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**The problems** of the education of officers in the armed services are at present the subject of vigorous debate within official and service circles in Australia. To what extent do officers in the Army, the Navy and the Air Force need to be provided with a full-fledged academic education in order to fulfil their responsibilities in the modern world? How can the demands of an academic education be reconciled with those of the inculcation of soldierly virtues and skills? Should the academic part of an officer’s education be imparted by military academies, or should it be undertaken by universities? Should the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force maintain separate academies, or has the time come for these to be replaced by a single, multi-service academy?

Professor P. H. Partridge recently had occasion to examine recent thought and practice concerning military education in Britain and the United States. Here he gives an account of his impressions and reflects about some of the major questions.
Professor P. H. Partridge has held the Chair of Social Philosophy within the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, since 1952. Between 1961 and 1968 he was also Director of the Research School of Social Sciences. He came to the Australian National University from the University of Sydney where he was Professor of Government from 1948 till 1952. During the past few years he has taken a close interest in questions of educational theory and policy; his book on *Society, Schools and Progress in Australia* was published in England towards the end of 1968.

This is the first occasion on which he has ever been known to manifest even the faintest show of interest in anything remotely connected with military affairs. Consequently, what he has to say on his present subject should be read with the utmost caution and scepticism.
Educating for the Profession of Arms

Comments on Current Thinking and Practice in Britain and the United States

P. H. PARTRIDGE

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Changes in the character of warfare and in the conditions under which contemporary states prepare for possible war have led many countries since World War II to a reappraisal of the kind of education and training necessary to produce a body of officers qualified to carry out the evolving and more complex functions of their profession. In this paper I intend to summarise recent trends in thinking and practice in the United Kingdom and the United States and to comment on the significance of some of those trends.

Perhaps the main changes in the character of warfare itself, and more especially in the conditions under which military policy is determined and military preparations made, are so much a matter of public knowledge and direct observation that it will be necessary to list them only in order to place in context what is said about the education of officers in the rest of this paper. The best known and most obvious of them is, of course, the revolutionising of the means and the character of war by scientific and technological development. Some of the consequences of this development are also obvious enough: one being that the armed services of contemporary states must possess officers who command the extremely advanced and necessarily highly specialised scientific and technological training needed for understanding the use and potentialities of the new weapons of warfare. Moreover, the military science and
technology of our own time is a rapidly progressing one; and we know
that so far as the two great powers at least are concerned the effort to
achieve or preserve military security of equal or superior ‘capability’
is in large measure an effort not to be outdistanced or surprised by
technological innovations and ‘break-throughs’ accomplished by poten­
tial enemies. Thus, the contemporary forces of great powers must possess
officers in their service who have not only a sufficient scientific and tech­
nological knowledge and skill to be able to deploy and utilise in strategi­
cal planning the weapons already available, but some who are also
sufficiently able in the branches of science and technology concerned
to appreciate the possibility and potentiality of technological innovation.
There is no need to labour the obvious point that the application of
very advanced science and technology to warfare requires certain radical
changes in older ideas concerning the kind and the level of education
needed by many of the officers who will occupy highly specialised
technical positions within the armed forces.

It has other broad consequences for officer education and its organisa­
tion. Advanced technology has also diminished the significance of the
distinction between warfare on land, sea, and in the air; fiercely contested
disputes that have occurred within the United States concerning the
organisation of the armed services, and less vehemently fought arguments
in other countries about the same great issues of defence policy, exem­
plify how technology has brought into question long established organised­
al and administrative divisions. Again, a considerable part of the
scientific and technological knowledge and skill now necessary for the
creation of effective armed forces is equally required by officers of an
army, a navy, and an air force; and this has therefore called into question
the economy and efficiency of systems of education and training in which
three armed services separately establish and control their own institu­
tions in which scientific and technological education is carried on. One
theme that inevitably arises as part of all serious examination of the
character and structure of scientific and technological education for the
profession of arms is the question of the advantages and disadvantages
of unifying or consolidating the scientific and technical education of all
the armed services.

