


THE MAY 30 MOVEMENT

Events and Themes



Richard W. Rigby

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The May 30 Movement of 1925 marked the beginning of a new period in the development of modern China, and demonstrated to both the Chinese and the foreigners the unprecedented level to which nationalist feelings and ideas has risen in China. In the course of the Movement the strengths and weaknesses of both foreign and Chinese forces were revealed. Although the Movement itself seemed to end in something of an anticlimax after the violence and bloodshed that had occurred, in the long run it proved to have been an event of major significance.

Despite the importance of the Movement, there is still no standard work in any language about it, indeed there is no book-length general study of any kind. While the standard work will have to wait until free access is permitted to sources in China, so far unavailable, this book tries to fill the gap, at least in the English language, by giving an accurate account of the events of the Movement and an examination of its principal themes.

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The May 30 Movement

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Richard W. Rigby

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Preface

On 30 May 1925, police of the International Settlement in Shanghai fired on a crowd of Chinese demonstrating in Nanking Road, leaving a number of dead and more wounded. The grievances of those taking part in the demonstration included labour issues, various problems relating to the position of the Chinese in Shanghai, and the wider question of China's international position generally. To the surprise of many foreigners living in or otherwise concerned with China, within a few days of the incident the whole country seemed to have been swept up into a tide of protest and indignation which rapidly expressed itself in riots, demonstrations, strikes and boycotts. Even those Chinese who had always been regarded as 'reasonable' and 'responsible' lent their voices to the demand for a more or less complete overhaul of China's relations with the major powers. The newly reorganised Kuomintang and the young Communist Party, only recently united, were able to point to the incident as proof of the correctness of their opposition to imperialism and the treaty system, and to harness the energies released by it to the furtherance of their cause. This in its turn played a significant part in preparing the way for the Northern Expedition. The May 30 Movement, as it soon became known, also served to convince many foreigners that it was no longer feasible or even desirable to maintain the position which they had enjoyed in China to the time of the movement. The Chinese showed that they could, and would, exact a price that the Powers were not prepared to pay.

In this book I have attempted to do two things. The first is to tell, as accurately and as fully as possible, what happened. This has not yet been done, and is obviously an essential preliminary step which must be taken before we can hope to look at the significance of the movement or to consider its theoretical implications. The second is to look at what the major protagonists themselves believed the movement and its events to have been all about. This has of course involved the exercise of judgment in the selection of just which protagonists deserve the most attention; but I believe that if the factual account of the movement is basically correct, then the decision to concentrate on the British, of the various foreigners

involved, and amongst the Chinese participants, the KMT and CCP, is appropriate.

A word may be required as to why I have not included the Canton-Hong Kong strike as an integral part of the movement. Some later writers, particularly non-Chinese, have certainly done so. Yet more than elsewhere, local conditions were of particular importance in the strike, and a thorough treatment of it would involve moving into areas outside the scope of this study. Moreover, the timing and duration of the strike only coincided with the May 30 Movement in the rest of China for a brief period. I have, therefore, followed the practice of most CCP historians in regarding the strike in Canton and Hong Kong as one of the results of the movement rather than as part of the movement itself, although its origins were firmly rooted therein. Teng Chung-hsia, himself an active participant in the movement, adopts this approach in his own history, and in this instance I am happy to accept his authority.

The reverberations of May 30 lasted for a long time. Liu Shao-ch'i told Nym Wales that it was because of the lesson that they had learned then that the British allowed the Hankow populace to seize the concession in that city during the Northern Expedition. Shortly after the Japanese defeat in 1945, K'ung Ling-ching wrote that without May 30 such an outcome to the war would not have been possible. Yet at the time, the movement was considered by most Chinese to have been something of a failure. At this remove, it seems clear that the movement was principally significant for what it started, rather than as an isolated event; accordingly, in the final chapter, rather than attempting to give a neatly rounded conclusion to this study of a movement which itself had no such conclusion, I have indicated some of the principal directions in which it subsequently developed, in the hope that this might best illustrate what changed in China as a result of it. Where possible I have tried to resolve specific issues in the relevant chapters, only recapitulating what I consider to have been the most significant aspects and results of the movement at the end of the work.

This book is based on a thesis which I presented to The Australian National University for a doctoral degree in 1975. Had I remained in the university world I would probably have extracted a few articles from the body of the thesis, and in the fulness of time, with a good deal more research, produced a rather different book from that which I now offer the interested reader. Circumstances, however, have ordained that since the completion of the thesis I have followed another path, and while my present occupation has at the least enabled me to learn Japanese, the lack

of which language was a major factor preventing me from writing a more complete account of the May 30 Movement, that same occupation has denied me the time or opportunity to use this skill to further my researches. I have, however, maintained an active interest in modern Chinese history, and through reading and conversations with scholars better placed than myself to judge, I have been persuaded that what I have done is worth publishing, and so, in the words of the proverb, I offer it in the spirit of one who 'hurls a brick in order to attract jade'.

Acknowledgments are due to more people than space permits me to name, but at the very least my thanks must go, first and foremost, to Professor Wang Gungwu of The Australian National University, who first made it possible for me to learn the language and begin my studies of the culture and history of China, thus putting me in his debt for life; to Dr S. T. Leong; to my friends, Adrian Chan and Warren Sun; to Mr Y. S. Chan; to my father for his assistance with Russian material; in Hong Kong, to Dr J. Cheung, former Master of Robert Black College; to my tutor Mr Chang I-t'ao; to Mr Leong Pui-kam; in Tokyo, to Professor Banno Junji and family; to Mr Liang Tao-wei; to the staff of the Tōyō bunko; and in London, to the staff of the Public Record Office and the British Museum Reading Room.

Particular mention should be made of two scholars whose works on aspects of the May 30 Movement appeared only after my own study had more or less assumed its final form. These are Thomas Creamer and Nicholas Clifford, both of the United States. There is, fortunately, little duplication in our three studies, although it is reassuring to note that where common ground has been covered our findings are mutually supportive. Although I was not able to benefit by their work at the research and drafting stage, both Dr Clifford and Mr Creamer have been generous and informative correspondents.

I must pay special thanks to Dr Pierre Ryckmans and his wife Han-fang; and to Tai-fang, my own wife. More than any other others, these three have assured that what Professor Wang Gungwu started bids fair to become a lifelong obsession.

To those other friends and scholars whose names I have omitted, my apologies; they will have the consolation of not sharing with the above-mentioned the unjust but perhaps unavoidable opprobrium of association with the present work.

Tokyo 1980

R. W. R.

Abbreviations

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
FO	Foreign Office
FSU	Federation of Student Unions
GCC	General Chamber of Commerce
GTU	General Trade Union
IEC	International Export Company
KMT	Kuomintang
NCMP	<i>North China Morning Post</i>
NWK	Naigai Wata Kaisha
SMC	Shanghai Municipal Council
SSJC	Shih-shih jih-chih
TUC	Trade Union Council

Introduction*Politics*

In listing the immediate and proximate causes of the disturbances which initiated the May 30 Movement, the American member of the Judicial Enquiry, Judge Finley Johnson, included the following:

The failure on the part of the foreigners in China to realize that the Chinese people have made greater advancement during the past 10 years in civics, in the fundamental principles of government and in the better understanding of individual rights under the law, than they have made in any 100 years of their entire history.¹

While we may wish to demur from the judge's opinion on points of detail, yet he should be given credit for perceiving the positive features emerging from a period regarded by most foreigners concerned with Chinese affairs as one of increasing chaos and absurdity, when things seemed clearly to be going from bad to worse, and the call that 'China must be saved from herself' fell on receptive ears.² This was a time when the birth pains attendant on the appearance of the new order were all too easily confused with the simultaneous death agony of the old, and for those who lacked either informed interest or intelligent sympathy it was all too easy to shut the doors of their minds to the confusion round about them; and when the howling and raging still persisted, they sought to still it by 'active measures', or 'resolute action'.

Looking back now from a vantage point of fifty years remove, the pattern is clearer, and much that then seemed arbitrary now appears inevitable. As in Europe, so in the Far East, the Great War formed a watershed. For the first time the Chinese were treated to the spectacle of the Powers, as they were then known, engaged in a total conflict, whose savagery more than equalled anything seen in China's civil strife. Here were the nations which had together imposed the treaties, burned the Summer Palace, crushed the Boxers, sacked Peking, the nations which claimed not only undoubted superiority in the arts of war, but also in the gentler aspects of civilisation, tearing one another to pieces. The Chinese observed with interest the humiliating treatment meted out to Germans

and Austrians resident in China, now suddenly thrown out of the club. Extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction, hitherto regarded as the sacred rights of all foreigners—Europeans and Japanese at least—were suddenly denied to citizens of the Central Powers, who were thrown by their fellow Europeans on to the mercy of the very Chinese legal system whose nature, it was claimed, made it unthinkable that non-Chinese be subjected to it.

However, nothing was more crucial in forming the attitudes of a whole generation of Chinese towards the Powers than the treatment accorded to China by her fellow 'victors', assembled at Versailles.

In 1915, having seized the German concessions in Shantung on behalf of the Allies, Japan proceeded to present the infamous 21 demands to the Peking government. The ultimate result of accession to these demands would have meant Japanese colonisation not only of Shantung, but also of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, the South-eastern coast and the Yangtze valley; in other words, effective Japanese control of China. Two years later, China herself entered the war on the Allied side, and thus when the armistice finally came, the Chinese felt not unreasonably that they should be given a share of the spoils of war. The spoils particularly desired were those which President Wilson was apparently so eager to distribute— independence, equality, better standing in the community of nations. When, therefore, the Versailles Conference gave its blessing to Japanese ambitions, Chinese indignation, simmering since 1915, burst out with renewed vigour in the demonstration of 4 May 1919, when the students of Peking took to the streets to protest against the actions of the Powers and the supine position of their own government.

The movement which took its name from the events of that day not only achieved a signal political victory in ensuring that China did not become a signatory to the Versailles Peace Treaty, but coming as it did at a time of already quite considerable social and intellectual change, it also brought together the various themes of anti-imperialism, anti-Confucianism, science, democracy, and literary revolution, and acted as a catalyst in raising the ferment to new levels, strikingly accelerating the more gradual changes which had been taking place throughout the previous decade. While the May 4 Movement was very much one of students, in some places, especially Shanghai, they combined their forces with merchants and urban workers, forming a new pattern of activity which would reach its apogee during the May 30 Movement. Whether its object was the state, literature, international relations, or the family, the word revolution was in the air once more.

The previous revolution, that of 1911, had been in reality little more than a full stop at the end of the Ch'ing dynasty, which had long before entered a period of decadence and decline. Any other hopes that Sun Yat-sen and his fellow conspirators may have had for the Republic soon foundered when Sun yielded the Provisional Presidency of China to Yüan Shih-k'ai in 1912. In 1913 following the assassination, probably at Yüan's instigation, of Sung Chiao-jen, Chairman of the Kuomintang, and the clandestine signing by the government of the so-called Reorganization Loan in the face of strong KMT opposition and without the approval of the National Assembly, the 'Second Revolution' broke out, was defeated, and the KMT declared illegal. Sun retired to Canton and the wilderness of plot and counter plot, alliance and betrayal, while in the north Yüan attempted unsuccessfully to set himself up as emperor of a new dynasty, and subsequently 'died of a broken heart'. In 1917 an equally unsuccessful attempt was made to restore the Ch'ing dynasty, and China staggered into the 1920s with a series of more or less corrupt and ineffectual governments in Peking, most of the country controlled by provincial military governors turned warlords, who fought, taxed, and in some cases restored or reformed, much as they pleased.

It was against such an internal political background that young Chinese of the May 4 era searched for solutions to their plight.

One possible source of light to which members of this generation turned their attention was the young Soviet republic to the north. Here was a revolution which had not only overthrown an ancient autocracy, like the Chinese in 1911, but which also appeared to be bent on carrying out a far more fundamental reform of society. To a generation which had turned its back on tradition, the Soviet experiment and its ideology appeared to be the very newest of the new. Even more important, however, was the announcement by the Soviets in March 1920 that they intended to renounce all their treaty rights in China. They were the first nation to do so, and the effect was doubled by its conjunction with the performance of the other former allies at Versailles. Under the circumstances, this was more than enough to ensure that increasing numbers of Chinese would begin to take seriously the claims and ideals of the Bolsheviks, particularly the anti-imperialist part of their program.³

It was the combination of the Russian Revolution with the May 4 Movement which first stimulated an interest in Marxism in China, and in Peking and elsewhere, Marxist and Socialist study groups were formed.

By the end of 1920, there were groups which called themselves communist in Shanghai, Peking, Canton, and amongst Chinese students in

Paris; the Comintern agent Voitinsky had arrived in Peking, and the question of organising a Chinese Communist Party was being raised with increasing urgency. In May of 1921 the various branches of the socialist youth group were reorganised, and in July, the First Congress of the CCP was held in Shanghai.⁴ At this congress the decision was taken to set up the All-China Labour League, with Chang Kuo-t'ao as its secretary, and the new party quickly entered the field of labour organisation, notably amongst the mine workers of Anyüan, and the railwaymen of central and north China.

Throughout 1922, one of the questions most discussed in the party was that of a united front, and particularly the attitude the party should take towards the KMT. Although a decision was taken by the Central Committee in June to regard the KMT as an 'ally', what this would mean in organisational terms remained undefined. Ch'en Tu-hsiu and other leading party members were against forming a 'bloc within' the KMT, wishing to preserve the CCP's independence to engage in mass work. Neither was the KMT over anxious to adopt a policy of co-operation with the CCP, and had matters been left at that, it is unlikely that the two would ever have formally come together. In the Soviet Union, however, a match-maker was at hand.⁵ The Russians sought tirelessly to bring the two parties together, and at a crucial moment, when Sun's ejection from Canton by his erstwhile warlord ally Ch'en Chiung-ming had revealed the utter bankruptcy of his scheming, he met with Adolf Joffe in Shanghai and resolved to embrace the CCP, almost, as it were, on the rebound. The Communists, for their part, were virtually coerced into the match by the authority of Comintern; Sun and Joffe proclaimed a joint four-point declaration confirming the *entente*, and Stalin's favoured policy of a 'bloc within' was officially inaugurated. It had hardly been an ideal courtship, and even in China, arranged marriages were on the way out. Nevertheless, for the time being, the reorganisation of the KMT along Bolshevik lines, with Russian advisers, and the influx of new blood from the communists, revitalised and transformed the old party into a radically new organisation, which could not only arouse enthusiasm, but also had the organisational skills and resources with which to channel it to concrete ends.

The first national congress of the reorganised KMT, held in January 1924, emphasised these points, and revealed the formation of a left wing within the party which controlled policy making, consolidated and prolonged the alliance with Russia and the CCP, and was a dominating factor in the China policy of the Soviet Union. Just how it, and the KMT generally, should be interpreted, became yet another bone of contention

between Stalin and Trotsky.⁶ In the Manifesto of the Congress, the KMT stated officially for the first time in its history that 'the Powers were to a large extent responsible for the progressive deterioration of conditions in China',⁷ and its foreign policy platform called for the complete abrogation of the 'unequal treaties'; those States which voluntarily complied would be accorded Most Favoured Nation status.⁸

The slogan 'abrogate the unequal treaties' would soon be taken up throughout China, to become the quintessential catchphrase of the 1925-7 revolution. This was a far cry from the position that had been taken by the Powers themselves at the Washington Conference in 1920-1. They were against any substantial changes in the treaty system, and were willing merely to convene a Tariff Conference to effect moderate changes in the tariff rates, and an Extraterritoriality Commission to investigate the Chinese situation with a view to suggesting certain reform measures.⁹ In fact, owing to various difficulties, even these two steps had not been taken by 1925, and when they finally were, they were impelled by events far more dramatic than a conference five years gone. Behind the conference decision lay the idea that the Powers would not abandon their treaties and privileges until China had 'put her house in order', that is developed the ability to govern herself according to conventional Western standards;¹⁰ but on this very point China and the Powers were at an absolute impasse, for China argued that it was this very system that rendered her further progress impossible.

Meanwhile the warlords fought on. A major blow against the hegemony of Wu P'ei-fu was struck by the second Chihli-Fengtien War of September and October 1924, principally due to the defection from Wu's forces of Feng Yü-hsiang and his troops. Feng marched on Peking, and there held the balance of power. Not strong enough to defeat the Fengtien warlord, Chang Tso-lin, neither could he be defeated by him. While the pro-Japanese Tuan Ch'i-jui was set up in Peking as President of the Provisional Government, Chang Tso-lin controlled Manchuria, parts of Chihli and Shantung; Feng Yü-hsiang, part of Chihli, and north-west China; Wu P'ei-fu, central China, Sun Ch'uan-fang, east and south-east China (following the second Kiangsi Chekiang War—late 1924 early 1925—Shanghai came under Fengtien troops); the KMT was more or less established in Canton, and was seeking to expand its authority in the surrounding areas, although its situation was frequently rendered precarious through shifting alliances. Disunity amongst the warlords was more conspicuous than ever, and both Communists and KMT seized the opportunity for renewed activity. The Communists, in particular, follow-

ing their 4th congress in January 1925, plunged into the labour movement with renewed vigour, adjudging the situation favourable to the further development of the bourgeois democratic revolution. Efforts amongst the peasants received rather less attention.¹¹ Thus the political stage was set for the events with which we shall be most concerned.

Industry and labour

We must now turn to consider the economic background, and the new social forces to which industrialisation was giving birth. Like so many aspects of Chinese life at the time, this will also involve us in the story of the largely unhappy contacts between China and the industrialised, capitalist world. We shall concentrate on the textile industry, both because it was there that the specific troubles leading up to the May 30 incident occurred, and because it was the largest factory industry in China during our period.¹² Cotton alone, the most important branch of the textile industry, accounted for 25 per cent of all factory workers, and of these 56.2 per cent were living in Shanghai in 1925.¹³ The history of China's textile industry in this period embodied many of the greatest problems of the time, and carried with it some, at least, of the answers.

The cotton industry, 'the pioneer of the industrial revolution the world around',¹⁴ got off to a rather slow start, and it was not until the beginning of World War I, with the consequent diminution of imported yarn and piece goods, that it really got under way. After the war, the industry again suffered a setback, as British imports once more competed with Chinese factory products on Chinese soil. Yet after a year or so, the Chinese mills were back on their feet, and in 1924-5 they had more mills, spindles and looms than in any preceding year. The Japanese, however, also profited from the absence of European competition during the war years, and were not long in taking advantage of their old footholds in Manchuria and Shanghai, and their new one in Shantung. Doubtless the low prices and abundant, cheap labour were important factors, as modern Chinese writers emphasise,¹⁵ although this has been questioned.¹⁶ Equally important, though, was the Shanghai Tariff Conference of 1918, when differential tariff rates for different grades of cotton yarn were adopted. In the words of an early Chinese historian of the industry:

This was a great blow on Japanese imported yarn and encouraged the establishment of Japanese mills in China. While in 1918 there were only 29,000 spindles owned by Japanese merchants in their Chinese mills, in 1921 the number increased to 867,000. It was

probably not until this time that the Japanese began in earnest to establish cotton mills in China, while hitherto they had preferred to send their home manufactures to this country. This is really an important turning point, for otherwise Japan might have maintained her original policy and be contented with a few mills in China.¹⁷

Thus the Japanese presence grew markedly, particularly in Shanghai, and a contemporary journal noted that:

those Japanese directly connected with cotton mills in the city represent 1,196 families. The population directly connected with Japanese mills totals 4,400. Of a total Japanese population of 25,000, nearly a quarter of them are directly connected with the cotton industry, and a large proportion of the rest are doing business of one kind or another with the mills or are supported by the mills in one way or another. A total of 60,000 Chinese are supported by Japanese mills in Shanghai. Counting their families brings the total up to 200,000.¹⁸

The British, on the other hand, were more concerned with trade than with setting up industries on Chinese soil, and at the highest point had only five cotton mills, one of which was sold to the Japanese in 1925, another of which went into liquidation in 1928.¹⁹

If we look at the capitalisation relative to the total number of these enterprises, the Japanese impact is even more striking. Of a total of 120 mills, 73 were Chinese owned, 44 Japanese, 3 British. Total capitalisation: Taels 74,232,390; \$(Mex)75,610,000; Yen 151,480,000; of which China claimed Taels 37,832,390 and \$75,610,000; Britain: Taels 5,400,000; Japan: Taels 31,000,000 and Yen 151,480,000. Thus, while there were nearly twice as many Chinese as Japanese mills, according to contemporary exchange rates total Chinese capital was only a little over half of the amount invested by the Japanese:

In Shanghai alone the Japanese are credited with having nearly five times as much capital invested in the cotton industry as the Chinese, but the fact cannot be ignored that many of the Japanese mills are only branch organizations of big spinning concerns in Japan whose interests are rather widespread and which do not naturally devote their whole capital to directing mills in China alone.²⁰

There is some disagreement about the effect that all this had on Chinese manufactures. Communist historians tend to agree that from 1921-2 onwards, many Chinese concerns were forced to close down,²¹ while King and Lieu claim that although the Japanese mills certainly made their

influence felt, it did not mean that Chinese mills were worse off than before.²² But at least we may be safe in assuming that Chinese capitalists did not welcome this competition, with its superior capitalisation, technical knowledge and experience.

As in the rest of China, so in Shanghai, conditions of labour were generally bad, sometimes appalling, and low wages, long hours, dangerous equipment, female and child labour, were the rule rather than the exception. A few brief extracts from the *Report of the Child Labour Commission 1923-1924* should suffice. Here is a description of night shift in a cotton mill:

Rows of baskets containing babies and children, sleeping or awake as the case may be, lie placed between the rapidly moving and noisy machinery. Young children, who are supposed to be working, but who have been overcome by fatigue or who have taken advantage of the absence of adequate supervision, lie asleep in every corner, some in the open, others hidden in baskets under a covering of raw cotton.²³

In the silk filatures, the brushing of cocoons was performed over boiling water, which caused the fingers and hands to become roughed and ugly. Many children thus employed were no more than six years of age. Because of the hot water, the temperature in the rooms was always very high, the atmosphere humid, and fainting was common in hot weather :

In the main they present a pitiable sight. Their physical condition is poor, and their faces all devoid of any expression of happiness or well being. They appear to be miserable, both physically and mentally. The adults are given a certain number of cocoons from which they have to produce a certain quantity of silk. Should they fall short of this quantity they are fined. They then frequently revenge themselves by ill-treating the children working under them.²⁴

The contract labour system was widespread, a contractor supplying the labour and being paid on production. The system, which may have had its origins in traditional rural modes of labour recruiting,²⁵ had been adopted by foreign enterprises in China during the early days of Sino-foreign intercourse; wishing to be spared the difficulties of language and of handling the workers, they came to depend on local elements to do the hiring at mutually agreed upon specifications.²⁶ At the time of the Commission's hearings, the average earnings of a young child were 20 silver cents a day:

By employing such children in the mills and factories the contractor is able to make a profit of about \$4 a month in respect of each

child. These children are frequently most miserably housed and fed. They receive no money and their conditions are practically those of slavery.²⁷

According to Hauser, writer of one of the best and most lively books written about Shanghai:

Contractors would go out to the country, would prefer places that had been visited with famines and floods, and would buy all the girls in town for a song. The understanding was that the contractor would have to feed, clothe, and shelter them for the next three or four years, until they had 'worked off' the price...

In the dingy rooms of the silk filatures, the working women of Shanghai were reeling the tender threads. So tender were those threads, in fact, that the slightest draught would have damaged them. Windows had to remain closed, which meant torture in a hot Shanghai summer. A working day of over thirteen hours was quite common, and the meager earnings were cashed in by the contractor who owned the girls. He had spent thirty to forty Chinese dollars on each of them, and during the three years of the contract, he expected to make a profit of two hundred or so for each slave. During this time, he kept them in crowded dormitories, fed them rotten food, and had to see to it that they would not run away: he had to pay the factory six dollars for each girl that managed to disappear.²⁸

China, in other words, and particularly Shanghai, was going through all the horrors of an industrial revolution, in which native and foreign capitalists both competed, and new and traditional methods of exploitation flourished side by side, at a time when there was no national authority competent to enforce the most elementary controls.

Nevertheless, if we investigate industrial conditions taking the nationality of the various enterprises as a starting point, we are faced with a contradiction. Many Chinese writers, particularly Communists, flatly claim that conditions in Japanese (and in some cases, British) mills and factories were worst of all; and a cursory examination of the occurrence and frequency of industrial disturbances lends great credibility to this point of view. Yet most foreign observers, particularly the British, who had no special reason for wishing well to Japanese industrialists, agreed that conditions in Japanese enterprises were the best in Shanghai. According to Woodhead, editor of the *Peking and Tientsin Times*: 'At that time [early 1925] the Japanese cotton mills were an example to all other foreign employers of labour in their treatment of their workers.'²⁹ Dame Adelaide Anderson, the first woman factory inspector in Britain, who had worked heroically for the ending of child labour in Lancashire in the

1890s, who had sat on the Child Labour Commission and written damning accounts of much that she had seen in Shanghai, yet wrote of:

The Japanese mills, new, large, equipped in the most modern manner, well lit, clean and thoroughly organized, with various amenities for the workers hardly to be seen in other mills...³⁰

A. S. Pearce, a Manchester industrialist, was sent on a visit to the Far East by the International Federation of Master Cotton Spinners; he reported that:

The Japanese mills in China are managed almost exactly as the mills in Japan, the only difference being that welfare work is not on as elaborate a scale, and that owing to the inferior labour available in China they have to employ more operatives per machine than in Japan. . . . The discipline, cleanliness, and general efficiency which characterize the mills in Japan, are also outstanding features of their mills in China, though not exactly the same high standard is always possible in view of the inferior labour, nevertheless they are not far behind.

The Japanese have to treat the Chinese labour with more consideration than the Chinese owned mills, and probably they do so not only because they are in a foreign country where, owing to their strength, they are disliked, but because their experience at home has taught them that it pays to treat labour humanely.³¹

The largest of the Japanese companies, Naigai Wata Kaisha, the most plagued by industrial strife, and where the events leading up to 30 May occurred, had been highly praised for its hospital, dispensary and educational facilities,³² and Sokolsky, writing in the *China Year Book 1926-1927* claimed that 'it is a recognized fact' that the company's mills had the best conditions in Shanghai.³³ This judgment was concurred in by Ma Ch'ao-chün in the official KMT history of the Chinese labour movement published in Taiwan in 1959; Ma himself was active in right-wing labour activities in Shanghai throughout 1925. In discussing the discrepancy between the 'dismal' labour efficiency in Chinese mills, and the rather better standards obtaining in Japanese concerns, H. D. Fong of Nankai University, Tientsin, advanced the 'relatively higher' wages given in the latter as an important reason.³⁴ Furthermore, as we shall see on p.32, it is clear that the only real opposition to the bid to restrict child labour came from the Chinese, and of the foreign community, the Japanese in particular were anxious to eradicate it, or at least to control it.

The crux of the problem probably lies in the fact that the Chinese and foreigners by no means agreed on what amounted to 'good conditions'. There is little doubt that the Japanese mills in Shanghai represented

industrial capitalism at its most advanced, and the features most admired by British observers were part and parcel of such a level of development; e.g. Pearse's 'discipline, cleanliness and general efficiency', and Anderson's 'Japanese mills, new, large, equipped in the most modern manner, well-lit, clean and thoroughly organized'. What should be recognised is that this advanced mode of production, in all its features, 'good' and bad, brought to the Chinese workers those forms of work and relationships most alien to anything in their previous experience; and this was emphasised all the more in that such a system was in the hands of another race, simultaneously envied and despised, with a recent history of unhappy contacts with China. The most common relationship between the industrial proletariat and foreigners in China at this time was the labour-capital relationship, and particularly was this the case in Japanese mills where Japanese nationals were employed from manager to foreman, and Chinese below that level. Where Chinese foremen were employed, they had usually been brought from Japan's sphere of influence in Shantung, and regional rivalries served to further embitter relationships. Shantung men, known for their heavy build and physical strength, treated the Shanghai workers under them very roughly. Rows were frequent, and they sometimes developed into pitched battles in which numbers were killed and wounded and much damage was done, as happened in June 1926 in Naigai Wata Kaisha's no. 4 mill.³⁵

It was, of course, precisely in such relatively advanced conditions that we might expect the emergence of a genuine industrial proletariat, as indeed occurred. Yet we should also bear in mind just how young this proletariat was. It had, effectively, only begun to grow during the war years, and in the mid-1920s the majority of factory workers in Shanghai came direct from the countryside (mainly from Kiangsu, especially the area around Ningpo, although some did come from cities such as Canton or Wusih). A study made in one large Japanese mill in Shanghai revealed that of 1,919 workers, only 231, or 12.04 per cent, were natives of that city. Another investigation of 100 mill workers' families in the Yangzepoo district again showed only 12 per cent of family heads as Shanghai born and bred.³⁶ Ties with the land were still strong and absenteeism in factories increased regularly with the summer harvest.³⁷ These were people who had already spent part of their lives as peasants, fishermen or seasonal labourers,³⁸ in circumstances far removed from the clock-watching, 'discipline' and 'efficiency' which they encountered when they came to the city. As we look at the record of strikes, and the demands made by the strikers, it is instructive to observe just how many of their

complaints arose directly from the demands made on them by modern methods of production, particularly efficiency and discipline (which in the Japanese mills included beatings and fines).

According to Kotenev, a contemporary observer who was generally fairly sympathetic to the Chinese:

it takes a considerable time to train them to the essential discipline of labour, which is particularly required in the textile industry ... A Chinese common labourer is not, as a rule, accustomed to such discipline. He cannot understand the complete mechanization of modern production, which requires from the worker not only training, but also punctuality and a certain mechanical proficiency at his work. He fails to realize that any retardation or interruption of a single worker destroys the whole system of production, causing expensive delay in the work and movement of machines. The foreman, whether foreign or Chinese, who supervises his work and requires that the timekeeping corresponds with the normal speed of the machines, appears in his eyes as an oppressor, who tries to squeeze out of them everything for the benefit of the employer. The imposition of fines and other disciplinary measures, applied in modern industry as measures to maintain the necessary discipline of labour, is for a Chinese worker nothing more than another inquisitional way to deprive him of his lawful earnings.³⁹

That this in no way relates to any peculiarity of the 'Chinese character' should be immediately apparent to anyone at all familiar with the process of industrialisation in other countries. An Indian economist, writing of his own countrymen in 1925, noted that the factory labourer, who (as in contemporary China, or Britain at an equivalent stage) came originally from a village community, was: 'irregular and unsteady, likes to take things easy, and chafes at the rigorous discipline of the factory as compared to the easier methods of the field'.⁴⁰ A few years earlier, a commission of inquiry held in the United Provinces and Bengal similarly found that: 'One cause for the unpopularity of mill labour is undoubtedly the distaste for discipline coupled with long hours in the mill.'⁴¹ However, simple dislike for industrial labour, universal in itself, was only one factor in the unique assembly of circumstances prevailing in China, and it was the sum of all these forces which governed the particular manner in which the workers tried to deal with the situation.

In 1933 the Social Bureau of the Shanghai Municipal government (the Chinese city) produced a weighty study of industrial conflict in the city between January 1918 and December 1932. They recorded a total of 1,121 strikes and stoppages, and found that the industry most affected

was the textile industry, cotton spinning alone being responsible for 20 per cent of the cases.

According to a classification of the cases by the nationality of the managements, about 64% of the cases occurred in establishments under Chinese management. . . . Among the foreign establishments, those of Japanese and British managements contributed the largest portion; in the former occurred 159 cases or 14% of the total, and in the latter 136 cases or 12% . . . In disputes in foreign establishments, racial and national animosities were frequently involved. There were many instances in which strikes arising in Japanese cotton mills were immediately responded to by the simultaneous action of workers of other affiliated or independent mills of the same nationality.⁴²

These figures, of course, only refer to the number of cases, not to their seriousness, duration, numbers or losses involved. Many in small Chinese workshops and factories were only one or two day affairs, and cannot be compared with long strikes in the big foreign factories involving hundreds, sometimes thousands, of workers.

Of greater significance is the fact that there were nineteen establishments, all of them leading concerns in their respective industries, which were particularly bedevilled by strikes. These nineteen accounted for 312 cases, that is 28 per cent of the total number. Distributed by nationality we find:

<i>Nationality</i>	<i>No. of Establishments</i>	<i>No. of Strikes</i>
Japanese	4	118
British	5	91
Chinese	8	78
French	1	18
US	1	7

Of the 312 cases, 75% or 234 cases have been concentrated in the 11 leading foreign establishments in Shanghai. A tense racial difference between the employers and the workers has undoubtedly embittered relationships between employers and workers whenever a conflict of interests has arisen. Of all the foreign establishments, Japanese are the most liable to conflict. The four Japanese textile mills, the Naigai Wata Kaisha, the Japan China Spinning and Weaving Company, the Toa Seima Kaisha and the Shanghai Cotton Manufacturing Company, have been confronted with 118 cases of strikes during the past decade and a half. The nation-wide resentment against Japanese aggression forms a deep-rooted psychological backdrop among Chinese workers, and it seems almost

impossible for the Japanese mill owners to maintain a harmonious relationship between management and labour.⁴³

It is interesting to note in this connection that the form of industrial action known as *ta ch'ang*, factory wrecking, common in the early stages of the labour movement, was almost exclusively directed against foreign enterprises, suggesting a link with the anti-Western mass movements at the end of the nineteenth century, and the machine-wrecking activities of the Boxers. Thus it would appear that the Luddite tendencies within Chinese labour were not simply expressions of protest against the disruption of traditional ways of life by the new machines, as had been the case in England, but were also motivated by political, or at least anti-foreign, feeling.⁴⁴ Here lay another source of energy for those who could tap it.

In discussing labour problems, the word 'conditions' is used in at least two senses: the first refers to such matters as the physical state of the workplace, hygiene and safety, and also hours worked, holidays and rates of pay; the second refers to the treatment workers receive from the management at a more personal level, particularly on the factory floor, in the day to day performance of their duties. The favourable judgments passed on conditions in Japanese mills by the British observers that we have noted above, generally refer to the first sense of the word, and from such a standpoint, the superiority of Japanese over other establishments was undeniable. Yet in those mills, the Chinese worker, unaccustomed to the new demands being made on him, unable to see why they should be made, and frequently rebellious, was exposed to a series of humiliations probably far more galling than the filth and danger encountered by his compatriots in the physically poorer conditions of a Chinese workshop. In a small workshop of the traditional type, despite long hours, great physical demands and appalling sanitary conditions, class distinctions were less sharp, the distance between employer and worker was not so great, and every worker could at least entertain the hope of some day becoming a small producer in his own right. The worker in large scale modern industry was only made more aware of his own insignificance by its size, technological and financial resources,⁴⁵ and the gap between him and his employers was widened even further when they were of different race.

Arduous work in miserable surroundings was nothing new in itself; what were new were the insults and abuse of Japanese foremen, the fines, the compulsory retirement savings that were regarded as simply a way of defrauding workers of their wages, having to mutely watch Japanese flirting with female workers, the restriction of movement, even of bladder

and bowels; these matters were all raised time and again in lists of workers' demands. The following passage brings out well the difference in 'feel' between Chinese and Japanese mills as well as certain specific points of difference:

As in Japanese mills very little loitering is allowed, contrary to what takes place in the general run of Chinese mills, I am convinced the Japanese get as much and more, work out of their operatives than the Chinese mill running one hour longer. It must not be thought that 12 hours in the Chinese mill means 12 hours of work such as the operatives in European mills are performing. There is a good deal of sitting about in Chinese mills and playing about amongst juvenile labour.⁴⁶

This 'loitering', also a feature of Indian factories at the time, has been called 'a manifestation of the adaptive capacity which all human beings possess more or less to long hours';⁴⁷ a capacity, nonetheless, which met its match in the mills of the Naigai Wata Kaisha.

Most humiliating of all, perhaps, was the infliction of body searches:

It is strange to find each exit of a mill in China provided with wooden barricades in zig-zag form. Through these the operatives have to pass, one by one, to be thoroughly searched for anything they may have taken out of the mill . . . That such a search is absolutely necessary is another indication of the low state of civilization which the Chinese mill operatives occupy. At one Japanese mill there were red boxes attached to pillars near the barricades; a large white hand was pointing to the opening of the box and underneath was an inscription to the following effect: 'Have you something in your pocket? Ask your heart. You do not want to steal. If the answer is yes, put it at once into this box.' In about 14 days every box is full with all kinds of waste, bobbins, bits of cloth, etc.⁴⁸

I leave Pearse's obnoxious comment where it stands, as it affords a good insight into the attitude of foreign employers. With such an approach, how could they fail to humiliate their workers? Quite apart from the consideration that the workers may well have needed all they could get to supplement their meagre wages, the simple fact is that in Chinese concerns the removal of 'waste' would have been regarded as fair game, legitimate squeeze in the age old tradition; a tradition which was not fashioned by, or for, industrial capitalism.⁴⁹

The results of such treatment were indicated by Dame Adelaide Anderson in a passage immediately following the one quoted above in which she referred to the superiority and excellence of the Japanese factories. 'But', she went on:

there was one feature in the arrangements which surprised me, and gave me a feeling of uneasiness. I saw a large building, much more than a glorified gatehouse, at the entrance to the courtyard of one of the largest of these mills, asked what was the department of work in it, and was informed that it was 'for the police', in case of difficulty. I should say, from all I saw, that discipline is not a matter on which much stress is laid in the Chinese mills.⁵⁰

Strikes and unionisation

According to Ma Ch'ao-chün, the first strike in a Japanese mill in Shanghai commenced on 8 February 1919, and lasted one week. The two principal disputes concerned the announced intention of the management to pay wages on a piece work basis rather than for time, and their plans to phase out gradually the employment of over and under age female labour. In a petition to the Japanese Consul-General on 12 February, the strikers also demanded that certain operations which women were now supposed to perform, be restored to child labourers; and they demanded that Japanese be not allowed to strike workers. With the exception of this last, all the demands were for a restoration of former conditions; indeed, if one is to believe the Japanese, all were, as they denied having ever beaten workers in the past. From that time on it became regular practice for strikers to demand that beatings be stopped, the Japanese acceding, noting that as they had never yet beaten anybody, so they did not intend to start now. On this first occasion, a compromise was reached, and the strikers returned to work. No demand had been made for a wage increase; it was only later that this became a common feature of strikes.⁵¹

Shortly afterwards came the May 4 Movement, and strikes involved workers in most foreign concerns, including Japanese textile works, but no demands were made on the employers. When satisfaction was given by the Peking government, with the release of arrested students and the sacking of the guilty officials, strikers in industry, commerce and education, all returned to work.⁵²

The year 1922 marked the beginning of the first major nationwide wave of strikes, the most significant and famous of which was also the last, the Peking-Hankow railway strike (early 1923). Shanghai, now the base of the China Labour Secretariat (the first stage in the CCP effort to establish an all China labour organisation), also responded, although as Teng Chung-hsia admits, with considerably less success than many other areas in the interior. He ascribed this to the immaturity of labour, the experienced methods employed by the imperialists in handling such situa-

tions, and the prevalence of female and child workers, who lacked the awareness and fighting capability of men. Nevertheless, strikes did occur, and in some, claims for shorter hours and increased wages were made, and for recognition of unions, while others concerned such matters as members of workers' families being forbidden to take food to them in the factory for fear that they might steal silk. There were a few minor successes, but most of the strikes failed, and were followed by the closure of the Labour Secretariat by the Municipal Council and the arrest of a leading member, Li Ch'i-han, on a charge of incitement. Li was handed over to the Chinese authorities, and was imprisoned, to be released two years later when control of the city changed hands. After several further defeats, the labour movement in Shanghai entered a bleak period.⁵³

The years between late 1922 and early 1925 were not devoid of activity, however. Following the 7 February massacre, a number of leaders of the Peking-Hankow railway strike, mainly Hunanese, fled to Shanghai, and it was at their instigation that the Shanghai Labour Federation was formed.⁵⁴ The Federation had some thirty original member bodies, and consisted of a mixture of genuine labour unions, such as the seamen's union, textile workers, Shanghai machine workers, and other societies and organisations such as the Chinese Workers Self-help Society, Joint Association of Cantonese Workers, Union of Chinese Veterans of WWI, The Union of Anhui Residents of Shanghai, etc. Total membership was around 300,000. The Federation was responsible for organising a number of new unions, including tram-workers, barbers, Wusung steel factory workers, and also set up an Association of Labour Youth to train cadres.⁵⁵

Some 80,000 people attended the celebrations held by the Federation on May-day 1924. Many workers were given, or took, the day off, and they were addressed by Japanese labour leaders, by Dame Adelaide Anderson, and by Wang Ching-wei, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang and Shao Li-tzu on behalf of the KMT. The meeting passed ten resolutions, which included demands for no child labour under 14 years of age, for an eight-hour day, and for the summoning of a national labour conference to discuss the current problems then facing labour in China. The final resolution read 'Unite with the workers of the whole country, and of the whole world, organize a great united front, and clear away obstacles to humanity.'⁵⁶

The Federation was generally regarded as a 'moderate' organisation, and it included amongst its most important members men who had close contacts with the right wing of the KMT,⁵⁷ which had considerable influence in Shanghai. These men never fully reconciled themselves to the

policy of co-operating with the Communists,⁵⁸ thus when the latter became active in the field of Shanghai labour, from 1924 on, under the cover provided by this policy, clashes were inevitable and a fierce struggle for control of the labour movement ensued. It is now not always easy to identify the sides in this struggle, as pseudonyms were the order of the day, and the Communists generally operated in the name of the KMT. They appear to have controlled the newspaper, *Min-kuo Jih-pao*, at least for a period, and the Shanghai KMT executive branch included such prominent Communist members as Hsiang Ching-yü, Shen Tse-min, Yün Tai-ying and Mao Tse-tung. The now illegal Labour Secretariat also entered the Federation, and managed to get a number of positions on its Standing Committee;⁵⁹ the part they played there, though, is unclear, as the Federation continued to play an increasingly negative role through late 1924-early 1925, until it completely lost its hold on the working class during the May 30 Movement. The Communists did succeed in getting the Federation's name used to summon the Second National Labour Conference, held in Canton in May 1925. Thirty-three member organisations opposed such a use of its name, but their protests went largely unheeded.⁶⁰

More positively, the Communists set up a number of night schools for workers in the most concentrated industrial areas—Hsiao Sha Tu, Yang Shu Pu, Pu Tung, and others. Then other bodies were set up, such as the West Shanghai Workers' Club, and in the east, the Workers' Improvement Society; these schools and associations were run by staff and students of Shanghai University, a centre of radical propaganda and educational work. In 1958 Wang Cheng-sheng, an old worker from Naigai Wata Kaisha Mill no. 5 (whose chief complaint was that if you arrived 'even a bit' late for work, the factory gates would be closed), recalled the early days of the Workers' Club in Tsao Chia Tu: there was drama, chess, table tennis, 'very very lively' (*Shih-fen je-nao*). Every evening there were classes in culture, and on Wednesdays, politics. Li Li-san would describe their working lives to them, and then ask if people should suffer such ill treatment. 'When we heard him talk, we were very moved.' Then he told them that they should ask for higher wages.⁶¹

One of those who regularly attended the club was Ku Cheng-hung, whose subsequent shooting by Japanese led to the protests on 30 May. He used to like to play chess and watch educational playlets, but when he told his father what Li Li-san and others had said, his father replied 'don't let yourself be fooled by those foreign devils!' Dad took a lot of convincing that there were only Chinese down at the club engaging in such talk.⁶² According to Wang, when Li was asked what sort of a rise should be

demanded, he replied 2 cents a day, obviously in the workers' eyes a considerable sum: 'When we heard that, we were happy and excited alright, but no one had ever raised any demands before the Japanese imperialists previously, and we were worried. But the party supported us.' Wang went on to say that when they knew there were people to help them, they were prepared to act.⁶³ And act they did, as we shall see in the following chapter.

Shanghai: the International Settlement

It would be a mistake to think that only the workers of Shanghai were unhappy with their lot. Shanghai was 'a concrete example of the problem of China',⁶⁴ and the problem was in varying measure shared by all Chinese. Particularly was this true of matters touching on China's relations with the outside world. To many Chinese the relative positions of Chinese and foreigners in the International Settlement vividly symbolised the position of their nation, crushed beneath the weight of the unequal treaties; the fact that many of the activities of the foreigners in the city far exceeded anything provided for by those treaties strengthened rather than moderated such a view.

During the first sixty years of the International Settlement, the Chinese on the whole submitted passively to foreign rule. What occasional riots or disturbances there were, were only quarrels over particular matters, with no deep seated causes or wider significance. From 1905 onwards, however, a change in the attitude of educated Chinese became apparent. Soon after the boycott against American goods, carried out as a protest against US immigration restrictions, there occurred the Mixed Court Riot,⁶⁵ during which the Louza Police Station was attacked and set on fire. Subsequently this action would acquire greater significance, as it was in 'defence' of this same Station that the shooting on 30 May 1925 was ordered. But at the time the main focus of discontent was the Mixed Court, which had become unpopular with the Chinese community as the most obvious expression of the dominant position of the foreigners in the Settlement.⁶⁶ It was a 'mixed' court because, owing to the provisions of the treaties on extraterritoriality, foreign assessors and consuls sat side by side with Chinese magistrates on any case concerning foreign interests.

The 1911 revolution made the situation worse by introducing four unprecedented changes: 1. complete independence of the Mixed Court from the native judicial system, and thus from the authorities both in Peking and in the Chinese City; 2. the presence of foreign assessors

watching proceedings in purely Chinese civil suits; 3. recognition of the possibility of foreign interests being involved in purely Chinese matters; 4. appointment of a Registrar.⁶⁷ Originally these changes had been intended as temporary and provisional only, and arose out of the sudden vacuum in local Chinese authority caused by the departure of the Ch'ing dynasty. But it was not in the nature of the men who made up the foreign community in Shanghai to lightly cast aside such powers once in their hands, and the absence of any Chinese government remotely capable of persuading them to do so ensured that the changes remained. This is not to say that the government in Peking made no attempt to restore its rights, and from 1912 on they made what have been somewhat imaginatively described as 'strenuous efforts', and rendition of the Court was included in the memorandum to the Versailles Conference in 1918. To the articulate and educated generation brought to the fore of public opinion by the May 4 Movement, in the words of a Chinese lawyer from Shanghai:

the status of the Court was not only an abnormality created by unjust treaties, but a gross violation of the same treaties on the part of the foreigners, which China sought to abolish at the Peace Conference at Versailles and at the Washington Conference. In fact, the Supreme Court at Peking regarded the International Mixed Court at Shanghai as not even a 'judicial tribunal'. The only remedy against such an abnormal State of affairs ... was the immediate rendition of the Mixed Court.⁶⁸

Up until 30 May 1925, however, the situation remained unchanged, but following that date, what had until then been a matter of interest and discussion in political and judicial circles became 'the obsession of the masses',⁶⁹ and the more perceptive, or panic stricken, of the Taipans saw the writing on the wall.


By any standards, the government of the International Settlement was grossly unfair. Two rate-payers' associations existed, one for the Chinese and one for foreigners. The latter body ratified decisions of the Municipal Council, and voted for members of the same council; the Chinese simply paid taxes. One of the first steps of the street unions set up during the general strike of 1919 was directed against increased municipal assessment, and demands were made for Chinese representation on the council, and for revision of the Land Regulations (the legal basis of the International Settlement) so as to ensure a decisive Chinese majority on the council. Yet by 1925, all that had been achieved was the appointment of a few Chinese advisers, whose opinions counted for very little indeed, despite the fact

that 70 per cent of the rate-payers were Chinese. In 1925, nine members sat on the Board of Directors of the Ratepayers' Association: six Englishmen, two Japanese, and one American.⁷⁰ The International Settlement was governed in the interests of a minority of the population by an even smaller minority. As Hsia Ching-lin wrote:

The Chinese in the Settlement are political outcasts; they are taxed and governed but have no civic rights nor even the right to own land in the same way as the foreigners have. They were until 1927, excluded from the public parks and playgrounds which they helped to maintain.⁷¹

The Settlement, moreover, although supposedly fixed to a certain area, yet found ways of expanding, and during eighty years of its history had grown remarkably. During the 1920s it continued to do so by sending out roads, like tentacles or threads of cobweb, into the surrounding Chinese territory. And along these extra-concessional roads they claimed that the law of the Settlement operated. The authority of the Municipal Council extended, and its police, and in times of emergency, armed forces were to be found operating deep in what were supposed to be purely Chinese areas. It so happened that the council road makers were at their busiest at a time when a new awareness was spreading through China. A reading of the relevant treaties showed only one fact to be beyond dispute, that the foreigners were entitled to reside, lease land, and build houses in certain parts of Chinese territory, the Treaty Ports; all other rights, including the right of further extension of the concessions and settlements, were open to dispute, had been disputed, and would be increasingly so disputed. The mid-1920s were marked by a growing sensitivity on the part of ever wider circles of Chinese, towards the exercise of authority by foreigners. This was the background to the opposition from the more well-off Chinese to the by-laws which the Municipal Council tried to introduce in the early part of 1925, and which we shall look at in more detail in the following chapter.

Here, then, is China at the beginning of 1925, wracked by pointless wars and civil dissension, her victories of 1911 and 1918 more bitter than any defeat. In her cities, especially Shanghai, the painful beginnings of an industrial revolution, an important part of which was controlled by people of alien race, by nationality and social position doubly opposed to the interests of the new proletariat to which they gave birth. And in this same city of Shanghai, Chinese of every class and condition (save the indispensable compradors) increasingly restive beneath the hand of



The structure of authority in the International Concession, Shanghai

foreign administration. To this we must add two political parties, fundamentally different in many ways, and held together only precariously; yet held together, with a common resolve to break the hold of the Powers over China, to rid her of the warlord plague and unite her under one government, to gain independence and equality in the community of nations, and to ensure that China grow strong in her own way.

May 30: Shanghai

Strikes and by-laws

Following the outbreak of World War I the cost of living in China rose sharply. From 1914 to 1922 the price of rice had risen 100 per cent, and the price of polished rice in Shanghai, 135 per cent. Wholesale prices in the city had increased 140 per cent, while average wages had only gone up by 80 per cent.¹ A slight easing of the situation occurred in 1923, but by 1925 it was worse than ever, and the *China Year Book* was writing of a 'phenomenal increase of prices . . . throughout the country'.² It noted in reference to unskilled labourers that: 'There is no doubt that the real standard of living has been cruelly depressed for this poorest and most helpless class of the population.'³ The figures for foreign rice imports into Shanghai are instructive:⁴

1920	2,000,000 lbs
1921	15,000,000 lbs
1922	40,000,000 lbs
1923	3,000,000 lbs
1924	200,000 lbs
1925	210,000,000 lbs

While prices followed a constant upward trend, nevertheless there were sudden and spasmodic fluctuations, which made it very difficult for wages to follow prices sufficiently closely to avoid friction on this issue, and the workers, on a minimal wage at the best of times, could not afford to wait for a gradual adjustment.⁵

The situation was further aggravated by the steady depreciation of the copper coinage, which was the chief currency of the working classes.⁶ There was no legal ratio between copper cash and the silver dollar, and subsidiary coins of all denominations were produced in a completely unregulated manner, a state of affairs which destroyed any normal relationship between wages and the minimum cost of living.⁷

Accordingly, when Li Li-san and his comrades urged the members of the workers' clubs to ask for a raise, and promised the support of the CCP,

the workers were more than eager to follow such advice. Their first demands were modest, and they were granted a few days later, the Japanese appearing anxious to avoid conflict. Although this was small enough in itself, the success attracted more workers to the clubs and schools, confidence grew, and contacts between workers in different factories increased.⁸ But real trouble was not long in coming. On 1 February 1925, a number of male workers at Naigai Wata Kaisha's West Shanghai Mill no. 8 were sacked, allegedly as a disciplinary measure, and were replaced with younger workers trained by the company (*yang-ch'eng-kung*).⁹ On the 4th, the workers went to collect the wages owing to them; they were roughly treated, did not receive their wages, and delegates were arrested, whereupon the whole factory went on strike. From 9 February onwards, with Communist participation,¹⁰ more of the company's mills struck. Carrying a large banner reading 'Oppose Japanese beating people', workers went from factory to factory calling the others out. By the 12th, eleven Naigai Wata Kaisha mills were on strike, and the strikers set up their own union. By the 18th, 22 factories were out, with some 40,000 strikers.¹¹

On the night of the 15th, violence occurred when a large group of strikers marched from Jessfield Village to the Toyoda Cotton Mill in Jessfield Road, and got in by scaling a wall. The workers inside downed tools, joined forces with them and assembled outside the gate, where they attacked a car and its seven occupants, all Japanese employees of the mill. One Mr Harada died as a result of his injuries, another was shot through the chest, while a third was beaten up and thrown into Soochow Creek. There were not a few instances of serious beatings of Japanese during these months. In the eyes of the Settlement authorities, the Shanghai-Woosung police played the role of uninterested observers, 'and their laxity was undoubtedly largely responsible for the large proportions which the strike reached'.¹² The Fengtien troops in command of the Chinese city following the Second Kiangsu-Chekiang War of 1924-5 were by no means sure of themselves. They were described as Manchurian mercenaries and Japanese hirelings by the local Chinese populace, and the presence of a brigade of White Russians did not add to their popularity. Their actions were marked by indecisiveness, and in the eyes of foreign observers, at least:

in displaying leniency in many matters which required particular firmness, they obviously tried to win the sympathies of the local Chinese population and to dispel the odium which followed their steps in China inside the Great Wall.¹³

Popular sympathy for the strikes ran high, and a support association consisting of representatives of forty-seven local community organisations was formed to aid the strikers and collect money. Seeing their patriotism and profits coinciding so nicely, Chinese manufacturers also pitched in, raising 1,000 yuan for the strike fund.¹⁴ Even the action of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, in offering to mediate between the opposing parties on 26 February, supported the strikers, as it saved them from the humiliating defeat which would otherwise have been almost inevitable, despite such widespread sympathy.¹⁵ Many Chinese newspapers, notably the *Min-kuo jih-pao*, were so strongly on the side of the strikers that they were fined and threatened with closure by the Municipal Council.¹⁶ This was the largest strike since the founding of the CCP in Shanghai, and the party ordered all members to participate. Alarmed, the Labour Federation issued leaflets warning the workers against agitators, and appealed for a return to work, but this only served to undermine its own position.¹⁷ A strike committee was set up, and brigades of pickets guarded against the possibility of sabotage. Propaganda was carried out by various means, including songs, leaflets, meetings and drama; and this despite the fact that there was a distinct divergence of opinion between the Shanghai branch of the CCP and Comintern, a fact of which the British Foreign Office was well aware, although most Britishers in Shanghai put all the trouble down to 'Russian agitators' and 'Bolshevism'.

On 20 January 1925 a very profitable treaty had been concluded between the Soviet Union and Japan, one which would, in Karakhan's words, lay:

The first stone... of our relations with Japan... We look forward to extensive economic cooperation with Japan, which will offer us the possibility of developing our productive forces and of supplying Japan with the raw materials without which she is completely dependent upon America and Britain.¹⁸

Kotenev also noted that 'the Soviets refused to support the bellicose tendencies of the Chinese towards Japan, maintaining that the latter should be excluded from the anti-foreign policy of the Chinese revolutionary parties', and he claimed that this view was supported by documents seized in Chang Tso-lin's raid on the Soviet Embassy in Peking.¹⁹ The *New Shanghai Life*, a Soviet aligned Russian language newspaper, published a lengthy article on the strikes, in which the writer was at great pains to argue that 'the anti-Japanese nature of the strike movement forms an upper structure of a strike movement whose roots lie in class discontent'. The writer also referred to 'the regrettable acts of violence'

which 'can be properly attributed to disorganization in the Chinese labour movement'.²⁰ According to an official British report from Shanghai to the FO:

This strike has . . . been a cause of considerable embarrassment to the local Agitation Bureau, who have been torn between the necessity of obeying their instructions from above and the desire not to damp the ardour of the Chinese Communists . . . These Chinese agitators seemed to be sure that their activities would receive the blessings of their masters, the Third International Agitation Department, and they sought the latter's help, but without much success. Meetings were held in the Soviet Consulate-general to discuss the question of participation, and I am informed that a sum of 4,000 dollars was allotted by the Agitation Bureau to the strike funds. (Although the Shanghai municipal police have similar information, I cannot vouch for it.) But at all events, even if the money was paid, it was only in the nature of a sop thrown to the bureau's too eager disciples, for the bureau took no active part in the strike agitation and in general frowned on it.²¹

The Chinese Communists knew what they were doing, however, and if we are to believe Chang Kuo-t'ao, a member of the strike committee, they also learned a valuable lesson. After the strike ended:

I talked with some of the workers. Most of them indicated that it was absolutely right to oppose the Japanese for beating people, that every Chinese would endorse such action. Even the women and child workers with relatively low levels of intelligence, on hearing about 'anti-Japanese' action, were roused to take a righteous position. I considered that this indicated a new direction to be taken in the labour movement in Shanghai. The economic struggle of the workers, with the added factor of nationalism, endowed the movement with incomparable vitality for development.²²

On 15 February negotiations commenced, the leader of the Japan Association of Textile Manufacturers having come to China personally, and after a protest from the Japanese Ambassador to the Chinese government. On 1 March, following the intervention of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce mentioned above, the strikers returned to work in an ambiguous atmosphere which would allow later writers to describe the strike variously as a victory and as a defeat. But the experience had been valuable, and regardless of the terms of settlement, it could be argued that the very occurrence of the strike and the growth in militancy and unity were in themselves a victory. Following the return to work the West Shanghai workers' club became the Shanghai Cotton Mills Union, and under the able guidance of Liu Hua, a young Communist who had dis-

tinguished himself during the strike, it became quite powerful, even dealing on an informal basis with the Japanese, who, however, refused it official recognition.²³

The most common slogan of the strikers we have noted already: 'Oppose Japanese beating people'; others included 'Chinese, do what righteous Chinese must do', 'Workers, do what righteous workers must do', 'Everybody together to oppose the Japanese, everybody together to oppose the capitalists'.²⁴ As well as demands for reduced hours, higher wages and better treatment, matters raised included such items as the demand of the workers in the Tung-hsing silk factory that 'Japanese must not flirt with women workers, or behave in an arbitrary fashion'.²⁵ In the proclamations and strike appeals, the national element is particularly apparent: 'Compatriots! Quickly, quickly, gain some face for China ... our country is almost finished, everybody together against the Japanese, come together to save our nation!'²⁶ From the workers of Naigai Wata Kaisha mills came this appeal:

Dearest compatriots, we are all citizens of the Republic of China, like brothers and sisters; now we are suffering all sorts of mistreatment at the hands of foreigners, and cannot help but go on strike. This matter concerns the honour of our nation and the character of our compatriots, and therefore we call on assistance from our fellow Chinese in all areas of society ... [new factories are built with the sweat and blood of the Chinese workers, and the Japanese] ... should be grateful to us, but instead they mistreat us; isn't this a terrible insult to the citizens of the Republic of China? Furthermore they often call us 'worthless' [*chien-chung*] and 'slaves without a country' [*wang-kuo-nu*]; thus, unable to bear this any longer, we are calling a strike on the afternoon of the 9th [of February]. Our aim is contained in the slogan: Oppose Japanese mistreatment! This is a matter of our country and people fighting for their honour ... all must arise and fight for our country's glory and our compatriots' face, only thus can you be considered citizens of the Republic of China, and only thus can you be considered compatriots; whoever plays the traitor and running dog of the foreigners, and tries to interfere with our rights and impede our progress, is the common enemy of over 20,000 workers. This announcement is made by all members of the Naigai Wata Kaisha textile mills.²⁷

This from the silk workers:

Now China is suffering every sort of insult at Japanese hands. We are workers in Japanese silk factories, and the bitterness of our lives is indescribable. The establishment of silk factories by the Japanese within Chinese territory is in reality an act of aggression against our national sovereignty. Although China has not yet been swallowed

up by Japan, yet the mistreatment we receive from the Japanese is more horrendous than that of slaves, and our life worse than if we were in hell. Regardless of the fact that every day we work 12 hours, Japanese foremen still strike us with fists and sticks. In the past we were given an hour off for meals, then it was reduced to half an hour, most recently it has been reduced yet again to 15 minutes. The Japanese capitalists treat us as if we were cows and horses, our living quarters are worse than cattle stalls or stables, so is it any wonder that not a few workmen fall ill? And if they do, their wages are stopped. Brothers, how unfortunate it is to be born as a Chinese! If Chinese workers overseas were maltreated, perhaps there might be some justification for it; but today we are thus maltreated within the borders of our own country. Nothing could be worse than this. At the least provocation the Japanese land their marines at Shanghai. We ask you, where is China's national sovereignty now? Where is the Chinese people's self-respect? Can it be that our country has already been annexed? To help us is to help yourselves. Arise, everyone, and carry the struggle for China's dignity through to the end.²⁸

The agitation continued after the ending of the February strikes, and received further encouragement from the outbreak of strikes in Japanese mills in Tsingtao. On 19 April workers at the Da Kang mill struck in protest against being forbidden to form a union; representatives were sent from Shanghai to aid the strikers, other Japanese mills were soon affected, and by 29 April some 18,000 men were out. Eventually a compromise favourable to the strikers was reached and they returned to work. However, the Japanese tarried over carrying out their part of the agreement, and exercised pressure on the Chinese authorities to ban the union and arrest its leaders. In response to this, strikes broke out again on 25 May, and factories were occupied. On the 28th, two Japanese destroyers arrived in the harbour; at the same time, Fengtien warlord troops and security forces under the local martial law commander attacked the occupied factories, killing eight strikers, wounding ten and arresting over seventy.²⁹ The arrival of this news in Shanghai heightened anti-Japanese feeling still more on 30 May.

In Foochow, too, an incident had occurred, which, although it involved mainly students, also contributed to the heightening of feelings.³⁰ On 7 April, a demonstration against 'imperialist aggression in the field of education', which was principally directed against Japan, was fired on by troops of the local Fukien warlord, who was regarded by patriots as being hand in glove with the Japanese. On this occasion seven were killed and another seven seriously wounded.³¹

In the first week of May, Canton saw the 2nd National Trade Union Conference, at which it was resolved to set up a national General Trade Union. Resolutions were also passed to the effect that the economic struggles of the workers be turned into political struggles, and that the working class must take the lead in the national revolution, as only they were fully capable of carrying it through; and they could only do this by putting their own class interests first, and taking them as their guide along the revolutionary path.³² The conference ended, and the Shanghai delegates returned, to be confronted, sooner than they had expected, with the opportunity to carry these resolutions into practice.

On 4 May workers in Naigai Wata Kaisha no. 8 mill struck for a wage increase, but following negotiations, work was resumed on the 7th. Only a few hours had elapsed when the dispute again erupted, and the strike recommenced. Factories nos. 3 and 5 immediately struck in solidarity, and they were soon joined by workers from the T'ung Hsing and Japan-China silk companies. On the 14th, the strike spread to NWK no. 12 factory. On the 15th, no. 7 mill was closed down by the management, on the grounds that it could not function for lack of material from the other mills.³³ The workers who arrived for night shift did not accept this, and forced their way past a party of Sikh police and Japanese foremen. They armed themselves with sticks, iron bars, and other weapons, and surrounded a group of Japanese, whom they greatly outnumbered.³⁴ A young worker whom we have already encountered, Ku Cheng-hung, led a rush against them, whereupon the Japanese opened fire with pistols, injuring some ten Chinese, including Ku, who died of his injuries on 17 May. Four Japanese were also seriously wounded in the clash.³⁵ Most of the strikers then withdrew, but some, who sought refuge in Mill no. 5, were locked in by the Japanese, whereupon they wrecked the machinery, which resulted in further discontinuation of operations.³⁶

Following this incident, the strike spread further, and the Japanese requested a large force of Municipal Council Police to maintain order in their factories. The request was granted, and arrests were made, although no inquiry was made into the shooting, which not surprisingly served to convince the Chinese workers still further that they could not expect justice from the Settlement authorities.³⁷ The Japanese Consul, Mr Yada, also advised the Chinese authorities in Shanghai that unless they put an end to the strikers' activities, he would be forced to send for Japanese soldiers to do the job.³⁸ As a further precaution, Chinese newspapers were warned by the SMC not to publish anything favourable to the strikes, or that might stir up bad feeling, on pain of expulsion from the Settlement.

These threats were, by and large, effective, as a number of papers had been severely fined for similar reasons earlier in the year, and the shooting of Ku Cheng-hung remained unknown to many people for some days.³⁹ It was this press ban that led the students to adopt the tactic of public speaking in the streets, and was thus a significant factor leading to the eventual outbreak of violence.

On 16 May a mass meeting of strikers was held under the leadership of the union established following the February strikes. A strike committee was set up, as were picket groups, propaganda squads, and a body to handle public relations. Strike certificates were issued to enable workers to receive strike pay from union funds, and eight demands were raised:

- 1 Sack and punish the murderers.
- 2 Compensate the dead and wounded.
- 3 From now on no firearms to be carried in the factory by Japanese.
- 4 Restore the jobs of all sacked workers.
- 5 Recognise the authority of the union to represent the workers.
- 6 Pay wages for the strike period.
- 7 Do not abolish financial rewards.
- 8 Pay wages and rewards in silver dollars [i.e. not copper].⁴⁰

The strike committee was in touch with the All China General Trade Union in Canton, and on 20 May the central executive committee of the KMT in that city sent the following cable which appeared in several Chinese newspapers whose offices were not in the Settlement, as well as being transmitted to schools, unions and other organisations:

Our anger cannot be greater on hearing the news that Japanese textile factory officials in Shanghai have, for no reason, shot and killed three Chinese workers and seriously wounded scores of others [*sic*]. Our party expresses strong opposition to such wanton violence and killing of Chinese within the borders of their own country by the Japanese. Moreover we uphold the justice of the economic demands of the workers, who are in a pitiful situation, and we are undertaking measures to support them. Further, all killing of Chinese by foreigners must be stopped, and the people must unite and struggle for the abolition of the unequal treaties which the foreigners use as their pretext...⁴¹

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the comfort afforded by such friends from afar, isolation in Shanghai was a danger, and to safeguard against this the strike committee once more requested the good offices of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce. This time, however, the Chamber claimed that they could do nothing until after a meeting of the Board

of Directors was held. The strikers had rather more success with the students, who had been involved with labour since the February strikes,⁴² and a joint meeting was held with representatives of the Shanghai Student Federation (*Shanghai Hsüeh-sheng Lien-ho-hui*) on 16 May. Students took to the streets to give lectures about the strike and its causes, at the same time collecting money for the strike fund. While engaged in such activity two students from Wen-Chih University (close to NWK no. 7 factory, where Ku had been killed) were arrested. Several days later⁴³ students from Shanghai University were also arrested while on the way to attend a memorial meeting for Ku Cheng-hung, whereupon representatives of the staff and students of both universities went to the police to request their release, which request was refused; the students were charged with disturbing the peace, and the date of their trial set for 30 May.

The memorial service itself passed without incident,⁴⁴ although it was attended by over 5,000, and fiery anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist speeches were made. Those present 'seemed to ignore completely' parties of the Shanghai-Woosung Constabulary, who took no action.⁴⁵ On 27 May a further meeting was held, attended by representatives of some twenty schools and educational institutions. At this meeting the students of Shanghai University resolved to take the lead and to demand redress in connection with Ku's death,⁴⁶ and the decision was taken to bring the case to wider public notice through a demonstration combined with lectures and the distribution of leaflets, to be held on 30 May.

Ma Ch'ao-chün, whom we have already met, was in Shanghai at the time as a representative of the right wing of the KMT, trying to organise branches of the Sun Yat-senism Study Association (*Sun-wen-chu-i Hsüeh-hui*) amongst the Shanghai students. He was also connected with the Labour Federation, and using his contacts in both areas he called a meeting, also for 30 May, in an area of vacant ground known as Nine-acre Field (*Chiu-mu-ti*). He claims a leading role for himself and his organisation, but as neither he nor it received any mention in the official reports it seems that the part they played must have been a fairly minor one.⁴⁸

A more important meeting than Ma's was held by the Central Committee of the CCP on the night of 28 May, at which Ts'ai Ho-sen argued strongly that the time had come to put into practice the resolution of the 2nd National TUC, that the economic struggles of the workers be turned into political struggles, in this case, the national struggle. The anti-imperialist nature of the workers' fight should be brought to the fore, to gain the support of all other anti-imperialist forces, and to this end, the demonstrations to be held on 30 May should have two aspects. The first

was to support the strikers of West Shanghai and to protest against the killing of Ku Cheng-hung; the second was to oppose the four by-laws shortly to be introduced by the Municipal Council, which had aroused much hostility in recent weeks on the part of a wide circle of Chinese residents. Ch'en Tu-hsiu and others at first opposed this suggestion on the grounds that it was airy and impractical, but after a lively and protracted argument the majority sided with Ts'ai, and it was decided to act accordingly. Ch'en remained pessimistic and remarked that they would be lucky if 500 people turned up.⁴⁹ Like the Settlement authorities, he misjudged the people's mood badly.

The four by-laws, which were to be put before a meeting of the foreign Ratepayers Association on the night of 2 June, concerned proposals to increase wharfage dues, the registration of stock and produce exchanges, regulations on printed matter, and the introduction of preliminary legislation to restrict child labour. The details of the first two need not concern us, and they have been exhaustively treated by Kotenev in his *Shanghai: Its Municipality and the Chinese*. The child labour question was extremely complicated, and deserves treatment at greater length than is appropriate in this chapter (see appendix 3).

