chinese invasion and we may as well say so at once’.

Second was the fear that, even if the British Navy kept the new Chinese gunboats away, large concentrations of Chinese would raise problems similar to those experienced by parts of Southeast Asia where the Chinese had virtually taken over, as in Singapore, or been severely restricted to prevent them doing so, as in Java and the Philippines, ‘As we are bound’, remarked John Douglas after mentioning these places, ‘to resist the invasion of a foreign hostile power so we are bound to resist the invasion of foreigners who, whilst not coming with any hostile object, may arrive in such numbers as in the course of a few years to form a preponderating portion of our people’. At this time, in the large but sparsely settled area of Queensland north of Townsville, there were approximately 18,000 white males, some being children, compared with nearly 1000 adult male Pacific islanders and some 18,000 Chinese, with the last still arriving by the ship-load.

Third was the fear of a Californian situation where, though the Chinese were in a clear minority, they had given rise to a difficult social problem and much race antagonism. By 1877 Queensland politicians were reading and quoting from the Joint Congressional Committee Report on the Chinese in California, from American writers such as Hepworth Dixon (The Mongolian Invasion), and from American leaders such as George Seward, United States Minister to China, who had openly stated how glad and relieved he was that the ‘Chinese stream’ was now setting towards Queensland. Fourth, and closely related, was fear of social disorder, of uncontrollable clashes between Chinese and
The gates close against the Chinese, 1871-88

European miners, such as the Buckland River and Lambing Flat riots earlier in Victoria and New South Wales. As C. S. Mein put it: 'the habits of the races are so opposed to one another that a collision might take place at any moment if a large armed force is not maintained in the gold-fields to prevent it'.

These assessments and arguments carried the day, but it is important to see how the opinions of those concerned with tropical development affected the form of restriction. Douglas and other liberals were at this time seeking to compromise on the Pacific Islander problem, by continuing to allow their entry for the time being yet making sure they did not have the general run of the colony (so competing with white labourers and tradesmen) but were confined to areas of tropical or sub-tropical agriculture; hence his refusal, after becoming Premier in March 1877, to grant licences to import or transfer islanders except for such employment. This control of occupations and residence, by government control of immigration permits, later became a major element in both Australian and American administrative machinery. At this time its importance lies in revealing the attitude that discrimination of this kind was not only a quite legitimate and reasonable condition to impose on coloured labour but was the only condition on which certain liberal and working class groups were prepared to admit such labour to the colony. The same attitude lay behind the 1876 and 1878 moves to keep Chinese diggers off new gold-fields for at least several years but to impose no restriction on them should they wish to enter, as was hoped, other occupations in the tropics (in this case, though, was an added desire to prescribe definite areas for alien miners, as in New South Wales in 1861, in order to reduce the danger of collision between ethnic groups). Here planters watched with great interest the experiment of John Spiller when he engaged forty Chinese, recently arrived in Cooktown as part of the Cantonese gold-rush, to help with his sugar harvest at Mackay in November 1875; he and they were somewhat disgusted with the 'laziness' of these Chinese, though it seems more likely that the Chinese felt that islander wages were too low and that they could do better in the gold-fields. Though this particular experiment lasted only two months planters hoped for better results, which largely explains why the government's first attempt at control, in 1876, was not a
The great white walls are built

restriction on immigration in general but simply on entry to the
gold-fields. Only when Westminster queried this did the colony
introduce general restrictions on entry.

In the event the Queensland restrictions proved effective in
reducing the numbers of Cantonese; only 500 arrived between late
1877 and 1881 while clause 7 of the Immigration Act, refunding
the £10 entry tax to Chinese leaving Queensland within five years
without any record of crime or current debt, encouraged more to
leave than might otherwise have done. Moreover the gold areas of
the Northern Territory were by now offering a rival attraction. By
April 1881 the Chinese population had dwindled to 11,200 males
and 29 females.

In the Northern Territory of South Australia, the 150 or so
Singapore Chinese remaining from the recruitment of 1874 were
mostly at Pine Creek, working alluvial gold on their own account
during the wet season and coming in for public works employment
at Darwin during the dry. By late 1876 the Canton-Hongkong
merchants had become interested, rumours had reached Darwin of
a massive immigration, and in December ninety-five diggers arrived
from Hongkong announcing that if they were successful others
would follow.\textsuperscript{52} Further immigration occurred in 1878 and by
April 1879 there were some 3400 Chinese and thirty Malays in the
Territory, compared with 460 whites, a ratio of 8 : 1. Gold was,
however, less plentiful and easy than in Queensland and there the
migration stopped; indeed some returned to China leaving only
2770 in August 1879. Nevertheless, this was sufficient to alarm some
of the few white residents, and to annoy them when they saw
Chinese on public works relief during the dry season. Additionally
some Chinese took up market gardening—which pleased many as
it gave the little colony much needed fresh vegetables—but others
emulated their compatriots in South-east Asia and set up as
merchants and shopkeepers; which intensely annoyed the few white
storekeepers. Indignation meetings became common, cries for a
£20 entry tax were raised, and also talk of copying Queensland’s
gold-field laws.

On the whole the government in Adelaide did not feel that
3000 Chinese posed any strategic danger and contented itself with
restricting the employment of Chinese on government contracts.\textsuperscript{53}
Moreover, to ensure that Chinese residents were contributing adequately to local revenue, it imposed customs duties on various commodities enjoyed by the Chinese. Basically the government was very relieved to see some growth of population and activity, and hoped to divert Chinese miners into its schemes of large-scale plantations. It certainly had no intention as yet of imposing restrictions on their entry.

3 The seamen's strike (1878-9) and its aftermath

Meanwhile important events had been taking place in the eastern colonies. In 1873 the Clunes mines, operating in Victoria near Ballarat, had tried to use Chinese miners to break the resistance of European miners to changes in shift-work; the miners successfully countered this by attacking the carriages conveying the Chinese and turning them and their frightened inmates away. Then, at a time when working class and small-trade interests were becoming more conscious of the gradual shift of Chinese from rural to metropolitan residence, and of possible competition in urban occupations, came the great Seamen's Strike of 1878-9. This arose from moves by the Australasian Steam Navigation Company (a New South Wales enterprise developing considerable trade with New Zealand, New Caledonia and Fiji as well as along the New South Wales and Queensland coasts, including mail subsidies from both these colonies) to counteract competition from alien lines by substituting Chinese firemen for European—£2.75 compared with £6 a month. The Seamen's Union, now covering Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, went on strike in November 1878, enlisted the support of other unions, received moral and financial backing from public meetings and some middle class groups in all the eastern colonies, and eventually won the support of John Douglas and his Liberal government in Queensland. When that government, then in the midst of imposing further restrictions on the employment of Pacific islanders, decided to make its mail subsidy conditional on white crews only, the Company capitulated and agreed to phase out its Chinese over the next three and a half years.

The strike not only brought to a head much working class
unrest with the whole Chinese question but also gave great impetus later in 1879 to the Intercolonial Trade Union Congress, which unanimously condemned any further importation of Chinese workers and called for the imposition of a heavy poll tax on Chinese already resident. Embryonic working class political groups—the Political Reform Association of New South Wales, for instance, which already had ‘stringent restrictions’ against Chinese in its platform—were also active during the strike, organising public meetings both to support strikers and to demand heavy restrictions, as ‘the immigration of these mean and cringing aliens is fraught with injury to the operative classes, and to the welfare of the country’. Anti-Chinese Leagues, largely working class and small-trades in origin, also made their appearance. That of Victoria demanded ‘the restriction or, if found necessary, the complete prohibition of immigration of Chinese to this colony, [and] absolute discontinuance of trade and traffic with those already here’; that of South Australia, organised support for the strike, backed up radical politicians such as William Magarey and Patrick Coglin, and attacked the Morgan government for allowing the contractors building the Pt Augusta railway to use a few Chinese labourers; that of Queensland strongly backed the strikers and made preparations for its moves to appeal to the people of South Australia against continued Chinese immigration via Darwin.

It so happened that in December 1878 there occurred another rearrangement of the political forces in New South Wales, bringing to office a coalition of the factions led by Henry Parkes and John Robertson. These had both supported the colony’s anti-Chinese legislation of 1861 and, in all the political excitement surrounding the strike, and in view of a slight increase of Chinese arrivals, felt it advisable in January 1879 to introduce a Bill reviving the earlier restrictions, with an additional clause applying such restrictions to Chinese seamen employed on colonial vessels. Parkes carried the Bill through the Assembly (28 : 15) but Robertson could gain only four supporters in the Council; the remainder felt that the employment of Chinese on ships trading in the Pacific had little to do with the immigration of Chinese into the colony, or the behaviour of those already resident in it, so threw the Bill out in 1879. In Victoria the radical Berry might well have made similar moves but
was heavily embroiled in a bitter constitutional struggle with the Legislative Council, and a trip to Britain in connection with it.

In Queensland the Douglas government was replaced by the more planter-oriented McIlwraith ministry (21/1/79)—and in any case still had the restrictions of 1877—while in South Australia the Morgan government decided that the 300 or so Chinese in the south required no special action and that the north could not afford to discourage Chinese immigration as yet. Nevertheless both governments felt that, though their northern territories required more coloured labour, it would be inexpedient at this time too openly to encourage the recruitment of Chinese coolies; additionally, for political reasons, McIlwraith felt obliged to confirm Douglas' restrictions on Pacific Island labour in the Polynesian Labourers Act (No. 17 of 1880). Both governments therefore reopened negotiations with India, Queensland, on the basis of its Coolie Act of 1862 and South Australia on the basis of a special enabling Act of 1879 (reserved for Westminster and repassed in altered form in 1882). Again both negotiations foundered on India's insistence that the Australian governments pay the salaries of agents and protectors directly responsible to India. Western Australia remained little moved by all these events, quietly continuing to admit and recruit small numbers of Chinese, Malays and other Asians, mainly through its Imported Labour Registry Act.

With the settlement of the strike feelings quietened down for a time, only to rise again in New South Wales in 1880 when it became known that net immigration of Chinese was increasing: 1875, -584; 1876, -244; 1877, +394; 1878, +925; 1879, +1422; 1880, +2075; 1881, +3536. In May 1880, following a large public meeting at the Guild Hall, a deputation waited upon Henry Parkes, stressing the dangers of vice, depravity and race antagonism, complaining that Chinese 'numbers were increasing so rapidly that they would be able soon to defy the law' and 'absorb all the means by which Europeans derived a livelihood', hoping the government would take no notice of Treaties between Britain and China, and asking for combined action by all the colonies. Parkes refused to admit that the Chinese were the sole repositories of vice (especially when it had been Britain that had forced opium upon them), or that they could be dismissed as a semi-savage race when they
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possessed a great and ancient civilisation, but agreed that there was race incompatibility, that numbers were increasing too rapidly, and that the problem was an Australia-wide matter that should be solved by uniform legislation. He contacted the other colonies accordingly, including New Zealand, asked them to discuss various defence and trade issues as well, and rejected all moves for New South Wales restriction until the intercolonial conference had met at the end of the year.

In Victoria, also, anti-Chinese persons were watching the net migration statistics. Though there was clearly a marked long-term fall in the colony's Chinese population as miners and others either died, moved to another colony or returned to their villages in the Canton delta (1861, 24,732; 1871, 17,826; 1881, 11,959), there was a slight increase in net migration in the late seventies (1873, -254; 1874, -145; 1875, +222; 1876, +108; 1877, +239; 1878, +515; 1879, +616; 1880, +783; 1881, +696). This, plus the clamour of certain tradesmen alleging unfair Chinese competition, led the Assembly in September 1880 to approve the reintroduction of restrictions but to leave discussion of the exact form until after the conference. A move to deprive alien Chinese of the right to vote in municipal and parliamentary elections—a privilege then permitted aliens generally—was also postponed.

In South Australia 1880 saw the revival of anti-Chinese feeling in a somewhat different form. Robert Shapland's book *The Chinese Question: In Yellow Agony*, attacking the 300 odd Chinese in South Australia proper, especially those in Hindley St, Adelaide, aroused some attention, as did a small outbreak of violence in the suburb of Norwood where larrikins smashed numbers of Chinese windows. More attention was given to an increase of Chinese numbers in the Northern Territory (from 2700 in mid-1879 to more than 4000 in mid-1880) and to an appeal from the anti-Chinese Association of Queensland, published in the *Register*, 29/3/80, querying the value of Chinese in the north: 'a rush of Chinese invariably overwhelms, disheartens and drives valuable colonists away . . . like a swarm of locusts laying bare and withering all before them'; the tropical parts of Australia are under the trust of Queensland and South Australia, 'entrusted to us by our British fellow countrymen to hold for them and not for the Chinese'. J. C.
Bray, lawyer member for the working class electorate of East Adelaide, decided to force a Queensland-type restrictive measure on the government and obtained the support of the Assembly, including that of some of the Ministers, who claimed amidst ribald disbelief that they had been thinking of doing this themselves for some time.\(^65\) The Legislative Council, however, followed H. Scott in castigating those attempting to enlarge 300 Chinese in the south into a national danger and asking why, if the Northern Territory was marked out for European settlement, there were only 400 whites there after twenty years of strenuous government and private investment.\(^66\) After Hogarth, another member interested in northern development, had praised the contribution being made by the Cantonese to the Territory, and had said that he was all 'for encouraging anybody to come there who can do something with it, no matter if their skins are white, yellow or, for that matter, green',\(^67\) the Council threw the Bill out.

The government then took the matter over officially by introducing a Queensland-type restrictive Bill for the Territory alone, arguing that numbers there were still increasing and that some Councillors might reconsider restriction if the south, with its paltry 300 Chinese, were left out of the issue. Faint hope. The Council, this time led by Baker, stated its belief that the Chinese were doing more for the Territory than white 'loafers' and 'quasi-miners' who did little except lounge about the public houses abusing the Chinese at work. Baker, finishing his speech by quoting one Territory opinion that the government would do better to put a £50 entry tax on useless white loungers and grumblers rather than on the Chinese, 'our best colonists', carried a not unwilling Council against the Bill, 12:3. Morgan, the Premier, with Mann the government leader in the Council, thereupon went to Melbourne to draw inspiration and help from Henry Parkes and his intercolonial conference.

4 The Australasian Intercolonial Conference, December 1880 to January 1881

In practice the conference was somewhat divided on the Chinese question. In between discussions on customs duties, federation and
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naval defence, it managed to reach agreement on four general propositions: that Britain should follow America’s example and renegotiate its Treaty with China; that Chinese immigration to Australasia should be controlled; that this control should be uniform, based on a £10 entry tax plus tonnage restriction; that exemption should be made for crews, British subjects and Chinese residents of the colonies returning after temporary trips to China. Then came disagreement. The New South Wales and Victorian representatives wanted a unanimous resolution that ‘the introduction of Chinese into any colony of Australia or New Zealand is undesirable’ whereas Queensland and South Australia, mindful of their tropical norths, and Tasmania, mindful of its developing tin mines, insisted that the resolution be amended to read, ‘the introduction of Chinese in large numbers’; which explains why New South Wales and Victoria, while agreeing with Queensland’s £10 entry tax, pushed hard for a tonnage restriction of 100 tons whereas the others were content with something nearer the 10 tons of the Queensland Act. Furthermore, though delegates may have discussed various kinds of internal discrimination—denial of naturalisation, of the franchise, of free movement, of free choice of occupations—they made no statement of principle except on the desirability of preventing free movement of Chinese across the continent by imposing the £10 entry tax on Chinese crossing colonial boundaries overland. Finally, during the Conference, Graham Berry, Victorian Premier and delegate, heard about Western Australia’s continued efforts to recruit Chinese and, despite the explanation of Mr Justice Wrensfordesley (the Western Australian delegate) that only fifty Chinese were involved, compared with the annual intake of 2000 into New South Wales and nearly 1000 into Victoria, insisted that the Conference protest strongly to Westminster about this disruptive action of its wayward crown colony.68

The protest, conveying the impression of much greater unanimity than in fact existed, and of much greater willingness to submerge local colonial interests in a common policy than soon proved to be the case, nevertheless pointed out to Westminster that:

In all the six Colonies a strong feeling prevails in opposition to the unrestricted introduction of Chinese, this opposition arising principally from a desire to preserve and perpetuate the British type in the various
The gates close against the Chinese, 1871-88

populations. In several of the Colonies stringent measures have been passed at different times to restrict the influx of Chinese immigrants even at their own expense... At the present Conference... a resolution has been agreed to "recommending uniform legislation on the part of all the Colonies to restrict the influx of Chinese"... If Western Australia persists in her policy it cannot fail to engender among the people of the other Colonies a sense of public injury and of resentment... At a time when a disposition is growing up in the Colonies to draw more closely together the ties of political relationship, it is a matter for deep regret that the smallest Colony of the group should take a course so calculated to cut her off from popular sympathy and to isolate her in her colonizing progress [The six Colonies here included New Zealand and excluded Western Australia].

Hearing the full story from Mr Justice Wrensforesly, and that his explanation to delegates had been virtually disregarded, Western Australians took considerable umbrage. The Australian asserted that the Conference document was 'a piece of impertinence unparalleled in political affairs... a petty piece of busy-bodyism towards the internal affairs of Western Australia' by those impudent easterners, Parkes and Berry. The legislature later approved a memorial of protest and explanation to Westminster, to which even Marmion (the member for Fremantle consistently opposing Chinese immigration) agreed on the grounds that such high-handed interference from the eastern colonies was a more serious matter than the immigration of a handful of Chinese at public expense. Shadows of the separation movement of the twentieth century were casting tentative fingers ahead.

Delegates to the Conference returned home rejuvenated, weary, bored or annoyed and reported to their respective governments. Western Australia, of course, did nothing, except later in 1882 slightly alter the Imported Labour Registry Act, and that mainly to ensure a higher standard of coolie physique and health. The McIlwraith government in Queensland, busy with its Indian coolie negotiations and quite content with its two existing Chinese Acts, likewise did nothing. In Tasmania, the Attorney-General introduced a Queensland-type Bill, saying that though there were few Chinese in the colony at present it might perhaps be wise both to guard against the future and to ensure that 'we should not be the only colony open to them'. The Treasurer supported him, with the
somewhat unexpected argument that the new Bill proposed for New South Wales was 'almost inhuman in some of its provisions' and might divert Chinese to Tasmania; in any case the Assembly could make the relatively mild Tasmanian proposals still more mild if it so wished. This somewhat half-hearted introduction encouraged the Assembly to heed those who claimed that the Chinese were industrious, sober, law-abiding and useful, that their opponents revealed little but irrational prejudice, and that Tasmania could easily introduce restrictive measures should it ever receive definite proof that the Chinese were in fact injuring the Tasmanian population. The Assembly thereupon threw the Bill out without division.72

In South Australia, the election of April 1881 had not only revealed much anti-Chinese feeling but had increased the standing of J. C. Bray, who had introduced the abortive Bill of 1880 and was to become premier while the new Bill was still under discussion in late June. The nearly defunct Morgan government introduced a restrictive Bill on the general lines agreed to at the intercolonial conference—but choosing a tonnage limit of 50 tons as a reasonable compromise between the 10 tons of Queensland and the 100 tons wanted by N.S.W. and Victoria—and based its case on the clear wishes of the electors, the need to avoid the troubles of California and the danger of smallpox, leprosy and other 'loathsome diseases' apparently introduced to Sydney and Melbourne by recent Chinese arrivals.73 J. L. Parsons, who was to be Resident at Darwin during the 1888 crisis, revealed his views at this time in a speech praising the Chinese virtues and civilisation but strongly supporting the proposed restrictions lest there develop severe race conflict: 'I fear the Chinese as a race, chiefly because of their enormous numbers and the way in which they were taking control of Java, Cochin-China and Burma.74

Such arguments, however, left Scott, Baker and others in the Council still quite unmoved. They did not this time oppose restrictions in the south (after all, Baker magnanimously admitted, it was natural that southern workers should feel strongly about living standards and that the colony should safeguard its original ideal of an Anglo-Saxon yeomanry) but they deplored all 'the blind hatred' displayed against the Chinese people, all the false repre-
sentations about their immorality and uselessness, and all suggestions that an Upper House should defer to the wayward whims of electors—here looking hard at F. C. Buik, who had taken a strong anti-Chinese line at the recent elections and was 'certain that the pronounced views I hold on the subject have placed me in the position I now occupy'.75 Declaring that the Northern Territory would collapse without the Chinese, that all talk of it being 'flooded with Celestials' was sheer nonsense when numbers were declining (actually from 4350 in December 1880 to 3690 in August 1881), and that disease could be controlled by adequate quarantine, they insisted on inserting a clause which exempted the Territory from the restrictions, on reducing the 50 ton limit to 10 tons, and on lightening penalties against shipping companies breaking the regulations.76 Despite considerable objection by the Assembly they remained quite inflexible and eventually forced Bray reluctantly to accept their modifications;77 which meant fixing a boundary between the Northern Territory and South Australia proper (eventually designated as a line 1000 miles north of Adelaide) across which Chinese could pass southwards only if they paid the £10 entry tax.

In Victoria there was naturally less talk of the danger of China invading the empty north, and also less stress on growth of numbers, but more emphasis on cheap labour competition, disease, vice and racial homogeneity. In fact, despite all the outcry made by Trade Unions and Anti-Chinese Associations two years earlier, little concrete evidence was produced that Chinese moving to Melbourne were taking many jobs wanted by Europeans; the case was simply taken as proved and mentioned in general terms only, or else in terms of what was happening in San Francisco.78 Disease received more attention, especially the forty odd cases of smallpox that had followed the arrival of a diseased Chinese seaman in 1868, and also the later rumours of leprosy in New South Wales.79 More eloquent speeches were on race incompatibility, as that of W. Campbell asserting that 'the Chinese are objectionable physically [and] I believe that their presence here in large numbers would cause a degeneration in the race from which we have sprung; the Caucasian type exists here in its purity, and to have it mixed with what we must call an inferior race would be impolitic and unstatesmanlike'.80

Against this weight of public and parliamentary opinion a
few members of the upper House, less dependent on radical and working class votes, dared to express a few liberal-humanitarian opinions: that the Chinese population would undoubtedly continue its long-term fall without recourse to restrictions; that Chinese settlers did useful work as market gardeners and fishermen; that Chinese vices were grossly exaggerated by prejudiced persons who ignored equally bad vices amongst the white population.\textsuperscript{81} It was to no avail. Their only real victory, against the overlander clause, was rejected by the Assembly and the Bill became law substantially as introduced, i.e. £10 entry tax, 100 tons restriction, exemptions for officials, crews, British subjects and returning residents.\textsuperscript{82}

In New South Wales the issue was more complex. Parkes's new Bill not only adopted the £10 entry tax and 100 tons restriction but also contained two clauses not adopted by the intercolonial conference: a clause imposing exceptionally heavy and awkward quarantine restrictions against ships containing Chinese, and a clause prohibiting any Chinese alien from holding real property. These clauses gave an opening to persons who disapproved of working class and small-trader hostility to the Chinese but who, in view of the clarity and fervour of such hostility, felt unable to come out too strongly against the general principle of restriction. They also gave greater scope to the liberal-humanitarians, who at this time included not only the ageing Forster, Suttor and Piddington but also de Salis, Darley and Stewart.

Parkes based his case on his 1861 points: the need for building a homogeneous British-type nation; the danger presented to the small British-Australian colonies by the admission of settlers from such a vast population so close to the north; the real risk of social disorders if unpopular immigrants continued to arrive. But he also stressed the Chinese origin of smallpox and leprosy, the danger of Chinese competition with the Australian working class, and the importance of avoiding the troubles experienced by the Californians. He concluded with an earlier point, this time using the Duke of Newcastle's 1861 phrase that it was better 'to prevent the arrival of the immigrants than to discourage or harass them after they are arrived'; unless, he argued, 'you are prepared to permit these people to come amongst us, to intermarry with your children, to permit them to have the same rights and privileges as you possess to the
full measure of citizenship, then . . . you are simply supporting them in coming here in order to establish a degraded class . . . an eternal curse to the country'.

The majority of the Assembly readily supported his general thesis. Most working class and many other representatives echoed public opinion by expanding on 'the insidious invasion steadily undermining our industries', on the dangers of smallpox and leprosy, and on the squalor, vice and immorality of the Chinese communities of both Sydney and San Francisco. The opposition, both political and liberal-humanitarian, argued that the long-term trend in numbers was down (actually 14,000 in 1859 to 10,000 in 1881), that as many Chinese worked at European wages they were not undercutting white labourers, that the Chinese were not the only carriers of smallpox, and that there were white areas of Sydney just as vice-ridden and squalid as the Chinese areas. In any case, they concluded, Parkes was guilty of grave deception and inconsistency: first, why not be completely open about restriction instead of using a highly discriminatory and roundabout quarantine clause as a major weapon to prevent immigration (which Parkes eventually admitted was what he intended); second, if the Chinese were as bad for the colony as he alleged, why let in those whose sponsors who could pay the £10 entry tax, so condoning vice for filthy lucre; third, if he was genuine in not wishing to 'harass' Chinese already resident in the colony why prevent them, and them only out of all aliens, from owning real property.

On this last point Parkes emerged somewhat battered for, when one of his supporters said the clause did not really handicap the Chinese as they could become naturalised and then obtain real property, Parkes implied that his government fully intended to discriminate against Chinese residents by refusing all future Chinese applications for naturalisation. In the end Parkes's opponents in the upper House gave way on the entry tax which at first they rejected—but forced him to drop the discriminatory clauses on quarantine and real property.

This then was the outcome of Australia's first real effort to develop a common policy towards Chinese immigration: no restrictions at all in Tasmania, Western Australia or the Northern Territory (i.e. in most of the tropical north); relatively mild restrictions
in Queensland and South Australia proper; severer restrictions in New South Wales and Victoria. These last quickly took effect, reducing net migration in New South Wales from 3536 in 1881 to 123 in 1882 and in Victoria from 696 to −371; eventually, as Chinese became used to the system, net migration rose again a little, averaging 1200 a year in New South Wales in 1885-6 and 350 in Victoria. Immigration elsewhere remained comparatively steady, the Chinese population for some years fluctuating around the 10,000 mark in Queensland, 4000 in the Northern Territory and 1000 in Tasmania. In short, with some 10,000 in New South Wales and 11,000 in Victoria, the Chinese population of the whole continent was less than 40,000 all told, compared with that of 80,000 in California alone.

5 Internal discrimination: the right to vote

Though some Australian colonists liked to think they were abiding by Britain's injunction not to 'harass' Chinese immigrants—and on the whole approved of themselves in so thinking—they were nevertheless beginning to feel their way towards discriminatory policies. The first general issue was that of Chinese participation in local and parliamentary government. Victoria, when repealing its restrictive laws in 1865 had retained the clause denying Chinese miners the right to vote for local mining boards; to stop such boards becoming dominated by the numerically superior Chinese. In the late 1870s, however, certain politicians found to their indignation that some Chinese were enrolled as voters in their electorates, primarily because all ratepayers were entitled to vote in local government elections and electoral officials had become accustomed to using ratepayers lists as the electoral roll for parliament. While not objecting to other alien ratepayers having a vote, the thought of Chinese residents influencing the elections was too much; moreover, they were well aware that British Columbia had been permitted to pass its 1874 law denying the franchise to all Chinese residents in the colony. In mid-1880 Quick, member for the mining area of Sandhurst (which then contained a thousand or more Chinese miners) introduced a Chinese Voters Bill; but he
1. Illustrated Sydney News, 12 June 1880. Reproduced with the permission of the National Library of Australia.

Chinese life in Sydney (1. New arrivals at Circular Quay. 2. Chair-making in George Street. 3. Gardening at Botany. 4. Chinese vegetable sellers. 5. Police raid on a Chinese gambling den in Goulburn Street.)

and his supporters later agreed to let the Bill lapse provided a clause was inserted in the new Chinese Immigrants Bill preventing alien Chinese from voting at all elections—mining board, local government and parliamentary.95

The arguments for restricting the vote were: that the Chinese did not exercise an independent political judgment but voted as their headmen told them;96 that some Chinese headmen sold the votes under their control;97 that these headmen organised fraudulent voting by arranging for Chinese who had already voted to walk straight out of the polling booth, change their coats and hats, and come back to vote for a Chinese absent in China or elsewhere.98 The major argument, however, was that the Chinese, by nature or upbringing, were quite incapable of understanding democratic procedures and should, unlike other aliens, be denied all part in the law-making process. As John Woods, member for Stawell, summed it up:

the Chinaman knows nothing about Caucasian civilization or the laws of a country like this. In fact, a Chinaman is a mere dumb animal . . . and never could be anything else. It would be less objectionable to drive a flock of sheep to the poll than to allow Chinamen to vote. The sheep at all events would be harmless. To claim for Chinamen the right to have a voice in the making of the law of this country was a monstrous absurdity . . . and they should be deprived of the power of voting at municipal elections. . . 99

Opponents of the clause claimed that Chinese were not the only ones to vote for profit or under orders (here casting side glances at the Irish Catholics); that the liberals and radicals were simply afraid of legitimate Chinese votes going against them because of their anti-Chinese policies (a fear which could lead to the disenfranchisement of other groups); that the clause was in clear breach of the principle that Chinese residents should receive equal treatment with other aliens.1 As Wrixon, member for Portland, summed it up: the clause 'is opposed to the idea of the constitution', which sets itself firmly against the notion that 'any portion of the community—Chinese or other—should have no voice in the making of the laws by which they are governed. That would be simply making the inhabitants of a particular race serfs'.2
These few voices received scant hearing; the Legislative Council, in fact, accepted clause 14 without debate. Westminster made no real objection, partly because of the precedent of the Victorian mining boards and of the British Columbian law of 1874, and partly because there was no breach of Treaty; British traders in China were likewise denied any share in the Chinese political system.

In New South Wales the issue was raised by Abbott, member for Gunnedah, who asked for a special clause in the Chinese Restriction Act preventing any Chinese residents, British or alien, from becoming a member of Parliament, an elector, or a juror. This, however, was part of the move to prevent Chinese from owning real property and faded out with the failure of the main clause.

In South Australia and Queensland the question arose as part of the whole problem of the status of coloured labour in the tropics. In mid-1882 the Bray government in Adelaide decided to tidy up the Indian Immigration Act, to make clear its readiness to meet all India's requirements on control and protection, and had high hopes of at last getting Indian coolies for the proposed sugar plantations near Darwin. At the same time, when revising the Constitution Act to increase the number of electorates, it found itself confronted with a strong demand that the few hundred white persons in the Northern Territory receive a vote, either in a separate electorate or as part of a southern electorate. Having accepted this last proposition the government suddenly realised that the few hundred white votes might be eclipsed by the votes of thousands of British Indians and naturalised Chinese, so stated quite bluntly that it did 'not intend to allow the Asiatics in the Territory to vote but to confine the voting power to British subjects [i.e. British ethnics] and naturalized subjects of European or American birth'.

