Jean Martin  Community and Identity  Refugee Groups in Adelaide
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Immigrants in Australia 1
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The Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia
The Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia is the national body representing the social sciences. One of its objectives is the sponsorship of major research projects in areas of national importance. Two previous projects, sponsored under its earlier name of the Social Science Research Council of Australia, were *The Role of Women in Public and Professional Life* and *Aborigines in Australian Society*. It was hardly surprising that in 1966 the Council, as it then was, decided to sponsor another project designed to examine the contribution of overseas immigrants in Australia's economic, social, and cultural life, for new settlers had not only supplied slightly more than half the nation's growth from 7,579,000 in 1947 to 11,550,000 in 1966, but had brought into our society a great diversity of national groups from the United Kingdom and many parts of Europe.

The major difference between the flow after World War II and all previous immigration was the high proportion of non-British, first from northern and western Europe, primed by the influx of some 200,000 refugees in the immediate post-war years, and thereafter from southern Europe, particularly from Italy and Greece. The mosaic of post-war immigration is seen in the following estimate by Dr C. A. Price of the ethnic origin of persons who came to this country between July 1947 and June 1970 with the intention of settling here.\(^1\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Isles</th>
<th>1,086,500</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>121,300</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>337,700</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>68,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>Other East Europe</td>
<td>220,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>140,600</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>334,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>186,800</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,646,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the immediate post-war years, marked by high levels of economic activity associated with rebuilding the nation's capital stock and re-opening the channels of

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overseas trade, immigrants were absorbed into the economy almost without notice and with few structural changes. These were also years when, because of the very low fertility in Australia in the great pre-war depression of the thirties, there was a marked lag in the natural increase of the non-immigrant workforce: immigrants were welcomed if only because they filled that gap. They manned great national projects like the Snowy Mountains Scheme; they provided a great part of the labour force for new mineral enterprises; they helped to build houses, offices, and industrial buildings; they made the nation's steel; and they became the workhorses of the burgeoning motor industry. But, above all, they settled in the major cities, often forming substantial ethnic groups, restructuring national customs in their adopted environment, keeping alive their native languages, yet rubbing shoulders with Australians, being influenced by Australian culture—often through the participation of their children in Australian schools—and at the same time influencing by their presence and activity a remarkably homogeneous and at times slightly suspicious Australian society.

By the sixties few Australians could be unaware of the impact of the immigrants, whose flow continues to the present. As their numbers have grown, as the ethnic origins of the new settlers have become even more diversified, as the size of some of the ethnic communities in major cities has increased, as some schools have emerged in which the majority of children are immigrants brought up in a non-British tongue, and as job competition has grown keener as the swelling Australian cohorts of the post-war 'baby boom' have reached maturity and seek employment in the nation's workforce, the presence of the immigrant has been increasingly apparent. Some call for a reduction of the inflow; many seek to know what the impact has been on the nation's culture, economy, and society; none can ignore the immigrants' presence.

So the Academy sponsored a project to try and find at least some of the answers to the questions being asked, both by encouraging and helping workers already known to be engaged in immigrant research, and by organising new studies to fill some of the major gaps. In September 1967 two Honorary Directors were appointed: Dr C. A. Price, Professorial Fellow in the Department of Demography at the Australian National University, to
lead studies in the cultural, political, and social fields; and Professor R. T. Appleyard, Department of Economics, University of Western Australia, to lead work in economic and industrial studies. An Organising Committee with a wide geographical and disciplinary representation was also appointed and set about costing the enterprise, which proved to be beyond the financial capability of the Academy. It is with gratitude that the Academy acknowledges generous financial support from government, business and foundation sources. The Academy also records its appreciation of the Department of Demography of the Australian National University, both for its contribution in research and for its assistance in many organisational aspects of the project.

Throughout the project every attempt has been made to keep the research workers in communication with the main objectives of the project and with one another. To this end a major seminar was held in Canberra in May 1970.

The project does not, and indeed could not aim to produce a single definitive volume, but rather to sponsor books and journal articles within areas felt to be significant with regard to the processes of settling, the interaction of Australian and immigrant and the impact of immigrants upon the nation. Major areas in which studies are being sponsored are:

The economic role of immigrants in specific industries.
Patterns of immigrant consumption and expenditure.
Mobility and career patterns of immigrants.
Displaced persons and other refugees.
Professional and highly skilled immigrants.
Immigrant communities and problems of integration.
Studies of selected ethnic groups.
Immigrant concentrations in metropolitan areas.

In addition to articles in learned journals, it is expected that at least a dozen books will flow from the study. The sponsorship of new research ceased at approximately January 1971; the task now is to bring to publication work begun by that date. The manuscript of the first book went to press in September 1971. By December of that year three further manuscripts were virtually ready for the press, and the flow is expected to continue through 1972 and 1973.

The Academy hopes that the project will assist in the understanding of both a great national enterprise and the growing complexity of a nation in which almost a quarter of the population is of post-war immigrant stock;
Note on the Series

for, whatever the future of immigration, there can be no
doubt that the introduction of the 2,646,000 new settlers
from 1947 to 1970, of whom about 85 per cent have
remained in Australia, has changed the character as well
as the economic structure and the size of this young
nation.

W. D. Borrie
Chairman, Organising Committee

Canberra
December 1971
When, nearly twenty years ago, I first became interested in Eastern European refugees in Australia, I was particularly attracted by the unique opportunity I believed this group of immigrants would offer for the study of emergent group organisation and the relation of individual experience to social structure. As it turned out, however, among the small number of Displaced Persons whom I first got to know in a New South Wales country town in 1953, group organisation was weak and casual, and participation in organised group life of any kind almost non-existent. The 'D.Ps.' themselves I came to see as a group by default, not by choice. By 1962, when I renewed my acquaintance with some of the immigrants who had been involved in the original study, family and friendship groups and 'Australian' (i.e. non-ethnic) associations had become more important. It remained true, however, as I wrote in 1965, that 'the adaptation of these immigrants to life in Australia could best be understood in terms of individual rather than group processes'.

Despite this conclusion, I knew that organised groups of Eastern European nationals existed in the capital cities, that newspapers were being published and that at least some of these immigrants were intensely involved in national-political affairs, even if their activities were scarcely visible to the indifferent Australian public. A sense of uneasiness that my own studies had never brought me close to these communal aspects of migrant experience was intensified by Dr C. A. Price's questioning of my general hypothesis that conditions in present-day Australia inhibit the formation of ethnic group organisation. While I thought Dr Price unduly influenced by his historical studies of Southern Europeans in predicting that ethnic communities would continue to form and grow, I had to agree with him that I offered no

1 Jean I. Martin, Refugee Settlers, Australian National University, Canberra, 1965, p. 10.
real evidence to sustain a different expectation.2

The general question concerning the conditions which stimulate minority populations to generate group organisation and the more particular question of what is happening among immigrants in Australia seemed to both Dr Price and myself of substantial importance, and we talked at length about the kind of research that might help to throw light upon them. While we agreed that a wide-ranging survey of the participation of migrants of diverse origins in community life would be the most promising approach, a study of group organisation in a selected population seemed to offer a more realistic, though modest, beginning. With Dr Price's encouragement, I therefore decided to undertake a study of the sociological history of Eastern European groups in Adelaide during the post-war period. The result is presented in this book.

Throughout the project, I have had the benefit of Dr Price's counsel and support. In his capacity as Director of Cultural and Social Studies for the Immigration Research Committee of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, he also read the manuscript and suggested a number of helpful modifications. I am happy to acknowledge my debt to him as mentor, critic and friend.

I should also like to express my gratitude to Flinders University, the Australian National University and the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia for financing the Adelaide fieldwork from which most of the material for the study was obtained.

I had already left Adelaide when the fieldwork began, with the result that my Research Assistant, Mrs Barbara Dahl, not only carried out all the Adelaide interviews, but also assumed the more demanding responsibility of securing co-operation from the numerous associations, both migrant and Australian, which we had occasion to approach. In everything she did, her judgment was unerring, her sensitivity immaculate, and her patience infinite. Had it not been for her sympathetic interest—sustained during periods when I was too far away or too involved in other things to work intelligently with her—the research would never have been completed. I would like to thank her for the

very substantial contribution she has made at all stages of the project.

It is also a pleasure to be able to express my thanks to the numerous Adelaide residents, most of them members of immigrant associations, who agreed to be interviewed, who provided documentary material and welcomed Mrs Dahl to their homes, their meetings, their national celebrations and days of mourning. While here—as in the pages that follow—their anonymity must be preserved, the co-operation of each individual is gratefully recognised and acknowledged.

In the course of the study, I have received substantial help and encouragement from a number of friends and colleagues, in particular, Father J. Aerts, Professor W. D. Borrie, Mrs Magda Bozic, Professor Ray Brown and Father H. O’Leary. I am grateful to them and to my husband, who was involved in the project from its inception until the manuscript was in its final draft. My thanks are also due to the A.N.U. Press for their thoughtful editing of the text for publication.

Miss Lucy Capodilupo, Mr M. Cigler, Mrs Selga Judge and Mrs O. Wallis translated documents for me and clarified my understanding of the national and ethnic contexts to which this material belonged.

I am indebted to Mr Bob Powell for carrying out the computer analysis of the associational data, and to Miss Lyn Clarke, Mrs Jill Gooch, Miss Marie Peel and Miss Sheila Smith for the care and forbearance with which they typed the manuscript.

J.I.M.

Melbourne
December 1971
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Immigration, assimilation, integration, and ethnic group organisation have attracted considerable attention from sociologically-minded scholars in Australia over the past fifteen years or so. By contrast, in the United States, where the study of immigration formed one of the corner stones on which 'scientific sociology' was built,¹ sociological interest in the subject seems, at first glance, to have flagged. In the area of ethnic group studies, for example, North American sociology of the past forty years has produced few notable works in the tradition of Thomas and Znaniecki, Wirth or Galitzi.² Glazer and Moynihan's Beyond the Melting Pot, published in 1963,³ stands out as one of the few notable studies directly focused on minority communities in present-day American society. For the most part, investigations of particular groups have been the work of individual minority members fired with the mission to preserve the record of immigrant experience in the New World and deeply committed to propagating a sympathetic understanding of their own people in the larger society. Some of these ethnically-oriented writers, like the Yugoslav immigrant, Louis Adamic, have added


substantially to the store of knowledge on minorities in American life. Some have produced work which, though revealing in its own right, is so obviously biased to create a favourable ethnic image that it has limited value as a source of information on minority life. Many of these writers were influenced by the thinking of sociologists, but their central concern was the ethnic minority, not the development of sociological theory. By contrast, for writers like Thomas and Znaniecki, Wirth and Galitzi, the importance of research into ethnic groups lay in its contribution to a comprehensive understanding of social structure and social change.

Although no cumulative and systematic development has followed from the sociological work of the twenties, a number of diverse, and often quite unconnected, kinds of inquiry have nevertheless probed the sociological meaning of ethnicity in American society. Countless investigations attuned to a variety of issues—like class stratification, community structure, poverty, religion, residential mobility and urbanisation—contain a greater abundance of material on immigration and ethnic minorities than has yet been systematically collated. Well-known examples of research of this kind are the studies of an Italian slum in Boston by W. F. Whyte and H. Gans.4 Though originally stimulated by an interest in urban society, the research studies carried out by Whyte and Gans resulted in immensely illuminating reports on an ethnic community. Inquiries into immigrant history have also greatly expanded our knowledge of minority groups and processes of assimilation and non-assimilation, and brought closer the kind of comprehensive theory of minority behaviour which Robert E. Park envisaged fifty years ago.5 Although the period is now long past when political machines blatantly manipulated the vote of the immigrant poor, the political significance of ethnicity has, until recently, been largely neglected. ‘Americans generally’, say H. A. Bailey and E. Katz,


'have been loath to admit that ethnic loyalties could exert any influence on the making of American public policy . . . we have conceived of political interest based upon ethnicity as "un-American" and have often sought to stamp out such influences'. Ethnicity in American politics is now, however, attracting scholarly attention: see, for example, the Bailey and Katz reader, from which the above quotation is taken, and L. H. Fuchs's collection, *American Ethnic Politics*. Louis L. Gerson's *The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy*, a major contribution to this field of inquiry, is in fact an indictment of the manipulation of ethnic minorities in the interest of political groups.

So long as political strategists remain convinced they can predict as well as influence the direction of voting among ethnic groups, so long will the belief that ethnic groups have not been assimilated in the political life of the United States continue. It is the politician, not the immigrant, who has created and nurtured this belief, a belief which he cannot easily destroy.

Gerson documents and deplores the lack of political assimilation of ethnic minorities in the United States. Strongly opposing Gerson's position, the Latvian-American sociologist Juris Veidemanis rejects the notion of ethnic minorities as the tools of American power groups, and maintains that 'A pluralist society—characterized by large, well-integrated groups representing significant divisions of interests and values—represents the optimum condition for the development and maintenance of freedom.'


8 Juris Veidemanis, 'Toward the sociology of ethnic groups in politics', *Indian Sociological Bulletin*, vol. 3, no. 1, October 1964, pp. 14-25 (quotation is from p. 20). See also Joseph S. Roucek, 'American ethnic and religious minorities in American politics', *Il Politico*, vol. 24, no. 3, March 1959, pp. 84-100, for a valuable survey of the effects of ethnic and religious minorities on the course of American politics. Walter B. Simon, 'Integration and apartness of minority groups as reflected in election results', *The Sociological Quarterly*, vol. 3, no. 2, April 1962, pp. 123-34, makes an interesting examination of the hypothesis that 'the degree of difference between the effect of economic class as a factor in the vote of the minority group and its effect as a factor in the vote of the electorate as a whole is diagnostic of the degree of integration or apartness of the group in question'.
A rough survey of articles on immigration and ethnicity appearing in the sociological journals in the fifties and sixties shows that exploratory theoretical contributions far outnumber papers using new empirical material to test or generate theoretical propositions. Topics include the definition of ethnic group, a model for the study of intergroup relations, a group perspective on immigrant adjustment, an approach to intergroup relations theory through the development of the concept of group self-hatred, a survey of neglected areas in immigrant and ethnic group sociology, and a critique of work on the political role of ethnic groups. Writers meticulously preface their presentations with ritualistic expressions of regret for the neglect of empirical research, but examples of productive interplay between research and theory-building are few. The growing desire to integrate ethnic studies systematically into the body of sociological theory has, however, produced a new thrust in this field of inquiry, with the recent works of Lieberson, Gordon, Shibutani and Kwan, Blalock and Schermerhorn.9

On a subject in which, even with the best will in the world, the facts have often been extremely elusive, which has aroused passions and discouraged rationality, which is highly significant for the power structures of society, and whose exponents have often been personally involved, it is inevitable that there should have been diverse interpretations of the roles that minorities have played, do, will and ought to play, in present-day societies. I cannot do justice to this diversity here, but shall briefly outline the principal conceptions of minority structure and of the relation of minorities to the larger society emerging from the diffuse body of work on the subject (though not of course necessarily originating in it).

At one extreme is the idea that minority structures fade out of existence as each immigrant group becomes absorbed into a homo-

geneous community. In the United States, this conception was crystallised in the theories that have come to be known as 'anglo-conformism' and 'the melting pot'. 'Anglo-conformity' is the process by which immigrants shed their own traditional cultures and adopt in their place a common set of Anglo-Saxon behaviour patterns and beliefs.10 The Melting Pot was the title given by Israel Zangwill to a play produced in the United States in 1908. It was a passionate declaration of faith in 'God's Crucible'. 'Here you stand', says the hero to the newly arriving immigrants, '... in your fifty groups, with your fifty languages and histories, and your fifty blood hatreds and rivalries. But you won't be long like that, brothers, for these are the fires of God you've come to ... the real American has not yet arrived. He is only in the Crucible, I tell you—he will be the fusion of all races, the coming superman.'11 At the opposite extreme from the melting pot is the concept of 'cultural pluralism' put forward by H. M. Kallen in 1915, and powerfully reiterated by Louis Adamic in 1944 in a book which popularised yet a third apt phrase, taken from a poem by Walt Whitman, A Nation of Nations.12

That contemporary American society is most accurately described as ethnically pluralistic, in some sense or another, is commonly agreed upon. Milton Gordon's claim that 'Structural pluralism ... is the major key to the understanding of the ethnic make up of American society, while cultural pluralism is the minor one'13 also finds wide support and acceptance, at least in terms of the simple proposition that cultural diversity is declining, while structural pluralism—group organisation based on ethnic origin—is either disappearing much more slowly or actually consolidating.14 As Marshall Sklare points out, however, Gordon offers no convincing reasons why structural pluralism should show such persistence.15 He simply accepts the well-worn explanations: 'the pre-

13 Gordon, Assimilation in American Life, p. 159.
14 The most outstanding example of consolidation is, of course, the changing position of blacks in American society. In this case, there is a deliberate attempt to create a distinctive culture in the interests of structural differentiation.
judices of the majority' and 'the desire of most such groups (ethnic groups) to maintain their own communal identity and subculture'.

It is, then, in the answers given to the question, 'why does structural pluralism persist?', that the crux of present-day thinking about ethnic minorities is to be found. The two explanations offered by Gordon refer to the barriers to structural assimilation put up by the larger society and the strength of ethnic identity. Sklare rejects Gordon's concept of ethnic identity: 'a primitive form of social organization which will wither away at a higher stage of social enlightenment'. This higher stage is already fore-shadowed in Gordon's ideal of the ethnically diverse—and hence neutral—community of intellectuals. For his part, Sklare presents a very different source of structural differentiation from Gordon's 'ethnic parochialism', and an alternative, or a parallel, basis of differentiation from Gordon's intellectual commitment. This alternative he finds in a conscious adherence to a 'long and profound tradition'. Although he is referring specifically to the Jewish tradition, by implication his argument applies to all traditions worthy of man's deepest loyalties.

In the conceptions considered so far, ethnic minorities are seen as reactive or protective structures (in response to rejection from the dominant group), or as structures dependent on a unique cultural tradition (though not necessarily, or even probably, constituting a distinct comprehensive subculture). A third view presents contemporary minorities as essentially 'interest groups', viable in so far as they are effective in promoting minority goals. These goals may be thought of as basically economic and political, in which case the minority structure serves to channel some of the goods, services and power available in the larger society to the ethnic group. But they may also be closer to what are more often called 'needs'; the springs of primary group interaction, like sociability, personal and emotional support, self-expression and respect. Glazer and Moynihan present the minorities of New York City as interest groups in both senses.

In promoting their own good, minorities may have the help of outsiders, but the central point of reference is a set of goals shared by the minority as a whole, though not necessarily unique to it.

17 Sklare, 'Assimilation and the sociologists', p. 66.
Different again is the conception of the minority as a group created or sustained by structures external to itself, or by larger structures of which it is a component part, like political parties or church institutions. From this point of view, the minority persists primarily because it serves the ends of these larger, externally controlled bodies. This is Gerson's answer to the question, 'Why structural pluralism?'

The conception of the minority as activated and organised in response to pressures from these larger structures permits of a number of variations. One is the extent to which the controlling structure deliberately fosters ethnic solidarity, or, conversely, the extent to which solidarity develops as the more or less incidental outcome of policies directed primarily to some other end. Political parties, for example, may deliberately develop ethnic group organisation or may unintentionally encourage organisation of this kind in the course of cultivating the ethnic vote. Other variants refer to the extent to which the purposes of the larger structure coincide with, or embrace, in whole or part, the goals of the minority group, and the extent to which each is aware of the scope of common, or divergent, interests. While churches and encompassing nation-wide or international ethnic bodies, for example, can often operate on the assumption that what is good for them is also good for the ethnic minority, political parties usually have to sell this idea. Another major variation lies in the recruitment of the linkage-agents connecting the minority to the larger structure. Where these structures have their own organisation inside the minority, the ethnic individuals taking part may automatically become linkage-agents. The clergy are an example. On the other hand, the occupants of certain roles in intra-ethnic groupings may act as links. The president of an ethnic association may operate in this way, but so may more peripheral individuals, like professionals serving the minority but in process of gaining a footing in the larger society. Linkage-agents may also be non-ethnics, recruited because of their roles in the controlling structure. Agents of political parties are an obvious example.

I have highlighted these different conceptions of the *raison d'être* of structural pluralism as an introduction to the study that is described in the following pages. This is a history of formal group organisation in fourteen Eastern European minorities in
Adelaide from 1948 to approximately 1967. Through an examination of the changing structure and functions of ethnic associations, I shall try to discern the extent and nature of structural pluralism and the processes by which pluralism has developed or declined, and attempt to answer the question: under specified conditions, are ethnic minorities likely to remain as distinct structures, and, if so, in what form and why?
Minority groups are normally defined in terms of numbers, collective identity, and power: by comparison with the host or parent members of the society to which they belong, they are small in size, identifiable as a distinct group and inferior in status and power. The question of inferiority or subordination is a difficult one, since so-called minority groups often command different degrees of power in different life-sectors: despite exercise of substantial financial power, for example, Jews in Europe and Indians and Chinese in the Pacific have retained an essential minority group status.

The problem of definition need not, however, detain us here, since the groups we were dealing with in Adelaide were patently distinct and no better word than 'minority' is available to describe them. They all consisted of people who had come to this country as immigrants, together with the children who had been born to them since arrival. None apart from these Australian-born children spoke English as their native language. Except for some recent arrivals from Poland and Yugoslavia, all came as refugees in the years immediately following World War II. The boundaries of each minority were unequivocally defined by the names by which the members were known. They spoke of themselves, for example, as 'Poles' or 'Serbs', and nearly all the associations they formed were called by a name which identified the ethnic origin of its members, and often too their physical location: 'the Czechoslovak

Club in South Australia’, for example, and ‘the Latvian Relief Society of Australia’. A few individuals moved in more than one community—because of marriage ties or because they had professional expertise that was in wide demand—and others had severed all connections with the ethnic group of their birth, but there was never any doubt about which minority any particular person or association belonged to, or derived from. Nor, as it turned out, was there any ambiguity in what constituted an *ethnic* association. Most groups, as already noted, proclaimed their ethnic character in their names. To prevent confusion, the term ‘ethnic’ is reserved for populations born outside Australia. Non-ethnic populations and structures will be described as ‘local’ or ‘Australian’. The following pages provide ample evidence that this does not contain any implication that what is not ethnic is homogeneous. (The British-born would require another term; had we been obliged to take account of them we would simply have introduced a third category of ‘British’ minority.)

From these somewhat laborious preliminaries it should now be clear that minorities are here defined by the collective identity of their members, which, as later discussion will spell out, is not always the same thing as the collective identity ascribed to them by the Australian community. It should also be clear that the present study is concerned only with those structures generated by, or in some way identified with, the minority group, and makes no attempt to cover the range of non-ethnic associational activity in which individual migrants were engaged.

The members of the fourteen minorities included in the study came to Australia as Displaced Persons in the immediate post-war period—most of them between 1948 and 1951—under a resettlement program organised by the Commonwealth government and the International Refugee Organisation (IRO).\(^2\) The names of the minorities and their numbers in the Adelaide metropolitan area (excluding Elizabeth and Salisbury) at the 1966 Census are given in Table 1. The total population of the metropolitan area at that date was 771,000.

Table 1 Minority populations in the Adelaide metropolitan area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Est. Population*</th>
<th>Birthplace†</th>
<th>Number†</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td></td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td></td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>6,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussian</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croat</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>4,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21,920</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These very rough estimates are based mainly on information given us by inter­viewees in Adelaide. In addition, I have drawn on the 1961 Census, which gives separate birthplace figures for Russians (1,057) and Ukrainians (2,066), and on the 1966 Census religion by birthplace figures, which make it possible to identify the Serbs in the Yugoslav-born population, since they account for nearly all the 1,098 Orthodox adherents; see Table 3, p. 48.

† 1966 Census.

The fieldwork which provided the bulk of the data for the study was carried out between 1966 and 1970, but most of it took place in 1966-7. Interviews with office-bearers, former office-bearers, members and former members of associations absorbed most of the fieldworker’s time, but attendance at meetings and events organised by ethnic groups also yielded invaluable material. Newsletters, bulletins and similar publications issued by local groups, by the central or federated bodies to which they belonged, and more rarely by individual immigrants, were a further substantial source of primary data, although a certain constraint was placed on our use of this material by the fact that little of it was in English and the resources available for translation were limited.

Both because of the nature of voluntary associations and the special situation of Eastern European refugees, the collection of material for the study was no simple matter. Some associations had achieved the status of a recognised name without ever going on to adopt formal procedures for keeping records, establishing membership, or appointing office-bearers. Where records were made, they
were not necessarily preserved. Even if preserved, they sometimes remained in the hands of former office-bearers and were no longer under the association's control. Whether this was so or not, they were often poorly organised and incomplete. And further, whatever their location or condition, they were not necessarily available for our perusal: while a few groups were generous and open-handed, we had often to be satisfied with a small selection of records, which normally included a fair number of documents written especially for Australian consumption.3

Membership figures presented a major problem. There were a number of reasons why the figures we were given could not always be taken at face value and why, in some cases, not even an estimate of numbers could be obtained. Some associations had no formal record of membership, either because they claimed to embrace the whole ethnic community or some sub-community within it, such as the adherents of a particular faith, or because they had never got round to making up such a list. In other cases, current lists were out of date, or past variations were known to reflect the industry of the treasurer rather than changes in the number of supporters. In practice—and sometimes in theory—many associations were based on family rather than individual membership. But the factor by which the number of members had to be raised to give the total individual membership was never known. Even among associations with a written constitution, problems arose over membership qualifications. Most, though by no means all, associations were formally open only to persons of the specified ethnic origin. Some constitutions made provision for spouses of different origin by admitting to full membership all persons 'in accord with the objects of the association', or by including a special category of

members who were debarred from voting or holding office. Sometimes, however, the situation remained sufficiently obscure for an aspirant to office or the promoter of a particular cause to improve his position by mustering the support of outsider spouses who did not normally vote; in practice, these were usually the Australian-born wives of male members.

The accuracy of membership data was also affected by the fact that office-bearers did not necessarily think of keeping exact lists as a worthwhile effort. Activities seldom depended on subscriptions, which were usually small or non-existent, and no 'member' was likely to be denied the right to take part in the affairs of a group just because he was not financial. In some cases, however, the absence of up-to-date and accurate records had more significance. It reflected the common fear that any revelation of membership figures could attract potentially hostile attention from authorities in Europe or from the Australian government or community. Occasionally, where the local association was affiliated to an international body, uncertainty about membership numbers made it possible to give overseas headquarters a more impressive picture of the group's size than was warranted, and thereby inflate the importance of the association and the stature of its office-bearers.4

It was also for political reasons, in the narrow sense, that members were sometimes unwilling to reveal an association's affiliations, for there was a common fear that it might be to their disadvantage to make known connections with political, nationalist, or religious movements which were regarded with suspicion in Australia or abroad. The same considerations could lead to the very existence of an association being concealed. Another important reason why connections between associations were difficult to establish was simply that they had changed over time or had never been formalised. One group, for example, might develop under the wing of another, but at some unspecified time and by some informal process gain complete independence. Another, a women's club for instance,

4 See E. Dunsdorfs, *Tresā Latvija [Third Latvia]*, Loma Printing Service, Melbourne, 1968, pp. 184-6, for an interesting comment on the problem of securing figures for membership of Latvian associations and an attempt to estimate rates of participation. Dunsdorfs concludes that in 1954 about 16% of Latvians in South Australia belonged to Latvian organisations (apart from the church), and that at the time of writing only 'a very small number of Latvians is united in organisations'.
might provide substantial financial support for a number of groups with which it had no formal connection.

