Stephen FitzGerald
China and the World
Dr Stephen FitzGerald is Professorial Fellow in Modern Chinese History, Head of the Department of Far Eastern History and Head of the Contemporary China Centre in The Australian National University. He was formerly a member of the (then) External Affairs Department from which he resigned to enter academic life.

In 1971 he accompanied the then-Leader of the Opposition, E. G. Whitlam, to China and in 1973 he was appointed first Australian ambassador to the People's Republic of China.

During his tour of duty from 1973 to 1976 he established Australia's first embassy in China and has served under both Labor and Liberal ministries.

Dr FitzGerald's knowledge of China and Chinese has greatly enhanced Chinese-Australian understanding. This book achieves a difficult feat of interpretation: to explain, from the Chinese point of view as its author understands it, China's approach to the world outside its own boundaries and the difficulties most western governments experience in coming to terms with China. Against the background of past and contemporary Chinese history Dr FitzGerald builds an analysis of present-day China's approach to other countries of the world: the United States and the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia, Japan, and Australia. He believes there is a stability and a subtle and continuing theme unbroken even by the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution and the overthrow of the 'Gang of Four'.

This book—which embodies the revised ANU Convocation Lectures for 1977, given throughout Australia and broadcast by the ABC, and the 1977 Arthur Yencken Memorial Lectures—is unusually wide in the interest it will attract from 'China Watchers', academics, diplomats, businessmen, students of history and international relations; above all, from those concerned to know and understand China.

A transcript of the questions and answers at the lectures is available from Secretary, Contemporary China Centre, Australian National University, Canberra.

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CHINA AND THE WORLD
To Gough Whitlam

who turned Australia's face
towards the twentieth century world
with appreciation and affection
China and the World

Stephen FitzGerald

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Preface

As an ambassador who had the misfortune to preside over one of the more publicised involuntary 'leaks' in recent Australian diplomatic history, I have approached with usual schooling, and some care, the retreat from the (imagined) privacy of government service to the open enquiry of academia. On the one hand I am conscious of the complications which can ensue from breaches of the confidentiality of what passes between governments, and therefore perhaps more mindful than some of the necessity to protect what one has learnt from a position of confidence. But on the other, I am also aware of how much of what is supposedly confidential finds its way into public view. Unfortunately, this happens usually by 'seepage', by accident, or if by design, often mischievously so. I say unfortunately because much of what is debated within the public service ought to see the light of day, and could do so without damage to Australian governments or their relations with foreign governments. The 'Peking leak', for example, (in which the transcript of the first day's talks between the Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, and the Chinese Premier, Hua Kuo-teng, found its way into the hands of a journalist), while embarrassing at the time, has caused no damage to our relations with China or with any of the other governments named in the transcript or with an interest in what the Australian Prime Minister was talking about in Peking. This kind of thing only 'damages' relations if they are already bad or if someone is looking for a cause. I have no doubt that United States intelligence circles even welcomed this leak as evidence with which to press their point about alleged problems in Australian security, their real (but of course unrelated) point being concern over revelations about the Australian intelligence and
security services and the possible effect on United States interests of the official enquiry into these services then being conducted by Mr Justice Hope.

I am not suggesting that Australia ought to make public the confidential reflections of other governments, and I am certainly not about to divulge everything said to me in confidence by the Chinese Government. But I do believe that the reflections, the preoccupations, the debates and the arguments about international affairs and foreign policy which go on within the public service ought to be brought into the public forum. The public ought to be informed of what is being debated, and involved in the debate. The public service needs the stimulus of public scrutiny, particularly in periods of policy formulation or where policy is effectively being made by the service through its own interpretation of often broad ministerial directives. It is essential also that the public be aware of various entrenched positions, 'lobbies' and pressures which operate in foreign policy formulation, and given an opportunity to express opinions about them.

These lectures contain reflections of some of the major preoccupations and debates about China's foreign relations of the time I spent in Peking as ambassador. There is, of course, much more that might be said about China's foreign relations, and in due course I hope to write further about that question. But this lecture series, given throughout Australia for the Australian National University, is limited in scope. It seemed important to discuss publicly, at the earliest possible opportunity after leaving China, some of the arguments we debated within the Embassy, with our diplomatic colleagues in Peking and with colleagues at home in Canberra and elsewhere in the Australian foreign service. While the lectures contain conjecture, historical reflection and some theories, they are above all an attempt to address the real issues of Chinese foreign policy for those who have to deal with China;
governments, and the people those governments serve. Some of the arguments may seem puzzling to people outside government service, like tilting at straw men. But each is related directly to real and for the most part still unresolved intellectual problems, differences of interpretation or conflicting views within the Australian government service or those of other governments. The arguments are not intended to constitute a political model of Chinese foreign policy; indeed, I have some reservations about the models which have been advanced so far. The difficulty is not so much that they may have been wrong or of little value in predicting the trend of Chinese policy; that is to be expected. The problem is that they tend to 'dehumanise' Chinese politics, they tend to become self-persuasive, and policy-makers tend to become wedded to them as comforting shorthand explanations of a complex political system. I suppose anyone involved in the study of contemporary China is drawn ultimately towards the attempt to make some general theory about Chinese political behaviour and I cannot escape involvement in the attempt myself. But general theories should remain general theories and not become a substitute for sustained intellectual attention to the real problems.

This is not to say that everything in these lectures is 'policy-oriented', or argument about the ephemeral, or the quick reaction of the busy official called upon to provide instant assessment for busy ministers. They also contain some more far-ranging conclusions from my experience of living in China and observing China's foreign relations at first hand. Needless to say, neither the Chinese Government nor the Australian Government is to be held responsible for my views. This being said, I would like to acknowledge that my understanding of Chinese foreign policy would be the poorer without the great benefit of countless meetings and dinners, discussions and arguments I had with Chinese leaders and officials over the three and a half years I spent in
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Peking. I must acknowledge also my great debt to talented young members of the Australian Foreign Service who served with me in the Embassy in Peking. To the extent that there is useful substance in these lectures, it owes much to the combination of expertise, high motivation and enthusiasm of Embassy staff, and the daily intellectual tussles we used to have within the Embassy.

These lectures were my first attempt at some coherent statement about China after my departure from Peking, written during the period of my transition. Each was delivered a number of times, and revised as I went along to take account of points raised by audiences. As they appear here, they are not in all respects identical with the lectures as delivered or as broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting Commission. Having prepared and delivered these lectures 'on the run', as it were, I have now turned my attention to other matters relating to recent Chinese history and my experience in China, on which matters I hope to publish more in due course.

There are so many people I ought to acknowledge by name for their contribution to my own intellectual development or help in other ways during my time in Peking. But I know no one would consider me churlish if I were to express my gratitude elsewhere and here record a tribute only to the man who appointed me—Gough Whitlam, great Australian, memorable Prime Minister, towering figure in Australian history, and the one Australian politician in post-war Australia who understood the world enough to understand what had to be done to make Australia a part of it and what is more got himself into the one position where he was able to to do something about it.

23 August 1977

S. F.
Canberra
I think it no exaggeration that the great majority of governments having important relationships with China do not really understand what the Chinese are about, what motivates their behaviour. They make judgments, of course, about aspects of Chinese behaviour which they perceive to be familiar. But they are all, in some degree, assuming a confidence in the day-to-day decisions which affect their relations with China which I find they do not really have in their assessments of Chinese behaviour. I know of few statesmen or diplomats or other government advisers who are genuinely at ease with their own analyses of Chinese foreign policy (or, for that matter, in their dealings with the Chinese). For the most part, they are skating on the surface of communication, with a very thin and shaky intellectual underpinning to their expressed views. Indeed, I have been fascinated over these last few years in Peking by senior advisers on foreign policy to their respective governments who confess to bewilderment about Chinese thinking or their own inability to get their message across to the Chinese. There is, clearly, a very obvious problem in communication and understanding.

China itself is not exactly petitioning the world to be understood. Chinese leaders and officials are aware of strange thinking about China in the West, since they follow very closely what is said and written about China. They would, I am sure, appreciate greater efforts to understand their society on the part of those who deal with them. But since they have
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patience and a very long view of politics they probably feel time is ultimately on their side; and since they have also acquired a very considerable capacity to understand what we are about even if we don't understand them, they are probably, for the time being and except where major political crises arise from misunderstanding of China's motives, not too agitated about the intellectual difficulties we experience in coming to terms with them.

But the awkward fact is that we, for our part, we who deal with China in this decade, 130 years after the first Opium War, have only the haziest notion of why China behaves as it does—and from this general criticism I do not exclude the attitudes towards China of the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. And given both our perception of China's importance and its potential as a significant actor in world affairs, this is more damaging to us than it is to the Chinese.

This lecture is not, then, a plea for some kind of 'poor, misunderstood China', but an argument for greater self-interested intellectual attention on our part to China and to the attitudes which inform its foreign policy. Still less is this a pretence at oracular understanding. Nothing can be more self-deluding than to pretend in respect of another society that one is the sole receiver of revealed truth. I can claim only to have had a singular opportunity to observe China, in China, and thereby to have discovered how little I know about it; which I suppose—or at least, I hope—is some kind of beginning.

I have made no attempt in these lectures to present a general theory of Chinese foreign policy. In my view, allegedly comprehensive theories have so far made little contribution to the understanding of Chinese foreign policy by, on the one hand, governments which have to meet the challenges and make the responses, or on the other, people, non-specialists who must judge the actions of their governments, or who simply want to understand.
And it is people and governments that matter. I am not against constructing political theory, but I doubt if one can make a valid general theory about Chinese foreign policy. I speak only as an historian and diplomat, about my own subjective perception of Chinese behaviour, and I hope that through my observations I can offer some conclusions which may be of value. I would not, of course, wish to hold the Chinese Government responsible for any of my views.

Over the past three and a half years in China I have been struck, forcibly and increasingly, by what I see as distinctively Chinese aspects of contemporary Chinese society and behaviour. I believe this has always been present. But I also believe that the late Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the late Premier Chou En-lai in their last years turned their minds increasingly to reflection on the experience of fifty years of revolution in China and on the long historical experience of the Chinese people, and were prepared, perhaps more explicitly than previously, to acknowledge the great influence of Chinese history on thinking in contemporary China, both positive and negative. The enormous upsurge in the last ten years in archaeological work, in which both Mao and Chou took a close personal interest, is one striking indication of attention to the Chinese past. The renewed assault in the 1970s on the conservative influence of Confucius in Chinese society is another.

But the Chineseness of post-Liberation society has always been there. The West's problem has been that it failed to see this, largely for what might be called politico-cultural reasons, which I shall come to below. There were some historians who attempted to argue 'continuity' of Chinese society by comparing the forms of traditional and socialist China. But their arguments were often forced and overstated, or else, because they did not stress the communist 'evils' of Communist China, unpopular and unacceptable.
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Western attention tended to turn away from what was Chinese and concentrated on what was new. Discussion of Chinese foreign policy became part of Cold War discussion in the 1950s, and then became determined successively by China’s debates with the Soviet Union, the Chinese doctrine of People’s War, Vietnam, the revolution and now the struggle against the Super Powers. Leaving aside the distractions of senseless political argument about whether or not China was aggressive and expansionist, serious attention to Chinese foreign policy has concentrated on the Marxist-Leninist features, on the revolutionary in Mao’s revolutionary line. But this has created its own distortion. It ignores Chairman Mao’s own interest in China’s past, his belief that Marxism-Leninism must be fitted to the actual conditions prevailing in each country, his injunction to the Chinese people to ‘Let the past serve the present’.

To my mind, in many important ways, and without excluding the great significance of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and Mao’s own enormous contribution, China’s international behaviour is governed by attitudes and ideas which are ineluctably Chinese. I do not mean Confucianist or conservative; and I disagree strongly with the notion that in 1949 there was simply a new ‘dynasty’ in China. 1949 is a watershed in Chinese history which has transformed Chinese politics and society, the social fabric of political, work and human relations, in a fundamental way, and particularly by the introduction of class struggle. But China’s political culture provides a long history of dealing with foreign powers, and offers some alternative views to those which developed in modern Europe and which now dominate the conduct of international relations. China has a new and revolutionary social system. But it is still a Chinese state. The West’s problem is not so much that it cannot
understand socialist China but that it cannot recognise or comprehend distinctively Chinese patterns of behaviour.

Before I go any further, let me say that I am mindful of the trap of arguing that the Chinese require a special effort at understanding because they are, as a race, quite unlike the rest of mankind. Historically, this kind of proposition has been antagonistic and racist, regarding Chinese as somewhat less than human, 'inscrutable' to the point of being both incomprehensible and sinister, or, in the words of that great Australian journal, *The Bulletin*: 'something half-brute and half-human, a grovelling wretch, soaked with opium, degraded by vice, ignorance and superstition, a creature whose very touch would be pollution to the sons and daughters of a free and enlightened race'. (In fairness, that quotation is from the nineteenth century and not from last week's edition.) But there is also another expression of this argument, which sees the Chinese people as more than human, the very embodiment of perfection. This view I find equally unacceptable, and at times, observed in the slavering behaviour of some visitors to China, equally contemptible (as I believe also do Chinese people). Perhaps not contemptible but very stupid is that view which pretends there is no difference at all between ourselves and the Chinese. Unfortunately for both the Chinese and ourselves, China seems to be a country which has always invited such enormous and ignorant generalisations.