Again the argument raged. Liberal humanitarians claimed that several respectable naturalised Chinese merchants voted with the same sense of responsibility as other good colonists; that it was 'un-English' to deny the the few Chinese who would ever become naturalised in the Territory their right 'to have a vote in making the laws [they were] expected to obey'; that once a person was naturalised he was entitled to all the privileges of the Constitution. Countering these were claims that headmen would swing or
sell the Chinese vote; that Chinese voters might 'fill the House with yellow men' and that, even if only one were elected, there would be no advantage in 'having such a member except that we might be taught to speak pigeon English or Ching Chong'. In the Council R. C. Baker, still ardently pressing for plantations operated by coloured labour, made the position of himself and his friends quite clear: 'the sooner we recognize that the Northern Territory is too tropical to be a European settlement and must be populated by Chinese Coolies and Malays, to whom I would not give representation, the better'. His group, in short, were thinking much as the Queensland planters were thinking—of great tropical plantations controlled by a white planter class and worked by less privileged coolies.

In the end, the possibility of the few hundred white votes being overwhelmed by the votes of thousands of Indians and Chinese was too much for both Houses; hence clause 8 of the Constitution Act Further Amendment Act (No. 278 of 1882) which stated that 'no person brought into the Northern Territory of the province of South Australia under the provisions of the Indian Immigration Act, 1882, shall be qualified to vote in the election of members to serve in the Parliament of the said province, and no person residing in such Northern Territory shall be qualified to vote unless he be a natural-born subject of Her Majesty, or a naturalised subject of Her Majesty of European nationality or a citizen of the United States of America naturalised as a subject of Her Majesty'.

Queensland regarded matters somewhat differently. Already protected against mass naturalisation of Chinese by the 1861-7 Aliens Act (confining naturalisation of Asiatic or African aliens to persons resident in the colony for at least three years and with a wife residing with them—see chapter 4, section 1) the colony was more concerned with Pacific Islanders, and with any British coolies arriving as a result of McIlwraith's negotiations with India. As it happened, McIlwraith lost the 1883 election to Samuel Griffith before he could get Parliament to consider the new Indian agreement and Griffith at once stopped negotiations; he failed, however, to persuade the upper House to repeal the Coolie Act of 1862 until 1886. Furthermore, in 1884 Griffith introduced revised regulations for Pacific islanders, making yet more clear that new labour would
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be strictly confined to areas of tropical agriculture and, indeed, dispensed with altogether should he succeed in his efforts to promote small-scale sugar farms worked by white labour. With all this in train there seemed little possibility of either Indian coolies arriving in numbers and demanding a vote, or of Chinese and Pacific islanders becoming naturalised in sufficient numbers to influence elections. Nevertheless the government felt it advisable to insert in the Elections Act (13 of 1885) a clause prohibiting the enrolment of any 'aboriginal native of Australia, India, China or the South Sea Islands . . . except in respect of a freehold qualification'. More experienced than South Australians with the ambitions and customs of coloured labour in the tropics, the Griffith government felt this to be sufficient safeguard against mass coloured voting; and yet not a complete denial of liberal principles in that it permitted a few—those who established themselves sufficiently permanently and solidly to purchase real estate—to have a voice in making the laws by which they were governed. Though Griffith had no wish for the Europeans of Queensland to amalgamate with the Chinese or any other non-European people in the colony—and openly said so—he was on this issue a much more consistent and straight-thinking liberal than Parkes in New South Wales, Berry in Victoria or Downer and Bray in South Australia. His proposals passed both Houses with almost no debate.

In Western Australia and Tasmania there was no move to restrict the voting capacity of the small non-European populations. Nor were there, anywhere in Australia, serious moves to discriminate against Chinese residents in other ways, except in keeping them off new mining areas. To some extent this was regarded as part and parcel of immigration control, especially in South Australia and Western Australia, and for those colonies is better discussed in that context. In Queensland, however, there entered a more discriminatory note, partly because the McIlwraith group, though oriented to the interests of planters and business men anxious for coloured labour in tropical regions, realised that their main hope of wresting and keeping power from the Douglas-Griffith factions lay in being on good terms with those who controlled important sections of the northern voters, notably John Murtagh Macrossan.
This colourful personage had been a digger in southern gold-fields for many years, moved north to the Queensland fields in the late 1860s, became organiser of the Ravenswood Miners' Association, achieved fame in 1871 by publicly thrashing an unpopular Goldfields Warden, entered politics in 1874 as member for Kennedy and then Townsville, and thereafter skilfully organised the northern electorates on McIlwraith's behalf. Partly because of his own digger background, and partly because he knew how strongly many northern diggers, labourers and tradesmen felt about it, he rarely ceased to take an anti-Chinese line. In this he had considerable success. The McIlwraith government, in which he held several cabinet posts, was quite prepared to discriminate against the Chinese provided Macrossan did not interfere too much with its Kanaka and Indian coolie policy. The Griffith government was quite ready to listen to him, partly because many of its members sympathised with his anti-Chinese views and partly because they did not want to let any member of the opposition taunt them for dilatoriness in protecting the Queensland working class against cheap Chinese competition.

Having played no small part in passing the anti-Chinese Acts of 1877, Macrossan became Minister for Mines and Works under McIlwraith in 1879 and in 1882 carried the Mineral Lands Act (No. 8); this consolidated legislation relating to all mineral areas except gold-fields, restricted the practice of converting mineral leases into freehold, and prevented Asiatic and African aliens from obtaining a mining licence or mineral lease, and from conducting a business in any mineral area. Macrossan's argument here was that it would be 'going too far to prevent Chinamen from mining on goldfields seeing that they are in the colony, and came into it, for that purpose. But this is quite a new description of mining (tin, copper, etc.) and we have a perfect right to exclude them entirely. I think it is better to keep such aliens out altogether instead of waiting till there are two or three thousand of them on the mineral lands of the colony and then finding that they are a nuisance and objectionable'. To this no one in either House objected, Griffith simply drawing attention to the fact that the colony was moving beyond the stage of discouraging Chinese to the stage of absolute prohibition. Nor did the Imperial govern-
ment protest; having conceded discrimination against Chinese aliens in 1877 it saw nothing new about the later proposals.

Later, in 1886 when the Griffith government introduced the Gold Fields Homestead Leases Act to enable gold-miners to take up homestead leases in gold-field areas (some of which covered thousands of square miles and had gold in scattered patches only), Macrossan objected that there was no clause prohibiting Chinese from obtaining such leases: ‘I know they have got the right now but when we alter the law let us deprive them of that right as we have deprived them of other rights’.14 He then persuaded the government to insert phrases forbidding Asian and African aliens applying for homestead leases, taking out mortgages on such leases and buying such leases from Europeans: ‘there are many whites on the goldfields who would be mean enough to take up a homestead lease and transfer it to a Chinaman for the sake of a few pounds’.15

Both Houses again agreed without demur. In other words Queensland was quite ready not only to prevent Chinese from voting but also to prevent them living and working in mineral areas. This, together with earlier regulations confining Pacific Islanders to tropical agriculture, was the precedent for Queensland’s far ranging discriminatory legislation of later years.

6 Moves to further restrictions, 1884-7

Though the campaign to prevent further Chinese immigration quietened somewhat after the 1881 restrictions the anti-Chinese movement kept going. In particular the intercolonial Trade Union Conferences of 1884 and 1886, and the Sydney Labor Conference of 1885, passed strong resolutions in favour of complete prohibition. Events, too, were catching up with the less restrictive colonies, in the end leading them to further action.

The first colony to move was Queensland, now noticing the very rapid shift of its Chinese population from the dying mining areas; compared with some 10,000 there in 1877 there were only 6000 in 1881 and 1000 in 1891.16 Though some returned to China others stayed in North Queensland and opened up, as leaseholders or assistants, numerous market gardens, sugar and maize farms, and
banana plantations; by 1881 nearly 2000 were so engaged and by 1891 some 4000. Others moved into domestic service—nearly 700 by 1891—while others opened boarding houses, general stores and greengroceries; about 1000 in all by 1891. Relatively few entered the general labour market—about 600 during the 1880s—while less than 200 were station-hands, some of these being survivors of the Chinese station-hands of pre-gold days. Only a few hundred moved down into the more industrialised south-eastern corner around Brisbane and Ipswich—250 or so in Brisbane by 1891 and perhaps 500 more in neighbouring areas. Only a fraction were in laundries and furniture-making (thirty and sixteen by 1891).

These shifts involved little competition with white labourers, though they did mean some competition with stores and greengroceries. This, however, was enough for anti-Chinese groups to seize on as reason for further restrictions; their views were made very clear in the 1883 elections. Furthermore, this successful transition from mining to agriculture began to attract new arrivals, sponsored not only by the credit-ticket merchants of Canton and Hongkong but also by Chinese farmers in the colony who, mindful of lineage duties and needing extra labour, were not only anxious to bring out relatives but also able to pay their fares and entry tax. As a result, though the long-term trend continued downwards as many Chinese returned home (11,229 in 1881 to 10,463 in 1886), there was some increase in certain years, notably 1300 in 1883.

The Griffith government, even more determined to remove coloured labour from the tropics, and preparing itself for its 1885 ban against future recruitment of Pacific Islanders and 1886 repeal of the Coolie Act, decided in 1884 to deal very firmly with the matter of Chinese immigration by raising the tonnage limit from 10 to 50 tons and the entry tax from £10 to £20. Many attacked the new restrictions as too mild, not only those traditionally in favour of complete exclusion (e.g. Macrossan and Ferguson) but also some planters who stated, both in debate and petitions, that 'a large permanent settlement of Chinese on this coast would be pregnant with the greatest danger to the whole of Australia'; these were at once accused of taking a strong anti-Chinese line in the hopes of strengthening their case for more Indians and islanders, which was certainly true of some of the planters who
were later to support the separation movement as a means of freeing North Queensland from southern control, so making it easier for them to introduce more coloured labour. Griffith felt the Bill was reasonable, rejected Macrossan's move for a 200 ton restriction but agreed to increase the entry tax to £30. Despite a last-ditch stand by a commercial group fearful of losing some of their China trade, and by a group of planters taking the traditional line that Chinese were useful as tropical labourers and that anyone who said 'whites could or should be allowed to go and labour in these lands . . . was weak in the intellect or worse', the Bill became law in March 1884 (No. 13) and at once slowed the annual intake. Anti-Chinese groups now felt freer to concentrate on their chief remaining concern—the possibility of an overland movement from Darwin through country too difficult to be effectively policed.

Further west the crown colony of Western Australia also adopted an anti-Chinese policy. Numbers had been increasing slowly, under the Imported Labour Registry Act and through the pearling industry, in 1885 reaching perhaps 500 all told. In that year, however, news reached Perth of gold discoveries in the Kimberley mountains to the far north, and a gold-field was officially proclaimed in 1886. The Government at once decided to follow Queensland's example by passing one law to keep Chinese off newly discovered gold-fields, for five years, and another to restrict Chinese immigration by an entry tax of £10 and a tonnage restriction of 50 tons. The Goldfields Act borrowed the Queensland terminology and was worded to exclude all 'Asiatic and African aliens' but, although there had been general talk that 'our goldfields should be reserved for Europeans', it was clear that, as in Queensland, most colonists were worrying very little about Malays, Indians or Africans and were concentrating almost entirely on keeping out 'Chinamen or Mongolians'.

These two laws did not, in fact, represent any basic change in Western Australian attitudes. The government was still concerned with northern development—including pastoral expansion, pearling and tropical agriculture—and therefore exempted from the Immigration Restriction Act any Chinese coolies brought in under the Imported Labour Registry Act. But it was determined to avoid any massive influx of Cantonese gold-diggers, arguing that though
the Chinese were valuable as market gardeners, servants, public-works labourers, agricultural labourers and the like, they were 'most objectionable as miners' and it was 'highly necessary in the interests of peace and tranquility that Chinese be kept from our goldfields'; particular as there were already fears of trouble between the few Chinese and Europeans in the Kimberleys. Moreover the Kimberleys was 'the nearest place in Western Australia to China' and at the moment contained fewer than 1000 souls. As in Queensland, another major concern was how to police the long remote border with South Australia's Northern Territory. In the event the restrictions were effective, not only in the Kimberleys but in preventing a Cantonese influx to the richer gold-fields proclaimed soon afterwards at Pilbara and Yilgairn (1888). By April 1891 there were still fewer than 1000 Chinese in the colony, and fewer than 100 in the gold-fields.

In South Australia anti-Chinese moves also continued. Apart from the 1884 protest at Port Adelaide, when the government allowed Chinese seamen for a time to crew a Northern Territory vessel, discontent in the south arose mainly from the feeling that southerners were subsidising the Territory too much and that Chinese residents there should contribute more to finances; hence the stream of parliamentary questions about the efficiency of procedures for collecting mining licence fees and the moves to increase duties. In the Territory itself the small white population kept complaining about Chinese competition, disease and squalor, but made definite moves for a £30 entry tax only in 1886, when current alluvial diggings showed some decline, local unemployment increased, and the contractors for the Darwin-Pine Creek railway announced their intention of employing some Asiatics. The Downer government thereupon introduced two new Bills, one to remove the clause exempting the Northern Territory from the 1881 Immigration Restriction Act and the other, like those of Queensland and Western Australia, to keep Chinese miners off newly discovered gold-fields; again the Queensland phrase, 'Asiatic and African alien', was used. The Legislative Council refused the restriction move—on precisely the same grounds as in 1881—but agreed to the bar on new gold-fields. Even this, however, was passed only with the casting vote of the President, and after the three-year bar was
reduced to two years; the opposition claimed that the Chinese were the only useful and worthwhile residents of the Territory and that ‘if we let [them] come into the colony at all we should not prevent them from getting a living’. The opposition’s distaste for some of the Territory’s white colonists was apparently reinforced by the hostility these colonists displayed at Darwin against the Rev. Tom Ward’s efforts to start a night school for Chinese, on the grounds that educated Chinese would then supplant European clerks and professional men.

At the time neither Bill was really necessary. Chinese numbers were still fluctuating around the 4000 mark and showed no signs of marked increase. Nor were there any signs of new gold discoveries. In fact, the government was legislating to show its sympathy with working class and small-trade electors, its desire to meet the wishes of neighbouring colonies, and its wish to guard against a hypothetical future.

Next year (August 1887) the Downer government made another effort, this time reinforced by a perceptible increase in the net migration of Chinese to the Territory, 1500 in the previous twelve months, Ramsay, government leader in the Upper House, did his best to make his case appeal to the traditional opinions of northern developers. Having mentioned the wishes of neighbouring colonies, and the danger of allowing numerous non-British persons to ‘over-run’ the north, he asserted that the Chinese preferred to be their own masters as gold-diggers and traders and contributed very little to tropical agriculture; Indian coolies would, in fact, do that much better. The old guard, again led by Scott and Baker, remained quite unmoved: the few thousand Chinese in the Territory not only presented no strategic danger but were the only persons doing anything to develop this expensive outpost of South Australia; they had proved their value as tropical farmers in their indispensable market gardens and as labourers on some European controlled properties; the whole anti-Chinese campaign stemmed from a few discontented shopkeepers and a few white labourers who had shown their incapacity to adapt properly to life and work in the tropics. Again they rejected the Bill, 14:6.

In Tasmania the government was more successful in persuading the Upper House to accept restrictions, though only by one vote.
In fact the number of Chinese tin miners had increased very little since 1881—from 750 to perhaps 1000—and there was little increase in numbers elsewhere, from 100 or so to 200. But anti-Chinese moves on the mainland, the growing strength of the Trade Union Movement, and increasing talk of vice, disease and race miscegenation, at last led the government, somewhat reluctantly in 1887, to heed the requests of other colonies and implement restrictive legislation based on the Victorian law of 1881. Though a few members took a strong racist line,\textsuperscript{33} many expressed deep regret at the necessity for restriction; in fact the Premier, Philip Oakley Fysh, so regretted that Tasmania could no longer be hospitable to brethren from foreign lands, especially brethren so frugal and thrifty and so valuable to the mining industry, that he was asked point-blank whether he really wanted the Bill or not.\textsuperscript{34} Some members felt very resentful at those ‘wind-bags of Trade Unionists’, who were quite unnecessarily provoking hostility against the few representatives in Tasmania of a ‘plodding industrious race’,\textsuperscript{35} while others defended Chinese behaviour as much better than that of the ‘European larrikans’ who caused so much trouble;\textsuperscript{36} these saw no reason why Tasmania should be forced into surrendering its status as ‘the only liberal colony in Australia’, on this issue at all events.\textsuperscript{37}

In the end, talk of smallpox on the mainland carried the Assembly and pleas for uniformity with other colonies just carried the Council. The Assembly, however, insisted on modifying the Victorian law by exempting Chinese females from restriction. After considerable debate on vice and immorality the majority felt that, for reasons of morality and normal family life, Chinese residents should be free to introduce their wives without impediment.\textsuperscript{38}

With Tasmania’s somewhat reluctant addition to the ranks of the restrictionists in 1887, a barrier against the Chinese now completely encircled Australia. In New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania it was comparatively high—a tonnage restriction of 100 tons in addition to an entry tax of £10. In Queensland and Western Australia tonnage restrictions were lighter (50 tons) but special barriers existed against entry to gold-fields, while the Queensland entry tax was £30. In South Australia barriers were lowest; in the south a tonnage restriction of 10 tons and entry tax of £10 but pro-
hibition against entry to new gold-fields; in the north simply prohibition against entry to new gold-fields. With this somewhat uneven set of restrictions the continent lay uneasily waiting for the next episode. This was not long in coming; in fact it had already begun before Tasmania’s restrictive Act was proclaimed in October 1887.

7 The Australasian crisis of 1888

It is unnecessary to enter in detail into the highly complicated and somewhat bewildering events of 1888, especially as parts of the story are well covered by Myra Willard. Some short chronological introduction, however, is essential if the central issues are to be clearly understood. The story starts back in 1887 when Chinese Commissioners, appointed by the Emperor to report on conditions amongst Chinese emigrants to the Spanish, Dutch, British and American colonies or states of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, visited various parts of Australia in April-May and soon afterwards published their findings: that the treatment received by Chinese was much less severe in Australia than in Java, the Philippines or California, but that the entry tax was a discriminatory measure directed against Chinese only and, insofar as it affected Chinese merchants and others, was a clear breach of Anglo-Chinese treaties. This report not only annoyed Australians but embarrassed the British government, eventually leading it to ask the colonies for full details of exceptional laws or practices relating to Chinese immigrants (January 1888). It also stimulated some colonies, notably New South Wales, into thinking that the best solution might be to persuade Westminster to negotiate new treaties with China.

Meanwhile in mid-1887 Victorians had become aware, as had Californians a little earlier, that many Chinese were not at all hesitant about evading the provisions of what they thought were unreasonable discriminatory laws: in fact Victorian officials had tightened up the issue and use of naturalisation papers as early as 1885, on the grounds that some papers were carried or posted overseas and used by other Chinese to enter the colony illegally.
This also annoyed Australians and led to searching inquiries in several colonies. Additionally, though the long-term trend for the continent continued downwards, there occurred a noticeable increase in Chinese net migration during 1887, especially in New South Wales, Victoria and the Northern Territory; this once more aroused fears of a great Chinese influx. Finally, Australians were well aware of American moves to erect further barriers against Chinese immigration and became quite alarmed at the prospect of the Chinese tide being diverted to Australia.

These events coincided with and contributed to an increase in strength of anti-Chinese sentiments and activities. This was very clear in Victoria in 1887 and early 1888. The Anti-Chinese League of 1879-81 was revived by the United Furniture Trade Society, won support from many other Unions, organised numerous meetings in suburbs and country towns, and sent deputations to Parliament in July and August 1887: its whole objective was to convince every voter and member that Chinese were socially undesirable and economically dangerous, that all further immigration should be prohibited, that Chinese residents should pay an annual residence tax of £20, that no further Chinese should be naturalised, and that any naturalised Chinese leaving the colony, even for a short trip, should at once lose his citizenship. The League received considerable support from the Australian Natives Association, a combined benevolent and political association for professional men, business men and small farmers; this had branches in many suburbs and country towns, most of whom wished to keep the Australian continent free for a predominantly Anglo-Saxon race and society, and for other Europeans willing and able to conform to British-Australian ways. Another staunch ally was The Age, now as earlier serving as an organ for trade union opinion; it published article after article on the social and economic dangers of even small-scale Chinese immigration, on the terrible lesson of California, on the nearness of the vast Chinese population.

Similar activities were also occurring in New South Wales and Queensland where, as in Victoria, working class feelings had been exacerbated by the economic recession of 1886-8. The Sydney Bulletin, which had been taking an anti-Chinese line as early as 1880, decided to launch a full-scale campaign in 1886 and keep it
going until Chinese immigration was virtually stopped; it had considerable influence on the working classes, being read not only in the capital cities but in smaller country and coastal towns scattered about the continent. In Queensland William Lane, a dedicated radical with socialist ideals and great eloquence, later to leave Australia in an attempt to found a Utopian socialist colony in Paraguay, started his journal The Boomerang in 1887 and at once took the line that Chinese immigration presented two enormous perils to the young Australia: destruction of the working class by cheap coloured labour imported by monopolistic capital, and eventual race domination of European settlers by the Chinese. His influence on the developing Labor movement was considerable and his stimulus to the Anti-Chinese League important. The latter became so active that John Potts, one of its leaders, visited Adelaide in November 1887 to address meetings organised by the local Trades and Labor Council, and generally to stir up the Adelaide populace against Chinese immigration into the Northern Territory.

In reality the Australia-wide immigration, checked by restrictive regulations, was nothing like as large as that of the 1850s or 1870s; net immigration in New South Wales rose only from 1200 in 1886 to 1660 in 1887 and in Victoria from 600 to 1150. In the Territory it was somewhat greater, a net gain of about 2000 for 1887, compared with 500 or so for 1886; the main attractions here were the willingness of those building the Darwin-Pine Creek railway to employ up to 3000 or so Chinese and the rumour that rubies had been discovered in the interior (ruby-fields, of course, were free of the restrictions imposed on new gold-fields). Added to these were stories that a syndicate of Hongkong merchants was planning to invest capital and labour in the mineral and railway development of the Territory, and the more tangible arrival of 1000 more migrants during January 1888, some in vessels containing smallpox and which therefore had to enter quarantine.

At this point several persons either lost all patience or panicked. V. L. Solomon, a former miner and now the very anti-Chinese editor of the Northern Territory Times, decided to force the hand of the Legislative Council in Adelaide by appealing to the other colonies—hence his tour of eastern Australia early in 1888. J. L. Parsons, now
The gates close against the Chinese, 1871-88

Resident in charge at Darwin, became very alarmed about the smallpox and kept cabling Adelaide about imposing blanket quarantine restrictions on all vessels from infected Asian ports, instead of relying upon inspecting and quarantining individual ships; he also became convinced that no less than 500 Chinese ruby-miners were about to disappear into the interior and from there spread all over the continent. The new Playford-Kingston government (the Downer government had been defeated in the elections of March 1887) supported him on quarantine but felt he was unduly alarmist about the ruby-miners (in fact no Chinese came south to the ruby areas); they therefore instructed him in March to impose twenty-one days quarantine on vessels from specific parts of Asia, and to discourage further ship-loads from leaving Hongkong by announcing publicly that the government intended, subject to parliamentary approval, to extend the £10 entry tax to the Territory. Additionally, having received protests from other colonies, the government moved for a special inter-colonial conference in June.

The announcement of an impending entry tax decided credit-ticket merchants in Canton and Hongkong to suspend activities while the new quarantine arrangements led some ships to by-pass Darwin and come direct to disembark their few Chinese passengers destined for southern colonies. The s.s. Afghan duly arrived in Melbourne early in May but was found to contain forty-eight persons with fraudulent naturalisation papers and therefore subject to heavy fine. When the Gillies-Deakin government in Melbourne agreed to forgo prosecution, if the captain left without landing passengers legitimately entitled to land, the ship sailed on to Sydney, arriving in mid-May well heralded and amidst enormous public clamour and demonstration. Parkes, embarrassed by the arrival of three other vessels with Chinese immigrants (nearly 600 all told, perhaps half of whom were destined for New South Wales) decided to set the existing law aside, to refuse landing permission to Chinese who were bona fide returning residents or within the existing regulations, and to introduce a new law which would both indemnify his government against legal proceedings and raise the tonnage restriction from 100 to 300 tons and the entry tax from £10 to £100. He rushed the Bill through the Assembly on 16th May
The great white walls are built

1888 but failed to persuade the Council to do likewise; this body insisted on giving the Bill proper consideration, which lasted till early July and thus through the time of the intercolonial conference.

The Conference, lasting from 12-14 June, remained closed to the press and published very little discussion. Delegates, however, manifestly discussed several basic issues and, after cabling Westminster, reached certain definite conclusions: that traditional Chinese immigration should be virtually prohibited; that Britain should negotiate a new Treaty, along the lines of that being negotiated by the United States, whereby all Chinese should be denied entry except certain exempt groups such as crews, officials, merchants, students and tourists; that, to facilitate such negotiations, Australian colonial laws should not only contain a general power to make exemptions by proclamation (the South Australian delegates here had in mind exemptions for tropical labour also) but should abandon the entry tax so distasteful to China and rely solely on a heavy tonnage restriction, say 500 tons; that it was undesirable for Chinese populations already massed in certain parts of Australia to move to other parts of the continent unless the colonies concerned agreed and that, in the absence of an entry tax, control should be by treating unauthorised intercolonial movements as misdemeanours punishable by imprisonment and/or deportation; that the 1881 principle of exempting British subjects from restrictions should be abandoned, on the grounds that Chinese from Hongkong or Singapore were as much 'Chinese' as those from mainland China; that colonial legislation should be uniform and that Deakin of Victoria, Kingston of South Australia and Macrossan of Queensland should draft a Bill embodying all these conclusions. Besides omitting British Chinese from those specifically exempted, the draft Bill also omitted Chinese residents returning after short trips to China or elsewhere; apparently some delegates felt as strongly about this as did the Anti-Chinese Leagues, and as did some United States Senators, and decided to prevent commuter migration by denying free right of re-entry.

Certain delegates did not agree. Philip Oakley Fysh, Premier and delegate for Tasmania, attacked the draft Bill for ignoring the rights of naturalised Chinese temporarily absent from a colony and,
THE HEATHEN CHINEE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

HEATHEN CHINEE: "Why you send me offee?"
AMOR DE COSMOS (The Love of the World or the Lover of Mankind):
"Because you can't or won't 'assimilate' with us".
HEATHEN CHINEE: "What is datee?"
AMOR DE COSMOS: "You won't drink whiskey, and talk politics and vote like us".

FROM Canadian Illustrated News, April 26, 1879.

In 1879 Amor de Cosmos supported in the House of Commons a petition signed by 1,500 residents of British Columbia requesting the prohibition of Chinese labour in railway work.


indeed, the rights of British Chinese generally; clearly he regarded this, as had Parkes until persuaded otherwise by Gillies,\textsuperscript{51} as a dangerous assault on the doctrine that all subjects of Her Majesty had right of free entry to any of Her Majesty’s dominions. Moreover, he was very aggrieved that both conference and Bill took no notice of the point the Tasmanian Assembly had discussed so carefully a few months earlier, namely, the importance of allowing free entry of wives so that Chinese residents could live a normal family life. In general he felt that existing legislation was quite adequate and that the proposed Bill completely disregarded those ‘climatic characteristics of the northern territories of Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia (so) unsuitable to European labour’.\textsuperscript{52} On returning to Tasmania he made no attempt to change the existing law, which remained untouched until 1898 and proved quite adequate in controlling intake; numbers in fact fell quite sharply from 1891-1901, from 939 to 484.

Malcolm Fraser, Colonial Secretary and delegate for Western Australia, refused to do more than watch proceedings but on his return to Perth stated that, considering there were fewer than 40,000 Chinese in the whole continent (less than 1 per cent of the total population) he felt that all the agitation in the eastern colonies was ‘somewhat premature’ and that existing controls were adequate.\textsuperscript{53} A year later, however, he changed his mind and, in the interests of colonial uniformity, introduced a Bill abolishing the entry tax and imposing a 500 tonnage restriction on all Chinese entering the colony except those exempted by the Act itself or by proclamation. Here the Bill followed South Australian precedent in modifying the intercolonial Bill by exempting returning residents, and also by imposing a fine (£20) as alternative to imprisonment for unauthorised overland movement. It also specifically exempted British subjects, apparently because Western Australia, as a crown colony, felt somewhat uneasy about denying entry to other subjects of Her Majesty.

In debate S. Burt, representing northern pastoral and agricultural interests, insisted that the Bill specifically exempt Chinese introduced under the Imported Labour Registry Act, so that this small but important supply of labour to the northern regions should be protected by statute and not at the mercy of administrative
proclamation.\textsuperscript{54} As a result, partly under the provisions of the Registry Act, Chinese numbers rose slowly but steadily to reach 900 by 1891 (two-thirds being in northern and central areas) and to top the 1000 mark soon afterwards.

In South Australia, Scott, Baker and their friends were less successful than Burt in having a clause inserted specifically exempting tropical areas, or at least exempting Chinese imported for tropical development.\textsuperscript{55} This was not because the majority of South Australian parliamentarians had changed their minds about the unsuitability of white labour in tropical areas, though in fact a growing number were beginning to do so, perhaps under the influence of Griffith and the Queensland Liberals.\textsuperscript{56} The majority still favoured Asiatic labour but for three reasons did not feel that a clause specifically exempting Chinese in the Northern Territory was necessary. First, there were still some who disliked the independent habits of the Chinese and preferred to make stronger efforts to obtain ‘more docile, cheaper’ Indian coolies for plantation work;\textsuperscript{57} these would not be affected by the restrictive Acts. Second, it was clear that between January 1887 and March 1888 the Chinese population of the Territory had increased from 4000 to 7000 or so, and that there were therefore plenty of Chinese available; or would be when the railway was finished and nearly 3000 Chinese came on to the general labour market. Third, government leaders stressed that should a labour shortage occur they could use the general power of exemption to admit as many Chinese labourers as required; though Scott was not completely convinced that any government would be brave enough to stand up to the Trade Unions in the south and the small but vociferous groups of whites in the north, some of his friends were persuaded.\textsuperscript{58}

At long last, then, severe restrictions came into force against the entry of Chinese into the Territory. When the railway was complete, and harder times overtook gold-mining, many returned to China without bothering to obtain certificates entitling them to re-enter South Australia. By April 1891 numbers had fallen to 3600 and by 1901 to 3100. Though the small white community—only just over 1000 in 1891—had plenty of grievances remaining, their major worry was allayed.

Though the government won the battle to extend restrictive
entry laws to the Territory it lost on several other important issues. First, Playford and Kingston had scarcely arrived back from the Conference when their government suffered ferocious attack, not just on the draft Bill itself, but on its emergency proclamation in March re quarantine and the impending entry tax; such actions without any parliamentary sanction, claimed opponents such as Downer, were symptoms of panic and had set dangerous precedents for Gillies in Victoria and Parkes in New South Wales in their completely illegal setting aside of statutory provisions by administrative decree. Second, Playford and Kingston quickly realised they had little hope of obtaining agreement to certain provisions of the intercolonial Bill, notably that which placed established Chinese residents returning from short trips abroad under the same restrictions as newcomers, and that which treated all unauthorised intercolonial movement as a misdemeanour punishable by imprisonment or deportation; even if it involved a Chinese living just beyond the South Australian border, in an area miles away from anyone with power to authorise entry, wanting to visit nearby friends just inside the border. The Bill introduced soon afterwards, therefore, made special exemption for Chinese residents both British and alien, and substituted a small fine (£10) for imprisonment if convicted of unauthorised movement; the Council here insisted on adding a right of appeal.