It is nevertheless necessary to explain briefly why legislation aimed at alleviating the very shocking child labour situation in Shanghai should have aroused opposition on the part of the Chinese. We have noted above that early labour agitation was in part directed against moves to restrict the employment of children. The basic reason for this was simply that given current wage levels, it was necessary for working class families to have the maximum number employed. From the employers' point of view, restrictive legislation would put them at a major disadvantage *vis-à-vis* competitors outside the reach of the Settlement authorities, and they argued that only if such legislation could be made to apply to the neighbouring provinces of Chekiang and Kiangsu could they be expected to comply with it. Nevertheless, owing to pressure both from Britain and from reform-minded foreigners in Shanghai itself, a number of measures aimed at the gradual reduction of child labour in the Settlement were formulated in a draft by-law, and after some hesitation, this legislation gained the support of the British Chamber of Commerce, Japanese community leaders and a few Chinese employers. However, the Ratepayers Association meeting called to pass this by-law on 15 April failed to achieve a quorum, and a second meeting was scheduled for 2 June.

Between the two dates, Chinese opposition grew rapidly, not only for the two reasons just indicated. To many Chinese, the adoption of

gradualistic legislation was sheer hypocrisy—if the foreigners really wanted to abolish the evil, then why not do so at one fell swoop? That this would have been impossible was not regarded as a satisfactory response. Various Chinese laws governing child labour were indeed far more thoroughgoing, albeit totally ignored in practice. Yet it was felt that the law should present an ideal standard, and that anything less than this was little more than legal recognition of a social evil. Moreover, increasing numbers of people were asking by what right did the Settlement authorities seek to legislate on this or on any other issue concerning the Chinese. Regardless of the content of the legislation it was regarded as an encroachment on China's sovereign rights. Incorporation of the child labour by-law into a package containing the three other offensive items, to be passed together by the 2 June meeting, gave added strength to this view.

Of this legislative package, it was the printed matter regulations which aroused the greatest hostility, expressed in virtually all Shanghai journals of the time, from the 'respectable' *Eastern Miscellany* (*Tung-fang Tsa-chih*) to the Communist *Guide* (*Hsiang-tao*). These regulations sought to ensure that every printed item carried the name and address of its printer and publisher, with the express intention of stemming the flood of what were regarded by the Municipal Council as seditious or scurrilous publications; such regulations were in force in many countries, including Britain, but in Shanghai they were backed by quite severe fines and terms of imprisonment, which, opponents of the regulations were quick to point out, would never be tolerated by the freedom-loving English. The printing laws, declared the Communist Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, were 'a savage attempt to tear away the Chinese people's freedom'.⁵⁰

The harshness or otherwise of the by-laws, however, was not the main point. Such by-laws constituted in themselves activities quite beyond the scope of the treaties, according to *The Eastern Miscellany*,⁵¹ and even the old reformer Liang Ch'i-chao, who took an extremely moderate line throughout the troubles of 1925, argued that the Municipal Council was very wrong in taking such actions regardless of Chinese public opinion.⁵² Ch'en Tu-hsiu argued strongly that what was at issue was not whether the laws were good or bad, but whether the foreigners had the right to legislate in China at all. Denying that right, he then developed an attack on extraterritoriality and the treaties in general, and proposed that the movement against the printing regulations should become a movement for 'Shanghai for the Chinese'.⁵³ This slogan had already been raised in commercial circles,⁵⁴ and Ch'en's argument was repeated in a leaflet being distributed about the city in April, under the title 'Oppose the by-laws on

printed matter and wharfage dues'.⁵⁵ Widespread agitation and opposition to the proposed by-laws continued throughout April and May. Some thirty Chinese organisations sent a long joint letter to the Municipal Council listing the four measures, placing the child labour proposal last: 'Considerations of law, sovereignty and actual conditions impel us to oppose the first three resolutions, although, to some extent, we may feel inclined to endorse the fourth.'⁵⁶ It is ironical that those responsible for pushing on with efforts to have the rate-payers' meeting held in the face of strong opposition not only from the Chinese, but also from a section of the foreign community, did so in order to have the legislation on child labour adopted, and thus, as they thought, to better the lot of the workers and to ameliorate Sino-foreign relations. Such was not to be the case, and by late May all the frustrations of the Chinese inhabitants of Shanghai, not only workers, but stockbrokers, ship-owners, newspapermen, lawyers, radicals and conservatives, Communists and reformists, had come to the surface and were focused on concrete issues.

May 30

With such a background of events, it seems surprising that no special precautions were taken on the day set for the demonstrations. Yet Fessenden, the American Chairman of the Municipal Council (described in a telegram from the British Legation in Peking as 'a feeble creature, one of those who have gone to pieces in the East, and conspicuously unfit for his position'),⁵⁷ although he thought trouble might be in the offing, did not foresee any prospect of serious happenings on 30 May. The Police Chief, McEuen, 'a notoriously incompetent loafer',⁵⁸ did not even foresee the vague clouds on the horizon perceived by his colleague.⁵⁹ Despite the very full information in his hands regarding the situation and the events scheduled for that day, McEuen left the city shortly after midday on 30 May, without informing his deputy. He stayed away for some three hours, and on his return went directly to the racecourse (it was Saturday) without contacting any of his subordinates to inform himself of the progress of events. It was subsequently alleged that had he been present at the Louza Police Station as late as 3.15 p.m. on that afternoon, the firing could have been avoided.⁶⁰

In the late morning, large numbers of students entered the International Settlement, carrying banners, scattering leaflets and giving speeches. Some went to the Japanese Consulate, some to the Mixed Court and others gathered on Nanking Road. All political demonstrations were

illegal in the Settlement, and during the morning over a hundred students from Nanyang University were arrested, although they were released at about 2 p.m. the same day.⁶¹ Witnesses, both foreign and Chinese, agreed that at this stage, at least, the demonstrators had no intention of causing any major disturbance, still less of doing harm to persons or property.⁶² Although the slogan 'Shanghai for the Shangainese' was raised, and the administration of the Settlement attacked, yet the brunt of the anti-imperialist speeches and pamphlets was directed against the Japanese, with no specific singling out of the British. Indeed, foreign onlookers, other than police, were not molested or abused in any way, and did not feel themselves to have been in any danger. Several were handed leaflets, either at their own request or on the initiative of the students, and some spoke with the demonstrators in both English and Chinese.⁶³

In the early afternoon the demonstrators began to concentrate in Nanking Road, specifically in the Louza District.⁶⁴ At 1.55 p.m. information about student activities was lodged at the Louza Station, whereupon a party of European officers went to investigate. After the students refused to disperse, three were arrested and taken back to the station, followed by a crowd who entered the charge room and demanded that they too be arrested. Shortly afterwards Inspector Everson, in charge of the station, went to Thibet Road and arrested a man carrying an anti-Japanese banner; he, too, was followed by a crowd insisting that they be arrested. A constable rejoicing in the name of PC Andreatha Vandrales Stevens tried to disperse them and was knocked to the ground and assaulted for his pains. His six assailants were arrested, but they were followed by sympathisers who forced their way into the charge room, from whence they were ejected with some difficulty after a sharp struggle, in which blood was drawn.⁶⁵ Students struck at police with the poles of their banners, and Everson responded with his malacca cane, while his comrades employed wooden stools to the same purpose.⁶⁶ Although the police finally succeeded in removing the protesters, the six men charged with assault also escaped in the confusion.

The return to the street of those bloodied in the encounter in the charge room seems to have changed the mood of the demonstrators. As the police attempted to force them eastwards along Nanking Road, they suddenly halted opposite the Wing On department store. Two more constables were assaulted, and unsuccessful efforts were made to wrest their pistols from them. The police responded with sticks and batons, but were gradually pushed back to the station gate. As it appeared that the crowd would take the station, Everson gave a verbal warning in English and

Chinese that the police would open fire. It is unlikely that many could have heard it, and as the demonstrators continued forwards, Everson ordered his men to fire. As not all could hear his order above the noise of the protestors, he then signalled the order by firing a shot from his pistol into the air, whereupon Sikh and Chinese police fired into the crowd, killing four outright, and wounding others, five of whom later died.⁶⁷ The time was just after 3.30 p.m. Teng Chung-hsia wrote that: 'Blood and flesh flew in all directions, the scene was so appalling that people could not bear to look on it. The crowd scattered in confusion.'⁶⁸ The police report simply noted: 'The shooting had the immediate effect of dispersing the crowd and traffic became normal shortly afterwards.'⁶⁹

The incident caused no undue alarm in the foreign community, and shortly after it occurred the British Consul-General cabled the embassy in Peking:

This afternoon bodies of Chinese students distributed virulent anti-foreign pamphlets in settlement. Some sixty were arrested and ring-leaders detained. Remainder refusing to leave had to be ejected. Mob gathered in Nanking road attacked foreign police officer and attempted to rush police station. Police then fired inflicting twenty three [Pgroup omitted], seven fatal. This restored order and further trouble appears unlikely.

The situation was not regarded as being sufficiently serious to interfere with a projected royal visit, and the cable continued:

Pamphlets are evidently of Communistic origin... Prince George is due here early on June 1st and proceeds to Wei-hai-wei on June 2nd. He will stay at consulate and I trust no anxiety be felt as every precaution taken.⁷⁰

While the bodies of the dead were being laid out, emergency meetings were being held all over the city to discuss the events of the day and the most effective means of retaliation. An important gathering was called at the KMT headquarters at 44 Huan-lung (Vallon) Road, organised by Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang, Ma Ch'ao-Chün and Liu Lu-yin, at which it was resolved to call a triple strike, of commerce, education and labour. A telegram to be sent to various places both within and outside China was also drafted, calling on the support of all peasants, workers, merchants and students. Amongst those present at the meeting were numbered Lang Hsing-shih, Kui Ch'ung-chi and Lin Huan-ling representing the KMT; Feng Shao-

shan, a big businessman; Yü Jih-chang (David Yu) of the YMCA; and Tu Yüeh-sheng, with his associates Wang Hsiao-lai and Lu Po-hung.⁷¹ According to a rather fulsome biography of Tu published in Taiwan, his assistance was sought by (right-wing) KMT members following the shooting of Ku Cheng-hung. Despite resistance from certain of his followers, he resolved to support the patriotic movement, and went so far as to cancel all his social engagements and close down the gambling houses under his control for its duration. The shooting in Nanking Road 'fanned the patriotic embers burning in his heart', and he staunchly backed the activities of the Union of Labour, Commerce and Education, formed to direct activities during the May 30 Movement.⁷²

Also present at this meeting was Yün Tai-ying, a CCP member who was simultaneously serving as secretary of the Youth Department of the Shanghai Executive Department of the KMT. As soon as the meeting ended he hastened to the house of Chang Kuo-t'ao, where members of the Central Committee of the CCP were gathered, including Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Ts'ai Ho-sen, Wang I-fei, Lo Chüeh, Li Li-san and Liu Shao-ch'i. Yün reported on the meeting from which he had just come, saying that the KMT people were highly indignant and eager to initiate counter-measures, some of them even being moved to the point of beating their breasts and weeping. From this and other reports given it was clear that the entire city was seething with anger,⁷³ and the Central Committee resolved to call a general strike on three fronts, as had the KMT; and with this aim, a demonstration and mass meeting was arranged for the following day at the headquarters of the General (Chinese) Chamber of Commerce. Ts'ai Ho-sen was one of those who pushed most vigorously for these actions, as he had similarly argued for the demonstration on 30 May.⁷⁴ To better control the strike, it was decided to form a Shanghai General Trade Union and a tripartite union of Labour, Commerce and Education.⁷⁵ According to Chang Kuo-t'ao:

We also discussed the point that the movement, which was to be anti-imperialist, was not intended to inconvenience the citizenry as a whole, much less result in economic losses to Chinese. The main purpose of the strike of business, for example, was to cut off supplies to the foreigners in Shanghai. It was necessary to minimize any losses that Chinese merchants might suffer, while ensuring that citizens as a whole received their usual supplies. By the same token, the strike of workers should not spread to Chinese owned factories. And since such public utilities as power and water affected the livelihood of everyone, no strike would be called against them for the time being.⁷⁶

Shanghai reacts

Despite heavy rain and further arrests, over 1,000 students and women workers filled Nanking Road on the morning of Sunday 31 May, distributing leaflets and calling on all shops and businesses to close down immediately. They were not noticeably successful, and by 4 p.m. only a few stores had shut. It had been hoped that a general stoppage of business in Nanking Road would create such a serious situation that the General Chamber of Commerce would feel itself forced to support and enlarge the strike. In the late afternoon the demonstrators converged on the *T'ien-Hou Kung* where the General Chamber was meeting with the Federation of Street Unions.⁷⁷ The latter body represented the smaller traders and businessmen, and was organised geographically, the businesses in each street or group of streets having their own representatives, while the GCC represented big business, and entry was governed by the amount of capital one possessed. When the demonstrators arrived the GCC and the FSU were debating the desirability of a general stoppage of trading, the former opposing the idea and the latter, some of whose members had been amongst the dead and injured, supporting it.⁷⁸ Finding themselves suddenly outnumbered, the GCC finally agreed to sign the triple strike order, although the acting chairman, Fang Chiao-po, who had at first not attended the meeting and was only subsequently found and taken there,⁷⁹ protested to the last that no decision could be taken before the return of the Chairman, Yü Hsia-ch'ing (then in Peking) and a meeting of the Board of Directors. As soon as he could make good his escape, he hurried to inform the Shanghai Municipal Council that he was personally opposed to the strike and had signed the order under duress.⁸⁰

Altogether, some 1,500 people attended the meeting,⁸¹ and apart from the strike decision they also passed a number of other resolutions, the 'most important' of which, according to a publication of the students of Nan-fang University, were the following:

The SMC should:

1. Punish the murderers.
2. Indemnify the victims.
3. Apologize.
4. Abolish the printed matter by-law.
5. Return the Mixed Court.

The Chinese should:

6. Boycott British and Japanese goods.
7. Not use the notes of foreign banks.

8. Not travel on trams [these belonged to the Municipal Council].
9. Oppose foreign-run schools.
10. Not wear foreign clothes.⁸²

In the rash of meetings following the shooting in Nanking Road, such resolutions appeared many times over, with the exception of the last, which seems only to have been raised on this occasion. Judging from contemporary photographs, it did not carry much weight, but it represented a type of resistance appealing to the 'national essence' which was not uncommon, and greatly provoked the scorn and anger of Lu Hsün.⁸³

A joint meeting of Shanghai trade unions was held on the night of 31 May at which the proposal to form a General Trade Union was put forward by Li Li-san and backed by other Communists. The motion was passed quickly, as it was in conformity with the resolutions passed by the second all China TUC, and obviously made sense from the point of view of the struggle ahead. Ma Ch'ao-chün further seeks to explain the ease with which the GTU was set up by claiming that the workers were 'taken by surprise' by such a proposal, coming from men who had up to then been members of the Labour Federation,⁸⁴ so much so that they also requested Li to take charge of the new organisation's affairs, and thus, effectively, to lead the strike. Others elected to the GTU leadership included Liu Hua, Liu Shao-ch'i, San Liang-hui, and Yang Chih-hua, wife of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai; Yang Chien-hung, a KMT member, was put in charge of Public Relations.⁸⁵ The establishment of the GTU under such a leadership marked the triumph of the CCP's efforts to gain control of the labour movement in Shanghai, and it was to remain one of the most powerful organisations at the party's disposal for some years. Its first official act was to proclaim a general strike in Shanghai, effective from 1 June.⁸⁶

On the morning of that date the majority of Chinese stores put up their shutters, although most continued to do a certain amount of business throughout the duration of the strike.⁸⁷ Certain large concerns in Nanking Road did not participate at first, but following further violent clashes between Chinese and foreigners they too joined their compatriots in the stoppage.⁸⁸ Despite the order from the GCC, of which they were members, the bankers (represented by the Shanghai Bankers' Association and the Shanghai Native Bankers' Association) continued to carry on normally, although by way of protest they addressed the following letter on 1 June to the Municipal Council, which is of particular interest as a statement of the view of a conservative group in general very favourably disposed towards the foreign community:

Sir,—The unfortunate action on the part of the police, causing as it has the loss of so many lives of students and passers-by in the International Settlement, has occasioned our fellow-citizens untold pain and excruciating distress. It would undoubtedly be abhorrent to other nationals who have any respect for the principles of humanity. A very strong feeling of indignation is prevailing amongst the whole Chinese community, and the majority of traders here have already suspended their business.

As you are doubtless aware, the students carried no arms or any other dangerous weapons, and whilst they might have been making some demonstrations, nevertheless there is no evidence that their action was so menacing as to call for the indiscriminate rifle-shooting in which certain members of the police force appear to have indulged, thereby bringing about the lamentable loss of so many lives. If such a calamitous affair be not brought to a rapid but satisfactory conclusion, we are of opinion that the present crisis will become aggravated and will inevitably assume graver dimensions. The financial circles will then be involved, and consequently, the commerce of the foreigners of the various nationalities will thereby be injuriously affected.

We have, therefore, to request that the Municipal Authorities should assume the entire responsibility for the present situation and see that those who are responsible for the loss of so many lives be punished and that proper compensation be paid to the bereaved families and also to those who are injured. We have also to urge upon you and your colleagues the desirability of taking such steps as will conduce to the effective prevention of similar calamitous occurrences, so that the whole community may be pacified and the commercial interests of this port protected.⁸⁹

However, following a mocking rebuff by the *North China Daily News* and refusal on the part of the Municipal Council even to acknowledge having received their letter, the financiers and bankers joined the strike on 3 June.⁹⁰

In order to ensure the effectiveness of the strike order, from 7 a.m. onwards on the morning of 1 June, crowds filled Nanking Road, once again delivering speeches and scattering leaflets. The International Volunteer Corps together with the police attempted to break up the gatherings with firehoses, but the protesters responded by rushing a fire engine and pelting the police and other enforcers of law and order with cobblestones and tiles. Once more the police felt themselves obliged to open fire on the crowd, with fatal effect.⁹¹ In another incident on the same day a Sikh constable was attacked and fired on by his assailants, wounding three of them. A Chinese constable, similarly set upon on the following day, shot one of his attackers dead. Another Chinese was shot dead and

two more wounded by Japanese constable Tsukuzaki, who had been beaten with bamboo poles and thrown into the Soochow Creek. Further deaths occurred when mobs tried to wreck Japanese business premises, and on 17 June a Sergeant Gavan was attacked by a crowd armed with knives and choppers, only being rescued by fellow police when already at the point of death.⁹² The most serious attack on the foreign forces came on the evening of 2 June, when a party of the American troops patrolling Thibet Road was ambushed near the New World Amusement Park, coming under fire from the Wing On Building, Sincere's store and the Ningpo Guild Building. One American received a flesh wound, while his companion had his horse killed beneath him. Police and Volunteers fired 1,500 rounds in response to some 2,000 from the Chinese, but according to official sources only one Chinese, 'a coolie', was killed, and by the time the buildings were entered they were almost entirely deserted.⁹³ Teng Chung-hsia, on the other hand, claims that the killed and wounded were 'numberless' and that 300 people were arrested.⁹⁴

Such incidents of violence, however, became increasingly isolated following the declaration of a state of emergency by the Municipal Council on 1 June, which included the following points:

no person shall:—

- a. Organize or take part in any procession or assembly or take any action that may cause a crowd to collect in the public streets or in any public place.
- b. Loiter in the public streets or in any public place.
- c. Deliver any speech; or print, publish, distribute or exhibit any documents, picture, flag, banner or any other device; or invent, publish or spread any rumour or report which may stir up animosity, foment trouble, cause public alarm or incite to a breach of the peace.⁹⁵

A curfew was also imposed, and a manifesto widely placarded about the city, the tone of which was strikingly similar to various warlord proclamations. After justifying the 30 May shootings as self defence, it went on to warn:

The public should take note that all acts of intimidation and violence are unlawful, and all speeches of an inflammatory character made in the public streets are expressly prohibited.

The Council for the Foreign Settlement of Shanghai is determined to maintain peace and order in the Settlement. If, therefore, any person or persons disobey these injunctions all such who incite to disorder will be dealt with the utmost severity as disturbers of the peace and good order of the Settlement.

Warning is duly given. Let all obey.⁹⁶

To back up the threats, more volunteers for the Defence Force were called for, and troops were landed from British, American, Japanese, and Italian warships, of which there were twenty-two anchored in the Whangpoo River by 6 June. For many Chinese Shanghai became a frightening place in which to live (even more so than usual), as machine gun posts appeared on street corners, armoured cars patrolled the streets, and groups of US and Japanese marines went into the Chinese city, deliberately, it seemed, to stir up fights.⁹⁷ Chinese were cleared out of the area of Nanking Road around the Louza Police Station and forbidden to re-enter,⁹⁸ warrants were issued for the arrest of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai and other Communists, and on the afternoon of 4 June books and documents were seized from Shanghai University, the students expelled and troops billeted on the premises. The same occurred at Ta Hsia, T'ung Te and Nanyang Universities. On 8 June hotels were searched for 'Communists' and fifteen visiting students from Honan were arrested. But the Chinese were by no means helpless before such force; on the evening of 5 June, for instance, orders were issued to stop and search all Chinese on the streets, and many were taken to the Louza Station to be interrogated. The news quickly spread, and defying both curfew and a steady drizzle of rain, people immediately filled the streets in such numbers that it became impossible for the police to carry out their order, and those already apprehended were released.⁹⁹

Important as the stoppage of business was as a sign of Chinese unity in the face of foreign aggression, it provided no undue grounds for concern either to the municipal authorities or to the governments of the Powers. Ultimately the success or failure of the movement depended on the strength wielded by the striking workers, especially in the textile mills and on the waterfront, and thus they were in a very real sense the movement's vanguard and its backbone. On 1 June the workers from the Japanese textile mills already on strike were joined by the employees of Arts and Crafts, a British firm of cabinet makers, and about 2,900 male and female operatives of the Hung Foong Cotton Mill, a Chinese company.¹ Contrary to CCP policy, workers in other Chinese concerns also struck spontaneously, but by 11 June those Chinese businesses and industries thus affected were, with a few exceptions, working on a normal basis again.² As 1 June was a Monday, many workers were unaware of the strike resolution passed on the previous day, and reported for work as usual.³ On 2 and 3 June, however, the strike spread rapidly amongst both foreign and Chinese establishments, and during the following few days it encompassed almost all the waterfront workers, and subsequently the

crewmens of ocean-going vessels. This brought the strike home to the British, for whom the coastal and river shipping trade was the foundation of their commerce with China.⁴ Attempts to maintain a few tugs by manning them with White Russian blacklegs were unsuccessful, as the Russians were inexperienced, and moreover, as the commercial secretary of HM Legation in Peking bemoaned, they had to be paid five times the normal Chinese wage rate!⁵

At the end of the first week of June the strike was joined by 1,300 employees in the Riverside Power Station of the Municipal Electricity Department, and some 600 Chinese employed by the same Department in the Fearon Road Plant downed tools a few days later. Other public utilities affected were the Shanghai Mutual Telephone Company (400 operators),⁶ the Shanghai Tramway Company (325 fitters and others) and the Waterworks Company (320 employees); their members were further swelled by some 76 telegraphists and 110 chauffeurs. By the morning of 4 June about 74,000 industrial workers in the Settlement were already on strike, and by 18 June these numbers had increased to 82,500, and comprised the workers in almost all Japanese and British mills, the printing staffs of the principal European newspapers, and large numbers of domestic servants, seamen, firemen on ships, laundrymen, brass smiths, bank clerks, carpenters, and fitters and turners. Outside the Settlement, there were another 15,000 industrial workers on strike in Pootung.⁷

To co-ordinate the various fronts, the GTU suggested to the GCC, the FSU and the several student groups that they should form a Union of Labour, Commerce and Education. In the continuing absence of its Chairman, Yu Hsia-ch'ing, the GCC was reluctant to commit itself to any firm policy, and declined to enter the new organisation, claiming that the Chamber did not wish to prejudice its chances of later playing the role of mediator.⁸ The Street Unions and the students (represented by the National Student Union and the Shanghai Student Association) had no such scruples, and the Triple Union was established forthwith, each member body electing six delegates. The GTU played the leading role, and the students were content to follow its directives, thus outnumbering the Street Unions, who were less inclined to see eye to eye with the GTU (and thus the CCP) on all points. The Street Unions, however, maintained close contact with the GCC, as there was a certain amount of dual membership, not to mention inevitable financial ties. From the beginning the Triple Union was subject to internal strains, but in its early days the general atmosphere of patriotism and struggle served to hold it together, and for at least the first month of the movement in Shanghai, it was accepted

as the leading body by wide sections of the populace, from Ch'en Tu-hsiu to Tu Yüeh-sheng.⁹

From late 1924 Shanghai students had involved themselves in labour affairs, and as we have seen they played an important role in the events leading up to and including 30 May. In Shanghai as elsewhere they were very active in the movement, especially in its early stages, and the student movement, which had gradually weakened following the 4 May period, was given a strong boost. On 30 May the Shanghai Student Federation only represented ten educational institutions, but following the declaration of a general strike in high schools and universities, each organised its own branch of the Association, which was transformed into a mass organisation. Evidence of the strength and widespread nature of the feelings sparked off by the shootings in Nanking Road was given by the fact that even the notoriously conservative St John's University, an American mission foundation, entered the struggle, in the face of strong opposition from the principal.¹⁰

Propaganda work and supervision of the boycott of British and Japanese goods were the particular responsibility of the students, and their union established three committees to carry out these tasks. A Legal Committee collected evidence and interviewed witnesses concerning the shootings as a basis for lectures; a Boycott Committee took charge of the inspection of merchandise and the supervision of merchants (generally referred to in foreign publications as 'intimidation'); and a Military Committee took upon itself the task of military training to strengthen the nation and prepare for a war against the British.¹¹ This last notion, far-fetched as it may now seem, was shared by many at the time,¹² including Chiang K'ai-shek.¹³ Some 100 people were responsible for these three groups; at first they were extremely active, but time and economic difficulties, and later interference by the Chinese authorities, all took their toll of enthusiasm. Although the Shanghai Student Association, following a reorganisation which gave the top positions to the left, was aligned firmly with the GTU, varying opinions on strategy and wider issues also began to split the ranks, particularly after the appearance of Tai Chi-t'ao's group within the KMT and the debate over whether the attack should be directed against Britain alone, or against Britain and Japan, or against all the imperialist states together. The summer holidays also played a counter-revolutionary part, as unity was broken by the many students returning home; Teng Chung-hsia wrote that when they came back to Shanghai, they were like strangers to each other, and the old fire was no more.¹⁴

Nevertheless, on 7 June none of this had yet come to pass, and on that

day the newly constituted Union of Labour, Commerce and Education took its first step by issuing a list of four preliminary and thirteen formal demands. These demands are most instructive as a summary of the desires and frustrations of the various social groups represented by the Committee:

Preliminary Demands

1. The Council should issue a proclamation forthwith for the cancellation of the state of emergency.
2. That landing parties from the different gunboats should be withdrawn forthwith, and the volunteers and special police should be demobilized.
3. All persons arrested should be released forthwith and sent back to their homes; and
4. All schools, colleges and other places seized by the Council or sealed should be re-opened and returned to their rightful owners.

Formal Demands

1. The officer who gave the order to fire, and the police who fired and shot and killed the labourers and students, must be handed over to the Chinese Government at once for detention, trial and punishment.
2. Suitable indemnity must be paid by the Council to the families of the dead, the wounded, the labourers who have gone on strike, the merchants who have gone on strike, and the schools and other places seized and sealed by the subordinates and servants of the Council.
3. Formal apologies shall be tendered to the Chinese Government, the local officials, and those who have suffered.
4. The Secretary of the Council, Mr. E. S. Benbow Rowe, must be dismissed and replaced.
5. Chinese in the Settlement shall have absolute freedom of speech.
6. Better treatment shall be afforded to the labouring classes, who shall have liberty to form unions and declare strikes, and who shall not be dismissed as a result of the present strike, and further, rules for the protection of labourers to be drawn up jointly by the Council and the Chinese Advisory Board shall be observed by foreign and Chinese mill owners alike.
7. A Chinese Commissioner of Police must be appointed and all of his subordinates must be Chinese.
8. The proposed by-laws for the registration of the Press and Stock Exchanges, and the increase of wharfage dues, shall be cancelled forthwith.

9. The Council shall stop building roads into Chinese territory and the Council must not present any demands for the return of the existing roads, which shall be returned to the Chinese Government forthwith.
10. The Mixed Court shall be returned to China forthwith; in cases in which Chinese are the only parties concerned, only a Chinese magistrate shall sit and the assessors shall not be empowered to sit or watch the proceedings, and in cases where foreigners sue Chinese the Assessors shall be permitted to sit, but they shall not be empowered to interfere in the judgments; Chinese criminals shall be indicted according to the Chinese Criminal Code or the Municipal By-laws, but not by both; all the affairs of the Court shall be administered entirely by Chinese, including the work of the Registrar and the prosecuting solicitor, and all officials of the Court must be appointed to their places only by the Chinese Government.
11. Chinese shall be eligible for election to the Shanghai Municipal Council, and foreigners in whose names Chinese land is registered shall not be permitted to stand for election.
12. Extraterritoriality must be abolished forthwith; and
13. British and Japanese gunboats must be withdrawn from Shanghai permanently.¹⁵

So far we have only looked at the reaction of unofficial Chinese Shanghai. At the official level, too, protest, albeit somewhat more restrained, was not found wanting. On both 31 May and 1 June the Taoyin, with the Provincial Commissioner of Foreign Affairs and police with orders from the civil governor, presented notes to the senior consul demanding the release of all students, punishment of the Settlement police, and compensation, to which the consular body replied that such requests were not in order, and reminded the Chinese authorities of their own responsibility to maintain law and order in areas beyond the limits of the Settlement.¹⁶ In the face of such intransigence, the Chinese Advisory Committee of the Shanghai Municipal Council resigned on 6 June, and the *China Year Book* subsequently noted:

Its resignation en bloc at a time when the Council most required its advice and assistance did not produce a favourable impression on the foreigners, but it served to stimulate the strike movement.¹⁷

This action may also have been calculated to have some effect on the commission of inquiry appointed by Tuan Ch'i-jui's government, which had arrived from Peking one day previously. The two-man delegation consisted of Admiral Ts'ai Ting-kan, head of the Revenue Council, and

Tseng Tsung-chien, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, both of whom were known for their pro-British sympathies,¹⁸ and they set about their investigations in an atmosphere of tea-sipping politeness befitting their reverent and Confucian appearance, much to the delight of the foreigners, who felt that with such men handling affairs on the Chinese side, any unpleasantness would be quickly resolved.¹⁹ With the arrival on 8 June of a delegation from the Diplomatic Body, who were empowered a few days later to negotiate a settlement with the Chinese commissioners on the basis of their investigations, hopes were high in official circles that the affair would soon be over.

The Admiral and the Vice-Minister had rather less happy relations with the great mass of their own compatriots who were sustaining the strike. On 11 June, together with other officials of the local Chinese administration, they were invited by the Triple Union to attend a mass meeting of the citizens of Shanghai, at which they could learn the opinions of the people regarding the basis for a settlement, and give their own views. At the appointed hour some 200,000 people, mainly workers, small merchants and students, gathered in the sports stadium to meet the officials, who, however, failed to appear, whether out of fear of the mob, fear of compromising their position with the foreigners or because of other engagements, it is not clear, as they did not deign to excuse their absence. As may be expected, this raised the ire of the crowd, and when the meeting broke up, a large and angry demonstration against the officials was held in the Chinese city.²⁰

The best will in the world, however, could not ultimately disguise the real differences between the foreign interests and those of even conservative Chinese. Despite the lofty disregard with which Ts'ai and Tseng had treated the representative body of the majority of Shanghai people, they did feel obliged to heed the advice of the General Chamber of Commerce, who were apparently qualified by their higher station to have a more realistic view of what were the desires of the population of the city. As a summary of those desires, the GCC presented the Chinese delegates with a list of thirteen demands, based in part on the seventeen demands of the Triple Union but with certain items of working class concern omitted entirely, and others modified to a greater or lesser degree. It was made clear to the Chinese delegates that questions concerning Chinese representation on the Municipal Council and rendition of the Mixed Court lay at the heart of the issue, and they in turn brought this to the attention of the diplomatic delegation. The diplomats were only prepared to discuss such matters as compensation for the victims and the simultaneous sus-

pension of the Chinese police chief and of Inspector Everson pending an inquiry, to be followed by a cessation of the strike and withdrawal of troops, and their refusal to consider the wider issues made further progress towards a settlement impossible. They regarded the Chinese demands as being 'quite foreign to the matter at issue',²¹ and in the words of the Chinese Secretary at the British Legation: 'When it was found that the Chinese delegates insisted on putting forward extraneous demands... the Diplomatic Body's delegation left Shanghai on the 18th June to return to Peking...'.²² Accordingly, negotiations reverted to the capital, to drag out month after dreary month.

Merchants and workers: the strike continues

The alteration of the original seventeen demands by the GCC marked the adoption by that body of a more active role, made possible and largely inspired by the return from Peking of its chairman, Yü Hsia-ch'ing. Regarded by Communists and others both at the time and subsequently, as almost a traitor to the national revolution, he was at the same time held by many Britishers to be their chief enemy, the leader of the 'extremists',²³ and 'a great rascal'.²⁴ Great rascal he may well have been, for he revealed himself during the movement to be a consummate politician (Chang Kuo-t'ao was one of the many to pay tribute, albeit grudging, to his skills in this area),²⁵ and through a nice conjunction of patriotism (as he and certain other wealthy businessmen understood it), with his own particular line of business, his financial profits soared as high as the national spirit would take them.

Emerging from a rather shady background, he had first entered political life as an underling of the KMT's Ch'en Ch'i-mei. Following a fall in the latter's fortunes, he established himself in Shanghai as a comprador, and was soon wealthy enough to found his own San Pei Ferry Company; as his affairs continued to prosper, before long he became a leading light, and something of an *enfant terrible*, among the Chinese capitalists of the city. In the course of conducting his businesses, whose ramifications spread wider as his wealth increased, he made close contacts with the temporarily defeated politicians of the Wanhsi clique who had fled to Shanghai following defeat by Chi-hsi forces. With Wu P'ei-fu's defeat and the appointment of Tuan Ch'i-jui to lead the new government in Peking, the star of Wanhsi was once again in the ascendant, and by this time Yü Hsia-ch'ing was regarded as a member of it. Tuan formally recognised Yü's position as leading merchant in Shanghai, by appointing

him to the position of *Shang-hai Shang-pu Hui-pan*, and it was while Yü was consulting with him in Peking that the May 30 incident occurred.²⁶

Although the Settlement in Shanghai was international, many of its senior officers were British subjects, Britons had a majority on the board of the Ratepayers' Association, and in many ways, even down to such details as street signs and uniforms, the Settlement was run on British lines. Foreign public opinion expressed through such newspapers as the *North China Daily News and Herald*, was also overwhelmingly British, and of the diehard variety at that. It is not surprising, therefore, that many Chinese referred to the International Settlement as the British concession, to the exasperation of the legally minded, especially amongst HM's diplomatic and consular officials, who frequently wished that it did indeed have such a status, and was thus directly responsible to HM government, instead of being the prickly independent body that it was.²⁷ The Chinese, however, tended to regard such distinctions as legal niceties of little substance, and in the mood engendered by the May 30 incident, if the name 'British Concession' applied to Shanghai upset the British authorities, then so much the better. Moreover, whatever the legal situation, the Municipal Council was a predominantly British body, and as such more responsive to pressure from Great Britain than from any other quarter, and to the extent that it was unlikely to move to a less intransigent position without such pressure being applied by HM government, the Chinese attitude was not unreasonable.

Returning to Shanghai, Yü Hsia-ch'ing saw that if anyone was going to make concessions that mattered, it would be the British, and sizing up the forces on the Chinese side, he felt that the British could indeed be forced to do so. Yü had a sufficiently realistic picture of the weapons at China's disposal to realise that their chief hope lay with the striking industrial workers, and in order that their strength not be dissipated he argued that they should concentrate on Britain alone. After all, the officer who ordered the shooting was British, and this surely made the killings a British responsibility; the strike in the Japanese textile mills was a purely economic matter (he contrived to ignore poor Ku Cheng-hung) and a separate settlement should be quickly reached. That this tallied well with the pro-Japanese affiliations of China's Chief Executive and Yü's own sponsor, Marshal Tuan Ch'i-jui, was certainly no disadvantage. It also coincided with the feelings of a strongly pro-Japanese clique in the right wing of the KMT, who included the erstwhile Marxist Tai Chi-t'ao, who had coined his own slogan calling on the Japanese to 'come back to the East'.²⁸ We have also noted above that the Russians were by no means

happy about anti-Japanese agitation earlier in the year, and did not wish to jeopardise their relationship with Japan; nevertheless, whatever the feelings or actions of the Soviet government as such, the Comintern in its publications during the movement was completely behind the CCP,²⁹ which resolutely opposed all attempts to let Japan off the hook. Regardless of Communist feelings, however, such a proposed restriction of the scope and scale of the movement struck responsive chords amongst many of the smaller merchants and businessmen, to whom the prospect of protracted strikes and the cessation of business on a wide front could not have seemed attractive, however genuinely patriotic many of them were. By restricting strikes to British factories alone, and by resuming business in the Chinese city while boycotting British goods, they would be able to 'take a righteous stand' without unduly endangering their own position. Thus they began to waver, although their representatives in the Triple Union continued to be swayed by the students and workers for several more weeks, and the first cracks appeared in the united front.

Possibly somewhat underestimating Yü's political skills, on 4 June the Municipal Council announced through its chairman, Fessenden, that it was prepared to accept the GCC as a mediator in the conflict. Yü accepted the proposal with alacrity, and in this capacity was throughout the movement able to keep open his contacts with Fessenden, and the Japanese Consul-General Yada.³⁰ Yü's accusers from the left were correct in claiming that he sought a compromise, but it was to be a favourable compromise, a significant feature of which would be that the foreigners were seen to yield to some degree at least, and throughout the months following the incident, considerable efforts were devoted to achieving just this. To achieve any compromise at all it was important that the foreigners, particularly the SMC and the various foreign Chambers of Commerce, retreat from the widely held position that the shooting had been entirely justified, and that the Chinese had no grounds for dissatisfaction with the Settlement authorities over this or any other matter. Himself an ex-comprador, Yü set about his business by summoning a conference of the compradors of all the major foreign firms on 8 June, in the hope that these brokers of so many things between East and West might be able to persuade their employers to come out and take a stand 'on the side of justice'. This was unsuccessful at the time, but the compradors continued to play this role, for which they were so ideally suited, throughout the course of the movement; following the refusal of the diplomatic delegates to accept the thirteen demands, they issued a joint letter to the two main foreign Chambers of Commerce, expressing the hope that mutual understanding and forgiveness might be reached on a firm basis.³¹

On 10 June a general meeting of the GCC was called, at which a May 30 Committee was established.³² It was this committee that altered the original seventeen demands to thirteen, thus incurring widespread opprobrium, but Yü himself was clever enough to decline a position on it on the grounds that it would conflict with his role as chairman of the Chamber.³³ It was also at this meeting that Yü explained his strategy for handling the movement, and his ideas received general support. Opinion was unanimous that the strike of business, labelled a 'suicidal policy' by Fu Hsiao-an, should be called off at the earliest possible opportunity.³⁴ (Fu was managing director of the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, and thus had common interests with Yü; he did in fact remain Yü's supporter throughout the movement, and his company made considerable profits.)³⁵

The representatives of the Street Unions within the Triple Union were worried not only by the financial losses they were incurring, but also by the militancy of the students and workers, and they were susceptible to the rumours being spread by the SMC and others that not only the students and workers were dominated by radicals and reds, but that Communists were numbered even amongst the merchants themselves.³⁶

Their position became even more uncomfortable when the students and workers combined to outvote them when, at the suggestion of the GCC, they first raised the issue of recommencing business. Following this episode the feeling grew that they should best leave the Triple Union, but the students and workers accepted a motion of the Street Unions to give each organisation power of veto over the decisions of the others, thus averting, for the time being, a formal break in the alliance.³⁷ Nevertheless, the GCC kept up pressure and it became clear that a resumption of business was inevitable, the only question being, how soon? In this struggle with the GCC for the loyalty of the petty bourgeoisie, the GTU and students gained one final battle, for the GCC had advocated that business begin on the first day of the fifth lunar month. Traditionally all debts were settled on the fifth day of the fifth month (the Dragon Boat Festival), and as most of the debts would be being paid by the Street Unions to the members of the GCC, the former body was somewhat reluctant to return to work at that particular time. In a last burst of patriotism they declared that 'the Shanghai incident has not yet been solved, the conditions not recognized, to suddenly now return to work would bring shame on us merchants'; aware of what the problem really was, the GTU and students nevertheless gave their support, the GTU moving that the resumption of business be postponed to the sixth day of the fifth month.³⁸ The motion was carried, and although it only postponed the inevitable for a few days,

it did ensure that when the shops re-opened, they did so on a day fixed by the GTU. However, this did not disguise the fact that the Street Unions had been won over to the side of the GCC, and while events in other parts of China kept things going at the national level, in Shanghai, 26 June,³⁹ the date of the resumption of business, marked the beginning of the decline of the mass movement,⁴⁰ although shops continued to carry white flags proclaiming the intention of their owners to sleep on faggots and eat bitter gall, never forgetting their final aim.⁴¹

One of the arguments that had been used by the Street Unions was that by re-opening their shops they would be in a better position to assist the striking workers financially, and they accepted a proposal put forward by the GTU to place a levy of 50 per cent on foreign goods sold, and 1 per cent on Chinese goods, to be contributed to the strike fund. There was also to be a boycott of all British and Japanese merchandise, to last, in the case of the former, until a settlement of the incident was reached, and in the latter, until the textile strike was resolved.⁴² According to estimates by the GTU, the levy should have supplied at least Taels 300,000, enough to support the strikers for a month, but in fact the most they ever received was Taels 40,000.⁴³

The question of strike funds, obviously an essential aspect of the movement, was also the subject of considerable contention and mutual recrimination, and in considering it we once more find ourselves confronting the redoubtable Yü Hsia-ch'ing, for it was through the May 30 Committee of his Chamber that he was able to set up the principal relief organisation, the Chi-An-Hui, whose three Commissioners were his personal appointees, and thus virtually monopolise a good proportion of the strike funds.⁴⁴

The problem of how to supply the strikers was indeed daunting. For most of June there were some 100,000 men out on strike—some sources put the figure at 150,000—and it was estimated that \$1,200,000 (Mex) would be required to sustain them for one month. During the first month of the movement, however, problems of distribution were greater than any simple lack of funds, for money came to Shanghai from all over China, and indeed, from all over the world.⁴⁵ Within Shanghai itself funds were also forthcoming in respectable amounts, particularly from the tobacco and shipping companies, who saw in the prolongation of the strike an opportunity to deal crushing blows to their foreign competitors, and from the printers, to whom the sudden upsurge of national feeling brought a great increase of business, as the patriotic of all classes rushed to commit themselves to print; sustaining their striking colleagues from the International Settlement newspapers was a small price to pay.⁴⁶

As the Shanghai GCC was better known in other parts of China than any of the bodies set up following the incident, it was natural that most of the funds sent from elsewhere in China were sent to it, especially as most of those funds came from other businessmen. Up to 2 July the Chi-An-Hui had distributed \$470,000 (Mex), but the operation had by no means proceeded smoothly. According to the account of Professor G. C. Chen of Peking University, the commissioners appointed by Yü were:

so-called experienced persons in previous famine relief management, but advanced in age as they are, they never have caught the spirit of dealing with the new workers. They were experienced in charity work, but not yet in distributing wages. Late arrival at the place for distribution, careless keeping of accounts, and clumsy methods of apportioning the money, have caused great suffering on the part of the workers. Sometimes women and children had to sit on the dirt or curl themselves up among a thick crowd in waiting for the twenty cents to be given to each striker. Many a time they had to wait in that heat and on that dirt and suffer the misery [*sic*] in order to gain the next day's fee of maintenance.⁴⁷

Not surprisingly, the GTU chose to handle money which came to it directly as a separate fund, and to distribute it independently. In this way they gave out approximately \$350,000 (Mex) during June.⁴⁸ The remainder of the total sum needed was advanced by the Chinese banks through the intervention of the GCC,⁴⁹ and thus the expenses of the strike in its first month were more or less met.

The situation was obviously unsatisfactory, however, and in the face of mounting public criticism the three commissioners of the Chi-An-Hui resigned on 4 July. On 6 July the body was reorganised under the same name, but it now consisted of delegates from the GTU and the Triple Union, and the responsibility for receiving relief funds was taken from the GCC and given to Chinese banks. It was felt at the time that these steps would solve the major logistic problems of the strike;⁵⁰ but in July the strikers were to encounter far more serious obstacles in their path.

The return to work by the shopkeepers and traders made little difference to the situation as far as the foreigners were concerned,⁵¹ and the shooting in Canton on 23 June provided them with quite as much political excitement as it did the Chinese, one newspaper carrying a 'succinct' report by a female eyewitness of the event, complete with mounted Russians wearing paper masks leading the attack on Shameen.⁵²

Still, Canton was far away and by the beginning of July the foreign community was sufficiently relaxed to resume its cricket and its polo, while in the evenings those who wished to could enjoy such gripping dramas as 'The Bridge of Sighs' at the Apollo, or for those whose theatri-

cal tastes turned more to satire and realism, with a dash of the mysterious east to which they had come to enrich themselves, 'Shams of Society' was playing at the Victoria:

Her husband was rich but kept her penniless. The gaming tables lured . . . She played with borrowed money . . . Then she saw the jewel of the oriental Prince and the temptation gave to the man who watched the chance he wanted.⁵³

Some of the military apparatus which had appeared in the streets on 1 June was also gradually being dismantled; indeed, the defence forces began partial withdrawal as early as 13 June, and despite the murder of an Englishman two days after that date (which may or may not have been political), the dangers facing foreigners were perceived as being more financial than physical. The withdrawal was made possible by the arrival in Shanghai on 13 June of Chang Hsüeh-liang, backed by two battalions of Fengtien Cadets, 2,126 in number,⁵⁴ Chang Hsüeh-liang had been sent by his father, Chang Tso-lin, allegedly to 'protect' Chinese nationals,⁵⁵ although he hastened to assure the Settlement authorities privately that he was in Shanghai to preserve order and to facilitate a return to normal conditions, and would be happy to co-operate with them in every way; nevertheless, he explained that he would have to proceed cautiously, as both he and his men were strangers to the place.⁵⁶ Chang Hsüeh-liang and the Cadets returned to Tientsin on 22 June, on which day martial law was declared in the Chinese city, command over the troops being given to General Hsing Shih-lien. Troops from Shantung and elsewhere continued to arrive throughout the month, and during July the city was garrisoned by some 7,000 Fengtien soldiers;⁵⁷ this was sufficient to deter large public demonstrations which would otherwise have been held on the Dragon Boat Festival and on 30 June, to commemorate one month of the movement. During June, however, the Chinese authorities were not prepared to clamp down on all patriotic manifestations, to the discontent of the British Consul-General, who complained of continued acts of 'intimidation' on the part of the unions. In view of this situation, and as the martial law authorities still declined to follow the joint advice of the US, Japanese and British Consuls, to arrest the principal labour leaders ('whose names and whereabouts could be communicated . . . by the municipal police'), the Municipal Council decided to prod Marshal Hsing into adopting a more resolute stance.⁵⁸

They achieved this by cutting off the supply of electric power from 'non-essential' industries, an act which was aimed directly at the Chinese industrialists whose mills had for the most part remained active through-

out the strike, and whose coffers had supplied a significant proportion of the strike funds. As a witness of these events observed, it was 'a low blow, definitely below the belt, but it produced the desired effect'.⁵⁹ On 4 July notice was given of the stoppage of power to all mills other than those handling foodstuffs, to be effective from 6 July. On 7 July General Hsing informed the British Consul-General that he proposed to issue a proclamation against intimidation, which document was duly published two days later.⁶⁰ The strikers seem to have been signally unimpressed by the proclamation, blacklegs continued to be threatened, domestic servants of British subjects were kidnapped, and the same fate befell ten Chinese sailors from a British steamer who were taken into custody by the Seamen's Union while on shore leave. On 20 July Consul-General Barton took it upon himself to inform General Hsing that 'unenforced proclamations only acted as an incentive to intimidation', and that he might feel obliged to inform the Legation in Peking that the local authorities had no intention of carrying out their treaty obligations—those 'obligations' which most Chinese felt lay at the root of all the trouble. Two days later the General told Barton that he had closed down the offices of the Seamen's Union, the Foreign Employees' Union and the Union of Labour, Commerce and Education, and had arrested a number of their officers. He had further notified the GCC that he had vetoed the arrangement made by that body with the various waterside unions, whereby a levy was made on all cargo removed from the wharves, the money going to the strike fund.⁶¹

Talk of a general return to work was heard on all sides, but Yü Hsia-ch'ing had other ideas. While he wanted no truck with the Communists, he still had hopes of using the unions to his own ends,⁶² and accordingly lent his voice to the strong protests against the closures. Together with Fu Hsiao-an and the Taoyin, Chang Shou-yung, he forcefully declared his objections to the Martial Law Commander's move, and this pressure, combined with appeals to Peking and a threat by the seamen to call out the men on Chinese owned steamers unless their union were reopened (this with one eye on the General and one on Yü himself), proved to be too strong for General Hsing. On 25 July the Seamen's Union was reopened on Yü's security, as was the Triple Union a few days later.⁶³

General Hsing was also under pressure from his commander, Chang Tso-lin, not to take any too drastic steps, for it was feared that the strikers might invoke the aid of General Sun Ch'uan-fang of Chekiang to attack the Fengtien forces.⁶⁴ It was known at the time that General Sun was planning an attack on Nanking in the interests of Wu P'ei-fu's newly formed Yangtze Confederacy, and that once Nanking was taken, the

Shanghai garrison could be dealt with separately. General Sun did indeed take Shanghai in the Chih-Feng war of late 1925, although after a visit to Hangchow in early August, General Hsing informed the British, American and Japanese consuls that following an assurance on his part that Fengtien troops would withdraw from Shanghai as soon as quiet was restored, General Sun had discontinued the 'precautionary measures' he had been taking.⁶⁵ To the British, the assurances of both Generals appeared 'highly improbable', but General Hsing had sufficient confidence to outline a rather piecemeal proposal for ending the strikes, in which he undertook to give full protection to any body of workers wishing to return to work, his basic idea being that the workers be encouraged to return to work gradually, in groups. Securing a general termination of the strike by drastic measures was still beyond his power.⁶⁶

Compromise and repression: the strike ends

Following the cutting off of electricity, calls for the adoption of drastic measures were heard not only from the foreigners, but from an increasingly wide section of the Chinese bourgeoisie in Shanghai, particularly from the mill-owners who were the most severely hit by the cut. Previously happy enough with the strikes, even to the extent of offering financial support, they quickly changed their tune, despatching a delegate to both the Japanese and British Consuls; they:

were careful to explain that they did not wish to discuss the incident of the 30th May, but they were convinced that the exploitation of strikes for purely political ends as opposed to economic ends was in the present state of China fatal to industrial progress. The unions, which had sprung up like mushrooms since the declaration of a general strike... were being used for the enrichment of the agitator, for the furtherance of the private interests of individuals, and for the benefit of one political party. For these reasons they desired that you [the British Chargé in Peking] should be asked to approach Marshal Chang Tso-lin on their behalf with a view to General Hsing being accorded the support necessary to enable him to deal firmly with any union which might act illegally or concerned itself with other than economic questions.⁶⁷

That Yü Hsia-ch'ing was playing a double, if not even more complex game, is made clear by the fact that while he sought both to protect his immediate interests and to consolidate his position as a patriot by emerging as defender of the unions against General Hsing, and while he maintained what appeared to the British Consul-General to be an intransigent

stance, he was simultaneously putting out feelers towards foreign business. On the night of 13 July he called a private meeting of representatives of the British and American Chambers of Commerce, and offered to call off both the strike and the boycott if the two Chambers would agree to recommend: 1. rendition of the Mixed Court, 2. limited Chinese representation on the Municipal Council, 3. the participation of foreigners in a general subscription for the benefit of the strikers. The British and Americans at the meeting expressed their willingness to accede to the first two points, but were adamant in their refusal to consider the third.⁶⁸ The foreigners felt that the real object of this tentative demarche was to secure money, and that the strikers would be unable to hold out much longer, as at a subsequent meeting on 15 July, Yü asked for one-third, then one-fifth of the wages due as strike pay, and finally for a subscribed sum of \$700,000, at least half of which was to be paid by foreigners;⁶⁹ in mid August a similar approach was made.⁷⁰ But while the strike was producing severe economic difficulties on both sides, for the foreigners to contribute to the strike funds would also have been seen as a concession to the righteousness of the Chinese cause, something which Yü had consistently sought; and in their continued refusal to do this, despite the fact that the losses they were incurring through the continuation of the movement were far greater than any sum they had been asked to contribute, the foreigners also demonstrated their awareness of this aspect of Yü's request.

Confronted by the disintegration of the united front and the growing isolation of the striking industrial workers, the CCP realised that it would have to modify its objectives and tactics if it were not to be pushed into an untenable position. Some members, inspired by their early successes and their greatly increased numbers, felt that the time was ripe for an armed uprising. No doubt increasing economic difficulties and a sense of betrayal also played their part, and Chang Kuo-t'ao was later to write:

I had to keep a wary eye open to check excesses in the patriotic zeal of the masses. The situation at the time was so profoundly tragic that the masses might easily have let themselves go in destructive retaliatory action ... I felt that at any moment the people might fly out of control.⁷¹

The Central Committee itself was apparently not untainted by such tendencies, but less fiery counsel ultimately prevailed,⁷² on the grounds that the present stage of the Chinese revolution was one in which the main tasks were education, propaganda and organisation.⁷³ The party then made the following declaration:

To guard against the isolation of the working class and to safeguard the working class's organizations and the victories already gained, we should change our strike policy, and take economic demands and political demands of a local nature as our minimum conditions. As far as the basic demands of a national nature are concerned, the workers should urge the northern and southern governments [i.e. Tuan Ch'i-jui and the KMT in Canton] to form a joint committee to solve these questions. The working masses should unite their forces throughout the entire country, exerting themselves in supervising the committee, forbidding it to yield to foreign pressure, and ensure that it cannot but support the masses' demands.

They further resolved that:

In order to expand the new path of the Shanghai and Hong-Kong strikes, and to increase the element of a movement for popular rights within the general struggle, to the point of realizing that the workers should unite with the common people to rise up against the Fengtien warlords, who have smashed the national movement, even to the point of uniting with those military men who sympathize with the national movement, as everything is permitted which helps resist the Fengtien warlords.⁷⁴

(It should be noted here that in those parts of China more firmly under their control the Fengtien authorities had been much more openly repressive than in Shanghai.)⁷⁵ It is a tribute to the effective leadership which the CCP had gained over the Shanghai working class through the GTU during the May 30 Movement, that it was able to execute successfully this change of course at a very difficult juncture, without sacrificing the allegiance of its newly won supporters.

Under the new policy, the first step was to try to reach a settlement with the Japanese. From the beginning of the movement the Japanese had sought to have the textile strike separated from the issues arising out of the shooting, a point of view shared by Yü Hsia-ch'ing. During July *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, the journal of the Communist Youth League, reported him as 'running around telling everyone that only the seamen's and dockers' strike mattered, and that the strike in the Japanese textile mills was not important'. The writer of the article rebuffed Yü vigorously, pointing to the huge Japanese investments in textile manufacturing in China, and claiming that the mill strike was costing the Japanese \$30m per month, compared to a monthly loss in wages to the Chinese side of only \$1½m.⁷⁶ As Yü did not regard the Japanese as enemies, or even as business rivals, he was presumably unimpressed.

On Wednesday, 12 August, Yada, the Japanese Consul-General, and Hsü Yüan, the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, met in the house of

General Hsing Shih-lien to sign the terms of settlement agreed upon by the Japanese mill-owners. No union representatives were present, and the terms, when published the following day, gave little cause for satisfaction. On 16 August a token protest was made at a meeting of the GTU, but as the Japanese remained firm, the strikers felt that given the general situation they could not but reluctantly accept the terms and return to work, which they did in the last week of August. However, despite acceptance of the terms by the textile workers union, only those Japanese mills which supplied their own electric power could in fact recommence operation, as the SMC refused to resume electricity supplies until the dispute in the Electricity Department was settled.⁷⁷

On 26 August representatives of the GCC and the Japanese shipping lines met with the maritime unions, and produced a list of terms for settling the strike on Japanese ships. These terms, too, were nothing more than a reiteration of the conditions pertaining before 30 May, although a 'gratuity' was to be paid in recognition of the workers hardships over the past months, and an undertaking to open wage talks one month after the resumption of work was also made. The strike formally ended on 28 August, the same day that the SMC declared the state of emergency to be over and demobilised the Volunteers.⁷⁸

At this point foreign business decided that the time had come for them to respond to Yü Hsia-ch'ing's overtures, and at a joint meeting of the British Chamber of Commerce and the Shanghai branch of the China Association, a resolution was passed regretting the prolongation of the deadlock, and expressing the desire of those present to dispel 'certain misconceptions' that had arisen during the past months. To this end, the meeting declared itself in favour of prompt action in carrying out the proposals of the Washington Conference, and in support of the principles of Chinese representation on the Municipal Council and of rendition of the Mixed Court. Sending a copy to the GCC, the meeting declared that:

it tenders to the Chinese community in Shanghai an expression of its earnest hope that it will accept this resolution as evidence that the misconceptions alluded to above, amongst which is the belief that British merchants are unsympathetic towards China's national aspirations, are without foundation.⁷⁹

Significantly, the incident of 30 May itself was hardly touched on, attention being focused rather on the wider issues involved, in direct contradiction to the attitude taken by the Diplomatic Body's official negotiators. The foreign, particularly British, business community had come a long way—in relative terms at least—from their original diehard posi-

tion, and Yü Hsia-ch'ing now had what he wanted. On 3 September, following a special meeting of the board of directors of the GCC convened to consider the above resolution, Yü sent a letter to the British Chamber of Commerce expressing his appreciation of their move:

It is the earnest hope of this Chamber that further energetic efforts will be made by these two organizations after a careful survey of the situation, with a view to successfully inducing your Government's representatives to bring the pending negotiations to a full satisfactory settlement at the earliest possible moment.

With regard to the unfortunate incidents, the Chamber would like to say that it is also its ardent wish for an early settlement of the affair. Now that your Chamber and the China Association have formally declared their sympathetic attitude towards the national patriotic movements of our people, and have expressed their eagerness to see the problem solved, we confidently hope that on the basic principles of justice and fairplay the present unfortunate situation will come to an end.⁸⁰

The way was now clear to settle the strikes in the Municipal Electricity Department and in the various British enterprises. At a meeting held on 4 September to which the GCC called together Chinese negotiators from the Commission of Foreign Affairs and representatives of the employers and the GTU, the Chinese and Japanese textile manufacturers and the GCC agreed to contribute jointly a cash grant of \$60,000 to the workers (one-third of their wages during the strike), with an additional supplement of \$30,000 also contributed by the Chinese textile manufacturers' association and the GCC.⁸¹ This was accepted, and the employees of the Municipal Electricity Department returned to work on 9 September, followed by a general return of workers to Chinese and Japanese mills the next day.

The settlement in the British factories was negotiated by the GCC and British employers at a meeting held on 26 September. No union representatives were present, the GTU having been closed down several days earlier (see p. 62). A small amount of extra pay was granted, the bill being shared by the employers and the GCC, and only demands of the most basic kind were granted, for example, no dismissals to take place without just cause; no weapons to be carried by foreigners in the factories.⁸² From the end of September, British factories successively resumed work, thus ending the strike movement which had arisen from the May 30 incident. Only the seamen from British ships remained out, as their union was controlled from Canton, where the famous Canton-Hong Kong strike was in full progress. Moreover, the strike against British shipping was the aspect

of the movement most dear to Yü Hsia-ch'ing, and he gave it consistent support.⁸³

During the months of August and September, however, there were other strikes of an economic nature which had broken out after the change of policy by the CCP. In a despatch to Peking written in late August, Consul-General Barton noted accurately that:

It has been observed for some time past by those who are concerned with the investigation of Bolshevik activities in this country that an attempt is being made by the Communists to deflect the energies of the strikers from purely anti-foreign channels into a class movement against Capitalism generally. At all events, the labour agitators are not now confining themselves to attacks on foreign enterprise, and the last few days have witnessed strikes by the employees of a number of Chinese industrial and other concerns.⁸⁴

These included the postal workers, the Commercial Press, and the China Book Company. In each case higher wages and improved conditions were promptly awarded following mediation. On 28 August the Shanghai-Ningpo railway workers threatened to strike, but this was avoided by the immediate granting of their demands.⁸⁵

The final month of the movement was one of increasing difficulty and danger for the GTU as it encountered pressure not only from the GCC and the martial law authorities, but also from gangsters who, if not acting on General Hsing's orders, were certainly not opposed by him. Teng Chung-hsia claims that they included in their number members of the Shanghai Labour Federation, who were jealous of the GTU's leading position in the labour movement.⁸⁶ Isolated attacks were made on union leaders, and on 22 August a major attack was launched against the GTU headquarters by a mob of 'unemployed wharf coolies' who complained about irregularities in the handling of strike funds. Such allegations had been made from the beginning of the movement, against both the GCC and the GTU, and according to the *China Year Book* the workers' leaders handled the funds no worse nor better than anyone else.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, rumours of union and CCP corruption were assiduously spread by certain groups,⁸⁸ and it would be unrealistic to expect that believers were not to be found amongst some workers, at least, particularly the hungry and illiterate wharf coolies.⁸⁹ Be that as it may, the 'coolies' demanded to see Li Li-san, and when he did not emerge, knives and iron bars were distributed from two cars which suddenly pulled up at the scene. Li Li-san escaped through a back window, but union headquarters were severely

damaged and eight other GTU officials were stabbed and wounded, one very seriously. This took place close to the headquarters of General Hsing Shih-lien, but no action was taken whatsoever, and the attackers dispersed freely when their work was done.⁹⁰

After the GTU had served its last useful purpose by attending the negotiations which achieved a return to work in the electricity department, and backed up by such demonstrations of 'popular' hostility, General Hsing (and the GCC, without whose approval the General would not have moved) felt free to act against it. He was aided in this decision by the fact that, despite earlier protestations, it was now clear that Sun Ch'uan-fang was threatening Shanghai, and the General needed to guard against the possibility of strikes or even uprisings in support of Marshal Sun. Accordingly, the main office of the GTU was forcibly closed down on 18 September,⁹¹ other branches meeting the same fate four days later. Warrants were issued for the arrest of Li Li-san (who escaped) and other workers' leaders, some of whom were less fortunate.⁹² Nevertheless, the GTU continued to function illegally, later achieving outstanding successes.

The closure of the GTU, together with the ending of the strikes, is a fitting point on which to end this account of the May 30 Movement in Shanghai, although the national revolution, of which 30 May formed the opening chapter, continued to develop throughout the country, and soon reached a new stage with the outbreak of the anti-Fengtien war. Following its closure, the GTU, itself a product of the movement, issued a manifesto, in which the hardships and difficulties of the past months were recounted. What, asks the manifesto, had it all been for?: 'To win glory for our country and justice for humanity, in the hope that in some small way we might hinder the imperialists, who shrink from no atrocities the world over.'⁹³

Riots and disturbances

On 1 June a meeting was held in Peking to protest against the Shanghai events. Attendance was not large, and the proceedings were orderly. On the following day delegates from student organisations called at the Waichiaopu to demand that representations be made to the Diplomatic Body, and in Canton small groups of workers and students paraded through the streets. On 3 June Peking saw a much larger demonstration, led by students representing all colleges and schools, including missionary institutions, and numbering between 10–15,000. This impressive display was somewhat marred during the meeting which followed by a dispute in full public view between representatives of Peking University and Normal University as to who should be chairman. Mutual abuse almost led to fisticuffs, but cries from the disgusted crowd finally restored order on the rostrum, and the meeting proceeded.¹ On the same day more delegates were received at the Waichiaopu and at the residence of Tuan Ch'i-jui, and they demanded not only apologies, compensation, and death sentences for the responsible Shanghai police officers, but also the restoration of all concessions and the abolition of extraterritoriality.²

As the news continued to spread through China and the implications of what had occurred in Shanghai became clearer, so did the Chinese reaction grow in momentum, slowly enough for the first few days, as the news sank in, but then with increasing rapidity, enabling Kotenev to write that following the second demonstration in Peking, 'three days later the whole country was in flames'.³ During the month of June there can have been few towns of any size which did not respond in some way. Incidents are recorded for at least thirty-eight towns and cities, from Harbin to Hong Kong, from Ningpo to Chungking, and in Honan, Hunan and Kuangtung peasants also entered what was no longer referred to as the May 30 incident, but the May 30 Movement.⁴

In not a few instances, what in other circumstances might have remained local and isolated disputes took on a far more general character and were swept into the rising anti-imperialist tide. Thus in Ningpo an argument between the Chinese servant of a Japanese assistant at the

Maritime customs house, and a rickshaw coolie, resulted in a riot, complete with anti-imperialist slogans, in which the junior Customs House mess was burnt down, as was the house of a senior British assistant. Local police and soldiers were present but did not intervene, and the local Britons felt obliged to request the despatch of a man of war for their protection.⁵

Similarly, and more seriously, in Hankow on 10 June a quarrel on Butterfield and Swire's wharf—between coolies, according to British sources, while the Chinese unanimously state that it was between a coolie and an employee of the firm—turned into a general *mêlée* which was only broken up by the intervention of armed Chinese police. On the following morning placards appeared on the approaches to the wharf, threatening the company with retribution, while those men who reported for work were addressed by students, who in their speeches combined the events of the previous day with those of Shanghai; the men refused to work, crowds formed along the river bank, and were once again dispersed by Chinese police, at the request of the British Consul.

That evening, a group of Municipal Councillors of the Hankow British Concession, who had gone down to the river to inspect the state of a pontoon, were stoned by a crowd, who then proceeded along the Bund, tearing up the wooden seats as they went. As the crowd grew larger and it appeared that an attack on the concession was imminent, the Volunteers were called out, and foreign warships despatched landing parties. Pickets guarding Hankow Road, where a number of Japanese shops were situated, were forced to abandon their posts before a hail of stones, whereupon the crowd destroyed most of the Japanese shops and severely beat several Japanese who were unfortunate enough to be found there. One of these was stuffed into a drain, where he was found several hours later in a moribund condition; he was only extricated with great difficulty, and died shortly after.

Re-forming, the crowd 'many hundreds strong' and carrying sticks, iron bars, and other makeshift weapons, penetrated deeper into the concession. After unsuccessful attempts had been made to quell them with firehoses, manned by Chinese staff of the municipal fire brigade, naval ratings standing guard near the ammunition depot of the Volunteer headquarters opened fire on the front ranks of Chinese as they started to climb the barbed wire separating the opposing forces. The rioters immediately fell back, leaving behind four dead and ten wounded, four of whom died subsequently. Order was restored, but the movement had another massacre to inspire it, and as a direct result of the Hankow incident dis-

orders quickly broke out downriver at Kiukiang and upriver at Chungking.⁶

After a few minor demonstrations in early June, Canton became absorbed in its own troubles, as all supporters of the KMT government turned their attention to the task of driving the counter-revolutionary forces of Liu Chen-huan and Yang Hsi-min out of the city, which aim was achieved with the destruction of Liu's army on 12 June. This done the Cantonese turned their attention northwards once more. On 19 June, in response to the Shanghai and Hankow killings, the great Canton-Hong Kong strike commenced, and on 23 June a large procession, which included armed cadets from the Whampoa Academy, was fired on while parading down Shakee Road opposite the foreign concession on Shameen. Firing came from both sides, and the passage of fifty years has done nothing to elucidate the question—hotly debated at the time, but at this remove of questionable significance—as to who fired first. If the foreigners fired in self-defence, as they consistently claimed, they certainly did so with a vengeance, and more than fifty Chinese dead as compared to one European⁷ gave ample justification for the use of the word massacre.⁸ Following this event the Canton-Hong Kong strike greatly increased in seriousness and intensity, to such a point that, while it was definitely one of the most outstanding results of the May 30 Movement, as well as providing its bloodiest single incident, it deserves to be treated as a separate topic in its own right, and thus a detailed treatment of it falls outside the scope of the present study.

Where massacres did not occur, it appears that it was possible, even desirable, to invent them; for such seems to have been the case with Nanking. In its essentials, the story of the Nanking events runs as follows: on hearing the news from Shanghai, the students of Nanking went on strike, and on 5 June they successfully persuaded the workers at the International Export Company, a British firm (otherwise known as the Ho Chi Egg Factory) to join them. The strike at the IEC continued until 17 July, when a settlement, quite favourable to the workers, in which the Nanking General Chamber of Commerce had had a part, was reached, and the men returned to work. So far British and Chinese sources are in agreement. However, according to Chinese sources, KMT, CCP and others, after work was resumed the management refused to honour the agreement, and when the workers protested against this bad faith on the part of their employers, the latter summoned British marines from HMS *Durban*, who trapped the workers inside the factory grounds and opened fire, causing several deaths and many injuries.⁹

According to the note handed to the Waichiaopu by the British Chargé on 5 August:

On July 31 when the International Export Company were paying off a number of their workers, the great majority, apparently at the instigation of the Students' Union, refused to accept their pay from the date of resumption of work, July 17, and demanded a full month's pay, failing which they refused to leave the factory. Their demeanour rendered it necessary for a small naval party to be landed from H.M.S. 'Durban', who managed to clear them out without any untoward incident.