However, these questions fall outside the scope of this paper; I am not
concerned with the education of specialist officers who in their careers
are occupied with highly technical matters but rather with the education
of the ‘generalists’. And, from that point of view, perhaps the most
important change since World War II in the conditions within which
‘defence policy’ is made and the maintenance and preparation of the
armed forces ensured may be roughly expressed in this way: that politi-
cal, and more generally social, knowledge, thinking, and skill have be-
come increasingly more vital and influential in the projection and
execution of ‘defence policy’ and in most of what those operations include
and entail. It would be out of place in this paper to attempt a systematic
exposition and defence of this extremely sweeping proposition; perhaps
it will be sufficient to list a few points which will illustrate the kind of
consideration on which such an assertion could be based.

Firstly, since the end of the last great war the strategic perspective
in which issues of defence are thought out has changed in very important
ways—this is at least true so far as the politically and militarily import-
ant states are concerned. For example, it has been said by American
writers on this subject that many members of the U.S. higher command
have only painfully accommodated themselves to the conception that the
prime object of military policy broadly conceived is not the ultimate
prosecution of major war but its prevention; in other words, that
deterrence has become the controlling purpose at least of American
defence and military planning. And deterrence as a wide objective of
national policy has tended to accentuate and also widen the range of
political considerations which are taken into account in the articulation
of policy concerned in the last resort with national security. One import-
ant dimension of deterrence is discouragement of political intervention
or interference by a potentially hostile power that may affect the strategic
balance and increase the likelihood of ‘hot’ war. And one aspect of this,
in turn, is concern with the political, economic, and social strength and
stability of countries and areas in which intervention may occur. In
general, we may say that in the course of the last twenty years govern-
ments (and everyone else who apply their minds to these matters) have
grown much more sensitive than they were before to the influence of
political, economic, and social conditions on the relationships between
states, or to the manner in which war and security are aspects of world
politics, and world politics the product of political, economic, and social
developments and tribulations occurring throughout a more tightly
interlocking world. Of course, the connection between war and politics
has always been obvious; the doctrine that war is the continuation of
politics is one of great antiquity; but in the years since 1945 the inter-
connections between large-scale war and the politics (and economic and
social predicaments) of a large number of diverse nations have been
brought home with a greater force and in a new sense.

Obviously, there have been changes in the post-1945 world that
have mainly been responsible for this new sensitivity. Of these probably
the most important has been the 'enfranchisement' within the international system of the new nations of Africa and Asia. It is no longer true that international politics is predominantly an affair of a very few 'atomic', tightly organised and governed, political entities or sovereign national states—as it was perhaps largely true throughout the nineteenth century following the Napoleonic wars. Because the liberation of Africa and Asia from colonial status has in effect brought into international society large areas which are politically, economically and socially extremely fluid, incoherent, and unstable; and because (for a number of reasons) these still fluid and incoherent new 'nations' affect the relations between stronger, older, and more stable powers, their affairs and their prospects must always receive attention in the international thinking of the leading states. For that matter, the emergence from the war of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. as the two super-powers militarily speaking, and the tendency of each in consequence to assume responsibility for the 'security' of what each considered to be strategically vital areas, have led each of them to manifest a natural concern with the political and economic affairs even of 'advanced' and long-established states—as exemplified most notably in the post-war American interest in the political and economic recovery of Western Europe.

This is one familiar sense in which political and social knowledge has become more central in the projections of defence policy by the well-established actors within the international system. Next, if we consider the internal affairs of some of the newly liberated peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, we find another example of the manner in which politics and war, or politics and 'defence' and 'security', intertwine in ways more familiar to us than to the older colonial world. In parts of South-East Asia, for example, the old dictum has been reversed and politics is on occasion the carrying on of international war by other means. The phenomena of subversion, insurgency, and guerilla warfare may usually be phases in the development of the internal politics of these countries, but they are often also connected with the prosecution of the international politics of great or middle powers. Nations like the United States and Australia, which believe (rightly or wrongly) that their own national or strategic interests are affected by the internal warfare that occurs in Vietnam, Indonesia, or other former colonial areas, have to recognise that in so far as these struggles are indeed struggles concerned with internal political conflicts they require political solutions; if they wish to influence to their own advantage the direction of affairs in such countries, a necessary condition of success would be a sensitive awareness of political and social prob-
lems, whether or not military operations were also involved. As is well known, one of the strongest criticisms of American activity in Vietnam has been that the Americans have attempted to settle with military weapons problems that demand, at least in large part, political solutions.

