Opportunity and attainment in Australia

Leonard Broom
F. Lancaster Jones



Australia is often referred to as a classless society, with few of the class distinctions of the old world, but this description has never been tested systematically. More radical writers now assert that there is a rigid class structure and much special privilege. They maintain that there is little opportunity for persons to advance materially by their own efforts.

This book attempts to provide an answer to these conflicting claims. It examines how far equality of opportunity exists, in the educational system and elsewhere. It describes the long-term trend in the distribution of wealth and income and estimates how far Australian society is stratified compared with other countries. These and related questions are examined systematically by means of the results of a national sample survey conducted by the authors in 1965 and by comparison with other evidence relating to education, employment and income.

The authors' main conclusion is that, while Australian society is clearly stratified in each generation, high rates of mobility limit significantly the extent to which inequality is transmitted within the family from one generation to the next.

Though primarily intended for use in senior undergraduate and graduate courses in the social sciences there is much to interest readers concerned with contemporary Australian society in particular and advanced industrial countries generally.

Opportunity and attainment in Australia

Leonard Broom
F. Lancaster Jones
with the collaboration of
Jerzy Zubrzycki

Opportunity and attainment in Australia

Australian National University Press
Canberra 1976

First published in Australia 1976

Printed in Hong Kong for the Australian National University Press, Canberra

National Library of Australia
Cataloguing-in-Publication entry

Broom, Leonard.
Opportunity and attainment in Australia.

Bibliography.
Index.
ISBN 0 7081 1041 x.

1. Social mobility — Australia. 2. Australia — Social conditions. I. Jones, Frank Lancaster, joint author. II. Zubrzycki, Jerzy, joint author. III. Title.

301.440440994

Preface

The survey (ANU 1965) which is the primary source for this monograph was financed by the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. We acknowledge the co-operation of Mr Roy Morgan, Director of the Roy Morgan Research Centre, whose field staff conducted most of the interviews. Professor John Nalson kindly supervised the acquisition of a rural supplementary sample in Western Australia under difficult circumstances and we appreciate his generous assistance.

We thank the Australian Statistician for preparing tabulations from the 1969 survey of incomes and for making available unpublished tabulations from the 1966 census.

Planning for the study was helped by a fellowship to the first author at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. The collegial hospitality of the Center and of Dr Ralph W. Tyler are gratefully acknowledged.

Institutional support for analysis was extended in the form of visiting appointments by the ANU to Broom and by the University of Texas to Jones. We express thanks to Professor P.H. Partridge and Professor W.D. Borrie of the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University and to Dean Gordon Whaley of the University of Texas.

Professor J. Zubrzycki took an active part in the study design, project administration and early analysis. Other claims on his time made it impossible for him to participate in the final analysis and writing but his significant role is indicated on the title page.

We are grateful to Professor D.A. Aitkin and the Department of Political Science in the Research School of Social Sciences for access to the findings of their 1967 survey.

Mrs Betty Gamble prepared the manuscript and Mrs Gretchan Broom marked it for the press. When their contributions were not redactive they were auctorial.

Mrs Judy Dillon capably read proof and prepared the index.

We thank them for their contributions.

This monograph draws upon earlier publications, listed in the references, in which we reported specialised findings from the survey and related research. We express our appreciation to the editors of those publications.

L.B. and F.L.J.

Canberra 1975

Contents

Tables

1 Introduction

This book sets out to portray the patterns of social inequality as they existed in Australia in the mid-1960s. Primarily, we rely upon a national survey carried out in 1965 (identified as ANU 1965), a second survey undertaken by the Department of Political Science (ANU 1967), and upon social statistics gathered by other researchers or by governmental inquiries. We concentrate on work roles, the central and, in material terms, the most unequally rewarded roles in an industrial society in order to find out how different factors influence the jobs that people enter and how the rewards that flow from jobs are distributed. Our analysis starts with an assessment of the chances of securing a given level of education in Australia. Those chances are then related to changes in the occupational structure, to income inequalities in the marketplace, and to what people think about social class. With this evidence in hand we draw the strands together in a simple causal model that examines the relative importance of social background, education, and career beginnings in the process of occupational status attainment and on the amount of money income that people receive. Finally, we sketch in broad terms the main social strata in Australia in the mid-1960s.

Our presentation is in the genre of national occupational mobility studies of which Blau's and Duncan's (1967) is the best known contemporary example. While our sample was much smaller than theirs (we could not, as they did, draw upon the resources of a government agency), our questioning touched on more diverse topics, and we have attempted to integrate a wider range of sources. More importantly, the relative state of ignorance about Australian social stratification placed upon us the obligation to establish benchmarks where none existed and to provide points of reference for future research. As we shall complain in several chapters, official Australian statistics are deficient in many respects. We felt we should try to fill some of the more serious gaps, for example on the relationship between family background, education, income and other social characteristics. We are aware of the limited ability of small surveys to do what governments usually do with routine census or large population samples, but tentative and testable answers to important questions are better than unsupported or insupportable generalisations. We expect our characterisations to create as many questions as they settle, but that is a kind of progress in an area where almost all the logically possible variants of social interpretation have been advanced, frequently as if they were based on something stronger than impressions. At very least we hope that the questions we leave unanswered can now be more clearly stated and thus be made more amenable to efficient investigation.

The present study does not attempt to provide a detailed account of the evolution and development of Australian society. In the penal settlement out of which Australia grew, an early social division was between 'emancipists' (or ex-convicts) and 'exclusives' (free-born landowners, officials and officers of the garrison), breeding what has been described as 'the

stultifying hostility' between the two groups (Crawford, 1955:307). But the gold rushes of the 1850s, which attracted large numbers of immigrants with varied occupational and social origins, quickly muted this division, introduced new social distinctions, and led to the consolidation of a distinctive working-class movement. The growth of trade unionism and its extension into radical politics is the theme of an influential school of Australian historians, among whom the best-known are Fitzpatrick (1941), Gollan (1960), and Ward (1958). Their lineage goes back, like so much Australian historiography, to Hancock's *Australia* (1930).

The idea that nineteenth century Australian society represented an egalitarian paradise characterised by a wide working-class base set against a small aristocracy of landholders was doubtless an oversimplified model. There is abundant evidence in the writings of contemporary observers (Brady, 1890; Twopeny, 1883; Adams, 1893; Coghlan, 1896; Métin, 1901) that any analysis of Australian society in the second half of the nineteenth century had to take into account a variety of social groupings, not all of them based exclusively on economic factors. Although temperance-movement, philanthropic, and mutual-improvement associations were usually less homogeneous, less easily identified, and tended not to display the militant solidarity of the working-class movement, their middle-class composition has been commonly noted (e.g. Bollen, 1960-1; Barcan, 1954-5). Moreover, such groups constantly recruited new members, and the social networks thus created may have served as channels for social mobility.

The radical interpretation of Australian history was developed largely in the period after World War II (for a review of themes in Australian historiography up to the early 1960s, see Ward, 1963). During the same period social scientists other than historians began to apply different techniques of investigation to Australian society and to complement, and in some instances challenge, historical interpretations. In the early 1940s and throughout the postwar period, a group of social anthropologists at the University of Sydney began a series of rural community studies, following in the footsteps of W. Lloyd Warner and his colleagues in the United States. Reviews of these and other community studies are given in Martin (1957) and Oxley (1974).

Another line of research using sample surveys was begun in 1949 by the Department of Psychology in the University of Melbourne as part of an international UNESCO project on communities and social tension (Oeser and Hammond, 1954; Oeser and Emery, 1954). Interviews with small samples of adults and school children in Melbourne and a Victorian country town produced findings on social characteristics such as place of residence, political preference, and occupational aspirations, which were systematically related to subjective class identification, family roles, and other aspects of social structure.

The wide recognition of stratification as a fact of social life has also been a theme in popular writings, professional journals, and national surveys of occupational prestige and voting behaviour. A bibliography of published writing on Australian social stratification between 1946 and 1967 listed almost 1000 titles (Ancich *et al.*, 1969a, 1969b). Although some of the items cited are ephemeral, others have a solid empirical base, for example research on immigrants (e.g. Borrie, 1954; Zubrzycki, 1964; and for further bibliography, Price, 1970), on voting behaviour (Alford, 1963), on the social standing of occupations

(Taft, 1953; Congalton, 1969), on correlates of class identification (Broom and Hill, 1965), on class images (Oeser and Hammond, 1954; Davies, 1967) and on factors affecting educational achievement (Radford, 1962; Husén, 1967).

Of numerous postwar accounts of the Australian way of life, the most balanced remains Taft's and Walker's (1958). They recognised the difficulty of characterising Australian society in the absence of information on its recent past and the lack of systematic data permitting contemporary comparison with other countries. For example to say that Australians are egalitarian inevitably raises the question: egalitarian in what respects and compared to whom? Similarly, to say that Australians are moving away from the group value of mateship to the individual value of success raises the question of how valued mateship ever was in urban Australia.

Despite a tendency for commentators to dwell on rural images, Australia in the 1960s was a highly urbanised society in the mass consumption phase of industrial growth. After 1950 it experienced the 'most . . . prosperous and progressive era of its history. Even in narrowly economic terms before allowance is made for climate, leisure, and relative freedom from overcrowding and pollution the Australian standard of living is among the highest in the world' (Waterman, 1972: v). By way of international comparison, in 1966 only the United States, Sweden, Switzerland, and Canada had higher *per capita* incomes, and as we shall show later, income distribution in Australia is somewhat more equal then in most other nonsocialist nations.

The period of economic growth between 1950 and the late 1960s was associated with a diversification of the economy and a shift in international trade from the United Kingdom (which in 1950 was Australia's major trading partner) to Japan, the United States, and mainland China. An increased demand for labour occurred at a time when there were relatively few new recruits to the workforce because of low birth rates during the depression and World War II. The deficit was met largely by immigrants. Throughout the period under consideration net migration contributed only a little less to population growth than natural increase, and migrants included a disproportionate number of persons of working age (Appleyard, 1970: 8-9). About half the postwar migration was from non-British countries, so that by the mid-1960s the Australian population was ethnically far more heterogeneous than it was at the end of World War II. Official policy shifted from an assimilationist viewpoint in which the immigrant was expected, preferably at once, to merge indistinguishably with the majority, to an integrationist policy in which cultural diversity was tolerated, if not actively encouraged. Australia in 1965 was less 'a transplanted version of British culture ten thousand miles from its source' (Taft and Walker, 1958: 131) than it had been a decade before, and ethnic origin was firmly established as an element in Australia's stratification regime (Jones, 1969b). Our 1965 survey provided only muted evidence of this aspect of social differentiation because it underrepresented non-English speaking immigrants. Another important change was that Aboriginal Australians emerged as an important element on the political scene, and although we do not explicitly treat that topic here, we have done so elsewhere (Broom and Jones, 1973).

Of the other research and expository strategies open to us, the community study is an obvious one, and it has more exemplars both in Australia and inter-

nationally than the macroscopic approach. Oxley provides a useful summary of the findings of Australian community studies conducted in the postwar period. On rural townships in Victoria he commented that 'the obtrusiveness of stratification varied greatly from community to community' (Oxley, 1974:15), an observation that illustrates the difficulty of using a single community study, or several, to make valid inferences about the society as a whole. Generalisations about country towns are not a sound basis for characterising a whole society because over two-thirds of the population live in one or another of seven urbanising regions centered around the state and federal capital cities (Clarke, 1970:59). Suggestive as small-scale studies may be, they require a broader framework against which their specific findings can be assessed and their generality evaluated. A difficulty with providing that framework, however, is that a nationwide study cannot by its nature employ the same techniques used to investigate small-scale communities. The interviews for ANU 1965 and ANU 1967 were carried out in a large number of localities across the nation, but only in much larger surveys is it possible to amass sufficient interviews in a single community to yield a meaningful characterisation of its stratification system, or indeed to discover whether and in what respects it might differ from other places.

One way to reduce this lack of correspondence in technique and coverage would be to develop a series of intensive studies of specific localities in relation to a national overview and thereby build a bridge between the two approaches. Results from large-scale surveys could serve to provide a set of informed parameters and to establish criteria for selecting specific localities from the myriad of possible sites for intensive investigation. In due course the strategy might by reversed and the findings of locality research fitted back into the national survey framework to flesh out the statistical skeleton. Australia is an appropriate country in which to carry out such an articulated research program because it is ethnically relatively homogeneous, and its population is of modest size and highly concentrated in a few urban complexes. The widely scattered rural population, which is numerically small but not for that reason inconsequential, would inevitably complicate the study design.

Notice that we speak of closely scrutinising localities rather than communities. The standard practice in community research is to identify relatively self-contained settlements. Some of these would be appropriate units for a combined national survey-community study approach. But other localities would certainly be neighbourhoods in large cities or simply pieces of the metropolitan complex isolated for intensive examination. To require them to be communities in the strict sense would bias the sample, while to presume them to be communities would prejudice the findings.

Our proposal implies a high degree of articulation between methods that usually have not merely different, but different kinds of, research practitioners. The intellectual co-operation that is called for would not be easy to achieve, and we know of no examples of such an integrated approach. Nonetheless our work may open doors for progress in that direction except with researchers who believe that there is one and only one legitimate technique of social research.

Our decision to conduct a national sample survey on a restricted range of important and interrelated topics was dictated by several considerations, as

already indicated. There was little confident knowledge about Australian society as a whole, there were serious gaps in the topics enumerated by the census, and there was a need to set baselines for continuing scrutiny of the country, a task that had been too long deferred. We also recognised an obligation to introduce Australia as a national entity into the framework of comparative scholarship on stratification so that Australian studies might benefit from external as well as internal scrutiny, and we wished to provide a systematic context into which community studies and studies of specific aspects of stratification might be placed.

Once the decision was made to commit resources and effort to sketch out the 'big picture' and set the baselines for trend studies, other decisions were automatically taken. There are things that surveys such as ours cannot do and it is well to be explicit about them although they are familiar to the specialist. A national sample survey cannot easily study networks of social interaction, patterns of influence, or the reputations and ratings of persons that rest on knowledge and interpersonal relations. Such studies are best carried out in localities correctly scaled to the particular problems being scrutinised. When the localities are large or not self-contained the community study in turn is inappropriate and alternative lines of inquiry, e.g. the study of national élites and the location of power, become the focus of attention. Similarly occupational mobility cannot usefully be studied at a locality level unless the locality circumscribes the labour market, a situation that does not occur in urban industrial economies.

A sample survey like ours does not normally probe into the cognitive subtleties or conative impulses behind responses. Nor does it pretend to examine the properties of rare cases at the extremes of the status distribution. To do so would require costly oversampling of a few areas or occupations. Such information is best elicited by a different kind of research: intensive inquiries, for instance of élites, the downwardly mobile, or the poor. A study such as ours serves to outline the social setting within which the characteristics of special groups can be interpreted. Without such broad knowledge any close look at a particular segment of the society leaves much to surmise and fails to answer questions about how specific findings fit into an understanding of the whole society, or whether they fit at all.

Before our survey, there had been no national survey of occupational change in Australia, and few national surveys of anything else except electoral opinion. The task of establishing where Australia stands on numerous social indicators had barely begun. Therefore we cannot turn to the Australian past for guidance, but because the business of sociology is largely comparative assessment we can look to other nations for relevant standards of evaluation, or to analytical models, such as the model of equal opportunity that we use in our mobility analysis.

Every study of social inequality in Australia shows that there is evidence of stratification in life chances: the chances of staying alive, remaining in school, going to university, owning property, getting into the professions, and so on. Mate choice, family size, life span, and participation in most of the crucial areas of life are measurably influenced by social position. But there is no agreement as to how stratified Australian society really is nor about how far life chances depend on inherited or achieved social position. In the last chapter we offer an answer — that

while there is a distinct structure of stratification in each generation, there is only limited continuity between generations. So far as we can tell, Australia in the 1960s was about as stratified as the Czechoslovak socialist republic, which is the only other industrial country for which we could find near-comparable evidence in the form we required (Machonin, 1970).

This is an appropriate point to emphasise that this monograph is not an exercise in contemporary commentary. We have focused on the mid-1960s, a period of relative political and social calm before the polarisation of parties and people over the Vietnam war, the heightened activities of trade unions, the right-wing catchcry of law and order, student unrest on university campuses, the return to power of a Labor government after almost a quarter of a century in opposition, the economic disruption and inflation precipitated by OPEC, and the realignment of world currencies. How far these changes have altered or will alter the basic structure of inequality and opportunity in Australia is not yet clear, and in the face of rapid changes in government policy and political fortunes forecasts would be rash.

Evidence from other societies where adequate long-term data are available suggests that there has been a remarkable stability in the basic pattern of status transmission between the generations, and that once allowance has been made for overall changes in occupational structure, there has been no appreciable change in equality of opportunity during the present century, at least so far as father-to-son mobility is concerned (Hauser *et al.*, 1974; Hope, 1974). There are, however, other aspects of inequality that should be considered. The dominant focus of past mobility studies has been on the openness or permeability of the stratification order: how much mobility goes on, and whether it is decreasing or increasing. This focus needs to be supplemented by analysis of other, equally important aspects of structures of inequality, for example how much inequality exists, how it is changing, and how far the various forms of inequality, material and symbolic, feed on one another. If attempts to increase equality of opportunity turn out to have only limited success in a mixed society characterised by a nuclear family system and more or less segregated patterns of residence, both social scientists and policy makers will need to take these facts into account to achieve a better understanding of the outcomes of unequal opportunity. We hope that this book may contribute both to the body of knowledge about inequality in opportunity and attainment and to an informed and ameliorative public policy.

2 Education, social origins, and achievement

In an industrial democracy, an educated population is necessary simply to sustain a society dependent politically, economically and socially on written communication. Furthermore, as industrialisation transforms the nature of occupational tasks and as jobs grow more specialised and complex, the occupational and educational systems become more tightly linked: occupational achievement depends increasingly upon a person's educational attainment, and access to education beyond that prescribed by the state raises horizons or sets limits to lifelong careers. In such societies equal educational opportunity is a core value. Usually a major plank in the political platforms of Australian state and federal governments, equality in Australian education has tended to emphasise quantity, especially compulsory attendance at primary and secondary schools (Roper, 1970:11-12). For example in 1965 school attendance was compulsory between the ages of 6 and 14, and the minimum leaving age ranged from 14 in Western Australia to 16 in Tasmania.

The collective decisions a society makes about the education of its citizens express its commitment to ascription or achievement, to hierarchy or equality. To some extent educational inequalities are perpetuated by the lower expectations that the poorly educated have for the education of their children, either as an end in itself or as a way to improve their economic position. Even more important, lower expectations are consequences of economic deprivation, inability in many families to pay for their children's education beyond the middle years of secondary school, and the need of poorer families to turn dependants into earners. While educationists strive to advance the principle that each child should be educated to the full extent of his or her native ability, cultural and economic differences limit the education of a substantial minority of Australians. Thus, educational achievement is not only a function of innate ability but also of social origins: every child's educational aspirations and motivations, and the capacity to meet the costs of education, are conditioned by family and economic backgrounds. The effects of social origin persist throughout the educational process and are expressed as differences in achievement, in age at leaving school, and selective access to tertiary education (Radford, 1962).

Historical background

The historical foundations of education in Australia have been well documented (Austin, 1961; Butts, 1955; Forgarty, 1955; Partridge, 1968). We content ourselves with a few broad statements designed to give background to our own analyses and findings. As is well known, Australia's educational system was imported from Great Britain, and the education available to the earliest settlers — convicts, government officials, and free settlers — bore all the marks of British assumptions and practices. At first education was left to the churches, which meant initially the establishment Anglican Church but later included nonconformist churches and, especially, the

Catholic Church. Education beyond the elementary standard offered by church schools was left to private initiative, such as tutors or parental guidance. It was not long, however, before a group of officials, merchants and other leaders in Sydney formed a corporation to found an independent, fee-paying school in 1819.[1] By this means they sought to give their sons the type of education they had themselves received (or aspired to) in England, without incurring the inconvenience and expense of sending them to England.

Throughout the nineteenth century the system of primary schools was built up, mostly by the churches with the financial support of government. However, the various churches began to disagree over the control of education, and strong external pressures towards secularisation arose. These issues came to a head in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, leading to the separation of church and state in the field of education and the establishment of state systems of education, each with an education department under the supervision of a minister for education. The large areas of the states, combined with the pattern of metropolitan dominance which had already emerged, encouraged highly centralised systems, a continuing aspect of Australian education that still draws comment, usually unfavourable (Butts, 1955:17; Partridge; 1968: 213-15). Recent criticism of centralisation has led to a partial reversal of this policy and greater freedom for individual schools. The withdrawal of state support from church schools at the end of the nineteenth century brought particular pressure on the Catholic population, which by then had created an extensive network of parish schools. When government grants were withdrawn, parish schools were unable to continue paying salaries to lay teachers, and as a consequence religious orders took over most of the work. The more affluent fee-paying, non-Catholic, 'independent' schools were less affected, since they traditionally catered for a relatively small and well-to-do population. In this way the pattern of state, church, and independent schools was formed.

In the late nineteenth century a concern of Australian governments was to provide free, compulsory, and secular primary education. Once this had been largely achieved, by 1895, the states turned their attention to secondary education, which previously had been left to the independent schools. In the 1920s independent school enrolments were outnumbered, and in the 1940s far exceeded, by the system of state high schools, technical high schools, and central and intermediate high schools. However, the massive extension of secondary education did not come until after World War II. Student numbers declined during the Great Depression of the early 1930s and recovered only slightly during the war years. But in the twenty years from 1946 to 1966, enrolments in government and nongovernment schools increased from just over one million students to two and a half millions. Over the same period the population aged 5-19 increased more slowly at a rate of 93 per cent, while the total population grew by only 65 per cent. Thus the postwar increase in the school population was due to a higher birthrate (as compared with the 1930s), and to the tendency for teenagers to stay at school longer (Fitzgerald, 1970: 7-29; Pratt, 1966).

The expansion of the school population was felt most acutely by the state and Catholic school systems, which bore the

1 The first headmaster was an ex-convict transported for forging his clerical orders. His Doctor of Divinity was also forged (Grose, 1970:303).

brunt of the rapidly growing demand for primary and especially secondary education. Throughout the postwar period Catholic schools catered for about one-fifth of the nation's school population. This figure remained remarkably constant despite the increasing proportion of Catholics in the population resulting from immigration and higher fertility. Government schools enrolled about three-quarters of the total. The remainder attended the more prestigeful, fee-paying, independent schools, which are strongest at the secondary level and at the more advanced years (Fitzgerald, 1970:41-3).

As Radford has shown, children in government schools leave at younger ages whereas those at non-Catholic, independent schools leave at higher ages, a difference which has a marked effect on the types of occupation entered by students from each category of schools. 'Catholic Schools occupy a middle position, as one would expect, since they include schools which, in socio-economic terms, cover much the same total range as the combined Other [Independent] and Government schools' (Radford, 1962:12). Notwithstanding the consequential difference in school-leaving ages, which is linked both to the socio-economic status of parents and to the subsequent careers of their children, in overall terms the share enrolled in independent schools declined from about 6 per cent in 1946 to 4 per cent in 1968 (Fitzgerald, 1970:10-12). Thus, the rapid expansion of educational demand in the postwar period has reduced the reach of privileged education. A more critical question is whether the general, rapid expansion in enrolments has widened the quality gap between the different types of school, since state schools are not able to safeguard educational quality by restricting enrolments.

State aid to independent secondary schools and tax concessions for educational expenditures on children place nongovernment schools in an even more favourable position. Because, as is noted in Chapter 4, the Australian income tax was (and is) steeply progressive, a high-bracket taxpayer gains a larger rebate for expenditures on a child's education. In effect the government voluntarily subsidises the expense of educating a child in a nonstate school. To taxpayers in lower brackets, the same expenditure is to a greater extent a direct unshared charge. An American observer remarked, rather prophetically

> Australians are proud of their tradition of egalitarianism and lack of social snobbishness and class stratification. When I see how strong a place the private schools hold in the educational scene, I wonder how strong the tradition really is, and how long the tradition can be maintained. (Butts, 1955: 22).

Those words were written long before direct state aid to nongovernment schools had been reintroduced by an Australian government, a disproportionate number of whose members were educated at such schools. In 1968 fewer than one in ten persons in the Australian secondary school population was enrolled at a private, non-Catholic school, but almost two-thirds of the members of the then-governing Liberal Party were educated at such institutions (N.U.A.U.S., 1969:1). Among federal Labor politicians, there was a slightly larger proportion from Catholic schools than in the population generally, a fact which helps to explain Australian Labor Party (A.L.P.) ambivalence about state aid. But the differential between politicians and the public was most striking among the federal members of the Liberal Party, three in four of whose children were, or are being, educated in the nonstate sector.

> The Ministers and Liberal party backbenchers and to a lesser extent, Country party backbenchers do not send their children to State secondary schools. They are just not prepared to risk their children's futures in the inadequate state system . . . it becomes far more understandable that for the past decade they have denied the existence of a crisis in State education. Hardly any have experience of the State systems either through their own education or that of their children (N.U.A.U.S., 1969: 4).

The amount and terms of state aid to independent schools are the subject of continuous controversy in the media and in parliament.[2]

The Distribution of Educational Opportunity

The historical problems facing Australian education — privilege, religious claims, and the tension between demands for excellence and the desire for equality — have been less acute in the field of tertiary education, which is dominated by the federal and state governments. Australia never developed élite or religious systems of tertiary education except for colleges exclusively for the training of members of the clergy and religious orders. Religious groups have been more concerned with primary and secondary education, while the élite tended in the past to send their offspring to England, preferably to Oxford or Cambridge. Indeed, before World War II tertiary education was little developed in Australia. In 1947 less than 70,000 persons were enrolled in courses with some tertiary content, or 56 per 1000 persons aged 15 to 24. By the early 1960s the figure had more than doubled to 153,000 and the ratio had increased to 96 per 1000 persons aged 15 to 24. In the later period about half the enrolments were in universities, with most of the remainder in technical colleges or teacher-training colleges (Pratt, 1966: Table 9). In other words, until the recent past tertiary education has had a small and highly selective impact on the Australian population. The amount of education gained is of increasing importance in determining the life chances of Australians but type of education (state, 'private', or Catholic) is of continuing importance.

In recent years most Australians have been assured of an education at least to mid-secondary level. In 1966 nearly half the nation's 16-year-olds were still at school, a figure double the retention rate of ten years before. However, a precise mapping of changes in educational attainment in Australia is impossible, because a question on educational attainment was not included in an Australian census until 1966. Even the 1966 census gives an incomplete account of tertiary education. Among persons no longer in full-time education, only those with a tertiary *qualification* were called on to identify themselves. Nevertheless the data are adequate for a broad conspectus of trends. The figures shown in Table 2.1 report the educational attainment of 5-year age cohorts of the adult population at the time of the 1966 census. They thus afford a backward prespective on the distribution of educational opportunities in earlier years.

The first two rows of the table show

2 Reforms by the Labor government in the administration of grants to independent schools in 1973 ensure that schools with the greatest need receive relatively more governmental support, but it is clear that independent schools will continue to occupy a privileged position (Karmel, 1973). The ambivalence of the Australian Labor Party is well-instanced by its vacillation over reduced taxation exemption for the educational expenses of dependent children, which set a level that would protect most Catholic schools but not most independent non-Catholic schools (*Adelaide Advertiser*, 25 October 1974). A change of government would probably see a partial unwinding of these policies. Labor's vacillation was compounded by the 'reclassification', under pressure, of many 'Category A' (wealthy) independent schools which originally were entitled to only minimal federal assistance (Australian Minister for Education, Media Release, 25 October 1973).

Table 2.1: Educational attainment of adult males and females, 1966 (column percentages)

Level of education and sex		Age group in 1966 and year of birth										
		20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69	70 & over
		1942-46	1937-41	1932-36	1927-31	1922-26	1917-21	1912-16	1907-11	1902-06	1897-1901	before 1897
Never attended	M	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.5	2.1
	F	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.6
Attended primary	M	13.5	18.0	22.0	26.3	31.9	36.0	38.8	43.3	45.4	47.2	52.0
	F	14.0	18.9	23.9	29.1	35.4	39.4	42.4	46.2	48.5	51.0	56.2
Attended high school	M	29.4	33.2	33.3	30.5	27.2	25.7	24.2	23.0	22.4	21.9	19.3
	F	30.2	33.8	33.7	30.9	27.4	26.1	24.1	22.9	22.4	22.1	19.2
Intermediate certificate*	M	30.8	26.8	24.4	23.0	21.6	20.5	19.4	16.9	14.9	12.9	9.4
	F	35.2	30.2	27.2	25.8	24.0	22.1	20.5	17.7	15.2	12.4	8.4
Leaving certificate*	M	18.8	11.5	10.2	9.8	9.1	8.5	8.2	7.4	7.3	6.9	6.3
	F	12.7	9.3	8.7	8.2	7.7	7.2	7.2	6.4	6.3	5.6	4.6
Other tertiary qualification	M	2.8	4.2	4.1	4.3	4.0	3.7	3.6	3.3	3.1	2.6	1.9
	F	4.8	4.4	3.0	2.3	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.4	1.0
University qualification	M	2.4	3.8	3.2	3.1	3.1	2.4	2.1	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.1
	F	1.3	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.3
Not stated	M	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.7	3.2	3.9	5.4	7.8
	F	1.4	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.8	3.3	4.1	5.6	8.7
N in thousands (100%)	M	437	384	356	397	397	343	323	276	216	161	251
	F	417	362	332	367	377	335	318	367	220	195	379

*Intermediate includes junior certificate; leaving includes matriculation certificate.
Source: Census of Australia, 1966.

that throughout the present century only a small fraction of men and women never attended school. Doubtless some had immigrated as adults or teenagers from European nations where educational opportunities were even more limited than in Australia.[3] A substantial minority of Australians did not go beyond elementary school, although the proportion of the population with only primary education fell from about half at the turn of the century to under a third by the 1930s. But even among the youngest group shown on Table 2.1 — those aged between 20 and 24 in 1966 (born between 1942 and 1946) — one in seven dropped out after primary school. Such an attrition rate seems high in the affluent postwar period when wide educational opportunities were supposed to be opened. Probably the dropouts included disproportionate numbers of migrants: the foreign-born account for about one-third of primary-educated 20- to 24-year-olds compared with one-fifth of those with higher educational levels. Even so, about one in ten young native-born Australians achieved an educational standard that would equip them for only the lowest paid, most vulnerable jobs in a technological society. This disadvantaged group warrants more detailed attention than we can provide from limited census or survey statistics. We know that Aboriginal Australians are heavily concentrated in the lowest categories of education but because of census conventions, persons of more than half Aboriginal ancestry (the poorest educated segment) are not included in Table 2.1 (see Broom and Jones, 1973: ch. 2).

Early in the century a minority of the population went beyond primary school. By World War II most children entered the secondary system and by mid-century more than half the population had some experience of secondary education. Enrolment statistics indicate that in 1966 97 per cent of all 14-year-olds were at school; at age 15 the figure was 74 per cent, and at age 17 it was only 18 per cent (Fitzgerald, 1967: 6-9). Compared with other industrialised nations Australia had a high dropout rate of students older than the compulsory attendance age. An international comparison of achievement in mathematics showed that in the mid-1960s Australia ranked below the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Israel, and Finland in the proportion of 17-year-olds still at school (Husén, 1967: Vol. 1, 231). Of the countries included in the study, only England and Germany retained a smaller proportion than Australia. Retention rates in Australia have since risen, more among girls than boys (Borrie, 1975: 372-90).

As might be expected from this relatively high wastage during secondary school, Australia did not rank high among industrialised nations in the proportion of persons entering tertiary education. At the end of the 1950s only about one in eight Australian school leavers entered some form of higher education, a number comparable with some European countries (including Great Britain) but well behind Canada and the United States, where the figure was between one-quarter and one-third of the relevant age group (Australia, 1965: Vol. 2, 578). While the tertiary education of Australians has since increased, especially as a result of greater participation by women, higher education in Australia is still largely reserved for an élite. The concept of mass education has yet to spread from the primary and secondary to the tertiary level. However,

3 Immigration affects the interpretation of these statistics in several ways. 'Australians' here means Australian residents, not merely Australian-born. We should also note that differential mortality may affect the distribution at older ages.

the recent expansion of technical institutes and colleges of advanced education has modified the pattern and may introduce an element of stratification within the tertiary sector itself.

Education up to the early teens has been nearly universal for most of this century. Thereafter wastage begins, particularly after the legal minimum age for leaving school has been reached, when inequalities in social origins make a progressively heavier impact on educational attainment. To quote figures relevant to the period of our survey, at the beginning of secondary school 37 per cent of Australian pupils had fathers with white-collar jobs but at the end of secondary school the proportion had risen to 62 per cent, reflecting the much higher dropout rate among children from blue-collar homes (Husén, 1967: Vol. 1, 271-2). Since Husén's study did not include private schools his figures understate the extent of social selection in education at that time. The Karmel report for South Australia (1971: Ch. 14) indicates a continuing differential in retention rates.

In an earlier study Radford documented similar trends of social selectivity, but from another perspective. While not directly comparing the socio-economic background of different age groups in schools, he reported detailed information on father's occupation for pupils in various types of schools, which were themselves stratified. Radford showed that pupils stayed on longer at the higher status, private schools than at government schools, achieved higher levels of educational attainment, and entered higher status jobs when they did leave school. More than half the school leavers from government schools in Radford's sample but only one-tenth of private school leavers had fathers who were skilled, unskilled or semi-skilled manual workers. Private school leavers accounted for only 8 per cent of all school leavers in 1960, but for 24 per cent of those with fathers in professional or higher administrative grades. Among entrants to university 37 per cent had fathers in professional or higher administrative occupations (Radford, 1962: 47, 51). Data subsequently compiled by Anderson and Western (1970: 10) show that the bias in the social origins of university students did not decline in the 1960s despite the great expansion in student numbers: in 1965 and 1967, 48 per cent of the first-year students in four professional faculties (engineering, law, medicine, and teaching) of six Australian universities had fathers in professional and managerial jobs. Only one in five had fathers in manual work, a figure well below expectation. As Anderson and Western comment:

> The distribution of students' fathers' occupations is considerably biased in favour of the professional and managerial groups ... Manual occupations are correspondingly underrepresented: the proportion in the university from semi-skilled and unskilled manual worker backgrounds is one-fourth...of the corresponding groups in the work force (1970: 15-16).

The sons and daughters of skilled manual workers were somewhat better represented among the ranks of university students (about half the proportion expected from the census estimate), but it is clear that children from white-collar, managerial, and professional home backgrounds have gained most from the recent rapid expansion in student places in universities.

Attitudes Towards Education

To some extent the marked differences in the occupational background of students

Table 2.2: Education needed for a young man or woman to get along in Australia today, by education of male respondent (row percentages)

Education of respondent		Education needed by young man or woman					N (100%)
		Primary	Some secondary	Secondary	Tertiary	D.K.	
Primary	Man	3	30	56	10	1	371
	Woman	6	49	39	5	0	371
Some secondary	Man	0	32	58	10	1	568
	Woman	2	51	42	4	1	568
Secondary	Man	1	26	59	14	1	155
	Woman	3	41	50	6	0	155
Tertiary	Man	2	14	56	27	1	189
	Woman	2	30	53	13	3	189
Total	Man	1	28	57	13	1	1,283
	Woman	3	46	44	6	1	1,283

Source: ANU survey, 1965.

are explained by the economic cost of a university education, but cultural differences also play a part. Our 1965 survey indicates how attitudes towards education differ between occupational groups and between groups with different levels of education. The opening question related to education, and read as follows:

> About how much education would you say a young *man* should have, to get along in Australia today?

This question was then repeated for a young *woman*. These two questions served several purposes. They provided a topical and relatively straightforward introduction to the survey, which respondents had been told was about education and jobs. We were not at that point asking about their own education, or even their children's. The phrase 'get along' is sufficiently nondirective to allow respondents to apply their own cultural standards, and to project into it, at least partly, their own 'need for achievement' (McClelland, 1961). Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the results of these questions separately for male and female respondents in relation to their own level of education.

The last two rows of Table 2.2 illustrate the upgrading in educational expectations in Australia. Three in four men in the sample thought that just to get along a young man in 1965 needed at least to complete his secondary education. Yet only a little over one in four respondents had themselves completed secondary education or entered tertiary education. Almost no one thought a primary education sufficient for a young man to get along. Completing secondary school appeared to be the minimum educational goal among Australian males, even though according to the 1966 census 14 per cent of young men between 20 and 24 years old had not gone to secondary school. Of those that did, only a minority (under a third) matriculated or went on to tertiary education. Clearly the educational expectations of our sample had not been realised, even among this group of 20- to

Table 2.3: Education needed for a young man or woman to get along in Australia today, by education of female respondent (row percentages)

Education of respondent	Education needed by young man or woman						N (100%)
		Primary	Some secondary	Secondary	Tertiary	D.K.	
Primary	Man	0	30	55	16	0	179
	Woman	2	44	47	7	0	179
Some secondary	Man	0	14	71	14	1	336
	Woman	0	36	56	8	0	336
Secondary	Man	8	8	63	29	0	92
	Woman	0	25	58	17	0	92
Tertiary	Man	0	14	66	20	0	35
	Woman	0	26	63	11	0	35
Total	Man	0	18	65	17	0	642
	Woman	1	36	54	9	0	642

Source: ANU survey, 1965.

24-year olds educated in the years of postwar affluence.

As we have learned to expect from observations of women's liberation movements in many countries, men did not think a young woman needs as much education as a young man. Only half as many men regarded tertiary education as necessary for a young woman (6 per cent compared with 13 per cent for a young man), while 49 per cent thought that primary or some secondary education was enough for a young woman to get along in Australia in 1965. Radford (1962:41) noted that there was a pool of untapped talent among women because of the widespread attitude that women need less education than men. Table 2.2 shows that this attitude persisted irrespective of the educational level of male respondents. The pattern was remarkably stable and characterised responses at the top as well as the bottom of the educational scale.

Women also subscribed to this view, and the same pattern of unequal expectations emerges in Table 2.3. However, women in general appeared to place a higher value on education than men, and it is instructive to observe that more women than men saw a tertiary education as being necessary for a young man *or* woman, despite the fact that women received less education than men. Women, like men, agreed that education is more important for a young man than a young woman (Table 2.3).

This generalised attitude about male and female roles leads to the following consequence: at age 14 girls and boys are represented about equally in secondary schools; by age 17 boys outnumber girls by three to two (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1969a:8). In university enrolments, men outnumber women by about five to two (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1969b:9). Facts such as these led Butts to wonder about sexual inequality in education, just as he considered the social inequalities associated with fee-paying private schools:

> There is an assumption that those who are socially superior will go to a private rather than

> to a state school. I may be wrong, but I feel that there is also a similar assumption that the best schools should be reserved for boys because girls are not expected to play as important a role in society as boys... As Australia is predominantly a man's culture, so is Australian education predominantly designed to meet the needs of boys more fully than those of girls (Butts, 1955: 34).

Such expectations carry over from education into the occupational market, where women not only have difficulty in entering responsible positions but frequently receive less pay for the same work. Discriminatory pay differentials have been under widespread attack, and the June 1969 judgment of the Arbitration Commission aims at their progressive elimination (*The Australian*, 14 June 1969). However, as we show in more detail in Chapter 4, the occupational rewards that women receive for their educational efforts are consistently lower than those for men. In other words, in the 1960s experience reinforced lower educational aspirations for women: even if a woman obtained a high level of education she was unlikely to be rewarded as well as a man with the same qualifications. Subsequent increases in retention rates among girls at school and in higher enrolments in tertiary education may presage a shift in this traditional pattern.

Education and Marriage

Even though Australian men and women of all educational levels seemed in 1965 to agree that young women needed less education than young men, education is an important influence in selecting a spouse. To some extent education is only an indicator of socio-economic status, since the amount of education a person receives is partly determined by the economic status of his or her parents. Beyond that, however, people with similar amounts of schooling have been exposed to similar stimuli and experiences, and consequently have more things in common than persons with different educational backgrounds. Thus educational homogamy, the tendency of a person to marry someone with a similar amount of education, is the result of both socio-economic and cultural factors: the socio-economic status of parents influences the kind and amount of their child's education; and level of education, once achieved, is associated with a particular culture or subculture. Cultural and socio-economic differences contingent on origin and educational achievement interact to influence the choice of a marriage partner.

Because women in general receive less education than men, we cannot expect all

Table 2.4: Educational homogamy (row percentages)

Education of husband	Education of wife				N (100%)
	Primary	Some secondary	Secondary	Tertiary	
Primary	*68*	23	7	2	514
Some secondary	19	*67*	12	2	820
Secondary	18	40	*38*	4	205
Tertiary	8	41	33	*18*	227
Total	32	48	16	4	1,766

Source: ANU survey, 1965.

husbands and wives to be matched in the amount of education.

According to the survey data in Tables 2.4 and 2.5, 80 per cent of the married women in our sample and 75 per cent of the married men had only primary or some secondary education, proportions that are consistent with the 1966 census figures in Table 2.1 above. Inmarriage was high among those with primary or some secondary education: in two out of three marriages the partners had about the same amount of education. At higher levels of education, however, this pattern of inmarriage was less marked: only about one man in six with a tertiary education was married to a woman with tertiary education. Obviously this low figure can be partly explained by the relatively small number of women with tertiary education, and Table 2.5 shows that the rate of inmarriage was higher for tertiary-educated women. Indeed, it is surprising that this rate was not higher still. Perhaps Australian men believe that womanly virtues tend to be eroded by higher education. And perhaps highly educated Australian women have learned something that guides their choice of a spouse.

Statistics such as those in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 are more easily interpreted when framed in terms of an explicit comparison. Two evaluative frameworks that can be used are maximum homogamy (like marrying like) and an open-marriage system (marriages occurring irrespective of educational level). Maximum homogamy is represented by the proportion of husbands or wives who *could* have married a partner of the same educational level, given the existing (and different) distributions of educational attainment among marriage partners as a whole. Since men on average have higher educational levels than women, some outmarriage (heterogamy) must occur for that cause alone, barring celibacy. Not every man or woman can marry a person with the same education because there are not enough men with primary education, or women who have been to university, available for marriage to similar partners. In our sample, this 'forced' outmarriage amounts to 8 per cent of all marriages. This means that maximum homogamy, or inmarriage, could have been as high as 92 per cent. In fact it was 58 per cent.[4]

4 Throughout this discussion we are referring only to outcomes of the choice of marriage partners. We do not take into account the whole field of eligibles, including those who do not marry. To include all eligibles would allow a broader analysis, but our survey data do not permit us that extension. Our analysis here in some respects applies the paradigm of occupational mobility spelled out in Chapter 6.

Table 2.5: Educational homogamy (column percentages)

Education of husband	Education of wife				
	Primary	Some secondary	Secondary	Tertiary	Total
Primary	*62*	14	12	14	29
Some secondary	28	*65*	35	23	46
Secondary	7	10	*27*	11	12
Tertiary	3	11	26	*52*	13
N (100%)	557	846	284	79	1,766

Source: ANU survey, 1965.

Table 2.6: Educational origins of spouses (row percentages)

Husband's father's education	Wife's father's education				Total
	Primary	Some secondary	Secondary	Tertiary	
Primary	*82*	11	4	3	673
Some secondary	33	*45*	14	7	245
Secondary	29	23	*35*	14	84
Tertiary	24	23	25	*28*	71
Total	63	20	10	7	1,073

Source: ANU survey, 1965.

The concept of an open-marriage system asks what the pattern of marriage would be if men and women married without regard to their respective educational levels, if there were no tendency for husbands and wives to have similar amounts of education. On this assumption some husbands and wives would have the same amount of education, but only by chance. Applying this assumption, we would expect 34 per cent of the couples to have the same education (homogamy) and 66 per cent to have different levels of education (heterogamy).