The essence of the difference, of course, is cultural and political; and this is the origin of the distinctively Chinese patterns of behaviour which have puzzled and frustrated a great many people who have had to deal with the Chinese Government in recent years.

Whatever they may say in public about frank exchanges, ease of communication and so on, there is no doubt that politicians and diplomats, from
Western countries in particular, find great difficulty in coming to terms with the challenge of sustaining a dynamic political relationship with the Chinese in so far as that involves real dialogue and meaningful exchange. Their private, and sometimes semi-public, complaint is that they cannot really get through to the Chinese, so how can China be taken seriously or dealt with in real political terms or accepted as a significant power in world affairs.

The basis of their complaint is twofold. First, there is the question of talking with China. The Chinese are inflexible, it is said: 'they always say the same thing'. When taxed privately about their apparent lack of interest in stepped-up dialogue with the Chinese, senior United States spokesmen have argued that there is no point, because the Chinese are not really interested in discussing; they have a set presentation on the world situation, and they always respond in these terms. A senior Australian official once complained to me that he could not believe that Chou En-lai could possibly have meant what he said in official discussions with Prime Minister Whitlam in 1973; and another told a foreign ambassador after Prime Minister Fraser's visit to China last year that the Chinese never had anything to say.

Second, there is complaint about China's behaviour; and here I am not talking about the old argument about whether or not China is aggressive or expansionist (which incidentally no longer seems to bother too many people in the Western world who not so long ago found this a key issue in foreign policy debate). It is a question of the Chinese not behaving 'like us'. I have had it put to me, for example, and by senior diplomats from foreign governments, that the Chinese don't speak our kind of language and until they learn to do so they cannot expect to be taken seriously as a member of the international community. By this is meant that they
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don't address problems in the manner of the pre­
vailing Western international system, or use its
strategic and political concepts and its vocabulary,
that they don't act in ways familiar or predictable to
us.

The problem people experience in dealing with
China is epitomised by Western reactions to Chinese
idiom. Time and again in Peking I was asked why on
earth the Chinese used such 'quaint' language in
talking about international problems—'Flowers fall
off, do what one may', 'Great Disorder under
Heaven' and so on. I found in the end it was neces­
sary to compile a glossary of Chinese idioms in an
attempt to give some basic cultural and political
context to these otherwise apparently inexplicable
utterances.

Given this very obvious difficulty people have with
China, one has to ask, of course, who should bear the
responsibility for bridging the gap. In my view, the
onus lies equally with the Chinese and with
ourselves. But the difference is that while the
Chinese response has been to try to understand the
West without necessarily accepting its standards,
most Western approaches eschew proper under­
standing of China while demanding Chinese accom­
modation to our standards of thought and behaviour.
On balance, over the years, the Chinese have tended
to accept far more of the Western position than we
have of theirs—which leaves us, I believe, with the
major responsibility. Unless, of course, one accepts
the view current in some official Australian circles
that China must be 'demythologised'—which appears
to mean that China is no different from any other
country, that it holds no mystery, requires no
awareness of its cultural background, and hence is
best dealt with in the same way as, presumably, New
Zealand, Japan, Tanzania or the Soviet Union.
In my view, nothing could be more
simple-minded. Between the unification of China in
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the third century B.C. and the creation of something vaguely resembling a Chinese foreign ministry in the nineteenth century there was an interval of just over two thousand years, two thousand years in which China was a distinct and continuous politico-cultural entity, interacting with neighbouring peoples and cultures. This was a world unto itself, in which Europe had no part. It was a complete international system. For most of the time, China was a Super Power in this system. Not surprisingly, since they were also the inventors of bureaucracy, the Chinese had a long experience in diplomacy, in the conduct of foreign relations. But their concepts and attitudes were not those of Europe, or at least of nineteenth century Europe on which our present international system is based. Today’s Chinese are the legatees of a civilisation, in the height, breadth and excellence of its creativity not inferior to Europe, but excelling Europe in cultural continuity and cohesion. They are the legatees also of a world in which China, as the dominant power, determined the rules for the conduct of international relations.

To dismiss, as some do, the concept of the Middle Kingdom as some quaint ethnocentric pretension from a bygone era is to deny the importance of a political culture whose contribution to mankind has been at least as great as that of the whole of Europe (and also to overlook our own ethnocentricity). The Chinese recognise the great European contribution. They could hardly fail to do so in the face of the overwhelming weight of westernisation in today’s world. And they have tried in various ways, not always successful, to comprehend it and accommodate to it. But in the West particularly, and here again I include the Soviet Union, there is among politicians and their advisers such a tendency to assume a ‘natural’ superiority and excellence of the ideas and systems the West has evolved that they fail to perceive the excellence of China’s politico-culture
and hence do not acknowledge a need to understand it. This is the ultimate intellectual poverty of the thesis of 'demythologising' China. It is the origin of the idea that the Chinese ought, naturally, to conform to standards of conduct which they themselves had no part in shaping. This idea does not belong exclusively to any 'political' bias in the Left/Right spectrum of Western societies, or, for that matter, of China; Chiang Kai-shek complained of having the same problem with his Western friends. Nor is it exactly a strictly 'imperialist' problem, in that this kind of thinking is clearly manifest also in some small countries whose behaviour and outlook is anything but imperialist, including in some of China's Third World neighbours. It probably owes something to old European ideas about the mystery of China, and to the apparent self-containment of Chinese culture which has fascinated and daunted outsiders for so long. This is understandable, but for policy-makers and diplomats it is not excusable.

Let us take a look, then, at a number of manifestations of Chinese behaviour; at the process of erecting a cosmology or World View; at some concepts governing the conduct of relations in a world of less than equals; at the use of language; and at practices in diplomacy which seem to derive from what might be called 'the Chinese character'.

The Chinese first developed a cosmological approach to foreign affairs about two thousand years ago. It was, of course, conservative by the standards of the present Chinese Government, and appropriately simple to the relatively uncomplex system of that time. It also assumed a central role for China, the Middle Kingdom, an assumption which has been grossly overinterpreted in the West (which has itself had similar phenomena in large and powerful countries of both the Old World and the New). The evolution and the application of this cosmology deserve our closer attention; but my point here is
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simply that Chinese have been accustomed for about two millennia to approach world affairs in terms of a set and often inflexible general statement, an overview, strongly determined, moreover, by political/moral values. What actually happened in the world known to China was always read in terms of this constructed World View; each piece was slotted in to the general overview. There was also, in the moral content of the cosmology a kind of dynamic, by which was measured change in relationships between societies and in the overall balance of world forces, as well as the advance or retreat of Right. This latter, of course, was centred upon the Chinese Emperor (in effect, the Chinese Government). Harmony or otherwise in established relations with foreign peoples was one product and also one barometer of the Chinese Emperor's 'virtue' (tê) and of the legitimacy of his continuing mandate.

When it came to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, one reason why the Chinese had difficulty in coping with the arrival of importunate Westerners was that the West, largely unknown and its civilisation unappreciated, could not be fitted into this now rigidified cosmology in the terms demanded by the West. The West's importunities were an affront to the Emperor, which, by the disturbance they created, called question upon the Emperor's virtue; that is, upon his ability and therefore his mandate to conduct not only foreign affairs but the affairs of his own country. The harbingers of European imperialism, for their part, did not or would not comprehend; and thus began the unfortunate confrontation between these two vastly different ideas of how a world ought to be managed.

The practice of Marxism-Leninism requires of its practitioners what is called a 'scientific' analysis of the state of the world, a coherent and all-embracing world view. In this *weltenschaung* is contained an analysis of the condition of the world's contending
forces and a statement of the major contradictions, judged by Marxist-Leninist beliefs, and against which is measured the progress of countries and peoples. The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, although espousing an ideology in direct revolutionary refutation of that which sustained the old Chinese Empire, as Chinese, could not have been unfamiliar with this kind of 'methodological' approach to international affairs. As Marxist-Leninists, of course, they would not necessarily see it in this way and would argue that the scientific method is a function of ideology and could not derive from the ideas of the former feudal ruling class. But when Chinese leaders today engage in discussion about world affairs with foreigners they are in my view using a form of presentation which is, perhaps unconsciously, as much Chinese as Marxist-Leninist. A formal exchange of views with a foreign leader always involves, on the Chinese side, an extended general statement of the Chinese World View, which with Western leaders at least varies little from one to another, and in substance is quite predictable for anyone hearing such presentations at fairly frequent intervals.

Western representatives find this difficult precisely because it does always follow a set pattern, both in fundamental analysis of the world situation as well as in treatment of each major, and minor, world issue. I believe it is the case also that with one or two prominent world figures the Chinese presentation has been disliked not, as they would claim, because 'the Chinese always say the same thing', but because it is extremely difficult to score points against. A showy intellect cannot shine in such company. For the Chinese World View, as a format in discussion, has immense advantages to the Chinese of cohesion and consistency—from one meeting to another and from top to bottom in the Chinese Government. Slips of the tongue almost never occur and even
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someone dealing with an unfamiliar subject always has a framework to fall back on. There is also the advantage to the Chinese that if you begin with an attempt to see clearly the world as it is, and only then fit your own country into it you are less likely to arrive at distortions of your own position, power, influence, and even interests, than if you begin as we do, with your own country, and define the world in terms of your own relations with each segment of it.

Now it might seem that what I have described is no more than a familiar feature of the practice of governments which have a Marxist-Leninist ideological base. I agree it is familiar, up to a point, and I do not wish to suggest the Chineseness of Peking's behaviour is somehow unadulterated or absolute. Clearly, the Chinese have adopted much from other cultures and political philosophies. But I think that in the case of the Chinese there is a more deep-rooted cultural consciousness which gives to their acceptance of the Marxist-Leninist framework a character which is unlike that of other socialist countries and very different indeed from the Soviet Union. Perhaps the difference is expressed by Chairman Mao's dictum 'Let foreign things serve China', by which the foreign is adapted and absorbed into the Chinese. Certainly, among visitors to Peking and among my diplomatic colleagues there I found it was almost universally felt that there was something peculiarly Chinese about this approach of the Chinese Government, even if they could not explain or define it. In China, we are most decidedly not dealing with a reflection of the Soviet Union.

There is no point in us saying the Chinese ought not to approach the world this way or conduct dialogue with foreigners like this. And in fact, so long as we can see their motivation, and recognise their cultural and political impulses, it is more than possible to have a meaningful dialogue with the Chinese, on their terms. Their approach is in some ways no
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less effective a means of communication than ours. It is an extremely reliable guide to Chinese views. By its very nature it has to maintain consistency, both over time and in relation to the actual conduct of China's foreign relations, and therefore is not normally subject to sudden volte face. Moreover, because essential points of the World View have to be expressed in the same language every time, it is possible to detect or anticipate changes in policy through slight verbal modifications to established patterns of expression. I find also that the formal presentation of Chinese views in private talks usually conceals far less of what they really think than many people believe.

But it is not all the Chinese have to say and this is a point of some importance. Chinese spokesmen will often content themselves with a statement of 'the Chinese view', without elaboration, sometimes simply repeated, not departing from the brief. This is taken variously as a sign of inflexibility, poverty of ideas, inability to communicate or even stupidity. It is none of these. It is that characteristic of Chinese people often described as 'inscrutability'; it is a sense of time and patience, it is a sense of good tactics, it is treating each verbal encounter as a kind of guerrilla engagement in which you wait for the opposing side to move first and for him to make the mistakes. And I suppose overlaying all this there must be some sense of wariness in dealing with Westerners on the part of a people who have experienced a century and more of betrayal by the West.

But the Chinese are by no means unwilling to go further, to enlarge on their view, to deal with the specific, if their interlocutors understand what is happening and learn how to play the game. At high level, this requires patience and sustained intellectual effort; and it is unfortunate indeed that some strategically-placed people have apparently tired so quickly of this effort. I believe this to have been the
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case with Dr Henry Kissinger, who seems to have lost interest after Chou En-lai's illness prevented him from taking part in the Kissinger talks in Peking. In daily diplomatic dealings, certainly, it is perfectly possible to have quite straightforward and informative discussions on world problems. I acknowledge that bridging cultural gaps can be difficult and frustrating. But talking to the Chinese is not such a problem provided we do not demand that they talk like us all the time; and if we are to make that concession we have to go at least half way towards understanding why they present their views in the way they do. At the moment, I find the tendency of many people who talk to the Chinese is to switch off when the Chinese talk about their general World View or, when they do get away from the general brief into more detailed discussion, to suspect concealment or hidden motives.