These, then, are some reasons why defence or military planning and execution of policies proceeds now more and more within a wider context of political and social thinking. These reasons refer to the external relations of states; but they have their implications for the internal management of defence policy and military organisation. It may be said that tendencies of the kind that have been outlined have also tended to strengthen the influence of civilians over the shaping of defence and military policy. In spite of the warning of President Eisenhower about the dangers in the growth of the power of the higher military command (in their relationships with the controllers of great industrial enterprises), some American authorities have argued that the trend in the United States during the last two decades has been rather towards the growing power or influence of civilians in defence and military planning and the declining influence of professional soldiers; especially the growing influence of the political executive, and even, at a lower level, of the civilian professional administrators in the departments concerned with defence. It is well known that especially in the United States during the last ten years or so the best known (and possibly most influential) contributions to strategic thinking have been made by civilians—thinkers like Kahn, Schelling, Brodie, and Kissinger—most of them men who have come to these problems from professional specialisation in one of the social sciences. And, to wind up these introductory remarks with a final point, the enormously complex and costly technological, industrial, and economic demands imposed by military planning and preparation have meant that to an ever-increasing extent defence and military planning has had to proceed in the context of thinking about national economic policy and growth. The economic implications of defence policies have made it certain that an important part in the formulation of defence policy has to be allowed to those who understand the operation of the economy and who can speak the language of economists, and also of the politicians who have to be concerned about the allocation of economic resources to competing social demands. It seems inevitable that, within an increasingly integrated society, in the management of a defence establishment which has become itself a major factor within the economy, a major determinant of economic growth or strain, men who possess political and economic knowledge and responsibility will play an extremely influential role. This the British
public has recently learned from the discussions and decisions concerning Britain's military commitments throughout the world.

Current thinking about the education of professional officers naturally takes into account the national and international environment within which officers will pursue their careers, the different forms of basic knowledge that seem now to be made necessary by the nature of the problems which those concerned professionally with military thinking and practice may encounter. Recent thinking about the desirable type of education for 'generalist' officers both in Britain and the United States exhibits several common features which may be summarised as follows: The desirability of developing an education which is broader, more diversified and more 'liberal' in the sense of being less concerned in its earlier stages with practical training in a narrowly vocational way; one that provides for more advanced and rigorous theoretical or academic study; and a scheme of education that includes a much stronger emphasis than has been the case in the past on the study of the social sciences. These characteristics have been especially prominent in recent thinking and practice in Canada and the United States, but they have been manifested also in thinking that has gone on in Britain during the past few years. I shall therefore, say something about British thought before turning to deal at greater length with existing practice in the United States.

Proposals for the reform of officer education in Britain which were prepared during the last three or four years have unfortunately been deferred for reasons of economy. Yet the nature of the proposals is interesting. In November 1965 the British government appointed a committee, the Howard-English committee, to examine existing practice in Britain and to recommend reforms. The committee's report was submitted in July 1966. The Howard-English report did in fact propose some quite radical changes in the nature and organisation of the education of generalist officers; for the most part, its recommendations were accepted and plans made to put the new proposals into effect towards the end of last year. However, the government decided as part of the economy decisions it took in the course of 1967-8 that it could not provide the funds that the introduction of the proposed reforms would require, and the scheme has been shelved.

Some of the proposals of the Howard-English committee concerned the reorganisation of the technical education of specialist officers in the three services; they are not dealt with in this paper. So far as the education of non-technical officers is concerned, the committee was interested
in several central issues. The most important was, of course, the kind of education appropriate for officers in this stream. This involved the place that studies of a purely academic kind should have, the depth or standard of such studies, and the balance that should be maintained between this component of formal or 'academic' study and 'military' training itself—that part of the educational program more narrowly and directly concerned with the production of military skills and virtues.

Secondly, granting that the study of academic subjects in an academic manner should be one important part of the education of officers, what are now the subjects or fields of study most relevant to it? Thirdly, again assuming that academic work of a university type and standard must be an important component, should the services themselves maintain the institutions to provide this education, or should they arrange that their future officers attend degree courses within universities? And, fourthly, assuming that there are sufficient reasons for the services having their own academic institutions, should each of the services maintain its own college or high-level institution as is at present the practice in the United States and Australia, or should there be one college which maintains high intellectual standards and which educates the officers of all three services like the Royal Canadian Military College at Kingston, Ontario? All these questions excite a considerable amount of disagreement in military circles.