Although 92 per cent of marriage partners surveyed could have married a spouse with the same education, only two-thirds of the possible maximum did. By contrast if we compare the observed amount of heterogamy to what would be expected if education were irrelevant in the choice of a marriage partner (the condition of equal opportunity, as it were), we find again that the observed figure is two-thirds of that expected. The amount of free heterogamy is not only considerable, it is well above the minimum forced heterogamy. Thus Australian marriage patterns are about the same distance from both models, the maximum-homogamy and the open-marrriage systems. We interpret this result partly in socio-economic terms and partly in cultural terms, but we cannot disentangle their relative importance. If we allow for the fact that some outmarriage is 'forced' and adjust both observed and expected heterogamy correspondingly, we calculate that adjusted heterogamy was 59 per cent of that expected (also adjusted) on the equality-of-oppor-

Table 2.7: Educational origins of spouses (column percentages)

Husband's father's education	Wife's father's education				Total
	Primary	Some secondary	Secondary	Tertiary	
Primary	*82*	53	26	30	63
Some secondary	12	*51*	31	25	23
Secondary	4	9	*27*	17	8
Tertiary	3	7	16	*28*	7
N (100%)	675	218	109	71	1,073

Source: ANU survey, 1965.

tunity model.[5] That is to say, the amount of outmarriage amounted to about three-fifths that expected if marriage partners paid no attention to their spouse's educational level.

Since women in general receive less education than men, we might uncover more homogamy if we took into account family background. In some cases where the educational levels of husbands and wives differ, their parents' educational backgrounds may have been similar. Such marriages could also be thought of as homogamous because they reflect more distant, but nonetheless shared, socio-economic and cultural influences. This supposition can be partly tested from our survey, and the results are given in Tables 2.6 and 2.7.

Unfortunately some in our sample were unable to report the educational achievement of their spouse's father, and these nonresponses reduced the effective sample considerably. Furthermore, few of the respondents' fathers or fathers-in-law had completed secondary or tertiary education, as the cohort data shown in Table 2.1 would lead us to expect. Consequently only small numbers are found at higher levels of education.

With these cautions in mind, further analysis does not alter our conclusion that Australian marriage patterns are about equidistant from the closed and the open models. Endogamy is the rule at the lower end of the educational scale, in part because two-thirds of the fathers in the sample were in the primary education category. The overall correlation between the educational levels of husbands' and wives' fathers ($r = 0{\cdot}45$) is almost exactly that for husbands and wives (0·47). Similarly, the rates of inmarriage and outmarriage, while different in absolute terms because of the differences in education between fathers and their children, show a similar pattern. The observed rate of homogamy, while high at 65 per cent, is only two-thirds the possible maximum of 97 per cent. Yet the observed rate of heterogamy of 35 per cent is not inconsiderable and stands also at two-thirds the level expected on the open-marriage model. In sum, there appears to be a tangible continuity in socio-economic and cultural differences between the generations, at least to the extent that they are reflected in marriage patterns. However, marriage patterns amount neither to a closed system nor an open system but lie almost exactly between the two.

In what ways have marriage patterns changed? A tentative answer can be gained from the Australian census. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 are based on unpublished data relating to the education of husbands and wives enumerated together in the 1966 census. The educational categories are not precisely comparable with those used in our survey, since the census classification is largely limited to formal certificates and qualifications. In the census data, persons who undertook courses of education without gaining a qualification are not distinguished from those who never undertook such courses. The census tables are also relatively coarse groupings: persons with no education are grouped with 'not stated' and are therefore excluded from this analysis, while persons with some secondary education are combined with those who only completed primary school. Although the four categories in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 appear similar to those of Tables 2.6 and 2.7, the first census category is more inclusive than our first catogory (except that persons with no education are excluded because they were grouped with 'not stated'), whereas all other categories are less inclusive, because

5 Formally this measure is equivalent to the Yasuda index discussed in Chapter 6.

they focus on formal qualifications rather than attendance or experience. Many people 'completed secondary school' without matriculating, which was normally the formal requirement for entrance to university and other tertiary institutions. For these reasons, Tables 2.8 and 2.9 are not exactly comparable with our survey findings, but they can be used for internal analysis and to assess changes over time.

Tables 2.8 and 2.9 report levels of educational homogamy for all currently married, co-resident husbands and wives, divided into three groups with varying durations of marriage: persons married less than five years (married between 1961 and 1966), persons married for 10 to 14 years (married between 1951 and 1956), and persons married for 25 years or more (married before 1941). The final row of each panel of these tables gives comparable figures for marriages regardless of duration.

A difficulty in interpreting these tables is that both the educational structure and the significance of education, especially for women, have changed substantially. The last panel of Table 2.8 shows that half the wives married between 1961 and 1966 had only primary or some secondary education, compared with three-quarters of those married before 1941. This structural change contains within it cultural changes relating to attitudes towards, and the symbolic meaning of, education for

Table 2.8: Educational homogamy for selected marriage cohorts,* 1966 (row percentages)

Education of husband	Duration of marriage in years	Education of wife				N in 000s (100%)
		Primary, some high school	Intermediate	Matriculation	Tertiary	
Primary, or some high school	0-4	*73*	22	4	2	197
	10-14	*82*	14	3	1	195
	25+	*93*	5	2	1	408
	all	*84*	12	3	1	1,444
Intermediate certificate	0-4	33	*56*	7	3	106
	10-14	38	*54*	6	2	79
	25+	27	*68*	4	1	96
	all	34	*58*	6	2	522
Matriculation certificate	0-4	24	35	*32*	8	43
	10-14	29	32	*35*	4	32
	25+	28	23	*47*	2	39
	all	28	30	*37*	5	208
Tertiary qualification	0-4	15	32	21	*32*	30
	10-14	25	34	21	*20*	26
	25+	42	28	18	*12*	29
	all	28	33	20	*20*	159
Total	0-4	51	34	10	5	376
	10-14	62	27	8	3	331
	25+	75	18	6	1	571
	all	64	25	8	3	2,333

*Data relate to existing marriages only and to households in which husbands and wives were enumerated together. Persons with education 'not stated' have been excluded.

Source: Unpublished tabulations from the Census of Australia, 1966.

women in these different periods. The last column of Table 2.9 reveals a comparable but less extreme trend in the educational standards of their husbands. We also think that cultural changes have been less marked for men than for women.

Despite these qualifications, we can detect a trend towards lower rates of homogamy among more recently married men of all educational levels except the tertiary, where inmarriage has increased in recent years, possibly because the availability of women with higher education has increased. On the other hand, it could be argued that increasing homogamy at the tertiary level manifests a growing salience of education in the selection of a marriage partner among members of the higher socio-economic strata. However, this latter interpretation is not supported by Table 2.9, which shows that the rate of inmarriage among tertiary-educated women, while high in all groups, has not changed. Indeed, the overall relationship between the education of husbands and wives has if anything declined: the correlation is 0·52 for all marriage durations, compared with 0·48 for those married less than five years and 0·56 for those married 25 years or longer.[6] However, these correlations are relatively insensitive to changes in homogamy rates among those with higher education, since they form only a small segment of the total married population. Even among the most recently married couples, only 8 per cent of husbands and 5 per cent of wives have a tertiary education.

Differences in educational attainment affect patterns of marriage within each generation and from one generation to the next. But they do not appear to operate uniformly in such a cumulative and systematic manner as to produce clearly distinct classes bound together by common culture and socio-economic status. If different patterns hold among élites, as they may well do, our data cannot tell us. We do not have the evidence to undertake finer grained analysis of the extremes of the stratification system. Other studies have highlighted the importance of marriage in maintaining class boundaries and in cementing family fortunes and business dynasties (Martin, 1957; Rolfe, 1967:89-90; Campbell, 1963). But the role of education in such transactions remains obscure, even in these more detailed studies. We return to a consideration of the role of social origins and social status in the formation of strata and classes in Chapter 7.

Education and Stratification

Educational institutions through their internal differentiation and standards of evaluation look both forward and backward. On the one hand, a system of stratification based on social origins is reinforced by selectivity and differential opportunity. Residential segregation by socio-economic status, state aid for private schools, and special facilities subsidised by better-off parents all strengthen the advantages of children from affluent families. Staffing difficulties in urban slums and rural areas, language problems of Aborigines and migrant children, and lack of access to the better private schools diminish educational opportunities for Aborigines, immigrants, and the poor. Differences in expectations about and aspirations towards education work to crystallise the stratification in

6 Our data do not allow us to assess the possibility that marriages involving partners with greatly disparate amounts of education have a higher rate of dissolution than homogamous or near-homogamous marriages. If so, homogamy at longer durations of marriage would be overstated. To resolve this issue would require educational information on *former* as well as present marriage partners.

order (Roper, 1970; Smolicz, 1970).

On the other hand, insofar as schools stress universal criteria of achievement, they are oriented towards a future system of stratification rather than one in the past or present. But until policies are designed and implemented to surmount the handicaps of social origin, claims of equal educational opportunity must be judged premature — unless one rests content with a weak definition of equality of opportunity that underplays the complexity of the interrelations between social background and educational achievement.

Education serves two functions in industrial societies like Australia. It is a mechanism for reinforcing social origins, and it provides a channel for individual opportunity. Despite the obvious importance of education in the process of occupational achievement, there are few Australian studies which systematically relate these two central features of an industrial society. Caiden (1965:27-8) has chronicled the gradual movement of the federal civil service from a seniority system to a meritocracy based on education and qualifications. Radford's (1962: 16, 105-14) assessment of the effect of education on first occupation found that only 30 per cent of all school leavers went on to higher education or into clerical or semiprofessional jobs whereas 72 per cent of those who completed the highest form of secondary school (the matriculation

Table 2.9: Educational homogamy for selected marriage cohorts,* 1966 (column percentages)

Education of husband	Duration of marriage in years	Education of wife				N in 000s (100%)
		Primary, some high school	Intermediate	Matriculation	Tertiary	
Primary, or some high school	0-4	*74*	34	22	17	52
	10-14	*78*	31	22	20	59
	25+	*88*	20	20	30	71
	all	*81*	29	22	21	62
Intermediate certificate	0-4	18	*47*	22	18	28
	10-14	14	*48*	17	15	24
	25+	6	*64*	11	11	17
	all	12	*52*	17	16	22
Matriculation certificate	0-4	5	12	*38*	18	11
	10-14	4	11	*41*	14	10
	25+	3	9	*54*	12	7
	all	4	11	*44*	15	9
Tertiary certificate	0-4	2	7	18	*47*	8
	10-14	3	10	20	*51*	8
	25+	3	8	15	*47*	5
	all	3	9	18	*49*	7
N in 000s (100%)	0-4	193	127	36	20	376
	10-14	205	90	27	10	331
	25+	428	102	34	7	571
	all	1,498	592	178	65	2,333

*Data relate to existing marriages only and to households in which husbands and wives were enumerated together. Persons with education 'not stated' have been excluded.

Source: Unpublished tabulations from the Census of Australia, 1966.

form) had the same educational or occupational experience.

For entry to some occupations, for example the professions, high education is a prerequisite. In the case of other jobs, such as managerial work, formal education is less important and greater attention is given, in Australia at least, to on-the-job learning, social background, and personal connections. In a survey of 16 firms ranging in size from 100 to 5000 employees, Bennett (1967:8-10) was struck by the absence of graduates in many branches of industry and commerce.

> Careful enquiry had shown that in the original investment, administration, planning, purchasing, choice and installation of plant, manufacturing and packaging, executives with advanced tertiary qualifications were necessarily in control. *But once the finished product was on its way to market — that is, in advertising, marketing, sales, transport, warehousing and all related activities — most executives were men of secondary education, with nary a graduate in sight (Bennett, 1967: 9).*

Moreover, many executives earn their tertiary qualifications from para-tertiary institutions such as correspondence schools, professional institutes, and technical colleges while they are fully employed. Bennett found that only nineteen of the top ninety-two executives in his sample of sixteen firms held a university degree, mostly a degree in commerce. Forty executives had a secondary education, supplemented in some cases by a trade certificate, and thirty-three had diplomas in accountancy or engineering (Bennett, 1967:10). Rather than university education, on-the-job training, practical experience, common sense, and personal connections qualify most Australian managers for their jobs. Management has been learned rather than taught, at least at university level, and sometimes inherited rather than earned. But this situation is changing with the growth of schools of business administration in Australian universities and colleges, and the breakdown of family capitalism. The old-school-tie, however, is a durable currency, and the chances of upward mobility are enhanced by a private school education, even after controlling for attained education.

Data from the ANU 1967 survey, which included questions on type of school attended, allow a tentative answer to the question of how much a private school education influences later careers. For simplicity, and to preserve sufficiently large numbers for meaningful analysis, we consider only those men whose first and present jobs were not in farming. This restriction does not appear to introduce any distortion. Although independent schools have historically served the children of farmers and graziers, in fact a higher proportion of men educated in state or Catholic schools entered farming occupations than those from independent schools (21 per cent and 13 per cent respectively). In aggregate terms private schools serve to endorse the status of affluent urban families, as well as to provide a better education for the children of farmers.

Restricting ourselves to four broad groups of urban occupations — professionals and managers, clerical workers, skilled manual workers, and semiskilled and unskilled manual workers — and counting as mobility any movement between a lower and a higher ranked category, we find that 49 per cent of 113 men educated at independent Protestant schools were upwardly mobile during their working careers, compared with only 35 per cent of the 950 men educated at state or Catholic schools. These figures exclude men who entered the occupational structure at the 'top' and therefore have nowhere to go but down.

Part of this significant difference in

mobility experience must be attributed not just to type of school, but also to amount of schooling. We have already shown that students educated in the private school system tend to stay at school longer and to reach higher levels of education than students in the state or Catholic systems. Thus, men educated at private non-Catholic schools account for 11 per cent of the 1967 sample, but for 4 per cent of men with only primary education. At the top end of the educational scale, they amount to 36 per cent of those entering or completing tertiary education, or more than three times the expected proportion. Obviously before an accurate assessment of the occupational benefits conferred by the old-school-tie can be made, amount of education must be controlled.

Table 2.10 shows the mobility experience of private school boys compared with those educated in state or Catholic schools, distinguishing amount of education. The measure of mobility is based on the same four occupational groups listed above, and again, men whose first job was professional or managerial have been excluded since they cannot by definition experience upward mobility. Although the numbers for some categories are small, the pattern is clear and consistent: at each level of education men educated at private schools experience more upward mobility than men educated at other types of schools. However, the difference between each pair of mobility rates is reduced to an average of only 6 percentage points when differences in amount of education are taken into account, compared with 12 percentage points between the gross mobility rates for men from the two different types of schools when education is not controlled.

Affluent parents are able to provide some kind of insurance for their sons through a private school education. Even if a scholar at a private school fails to achieve a high level of education, he can still expect a brighter occupational future than the man who was educated to the same level at a government or Catholic school. Other evidence suggests that the old-school-tie (or whatever stands behind that symbol) is particularly effective in occupational areas where tertiary education is not a formal requirement for entry or advancement. In a survey of 180 firms Encel (1959:7-9) noted the relative unimportance of tertiary qualifications among business executives and the disproportionate number who had been educated at private schools. Although one-fifth of the 327 executives in his sample could be described as self-made men, for the remainder the chances of

Table 2.10: Percentage upwardly mobile by amount and type of education

Amount of education	Type of education	
	Private	Other
Primary	29 (17)	25 (291)
Some secondary	32 (38)	30 (332)
Secondary	54 (46)	46 (303)
Tertiary	100 (12)	90 (21)

The number on which each percentage is based is given in brackets.

Source: ANU survey, 1965.

success in the business world were strongly influenced by their social background; and in two out of three instances that background included a private school education. The private schools might argue that these results simply point to the better quality of education their schools offer, whatever the final level achieved by their pupils happens to be. Whether this kind of argument amounts to an explanation or a rationalisation is, like other arguments about 'discrimination', notoriously difficult to adjudicate (Brown, 1971).

The Tightening Bond Between Education and Occupation

There is evidence of a shift towards greater dependence upon formal qualifications in the selection and promotion of business executives, a trend which began earlier in some government bureaucracies. It is tempting to see in such trends a movement away from ascriptive principles of social background and personal networks, towards more universal principles of achievement. Yet in a society where the major institutional avenues for achievement — the schools, the colleges, and the universities — are linked with inequalities of income, prestige, and power, the inequalities of past, present, and future are causally interconnected so as to ensure at least some intergenerational continuity in social position. The analysis of these interconnections is a major preoccupation in the following pages, but before turning to those general issues, we conclude this chapter with recent data on education and

Table 2.11: Relationship between education and occupation of the male workforce, 1966 (row percentages)

Occupation group	Education					N in 000s (100%)
	Tertiary	Matriculation	Intermediate	Some secondary	Primary	
1. Upper professional	84	9	4	2	1	118
2. Graziers	1	9	21	30	40	91
3. Lower professional	34	32	20	10	5	152
4. Managerial	10	17	30	24	20	268
5. Shop proprietors	1	10	22	28	39	26
6. Farmers	1	5	15	26	54	150
7. Clerical workers	4	25	39	20	12	388
8. Armed services, police	3	13	39	33	13	74
9. Craftsmen	0	6	34	33	27	725
10. Shop assistants	1	10	30	35	23	89
11. Operatives	0	5	18	37	40	400
12. Drivers	0	4	17	39	39	220
13. Service workers	0	8	19	32	41	155
14. Miners	0	5	16	38	40	32
15. Farm workers	0	5	16	34	45	133
16. Labourers	0	5	16	33	46	371
Total stated	6	11	25	29	30	3,392

Source: Census of Australia, 1966.

occupational position.

The overall relationship between education and occupation as it emerges from the results of the 1966 census and the ANU 1965 survey is shown in Tables 2.11 and 2.12.

Bearing in mind the different definitions of the categories in the two tables, the results are mutually reinforcing. The proportion of the male workforce with primary education (or less) is virtually identical. There is a higher proportion of men in the tertiary category in our survey partly because we have included persons who entered higher education but did not obtain a qualification, and partly because the census codes tertiary education from qualifications listed in responses to the census question on occupation. Our survey respondents were asked to code themselves directly into one of seven educational categories (Broom *et al.*, 1968). Presumably our respondents were more prone to 'recognise' their tertiary qualifications than the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Even excluding those who had only 'some tertiary' education, 9 per cent of the men in our sample claimed to have 'completed' a course of tertiary standard. The difficulty of classifying advanced qualifications is illustrated by the 1966 codebook of qualifications of the Australian Bureau of Statistics, which runs to almost 150 foolscap pages. Of the three-quarters of a million men who listed an occupational qualification in the 1966 census (22 per cent of the total workforce), fewer than one-third were classified as having a tertiary qualification. The remaining half million were classified as subtertiary. Clearly there is considerable scope in surveys for men with some kind

Table 2.12: Relationship between education and occupation of the male workforce, 1965 (row percentages)

Occupation group	Education				N (100%)
	Tertiary	Secondary	Some secondary	Primary	
1. Upper professional	87	4	9	0	109
2. Graziers	6	12	52	30	64
3. Lower professional	53	14	27	6	70
4. Managerial	18	19	47	16	224
5. Shop proprietors	4	19	46	31	26
6. Farmers	2	6	29	63	145
7. Clerical workers	14	18	56	12	228
8. Armed services, police	10	32	47	10	19
9. Craftsmen	6	10	60	25	434
10. Shop assistants	4	21	48	27	48
11. Operatives	4	10	45	41	182
12. Drivers	1	5	48	46	132
13. Service workers	6	14	47	33	79
14. Miners	5	16	42	37	19
15. Farm workers	5	0	41	54	37
16. Labourers	4	6	37	53	108
Total	14	12	46	29	1,924

Source: ANU survey, 1965.

of further education to classify themselves as having a tertiary level of education when an independent coder might classify them at the subtertiary level.

Detailed scrutiny of the tertiary qualified in Tables 2.11 and 2.12 shows that some of the largest differences in the percentages of men with tertiary education are in occupations where higher education is not a prerequisite to entry to the job but is important in career mobility and promotion. While both sets of data report similarly high proportions of men with tertiary education in upper professional jobs, our survey shows higher proportions among lower professionals, managers, and clerical workers. Respondents in our survey probably took greater cognizance of on-the-job training and qualifications acquired in part-time studies (many such men were presumably still engaged in part-time studies), over and beyond university qualifications.

Problems of categorisation may account for the small but noticeable numbers of men in semiskilled and unskilled occupations who claimed some post-secondary education. Other respondents undoubtedly were migrants with qualifications not recognised either by the Australian Bureau of Statistics or by Australian employers (Zubrzycki, 1969). Nonetheless some survey respondents presumably counted in-service training and other subtertiary qualifications as tertiary. We have no way to test all these suppositions, but even granted Australia's dependence on immigrant labour and the contemporary phenomenon of dropping out, it is hard to believe that one in twenty service workers, miners, farm workers, and labourers had entered or completed tertiary education. At the lower end of the educational scale, however, the two sets of figures are in closer agreement for all occupational groups, and the overall correlation between education and occupation is virtually identical in both the census and our survey ($r = 0{\cdot}43$, $0{\cdot}41$ respectively).

In Chapter 6 we examine the role of education in the process of occupational achievement in relation to social origins. Although the connection between the educational and occupational systems appears to be growing stronger in Australia, it is weaker than in some other countries for which reliable data are available. For example in Czechoslovakia and the United States education is a more important determinant of occupational achievement (Safar, 1970; Jones, 1971b). But before we assess the relative importance of education in the process of status attainment, we need to clarify the nature of occupational change, for individual mobility is in large part conditioned by the changing shape of the occupational structure.

3 Occupational structure and occupational change

In the first census conducted by the Commonwealth in 1911 under the Census and Statistics Act of 1905 and in each subsequent census, a series of questions on occupation and occupational status has been asked. In 1911 responses were coded to 654 separate groups of job titles on the basis of the occupational classification used in the colonial censuses of 1891 and 1901. The same classification was used in 1921, but thereafter new occupational classifications were developed, making longitudinal comparisons problematic.

In analysing the results of our 1965 survey, we modified the 1961 census classification and constructed a prestige hierarchy of occupations (Broom *et al.*, 1965). In the course of reclassifying the census codes we explored the possibility of a retrospective reclassification of earlier census data on occupation into a common framework. Because the 1911, 1921, and 1933 censuses all used very detailed classificatory systems, it was apparent that an attempt to construct a time series of occupational data was feasible and justified. However, some limitations to the statistics and constraints on the analysis of historical changes in Australia's occupational structure should be noted.

The censuses of 1911 and 1921 made no systematic distinction between occupation (the nature of the work an individual performs) and industry, defined as the activities of persons, firms or businesses *considered as a group*, producing the same commodities, performing the same processes, or providing the same type of service. Thus whereas in an occupational analysis one is typically interested in level of skills, amount of responsibility or authority, and amount of economic rewards, in an industrial analysis such distinctions are not taken into account. It is enough to know that a group of workers is engaged in the production of a certain class of manufactured goods and not how many are involved at different levels of production, for example in supervisory, skilled, semiskilled, or unskilled jobs. Although gradings of skill were not clearly distinguished in the major categories used in 1911 or 1921, the minor groups used in the census classification are sufficiently detailed to allow a regrouping into broader occupational categories with reasonable accuracy. Indeed, for some specific jobs, notably professional, it is possible to produce a continuous time series from 1911 to the present. For other jobs, for example unskilled, semiskilled and some service occupations, it is virtually impossible to draw exact comparisons over the years because of incompatibility among census classifications. In recognition of these problems, our data are presented here in broad occupational groupings, although in Appendix 1 we show figures for the more detailed categories used in the original analysis.

The 1933 census made several innovations on earlier procedures. Industry and occupation were systematically distinguished, and a new occupational classification of almost 1000 separate groups of job titles was used. A distinction was also made between the economically active and inactive sections of the population. Before 1933 persons of independent means, retired persons, and pensioners had been

coded to their previous occupations if these were stated on the census form. To improve comparability, our re-analysis of the 1911 and 1921 censuses excludes persons, mainly retired, whose occupational status was 'not stated' or 'not applicable'. Some whose occupation was 'not stated' were probably in the workforce but others clearly were not: one in eight men who did not state their occupational status in 1911 were 65 years of age or older.

In the 1947 census the occupational classification was condensed to a shorter list of 219 groups of job titles and reduced further for publication to only 210 groups. In the 1954 census the Bureau was sufficiently uncertain about how to classify occupations that questions on occupations were not processed for publication. Consequently there is a gap of 14 years in occupational statistics, covering the period of rapid technological and social change up to the 1961 census, when a new classification with 348 groups of occupational titles was introduced. Although this classification was used for the 1966 census, in 1966 a new definition of the 'workforce' was introduced (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1968b), the effect of which was to include approximately 108,000 workers who in 1961 would have been excluded from the workforce. This increment of 2·3 per cent to the 1966 workforce consisted disproportionately of women working part-time in farm occupations, some for only a few hours a week. (See Table 3.5 below.)

In addition to problems of definition and documentation, a longitudinal analysis of the occupational structure faces the conceptual problem that the nature of occupational tasks with the same nominal title may have changed. A driver (horse-and-cart), in 1911 obviously performed a different set of operations from a driver (delivery van) in 1966. Moreover, some jobs have disappeared as a result of technological change, while others have been created. To take systematic account of the changes which have occurred in the nature of specific job tasks over half a century would be a major research project in itself. We have, *faute de mieux*, classified jobs on the basis of their verbal designation and simply warn our readers, and ourselves, that the changes we describe include elements of technological as well as occupational change. In some respects this expedient is not misleading. To return to our example of the driver, we note that in functional terms a person delivering goods from one place to another was engaged in the same general task of transporting goods at both periods, even though the technological means changed. More importantly from our point of view, there is evidence from another industrial society, the United States, that the relative social standing of jobs has remained much the same throughout the present century (Hodge *et al.*, 1966), so that in terms of the ranked hierarchy, treating the 'same' jobs as having the same general prestige is not likely to be seriously misleading.

Structural Change

Who goes to work, and in what kind of job, depends partly on the range of opportunities but also on the categories of the population seeking work. When educational expectations were lower, children left school earlier and entered paid employment at younger ages than they do today. When unemployment is high, there may be opposition towards the employment of married women. Fifty years ago or even more recently, the prospect of a large family limited the chance of a married woman remaining in paid em-

Tabel 3.1: A functional classification of the Australian population, 1911, 1933, 1947 and 1966

Workforce status and census year	Column percentages		
	Males	Females	Persons
1911			
Total workforce	*64.1*	*17.2*	*41.5*
Employer or self-employed	14.5	2.5	8.7
Employee or helper	47.6	14.3	31.6
Unemployed	2.0	0.4	1.2
Total dependants	*35.8*	*82.8*	*58.4*
Under 15	29.4	32.0	30.7
65 or older	2.1	3.9	3.0
Total population in 000s (100%)	2,313	2,142	4,455
1933			
Total workforce	*63.4*	*18.0*	*41.1*
Employer or self-employed	15.0	2.2	8.7
Employee or helper	36.4	13.5	25.1
Unemployed	12.0	2.3	7.3
Total dependants	*36.5*	*82.0*	*58.9*
Under 15	27.3	27.2	27.3
65 or older	4.2	6.3	5.2
Total population in 000s (100%)	3,367	3,263	6,630
1947			
Total workforce	*65.3*	*19.0*	*42.1*
Employer or self-employed	14.4	1.9	8.0
Employee or helper	49.2	16.7	33.0
Unemployed	1.7	0.4	1.1
Total dependants	*34.7*	*81.0*	*57.8*
Under 15	25.3	24.6	25.0
65 or older	4.9	8.2	6.5
Total population in 000s (100%)	3,797	3,782	7,579
1966			
Total workforce	*58.8*	*25.0*	*42.1*
Employer or self-employed	9.7	2.2	6.0
Employee or helper	48.3	22.2	35.4
Unemployed	0.8	0.6	0.7
Total dependants	*41.2*	*75.0*	*58.0*
Under 15	29.9	28.9	29.4
65 or older	5.3	9.3	8.5
Total population in 000s (100%)	5,816	5,734	11,550

Source: Censuses of Australia.

ployment outside the home, while the extension of pension schemes and mandatory retirement ages in governmental and other industries remove older workers from employment more abruptly now than was typical at the turn of the century. Some effects of these and other changes are shown in Table 3.1, which broadly portrays changes in workforce participation from 1911 to 1966.

These figures are drawn from census bulletins published around the time of each census and have so far as possible been made comparable. For example persons whose occupational status in 1911 was 'not applicable' or 'not stated' have been excluded. In the last column of this table, it is striking that the ratio of dependants to workers has changed little over the 55-year period, from a high of 58·9 dependants to 41·1 workers in the depression census of 1933 to a low of 57·8 to 42·2 in the postwar census of 1947.

Although the size of the workforce compared with the population it supports has been very stable, there has been a marked internal redistribution. Compared with earlier periods, more male workers in 1966 were employees rather than employers or self-employed. This shift away from entrepreneurial activity is related to the decline of family capitalism, the increasing scale of business activity, and the declining labour requirements of farming and small-scale mining operations.[1] The decrease in the proportion of younger dependants, evident in the 1947 census and indicative of low birthrates in the 1930s, was reversed later in the postwar period. The proportion of aged dependants has in contrast risen over the period, reflecting earlier retirement and improved longevity. Meshing with these changes is a substantial shift in the sex composition of the workforce, with declining male and increasing female participation (columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.1).

These interrelated trends mirror changes in Australia's industrial structure. Economic growth, changing technology and increased productivity have allowed governments to implement changing concepts of social welfare and to widen their spheres of responsibility. Changes in the legal age of school leaving and the abolition of child labour have reduced the workforce participation rate of children, in the case of boys from about one-half of those aged 10 to 19 years in 1911 to one-third by 1966. Girls, on the other hand, are going to work in increasing numbers: in 1911 only about one in four girls aged 10 to 19 was at work, compared with nearly a third in 1966. As already mentioned, the growth of pension schemes, compulsory retirement ages, and the declining proportion of entrepreneurs and working proprietors have reduced the number of older persons at work.

As Table 3.1 indicates, the proportion of employers and self-employed persons declined from about one-fifth of the working population in 1911 to about one-seventh in 1966. Over the same period aged dependants almost trebled, in relative terms. In 1911 only 7 per cent of the male population was 60 years of age or older, and of them at least 6 out of 10 were still at work. By 1966 males aged 60 or older had increased to 11 per cent of the total, but only 4 in 10 were at work. For men 65 and over (the present pensionable age), the workforce participation rate has approximately halved over the same period.

Declining workforce participation among younger and older men has been

1 The mining boom of the late 1960s and early 1970s was capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive, although doubtless the number of persons engaged in mining and related work rose after 1966.

largely compensated for by much higher participation rates among women, especially married women. This tendency did not become marked until after World War II: between 1911 and 1947 the proportion of women aged 15 to 64 who were not at work remained stable at around 47-48 per cent. By 1966 the figure had fallen to 40 per cent. The major increases in workforce participation among married women have thus occurred since 1947, as a result of changing social attitudes, changing technology, and changing family patterns, including earlier marriage and earlier completion of childbearing.

In 1947 only 6 per cent of married women were at work. This figure had doubled by 1954, trebled by 1961, and more than quadrupled by 1966, when 27 per cent of all married women were recorded as being in the workforce. The 1966 figure exceeded the projection for 1975 published by the Vernon Committee in 1965 and the participation rate among younger married women far surpassed the Committee's expectations: in 1966 the unweighted average participation rate for married women under 35 was 30 per cent, compared with a 1975 projection of 23 per cent (Australia, 1965: Vol. 2, 530).

Despite increased participation, the rewards for and terms of employment for women remain inferior to those for men. In 1965 the adult female minimum wage averaged 71 per cent of adult male wages (Davidson, 1970: 268). However, even this inequality represents a striking, if yet inadequate, improvement over the situation in 1914, when females averaged only 49 per cent of the male rate of pay. The slow pace of change in official policy is indicated by the fact that it was only in 1966 that the federal government abolished its 'marriage bar' which prevented married women from occupying permanent posts in the Public Service.

Changes in the workforce participation of the young, the old, married women and racial and ethnic groupings are linked with changes in occupational structure arising from shifts in the Australian economy and in its industrial base. The most dramatic trend in the development of modern, industrial economies has been the changing proportions of the workforce allocated to the different sectors of the economy. Agricultural employment has declined, manufacturing employment has increased to a point of relative stability, and the service sector of the economy has expanded. The generality of this phenomenon was documented by Clark (1951) and is sometimes known as the law of tertiary industry. Declining employment in agriculture is usually seen as a by-product of increasing productivity in the rural sector resulting from mechanisation and improvements in marketing. This increased productivity in agriculture releases manpower to other sectors of the economy and generates demand for industrial products. Industrialisation and urbanisation lead to further economies of scale and rises in productivity. In this way the conditions for economic growth are established. Finally, as real income rises, the demand for a range of specialised services expands (Moore, 1966).

Associated with these changes in industrial composition are a series of occupational adjustments related to technology, task specialisation, and the increasing scale of business activities. In brief, in any given branch of industry the relative number of professional, managerial, research, technical and supervisory personnel increases: the ratio of salaried to wage employees increases. At the same time, because of greater specialisation, there is a tendency for the

pool of knowledge and skill to become polarised. Those at the top are required to be more highly trained, while jobs which were not long before regarded as crafts are reduced to repetitive tasks by mechanisation or to automatic functions by computers. Formal education becomes prerequisite to most well-regarded and well-rewarded occupational roles. Out of the industrial society the programmed society is born (Touraine, 1974:3).

These occupational trends can be amply illustrated with Australian data. Statistics on the industrial composition of the workforce show that up to and including the 1966 census the proportion of persons engaged in primary industry had fallen at every census since the turn of the century (Ford, 1970:91). Since 1954 the number of workers in primary production has fallen in *absolute* terms as well: from half a million persons in 1954 to fewer than 400,000 persons in 1966. Balancing this decline, which became most rapid with the widespread use of mechanised farm equipment from the mid-1930s, a compensatory increase occurred in the relative importance of manufacturing industry, particularly during the 1940s, when industrial expansion was stimulated by the war effort. Both world wars caused industrial growth by forcing the home production of previously imported manufactures. Thus during World War I Australia's iron and steel industry grew out of its infancy, and many other manufacturing industries expanded because of the inability of overseas suppliers to meet demand.

> [Other industries] grew in the sense that they expanded the range of production and introduced new skills and techniques; these would include engineering and metal processing. These gains were permanent, for not only did the war directly diversify production, but indirectly, by making possible the [protective] tariff of 1920, it set the stage for the further diversification and general development of secondary industry which took place in the '20s. The war was the priming charge which set off the chain of events which changed Australia into a mature industrial economy (Forster, 1953:230).

Full maturation, however, did not come until World War II and the rapid industrialisation that followed it, a development made possible and sustained by the large-scale importation of immigrant labour. By 1966 postwar immigration had made a direct contribution of about 25 per cent to the Australian workforce (Ford, 1970:100). Furthermore without the support of immigrants the workforce would have begun a short-term decline because of depressed birth rates in the 1930s and the reduced numbers of native-born workforce entrants in the early postwar period.

The relatively rapid growth of manufacturing since 1947 is not clearly revealed in the proportion of the workforce engaged in that sector because of substitution of nonhuman for human labour and because of changes in productivity. Although the proportion of the workforce engaged in secondary industry (defined here as manufacturing, electricity, gas and water supply, and building and construction) grew from 27 per cent in 1901 to 37 per cent by 1947 (Jones, 1967:5; Ford, 1970: 91), the relative share of the industrial sector seems to have levelled off at about 40 per cent of the workforce, the figure recorded in each subsequent census (1954, 1961, and 1966). This contrasts sharply with the period between the wars, when industrial expansion was relatively labour-intensive. It is estimated that about two-thirds of the growth in manufacturing output between the wars was due to expansion in the labour force and only one-third to the increase in output per employee (Maizels, 1957:169). However, if changes in the standard working week are taken into account, we find that the output per employee-hour in manu-

facturing doubled between 1911-13 and 1953-5, with one-quarter of that 42-year increase being concentrated in the five years immediately following World War II (Maizels, 1957:171).

Although the proportion of the workforce engaged in secondary industry was stable during the 1960s, the proportion in primary industry continued to decline. Obviously the growth sector is in tertiary, or service, industries. Australia, which throughout her history has been more urbanised than other countries at similar levels of industrialisation, at the turn of the century already had a high proportion of its workforce employed in service industries — in the professions, in commerce, in personal and domestic services, and in transport and communication services. As early as 1911 two in five workers were in tertiary industries, a figure which by 1966 had risen to one in two. However, the gross distributions mask some important internal changes, the details of which are shown in Tables 3.2 to 3.5.

Occupational Change

Tables 3.2 to 3.5 use a hierarchical grouping of occupations into sixteen broad categories as a vehicle for presenting data on occupational change. The classification was developed from our analysis of data from the 1961 census and from ANU 1965. Construction of the scale, which has been described elsewhere (Broom *et al.*, 1965, 1968), serves as a ranking of occupations, distinguishing levels of prestige and industrial sectors. Categories 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 identify nonmanual jobs, categories 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 16 manual and service jobs, and categories 2, 6, and 15 farm jobs.[2]

The location of farm jobs at three points in the hierarchy recognises different levels of prestige in rural work. The ranking of shop assistants below craftsmen accurately represents the social standing of these occupations in Australia (Congalton, 1969), and incidentally in both the United States (Hodge *et al.*, 1966; Blau and Duncan, 1967:26-7) and the United Kingdom (Glass, 1954:21-32). Managerial occupations may appear to be ranked low, but in the census classification managers are a very heterogeneous category in terms of prestige, income and education. For example under the census classification a boarding-house keeper who employs one person is coded 'managerial', as is any dealer or proprietor who is an employer. The census seeks no information on the size of individual businesses, so that it is impossible to distinguish large from small businesses, or managers of large companies from backyard operators. For this reason the managerial category lumps together occupations with different levels of prestige and material rewards.

As is so often the case in historical analyses of not altogether satisfactory statistics, some apparent differences are the result of difficulties in matching different classifications. Thus it was impossible to distinguish semiskilled from unskilled workers in many branches of industry in the censuses of 1911 and 1921. Again in 1947 it was hard to separate professionally qualified persons (e.g. engineers, accountants) from those without such qualifications (e.g. mec-

2 The scale can also be used in a shortened form, to separate professional (1, 3), managerial (4, 5), clerical (7, 8), skilled manual (9), semiskilled (10, 11, 12), unskilled (13, 14, 16), graziers (2), farmers (6), and farm workers (15). The nine groups form scales *within* each functional category of urban and rural occupations but do not constitute a general scale. When using these groups as an overall scale, we have opted for a six point scale, scoring the urban occupations serially 1 to 6, graziers 1, farmers 2, and farm workers 6.

hanics, bookkeepers). This difficulty was overcome by the addition of a question on qualifications in the census of 1961 and a question on education in 1966.

Despite such reservations, the data provide the only relatively firm basis for identifying broad trends in Australia's occupational structure, and for tracing the growth or decline of those specific jobs that can be identified in each census (for example nurses, teachers, medical doctors and dentists, tailors and cutters, domestic workers, and waterside workers). Two particular trends stand out in Tables 3.2 and 3.3: the decline in the percentages of rural occupations, and rising levels of skill in both urban and rural jobs. Thus the proportion of labourers, rural and urban, has fallen from about one in five workers in 1911 to about one in eight by 1966. Similarly mining, whose importance in the Australian economy and workforce had declined from 1911 until the mid-1960s, has become highly capital-intensive, requiring unskilled and semiskilled labour only as support for skilled workers, highly trained technicians, and specialised equipment. (For an extended discussion of problems involved in using census data to measure workforce changes see Keating, 1973:43-58.)

The increasing scale of industrial enterprise and rises in productivity, resulting in growth of real income, have significant impacts on the occupational system. Occupational specialisation and the inten-

Table 3.2: Occupational distribution of the workforce, 1911 to 1966 (percentages)

Occupation group	Census year					
	1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
1. Upper professional	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.4[a]	2.8	2.7
2. Graziers	1.7[b]	1.6[b]	2.8	2.3[b]	2.3	2.1
3. Lower professional	3.2	3.5	3.9	4.5	5.9	6.9
4. Managerial	5.0	3.7	4.5	5.9	7.1	6.4
5. Shop proprietors	1.3	1.7	2.8	...[c]	1.2	0.8
6. Farmers	11.8[b]	11.3[b]	7.6	11.4[b]	4.6	3.6
7. Clerical workers	4.1	6.6	9.9	13.9[a]	15.6	17.7
8. Armed services, police	0.6	0.6	0.5	1.6	1.5	1.6
9. Craftsmen	17.3	17.0	12.2	15.9	16.4	15.9
10. Shop assistants	6.3	5.9	4.7	7.0[c]	5.0	5.2
11. Operatives	7.5[d]	8.8[d]	8.4	10.0	11.2	11.8
12. Drivers	5.2	5.4	5.1	5.5	5.0	4.7
13. Service workers	11.4	11.1	11.3	7.6	7.6	8.0
14. Miners	4.8	2.5	2.2	1.2	0.8	0.7
15. Farm workers	10.4	8.8	10.0	2.0	3.9	3.6
16. Labourers	7.7[d]	9.7[d]	12.3	9.9	9.2	8.2
N in 000s (100%)	1,831	2,166	2,696	3,072	4,171	4,856

[a] Accountants included with bookkeepers in group 7.
Professional engineers included with mechanics in group 9.

[b] Wheat and sheep farmers included with other farmers in group 6.

[c] Shop proprietors included in group 10.

[d] Some labourers included in group 11.

Source: Censuses of Australia.

sification of the division of labour lead to a separation of management and control functions from those of production. Thus there is a growing number of managerial workers (although this trend is obscured to some extent by changes in the size and distribution of physical plants), and a vastly increased army of white-collar workers. According to Table 3.2 the relative number of clerical workers more than quadrupled in fifty-five years. The need for specialised control functions in complex, industrial societies is perhaps best illustrated by the expansion of the federal civil service, which between 1933 and 1961 grew by almost 300 per cent, compared with only 55 per cent in the total workforce (Caiden, 1965:23, 481-2). In 1966 employment under the Public Service Act amounted to 5·1 per cent of the Australian workforce or 192,215 persons (Australia, 1967:10). Employment by state and local governments is much greater, and as we indicate in Chapter 6, in the mid-1960s almost 30 per cent of the male civilian workforce were in government employment.

Rising standards of living and increased affluence have raised demands for existing services and created new demands as well.

Table 3.3: Occupational distribution of male workers, 1911 to 1966 (percentages)

Occupation group	Census year					
	1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
1. Upper professional	2.1	1.8	2.2	1.6[a]	3.4	3.5
2. Graziers	2.0[b]	2.0[b]	3.4	2.8[b]	2.7	2.7
3. Lower professional	1.3	1.4	1.6	2.3	3.5	4.5
4. Managerial	5.5	4.1	5.3	6.1	8.1	7.9
5. Shop proprietors	1.3	1.7	2.9	...[c]	1.0	0.8
6. Farmers	13.8[b]	13.8[b]	9.2	13.8[b]	5.5	4.4
7. Clerical workers	4.4	6.4	8.3	10.1[a]	10.2	11.5
8. Armed services, police	0.7	0.8	0.7	2.1	1.9	2.2
9. Craftsmen	15.5	16.3	13.1	18.8	20.7	21.3
10. Shop assistants	6.1	5.2	3.6	5.5[c]	3.0	2.6
11. Operatives	8.6[d]	9.8[d]	8.0	9.4	11.0	11.8
12. Drivers	6.4	6.7	6.4	7.0	6.6	6.5
13. Service workers	4.2	4.6	5.0	4.4	4.6	4.6
14. Miners	5.9	3.1	2.8	1.6	1.1	0.9
15. Farm workers	12.9	10.9	12.5	2.6	5.0	3.9
16. Labourers	9.4[d]	11.5[d]	15.1	11.8	11.7	11.0
N in 000s (100%)	1,467	1,736	2,113	2,388	3,133	3,422

[a] Accountants included with bookkeepers in group 7.
Professional engineers included with mechanics in group 9.

[b] Wheat and sheep farmers included with other farmers in group 6.

[c] Shop proprietors included in group 10.

[d] Some labourers included in group 11.

Source: Censuses of Australia.

Not only has the demand for government-supplied services such as education grown, but the relative number of professional workers, groups 1 and 3 combined, about doubled between 1911 and 1966. The proportion of service workers (group 13) remained stable throughout the postwar period although, as we shall see below, the composition of this category has changed greatly since 1911. Detailed figures on professional services indicate that the increased demand for such services as health and education is located mainly among what we have termed 'lower' professionals. This is not surprising in the case of education, since all school teachers are included in this one category. From 26,362 persons in 1911, the number of teachers expanded fivefold to 128,717 persons in 1966, a period in which the workforce as a whole about trebled (Appendix 1).