There is nothing mysterious about the Chinese World View itself. It is just that, as the analytical base of Chinese foreign policy, it is the best demonstration that the way we look at China ought to take account of what is Chinese in this policy as much as of the other, often inappropriate, models we have used since 1949. Before turning to some other features of Chinese behaviour I should like to elaborate on two points which are of interest in this context.

The modern Chinese World View, developed by Chairman Mao in his lifetime, underwent considerable adjustment in the 1960s to take account of changes in the earth's political crust. In its present form it sees the world in three tiers. First, there are the two Super Powers, the world's biggest international oppressors and exploiters; they are the imperialists and the hegemonists. They are said to be both colluding and contending in their efforts to control the world. The danger of a new world war comes from them, but mainly now from the Soviet
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Union. The Second World comprises the rest of the developed world. It is said to oppress and exploit the Third World, but to share with the Third World in the struggle against the Super Powers. Australia is regarded by China as a Second World country. The Third World, in which category the Chinese place themselves, is the developing world, subject to oppression and exploitation, struggling against imperialism and hegemonism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. Chinese will agree that there are borderline cases between the Second and Third Worlds and that by straight Rich/Poor criteria not every country fits a single definition.

What almost all observers of the Chinese scene failed to see was the profound importance of this revised Chinese World View in liberating Chinese thinking about the modern world, in freeing Chinese foreign policy from the strictures of doctrinal definitions. I believe Chairman Mao had always felt uncomfortable in the alliance with the Soviet Union and the strict alignment with the Socialist Camp; but it served a practical purpose for a time. When he developed this three-tier view of the world he gave China the greatest possible scope for flexibility and the pursuit of a 'non-ideological' foreign policy through the development of relations with states and governments as distinct from movements and parties. The competition of a communist state against capitalist states was no longer the main theoretical determinant. This enabled China to identify most closely with the developing countries of the Third World, whatever their political complexion. It also facilitated a much easier, non-competitive relationship with advanced capitalist states. We have tended to see this shift in the Chinese World View as no more than a response to the breakup of the Soviet camp, a rationalisation for new patterns of foreign relations forced upon China. I think it is far more dynamic; and we ought to have perceived long ago
that the Chinese quite deliberately were dissociating themselves from Soviet ideas about competition for world influence or domination. Had we understood this, we might have come much earlier to accept that the Chinese were not about aggression or expansion or even the forcible projection of Chinese communism. There was already enough other evidence of this, but some people still used to argue that Chinese doctrine demanded the establishment, by force, of Chinese-style communism throughout the world; Mao’s new formulation leaves no doubt that this is not called for, even by Chinese doctrine. A favourite Chinese phrase in this presentation of their World View is ‘The situation is excellent’. Interestingly, when asked what they mean by this, the Chinese illustrate their meaning with the observation that more than eighty countries have become independent since World War II; and China, of course, has diplomatic relations with most of these, from Vietnam to post-Allende Chile, as also with the countries of the Second World.

What I find interesting about this World View in relation to traditional Chinese views is that it not only recognises existing inequality between states but sees this inequality as a function of the international system. It starts from the premise that states are now unequal and that there are gradations of inequality. It does not pretend, as we do, that there is equality between nation states. The Chinese may conform in practice to conventions necessary to the conduct of diplomacy which are based on the idea of full sovereignty and equal status between governments. But they are cynical about the reality.

Lenin also had such a view about inequality. But so also did the traditional Chinese World View acknowledge that ‘states’ in the Chinese world were not equal. The big difference, of course, was that the traditional Chinese view sought to maintain the in-
equality, the ascendancy of China over its neighbours; whereas the modern view holds that the state of inequality can and must be challenged—the Super Powers must not be allowed to get away with it. But I think it is important that over a very long period of history Chinese have been accustomed to think about the problems of international politics in terms of very real differences in the relative size and power and cultural sustenance of different countries. They had no false notions of equality and hence had to devise ways of handling superior/inferior relationships and to have some appreciation of the views of lesser states, weaker governments.

I reiterate that I do not think the present Chinese Government has the same viewpoint, or stand, as traditional Chinese governments; the Middle Kingdom, or the centre of the world, is not their way of looking at China in relation to the international situation (except in so far as, like most governments, they tend ultimately to be more preoccupied with their own domestic affairs). But I do believe that with their awareness of the past they derive some sense of how the affairs of the world might or ought to be conducted in a world where states are demonstrably so unequal.

This is seen clearly in the Chinese attitude to the rights, the obligations and the influence of large powers in relation to smaller powers.

China says it will never be a Super Power. What the Chinese mean by this is not economic might or the acquisition of military hardware. Their definition is one of behaviour. What they condemn about the United States and the Soviet Union is not the fact of their power but what they do with it or what they aim to do by increasing it. The Chinese did not, in earlier versions of their World View, deny the possibility of one or more countries playing a positive leading role in world affairs (in that case, the Soviet Union); and in their own case, they argue that when China
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becomes economically developed it should be able to make 'a comparatively big contribution to mankind'. But what they argue is that a government only has a right to a leading role if its behaviour is acceptable, and not by virtue of its material might. In this view, the American and Russian Governments do not have a right to exercise world leadership, because of their behaviour. The Chinese have even argued on this point that China itself can only have a world role if its government remains socialist, and that if it should turn 'revisionist' and become a Super Power, 'acting the tyrant in the world', the world's people are entitled to join with the Chinese people in overthrowing such a government.

Without forcing the historical analogy where it does not fit, I think it can be said that this idea of the right of a government to leadership being measured by behaviour does have some echoes of traditional Chinese political theory about the virtue or morality of Chinese governments determining the right to a leading world role. Certainly, it helps to explain Chinese protestations about never becoming a Super Power. We may object that there is a question about who has the right to decide what is moral behaviour on the part of the Super Powers. But it is interesting that the Chinese direct their criticism at both Super Powers, whose societies we tend to regard as political opposites, and in both cases their argument is about the record of external behaviour—and is not without foundation.

It follows from the idea of the 'right' to leadership that a power in such a position has obligations to its weaker associates. In the traditional Chinese tributary system there was a strong element of obligation on the part of China, even if China was not always able to assume its obligations. Again, I find echoes of this in present Chinese ideas, although I hasten to point out that I do not mean the forms of tributary relationships and Chinese suzerainty. I think the
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theory of obligations also illuminates one apparent contradiction in Chinese foreign policy, in its attitude to the United States. China continues to say the US is an oppressor and exploiter and one of the two main potential sources of world war. But it also approves United States alliances and urges both the US and its allies to strengthen these alliances. What the Chinese seem to be saying is that by its imperialist behaviour the United States really has no right to a leading role, but that its power leads it to assume such a role, and this carries obligations which it ought to fulfil. This is particularly evident in what the Chinese have to say about the United States obligations to Western Europe. In China's own conduct, it is very clear that the Chinese have carefully avoided claiming leadership of the world or the Third World or any part of it. To do so would, in their view (and even assuming they thought it would be acceptable) involve impossible obligations (for example, to supply Pakistan with nuclear weapons following the Indian nuclear test—a proposal the Chinese would not entertain).

Together with the rights and obligations, the Chinese also have views about the way in which a leading power ought to exercise its influence. I know we can point to examples of Chinese embroilment in wars with neighbouring peoples over the centuries, but the theory, and in large part the practice, of the direct extension of Chinese influence in history has not been military but a process for which Western historians have used the term acculturation; the diffusion, if you like, of Chinese culture to an extent that ultimately brings foreign peoples into the orbit of Chinese civilisation, sometimes directly but also in a less embracing influence beyond the immediate jurisdiction of China. I do not believe the present Chinese leadership has the slightest intention of absorbing neighbouring peoples by any means, military, economic or cultural. But I do believe that they see the exercise of Chinese influence in this region
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and in the world as being a process of projection of contemporary Chinese culture, including political culture, not forcibly but by the attraction of the example, the Chinese model. This is how we ought to see the role of Marxism-Leninism Mao Tse-tung Thought in Chinese foreign policy.

I emphasise that I do not see these parallels as absolute. China is pre-eminently a modern state. China is as much a part of the modern world as we are, and subject to its influence. But it would be surprising indeed if in this as in other matters Chairman Mao and his colleagues had not been guided by Mao's own exhortation to 'let the past serve the present', whether by acknowledging the traditional origins of contemporary ideas or by scientific examination and selective use of ideas from the Chinese past.

I come now to the question of language. There is no doubt that the Chinese are uncompromising in their verbal expression, whether in the often stilted political vocabulary which readers of the Peking Review complain about, or in the use of literary and historical allusions drawn from their own culture, or in their refusal to take up the idiom of the West (as the Russians do) to make themselves sound more plausible. Chou En-lai's great brilliance in handling foreigners was his ability to persuade by the force of his personality without abandoning the Chinese idiom, to make people think he was speaking their language.

The Peking Review is really a minor problem. It is a problem partly of poor rendering into English, and partly of the high incidence of political terms which by repetition may become indigestible but which are themselves easily comprehensible. I am pleased to notice also that a recent article in the People's Daily has condemned the deposed 'Gang of Four', who controlled the Chinese media for almost a decade,
for inhibiting the development of a lively style and expression in Chinese publications.

The fact remains that Chinese expression is seen as a barrier to understanding and in itself becomes matter for hot debate. I have heard it argued in Peking, for example, that the Chinese make themselves ridiculous by using the English term 'hegemonism' to translate a Chinese term, which they use to describe Soviet ambitions; and by people who do not understand Chinese or the origin of the Chinese word for this term. A large part of our problem is that not only do few non-Chinese speak Chinese, but that the culture, the history and the literature of China are not familiar in our societies even in translation. We are the prisoners of our education systems and Chinese culture is not part of our intellectual equipment; we have no ready frame of reference. I agree that the Chinese might do more to recognise this intellectual imprisonment. But I think it is also valuable for us to try to understand the Chinese in their own terms rather than in ours. To attempt to force them into the latter can lead us into serious miscalculation of the kind which says 'They must mean what they say because they talk so much like us'. I know it is difficult for many foreigners to understand why Chinese leaders don't adapt, if they have witnessed adaptability in the Overseas Chinese or the Kuomintang. But those examples provide their own answer; for this generation of Chinese leaders is strongly rooted in China itself, not dependent on foreign powers, and their expression is the language of the culture they represent, both past and present.

I have found in some who deal with the Chinese a related problem, a tendency to write off Chinese views in the mistaken belief that they know nothing about the outside world. I am not talking of those people who argue that because it's not in the People's Daily no one in China knows it's happened. But
there is a view which maintains that the stereotype Chinese World View and the uncompromising use of language indicate that the Chinese are quite out of touch with reality. The Chinese may have their weak spots, certainly, but I make no other comment at this stage on this view than that it would be very unwise indeed for governments to frame their policy on such an assumption.

The other general problem we seem to experience in dealing with the Chinese is in the area of China's diplomatic style. I do not mean protocol or correct behaviour but the practice of diplomacy, both strategically and tactically. I have sometimes referred to this as a kind of 'guerrilla diplomacy', but it seems to me there is also something beyond the recognisable parallels with the conduct of guerrilla warfare in the feints and the surprises and the shadow boxing which seems to characterise China's handling of difficult, complex relationships. The Chinese can be extremely blunt, but they can also be patient, oblique, subtle and elusive in ways which are recognisably 'Chinese', difficult to define except in terms of the Chinese cultural background. A Western diplomat may be all of these things; but we are still inclined to approach international relations in legalistic terms, demanding definitions, public formulae, exact solutions based on treaties and conventions and charters and formal precedents in the conduct of relations between the 'civilised' states who evolved these forms. The Chinese do not reject these forms, because they have to live with them and they are not without such things in their own history. But equally, they have a tradition in which solutions could be arrived at indirectly, important matters left unspoken, realities officially accepted which did not accord with formal official policies, and even the forms of tribute observed when the Empire was helplessly weak. There is something in this of what is known as 'face', not in the more debased sense of this
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word but in both a passive and dynamic way as a mechanism in the manoeuvring of diplomatic shadow play. This is not unique in China, of course, but I think the Chinese have it more, and more consistently, because outstanding among all Asian societies the leadership in China has abandoned itself least to ready acceptance of Western modes of behaviour.

This approach to diplomacy has its limitations, because the subtlety can be effective only if the other side understands what is going on. It is not surprising that we can see it operating most in China’s relations with Japan; and that in some other notable examples, for example the United States, the other side has failed even to see the message let alone understand it.

In this context, I think the Chinese concept of time deserves special attention. Partly because of the very length of their civilisation and partly because of cyclical views of history, the Chinese have a very different view of time from ours. They have enormous patience; they waited almost a generation to be admitted to the United Nations, on their terms. And they have a way of relating past and future with the present which gives greater political significance to long past events and the expectations of the future than we do. The warning for us, in the Western World, is that the Chinese also have long memories.