While the research could never have been accomplished without the co-operation of many individuals who talked honestly and openly, directed us to documentary material, and made it possible for the fieldworker to observe a variety of activities at first hand, the collection of data was hampered by the same mistrust and suspicion which research workers have often noted to be particularly characteristic of former Displaced Persons. Some people clearly feared we might be working on behalf of communist agents. It is commonly believed that such agents are active among East European refugees in Australia, and that any information they obtain is likely to be used to bring personal harm to the individual immigrant or his family in his home country, or to discredit refugee associations and activities in general. One can appreciate this diffuse but often intense anxiety only if one is aware of the long history of Soviet attempts to influence and harass emigrés and their organisations.

The most dramatic post-war instance of these attempts occurred over the issue of the repatriation of Soviet citizens whom the end of the war found in Western Europe. In accord with the Yalta Agreement of February 1945, mass repatriation began as soon as large-scale movements became possible. By the end of September, 2 million Soviet citizens from the west had been returned home, but the problem of enforcing the repatriation of unwilling Eastern Europeans was causing increasing difficulties. Soviet authorities claimed that the Yalta Agreement required the Western Allies to hand over all Soviet nationals for repatriation. It became clear that Allied authorities would have to use force to transfer a residue of some 35,000 Soviet citizens and some hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and White Russians from eastern Poland, Balts, Poles and others, who had never been Soviet citizens but whose homes

5 See Jean I. Martin, *Refugee Settlers: A Study of Displaced Persons in Australia*, A.N.U., Canberra, 1965, pp. 5-6. See also *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, Senate, 19 and 20 May 1964, vol. S. 25, pp. 1302-6, debate on a questionnaire issued to Latvian immigrants by a student of the University of Adelaide. Initiating this debate Senator Branson (W.A.) asked Senator Gorton, Minister for Works, 'Will the Minister assure these people that they do not have to answer this type of correspondence, that there is no compulsion about it and that if they do answer they are in a free country and do not have to fear persecution?"
were in areas now occupied by the USSR. The Western Allies, however, were not prepared to co-operate in enforced repatriation, and, despite Soviet objections, continued to accept responsibility for the care and maintenance of the refugees who refused repatriation. At the same time, unknown numbers of Eastern Europeans, fearing they would be handed over to the Soviet authorities, went into hiding or claimed a false national origin which would place them beyond the arm of the Soviet's claimed authority. Although the mass repatriation movement was over before the end of 1945, controversy between Soviet and western authorities over the right of so-called Soviet citizens to refuse repatriation continued into 1952, when the IRO went out of existence. By then it had resettled one million refugees overseas, nearly all of them citizens of countries occupied by the Soviet or under communist rule.6

Soviet authorities did not, however, lose interest in the refugees who remained in Western Europe or migrated overseas. With varying degrees of intensity, they have for the past twenty years kept up a campaign designed, on the one hand, to undermine refugee morale, destroy confidence in their leaders, split their associations, and damage their standing in the eyes of the host countries in which they have settled, and, on the other, to convince them how much they are missing in not sharing in the communist reconstruction of their home countries.

This prolonged campaign has taken many different forms. Soviet authorities were well practised in the arts of infiltrating movements in countries outside their own political control and in manipulating anti-communist bodies to their own ends. By the end of the war they already had twenty years' experience of emigre political groups, and were able to apply well-tried tactics in their dealing with the new population of refugees. Their policy was summarised in a Secret Directive to agents 'assigned to subvert the anti-Communist emigrant movement', dated 15 August 1947:

It is essential to intensify operations in the Allies' rear and to utilize every opportunity to subvert both the new and the old emigration.

We must gain control and even direct leadership over the DP and emigre camps and shelters.7

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A detailed and carefully-documented account of how this policy was implemented among both pre-war and post-war Russian emigré groups is to be found in the remarkable document, *Politics of the Russian Emigration*, by Boris L. Dvinov, from which the quotation above is taken. Dvinov sums up the post-war situation in the following words:

Soviet efforts to penetrate and control emigré organizations did not diminish after the war. If anything, they were further stimulated by the activities of the emigrés themselves and by the interest of the Western powers in using their organizations for political and psychological warfare as well as for intelligence purposes. From the Soviet point of view, it remained of great importance to misinform foreign intelligence services, control emigré attempts at underground activities in the Soviet zone, and in general to transform the emigré organizations into Soviet tools. To these ends, the Soviets used agents already planted among the emigrés during the war, and enlisted new recruits from among the D.P.'s, as well as postwar defector-agents. In a sense, it was a repetition of the 1920's and 1930's; but, in the postwar era, Soviet attempts at provocation were favoured by the confusion that prevailed after Germany's surrender and by the disillusionment of many of the D.P.'s with the West.8

In 1954, the year before Dvinov's report was published, the Soviet-dominated countries of Eastern Europe had initiated fresh and systematic campaigns to encourage their emigré countrymen—nearly all of whom were by then settled in Western Europe or overseas—to return home.9 All these campaigns had in common the offer of amnesty and the appeal to national sentiment and family loyalty. They relied heavily on testimony from returnees, which confirmed the evils of life in the western democracies and the corruption of exile organisations. Amongst the several groups established to promote this campaign was the East Berlin ‘Committee for Return to the Homeland’, founded in 1955, which distributes native-language newspapers among refugee groups in Europe and overseas. In recent years more subtle approaches seem to have been adopted. One example is ‘The Latvian Cultural

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8 Ibid., pp. 400-1.
Committee for Contact with Compatriots Living Abroad', founded in Riga in 1964. The by-laws of this Committee state that its aim is 'to develop and strengthen cultural ties between the homeland and its Latvian emigrés and displaced persons who for various reasons live abroad. The Committee acquaints the compatriots living abroad with Soviet life and achievement . . ., thus furthering among them patriotism and love for their country.'

In addition to the organisation of personal appeals to return home made through individual agents, communications from family and friends at home and radio propaganda, the press has been an important medium through which Soviet authorities have sought to influence refugees and their host countries. The use of publications aimed at the refugees themselves has been noted above. The press in the emigrants' home countries reports on emigrant life abroad and on relevant public events such as Captive Nations Week. In recent years there have also appeared in Australia several books and pamphlets published in Eastern Europe in English and aimed directly at the vilification of refugees now settled in English-speaking countries. A typical example is Daugavas Vanagi: Who are They?, published by the Latvian State Publishing House, Riga, in 1963. This booklet aims at exposing the Latvian association, Daugavas Vanagi (DV), known in Australia and other English-speaking countries as the Latvian Relief Society. The authors, E. Avotins, J. Dzirkalis and V. Petersons, claim to establish that DV is dominated by men who served the Nazi cause as members of the Latvian S.S., or in other capacities, and who enthusiastically supported Germany's most inhuman policies. The careers of a large number of alleged war criminals are described in appalling detail, with photos as supporting evidence. In many cases, information on their current addresses, occupations, and positions in exile organisations is also given. Whether the element of truth in the allegations put forward in Daugavas Vanagi


is large or small, the booklet is obviously a propagandist exercise, designed to discredit the most outspoken anti-communists among the Latvian emigrants and isolate them from both their fellow-Latvians and their English-speaking hosts.

Dvinov's reference to 'The interests of the Western powers in using [emigrant] organizations for political and psychological warfare as well as for intelligence purposes' points to the cross-pressures to which refugees are often subjected.12 Like the USSR, western governments, particularly the United States, through its Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), have tried to turn refugees and refugee associations to their own political purposes. In some cases, their operations have been if not official at least public knowledge, and there has been little attempt to cover up the essential political function. One example is Radio Free Europe, which is financed by private and government funds in the United States and has been broadcasting from the west to Eastern Europe since 1950. Refugees have played a major part in Radio Free Europe's programming and in the actual transmissions.13 Some indication of their role vis-à-vis the Americans can be gained from the following account of Radio Free Europe's Polish section, by Stefan Korbonski, lawyer, former underground leader and one-time Chairman of the Assembly of Captive European Nations:

Was [Radio Free Europe] to be an American broadcasting station or . . . Polish? Several years of practical activity were to show that in fact it would be neither, but would have a mixed Polish-American character. Admittedly the main leadership was in American hands, but Polish political groups and over a hundred Polish writers, journalists, politicians, artists and scholars were, by the strength of their number, intellect and patriotism, to exert such an influence on the American management that whenever fundamental Polish interests were concerned, such as the defence of the Oder-Neisse frontier, still not recognized by the United States, Polish views won the day. Polish-American co-operation was facilitated by the unity of the main aim, i.e. the restoration to Poland of her independence

12 For discussion and examples of how either the USSR or western countries, or both, have used refugee groups for intelligence purposes, see A. W. Dulles (former Director of CIA), The Craft of Intelligence, Harper & Row, New York, 1963, p. 107 and chapter 10, 'Volunteers'; G. G. Govorchin, Americans from Yugoslavia, University of Florida Press, Gainesville, 1961, pp. 210-11; Berzins, The Unpunished Crime, pp. 282-4.

13 See Michie, Voices Through the Iron Curtain.
and a democratic system of government. As regards the way to attain this aim, i.e. strategy and political tactics, differences existed between the American and Polish points of view. In matters of this kind, the policy of Radio Free Europe became the resultant of a conflict between American and Polish views.14

The west has also tried to make use of refugee expertise and organisation in more under-cover fashion. Individuals have been recruited as agents, and financial support has been indirectly provided for anti-communist associations and publications. The extent of government support for refugee groups in the United States was indicated in the course of the revelations of CIA activities in 1966. At the time of these exposures, the Deputy Director of CIA acknowledged in a Federal Court, where he was giving evidence in a slander suit against an Estonian CIA agent, that the Agency 'had "foreign intelligence sources existing within or developed through" emigre groups'. After reporting this statement, the New York Times went on to add:

According to unofficial estimates, there are about 100,000 members in several hundred active emigre associations in the United States, organized by exiles of countries now under Communist rule. Most of them are strongly nationalist and anti-Communist, and many maintain informal connections with countrymen still living behind the Iron Curtain.15

While there can be no doubt that the intelligence services of the west have considered it important to keep a watchful eye on counter-espionage among refugee associations and to use these groups as a source of information and influence, there is little evidence to show that, in pursuit of these aims, western powers have used the kind of force, intimidation and terrorism characteristic of Soviet tactics.16 Nevertheless, there have been grounds for the refugees to suspect the good faith of western governments. They have, for example, often interpreted it as a rebuff when the

16 Dvinov's study contains abundant evidence of the personal danger to which not only intelligence agents, but also established emigre leaders, were exposed. For further examples of possible annihilation of refugee leaders by Soviet agents, see J. M. Kirschbaum, Slovaks in Canada, Canadian Ethnic Press Association of Ontario, Toronto, 1967, p. 216; ABN Correspondence, vol. 10, no. 12, December 1959, p. 3; Michie, Voices Through the Iron Curtain, pp. 278-83.
western powers have refused support to extreme anti-communist emigré groups. They have assumed that attempts by western countries to establish a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet imply a rejection of their own cause, and possibly even a threat to their personal safety. An example of this kind of interpretation is contained in the following paragraph from a publication by a Russian emigré group, NTS:

The senseless and inhuman policy of forced repatriation was denounced in many petitions and protests addressed to the Western authorities . . ., without other result than the internment of some NTS members in allied internment camps.\(^{17}\)

It is not possible to say exactly what knowledge or experience Eastern European immigrants in Australia have of attempts by the Soviet, other Eastern European governments or the western powers to exercise the various kinds of influence over refugees and their affairs that have been described in the pages above. A few are probably in the thick of the situation, acting as Soviet agents or Australian counter-agents. Many have at some time or other received communist literature or personal communications which they believe to have been inspired by authorities in their homelands. Probably all are familiar with earlier Soviet attempts to encourage repatriation and are aware that communist authorities view exile associations as an unwelcome source of anti-communist influence in the western world.\(^{18}\) Much as personal experience has

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17 *NTS: Union of Russian Solidarists*, pamphlet, NTS Section for External Relations, Frankfurt am Main, 1961, p. 21. For further discussion of NTS, see pp. 60-2.

18 In answer to a question in the Commonwealth Parliament in August 1970, the Minister for Immigration, Mr P. Lynch, said that 155 communists and 14 right-wing extremists had had their applications for naturalisation refused during the preceding 4\(\frac{1}{2}\) years: *Australian*, 22 August 1970. In 1955 and 1956, the *Adelaide Sunday Advertiser* carried in its 'News from European Homelands' section a number of items on the repatriation campaigns being conducted by Eastern European countries. All stressed the sinister intent of these campaigns and the dangers awaiting emigrants who innocently accepted the offer to return 'and be forgiven'. The news reported in this section was 'culled from newspapers published overseas and in Australia, and was supplied by representatives of New Australian national groups in Adelaide', See, e.g., 'Refugees sent to labor camps', Saturday night, 22 October 1955; 'Voice of Home' not enough', Saturday night, 1 October 1955; 'Return Home' procedure', Saturday night, 17 December 1955; 'Angered by "Return Home" invitations', Saturday night, 29 October 1955.
varied, there are clearly enough sources of anxiety for even the least suspicious of Eastern European immigrants to be made anxious by more than superficial inquiries about the groups they belong to and the roles they play in them. Among the people we approached in Adelaide the additional conviction that Australians are antagonistic to ethnic group organisation as such often reinforced the uncomfortable feeling that no good could come to them from our researches.
Although all the obstacles that have been described above hindered the collection of accurate and complete information, sufficient data were obtained to allow 245 associations to be classified into a simple but theoretically useful scheme. First there are what will be called 'community' associations. These groups claimed to embrace whole families, to provide for the general well-being rather than the particular interests of the members, to be responsible for the continuity of cultural traditions, and to represent the minority (or some sub-community within it) to the wider Australian society and fellow-countrymen interstate and overseas. These community associations normally generated a series of affiliated interest groups, such as schools, choirs and folk-dancing groups, and youth, professional and women's clubs. Such affiliated groups constitute the second category of associations. In most minorities there also existed independent groups. This third type of association served interests similar to those of the affiliated groups. In some cases, they were independent only from the viewpoint of the local group organisation, being affiliated to some federated or centralised interstate or international body. Sometimes again they were loosely tied to a community association or to other independent groups, and occasionally gave rise to affiliated bodies of their own, like the Parents' Groups attached to the Boy Scouts.

As we shall now see, these three types of association—community, affiliated, and independent—provide the basis for a structural classification of the minorities themselves. For the purpose of establishing an association's duration of life, the foundation date is taken as the year when, so far as we could ascertain, the first continuing
group activities took place, however informally organised. The foundation date of most associations could in fact be confidently established within at most two or three years, but associations that had become defunct had rarely been formally wound up and their passing had often gone almost unnoticed. The date of demise of an association is more often, therefore, approximate. Although we made every attempt to obtain information on all groups that had existed at some time between 1948 and 1967, our listing is certainly incomplete. The most numerous omissions doubtless consist of short-lived independent groups which came and went between 1950 and 1960. As Fig. 1 shows, there was a rapid increase in the formation of associations between 1949 and 1952, with a levelling off to a slow, steady rate of growth in subsequent years.

Of the total of thirty-six community associations formed between 1949 and 1967, eighteen were in operation by 1950, when every minority except the Slovaks and Slovenians had at least one group
of this kind. We obtained information on the foundation date of twenty-nine of the thirty-three community associations still in existence in 1967; the average age of these twenty-nine was 13 years, seventeen of them being 17 or 18 years old. By 1967, the Slovaks and Slovenians also had a community association each, and most of the other minorities had two, three, or four. Secular community groups existed in all the minorities except the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Russian, and Serb. The existence of more than one secular association within a minority was the result of a split, as in the case of the Czechoslovaks, or reflected two overlapping foci of organisation, as with the Latvians, or derived from the regional dispersal of a comparatively large ethnic population, as in the case of the Poles. Secular community associations were not necessarily outside the sphere of church influence but they were formally distinct from church communities, which embraced the adherents of a particular religion and usually operated under the aegis of the clergy.

In this study the relationship of community associations to one another is used as the basis for a classification of minorities as cohesive, fragmented, or divided. Minorities are described as cohesive if they contained only one community association or two or more such associations with overlapping membership. In the latter type of cohesive minority, a secular association (or associations) might embrace the membership of one or more religious congregations; among the Ukrainians, for example, the community secular body brought together people who belonged to religious groups that were not only different but at times in conflict with one another. Minorities containing two or more community associations, none of which embraced the membership of the minority as a whole (although they might theoretically have been intended to), are described as either fragmented or divided. They are fragmented if two or more community associations in effect separated groups of families from one another, but were not in conflict. They are divided if two or more community associations were in conflict, which did not necessarily mean that the antagonistic associations had no overlapping membership, nor that the minority was altogether polarised around distinct groups.

The fourteen minorities can be arranged in rank order according to the percentage of ever-formed special interest associations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>No. ever formed</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>No. still in existence, 1967</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>Russian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
<td><strong>104</strong></td>
<td><strong>105</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td><strong>79</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Where an association has become defunct and re-formed, each new formation is counted as a separate association.
affiliated with community associations. This order gives a continuum of minority structures from the highly centralised at one end to the highly dispersed at the other. It should be remembered that the terms centralised and dispersed refer to community structure, not to the rate of participation of minority members in group life. Thus a highly centralised minority could theoretically have a far smaller proportion of its members engaged in group activity than a dispersed minority with little overlap of membership among its many independent interest groups.

The fourteen minorities may also be placed in rank order in terms of the percentage of ever-formed associations still in existence. This gives a continuum of stability, which again is a structural variable. It measures the degree to which a minority maintains continuity of formal group organisation, not the continuity of group participation on the part of the minority population. The two are of course related in that the degree of continuity of group organisation places limits on the continuity of individual participation. But there could theoretically be a high degree of continuity of group organisation and also a high degree of membership turnover resulting in a low degree of continuity of individual participation.

The difficulty about measuring minority stability in terms of longevity of associations is that defunct associations are necessarily compared with groups that are still in existence and whose life-span is an unknown factor. A highly stable minority could be one in which, for example, nine out of ten ever-formed associations were still in existence, although all ten had been formed within the previous five years, and the average duration was four years; or, on the other hand, a similarly high rate of stability (90 per cent) could be achieved where the ten groups had all been formed over twelve years earlier and the average duration was fifteen years. As Fig. 2 shows, however, there was a clear tendency for the degree of stability, as defined, to be associated with longevity: the more stable the minority, the longer was the average life of its individual associations.

Longevity of associations was not associated with the degree of centralisation or dispersal of the minority. Neither was there any difference in the average length of life of affiliated and independent associations: in both cases the mean was nine years. This
latter comparison is, however, somewhat misleading, since a greater proportion of independent than affiliated associations had completed their life-span: one in 4.4 of all ever-formed affiliated associations had become defunct by 1967, compared with one in 3.0 of independent associations. Since the average length of life of all defunct associations was four years, compared with eleven years for all associations still in existence in 1967, it is clear that a selective process had been in operation over the 19-year period covered by the research: most of those associations in existence in 1967 were the ones that had successfully survived the danger of dissolution in the first four or five years of their existence.

A further ranking in terms of the total number of interest associations ever formed gives another continuum of more and less active minorities.
At the conclusion of the study, it will be shown that, on the basis of statistical analysis of these measures of cohesion, centralisation, stability and activity, combined with additional measures which will be introduced in the following pages, the fourteen minorities can be grouped into four distinct clusters. For the moment we can simply note the following trends. The Estonians, Latvians, and Ukrainians stand out as being highly cohesive, active, and stable. The Lithuanians and Poles resemble these three except that both are divided instead of cohesive. The Serbs and Russians are alike in the extent to which they are fragmented, stable, and dispersed. Hungarians and Czechs have in common their non-cohesiveness and low degree of stability; overall the cohesive Croats and Bulgarians are closer to these two than to other groups. The Byelorussians, Slovaks, and Slovenians are alike in the negative sense that their numbers are very small and their organised group life scarcely developed or differentiated at all. The most notable general trends to be taken account of at this stage of the discussion are for the cohesive minorities also to be active, the divided to be less stable, and the fragmented to be also dispersed.

In the remainder of this chapter and in the next, the relationships among these several characteristics of minority group structure will be clarified through an examination of minority goals and the organisation of group life and mobilisation of resources to meet these goals. Chapter 5 will be concerned with the relationships of associations to one another within each minority. Chapters 6 and 7 will then go on to deal with the external relations of minorities with other ethnic groups in Adelaide, with their fellow-countrymen elsewhere, and with Australian groups. Chapters 8 and 9 will take up the question of minority types and return to the problems raised in Chapter 1.

In the early days, when most of them were poor, badly housed, unsettled, lonely and incompetent in English, these Eastern European immigrants founded embryonic groups in a search for companionship and for relief from the dreariness and frustration of their daily round. Before long these needs became absorbed into the more self-conscious aim of preserving ethnic cultural traditions and identity. Most minorities soon set about establishing choirs,
folk-dancing groups, theatres, Saturday schools, and Scout groups. They were meticulous in observing anniversaries, holy days and national celebrations. At this time—the early 1950s—there seems to have been a high degree of consensus within minorities on the form these group efforts should take and solid support for communal events. Many immigrants also saw these activities as a means of creating a favourable image in the eyes of Australians. Choir-singing and folk-dancing best served this purpose, since the impact of these arts was not diminished by the barrier of language. After it was established in 1960, the biennial Adelaide Festival of Arts provided a special occasion for new arrivals to advance their claim to recognition by these means.

Acutely aware of the plight of their fellow-countrymen recently left behind in Displaced Persons camps, the Adelaide immigrants were also quick to organise the despatch of goods and money to refugees in Europe and elsewhere. This too represented a goal that everyone could work for, and support was generous.

The early fifties was probably also the period of greatest consensus within and among minorities about their political role in Australian society. Diverse as their affiliations were, the great majority of Displaced Persons arrived in Australia sharing a common hostility to communism and a common hope that a third world war would soon free their native countries from communist control and enable them to return home. Through their ethnic associations they issued anti-communist statements and reports of conditions and events in their homelands, organised petitions to Australian authorities and the United Nations, and celebrated the anniversaries of national triumphs and tragedies. In all this they were following two inextricably associated objects. They were determined to keep the wider society as well as their own people alive both to the dangers and horrors of communism and to the obligation to pursue uncompromisingly the goal of bringing independence to countries dominated by the Soviet Union.

In these early years, then, a set of fairly clear-cut goals received wide support. But in time they came increasingly into question or took on overtones that blurred their original, deceptively simple, outlines. Celebrations of national events sometimes assumed a wan and unrealistic tone as they were repeated year after year. One Czech thought that the commemoration of the proclamation of
the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 had become something of a
farce, because 'we are celebrating something that doesn't exist'.

At first it had seemed fit and natural that immigrants should
look to their fellow-countrymen for friendship and society. The
indifference or hostility of the local people had accentuated this
tendency. But, when Australian coldness persisted after the new-
comers had become proficient in English, had established them-
selves economically, and had learnt to conform in the way which
they once expected would open doors to full acceptance, their
dependence on their own groups for sociable intercourse took on
a new, less happy, significance. It was one thing freely to enjoy the
companionship of one's fellow-countrymen, another to feel that
one had in fact no alternative.

At the same time the purpose and content of cultural expression
were also becoming less obvious, for circumstances did not favour
the development of an ethnic cultural identity. The minorities
were small in number and most of them lacked enough qualified
people to permit a diverse and continuous cultural life. Some
groups were still-born because the expertise of their leaders was not
equal to the enthusiasm. Others disbanded when no one could be
found to carry on the work of the talented individuals who had
inspired them. Many migrants felt isolated from a living cultural
tradition: few creative artists of merit were producing for the
limited audience of their fellow-countrymen in Australia, and it was
not easy to identify with the work of exiled writers, artists or
musicians in Europe or the Americas. Although individual immi-
grants read the literature emanating from their communist-con-
trolled homelands, theatre groups seldom drew upon contemporary
drama being produced in these countries. In an attempt to fill the
gap in acceptable material, drama groups sometimes resorted to
translating modern English-language plays into their native lan-
guage, and familiar songs and dances were refurbished. But for the
most part, song, dance and theatre continued to take traditional
expression, and many people came to find 'the same old stuff', as
one woman described it, tedious and irrelevant.

In time too the organisation of assistance to fellow-refugees in
other countries declined, partly because most Displaced Persons
were resettled by the mid-fifties and partly because time and dis-
tance lessened the sense of urgency to do something for the hard
core who remained in Europe. Some associations had already di­rected their attention to local families in need, but IRO immigrants to Australia had been selected in such a way that dependants without family support were almost non-existent. The few old immigrants were people who had accompanied their adult children to Australia or joined them more recently. Most immigrants had in fact moved into a period of economic self-sufficiency. It was only in occasional cases of serious illness, accident, or untoward death that the associations were required to take on welfare functions.

In view of the fact that all these minorities shared an anti­communist position, it was to be expected that there would be attempts to form inter-ethnic associations to promote common political ideals. Sporadic attempts of this kind seem to have been made throughout the post-war period. An extract from a letter written by the Organising Secretary of the International Anti-Communist Council to the president of one of the community associations illustrates both the difficulties of getting inter-ethnic groups like this under way and the necessary vagueness of aims if there was to be any hope of wide support. The date of the letter is 18 June 1962.

Since we did not receive a quorum for our meeting on Sunday . . . it was decided to hold a meeting at a more suitable time, namely . . . This Council is intended to show our fellow Australians the true face of Com­munism, regardless of whether it is of the Moscow, Peking or one of the many home-grown varieties.

There will be further discussion of inter-ethnic organisations in a later section of this study. In the present context, it is sufficient to note that a simple anti-communism did not survive as a unifying force among or within minorities. On the contrary, sharp differ­ences in ideology and in views on political strategy became exposed as time went on. Only the three Baltic countries established a stable organisation for proclaiming a common political position. The Ukrainians clashed with the Russians over their insistence that the anti-communist platform must include the right to auto­nomy on the part of non-Russian minorities in the USSR. Slovaks and Croats came to concentrate their energies on establishing the right of their respective peoples to exist as autonomous states.
Czechs, Hungarians, Poles and Serbs became involved in internal conflicts which apparently distracted them from serious commitment to a united inter-minority anti-communist effort.

With the growing realisation that Australians did not want to be educated in the evils of communism, the attrition of hopes of returning to an independent homeland, and the emergence of new interests and aims, the immigrants also became less convinced about their unique political mission. Their experience in Europe had in any case made many of them anxious to avoid political involvement that could expose them to hostile reactions. Attempts in some sections of the Australian press to pin fascist or terrorist labels on certain minority groups accentuated this anxiety, and had the effect of damping down overt support for political causes throughout the Displaced Person population as a whole.1 A letter sent to the Good Neighbour Council of South Australia in May 1966 by the Sydney editor of News Digest International, a 'Quarterly Magazine of Anticommunist Forces in Australia, New Zealand

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and South-East Asia', suggests that more direct economic sanctions may also have been in operation. It reads in part:

Because of the uncompromising Anti-Communist line adopted by the magazine we are having difficulty in securing advertisers and a majority of them refuse to be associated with a magazine voicing strong political views.