Expansion in the health field appears to have been located at the paramedical level, although our statistics cannot reveal changes in the character or quality of medical services offered, for example greater specialisation. The 1911 census reported 7849 medical practitioners and dentists, or one to every 550-600 of the population. In 1966 they numbered 17,164, or one to every 650-700 of the population, representing a modest deterioration in the ratio of population to health professionals. However, over the same period nurses and other paramedical staff increased from 13,305 persons in 1911 to 82,257 by 1966. Whereas in 1911 nurses outnumbered doctors by less than two to one, in 1966 the ratio was almost five to one. Without doubt the recent dissatisfaction among nurses with their working conditions stems in part from this structural change in the composition of the health industry, and the persistence of traditional relationships in a changing and more technological work setting.

Women in the Workforce

The trends discussed so far — the decline of workers in primary industry, the increase of professional, managerial, and white-collar occupations and the enhanced 'quality' of the workforce — have been documented with data for the workforce as a whole. They need to be related to the other major trend mentioned above, the expanded participation of women in paid work outside the home.

Table 3.5 shows that women increased their share of the workforce from a little over one-fifth at the end of World War II to nearly one-third in 1966.

In some occupational groups women have long been a majority: throughout the twentieth century they have been greatly overrepresented in lower professional jobs (nursing and teaching), and service work (as domestics early in the century and more recently as cleaners, hospital attendants, and waitresses), although their preponderance in these broad groups has somewhat declined. In some other categories the proportion of women has increased strikingly, particularly in clerical work which in 1911 was the preserve of men. By 1966 more than half those in clerical work were women, mainly typists, office machine operators, and telephonists. A parallel change occurred in the shop assistant category, which was characteristically a male occupation in 1911 but by 1966 was primarily a female occupation. The declining proportion of women in crafts and the expanding proportion in operative jobs are responses to technological changes, such as the devolution of a skilled trade like tailoring into semiskilled textile factory work. We note in passing that the larger number of women in farm jobs in

Table 3.4: Occupational distribution of the female workforce, 1911 to 1966 (percentages)

Occupation group	Census year					
	1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
1. Upper professional	0.9	1.3	0.5	0.6	0.9	0.8
2. Graziers	0.3	0.3	0.7	0.5	1.0	0.8
3. Lower professional	10.7	11.8	12.0	12.1	13.2	12.8
4. Managerial	3.4	1.9	1.8	5.1	4.2	2.7
5. Shop proprietors	1.4	1.6	2.6	...	1.8	0.7
6. Farmers	3.6	1.5	1.9	2.7	1.7	1.4
7. Clerical workers	2.7	7.6	15.7	27.1	31.9	33.1
8. Armed services, police	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2
9. Craftsmen	24.3	19.8	9.3	5.8	3.3	2.6
10. Shop assistants	7.3	8.8	8.7	12.2	10.9	11.5
11. Operatives	3.2	4.8	9.8	11.9	12.0	11.9
12. Drivers	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4
13. Service workers	40.7	37.4	33.9	18.6	16.3	16.4
14. Miners	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
15. Farm workers	0.2	0.4	0.7	0.0	0.8	2.8
16. Labourers	1.1	2.4	2.2	3.2	1.6	1.9
N in 000s (100%)	364	430	583	684	1,038	1,435

[a] Accountants included with bookkeepers in group 7.
[b] Professional engineers included with mechanics in group 9.
[b] Wheat and sheep farmers included with other farmers in group 6.
[c] Shop proprietors included in group 10.
[d] Some labourers included in group 11.
Source: Censuses of Australia.

1966 is the result of a redefinition of workforce status, which led to the inclusion of many more part-time workers. This same change also partly explains the higher overall workforce participation rates of women recorded in the 1966 census.

Notwithstanding these shifts during the present century in the kind of work that women have performed, a striking feature of their workforce distribution is that they hold jobs which typically are not entered by men. The detailed occupational distributions (Appendix 1) on which Tables 3.3 to 3.5 are based show that at every census a handful of jobs accounts for the majority of women in paid employment. In 1911 six of our 100 occupational groups accounted for 74 per cent of women in paid employment. The same six job clusters — cleaners and domestics, tailors and cutters, shop assistants, teachers, nurses, and writers and entertainers — accounted for only 11 per cent of men at work. Moreover, the six largest employment groups for men — farmers, drivers and transport workers, farm workers, shop assistants, grazing station hands, and metal miners — accounted for only 34 per cent of male workers compared with 74 per cent for the six largest employment groups for women.

By 1966, the largest employment

Table 3.5: Women as a percentage of the total workforce in different occupational groups, 1911 to 1966

Occupational group	Census year					
	1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
1. Upper professional	10	15	6	9[a]	8	9
	(33)	(37)	(50)	(42)	(115)	(129)
2. Graziers	4[b]	3[b]	5	5[b]	11	11
	(31)	(35)	(75)	(71)	(95)	(102)
3. Lower professional	67	67	67	60	56	54
	(58)	(75)	(104)	(138)	(248)	(330)
4. Managerial	13	10	8	19	15	12
	(92)	(80)	(122)	(181)	(298)	(305)
5. Shop proprietors	21	19	20	...[c]	36	26
	(24)	(37)	(76)	(...)	(51)	(36)
6. Farmers	6[b]	3[b]	5	5[b]	9	12
	(215)	(246)	(206)	(349)	(191)	(170)
7. Clerical workers	13	23	34	43[a]	51	54
	(74)	(143)	(266)	(427)	(651)	(848)
8. Armed services, police	0	0	0	2	3	4
	(11)	(14)	(14)	(50)	(61)	(77)
9. Craftsmen	28	23	16	8	5	5
	(316)	(369)	(330)	(488)	(683)	(760)
10. Shop assistants	23	30	40	39	54	64
	(115)	(127)	(127)	(215)	(208)	(250)
11. Operatives	9[d]	11[d]	25	27	27	29
	(138)	(191)	(226)	(307)	(468)	(565)
12. Drivers	1	1	1	1	1	2
	(94)	(118)	(137)	(168)	(208)	(225)
13. Service workers	71	67	65	55	54	60
	(210)	(240)	(304)	(234)	(315)	(382)
14. Miners	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(87)	(53)	(59)	(38)	(33)	(32)
15. Farm workers	0	1	2	0	5	23
	(190)	(190)	(269)	(62)	(163)	(172)
16. Labourers	3[d]	5[d]	4	7	4	7
	(141)	(211)	(331)	(303)	(384)	(398)
Total	20	20	22	22	25	30
	(1,831)	(2,166)	(2,696)	(3,072)	(4,171)	(4,856)

Explanation: The base number in thousands from which each percentage is calculated is given below in brackets.

See Table 3.4 for explanation of superior letters.

categories for women had changed little, but sex segregation in other forms of employment had declined slightly. In 1966 the six largest employment groups for women — clerks and typists, shop assistants, cleaners and domestic workers, textile and clothing factory workers, nurses, and teachers — accounted for 60 per cent of women in the workforce. Note that four of these largest employment groups were the same in 1966 as they had been half a century earlier and that another (textile workers and clothing factory workers) was the functional equivalent of a 1911 category (tailors and cutters). Although the proportion of women employed in these six largest categories was still very high (60 per cent), the occupational concentration among women had diminished. However, the degree of sex segregation declined only fractionally during the period under consideration. In 1911 there were 15 men for every 100 women employed in the six largest employment categories for women. By 1966 the ratio had changed only slightly, to 17 men for every 100 women in the six predominantly female categories.

Tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide a basis for evaluating segregation in the workforce. It is simply necessary to calculate the proportion of women who would need to change from one major employment group to another in order to make the distribution of women's jobs the same as that for men. Technically this amounts to computing the index of dissimilarity (ID) between the relative distributions of men's and women's occupational groups, or half the sum of the absolute differences in the column percentages (disregarding sign) for the various occupational groups at each census. We find that in 1911 the ID across these sixteen groups amounted to 56 per cent. In other words 56 per cent of women would have needed to change to another occupational group to achieve the same occupational profile as men (if more detailed job listings were used this figure would be larger, but for broad comparisons the sixteen categories will suffice). By 1966, the index had declined six percentage points, to 50 per cent.

It is instructive to compare the dissimilarity between men's and women's jobs with the dissimilarity exhibited by ethnic and racial minorities in relation to the native-born. The occupational distributions of Italian and Greek men in 1966 were markedly different from those of Australian-born men. Their indices of dissimilarity from the native-born were 32 per cent and 35 per cent respectively. Thus, the occupational distance of Italian and Greek immigrant men from Australian-born men was significantly less than the general occupational distance between men and women. The only minority population with a greater occupational distance from Australian-born men than that between men and women was Aboriginal-Australian men, for whom the ID was 58 per cent (Broom and Jones, 1973:34). That figure is somewhat greater than the male-female difference in 1966, and about the same as the male-female difference in 1911. However, when we consider that women in 1966 made up 29·5 per cent of the total workforce, compared with 2·4 per cent for Italian men, 1·2 per cent for Greek men, and 0.3 per cent for Aboriginal-Australian men, the impact of sex segregation in the workforce is striking. But in this respect Australia is not unique: occupational segregation, whether by sex, ethnicity, region, or race, is a characteristic of all industrial societies for which we have evidence. [3]

The segregation of occupational roles has major implications for social stratification, not all of which receive equal attention in this book. In our 1965 survey,

women were interviewed only to obtain information on their husbands, and non-English speaking respondents were underrepresented. In any event our sample was too small to yield suffiently large numbers of non-British immigrants — let alone numerically smaller minorities, such as Aboriginal Australians. We have, however, explored the relationship of racial and ethnic minorities to the overall stratification of Australian society in other contexts (Broom and Jones, 1973; Jones, 1969b), and in Chapters 5 and 7 we make some observations on women's income and the position of the foreign-born in the Australian stratification system. Some of the implications of the findings of this chapter on the changing structure of occupational roles are explored in a different context in Chapter 6, since aggregate changes in the composition of the workforce provide the minimal conditions for individual mobility. Structural changes, such as the movement of farm labour to urban factories or women into jobs previously the monopoly of men, change the pattern of occupational opportunity and the distribution of economic rewards, the topic of the next chapter.

3 For example, on women's status internationally see Broom and Selznick (1973:180-2); on French and English employment in Canada (ibid: 493-4); on the nonwhite labour force in the United States (ibid: 502-4).

4 Wealth and income

To estimate the distribution of personal income, the concentration of wealth, and the extent of poverty in any country is not easy; and to establish trends is even more difficult. Undertaking such investigations in Australia is particularly hazardous and frustrating because Australian statistics on the distribution of income and wealth are even more deficient than are data on occupational and educational status. Questions on income were asked only in a special wartime census in 1915 and in the regular census of 1933 (results from the wartime census are discussed below). In the 1933 census the government attempted to measure the extent of economic deprivation in a depression, but the data are of little use for establishing a baseline distribution, much less a trend in distribution, since they relate to a year in which the pattern of income distribution was unusually distorted. The census question called for income in six categories: no income, less than £52 per annum, £52-103, £104-155, £156-207, £208-259, and £260 and over. Consequently, the data are useful mainly for estimating numbers in the lower-income brackets.

Income has not been asked in any other Australian census. An income question was to have been included in the 1971 census, and the necessary preliminary work was done. A successful pilot test was carried out in the Quarterly Population Survey of November 1969 and a pretest was conducted in 1970. However, Cabinet abruptly deleted the question not long before census night. Thus large-scale baseline data on income distribution related to other significant social variables will not be available until 1976 at the earliest, and only then if administrative and political decisions coincide.

Attempts to measure the changing shape of the income distribution in Australia must therefore rely on sources other than the census. In the absence of regular government surveys of income and expenditure,[1] such as exist in almost all advanced countries, policy makers and scholars must depend on guesses, on sample surveys, or on indirect evidence created as a by-product of taxation procedures. National surveys are few, usually small in scale, and hardly permit detailed comparisons. Intensive studies of the earnings of a few specific occupational categories afford no basis for generalisation to other occupations except by the risky process of analogy. Among industrialised countries Australia is nearly unique in that it has not been possible to relate earnings to educational qualification in a comprehensive way until the publication in 1973 of the results of the 1969 pilot survey for the 1971 census.

Of the available sources, taxation statistics present no problems of sample size or inclusiveness: any person with an income of taxable size (in the mid-to-late 1960s, $416 per annum) is required to lodge a taxation return. But there are other complications: income splitting by the self-employed, allowable deductions which usually have a regressive effect, nontaxable fringe benefits, and capital

1 From July 1974 to June 1975, the Australian Bureau of Statistics conducted the first official survey of household expenditure in Australia.

gains which have tended to escape taxation. For sociological purposes taxation statistics suffer from the limitation that they are rarely related to other information about taxpayers, so that it is impossible to know how income differs by age, occupation, education, region, or ethnic and racial origin.

Not surprisingly, the available evidence on income distribution in Australia is sufficiently ambiguous to tolerate divergent interpretations, all of which Encel has offered: growing inequality, shrinking differentials in the postwar period, and stability in income distribution for most of the twentieth century:

> The growth of affluence [between 1949 and 1966] was accompanied by increases in social and economic inequality and an enhancement of the privileges of already privileged groups (Encel, 1970:5).

> Since the middle of the 1950s, distribution of income has become more unequal (Encel, 1970: 114).

> Since 1939 there has been a world-wide tendency for wage and salary differences to contract. In Australia this takes the form of a shrinking of the 'margin' for skill according to which wages and salaries above the basic wage are traditionally fixed (Davies and Encel, 1965:31-2).

> It should be noted, however, that the distribution of income appears to have remained largely unchanged during this century (Encel, 1970:115).

In what follows, we try on the basis of sketchy evidence — but the only evidence available — to assess the trends in the distribution of income and wealth up to the mid-1960s. On the whole we are forced to rely on data outside our own survey, since when we planned our 1965 study we were unduly influenced by the conventional ignorance that Australians would be reluctant to answer questions on income. Accordingly, we sought limited information on personal and family income in terms of six broad categories.

Poverty

In a supplement on Australia which appeared in the London *Times* on 10 March 1971, an unidentified commentator wrote:

> Distribution of wealth in Australia is among the most inequitable in the civilized world. The rich are very rich and the poor are very poor, and while there is really no excuse for poverty in such a potentially rich country, nevertheless it exists to an alarming degree.

No supporting evidence was offered for this assertion except some statistics on social services expenditure as a percentage of gross national product for several advanced industrialised nations, including Australia, a test on which Australia emerged poorly. There are, however, difficulties in interpreting statistics on social service expenditure and in using them for international comparison (see Kaim-Caudle, 1973, for a discussion of the main problems).

A major study of poverty conducted in the 1960s arrives at a different conclusion:

> Australia, while maintaining full employment and high wages, has made only very moderate social security expenditures *and yet has had considerable success in reducing proverty* (Henderson *et al.*, 1970:13. Our italics).

So the position is more complex than the *Times* columnist asserted, and involves more than a surface consideration of social security expenditure. The Henderson study suggested that about 7 per cent of Melbourne households were in poverty, compared with estimates of 14 per cent in the United Kingdom and 20 per cent in the United States (Henderson *et al.*, 1970: 3-4). His more recent inquiry on behalf of the Australian government gives the higher figure of 10 per cent (Henderson, 1974; see also Samuelson *et al.*, 1975: 210-13). We cannot say whether the Australian poor are poorer than those in

Britain or the United States, but almost certainly they are a smaller proportion of the population. A legitimate complaint is that, having come somewhat closer than either of the other two countries to eliminating poverty, Australian governments have not taken further steps to increase expenditure on social security in areas that would eliminate poverty suffered by one in ten Australian households ('income units' in Henderson's terminology).

Table 4.1 presents figures from the most recent International Labour Office compendium on social security expenditures in sixty-three countries for calendar year 1966, or financial year 1965-6. According to these statistics (and

Table 4.1: Social security expenditures as a percentage of gross national product and by origin of receipts, 1965-6 or 1966

Country	Percent of GNP	State receipts[a] (per cent)	Country	Percent of GNP	State receipts (per cent)
Australia	8.2	74.1	Jamaica	2.9	68.2
Austria	18.5	21.2	Japan	6.0	31.0
Belgium	16.3	26.9	Luxembourg	16.3	27.0
Brazil	6.7	N.A.	Malaysia	3.0	30.4
Bulgaria	10.0	29.3	Malta	8.8	67.5
Burma	0.9	87.4	Mexico	2.9	20.9
Cameroon	1.4	63.8	Netherlands	16.7	10.8
Canada	9.6	51.4	New Zealand	11.8	45.6
Ceylon	3.6	55.6	Nicaragua	2.6	52.3
China (Taiwan)	1.2	71.7	Norway	11.3	37.9
Colombia	1.2	36.1	Pakistan	0.5	44.9
Costa Rica	2.6	27.0	Panama	6.2	35.3
Cyprus	2.1	41.6	Paraguay	2.1	16.8
Czechoslovakia	17.0	64.1	Poland	9.4	36.9
Denmark	13.2	72.0	Portugal	5.3	22.5
Ecuador	2.9	20.5	Spain	4.0	4.2
El Salvador	2.4	52.8	Sweden	15.6	56.8
Finland	11.6	48.0	Switzerland	8.9	33.5
France	15.6	16.9	Syrian Arab Rep.	0.9	26.5
Germany (FR)	17.4	27.0	Toga	2.0	31.6
Ghana	1.3	49.5	Trinidad and Tobago	3.2	76.5
Greece	10.4	25.2	Tunisia	3.7	43.4
Guatemala	2.0	48.6	Turkey	1.7	4.9
Guyana	4.2	77.3	USSR	11.1	N.A.
Honduras	1.0	61.0	UK	12.6	42.7
Hungary	11.2	44.7	USA	7.2	37.4
Iceland	7.8	62.1	Upper Volta	2.8	44.8
India	1.7	30.7	Uruguay	7.5	8.6
Iraq	1.3	87.0	Venezuela	3.5	77.9
Ireland	10.2	68.8	Yugoslavia	12.3	6.9
Israel	7.1	31.8	Zambia	1.9	75.3
Italy	16.2	18.2			

[a] Percent of receipts from state and public authorities.
Source: ILO (1972): Tables 2 and 8.

it might be observed that no two sources for social security expenditures ever seem to give the same figures), Australia's expenditure on social security in 1965-6 was 8·2 per cent of gross national product (GNP), which placed Australia twenty-fifth among the countries listed — ahead of most developing countries but well behind most industrialised nations except Japan, Switzerland and the United States. Grouped into broad categories, only nine of the sixty-three countries (Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden) spent more than 15 per cent of GNP on social security, while thirty spent less than 5 per cent — mainly the poorer countries of Africa, Asia, and Central and South America. Australia is in a middle group of fourteen countries spending between 5 and 10 per cent of GNP on social security: Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Malta, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, the USA, and Uruguay.

The second column of Table 4.1 presents data which in the view of some economists (Downing, 1965:159) shows Australia in a more favourable light and partly explains the cost-effectiveness of the Australian social security system. The column shows for each country the percentage of receipts for social security expenditures that derive from state and other public authorities rather than sources such as contributions by insured persons and employers. According to this statistic about three-quarters of social security receipts in Australia come from public funds, a figure approached among European countries only by Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ireland, and Malta.

A distinction is thus made between countries that finance social security primarily through general government revenue (that is taxation) and those that rely more heavily on special taxes from insured persons or employers. While both systems result in some income redistribution, the first achieves a greater degree of vertical redistribution (transfers from the rich to the poor) because of the progressive nature of general taxation. The second system tends to make horizontal transfers of income from the healthy to the sick, from persons with no or few dependants to those with many, and from those with a lower incidence of misfortune, such as unemployment or injury, to those with a higher incidence (Kolsen, 1965:3). In short, under the first system payments tend to be in accordance with ability to pay, whereas in the second case payments tend to be at a flat rate, and the poor pay as much as the rich. It is partly because of its heavy reliance on taxation and public funds to finance social security that Australia has been able to support a reasonable standard of welfare even though it spends what at first sight seems a relatively low proportion of GNP on social security.

A second factor to be considered in evaluating social security expenditure is Australia's reliance, unusual in advanced countries, on the means test to determine eligibility for cash benefits. Although some welfare provisions, e.g. maternity allowances, child allowances, education, and scholarships,[2] are available universally, cash social benefits of an income maintenance type are subject to a test of need. We need not describe the procedures in detail since excellent accounts are readily available and the actual cutoff levels vary over time according to governmental decisions (Henderson *et al.*, 1970; Kolsen, 1965; Hancock, 1965, 1971).

2 Educational allowances are treated as taxable income in the case of dependent children.

Most Australians accept what may appear a denial of social justice, that a person who has paid taxes to finance social security benefits may be disallowed from lodging claims for an aged or widow's pension because he or she has private means above the level permitted by the means test. There is widespread acceptance of the means-test principle, and although it has been progressively liberalised, particularly for the old, its total abolition is unlikely. Political parties when in opposition tend to declare their intention, if elected, to abolish the means tests (Kolsen, 1965:19; Henderson *et al.*, 1970:10-13), but abolition would be expensive, since the main advantage of the means test is that it concentrates benefits where they are most needed — among those with little income or property. The introduction of the tapered means test in 1969 and the abolition of the means test for persons over the age of 75 in 1973 significantly eased the difficult position of many older persons whose fixed incomes had been eroded by inflation but who had some assets and consequently were ineligible for aged pensions. Even so, pride seems to keep some older persons from applying for the pension even though they are eligible (Henderson *et al.*, 1970:70-2).[3] Although the Australian Labor Government has announced its intention to abolish the means test for aged pensions, it has yet to implement that policy for aged persons under 75.

3 Kaim-Caudle (1973:131) notes that expenditure on pensions for the aged is usually the largest single item in social security expenditure. It is worth observing therefore that because of the means test, expenditure on aged pensions in 1962-3 amounted to about one-third of total social security expenditure in Australia (a country with relatively low *per capita* expenditure) but for example one-half in West Germany which had higher *per capita* expenditure but achieved virtually no vertical redistribution of income through its earnings-related pension insurance scheme (Kaime-Caudle, 1973:138).

Without doubt a significant number of people live in poverty in Australia, if not on the scale sometimes suggested by popular journalism. Poverty is often the lot of the old (especially migrants), families without fathers, large families, the unemployed, the chronically ill, and persons with multiple handicaps.

> Most poverty [in Melbourne] is among the existing social service beneficiaries-above all the aged, the widowed, the invalid and the sick. The machinery exists, therefore, for coping with most of the problems of poverty. It can be largely eliminated by quite moderate increases in rates of cash social benefit ... The net cost of [our] proposals could be brought to about $100 million by the elimination of tax deductions for dependent children, which would be made redundant by our proposals for higher rates of child endowment (Henderson *et al.*, 1970).

In his nationwide study of poverty Henderson found much the same pattern as he had in Melbourne, with the greatest poverty still among the recipients of welfare payments (Henderson, 1974). Thus inflation has eroded the real value of pensions despite increases in nominal benefits. There is moreover an inherent ambiguity in public policy about the role of the state in reducing inequality and a major difference on this question between political parties of the right and left (Mathews, 1970:234-5).

The Distribution of Wealth

There are more studies of the poor than of the rich, of the powerless than the powerful: the poor and the powerless are less organised and less able to resist the efforts of researchers. Moreover, researchers are often more motivated to understand and ameliorate the position of disadvantaged groups in the population. As a consequence little systematic knowledge exists about the role of the rich in Australian industrial, commercial, political and social life.

A small probability sample of the workforce such as ours obviously cannot tell much about the top 5 or 10 per cent of the income distribution. Studies which have concentrated on the top of the income structure have reached varying conclusions. Although one day it may be shown that there are '60 families who own Australia' [4] (Campbell, 1963), the most extensive study to date of company ownership suggests that this is a caricature of the Australian economy (Wheelwright and Miskelly, 1967:4). Their study of 299 large companies did indeed reveal a high concentration of ownership and a core of wealthy families. Even in their restricted sample Wheelwright and Miskelly identified eighty-four persons with more than half a million dollars in shareholdings alone. But they concluded that family capitalism was no longer extensive, that it had declined after World War II as a consequence of the growing importance of overseas corporations and overseas investment. They found that most large holdings were in the hands of companies and overseas investors: 36 per cent of total shareholdings and 62 per cent of the twenty largest shareholdings were held almost exclusively by companies (Wheelwright and Miskelly, 1967:2-3). However, there is no doubt that if one could trace out company linkages in detail and decompose company holdings into effective ownership, indirect family shareholdings would prove to be more significant.

Evidence from Death Duties

In an attempt to measure the distribution of wealth in Australia, we have analysed estate duty returns for the state of Victoria, for which reasonable longitudinal data exist. State data are more suitable for such an analysis because state probate exempts fewer property holders and therefore covers a greater proportion of deceased estates than federal statistics on death duties.

There are numerous difficulties in undertaking such an analysis. Apart from questions about the reliability and inclusiveness of probate returns, the use of reports on the estates of deceased persons to estimate the distribution of wealth in a community implies that persons die randomly, or nearly randomly, irrespective of their economic positions. While death in the long run may not be a respecter of persons, it is more likely to respect the rich than the poor. For example the succession period among the wealthy is longer than among the poor. But because the poor have little or no property to bequeath, this differential may not be consequential for our analysis. For a longitudinal analysis it may be more important that wealthy persons can anticipate succession by passing on part of their wealth *inter vivos* in the form of gifts, which attract a lower rate of tax than bequests, or by the formation of family companies, which can survive the death of individual family members. We return to these problems of interpretation below.

Table 4.2 provides a comparison of the number and value of the estates of deceased males which were submitted for probate assessment in Victoria in 1915 and 1965. In 1915 estates up to a net value of £1000 were exempt from probate duty. Knibbs (1918:30) estimated from the results of the 1915 wartime census that the average net assets of Victorian males was £729 and that in Australia as a whole 89 per cent of men had net assets amoun-

4 That Australia and the United States should both have had 60 families that owned their respective countries is a remarkable coincidence of statistics or sloganeering (cf. Lundberg, 1937).

ting to less than £1000. It seems clear that an overwhelming majority of Australians at that time left estates which attracted no probate duty. To illustrate this fact we can relate the total number of estates shown in the second column of Table 4.2 (2919) to the number of adult male deaths recorded in Victoria in 1915 (6596 among men 20 years of age or older). The calculation suggests that fewer than half (44 per cent) of the men who died in 1915 had any assets at death. If we take £1000 as a lower limit, in 1915 only about one in seven men died with substantial net assets.

In 1965, however, as many as 80 per cent of adult men who died were included in the probate returns: 14,406 deaths of men 20 years of age or older were recorded in that year, compared with 11,534 estates of men for which probates or letters of administration were issued.[5] In 1965 any estate with a net value exceeding $1200 attracted probate duty unless the estate passed to a surviving spouse or to children, in which case the exempt net value was $12,000 (*Victorian Yearbook*, 1968: 637). Therefore many more small estates are reported in the 1965 returns than in 1915, but because of changing money values the categories used do not differentiate the two time points equally well. The 1915 categories are more clumped at the bottom, reflecting also the lower incidence of home ownership at that time. In 1965 the family home and consumer durables were the main forms of wealth for most families (Podder and Kakwani, 1973).

Table 4.2 presents unadjusted figures

5 We are unable to allow for the fact that some estates are not processed in the year in which the death occurs. However, unless there are major differences in death rates or in the speed with which probate is assessed from one year to the next, this lack of parallelism between the two sets of statistics should not introduce systematic error.

Table 4.2: Number and value of estates of deceased males in Victoria, 1915 and 1965 (in cumulative percentages)

Value in 1915 (1)	Number (2)	Net value[a] (3)	Number (4)	Net value[b] (5)	Value in 1965 (6)
Under £100	16.8	0.3	3.6	0.0	Under $200
£100-299	38.7	2.0	10.4	0.2	$200-599
£300-499	51.1	4.1	15.5	0.5	$600-999
£500-999	66.3	8.6	25.7	1.4	$1,000-1,999
£1,000-1,999	79.4	16.6	40.0	4.2	$2,000-3,999
£2,000-2,999	85.6	23.0	50.3	7.5	$4,000-5,999
£3,000-3,999	88.8	27.7	59.1	11.5	$6,000-7,999
£4,000-4,999	91.3	32.4	66.7	15.9	$8,000-9,999
£5,000-9,999	96.6	47.4	82.2	30.1	$10,000-19,999
£10,000-14,999	98.4	56.3	87.9	39.0	$20,000-29,999
£15,000-24,999	99.0	61.9	93.2	52.3	$30,000-49,999
£25,000-49,999	99.6	69.9	97.8	72.8	$50,000-99,999
£50,000-99,999	99.7	72.9	99.6	88.6	$100,000-199,999
£100,000 or over	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	$200,000 or over
Total (100%)	2,919	6,959	11,534	177,382	Total (100%)

[a] in £000s.
[b] in $000s.
Source: *Victorian Yearbook*, 1915-16, and 1968.

for both periods. Even at face value they show a significant decline in the inequality of wealth over the fifty-year period. In 1915 the top 0·3 per cent of estates accounted for 27·1 per cent of the net value of estates, whereas in 1965 0·4 per cent accounted for less than half that figure, 11·4 per cent. However, even the more recent figure is indicative of a high degree of inequality in the distribution of wealth. Note that half the estates reported in 1965 account for a mere 7·5 per cent of total net value, compared with 4·1 per cent in 1915. A summary measure of inequality is provided by the Gini coefficient of concentration, which approaches zero as the share of each estate approaches equal net value and approaches unity as fewer estates account for a greater share of total net value. In the extreme case where one person owned all the wealth this coefficient would be 1·00. If it were equally shared, it would be 0·0 (cf. Samuelson *et al.*, 1975:196). In 1915 the Gini coefficient calculated from the figures shown in Table 4.2 is ·80 indicating great inequality. By 1965 it had declined to ·69.

To correct for the lower proportion of small estates in the 1915 statistics, we have simply inflated the number of returns from 44·2 per cent of adult male deaths to 80·1 per cent (the 1965 proportion) and increased the *lowest* category of estates by an additional 2364 men, the net value of whose estates we have estimated at £38.71, or the average net value of estates already included in that category. This estimate has the effect of increasing the number of estates by 81 per cent but their net value by a mere 1 per cent because the adjustment is for very small estates and presumably some with a negative valuation. This correction seems appropriate in view of the fact that although 'probates or letters of administration are taken out in respect of about 25 per cent only of the persons who die each year in Victoria ... it would seem that property belonging to the poorer classes of the community will be small in proportion to the total ...' (*Victorian Yearbook*, 1915-16:293).

The above correction is crude and to a degree inaccurate, but some allowance needs to be made for small, unreported estates in 1915 in order to derive a more realistic comparison with 1965. Its obvious effect is to increase inequality in 1915, so that the share of the bottom half of the estates of deceased males is reduced to less than 2 per cent while the share of the top one-half per cent is increased to 37·6 per cent. The Gini coefficient is thus increased from ·80 to ·87, showing extreme inequality compared with the 1965 figure of ·69.

This analysis suggests that in the half century from 1915 to 1965 inequality in the distribution of wealth, as revealed in the estates of deceased men in Victoria, decreased by about a fifth. Even so, in the mid-1960s wealth inequality was still quite marked and much greater than income inequality, as we shall see below.

In an analysis covering the same period but using different data, Podder and Kakwani (1973) compared income and wealth from 1915 census figures with a survey of income, assets, and expenditure conducted by Gates, Edwards, and Drane (for a report of the survey see Bentley *et al.*, 1973). Their findings for the whole country in 1915 are similar to ours for the state of Victoria. The Gini index of inequality is calculated at ·861 (almost identical with our adjusted figure), and their distribution of wealth shows that the top one-half per cent of adult males controlled 31 per cent of the net assets held by the adult males resident in Australia. Our estimate (adjusted) is somewhat higher, 37·6 per cent.

The Podder and Kakwani figures for 1966-7 are not entirely comparable with ours, since their units of analysis are households rather than adult males and because the geographical areas are different. They derive a Gini coefficient of ·521, which is substantially lower than our calculation from Victorian probate returns of ·69. However, the 1966-7 survey on which their analysis is based was restricted to urban areas and therefore excluded many wealthy farmers. We know from federal estate duties that a high proportion of wealthy Australians are in primary industry. In 1965-6, 26 per cent of the estates of deceased males subject to federal estate duty were in primary industry, and the average dutiable values of their estates was $43,447, 32 per cent higher than the average of $32,948. Therefore the exclusion of rural properties from the 1966-7 survey understates the real inequality in the distribution of wealth in Australia in the mid-1960s. Our comparison based on the Victorian probate returns seems to provide a fairer estimate of long-term change in the inequality of wealth in Australia.

The figures given in Table 4.2 indicate that a small proportion of Australians occupy a highly privileged position in the ownership of property and that position is sustained through the inheritance system. Our estimates suggest that the top one-half per cent of the population controls over 10 per cent of the country's wealth that appears in the estates of deceased males. With improved legal advice on estate management, an increasing proportion of private wealth never appears in deceased estates at all. Income from property has a direct effect on the material well-being of a decreasing proportion of Australians since most derive their income from wages and salaries. Over the postwar period the share of personal disposable income from property and unincorporated enterprises has fallen while the share from wages and salaries has risen from 65 per cent in 1948-9 to 78 per cent in 1967-8 (Hancock, 1971:31). The quality of life of most Australians is thus less affected by inequality of wealth than by the distribution of wages and salaries. Even if wealth were more equally distributed it would have only a modest effect on the living standards of the middle mass. Nonetheless redistribution to the bottom 5-10 per cent would tangibly reduce poverty. In the longer run the dispersion and absolute level of incomes are probably more crucial to material well-being.

The Distribution of Income

Studies of the dispersion of employment incomes in Australia, carried out by Lydall (1968) and Hancock (1971), rely mainly on income tax statistics, which until recently were the only comprehensive source for an analysis of income inequality. Lydall included twenty-five countries in his comparative analysis but he was forced to make preliminary judgments about the distribution of wages and salaries in Australia to bring tax data in line with his concept of the standard income distribution (1968:141-2, 190-3). Lydall calculated income dispersion in relation to the ratio of specified percentiles of the income distribution to the median (1968: 142-4), whereas Hancock calculated both the Gini coefficient of concentration and the ratio between different quartiles of the income distribution, using unadjusted returns separately for male taxpayers and all taxpayers (1971: 33-4).

As a result of his analysis Lydall clustered twenty-five countries into five groups, ranging from those with the most equally distributed employment incomes

to those with the least. Australia was found, along with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and New Zealand, in the most equal group. The next group consists largely of western European and North American countries. The Netherlands, Spain, France and Finland had more unequal distributions. The five countries with the most unequally distributed incomes were in Asia and Latin America.

> The broad picture seems, then, to be that, amongst non-communist countries, the degree of dispersion of pre-tax employment income is related roughly to the degree of economic development, although Australia and New Zealand are exceptionally equal on this criterion, and France is exceptionally unequal. The communist countries are, in relation to level of economic development, all more equal than the non-communist countries, but amongst them the more highly industrialized seem to be more equal than the others. The widest dispersion occurs amongst the very poor and industrially backward countries of Asia and Latin America (Lydall, 1968:157).

Lydall's conclusion that employment incomes are relatively equally distributed in Australia receives support from the finding of the Melbourne poverty survey that, by contrast with some other countries, low skill and unemployment do not appear to be important causes of poverty (Henderson *et al.*, 1970:40).[6] Australia's system of industrial arbitration and the long reliance on the concept of a basic wage (the amount necessary to support a worker and his family in reasonable comfort) has tended to keep persons able to work above the poverty line. The postwar policy of full employment also reduced the 'army of the poor'.

Hancock's analysis of the distribution of personal disposable incomes in Australia during the postwar period confirms Lydall's conclusion about the relatively equal dispersion of income. Hancock found that the Gini coefficient of concentration of taxable incomes of male taxpayers decreased slightly between 1951-2 and 1966-7 from ·33 to ·29, a level of inequality reduced further by the effects of tax to ·26 (1971:34). A pretax figure is not available for the earlier period. We have not used Hancock's 1950-1 inequality figure since that income year was characterised by abnormally high rural incomes, which distorted the established pattern of inequality. The Gini coefficient for 1950-1 was ·42, a figure much higher than in the year before or the year after (·34 and ·33 respectively). This marked distortion illustrates the effect that sharply increased earnings in one sector of the workforce can have on income inequality and should serve as a *caveat* for those looking for trends and making historical comparisons.

Tax statistics are not an entirely adequate source of information for the analysis of income inequality. There is the possibility of taxpayers misreporting, intentionally or unintentionally, and the figures do not distinguish full-time from part-time workers or earned income from property income. Some income earners, moreover, earn their income from more than one job, and 'moonlighters' and other casual workers may evade tax by failing to report at least part of their income. However, apart from such evasion, wage and salary earners are not in a position to avoid tax.

Whereas wage workers may *evade* tax, the self-employed and managers can with legal guidance *avoid* tax. The self-employed can take advantage of income-splitting devices such as partnerships and private companies; highly paid managerial staff often receive nontaxable fringe benefits. We know of no Australian data that bear on the value of fringe benefits, but some British evidence indicates that fringe benefits and perquisites

6 Low skill, however, does appear to be a cause of unemployment. See Chapter 2.

amounted to 11 per cent of salary (for managers on a basic salary of £1050), rising to 31 per cent for those on a basic salary of £7000 or more (Lydall, 1968: 269). Such untaxed benefits are an attractive way to offset the progressive effects of income taxes, particularly in a country like Australia, where the structure of tax rates remained basically unchanged for two decades after 1954[7] despite the fact that between 1954 and 1966 average weekly earnings increased by 75 per cent (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1967a:326). Throughout this period and afterward, the impact of income taxation has increased substantially, both in the number of persons affected and in the percent of incomes taken by government.

Evidence on income splitting shows that in the 1960s the tax laws benefited taxpayers obtaining their income from rents, interests, and profits, and weighed more heavily on wage and salary earners (Russell, 1970:114). Between 1954-5 and 1966-7 the amount of income tax revenue extracted from wage and salary earners increased by 311 per cent, but the number of individual taxpayers increased by only 34 per cent. Over the same period partnerships increased by 110 per cent and private companies by 218 per cent (Russell, 1970: x-xi, 52). In short, figures for individual taxpayers tell only part of the story about income distribution, and as the incentives for finding legal ways of avoiding income tax (or estate duty) increase, the task of interpreting such statistics, and changes in them, becomes more complex.

Despite these problems of interpretation, Hancock's analysis identifies the broad trends. A comparison of the relative incomes of the highest and lowest quarters of taxpayers (the high- and low-income groups), shows that after the early 1950s the income gap became narrower. However, comparing the quartile just above the median with that immediately below (the middle-income groups), suggests that the gap was constant throughout the 1950s but widened in the 1960s. These apparently countervailing trends can be attributed to several causes: to the worsening position of primary producers, to income splitting among high-income earners, to the policies of wage-fixing tribunals regarding payments for margins of skill above the basic wage, and finally to wage drift resulting from over-award payments in industries that are able to pay higher wages to attract and retain skilled workers or, perhaps, cannot afford protracted strikes (Hancock, 1971:24-5; Lydall, 1968:191-3).

Another longitudinal analysis of changes in income distribution compares data from the 1915 wartime census and a quarterly population survey conducted in November 1969 by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (Jones, 1975a). In 1915 the top 1 per cent of male income earners received 14·6 per cent of the total net income reported by adult males, a figure that declined to 7·9 per cent in 1969. Over the same period the Gini coefficient of income inequality fell from an estimated ·42 in 1915 (adjusted to include pensioners) to ·34 in 1969. The latter figure is conservative in relation to the 1915 index, which is based on net income, not gross personal income as was the 1969 survey. Note that the level of income inequality indicated by the 1969 survey is higher than Hancock's calculation from tax statistics, a difference attributable to the exclusion from taxation returns of many low income earners, especially pensioners. But even on a conservative estimate, it

7 There have, however, been rebates and surcharges appled from time to time. See Hancock, 1971:19; and Samuelson *et al.*, 1975:183-9.

appears that in the half century from 1915 to 1969 income inequality among adult men, like wealth inequality, decreased by at least one-fifth.

Sources of Income Inequality: Sex, Age, Education, and Occupation

So far we have discussed income inequality only for male income earners and in aggregate terms. We have not yet addressed the questions of inequality in the incomes of women or how their incomes have changed over time. One difficulty is that even in the 1960s a minority of women had earned incomes. According to the 1969 survey of income, 61·5 per cent of women with income gained it in transfer payments from the government, that is to say in the form of pensions and endowment for their children. Only 27 per cent of women who reported income, but 91 per cent of men, derived it from wages or salary, business, trade, profession, or a share in a partnership (Jones, 1975a).

It is common knowledge that women in Australia have been paid less than men, even when employed in the same work category. Although the principle of equal pay for equal work has lately been accepted, its application is recent, partial, and in many cases irrelevant, since the jobs men and women pursue overlap little. Women in the same jobs as men earn less, and women with the same educational level (presumably with equivalent skill) also earn less. Table 4.3 presents survey data documenting inequalities between the sexes for five age groups and for different educational levels. Regrettably, the smaller number of women engaged in full-time year-round work limits the detail in which the educational analysis can be pursued.

Women earn less than men because of discriminatory wage practices and the unwillingness of employers to give women jobs with the same responsibility as men. Women's careers are typically discontinuous because the fulfilment of wifely roles often involves the interruption of working careers with the consequent loss of momentum, seniority, and work experience. The last two factors are usually not important in the early stages of a woman's career, but as Table 4.3 shows even among the youngest cohort (persons aged 15 to 24 years) men earn considerably more than women. While the numbers are not large enough to sustain close comparison at the higher educational levels, a conservative estimate indicates that a woman aged 15 to 24 with technical or trade qualifications earned $2110, or 33 per cent less than the $3140 for a man of the same age with only a trade level qualification. The median income of women aged 25 to 34 with a tertiary education is less than a man in the same age group with only a trade qualification ($3830) and barely higher than a man who left school at 17 ($3480). This pattern of lower earnings is consistent across all age groups and all levels of education. Thus, a woman aged between 25 and 34 in 1969 who left school when she was 13 or younger earned a median income of $1760, a figure little more than half that of her male counterpart.

An undetermined amount of the income difference between the sexes is attributable to the fact that women are heavily concentrated in jobs that pay less than other jobs in the same broad category: in the medical professions the tertiary educated woman is likely to be a nurse, not a doctor; in the teaching profession a primary school teacher rather than a headmaster or a subject master; in white-collar work a typist, not a supervisory clerk; on the factory floor, an operative,

not a foreman. But before considering detailed occupations, a few comments on age patterns of income are required.

According to Table 4.3, income rises with age for men and women, regardless of education, until middle age. From age 45 onwards median income tends to decline except among men with tertiary education, whose incomes continue to increase. A man who left school with a matriculation certificate or its equivalent and had no other qualifications, experienced increasing income until his mid-fifties and a decline thereafter, a pattern paralleled by women with technical or trade qualifications.[8]

Although the age figures are incomplete because of the small numbers of cases, it is instructive to estimate lifetime earnings for different classes of workers by projecting the experience of workers in 1968-9. We assumed a working career spanning ages 22 and 64 years for persons with tertiary qualifications, and a working career from age 18 to 64 for those with other qualifications or the matriculation certificate. For those with no postschool qualifications we assumed a career spanning the year after school-leaving age to age 65. We emphasise that our results are only crude approximations of actual lifetime earnings. We estimated the values for missing cells by extrapolation from the mean income in the nearest level of education and age; we left out of account changes in income within broad age groups; and we made no adjustment for changing money values.

8 We recognise that technically cross-section data cannot be used to define lifetime earnings in any rigorous way. But in the absence of longitudinal data, we have to make do with the hypothesis that wage relativities by age (or better, work experience) are fairly constant over time. This hypothesis is fairly secure for men, but not for women because an increasing proportion pursue work without interruption.

Moreover, since part of the reason for the lower incomes of women is discontinuity in their careers, the application of observed income levels as though they represented actual income levels of a continuous working life overstates the true difference between the incomes of men and women and exaggerates the 'wages of sex' (Power, 1974). But we know of no published data that would allow us to take into direct account the effect of a shorter working life on earned income.

The cost of a broken career, or discrimination in promotion and pay, is greatest for women with a tertiary education. Although they start out with earnings 80 to 90 per cent that of men with equivalent qualifications, relative average earnings decline with age until by their late thirties and early forties tertiary-educated women earn only half as much as their male counterparts. There is no expectation on average of increasing remuneration for women as they grow older, a fact we interpret to mean that because of interrupted careers older women must compete with younger women and with younger men, and therefore at lower ranges in the pay structure. The higher the skill a woman has, the greater her financial sacrifice because of marriage and childrearing.