On other matters the government carried both Houses, despite some vague murmurings that Tasmania might be right in its stand on easy entry for wives and children and on the sanctity of British citizenship. The whole process, however, took from 28 June to 8 December, 1888 and although other colonies followed the South Australian discussion with interest—especially on the Northern Territory and intercolonial movement issues—they decided to introduce their own Bills without awaiting the final outcome in Adelaide.

Queensland had just seen an election which put the McIlwraith government back in office. The voice of the electors, however, was so definite on the need for Chinese exclusion—allied as it was with some violence against Chinese shops and the expulsion of Chinese miners from one or two gold-fields—that, quite apart from the presence in Cabinet of the perennially anti-Chinese John Macrossan,
McIlwraith's group again decided that a strong anti-Chinese line now might make things easier for them later if they wished to encourage other forms of coloured labour; indeed, there were already moves afoot to introduce Japanese cane workers to the north.\(^62\) The tropical labour issue, therefore, scarcely emerged and both parties were quite unanimous, somewhat to their surprise and gratification, in swiftly passing a Bill modelled closely on the intercolonial draft. The two principal modifications were on South Australian lines but less liberal: the specific exemption of Chinese born in Queensland and an alternative of £50 fine for unauthorised overland movement; here Queenslanders were still determined to keep the Darwin Chinese away from their northern areas.\(^63\)

The Queensland Bill, however, contained such severe penalties (e.g. imprisonment without option for the master of a vessel even accidentally infringing the law) that the Governor reserved it for Westminster. It eventually received royal assent but only after Queensland agreed to modify the penalties, which it eventually did in 1890.\(^64\) Westminster had long ago admitted the colonies' right to determine the composition of their own populations: it had certainly not yet surrendered its power to block colonial laws interfering so drastically with international and British shipping.

The Victorian government, having waited to see what other colonies would do, and surviving some trenchant criticism of its high-handed and 'panicky' actions over the Afghan,\(^65\) passed its restrictive Act even more quickly than Queensland. Gillies introduced the Bill, following very closely that agreed to by the intercolonial conference, and defeated all attempts to make special exemption for wives and children and for returning Chinese residents,\(^66\) he did agree, however, to introduce a heavy fine as alternative to imprisonment for unauthorised overland movement (£50). The upper House was more sensitive and introduced clauses exempting women, children and Chinese naturalised in Australia.\(^67\) After conference with the Assembly it gave way on the wives clause (having been told that leading Chinese in Australia did not want it) but insisted on exempting at least Chinese naturalised in the colony and on having the milder South Australian fine (£10) against unauthorised overland movement.\(^68\) On the main issue, virtual prohibition of further Chinese immigration, almost everyone was
agreed. Indeed, with public opinion as it was, it would have been
difficult to disagree.

In New South Wales the position was much more complex, and
here we return to the great public outcry and demonstrations
surrounding the arrival of the *Afghan* in May 1888, to Parkes’s
precipitate action in preventing the disembarkation of Chinese
entitled to land by existing statute, and to his attempt to rush
through a Bill indemnifying his government and imposing much
more severe restrictions. The atmosphere of the time, excitable
and verging on violence, is reflected in the Bill and the debates.
The opposition attacked the government for losing their heads
over the arrival of a paltry two or three hundred Chinese (some
of whom were returning residents), for unjust high-handed
arrogance, and for not having taken adequate steps until the last
minute. Government supporters retorted that the *Afghan* Chinese
were but the forerunners of thousands more on their way and that
citizens must think of themselves ‘in a state of siege, with a foe in
front of us’; at the very least these Chinese constituted a ‘gangrene
in the body politic’, an insidious ‘poison’, and that Parkes was
justified in declaiming to the Assembly: ‘I cast to the wind your
permits of exemption. I care nothing about your cobweb of tech­
nical law; I am obeying a law far superior to any law which issued
these permits, namely, the law of the preservation of society in New
South Wales’. With vehemence as much as argument Parkes got
his Bill through the Assembly in one day, and later survived a
motion of censure brought not only by persons genuinely upset at
the treatment given the Chinese but also by political opponents
such as George Dibbs; the latter, as Chairman of the Australasian
Steam Navigation Company, had done his best to obtain Chinese
crews for his ships in 1878 but was now attacking Parkes for not
introducing a harsher Bill.

The important point of Parkes’s Bill lay not only in its lifting
the tonnage restriction from 100 tons to 300, and the entry tax
from £10 to £100, but in its other provisions and general philosophy.
In the weeks before the crisis Parkes had been corresponding with
the British government about the Chinese Commissioner’s complaint
that the New South Wales entry tax was a breach of Anglo-Chinese
treaties. Very well, he in effort retorted, we will deal with the
The great white walls are built

Chinese in New South Wales exactly as the government of China deals with British subjects in China, with all the restraints on residence, movement and occupation imposed on them there: then let the government of Britain and China see which country had been the more liberal; then let them see where the 'harassing' really lay. Hence a great array of clauses which amongst other things enabled the government to set aside certain areas of Sydney, Newcastle and other towns where Chinese could reside, with their families and establishments, for the purpose of carrying on mercantile pursuits without molestation or restraint (cl. 11); prohibited any Chinese from residing or travelling elsewhere in the colony without a special permit (cl. 12); prohibited any Chinese arriving in New South Wales after the Act from engaging in any mining pursuit whatever (gold, silver or any other) without express authority from the Minister for Mines (cl. 13); raised the mining licence fee for Chinese already resident from 10 shillings to £10 a year (cl. 16); prohibited any further naturalisation of Chinese in New South Wales on any ground whatever (cl. 3); and withdrew all privileges enjoyed by Chinese residents once they left the colony, whether naturalised or not (cl. 3). The Bill graciously exempted from these restrictions, and from the tonnage and entry tax provisions, official representatives of the government of China (cl. 14), crews engaged upon their proper business (cl. 15), Chinese genuinely naturalised in New South Wales, and—in deference to Great Britain—any Chinese possessing British nationality by birth (cl. 19). 'So that', concluded Parkes, 'exactly what is done to us in China we do to Chinese in Australia, except that we do it with a more liberal hand'.

This 'tit for tat' approach was accepted by the Assembly almost without demur but was almost entirely rejected by the upper House, which refused to be stampeded and insisted on considering the ramifications of each clause. It knocked out the clauses imposing restraints on residence, movement and occupations, except the restraint on mining now so common in other colonies, and insisted that established Chinese residents, and Chinese naturalised in New South Wales, should not lose their privileges if leaving the colony only temporarily; it also insisted that established residents should not have to pay discriminatory licence fees. It did not, however,
The gates close against the Chinese, 1871-88

delete the clause prohibiting further naturalisation; there had been trouble enough over fraudulent papers and, as the government assured those disturbed by this discriminatory provision, respectable Chinese could be naturalised at any time by Private Act of Parliament.74 Some members of the Council objected to the preamble—'to provide for the protection of the colony of New South Wales from the disturbances and national dangers which may arise from the influx of Chinese under restrictions'—as conveying the quite erroneous impression that the working classes had been on the verge of insurrection; but Parkes insisted that these words were essential to any Act called upon to deal with grave emergency and to indemnify the government against challenge for its actions in such emergency. He agreed, however, to the Council's other deletions—even though these wrecked his 'tit for tat' philosophy—and the Bill became law on 11 July, 1888.75

At one point the Bill nearly foundered altogether in the Council. When they heard the preliminary results of the intercolonial conference (13 June) some members wanted to drop Parkes's emergency Bill and introduce the one then being drafted by the conference.76 With an indemnity clause involved, and with no definite assurance that the conference Bill would be accepted by other colonies, the government persuaded the Council to continue; at the same time Parkes rejected a request from Westminster that, in the interests of the proposed Anglo-Chinese Treaty, he drop the heavy £100 entry tax. Parkes promised the intercolonial conference, however, that although he could not hold back the current Bill he would introduce the conference Bill as soon as two other colonies had adopted its basic principles. In December 1888 both South Australia and Victoria joined Queensland in passing their restrictive Acts, and so provided the necessary conditions. Parkes, however, failed to keep his promise and retained the old law.

From 1888-9 on, then, Australia had virtually uniform and almost prohibitive laws against Chinese immigration in Queensland, Victoria, South Australia and the Northern Territory, an almost prohibitive law of another kind in New South Wales, and a milder law in Tasmania. The Australian colonies, in short, were in much the same position as the United States, except that little came of Britain's negotiations with China for a new Treaty. As
the Chinese commuting system continued, many returning permanently to China, the Chinese population of Australia continued its steady decline—from 38,500 in 1881 to 35,800 in 1891 and 29,600 in 1901.

The other important decision made at the 1888 Conference concerned naturalisation; though no full record of the proceedings is available it is plain that the majority of delegates agreed to prevent any more Chinese residents acquiring British citizenship in their colonies, either by legislative prohibition or by using the discretionary power to grant or refuse naturalisation held by the Governor-in-Council under the relevant Aliens or Naturalisation Acts. In accordance with this decision New South Wales kept clause 3, prohibiting further naturalisation, in its 1888 Chinese Restriction Act, while the Victorian and South Australian governments simply rejected all further Chinese applications for naturalisation. Philip Fysh, as part of his general distaste of the Conference proceedings, refused outright to take such steps in Tasmania and was later joined by the Queensland government, which refused naturalisation applications until 1891 but then once more started to grant a few each year; both these colonies continued to naturalise resident Chinese until prevented by the Federal Naturalization Act of 1903. Western Australia continued to naturalise Chinese while still on crown colony status but, after acquiring self-government in 1890, switched to the Victorian and South Australian practice. The majority of Australian colonies, in short, were quite clear that they not only did not want further Chinese immigration but also did not intend to admit any more Chinese residents to full membership of the body politic.
Chapter 8

1 New Zealand, 1872-81

At this time New Zealand considered itself closely linked to the Australian colonies, sending representatives to various intercolonial conferences, associating itself with protests to Britain against the expansion of France and Germany in the south-west Pacific, pressing Britain to allow the Australasian colonies to make special trading agreements with each other, and basing its anti-Chinese legislation on that of Queensland and Victoria. Furthermore, events in the Australian colonies often had profound influence in New Zealand, especially as numerous Australian residents entered the colony during the gold rushes of the 1860s and the developmental boom of the 1870s; some of these were influential persons, such as Richard Seddon, later to become a leading radical politician and then Premier. Nevertheless, it is proper to treat New Zealand separately. Though tempted by moves to Australasian federation the colony eventually refused to adopt the Federal Council of Australasia Act, 1885, and retained its own initiative on all important matters.

In addition to geographical distance, there were several basic factors keeping Australia and New Zealand distinct in circumstance and policy. First, the Maori population, relatively more numerous and powerful than the Australian Aborigines, gave such good account of themselves during the wars of the 1860s and early 1870s that they won widespread respect and direct representation in both houses of Parliament; the wars themselves became a major factor in colonial politics and a vast drain on resources. Second, though the Australasian colonies generally experienced considerable economic growth during the 1870s, the New Zealand boom, largely initiated and maintained by the active public works and immigration policy of the Colonial Treasurer, Julius Vogel, lasted only till 1879: while development in Australia continued until 1890, with occasional set-
backs and New Zealand suffered a prolonged depression for most of the 1880s, culminating in 1888 with a net emigration, mainly to Australia. Third, though the provinces saw their very considerable powers drastically reduced in 1875-6, they nevertheless remained influential as centres of regional loyalties and interests; for the most part very different from the more highly centralised Australian colonies.

The liberal era of New Zealand's nineteenth century Chinese history, confirmed by the 1871 Parliamentary decision to reject all legislative restriction and discrimination (chapter 4, section 2), continued with an attempt to harness Chinese coolie labour to Vogel's public works scheme. Difficulty in obtaining labourers for railway construction in 1872 led the central government to ask the provinces whether they would agree to limited numbers of industrious, frugal and orderly Chinese working on railways in their territory; to which the northern provinces in part agreed but the southern definitely disagreed, either because their railways were almost complete or because anti-Chinese sentiment was still strong, notably in Otago. In the end immigration from Britain and Scandinavia remedied the labour shortage and the Chinese proposals lapsed.

Despite this lack of official encouragement Chinese immigration continued, though at a relatively low level: a net gain of 2000 or more during the boom years 1873-5; a net loss of some 200 during 1876-7; a net gain of 700 or so in 1878. Many of these newcomers, together with some of the earlier Otago diggers, went to the West Coast gold areas, but some joined the small colonies now building up in cities such as Dunedin, Christchurch, Wellington and Auckland. These urban groups provoked little outcry, even during the sporadic outbursts of unemployment in Dunedin and Christchurch 1876-7; nor was there widespread and active hostility against the 3500 or so in the Otago gold-fields or against the 1500 or more on the West Coast diggings, even though the gold production of both areas was continuing slowly and steadily to decline.

It was, however, from Westland that there came the first rumblings of a substantial anti-Chinese political movement. A number of radically minded settlers, who had imbibed anti-Chinese sentiments on the Victorian and New South Wales gold-fields and then moved to the Westland diggings as miners, shopkeepers or
agents (notably Richard Reeves and Richard Seddon, both of whom were then in Parliament) decided in 1878 that the West Coast had quite enough Chinese and should act against further immigration. Reeves, having discovered that Attorney-General Robert Stout was opposed to restriction, decided to force his hand by moving that the House of Representatives resolve that further Chinese immigration be prohibited; on the grounds that the Chinese in California, Hawaii, Queensland and Victoria had 'completely demoralized' local communities with their disease, vice and secret societies, had driven numerous labourers and tradesmen out of business by their cheap labour, were on the verge of causing 'frightful bloodshed and loss of life', and generally constituted a 'yellow agony' which New Zealand should at all costs avoid. He received solid support from J. P. Joyce, who represented Otago miners and objected to 'degrading our race' by admitting 'these animals', these specimens of 'an effete race which might very well be left to die out'. Other mining representatives did not agree, however, while landed and commercial groups saw no more reason to discourage the Chinese than they had earlier, especially as numbers were increasing very slowly. Reeves eventually withdrew his motion, on the understanding the government would consider the matter.

Reeves had, in fact, chosen his time well. Members of the 'Continuous Ministry', a shifting combination of established landed and commercial interests which were almost continually in office from the early 1870s until 1891, had shown their dislike of restriction in 1871. But 1877 had seen their temporary defeat by Sir George Grey, the famous former governor who had supervised the Maori Wars and the developmental and constitutional problems of the 1840s and 1860s and had now returned to New Zealand as a private settler; an awkward volcanic mixture of idealist and man of action, Grey could now implement some of his radical notions and chose his 'Liberal' ministry from a larger pack of radical young 'greyhounds'. Reeves knew that some ministers, including Stout, felt anti-Chinese legislation to be quite unnecessary; but he was really appealing to Grey himself, and Grey's almost religious devotion to the ideal of making New Zealand a great centre of Anglo-Saxon civilisation in the South-west Pacific.

Grey rose nobly to the lure, deciding to introduce in the 1879
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session a Bill modelled closely on that of Queensland’s Act of 1877 (tonnage restriction of 10 tons and entry tax of £10). Though his government was defeated during 1879, the restored Continuous Ministry decided to let the Bill go forward to a first reading, with a supporting memorandum from Grey. They also agreed to add to the Queensland Act a clause suspending operation of the restrictions until the Chinese population reached 5000, i.e. about 1 per cent of the white population.

In his memorandum Grey set forth much the same opinions he was later to express when supporting the restrictive Bills of 1880, 1881 and 1888. These all boiled down to several interrelated propositions: the extension of civilisation throughout the Pacific region, with its great variety of barbarous and semi-barbarous peoples, would be long and difficult; the process would require a centre from which the Anglo-Saxon race could gradually spread its rule, its faith, its laws and its language; this would eventually bring into existence a prosperity and contentment such as no former age of the world had known; in the meantime it was vital to protect such a centre against being overborne or interfered with by peoples of inferior civilisation; the United States, with its Negro problem in the south and Asiatic problem in the west, gave a glimpse of the strife that could arise if coloured persons were allowed to mix with Europeans; moreover, large-scale mixture between whites and others resulted in a population of ‘mean whites’, a mixed race that could never become a great nation; Australia could never be a pure and effective centre for civilisation as its vast tropical north would inevitably be developed by Malays, Chinese and other coloured peoples, and this doomed it to be a battlefield between a large coloured population and a small European population; as New Zealand was the only country in the Pacific where such a centre could be developed the whole future of the Pacific depended on New Zealand preserving a European type Anglo-Saxon population; it thus behoved Parliament to introduce restrictions against Chinese immigration and to pay far more attention to the business of human breeding-stock, as the future of any young nation hinged on this.10

Grey modified his views substantially only once. In 1881, with his interest in breeding stock, he became intrigued by the suggestion that Chinese should be so restricted that they never exceeded
1 per cent of the total population: 'I will suggest to the government that they should add to the Bill a clause providing for a full trial of their plan for breeding a superior race in this country, and that funds should be set apart for the purpose of introducing here specimens of every coloured nation to the exact extent of one per cent in each case on our present population. It is a statesmanlike and philosophical idea'.

In the event the 1879 Bill never received a second reading being 'slaughtered', so the radicals claimed, along with many other 'innocent' liberal measures formulated by the short-lived Grey government. In any case the new government was more concerned with the onset of depression than with worrying about a small Chinese immigration which in 1879 showed every sign of becoming a net loss. This was not good enough for the radicals, now being affected by the developing Australian campaign for restriction and the general unrest provoked by serious economic recession. This time it was William Hutchison, radical member for Wellington city, who tried to force the government's hand by introducing into the House of Representatives a private member's Bill prohibiting all further Chinese immigration, with a £10 fine to be levied on an offending vessel for every Chinese landing.

Hutchison argued much the same case as had Reeves in 1878, and was strongly supported by Reeves, Grey and Seddon. The last had been elected in 1879 and became most indignant when the Chinese were likened to the Irish and Jews. This he warmly insisted, was 'an insult to every Irishman in the colony' for 'there is about the same distinction between a European and a Chinaman as that between a Chinaman and a monkey. . . . I think the Chinaman is inferior in every way, shape or form and I hope that such an inferiority will never be tolerated here'.

The one new note in the restrictionist case sounded from Hutchison himself, who attempted to spike anti-restrictionist guns by tackling the question of basic principle. 'As an abstract proposition it might be conceded that human beings had a right to locate themselves wherever they pleased on God's earth', but in practice this was absurd. 'It is not . . . . a rule of human action to carry out large propositions with inexorable logic', as witness the refusal of countries to admit immigrants with loathsome diseases.
His opponents were not impressed. The liberal-humanitarian group could not understand why Hutchison, 'who professed to be a Liberal', should 'so far forget the traditions that ought to cling to him' as to introduce such illiberal and unnecessary proposals; he was simply treating the Chinese to the barbaric principles of which he accused the Chinese Empire though, in fact, the Chinese were an ancient, orderly and civilised people with no more vice-ridden, immoral and diseased persons than European peoples. Moreover, if the British claimed Australasia by right of discovery the Chinese had some right in the area—'the right of being in the neighbourhood'. The more pragmatic group felt that, with numbers practically stationary and with no evidence of serious crime or violence, the matter could well be deferred until clearly necessary; in any case the government was in touch with the Australian colonies about joint action and would prefer to legislate in conjunction with them. Three West Coast representatives opposed the Bill (Trimble, Reid and Gisborne), charging Reeves and Seddon with grossly exaggerating Chinese vice, disease and crime in the area and with omitting to mention obvious Chinese virtues; Reid, indeed, claimed that many miners got on very well with Chinese diggers and that the Europeans who were most hostile to the Chinese were they who had least to do with them. A Maori representative, Te Wheoro, added that the Bill seemed somewhat hard on the Chinese and that the Maori had little fault to find with Chinese settlers.

In the end, though Hutchison just managed to carry the second-reading (13:12), he agreed not to press the Bill provided the government continued to negotiate with other colonies about joint action.

New Zealand was represented at the intercolonial conference (Sydney—January 1881) by Thomas Dick, an Otago settler and official who was variously Colonial Secretary, Minister for Justice and Minister for Education. He agreed to the letter of protest to Westminster about Western Australia's Chinese policy but sided with representatives from Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania in favouring the relatively mild Queensland restrictions rather than the severer measures demanded by New South Wales and Victoria. After his return the Government decided to revive
the Queensland-type Bill of 1879, being moved by a small increase in Chinese net migration (from -100 in 1880 to +600 in 1881), by the deepening of the depression, by the strengthening of anti-Chinese sentiments amongst tradesmen and labourers, and by the near approach of elections. The Bill not only contained all the Queensland provisions (tonnage restriction of 10 tons, £10 entry tax, refund of tax to Chinese leaving within three years, exemption of Chinese residents) but also the 1879 provision suspending restrictions until the Chinese population of New Zealand reached 5000; it then being about 4600.

This time the arguments and groupings were slightly different.20 The pragmatic element argued that, although numbers were still small, conditions were sufficiently different from those of 1880 to warrant action and that they thought Westminster, having accepted Queensland's Bill in 1877, would probably accept this one also.21 Grey and Whitaker strongly argued the case for maintaining the superior Anglo-Saxon civilisation against that 'partial civilization which has lasted 3,000 years without ostensible progress', asserting that, should Westminster object, the basic principle should be forced through 'even at the price of separation from the Old Country'.22 Mining, working class and radical representatives stressed disease, vice and cheap labour, Hutchison firmly dismissing any need to defer to Britain: 'supposing 200 Chinese were to land in England every second day, would the people stand it?' No, Parliament would pass a restrictive Act within a week.23 Against the Bill were various landed and business interests, blaming the whole thing on working class agitation (Fulton, Murray, Turnbull). This time they received little concrete support from leading liberal-humanitarians: both Sir William Fox and Dr Wallis felt the Bill broke both the British tradition of welcoming anyone who wanted a place of refuge and the humanitarian principle that all men were equal, no matter what their colour or race might be; nevertheless they agreed reluctantly to support this 'humiliating' restrictive measure.24 As a result the House not only passed the restrictions but allowed the radicals to strike out the suspension and refund clauses; it rejected however, though only just (24:23), Hutchison's attempt to raise the tonnage restriction from 10 tons to 50 tons.
In the Legislative Council business and humanitarian interests fought much harder against this ‘inhuman and barbarous measure’. Holmes of Otago asserted that the Bill was simply continuing the systematic wrong done by Europeans to the Chinese in the past, especially by the British government when using force to make China accept the infamous opium trade; on that occasion the Chinese Emperor showed how much more civilised he was than the British when he said ‘nothing will induce me to derive a revenue from the vice and misery of my people’. Colonel Brett, from the predominantly English settlement of Canterbury, upheld Christian principles of equality and castigated the radicals for attacking Chinese vice, illiteracy and disease and deliberately ignoring the same things amongst Britons: ‘is there’, he asked, ‘a dirtier breed on the face of the earth than Scotchmen and Irishmen.’ Others attacked working class agitation.

This time, however, the pragmatic element turned away from its earlier pro-Chinese views and agreed with the restrained and careful case for restriction put by the Attorney-General, F. Whitaker: that tension already existed between Chinese and European in New Zealand; that restrictions were necessary to avoid the kind of violence evident in California; that though the Chinese did not start the brawls it was their presence which precipitated them. Some went further, stressing the political dangers of allowing too many into the country: the Chinese ‘are like the sands upon the sea-shore’ and New Zealand should not allow itself to be ‘swamped by an immense influx’, no matter how sober and industrious. Moreover, the Chinese Empire was now awakening so quickly from its long sleep that, should Chinese immigrants become a substantial element in New Zealand, ‘those who come after will have to settle with China itself, which will be one of the greatest Powers on earth’. Apparently because he thought he would not get the Bill through Council without some concessions, Whitaker at first suggested restoring the suspension and refund clauses. But he found so much support, albeit somewhat sorrowful, that he let the Bill ride as it was and managed to carry the second reading 13:10. Indeed, when Dr Pollen later made an effort to restore the suspension clause—this time specifying 2 per cent (about 10,000 rather than
the earlier 5000 or 1 per cent) the Council voted emphatically against it, 14:7. So disappeared one important feature of the Bill that had come through from the 1879 proposals; i.e. an early attempt to relate alien immigration to total population via some kind of quota or proportionate limit, thus reflecting the feeling that a population could assimilate, or at least accommodate, a small proportion of persons of completely different race and culture, and that judicious adjustment of this proportionate limit was a more humane method of controlling immigration than complete exclusion or fixed arbitrary restrictions.

In the event Westminster ratified the Bill without demur—being based on Australian precedent it raised no new imperial issues. Its effect on Chinese immigration, however, is debatable. New migration dropped from +600 or so in 1881 to some -200 a year, 1882-4; but 1881 had been much higher than 1878-80 and it is difficult to separate out the effects of restrictions from those of depression and of changes within the Chinese immigrant communities. Nevertheless, the fall gave satisfaction to radical politicians, though some remained convinced the Act was far too gentle.

The restrictions were, in fact, relatively gentle, being based on the Queensland Act of 1877 and not on the severer laws being introduced at the time into New South Wales and Victoria, and soon afterwards into Queensland and Western Australia. Though not as gentle as Tasmania, New Zealand was maintaining her reputation for reasonable humanitarianism.

2 Internal discrimination in New Zealand

Likewise moves to prevent Chinese settlers from becoming naturalised or casting votes were less belligerent in New Zealand than in Victoria and New South Wales. The issue arose in 1882, when the government introduced a supplementary Aliens Bill to remove an unforeseen difficulty in the Aliens Act of 1880, whereby native-born children of aliens could not become naturalised. Those interested in the plight of various Scandinavian and German settlers, many of whom had come to the colony under Vogel’s immigration program of the 1870s and were now in trouble because of the
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depression, took the opportunity to persuade the government to insert an additional clause reducing the £1 naturalisation fee of the 1880 Act to five shillings. At this point Vincent Pyke, who had come to the Otago gold-fields from Victoria, had explored the West Coast gold areas and become secretary for the Otago Gold-fields Department, and was now representative for the mining electorate of Dunstan, moved a proviso that the concessions of the Bill be denied to persons of the Chinese race; and carried it without debate.31

In the Legislative Council, however, liberal-humanitarians thought it disgraceful that children of, say, a Chinese father and Irish mother could not become naturalised; and that Chinese aliens becoming naturalised under the 1880 law should be singled out as the only persons required to pay £1. They knocked the proviso out.32 Back in the lower House the government decided to uphold the proviso, on the grounds that 'we should . . . not admit members of the Chinese race to the privileges which were granted to other naturalized subjects'.33 This received strong support from certain mining representatives who argued, as had recently been argued in Victoria and contemporaneously in South Australia, that Chinese were 'serfs in the truest sense of the word', were under the command of their headmen, and were susceptible to bribes by 'moneyed men' willing to corrupt the voting system.34

Richard Seddon, however, was ready to drop the proviso, not only because he felt that few Chinese ever bothered to become naturalised and that it was pointless to make a fuss about their fees, and even more about their New Zealand born children, but also because his radicalism was at this time more humane than that of many others. While strongly set against Chinese immigration he did not relish discrimination against those already admitted for settlement. Even when working hard in 1888 for virtual prohibition of Chinese immigration, he fought against moves to remove Chinese names from voting lists and asked for an inquiry into reports that police had used unnecessary brutality in breaking up a Chinese card-game: Chinese in New Zealand, he insisted, 'ought to have the same personal freedom as people of other nations'.35 It was not till some years later that he swung over to full-scale discrimination.
Despite Seddon's intervention the proviso was restored, on the grounds that the 1881 Chinese Immigrants Act showed that New Zealand intended to treat Chinese 'exceptionally' and that there was some danger of adding 'to the voting power a large number of persons ignorant of European habits of thought'. Again the majority of Councillors disagreed, arguing that the proviso did not touch the 1880 Act whereby Chinese could become naturalised, but was simply an 'illiberal, un-English', petty and spiteful attempt to make life uncomfortable for certain settlers of Chinese race. In the end, however, the Council agreed to retain the discriminatory £1 fee if the Assembly agreed to cut out the discrimination against native-born children. Hence the clause of the 1882 Aliens Act limiting discrimination to payment of fees.

Another attempt to introduce Australian-type discrimination—excluding Chinese from gold-fields—failed to get far. Here it is unclear whether those sponsoring it were intimidated by the hostility of the liberal-humanitarians, or put off by Seddon's refusal to support it, or fearful that such a measure would speed up the steady move of Chinese from the gold-fields to the cities, some to compete with under-employed Europeans. At all events, the two radicals introducing the Bill (Turnbull and Daniels) eventually let the matter drop.

3 New Zealand becomes somewhat firmer, 1882-9

During the mid-1880s, though depression conditions worsened and Chinese net migration showed a small surplus (just over 100 for 1885-6), the anti-Chinese movement remained comparatively quiescent. Sir George Grey made a half-hearted attempt in 1886 to place restrictions on all coloured labourers entering the colony, but did not push it further than a first reading. The report of the Chinese Commissioners in May 1887, however, together with subsequent inquiries by the British government and anti-Chinese agitation in Australia, stirred up the restrictionists to further activity. In October/November Reeves asked the government to do what was being suggested in Australia, namely, raise the entry tax, prevent the return of Chinese residents temporarily absent
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from the colony, and refuse all further Chinese applications for naturalisation; to which Atkinson, the Premier, replied that he would investigate allegations of Chinese fraudulently entering on someone else's naturalisation certificate and, if numbers increased, would definitely consider additional restrictions in order to 'protect [the colony's] civilization against the civilization, if I may call it so, of the Chinese'. In December Seddon was pressing the government on Chinese numbers, on Chinese hygiene, and on allegations that young girls were frequenting the Chinese quarter of Wellington for immoral purposes. At the same time Atkinson was corresponding with Australian Premiers about fraud, quarantine and the desirability of an intercolonial conference.

Nothing definite was done, however, until the Afghan was prevented from landing Chinese in Melbourne, starting rumours early in May that hundreds of Chinese rejected in Australia were transhipping for New Zealand, the first ship being the Te Ana due to arrive at Invercargill in the far south about the sixth of May; all this in the depths of the depression in a year when so many settlers were leaving the colony that total net migration was -9000. A meeting of Invercargill citizens at once appointed a Vigilante Committee, armed them with guns to resist a Chinese landing, and put them on a special train for the landing place at Bluff; the train also carried special police hastily sworn in to maintain law and order and, if necessary, to read the Riot Act. The ninety-four Chinese aboard the Te Ana did not, in fact, try to land, so received no more than wharfside abuse before sailing on to Dunedin, here again to be greeted by 'a working-class and larrikin element' gathered at the port. After nineteen Chinese had landed inconspicuously by night the rest went on to Greymouth, on the West Coast, where they landed without interference.