The sum of the problems I have mentioned in this lecture suggests a reasonably formidable barrier to communication, and to balance it we must recognise that governments do communicate with the Chinese Government, business is conducted, agreements are reached, conflicts are avoided—even between China and the Soviet Union. Why, then, bother so much about the Chinese difference? I would argue that we ought to bother. First, because we need a far more effective basis for analysing Chinese foreign policy. It is certainly the case that the ‘Chinese’ compulsions have received far less attention than they might and
in my own opinion they are far more important than has been thought. I do not believe we can properly evaluate the specific problems in China’s foreign relations, or governments effectively meet them, if we, and they, do not recognise this point. And secondly, the fact remains that there is still a very significant gap in communication, that Chinese efforts to meet us half-way have not been matched by comparable efforts on our part, and that governments which do not make the effort or simply miss the point will encounter problems in their relations with China. We have tended to have very flat images of China; it is either one thing or the other. As China grows in influence in the last part of this century I hope we can develop a more rounded image, one that is not unconscious of any of the components which go to make up China’s world outlook, and one in which the political culture of a people who inherit a longer political history than any other has an important and distinguishing part.
The difference between the United States and the Soviet Union in their approaches to China in the recent past is that the United States has believed it is playing a clever and hard-headed game which has in fact already led it into several blunders, whereas the apparent blunders of the Soviet Union are in fact calculated moves in a clever and hard-headed policy to outmanoeuvre both the Chinese and the Americans. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are heavy-handed and bring to the conduct of their relations with China what I would call Super Power mentality. Both have a history of trying to put the Chinese down, both have been mistaken in their calculation that this could be done, both have shown a great capacity to misread the Chinese and both have shown considerable clumsiness in their handling of China policy. It may seem surprising that two such countries which had a long history of involvement in the affairs of modern China should have been so unsuccessful in their dealings with the new Chinese state which emerged in 1949. Perhaps it is a characteristic of Super Power mentality. Perhaps also it is a proof of the paternalism and the conviction of cultural superiority which informed their involvement in China in the years before 1949.

I find it difficult to discern whether one understands China better than the other. Sometimes I think the Russians have a better appreciation of Chinese politics and culture, and are more cynical in their application of this appreciation. The Americans have a lot of idealistic notions and a great capacity for
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self-delusion in respect of China. But I think that if one were to ask ordinary Chinese people, they would give the Americans the edge over the Russians in the matter of understanding their country.

I am not about to argue that the Chinese Government itself is not capable of making miscalculations and blunders. It has, and it does. But the fact is that for the past twenty-eight years, China has been on the receiving end of Super Power attentions, economically and militarily inferior to them, wanting their co-operation but meeting instead attempts to impose on them and prolonged periods of hostility and military threat from both, when China could not conceivably have been a threat to either.

The Chinese Government takes an intense interest in the global activities of the Super Powers and their relations with each other. It follows in the greatest of detail what foreign statesmen and commentators have to say about them. They are a central preoccupation in Chinese thinking about the world. Chinese interest in Europe is primarily a function of their interest in the Super Powers. The same is true at least at one level of their interest in Japan, although Japan is a special case which I will be dealing with separately.

China's own relations with the Super Powers are themselves a matter of intense interest to the world as well as to the Chinese. Even those sceptics who argue that China itself cannot in any sense be considered a major power seem to concede that the state of China's relations with these powers is important in global affairs. My interest, in this lecture, is in the practical issues in these relationships, rather more than in Chinese theory as expressed in their analysis of the state of the world. But the Chinese theory is a determinant in Chinese policy and I think deserves more serious attention as a sober analysis of the world than it often gets. I should say that I am personally inclined to agree with the broad outline of
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the Chinese analysis, which I think reflects one reality of current world politics. I shall begin, therefore, with some remarks about the Super Powers in China's cosmology.

The Chinese World View holds that the major contradiction in the world is between the two Super Powers and the rest; the rest being both the developing and the developed world, the Third and Second Worlds in Mao's three-tier analysis. These two powers are seen as the main source of tension and from them comes the main danger of war. Unlike the traditional Chinese view, in which the responsibility for moral or virtuous behaviour for the good of the whole world rested with the centre, the Chinese Super Power and the person of the Chinese Emperor, in the contemporary Chinese view this responsibility lies with the rest of the world, the nations and peoples who in varying degrees suffer from the exploitation and oppression of the Super Powers. 'Super Power' in the Chinese lexicon is not a factual statement of relative superiority in economic and military might. It carries a moral judgment about unacceptable behaviour.

At this point I ought to attempt some explanation of the Chinese use of the word hegemony or hegemomism to describe the ambition or behaviour of the Super Powers, particularly the Soviet Union. This word was first introduced into the vocabulary of international politics by the Chinese about five years ago and it had, initially, a general application which others did not find objectionable. The United States, for example, committed itself to anti-hegemonism in the Shanghai Communiqué; and so also did Australia in the joint press communiqué following Mr Whitlam's visit in 1973. It became apparent, however, that in the Chinese view the term was applied fairly specifically to the behaviour of the two Super Powers, and more particularly to the Soviet Union. In certain contexts it is a synonym for the Soviet...
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Union, and it is this consideration which has prompted the Japanese Government to baulk at including a clause against hegemonism in the proposed Peace and Friendship Treaty with China.

The derivation, in Chinese usage, is not exactly the same as with the Greek origin of the English term. But the Chinese have chosen this term to translate a Chinese word, *ba*, an ancient Chinese term which means usurpation or the unlawful exercise of power and influence and domination. When the Chinese accuse the Super Powers of hegemonism they mean the improper exercise of influence or control over other countries, by might and not right, with no 'legal' or agreed sanction even in the accepted principles supposedly governing behaviour between states in the Western international order. The use of this term is important, I think, in conveying what the Chinese are getting at in their fulminations against the Super Powers. It is not just the open acts of military force, intervention and control they condemn, but the misuse or abuse of their power and position, in less obvious ways, ways which promote and sustain their dominant influence over the affairs of mankind.

The struggle against the Super Powers is the dynamic in the international system. But the two Super Powers are not only oppressing and exploiting others; there is also a dynamic relationship between them which the Chinese characterise as 'collusion and contention'. It is in this latter context that some more specific questions of Chinese policy arise.

Collusion between the Super Powers means those acts of exclusive co-operation between the two which tend not only to secure a permanent military superiority over the rest of the world but also directly and indirectly to confine, limit and reduce the sovereignty and independence of the rest of the world. The Chinese argue that the two Super Powers have a habit of getting together to make agreements
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which are fundamentally best suited to their interests, but which they then present in terms of the interests of the whole world. Having done so they then call on the rest of the world to endorse what they have done and express displeasure at those who refuse. It is in this light that the Chinese view the Test Ban Treaty and Non-proliferation. 'Why', they ask, quoting an old Chinese aphorism, 'should the magistrates be allowed to burn down houses when the people cannot even light fires.' The Chinese do not oppose the principle of a total test ban and the complete prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons, an objective they have publicly espoused. But for the Super Powers to demand that others forgo the decision to develop nuclear weapons is to demand compliance in securing their permanent nuclear domination or monopoly.

Similar considerations govern the Chinese attitude towards SALT, Helsinki, and other manifestations of détente between the Super Powers. Their opposition to détente is not, in my view, total. They are practical and realistic, and understand that there must be some communication between Russia and the United States to facilitate intercourse and reduce the possibility of miscalculation. But they oppose what might be called the objectionable aspects of détente, which they would see as predominant. This means, first, the extent to which the process of détente has drawn the Soviet Union and the United States into a cosier relationship which nurtures their belief in their special, almost ordained, 'responsibility' for the security of the world and hence engenders further agreements which they work out to suit themselves and then try to sell to the world as of great benefit for mankind. Second, their objection to détente is that it is deceptive, it tends to blind people to the collusion of the Super Powers. People are persuaded that détente is laudable because they see it as reducing world tensions, but the Super Powers are careful not
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to talk about how, in the process, their own influence might be enhanced.

The deception also concerns the Chinese premise that the two Super Powers are contending. They argue that détente has tended to dull the world’s sensitivity to the real tensions between the Super Powers and to the real dangers of war. Notwithstanding their co-operation on many issues, the two Super Powers are still competing for influence, to get the upper hand in the game of world domination. So long as the Super Powers behave like this, war is inevitable, the Chinese say, although not inevitably nuclear, and for the present and in the immediate future fought by proxy, as in Zaire. A major war is most likely to occur in Europe, which China has now defined pretty broadly to include the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It is this area which is the focus of Super Power contention. Each Super Power will take advantage of the weakness of the other, and since the Chinese regard the United States as being in a condition of ‘strategic passivity’, they are particularly opposed to the Helsinki Agreements, which they believe offer the USSR opportunities to advance at the expense of the United States. They see naïveté in those in the West who hailed these agreements as a major achievement, who believed the Russians had made some new commitment to responsible international behaviour.

In this general picture, then, the Chinese see the United States as, relatively, less of a menace than the Soviet Union. But there is an enormous irony in this view. On the one hand, the decline of an imperialist power ought to be cause for satisfaction, but the fact is that the United States is the only power with the capacity to resist the ‘social-imperialism’ of the Soviet Union, and hence needs to be encouraged in its alliances, to have its spine stiffened. (I might add here that the United States has objected strongly to being lectured on this subject by the Chinese.) The
Chinese might argue that the United States has no right to act in an imperialist and hegemonist manner, but as leading power in world affairs it has obligations which it ought to fulfil. Thus, the Chinese have urged the United States to look to its defence commitments in Europe, and Europe itself is enjoined to unite and strengthen its capability to resist non-nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. They have also expressed approval, for example, of Washington's defence arrangements with Japan and of the ANZUS Pact with Australia and New Zealand.

But the general priority in the Asia Pacific region is ostensibly much lower than that in Europe; the Chinese are less agitated about an imminent prospect of war in this region. They argue that the concentration of Soviet forces in the East is directed not so much at China, but primarily at the United States, and only secondly at Japan and thirdly at China. They do not see the same kind of confrontation between the Super Powers, and even on the question of Korea they have been more relaxed, publicly, than the United States and its friends. If we measure the pattern of current United States interest and activity in the region against its interest and activity in Europe it is clear that the Chinese are not unjustified in their view. I think, however, that they also have some concern for the longer term prospects in Asia, reflecting not so much increased Soviet activity as the very different pattern of politics in this region. It is noticeable that in the case of Europe, while arguing that the US and Europe need each other, they are consistently urging greater European self-reliance, on the ground that the United States will not come to Europe's support, whereas in this region they are less prone to argue the case for United States unreliability. Japan, for example, is urged, not to develop an independent military capacity, but to strengthen its relations with the United States, to the extent of giving these relations priority over relations
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with China. Australia and New Zealand are told that China hopes they will strengthen their joint defence efforts with the United States. ASEAN countries have not been nudged by China to reject their United States connections and go it alone.

One difficulty for the Chinese in defining the strategic situation in this region is the definition of their own role. Clearly, China is a major actor in this part of the world, but the Chinese reject any suggestion that they see themselves, even passively, as part of a strategic alliance, and they are not seeking an alliance with the United States. So the Asian region remains less cohesive in their view, and because the lines are not as clearly drawn as they seem to be in Europe the contention of the Super Powers in this part of the world is less clearly focused.

How does this general view of the Super Powers affect the Chinese approach to relations with them? Clearly, their appraisal of the behaviour of the two must place some limit on the extent to which they are prepared to co-operate with them, but there is nothing in their formulations which actually prevents development of state relations. China has specifically ruled out participation in alliances, against one or the other or against both. As a victim of the two-camp division of the world the Chinese are sceptical of the value of formal alliances and see them as potentially dangerous, involving unwanted confrontations or the making, or breaking, of uncomfortable commitments. They are prepared to acknowledge identity of interests, but no more, and this is probably the best guide to their objectives in respect of the Super Powers. They wish to maintain an independent position against the two, and will act wherever possible to maximise their own absolute independence from both, and in relation to other centres of power. I don’t think it is fully realised in the world at large just how strongly the Chinese are committed to a total
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independence, rejecting even influences on domestic Chinese society which many strongly nationalist societies have come to accept as part of the pattern of interdependence in the modern world. Common interests might incline them, therefore, towards one or other of the Super Powers but they will always be looking for opportunities to enhance their manœuvrability between the two.

What, then, is the current state of China's relations with the Super Powers and how are these likely to develop? I think, first, that both the Soviet Union and the United States have got themselves into unnecessary, and disadvantageous, difficulties with China which could but probably will not be relatively easily overcome; and second, that the Chinese will never agree to a restoration of the kind of relations they had with the Russians up to 1957 but that it would be foolish for us to think that this means there cannot be considerable reversal in their relations with both the Russians and the Americans.

The Soviet Union, once China's greatest friend, is now her greatest enemy. In retrospect, it is sometimes difficult to believe that the Chinese and the Russians did get on as well as they seemed to in the 1950s. There was certainly no natural compatibility. Where the interests of Czarist Russia and Imperial China had intersected the connection was not such as to have made the Russians popular in China, and thirty-odd years of revolutionary Soviet Russia had not done much to improve the Russian image at the time of the Chinese Communist Party's victory in 1949. Indeed, the Chinese leadership found it necessary at that time to mount a special campaign to persuade the Chinese people that the Russians were respectable and likeable. The enormous gulf between the two societies, ethnic, cultural, economic and social, was underscored by historical myths about Mongol Hordes, for the Russians, and Northern Barbarians, for the Chinese. To go from Peking to
Moscow today is to be translated into a world which bears no resemblance to China.