When the workmen got outside the factory they fell foul of the Chinese police, for reasons which are not yet fully clear, but it seems that an affray arose out of the workmen's resentment against the police, because the latter tried to keep them in order instead of assisting them against the Company. The police eventually opened fire, with the result that one or more of the workmen were wounded. About a dozen policemen were injured.¹⁰

The Admiralty Report states categorically that 'no fire was opened by the Marine Platoon', and agrees with the above account on all points. Both deny that any deaths occurred.¹¹

The first press reports were confused, as an examination of three Shanghai newspapers quickly reveals. Several conflicting stories at first appeared in the *North China Morning Post* (the daily edition of the *North China Herald*) followed by the official British version a few days later, which, as far as that publication was concerned, settled the matter. However, note was taken of a telegram sent from Nanking to the Shanghai Student Association claiming that British bullets had killed four Chinese and wounded many others; and that the Association of Nanking Merchants of Shanghai had in turn despatched a telegram to Chang Chien, the Civil Governor of Kiangsu, drawing the massacre to his attention and advising him to begin negotiations with the British authorities immediately.¹² A first report in *Shen Pao* on 3 August tallies with the British story, noting that in the course of a clash between workers and police both sides suffered casualties.¹³ A more detailed version printed the following day reiterated that the fight had been between opposing groups of Chinese.¹⁴ On 5 August, however, *Shen Pao* carried an account of a meeting held by students in Nanking two days previously 'to set the picture straight', the picture being that both strikers and police were injured by attacking British sailors.¹⁵ *Shih Pao* of 2 August carried a story, based on cables from the Nanking Students Association and the IEC workers, to the effect that 'many Chinese' had been killed by marines, but the late

cables printed in the same issue reported that it was the Chinese police who had fired; the cables also mentioned the kidnapping by the workers of one Mr Clarke, an employee of the Company.¹⁶ None of this reappeared in subsequent issues of the paper, however, and further news from Nanking was concerned solely with accounts of activities arising out of the massacre, now considered an historical fact. The activities of Nanking merchants resident in Shanghai mentioned by the *NCMP*, were also treated in detail.¹⁷

The CCP's organ *Hsiang-tao*, in its 8 August edition, by which time the 'news' was well known, made no mention of Nanking in an enumeration of massacres, although it did include Chungking, another doubtful case. However, the following issue contained a declaration to the workers of China concerning the Nanking massacre, which included the stirring information that, unable to bear the sight of their compatriots being slaughtered by British marines, Chinese soldiers tried to protect them. The editors of *Hsiang-tao* were encouraged by this 'most admirable action' to hope that the soldiers would realise their true position and join the people's cause.¹⁸

As elsewhere in China during the May 30 Movement, the students were very active in Nanking. They published a small pamphlet describing the massacre, which received wide circulation and wider credit, despite the immediate publication of a counter-pamphlet, in Chinese, by the IEC,¹⁹ and the by now familiar lecturing groups were sent throughout the city and into the countryside beyond, spreading the 'true' story. At the official level, a note from the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in Kiangsu, protesting against the massacre and quoting from the students' pamphlet, was treated by the British authorities in China as 'not having been sent',²⁰ but the whole affair seems to have been, understandably enough, particularly exasperating to the hard pressed British Chargé in Peking, who, after writing of 'the cynical mendacity' of the Chinese press, went on to report to Chamberlain that:

It was only after I had protested to the Minister for Foreign Affairs against this outrageous attempt to embitter Anglo-Chinese relations that the Chinese Government, who had been for some time in possession of official reports from the Chinese authorities at Nanking, stating clearly that not a single shot was fired by British sailors, at last published the truth.²¹

This may have satisfied the British, but most Chinese had as much faith in the veracity of the Peking government as the Chargé had in the Chinese press, and so, despite the reports from Consul C. G. Giles of 'universal

knowledge of the true facts of the incident of July 31st', and 'the entire lack of response among the general public to the unscrupulous propaganda of the students'²²—this latter clearly based more on pious hope than observation—the story of the Nanking massacre has held to this day, and has continued to find a place in publications emanating from both CCP and KMT sources, be it through genuine misapprehension, or through a politic grasping of the principle so exquisitely expressed by the Italian proverb 'Se non è vero, è molto ben trovato'.²³

The Chungking massacre referred to by *Hsiang-tao* seems to have been a somewhat similar case, although the British did admit to shedding Chinese blood. The situation in Szechuan had been very tense throughout June, and on the night of 2 July, when it appeared that crowds were going to rush the compound where most British subjects resident in Chungking had taken refuge, four sailors and a petty officer were landed from a gunboat to disperse the Chinese. In the course of this action four Chinese received bayonet wounds, three of these, according to a British Note to the Waichiaopu, being only slight. The Note also refers to a report from the Szechuan authorities concerning a corpse discovered close to a British gunboat:

This corpse was paraded through the city as an evidence of British brutality. The fact is, that when discovered, the corpse had evidently been in the water for several days and Captain Lei [a staff officer of General Lei, commandant of the city] agreed with His Majesty's Consul that it could be connected in no way whatever with the trouble on July 2.²⁴

Possibly because of its relative remoteness, the Chungking 'massacre' did not excite as much interest in the rest of China as did that of Nanking, and has not figured so prominently in later accounts.

In the capital, meanwhile, demonstrations continued, celebrated by the *North China Herald* with such titles as 'Students Hysterically Dancing like Dervishes Outside Legation Quarter',²⁵ some 100,000 people participating in a march held on 6 June. On 15 June, a demonstration was held to protest against the Hankow shootings, and another, followed by a memorial meeting for the Hankow and Shanghai dead, was held on 25 June. Indignation was well-nigh universal in Peking, although various groups expressed it in various ways, not always to their mutual satisfaction. At the lower levels of society, the rickshaw men, generally regarded by radicals as the most backward category of workers, joined the struggle, affixing signs to their vehicles reading 'No English or Japanese'. Unfortunately this boycott was wrecked by the rickshaw men of the

Legation Quarter, and bloody fights resulted. This was not unusual, for the rickshaw men were organised along traditional guild lines and by their native place, and splits were frequent. Nevertheless, as a result of the May 30 Movement, they were organised into a modern trade union in December 1925.²⁶ At the opposite end of the social spectrum, the Peking Bankers' Association passed a resolution that all Chinese bankers should contribute to the Shanghai strike fund.²⁷ The manager of a sewing factory was so moved by the news of the Shanghai shootings that he destroyed all his machines and materials of British or Japanese origin, and on 9 June summoned his workers together to announce to them that as of that day they were on strike, but that they would continue to receive their wages. Not surprisingly the workers unanimously concurred in their employer's decision, whereupon he led them into the streets, marching at their head.²⁸ Inspiring and stirring as his example may have been, however, it was followed by few, if any of his colleagues.

On 15 June the Merchants Association (*Shang-lien-hui*), which had already twice petitioned the government requesting it to take a strong line in its negotiations with the offending powers, announced an economic boycott of Britain and Japan.²⁹ Nevertheless, they decided against a stoppage of business, much to the disgust of the students,³⁰ who gave a demonstration of the intransigence they wished the government and others to display by smashing up some thousands of dollars worth of furniture and decorations at the Waichiaopu when denied an interview with the Foreign Minister.³¹ Feelings amongst the students of Peking were particularly sharp, as before 30 May they had already been involved in considerable agitation against the education authorities, and they were not averse to taking a side-swipe at an unpopular school principal in the course of demonstrating against foreign aggression.³² Analysing the role played in the Peking movement by the various social groups, the Communist Youth League's organ *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* accused school teachers and staff members of being 'just as bad' as the merchants, and on the whole hostile to anti-Japanese agitation. However, such resolution on the part of the students did not save them from splitting into two groups, frequently at odds with one another, the All Schools Shanghai Aid Society being a self-proclaimed non-revolutionary body, while the Peking Students Association was generally regarded as revolutionary in orientation.³³

Despite such disunity, the students were clearly a force to be reckoned with, particularly when they combined with the proletariat, although the latter was not as important a factor in the less industrialised capital as it

was in Shanghai. Peking had no factories employing more than 2,000 workers, and before 30 May they had no modern trade union organisation to speak of; but as elsewhere, this developed in the course of the movement, starting with the printing workers, who made up the largest group within the industrial proletariat and who in common with their colleagues in many other countries were susceptible to radical ideas, and eventually extending, as we have seen, even to the rickshaw pullers.³⁴ Despite these qualifications, the student-worker alliance was sufficiently impressive to move the then Chancellor of Peking University, Chiang Monlin (Meng-lin), to recollect:

After the workers had joined the student movement, the number of demonstrators was increased by thousands. Often one would see a vast motley crowd in the mass meetings or parading on the streets of Peking, shouting slogans and waving banners. In one of these meetings a white Russian, shuddering, remarked that he had seen many such mass meetings in Russia—the sure signs of an impending revolution—and he wondered whether it was safe for him to stay in China.³⁵

An attempt to involve and organise the peasants from the western outskirts of the city was made by students from the agricultural university, and some of them took part in a mass meeting held on 10 June; but as the peasants were returning to the countryside they were set upon by gangsters, and this seems to have discouraged them from further participation.³⁶

During the month of June several unsuccessful and apparently rather half-hearted efforts were made to invade the sanctity of the Legation Quarter, but the diplomats were not unduly alarmed, surrounded as they were by barbed wire and their own troops, of various nationalities.³⁷ Indeed, to those who had lived through the days of the *I-Ho-T'uan*, it may well have seemed that history was repeating itself as farce. What did not strike the British as farcical, however, although it afforded immense glee to their next door neighbours in the Soviet Embassy, was the strike in early August of all their Chinese servants, from chauffeurs to amahs, many of whom were trusted retainers of many years standing. To be confronted en masse by these, of all Chinese, demanding 'the just resolution of the Shanghai and other conflicts', must have been the last straw for many Englishmen, not a few of whom were themselves suffering from a considerable sense of injustice. Nerves were frayed to such an extent that an unfortunate Japanese journalist, attracted to a servants' demonstration outside the gates of the British Legation, was taken to be a student

agitator, arrested, given a beating, and shut in a cellar for several hours, until the misunderstanding was brought to light and the British Chargé set off to the Japanese Embassy to apologise as best he might to Minister Yoshizawa.³⁸ All in all, as the editor of the *Peking and Tientsin Times* remarked, it was a time when ‘“Civis Britannicus Sum” was no longer a phrase that Britons in China could use with any pride’.³⁹

As will be apparent from the events described above, and in the previous chapter, during the May 30 Movement the students played a vital role in spreading news and mobilising popular sympathy. Within a day of the Shanghai shootings, students from that city were despatched all over China to publicise the events and help in the organisation of protests.⁴⁰ Pa Chin’s novel *Ssu Ch’ü-ti T’ai-yang* describes the experiences of one such student, Wu Yang-ch’ing, who was sent to Nanking where he was invited to address a mass meeting held at Tung-nan University:

Wu Yang-ch’ing, his excitement mingled with nervousness, ascended the rostrum. Standing beside the table, looking down at the countless sincere faces and burning eyes below him, he was suddenly filled with boundless emotion. He felt his whole body trembling, his eyes were moist, and it seemed as though some object were blocking his throat, preventing him from uttering a word. He only felt like weeping. But the innumerable longing eyes below the stage spurred him on, and after a moment’s struggle, he began.

‘I have not come to lecture, I have come to weep’. Ice cold tears washed his burning face like rain, eager words welled up from his heart without ceasing. His eyes misty with tears, he could not see the audience, and instead there appeared before him a picture of the great slaughter. He saw a dozen or so dead and wounded lying in the middle of the street, he saw Nanking road dyed red with blood... His eyes lit up with the fire of revenge. He roared, as if he were almost mad. When he finally came to an end, his voice was nearly gone, and his strength to continue seemingly exhausted, he came unsteadily down from the rostrum. Sweat poured from his brow, black dots appeared before his eyes, and his body felt utterly weak. After a brief pause, the sound of a few isolated claps was heard, quickly followed by the applause of the entire audience.⁴¹

After the meeting, Wu remained in Nanking, where he took part in further demonstrations and helped to organise the strike of workers in a foreign-owned factory.⁴² This description, although fictional, is clearly based on fact, Pa Chin himself having been a participant in the movement,⁴³ and captures well the heightened emotions of the time and the part played by students in fomenting and sustaining them.

As successive incidents occurred in various places, so local students set

off to spread the word, in a way somewhat similar to the heady days of revolutionary *Cb'uan-lien* during the Cultural Revolution. One of the students of Canton National University recounted in a publication issued by that university on the first anniversary of 30 May how he and a fellow student were put in charge of 'patriotic and propaganda activities', and arranged for propagandists to be sent to all parts of the province and beyond. Significantly, he added that as not all the propagandists followed the same line, they had to be recalled and instructed to base their speeches on the Party (i.e. KMT) program to overthrow imperialism and the war-lords, and to unite with the oppressed of the whole world. Only thus was the movement prevented from becoming xenophobic and turning into a phenomenon similar to the *I-Ho-T'uan*, which would have been a fundamental error.⁴⁴

Even more important, perhaps, was the respectability that student involvement lent to the movement, and, it must be said, the lamentable fact that much of the outrage following the first shootings in Shanghai was due to the fact that *students* were numbered amongst the victims, who thus could not be dismissed as any common mob of riotous coolies. The traditional Chinese respect for scholars was still a very real force, and those young men and women who were seen by many old China hands as being nothing but ignorant, callow and excitable youths, easily led astray by Bolshevik agitators, were seen by the Chinese in a very different light:

In China as elsewhere, school boys and girls of today are the rulers and workers of tomorrow, and a nation is necessarily interested in its student class. There is also a special reason why the Chinese people are interested in their students. A nation that is not dying must have an articulate group, and for reasons inherent in the present period of transition through which China is passing, this mark and quality of vitality in a nation is possessed by the Chinese student class. If China is to live, her students must continue to voice the new economic and political needs of the transition until a new equilibrium is established between the Chinese people and the changed environment in which they find themselves after three-quarters of a century of commercial, diplomatic and social intercourse with foreigners.

This view of the Chinese student class explains the range and depth of the repercussion of May 30 on the Nation.⁴⁵

Chiang Monlin argued that the students were able to exercise the power they did precisely because they were in large part the sons and daughters of the ruling classes. The workers, whose lot it was to submit to the whips

of the police or to military bayonets, were only able to make their power strongly felt when they acted in co-operation with the students.⁴⁶

More bluntly, Teng Chung-hsia declared that had the dead and wounded of 30 May only been workers, the rest of Chinese society wouldn't have given a damn (lit. *mo pu kuan-hsin, i p'i pu fang*). To Teng, this was perhaps the major contribution of the student movement.⁴⁷

Taking advantage of their social position, the students were frequently able to bring considerable pressure to bear on more reluctant patriots, and wherever boycotts were declared, it was the task of the students to supervise the merchants and shop-keepers, to check their goods, to ensure that no covert boycott-breaking occurred, or if it did and was discovered, to exact fines or confiscate the offending goods. The Shanghai students, in addition to painting slogans, writing leaflets and big character posters, and publishing an English language newspaper in which they hoped to appeal to the fairer minded amongst the foreigners (which unfortunately folded after nine issues owing to difficulties in finding an editor), also published the *Blood Tide Daily* (*Hsüeh-ch'ao Jih-k'an*), which ran for ninety-four issues, and was the self-proclaimed deadly enemy of the propaganda sheet published by the SMC, *Ch'eng-yen* (*Honest Words*). Discovering that *Ch'eng-yen* was being printed for the SMC by the Commercial Press, that publishing house was visited by a student delegation, who extracted from them the admission that they had been involved in traitorous activity. By way of reparation, the Commercial Press 'voluntarily' printed several tens of thousands of leaflets reading '“Honest Words” are the rumours of the English' (*Ch'eng-yen shih Ying-kuo-jen-chih yao-yen*). *Ch'eng-yen* messages were also carried by the *Shen Pao* and *Hsin Pao*, and the students cancelled all their orders, and moreover forbade street vendors to sell either newspaper. The ban was only lifted after both papers contributed substantially to the strike funds.⁴⁸

Reporting the situation in Chungking, the British Acting Consul informed his Legation that 'the Civil Governor... is very friendly and anxious to avoid any incidents, but both he and General Wang, like all Chinese officials, dare not suppress the students too much'.⁴⁹ In the same vein, the Consul in Foochow complained of terrorism of his employees by students, 'who had been emboldened by their impunity during the past winter when successfully conducting an agitation against the sale of Canadian salt fish in Foochow'.⁵⁰ The *North China Herald* professed to be vastly amused by the spectacle of grown men being cowed by schoolboys, and in one issue carried a cartoon showing a group of nervous looking long gowned businessmen being harangued by a highly agitated and

rather ridiculous looking young man; in the next frame they have weakly resolved to do his bidding, be it stop business or declare a boycott. Contrasted to this is a group of British businessmen, being similarly addressed by a schoolboy of their own nationality. The boy is given a good hiding on the seat of his pants, and ejected bodily.⁵¹

Nevertheless, as with workers, even so with students and businessmen, there were limits to what could be done, and these varied greatly from place to place. In at least one instance, an experienced British Consul was able to stem the floodtide through his skilful handling of the situation, although in the process he lost the confidence of the British community which he was protecting. Meyrick Hewlett, Consul in Amoy, had the advantage of being rather popular amongst the poorer Chinese in that city, owing to his activities in improving the conditions of the large numbers of emigrants for which Amoy was well known. He had also formed a number of friendships amongst the students, and both these factors stood him in good stead at a time when 'the city was placarded with crude posters showing students being murdered in Shanghai, and the wildest appeals were made to raise an anti-British movement'.⁵²

Even more significant, however, was the fact that on the very day that an anti-British boycott was decided on (10 June), Hewlett had 'a long and most satisfactory interview' with the Chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, who promised to do all in his power to keep the movement peaceful. Throughout the boycott these two gentlemen maintained close, and secret, contact, with the result that Hewlett was not only fully informed as to the intentions of the boycott committee, but also had in Huang I-chen, the Chairman, a useful mouthpiece. On one occasion when Hewlett volunteered to attend two mass meetings to put the British case and answer questions, Huang felt that the presence of an 'unruly element' would make this unsafe, but he himself volunteered to read a statement from the Consul, which was apparently well received.

A projected general strike was unsuccessful, as the sampan men refused to come out unless they received in cash, in advance, the sum which they would lose through such action. Nevertheless, agitation for a strike continued, and the Chinese secretary of the Municipal Council was shot, not fatally, on suspicion, no doubt justified, that he was favouring the British. One of the principal activists, who had organised the student demonstrations and tried to call out all employees of British establishments, was a young man named Lim Tiong-hock. Through the mediation of the local Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Hewlett had two secret meetings with him on 7 and 9 July and the latter was won over, declaring

that he was definitely opposed to the strike. Lim then exerted himself against the strike with vigour equal to that with which he had at first supported it; on 28 July he was shot in the back by three assailants as another stopped him in the street to hand him a letter. Yet Lim's murder was counter productive, and there was no strike in Amoy. Immediately afterwards, a 'society for the protection of labour' was formed, with Hewlett's No. 1 boatman as chairman, whose members bound themselves never to strike unless the students guaranteed them \$30 a month. As for the strike funds that had been collected in Amoy or sent there from overseas Chinese, Hewlett, knowing 'that whereas \$10,000 and whatever might come from Batavia was dangerous in Amoy, it would mean nothing when sunk in the hundred of thousands, if not millions, collected in Shanghai', persuaded the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce to forward all such monies to the latter city, adding that 'as no blood had been shed in Amoy and Amoy was consequently known as the city of shame, they might redeem their reputation by such an action'.

Throughout the movement Hewlett was also aided by a Captain Lin, CMG (this officer having been trained in England and present at the battle of Jutland), who was in naval and military control of Amoy.⁵³ Lin guaranteed full protection to all foreigners and their property, provided no warship came. To this Hewlett readily assented, feeling that 'the presence of a British ship would have acted like a bomb thrown into a powder magazine'. The panic stricken British community did not agree, and went out of their way to make things as difficult as possible for their Consul, who in turn:

often wondered when Britons in Amoy talked glibly of a 'strong' attitude what they really meant. Whether in fact they wanted bloodshed and the killing of unarmed students and other agitators, or even the risk of war.⁵⁴

The Consul had his way, and Amoy was the only port in what he himself called the 'hideous' years of 1925-7 which not only maintained but increased its trade; but despite this, the British community refused to give Hewlett an official farewell. On the other hand, he did receive a silver shield from the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, inscribed 'In memory of justice, carefulness, peacefulness, and kind co-operation'.⁵⁵

* *Warlords*

Amoy was an example of what could be achieved by a respected and skilful consul working in co-operation with sympathetic and capable Chinese

officials, both military and civilian. Without the latter assistance, no consul could hope for success, whatever his personal qualities. In giving closer consideration to the varying attitudes of official China towards the movement, we must now turn our attention to that motley body of men who went under the collective title of the warlords, to whom the failure of the movement to gain more than it did was in large part attributed, both at the time and subsequently. There was, however, one significant exception, in this as in so much else: the 'Christian General', Feng Yü-hsiang, who in Foreign Office correspondence of the time shared with Chiang Kai-shek the sobriquet of the 'Red General'. Indeed, at one point the London *Times* even claimed that Feng was one of the initiators of the whole affair, quoting 'Chinese sources' and 'my informant' to the effect that the raid on Louza Station was planned in the Soviet Consulate in Shanghai on 28 May as part of a move by Feng, Moscow and the KMT against Chang Tso-lin and the Peking government, which by provoking foreign intervention, would open the capital to the triumvirate.⁵⁶ Credulity and rumour-mongering were not the special province of any one of the contending forces.

What certainly is true is that Feng immediately responded to the news from Shanghai by cabling a very vigorous message of protest to Peking, in which he expressed strongly anti-British sentiments;⁵⁷ he also took advantage of the prevalence of such feelings to confiscate 27,000 British owned sheep, which he used to clothe and feed his men.⁵⁸ All available means were used by Feng to fill his soldiers with righteous indignation, and for the duration of the movement they wore armbands as a sign of mourning. A copy of his army's official newspaper, *The Young Soldier*, which was obtained by the British Legation in Peking, contained highly emotional accounts of 30 May and the Canton incident, and included a photograph of a Chinese student alleged to have been shot by English soldiers, with the caption:

The shots entered through the back. After his death his body was left lying by the roadside, and the English soldiers deliberately took knives and slashed his face and ribs. A dead dog would not have been so treated.⁵⁹

Twice daily the army and camp followers were lectured by officers 'in order to create a spirit of unity against the imperialists',⁶⁰ and more lively propaganda was conducted in the form of plays re-enacting the Shanghai tragedy.⁶¹

As a Christian, Feng was dismayed by the lack of response from other Christians throughout the world, and early in July he wrote an open letter

calling on Christians to take a stand against imperialism and the brutalities of the British, arguing that the fate of organised Christianity hung in the balance.⁶² Shortly before this he had also issued an appeal to British workers, which was published in the organ of the British Communist Party, *Workers' Weekly*.⁶³ The strikers in Shanghai received more tangible assistance from him in the shape of a donation of \$20,000 to the strike fund.⁶⁴ So committed to the movement against imperialism was Feng, in fact, that he did not shrink from proclaiming his readiness to make war on Great Britain without delay. While the British were not inclined to take his words at face value,⁶⁵ numbers of students were pressing for just such 'practical' action, and to cater for these firebrands, Feng opened a special military training school in Kalgan, which enrolled between 600 and 1,000 students.⁶⁶

Feng's anti-imperialism was limited, however, to the British, who had to bear the full brunt of his wrath. They were the chief culprits and the main cause of China's troubles, and China's aim must be to 'break the economic backbone of England in China'.⁶⁷ Japan, on the other hand, was not only let off lightly, but even benefited from the affair, in those areas of China under Feng's control. The General's racial theories may have played some part in this, as he argued that 'Chinese and Japanese are descendants of the same ancestors'. In an interview given on 20 July Feng declared that he had originally intended throwing the North West open to all foreign capital, but that recent events had decided him in favour of extending the invitation to one nationality only: 'I have decided to accept the offers of those who have the same colour and ideas as we Chinese, namely the Japanese.' He also announced that the North West would soon send 10,000 students to Japan and that 180 Japanese professors would be invited to come to China.⁶⁸ (Following the war with Chang Tso-lin, who received Japanese support against Feng and the other opposing forces, the Japanese connection was broken and these plans came to naught.)

Accordingly, while not calling Feng's sincerity in question—he wrote in his diary a week after 30 May that foreigners looked on Chinese as worse than cattle or horses, and he resolved to wipe out the humiliation⁶⁹—we must agree with Sheridan that: 'Feng Yu-hsiang's most vehement anti-imperialism, like that of other warlords, was usually directed only against those nations from which he could expect enmity in any event'.⁷⁰ On the other hand, equally important, perhaps more so, the same biographer also writes that 1925:

witnessed a shift in Feng's political orientation in the direction of a greatly increased emphasis on anti-imperialism. This shift may well

have reflected Feng's increased awareness and resentment of the dominant position of the Western powers in China.⁷¹

It was precisely this 'increased awareness' that many observers felt to have been one of the major results of the May 30 Movement, and Feng himself, by his proclamations and actions, certainly contributed to it.

Writing back to London on 21 June, Palairet, the British Chargé, noted that 'the obscure point in the present situation is the question of the relations between Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yü-hsiang'.⁷² While Feng's attitude was to have been expected, the British were both shocked and disturbed when Chang Tso-lin also issued a cable protesting against the Shanghai shootings, which while not so violently phrased as Feng's, was nevertheless definitely hostile to Great Britain. Subsequent events were to prove that this one cable was to be the sole extent of Chang's participation in the movement, but it is a credit and a testimony to the strength and universality of the feelings aroused by the Shanghai incident that he felt himself obliged to take such a step. As he explained to HM Consul-General at Tientsin, he could not stand aloof and leave national sentiment to be expressed by others alone.⁷³ And it was out of respect for such sentiments that the troops he despatched to Shanghai with his son to keep order in the Chinese city went with the explanation that they were being posted there to protect their fellow Chinese. That Chang's cable created such a stir in British circles may be better understood when we observe that this was the man of whom conservatives on the FO China desk (still unaware of his message) were writing that the Powers should intimate to him that failing resolute action from the Peking government in suppressing the agitation, he should: 'see to it that a situation such as that of 1900 does not recur, and to prevent the government of China from disintegrating under the influence of Communism'. It was added that this would involve protecting him against the USSR and lifting the China Arms Embargo in his favour. To his credit, the head of the department, Waterlow, doubted the wisdom of such a plan,⁷⁴ and the suggestion was not acted on.

Once having issued his cable, Chang immediately set about the task of persuading the British that he had not really meant it, sending an emissary to the British Legation to explain that in order to evade Feng Yü-hsiang's suggestion that they send a joint cable, he had been compelled to send a message on his own account. Palairet was not convinced, and felt that Chang was undecided as to whether or not he should occupy Peking, and thereby risk a collision with Feng, and hence felt himself obliged to avoid committing himself to any firm stand:

The outcome of the present uncertain situation depends upon his action, and more competent observers than myself hold that we shall not reach any satisfactory solution of the present crisis until the issue between Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yü-hsiang is settled.⁷⁵

One FO official observed lugubriously, 'definite decisions are so rare in China that this might mean the Greek Kalends'.⁷⁶

Chang continued his protestations of friendship throughout June, and in Tientsin made personal overtures to an Englishman named Stewart, who cabled Churchill warmly recommending Chang's request for British support.⁷⁷ Simultaneously Chang Tso-lin offered troops to protect the Legation Quarter in Peking, an offer which the British and Americans thought unnecessary, although the other ministers were in favour of accepting it. It was accordingly decided to request Chang's assistance 'indirectly', by asking him to help the Chinese government maintain order.⁷⁸

Like the correspondent for *The Times*, Chang consistently asserted that Feng was behind all the trouble, and made repeated requests for British support against him.⁷⁹ On the British side, the flurry over his telegram having died down somewhat, considerable pressure was being exerted to grant such support from both within and without the Foreign Office. A telegram sent to the China Association and forwarded to the Foreign Office, from a number of businessmen in Shanghai, arguing that Chang should be backed with money and arms, was also endorsed by such powerful backers as P. & O., Jardine Mathesons, Lord Inchcape, and a deputation from Manchester.⁸⁰ The French, too, favoured such action, and wished to lift the arms embargo to that end.⁸¹ The only reservation felt by the more conservative FO officials, who had hoped: 'ever since the time of Yüan Shih-k'ai... that some reasonably effective Central Govt. would emerge which the Foreign Powers could support...' was that despite such assistance, Chang might still not be sufficiently powerful to fulfil such a task.⁸² Waterlow, however, disagreed, rightly feeling that the underlying idea behind such schemes was that China could be saved by one strong man (a typically warlord notion that was shared by not a few foreigners who should have known better); he believed this 'to be an absolute fallacy which lingers on by force of tradition'.⁸³ Going to the heart of the problem, he further argued:

We are, it seems, up against a movement which at any rate for the moment, has a genuinely nationalist and anti-foreign character, and exploited by Moscow. [*sic*] If so, no Chinese leader will dare to set

his face against such a movement, rather will they compete with one another ... to *appear* to be in favour of it ...

Today I doubt whether Chang would take foreign support, if offered. [He subsequently admitted that he had been mistaken on this point, but felt it did not affect his general argument.]⁸⁴ And we, if we were to offer it, might unite all classes of Chinese (given their present temper) against us. And, once having supported with arms and money the faction labelled 'reactionary' against the faction labelled 'progressive', we should have large sections of opinion at home down on us for subsidising brutal militarism etc. in the interests of the very people who are said to be exploiting Chinese children in the mills. This alone could make intervention on Chang's behalf difficult, even if it were a wise policy. But, for the broad reason I indicated, I believe it to be a hopeless policy. To foreign powers now to back any Chinese militarist—there is nothing to choose between any of them—would be suicidal.

To this, both Wellesley, Deputy Under Secretary of State, and Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State, expressed their agreement, and there, for the Foreign Office, the matter rested.⁸⁵ Unfortunately for the British, it was so much an article of faith that behind every warlord there stood an imperialist power, that the Foreign Office's caution was to little avail, and the unpopularity which Waterlow had sought, somewhat belatedly, to avoid, was nevertheless incurred, as the KMT, Communist and student press poured out articles accusing the British of doing just what they had decided, after some argument, not to do.

To be fair, however, we must not forget that the writers of such articles did not have the benefit of access to British government files, and were basing their opinions not only on what they believed, but on what they saw; and on this basis, their opinions were not groundless. To mention only a few points raised in an article by Ch'en Tu-hsiu,⁸⁶ Chang Tso-lin's troops did keep a tight hold on popular activities in Fengtien, Tientsin, and Shantung, and as their confidence grew, in Shanghai too; and they did so to applause from the foreign communities. Chang did receive large loans from the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (Sir Nigel Stabb, Director of the Bank, was one of his strong supporters).⁸⁷ His son Chang Hsüeh-liang did have secret talks with the British Consul-General as soon as he arrived in Shanghai.⁸⁸ As the diplomats themselves noted, the foreign community in that city was strongly in favour of supporting Chang Tso-lin, and the English language press on more than one occasion referred to the desirability of the 'discreet' use of force.⁸⁹

What manifestations that were permitted in areas fully controlled by Fengtien forces were restricted to a few quiet demonstrations. Tientsin,

controlled by Li Ching-lin, Tupan of Chihli, witnessed a peaceful demonstration of some 4,000 people on 30 June, in commemoration of the victims of the Shanghai, Hankow and Canton incidents, but, as the *Shanghai Mercury* reported with satisfaction:

General Li... having previously issued a notice to the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, absolutely prohibiting the latter to carry a general strike into effect, on the ground that such is an action of self-destruction, the instructions were fully observed, there being not a single shop that closed its door today.⁹⁰

When workers attempted to take industrial action, as in the Japanese textile mills in Tsingtao, the local Fengtien commander, the notorious Chang Tsung-chang, crushed the strike with far from discreet force, and executed the workers' leader Li Wei-meng and the editor of a local newspaper which had supported the workers, Hu Hsin-chih. As was the general practice, both men were first severely beaten before being shot.⁹¹

The issue between Feng Yü-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin was finally settled in the latter's favour by the war which broke out in October. Started by Sun Ch'uan-fang, nominally a member of Wu P'ei-fu's Chihli clique, and directed against the expansion of Fengtien power into Kiangsu, where Sun himself had strong ambitions, one of the war's more ironical effects was that the revolutionary forces extended their support not only to Feng's *Kuominchün*, but also to the forces of Wu P'ei-fu. With Kuo Sung-ling's revolt against his master, Chang Tso-lin, it seemed for a time that the anti-Fengtien forces might triumph, and the Foreign Office, primarily concerned as they were with the establishment of almost any stable government which would enable them to get on with the serious business of trade, made a remarkable *volte face* in their assessment of Feng Yü-hsiang and the KMT, and welcomed the chance of making a new start in Sino-British relations, even though they were aware that the advent of a Feng-KMT government would be strongly nationalist 'and may make things uncomfortable for us in various ways'.⁹² G. S. Moss, who wrote the first minute advocating support of Chang Tso-lin and lifting the arms embargo in his favour, now felt that while Feng's radical displays of the previous months may have 'fooled the Russians to the top' ('what about the FO?' one may well ask) in order to obtain supplies and training from them, 'responsibility will make him less "red"'.⁹³ (Note the inverted commas—a new phenomenon.) Such was not to be the case, however, as Japanese intervention removed the threat to Chang from Kuo Sung-ling; this accomplished, Wu P'ei-fu needed little persuasion from his Manchurian rival that their real mutual enemy was Feng Yü-hsiang. Feng

retired from the scene, and in March he left China for Mongolia and the USSR.⁹⁴

Revolutionary support for Wu P'ei-fu was doubly ironical, for not only was he the man who had bloodily suppressed the great railway strike, but during the May 30 Movement neither he nor any of his nominal subordinates were any more favourably disposed to it than were the adherents of Chang Tso-lin. Like Chang, he also hoped for British support, and in August of 1925 the Consul-General in Hankow reported that Wu was willing to head a combination against the present 'Chinese and Soviet menace' if only HMG would contribute some \$4,000,000 to his coffers; 'a complete change of present anti-British policy would follow'. The Foreign Office instructed its representatives to make a negative reply, although Moss, the ex-consular official who at various times favoured both Chang and Feng, wrote an interesting little minute revealing not only certain of Wu's attitudes but also one school of Foreign Office thinking. Wu was:

one of the finest characters, if not the finest, in modern China and one who is disposed to be sympathetic to British conservative ideals and to be consistent in his theory and practice. (He has always held that China must ultimately be governed by force, Communist or Conservative, and is opposed to Communists, politicians, Japan, the Kuomintang and the Anfu Party.)⁹⁵

The Tupan of Hupeh, Hsiao Yao-nan, was a member of Wu's Chihli clique, and as has already been mentioned, he sought to avoid trouble in Hankow by advancing the date of the summer vacation, thus dispersing the students. Following the shootings of 13 June, he declared martial law in the city, forbade all strikes, and carried out several executions, all of which moved HM Consul-General to request that he be permitted to convey to the Marshal a personal message from HM government expressing appreciation of his successful efforts in curbing trouble on the middle Yangtze. Approval was given on the grounds that 'it would do no harm, and might do good'.⁹⁶ The leading article of an emergency edition of the British community's newspaper carried the headline 'Jolly Good Show, Marshal Hsiao!'⁹⁷ Yet even Marshal Hsiao felt obliged to cable his own government in Peking, advocating abrogation of the unequal treaties,⁹⁸ and regardless of the degree of hypocrisy involved, it was a sign of the changing times that warlords sought the title of patriot by taking up what had hitherto been the slogan of a highly suspect minority.

In Hunan neither Chao Heng-t'i's affiliations with the KMT nor his links with Wu P'ei-fu⁹⁹ deterred him from stern measures. Large demon-

strations were held in Changsha on 2 June, and a 'Society for Wiping out Shame' (*Hsüeh-ch'ih-hui*) was organised. An even larger demonstration was held on 5 June, but Chao declared martial law and carried out searches and arrests of activists. The death penalty was proclaimed for all who propagated radicalism or sought to incite the troops. A strike and demonstration at the Shui-k'ou-shan lead factory was suppressed with bullets, and Chao ordered the execution of all the arrested representatives of the mine workers.¹ Chao's proclamation is typical of those officials who in effect suppressed any popular manifestations, while claiming to be true patriots:

It is hereby proclaimed that since the outbreak of the case of Shanghai our people feel very much exasperated and all are of the same spirit. The Peking Government has duly taken up severe measures and I, the Governor, have also telegraphed repeatedly giving my opinion. As this relates to the right of our nation and to the lives of our people, there is no reason why we should not struggle strongly. But on the other hand, there must be a limit to the patriotic action and there must be nothing done against International Law. While diplomatic relations are still not yet severed, the treaties into which we have entered with foreign countries must be respected. It must be understood that the treaties allow foreigners to trade in the different ports of China, to run steamers in inland waters and to spread doctrine and travel in the interior, and the obligation of the Chinese Government is to give protection in accordance with the treaty. With regard to Chinese employees who are engaged by foreigners to do the usual work, they should not be interfered with according to the treaty. Therefore the patriotic action taken by our people must be bound by this limit and they should not interfere with anything which is allowed by the treaty such as buying and selling goods, travelling by steamers, engaging employees, supplying of coal and rice. This is up to the freedom of individuals and no forcible action or threats can be allowed. Should any forcible action be taken, not only will this be against the treaty but it means also disturbances and violation of the law as far as our part is concerned. Moreover it must be feared that lawless scoundrels will take advantage of the opportunity to plunder, so that it will be difficult to distinguish the good people from the bad ones. The real patriots should understand law and also diplomatic relations very well and that such things can thus not be allowed! Therefore this is the reason why I, the Governor, am obliged to repeat orders.

As to the daily needs of foreigners; they are obliged to obtain the same locally, and it is not right to force the mercantile shops not to sell them anything. It should also be understood, that there are foreigners who reside in China, and Chinese who reside in foreign

countries, of which there are also very many, and that mutual protection must be given by both as stipulated in the treaty. If we interfere with their daily needs, they can do the same to our Chinese in their countries. As Chinese who reside in foreign countries are more numerous than foreigners in China, we would suffer more than they would. Furthermore, diplomatic relations are not yet severed; and even if war were declared, enemies should be protected in accordance with International Law. Therefore real patriots should not do such actions as would cause difficulties to the negotiations. What I have now explained is in such detail that all our people should now understand how to obey. The Government will certainly give protection with its best efforts to any patriotic action which is not against the treaty and beyond the law. Should there be any lawless plunder, action or any lawless scoundrels who try to take advantage or opportunity to plunder, stir up troubles, to use falsely the name of patriotism, and to cause disturbance to the peace, I, the Governor, must strictly uphold the law and give no pardon whatever.

All of you are now hereby instructed to obey accordingly²

Despite such examples, there was some hope in Shanghai that the movement would receive a new lease of life following the city's evacuation by Hsing Shih-lien's Fengtien troops and the assumption of power by Sun Ch'uan-fang in mid-October.³ The GTU took the opportunity to re-open its doors, but they were immediately shut once again by the new authorities, who were quite as determined as their predecessors that their power should not be challenged from this quarter.⁴ Moreover, they were in a stronger position to take action, as a victorious army that had just taken the city without firing a shot, and unhampered either by the regional prejudice or by the suspicion of pro-Japanese tendencies which had made things difficult for Marshal Hsing and his troops.

Any remaining illusions concerning Sun Ch'uan-fang were shattered by the case of Liu Hua, the young Communist union organiser who had distinguished himself during the February strikes. During much of the May 30 Movement he had been confined to his sick bed as a result of exhaustion due to overwork, and shortly after his recovery, he was arrested by the Shanghai Municipal Police while passing through the International Settlement.⁵ As was the normal practice, he was handed over to the Chinese authorities, who after imprisoning him for some weeks, secretly shot him on the night of 17 December.¹⁷ The Chinese newspapers learnt of his death only through a report published in the *North China Post*, and student and labour groups immediately protested;⁶ but such cries came too late to save Liu Hua, and Yü Hsia-ch'ing and the

other notables of Shanghai gave no support to the protests. *Hsiang-tao* wrote that the capitalists and imperialists were delighted, and were confident that the city would now revert to its pre-May 30 condition.⁷

The Peking Government and the Diplomatic Body negotiate a settlement

The position of the Peking government was complicated by a multitude of factors, not the least of which was that it owed its very existence to the precarious balance of power between the forces of Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yü-hsiang. Furthermore, its official status was only that of a provisional government, and Tuan Ch'i-jui, who would otherwise have been referred to as the President, had to be content with the title of Chief Executive. Apparently anxious to forestall a KMT coup, the powers had extended *de facto* recognition to the regime, but only on the understanding that it should honour all the treaties and engagements entered into by previous governments, including the Ch'ing, 'which according to international usage, can only be modified by the mutual consent of the contracting parties'; the Diplomatic Body added that: 'on the above understanding their Governments are willing and anxious to proceed as soon as possible with the carrying out of the measure contemplated in the Washington treaties and resolutions'.⁸ Throughout the early months of 1925 the question of *de jure* recognition was the subject of discussion between the diplomats in Peking, and in the Foreign Ministries of their home governments, but no decisions had been reached when 30 May intervened.

Already on 28 May the Waichiaopu had sent a note to the Diplomatic Body requesting that the Shanghai Municipal Council be instructed to abandon the proposed by-laws,⁹ and it was regarded as a matter of course that stiff notes of protest concerning the shootings on 30 May and 1 June were presented (see Appendix 3). But like Chang Tso-lin, the government no sooner issued its notes than it set about attempting to convince the representatives of the Powers that it did not mean them. As Palairet, the British Chargé, informed Chamberlain:

The heads of Legations were given privately to understand, when the Wai-chiao Pu addressed its first note of protest to the Senior Minister on the 1st June, that this was a mere gesture to conciliate public opinion. . . .

Nevertheless, the *Chargé* continued:

having once given way, the Chinese Government soon allowed the direction of affairs to be taken out of their hands, and both the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Chief Executive have openly declared that they cannot take the risk of prohibiting the numerous demonstrations which have taken place in Peking. They were fully alive to the danger of them, for they begged the heads of Legations to prevent their nationals from approaching the agitators, but they would take no steps themselves to allay the danger.¹⁰

The situation in Peking was indeed electric, and alarmist rumours found ready ears. It was put about that Feng's troops, who garrisoned the city, could not be relied upon, and that they would at any moment take up arms against the foreigners. It was also feared that civil war was on the point of breaking out between Chang and Feng, and that Peking would be the scene of bloody street fighting. There was even a rumour to the effect that a coup was imminent, and that the students, after assassinating the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Chief Executive, would set up a Bolshevik government with the assistance of Karakhan.¹¹

The government was in a state of near panic, and after a visit to Shen Jui-lin, the Foreign Minister, the British and American Ministers observed that 'he was obviously extremely upset and alarmed, and he begged them to do what they could to allay the trouble'. Shen, whom the British regarded as a characterless weakling, was living in daily fear of being assassinated and was constantly escaping from students assaulting the Foreign Ministry.¹² While the British were at first disposed to credit the government with a desire to be conciliatory 'so far as they dared to risk the displeasure of the students by doing so', and appreciated that the investigators sent to Shanghai, Admiral Ts'ai and Mr Tseng, were known for their pro-British sympathies,¹³ their exasperation grew daily stronger, as well it might when confronted with requests from Marshal Tuan that the powers 'save the face of the Chinese Government by punishing those concerned in the shooting'.¹⁴

By late June, a distraught Palaret was cabling back to London that the Peking government was almost impossible to deal with, and that its only motive force was fear.¹⁵ The *Chargé* did notice however, a slight improvement following Chang Tso-lin's intimations that he would welcome an invitation to restore order in Peking.¹⁶

The problem for the government was not that it did not wish to be conciliatory, but that it was obliged to be conciliatory simultaneously to a number of opposing groups: the students (and the other representatives

of nationalist sentiment), the forces of Feng Yu-hsiang and of Chang Tso-lin, and the Powers. Vulnerable to pressures from all of these sources, the government also no doubt wished to gain what it could from attempting to use the forces unleashed by the incident of 30 May to better its own position, both nationally and internationally; but sheer survival was undoubtedly the deciding factor in both what it did and what it left undone. It is possible, however, that the inspiration motivating certain members of the Foreign Ministry came from a more worthy source. Writing a few years after the events, an American scholar noted that:

During the period of tuchunism, the foreign policy of China was determined almost exclusively by a relatively small group of men well trained in international law, experienced in diplomacy, and not in the least ignorant of conditions in Western countries... Cabinets and cliques might come and go, and the provinces might be ruled by ex-bandits, but the Foreign Office and the diplomatic service remained in the hands of the younger men of the Returned Student class. They voiced the nation's grievances at Paris and again at Washington. They stood firmly for the principle that China was entitled to equal treatment as a sovereign nation....

He went on to quote a statement by T. F. Millard, editor of the *China Weekly Review*, that:

It has been said, and justly said, that if all branches of the Chinese Government displayed the ability its diplomats usually do, especially in the last decade, China would be one of the leading nations of the world.¹⁷

Until the relevant sources in China are made available, the extent to which the Waichiaopu operated independently of the provisional government must remain an unknown quantity, but the fact that important differences existed between them should not be overlooked.

If the government presented a pitiable spectacle to the foreign diplomats, it presented a different aspect to the nation at large. Wide publicity was given not only to the protest notes, but also to the government's heavy contribution to the Shanghai strike fund. Non-diplomatic foreign observers drew inferences quite different from those of their compatriots in the Legations, and George Sokolsky, whom we have referred to as an acute and generally well-informed commentator, wrote in the *China Year Book* that:

The motives of the Chinese Government were entirely political, for as long as the strike and disturbance lasted, the present Government in Peking could continue in office, as no-one else would care to take hold of such a mess.¹⁸

There can be no doubt that the government's popularity with the people was greatly boosted by such actions,¹⁹ and for some months liberal journals like *Tung-fang Tsa-chih* maintained an attitude of restrained optimism towards the progress of the official negotiations,²⁰ although the CCP organs *Hsiang-tao* and *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* were more sceptical. Nevertheless, Chang Kuo-t'ao recalls that even leftist students advocated that the government work out effective negotiations in keeping with legal procedure.²¹ This popularity, however limited it may have been, punctuated as it was by raids on the Waichiaopu, must have been a new and somewhat heady experience for Marshal Tuan and his colleagues, and, ever sensible of their survival prospects, it must also have been cause for hope. Thus the picture of a government terrified and helpless in the face of angry demonstrators, imploring assistance from the Powers, which we have drawn on the basis of diplomatic reports, must now be modified to one of more subtle shading, where the government appears to have been attempting to use nationalists and foreigners to control one another, and to simultaneously consolidate its own position. It is a comment on the vanity of the diplomats that, while ever ready to believe in the Chinese government's insincerity in dealing with its own citizens, they yet seem to have taken it at face value when it protested its 'real feelings' to them. Even such a government as Tuan's could be underestimated.

The Marshal himself learned at least one valuable lesson in the course of the Movement, which he passed on to Palairat in an interview on 16 June:

In times past, he said, the Chinese Government had negotiated (often in a very foolish manner) with foreign Powers without even thinking of taking the view of the Chinese nation into consideration. They did what they thought suitable without reference to any other authority than their own convictions or interests. This, he said, was now impossible, and henceforward Chinese public opinion would have to be taken into account by every Chinese Government.²²

The final sentence seems to contain not only explanation, but even a hint of a threat – or is it only an apology?

The negotiations between the government and the Powers began, it will be recalled, with the despatch of diplomats from six nations—France, Britain, America, Japan, Italy and Belgium—to Shanghai, where they were to conduct an investigation into the incident, and if possible to arrive at a settlement with the investigators from the Peking government.

The heads of legations felt that as they bore the ultimate responsibility, they:

must take some constructive measure to deal with the situation, and that the Shanghai consular and municipal authorities, who were necessarily not in a position to realise as fully as ourselves what far-reaching issues were now involved, should not be left to seek a solution unaided.²³

These attempts to reach a settlement were unsuccessful owing to the refusal of the diplomats to consider what they felt to be extraneous matters raised by the Chinese, namely the thirteen demands of the GCC, and the delegation returned to Peking on 18 June to report to the heads of missions. On the following day, the Diplomatic Body issued a statement declaring that they wished to reach an immediate and equitable settlement, and added with reference to the Waichiaopu's note of 11 June transmitting the thirteen demands, that they were prepared to ask their governments for authority to discuss proposals put forward by the Chinese regarding the organisation of the International Settlement and the administration of justice in Shanghai.²⁴

On 24 June the Waichiaopu issued two very important notes, the first declaring that the thirteen points must be taken as the basis for all further negotiations, the second urgently requesting the revision of China's treaty status.²⁵ The latter note asserted that the inequalities of the treaty system would prove a permanent source of friction between China and the Powers, and that its continued existence made the re-enacting of tragedies like that of 30 May inevitable. Accordingly, the government hoped for 'an encouraging response'.²⁶ Referring to these two notes, an article in *Tung-fang Tsa-chih* commented that though they had nothing very substantial about them, yet the fact that 'the customarily weak and spineless foreign ministry' had taken such action could not but cause people to be optimistic.²⁷ Mayer, the US Chargé, when forwarding the notes to Washington, wrote that their purpose was twofold:

first, to take action to realize China's legitimate national aspirations, second, to neutralize radical propaganda directed towards immediate cancellation of the treaties, by demonstrating to the Chinese people the intent of the Peking Government to initiate revisionist action at once in a friendly manner consonant with principles of international law.²⁸

On 26 June the Diplomatic Body replied that the thirteen points should be considered by experts in the various relevant fields, following a settlement of the specific issues involved in the shootings on 30 May and 1

June, and that while sympathetic towards treaty revision, they would of course have to wait on instructions from their home governments.²⁹ The note concerning treaty revision became the basis of negotiations on this topic carried out amongst the Powers throughout the summer of 1925, and eventually led to the convening of both the Tariff Conference and the Extraterritoriality Commission.³⁰ Possibly feeling more secure in its own claims to patriotism and certainly with one eye on Chang Tso-lin and another on the Powers, on 29 June the provisional government cabled to all provincial authorities that they must prevent all 'destructive activities carried out in the name of false patriotism'.³¹

On 1 July the Waichiaopu instructed its overseas embassies to urge all governments concerned to respond quickly to the requests for treaty revision.³² On the fifth of the same month the government announced its decision that the Waichiaopu should handle the first five of the thirteen demands, while three special commissioners, Yen Hui-ch'ing, Wang Cheng-t'ing and Ts'ai T'ing-kan, would be responsible for the remaining eight.³³ But just when the basis for continued negotiations had been firmly established on the Chinese side, the Powers ran into trouble of their own. With the aim of reaching a quick settlement, the Diplomatic Body drew up a report based on the findings of the commissioners whom they had sent to Shanghai. (This report of the Diplomatic Body is separate and different in content from the report of the Diplomatic Commission, which put principal responsibility on the negligence of the Chinese authorities; historians have sometimes confused these two reports.)³⁴ The Diplomatic Body's report was surprisingly critical of the administration of the Shanghai International Settlement, formulating their findings under four points:

1. They expressed the opinion that the chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council was not devoid of blame.
2. They censured Colonel McEuen, the commissioner of police, for negligence and incompetence, and stated their view that he should be replaced.
3. They exonerated a subordinate official, Inspector Everson, from any serious charge, though they suggested that he might perhaps have called for reinforcements earlier.
4. They expressed the opinion that defective police regulations were partly responsible and should be revised and made public.

The report added that as the demonstrations had been organised on Chinese territory, the Chinese government should take measures to

punish the responsible officials.³⁵ Nevertheless, they emphasised that McEuen's was 'the responsibility... primarily involved', and accused him of 'negligence, lack of judgement and lack of professional ability'.³⁶

On 1 July these findings and the intention to publish them were telegraphed to the Foreign Office by Palairet, and at the same time they were communicated by the Diplomatic Body to the Consular Body at Shanghai, with instructions to pass them on to the Municipal Council. If the latter body proved recalcitrant, they were to be warned that the Diplomatic Body were prepared in the last resort to dissolve them and carry on the administration of the Settlement through the consuls.³⁷ It was hoped that by declaring their findings to the Chinese government and press, they would be able to 'allay Chinese feeling and give proof of their determination to act without fear or favour'.³⁸ Such hopes, however, were destined to come to naught, for the men of the SMC proved very recalcitrant indeed, expressing their categorical dissent from the first two conclusions of the Diplomatic Report, refusing to dismiss the police commissioner, and adding that they were 'primarily responsible only to the electorate of the International Settlement at Shanghai'. The SMC requested the convening of an independent tribunal, a suggestion which the Diplomatic Body felt to be most unwise on the grounds that the proceedings of such a tribunal would indefinitely delay a settlement; they also were convinced that 'no commission which included Chinese could be expected to reach a unanimous decision, while exclusion of Chinese would merely provoke hostile criticism of Chinese'.³⁹

The Consuls of Great Britain, the United States and Japan tended to side with the SMC, requesting their home governments that action be delayed,⁴⁰ and the British government instructed its representatives in Peking to postpone the communication of their findings to the Chinese.

It was now the turn of the Diplomatic Body to feel indignant, and Palairet expressed his surprise and resentment at the way in which their authority *vis-à-vis* the Consular Body had been diminished.⁴¹ Behind this dispute lay a long history of tension between Peking and Shanghai dating back to the Land Regulations of 1869, the only legal constitution of the Settlement. Neither in those regulations nor elsewhere were the powers of the municipal council and its relations with the Consular Body and the Diplomatic Body precisely defined. The Diplomatic Body now wanted a thorough discussion of the situation, but the Foreign Office in London vetoed this for the reason that it would involve examining the authority of the SMC with the Chinese government at the most inauspicious time possible. The US Secretary of State, Kellog, did not agree, however, and

granted the requisite authority to US officials in Peking.⁴² To add to the confusion, on the morning of 11 July the French Minister 'very improperly' published a communiqué referring to the divergence of views between Shanghai and Peking, adding that he considered it useless to start negotiations with the Chinese officials appointed six days earlier, pending settlement of the controversy.⁴³ This delighted the Chinese, and further leakage enabled the Chinese newspapers of Peking and Shanghai to publish articles with reference to these events which even Palairet was forced to admit were on the whole accurate and detailed.⁴⁴ The British Consul-General in Shanghai complained that:

Our task has been rendered more difficult by fact that resolutions of corps diplomatique have become generally known here and although actual publication has so far been avoided a group of influential Chinese were only prevented from organising a monster victory demonstration by a vigorous denial of accuracy of rumours.⁴⁵

As hopes for a speedy settlement receded, the British government decided to go ahead with an independent judicial inquiry, spurred on by the hope that McEuen's offer to resign voluntarily 'as a loyal British subject' might to some degree appease Chinese hostility.⁴⁶ After some further disagreement amongst the Powers, it was resolved that the Diplomatic Body's commission of inquiry should be regarded as having been a preliminary investigation which had made out a *prima facie* case for further public judicial inquiry. In order to save face for the diplomats, it was further resolved that the initiative for making such a proposal (with which they unanimously disagreed) should come from the Diplomatic Body.⁴⁷

No sooner had this been settled than a new dispute broke out over the composition of the judicial commission, the British being opposed to the presence of a Chinese judge. Chamberlain wrote:

I do not think that any Chinese representative should be included as the Chinese Government are not responsible for the administration of the International Settlement and have shown a persistent desire to use the Shanghai incident as an argument in a different and larger issue instead of judging it strictly on its own merits.⁴⁸

The Americans, however, were insistent that the presence of a Chinese judge was essential to the success of the inquiry, the main aim of which was to have a beneficial effect on Chinese public opinion,⁴⁹ and after some discussion the British reluctantly agreed, doubting the ability or courage of a Chinese judge to be 'impartial', but adding hopefully: 'it ought to be

possible for other judges to expose any insincerities or intrigues on his part'.⁵⁰ In the event, this all proved to have been a storm in a teacup, for the provisional government spurned the invitation to appoint a Chinese Commissioner, and expressed its repeated opposition to the whole concept of a judicial inquiry, which it argued would 'only serve the purpose of further complicating the issue'.⁵¹ Confronted with further accounts of news leakage, Ashton-Gwatkin, a clerk on the China desk in the Foreign Office, felt constrained to note:

A shocking business.

No wonder the Judicial Enquiry is looked upon as a mere manoeuvre on our part, and the Chinese Government will have no share in it.⁵²

Not only would the Chinese government have no share in it, but when it was finally convened on 7 October, it was totally boycotted by all Chinese, which rendered rather pathetic Chamberlain's statement that the inquiry:

offers the only possible method of securing not only that justice is done, but, what is equally important, that all concerned, Chinese or foreigners, should know that justice has been done. Only in this way can confidence be restored.⁵³

A further unfortunate consequence of all this was that the report of the Diplomatic Commission was suppressed, and quite naturally the Chinese were convinced that it had been withheld because it had found in their favour.⁵⁴ Teng Chung-hsia's claim is standard in various Chinese histories of these events:

The results of the investigation showed without a trace of doubt that the British police were responsible for the massacre, but the British Commissioner was irrationally adamant, and so the Commission came to nothing and returned in disappointment to Peking, where their findings were kept secret.⁵⁵

Between late July when the decision to hold the judicial inquiry was made, and early October when it was finally convened, the provisional government and the Diplomatic Body continued their mutual barrage of notes, the general tenor of which was that the government accused the Powers of stalling over the negotiations, while the Powers replied that no meaningful negotiations could eventuate until peace and order were restored in the country; whereupon the government would reply that disorder was caused by the failure of the Powers to reach a settlement with China, and would cease as soon as satisfactory arrangements were made. However, the government did issue a proclamation on 15 July to

the effect that as it had repeatedly protested against the Shanghai incident, and as negotiations were proceeding, the people should calm themselves and maintain the peace. Provincial officials were instructed to uphold law and order, and to suppress all those who attempted to stir up trouble.⁵⁶

More substantially, the US Minister was able to inform the Chinese on 8 August that the Washington Conference's Nine Power Treaty was to be signed in Washington on the fifth day of the following month, and requested the provisional government to fix a date for the Special Customs (or Tariff) Conference;⁵⁷ the government agreed, and chose 26 October.⁵⁸ On 4 September, Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Italy, Holland, Portugal and Belgium sent a joint reply to the Waichiaopu's note of 24 June concerning treaty revision, stating that how far they could go towards fulfilling China's desires depended on the degree to which China could safeguard the foreigners' interests. Customs autonomy would have to wait on an improvement in China's finances, and the question of the abolition of extraterritoriality would be the subject of further investigation.⁵⁹

If this note was not very encouraging, more hope was held out on specific issues in a note concerning the thirteen points from the Diplomatic Body, sent to the Waichiaopu on 1 October. The note observed that the state of emergency in the Settlement had already been lifted, the arrested released, and the occupied schools and colleges restored to their owners. (Shanghai University was the sole, significant, exception, and was not mentioned in the note.) While the question of responsibility should wait on the findings of the judicial inquiry, they declared themselves ready to do their utmost to solve labour problems. Preparations were under way for talks on rendition of the Mixed Court and the provision of Chinese councillors in the SMC. The problem of external roads should be solved by the Consular Body and local Chinese officials. As for the three by-laws, it was pointed out that they had not yet been passed, and before further action on them was taken, the SMC would be instructed to see whether they were consonant with justice and Chinese law (a distinction which can have afforded little pleasure to the government).⁶⁰ Thus by the time the judicial inquiry was opened, the Powers had gone some way towards meeting the demands of at least the wealthier Chinese of Shanghai.

The judicial inquiry formally opened on 10 October, and began hearing evidence two days later. The judges were, for the British, H. C. Gollan, Chief Justice of Hong Kong, for the Japanese, Kitsuburo Suga, Judge of the Hiroshima Appellate Court, and for the US, E. Finley Johnson, Chief Justice of the Philippines. There were thirteen sessions in all, and while

Chinese unanimously refused to give evidence, the proceedings were not interrupted in any way, many Chinese came to listen, and the Chinese press published daily reports.⁶¹ As with all the other plans of the Powers, this too came unstuck when the judges found themselves unable to submit a unanimous report; Gollan and Suga exonerated the police and SMC officials from all blame, while Finley Johnson, to the general rage of the foreign community in Shanghai, not only censured the police, but by taking into account a good deal of the essential background of the affair, seemed to vindicate the Chinese position that the shootings could not properly be treated as isolated incidents.⁶² This background material was listed under headings from 'a' to 'y' and the *North China Herald* found it difficult to understand why he did not reach 'z'. His statements 'include so many rumours and hearsays and biases that one wonders that a man of his judicial reputation and ability should stoop to such generalities'.⁶³ The more liberal (and American) *China Weekly Review*, however, described his remarks as 'admirably judicial and restrained'.⁶⁴

The differences between the merchants of Shanghai and the mandarins of the Foreign Office were never more clearly revealed than in a long and fascinating minute to Finley Johnson's report written by the later Sir John T. Pratt (who had left Shanghai only four days before the shooting) and which deserves quoting at some length. Pratt opened:

On reading these telegrams one's first reaction is indignation that the American Judge should have deliberately gone beyond the terms of reference and in other ways acted with a total disregard of the ordinary decencies of official intercourse in order to exploit the situation to our disadvantage. But further reflection somewhat modifies this feeling. The chief cause of the dangerous and difficult situation in which we are placed is not the antics of the American judge but the failure of the British judge to do substantial justice.

Pratt argued that 'had the control of the police been in competent hands the tragedy could easily have been averted', and claimed that McEuen's conduct in not going to the scene of the riot was 'so extraordinary that it is inconceivable how any reasonable person could exonerate him'. Waterlow noted on Pratt's minute that this opinion was shared by Lyle, the Commissioner of Customs in Shanghai at the time, 'a most intelligent and impartial observer'.

Pratt then went on to say what no other British official had yet said:

The American Judge holds that under the circumstances existing at the moment of firing the firing was justified. I myself would hold that it was *not* justified... In truth he [Everson] fired because that

was the simplest and most efficient way of restoring order—not because there was nothing else to be done.

At Chinkiang a much more dangerous riot had been dealt with without recourse to firearms, because the chief officer, who assumed the direction of affairs was 'a man of courage, judgement and an adequate sense of responsibility... Had these qualities been displayed in Shanghai there would have been no tragedy'. As for Judge Finley Johnson:

He went as far as he possibly could in order to agree with the British judge but finding that the latter was bent, in the face of all fairness and reason, on a policy of hush up and whitewash, it may be that he decided it was his duty to speak out. It is no use complaining of American methods—it is the lamentable failure of British justice that is the cause of our trouble.⁶⁵

Chamberlain wrote that Pratt's minute 'compels careful attention', and it aroused no real opposition amongst other members of the Foreign Office. Even a conservative man like Wellesley, Deputy Under Secretary of State, was writing two days later of the 'whitewashed police officers'.⁶⁶

Both McEuen and Everson were retired on pensions. It had been clear that the former must go, and even before he offered his own resignation the British had promised the Americans that he would 'disappear', although they wished the disappearance to occur after rather than before the judicial inquiry.⁶⁷ More indignation was felt over Everson's retirement, the *North China Herald* pointing out that:

It was not suggested by any of the judges, but was obviously forced upon the Shanghai Municipal Council by the Diplomatic Body... as an effort to conciliate the Chinese through the sacrifice of a blameless public servant.⁶⁸

Everson was given a big send off, and presented with a gold watch by the police, 'felicitously inscribed'. (Presumably not one of the 'May 30 memorial' gold watches being advertised widely in the Chinese Press.) He declared that he would always prize his memories of Shanghai.⁶⁹

The Japanese attempted to have the judges' reports suppressed, but the British pointed out that as the Diplomatic Body had told the Chinese that negotiations for a settlement depended on the findings of the judicial inquiry, such action, however desirable, would not be feasible.⁷⁰ In an attempt to soothe Chinese feelings further the SMC was persuaded to offer \$75,000 to the victims and their families as a mark of sympathy.⁷¹ This was refused by the Waichiaopu, who put in a counter claim of \$2,000,000,⁷² and in mid-February of the following year, the Chinese merchants of Shanghai, estimating their business losses following 30 May

at over \$10,000,000, cabled the Waichiaopu to lay claim to this sum, in addition to that already requested.⁷³

Publication of the reports did not lead to the fearsome results expected, as by that time China was once again caught up in a civil war, and as Chinese attention turned towards purely internal matters, those most affected by the judges' findings were the foreign community. The negotiations, too, upon which so much diplomatic effort had been expended, eventually simply faded away, as with the defeat of Feng Yü-hsiang's troops in April 1926, Tuan and his officials fled, the provisional government was declared at an end, and the Powers finally abandoned the pretence that a central authority existed in China. The only negotiations of any substance were those held between the British and the KMT government in South China to settle disputes in Kuangtung and Kuanghsi,⁷⁴ in July 1926, and when the Powers once again recognised a government of all China, it was also to be a government of the Kuomintang.

The May 30 Movement and the Chinese

'Friends of the intelligent class'

A cable sent to the Foreign Office in mid-June stated that 'the positive views and strong anti-British feeling held by even the best class of Chinese is beyond foreign understanding'. Commenting on this, and noting that the 'generally friendly' British Returned Students Association of Peking had also telegraphed the Foreign Office associating itself with the feeling of public indignation, Moss added that he feared that:

this feeling is genuinely shared by many responsible Chinese, and the Communists are exploiting it. It is most important that our Chinese friends of the intelligent classes should not be estranged.¹

The damage, however, had been done, as one Miss D. M. Arnold, a director of the British-American Tobacco Company in Shanghai, also known as an energetic social worker, wrote:

I have assisted at meetings of Chinese women where I have been aghast at the venom of bitter resentment against the British in general. Many of these women are cultured and educated women, and I should have thought, prior to this, that some of them would have been incapable of being 'anti' anything.

Miss Arnold felt that in Shanghai, at least, the situation had been worsened by the attitude taken by the editor of the *North China Daily News and Herald*, arguing that through his 'harsh judgement of the Chinese concerned', his refusal to print letters from the opposition and his partial statements, Mr Green had made himself 'quite frankly a serious menace to British interests in this country'. Miss Arnold, who was herself convinced that the shootings had been unnecessary, also noted that the Chinese keenly resented the fact that to the time of her writing in early July, there had been no expression of sympathy for the victims on the part of the British authorities, while the Japanese, expressing their regret volubly and declaring their sympathy with the patriotic motives of the students, were gradually shifting the onus of the whole affair on to Britain's back.²

In our examination of Chinese reactions to the incident of 30 May, and the various interpretations of the movement by various groups within

Chinese society, we may profitably commence with these 'Chinese friends of the intelligent classes', whom we may identify with those *kao-teng Hua-jen* (upper class Chinese—upper class usually by virtue of a combination of wealth and education), scornfully referred to in the Communist writings to which we shall turn later in the present chapter.

On 7 June an important manifesto was published by leading Chinese residents of Tientsin. It was drafted by the old reformer Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and was signed by seven other notables, who included Wellington Koo, Hollington Tong and Ting Wen-chiang. Noting the gravity of the situation, the authors urged that all thoughtful people interested in the promotion of good will and international understanding should use their influence to relieve the tension and to resolve the disputes in a calmer atmosphere. Observing that the Municipal Council stated positively that the shooting was unavoidable, while the Chinese claimed that the police had acted brutally and for no good reason, the writers of the manifesto were content to state their view that a heavy responsibility rested on the Shanghai authorities to prove to China and the world at large that the police action was really justified.

To prevent the situation from worsening, three steps should be taken. First, the Legations should instruct the SMC, through their consuls, to refrain from the further use of arms against unarmed Chinese. Second, the Chinese of Shanghai should keep the peace and refrain from either putting their own lives in jeopardy or from adding to the obstacles in the way of a settlement. Thirdly, a mixed commission of impartial Chinese and foreigners should conduct a 'free and full' investigation, and make a report which would be the basis of a settlement, it being understood that should the killing be ascertained to have been unjustifiable, redress of the wrong should be given in full.

As to the question of Communist influence in the movement, assertions concerning which were appearing in the foreign press, it was difficult to say whether or not Communist elements were working in the ranks of the demonstrators:

but to say that those participating in the recent demonstrations, which would appear to have been stimulated in a way by the quality of vigorous repression itself, were all tools of the Communist agents, seems scarcely reasonable. Nor can it be believed as a fact.