The Bluff incident of 6 May 1888 stirred the Continuous Ministry into immediate action. On 11 May, five days before Parkes moved his drastic Bill in New South Wales, Atkinson announced the introduction of a new Bill based on the Victorian Act of 1881 (100 tons restriction) and that he intended to enforce quarantine and health regulations very strictly, ask Westminster for a new Treaty with China, and send a representative to the Sydney Conference in June.
The gates close against the Chinese, 1871-88

The new Bill drew criticism from two quite different directions. On the one side were those attacking the Bill for being too mild. First were Seddon and his radical friends, expressing dissatisfaction with the 100-ton restriction and £10 entry tax of Victoria's 1881 Act as they knew many Victorians were now pressing for much heavier restrictions. Second were those who discovered that, in contrast to New Zealand's 1881 Act (which, save for Chinese residents of the colony, enforced the restrictions on all persons of Chinese race, both British and alien) the Victorian Act exempted all British subjects from restriction; several members at once became worried about a great influx of Chinese from Hongkong and Singapore, then rumoured to total some 300,000. Third were those wanting restrictions on Chinese freedom to enter certain occupations, notably mining. Many of these three groups, however, were gratified to see the Victorian clause which prohibited unnaturalised Chinese from voting in local and colonial elections.

On the other side were the traditional liberal-humanitarians and well entrenched pastoralists and business men. Some asserted that as the Chinese population of New Zealand had not been increasing the Bill was a quite unnecessary 'pandering to popular clamour', a weak surrender to 'a very small minority of the working classes', to a 'portion of the population whose opinion is scarcely entitled to consideration'. (Officially Chinese numbers had declined from 5000 to 4500 over 1881-6 but had increased by 100 or so in 1887; Seddon countered this numerical argument by claiming that Chinese were 'too cunning' to declare themselves at censuses and that numbers were in fact rapidly increasing.) Others accused the government of being stampeded by events in Australia, particularly by the actions of Parkes in New South Wales; as Richmond of Nelson put it, economic depression is a time 'when men lose their heads' and are affected by 'agitations emanating from elsewhere', when 'a screaming Premier in one of the Australian colonies is heard, and rouses sympathy, and perhaps creates insanity through the group'. Yet others charged the restrictionists with again exaggerating Chinese vice and disease, with again completely ignoring the virtues of Chinese settlers and the contribution they had made as market gardeners, miners, domestic servants and merchants, and the value they could have as a labour force for
textile manufacturing.\textsuperscript{48} A Maori view was expressed by Hirini Taiwhanga when saying that he did not want New Zealand to be overrun by Chinese but that he had not been able to get labour for his silver mine for fourteen years and would like a few Chinese miners.

Complicating these diverse opinions and interests was a conflict between those wanting new restrictions as soon as possible and those wanting to defer action until the intercolonial conference in Sydney in June, either because they preferred a uniform Australasian action or because they suspected most Australian colonies would subsequently introduce much heavier restrictions than those of Victoria in 1881. Here the radicals, notably Seddon, were well and truly torn. On the one hand they did not want to let an essentially upper class government appear as the champions of the working class, as the ones most energetic and speedy in meeting proletarian clamour for immediate action: on the other hand they did not want to agree to restrictions which a month later, after the conference, would seem much too mild. Hence Seddon's swinging between attempts to defer matters till after the conference and attacks on the government for its dilatory handling of the Bill.\textsuperscript{49} Another complication was Dr Pollen's attempt to resurrect the quota notion of 1879-81, this time proposing a limit of 1 per cent of total population before restrictions started to operate.\textsuperscript{50}

The Bill, as it finally emerged for presentation to Westminster, was a curious compromise between these diverse forces. In the lower House the government eventually agreed to remove the clause exempting British Chinese, and to press Westminster to negotiate a new Treaty with China on the lines of the proposed United States-China Treaty.\textsuperscript{51} But it managed to block Seddon's attempt on the one hand to strike out the clauses discriminating against Chinese voters and, on the other hand, to raise the tonnage restrictions from 100 to 200 tons. The Legislative Council, however, where seats were less dependent on public opinion, saw the liberal-humanitarians and establishment less ready to rush into heavy restrictions. They finally agreed (16:9) to accept the 100 tons clause but struck out the clauses discriminating against Chinese voters, reinserted a clause exempting British Chinese from restriction, added clauses exempting crews of Chinese men-of-war and Chinese
immigrants already on the way to New Zealand, and limited the operation of the restrictions to one year.

By the time these amendments were considered in the lower House, the intercolonial conference was over and the New Zealand representative, R. Oliver, though he missed the ship and did not arrive in Sydney until two days after the conference finished, had collected and transmitted the draft intercolonial bill and diverse Australian opinions about it. The House of Representatives, reinforced by unanimous Australian opinion against British Chinese, insisted on applying restrictions to them, on the grounds that ‘persons of the Chinese race . . . although natural-born British subjects, have all the characteristics which render them undesirable citizens in a European community’.52 They further insisted on re-inserting the clauses denying Chinese voting rights, arguing that ‘Chinese modes of thought and life are so unlike those of a European population that they do not understand the institutions of the country, and are likely to introduce into our local elections an incongruous and, therefore, a disturbing element’.53 Though some would dearly like to have adopted the 500 tons restriction of the conference draft bill they decided, to avoid giving the Council a chance of becoming even more ‘obstinate’, to leave the figure at 100 tons.54 For the same reason, it seems, they accepted the Council’s other amendments.

The Legislative Council remained quite adamant: no subject of Her Majesty should be deprived of the rights and privileges of a British subject unless proved to be a scoundrel, and no person should be denied a vote where such denial breached the fundamental principle of ‘no taxation without representation’. (The Council, having overlooked the 1881 Act’s failure to exempt British subjects, were now trying to undo the damage; Dr Pollen also made an unsuccessful attempt to have the discriminatory provisions of the Aliens Act re-examined.55) Several stormy meetings of representatives of both Houses failed to produce agreement. Eventually, near the end of the session, when Dr Pollen and several other anti-restrictionists in the Council had gone home, the government organised a meeting which at last reached an acceptable compromise: the Council agreed to stop fighting for the rights of all British subjects provided Chinese naturalised in New Zealand were exempt
from restrictions when travelling and provided Chinese residents had the same voting rights as others. The Council later agreed, though only by 16:10, to extend the Act beyond the one-year period.56

In this curious and complicated fashion New Zealand eventually lurched into a new set of restrictions on Chinese immigration. Clearly, anti-restrictionist forces were stronger than in any other Australasian colony except Tasmania, and were able to put the brakes quite firmly on those proposing the heavy tonnage restrictions favoured on the Australian mainland. In the event their judgment about the need or otherwise of heavy restrictions proved correct: after the Act Chinese arrivals dropped sharply, net migration running at a deficit of a hundred or more a year until 1894 and the census count of Chinese falling from 4542 in 1886 to 4444 in 1891 and 3869 in 1896. Though economic conditions may have kept many potential settlers away, it was clear that in the prevailing circumstances the relatively mild New Zealand Act was as capable as the mild Tasmanian Act in preventing the great influx of Chinese so much talked about during the Afghan panic in 1888.

It is interesting to speculate on the reasons for this similarity between Tasmania and New Zealand, both colonies then having almost identical restrictions. Greater isolation, less industrialisation and fewer members of the working class, relatively small Chinese populations, and other factors were all involved. Suffice it to say that, in this era of closing gates firmly against Chinese migration about the 'white Pacific', it was the two island colonies of Australasia, and the far distant dominion of Canada, which closed the gates least firmly.
Chapter 9

Chinese life in Australasia

As in North America, the 1870s and 1880s saw the 40,000 or so Chinese of Australasia in a state of transition. Though most had arrived to work in the gold-fields, the number of miners steadily decreased until by the early 1890s there were only 10,000 or so left: some 2500 in New Zealand; about 2000 in New South Wales, Victoria and the Northern Territory; 1000 or fewer in Queensland; about 500 in Tasmania, these mining tin rather than gold; and a thin scatter in South Australia and Western Australia (see Table appended). Though a few were employed by companies engaged in deep mining, most worked as they had in the 1850s and 1860s, in small gangs on alluvial fields deserted or untouched by white miners. Some were still in the wilds, in tents or huts, supplied with Chinese food and clothes by temporary stores or travelling hawkers and traders. Others were based on well established ‘villages’ or ‘camps’ in the larger mining districts, as at Ballarat, Bendigo or Beechworth in Victoria where the officially organised ‘mining villages’ of the 1850s survived, after the regulations themselves lapsed, to become the homes not only of miners but also of Cantonese market gardeners, rural labourers, shearers, skilled tradesmen, hawkers, storekeepers and the like.¹

Other ‘camps’ catered more for rural workers, as instance those at Albury, Wagga, Narrandera, Hay and Deniliquin (all in or near the Riverina of New South Wales); in the 1880s these contained 100-300 adult men each, most employed as agricultural and pastoral labourers, or market gardeners, with attendant numbers of storekeepers, fruiterers, cooks and shop assistants.² The camp at Darwin (Palmerston) likewise consisted mainly of market gardeners, storekeepers and assistants, but also contained bootmakers, tailors and hairdressers catering to the European as well as Chinese popula-

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tion. Smaller colonies of Cantonese located themselves near other country towns, as market gardeners or agricultural labourers, or on sugar and rice farms in northern Queensland and the Northern Territory.

Other Chinese were more remote. Some worked on pastoral properties or in country hotels as station-hands, cooks and domestic servants; Coghlan later estimated that in 1891 half the cooks in the country hotels of Australia were Chinese and one-quarter of the cooks in private homesteads. Others were out in gangs clearing scrub, ring-barking timber and digging dams, working in mobile gangs of anything up to 500 under the control of headmen engaged by Chinese rural entrepreneurs such as Wong Gooey of Narrandra or Jimmy Ah Kew of Wahgunyah. In all there were, in the late 1880s and early 1890s and excluding miners, between 20,000 and 25,000 Chinese scattered through rural Australasia from the tropical north to the much colder areas of Tasmania and Otago (see Table appended and also various colonial censuses).

A steadily increasing number were living in metropolitan areas, either on the fringe as market gardeners supplying suburban needs as well as the city fruit and vegetable markets, or in better class suburbia if successful merchants, or else in the city 'Chinatowns' as storekeepers, shop assistants, petty traders, skilled tradesmen (notably cabinet-makers), labourers and servants. By 1890 between 8000 and 9000 Chinese were in metropolitan Australasia, here including Auckland, Canterbury and Dunedin as well as Wellington (see Table appended).

In all areas—metropolitan, other urban and rural—there were at the end of the 1880s about 10,000 miners, 10,000 market gardeners, 1000 pastoral workers, 4000 agricultural labourers, 3000 general labourers, 3500 domestic and hotel workers, about 150 larger merchants, 2000 storekeepers and lesser traders, 1000 hawkers, 750 greengrocers, 2000 clerks and assistants, 1000 cabinet-makers, 150 or so launderers, 1000 other workers.

As in North America, this population remained overwhelmingly male, fewer than 400 full-blood females being recorded in 1891, i.e. fewer than 1 in 100. Most of these were children, so leaving, apart from the occasional Chinese prostitute, only 150 or so Chinese wives, mainly those of wealthier merchants in metropolitan
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towns. Thus the Rev. William Young, on his visit to the Chinese country camps of Victoria, found that amongst the 10,000 or more Chinese males living there in 1868 only ten of the nearly 5000 married men had their wives with them; likewise the New South Wales Report of 1883 (Inspector Brennan and Quong Tart) found only one Chinese wife amongst the 800 Chinese living in the country camps of the Riverina. Later, the 1891 Royal Commission on Chinese Gambling in Sydney found that few of the smaller traders and shopkeepers, and fewer of the assistants, labourers and market gardeners, had their wives with them. It was well established merchants, such as Way Kee and Ah Wah, or formerly prosperous merchants such as Way Shong, that had paid the poll tax and brought their wives for long-term settlement.

Some single Chinese married European girls. In addition to the occasional wealthy trader marrying an English girl (Quong Tart, for instance), or those on isolated stations and farms marrying an Irish or Scottish domestic servant, there were a number who had met European girls in city Chinatowns or country camps. William Young found nearly forty such wives in the mining camps he visited in 1868, the Brennan and Tart inquiry found thirty-six in the Riverina camps in 1883, and the Royal Commission found a number in Sydney's Chinatowns in 1891. Some, perhaps half, were 'decent' women who took pride in their homes, looked after their husbands and kept their children away from the seamier side of camp life. Others, often former prostitutes, made their husband's lives miserable with fighting, promiscuity, alcohol or opium.

Other Chinese lived with European women on a de facto basis, some practising the old Cantonese custom of taking a second or third woman when dissatisfied with the first, but others marrying the girl when the relationship became stable. European investigations of these relationships, sometimes undertaken in response to public outcry that Chinese men seduced innocent European girls or lured them into the camps for purposes of prostitution, generally concluded that the women had been either unhappy prostitutes, or else white girls leaving European homes because of cruelty or seduction, who had found shelter with some kindly and lonely Chinese. Other European women, usually prostitutes long before entering the Chinese quarter, remained professional prosti-
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tutes, plying their trade not only with Chinese but with the periodic invasions of shearers and miners, if a country camp, and regular inflow of sailors if a city Chinatown. Some indeed had regular beats, working in Chinatown for much of the time but visiting country camps at shearing time.9

The fruit of these various unions were, by 1890, about 2500 mixed-blood children, some growing up to marry ‘white’ and become slowly absorbed into the European population: others to marry Chinese and become part of the Australasian Chinese community.10

Some Chinese managed to save enough to commute regularly to China—occasional statistics of Chinese residents re-entering Australia give glimpses of this. The Victorian statistics for 1886, for instance, though they may, because of fraud, exaggerate the numbers of naturalised Chinese re-entering the colony, suggest that well over half the 1100 Chinese arrivals of that year were returning residents.11 This fits with biographical information available about carpenters and market gardeners who in the space of twenty years or so in Australia made anything up to seven visits back to China, each visit lasting between one and two years.12 Nevertheless, though such voyages enabled Cantonese men to fulfil their filial duty of marrying, begetting children, taking part in family councils and sharing in the appropriate rituals before the family shrine, they did little to ease the long periods in Australasia away from normal family life.

In terms of substitute activities there was little that was constructive. The Chinese theatre never seems to have found the same vitality in Australasia as in California, perhaps because of fewer numbers and the absence of any Chinatown comparable to that of San Francisco; this provided not only the core audience but acted as a base from which the theatre could tour country areas. The principal substitutes, apart from European women, were gambling and opium establishments, providing the traditional games of fan-tan and pak-ah-pu (a kind of lottery) or hours of withdrawal into drugged forgetfulness. The 1891 Royal Commission concluded that the three small Chinatowns of Sydney contained over eighty gambling houses and dens and that 700 of the 3500 Chinese there living subsisted wholly or in part on gambling. Much the same
picture emerges from inquiries at the Chinese camps of Wagga and Narrandera.\(^{13}\)

Though gambling may have sent some Chinese broke it provided numerous others with a pastime little different in kind from the horse-racing, two-up and other games of chance so popular among Europeans. Opium was different. The Royal Commission concluded that an occasional trader, a few cabinet-makers, many market gardeners and European prostitutes, and all the professional gamblers, regularly smoked opium—often at 3 shillings a day—so rendering themselves both broke and broken. Leading Chinese merchants, such as Quong Tart in Sydney and Kong Meng in Melbourne, conducted campaigns against the trade, pleading for strict laws against the import of opium and strict enforcement of such laws by customs officers and police.\(^{14}\)

Despite this addiction to gambling and opium by some of their number, the Chinese population of Australasia remained relatively peaceful and law-abiding. Various reports and committees testified to this, pointing to police records showing that Chinese convictions for serious crime were relatively much less than European convictions.\(^{15}\) This law-abiding tendency stemmed partly from the continuing strength of traditional Chinese values and customs, notably the control exercised by headmen and local societies. By the 1880s the societies were well entrenched. In Victoria, where nearly 90 per cent of Chinese came from the Sze Yap (the Four Districts south of Canton city) and only a few from the Sam Yap (the Three Districts around Canton) or from Chungshan and other Cantonese districts, and still fewer from the Teochiu and Hokkien speaking districts further north, the Sze Yap societies were well established and powerful.\(^{16}\) Though dominated by the two majority districts—Toishan and Sunwei—they acted at this time for most Sze Yap persons, providing help in illness and unemployment, assisting elderly Chinese wishing to return to their native villages, arranging for the bones of deceased Chinese to be returned for burial in the ancestral tombs, building joss-houses in the main Chinese areas of Victoria, organising social and boarding facilities. They also encouraged members to avoid conflict with other Australians, to obey Australian law and to settle disputes within the
community; the Kong Chew society, in fact, became known as the principal body for arbitrating between those in dispute.\textsuperscript{17}

In New South Wales the Chinese population, while still overwhelmingly Cantonese (just a handful of the old Teochiu and Hokkien coolie groups survived), were more evenly balanced between Cantonese areas of emigration. Though exact statistics are not available it appears that relative percentages were approximately: Chungshan 40; Kao Yao 24; Tungkoon 20; Sze Yap 10 (mainly Toishan and Sunwei); Sam Yap 3; non-Cantonese areas 2. Additionally there were a few settlers from the Hakka villages of Kwantung (Canton Province), perhaps 1 per cent in all.\textsuperscript{18} Each of these communities had its own society, the most powerful being the two Chungshan societies (Bow On Tong and Chung Fue Tong) and the principal Tungkoon society (Koon Yee Tong).\textsuperscript{19}

As in Victoria these societies concerned themselves mainly with social and charitable activities but the Ki Tong, run jointly by leading merchants, made its main business the settling of disputes before matters reached Australian courts. New South Wales also possessed another kind of society, the Loon Yee Tong, run jointly by certain immigrants from Chungshan and Tungkoon to protect gamblers, cover their legal costs and threaten or assault any Chinese liable to endanger the gambling business.\textsuperscript{20} It apparently split asunder in 1889 and in any case would probably, after the investigations of the Royal Commission, have come to an end before much longer.

In Queensland, Chungshan persons were in the great majority but were so scattered through the country towns and diggings that they apparently used the local society more for organising charitable works, and for returning bones to China, than for social purposes. In New Zealand, the next largest Chinese population in Australasia, immigrants came from the Sze Yap, the Sam Yap (mainly from Namhoi and Punyiu), and Chungshan and Tungkoon. In the main urban settlements these eventually settled down into three main associations: the Sze Yap society, the Poon Fa society (Sam Yap) and the Tung Sang society (Chungshan and Tungkoon).\textsuperscript{21}

As in America these societies were usually run by the well-to-do merchants. Way Kee, for instance, the leader of the Tungkoon community in New South Wales, had been a Sydney merchant since
the 1860s, and treasurer of the Koon Yee Tong, and by 1891 was a very wealthy man. Many Tungkoon settlers were market gardeners on the fringe of Sydney or in the country, or had small country stores or petty shops in Sydney Chinatown; Way Kee often acted as their banker and agent. Kao Yao settlers in New South Wales were likewise largely scattered as market gardeners; many had their affairs in the hands of the Choy family, later organised as War Hing & Coy. Chungshan settlers, more widely scattered through the occupational and geographical structure of the colony, had several leading merchants, notably Tin War and On Yik Lee; the latter founding a firm which still survives. Other communities had similar leaders.22

Some of these leaders exercised peculiar positions of power, in that they also had some entree to the British-Australian establishment. Quong Tart, in Sydney, originally arrived with his uncle at the Braidwood gold-fields at the age of nine (1859), was semi-adopted by the principal British business man in the area and from him acquired a valuable gold claim, developed a profitable mining operation employing 200 Chinese and Europeans, built a local school and church, became a patron of cricket and horse-racing and an expert singer of Scottish songs, and left Braidwood in 1874 to establish a tea and silk business in Sydney. He visited his mother in China (causing much amazement there by his insistence on wearing European clothes and rejecting any Chinese girl for wife), returned to Sydney eventually to marry a Liverpool girl called Margaret Scarlett, and remained a leader of the Chinese merchant class in Sydney and a prominent figure in charitable affairs, both Chinese and Australian. Quong Tart was highly regarded by the Ching Emperor and, in the absence of any consular representative, did much official business for the Chinese government; eventually he received the Order of Mandarin of the Blue Button (4th class) and was welcomed with ceremony and guards of honour on another visit to China in 1891. He was also a *persona grata* with Sydney's establishment, served on the Commission of Inquiry into Chinese camps in 1883, was a powerful mediator in the *Afghan* troubles of 1888, served on the Royal Commission on Chinese Gambling in 1891, and was heard with respect, if not agreement, during the anti-alien moves of the mid-1890s.23

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Similarly, some of the prosperous merchants of Melbourne's Chinatown in Little Bourke Street had feet in both worlds. Louis Ah Mouey, a builder who arrived about 1853, and Lowe Kong Meng, a tea merchant arriving about 1854, held powerful positions in their respective societies, led the joss-house ceremonies, exercised judicial functions in various Chinese guilds, looked after the business affairs of numerous compatriots and had considerable influence over the passenger trade with China. The emperor rewarded Lowe Kong Meng's services to the Australian Chinese by making him a Mandarin of the Blue Button. But he was also influential in Melbourne business circles, being a major shareholder and director (with Louis Ah Mouey) of the Commercial Bank, a shareholder in various mining enterprises and a participant in various trading enterprises in Hongkong. He was called to assist various Committees (he gave evidence as early as the Legislative Council's Committee on Chinese Immigration in 1857), wrote a booklet, with Louis Ah Mouey and the Rev. Cheok Hong Cheong, on the Chinese issue in Australia at the time of the Seamen's Strike 1878-9, and helped in the negotiations over the Afghan affair in 1888.

In South Australia, Way Lee fulfilled much the same role, as did various leading Chinese merchants and business men elsewhere in Australasia.

In short, the Chinese-Australasian communities, like the Chinese communities in America and South-east Asia, were finding in the leading merchants some substitute for the Chinese gentry and scholar-officials. True there were Chinese of some education in Australasia, acting as doctors, interpreters and schoolmasters for those wanting to learn English. But they were not of scholar-gentry origin; at least two investigated by the Royal Commission of 1891 were bankrupt storekeepers and market gardeners who had adopted interpreting and teaching as more profitable activities.

Though influential, these merchant leaders were no more able to maintain permanent and complete peace in Australasia than were the gentry and officials in China. Occasional fighting still occurred between the various lineages and district communities— as at Ballarat between the Sze Yap, the Chungshan and other groups, and between the 'strong-arm' elements associated with
community gambling houses in Sydney.\textsuperscript{27} Indeed, it is almost comical to see the efforts of members of one community to attribute gambling and opium entirely to persons from other districts. One bright gentleman—describing himself as a convert from Wesleyanism to the Salvation Army—went so far as to accuse Quong Tart of having 'relatives' who ran all the gambling in Sydney simply because, it eventually emerged, Quong Tart had come from the same district as some of the numerous Chinese gamblers; Quong Tart retorted by showing that witness came from the same district as one of Sydney's best known opium smokers.\textsuperscript{28} Nevertheless, the general picture is one of peacefulness and orderliness, often in contrast, so police and others said, to the 'larrickinism' displayed by some Europeans.

Besides respect for lineage and district leaders, another traditional Chinese element was becoming well established in Australasia—looking after and co-operating with other members of the family and lineage (see chapter 3, section 1). This was the period when successful business men were sponsoring younger relatives, eventually to bring them into partnership and succession, as did Way Kee with his grandson Ah Wah. It was also the period when gold-diggers from the same lineage or district left the gold-fields and went into partnership to lease land for market gardening. Admittedly there were large market gardening entrepreneurs, such Chen Ah Teak who during the 1880s owned or leased more than half-a-dozen gardens in different parts of outer Sydney, engaged a headman to recruit a team of gardeners for each garden, and paid each headman £50 a year and each gardener £40 a year, plus three meals a day costing 10 shillings a week.\textsuperscript{29} But others formed independent partnerships, including many of the numerous Ko Yiu gardeners who later extended their activities by opening vegetable stalls in the City Markets; for example, War Lee & Coy, a market garden at Botany had a shop at 215 Thomas Street and for many years operated as a partnership among six friends from Shueking near Kao Yao.\textsuperscript{30} The Royal Commission calculated that after six months hard work on new ground the partners could get their first returns and thereafter save £50-60 each a year. To do so, however, required long hours of careful gardening, taking off only Sunday and two hours on Saturday, but otherwise working from dawn till
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dusk every day. Moreover, as British observers pointed out, the
Chinese brought a measure of skill from their intensive farming
background, and on this count alone worked more efficiently than
most European gardeners.32

While gardeners, miners and city workers—carpenters and the
like—all lived cheaply they certainly did not live below a reasonable
level of sustenance, at any rate while employed: three meals a day
with pork, fish, rice, cabbage, other vegetables and tea, with poultry
and liqueurs on Sunday.33 Their level of hygiene, however, was not
high, even setting aside the gardeners' traditional practice of ferti­
lising vegetables with human dung and urine.34 Not only Euro­
peans noted the crowded living quarters and fierce human odour,
the District Council of Darwin going so far as to place the Chinese
camp on the north-east of the town as the wind normally blew in
that direction.35 Chinese observers such as Quong Tart agreed that
the country camps were often smelly from neglected water-closets
and that cooks in city cook-shops sometimes prepared meals in the
backyards alongside the open privy.36 They also commented on the
Chinese tendency to overcrowding and antipathy to ventilation. In
city tenements and country camps bunks were stacked around the
bed-rooms, sometimes double, with six to eight persons crammed
into a space adequate, in European eyes, for no more than two;
likewise the cook-shop at Wagga contained numerous wooden
shelves for visiting miners and shearsers, on which visits twenty men
occupied space for five.37

Perhaps generations of living in such conditions had hardened
Cantonese to the health hazards involved; certainly there are
relatively few references to outbreaks of dysentery or similar diseases.
Observers concentrated on smallpox and leprosy. Undoubtedly a few
cases of smallpox slipped by the quarantine arrangements, while
William Young found a number of lepers in the Victorian mining
villages in 1868 and Quong Tart a number in the New South Wales
villages in the 1880s.38 Others refer to their occasional appearance
outback.39 Quong Tart, indeed, inspired a campaign to return
twenty-one Chinese lepers to their Cantonese villages in 1896.40
While in Australia, the lepers were usually cared for, as were other
such Chinese, by the district societies; in general the traditional
quarantine arrangements were such that the disease spread little

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in Australia and hardly touched the European population; in the long run it spread very much more amongst the Aborigines.

With their savings, if not dissipated in gambling and opium, the Cantonese of Australasia paid their dues to their district society, saved their passage costs for commuting trips home, and invested what was left in family and lineage causes in the village of origin. This, together with their failure to bring out womenfolk, constantly fed the accusation that they wanted no permanent part in the development of Australia but wanted simply to exploit its resources and return home. The European members of the 1891 Royal Commission often assumed this in their questions and it was left for Quong Tart to draw out from the witnesses the fact that quite a number of Chinese had been in Australia for many years and that a few at least had permanent establishments and families.41 The district societies also at times supported local Australian charities. Nevertheless, the impression remains: that Chinese Australasia, like Chinese America, was a sojourner society, in that sense like British India. While it had a core of permanent settlers well involved with colonial business and affairs, it was basically part of China temporarily overseas, reared unshakably in the values of a family-lineage dominated society, eyes set firmly on eventual return to the sacred ancestral graves and halls of the little villages and towns of origin scattered through the emigrant districts of Kwantung.
Chapter 10

The closing gates: assessment

With this brief glimpse of Chinese life in Australasia we can now review this second great confrontation between Europeans and Chinese in the Pacific, a confrontation which emerged from the more tolerant years of the mid-1860s and came to an end in the late 1880s with virtual prohibition of all Chinese settlement. A major force in bringing about this prohibition, on the surface at least, was the determined and persistent efforts of leaders of the skilled and unskilled working classes, and of various small independent trades and businesses, not only to prevent further Chinese immigration but to force out most of those already present; on the grounds that cheap Chinese labour and skill presented a very real and dangerous threat to the wages, profits and living standards of European labourers and tradesmen. As the 1877 Manifest of Denis Kearney and the California Workingmen's Party asserted: 'We have made no secret of our intentions. We make none. Before you and before the world we declare that the Chinaman must leave our shores. We declare that white men, and women, and boys and girls, cannot live as the people of the great republic should and compete with the single Chinese coolie in the labour market'.

Or, to take an Australian example, as an 1878 meeting of 'working-class' persons at Newtown, Sydney, heard when protesting against the decision of the Australian Steam Navigation Company to employ cheap Chinese seamen on its coastal ships: the Chinese 'live on the smell of a rag, few of them have wives or families to support, and they have cut down wages to a miserable pittance'.

Unquestionably, this working class clamour against cheap Chinese labour was influential, forcing some politicians, particularly at election time, reluctantly to toe the anti-Chinese line and support proposals for restrictive and discriminative legislation. It does not,
however, explain the whole story. In the first place, working class agitation was spread far wider than the areas of Chinese settlement. In the United States it was not only in the western coastal states, where more than 80 per cent of the Chinese were (88,000 of 105,500 in 1880), that working class hostility was bitter and determined. In the east, after A. C. Cameron in 1869 had launched in the Workingmen’s Advocate his campaign to ‘destroy the Mongolian blight’, numerous labour leaders became outspokenly anti-Chinese; even Negro delegates to the Colored State Labor Convention in Baltimore, 1869, passed a resolution that Chinese be excluded from the country. Nor were the radicals any less extreme: the International Workingmen’s Association, having in 1872 called for ‘complete political and social equality for all, without distinction of sex, creed, color or condition’, next year passed a resolution supporting the western demand for coolie exclusion. Similarly in Australia working class leaders in areas of slight Chinese settlement—South Australia, for instance, with its 300 to 400 Chinese—were as denunciatory as those in Melbourne or Sydney where the Chinese numbered several thousand. In short, the nation-wide labour movements of the United States and Australia had by the eighties definitely decided to adopt the anti-Chinese views and policies of those of their members who lived near Chinese concentrations, and to demand uniform legislation in all states and colonies, whether working class families were suffering from Chinese competition or not.

In the second place, it is not at all clear that Chinese competition was a reality, at any rate on anything like the scale working class leaders claimed. In a few trades and industries, this might have been so. On Australian coastal shipping it was the Seamen’s Strike of 1878-9 that stopped the Company continuing with its plans to recruit Chinese crews. In Sydney and Melbourne Chinese furniture-making firms, employing 700 or so cabinet-makers all told, had about one-quarter of the furniture trade and presented a competitive threat to European carpenters and firms during the recurrent recessions in the building trade. In San Francisco, some of the 20,000 or more inhabitants of Chinatown engaged in cigar-making, carpentering, shoemaking and laundering, may have cut into the wages and profits of white San Franciscans competing in
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those industries. In various parts of rural Australasia and North America Chinese shopkeepers did compete, often successfully, with European proprietors. But the great majority competed relatively little with European labourers and tradesmen. Many of those in Chinatown were merchants trading with China, or involved in establishments catering almost exclusively for the Chinese themselves—gambling and opium dens, restaurants, clothing and food stores, and so on. Many others were in market gardening, railroad building, agricultural and pastoral labour, domestic service and the like, and these were not jobs for which Europeans showed marked affection. In fact, observers such as Coghlan in Australia, and the Daily Alta in California, felt that the Chinese were performing essential tasks and that many industries would suffer severely if they were withdrawn as there were so few Europeans able and willing to replace them.