Some critics affirm that British practice in the past has given little emphasis to the formal education of its future officers. It has been said that academic courses have usually been slight in content; in many cases they have done little more than traverse ground already covered in the senior forms of schools; they have been subordinated to the requirements of military training; the arrangement of training, the sequence of courses, the allocation of time, the attitudes of some senior officers in the service, even of some of those teaching within the service colleges, have conspired to establish conditions not favourable to serious study of academic disciplines. (I am not qualified to express an opinion on these matters myself; the foregoing reproduces criticisms sometimes advanced by men who supported the reconstruction proposed in the Howard-English report.) The proposals of the committee were in part intended to strengthen, enrich, and diversify the intellectual content of the education of one stream of the men entering the profession of arms.

If we compare it with what has for some time been the practice of the U.S. service academies or the Royal Canadian Military College, the reorganisation decided upon as a result of the Howard-English report might be judged to be only a small step towards the intellectual broadene-
ing and upgrading of the education of non-technical officers. Very briefly, the decision taken was to develop out of the army college at Shrivenham a Royal Defence Academy for the training of non-technical officers in all three services. Recruits would spend two years in prior service; and then be admitted to the Royal Defence Academy for a course lasting either one year or three years. If they completed the 3-year course, they would be awarded a degree approved by the National Council for Academic Awards. It seems to have been expected that about 20 per cent of those admitted to the college would prove to have the capacity to complete a 3-year degree course at university standard, while about 80 per cent would probably be better advised to spend only the one year in full-time academic study. This expectation was perhaps based on experience of the qualifications and academic promise of the recruits of the past few years, but this is only a guess. It was also hoped that many of those whose formal academic study finished at the end of the first year would return after a few years of service to continue work at the college. This may seem an over-optimistic expectation; on the other hand, it is now the case that a quite considerable proportion of the graduates of the U.S. service academies enrol after several years service in a graduate school of one of the universities.

The Royal Defence Academy at Shrivenham was to have been organised into three schools of studies: a school of Applied Science and Weapons Technology, a school of Political and Strategic Studies, and a school of Economic and Management Studies. All cadets would take a common first year, made up of courses from the three schools. Those who continued beyond the first year would then specialise in one of the three schools, thus completing a degree which would provide a considerable measure of depth and specialisation within one coherent area of study. Before the government's decision not to proceed with the proposals, possible outlines of courses had been prepared, but these were possible courses only because it was intended to allow the college a considerable measure of autonomy so far as its academic work went, and it was understood that the principal and teaching staff when appointed would develop their own views about courses and degree requirements.

What was being envisaged for the schools of Political and Strategic Studies and Economic and Management Studies seemed to be liberal and imaginative. It is probable that a fairly wide range of courses would have been offered in each of the schools. The school of Political and Strategic Studies would have provided a number of courses in British, European, and world history, the history of international relations, strategic theory,
basic courses, on the structure and working of the major political systems, political philosophy, and the history of political thought. No doubt, the school of Economic and Management Studies would have contained courses on economic theory and economic systems, on psychology as related to management and leadership, an introduction to organisation theory, and courses dealing with the more technical aspects of decision-making and the management of large-scale organisations.

It may be worth while to mention very quickly some of the most interesting general features of these proposals. It was intended to effect an almost complete separation of academic study from purely military training; to provide an interval during which three years could be devoted—for those who could stand the pace—to solid academic work almost without distraction. It is also interesting that it was intended to provide for those generalist officers who chose it what amounted to a social science degree which would have embraced a pretty wide range of historical, political, and economic studies, a program liberally conceived and without too anxious a concern about the immediate vocational usefulness of some of the subjects it was thought would probably be included in the course. The proposals for two of the schools very clearly reflected the belief that political and social knowledge and professional competence are a desideratum for some of the officers of the modern armed services. I have not dealt here with the question of the reasons why this sort of education should be provided by a services college instead of officers being sent to universities for training in sciences or the social sciences; the same question can be asked in relation to American practice and it will be better to consider it in that context. It may be added, however, that the recent British proposals amounted in effect to the creation of something very like a new small university for the education of what must have been a very small number of students; and it is possible that this consideration influenced the decision of the British authorities not to proceed at this time with the recommendations.