The Sino-Soviet alliance concluded in February 1950 was one of straight political convenience; and with no other substance to sustain it, when the political convenience became inconvenient, the alliance came to an end. The Chinese Party, itself inspired by the October Revolution and the great Lenin, and moved in spirit by the support of Stalin, however patchy, looked in 1949 to the Soviet Party as its ideological soulmate. China was, moreover, impoverished, devastated and exhausted by war and had no other source of material assistance. Chairman Mao was prepared, therefore, not simply to ally himself with Moscow but to acknowledge Moscow's leadership in a kind of socialist suzerainty, provided Moscow itself was prepared to assume its obligation to upright and moral behaviour, and an obligation to support and defend the new Chinese state beset by Moscow's own enemies and a cynical trade embargo imposed by a selfish capitalist world. There was, in this Chinese position, an echo of traditional Chinese ideas about the mutual obligations of less than equal powers.

But the argument about the virtues of the Soviet alliance must have worn very thin at times in the councils of the Chinese Party, long before the open rift. Apart from the problems of the Korean War which placed some strains on the alliance, we know now that the Russians tried in one way and another throughout the 1950s to get the Chinese to agree to arrangements (such as a joint fleet under Soviet command) that would have bound them to an inferior position and circumscribed their independence. It is difficult to make a judgment about Soviet aid to China in the 1950s. The Russians and some others certainly claim a great generosity on their part, although that must be balanced against their lack of generosity in demanding full repayment.
for arms, ammunition and equipment supplied to the Chinese during the Korean War, which the Russians had started. One thing, however, is certain. When it came in the late 1950s to crucial issues touching directly and deeply on China's defence and territorial interests, the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958 and the supply of nuclear weapons technology, the Soviet Union backed away from supporting the Chinese, in the interests of its own relations with the United States. The Russians now condemn as 'adventurism' the Chinese stand on these issues, but the Chinese had every reason to expect Soviet support on such matters when the alliance was first concluded.

Perhaps the ultimate measure of the Russian generosity towards their relations with their great friends, the Chinese people, came with the final break in 1960. It was sufficient that they had an ideological/political disagreement with the Chinese for them to have decided to terminate, without warning, all forms of assistance to China. A cynical act of economic sabotage of a developing country, this was every bit as damaging as the American embargo and more, because it dealt a sudden crippling blow, and to a country which was then experiencing a period of economic crisis and which had no one else to turn to. Although the Chinese now say they have to thank the Russians for setting them on the road to self-reliance in economic policy, they do not admire the Soviet Union for this act. Indeed, I think it illustrates a fundamental point about Chinese attitudes towards the Soviet Union, touching on the most sensitive nerve ends of Chinese pride and dignity and national self-respect. For more than a century, the record of China's relations with the West had been one of Western imposition and betrayal. The Soviet Union, which had been expected to behave differently, turned out to be no better than the rest, and the Soviet betrayal, the
latest in a long succession, was greater, and more deeply felt.

After 1960, I doubt if there was any possibility on the Chinese side of re-entering a fraternal relationship, one of full confidence and trust in Soviet intentions. But for a period they were still reluctant to believe that the Soviet leadership was a totally lost cause. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet doctrine of limited sovereignty put paid to any lingering doubts they may have had. In fact, the doctrine of limited sovereignty, as a concept, was not so far removed from the idea of Soviet leadership of the socialist camp which the Chinese Party had once accepted. But the Soviet application of this concept as exemplified in Czechoslovakia was unacceptable. Here again, I think Peking was also making a Chinese judgment; that is, that external behaviour is both a symptom and a test of the rectitude of a country's leadership. The Chinese believed by this stage that the Soviet leadership was so far gone that it had no right to assert a leadership role towards other countries, and Czechoslovakia was the proof that revisionism at home was now producing social-imperialist muscle-flexing abroad.

In the following year, 1969, the clashes on the Sino-Soviet border suggested to the Chinese that Moscow might just be mad enough to try a Czechoslovakia in China, and from that time the Chinese began to give the Soviet Union the edge over the United States as the more dangerous of the two. Clearly, conditions were favourable for an improvement in relations with the United States, but I think we need to be very clear-headed indeed about what went on at that time because the last United States Administration, at least, subsequently talked itself into a number of mistaken positions which led to mishandling of relations with China in the mid-1970s.

I do not accept what I understand to have become
the Kissingerian thesis that China 'turned to' the United States because it had no possible alternative and that the continuing intensity of Chinese hostility towards the Soviet Union means that China still has no alternative but to continue to seek improved relations with the United States. As United States spokesmen were wont to put it, 'China needs the United States'. The situation was not and is not so simple.

I have no doubt whatever that the Chinese leadership firmly believes its much-publicised position about the Soviet Union. I have no doubt either that the belief, and the feeling, is widely shared by the Chinese people. Chinese public opinion on this issue is a real consideration for Chinese decision-makers. There is a strong inhibition to any unchecked drift back into a Party-based and ideologically-aligned relationship with Moscow. But ideological alignment is far from indispensable for the conduct of foreign relations. In my opinion, far from being boxed in, the closer China comes to a clean ideological break with Moscow the greater independence and manoeuvrability it has in handling relations with the Soviet Union in its overall foreign policy; and that, as I have suggested earlier, is the Chinese objective.

The argument that China was virtually forced to turn to the United States simply ignores too much. It ignores the fact that for seventeen years, up until the Cultural Revolution, China had been prepared to have relations with the United States if the United States had been willing, and that in the late 1960s when it turned from preoccupation with domestic affairs China was simply taking up the strands of a long-established policy. It ignores the coincident advent of Kissinger himself and his desire to open up United States policy towards China. It ignores the added compulsions on the United States side, deriving from domestic mobilisation of opinion and the
foreign problems of Indo-China. It ignores the fact that China was voted into the United Nations before the first Nixon visit to China.

I do not argue that the increasingly menacing posture of the Soviet Union was not a consideration on the Chinese side. There were others, such as China’s apprehension about militarist revival in Japan. Nor do I argue that China’s relations with the Soviet Union are unrelated to its relations with the United States. But the assumption that China has an overriding need of the United States has, I believe, led the US into error. I do not intend to go into the twenty years of errors in United States-China relations before the first private Kissinger contacts. The record is well known and it is now widely accepted that United States policy in that period was at best inept and unsuccessful.

The basic document in the new relationship between China and the United States is the Shanghai Communiqué, concluded at the end of Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. The Chinese insist that fundamental points in the Shanghai Communiqué are non-negotiable and they use it as a yardstick of United States behaviour. The United States, for its part, accepts the Chinese view of the status of the Communiqué in the sense that Washington claims its behaviour has been consistent with the principles it contains.

Since the Shanghai Communiqué, the Chinese have developed a formula for describing their relations with the United States, in terms of a ‘minor aspect’ or lesser concern, and a ‘major aspect’ or primary concern. The ‘minor aspect’ is the question of Taiwan in bilateral relations. The Chinese propose that the Taiwan question can only be settled on the basis of three conditions: withdrawal of all United States military support for Taiwan, abrogation of the United States-Taiwan Security Treaty and transfer of diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Peking. They
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refer to this as the Japanese Formula. They refuse to renounce the right to use force against Taiwan as a matter affecting the sovereign rights of the Chinese Government; but they have declared that matters affecting the United States in relation to Taiwan should be settled through negotiation.

The critical point about the Chinese position on Taiwan is that it is, for them, the secondary consideration in their approach to the United States. They have consistently maintained that they are in no hurry; and given that the idea that Taiwan belongs to China is an important national political commitment, the Chinese have not been as inflexible as might seem. So long as they have not been required to abandon their three conditions or renounce the right to use force, they have been prepared to go a long way towards normalisation of relations with the United States.

What really concerns the Chinese, the so-called 'international aspects', is the nature of the political relationship with Washington, the development of political dialogue, the weight given by Washington to Peking's views. This is where the relationship has gone wrong. There is, of course, a quite different preoccupation in Washington. For the Americans, the preoccupation is how to cope with the problem of Taiwan on the path to normalisation with the People's Republic of China. For the Chinese, it is the state of the already existing political relationship. The two sides have not been concentrating on the same issue, and there has so far been no indication of significant change on the part of the new United States (Carter) Administration.

Nor is it simply a case of the two sides talking past each other. The United States has taken so much for granted China's alleged need for relations with the United States that it has not bothered to cultivate political relations in the way it does with other countries or in the way China was led to expect
before the Nixon visit in 1972. Notwithstanding the protestations of the previous US Administration and the private assurances it gave to foreign leaders who expressed concern about the US attitude, the plain fact is that the United States has not made China fully a part of its consultative process or heeded Chinese views on international issues. The United States itself seems to have acknowledged that something had gone wrong when, late in 1975, it began publicly assuring the Chinese that the United States took their views fully into account in forming its own international policies. But, in substance, there was no change. When taxed on this point, Dr Kissinger’s defence was a mixture of contradiction. He argued that the Chinese had not expressed directly to the United States Government any dissatisfaction or resentment, but he ought to have known that it was characteristic of the Chinese to be less direct on such sensitive matters (and I, for one, had unmistakable echoes of dissatisfaction with the United States), and there is no way the Chinese are going to go cap in hand to the United States and beg it to take more notice of them. Dr Kissinger also argued that all Peking wanted was for the United States to reverse the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, but this was, in fact, only the outstanding policy disagreement, the symptom of United States disregard for Chinese views. When really pushed, Dr Kissinger is reported to have retorted on one occasion that the United States had no need to take any more notice of China because it had nothing to offer the United States.

The Chinese were aware of how thinking had evolved in Washington after the Shanghai Communiqué. They can hardly have been convinced by United States assurances about taking them seriously. They would be hard put to point to one United States decision on a major international issue in which Chinese views had had a decisive influence.
They are even now still excluded from Washington's major multilateral consultative meetings and Peking is still left off the list of places to visit for members of the United States President's cabinet. For Dr Kissinger, who held China policy so tightly in his own hands, Peking became a ritual, and he seemed to have disengaged intellectually from the problem of China.

In my view, Chinese concern for the political relationship is not a case of wanting to change every United States policy, not even détente. They feel they have something useful to offer on the question of the Soviet Union and they genuinely believe the United States has walked into some traps. But I think what they would appreciate more generally, beyond the question of détente, is consultation instead of notification, less inclination on the part of the United States to take them for granted and more attempt to understand what they are about. I have spoken in the first lecture of the difficulties this problem, understanding what the Chinese are about, seems to pose for Western statesmen and diplomats. The case of the United States is the most obvious current example. I think the United States has quite missed the point of Chinese dissatisfaction, and the new Administration has, if anything, accentuated the problem by the early pattern of high-level visits and policy priorities, which almost pointedly put China well down the list.

For China, relations with Washington touch directly on the rawest nerve ends of Chinese sensitivity. Despite a generation of grievance against the United States, they feel they came towards the Americans in a spirit of equality, and yet the Americans have treated them as less equal even than Japan or Western Europe. Continued neglect of this aspect of relations with China could result in a change of heart in Peking, with serious consequences for the United States.
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First, there is the question of Taiwan. China is prepared to regard this as secondary, but only on the condition that the United States gives some satisfaction on the primary issue of the political relationship. This means both commitment to a serious political engagement with China and honouring the Shanghai Communiqué. Any backing away from the Shanghai Communiqué by the United States will be seen by the Chinese as setting at nought what they regard as a serious political commitment entered into at Shanghai in 1972. This was nicely illustrated in July 1976 in relation to a series of incidents concerning, as it happens, Taiwan. The United States attitude to Taiwan's participation in the Olympic Games, some strong talk on Taiwan's importance to the security of Japan by former Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, and some apparently speculative discussion on the Taiwan question by Senator Scott during a visit to Peking, all in that month, seemed to suggest Washington might be rethinking its position on Taiwan. Peking reacted with some remarks which restated China's position with unusual force, and in private conversation Chinese spokesmen accused the United States of acting counter to the Shanghai Communiqué. There was no specific hardening in the Chinese position on Taiwan, but there was certainly a strong warning. (It is possible also that this sharpness derived in part from the 'Gang of Four', a subject addressed in the last of these lectures.)

I am not certain how far the United States Administration appreciates just how soft the Chinese position on Taiwan has been made for them. Not only is Peking not pressing for immediate solution, but it seems to me to be offering a much better bargain than the United States could have hoped for. Its three basic conditions are not-negotiable, to be sure, and Chinese refusal to bow to US pressure to renounce the right to use force may present public opinion problems for the US Government. But what
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seems to have been neglected is the Chinese description of their offer as the Japanese formula. On only one count, the transfer of diplomatic relations, is the United States position like that of Japan; the other two Chinese conditions concern matters which have no parallel in the Japanese case.