The matter may be put another way. Between 1870 and 1890 total population, excluding Indians, Maoris and Aborigines, increased from some 560,000 to 1,200,000 in California; from 900,000 to 1,700,000 in the Australian colonies; from 295,000 to 670,000 in New Zealand; and from 35,000 to 95,000 in British Columbia; that is, from about 1.8 to 3.7 millions, or an increase of 2 million odd, much of it by adult immigration. Over the same period the Chinese population of these areas increased by 44,000 from some 86,000 to 130,000. Though economic development was by no means smooth and easy the fact remains that a million or more white adults were absorbed into the various economies with much less fuss and bother than were the 44,000 Chinese. Sometimes there was agitation against Irish, German, and even English and Scottish immigrants, and their depressing effect on wages, but the agitation was petty compared with that against the Chinese. Yet compared with the threat to wages presented by hundreds of thousands of European immigrants, and by natural increase, Chinese immigration held very little danger.

There may, in a few occupations, have been a real economic case for controlling the immigration of Chinese, to stop a great avalanche into particular industries and the dismissal of Europeans engaged therein. Taken by and large, however, there was little economic case for prohibiting all further immigration, and no case
at all for reducing numbers of Chinese resident in the country by refusing to readmit persons visiting their homes in China or by imposing such heavy taxes and other disabilities that most Chinese would have to leave, which is what the various working class movements were demanding. The great threat to the working class, the terrible capitalist plot to lower wages by introducing hundreds of thousands of cheap Chinese labourers, so dwelt—indeed almost ranted and raved—upon by working class leaders in North America and Australasia, in retrospect seems somewhat unreal, except in the sense that had there been no controls at all there may eventually have been in some places a real threat to wages and living standards. But, as New Zealand showed, the relatively mild restrictions of 1881—or even no restrictions at all, as in Tasmania and the Northern Territory before 1887–8—were usually quite adequate to keep immigration within tolerable limits.

The one country where it might be argued that Chinese immigration had a widespread depreciating influence on wages was British Columbia—with the Chinese at 20 per cent or more of the total non-Indian population. But, as Woodsworth suggests, in remote British Columbia European labour was so scarce that it not only commanded far higher wages than in the east but could not fill anything like all the jobs vacant, notably market gardening and domestic service. The Chinese filled many of these vacancies and pulled some wages down to a level which, although often still higher than in the east, was less astronomical than before. There is no evidence that, except for brief periods of recession as in 1884, the Chinese were seriously affecting the general living standards of the working class, or bringing them below the level of those of European labourers across the Rockies where Chinese competition did not exist.10*

In the third place, it is plain that the working classes were not the only ones involved: prominent persons in the professions, industry, commerce and agriculture were, as in the earlier period,

* The view expressed here, that the existing danger of cheap Chinese labour to living standards was greatly exaggerated, runs counter to the older view of many historians and politicians in both America and Australasia. One of the last defences of this older view was in the articles by Carlotta Kellaway and K. C. Dallas in the Australian Quarterly's debate on the origins of the White Australia Policy.11
equally committed to the anti-Chinese cause. Notable here are men such as Alfred Deakin in Victoria, with all his professional and business colleagues in the Australian Natives Association, or Griffith and Macrossan in Queensland, or Grey, Hall and Atkinson in New Zealand, or Playford, Downer and Dr Magarey in South Australia, or Parkes and Robertson in New South Wales, these last two being old campaigners from the 1850s. To sound names such as these is almost like calling up the ‘establishment’ of the colonies, or at any rate a goodly and respected slice thereof. In California prominent farmers such as Henry Larkin, ministers of religion such as I. S. Kalloch, and numerous professional and business men, took a strong anti-Chinese stand, some as extreme as any working class leader. In the eastern states, professional men such as Dr Arthur Stout, conservative politicians such as Horatio Seymour and James Blaine, and even the mild-mannered poet William Cullen Bryant, also took a strong exclusionist line. In British Columbia all but a few die-hard entrepreneurs, anxious for cheap labour, identified themselves with the campaign to force Ottawa to pass legislation restricting Chinese immigration; indeed, in the mid-1880s it was a legislature composed largely of merchants, lawyers, industrialists and landed proprietors, who had done well in the days of railway development and were now regarding themselves as the provincial establishment and voting conservative in federal elections, that put through the procession of anti-Chinese laws. Robson, proposer of so many discriminatory measures, was as much part of this establishment as anyone else.

Against this formidable array of working and middle class opinions, interests and feelings, those favouring Chinese immigration—or, at any rate, opposed to the drastic prohibitions demanded by the anti-Chinese lobbies—were far less successful than in the 1850s and 1860s. Then they had not only thwarted anti-Chinese forces in Washington, Ottawa, Queensland, Tasmania and New Zealand, but had succeeded in repealing restrictive legislation in South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales. Now they could do no more than occasionally convert demands for complete exclusion, and even expulsion, into relatively mild restrictions—as in Canada, New Zealand and Tasmania—or block some of the fiercer attempts at discrimination. Why were they so much less successful
than before? Their composition was much the same: Chinese merchants pleading on behalf of their compatriots; white merchants with interests in the China trade and in passenger shipping to and from the Orient; industrialists, graziers and farmers anxious for labour in places or occupations undersupplied by Europeans, especially in tropical areas; liberal-humanitarians dismayed by what they felt was gross and malicious exaggeration of so-called Chinese vices, by moves to deny British or American 'justice' to an inoffensive people, by the whole trend to treat the Chinese as a sub-human species unworthy of possessing the political rights and freedoms so hardly won by Europeans at home and overseas.

In vain were the pleas of the Chinese leaders of the Six Companies in San Francisco, the petitions of Chinese merchants in Adelaide, the quiet good sense of Quong Tart in Sydney, the pamphlets or articles of men such as Lowe Kong Meng in Melbourne, appealing to Christian tolerance and British justice and stressing that Chinese had been reared in the Confucian doctrines of obedience, order and benevolence: these were either completely ignored or else did no more than persuade local politicians to avoid some of the extremer forms of discrimination. Likewise the cries of dismay by those fearful that restrictive legislation would reduce trade with China were dismissed by their opponents as a 'mere bagatelle', or as a shameful placing of money before life, or as a disgraceful effort to keep public subsidies coming to shipping companies. Exceptions were perhaps Canada, where John MacDonald in Ottawa delayed action against Chinese immigration lest this interfere with Canada's infant trade across the Pacific, and South Australia where some members of the Legislative Council still had hopes of turning Darwin into a great trading post and, for this and other reasons, kept blocking restrictive legislation till 1888.

The 'tropical labour' cry took longer to silence. Indeed it was not really silenced but simply diverted. In Queensland the tropical planters and developers were finally quietened with promises of interim continuation of Pacific Island labour and attempts to obtain Indian coolies; in Western Australia they were satisfied with the exemption from restriction of all Chinese entering under the terms of the Imported Labour Registry Acts; in the Northern Territory of South Australia they were partially placated by talk of Indian
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coolies and by the government's promise to use the exemption clause of the 1888 Restriction Act to allow Chinese labourers to enter the Territory if developmental needs justified it. Though opponents of the Chinese sometimes argued that Europeans could manage fieldwork in the tropics as well as any Asiatic, the time was not ripe for pressing this doctrine too far; another ten years were needed to convince many tropical developers that their economic ambitions could be realised within the framework of a 'White Australia'.

Finally, the liberal humanitarians were overwhelmed, even though by this time they had some support from that small section of the working class, represented in New South Wales by The Radical, which was taking an anarchist egalitarian line supporting both European and Chinese workers, as equals, against capitalist exploitation. Sometimes the liberal-humanitarians took a religious line, asserting that Christianity taught the 'brotherhood' of the human race, that the Earth is the Lord's and that all men are created alike in His image, that there should be no barriers against 'the free circulation of people on God's Earth', and that restrictive legislation was tantamount to 'libelling' the Creator. Their opponents simply replied that such talk was 'sentimental claptrap'; that no Christian principle allowed 'the unrestricted invasion of one country by the barbarians of another, or even by the civilized members of another state', that 'my position as a Christian and a citizen does not prevent me from desiring that we should, as it were, put a stone wall around Australia and keep out such a degraded and debased race'. The most succinct exchange here was in Adelaide when J. Fisher opposed restrictions on the ground that 'God made of one blood all nations to dwell together on the face of the earth': Ramsay at once retorted that the Bible said nothing about all nations having to 'dwell together' or encroach on one another's territory. Others conceded the correctness of the humanitarian argument but lamented that 'the world has not come to that stage of perfection where a universal brotherhood prevails', or else sadly concluded that the 'humiliating' restrictions proposed deserved support because if Chinese migrated they would be educated in wickedness and do untold harm to missionary work on their return to China.
Appeal to basic human justice was equally unsuccessful. If the liberal-humanitarians asserted that it was ludicrously unjust for Anglo-Saxon powers to force their way into a reluctant China yet not allow Chinese to enter their own domains, opponents replied that Imperial China did not permit the entry of European labourers or farmers, imposed stringent controls on the movement and activities of European merchants and missionaries, and had so little consideration for them that it allowed its people to insult and even murder them; hence the 'tit for tat' approach of Parkes's 1880 Bill and the fury in the United States at the Tientsin massacre of missionaries, the murder of ship-wrecked sailors, and the frequent harassment of foreigners visiting China. If the liberal-humanitarians argued that it was outrageously unfair for the Anglo-Saxons to have taken American Indian, Maori or Aboriginal land by force, yet deny the Chinese any right of peaceful entry, their opponents either ignored the point or else replied that the original native peoples would never have allowed Europeans to land had they known the outcome, and that there was no reason for Anglo-Saxons to be equally foolish and short-sighted in setting aside the basic 'law of self-preservation'. If the liberal-humanitarians argued that restrictive laws broke the British (or American) tradition of providing a refuge for those in need—'in the Old Country we have held out open arms to any one as a place of refuge'—their opponents at once retorted that if as many Chinese were to land in England as were landing daily in the Australian or New Zealand colonies the British people would demand, and get, restrictive legislation immediately. If liberal-humanitarians claimed that restrictions on entry, restrictions on naturalisation and restrictions on voting were unjust in that they broke such basic rights as 'no taxation without representation', or 'those affected by the law have the right to be heard in its making', they were told that the Chinese did not understand such rights, or any other kind of democratic right, but simply did as their headmen told them.

Another line of argument was that restrictive laws quite wrongly and unfairly discriminated between the Chinese and other alien immigrants: it was disgraceful, asserted some, that representatives of an ancient and great civilisation, such as the Chinese, should be treated differently from other peoples, many of whom
were much less civilised. The reply came back at once that European aliens mixed with British (or Americans) whereas Chinese did not and that applying restrictive or discriminatory laws against Europeans would 'irritate a valuable portion of the colonists whom the legislature had invited to come here'. If the argument was put in terms of China's having more right to be in Australasia than Europeans as this was China's part of the world, the reply came back that China had made no use of the long centuries before the British arrived, and that once the British had arrived the colonists automatically won the universal 'right to say what shall be the component parts of the nation in the future'.

This particular argument has, in effect, been consistently used by America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand as their final 'irrefutable' defence against outside criticism of their immigration policies.

Why was it that these humanitarian, economic and ethnic forces defending Chinese immigration should, after a largely successful attack on restriction and discrimination during the 1860s, and a partly successful rear-guard action during the 1870s and early 1880s, have found by 1888 their arguments ignored or derided and their policies suffer severe defeat? In the earlier period the scale and rapidity of the Chinese influx, with the speedy, visible and disconcerting alteration to the customary human environment, had been important; in some places it was important in the second confrontation also. In Queensland the 17,000 Chinese entering the northern gold-fields from 1874 onwards by 1877 outnumbered not only the white population of the fields but also that of the whole of North Queensland; in fact it made up nearly 10 per cent of the colony's total population and the speed with which it appeared was undoubtedly a major element in Queensland's somewhat fiery reaction. In British Columbia the increase from some 3000 Chinese in 1871 to an estimated 12,000 in 1883 (i.e. from about 22 to 35 per cent of the total non-Indian population) goes far to explain the bitter anti-Chinese agitation in that colony all through the 1870s and 1880s. In the Northern Territory of South Australia the growth of the Chinese population, from 200 or so in 1877 to 3500
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in 1879 and 7000 in 1888 drove the few hundred white settlers nearly frantic and explains their persistent campaign for restriction. In New South Wales the inflow between 1877 and 1881, which lifted the Chinese population from 7200 in 1871 to 10,200 in 1881, prompted the agitation of the early 1880s; likewise the renewed immigration of 1886-7, which lifted the Chinese population to more than 13,000, had something to do with the anti-Chinese outburst of 1887-8. In New South Wales, much of the bitterness against the Chinese stemmed directly from the continuance of substantial Chinese immigration until 1882, and the growth of the Chinese population from 40,000 in 1871 to 80,000 in 1882. In both New South Wales and California, though, these increases were insufficient to maintain the Chinese proportion of total population: in New South Wales it fell from 3.7 per cent in 1861 to 1.45 per cent in 1871, 1.4 per cent in 1881 and 1.2 per cent in 1891; in California it fell less rapidly, from 9.0 per cent in 1860 to 8.8 per cent in 1870, 8.7 per cent in 1880 and 8.6 per cent in 1882.

Elsewhere, the connection between numbers and campaigns for restriction is less clear-cut. Admittedly, in Victoria there was a connection between the anti-Chinese campaigns of 1881 and 1888 and the slight increase in net migration that had occurred in the months before; but the effect on the size of total Chinese population was practically nil and failed to reverse the long-term trend downwards, both in terms of absolute numbers and proportionate strength (from 24,700 or 4.6 per cent in 1861 to 17,800 or 2.4 per cent in 1871, 12,000 or 1.4 per cent in 1881 and 8400 or 0.75 per cent in 1891). In New Zealand the Chinese immigration was patchy and slight, and changes in total Chinese population—from 4800 in 1871 (1.7 per cent) to 5000 in 1881 (1.1 per cent) and 4500 in 1891 (0.7 per cent)—seem little associated with campaigns against Chinese immigration. In South Australia, Western Australian and Tasmania, the Chinese populations remained small, less than 1000, yet anti-Chinese agitation was appreciable in the first but very slight in the last two. Clearly forces other than reaction to numbers were heavily involved.

One force operating in certain areas, a force associated with rapidity and size of influx, was fear of military or peaceful invasion. In Australasia there were oft-expressed fears of the 'awakening'
Chinese Empire, of China's fighting ability and program of building warships. This fear, however, emerged in different ways. Some said that as China was a great power 'we cannot afford to provoke the hostility of such a country' by restrictive entry laws; the time would come when China would take reprisals. Or, to use the words of Sir John Downer in South Australia, a young nation, such as any of the Australian colonies, 'should not make its relation with a powerful nation at its doors so unfriendly that in future times we might have cause for bitter regret'. Others drew quite opposite conclusions—that restrictive entry laws were essential to stop China obtaining 'a strong foothold [because], well-armed and well-officered, the Chinese would possess a power that would be practically unlimited'; or, as Waterhouse in New Zealand put it, the Australasian colonies should beware lest Chinese settlers act like Hengist and Horsa during the Germanic invasions of ancient Britain; if a Chinese interest were allowed to develop in Australasia 'those who come after will have to settle with China itself, which will be one of the greatest powers on earth'. Waterhouse later changed his tack and in 1888 said New Zealand should not unilaterally introduce heavier restrictions but should await a new Treaty, lest China be angry. Some, Henry Parkes for instance, felt that the signs pointed to China's deliberately planning a settlement in a remote part of tropical Australia though others, McIlwraith in Queensland for one, who had been fearful of this in the early 1880s, by 1888 were convinced that China had no such plans and was actually discouraging emigration.

Others dismissed fear of Chinese invasion as 'a mere bogey', either because the Chinese Empire would not worry about the fate of a few thousand of its 450 millions, or because Great Britain would soon stop any attempt at invasion, or because the Anglo-Saxons were so superior to the Chinese that an attempted invasion would be defeated with ease. A more balanced line was that taken by W. Forrest in Queensland; he advocated restrictive legislation to control immigration but also held that, as China was so near and its numbers so dangerously great, Queenslanders should refrain from their unnecessary and exaggerated anti-Chinese remarks—'China is not a power to be despised; very far from it'. In sum, it seems that, while many Australasians felt that a Chinese invasion
was remote they also felt it was possible and that as little excuse as possible should be given for it to happen.

In North America, with no sparsely settled tropical areas close to Asia, and with a growing confidence in domestic military power, there was much less talk of China's political and military might. But there was much talk of surreptitious 'invasion', of the gradual overrunning of California, and the new American way of life therein, by a 'further influx of the Mongolian horde'. As the editor of the Marin Journal expressed it: 'We have won this glorious land inch by inch from the red man in vain; we have beaten back the legions of George the Third for nothing; we have suppressed rebellion and maintained the integrity of our country for no good purpose whatsoever, if we are now to surrender it to a horde of Chinese'. Some easterners were equally worried, speaking of the 'Asiatic invasion', of the 'inevitable tide of an illimitable sea', of 100 million Chinese in the United States by 1900. British Columbians, with the Chinese making up more than 20 per cent of the non-Indian population, not unnaturally emphasised this particular point when pleading with Ottawa for measures 'to prevent this province being overrun with a Chinese population'.

Australasians were equally emphatic, claiming that Chinese immigration 'really is an invasion' which should be stopped forthwith; that Chinese would swarm in like locusts; that without restriction European labour would be swamped by the 'pent up torrent of humanity in China'; that, though numbers might now appear to be relatively small and the Chinese unoffending, 'the moment they became a majority in any locality, or arrive in any great numbers ... they act on the aggressive'. Here Australasians had Singapore and parts of Malaya very much in mind.

In all this, as in other ways, the Australasian colonies were much influenced by events in California. There the immigration of the 1870s and 1880s held the Chinese population to a slow proportionate decline 9.0 to 8.6 per cent), i.e. just over one-twelfth of total population, comparable in strength and almost as visible as the Negro population over the Rockies. Though a net migration not quite sufficient to maintain relative strength can hardly be called an 'invasion', it was nevertheless enough to keep the Chinese prominently before Californian eyes, to make it seem that despite
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all their protests to Washington and attempts at discrimination they were making no headway at all against their 'yellow agony'. In Australasia, however, the strength of the Chinese population, relatively slight in the 1870s (except in Queensland at 9.3 per cent in 1877, and in the Northern Territory), declined still further during the 1880s until by the crisis of 1888 it was only about 2.5 per cent in Queensland, 2.0 per cent in Western Australia, about 1 per cent in New South Wales, Victoria and New Zealand, and almost unnoticeable in South Australia and Tasmania. Talk of an ongoing 'invasion', of the overthrow of the British-Australasian way of life, was as manifestly unrealistic as was talk of widespread undermining of wages and living standards.

In fact, what the Australasian colonies were doing was to harken to the clamour in North America and transfer holus bolus the arguments used there to the somewhat different conditions of the South-western Pacific; or else to hold up the 'terrible condition' of California as an example of what at all costs they must themselves avoid. Hence the constant references by Parkes, Deakin, Griffith, Playford, Reeves and numerous working class leaders to events in North America, the constant quotation of American books and articles, and the frequent reference by Australasian Trade Union leaders to the utterances of Denis Kearney and other labour leaders across the Pacific. Particularly popular were the Report of the Joint Congressional Committee of 1876, the book *Lights and Shades of California* describing Chinatown in San Francisco, maps of Chinatown to show the kind of Chinese ethnic concentration that should at all costs be avoided in Australasia, Bayard Taylor's works on India, China and Japan, Hepworth Dixon's *Mongolian Invasion*, and various choice extracts from Californian papers, such as that used by Ramsay in South Australia in 1880 when asserting that it was quite impossible to tell when Chinese were misleading a European as their yellow skins hid their blushes when they lied. In New Zealand, R. H. J. Reeves went so far as to word his 1878 resolution in favour of restricting Chinese immigration: 'that taking into consideration the alarming position of the United States of America and the Australian colonies through the large influx of Chinese, and the probable influx of Chinese into
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this colony, this House is of the opinion that immediate legisla­
tion should take place'.

This elevation of a tiny minority into a massive invasion, except in the Northern Territory (where the Chinese majority had the warm approval of a substantial segment of the South Aus­tralian establishment), indicates that there was much more to the Chinese question than large-scale influx or threat of one. Opponents of the invasion were quick to point this out. In New South Wales Fitzpatrick, while personally disliking Chinese and refusing to employ them, nevertheless could not believe that the small num­bers of Chinese then entering constituted a major threat. De Salis likewise refused to be carried away by the ‘self-preservation’ argument, pointed to the long-term decline in the Chinese popula­tion, and concluded that an adequate control would be to keep the Chinese at one-fiftieth (2.0 per cent) of the total population of the colony—which, as it was about 1.4 per cent at the time, meant letting it increase by half and then grow slowly with total population increase. This form of quota restriction, while also advocated in New Zealand and later suggested in America, was rarely mentioned in Australia; in fact it is only in recent years that it has emerged again in discussions on immigration.

In other colonies those defending the Chinese were also quick to point out how much the ‘peaceful invasion’ thesis exaggerated the real situation, especially where, as in Victoria and New Zealand, census counts showed the Chinese population to be either static or decreasing outright. So too did Scott, Baker and other tropical developers in South Australia.

In California, too, amid all the noise and the shouting a quiet sober voice occasionally lifted itself, as that of Senator Morton when writing his minority report of the Joint Congressional Com­mittee:

I am strongly of the opinion that, but for the presence of the Chinese, California would not now have more than one-half or two-thirds of her present population; that Chinese labor has opened up many avenues and new industries for white labor, made many kinds of business possi­ble, and laid the foundations of manufacturing interests that bid fair to rise to enormous proportions; that the presence of the Chinese, holding out the prospect for labor at reasonable rates, induced the transfer of large amounts of capital and immigration to California, and of large
numbers of business and enterprising men, thus making California the most inviting field for immigrants from every class of society, including laboring men; and, lastly, that the laboring men of California have ample employment, and are better paid, than in almost any other part of the country.72

Morton, as an eminent elder statesman, was heard with respect, but his views that Chinese immigration, so far from constituting an invasion had actually been responsible for introducing a far greater number of white labourers, were soon overborne.

Also overborne were those defending the Chinese against the barrage of complaints about disease, vice, criminality and low cunning. Of all cries these were, perhaps, most often heard, from the California Workingmen's Convention of 1870 through to the Geary Act of 1892 and, in Australasia, from the Queensland panic of the 1870s to the restrictive Acts of 1888. In the United States the medical profession was becoming both deeply interested in the racial aspects of disease and highly conscious of dirt as an enemy to communal health; the influx of southern Europeans and Asiatics, from backgrounds ignorant of modern hygiene and immune to their own diseases, posed, they claimed, a real threat to American health and well-being. Dr Arthur Stout produced a long book entitled *Chinese Immigration and the Physiological Causes of the Decay of a Nation* (1862); Dr Marion Sims broadcast his opinions on the Chinese origins of syphilis (1876); Dr C. C. O'Donnell received close attention when accusing Chinese lepers in San Francisco of publicly haunting street corners (1872): these opinions anti-Chinese leaders gladly translated into popular cries about 'filth' and 'frightful and nameless diseases and contagions', about 'a multitude bearing pestilence in their garments and reeking with filth and decay'.73

Health officials in San Francisco were also inclined to hyperbole, asserting that in Chinatown 'the most absolute squalidness and misery meets one at every turn', that Chinese disregarded 'our sanitary laws, concealed and are concealing their cases of small-pox', that 'this laboratory of infection—situated in the very heart of our city, distilling its poison by day and by night, and sending it forth to contaminate the atmosphere of the streets and houses of a populous, wealthy and intelligent community—is permitted to exist, is a disgrace to the civilization of the age'.74 Though there was some
foundation for these remarks (see chapter 6, section 4 above) they exaggerated and distorted the true situation, neglecting to note that deaths from epidemic disease were relatively low in Chinatown and that much of the squalor and filth arose from the failure of the local authorities to compel the white landlords of Chinatown to put their decrepit but profitable properties in order, as were landlords in all other parts of the city.75

In Australasia the same cries arose, part echoing American cries and part arising from observations of Australasian Chinatowns, mining camps and market gardens. Political leaders made relatively little use of hostile medical opinion: they either made highly generalised remarks about 'filth', 'loathsome diseases' and the Chinese 'habit' of introducing 'every disease that human flesh is heir to',76 or else made very specific references to unhygienic living conditions and to smallpox and leprosy. There was no doubt that all these existed in Australasia and there is one view that hostile white reaction was quite justified, that restrictions on immigration were largely an effort to isolate the Australasian new world from the diseases of the east.77

What the anti-Chinese groups paid scant attention to were assertions that much of the attack was exaggerated, that China was not the only country with smallpox and leprosy (in fact it had less than some), that not all outbreaks of smallpox in Australasia could be blamed on Chinese immigrants, and that some Europeans lived in equally unhygienic conditions of filth and overcrowding; in short, that what was needed was not restrictions on Chinese immigration but adequate quarantine of all ships from areas of epidemic risk, proper inspections by local health authorities of all dirty unhygienic living areas, and proper care or repatriation of lepers, wherever they came from. Though some of these remarks were heeded by government—the quarantine regulations imposed in the Northern Territory in 1888 affected all passengers and crews from Asia and not just the Chinese—they were usually ignored. Unquestionably though, this continual outcry about health and disease did influence many persons to approve anti-Chinese legislation, notably in Tasmania where a somewhat reluctant lower House eventually agreed to restrictive legislation in 1887.78

Equally loud were cries against Chinese vice, special emphasis
being given to gambling, opium smoking and the seduction of white women into prostitution. Again there appeared highly generalised assertions, as that of a San Francisco health officer reporting that, in Chinatown ‘vice in all its hideousness is on every hand’, or reports in various American newspapers and ladies’ magazines of the horrors of opium smoking, polygamy and infanticide, or talk of Chinese men attending Sunday School in order to debauch their white female teachers or drug them into marriage, or editorials speaking of ‘a population befouled with all the social vices’ and of ‘the beastliness, the filth, squalor, leprosy, venereal diseases; the lawlessness, perjury and violence; the corruption of youth and the injury to the laboring classes that make the Chinese quarter of San Francisco a huge festering ulcer which is eating into the morals of the country’. Here again voices protesting that all this was gross exaggeration were rarely heeded, though sometimes they were heard (some witnesses before the 1876 Congressional Committee of Enquiry testified that drunkenness was almost unknown amongst the Chinese, that police records showed crime and vice to be no greater amongst Chinese than amongst whites, that prostitution and seduction were no worse in the Chinese areas than elsewhere).

Similarly in British Columbia there was much outcry against vice and disease, with only an occasional voice of moderation, such as that of the Federal Commission of 1884 which found charges of Chinese crime and vice to be greatly exaggerated.

In Australasia events followed the same path. Meetings and deputations clamoured against Chinese ‘sanctuaries . . . reeking with their abomination’, turning Australasia into ‘a sink of Chinese depravity’; the Bulletin published horrifying stories of machiavellian Chinese storekeepers and degraded white women running brothels and opium dens for the debauchment and fleecing of innocent young whites; social historians asserted that ‘leprously, filth, opium-smoking and unmentionable vices have made a portion of the Chinese a moral and physical pest’; working class leaders affirmed that ‘every Chinese quarter and camp is the centre of debauchery, gambling and opium-smoking, places where foolish animal-minded European girls are tempted and enslaved’. Politicians debating the pros and cons of restrictive legislation quickly adopted this mode of thought and expression: their ‘accumulated
dark and hideous vices';\(^9^0\) their 'horrible dens and infamous houses';\(^9^1\) their 'indulgence in what is not to be mentioned in a civilized country';\(^9^2\) their habits of biting Europeans to death;\(^9^3\) their inability to refrain from crime as they were so often reared as river pirates;\(^9^4\) their custom of luring fourteen-year old girls into their dens and setting them on a path of drug-addiction and prostitution.\(^9^5\) In short, as Cameron summed it up in Sydney in 1880: 'there is about the immorality of Chinamen a distinct and peculiar character which is more loathsome in a tenfold degree than the character of the Europeans' iniquities'.\(^9^6\)

As in America, against this clamour the quieter voices defending the Chinese were seldom heard. In vain did Walsh in Queensland say he had once sat on a committee to examine working class conditions in Sydney and knew first-hand that Australian slums were just as bad as Chinese, adding that when Europeans committed brutality little was said but that 'if the Chinese commit an offence it is made known throughout the length and breadth of the land'.\(^9^7\) In vain did liberals such as Rooke in Tasmania assert that the Chinese had not proved obnoxious and did not behave nearly as badly as many European larrikins.\(^9^8\) In South Australia, Scott and others in the Legislative Council were able to delay restrictions longer, though it was probably their case for tropical development which delayed things rather than their reminders that white prostitutes in Chinatown were prostitutes long before moving there, and that the evidence of Europeans who had lived amongst the Chinese showed how false were most attacks on Chinese morality and virtue.\(^9^9\)

Unquestionably there was opium smoking and gambling in Chinese camps and quarters but not on such a degrading scale as most people apparently thought. Nor did the evidence, when soberly collected and analysed, support the view that young white girls were lured into Chinatown, debauched and prostituted; in fact, most evidence indicated that white women living with Chinese were either professional prostitutes or else the waifs, strays and rejects of white society, who found kindliness and companionship amongst the lonely Cantonese (see chapter 9 above). Likewise, the police and court evidence suggested that the crime rate amongst Chinese was noticeably less than amongst Europeans and that alcoholism and similar social offences were almost entirely absent.
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The main question, then, still remains: at a time when Chinese immigration and population growth in North America and Australasia was far less than that of Europeans, when their threat to wages and living-standards was relatively slight, when their connection with disease, vice and crime was in general no greater, if as great, than that of Europeans, why should so many Europeans conduct such a long fierce struggle for Chinese exclusion? Fear of Chinese imperial power gives some of the answer in parts of Australasia but does not help with events elsewhere, notably in the United States. In that country the anti-slavery issue is perhaps more relevant.

The emergence of the United States from the Civil War in 1865, outwardly united though battered and torn within, saw numerous persons still very worked up about slavery and, with local Negroes liberated, ready to turn their attention to slavery elsewhere. In spite of repeated assurances that Chinese immigrants were free men, and that American officials were carefully implementing the 1862 federal law requiring them to certify at ports of embarkation that each migrant was embarking voluntarily and in full understanding of his contract, many Americans never lost their suspicion that Chinese immigration constituted a new form of slave labour. First, Chinese were always called 'coolies' and associated with gangs of semi-servile labourers. Second, reports of ill-treatment of Chinese coolie recruits in central and southern America, especially Peru, received considerable prominence and much comparison with slave conditions. Third, some publicists made much of the credit-ticket passage conditions whereby, if a Chinese in America failed to repay his debt, his wife and children could be put in bondage in China. Fourth, it became noised abroad that some if not all Chinese women coming to America were girls who had been sold by impoverished families into prostitution and were kept by their employers in conditions of virtual slavery. Fifth, many Americans seized upon the sensational but quite unreliable remarks of the corrupt and ignorant American Consul in Hongkong, D. H. Bailey (1871-9), about coolies and slavery in China.