The three American academies, the Naval Academy at Annapolis, the Military Academy at West Point, and the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs have had different histories and they differ from one another in interesting ways. The Air Force Academy was established by legislation passed in the early fifties and began teaching later in that decade; as the newest of the three it has been most experimental and has carried the development of academic work much further than the other
two. Still, between the three there is very considerable similarity of educational 'philosophy' and practice. They all provide a 4-year undergraduate course leading to a degree. They all admit approximately 1400 cadets each year; thus, allowing for a considerable number of drop-outs, they all have an enrolment of between four and five thousand cadets. This is worth noting, because it makes possible the great range or variety of courses that all of them, and especially the Air Force Academy, provide. In all of them military training is markedly subordinated to academic study; they are all in many respects university-like institutions though in some respects very different from universities. But they all consider that one of their basic functions is formal education at an undergraduate level. It is said that at West Point more than 80 per cent of the cadets' time is given to academic study and less than 20 per cent to non-academic forms of training throughout the four years of the course, and much the same allocation of time applies in the other academies, but this has to be qualified by the fact that in the second, third, and fourth years cadets spend the summer period from June to early September attached to a service unit. Generally speaking it can be said that in American practice a period of four years of formal academic education precedes more specialised vocational training.

The structure of the course is essentially the same in all academies. During the four years cadets are required to take the courses which comprise what is called a 'core curriculum' and in addition, they take a number of other courses which make up an area of specialisation—resembling the 'major' of the typical American university. The required 'core curriculum' contains courses drawn from all the main areas of study—mathematics, science, in some cases some applied science, foreign language, English and humanities, social sciences. The three institutions appear to differ a little as regards the balance within the 'core curriculum'; at Colorado Springs about half of the curriculum is made up from courses drawn from the basic sciences, the humanities, and the social sciences, while at West Point the emphasis falls a little more heavily on the science and engineering side. Colorado Springs differs not only from the other two academies with respect to the emphasis given to humanities and social sciences but also with respect to the extraordinary number and variety of 'electives' available in all of the main academic divisions. The 'core curriculum' for the Air Force cadets, for example, requires four semesters of English, four of history, three of political science, two of economics, one of philosophy. This is the extreme example, but all the academies require a significant amount of work in humanities and the social sciences.
Then, in addition to the subjects which comprise the 'core', cadets must choose a number of further courses drawn from a particular area of study which, when added to the courses from the same area already included in the 'core', provides a study in considerable breadth and depth of some one branch of academic knowledge. As has been remarked the Air Force Academy exceeds the other two institutions in the number and range of courses taught. At that academy there are more than twenty different majors (sequences and combinations of courses drawn from the same broad field) which cadets can choose from; it is possible for cadets to cover a set of courses in history or political science or economics or humanities, or in the languages and culture of half a dozen countries, or in 'area studies' dealing with Europe, Latin America, Asia and so on that would compare with the academic abundance of a major American university. There is equally an abundance in the electives provided in each of the main disciplines. There are approximately thirty different courses in economics listed in the calendar; almost the same number of politics courses which include, in addition to the courses we might expect on the political systems of major powers, such offerings as classical political theory; modern political theory since Machiavelli; contemporary political theory; political parties and the democratic process; the American foreign policy process; international organisation and military security systems; the communist system; politics of the European community; politics of the Far East; politics of Latin America; problems of developing areas; methods of strategic analysis; international politics— theories and concepts; science, technology and government. Within its humanities division the Air Force Academy lists eight separate electives in philosophy which include such titles as introduction to the philosophy of science; philosophical analysis; introduction to symbolic logic; American philosophy; the great World Religions.

I must repeat that I am describing in some detail the most spectacular example; the other two academies are much more modest; and one even hears in them some expression of sceptical awe concerning what Colorado Springs attempts. Nevertheless, it is the policy of them all to insist on a broad selection of courses from all the main branches of academic knowledge, and also to require special emphasis within a particular area. The military academy at West Point provides good opportunities for study of the culture and languages of several countries which include English, French, German, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, and Portuguese.

Before I leave this illustrating of range and variety of courses there is one other feature of the academic program that is interesting. There is one particular type of course or seminar which should provide cadets with
an opportunity to gain knowledge of political, economic, and social issues with reference to warfare and the making of military and strategic policy. I am thinking of such courses or seminars as (at West Point) economics of defence management; the national security seminar; the public policy seminar which includes the study of central issues of American domestic life—poverty, race, problems of urban society, elections, parties and public issues, manpower for the armed services. Or again, at Colorado Springs, courses on defence economics, defence policy, the formulation of military strategy. One would expect that such courses as these would be valuable for two reasons: in bringing a knowledge of politics and economics to bear on the problems of military activity and policy-making, and also in giving cadets an educated awareness of the political and social processes and problems of their own country; in laying down lines of communication between the military professionals and those who concern themselves with the economic and social affairs of the country.