Once again we appeal to you to support the 'News Digest International' with generous financial contributions.

The task of cultivating anti-communism gradually ceased to be everyone's responsibility. In some cases, the clergy, particularly the Catholic priests, came to stand out as the minority's recognised anti-communist spokesmen. The fusion of Catholicism, nationalism and opposition to communist control into a single cause is illustrated in a speech given by the Croatian priest in 1963:

I am a Croat [he said]. In the year 1945 my fatherland was thrust into an artificial formation which is called New Yugoslavia. With the change came godlessness of a bloodthirsty, ferocious, arrogant and tyrannic system called Communism . . . Communistic 'red Paradise on earth' is not Paradise, but a valley of tears and a Red Hell. Therefore, we who left it want to proclaim to all the free world, 'Believe us, while there is time recognise that Communism is the biggest devil of today.'

As well as the clergy and sometimes also the teachers in the Saturday schools, other self-selected individuals and groups became the repositories, as it were, of the minority's political conscience: in some minorities, one or two associations came to concentrate on this role; a very few inter-ethnic bodies also existed to serve this purpose alone. Occasionally an individual mounted a one-man campaign, without group support of any kind. The more committed of these individuals, sometimes driven to extremes by what seemed to them the treacherous indifference of their fellows, became an embarrassment. They were out of tune with the times and fostered a damaging image of Eastern Europeans as political troublemakers.

All the Adelaide minorities had been affected by the changes that have been described. Some had limited and crystallised their goals more realistically than others, and some had maintained greater continuity in their activities than the rest. Because our record of associations is almost certainly incomplete, comparisons
of longevity between different types of association and different minorities must be made with caution. Some trends are nevertheless so marked and so well substantiated by a variety of evidence that they can be taken to represent genuine differences.

In all the minorities, community associations had survived as active bodies in their own right, apart from their affiliated associations. In some instances the original all-embracing community groups remained dominant. In others fission had produced more narrowly based structures. But in either case these associations had become less important than they were in the early days as direct promoters of political and nationalist aims. Most community associations—particularly the non-sectarian ones—had in fact always pursued goals that were sufficiently general and vague to ensure the support of a highly varied membership, while the main activities they sponsored were of the sociable and traditional kind—club facilities, regular socials, balls, picnics, Christmas, New Year and anniversary celebrations—which had a wide appeal. Indeed many immigrants who would have deliberately avoided taking out formal membership in any association did in fact join in community group activities, in much the same casual spirit as they took part in events connected with their work, church, sports groups or children's schools.

Looking across the whole range of minority group activities, one can see that certain interests have survived better than others. The most successfully maintained groups were those connected with folk-dancing, singing and music and the Scout and Guide movements. On the other hand, there were markedly high casualty rates among national, political, and ex-service groups and among lay groups attached to the Catholic church. Almost all the minorities have at one time or another had sports groups in operation. Although these have represented a variety of interests, soccer and international basketball are the games with which European immigrants to Australia have been particularly identified and in which they have excelled. The Latvian and Czech soccer clubs went out of existence in the fifties, however, and the six national clubs remaining in 1969 had long since ceased to field ethnic teams. By 1969 support for the previously flourishing national basketball clubs had also diminished, and the standing of three Baltic clubs, which retained a predominantly ethnic character, had declined. The Hun-
garian club had survived through merging with a district club. Years earlier, the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians had begun to diversify their sporting activities so as to include more typically Australian pastimes such as swimming, golf and tennis.

A comparison of the minorities also shows that, over the years, the more cohesive, centralised and stable Estonians and Latvians produced the smallest number of ex-service, national, and political associations, and were the most effective in maintaining choirs, dancing groups, Scout and Guide troops and Saturday schools. In recent years they have also been the most active in forming youth groups. These minorities had gradually concentrated their energies more markedly than others on activities that were congenial to Australian expectations and promised at least some measure of society-wide respect. At the same time they had played down those interests which, like soccer, did not improve their group image from the social status point of view, or, like political and nationalistic agitation, aroused a distinctly unfavourable response from the larger society. The more numerous Poles, divided and less stable in structure, were somewhat less consistent in their support of musical and theatre groups, and formed more ex-service, political, and national associations. But they too put considerable effort into Saturday schools, Scouts and Guides, and in the later years established a number of youth groups. At the extreme, the kinds of groups to which the markedly non-cohesive and unstable Czech and Hungarian minorities devoted more effort were the less viable sports, national, political and Catholic laymen’s associations.
The minorities differed in the way they went about achieving the goals described in the previous chapter. These differences can best be understood through an examination of the resources they mobilised in support of their community life. Amongst the most important of these were the publication of papers and newsletters and the harnessing of professional talent to group activities. Since it was quite impossible to arrive at even a rough estimate of the financial resources which the several minorities had been able to muster, an indicator of comparative affluence has been sought through a survey of one item of expenditure, namely expenditure on community properties. These three resources—publications, professional leadership, and the ownership of property—are the subject of the present chapter.

Newspapers and newsletters

At the time of the inquiry, no ethnic 'mass circulation papers' were published in Adelaide. The only example of this kind of publication ever produced in South Australia by post-war Eastern Europeans was the *Australijos Lietuvis (Australian Lithuanian)*, which first came out as a local newsletter in Leigh Creek in 1948 and later gained Australia-wide circulation as a fortnightly tabloid.

1 See Miriam Gilson and Jerzy Zubrzycki, *The Foreign-language Press in Australia 1848-1964*, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1967, p. vii and p. 26n., where the mass circulation press is defined as consisting of 'printed newspapers devoted to general information, primarily weeklies . . . [with] a substantial list of subscribers (usually not confined to one city, or state) and an income from advertising'. I have used Gilson and Zubrzycki's information on ethnic papers in Adelaide to check and supplement my own.
It ceased publication in 1956. The editor brought with him to Australia a typewriter and duplicator with the intention of producing a newspaper for his fellow-countrymen. From a one-man effort, financed out of his own pocket, his paper became the nucleus of a printing business in Adelaide. Here he continued to publish it until competition from Sydney and Melbourne community papers made him decide that his own had served its purpose. The *Australian Lithuanian* had never in fact been the organ of an association. It was a private venture designed to cater for all Lithuanians throughout the country.

For the mass circulation type of national paper, Adelaide residents relied on weeklies or fortnightlies published in Sydney or Melbourne, usually containing items of Adelaide news supplied by local correspondents. The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian community associations, the Hungarian Presbyterians, the Lithuanian Catholic congregation and the Russian Orthodox church published regular news bulletins, mostly monthly or more often. The *Australian Latvian Catholic Bulletin* was also being published in Adelaide in 1967, as the headquarters of the Australian Latvian Catholic Association, which rotates between states every two years, was currently in South Australia. The only other regular local publications were the Czech community club news bulletin, sent out twice a year, a Russian political group's bulletin, and a privately-issued Polish newsletter with a strong anti-communist line. The Serbian National Defence also produced a paper at irregular intervals. Of those eight minorities which were producing regular publications of some kind in 1967, nearly all had in the past issued other papers or bulletins which had been discontinued. So had the Bulgarians, Croats and Ukrainians. Only the Byelorussians, Slovaks and Slovenians appear never to have produced a regular local publication.

The minorities without regular community newsletters relied on word-of-mouth communication of group activities or used the 'News for New Citizens' weekly column in the Adelaide *Advertiser*. This column was a service provided by the morning daily for the publication of notices of forthcoming events submitted by ethnic clergy and office-bearers in ethnic associations. Despite representations to the *Advertiser* from the Good Neighbour Council on
behalf of the minority groups, this column was discontinued in 1967.

In addition to the news bulletin type of publication, the minorities also generated countless occasional and intermittent documents, such as booklets of religious readings, political pamphlets, and programs and booklets printed in connection with festivals of various kinds. The Lithuanian community association sponsored a comprehensive and excellently maintained museum and collection of archives. The Polish Historical Society, an independent association, collected Polish material. Estonians and Latvians sent documents to the central archives under the control of their respective federated bodies in Sydney. The Estonians, Latvians, Poles and Ukrainians also had libraries of native-language books. Only private collections of books and papers, spasmodically collected by interested individuals, existed in the other minorities.

It is probably not fortuitous that organised, community-sponsored regular media for disseminating news and ideas and preserving archival material were maintained by the more cohesive, centralised and stable minorities, but not by the other ethnic groups. The businesslike procedures which these minorities were able to establish obviously helped to ensure continuity of production, while the publications themselves seem to have been a significant factor in developing a common body of knowledge and promoting a common set of interests and enthusiasms among minority members. Although community newsletters seem at times to have been as partisan as church-sponsored or other publications avowedly devoted to a particular viewpoint, they have probably had a calming rather than an inflammatory influence on internecine conflicts, simply because they have ensured the spread of a minimum of 'hard' information and provided avenues both for letting off steam and for canvassing the reconciliation of opposing ideas. In the case of some minorities, the absence of a body of 'hard' data accessible to everyone appears to have encouraged misrepresentation and misunderstanding, while the lack of a medium for public debate of local issues has apparently increased the tendency for conflicts to be played out within the arena provided by the internal operation of the associations themselves.

Interest in collecting and preserving documents was at the time of the study confined to a few enthusiasts. But the very existence
of these collections—especially when organised with professional competence—acted then as in some measure a focus for group identity and a source of pride, and might well provide support for some future rallying of interest in ethnic history and culture.

**Professional leadership**
Like many other minority activities, the publication of newsletters and the preservation of archives can be undertaken by people with little or no qualifications or experience, but can also provide opportunity for trained immigrants to exercise their skills. From an examination of the qualifications of eighty leaders in literary activities, in intellectual, drama, musical and folk-dancing groups, including teachers in the Saturday schools, it appears that choirs, music-making and Saturday schools were the most successful groups in attracting the professionally-trained. Folk-dancing and drama drew to a lesser extent on well-qualified leaders and relied more on the enthusiasm of amateurs. Some historians, journalists, writers, and publishers became involved in producing newsletters and organising libraries, archives and museums, but non-professionally trained intellectuals—that is, people with a cultivated interest in art, letters and public affairs, and usually university graduates—predominated in these fields. The vigour and stability of a number of particular associations were clearly the direct outcome of the fact that one or two people, sometimes a married couple, had been the moving spirits in them for fifteen to eighteen years, not only recruiting and training participants, but also acting as entrepreneurs in arranging opportunities—such as music and drama festivals—for public performances.

Not all minorities were equally fortunate in securing the services of professionally-trained leaders, however. It will be recalled that continuity in the life of their associations is the criterion used in classifying the minorities as stable or less stable. Although the professional training of leaders provided no guarantee of continuity, nevertheless the rate of demise of associations was higher where professional leadership was lacking than where it was available. Some minorities, like the Bulgarians and Serbs, did not at any time develop substantial activities of the kind that could draw on professional leadership. Others, like the Czechs and Hungarians, relied heavily on non-professionals. Some of these were intellectuals.
Others were people of limited education seeking to enrich what they saw as the barren, materialistic, and often godless lives of their fellows, and to fill the cultural vacuum in which, as it seemed to them, their children were growing up. In addition to the obvious technical difficulties which they inevitably encountered in organising activities like schools, choirs and folk-dancing, inexperienced leaders often failed to gain the confidence of their fellow-countrymen. However realistic most immigrants were about the standards of cultural achievement to be expected from their small and newly established numbers, the more fastidious of them often gave only lukewarm support to what they saw as amateurish and 'low-brow' efforts.

 Without knowing the educational background of the ethnic populations in Adelaide, I cannot say whether some minorities could have been expected to be more culturally productive than others. But in even the most active groups, the number of professionals serving the associations was small, while in all minorities there certainly existed some people with skills that they had never—or only briefly—made available to their fellow-countrymen. It therefore seems unlikely that differences in leadership potential offer the main explanation for differences in the intensity of cultural life. What appears to have happened is that minorities which could muster a substantial body of fairly well educated supporters succeeded in establishing a varied group life around a core of secular singing, music, dance, and sport. These activities became mutually supporting, and arts with a narrower, more purely ethnic appeal, like drama, were nourished by their association with more popular activities. Where no such core developed, either the church provided the nucleus for a differently oriented group organisation, as among the Ukrainians, or activities were fragmentary and non-cumulative. In the latter case, people with talent were sometimes drawn into brief and frustrating participation in cultural activities or they devoted their energies to political and nationalist causes, or dissociated themselves altogether from community affairs. It is also notable that the very few immigrants who had made a place for themselves in cultural activities outside as well as within the ethnic group all belonged to the more vigorous, stable minorities. In the other groups, the few individuals who had become involved in the
cultural life of the wider society played no similar role in their own communities.

It is important, however, not to exaggerate the differences between the more vigorous minorities and the rest. Even in the most productive groups, key activities often hung precariously by a slim thread, largely dependent on the older-generation leaders who arrived in Australia as adults and had received their education as musicians, choir-singers, actors, teachers and so on in Europe. These older generation professionals were being assisted by a few younger people whom they had themselves trained in Adelaide, but—except for the coming generation of state-educated teachers and a few musicians—the younger people had had less opportunity for training and experience than their elders. Ethnic activities provided them with a hobby, not a vocation. In every minority there were people who predicted that the shortage of reliable, trained leaders would be the most serious limiting factor in maintaining ethnic culture in the future, as it had in many instances already proved in the past.

One important kind of professional role remains to be mentioned, the role of the clergy. The Orthodox churches to which most Bulgarians, Russians and Serbs and some Ukrainians belonged were essentially non-English-language churches, organised into ethnic communities. Although the Catholic church has not established national parishes in Australia, the ethnic priests in Adelaide were in fact working largely among their fellow-countrymen. Lutheran Estonians and Latvians and Hungarian Presbyterians had established their own church groups, and services, though not always held regularly, were in the native tongue.

In 1967 every minority included in the study, except the Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks and Slovenians, had at least one ethnic priest or pastor in Adelaide. The Ukrainians had the largest number, six in all. The Latvians were the only group with both a

2 In addition to the main church groups considered here, there are in Adelaide some small congregations of Eastern Europeans, like the Independent Slavic Pentecostal Church, composed of Russian emigrés who recently came to Australia from China, and the Molokan Holy Jumpers, members of a Russian religious sect, who settled in the United States early this century. See Tess Van Sommers, *Religions in Australia*, Rigby, Adelaide, 1966, pp. 165-70 for a brief account of Pentecostal groups, and pp. 135-8 for the Molokan Holy Jumpers.
permanent Protestant pastor and Catholic priest. Orthodox Bulgarian churchgoers attended the Greek, Serbian or Russian Orthodox churches. A Czech Catholic priest had died shortly before and not been replaced. The Slovak priest from Melbourne visited Adelaide about three times a year. The Presbyterian church assigned a Hungarian minister to a suburban parish, where he served both the local Australian congregation and the Hungarian Presbyterian community in Adelaide. Since this man left Adelaide in 1957, the Hungarian Presbyterians have not had a minister of their own, but they occasionally invite him, or another Hungarian pastor from interstate, to take special services. For the rest of the time monthly services are conducted by one of their own church elders. Some ethnic clergy had migrated to Australia as Displaced Persons, others had come later specifically to minister to their communities, sometimes in response to an invitation from the local people themselves. Like the cultural leaders referred to above, the clergy had no obvious source of replacement. Training institutions in Europe and the United States will presumably be able to provide native language speaking clergy for some time to come, but there seems to be a growing feeling that future clergy should be recruited from the Australian minorities themselves. At least one Adelaide priest was an immigrant who had gone from Australia to the United States for training, and one minority group was making arrangements for selected boys destined for the priesthood to live under the tutelage of the ethnic priest until the time came for them to go overseas to be educated in a seminary under the control of exiled priests from their native land.

Ownership of property
Soon after establishing their community groups, nearly all the minorities began to work towards acquiring a permanent home for themselves. Most bought their first properties between 1953 and 1959, and by 1960 at least one community association within every minority except the Slovaks and Slovenians owned property of some kind. (By 1970, the Slovenians were building their own hall.) By 1967, ten of the minorities had halls and meeting-rooms of some kind run by secular groups and seven had their own churches. The most elaborate community buildings contained large and small halls, with equipment for dramatic productions, kitchen, meeting-
rooms, school-rooms and library or archives. The more modest consisted only of meeting-rooms and had few amenities. Several minorities also owned country properties, used mainly for Scout, Guide and youth camps. A national organisation, the Latvian Relief Society, had built flats for aged people at Elizabeth. The Poles had established an orphanage.

Most buildings were erected or renovated gradually over a period of years. Materials were often given free and the work carried out by voluntary labour. For these reasons, and also because records were not always carefully kept, it is impossible to say exactly how great the investment in these properties has been. However, the minorities fell into three distinct categories so far as the value of their current properties was concerned. The Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, and Ukrainians each had properties worth about $100,000 or more. The Bulgarians, Croats, Estonians, Russians, and Serbs owned properties to the value of something less than $70,000. The rest had properties worth less than $20,000. Of the groups which owned substantial properties, the predominantly Catholic Poles and Lithuanians, the Orthodox Russians and Serbs, and the mixed Catholic and Orthodox Ukrainians had devoted the greater part of their resources to churches and to institutions, like the Polish orphanage, directly under the control of the church. The predominantly Protestant Latvian and Estonian minorities, on the other hand, had used their considerable wealth to provide buildings and facilities for their secular community groups. In 1967 neither minority had a place of worship of its own, but the Latvians are building a church.

The better-equipped halls were rented out and provided a valuable regular income for the community associations: in 1965-6, for example, the Bulgarians had an income of $2,500 from their hall. The fine Latvian and Estonian halls, both located in upper class residential suburbs, were in constant demand. The possession of property also had a fairly obvious social significance. Even the simplest building and facilities encouraged an active group life and assured a degree of independence and privacy. A spirit of competition within and between minorities also acted as an incentive to achieving high standards, as fine, well-equipped buildings that compared favourably with the accommodation of other associations—ethnic or Australian—were a source of pleasure and pride: senti-
ments that were nicely conveyed in a Latvian publication which recorded in 1953 that

The last important achievement of the Latvians in Adelaide is their purchase of a house. It has been much discussed, much argued, but now at last all societies have agreed. Who knows, Adelaide may have to organize Cultural Days (a nation-wide annual festival) again, and then we may be able to show our visitors—look, here is our house!\(^3\)

In some other cases, buildings that were located in the poorer areas of the city and had remained cramped, shabby and lacking in amenities while plans for their renovation fizzled out time and again, had become an embarrassing burden and a major influence deterring the more discriminating or status-conscious immigrants from taking part in community life.

The very process of acquiring and maintaining property also provided the occasion for substantial and often highly satisfying co-operative effort, in the form of planning, fund-raising and building operations, scheduling the use of facilities and caring for the buildings once in use. Building operations were typically regular weekend social events continuing over periods of many months and drawing into active participation people not normally involved in community affairs—both men, who worked on the site, and women, who provided them with meals. Indeed, by 1967, some people looked nostalgically back on these times as the highlight of their community’s history, when, as it now seemed, everyone gave generously of their time, labour, and money to achieve a major goal they held in common. One can foresee that in the future the properties themselves will become a factor in the survival of the ethnic groups as distinct entities.

\(^3\) Alberts Prieditis (ed.), *Latvieši Austrāliā* [Latvians in Australia], Apgāds Austra, Melbourne, 1953, p. 70.
Although none of the ethnic minorities in Adelaide consists of a representative cross-section of the society of origin, each contains people of markedly divergent background and current occupations, interests, and values. Certain role expectations and certain structural arrangements have emerged to facilitate the pursuit of common goals and the protection of identity in these heterogeneous groups. People who showed a high degree of tolerance and patience, a willingness to act as links between groups and a capacity to provide concrete help to their fellow-immigrants were the most likely to win general respect. Those who tried to use the ethnic associational structure too blatantly to advance political causes or promote their own individual ambitions—sometimes diffuse status ambitions, sometimes specifically political or economic—had gradually been separated from the main streams of minority affairs. Sometimes they carried one or two faithful associations with them or successfully established themselves in the Australian community. More often, they drifted into a more or less embittered isolation.

Community associations sometimes developed for the specific purpose of co-ordinating already long-established interest groups. For example, after the celebration of one thousand years of Polish Christianity was completed, the Millennium Committee was kept in existence so that it could continue to exercise the co-ordinating functions it had carried out in organising the celebrations. Some highly cohesive minorities were successful in creating well-rationalised procedures for integrating associational activities. All secular Estonian associations, for example, came under the umbrella of the Adelaide Estonian Society, and an annual planning meeting, at
which the Lutheran church was also represented, worked out the calendar of events for the coming year.

As time went by and the unity of anti-communist sentiment waned, the emergence of sharp ideological differences among their members presented certain minorities with a serious challenge. We shall see shortly that the outcome was sometimes the splitting or fragmentation of the minority community. But there were also other responses to the threat to co-operative endeavour implied in these changes. One was the deliberate decision made by a number of associations—and sometimes formally written into the constitution, sometimes not—to concentrate on social, cultural or religious goals, and to ban any kind of involvement with partisan sentiments or causes. In a publication in 1966, for example, the Latvian Federation of Australia declared:

We have not had any great fights or arguments. This was feared at first, especially when it was proposed that the old political parties should be revived and incorporated in the Federation. The members, supported by the press, decided not to revive the parties, as there was not enough reason for their revival and it was thought that the strength [of the Federation] would be undermined by party divisions.¹

A second and very different response to the threat posed by the decline of ideological unity was for decision-making to become concentrated in the hands of one or two individuals or a small committee, who were able to operate with the minimum of pressure from, or responsibility to, the diverse membership by suspending—or only intermittently observing—the normal processes of holding regular meetings and electing officers.

These trends were emerging while the disruptive effects of intra-minority cleavages were becoming apparent, but they did not always suffice to prevent dissension from developing into open conflict. As a preliminary to a more detailed discussion of the nature and outcome of these cleavages, however, it should be made clear that some factors which might have been expected to produce conflict had not done so, or not to any notable extent. I refer particularly to ethnic differences between members of the same nation-state and inter-denominational differences. Separate ethnic struc-

tures kept nationally-minded Slovaks apart from Czechs, Serbs from Croats, Ukrainians and Byelorussians from Russians. Mutual hostility remained, but confrontations were rare, and usually the result of Australians ignoring the claims of each of these groups to separate identity and treating them collectively as ‘Czechoslovaks’, or ‘Yugoslavs’ or ‘Russians’.

**Ethnic churches**

As Table 3 shows, there was scope enough for inter-denominational cleavage. The predominantly Catholic Polish and Hungarian minorities and the mainly Orthodox Russians included small Protestant groups, and the largely Protestant Latvians contained a small Catholic congregation. The Ukrainians were mostly Catholic, but included a sizeable Orthodox community. There were a few Moslems, not ethnically organised, among the Croats, and some Jews and small sects in several minorities. We learnt of isolated instances of tension between different denominations within the one minority, but recorded very many more cases where adherents of different religions co-operated in secular associations and supported fund-raising and social activities organised by one another’s church-affiliated associations. In a number of cases the source of this cooperation was a family in which husband and wife followed different faiths.

It was the cleavages within, not between, denominations that had been crucial to the development of ethnic minority structure in Adelaide. In the Orthodox communities, dissension revolved around issues that are the subject of world-wide controversy. The source of these controversies and the forms they have taken are extremely complex, and cannot be treated adequately here. The common theme is the question of jurisdiction or autonomy. Although the Orthodox churches have established procedures by which a new autocephalous, or independent, church may be formally recognised by the appropriate mother church, the mother churches are in practice extremely reluctant to grant such recognition. In recent times, challenge to the authority of the mother churches has come from two principal sources. In North America in particular the Orthodox communities founded in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by migrants from Eastern Europe eventually lost their sense of attachment to the mother churches in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catholic and Roman Catholic</th>
<th>Church of England</th>
<th>Orthodox</th>
<th>Lutheran</th>
<th>Presbyterian</th>
<th>Hebrew</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>290</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1,637</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>2,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1,795</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>2,410</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>4,903</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>665</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,282</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>3,186</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>2,827</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>4,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,392</strong></td>
<td><strong>228</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,021</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,230</strong></td>
<td><strong>172</strong></td>
<td><strong>131</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,746</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,920</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Europe. Mladenovic's description of the development of the Orthodox churches in Canada seems to apply generally to North America:

in spite of all the nationalistic eagerness displayed by their mother churches, Orthodox communities in Canada continued to relax their trans-atlantic ties more and more with every new generation born here. The increasing impact of their new surroundings and the effect of the distance between them and their old sources of tradition persisted in giving Orthodox Canadians an ever-deepening feeling of the remoteness from the roots of their national and religious past, a feeling which slowly but steadily has been developing into an attitude of quasi-indifference towards their mother churches.\(^2\)

This estrangement, Mladenovic goes on to note, has been increased with the establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Refugees from communist Europe often reinforced separatist tendencies for they saw the mother churches as the tools of the communist state. The outcome of these developments is that there have emerged in North America numerous independent Orthodox churches, many of them sustaining close relations with one another. The possibility of their forming some kind of union is widely discussed.

The principal Eastern European Orthodox communities in Adelaide are the Russian, Serbian, and Ukrainian. Russian immigrants established the Parish of St Nicholas soon after their arrival in Adelaide. The Parish adheres to the Russian Orthodox Church (Abroad), established immediately after the Revolution by Russian exiles with the authority of the Moscow Patriarch, who anticipated that, under communist rule, he would no longer be able to exercise his office as head of the church. Although the Moscow Patriarchy has in fact continued in existence, the Russian Orthodox Church (Abroad) has remained independent under its own Metropolitan, now resident in New York. The Adelaide community is linked to the Metropolitan through the Ruling Archbishop of the Australian and New Zealand Church, located in Sydney.

In the early fifties, friction between clergy and laity led to the removal of the first priest for alleged communist sympathies. Con-

continuing conflict culminated in a crisis in 1955 over the location of the church whose construction was under consideration. The outcome was that the priest and a minority of lay followers severed their connection with the Russian Orthodox Church (Abroad) and established their own parish, now known as the Hillside Church, under the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Church. The original community has maintained the adherence of the majority of Russian emigrants in Adelaide.

Soon after arriving in Adelaide, Serbian immigrants founded an Orthodox Church, under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch in Belgrade. Dissension within the community came to a head in 1960, when, with some public unpleasantness, the community divided its church properties and split into two. One group continued under the jurisdiction of the Belgrade Patriarch and was accused of being sympathetic to communism as a result. The other eventually placed itself under the Free Serbian Orthodox Church which emerged in the United States following upon the refusal of the ruling American Bishop to continue to accept the authority of the Belgrade Patriarch. As the outcome of a visit by the American Bishop to Australia in 1965, an Australian Diocese, with its own Bishop, was established; the Free Church in Adelaide then came under his jurisdiction.