The writers then raised the other points at issue, including the agitation over the three proposed by-laws, and pointed out that regardless of the merits or demerits of the various measures, people should realise that

China had changed considerably in the past decade, and that although educational standards were still low, the 'general standard of enlightenment' had risen markedly. This brought them to the crux of their statement, which deserves quoting at length:

What was done by the foreign nations or their nationals in China a score of years ago without a protest can no longer be safely done without first consulting the views of the local Chinese community affected by it or the public opinion of the country at large. So much of the welfare of the foreign community in China and the interests of foreign trade with her depend upon the existence of a feeling of mutual understanding and confidence between the Chinese and foreigners in China, that, if not on the high ground of justice, at least as a matter of expediency, it would be well for the foreign nations or their agents in China, who still exercise special rights of a political character nowhere enjoyed by foreigners in other great countries and who still enjoy extraordinary privileges nowhere enjoyed by foreigners in other civilized lands, to seek to understand the view-point of the Chinese people and at least in some measure to consult their interests in matters vitally affecting them, especially relating to questions arising in the foreign settlements, where as a rule they are not accorded the right to vote which the foreign rate-payers enjoy, though they contribute the main portion of the Municipal revenue by paying the bulk of the taxes.

The manifesto concluded with the warning that: 'no class of Chinese people should seek to antagonize the foreign residents in China merely because they still hold on to their special problem of treaty revision...', and argued that nothing could be settled by 'coercion, antagonism, force or violence on either side'. What was most needed under the circumstances was 'friendly consultation' in an attitude of 'sympathetic understanding and mutual conciliation'.³

This was not far removed from the position taken by Yü Hsia-ch'ing and the GCC, that the questions of the Mixed Court and Chinese representation on the SMC Board lay at the heart of the matter. It is noteworthy that no mention was made of labour issues or the specific problems of the working class, let alone any suggestion that the workers had a role to play in the movement. Fundamental to the writers' position was that there was no basic conflict of interests between China and the Powers, and that what problems did exist could be solved through negotiations. They did, however, disagree with the stand taken by the Powers, and especially by Britain, that the May 30 affair could be treated as an isolated incident, seeing it, as did almost all Chinese who committed their thoughts to paper during the period, as the symptom of a more deep

rooted malaise. The foreigners must realise that China was changing, and that they too would have to move with the times.

Similar views were published in a statement issued by the American Returned Students' Club of Tientsin, whose committee included Hollington Tong and Ting Wen-chiang from the above group. Other committee members were P. M. Pien, President of the Tientsin Bankers' Association, Mour [*sic*] Hsu, professor of Political Science at Nankai University, K. K. Chang of the Oriental Banking Corporation, S. S. Kwan, an engineer, and Dr M. J. Ting, Director of the Peiyang Women's Hospital. Together they made up a typical group of successful bourgeois American returned students, who were anxious that their views be considered as those of 'Chinese who are in no way unfriendly to foreigners in general, but who are not less patriotic as Chinese citizens'. While agreeing that all the incidents which had so far occurred could be settled through negotiation, they were somewhat more forthright in their assertion that it was up to the Powers to make the first move towards reconciliation:

Thus far everybody has been arguing in a circle. The Chinese Government has repeatedly asked the Legations to stop the rigorous measures of repression in the foreign concessions, and the Legations have repeatedly replied that the Chinese Government must first stop the nationwide agitation. We ask all fair-minded foreigners to consider whether or not the killing of scores of unarmed Chinese citizens on May 30 constituted a *prima facie* case against the Shanghai police, and whether the formal attitude adopted by the Legations in their first reply to the protest of the Chinese Government, in which they placed the whole responsibility on Chinese shoulders, has not stirred up the intense feeling of injustice and indignation. It is not to be expected that China, which is, after all, the first injured party and which has lost far more lives than the foreigners, can take the first step towards understanding. . . . In view of the present unprecedented crisis, we believe that it behoves the foreign Powers to make a frank declaration of their willingness to render full justice to China both in the settlement of the Shanghai case and in the proposed revision of treaties. This can surely be done without losing their dignity, and it will do far more to quiet down the intense feeling of the Chinese than anything the Chinese Government can promise or carry out.⁴

Here, too, the several shootings are related to the more general question of China's relations with the Powers, and specifically with the issue of treaty revision.

Ting Wen-chiang was the co-author of yet another statement, together with Lo Wen-kan (ex-president of the Peking Supreme Court), K. L. Yan (Professor of Physics at Peking University), and Hu Shih. This was the

pamphlet *China's Case*, which received wide circulation both within China and overseas, being published in Britain by the Union of Chinese Associations, appearing there in early July. The pamphlet opened with an attack on Chamberlain's statement to the Commons that the shooting was ordered only when the police station and the arms it contained were endangered. The writers felt that such an explanation was unstatesmanlike, and that the minister would be better advised to await the findings of an unbiased commission before making judgments. Obviously not feeling themselves bound by similar statesmanlike constraints, and concerned that the British public not be misled by such official statements, the authors of the pamphlet first declared in a loaded sentence: 'We are far from being in possession of all the facts concerning the Shanghai tragedy where scores of unarmed Chinese citizens were killed by the order of a non-commissioned British police officer.' After quoting the statements of two European witnesses to the effect that prior to the shooting no acts of violence had occurred, they continued: 'Thus a defenceless crowd was repeatedly fired upon point blank after it had been given a warning in a language which the great majority could not understand.' (In fact Everson claimed that he gave the warning in both English and Chinese, although his Chinese may not have been comprehensible, or audible, to the crowd.) As to Inspector Everson's claim that the police station was endangered, this was surely merely a story which Everson made up after the event to justify his action. The writers noted, with justice:

What overwhelming proof would be required to substantiate his case if the same thing happened in the streets of London . . . The most charitable view one can take is that the subordinate officer lost his head and acted in pure panic; but that would neither lessen his responsibility nor defend the system that allowed a non-commissioned officer to shoot down unarmed citizens at his own discretion.

Moving on to more general issues, it was observed that Chamberlain had rightly declared that 'the discontent of the Chinese people with their present conditions' lay at the seat of the trouble, but Chamberlain had failed to take note of the 'special kind of discontent resulting from our foreign relations . . . namely, the resented privileges of extraterritoriality'. Specific examples of these latter were given in some detail, the Mixed Court and the constitution of the SMC once again being singled out for special mention:

the Shanghai International Settlement has become a sovereign state governed by an oligarchy, through a bureaucratic official in the per-

son of the secretary of the Municipal Council in the interests of the foreigners alone.

It was for this reason that the 'Shanghai Chinese have stood solidly behind the students'. The only mention given to the workers was in a sentence explaining that the students were not only trying to enlist sympathy for the strikers in the Japanese mills, but, obviously more important to the authors of the pamphlet, were protesting against the three by-laws 'against which the whole Chinese community had expressed strong opposition'.

As in the other documents considered so far, the only nation singled out by name for attack was Britain. The writers admitted that given that the British formed only part of the foreign electorate in Shanghai this seemed unfair, but that in reality the Settlement was only nominally international, all the administrative machinery being in fact in British hands. No blame was attached by the writers to Japan, let alone to any of the other Powers who had sent their troops and naval vessels to maintain order in Shanghai and elsewhere.

China's Case went on to examine the foreigners in China, and found that although their group feeling was stronger than anywhere else in the world, it was significant that on the issue of 30 May and subsequent developments the community was divided, and two statements, one from a group of thirty British missionaries expressing their 'intense regret' and admitting that they were largely to blame for 'racial animosities', were quoted in illustration of this. Both of these statements came from foreigners who lived outside the concessions and without the extraordinary privileges of their Treaty Port compatriots and the authors were certainly correct in asserting that this helped them 'to see matters in a truer light'. The Shanghai foreigners, on the other hand:

have been so accustomed to see the Chinese kicked and beaten by the police and by themselves without any consequences that they are amazed as well as indignant that these people should dare to rise and offer some resistance.

Panicking, they had over-reacted violently with further shootings, arrests, searches, and rough handling of Chinese, and these measures, 'even more than the shooting incident itself', had roused the intense feelings of Chinese throughout the land.

The writers of the pamphlet felt that the government was acting in the only way possible under the circumstances:

The Chinese Government has so far wisely refrained from interfering with the outbursts of popular feeling, otherwise the situation

would have become more grave.... *Unless and until the foreign authorities realise that justice is more important than prestige, and that fair play is more effective than brutal force, the agitation is bound to continue and to spread*, and the Chinese Government, which tries to suppress popular feeling by administrative means, before it has obtained some satisfaction from the Foreign Powers, will surely have its days numbered. And if the present Government should yield to the insistence of the Powers to stop the agitation, the inevitable disastrous result would be seized upon and proclaimed to the world as one of the many proofs that China is unable to utilise the opportunity given her by the Powers to set her house in order.

Lastly, the pamphlet dealt briefly with the question of Communism, noting that the use of an unpopular catchword to label a movement and mislead the public was an old trick. Pointing out that the estimated loss per day by Shanghai businessmen during the stoppage was over £300,000, the writers asked:

Does anybody seriously think that shrewd and hardheaded men would be willing to sacrifice their earnings and livelihood at the bidding of the Bolshevik school-boys and factory coolies?

(As we are aware, a number of Europeans did believe just this, although it puzzled them. We may conjecture that the alternative, that the 'shrewd and hardheaded' businessmen of Shanghai were genuine in their patriotic fervour, was a notion even less acceptable to the readers of the *North China Herald*.) While there may have been Bolshevik sympathisers amongst the strikers, the pamphlet argued, there was no reason to characterise the whole movement as such, and it concluded with the declaration:

The Shanghai Municipal Council is the best friend of the Bolsheviks; for the action of the Shanghai police on May 30 and the days that followed is the best piece of Bolshevik propaganda that has ever been carried out in the Far East.⁵

One of the most vocal groups which must be included under the heading of *kao-teng Hua-jen* was made up of those who signed a number of statements under the name of 'the Professors of the National University of Peking'.⁶ As their individual names were not included on any of the manifestos or telegrams, it is not possible to say whether they were all composed by the same body of men or not. Only a letter to the provisional government on behalf of the university bore the signatures of Chiang Meng-lin (Monlin), Li Shih-tseng, Wang Shih-chieh and Shen Shih-yüan. Going a step further than the writers of *China's Case*, the professors wanted the government to take an active role in protecting its citizens, earnestly requesting that troops be despatched to the International Settle-

ment in Shanghai for that purpose. (Chang Tso-lin, as has been noted, took that responsibility upon himself, and we also know how he interpreted the task.) The professors were careful, and correct, to point out that such action would not be contrary to the treaties.⁷

The general tone of the professors' statements was shriller and more given to hyperbole than those which we have so far considered. The intellectuals and scholars of the world, notably Lawrence Binyon, George Bernard Shaw, John Dewey, Upton Sinclair, Henri Bergson, Otto Von Keyserling, and Oswald Spengler,⁸ were informed that:

The regrettable incidents which have so immensely antagonised the Chinese people . . . are now everywhere known but owing to the clever news with which many foreign owned news agencies have been able to control the news [*sic*] sent to different parts of the world it is not sufficiently known that those acts of brutality which the British Police caused to have committed on harmless Chinese citizens were deliberate acts of murder which no civilized powers under any circumstances can tolerate on their own soil.

The Chinese nation was determined that the guilty be punished, and unless an 'absolute guarantee' was given that such killings would never again occur, it would: 'take no rest and continue to fight to the end that righteousness and freedom will be firmly established in the world'. Denying the charges of Bolshevism and anti-foreignism, but explaining that they did: 'in the height of moral indignation condemn those acts of barbarism and of militaristic terrorism calculated to humiliate a civilised and peaceful nation . . .', the professors then reached their highest point with the statement that: 'Very rarely has the sense of justice and humanity been so outraged in the history of civilized mankind . . .'.⁹ The comment of Sir Francis Aglen, Inspector General of the Chinese Customs, that 'the Chinese . . . have a case, and a strong case, but, as usual, they are spoiling it by over-statement and extravagant demands', was not totally unfair.¹⁰

Their demands, in fact, were no different from the Shanghai GCC's thirteen points, and in a manifesto written in Chinese for local consumption there was less talk of China's civilisation and peaceful nature, and more analysis of what was really wrong, with the admission that 'the unreformed state of our nation's internal politics is like a matchmaker inviting insults'. It was painful to recall, the professors wrote, that despite the fact that China had the largest number of soldiers in the world, they were not only incapable of resisting insults to the nation, but even contributed to such misfortune by their own behaviour. More important than this, however, was the use of force by the Powers to expand their own economies and to repress the new industries of China. If a country could

not freely manage its own economy, there was no hope for it, and China could only achieve this by a united effort on the part of all its citizens to attain the abrogation of the unequal treaties.¹¹

The call for mass action introduced a new note, with a correspondingly smaller emphasis on negotiations, and the consideration of foreign economic expansion on the part of the Powers as being fundamental both to the May 30 incident and to China's woes more generally, was also an aspect largely ignored by other 'upper-class' Chinese. Yet the solution advanced by the professors for all these problems was the same, although the means to be employed differed somewhat: the abolition of the treaties; and to anticipate the substance of the remainder of this chapter, it will be found that this was the consistent theme running through the statements of almost every shade of contemporary Chinese opinion.

The statements prepared for the home front were more interesting and more compelling than those with which the professors saw fit to treat the outside world, and of their cable to the *New York Times*, the less said the better, although they should be given credit for paying attention to the problems of the proletariat. But in claiming that China had laws to protect child labour, while ignoring the fact that they were universally disregarded by Chinese industrialists, who, together with the workers themselves were the principal obstacle to every effort made by the foreigners in Shanghai to control the exploitation of children,¹² and in deliberately conveying the impression that only in foreign factories and mills did children and adults work long hours under harsh conditions, the leading lights of Peking University revealed themselves to be either so dishonest or so ignorant of conditions in their own country that one wishes that they had kept silent on such matters.¹³ The workers of Shanghai had far better spokesmen in the GTU. In a separate manifesto of his own, Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei also gave the impression that foreign industrialists, particularly the Japanese, had a monopoly on exploitation.¹⁴

All the material considered so far was issued in the first month or so of the movement, when the united front was a reality. By late July it had broken up, and it is with this in mind that we should look at the statement given by Hu Shih to a reporter from the *Baltimore Sun* in Peking on 29 July.¹⁵ Hu, it will be remembered, had been one of the authors of *China's Case* a month previously, but as the reporter noted, he had 'come into unpopularity during the present agitation because of his opposition to the methods of violence'. He now informed his interviewer that he was 'not very enthusiastic about these nationalist cries' because 'the need is largely for internal reform'. But, regardless of his personal feelings:

the fact is that nationalist sentiment has grown. Four or five years ago, when someone mentioned to me the possibility of an anti-foreign movement, I could hardly believe it possible. There has been a growth of national consciousness. It has been brought about, I think, first, by the revolution and, second, by the European war ... then, again, there has been the conscious advocacy of a nationalist philosophy.

To the charge of Bolshevism, he was only prepared to declare, none too clearly, that 'it is not quite true to say that it is Bolshevism ... that has initiated the present movement'; the labour demands put forward were only what were generally recognised as reasonable in any Western country.

While opposition to imperialism was part of the nationalist platform, so too was opposition to militarism:

This nationalist movement in China is quite different from the blind reaction against foreign aggression in the closing years of the last century. Instead of that blind reaction we have conscious advocacy of nationalism. At the same time the movement against militarism within the country becomes stronger. The commercial class among the Chinese cared little about the civil wars until last year, when the big commercial centre, Shanghai, was affected. Now the merchants are as keen as others to put an end to the strife of rival military leaders. ...

Hu also emphasised that the privileges of foreigners in China were not only disliked in themselves, but had an evil effect upon the psychology of the foreign residents, and the Shanghai incident was merely a symptom indicative of a chronic illness 'Like a carbuncle, it was bound to break out somewhere or other, as the diseased condition existed.' Asked whether there was any one thing the Chinese particularly desired, he replied that he thought it would be sufficient if the powers were simply to recognise the principle of treaty revision within a given time.¹⁶

This is rather far from the tone of *China's Case*, and although Hu was only speaking for himself in the interview, it is reasonable, from what we know of the course of events, to assume that his growing alienation from the movement and its specific demands was shared by others of his class. What was not abandoned was the desire for a change in China's treaty status, although revision, rather than abrogation, was the aim, and once the Powers had been seen to relax their position on this point, the actual implementation of any new measures need not be hurried.

Nevertheless, while Hu Shih's moderation of his position in the course of the movement may have been typical of the reactions of many of his

associates, no less so was the change undergone by Lu Hsün, at least as described by 'a Red' (Ch'ih Fu), writing in the CCP's *Hsiang-tao* on the first anniversary of the Shanghai incident:

if we look at the manifestations of another section of the intelligentsia, for example, Lu Hsün, the editor of *Wen-hsüeh Chou-pao*, whose political colouring was originally an unspeakable grey, we see that he was dyed by the red blood of May 30, his attitudes turned to the left, and his colouring turned red.¹⁷

This passage, however, should be taken with a degree of caution, as an examination of Lu Hsün's writings of the period immediately preceding and following the movement do not reveal any sudden change of orientation. And while there is no questioning Lu Hsün's indignation over the affair, his most biting criticisms were reserved for his compatriots. Not only the shootings, but also the way in which the Chinese reacted to them, were symptomatic of what was wrong with China:

When Chinese citizens were killed by British police in the International Settlement in Shanghai, instead of hitting back we hastened to clear the names of those who were killed. We protested that we were not 'Reds', for we had not been incited by some foreign power; neither were we 'rioters', for we all marched empty handed and unarmed. But I cannot understand why Chinese should be executed by British police even if China really were 'Red', or riots had actually started here... Only we Chinese, after our citizens have been killed, have to hasten to defend ourselves, looking hurt as we beg the world for justice.

The reason for this was precisely because the Chinese were not rioters or Reds, and so:

we feel wronged and complain loudly that their [European] civilization has gone bankrupt. In fact, civilization has always been like this, and it is not only today that it has been unmasked. But because in the past other people were the victims, we did not know of their sufferings; or we had forgotten our own past misery.

Despite this, there were genuinely civilised men in England, as was witnessed by the 'Declaration to the Chinese People' sent by the International Workers' Aid-China Committee, which numbered George Bernard Shaw amongst its English signatories. Barbusse's name was also there, and Lu Hsün pointed out that his mother was English, which may have accounted for his realism and the absence in his writing of 'the hedonism common to French writers'.

Now all these men are coming out to demand justice for the Chinese, so I feel there is still much we can learn from the

English—I do not, of course, include those policemen and merchants, or those ‘ladies’ who clapped and jeered from their balconies when the student demonstrators marched past.¹⁸

In a letter to a friend, this message was repeated:

Amongst those who say that England is in the wrong are also to be found Englishmen. So, despite everything, I still think that the foreign devils are more civilized than the Chinese, and while we can boycott their goods, there is much of value to be learned from their moral character. Chinese are sadly lacking in this sort of daring to point out one’s own errors.¹⁹

Running throughout Lu Hsün’s writings on 30 May—as in his other works—was his concern that the Chinese see themselves truthfully. The movement had produced a lot of wild and woolly statements and misleading claims:

Our patriots also tell us that China loves peace. But why, if we love peace, do we fight among ourselves year after year? [A question many foreigners, not all hostile, were also asking.] Perhaps it would be more accurate to say: China loves peace with foreign powers.

Surely the time has come for us to examine ourselves carefully and stop telling lies. Once we cease deceiving ourselves and others, there will be fresh hope for us.

To my mind, admitting our weaknesses is less shameful than boasting of our love for peace.²⁰

This was not to say that the movement should not be prosecuted as vigorously as possible, and Lu Hsün approved the actions of China’s students as being an improvement on past years. Because China had traditionally had a majority in favour of national spirit rather than national strength, Chinese youth bore a heavier responsibility than their contemporaries in other countries:

For our forebears devoted so much energy to being mysterious and unfathomable, balanced and smooth, that they left all the real, difficult jobs for those after them. So now that one man has to do the work of several, if not of ten or a hundred, we have a chance to prove our worth. And our opponents are the stubborn Britishers, who are a good whetting stone on which to improve our mettle.²¹

Nevertheless, Lu Hsün had strong ideas of his own both on the specific demands of the movement and its methods. He felt that apart from clearing themselves, the Chinese were only asking for some ‘slight compensation’. As for the thirteen demands: ‘all they amount to is “We shall sever relations”, and “have no more to do with you.” Even the closest friends might do the same’. But China could do little else while she only had right,

but not might, on her side.²² Her principal weapon, the economic boycott, was simply the best one that could be thought of in a helpless situation, and to have any value it would have to be carried out effectively and maintained over a long period. Even if this were done, those Chinese who claimed that it would promote Chinese commerce and industry were deluding themselves and others, for the money originally destined for England and Japan would go not to China, but to France and the US. Still, the two former countries would suffer loss, which would satisfy the desire for revenge, if nothing else.²³

Lu Hsün was resident in Peking during the May 30 Movement, and this may account in large measure for his view of it as a specifically student affair, and his advice and warnings were all directed to these students, as were his hopes. One may search his work of this period in vain for any mention of the industrial proletariat, and this alone should cause the reader to be wary of *Hsiang-tao's* claim that as a result of the movement, he became 'red'. Even the almost universal cry 'abolish the unequal treaties' does not appear in his writings, although it is hinted at in the phrase 'we shall have no more to do with you'. Moreover, his own participation in the movement was strictly limited, and on 8 July he was able to write that 'the situation in Peking is just like that on May the twenty-ninth',²⁴ despite the fact that the state of affairs in Peking was still causing the foreign community there a great deal of alarm, and the boycott of British goods was continuing. Attempts, ultimately successful, were being made to unionise the rickshaw coolies, and the servants' strike in the British Legation was yet to come. In Shanghai, Canton and elsewhere it was even less true that things had returned to their pre-May 30 state. Yet an examination of his work reveals no indication that the movement continued for at least two months after his essay of 8 July.

While Lu Hsün saw the movement principally as a student movement, he did not blame the students for its relative lack of success, for its failure to produce more than the usual 'five minutes' fervour', a failing which the critics were always ready to denounce, and of which the students themselves were painfully aware. For despite the fact that students were a special class in China, they were after all still young, and had no super-human powers:

All they can do is make speeches, march on parades, do propaganda and the like, to light sparks which may kindle a fire in men's hearts and create a blaze which may revive the nation. If men refuse to be kindled, however, the sparks can only burn themselves out... If nobody else will budge, how can these youngsters manufacture

guns, warships and aeroplanes by themselves, or capture barbarian generals and conquer barbarian countries? So this 'five minutes' fervour' is a national disease, not just a students' disease. It disgraces not only the students but the whole nation, for in other more vigorous countries such things do not happen. We need not blame foreigners, but our own cold, colourless people are certainly shameless and stupid—those in power as well as mere onlookers—when they all start jeering at the students after such an event.²⁵

The passion and clarity of this and other passages are undeniable, but it is difficult to see what makes them particularly 'red'; they are simply Lu Hsün, a man whose individuality defies all those who wish to regard him as typical of anything.

Nationalists and Communists

We have so far dealt only with the views of individuals and *ad hoc* groups, who, moreover, all came from rather similar backgrounds. It is now time to turn to the political parties, of which the KMT and CCP were the most significant, and while we shall attempt to consider them separately, we should be aware of certain difficulties. As mentioned in chapter 1, the May 30 Movement came about at a time when the two parties were united, and Chesneaux has argued correctly that it 'demonstrated the possibilities that were opened up for the Nationalist movement by the alliance'.²⁶ Furthermore, most contemporary foreign sources regarded the two parties as one and the same, and later historians have taken advantage of this confusion to exaggerate the role of their favoured party.²⁷ Yet the most cursory examination of the CCP's publications reveals that the party members had a very clear view of the different roles played by the two allies, and as Ch'en Tu-hsiu noted, the Communists were able, both before and during the movement, 'to make severe criticisms of the compromising policy of the Kuomintang'.²⁸ The differences and tensions, rather than diminishing, positively increased in the course of the struggle against the common enemy.

Shortly before 30 May, the Executive Branch of the KMT in Shanghai issued a manifesto protesting against the rate-payers' meeting, scheduled for 2 June, which was to pass the controversial by-laws. Pointing out, rightly, that there was no legal foundation for this, they accused the foreigners of behaving as if Shanghai were a colony, and by this usurpation of powers, they were, in the words of the proverb, behaving like a rowdy guest usurping the position of the host. The KMT wished to unite with all those Chinese who did not want to see the loss of their rights and

their country, and with all fair-minded and self-respecting foreigners, to wash clean this stain on world civilisation and to restore the independent and equal status of the Chinese race (*min-tsu*).²⁹ The civilisation stained, it is to be understood, was that of the foreigners, a view which, as we have seen, Lu Hsün firmly rejected.

Accordingly, the KMT approved the demonstration on 30 May as being consonant with its own aims, and reacted immediately to the shootings by calling an emergency meeting on the same night, which we have described in chapter 2 (pp. 36-7). A manifesto published by the Shanghai Executive Branch on the afternoon of 1 June, following the shootings of that morning, declared:

On May 30, patriotic students and workers of the Republic of China went out quite unarmed to deliver speeches in order to gain sovereignty for the Chinese people, freedom for the citizens of Shanghai, and to tell of the injustice done to a slaughtered worker. Despising China's national rights and universal standards of humanity, the British police of the S.M.C. enacted a bloody tragedy never before witnessed in China or the world. . .

China's prestige, Britain's good name, and twentieth-century culture were all obliterated by this volley, and the insult and shame is not to China alone, but to the people of Britain who call themselves advanced and cultured, and to all the people of the whole world who, seeing the cruel and inhuman conduct of the imperialists, do not arise and cry for justice for the Chinese.

Following the incidents of 1 June:

The sun is still in the sky but obscured by dark clouds, and the future of the human race does not bear thinking on . . . [the behaviour of the British] . . . was worse than that of the Boxers, and they further insult the Chinese and confuse world opinion with the labels 'xenophobia' and 'red'; both their words and actions should be considered shameful by the Christian and freedom loving Anglo-Saxon people . . .

The Kuomintang, confronting this inhuman and bloody conduct and the armed aggression it represents, will exert its utmost efforts to help the patriotic and freedom and equality loving people of China to enlarge their human rights, and to restore the prestige of our country.³⁰

Human rights and national prestige form a leitmotiv running through the proclamations of the time. Equally insistent, however, was the claim that these could only be achieved by a united struggle of the whole Chinese people against their enemy. Lu Hsün had claimed that the Chinese had not yet identified this enemy,³¹ but to the KMT it was represented by one word: imperialism; and it was

one of the results of the May 30 Movement and the propaganda of the KMT and the CCP that this hitherto unfamiliar word became known all over China. Indeed it was essential that the people learned what imperialism was, and learned it quickly, for unless they did, China would quickly sink to the level of an imperialist colony. In the May 30 Movement, the KMT had its chance to explain the imperialist threat and the unequal treaties, as expressed in its program and various manifestos,³² and the Chinese were warned by the KMT Central Executive Committee that:

The English are now using their cruel methods of dealing with the peoples of India and Egypt on Chinese soil, and if the Chinese people do not arise and struggle, the shameless atrocities of imperialism will become even worse than this... Every party member must exert himself to aid the people and fight British imperialism...³³

Reminding the Chinese of all that they had suffered at foreign hands since the Opium Wars, the Canton Revolutionary government solemnly declared that:

this act of violence by the authorities of the Shanghai Municipal Council, ... and the losses and insults suffered, cannot be compensated for simply by apologies, punishments, compensatory payments and other such trifles, but only by abolition of the unequal treaties and rendition of the concessions, the fundamental solution of our problems.

However, although China's basic problem was imperialism as expressed in the treaties, the revolutionary government admitted that the fact that such an incident as that of 30 May could come about was also due to the lickspittle attitude of the Tuan Ch'i-jui government towards the Powers, and Tuan's undertaking to observe the unequal treaties in return for recognition. Furthermore:

Since his recent victory, Chang Tso-lin's faith in and reliance on the foreigners has grown stronger, and this is an additional factor in these bloody events. Carrying out the last instructions of our commander in chief, this Government swears that it will exert itself in struggle until it has completely obliterated such instances of war-lord and imperialist collusion. We call on the people of the whole country to arise to this end.³⁴

We now have all the principal elements of the picture of the May 30 incident and movement as reflected in the published sources of the KMT. The shooting was the work of an aggressive imperialism, led by Britain, which wished to reduce China to colonial status, and such incidents

would continue and become more serious as long as the Chinese people did not realise what was happening and resolve to fight. The Chinese could only fight effectively if they were united under the leadership of the KMT and armed with the knowledge of China's problems and their solutions contained in the Party program. The principal obstacles standing in the way of the Chinese people in their fight for national prestige and human rights were the pro-foreign government in Peking and the warlords who benefited from their contacts with the imperialists. By overthrowing the warlords and forcing the imperialists to yield by abrogating the unequal treaties, China would be fulfilling the will of Sun Yat-sen.

A good deal of this was similar to the Communist picture, and the fundamental direction of the fight, against imperialism and warlordism, was the same. On the whole, the notion of class struggle, although referred to by some writers, did not form a major part of the KMT's scenario for China's liberation, and the proletariat and peasantry were certainly not assigned the key roles; and unlike the KMT, CCP sources did not constantly refer to the will of Sun Yat-sen. Furthermore, while in their propaganda for the masses the CCP defined imperialism simply by what it did, that is kill Chinese, in their more theoretical articles they adhered to the classical Leninist analysis. While this view also had currency in certain KMT circles, particularly since the acceptance by Sun of Soviet advisers, and the vast majority of the KMT accepted that imperialism was a reality threatening China, there was less ideological uniformity as to the nature of the phenomenon, and a leading theoretician like Tai Chi-t'ao could claim in an influential booklet published during the movement that imperialism grew out of the racial struggle, which was in turn the product of man's sexual drive, and that the real racial struggle would only break out after the capitalist order was destroyed.³⁵

The doctrinal variety within the KMT was also illustrated by their approach to class struggle. On May-day 1924 Sun Yat-sen told the workers of Canton:

The difference between the Chinese workers and foreign workers lies in the fact that the latter are oppressed only by their own capitalists and not by those of other countries... The Chinese workers are as yet not oppressed by Chinese capitalists... They are oppressed by foreign capitalists.³⁶

This may have gone down well enough in the less industrialised city of Canton, but it could be said of Shanghai only through ignorance or opportunism. Sun did, however, partly cover himself by the use of the word 'yet', leaving a question mark as to future developments. But later in

Shanghai, during the movement, the erstwhile Marxist Tai Chi-t'ao argued more strongly than ever against the advocates of class struggle, declaring that 'in my heart, there lie only the needs of the Chinese *nation* and *people*'.³⁷ Nevertheless, only three months after Sun Yat-sen's speech quoted above, the second plenary session of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT, elected by the reorganisation Conference, passed three resolutions on the question of co-operation with the CCP, which included the statement that:

The Chinese Communist Party is a political organization that is crystallized out of the natural class struggle of the industrial proletariat that is just developing in China... Even were we able to dissolve the existing Chinese Communist Party by force, we could not destroy the Chinese proletariat, for they would organize again.³⁸

Despite this, though, the class struggle as such was not given a central role in the May 30 Movement even in those publications which came from recognisably 'left' KMT sources, and when compradors and certain wealthy merchants were accused of wrecking the movement, they were guilty as traitors to the national cause rather than as representatives of a particular economic and social class.³⁹

Opinions and actions also varied with the circumstances in different parts of the country. As the base area of the revolutionary government, the city of Canton was the KMT's principal stronghold, and the authority of the KMT *vis-à-vis* the CCP was boosted by the presence of Soviet advisers. In reports to the Central Committee, the Kuangtung District Committee frequently used Borodin's name to explain why directives of the former body had not been followed, much to the disgust of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who felt that since Borodin's arrival, the Canton Communists no longer respected the Central Committee.⁴⁰

The united front of the two parties was the strongest in Canton, and they were together able to prosecute vigorously the great Canton-Hong Kong strike.⁴¹ Moreover, whatever faction fighting and disagreements may have been going on behind the scenes, at least on the surface there was greater unity of outlook within the Canton KMT than elsewhere. The collection of articles published by the KMT's National Canton University on the first anniversary of the May 30 incident confirms in every point the outline of the party's views on the significance of the movement which we have drawn above from other sources.⁴² The first article repeated that only by carrying out Sun Yat-sen's dual program of overthrowing imperialism and abolishing the unequal treaties could the national shame be wiped out and such incidents be prevented in the

future.⁴³ Others emphasised the role played by the movement in awakening the Chinese people, and historical parallels were drawn. One writer explained that while the May 4 Movement had already wakened quite a few from their deep slumbers, they were 'still drowsy and numbed with sleep, unable to see who their enemies really were'. May 30 had been 'like a dose of stimulant'.⁴⁴ As the KMT took the opportunity to spread its views,⁴⁵ more and more people realised the true nature of imperialism and entered the struggle against it, and against its Chinese allies, the warlords.⁴⁶ The perspective of a year's remove only emphasised the importance of the events of 1925, and another article claimed that 'October 10 is the date which marks the success of the Chinese revolutionary movement, and May 30 is the starting date of the Chinese people's liberation movement'. This was because China had long lacked nationalism, 'the precious thing on which the development of the state and the existence of the race depend', but that 30 May had finally awakened this national feeling which could alone save China.⁴⁷

In Peking, where the main strength of the movement came from student groups and patriotic merchants, there were also no open splits between the KMT and the Communists, although the Communists did have to devote some of their energies to dealing with their anarchist rivals, a conflict which forms the basis of Hu Yeh-p'in's novel *Kuang-ming Tsai Wo-men-ti Ch'ien-mien*.⁴⁸ By 1924 relations between these two groups had become strained, and their struggle for influence amongst the intellectuals and workers intensified during the May 30 Movement, with the Communists emerging as the victors. These anarchists were anti-Bolshevik syndicalists, similar to the founders of the Shanghai Labour Federation, and like their Shanghai comrades they may have had links with the right wing of the KMT, although in the absence of sufficient evidence this cannot be proved.⁴⁹ Certainly Hu's novel, which sought to present a realistic picture of the May 30 Movement in the capital as seen through the eyes of a young Communist, makes no mention of any conflict with the KMT.

In Shanghai, however, the situation was different, for a number of reasons. As far back as 1922, KMT leaders of the labour syndicates (*kung-t'uan*), which were subsequently united in the Shanghai Federation of Labour, had expressed their unease over Sun Yat-sen's attitude to Soviet Russia and the local Communists, and strongly opposed any policy of collaboration with the latter, arguing that the Communist thesis that 'the workers have no fatherland' was incompatible with Sun's own Three People's Principles and Chinese national feeling. But despite eight inter-

views with Ma Ch'ao-chün, representing Shanghai, Sun did not change his mind. As the attitude of the Shanghai leaders also remained unchanged Sun sent a delegation from Canton which included Wang Ching-wei and Liao Chung-k'ai, to meet with them, together with Ch'en Tu-hsiu and other Communists. Ch'en denied any plot to destroy the KMT, and explained that the leftist newspaper in Canton which was supporting the policy of Ch'en Chiung-ming against Sun Yat-sen was controlled by T'an P'ing-shan and Ch'en Kung-po, and did not reflect his own opinions. This somewhat mollified the Shanghai KMT and labour leaders, as did the joint declaration of Sun and Joffe on Communist-KMT co-operation in the following year, but they were never really happy with the alliance.⁵⁰

No sooner was the alliance formed than a fierce struggle for control over the working classes of Shanghai broke out between the CCP and the Federation of Labour, whose leaders were not prepared to accept the statement made by the KMT in Canton that the CCP was 'crystallized out of the natural class struggle of the industrial proletariat'. It was to counter the growing Communist influence with youth and labour that right-wing KMT members began to set up branches of the Sun Yat-senism Study Society, led in Shanghai by Ma Ch'ao-chün.⁵¹ Ma had been director of the Workers' Department of the Canton Municipal Kuomintang Headquarters, but his position there had become too uncomfortable following a Communist campaign against him which included a widely publicised ten-point charge of exploiting the proletariat.⁵² He was condemned as a scab at the Labour Conference in Canton in May 1925.⁵³ Nevertheless, his influence within the Shanghai KMT was such that his name, together with those of Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang and Liu Lu-yin, was used to summon the emergency meeting at the KMT headquarters in Huanlung Road on the night of 30 May. These right-wingers were only one group within the KMT, of course, and the Shanghai Executive Branch included such Communists as Mao Tse-tung, Yün Tai-ying and others. However, they were the most significant non-Communist component of the Shanghai Party, and had led it prior to the period of co-operation. They could, accordingly, feel with some justification that they were the 'real' KMT in Shanghai, and their dismay at the growth of Communist power under the cover of their own name is understandable.

Unfortunately for them, although they had succeeded by early 1925 in gaining the allegiance of some Shanghai notables such as Tu Yüeh-sheng, the gangster, and Yü Jih-chang of the YMCA, they had still made no great headway with the majority of the big bourgeoisie who made up the GCC.

Yü Hsia-ch'ing, for example, had no KMT affiliation, and consequently when the Communists finally succeeded in gaining control of the Shanghai workers, through the GTU, the non-Communist KMT had no other power base to turn to. Deprived of influence over the two most significant forces within the movement in Shanghai, they were unable to assume any role of leadership. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao: 'When action had to be taken, decisions were usually made in secret by a CCP caucus and then formally adopted as a resolution by the KMT organization.'⁵⁴ Unfortunately, Chang does not indicate who were the KMT members who passed these caucus decisions. It is most unlikely that the rightists associated with the Sun Yat-senism Study Association would have allowed themselves to be put in such a position.

This brings us to the question of the extent of Communist control over the movement. It is ironical, although by no means surprising, that while at the time the Chinese indignantly denied all allegations that the movement was masterminded by the 'reds', and Communist writers like Teng Chung-hsia could write that such charges were merely British propaganda,⁵⁵ yet subsequently Communist historians have claimed that the movement was indeed initiated and led by the young Communist Party.⁵⁶ Doubly ironical, a year after the event, the *China Yearbook*, edited by H. G. W. Woodhead, known as a diehard, confessed:

The serious mistake made by foreigners was to emphasize Communism as the cause of all the troubles in 1925. Chinese resented this explanation as giving the impression that the Chinese cannot even make disturbances without foreign [i.e. Russian] supervision. As long as anti-Communism was, in any way, identified with pro-foreignism, there was little hope of the better elements among the Chinese really opposing the Communists.⁵⁷

Almost simultaneously, a Chinese magazine in Shanghai published a long article commenting on the fact that the movement had in truth been taken over by the Communists, as a result of whose 'ridiculous ideas and wild and crazy actions':

the people's hatred and wrath were turned to melancholy, the fight against the external enemy turned into an internal power struggle, and the people's bad and weak points were exposed to the outside world, causing people to despise them.⁵⁸

Quite plainly, the question of who led the May 30 Movement cannot be given a simple answer. As has been shown in our account of the history of the movement in Shanghai, the CCP played an important role in the labour disputes which continued throughout the first five months of

1925, and when the central committee called the demonstration on 30 May to protest against the killing of Ku Cheng-hung, they were astute enough to combine this issue with others affecting a wider number of citizens. Furthermore, by setting up the GTU, the communists were able to establish their control over the industrial workers, who formed the backbone of the strike movement; and this, combined with influence with the students, enabled them to dominate the Union of Labour, Commerce and Education. Thus it seems that in the early stages of the movement, the CCP was the most influential of any of the participating groups and organisations.

Nevertheless, it is clear that once the GCC began to take positive action, with the return to Shanghai of its leader Yü Hsia-ch'ing, the CCP was pushed into an increasingly defensive position, and following the break up of the Union of Labour, Commerce and Education, signalled by the return to work of the street unions in the face of opposition from labour and student representatives, it became evident to the leaders of the party that they needed to make major changes in the policy they were pursuing. The fact that the CCP could carry out such changes successfully without losing its hold over the workers, however, indicates the degree to which it had consolidated its position *vis-à-vis* the Shanghai proletariat during the movement.

Despite growing difficulties, the GTU continued throughout July and August to act as the recognised spokesman of labour in Shanghai, holding press conferences, receiving a Soviet trade union delegation, and even engaging in public discussion with the Peking government over projected trade union laws. At the very least, it was the only body with sufficient authority to ensure an orderly retreat.⁵⁹ A retreat there was, though, and while Van Slyke writes of the GTU's 'brilliant handling of the Shanghai strikes', he nevertheless concedes that 'the mass movement was growing at a rate beyond the CCP's capacity to control or even encompass it'.⁶⁰ This is confirmed by Chang Kuo-t'ao's fear that 'the people might fly out of control', and Chang explains:

The C.C.P. ... played a leading role in the Movement; but at the same time, the Movement fully exposed the fact that the C.C.P. had not yet acquired adequate leadership power. Caught up in this great tide of anti-imperialism, the C.C.P. immediately realized that it did not have enough workers ... This was especially true for the C.C. of the C.C.P., which was so harried that it could not devote enough time to the formulation of policy. It was constantly called upon to look after specific, concrete tasks that could not be postponed for a moment. Although, as I have mentioned, the C.C. of the C.C.P.

worked out thorough preliminary plans for the Movement, it was unable to produce additional policies to cope with new situations. As a result, it could only watch the leadership of the Movement being taken out of its control.⁶¹

This fact also had implications for the China debate within the Communist Party of the USSR. The assumption implicit in the Trotskyist attacks against the Stalinist line was that the Chinese Communists actually had effective control over the mass movement. Yet while their influence was strong, particularly in the initial phases of the May 30 Movement, they were in fact still incapable of withstanding a determined effort to break their hold.⁶² Despite these qualifications, however, it can be stated with confidence that inasmuch as the movement was led by any single body of men, it was led, at least in Shanghai, its place of origin, by the CCP, and the gradual loss of control by this body of the wide sections of the non-Communist populace who participated in the movement, coincided with the slowing down and eventual suppression of the movement itself. At no point was the CCP challenged for leadership of the movement by another group which either desired or had it in its power to prosecute it with equal resolution.⁶³ Both for this reason, and in the light of subsequent Chinese history, it is accordingly appropriate that special attention be devoted to the way in which the Communist leaders of the time viewed the movement.

Unlike most foreign observers, the Communists were convinced that the shots fired on 30 May were by no means fortuitous, but were the result of a well thought out policy. A writer in *Hsiang-tao*, using the pen-name of 'a fact seeker', explained that to understand the events of that day, it was necessary to go back to World War I. Europe, its treasures drained and resources depleted, needed to recover her losses, and to do so she turned to China, to buy, to sell, and to use cheap labour, thus dashing the hopes of China's infant industries. But simultaneously, Chinese resistance began to make itself felt, through the May 4 Movement, the emergence of warlord politics, and in early 1925, the re-birth of a China-wide labour movement. The establishment of societies to hasten the calling of a national parliament, the raising of the slogan 'abolish the unequal treaties', and the participation of students in politics, all contributed to the increasingly uneasy feeling of the imperialists that their position was dangerously threatened, and that resolute action was called for.⁶⁴ The manifesto issued to the people of China by the CCP following the shooting also emphasised that this was the response of the imperialists to the new awakening of the Chinese,⁶⁵ and almost a year later, Ch'ü

Ch'iu-pai repeated this message, adding that as they saw their old policy of relying on the warlords to rule China indirectly being rendered unsuitable by the changing political climate, the imperialists resolved on a policy of 'direct massacre' to silence the demands for treaty abolition and a national parliament.⁶⁶ As another manifesto proclaimed: 'The blood bath in Shanghai is not a chance occurrence but is the inevitable consequence of the imperialist policy in China and the result of its enslavement.'⁶⁷

It followed from this that further and even bloodier massacres would only be avoided in the future if China were able to escape fully the clutches of imperialism.⁶⁸ The May 30 Movement, therefore, was part of China's long struggle against imperialist aggression, and followed in the tradition of the Taiping rebellion, the Boxers, and the May 4 Movement, and as good Marxists the Communist writers were concerned to place it in its proper historical perspective. At the same time, however, they wished to emphasise important points of departure from all previous such activities.

According to T'ang Hsing-ch'i, the severe oppression of South China by British and French imperialists had been a major factor initiating the fifteen year long struggle of the Taiping rebels, which was eventually defeated through collusion between the imperialists and the Manchu government, and because Hung Hsiu-ch'üan had wanted to introduce Christianity into China and to establish himself as emperor, aims which caused the rebels to lose much popular support. In 1900 the Boxers rose in response to the oppression of North China by Germany, Japan and Russia, but they in their turn were also defeated, partly through the stupidity and reactionary nature of their leaders, and partly because of the xenophobic character of their movement, which opposed not only foreign oppression, but all contact with foreigners whatsoever. The May 30 Movement, which united the people of all China against their common imperialist foe, did not only not oppose, but advocated co-operation with any nation which would treat China on equal terms, such as the Soviet Union.⁶⁹

The most thorough treatment of the relationship of the May 30 Movement to that of the *I-Ho-T'uan* was an article written by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai in September 1925, entitled 'The Meaning of the *I-Ho-T'uan* Movement and the Future of the May 30 Movement'. The latter, he argued, was a direct continuation of the anti-imperialist struggle of the former, but it differed radically in methods, organisation and strategy. Firstly, the working class now had a clear idea of what it opposed when it spoke of imperialist

aggression, and in the place of blind xenophobia, it raised concrete demands: it opposed the unequal treaties, imperialist massacres, the concession system, consular jurisdiction, and the stationing of foreign troops in China; it demanded the right to form unions and to strike, and insisted on normal political rights for all the Chinese people. This was a far cry, Ch'ü pointed out, from wishing to destroy all 'western culture' in order to preserve China's 'national essence'.

Secondly, the working class was fighting for its own ends, while at the same time struggling against those warlords and capitalists who wished to sell the country, and those others who were prepared to weaken or compromise. They were quite unlike those who claimed to fight only for 'the nation' or 'the race', and it was imperative that the Chinese workers participating in the National Revolution take class struggle as their guide, and reject the nonsense about the harmony of class interests being peddled by Tai Chi-t'ao and his ilk.

Thirdly, aware of the duties it must perform in the National Revolution, the working class raised concrete political and economic demands, and through these brought the capitalists and petty bourgeoisie into the anti-imperialist struggle. The workers relied not on any amorphous concept of loyalty, but on the real needs and desires of the various classes, in order to set up a united front.

Fourthly, the working class understood the international significance of China's National Revolution, and saw that as a blow against world imperialism it could not but gain the support of the oppressed classes within the imperialist countries. Therefore only the imperialists were opposed, not all foreigners, and the Chinese working class made great efforts in the field of international propaganda, to get in touch with the proletariat and oppressed people of all lands. The Chinese proletariat realised that China could only be truly free when the socialist revolution was triumphant throughout the world.

The desire of the Chinese workers—or at least their representatives in the CCP — to clear themselves of the charge of xenophobia was understandable and persistent, and as Ch'ü indicated in the above paragraph, they were anxious for contact with sympathetic foreigners, just as much as were such men as Hu Shih and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. This aspect of their proletarian internationalism is rather touchingly illustrated by a telegram sent by the Chinese Railway Workers' Federation to the General Council of British Trade Unions, inviting a delegation to visit China:

The delegation would be the best means of establishing brotherly relations between the British and the Chinese working class, at the

moment when British imperialism, along with Japanese and other imperialisms, is attempting to fasten fresh chains upon the people of China. Your arrival would suffice to expose the lies and calumnies of the imperialist press, which is attempting to represent the revolutionary and anti-imperialist movement in China as a fight against foreigners.⁷⁰

Fifthly, Ch'ü continued, the Chinese working class was now well organised, and not merely spiritually united in the manner of some religious organisation, as the Boxers had been.

Thus, the article concluded, while 30 May was a continuation of the struggle led at one time by the *I-Ho-T'uan*, it differed in that it was led by the proletariat, had the concept of class struggle as its guiding light, raised concrete political and economic demands to ensure a union of all the nation's oppressed, and had an international significance and future.⁷¹

Both for its nation-wide, and even international scope, and its mass and organized nature, the May 30 Movement was recognised by Chinese Communists at the time, and by later CCP historians,⁷² as something quite new in Chinese history. In an article already referred to above, Ch'iu Shih argued that while the *I-Ho-T'uan* was a movement of poor peasants, 4 May of students, and the first strike wave of 1922-3 the work of the most advanced workers, 30 May involved all the oppressed, workers, students, businessmen and peasants. Moreover, China had received support from other countries, something that had never happened before, and not only from Russia, which was a matter of course, but from the oppressed of many other nations, including Britain, the United States and Japan.⁷³ Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai claimed that 30 May turned a Chinese political movement into a mass movement for the first time,⁷⁴ and an article in *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* argued that it was a great improvement on the May 4 Movement, when one had simply involved oneself, but not others.⁷⁵

The mass movement initiated by 30 May was, in fact, the beginning of a revolution, as article after article in the Communist press constantly emphasised. 'This movement is the beginning of the Chinese masses' anti-imperialist revolution', proclaimed one writer.⁷⁶ 'May 30—this is really the day when the Chinese National Revolution commenced', stated another.⁷⁷ On the first anniversary of the incident the claim was repeated: 'May 30—the day when the Chinese National Revolutionary movement really started.'⁷⁸ The battle cry of the revolution was the slogan 'Abolish the Unequal Treaties', and it was argued that this meant nothing less than demanding the radical overthrow of the ruling position of the imperialist powers in China. Previously, those who had raised the slogan were frequently regarded as dangerous reds, but in the course of the movement it

was heard across the country, cried not only by the workers, but even (in modified form) by the Peking government, which, like the Shanghai GCC and the other businessmen and merchants who each participated in their own way, could not but ask for treaty revision: 'Why is this? Because after May 30 Chinese history has entered a new period—the period of carrying out the National Revolution.'⁷⁹

The similarity between this and the statements of the KMT will be readily appreciated, and there is no need to dwell further on that large amount of material which simply repeats the KMT position outlined above. One major point of difference, however, has already emerged from Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai's article comparing the Boxers and the May 30 Movement, where he gave a central role to the concept of class struggle. While few Chinese would have denied that 30 May initiated a mass movement on a scale new to Chinese history, only the Communists made the claim that: 'The May 30 movement effectively began a revolutionary mass movement, that was quite unprecedented in China, and moreover, in every place the working class acted as the vanguard.'⁸⁰ The CCP made no attempt to hide their belief that joining in a united front in no way implied an abandonment, or even temporary relaxation, of the class struggle; if anything, it was to be intensified. A frequent line of argument was that the class struggle was also the national struggle, because the workers were the most revolutionary force within the national struggle, and their victory would be a victory for the national revolution.⁸¹ This identification of the class with the nation must have been particularly appealing to workers in foreign enterprises.

The fullest statement of the CCP position on this question was made in an article in *Hsiang-tao*, again by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, entitled 'The National Revolution and Class Struggle in the May 30 Movement',⁸² in which he argued that the class struggle and the anti-imperialist struggle were indivisible; wherever the movement had been strongest, the workers had formed the vanguard, and other classes had entered the movement, all with their various demands, because of the strength of the working class. Had it not been for warlord oppression, the patriotic anti-imperialist movement might have succeeded in uniting the country under a popular government and revolutionary army. At the very least it could have established basic political freedoms and further united the people in preparation for still greater struggles. At the time of writing (September 1925), however, the anti-imperialist movement had encountered a great stumbling block. The interests of the working class were in line with those of the majority of Chinese, while those of the big capitalists were in opposi-

tion. The latter were ready to take advantage of the sacrifices made by the former, and then abandon them. The petty bourgeoisie was wavering, its organisation loose and fighting strength feeble. Taking advantage of these differences, the imperialists were using the help of the warlords and the readiness of the big capitalists to compromise in order to attack the workers' movement, while at the same time tempting the bourgeoisie with possible concessions to be gained from the Tariff Conference and other such schemes.

Ch'ü listed the following examples of compromise on the part of the capitalists: 1) The thirteen demands of the GCC had been substituted for the more radical seventeen demands of the Union of Labour, Commerce and Education; 2) the GCC wished the anti-Japanese struggle to be restricted to the textile factories, and once labour problems were settled there, the boycott of Japanese goods should be ended, thus ignoring the entire history of Japanese aggression against and humiliation of China. Simultaneously, bourgeois scholars promoted the slogan 'solely against England', a policy which was even supported by Tai Chi-t'ao, a KMT member, who claimed that such was the will of Sun Yat-sen. It was under such conditions that the workers in Japanese mills were forced to yield considerably by accepting the Japanese conditions and unhappily returning to work; 3) When the electricity supply was discontinued, the capitalists stepped up their activities against the workers and cut off their strike funds, at the same time using warlord forces to make the electricity workers return to work unconditionally. They also used gangsters to engage in wrecking and intimidation; 4) Quite a few merchants secretly disobeyed the order to boycott British and Japanese goods.

Summing up the experience of the past months, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai felt that, if the proletariat were victorious, the full development of the national revolutionary movement would be assured, while if the bourgeoisie were to triumph, both national aims and the demands for popular rights would be sacrificed to their selfish policy of compromise. As a result of the May 30 incident, the Chinese masses realised the necessity of struggling against oppression, and in the course of the movement they learned how to do so. Moreover, *pace* Tai Chi-t'ao, the workers would struggle against all oppression, Chinese and foreign, and if they were unable to persuade Chinese employers to recognise their unions, how could they ever hope to persuade the imperialists? How could the Chinese proletariat know that it should oppose imperialist oppression while not lifting a finger against exploitation by fellow Chinese, Ch'ü asked? He concluded his article with the statement that experience during the May 30 Movement had taught

that the majority of Chinese industrialists would rather submit to the imperialists than yield to the working class.

Much of this was repeated by Ch'en Tu-hsiu in his open letter to Tai Chi-t'ao,⁸³ and in another article published in November 1925 in which he excoriated the Chinese press in Shanghai for their unsympathetic and unpatriotic attitude. He also attacked the so called *kao-teng Hua-jen*, and scholars such as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Ting Wen-chiang, for their constant prating about 'friendly talks', and 'mutual forgiveness and understanding'. With such a bourgeoisie, under such conditions, Ch'en exclaimed, of course class struggle was justified in the national movement.⁸⁴ The CCP regarded Tai Chi-t'ao's *The National Revolution and the K.M.T.* as the manifesto of a new right wing within the KMT, and Teng Chung-hsia claimed that the doctrine of class conciliation it preached was sufficiently influential to force the CCP to attack it vigorously over a period of several months.⁸⁵ Indeed, according to Ch'en Tu-hsiu's own apology:

As soon as the proletariat raised its head in the May 30th Movement, the bourgeoisie was immediately aroused. Responding to the tide, Tai Chi-t'ao's anti-Communist pamphlet appeared. At the enlarged plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Peking in October of the same year, I submitted the following proposal to the Political Resolution Committee: Tai Chi-t'ao's pamphlet was not accidental, but an indication of the bourgeoisie's attempt to strengthen its own power for the purpose of checking the proletariat and going over to the counterrevolution. We should prepare ourselves immediately to withdraw from the Kuomintang and become independent. We should maintain our political identity and lead the masses; we should not be restrained by the policy of the Kuomintang.

This resolution was opposed, however, and Ch'en, 'lacking in resoluteness' (his own words) did not insist for the sake of party discipline and in deference to majority opinion.⁸⁶

Shortly after the movement began, G. S. Moss of the Foreign Office wrote in a short minute: 'The crisis will show how far property-owning Chinese . . . will react against Communism and the irresponsible agitation of students.'⁸⁷ Communist writers agreed that involving as it did such a wide cross section of the population, the movement provided an unparalleled laboratory for testing the true nature of the various groups within society.⁸⁸ In this respect it played a role similar to that of the 1905 Revolution in Russia.⁸⁹ Writing on the first anniversary of the incident, one writer declared that the pressures and strains of the movement had re-

vealed class divisions more clearly than ever before in modern Chinese history, and not in China alone, but on an international scale. On the one side were ranked the workers, peasants, handicraft workers, small merchants, the majority of students, the majority of the KMT, the Canton government, the CCP and CYL, the Soviet Union and the oppressed peoples of all colonial countries; the enemy they faced was composed of the imperialists, the warlords, compradors, big capitalists, upper-class Chinese (*kao-teng Hua-jen*), landlords, nationalists (*kuo-chia-chu-i-che*), the KMT right, labour scabs and, ignominiously last even in this lineup, the god-professors (*hsüeh-fa*).⁹⁰

More detailed was an article entitled 'Revolutionary Forces and Counterrevolutionary Forces', according to which each group was composed of five categories. The counterrevolutionaries all came from the bourgeoisie, but could be sub-divided into the following groups:

1. Big businessmen and compradors, who, disregarding the seven-teen demands, tried to monopolise the movement and privately contacted the official investigators from Peking.
2. Upper-class Chinese, such as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Ting Wen-chiang, Hu Shih, Yü Jih-chang and others; they didn't understand the need for the people to organise and help themselves, and failed to comprehend the real significance of mass meetings and demonstrations. Instead, they begged the imperialists to be 'just, fair, and impartial', and wished to organise their own ideal type of 'neutral' investigating committee.
3. Those who wished to restrict the scope of the movement, concentrating opposition against Britain and Japan alone, or even just Britain, instead of imperialism in general. Most of this group were comparatively progressive, but did not trust the strength of the people. They were also in favour of a return to business 'to help the strikers', and a return to work in Japanese factories 'to help the strikers in British factories'; but such moves in reality only weakened the will of the remainder to persist in the struggle.
4. Those who relied on the Peking government or warlords, or on a purely legal settlement. They opposed all strikes, and wished everybody to wait quietly for a legal solution. Some of them also wished Chang Tso-lin or Sun Ch'uan-fang to take back the International Settlement by force, or to declare war against England; but this was a hopeless path, nothing more than 'entreating the spirits and worshipping Buddha'.

5. Those capitalists and educators who not only opposed, but went so far as to wreck the workers' and students' organisations, such as Mu Ou-ch'u (Hsiang-yüeh) and Wen Lan-t'ing, who aided and abetted the Japanese textile manufacturers in their refusal to grant the right of representing workers to the trade union delegates; and Ts'ao Mu-kuan and Ku Feng-chen, who were afraid that if students were allowed to organise, they would break out of the shackles imposed on them by their teachers.

On the side of revolution were to be found:

1. The workers.
2. The students, who were easily moved and fired with sympathy and enthusiasm, but who were not able to maintain a protracted struggle, and tended to be romantic.
3. Small businessmen, whose links with imperialism were not very close, and who rarely had occasion in the course of business to clash directly with the industrial workers. They were 'fairly patriotic'.
4. The peasants, who lacked the organisation and self-confidence of the workers; but because of their position in society, they needed and were willing to engage in revolution.
5. Soldiers, who were in fact poor or ruined peasants, and who in an atmosphere of national struggle might mutiny and fight on the side of the people.⁹¹

This article may be taken as typical of the large number of such analyses of Chinese society which appeared in CCP organs in the year or so following the May 30 incident. Not so typical was the article, later to achieve much fame, written two months before (March 1926) by Mao Tse-tung, entitled 'An Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society', in which Mao pointed to the events of the movement for proof of the theses he advanced.⁹² Although Mao's treatment of the revolutionary possibilities of the bourgeoisie and proletariat conform to the general pattern, his article seems to be unique for the amount and detailed nature of the attention he paid to the peasantry, a good half of the work being devoted to this class.

Several factors account for this difference, not the least of which must have been the fact that Mao himself was of peasant origin, unlike the majority of the CCP leadership, which was composed mainly of city dwellers and the scions of decayed landlord families. It was also in part fortuitous, for an illness had forced Mao to leave Shanghai before the movement commenced, and he had returned to convalesce at his old

home. While his comrades were engaged in leading the most significant manifestation of the power of the proletariat that had so far appeared in China, Mao himself was unable to play any part in the great events occurring in Shanghai.⁹³ However, there were compensations, as he explained to Edgar Snow:

Formerly I had not fully realized the degree of class struggle among the peasantry, but after the May 30th Incident and during the great wave of political activity which followed it, the Hunanese peasantry became very militant. I left my home, where I had been resting, and began a rural organizational campaign. In a few months we had formed more than twenty peasant unions, and had aroused the wrath of the landlords who demanded my arrest. Chao Heng-t'i sent troops after me, and I fled to Canton.⁹⁴

As has been noted, such peasant activity was the exception rather than the rule during the May 30 Movement, and Mao would certainly have been aided in his organisational work in Hunan by his own local and peasant background. It is highly unlikely that men like Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai or Ch'en Tu-hsiu would have been able to present themselves to the peasants in an equally convincing manner. Moreover, the general absence of peasant response was coupled with ideological deprecation of their revolutionary role by Comintern, one of whose journals claimed in an important article on the Chinese situation that:

The role of the peasantry, on the contrary [to the petty bourgeoisie], despite its numerical strength, will probably be of smaller importance than it was in Russia. There is no large landowning class in China.⁹⁵

This is not to say that the Chinese Communists themselves were generally uninterested in the peasants. Indeed, repeated appeals were made by the Unions and the CCP for unity between workers and peasants, and the organ of the Communist Youth League constantly admonished China's youth to engage in political work with them, although it was admitted that 'due to their backwardness, this is more difficult than working with the proletariat'.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, during the summer and winter holidays when they returned to their villages, students were encouraged to undertake such activities as lecturing, drama, the establishment of schools, associations of poor peasants, the promotion of co-operatives and military training groups, and they were told to get in touch with 'advanced peasants' and local lower school teachers in order to organise KMT branches as the basis for long term activities. Although a large number of Chinese had gained a full realisation of the true nature of

imperialist aggression due to the lessons of 30 May, writers argued that many peasants, although suffering because of it, still did not identify it as the enemy. Landlords and warlords were far easier targets for them to pick out, although even here hostility could assume strange forms, such as the 'death hastening' (*su-shu*) spells employed by the peasants of Shantung against Chang Tsung-ch'ang.⁹⁷ It was the duty of educated youth to further enlighten the peasantry about the relationship between warlords, landlords, and imperialism.⁹⁸

From this it would appear that Teng Chung-hsia's later (1930) accusation that at the time of 30 May the leadership of the CCP did not think of uniting with the peasantry 'even in their dreams' was not strictly true.⁹⁹ But whatever the leadership may have dreamed, it was true that, with the significant exception of Mao, nobody else within the party at the time had any practical success in gaining peasant support for the movement. According to Chang Kuo-tao, the CCP was 'profoundly aware' that it was not enough to rely on the workers alone, and that the support of the peasants would be necessary. Yet at the time the young party was simply unable to mobilise them.¹

This indicated the limitations of the CCP's control over the mass movement, and while this movement did involve the masses on an unprecedented scale, the fact remained that by and large the peasantry, in other words the great majority of China's population, did not participate. Once the upper classes had been persuaded that their interests lay in an accommodation with the imperialists rather than in continuing the struggle, the still very small working class was left standing alone, and it was to this, more than to warlord oppression, bourgeois sell-outs or petty-bourgeois wavering, that Teng Chung-hsia attributed the movement's relative lack of success,² and this has also been the position taken by later Communist historians.³

We may conveniently summarise this account of how the movement appeared to the CCP by referring to an article published on the first anniversary of the Nanking Road incident, which briefly recapitulates the various features remarked upon above: 'On May 30 all the small streams of revolution lying hidden in society flowed together into a single flood.'⁴ This flood shook the foundations of imperialism in China, and opened a new period in the National Revolution. Never had the imperialists suffered such a blow to their prestige, nor popular participation in a movement been so widespread. The revolutionary aim, abolition of the unequal treaties, was also more concrete and thoroughgoing than any previous demands, and this had forced the imperialists to reveal their true face to

the Chinese, as a result of which more and more people came to identify them as the enemy, and wider and wider areas of Chinese society were revolutionised. This, combined with the support given to the Chinese by the proletariat of other nations and the emergence of a united front on a world scale, greatly helped to strengthen the position of the People's revolutionary government in Canton. The Communists gained many new lessons and fresh experience in the movement, which was one with a concrete political program in which the broad masses took part in a united front, with the working class as the backbone, and the writer stressed heavily the fact that it was the participation of the proletariat which had given the movement its teeth.

The two major defects revealed in the course of the struggle had been that an unarmed people could not fight back once the tide began to turn against them, and that the power of the CCP was still not sufficiently strong to lead the united front in all places and at all times. The article concluded by expressing the opinion that from now on it would be the duty of revolutionaries to apply all their efforts to organising and arming the masses.⁵

This was written following the defeat of the anti-Fengtien forces, at a time when an anti-Communist campaign was in full force throughout northern China. Nevertheless, as another article written shortly before had argued, warlord and imperialist control had still not been firmly consolidated, because of internal conflicts, and the opposition of the masses of workers and students, and in Honan, the peasants. Most important, the situation in Canton was excellent, and the eyes of all progressives turned south. The movement of 30 May, having passed through the anti-Fengtien war, now merged with the next major stage of the Chinese Revolution; and the Northern Expedition was clearly the one path to be taken in order to bring to a successful conclusion what had been started in Shanghai not quite a year before.⁶

The May 30 Movement and the Foreigners

Foreign support

One of the unprecedented features of the May 30 Movement noted by Communist commentators was the support given to China's cause by foreign sympathisers. Such support was widespread and on occasion bluntly worded. Thus the redoubtable Senator Borah, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, responding to protests from the American Chamber of Commerce at Hankow caused by his advocacy of the early abolition of extraterritoriality, declared that body to be 'a part of the imperialistic trust which exploits the oppressed peoples of the East, especially the people of China'.¹ In the House of Commons, Lloyd George also expressed his sympathy for the Chinese, attacking the Treaty Port System,² and presumably giving but cold comfort to his Conservative colleagues, when he argued that: 'this is largely a nationalist and patriotic movement. It is, if I may put it by comparison with what has taken place in other nations, more Sinn Fein than Bolshevik'.³

The appeals of the professors of Peking University received favourable responses not only from the intellectuals of the International Workers' Aid Society, such as Henri Barbusse, George Bernard Shaw, Upton Sinclair, and Clara Zetkin, who gave financial as well as moral support,⁴ but even from the Pope in Rome, who expressed the opinion that the patriotic feelings of all Catholics, including Chinese, were right and proper and should receive the support of the Church.⁵ Within China, the Church did not try to restrict the patriotic activities of the faithful, and in early 1926, in response to the rising nationalist tide, the first Chinese Bishops were appointed.⁶

It was the Protestant missionaries, however, particularly the Americans amongst them, who were most vocal in their support for 'Young China', 'adopting many of the catchwords which had been made familiar by the Soviet emissaries', as the editor of the *China Year Book* sourly remarked.⁷ Overeagerness to support the good cause could on occasion give rise to embarrassment, as occurred in Canton following the shooting in Shakee Road on 23 June. On the basis of statements from

their students, the American members of the Canton Christian College, together with their English President, Alex Baxter, immediately adopted a series of resolutions to the effect that: 'the blame and responsibility for the merciless and unjustifiable assault rests upon those who directed the firing from Shameen.' None of the foreign staff had been present at the events which gave rise to their protest, and in the face of contrary evidence, Baxter publicly retracted his signature a few days later. By this time, however, according to the *China Year Book*, the 'mischief' had already been done, that is the Chinese had noted this further expression of foreign support and received due comfort.⁸

Such activities did not greatly enhance the position of the missionaries in China, though. The anti-Christian movement had been vigorously prosecuted by the Communist Youth League throughout the early months of 1925,⁹ and this combined with nationalism following the May 30 incident to hit the missions hard, particularly on the educational front.¹⁰ Chinese Christian organisations suffered similarly, as S. S. Garrett has shown in his study of the Chinese YMCA, which body, under David Yui (Yü Jih-chang) strongly opposed the British, and whose publication *Chin-pu* (Progress) refused to carry British advertising. Yet this did not save the YMCA from attack, and it appeared to its leaders at the time that their attempted participation in the movement was simply a last desperate fling.¹¹

Despite the good intentions of friendly missionaries, however, they were only a minority of the mission body, and in considering Chinese reluctance to heed them we should take note not only of such men as the American staff of the Canton Christian College, but also of the like of the Rev. J. Darrock, D. Litt., in whose opinion it was:

questionable whether the missions, with all their foreign subsidized schools and colleges, have done more for China than the foreign manufacturers who have transformed thousands of farmer louts into skilled, and in comparison with other workers, well paid mechanics.¹²

In as much as these ex-louts became the backbone of the trade unions, Darrock had a point.

Support for the movement, particularly for the strikers in Shanghai, was expected and received from the Soviet Union, and Trotsky praised the workers of Shanghai for infusing that city with 'the spirit of Moscow'.¹³ On 3 June, Karakhan sent a note to Shen Jui-lin, the Chinese Foreign Minister, expressing his deepest sympathy with the people of China, especially the bereaved families. Similar sentiments appeared in

Pravda, and messages were sent to China by various workers' organisations, the Soviet Proletarian Students' Association, soldiers' groups, and Pavlovich, head of the Far Eastern Academy. Funds were collected, and demonstrations held across the Soviet Union, Moscow witnessing on 12 June a procession of over 50,000, which included representatives from Britain, Japan, France and the USA. The Chinese residents of Moscow had their own mass meeting, which was also addressed by Communists from a variety of countries. A British Communist who addressed the meeting was given a tremendous reception, as was a Japanese speaker, who claimed that the imperialists wished to turn a peaceful economic struggle into a second Boxer rising, but that the Chinese people were too wise to allow this to happen; he advised them to use the economic boycott as their principal weapon.