There is one more thing that must be mentioned if one is to understand the educational aspirations that seem to characterise this whole system. That is the encouragement given to postgraduate studies. All the academies encourage a considerable proportion of their graduates to go on to more advanced study in the graduate school of a university, either immediately after graduation from the academy or after a few years of service in the forces. West Point sends about 5 per cent of its best graduates each year directly to a graduate school, and it is said that eventually more than 70 per cent of its graduates spend a longer or shorter period at a graduate school. The Air Force Academy has standing arrangements with the graduate schools of several American universities by which its graduates are admitted for more advanced study. And a considerable proportion of these graduates may specialise in their postgraduate studies in a humanities discipline or in one of the social sciences. I was told that of the West Point graduates at that time in graduate schools a little more than 50 per cent were working in mathematics, science, or engineering and more than 40 per cent in humanities and social sciences.

This, incidentally, is one main reason for the spread of courses provided in the academies and also for the provision of study in depth in a particular area. It is frequently claimed that in American universities the demands of the graduate schools are determining the structure and teaching of undergraduates, and this influence appears to be felt even in the military academies, which in the framing of their own requirements pay some attention to the admission requirements of graduate schools.
One will naturally ask, how are these impressive and ambitious courses taught and how well are they taught? The second question could be answered fairly only by someone who had had the opportunity to study closely teaching in progress. At West Point and Colorado Springs, the faculty consists wholly of serving officers, almost always officers who have graduated from one of the academies and who have gained postgraduate qualifications from a university. At Annapolis the teaching staff is half service, half civilian; the use of civilian teachers is not approved by the other two institutions. The two older academies take pride in the comparatively large number of Rhodes Scholars they have produced and some of these are now members of the faculty. The majority of officers teaching at the academies have returned for a short term (usually three years) of teaching from their other occupation in the forces, but a minority, usually heads of academic departments, have 'tenure' and will serve out the rest of their careers as teachers.

This is a sketchy outline of the academic practice of the American academies and of the kind of education they consider proper for the profession of arms. I shall turn now to a short discussion of some of the questions it suggests.

And the first question is whether this elaborate formal and academic education is desirable or necessary. What is the point of requiring men who will spend a large part of their lives in the military profession to give so much of their time over a period of four years to the study of basic sciences, humanities, and social sciences? Does this kind of education add very much to ultimate professional competence, or is there a functionless educational extravagance at work here?

I am, of course, not competent to answer this question because an answer would require a prolonged study of the American military profession. I can make only a few tangential comments. There is no doubt that American practice has been influenced by the strong American cult of higher education, the optimistic faith in the power of education. Again, the military academies have been influenced by the model of the great American universities; this is the sort of intellectual world the universities have created and this will be also the world of the academies. One also feels that the range of teaching in the academies (as in the leading universities) reflects America's status as a great metropolitan power with strong and ever-expanding interests in every part of the world. This point is suggested by the place that is accorded within the academies to what may be called 'area studies' — courses on the languages, politics, social problems of Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and South-
East Asia. Intellectually the Americans are increasingly viewing the whole world as their oyster, and this is reflected in the great universities and also in the military academies.

The comparison of the academies with the universities leads to another very relevant point. One argument that is frequently employed both in Britain and the United States concerns the conditions of recruitment to the armed profession. The argument is that in all the highly developed and very prosperous countries a steadily growing proportion of the young are demanding opportunities for higher education, and seeking professions that require and provide education and technological training of a very advanced kind. In America-type countries the prestige of occupations tends to be closely related to the level of education necessary to gain access to them. And there are many both in Britain and the United States who believe that the military profession will become less capable of attracting the necessary number of intellectually able and ambitious young men unless that profession also, like law, medicine, engineering, management, and the rest presents itself as one of the 'learned' or at least highly educated professions. One suspects that one reason why in the American academies there has been so much expansion in the teaching of the social sciences, and why those academies are so liberal in allowing graduates to proceed to graduate schools to continue their study of social sciences, is that the military profession is eager to get hold of young men whose intellectual bent may lie in that direction, but who also have an inclination towards a military career. This is an important and interesting point concerning the sociology of the profession of arms. It is not only that, since defence and warfare have become more complex in the ways mentioned at the beginning of this paper, officers may require a more advanced and broader education; it is also that, increasingly in contemporary societies, social prestige is connected with educational level. Those who are concerned with the political and social standing and weight of the military profession must also be concerned with the weight it carries, the 'image' it projects, within the society. In Britain and other 'older' European countries prestige and influence stemming from older social conventions and class structures are a rapidly wasting asset; in contemporary societies which have become highly professionalised, and in which knowledge is to such an extent taken as the key to competence and authority, the military profession also must conform to newly established criteria of what confers authority and demands respect if it is to retain an influential role in political and social affairs.