Two telling generalisations can be drawn from Table 4.4. First, women who worked full-time and for a full year in 1968-9 had a pattern of earnings amounting on average to between one-half and two-thirds the lifetime expectations of men with the same general level of education. Second, the relative income gap between men and women is nearly constant across all educational groups except for those with a tertiary qualification (degree or non-degree), where the income gap is greatest. This suggests that a break in work experience 'costs' highly educated workers

more, presumably because their skills depreciate through disuse or obsolescence.

We reported in Chapter 2 that in the mid-1960s both men and women in Australia thought that a young girl needed less education to get along than a young man. This popular opinion gains practical support from the lower financial returns of education to women who participate in paid employment outside the home.

Income data for specific occupations are presented in Table 4.5 at the end of this chapter. Although the census classification distinguishes over 300 such occupational groups, detailed data are available for only 69 occupations. Of these occupations, there were no males or too few in ten occupations, and nil or too few females in forty-seven to warrant calculating a median income. Because women are concentrated in so few occupations, data for both sexes can be given for only

Table 4.3: Median income of full-year, full-time male and female workers in relation to educational attainment and age, 1968-69

Educational attainment	Age					Total
	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and over	
			Males			
With post-school qualifications						
University degree	*	5,900	7,350	7,940	8,060	6,620
Non-degree tertiary	3,500	4,660	5,770	5,850	6,380	5,110
Technician level	3,210	4,460	5,080	5,080	4,530	4,610
Trade level	3,140	3,830	3,960	3,820	3,450	3,690
Without post-school qualifications						
Matriculation	2,740	4,110	4,510	5,120	4,590	3,780
Left school at						
17	2,560	3,480	4,130	4,200	4,090	3,300
16	2,240	3,470	4,070	3,910	3,570	3,120
14 or 15	2,220	3,230	3,510	3,310	3,050	3,090
13 or under	*	3,020	3,030	3,130	2,850	3,010
			Females			
With post-school qualifications						
University degree or non-degree tertiary	2,820	3,620	4,090	3,990	3,940	3,210
Technician or trade level	2,110	2,550	2,490	2,700	*	2,380
Without post-school qualifications						
Matriculation	2,000	*	*	*	*	2,370
Left school at						
17	1,870	2,330	2,470	2,350	*	2,080
16	1,690	2,310	2,510	2,370	2,180	1,950
14 or 15	1,580	2,170	2,080	2,080	1,950	1,910
13 or under	*	1,750	1,970	1,960	1,930	1,880

An asterisk indicates too few cases to calculate a reliable median.
Source: Australia, 1973: Part 2, Table 17 (sample survey).

Table 4.4: Estimated life-time earnings of full-year, full-time workers by education, 1968-69

Educational attainment	Estimated life-time income in $000s		
	(1) Males	(2) Females	(3) (2) ÷ (1)
With post-school qualifications			
University degree	371	192	.52
Non-degree tertiary	270	151	.56
Technician level	233	150	.64
Trade level	*	*	*
Without post-school qualifications			
Matriculation	222	143	.64
Left school at 17	202	123	.61
16	192	117	.61
14 or 15	171	107	.63
13 or under	163	102	.63

Missing data for women were calculated from a detailed comparison of incomes for males and for males and females together. For this purpose unpublished data on the number of income earners in each category were used.

*Too few cases for comparison.

Source: Australia, 1973: Part 2, Table 18 (sample survey).

twelve of the sixty-nine occupations listed.

It can be seen that the dispersion of income among men is much higher than among women. To some extent this is an artifact of differences in occupational distribution and of the lower workforce participation rates among women, and the figures indicate the overall impact of such factors on women's incomes. Of those occupations for which we have data, the highest average female incomes were earned by school teachers ($3360) and the lowest by domestics ($1270). The ratio of high to low is about two and a half to one. Among men a high of $11,500 among medical practitioners and a low of $2140 among station hands gives a ratio of more than five to one. While it is obvious that women doctors earn more than women teachers, it is also obvious that teaching is more typical of the jobs women can enter. Our point is simply that the effective range of income to which most women can aspire is far narrower than is the case for men. The lack of data on the earnings of women professionals is also evident in the periodic reports of the Appointments Board of the University of Melbourne. In a 35-page booklet women receive half a page.

> Because of the small number of women included in the survey it has not been possible to analyse their incomes in detail. Average incomes of women are lower than those of men in every profession — in general much lower, proportionately, than the provision made by award rates in non-professional occupations (Gravell, 1970:35).

In none of the twelve occupations for which there are data on both men and women does the average income for men fall below that of women. The smallest absolute difference in median income between the sexes is $620 among barbers and hairdressers. The largest is $1520

Table 4.5: Median dollar incomes of male and female full-year, full-time workers in selected occupations, 1968-69

Occupation (a)	Males	Females
Civil engineers	7,720	n.a.
Electrical and communications engineers	6,670	n.a.
Medical practitioners	11,500	*
Nurses, incl. trainees	*	2,220
Primary and secondary teachers — government	4,660	3,360
Judges, magistrates, barristers, solicitors and legal officers	9,800	*
Draftsmen and tracers	4,300	*
Technicians and technical assistants n.e.c. (excl. laboratory technicians and assistants)	3,980	*
Accountants and auditors	5,870	*
Employers, workers on own account, directors, managers, n.e.c. —		
Manufacturing, incl. electricity, gas, water and sanitary services	5,720	*
Building and construction	4,890	*
Finance and property	6,140	*
Commerce, excl. shopkeepers working on own account	4,280	2,820
Amusement, hotels and other accommodation, cafes, personal services	4,310	2,870
Bookkeepers, cashiers, incl. bank tellers	3,480	2,270
Stenographers and typists	*	2,180
Office machine operators	*	1,990
Receptionists	*	1,960
Clerical workers — government, n.e.c.	3,790	2,270
Clerical workers — non-government, n.e.c.	3,440	2,070
Auctioneers, valuers and real estate salesmen	4,880	*
Commercial travellers and manufacturing agents	3,800	*
Proprietors and shopkeepers working on own account, n.e.c. retail and wholesale trade	2,900	*
Salesmen and shop assistants, n.e.c. retail and wholesale trade	2,770	1,790
Graziers	3,030	*
Dairy farmers	2,240	*
Wheat and sheep farmers	3,420	*
Farmers — mixed, and farmers	2,760	*
Station hands, drovers, shearing shed hands and general hands, grazing	2,140	*
Gardeners, nursery workers	2,460	*
Car, taxi and hire car drivers	3,000	*
Motor truck and van drivers, incl. delivery men and motor drivers	2,970	*
Telephonists and phonogram operators	*	2,090
Postmen, postal assistants, postal officers and telegram delivery men	3,050	*
Machinists, sewers, embroiderers, textile products, leather garments and gloves	*	1,720
Fitters, n.e.c. and fitters and turners	3,530	n.a.

Occupation (a)	Males	Females
Machine tool setters and operators, metal working incl. metal machinists	2,890	*
Motor vehicle mechanics	3,080	n.a.
Sheet metal workers, can makers and panel beaters	3,150	*
Plumbers and pipe fitters	3,340	n.a.
Welders and flame cutters	3,140	*
Boilermakers, incl. metal plate and structural steel workers	3,660	*
Electricians, incl. electrical mechanics	3,700	*
Telecommunications technicians	3,910	*
Linemen, electrical, cable jointers	3,190	*
Assemblers, process workers, metal, electrical	2,880	1,900
Tradesmen's assistants, metal, electrical	2,840	*
Carpenters, joiners	3,370	n.a.
Painters and decorators, building, construction and maintenance, incl. painters	3,110	*
Bricklayers, stonemasons	3,480	n.a.
Plasterers	3,190	*
Concrete and terrazzo workers	3,240	n.a.
Printing machinists, printers	3,500	*
Bakers, pastrycooks	3,040	*
Meat cutters, canners, preservers	3,060	*
Packers, wrappers, labellers	2,640	1,760
Operators of earthmoving and other construction machinery	3,100	n.a.
Waterside workers	3,470	n.a.
Storemen, incl. storemen and packers	2,890	*
Labourers, metals, engineering and electrical goods	2,700	*
Labourers, building and construction, n.e.c.	2,630	n.a.
Policemen	3,930	*
Maids, hotel, hospital, incl. cabin stewards (excl. private households)	*	1,810
Catering and kitchen workers, incl. canteen assistants (excl. private households)	*	1,847
Domestic workers, private households, n.e.c.	n.a.	1,270
Waiters and waitresses	*	1,770
Cleaners, offices, buildings	2,620	1,840
Barbers, hairdressers, beauticians and related workers	2,550	1,900
Attendants, hospital and other medical, incl. nursing aides and assistant nurses	2,700	1,740

(a) According to the 1966 Census classification of occupations.
n.a. — Not available.

*Figure not shown because of high sampling variability.

Note: 1. The occupations shown are those recorded at the time of the survey (November 1969). They are not necessarily the occupations or principal occupations engaged in during the year 1968-69.
2. The figures shown are based on unweighted sample data and a limited number of income intervals and may subsequently be revised.

Source: Australia, 1973: Part 2, Table 20 (sample survey).

among government clerical workers, an ironic commentary on the performance of government on the principle of equal pay, at least up to the late 1960s. We recognise that the average age of women in these jobs is rather low, but this observation presumably holds also for clerical workers in private industry where the gap is $150 less. The data in Table 4.5, although the best available, are admittedly crude and make no allowance for overtime, second jobs, age, or years employed. If more reliable statistics were available, we could better evaluate the cost of age and sex in the marketplace and the advantages of youth, education, and masculinity. As we have repeatedly complained, income data in Australia are meagre, and there is no continuous official source to give anything but the vaguest answer to questions of great importance. The evidence is slender indeed for formulating governmental policy and for government to monitor the impact of the economy on the populace — or for the people to monitor the performance of government.

5 Class

In 1930 Morris Ginsberg observed, 'it is extremely difficult to say what exactly one is conscious of when one is class conscious' (Ginsberg, 1930:536). In the intervening decades there has been a wealth of empirical research and some convergence of competing theories and methodologies, but there is still no universally accepted paradigm for the study of social class. At one extreme, classes are conceived as actual or potential conflict groups in the process of social change. At the other extreme, classes are considered as little more than nominal constructs used by social observers to describe relations of superiority and inferiority between persons and groups. Dahrendorf's point of view, which derived explicitly from the writings of Karl Marx, illustrates the conflict perspective. For Dahrendorf, '*Class* is always a category for purposes of the dynamics of social conflict and its structural roots ...' and he separates the study of stratification from the study of class (1959:76, 140). However, he seems to have modified his position in later writings (Dahrendorf, 1964, 1967).

For other writers class involves more subtle behaviour, with no necessary implications about conflict. 'Class schemes reveal individual and distinctive ways of dealing with unfairness, condescension, neglect, and feelings of unworthiness and envy, and of rationalising failure (or success)' (Davies, 1967:3). The differences between the conflict group and nominal usages, that is the strong and weak conceptions of class, do not necessarily run very deep. Few sociologists hold that society can be understood solely in terms of the accounts offered by its members, whereas the social scientist who ignores such evidence cuts himself off from a rich source of information about human perception and an opportunity to test theoretical constructs against understandings of the people themselves. On the other hand, many of the more profound structural features of complex societies can be laid bare only after the careful scrutiny that a scholar rather than a day-to-day participant can give.

Class Schemes

Australian data on class schemes, popular understandings of class, have been derived from small, nonrepresentative samples in Melbourne (Oeser and Hammond, 1954; Davies, 1967; Hiller, 1975a). None of the studies can be readily generalised, since none was a representative sample. Oeser's and Hammond's 1949 data were drawn from the parents of 129 sixth-grade primary school children in one suburb of Melbourne, while Davies's 1962 data come from three purposely selected areas — 'new-outer', 'old-middle', and 'old-industrial'. New-outer respondents had been interviewed in an earlier survey and were selected for reinterview because 'their protocols showed political competence or affect above average' (Davies, 1967:71). The other respondents were selected randomly by street numbers except for a quota requirement that one-fifth of the final sample were to be women. Hiller's sample is confined to three

electoral subdivisions, and while selection within each subdivision was random, it is unclear what the three subdivisions 'represent'.

Our interest in these studies is less in gauging the distribution of different class schemes in Australia at large than in gaining insight into the range and variety of Australian perspectives about class. However, since our primary goal in this discussion is to consider self-placement in relation to varieties of class schemes, we restrict ourselves to the two earlier studies. Hiller (1975a, 1975b) does not present data on self-placement, but he notes that the schemes provide 'at a very general level, some confirmation of earlier results [as well as] some interesting divergences' (1975a: 20).

Table 5.1 brings the findings from the two earlier surveys into a common framework. The comparison is only approximate since different questions and classifications were used. The first important observation on this table is that there is almost no self-placement in the highest or lowest class. All except one person placed themselves in the middle or working class, which in most industrial countries are the two most commonly volunteered class identifications. The fact that the democratic ethos deters people from placing themselves in the highest group indicates the limitations of any attempt to identify by self-classification members of a ruling élite. There are by definition few such persons in any community, and even if they were encountered in a sample survey they may choose not to respond or they may deny their élite status. For example Runciman (1972: 181) reports that the only titled woman interviewed in his 1962 British survey did not give a class in answer to the open-ended question and refused to place herself in terms of the forced-choice question which mentioned only working and middle class. Clearly she was neither.

Table 5.1: Class schemes

Class scheme	Self-identification	Column percentages: Hammond 1949[a]	Davies 1962[b]
1. Power model (two classes)	working	12	22[c]
	top	0	1
2. Prestige model (three classes)	lower	0	0
	middle	28	33
	upper	0	0
3. Composite model (four classes)	lower	0	0
	working	29	12
	middle	31	32
	upper	0	0
N (100%)		118	88

[a] Oeser and Hammond (1954: 273). Eleven persons gave no class schemes.

[b] Davies (1967: 81). About one in three persons offered class schemes but were unwilling to locate their own position in it. Only persons who classed themselves have been included. Schemes Ia-b, IVa-b are treated as dichotomous, Ic-d, Va-b as trichotomous, and IIa-d, IIIa-b as composite.

[c] Including four persons who described themselves as 'ordinary'.

Because most respondents describe themselves as working or middle, information about self-assigned class can hardly throw light on theories of class stratification which distinguish, for example, the petit bourgeoisie from the proletariat, or capitalists from workers. Such intellectual constructs are not real-life categories according to which most members of industrial societies understand their day-to-day experience. Yet it is important to identify the categories that order experiences of social inequality, and the extent to which these experiences give rise to conflict and polarisation of interests.

Before discussing these issues, some other comments on Table 5.1 are required. Respondents in the two surveys identified themselves within three different schemes we have termed power, prestige, and composite models, that is, schemes appearing to involve an opposition in terms of power, those which seem to rest on gradations of prestige, and those involving elements of both. We believed this broad reclassification is fair to the original data, but we point out that Davies's own comparison of his data with Oeser's and Hammond's is different from ours (Davies, 1967:90-2).

The frequency of mention of each scheme follows the same order in both studies: composite, prestige, power. The composite model is (by definition) the only scheme used both by middle- and working-class respondents, but about half the middle-class respondents employed a prestige model that contained no working class. The trend among working-class respondents is less clear, perhaps because of some ambiguity in the classification of those who described themselves as 'ordinary' in Davies's study. However, these data suggest three conclusions: only about half the persons surveyed used a class scheme which included both a working and a middle class; middle-class respondents are as likely to employ a prestige scheme as they are a composite scheme, with the possible connotation of structural integration among the different classes; and a proportion of working-class respondents (larger in Davies's than in the earlier study) use a power model, implying structural conflict between classes. These last two observations lead us to expect that in a random sample of the Australian population, working-class identifiers will be more likely than middle-class identifiers to conceive of the class structure in conflict terms.

Self-Assigned Class

In recent years scholars interested in national societies rather than small, relatively self-contained communities, or in the distribution of authority and rewards in organisations, have relied mainly on mass surveys for data on class and class consciousness. Data from such surveys enable the researcher to objectify and test his own construct of class and to relate respondents' socio-economic statuses to their perceptions of social inequality.

The shape of inequality in modern industrial societies is expressed through the occupational system because the kind of work a person does largely determines his or her share of valued resources such as wealth, prestige, and authority. To be sure, differences in resources in earlier generations limit the possibilities open to later members of that society, a fact emphasised by Bottomore:

> it would be a more accurate description of the social class system to say that it operates, largely through the inheritance of property, to ensure that each individual maintains a certain social position, determined by his birth and irrespective of his particular abilities. This state of affairs is only mitigated, not abolished, by various social influences . . . (1965:16).

Other scholars, Europeans in particular, have criticised a perhaps excessive dependence on occupation as an indicator of class (Beteille, 1969; Müller and Mayer, 1973). Yet to a large extent occupation is a better indicator of class in the industrial countries of the New World such as Canada and the United States, and of Australasia than in Europe, since in none of these 'new' countries has the stratification system evolved from a feudal past. Thus the concentration on occupation in analysis of stratification is a legitimate approach to understanding social reality, at least in 'new' nations. A practical advantage of using occupation as an index of class is that information on occupations — past, present, and future (the last in the form of occupational aspirations) — can be relatively easily obtained by survey or census.

The social standing of persons and families in the community is often assessed by reputational rating techniques that use a number of well-informed 'judges'. This strategy, however, requires familiarity with and reliable knowledge about persons and is thus restricted to fairly small communities. In studies of national societies and even large communities, the reputational technique is unwieldy and inappropriate because not enough persons know each other. In such cases respondents are asked to place themselves in a broad class structure in order to elicit their general view of their own social positions.

The difficulties of interpreting replies to questions about self-identified class are well-known. Respondents from the same society have divergent views of the class structure. They disagree not only about the number, names and sizes of the classes, but also about their importance and even their existence. Few people voluntarily describe themselves as members of the upper or lower class, since these two labels have invidious connotations in a society with an egalitarian ideology. Most people prefer to identify themselves as middle class or working class, as members of the 'mass'. Class identification is also affected by the wording of questions and the list of classes offered to the respondent. Such difficulties indicate the need for carefully designed questions and the desirability of obtaining supplementary information about criteria of class membership and class schemes.

Our brief 1965 interviews could seek only a limited amount of information on how people placed themselves in the class structure. Unstructured questions on class self-identification (Q.11a-c) were followed by structured, fixed-choice questions (Q.11d-e) limiting the respondent to a choice from four classes — upper, middle, lower, working. A probe to distinguish upper and lower middle class was asked of those who replied 'middle'.

Table 5.2: Opinions about the existence of social classes (column percentages)

Do you think that there are social classes in Australia?	Survey	
	ANU 1965	ANU 1967
Yes, there are	81	79
No, there are not	12	14
Don't know	7	7
N (100%)	1,925	1,668

The 1965 questions were as follows:

11a. Some people say there are social classes in this this country. Do you think there *are* — or are *not* — social classes in Australia?	ARE ..... 0 ARE NOT ..... 1 UNCERTAIN 2	
11b. Why do you think that?		
11c. (If there are social classes) to which class would you say you belong?		
11d. Here (HAND *YELLOW* CARD) are the names some people use for social classes If you *had* to say which of *those* social classes you belong to, what would you say?	UPPER ..... 0 Go to 12 MIDDLE ..... 1 Ask e LOWER ..... 2 WORKING 4 OTHER ..... 4 Go to 12 NO ANSWER 0	
11e. If *MIDDLE*: Would you say you're in the *upper* middle, or *lower* middle? CIRCLE 1 IF ANSWER IS "JUST MIDDLE"	UPPER MIDDLE ..... 0 MIDDLE ..... 1 LOWER MIDDLE 2	

As a supplement for information on criteria of class membership, we draw upon the ANU 1967 survey (Kahan and Aitkin, 1968).[1] The ANU 1967 questions were identical except Question 11e. Respondents placing themselves in either the working or middle class in 1967 were offered a third choice: 'Would you say that you were about *average, lower*, or that you were *upper*?' Most respondents chose to be average: 82 per cent of the middle class and 87 per cent of the working class said they were about average in their chosen class. In ANU 1965, where the respondent had to volunteer a preference for an average position against the interviewer's offered alternatives of upper and lower middle, only 56 per cent said that they were 'just middle class'. The remaining 44 per cent split evenly between the upper and lower sections of the middle class. Differences in the form and flow of questions make comparison difficult and, in the case of the question about the division of the middle class, unwarranted (ANU 1965 did not provide data on the division of the working class). The varying responses to differently phrased questions underscore the fact that class schemes are rarely expressed in absolute terms. Rather, the conceptions revealed depend upon the way questions are posed: whether respondents are asked to present their own class scheme, to respond to a scheme provided by an interviewer, or to formulate what

1 We have excluded from ANU 1967 386 respondents, mainly widowed, divorced, and never-married women, in order to make the sampling frames more nearly comparable.

Table 5.3: Self-identified class (column percentages)

Self-identification (open and closed question)	Survey	
	ANU 1965	ANU 1967
Upper	1	1
Middle	49	50
Working	44	42
Lower	4	1
Don't know	2	7
N (100%)	1,925	1,668

they believe is the scheme used by most other people.

In broad terms the results of the 1965 and 1967 surveys reveal a similar picture about the way class is perceived and conceived. In both surveys a minority of respondents denied the existence of classes, but four out of five asserted that social classes exist in contemporary Australia. As the figures from surveys show, many of those who at the outset doubted or rejected the existence of classes were prepared to allocate themselves to a class when asked to do so. An initial denial of class awareness sometimes hid a deep-rooted ambivalence about class. One woman who said there were no classes ('We're all equal.' 'It's a lot of nonsense.') subsequently saw herself, her parents, her friends and her neighbours as middle class when confronted with more forceful questions. When asked about the ease or difficulty of class mobility, she said that mobility was very difficult ('Money is no good. They wouldn't be accepted. They need education.'). Finally she described a model of class conflict in which the middle class supported the Liberal Party against a working-class Labor Party.

Most of those who did not at first express class awareness chose to identify with one of the classes offered on a list: only 2 per cent of respondents were unable or unwilling to do so. Probably the higher proportion of nonidentifiers in the 1967 survey resulted from the much longer questionnaire and its different primary objectives. Respondents and interviewers may have been readier to offer and accept a 'don't know' response.

Comparisons with other surveys in Australia or in other countries are difficult to make because of differences in samples and questions. Data from the United Kingdom and the United States suggest that Australians are more prone to see themselves as middle class (Broom *et al.*, 1968). In the British election study of 1963 (Kahan *et al.*, 1966:124) working-class respondents outnumbered middle-class respondents by 2 to 1 (67 and 32 per cent respectively), while the 1964 election study conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan returned percentages of 56 per cent working class and 39 per cent middle class. In comparison the 1967 Australian electoral study, which was modelled on the British and Michigan surveys, reports only 42 per cent working class and 50 per cent middle class. The larger proportion identifying as middle class in Australia cannot be explained by differences in occupational structure: Britain and the United States have higher, not lower, proportions of nonmanual or middle-class workers. Presumably there are real variations in class images among these three countries, with more Australian manual workers identifying with the middle class. Whether this process amounts to embourgeoisement is an open question (cf. Parsler, 1970, 1971), but there are several aspects of Australia's social structure which may encourage middle-class identification among manual workers: for example a high incidence of home ownership, low unemployment, and relatively high social and cultural homogeneity, at least by comparison with the United States. The first factors, and by extension the third, would be conducive to a middle-class rather than a working-class identification.

There is evidence that this Australian pattern of class identification may be a relatively recent phenomenon. In the ANU 1967 survey respondents were asked to report not only their own social class but also the social class of their parents when they were growing up. Only 45 per

cent of those who gave a class identification said they were working class, whereas 64 per cent said their parents were working class. To some extent this discrepancy can be explained by occupational changes such as the increasing proportion of white-collar workers. However, Table 5.4 shows that when occupation is held constant the trend towards increased middle-class indentification remains.

In every occupational group fewer men in 1967 said they were working class. Yet these same respondents were more likely to describe their parents as working class when they (the respondents) were growing up, even when the fathers had jobs in the same broad occupational group. In fact the class identification of parents (which is a reconstruction by their sons, who were respondents in the survey) bears a striking resemblance to the pattern obtained in the 1963 British survey. In Britain the extremes of working-class identification were a low of 21 per cent among higher professional and managerial workers and a high of 92 per cent among unskilled manual workers, figures much closer to those for Australian parents (in the second column of Table 5.4) than for respondents themselves (the first column). These results point to a substantial intergenerational shift in images of class in Australia since the end of World War II. In his comparison of class schemes in 1962 with those volunteered in the Oeser and Hammond survey of 1949, Davies noted an impression of evaporating proletarian feeling over this period. As Ancich *et al.* (1969a: 48) note, Oeser's and Hammond's 1949 work coincided with a period of postwar upheaval and political stress and

Table 5.4: Working-class identification of respondents and their parents classified by occupation, 1967

Respondent's or father's occupation	Percent identifying with working class	
	Respondents	Parents
Upper professional	8 (99)[a]	26 (62)[a]
Graziers	16 (37)	29 (55)
Lower professional	17 (71)	26 (35)
Managerial	27 (152)	31 (136)
Shop proprietors	41 (49)	46 (59)
Farmers	41 (106)	61 (206)
Clerical	33 (167)	45 (100)
Armed services	33 (21)	53 (34)
Craftsmen	56 (302)	73 (275)
Shop assistants	36 (22)	50 (10)
Operatives	66 (154)	81 (140)
Drivers	57 (117)	83 (118)
Service workers	57 (88)	79 (47)
Miners	87 (15)	97 (60)
Farm workers	78 (37)	89 (65)
Labourers	69 (107)	92 (122)
Total	45 (1544)	64 (1524)

[a] Ns are given in brackets after each percentage. The total excludes persons who did not state occupation or class identification.

Source: ANU Survey, 1967.

industrial conflict.

So far we have not attempted to indicate what people have in mind when they say they, or their parents, belong to a particular social class. In the 1967 survey respondents were asked what sort of people belonged to the middle and working classes. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 report their answers in terms of their own occupation and class identification.

The bottom panel of Table 5.5 shows that middle-class and working-class respondents agree that the work people do and the income they earn predominantly determine membership in the middle class. Middle-class occupations were seen as white-collar jobs, professional and managerial work, jobs with a steady income. Some respondents even volunteered a cutoff point on income, describing

Table 5.5: Views about middle-class people, classified by occupation and self-identified class of respondents (column percentages)

Characteristics of middle class	Self-identified class: Middle or upper	Self-identified class: Working or lower	Total
	Nonmanual workers		
Type of occupation	43	47	44
Level of income	26	26	26
Educational level	9	2	7
Manners and morals	5	4	5
Other	17	21	18
N (100%)	401	137	538
	Manual workers		
Type of occupation	36	45	41
Level of income	27	26	26
Educational level	7	3	5
Manners and morals	7	2	4
Other	23	24	24
N (100%)	335	491	826
	Farm workers		
Type of occupation	32	38	35
Level of income	25	17	22
Educational level	10	3	7
Manners and morals	7	1	4
Other	26	41	32
N (100%)	102	78	180
	Total		
Type of occupation	39	45	42
Level of income	26	25	26
Educational level	8	3	6
Manners and morals	6	2	4
Other	21	25	23
N (100%)	838	706	1544

Source: ANU Survey, 1967.

the middle class as persons who earned about $60 a week or more. Others defined the middle class simply as those with relatively high incomes, as 'more financial' than the working class. But the most general distinction was between the blue-collar worker 'battling' from week to week on the basic wage or a little more, and the white-collar worker with a higher, regular, and more secure income.

Comparatively few people saw education or manners and morals as distinguishing criteria of middle-class membership, but those who did were more often middle-class identifiers. The 'other' category spans a wide variety of responses, but fewer than one in a hundred mentioned such factors as family background or political affiliation.

Assuming that nonmanual workers can be categorised as middle class and manual workers as working class, do 'realistic' and 'unrealistic' respondents differ in the ciriteria they use in defining class membership? Do manual workers who identify with the middle class de-emphasise occupation as a defining characteristic of middle-class membership? Some evidence on this and related questions can be found in the second panel of Table 5.5, which indicates that unrealistic (middle-class) manual workers more often stressed life-style characteristics such as education and manners and morals than realistic (working-class) manual workers. By contrast the unrealistic nonmanual workers — those identifying with the working class — more frequently mentioned occupation, perhaps regarding all those who work for a living as working class, regardless of the colour of their collars. Middle-class farmers were most likely of all to mention education and manners and morals, and this may be a remnant of the pastoral aristocratic culture. We may reasonably hazard that when a farmer mentioned education he was thinking less of the total amount of education received than of a gentleman's education at an exclusive private school.

Table 5.6 presents a parallel analysis of answers to a question about the sort of people who belong to the working class. In general, both middle-class and working-class identifiers agreed that job and income are what matter, but middle-class respondents (except for white-collar workers) tended to give more weight to income than did working-class identifiers. They were also less uncertain about what determined membership of the working class, reflecting the more concrete implications of that term. Life-style characteristics and level of consumption were seen as less important in determining working-class identity, which these respondents defined very largely by the sort of work a person does. Hard work and manual labour were recurring themes in describing the sort of people who belong to the working class. The greater emphasis placed on income by middle-class identifiers indicates their concern with life-style and consumption levels in defining social classes. But these patterns represent broad contours and not sharp cleavages in opinions and in some cases emergent viewpoints rather than fixed beliefs. For instance, some respondents changed their expressed attitudes in the course of the interview.

One example was a 60-year old man who worked in his son's cutlery business sharpening shears and tools. His earliest memories of politics were when conscription was an issue in Melbourne during World War I. At first he thought of himself as a Labor man but began voting Liberal after the Labor split in the 1950s. He is convinced about the existence of social classes, although he had not felt personally the impact of class differences

very strongly. When asked what class he belonged to, he volunteered 'middle'. But after he had answered questions about the class of his friends ('mostly working class') and parents ('working class') and about the sort of people who belonged to the middle class, he felt he had answered the question on class identification incorrectly: 'I think I should have said working class'. Other comments make it clear that he is ambivalent about class differences: 'I think class distinction is all in the mind. [Middle class people are] people that imagine they're on the plateau a bit higher than someone else. Some of the wealthy people are right down to earth though.' Yet he thinks it is impossible to change classes — 'unless you got filthy rich overnight'. His views of class express the dilemmas and contradications of his own experience,and he combines a rejection of the middle class with deference to at least

Table 5.6: Views about working-class people, classified by occupation and self-identified class of respondents (column percentages)

Characteristics of working class	Self-identified class: Middle or upper	Self-identified class: Working or lower	Total
	Nonmanual workers		
Type of occupation	59	55	58
Level of income	19	21	20
Educational level	5	3	4
Manners and morals	3	1	2
Other	14	20	16
N (100%)	401	137	538
	Manual workers		
Type of occupation	48	61	56
Level of income	23	16	19
Educational level	3	1	2
Manners and morals	6	4	5
Other	20	18	19
N (100%)	335	491	826
	Farm workers		
Type of occupation	52	68	59
Level of income	21	6	15
Educational level	4	1	3
Manners and morals	4	4	4
Other	19	21	20
N (100%)	102	78	180
	Total		
Type of occupation	54	61	57
Level of income	21	16	19
Educational level	4	1	3
Manners and morals	4	3	4
Other	17	19	18
N (100%)	838	706	1544

Source: ANU Survey, 1967.

some wealthy people or a sense of identification with a few of them.

This interview illustrates some of the difficulties of interpreting data on class identification. When this man first said middle he was probably thinking of an upper-middle-lower scheme. Subsequent questions put by the interviewer employed a dichotomy in which a working class appeared as a distinct category, and he was forced to think in terms of a different scheme. This new frame of reference may have led him to see the middle class as a snobbish group trying to establish a false distinction from the working class, while earlier he had not distinguished working from middle class. Having to abandon an upper-middle-lower scheme, he tried to adopt a working-upper scheme but found a middle class between the two. At least this is a plausible reconstruction of the development in his viewpoint.

Because neither ANU survey obtained explicit information on class schemes, although some persons disclosed them in the course of answering other questions, the interpretation of responses characterising differences between the middle and working classes remains problematic. As Table 5.1 indicates, perhaps as many as half those who say they are middle class do so in relation to a class scheme which does not include a working class; and the class scheme of a similar proportion of working-class respondents does not include a middle class. Even so it is clear from Tables 5.5 and 5.6 that most Australians can give some description of both the middle and the working class, and to judge from these interviews the working class is uniformly ranked lower than the middle class in terms of occupational prestige, amount of income, and level of education, in those cases where the two classes are differentiated from each other.

Class Affiliation and Class Conflict

Despite the fact that most Australians claim that social classes exist, class differences are not regarded as major factors influencing day-to-day behaviour, except perhaps at the extremes of the stratification scale, about which sample surveys such as ours can reveal very little. Classes as conflict groups with intrinsically opposed interests between the owners of the means of production and those whose only property is their labour, is not a view endorsed by many members of Australian society, at least in the late 1960s. Perhaps Australians are unaware of their 'real' class interests but more probably they are unable to draw a sharp line between capitalists and workers in a modern mixed economy.

The degree of inequality in wealth and income has been reduced significantly over the last half century, and the standard of living has increased in real terms. When people remember their childhood and the living conditions of their parents, they feel better off and, moreover, anticipate future improvement. Rising productivity and increases in real income have deflected dissatisfaction with the unequal distribution of income and wealth. In conditions of spreading affluence people are unlikely to feel relative deprivation when they compare themselves with their parents, but when they look to their own generation a sense of relative deprivation is more likely to surface. As kinship ties weaken and people focus more on comparisons with their own generation and not with their parents, the drive for equality may intensify.

For reasons outlined earlier in this chapter, survey research has limitations in answering questions about class affiliation and the relations between classes.

In the first place, most surveys obtain information only on a nominal classification in which there is less concern with the intrinsic meaning of class labels than with their relative order. Thus Morris and Jeffries (1970:307) justify their choice of three middle-class labels (upper middle, middle middle, and lower middle) on the grounds that this avoids the usual pile-up of respondents in an undifferentiated middle class, not on the grounds that these labels correctly describe the distinctions Americans make about their class structure. A second limitation of survey research is that few respondents place themselves in the upper class, although as Table 5.1 indicates all the class schemes volunteered in the Melbourne studies include an upper class. One cannot expect to discover many members of a small élite in a representative sample of 2000 respondents. Furthermore, because of the undemocratic connotation, people are reluctant to admit membership in an upper class: self-placement in the class structure has limited application and is least effective for the top. Thirdly, few surveys (our own included) ask for complete descriptions of class schemes, least of all for descriptions of the upper class. Consequently views of the class structure, class affiliation and class conflict based on the reports of the 'man in the street' are necessarily incomplete, although they do provide limited information on what are conventionally termed the middle and working classes.

Respondents in the 1967 survey were asked to indicate the social class of their closest friends, neighbours and parents (when the respondent was growing up). They were also asked about class mobility, class conflict, and the relationship of class to politics. In the following analysis we look at each of these questions in terms of four major class categories. In Table 5.7 immobile middle-class persons are those who identified with the middle class and said their parents were middle class. Upwardly mobile middle-

Table 5.7: Class origins, class placement, and class of friends (row percentages)[a]

Class category	Class of friends				N (100%)
	Mostly middle	Mostly working	Mixed	Don't know	
Immobile middle class (old-timers)	55	4	40	1	462
Upwardly mobile middle class (newcomers)	36	10	53	1	360
TOTAL MIDDLE CLASS	47	7	45	1	822
Downwardly mobile working class (skidders)*	11	37	51	1	74
Immobile working class (old-timers)	5	57	36	2	620
TOTAL WORKING CLASS	5	55	38	2	694
ALL RESPONDENTS	27	27	42	4	1668

[a]Marginal totals do not sum to the total because some response categories are not shown.
Source: ANU Survey, 1967.

class persons are those who identified with the middle class but said their parents were working class. Similarly, working-class immobile persons are working-class identifiers from working-class backgrounds, while the downwardly mobile working class consists of working-class identifiers from middle-class backgrounds, 'skidders' as they are termed in some studies. However, there are not many skidders; as we noted earlier there has been a trend away from working-class identification.

Do the data in Table 5.7 suggest open or closed class relations? For the totals of middle- and working-class respondents, the modal response categories are *within* class choices: 47 per cent of middle-class persons say that their friends are mostly middle class, and 55 per cent of working-class persons say their friends are mostly working class. Few persons claim that most of their friends belong to the other class. Only 5 per cent of the working class claim mostly middle-class friends, and 7 per cent of the middle class claim mostly working-class friends. Thus the first two columns of this table indicate that for a large part of the population friends are chosen from the respondent's own class. However, the third column shows that two in five Australians have friendships which surmount subjective class boundaries. This finding is not surprising given the facts of high occupational mobility between generations and during careers (see Chap. 6 and Broom and Jones, 1969a, 1969b) and the emphasis on occupation as a determinant of class membership (Tables 5.5 and 5.6).

The immobile members of each class (that is, those who reported the same class for themselves and their parents) are much more likely than mobile persons to have friends who belong to their own class. The difference amounts to 20 percentage points in both classes. Yet even immobile class members have a substantial proportion of mixed-class friends. Perhaps the most striking feature of this table is its symmetry: upward mobility into the middle class and downward mobility into the working class affect the reported pattern of friendships in the same way. Newcomers to both classes occupy an intermediate position between the old-timers in their class of origin and their new class position, expressing the continuation of long-established friendships as well as the formation of new ones.

Table 5.8 focuses on the social class of neighbours rather than friends. If perceptions of class are significant in the behaviour of contemporary Australians, it should be apparent in the social composition of residential areas: class-conscious persons should prefer socially homogeneous neighbourhoods. Both these expectations are supported by Table 5.8, which shows that more immobile than mobile members of both the middle and working classes claim they live in relatively homogeneous neighbourhoods. Half the immobile middle class say that their neighbours are mostly middle class, compared with about one-third of the upwardly mobile middle class. A similar, although less marked trend, is apparent among the working class.

An interesting difference revealed in the tables is that a greater proportion of the sample (35 per cent in Table 5.8) claim that their neighbours are mostly working class than is the case for friends (27 per cent in Table 5.7). This difference persists even when present class position and class of origin are controlled (column 2 of both tables). In each of the categories shown the proportion of neighbours said to be mostly working class is several percentage points higher than the proportion of

working-class friends. This discrepancy may reflect the lack of freedom people have in choosing neighbours compared with choosing friends, and the somewhat negative connotation that the term working class seems to have acquired. Even working-class people themselves are slightly less likely to claim they have mostly working-class friends than to say they have mostly working-class neighbours (55 and 59 per cent respectively). The difference (7 per cent versus 17 per cent) is more marked among middle-class respondents reporting on the class of their friends and neighbours. This hint of a tension between friendship and neighbouring links with Adelaide findings that relations with neighbours were typically regarded as problematic.

> In all three [study] areas the quality of neighbouring seemed to be greatly influenced by the conviction that relations with neighbours are always in danger of getting out of hand and must therefore be kept under continuous scrutiny (Martin, 1970:315).

Since our analyses relating class identification and class of parents, friends and neighbours to attitudes about class mobility, conflict, and politics yielded broadly similar results, only the findings for class identification and class of friends are presented in Table 5.9. The class categories were constructed as follows: the solid middle class consists of those who identify with the middle class and have mostly middle-class friends, and the marginal middle class of middle-class persons with working-class or mixed friends. Similarly, the solid working class consists of persons who identify with the working class and have mainly working-class friends, and the marginal working class of working-class persons with middle-class or mixed friends. In other words, the categories break up the sample according to the perceived degree of within-class affiliation.

Contrasting middle-class and working-class totals, we find that members of the middle class are less likely to vote for the Labor Party, to see the middle class as

Table 5.8: Class origins, class placement, and class of neighbours (row percentages)[a]

Class category	Class of neighbours				
	Mostly middle	Mostly working	Mixed	Don't know	N (100%)
Immobile middle class (old-timers)	49	10	37	4	462
Upwardly mobile middle class (newcomers)	36	24	39	1	360
TOTAL MIDDLE CLASS	43	17	38	2	822
Downwardly mobile working class (skidders)	7	53	31	9	74
Immobile working class (old-timers)	6	61	28	5	620
TOTAL WORKING CLASS	6	59	29	6	694
ALL RESPONDENTS	25	35	33	7	1668

[a]Marginal totals do not sum to the total because some response categories are not shown.
Source: ANU Survey, 1967.

Table 5.9: Class solidarity and class-related attitudes

Class category[a]	Percent of respondents who say that:				
	It is very difficult to move from one class to another (Class mobility) Col. 1	There is bound to be some conflict between classes (Class conflict) Col. 2	The middle class votes for a particular party (Political commitment of classes) Col. 3	The working class votes for a particular party Col. 4	They would vote for Labor if a Federal Election were held tomorrow (Voting intention) Col. 5
Solid middle class (N=391)	15	28	23	71	23
Marginal middle class (N=439)	16	24	19	62	35
TOTAL MIDDLE CLASS (N=830)	16	26	21	66	29
Marginal working class (N=310)	20	24	25	51	55
Solid working class (N=386)	27	24	27	47	57
TOTAL WORKING CLASS (N=696)	25	24	26	49	56
ALL RESPONDENTS (N=1668)	19	24	23	56	40

[a]The categories shown do not add to the total sample because some response categories are excluded.

Source: Constructed from ANU Survey, 1967.

supporting a particular political party, or to see restrictions to mobility. However, the middle class is more likely than the working class to see the working class as supporting a particular party. The two classes differ little in their views about class conflict: about a quarter of both assert that there is bound to be some conflict between classes. Note, however, that the phrasing of the question does not allow interpretation about the nature of the conflict or the particular classes with which conflict is seen as inevitable. Perhaps both middle- and working-class respondents were thinking of conflict with controlling elites rather than of conflict with each other.

The impression that emerges from these data is that a minority of Australians — but a significant number — hold class-interest views in which social classes are seen as having opposed interests, as being inevitably in conflict over those interests, and as expressing conflict partly through the political system. Each class believes that the other has a greater involvement in party politics than itself: only about one-quarter of the sample sees the middle class as supporting a particular political party, a view held somewhat more strongly by working-class than middle-class respondents. Both classes see the working class as more politically committed than the middle class, a view predominant among middle-class adherents.

Yet as the last column shows, *both* classes, and especially the members of the middle class, seem to underestimate the commitment to a particular political party among their fellow class members. When asked their voting intentions, more working-class respondents indicated they would vote for the Australian Labor Party than the proportion who said the working class votes for a particular party (56 and 49 per cent respectively). Among middle-class persons the discrepancy is even greater if we assume (as is the case) that most of those not voting A.L.P. would vote for the Liberal-Country Party coalition: 71 per cent would vote against Labor, compared with the modest 21 per cent prepared to admit that the middle class votes for a particular political party. Indeed, middle-class identifiers seem to play down their role in class politics while exaggerating the role of the working class.

The pattern of responses in Table 5.9 is less consistent than those in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. Generally the solid middle and solid working class occupy more extreme positions than the marginal members of both classes, but the differences are not always consistent, or very large. The solid middle class are more likely than marginal middle-class members to see class conflict as inevitable, to think that the working class supports a particular party, and to vote against the Labor Party. On the other hand they do not differ significantly from the marginal middle class (middle-class identifiers with mixed or working-class friends) in their views about the difficulty of class mobility. In three comparisons (class mobility, class conflict, and voting intention), the greatest polarity is between solid middle-class and solid working-class identifiers, a pattern not maintained in relation to views about the political commitment of each class. However, because all these data are based on the perceptions of respondents (rather than on their objective position in the social structure or their observed behaviour patterns), there is the possibility of an aggrandisement effect, that is a tendency to assimilate social background, neighbours, and friends to their own class identification. We note that of the self-identified working class 56 per cent say they would vote Labor; of the solid

working class, 57 per cent intended to vote Labor. This nondifference suggests either that having working-class parents, friends and neighbours makes no appreciable difference in the level of support for what is generally seen as a working-class party, or that contemporary Australians shape and reshape their social worlds in terms of their self-perceived class position.

Determinants of Class Identification

The discussion of class identification based on responses to national surveys suggests diverse attitudes towards social class and a variety of class schemes. Yet there are some broad areas of agreement. Only a minority holds to a class conflict scheme in which the boundaries between classes are clearly drawn and hard to cross. Most people think of classes in terms of the sort of work a person does, the amount of money income he receives, and the style of life that income allows him to lead.