The stormy history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Australia is reflected in the organisation of the Adelaide Orthodox congregation. Only a brief summary of this complicated story can be given here.8 Within four years of the arrival of the first Orthodox priest in Australia in 1948, the church had split into three divisions. One was a constituent part of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Foreign Lands (UAOC). The Autocephalous Orthodox Church was founded in 1942 as an indepen-
dent fully national Ukrainian church. Its founders were priests who had previously accepted the authority of the Patriarch in Moscow, but now, for political as well as religious reasons, decided to sever their connections with the Russian-dominated Autonomous Church. When the Soviet armies reconquered Ukraine, the leaders of the UAOC fled to the west. One of them, Archbishop Polykarp, became the Metropolitan of the new church when it was reorganised in Germany, and in 1948 he designated Father A. Teodorowycz, a Ukrainian priest who had come to Australia as an IRO immigrant, as the administrator of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Australia.

The second Australian church was established by Bishop Sylvester, a former Kiev professor, who had been consecrated as bishop of the newly formed Autocephalous Church in 1942. Before leaving Germany to migrate to Australia in 1949, however, Bishop Sylvester severed his connection with the UAOC and announced his intention of establishing an independent episcopate in Australia. The parish which he founded on arrival at Redfern (Sydney) followed a so-called 'Council-led' group which had broken away from the UAOC in Foreign Lands at a church congress in Aschaffenburg, Germany, in 1947.

A third parish was formed when the members of Bishop Sylvester's congregation split, one group following the Bishop and his clergy, the other, dominated by lay members, placing themselves under the jurisdiction of the head of the 'Council-led' group, resident in the United States. In 1953, immediately after being appointed by the UAOC in Foreign Lands as head of the Church in Australia and New Zealand, Archbishop Ivan Danilyuk brought about a reconciliation with Bishop Sylvester, who placed himself under the Archbishop's jurisdiction. A similar attempt to bring the 'Council-led' Redfern group back into the fold failed, and additional parishes, one of them in Adelaide, joined the 'Council-led' group, which established a Regional Church Council, elected their own leader, later known as Bishop Donat, and sent him to the United States where he was consecrated as Bishop in 1955.

After the sudden death of Archbishop Ivan at the end of 1953, Bishop Sylvester was elected as head of the UAOC in Australia and New Zealand, with the title of Archbishop. Conflict between the new Archbishop and the Church Council soon developed, however,
and in 1956 culminated in the situation where three Council meetings were held in Melbourne at the same time. One consisted of the priests and laymen who, following the dispute with Archbishop Sylvester, had decided no longer to accept his leadership and had requested, and been granted, permission to place themselves under the immediate jurisdiction of the Metropolitan in West Germany. The other two Councils were called by agreement between Archbishop Sylvester and Bishop Donat. The legitimacy of Bishop Donat's episcopal consecration had previously been one of the major issues in dispute between Archbishop Sylvester and the Council. These latter two Councils agreed to form a 'United UAOC' in Australia, with Archbishop Sylvester as its head and acknowledging the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan of the UAOC in Foreign Lands. Shortly afterwards one of the 'Council-led' parishes broke away from this United church. The church in Australia was thus split into two groups, each claiming to be the legitimate affiliate of the UAOC in Foreign Lands in Australia. Recognising this split, the Metropolitan decided to form two Eparchies in Australia, one the 'Metropolitan Eparchy' the other the 'United Eparchy of the UAOC'.

Some indication of the repercussions of this division is given in the account by Teodorowych. 'The parallel existence of two eparchies', he writes,

without the establishment of territorial boundaries to their activity, or of other objective bases for the distribution of the faithful, led to unhealthy competition in places, and the creation of parallel parishes on the basis of territorial . . . distinctions and traditions.4

Following his arrival in Australia in 1959 as head of the Metropolitan Eparchy, Bishop Varlaam sought to re-establish church unity. One obstacle was removed when, in 1962, he accepted the legitimacy of Bishop Donat's status. On the retirement of Archbishop Sylvester in 1965, Bishop Donat became head of the United Eparchy. Progress towards unity between the two Eparchies, however, generated further tensions, and after Bishop Donat had become head of the unified UAOC in Australia, several parishes broke away and placed themselves under the independent jurisdic-

4 Ukrainians in Australia, p. 180.
tion of Archbishop Sylvester, who emerged temporarily from retirement, and eventually under the ruling bishop of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada. Conflict over the ownership of church property is still going on between these parishes and Bishop Donat. Several 'Council-led' parishes have remained under the jurisdiction of their American head.

The establishment of four Ukrainian Orthodox parishes in Adelaide is to be understood in the context of these church events on the national and international scene. St Michael's parish was founded in 1950; it appeared in 1967 to be still the largest parish, but had diminished to about 150 families following the decision of its members to transfer from the Metropolitan Eparchy to the jurisdiction of Archbishop Sylvester and later of the head of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada. The Holy Protectress parish was founded in 1957 under the jurisdiction of Bishop Donat; it became part of the United Eparchy, and is now under the jurisdiction of Bishop Donat and the Metropolitan of the UAOC, resident in New York since the death of the former Metropolitan in Germany. In 1967 this parish had something over one hundred member families. Both St Michael's and the Holy Protectress parishes have their own church properties.

The third parish, the Holy Trinity Mission Centre, affiliated with other 'Council-led' groups in 1953 and became part of the Regional Church Council which in 1955 elected Bishop Donat as their leader. The parish later became part of the United Eparchy and in 1959 moved from the jurisdiction of the United Eparchy to the Metropolitan Eparchy. It is now under the jurisdiction of Bishop Donat. The church is the private property of the priest, and in 1967 the congregation numbered only about twenty families. The fourth parish of St Vladimir's is served by the priest who established the Holy Protectress parish in 1957. It is under the jurisdiction of Archbishop Grigory, head of the 'Council-led' UAOC in the United States. This parish owns no property and consists now of only a few families.

The church organisation of Orthodox Ukrainians in Adelaide at the present time thus reflects the wider divisions that have challenged church unity over the past twenty odd years. All these major divisions have found their representatives in Adelaide. In these conflicts two general underlying issues can be discerned. One
is the distribution of authority between ruling bishops, parish priests, and laymen. On a number of occasions splits have occurred because of the unwillingness of clergy and laymen to accept decisions which, they believed, were being imposed without adequate consultation with the church Council. As its name suggests, the ‘Council-led’ movement which developed in Germany in 1947 originated over this issue of the location of authority. On the other hand, there also appears to have been an abiding concern over legitimacy. Although the structure of the Orthodox Church is such that a congregation of believers can in practice operate more or less autonomously, there is nevertheless a clear acceptance of the value of formal recognition by which the parish is directly associated with the sanctioned leadership of the church, and hence legitimated as belonging to the one Christian community of unbroken tradition. In fact, the Adelaide situation suggests that this concern over legitimacy is justified, for the parishes which have joined the dominant groups within the international church have flourished, while the others appear to have suffered from their isolation and equivocal status. There is, of course, an element of tautology in this interpretation, since presumably the support of local parishes helps a central organisation to maintain its position of world leadership.

Protopresbyter A. Teodorowych summed up his account of the history of the Ukrainian church in Australia in these words:

The maladies and weaknesses of our church life did not arise on this continent. We brought them here with us from Europe, and perhaps even from the lands we were born in.5

But it is not only that these immigrants brought the seeds of dissension with them to Australia, nor that they have been simply the visible actors in a play directed from distant and hidden centres of power. A more accurate interpretation is that the world-scale drama has provided them—particularly the church leaders— with no more than the skeleton for a plot, a pattern and sanction for confrontations that remain in many respects essentially local and personal.

Though in the Orthodox communities there was dissension over clerical domination of minority affairs, it did not develop

5 Ibid., p. 186.
into organised opposition to the church establishment as such. It was in the predominantly Catholic Hungarian, Lithuanian and Polish groups that major conflicts over church-community relations arose.

The claim of the Catholic priests to exercise general authority within the community rested on two grounds: their spiritual functions and their traditional role as guardians of ethnic culture and identity. Although, especially in the early days, they acted often as intermediaries in dealings between their fellow-countrymen and local institutions, such as hospitals, government departments and banks, they did not provide an effective link with Australian Catholic individuals or institutions. Indeed, their lack of recognition in the Australian community clearly acted to depress their standing in their own, and hence to discourage strict adherence to their authority. On many issues they did not share common understandings with their parishioners and when they appeared to the faithful to be acting autocratically and in disregard of lay opinion, they saw themselves as providing necessary guidance to people who did not know what they wanted and were floundering in alien waters. As one priest said to us, 'What is the good of a committee? They will always have different opinions. It is better to do it yourself.'

Among the Hungarians a few influential individuals softened the impact of church-community conflict by continuing to take a part in both church and anti-clerical groups. But by 1966, some fourteen years after the original confrontation, the outcome seemed to be the consolidation of a number of devout families around the church and the fragmentation and decline of opposing groups. In the Lithuanian minority the split resulted in Catholic and community centres duplicating accommodation, Saturday schools, and newsletters. Although some bitterness remained, and much regret for the uneconomical dispersal of effort, by 1966 many Lithuanians were again supporting both church and community, earnest efforts having been made on both sides to prevent the breach from becoming permanently debilitating. In the much larger Polish minority, dissension between church and community was only one of a number of issues that had erupted into open conflict from time to time. This particular controversy centred around the provision of accommodation for Polish activities. It resulted in the establish-
ment of two centres: one, a Catholic centre, consisting mainly of a chapel and an orphanage run by Polish nuns; the other, an old house with some meeting facilities, owned by the community association. It was apparently largely in response to conflict between community and church, and the meagreness of accommodation and facilities which resulted from this conflict, that Polish residents in the outer suburbs developed their own vigorous and largely autonomous communities.

**Political alignments**

As already noted, the anti-communist ideology shared by most Eastern European immigrants did not prevent intra-minority dissension on political issues. It was particularly in the minorities from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia, whose numbers had been increased by recent waves of refugees and immigrants, that there developed confrontations between hard-line anti-communists and moderates. The hard-liners accused the moderates of falling victim to communist propaganda. At worst, they suspected the newer arrivals of being communist infiltrators, planted among them by Soviet authorities. At the associational level, conflict arose over questions like supporting visiting artists from communist states, and using in the Saturday schools text-books produced in the home country, and made available free or at very low cost as—many hard-liners believed—an insidious form of propaganda. The youth groups established in several minorities in recent years represent a considered and organised attempt to combat communist influence among the younger generation.

During the sixties, dissension in the Serb and Croat minorities was provoked by the foundation of a 'Yugoslav' association, initiated by recent arrivals from Yugoslavia committed to promoting the ideal of national unity and developing a favourable image of the Yugoslav state under the present communist régime.

The dissension which split the Czech community in 1964 was the outcome of a conflict which had divided Australian Czechs over a number of years and which reflected deep-seated divisions at the international level. The issue at stake was how far refugee...
Czechs should persist in an uncompromising anti-communist line or support policies of 'gradualism' or co-existence. The Council for Free Czechoslovakia, the international supreme political body of Czech exiles, moved in the late fifties towards the gradualism position, and in the process alienated many of the people who had previously accepted its leadership. In 1961 the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN) suspended the Council for Free Czechoslovakia representation because of alleged deviation from the Assembly's anti-communist position, and a newly formed body, the Committee for Free Czechoslovakia, gained ACEN recognition as the legitimate spokesman for Czech exiles throughout the world.

Before the foundation of the Committee for Free Czechoslovakia, one of the two Czech representatives on the ACEN delegation in Australia was the President of the Czechoslovak Club in South Australia, who had also been a member of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia since 1948, and Chairman of the Alliance of Czech Clubs in Australia since 1956. Following the foundation of the Committee for Free Czechoslovakia in 1961, a supporter of the new Committee replaced the Czech Club President as one of the two Czech members of the ACEN delegation in Australia. Disension over the issue of anti-communism became compounded through personality clashes and confrontations between supporters of different political parties in pre-communist Czechoslovakia. Matters came to a head in 1964, when a splinter group broke away from the Czech Club in protest against the Club having taken part in the Adelaide Festival of Arts, thus implicitly associating itself with the visiting Black Theatre of Prague, one of the principal Festival attractions of that year. The dissident members accused the Club of refusing to take part in an anti-communist demonstration organised by the Council of the Voice of Witnesses of Communist Oppression in 1962, exercising censorship over the Club newsletter, Zivot, controlling admissions to Club membership in order to stifle opposition, and in general compromising with communism and promoting a 'narrow political attitude'. While the Club was dominated by National Socialists and its President envisaged that only two political parties, Communists and National Socialists, would have a place in free Czechoslovakia, the splinter group consisted
THE BLACK THEATRE OF PRAQUE IN AUSTRALIA

MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S SECOND FRONT

It's time every Australian citizen considered why Communist Cultural Bodies outnumber other Societies from free friendly countries, when Australia has no Cultural Exchange Agreements with the Countries behind the Iron Curtain. This means that all Cultural Communist Bodies have come to Australia through the arrangements of private bodies or private persons - not by Government sanction.

Mr. Khrushchev in his speech at the 21st Communist Congress in Moscow ordered the use of Culture in the Cold war in order to infiltrate and undermine the Western Democratic Countries.

Professor J. Bishop - Red Violinist Jasek - University of Adelaide. From the Communist Czechoslovakian press we learn, that at the beginning of 1959 a vacancy existed for a violin teacher in the Conservatorium of Music in the University of Adelaide. The director of the Conservatorium, Prof. John Bishop, in searching for a candidate turned to Moscow, and asked help of the Soviet violinist D. Oistrach. Oistrach recommended the Czech violinist Ladislav Jasek from Prague. So Jasek came to Australia. Then Jasek, with the help of Prof. Bishop, arranged the Festival of Czech Music in Adelaide in 1959, sponsored by the Communist Czech broadcast in Prague. This Festival was described by the Communistic Czech broadcast in Prague as not so much a Cultural as a Political Invasion of great significance to Australia. Prof. Bishop was rewarded by the Communist Dvorak Medal from Czechoslovakia.

Musica Viva Society. From programmes of Communist performances in Australia we learn that they were arranged by the Musica Viva Society. - Who does this? - What are the Anti-Communist Members of this Society doing? - An ignorance of facts causes a Social Acceptance which could cause the Death of Australia.

Australia - Soviet Union Friendship Association. From Members of the Czech Philharmonic Orchestra we learnt that the expenses of this body (over 100 men) were paid by the Communist Czech Government. The fees for their performances in Australia (thousands of pounds) were given to this Association. - The Leader of the Australian Communist Delegation to Moscow, Mr. Sharkey, at the 21st Communist Congress highly praised this Association for its work in respect to the aims of the Communist Party.

DO NOT SUPPORT COMMUNIST PERFORMANCES IN AUSTRALIA!
DO NOT ENTERTAIN THEIR MEMBERS!
BY SO DOING YOU COULD UNWITTINGLY HELP TO FULFIL MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S STATEMENT TO THE WEST:

"I WILL BURY YOU"

S. POKORY, President of the Alliance of the Czechoslovakian Democratic Organisations in Australia and New Zealand.
of supporters of the opposing National Democratic Party and the Catholic Church.

National support for the Democratic Czech group in Adelaide crystallised at a meeting of the federal body, the Alliance of Czechoslovak Democratic Associations in Australia, held in Melbourne in March 1964. As an outcome of this conference, the Alliance published, in English and Czech, a pamphlet called *Positive Anti-Communism*, which presented proposals for moral, economic and social reform as a guide-line for planning towards a free Czechoslovakia. The program had also a wider aim, for it was recommended as the basis for action in ACEN and all exile national organisations, 'a sort of a program of an exile coalition'. And it was to be 'propagated even now by radio and by these means into all the countries behind the Iron Curtain, so that there, too it could be studied, improved, and different possibilities of its application be sought by the people'. The concluding section of the pamphlet contained a vigorous rejection of co-existence. 'The acceptance of co-existence', it said, 'would mean the intellectual and moral suicide of the exiles and the whole Western world ... We should not let ourselves be beguiled by the naïve notion that by co-existence we can improve the Communist system ... The moral and intellectual sterility of co-existence and gradualism only ... prepares the conditions for further Communist aggression.'

The formal problem of representation on ACEN was eventually solved by an agreement that one of the Czech delegates should be a representative on the Council for Free Czechoslovakia and the other a representative on the Committee. With the passing of time, some of the bitterness of the early 1960s has evaporated, but the split in the Adelaide Czech community has not been healed. It has deterred many Czech immigrants from involving themselves in community affairs and discouraged the development of stable and effective non-political activities.

As the Czech example illustrates, conflict over the stance taken by immigrant groups towards contemporary communist régimes is

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8 Ibid., pp. 19-21.
Community and Identity

often tied up with pre-communist party politics. Indeed, although a number of immigrants, including a few minority leaders, have at some time been active in local politics, notably the Democratic Labor Party, the significant lines of cleavage are still drawn overwhelmingly in terms of pre-communist political structures in the immigrants' home countries and the successors to these that have been formed in exile.

A brief account of the history of one of the major Russian political associations will illustrate how complex these groupings can be.

The Russians who did not return home at the end of the last war were, of course, in a different situation from other refugee groups because an emigré community—or series of communities—had already been established in the west for over twenty years, and in the course of those years had generated an intricately ramified network of co-operating and competing associations. In his study published in 1955, Dvinov listed forty-eight Russian emigré political associations (that is, as apart from cultural and other types of groups) in existence in Europe at some time between the 1920s and 1953.9 I do not know how many of these have been represented among Russians in Australia, but the major post-war organisations have at some time had branches, affiliated groups, or individual members in Adelaide.

Probably the most powerful of the present Russian emigré organisations is the NTS, or National Alliance of Russian Solidarists, which held its first Congress in 1930. During the 1930s the group developed links with Fascist organisations in Germany and Italy, and adopted an ideology and structure that owed much to Fascist example. Its members saw themselves as controlling the whole exile movement for the overthrow of the communist government in Russia, and during the war collaborated with the Germans in the hope that a German victory would secure them the dominant position in a 'liberated' Russia. Doubts about Nazi support, however, led to a decline in NTS's enthusiasm for collaboration, while the Germans for their part became increasingly uneasy about the NTS's extreme nationalism. In 1944 almost the entire leadership was arrested by the Gestapo. The group survived, however, and after the war repudiated its German association and tried to adapt

its program in such a manner as to secure the goodwill of the western democracies.\textsuperscript{10} It set up a broadcasting station, Radio Free Russia, and from its headquarters in Frankfurt began publishing a variety of political and cultural materials, the most important of which are a monthly magazine, \textit{Grani}, and a weekly newspaper, \textit{Posev}, a source of information on happenings inside the Soviet Union, allegedly supplied by NTS members living in Soviet countries.

NTS is essentially a Russian organisation, aimed at 'the overthrow of the communist régime in Russia and its substitution by a democratic system'. Although acknowledging the right of 'all the peoples integrated into the Russian state to become independent', it nevertheless holds 'that such dismemberment is not desirable'. 'It aspires to preserve the unity of the great family of Russian peoples and proposes a truly federal state.'\textsuperscript{11} To the non-Russian Soviet minorities, NTS's program means nothing more than the substitution of a new form of Russian domination for the present oppression by the Russian-controlled communist state. Anti-NTS references are common in the literature of the non-Russian emigres. Here and elsewhere convincing claims have been made that NTS both receives financial support from the United States and harbours Soviet agents.\textsuperscript{12}

Writing in 1955, Dvinov had concluded that 'The NTS, although able to preserve the appearance of unity somewhat longer than most emigre organisations, in its turn is beginning to

\textsuperscript{10} See ibid., chapter IV, for a detailed account of the origins of NTS and its activities during and after World War II.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{NTS: Union of Russian Solidarists}, published by the NTS Section for External Relations, Frankfurt am Main, 1961, pp. 30-1.

\textsuperscript{12} Dvinov, \textit{Politics of the Russian Emigration}, chapter XI, contains details and evidence of Soviet provocation and infiltration of NTS; pp. 189, 191, 193 have references to U.S. support of NTS. See also G. D. Gourjian, 'Russian emigration and the anti-communist struggle', \textit{The Ukrainian Quarterly}, vol. XV, no. 2, June 1969, pp. 116-27; on p. 126 Gourjian writes, 'It is commonly assumed that the NTS is receiving financial and political support from the United States, as does the Central Association [of Post-war Refugees]. . . . Both organizations recruit their membership from recent Soviet escapees. Many of those who recently returned to the USSR were in key positions in the NTS and Central Association. Thus they knew all the "secrets" of Russian political emigrés and their relations with the United States organizations.' See also N. P. Vakar, \textit{Belorussia: The Making of a Nation}, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, pp. 187-8 for a brief account of how the NTS was used by the Germans to support the oppressive German occupation of Byelorussia.
succumb to internal conflicts.'\textsuperscript{13} While NTS did not in fact disintegrate, the conflicts to which Dvinov referred—over Russian infiltration and the acceptance of American financial support—resulted in a split and the formation of a new group, the Democratic Union of Russian Anti-Bolshevists, both groups working, according to one member of the Democratic Union, parallel to one another rather than in opposition. Since 1950, the Melbourne NTS has published a paper, \textit{Unification}, which is distributed in the other states, including South Australia. A \textit{Bulletin} is also produced by the Democratic Union from its headquarters in Adelaide. It carries reports on the current situation in the USSR and on other Russian communities abroad, and announcements about forthcoming events and reports of past activities in the Adelaide community. It also contains fiercely anti-left-wing comments on Australian political affairs; an article in April 1970 condemning the approaching Moratorium march is an example.\textsuperscript{14} The Democratic Union's general alienation from Australian society is indicated in an article called 'Without a Career', published in 1969. The translator's summary is as follows:

Man's real career is to aid the development of his native land; thus we immigrants are without a career. Our brothers in the Soviet Union are also without a career, since they are not working for the true development of Russia. The foreign peoples among whom we live do not understand Russia; they fear it and write untruths about it. They don't believe what we say. We have to accept inferior positions here, but it is better to live without a successful career in the accepted sense than to betray man's real career.\textsuperscript{15}

Leaders of the Democratic Union were responsible for the recent introduction of a new kind of activity, the 'Living Newspaper'. Contributions on a wide range of cultural, social, and political topics are presented at meetings held about every two months and open to anyone interested to attend.

In our material in general, associations identified with a particular political position are certainly under-represented, since these were the groups the immigrants were most reluctant to talk about.

\textsuperscript{13} Dvinov, \textit{Politics of the Russian Emigration}, p. 191.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Bulletin} of the Russian Democratic Union, 1 March 1969, pp. 1-2.
Nevertheless our impression that controversy over political issues was played out mostly within associations—often taking the form of inter-personal frictions and rivalry for office—may well be correct.

These political struggles, frequently linked with the church controversies referred to above, have been paramount factors in the fluctuating fortunes of both community and special interest associations. When control of an association was seized by one political element, members of different persuasions often either melted away or split off to form new groups. When every group activity became saturated by political controversy—and moreover, controversy over what were often regarded as dead and meaningless issues—many people lost interest and withdrew from community affairs altogether.16

16 See Dunsdorfs, Third Latvia, p. 192: ‘Nothing prevents people from joining an organisation more than dissent among the leaders of societies’.
The Eastern European minorities in Adelaide have developed structural arrangements, defined goals and mobilised resources to achieve these goals in a multi-dimensional context. One dimension of this context consists of the national and international organisations of their expatriate fellow-countrymen. Another is the multi-ethnic immigrant world itself. Relationships of the Adelaide minorities with nation-wide and international ethnic bodies and the development of local inter-minority groups are discussed in the present chapter. In Chapter 7, we shall change perspective and look at these minorities in the context of that part of the organised group life of the Australian community to which they have had to relate. In both of these chapters we shall continue to focus on associational affiliations and links, recognising that this is only part of the total pattern of interaction between Adelaide migrants and other people.

**National and international ethnic federations**

By far the most important nation-wide bodies are the federal organisations of the several state secular community associations. The nature of these federal bodies varies greatly, from the kind of highly-organised, active and coherent group represented by the Australian Latvian Federation to more loosely-knit structures like the Croatian Federal Conference. As one would expect, the functions assumed by the more highly organised bodies were found to be more comprehensive and to have more impact on the life of the local minority than in the case of the more loosely organised groups. The Latvian Federation provides an example of a national body that has now played a major role in ethnic affairs for about
twenty years. It was formed in Melbourne in 1951, with the aims of encouraging co-operation among state associations in social, cultural and relief activities, maintaining national traditions and establishing contact with Latvian exiles in other countries with the hope of eventually creating a world-wide federal body. The location of the President and governing committee rotates every three years between Sydney, Melbourne, and Adelaide.

One of the first activities of the Australian Federation was to organise a festival of Latvian music, theatre, dance, arts and crafts, painting and sports in Sydney at Christmas 1951. These 'Cultural Days' have been held every year since, in the various capital cities in turn, and are attended by many hundreds of Latvians from all states. Their planning is a major undertaking and demands the devoted attention of the host community for a year or more in advance. Profits are used in part to assist soloists, conductors and other participants, and to provide initial finance for the planning of the next festival and a contribution to the Cultural Fund. This is the Fund which the founders of the Federation, with notable foresight, established in 1952 to ensure its financial viability. Income is derived from various sources, including the Cultural Days and the annual door-knock appeal. It is through this Fund that the Federation supports an impressive variety of activities, including the Saturday schools, musical productions and competitions, creative writing, painting, the preservation of archives, and student loans. The Federation is directly responsible for the Central Archives, housed in Sydney, the Musical Archives, in Adelaide, and an Information Fund, located in Melbourne, which is concerned mainly with the dissemination of anti-communist literature. It appears to be highly effective in keeping widely dispersed Latvian populations in touch with one another and in uniting a multiplicity of activities and interests together into a coherent pattern of community life. It also provides the link between Latvians in Australia and overseas through its membership of the World Latvian Federation.

Like the community associations, ex-servicemen's, national, political and liberation movements are also in most cases affiliated in some way with the national and international bodies which were formed immediately after the war, with headquarters in London, the United States, or Latin America. Some of these were new
groups: most—like NTS and the Latvian Daugavas Vanagi—were continuations of associations that had previously existed among pre-war exiles or in the home country. Australia-wide meetings of delegates from these groups sometimes take place, usually incidental to meetings of community associations, but interstate activities involving the membership as a whole are rare.

Except under the umbrella of one or two of the community bodies, cultural associations do not usually have formal national affiliations. Sports groups sometimes do, and Scouts and Guides are active in organising camps and meetings in conjunction with their ethnic counterparts in other states.

It is not possible here to describe in detail the relationship of the Adelaide church communities to the national and international ethnic bodies, although from time to time reference is made to particular aspects of this relationship. The Ukrainian Catholics arrange national priests' meetings every few years, but this is the exception rather than the rule, and most ethnic clergy have only occasional opportunity to meet in groups with their fellows in other states. Some regard this as a severe penalty, understandably, since the number of any clergy of any one ethnic group in Adelaide is only one, two or three. National gatherings like cultural festivals and Scout camps often provide the occasion for gatherings of the laity.

Ties between the Adelaide minorities and national or international bodies were not in any sense 'given' by the immigrant situation and did not develop automatically. They had to be built and maintained by the efforts of individuals striving for personal fulfilment or moved by a more or less realistic view of the strength which their Adelaide community would derive from participation in wider movements. Among the most satisfying outcomes of these labours were the visits made by notables from other states, and particularly from overseas, to the Adelaide community. It was a memorable event, for example, when the world head of Latvia's Lutheran Church in exile spent six days in Adelaide, or the President of the Lithuanian World Community visited the city to open the Lithuanian Museum.