What the Chinese seem to mean, therefore, is that there are precedents for the United States in the actual handling of relations between China and Japan. In other words, they seem to be offering the United States a solution in which China is prepared to tolerate far more in the way of continuing United States interests in Taiwan than would be possible with a straight Western, legalistic transfer of recognition and diplomatic relations. They seem to be saying that in return for this, the United States should drop its demand for the renunciation of force, tacitly conceding Peking sovereignty over Taiwan. It follows that much would need to be left undefined, even apparently ignored. For the original Japanese formula seems to me, above all, to have been a means of satisfying the demand for diplomatic relations while enabling Japan to continue trade, investment and an ‘unofficial’ diplomatic presence in Taiwan as well as to sidestep difficult bilateral disputes such as the question of which country owns the Senkaku Islands. In short, the apparent status of Taiwan would change but its actual status would not immediately be altered.

Since the Taiwan question is the big issue in China policy on the United States side, a toughening in the Chinese position on Taiwan could make difficulties for the United States Government. China could, for example, reverse the priority of its two aspects of relations with the United States and refuse to advance on any front before the Taiwan question was solved; or it could remove the ambiguous loopholes implied by the Japanese formula. And neither need be seriously detrimental to China’s interests.
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A second respect in which the United States could find itself in difficulty is if China chose to alter those policies which currently coincide with the United States' own interests, including its relations with the Soviet Union. Clearly, the Chinese are not going to initiate new moves for improvement in state relations with the Soviet Union while the Soviet Union maintains its present stand. But I do believe China's relations with the Soviet Union are a function of its relations with the United States to the extent that reappraisal of the possible benefits of improved state relations with Moscow is most likely in the event of a very serious breakdown in the process of China's normalisation with the United States. This would be consistent with China's policy of manoeuvring for maximum independence. The border dispute could be defused quite easily if the Russians were to accept the unexceptionable proposals put by Premier Chou En-lai to Premier Kosygin in September 1969. And it would not be too difficult for the Russians to take some meaningful measures both internationally and in relation to China as an earnest of their good faith, and to which the Chinese could respond.

It seems to me, however, that the Soviet Union believes it has a strong interest in actually preventing an improvement in its relations with China. Any substantial improvement in relations and cooperation between the Soviet Union and China will inevitably rekindle the interest of the United States in improving its relations with China, which the Soviet Union sees as detrimental to its own interests. It is on record as condemning China's relations with the United States as serving the cause of US imperialism. For this reason, I believe the so-called gestures of conciliation by the Soviet Union since the death of Chairman Mao (the condolence message to the Chinese Party and the suspension of public attacks) are no more than gestures, designed to show Soviet reasonableness and Chinese intransigence,
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and make the point to the United States that the Chinese are difficult to deal with. I think this is a mistaken policy which does not serve the interests of the Soviet Union, and their party-to-party condolences message at the time of Mao's death (when the parties do not have relations) I regard as particularly ham-fisted. The Russians themselves are still living with the ideological battles of the past and their failure to control the Chinese, their greatest single failure in the post-war world. It would be far more in their interests to improve relations with China. There are those in Moscow who favour a more conciliatory China policy, and I think their influence may be growing.

It might be useful for us to bear in mind also that there could be economic arguments to help justify a Chinese turn to the Soviet Union. China's trading pattern in recent years has made it susceptible in some measure to the economic crisis in the capitalist world. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe might seem to offer greater stability, and at a time when China needs to re-equip and retool many plants and factories established in the 1950s with Soviet-bloc equipment.

We should bear in mind also that it is the official policy of the Chinese Government that 'polemics on principle . . . should not hamper the development of normal relations between the two countries'; and I believe that it is always open to the Chinese to make some gestures of conciliation towards the Soviet Union if they see some reasonable prospect of positive response. I do not argue that this is now in prospect, but I make the point simply to suggest that China is not without alternatives, and I have no doubt that with sufficient will on both sides relations could be substantially improved in a very short period of time.

Of course, there is no reason for the United States
to find amelioration of Sino-Soviet differences inimical to its own interests. Such a development ought to be welcomed. But if it were to take place in a context of Chinese hostility to the United States or serious breakdown in Sino-United States relations, or even Chinese co-operation with the Soviet Union against United States interests, that obviously would give Washington cause for concern. Even without such co-operation, I think it is the case that the United States has been far too slighting about the positive role China plays, even passively, in world affairs, and would find a reversal of this role very much to its disadvantage. China's relations with the Soviet Union do have a function in the strategic balance, because of the deployment of Soviet forces against China and general Soviet preoccupations with China's opposition to its external policies. China's role in North Asia is generally helpful to the maintenance of a stable balance in that area. China has adopted a very positive attitude towards Japan-United States relations which the US and Japan must find useful. It is widely believed that China is an influence inhibiting any tendencies within North Korea to military action against the South. Elsewhere in the region, the Chinese have also been pursuing policies which happen to suit the United States, in Hong Kong and Macao for example, or in Southeast Asia, where their endorsement of ASEAN, their low-profile revolutionary stance and generally muted opposition to United States imperialism are more favourable to Washington than to Moscow. Of course, there are fundamental differences between China and the United States and many areas of policy disagreement. But there is a far greater compatibility between Chinese and United States policies in the Asia Pacific region and in respect of the Soviet Union than United States insensitivity to Chinese views and interests seems to allow.

It can be argued that the Chinese have no leverage
on the United States because it is not in their own interests to change these policies. That is true up to a point, and I am sure the Chinese do not wish to precipitate a serious reversal in these policies or in the process of normalisation with the United States. But if the United States makes the process too costly and gives no respect to the Chinese the Chinese must, for their own benefit, consider whether the cost, for example, of confronting the Soviet Union or restraining the North Koreans is worth sustaining.

There have been some suggestions that when President Carter does move on China, it will be to full normalisation on the basis of China's three conditions rather than to piecemeal dismantling of the relationship with Taiwan. That would be an enormously effective move: a reaffirmation of the Shanghai Communiqué and a demonstration that a powerful Western nation is capable of keeping its trust. If such normalisation were accompanied by a serious attempt by the United States to engage in full political consultation with China, this would help further to diminish the sense of imposition, suspicion and betrayal which has marked China's relations with the West for so long. It would, in my view, also make a beginning for longer term solutions to the rivalries and divisions of the whole region, not because I believe in a divine right of Great Powers but because the divisions between the Great Powers exacerbate tensions between the less powerful, inhibit the resolution of lesser conflicts and in fact tend through the direction of economic and arms policies to enhance the material supremacy of the strong against the weak and impede the dilution and diffusion of power. I would argue that we ought to hope for normalisation of relations between China and both the United States and the Soviet Union if we want to see a resolution to the problems of this part of the world.

The answer for the time being, I think, lies more
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with the United States than with the Soviet Union. I have spoken of popular Chinese attitudes towards the Soviet Union. It is perhaps ironical that there is a great reservoir of goodwill in China towards the United States. I hesitate to say this confirms American views about the old ‘special relationship’ with China because I think those views were too often paternalistic. But there is admiration for the American people and there is an opportunity for the United States, if it has the intellectual stamina, to make the first really significant break with the traditional pattern of Sino-Western relations since the Opium Wars.
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There is more apparent ambiguity in China's policies towards Southeast Asia than towards any other region of the world. Some Southeast Asians, and most Western governments with an interest in the region, find this disturbing, either because they want something more clear cut or because they believe the ambiguities conceal less subtle objectives which must, by concealment, be totally cynical. I think they are wrong to find these ambiguities disturbing. Indeed, I think we ought to find them reassuring. I am not about to suggest that China does not have a respectable concern for its own national interests in its Southeast Asian approaches. What I do believe, however, is that China is displaying a regional self-interest which reflects in some measure the very absence of simplicities and certitudes in the Southeast Asian region, and which casts a different shadow even on China's support for Southeast Asian revolutionary movements. China itself is aware of certain contradictions in its Southeast Asian policy which might with benefit be resolved. But I think most Southeast Asians who have thought about the problem understand that the subtleties and ambiguities of today's China are preferable to the self-approving, 'civilising', unquestioning certainty of European colonialists, militarist Japan, or the United States between the defeat of Japan and the defeat in Saigon.

China's intentions in Southeast Asia, of course, have been a live public issue since the beginning of this century. This is not surprising. In pre-modern, pre-colonial Asia China was a Super Power which
asserted, even if it could not always exercise, suzerainty over Southeast Asian societies. While threats to China came mainly from the north, the 'weight' of China's size and population and political system and pre-eminent culture hung, as it were, over the south. Leaving aside the less-remembered facts of China's tributary relations with Southeast Asia, the emergence of modern Southeast Asian nationalism, coinciding with the emergence of modern Chinese nationalism, raised in the minds of Southeast Asians a question about whether a strong modern China might not try to reassert this suzerainty. The migration of large numbers of Chinese into Southeast Asia did not help. Nor did the chauvinism of Chiang Kai-shek and his Government. Before 1949, Chinese and Southeast Asians alike tended to take fairly single-minded views of China's interests in Southeast Asia.

It was even less surprising that controversy became crusade after the Communist victory in 1949. Southeast Asia was now a battleground of Cold War, anti-colonialism, revolutionary struggle, anti-communism, anti-China. The Chinese Government, by and large, advocated change in the status quo, revolution and the expulsion of colonial powers, and for this earned for itself from the United States the labels subversive, aggressive, expansionist. Southeast Asians, swept up in great movements of revolutionary change, found themselves caught in the terrible web of Cold War politics, the upheavals in their own societies cast in the pro and anti of the quarrels of the world's political giants whether such formulations fitted or not, and all the while terrorised by the spectres of an allegedly voracious Asian communist ogre to their north. Because of the politics of powers outside the region, Chou En-lai's bid to sort things out with China's Southeast Asian neighbours at Bandung in 1955 was thwarted in many directions. It has taken another twenty years for China to reach the
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point where it has found some kind of accommodation with the majority of Southeast Asian nations; the only exception now being Indonesia, which does not have anything to do with China beyond an occasional, indeed rare, chat between Ministers in New York.

It is still the case, however, that China's policies in this region seem not to have a high degree of credibility, particularly among Western powers and Western-educated élites in Southeast Asia. The remote and recent past, the ambiguities in present policy, and the very newness of China's political relations with Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, are contributing factors. The ideas of John Foster Dulles have been swept, rightly, into what the Chinese might call 'the garbage heap of history' but it is still very noticeable that governments and bureaucracies are a little nervous about abandoning them for a more updated and realistic view. In the Australian bureaucracy, for example, there was an attempt a couple of years ago to turn back the judgment of history and the Labor Government on the new trends then becoming apparent within Southeast Asia and in China's relations with the region; and there is even now an apprehension in other bureaucratic quarters that the Defence White Paper was going too far when it asserted that China's support for 'insurgency' was at its lowest level for many years. The present Australian Government, with one eye to residual anti-Chinese sentiments in this country (which have never been the preserve of any one political party) feels it necessary still to list on public occasions its major points of difference with China including China's support for 'insurgency' in Southeast Asia.

Bureaucracies and governments seem to want a direction, a precision and a lack of ambiguity in China's policies towards Southeast Asia which they are far from being able to display in their own
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policies. If that seems a little strong, we might usefully recall the ambiguities in the position of both the Labor Government and the present Australian Government on East Timor; or the different standards we apply to 'immoral' behaviour by different governments in the region, by Indonesia, for example, in comparison with Cambodia; or the contradiction in our urging the United States after Saigon to be tolerant and far-sighted and recognise the government in Hanoi, while we ourselves were being just as intolerant and narrow-sighted on the question of recognising the new government in Cambodia.

The current argument about either/or in China's relations with Southeast Asia is whether China is really interested in the development of relations at the state level, with ruling governments in Southeast Asia, or whether this is a short term tactic concealing some other goal. This question is often put in terms of Russian interest in the region; is it not the case that China is only interested in state-to-state relations in Southeast Asia now because it is reacting to the Russians?

In my opinion, China has a much longer view of its relations with the region, not without some flavour of traditional Chinese attitudes, but, I think, alert to the light and shadow of contemporary Southeast Asian politics. China's objective is a harmonious and peaceful relationship between China and Southeast Asia, which is essential to China's own internal development; a relationship of mutual obligation to the benefit of both, and one in which the influence of China is recognised, but exercised through 'moral behaviour' and the attraction and relevance of the example of China as a political model. This will inevitably be pigeonholed 'sphere of influence' by Western observers. So it is, but not in our sense, not in the sense of Great Powers carving up the world of lesser powers, staking out spheres of influence which become 'theirs', as it were, by declaration, inviolable
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extensions of territorial space. The Chinese model is more subtle, the emphasis more reciprocal, the influence moral not military. It might be labelled 'tributary', but that, also, is inaccurate in terms of any popularly understood meaning of that word. And whatever else, the Chinese are not interested in the conquest, occupation or control of territory and people in Southeast Asia. Of course, future governments in China could develop a different approach, but they cannot depart too far from this formula for reasons of pure self-interest, and if they should the departure could only be short lived and unsuccessful. In any event, I do not see such a development in prospect, and the model I have outlined here represents Mao's own thinking and a strongly-held view throughout the Chinese leadership. It is the only realistic backdrop against which to consider what China is doing in Southeast Asia.