That there were limits to the degree of Soviet support, however, is indicated by a story from Reuter, which appeared in the *North China Herald* under the headline 'Chinese in Moscow—Demonstrators Sternly Repressed by Soviet Troops', and according to which, following their meeting, the Chinese residents went in procession to Vorovsky Street, where most of the foreign missions were situated. On arrival, the demonstrators were dispersed by Soviet militia who had been previously stationed outside the British and Japanese missions.¹⁴ Yet, whatever its truth, the story did not appear in any Chinese publications, including those non-Communist newspapers such as *Shen Pao* and *Hsin Pao*, which occasionally used material from the *North China Herald*, and it was not allowed to mar the impression of complete Soviet sympathy and support.

Comintern and Profintern jointly requested the Second International and their trade union organisations to join with them in a united committee to assist China, and the temporary coalition was duly effected, although according to the Peking newspaper *Ch'en Pao* the Third International was more enthusiastic and forthcoming with financial aid than was the Second. Nevertheless, in his address to the Moscow demonstration of 12 June, Zinoviev praised the British workers for the stand taken by them in opposing their government's China policy, claiming that it was their strongest display since the Chartist movement.¹⁵

Not only the British Communist Party, but also the Independent Labour Party, which requested its 1,000 branches to organise protests, and the Labour Party, all lent their support to the Chinese cause. Miners' leaders telegraphed Baldwin to protest against using British forces to assist employers in sweating their employees, and in like vein, on 15 June one Mr Jones, MP, asked in Parliament if the government would promise

that British warships should not be used to support international sweat shop employers. George Lansbury asked the government if it would organise a battalion of share-holders to 'do their own dirty work' in Shanghai.¹⁶

Japanese labour organisations had expressed their sympathy with the Chinese workers from the beginning of the February strikes,¹⁷ and on 24 May a mass meeting of thirty-two 'revolutionary left' workers' groups was held in Kobe in support of an alliance of labour in the Far East. Delegates were also sent to the *Gaimusho* on 28 May to question the government over its attitude to the strikes in Tsingtao. The delegates demanded that the Japanese capitalists be penalised and the consul withdrawn. Following 30 May student and worker demonstrations were held, the principal slogan being a call to 'immediately abandon the imperialist policy towards China'.¹⁸

Figures are not available for the total amount of money sent to China from overseas sympathisers during the movement, and given the increasing financial difficulties experienced by the strikers after the first month, it seems unlikely that such contributions were sufficiently substantial to be of decisive importance. More generally, foreign support did not greatly alter the situation in any practical way, although it may be that in the absence of hostile public opinion certain governments, notably that of Britain, might have been more inclined to adopt a tougher stance.¹⁹ There can be no doubt, however, that the Chinese, with their overriding concern that all should see that their country had suffered from an 'injustice', and their understandable fear that their reactions to the injustice might be mistaken for a repetition of the Boxer xenophobia of two decades earlier, derived a great deal of moral support from the expressions of sympathy which came flooding into China following the shooting on 30 May, and the fact that these sentiments came from such diverse sources as Bertrand Russell, Trotsky and the Pope cannot but have strengthened their conviction that they were utterly in the right. Particularly was this the case regarding support, moral or financial, from the two most guilty nations, Britain and Japan, which embodied both the universal brotherhood of man (for the upper-class Chinese) and the solidarity of the international proletariat (for the Communists).

Japan and Britain: the boycott

One of the more curious features of the events of 1925 in China was the way in which hostility was concentrated first against Japan, and then

moved strongly towards Britain. On the surface the explanation is simple enough, namely that Britain was held responsible for the killings on 30 May, and thus it was only natural that she bear the full brunt of the attack. But a closer examination reveals the situation to have been rather more complicated.

We have noted above that the Soviet Union was equivocal in its support of the anti-Japanese activity of the first months of the year. Writers in *Hsiang-tao*, however, were quite clear in their identification of Japan as the main enemy, and saw the shooting of Ku Cheng-hung as only one incident in a new offensive being launched against China by Japan, which had commenced with the accession to power in Peking of the Japanophile Tuan Ch'i-jui.²⁰ It was claimed that Japan wished to make another Korea out of China.²¹ Furthermore, Japan was the only country singled out by name in the slogans and leaflets of 30 May. Nevertheless, as the CCP's manifesto pointed out, what started off on that day as a protest against the Japanese in Shanghai and Tsingtao was crushed by the British, with the Americans right behind them,²² and the lesson to be drawn from this, CCP organs tirelessly repeated throughout the course of the movement, was that the imperialist nations were united against China despite their internal contradictions, and the Chinese should resolutely fight against them all, equally and without exception. Those who singled out one or two particular nations as the enemy were doing China's cause a grave disservice, and an article in a Comintern journal, which followed the CCP line closely, roundly condemned the Chinese bourgeoisie for opposing only Britain, unlike the Communists, who opposed all imperialism.²³

In effect, this meant that the Communists wished to continue the fight against Japan, and whatever reservations the Russians may have had about this earlier in the year, Comintern sources increasingly emphasised the danger from Japan as the year went by. The strikes in Tsingtao and their bloody repression by the Japanese were fully reported in *International Press Correspondence*, the degree of attention being paid to the subject giving to the reader the impression that the demonstration on 30 May was the direct result of events in Tsingtao rather than of the specific situation in Shanghai.²⁴ According to Voitinsky:

Japan has in fact in the course of the past ten months, i.e. since the October revolution in Peking, once more became the most important imperialist power in China, the most important in that the power of the State in China, in the form of Tuan Tsi Tshui [Ch'i-jui] and partly in the person of Chang Tso Lin, is on the side of the Japanese imperialists.²⁵

In April 1926 Voitinsky reiterated this claim:

at the end of the summer of 1925 Japan had once more become a factor to be counted with before any other, and had concentrated all her forces on assisting the counter-revolution which has its centre in Mukden.

He added, however, that:

The American and British imperialists, especially the latter, helped her in this, understanding the danger threatening imperialism in the event of a victory of the revolutionary movement.²⁶

We would, accordingly, at a time when the boycott of foreign goods was China's main weapon, expect to see this continued attack on Japan in China borne out by trade figures for the relevant period. Comintern certainly did, their expert on the Chinese labour movement writing towards the end of the movement that he expected Japanese losses to be incomparably higher than the 40 per cent reduction in their trade with China which resulted from the 'less effective' boycott of 1919.²⁷ Such, however, was not the case, as Remer has shown conclusively in his standard work on *Chinese Boycotts*. During early June, to be sure, Japan's losses in Shanghai and Canton were equal to Britain's, but this was due to the general strikes as much as to discrimination against Japanese goods.²⁸

Given the condition of China at the time, it is not surprising that there were marked regional differences in the extent to which the anti-Japanese boycott was prosecuted. In North China and Manchuria, controlled jointly by Chang Tso-lin, Tuan Ch'i-jui and Feng Yü-hsiang, all of whom had links of some sort with Japan, the boycott was hardly in evidence.²⁹ There is no indication from either Chinese or Japanese figures that the brief but drastic boycotting in Central and South China ever took place in the North or North-east. In fact Japanese exports rose fairly steadily throughout the year, and reached a total well over that of 1922, when there had been no boycotts. Customs reports from Tientsin show that Japanese firms in that city profited from the shipping strike in Shanghai, and that imports from Japan were uncharacteristically high throughout June, July and August. In North China, the movement was generally referred to as anti-British, or as 'the Shanghai strike'.³⁰ In this connection it is worth noting that Lu Hsün, then resident in Peking, made no mention of Japan as one of the targets of the movement.³¹

In the Yangtze valley, however, the situation was different, and the usual reference in reports from that region was to an anti-Japanese and anti-British boycott, although the Japanese recovered their position fairly

quickly.³² In the south, a similar pattern emerged. In Amoy and Swatow the Japanese were boycotted until the settlement of certain specific details in September, when the British became the sole objects of the boycott. Likewise in Canton, where the boycott directed against both Britain and Japan was directed against Britain alone from the first of September.³³ This latter decision, together with the further decision to allow Japanese shipping to come direct to Canton, and thus avoid losses through the Hong Kong strike and boycott, is particularly interesting in view of the role played by Soviet advisers in Canton at the time, and seems rather unusual in view of Comintern identification of Japan as the major threat. But the power of Britain, represented by the neighbouring Crown colony, may have loomed larger to those who were actually living in Canton. Nevertheless, the boycott of Japanese goods was effective while it lasted; as is evidenced by the sharp drop in Japanese exports to Central and South China (including Hong Kong) in June and July. The average figure for Japanese exports to Central China for the month of June was a little over \$US3 million, as against an average of more than \$6 million per month from January to May. Japanese exports to South China, averaging \$3 million a month for the first six months of the year, dropped in July to \$182,000.³⁴ Once again, however, these trading losses could be attributed as much to the generally disturbed conditions in Shanghai, Canton and Hong Kong as to any particular ill-feeling towards the Japanese. There was a limited recurrence of anti-Japanese agitation following the despatch of troops to Manchuria, ostensibly to protect Japanese citizens but in reality to prop up Chang Tso-lin following Kuo Sung-ling's rebellion, but this subsided quickly, and Remer's general conclusion was that the anti-Japanese boycott was 'almost completely overshadowed' by that against Great Britain.³⁵ The ironical result of the movement was that while there was indeed a marked falling off in Japanese imports for a brief period, the increase in later months, largely attributable to civil war and industrial disputes (by no means always unfavourable to Japanese trade) more than made up for these initial losses.³⁶

The anti-British boycott, which certainly was effective, became a stimulus to Japanese trade, with the result that despite grave Japanese fears in mid-1925, it would eventually go down on record as being a particularly good year for them.³⁷ As a student of Chinese boycotts, Remer was very impressed by the ease with which Japan weathered the storm.³⁸ It is also a further illustration of the limits to the power of the young CCP, whose propaganda leaves the reader with no option but to

believe that had the Communists had their way, Japan would have been boycotted as thoroughly as was Britain.

That it was not may have been due in part to the far greater purchasing power of the wealthier Chinese, who were not prepared to support such action. As long as the majority of the boycotters were relatively impoverished students and strikers, the loss sustained by Japanese business could never have been more than minimal. Moreover, following the shooting on 30 May, the Japanese sought to adopt what would now be known as a low posture, claiming that the industrial trouble in their mills was quite separate from the 'British' response to the demonstration. The British Ambassador in Tokyo reported to London that 'anti-British papers' professed anxiety lest Japan should be involved in the unpopularity Great Britain (in some cases the United States was added) had brought upon herself.³⁹ The Ambassador was told by Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister, that Japan thought it was advisable to station more foreign troops in places with foreign populations, but in such a way as not to give the Chinese, who were in 'a highly nervous condition', grounds for belief that there was a plot afoot to occupy their country.⁴⁰ This went well with Shidehara's relatively liberal but essentially paternalistic attitude towards China:

The Chinese, he went on to say, were like young children, naughty children no doubt, and fond of playing most dangerous tricks, but still mere children, and not to be taken too seriously, as he thought we and the Americans did, each in our own way. We were apt to regard them as adult misdemeanants in need of severe correction and reform, but to be dealt with by the law like other adults. The United States treated them like promising youths, who, after a few years of American education, would develop into good businessmen. But he himself thought of them as mere children, who might require an occasional slapping, but should as a rule be soothed rather than scolded.

Ambassador Eliot felt constrained to add that:

according to European ideas, the Japanese habitually spoil their children. There is no regular discipline in a Japanese household, and children take liberties with their parents, especially their mothers, which seem to us most undesirable.⁴¹

Desirable or not, however, liberty was not what the Japanese were ultimately intending for China, anymore than for their children, and while compromise, even indulgence, may have been deemed tactically necessary for the purpose of riding out the storms of 1925, the grand strategy led in

a different direction, as a senior French official, M. Léger, *chef de cabinet* to Briand, informed the British: 'In his opinion, the Japanese . . . were fundamentally partisans of order, and were pursuing by whatever devious routes, a "politique d'autorité" in China'.⁴² Despite protestations to the contrary,⁴³ the Japanese were prepared to profit by the prevailing anti-British feelings in China, but they would only do so up to a certain point, falling well short of the surrender of any real privileges, notably their treaty rights,⁴⁴ and in October 1925 Pratt complained that Japan's attitude was 'that of a reactionary reluctantly compelled to make concessions to liberal sentiment'.⁴⁵

It is most improbable, therefore, that the shrewd Chinese businessmen of Shanghai, who had happily supported earlier anti-Japanese boycotts and contributed significantly to the anti-Japanese strikers in the months prior to 30 May, and many of whose economic interests clashed directly with those of the Japanese, were taken in by the low posture adopted by Japan. Far more likely is it that the appearance of willingness to compromise on the Japanese part, plus frequent protestations of distress over the deaths of Chinese citizens, made it easier for the Chinese bourgeoisie to let the Japanese off the hook when they realised that their position as a class was threatened more by their own less fortunate compatriots, who had organised and demonstrated their strength in a quite unprecedented fashion, than it was by foreign competition. As a British official remarked:

I think . . . that Chinese industrial interests are at last beginning to realize that the encouragement given by the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and other bodies to the strike movement directed against British and Japanese enterprises has recoiled with very serious effects upon themselves.⁴⁶

The rash of strikes in purely Chinese enterprises, which commenced in the latter stages of the movement and continued into the following year,⁴⁷ can only have reinforced them in this opinion, and accounted in large part for the 'more reasonable spirit' prevailing amongst the upper class Chinese following the arrival of Sun Ch'uan-fang in Shanghai,⁴⁸ which spirit, with the passage of time, was extended not only to the Japanese but to the British as well. Yet this did take longer, and British interests were made to suffer substantial losses before any degree of conciliation became possible, for there was no doubt amongst the Chinese generally that Britain was the principal enemy, both for the undeniable fact that it was a British officer who had ordered the shooting on 30 May, and for the equally undeniable fact of Britain's historical position as the leading imperialist power in China. When Hewlett, HM Consul in Amoy, asked a

Chinese friend why Britain had been singled out, the friend replied that only Britain was really worth going for. The Consul found this explanation 'complimentary but unpleasant!'.⁴⁹ As the principal target of the movement, it is therefore appropriate that in examining the overseas repercussions of the May 30 Movement, particular attention be given to Great Britain.

A curious point which arises when considering the effect of the anti-British boycott is that certain Englishmen themselves deprecated the significance of the British position in China. Thus Woodhead, editor of the *China Year Book* and the *Peking and Tientsin Times*, wrote in connection with 30 May that Great Britain's financial and commercial interests in China were 'relatively unimportant';⁵⁰ a modest claim which one would not, perhaps, expect to hear coming from the lips of a man whose entire life was bound up with those very interests, and which contrasts markedly with the opinion of an American contemporary, in whose view Britain's position as the world's greatest trading power made it inevitable that she should bear the brunt of the attack.⁵¹ What may have been relatively unimportant to Britain, of course, when set against India, Africa and the Dominions, was not necessarily unimportant to China; and Britain was, in fact, the largest foreign holder of investments in that country, the total figure (not including Hong Kong) being ten times that of the United States and twice that of Japan.⁵² To this must also be added the importance of China as a market, particularly for the products of the Lancashire mills, whose cotton cloth was purchased by the Chinese in vast quantities. This trade was gravely imperilled by the nationalist demands for a revision of the tariff rates.⁵³

Furthermore, some businessmen of the time, like other people, were motivated not only by the present state of affairs, but also by their hopes and fears for the future, and few hopes were greater than that of cornering the Chinese market, the dream of which has haunted every major commercial power from the Dutch and Portuguese to the United States. The author of the following extract certainly was more in agreement with the American Norton than with his compatriot Woodhead, when he wrote that:

Britain, with her unemployment problem, has too much at stake in China to allow her vast interests in the largest market of the world to be endangered without adopting prompt measures to secure them. Every British industrial and commercial organization should realize that this question affects them directly and materially, and should urge the British Government to take immediate steps in defence of their interests.⁵⁴

Similarly A. E. Rose of the China Society claimed that 'China is the one hope for our flagging trade and industry and our problem of unemployment'.⁵⁵ In the House of Lords, Lord Gosford, just returned from six years in China, declared:

Labour in this country has a vast interest in the welfare of China. If peace could be restored in China that market would offer the greatest and quickest conceivable outlet for the products of British industry. It is the one market in the world which could offer an immediate solution for our unemployment problem... If once it were realized how immense an outlook for our industries and our trade would be available—if only we could help China get on to her feet again—it would be clear that the solution of the China Problem is the greatest problem of British statesmanship of our day.⁵⁶

British political interests were equally if not more important than their financial and commercial stake, for it was realised that loss of prestige in China would be a tremendous blow to British hegemony in Asia generally, and in India in particular.⁵⁷ At least one conservative in the Foreign Office saw the possibility of events in China having serious reverberations in Britain itself, arguing that if the initiative were left to the KMT and the communists, there would be 'violent attacks on foreigners, the trouble will spread to India, and Melanesia, and thence to this country'.⁵⁸ Moreover, one feature of the old order which neither the Great War nor the October Revolution had done away with was the traditional rivalry between Russia and Britain, and fears of a Communist victory in China were dictated quite as much by this consideration as by possible financial losses or a concern for the future of Chinese democracy.

Both the significance and limits of British interests in China will be made clearer by the reactions of various groups within British society—other than the working class, who as we have already observed, were generally sympathetic to the Chinese—to the strike and boycott. But first we should ask how effective they were, and what was the extent of loss inflicted by them. Summing up the boycott's results, Remer found that it was 'fairly effective' from June on, especially in the Yangtze valley and the South, although as in the case of the Japanese, it is difficult and pointless to attempt to estimate how much greater British trade might have been without the boycott, given the extensive disturbances within China. Both merchants and shipowners suffered losses, and the movement made itself felt in Lancashire. The British share in China's imports, the best single index of the boycott's effectiveness, fell from 12.4 per cent in 1924 to 9.8 per cent in 1925, a 'prompt and great change', which marked the boycott of 1925 as more successful than any previous efforts.⁵⁹

The strike, however, was more important than the boycott *per se*, particularly that of the seamen and the wharf coolies, as a result of which the British Commercial Secretary in Shanghai had to report in July that 'the movement of import cargo from British ships or belonging to British firms has almost ceased'.⁶⁰ Fears were held at the time that if the situation was 'unduly prolonged' the British position in the China shipping trade, one of the foundation stones of British trade in China generally, would be gravely imperilled, a development which would have extremely serious consequences for British interests. It was generally felt in business circles that once a settlement of the general strike had been reached, the boycotting would gradually subside, or that at the least, means would be found to cope with the situation.⁶¹

As the import figures show, strike and boycott combined to make severe inroads into Britain's China trade. In monetary terms, the value of British imports into China fell from HK. Taels 126.0 million in 1924 to 93.1 million in 1925; UK trade statistics show a fall in exports to China from £28.9 million to £19.7 million in the same period. The movement of British goods to China declined by 30 per cent, against a total export decline of only 3.5 per cent, and in the important field of cotton goods, the British proportion of the trade dropped from 59.1 per cent in 1924 to 48.0 per cent in 1925. This was accompanied by a marked rise in Chinese imports of woollen goods from Germany and France. The direct connection of these losses to political events may be established even more closely when it is seen that there was a continuous decline in British imports throughout the year, their value being £11.1 million for the first half, then falling away markedly to only £8.6 million in the second.⁶²

What these figures, compiled after the event, do not show, are the far greater anxieties and fears held by British businessmen while the movement was in full swing, when they had no way of knowing the final outcome and ruin seemed imminent to not a few, particularly those men whose firms were actually based in China. Quite apart from the payment of often quite heavy overhead expenses for an indefinite period with no business being transacted, there were also the steadily mounting charges for storage, insurance and interest on goods ordered, either for Chinese customers or for themselves, which were impossible to trans-ship. Many of such goods were seasonal cotton and woollen goods for which demand would cease if the strike went on too long, and it was not possible to compel Chinese dealers to take delivery. This was the situation in late July when the commercial secretary reported to London that failing a quick settlement, a number of British firms in Shanghai would almost certainly

be forced into liquidation.⁶³ In the same month the Asiatic Petroleum Company (a British concern) described the position of British firms trading in China as 'disastrous',⁶⁴ and in the Foreign Office, Waterlow noted with some anxiety that feeling in the City was becoming increasingly more concerned; there was talk of bankruptcies on a large scale unless the situation improved.⁶⁵ In the event, this was not the case, and although four months of stagnation told heavily on many business houses, all the more substantial firms weathered the storm.⁶⁶ At the time, however, there were few grounds for optimism.

Two of the larger British firms seriously hit by boycott and strikes were the APC, referred to above, and the British-American Tobacco Company (BAT). In both cases there was a competitive product on the market, with which consumers could satisfy their needs without incurring the title of traitor; and the system of trading through agencies, where considerable stocks were stored, employed by these two major distributing companies, made them particularly vulnerable to attack. They were, in the words of a diplomatic report: 'singled out for every kind of interference with their business ranging from more or less peaceful propaganda to such violent measures as seizure and destruction of their goods and assault on their agents'.⁶⁷ The APC's business in Shanghai ceased completely (except for sales of benzine) for the duration of the strikes, which prevented the discharge and shipment of cargo, although in areas other than Shanghai its trade was not diminished to so marked an extent.⁶⁸ The company made vigorous efforts to fight the boycott by such means as cutting prices, but as American oil (from Standard Oil, known throughout China as Socony) could be bought without disturbing the students, who in most parts of the country were in charge of supervising the boycott, little was achieved. Indeed, a spokesman for the APC confidentially informed the Commercial Secretary that they had 'good reason' to suspect that Chinese agents of Standard Oil were deliberately fomenting the boycott for their own gain, 'presumably without the approval of their company'.⁶⁹ A month or so later this last presumption had been changed to 'usually without the knowledge and approval of foreign employees'.⁷⁰

The BAT was the principal sufferer from the boycott, and like the APC, its business practically ceased in the Shanghai area. The fact that its products were sold in small packets with designs and lettering clearly indicating the nationality of the company was certainly no help, but the greatest thorn in the side of the BAT was the Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company, which 'left no stone unturned to push their sales, often by the most disreputable means', at the expense of the former.⁷¹ According to the commercial secretary:

violence and intimidation are being resorted to in innumerable cases... stocks in many up-country districts have been seized or sealed up, and... the local officials have as a rule showed no disposition whatever to protect the company's agents.⁷²

By mid-July the BAT's total business in China had been reduced by at least 40 per cent, according to British figures.⁷³ Still more dramatic statistics published in a Peking newspaper on 6 July claimed that while the daily takings of the BAT had fallen from over \$600,000 to a mere \$50-60,000, those of the Nanyang Bros. increased from \$50-60,000 to some \$250,000.⁷⁴ It was not surprising, therefore, that the latter company was a rather generous contributor to the strike funds,⁷⁵ and that its patriotic exhortations to buy 'national goods' appeared so frequently in the press. Even the cutting off of the electricity supply did not scotch this particular snake, as the Nanyang Bros. had made enough money out of the strike and boycott to be able to afford promptly to instal a diesel generator of their own.⁷⁶

Under such conditions, it was only to be expected that British businessmen with a stake in China should voice their growing concern to the Foreign Office, where their complaints were met with a mixture of sympathy and exasperation. Relations between the diplomats in Peking and the businessmen in Shanghai were frequently strained, and it was the opinion of several of those in the Foreign Office responsible for China that the Shanghai people were 'particularly tiresome and selfish'.⁷⁷ These were the people, after all, of whom Arthur Ransome wrote that: 'English prestige is at stake when their interests are threatened, but unless English policy coincides with their own they are prepared at any moment to be the Ulster of the East.'⁷⁸ In late June a deputation from Manchester, in the course of an interview with Waterlow, pressed for British support for Chang Tso-lin, a policy also favoured by the China Association (composed mainly of businessmen with interests in China) and Sir Nigel Stabb of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. They were unimpressed by anything the Foreign Office was prepared to offer, and Waterlow wrote that they departed: 'with a sad sense that we are supine and backboneless. They long for spectacular and forcible action'.⁷⁹

Few tributes to the effectiveness of the movement could be greater, therefore, than the fact that within a month, a joint letter signed by most of the major British firms in China was urging that the Foreign Office consider the possibility of making an immediate statement of regret for the loss of life, and announce the prompt return to China of Macleay, the minister, to investigate and remedy any existing grievances.⁸⁰ One month later again, the China Association and the British Chamber of Commerce

at Shanghai sent what Waterlow referred to as 'this extraordinary telegram—extraordinary because it shows how far and fast the Shanghai diehards have moved', in which they requested that HMG make a statement (also 'immediate') in the Commons expressing their willingness to settle the Shanghai incident in a conciliatory spirit, and embodying a declaration of British policy with regard to tariff autonomy, extra-territoriality, rendition of the Mixed Court and the question of Chinese representation on the Shanghai Municipal Council. They further requested a compassionate grant be made to the Chinese victims of police action. Austen Chamberlain replied that if such a grant were to be made at all, the SMC rather than the British taxpayer should find the money; concerning the need to take action on the Chinese political grievances, he explained that he was glad to learn that the China Association and Chamber of Commerce now adopted such a view, for 'I had come to the same conclusion some time ago'.⁸¹ Such a change of heart may have been welcome in itself, but it also bore out the complaint of one Foreign Office official that:

the advice we get from the business community in China on political matters is usually extremely bad being ill-considered, violent and fluctuating from one extreme to another. Whenever any incident occurs they always start by crying out for strong action while the moment there is any threat of a boycott they are all in favour of giving way.⁸²

The view from Whitehall

From this statement, true enough in itself, one might be led to infer that the policy adopted by the Foreign Office was the opposite of those epithets applied to the businessmen's advice. To see how far this was the case, it is necessary to go back to early 1925 and then to retrace the events of that troubled year through Foreign Office eyes. By doing this, we shall also be in a better position to form a true impression of the impact of the movement on the British than if we were to confine ourselves to purely business or local British reactions in China itself, for one of the bitterest complaints of the old China hands and the taipans, as Hauser has pointed out, concerned the way in which the responsibility for handling the affair was taken away from them by 'the diplomats and the foreign offices'.⁸³

At the beginning of March the *Birmingham Post* published an article expressing their correspondent's fears that the 'anti-Christian and anti-foreign propaganda' then being conducted amongst the intellectual and student classes of China by Bolshevik agents might precipitate an out-

break similar to the Boxer rising. The correspondent accused the Powers of apathy and urged them to take strong measures to prevent China from falling into anarchy.⁸⁴ In the Foreign Office, Moss wrote that the writer fairly represented the feelings of British residents in China.⁸⁵ Similar articles continued to appear, *The Times* printing one with the eye catching title 'The Chaos in China—Bolshevism at Shanghai', according to which the February strikes were entirely engineered and financed by Bolsheviks, and that the great majority of workers were not at all interested, being only too happy to get back to work and wages. Despite this, the writer warned:

The fact remains that Bolshevism was able to create a great stir in the biggest industrial center in the country, and to jeopardize very important foreign financial interests. As time goes on, and the bad seed bears fruit, no doubt trouble will be on a greater scale.⁸⁶

The Foreign Office and HMG, however, preferred to take a longer, and more relaxed, view of such developments and when the Minister in Peking raised the question of Britain requiring the Soviet government to cease its propaganda activities in China, the Secretary of State replied that this would be both difficult and undesirable; moreover, since:

the danger from Bolshevik activities in China is not so much the permanent infection of the Chinese people with Communist doctrine as a more or less temporary Soviet control over the Chinese Government, there seems something to be said for allowing the authors of these activities ample opportunity to discredit themselves in Chinese eyes.⁸⁷

Nevertheless, there was a sufficient degree of concern to have Major Hilton-Johnson, Commissioner-General of the SMC, draw up a memorandum on anti-foreignism which he completed in March. The Major saw no immediate danger to foreign interests in the current situation, and though Soviet propaganda had been responsible for a growth in anti-foreign feeling amongst students and intellectuals, he pointed out that the position was quite different from that of 1900, when the Chinese masses were permeated with anti-foreignism:

The truth, I think, is that the Chinese generally are neither anti- nor pro-foreign: primarily they are intensely pro-Chinese innately, and nationally, they still have a deep rooted suspicion of all foreigners, and until that suspicion is dispelled their attitude is one of indifference, or even disdain.

In view of Soviet propaganda, he suggested that the British respond in kind, but as Waterlow minuted, 'there wasn't the faintest chance that the Treasury would look at any such suggestion'.

Brief references were made to Moscow, the KMT, the anti-Christian League, and Shanghai University, but Hilton-Johnson insisted that in his opinion there was nothing in them that need cause any special anxiety:

Real anti-foreignism, the kind that matters, is something very different from anything that exists in China today. The essential ingredient in a dangerous situation of this kind is a deep-rooted and widespread hatred of foreigners by the masses of the Chinese people predisposing them to violence towards the object of their hatred on almost any pretext. In 1900 this essential was present in a very definite form. The issue then was clear cut and the grievance was perhaps not an unreasonable one... But there is no issue involved and nothing tangible that can be used to stir up feeling against the foreigners as a whole.

Two months later the police of the SMC would provide just that tangible issue, an eventuality against which the Major had covered himself by quoting the platitude that 'it is usually the unexpected that happens in China', and adding that the easy going masses were very credulous and capable of being worked up to a great pitch: 'But even with the Chinese my belief is that there must be a sufficient basis of truth to make an appeal to the people in the propaganda used'.⁸⁸

In April, the Foreign Office received a despatch sent by Palairé on the subject of anti-foreignism, which summarised consular reports and contained cuttings from the *North China Daily News*, which had as early as January made allusions to 'a serious wave of anti-foreign feeling sweeping across China'.⁸⁹ Yet Palairé's feelings on the subject were very close to those of Major Hilton-Johnson, and while he felt bound to call attention to the claims of the *NCDN*, since it was the leading British newspaper in Shanghai, he found it 'hard to believe that they do not contain a good deal of wilful exaggeration'. To one of the officials reading the dispatch, the main feature of the movement was its completely opposite character to the reactionary xenophobia of the Boxers. In almost exactly the same words as Ch'ü Ch'ü-pai he explained that there was now no opposition to foreign ideas as such, but only to those foreign influences which were felt to be dangerous to China's independence. He thought that missionaries should be warned to avoid connection with other foreign activities, observing that although British missionaries were usually careful enough in this respect, such was not the case with their American brethren, as witnessed by an article carried in a recent edition of an American trade journal entitled 'The Missionary in China as a Pioneer of American Commerce'. Chamberlain found all this both interesting and disturbing, and

commented that 'Western ideas awake strange ideas in Eastern civilizations'.⁹⁰

It is clear from the modest file on 'anti-foreignism' compiled in the early months of 1925 that the Foreign Office was aware of a current of unrest in China, directed against the influence of the Powers, but it is equally clear that, unlike many of their fellow Britons resident in China, they did not regard it as a threat. Feeling that the only real danger to foreigners in China was that presented by a repetition of the Boxer rising, which they correctly believed was not on the cards, they did not allow for the possibility of a new and different, but equally if not more damaging type of movement. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai could have justifiably criticised their thinking for being insufficiently dialectical; but even had they wished to devote more energy to pondering over the matter, the pressure of other more immediate problems would have made it impossible, for before 30 May they were principally concerned with such questions as the possibility of further fighting between Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yü-hsiang, the suppression of piracy, the 'tedious' manoeuvring in the South, and the recognition of Tuan Ch'i-jui's provisional government, each of which was responsible for the expenditure of more ink than was anti-foreignism.

There was also the question of introducing reforms in China's relations with the Powers. It would be wrong to assume that the May 30 Movement was solely responsible for causing the Foreign Office to see the necessity of such reforms, however great a part it may have played in forcing diehards within and without the service to agree to them. On the fateful thirtieth of May, some hours before the news of the Shanghai shootings reached London, *The Times* published an article criticising the apathy of the Powers in the face of the present chaotic situation in China, and urging them to utilise the Special Tariff Conference, projected by the Washington Conference, as an instrument for the general rehabilitation of the country. By the time the press clipping had done the rounds of Foreign Office desks, several days had passed, and it elicited the following interesting exchange between Waterlow and Sir Arthur Willert:

This excellent article is, so far as I know, in no way inspired by the Foreign Office; I have seen none of the Times people for a long time. It is all the more satisfactory, as it almost exactly represents our general view.

Willert replied:

Mr. Waterlow: as a matter of fact Mr. Norton, in my absence, did in consequence of a minute from your Dept. saying that it would be unfortunate if 'The Times' took the wrong line, take particular care to put them on the right lines.

Waterlow commented that the result was admirable.⁹¹

It is clear, therefore, that had the May 30 incident not occurred, there would still have been pressure from the Foreign Office to adjust China's treaty status, a question on which a number of the officers concerned with China, notably Waterlow, the head of the department, felt quite strongly. Once the movement got underway, despite the initial calls from commercial circles to take strong action against it, and despite their own obvious distaste for mass movements of almost any sort, they were quite prepared to concede that in treaty revision—even, ultimately abrogation—the Chinese had a good case. And despite their pretence, for the purposes of negotiation, that the only issue at stake was the question of whether or not the shooting on 30 May was justified and that other extraneous questions should not be considered in the attempt to reach a settlement, they were well aware that in reality it was these questions that lay at the heart of the matter. In Maoist vein, Chamberlain referred to the Nanking Road incident as 'a chance spark' which 'set fire to all the inflammatory material that was lying about',⁹² and Ashton-Gwatkin of the Foreign Office wrote that it was 'merely an incident in the great drama of Treaty Revision'.⁹³ In mid-June, with no demurring voices from his colleagues, Waterlow suggested:

It is really time we did something to overhaul a system which has not changed since the middle of the 19th century and which involves real Chinese grievances. So long as we don't, there will remain a fund of justification behind the ... misrepresentations of our critics.⁹⁴

He regarded the system as 'obsolete',⁹⁵ and a few months later J. T. Pratt argued with some vigour that:

The Chinese have a very strong case for treaty revision. It would be easy to show—if one wished to argue their case for them—that in 1861 we forced a treaty on them at the point of the bayonet, that we have held firmly to the 'rights' conferred on us by this treaty ever since, but that as the conditions of modern commerce changed we by means of legal fictions and other devices, drove a coach and four through the treaty whenever it suited us to do so.⁹⁶

As indicated by *The Times* article, even before 30 May the Foreign Office had planned to make use of the Tariff Conference to reach a new series of agreements with China and the other interested Powers, which it was hoped would go at least some way to satisfying the demands of the former nation, and this remained the central feature of British policy. Disagreement within the Foreign Office on just how much should be

changed continued throughout the period of the movement, with Pratt taking the most radical stance, Moss the most conservative, and Waterlow taking the *via media*, but generally tending more towards Pratt's way of thinking. More significant, however, was the fact that no one advocated maintenance of the *status quo*, and there was general agreement on the necessity for change.

It is ironical, therefore, that they saw the movement and its demands as being one of the major obstacles standing in their way, and they did so largely for reasons of face, which would have been readily understandable to the Chinese; they were deeply concerned that no one, especially the Chinese, should think that the concessions and innovations that Britain was prepared to make were the result of external pressure rather than Britain's own disinterested pursuit of a policy of justice and fair dealing. Right at the beginning of the movement Waterlow drafted a parliamentary statement to the effect that the shooting was 'a symptom of a disease we want to help the Chinese to check', that the Tariff Conference would provide the opportunity for this, and that 'meanwhile we look to the Chinese to do nothing to prejudice the prospects of the conference'.⁹⁷ A week later he spelt out more clearly the difficulty facing Britain, and after summarising the factors working against her in the current Chinese situation, he continued:

As against these forces, our only cards are the honesty of our policy and our prestige. Our policy is one of reasonable concessions and constructive help. It involves drastic revision of the treaties and a readiness to overhaul the extra territorial system and to remedy the many points where the Chinese have real grievances. But to announce this now would be interpreted as weakness; we must not come forward with gifts when there is a pistol at our heads.⁹⁸

Chamberlain, too, declared that he was all for a conciliatory policy and redress of grievances, but was 'not in favour of "gush" as a reply to riot'; he was uneasy that at least some reforms had not been made earlier, but equally uneasy lest they be yielded in the face of strike and boycott.⁹⁹ Even Pratt, arguing in favour of granting tariff autonomy to China, felt that: 'The great danger is that if the Chinese get wind of our intention they may discount it in advance, take it with a bad grace and ask for more'.¹

These fears all centred around a word used by Waterlow in the above quotation, a word which featured very prominently both in intra-departmental minutes and public speeches. The word was 'prestige', and the British were worried that they were losing it. On 4 June, Sir Nigel Stabb of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank wrote regretfully to Water-

flow that the Chinese had 'lost respect for the Foreigners in recent years', and that unless Britain's prestige was restored, they would be in for trouble. Sir Nigel opined that Russia was at the bottom of this.² Similarly, A. E. Rose of the China Association urged:

We want a new attitude of mind in regard to China. We have allowed things to slip too far and we are out of tune. We cannot afford that now, for China is the one hope of our flagging trade and industry and our problem of unemployment. Our prestige must be re-established and the road to this lies along the path of sympathy, justice and courage.³

Important though these qualities were, the Foreign Office was well aware that they were not sufficient in themselves, as Wellesley observed in a general review of British policy in China:

Our position in China was originally founded on force. Up to the Great War it was maintained on prestige. Since the War, the voluntary relinquishment by Russia and the enforced surrender by Germany and Austria of their extraterritorial rights, together with the capitulation to the Turks at Lausanne, have all had their effect on the Chinese who have gradually come to realize that prestige is, unless it rests on force, bluff pure and simple. Worst of all they know that they can call it every time. They are therefore convinced that they can get the powers on the run.⁴

Waterlow, who was relying on this now rather battered prestige to convince the Chinese that Britain was in earnest with the Tariff Conference,⁵ thought that the problem was to some extent due to the fact that the flag had not been shown enough, and advocated strengthening the fleet in Chinese waters.⁶ Moss was prepared to go somewhat further, advocating a blockade:

We have already exhibited magnanimity and forbearance. We have not been hasty, and if we show we really are a great Power we are likely to regain our prestige in an enhanced degree ... We have suffered greatly, it is up to us to save ourselves.

'Pray God our Greatness never fail Through craven fears of being great.'

Collier was in favour of the blockade, but warned that they would have to go very carefully, as technically it was an act of war and the public might not like it. Both Waterlow and Newton felt that such an act would play right into the hands of their enemies, and dismissed it as being quite out of the question.⁷ The bluff upon which prestige rested was wearing very thin, as the British, and others, were only too well aware. The British Ambassador to Brussels reported a conversation he had held with M. de

Remaise, Director of Political and Commercial affairs, in which the latter warned against making any threats against the Chinese, as 'it was well known in China that the Powers were not prepared to take serious military action in that country'. None of those who read the despatch demurred.⁸

The difficulty of retrieving the situation under such circumstances and given the limits beyond which the British felt themselves unable to go, was summed up late in the year by a Chinese resident of London, a frequent correspondent with the Foreign Office who argued in sentences of Jacobean complexity:

that in slow process and by a thousand and one intricate reasons has Great Britain, China's best friend and once most respected, most feared, most exulted [*sic*] nation in China, become the most suspected, the most hated nation there... Great Britain has not attempted to explain, nor would she succeed, even if she did, because the Chinese minds have been so deadly poisoned against her and their ears are absolutely set stone deaf against anything good and reasonable an Englishman might say. Moreover how could Great Britain undo these thousands and one tangled knots, unless she could trace each single strand in this muddled heap of entanglement?⁹

It was a difficult question, even for the Foreign Office. Moreover, men with financial interests in China, to whom prestige was not the most important consideration, began to urge that, despite the unfavourable circumstances, treaty revision nevertheless be undertaken. Sir Nigel Stabb warned that if Britain did not take the initiative, they would eventually reach a point where they had to choose between an undisguised capitulation, as had happened in Turkey, or being 'boycotted out of existence'.¹⁰

Boycotts and loss of prestige, as the men in the Foreign Office recognised in their analyses of just what the movement was all about, were only two aspects of a China that was changing dramatically; although they would qualify this by pointing to the statement of Sir Robert Macleay that one of the peculiarities of that country not fully appreciated in the outside world was the simultaneous existence of two Chinas, practically distinct yet interacting upon one another, the new China of the treaty ports, mainly controlled by the 'young element', and the old world China which in its civilisation was where Europe was in the sixteenth century.¹¹

One thing that the Foreign Office insisted that the movement was not about, was labour conditions. Both they and the government, aware that the sympathy of their fellow Britons for the Chinese was principally based on the idea that appalling conditions forced on Chinese workers by

British capitalists were the cause of all the trouble, were most anxious to disabuse them of such a notion; not only for the sake of truth, as they saw it, but also because as Waterlow warned in mid-June, the 'well-meaning demonstrations' on behalf of Chinese workers going on all over England at the time, were aiding Soviet policy in China.¹² While the Powers wished to help China, he wrote in notes for a speech to be given by Chamberlain, they could not do so until the agitation subsided:

Now if it should go out as the view of any large, responsible section of British opinion that the Chinese trouble is due to discontent with terrible conditions in Chinese mills, the only result will be enormously and dangerously to stimulate the anti-foreign movement. That is why I wish to make it perfectly clear... that this view is entirely unfounded.¹³

Justifying this stand, it was argued that the Chinese could have no real cause for complaint, as conditions in Chinese factories were so poor, generally much worse than in foreign enterprises, and the Foreign Office pointed out that 'considerable efforts' had been made, with the active support of HM Consul in Shanghai, to promote reforms, which were, however, hampered by the low standards prevailing in native factories. It was further pointed out that the International Settlement in Shanghai was not controlled by the British government, which would nevertheless use its influence to the full to secure the improvement of industrial conditions. To such an end, papers were laid before Parliament showing the current position, and the Foreign Office hoped that the constructive criticisms of members would help to strengthen the government's hand in order to bring about reform.¹⁴

Despite a degree of anxiety over the policy of the Soviet Union, it was recognised in the Foreign Office that 'Bolshevik tendencies' were no more a fundamental cause of the troubles than was labour unrest.¹⁵ Sir Francis Aglen of the Chinese Customs wrote to the Foreign Office, in a letter with which Waterlow 'entirely agreed', that:

Too much attention is... being directed to the activities of the Soviet and to the reaction of the press and student element to the encouragement of Karakhan and his propaganda. China has no leanings towards Communism, but to further national aspirations will use any weapon which comes to hand. The press and student element are practically the only articulate portion of the Chinese nation, and are using the Soviet for their own purposes, very much as the Soviet is taking advantage of a genuine, national sentiment to stir up trouble for the embarrassment of certain foreign Powers... the Chinese are pursuing ends of their own, and will drop the Russians when they have served their purpose.¹⁶

Others widely concurred in the opinion expressed in Aglen's last sentence, in particular. Looker, a Conservative MP closely identified with British business interests in China, declared in the House of Commons: 'The Chinese are a very shrewd nation. When it suits them, they will drop the Russians and say "Thank you very much; we have no longer any use for your services".'¹⁷

Wellesley felt that the movement was for the time being exploited by the Bolsheviks, but that Bolshevism was not its true meaning.¹⁸ Pratt believed that 'the relation between the Bolsheviks and the Chinese radicals is that each is trying to use the other for their own ends'.¹⁹

Preparing Chamberlain's speech, Waterlow wrote:

The fundamental causes of the present trouble do not lie in anti-foreign feeling or in Bolshevik tendencies on the part of the Chinese, or in labour unrest. All these factors have been used and have been apparent on the surface. But the trouble lies far deeper—in the sufferings of a great people caused by political unrest.²⁰

Elsewhere he warned of the possibility of a very serious upheaval, caused by:

the long drawn out misery and *malaise* of civil wars, the increasing disintegration of all responsible political forces, the increasing self-assertion—half fanatical, half dishonest—of the noisy 'educated' minority.

To this he added the influence of the Soviet Union, which had taken advantage of the growth of newspaper reading and of students' organisations all over China.²¹ A telegram from Chinese intellectuals to the Parliament and people of Britain gave Ashton-Gwatkin the opportunity to expand somewhat on Waterlow's reference to the 'educated' minority:

This confirms suspicions which I have had for some time that the Chinese students have been carefully organized and are now being cleverly used by a group of their Professors, of whom Tsai Yuan Pei is probably the leading spirit, whose one specific object is treaty revision.

As to the appeal of the Peking University professors to the intellectuals of the world:

it will be noticed at once that . . . [it] is most cleverly and plausibly worded, that it is neither offensive nor violent, and the political issue of treaty revision, *which is the one and only thing really in the mind of these men*, is most cleverly interwoven.

We are up against, not a mere mob of students, but a formidable organization most ably directed, which has already tasted blood in procuring the Shantung settlement, for which it was to a considerable extent responsible. We are up against something in China which is at least united, cohesive, determined to get its own way, inspired by a kind of religious zeal and probably comparatively incorruptible.

This factor is probably more important than the question of the preponderance of rival *Tuchuns* [warlords].²²

Sir Francis Aglen, in the letter already quoted, was in full agreement with Ashton-Gwatkin:

Broadly speaking, current events in China should be interpreted as the indication of a national determination to challenge the privileged position of the subjects of those foreign Powers which have not yet relinquished extra-territorial rights... the movement is deep seated, it has the sympathy of all classes, it will continue to grow...²³

Major Hilton-Johnson, who only a few months earlier had written his rather comforting report on anti-foreignism, now confessed:

I do not think we... visualized quite what was coming so soon... the events of May 30 merely served to start things off. Chinese writers and public propaganda bodies are dragging in everything they can think of that might have any possible bearing on the present feeling of hostility towards Britain. The Opium War of 1839 to 1842, what they call the 'superiority complex', imperialism, capitalism, the exclusion of 'Chinese and dogs' from the Shanghai public parks, and many other such things of a wholly real or partly fanciful nature are commonly cited as the real causes of the trouble. On the other side, of course, there is the intense conceit of the Chinese, both individually and nationally, and the grave discontent that there must be among people who care to think, with political and local conditions throughout the country...

The one bright spot for the Major was the lack of peasant involvement, which differentiated it markedly from the Boxer rising of twenty-five years previously.²⁴

There was no doubt in the minds of those responsible for British policy towards China that they were faced with the rise of a new type of movement, which they realised had more in it of modern nationalism than anti-foreignism of the traditional kind. In this, at least, they were in agreement with the KMT and the CCP. But as indicated by Major Hilton-Johnson, they did not attach a great degree of importance to the May 30 incident itself, and would never have agreed for an instant with the Chinese that it

was part of a deliberately worked out policy of massacre to cope with China's awakening; they would have said with Lord Gosford, rather:

A very real spirit of nationalism has been growing up in recent years and is fed and inflamed by attributing all the ills of China to foreign privilege and foreign influence. In such an atmosphere the most trifling incident may cause nation wide conflagration. This indeed is what has just happened.²⁵

They knew that the movement had come to stay, and the 'radicals' who led it, Pratt declared, wanted social reform and national independence.²⁶ As this was just what the British claimed that they also wanted for China, it was rather difficult for them to argue with such a stand. Moreover, even had they wished to, they were well aware, as Wellesley put it, that the time when Britain could browbeat the Chinese into submission, or simply ignore their demands, was well passed.²⁷ It is apparent that, taken as a body, the Foreign Office officials entrusted with Chinese affairs had quite a clear picture of what was happening in China and its implications for the future of that country and its relations with Britain; and while they were occasionally exasperated by what they felt to be quite unwarranted hostility towards Britain on China's part, they were not unsympathetic to the aspirations of the newly emerging forces. At the height of the Canton-Hong Kong strike and boycott Sir James Jamison, Consul-General in Canton, who had long been the object of pointed attack from the local Chinese authorities, informed the Foreign Office, where the possibility of supporting some local anti-KMT force had been mooted, that: 'the present Canton Government is the best administration that China has ever seen and that he would deprecate the incursion of a Northern Army'.²⁸ Throughout 1925, the Foreign Office, on the basis of their understanding of the situation, sought to formulate a long term policy which would take into account the realities of a changed state of affairs. Yet the understanding of a situation does not necessarily imply its solution and the concern for British prestige was but one of the several factors which made action of any sort extremely difficult, notwithstanding the generally satisfactory analysis of the China problem and what was needed to overcome it.

Some of those difficulties we have noted in an earlier chapter, where we saw how successive inquiries and committees all failed to live up to the expectations of those who had hoped that they would be sufficient to put an end at least to the most immediate troubles. One of the greatest problems, however, was caused by the British desire to act in concert with the other Powers, notably Japan and the USA, two nations which seemed

constantly to be pulling in opposite directions, with the hapless British caught in between. Nowhere is this made clearer than in the story of events and arguments leading up to the Tariff Conference, a story too complex to be considered here in detail, yet the outline of which is sufficient to illustrate the point.²⁹ At the beginning of June, Waterlow wrote:

while we must insist on the restoration of law and order at Shanghai, we deeply deplore the loss of student life and regard this tragedy as a symptom of a disease we want to help the Chinese to check; the Tariff Conference will give the opportunity for the constructive co-operation between China and the powers to that end, and meanwhile we look to the Chinese to do nothing to prejudice the prospects of the Conference.³⁰

This short passage contains the two principal elements of Foreign Office planning, namely that Britain was prepared to use the Tariff Conference to make concessions, but that the Chinese should first cease their 'riotous behavior'. Both were important, for as Wellesley argued, granted that indefinite maintenance of privileges would have to involve the use of force, 'which I think is generally admitted to be out of the question':

It would be nothing short of disastrous if the Chinese were driven to take matters into their own hands. A retreat it therefore unfortunately must be, and as I believe the highest test of good generalship is how to conduct an orderly retreat, so in this case it will be the test of good statesmanship to prevent it from turning into a rout.

Wellesley went on to observe that there were two schools of thought on how to carry out the retreat, the first advocating taking advantage of the conference to raise the whole problem of China's rehabilitation, 'a policy of reconstruction on a grand scale to inaugurate a completely new era'; the second held that the process should be more gradual, and Wellesley's personal advocacy of this latter course bore tribute to the strength of the new forces being unleashed in China. Certainly few contemporary Chinese saw the situation in quite this light:

To risk battle on a grand scale with superior forces when you are in full retreat seems to me to be courting disaster. I believe such an attempt to be not only Utopian in the present state of China but exceedingly dangerous because if it proved abortive, as in my opinion it inevitably must, the position will be infinitely worse and the Chinese would then have good reason to know that they had got the powers on the run.³¹

In line with the more gradualist school, for which the majority of the Foreign Office decided, the British Government wanted first to hold the

Tariff Conference, in return for a settlement of the May 30 incident, and only after this came to a satisfactory conclusion would they proceed to the Commission to investigate the problems of extraterritoriality. They did expect that wider questions than tariff issues alone would arise at the Conference, and were prepared to deal with them there, but for reasons of face and tactics they were not prepared to admit this publicly. When three members of Parliament asked Chamberlain whether the government would not call a conference of the Treaty Powers with a view to liquidating the current difficulties on the basis of treaty revision, the only reply that was given was that the government was consulting other governments, but that no discussion was possible with the Chinese until they had quelled the anti-foreign agitation.³² Waterlow noted:

The difficulty about these questions—evidently prompted by the able propaganda of the Chinese intelligentsia—is this. We can not now, or at any stage, *say* that we are in favour of a conference to discuss these larger issues, because our idea is that they will in fact arise and have to be dealt with by the Tariff Conference. I, at least, am convinced that, if our Tariff Conference policy is to be really constructive, it will shape along these lines; and that is the American view too. But neither can we *say* that.³³

The Americans, however, were prepared to say somewhat more, for three days after Waterlow wrote this, the Foreign Office received a copy of a telegram from the State Department to the US Minister in Peking instructing him to make clear to the Chinese government that the US favoured both treaty revision and investigation of the extraterritoriality question when China had shown her ability to fulfil her obligations and assume the protection of foreign rights and interests. The British were upset by the specific mention of extraterritoriality, and Waterlow regarded the statement as 'a concession both to Chinese propaganda and to domestic sentimentalism. Perhaps too Senator Borah counts for something'.³⁴ Secretary of State Kellogg did not, in fact, have any well worked out plan for coping with the Chinese situation, and according to Dorothy Borg, the steps he took were more the outcome of an 'almost instinctive reaction' to events. Furthermore the Secretary's greatest concern with regard to the Washington Conference was no more than that the United States should continue to lead the Powers in a progressive policy towards China.³⁵ Not surprisingly, the Foreign Office took a rather dim view of this, Ashton-Gwatkin noting:

The United States are pursuing their policy of altruism as a business asset. They wish to pose, for the benefit of China, as the moderating

influence on Great Britain's intransigent attitude... We must expect this kind of thing.³⁶

Collier, too, referred to 'the obstinate determination of the U.S. Government to take the lead in Chinese questions'.³⁷ Yet there was no general agreement within the Foreign Office on what should be done, some wishing to act without the Americans, others being prepared to let them take the lead, while still others advocated continuing to work for a compromise. This state of affairs continued throughout July, and by the end of that month Chamberlain was feeling rather desperate, complaining that there was no agreement in the Foreign Office over what should be done. He admitted that he himself lacked confidence where the affairs of China were concerned, and that the Foreign Office confused him 'with a babel of tongues'.³⁸

During July, the more conservative tended to agree with Collier's statement that while 'the U.S. Govt. will be our great difficulty throughout... the Japanese will help to counteract them'.³⁹ Yet as discussions continued between the three governments, it became increasingly obvious that the differences between Britain and Japan were rather more substantial than those between Britain and the United States, which as Borg observed, lay less in the actual measures they were prepared to adopt than in the manner in which they wished to execute them.⁴⁰ Both Britain (after a good deal of debate on the issue within the Foreign Office) and the United States were prepared to concede tariff autonomy to China, but were rather more cautious over the question of surrendering their extra-territorial rights. The Japanese, however, took the opposite view, and while stating that they wished to be positive and desired above all to present a united front with the other two Powers, in practice their attitude made it extremely difficult to find a solution acceptable to all the nations concerned.⁴¹ Following a conversation with Yoshida, the Japanese Ambassador to London, Wellesley wrote in mid-August:

While Japan may not like to see chaos rule supreme in China, she also does not wish to have a strong and well ordered China. She objects to the principle of fiscal autonomy... She goes so far as to admit that the increase of the Tariff hits her trade more than it does that of any other Power; but what she probably fears even more than that is the rapid growth of Chinese industries behind the Tariff wall which will not only deprive her of the Chinese market for her own goods but might ultimately result in swamping her own home market. Japan seems to me to be quite clearly on the horns of a dilemma and she is trying to steer between the Scylla of political isolation and the Charybdis of a formidable China.⁴²

Eventually, after much exchanging and mutilation of one another's drafts for a declaration of their intentions to the Chinese government, sufficient agreement was reached for the identical note of 4 September to be despatched.⁴³ Yet preparations for the ensuing conference only made the differences between Japan and Britain more obvious, and the contrast between the following statement from Pratt, made in mid-October, and Collier's hopes of a few months earlier, points not only to the more liberal views of the former, but also to the growing realisation in Britain that their difficulties would lie more with Japan than the United States.

We should have no difficulty in going all the way with America, but Japan's attitude . . . is that of a reactionary reluctantly compelled to make concessions to liberal sentiment . . . Our policy fundamentally is as liberal as that of America, but our loyal desire for solidarity (especially with Japan) may make us appear to be reactionary at the Conference, as if concessions were wrung reluctantly from us—and at this crisis that would be fatal to our interests for a whole generation.⁴⁴

Meanwhile it was becoming increasingly clear in China that the progressive forces the British hoped to appease with their Tariff Conference policy were not only unimpressed by it, but even opposed it. Ch'en Tu-hsiu explained that it was simply a bait being used to lure the warlords and the Peking government back to the embrace of Imperialism.⁴⁵ Equally important, as Chang Tso-lin controlled the north-east coast, he would greatly benefit from increased customs dues⁴⁶ and then strengthen his domination of any central government. Such was the opposition that Macleay, who had by October returned to his position in Peking, suggested the conference be postponed.⁴⁷ Yet at such a late stage the reversal of policy would only have involved still greater difficulties, and on 26 October 1925 the conference duly opened.

In his farewell speech to the British delegates Chamberlain had declared:

Unless the signs deceive me, this great nation is rousing herself from sleep and bidding fair to renew her mighty youth. I trust that our country will not play a halting part, but that we shall continue to lead, as we have always led, in China, and that, with our feet upon the solid ground of experience, we shall allow our eyes to look towards a broader and brighter Eastern horizon. . . .⁴⁸

Yet once again, forces quite beyond the control of diplomats or delegates would ensure that leadership was kept from Britain's grasp, for while the conference talked, the civil war raged, and Peking became a besieged city.

In April it was taken by Chang Tso-lin, and the provisional government was no more; with no recognised Chinese government, no Chinese delegation could be accredited to the conference, and its final sessions terminated in that same month. Although it had not been entirely futile, at the time it certainly seemed to have been so.

The signs did not deceive Chamberlain, but neither did they tell him that China's arousal would preclude that leadership he sought to maintain for Britain. The makers of Britain's China policy found that an accurate picture of what was occurring, based on long experience and abundant information, did not necessarily ensure that they could master the situation or turn it to their advantage. It has been said that during the inter-war years the British in the Far East felt themselves buffeted by forces beyond their control.⁴⁹ This is certainly true of the 30 May period, and although, when *The Times* thundered 'Britain is attacked and Britain must act',⁵⁰ the government could quite correctly point out that only China herself could bring about the necessary changes which might give promise of happier relations in the future,⁵¹ this was less the result of a well planned policy than the growing realisation that there was not very much that could be done. Ashton-Gwatkin wrote that the movement was like a natural wave which would have its inevitable recoil, and that it was at the ebb rather than the flood that Britain should seek to improve her prospects. Wellesley put it rather more starkly: 'When one is impotent the only thing to do is to maintain a systematic attitude as long as possible and not indulge in experiments'.⁵²

Results and Developments

Recalling the latter months of 1925 in Shanghai Chang Kuo-t'ao wrote that: 'As for the Chinese people, outraged and depressed by the defeat of the May Thirtieth Movement, most of them felt heavy-hearted.' He even went so far as to say that the British 'sounded the drums of victory', a claim which seems rather startling when viewed in the light of the evidence presented in the previous chapter. But the discussions going on in the Foreign Office were of course quite unknown to the Chinese supporters of the movement, to whom the breakup of the united front, the forcible closure of the GTU and the renewal of contacts between the wealthy Chinese businessmen of Shanghai and their foreign counterparts were obviously of far more immediate importance. Moreover, to the ordinary participant, little that happened between the closure of the GTU and the first anniversary of the incident could have given any impression other than that a defeat had been suffered. Initial hopes that Sun Ch'uan-fang would prove a more sympathetic administrator than the Fengtien authorities whom he replaced were soon dashed by his anti-trade union stance, and the execution of Liu Hua in December confirmed that he was quite as bad as his predecessors. The expectations aroused by the anti-Fengtien war were also shattered by the Japanese intervention in Chang Tso-lin's favour. The war did result in the removal of Tuan Ch'i-jui's government, not before it demonstrated in its 18 March massacre of unarmed students, the very class for whose welfare it had seemed so solicitous when a far smaller number perished at foreign hands, that it had learned nothing from the events of 1925.² Yet there were no grounds for believing that what replaced it would be any better, and those few Chinese who still hoped for real gains from the Customs Conference saw the conference itself disappear in the turmoil.

The gloom, and even despair, felt by many of those who had entered the movement a year previously with such high expectations is clearly reflected in the first anniversary publications. Twelve months had proved that liberation was not to be attained as easily or as quickly as had been

imagined in the first euphoric weeks of June 1925, when the whole city of Shanghai had come to a standstill and the new era seemed to be at hand. Nowhere was this made more plain than in a quite amazing short story published by a perfectly serious magazine, *Tu-li P'ing-lun* (The Independent Critic). The story, 'Ling Kuang', tells of a young man who shuts himself off from the world for ten long years, working on a project to avenge his fallen comrades. He successfully invents and perfects an electric ray, and on 30 May 1935 he emerges from his seclusion to turn it on the foreigners in Shanghai, leaving their persons unharmed but completely destroying all their weapons and warships. Before long, China's new secret having been made known, the whole world is disarmed and a world government devoted to universal peace and harmony rules from Shanghai. Only Japan, refusing to face reality, stubbornly attempts an invasion, is of course defeated, and her premier publicly scolded. This achieved, our hero departs on his honeymoon, observing that it had all been made possible by science and organisation.³

While the dedication to the achievement of peace and justice through the development of technology and a new social order was admirable, and typical, the quite unreal content of this little fable, in which the concept of science had more in common with the Taoist pill of immortality than with relativity or quantum theory, and which portrays China's liberation as dependent on the invention of a mysterious ray, can have given little comfort to those who had expected to achieve it through boycott and strikes, and the abrogation of the unequal treaties. The proclamation issued by the Shanghai Student Federation on 30 May 1926 declared that the struggle must continue as nothing concrete had been gained.⁴ The executive committee of the National General Students' Union similarly exhorted its followers, pointing out that despite all their activity, the situation in North China was worse than it had ever been before, owing to warlord-imperialist collaboration.⁵ The CCP also described the situation as 'very dangerous, the anti-red movement having replaced the anti-imperialist movement, and the counter-revolutionary high-tide having replaced the revolutionary one'. The party called on the Chinese people to revive the spirit of 30 May and to restore the united front.⁶

At least some of this gloom may be attributed to the heightened political awareness of wide sectors of the population which was one of the results of the movement. What they had formerly regarded as inevitable now appeared intolerable. Yet it is also true that up to May 1926, little concrete had been gained, especially if the real aims of the movement were taken to be not simply compensation and apologies from or

punishment of the guilty parties, but the abrogation of the unequal treaties and the overthrowing of imperialism; and as we have observed, to many of the movement's participants, this was precisely what the struggle had been for.⁷ What they had instead was the offer of \$75,000 compensation (refused) and the return of Britain's Boxer Indemnity (not one of the movement's demands);⁸ discussions as to the rendition of the Mixed Court were under way, but it was not in fact returned to Chinese control until January 1927;⁹ four Chinese officials (*shui-wu-ssu*) had been appointed to the customs administration;¹⁰ the decision had been taken to go ahead with the two conferences on Tariffs and Extraterritoriality; and, the most solid gain, the SMC decided to add three Chinese members to its board of directors. Chinese were also admitted to the board of the Hankow Municipal Council for the first time.¹¹ Yet even this was of only limited concern, and was dismissed by student and CCP publications as the affair of *kao-teng Hua-jen* only.¹² The general opinion in radical circles was that these were all very small matters indeed, but on the other hand, had it not been for the movement, the imperialists would not even have given this little.¹³ As the Shanghai Student Federation declared, they were all tricks, which nevertheless showed the panic which the movement had caused amongst the imperialists.¹⁴

It was here, in this panic, that hope lay, for the foreigner had at last been seen to move—not far, not nearly far enough—yet move he had, and it was believed that he had done so out of fear of the massed strength of the Chinese people. The realisation that the imperialist nations, at whose hands China had suffered successive defeats, both military and diplomatic, were not invincible, was a fact of tremendous significance. The psychological liberation which this involved extended through many levels of society, right down to the rickshaw puller depicted in a contemporary cartoon, who is on the point of tipping his fat European passenger into the muddy waters of the Whangpoo.¹⁵ The new sense of confidence was reflected in the words of Mac Murray, the US Minister in Peking, who reported to Washington that following 30 May, if the Chinese wanted to do something, they just did it.¹⁶ The old concierge in Hu Yeh-p'in's novel of the movement in Peking had complained that the trouble with the Chinese was that they went into a panic at the sight of a foreigner,¹⁷ but by early 1926, the criticism no longer held true, and the day was past when the overweening pride of the foreigner in Shanghai, and in China generally, could go unchallenged.

All this was emphasised for the Chinese by the events leading up to and on the day of the demonstrations marking the first anniversary of the

incident. What might possibly happen on that day, referred to by one English language journal as 'the May 30 spectre',¹⁸ gave the SMC cause for grave concern well before the event. The early months of 1926 were marked in Shanghai by comings and goings between upper-class Chinese and Europeans, both socially and officially, on a hitherto unprecedented scale, and on 18 March Fessenden held a banquet for Yü Hsia-ch'ing and thirty to forty others, at which he, on behalf of the Council, asked them all to co-operate in making adequate preparations against the day, emphasising how conciliatory the attitude of the Council had been since the winding down of the movement the previous year.¹⁹

This was the reverse of the coin of bourgeois treachery reviled by the radicals, for here was the leader of the SMC feasting and making earnest requests to the hitherto largely ignored Chinese business community,²⁰ in particular the very man whom a year earlier had been condemned as a dangerous rascal. It was a confession by the foreigners that they could no longer go it alone, knowing that if they wished to maintain their position they would have to ask for Chinese assistance. It was this realisation which lay at the base of the changes which enabled Kotenev to write in 1927 that:

The year 1925 marked not only the beginning of a new era in Sino-foreign relations but also a new epoch in the traditional methods of administration of the foreign settlements and concessions in China.²¹

The fact that the foreigners needed, and got, the help of the big bourgeoisie was of little comfort to the students and workers, who at the time saw the strength of the enemy confronting them increased rather than diminished, yet it was very real evidence of the changing balance of forces in China.

On 29 May a common grave was unveiled in the Chinese city, accompanied by various ceremonies, and homage was paid to the martyrs. Some five and a half thousand people were in attendance, but the whole affair passed off without incident.²² Ch'en Tu-hsiu was rather scornful of this type of observance, dismissing the bell ringing, fasting, and silences as 'comic and negative'.²³ The same could not be said of the next day, the morning of which was marked by stoppages of students, workers and merchants. At the conclusion of a mass-meeting held in Chinese territory, the demonstrators moved off in procession, and as they had done a year earlier, broke municipal regulations by entering the International Settlement. Making for Nanking Road, they attempted to block the traffic, and passing cars were pelted with bricks and rocks. Slogans were painted on

walls, speeches were made, leaflets scattered, and a number of foreigners injured. Yet the police, who were fully mobilised and the reserves and volunteers who had been ordered to stand by, never even threatened to shoot, and used batons only as a last resort. After three very tense hours, peace returned to Nanking Road, and the demonstrators left the Settlement.

To the foreigners, such a fortunate conclusion to a demonstration considerably more violent than that of a year ago simply showed that appropriate and timely preparations avoided the necessity of a recourse to firearms. In their view, had sufficient warning been given in 1925, that is had the authorities been aware of the gravity of the situation which had been developing under their noses for several months, the incident need never have occurred.²⁴ Such a viewpoint has much to commend it, but to many of the Chinese, to whom, as we have noted, the deaths on Nanking Road were by no means fortuitous, but the direct expression of a well planned policy of massacre in response to the stirrings of Chinese nationalism, the failure of the SMC to take violent action in 1926 was a confession of weakness. This opinion was expressed not only by the Communists in their official organ,²⁵ but also by the Chinese Student Federation (*Chung-hua Hsüeh-sheng Lien-ho-hui*), which claimed that the terrified imperialists, although armed and ready, had simply not dared to open fire, thus demonstrating the strength of the people's forces. Despite the generally bad situation prevailing throughout northern China, therefore, a great victory had been won.²⁶

From this it should be apparent that the depression to which Chang Kuo-t'ao referred was only a temporary phenomenon, and should be balanced against his statement that the anti-imperialist fervour aroused by 30 May did remain to germinate subsequent developments.²⁷ As seen by an Australian doctor working in China at the time, the years immediately following 30 May appeared like this:

The conflagration died down; but from then onwards the propaganda has never ceased. The schools one by one resumed; the shaken hospital staffs settled down; the whole round of missionary work or trade was carried on outwardly much as before. But there was a sense of tenseness in the air that was new. Foreign lives and property were as safe as ever and the great mass of the common people just as friendly; but there were the frequent posters on the walls with their anti-foreign exhortations and their crude or bloody pictures of foreign atrocities, there were more frequent and troublesome strikes in the business world, and there were ever-recurring indications and hints of the propaganda work, especially in the schools.²⁸

T. C. Woo observed that, 'the affair [of 30 May] gave a tremendous impetus to many kinds of movements on a national scale',²⁹ and Owen Chapman was right to single out students and labour for special mention. According to an article in *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* written in November 1925, 30 May had given a new lease of life to the student movement. On 26 June a national meeting of student delegates summoned by the National General Student Union (*Ch'üan-kuo Hsüeh-sheng Tsung-hui*) was held in Shanghai, at which the students of China resolved to strengthen their organisation in order to engage in a protracted anti-imperialist struggle. It was also decided to co-opt worker and peasant representatives into student organisations.³⁰ The Shanghai students then proceeded to reorganise their Federation along the lines of democratic centralism, in accordance with a resolution of the National Congress.³¹ After the movement commenced, the Shanghai Student Federation co-operated with the GTU in setting up a number of 'Common People's' (*p'ing-min*) schools, and they continued this work on their own after the closure of the GTU. In late 1925 there were at least ten such schools, with some 1,570 pupils, a third of whom were women.³² Not only was there more unity on the organisational level, but also on that of morale. The Cantonese students and those from other parts of China resolved to do away with their differences and even the perpetually feuding students of Peking were finally reunited, albeit temporarily, in a new Peking Student Federation (*Pei-ching Hsüeh-sheng Lien-ho-hui*). Following the decline of the May 30 Movement proper, the students continued to play an active role in agitation over the Tariff Conference and in the anti-Fengtien movement.³³

It was, however, in the growth of organised labour, closely linked to the growth of the CCP, that the movement produced results which would eventually contribute most towards achieving its revolutionary goals. Both Communists and Imperialists agreed that, in the words of the *China Yearbook*: 'The unionizing of labour in Shanghai, and therefore in China, will be the outstanding result of the strike arising out of the events of May 30.'³⁴ An article in *Hsiang-tao*, written in September 1925 at a time when it was becoming apparent that the principal demands of the movement were not going to be met, also stated that this was one undeniable gain that had been made. Moreover, the writer went on to argue, the consciousness of these newly organised workers had been raised during the struggle, and they now realised that they could not achieve their twin aims of national independence and class freedom without a people's government and army.³⁵

In the few months following 30 May general trade unions were

founded in Shanghai, Peking, Tientsin and Tsinan. The greatly increased forces of organised labour added considerable strength to the Third National TUC (1 May 1926), which amongst other things came out strongly in support of the Northern Expedition.³⁶ This latter was also greatly assisted by the Canton-Hong Kong strike, in the course of which some 200,000 workers left Hong Kong for Canton and there provided additional forces for the campaign. The strike, which delivered a heavy blow to British prestige and wealth, was itself a reflection of the effect of 30 May on labour. The national figure for union membership before June 1925 was 540,000, which had increased by April 1926 to 1,240,000. In Shanghai the increase was even more startling, leaping from 20,000 to 220,000 over the same period.³⁷

Between the closure of the Shanghai GTU and the end of 1925, strikes broke out repeatedly in the city despite repressive measures taken by the local Chinese authorities; in December alone there were fourteen cases, involving both foreign and Chinese businesses, a figure equal to the total number of strikes in 1923.³⁸ This trend continued into 1926, when following the first anniversary observances, a three month strike served to further swell union strength.³⁹ In fact the year 1926 was marked by a strike wave of unparalleled intensity in all the major industrial centres of China, the total number of strikes being 535 as against 318 for 1925. As Isaacs observed, most were based on demands for wage increases and improved conditions, but as time progressed they became increasingly political,⁴⁰ a fact remarked on by a number of observers, who traced this development back to 30 May. Lin Tung-hai, writing under the auspices of the KMT a few years later, observed:

Both the idea of social justice underlying the programme of organized labour, and the need of organized action as a means of economic self-protection had made a deep impression on the working class as a whole, an impression that was deepened by the Shanghai May 30th Incident. This event also proved the turning point in the Labour Movement. The strategy of Chinese Labour turned from a primarily economic struggle aided by political support to primarily political agitation for economic ends.⁴¹

Another Chinese writer also noted: 'But after the May 30th (1925) Incident in Shanghai, the labor movement instead of being a mere device for securing economic betterment for the workers, swiftly became a political weapon.'⁴² Both aspects of the strikes were important, as a writer in the *China Yearbook* showed:

Labour is ... important in that, in the large cities, it is an adjunct of the students' movement in political matters and therefore can exert

a pressure on the country's international relationships. In the meantime, the strikes are constantly bringing to labour better wages and better conditions.⁴³

As Trotsky observed in one of his articles on China: 'Really to arouse the workers and peasants against imperialism is possible only by connecting their basic and most profound life interests with the cause of the country's liberation.'⁴⁴ With the workers, at least, 30 May had done just that, and the movement marked definitively the entrance of organised labour onto the political stage.