The greater attention to humanities and social sciences in the education of a proportion of officers, evident in Canadian and American practice
and in the thinking embodied in the Howard-English report, has already been touched on. It is connected with the fact that issues concerning foreign policy, the nature and size of the defence establishment, the nature and extent of national commitment beyond the national borders, are in large part argued out in the language of politics and economics. Civilians in politics and administration who are professionally involved in the making of defence policy tend to be men who speak the language of the social scientists. And one argument that is sometimes heard in Britain and also in the United States is that if the military is to be able to hold its own in the discussion and determination of policy concerning military security, it too should have men able to talk the language of the social scientists, capable of acquiring an educated understanding of the political, economic, and social forces and circumstances, national and international, which bear directly on military policy and activity. This, of course, is a mode of thinking more compelling in a great world power like the United States than it might be in a very small country like Australia; nevertheless, it also has its relevance to Australian circumstances.

We have not yet dealt with one important question which was mentioned at the beginning of the paper. If in many countries it is now held that officers practising the profession of arms need an education of university level, with something of the range and diversity characteristic of university education, why should not the armed services arrange that a large proportion of their officer recruits enter a university and take a degree there, with narrower forms of professional training following the completion of the university degree?

This has been an issue in Britain where for many years some officer-trainees have been permitted to take a university degree; some would still have been allowed to do so after the establishment of the degree-granting college at Shrivenham. And there are some who are sceptical about the proposal to create a separate ‘Armed Services University’ apart from existing universities. In the United States and Canada many officers gain their undergraduate education at universities through Reserve Officer Training Corps schemes and the like; in fact, the three service academies do not by any means educate the whole of the U.S. officer corps. And, as has been said, in all three countries there are some who maintain that the more advanced and ‘liberal’ education that the contemporary officer should receive could best (and most economically) be provided by a much greater use of the universities.

However, it seems to be a very small minority who take this view. The predominant view is that it is better, in fact highly desirable, for the mili-
tary profession to develop its own institutions of higher education. The Americans talk about providing an undergraduate education within a military environment, and this suggests the line of argument. On the one hand, there is a pretty strong consensus that 'military' training should not be allowed to interfere with 'academic' education in the period that is devoted to the latter. On the other hand, it is also insisted that education for the military profession must have a component that a university cannot provide; that it may even be that three or four years experience within a university might in some cases develop habits and attitudes that would be incompatible with thorough professionalisation for a military career.

One aspect of education for the profession of arms must be the inculcation of military attitudes and virtues—a sense of loyalty to and solidarity with the service, the absorption of its traditions and its 'style', the development of habits of rigorous discipline, the identification with an organisation which must become second nature, and so on. The American academies are extremely interesting because of this two-dimensional character: on the one side, much of the intellectual earnestness, busyness, hopefulness, and aspiration of a good American undergraduate college with the appurtenances thereof such as fine libraries, impressive lecture and seminar rooms and the like; on the other side, an intense cult and cultivation of the virtues and values of the American army, navy or air force, a severe discipline, a heavy emphasis on 'morale' and identification with the 'aims' and 'ideals' of the institution and of the wider organisation which it serves. Those who know something of the cult of the Alma Mater which often characterises an American college, or of the spirit of the college fraternity, can imagine the cultivation of 'morale' which informs the practice of the service academies.