One of the most attractive features of membership in these larger bodies was that it brought within reach of Adelaide immigrants an additional set of offices, more interesting, prestigeful and
powerful than the leadership roles offered by their local associations. Such offices consisted not only of the permanent executive positions, but also the demanding temporary roles connected with the organisation of nation-wide events, like arts or music festivals. Because of the commonly accepted principle that both executive offices and major events should rotate between states, the local minority was guaranteed access to a wide range of these nationally recognised positions.

Effective organisation at the federal level could also promote a division of functions between states and so allow the nation-wide minority group to develop institutions which the members in any single state would have had difficulty in achieving on their own. Newspapers, central archives and music libraries provide the most striking examples. Most major nation-wide events were concentrated around arts festivals of one kind or another, and these appear to have strengthened and stabilised activities within each state in a variety of ways. The very scope of these events lent weight to the claim for recognition on the part of the traditional culture, for gatherings of several thousand people and programs sustained over several days could not be altogether ignored. In exposing the minorities to the judgment of an Australian as well as an ethnic public, these events also set higher standards of achievement than could be demanded of purely local activities. In addition, they provided an incentive to creative effort, like preparing the choreography for a new ballet or writing a new play, and stimulated into co-operative activity the many special-interest local associations which normally functioned more or less independently. In straightforward objective terms, these occasions generated a heightened intensity of activity and an increase in group productivity.

How far they also intensified the 'collective conscience' I am not sure, but there is no doubt that they were more successful in maintaining nation-wide ethnic solidarity than were any local exercises in inter-minority co-operation in creating a common identity among different ethnic groups. With the exception of the political structures to be mentioned below, combined minority group activities in Adelaide consisted entirely of occasional events sponsored by Australian associations, notably the Good Neighbour Council. Since its inauguration in 1960 the Adelaide Festival of Arts has
provided the principal occasion for such joint efforts. A United Nations Arts Festival, held in 1951, was typical of earlier events. Sponsored by the Australian National Committee for United Nations, the Good Neighbour Council and the United Nations Association, this Festival was presented by 'New and Old Australians', and extended over three days. Ethnic choirs, as well as individual immigrant artists, took part in the four concerts. The arts and crafts exhibition, according to the program, was 'achieved by many people working together in harmony, overcoming the barrier of differences in language, custom, and creed'. While events of this kind probably in some measure achieved their object of encouraging respect for immigrant culture, they did not establish any tradition of immigrant-inspired inter-ethnic undertakings. Indeed the Australian sponsors did not always find it easy to keep inter-ethnic hostilities at bay, and in their zeal to show how 'the barrier of differences' had been overcome, they sometimes aroused intense indignation. At one Adelaide Festival of Arts, for example, the organisers arranged for Croats and Serbs to march together in the procession, and a crisis was only averted by the Croats being hurriedly allocated a new position between the Latvians and the Spaniards, and the Lord Mayor tendering an apology.

Inter-minority associations
In so far as these immigrants were organised *qua* immigrants, the organisation was, then, almost entirely intra-ethnic. The only important exceptions were several anti-communist movements, of which the most important in Adelaide were the Baltic Council, the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, and the Captive Nations Committee. The Adelaide Baltic Council was affiliated with the Baltic Council of Australia and consisted of representatives of the three Baltic states. It existed primarily to organise the annual commemoration of the mass deportations from these countries carried out by the Soviet Union on 13-14 June 1941. In 1966, some 1,500 people—Baltic immigrants, their Australian guests, and invited public citizens—attended a commemorative ceremony, consisting of speeches and a concert, held in the Adelaide Town Hall. The ceremony was preceded by the laying of wreaths at the War Memorial, and the occasion was marked by the sending of a resolution to
the Prime Minister, commending Australia's fight against communism in Vietnam. Although the Baltic Council has, in ways like this, publicly endorsed the Liberal government's policy on Vietnam, it has been at pains to stress that it is not aligned with any political party. 'We are simply anti-communist', as one member put it. The Memorandum put out in 1968 in Adelaide by the Baltic Council of Australia to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the proclamation of independence of the three Baltic states contained an appeal
to all the free nations and governments, to the free press, and the public opinion of the free world, to help us to expose and to oppose the expropriation, exploitation, pauperisation, the suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Russification, the slave labour, the political terror, and the genocide perpetrated and still being perpetrated in the Baltic States, illegally and forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union, and still held in bondage today.

In origins, membership, structure and mode of operation, the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN, as it is known in all languages) is a very different kind of body from the Baltic Council. ABN was founded in Volhynia, Western Ukraine, in 1943 under the sponsorship of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). It consisted originally of representatives of 'the nations of Turkestan, Byelorussia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, North Caucasus and others', ¹ but when re-formed immediately after the war with headquarters in Munich it encompassed also the Underground Resistance Movements of a number of other peoples under Soviet domination, including Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Slovaks, Czechs, Hungarians, Serbs, Croatians, Slovenes, Albanians, Bulgarians and Romanians.² As this membership list indicates, ABN is committed to 'the national idea' and the rejection of imposed federalist systems. In its fight 'to bring about the disintegration of the Russian empire into national states', it 'puts its faith in national and social

² Ibid., p. 4.
revolution *within the U.S.S.R.*[^3] It has continued to represent
highly nationalistic, often military-oriented and right-wing sections
within the member minorities and to follow an extreme anti-
Russian line.[^4] Not surprisingly, ABN has a long history of conflict
with the Russian emigré association, NTS.

The President of ABN is Yaroslav Stetzko, also President of the
Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. Mr Stetzko has visited
Australia several times, most recently in January 1970, while on a
world tour.[^5] News of ABN activity in Australia is published regu­
larly in *ABN Correspondence*, an English-language bulletin pro­
duced by the Press Bureau of ABN in Munich. However, the
Central Delegacy established in Australia in 1957 avoids local
publicity and works mainly through other bodies. It seldom issues
documents or organises public events in its own name, and to
Australians at least membership is not readily admitted. In Adelaide
the movement seems to be largely sustained by the efforts of the
local branch of the international Ukrainian Anti-Bolshevik League.

The ABN movement in Adelaide is linked through personal
 ties to another body, the Captive Nations Committee, a different
kind of association again, fostered largely by the Baltic countries,
and the only one of the three inter-ethnic groups being discussed
here which includes Australian representatives. To understand the
origins of the Adelaide Captive Nations Committee, however, it is
necessary to take account of yet another international body, the
Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN). This 'little UNO'
was formed in New York in 1954. It is an international organisa­
tion representing the nine 'formerly independent and sovereign
nations' of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, and including also dele­
gates from the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe,
International Centres of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, Inter­
national Peasant Union, and the Liberal Democratic Union of

[^3]: 'A.B.N. Statutes, Part I' in *The Road to Freedom and the End of Fear,
Report of the Third Congress of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (A.B.N.) in
Munich in March, 1954*, Foreign Affairs Information Series, No. 26, published
by the Scottish League for European Freedom, Edinburgh, n.d., pp. 32-5. Italics
in the original.

[^4]: Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, p. 317; H. Jaeger, '“Anti-Bolshevist
Block of Nations”, Fascist Emigrés in Germany', *The Wiener Library Bulletin,*
vol. 16, no. 2, April 1962, p. 29.

Central Eastern Europe. Since its stated primary purpose is 'the restoration of self-determination and personal freedom to the peoples' of the 'captive nations', it is not surprising that communist sources have denounced it unreservedly. In one publication from the State Publishing House in Riga, it is said to have been founded by reactionary emigrants on the initiative of the U.S. State Department, in order to organise 'political diversions with the object of establishing fascist regimes' in the Baltic republics and other countries of Eastern Europe.

Delegates and officials of the permanent ACEN headquarters in New York are mostly former parliamentarians, army officers, intellectuals, or political activists. Plenary sessions are timed to coincide with the General Assembly of the United Nations so that ACEN may most effectively pursue its goal of mobilising public opinion in the western world and in neutral countries against the Soviet occupation of the member nations. As a tireless pressure group, it produces numerous publications, many of them covering current events in the occupied countries, distributes commentaries and statements on relevant aspects of government and UN policy, and organises public meetings and demonstrations on appropriate occasions. Permanent delegations exist in ten western countries, apart from the United States. According to Stefan Korbonski, one-time Chairman of the General Committee in New York, 'When a button is pressed in the central ACEN office in New York, the overseas branches take co-ordinated action.'

Korbonski's description of the inauguration of Captive Nations Week in 1959 highlights a crucial issue in refugee politics: the definition of a 'captive nation'. The resolution passed by the United States Senate and House of Representatives in July 1959 requested the President to proclaim Captive Nations Week as a manifestation of support for the cause of freedom of twenty-two named Soviet-dominated nations ('and others' unnamed), including

8 Korbonski, Warsaw in Exile, p. 105. Korbonski's book contains a useful account of the operations of ACEN; see particularly chapters XII and XXVII. ACEN News, formerly a monthly, now a two-monthly publication, provides the official report. See also Berzins, The Unpunished Crime. Berzins was Chairman of the General Committee of ACEN in 1969-70.
9 Warsaw in Exile, pp. 246-8.
the nine members of ACEN, Ukraine and seven other non-Russian minorities within the Soviet Union, East Germany, Mainland China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Tibet. Although the presidential proclamation itself referred only to 'the captive nations', without enumeration, the original resolution aroused some controversy because it implied official support for the dismemberment of the Soviet Union. This was the platform supported by ABN, but rejected by ACEN, at least some of whose members found the Congressional resolution somewhat unpalatable. "This failure to differentiate between the nine nations and the other nations in the resolution", writes Korbonski, 'was equivalent to a sort of de-classifying of the main argument, which could not but be regarded as a minus from the point of view of the nine nations.'

Captive Nations Week has been officially endorsed by the United States President every year since 1959, but the issue: 'who are the captive nations?' has been carefully played down. In the United States and elsewhere, ACEN has assumed responsibility for organising, in the words of the President's proclamation, 'appropriate ceremonies and activities'.

In the course of an official visit to Australia in 1959 Korbonski attended a 'crowded meeting' at the Metalworkers' Union and a 'magnificent reception' in Sydney. He also called upon the Prime Minister and the Ministers for External Affairs and Immigration in Canberra. He left the country, apparently satisfied that his visit had aroused the Australian conscience to an awareness of the Eastern European problem.

A permanent ACEN Delegation in Australia was established at a meeting in Sydney in 1959, with the President of the Czech Club in Adelaide as Chairman. In the following year, the Delegation organised a 'Freedom Photographic Exhibition', previously shown overseas, to tour Australia. It was shown in Adelaide in April, and, according to the ACEN News, 'drew many thousands of visitors'.

In Sydney ACEN has assisted in the organisation of Captive Nations Week since the first observance of this occasion in 1965. Although, in Brisbane and Adelaide, this responsibility rests with independent local committees, the state committees consult with one another and

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10 Ibid., p. 248. 11 Ibid., pp. 171-3.
12 ACEN News, no. 55, October 1959, p. 16.
Figure 4 Advertisement for the ACEN 'Freedom Photographic Exhibition'

**ASSEMBLY OF CAPTIVE EUROPEAN NATIONS**

**PRESENTS**

**Freedom PHOTOGRAPHIC Exhibition**

**SEE IT AT THE AUSTRALIA HALL, ANGAS STREET**

**ADMISSION FREE**

The Freedom Photographic Exhibition displays the terror and purge of the Bolshevik System, the wide gulf between Communist promises and Communist reality. **THE RECORD OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM** from Lenin to Stalin and to Khrushchev, and instances of individual, national, and international resistance to Bolshevism on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

**IT HAS BEEN SHOWN IN THIRTEEN STATES IN THE U.S.A. AND A NUMBER OF FRENCH AND ITALIAN CITIES. RECENTLY IT WAS SHOWN IN MELBOURNE AND BALLARAT, AND WILL APPEAR IN ADELAIDE AT THE AUSTRALIA HALL, ANGAS STREET, FROM 12 NOON TO 9 P.M. ON SUCCESSIVE DAYS IN THE WEEK 4th to 8th APRIL, 1960.**

In the view of the Assembly of Captive European Nations, the free voice of the Soviet-enslaved peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Rumania, the value of this Exhibition is obvious today within the atmosphere created by Soviet missiles and satellites. The Soviet Rulers are now engaged in an all-out effort to impress the world with their scientific and technical achievements.

On the one hand they want to induce people to regard these achievements as evidence of the superiority of the Soviet System, as a portent of its "inevitable" world-wide victory.

On the other hand, they seek to overawe the world with their military might. This is to generate fear in the free world which, in turn, is expected to degenerate into hopelessness and defeatism, into a disposition to surrender rather than risk destruction of civilised life on earth.

The A.C.E.N. believes these Soviet designs can be brought to naught. In showing that blandishments and threats, false promises and treachery, sweet words and brutal deeds have marked the entire forty-year history of Soviet Communism and that these tested Communist methods of struggle have been overcome in the past and can be beaten today only by a purposeful policy backed by strength and determination, this A.C.E.N. Exhibit is presented as a modest but not unnecessary contribution to the coming fight against Soviet nuclear blackmail.

the pattern of activities everywhere follows generally the procedures established by ACEN in New York. To date, nothing has come of moves to establish a formal interstate co-ordinating body. Captive Nations Week is not officially sponsored in Australia, but individual politicians take a prominent part in its observance.14

14 See Playford, *The Truth behind 'Captive Nations Week',* for a summary of ACEN developments in each state.
Credit for the Adelaide group, founded in 1966, has been claimed by both Ukrainians and Lithuanians.\textsuperscript{15} Originally named the 'Captive Nations Week Committee', it soon became the 'Captive Nations Committee', in accord with objectives which include not only the promotion of the annual observance but also the continuing task of reminding 'the public of the tragic fate of the captive nations under communist domination throughout the world', and exposing and countering 'subversive communist activities in the interest of the security of the democratic institutions of Australia'.\textsuperscript{16} The first president of the Committee was a Liberal Member of Parliament. Up to the present time, there has been only one secretary, who is also Secretary of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP). Accredited representatives of 'National or Australian' groups form the membership. The ethnic representatives who have consistently supported the Committee's work are the Bulgarian, Croat, Czech, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Hungarian, Polish, Russian, Serb, Slovak, and Ukrainian. The letterhead of the Committee contains, in addition to the names of these twelve members, a further eighteen names, including some, like the Azerbaijanis, Cubans, Georgians, Kazaks, Mongolians, North Koreans, North Vietnamese, Tibetans, Turkomans, and Uzbeks, who have no group organisation—and in some cases almost certainly no representatives—in Adelaide. The list of thirty names conforms closely to the membership of ABN, and some representatives are ABN nominees. Captive Nations Week observances held in Adelaide, as in other states and countries, are reported regularly in \textit{ABN Correspondence}. The Adelaide Committee is not, however, simply an ABN front group. It includes Russian representatives, which ABN does not; it follows an ACEN rather than an ABN line, and some representatives are unequivocally anti-ABN.

The Committee's work has at times been hampered by the rigid nationalism of some members and by inter-ethnic rivalries, and its achievements extend little beyond the organisation of the annual Captive Nations Week. Nevertheless, it is stable and effective to a degree that has not been achieved by any other inter-ethnic group in Adelaide. This may be partly due to a common resentment

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{News Digest-International}, no. 2, 1966, p. 45; \textit{ABN Correspondence}, vol. XX, no. 6, November-December 1969, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{16} Rules, Captive Nations Committee, 1966, paragraph 3.
against what some members see as the exploitation of the Committee by Australian political groups, especially the DLP: resentment based on the belief that Australians are interested in the Committee, not because of concern about captive nations, but as a platform for vote-catching propaganda.

A description of the 1966 commemoration of Captive Nations Week in Adelaide will serve to illustrate how the Committee carries out its main function. The Week's activities began on Sunday, 17 July (to coincide with the date proclaimed by the President of the United States) with the laying of a wreath at the War Memorial, musical items, addresses by the Chairman of the Committee, Liberal and DLP members of Parliament, and a representative of the 'captive nations', and the reading of an anti-communist Resolution to be forwarded to the Prime Minister. The following night was devoted to films and on Friday there was an International Song and Dance Evening. The Week concluded with an International Ball at Lithuanian House on the Saturday night.

None of the three inter-ethnic associations described—ABN, the Baltic Council, or the Captive Nations Committee—has claimed the role of promoting inter-ethnic unity beyond specific demonstrations of a common anti-communist purpose. Organised group life among these East European minorities has been based essentially on common ethnic origin, and most people interviewed and documents consulted maintained that, at least for the time being, 'national groups', as they were usually called, constituted a positive value in the adaptation of immigrants to Australian life. But it was also widely believed that these groups appeared to Australians as an embarrassment, an irritation, or even a threat. To obtain a better understanding both of the immigrants' image of themselves and of the Australian context in which they were embedded, it will be useful to look at the areas in which migrant groups interacted with the Australian community.
The Adelaide minorities often made serious attempts to establish the legitimacy of their position by having public figures take part in their more noteworthy activities. The attendance of the Chief Justice and the Archbishop of Adelaide at the Adelaide Town Hall for the celebration of one thousand years of Christianity in Poland and the opening of the Latvian Hall by the Premier—both events taking place in 1966—clearly had this symbolic purpose.

Beyond ritual occasions of this kind, the Australian community rarely penetrated into the group life of the minorities in any patterned or established way. But there were other kinds of links reaching out from migrant associations to local groups. The most visible of these took the form of migrant participation in public events like the Adelaide Festival of Arts. In addition, particularly during the fifties, migrant groups made speakers available for churches and organisations like Rotary, and provided entertainment in the form of folk-dancing and choir-singing to enliven a variety of social gatherings. On the Australian side, the novelty of these contributions eventually wore off. From the immigrants’ point of view, pride in displaying national arts was sometimes deflated by the suspicion that they were being patronised and exploited. The fact that Australian groups rarely offered even token expenses to visitors came to seem like a belittlement of their efforts.

In recent years, this form of contact between ethnic and Australian associations has markedly declined. Of more continuing interest are the relations of ethnic groups and certain Australian bodies which these migrants saw as potentially pluralist structures, with ethnic associations forming component parts while main-
taining their own integrity. The most important of these Australian bodies were sports groups, the Scouts, and the churches.

**Sports groups**

As the first contingent of post-war European immigrants to arrive in Australia, the Displaced Persons were responsible for stimulating a wave of enthusiasm for soccer and international basketball. Nearly all the Eastern European minorities established their own clubs in one or both of these sports, and several ethnic teams maintained first division standing over a decade or more. During the 1960s, however, both the Amateur Basketball Association and the Soccer Federation adopted a policy of encouraging ethnic, and other non-regional clubs, to become district clubs. This trend in the policies of the Association and the Federation came at a time when the ethnic clubs were having great difficulty in maintaining recruitment and minority support at the previously high level. Although, in 1969, ethnic committees still ran most of the soccer clubs, the leading teams were by that time extremely mixed in ethnic origin, and it was well known that teams had to import outsiders (other ethnics or Australians) if they were to remain among the top players. Basketball teams had remained mainly national in composition, but had lost ground to district teams in recent years.

There were many immigrants who saw these sports, especially soccer, as a serious businesslike undertaking, not to be jeopardised by the intrusion of sentiment of any kind. To them, the policy of the federations seemed rational enough, although they sometimes resented the strict control the federations exercised over member clubs. Others, however, saw the Basketball Association and the Soccer Federation as inflexible and ruthless, insensitive to the special situation of the ethnic clubs, and bent on a policy of petty harassment aimed at wearing the immigrants down. Conflict between the state bodies and the ethnic clubs crystallised around the issue of names, some clubs holding tenaciously to their own names, like Polonia and the Croatian Club, some responding to Federation pressure and the new realities of their situation by adopting a combined title, like Beograd Woodville. Although the Ukrainian and Russian clubs had not changed their names, they were known by titles which told the uninitiated nothing of their origins, the
Lions and Don United. It was the Latvians who first found an acceptable compromise, when, upon the amalgamation of three ethnic sports clubs in 1957, they adopted the name Adelaide Sports Klub, known as ASK.

As long as sports clubs remain tied to their relatively small ethnic groups, it seems that they are bound to be beset by problems of one kind or another. Recruiting first-rate players is only the most obvious of these problems. Some clubs have suffered more from the incompetence of their organising committees than the poor standard of their players, and most face financial problems. In soccer, players have to be bought. In both sports, coaches have to be paid. In basketball, Association funds for a stadium are available only to clubs that can muster teams in ten different categories, a considerable financial undertaking. Funds of this order depend on a strong body of supporters. But ethnic sports clubs have to compete for financial support with other ethnic activities, and in several minorities there has been a running argument over the rival claims of sporting, cultural, and educational activities. The Polish soccer club, Polonia, has probably been the most successful in maintaining both its national character and its high standard of performance. This has been possible because of the size of the Polish community in Adelaide, the widespread support of the game among Poles, and, in recent years, the recruitment of professional players direct from Poland.

**Scout and Guide movements**

Another area of interaction between local and immigrant groups was provided by the relations between the ethnic minorities and the Australian Scout and Guide movement. The movement had become firmly established in Eastern Europe in the early years of the century, and refugees from countries in the area were quick to re-form their national organisations in Western Europe and later in the countries to which they emigrated. In the case of the Russians, the new wave of refugees became associated with the exile organisation that had been founded much earlier, in 1920, by emigrés of the revolutionary period. The large and highly-organised movement of ‘Scouts in Exile’ that has emerged from these beginnings over the past twenty years has been a continuing source of embarrassment and concern to the Boy Scouts International Bureau.
In an attempt to integrate exile groups into the established regional organisation, the Bureau has recommended that refugee bodies should 'sponsor' their own scout groups in the same way as a school, church, or other institution may found a group for its members. The Bureau has agreed that these sponsored groups 'may use their own language for all internal purposes and it is expected that they will retain all their own national, traditional and cultural customs, and religious observances exactly as if they were operating within their own homeland'. While recognising the right of such groups to correspond with similar groups in other countries, the Bureau does not officially recognise any international ethnic organisations, and permits ethnic groups to take part in world events only as members of local bodies. Most Scouts in Exile have refused to accept these rulings, with the result that they have either severed all connection with the World Conference or have tried to devise some compromise by which they can belong both to the official regional organisation and to the Scouts in Exile.

Scout groups were among the first associations to be established by the Displaced Persons on their arrival in this country. They have presented the Australian Boy Scouts Association with a problem ever since. The Australian Association has followed the policy of the world movement in refusing to recognise Scouts in Exile. Although exile bodies are known to be functioning in Australia, little attempt is made to collect information about them, and the conviction that their leaders are inadequately trained, their standards low and their activities in general poorly organised persists on the basis of hearsay and rare, unproductive contacts. Despite this tendency to ignore the Scouts in Exile movement, however, the Association is on occasion forced to acknowledge its existence. It has for instance recently been exercised about whether to take action over the appointment by the Hungarian Scouts in Exile of a 'Chief Scout of Australia', the title traditionally held by the Governor-General. From time to time there have also been confrontations over the adoption by some exile groups of names, titles and insignia whose use is legally restricted to members of the Association. The Association has indeed tried to prevent non-registered ethnic groups from using the name 'Scout' itself.

1 Australian Boy Scouts Association, National Organisation of Russian Scouts, MS, document, 2 pages, n.d.
The situation in Australia has been exacerbated by the fact that the 'sponsorship' of groups by particular bodies (as compared with the normal practice of developing groups on a neighbourhood, residential basis) is favoured far less than in the United States and Britain, and in fact only about 10 per cent of all Australian groups are of the 'sponsored' kind.² This method of incorporating ethnic groups into state organisations has thus found little support, and such interest as has been shown in migrants has been directed at attracting them as individuals into local groups. Sporadic attempts have been made to overcome financial obstacles to the participation of migrant children and to counteract what is seen as the resistance of many migrant families to their children joining extra-familial associations. From time to time officials of the Scouts Association have exhorted local groups to take the initiative in offering friendship by visiting migrant children newly arrived in the district and by interesting parents as well as children in Scout activities. Although Scouting officials seem to have no confidence that these half-hearted efforts have been successful, no attempt to assess migrant participation on an overall national basis, or to devise a coherent program for incorporating migrants into the movement, was made until 1970. Now, as part of a long-term plan called 'Design for Tomorrow', the national Association is considering the possibilities of a far-reaching program of this kind.

To inform this discussion, the Association has obtained figures on the participation of migrant boys in Cub and Scout Associations in seven Melbourne districts. These figures show that, while about 14 per cent of all boys aged 8-14 participate in Cubs or Scouts, only about 7 per cent of migrant boys do so. Analysis of the origins of migrant members shows that they are predominantly Dutch, German, Greek, and Italian. The combined membership of all the Eastern European groups to which my own study refers was seventeen (of whom eight were Yugoslavs), out of a total of 780 members.³

² Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life*, reports that over 50% of all Scout troops and a quarter of Guide troops in the United States are under sectarian sponsorship. Gordon claims that, by the widespread acceptance of religious sponsorship, the Scout and Guide movement is abandoning its community-wide, integrating function and encouraging fragmentation along religious lines; see pp. 222-4, 238.

³ From information, including statistics, kindly made available by E. M. Derrick, National Secretary of the Australian Boy Scouts Association,
No figures of this kind are available for Adelaide, although impressionistic evidence suggests that very few children from Eastern European families take part in local clubs. As elsewhere in Australia, the immigrants founded Scout groups immediately after their arrival, and the movement soon became firmly established. The Guide movement—which is not dealt with in detail here, but whose policies have run closely parallel with those of the Scouts—was founded at the same time. Estonian and Latvian Scouts and Guides became registered with the state Associations as 'sponsored' groups. The Lithuanian Scouts and Guides were also registered, but the Guides withdrew from the Association in 1958. Although members of these three minorities expressed to us some criticism of the restrictions imposed on them by the state Associations—particularly resenting that they could not attend international events as members of their own world-wide ethnic movement—by the time of our study these groups had established a reasonably satisfactory *modus vivendi* with the Australian body. While conforming to Associational requirements, they retained their affiliations with their respective national and international movements and devised their own solutions to minor points at issue. One group, for instance, resolved the conflict between the Associational rule that its members could not wear national colours and their own determination to do so by having 'national' (ethnic) colours on one side of their kerchiefs and Associational colours on the other, turning to the outside whichever colours the occasion demanded. The nation-wide ethnic movements to which these three minorities belonged had an independent structure of officials, held interstate meetings and camps, published regular journals and linked the Australian ethnic scouts to their respective international movements. But these affiliations were not publicised, and the ethnic groups in practice kept very much to themselves. The South Australian Associations, for their part, adopted a more liberal policy than some other states, and came, if somewhat regretfully, to accept the right of ethnic groups to a substantial measure of self-determination. They even went so far as to condone such radical practices as the holding of combined Scout and Guide camps. Association officials asked few questions, and seemed to have come to the conclusion that what they didn't know wouldn't hurt them.
A Hungarian Scout group had been registered in the early fifties; it was being re-formed in 1966, but had no contact with the state Association. Poles, Ukrainians and Russians had rejected overtures from the Association and had formed independent groups with a much closer integration of Scout and Guide activities than is normal in British forms of the movement. Polish immigrants, for example, have registered their association under the English title 'Polish Youth Association in Australia Incorporated', thus avoiding the contested terms 'Scout' and 'Guide'. The group aims, in the words of its constitution, 'To promote scouting, camping, recreation and sports, cultural activity and education, welfare and social aid for youth of Polish descent.' It was closely linked with the Catholic church, and ran Saturday schools in opposition to those sponsored by the Polish Education Society and alleged (by officials of the Youth Association) to be soft and compromising in their approach to communism.