The word 'class' and the study of social inequalities are clouded by ideological differences and commitments. There is less disagreement about facts than about what the facts mean. For example what sorts of conflict — and there are many in modern societies — qualify as class conflict? Without a clear definition of class no firm answer can be given, and the massive literature on class — both Marxist and non-Marxist — betrays the sterility of merely terminological argument. A further complication is that 'social class' has become part of the language of everyday life, and in the preceding discussion of class identification we have accepted the term more nearly in its popular than any strict social science meaning.

Historically, three broad kinds of stratification systems, or systems of social inequality, can be distinguished: caste, estate, and 'class' systems, each related to a specific type of economic production — peasant, agrarian, and industrial. The accepted examples of caste and estate societies are traditional India and medieval Europe. Modern industrial societies are often termed class societies, in which access to valued resources is governed not by birth or heredity but by position in the economic market. Whereas castes and estates are often seen as engaged in complementary and supportive relationships, classes are typically viewed as conflict groups — except by some functionalist theorists who stress the complementarity of social strata (not classes) and the legitimising force of a central and largely consensual value system.

For sociological analysis, as distinct from ideological purposes, we would argue (with sharp disagreement from those wishing to preserve Marxist usage) that classes are best considered as a special case of social strata. In any society individuals can be classified according to different kinds of inequality, whether material or symbolic, related to position in the market or to variations in life-style. The empirical questions that need to be answered are how a person is allocated to or enters a social position, the amount and kind of resources the position controls, the equality or inequality in the dispersion of those resources both historically and at one point in time, and how far persons sharing similar life-chances and life-styles form more or less closed social groups as a result of restrictive social participation and patterns of marriage. When boundaries between such groups are relatively permeable, they are usually termed social strata rather than social classes, although the phrase 'open-class system' is also

applied. In our terminology social class is a special kind of social stratum, distinguished by a high degree of endogamy, low rates of social interchange (especially social mobility), and an awareness of and competition with other social classes. Whether social classes exist or not is thus a question to be resolved by empirical observation, not by fiat.

Survey research cannot explore all questions about social stratification, but it can inquire into popular conceptions about stratification and inequality, into the situational and structural factors that give rise to these conceptions. Although people mean different things when they talk about classes as conflict groups, the majority seem to view class as a gradation of hierarchical categories rather than a conflict between inevitably opposed groups. To this statement a Marxist might reply that what people think about social reality is, for this purpose, beside the point: they are unaware of their 'real' interests and are participating in a class society whether they happen to be aware of it or not.

Sooner or later, however, some appeal must be made to the sociological evidence. In Australia as in other industrial economies the role of governmental authorities in the economic system, the so-called managerial revolution, the growth of joint-stock companies, and the expansion of social welfare have transformed the relations of production over the course of the last 100 years. Democratic and welfare-oriented governments tend towards a type of society where conflict is less about property rights narrowly defined than about citizenship rights broadly conceived. Minority interest groups become increasingly important, as we see in the growing self-awareness of ethnic groups, racial groups, women (though scarcely a minority numerically), students, or any group that can define and present a set of cultural values at odds with those at the centre of society. Moreover, far from the middle classes being squeezed between the extremes of capitalists and manual workers, many workers have attained what used to be middle-class incomes and middle-class attitudes. As Bottomore has recently argued:

> we must also take account of a second major change in modern capitalism: the achievement, over the past twenty-five years, of sustained economic growth, ... which has produced a marked and continuing improvement in the general level of living. The effects of this change upon social consciousness are twofold. First, it reinforces the tendency, produced by the movement into middle-class occupations, to establish as predominant the image of modern societies as 'middle-class societies' ... Secondly, it establishes economic growth itself as a new ideology (Bottomore, 1971:61).

While his second point is under challenge, the first is not.

Education, occupation, and income are linked together not only in the consciousness of the members of industrial society, but also in their day-to-day living. Tables 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12 relate these three variables to self-identified class and show how class identification varies by educational level, occupational position, and amount of income. We present data from ANU 1967 as well as from our own 1965 survey.

Generally the agreement between the sets of data is very good — especially at the extremes of the educational scale: nine out of ten persons with tertiary education say they are middle class, while three out of four persons with only part-primary education or less say they are working class. There is some discrepancy in the 'attended tertiary' and 'attended secondary' categories, where the 1967 survey shows higher middle-class identification. However, the later survey defined tertiary as university, so that the 'attended

Table 5.10: The educational basis for self-identified class (row percentages)

Education of head of household	Year of survey	Self-identification of respondent				N (100%)
		Upper	Middle	Working	Lower	
1. Completed tertiary	1965	2	87	10	1	169
	1967	4	91	5	0	74
2. Attended tertiary	1965	3	73	21	3	81
	1967	0	86	11	3	36
3. Completed secondary	1965	0	65	30	5	212
	1967	1	66	33	0	212
4. Attended secondary	1965	1	47	49	4	869
	1967	0	58	41	1	707
5. Completed primary	1965	0	37	60	4	428
	1967	0	39	59	2	374
6. Attended primary	1965	0	21	75	3	118
	1967	0	24	74	2	124
Total with stated education	1965	0	51	45	4	1877
	1967	1	54	45	1	1527

Source: ANU Surveys, 1965 and 1967.

tertiary' category excludes those who had attended non-university tertiary institutions. Their inclusion in the 'attended secondary' category (in the past completing secondary school was typically a university entry requirement) presumably inflated the middle-class identification in that category in 1967. The 1967 survey gives a slightly higher middle-class identification than the 1965 survey.

The evidence from both sets of figures is unambiguous. At each higher step in the educational ladder a larger percentage identifies with the middle class, and among those completing secondary education and attending a tertiary institution middle-class identification predominates. However, the pattern is not perfect, and the correlation between self-identification and education is only of medium strength (0·35 and 0·33 for 1965 and 1967 respectively), indicating that at each level of education some respondents identify with the 'wrong' class — a tendency more marked among working-class than middle-class identifiers. Education influences but does not determine how people place themselves in class terms.

Table 5.11 shows the relationship between occupational prestige and self-identification. Upper professionals are most likely to see themselves as middle class, whereas miners, farm and rural workers, and labourers are least likely. Miners seem to have the strongest working-class consciousness of all the occupational groups considered, a finding consistent with the nature of mining work, the solidarity and militancy of mine workers, and the strike record of the mining industry.[2] However, there are differences between the two surveys: in 1967

2 This is so at least in the 1967 survey. We guess that 1965 'miners' include a few mining engineers wrongly described by their wives.

Table 5.11: The occupational basis of self-identified class (row percentages)

Occupation of household head	Year of survey	Self-identification of respondent				N (100%)
		Upper	Middle	Working	Lower	
1. Upper professional	1965	2	89	8	1	100
	1967	2	90	8	0	99
2. Graziers, wheat and sheep farmers	1965	0	87	10	3	63
	1967	3	81	13	3	37
3. Lower professional	1965	0	78	20	3	70
	1967	0	83	17	0	71
4. Managerial	1965	0	71	26	3	219
	1967	3	69	26	1	152
5. Self-employed shop proprietors	1965	0	72	24	4	25
	1967	0	59	39	2	49
6. Other farmers	1965	1	53	40	7	141
	1967	1	58	39	2	106
7. Clerical and related workers	1965	1	66	27	6	226
	1967	0	67	32	1	167
8. Members of armed services and police	1965	0	47	42	11	19
	1967	0	67	33	0	21
9. Craftsmen and foremen	1965	0	39	57	4	422
	1967	0	44	55	1	302
10. Shop assistants	1965	0	50	48	2	48
	1967	0	64	36	0	22
11. Operatives and process workers	1965	1	30	65	4	178
	1967	0	34	66	0	154
12. Drivers	1965	0	25	74	1	129
	1967	1	42	56	1	117
13. Personal, domestic and service workers	1965	1	38	58	3	76
	1967	0	43	56	1	88
14. Miners	1965	11	11	72	6	18
	1967	0	13	87	0	15
15. Farm and rural workers	1965	0	31	67	3	36
	1967	0	22	78	0	37
16. Labourers	1965	1	24	72	3	107
	1967	0	31	65	4	107
Total with stated occupations	1965	0	51	45	4	1877
	1967	1	54	45	1	1544

Source: ANU Surveys, 1965 and 1967.

Table 5.12: The income basis of self-identified class (row percentages)

Annual income of household head	Year of survey	Self-identification of respondent				N (100%)
		Upper	Middle	Working	Lower	
1. $5,000 or more	1965	0	81	16	3	212
More than $5,250	1967	2	85	13	0	182
2. $4,200-4,999	1965	0	80	15	5	122
$4,251-5,250	1967	0	75	25	1	130
3. $2,600-4,199	1965	1	58	38	4	704
$3,251-4,250	1967	0	60	39	0	293
4. $1,800-2,599	1965	1	34	63	3	727
$2,251-3,250	1967	0	45	54	1	439
5. Less than $1,800	1965	0	28	68	4	112
$2,250 or less	1967	0	33	65	2	330
Total with stated income	1965	0	51	45	4	1877
	1967	1	53	45	1	1374

Source: ANU Surveys, 1965 and 1967.

shop proprietors were more likely to say they were working class, while shop assistants show the reverse tendency. However, some of these comparisons involve small numbers, so that we should focus on the broad trend rather than specific occupational categories. In general, the surveys reveal a similar relationship between occupation and class. Those with higher occupational prestige are more likely to identify with the middle or upper class rather than with the working or lower class, and the correlation between occupational prestige and social class (using the rank order scores of Table 5.11) was 0·36 in both surveys.

There is only limited comparability in Table 5.12 because the ten income categories used in 1967 differed from the six in 1965. In each case the 1967 categories comprise slightly higher incomes, reflecting changing money values and higher real incomes. The result is that except in the second category there are more middle-class identifiers in each category in 1967 than in 1965. Once again, however, the pattern is similar, and the correlation between income and self-

Table 5.13: Four measures of social rank, 1965 and 1967[a]

Measure	Zero order correlation coefficients			
	1	2	3	4
1. Self-identification	*1.00*	.35	.36	.37
2. Education	.33	*1.00*	.41	.33
3. Occupation	.36	.40	*1.00*	.51
4. Income	.37	.38	.40	*1.00*

[a] The figures above the diagonal are for 1965 (1,877 cases), below the diagonal for 1967 (1,231 cases).

Table 5.14: Relationship between self-identified class and selected characteristics

Characteristics of respondents	Respond middle or upper class	Correlation with class[a]	N
1. Completed secondary school or higher	76	.29	462
2. Nonmanual worker	73	.32	659
3. Manual worker	33	−.35	978
4. Farm worker	59	.06	240
5. Income $3,400 or more	75	.32	567
6. Has own business	65	.15	439
7. Does not vote A.L.P.	62	.27	1,081
8. Is not a trade union member	63	.25	948
9. Has a telephone	65	.28	943
10. Father nonmanual worker	66	.17	473
[Has high socioeconomic status]	91	.34	281
[Has medium socioeconomic status]	59	.15	831
[Has low socioeconomic status]	27	−.40	765

[a] The values are the simple correlations between self-identified class and each characteristic. Each variable is scored as a dummy variable (1 if the person has the characteristic mentioned, 0 if he does not). Middle and upper class respondents are scored 1, others 0.

Source: ANU Survey, 1965.

identification is the same in both surveys (0·37).

Table 5.13 summarises the relationships between self-identified class, education, occupation and income in the two surveys. As the first row and column of this table show, the relationship between class identification and the three indicators is virtually identical in both surveys, although the absolute level of correlation is only moderate. If we were to carry out the same analysis for groups of people sharing a common class scheme, we would improve the fit between self-identification and educational, occupational, and economic status. But self-identification undoubtedly rests on other factors as well, for example career expectations, stage in the life cycle, family background, recent or expected mobility, ethnic-racial origin, even perhaps religious affiliation.

One way to establish the relative importance of different factors influencing a person's class identification is multiple regression. In Table 5.14 we present an analysis in which, for reasons of simplicity, the different variables have been expressed as categories called 'dummy variables'. In this kind of analysis a person receives a score of 1 if he displays a given characteristic and a score of zero if he does not. The variables shown in Table 5.14 have been scored in this way. The last three variables are derived from a simple summation of six-point scores on education, occupation, and income. The high socio-economic status (SES) group comprises persons with scores between 14 and 18 points, the medium SES group those with scores between 9 and 13, and the low SES group those with scores of 8 or less. This constructed variable is an effective predictor of self-identification, and in its continuous form correlates as well with self-identification as the three 'independent' predictors of education,

occupation, and income (a multiple correlation of 0·46). This figure is almost identical with the correlation (0·44) reported in a similar analysis for the United States (Hodge and Treiman, 1968: 547).

Among the variables listed in Table 5.14 level of education, kind of occupation, and amount of income appear to be the best predictors of self-indentification, both in terms of the proportion identifying with the middle and upper classes and in terms of their overall correlation with class identification. The other variables appear to be less effective predictors, although they are positively correlated with how people place themselves in classes. The rather weak correlation between being an employer or self-employed worker ('has own business') and class identification reflects the extent to which ownership, control, and class have been separated by technological and economic change.

In Table 5.15 we take our analysis a step further by estimating the relative importance of the different variables in predicting self-identification by the technique of multiple regression. Variables 1, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3 and 4 represent the respondent's socio-economic position, whereas variables 5 and 6 reflect participation in class-linked organisations. However, because trade union membership is compulsory in many industries, the implication of membership is not identical for all persons. The significance of union membership is better investigated in its own right rather than by statistical inference. Nevertheless the differences here are worth interpreting.

The variable 'has a telephone' was included as a potential indicator of lifestyle, but it turns out to be more nearly an indicator of income: telephone installation and rental are relatively expensive in Australia. Other indicators were tested in different regression solutions (for example ownership of consumer durables), but none contributed independently to the prediction of self-identification once the socio-economic status variables were included. In other words, available measures of life-style and consumption patterns closely mirrored income differences. Variable 8 is designed to give some indication of the influence of social origins on class identification.

In regression analyses where the dependent variable (in this case class identification divided into the two categories middle-upper and working-lower) is expressed as a dummy variable, the regression can be interpreted as an estimate of the conditional probability of a person's displaying the characteristic concerned (in this case identifying with the middle or upper class and not the working or lower class), the estimate being conditional upon displaying the other characteristics included in the analysis (in this case the variables listed in the body of Table 5.15). The interpretation of the figures in Table 5.15 is as follows: because a person receives a score of zero if he does *not* have the characteristic listed, the weights (regression coefficients) have a positive value only for those who have the characteristic (a score of one times the coefficient). Therefore, the constant term provides an estimate of the conditional probability identifying as middle or upper class for a person with none of the listed characteristics for which weights are shown. No separate weight is shown for manual workers since by definition a person who is not in a non-manual or farm job must be a manual worker.

According to our data the conditional probability of identifying with the middle or upper class for a person who did not

Table 5.15: Relative importance of selected characteristics in predicting class self-identification

Characteristic	Regression coefficients[a] (1)	(2)
1. Completed secondary school or higher	.17 (.15)	*
2a. Nonmanual worker	.18 (.17)	*
2b. Manual worker	* *	*
2c. Farm worker	.08 (.05)	*
3. Income $3,400 or higher	.13 (.10)	*
4. Has own business	*.02* (.02)	*.02* (.01)
5. Does not vote A.L.P.	.12 (.11)	.11 (.11)
6. Is not a trade union member	.07 (.08)	.07 (.07)
7. Has a telephone	.10 (.10)	.08 (.09)
8. Father nonmanual worker	*.03* (.03)	.06 (.05)
High SES	*	.48 (.34)
Medium SES	*	.24 (.24)
Low SES	*	* *
Constant term	.13	.13
Multiple R	.48	.49
Multiple R^2	.23	.24

[a] Standardised regression coefficients are given in brackets. Italicised coefficients do not exceed twice their standard error.

*Not included in the regression.

Source: ANU Survey, 1965.

complete secondary school, had a manual job, received an income of less than $4400 per annum, was an employee, voted for the A.L.P., belonged to a trade union, did not have a telephone, or had a father who was manual worker, is 13 chances in 100. For persons who displayed one, more than one, or all of the characteristics listed in Table 5.15, the probability of identifying middle or upper class is increased by adding the unstandardised regression coefficient to the constant term. Consequently, having a nonmanual father or being an employer or self-employed person has much less net effect on class identification than, say, having a white-collar job or a good education. However, persons who have all the characteristics listed in the table are most likely to identify with the middle or upper class: the sum of the constant term and the various weights gives an estimated probability of 0·95. In other words, these variables clearly discriminate between middle-upper-class and working-lower-class identifiers. At one extreme we expect only 13 per cent of those *without* these characteristics to identify with the middle or upper class, while at the other extreme 95 per cent of those *with* these characteristics can be expected to be middle- or upper-class identifiers. This range is much wider than the differences in Table 5.14, where we consider only one variable at a time, or indeed in any of the other tables presented.

The second column of figures in Table 5.15 illustrates the use of the constructed variable, socio-economic status. Since the first five variables (1, 2a-c, 3) are included in the construct, they are omitted from the calculations. The results are virtually

identical. The conditional probability of a person who has low socio-economic status, employee status, votes A.L.P, belongs to a trade union, does not have a telephone, and comes from a manual background identifying with the middle or upper class is only ·13. At the other extreme (high SES, employer or self-employed status, no A.L.P. vote or trade union membership, telephone possession, and non-manual background), the figure is again ·95 (the sum of the relevant weights and the constant term). As before the SES variables dominate in predicting class identification.

The conclusion from this analysis is unequivocal: the way contemporary Australians conceive of the class structure and their position in it has its basis in the division of labour and the socio-economic inequalities associated with the world of work. Amount of education influences the range of jobs to which a man can aspire, and that range delimits the amount he can expect to earn. Money income, kind of work, and educational level partly determine life-style and social participation. In short, it is through the occupational system that inequalities in life chances and life-style are expressed. In the next chapter therefore we examine the patterns of movement within the occupational system and evaluate the relative importance of ascription and achievement in the process of occupational mobility.

6 Mobility and the process of occupational achievement

In industrial societies the kind of work a person does is an immediate measure of the income, prestige, and authority he receives. The study of occupational achievement is thus a preferred way to come to grips with the equities and inequities in the social order. But the occupational system does not stand alone. The point of entry into it and movement within it are conditioned by and interconnected with other social institutions such as the family and kinship, and formal education. Even in nations that stress egalitarian values and the principle of achievement, family background mediates prospects for individual achievement, and accidents of birth interact with personal ability in the process of occupational attainment. No society has resolved what Aron (1968: xv) calls the continuing dialectic between equality and hierarchy except those caste and slave societies that solve the dilemma by denying it. No society has been able to erase ascriptive influences from the life chances and occupational prospects of its citizens.

Australia exemplifies the tension between these contradictory principles of social organisation: equality versus hierarchy, and achievement versus ascription. According to Lipset (1963: 521) Australia is more egalitarian than the other Anglo-American democracies, although it falls behind the United States in the stress given to achievement. In this chapter we examine evidence relevant to this broad generalisation. But irrespective of its accuracy, the tension between these competing principles is amply evidenced in Australia's occupational system and in the process of individual occupational achievement.

The aggregate changes in the composition of the workforce examined in Chapter 3 provide the minimal conditions for individual mobility. Economic growth, technological change, lower fertility and smaller families, migration, and shifting demand for and availability of formal education influence occupational opportunity in two ways: they determine both the number and kinds of jobs available, and the number and qualifications of people available to fill them. The changes that flow from these influences guarantee a degree of occupational mobility. For example farm workers move to urban factories because of the mechanisation of rural production and women, freed from the home by fertility control and changing attitudes towards family and work, enter jobs such as clerical work and retailing previously monopolised by men.

The analysis of rates of occupational mobility involves a kind of assessment as well as descriptive measurement. It is one thing to state that at a particular time a society displays a given rate of mobility between fathers and their sons. It is another matter to assess that rate as high or low, and yet another to know if it is declining or increasing. In Australia the absence of previous national studies of father-to-son and career mobility precludes historical comparison. As discussed in Chapter 5, Melbourne data for father-to-son mobility are an unsuitable basis from which to generalise to the country because of the restricted nature of the sample (Oeser and Hammond, 1954).

Similarly Allingham's (1967) study of New South Wales marriage records uses a design sufficiently different from ours to make comparison unfeasible.

Given the impossibility of comparisons with earlier periods, we can undertake two other kinds of evaluation: comparisons with other countries and with abstract models. For international comparison we focus on the United States, because there is an excellent study (Blau and Duncan, 1967) conducted about the same time as our own, the results of which are amply documented and suitable for detailed assessment. The discussion that follows is an extension of our earlier papers (Broom and Jones, 1969a, 1969b) but is based on a more detailed occupational classification. We are not concerned to rank one country against another. Rather we are interested in examining how the level and type of industrial development are related to the patterns and rates of occupational mobility, and we draw comparisons with that objective in mind.

The second kind of interpretation compares observed rates of mobility with the rates that might be expected under the hypothetical conditions of equal opportunity. For example, the model of equal opportunity can be conceived as one in which each son regardless of his social origin has an equal chance of entering any job. This concept can be applied either to father-to-son or to career mobility. In the first case the criterion for comparison is father's job, in the second the individual's first job. Applied to Table 6.1, this model requires that the jobs sons enter should not depend on their father's jobs (the familiar concept of statistical independence between rows and columns). For example since 9·2 per cent of all sons in our sample are professional workers (the second last row of Table 6.1), equal occupational opportunity dictates that 9·2 per cent, not the observed 32·9 per cent, of the sons from professional backgrounds should themselves be professionals. The fact that the observed figure is higher than the 'expected' figure indicates that there is unequal advantage for sons from better-off families to enter better-off jobs. The same expectation of equal opportunity applies to sons from other social backgrounds; therefore, all the expected values in the first column of Table 6.1 should be 9·2 per cent if equality of opportunity actually did exist. Under conditions of unequal opportunity, this uniform expectation is not met: the percentages in the columns of Table 6.1 deviate sharply from those in the second last row. Almost four times the expected number of sons from professional background become professionals and less than one-third the expected number of farmers' sons become professionals.

In addition to distinguishing observed from expected mobility, we distinguish structural, or forced, mobility from circulation, or free, mobility. That distinction can be made most clearly by interpreting findings on father-to-son mobility in Australia and the United States.

Father-to-Son Mobility in Australia and the United States

Father-to-son mobility, or generational mobility as it is commonly termed, is conventionally assessed by asking a cross-section of men about their own occupation and that of their father (analogous questioning of women about themselves and their mothers has less frequently been carried out). Information about the older generation can be collected in several forms. Some studies ask for the present job of the father, or his last job if he is

dead or retired. Others ask for his main job during his working career, his job when his son was growing up, or his job when the father was the same age as his son when interviewed. In studies linking official records, the father's job may be taken as the one he had at the time of his son's birth or his son's marriage (cf. Allingham, 1967). All methods have advantages and disadvantages. Asking for present or last job involves less uncertainty about recall, particularly if a wife is supplying information about her father-in-law, since she is more likely to know his most recent occupation. When the son supplies the information, a more distant occupation, such as the job the father had when his son was growing up, can be used with a fair expectation of reliable recall.

Our survey (ANU 1965), in which wives were accepted as respondents on behalf of their husbands if their husbands were unavailable for interview, used the present/last job question. The U.S. study, which did not accept wives as proxies for husbands, used the job-during-adolescence form of question, in this case father's job when the son was 14 years old. Elsewhere (Jones, 1971b:532) we have provided evidence from the ANU 1967 survey that this variation in form of questioning does not appear to affect the gross pattern of association between father's job and son's education, son's first job, or son's present job. The correlations are virtually the same regardless of whether father's job was his most recent or the one he held when his son was growing up (the question used in ANU 1967). The reason for this result is that a father is not likely to experience much career mobility after his son has reached the age of 14. Even a young father would be in his early to mid-thirties by the time his first-born son was fourteen, while most fathers of 14-year-old sons would be forty or older. So the time gap between the two dates (age 14 of son, and present or last job) is on average not great and occurs at a stage in the father's life-cycle when most of his career mobility has already occurred.

Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present data on

Table 6.1: Father-to-son mobility in Australia (1965)

Father's job	Son's present job										N
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(100%)
1. Professional	*32.9*	24.7	21.9	9.6	1.4	2.7	2.7	1.4	1.4	1.4	73
2. Managerial	15.2	*21.8*	17.1	14.2	2.8	14.2	3.8	2.4	6.6	1.9	211
3. Clerical	19.2	16.8	*21.5*	16.2	2.4	12.6	3.0	4.2	2.4	1.8	167
4. Craftsmen	8.1	11.2	12.8	*39.3*	2.2	14.0	4.0	6.5	1.6	0.3	321
5. Salesmen	10.0	10.0	20.0	35.0	*20.0*	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20
6. Operatives	3.9	11.1	11.1	26.5	1.3	*27.8*	5.9	7.2	5.2	0.0	306
7. Service	10.7	17.9	14.3	27.4	4.8	13.1	*5.9*	3.6	2.4	0.0	84
8. Labourers	7.2	8.0	13.0	26.8	2.9	18.8	5.1	*10.9*	3.6	3.6	138
9. Farmers	2.8	10.2	4.8	11.0	2.0	16.4	2.3	4.0	*43.1*	3.4	353
10. Farm labourers	3.6	14.3	5.4	21.4	3.6	16.1	7.1	12.5	7.1	*8.9*	56
Total	9.2	13.5	12.6	22.5	2.5	16.7	4.0	5.5	11.7	1.8	1,729
N	159	234	217	389	43	288	70	95	203	31	

Source: ANU Survey, 1965.

father-to-son mobility in Australia and the United States. The occupational categories form a generalised status hierarchy of nonfarm jobs (categories 1 to 8) and of farm jobs (farmers and farm labourers). Immobility is highest at the top of each of the three broad strata of jobs: nonmanual (categories 1 to 3), manual or service (categories 4 to 8), and farm jobs (categories 9 and 10): The sons of professionals, craftsmen, and farmers display the highest rates of immobility and the lowest rates of outflow mobility. The same pattern can be observed in the American data, except that immobility is much lower among farmers' sons, owing to a more rapid decline in the relative number of farm jobs in the United States than in Australia. Also is the United States sons of managers tend to be more immobile than in Australia, where managers are more often self-made men with relatively low educational attainment (Bennett, 1967).

Although higher status occupations show lower rates of out-mobility because better-off parents can promote the careers of their children, in no occupational group is immobility the rule. All categories display more mobility than immobility. In Australia service jobs, farm labouring, and general labouring display very high rates of out-mobility, with the largest proportions of sons entering skilled trades and to a lesser degree semiskilled and mangerial work. The same pattern is evident in the United States except that the main movement is into semiskilled ahead of skilled jobs. The rates of upward mobility from farm labouring, general labouring, and service work into the managerial category are similar in both countries.

While relatively high rates of mobility are the rule, most mobility does not cross the nonmanual/manual line. In Australia 80 per cent of the sons of professionals remain in nonmanual jobs; in the United States the figure is slightly lower, 73 per cent. A smaller proportion, but still a majority, of sons from managerial backgrounds remain in nonmanual jobs: 54 per cent in Australia and 69 per cent in the

Table 6.2: Father-to-son mobility in the United States (1962)

Father's job	Son's present job										N
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(100%)
1. Professional	*41.0*	17.5	14.2	8.7	1.7	10.3	3.1	2.0	1.2	0.4	1,633
2. Managerial	21.6	*34.1*	13.4	13.9	2.7	8.5	2.5	1.9	1.0	0.3	4,001
3. Clerical	26.1	23.5	*17.4*	14.6	2.3	8.2	4.4	2.2	1.3	0.1	1,883
4. Craftsmen	13.0	16.5	11.0	*29.4*	1.5	17.5	5.1	4.8	0.8	0.4	6,274
5. Salesmen	15.3	27.2	16.1	13.1	*2.8*	14.7	4.9	3.5	2.4	0.0	633
6. Operatives	11.7	12.2	9.5	23.9	1.5	*25.9*	6.9	7.5	0.9	0.9	5,242
7. Service	10.1	14.2	13.2	21.0	2.0	20.9	*11.1*	6.3	1.0	0.3	1,626
8. Labourers	5.9	8.0	10.1	22.5	1.5	26.3	9.1	*14.2*	1.2	1.1	2,210
9. Farmers	5.3	11.5	6.0	19.7	1.2	20.5	5.2	8.5	*17.8*	4.3	9,508
10. Farm labourers	2.3	7.5	4.5	20.5	1.4	26.0	8.1	13.4	6.2	*10.2*	962
Total	12.9	16.2	10.1	20.8	1.7	18.6	5.5	6.5	5.9	1.8	33,972
N (000s)	4,370	5,517	3,438	7,055	562	6,331	1,857	2,220	1,997	625	

Source: Blau and Duncan, 1967: 496.

United States (in Australia a larger proportion were in semiskilled work). Among clerical workers, upward mobility or immobility is more frequent than downward mobility in both countries (58 per cent and 67 per cent respectively), with relatively more upward mobility in the United States, probably because of the more rapid expansion of higher status nonmanual jobs (see Table 6.3).

Among manual and service workers in Australia, the same pattern of immobility and mobility within the manual stratum is evident: a majority of craftsmen (64 per cent), salesmen (60 per cent), operatives (69 per cent), service workers (65 per cent), and labourers (65 per cent) remain in manual jobs. The comparable figures for the United States are 58 per cent, 39 per cent, 65 per cent, 61 per cent, and 74 per cent, values similar to those for Australia except for salesmen[1] who show higher rates of upward mobility in the United States. However, not many fathers were in sales work in Australia, and little reliance can be placed on the percentage differences in this case.

In both countries the sons of farm workers are highly mobile, but they are less so in Australia than in the United States. The much higher rate of outmobility among farmers' sons in the United States can be explained in terms of more rapid structural change in the U.S. economy.

Table 6.3 presents summary data derived from Tables 6.1 and 6.2, and permits a more direct examination of the structural differences between the two countries. From the first column of this table, it is apparent that there are few major differences in the occupational distributions of fathers. The average difference (regardless of sign) between the several pairs of percentages is only 1·8 per cent. Only 9 per cent of Australian fathers would need to shift occupational group to mirror the U.S. distribution exactly. Farmers, who are much more numerous among American than Australian fathers, make up the largest single difference.

In the second column (son's job) differences are slightly more marked: white-collar jobs are more numerous and farm jobs less numerous in the United States than in Australia. Although fathers in the surveys do not represent a previous generation or a previous historical workforce, it is clear that the rate of structural change in the American workforce has been more rapid than in Australia. Census statistics show that in the 50 years from 1910 to 1960 the proportion of men working in the rural sector of the economy fell from 35 to 8 per cent in the United States, but from 37 per cent to 15 per cent in Australia (Broom and Jones, 1969a: 339). In other words more father-to-son mobility in the U.S. survey is attributable to exogenous changes in the economic structure. Changes in structural opportunities partly, but only partly, reflect gross movements over time in the occupational composition of the whole labour force. It is a simple matter, for example, to document the long-term decline in the relative number of farm jobs in each country.

Two erroneous inferences need to be avoided: that the fathers represent any pre-existent labour force, and that the fathers represent a generation of fathers and the sons a generation of sons. It is clear that in sample surveys the respondents (sons) do indeed represent a cross-section of an existing labour force. The fathers, however, are not similarly

1 In the Australian survey the salesman category is restricted to shop assistants who are characteristically persons just entering the workforce. The American category refers to retail salesmen, a more broadly defined occupational grouping.

isomorphic to any pre-existent labour force. The fathers of some young respondents may still be at work, while the fathers of the oldest respondents may be long dead. The fathers of immigrants belonged to the labour force of another country, and differential fertility (counterbalanced to some extent by differential mortality) ensures the overrepresentation of some occupational groups and the underrepresentation of others. But the most important and elementary distinction to keep in mind is that although all men *have* fathers, not all men *are* fathers. At any time the workforce of a country will include many men who do not, and never will, have a son.

The second erroneous inference is that the sons and fathers represent distinct generations. However the concept generation is defined, any sample of adult workers covers more than one generation. The age spread among respondents in our Australian sample is about 40 years, and because men vary in the age at which they have children, the fathers are spread over an even wider time span: some may have been born as recently as 1925, while others

Table 6.3: Structural change and patterns of father-to-son mobility in Australia (1965) and the U.S.A. (1962)

Occupational group		Father's job	Son's job	% Mobility Outflow	% Mobility Inflow	Coeff. of openness*
1. Professional	Aust.	4.2	9.2	67.1	84.9	.74
	U.S.A.	4.8	12.9	59.0	84.7	.68
2. Managerial	Aust.	12.2	13.5	78.2	80.3	.90
	U.S.A.	11.8	16.2	65.9	75.3	.79
3. Clerical	Aust.	9.7	12.6	78.4	83.4	.90
	U.S.A.	5.5	10.1	82.6	90.5	.92
4. Craftsmen	Aust.	18.6	22.5	60.7	67.6	.78
	U.S.A.	18.5	20.8	70.6	73.9	.89
5. Salesmen	Aust.	1.2	2.5	80.0	90.7	.82
	U.S.A.	1.9	1.7	97.2	96.8	.99
6. Operatives	Aust.	17.7	16.7	82.2	80.5	.86
	U.S.A.	15.4	18.6	74.1	78.5	.91
7. Service	Aust.	4.9	4.0	94.0	92.9	.98
	U.S.A.	4.8	5.5	88.9	90.3	.94
8. Labourers	Aust.	8.0	5.5	89.1	84.2	.92
	U.S.A.	6.5	6.5	85.9	85.9	.92
9. Farmers	Aust.	20.4	11.7	56.9	25.1	.32
	U.S.A.	28.0	5.9	82.2	15.1	.21
10. Farm workers	Aust.	3.2	1.8	91.1	83.9	.87
	U.S.A.	2.8	1.8	89.8	84.3	.87
Total	Aust.	100.1	100.0	71.2	71.2	.79
	U.S.A.	100.0	100.0	76.8	76.8	.83

*Yasuda Index. See text for discussion.

Source: For Australia, Broom and Jones, 1969b.
For U.S.A., Blau and Duncan, 1967:496.

were presumably born as long ago as the 1860s. A sample of respondents who themselves vary in age by as much as 40 years cannot be called a generation. The term is even less meaningful when applied to fathers. In kinship terms, each individual son and his father represent two generations, but sons and fathers of widely different ages represent several cohorts and do not form two distinct labour-force generations.

Total observed mobility (the bottom rows of columns 3 and 4) is higher in the United States: 77 per cent compared with 71 per cent in Australia. Furthermore the difference between the marginal distributions of fathers and sons is more marked in the United States, showing more structural mobility than in Australia. For example 30·8 per cent of fathers but only 7·7 per cent of sons in the American sample were in farm jobs. Therefore, three out of four sons from farm backgrounds had to find other kinds of jobs because of the declining demand for farm workers. This decline is less marked for Australia: from 23·6 per cent of fathers in farming to 13·5 per cent for sons.

To calculate the amount of overall structural mobility involves calculating the index of dissimilarity (see page 40) between fathers' jobs and sons' jobs in each country. This index gives a measure of the number of sons who had to move from their fathers' occupational category because there were fewer such jobs among sons than among fathers. From the first two columns of Table 6.3 we calculate that structural mobility as measured by the index of dissimilarity amounted to 23·3 per cent in the United States but only 14·5 per cent in Australia. By subtraction (total observed mobility minus structural mobility) we can see that circulation, or free, mobility is slightly higher in Australia than in the United States: 56·7 per cent and 53·5 per cent respectively.

We can now relate these summary measures of mobility to the model of equal occupational opportunity, both for the occupational system as a whole and for each occupational stratum separately. The basis for this calculation is the ratio of observed to expected mobility after correcting for structural mobility (Yasuda, 1964: Jones, 1975b). 'Expected' in this instance means the amount of mobility expected on the equal opportunity model outlined above. From the fact that expected mobility was 86·5 and 87·8 per cent respectively in Australia and the United States, and from the formula for the coefficient of openness (or the Yasuda index of equality of occupational opportunity) expressed as

$$Y = \frac{\text{observed} - \text{structural}}{\text{expected} - \text{structural}}$$

we calculate that there is a high degree of openness in both societies, and that the United States is slightly more open. The last two statistics in Table 6.3 can be interpreted to mean that in Australia in 1965 observed father-to-son mobility was 79 per cent of the amount expected on the assumption of equal occupational opportunity after controlling for structural mobility. In the United States this expectation was approached even more closely, 83 per cent.[2] Both societies are therefore closer to the ideal of equal opportunity than to a closed society

2 The Yasuda index can exceed 1, or 100 per cent, in cases where there has been a more radical transformation of the occupational structure than that required by the liberal assumption of equal opportunity. With equal opportunity, some sons remain in their father's stratum. If such inheritance (broadly defined) were disallowed, the Yasuda index would exceed 1. See Jones, 1975b.

where a person's future statuses are rigorously determined by the social position of his or her father.

It is instructive to scan the last column of Table 6.3 and to examine the degree of openness in each occupational stratum. In both countries there is least openness among farmers, which is an occupational category with little inflow from other groups despite high outflow. The competition for farmers' jobs occurs almost entirely among the sons of farmers and farm workers, with the surplus from those backgrounds entering manual and, to a lesser degree, nonmanual jobs. After farmers there is a large jump to the next lowest value of the coefficient, among professionals who in both countries form the next most 'closed' group. This élite group enjoys a considerable capacity to transmit advantages to their sons, but even among professionals equality of opportunity is two-thirds of the level expected. The expanding professional category is characterised by a high rate of inflow from other social origins. (The outflow perspective, shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, focuses on the supply of job occupants from a particular stratum, whereas the inflow perspective focuses on the recruitment side. It answers the question, from what social background do the present occupants of a particular stratum come?) In the U.S. sample the coefficient of openness for managers is lower than in Australia, a fact on which we have already commented. Except for salesmen, which is a small category in the Australian sample, the other coefficients are remarkably similar between the countries, suggesting a basic similarity in the opportunity structures of two industrialised societies. When differences in the rates of structural change are taken into account, the chances of achieving a given occupational position look very similar.

Another way to compare two occupational mobility structures, and to confirm the basic similarity of the mobility experience of the men in the two samples, is to standardise one occupational structure to the other by the method of proportional adjustment (Mosteller, 1968; Hazelrigg, 1974). As applied here the method reproduces the pattern of mobility experienced by the men in the American sample *as if* they had had the same present jobs and the same parental origins as in the Australian sample. In practical terms it means rescaling the internal figures in the mobility table for American men until the rows and columns (fathers' and sons' jobs) converge to the Australian sample.[3] We spare our readers the details of the analysis and simply report that its results confirm our previous interpretation. When the difference in structural mobility is eliminated by standardising the U.S sample to the Australian, we find great similarity in their patterns of mobility. The total rate of observed mobility in the adjusted American sample is reduced to 71·9 per cent, almost exactly the Australian figure, while the average difference between the outflow rates for each pair of origin strata (summed without regard to sign) is halved, from an initial 10 per cent to an adjusted 5 per cent. Because the adjusted sample gives exactly the same amount of expected and structural mo-

3 This iterative procedure is easily done by computer, by rescaling first the rows, and then the columns, and so on iteratively until the two sets of marginals converge. The rescaling factors are the ratio of Australian to American men in any origin (row) or destination (column) category. The technique attempts to give an answer to the counterfactual conditional: what kind of mobility pattern would American men have shown if the internal pattern of father-to-son inheritance had taken place in an opportunity structure the same as that faced by Australian men. Cf. Popper, 1972: 436-41.

bility as the Australian sample, the coefficients of openness in the two occupational systems are virtually identical: 0·79 in Australia and 0·80 in America. This finding means that if the American sons had begun from the same social origin distribution as the Australian sons, and if they had competed within the same occupational opportunity structure, their mobility experiences would have been indistinguishable.

Career Mobility in Australia and the United States

The position that a person reaches in the occupational structure depends not only on his social background but also on where he begins his working life. In this analysis we restrict ourselves to the question of how far men move from the particular occupational group in which they start, reserving for a later discussion an examination of the effects of social origins. It is obvious that the number of changes an individual experiences is related to the length of his working career, but our samples are not large enough to reveal reliable age patterns within a detailed occupational classification. Our focus is on the employed male population as a whole, and the samples that we analyse comprise a cross-section of men of different ages and at different points in their careers.

In discussing career mobility[4] we follow the same line of interpretation as for father-to-son mobility. We compare the standard outflow matrices in Australia and the United States and then summarise their respective mobility experience in terms of an equal opportunity model. It is important to identify occupational strata that may be termed entry occupations, that is jobs in which men are apt to begin their careers but which they

4 To speak of a career may imply orderly progress as in a firm or profession. We use career mobility in a broad sense to indicate the course of an individual's working life whether occupational changes are few or many, upward or downward, short- or long-distance.

Table 6.4: Career mobility in Australia (1965)

First job	Present job										N
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(100%)
1. Professional	*76.8*	8.0	4.5	3.6	1.8	2.7	1.8	—	.9	—	112
2. Managerial	11.1	*55.6*	—	—	5.6	11.1	11.1	5.6	—	—	18
3. Clerical	10.4	20.9	*37.7*	7.7	3.7	9.8	3.7	3.4	2.0	.7	297
4. Craftsmen	4.6	12.7	7.4	*55.2*	1.5	9.4	2.8	2.8	2.8	.7	458
5. Salesmen	3.8	24.0	12.5	15.4	*8.7*	18.3	1.9	8.7	3.8	2.9	104
6. Operatives	2.8	10.7	11.1	15.4	1.6	*42.7*	5.5	6.3	3.6	.4	253
7. Service	1.9	18.9	13.2	17.0	0.9	22.6	*18.9*	1.9	3.8	—	53
8. Labourers	5.4	15.2	7.1	17.0	1.8	22.3	5.4	*22.3*	2.7	.9	112
9. Farmers	—	4.7	2.3	3.1	1.6	10.9	2.3	3.1	*71.3*	.8	129
10. Farm labourers	1.7	5.4	5.0	12.6	2.9	20.9	4.2	7.9	30.1	*9.2*	239
Total	9.1	13.4	12.5	22.4	2.6	17.2	4.1	5.5	11.4	1.9	1,775
N	162	237	222	397	46	305	73	98	202	33	

Source: Broom and Jones, 1969b.

tend to leave as they grow older. The two most clearly defined entry occupations in both countries are salesmen and farm labourers. Outflow mobility from these two groups exceeds 90 per cent in both Australia and the United States, representing an upward progression into entrepreneurial positions: managers and farm proprietors. Clerical work and labouring also tend to be young men's tasks, and again in both countries fewer men are currently employed in such jobs than the number who started their working lives in such occupations. Labourers tend to graduate to semiskilled and skilled manual work in both countries, and some even become proprietors, while clerical workers tend to move further up the ladder of nonmanual employment: in Australia 31 per cent, and in the United States 41 per cent, of men who began as clerical workers are currently managers or professionals.

Jobs with easy access can be contrasted to occupations where entry is restricted by qualifications (professionals and craftsmen), or by capital and property requirements (managers and proprietors, and farm proprietors). Relatively few men start out in these categories compared with the number currently employed in them. Those who do start out in them tend to be relatively immobile: in both Australia and the United States the highest rates of career immobility are found in these four strata, and the immobility rates in Australia are particularly high, ranging from one-half to three-quarters.

We should comment upon one artifactual difference between the two studies that hinges on the way craftsmen are defined. In the 1961 Australian census classification of occupations, apprentices were coded to the trade or craft to which they were apprenticed. In the 1960 U.S. census classification, however, apprentices were coded into the operatives group, a lower level of skill than qualified tradesmen. Therefore, career 'mobility' from operatives to craftsmen in the American sample is nearly double the rate in the Australian sample, and the rate of immobility within the operatives stratum is consequently much lower.