When I first went to Peking as ambassador, I found it was not always easy to develop a sustained conversation with Chinese on the politics of Southeast Asia beyond the general problems, and with the exception of the war in Indo-China (on which latter subject their interest bore no resemblance to what was put about to justify the Western war of intervention against the three States of Indo-China). This situation changed considerably over the time I spent there, partly as a result of the considerable movement in China's relations with Southeast Asia, and also in recognition of Australia's own expressed interest in the region, in response to our frequent initiation of conversations on the subject. Certainly, the Chinese made no attempt at any time to disguise their approval of revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia. But in discussing the issues which concern Southeast Asians, I found initially in Peking in some people a kind of tentativeness and even reticence at times. I often pondered this question, because it seemed to me insufficient to conclude that
the Government of which Chou En-lai was Premier could be ignorant of the issues in Southeast Asian politics, and in due course a couple of interesting possible explanations emerged.

First, at Bandung in 1955 and subsequently, Chou En-lai, the chief executor of Chinese foreign policy, had made repeated efforts to establish relations with Southeast Asian governments. At Bandung he was responding in part to the anti-Chinese propaganda of the United States which had been surprisingly successful in the first few years of the People's Republic of China in blocking what I think the Chinese had expected would be a natural and fairly easy association between newly independent and poor China and other similarly placed Asian countries. Between 1955 and 1973, however, Peking won recognition from only one more country in Southeast Asia, Sihanouk's Cambodia, which by 1973 was in the hands of Lon Nol following the United States-backed coup of 1970 and no longer in diplomatic relations with Peking. Relations with Indonesia were suspended, and relations with Burma had not fully recovered from the riots among the Chinese community in Rangoon in 1967. China's diplomacy in Southeast Asia had not been notably successful, even if the reasons for this lack of success were largely beyond China's control. From this experience there were some people in Peking, I believe, not many but perhaps including the former Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, who had turned their attention away from Southeast Asia (apart from the Indo-China War), to the major global problems of the Super Powers, Europe, and the Middle East and North Asia. Southeast Asia outside the war was not, for them, a high priority.

But there was also a more positive Chinese reaction to this long and frustrating experience. I think the Chinese Government had come to the view that in order to overcome both inherited fears of China in
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Southeast Asia and the effects of a generation of anti-China United States propaganda, it had to be more than usually sensitive in its handling of the whole question of normalisation of relations with Southeast Asian governments. Hence, the tendency was to listen to what others had to say, and to reserve their own comments, on the polite argument that their interlocutors were more conversant with the issues than they were. In Australia's case, the Chinese seemed to accept our position that we were a reasonably close associate of the ASEAN countries, with a 'natural' interest in the Southeast Asian region and views which might be taken into account. We did have many useful conversations on the subject. But for their own part, they were not inclined to offer any detailed comment on the state of their own relations with Southeast Asian countries beyond a clearly expressed readiness to have diplomatic relations whenever the Southeast Asians were ready. They were meticulous in avoiding any impression that they wanted to force the pace or otherwise press Southeast Asian governments. The Chinese said they understood the problems and the inhibitions felt by Southeast Asian governments, and would be happy to wait until these governments themselves felt in a position to move. This remains their position in regard to Indonesia, which is the main repository for anti-Chinese sentiment in the region. In the case of Singapore, Peking was even prepared to arrange a full state visit to China for Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew, in the absence of diplomatic relations. Lee came and went and both sides declared themselves satisfied with the result; but nothing was done to formalise the relationship.

There is, however, a more fundamental reason for China's seeming reticence and even elusiveness on Southeast Asian questions. If we compare what they say about Europe and Southeast Asia there is a quite
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remarkable difference, and since this difference carries over into the period after the resolution in Indo-China, restoration of good relations with Burma, normalisation with three ASEAN states, and de facto normalisation with Singapore, it obviously has more to it than just a careful tactic to secure diplomatic relations. What China has to say about Europe is clear, forthright, unequivocal, and repeated loudly and often. In private conversation, I found Chinese well-informed about Europe, and willing to discuss in great detail both the political and economic issues as well as military and strategic questions and the different scenarios for possible war in Europe. The Chinese certainly follow Southeast Asian developments but not with anything like the same conviction or certainty, and this is reflected in the pages of the Party's national newspaper, the People's Daily.

The reason for the difference is that Southeast Asia is on China's doorstep and that its politics are not susceptible to simple or single definitions. There is nothing in Southeast Asia approaching the economic and political co-operation or unity of purpose of Western Europe, or for that matter Eastern Europe. China can applaud and encourage European unity. What is unity in Southeast Asia? Even the divisions are not clear cut. Before colonialism, Southeast Asia was not one society or culture, but many. The colonial legacy has left problems of borders and the incorporation or exclusion of bits of territory and groups of people. It has left a variety of social systems and institutions, imposed on already disparate indigenous social patterns. There are quite serious problems of ethnic minorities, including Overseas Chinese. The whole region is underdeveloped, but the various countries are at different stages of development, travelling different paths. Despite some occasional nods in the direction of commitment to familiar Western models, such as parliamentary democracy, there is in practice no consensus about
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ideology or desirable political systems even within the two main groupings, ASEAN and the socialist states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

And for a revolutionary government such as that in Peking, what is the situation regarding revolution? The former colonies of Southeast Asia have won independence, and if the governments of those independent Third World states are pursuing independent policies and resisting external manipulation is that not also to be applauded and supported even if these governments are not, by Marxist-Leninist definition, revolutionary? How does one cope with a revolutionary movement among ethnic Chinese, a sure-fire formula for failure and cause for resentment of China itself? What does one do about revolutionaries who call themselves Maoists without any formal connection with China? And what is the case with revolutionary governments? Vietnam has a revolutionary government, friendly to China but apparently more receptive to Russian policies in the region than the Chinese would find compatible, with an influence in Laos and a desired influence in Cambodia which China might view with concern, and an attitude to ASEAN which seems directly counter to China's open support for ASEAN as a regional grouping.

China's policies have a direct influence in Southeast Asia and it is important for the region that the Chinese Government's policies are so subtle and shaded and ambiguous. Dogmatic and allegedly universal prescriptions for the internal politics of the region would be inappropriate and disturbing. A similar sensitivity is displayed, incidentally, in China's policies throughout the Asia Pacific region, from Japan to Pakistan. Its regional policies are informed by a realistic assessment of the enormous differences between the countries and regions in this large part of the world. It was this assessment, and not outright opposition or political objection, which
determined the Chinese response in 1973 to the Australian Labor Government's suggestion concerning a new regional organisation. In principle, the Chinese thought it was desirable, but they argued that there were so many differences to be sorted out between the states of the region and between the region and outside powers that it was for the time being simply not feasible.

The subtlety and variation and complexity of China's Asian policies puts the question of opposition to the Soviet Union in perspective. As a factor in China's Southeast Asian policies, it seems prominent, even dominant, because it introduces, uncharacteristically, a single political issue, across China's relations with all countries of the region. It is not, of course, unimportant. But China has more enduring interests in Southeast Asia than anti-Sovietism. From the very beginning, in 1949, China has been willing to have state relations with any country of the region willing to do so. The enemy at that time was the United States not the Soviet Union, but China's desire to have relations with Southeast Asia then was not a function of its differences with Washington. The major offensive to break the deadlock with Southeast Asia began in 1955 at Bandung, at a time when the ending of the Korean War, the Geneva Conferences and the inauguration of talks between China and the United States had led the Chinese Government to believe there could be a reduction in Sino-United States tensions and normalisation of relations with Washington. This was also almost twenty years before China began to agitate publicly about the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia.

There were also, from the very beginning, strong compulsions to identification with the developing world. As the less comfortable concept for China of the Socialist Camp collapsed, through internal conflicts and disintegration, and China developed Mao's
Three Worlds concept, China’s identification with the developing countries of the Third World became more complete. It is not yet recognised in Western countries just how important this formulation has been. When it was Two Camps and one had to ‘lean to one side’, as the Chinese said, the important difference was communism *versus* capitalism; one identified with the Socialist Camp and wooed the middle ground. Even in that period the Chinese pursued a policy of developing state relations outside the Socialist Camp, but the evolution of the Three Worlds concept facilitated and justified the adjustment to non-socialist states. It meant the development of strong relations with governments, including governments that are neither socialist nor revolutionary. It meant the identification of common interests between China and those governments, irrespective of the social systems of the countries they governed. A phrase which occurs in every conversation the Chinese have with foreign statesmen is that the respective governments must strive ‘to enlarge what they have in common and give less weight to their differences’. This is the intent in China’s relations with the Third World (and the Second World), and if there is any doubt that they are serious about state relations, the pattern of their diplomacy ought to dispel that doubt. One of the outstanding examples in recent times was China’s recognition of the new Chilean Government after the overthrow of Allende. But they also have diplomatic relations with a large number of unsavoury governments around the world. And their consistent practice is to ride out the storm of putsches and *coup d’état* and continue relations as soon as the threads can be taken up, even if the *coup* is rightist or reactionary, as was the case recently in Thailand. Their interest in state relations, in Southeast Asia or anywhere, is not dependent on what they think about the Russians. Indeed, in the early years of
independent Bangladesh, they consistently withheld recognition despite the advantage this seemed to present to the Soviet Union.

The Chinese are serious about state relations, but they do support revolution. Is it the case, then, that the emphasis given to each is the result of apprehensions about the Russians? I think not. The Chinese regard state relations as the basic instrument of foreign policy, and even their support for specific revolutionary movements is highly selective. There is no sign that their basic position is any different in Southeast Asia. They are not even pushing state relations in a way which competes with the Soviet Union. They have offered no inducements to Indonesia to have diplomatic relations, for example, or to Singapore, where the Russians have shown great interest in naval facilities. Their foreign aid in the region is almost non-existent and unlike the Soviet Union they wait until they are asked for aid. They have made no attempt to hide or play down their position on revolution, and that is probably the most obvious refutation of the argument that Soviet penetration of Southeast Asia has prompted the Chinese to some devious manoeuvre to emphasise their respectability for short-term gain against the Russian enemy.

China's concern about the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia is very real. Moscow's growing interest in the region has been a factor in focusing China's attention on a part of the world which hitherto had a lower priority in its foreign relations. This does not determine the Chinese approach to the question of state relations and revolution, but it is a factor in China's overall tactics in the region and that is where we ought to see its importance. While Soviet foreign policies remain unchanged, China can be expected to encourage opposition to Moscow in the region, and to applaud moves towards regional unity and solidarity. This is already apparent in China's
endorsement of ASEAN and the ASEAN proposals for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia, as it is also in China's obvious desire to see the socialist states of Indo-China resolve their differences with ASEAN and develop a co-operative relationship with ASEAN as a grouping and not only bilaterally with each state. China is not opposed to governments having relations with Moscow, in Southeast Asia or anywhere else. But it can be expected to try to discourage any government in the region, socialist or otherwise, from lending itself to Moscow's designs, and this is essentially the problem with Vietnam. Should the Vietnamese decide that their own interests can be advanced, in Cambodia and Laos, for example, or in the disputed islands in the South China Sea, by supporting Moscow in Southeast Asia and even endorsing its Asian Collective Security idea, this will be objectionable to the Chinese. They regard the Asian Collective Security ideas as anti-Chinese in intent if not in explicit declaration. They believe the Russians are seeking, as they were in Europe, a range of agreements which capitalise on the desire of other governments for peace and regional stability but which Moscow itself either has no intention of honouring or else calculates to advance its interests in ways not immediately apparent to others. China is not, however, sitting idly on the sidelines watching a developing friendship between Hanoi and Moscow. It is diplomatically active and can be expected to make considerable efforts to forestall a Hanoi-Moscow entente.

China is not seeking alliances and claims it can do no more than draw the attention of Southeast Asians to what it believes the Russians are up to, from the movements of the Soviet Navy to the activities of the KGB. But it will certainly do what it can diplomatically to encourage any development which runs counter to an extension and consolidation of Russian
influence, and this includes adopting a positive atti-
tude to a United States presence in the region. Since
the end of the Indo-China War and the establishment
of relations between China and three of the ASEAN
states, the Chinese attitude has been extremely
helpful to the United States and to broad regional
stability. Just how helpful would be immediately
apparent if China were to reverse its present stance.