Poles, Ukrainians and Russians all belonged to international Scouts in Exile movements. In 1969 the Australian Commissioner of the Russian Scouts, an Adelaide man, was sent to the United States as Australian representative to celebrations of sixty years of Russian scouting. These three minorities had had no dealings with the state Associations since early contacts or inquiries had convinced them that affiliation would destroy the ethnic character of their organisations. Only by keeping to themselves, they believed, could they be assured of control over their own affairs. So successful were they in fact in remaining unobtrusive that in 1966 the officers of the state Associations believed that most groups had faded out, and knew of the existence of only two of the six that were in fact functioning effectively in these minorities at that time.

It is difficult to get an accurate picture of changes in Scout and Guide membership figures over the years, but most groups appeared to have reached their peak some time before we began our survey in 1966. At that date, combined enrolments of Scouts and Guides ranged from about 22 in the re-formed Hungarian group to about 150 in the Polish Youth Association. Enrolments in the four non-affiliated minorities numbered about 300, or twice the number in the three minorities with registered groups. If anything, the non-affiliated groups seemed to be holding their members
better than the registered ones. The scale of their most ambitious activities is indicated by the fact that, at New Year 1967, the Polish Youth Association conducted a camp for 188 members, of whom 35 were interstate visitors. All minorities except the Hungarian and Russian have their own country properties and hence autonomy in arranging camps and exercises.

The scope of the movement was being affected, however, by similar internal problems in every minority. Young leaders were not coming forward to replace the older people who had been trained in their homelands. Community support was far from whole-hearted, and indeed the Scout and Guide movement presented the thoughtful migrant parent with an uncommonly difficult decision. He was under some pressure from his own community to send his children to an ethnic group, and recognised this as one possible and fairly painless way of making sure that they received some systematic training in ethnic traditions. But he was also aware that, in encouraging his children to take part in ethnic groups, he was specifically rejecting the alternative offered by the local Australian community. It was the fact that an exact counterpart of the ethnic association was available that made the issue particularly pointed and clear. Moreover, the Australian alternative had some tangible attractions: it avoided transport problems, it provided better trained leaders, and it gave his children a chance to make or consolidate friendships with the 'better type' of neighbourhood companions. These considerations did not weigh equally with all parents, but they entered into the thinking of enough to represent a commonly recognised dilemma.

Despite these problems, the Scout and Guide movement emerges as well organised, coherent, and stable compared with most other immigrant activities. It was rivalled only by the churches—with which it is often closely associated—in fulfilling the role of guardian of ethnic culture. Meetings were conducted in the native tongue and every effort was made to preserve the form of the movement as it was traditionally practised in the home country. That the question of retaining the native tongue has aroused some controversy is indicated in the report of the 9th Regional Ukrainian Scout Congress held in Melbourne in 1967. 'The Scout press', says the report, 'should be read by all Scouts. Anyone who doesn't
want to read the papers in the Ukrainian language has no place in the Scout movement.¹⁴

The role of transmitter of the ethnic heritage appeared to be explicit throughout the ethnic movements. The 1964 issue of *The Pathfinder*, the official organ of the Lithuanian Scouts’ and Girl Guides’ Associations in Australia, illustrates the point. The opening article, by the Chief Commissioner for the Lithuanian Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, addresses itself to the question: ‘Why are there Lithuanian Scouts in Australia?’ In answer the author summarises the reasons under three headings: ‘(a) the continuation of Lithuanian scouting traditions, (b) the safeguarding of our inheritance which we brought with us to Australia, (c) our full participation in the world-wide brotherhood of scouting.’ Elaborating, he says, in part:

How many of our brothers in Lithuania will be able to remember the ideals of B.P. to revive this wonderful movement when the time comes? Will it not be our duty to return to our motherland what we received from her initially? . . . It should also be remembered that most of the boys in our troops would not be in the scout movement at all if it were not for the national flavour. Our parents support national troops because here, the children acquire some of the Lithuanian way of life, which they, very often after a hard day’s work, are not able to give them.

Letters written to the editor of *The Pathfinder* in answer to the question, ‘Why I want to be a Lithuanian Girl Guide’, similarly stress a proud identification with the traditional culture, if less conviction about the future. ‘My country is one, to which I shall probably never be able to return’, wrote one girl. ‘Perhaps that is why so many Lithuanian speaking girls and boys have joined this scouting movement. They know that they could acquire some scouting knowledge in any other scouting group, but would not receive the wealth of information about their own country that they do at our meetings.’⁵

My observations of both registered and unregistered groups accord with the conclusions of the Reverend David Cox, Secretary of the Melbourne European-Australian Christian Fellowship, who

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¹⁴ Information Bulletin of the Association of Ukrainians in South Australia, 1 September 1968, no page nos., translated from the Ukrainian.
has written recently in a report to the national Association that ethnic troops 'tend to be aimed at the extension of the ethnic community, rather than either at integration or an extension of scouting ideals per se (although incidentally they may do this').

In conclusion it can be said that, although it might have been expected that this 'brotherhood of the open air', as scouting has been called, would provide a ready-made framework within which migrant-Australian relationships could flourish, it has had the opposite effect, constituting a continuing source of misunderstanding and distrust. Australian Scouts have interpreted the migrant attitude as narrow, unco-operative isolationism, and turned their backs in the hope the problem will disappear while they are not looking. The migrant groups for their part have experienced the Australian position as a form of pressure aimed at making them abandon their own identity and have responded by withdrawing. Both sides have tried to stick rigidly to established procedures and structures. Adaptation has been limited to the kind of unacknowledged compromises reached in relations between the Australian organisations and the three registered minorities.

The Catholic church
A much tougher problem of adaptation was presented to the Adelaide immigrants by the Australian churches. Since the Catholic church has more than twice as many adherents among Eastern Europeans as any other church in Adelaide, I have chosen to discuss it here in some detail.

Between 1947 and 1966 the Catholic population of Australia increased by over one million. As the greater proportion of this increase was due to the immigration of non-English-speaking Catholics and the children born to them in Australia, it is surprising that there has been so little public discussion of the relationship these newcomers have established with the Australian church. The widely-read Catholic papers, like the Advocate and Southern Cross, seem to have been largely concerned with encouraging a favourable attitude towards immigrants and a vigorous immigration policy, providing information about the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee, and describing the more colour-
ful events in which immigrants take part as distinct groups, such as the Marian Congress. Catholic scholars appear to have made no serious examination of exactly how and to what extent immigrant Catholics are being integrated into the Australian church, nor tested the popular assumption that a common faith automatically unites locals and newcomers. Occasional references to immigrants and the Catholic church, included in general surveys of immigration and religion in contemporary Australia, go little beyond the level of description of the formal structure.

While there is, then, a serious dearth of informed discussion on the actual position of immigrant Catholics in Australia, the formal institutional structure through which immigrants are incorporated into the Australian church has received some attention from Catholic scholars. One of these is a Belgian Jesuit, Father H. G. Aerts, whose article, significantly entitled 'Religious Problems of Migrants', published in 1968, contains the only wide-ranging, serious public examination of the question that I have been able to locate. After referring to language difficulties which limit the migrant's participation in the church and the diversity of the religious traditions that immigrants bring with them from Europe,

7 These observations are based on a survey of The Australasian Catholic Record for Clergy and Religious, the official organ of the Apostolic Delegate to Australasia, 1949 to date, on a more selective and less thorough survey of the files of the Advocate, Advocate Press, Melbourne, and the Southern Cross, Southern Cross Publishing Co., Adelaide, 1949-67, and on responses to my inquiries about material from Australian priests in Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide, who had special knowledge of migrant matters. One of the few general statements on the church and migrants is: Giorgio Baggio, 'Religious Integration of Italian Migrants in Australia', Migration News, 18th year, no. 3, May-June 1969, pp. 15-20.

It may be that the foreign-language press, both Catholic and secular, has given more attention to these issues than English-language publications. It has not been within the scope of this study to examine these foreign-language papers systematically, but a cursory examination of church papers in several languages suggests that they are mainly concerned with intra-ethnic affairs. Their religious content tends to follow the pattern of Polish Catholic papers described by Gilson and Zubrycki, The Foreign-language Press in Australia, p. 121: Bible readings, sermons, religious articles on subjects like 'Christ has Risen', and biographies and activities of church leaders.


Father Aerts concludes: 'It is obvious... that the migrants cannot be adequately helped by the ordinary ministry of the existing Australian parishes, at least in the initial stages...'. He sees a possible solution to the immigrants' problems in the enhancement of the ministry of national chaplains, whose contribution to the church's work, he suggests, has not always been recognised and whose efforts have not been well planned or properly co-ordinated with the ministries of the parish priests: 'Every Chaplain', he writes, 'had to find his own way'. National parishes may have been a better solution, but the time has now passed when this could be contemplated as a serious possibility.

Authority for the foundation of national parishes was contained in the Apostolic Constitution of 1 August 1952, *Exsul Familia*, which for the first time established general norms for the spiritual care of migrants and remained in force until superseded by the Apostolic Letter of 15 August 1969, *Pastoralis Migratorum*. *Exsul Familia* confirmed the authority of the Consistorial Congregation to grant permission for the establishment of national parishes. It also ruled, however, that wherever it seemed inexpedient to establish such parishes, 'Every local Ordinary is to make an earnest effort to entrust the spiritual care of aliens or immigrants to priests, whether secular or regular, of the same language or nationality.'

In his authoritative and detailed commentary on *Exsul Familia*, Father Humphrey M. O'Leary, an Australian canonist, emphasises that the establishment of national parishes in any particular set of circumstances is not made obligatory. The decision, he says, is wisely left to the judgment of the local Ordinary. Similarly, there is no absolute obligation to employ a missionary of migrants where national parishes have not been established; the Ordinary's responsibility does not go beyond the 'earnest effort' referred to above.

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10 Ibid., p. 147.  
11 Ibid., p. 150.  
By the time *Exsul Familia* appeared in 1952, the Australian hierarchy had already established its own pattern for dealing with the influx of post-war Catholic migrants. 'When the immigration inrush began after the Second World War,' wrote Father O'Leary in a recent paper,

there was fear in Australia as to the possible disruptive effects of introducing many diverse varieties of Catholic life and practice. There seems to have been a policy decision in Catholic circles to play down these diversities and to accelerate as much as possible the complete Australianisation of the immigrants or at least of their children.\(^{14}\)

The norms laid down in the Apostolic Constitution were regarded as deriving from the existing situation in Europe, where there was an urgent need to provide pastoral care for Italian migrant workers temporarily domiciled in foreign lands. These norms were not accepted as appropriate to the Australian situation,\(^{15}\) and for this reason, presumably, the contents of *Exsul Familia* were not publicised, nor its implications for Australia widely interpreted and discussed. Although the official organ of the Apostolic Delegate to Australasia, *The Australasian Catholic Record*, described the Constitution as 'this splendid document',\(^{16}\) it could not find space to print a full translation of the text, and none has ever been published, or is generally available, in this country. Father O'Leary's little-known work is, so far as I can ascertain, the only locally published commentary. It is a highly informative exposition of the legislation, but contains no more than brief and passing reference to the Australian situation.

The impact of *Exsul Familia* in Australia was slight. As Father O'Leary says, 'a great deal of it was ignored or evaded'.\(^{17}\) While occasional *de facto* national parishes are to be found in this country—that is territorial parishes in which parish priest and most

\(^{14}\)H. M. O'Leary, 'Legislation on Migrant Care', *The Australasian Catholic Record*, vol. xlviii, no. 2, April 1971, pp. 127-51, a commentary on the more recent legislation, *Pastoralis Migratorum*, an Apostolic Letter of 15 August 1969, set out in an Instruction of the Congregation of Bishops, 22 August 1969. In the following pages I draw heavily on this paper and on personal correspondence and discussion with Father O'Leary. The quotation in the text is from pp. 150-1 of 'Legislation on Migrant Care', henceforth shortened to 'Legislation'.

\(^{15}\)O'Leary, 'Legislation', p. 129.

\(^{16}\) *The Australasian Catholic Record*, vol. xxi, no. 1, January 1953, p. 3.

\(^{17}\) 'Legislation', p. 129.
parishioners are of a non-English-speaking ethnic origin—there are no juridic national parishes, that is, non-territorial parishes consisting of all the members of a certain language group or ethnic origin, scattered through a number of territorial parishes. Father Aerts suggests that it was the intervention of certain American bishops that persuaded the Australian hierarchy to decide against the development of national parishes in this country.\textsuperscript{18} Father O'Leary also refers to the difficulties of suppressing national parishes in the United States after they had served their purpose, and the problems posed by the disposal of churches and other buildings when the national parishes declined. Conflicts between the local Ordinary and the priests responsible for the national parish were clearly the underlying source of strain.\textsuperscript{19} Even such a convinced supporter of national parishes as the Reverend Henkey-Honig recognises, in his commentary on \textit{Exsul Familia}, that such parishes have not always been associated with the most pleasant experiences for Ordinaries, even in America. Exaggerations, seclusion from the Catholic life of the country . . . , relations to the home country touching the limits of politics, inside differences between political parties, denunciations against their own priests, are not too rare.\textsuperscript{20}

There seems no doubt that the American experience influenced Australian thinking in the shaping of post-war policy. It is also likely that Australian authorities took into account the potentially disadvantageous effects of national parishes on parochial schools, for national parishes would certainly have diverted the migrants' financial and moral resources from the local parishes, on which the Catholic school system depends.

In addition to national parishes, \textit{Exsul Familia} also provided for missionaries both with, and without, care of souls. The missionary with care of souls has parochial power; the mission which he rules is similar to a juridic national parish; his rights are equivalent to those of a parish priest. It is therefore consistent with the policy on national parishes that no missions with care of souls have

\textsuperscript{18} Aerts, 'Religious Problems of Migrants', p. 149.
\textsuperscript{19} 'Legislation', p. 142.
\textsuperscript{20} C. Henkey-Honig, 'The Care of Migrants' in Tessarolo, \textit{Exsul Familia}, p. 270.
been erected in Australia. Instead special provision for the spiritual welfare of migrants has been entrusted to missionaries without the care of souls, that is the priests who in this country are known as ‘migrant chaplains’, and who do not exercise parochial powers.

In the immediate post-war years, migrant chaplains had already been appointed to parishes where Eastern European Catholic immigrants were concentrated, particularly, in the early days, for the purpose of ministering to new arrivals living in migrant camps. Their work was co-ordinated by the National Director of the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee, founded in 1947, as one of the first attempts by the Australian hierarchy to plan for a major area of pastoral activity on a national basis.\(^{21}\) The structure thus established, however, was not in accord with the norms laid down in \textit{Exsul Familia}. These rules reflected the system operating in parts of Europe, where the chaplains of each nationality worked under a Director of that nationality, who himself came within the jurisdiction of an official of the Consistorial Congregation in Rome. On this point, writes Father O'Leary, ‘the \textit{Exsul Familia} legislation was not acceptable in Australia. It was preferred that here the chaplains work under the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee and its National Director.’\(^{22}\) The Federal Catholic Immigration Committee itself was established as a Committee of the Catholic National Episcopal Conference, and hence under the control of the Australian hierarchy. The pre-\textit{Exsul Familia} Australian organisation was brought into line with the new legislation when the Australian hierarchy secured from the Consistorial Congregation the appointment of the National Director as Director of the chaplains of all nationalities in the country. The situation remained, however, somewhat confused and unsatisfactory, since the Consistorial Congregation also named individual Directors for certain national groups.\(^{23}\)

In his commentary on \textit{Pastoralis Migratorum}, Father O'Leary proposes that the procedures and structures developed in Australia over the past twenty odd years are, in these new prescriptions, established as legal and appropriate. He writes,

\(^{22}\) Ibid., p. 135.
\(^{23}\) Ibid.
the legislator now approves as legitimate certain procedures in use in Australia before 1952 but hardly allowed for in *Exsur Familia*. In a pre-conciliar exercise of collegiality and subsidiarity, the Australian hierarchy refused to discontinue effective pastoral procedures in order to conform to a curial blueprint. Their quiet revolt has brought ultimate approval from Rome.24

In *Pastoralis Migratorum* and subsequent legislation of March 1970, the tendencies to centralise the oversight of migrant spiritual welfare in Rome and the attempt to set up uniform world-wide procedures after the European model have disappeared. The national episcopal conference rather than the Congregation for Bishops in Rome (the former Consistorial Congregation) now becomes the body charged with the special responsibility for promoting the spiritual care of migrants. The National Director is now to be appointed on the authority of the national episcopal conference, instead of, as previously, by the Consistorial Congregation on the nomination of the episcopal conference. The Delegates for chaplains or missionaries (formerly Directors) are no longer required to perform their work under an official of the Congregation of Bishops, and their precise status is left for the national episcopal conference to determine.25

*Pastoralis Migratorum* offers four distinct patterns for providing for the spiritual care of immigrants. The first is the juridic national parish, here referred to as a personal parish; the authority to establish or suppress such a parish now lies with the local Ordinary, as also does the right to determine whether migrants are members of both the personal and local parish. The second pattern is the mission with care of souls, especially recommended for transitory congregations of migrants where the establishment of a more permanent personal parish would not be appropriate. The third is that of a chaplain, who exercises a ministry among migrants within a determined territory, under the jurisdiction of the local Ordinary. And fourthly there is the *de facto* national parish, a predominantly migrant territorial parish, as previously described.26

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24 Ibid., p. 130.
25 Ibid., pp. 133-6.
26 Translations of the Apostolic Letter, *Pastoralis Migratorum*, and the Instruction of the Congregation of Bishops were published in *L'Osservatore Romano*, 13 November 1969, henceforth referred to as 'Instruction'. The reference is to the 'Instruction', chapter IV; see also O'Leary, 'Legislation', pp. 138-41.
Australian practice is justified in terms of the new norms regarding the roles of parish priests and missionaries of migrants, for in *Pastoralis Migratorum* the role of the pastor of the territorial parish takes on much greater significance than under the *Exsul Familia* legislation: 'The spiritual care of all the faithful, and thus of the immigrant people, falls most especially on the shoulders of the pastors of the parishes within which they live . . . Let them bear this heavy burden in association and union with the chaplain or missionary if there is one present.'

The non-prescriptive wording of *Pastoralis Migratorum* justifies Father O'Leary's suggestion that, despite 'a wistful preference' for juridic national parishes and missions with care of souls, the local Ordinary is left free to decide which pattern to use. The new legislation clearly proposes, nevertheless, that one or another should be adopted: 'When neither a personal parish nor a mission with care of souls— independent or attached to a parish—seems opportune, then let the spiritual care of migrants be provided by a chaplain or missionary of the same language, with a determined territory in which to exercise his ministry.' Although, as Father O'Leary says, *Pastoralis Migratorum* comes far closer to Australian practice than did *Exsul Familia*, it is still likely to appear to a lay reader to require the local Ordinary to be somewhat more active in making special provision for migrant care than is normally the case in this country. Australian effort seems to have concentrated on the National Director's vigorous policy of sponsoring migrants and recruiting national chaplains and on the welfare services provided by the district Catholic Immigration Offices in each state.

Father O'Leary himself gives tacit recognition to the discrepancy between the spirit of the Apostolic Letter and Australian practice when he concludes his latest commentary with the suggestion that the time may now be ripe for Australia to re-appraise its traditional policies. 'The decision never to give chaplains parochial powers with respect to their individual flocks was made at a time when Australia had little experience of extensive migration from non-English-speaking countries', he writes.

27 'Instruction', no. 30, para. 3.
28 'Legislation', p. 142.
29 'Instruction', no. 33, para. 4.
It was felt necessary to avoid the apostolate of these priests clashing with the existing parish apostolate. The experience of more than twenty years should make it possible to do this in more discerning ways than by blanket refusal of parochial powers... Now is perhaps the time to initiate limited experiments as to the type of apostolate to be exercised by at least some of the foreign priests in Australia. The attaching of missions with care of souls to existing parishes staffed by foreign priests, and the committing to those missions of a limited role regarding people of that nationality in neighbouring areas is one obvious possibility.30

When post-war migrants first began arriving in Adelaide, the priest social worker who was Director of the Catholic Family Welfare Bureau became also Immigration Officer; in the ensuing years the clerical assistant who helped with migrant affairs was usually a person with some knowledge of European languages. At first the Immigration Officer's main tasks were finding jobs and accommodation for migrants who had been lodged in the Woodside Immigration Centre on arrival. Family problems also came to demand much of his time, and in the fifties he became the effective sponsor for individuals and family groups migrating with the assistance of bodies such as the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (successor to the International Refugee Organization). The job of Immigration Officer has remained a part-time responsibility for the Director—or, as at present, the Assistant Director—of the Catholic Family Welfare Bureau. A full-time social worker, paid by the Commonwealth Department of Immigration and working solely with migrant families, has recently been added to the staff of the Family Welfare Bureau. A clerical assistant is also employed full-time on migrant work, and other members of the Bureau staff deal with migrant problems in the course of their everyday work.31

The efforts of the Catholic Immigration Officer and his assistants are thus concentrated on sponsorship and welfare. Migrant chaplains are called upon for help as the need arises, but in practice only the chaplains of those groups to which new arrivals are still being added—particularly, the Italians, Poles and Yugoslavs—are in frequent contact with the Immigration Officer.

30 'Legislation', p. 143.
31 The account of the work of the Immigration Office is based on interviews and on a manuscript kindly prepared for this study by Father L. Roberts, the first Immigration Officer in Adelaide.
When the first Displaced Person priests were appointed by the National Director as migrant chaplains, it was intended that each one should act as chaplain to migrants of all nationalities. In Adelaide, the many ethnic groups who passed through the Woodside Centre were cared for by one or two priests, fluent in several languages and living at the Centre or visiting it from Adelaide. Had this arrangement been successful, it could also have been applied to the city parishes as migrants began to take up residence in Adelaide itself. But it was not entirely satisfactory, partly at least because the migrants themselves preferred an Australian priest if none of their own nationality was available, and the migrant priests did not become part of the parochial structure.

As it turned out, the chaplains developed their roles in a variety of ways. But before these varying roles are described in more detail, some general outline of the relationship of ethnic Catholics to the Australian church needs to be given.

As shown previously, much feeling and tension in the Catholic minorities revolved around the role of ethnic priests in community affairs. The issue of relationships with the Australian church seemed of far less concern to the laymen we interviewed. In general, they felt that Australian Catholics were indifferent to the special needs and problems of European Catholics and disapproved of national churches. Some resented what they believed to be the hierarchy's official policy of denying their right to have their own church buildings. But many also believed that European Catholics in Adelaide had been treated with especially sympathetic understanding because the Archbishop of Adelaide, Archbishop Beovich, was himself the son of an Irish mother and Croat father.

Although national chaplains expressed appreciation for the assistance they had received from the local hierarchy, their position seemed to involve many strains and frustrations. On the one hand, it was clear that, however marked the anti-clerical feeling among some immigrants, many others relied heavily on the priest as guide, mentor and mediator in all manner of secular matters, from buying a house to arranging an admission to hospital. Demands of this kind were most burdensome in the early post-war years, but migrant chaplains have continued to fulfil more numerous and varied 'service' functions than is usual with their Australian counterparts. Some probably encouraged this extension of
their activities as a means of strengthening their leadership in community affairs. Others certainly found their parishioners' expectations excessive.

The chaplains also laboured under practical difficulties particular to their own situation. One of these was the scattered distribution of the migrant population under their care. The Adelaide priests are the only migrant chaplains in South Australia; at various times, depending in the early days largely upon the location of migrant hostels and other migrant concentrations, nearly all of them have had to travel hundreds of miles, or even as far as Perth in Western Australia, in the course of their duties. Even within Adelaide, the members of any one nationality group are widely enough distributed to make unusual demands on the chaplain's zeal and energy. Maintaining good relations with a number of parish priests has often been an essential, and not always easy, element in ministering to the needs of a scattered flock. The dispersal of the people under a chaplain's care also hampers him in exercising surveillance over individual conduct. Ultimate responsibility rests with the parish priest, and, as one chaplain said, 'If they tell me they attend the local Australian church, and support it financially, what can I do?'

The intermittent nature of contacts between ethnic Catholics and their priests was one factor which the national chaplains felt had contributed to the decline in respect for the church and priestly authority among migrants in Australia. Another factor they saw as the conditions of the migrant process itself, particularly the breaking-up of families and the loss of kin and group ties and controls of all kinds. The ready availability of opportunities for material advancement was also believed to have seduced many immigrants, turning them towards worldly concerns and away from the church. The examination of overall trends in religious participation was beyond the scope of this study. So far as I am aware, no one can say how far the decline in church attendance referred to by several migrant chaplains is compensated for by attendance at the migrants' own parish churches. Our interviews show, however, that many migrants attend both their parish church and their ethnic church.

By the time of this study, the Lithuanians had their own church. But in the early days they too, as other minorities still
Table 4 Number of Eastern European Catholics and Roman Catholics compared with number of priests, Adelaide, 1966

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<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Priests</th>
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<tr>
<td>Czech, Slovak</td>
<td>545*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>1,637*</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>944*</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>4,903*</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>1,220*</td>
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<td>Croat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenian</td>
<td>500 est.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1966 Census.

...do, used the parish churches readily made available to them by the local hierarchy. Some priests, as well as laymen, however, felt it as a loss of dignity that they were no more than temporary visitors in the churches where they worshipped and had no place they could call their own. 'In Europe,' one said, 'people are accustomed to fine, big churches. They don't like attending a church like this, which has to be shared with so many other groups. In the old days, when there were four masses here every Sunday morning (as each migrant group took its turn), we often had to wait half an hour to get in. What is a priest without a church? Like a soldier without a gun.'

While there was some element of common experience and common attitude among the various minorities, there was so much variation in the church's provision for care of Catholic migrants in different groups that it was difficult to discern the workings of any underlying coherent policy. The situation of each minority, and the position and functions of its priest, seemed rather to reflect the varying resources made available by each ethnic group and the varying pressures exerted by local migrants and church bodies overseas. As Table 4 shows, in 1966 there was no clear-cut relationship between the size of each Catholic group and the availability of priests.

Diversity in the priest's functions, accommodation and source of financial support was also marked. The Latvian priest worked...
among Italians as well as the small group of Latvian Catholics, lived in the Archbishop's House and was maintained by the Diocese. Of the remaining five priests in Adelaide in 1966, two had certain responsibilities in the institutions where they lived, and one said mass daily in a home for destitute women. The other two worked entirely among their own people. The two Polish priests said mass in nine different Adelaide churches at various times throughout the year, in addition to the daily mass in the chapel at the Polish Orphanage; by contrast, the Lithuanian priest said mass only at the Lithuanian Catholic Centre. Three priests—the Croatian and Lithuanian and one of the Poles—lived in their own community Catholic Centres; the other Polish priest and the Hungarian were accommodated in Catholic institutions (a school and a home for delinquent girls). The Czech priest, who died in 1962, lived in a monastery at Mt Lofty. The Lithuanian community was entirely responsible for the support of the Lithuanian priest, while the Diocese provided fully for the Latvian chaplain; in the other minorities, the priest was supported partly by the Diocese and partly by the ethnic community.