It is impossible in view of the different

Table 6.5: Career mobility in the United States (1962)

First job	Present job										N
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(100%)
1. Professional	*65.3*	17.4	7.9	4.0	.4	2.4	.9	.6	.9	.2	3,047
2. Managerial	17.7	*49.9*	10.6	7.9	2.4	5.3	1.9	2.3	1.7	.3	696
3. Clerical	14.9	25.9	*26.9*	11.4	2.1	10.3	4.5	2.7	1.2	.2	4,488
4. Craftsmen	9.2	18.6	6.4	*41.2*	1.8	12.6	3.6	4.2	1.9	.5	3,433
5. Salesmen	12.6	28.3	19.7	12.6	*5.3*	14.1	3.2	3.1	1.1	.1	1,814
6. Operatives	6.5	14.3	8.3	26.6	1.6	*27.5*	5.6	6.6	2.1	.8	9,688
7. Service	8.2	12.0	6.9	17.4	1.4	22.7	*21.5*	9.0	.4	.5	1,404
8. Labourers	6.2	10.9	7.5	23.1	1.3	25.2	7.2	*15.2*	2.1	1.3	4,865
9. Farmers	2.7	6.7	5.2	16.4	1.3	14.1	4.9	5.3	*38.0*	5.3	1,181
10. Farm labourers	2.1	7.7	3.8	18.6	1.1	21.4	6.3	10.3	21.0	*7.6*	5,243
Total	12.6	16.1	10.1	20.8	1.6	18.8	5.6	6.9	5.7	1.8	35,859
N (000s)	4,514	5,759	3,626	7,451	593	6,761	2,005	2,466	2,037	647	

Source: Blau and Duncan, 1967: 498.

classification of apprentices to compare patterns of mobility involving craftsmen and operatives in the two surveys. This problem complicates interpretation of Table 6.6, which presents summary patterns of mobility in each country. In terms of structural change, that is differences in aggregate distribution of first and present jobs, it is apparent that there is more structural mobility in the American sample: slightly more American men had moved into professional jobs and many more had moved out of the farmers category. Taken at face value, the index of dissimilarity calculated from the figures as shown for first and present jobs in Table 6.6 is 33·5 per cent for the United States but only 23·3 per cent for Australia. However, a high proportion of this difference is located in the craftsmen-operatives interchange, which as already explained is only an artifact. If we combine those two strata, the indexes of dissimilarity are more similar, 25·4 (U.S.A.) and 20·4 (Australia), but even so, career mobility in the United States

Table 6.6: Structural change and patterns of career mobility in Australia (1965) and the U.S.A. (1962)

Occupational group		First job	Present job	% Mobility Outflow	% Mobility Inflow	Coeff. of openness*
1. Professional	Aust.	6.3	9.1	23.2	46.9	.26
	U.S.A.	8.5	12.6	34.7	55.9	.40
2. Managerial	Aust.	1.0	13.4	44.4	95.8	.51
	U.S.A.	1.9	16.1	50.1	94.0	.60
3. Clerical	Aust.	16.7	12.5	62.3	49.5	.60
	U.S.A.	12.5	10.1	73.1	66.7	.76
4. Craftsmen	Aust.	25.8	22.4	44.8	36.3	.49
	U.S.A.	9.6	20.8	58.8	81.0	.74
5. Salesmen	Aust.	5.9	2.6	91.3	80.4	.85
	U.S.A.	5.1	1.6	94.7	83.8	.88
6. Operatives	Aust.	14.3	17.2	57.3	64.6	.69
	U.S.A.	27.0	18.8	72.5	60.6	.83
7. Service	Aust.	3.0	4.1	81.1	86.3	.85
	U.S.A.	3.9	5.6	78.5	84.9	.83
8. Labourers	Aust.	6.3	5.5	77.7	74.5	.80
	U.S.A.	13.6	6.9	84.8	70.0	.81
9. Farmers	Aust.	7.3	11.4	38.7	54.5	.32
	U.S.A.	3.3	5.7	62.0	78.0	.66
10. Farm Labourers	Aust.	13.5	1.9	90.8	33.3	.39
	U.S.A.	14.6	1.8	92.4	38.5	.45
Total	Aust.	100.1	100.1	59.0	59.0	.55
	U.S.A.	100.0	100.0	73.2	73.2	.72

*Yasuda Index.

Source: For Australia, Broom and Jones, 1969a.
For U.S.A., Blau and Duncan, 1967:498.

appears to be greater: in every stratum of origin there is greater outflow to other jobs than is found in Australia. The recruitment (inflow) patterns are less one-sided. Ignoring the craftsmen-operatives categories, we find that in five strata inflow is higher in the U.S. sample, but in the three remaining strata — managerial, service, and labourers — the rate of inflow in Australia is fractionally higher.

So far as equality of opportunity is concerned, the evidence is unequivocal that career beginnings are less confining in the United States than in Australia. Except for service jobs, the coefficient of openness is higher for the American sample than the Australian, often by a substantial margin. In the American sample as a whole, observed mobility amounts to 72 per cent of that expected on the model of equal occupational opportunity (that is to say, on the assumption that a man's present job is independent of his career beginnings), compared with only 55 per cent in Australia. This comparison controls for differences in structural change and is not affected by the artifactual mobility between operatives and craftsmen. If we group these two categories in both samples and ignore interchange mobility between them, the coefficients are left virtually unchanged: 0·56 in Australia and 0·71 in the United States.

To check further the reliability of these results, we applied the method of proportional adjustment to Tables 6.4 and 6.5. Recall that in the case of father-to-son mobility we found no appreciable difference between the two samples. For career mobility differences persist. The per cent mobile in the American sample, even after standardising its occupational structure to that of the Australian sample, is higher 68·4 per cent compared with 59·0 per cent, an excess of 9·4 per cent. This mobility 'gap' is narrowed to 6·6 per cent when craftsmen and operatives are grouped together (61·0 and 54·4 per cent respectively), but the finding of high mobility is sustained. In a further test, we examined upward and downward mobility among nonfarm jobs, using six categories: the first three in Table 6.6, four to six grouped together, and the last two nonfarm strata (service, labourers). We found greater immobility in the Australian sample (54·5 per cent compared with 48·3 per cent). The more mobile American men were evenly distributed in the direction of their mobility: 3·0 per cent had moved to a higher status job; 3·2 per cent moved down.

While in comparative terms these are not large differences, the somewhat higher career mobility in the United States may be explained by a greater competitiveness in the American occupational system, which is characterised by lower rates of unionisation, lower proportions of employment in the public sector (where job security is high), and higher rates of unemployment, at least for most of the period covered by our sample. Probably the American experience is less homogeneous than the Australian, which has no real equivalent to the industrial diversity of the various regions of the United States. Australia is probably characterised by lower geographical mobility and lower movement between firms than the United States, and the wider roles of unions and government in Australian employment may restrain the flow of manpower from one kind of work to another. In the mid-1960s more than half of Australian wage and salary workers were union members (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1967b:247). Although strictly comparable figures for the United States are not available because of differences in criteria and definition, the

comparable American proportion was probably between one-quarter and one-third (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972: 242). While it is difficult to document the exact difference between government employment in the two countries, public utilities (for example gas, electricity, telephone and telegraph services) are typically governmental or statutory bodies in Australia but more often private companies in the United States. According to official figures, 28·6 per cent of the Australian male civilian workforce in 1966 were in government employment (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1968a: 1168), compared with only 13·1 per cent of males employed in nonagricultural industries in the United States in 1965 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972: 238). In Australia unionisation probably inhibits movement between different kinds of jobs, while government employment provides a career system of advancement through seniority without necessarily changing one's occupation, at least not in terms of the broad groups defined here.

The Process of Occupational Achievement

Our analysis of occupational mobility between the generations or over individual careers has served to establish how much mobility occurs in Australian society, and how that mobility compares in amount and direction with mobility in another industrial society, the United States. In both societies we found support for the generalisation that a society reaching an advanced level of industrialisation experiences high rates of mobility. However, in the case of career mobility we identified some differences which seem to reflect differing institutional and political structures.

In both countries the amounts of mobility observed indicate that there is some approximation to the ideal of equality of occupational opportunity, at least in broad terms. However, we also noted in every occupational group examined that the amount of inheritance exceeded that expected on the basis of equal opportunity. Ascription as well as achievement plays a part in the process of occupational attainment.

The relative importance of ascription and achievement in occupational mobility may be evaluated by considering a person's occupation as the outcome of family background and early educational and occupational experiences. Put schematically the process appears as in the diagram presented below.

In this model, developed and first used extensively by Duncan (Blau and Duncan, 1967), family characteristics represent the initial conditions from which individual careers begin. Education links the family with work experience, and social origins interact with (limit or facilitate) the process of occupational achievement.

This simplified model could be elaborated to take into account relevant social-psychological variables, such as the influence of peer groups, intelligence, aspiration (cf. Sewell *et al.*, 1970), and also relevant structural features of society in general and the economy in particular.

Time	1	2	3	4
Life cycle stage	Birth and childhood	Socialisation	Career beginnings	Present attainment
Indicator	Father's education Father's job	Person's education	Person's first job	Person's current job Current income

Analysis of particular age groups, for example, indirectly mirrors changes in the external structure of opportunities. Our present analysis is largely limited to the basic six-variable model outlined above. But by analysing three broad age cohorts — men under 35, men 35 to 49 years, and men 50 years of age and over — we can make some inferences about changes in the process of stratification during the lifetimes of men in our sample.

In conceptualising the process of occupational achievement in causal terms, certain logical requirements are imposed on the data. The most important is that the process is seen as a temporal sequence, that is the four stages are ordered in time: (1) birth and childhood, (2) socialisation, (3) career beginnings, (4) present achievement. Our data do not strictly fulfil this requirement. For example some fathers were still at work when we interviewed their sons. Thus, the time to which father's job refers is, in terms of the model, Time 4, not Time 1. The requirements of the model would be better satisfied if father's job were measured when son was aged 14, but father's job as described in our survey does not appear to create a serious problem. Secondly, beginning work does not signal the end of full-time education for a few men who begin work and then return to full-time education. In such cases — probably not more than 5 per cent of our sample — the assumed sequence between education and first job does not hold. Ideally education should be measured as a lifetime process that extends into and through an occupational career. Financial constraints restricted our 1965 inquiry to a single measure of education. But we know from other results that further education is a significant factor in career mobility, especially for the 'middle mass' (Müller, 1973).

The process model of occupational achievement is depicted in Figure 6.1. The correlations from which the path coefficients (standardised regression coefficients) have been calculated are shown in Table 6.7 and the path coefficients in Table 6.8. The analysis has been carried out for the sample as a whole, and for three age cohorts: men aged 21-34 years, 35-49, and 50 or older. In path analysis the causal structure of a model is conventionally indicated by the unidirectional arrows (causal paths). Thus, son's education (X_3) is seen as a joint function of the two prior exogenous variables and of a disturbance variable (R_w), which represents influences not explicitly included in the model. This disturbance variable gives the system formal completeness by representing effects outside the model. The fourth variable is in turn determined by the second and third variables, but it is not directly influenced by the first: the model assumes that any effect of father's education on son's first job is expressed indirectly through father's occupation and son's education. Again a disturbance factor (R_x) completes of set of determinants. Present occupation is determined by the second, third, and fourth variables (and by the disturbance variable R_y), but no direct path is shown from the first variable, indicating again that its effect is mediated through intervening variables. Finally, income is seen as jointly determined by all other variables (and the disturbance term (R_z) except father's education.

Path analysis as we use it here is based on four assumptions: (1) all variables — exogenous, endogenous, and disturbance — are in standard form, (2) there is only one-way causation between variables, (3) the disturbance variables are not intercorrelated, and (4) the appropriate equations for representing the relationships

Figure 6·1: Process Model of occupational achievement



Variables
X_1 = Father's Education
X_2 = Father's Job
X_3 = Son's Education
X_4 = Son's First Job
X_5 = Son's Present Job
X_6 = Son's Present Income

between variables are linear and additive. Given these assumptions, we can apply conventional techniques of multiple regression to calculate path coefficients by taking seriatim the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth variables as dependent on 'earlier' variables from which direct causal influence is hypothesised. The path coefficients yielded by this (controlled) stepwise procedure are simply standardised regression coefficients. A final point worth noting is that in cases such as the present

Table 6.7: Simple correlations among six status characteristics in Australia (1965)

Status characteristic	Birth cohort	Status characteristics 1	2	3	4	5	6
	All men	1.00	*.29*	*.47*	*.24*	*.23*	*.18*
1. Father's education	1931-44	1.00	.31	.46	.20	.31	.16
	1916-30	1.00	.35	.45	.26	.23	.21
	1900-15	1.00	.25	.47	.23	.18	.16
	All men		1.00	*.18*	*.19*	*.29*	*.22*
2. Father's job	1931-44		1.00	.14	.16	.24	.20
	1916-30		1.00	.24	.23	.31	.23
	1900-15		1.00	.20	.18	.30	.22
	All men			1.00	*.43*	*.43*	*.33*
3. Son's education	1931-44			1.00	.41	.50	.26
	1916-30			1.00	.45	.43	.37
	1900-15			1.00	.41	.38	35
	All men				1.00	*.40*	*.28*
4. Son's first job	1931-44				1.00	.45	.23
	1916-30				1.00	.40	.33
	1900-15				1.00	.36	.25
	All men					1.00	*.51*
5. Son's present job	1931-44					1.00	.37
	1916-30					1.00	.57
	1900-15					1.00	.54
	All men						1.00
6. Son's present income	1931-44						1.00
	1916-30						1.00
	1900-15						1.00

Source: ANU Survey, 1965.

where some logically possible paths are not shown (namely, P_{41}, P_{51}), it is possible not only to estimate the path coefficients but also to test the internal consistency of the model. Because paths between father's education and son's first job, and father's education and son's present job are not indicated, the model implies that the zero-order correlations between these variables (·24 and ·23 respectively) are spurious, that is attributable entirely to the effects of intervening variables (father's occupation and son's education). In these circumstances we should expect to find that these paths, if estimated, would turn out to be statistically insignificant. The twin advantages of path analysis are that it enables the researcher to decompose gross relationships between variables in a causal model into direct and indirect effects and to test the internal consistency of the causal model itself through the deletion of logically possible paths between variables. These advantages can also be obtained by conventional techniques of regression analysis, but with less force and clarity.

We extend an earlier analysis (Jones, 1971b) by including income level (six broad income groupings, ranging from

Table 6.8: Path coefficients in the process of achievement in Australia (1965)

Paths to dependent variables	All men	Birth cohort 1931-44	1916-30	1900-15
Son's education (X_3):				
P_{31}	.45	.46	.42	.45
P_{32}	.05	.00	.09	.09
P_{3w}	.88	.89	.89	.88
Son's first job (X_4):				
P_{42}	.12	.11	.13	.10
P_{43}	.41	.40	.42	.39
P_{4x}	.90	.91	.88	.91
Son's present job (X_5):				
P_{52}	.19	.15	.19	.21
P_{53}	.29	.37	.28	.25
P_{54}	.24	.28	.23	.21
P_{5y}	.85	.81	.85	.87
Son's present income (X_5):				
P_{62}	.07	.11	.05	.05
P_{63}	.13	.09	.14	.15
P_{64}	.03	.04	.06	.00
P_{65}	.42	.28	.48	.47
P_{6z}	.85	.92	.80	.83

Note: The paths and their identifying subscripts are identified by reference to fig. 6.1.
Source: ANU Survey, 1965.

less than $1800 to $5000 or more) but omit the direct comparison with the United States because a later analysis shows that some of the differences noted were owing to differences in the method of scaling occupations (Featherman *et al.*, 1975). First, let us consider the pattern of intercorrelations among the six status characteristics in the sample as a whole and in the different birth cohorts.[5] The weakest correlations are generally for father's education, which rarely approaches or exceeds 0·30 except with son's education: in all age groups the educational level of sons and fathers is quite highly correlated. This result is not particularly surprising, since an overwhelming majority of sons and fathers are found in only three of the six educational categories: some primary, completed primary, and some secondary for fathers, and completed primary, some secondary, and completed secondary for sons. In short, there has been a rise in the level of education between the generations, with a tendency for fathers who were better educated than their peers to facilitate a higher level of education for their sons. This pattern is consistent across all three age groups.

The relationship between education and

5 We ignore differences less than ·05 in this discussion. Even with a sample of 1500 men, differences greater than ·05 could easily be due to sampling variability. For example the largest coefficient for all the men included in this analysis (the correlation between son's present job and present income) has a standard error of ·026 and a confidence interval of ·51 $\pm$ ·05.

work seems to have grown stronger over time. Whereas the correlation between father's education and his last or present job is only 0·29, among sons the correlation is substantially higher (0·43). When we examine birth cohorts we find some fluctuation in the strength of this relationship among both fathers and sons, with the lowest correlation being for the fathers of the oldest sons in our sample (those 50 years of age or older). This suggests that education was less important to the occupational achievement of these 'oldest' fathers. A similar pattern can be observed among sons: education is a stronger influence on the present job of younger than older men, indicating the increasing importance of education in the process of occupational achievement. However, this finding may be an artifact of the brevity of the younger men's careers. By the nature of the case, the present jobs of men aged under 35 in 1965 are closer to the time they finished their education than the jobs of men aged 50 or older. Note that the impact of education on career beginnings does not vary much among the three birth cohorts, although it is highest among the group of men born between 1916 and 1930 whose careers began in the period spanning the depression of the 1930s and the outbreak of World War II. The severe competition for jobs in those years may have given an advantage to men with more education, but we would not press that interpretation without stronger evidence.

It is interesting that the correlation of income with every other status characteristic is highest for the middle birth cohort, which spans the years of highest earning capacity (see Table 4.3) Whether we consider the relation to income of social background, education, first job, or present job, in each case the correlation is strongest for the middle group and weakest for the youngest. This finding suggests a model of career growth in which the effects of ascribed and achieved characteristics on earnings are not fully expressed until mid-career, after which the pattern of average earnings fluctuates depending on occupation and further training. Since our data on income are available only in very broad groups and we have no information on lifetime education, we cannot attempt a formal human capital model (cf. Mincer, 1974).

These broad features of contemporary Australian stratification are shown in Figure 6.1, which depicts the process of occupational achievement in terms of several temporally ordered statuses, and in Table 6.8, which presents the same data in tabular form for the total sample and for the three birth cohorts. As the diagram indicates, we are not concerned with explaining the job or the educational level of a father: in terms of this causal model, the characteristics of a man's social background are taken for granted as resources or starting conditions for his own career. A son's education is conceived as the joint outcome of his father's job and educational achievement, while the son's first job, present job, and income level are similarly considered to be outcomes of earlier events or conditions.

In each case where we assess the relative influence of any characteristic on some later status, we also include residual terms (R_w, R_x, R_y, and R_z), which represent factors not explicitly taken into account by our model. The square of this residual path coefficient gives a measure of the variation not accounted for in the model. For example 77 per cent of the variance in son's education is not accounted for by father's job and education although, as Table 6.8 shows, we are more successful in explaining variations in income among middle-aged men and in

occupational achievement among younger men. If we isolated groups of men with more homogeneous backgrounds and experience (for example native-born men of native-born parents who took their first job between 1946 and 1950 in the Sydney metropolitan area), we would expect to improve the explanatory power of our model. As we have already suggested, the inclusion of social-psychological and structural variables would give further insight into the dynamics of occupational change. But the restricted range of our data, combined with a modest sample, limit the extent to which we can develop more complex, disaggregated models. For present purposes we focus on the national opportunity structure as a whole, on a few major variables, and on three birth cohorts distinguishing both life-cycle stages (early, middle, and late career) and different historical periods.

According to Table 6.8 the main influence on the education of a man is his father's education. Father's job is by comparison of little independent importance. Indeed among the younger men in our sample, father's job has no independent effect. So far as career beginnings are concerned, there are no appreciable differences by age or period of workforce entry: the pattern of coefficients is much the same in all three birth cohorts, and the man's education is the most important influence on first job. Using the path coefficient formula for distinguishing components of covariation, we find that

$$R_{43} = P_{43} + P_{42}\,r_{21}$$

the observed correlation between son's first job and his education can be interpreted as

$$\begin{aligned} \cdot 43 &= \cdot 40 + (\cdot 12)(\cdot 29) \\ &= \cdot 40 + \cdot 03 \\ &= \cdot 43 \end{aligned}$$

Only a minor part of the correlation between son's first job and his own education is due to the direct effect of social background: the main importance of social background for career beginnings is in its effect on education. Note that Figure 6.1 does not trace a direct effect of father's education on son's career beginnings. The above calculation indicates that if such a path were shown, it would turn out to be zero. The influence of father's education in this case is mediated by its effect via son's education and father's job. In path analysis terms

$$\begin{aligned} R_{41} &= P_{43}\,r_{31} + P_{42}\,r_{32} \\ \cdot 24 &= (\cdot 45)(\cdot 47) + (\cdot 12)(\cdot 18) \\ &= \cdot 21 + \cdot 02 \\ &\doteq \cdot 23 \end{aligned}$$

This result almost exactly reproduces the observed value of the correlation coefficient between father's education and son's first job (see Table 6.7). As already noted, the effect of father's education can be treated as wholly indirect, and predominantly via son's education. In other words, the educational system acts as the main link between favourable, or unfavourable, family origins and a higher, or lower, occupational status at the time of first beginning work.

So far as present job is concerned, there are consistent differences by birth cohort, or age, in that the careers of younger men are more predictable than those of older men. This is due to two factors: the greater importance of education as a determinant of present occupational status and the greater importance of career beginnings. The second factor can be seen as an artifact of the short careers of the younger men. Their first and present jobs are necessarily closer together in time than those of older men, and they had therefore experienced less career mobility when they were interviewed in

1965. The greater influence of education among younger men is also in part an artifact of short careers, as well as a reflection of the increasing importance of educational requirements in the process of occupational achievement. However, to disentangle the effects of age and time would require information we do not have for our older birth cohorts, for example the job held at a specific interval (say, ten years) after beginning work. For younger men the effect of social background has a weaker influence on present job, hinting at a trend towards an achievement orientation. However, given the rapid expansion of facilities for higher education in postwar Australia, we cannot press this interpretation further. Nor can we say definitively what part of educational attainment is achievement and what part ascription.

Finally, we turn to income. In general, factors associated with family background are weakest of all in the determination of level of income. In our survey income was defined as income from all sources and not merely from paid employment. It is interesting that father's job is a more important influence on income for the youngest cohort, even though their income is less predictable than either of the older cohorts. This suggests that affluent parents may give direct financial assistance or indirect sponsorship of first jobs, opening the way for their sons into better-rewarded jobs than they might have been able to achieve on their own. However, in all three age groups the major determinants of income are current occupation and education. Education seems to be underrewarded among younger men, a finding consistent with a human captial view of education, since younger men with higher education have had less work experience than younger men who left school earlier.

Among middle-aged and older men, the influences of first job and father's job virtually disappear, and we could estimate their current income almost as accurately simply from a knowledge of their education and occupation. If we deleted the direct paths from father's job and first job, leaving education and present job as the only determinants of current income, the correlation between occupation and income (R_{65}) could be expressed as

$$\begin{aligned} R_{65} &= P_{65} + P_{63}r_{65} \\ \text{Or} \quad \cdot57 &= \cdot52 + (\cdot15)(\cdot43) \\ &= \cdot52 + \cdot06 \\ &= \cdot58 \end{aligned}$$

a result that reproduces almost exactly the observed correlation. The inclusion of information on business ownership does not materially improve the explanation of income levels because its effects tend to be subsumed in our occupational scale. In an analysis not shown here, data on business ownership improved the fit of our model slightly (from 36 to 38 per cent of the variance between income categories among men at peak career). However, it is interesting that when such information is included, it has a weight almost exactly equal to that of formal education, identifying two different routes to higher income: formal education or entrepreneurship.

Within the limits of our data, occupational achievement and economic reward in Australia can be represented as a process in which inequalities in one generation influence achievement in the next, through two major mechanisms: the educational system and the inheritance of property, especially family businesses. This status transmission system is, however, far from ironclad, and we have already seen that considerable mobility between the generations occurs. Australia's status transmission system in the mid-

1960s was neither perfectly open nor rigidly closed. The amount of mobility greatly exceeded that necessary for any simple reproduction of inequality from one generation to the next. Whether or how far this kind of status transmission system can be termed a class system is a question we address in the next chapter.

7 Social strata: stability and change

Earlier chapters were concerned principally with individuals and the differences among them. We presented evidence on the changing pattern of educational opportunity, on inequality in income and wealth, and on the process of occupational achievement. In Chapter 5 we examined the perceptions held by a sample of Australians about social classes and how those perceptions could be related to the educational, economic, and occupational positions of the persons who held them. In this chapter we examine the fit between self-perception and socio-economic status from a different viewpoint, and so far as possible attempt to delineate the major social strata in the mid-1960s.

There are at least three important preconditions to the emergence of identifiable social strata in a society: social differentiation and a divison of labour in which the incumbents of different social roles receive unequal amounts of material and nonmaterial rewards; a degree of exclusiveness in patterns of social participation among persons who occupy social roles commanding similar rewards; and unequal opportunities for incumbents to transmit advantages to successive generations. If only the first condition were met, the society would have inequality without social strata, that is a more or less continuous gradation of social positions without sharp cleavages in the continuum. If both the first and second conditions were satisfied, a society would be both unequal and stratified into discernible social groups hierarchically arranged. In a society where all three conditions were present, much the same pattern of inequality and stratum composition would be maintained from one generation to the next. In the last case, one would expect a high degree of social awareness about stratification, though not necessarily acute feelings of deprivation and rivalry because some inequalities might be perceived as just, or at least as part of an accepted order. Indeed, the most stable social orders (for example caste and feudal societies) have sometimes been characterised by gross inequality, clearly defined strata, and comparatively high degrees of 'consensus', at least in the sense of acceptance of the *status quo* by the less powerful.

Thus far, we have discussed societies as if they displayed only one kind of social inequality, leading to a unitary form of social stratification. But in any complex large-scale society there may be several loosely co-ordinated subsystems based on divergent criteria. Stratification by economic class may co-exist with stratification by age (deference to the old, or to the young), stratification by sex (restriction of certain highly rewarded roles to men, or more rarely to women), stratification by ethnic origin, family background, and so on. The recognition that there may be several bases of stratification in complex societies has led to a large body of writing on discrepancies between statuses derived from different sources. This topic of status consistency and inconsistency has gained attention partly because scholars strive to find order in the social world, and partly because the issue of consistency is at the heart of

functional theories of stratification, which typically posit equilibrating processes aligning different social positions.

Most research on status consistency has concentrated on equilibration at the individual level and on the presumed stress experienced by people who simultaneously occupy social roles that command unequal rewards, whether material or symbolic. It has usually been argued that the occupancy of such discrepant roles (for example the rich but poorly educated man, the black professional, the female executive, or the economically successful member of a subordinate minority) creates inconsistent demands and expectations in social behaviour, leading to feelings of stress and to adaptive responses, such as political radicalism, psychosomatic symptoms, withdrawal from social participation, or increased prejudice (for general reviews see Broom and Jones, 1970; Jackson and Curtis, 1972; Segal *et al.*, 1970; Segal and Knoke, 1971).

The outcome of this research is conflicting, perhaps because it is largely made up of retrospective explorations of survey data collected for other purposes. However, in view of the large number of status inconsistency studies it is surprising that so little attention has been given to the process of stratum formation, for without some coalescence of the different aspects of stratification into a unifying scheme, it is unlikely that an ordered set of strata could be discerned.

> If a stratification system is made up of strata whose populations are homogeneous, and if the strata are composed of individuals with flat status profiles, one might expect the individuals readily to perceive the strata as distinctive entities and to be aware of their own positions in the hierarchy of strata. Such conditions would contribute to the transformation of a statistically distinguishable stratum into a consciously identifiable class. On the other hand, if a stratum is made up of rather heterogeneous population elements with diverse profiles, it would seem more difficult for positional awareness and class consciousness to develop (Broom, 1959:434).

Questions relating to the consistency of the stratification order can be posed at different levels. In this chapter we focus on the consistency and inconsistency of social strata defined in terms of the socio-economic statuses of individuals. By examining the actual distribution of such statuses in terms of educational attainment, present job, and amount of income for Australian men in the 1960s, we identify commonly occurring status profiles and aggregate like with like into relatively homogeneous clusters. In aggregating profiles we do not assume that they are internally consistent. Indeed, it is possible that some strata are characterised by inconsistency among the status characteristics we consider. Later, we assess the extent of status homogeneity within different strata and relate variations in stratum homogeneity both to positional awareness among the members of each stratum and to stratum permeability defined in terms of father-to-son mobility. The approach developed here was foreshadowed in a preliminary account of our survey (Broom *et al.*, 1968), but we have now constructed an index of social position based entirely on socio-economic status, as measured by education, occupation, and income. Our earlier index of social rank also included data on self-assessed class and interviewer assessment of economic position. Since one of the objects of the present analysis is to treat the consistency of self-assessment as a contingent property of social strata, we need to exclude it from consideration in our initial clustering.

Identifying Social Strata

There is no generally accepted methodology for defining social strata in indus-

trial societies. No matter what criteria are adopted, they are always open to the objection that they are insufficient, ambiguous, or not universally necessary (cf. Jarvie, 1972:98-101). Although a combination of reputational and observational techniques has been applied in small-scale communities (e.g. Warner *et al.*, 1949; Barnes, 1954; Hollingshead and Redlich, 1958) to determine the membership of defined social strata, such techniques cannot be readily applied to large-scale communities, much less to national societies, except perhaps for identifying a national 'élite'. To delineate the broad structure of a national society, the sociologist must use relatively abstract procedures to detect regularities in the distribution of unequally valued and unequally rewarded social positions.

Most attempts to portray the broad stratification features of nations have been impressionistic, but such accounts are not necessarily invalid. Rather they are like incomplete directions that may point the right way but give insufficient detail for someone else to follow the same route to the same destination. Encel (1970:101-8) has described the Australian stratification system in terms of class, status, and power. He takes occupation, income (treating income as a proxy for ownership and control), and education as indicators of the most important '"objective" categories of social differentiation [that] contribute to the structure of class, status and power' in Australia (Encel, 1970:104). He also asserts that 'the three dimensions are not closely articulated' (Encel, 1970:101). However, in the absence of a criterion of closeness it is impossible to evaluate this assertion; and because he does not specify how the indicators are to be combined to identify different strata, it is impossible to evaluate the accuracy of his description.

Even when their theoretical perspectives differ, most observers of industrial societies agree that occupation is the best single indicator of an individual's position in the stratification order (cf. Runciman, 1968:54; Blau and Duncan, 1967:6-7; Machonin, 1970). For this reason so-called occupational prestige scales based on popular evaluations of the social standing of different jobs tap a common factor in perceptions of occupational inequality, whether conceived in terms of standard of living, prestige in the community, power and influence, or value to society (Goldthorpe and Hope, 1972: 12). Similarly, defining social strata in terms of a person's occupational position, including a measure of the rewards he gains from it and the skills he brings to it, captures what is common in socio-economic status differences among occupations.

Our methodology for identifying social strata bears some resemblance to the work of a research team (Machonin, 1970) that attempted to present an objective and exhaustive typology of social strata in Czechoslovakia. Five indicators of a person's position in the stratification order were available in the Czech study: complexity of work, life-style, education, participation in management, and income, all categorised in terms of six-point scales. When combined these scales yielded a possible total of 7776 different patterns; yet the Czech sample (over 10,000 heads of households) could be classified into only 1769 patterns because many potentially inconsistent configurations of statuses were not encountered.

The Czech team used two methods for defining strata, the first based on 'consistent centres' and the second on 'optimum centres'. The latter method, which clusters profiles in terms of their overall similarity rather than their status

Table 7.1: Social characteristics of ten strata, 1965 (row percentages)

Stratum	Social characteristic							N (100%)
	Educ.:	Primary		Secondary		Tertiary		
		Some	Compl.	Some	Compl.	Some	Compl.	
	Occ.:	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	
	Inc.:	< $1800	$1800–$2599	$2600–$3399	$3400–$4199	$4200–$4999	$5000+	
1	Educ.	0	0	0	0	11	89	126
	Occ.	0	0	1	3	19	77	126
	Inc.	0	0	0	13	30	57	126
2	Educ.	0	0	0	0	32	68	81
	Occ.	2	1	9	17	24	47	81
	Inc.	2	20	46	24	5	4	81
3	Educ.	6	17	51	26	0	0	181
	Occ.	0	0	2	4	61	33	181
	Inc.	0	0	0	7	21	72	181
4	Educ.	8	32	60	0	0	0	222
	Occ.	0	4	4	15	61	15	222
	Inc.	0	7	35	43	10	4	222
5	Educ.	0	0	0	85	15	0	85
	Occ.	0	4	13	44	29	11	85
	Inc.	0	13	47	29	11	0	85
6	Educ.	0	0	0	68	25	7	128
	Occ.	12	31	38	18	1	0	128
	Inc.	6	54	34	6	0	0	128
7	Educ.	1	8	91	0	0	0	278
	Occ.	4	11	50	23	13	0	278
	Inc.	0	13	59	22	4	2	278
8	Educ.	4	40	57	0	0	0	357
	Occ.	0	16	53	18	12	1	357
	Inc.	7	70	22	1	0	0	357
9	Educ.	0	0	93	6	1	0	218
	Occ.	49	48	3	0	0	0	218
	Inc.	13	79	8	0	0	0	218
10	Educ.	31	69	0	0	0	0	245
	Occ.	44	47	9	0	0	0	245
	Inc.	21	71	9	0	0	0	245
Total	Educ.	6	23	46	12	4	9	1921
	Occ.	13	19	23	13	21	12	1921
	Inc.	6	39	25	12	6	12	1921

Note: The occupation categories are: I Unskilled II Semiskilled III Skilled IV Clerical V Managerial VI Professional. Source: ANU Survey, 1965.

consistency, yields the more interesting results, and from it they identified four relatively consistent strata and three relatively inconsistent clusters. They also found some evidence of stratum consciousness.

This ambitious and extensive study (see also Machonin, 1969) parallels our own in its general goals. The Czech analysis consists in the comparison of profiles across several aspects of socio-economic status in an attempt to identify clusters of individuals with similar status profiles. In our case each scale (education, occupation, and income) has six categories, so that the maximum possible number of different profiles is 216. Of these 170 (79 per cent) actually occurred, although few appeared with any frequency: 24 profiles with 20 or more occupants accounted for 57 per cent of our sample.[1] We grouped these different profiles into ten clusters and as we shall see, four main types of status configurations largely account for the status variation in our sample.

Table 7.1 summarises the characteristics of each stratum. We have attached a label to each stratum, but we should warn the reader that the terms are only indicative and not intended to exhaust the descriptive variability in a cluster. We also recall what our analysis can and cannot achieve. Unless they are very large indeed, representative samples cannot capture the very top or the very bottom of the stratification regime. In our sample we do not expect to uncover either an élite or the substratum of extreme poverty: to our knowledge there are no millionaires and no Aborigines in our sample. Within these extremes, however, we can expect our analysis to yield a meaningful characterisation of the main structural tendencies in the system of socio-economic differentiation in Australia.

The Strata

Tables 7.1 and 7.2 list the ten strata in roughly descending social rank from higher to lower socio-economic status. Strata 5 and 6, and perhaps also 2, in some respects seem to stand outside the main ordering. The first stratum is consistently high status. Its members are predominantly in the higher income brackets, work in professional or managerial jobs, and have experienced higher education. The 'central' profile in this stratum is a man with tertiary education, a professional job, and a yearly income of $5000 or more (the highest income group identified and the top 10 per cent of male income earners). Eighty-two per cent of the men in this stratum had profiles that differed by no more than one or two ranks from this central pattern (see Table 7.2).[2] Men in this stratum tend to be at the peak of their occupational careers, with 41 per cent in their forties compared with only 29 per cent in the sample as a whole. It accounts for 70 per cent of all the upper professionals, 27 per cent of lower pro-

1 We are indebted to Paul Duncan-Jones for the computations in this analysis. Since initially all possible pairs have to be considered, the whole sample could not be included in the first clustering. With 1921 persons, almost four million dissimilarity coefficients need to be calculated, a formidable task even with a high-speed computer, as only the first step in a numerical taxonomy. Accordingly, two independent taxonomies were performed on two subsamples (each one-third of the sample). Ten clusters were defined in each subsample. Of these ten, eight clusters were closely matched between the two samples and the similar pairs were amalgamated. The two dissimilar clusters from each solution were retained with the amalgamated eight, yielding twelve. A discriminant function was found for each cluster, and the remaining one-third of the sample was allocated to one of the twelve clusters. In a final step, the twelve clusters were further reduced to the ten shown in the present analysis. The measure of dispersion was squared Euclidean distance, and centroid sorting was used.

Table 7.2: Average status levels and status consistency of ten strata

Stratum	Average status[a]				Stratum[b] homogeneity
	Education	Occupation	Income	General status	
1. Upper middle class A	5.89	5.72	5.44	5.68	81.7
2. Upper middle class B	5.68	4.99	3.40	4.69	71.6
3. Old middle class A	2.98	5.26	5.66	4.63	84.5
4. Old middle class B	2.52	4.79	3.70	3.67	74.8
5. Marginal? A	4.15	4.31	3.38	3.95	75.3
6. Marginal? B	4.39	2.63	2.41	3.14	73.4
7. Middle mass A	2.90	3.31	3.22	3.14	77.3
8. Middle mass B	2.53	3.28	2.17	2.66	71.1
9. Working class A	3.07	1.55	1.94	2.19	98.2
10. Working class B	1.69	1.64	1.88	1.74	95.1

[a] The average scores are calculated by giving a score of six to the highest category, five to the second highest and so on down to one to the lowest. General status is the weighted average of the scores for education, occupation and income.

[b] Stratum homogeneity is defined as the percentage of profiles which differ by $\sqrt{2}$ or less from the most common profile in each stratum. See text.

Source: ANU Survey, 1965.

fessionals, and 10 per cent of managers, categories which together make up 93 per cent of the stratum. It is urban, white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant. Only 15 per cent of this stratum are Catholics, although Catholics are 23 per cent of the sample.

Eighty-nine per cent were born in Australia, New Zealand, or the United Kingdom, which is almost exactly the expected proportion (as we noted earlier our sample is somewhat deficient in non-English speaking migrants, and this fact limits our ability to identify immigrant strata). About three in four are employees, and one in four self-employed professionals, proportions that mirror the

2 As a measure of profile consistency, we have used a difference of $\sqrt{2}$ or less in status profile. To fall within this range of variation, a man might have a profile that varied by only one rank on two of the three statuses. A variation greater than one rank on any status, or a variation on all statuses, falls outside this range. Machonin (1970:734) used $\sqrt{6}$ for five statuses. This allows a slightly wider range of variation, since a difference of two ranks on one scale might be accepted if the other statuses were nearly identical.

general distribution of self-employment in our sample. As expected, the men in this stratum are not very likely to vote for parties of the left. Three out of four claim to vote for the Liberal or Country Party, a proportion exceeded only by men in stratum 3 (the Old Middle Class A). As Table 7.3 below indicates, four out of five men in this stratum placed themselves in the middle-middle or upper-middle class, and we assume that the small proportion who say 'working' have a two-class (working/upper) scheme in mind. Stratum 1, then, is a familiar category of highly educated, well-rewarded, urban professionals and higher managers.

The second stratum is similar to the first in that it consists entirely of tertiary educated men (although fewer completed their tertiary education), but they come from a wider range of occupations and earn significantly lower incomes. To some extent this last difference is a life-cycle difference. Forty-four per cent of men in stratum 2 are under 35 years of age and thus at an earlier stage of their careers than men in the highest stratum, of whom only 24 per cent are under 35. We would expect some of these younger men to move into higher salary brackets later in their careers. Perhaps because on average they are younger than men in the first stratum, they are drawn disproportionately from the children of postwar immigrants: 43 per cent are children of men born overseas, compared with only 30 per cent in the first stratum. In the sample as a whole the proportion is 33 per cent. Men in this stratum tend to favour the Liberal-Country Party (65 per cent of those expressing a political preference), and most of them place themselves in the middle of the middle class. Thus, stratum 2 is in some ways an image of stratum 1 at an earlier stage in the life-cycle and is therefore clearly a step below in occupational status and amount of income. Stratum 2 consists predominantly of younger upper professionals and lower professionals, middle-rank managers, and higher white-collar workers, who together account for four-fifths of the stratum. They are somewhat less likely to be self-employed or employers (17 per cent compared with 24 per cent in stratum 1), and they are somewhat more status inconsistent than those in the first stratum. The central profile is tertiary education, professional work, but an income between $2600 and $3399. Seventy-two per cent have status profiles not very different from this core group. We cannot be certain whether the differences between the two top strata would be reduced if we had lifetime profiles for both groups, but because we suspect that would be the case we have given these strata the same general title.

The next two strata (3 and 4) are termed old middle classes because they contain occupations that require entrepreneurial skills rather than formal education: none of the men in these strata has a tertiary education, but their average occupational status and income compare favourably with those in the first two strata. Although they account for only one-fifth of the total sample, strata 3 and 4 contain one-third of the self-employed and employers, two-thirds of graziers, one-third of managers, two-fifths of shop proprietors, and two-thirds of farmers. Thus, these strata span a range of rural and urban occupations distinguished by relative independence in employment status, high income, but low formal education. The men in stratum 3 are distinguished from those in stratum 4 mainly by higher income. The central profiles of both strata are some secondary education and a managerial or farm job. In stratum 3 these characteristics go with

the highest income category; in stratum 4 they go with the middle-income group ($2600 to $3399). Stratum 4 is also slightly less homogeneous than stratum 3, with respectively 75 and 84 per cent of their status profiles falling within a close range of the modal profiles.

Strata 5 and 6 are difficult to interpret. They both rank high on education (higher than the old middle classes) and both exhibit a variety of mixed status profiles. In fact 22 per cent of the observed status profiles (37 out of 170) but only 11 per cent of the total sample are found in these two strata. Unlike the other strata so far discussed, these strata do not seem to be differentiated by any age or life-cycle effects. On average the men in stratum 5 are occupationally more 'successful' than those in stratum 6 even though the latter have a higher average level of education. The low 'pay-off' of educational attainment for the men in stratum 6 apparently influences their voting pattern and their class identification: nearly twice as many in stratum 6 compared with stratum 5 vote for the Labor Party (48 and 28 per cent respectively) and twice as many identify as working class (42 and 20 per cent respectively). Half the men in stratum 6 had foreign-born fathers and 24 per cent were themselves first generation non-British immigrants, compared with 18 per cent in stratum 5 and 10 per cent in the sample overall. These two strata may consist of 'marginal men' whose educational attainment has not been matched by typical occupational and financial rewards. But to some extent they are residual categories of men who do not fit the more dominant patterns of social differentiation.

Except for stratum 4 the highest six strata are smaller than the lowest four. They account for 43 per cent of the total sample, but all of the tertiary-educated men, most of those on incomes of $4200 per annum or above (the top 30 per cent of income earners), all the upper professionals, a majority of lower professionals, graziers, farmers, and managers (88, 97, 69, and 86 per cent respectively). The remaining four strata (7-10) are relatively large, and each shades into the next without abrupt demarcations between them. Indeed, since the main difference between adjacent pairs of these strata seems to represent cohort effects in education and, to a lesser degree, a life-cycle effect on earnings, the middle mass and working class strata are more like each other in their status characteristics than strata 1-6.

The middle mass strata (7 and 8) jointly account for one-third of the sample. About half their members are skilled manual workers (three-quarters of this occupational category are found in these strata), and about a fifth are lower white-collar workers. Less well-off farmers and managers and higher-paid operatives make up most of the remainder, with farmers being somewhat more prominent in stratum 8 than in 7. The men in stratum 7 tend to be younger than those in stratum 8: 48 and 36 per cent respectively are aged between 25 and 39 years. As we showed in Chapter 4, the earning power of manual workers tends to decline after about age 40. In fact the higher proportion of older men in stratum 8 (18 per cent, or twice as many as in stratum 7, are 55 or older) in part accounts for the lower average income in this stratum. The modal income category for men in stratum 7 spans average male weekly earnings in 1964-5 (about $2850 per annum), whereas the modal category for stratum 8 spans the basic wage (about $2150 per annum). Men in stratum 7 have somewhat more education, reflecting the upward secular trend in school-leaving age during the first half of the century.