In the light of all this, various prominent persons in the eastern states remained very concerned about 'Chinese coolie slavery' and felt the only way to stop it was to restrict immigration. Hence President Grant's statement in 1874 that 'the great propor-
tion of the Chinese immigrants who come to our shores do not come voluntarily, to make their homes with us and their labor productive of general prosperity, but come under contracts with headmen who own them almost absolutely. In a worse form does this apply to Chinese women. Unquestionably this coolie-slavery interpretation, though consistently denied by those knowledgable of the credit-ticket system, was largely responsible for swinging easterners to support the western call for restriction. In British Columbia the slavery issue was less acute as that colony had neither slavery nor a large Negro population—the main references to slavery were either echoes of Californian opinion or highly generalised statements about the power of the local tongs.

In Australasia the slavery issue expressed itself somewhat differently. On the one hand, though slavery had never officially existed in these distant colonies, the question had early appeared in connection with cheap convict labour and attempts from the mid-1830s onwards to replace it by cheap Indian coolies or Pacific Islanders. On the other hand, the Imperial and Indian Parliaments officially approved schemes for taking Indian coolies for plantation work elsewhere, provided that the labourers were themselves willing to go, that shipping, living and working conditions were properly supervised, that men could take their families with them, and that free return passages to India were guaranteed. The association so closely drawn in many American minds during the 1870s and 1880s between slaves and coolies was not nearly so closely drawn in Australasia, where so many persons had previously had first-hand acquaintance with the coolie trade in India, Mauritius, the Caribbean and elsewhere in the British Empire, or knew full well that the failure of all Australian attempts to import Indian coolies lay in the inability of colonial governments to meet the strict requirements for coolie welfare demanded by the government of India. Certainly, during the 1870s and 1880s there was relatively little talk in Australasia of 'coolie slavery': what talk there was mainly concerned Pacific Island labourers in North Queensland. Admittedly there were occasional references to Chinese immigrants being 'virtual slaves' to their headmen or to their secret societies—sometimes as quotations from American works—but speakers almost seemed to be saying this for something to say, or as part of a set routine; they
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did not get nearly so worked up about it as about invasion, disease, vice and living standards.

Hesitation about pressing the slavery argument was, then, more evident in Australasia than in North America. Another factor here may have been that most Chinese in Australasia had originally come as miners, and not as cheap railroad labourers, and if not still in mining were predominantly in market gardening and other agricultural work, in domestic service or in trade (see chapter 9); they were often and manifestly achieving a measure of economic success and sometimes entrepreneurial independence. One might talk about slave-labour in the Chinese furniture factories of Sydney and Melbourne, or tell horrifying tales about the power of headmen and secret societies, but it was difficult to associate the majority of Australian Chinese with the common picture of slaves as a gang of toiling cotton-pickers or sugar-cane cutters, labouring under the cruel whips of brutal overseers. Even in California, though there was enough emotion left over from the Civil War to make charges of slavery politically useful (though not as much as in the east) there was much less sting in them than in charges of disease, vice and cheap labour.

The anti-slavery issue, then, does not in terms of basic issues take us far. Is there more help to be found in notions of race superiority? Certainly during the 1870s and 1880s notions of racial differences deriving from de Gobineau, Darwin and others, though making little scientific advance except perhaps in terms of anthropometry, were now becoming more widely known. The Popular Science Monthly in 1882 asserted that social characteristics were as 'fundamental and immutable as are the physical characteristics of races' and that it would be nonsense to expect the Chinese to adjust to American institutions any better than the Negro or Indian. The daily press ran the same theme: the Chinese, as Asiatics, 'are cunning, treacherous, and vicious, possessing no conception of American civilization'; 'one of the debased races of the earth'; 'groveling semi-barbarians'. Local Californians, of course, were well to the fore here, as instance Frank Pixley giving evidence to the 1876 Congressional Committee: 'The Chinese are inferior to any race God ever made . . . I think there are none so low . . . I believe that the Chinese have no souls to save, and if they have,
they are not worth the saving'. The remarks of Congressmen, from both east and west, often carry the same note.

In Australasia the same theme appears. Some claimed that the Chinese were so much lower on the life-scale that they were mere beasts; 'grovelling animals' or 'dumb animals' whose entry would pull down the standards of the colonies. As J. P. Joyce of Otago, New Zealand, put it: 'if we admit these animals, for I can call them nothing else, into the colony we would be degrading our race . . . [We should] not allow the introduction into this young nation of a very low type of humanity. I look upon the Chinese as an effete race which might very well be left to die out . . . otherwise there will come a time when the superior race, in obedience to the first law of nature—self preservation—will be compelled to wage against them a war of extermination'. Similarly the Shearer's Record in Australia claimed (15 August 1888) that 'a congregation of Europeans numbering a thousand persons and embracing representatives of every class and creed, assembled on one of the Hobson Bay piers, and looking at the cargo of immigrants from the "Flowerly Land", would regard their appearance on deck much in the same light as they would a similar detachment of a certain kind of animal which youngsters exhibit a partiality for in the Zoological Gardens'.

Others would not go as far as categorising the Chinese as animals. Seddon conceded that on the scale of life the Chinese lay mid-way between a European and a monkey, and so virtually did Sir George Grey. Others simply spoke of them as a congenitally lower kind of human with a hereditary incapacity for higher development: 'they are in as unfortunate a position as people are unfortunate who are born paralysed, with hereditary diseases, or who are maimed'. Yet others held that they were equal in capacity with Europeans but of such a different kind that intermixture would be degrading to both races in much the same way that mixing a first-class beef strain with a first-class dairy strain would produce off-spring less advanced as beef or dairy cattle than the pure lines. Dr Campbell put this point to the Legislative Council of South Australia in 1880 when saying that the Chinese 'are not an inferior race' but are quite different; 'the line that separates the Anglo-Saxon from the Mongolian is deep and unalterable'.

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Whichever opinion was held the result was much the same: the maintenance of high standards amongst the Anglo-Saxon race occupying Australasia meant preventing degradation arising from mixture with the Chinese. The only persons Australasia could admit with safety were persons of the ‘Caucasian race’, preferably ‘pure blooded Anglo-Saxons’. Some Australians were almost upset that they felt obliged to accept this conclusion, and hastened to add that they did not mean to challenge the Creator’s decision to put Chinese on the earth: on the contrary, ‘The Almighty has created the Chinese, as well as the European, with certain wise ends . . . it shows what a favoured people we are and we ought to preserve our nation from contamination’.

Against this view of the hereditary inequalities, of the unbridgeable differences, amongst the races of mankind the liberal-humanitarians launched attack after attack. Some appealed to Christian tradition—that God created all men in his image and that in Christ was neither Jew nor Gentile, slaveman nor freeman. Others attacked allegedly ‘Darwinian’ views of race differences saying that if the Darwinian theory were true then the Chinese were clearly superior to the Anglo-Saxons as they had greater capacity to survive in tough conditions. Others attacked the ‘inferiority’ view as plainly conflicting with the evidence that China had a much older civilisation than had Europe, that close acquaintance with ‘reputable Chinese’ showed them to be very similar to reputable Europeans, that ‘the Chinese are a race that will yet take a leading place among the peoples of the world’, and certainly, if inferior, could not have survived the conditions in which they had in fact survived, and that ‘under the cry about inferior races I have known the grossest injustice to be done to millions and millions of people . . . kept in absolute slavery, deprived of every privilege belonging to human beings’.

Back from their opponents came cries of Chinese vice and criminality, with liberal quotations from writers such as Bret Harte—‘for ways that are dark and tricks that are vain, the heathen Chinee is peculiar’—or else categorical denials that the Chinese could be compared with Europeans, or equated with Italians and Germans. As the Irishman O’Connor put it: ‘to compare the land which gave us a Caesar, and which still preserves the greatest cul-
tured—and the land (Germany) from whose veins the best blood of England is drawn—with an emaciated degraded race like the Chinese is going too far'.

Or, as another Irishman remarked 'when a moral cancer makes its appearance in our midst, when we find a horde of savages invading the colony to demoralize our society, the Imperial Government will disregard our efforts to check and cure the evil...'; we must ourselves stop the Chinese entering as 'they cannot mingle with the rest of the population'.

As in the earlier period the sticking point for many persons with these opinions was their horror of intermarriage and the degenerate 'mongrel' offspring that they feared would result. In New South Wales Fletcher wanted to punish any European woman who dared marry a Chinaman while Salomons warned the populace that if the Chinese 'should join in undesirable union with our people, whether lawful or unlawful, the mongrel breed which springs from such a union, is to my mind, less desirable than the original Chinese labourers'.

In South Australia J. H. Howe asserted that 'so far as commingling their blood with ours is concerned I would personally rather see my children in their graves', while in Tasmania Moore claimed that 'the children of Chinese and European parents have all the vices of both without having the virtues of either'. This was one of William Lane's objections to Chinese immigration; he frequently spoke disparagingly, almost fearfully, of a 'piebald' population.

Though many voices were lifted against Chinese 'inferiority' only a few hardy souls ever attempted to defend mixed marriages. In Adelaide Rees claimed that intermarriage was good, that one Chinese-Irish marriage had resulted in a very beautiful girl, while in New Zealand J. C. Brown claimed that 'children of mixed Chinese and European parentage compared favourably with other children, both as regards appearance and intelligence'. In Tasmania Coote spoke of cases where a European girl married to a Chinese was getting on well: she was 'only a servant' and had she married a European working man would probably have been regularly beaten. These views, however, received scant attention, most simply accepting without much query the undesirability and dangers of a 'discoloured population'.

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One's general impression here is that, whereas in the 1850s and 1860s Australians were worried by intermarriage and 'mongrel' children because they were relatively unfamiliar with the phenomena and could not see where such children fitted into society, by the 1880s Australians were much surer where they stood: a mixed blood stock would definitely be degenerate, would degrade society, and should be avoided at all costs.

Another noticeable feature of the times was the growing use of the word 'white' as a racial term, as distinct from the simple descriptive or legal meaning it had carried for decades in countries such as the United States. Though Blumenbach had used the term in connection with his hypothetical 'Caucasian' race in the eighteenth century, and though mid-nineteenth century scientists were using it when discussing race in terms of skin colour, it was not in common use as a racial term during the 1850s and 1860s: then men usually spoke of Europeans, Chinese (or Mongolians), Negroes or—even more commonly and specifically—Anglo-Saxons, Germans, Italians, and so on. In the 1870s and 1880s, though still using these terms, they were beginning also to use more generalised racial terms such as 'white', 'Caucasian', 'yellow', and so on. So Salomons referred the New South Wales legislature in 1888 to Darley's report suggesting that 'no white woman be permitted to live in or frequent these [Chinese] camps unless she be the bona fide wife of, and living with a Chinaman as his wife . . . [and] that no Chinaman should be permitted to marry a white woman unless with the consent of the police magistrate'.33 The Queensland debates of 1888 saw the term used quite frequently: 'we want no Chinese here at all; we do not want this country a mixture of Chinamen and whites; we want it for whites alone'.34 And again, 'we white men have our vices . . . . but there is no man of our race so depraved as not to have some sense of decency, some sense of respect for that which is holy and pure; that feeling appears to be absent from the Chinese, probably as a result of their atheistical religion'.35 Politicians were matching publicists, the Bulletin accusing the Chinese of neglecting 'all the first duties of white humanity' (1/5/86) and William Lane's Boomerang speaking of Queensland miners expelling some Chinese from one gold-field in 1888 as 'determined and deliberate blows on behalf of White Australia'; Lane
later claimed that 'the very life of the white race in Australia is involved in the conflict'.

Actually, the term 'white' goes back further than the late 1880s, to the debates in Queensland and South Australia about the suitability of Europeans for tropical labour, especially in areas where planters were introducing Pacific Islanders. So Dr Challinor in 1868 attacked kanaka labour on the grounds that the immigration of persons 'in a semi-barbarous state would not tend to improve the white population' while those giving evidence to the Select Committee on the working of the Polynesian Labourers Act of 1868 used the term quite frequently. It also appears in the debates on O'Doherty's attempt to repeal the 1868 Act in 1871. Similarly in South Australia in the 1870s Coglin had been attacking plans to introduce Indians and Chinese to the Northern Territory—on the grounds that he wanted 'white faces'—while those favouring Asiatic labour argued that in the Northern Territory 'white people cannot do heavy work'. Apparently, as a result of the problems presented by tropical development, some Australians were beginning to slip away from the older custom of specifically referring to people by their country or culture of origin and were starting to think in more generalised racial terms.

In British Columbia the term 'white' flowed over from California, being used by leaders such as de Cosmos and Robson when asking for federal action against the Chinese; as one historian suggests, the notion of 'white' British Columbia was being laid well and firmly in the 1880s. In California, and still more in the eastern states, the term 'white' had for long been used, mainly as a convenience to distinguish the Negro population from the rest of the population (excluding Indians) taken together; hence the 1790 law confining naturalisation to 'any alien being a free white person' and the term's appearance in official documents and reports, as when the report of the 1876 Congressional Committee said 'there was danger of the white population of California being outnumbered by the Chinese'. The term 'mean white', or 'poor white', had also been used for some decades to refer to those Europeans in the southern states whose standards of living were little above those of the Negroes.

Speaking generally, the term 'white' in America, while clearly
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being used in a racial sense by the 1880s, does not seem to have carried the same intensity of racial feeling as it did in Australia. Maybe where immigration was involved, the older established population was less ready to think simply in terms of colour in the United States than in Australia, partly because there it had been very critical of a large slice of European immigrants during the 1850s, especially Irish and Germans, and were becoming increasingly concerned at the origin and character of much of the European immigration of the 1880s; this being increasingly southern and eastern European in origin and totalling some four million. For the United States as a whole, oriental immigration was in reality a minor problem compared with the quantity and quality of European immigration; by 1890 men such as General Francis Walker were beginning to broadcast their notions of Anglo-Saxon superiority over other European races while as early as 1870 one paper had lumped certain European groups with the Chinese, presuming that God must have had some reason for bringing into the community such inferior types as Negroes, Chinese and Irish.42

Do all these racial terms, all these opinions about racial differences and inferiorities, help explain the anti-Chinese legislation of the late 1880s? Not entirely. They certainly gave anti-Chinese persons a convenient set of terms, a ready-made set of reasons for their demands, and an acceptable outlet for the feeling that things were not right with the social system. But that there are grounds for doubting that at this time racial notions usually sprang from deep conviction, or a firm ideology of 'racial superiority', is clear when we consider policies and opinions concerning other non-Europeans. In America, though there were occasional criticisms of the Japanese—leading to general denunciation of all 'Mongolians'—the general attitude was favourable; they were a 'brave, clean' race, ready to adopt European and American methods of industry and warfare, the 'most progressive people of the Mongolian race'.43

In Australasia there were references to other non-European peoples, rarely in terms of restricting entry but sometimes in terms of preventing them from entering gold-fields or exercising the vote; hence the clauses of the Gold Fields Acts of Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia to prevent Asiatic and African aliens entering newly discovered gold-fields and the clause in the
South Australian Constitution Act preventing any naturalised or alien persons of non-European origin casting a vote in the Northern Territory. But these clauses were considered less in terms of ‘race’ as such than in terms of preventing any repetition of a massive and disturbing invasion of the gold-fields and of confining the vote to persons reared in traditions of European democracy.

Occasionally someone did raise the question of the immigration and assimilation of Asiatic peoples other than the Chinese, as instance the 1888 debate on Chinese Immigration in New South Wales when O’Sullivan, former President of the Sydney Trades and Labour Council, stated that ‘some day we may have to pass a similar law applying to the natives of India, or to any other coloured race which threatens our civilization’; to which Parkes replied that he had ‘as much opposition to any inferior race from any other part of the East’ but that restricting all such peoples was very complicated, diplomatically delicate and at present unnecessary. In practical terms, Parkes’s line of thought in these years is clearer from his agreement to narrow the scope of the proposed Bill of 1881 to persons of ‘Chinese race’, instead of applying it as originally planned to all persons of ‘Mongolian race’, because Sir Patrick Jennings objected that it would exclude ‘Burmese, Siamese, Japanese’ and other Asiatics who ‘might be a gain to us’. Elsewhere in Australasia the entry of Asiatics and Africans usually came up in connection with tropical development, and whether they were or were not necessary for tropical agriculture. Though in the late 1880s Indians, Afghans, Malays and other Asiatics totalled only 6000 or so, compared with 35,000 Chinese and 11,000 or so Pacific Islanders, this number was quite enough to have drawn the belligerent attention of persons ideologically convinced of the dangers to a superior white race presented by mixture with inferior coloured peoples. In other words it seems that both in North America and Australasia there were other forces, much deeper, that were responsible for the prolonged campaign to exclude the Chinese and no other peoples.

A major factor here, working away deep in men’s minds and feelings, was the marked difference between the Chinese and other peoples of Australasia and western America. The fact that so many of them, while abandoning their flowing clothes and winding their
pig-tails less conspicuously under their hats, failed to learn much English, cooked their own traditional food, continued working in ethnic groups (even when abandoning mining and railway building for market gardening, furniture-making and the like), kept up the custom of returning regularly to visit their wives and families in China instead of bringing them to settle in the new world, marked them off, quite as much if not more than skin colour, from colonial society as a people strange and apart. Yet these new young societies in America and Australasia were just at that stage of development when they were trying to find their own identity, to weld the diverse traditions and backgrounds of all the variegated elements of their rapidly growing populations into an acceptable whole. The Chinese, though useful in various occupations, as more moderate persons were quite willing to admit, and law-abiding and quiescent, simply did not swim with the main stream of colonial development. They not only persisted in remaining visibly distinct: they seemed completely unable to catch the vision of the new egalitarian democratic society dreamed of by the emigrant chartists and other radicals of the old world of Europe, or by the moving frontiersman and other second and third generation individuals born in the new world. The Confucian virtues of obedience, order, loyalty to family, headman and emperor, seemed quite alien to such visions; indeed, they seemed quite inimical to them, especially as the more conservative members of the economic and political establishment often seemed to place much emphasis on such values. Hence the Bulletin’s continuous attack on Chinese docility as a danger to Australian democracy—like ‘dumb-driven cattle’ they were a menace to a community of free men—and also the drive during the mid-1880s in the Australian colonies to disenfranchise them and prevent further naturalisation.

Through and beneath all the noise about cheap labour, vice, disease, racial inferiority and invasion, are discernible signs of this basic anger at the Chinaman’s apparent refusal to change his ways and become more like his fellow colonists; that is, to assimilate to the customs and opinions of Anglo-Saxon new world society. California’s official declaration on this point went as follows:

During their entire settlement in California they have never adapted themselves to our habits, modes of dress, or our educational system,
The gates close against the Chinese, 1871-88

have never learned the sanctity of an oath, never desired to become citizens, or to perform the duties of citizenship, never discovered the difference between right and wrong, never ceased the worship of their idol gods, or advanced a step beyond the musty traditions of their native hive. Impregnable to all the influences of our Anglo-Saxon life, they remain the same stolid Asians that have floated on the rivers and slaved in the fields of China for thirty centuries of time.48

In the east Horace Greeley conceded in the New York Tribune that the Chinese were an industrious orderly people but that only the 'Christian races' or any of the 'white races' were welcome as permanent settlers since they alone 'assimilate with Americans'.49 Similarly James Bennett, junior, in the New York Herald, concluded that the Chinese 'are a people who are our antipodes in all social and intellectual regards; it is not possible to imagine civilizations more widely at variance than their's and our's; and varying civilizations never harmonize side by side'.50

British Columbians also, amidst their accusations of vice, disease and crime, usually had some remark to the effect that Chinese habits and customs were so dissimilar that they could never become assimilated. A good illustration here is a cartoon from the Canadian Illustrated News of 26 April 1879 concerning Amor de Cosmos's anti-Chinese policies;51 the cartoon shows a large frock-coated de Cosmos seizing a much smaller Chinaman by his pig-tail and conversing as follows:

Heathen Chinee: 'Why you send me offee?'
de Cosmos: 'Because you can't or won't "assimilate" with us'.
Heathen Chinee: 'What is datee?'
de Cosmos: 'You will not drink whiskey, and talk politics and vote like us'.

In Australasia the line of thought, as expressed by the more moderate rather than the more extreme anti-Chinese groups, ran roughly as follows. Though the Australasian new world was to be a very different place from the old it was nevertheless to be basically British in character: 'this is a British colony and we hold it in trust for posterity'; its ways are thoroughly British in manners,

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customs, laws, religion, social habits and mode of life.\textsuperscript{52} Henry Parkes in New South Wales perhaps had it clearest: ‘it is our duty to preserve the type of the British nation and we ought not, for any consideration whatever, to admit any element that would detract from or in any appreciable degree lower that admirable type of nationality’.\textsuperscript{53} Nevertheless, the colonists felt they need not be narrow-minded and exclusive but would ‘welcome’ anyone who assimilate to this gradually evolving British-Australian way of life and help develop these new antipodean nations.\textsuperscript{54} Most Europeans were able and willing to do this—‘we can hope to build up a great nation out of the Slavs, the Russians, Norwegians, Germans and Spaniards’, but ‘it cannot be done in our midst by the Mongolians’.\textsuperscript{55} The Chinese simply would not mix or change their ways; hence Gillies’s (radical Premier of Victoria) report to the Imperial Parliament in 1887 saying:

Members of the European family of nations joining our community become amalgamated with the general population . . . (but) the Chinese stand out in marked contrast. They come without their women and children, apparently having no intention to settle, and occupy an isolated position in every community where they are found . . . Nor is it the mere fact of this isolation, but the impossibility of it being otherwise. The Chinese from all points of view are so entirely dissimilar as to render a blending of the peoples out of the question. They are not only an alien race but they remain aliens.\textsuperscript{56}

In short the Chinese had not only remained distinct and separate for forty years or so in Australasia but would go on like that for ever, eternally unassimilable: ‘they cannot mingle with the rest of the population and they will not be in the slightest degree different from what they always have been’:\textsuperscript{57} or, as Oliver put it in New Zealand, the Chinese will not by any possibility ‘be able to coalesce with us, they will always live apart, their ideas are not our ideas, their modes of life are not ours’.\textsuperscript{58}

On this score it was quite immaterial to argue whether the Chinese were inferior or not, or had a great civilisation or not; if they could not mix they were useless for the basic task of nation-building. As J. L. Parsons in South Australia said, though he admired the wonderful ability and industry of the Chinese, and their writings and philosophers, they were too different from the
European majority in Australasia: 'it is almost impossible for such diverse elements to build up a solid, compact and well-welded state';\textsuperscript{59} or as Dr Menzies in New Zealand put it, the Chinese manifestly have many virtues—sobriety, industriousness, thrift, orderliness—but are too different to 'share with ourselves a common feeling of patriotism'.\textsuperscript{60}

Nor could the colonies, it was felt, run the risk of retaining an unassimilable unco-operative sub-population in their midst. Not only would it seriously interfere with the process of nation-building but it could lead to grave internal conflict. Sir William Manning expressed this somewhat sadly when he said: 'we all know from experience, coming alas too near home (presumably here referring to Anglo-Irish relations), the antagonism that exists between races. You cannot get races that are totally different from each other to amalgamate. There will be strong feeling against an alien race, an antagonism which it is impossible to suppress'.\textsuperscript{61} Henry Parkes had no hesitation in stressing this point to the Imperial Government: 'there can be no sympathy, and in the future it is to be apprehended that there will be no peace, between the two races'.\textsuperscript{62} Others put the same point, but less in terms of race and more in terms of civilisation: it is 'a matter of two systems of existence which can hardly combine together—it is a conflict between two systems of existence'.\textsuperscript{63}

The whole matter then, it was held, boiled down to the fact that the continued presence of the Chinese was a serious obstacle to the orderly process of nation-building and that continued Chinese immigration transformed this obstacle into a grave immediate danger. Parkes had raised this point of homogeneity in New South Wales in the 1860s and by the 1880s had it very clear: the Chinese 'cannot amalgamate with us or help us build an empire; nor should we admit persons who cannot take up all our rights, perform on a ground of equality all our duties and share in our august and lofty work of founding a free nation'.\textsuperscript{64} In New Zealand the leading exponent of this view was George Grey, a very different personality from Parkes but equally filled with that curious mid-nineteenth century conservative English radicalism: 'we want citizens who can intelligently watch the introduction of laws and assist in the administration of them, who in fact are

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interested in the immediate progress and in the future of the coun­
try of their adoption—and who feel they are part of a youthful
nation'.

Though pro-Chinese groups cheerfully if unavailingly entered
the lists to defend Chinese against accusations of disease, vice, crime, invasion and the like, they rarely felt able to advance a
defence against this proposition. The tropical developers could not: they could only argue in favour of coolie-type labour as a
necessary foundation for the development of northern Australia, on
a limited term contract basis, but in no sense as an equal integral
part of the nation. A few liberal-humanitarians and business men
made an effort, especially those who had become friends with some
of the leading Chinese merchants, and saw them adopting certain
European customs and becoming familiar with British democratic
procedures. Even the anti-Chinese groups could not always ignore
this obvious fact that Chinese merchants sometimes became
assimilated, at least in part. Cameron, a leading restrictionist in
Sydney, admitted that 'some Chinese are a credit to their country
and have adopted European manners and customs', but went on to
suggest that these were the exceptions that proved the rule. In
Brisbane, J. Watson tackled the problem by reviving Fawkner's
old distinction between Tartars and Chinese: 'the Chinamen we
receive here are not Chinamen—they are only Tartars, with the
exception of the high-class Chinamen', and therefore must be
excluded. No one was sufficiently impressed with this distinction
to attempt to distinguish between 'Tartars' and 'Chinamen' in the
restrictive legislation.

One group that might have defended the Chinese were the
leading Chinese themselves; in fact very few could go all the way
in claiming or advocating complete assimilation. They could point
to the Chinese virtues of orderliness, obedience and integrity, or
could appeal to the doctrines of Christian brotherhood and British
justice; as did Lowe Kong Meng and others in their writings: but
very few could claim that they were willing to become completely
assimilated to the British-Australian (or Californian) way of life.
Quong Tart, could, maybe, with his English wife, his refusal to
wear Chinese clothes even in China (except on ceremonial
occasions), and his love of British sport and singing; but Quong
Tart and his like were few and far between. The ones who could have made the strongest case were those scattered country store­keepers or cooks or agricultural labourers who, perhaps because of a broken lineage in China that left them nothing on which to bestow their filial loyalty, or because they were working virtually alone and out of contact with Chinese ethnic life, or because they had been long away from home and had married an American or Australian or European girl, had become virtually completely assimilated. But such persons were too scattered to organise any effective pressure group, and in any case probably did not care whether Chinese immigration continued or not.

What in fact the leading Chinese merchants and apologists were wanting was not complete assimilation but a pluralist system that would allow them to maintain some of the social customs and values of Chinese life while becoming full members, politically and economically, of America or Australia. In the mid-twentieth century this has become a possibility: in the 1880s it was just not possible. Too unsure of themselves, of their identity, of their culture, of their future, the new white societies of the Pacific had not worked out exactly who they were and where they were going; except that they were going to create some new kind of society and that everyone had to be together in the creation. If there had been a few Chinese helping the polyglot bunch of diggers confronting the establishment at Eureka, if as individuals some Chinese had from the beginning joined the relevant Trade Union and identified themselves with the cause of higher wages and better working conditions, if some had become ardent Orange supporters against the Catholic Irish or vice versa, if some had joined in local alcoholic orgies and fist-fights, then the Anglo-Saxons and others of North America and Australasia may have recognised them as ‘buddies’ or ‘mates’ in the cause, and been ready to accept them. But the age-old Confucian training in obedience and orderliness, the strong hold of Chinese ethnic loyalties, the pull of family and lineage loyalties back in Kwantung, the desire to avoid becoming embroiled in the strange affairs of the Europeans, all conspired to make this impossible—except for the few scattered souls who did not count.

Even in societies which were starting almost from scratch, and where the Chinese had been from the very beginning, these forces
were clear and strong. Vancouver city is a case in point. Starting as a new town in 1886, growing to 5000 in the next year (about one-fifth the total non-Indian population of the province), it surged ahead until by 1891 it contained nearly 20,000 souls. It is quite fascinating to observe the town as it grew so rapidly in the late eighties. From every direction people came, notes one historian: from Yale and other deserted construction camps drifted engineers, carpenters and common labourers; from Manitoba arrived young Englishmen broke from abortive farming efforts on the prairies; from Ontario, Quebec and the Maritimes came real-estate men, lawyers, lumbermen, fishermen and the like; from Pennsylvania came young traders; from San Francisco sailed in capitalists anxious to get into the growing lumber industry; from Ireland stormed in young men disappointed with the failure of Irish nationalist agitation; from England arrived scions of upper class families contemplating a new life on the western ranches; from Germany came bankers and brewers; from Italy came unskilled labourers; and from Hongkong came ship-loads of Chinese. All these newcomers found a place in the rapidly growing city. All were made welcome, except for occasional ethnic friction, as part of the new western metropolis, Canada's gateway to the Pacific and the Orient. All, that is, except the Chinese. Despite their usefulness, they alone were not permitted to share the experience of belonging, of being one in a great venture of creating and building an exciting new enterprise.

There are several matters involved here. First is that impatient brashness, that intolerance of anyone or anything that does not seem to be completely 'with it', which is so often characteristic of new young societies struggling to create a corporate identity, a new national organism. This is the sense in which the Chinese were the anvil on which the new young societies were slowly hammering out their national identity.

Second, there is that deep fear of the strange and different, which so often arises when a human individual or group is confronted with another individual or group of quite different character and customs, and does not understand it. There is no need here to enter the dark realm of basic social motives and group psychology, or debate whether Jung's 'archetypal stranger' theory is
at all relevant. It is sufficient to note that an equable pluralism is only possible when the various groups, or at least its leaders, know the other groups well enough to realise that they all share a basic common purpose and that the differences between them arise quite sensibly and rationally from different but compatible value systems. Such understanding certainly did not exist between the Europeans and Chinese of North America and Australasia in the 1870s and 1880s—or only between too few to be ineffective.

A less equable pluralism is also possible, when one group has so great a mastery over others that, though it may not understand them, it can look upon them without feeling anxious or threatened; much as a master looks upon a harmless docile little dog. In this light did many Australians of the day regard the Pacific Islanders; but the Chinese immigrants, as forerunners of a great Empire and civilisation, heirs of Kubla Khan and the Eastern Mongolian Horde, could not be looked upon in this way; fear and anxiety, not fearless affectionate mastery, were heavily involved. This deep element of fear, quite as much as youthful intolerance and brashness, goes far to explain why there was at this time so much heat, abuse, vituperation, exaggeration, and refusal to examine or listen to the facts.

This, then, was the situation: the Chinese were neither accepted by nor acceptable to any but a handful of white Americans and Australasians. As a conspicuous separate people they were, as in the earlier period, a ready-made scapegoat on which could be piled blame for many of the social weaknesses of the day: occasional recession and bouts of unemployment amongst various sections of the working-class; inadequate public health arrangements; petty crime, prostitution and ill-treatment of women. Even the opium habit, forced on an unwilling China by British merchants greedy for profit, was made a major occasion for attacking the Chinese: yet, despite the pleas of leading Chinese, governments were slow to outlaw it; rather did they continue to let it enter and derive a handsome revenue from the customs duties thereon.