The kind of relationship which each minority had developed with the local church hierarchy, and the degree of organisation and vitality which characterised its religious life, were clearly related to the overall minority group structure. The Slovaks and Slovenians were too few in number to have developed more than an embryonic community organisation; lacking their own resident priests in Adelaide, both groups relied on occasional visits from priests in other states to maintain some continuity of their ethnic religious traditions. In the Czech, Hungarian, and Polish minorities, internal conflicts weakened the position of the church, financially and in terms of its moral reputation and influence. The Czechs, characterised in our terms as relatively divided, dispersed and unstable, had not succeeded in replacing their priest when he died. The position of Catholics in the more cohesive, centralised and stable Latvian minority presented a very different picture. Faced with the same eventuality as the Czechs, the Latvians had ensured that a priest was brought from Europe to care for their much smaller number of Catholic families. The Lithuanians had lived through internal conflict to develop a vigorous and prosperous ethnic church. They were able to build a Catholic Centre,
which they own, and which contains a chapel to seat about 500, the only ethnic Catholic church in Adelaide (excluding the Ukrainian Catholic church and the little chapel in the Polish Orphanage). Their relatively privileged and independent position appeared to be related to the fact that, unlike all other migrant priests except one of the two Poles, the chaplain did not belong to the Diocesan clergy but to a religious order. He was a member of the Marian Fathers, who in 1948 had been given permission to establish the Lithuanian College of St Casimir in Rome for refugee bishops and priests from Lithuania.

The most independent group of all, however, were the Ukrainians, who, since the establishment of a Ukrainian Diocese in Australia in 1958, have not been subject to the limitations imposed on other Eastern European minorities by the general policy and stance of the Australian hierarchy previously described. Two Ukrainian priests of the Eastern rite arrived in Australia in 1949 as Displaced Persons; more were brought from Italy and Canada by the church itself, and by 1951 there were nine altogether. According to the account of the development of the Ukrainian Catholic church in Australia written by Bishop Ivan Prashke, the first Australian Bishop, Ukrainian Catholics received timely help and support from the Australian clergy and laity, but had something of a struggle to assert their right to independence and the maintenance of their own ethnic traditions. In the early days, he writes, ‘it was still difficult for many simple Australians to accept as Catholics a group who not only did not follow the Latin rite but also allowed a married priesthood’.32

An Australia-wide conference of Ukrainian priests in 1953 resolved to inform the Apostolic Delegate for Ukrainians in Western Europe, Archbishop Bücke, in Rome, of the urgent need for more clergy and of problems confronted by the married clergy. The Exarchate for the Eastern churches, who was present at this first priests’ conference, promised to discuss the question of national parishes with the Australian bishops. Autonomy was not, however, achieved until 1958, following upon the visit to Australia of

32 The account of the Ukrainian Catholic Church is based on interviews with clergy and others in Adelaide and on a translation of Bishop Ivan Prashke’s chapter, ‘The Ukrainian Catholic Church in Australia’, in Ukrainians in Australia. The quotation is from p. 80.
Metropolitan Maxim Hermanyuk, Metropolitan of Ukrainians in Canada, as an Apostolic Visitor. The high dignity of the Metropolitan's office drew favourable public attention, and events like the celebration of mass in St Patrick's Cathedral, Melbourne, attended by 2,000 of the faithful, and a concert in the Melbourne Town Hall, at which 3,000 were present, appear to have been significant in stimulating Ukrainian religious life and national consciousness. During his visit, the Metropolitan also met with the Australian bishops, assembled for an episcopal conference in Sydney, apparently preparing the ground for the announcement, six months later, that Pope Pius XII had created an Apostolic Exarchate for Ukrainians of the Byzantine Rite in Australia. To convey the import of this development to the faithful, the Ukrainian clergy issued a Proclamation explaining

That we would have our own real pastors, knowing our needs. That all efforts would be made to preserve the rights of our rite; that the number of priests and parishes in Australia would be increased; that our Sister-Servants would be brought to Australia to run orphanages and homes for the elderly; that Ukrainian schools would be created so that our children would be inspired with love for the Ukraine, for our rite, and for our faith. In this way all those things of value that we brought from our native land would be transmitted to our children.33

The Bishop's seat was located in Melbourne; candidates for the priesthood were to be trained in the Ukrainian Theological Seminary in Rome. Local communities of Ukrainian Catholics began building their own churches. A church paper, Church and Life, was established in 1960, and in 1964 the Union of Ukrainian Catholic Organizations of Australia was formed to co-ordinate the work of church groups and assist in the development of centralised religious, educational, charitable, social, and publishing activity. Close links with Eastern Rite churches overseas have been developed and maintained through frequent exchanges of visits between the clergy in Australia and other countries.

Even before Ukrainian Catholics had their own Diocese in Australia, they were, as Bishop Prashke says, in a privileged position compared with other national groups: 'We kept our own

33 Ukrainians in Australia, pp. 101-2.
birth-records of baptisms, organized groups of our children for first Communion, had jurisdiction over mixed marriages if the bridegroom was of the Ukrainian rite. . . One could say that we were respected as a kind of national pastorate in our own way.34

Since 1958, the unique position of Ukrainian Catholics has been confirmed and consolidated. Most Ukrainians in Adelaide (as in Australia as a whole) are Catholics. One elaborate and beautiful church has been built by voluntary labour; it was completed in 1964, and serves almost 360 families. A second and larger church is now being built on another church property, where the two priests, members of the Basilian order, are accommodated in a house on the site, known as the Ukrainian Catholic Centre. Mass is still said every week in St Patrick's Church, which the Ukrainians have used since 1949. In the 1950s a Ukrainian school was conducted in rooms in two Catholic schools in the centre of the city which the Adelaide Diocese made available at weekends for this purpose. The school appears to have come more directly under community control when it moved to the quarters of the Ukrainian Community Association in the early 1960s. The possibility of establishing full-time Ukrainian parochial schools in Australia has been considered from time to time, but resources seem scarcely adequate for such a venture.

Ukrainian Catholics thus enjoy a unique position among migrant Catholics in Australia. They have drawn immense strength from the good will and support of Eastern Rite churches in other countries, particularly the influential migrant churches of North America, and have benefited from the Holy See's firm policy of fostering the Oriental churches and protecting them from latinisation. While the distinctiveness of other ethnic churches of the Latin rite has received little recognition, the Ukrainian church's right to be different has been confirmed and respected.35

The common theme running through the various Australian-immigrant interactions that have been described in this chapter so

34 Ibid., p. 95.
35 See H. M. O'Leary, 'Our Oriental Migrants', Emmaus, June 1956, pp. 67-73, for a statement of the case for greater recognition of the special position of Eastern rite migrants in Australia, and 'sympathy with their distinctive needs'. This article appeared just two years before the announcement of the formation of the Ukrainian Diocese.
far is the resolving of tensions generated by the immigrants' determination to assert their group identity, on the one hand, and the attempts of Australian bodies to incorporate them (if at all) as individuals, on the other. I want now to go on to consider the relationships of these Adelaide minorities to a movement that was originally established with the clear intent of promoting assimilation—or, as it later came to be called, integration—of immigrants into Australian community life.

**The Good Neighbour movement**

The founding of the Good Neighbour movement by the Commonwealth government in 1949 reflected a concern to promote the assimilation of the Displaced Persons, of whom 75,500 migrated to Australia in that year. The movement was, however, intended to cater for all newly-arriving immigrants, and soon became Australia wide. Formally the Good Neighbour Councils (GNC) in each state have functioned as co-ordinating bodies, the members of each Council consisting of delegates from churches, voluntary associations and the diverse groups interested in migrant welfare, together with representatives from local Good Neighbour branches and groups, and, in some cases, individuals who are members in their own right. In practice, member organisations have varied enormously in their contributions to the movement. State Councils, helped by local branches and groups, have themselves initiated numerous activities; they are now recognised as direct service agencies. A South Australian Council was formed in 1949. Ethnic minorities did not originally have the right to appoint delegates to the Council, but in 1951 a Nationality Advisory Committee (NAC), representing sixteen ethnic groups, was formed to act as the liaison between the Council and the minorities. The fact that some minorities had no association representing the group as a whole presented the GNC with something of a dilemma, and on occasion the Secretary herself tried to encourage the formation of a community-type association in order to establish a legitimate representative voice for a minority which was fragmented into distinct or conflicting groups. The Council of Hungarian Associations, founded in 1966 after the ceremonies commemorating the 1956 uprising, was such a body, but existed in name only. A similar attempt to unite the Russians was still-born. No more successful
were Good Neighbour efforts to establish joint Australian-ethnic bodies. The Australian-Ukrainian Association, for example, lasted about four years, 1957-61, but seems to have been sustained only by the semblance of life breathed into it by the Secretary of the Good Neighbour Council.  

It was, then, the NAC that provided the one effective associational link between the Good Neighbour movement and the migrant communities. Members of the NAC organised the contributions of ‘National Groups’ (as the minorities were officially called) to a variety of community events and later to the Adelaide Festival of Arts, found speakers and performers to fill requests from Australian associations, interpreted and translated documents, and operated as a pressure group on government in relation to legislation affecting migrant welfare. In 1962, the South Australian Council for the first time admitted ‘stable National Groups’ as member organisations. From among the Eastern European minorities, the Czech, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian community associations, and the two Serbian Orthodox Communities accepted the invitation to become members. By this time the NAC had lost some of its earlier vitality. Attendance at meetings had declined, and the Committee had ceased to be a dynamic, initiating body. The question inevitably rose, should the Committee continue in existence, or would its role now be adequately filled by the ethnic representatives on the Council? Several Eastern European delegates felt that their communities needed the NAC less than in the past, but that it could still profit from their experience in its work with more recent arrivals. The active members of the Committee were clearly reluctant to see the group go out of existence, and it was agreed that it still had a job to do. Interest did not revive, however, and meetings were punctuated by anxious examination of the Committee’s role and its future. By 1965, regular meetings were no longer being held and the Committee came together only when specially called. ‘Most of the national groups’, the President reported in 1966, ‘now

36 The history of the Good Neighbour movement in South Australia has been constructed from interviews with officials and delegates, from the Council’s published annual reports and reports of the annual conferences which it publishes, and from the unpublished minutes of National Advisory Committee meetings.
belong directly to the Council.'37 In fact, the only Eastern European minorities represented on the Council were the Czechs, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, all by their secular community associations, one of the Serbian Orthodox communities, and the Australian Polish Association, a group that was never more than peripheral to the Polish community and has since become defunct.

As originally conceived, the Good Neighbour movement had no place for 'national groups' as such. The Council in South Australia was quicker than some others to recognise the potential value of an organised ethnic community in promoting assimilation, and for about ten years the NAC did in fact operate as an effective link between certain segments of the minorities and the Council, and through the Council, the Commonwealth government itself. The linking agents consisted in fact of a handful of older, well-educated people, nearly all with a professional background, and nearly all men. They were not, and could not have been, altogether representative of the minority populations. The information and attitudes they channelled through to the Council reflected their particular preoccupations rather more faithfully than the situation of their fellows with different backgrounds, and some deeply felt grievances, particularly the inability of migrants trained overseas to obtain recognition for their professional qualifications in Australia, became perennial subjects of discussion. These people also saw the Committee as a platform from which they could convey to the Australian authorities a favourable image of immigrant culture, although it seems likely that these efforts, often couched in terms of comparisons between the crudeness and complacency of Australians and the cultivation of Europeans, were self-defeating. There was little turnover in membership of the NAC, and these few representatives became to a large measure the minorities' experts in contacts with officialdom. The allocation of this responsibility to a particular set of linking individuals was clearly an economy for the ethnic associations. In practice, too, the delegates operated mostly as individuals in their efforts on behalf of the Council. Except in encouraging their own communities to contribute towards festive occasions, the NAC members had little success in involving

their fellows in the Council’s ‘assimilationist’ or ‘integrationist’ activities.

From the point of view of the Council and its executive officers, the NAC worked well enough during its first ten years. It certainly helped affirm the success of Good Neighbour efforts by ensuring migrant participation in the public rituals of festivals, exhibitions, and processions. Inevitably there was occasional tension. One source of difficulty was the problem of keeping the Good Neighbour movement free from entanglement in intra-ethnic cleavages. In the effort to remain uninvolved, the executive seems at times to have deliberately avoided becoming informed, with the result that there was much about the complexity of ethnic group life which it never understood. Despite the Council’s acceptance of the role of ‘national groups’, this issue too was sometimes a source of tension. The Council was not in fact willing to accept anything but an Australian-oriented and transitional kind of ‘nationalism’, and avoided facing squarely up to the implications of national organisation. The issue was unmistakably, if unintentionally, implied in the President’s Annual Report for 1962-3. Referring to a recent meeting of the NAC, the Report stated: ‘It was programmed as a debate on whether National Associations and Centres were advisable, but quickly developed into a discussion of the difficulties inherent in organisations of this type with everyone agreeing on the basic assumption that such meetings and meeting places were inevitable if not advisable.’

In recent years, the NAC has experienced something of a revival. In the Sixteenth Annual Report, 1966-7, the President of the Good Neighbour Council reported that ‘after a period in recession the Nationality Advisory Committee has been re-established’. M. J. Kelly, who is at present making a sociological study of the Good Neighbour movement in New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia, has suggested that a number of factors have been responsible for this change.

From the point of view of the migrants now sitting on this Committee, [he writes] a key factor was the appointment of a migrant as Chairman.

This deviated from the former practice of having the Executive Committee of the Good Neighbour Council appoint an Australian Chairman. In addition, the working rules of the NAC have been changed so that all future Chairmen will be elected from within the ranks of the delegates.

If a lack of projects was the cause for the temporary demise of the NAC in the early 'sixties, then its resurgence should perhaps be manifested in a new and increased involvement in both the affairs of the Council and associated activities as well. This seems to have been the case, for in the seventeenth Annual Report, 1967-68, the Secretary reported that 'the Council's involvement, through the Nationality Advisory Committee, in the Festival of Arts was increased considerably this year.' In addition, although an activity described by some migrants as either denigrating or useless, and often labelled both, the NAC again found itself planting trees.

A preliminary survey of the minutes of NAC meetings from its re-establishment to the present seems to indicate that to date the Committee has not returned to the narrow and ineffective stance that prevailed during the early 'sixties. Topics of discussion have ranged from charter flights to drug addiction and have included as well constructive criticism of the Good Neighbour Council itself.

At this early stage of investigation it is still unclear as to whether or not the NAC has been effectively reconstructed so that it can function independently of the personalities of its more active members, or whether it is merely riding a new wave of dynamism brought about by the infusion of new personalities. The answer may only be determined when the Committee is called upon to do just that.40

The study reported in these pages does not claim to describe the life of Eastern European immigrants in Adelaide in any total sense. Its aim is the limited one of examining the structure and functions of ethnic minorities through a detailed analysis of ethnic associations. In attempting some general interpretation of the material, I want not only to summarise part of what has been presented in preceding chapters but also to introduce wider considerations whose detailed treatment falls outside the scope of this study.

The analysis presented so far is based on a dynamic model of minority group functioning, that is, a model whose elements are processes rather than states, the component processes referring to internal minority organisation, goal definition and achievement (including the mobilisation of resources to achieve goals), the attainment of identity and the handling of external relations. Before looking at some aspects of the relationships among these elements, I shall summarise the conditions that are assumed to be held constant.

We are, to begin with, concerned with immigrants, not with groups like the national minorities in the USSR, who have become minorities through absorption into a more powerful state, and who normally remain settled in their own traditional territory. So far as the characteristics of the immigrant minorities themselves are concerned, the assumed conditions are: a large enough population settled within a specified area to support some differentiation of associational structure, and no sharp changes in population size. So far as the host society is concerned, we assume: an open
and relatively prosperous economic situation, with opportunities
for both horizontal and vertical mobility based on widely attainable (i.e. not ascribed) qualifications; a high degree of centralisation of governmental and non-governmental (e.g. trade union, professional association) control, resulting in all minorities (and members of the host society, in most circumstances) having the same formal rights and duties regarding employment, welfare services, education, political participation, freedom of movement, etc.; the absence of legal, formal or publicly accepted practices of discrimination against minorities; the rejection of overtly authoritarian leadership patterns (i.e. the acceptance of democratic decision-making procedures); and a sense of confidence on the part of the host society in the propriety of its policies towards minority groups and in its own future. The constants I am assuming also include more general cultural conditions which are affecting the relationships of minorities and hosts throughout the world: the mass production of goods, ideas and entertainment, and the related cultivation of mass consumption, processes which drastically undermine cultural variation of all kinds.

As a first step in the attempt to identify patterns or types of minority characteristics and experiences, the minorities were compared on the basis of data from the 1966 Census. The relevant data available by birthplace categories are: size of population, percentage of the male workforce in white-collar occupations, and percentage of the male plus female population who are of British nationality (i.e. who have been naturalised). In addition, Census data have been used to construct a Gini Index of residential concentration of each birthplace category. At the Index's lowest value of zero, the birthplace group is equally distributed throughout the residential area on the same basis as the total population. The highest theoretical value is one, and the closer the Index is to one, the greater is the birthplace category's residential concentration. For the present purpose, the data used were the 1966 figures for the metropolitan area of Adelaide, and the unit of analysis was the Local Government Area. It will be recalled that Census data

Table 5 Some characteristics of the Eastern European population of Adelaide, 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>-64</td>
<td>Cohesive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovak</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>Czech divided Slovak cohesive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>Cohesive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>2,325</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>Cohesive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>-24</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>6,133</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>3,186</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>Byelorussian divided Russian fragmented Ukrainian cohesive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav</td>
<td>4,635</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>Croat cohesive Serb fragmented Slovenian cohesive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
do not exactly match the minorities distinguished in our own study, because the Census combines Russians with Ukrainians, Czechs with Slovaks, and Croats, Serbs and Slovenians together as Yugoslavs.

Table 5 sets out the relevant Census data, the Gini Index and minority cohesion, as previously defined. If the small Bulgarian population is omitted, what stands out from this table is that populations with a higher proportion of white-collar workers also tend to have a higher proportion of members who have been naturalised, and are markedly less residentially concentrated than the rest. If we compare only those Census groups which match up with the minorities, and again omit Bulgarians, the cohesive minorities appear as less residentially concentrated than the fragmented and divided communities. It is possible that the Estonians and Latvians have approached a type of social structure characteristic of those middle class Australians among whom there is a comparatively high degree of group organisation independent of residential propinquity.

The method of numerical classification analysis used to identify like and unlike minorities was the ‘Multbet’ analysis due to Lance and Williams. For purposes of the ‘Multbet’ analysis, the Gini Index was combined with twenty-three variables representing all the manageable data referred to in the preceding chapters. Because of the distortion involved if Census data on Czechoslovaks, Russians, and Yugoslavs are taken to refer equally to the minorities (as distinguished in the present study) within each of these larger categories, these data were not used in the ‘Multbet’ analysis, except in the case of the Gini Index. The variables are listed below in three categories according to my subjective assessment of their potency in differentiating one cluster of minorities from another.

First priority variables

Gini Index
number of special interest associations ever formed
percentage of ever-formed associations still in existence, i.e. stability
cohesion of associational structure (cohesive, fragmented, divided)
ethnic school in existence more than five years continuously (yes, no)

Scouts in existence more than five years continuously (yes, no)
mobilisation of professionals in service of associations (high, medium, 
none or low)
number of clergy resident in Adelaide
approximate improved capital value of church properties
approximate improved capital value of secular properties
affiliation of secular community association with nation-wide ethnic 
body (yes, no)
affiliation of special interest associations with Australian associations 
(yes, no)

Second priority variables

percentage of ever-formed special interest associations affiliated with 
community associations, i.e. centralisation
percentage of ever-formed special interest associations classed as cultural
percentage of ever-formed special interest associations classed as national 
and political
regular religious publications (yes, no)
regular secular publications (yes, no)
archives, local or national (yes, no)
library (yes, no)

Third priority variables

number of community associations ever formed
percentage of minority population participating in community life
percentage of children at ethnic schools
affiliation of special interest associations with nationwide or international 
associations (yes, no)

'Multbet' analysis using all twenty-three variables revealed four 
like clusters of minority populations, and the stability of the group­
ing was maintained as third and second priority variables were 
withdrawn. In Fig. 5, the closer to the base line a pair joins to 
form a new combination, the more alike the members are in terms 
of the chosen variables. Thus, the most alike pair are the Slovaks 
and Slovenians. Four clusters emerge near the base of the diagram; 
that is, very little information about the individual minorities is 
lost by combining them into these four clusters. Somewhat more 
information again is lost in combining the four clusters into two 
higher-order clusters. Overall, more than twice as much informa­
tion is lost when all minorities are combined into a single type 
as when the fourteen are grouped into two higher-order clusters
'Multbet' classificatory analysis of 14 Adelaide minorities, showing 4 clusters of 'like' minorities
**Table 6 Patterns of minority organisation and development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal minority organisation</th>
<th>Rudimentary</th>
<th>Consolidation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>associational structure only; differentiation of quasi-group kind, potential rather than actual</td>
<td>of associational structure around community associations; stabilisation of special interest groups, with a high proportion of affiliated groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Specific simple definition of goals, with a high degree of consensus</td>
<td>Diffusion of community association goals to keep general consensus; consolidation of selected special interests, some new ones having been acquired, some old ones dropped or changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and attainment of goals</td>
<td>Unknown and unavailable to the minority, latent only</td>
<td>Development of mechanisms for ensuring continuity of resources: buildings, schools, training programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Future attainment emphasised; present a temporary interlude</td>
<td>Faith in continuing ability to attain goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attainment</td>
<td>Rigid determination to preserve traditional identity intact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attainment of identity</td>
<td>‘Assimilationist’ stance of host seen by minority as threatening; minority perceived by host as intransigent and unknowable; perceptions deter communication and consolidate in mutual ignorance</td>
<td>Development of new and unique identity, viable in minority’s present situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interplay of host and minority perceptions</td>
<td></td>
<td>‘Assimilationist’ stance of host not accepted by minority, but recognised as one of many situational factors minority has to adapt to; development of some measure of tolerance and respect on part of host for what is seen as minority co-operativeness; perceptions stabilise communication at level adequate to preserve modus vivendi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling of external relations</td>
<td>Minimal involvement in external relations; belief in temporariness of situation encourages apartness from host society</td>
<td>Organisation of external relations of all kinds to maximise attainment of minority’s own goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal minority organisation</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>as cleavages develop within or between community associations; proliferation of special interest associations, lack of mechanisms for effective control of inter-ethnic relations</td>
<td>between community associations develops to point where members become polarised around one association; decline in vigour of associational life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Attempts to arrive at commonly agreed-upon goals, but attachment to particularist and external goals prevails</td>
<td>Consolidation of conflicting particularist goals; abandonment of attempt to arrive at all-embracing goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition and attainment of goals</td>
<td>Attempts to mobilise scarce resources of personnel and finance frustrated by lack of consensus on goals; disillusioned individuals dissociate themselves from minority affairs</td>
<td>Thin spread of resources over conflicting activities and groups; no policy for sharing resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attraction</td>
<td>Frustration because of failure to define or achieve commonly agreed upon goals</td>
<td>Concentration of attainment within limited, particularist areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attainment of identity</td>
<td>Disagreement about what constitutes identity, and whether emphasis should be on forging a new identity or preserving the old</td>
<td>Struggle between groups over claim to represent minority's true identity; some group and individual self-hatred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interplay of host and minority perceptions</td>
<td>'Assimilationist' stance of host partly blamed for minority's troubles; minority seen by host as embroiled in arcane and dangerous dissension; highly selective communications reinforce mutually unfavourable perceptions</td>
<td>'Assimilationist' stance of host perceived differently by different factions and individuals, and warmly supported by some as part of their rejection of minority identification; as a group, minority not readily visible to host and host perceptions remain generalised and embryonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling of external relations</td>
<td>Neglect of relations with host society because of concentration on internal problems and/or external ethnic relations</td>
<td>Impingement of external (particularly international ethnic) bodies exacerbates internal conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(the observation ‘more than twice as much’ being possible because the scale of information loss is an equal interval scale and the points at which the two higher-order clusters emerge are less than half way up to the top of the tree).

A further analysis of discriminating variables shows that the two main higher-order clusters are distinguished principally by their activities and stability: the Ukrainians, Latvians, Estonians, Poles, Lithuanians, Russians and Serbs, on the one hand, are more highly organised and active over a wider range of areas and more continuously than the Slovenians, Slovaks, Czechs, Byelorussians, Hungarians, Croats and Bulgarians, on the other. Because we do not have separate population figures for the minorities which are not counted by the Census as birthplace categories, it is not possible to say whether the minorities in the two cluster pairs are significantly different in size. A glance at Table 5 suggests that there is probably a mean difference, but that ‘large’ numbers alone do not ensure activity nor ‘small’ numbers prevent it: compare the
Hungarians and Estonians. Within the more active higher-order cluster, the most alike pairs of minorities are the Serbs and Russians, the Lithuanians and Poles, and the Estonians and Latvians. The most powerful factors distinguishing the Russian-Serb cluster from the other five minorities in this higher-order cluster are the smaller proportion of their population participating in community affairs, the larger proportion of national and political associations, and the absence of libraries, secular community associations, or secular properties.

The 'Multbet' analysis blocks out in bold shape the patterning of minority attributes and experiences. As I have tried to show in the preceding chapters, the relationships among these attributes and experiences are complex, subtle, and often elusive. In Table 6, I have tried to summarise four ideal-type patterns of minority group development. Crude as these models are, they provide a tentative framework for clarifying the relationships between minority structure, experience, and perception.
It may also be useful to highlight four of the more promising propositions suggested by the Adelaide research. They are:

1a. In the circumstances previously specified, the membership of an ethnic minority will emerge as heterogeneous in interests and values.

b. To the extent that the associational structure of the minority develops entirely or predominantly around these diverse interests and values, effectiveness in defining and achieving community goals and in developing community identity is impaired and the probability of the minority becoming fragmented or polarised into conflicting factions is increased.

c. To the extent that the minority develops community associations whose goals are sufficiently diffuse and flexible to embrace diversity of interests and values, effectiveness in defining and achieving community goals and in developing community identity will be promoted.

2. The more minority leadership becomes concentrated in authoritarian individuals, the less responsive are minority goals to the realities of the minority situation and the expectations of the larger society, and hence the more introverted is the minority likely to become.

3. The greater the resources available to the minority from external ethnic structures in maintaining distinctive cultural patterns and social structures, the more effective will the minority be in maintaining these patterns and structures.

4. The more structural links connect associations with one another, either within or outside the minority, the more stable is the minority's associational structure likely to be.

The attempt to frame simple propositions of this kind is an instructive exercise, but the outcome scarcely does justice to the on-going process of interaction within local minorities and between them and other structures.