The older men grew up when leaving school at the end of primary education was the norm, whereas for younger men the norm (and the law) required a few years of secondary education (see Chapter 2). In terms of relative life chances among their age peers, there is little effective difference between these two strata apart from stage in the life cycle. We would expect the earnings of the men in stratum 7 to decline as they grow older to about the relative level of the men in stratum 8. The higher education of men in stratum 7 gave them no more competitive advantage for their careers than the less extensive education (but still average for their time) of the older men in stratum 8. Stratum 7 includes a few more self-employed men (20 per cent compared with 16 per cent in stratum 8), mostly independent tradesmen and small farmers. As might be expected, the ratio of Labor to Liberal-Country Party support is somewhat higher in stratum 8 (57:33) than in stratum 7 (48:52). Stratum 8 is distinctly more working class in its self-identification although less homogeneous in its main status profiles. The difference in class identification may be the result of the older age composition of stratum 8. The younger men of stratum 7 experienced higher incomes in their life-times and are more inclined to identify with the middle class irrespective of occupational status (see Table 5.4). Seventy-seven per cent of men in stratum 7 have status profiles similar to the modal pattern (some secondary education, skilled manual work, and an annual income of $2600 to $3599), compared with 71 per cent in stratum 8, whose modal status profile is the same except for lower income. In short, these two strata could be aggregated into a single broad grouping without much information loss.

The last two strata (9 and 10) consist overwhelmingly of the semiskilled and unskilled. Like the middle mass, they differ little one from the other, although a finer classification (not used in developing this typology) shows that there are more service workers and shop assistants in stratum 9, occupations that tend to be held by men starting out on their working lives. The age difference between men in strata 9 and 10 is marked, with 56 per cent under 40 years of age in stratum 9 but only 31 per cent in that age bracket in stratum 10. Thus the lower education and lower earnings of men in the last stratum can be explained in the same way as the differences between the two middle mass strata, that is as cohort and life-cycle effects. Two-thirds of the men in stratum 9 and three-quarters of those in stratum 10 identify as working class, and as the final column of Table 7.3 shows there is less variation in class identification among men in stratum 10 than in any other stratum. The proportions voting Labor (65 and 75 per cent respectively) almost exactly parallel the proportions identifying as working class. The status profiles of men in these strata are highly consistent; 98 and 95 per cent fall within a narrow band of differences from their modal patterns, which are semiskilled work, low income ($1800 to $2599 per annum), and low education. However, all the men in stratum 9 had some secondary education, but none of those in stratum 10 had progressed beyond primary school.

These descriptive data serve as background to our main interest, which is to assess how far these statistical strata exhibit a consciousness of kind (class identification) and a degree of closure in stratum recruitment as measured by rates of father-to-son mobility. In general we expect higher degrees of class consciousness and lower rates of generational mobility in strata characterised

by high homogeneity. Homogeneity in this case is less the consistency in individual characteristics than the similarity of status profiles within each stratum. Ignoring strata 5 and 6, to which we cannot attach an unambiguous meaning, we anticipate less agreement about class identification in stratum 2 compared to stratum 1, stratum 4 compared with stratum 3, stratum 8 compared with stratum 7, and stratum 10 compared with stratum 9, since that ordering reflects the ranking of these paired strata in terms of profile homogeneity. We expect to find parallel differences in rates of mobility as well.

Before presenting these analyses, however, we should make a few general observations about stratum formation in Australia in the mid-1960s. While the correlations between the indicators of socio-economic status are positive, so that on average a high position on one index implies a high position on the others, they are far from perfectly correlated. Yet, this lack of symmetry should not distract us from the important fact that a small number of specific status profiles, some consistent and others inconsistent at the individual level, account for a very large proportion of the population. For example if we ignore the two ambiguous strata (5 and 6), 82 per cent of the rest of our sample either have the modal profile in their stratum or differ from it by only a small amount. In this sense Australian society is highly stratified, since only a small subset of the logically possible patterns of status profiles account for most of our sample. The effects of structure are prevasive.[3] However, the existence of such a pervasive structure of social stratifica-

3 The only comparison we can make on this point is with Czechoslovakia where Machonin (1969), using a slightly less restrictive definition of profile homogeneity, was able to account for 92 per cent of his sample. We guess that were the two studies more nearly equivalent, the comparable Australian figure would be somewhere between 85 and 90 per cent, which suggests that socio-economic stratification in Czechoslovakia is no less pervasive than in Australia, and might indeed be slightly greater.

Table 7.3: Stratum consistency and class self-identification, 1965 (row percentages)

Stratum	Self identification							N	$\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$
	Upper	Upper middle	Middle middle	Lower middle	Working	Lower	Don't know	(100%)	Score*	Deviation*
1	1	36	43	10	6	1	4	126	4.13	.68
2	2	17	47	16	11	1	5	81	3.79	.76
3	0	25	41	10	17	5	2	181	3.66	.97
4	0	9	38	14	31	5	2	222	3.14	1.01
5	1	15	41	16	20	4	2	85	3.49	.96
6	2	10	29	10	41	3	5	128	3.07	1.08
7	0	7	31	14	41	5	1	278	2.95	.98
8	0	4	19	11	60	5	2	357	2.56	.84
9	1	4	14	9	67	1	2	218	2.55	.81
10	0	2	11	5	77	3	1	245	2.33	.59
Total	1	10	28	11	44	4	2	1921	2.98	

*Scores and average deviations are calculated by giving a score of six to upper, five to upper middle, and so on to one for lower. 'Don't know' responses were ignored.

Source: ANU Survey, 1965.

tion says nothing in itself about the inheritance of unequal statuses from one generation to the next. On the other hand, two cross-cutting factors may mask the existence of strata defined strictly in socio-economic terms: (1) immigration, which alters the meaning and acceptance of educational attainment and other social characteristics, interrupts (sometimes enhances) the flow of an occupational career, and results in a possible drop or increase in earnings compared with men who are similar in other respects; and (2) life-cycle effects associated with societal change, for example the reduced earnings of manual workers in later career and the rise in the legal age of school leaving during the present century. Ethnicity, life-cycle, and secular change intersect strictly socio-economic differences and mask the clarity with which social strata can be distinguished.

Stratum Consciousness

Class self-placement was not an explicit criterion in defining strata, but rather a contingent property, free to vary from one stratum to another. We expect to find a relationship between socio-economic status and self-identification such that the higher the internal homogeneity of a stratum, the higher the consistency of self-identified class. As we have already pointed out, we focus on stratum homogeneity viewed as the similarity between status profiles within the same stratum and not status consistency viewed as the similarity between the statuses of a single individual. Some strata (2, 3, and 4, for example) are inconsistent in this latter sense but more homogeneous in terms of the former.

The final column of Table 7.2 provides a measure of the internal homogeneity of each stratum. Homogeneity is especially high in the working classes, the old middle class A, and upper middle class A.

In terms of the expectations outlined above, the pattern of variation in consistency of class identification seems to bear no systematic relationship to stratum homogeneity. Among the upper middle classes and the old middle classes, there is an apparent relationship in the expected direction: strata 4 and 2 show both less homogeneity in status profiles (Table 7.2) and less consistency in their self-identification (Table 7.3, last column). However, among the middle mass and the working class the pattern is reversed. Insofar as there is a pattern in the consistency of class self-placement, it seems to be a function not of status profile homogeneity but rather of overall socio-economic status. Omitting strata 5 and 6, the variation in class identification is greatest in the middle of the status order but declines towards the extremes, where variation is least. High or low socio-economic status appears conducive to greater consistency in class identification, whereas in the middle ranks there is less agreement and therefore more variation in the class labels people use to describe their own social position.

No stratum, however, approaches a fully consistent pattern of class-indentification. As we noted in Chapter 5, some Australians see their society in terms that do not include both a working and a middle class. Since this view probably is reflected in our data, part of the lack of agreement in class identification within strata is attributable to differences in class schemes. But the existence of different class schemes points to factors in social consciousness that cut across objective status differences and to disagreement about the basis of social class differences and group affiliation. Verbal differences may be alternative ways of expressing the

same reality, but our data do not permit us to explore this possibility. Nor can we determine how far occupancy of an objectively defined socio-economic stratum implies socially significant patterns of day-to-day behaviour. We can, however, evaluate the degree of closure in the stratification regime in terms of the permeability of strata between generations.

Permeability

We expected to find a relationship between stratum homogeneity and self-identification, but that expectation was not supported. Overall socio-economic status seemed a more dominant influence than homogeneity *per se*. In the absence of comparative information on similarly defined strata in Australia at an earlier period or in other countries at a similar stage of economic development, our interpretation must remain tentative. Some might see in our data the latency of strong group awareness, others a modest manifestation of perceived differences in life chances. We tend to a low salience interpretation for several reasons: first, in a mass consumption society social differentiation tends to be a regular gradient rather than an abrupt transition from a less privileged to a more privileged group; second, income differences are not as great in Australia as in some other societies; and finally, high rates of father-to-son mobility prevent the maintenance of rigid boundaries between social groupings for long periods. Having already discussed father-to-son mobility in detail, we now focus on amounts of mobility into and out of each stratum, defining mobility as movement between the six broad occupational categories of Table 7.1. Because there are small numbers in any given category our analysis must be rather crude. Our main interest is to evaluate how open, or how closed, the different strata are.

Table 7.4 shows a high rate of father-to-son mobility in the sample as a whole, and in all strata except the old middle class A. In other strata from two-thirds to three-quarters of the men in each stratum

Table 7.4: Father-to-son mobility in ten social strata, 1965

Stratum	Percentage of sons who were			
	Upwardly mobile	Downwardly mobile	Immobile	Mobile within short range*
1 High	70	4	26	28
2	62	20	18	30
3	41	7	53	19
4	51	9	40	17
5	45	22	32	28
6	33	48	20	32
7	36	31	33	29
8	44	26	30	29
9	12	62	26	30
10 Low	16	55	29	25
Total	38	30	32	26

*Father's job was in a category immediately adjacent to son's present job.

Source: ANU Survey, 1965.

come from social origins that are higher or lower than would be expected on the basis of inheritance. Upward mobility is more common than downward mobility, because there has been an expansion of higher-status jobs. However, as the final column of Table 7.4 shows, most mobility is restricted to jobs with similar social standing: in the sample as a whole, one in four sons moved to an occupational stratum immediately above or below his father's, and another third remained in the father's stratum. Inheritance is most marked in the old middle classes, which as already noted are characterised by entrepreneurship. The bottom two strata consist predominantly of downwardly mobile men, a finding indicating that the lowest strata are not markedly self-perpetuating. Our sample, however, is restricted to the employed. We have no data on the unemployed or the unemployable (no more than 2 per cent in 1965), among whom there may be a cycle of self-perpetuating poverty, just as there may be a cycle of self-perpetuating wealth and authority among the top few per cent. Nevertheless for the bulk of the population the prospect of generational mobility is not an illusion, because of low rates of inheritance and the expansion of higher status jobs. Father-to-son mobility undoubtedly limits the growth of strong stratum consciousness and acts as an impediment of group definition. The effect of mobility in modifying the composition of social strata over time can be seen in Table 7.5, which shows how each stratum differs in terms of social origins.

The highest four strata are characterised by larger than expected proportions of sons from professional backgrounds and the lowest four by larger than expected proportions of men from semiskilled or unskilled jobs. However, the average occupational status of each stratum is much closer to the sample average when social origins rather than present jobs are considered, and the diversity of origins within every stratum is relatively wide. Although men in higher strata tend to come from more favoured

Table 7.5: Stratum consistency in terms of social origins[a] (1965) (column percentages)

Father's occupation	Stratum										Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
1. Professional	24	16	22	10	12	9	4	4	4	6	9
2. Managerial	24	20	46	36	25	20	28	21	19	28	27
3. White collar	18	22	8	7	15	11	10	8	12	3	10
4. Skilled manual	13	25	7	13	19	20	24	26	19	15	18
5. Semiskilled	10	11	8	15	12	19	16	20	20	16	16
6. Unskilled	11	5	9	19	16	21	18	22	26	33	20
N (100%)	124	80	117	215	80	122	267	353	200	227	1845
$\bar{X}$ score[b]	3.55	3.90	4.38	3.56	3.58	3.17	3.28	2.99	2.91	2.95	3.37
$\bar{X}$ deviation[b]	1.38	1.28	1.26	1.58	1.45	1.44	1.35	1.26	1.36	1.40	1.30

[a] Origin defined as father's occupation.

[b] Scores and average deviations are calculated by giving a score of six to the highest category, five to the second highest, and so on to one for the lowest.

Source: ANU Survey, 1965.

social origins, the span of status inequality is much reduced when social origin rather than current position is considered. For example in Table 7.2 the largest difference between strata in average occupational status is just over 4 points on a six-point scale (strata 1 and 9), whereas when father's job is considered (Table 7.5) the maximum difference is only 1·5 points (strata 3 and 9). In short, even though the structural relationships between socio-economic statuses such as education, occupation, and income generate relatively clearly defined social strata embracing a large proportion of the population at any point in time, father-to-son mobility creates discontinuity between generations in the inheritance of structured inequality.

In conclusion, we characterise Australia as a stratified society with relatively clear patterns of inequality in occupational position, skill and training, income, and other characteristics. We do not term it a class society, if class is meant to imply the large-scale reproduction of unequal life chances from generation to generation. Australia is not a nation in which social and economic inequalities are rigidly transmitted from one generation to the next, although as our analysis shows such transmission does occur. In Australia, like other industrial countries, inequalities in social origin arising from the division of labour, elaborate and often invidious socio-economic differentiation, and inequitably allocated opportunities and rewards influence, but do not determine, future achievement. The crucial questions are how far those influences are diminishing, or increasing, and how great a range of inequality they imply.

In answering such questions we have been hindered by the absence of earlier baseline data that could be used as a basis for evaluation trends. A benchmark study conducted in the early 1950s, before the main period of postwar economic growth, would have been of inestimable value in assessing trends in the structure of Australian society. Although better than any later date, 1965, the year of our survey, is not an ideal baseline from which to measure trends. Growth, expanding opportunity, and increasing personal consumption were making an impact and the country was on the threshold of changes that were to shift the balance of political power and to remould the life-styles of its people. The findings of our analysis, tentative and incomplete though they must be, provide a description at a moment in history, and a basis for future comparison and for measuring and interpreting the direction of social change.

In the absence of baselines, we have couched our interpretation in terms of a theoretical definition of equality of opportunity and, where suitable evidence exists, in terms of international comparisons. However, seemingly comparable data often turn out to be inappropriate, and we are conscious of the pitfalls of comparative analysis even when the evidence appears reasonably compatible. For example, to make any judgment about whether a society is fundamentally a class society involves not merely questions of definitions but also questions of degree: how much inequality, how much transmission of inequality, and how much closure in social relations? Different people looking at the same information might arrive at different answers. At least we have laid bare the criteria used to reach our own conclusion.

In terms of income distribution by international standards Australia has a relatively low degree of inequality that places it in a small group of capitalist and socialist countries (p. 51), a finding that supports Lipset's suggestion that of four

Anglo-American democracies Australia is more egalitarian than the United States, the United Kingdom, or Canada (see also p. 65). Of course, it needs to be borne in mind that the distribution of *property* affects inequality to a far greater degree in a capitalist than in a socialist society, and on that score Australia is significantly more unequal than Czechoslovakia or Hungary, countries which in the 1960s had similar degrees of income inequality. As shown in our analysis of death duties, inequality in the distribution of wealth is probably at least double the degree of inequality in the distribution of income (p. 49 and p. 52).

Perhaps this more even distribution of earnings helps to explain a rate of middle-class identification in the Australian population exceeding the 'middle-classness' of even the United States, where absolute levels of income are higher. Given the limitations of data on class identification we should not press this point too far, but certainly Australians are much more likely to see themselves as middle-class than the British (p. 65), and than Australians of a generation ago.

Our most systematic comparisons focus on occupational mobility (pp. 86 ff.), because we could use the results of a major American study conducted about the same time with similar objectives. That comparison showed that the volume of mobility was higher in the United States than in Australia, suggesting, contrary to some opinion, that the traditional view of America as the 'land of opportunity' might not have been so wide of the mark. However, the difference between the countries in father-to-son mobility stemmed mainly from the more rapid transformation of the American occupational structure during the period studied. In terms of equality of occupational opportunity, there was no difference between the two countries. The same was not true for career mobility, and where one starts in the occupational structure appeared to have more impact on future achievement in Australia than in the United States (p. 96).

Finally we tried to develop an overall characterisation of patterns and processes of status inequalities in Australia, using status profiles of respondents in the 1965 survey. Those results indicated that Australia in the mid-1960s was a highly stratified society in the sense that the patterns of association among social statuses such as amount of education, kind of job, and income were far from random. On the other hand the strata are far from ironclad, and are not reproduced from generation to generation in any simple way. To place this part of our analysis in comparative context we drew on findings which showed that Australia was no more highly stratified than Czechoslovakia.

Appendix 1

The occupational distribution of the male Australian workforce 1911-1966

		Census Year					
	Occupation Group	1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
1.	**Upper professional**	**30,207**	**31,587**	**46,822**	**37,829**	**106,236**	**118,364**
00	Architects, engineers, surveyors[a]	6,401	5,838	5,538	4,573	29,776	31,560
01	Natural scientists, university teachers	2,857	3,899	4,243	4,248	15,010	18,455
02	Medical practitioners, dentists	6,571	7,370	7,607	8,890	13,920	15,491
04	Pharmacists	3,658	4,344	4,794	4,551	6,926	6,580
06	Clergymen, religious workers	5,340	6,106	6,708	8,158	10,925	12,573
07	Judges, magistrates, barristers, solicitors	2,955	418	5,256	4,467	6,484	7,694
10	Accountants, auditors, economists[a]	1,950	3,067	10,544	0	17,167	19,183
46	Ship, aircraft officers	475	545	2,132	2,942	6,028	6,828
2.	**Graziers, wheat and sheep farmers**	**29,383**	**33,828**	**71,121**	**67,464**	**84,965**	**90,888**
30	Wheat, sheep farmers[b]	0	0	42,739	0	28,857	31,723
33	Graziers	29,383	33,828	28,382	67,464	56,108	59,165
3.	**Lower professional**	**19,287**	**24,567**	**33,998**	**54,854**	**110,194**	**152,074**
03	Nurses, professional medical workers (n.e.c.)	229	664	566	4,068	6,645	6,727
05	Teachers (exc. university)	9,769	12,059	17,315	21,852	41,560	54,278
08	Writers, creative artists, entertainers	6,577	5,443	9,873	10,490	15,371	16,964
09	Draftsmen, technicians	1,001	4,486	3,966	12,530	36,230	58,981
11	Other professional workers	938	1,078	1,593	3,581	7,431	12,718
40	Wool classers	773	837	685	2,333	2,957	2,406
4.	**Managerial**	**80,092**	**71,343**	**111,815**	**146,660**	**254,543**	**268,067**
12	Public service administrators, overseas officials	20	25	484	1,022	3,765	3,382
13	Inspectors, local government inspectors	716	853	845	8,141	7,737	8,570
14	Managers (manufacturing)	13,986	15,345	36,685	36,021	57,038	63,646
15	Managers (building, construction)	5,920	6,368	16,493	13,882	28,469	22,251
16	Managers (transport, storage, communication)	483	442	8,850	10,422	12,032	11,259
17	Managers (finance)	5,245	5,460	13,479	6,247	20,105	20,975
18	Managers (commerce)	31,420	25,370	18,080	36,734	86,986	99,418
19	Managers (personal services)	7,912	7,455	8,724	19,171	23,559	24,773
20	Managers (rural services)	14,321	9,934	4,389	4,126	4,813	3,708
21	Managers (business services, other)	69	91	3,786	10,894	10,039	10,085

	Occupation Group	Census Year 1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
5.	**Self-employed shop proprietors[c]**	**19,169**	**30,161**	**60,907**	**0**	**32,193**	**26,380**
27	Shop proprietors (self-employed)[c]	19,169	30,161	60,907	0	32,193	26,380
6.	**Other farmers**	**201,996**	**239,308**	**194,511**	**330,431**	**173,026**	**149,988**
31	Fruit, vegetable, sugar-cane growers, poultry farmers, other primary producers (n.e.c.)	44,580	47,901	48,924	12,781	53,535	50,139
32	Mixed farmers, farmers (n.e.c.)	127,287	166,994	96,884	223,423	54,482	42,882
34	Dairy farmers	30,129	24,413	48,703	94,227	65,009	56,967
7.	**Clerical and related workers**	**64,781**	**110,441**	**174,781**	**241,717**	**319,677**	**388,238**
22	Bookkeepers, cashiers[a]	3,781	11,139	867	18,150	23,880	35,994
23	Clerks, typists, office machine operators	24,304	37,937	87,719	159,059	143,487	136,969
24	Public servants (n.e.c.)	16,575	31,338	39,185	17,767	73,878	112,326
25	Insurance, real estate salesmen	4,480	4,979	7,405	9,556	11,528	22,079
26	Commercial travellers	2,869	9,167	17,422	19,563	34,519	47,239
48	Stationmasters, postmasters, transport inspectors[d]	0	0	6,184	7,357	8,297	8,044
49	Postal officers, telephone, telecommunication workers	12,772	15,881	15,999	10,265	24,088	25,587
8.	**Members of Armed Services and Police Force**	**10,712**	**13,991**	**14,400**	**49,622**	**58,825**	**73,787**
88	Policemen	6,184	6,919	8,779	10,259	16,599	18,942
98	Members of Armed Services	4,528	7,072	5,621	39,363	42,226	54,845
9.	**Craftsmen and foremen**	**227,360**	**283,647**	**276,003**	**447,742**	**648,792**	**724,594**
51	Tailors, cutters, related tradesmen	28,901	30,279	18,891	17,249	18,562	16,900
54	Blacksmiths, moulders	17,802	14,667	14,891	14,459	11,065	10,114
55	Precision instrument makers, watchmakers, jewellers	6,334	8,008	7,152	6,662	12,309	16,375
56	Fitters, turners, toolsetters, toolmakers	16,250	25,320	23,219	67,734	101,807	116,117
57	Mechanics, vehicle body builders[a]	19,771	38,402	47,146	92,916	108,444	125,368
59	Plumbers, welders, boilermakers	12,959	16,220	19,667	37,352	70,549	82,736
60	Electricians, radio, TV mechanics	4,563	11,379	20,552	40,589	78,067	89,752
63	Carpenters, cabinetmakers	49,216	55,943	53,783	76,820	103,355	101,746
66	Painters, decorators	14,114	14,366	20,383	31,117	46,554	50,791
67	Bricklayers, plasterers, related tradesmen	18,035	22,215	17,945	20,989	37,009	45,212
68	Building, construction foremen	2,321	4,494	174	9,067	11,826	15,809
70	Printing machinists, compositors, related tradesmen	15,709	16,689	17,294	16,551	31,369	34,004
73	Bakers, confectioners, brewers	21,385	25,665	14,906	16,237	17,876	19,670
10.	**Shop assistants**	**89,116**	**89,519**	**76,408**	**132,152**	**95,201**	**89,149**
28	Shop assistants	89,116	89,519	76,408	132,152	95,201	89,149

	Occupation Group	Census Year 1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
11.	**Operatives and process workers**	**141,961**	**191,049**	**175,775**	**248,383**	**366,495**	**399,543**
50	Textile, clothing factory workers	3,434	6,325	8,238	20,253	20,387	22,450
52	Leather, shoe factory workers	12,052	12,151	19,698	18,054	13,767	11,414
53	Metal workers, iron workers	18,084	28,665	14,548	17,649	35,530	35,246
58	Sheetmetal workers	2,538	1,859	5,376	12,421	22,956	27,885
61	Linesmen, electrical, metal process workers (n.e.c.)	5,774	6,052	9,743	38,691	46,852	56,616
64	Wood machinists, box- basket-makers	1,803	2,444	10,816	8,635	15,451	14,943
65	Sawmill, wood factory workers	15,713	20,941	7,503	22,898	23,270	24,124
71	Glass factory, pottery workers	8,440	12,621	5,170	10,991	10,490	10,953
72	Food, beverage production workers	36,694	45,591	37,004	40,893	64,022	66,323
74	Chemical, paper production workers	14,790	15,927	7,341	12,994	18,545	23,446
75	Rubber, plastic production workers	0	0	3,543	6,950	12,443	13,941
76	Miscellaneous craftsmen, process workers (n.e.c.)	965	1,595	4,671	12,141	6,946	7,042
78	Lifting equipment, stationary engine operators	498	1,535	14,999	9,006	32,466	41,506
79	Earthmoving, construction equipment operators[e]	0	0	828	0	20,105	24,552
80	Railway, tramway repairmen, oilers and greasers	21,176	35,343	26,297	16,807	23,265	19,097
12.	**Drivers**	**93,524**	**116,397**	**135,261**	**166,332**	**205,372**	**219,582**
47	Drivers and workers in railway, road, sea transport	93,524	116,397	135,261	166,332	205,372	219,582
13.	**Personal, domestic, and other service workers**	**61,372**	**79,411**	**105,845**	**106,123**	**145,604**	**154,514**
29	Service station attendants, salesmen (n.e.c.)	4,677	5,555	15,353	603	14,602	11,438
39	Gardeners, groundkeepers	5,433	15,256	20,299	15,937	17,089	21,130
87	Firebrigade men, protective service workers (n.e.c.)	1,836	1,999	5,643	10,883	15,030	17,263
89	Cleaners, caretakers, domestic service workers, maids housekeepers	23,326	24,355	17,136	26,979	30,738	34,859
90	Cooks, chefs[d]	0	0	6,046	8,421	9,421	9,600
91	Catering workers, waiters	2,622	2,953	5,055	4,162	6,471	6,909
92	Bartenders	947	1,504	5,210	6,876	10,954	11,191
93	Hairdressers, beauticians	6,723	7,314	10,759	9,317	9,291	9,690
94	Launderers, dry cleaners	1,731	1,582	3,057	4,748	6,992	6,488
95	Athletes, sportsmen	4,167	4,619	4,447	3,455	3,215	3,317
96	Photographers, undertakers, service workers (n.e.c.)	7,763	10,739	9,684	10,458	13,511	14,087
97	Hospital, medical attendants	2,147	3,535	3,156	4,284	8,290	8,542
14.	**Miners**	**86,824**	**53,222**	**59,320**	**38,439**	**33,169**	**31,816**
43	Non-metalliferous miners, quarrymen	13,640	8,438	32,219	38,439	20,051	20,236
44	Coal miners[e]	20,334	25,826	15,769	0	6,179	4,936
45	Metalliferous miners, mineral treaters[e]	52,850	18,958	11,332	0	6,939	6,644

	Occupation Group	Census Year 1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
15	**Farm and rural workers**	**189,335**	**188,532**	**265,290**	**62,115**	**155,258**	**133,464**
35	Farm workers (exc. grazing, dairy farm)	91,161	97,654	188,204	9,300	61,187	54,167
36	Grazing station hands	56,924	53,025	45,599	11,459	40,924	36,677
37	Shearers	0	0	4,640	5,492	9,046	6,806
38	Dairy farm workers	17,173	15,007	858	1,278	21,477	15,304
41	Hunters, trappers, fishermen	11,401	10,152	13,382	15,178	8,958	8,375
42	Timber getters, forestry workers	12,676	12,694	12,607	19,408	13,666	12,135
16.	**Labourers**	**121,677**	**179,274**	**310,871**	**258,295**	**343,658**	**371,092**
62	Labourers, tradesmen's assistants in electrical, metal manufacturing[e]	0	0	7,031	40,178	51,992	60,173
69	Building, construction labourers	27,593	28,674	41,946	71,056	89,028	101,377
77	Packers, labourers in glass, ceramics, chemical, manufacturing (n.e.c.)	702	1,493	256	12,502	26,976	30,736
81	Waterside workers	13,331	14,572	12,522	21,218	22,260	20,710
82	Storemen, packers, transport labourers	18,010	23,516	23,818	53,081	83,755	92,906
83	Labourers in textile, clothing factories[e]	0	0	3,402	4,454	3,497	3,616
84	Labourers in food, drink processing factories[e]	0	0	0	15,169	15,826	16,942
85	Labourers in electricity, gas, water production supply	8,654	15,855	3,689	6,384	18,095	17,430
86	Labourers (n.e.c.)	53,387	95,164	218,207	34,253	32,229	27,202
17.	**Inadequately defined**	**23,836**	**12,537**	**31,609**	**91,111**	**32,719**	**30,274**
99	Other (inc. not stated)	23,836	12,537	31,609	91,111	32,719	30,274
	Total workforce	**1,490,632**	**1,748,814**	**2,144,737**	**2,479,269**	**3,165,927**	**3,421,814**

a. In 1947 'Accountants' were grouped with 'Bookkeepers', and 'Engineers' with 'Mechanics'.
b. In 1911, 1921, and 1947 'Wheat and sheep farmers' were grouped with 'other Farmers'.
c. In 1947 'Shop proprietors' were grouped with 'Shop assistants'.
d. Not distinguished in 1911 or 1921.
e. Not distinguished in some censuses from operatives in similar branches of industry.

The occupational distribution of the female Australian workforce 1911-1966

	Occupation Group	Census Year 1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
1.	**Upper professional**	**3,159**	**5,644**	**2,815**	**3,799**	**8,935**	**11,065**
00	Architects, engineers, surveyors[a]	90	241	27	58	170	197
01	Natural scientists, university teachers	456	1,061	340	378	1,642	2,438
02	Medical practitioners, dentists	1,278	1,813	435	656	1,497	1,673
04	Pharmacists	365	961	720	936	1,588	1,794
06	Clergymen, religious workers	783	893	779	1,662	3,124	3,767
07	Judges, magistrates, barristers, solicitors	6	5	96	109	260	377
10	Accountants, auditors, economists[a]	181	669	418	0	635	787
46	Ship, aircraft officers	0	1	0	0	19	32
2.	**Graziers, wheat and sheep farmers**	**1,214**	**1,148**	**3,988**	**3,431**	**10,519**	**11,499**
30	Wheat, sheep farmers[b]	0	0	1,551	0	2,678	3,038
33	Graziers	1,214	1,148	2,437	3,431	7,841	8,461
3.	**Lower professional**	**38,933**	**50,598**	**70,059**	**82,979**	**137,690**	**178,338**
03	Nurses, professional medical workers (n.e.c.)	13,076	18,583	27,599	39,584	63,490	76,580
05	Teachers (exc. university)	16,593	23,658	30,104	28,903	56,063	74,439
08	Writers, creative artists, entertainers	8,322	6,898	7,546	5,995	6,859	8,881
09	Draftsmen, technicians	8	74	247	2,417	6,360	11,088
11	Other professional workers	933	1,383	4,563	6,071	4,918	7,350
40	Wool classers	1	2	0	9	0	0
4.	**Managerial**	**12,261**	**8,314**	**10,188**	**34,606**	**43,337**	**36,572**
12	Public service administrators, overseas offcials	0	2	0	23	156	100
13	Inspectors, local government inspectors	7	10	0	235	96	75
14	Managers (manufacturing)	3,593	2,107	3,783	3,122	5,536	4,912
15	Managers (building, construction)	4	27	26	48	1,170	709
16	Managers (transport, storage, communication)	4	1	237	582	1,336	795
17	Managers (finance)	665	448	883	200	1,097	1,811
18	Managers (commerce)	2,944	1,736	1,086	5,850	19,542	15,314
19	Managers (personal services)	5,030	3,971	3,530	22,693	11,606	9,273
20	Managers (rural services)	12	10	30	36	201	126
21	Managers (business services, other)	2	2	613	1,817	2,597	3,457
5.	**Self-employed shop proprietors[c]**	**5,021**	**7,032**	**15,141**	**0**	**18,401**	**9,400**
27	Shop proprietors (self-employed)[c]	5,021	7,032	15,141	0	18,401	9,400

	Occupation Group	Census Year 1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
6.	**Other farmers**	**13,099**	**6,364**	**11,122**	**18,669**	**18,030**	**19,920**
31	Fruit, vegetable, sugar-cane growers, poultry farmers, other primary producers (n.e.c.)	1,359	1,136	2,122	1,272	5,311	6,491
32	Mixed farmers, farmers (n.e.c.)	5,904	3,120	4,389	7,549	5,058	4,288
34	Dairy farmers	5,836	2,108	4,611	9,848	7,661	9,141
7.	**Clerical and related workers**	**9,637**	**32,750**	**91,539**	**185,188**	**331,150**	**460,132**
22	Bookkeepers, cashiers[a]	1,649	6,597	2,626	11,343	20,109	35,327
23	Clerks, typists, office machine operators	2,162	10,407	77,747	154,487	271,265	351,423
24	Public servants (n.e.c.)	817	4,940	3,757	4,115	15,434	41,509
25	Insurance, real estate salesmen	182	618	77	363	697	1,515
26	Commercial travellers	1,515	5,984	143	340	619	1,514
48	Stationmasters, postmasters, transport inspectors[d]	0	0	2,034	1,717	2,000	2,263
49	Postal officers, telephone, telecommunication workers	3,312	4,204	5,155	12,823	21,026	26,581
8.	**Members of Armed Services and Police Force**	**0**	**31**	**31**	**756**	**2,021**	**2,757**
88	Policemen	0	31	31	106	241	296
98	Members of Armed Services	0	0	0	650	1,780	2,461
9.	**Craftsmen and foremen**	**88,531**	**85,114**	**53,997**	**39,767**	**34,060**	**35,373**
51	Tailors, cutters, related tradesmen	80,447	69,734	47,206	30,747	18,878	16,080
54	Blacksmiths, moulders	26	79	49	181	0	0
55	Precision instrument makers, watchmakers, jewellers	392	846	485	338	802	873
56	Fitters, turners, toolsetters, toolmakers	72	325	324	1,839	2,844	0
57	Mechanics, vehicle body builders[a]	545	2,490	0	420	113	264
59	Plumbers, welders, boilermakers	43	101	0	82	204	397
60	Electricians, radio, TV mechanics	100	440	325	242	113	234
63	Carpenters, cabinetmakers	213	591	45	345	322	342
66	Painters, decorators	25	64	136	209	393	673
67	Bricklayers, plasterers, related tradesmen	7	45	0	15	0	56
68	Building, construction foremen	26	140	0	2	0	22
70	Printing machinists, compositors, related tradesmen	3,836	5,163	4,567	4,599	7,808	9,458
73	Bakers, confectioners, brewers	2,799	5,096	860	748	2,583	6,974
10.	**Shop assistants**	**26,381**	**37,743**	**50,760**	**83,237**	**112,972**	**160,362**
28	Shop assistants	26,381	37,743	50,760	83,237	112,972	160,362
11.	**Operatives and process workers**	**11,777**	**20,508**	**57,597**	**81,423**	**124,929**	**165,850**
50	Textile, clothing factory workers	4,354	9,398	31,783	52,071	67,056	82,228
52	Leather, shoe factory workers	486	984	7,733	8,226	10,232	11,680

	Occupation Group	Census Year 1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
11. cont.							
53	Metal workers, iron workers	184	665	391	628	1,782	2,329
58	Sheetmetal workers	39	90	231	181	337	0
61	Linesmen, electrical, metal process workers (n.e.c.)	41	166	204	5,939	17,810	34,148
64	Wood machinists, box- basket-makers	23	192	165	853	588	677
65	Sawmill, wood factory workers	20	90	153	300	488	1,134
71	Glass factory, pottery workers	125	210	267	453	1,264	1,716
72	Food, beverage production workers	3,556	4,390	5,335	5,313	11,543	12,180
74	Chemical, paper production workers	2,087	2,921	3,074	2,925	6,016	8,411
75	Rubber, plastic production workers	0	0	1,385	1,369	4,270	6,620
76	Miscellaneous craftsmen, process workers (n.e.c.)	240	427	6,876	3,013	3,543	4,502
78	Lifting equipment, stationary engine operators	0	0	0	122	0	131
79	Earthmoving, construction equipment operators[e]	0	0	0	0	0	31
80	Railway, tramway repairmen, oilers, greasers	622	975	0	30	0	63
12.	**Drivers**	**719**	**1,276**	**1,481**	**1,255**	**2,788**	**5,192**
47	Drivers, workers in railway, road, sea transport	719	1,276	1,481	1,255	2,788	5,192
13.	**Personal, domestic, and other service workers**	**148,170**	**160,954**	**197,752**	**127,489**	**169,285**	**227,259**
29	Service station attendants, salesmen (n.e.c.)	756	1,447	1,692	20	1,983	6,390
39	Gardeners, groundkeepers	11	189	138	99	364	1,075
87	Firebrigade men, protective service workers (n.e.c.)	123	126	98	623	290	313
89	Cleaners, caretakers, domestic service workers, maids, housekeepers	129,239	134,386	160,890	74,263	85,014	100,108
90	Cooks, chefs[d]	0	0	8,454	6,579	9,695	12,887
91	Catering workers, waiters	6,443	10,720	12,820	18,222	26,601	41,941
92	Bartenders	141	590	1,803	3,993	7,695	9,710
93	Hairdressers, beauticians	535	613	3,623	8,736	13,355	20,215
94	Launderers, dry cleaners	6,513	4,500	3,759	6,251	11,287	13,912
95	Athletes, sportsmen	1	0	122	62	202	503
96	Photographers, undertakers, service workers (n.e.c.)	2,549	3,960	2,109	4,659	3,009	4,459
97	Hospital, medical attendants	1,859	4,423	2,244	3,982	9,790	15,746
14.	**Miners**	**57**	**197**	**0**	**18**	**15**	**48**
43	Non-metalliferous miners, quarrymen	47	90	0	18	10	41
44	Coal miners[e]	5	47	0	0	0	0
45	Metalliferous miners, mineral treaters[e]	5	60	0	0	5	7

	Occupation Group	Census Year 1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
15.	**Farm and rural workers**	**708**	**1,830**	**4,006**	**180**	**7,972**	**38,681**
35	Farm workers (exc. grazing, dairy farm)	112	183	1,601	60	3,203	18,062
36	Grazing station hands	43	77	0	28	1,119	8,457
37	Shearers	0	0	0	0	0	0
38	Dairy farm workers	518	1,503	2,405	32	3,541	11,928
41	Hunters, trappers, fishermen	19	46	0	48	84	172
42	Timber getters, forestry workers	16	21	0	12	25	62
16.	**Labourers**	**4,039**	**10,378**	**12,511**	**21,424**	**16,125**	**26,886**
62	Labourers, tradesmen's assistants in electrical, metal manufacturing[e]	0	0	0	1,220	0	707
69	Building, construction labourers	7	43	0	51	0	151
77	Packers, labourers in glass, ceramics, chemical, manufacturing (n.e.c.)	771	1,985	646	2,621	14,727	21,546
81	Waterside workers	1	14	0	0	0	13
82	Storemen, packers, transport labourers	2,998	7,932	7,429	12,558	1,398	2,981
83	Labourers in textile, clothing factories[e]	0	0	4,299	2,193	0	419
84	Labourers in food, drink processing factories[e]	0	0	0	1,852	0	444
85	Labourers in electricity, gas, water production supply	258	401	137	128	0	31
86	Labourers (n.e.c.)	4	3	0	801	0	594
17.	**Inadequately defined**	**4,751**	**6,686**	**16,081**	**32,941**	**20,940**	**45,307**
99	Other (inc. not stated)	4,751	6,686	16,081	32,941	20,940	45,307
	Total workforce	**368,457**	**436,567**	**599,068**	**717,162**	**1,059,169**	**1,434,641**

a. In 1947 'Accountants' were grouped with 'Bookkeepers', and 'Engineers' with 'Mechanics'.
b. In 1911, 1921, and 1947 'Wheat and sheep farmers' were grouped with 'other Farmers'.
c. In 1947 'Shop proprietors' were grouped with 'Shop assistants'.
d. Not distinguished in 1911 or 1921.
e. Not distinguished in some censuses from operatives in similar branches of industry.