This was clearly recognised by the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang, held in Canton in January 1926, which passed the following resolutions on the political aspect of the labour movement:

1. Since the movement of the 30th of May, the labour movement in the country has passed from purely economical struggle to political struggle. In the great anti-imperialist movement everywhere, especially in Shanghai and in Canton, there was extensive participation by labour. The Kuomintang should utilize this opportunity well and make special efforts in the revolutionary propaganda amongst the workers, to make the labour masses understand that the political struggle is not a temporary one but is a permanent one, and to develop the power of sustained efforts of the labour masses in the political struggle.
2. The labour masses of the country have received proper experience and instruction in the struggle of the movement of May 30th. From the national point of view the result is satisfactory. The rapid rise of the labour movement in all places, and the emergence of the great labour organizations during the last half-year, are all proofs of the great development of the solidarity of labour. The party should at this time render great help to speed up its quick and further development, so that the all-China Labour Federation, the regional labour organizations, and other trade unions, may develop into healthy, independent, and systematic organizations.
3. The imperialists and their tools, the militarists, the big merchants and *compradors* [*sic*], seeing the danger in the gradual awakening of labour, are using all kinds of cruel methods to destroy the labour masses and organizations, killing labour leaders without any pretext. Such things have aroused the more violent resistance of the labour masses. It is the duty of our party to render help to the labourers in this instance.⁴⁵

Despite such intentions on the part of the KMT, however, the question of who was to lead this new force was decided in favour of the CCP, and the CCP as such rather than as an adjunct of the KMT. Teng Chung-hsia, writing of the new look of the labour movement after 30 May, admitted

that formerly the workers had considered the KMT a fearful thing, and were afraid of the very name of the Communist Party.

Following Sun Yat-sen's trip north, the KMT no longer appeared so frightening, but the word 'Communist', generally linked with 'radical', still struck fear into people's hearts. The average Chinese thought of a radical as being necessarily akin to those photographs of European radicals just released from prison which appeared in the press from time to time—gaunt, ill-clad, and very, very hairy. But, Teng pointed out, Europeans were like that anyway, especially after a few years on bread and water in a dark cell with no opportunity to shave. Amongst the Chinese radicals, however, there were some who were most attractive! After 30 May, and the leadership given the labour movement by the CCP, this negative picture changed, and in the anti-Communist campaign in north China which followed, the workers were not fooled, and continued to come forward enthusiastically, in ever greater numbers, 'to join the hairy ones'.⁴⁶

As Warren Kuo, the KMT historian of the CCP admits:

The May 30 Movement was not only helpful to the C.C.P.'s work among the masses but also to the development of its organization... This marked the beginning of its mass recruitment policy designed to turn itself into a 'party of the masses.' And it also showed the implementation of the Fourth Congress' resolution of escalating the Party from 'a small propaganda working unit into an organization working to awaken the vast masses of peasants and the revolutionaries.'⁴⁷

The most eloquent testimony of all, however, is provided by the Party membership figures:

1921 (1st Congress) 57
 1922 (2nd Congress) 123
 1923 (3rd Congress) 342
 1925 (4th Congress) 980 (CYL 2,635)
 1925 November 10,000 (CYL 9,000)
 1926 July 30,000⁴⁸

In Shanghai, at least, the major industrial centre in China at the time, this simultaneous increase in unionised labour and Communist Party power was made at the expense of the right-wing of the KMT, who were not to come into their own until 12 April 1927. Even after that date, they never gained full control over the labour organisations other than the so-called yellow unions, which were simply instruments of government control.⁴⁹ This helps to explain the differing emphasis placed on the

movement in the historiography of the revolution by writers aligned with the post-1927 KMT and with the Communist Party. Communist writers have consistently claimed that 30 May was the start of the 1925-7 revolution.⁵⁰ They also strongly emphasise the importance of the May 30 Movement and the ensuing Canton-Hong Kong strike in consolidating the revolutionary base area, without which the Northern Expedition would have been impossible.⁵¹ More generally, the widespread growth of anti-imperialist sentiment, coupled with the increasing acceptance of the necessity of first disposing of the warlords as a preliminary to defeating the imperialists, ensured that the revolutionary army would find plenty of supporters behind enemy lines on its northward advance. It was the growth of political awareness, combined with organisation under the GTU and the CCP, that enabled the workers of Shanghai to launch three risings and to deliver that city to the forces of the Northern Expedition;⁵² for which service Chiang Kai-shek rewarded their leaders with death and imprisonment. The significant role assigned to the May 30 Movement by the present Chinese leadership is attested to by the fact that one section of the bas-relief on the monument to the revolution in T'ien An Men square is devoted to it.

To those who write from the perspective of the post-1927 KMT, however, the Northern Expedition itself occupies a far more central position. While they could only approve of 'the wave of nationalism which was growing stronger every day in China as a result of the Shanghai shootings',⁵³ they could not but have grave misgivings over a movement which also gave so much additional strength to the men who would later become the KMT's deadliest enemies. With the exception of those historians such as Kuo, who concentrate on the CCP itself, and must perforce examine all aspects of the movement, most KMT aligned writers are content to refer to the incident itself as a particularly nasty episode in the long tale of imperialist oppression, and to note with approval the patriotic reaction to it on the part of the Chinese. But in general histories the movement occupies only a small place, and is not generally credited with being either the beginning of the revolution or the necessary prelude, even initiator, of the Northern Expedition.⁵⁴ Ma Ch'ao-chün, it is true, admits that the newly organised working class 'formed the vanguard of the National Movement, and was a most significant element in hastening the Northern Expedition',⁵⁵ but Ma had necessarily to argue the importance of the labour movement, which is not usual in KMT histories. This puts him in the unfortunate position of at one point bemoaning the fact that the workers were caught unawares by the Communists and

trapped into forming the GTU, but at the same time trying to argue that the movement was in fact led by the KMT. Unable to produce any Chinese sources to prove this latter point, he falls back on the English language *China Yearbook*, which as anyone at all familiar with the conventions of the time will attest, used the words 'Communist' and 'Kuomintang' as if they were synonymous. Small wonder that most historians of Ma's persuasion prefer to steer clear of such tricky waters, and sail with greater confidence on those offered by the Northern Expedition.

Moreover, this campaign did succeed to a considerable degree in achieving the unity of the country under Nationalist rule, which was one of the major aims of the KMT, whereas the arrival in Shanghai of the Expedition's forces was very nearly the end for the Communists. From the KMT viewpoint, therefore, its achievements are much less ambiguous than those of 30 May. As Chiang Kai-shek remarked at the time, with unintended irony: 'With the removal of the Communists, the Kuomintang's true face is clear to everyone.'⁵⁶ It is only natural, therefore, that the two sides should differ in the emphasis they attach to the various episodes of what is now known in China as the first period of revolutionary war. Indeed, it would be strange if it were otherwise, and we may take the relative silence on the subject by KMT writers as additional evidence of its importance to the development of the CCP.

When considering the question of China's eventual liberation from the nineteenth-century forms of foreign domination conveniently referred to as the treaty port system, or extraterritoriality, non-Chinese students have tended to ascribe a greater degree of success to the movement than did its contemporary Chinese supporters, to whom the evidence later used by foreign scholars was not available. Studies of American and British diplomatic records do indicate a major change in the China policies of those two states, which may be directly traced to the movement of 30 May, although it was not until after China had been re-unified under the KMT government that this became generally apparent. Yet even before this time, there were indications. Dorothy Borg, for instance, in her standard work, offers the following judgment of the achievements of the Tariff Conference, regarded by more radical Chinese opinion at the time as simply a trick on the part of the Imperialists with which to bribe the Peking government and warlords, and lure the wealthy bourgeois, who would profit most by tariff increases, into abandoning their compatriots in the united front:

It is frequently said that the Special Tariff Conference was entirely futile. In considering its influence on the tariff problem—as dis-

tinguished from political matters—many factors point to such a conclusion. The Delegates did not succeed in carrying out the task with which they were specifically charged, namely, the realization of the Washington Customs Treaty, and they were even less able to conclude a new treaty with more far-reaching aims. . . .

An estimate of the political aspects of the Conference leads to very different conclusions. If the Conference had been held before the May 30th Incident, the Powers probably would have refused to discuss a program that exceeded the requirements laid down in the Washington Customs Treaty. That they were willing to enter into negotiations that went far beyond the obligations undertaken at the Washington Conference, furnished impressive evidence of the effectiveness of the anti-foreign movement.⁵⁷

As we observed in the previous chapter, the wide ranging nature of the discussions at the conference was just what the British Foreign Office had planned and hoped for.

Nevertheless, the opinions expressed by the foreign delegates still reflected traditional approaches, as both British and Americans 'persisted in inquiring into conditions which the Chinese regarded as questions of internal administration',⁵⁸ and continued to regard the Customs Administration as an instrument through which the powers would, and should, exercise control.⁵⁹ That this did not represent the new current of thought in Foreign Office and State Departments, however, and was more a reflection of ways of thinking already regarded by many as outmoded, was made apparent by the British memorandum addressed to the US government in May 1926, by which time it had become clear that the Tariff Conference was doomed. The memorandum declared that it would not be right for HMG:

to associate themselves with any attempt to force upon the Chinese a greater degree of foreign control over the revenues . . . than they are prepared voluntarily to concede. A policy involving increase of foreign control, and capable of being regarded as an encroachment on that sovereignty and independence of China which the Powers agreed at Washington to respect, is so fundamentally opposed to the traditional policy of the United States that His Majesty's Government are disposed to believe that the State Department will share their anxiety on this subject . . . Any failure to implement the Washington Treaty might create a very dangerous situation, and His Majesty's Government, now, therefore, hold the view that if any reasonably satisfactory assurances are given by the Chinese Government as to the use which it proposes to make of the new revenues, the Powers should accept such assurances, abstain from any attempt to impose control or exact guarantees, and forthwith authorize the levy of the surtaxes. They feel confident that a policy,

so closely in accord with the friendship and generosity always displayed by the United States of America towards the people of China, will receive the full and cordial support of the United States Government.⁶⁰

In the opinion of the US Ambassador in London, the British were anxious that the conference, which would soon collapse, should make some gesture that might help to quell anti-British feeling in China.⁶¹ To Pratt, it came as the result of Britain's realisation that: 'if order and stability were ever to reign in the Far East, an entirely new basis must be found for the relations between China and the foreign Powers'.⁶² The two views do not necessarily conflict, and the memorandum was most valuable, in Borg's words, in that it did 'attempt to break through traditional ways of thinking and place the negotiations on a level more in keeping with ideas of international equity'.⁶³ International equity, as Chinese of varying shades of opinion tirelessly repeated, was what the movement had been all about.

That the memorandum represented the main line of Foreign Office thinking was confirmed by a further British communication, delivered in December 1926 and known to the State Department as the 'Christmas present', which, summing up the lessons of the past eighteen months, declared that conditions in China had changed, and that the Powers should 'abandon the idea that the economic and political development of China can be secured under foreign tutelage'. While the US was not entirely happy that 'the first imaginative and courageous public statement made by any foreign government since the beginning of the Nationalist Revolution' should have come from the British rather than from themselves—Kellog was particularly concerned that the US should lead in a progressive China policy—they could not really quibble with such a statement, which did not fundamentally differ from their own position, and the following month they declared their agreement with it. As Fishel has written:

The British, by the issuance of a demarche in December 1926, sought to ameliorate the intense anti-British sentiment which the Chinese people had manifested since 1925. By proclaiming their intention to adopt a most conciliatory attitude towards Chinese aspirations, they were able to regain in large part their position as a friend to China.⁶⁴

The Chinese nationalists, in fact, must have been much less impressed by the proclamation of intention than by positive action taken by Britain on a number of issues, including customs revenue, the leased territory at

Weihaiwei, the concessions at Chinkiang, Kiukiang, Hankow, Tientsin and Amoy, the Shanghai Mixed Court and the problems arising from mixed hearings in general. By the time the new National Government had been established in Nanking:

Great Britain... had recovered her prestige and her position of acknowledged leadership, but she was no longer using this position to maintain the 'unequal treaties' for the benefit of the foreign Powers in general. She now took the lead in dealing with the two major problems of tariff autonomy and extraterritoriality.⁶⁵

Borg appears to be correct in stating that the issue of whether or not the treaty system should be defended against Chinese demands for its abolition depended on the Powers' judgment as to whether, first, they would be politically or morally justified in so doing, and second, as to how great would be the price such a defence might entail, and whether it was worth paying.⁶⁶ Even before the movement commenced men like Pratt and Waterlow were declaring that the system was both obsolete and morally questionable, but there were others within the Foreign Office, and still more in commercial circles in the treaty ports, who saw nothing very wrong with things as they were, and even felt them to be quite defensible. The outbreak of the movement brought the question of the price to be paid into clearer focus. The intensity of Chinese feelings on the treaty question came as a surprise to many foreigners, not all unsympathetic, and as the movement progressed, Britain, singled out as the chief object of nationalist wrath, saw her political and commercial position dangerously undermined. The most conservative groups, such as the British Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai and the Municipal Council in that city, made what they, at least, considered to be major concessions to Chinese opinion, and from demanding that the British government take strong action against the Chinese, ignoring the fact that since World War I it was in no position to do so, they changed to requesting it do nothing to inflame the situation further. Within and without the Foreign Office, those men who earlier in 1925 had doubted the wisdom of interfering with the *status quo* now saw that *status quo* being changed out of all recognition, regardless of British action or lack of it, and they no longer stood in the way of those men of more liberal opinion, who could, if they had wished, have said 'I told you so'. Thus Pratt, who appears in his minutes of 1925 as something of a maverick, eventually became, as Sir John, one of the principal architects of Britain's China policy.

At the same time, however, it must be understood that none of these changes involved the immediate or total sacrifice of those privileges

which foreigners in China had learned to hold so dear, and which were so detested by the Chinese. Many more years were to elapse before they completely disappeared, for only during World War II were these nineteenth-century chains finally loosed from the Chinese nation, due in large part to the fear of the Western Powers that Chiang Kai-shek might take China out of the war by making his own arrangements with Japan. Yet whatever the motives, the final abolition of extraterritoriality signified the accomplishment of a great part of what the original participants in the May 30 Movement had wished to achieve. Pratt himself recognised this, writing in 1943 that:

China will emerge from the war a fully sovereign state. The shackles of extraterritoriality have been struck off. For a hundred years the Chinese, a nation conscious of a long unbroken tradition of great achievement, have been suffering from loss of face, a sense of failure, an inferiority complex. Under such afflictions an individual Chinese could hardly bear to go on living. As a nation their whole outlook on the world has been warped and their natural genius sterilized. It is difficult for any foreigner to realize the great psychological effect this change will have. The Chinese will address themselves to the task of reconstruction with a sense of corporate responsibility, and pride and feeling of elation to which they have long been strangers.⁶⁷

Few, if any, of those who had gathered outside the Louza police station in Nanking Road on the afternoon of Saturday 30 May 1925, could have known that they would have to wait so long for the ending of extraterritoriality and the emergence of their country as a sovereign state in fact as well as name. Nor could they have imagined how many more of their compatriots would die before that time, at the hands both of one another and of the Japanese against whom they had initially raised their cry of protest. Yet the train of events which began on that day did lead, albeit through tortuous paths, to the realisation of their call to abolish the unequal treaties, and ultimately, to the reconstruction of their nation.

The significance of the May 30 Movement lies most in what it began, and growing as it did into the National Revolution, there is no one day when it can really be said to have ended. In early 1926 *Hsiang-tao* declared that the only path left open for its continuation was the Northern Expedition, while a KMT publication issued to commemorate the sixth anniversary of the incident proclaimed that the shame of the day had not yet been wiped out, and that the revolution against imperialism must be carried on to comfort the souls of the dead.⁶⁸ It is thus more fruitful to consider the movement as a beginning rather than as a entity in itself, and to recapitu-

late briefly what has gone before, let us enumerate some of the most important developments whose origins may be traced back to it.

It convinced large numbers of Chinese, particularly in urban areas, that their misfortunes were the result of something called imperialism, something with which all the dissatisfaction on the part of both individual and groups of Chinese with foreign behaviour could be, and was, identified. The symbol of foreign oppression was the unequal treaties, and their abrogation was its solution.

It saw the entry, on a mass scale, of organised labour into politics.

It contributed much to the growth and leadership within the mass movement of the CCP; less obvious at the time, but in the long run extremely important, it was at this time that Mao became aware of the revolutionary potential of the Chinese peasantry.

Both through its educational and organisational effects in other parts of China, and through the Hong Kong-Canton strike which resulted from it in the south, it helped to consolidate the revolutionary base area, and to prepare the way for the Northern Expedition.

It was responsible for the abandonment of many traditional foreign, particularly European and American, attitudes towards China, and provided the impetus for the adoption of a new approach to Chinese political problems by the two leading western nations, Britain and the USA. Although this was not immediately apparent to the Chinese, even the relatively small concessions given at the time increased their confidence in their capacity for taking meaningful action on their own behalf.

These points may all be qualified; the order is arbitrary, as they are closely linked, and woven together they form the strand which runs consistently through China's history in the first half of the present century, her fight for sovereignty and equality combined with the search for a new social order. The movement that resulted from the shots fired on Nanking Road marked the commencement of a new stage in that fight, and shocked many foreigners into the awareness of how much the Chinese were prepared to do in order to win it. And the more fair-minded of those foreigners, at least, knew that behind all the exaggeration, mendacity, ignorance and hysteria which both sides displayed—for the actors in the drama were only human, and the stakes high—the Chinese were motivated by a very real and burning desire for justice, a desire which ennobled their cause, and strengthened them in its pursuit.

Appendix 1

A Calendar of the May 30 Movement

Where there is disagreement on dates I have followed majority opinion except in cases where there is clear evidence in favour of a particular date; dates given by other sources are given in brackets following the matter in question.

1925

- | | |
|----------|---|
| February | 1st strike wave in Japanese owned mills in Shanghai; strikers resume work 1 March. |
| April 7 | Anti-Japanese demonstration in Foochow fired on by local authorities. |
| April 19 | Strikes begin in Japanese owned mills in Tsingtao; compromise reached after some days. |
| May 1 | 2nd National TUC in Canton, resolves to establish a national GTU. |
| May 4 | Shanghai: strike in Naigai Wata Kaisha (NWK) mill no. 8, lasts three days. |
| May 7 | Further strikes in NWK mills, unrest and strikes spread to other mills in the following week. |
| May 15 | Clash which results in the death of Ku Cheng-hung two days later. |
| May 16 | Strike Committee set up at mass meeting; students participate, a number of whom are arrested during the following week by SMC authorities. |
| May 24 | Memorial Service for Ku Cheng-hung (May 22?). |
| May 25 | New outbreak of strikes in Tsingtao. |
| May 27 | Student mass meeting in Shanghai resolves on demonstration to be held 30 May. |
| May 28 | Strikers in Tsingtao repressed by military; Waichiaopu sends note to Dip. Bod. requesting them to have the SMC cancel its projected by-laws; meeting of CC of CCP resolves to participate in May 30 demonstration and widen its scope to include these by-laws. |
| May 30 | Demonstration and shootings; meetings held throughout the city to discuss means of retaliation. |

- May 31 Mass meeting persuades GCC to agree to general strike; Shanghai GTU established.
- June 1 General strike begins; clash in Nanking Road involves further fatal shooting; SMC declares state of emergency.
- June 2 'Battle of Thibet Road'; SMC calls for volunteers; demonstration in Changsha.
- June 3 Waichiaopu's first note to Dip. Bod. on Shanghai events; Karakhan sends message of sympathy to Prov. Govt; large demonstration in Peking; students demonstrate in Nanking.
- June 4 Legations reply to Waichiaopu; further note from Waichiaopu; Peking GCC resolves on boycott of Britain and Japan; student strike at Wuchang.
- June 5 Commissioners Ts'ai T'ing-kan and Tseng Tsung-chien arrive in Shanghai; disturbance in Chinkiang (June 7?); demonstration in Changsha, where Chao Heng-t'i declares martial law.
- June 6 Chinese Advisory Committee to SMC resigns; total of 22 foreign warships in Shanghai; Dip. Bod. replies to second Waichiaopu note; strike at Kiukiang; student demonstrations in Peking, Wuhu and Foochow.
- June 7 Triple Union publishes 17 demands; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and others publish their manifesto in Tientsin.
- June 8 Shanghai Seamen's Union declares strike.
- June 9 Legation Secretaries arrive in Shanghai to investigate.
- June 10 Large demonstration in Peking; anti-British boycott decided on in Amoy.
- June 11 Hankow shootings; third note to Dip. Bod. from Waichiaopu.
- June 12 Dip. Bod. replies to third note; disturbance at Kiukiang (June 13?); procession in Moscow.
- June 13 Chang Hsüeh-liang arrives in Shanghai; Waichiaopu protests to British Legation over Hankow shootings.
- June 14 British Legation tells Waichiaopu Hankow shootings were in self-defence; requests them to put a stop to anti-British activities.
- June 15 13 demands of GCC published (June 13?); further demonstrations in Peking, Legation Quarter guarded; Peking Merchants Assoc. decides to boycott Britain and Japan; strike at Tangshan.
- June 16 Peking Commissioners and Legation Secretaries begin negotiations in Shanghai.

- June 17 Dip. Bod. sends third note to Waichiaopu; foreigners evacuate city side of Chinkiang; general strike resolved on in Canton.
- June 18 Negotiations in Shanghai break down; foreigners prepare to evacuate Chinkiang; Chamberlain states British Govt position in Commons debate.
- June 19 Dip. Bod. issues communiqué on breakdown of talks; Ts'ai and Tseng ordered to return to Peking (June 21?); general strike begins in Hong Kong; Shanghai GCC calls meeting to discuss date of resumption of business.
- June 20 Waichiaopu replies to Dip. Bod's note of June 17.
- June 21 Hong Kong strike grows; majority of Chinese leave Shameen.
- June 22 Chang Hsüeh-liang returns to Tientsin (June 21?); martial law declared in Chinese city of Shanghai, Hsing Shih-lien appointed martial law commander; disturbance at Ningpo.
- June 23 Shakee Road massacre; Chinese authorities in Tientsin forbid general strike.
- June 24 Waichiaopu reiterates 13 demands.
- June 25 One day triple strike throughout China; large demonstration in Peking.
- June 26 Shops and banks re-open in Shanghai; Dip. Bod. replies to Waichiaopu's demands of 24 June.
- June 28 W.W. Yen, C.T. Wang, Ts'ai T'ing-kan appointed by Prov. Govt to negotiate Shanghai settlement (June 27?); Hsiao Yao-nan guarantees peace in Hankow, British volunteers withdrawn and defences removed (June 29?).
- June 29 Prov. Govt cables all provinces instructing them to guard against destructive activities carried out in name of patriotism.
- June 30 All hotels and restaurants owned by British Chinese in Swatow sacked.
- July 1 Waichiaopu instructs all overseas missions to press respective host countries to speed up treaty revision; SMC informed of findings and proposals of Dip. Bod. but refuses to carry out said proposals (July 6?).
- July 2 'Chungking Massacre'; domestic servants strike in Swatow; Shanghai Electricity Department gives warning to mill-owners.
- July 4 Electricity cut off from Shanghai mills; British women and children evacuated from Chungking.
- July 5 Prov. Govt decides to let Waichiaopu handle first 5 of 13 demands, Yen, Wang and Ts'ai the remainder.

- July 6 Further electricity cuts in Shanghai.
- July 8 Statement of Tientsin American returned students; Japanese Minister protests to Prov. Govt about anti-Japanese incidents (July 10?).
- July 9 Hsing Shih-lien issues warning against intimidation.
- July 10 French Minister, appointed to Dip. Commission to negotiate Shanghai settlement, resigns.
- July 11 French Minister publishes statement on the dispute which caused his resignation; Waichiaopu protests to Dip. Bod. over Shanghai electricity cuts.
- July 13 Yü Hsia-ch'ing has meeting with British and US businessmen.
- July 14 Waichiaopu requests Dip. Bod. to fix date for Shanghai negotiations as soon as possible.
- July 15 Prov. Govt issues statement calling on people to maintain the peace as negotiations were underway; Yü Hsia-ch'ing has further meeting with foreign businessmen.
- July 18 Announcement of decision to hold judicial inquiry.
- July 19 Shanghai: offices of Seamen's Union, Triple Union and several others, closed and sealed by Hsing Shih-lien.
- July 25 Seamen's Union reopened (July 28?).
- July 29 Triple Union reopened (July 28?).
- July 30 Soviet Trade Union delegation arrives in Shanghai.
- July 31 Prov. Govt informally objects to judicial inquiry; 'Nanking Massacre'.
- August 1 Waichiaopu repeats request to Dip. Bod. to fix date for negotiations.
- August 4 British Chargé denies British responsibility for Nanking affair, reserves right for Britain to claim compensation.
- August 5 Chinese Chargé in London protests against judicial inquiry, informed that concerned govts were still discussing the question.
- August 7 Strike of Chinese servants at British Legation (August 6?).
- August 8 US informs China that Washington treaty is to be signed in September, requests China to fix a date for Tariff Conference (August 10?).
- August 11 Prov. Govt announces decision to convene Tariff Conference 26 October (August 18?).
- August 12 Shanghai: signature by Japanese Consul and Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of terms of settlement of Japanese mill strike; disturbance in Tientsin.

- August 14 Li Ching-lin, Tupan of Chihli, closes leading Tientsin unions; Ministers of the Powers receive telegrams from Shanghai GCC opposing judicial inquiry.
- August 16 Shanghai GTU meets to oppose return to work in Japanese mills.
- August 17 Strike in Chinese Post Office, Shanghai (August 19?).
- August 20 Some Japanese cotton mills resume work.
- August 22 Attack on headquarters of Shanghai GTU; strike at Commercial Press.
- August 26 End of strike in British Legation; representatives of Powers inform Waichiaopu that they are agreeable to commencing Tariff Conference on 26 October; terms for a settlement of Japanese shipping strike agreed on.
- August 27 End of strike at Commercial Press.
- August 28 Chinese sailors return to work on Japanese ships; SMC cancels state of emergency and demobilises volunteers (August 30?).
- August 31 British CC in Shanghai and China Association send conciliatory resolution to Chinese GCC.
- September 1 Chinese Chargé in London expresses opposition to judicial inquiry; British take note, but inform him they intend to go ahead with it.
- September 3 Yü Hsia-ch'ing responds to resolution of 31 August.
- September 4 Powers reply to Waichiaopu note of 24 June concerning treaty revision.
- September 6 Waichiaopu again protests over judicial inquiry and refuses to participate.
- September 9 Employees of Shanghai Municipal Electricity Dept return to work (Sept. 8?).
- September 10 General return of Shanghai workers to Chinese and Japanese mills.
- September 15 Decision to appoint Judicial Commission of Enquiry formally communicated to Prov. Govt by Powers.
- September 18 GTU closed down.
- September 22 Waichiaopu once again protests over judicial inquiry.
- September 26 Settlement of strike in British mills (September 27? 28?).
- September 28 Strike of employees of Chinese Telegraph Administration.
- October 1 Dip. Bod. sends note to Waichiaopu concerning 13 points.
- October 6 Chinese organisations in Shanghai express opposition to judicial inquiry.

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| October 10 | Judicial inquiry commences in Shanghai (October 7?). |
| October 14 | Chekiang forces under Sun Ch'uan-fang move on Shanghai, Hsing Shih-lien ordered to lift martial law and evacuate Shanghai. Following this, city invested by Chekiang troops. |
| October 17 | Sun Ch'uan-fang arrives in Shanghai to supervise establishment of power in the city; by this time a state of war between Chihli and Fengtien forces exists throughout North China. |
| October 26 | Tariff Conference opens in Peking; police and students clash. |
| November 29 | Liu Hua arrested. |
| December 29 | Liu Hua shot. |
| Late December | Everson and McEuen resign; victory of Chang Tso-lin, execution of Kuo Sung-ling. |

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| January/
February | Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu cease hostilities and form alliance against Feng Yü-hsiang; 'anti-red' campaign throughout North China; position of Tuan's Prov. Govt becomes more and more precarious. |
| March 18 | Massacre of students by Prov. Govt. |
| April | Defeat of Feng's troops; Prov. Govt collapses. |
| May 29/30 | First anniversary observances in Shanghai and elsewhere. |

Appendix 2

Child Labour: reform and opposition at the time of May 30

This brief essay is concerned less with the details of child labour itself, the horrors of which are adequately documented in the report of the Commission, and other contemporary materials,¹ than with the problems of reforming the situation within the International Settlement in Shanghai. This has direct bearing on the May 30 Movement both as an indication of the difficulties of Sino-foreign co-operation at the time, even when there was ample good will, and more specifically because one of the by-laws to which objection was taken was concerned with basic measures to control the use of children in factories. By way of putting the issue in perspective, it is worth recalling that children were still legally employed in Lancashire cotton mills only a little more than twenty years earlier, while even in 1925 unregulated child labour continued to exist in several states of the USA.²

As mentioned in chapter 1 (p. 16), the first strike in a Japanese mill in Shanghai was prompted by, amongst other things, the workers' opposition to attempts on the part of management to reduce the role played by children and over-aged women in the production process. This seems to have been the first such attempt, and the opposition to it needs some explanation. The reason, however, was simple enough: the parents needed the extra income. In the villages from which the majority of workers came, it had always been accepted, and necessary, that children should begin to work in the fields, or engage in some form of handicraft industry, as soon as possible, and in the traditional cities children similarly became apprenticed at an early age. It was only natural, therefore, that when the parents became industrial workers, similar patterns of employment should persist. Moreover, only by having the maximum number of family members employed was it possible to maintain a minimum standard of living, given the prevailing wage levels. When factories attempted to introduce controls by imposing a minimum age limit, parents lied about their children's ages, and when, to counter this, height, rather than years, became the standard, an older member of the family would be sent

to sign on and be issued with the necessary factory pass, which would then be given to the underaged, or undersized, child. Both Japanese and British mills encountered this problem.³

The credit for the first serious attempt to investigate the situation, with a view to its amelioration, must go to the YMCA, under whose auspices the Child Labour Commission was established and made its report in 1924. The Commission included Dame Adelaide Anderson and Sung Mei-ling (later to become the wife of Chiang Kai-shek). The year 1924 also saw the first Chinese call for the abolition of factory labour for all children under 14, made at the May-day celebrations held under the auspices of the Labour Federation, which had friendly contacts with the YMCA and 'progressive' foreigners. The CCP does not seem to have interested itself greatly in the question, finding in anti-Japanese agitation a better way of gaining working class support.

The Commission's Report, which noted in its introduction that: 'It was early apparent that ... there was little public interest in Shanghai in the subject matter of this enquiry. ...' pointed out that one of the main problems facing reformers was the absence of a central government with the power to enforce its decrees throughout the country. Consequently those who wished to restrict child labour in the Settlement would have to do so without unduly injuring the industries which would be adversely affected by having to compete with those outside the SMC's jurisdiction, which were subject to no such restrictions. This aspect of the problem was illustrated by the replies of the Cotton Mill Owners' Association of China (foreign) and the Chinese Cotton Mill Owners' Association (Chinese) to the question of their attitude towards some sort of legislation on the matter. The foreign employers stated:

- a. (1) That this Association would welcome regulations limiting the employment of children below a reasonable age, provided these regulations were applicable to and were rigidly enforced in the adjoining provinces of Chekiang and Kiangsu, or even Kiangsu only.
- (2) That this Association considers 'a reasonable age' referred to in (1) above to be 12 years (foreign count) for the first 2 years, and thereafter 13.
- (3) That in the event of no regulations applicable to the surrounding district being possible this Association would not oppose regulations limiting the age of employment inside the Settlement to 9 years (foreign count).
- b. That the Association would welcome regulations prohibiting the employment of children below the full age of 12 provided similar regulations were made applicable and rigidly enforced

outside the Settlement limit—say, at least in the provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang.

The Chinese employers declared:

- a. That the Association would regard the enforcement of prohibition in the Settlement only as an augmentation to the disadvantages already existing at which the mills in the Settlement are working, as the prohibition when enforced would drive away from the Settlement not only all the workers affected but also their parents to obtain work outside, and would result in a shortage of labour in the Settlement where the mills in addition to paying higher taxes and dearer raw cotton than those in the interior would have to pay still higher wages in order to attract labour.
- b. That in the opinion of the Association the employment of children by mills is a matter of charitable nature towards the parent workers; for so long as their children are employed, it adds to their income, relieving the burden of supporting their children, and also removes their anxiety for the safety of their children who, from the parents' point of view, are safer and more comfortable in the mills than they would be if left to run wild on the street.
- c. That many mills have tried to eliminate small children from employment but they have met with little success owing to the pitiful requests by the parents of the children.

Little wonder that the Report concluded with these words, signed by both Chinese and foreign members of the Commission:

Reform of present industrial conditions and the consequent amelioration of the lot of the Chinese child workers cannot be achieved unless it receives the moral and active support not only of the foreign residents but of the vastly greater body of the Chinese public.⁴

Despite such difficulties, however, sufficient support was given to the recommendations of the Commission to result in their being put into the form of a by-law to be considered at a special meeting of SMC rate-payers to be held on 15 April 1925. The measures were gradual and designed to lead to an eventual phasing out of child labour over a period of a number of years, and they were strongly backed by the Foreign Office, who instructed the Consul-General (Pratt) to use his influence to obtain the passage of the by-law.⁵ After what seems to have been a certain amount of indecision, the British Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai also threw its weight behind the proposals, arguing in its journal:

A thought for those who are in doubt on this subject is the following. If to the average man in England Shanghai were to become known as 'that place that makes money out of child labour' very little sympathy or support could be expected, or would be forthcoming, in our struggle for the maintenance of treaty rights. We should automatically lose the sympathy of all the Liberal and Labour forces in the United Kingdom.⁶

On 3 April a large meeting of Japanese residents, including managers and foremen from all the major mills, was addressed by a number of speakers, who all stressed the need to support the new legislation. Amongst others, the meeting was addressed by Mrs Sakamoto of the Joint Committee of Shanghai Women's Clubs, formed specially to promote reforms, Mr Bunji Suzuki, President of the Japanese General Federation of Labour, and Mr Okada, the leading Japanese employer, whose speech, in which he declared the by-law to be perfectly reasonable and practicable, commanded especial appreciation.⁷ Other employers' organisations, including several important Chinese employers, also added their support to the measure,⁸ and the British Chamber of Commerce passed the following resolution at their annual general meeting:

Your Committee is in sympathy with the movement for improving the conditions of labour in Shanghai and with the suggestions put forward by the Child Labour Commission. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce has asked us to urge the Municipal Council to adopt the Commission's recommendations. Our Council, I am glad to say, needs no urging. But perhaps the ratepayers, who have to provide the quorum necessary for local legislation, do. Accordingly, I wish as Chairman of the Chamber to endorse the view expressed in this month's issue of the 'Journal' that failure to get a quorum at the forthcoming ratepayers' meeting could be most unfortunate for the reputation of Shanghai.⁹

Nevertheless, on 15 April, despite the best efforts of many people, there was no quorum. As can be imagined, this caused a good deal of disappointment to the reformers, who had not expected such a result, feeling that while a minority of foreigners were against the by-law, most were in favour. As Pratt reported to the FO on 30 April:

The opposition, such as it was, was voiced for the most part by a half-crazy individual who suffers from a kind of itch which compels him to write to the newspapers on every conceivable topic and every conceivable occasion. His arguments were not sincere and were hardly worthy of refutation. Some few persons were genuinely of opinion that it was unwise to interfere in any way with the Chinese, while others were perturbed at the thought that children

might be thrown out of the mills to starve. Yet others disliked being faced with a moral issue and resented having social reform forced upon them by groups of women. Allowing for all these, however, there is no doubt that the by-law commanded the approval of the great majority of the foreign residents of Shanghai.

Pratt felt that the failure to get a quorum (traditional at Special Meetings of the Ratepayers' Association) was due less to apathy than to 1) the way the campaign had been carried out (entirely by women, with no personal canvass of rate-payers), 2) the fact that some opposing the by-law deliberately stayed away, and 3) most of the 500 Japanese rate-payers spoke no English, and could not be expected to attend a meeting where no provision was made for interpretation. Accordingly, with the approval of the Foreign Office, Pratt requested the Council to call a further meeting, to be held on 2 June, and ensured that there was a personal canvass of each rate-payer, and that special arrangements were made for the Japanese. He also drafted a letter by a number of important rate-payers pledging their attendance.¹⁰

However, Chinese opposition, already in evidence before the first meeting, grew rapidly in the following month, and proved to be a far greater problem than any half-crazy writer. George Sokolsky wrote in the *China Yearbook* that:

Those... who were fighting the battle for the restriction of child labour could not understand the local situation, as they were not local people and they could not believe that the Chinese were really opposed to the legislation, as they were incorrectly informed of Chinese public opinion by Chinese Christians and reformers, who had come to believe that their own advanced opinions were the same as that of other Chinese. This error was one of the causes for the Chinese excitement on the eve of May 30.¹¹

Sokolsky's view commands respect, as he was generally an accurate observer. But as far as the Chinese were concerned, child labour itself was no longer the issue. As mentioned in the second chapter of this work, the child labour by-law was only one of four which were to be passed by the Special Meeting, one of which, concerning printed matter, was especially detested by the Chinese, who were becoming ever more strongly opposed to any extension of the SMC's authority, and quite legitimately felt the proposed by-laws to be an encroachment on China's sovereign rights.¹² This view was taken by practically all Chinese who cared to think about such things, from businessmen to Communists,¹³ although only the latter went so far as to argue that the child labour by-law would simply make exploitation more efficient.¹⁴

The Chinese also pointed to the regulations already formulated on the subject by the Chinese government in 1923, and claimed that if the foreigners were in earnest they should enact them, although they were nowhere enforced elsewhere in China. Sokolsky explains that there were legal complications which rendered this impracticable, adding:

The Chinese opponents of the measure undoubtedly knew of these difficulties, but avoided such impediments as part of a nationalistic effort to force upon the Council recognition of Chinese law.¹⁵

The Chinese regulations were in fact far more thorough-going and came closer to the Communists' demands that *real* changes should be made and a law with real teeth formulated, in place of the 'petty' recommendations of the Commission.¹⁶ Unfortunately, for reasons outlined above, such a law would have had no chance of being put into practice given prevailing conditions and expectations. In this context we cannot avoid mentioning the different attitude of the Chinese and Europeans to the concept of law, frequently commented on by observers of China, ancient and modern, and we can do no better than to take note of the following remarks of Sir John Pratt on the factory law passed by the Chinese government in 1929:

When the law was finally promulgated it was found that it was composed of all the most idealistic provisions selected out of the most advanced laws of the most progressive and highly developed industrial countries. In spite of the practical nature of the problem and its extreme urgency the Chinese could not bring themselves to act otherwise than upon the principle that the law must proclaim an ideal standard of conduct at which all factory owners should aim. The Chinese authorities had no intention of applying the penal provisions of the law to those who did not attain this ideal standard, but according to Chinese ideas grave moral harm would result if the law were such as to induce in men's minds the belief that in a matter where human relationships were so greatly concerned, anything less than the highest standards could be regarded as satisfactory.¹⁷

Such an attitude could only serve to increase Chinese doubts as to foreign sincerity, and suspicion that the agitation over child labour was a subterfuge to obtain a quorum to pass the other by-laws to which they objected so strongly.

Chinese opposition to all the by-laws grew stronger and stronger, and even a rascal like Marshal Chang Tsung-ch'ang could declare that the proposal to 'abolish' child labour, to which he was strongly opposed, thinking those who advocated it to be 'crazy', constituted unwarrantable interference in Chinese affairs.¹⁸ Nationalists, abominably reactionary war-lords and equally reactionary Shanghai old China hands all united in their

opposition to the bid to better the lot of the child workers of the international settlement (for there can be no doubt that this is what the supporters of the reform had uppermost in mind, despite opinions to the contrary). We know that this was one of the issues involved in the demonstration on 30 May and the declaration of a state of emergency ensured as nothing else could have done that the 2 July meeting also failed to secure a quorum. Nevertheless, there was an increased attendance, despite private messages from the SMC warning rate-payers not to attend for fear of the consequences if the measures were passed, and this led Pratt to believe that if normal conditions prevailed a quorum would have been secured.¹⁹

The Foreign Office kept up the pressure throughout the year, preparing questions (with answers already supplied) to be asked in Parliament, with the stated intention of throwing discredit on conditions in Shanghai. As Waterlow wrote on 16 June: 'No refinements and no dwelling upon difficulties can get away from the fact that we are partly responsible for the exploitation of small children, and that this has got to stop.'²⁰ A few days earlier he noted with regard to another parliamentary question:

A useful question because it will bring out the disgraceful facts about child labour and stimulate the ratepayers to pass the necessary regulations. [Despite difficulties] ... it is absolutely necessary that the foreign settlement should be made a model in this respect. Our whole handling of China will be made more difficult so long as this shame remains. Increased driving power to remedy it will perhaps be the only good coming out of the present agitation.²¹

Such, however, was not to be the case, and Anderson wrote that following 30 May:

it was the opinion of a good many foreigners that any question of regulation by the Council of the conditions of child workers was finally closed in the Foreign Settlement, for they were convinced of the inadvisability of there [*sic*] attempting regulations affecting Chinese customs, against the national feeling.²²

She did add, however:

Something may, on the other hand, be gained for the children, meanwhile, by the improved economic status for the adult workers, which was undoubtedly partly obtained through that year of economic and political strikes.²³

The reader will observe that I have relied heavily on English sources for this short essay. This is because of an interesting shortage of material on the subject from later Communist writers, which seems to indicate a

reluctance to explain the reasons for opposing the Child Labour by-law, particularly to ordinary readers. Thus the issue is skirted in three 'popular' histories published in post-liberation China: Hsü Shih-hua and Ch'iang Chung-hua ignore it completely, referring simply to opposition to the 'three proposals' (op. cit., p.20), as does the most recent work (1976) on the subject;²⁴ Liang Hsiao-ming refers to the 'four proposals', naming the first three, wharfage dues, printed matter and registration of stock and produce exchanges, but leaves the subject of the fourth a mysterious blank (op. cit., p.19). Teng Chung-hsia lists the four proposals by name, with no comment on any of them (op. cit., p.182) other than that they were all designed to oppress the Chinese commercial class. Only in the scholarly *Li-Shih Yen-chiu* is the reader given more enlightenment. The following is a translation of extracts from a longish footnote on the matter in Ch'i Wu's article on the historical significance and lessons of the May 30 Movement (no. 3, 1965, n.1, p.27):

The proposal concerning the 'abolition of child labour' was a trick of the S.M.C. to fool the Chinese people and world opinion... [Ch'i gives facts and figures concerning child labour and adds that the situation had long been the subject of condemnation. He goes on to list the provisions of the by-law, and then explains] This proposal, nominally for the 'protection of child labourers', was in practice the legalisation of the fact of cruel exploitation of Chinese children by the capitalists. However, Chinese and foreign capitalists were still not satisfied with it. The aim of the S.M.C. in placing it on the agenda together with the other three proposals was to put the responsibility for approving the banning of cruel exploitation of child labour onto the shoulders of the Chinese capitalists, and to cover up the reality of the consistent opposition to the proposal from foreign enterprises. Thus, during the May 30 movement, the working class and the broad masses of city-dwellers only opposed three proposals, the capitalists alone opposing all four.

Appendix 3

Documents

1. The 13 Demands of the GCC.¹

1. Cancellation of state of emergency.
2. Release of all Chinese arrested in connection with this affair and restoration to original state of all educational institutions in the International Settlement sealed and occupied (by the authorities).
3. Punishment of offenders. To be suspended pending investigation and thereafter to be seriously dealt with.
4. Compensation for the dead and wounded and for the damage sustained by the labourers, merchants and students in connexion with this affair.
5. Apology.
6. Rendition of Mixed Court. Complete restoration to the state consistent to the provisions of the treaties.

When any Chinese is prosecuted under the Criminal Code of the Republic of China or under the Municipal By-laws, the prosecution shall be in the name of the Republic, and not in that of the Shanghai Municipal Council.

7. All the employees of the foreigners, seamen and workers of mills or factories and others who turned out on strike in sympathy, shall be reinstated, and their wages during the period of the strike shall not be deducted.
8. Better conditions for the labourers. Any labourer may work or not on his own accord and shall not be punishable for refusal to work.
9. Municipal franchise.
 - (a) The Chinese may participate in the Municipal Council and ratepayers' meetings. The ratepayers' representation in the Council shall be in proportion to the amount of the rate payable and paid to the Municipal revenue, and the qualifications for franchise of the Chinese shall be similar to those of the foreigners.

- (b) For the purpose of the franchise, distinction shall be made as to the beneficial and trust (or legal) interests of property: with the beneficial interest, the right of franchise shall accompany, and in the case of the trust interest such right shall be exercised by the beneficial owner thereof.
- 10. Restraint to construct roads beyond boundaries. The Shanghai Municipal Council shall not construct roads beyond the Settlement boundaries; those roads which are already so constructed shall be unconditionally turned over to the Chinese Government.
- 11. Withdrawal of the resolutions concerning printed matter, increase of wharfage dues and licensing of exchanges.
- 12. All Chinese residents of the Settlement shall have liberty of speech, assembly and publications.
- 13. Dismissal of the Secretary of the Municipal Council, E. S. B. Rowe.
- 2. First Waichiaopu note to the Diplomatic Body (June 3).

I have the honour to draw the very serious attention of your Excellency to the following unhappy facts which occurred on May 30 in the International Settlement in Shanghai.

Following the arrest of students and acts of violence towards Chinese workers, several of whom were wounded, a certain number of students from different universities in Shanghai proceeded on the afternoon of May 30 to a police station of the International Concession as a sign of protest and made speeches. Armed intervention by the police led to more than 40 students being arrested. Four were killed outright, six seriously wounded, of whom two succumbed a little while afterwards, and 17 slightly wounded, three of whom died later.

On learning these facts, which have deeply impressed me, I wish to point out that, no matter what the nature of their demonstration may have been, the students, being young men of good family, full of patriotism and unarmed, should not be treated, no matter what the circumstances, as ordinary law-breakers and criminals, and that the police, instead of attempting to pacify them by appropriate means, had recourse to those extreme measures which are condemned both on humanitarian grounds and from the viewpoint of justice.

Consequently I find myself placed in the absolute necessity to address to your Excellency the most solemn protest, reserving the right to put forward, as soon as complete reports shall have come to

hand with all the details, the necessary redress for this deplorable incident, for which the authorities of the International Settlement are solely responsible.

Moreover, I have to beg your Excellency to be good enough to communicate with the Ministers of the interested Powers the text of this communication and to give urgent instructions to the Consular authorities in Shanghai to release the arrested persons and to come to some arrangement with the Special Commissioner for Foreign Affairs resident in Shanghai, to secure that there be no repetition of such events.

3. Second Waichiaopu Note (June 4).

Contrary to my expectations, fresh reports of an alarming character continue to reach me to the effect that the police of the International Settlement on June 1 again shot certain persons, three of whom have been killed and 18 wounded, and that the arrested persons have not yet been released.

Other reports inform me that the greatest number of victims have received bullets in the back, while not a single policeman has been killed or wounded, which proves that the shooting was not justified.

The violent attitude of the authorities of the International Settlement, which has aroused the utmost feeling among the general public, has created the gravest consequences, chiefly the strike among the merchants and labourers of Shanghai. Against such little respect for the elementary principles of humanity for which the authorities of the International Settlement are entirely responsible, I am obliged once more to address Your Excellency with a most energetic protest.

Furthermore, I must request Your Excellency to communicate the above to the Ministers of the interested Powers and to send without delay most urgent instructions to the Consular authorities of Shanghai and to order them to stop immediately the use of arms, which was the cause of the original trouble and bloodshed.

4. Reply of the Diplomatic Body to the first Note (signed by V. Cerrutti, Italian Minister, Doyen of the Diplomatic Body).²

While deploring with you the events referred to, during which persons were killed and others seriously injured, we believe that it is necessary to specify the circumstances under which the police were led to make use of their arms.

Demonstrative groups, who were in the act of distributing subversive and clearly anti-foreign pamphlets in the Concession on Nanking Road, were requested to disperse, and the leaders were arrested. The crowd, which refused to obey the orders of the police, then attacked them and attempted an assault on the police station. It was then only that the police made use of their arms.

It would therefore result that the responsibility of the events which followed rests on the demonstrators and not on the Authorities of the Concession.

On the other hand, subsequently the same Authorities gave proof that they were very well disposed, and the Mixed Court, before whom the culprits were summoned, ordered their provisional release on bail.

While awaiting further information we hope that the Chinese Government will continue to envisage this unfortunate incident with the same conciliatory spirit which inspires the interested diplomatic representatives to the end that order and tranquility may be re-established in Shanghai with the least possible delay.

5. Extract from the Report of the American Judge on the Judicial Enquiry.³

I. The Origin of the Disturbances.

First:—The cause of many years standing.

- (a) The status of the Mixed Court;
- (b) That the Chinese residents of the city of Shanghai have no part nor representation in the government of the city;
- (c) In all cases, whether civil or criminal, where a foreigner is a party by or against a Chinaman, a foreigner is in fact the judge;
- (d) Extraterritoriality;
- (e) Loss of sovereignty over territory;
- (f) Projection of roads into Chinese territory without authority of the Chinese Government;
- (g) Extension of the Government of Shanghai into Chinese territory over said roads;
- (h) Modification of treaties;
- (i) The mental attitude of both Chinese and foreigners due to the failure to have important questions of differences between them settled;
- (j) Usurpation of legislative, judicial, administrative, and police powers in Chinese territory.

Second:—The Immediate and Proximate Causes.

- (a) The killing of Chinese laborers by Japanese in cotton mills;
- (b) The killing of Japanese by Chinese;
- (d) The disturbances caused by strikes in various cotton mills occurring almost daily;
- (e) The open and notorious agitation by members of Labour Unions;
- (f) The agitation of the trouble by persons of bolshevistic tendencies;
- (g) The proposal by the Municipal Council to adopt by-laws creating new criminal offences;
- (h) The proposed by-laws by the Municipal Council, licensing stocks and produce exchanges;
- (i) The proposed by-laws by the Municipal Council, punishing any person who shall print or publish or cause to be printed or published any newspaper, pamphlet, circular, handbill, leaflet, playcard or other paper containing public news, intelligence, or occurrences, or any remarks or observations thereof;
- (j) The proposed by-laws seeking to restrict child labour.
- (k) The opposition to the proposed by-laws was made through the public press. The opposition was based upon the grounds that said proposed by-laws were (a) *ultra vires*, (b) unnecessary, (c) vexatious, (d) illegal in principal and wrong in force, and (e) for the further reason that the present laws were fully adequate;
- (l) The labourers in the cotton mills to be paid more frequently and in a different kind of money;
- (m) The failure to release students who had been arrested prior to the 30th day of May;
- (n) The failure to pay indemnity to those who had been wounded and killed;
- (o) The continuance of the construction of roads outside of the International Settlement;
- (p) The failure to comply with the demand that certain Japanese employed in the cotton mills who had opened fire on the labourers be dismissed;
- (q) The fact that various meetings held by Chinese students and others were broken up by the police;

- (r) The failure to make an apology by the Japanese consular representatives to the Chinese Government for the treatment of the Chinese;
- (s) The failure to make an apology by the Municipal Council for alleged incivilities by its officers;
- (t) The failure to suppress gambling and abuses generally, including illicit traffic in opium;
- (u) The many other supposed grievances between December 9, 1924, and May 30, 1925, which are found in the daily reports of the Police Department to the Municipal Council;
- (v) From the daily report of the Police to the Municipal Council it will be seen that there were continuous troubles in some cotton mills between the laborers and the so-called students on one hand, and the management of the Japanese cotton mills on the other;
- (w) The demand for the dismissal of foreign Sikh police;
- (x) The evil and destructive influences to good and orderly government by paid foreign emissaries of Bolshevistic and Communistic governments, whose only purpose was not to assist and aid the Chinese people, but to excite and arouse a spirit of antagonism against all foreigners except themselves.
- (y) The failure on the part of the foreigners in China to realize that the Chinese people have made greater advancement during the past 10 years in civics, in the fundamental principles of government and in the better understanding of individual rights under the law, than they have made in any 100 years of their entire history.

The mere enumeration of foregoing causes is no expression of opinion as to their merits or justice. They are mentioned to show the frame of mind of the Chinese on May 30, 1925.

- 6. Demands of the Workers in Japanese mills (presented in June).⁴
 - 1. The Millworkers' Union must be recognized, and its delegates, properly accredited, shall have full power to speak on behalf of the workers.
 - 2. Indemnities must be paid to families of the dead and wounded.
 - 3. The murderers of the Chinese workers must be arrested and punished.
 - 4. Wages must be increased by 30 per cent.
 - 5. Wages must be paid in big money.

6. There must be no ill-treatment meted out to the workers.
 7. Japanese employ  s must not carry arms.
 8. Wages must be paid during the period of the strike.
 9. No workers must be dismissed as a result of the strike.
7. Settlement of the Japanese mills strike.⁵
1. The Japanese mill owners agree to recognize the unions as representatives of their employees when such an organization has been formed according to Labour Union law to be promulgated by Peking after peace and order is established.
 2. The mill owners do not recognize the principle of strike pay, but have agreed, in view of the hardships occasioned by the strike, to assist them reasonably (this assistance will equal four days' pay, for all employees—a total of \$100,000).
 3. The wages of workers are to be increased according to the merit of their respective skill. Upon resumption the mills are inclined to give further consideration of a readjustment of wages.
 4. In future the workers are as in the past to be paid big money. That fraction over and above an even amount will be credited to the next pay cheque.
 5. No arms are to be carried by foremen in the mills under ordinary conditions.
 6. No workers to be dismissed without just cause.
 7. Those mills having electric power are to resume operation at once. Those dependent upon the Electricity Department for power will open as soon as power is furnished them.
8. Terms of settlement of the Japanese shipping strike.⁶
1. The Unions to abandon the principle of pay for the duration of the strike.
 2. The steamship companies, on the other hand, recognizing the hardships which the seamen have endured, have agreed to pay them a gratuity when they resume work.
 3. It is understood by both contracting parties that there will be no immediate increase of wages, but, within one month the seamen are to prepare a scheme, for discussion between them and the owners.
 4. The operators agree that there shall be no unjust dismissals of men and that participation in the strike shall not be considered just reason for such action.

9. Terms of settlement of the strike in British factories.⁷
 1. Recognition of the Union must wait on publication of the Government's Labour Law, and is further conditional on the restoration of law and order locally.
 2. Pay for strike period to be issued jointly by management and the G.C.C.
 3. Each factory should investigate workers' living conditions and engage in wage discussion as the need arises, to be managed on the same basis as in Chinese and Japanese factories.
 4. Wages in all factories to be given in big money, extra small change to be held over until the following pay day, to be converted into big money.
 5. Foreign employees should not normally carry weapons within the factory.
 6. Every factory should pay attention to the treatment of workers; no dismissals without just cause.
 7. Resumption of work to follow on the cleaning up of factories.
10. Statement of the Shanghai Sane Aim Association.
(This is typical of a number of such scandal sheets circulated during the movement. It was produced at the trial of those arrested on 30 May, and is held in FO *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F4125/194/10; the English translation was made for the Mixed Court.)

Talking of Chen Tou Seu [Ch'en Tu-hsiu] he bought 60 mow of land near the Seu San Public Garden in Nanking on which site he built a three storied house which is only a portion of his private property. As regards his other properties and the properties of other communists we believe the total value must be very large. However they are not satisfied with this they are now taking advantage of our present patriotic movement by driving our students into the fighting zone thus causing them to be shot dead. For one death they obtain \$50,000.00 from Soviet Russia, and for ten deaths they get \$500,000.00. The more deaths the more money they can secure. So from the death of several of our citizens, only communists can reap a huge reward. We weep over the death of our brethren while they laugh heartily in the dark. We are fighting for our national rights whilst they sell those national rights to foreigners in order to make money. We are fighting for the freedom of our people while they are selling our freedom to Soviet Russians.

Citizens! It is not the foreigners who kill us. It is the communists who are killing us by using the hands of the foreigners.

There are several thousands of Chinese workers in Japanese Mills thrown out of employment. They have neither food or clothing and are weeping bitterly every day, but that does not affect the conscience of the communists. They even refuse to render us assistance. The cry of the communists is 'Overthrow Imperialism' but they themselves are running dogs of the Red Russian Imperialists. Their leader Chen Tou Seu a man of magical power. Jiu Chu Pah, [Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai] a strong supporter of the communist party is under the protection of the Russian Consular Authorities. Men like Hwei Tan Ying [Yün Tai-ying], Shen Tsai Ming [Shen Tse-min], Sze Chuan Tong [Shih Ts'un-t'ung], Dung Chung Hsia [Teng Chung-hsia], Liu Ki Ching [Liu I-ch'ing], and Han Kou Ming [Han Ch'ueh-min], all act according to the instructions of Russians, and are mingled up in our patriotic movements. The scheme of the communists is to spread its members amongst all commercial and educational organisations and to take charge of all affairs therein. They have no regard whatever for the lives of others or for the loss of their national rights. Their object is not to protect their own nation but to give it away to Russians to subject their own nationals to the rule of Soviet Russia under the pretext of abolition of class distinction all over the world. We people are patriotic towards our country but these Chinese communists are selling our country to foreigners while we are carrying out patriotic movements. Communists are therefore our public foes. We must oppose the laws governing printed matters and the increase of the wharfrage dues. We must oppose the construction of roads by foreigners in territory under Chinese jurisdiction and the licensing of stock exchange Coys. We must demand the punishment of the assailants in the recent riot, the payment of compensation to the families of the victims and the tendering of an apology to our Government. Above all we must first overthrow the Communist Party.

WE NOW OPENLY ANNOUNCE THE DEFECTS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

- (1) The killing of our people by using the hands of foreigners, thereby obtaining compensation from foreigners.
- (2) The conferring of the term 'Running Dogs' on others, while they themselves are running dogs of the Imperialists of Soviet Russia.
- (3) The making of profit under the pretext of rendering assistance to labourers.

- (4) The deceiving of their nationals by the cry 'Overthrow Imperialism and Militarism'. In the meantime they themselves are receiving support from militarists and Imperialists and assisting the militarists to become reckless in China.
- (5) The urging upon the people to give up their property, while they themselves are making a lot of money thus enabling them to become capitalists.
- (6) Taking advantage of patriotic movements they further their activities by selling their own country to foreigners.
- (7) The abusing of people for having no cooperation, while in the meantime they are boycotting public bodies other than their own.
- (8) The praising of the alliance of public bodies, while in reality they are stealing the plans of the public and claiming them as their own achievements and thereby winning the favour of Russians.

Issued by the Shanghai Residents Sane Aim Association.

Chapter 1

- 1 A. M. Kotenev, *Shanghai: Its Municipality and the Chinese*, p. 320; all references below to Kotenev, op. cit., refer to this work. For the judicial inquiry, see pp. ff.
- 2 Digby C. H. D'Avigdor, 'Chinese Troubles', 1923; this article is contained in the *Collected Papers*, vol. 58, of the Hankow Club.
- 3 Far less important, but significant nonetheless, the influx of large numbers of Russian refugees also provided a new element in every city where they congregated, and nowhere was this more true than in Shanghai, where there appeared, in significant proportions, that strange phenomenon, poor Europeans, some, at least, of whose men could be hired as mercenaries, and whose women could be bought. In 1924, 1,600 Russian refugees emigrated from Shanghai, and 1,000 more arrived. Out of a total of 8,400 Russians in the city, 8,000 had lost their citizenship; 1,350 were unemployed and dependent on charity, 2,000 were partially supported. White beggars were not unknown. *Chinese Economic Bulletin*, nos. 220, 9/5/25, p. 273; 226, 20/6/25, p. 349.
- 4 The precise chronology of all this is still not clear; see Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement*, p. 244, n.k.
- 5 The matchmaking metaphor comes from J. Ch'en, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution*, pp. 88f.
- 6 Ibid., p. 96. Also see L. Trotsky, *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*.
- 7 D. Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution of 1925-28*, p. 17.
- 8 For the full text see T. C. Woo, *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution*, Appendix C, pp. 258-69, especially p. 267.
- 9 Borg, op. cit., p. 428.
- 10 Ibid., p. 12.
- 11 Ch'en, op. cit., p. 99.
- 12 H. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, p. 29.
- 13 Hsien-ting Fong, *Cotton Industry and Trade in China*, pp. 111-14.
- 14 W. W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan*, p. 28.
- 15 E.g. Hsü Shih-hua and Ch'iang Chung-hua, *Wu-sa Yün-tung*, pp. 3-4. For a detailed account of the Chinese cotton textile industry during this period, see Yen Chung-p'ing, *Chung-Kuo Mien-fang-chih Shib-Kao*, chap. 5.
- 16 E.g. A. S. Pearse, *The Cotton Industry of Japan and China*, p. 221; Lin Tung-hai (J. D. H. Lamb), *The Labour Movement and Labour Legislation in China*, p. 47.
- 17 S. T. King, and D. K. Lieu, *China's Cotton Industry*, p. 3.
- 18 *Far Eastern Times*, vol. XXIV, no. 5, quoted in King and Lieu, op. cit., p. 18. The figures for 1925 would be rather lower, the total Japanese population in

Shanghai at the time of the census of 1 May 1925 being 18,902; *Chinese Economic Bulletin*, no. 226, 20/6/25, p. 349.

19 King and Lieu, op. cit., p. 19.

20 This passage, and the figures above, are from *ibid.*, p. 16. The figures are for 1928, but are certainly very close to the situation in 1925. According to the *China Yearbook 1926-7* (hereafter referred to as *CYB 1926-7*) pp. 914-15, in 1925 there were 122 cotton mills in China; 73 were Chinese owned, 45 Japanese and 4 British. There was an American creditor's interest in one Chinese mill in Kinkiang Fong, op. cit., p. 13, gives a total of 125 for the same year: 76 Chinese, 45 Japanese and 4 British. Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo Chih-kung Yün-tung Chien-shih*, p. 130, claims 76 Chinese, 41 Japanese and 3 British.

As will be clear from the above, precise figures for industry in China at this time are difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. For instance, on 15 June 1925, in response to a parliamentary question concerning labour conditions in Shanghai, a government spokesman stated that there were 14 British textile mills in the Settlement (*Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 185, 15/6/25, p. 31); but in information supplied to the Foreign Office to aid them to answer a similar question three days later, Jardine Mathesons claimed that there were only 5 British Mills, managed by 3 companies, 3 of the mills belonging to Jardine Mathesons themselves. There were also 'about' 22 Chinese mills and 'about' 28 Japanese, managed by 9 companies. They claimed that some 75 per cent of the capital in British Mills was Chinese (*Diplomatic Correspondence*, F2438/120/10). In response to a further question, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs quoted a list of factories in Shanghai, grouped according to nationality, published by the Municipal Council and attached as an appendix to the report of the Commission on Child Labour, in which it was stated that the total number of British mills and factories within the Settlement was 23 (F3523/120/10). However, this elicited a response from Barton, Consul-General in Shanghai, who wrote that a number of those so listed were not, in fact, British, but had simply appointed British firms as agents for the sale of their products (F4923/120/10). A further problem was that much Chinese property was registered with foreign consulates, which 'beneficial ownership' was meant to make it doubly safe, the Chinese proprietors thus enjoying the full benefits of extraterritoriality (E. O. Hauser, *Shanghai: City for Sale*, p. 248).

21 Hsü and Ch'iang, op. cit., p. 4; Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo Chih-kung Yün-tung Chien-shih*, p. 131; all references below to Teng, op. cit., refer to this work.

22 King and Lieu, op. cit., p. 3.

23 The *Report* is contained in FO *Diplomatic Correspondence* 1925, F395/120/10; it was originally printed as a supplement to *Christian Industry*, no. 4, 19/9/24, published by the Industrial Committee of the National Christian Council, Shanghai. A representative extract is contained in pp. 30ff. of vol. II of the Honourable Richard Feetham's *Report to the Shanghai Municipal Council*, 1931; the passage here quoted is to be found on p. 31 of this work; also *CYB 1925-6*, pp. 545ff.

24 *Ibid.*; Feetham, op. cit., p. 32. For a further account, see M. N. Gamewell, *The Gateway to China*, chap. 14.

25 J. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labour Movement 1919-1927*, p. 61.

26 Lowe Chuan-hua, *Facing Labor Issues in China*, pp. 20-1.

- 27 *Report* . . . ; quoted in Feetham, op. cit., p. 31.
- 28 Hauser, op. cit., p. 138.
- 29 H. G. W. Woodhead, *Adventures in Far Eastern Journalism*, p. 106.
- 30 Dame A. M. Anderson, *Humanity and Labour in China*, p. 248.
- 31 Pearse, op. cit., pp. 161-2.
- 32 Kotenev, op. cit., p. 14.
- 33 CYB 1926-7, p. 1004.
- 34 Fong, op. cit., pp. 319-20. It is accordingly interesting to note that in the recent strongly pro-KMT *Chiang Tsung-t'ung Mi-lu*, written by a Japanese under the joint auspices of the *Chung-yang Jih-pao* (and hence the KMT) and *Nihon Sankei Shinbun*, it is claimed that wages in Japanese mills were only three-quarters of those paid in other foreign mills (Chinese ed., vol. 6, p. 44); yet this does not seem to be borne out by contemporary sources. If it were true, there is certainly no reason why the British and other writers quoted above should wish to conceal it.
- 35 Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 80.
- 36 Fong, op. cit., p. 115.
- 37 Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 50.
- 38 Kotenev, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 P. P. Pillai, *Economic Conditions in India*, pp. 236-7.
- 41 Ibid., p. 237.
- 42 Shang-hai Shih-cheng-fu She-hui-chü, *Chin-shih-wu-nien-lai Shang-hai-chih Pa-kung T'ing-yeh*, pp. 16, 40. This book is published in both Chinese and English, but as the English is occasionally somewhat eccentric, I have made my own translations from the Chinese, and given page references for both versions.
- 43 Ibid., pp. 16-17, 41-2.
- 44 Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 128.
- 45 Ibid., p. 87.
- 46 Pearse, op. cit., p. 164.
- 47 Pillai, op. cit., p. 237.
- 48 Pearse, op. cit., p. 172.
- 49 With the advance of Chinese industry, native industrialists also learned such tricks of the trade. See, e.g., Li Yü-ch'ing (ed.), *K'u-nan-ti Chiu Chung-kuo*, which on p. 37 contains a photograph of the device described by Pearse, in a Chinese mill. But at the time with which we are concerned, such things were still a foreign preserve.
- 50 Anderson, op. cit., p. 248. In this context, the remarks made by the editor of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* on the occasion of the anti-Japanese demonstrations in South-east Asia in early 1974 are most apposite: 'In fact, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that much of the anti-Japanese emotionalism is part and parcel of the kicking and screaming as the rest of the region is dragged into the mid-20th century. Japan gets clobbered because it is the most conspicuous modernising force in the area, falling heir to the bitterness which other agents have inspired. The tragedy is that the Japanese concept to modernization does not go beyond their bright, shiny factories and the purchase of their bright, shiny machines. They have much to learn about promoting human relations.' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4/2/74, p. 19. *Tout ça change*. . .