The scapegoat thesis raises another issue, namely, relations between the Chinese and the Irish. Some American historians have argued that the Irish were largely to blame for the anti-Chinese
movement. Mary Coolidge, for instance, the first person to write a major book on the topic, concluded that:

A minor cause of anti-Chinese movements was undoubtedly the large proportion of Irish among the foreign born. Not only in California but elsewhere in the larger cities they have shown violent antipathy to the darker races, and have brought with them from Ireland the tradition of turbulency... The preponderance of Irish names in the leadership of mobs, anti-coolie clubs, persons arrested for attacks upon the Chinese, and also among legislators and municipal officers, bears witness to the rapidity of their assimilation—but it was a great misfortune to the Chinaman. The enforcement of anti-Chinese legislation before 1882 by state officers and the administration of the exclusion laws since that time, has also been largely in the hands of men of Irish birth or parentage.72

There is some evidence to support this view. Not only were Irish names such as Kearney, O'Donnell, Kennedy, Phelan, and others prominent in the anti-Chinese cause in California but various Irish persons were prominent in the east; as instance the two Irish prostitutes of New York who precipitated an outburst of anti-Chinese feeling by claiming that Chinese laundrymen had seduced them into their 'shameful life' at a very tender age.73 It is also true that in California the Roman Catholic clergy and press—largely Irish in personnel—were sympathetic to exclusion whereas Protestant clerics sometimes opposed it.74 The same case could be argued in Australia. In New South Wales the names O'Connor, Plunkett, Cunneen, and O'Sullivan loom large in the political campaigns to introduce restrictive legislation, as do names such as O'Doherty in Queensland, Coglin in South Australia, and Laughrey, Joyce, and Reeves in New Zealand. There were also numerous Irish names amongst the leaders of public meetings, demonstrations and the like.

The matter is not as simple, however, as Mary Coolidge implies. In the 1870s and 1880s, both in California and Australia, the Irish made up from one-sixth to one-quarter of the foreign born; one would therefore expect some Irishmen to be prominent in anti-Chinese activities, especially as the Irish were relatively more numerous in the working-classes where so much of the bitterest anti-Chinese sentiment lay. In any case, name counts reveal just as many Scottish names prominent in anti-Chinese activities
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in Australasia, in British Columbia and, to some extent, in the United States; but the Scottish were not as numerous as the Irish in many areas. Furthermore, Miller's work in the United States shows that, although the Irish ethnic newspapers, certainly in New York, were unanimously opposed to Chinese immigration, they were far less obsessed with the matter than was the labour press generally, little of which was under Irish control.75

Nevertheless, the Chinese were undoubtedly useful to the Irish, both in America and Australasia. A major victim of the anti-alien Know-Nothing movement in the United States in the 1850s, and a continual target for the nativist press in later years, the Irish could use the Chinese as a diversionary scapegoat, as an alternative victim for nativist attacks. Similarly in Australia, with frequent conflict between Irish-Catholic minority and English-Scottish Protestant majority, anti-Chinese feeling could be used to divert hostility from the Irish minority. Certainly, some of the Irish involved were amongst the most vituperative speakers, and most ready to attack the Chinese for vice, disease and 'nameless' and 'unmentionable' evils.

The extent of the Irish use of the Chinese as an alternative scapegoat is debatable. There is no doubt, though, that as the century progressed the Chinese became increasingly useful as a device for political and demagogic manoeuvring. In California, working class leaders such as Dennis Kearney may well have been quite sincere when saying that 'to an American, death is preferable to life on a par with the Chinaman' (16/10/77),76 but others were clearly using the Chinese as a means of political advancement, as a way to make themselves known in the state legislature.77 Over the Rockies, though opinions about the Chinese were frequent in the 1850s and 1860s, it was not till the balanced position of the political parties in the seventies and eighties, and the possibility of using the Chinese question for political gain, that demagogy became common; though here again it is not easy to decide how far the sinophobia of Blaine (Maine), Willis (Kentucky), Cameron (Wisconsin), Browne (Indiana) and Speer (Georgia) was sincere and how far simple political expediency. Some political opinions were, however, quite clear; as instance that of Butler of Tennesee when speaking of events before the 1888 Scott Act: 'it is a game of

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politics . . . and not a seemly one I must say. But for the fact that we are on the eve of a Presidential election, and each Party wants to get the vote of the Pacific Slope, this Senate would not be engaged in this debate'.

Likewise in British Columbia it is sometimes difficult to decide how far the advocates of Chinese restriction were genuine in feeling there were too many Chinese in the province and how far they were merely competing for working class votes. It is significant, though, that the provincial parliament was comfortably passing anti-Chinese legislation as early as 1874 and that it was the business and humanitarian groups in Ottawa who delayed restriction for another ten years; quite clearly, in the province, nearly everyone was persuaded to adopt an anti-Chinese viewpoint, or else realised that so many persons were ardent restrictionists that advocacy of any other course was pointless.

In Australasia there were several kinds of political expediency. First were politicians who, because they believed it was pointless to continue standing out against strong public feeling, voted for restrictive measures on the grounds that this was what the people wanted. So in 1881 Tomkinson and Ward stated that measures against Chinese immigration were unnecessary but that 'as the opinion of the country is against it, and I respect that opinion', they would not oppose it. Even Legislative Councillors, less exposed to popular pressure, were affected. In New South Wales both Darley and Frazer admitted that they were against the restrictive Bill but would either vote for it, or abstain, out of deference to the large majority it had received in the Assembly. In Victoria some took a stronger line, Anderson declaring that it was the business of Legislative Councillors not to yield to public clamour but do what was right.

Second were they who, while actually favouring Chinese immigration for developmental purposes, realised they had no hope of resisting the general move to restriction and that they would do better to approve anti-Chinese legislation in the hope of winning sympathy for their efforts to obtain other coloured labour. Many Queensland planters took this line during the 1880s, as did a number of Legislative Councillors in South Australia when at last,
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in 1888, agreeing to restrictions on Chinese immigration to the Northern Territory.82

Third were the true demagogues, whipping up public fear and hostility to further their own political careers or the position of their own cliques, factions or parties. It is not always easy to distinguish this, though political opponents naturally made plenty of accusations. David Buchanan, for instance, who had taken a strong anti-Chinese line in the 1860s but by the 1880s was more kindly disposed to them, accused the Parkes-Robertson government of grossly exaggerating the smallpox scare of 1881 in order to win working class support.83 Parkes came under similar fire in 1888, opponents such as Abbott and McElhone asserting that Parkes's talk of 'grave crisis', and rushing an emergency Bill through the lower House in one day, was sheer pandering to popular demand when only a few hundred Chinese were involved.84 Another opponent, the merchant George Dibbs, accused Parkes of introducing far too feeble a Bill and of allowing a few Chinese actually to land; here it was Dibbs rather than Parkes who was playing the demagogue as Dibbs had earlier endeavoured to introduce low-wage Chinese seamen on to Australian ships.

In South Australia similar accusations flew gaily about. In 1881, in the Legislative Council, Hodgkins asserted that the Bill was 'a piece of clap-trap to catch the applause of a few opponents of the Chinese'; Scott went further, arguing that, while 'it is not surprising that ignorant persons of the working class, who look upon the Chinese as dangerous rivals in the labour market, should denounce and do all in their power by falsehoods or otherwise to prevent this industrious race coming to our shores . . . . it is most abominable that educated men, even members of Parliament (just to please the working-classes and obtain votes) should publish such false representations of their character, industry and usefulness'.85 Later, in 1888, the Playford-Kingston government was accused of bringing J. L. Parsons back from the Northern Territory, just in the nick of time to influence the Council elections by making rabid anti-Chinese speeches and causing demonstrations amongst Trade Unionists.86

In New Zealand there were persistent accusations that restrictive Bills were introduced shortly before elections, simply to catch
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the working class vote, 'a sop to the mob in obedience to popular clamour'\textsuperscript{87} Certainly there was some coincidence between the introduction of restrictive Bills and the timing of elections; and in the 1880s, with recession widespread and severe, the position of the Continuous Ministry was often somewhat shaky and their anti-Chinese opinions much more strongly in evidence than earlier.

In all this political back-biting there were two other political positions of importance. One was that expressed by Sir John Downer in South Australia over the Playford-Kingston government's 'panicky' and 'illegal' restrictions in the Northern Territory in 1888 and its introduction of the restriction Bill drafted by Kingston and others at the 1888 Intercolonial Conference. Downer, though basically in favour of restricting Chinese immigration into the Territory, was nevertheless dismayed at the way things were being handled, and at what he felt was the unnecessary severity of the proposed restrictions: in some circumstances, he argued, it might be necessary to curtail rights of entry and citizenship but 'we should go no further than the occasion requires (lest) we voluntarily invite an attack and create a bitterness which is absolute unnecessary';\textsuperscript{88} or as he put it a few days later: every nation has the right of prohibiting any other nation from landing on its shores but this must be done in a decent and civilised way.\textsuperscript{89} This is the pragmatic philosophy of the common-sense conservative statesman and has been expressed by numbers of moderate Australian conservatives ever since, notably by Robert Menzies and Harold Holt in 1949 when attacking the efforts of the Chifley-Calwell Labor government to expel a few hundred Asians who had been admitted as refugees early in World War II and had made permanent homes there (to be discussed in a subsequent volume). It was also the policy of the Barton-Deakin government early in the first years of the Australian Commonwealth in admitting Asian students and families; a concession at once stopped when the Labor Party became strong enough to influence immigration policy. It has also appeared from time to time in North America, as in the views of Senator Platt (Connecticut) and others when opposing the American Restrictive Bill of 1882, on the grounds that it went well beyond restriction, which might truly be desirable, and was quite unnecessarily aiming at complete exclusion.
Another position of interest is that affirming that the general public was so worked up about the Chinese that there would be serious outbreaks of anti-Chinese rioting if restrictions were not introduced. This became the view of some political leaders in America during the 1870s and 1880s when anti-Chinese demonstrations became common and outbreaks of violence not infrequent. Certainly many anti-Chinese leaders did their best to foster this view, as when the leaders of the great demonstration in San Francisco in 1870 sent a written warning to the heads of Chinese Six Companies stating, 'we do not consider it just to us, or safe to the Chinamen to continue coming to the United States, and request them [the Companies] to give such notice to the public authorities of the Chinese Empire'. Sometimes this behaviour overreached itself: the riots and killings of the early 1870s, for instance so horrified many easterners, and indeed many Californians, that they started calling not for restrictions on Chinese immigration but for strong measures against lawless whites. But in the long run those outbreaks were undoubtedly effective, as is clear from the rapid action of Peking, after the series of violent outbreaks in the western states in 1885, in negotiating a new Chinese-American treaty to reduce numbers, avert causes of danger and preserve lives.

These events did not go unnoticed in Australasia, even the lesser troubles of the 1870s and the constant insults and pin-pricking in between outbreaks. Charles Mein, when introducing the 1877 Bill into the Queensland Legislative Council, referred to the American experience and forecast similar 'collision' between Chinese and Europeans in the gold-fields if restrictions were not applied at once. In New Zealand, Reeves introduced his 1878 motion for restriction by reading extracts from Lights and Shades of San Francisco, concluding that California was already demoralised and that there had already been so much trouble that 'we may before very long expect to hear that there has been frightful bloodshed and loss of life in the State of California'. Two years later the Attorney-General, F. Whitaker, admitted that though the Chinese in California did not start the fighting and brawling 'these disturbances seemed to be the necessary result of placing the two races together'.

Partly because of this American experience, and partly because
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in their own colonies there were petitions, public meetings, and rumours of preparations for white violence, some politicians felt that public order required restrictions, even though they themselves had no particular wish to reduce the inflow of Chinese. This is particularly clear in 1881. In New South Wales Reid said somewhat ruefully that he was supporting the Bill because the dissatisfaction and violence resulting from unrestricted immigration tended to degrade the character of the whole community; no people, he concluded, were more generous and enlightened than those of New South Wales, and the fact that they were so upset and ready for violence showed the nature of their conception of the evil threatening them. Likewise in South Australia Pearce supported the government against the tropical developers saying that he had seen the Chinese ill-treated in Victoria, that the government must protect the Adelaide Chinese against local larrikins, but that as under the proposed Act only a few Chinese would be entering this should be possible. These views undoubtedly had some effect on the passing of the 1881 Bills.

The fears of 1881 were largely anticipatory and quite moderately, even sadly, expressed. Fears of quite another kind were involved in the Afghan crisis of 1888. A large public meeting in the Melbourne Town Hall agitated for drastic action but were placated by the government’s action in persuading the Afghan to continue on to Sydney without landing any Chinese in Melbourne. Fears that some of these were transhipping for New Zealand led to the Vigilante Committee of Invercargill and stirred the somewhat lethargic Continuous Ministry into immediate legislative action. When the Afghan reached Sydney a few days later a great crowd milled around Parliament House, accompanying the delegation sent to urge the Premier, Henry Parkes, to prevent the Chinese landing and to introduce an immediate exclusion Bill; according to Parkes some got into the building, crowded the corridors and tried to force their way into a sitting of the Legislative Assembly. Though Parkes claimed that his judgment was not unduly swayed by all this, it is quite plain that he and his Ministers were very much influenced by the excitement of the mob and the possibility of violence; hence their decision not only to avoid bloodshed by holding the Chinese aboard for a while but also, instead of letting
those with proper entry permits land elsewhere or later on, when things were quieter, to ‘get rid of the trouble altogether’ by virtually prohibiting further landing of any Chinese. Though there was nothing like the great rioting in western America in 1885, the events for 1888 showed that some Australasian governments could be forced into rapid action by large-scale assemblies and threats of violence against the Chinese.

This fear of disorder and violence, and rapid action to placate the mob with restrictive legislation, is the last of the major forces involved in virtually excluding Chinese by the late 1880s. Though the precise interrelationship of all these forces is difficult to unravel it seems, in general terms, that there was in all the new young countries concerned a deep underlying ignorance, intolerance and fear of a people that remained strange, separate and highly resistant to assimilation: and that this resulted in gross exaggeration about the extent of the ‘invasion’, the threat to living standards, the dangers of a new slavery, and the seriousness of disease, vice and criminality. But ignorance, intolerance and fear, even when quite irrational, are powerful social forces, capable of producing prolonged political campaigns, mass demonstrations and real possibilities of rioting, murder and destruction. Strong military or police action could doubtless have prevented major outbreaks, but many of the police, military and political leaders were themselves victims of the fever of the times and either welcomed the opportunity for further restrictive action or else acquiesced in it as an unfortunate necessity. As a result, or so it seems to later eyes, some governments overreacted and introduced restrictions that were unnecessarily severe. The fact that complete absence of restrictions in Tasmania and the Northern Territory of South Australia until the late 1880s produced no more than 7000 Chinese as a temporary maximum in the latter and fewer than 1000 in the former, despite considerable governmental encouragement for part of the time, shows that where legislatures refused to be stampeded the outcome was by no means catastrophic; similarly the relatively mild restrictions of New Zealand proved quite capable of keeping Chinese numbers down to 5000 or fewer all through the 1880s and 1890s.

This, then, seems to be the basic motif: the clash of very different peoples at times and places where marked social differences
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were not acceptable. On the one hand was a people from an ancient, oriental, and basically very stable civilisation, with their particular value system deeply engrained and their first loyalty to the villages and lineages in their land of origin: on the other hand were peoples from a western civilisation undergoing all the changes associated with industrialisation, with all the restless, inquisitive, acquisitive traits of the times, striving to find a new identity and quite intolerant of anyone unwilling to join with them in the search. No wonder the conflict and no wonder the outcome, despite the efforts of liberal-humanitarians to avert it.

The upshot of all this was that by the late 1880s the white countries of the Pacific had either virtually prohibited, or else imposed heavy restrictions on, traditional Chinese immigration, the controls being toughest in the United States, New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and South Australia and somewhat milder, because based on an earlier pattern, in British Columbia, Western Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand.

To these controls were certain exemptions. All countries exempted officials of the Chinese government and Chinese seamen in port with their ships. The United States also exempted merchants, ministers of religion, students and tourists, which New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia were quite prepared to do, under their 1888-9 powers of general exemption, once Great Britain had negotiated a Treaty similar to that under discussion between China and the United States. Till that time, and in fact the Treaty never eventuated, merchants and others had to take their chance of obtaining places amongst the select few admitted under the 500 ton shipping restrictions. In British Columbia, New Zealand and Tasmania, with their milder legislation, merchants and others had easier entry.

There was also considerable difference in government policy to the family life of the Chinese immigrants. Except in Tasmania, no provision was made for the entry of wives—they simply had the same chances of entry as anyone else. In fact, with Chinese traditional values so strong, there was little attempt to bring wives and children—as evidence Tasmania where, despite absence of restrictions, there were in 1891 only sixty-three females (some being children) in a total Chinese population of 1056. This fits with
Cuthbert's plea to the Legislative Council in Victoria in 1888 not to press their suggestion of exempting wives from restriction as the Chinese headmen in Melbourne were not in favour of it. The immigrants' main commitment here was still to the lineage in Kwantung—where nearly all the wives stayed to maintain family status—and to the system of commuter migration arising from this separation from families. United States Congressmen, and those Australian statesmen attending the 1888 Intercolonial Conference, were quite determined to smash this system—hence the Scott Act of 1888 preventing the return to the United States of any Chinese labourer or tradesman, unless he had left family or property there, and the draft bill of the Australasian Intercolonial Conference of 1888 refusing exemption to Chinese residents of Australasia wishing to come back after a visit to China. In the event, though the United States stuck to its firm line, the Australasian legislatures would not go all the way with their leaders; South Australia, Western Australia (and Tasmania with its old 1887 law) allowed complete freedom of movement to all Chinese residents; New South Wales, Victoria and New Zealand exempted those naturalised in the colony; Queensland, most rigid of all, exempted only those born in the colony. As New South Wales and Victoria granted no further naturalisations after 1888 (New South Wales by law and Victoria by administrative decision) the system pressed most heavily on Chinamen resident in eastern Australia; there commuter migration was restricted to the very few already naturalised and the few able to return under the 500 tons restriction.

This matter was closely connected with another problem, non-existent in the United States but of considerable importance to British colonies, namely, the rights and privileges of British subjects moving about within the British empire. The 1881 legislation, except in New Zealand, exempted British subjects from the restrictions, but by 1888 it seemed clear that many Chinese immigrants had been either born or naturalised in British territories such as Hongkong and Singapore and therefore possessed British citizenship. Amidst much heart-burning—especially in men like Parkes, with his great emphasis on the British background—the colonies eventually decided that racial homogeneity and national unity were more important than British citizenship, and that Chinese remained
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eternally Chinese no matter what their citizenship was. Tasmania and Western Australia continued to exempt British subjects but elsewhere the colonies abolished all privileges for British Chinese (apart from those born or naturalised in the colony) except in New South Wales where a compromise was effected exempting persons who were British by birth. It was nearly a century before Britain, faced with the massive immigration of British Indians and British West Indians, was forced to a similar decision.

On this issue then, as on Treaty relations between Great Britain and China, the colonies became quite adamant: they would defend their right to decide the composition of their own populations against all comers, including the mother country. On this, some persons with republican leanings, and even some loyal to the Crown, felt so strongly that they were prepared to break with the United Kingdom. In New South Wales, McElhone stated outright that if Great Britain objected to Australian restrictive laws then the colonies should break free; the United States, he added, had had far less cause than this to break away. In 1888 Buchanan heartily approved the sentiments, expressed by some speakers at the public meeting over the Afghan, in favour of breaking away from the British Empire; especially as Westminster, he held, had been deplorably slow in replying to correspondence and had showed itself quite insensitive to colonial feelings. Parkes himself was content with saying that ‘with the most earnest desire to preserve the integrity of the Empire, with as loyal a feeling to Her Majesty the Queen as any other man amongst her subjects . . . . [I feel nevertheless] we must be loyal to ourselves . . . . [There is] one law that overrides all others, and that is the law of preserving the peace and welfare of civil society . . . . Neither for Her Majesty's ships of war, nor for Her Majesty's representative on the spot, nor for the Secretary of State for Colonies, do we intend to turn aside from our purpose, which is to terminate the landing of Chinese on our shores for ever’.2

In fact Great Britain was not nearly so unsympathetic as many colonists, and some later historians, thought. As in the earlier period she recognised the unusually difficult position of the Australasian colonies and was ‘as anxious as any of the Colonial Governments to secure that proper checks shall be put upon this Chinese
immigration, and proper precautions taken to prevent these Colonies from being swamped by it'. She certainly had no intention of becoming involved in a major row with the colonies, let alone in a Second War of Independence, just to go all the way in meeting requests from the Chinese Empire. In the event she agreed to negotiate another Treaty with China if China agreed, and to ratify all the colonial restrictive laws provided Queensland modified the unnecessarily severe penalties imposed on any international shipping which unwittingly or unavoidably broke the restrictions; she also asked Parkes to reconsider the very heavy landing tax imposed by New South Wales but, when Parkes refused, agreed to ratify the Bill as it stood. Britain's main concern was that a way be found to achieve what the colonies wanted without causing China to lose too much face; hence Lord Knutsford's 1888 suggestion that the colonies pass laws restricting all working class immigration and then use powers of exemption to admit any peoples felt to be useful and assimilable. This suggestion, to be put more forcefully a few years later, was rejected by the Intercolonial Conference on the grounds that the colonies intended not only to keep Chinese immigrants out but also to make their objectives quite plain. Again Westminster let things go.

In all this Great Britain was considerably more sympathetic to the colonies than was Washington or Ottawa to California or British Columbia, at any rate for many years. It was not till 1882 and 1885 that Washington and Ottawa eventually acted against Chinese immigration, and then only after rejecting request after request from the Pacific states.

As in the earlier period these delays resulted in much local anger and dismay, and this, when added to the fear and hostility already felt against the Chinese, resulted in the great battery of discriminatory laws. In the 1870s and 1880s, however, California was much less successful than in earlier years, mainly because the Burlingame Treaty, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act encouraged Chinese, through the agency of the Six Companies in San Francisco, to challenge each discriminatory law fairly quickly and have it invalidated by a federal court. Almost every major discriminatory law or ordinance passed by state or municipal authority received this treatment, the main exception
being the 1880 law requiring Chinese children to be educated at separate schools. In like manner most British Columbian discriminatory laws were invalidated—as being in breach of the federal power over immigration—the major ones surviving being those denying Chinese the provincial vote and the right to purchase crown land. Though there was still much informal discrimination against the Chinese of western America, and many frightening cases of insult and assault by gangs of white hoodlums, the Chinese were protected from much earlier discrimination by the federal courts, and on the whole fared better. The steady increase of the Chinese population is evidence that conditions were not so unpleasant as to reduce immigration drastically and drive existing residents away. Indeed, it is true to say that the principal discriminatory measures were not local but federal in origin, notably the 1870 refusal of Congress to extend naturalisation to Mongolians.

In Australasia, with restrictive entry laws relatively easy to pass, internal discrimination was much less of an issue. The first major discrimination prevented entry to new gold-fields until European miners had had ample opportunity to take the first pickings (Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia), in 1882 extended by Queensland, and in 1888 by New South Wales, to cover all mining. The second major discrimination lay in denial of the right to vote (Victoria and the Northern Territory), or else denial of naturalisation either by law (New South Wales) or practice (Victoria, South Australia): Queensland and New Zealand practised minor discrimination in naturalisation, the former by confining it to non-Europeans with freehold land and the latter charging Chinese a higher fee for the privilege.

Basically these discriminatory measures were not meant to 'harass' the normal Chinese immigrant, or render his life so miserable that he would leave the colony, but expressed two basic Australasian reactions. First, it was the gold-fields that had attracted the Chinese in the first place, and in such numbers that they had seemed to present a real danger, and it was therefore in the gold-fields that one had to implement controls supplementing the main restrictive entry laws. Second, it seemed so apparent that the Chinese were unassimilable aliens, who could never understand European
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systems of values and government, that it was pointless to give them citizenship or the vote; those few who did acquire some European notions and customs could be naturalised and enfranchised by special Act of Parliament; as was the custom for all applications for citizenship in the days before Aliens and Nationality Acts. The denial of citizenship also expressed the anger of some colonies at the practice of some naturalised Chinese sending their certificates to China for the use of a relative who wanted to enter the colony but could not get through the restrictions.

The main point, however, was not the amount of discrimination—though in fact it was relatively slight, except the denial of citizenship in the United States, New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria. The main point is that by the late 1880s the young white societies of the Pacific had rejected the liberal-humanitarian argument of basic human similarity and equality and had definitely decided that the Chinese were unassimilable, that they were a positive hindrance to the process of nation-building, and that with a few exceptions their immigration should be stopped completely. In some places—notably Tasmania, New Zealand and British Columbia—liberal-humanitarian forces were somewhat stronger and the restrictions somewhat less severe, but restrictions existed even there. The major victory achieved by the liberal-humanitarians, here finding themselves in alliance with the moderate restrictionists, was to stand firm against all attempts to expel Chinese already resident in the country. This refusal at first annoyed extremer groups—as witness California's attempt to expel Chinese in 1891, well after the Scott Act of 1888—but gradually became acceptable when the restrictions on commuter migration and the continued drain of Chinese to rejoin their families in Kwantung and their non-replacement by new immigrants, steadily began to reduce the resident Chinese population.

This decision, not to expel but to prevent further entry, marks the end of an era, that of traditional Chinese migration to the developing economies of the new world. It also marks the beginning of another era, the extension of restrictions to other non-Europeans. Once having worked out a case against one non-European nation these white societies apparently found it impossible to refrain from

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extending it to similar nations, even though one of these—Japan—was rapidly becoming an industrialised military power not unlike those of Europe itself. When this happened it became truly possible to speak of a White Canada, White America, White Australia or White New Zealand Policy.
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<td>817</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,312</td>
<td>18,166</td>
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<td><strong>Total Canada</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>4,383</td>
<td>16,600</td>
<td>17,312</td>
<td>27,774</td>
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<td>New South Wales</td>
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<td>12,988</td>
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<td>10,222</td>
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<td>Victoria</td>
<td>25,424</td>
<td>24,732</td>
<td>17,826</td>
<td>11,959</td>
<td>8,489</td>
<td>6,347</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>939</td>
<td>506</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>347</td>
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<td>287</td>
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<td>Northern Territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>1,521</td>
<td>1,812</td>
<td>1,325</td>
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<td>Queensland</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>3,305</td>
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<td>7,672</td>
<td>5,995</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Australia</strong></td>
<td>27,272</td>
<td>38,348</td>
<td>28,631</td>
<td>38,533</td>
<td>35,821</td>
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<td>22,754</td>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2,641</td>
<td>4,950</td>
<td>4,384</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>2,630</td>
<td>3,116</td>
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**Notes:**
- a estimates
- b areas later to be Queensland shown under Queensland

For U.S.A. figures are census statistics of race; for Canada origin; for Australia full-blood Chinese.
Notes

Preface


3. For other examples see P. V. Tobias, The Meaning of Race, Johannesburg, 1961.


Chapter 1


8. Ibid.


14. 'Malay' is here used in the broad sense to cover both proto-Malay and deutero-Malay.

15. In the years 1959-66 net Filipino emigration averaged each year some 3000 to the United States, seven to New Zealand and 105 to Australia; since Australia's easier entry policy (1966) these numbers have changed to some 15,000 to the United States, fifty to New Zealand and 400 to Australia.

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Chapter One—continued


18. Various estimates exist for the United States, some relating to the 'quota' and 'national origins' debates in the 1920s. My figures are designed not for precision but to indicate the large north-western European element and the approximate contribution of British stock.


Chapter Two


12. Ibid., p. 676.


16. For example Sir William Molesworth, the prominent 'Colonial Reformer' to the House of Commons Committee on Transportation, pp. 1837-8, Vol. 22.


21. Ibid., pp. 15, 27.


23. Report from Select Committee on Asiatic Labor, 1854, N.S.W. L.C. *V.* & *P.* 1854 (2), p. 944 (p. 18 of Minutes).

24. Ibid., evidence of George Sandeman, pastoralist of Moreton Bay, pp. 6-7 (Minutes).

25. Ibid.


27. Letters of Burton to Sir Henry Pottinger 16/1/52 and to Colonial Secretary, N.S.W., 27/1/52 and letter of N.S.W. Immigration
Chapter Two—continued

Agent (H. H. Browne) to Colonial Secretary, N.S.W., 15/6/52, N.S.W. L.C. V. & P. 1852(2), pp. 211-19; Willard, *White Australia Policy*, p. 8, n. 29.


29. Browne, letter of 15/6/62—see note 27 above.

30. Evidence to Committee (note 28).


32. Precise statistics, by area, are given for persons of Indian race in the Victorian census (188 males, 16 females) and for person of Indian birth in Victorian, Queensland and N.S.W. censuses; a rough estimate for persons of Indian race in N.S.W. and Queensland may be derived by applying the proportion of Indian race/Indian birth in Victoria to the Indian birth figures of N.S.W. and Queensland.


34. Lowe to Legislative Council, N.S.W., 1/10/1847, reported *S.M.H.*, 2/10/1847, p. 2, cols. 3, 4.


39. Earl Grey to Fitzroy, 29/7/48, *H.R.A.* Series 1(26), pp. 524-5. For the somewhat spectacular career of Boyd, his bankruptcy, his attempt to retrieve his fortunes by taking himself and his Pacific island crew to the Californian gold diggings in 1849, his attempt to found a ‘Papual Republic’ in 1851, and his death at Guadalcanal, see Watson, ‘Benjamin Boyd’, and C. P. Walsh ‘Benjamin Boyd’, *A.D.B.*, Vol. I. Boyd has received harsh treatment by most historians, most completely ignoring the evidence in his favour produced by his partner Robinson in the Legislative Council, 1/10/47 (see *S.M.H.*, 2/10/47).


42. Towns to Committee on Asiatic Labor, 1854, N.S.W. L.C. V. & P. 1854(2), pp. 11-12 of Evidence; also Willard, *White Australia Policy*, pp. 11-12.

43. Wang, ‘The Organization of Chinese Emigration’, has carefully checked records of ships
Notes for pages 46 to 57

arriving in Sydney, etc., and reports of emigration from Amoy, and produces totals somewhat lower than mine. When taking into account emigration via Hong Kong and other ports than Amoy, and the imperfect recording of ships arriving at smaller ports in Australia, my estimate seems reasonable.

44. Sandeman to Committee on Asiatic Labor, 1854, N.S.W. L.C. V. & P. 1854(2), pp. 6-8 of Evidence; also Willard, White Australia Policy, pp. 11-12.

45. Committee on Asiatic Labor, 1854, N.S.W. L.C. V. & P. 1854(2), pp. 1 of Evidence.

46. People’s Advocate, Sydney, quoted Campbell, Chinese Coolie Emigration, pp. 57-8.

47. Report of Committee on Asiatic Labor, 1854, N.S.W. L.C. V. & P. 1854(2), questions asked Shortrede and Sandeman, pp. 1-6 of Evidence.