The occupational distribution of the Australian workforce 1911-1966

	Occupation Group	Census Year 1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
1.	**Upper professional**	**33,366**	**37,231**	**49,637**	**41,628**	**115,171**	**129,429**
00	Architects, engineers, surveyors[a]	6,491	6,079	5,565	4,631	29,946	31,757
01	Natural scientists, university teachers	3,313	4,960	4,583	4,626	16,652	20,893
02	Medical practitioners, dentists	7,849	9,183	8,042	9,546	15,417	17,164
04	Pharmacists	4,023	5,305	5,514	5,487	8,514	8,374
06	Clergymen, religious workers	6,123	6,999	7,487	9,820	14,049	16,340
07	Judges, magistrates, barristers, solicitors	2,961	423	5,352	4,576	6,744	8,071
10	Accountants, auditors, economists[a]	2,131	3,736	10,962	0	17,802	19,970
46	Ship, aircraft officers	475	546	2,132	2,942	6,047	6,860
2.	**Graziers, wheat and sheep farmers**	**30,597**	**34,976**	**75,109**	**70,895**	**95,484**	**102,387**
30	Wheat, sheep farmers[b]	0	0	44,290	0	31,535	34,761
33	Graziers	30,597	34,976	30,819	70,895	63,949	67,626
3.	**Lower professional**	**58,220**	**75,165**	**104,057**	**137,833**	**247,884**	**330,412**
03	Nurses, professional medical workers (n.e.c.)	13,305	19,247	28,165	43,652	70,135	83,307
05	Teachers (exc. university)	26,362	35,717	47,419	50,755	97,623	128,717
08	Writers, creative artists, entertainers	14,899	12,341	17,419	16,485	22,230	25,845
09	Draftsmen, technicians	1,009	4,560	4,213	14,947	42,590	70,069
11	Other professional workers	1,871	2,461	6,156	9,652	12,349	20,068
40	Wool classers	774	839	685	2,342	2,957	2,406
4.	**Managerial**	**92,353**	**79,657**	**122,003**	**181,266**	**297,880**	**304,639**
12	Public service administrators, overseas officials	20	27	484	1,045	3,921	3,482
13	Inspectors, local government inspectors	723	863	845	8,376	7,833	8,645
14	Managers (manufacturing)	17,579	17,452	40,468	39,143	62,574	68,558
15	Managers (building, construction)	5,924	6,395	16,519	13,930	29,639	22,960
16	Managers (transport, storage, communication)	487	443	9,087	11,004	13,368	12,054
17	Managers (finance)	5,910	5,908	14,362	6,447	21,202	22,786
18	Managers (commerce)	34,364	27,106	19,166	42,584	106,528	114,732
19	Managers (personal services)	12,942	11,426	12,254	41,864	35,165	34,046
20	Managers (rural services)	14,333	9,944	4,419	4,162	5,014	3,834
21	Managers (business services, other)	71	93	4,399	12,711	12,636	13,542
5.	**Self-employed shop proprietors[c]**	**24,190**	**37,193**	**76,048**	**0**	**50,594**	**35,780**
27	Shop proprietors (self-employed)[c]	24,190	37,193	76,048	0	50,594	35,780

	Occupation Group	Census Year 1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
6.	**Other farmers**	**215,095**	**245,672**	**205,633**	**349,100**	**191,056**	**169,908**
31	Fruit, vegetable, sugar-cane growers, poultry farmers, other primary producers (n.e.c.)	45,939	49,037	51,046	14,053	58,846	56,630
32	Mixed farmers, farmers (n.e.c.)	133,191	170,114	101,273	230,972	59,540	47,170
34	Dairy farmers	35,965	26,521	53,314	104,075	72,670	66,108
7.	**Clerical and related workers**	**74,418**	**143,191**	**266,320**	**426,905**	**650,827**	**848,370**
22	Bookkeepers, cashiers[a]	5,430	17,736	3,493	29,493	43,989	71,321
23	Clerks, typists, office machine operators	26,466	48,344	165,466	313,546	414,752	488,392
24	Public servants (n.e.c.)	17,392	36,278	42,942	21,882	89,312	153,835
25	Insurance, real estate salesmen	4,662	5,597	7,482	9,919	12,225	23,594
26	Commercial travellers	4,384	15,151	17,565	19,903	35,138	48,753
48	Stationmasters, postmasters, transport inspectors[d]	0	0	8,218	9,074	10,297	10,307
49	Postal officers, telephone, telecommunication workers	16,084	20,085	21,154	23,088	45,114	52,168
8.	**Members of Armed Services and Police Force**	**10,712**	**14,022**	**14,431**	**50,378**	**60,846**	**76,544**
88	Policemen	6,184	6,950	8,810	10,365	16,840	19,238
98	Members of Armed Services	4,528	7,072	5,621	40,013	44,006	57,306
9	**Craftsmen and foremen**	**315,891**	**368,761**	**330,000**	**487,509**	**682,852**	**759,967**
51	Tailors, cutters, related tradesmen	109,348	100,013	66,097	47,996	37,440	32,980
54	Blacksmiths, moulders	17,828	14,746	14,940	14,640	11,065	10,114
55	Precision instrument makers, watchmakers, jewellers	6,726	8,854	7,637	7,000	13,111	17,248
56	Fitters, turners, toolsetters, toolmakers	16,322	25,645	23,543	69,573	104,651	116,117
57	Mechanics, vehicle body builders	20,316	40,892	47,146	93,336	108,557	125,632
59	Plumbers, welders, boilermakers	13,002	16,321	19,667	37,434	70,753	83,133
60	Electricians, radio, TV mechanics	4,663	11,819	20,877	40,831	78,180	89,986
63	Carpenters, cabinetmakers	49,429	56,534	53,828	77,165	103,677	102,088
66	Painters, decorators	14,139	14,430	20,519	31,326	46,947	51,464
67	Bricklayers, plasterers, related tradesmen	18,042	22,260	17,945	21,004	37,009	45,268
68	Building, construction foremen	2,347	4,634	174	9,069	11,826	15,831
70	Printing machinists, compositors, related tradesmen	19,545	21,852	21,861	21,150	39,177	43,462
73	Bakers, confectioners, brewers	24,184	30,761	15,766	16,985	20,459	26,644
10.	**Shop assistants**	**115,497**	**127,262**	**127,168**	**215,389**	**208,173**	**249,511**
28	Shop assistants	115,497	127,262	127,168	215,389	208,173	249,511
11.	**Operatives and process workers**	**153,738**	**211,557**	**233,372**	**329,806**	**491,424**	**565,393**
50	Textile, clothing factory workers	7,788	15,723	40,021	72,324	87,443	104,678
52	Leather, shoe factory workers	2,538	13,135	27,431	26,280	23,999	23,094

	Occupation Group	Census Year 1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
11. cont.							
53	Metal workers, iron workers	18,268	29,330	14,939	18,277	37,312	37,575
58	Sheetmetal workers	2,577	1,949	5,607	12,602	23,293	27,885
61	Linesmen, electrical, metal process workers (n.e.c.)	5,815	6,218	9,947	44,630	64,662	90,764
64	Wood machinists, box-, basket-makers	1,826	2,636	10,981	9,488	16,039	15,620
65	Sawmill, wood factory workers	15,733	21,031	7,656	23,198	23,758	25,263
71	Glass factory, pottery workers	8,565	12,831	5,437	11,444	11,754	12,669
72	Food, beverage production workers	40,250	49,981	42,339	46,206	75,565	78,503
74	Chemical, paper production workers	16,877	18,848	10,415	15,919	24,561	31,857
75	Rubber, plastic production workers	0	0	4,928	8,319	16,713	20,561
76	Miscellaneous craftsmen, process workers (n.e.c.)	1,205	2,022	11,547	15,154	10,489	11,544
78	Lifting equipment, stationary engine operators	498	1,535	14,999	9,128	32,466	41,637
79	Earthmoving, construction equipment operators[e]	0	0	828	0	20,105	24,583
80	Railway, tramway repairmen, oilers, greasers	21,798	36,318	26,297	16,837	23,265	19,160
12.	**Drivers**	**94,243**	**117,673**	**136,742**	**167,587**	**208,160**	**224,774**
47	Drivers, workers in railway, road, sea transport	94,243	117,673	136,742	167,587	208,160	224,774
13.	**Personal, domestic, and other service workers**	**209,542**	**240,365**	**303,597**	**233,612**	**314,889**	**381,773**
29	Service station attendants, salesmen (n.e.c.)	5,433	7,002	17,045	623	16,585	17,828
39	Gardeners, groundkeepers	5,444	15,445	20,437	16,036	17,453	22,205
87	Firebrigade men, protective service workers (n.e.c.)	1,959	2,125	5,741	11,506	15,320	17,576
89	Cleaners, caretakers, domestic service workers, maids, housekeepers	152,565	158,741	178,026	101,242	115,752	134,967
90	Cooks, chefs[d]	0	0	14,500	15,000	19,116	22,487
91	Catering workers, waiters	9,065	13,673	17,875	22,384	38,072	48,850
92	Bartenders	1,088	2,094	7,013	10,869	18,649	20,901
93	Hairdressers, beauticians	7,258	7,927	14,382	18,053	22,646	29,905
94	Launderers, dry cleaners	8,244	6,082	6,816	10,999	18,279	20,400
95	Athletes, sportsmen	4,168	4,619	4,569	3,517	3,417	3,820
96	Photographers, undertakers, service workers (n.e.c.)	10,312	14,699	11,793	15,117	16,520	18,546
97	Hospital, medical attendants	4,006	7,958	5,400	8,266	18,080	24,288
14.	**Miners**	**86,881**	**53,419**	**59,320**	**38,457**	**33,184**	**31,864**
43	Non-metalliferous miners, quarrymen	13,687	8,528	32,219	38,457	20,061	20,277
44	Coal miners[e]	20,339	25,873	15,769	0	6,179	4,936
45	Metalliferous miners, mineral treaters[e]	52,855	19,018	11,332	0	6,944	6,651
15.	**Farm and rural workers**	**190,043**	**190,362**	**269,296**	**62,295**	**163,230**	**172,145**
35	Farm workers (exc. grazing, dairy farm)	91,273	97,837	189,805	9,360	64,390	72,229

	Occupation Group	Census Year 1911	1921	1933	1947	1961	1966
15. cont.							
36	Grazing station hands	56,967	53,102	45,599	11,487	42,043	45,134
37	Shearers	0	0	4,640	5,492	9,046	6,806
38	Dairy farm workers	17,691	16,510	3,263	1,310	25,018	27,232
41	Hunters, trappers, fishermen	11,420	10,198	13,382	15,226	9,042	8,547
42	Timber getters, forestry workers	12,692	12,715	12,607	19,420	13,691	12,197
16.	**Labourers**	**125,716**	**189,652**	**323,382**	**279,719**	**359,783**	**397,978**
62	Labourers, tradesmen's assistants in electrical, metal manufacturing[e]	0	0	7,031	41,398	51,992	60,880
69	Building, construction labourers	27,600	28,717	41,946	71,107	89,028	101,528
77	Packers, labourers in glass, ceramics, chemical manufacturing (n.e.c.)	1,473	3,478	902	15,123	41,703	52,282
81	Waterside workers	13,332	14,586	12,522	21,218	22,260	20,723
82	Storemen, packers, transport labourers	21,008	31,448	31,247	65,639	85,153	95,887
83	Labourers in textile, clothing factories[e]	0	0	7,701	6,647	3,497	4,035
84	Labourers in food, drink processing factories[e]	0	0	0	17,021	15,826	17,386
85	Labourers in electricity, gas, water production supply	8,912	16,256	3,826	6,512	18,095	17,461
86	Labourers (n.e.c.)	53,391	95,167	218,207	35,054	32,229	27,796
17.	**Inadequately defined**	**28,587**	**19,223**	**47,690**	**124,052**	**53,659**	**75,581**
99	Other (inc. not stated)	28,587	19,223	47,690	124,052	53,659	75,581
	Total in workforce	1,859,089	2,185,381	2,743,805	3,196,431	4,225,096	4,856,455

a. In 1947 'Accountants' were grouped with 'Bookkeepers', and 'Engineers' with 'Mechanics'.
b. In 1911, 1921, and 1947 'Wheat and sheep farmers' were grouped with 'other Farmers'.
c. In 1947 'Shop proprietors' were grouped with 'Shop assistants'.
d. Not distinguished in 1911 or 1921.
e. Not distinguished in some censuses from operatives in similar branches of industry.

Appendix 2 The 1965 survey: sample and questionnaire

The survey was conducted between February and May 1965 by the Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd (Australian Gallup Poll) for the Department of Sociology in the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University. Some supplementary interviews were conducted in rural New South Wales and Victoria under our supervision and in Western Australia under the direction of Professor John Nalson. The sample, which was drawn by the contractor, used a two-stage probability design, the first stage of which involved selecting 23 of the 122 Federal Electoral Districts into which Australia (excluding the Northern Territory) was then divided. Within each electorate thus selected, ten names were chosen at random from the electoral rolls and their addresses were identified. In an attempt to minimise sample bias against noncitizens, interviewers were instructed to select as the starting address for interview the one next door to this randomly selected address. Subsequent interviews were conducted within the same block, until ten interviews had been obtained. Because a few interviewers contacted more than ten eligible dwellings (an eligible dwelling was defined as one that contained a male worker 21 years of age or older) a total of 2319 eligible dwellings was listed. Usable responses numbered 1925, an overall response rate of 83 per cent. The main components of nonresponse were refusals (10 per cent) and poor English among recently arrived settlers (4 per cent). Wives of married men answered the questionnaire as proxies for their husband in about one-third of the cases. Interviews averaged fifteen to twenty minutes.

The four tables at the end of this appendix provide information on how the obtained sample compares with expectations based on the 1966 census in geographical distribution, age, occupation, and birthplace. Note that the geographical spread of the sample compares closely with the census: there was a slight tendency to overrepresent metropolitan residents, but in most cases the obtained distribution lies within 1 per cent of that expected on the basis of the census. The largest discrepancy is a 1·9 per cent excess in Victoria.

In terms of age distribution the sample is deficient among younger men, who tend to be away from home more often than older men. Since older men are more likely to be married, their wives could answer questions on their behalf. As Table A2.3 indicates, the sample contains approximately the right proportions of men in professional, white-collar, and farm jobs (allowing for some slippage in the definition of farmers and farm labourers) but has an excess of managers and skilled workers, and deficits in the other two manual categories, especially labourers. Since semiskilled and unskilled jobs are often held early in a person's work experience, the underrepresentation of younger men is partly the cause of underrepresentation in such jobs. No doubt some self-employed service workers were misclassified as managers, but the deficit of unskilled workers reflects the underrepresentation of non-British settlers in our sample: as Table A2.4 shows, the proportion of British immigrants is almost

exactly the proportion expected on the basis of the 1966 census, but there is a shortfall of 5·6 per cent in immigrants from other countries. A disproportionate number of such immigrants worked in unskilled manual jobs.

The foregoing account differs from that given in Broom *et al.* (1968:216-17), which used 1961 census data. At the time that comparison was made 1966 census

Table A2.1: Geographical distributions in the 1965 Survey and the 1966 Census (column percentages)

State and division	1965 Survey	1966 Census
NSW	*38.0*	*37.3*
Metropolitan	20.8	22.0
Non-metropolitan	17.2	15.3
VICTORIA	*26.1*	*28.0*
Metropolitan	17.5	18.6
Non-metropolitan	8.6	9.4
QUEENSLAND	*13.5*	*14.2*
Metropolitan	5.7	5.9
Non-metropolitan	7.8	8.3
SOUTH AUSTRALIA	*9.9*	*9.4*
Metropolitan	5.2	6.1
Non-metropolitan	4.7	3.3
WESTERN AUSTRALIA	*8.0*	*7.2*
Metropolitan	4.1	4.1
Non-metropolitan	3.9	3.1
TASMANIA	*3.7*	*3.1*
Metropolitan	2.1	1.0
Non-metropolitan	1.6	2.1
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY	*0.8*	*0.8*
Metropolitan	0.8	0.8
Non-metropolitan	0.0	0.0
TOTAL AUSTRALIA*	*100.0*	*100.0*
Metropolitan	56.2	58.5
Non-metropolitan	43.8	41.5

*Excluding Northern Territory. Male workforce 15 years of age and over.

Table A2.2: Age distributions in the 1965 Survey and 1966 Census (column percentages)

Age group	1965 Survey	1966 Census
21-34	29.3	35.1
35-49	44.4	37.0
50 and over	26.3	27.9
Total		100.0

data were not yet available. Although in an earlier analysis (Broom and Jones, 1969b) a form of weighting was used to clarify cross-national comparisons, for internal analyses no weighting is attempted. We have tried instead to take into account the effects of the biases mentioned above (especially the under-representation of non-British settlers) in our interpretation of results.

Table A2.3: Occupational distributions in the 1965 Survey and the 1966 Census (column percentages)

Occupation group	1965 Survey	1966 Census
1. Professional	9.3	8.4
2. Managerial	13.0	9.9
3. White collar	12.8	12.5
4. Skilled manual	22.5	20.5
5. Semiskilled manual	18.8	20.9
6. Unskilled manual	10.7	16.7
7. Farmers	10.9	7.8
8. Farm labourers	1.9	3.3
Total	99.9	100.0

Note: Male workers 21 years of age and over only are included.

Table A2.4: Birthplace distributions in the 1965 Survey and the 1966 Census

Birthplace	1965 Survey	1966 Census
Australia	80.1	74.2
United Kingdom	9.5	9.8
Other countries	10.4	16.0
Total	100.0	100.0

QUESTIONNAIRE

Department of Sociology Australian National University STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

INTRODUCTION: Good (morning). I'm (SAY YOUR NAME) of the Australian National University. We are making a survey throughout Australia about education and jobs.
May I speak to the youngest man 21 or over (now at home) who works full time?
IF NONE HOME: Well, may I speak to a married woman whose husband works? END INTERVIEW IF NO MALE WORKERS LIVE THERE.

1a. First, a question on *education*. About how much education would you say a young *man* should have, to get along in Australia today? ACCEPT ANSWERS IN YEARS OR STANDARDS. PROBE IF VAGUE. .....

1b. And how much education should a young *woman* have, to get along in Australia today? .....

2a. Do you have TV in your home?	NO .....0 YES X	Go to 3 Ask b
2b. IF *YES*: Are you buying it on *hire purchase,* or do you *own* or *rent* it?	H.P. .....1 OWN .....2 RENT .....3 D.K. 4	
3a. Nowadays many people buy things on hire purchase. Do you happen to be buying anything (else) now on the hire purchase plan?	YES .....0 NO 1	Ask b Go to 4
3b. IF *YES*: What would that be? Anything else?		
4a. Do you think hire purchase is a *good* plan — or a *bad* plan — for the *average* family?	GOOD .....0 BAD .....1 UNDECIDED 2	
4b. Why do you say that?		
5a. Now one on *living costs.* In your opinion, what's the smallest amount a family of *four* — two parents and two children — need each week, to keep in health and live decently — that is, the *smallest* amount for all expenses, including rent?	£..... NO IDEA 9	
5b. *About* how much is *food* costing *your* family each week?	£..... NO IDEA 9	
5c. Including yourself, how many adults live here, in your family?	ADULTS	
5d. And how many children?	CHILDREN	
5e. That makes a total of .....?	TOTAL	
6a. Here (HAND *WHITE* CARD) are some *income groups.* Would you please say the letter at the end of the line which includes your (husband's) total income last year — that is, *before* any deductions. CIRCLE FIGURE AFTER LETTER NAMED. ——→ REGAIN CARD ←——	A — 0 B — 1 C — 2 D — 3 E — 4 F — 5 D.K. — 6	
6b. Did anyone else in your household receive any income last year?	YES.....0 NO.....1	Ask c-e Go to 7
6c. IF *YES*: How is each related to (you) (your husband)? WRITE IN 1st COL. BELOW.		

6d. What (does he/she) (do they) do? WRITE IN 2nd COL. BELOW.

6c: *Relationship to man*	6d: *Job*
.....	.....
.....	.....
.....	.....

6e. And on this card (HAND *BLUE* CARD) would you please say the letter at the end of the line which includes the *approximate total* income last year of *all* members of your household, including yourself? CIRCLE FIGURE *AFTER* LETTER NAMED.

——— REGAIN CARD ———

A — 0
B — 1
C — 2
D — 3
E — 4
F — 5
D.K. — 6

7a. Was the man born in Australia or overseas?

AUSTRALIA .....0 Go to 8
OVERSEAS .....1 Ask b, c

7b. If *OVERSEAS*: In which country? .....

7c. When did he come to Australia? 19.....

8a. Was his wife born in Australia or overseas?

AUSTRALIA .....0 Go to 9
OVERSEAS .....1 Ask b, c

8b. If *OVERSEAS*: In what country? .....

8c. When did she come to Australia? 19.....

9. In what country was his father born?

AUSTRALIA 1
OTHER (WRITE) .....

10a. Next about *education.* Looking at this card (HAND *PINK* CARD) how much *education* would you say you had? Would you please read the line or lines which apply to you? CIRCLE ANSWER IN COL. 1 or 3 BELOW.

10b. What certificates, diplomas, or degrees do you have?

.....

10c. Looking at the card again, about how much education would you say your father had? CIRCLE IN COL. 2 OR 4.

10d. What certificates, diplomas or degrees (does) (did) he have?

.....

IF *MARRIED,* ASK 10e-h:

10e. And how much education did your (wife) (husband) have? CIRCLE IN COL. 1 OR 3.

10f. Any certificates or diplomas? .....

10g. About how much education did (her)(his) father have? CIRCLE IN COL. 2 OR 4.

10h. And what certificates or diplomas? .....

10h. cont.	Col. 1 MAN	Col. 2 MAN'S FATHER	Col. 3 WIFE	Col. 4 WIFE'S FATHER
NONE	0	0	0	0
ATTENDED PRIMARY	1	1	1	1
COMPLETED PRIMARY	2	2	2	2
ATTENDED SECONDARY	3	3	3	3
COMPLETED SECONDARY	4	4	4	4
ATTENDED TECH COLL OR UNI	5	5	5	5
COMPLETED TECH COLL OR UNI	6	6	6	6
DON'T KNOW	7	7	7	7
TRADE CERTIFICATE	8	8	8	8
UNMARRIED	9	9	9	9
YEARS OF SCHOOLING	...	...	...	...

→ **REGAIN CARD** ←

11a. Some people say there are social classes in this country. Do you think there *are* — or are *not* — social classes in Australia?

ARE 0
ARE NOT 1
UNCERTAIN 2

11b. Why do you think that? .....

11c. (If there are social classes) to which class would you say you belong? .....

11d. Here (HAND *YELLOW* CARD) are the names some people use for social classes. If you *had* to say which of *those* social classes you belong to, what would you say?

UPPER 0	Go to 12
MIDDLE 1	Ask e
LOWER 2	
WORKING 3	
OTHER:	Go to 12
NO ANSWER 9	.....

11e. IF *MIDDLE*: Would you say you're in the *upper* middle, or *lower* middle?
CIRCLE 1 IF ANSWER IS "JUST MIDDLE".

UPPER MIDDLE...0
MIDDLE 1
LOWER MIDDLE ..2

→ **REGAIN CARD** ←

12. Next, about church-going. Apart from weddings, christenings, funerals and similar occasions — about how long is it since you *last* went to Church?

DAYS .....
WEEKS .....
MONTHS .....
YEARS .....
NEVER GO 8
CAN'T SAY 9

CIRCLE AFTER PERSON YOU ARE INTERVIEWING.

MAN .....1 Ask 13 & 14 about *his* work.
MARRIED WOMEN ....2 Ask 13 & 14 about her *husband's* work.

13a. Now some questions about jobs.
(Are you) (Is your husband) now working *full* time?

FULL TIME 0
PART TIME 1
UNEMPLOYED ...2

13b. What *kind of work* (do you) (does he) do there. IF *NOT* NOW WORKING, ASK (BOTH HERE & IN 13c) ABOUT HIS LAST REGULAR JOB.
DETAILED ANSWER: e.g. Electrical engineer, costing clerk, shoe salesman, plasterer's labourer. .....

13c. In what kind of business or industry (do you) (does he) work? DETAILED ANSWER: e.g. Radio factory, motor vehicle manf., retail footwear, home building.
KIND: .....
NAME OF COMPANY: .....

13d. (Do you) (Does he) belong to a trade union?

YES 0
NO 1
NO RESPONSE 2
PROF. ASSOC. 3

13e. Is it (your) (his) own business?

YES 0
NO 1

14a. Now, I'd like to ask about (your) (his) occupation when (you) (he) began regular full-time work. What kind of work did (you) (he) do then — the first job?
.....

14b. What kind of business or industry did (you) (he) work in then?
KIND: .....
NAME OF COMPANY: .....

14c. Did (you) (he) then belong to a trade union?

YES 0
NO 1
DON'T KNOW 2
PROF. ASSOC. 3

14d. Was it (your) (his) own business?

YES 0
NO 1
DON'T KNOW 2

15a. And, about your (husband's) father's occupation. What kind of work does he do? IF DEAD ☐ RETIRED ☐ OR UNEMPLOYED ☐ TICK IN SQUARE AND ASK: What kind of work was his *last* regular job?
.....

15b. What kind of business or industry (does) (did) he work in?
KIND: .....
NAME OF COMPANY: .....

15c.	(Does) (Did) he belong to a trade union (in his last regular job)?	YES .....0 NO .....1 DON'T KNOW .....2 PROF. ASSOC.....3
15d.	(Is) (Was) it his own business?	YES .....0 NO .....1 DON'T KNOW 2
16a.	About *how long* have you lived at this address?	MONTHS ..... YEARS ..... NO RESPONSE 9
16b.	In which State and district did you live *before* moving here?	STATE: ..... CITY OR TOWN: .... SUBURB: ..... NO RESPONSE: ...8
16c.	Do you happen to *own* or *rent* your home — or do you *board*?	OWN .....0 PAYING OFF .....1 RENT .....2 BOARD 3

EXPLAIN: The remaining questions are to be sure we get opinions from a true cross-section of people. ESTIMATE ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATION WHILE ASKING Q. 17 & 18

17.	Do you happen to have *a private* motor car in your family? COMMERCIAL VEHICLES & EMPLOYERS' CARS ARE "NO". UTILITIES, EXCEPT EMPLOYERS', ARE "YES".	YES .....0 NO 1
18.	Have you a *private* telephone in your home — not a business line? IF *YES*: Would you mind telling me the number (so the office can check my work, if necessary)? RECORD "YES" ONLY IF IN NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED OR OTHER MEMBER OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY.	YES .....0 NO .....1 .....

Economic Classification:

CONSIDER ANSWERS TO 6, 10, 13, 17 & 18 — i.e. TAKE INTO ACCOUNT INCOME, EDUCATION, OCCUPATION, CAR AND PHONE; ALSO HOME AND DEMEANOUR, BUT *NOT* ANSWER TO Q.19.

	Town	*Farm*
Well-to-do (Definitely above middle class)	0	4
Better-off (Down to those who must save for costly luxuries)	1	5

Economic Classification: cont.	*Town*	*Farm*
Artisans, clerks etc. (Relatively few luxuries)	2	6
Lowest income (Poorest group locally)	3	7

19. Would you mind telling me which party or candidate you voted for at the *Senate* election last December.
If *NO VOTE*: Well, which party do you prefer?

ALP 0
DLP or QLP 1
LIBERAL or COUNTRY ... 2
INDEPENDENT ETC 3
COMMUNIST 4
WOULDN'T SAY 5
DIDN'T VOTE 6
INELIGIBLE 7

IF *EVASIVE*, EXPLAIN THAT WE WANT TO STUDY OPINIONS OF LCP & LABOR VOTERS SEPARATELY.

20. Would you mind telling me your *approximate* age please? AGE: .....

21. Sex: MAN ..... 1 WOMAN 2

22a. To help classify answers, would you tell me your religion? IF NOT LISTED, WRITE IT. IF "PROTESTANT", ASK: "Which denomination?"

CHURCH OF ENGLAND 0
CATHOLIC 1
PRESBYTERIAN 2
METHODIST 3
BAPTIST 4
LUTHERAN 5
NO RELIGION 6
WOULDN'T SAY 7
GK. ORTHODOX 8
OTHER 9

IF *MARRIED*, ASK:

22b. And your (wife's) (husband's) religion?

CHURCH OF ENGLAND 0
CATHOLIC 1
PRESBYTERIAN 2
METHODIST 3
BAPTIST 4
LUTHERAN 5
NO RELIGION 6
WOULDN'T SAY 7
GK. ORTHODOX 8
OTHER 9

23. May I have your name (not for publication, but only to show it's a genuine interview)? PLEASE *PRINT*. ASK CHRISTIAN NAME & SURNAME.
M .....
No. .....
Town or Suburb: .....

References

Adams, Francis (1893). *The Australians: A Social Sketch.* London: T. Fisher Unwin.

Alford, Robert R. (1963). *Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies.* Chicago: Rand McNally.

Allingham, John D. (1967). 'Class regression: an aspect of the social stratification process', *American Sociological Review*, 32 (June): 442-9.

Ancich, Mary, Connell, R.W., Fisher, J.A. and Kolff, Maureen (1969a). 'A descriptive bibliography of published research and writing on social stratification in Australia, 1946-67', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, 5 (April): 48-76.

_____ (1969b). 'A descriptive bibliography of published research and writing on social stratification in Australia, 1946-67, Parts III and IV', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, 5 (October): 128-52.

Anderson, D.S. and Western, J.S. (1970). 'Social profiles of students in four professions', *Quarterly Review of Australian Education*, 3/4 (December): 3-28.

Appleyard, R.T. (1970). 'The population'. Pp. 3-15 in A.F. Davies and S. Encel (eds.), *Australian Society: A Sociological Introduction*, 2nd ed., Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire.

Aron, Raymond (1968). *Progress and Disillusion: The Dialectics of Modern Society.* London: Pall Mall Press.

Austin, A.G. (1961). *Australian Education, 1788-1900: Church, State and Public Education in Colonial Australia.* Melbourne: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons.

Australia (1965). *Report of the Committee of Economic Enquiry* (The Vernon Report). 2 vols. Melbourne: Wilke and Co.

_____ (1967). Public Service Board Report 1966-7. Canberra: Government Printer.

_____ (1973). See Australian Bureau of Statistics (1973).

Australian Bureau of Statistics (1967a). *Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia: No. 53.* Canberra: Government Printer.

_____ (1967b). 'Labour Report No. 52'. Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics.

_____ (1968a). *Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia: No. 54.* Canberra: Government Printer.

_____ (1968b). 'Census Bulletin 9.6: Population by Industry and Occupational Status'. Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics.

_____ (1969a). 'Schools 1969'. Ref. No. 13.5. Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics.

_____ (1969b). 'University Statistics, 1969: Part 1. Students and degrees conferred'. Ref. No. 13.7. Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics.

_____ (1973). 'Income Distribution 1968-69: Part 1'. Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics.

Barcan, Allan (1954-5). 'The development of the Australian middle class', *Past and Present*, No. 8: 64-77.

Barnes, John Arundel (1954). 'Class and committees in a Norwegian island parish', *Human Relations*, 7 (Feb-

ruary):39-58.

Bennett, Graham (1967): 'The academic qualifications of Australian executives', *Rydge's*, May: 8-10.

Bentley, Philip, Collins, D.J. and Drane, N.T. (1973). 'The incidence of the Australian tax structure'. Macquarie University School of Economic and Financial Studies, Research Paper No. 34.

Beteille, Andre (ed.) (1969). *Social Inequality*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Blau, Peter M. and Duncan, Otis Dudley (1967). *The American Occupational Structure.* New York: Wiley.

Bollen, J.D. (1960-1). 'The temperance movement and the Liberal party in New South Wales politics, 1900-1904', *Journal of Religious History,* 1:160-82.

Borrie, W.D. (assisted by D.R.G. Packer). (1954). *Italians and Germans in Australia: A Study of Assimilation.* Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire.

_____ (1975). *Population and Australia: A Demographic Analysis and Projection.* First Report of the National Population Inquiry: Vol. 1. Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service.

Bottomore, T.B. (1965). *Classes in Modern Society.* London: George Allen and Unwin.

_____ (1971). 'Class structure and social consciousness'. Pp. 49-64 in Istvan Meszaros (ed.), *Aspects of History and Class Consciousness.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Brady, E.J. (1890). 'The clerk and the capitalist', *The Centennial Magazine*, 3 (September):93-6.

Broom, Leonard (1959). 'Social differentiation and stratification'. Pp. 429-41 in Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr (eds.), *Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects.* New York: Basic Books.

_____ and Hill, Richard J. (1965). 'Opinion and social rank in Australia', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, 1 (October):97-106.

_____ and Jones, F. Lancaster (1969a). 'Father-to-son mobility: Australia in comparative perspective', *American Journal of Sociology*, 74 (January): 333-42.

_____ and _____ (1969b). 'Career mobility in three societies: Australia, Italy and the United States', *American Sociological Review,* 34 (October): 650-8.

_____ and _____ (1970). 'Status consistency and political preference: the Australian case', *American Sociological Review*, 35 (December): 989-1001.

_____ and _____ (1973). *A Blanket a Year.* Canberra: ANU Press.

_____, _____ and Zubrzycki, Jerzy (1965). 'An occupational classification of the Australian workforce', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology,* 1 (October): Supplement.

_____, _____ and _____ (1968). 'Social stratification in Australia'. Pp. 212-33 in John A. Jackson (ed.), *Social Stratification.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____ and Selznick, Philip (1973). *Sociology: A Text with Adapted Readings.* 5th ed. New York: Harper and Row.

Brown, Robert (1971). 'Policy-dependent terms in sociology: the case of "discrimination"', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology,* 7 (October):2-18.

Bryson, Lois and Thompson, Faith (1972). *An Australian Newtown: Life and Leadership in a Working Class Suburb.* Ringwood: Penguin Books Australia.

Butts, R. Freeman (1955). *Assumptions Underlying Australian Education.*

Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research.

Caiden, Gerald E. (1965). *Career Service: An Introduction to the History of Personnel Administration in the Commonwealth Public Service of Australia 1901-1961.* Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Campbell, Ernie W. (1963). *The 60 Rich Families Who Own Australia.* Sydney: Current Book Distributors.

Clark, Colin (1951). *The Conditions of Economic Progress.* 2nd ed. London: Macmillan.

Clarke, George (1970). 'Urban Australia'. Pp. 31-83 in A.F. Davies and S. Encel (eds.), *Australian Society: A Sociological Introduction.* 2nd ed. Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire.

Coghlan, T.A. (1896). *Wealth and Progress of New South Wales, 1894.* Sydney: Government Printer.

Congalton, A.A. (1969). *Status and Prestige in Australia.* Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire.

Crawford, R.M. (1955). 'The Australian national character: myth and reality', *Journal of World History*, 2 (no. 3): 704-27.

Dahrendorf, Ralf (1959). *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

_____ (1964). 'Recent changes in the class structure of European societies', *Daedalus*, 93 (Winter): 225-70.

_____ (1967). *Conflict After Class: New Perspectives on the Theory of Social and Political Conflict.* London: Longmans for the University of Essex.

Davidson, F.G. (1970). 'Technical and manpower trends'. Pp. 260-94 in G.W. Bassett (ed.), *Planning in Australian Education.* Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research.

Davies, A.F. (1967). *Images of Class: An Australian Study.* Sydney: Sydney University Press.

_____ and Encel, S. (eds.) (1965). *Australian Society: A Sociological Introduction.* Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire.

Downing, R.I. (1965). 'Social welfare and public finance'. Pp. 147-71 in Keith Hancock (ed.), *The National Income and Social Welfare.* Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire.

Encel, S. (1959). 'The old school tie in business', *Nation*, 10 (October): 7-9.

_____ (1970). *Equality and Authority: A Study of Class, Status, and Power in Australia.* Melbourne: Cheshire.

Featherman, David L., Jones, F. Lancaster and Hauser, Robert M. (1975). 'Assumptions of social mobility research in U.S.: the case of occupational status', *Social Science Research*, 4: 329-60.

Fitzgerald, R.T. (1967). 'The new secondary school population in Australia', *Quarterly Review of Australian Education*, 1 (Dec.): 1-18.

_____ (1970). *The Secondary School at Sixes and Sevens.* Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research.

Fitzpatrick, B.C. (1941). *The British Empire in Australia: An Economic History.* Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Fogarty, R. (1955). *Catholic Education in Australia 1806-1950.* Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Ford, G.W. (1970). 'Work'. Pp. 84-145 in A.F. Davies and S. Encel (eds.), *Australian Society: A Sociological Introduction.* 2nd ed. Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire.

Forster, Colin (1953). 'Australian manu-

facturing and the war of 1914-18'. *Economic Record*, **29** (November): 211-30.

Ginsberg, Morris (1930). 'Class consciousness'. Pp. 536-8 in Edwin R.A. Seligman (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 3. New York: Macmillan.

Glass, D.V. (ed.) (1954). *Social Mobility in Britain*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Goldthorpe, John H. and Hope, K. (1972). 'Occupational grading and occupational prestige'. Pp. 19-80 in Keith Hope (ed.), *The Analysis of Social Mobility: Methods and Approaches*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gollan, Robin (1960). *Radical and Working Class Politics: A Study of Eastern Australia, 1854-1910*. Canberra: ANU Press.

Gravell, K. (1970). *Professional Incomes in Victoria, June 1969*. Melbourne: University of Melbourne Appointments Board.

Grose, Kelvin (1970). 'Dr Halloran—pioneer convict schoolmaster in New South Wales: a study of his background', *Australian Journal of Education*, **14** (October): 303-24.

Hancock, W. K. (1930). *Australia*. London: Benn.

Hancock, Keith (1971). 'The economics of social welfare in the 1970's'. Pp. 17-40 in Harold Weit (ed.), *Social Welfare in the 1970's*, Sydney: Australian Council of Social Service.

Hauser, Robert M., Koffel, John N., Travis, Harry P. and Dickinson, Peter J. (1974). 'Structural changes in occupational mobility: evidence and hypotheses for the United States'. Madison: University of Wisconsin Center for Demography and Ecology, Working Paper 74-6.

Hazelrigg, L.E. (1974). 'Partitioning structural effects and endogenous mobility processes in the measurement of vertical occupational status change', *Acta Sociologica*, **17** (June): 115-39.

Henderson, Ronald F. (1974). *Poverty in Australia: Interim Report of the Australian Government's Committee of Inquiry into Poverty*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

_____ Harcourt, Alison and Harper, R.J.A. (1970). *People in Poverty: A Melbourne Survey*. Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire.

Hiller, Peter (1975a). 'The nature and social location of everyday conceptions of class', *Sociology*, **9** (January): 1-28.

_____ (1975b). 'Continuities and variations in everyday conceptual components in class', *Sociology*, **9** (May): 255-87.

Hodge, Robert and Treiman, Donald J. (1968). 'Class identification in the United States', *American Journal of Sociology*, **73** (March): 535-47.

Hodge, Robert W., Treiman, Donald J. and Rossi, Peter H. (1966). 'A comparative study of occupational prestige'. Pp. 309-21 in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), *Class, Status and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective*. 2nd ed. New York: The Free Press.

Hollingshead, August B. and Redlich, Frederick C. (1958). *Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study*. New York: Wiley.

Hope, K. (1974). 'Trends in the openness of British society'. Paper presented to the Research Committee on Social Stratification of the International Sociological Association, Warsaw.

Husén, Torsten (ed.) (1967). *International Study of Achievement in Mathematics*. 2 vols. New York: Wiley.

International Labour Office (1972). *The Cost of Social Security. Seventh International Inquiry, 1964-1966.* Geneva: I.L.O.

Jackson, Elton F. and Curtis, Richard F. (1972). 'Effects of vertical mobility and status inconsistency, a body of negative evidence', *American Sociological Review,* **37** (December): 701-13.

Jarvie, I.C. (1972). *Concepts and Society.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Jones, F. Lancaster (1967). 'Australia's changing occupational structure', *Hemisphere,* **11** (February): 2-12.

_____ (1969a). 'Social mobility and industrial society: a thesis re-examined', *Sociological Quarterly,* **10** (Summer): 292-305.

_____ (1969b). *Dimensions of Urban Social Structure: The Social Areas of Melbourne.* Canberra: ANU Press.

_____ (1971a). 'Occupational change in Australia, 1911-66'. *Indian Journal of Sociology,* **2** (September): 123-37.

_____ (1971b). 'Occupational Achievement in Australia and the United States: a comparative path analysis', *American Journal of Sociology,* **77** (November): 527-39.

_____ (1975a). 'The changing shape of the Australian income distribution', *Australian Economic History Review,* **15** (March): 21-34.

_____ (1975b). 'Measures of father-to-son mobility: a liberal or radical criterion of evaluation', *Quality and Quantity,* 9:361-9.

Kahan, Michael and Aitkin, Don (1968). *Drawing a Sample of the Australian Electorate.* Occasional Paper No. 3. Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra.

_____ Butler, D.E., and Stokes, D.E. (1966). 'On the analytical division of social class', *British Journal of Sociology,* **17** (June): 122-32.

Kaim-Caudle, P.R. (1973). *Comparative Social Policy and Social Security: A Ten-Country Study.* London: Martin Robertson and Company.

Karmel, Peter (1971). *Education in South Australia.* Adelaide: Government Printer.

_____ (1973). *Schools in Australia.* Report of the Interim Committee for the Australian Schools Commission. Canberra: Government Printer.

Keating, M. (1973). *The Australian Workforce 1910-11 to 1960-61.* Canbera: Department of Economic History, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.

Knibbs, G.H. (1918). *The Private Wealth of Australia and Its Growth.* Melbourne: McCarron, Bird.

Kolsen, H.M. (1965). 'Social services in review', *Economic Papers,* No. 18 (February): 1-28.

Lipset, Seymour Martin (1963). 'The value patterns of democracy: a case study in comparative analysis', *American Sociological Review,* **28** (August): 515-31.

Lundberg, Ferdinand (1937). *America's 60 Families.* New York: Vanguard.

Lydall, Harold (1968). *The Structure of Earnings.* London: Oxford University Press.

Machonin, Pavel (1970). 'Social stratification in contemporary Czechoslovakia', *American Journal of Sociology,* **75** (March): 725-41.

_____ (ed.) (1969). *Ceskoslovenskā Spolecnost.* Bradislava: Epocha.

McClelland, David C. (1961). *The Achieving Society.* Princeton: Van Nostrand.

Maizels, A. (1957). 'Trends in production and labour productivity in Australian manufacturing industries', *Economic Record*, 33 (August): 162-81.

Martin, Jean I. (1957). 'Marriage, the family, and class'. Pp. 24-53 in A.P. Elkin (ed.), *Marriage and the Family in Australia*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson.

_____ (1970). 'Suburbia: community and network'. Pp. 201-339 in A.F. Davies and S. Encel (eds.), *Australian Society: A Sociological Introduction*. 2nd ed. Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire.

Mathews, R.L. (1970). 'Economic trends relevant to the next two decades in Australia'. Pp. 227-59 in G.W. Bassett (ed.), *Planning in Australian Education*. Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research.

Mētin, Albert (1901). *Le Socialisme Sans Doctrines: La Question Agraire et la Question Ouvriere au Australie et Nouvelle-Zēlande*. Paris: F. Alcan.

Mincer, Jacob (1974). *Schooling, Experience, and Earnings*. New York: Columbia University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Moore, Wibert E. (1966). 'Changes in occupational structures'. Pp. 194-212 in Neil J. Smelser and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), *Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development*. Chicago: Aldine.

Morris, Richard T. and Jeffries, Vincent (1970). 'Class conflict: forget it!', *Sociology and Social Research*, 54 (April): 306-20.

Mosteller, Frederick (1968). 'Association estimation in contingency tables', *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 62 (March): 1-28.

Müller, Walter (1973). 'Family background, education and career mobility'. Pp. 223-56 in Walter Müller and Karl Ulrich Mayer (eds.), *Social Stratification and Career Mobility*. Paris: Mouton.

_____ and Mayer, Karl Ulrich (eds.) (1973). *Social Stratification and Career Mobility*. Paris: Mouton.

National Union of Australian University Students (N.U.A.U.S.) (1969). 'Education Newsletter', No. 4. Melbourne: N.U.A.U.S.

Oeser, O.A. and Emery, F. E. (1954). *Social Structure and Personality in a Rural Community*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

_____ and Hammond, S.B. (1954). *Social Structure and Personality in a City*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Oxley, H.G. (1974). *Mateship in Local Organization: A Study of Egalitarianism, Stratification, Leadership, and Amenities Projects in a Semi-industrial Community of Inland New South Wales*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Parsler, R. (1970). 'Some economic aspects of embourgeoisement in Australia', *Sociology*, 4 (April): 165-79.

_____ (1971). 'Some social aspects of embourgeoisement in Australia', *Sociology*, 5 (January): 95-112.

Partridge, P.H. (1968). *Society, Schools and Progress in Australia*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Podder, N. and Kakwani, N.C. (1973). 'Distribution of wealth in Australia'. Department of Econometrics, University of New South Wales. Mimeo.

Popper, Karl R. (1972) [1934]. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. 3rd English Edition. London: Hutchinson.

Power, Margaret (1974). 'The wages of sex', *Australian Quarterly*, 46 (March): 2-14.

Pratt, J.J. (1966). 'The general pattern of development in Australian education', *Australian Journal of Education*, **10** (October): 206-28.

Price, C.A. (ed.) (1970). *Australian Immigration: A Bibliography and Digest*, No. 2. Department of Demography, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra.

Radford, W.C. (1962). *School Leavers in Australia 1959-60*. Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research.

Rolfe, Hylda A. (1967). *The Controllers: Interlocking Directorates in Large Australian Companies*. Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire.

Roper, Tom (1970). *The Myth of Equality*. North Melbourne: National Union of Australian University Students.

Runciman, W.G. (1968). 'Class, status and power?' Pp. 25-61 in John A. Jackson (ed.), *Social Stratification*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____ (1972) [1966]. *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*. Hammondsworth: Penguin.

Russell, Donald Eric (1970). An Appraisal of the Australian Personal Income Tax 1954-1967. B.Ec. honours Thesis, School of Social Sciences, Flinders University, Adelaide.

Safar, Zdenek (1970). 'Basic data on social differentiation in the Czechoslovak socialist society'. Paper presented to the 7th World Congress of Sociology, Varna, Bulgaria, September 14-19.

Samuelson, Paul A., Hancock, Keith and Wallace, Robert (1975). *Economics: Second Australian Edition*. Sydney: McGraw-Hill.

Segal, David R. and Knoke, David (1971). 'Class inconsistency, status inconsistency and political partisanship in America', *Journal of Politics*, **33** (November): 941-54.

_____, Segal, Mady W. and Knoke, David (1970). 'Status inconsistency and self-evaluation', *Sociometry*, **33** (September): 347-57.

Sewell, William H., Haller, Archibald O. and Ohlendorf, George W. (1970). 'The educational and early occupational attainment process: replication and revision', *American Sociological Review*, **35** (December): 1014-27.

Smolicz, J.J. (1970). 'On educational equality: Part II', *South Australian Education*, **7**: 27-45.

Taft, Ronald (1953). 'The social grading of occupations in Australia', *British Journal of Sociology*, 4 (June): 181-7.

_____ and Walker, Kenneth F. (1958). 'Australia'. Pp. 131-92 in Arnold M. Rose (ed.), *The Institution of Advanced Societies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Touraine, Alain (1974). *The Post-Industrial Society*. London: Wildwood House. Translated by Leonard F.X. Mayhew.

Twopeny, R.E.N. (1883). *Town Life in Australia*. London: Stock.

U.S. Bureau of the Census (1972). *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1972*. 93rd ed. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Ward, John M. (1963). 'Historiography'. Pp. 195-251 in A.L. McLeod (ed.), *The Pattern of Australian Culture*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Ward, Russell (1958). *The Australian Legend*. Melbourne. Oxford University Press.

Warner, W.L., Meeker, Marchia and

Eels, Kenneth (1949). *Social Class in America.* Chicago: Science Research.

Waterman, A.M.C. (1972). *Economic Fluctuations in Australia 1948 to 1964.* Canberra: ANU Press.

Wheelwright, E.L. and Miskelly, Judith (1967). *Anatomy of Australian Manufacturing Industry*. Sydney: The Law Book Company Ltd.

Yasuda, Saburo (1964). 'A methodological inquiry into social mobility', *American Sociological Review*, **29** (February): 16-23.

Zubrzycki, Jerzy (1964). *Settlers of the Latrobe Valley: A Sociological Study of Immigrants in the Brown Coal Industry in Australia.* Canberra: ANU Press.

_____ (1969). 'Migrants and the occupational structure'. Pp. 31-44 in Harold Throssel (ed.), *Ethnic Minorities in Australia: The Welfare of Aborigines and Migrants.* Sydney: Australian Council of Social Service.

Subject Index

Leonard Broom was formerly Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of California, Los Angeles, and Ashbel Smith Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas. He is now Professor of Sociology, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University. He has been editor of the American Sociological Review and a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. He is at present working in the stratification research group of that department, on the tertiary education of Australians in Britain, and on the subject of ethnic minorities.

Frank Lancaster Jones is professor and head of the Department of Sociology, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University. He has written widely on ethnic groups, urban ecology, and social stratification and mobility. He is a former editor of the Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology and assisted the Cities Commission in its report on the results of the Australian Use of Time study.

Jacket Designed by ANU Graphic Design
Printed in Hong Kong