- 51 Ma Ch'ao-chün *et al.*, *Chung-kuo Lao-kung Yün-tung-shih*, pp. 129-30.
- 52 Teng Chung-hsia, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.
- 53 *Ibid.*, pp. 34-7.
- 54 Ch'en Ta, *Chung-kuo Lao-kung Wen-t'i*, pp. 102-3; Ma Ch'ao-chün, *op. cit.*, p. 260.
- 55 Ma Ch'ao-chün, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-2.
- 56 *Ibid.*, p. 297.
- 57 Ch'en Ta, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
- 58 Ma Ch'ao-chün, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
- 59 *Ibid.*, p. 356. The question of the control of the *Min-kuo Jih-pao* is obviously a complicated one. Ma claims that it was in Communist hands during the early months of 1925; yet before the year was out, it had become the main mouth-piece of the KMT rightists of whom Ma himself was an important leader (Li Yün-han, 'Sun-wen-chu-i-hsüeh-hui yü Tsao-ch'i Fan-kung Yün-tung', *Chung-hua Hsüeh-pao*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1974, p. 209; English translation p. 276). This would indicate that the rightists had been able to take control of the paper during the May 30 Movement, a singular performance given their general weakness at the time. Yet the full story does not seem to have been written.
- 60 Ma Ch'ao-chün, *op. cit.*, p. 356.
- 61 Wang Cheng-sheng, 'Hui-i Wu-sa', *Wu-sa Yün-tung P'ien-tuan Hui-i*, p. 2.
- 62 Han A-chiu, 'Hui-i Ku Cheng-hung Lieh-shih', *ibid.*, pp. 29-30. In post-Liberation Chinese works, Ku has usually been described as a party member. There is no reason to believe that this is true. Had he been, much play would have been made of his death at the hands of the Japanese in contemporary communist writings; but at the time he was only described as a worker (*Kung-jen*).
- 63 *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- 64 Hsia Ching-lin, *The Status of Shanghai*, p. ix.
- 65 *Ibid.*, p. 142.
- 66 *Ibid.*, p. 57.
- 67 *Ibid.*, p. 64.
- 68 *Ibid.*, p. 70.
- 69 *Ibid.*, p. 71.
- 70 Teng Chung-hsia, *op. cit.*, p. 195.
- 71 Hsia, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

Chapter 2

- 1 N. Wales (Helen Snow), *The Chinese Labour Movement*, p. 13.
- 2 CYB 1925-6, p. 541.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 544.
- 4 Rhoads Murphy, *Shanghai — Key to Modern China*, p. 150.
- 5 Kotenev, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
- 6 CYB 1926-7, p. 903.
- 7 Kotenev, *op. cit.*, p. 13. This is the 'big' and 'little' money referred to in the various lists of workers' demands to be found in the appendix. The currency was based on the silver dollar (Mex.) which was convertible into paper notes of 10, 20 and 50 cents (big money) or 10 and 20 cent silver coins and coppers

- of lower denomination (small money) the value of which relative to the silver dollar varied from day to day; *Shanghai: A Standard Guide Book*, 1934-5 ed., p. 103.
- 8 *Wu-sa Yün-tung P'ien-tuan Hui-i*, p. 2.
 - 9 The *yang-ch'eng-kung* system was a variant of contract labour employing children and youths. For a summary of its main features see the article by Ch'en Hui-li on the subject in Li Yü-ch'ing, op. cit., pp. 14-21.
 - 10 Liang Hsiao-ming, *Wu-sa Yün-tung*, p. 7, claims the strikes were led by the party; Teng Chung-hsia, himself a participant, says they were spontaneous; op. cit., p. 126.
 - 11 Liang, op. cit., p. 10.
 - 12 Police Report on 'The General Strike', *The Municipal Gazette*, Shanghai, 6/8/25; hereafter referred to as Police Report.
 - 13 Kotenev, op. cit., p. 121.
 - 14 Liang, op. cit., p. 10.
 - 15 Chesneaux, op. cit., pp. 225-6.
 - 16 Ibid., p. 255.
 - 17 Ibid. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party 1921-27*, p. 420, the federation: 'organized an "Anti-Communist alliance of Male and Female Workers". It distributed pamphlets amongst the workers expressing its readiness to support the strike but advising the workers not to let themselves be used by the Chinese Communists. The incident outraged the CCP, which felt that the pamphlet was aimed at undermining the anti-Japanese strike. Moreover, the federation failed to fulfil its promise to support the strike.'
 - 18 Speech in Peking 24/1/26, quoted by Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia in the Far East*, pp. 331-2.
 - 19 A. M. Kotenev, *New Lamps for Old*, pp. 215-16. Kotenev is a generally reliable author, although he does not quote his source of information on this point. An examination of the material presented in C. Martin Wilbur and J. Lien-ying How, *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China 1918-1927*, has failed to reveal such evidence, although Kotenev may well have seen documents not included in this collection.
 - 20 *New Shanghai Life*, 22/2/25; quoted in *Foreign Office Diplomatic Correspondence*, F1812/120/10.
 - 21 F1813/120/10. The 'Agitation Bureau' is unexplained. It may have been the term by which the British referred to those members of the Soviet Consulate in Shanghai whose business it was to make contacts with local Communists.
 - 22 Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 414.
 - 23 Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 256.
 - 24 K'o Fang, 1925 *Shang-hai Jih-shang Sha-ch'ang Kung-jen Pa-kung-chih Nei-mu chi Shih-mo-chi*, p. 25.
 - 25 Ibid., p. 46.
 - 26 Liang, op. cit., p. 9.
 - 27 K'o Fang, op. cit., pp. 49-50.
 - 28 Ma Ch'ao-chün, op. cit., p. 374.
 - 29 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., pp. 143-9; *North China Herald*, 30/5/25, p. 373.
 - 30 *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 121, 30/5/26, p. 557.

- 31 Liang, op. cit., p. 11.
- 32 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., pp. 155ff.
- 33 Ch'en Ta, op. cit., p. 200.
- 34 Wang Cheng-sheng's reminiscences in *Wu-sa Yün-tung P'ien-tuan Hui-i*, p. 4.
- 35 K'o Fang, op. cit., p. 18.
- 36 Police Report; *Shih Pao*, 16, 17/5/25; *Shen Pao*, 16, 20, 24/5/25; *North China Herald*, 23/5/25, p. 327.
- 37 In fact the Japanese probably simply hired the police, as any individual requiring their services was entitled to do. The going rate was 25 yuan per day for a white mounted policeman, 16 yuan for a white on foot, 8 yuan for a Japanese, 6 yuan for a Sikh and 3 yuan for a Chinese; an interesting index of racial worth in the Settlement. See Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 125.
- 38 *Shih Pao*, 21/5/25; all Chinese sources consulted agree on this point, which clashes somewhat with Iriye's claim, based on official Japanese sources, that 'Yada had believed at first that the student demonstrators were motivated by patriotism and that labor unions should be recognized as legitimate organs by the foreign capitalists so long as they did not aim at the overthrow of the existing industrial system'. It was only after 30 May and conversations with Li Li-san that he decided that the latter was precisely what they did aim at, and accordingly changed his attitude towards the unions. See A. Iriye, *After Imperialism*, p. 66.
- 39 Ma Ch'ao-chün, op. cit., p. 377.
- 40 Liang, op. cit., pp. 14-16.
- 41 K'o Fang, op. cit., pp. 80-1; this also appears in Lo Chia-lun (ed.), *Ko-ming Wen-hsien*, vol. 18, p. 3305; there the date given is 25 May.
- 42 The best account of the student role throughout this period is to be found in an unpublished M.A. thesis by T. Creamer entitled *Hsueh-Yun: Shanghai's Students and the May 30 Movement*.
- 43 There is some confusion over the dates of various events between Ku's death and 30 May, although the actual sequence is the same in all cases. According to Liang, op. cit., p. 17, the students from Wen-chih were arrested on 16 May, while the memorial service was held on 24 May. Ma Ch'ao-chün op. cit., p. 377, has the students from Wen-chih being arrested on 21 May, and the memorial service on 22 May. Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 182, agrees with Ma's dates, but according to the Police Report and Kotenev, op. cit., p. 129, the memorial service was held on 24 May, as stated by Liang. This date is also the one given in *Shih Pao*, 25/5/25, but Hsu and Ch'iang, op. cit., p. 19, are also amongst those who claim it was held on 22 May. A pamphlet published by the Shanghai Student Association in August 1925, *Wu-sa Hsüeh-an Shih-lu*, states that students from Wen-chih were arrested on 23 May, and students from Shanghai University on the following day.
- 44 Kotenev, op. cit., p. 129.
- 45 Police Report.
- 46 Kotenev, op. cit., p. 130.
- 47 Police Report.
- 48 See the first chapter on 30 May in Ma, op. cit. Ma was a crony of the notorious Tu Yüeh-sheng, and when Tu's body was brought to Taiwan, Ma wrote a

- poem about how he and Tu had together awakened the spirit of the Chinese people during the May 30 Movement. See Chang Chün-ku, *Tu Yüeh-sheng Chuan*, p. 261. For the *Sun-wen-chu-i Hsüeh-hui*, see Li Yün-han's article referred to in the first chapter, n. 59.
- 49 Biography of Ts'ai Ho-sen in *Hu-nan Ko-ming Lieb-shih Chuan*, p. 15. It is not impossible that the account of Ch'en's role is slanderous, or at least biased; here we are at the mercy of our limited sources. This biography also appears in Hua Ying-shen (ed.), *Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang Lieb-shih Chuan*, pp. 56ff. Ch'en certainly believed in guiding the opposition to the by-laws on printed matter into broader political channels, as witnessed by his article referred to below (p. 33, n. 53).
 - 50 Article by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai (pen-name Shuang Lin) in *Hsiang-tao*, no. 109, 5/4/25, p. 1002.
 - 51 See for instance the article by Yü Chih, 'Wu-sa Shih-chien Chi-shih', *Tung-fang, Tsa-chih, Wu-sa Shih-chien Lin-shih Tseng-k'an*, July 1925, pp. 3-5.
 - 52 'Liang Ch'i-ch'ao-teng Hsüan-yen', *ibid*.
 - 53 Article signed 'Tu-hsiu' in *Hsiang-tao*, no. 111, 19/4/25, p. 1015.
 - 54 *Ibid*.
 - 55 Reprinted in *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 74, 11/4/25.
 - 56 Quoted in *CYB 1926-7*, p. 907.
 - 57 *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F2776/194/10.
 - 58 Minute from J. T. Pratt, *ibid*, F834/194/10.
 - 59 *Report of the Diplomatic Commission*, reprinted in Kotenev, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-18.
 - 60 Judge Finley Johnson's Report, Judicial Inquiry's Report on 30 May, Kotenev, *op. cit.*, pp. 319-23.
 - 61 Teng Chung-hsia, *op. cit.*, p. 183.
 - 62 Judge Finley Johnson's Report.
 - 63 Evidence of Inspector Everson and others at the trial of those arrested on 30 May and 1 June, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F4125/149/10.
 - 64 J. Pal, *Shanghai Saga*, p. 109. In the colourful words of an Australian then working in the Shanghai Customs: 'One thing could be said about the Louza District: it had more people to the acre than any other part of Shanghai, and any sort of disturbance could attract ten, even twenty, thousand rubbernecks in a few minutes.'
 - 65 Police Report.
 - 66 Report of the fourth day of the judicial inquiry, *North China Herald*, 17/10/25, pp. 96-100.
 - 67 Police Report; the extract from the Municipal Council's Report printed in *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F2685/194/10 gives four killed outright, with three subsequent deaths; according to Teng Chung-hsia, *op. cit.*, p. 183, 13 were killed; Ma Ch'ao-chün, *op. cit.*, p. 377 has four killed, with nine later deaths from wounds. For press accounts of the incident, see *Shen Pao*, 31/5/25; *Shih Pao*, 31/5/25; *North China Herald*, 6/6/25, p. 411. It should perhaps be emphasised that Everson's was not a warning shot, but the signal for his men to open fire.
 - 68 Teng Chung-hsia, *op. cit.*, p. 183.
 - 69 Police Report. Ma Ch'ao-chün's meeting in the Nine Acre Field was held as scheduled despite the shootings, but the numbers in attendance were heavily

depleted. Ma informed those who still did not know what had happened, and following emotional scenes the meeting broke up into several processions, which were quickly dispersed by the Municipal Police; Ma Ch'ao-chün, op. cit., p. 378.

- 70 *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F1981/194/10.
- 71 Ma Ch'ao-chün, op. cit., p. 378; also see above, n. 48.
- 72 Chang Chün-ku, op. cit., pp. 256-62.
- 73 Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 426.
- 74 *Hu-nan Ko-ming Lieb-shih Chuan*, p. 16.
- 75 Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 427. According to *Hu-nan Ko-ming* . . . , p. 16, the decision to form the Triple Union was only taken, at Ts'ai Ho-sen's insistence, at a Central Committee meeting on the night of 1 June. This discrepancy does not, however, interfere with the basic order of events.
- 76 Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 477. As will be seen below, 'for the time being' was simply that.
- 77 These were originally formed at the time of the May 4 Movement. See Chow Tse-Tsung, *The May Fourth Movement*, p. 255.
- 78 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., pp. 183-4.
- 79 *CYB* 1926-7, p. 922.
- 80 *North China Herald*, 6/6/25, p. 414; *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F2685/194/10. The Japanese Consul, Yada, was also informed; see Huang I-feng, 'Wu-sa Yün-tung chung-ti Ta-tzu-ch'an-chieh-chi', *Li-shih Yen-chiu*, no. 63, 1965, p. 13.
- 81 Police Report.
- 82 Nan-fang Ta-hsüeh Hsüeh-sheng-hui, *Wu-sa Chi-nien T'e-k'an*, 1926, p. 5.
- 83 Lu Hsün, *Selected Works*, p. 169. In Peking, however, less cosmopolitan than Shanghai, people wearing foreign clothes at the height of the movement were liable to have them splashed with acid, or to have insulting epithets written on pieces of paper secretly stuck on their backs; see Hu Yeh-p'in's novel of the movement *Kuang-ming Tsai Wo-men-ti Ch'ien-mien*, p. 278. The *North China Herald*, 13/6/25, p. 445, also refers to this phenomenon in the capital, and even claims that some Japanese had adopted Chinese dress.
- 84 Ma Ch'ao-chün, op. cit., p. 382.
- 85 Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 431. N. Wales, op. cit., p. 215, lists the name of one Han Ying as a leader of the general strike, but his name does not figure elsewhere, even in the exhaustive list of leading figures in the movement to be found in *Chan-wang*, 1/3/74, no. 290, pp. 22-3.
- 86 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 185.
- 87 Police Report.
- 88 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 188.
- 89 *British Chamber of Commerce Journal*, Shanghai, June-August, 1925, pp. 173-4.
- 90 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 188; *North China Herald*, 6/6/25, p. 419.
- 91 The usual confusion with figures pertains; Police Report: one killed, seventeen wounded; cable from the British Consul-General to the Legation in Peking (F2685/194/10): three killed, several wounded; Kotenev, op. cit., pp. 133-4: three killed, fourteen wounded; Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 185, more killed and wounded than on 30 May. See also *North China Herald*, 6/6/25, pp. 411ff; *Shen Pao* 2/6/25; *Shih Pao* 2/6/25.

- 92 Police Report.
- 93 *Report of the Diplomatic Commission*, F3917/194/10.
- 94 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 186; the official British account is given in the *North China Herald*, 6/6/25, p. 412, where the incident is referred to as 'The Battle of Thibet Road'; *Shen Pao*, 3/6/25, also gives this version.
- 95 *British Chamber of Commerce Journal*, Shanghai, June-August 1925, p. 173.
- 96 Ibid.; see also *North China Herald*, 6/6/25, p. 414.
- 97 For a particularly lurid account, purportedly by an American, see *Wu-sa Hsiung-shou-chih Kung-chuang* (see note on this in bibliography).
- 98 *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F2685/194/10 (Enclosure 1 in No. 1).
- 99 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., pp. 186-7.
 - 1 Police Report.
 - 2 Ibid.
 - 3 Ma Ch'ao-chün, op. cit., p. 382.
 - 4 Minute from A. L. Scott, F4325/194/10.
 - 5 Diplomatic Correspondence F3736/194/10, (Enclosure 2 in No. 1).
 - 6 For a lively account of their role in the strike see *Wu-sa Yün-tung-chung-ti Shang-hai Kung-jen*.
 - 7 Police Report. According to Hsü and Ch'iang, op. cit., p. 24, from 15 May to 13 June, 107 foreign factories were closed by strikes, involving 130,000 workers; there were also 11 Chinese factories, with 16,000 workers. See also the report of the Shanghai GTU, 13/6/25, reprinted in Ma Ch'ao-chün, op. cit., pp. 386ff., according to which altogether 115 concerns were involved, with over 156,000 strikers.
 - 8 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 189.
 - 9 Chang Chün-ku, op. cit., p. 259. Chang claims that Tu was from first to last a fervent supporter of the organisation.
 - 10 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 188. For a more detailed account of this incident and other clashes in mission schools (especially US ones) see 'Mei-ti-kuo-chu-i Li-yung Tsung-chiao Chen-ya yü P'o-huai Wu-sa Yün-tung-ti Tsui-hsing', in the post-Liberation Christian journal *T'ien-feng*, no. 11, 1960. See also the advertisement placed by the students of St John's on the front page of *Shen Pao*, 8/6/25, and Creamer, op. cit., pp. 36-7.
 - 11 Nan-fang Ta-hsüeh Hsüeh-sheng-hui, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
 - 12 See the article by Hsiao Ch'u-nü, 'Chung-kuo Jeng Ying Tui Ying Hsüan-chan', *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 84, 25/7/25.
 - 13 Letter to Galen, 26 June 1925, in which he urges that military preparations be made for a protracted war with Great Britain; reprinted as Document 13 in Martin Wilbur and How, op. cit., p. 176.
 - 14 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 204.
 - 15 *British Chamber of Commerce Journal*, Shanghai, June-August 1925, pp. 174-5; for the Chinese text, see Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., pp. 196-9.
 - 16 *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F2009/194/10; for the full text of the reply, *British Chamber of Commerce Journal*, Shanghai, June-August 1925, pp. 174-5.
 - 17 CYB 1926-7, p. 925.
 - 18 *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F3055/194/10; see also F2087/194/10, in which the British Chargé describes the two men as 'particularly friendly to us'. The *North China Herald*, 13/6/25, p. 443, gave an example of the wit for which it

- was renowned in the taipan's clubs with its quip 'Admiral Tsai Ting-kan (affectionately referred to by his friends as Tin-can, the Land Admiral)'. The Admiral himself sought to reassure foreign opinion by claiming that the fact that he had been held up by Jesse James during a visit to the US in the 1880s was 'merely an incident — I do not hold that against anyone'; *North China Herald*, 20/6/25, p. 477. Tseng was for a period Chinese Consul-General in Sydney.
- 19 Consul-General Barton to the British Legation, Peking: 'I am not without hope that the impending return of Hsu Yuan to his old post of Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, and the arrival of Admiral Tsai Ting-kan and Tseng Yeng-chien [*sic*] ... will enable the conciliatory spirit which exists to take effect in a frank discussion of these issues.' *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F2685/194/10. Also see Palairer's own comments in F2087/194/10 to the same effect. For the way 'these two grand old gentlemen swaggered about Shanghai' and the 'very genteel manner' in which they conducted their negotiations, see the article by T'ien Hung-t'ao in Nan-fang Ta-hsüeh Hsüeh-sheng-hui, op. cit., p. 6.
 - 20 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 189. According to Hsü and Ch'iang, op. cit., pp. 33-4, the meeting was attended by 100,000; a resolution was passed that the negotiations must be based on the 17 demands, otherwise a triple strike would be called throughout China. They also resolved from the following day to boycott British and Japanese goods. I have been unable to discover whether the Commissioners had originally accepted the invitation or not.
 - 21 *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F3690/194/10.
 - 22 *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F3055/194/10; for the text of the 13 demands, see Appendix 3. According to K'ung Ling-ching, *Wu-sa Wai-chiao-shih*, pp. 35-75, the Chinese Foreign Ministry originally accepted the 17 demands as a basis for negotiation, but unknown to the Ministry, the two Commissioners accepted the alternative 13 demands; this gave a bad impression to the foreigners, who, seeing the lack of unity amongst the Chinese, became more rigid in their approach. K'ung is probably correct in his first statement, but the latter claim concerning a change in foreign attitude and the reason for it, is not borne out by Foreign Office records.
 - 23 Consul-General Barton to Palairer, F8829/194/10.
 - 24 Minute by Waterlow, F4818/194/10.
 - 25 Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 440. For an interesting account of the role Yü played in the May 4 Movement in Shanghai, which has some striking similarities with his 1925 performance, see Chow Tse-tsung, op. cit., p. 155.
 - 26 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 195. Hao Yen-p'ing, *The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China*, makes frequent reference to Yü, pointing out that he was 'the biggest Chinese investor in the steamship enterprise' (p. 124), and calling him 'one of the typical cases of the self-made men who established themselves "from rags to riches"' (p. 105). He also notes that 'his important role in the split between the Nationalists and the Communists in 1927 remains to be explored' (p. 194).
 - 27 For tension between Shanghai and the Foreign Office, see below, chaps 3 and 5.

- 28 Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, 'Kuo-min-hui-i yü Wu-sa Yun-tung ...', *Hsin Ch'ing-nien*, March 1926, no. 3, p. 296.
- 29 See, e.g. *Inprecor*, vol. 5, no. 18, L. Geller, 'The Labour Movement in the Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries'; *ibid.*, vol. 5, no. 52, G. Voitinsky, 'The Struggle of the Imperialists against the Chinese Labour Movement'.
- 30 See p. 14 of the well documented study by Huang I-feng, referred to in n. 79 of this chapter. Huang was of course able to use a number of sources generally unavailable to Western scholars, including the papers of both the SMC and the GCC.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 18.
- 32 According to an article by Yü Chih in the special 30 May edition of *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*, p. 22, Yü Hsia-ch'ing called the meeting at the instigation of several Cantonese members of the GCC. Other sources do not mention this.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 23.
- 34 Huang I-feng, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
- 35 Cable from Consul-General Barton to Palairat, in which he refers to Yü and Fu as 'two of the most unscrupulous and anti-foreign of the local Chinese merchants'. F4818/194/10.
- 36 For an example of such rumour-mongering, see the document by the Shanghai Residents' Sane Aim Association, reproduced in Appendix 3.
- 37 Teng Chung-hsia, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-5.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p. 206.
- 39 According to most sources, e.g. *British Chamber of Commerce Journal*, Shanghai, June-August 1925, p. 172; Teng Chung-hsia, *op. cit.*, p. 201, has 23 June.
- 40 Chang Kuo-t'ao, *op. cit.*, p. 442.
- 41 *Tung-fang Tsa-chih* (Wu-sa Tseng-k'an), Yu Chih, 'Wu-sa Shih-chien Chi-shih', p. 25; for pictures of the flags and slogans, see the pictorial weekly section of *Shih Pao*, 28/6/25. The return to work did not stop the merchants from bringing patriotism into their business activities, as a string of advertisements in the Chinese press attests. In *Shen Pao* during the months following 30 May are to be found announcements concerning the appearance on the market of 30 May memorial gold watches (25/6/25), 30 May hot sauce (4/8/25), and 30 May memorial spectacles (26/8/25); the May 30 incident was also used to sell fruit syrup (18/8/25) and a 30 May sock factory was established (7/9/25). This latter had a humorous sequel, for in February 1926 the owner was requested by the SMC to change the name, on the grounds that it was likely to cause offence. The owner claimed in court that the name, literally 'five thirty', represented the five principal stockholders who were all thirty years old. To this the reply of the British Vice-Consul in the Mixed Court hearing was that as the two characters could easily lead to bad feeling between Britain and China, they should be changed, and the court accordingly ordered this, 'simply to resolve the dispute and to ensure calm'; 'Ts'un T'ie', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 145, 10/2/26, p. 1338. Such commercialism inspired the scorn of Chou Tso-jen, who attacked it in an article entitled 'Ch'ih Lieh-shih', *Tse-hsieh-chi*, pp. 163-7.
- 42 P. 25 of the article by Yü Chih referred to above, n. 141.
- 43 Teng Chung-hsia, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

- 44 Ibid., p. 201; Huang I-feng, art. cit., p. 14; Chen Han-sun, 'Shanghai Organization for Shanghai Relief, *Inprecor*, vol. 5, no. 62.
- 45 See chap. 5.
- 46 CYB 1926-7, p. 1005.
- 47 Chen Han-sun, op. cit., *Inprecor*, vol. 5, no. 62.
- 48 Ibid.
- 49 Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 266.
- 50 Chen Han-sun, op. cit., *Inprecor*, vol. 5, no. 62.
- 51 *Shanghai Mercury*, 27/6/25, leading article.
- 52 Ibid., Emergency Edition, 1/7/25, p. 11.
- 53 Ibid., pp. 7a, 9.
- 54 Police Report; *Shen Pao*, 14/6/25.
- 55 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 208; a number of Chang's troops wore armbands proclaiming their support for the movement.
- 56 Barton to Palaret, 30/7/25, F4818/194/10.
- 57 Ibid.; Police Report.
- 58 Barton to Palaret, 30/7/25, F4818/194/10.
- 59 Hauser, op. cit., p. 158; see also *North China Herald*, 11/7/25, p. 4, according to which it was a 'Case of Necessity not Retaliation'.
- 60 Barton to Palaret, 30/7/25, F4818/194/10.
- 61 Ibid.
- 62 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 202.
- 63 Letter from Major Hilton-Johnson to A. Rose, 6/8/25, forwarded to the Foreign Office 22/9/25, F3695/2/10; also Barton to Palaret, 30/7/25, F4818/194/10.
- 64 Ibid.
- 65 Barton to Palaret, 21/8/25, F5103/194/10.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Barton to Palaret, 30/7/25, F4818/94/10.
- 68 Huang I-feng, op. cit., p. 18.
- 69 Ibid., p. 18.
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 438; also see *Communist International*, no. 17, 1925, p. 21; no. 18/19, 1925, p. 103.
- 72 Russian historians give credit for this to the Comintern agent Voitinsky. See, e.g. M. I. Sladkovsky *et al*, *Noveistaia Istoria Kitaia 1917-1970 g.g.*, p. 93, according to whom both Li Li-san and Ch'en Tu-hsiu were in favour of an armed rising. Yet the Central Committee decided against this, adopting the new policy 'on the recommendation of the Comintern'. The party put this new policy into practice 'with the help of the Comintern agent G. N. Voitinsky'. Chinese sources make no mention of this, following Teng Chung-hsia op. cit., pp. 209-10, in ascribing the decision and execution to the Central Committee alone.
- 73 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 210; Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 'Wo-men Ju-ho Chi-hsü Fan-ti-kuo-chu-i-ti Cheng-tou', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 126, 23/8/25, pp. 1154-5.
- 74 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 210; see also the manifesto to workers, soldiers and students in *Hsiang-tao*, no. 125, 18/8/25, pp. 1143-4.
- 75 See chap. 3.

- 76 Hsi P'ing, 'Kao Yü Hsia-ch'ing Yü T'a-i-lei-ti Jen-men', *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 84, 25/7/25.
- 77 For the texts of the workers' demands, presented in June, and the final terms of settlement, see Appendix 3.
- 78 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 212; for the text of the settlement, see Appendix 3.
- 79 Kotenev, op. cit., p. 148; also *CYB 1926-7*, p. 959.
- 80 Ibid., p. 960.
- 81 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., pp. 212-13.
- 82 Ibid., p. 213; see Appendix 3 for the text of the settlement.
- 83 Barton to Palairret, 7/10/25, F5829/194/10.
- 84 Barton to Palairret, 31/8/25, F5398/194/10.
- 85 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., pp. 214-15; for the texts of the settlements, see *British Chamber of Commerce Journal*, Shanghai, September 1925, pp. 227-30.
- 86 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 216.
- 87 *CYB 1926-7*, pp. 1005-6.
- 88 See the pamphlet by the Shanghai Sane Aim Association in Appendix 3.
- 89 Indeed, Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 220, notes that one of the reasons why the party failed to achieve more in the movement was its failure to unite with the city poor, i.e., the lumpen proletariat which provided the gangs with their social base.
- 90 Barton to Palairret, 31/8/25, F5398/194/10; the report of the incident in *Shih Pao*, 23/8/25, simply referred to the attackers as thugs, or toughs (*ta-shou*), and did not claim that they were strikers.
- 91 This date is certainly correct, as the closure is reported in both *Shih Pao* and *Shen Pao*, 19/9/25; the latter carries the Martial Law Commander's proclamation; Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 218, also gives this date. Yet the *British Chamber of Commerce Journal*, Shanghai, October 1925, p. 272, gives the date as 20/9/25; this must be a mistake.
- 92 Barton to Palairret, 7/10/25, F5829/194/10; Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., pp. 217-18; *North China Herald*, 26/9/25, pp. 430-1.
- 93 Ma Ch'ao-chün, op. cit., p. 494.

Chapter 3

- 1 Letter from Hsü Kuang-p'in to Lu Hsün, *Lu Hsün Ch'üan-chi*, vol. 9, p. 69.
- 2 Kotenev, op. cit., pp. 134-5.
- 3 Ibid., p. 135.
- 4 The figure of 38 towns comes from collating the place names mentioned in Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., pp. 190-2; *Wu-sa T'ung-shih*, published by the Peking *Ch'en Pao* in late 1925, pp. 50-1; plus additional places mentioned in connection with 30 May in the *North China Herald*, *Shen Pao* and *Shih Pao*. While no claims are made for its completeness, the list is as follows: Amoy, Anking, Changsha, Chengchow, Chungking, Chinkiang, Canton, Chuohsiencheng, Chefoo, Chengtu, Changhsintien, Dairen, Foochow, Fengyuan, Hankow, Hangchow, Harbin, Hsiangyang, Hong Kong, Kiukiang, Kaifeng, Mukden, Nanking, Nanchang, Ningpo, Peking, Swatow, Soochow, Sungkiang, Shanghai, Tientsin, Tangshan, Taiyuan, Tuolun, Wuchang, Wuchow, Yangchow, Yüan-te; *Wu-sa T'ung-shih* also mentions events as having occurred in the province of Suiyuan, but names no towns.

- 5 *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F2541/194/10.
- 6 The main substance of this account comes from Acting Consul-General Porter's report to Peking, F3915/194/10. See also Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., pp. 190-1; according to Teng's account, activities in connection with 30 May had been planned by the workers for 13 June, to be followed by a strike. Students were also involved, although their numbers were depleted by having the date of their summer vacation brought forward on the orders of the local warlord, Hsiao Yao-nan. The fact that anti-British and Japanese activity had already been planned before the events of 10-11 June intervened must certainly have affected the mood of the participants, on both sides. The *Independent Herald*, of Hankow also published a volume of clippings concerning the events of May and June; it gives considerable detail on the Kiukiang riot.
- 7 Some Chinese would not credit even this death to their own forces. HM Consul-General noted indignantly of a deputation of returned French students that 'these individuals firmly believed, or pretended to believe, that I shot M. Pasquier, the one victim of the Shakee incident, and induced a local British subject to commit suicide'. F4058/194/10.
- 8 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 191; June 23rd — *The Report of the Commission for the Investigation of the Shakee Massacre* ... (this commission was set up by Hu Han-min, then Governor of Canton); *The Canton Incident of June 23rd — the Truth*, by A.G.M., who presents the British version. For light relief, see the article referred to in the preceding chapter, *Shanghai Mercury* 1/7/25, 'Canton Refugees Interviewed', being a 'succinct' account by 'a lady'.
- 9 See Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., pp. 190 and 209; for a more detailed account, see Ma Ch'ao-chün, op. cit., pp. 393-6.
- 10 Quoted in the *British Chamber of Commerce Journal*, Shanghai, June-August 1925, p. 180.
- 11 Admiralty Reports from the Commander-in-Chief, China, 4/9/25, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F5375/2/10.
- 12 *North China Herald*, 8/8/25, pp. 115, 123-4.
- 13 *Shen Pao*, 3/8/25.
- 14 *Ibid.*, 4/8/25.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 5/8/25.
- 16 *Shih Pao*, 2/8/25.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 3/8/25.
- 18 *Hsiang-tao*, no. 123, 10/8/25, p. 1133; no. 124, 15/8/25, p. 1140.
- 19 *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F4827/194/10.
- 20 *Ibid.*
- 21 *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F4720/194/10; where they published the truth is not disclosed.
- 22 *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F4827/194/10.
- 23 After all, it may be argued, after massacres in Shanghai, Tsingtao, Hankow and Canton, why shouldn't there have been one in Nanking? These other instances certainly provided good grounds for belief in the story once it had been spread around, and especially once it had been committed to print, given the respect paid by the illiterate to the written word, noted by many foreigners in China at the time. It is interesting, however, that Pa Chin, in his novel of the movement in Shanghai and Nanking, *Ssu-ch'ü-ti T'ai-yang*, makes no mention of any

- Nanking massacre, although his descriptions of other events in the two cities are vivid, accurate, and, of course, completely committed to China's cause.
- 24 Note from the British Chargé to the Waichiaopu, 7/8/25; quoted in the *British Chamber of Commerce Journal*, Shanghai, June-August 1925, p. 179. How anxious the British were to avoid further trouble may be seen from the instructions sent from the Legation to the consulate in Chungking on July 29: 'British subjects, while they have an undoubted right to protect their lives and property if they are attacked and if the Chinese refuse or are unable to give protection, in the present state of popular feeling in China should not have recourse to firing except as a last and desperate expedient, necessary to avoid imminent danger to life. Danger to property alone would not, I consider, justify firing.' F4553/194/10.
 - 25 *North China Herald*, 13/6/25, p. 445.
 - 26 V. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years in Revolutionary China 1925-1927*, p. 62.
 - 27 Kotenev, op. cit., p. 135.
 - 28 Ma Ch'ao-chün, op. cit., p. 399.
 - 29 *Wu-sa T'ung-shih*, p. 49.
 - 30 'Wu-sa-hou-ti Pei-ching Min-chung', *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 83, 23/7/25, pp. 492-3.
 - 31 *China Weekly Review*, vol. XXXIII, no. 3, 20/6/25.
 - 32 *Lu Hsün Ch'üan-chi*, vol. 9, p. 69.
 - 33 *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 83, 23/7/25, p. 490.
 - 34 *Ibid.*, p. 491.
 - 35 Chiang Monlin, *Tides from the West*, p. 132.
 - 36 *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 83, 23/7/25, p. 492.
 - 37 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 190.
 - 38 Vishnyakova-Akimova, op. cit., p. 77.
 - 39 Woodhead, op. cit., p. 108.
 - 40 *Wu-sa-hou-chih Shang-hai Hsüeh-sheng*, p. 12.
 - 41 Pa Chin, *Ssu-ch'ü-ti T'ai-yang*, in *Pa Chin Wen-chi*, vol. 1, pp. 358-9.
 - 42 For a précis of the story, see O. Lang, *Pa Chin and His Writings*, pp. 87-92, 105-8.
 - 43 Introduction to *Ssu-ch'ü-ti T'ai-yang*.
 - 44 Kuo-li Kuang-tung Ta-hsüeh, *Wu-sa Chi-nien*, p. 15.
 - 45 Statement of the Chinese Delegate at the second session of the conference for the settlement of the Chinese-British disputes in the Liang-Kuang, 16/7/26; quoted in *CYB* 1926-7, p. 987.
 - 46 Chiang Monlin, op. cit., p. 133.
 - 47 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 204.
 - 48 *Wu-sa-hou-chih Shang-hai Hsüeh-sheng*, pp. 12-16.
 - 49 *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F4122/194/10; all serial number references below are to *Diplomatic Correspondence*.
 - 50 F3901/194/10.
 - 51 *North China Herald*, 20/6/25, p. 476.
 - 52 F3897/194/10.
 - 53 Many Chinese naval officers had received British training, and the Chinese navy was well disposed towards Britain (e.g. Admiral Ts'ai).
 - 54 Sir Meyrick Hewlett, *Forty Years in China*, p. 169.

- 55 Hewlett's account of the May 30 Movement is to be found in pp. 153-71 of his book. A briefer account is to be found in his report to Peking, F3897/194/10, and for his difficulties with other Britons, F5385/194/10. For the murder of Lim, see *North China Herald*, 8/8/25, p. 115.
- 56 *The Times*, 8/6/25, 'The Danger to Foreigners'.
- 57 F2226/194/10.
- 58 J. E. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord*, p. 157.
- 59 F3699/194/10.
- 60 Vishnyakova-Akimova, op. cit., p. 81.
- 61 Sheridan, op. cit., pp. 173-4.
- 62 Ibid., p. 174.
- 63 Vishnyakova-Akimova, op. cit., p. 81.
- 64 Sheridan, op. cit., p. 174.
- 65 F3690/194/10. However, they were not absolutely certain that Feng would not act, e.g. F3007/2/10.
- 66 Sheridan, op. cit., p. 168.
- 67 Ibid., p. 174.
- 68 *North China Herald*, 25/7/25, p. 49; the page references to this newspaper given by Sheridan do not tally with those of the issues held by the National Library of Australia, although the dates do; e.g. the reference given by Sheridan for this, op. cit., p. 154, p. 337n., is to p. 41 of this issue. Feng believed that as the Japanese pronunciation of many Chinese characters was similar to that of the Wu dialects, this proved that they were actually Chinese emigrants. He once told Wu Pei-fu that in the case of any difficulty with Japan, it would only be necessary to cable the Emperor and explain this fact to him, and all would be well; Chang Chün-ku, *Wu Pei-fu Chuan*, vol 2, p. 526.
- 69 Sheridan, op. cit., p. 172.
- 70 Ibid., p. 290.
- 71 Ibid., p. 175.
- 72 F3690/194/10.
- 73 Ibid.
- 74 F2009/194/10.
- 75 F3690/194/10.
- 76 F2420/194/10.
- 77 Stewart was of part Chinese blood, a prominent local sportsman, and had made a name for himself by helping to recruit Chinese labour for South African Mines in 1901; FO sources described him as a 'loyal British subject'. F2233/194/10.
- 78 F2234/194/10.
- 79 E.g. F2266/194/10, F3690/194/10.
- 80 F2575/2/10.
- 81 F3451/2/10.
- 82 F2575/2/10.
- 83 F2191/194/10.
- 84 F2633/2/10.
- 85 F2575/2/10.
- 86 *Hsiang-tao*, no. 120, 2/7/25, p. 1104.
- 87 F2653/2/10.

- 88 Eg. F4818/194/10, Enclosure in no. 1.
- 89 *Shanghai Mercury*, 27/6/25, p. 1.
- 90 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- 91 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 192, calls the newspaper *Kung-min Pao*, and calls Hu a reporter; *North China Herald*, 8/8/25, p. 121, calls him the editor of the *Kuominpao*.
- 92 F5844/2/10.
- 93 F5844/2/10; F5907/2/10.
- 94 For a full account of the intricacies of this war, see Sheridan, op. cit., pp. 179-97. Some concise information on Sun Ch'uan-fang is to be found in the 'Who's Who in China' section of *The China Weekly Review*, 24/10/25, p. 197.
- 95 F3947/2/10; the Anfu party was behind Tuan Ch'i-jui.
- 96 F4178/2/10.
- 97 A copy of this paper is kept in the papers of the Hankow Club, now in the Library of Hong Kong University.
- 98 *Shen Pao*, 8/8/25.
- 99 H. L. Boorman and R. C. Howard, *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, vol. 1, p. 144.
- 1 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., pp. 191-2; *North China Herald*, 27/6/25, p. 489; 8/8/25, p. 116.
- 2 CYB 1925-6, pp. 960-1.
- 3 For an account of these events, see *North China Herald*, 17/10/25, p. 101.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 24/10/25, p. 158.
- 5 He was arrested on 29/11/25; *North China Herald*, 12/12/25, p. 480; *Shih Pao*, 1/12/25.
- 6 *North China Herald*, 26/12/25; *Shih Pao*, 20/12/25; *Shen Pao* 21/12/25.
- 7 *Hsiang-tao*, no. 140, 30/12/25, p. 1271; there is a biography of Liu Hua, together with an account of the circumstances of his execution, which suggests that the foreigners had a hand in it, in Hua Ying-shen, op. cit.
- 8 W. Fishel, *The End of Extraterritoriality in China*, p. 81.
- 9 *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*, vol. 22, no. 13, p. 156.
- 10 F3690/194/10.
- 11 *Ibid.*
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 F3055/194/10.
- 14 F2106/194/10.
- 15 F2420/194/10.
- 16 F3690/194/10.
- 17 R. T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relations 1917-1931*, p. 407.
- 18 CYB 1926-7, p. 1005.
- 19 See Fishel, op. cit., p. 90.
- 20 See the column 'Nei-wai Shih-p'ing' in the months following 30 May; also the article 'Kuan-shui Hui-i yü Hsiu-kai T'iao-yüeh', vol. 22, no. 16, 25/8/25.
- 21 Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 438.
- 22 F3690/194/10; that he did not remember the lesson long is indicated by the events of 18 March 1926, referred to in the final chapter of the present work.
- 23 *Ibid.*

- 24 F3055/194/10; F3690/194/10; 'Shih-shih Jih-chih' (SSJC), 19/6/25, *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*, vol. 22, no. 15, p. 128.
- 25 Ibid., p. 129.
- 26 See Borg, op. cit., p. 56; Fishel, op. cit., pp. 90-1.
- 27 'Kuan-shui Hui-i yü Hsiu-kai T'iao-yueh', *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*, vol. 22, no. 16, p. 2.
- 28 Fishel, op. cit., p. 91.
- 29 SSJC, 26/6/25, *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*, vol. 22, no. 15, p. 129.
- 30 Borg, op. cit., p. 31.
- 31 SSJC, 29/6/25, *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*, vol. 22, no. 15, p. 130.
- 32 SSJC, 1/7/25, *ibid.*, *Tung-fang*, vol. 22, no. 16, p. 135.
- 33 SSJC, 5/7/25, *Tung-fang*, p. 136.
- 34 See Borg, op. cit., p. 35, n. 58; for the text of the report of the Diplomatic Commission, see Kotenev, op. cit., pp. 316-18.
- 35 F3204/194/10.
- 36 F2776/194/10.
- 37 F3055/194/10.
- 38 F3204/194/10.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 F2841/194/10; F2894/194/10.
- 41 F2909/194/10.
- 42 Borg, op. cit., pp. 33-4.
- 43 F3067/194/10; according to SSJC, *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*, vol. 22, no. 16, p. 137, this was 10 July.
- 44 F3997/194/10.
- 45 F3107/194/10; see also F3276/194/10.
- 46 F3276/194/10; also F3108/194/10.
- 47 F3204/194/10.
- 48 F3275/194/10.
- 49 Borg, op. cit., p. 36.
- 50 F407/194/10.
- 51 Borg, op. cit., p. 36. See the chronology in Appendix 1 of the present work for the repeated protests of the government against the judicial inquiry.
- 52 F3997/194/10.
- 53 F3276/194/10.
- 54 Borg, op. cit., p. 37.
- 55 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 193.
- 56 SSJC, 15/7/25, *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*, vol. 22, no. 16, p. 138.
- 57 SSJC, 10/8/25, *ibid.*, vol. 22, no. 18, p. 151.
- 58 SSJC, 18/8/25, *ibid.*, vol. 22, no. 19, p. 136.
- 59 SSJC, 4/9/25, *ibid.*, vol. 22, no. 20, p. 142; for full text, F4754/2/10.
- 60 SSJC, 1/10/25, *ibid.*, vol. 22, no. 22, p. 139.
- 61 F5607/194/10; *North China Herald*, 10/10/25, p. 55; 17/10/25, pp. 96-100; 24/10/25, pp. 149-53.
- 62 See Appendix 3 for an extract from his report; for a more complete text, together with reports of the other judges, see Kotenev, op. cit., pp. 319-27, and *North China Herald*, 9/1/26, pp. 59-61; Borg, op. cit., p. 37, quotes a passage not generally included in other published versions.

- 63 *North China Herald*, 9/1/26, p. 49.
- 64 *China Weekly Review*, 23/1/26, p. 206.
- 65 F5834/194/10.
- 66 F5733/194/10.
- 67 Ibid.
- 68 *North China Herald*, 2/1/26, p. 4.
- 69 Ibid., 16/1/26, p. 106.
- 70 F5733/194/10.
- 71 F5843/194/10; *North China Herald*, 26/12/25, p. 562.
- 72 *North China Herald*, 2/1/26, pp. 4-5.
- 73 Ibid., 13/2/26, p. 285.
- 74 See CYB 1926-7, pp. 987-90.

Chapter 4

- 1 *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F2414/2/10; all serial number references are to this source.
- 2 F2942/194/10.
- 3 English text in *British Chamber of Commerce Journal*, Shanghai, June-August 1925, pp. 177-8; Chinese text in 30 May special edition of *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*, July 1925.
- 4 *British Chamber of Commerce Journal*, Shanghai, June-August 1925, p. 178; originally in *North China Daily News*, 8/7/25.
- 5 *China's Case*, copy held in Foreign Office *Diplomatic Correspondence*, F3035/194/10. The last statement received wide currency, appearing, for instance, in a book about China written by a Swede, J. G. Andersson, *The Dragon and the Foreign Devils*, p. 278, where it is attributed by him to 'one of my Chinese friends'. The friend was probably the geologist Ting Wen-chiang, for Andersson was the Swedish geologist Gunnar Andersson who discovered the Yangshao Culture; Marc Kasanin, *China in the Twenties*, p. 154. In a minute to the pamphlet, written on 10 July, Moss observed: 'The pamphlet is a dastardly attack on the Shanghai Settlement administration. It is clear proof of the unfitness of the Peking University luminaries to hold any responsible positions [a reference to the fact of Hu and Ting's being at the time considered for the Boxer Indemnity Money Advisory Committee] not because of their lack of intelligence or education but because of their intellectual dishonesty. These are the disciples of Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, the political associates of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, and the friends of Bertrand Russell.'
- 6 Telegram to the scholars and intellectuals of the world, 14 July; two manifestos, one dated 9 June, the other undated, appearing in the special edition of *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*; letter from the Professors of Peking University to the Tuan provisional government; cable of Pei-ta professors to the *New York Times*.
- 7 'Pei-ching Ta-hsüeh Chiao-shou Shang Tuan-chih-cheng Shu', special 30 May edition of *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*, July 1925.
- 8 Other names specifically mentioned were H. N. Brailsford, Edward Carpenter, Michael Sadler, A. E. Shipley, Graham Wallas, G. Lewes, Rudolf Eucken and Hans Driesch.
- 9 Quotations are from the English translation issued by the Union of Chinese Associations of Gt. Britain and Ireland, F2485/194/10.

- 10 F2694/2/10.
- 11 'Pei-ching Ta- hsüeh Chiao-shou Hsüan-yen', special 30 May edition of *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*, July 1925.
- 12 See Appendix 2.
- 13 The text of the cable is contained in the special 30 May edition of *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*, July 1925.
- 14 The text is in Lo Chia-lun, op. cit., no. 18, pp. 3312-17.
- 15 *Baltimore Sun*, 31/8/25, F4847/2/10.
- 16 Between the publication of *China's Case* and this interview, the FO had modified its position, and Moss, author of the unflattering minute quoted in n. 5 of this chapter, wrote of Hu's later statement that it was 'very intelligent and interesting'. Pratt felt that 'all his remarks are thoroughly sound and are deserving of close attention'. F4847/2/10.
- 17 Ch'ih Fu, 'Wu-sa-ti Ch'ih-hsüeh yü Chung-kuo-ti Ch'ih-hua', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 155, 30/5/26, p. 1498.
- 18 The above quotations are from 'Sudden Notions' (10), 11/6/25, *Selected Works*, vol. 2, pp. 163-4.
- 19 Letter to Hsü Kuang-p'ing, no. 29, 13/6/25, *Ch'üan-chi*, vol. 9, p. 72.
- 20 'Stopgap Writing', 23/6/25, *Selected Works*, pp. 169-70.
- 21 'Sudden Notions' (10), 11/6/25, *ibid.*, p. 166.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 165.
- 23 Letter to Hsu Kuang-p'ing, *Ch'üan-chi*, vol. 9, p. 73.
- 24 'Stopgap Writing', 8/7/25, *Selected Works*, p. 175.
- 25 *Ibid.*, pp. 176-7.
- 26 Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 262.
- 27 See the comment on Ma Ch'ao-chün in the final chapter of this book, pp. 172-3.
- 28 'A letter to All Comrades of the Party' (10/12/29), in *Chinese Studies in History*, vol. III, no. 3, 1970.
- 29 Originally published in the KMT propaganda bureau's *Tang-sheng Chou-k'ao*, no. 66, 29/6/25; reprinted in Lo Chia-lun, op. cit., no. 18, pp. 3305-7.
- 30 'Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Shang-hai Chih-hsing-pu Hsüan-yen' (1), 1/6/25, *ibid.*, pp. 3279-80. This is also in the 30 May special edition of *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*, July 1925.
- 31 'Sudden Notions' (10), *Selected Works*, vol. 2, p. 164.
- 32 'Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Shang-hai Chih-hsing-pu Hsüan-yen' (2), 4/6/25, Lo Chia-lun, op. cit.; no. 18, pp. 3281; also in the special 30 May 30 edition of *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*, July 1925.
- 33 'Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yüan-hui T'ung-tien', 2/6/25, Lo Chia-lun, op. cit., no. 18, p. 3279; also in *Tung-fang Tsa-chih* (as for n. 32).
- 34 'Kuang-chou Ko-ming Cheng-fu Hsüan-yen', 7/6/25; this is signed by Hu Han-min and was originally published in *Lu-hai-chün Ta-yüan-shuai Ta-pen-ying Kung-pao*, no. 14, reprinted in Lo Chia-lun, op. cit., no. 18, p. 3288.
- 35 Tai Chi-t'ao, *Kuo-min Ko-ming yü Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang*, pp. 70-1.
- 36 Quoted in Isaacs, op. cit., p. 66.
- 37 Tai Chi-t'ao, op. cit., p. 67.
- 38 Woo, op. cit., pp. 165-6.

- 39 See, for instance, the article by Hsiao Hsiao-yü, '“Wu-sa” Ts'an-an yü “Fan-ti” Yün-tung', in Canton National University's *Wu-sa Chi-nien*, pp. 26-7, and on pp. 36-8 of the same pamphlet, Yang Yung-chiang, 'Pei-ya-p'o Chieh-chi yü Wa-sa Chi-nien'. If this has done no more than to emphasise the well-known fact that the KMT represented a congeries of political tendencies, it should at least illustrate the difficulty of saying exactly what was the KMT position, and in the present work I have only sought to bring forth those aspects which were common to the majority of KMT members, as represented in contemporary publications.
- 40 Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 407.
- 41 Of course there was a good deal of hostility and mutual distrust between various factions in Canton, as subsequent events proved all too clearly, e.g. the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai, and the Chung-shan gunboat incident; but despite this, the united front had more substance than elsewhere in China.
- 42 Kuo-li Kuang-tung Ta-hsüeh Mi-shu-ch'u, *Wu-sa Chi-nien*.
- 43 Lu Hsiang-yüan, 'Wu-sa-an-chih Hui-su', *ibid.*, pp. 2-6.
- 44 Tung Kuang-fu 'Wu-sa Ts'an-an', *ibid.*, pp. 23-4.
- 45 Chou Yung-kuang, 'Wu-sa Ts'an-an ho Ko-ming Ch'ien-t'u', *ibid.*, p. 19.
- 46 Hsiao Hsiao-yün, op. cit., *ibid.*, pp. 25-8.
- 47 Huang Yen-ch'ang, 'Wu-sa Ts'an-sha ho Chung-kuo Min-tsu Chieh-fang Yün-tung', *ibid.*, pp. 33-4.
- 48 *Hu Yeh-p'in Hsüan-chi*, pp. 120-307.
- 49 For the Communist-Anarchist conflict at this time, see Lang, op. cit., p. 93.
- 50 Ma Ch'ao-chün, op. cit., pp. 235-8.
- 51 *Ibid.*, p. 382; also Li Yün-han, op. cit.; *Chung-hua Hsüeh-pao*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1974, pp. 187-217.
- 52 W. Kuo, *Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party*, Book 1, p. 146; the charges against Ma are printed in *Hsiang-tao*, no. 87, October 1924, pp. 721-2.
- 53 Ma Ch'ao-chün, op. cit., p. 360; Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 169.
- 54 Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 436.
- 55 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 193.
- 56 E.g. Hua Kang, *Chung-kuo Ta-ko-ming-shih*, chap. 4, pt. 1; Hsü and Ch'iang, op. cit.; Liang Hsiao-ming, op. cit.
- 57 *CYB* 1926-7, p. 1011.
- 58 Ku Ho, 'Wu-sa Ts'an-an yü Tz'u-hou Kuo-jen tui ch'ün-chung Yün-tung Ying Chu-i-chih Kuan-tien', *Tu-li P'ing-lun*, no. 10, 30/5/26, p. 3.
- 59 Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 270.
- 60 L. Van Slyke, *Enemies and Friends*, pp. 25.
- 61 Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 436.
- 62 Van Slyke, op. cit., pp. 22-3.
- 63 This is also the view of Conrad Brandt, who writes that, 'Because of the wide popular appeal of the May 30 Movement, Communist sources tend to exaggerate the role that the party played in it. But it is certain that this role was great and that, in so far as the movement was launched by the efforts of any one group, this group was the Communist leadership.' C. Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China*, pp. 51-2.
- 64 Ch'iu Shih, 'Hung-se-ti Wu-yüeh', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 121, 30/5/26, pp. 556-60.

- 65 'Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang wei Fan-k'ang Ti-kuo-chu-i Yeh-man Ts'an-pao-ti Ta-t'u-sha Kao Ch'üan-kuo Min-chung', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 117, 6/6/25, p. 1075.
- 66 Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, 'Kuo-min Hui-i yü Wu-sa Yün-tung...', *Hsin Ch'ing-nien*, March 1926, no. 3, pp. 292-3.
- 67 'Manifesto of the Communist Party of China', Moscow, 17 June 1925, *Inprecor*, vol. 5, no. 52, p. 704.
- 68 Jen Pi-shih, 'Shang-hai Wu-sa Ts'an-sha chi Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien-t'uan-ti Tse-jen', *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 81, 23/5/25 (*sic*) pp. 452-5.
- 69 Tang Hsing-ch'i, 'Wu-sa Yün-tung-chih I-i', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 121, 16/7/25, p. 1115. An English version of this article appears in *Inprecor*, vol. 5, no. 50, p. 665, where the author is called Tang Shin She.
- 70 *Inprecor*, vol. 5, no. 52, p. 705. This cable is also given special mention as a 'clear refutation of the legend concerning the alleged anti-alien sentiments of the Chinese' in an article entitled 'China Awakened' in the Comintern journal *Communist International*, no. 13, 1925, p. 18.
- 71 Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, 'I-Ho-t'uan Yün-tung-chih I-i yü Wu-sa Yün-tung-chih Ch'ien-t'u', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 128, 7/9/25, pp. 1170-1.
- 72 Hsü and Ch'iang, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
- 73 See n. 64.
- 74 Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, 'Kuo-min Hui-i yü Wu-sa Yün-tung...', *Hsin Ch'ing-nien*, March 1926, no. 3, pp. 292-3.
- 75 'Chih Chih-tao Yün-tung Tzu-chi Pu-yün-tung Pieh-jen-ti Wu-ssu Yün-tung'; Ch'iu Jen, 'Wu-sa Ts'an-an-chung-ti Hsüeh-sheng Yün-tung', *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, nos. 91-2, 1/9/25, p. 625. An article in *Chung-kuo Hsüeh-sheng*, 29/5/26, p. 248, also claimed that 30 May was more important than either 1911 or 4 May, because of the united front, which shook the base of imperialism in the east.
- 76 Ch'ao Lin, 'Ti-kuo-chu-i T'u-sha Shang-hai Shih-min-chih Ching-kuo', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 117, 6/6/25, p. 1085.
- 77 Ch'iu Pai, 'Ti-kuo-chu-i-chih Wu-sa T'u-sha yü Chung-kuo-ti Kuo-min Ko-ming', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 119, 22/6/25, p. 1097.
- 78 Lien Sheng, 'Wu-sa-hou-chih I-nien', *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 121, 30/5/26, p. 561.
- 79 Ch'iu Pai, 'Wu-sa-hou Fan-ti-kuo-chu-i Lien-ho Chan-hsien-ti Ch'ien-t'u', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 125, 18/8/25, p. 1146.
- 80 Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, 'Kuo-min Hui-i yü Wu-sa Yün-tung', *Hsin Ch'ing-nien*, March 1926, no. 3, p. 293.
- 81 E.g. Ch'ü ying, 'Ch'ing-tao Jih-pen Sha-ch'ang Kung-jen-ti Tou-cheng', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 125, 18/8/25, p. 1146.
- 82 Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, 'Wu-sa Yün-tung-chung-ti Kuo-min Ko-ming yü Chieh-chi Tou-cheng', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 129, 11/9/25, pp. 1183-6. According to Ssu-ma Lu, this was an extremely important document, and was in fact a first outline of 'New Democracy'; *Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai Chuan*, pp. 44-5.
- 83 *Hsiang-tao*, nos. 129, 130, 11/9/25, 18/9/25, pp. 1186-90, 1196-7.
- 84 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 'Chung-kuo Min-tsu Yün-tung-chung-chih Tzu-ch'an Chieh-chi', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 136, 21/11/25, pp. 1239-41.

- 85 And sufficiently influential to warrant a special section being devoted to it in Teng Chung-hsia's account of 30 May; Teng, op. cit., pp. 218-19. Tai had little to do with 30 May (he was apparently in Canton until 30 May when he left for Shanghai). Once in Shanghai, he established an office, and sat down to write his *Kuo-min Ko-ming yü Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang*, which he completed on 23 July and had published in August. Thus the work was produced at the height of the movement, and the Communists were quite justified in seeing in it the response of the 'New Right'; see Li Yün-han's article referred to above, *Chung-hua Hsüeh-pao*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1974, pp. 187-217.
- 86 'A Letter to All Comrades of the Party', 10/12/29; *Chinese Studies in History*, vol. III, no. 3, 1970, pp. 227-9.
- 87 F2009/194/10.
- 88 This has also been emphasised by later Communist historians, e.g. Ch'i Wu, op. cit., *Li-shih Yen-chiu*, no. 63, 1965, section 3, pp. 29-32.
- 89 Ibid; Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, 'Kuo-min Hui-i yü Wu-sa Yün-tung', *Hsin Ch'ing-nien*, March 1926, no. 3, p. 307; see also Lenin, 'The Lessons of the Revolution', *Selected Works*, vol. 1, pt 2.
- 90 Lien Sheng, 'Wu-sa-hou-chih I-nien', *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 121, 30/5/26, pp. 561-74.
- 91 Tan I, 'Ko-ming Shih-li yü Fan-ko-ming Shih-li', *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 83, 23/7/25, pp. 482-3.
- 92 'Chung-kuo Ko-chieh-chi-ti Fen-hsi', *Mao Tse-tung Hsüan-chi*, 1968, p. 6.
- 93 Ch'en, op. cit., pp. 99-100.
- 94 E. Snow, *Red Star Over China*, p. 159.
- 95 L. Heller (Geller), 'The Nationalist Movement and Labour in China', pt. 3, *Inprecor*, vol. 5, no. 73, p. 1084.
- 96 Jen Pi-shih, 'Shang-hai Wu-sa Ts'an-sha chi Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien-ti Tse-jen', *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 81, 23/5/25 [sic], p. 460.
- 97 'S' Sheng, 'Chang Tsung-ch'ang Chih-hsia-ti Shan-tung', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 131, 25/9/25, p. 1206. The peasants in the district of Li Ch'eng made little models of Chang out of dough, writing his name on them. The dolls were then soaked in boiling water and the remains thrown into the toilet. This operation was performed twice daily.
- 98 See n. 96.
- 99 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., pp. 220-1.
 - 1 Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 442.
 - 2 Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., pp. 220-1.
 - 3 Ch'i wu, op. cit., *Li-shih Yen-chiu*, no. 63, 1965, pp. 31-2.
 - 4 Tzu Yün, 'Wu-sa Min-tsu Chieh-fang Yün-tung-ti Hsin-shih-ch'i', *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 121, 30/5/26, p. 576.
 - 5 Ibid, pp. 576-80.
 - 6 Su-shih, 'Kuo-min-chün Shih-pai-hou Min-chung Ying-you-chih Chüeh-wu yü Tse-jen', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 147, 27/3/26, pp. 1365-6.

Chapter 5

- 1 CYB 1926-7, Preface, p. xiv.
- 2 Ibid, p. xvii.
- 3 *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), vol. 185, 18/6/25, p. 926.

- 4 The society sent 50,000 gold roubles, worth 500,000 yuan to the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce to aid the strikers; *Wu-sa T'ung-shih*, pp. 114-15.
- 5 Ma Ch'ao-chün, op. cit., p. 444. The appeal of the professors to the Pope to mediate in the dispute provoked the scorn of Lu Hsün's brother and fellow writer Chou Tso-jen, who quoted the former's comments on the predicament of the wronged party pleading his innocence, adding that it was rather strange for the person falsely accused to first try and clear himself through appeals to people who belonged to the same gang as the murderers, which was what the cable to the Vatican amounted to. Such an act was not only asking for trouble, according to Chou, but was also extremely laughable; 'Wu-sa', *Chih T'ang Hui Hsiang Lu*, vol. 2, p. 451.
- 6 Ma Ch'ao-chün, op. cit., p. 444-6. As regards the attitude of the Roman Church to the events in China, the following note from C. Dormer, of HM Embassy to the Holy See, summarising a despatch of 9 July from the Apostolic Delegate at Peking, is of interest: 'The line the Apostolic Delegate intends to follow, and the Bishops are in agreement with him, is that the Missions must not concern themselves in the slightest degree in political matters. Chinese Catholics are free to manifest their patriotism so long as they use lawful means... Catholic students had taken part, here and there, in the demonstrations of their colleagues. To have prevented them would have been to raise a movement against the missions, because the Chinese regard these demonstrations as a legitimate manner of showing their nationalism.' F3815/2/10; Diplomatic Correspondence.
- 7 CYB 1926-7, Preface, p. xiv.
- 8 Ibid., p. xv; *Shanghai Mercury*, 27/6/25, p. 7; *The Canton Incident of June 23rd — The Truth*, pp. iv, xii; *June 23rd — The Report...*, Appendix A; Woodhead, op. cit., p. 107.
- 9 See any copies of *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* for the period.
- 10 London Mission (Men's) Hospital, Hankow, 'The Political Upheaval', *Annual Report for 1925*, pp. 1-2.
- 11 S. S. Garrett, *Social Reformers in Urban China...*, p. 178.
- 12 *China, the Foreign Powers and the 'Unequal Treaties'*, Presbyterian Mission Press, Shanghai, 1927.
- 13 'Spirit of Moscow' was a term first used by the London *Times*, which claimed that it was present in China; Trotsky agreed, see *Hsiang-tao*, no. 122, 26/7/25, pp. 1123-4; the article has recently been reprinted in *Chan-wang*, no. 291, pp. 28-9; English version, *Inprecor*, vol. 5, no. 51, pp. 682-3.
- 14 *North China Herald*, 20/6/25, p. 466.
- 15 *Wu-sa T'ung-shih*, chap. 4, pp. 115-22.
- 16 Will Thorne, Labour, asked if the trouble did not arise from the use of child labour and the 'beastly low' wages paid workers; *Shanghai Mercury*, 27/6/25; *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), vol. 185, June 15 and 17, 1925, pp. 27-36, 475-7; F2266/194/10. In Australia, Labor members raised questions concerning the use of the Australian cruiser *Brisbane*, attached to the British China Squadron in 1925; *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, H of R vol. 110, pp. 463-7, 703-17, 763, 850; *North China Herald*, 29/8/25, p. 277. I am grateful to Humphrey McQueen for bringing this to my attention.
- 17 Article by 'A Japanese', 'Jih-pen Ti-kuo-chu-i ho Chung-kuo Kung-jen', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 104, 28/2/25, pp. 865-7.

- 18 Hua T'ien-sheng, 'Shang-hai Ta-pa-kung yü Jih-pen Kung-jen Chieh-chi', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 118, 20/6/25, pp. 1088-9; a brief account of Japanese working class support is given in Hsü and Ch'iang, op. cit., p. 44.
- 19 If this was indeed the case, the FO records do not reveal it directly; but this does not necessarily mean that it was not so. Waterlow's explanation of why support for Chang Tso-lin was inadvisable indicates that such popular pressures were taken into consideration; see p. 153.
- 20 Ch'ao-lin, 'Shang-hai Jih-pen Tzu-pen-chia Ch'iang-sha Chung-kuo Kung-jen', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 115, 17/5/25, p. 1060.
- 21 Shuang-lin (Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai), 'Jih-pen tui Hua-chih T'u-sha Cheng-ts'e', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 116, 25/5/25, pp. 1068-70.
- 22 'Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang wei Fan-k'ang Ti-kuo-chu-i Yeh-man Ts'an-pao-ti Ta-t'u-sha Kao Ch'üan-kuo Min-chung', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 117, 6/6/25, p. 1075.
- 23 'The Working Class as the Leader of the Chinese Struggle for Freedom', *Inprecor*, vol. 5, no. 67, p. 974; see also vol. 5, no. 52, p. 704.
- 24 'Against the Atrocities of International Imperialism in China', *Inprecor*, vol. 5, no. 50, p. 666. This impression is also given by some later Soviet accounts of the May 30 Movement, which like the Comintern journals, presumably the principal sources for these writers, concentrate far more on the shooting of workers in Tsingtao than of students in Shanghai, giving a different (and inaccurate) picture from that supplied by Chinese accounts. This comment does not apply to Sladkovsky, op. cit., but does to G. B. Erenburg, *Ocherki natsional'no-onvoboditel'noi bor'by Kitaiskogo naroda v noveishee vremia*, p. 75.
- 25 G. Voitinsky, 'The Struggle of the Imperialists against the Chinese Labour Movement', *Inprecor*, vol. 5, no. 52, p. 704. The 'October Revolution' simply refers to the establishment of the Tuan government.
- 26 G. Voitinsky, 'The Situation in China', *Communist International*, no. 21, 1926, pp. 55-6.
- 27 L. Heller, 'The Nationalist Movement and Labour in China', pt 2, *Inprecor*, vol. 5, no. 72, p. 1064.
- 28 C. G. Remer, *A Study of Chinese Boycotts*, pp. 94-5.
- 29 Ibid, p. 95.
- 30 Ibid, p. 117.
- 31 This was, of course, in keeping with Lu Hsün's general approach to Japan.
- 32 Remer, op. cit., pp. 96, 117.
- 33 Ibid, p. 96.
- 34 Ibid, p. 117.
- 35 Ibid, pp. 96-7. This was as the Peking government had hoped. Iriye's study, based on official Japanese documents, shows that after 30 May, Peking attempted 'to isolate Britain by approaching Japan. Chinese officials urged that Japan be cool and cautious in this dangerous hour and take no oppressive measure which would further irritate the populace. They hoped that the labor strikes could be solved by the two countries and separated from the nation-wide movement of protest against the shooting of May 30 in which presumably only the British were involved. At the same time officials in various cities took the initiative in directing and coordinating demonstrations and boycotts, seeking on the whole to turn the movement into an exclusively anti-British affair'; Iriye, op. cit., p. 62; but see n. 43.

- 36 Ibid, p. 118. See also *Chiang Tsung-t'ung Mi-lu*, vol. 6, pp. 185-6, which refers to the way in which Japan was able to take advantage of 30 May and the somewhat changed atmosphere, at least at official levels, in the Sino-Japanese relationship which marked the relatively brief Shidehara period, to make very significant economic advances.

According to this book (p. 97), the principal reason for the course the boycott took is to be found in the results of a meeting held at Peking University on 31 May. CCP students wished to conduct a boycott against both Great Britain and Japan, but the KMT students, who carried the day, argued that it be restricted to Britain alone, as it would be unwise to force Britain and Japan into co-operation so soon after the ending of their alliance. This may well be the case, and is significant as an example of one way of thinking in nationalist circles. However, the book attributes far too much importance to the role of the Peking students, going so far as to claim erroneously that they were in fact the leaders of the movement. Accordingly, the significance of their decision is overrated.

- 37 Ibid, p. 127.

- 38 Ibid, p. 93.

- 39 Telegram from Eliot to FO, 12/6/25, F2198/2/10.

- 40 Telegram from Eliot to FO, 5/6/25, F2102/2/10.

- 41 Eliot to FO, 16/7/25, F3827/2/10.