Now this raises an extremely important and interesting question concerning educating for the profession of arms, remembering that professionalisation (or what sociologists call 'professional socialisation') is a legitimate interest of this education, just as it is of the education of medical men and lawyers. Do the two different dimensions of education in the service academies really lie comfortably side by side? Does not the one objective prejudice or make impossible the realisation of the other? And how fertile or fruitful is the teaching of humanities and social sciences in such institutions (one imagines that there would be less likelihood of friction between technological training and the requirements of military professionalisation)? Is it really possible for military academies to provide an undergraduate education in the humanities and social science which they now profess to be necessary for officers of the armed services.
These would be extremely difficult questions to answer; one does not imagine that the quality of education on the humanities and social science side, its interactions with the moral and other constituents of professional moulding, has ever been closely investigated by a detached inquirer. Of course, one does not suppose that the service academies produce the inquiring, speculative, independent, and critically-minded students that universities claim (not always very plausibly) to be the genuine product of their own system of education. The conditions in which the academies work—the large number of diverse courses, the teaching faculty mainly made up of serving officers on short-term teaching appointments and so on—no doubt ensure that the atmosphere and the practice are quite different from those the universities say they strive to create. What one would expect from the academies is more in the nature of instruction in one or more of the social sciences aimed at producing a competent understanding of the elements of subjects together perhaps with the stimulation of curiosity and habits of inquiry. If this is so, it would be a reasonable standard of judgement to apply; the academies are entitled to say that their purpose is professional training, not that of producing humanists or social scientists as the universities must attempt to do at least in part.

And, applying that standard, the teachers in the service academies are apt to claim that their teaching compares well in efficiency and achievement with that of the undergraduate colleges. They may argue that, more than would be the case if their cadets had their social education in a university, the relevance of social sciences for the demands made upon practitioners of the profession of arms is made manifest. Again, they will often insist that the 'moral' components of education in the academy—discipline, corporate spirit and responsibility, devotion to the traditions and ideals of a great organisation—supply an incentive or psychological drive that enables more to be achieved more efficiently than can usually be achieved in the instruction of undergraduates in a university. At West Point and Colorado Springs considerations of this kind are employed to defend the system of an all-service teaching faculty. No doubt, there are serious disadvantages in a tour of teaching duty as short as three years, but these, it is claimed, are balanced by the gains that ensue from the fact that cadets are being introduced to academic disciplines by members of their own organisation who have served, sometimes with considerable distinction, in the activities, including often the combat duties, of their service. And who have, moreover, demonstrated their interest and competence in an academic discipline by having pursued it successfully in a graduate school.
Again, the argument is a 'moral' one: the notion that the officers who teach in the academies provide a model, as civilian teachers could not, of that combination of intellectual interest and capacity with professional dedication which is the educational goal the cadets themselves are expected to pursue. However it may work out in practice, it is an interesting theory of professional education that appears to be more or less explicit in the practice of the U.S. military academies. According to the theory, on the one hand an academic education ought to be pursued for its own sake, not subordinated to narrowly conceived ideas of vocational relevance. But, on the other hand, the idea of a separation of more general education of an undergraduate type from professional training is very firmly rejected. Almost everything is done that can be done to integrate broader intellectual training into the professional moulding necessary for the future officer. This is the basic argument for the maintenance by the military establishment of its own separate and distinctive colleges which are in some ways very like the late-twentieth century American university, but in other ways a little reminiscent of seminaries.

Institutions and processes concerned with educating for the profession of arms have so far not much interested educational theorists or sociologists of education; they have not been studied to anything like the same extent as medical education or the education of engineers or technologists. This comparative neglect is perhaps partly due to the feeling that war is a pathological or disgraceful aspect of human existence, and anything connected with it not so valuable or important socially as medicine, law, or technology. And also there may exist the attitude which has been deeply implanted by the different circumstances of the past that there is little in common between warfare and education; that the knowledge and skills that soldiers possess is an arcane knowledge with little connection with the knowledge and skill which play a fundamental role in civilian social life. Historically, the military has been a caste or profession isolated from the ordinary concerns of civilian society and politically (at least in peacetime) suspect—to be kept well under civilian control. If there was ever any truth in the popular idea that military knowledge and expertise are arcane, sharply separated from the main stream of socially relevant knowledge, that is certainly no longer true. It has been an underlying theme of this paper that to a rapidly increasing extent military and civilian thinking interpenetrate and overlap; civilians in growing numbers invade the field of strategical thinking while not only science and technology but the social sciences also impinge on the thinking of the soldiers. These remarks suggest some of the reasons why the professional education of the military is a subject of considerable interest to educational theorists and to sociologists of education and of the professions.
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