Depicted in very general and abstract terms, host-minority interaction is expressed in Fig. 6. Both host and minorities enter into the initial interaction with pre-existing definitions of the emerging situation in which they are jointly involved. These original definitions are modified through the interaction itself and in
response to what are perceived as the definitions of the situation held by the other side. Each enters the next situation of interaction with these modified definitions, and so the process continues.

But this model is again misleading in its simplicity. Like the 'dialectical viewpoint' espoused by Schermerhorn, it is based on a dichotomy: in this case, host vis-à-vis minority. But in reality many different minorities and many different structures within and outside the host society contribute towards the development of the definition of the situation which is salient for the outcome of any particular occasion of interaction, and the interaction itself may involve several minority and host structures just as readily as the duality of a monolithic host vis-à-vis a monolithic minority. Highly schematised, the more complex model looks as in Fig. 7.

In the following chapter, I shall explore further some of these theoretical problems in the light of the Adelaide material and return to the question posed in the first chapter: under such conditions are ethnic minorities likely to remain as distinct structures; in what form and why?
Before taking up the theoretical questions which will form the substance of this concluding chapter, I wish to emphasise again that I am not presuming to assess how far minority group life embraces the total minority population, nor what significance this group life or the symbols of minority unity may have for people who do not share them. These questions are immensely important, but an altogether different study from the one we have attempted would be necessary to answer them. The best we can do is make crude estimates of the proportion of the minority population which takes part in the organised group life of the minority community. ‘Takes part’ obviously covers a great range of behaviour. Table 7 ranks the minorities in terms of my judgment of percentage of the population which has some connection with community affairs, without necessarily belonging to any association. This judgment was based on figures for attendance at major events, membership of community associations, and support of community projects, and was made independently of information on enrolment of children in ethnic schools, which is given in the second column.

The possible range of error in both sets of figures is considerable, but the relative positions of the fourteen minorities are probably reasonably accurate. Since the figures in the left-hand column represent my estimate of maximum participation, the obvious inference is that a substantial proportion of Eastern European immigrants have no involvement in the organised group life of their communities. The discussion that follows concerns mostly those who do, or who at some time in the past have done so. But in the last pages, I shall briefly touch upon the area of ethnic social life that has fallen largely outside the scope of my own study: the
### Table 7 Ranking of minorities according to their participation in community life and children's school enrolment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population participating in community life (%)</th>
<th>Children enrolled in ethnic schools (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussian</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croat</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Informal, non-institutionalised relationships that link people as, for example, kin, friends, neighbours or fellow-workers. My concentration in the present study on associational organisation does not signify any lack of appreciation that a minority population might well have an active and complex social life based entirely on such informal ties. Indeed, it may be that some of the minorities whom I have described as inactive and non-cohesive, in terms of associational structure, have an intense and intricately cross-cutting social life of this non-institutionalised kind. Moreover, minorities which are active and cohesive in our definition may well contain substantial numbers of people who are similarly linked together by informal ties, but play little or no part in the organised group life of the ethnic community.

All the Adelaide minorities, except perhaps the very smallest, have at some time specified creativity (particularly cultural creativity, making music, playing sport etc.) and productivity as goals worthwhile in themselves and essential to the development and maintenance of a positive group identity. Creative thinkers and artists are few in any community, and it is impossible to say whether these Adelaide minorities had produced more or less of them than might have been expected in terms of some theoretical norm. But we can take note of factors in the Adelaide situation which clearly ham-
pered creative activity. The small size of the local group was cer­
tainly a discouragement. To take one simple example: months of
work had to go into the writing and production of a play that
could attract an audience on no more than one or two nights. The
combination of the smallness of the local group, the remoteness of
a wider ethnic audience or public and the sense of alienation from
Australian culture seems to have had a stultifying effect on many
individuals with an urge to do creative work; histories of migrant
group settlement in Australia are among the many unfinished pro-
jects that accumulate with the years. The urge to preserve con-
tinuity with the past has also, in one sense, been a deterrent, for it
has led potential artists to devote their talents to reproducing
familiar 'art and handcraft' objects and scrupulously copying the
works of 'old masters' instead of trying to interpret their own
experience in their own way. Different kinds of creative activity
are, of course, dependent in different degrees on group support:
choreographers and composers need access to dancers and musi-
cians, while writers, painters and sculptors are, by comparison, more
independent. In practice, however, the Adelaide minorities that
were able to provide choreographers and composers with avenues
of expression were also the ones which encouraged other kinds of
artists, through, for example, bringing their work before the public
at times of festivals and exhibitions of all kinds. In this context,
the individual artist did not have to vie for public attention with
the great range of competitors he would have faced in the 'open'
market of the wider Adelaide community. Active minorities pro-
moted creativity by mobilising a public and establishing a protected
market.

Productivity is, however, more directly related to minority
group structure than is creativity. The connection is obvious,
since productivity depends heavily on the stability of group life.
Like creativity, but more so, it is also encouraged by the partici-
pation of the minority in an effective nation-wide organisation,
and in this the cohesive and stable secular minorities had an
advantage over all others.

I have been speaking of creativity and productivity here in a
somewhat narrow sense. As I have already shown, the more co-
hesive, centralised, and stable minorities were also the most effec-
tive in mobilising all kinds of resources among their membership
Group Life in the Minority Community

—including professional expertise—and in providing a variety of socially valued, significant and satisfying roles for their members to play. These considerations lead to a question which is outside the range of the present study, but which calls for comment, since our material bears indirectly upon it at many points: namely, how is minority group structure related to the well-being or personal adjustment of the individual migrant? For answer I can make only inconclusive observations. The first is that an effective and productive group life has obviously been immensely satisfying to many immigrants, providing them with status and an outlet for energies and opportunities of self-expression not readily available to them elsewhere. Secondly, it is equally obvious that an unstable and conflict-ridden group life has frustrated and embittered many others. While disillusionment has thrown some of these into the arms of the Australian community, it has left others anti-social (or anti-group) in attitude and isolated in position. But, thirdly, being at the centre of group conflict has been for others again a 'growing experience'. I am not referring simply to the fact that some people thrive on strife—although this is certainly true—but to the observation that on occasion the destructiveness of internecine conflict has challenged the parties involved to take a fresh and hard look at what they are about. In the process, some of these immigrants have gained a new understanding of group dynamics, of how groups can function effectively in unfavourable surroundings and how to develop mechanisms that reduce the likelihood of group cleavage degenerating into enervating struggles. Many have come to believe that their present situation calls for a different kind of 'association-personality' from the kind that was appropriate during their early days in Australia. In the refugee world that they inhabited then, a stubborn faith in the transient nature of their position and an uncompromising commitment to self-evident political goals (the overthrow of communism and the restoration of independence to their home countries) were the essential qualities in anyone who sought to play an active part in ethnic affairs. Now what is required—as these people have come to see it—is a more disciplined kind of 'association-personality', open-minded rather than single-minded in ideology, sensitive rather than aggressive in approach.

Having first posed the problem of the relationship of individual behaviour to minority group structure, I now wish to pursue a little
further the question of the part played by the ethnic community in encouraging or forcing the immigrant, as an individual, to relate himself to the larger society, or preventing him from doing so. The question is a basic one because none of the Adelaide minorities is self-contained, or is likely to become so. For better or worse, all except a few immigrants—like elderly housewives, isolated within the circle of their protective families—do in fact have to relate themselves personally to structures within the larger society, and can do so to their own benefit only if they have acquired some minimum competencies of skill (especially language) and knowledge. Beyond this minimum degree of acculturation lies a wide range of possible types of adaptation, of which full assimilation, or the disappearance of all distinctively ethnic characteristics and behaviours, is only one.¹

Theoretically, ethnic associations might take upon themselves the role of socialising individual immigrants into the host society; like some therapeutic groups, their success might then be measured by their disintegration. No such function formed any part of the goals of ethnic community organisation in Adelaide. In addition to encouraging prowess in sports (and even here there has been more enthusiasm for educating Australians in European sports than in developing new skills among the migrants themselves), associations have of course provided the occasion for their members to acquire, incidentally, new skills and knowledge of many kinds: widely-shared experiences of building churches and halls are an obvious example. But, apart from minor efforts on the part of a very few associations like the Polish-Australian Family Club, they have avoided undertaking even the most neutral of acculturation-oriented tasks, such as providing opportunities for members to improve their command of English or acquire basic knowledge about local institutions like banks, insurance companies, building societies, hospitals and schools. Nor, except in sports, have they taken initiatives in developing contact with Australian groups or exposing their members to the life of the community around them. Priests and other ethnic leaders have, in many instances, acted as individual socialising agents, but the associations as such have not normally seen the orienting of the immigrant community towards

¹ For an analysis of types of individual adaptation, see Martin, Refugee Settlers, pp. 80-91.
Australian society and culture as part of their function. For their part, Australian groups with an interest in promoting immigrant well-being or encouraging assimilation have rarely perceived ethnic associations as potential allies.

The minorities with a dominant religious orientation have probably been the most introverted. The more cohesive, active minorities with a secular orientation have evolved more in the direction of meeting the expectations, and hence reaping the rewards, of the wider Australian society. In doing so, this type has gone far towards creating a 'holding' environment which enfolds the individual if he wishes it and sustains his self-respect as he confronts the world beyond the ethnic community. It may even be that this protective environment discourages more than superficial exposure to the wider society. It certainly stimulates a strong sense of what Milton Gordon would call 'ethclass' pride, for minorities of this type think of themselves, as a group, as having both a cultural and a middle class identity. By contrast, the minorities with a religious orientation show a more purely ethnic consciousness, or perhaps a kind of 'ethclass' pride which takes little cognisance of Australian class concepts.

In the less active and stable minorities, lack of continuity of activities and the pervasiveness of political and religious controversy have discouraged many people from taking part in minority group affairs and stimulated some of them to move purposefully towards the Australian community. Many Hungarians, for instance, saw the fragmentation of their own group as the most effective encouragement to the individual to find his own personal route into Australian society. In the most divided and unstable groups the lack of any viable organisation for preserving traditions and passing them on to the younger generation meant that ethnic culture was becoming little more than a memory and there was no tangible achievement for ethnic pride to attach itself to. National or cultural consciousness could, nevertheless, of course remain a compelling force even though the local minority was held in contempt.

At many points in the preceding chapters the discussion has touched upon the decisive influence of external groups and institutions over developments within the Adelaide minorities. This influence took two interrelated forms: attempts of a variety of kinds by external bodies to control what happened within the minorities, and decisions initiated by the minorities themselves in the hope of affecting the image of the minority held by, or believed to be held by, these external bodies. Of the several kinds of external relations, we found it useful to pay special attention to relations with established structures in the Australian community, inter-ethnic associations and federated or centralised ethnic bodies, operating nationally or internationally.

Links with federated and centralised structures had immense positive significance for the minority associations in Adelaide. They gave standing, continuity and purpose to local activities, and helped dispel the sense of isolation and alienation from the surrounding society, by which many of these refugees were acutely affected during their early years in Australia. By the same token, however, where these external structures were themselves in conflict, they could become a powerful source of dissension within the minority community. The Orthodox churches provide obvious examples of this kind of divisive influence.\(^4\)

The particular aspect of external relations that I wish to explore further now is one that runs implicitly through much of the discussion in the preceding chapters. This is the sense of pressure which commonly characterises the experience of migrant groups in their dealings with external bodies. The point at which a norm or expectation comes to be experienced as a pressure is often ambiguous, but the theoretical distinction I am making here is clear enough: in a situation where the right of one group to dominate over another is not legitimised, but where one group comes to believe that the other is trying (i.e. illegitimately) to restrict its powers of self-determination, then the expectations of the second will come to be perceived as pressures by the first. In

\(^4\) See Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations*, pp. 269-75, for illustrations of ‘cross-national chains of dependence and interdependence’ affecting the position of ethnic minorities. Schermerhorn describes these linkages as ‘potential fulcrums of division that can be manipulated from outside a society while having strong repercussions within’, and refers to them as ‘links that divide’ (p. 270).
these terms, pressure can obviously be exerted to encourage groups or individuals to change or to stay as they are: that is, deliberately to resist change. All members of a minority do not necessarily share the same perception of external expectations as legitimate, on the one hand, or as a form of pressure, on the other. Indeed, in Adelaide, external bodies of many kinds found faithful supporters within the minorities themselves, and the confrontation between the minority community and external powers was often played out inside the ethnic structure. Church-community cleavages in the Catholic minorities are instances of this kind.

The extent to which the Adelaide immigrants perceived external expectations as pressures was partly determined by their assessment of these expectations as realistic or feasible. Lack of realism was a sore point, for it usually implied a careless unconcern on the part of the external body about becoming informed on the migrants' actual situation. Australian attempts to stimulate assimilation, inter-ethnic co-operation, and the breakdown of ethnic barriers were experienced as particularly threatening just because they so often displayed what appeared to the immigrants as a contemptuous ignorance of what national identity really meant. Organisations with a remote source, like federated or centralised, national or international ethnic bodies, also often appeared to the immigrant to be quite out-of-touch with the reality of his new life. In terms of their norms and goals, he was expected to supply money, carry out programs, publicise points of view, which were often beyond his capacity, damaging to some facet of his life outside the external body's range of vision, the subject of local dispute, or simply inappropriate or untimely. Even within the local minority itself, representatives of external structures could be so removed in spirit from the world of the immigrants' daily strivings and emerging aspirations that what seemed to them legitimate expectations could strike their fellows as anachronisms. The exhortations and demands of the clergy were often viewed in this light.

One particularly unwelcome form of external pressure was the attempt to homogenise the immigrant population: that is, the expectation or requirement that people of various ethnic origins should speak and act with one voice, and in general behave as if they all shared common interests, purposes and characteristics. In the immediate post-war years, ignorance of ethnic differences and
the urgency necessary in dealing with a predominantly refugee migrant intake encouraged Australians to think of and treat all newcomers in this way. Because the first refugees were mostly Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians, the name 'Balts' came to be attached to all Eastern European immigrants. They were also known as 'D.P.s', and later, as the direct outcome of government policy, as 'New Australians'. What I have previously written about the 'D.P.' label applied with as much force to the term 'Balts':

What none of them wants to be is a 'D.P.' The term both implies inferiority and denies national, and hence individual, identity. In 1953 many of the immigrants were acutely resentful of this enforced status. It was like an ugly, inappropriate, and restricting garment which they were anxious to discard. But the Australians would not let them get rid of it.5

With the passage of time Australians have become more aware of ethnic distinctions among these former Displaced Persons. Today one seldom hears the term 'D.P.', although 'New Australian', 'foreigner', or simply 'immigrant', are common enough. But often the foreign-born are identified by their national origin as 'Polish', 'Hungarian', or, often, 'Greek or Italian'. The main impact of the expectation of homogeneity now concerns the internal structure of the individual minorities. Firmly convinced that its work could only be hampered if it became involved in the internal affairs of immigrant communities, the Good Neighbour Council in Adelaide deliberately adopted a policy of disregarding—as far as it could—intra-ethnic divisions. (The most stubborn insistence on minority group unity, however, wilted before the intransigence of Serb-Croat and Czech-Slovak divisions.) International ethnic associations—though better informed than Australian groups about the bases of internal alignments—also often put pressure on their affiliates in Australia to speak with a common voice. National associations, though better informed still, sometimes did the same. In practice, these demands normally required that a minority community deal with the external body and participate in its activities through one or two delegates, who were assumed to represent their fellow-countrymen as a whole.

Without acceding to this pressure, a minority had little hope of acting as an effective link between the local ethnic community

5 Martin, Refugee Settlers, p. 78.
and other groups. A minority which allowed internal divisions to generate quarrels among its representatives, or would-be representatives, dissipated its strength and jeopardised external respect and goodwill. Australian bodies sometimes recognised the right of a minority to religious differentiation, but intra-minority ethnic and political divisions were more likely to be seen as a sordid, irrelevant and petty form of in-fighting.

The pressure towards ethnic homogeneity is maintained by a complexity of mechanisms. In return for yielding to this pressure, as I have indicated, a minority is rewarded by having its voice heard. The related reward of securing external respect—or at least avoiding external contempt—is also important. The Adelaide minorities that have been most effective in dealing with external bodies are the more cohesive, secular communities. They have recognised the advantages of presenting a united front and have had the internal control and stability to do so. The cohesive, religion-oriented communities have tried to avoid Australian pressures by keeping to themselves; internal divisions are taken care of, and—all the more easily because of their self-contained group life—they appear to the outside world as a united, undifferentiated whole. In the divided and fragmented minorities, external pressures towards homogenisation exacerbate and provide a focus for internal conflict.

Many immigrants for their part have also in their own minds telescoped all the Australian pressures that they experience into a powerful, monolithic force. Even though public demands on them to become assimilated have abated in recent years, their significant contacts with Australian groups—churches, sports bodies, Scouts and Guides and Good Neighbour Council have been considered in some detail—have all had in common the underlying requirement that they should adapt themselves to established local patterns and the complementary attitude that, apart from cultural frills like folk-dancing and choir-singing, the perpetuation of different customs and distinct groupings is, at best, something to be tolerated temporarily during their initial period of adjustment to Australian life.

These requirements and expectations have been conveyed to the immigrants in diverse and often subtle ways. Indeed it seems that the Australian community has exercised its strongest influence on
minority groups, not through positive pressure to make them conform in any particular way, but simply through the process of denial. The characteristic response of the Australian bodies included in this study has been to go on with their activities as if the advent of European settlers could (or need) make no difference to them. It has been easier for them to maintain this stand because they have avoided collecting, or if available absorbing, information about the realities of the migrants' origins and their present situation. Fostered ignorance has saved them from having to confront the fact that European immigrants are different and have given expression to this distinctiveness, not only by establishing their own community life, but also by cultivating characteristic forms of participation in Australian structures. While the Australians have been stubbornly looking in the one direction, a kind of pluralism has been quietly consolidating in the other.

On what basis, if any, is this pluralism likely to persist? As carriers of distinctive and 'whole' cultures, the Adelaide minorities are clearly losing ground. But this process is far more advanced in some minorities than in others, and in several of them particular traditions, such as choir-singing, Scouting or religious observances, are very much alive. Some of these particular traditions will certainly be integrated into the wider Australian culture, taking on a new significance in the process, and in time ceasing to be identified with the minority which introduced them. It seems likely that, during this transition phase, many of the younger generation, though not necessarily committed in any overall sense to the maintenance of ethnic identity, will nevertheless find much pleasure and an enjoyable sense of pride and distinction in their command over these traditional practices. Other traditions will survive because of the strength they draw from integration into world-wide structures; the religious traditions of the Orthodox churches are obvious examples. But, from acting as central organising principles of immigrant life, traditions such as these are likely to become limited to a sharply-defined and narrow sphere of activity, just as Scottish Presbyterianism and Irish Catholicism no longer represent different ways of life, but little more than different religious observances. If, then, we grant that the Adelaide minorities are unlikely to establish themselves in any long-term sense as distinctive
cultural entities we can go on to ask: will they survive as interest groups?

Our research has shown only a weak development of the fraternal or mutual-help type of organisation which served a highly important function in migrant communities during the period of large-scale immigration to the United States. Again, without presuming to imply that associations of this kind are insignificant among all Australian minorities, I suggest that conditions in Australia today are crucially different from the situation in the United States when this type of organisation flourished (and in many ways different even from conditions in the United States today). Welfare services are becoming increasingly professionalised and expensive, increasingly standardised for the whole population, and increasingly the responsibility of government or government-sponsored bodies. In these circumstances it seems unlikely that ethnic minorities will begin to play a substantial role in this field.

Immigrant minorities might theoretically develop as interest groups of a different kind, based on common occupational concerns. Groups of this kind are not unknown in Australia and more may emerge in the future if numbers of immigrants become concentrated in the same industry in the one locality. Such concentrations are, however, exceptional, and the very wide distribution of the European-born throughout the occupational structure means that common occupational interests are not likely to form a basis for ethnic organisation.

In the United States some large and well-organised minorities function as interest groups of a more diffuse kind, giving their members access to a wide range of economic or political resources. Some sections of Australian minorities, of which the Italians, Greeks, Jews, and Chinese are probably the most notable, appear also to operate as interest groups in this sense, through their command of financial credit and their control of the production and marketing of certain types of goods. The Eastern European minorities in Adelaide have no such significance, and there is little indication that they ever will have, since individuals who have become successful enough to form the nucleus for a development in this direction have tended to disengage themselves from the minority community. So far as access to political power goes, the only strength of the Adelaide minorities lies in their associating themselves from time
to time with extreme anti-communist movements like the Democratic Labor Party, and there is little sign that they can—or do—expect much return from this kind of alliance. The situation may well be different among some other ethnic minorities in Australia. But it is worthwhile to note that, in this respect, Australia offers far less scope for interest group activity than does the United States, for the range and number of jobs and offices that are, directly or indirectly, political appointments is, by comparison with America, extremely small. The scope for patronage on the part of interest groups is correspondingly less.

While there have from time to time been attempts to cultivate minorities as interest groups in the service of Australian political parties, immigrant and local purposes have not easily meshed, and minorities do not seem likely to draw strength from this stimulus.\(^6\)

The present study, then, gives little indication that minorities like those we have been describing are likely to consolidate as unified interest groups of any kind.

Conflict about purposes and about the location of power is, as we have seen, far more common. It seems likely that there is something about the very fact of minority group status that encourages internal conflicts and cleavage.\(^7\) The position of minority groups like these I have been describing is not in any sense closed or fixed. They are open to pressures and expectations from many directions. Tension builds up at least partly because different groups and individuals within the minority grow in different directions, like flowers with different suns: inwardly towards the local minority community, outwardly towards the host society, or outwardly towards international ethnic organisations and movements. Tension also comes from the inconsistency between the minority's goal to develop as a *community*, on the one hand, and the particularist goals of external forces on the other. Those Adelaide minorities which have succeeded in controlling these tensions have done so, not by uniting around some common, highly committing interest, but by containing sharply defined interests within firm boundaries and

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7 See Glass, 'Insiders-Outsiders . . .', for an excellent analysis of the duality of the minority's role—as both insider and outsider—and the implications of this duality for internal cohesion and external relations.
thus, as it were, de-fusing the potential explosiveness of community life.

The Adelaide minorities, then, are not likely to crystallise into distinctive sub-cultures. Nor are they likely to become interest groups, in the sense of being organised to promote their own agreed-upon purposes by exerting influence on the power structures of the larger society. Are they then likely to persist as informal networks?

A network is a theoretical model of the linkages which connect people to one another within a specified system or field of interaction. People with certain characteristics in common—for example, common residence, kin ties, age, religion, occupation, ethnic origin—provide the potential basis through which actual linkages are generated. Networks coalesce into groups when all or most members of the network have linkages with one another. But the network also provides a conceptual tool for analysing linkages that cut across group boundaries. The part of the network consisting of all the people linked to one individual is, in modern urban societies, likely to contain many individuals who have no linkages with one another; the individual may be a member of several groups, but he is also a member of a network which, in its totality, lacks the characteristics of a group.8

While earlier analysis of modern urban society stressed the importance of association-type groups, recent work has directed attention to the more inclusive network structures.9 Systematic evidence on the functions of networks is fragmentary, but it is clear that they operate as a major mechanism for the distribution of information, goods, services, positions, status and power. The networks that are most effective from the point of view of the membership as a whole are those with the highest degree of substitutability: that is, those which, no matter how restrictive the criterion on which they are founded, operate to distribute a variety of resources to their mem-


bers without respect of persons. The continuing importance of kinship networks, for example, is closely related to the wide spectrum of resources that are channelled through kinship linkages: nothing is too trivial, nothing too important, to fall within the domain of the kin network.

Common ethnic origin is a source of network ties that operate very much like kinship networks, except that they may act as the basis of more formal groups such as ethnic churches or community associations. Although no material on networks has been produced in the present study, the research revealed substantial evidence of their importance; indeed, associations often appeared to have developed as a formalisation of network ties. But the informal network is much more resilient than the associational structure. It more readily absorbs opposing viewpoints and interests. It is less likely to take stances, or make commitments. It is less socially visible, and seldom has an image. It can be eroded as individuals drop out, but it is not usually vulnerable to external manipulation or attack. The function of ethnic origin in generating networks for immigrants and their children is likely to continue long after the more brittle of ethnic associations have disintegrated. Some of the Adelaide minorities exist at the present time more as generators of informal networks than of organised forms of group life. Others reveal a range of network structuring similar to that which exists in other parts of our society: a far-reaching and complex pattern of personal linkages, through which more and less structured groups are related to one another, and from which further linkages extend outside to networks established on different bases.

Australia is not a plural society in the sense that our polity is based on ethnic segments, but in the more limited sense that ethnicity is a source of formal and informal groupings and of some cultural differentiation. Why has this pluralism developed and why does it persist? The responsibility—or what may be seen as the 'blame'—is sometimes laid at the door of the Australian community: Milton Gordon's 'prejudices of the majority'. It is certainly true that Australians have failed to build effective bridges between migrant

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and local structures and neglected the potential of migrant communities as genuine collaborators in the social process. We have also exerted pressures towards assimilation and against differentiation along ethnic lines. Such indifference and hostility help to explain the form ethnic group life has assumed, its weaknesses as well as its strengths. But to see the mainspring of ethnic pluralism as a defensive reaction against Australian pressures and prejudice is a serious misinterpretation. Some of these immigrants have been sadly disappointed by their experiences in Australia, and a few are exceedingly critical of the country on every count, but there is little evidence that disillusionment has been significant as a spur to group organisation. To the extent that their community life represents a reaction against anything, it is the image of communist society and of the subversive elements within their own minority that provide the most potent negative points of reference.

But the effective stimulus to group organisation among these European minorities is not finally a defensive reaction against anything. It comes, for one thing, from the positive value attached to the opportunities for self-expression, gaining recognition and exercising influence provided by ethnic associations and to the role of informal networks in channelling resources from the wider society to the individual immigrant. Above all, this stimulus represents the positive concern to maintain group—and hence individual—identity, to keep alive 'long and profound' traditions or, less self-consciously, simply to preserve continuity between past and present, and so safeguard the individual's sense of personal location in time.

Most modern large-scale societies contain peoples of diverse ethnic origins and have accordingly developed plural ethnically based foci of cultural, social, economic or political organisation. In the past twenty years Australia's population has been substantially increased by immigration from many different countries. Had we emerged from this period as a homogeneous society, we would be the exception in the modern world. The distinction would be nothing to be proud of, for it would mean that we had succeeded in imposing on our ethnic populations a rigid conformism that is increasingly unacceptable in our own lives and alien to the spirit of the times.
### Appendix Summary of Characteristics of Adelaide Minorities

1. Associational Structure

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. community associations ever formed</th>
<th>No. special interest associations ever formed</th>
<th>Stability*</th>
<th>Cohesion†</th>
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* Percentage of ever-formed associations still in existence.
† Community associations cohesive (C), fragmented (F), or divided (D).
‡ Percentage of ever-formed special interest associations affiliated with community associations.
## 2. Activities and Resources

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<th>Schools in existence more than 5 years continuously</th>
<th>Scouts in existence more than 5 years continuously</th>
<th>'Cultural' associations as % of ever-formed special interest associations</th>
<th>National and political associations as % of ever-formed special interest associations</th>
<th>Regular religious publication(s)</th>
<th>Regular secular publication(s)</th>
<th>Archives (local or national)</th>
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* H = high, M = medium, N = low or none.
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