- 42 Conversation with Waterlow, 25/9/25. For more on Shidehara, see *Chiang Tsung-t'ung Mi-lu*, vol. 6, pp. 169-86; G. Sokolsky, *The Tinder Box of Asia*, pp. 143, 188, 207.

- 43 Telegram from Eliot to FO, 20/6/25; Shidehara informed him that 'the Japanese were determined to stand together with Great Britain and had no idea of disassociating themselves from British policy in China'. F2419/2/10.

- 44 See H. K. Norton, *China and the Powers*, p. 71: 'Both Great Britain and Japan need access to the Chinese market, but they are each other's strongest competitors in that market. Just as Lancashire would profit greatly if Japanese goods could be eliminated, so would Osaka make tremendous gains if British cottons were out of the way. In her present position Great Britain could hardly hope to exclude Japan, but there are indications that some Japanese interests would be quite willing to work out a connection with China or Russia or with both that would increase the Chinese animosity towards the British without surrendering any essential Japanese right. In plain words they would be ready to take any necessary measures which might narrow the present anti-foreign feeling into an anti-British feeling, if that could be done without placing weapons in the hands of the Chinese, such as a surrender of treaty rights which might later be used against the Japanese themselves.' This was published in 1927.

- 45 Minute from Pratt, 16/10/25, F5038/2/10.

- 46 Brett to Chamberlain, 30/9/25, F5410/194/10.

- 47 *Chin-shi-wu-nien-lai-ti Shang-hai-chih Pa-kung T'ing-yeh*, pp. 6, 27.

- 48 CYB 1926-7, p. xvi.

- 49 Hewlett, op. cit., p. 182.

- 50 Woodhead, op. cit., p. 240.

- 51 Norton, op. cit., p. 67.

- 52 Ibid, p. 67: 'The total amount of British investment is not ascertainable; but in loans, railway, and other concessions, credits, factories, banks, real and other property in China itself she has a total investment approximating \$1,500,000,000 (silver) or \$750,000,000 (gold). This total is more than ten times the American investment in China and more than twice that of Japan.'
- 53 Ibid, pp. 67-8: 'The provisions of the treaties by which the duty on cotton piece goods has been held to five percent have thus worked to the direct advantage of British industry and of the workers in the Lancashire mills. If the Chinese tariff on cotton goods were increased to a figure which would protect the Chinese industry, the Lancashire mills would be forced to the almost hopeless task of finding another market. Hence Britain's very practical interest in preserving the Chinese tariff schedules.'
- 54 'Diplomat', 'The Situation in China', *Empire Review*, 1925.
- 55 Letter to FO, 24/6/25, F3233/2/10; Rose's general position is summarised in an article he wrote entitled 'The Mind of China', *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs*, March 1925.
- 56 *Parliamentary Debates* (Lords), vol. 62, 5/8/25, pp. 715ff. This speech, called 'quite good' by Waterlow, may in fact have been drafted by the above mentioned Mr Rose, who had, himself served the British Government in China for many years'; F5308/2/10. Not long after this Rose, in his capacity as a director of the British-American Tobacco Co. (BAT), interviewed the young Graham Greene for a post with that company in China. Greene wrote of him that: 'He would have made a good Intelligence officer, and I have little doubt that he belonged, however distantly, to the Secret Service. A man in his position, recruiting and controlling men for the Chinese hinterland, could hardly have escaped contact with the "old firm", and perhaps for that reason he was not scrupulously accurate about the details of the employment.' *A Sort of Life*, Penguin, 1974, pp. 108-9.
- 57 Norton, op. cit., pp. 68-9.
- 58 Minute from Moss, 22/6/25, F2420/194/10.
- 59 Remer, op. cit., p. 122.
- 60 16/7/25, F3736/194/10.
- 61 Brett to Chamberlain, 24/7/25, F4325/194/10.
- 62 Remer, op. cit., pp. 118-22.
- 63 F3325/194/10.
- 64 Minute from Moss, 21/7/25, F3239/194/10.
- 65 20/7/25, F3436/194/10.
- 66 Brett to Chamberlain, 30/9/25; minute from Moss, 9/11/25, F5410/194/10.
- 67 Memo. by Commercial Counsellor, Peking; Palairret to Chamberlain, 30/9/25, F5563/194/10.
- 68 Brett to Palairret, 10/8/25, F4779/194/10; F4325/194/10.
- 69 Report from Brett, Palairret to Chamberlain, 16/7/25, F3736/194/10.
- 70 F5563/194/10.
- 71 F4325/194/10; F5563/194/10.
- 72 F4325/194/10.
- 73 Ibid.
- 74 Originally appeared in *Ching Pao*, 6/7/25; quoted in Huang I-feng, art. cit., *Li-shih Yen-chiu*, no. 3, 1965, p. 19.

- 75 F4325/194/10; *CYB* 1926-7, p. 1005; in May 1926 they also contributed \$300 to establishing a suitable resting place for the remains of the martyrs, a rather paltry sum when compared with the figures in *Ching Pao*; see the announcement in *Shen Pao*, 29/5/26.
- 76 *Daily Telegraph*, 7/7/25, enclosure in F3310/194/10. It is worth noting that working conditions in the BAT's Shanghai establishment were generally good, with first aid units, elementary schools, and no children employed under 14. Dame Adelaide Anderson was 'completely satisfied' with conditions there; quoted in a dispatch from Barton to the FO, 27/8/25, F4923/120/10.
- 77 Minute (writer's name indecipherable) on a dispatch from HM Minister in Peking concerning the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce; beneath this comment is written 'I agree' (signature also indecipherable); 2/3/25, F740/2/10.
- 78 A particularly apt comparison, given Lloyd George's characterisation of the Chinese nationalists as Sinn Fein! Arthur Ransome, 'The Shanghai Mind', in *The Chinese Puzzle*, pp. 29-30.
- 79 F2653/2/10.
- 80 The signatories to the letter were Jardine Matheson and Co., J. Swire and Sons, APC, Dodwell and Co., the China Association, BAT Co., and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Co.; 24/7/25, F3436/194/10. The fact that Macleay was on leave for the greater part of the movement also greatly worried the businessmen, who had no faith in Palairt, the Chargé; this in turn angered the FO, see minutes by Newton and Wellesley to a letter written by H. W. Looker on 5/8/25, and Chamberlain's reply to that letter, 13/8/25, all in F3978/3/20; FO comments on a letter from the China Association, especially those of Chamberlain, 7/8/25, F3833/2/10.
- 81 F3833/2/10.
- 82 F3978/2/10.
- 83 Hauser, op. cit., p. 156; see also the cable from Palairt to Chamberlain, 6/6/25, F2106/194/10: 'We felt it would be a mistake to leave the matter entirely in the hands of the Shanghai authorities who cannot be expected to realise what issues are raised by present crisis.'
- 84 *Birmingham Post*, 2/3/25; F786/2/10.
- 85 F786/2/10.
- 86 *The Times*, 28/3/25; F1153/2/10.
- 87 Letter from Macleay, 4/2/25, F350/2/10.
- 88 F1206/194/10.
- 89 *North China Herald*, 10/1/25, cutting in F1260/194/10.
- 90 F1260/194/10, sent from Peking 25/2/25, received in the FO 8/4/25.
- 91 F2045/2/10.
- 92 Speech given at a luncheon given by the China Association for British Delegates to the Tariff Conference; *The Times*, 19/9/25; F4655/190/10.
- 93 Minute written on 12/8/25 to F3815/2/10.
- 94 F2327/2/10.
- 95 FO Minute, 13/6/25; F2230/2/10.
- 96 13/10/25, F4990/2/10.
- 97 5/6/25, F2045/2/10.
- 98 F2230/2/10.

- 99 22/6/25, F2420/194/10.
 - 1 F4990/2/10.
 - 2 Letter to Waterlow, 4/6/25; F2082/2/10.
 - 3 Rose had been asked by the FO for suggestions; received 17/7/25, F3233/2/10.
 - 4 FO Minute, 10/8/25, F3860/2/10.
 - 5 F2230/2/10.
 - 6 F3860/2/10.
 - 7 These were all comments on a letter from a Liverpool shipping company, sent 16/7/25, wishing to know what steps were being taken to reopen British trade with China; F3239/194/10.
 - 8 11/7/25, F3054/2/10.
 - 9 29/11/25, F5772/2/10; the writer, Y. H. Tsan, was married to an English-woman and was intensely loyal to the country in which he resided. His ambition was to become Warden of a Boxer Indemnity Hostel for Chinese students in London, which post the FO felt for some reason that he should not be given.
 - 10 Letter to Waterlow, 21/7/25, transmitting a communication from the Peking representative of the HK and S Bank; F3322/2/10.
 - 11 In reply to Chamberlain's speech at the China Association luncheon, 18/9/25; *The Times*, 19/9/25; F4655/190/10.
 - 12 F2230/2/10.
 - 13 17/6/25, F2417/2/10; for the speech itself, see *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), vol. 185, 18/6/25, pp. 906ff.
 - 14 Notes for the PM 'on points of current misrepresentation about China', 17/6/25, F2416/2/10.
 - 15 F2417/2/10.
 - 16 Letter written 30/6/25; F2694/2/10.
 - 17 *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), vol. 187, 7/8/25, pp. 1803-40; Looker's comment is on p. 1828; F3778/2/10.
 - 18 F3860/2/10.
 - 19 Comment on the interview with Hu Shih in the *Baltimore Sun*; F4847/2/10.
 - 20 F2417/2/10.
 - 21 F2230/2/10.
 - 22 21/6/25, F2493/194/10.
 - 23 F2694/2/10.
 - 24 Letter to A. Rose, 6/8/25, forwarded to the FO on 22/9/25; F4695/2/10.
 - 25 *Parliamentary Debates* (Lords), vol. 62, 5/8/25, pp. 714ff; F3308/2/10.
 - 26 F4847/2/10.
 - 27 F3860/2/10.
 - 28 12/3/26, F1025/184/10.
 - 29 For a good account, see Borg, op. cit., chap. iv.
 - 30 F2045/2/10.
 - 31 F3860/2/10.
 - 32 *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), vol. 185, 1/7/25, pp. 249 ff.
 - 33 Draft reply to the above questions, 30/6/25; F2853/2/10.
 - 34 3/7/25; F2828/2/10.
 - 35 Borg, op. cit., p. 419.

- 36 12/7/25, F3090/2/10.
- 37 F3446/2/10.
- 38 28/7/25, F3446/2/10; it is clear from the context of Chamberlain's minute that the disunity he refers to is only over what should be *done*, particularly *vis-à-vis* the other Powers; by late July, as we have seen, there was a fair degree of unanimity within the FO on their general picture of what was happening in China itself.
- 39 Minute on a cable from Washington re State Department attitudes, 9/7/25, F2999/2/10.
- 40 Borg, op. cit., p. 58.
- 41 Ibid., p. 602.
- 42 F4179/2/10.
- 43 See p. 180; Borg, op. cit., p. 64.
- 44 FO Minute, 16/10/25, F5038/2/10.
- 45 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 'Wo-men tui-yü Kuan-shui Wen-t'i-ti I-chien', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 131, 25/9/25, pp. 1200-24.
- 46 Moss wrote (19/10/25) that 'the Nationalists are reported to be against the Tariff Conference' on this ground; F5064/2/10.
- 47 Cable sent 19/10/25, F5083/2/10. For a gloomy picture of the conference setting, see *The Times*, 19/10/25, 'The Chaos in China'.
- 48 F4655/190/10; *The Times*, 19/10/25.
- 49 W. R. Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East 1919-1939*, p. 267.
- 50 *The Times*, 6/8/25; F3770/2/10.
- 51 Lord Balfour for the government; *Parliamentary Debates* (Lords), vol. 62, 5/8/25, pp. 726ff. The message was repeated in Chamberlain's farewell speech to the conference delegates.
- 52 Comment on a letter from Dr H. T. Hodgkin to Waterlow (24/8/25); Hodgkin had been invited to attend a conference on Sino-American relations in Washington, and he was 'puzzled to know' what HMG's China policy was.

CHAPTER 6

- 1 Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 706.
- 2 Many accounts of *San-i-pa* exist; for one by the then acting Chancellor of Peking University, see Chiang Monlin, op. cit., pp. 132-3. Some 30 students were killed.
- 3 *Tu-li P'ing-lun*, no. 10, May 30 memorial issue, 30/5/26; pp. 11-14. The name of the story literally means a strange or supernatural light; however, it is also a Buddhist term for man's natural inclination to goodness, and is further a Shanghai dialect word meaning great, wonderful, terrific.
- 4 *Shang-hai Hsüeh-sheng*, no. 19, May memorial issue, 30/5/26; p. 1.
- 5 'Ch'üan Kuo Hsüeh-sheng Tsung-hui Chi-nien Wu-sa T'ung-kao', *Chung-kuo Hsüeh-sheng*, no. 28, 22/5/26.
- 6 'Wu-sa Chou-nien Chi-nien Kao Ch'üan-kuo Min-chung', *Hsiang-tao*, 30/5/26, pp. 1488-9.
- 7 Re-emphasised by the student union of Nan-fang University (Shanghai) in their *Wu-sa Chi-nien T'e-k'an*, May 1926; see the article by T'ien Hung-t'ao.
- 8 Shang-hai Hsüeh-heng Lien-ho-hui, *Wu-sa-hou-chih Shang-hai Hsüeh-sheng*, December 1925, Preface, p. 9.

- 9 R. Gilbert, *The Unequal Treaties*, p. 230; see also Hsia Ching-lin, op. cit., pp. 72ff.
- 10 Chien Chün, 'Wu-sa Yün-tung-chih Shih-pai yü Ch'eng-kung', *Chung-kuo Hsüeh-sheng*, no. 29, May 30 memorial issue, 29/5/26, pp. 238-41.
- 11 *Wu-sa-hou-chih Shang-hai Hsüeh-sheng*, Preface, p. 9.
- 12 E.g. Hui-ling Hsüeh-hsiao Hsüeh-sheng-hui, *Wu-sa Chi-nien-k'an*, 30/5/26, p. 1.
- 13 *Chung-kuo Hsüeh-sheng*, no. 29, 23/5/26, p. 241.
- 14 *Wu-sa-hou-chih Shang-hai Hsüeh-sheng*, Preface, p. 9.
- 15 *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, 30/5/26, p. 566.
- 16 This is a retranslation from the Chinese 'yao kan chiu kan'; Ch'i Wu, 'Wu-sa Yün-tung-ti Li-shih I-i ho Ching-yen Chiao-hsün', *Li-shih Yen-chiu*, no. 63, 1965, p. 33.
- 17 Hu Yeh-p'in, op. cit. p. 200.
- 18 *China Weekly Review*, 5 June, 1926, p. 12.
- 19 Shuo-fu, 'Shang-hai Wu-sa Chou-nien Yün-tung-chih Ching-kuo chi ch'i I-i', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 156, 3/6/26, pp. 1505-6.
- 20 Ignored, that is, socially and politically, rather than commercially.
- 21 Kotenev, op. cit., p. 116.
- 22 *Shih Pao*, 29/5/26; Shuo-fu, op. cit., *Hsiang-tao*, no. 156, 3/6/26, pp. 1506-7.
- 23 Ch'en Tu-hsiü, 'Tui-yü Shang-hai Wu-sa Chi-nien Yün-tung-chih Kan-hsiang', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 156, 3/6/26, pp. 1504-5.
- 24 See the British reply to the Chinese delegate's speech at the second session of the conference for the settlement of Sino-British disputes in the Liang-Kuang, CYB 1926-7, p. 990. The *North China Herald* dismissed the 1926 demonstration as 'a damp squib', claiming that 'responsible Chinese' were disgusted by the riot and full of praise for the police. For their full account, see the edition of 5/6/26, pp. 441-3.
- 25 Shuo-fu, art. cit., *Hsiang-tao*, no. 156, 3/6/26, pp. 1506-7.
- 26 Chung-wen, 'Shang-hai Min-chung Wu-sa Ta-shih-wei-ti Chiao-hsün', *Chung-kuo Hsüeh-sheng*, no. 30, 5/6/26, p. 256. For an account of memorial services (or lack of them) in all major cities and towns, see 'Chin-nien-ti Wu-sa', *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 121, 30/5/26, pp. 625ff.
- 27 Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 444.
- 28 H. Owen Chapman, *The Chinese Revolution 1926-27*, p. 26.
- 29 Woo, op. cit., p. 198.
- 30 Hsiao Hsia, 'Wu-sa-i-hou-ti Chung-kuo Hsüeh-sheng Yün-tung', *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 103, 28/11/25, pp. 84-5.
- 31 *Wu-sa-hou-chih Shang-hai Hsüeh-sheng*, p. 17.
- 32 Ibid., pp. 58, 60.
- 33 Ibid., pp. 32-52; Hsiao-hsiao, op. cit., *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no. 103, 28/11/25, pp. 84-5.
- 34 CYB 1926-7, p. 1002.
- 35 Hsin Ch'eng, 'San-nien-lai-ti Chih-kung Yün-tung', *Hsiang-tao*, no. 128, 7/9/25, p. 1177.
- 36 Hsü and Ch'iang, op. cit., pp. 53-6.
- 37 Ch'i Wu, 'Wu-sa Yün-tung-ti Li-shih I-i ho Ching-yen Chiao-hsün', *Li-shih Yen-chiu*, no. 63, 1965, p. 34.
- 38 *Chin-shih-wu-nien-lai Shang-hai-chih Pa-kung T'ing-yeh*, pp. 6, 27.

- 39 Hsü and Ch'iang, op. cit., pp. 55-6.
- 40 Isaacs, op. cit., p. 123.
- 41 Lin Tung-hai, *The Labour Movement and Labour Legislation in China*, pp. 103-4.
- 42 Lowe Chuan-hua, *Facing Labor Issues in China*, p. 43.
- 43 CYB 1926-7, p. 1012.
- 44 Trotsky, 'The Chinese Revolution and the Theses of Comrade Stalin', *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, p. 22.
- 45 Woo, op. cit., pp. 199-200.
- 46 Teng Chung-hsia, 'Wu-sa-hou Chung-kuo Chih-kung Yün-tung-chih Hsien-hsiang', originally published in *Jen-min Chou-k'ao*, nos. 1 and 3, 7 and 24 February, 1926; reprinted in *Ti-i-tz'u Kuo-nei Ko-ming Chan-cheng Shih-ch'i-ti Kung-jen Yün-tung*, pp. 98ff.
- 47 Kuo, op. cit., p. 146.
- 48 J. Guillermez, *A History of the Chinese Communist Party 1921-1949*, p. 83. Yet again, alas, there is no unanimity on these figures, but a number of sources indicate a tenfold increase in the second half of 1925, e.g. *A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party*, contained in Martin Wilbur and How, op. cit., p. 74; Ch'en, op. cit., pp. 99-100; Woo (op. cit., pp. 139-40), however, claims the party membership grew fourfold in the two years following 30 May, yet the actual figures he gives account for a tenfold rise at the very least! Liu Shao-ch'i told Nym Wales (op. cit., p. 46) that in the month following 30 May, membership rose from only 200 to 800. Kuo (op. cit., p. 146), writes, 'In the period of the movement, its membership increased from 950 at the time of the Fourth Congress to 600,000'; this is surely a (printer's?) mistake. Sladkovsky (op. cit., p. 95), claims that in the four summer months of 1925, CCP membership increased two and a half times, from 1,400 on the eve of 30 May to 3,800 by 1 October. Over half of these members were workers.
- 49 These unions were described by Lowe Chuan-hua, Industrial Secretary for the National Committee of YMCAs in China, as 'fascist'. The term was not used in any abusive sense, and the foreword to Lowe's book was written by Ch'en Kung-po, then Minister of Industry in the Nanking government; op. cit., p. 51. See also J. Blofeld, *Red China in Perspective*, p. 90.
- 50 Quotations from Hsiang-tao, above, chap. 4; Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, *Chung-kuo Ko-ming yü Kung-ch'an-tang* (report to 6th Congress), p. 10; Teng Chung-hsia, op. cit., p. 143, Hua Kang, *Chung-kuo Ta-ko-ming 1925-7*, chap. 4, pt 1; and practically all CCP sources referred to in this work. This was also the opinion expressed by the Comintern agent P. Mif, in his *Heroic China*, p. 34, where he wrote: 'It was only as the result of the Shanghai and Hongkong general strikes that the national liberation movement took the path of genuine mass revolutionary struggle against international imperialism. The heroic action of the Chinese and Hongkong proletarians marked the beginning of the Chinese revolution of 1925-27'.
- 51 E.g. Mif, op. cit., pp. 32-3; Hsü and Ch'iang, op. cit., p. 56; Liu Li-k'ai and Wang Chen, 1919-1927 *Nien-ti Chung-kuo Kung-jen Yün-tung*, p. 41, refers to 'the Northern Expedition, initiated by the May 30 movement and the Hongkong-Canton general strike'.
- 52 Hsü and Ch'iang, op. cit., p. 56; Ch'i Wu, op. cit., pp. 33-4.
- 53 T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, pp. 209-10.

- 54 E.g. Li Shou-kung, *Chung-kuo Hsien-tai Shib*, Taipei, 1968, chaps. 7 and 8; Li Fang-ch'en, *Chung-kuo Chin-tai-shih*, San-min Shu-chü, Taipei, 1972, chaps. 6 and 8.
- 55 Ma Ch'ao-chün, op. cit., p. 488.
- 56 Chiang Kai-shek, *Manifesto to the People*, April 1927, p. 14.
- 57 Borg, op. cit., p. 20.
- 58 Ibid., p. 120.
- 59 J. T. Pratt, *War and Politics in China*, p. 201.
- 60 Quoted in Borg, op. cit., pp. 112-13; see also Pratt, op. cit., p. 202.
- 61 Borg, op. cit., pp. 113-14.
- 62 Pratt, op. cit., p. 202.
- 63 Borg, op. cit., p. 120.
- 64 Fishel, op. cit., p. 220.
- 65 Pratt, op. cit., pp. 203-4.
- 66 Borg, op. cit., p. 419.
- 67 Pratt, op. cit., p. 268.
- 68 Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang . . . , *Wu-sa Ts'an-an Hsiao-shih*, pp. 20-1.

Annotated Bibliography

A. Contemporary Official Sources

1. UK Foreign Office *Diplomatic Correspondence*, China, 1924-6.

This source, held in the Public Records Office in London, includes most official British material relevant to events in China (excluding that gathered by intelligence services, although some information from SAS is included): diplomatic, consular, naval and internal FO minutes; it also includes a good deal of non-official material, including quite a number of private letters on the situation passed on to the FO by their recipients, clippings from *Hansard*, copies of pamphlets, and clippings from the following newspapers: *The Baltimore Sun*, *The Birmingham Post*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Times*.

2. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), 1925, vols. 185-7.
3. *Parliamentary Debates* (Lords), 1925, vol. 62.
4. *Papers Respecting Labour Conditions in China* (FO Memorandum) China no. 1 (1925), Cmd. 2442.
5. *Papers Respecting Labour Conditions in China* no. 2 (1927), Cmd. 2846.

B. Contemporary Periodicals and Newspapers (consulted in series)

1. *British Chamber of Commerce Journal*

Published by the BCC in Shanghai—relevant issues, particularly that of June/August 1925, contain a good deal of documentary material, plus a 'diary of the strike'.

2. *China Weekly Review*

The most liberal of the English language journals in Shanghai, run by an American; also known as *Millards Weekly*.

3. *Communist International*

4. *International Press Correspondence* (Inprecor)

These two journals were both published by Comintern, and contain quite a few articles on China, which, with the exception of

those translated from Chinese sources, are of greater value in ascertaining the viewpoint of Comintern than in understanding events in China.

5. *North China Herald*

The weekly edition of the *North China Daily News*, this is essential reading, for the information contained, what it tells of typical Shanghai British attitudes, and for the unfortunate fact, lamented by Arthur Ransome (see below), that most Chinese thought it reflected official British opinion.

6. *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*

The organ of the Communist Youth League. The first edition after 30 May is dated 23/5/25.

7. *Chung-kuo Hsüeh-sheng*

This is a national student periodical which on different occasions published proclamations in the name of both the *Ch'üan-kuo Hsüeh-sheng Tsung-hui* and the *Chung-hua Hsüeh-sheng Lien-ho-hui*.

8. *Hsiang-tao*

The weekly newspaper of the CCP.

9. *Hsin Ch'ing-nien*

By the time of 30 May, this had also become an official organ of the CCP, but was more theoretical than *Hsiang-tao*.

10. *Shen Pao* (Romanised title on masthead *Shun Pao*).

11. *Shih Pao*

It was widely felt at the time that the Shanghai newspapers were not sufficiently patriotic in their stance. This is remarked upon in the closing chapter of Mao Tun's novel *Hung*, and an article on the question appears in Chang Ching-lu, op. cit., *Pupian*, pp. 259ff (see below, D, 10).

12. *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*

Apart from the regular issues, there was also a special 30 May edition. Unfortunately this is missing from the original sets held in the ANU library, the Feng Ping-shan library of HKU and the *Toyo Bunko*, and for the purposes of this work I have only been able to consult the reprint made in Taiwan, which may possibly have deleted certain items of interest. The editors of the journal were taken to court by the SMC police over this particular edition, and charged with disturbing the peace and incitement; for a full account of the incident, see Chang Ching-lu, op.cit., *Chia pian*, pp. 230ff. (see below, D, 10).

C. Individual Periodicals and Newspapers

(This does not include those held in FO *Diplomatic Correspondence*)

1. *The Chinese Economic Bulletin*

This was published by the Chinese Government Bureau of Economic Information; several issues from 1925 are included in *The Hankow Club Papers* held by HKU, giving figures on trade unionism, the population of Shanghai and other items of interest.

2. *The Municipal Gazette*, 6/8/25.

This was the official organ of the SMC, and this particular issue includes the Police Report on 30 May which Kotenev (op.cit., p. 130) calls 'the most impartial of all documents containing the description of the May events'.

3. *The Shanghai Mercury*, 27/6/25; emergency edition, 1/7/25.

4. *Chan-wang*

Nos. 286-91 (1974) of this Hong Kong based journal contain a selection of historical material related to 30 May; the material itself is taken from sources listed elsewhere in this bibliography, but several of the introductory essays by Ssu-ma Lu (Smarlo Ma) are of interest.

5. *Independent Herald* (Hankow)

This newspaper compiled a useful volume of clippings in late June 1925, 'at the suggestion of residents of Hankow, whose wish it was to be able to present to their friends at home a true and detailed account of what took place here recently when the lives and property of foreigners in the port were in extreme danger'. Apart from Hankow, the clippings also cover the incident itself in Shanghai, and the riot in Kinkiang.

6. *Shang-hai Hsüeh-sheng*, no.19, 30/5/26.

Special first anniversary edition of this journal published by the Shanghai Student Federation.

7. *Tu-li Ping-lun*, no.10, 30/5/26.

This anniversary edition has three items of special interest: 1) an article by T'ao Hsi-sheng on the movement and its results, 2) an article by 'Ku Ho' attacking the communists for their role in the movement, and other Chinese for their unwillingness to involve themselves, 3) the strange short story 'Ling Kuang' about the man who invented a marvellous ray.

D. Books, Pamphlets and Articles

1. A.G.M., *The Canton Incident of June 23rd—The Truth*, no publisher; no place; 1925.

A British view of the Shakee massacre.

2. Anderson, Dame A.M., *Humanity and Labour in China: an industrial visit and its sequel* (1923-1926). SCM, London, 1928.

This is an invaluable first hand account of labour conditions in China, particularly Shanghai, during the 1920s. As well as being qualified by virtue of her experience in England as a Factory Inspector, the author had a very wide range of contacts in China, from Sun Yat-sen to Hsiao Yao-nan.

3. Andersson, J.B., *The Dragon and the Foreign Devils*, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1928.

This famous archaeologist stresses that unknown to foreigners, the humiliated Chinese had begun to rise; the incident itself was much more important than the activities of Bolshevik agents as a factor contributing to the vehemence of the movement.

4. Ayers, W., 'Shanghai Labour and the May 30th Movement', *Harvard Papers on China*, Harvard University, vol. 5, May 1951.
5. Blofeld, J., *Red China in Perspective*, Allan Wingate, London, 1951.
6. Boorman, H.C., and Howard, R.C. (eds.), *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, Columbia University Press, 1967.
7. Borg, D., *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution of 1925-28*, American Institute of Pacific Relations, Macmillan, New York, 1947.

This is a basic source for the international aspects of the movement, and while the emphasis is on the US, of necessity the author also devotes a good deal of attention to Britain.

8. Brandt, C., *Stalin's Failure in China*, Norton, New York, 1966.

Brandt shows that in as much as anyone led the movement, the CCP did, and claims that it was 30 May that 'set Mao on his path'.

9. Burgess, J.S., *The Guilds of Peking*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1928.

Of interest to those concerned with trade union history; it is interesting to note how many of the traditional guilds continued to exist well after the establishment of modern labour organisations.

10. Chang Ching-lu (ed.), *Chung-kuo Hsien-tai Ch'u-p'an Shih-liao*, Shanghai, 1959.

Of particular interest is the article by Huang Ho on *Je-hsüeh Jih-pao*, the paper published by the CCP (edited by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai) during the movement in Shanghai; see also other references above, B, 11 and 12.

11. Chang Chün-ku, *Tu Yüeh-sheng Chuan*, Chuan-chi Wen-hsüeh Ts'ung-k'an, Taipei, 1969.

12. Chang Chün-ku, *Wu P'ei-fu Chuan*, Chuan-chi Wen-hsüeh Ts'ung-k'an, Taipei, 1968.

As Wu's greatest days were already over by the time of the movement, 30 May is not treated in any detail. The book is useful, however, for background information on warlord allegiances and manoeuvring. It is strongly pro-Wu, and the calligraphy on the cover is by Chao Heng-t'i, responsible for suppressing the movement in Hunan.

13. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party 1921-1927*, Kansas University Press, 1971.

This is, of course, an essential source; understandably, Chang ascribes to himself a role of considerably greater importance than that given him by other writers.

14. Chao Hsin-chu, 'China Waiting for Development', 1923.

This article (publication details not given) is held in the *Hankow Club Papers*. Chao was Chargé d'Affaires in London at the time of 30 May, and argued in this article against the introduction of western labour methods to China.

15. Ch'en Hsi-ying (Ch'en Yüan), 'Wu-sa Ts'an-an', in *Hsi-ying Hsien-hua*, Shanghai, 1928.

This particular article was written during the movement, and deals with the various problems facing it, including propaganda and fund raising.

16. Ch'en, J., *Mao and the Chinese Revolution*, Oxford University Press, London, 1967.

Useful both for the general political background and for more detailed information on Mao's activities at the time.

17. Ch'en Ta, *Chung-kuo Lao-kung Wen-t'i*, Shang-wu Yin-shu-kuan, Shanghai, 1929.

This pioneering Chinese study of labour problems analyses the 30 May strikes, and demonstrates the loss of authority of the Federation of Labour and the corresponding rise in the fortunes of the GTU.

18. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 'A Letter to All Comrades of the Party' (10/12/29), in *Chinese Studies in History*, vol. 111, no. 3, 1970, pp. 227-8.
19. Chesneaux, J., *The Chinese Labour Movement 1919-1927*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1968.
This is also an essential source, one lengthy chapter being devoted entirely to the labour aspect of the May 30 Movement. The author had the advantage of being able to consult SMC archives in Shanghai.
20. Chiang Kai-shek, *Manifesto to the People*, April 1927, Commercial Press, Shanghai.
Chiang refers to 30 May as the day when imperialism killed 'our youths'.
21. Chiang Monlin (Chiang Meng-lin), *Tides from the West*, Yale University Press, 1947.
The author was Chancellor of Peking University at the time, and stresses the importance of the student element in mobilising public opinion.
22. Chiang Tsung-t'ung Mi-lu, *Nihon Sankei Shinbun* (Furuya Keiji ed.), Chung-yang Jih-pao-she, Taipei 1976 (trans. from the Japanese).
This Sino-Japanese co-operative history of relations between the two countries has the official blessing of the KMT, and must be used with some care. In the text of the present work the reader will note that I have had cause to disagree with this book on several occasions. However, generally unavailable KMT and Gaimusho sources are frequently quoted, and for this alone it should not be ignored. Furthermore, the book is of interest as the closest thing to an up-to-date 'official' KMT version, despite its having been compiled by a Japanese. For a lively attack on it, see Ah Hsiu-pa, "'Chung-yang Chien-pao" yü ch'i-ta', *Nan-pei-chi*, no. 82, Hong Kong, March 1977.
23. Chou Tso-jen, *Tse-hsieh-chi*, Shanghai, 1927.
This contains Chou's original essay on 30 May, which is also included, with additional comments, in the later collection immediately below (no. 24).
24. —, *Chih T'ang Hui-hsiang Lu*, vol. 2, San Yü, Hong Kong, 1972.
25. Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement*, Harvard University Press, 1960.
This standard work provides much essential political, social and intellectual background to the 30 May era.

26. ———, *Research Guide to the May Fourth Movement*, Harvard University Press, 1963.

A number of the magazines and periodicals included here are also of relevance to the 30 May period.

27. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, *Chung-kuo Ko-ming yü Kung-ch'an-tang*, Feb. 1928, no place.

This was written as a report to the 6th Congress, and emphasised that the movement commenced the revolution and intensified class struggle.

28. Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Che-chiang-sheng Chih-hsing-wei-yüan-hui Hsüan-ch'uan-pu, *Wu-sa Ts'a-an Hsiao-shih*, 1931, no place.

This short history was published on the 6th anniversary of the movement. The shame had still not been wiped out, it was claimed.

29. Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Shang-hai-shih Chih-hsing-wei-yüan-hui Hsüan-ch'uan-pu, *Sha-chi Ts'an-an Chi-nien Ta-hui T'e-k'an*, Shanghai, June 1927.

All writers in this collection agree that the Canton events were in response to 30 May, and that both the Shanghai and Canton massacres were the imperialist reply to Chinese nationalism.

30. *Chung-Kuo Kuo-min-tang Wei Wu-sa Ts'an-an Chou-nien Kao Ch-üan-kuo Min-chung-shu*, no place, 1926.

This manifesto advocates the continuation of a policy of economic boycott and non-co-operation.

31. Creamer, T.A., Hsueh-yun: Shanghai's Students and the May Thirtieth Movement.

This is an unpublished Master's thesis presented to the University of Virginia in 1975. It is an extremely useful study of the student role. The present writer is in Mr Creamer's debt.

32. Darrock, Rev. J., *China, the Foreign Powers and the 'Unequal' Treaties*, Presbyterian Missionary Press, Shanghai, 1927.

The author's use of inverted commas indicates his position on the question.

33. D'Avigdor, Digby C.H., 'Chinese Troubles', 1923, Hankow Club Papers.

The writer argued that China must be saved from herself by the Powers.

34. Decker, H.W., 'Industrial Hospital, Shanghai: Review of 880 cases from the Cotton Mills', reprinted from the *China Medical Journal*, March 1924.

The average age of injured children was 12, although children as young as five had been admitted to the hospital. Weaving women frequently suffered serious injuries.

35. 'Diplomat', 'The Situation in China', *Empire Review*, 1925.

'Diplomat' claimed that the Chinese government was being coerced by students, and that a show of strength was needed. China was the key to Britain's unemployment problem.

36. Erenburg, G.B., *Ocherki natsional'no-osvoboditel'noi bor'by Kitaiskogo naroda noveistee vremia*, Moscow, 1951.

This 'sketches of the national liberation struggle of the Chinese people in the contemporary period' gives a very similar picture to that portrayed in the Comintern sources referred to above, B, 3 and 4.

37. Eudin, X.J., and North, R.C., *Soviet Russia and the East 1920-1927*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1957.

This contains the treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union agreed upon shortly before the February 1925 strikes.

38. Feetham, Hon. Richard, *Report to the Shanghai Municipal Council*, North China Daily News and Herald, Shanghai, 1931.

Feetham gives his own account of 30 May, as well as much background material on the International Settlement.

39. Fishel, W., *The End of Extraterritoriality in China*, California University Press, 1952.

40. Fong Hsien-ting, *Cotton Industry and Trade in China*, Nankai Institute of Economics, Nankai University, Tientsin, 1932.

This is a useful study from the sociological as well as strictly economic viewpoint.

41. Gamewell, M.N., *The Gateway to China*, Ch'eng Wen reprint, Taipei, 1972.

This is the second edition (1st ed. 1916), published at some unspecified date during the 1920s, and gives a general, if at times somewhat naive, introduction to the Shanghai of the time.

42. Garrett, S.S., *Social Reformers in Urban China: the Chinese Y.M.C.A., 1895-1926*, Harvard University Press, 1970.

43. Gilbert, R., *The Unequal Treaties: China and the Foreigner*, John Murray, London, 1929.

The writer, also author of *What's Wrong with China?*, is very hostile to 'New China'.

44. Glasgow, G., 'Foreign Affairs', *Contemporary Review*, August 1925.

The author argues that China has seen the birth of a nationalist

movement, not mere transient disorders; he also mentions the controversy between the Diplomatic Body and the SMC.

45. Guillerma, J., *A History of the Chinese Communist Party 1921-1942*, Methuen, London, 1972.
46. Hao Yen-p'ing, *The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China: Bridge between East and West*, Harvard University Press, 1970.
47. Hauser, E.O., *Shanghai: City for Sale*, Harcourt Brace & Co., New York, 1940.

This is probably one of the best and liveliest general histories ever written about Shanghai.

48. Hewlett, Sir M., *Forty Years in China*, Macmillan & Co., London, 1943.

Hewlett was obviously a good hearted but old-fashioned man who found warlords and Confucian scholars much easier to understand and get on with than the new student class; his book contains very interesting information on the movement in Amoy, where he was Consul.

49. Hsia Ching-lin, *The Status of Shanghai*, Kelly & Walsh, Shanghai, 1929.

Hsia writes from a nationalist standpoint, calling the Chinese outcasts in their own city. He takes issue with Kotenev (see below, no. 62 on several points.)

50. Hsü Shia-hua and Ch'iang Chung-hua, *Wu-sa Yün-tung*, Kung-jen Ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1956.

This contains more information on US activities in China at the time of the movement than do earlier Chinese accounts.

51. Hua Kang, *Chung-kuo Ta-ko-ming shih, 1925-1927*, Ch'un-keng Shu-tien, Shanghai, 1932.

This standard history contains little of special interest that is not to be found in other sources; the author stresses that 30 May began the revolution.

52. Hua Ying-shen (ed.), *Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang Lie-shih Chuan*, Hsin-min-chu Ch'u-pan-she, 1949, no place.

This includes biographies of Ts'ai Ho-sen, Liu Hua and Teng Chung-hsia.

53. Huang I-feng, 'Wu-sa Yün-tung-chung-ti Ta-tzu-ch'an-chieh-chi', *Li-shih Yen-chiu*, no. 63, 1965.

This article discusses the part played in the movement by the big bourgeoisie.

54. Hui-ling Hsüeh-hsiao Hsüeh-sheng-hui, *Wu-sa Chi-nien T'e-k'an* (Shanghai), 30/5/26.

The analysis of the movement and its lessons given here are identical to those of CCP writers in *Hsiang-tao*.

55. Hu-nan Sheng-wei Hsüan-ch'uan-pu, *Hu-nan Ko-ming Lie-shih Chuan*, Hu-nan T'ung-su Tu-wu Ch'u-pan-she, no date.

This includes biographies of Teng Chung-hsia, Jen Pi-shih and Ts'ai Ho-sen.

56. Iriye, Akira, *After Imperialism*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1965.

Iriye's work includes some useful material based on official Japanese sources.

57. Isaacs, H., *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2nd ed. 1961.

58. Kasanin, M., *China in the Twenties*, Central Department of Oriental Literature, Moscow, 1973.

Kasanin was a young Soviet diplomat in China at the time; the book consists largely of reminiscences.

59. King, S.T., and Lieu, D.K., *China's Cotton Industry*, Shanghai, 1931, no publisher.

60. K'o Fang, *1925 Shanghai Jih-shang Sha-ch'ang Kung-jen Pa-kung-chih Nei-mu chi Shih-mo-chi*, February 1926, no publisher.

This extremely interesting analysis of the 1925 strikes lays some stress on the anti-Japanese violence early in the year.

61. Kotenev, A., *New Lamps for Old*, North China Daily News & Herald, Shanghai, 1931.

This contains a number of essays dealing with the various aspects of the nationalist movement.

62. —, *Shanghai: Its Mixed Court & Council*, NCDNH, Shanghai, 1925.

This is a detailed study of the legal and administrative structure of the International Settlement.

63. —, *Shanghai: Its Municipality and the Chinese*, NCDNH, Shanghai, 1927.

This is really a study of the effect of Chinese nationalism on the structures examined in no. 62, above. Kotenev devotes a good deal of attention to 30 May, particularly to its legal aspects.

'Kotenev, op.cit', in the text refers to this work.

64. Ku Cheng-sheng and Chang K'o-sheng, 'Mei-ti-kuo-chu-i Li-yung Tsung-chiao Chen-ya yü P'o-huai Wu-sa Yün-tung-ti Tsui-hsing', *T'ien-feng*, no. 11, 1960.

This deals with the activities of US missionary institutions, particularly schools, during the movement. The magazine is a post-Liberation Christian journal published by the *Chung-kuo Chi-tu-chiao San-tzj Ai-kuo Yün-tung Wei-yüan-hui*.

65. K'ung Ling-ching, *Wu-sa Wai-chiao-shih*, Yung-hsiang Yin-shu-kuan, Shanghai, 1946.

This was written as one chapter of a book of historical materials on 30 May, *Wu-sa Yün-tung Shih-liao*, to be published by the Chung-hua Shu-chü. The completed work does not appear to have seen the light of day.

66. Kuo-li Kuang-tung Ta-hsüeh Mi-shu-ch'u, *Wu-sa Chi-nien*, Canton, May 1926.

This is one of the best sources for the ideas and activities at the grass-roots level of the KMT, especially in Canton. It includes a Chinese translation of an article by Bertrand Russell on the exploitation of China.

67. Kuo Mo-jo, *Ko-ming Ch'un-ch'iu*, Hai-yen Shu-tien, Shanghai, 1947.

Kuo was in Shanghai at the time of the movement, but explains that he reached Nanking Road just a bit too late to become a martyr. He also planned to write a play about it but 11 years after the event he complained about the lack of materials on which to base such a work.

68. Kuo, W., *Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party*, Book 1, Institute of International Relations, Taipei, 1966.

Kuo, writing from a KMT standpoint, shows how 30 May enabled the CCP to become a mass party.

69. Kwei Chung-gi, *The Kuomintang Communist Struggle in China 1922-1949*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970.

Disappointingly little of direct relevance to 30 May, although the author gives details of an abortive plan of Sun Yat-sen's to improve Sino-British relations, which is of some related interest.

70. Lang, O., *Pa Chin and His Writings*, Harvard University Press, 1967.

This study is interesting not only for the sections specifically concerned with 30 May, but more generally for the insights it affords the reader into the ideas of young Chinese, particularly students, at the time. See below, Section E.

71. Lee Teng-hwee, *Vital Factors in China's Problems: Readings in Current Literature*, Ch'eng Wen reprint, Taipei, 1971.

This book was first published in 1927 as a text for Chinese students of English. It contains an essay by S.H. Chang, 'A May-

Thirtieth Policy', which is a good example of the *Kao-teng Hua-jen* approach. It sums up almost all of the issues very concisely, in several places paraphrasing Judge Finley Johnson's report. However, it completely ignores labour issues. This article, originally published in *The China Courier* in 1927, is followed by an interesting series of questions posed by the book's editor, e.g. 'What kind of excuses have the foreign powers preferred for retaining their so-called special rights? Why are they not justified?'

72. Lenin, V.F., 'The Lessons of the Revolution', *Selected Works*, vol. 1, pt 2, Moscow, 1951.

The revolution in question is that of 1905, with which Communist commentators on 30 May drew many parallels.

73. Li Li-san, 'Chi-nien Ts'ai Ho-sen T'ung-chih', *Hung Ch'i P'iao-p'iao*, no. 5, p. 48.

This largely repeats the information on Ts'ai's role in 30 May given in other biographical sources, but it is of particular interest coming from Li, himself an important participant and leader.

74. Li Yü-ch'ing, *K'u-nan-ti Chiu Chung-kuo*, Chao-yang Ch'u-pan-she, Hong Kong, 1971.

Not a 'scholarly' work, but apposite nonetheless for its accounts of various facets of industrial life in pre-revolutionary China, particularly Shanghai.

75. Li Yün-han, 'Sun-wen-chu-i Hsüeh-hui yü Tsao-ch'i Fan-kung Yün-tung', *Chung-hua Hsüeh-pao*, vol. 1, no. 1, Taipei, 1974.

This article is printed in Chinese and English and provides quite detailed information on the early period of the Sun Yat-senism Study Association, with which Ma Ch'ao-chün was involved; there are also references to the activities of Tai Chi-t'ao at the time of 30 May.

76. Liang Hsiao-ming, *Wu-sa Yün-tung*, Tung-su Tu-wu Ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1956.

This is a short popular history of the movement; it contains a number of woodcut illustrations.

77. Lieu, D.K., *The Growth and Industrialization of Shanghai*, China Institute of Pacific Relations, Shanghai, 1936.

Rhoads Murphy (below, no.101) warns that this book must be used with great care, especially the figures.

78. Lin Tung-hai (J.D.H. Lamb), *The Labour Movement and Labour Legislation in China*, China United Press (KMT), Shanghai, 1933.

Lin argues that 30 May marked the stage where labour turned from economism to political action.

79. Liu Li-k'ai and Wang Chen, *1919-1927 Chung-kuo Kung-jen Yün-tung*, Peking, 1957.

A short but valuable account of labour activities over the period; important roles are assigned to both Liu Shao-ch'i and Li Li-san.

80. Lo Chia-lun (ed.), *Ko-ming Wen-hsien*, Kuo-min-tang Chung-yang Wei-yüan-hui Tang-shih Shih-liao Pien-tsuan Wei-yüan-hui, Taipei, 1957.

This is a collection of documents, many of which are also contained in the 30 May special edition of *Tung-fang Tsa-chih*, B, 12.

81. Lockwood, W.W., *The Economic Development of Japan*, Princeton University Press, 1954.

The author emphasizes the importance of the cotton industry as the pioneer of the industrial revolution; at the time of 30 May, Japanese industry was advanced technically but not socially.

82. Lowe Chuan-hua, *Facing Labour Issues in China*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1934.

Lowe also comments on how 30 May politicised the working class; the book has a preface by Ch'en Kung-po.

83. Louis, W.R., *British Strategy in the Far East 1919-1939*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971.

The author of this study, based on FO sources, argues that Britain had neither the might nor the will to maintain her nineteenth-century status in the Far East.

84. Lu Hsün, *Lu Hsün Ch'üan-chi*, vol. 9, Peking, 1963.

This contains a number of relevant letters.

85. —, *Selected Works*, vol. 2, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1957.

Further relevant articles in English translations.

86. Ma Ch'ao-chün et al., *Chung-kuo Lao-kung Yün-tung Shih*, Chung-kuo Lao-kung Yün-tung Shih Pien-tsuan Wei-yüan-hui, Taipei, 1959.

This is a massive history of the labour movement, written from a right-wing KMT position; the sections on 30 May are disappointing for their heavy reliance on the English language *China Yearbook* (see below no. 124); Ma complained about the lack of material for a study of the movement (p. 400).

87. Martin Wilbur, C., and J. Lien How, *Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China 1918-1927*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1956.

This contains the early 'Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party' and Chiang Kai-shek's letter to Galen urging preparations for protracted war with Britain.

88. Mif, P., *Heroic China—15 years of the Communist Party of China*, Workers Library, New York, 1937.

Mif claims 30 May had an 'enormous' influence on subsequent events and definitely marked the beginning of the revolution.

89. Musso, G.D. *La Cina ed i Cinesi*, Milano, 1926.

The author was a lawyer who had lived long in China; he was hostile to the movement, as evidenced by a long footnote on pp. 732-4; the book contains a number of extremely good photographs showing the great youth of many of the demonstrators, a good number of whom seem to be at the most in their early teens. Unfortunately this book, a private printing, is very rare.

90. Nan-fang Ta-hsüeh Hsüeh-sheng-hui, *Wu-sa Chi-nien T'e-k'an*, Shanghai, 1926.

This contains useful information on student activity during the movement.

91. North, R.C., *Moscow and Chinese Communists*, Stanford University Press, 1963.

North's assessment of 30 May is based on that of Teng Chung-hsia; in connection with KMT/CCP feuds and alliances, he makes the important point that 'in the early twenties few observers knew who the real communists were' (p. 5).

92. Norton, H.K., *China and the Powers*, John Day, New York, 1927.

Norton emphasises the importance of British interests in China; he was himself acting Secretary of the American Asiatic Association, which represented US financial interests in China.

93. Owen Chapman, H., *The Chinese Revolution 1926-27*, Constable, London, 1928.

The revolution, of which 30 May was the beginning, through the eyes of a foreign doctor.

94. Pal, J., *Shanghai Saga*, Jarrolds, London, 1963.

Lighthearted reminiscences, anecdotal in tone; the author was in Shanghai at the time of the movement.

95. Pearse, A.S., *The Cotton Industry of Japan and China*, International Federation of Master Cotton Spinners & Manufacturers Associations, Manchester, 1929.

The author had a lot of time for the Japanese, not much for the Chinese, particularly the workers.

96. Pillai, P.P., *Economic Conditions in India*, George Routledge & Sons, London, 1925.

The reader will be struck by a number of similarities between Chinese and Indian labour problems, which go far to dispose of the 'national character' factor.

97. Pollard, R.T., *China's Foreign Relations 1917-1931*, Macmillan, New York, 1933.

Pollard is one of the few who have friendly words for the hard pressed diplomats of the Waichiaopu.

98. Pratt, Sir J.T., *War and Politics in China*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1943.

This is a standard work by a man whose opinions have been frequently quoted in this study.

99. Ransome, A., *The Chinese Puzzle*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1927.

This book contains a number of very perceptive essays, sympathetic to Chinese nationalism and highly critical of the 'treaty-port mentality'; 'The Shanghai Mind' makes particularly good reading.

100. Remer, C.F., *A Study of Chinese Boycotts*, Baltimore, John S. Hopkins, 1933.

This is still the best work on the subject.

101. Rhoads Murphy, *Shanghai—Key to Modern China*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953.

This book contains no specific material on 30 May but is nonetheless essential background reading.

102. Rose, A., 'The Mind of China', *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs*, March 1925.

Rose was secretary of the China Association and was frequently in touch with the FO and British interests in China. See fn. 56, chap. 5.

103. *Shanghai: a Standard Guidebook*, Ch'eng-wen reprint, Taipei, 1973.

This useful book, also known as *All About Shanghai and Environs*, was originally published in 1935, and includes a brief account of 30 May.

104. Shang-hai Shi-cheng-fu She-hui-chü, *Chin-shi-wu-nien-lai Shang-hai-chih Pa-kung T'ing-yeh*, Shanghai, 1933.

An analysis of labour problems in Shanghai carried out by the KMT city government; a major role is attributed to racial factors.

105. Sheridan, J.E., *China in Disintegration*, Free Press, New York, 1975.
An excellent study of the Republican period, this work also provides a useful summary of the May 30 Movement on pp. 152-5.
106. Sheridan, J.E., *Chinese Warlord*, Stanford University Press, 1966.
This contains a useful and quite detailed account of Feng's activities during the movement.
107. Sladkovsky, M.I. *et al.* (eds.), *Novestaia istoriia Kitaia 1917-1970 g.g.*, Mysl Publishing House, Moscow, 1972.
This is a standard work, prepared by the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Academy of Sciences. The Hong Kong-Canton strike is included as one of the most important events of the May 30 Movement, rather than as a separate matter.
108. Snow, E., *Red Star Over China*, 1st rev. enlarged ed, Grove Press, New York, 1968.
Snow gives Mao's own account of the effect of 30 May on his political development.
109. Sokolsky, G., *The Tinder Box of Asia*, Doubleday-Doran, New York, 1932.
Sokolsky wrote most of the material on 30 May for the *China Yearbook*. By his own account (p. viii) he had acted as adviser to the Shanghai Students Union during the May 4 Movement, and knew personally many of the leaders of the national movement. His writings are well worth reading. A member of the CCP once told him 'We did not make May 30: it was made for us' (p. 36).
110. Ssu-ma Lu (Smarlo Ma), *Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai-Chuan*, Tzu-lien Ch'u-pan-she, Hong Kong, 1962.
This biography naturally includes a section on Ch'ü's role in the movement, and attaches some importance to his writings on the subject.
111. Tai Chi-t'ao, *Kuo-min Ko-ming yü Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang*, Ming-tung Shu-chü, Shanghai, no date.
This work has been interpreted as the response of the KMT's 'new right' to 30 May.
112. T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, Routledge, London, 1930.
T'ang writes that 30 May set off 'a wave of nationalism'.
113. T'ao Meng-ho (ed.), *Ti-i-tz'u Chung-kuo Lao-tung Nien-chien (Chinese Labour Yearbook)*, Institute of Social Research, Peking, 1928.
Most of the information is available from other sources, although it is useful having it together in one place.

114. Teng Chung-hsia *Chung-kuo Chih-kung Yün-tung Chien-shih*, Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1949.
This standard work on labour history by a participant (later executed by the KMT) has a freshness and enthusiasm about it lacking in other works on the subject. A special chapter is devoted to 30 May.
115. Ti-i-tz'u Kuo-nei Chan-cheng Shih-ch'i-ti Kung-jen Yün-tung, Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1949.
This contains two items of special interest: 1) an extract from the CCP's *Je-hsüeh Jih-pao*, no.1, 4/6/25; 2) an article by Teng Chung-hsia on the new features of the post-May 30 labour movement.
116. Trotsky, L., *Problems of the Chinese Revolution* (ed. Max Schachtman), Ann Arbor University Press, Michigan, 1967.
Trotsky attacks Stalin's false conception of imperialism and class relationships in China.
117. Van Slyke, L., *Enemies and Friends: the united front in Chinese Communist history*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1967.
The author speaks of the 'brilliant' handling of the 30 May strikes by the GTU, but argues that the mass movement was growing too quickly for the CCP to control it fully.
118. Vishnyakova-Akimova, Vera V., *Two Years in Revolutionary China 1925-27*, Harvard East Asian Monographs, Harvard University Press, 1971.
The author gives interesting descriptions of the movement in Peking and its effect on Feng Yü-hsiang.
119. Wales, N. (Helen Snow), *The Chinese Labour Movement*, John Day, New York, 1945.
One of the interesting features of the book is that the author derived much of her information from interviews with Liu Shao-chi.
120. Whiting, A., *Soviet Policies in China 1917-1924*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1954.
Pages 122ff. show how pessimistically Profintern estimated China's revolutionary prospects.
121. Woo, T.C., *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1928.
The author writes from a left KMT standpoint; he shows how the movement helped the growth of the CCP and politicised labour.

122. Woodhead, H.G.W., *Adventures in Far Eastern Journalism*, Hokuseido Press, Tokyo, 1935.

The author, editor of the *CYB* and *Peking & Tientsin Times* was renowned as a diehard, although he himself did not accept the title. He claims that 30 May came 'like a bolt from the blue'; labour unrest was artificial, as the Japanese had the best mills.

123. —, (ed.) *China Yearbook 1925-6*, Tientsin Press, 1925.

124. —, (ed.) *China Yearbook 1926-7*, Tientsin Press, 1926.

No. 124 contains the most information, including a lengthy essay on 30 May by George Sokolsky. No. 123 only goes up to the end of April 1925.

125. *Wu-sa-hou-chih Shang-hai Hsüeh-sheng*, Shang-hai Hsüeh-sheng Lien-ho-hui, December 1925.

Valuable information on the activities of Shanghai students.

126. *Wu-sa Hsiung-shou-chih Kung-chuang*, Shanghai, 1926.

This rather unpleasant little pamphlet (32pp.) purports to be a letter written by Larry, or Laurie (Lo-li) to his friend Hank in the US, describing his experiences in Shanghai during the movement. He gives gleeful accounts of breaking heads with baseball bats and crushing people to death with armoured cars. The publishers of the pamphlet (name not given) claim that it was a Chinese translation of the original letter which appeared 'in an American magazine' (unspecified). It seems quite possible that the whole thing was a fabrication, but this cannot be proved. Certainly the 'confession' received wide circulation, and in Pa Chin's *Ssu-ch'ü-ti T'ai-yang*, the hero has a dream in which a foreigner enters his room and begins to boast of his exploits; the words are taken directly from this pamphlet. During the Aid Korea Resist America campaign it was resurrected, and sections of it were published in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 17/11/50, p. 3, under the title 'Wu-sa Ts'an-an-shih Mei-ti Tsai Hu Sha-jen Tsui-hsing!' This article also appeared in *Ta Kung-pao*, 8/11/50, and two decades later on pp. 31ff. of Ah Chieh, *Chung-kuo Hsien-tai Hsüeh-sheng Yün-tung Chien-shih*, Ta Sheng Ch'u-pan-she, Hong Kong, 1972.

127. *Wu-sa-Hsüeh-an Shih-lu*, Shang-hai Hsüeh-sheng Lien-ho-hui Wu-sa Ts'ung-shu, Shanghai, August 1925.

According to this record of events, students from Wen-chih University were arrested on 23 May, and those from Shanghai University on the following day.

128. *Wu-sa T'ung-shih, Ch'en Pao*, Peking, 1926.
This is quite a long and detailed account of the movement, which includes Chinese translations of the trial of arrested students in the Mixed Court, the judicial inquiry, etc.; a special chapter is devoted to foreign support. The blame is put chiefly on Britain, and Japan gets little mention.
129. *Wu-sa Yün-tung-chung-ti Shang-hai Kung-jen*, Shang-hai Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1957.
130. *Wu-sa Yün-tung Pien-hsieh Hsiao-tsu, Wu-sa Yün-tung, Chung-kuo Hsien-tai-shih Ts'ung-shu*, Shang-hai Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1976.
This is the most recent work on the subject to appear in China. The date of its publication is borne witness to in the text by a special section on the anti-Confucian aspect of the movement, which had hitherto not rated such treatment.
131. *Wu-sa Yün-tung P'ien-tuan Hui-i*, Shang-hai Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1958.
Both 129 and 131 consist of an interesting series of recollections by participants, chiefly workers, who naturally assign a most prominent role to the CCP.
132. Yang Chih-hua, 'Hui-i Wu-sa Yün-tung', *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, no.66, 1951, pp. 20f.
The principal interest of this article is that the writer was the wife of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, and was herself an active participant in the movement. She claims 50 were killed in the 'Battle of Thibet Road'.
133. Yen Chung-p'ing, *Chung-kuo Mien-fang-chih Shib-kao*, K'o-hsueh Ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1955.

E. The May 30 Movement in Fiction

A number of novels and stories concerning the May 30 Movement are available, which are of great value in helping the interested reader grasp more fully what 30 May meant to the lives of individual Chinese. Unfortunately, the élitist nature of the literature (despite the best wishes of all the authors considered here) means that the heroes and heroines are almost without exception intellectuals, and it is through their eyes rather than through the eyes of workers or capitalists, that we must gain the additional insight such literature affords us. The main works are as follows:

1. Hu Yeh-p'in, *Kuang-ming Tsai Women-ti Ch'ien-mien*, Hu Yeh-p'in Hsüan-chi, Peking, 1951.

This edition also contains an article on the book by Chang Hsiung-chung. Hu's appears to be the longest single novel devoted entirely to 30 May.

2. Mao Tun, *Hung*, K'ai-ming Shu-tien, Shanghai, 1949.

Only the final chapters deal directly with 30 May. Of these chapters, C.T. Hsia (see below) writes: 'An insidious propagandist note has crept in and the texture of reality is much altered for the worse' (op.cit., p. 154).

—, *Midnight*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1957.

This work, although dealing with a later period, has a number of significant references to 30 May, on pp. 83-5, 234-5, which are interesting to contrast with the treatment of the subject in *Hung*.

3. Pa Chin, *Ssu-ch'ü-ti T'ai-yang*, *Pa Chin Wen-chi*, vol. 1, Jen-min Wen-hsüeh, Peking, 1958.
 4. Yeh Sheng-t'ao, 'Ying-wen Chiao-shou', *Yeh Sheng-t'ao Wen-chi*, Ch'un-ming Shu-tien, Shanghai, 1948.
- , *Ni Huan-chih*, *Yeh Sheng-t'ao Wen-chi*, vol. 3, Jen-min Wen-hsüeh, Peking, 1958.

The 1953 edition of *Ni Huan-chih* misses the original chapter 20, and the final 6 chapters which deal with Ni's fortunes after 30 May. The 1958 edition is complete but has nevertheless had certain changes made by the author, which he states are only in the language (*wen-tzu-shang*). Yeh Sheng-t'ao is also known as Yeh Shao-chün.

A number of these works are discussed in:

Hsia, C.T., *A History of Modern Chinese Fiction*, 2nd ed., Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1971.

This is an absolutely invaluable work. However, the author's statement concerning Pa Chin's *Hsin Sheng* (p. 244) is somewhat misleading, as the only reference to 30 May in that novel is a passing one occasioned by the anniversary of the incident.

Of all these works, Yeh Sheng-t'ao's 'The English Professor' (Ying-wen Chiao-shou) is the most representative of the issues involved in 30 May, and is also the shortest. We see the hero use the word 'imperialism' for the first time, and abandon his beloved English cigarettes for a 'just smokeable' Chinese brand; his sex-life diminishes as his political activities grow, he joins the Communist Party, and embarrasses his working class comrades by his effusive attentions; he learns to hate the warlords as much as the imperialists, and looks to Canton and the Northern Expedition as China's only hope.

'The English Professor' is essentially a distillation of the essence of the author's longer novel *Ni Huan-chih*. Ni, having been caught up in the May 4 Movement, attempts to introduce a number of reforms at the county school where he teaches, but becomes depressed when these efforts meet with no response, and even hostility. Abandoning the village, he arrives in Shanghai in time to participate in 30 May, which rekindles his enthusiasm while at the same time making him more politically aware than had 4 May. Full of hope, he strides off to join the workers: the intellectual, having first gained a degree of awareness from 4 May, is shown by 30 May that his future, and that of China, lies in joining forces with the proletariat.

The hero of Pa Chin's novel *The Setting Sun* (*Ssu-ch'ü-ti T'ai-yang*) undergoes a similar conversion, although the romantic nature and severe limitations of the students are also brought out by the author. The workers at a Nanking factory strike at the instigation of the students, but as the force of the movement gradually dies away, the students lose interest in the strike, and the workers' leader is executed. The overall impression given by the novel is that the students, however emotionally involved they become in the early stages of the movement, lack the fundamental seriousness of the workers, for whom it is in truth a life and death struggle and not simply a matter of slogans. Although marred by the sentimentality which pervades so much of Pa Chin's work, the novel nevertheless offers an insight into the psychology of the students, and in the early pages gives a very vivid description of the demonstration and shooting on 30 May.

The latter part of Mao Tun's *Rainbow* (*Hung*), a novel of greater literary merit, also contains some good descriptions of Shanghai during the movement, in the course of which the heroine, Mei, finally puts behind her the uncertainties, doubts and romantic difficulties of her former life, and commits herself to Communism (with which she has already become acquainted since arriving in Shanghai). Returning home on the night of 30 May, Mei informs her flatmate that she has found the solution to the triangular love affair of which she forms one corner: 'I've resolved to give myself to a third lover—the cause' (p. 251). The very next day we find her scattering leaflets along Nanking Road and narrowly avoiding arrest, a far cry from the decorous tutor to the divisional commander's children which she had been in Szechwan. Like Ni Huan-chih, she throws off the shackles of tradition during the May 4 Movement, but until 30 May she finds nothing to replace them. The crucial psychological turning point for Mei comes when, having for several years led a life of great individualism,

she determines, not without difficulty, to submit to party discipline and to regard orders from above as 'sacred'. This seems to be simultaneously a fulfilment and a rejection of the spirit which fired her at the time of 4 May. Fulfilment or rejection, however, the reader is left in no doubt that Mei has been strengthened, and in common with the other heroes and heroines we have dealt with, she is resolved to devote herself entirely to China's cause.

Kuang-ming Tsai Women-ti Ch'ien-mien portrays much simpler characters, although its descriptions of Peking in the midst of the boycott are interesting, as are the efforts of a group of students to explain the meaning of imperialism to the domestic staff of their boarding house. However, if we are to accept Lu Hsün's account of the degree to which Peking life was affected by the movement, it is obvious that Hu's novel contains a good deal of exaggeration. We have referred to this work several times in the body of our study.

Taken together, these stories and novels are of great help in making the period live for the reader. But as remarked above, they all take intellectuals as their starting point, and this helps to explain the sorry ends of a number of the main characters following the setback to the movement after 1927. Ni Huan-chih dies of despair, drink and typhoid, and the English Professor turns to Pure Land Buddhism. We do not know what happens to Mei, but another young lady appears in *Midnight*, 10 years later, for whom a tattered copy of *The Sorrows of Young Werther* and a faded rose summon up memories of the movement; yet they are only memories, for she is no longer the student of 1925, but the wealthy capitalist's wife of 1935. Most of these options were not open to the workers, who had a far greater stake in continuing the struggle.

Glossary

Chang Hsueh-liang	張學良
Chang Kuo-t'ao	張國燾
Chang Shou-yung	張壽鏞
Chang Tso-Lin	張作霖
Chang Tsung-ch'ang	張宗昌
Chao Heng-t'i	趙恒惕
Ch'en Ch'i-meï	陳其美
Ch'en Chiung-ming	陳炯明
Ch'en Tu-hsiu	陳獨有
Chi-an Hui	濟安會
Chiang Kai-shek	蔣介石
Chiang Monlin (Meng-lin)	蔣夢麟
Chih-hsi	直隸
Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai	秋白
Ch'uan-Kuo Hsüeh-sheng Tsung-hui	全國學生總會
Ch'uan-lien	串聯
Chung-hua Hsüeh-sheng Lien-ho-hui	中華學生聯合會
Chung-hua Hsüeh-sheng Tsung-hui	中華學生總會
Fang Chiao-po	方叔伯
Feng Shao-shan	馮少山
Feng Yü-hsiang	馮玉祥
Fu Hsiao-an	傅筱庵

Hsiang Ching-yü
Hsiao Yao-nan
Hsing Shih-lien
Hsü Yuan
Hsüeh-chi'ih-hui
Hsüeh-fa
Hu Shih
Hu Yeh-p'in
I-H'o-t'uan

白警予
蕭耀南
邢士廉
許沅
雪耻會
學閑
胡適
胡也頻
義和團

Kao-teng Hua-jen
Ku Cheng-hung
Ku Wei-chün
Kuei Ch'ung-chi

高等華人
顧正紅
顧維鈞
桂崇基

Kung-shang-hsüeh Lien-ho Wei-yuan-hui 工商學聯合委員會
Kung-t'uan 工會
Kuo-min-chün 國民軍
Kuo Sung-ling 郭松齡

Lang Hsing-shih
Li Ch'i-han
Li Ching-lin
Li Li-san
Li Shih-tseng
Li Ta-chao
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao
Lin Huan-t'ing
Ling Kuang
Liu Chen-huan
Liu Hua
Liu Lu-yin
Liu Shao-ch'i
Lo Chüeh
Lo Wen-kan
Lu Hsün
Lu Po-hung

郎醒石
李啟漢
李景林
李立三
李石曾
李大釗
梁啟超
林煥庭
靈光
劉震寰
劉震華
劉蘆隱
劉少奇
羅覺奇
羅文幹
羅魯迅
陸伯鴻

Ma Ch'ao-chün

馬超俊

Mao Tse-tung

毛澤東

Pa Chin

巴金

Pei-ching Hsüeh-sheng Lien-ho-hui

北京學生聯合會

P'ing-min

平民

Shang-hai Shang-pu Hui-pan

上海商部會辦

Shang-lien-hui

商聯會

Shao Li-tzu

邵力子

Shen Jui-lin

沈瑞麟

Shen Tse-min

沈澤民

Shui-wu-ssu

稅務司

Su-ssu

速死

Sun Ch'uan-fang

孫傳芳

Sun Yat-sen

孫逸仙

Ta-shou

打手

Tai Chi-t'ao

戴季陶

T'ang Hsing-ch'i

唐興奇

Teng Chung-hsia

鄧中夏

Ting Wen-chiang

丁文江

Ts'ai Ho-sen

蔡和森

Ts'ai T'ing-kan

蔡廷幹

Tseng Tsung-chien

曾宗鑒

Tsung-shang-hui

總商會

Tupan

督辦

Tu Yüeh-sheng

杜月笙

Tuan Ch'i-jui

段祺瑞

Wai-chiao-pu

外交部

Wang Ching-wei

汪精衛

Wang Hsiao-lai

王曉籟

Wang I-fei
Wang Shih-chieh
Wanhsi
Wu P'ei-fu

王 一 飛
王 世 杰
皖 系
吳 佩 孚

Yang-ch'eng-kung
Yang Chien-hung
Yang Chih-hua
Yang Hsi-min
Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang
Yen Hui-ch'ing
Yuan Shih-k'ai
YU Hsia (Ch'ia)-ching
YU Jih-chang
YUn Tai-ying

養 成 工
楊 劍 虹
楊 之 華
楊 希 閔
葉 楚 倉
顏 惠 慶
袁 世 凱
虞 洽 卿
余 日 章
惲 代 英

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