48. Ibid., pp. 3-5 of Report.


50. See various statements in recent years by the Australian Council of Churches.

51. With apologies to the stimulating phrases of W. K. Hancock, Australia, London, 1930, chapter 3.

52. Lowe to Legislative Council, S.M.H., 2/10/1847, p. 2, col. 3.


55. For the northern settlements and the numerous reasons for their failure, see A. Grenfell Price, History and Problems of the Northern Territory, Adelaide, 1930, pp. 3-6; for a discussion of European capacity to colonise tropical areas see A. Grenfell Price, White Settlers in the Tropics, New York, 1939.

Chapter Three


2. Ibid., p. 46.

3. Ibid., passim; Gunther Barth, Bitter Strength, p. 23.


5. Ibid., p. 7.

6. Ibid., p. 53.


10. Details of the Australian commuting system will appear in a subsequent volume.


12. Ibid., p. 83.

13. Freedman supports the connection, ibid., p. 95.
Chapter Three—continued


15. Ibid., pp. 40-4.

16. Ibid., p. 94.


18. Ibid., p. 7.


20. Ibid., p. 31; Barth, *Bitter Strength*, p. 25.


27. Ibid., p. 193.


31. Ibid., p. 45.

32. Ibid.


34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., p. 22; Sandmeyer, *Anti-Chinese Movement in California*, p. 44.

37. Ibid., p. 21.


40. For example, Paul, 'Origin of the Chinese Issue', pp. 188, 191; Sandmeyer, *Anti-Chinese Movement in California*, also gives and explains estimates made later by the Immigration Commission and Bureau of Immigration; they differ little from the San Francisco figures.


Notes for pages 68 to 71


44. Serle says nearly 3000, but of the 3500 or so Chinese in Victoria a few hundred were in the pastoral areas, some 500 in Melbourne and a few in Geelong, and several hundreds mining in the Ballarat and Castlemaine areas. The distribution of 'pagans' in the religious tables of the Victorian Census of 26/4/54 gives, in default of statistics of race or birthplace, some guide to the Chinese distribution.

45. See note 47.

46. The revolutionary role of Americans in the Australian gold-fields and the dangers of an American-type republican movement, have sometimes been exaggerated; see F. Daniel and Annette Potts, 'American Republicanism and the Disturbances on the Victorian Goldfields'. Historical Studies 13(50):145-64, April 1968.


50. Ibid.

51. Legislative Council, 23/5/55, 30/5/55, reported in The Age, 24/5/55, 31/5/55. For the classification of members into liberals, democrats, conservatives, etc., see Serle, Golden Age, p. 259.

52. This suggestion came from A. Fyfe (democrat) to the Council, 30/5/55. Exclusionists included numbers of conservatives, liberals and democrats.

53. Serle, Golden Age, p. 324; W. Bate, records of Ballarat, pers. comm.

54. Serle, Golden Age, p. 322.

55. Governor Hotham to Colonial Office, No. 80 of 15/6/55, and minute of Elliott theron, C.O. 309/33.

56. Several hundred died while others arrived very weak and ill at Ballarat, Hood to Legislative Council, 3/6/57 (The Age, 4/6/57); W. Bate, records of Ballarat, 57A/7231, 7309 (Oct. 1857), pers. comm.

57. Petitions of 5000 Chinese at Bendigo, and other Chinese at Ballarat, to Legislative Assembly, L.A. V.P.D. 1856-7, pp. 27, 52; debates on repeal in Assembly 9/12/56, 14/1/57, 3/2/57; Serle, Golden Age, p. 329.

58. L.A. V.P.D. 1411/57, p. 266.

Chapter Three—continued

61. Serle, Golden Age, p. 325.
67. Ibid., p. IV.
69. Government estimates, ibid.
70. Ibid.
74. Forster to Legislative Council, S.A.P.D. 7/5/61, p. 57; the debate continued on 14/5, 26/9, 5/11/61.
77. Debate in Legislative Council, Committee stage, on cl. 8, 10, S.M.H., 23/12/52, especially speeches of W. C. Wentworth.
78. Ibid., 8/9/56.
80. Ibid., 11/11/57.
81. Ibid., 20/3/58, p. 5.
82. Legislative Assembly debates, reported ibid., 10/4/58, 21/5/58, 19/6/58, 25/6/58, 3/7/58.
83. For example, miners meeting at Bathurst, ibid., 13/4/58; petitions from Meroo and Rocky River goldfields, N.S.W. L.A. V. & P. 1858(1), p. 818, petitions of 30/6/58, 10/8/58.
84. Petition from Sydney persons, ibid.
85. N.S.W. L.C. reported S.M.H., 22/7/58, 29/7/58.
86. N.S.W. L.C. Journal 1858(3), Report tabled 16/9/58.
87. N.S.W. L.C. reported S.M.H., 13/10/58, 30/10/58, especially Docker, Isaacs, Thompson.
88. Interview with Henry Leau Appa, ibid., 6/7/58, Q.298-310; (Appa uses the alternative forms of Akbar for Hakka and Pontes for Cantonese).
89. Brackenbury, a Gold-Fields Warden from Victoria, told the Council’s Select Committee that
the ‘headmen’ were probably those who had advanced the money and had come to protect their interests, Report 8/5/58, Q.13, p. 338. I prefer the evidence of the Chinese merchants Leau Appa (Report 6/8/58, Q.9-10, pp. 344-5, and interview with S.M.H., 30/6 and 6/7/58, Q.255-8) and Chin Ateak (Report 10/8/58, Q.60-81, p. 349) which suggest that merchants usually remained in China, or in Sydney and Melbourne, and appointed agents in the fields; this fits with the more general evidence of the credit-ticket system, see Campbell, Chinese Coolie Emigration and also Wang, ‘Chinese Emigration’, p. 86.

90. For example, report of Chinese moving in and out of Bathurst, S.M.H., 1/9/58.
91. Ibid., 26/5/58, quoting Bathurst Free Press, 22/6/58; reports from correspondents at Ironbark and Wellington diggings.
92. Ibid., 1/9/58, from Bathurst Free Press.
93. Ibid., 19/6/58, from Bathurst Free Press.
94. Ibid., 12/1/57, 4/4/57.
95. Ibid., 19/6/58.
96. For example, Rocky River, ibid., 18/6/58.
97. Ibid., 22/6/58.
99. Cowper to Legislative Assembly, re cl. 3, S.M.H., 2/5/61, p. 3.

1. Lucas, D. Buchanan, Caldwell, Dalgleish, T. Garrett, Gray, Hoskins, George Markham, all in the Assembly.
5. Kemp, ibid., 10/10/61.
7. Piddington, ibid., 6/4/61 re cl. 4 (3 speeches) and 7.
8. For example, Docker and Johnson, ibid., 3/5/61.
12. Robertson 12/3/61 in Assembly and 2/5/61 in Council; Cowper in Assembly 1/5/61 re cl. 4, Goldfields Bill.
17. Lucas Bill rejected 2/5/61, Cowper Bill accepted by Council with minor amendments 9/5/61 (No. 4 of 22/11/61).
18. For a full description see D. L. Carrington, ‘The Gold Rushes...
Notes for pages 85 to 96

Chapter Three—continued
of New South Wales 1851-74',
M.A. thesis, Australian National
University, 1960.

19. Petitions of various Chinese, of
European miners at Rocky River,
Sofala, Hanging Rock and Major's
Creek, of residents of Sydney
and suburbs, N.S.W. L.A. V. & P.
1861-2(2), pp. 1-11, 801-13;
1862(4), pp. 9-27.

20. Manning and Kemp, cl. 9, S.M.H.,
17/10/61.

21. Forster to Legislative Assembly
(3R of Bill), ibid., 27/9/61, p. 4;
for more of Forster see Bede
Nairn’s article in A.D.B., Vol. 4.

22. Newcastle to Governor Young
26/2/62, N.S.W. L.A. V. & P.

23. G. L. Buxton, The Riverina
214, 219-31.

24. Carrington, ‘Gold Rushes of
N.S.W.’, p. 178.

25. Ibid., p. 179.


27. N.S.W. L.A. V. & P. 1863-4(3),
pp. 1133-4; of thirty odd
signatories four were Chinese,
two being Henry Leau Appa
and Chin Ateak.

28. N.S.W. L.A. V. & P. 1862-6(2),
p. 233.

29. In L.A., S.M.H., Lucas 15/8/66,
21/9/67, 5/10/67, Garrett 15/8/66,
4/10/67, Donnelly 15/8/66,

30. In L.A., ibid., Lang 15/8/66,
21/9/67, Forster 15/8/66,
Piddington, 5/10/67, Forlonger
15/8/66.

31. Parkes in L.A., ibid., 15/8/66,
21/9/67.


33. R. Stewart, ibid., 21/9/67.

Chapter Four

1. Hodgson in Legislative Assembly,
S.M.H., 26/5/58.

2. Bolton, A Thousand Miles Away,
p. 72.


4. Ibid., 10/6/62.

5. Ibid., 18/6/62, debate in
Legislative Assembly.

6. Ibid., 26/6/62.

7. Ibid., 17/5/61, debate in
Legislative Assembly on 2R.


9. Nelson Examiner, 19, 22/8/57,
quoted Fyfe ‘Chinese Migration
to N.Z.’, pp. 11-12.


11. Fyfe, ‘Chinese Migration to N.Z.’,
pp. 14-22.

12. P. R. May, The West Coast Gold

pp. 23-4, G. H. Scholefield and
T. D. H. Hall, ‘ Asiatic
Immigration in New Zealand: its
History and Legislation’, Proceed­
ings of the Institute of Pacific
Relations, Honolulu 1927, p. 4.

14. Otago Daily Times, 17/8/71,
quoted Fyfe, ‘Chinese Migration
to N.Z.’, p. 25.

15. Ibid., pp. 46-7.

29/8/71, p. 150.

17. Scholefield ‘ Asiatic Immigration
in N.Z.’, p. 4; Fyfe, ‘Chinese
Migration to N.Z.’, p. 25.

18. Ibid., pp. 29-31.

19. For example, those miners
described by W. B. Cheadle,
Journal of a Trip across Canada,
1862-3, Ottawa, 1931, including

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Miller and Stenhouse, the latter a former stage-coach driver in Australia (26 and 29/10/62).


21. The 1545 given in the ‘quasi-census of 1870’ (see Canada Census 1870-1, Vol. 4, pp. 376ff.) seems too low when compared with the quite conservative estimates of 1864 and 1874 (2500 and 3000), these being based largely on Chinese estimates which, in their turn, were much lower than other estimates, e.g. the 6000 given in the Legislature in 1874. I have taken 3000 as a reasonable compromise.


25. Ibid.

**Chapter Five**


4. Ibid.


8. R. Owen, barrister and judge, N.S.W. L.A., *S.M.H.*, 3/7/58 (3R); for these and later references to violence in S.E. Asia see Purcell, *Chinese in S.E. Asia*, pp. 247, 368, 530, especially the Chinese uprising in Sarawak, 1857.


15. For example, Colley to *S.M.H.*, 13/7/58.

Chapter Five—continued
Sandmeyer. *Anti-Chinese Movement in California*, p. 44.


19. Governor Hotham, Victoria, see chapter 3, note 49 above; Cowper, N.S.W. L.A., *S.M.H.* 10/4/58 moving 2R; Douglass, N.S.W. L.C., *S.M.H.* 29/7/58, motion re Select Committee. This point became of great importance later in California, see chapter 6, section 2.


23. For N.Z. see chapter 4, section 2 above; for California see Sandmeyer, *Anti-Chinese Movement*, p. 44.

24. Griffith to Legislative Council (Victoria), *Age*, 31/5/55; Magarey, chapter 3 note 75 above.


38. Plunkett to N.S.W. L.C., ibid., 17/10/67; Aaron to Select Committee on Chinese Immigration, N.S.W. L.C., *Journal* 1858, p. 351, Q.35ff.
42. Senate Journal 1862, quoted Sandmeyer, *Anti-Chinese Movement in California*, p. 44.
44. N.S.W. L.A., ibid., 19/6/58, 9/3/61.
50. Select Committee on Chinese Immigration, N.S.W. L.C. *Journal* 1858, evidence of Daly, Q.8-9, 58, p. 331-2; Brackenbury, Q.49, p. 339; Ingelow, Q.18; Daly, Q.92, p. 333; Brackenbury, Q.41-4, p. 339; Daly, Q.81, p. 333.
56. Chapter 4, note 9 above.
58. Magarey, ibid.
60. N.S.W. L.C., S.M.H., 17/10/67, p. 2.
61. N.S.W. L.C., ibid., 29/7/58, p. 5.
Chapter Five—continued


64. Miller, *Unwelcome Immigrant*.


68. For interesting articles on parts of this issue see Bruce C. Mansfield, 'The Origins of "White Australia"', *Australian Quarterly* 26(4): 61-8, Dec. 1954, and Nairn, 'History of the White Australia Policy'.


70. Governor Hotham stressed this point to Westminster in 1855.


72. On this see the mental struggles, coming down in the end against Chinese naturalisation, of leaders such as Cowper and Parkes, N.S.W. L.A., on cl. 14, ibid., 15/4/61.

Chapter Six


5. Ibid., pp. 47-8.


20. Ibid., p. 55.


23. Ibid., pp. 96-7.


28. Ibid., pp. 144-5, 177, 191.
34. Ibid., pp. 25-6; Huang, *Legal Status of Chinese Abroad*, pp. 27, 103.
38. For these Acts see ibid., pp. 27-8, 232, 263; Woodsworth, *Canada and the Orient*, pp. 30-2.
40. Ibid., p. 35.
41. Ibid., pp. 28-9, 40-1.
43. Dufault, 'Chinese in the Mining Camps', p. 166.
47. Ibid., pp. 120ff.; Ormsby, *British Columbia*, p. 303.
48. Though the Manchu empire withdrew its prohibition against emigration in 1860 it was not enthusiastic about it until much later in the century.
52. Barth, *Bitter Strength*, pp. 84-5, 90.
53. Ibid., pp. 102-4.
55. Ibid., pp. 86, 99.
56. Reliable statistics of intermarriage do not exist for the nineteenth century; one can only argue from the occasional known cases of intermarriage, such as that between Dr Yung Wing and Mary Kellogg in 1876—see Kung, *Chinese in American Life*, p. 214.

**Chapter Seven**

1. Choi, 'Chinese Migration', p. 68; also Censuses of N.S.W. and Victoria, 1871-91.
Notes for pages 147 to 156

Chapter Seven—continued
3. Act No. 5, July 1862.
5. Ibid., p. 57; Queensland Census 2/3/68.
6. Notably ibid. See also Willard, History of the White Australia Policy; Bolton, Thousand Miles Away; Yarwood, Attitudes to Non-European Immigration.
8. King (Wide Bay), L.A. 28/12/71 Q.P.D., pp. 387-8; see also Hemmant, Lilley and O'Doherty 22, 28/11/71.
10. Ibid.
17. Correspondence with Ceylon and Mauritius 1874, S.A.P.P. 1875(3), No. 61.
For earlier negotiations and correspondence see ibid., No. 65; for arrangements for return see Rendell, 'Chinese in S.A. and the N. Territory', pp. 54-5.
19. Ibid., p. 55.
31. Censuses of Queensland, 1/1/64, 2/3/68.
32. Bolton, Thousand Miles Away, pp. 54-6; Willard, White Australia Policy, pp. 39-40; Censuses of Queensland.
34. Ibid., p. 56.
38. Gold Fields Amendment Act, No. 12 of 1877 and Chinese Immigrants Regulation Act, No. 8 of 1877.
39. A. H. Brown to Legislative Council, Q.P.D. 6/9/76, pp. 621-2; also 4/7/77, p. 85; see also Walsh to Legislative Assembly, 26/6/77, p. 348; W. Thornton to Legislative Council, 6/9/76, p. 623; and Gibbon to Legislative Council, 5/7/77, p. 691.
40. Murray-Prior to Legislative Council, Q.P.D. 6/9/76, p. 623; see also Heussler to Legislative Council, 6/9/76, pp. 623-4; and Hart to Legislative Council, 7/9/76, p. 635.
41. Hockings to Legislative Assembly, Q.P.D. 13/6/77, p. 251.
42. McLean and Bailey, Q.P.D. 3/8/76, pp. 377-9; Macrossan, 26/6/77, p. 357.
43. Mein to Legislative Council, Q.P.D. 6/9/76, p. 618.
44. Bailey to Legislative Assembly, Q.P.D. 13/6/77, p. 235; see also Thorn and Douglas to Legislative Assembly, 13/6/77, pp. 234, 245 and Douglas, 26/6/77, pp. 343-4.
45. Douglas to Legislative Assembly, Q.P.D. 26/6/77, p. 345; see also Macrossan to Legislative Assembly, 26/6/77, p. 356.
46. For example, Griffith to Legislative Assembly, Q.P.D. 13/6/77, p. 259.
50. Parnaby, Britain and the Labor Trade, p. 126.
55. Willard, White Australia Policy, pp. 51-6; Yarwood, Attitudes, pp. 82-8.
57. Meeting at Newtown, called by the Political Reform Union (Association) 20/12/78, quoted Yarwood, Attitudes, pp. 85-6.
62. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
63. For example, his reply to Cameron’s motion of 8/6/80 that another Chinese Bill be introduced as soon as possible, N.S.W.P.D., pp. 2701-2.
65. King (Minister of Education) and Bray’s reply, I.A. S.A.P.D. 28/7/80, pp. 529-30.
Chapter Seven—continued

68. For proceedings of Conference see S.A.P.P. 1881, 28(2) and S.M.H., 19, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28/1/81.
69. Memorial to Secretary of State for Colonies, Westminster, from the Colonial Secretary's Office, Sydney, 25/1/81, quoted Yarwood, Attitudes, pp. 90-1.
70. L.C. W.A.P.D. 29/3/81, p. 90.
71. Imported Labour Registry Act, No. 21 of 1882.
72. Tas. L.A. 13/10/81, reported in Hobart Mercury, 14/10/81.
75. Buik to Legislative Council, S.A.P.D. 19/7/81, p. 294; see also speeches of Baker and Scott at same time.
76. L.C. Speeches on 2R. and in Committee, S.A.P.D. 19/7/81, 10/8/81, 23/8/81, 30/8/81.
77. Bray to House of Assembly, S.A.P.D. 11/10/81, p. 1056 and 1/11/81, p. 1514; the Act was the Chinese Immigration Regulation Act, No. 213 of 18/11/81.
78. McColl, Williams, O'Loghlen, V.P.D. 4/10/81, pp. 222-3.
80. Campbell to Legislative Council, V.P.D. 20/12/81, p. 1243.
81. See speeches on 2R. in Legislative Council, V.P.D., Sladen 30/11/81, pp. 934-5, Balfour, Ross and Jenner 20/12/81, pp. 240-6.
82. Chinese Immigrants Statute Amendment Act, No. 723 of 24/12/81.
83. Parkes in 2R., N.S.W.P.D. 13/7/81, pp. 97, 100; also on 3R. 2/8/81, pp. 414-17.
84. Poole, South Sydney, N.S.W.P.D. 14/7/81, p. 149; see also Cameron and Melville 13/7/81, pp. 104-7, 119-22; Henson, Turner, Martin, Garrard and Beyers 14/7/81, the last speaking for rural labourers, pp. 160-71.
85. N.S.W.P.D.: Cameron and Fremlin 13/7/81, Poole and Trickett 14/7/81, pp. 105, 113, 149.
86. N.S.W.P.D.: Reid and Piggott 13/7/81, p. 122, Abigail, Henson and Trickett 14/7/81, pp. 141, 160, 169.
90. Suttor, L.C. N.S.W.P.D. 18/8/81, p. 691.
91. L.A. N.S.W.P.D. re cl. 2 21/7/81, pp. 263ff.; L.C. N.S.W.P.D. 18/8/81, pp. 683ff.


97. V.P.D.: Graves 8/6/81, p. 2575, Richardson 10/11/81, p. 700.


99. To Legislative Assembly, V.P.D. 10/11/81, p. 699. For similar if less extreme views see Berry, O'Loghlen, L. L. Smith, McColl, Graves 10/11/81, cl. 14, pp. 698-702.


2. Wrixon, V.P.D. 10/11/81, p. 700.

3. Abbott in Legislative Assembly, N.S.W.P.D. 27/7/81, p. 349.


17. Queensland Censuses.

18. Petition to the Assembly 1884, quoted Yarwood, Attitudes, pp. 60-1; Hamilton to Legislative Assembly, Q.P.D. 13/2/84, p. 348.

19. Attorney-General Rutledge and Colonial Treasurer Dickson in Legislative Assembly, Q.P.D. 13/2/84.


22. W.A. Gold Fields Act, No. 18 of August 1886, cl. 3; Chinese Immigration Restriction Act, No. 13 of July 1886.

23. For example, Grant, L.C. W.A.P.D. 21/9/85, pp. 365-6.


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28. For example, Moule to Legislative Assembly, S.A.P.D. 30/7/84, p. 448 and Hardy to Legislative Assembly, 21/7/86, pp. 465ff.


33. Lewis in Legislative Assembly and Moore in Legislative Council, Reports of these, and speeches referred to in notes 133-7 are in Hobart Mercury and Launceston Examiner.

34. For example, Scott in Legislative Council 26/10/87 re cl. 3 and Premier's speeches in Legislative Council 30/9/87, 26/10/87.

35. Hodgson, L.C. 26/10/87, re cl. 3.

36. Rooke, L.C. 30/9/87, 2R.

37. Rooke, L.C. 1/10/87, on 2R.

38. For example, Hamilton and Crowther, L.A. 20/9/87 on 2R.; also definition of a 'Chinese' as any 'male person' in cl. 1, Chinese Immigration Act, No. 9 of 1887.


40. Langridge and Deakin, L.A. V.P.D. 7/7/87, p. 301; see also Willard, White Australia Policy, p. 71.

41. Objectives of the League as reported in the Age, 27/10/87, quoted Oddie, 'Chinese in Victoria', p. 60.

42. For all this see ibid., pp. 55-70.


44. Ibid., pp. 63-4.


46. Statistics given by the Resident or Territory Reports are not always consistent or easy, and appear here as estimates only.


Notes for pages 192 to 198


64. Chinese Immigration Restriction Bill Amendment Act, No. 22, 1888, proclaimed 5/2/90 and Chinese Immigration Restriction Act Amendment Act, No. 29, 1890, proclaimed 16/1/91.


66. Ibid., also Walker, p. 2367.

67. L.C. Committee V.P.D. 18/12/88, cl. 4.

68. L.C. and L.A. V.P.D. 20/12/88 before and after conference of two sub-committees. The Bill became law as the Chinese Immigration Restriction Act No. 42 of 22/12/88.


73. Parkes, Fifty Years, p. 490.


75. Chinese Restriction and Regulation Act No. 4 of 1888.

Chapter Seven—continued

77. References to the decision are in certain parliamentary debates, e.g. *S.A.P.D.* 10/91, p. 1468, and 8/98, pp. 1004-5.

78. For annual naturalisations, and policy thereto, see colonial Year Books and Statistical Registers.

Chapter Eight

1. Net gain from migration with Australia 1871-80 was only 7005 but the total movement was eight times as great; see W. D. Borrie, ‘Immigration to New Zealand since 1854’, M.A. thesis, University of New Zealand, 1939, p. 456.

2. In the early 1860s the Maori population totalled some 50,000, about one-third of the total population.

3. Abolition of Provinces Act, No. 21, 1875.


5. Fyfe, ‘Chinese Migration to New Zealand’, Appendix 2—approximately 100 Chinese in each city by 1881.


8. Ibid., p. 419.


11. Grey to House of Representatives, *N.Z.P.D.* 15/6/81, p. 72. He could, of course, have been trying to be ironic.


17. Ibid.


19. Hutchison, *N.Z.P.D.* 23/7/80, p. 615. He still, however, asked that the feeling of the House be tested on the motion to commit the Bill—this was lost on the voices as many felt his agreement with the government was sufficient.


37. e.g. T. Bracken, House of Representatives, N.Z.P.D. 16/6/82, p. 518.
51. Atkinson apparently said in Committee he would put this last point as a special resolution later on, but, when the Committee reported the Bill with amendments, was accused by Seddon of gross breach of agreement. Hutchison and other radicals sided with Atkinson on this (N.Z.P.D. 18/5/88, pp. 154-7) so enabling the latter to win his special resolution on 1/6/88, pp. 418-21.
52. Statement of reasons for refusing to accept Legislative Council amendments, House of
Chapter Eight—continued
Representatives N.Z.P.D. 20/6/88, p. 211.
53. Ibid.

Chapter Nine
10. In 1891 Census N.S.W. gave 422 mixed-blood (i.e. 'half-caste') males and 445 females. The numbers in other colonies are less clear but, by contrasting Chinese born abroad and born in Australia, we can come fairly close to the Commonwealth Year Book estimate of 1000 males and 1015 females for Australia (Year Book 1925, pp. 951-6). There were several hundred in New Zealand as well.
12. Survey of Asians in Australia to be published in a following volume.
14. See addendum by Quong Tart to Brennan and Quong Tart, 'Report on Chinese in Camps in N.S.W.', N.S.W. L.A. V. & P. 1883, and his questions during the Royal Commission on Chinese Gambling, ibid. 1891, e.g. Minutes, pp. 43-4; also Margaret Tart, The Life of Quong Tart, Sydney, 1911, pp. 46-57.
Notes for pages 219 to 226

15. Oddie, ‘Chinese in Victoria’, pp. 137-8; Coghlan, *Labour and Industry in Australia*, p. 1334; Brennan and Quong Tart Report (N.S.W. L.A. V. & P. 1883) showing that, even in Chinese camps, there were three Europeans prosecuted for every one Chinese (p. 3).


18. Survey, see chapter 9, note 12.


20. Ibid., p. 28 and evidence of Long Pen and Robert Lee Kum.


22. Survey, see chapter 9, note 12.


29. Ibid., evidence of Chen Ah Teak.

30. Survey, see chapter 9, note 12.


34. Ibid.


37. Ibid., p. 26; Brennan and Quong Tart Report, N.S.W. L.A. V. & P., p. 2.


Chapter Ten

Chapter Ten—continued

2. Quoted Yarwood, *Attitudes to Non-European Immigration*, p. 86.

3. See chapter 6, sections 2 (U.S.A.) and 5 (British Columbia); chapter 7, sections 4 (S.A.) and 5 (Q.); chapter 8 (N.Z.).


5. Ibid.


7. See chapter 4, section 5 above.


10. For example, Woodsworth, *Canada and the Orient*, pp. 96-7.


13. Ibid., pp. 161, 176, 178.


15. For Quong Tart and Lowe Kong Meng see chapter 9 above.


25. L.C. *S.A.P.D.* 9/80, pp. 1042-3. Ramsay was right: Acts 17-26 (Authorised Version) reads ‘and [God] hath made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on all the face of the earth’. Other translations likewise do no more than mention Man’s common origin and spread over the whole earth.

27. Dr Wallis, House of Representatives \textit{N.Z.P.D.} 6/81, p. 125. Wallis here dropped his 1880 opposition to restriction, see footnote 21 above.


31. For example, White, H.A. \textit{S.A.P.D.} 8/80, p. 668.

32. For example, Swanson, House of Representatives, \textit{N.Z.P.D.} 6/81, p. 72.

33. Sir William Fox, ibid., p. 69.

34. Hutchison, ibid., p. 74.


45. Downer, H.A. \textit{S.A.P.D.} 7/88, p. 442. Downer, later supported by Gilbert (8/88, p. 576), was here taking a political line as, when Attorney-General a short time before (1886) he had supported yet another attempt to get the Legislative Council to agree to restrictive entry laws in the Northern Territory.


54. 13/4/1876, quoted Sandmeyer, ibid., p. 38.


60. See above chapter 7, sections 2, 4.

Chapter Ten—continued

63. For example, Cadman, House of Representatives, *N.Z.P.D.* 5/88, p. 34.
64. For example, Hopkins, *S.A.P.D.* 7/88, p. 334.
70. For example, Sladen, Balfour, W. Ross and Jenner, *L.C. V.P.D.* 30/11/81, 20/12/81, 2R., and New Zealand chapter 8, section 1, § above.
71. See chapter 7, sections 3, 4, 6.
75. Coolidge, *Chinese Immigration*, p. 413.
77. For example, Grenfell Price, *Island Continent*, pp. 169, 186.
81. Ibid., p. 185.
83. Sandmeyer, Anti-Chinese Movement in California, p. 86; Coolidge, Chinese Immigration, p. 93.
84. The 1879 provincial Committee, for example; see Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, pp. 27-8.
85. Ibid., pp. 32-3.
86. Deputation to Henry Parkes, N.S.W., 29/5/80, quoted Yarwood, Attitudes, p. 89.
96. Cameron, N.S.W.P.D. 6/80, p. 2896.

3. For example, Russell Conwell, Why and How, 1871, quoted ibid., p. 153.
5. For this and similar statements see Miller, Unwelcome Immigrant, pp. 153-4; Coolidge, Chinese Immigration, p. 50.
Chapter Ten—continued

8. Ibid.
38. For example, McDonnell and Whish, Qld. L.A. V. & P. 1869(2), 3/6/69, 9/6/69, 29/6/69.
42. Daily Evening Transcript, 14/7/70, quoted Miller, Unwelcome Immigrant, p. 179.
43. Quoted Miller, Unwelcome Immigrant, pp. 149-50.
49. Miller, Unwelcome Immigrant, p. 170.
50. Ibid., p. 182.
51. Quoted Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 280.
54. For example, Landseer, H.A. S.A.P.D. 7/88, p. 452.
60. Menzies, L.C. N.Z.P.D. 6/81, p. 239.
68. Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 299.
69. This national scheme has been emphasised by scholars such as Oddie, Mansfield and Nairn—see bibliography.
70. Mary Coolidge shows this clearly in connection with the troubled social and economic conditions in California in 1877, Chinese Immigration, p. 116.
Chapter Ten—continued
73. Miller, *Unwelcome Immigrant*, p. 185.
74. Ibid., p. 195, quoting Robert Seager.
75. Ibid., p. 199.
77. Ibid., p. 59; Coolidge, *Chinese Immigration*, p. 125.
78. Quoted ibid., pp. 198-200.
82. See chapter 7, sections 6, 7 above and Bolton, *Thousand Miles Away*, p. 151.
89. Ibid., pp. 437-8.
91. Ibid., p. 48.
92. Mein (Postmaster General), L.C. Q.P.D. 7/77, pp. 72-5; see also his warnings about future rioting on the gold-fields the year before, ibid., 9/76, pp. 618, 635-6. Here he was foreshadowing Douglas (Premier) in the Assembly, talking of whites arming on the gold-fields L.A. Q.P.D. 6/77, p. 247.
3. For example, Kellaway, 'White Australia', p. 11.
5. Ibid., p. 81.
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Dr Charles Price was born and educated in Adelaide, South Australia, and first became interested in migration and assimilation when meeting Germans, Italians and people of other nationalities during the war. He took his D.Phil. at Oxford, with a review of Maltese emigration, and in 1952 returned to Australia to specialise in migration work—historical, demographic and sociological—and has published several books and numerous articles on it. He takes a practical interest in migration and has for many years worked for the Good Neighbour Council, the Immigration Advisory Council, the Refugee and Migration Committees of the World Council and Australian Council of Churches. Dr Price is now Professorial Fellow in the Department of Demography at the Australian National University.

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