China itself is not yet threatened militarily from a
Soviet presence in Southeast Asia, or at least not in
the way it once was by the United States. But the
Soviet presence is nevertheless a headache for the
Chinese Government. By its very opposition to
China, its presence and its policies are an additional
impediment to the smooth development of China's
relations with the region. So far, Southeast Asians
have been wary of Soviet intentions because they do
not wish to become involved in Sino-Soviet
problems. But the Russians do not hesitate to play on
Southeast Asian fears, raising, for example, the
spectre of subversion through the Overseas Chinese
communities, as the United States once did. They
also give encouragement to the idea that closer rela-
tions between China and Japan mean a frightening
spectre of Chinese manpower and resources plus
Japanese technology threatening the independent
existence of Southeast Asian nations. In other con-
texts, Moscow berates the Chinese for betraying the
revolution and colluding with the United States; but
in Southeast Asia, the tune is Chinese perfidy and
outright support for revolution. The problem is not
yet too serious for China, which of course has its own
counter-tune, as well as a much stronger claim to
natural identification with the region. But there is for
Peking a potentially dangerous coincidence of views
between the Soviet Union and Indonesia on China's
policies in Southeast Asia, which at a minimum may
well accentuate China's difficulties in reaching an
accommodation with Indonesia, and which could,
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through Indonesia's influence, create problems for China throughout the region. Ideologically, Indonesia and Vietnam are poles apart, but they are China's two most difficult problems in Southeast Asia, and the Soviet Union is, potentially, an ally of both.

There is another problem for the Chinese, which is the possibility of espionage and subversion from Southeast Asia. Unlike the Soviet Union itself, China has an 'open' border in Hong Kong and Macao, through which Chinese from those two foreign-controlled enclaves and from Southeast Asia pass in their thousands every week to visit relatives in the adjoining provinces. The opportunities for subversion have long been apparent to anyone observing this movement of people, not least to the British who control Hong Kong and who, in the interests of preserving good relations with Peking, have long been concerned to keep the Soviet Union out. Another point in the Chinese border is also 'open', where it touches Burma, in that the writ of the Burmese Government does not run in the border area, and almost anything goes, from Burmese-style revolution to minorities rebellion to the cultivation of the opium poppy to the opportunity for infiltration into China's Yunnan Province across a border which is in rough terrain and difficult to seal. This is what Chinese troops are concerned with in that border area. Should Vietnam and Laos become hostile the borders with these two will also present problems to the Chinese. China believes it can handle whatever the Soviet Union might attempt through such channels, but the Soviet presence has added to China's security problems in the south, and there is no doubt the Chinese would view with considerable alarm the open allegiance to Moscow of any Southeast Asian power. China's answer is not to try to interpose itself between Moscow and Southeast Asian governments but to look encouragingly to the Southeast Asians independently to resist Russian
influence, and to leave it to the United States to provide an alternative support and a military counterweight, to Japan to develop economic links which benefit the Southeast Asians and assist their technological development, and to countries like Australia and New Zealand to help with technical assistance and whatever influence their policies might have in consolidating the Southeast Asian view that a too heavy Soviet presence is unacceptable. It is for China essentially a political or diplomatic policy, and not military; or even, for the time being, economic, although as China’s own economy develops there is very considerable room for development of strong complementary economic interdependence between China and Southeast Asia.

What, then, has happened to the revolution? It is time now for a more sophisticated view of China’s revolutionary posture in Southeast Asia than that which comes straight out of the almost religious fervour of the 1950s. But before addressing the general problem we ought to dispense, first, with the question of the Overseas Chinese. The Chinese in Southeast Asia, long denounced as a Fifth Column for China, are a political liability to the Chinese Government and recognised as such in Peking. Since 1949, they have been taken by some Southeast Asians as an excuse for not having relations with China, they have caused friction and open rifts even where China has had diplomatic relations, and as the spearhead or even the rearguard of revolution in Southeast Asia, they could only be disastrously unsuccessful because they are a resented identifiable migrant people from the once dominant power in Asia. Their very involvement in lawful politics can become a political issue; their very presence seems to excite murderous instincts in some quarters, a recent example being the killing of inoffensive pro-Indonesian Chinese in East Timor at the time of the Indonesian invasion. The problem has proved
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intractable for the Chinese Government. They have experimented with various policies, including one proposal for massive repatriation of Southeast Asian Chinese for permanent settlement in China. But none of these policies worked, for the reason that China simply does not control the Overseas Chinese. Before going to Peking I had undertaken a research project on this question. From conversations with Chinese leaders and officials I am convinced of the accuracy of this view of their policy towards Chinese in Southeast Asia, and more acutely aware, particularly from remarks by the late Premier Chou En-lai to Whitlam, of the immense problem they have posed for the Chinese Government. I can understand the apprehensions of indigenous Southeast Asians, which arise from the difficult history of the Overseas Chinese problem. But it has been a real problem in recent years only in so far as it has been played upon by a variety of interests for the purpose of keeping alive the fear of China in Southeast Asia. It is certainly not a problem the Chinese Government wishes to exploit for revolutionary objectives.

What, then, are the Chinese doing in support of revolution in Southeast Asia? There is, first, the revolutionary stand of the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese leaders say quite plainly that they have a revolutionary commitment, an internationalist obligation to support revolutionary movements in other countries. This is hardly surprising, and unless we are going to demand that other governments should not be permitted to hold different views we can hardly take exception to the Chinese holding this view or propagating it abroad in the same way as we expect to be able to propagate our views. How this affects other countries depends on internal factors in those countries; as the late Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, had the boldness to point out in the case of his own country, if a society cannot resist the force of external propaganda the problem
lies within the society itself. This is close to the Chinese position that 'revolution cannot be exported', or more accurately, 'imported', the Chinese argument being that irrespective of what one country offers in support of a revolution in another, there is no prospect of success unless that revolution is indigenous, broad-based and relies primarily on its own efforts. This is a deeply held conviction in China, reinforced by the memory of early attempts by Moscow to direct the Chinese revolution which frequently resulted in disaster for the Chinese Party.

China's support for revolution goes beyond general statements, of course, to support for specific revolutionary movements or parties in Southeast Asia. When pressed in recent years, Chinese leaders have asserted that there is a distinction between Party-to-Party relations and State-to-State relations; and when questioned further by Australian Prime Minister Fraser, last year, the man who subsequently became Chairman Mao's successor, Hua Kuo-feng, said that party relations would not be permitted to influence state relations. What the Chinese mean by this is that they have an inescapable commitment, through their own beliefs, to back revolutionary movements, but that the main thrust of their foreign policy lies in the development of state relations.

Chinese material support for these movements is minimal. In fact, if we compare Chinese support for revolution with political intervention by other outside governments it is insignificant, so much so that any Southeast Asian revolutionary who imagined Chinese support was the essential ingredient to his success would find more to criticise than to thank in Chinese assistance (but he would, of course, also be misreading Maoist doctrine on the subject). In my view, we should regard all forms of direct country-to-country material assistance to foreign countries as an attempt to influence the direction in which those
countries will move. We ought to accept that China does it, acknowledge that what she does is fairly marginal, and concentrate on what she wants to achieve by doing it. Clearly, the Chinese position reflects an interest in trying to influence the general direction of politics, but in a way which is no more or less worthy of condemnation than, for example, Japanese investment or Australian aid. Chinese support for revolution is certainly nothing like the intervention of the United States. It is also, in my view, less reprehensible than some because it does not play upon ethnic difference, it does not encourage war between the states of Southeast Asia or the armed occupation of one by another or the settlement of historical colonial or territorial problems by armed force, and it does not encourage or approve separatist movements such as the Bougainville movement in Papua New Guinea or the Muslim separatism supported by distant Libya in the Philippines. The Chinese approve of socialism; they would like to see it succeed in Southeast Asia.

An associated motive, which is contrary to the popular view of Chinese responses to the Soviet Union, is a concern to influence the political leanings of these movements, to prevent them coming under the control of Moscow. China's interest is not simply in the purity of the revolutionary cause but in forestalling the replacement by revolution of existing local governments by governments more susceptible to Russian influence. The Chinese seem to have had this strategy in mind in giving support to the Government-in-exile of Prince Sihanouk, and in that case it met with success. The idea of subversion by the Russians in Southeast Asia might seem to be carrying the argument too far. But the Chinese have clearly in mind the Russian operation in Angola, even though that did not involve toppling an indigenous government. They might now see vindication for their views in what is going on in Zaire. They are
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convinced the Russians had a hand in the dismemberment of Pakistan. They know the Russians have tried to encourage Malay extremism in Malaysia.

The Chinese are sufficiently serious about general regional stability in Southeast Asia not to want or to precipitate ill-considered and unsettling revolutionary upheavals. They have not started revolutions in Southeast Asia, nor is their support essential to the continued existence of revolutionary movements. To some extent they are simply keeping options open, and maintaining credibility, by adopting a positive attitude towards revolutionary political forces outside the ruling governments of the region. One might argue that in volatile political situations, if one is seeking stability it is irresponsible to support political groups which place themselves in opposition to ruling governments or which want to upset the status quo. But China is not interested in stability for its own sake and in any event its concern is for stability across the region and not for static and reactionary 'stability' within each country. I would suggest also that for China, or for any government involved with Southeast Asia, it is probably wise not to identify, as Australia has on occasion, one's own interests with the survival of any particular government.

There is also the problem of philosophical point of view. If one believes, as the Chinese do, in revolution as an instrument of social change, there is nothing wrong with advocating it, and they would tend to see it as just as legitimate and responsible to lend limited support to revolution as other governments do to support ruling governments or the financial and business interests which support them, or lawful opposition groups or unlawful counter-revolutionaries. What differentiates the Chinese position from some others is that they are open about it and even broadcast support from within Chinese territory.

There is in a limited sense an interesting example
of this kind of international behaviour emerging in the position of President Jimmy Carter on Human Rights. I mention it not because it mirrors Chinese behaviour in all or even most respects but because it suggests a need to be cautious about supposedly clearcut moral judgments relating to other governments' behaviour and what constitutes 'interference' in the internal affairs of another country. In the final analysis, what ought to interest us about the politics of China's support for revolution is that it is not now a major source of friction with those Southeast Asian governments which do have diplomatic relations with China.

Questions of revolution, morality and the exercise of influence have dominated Western thinking about China in Southeast Asia for a generation. I believe they are also dominant in Chinese thinking, but more in the way I have suggested at the beginning of this lecture. I think China is seeking a relationship with Southeast Asia which is contemporary and revolutionary, but which in certain respects might be recognisable to Chinese of Imperial times. I do not mean a tributary relationship, which in any event was more often than not a fiction. But I think the Chinese do accept that China will have a prominent role in the region. They are opposed to attempts at conquest or control, doctrinally and also because of deep-seated objections arising from their own experience with the Japanese invasion, and their observation of French and Americans in Indo-China. They see the possibility for influence. But, and this point is almost never appreciated, they see the region as being as important to China as China is to the region and they also see, therefore, the necessity for the right kind of influence and the acceptance by both of reciprocal obligations. They see their capacity to influence the region as depending largely on how much they can impress by the success of their strategies for development and their adherence to their own poli-
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tical creeds and codes (which, ironically, makes the revolutionary stance a positive and not a negative factor). Morality, and the kind of close personal associations which are essential for making reciprocal obligations between states a reality, are of the utmost importance. The Chinese can be cold and tough and legalistic in international politics but they can also be fluid and elusive and absorbent.

When Lee Kuan Yew went to China in 1976 both he and his Chinese hosts engaged in an encounter of great interest and subtlety. His visit was historic, the first by a representative of the Chinese diaspora, returning as the leader of an independent state in no way beholden to China. He spoke in English to emphasise the point. He had close 'unofficial' links with Taiwan which Peking knew about. The Chinese Government gave him what he needed, both domestically in Singapore and for suspicious neighbours in ASEAN. They gave him a firm statement that Singapore could do what it liked with its communists, and an opportunity for him to repeat this in a public forum in China, which he did, throwing it back at his hosts in a way which clearly was intended to seal a commitment and show him thumbing his nose at great China. The Chinese Government also got what it wanted; the consolidation of personal relations, already begun by Lee's Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam, an opportunity to show Lee the Chinese model in action in an extensive tour of China, an occasion to demonstrate that China accepted that Singapore was Singapore and not the Third China. The talks were as fruitful as those of other ASEAN governments, but formal recognition did not follow. It was not necessary. Accommodation had been reached, and relations could go forward. Not very much was defined, but I think the level of understanding was deep. It was partly because Lee is ethnically Chinese in origin that he apprehended what Peking was about but it was only because he is
Southeast Asian and not just 'a Chinese living abroad' that he was able to do what he did.

Similar undertones are evident elsewhere. In Burma, for example, there has just been a state visit by Chou En-lai's widow, Madame Teng Ying-ch'ao; an exercise in 'old friends' diplomacy which both sides recognised as a kind of reconciliation, while the border remained uncontrolled and the Burmese Communist Party, represented and accepted officially in Peking, did battle with the Burmese army. In the case of Indonesia, the Chinese are worried about continuing and strong anti-China convictions in Jakarta, but they persist in their policy of not hassling the Indonesians, waiting until the Indonesians decide for themselves that what they call the 'psychological' problem of China has been overcome. China's handling of relations with Thailand since the most recent coup has been to absorb the rightist move into its regional diplomacy. And if any proof were needed of China's capacity to see itself involved in less than dogmatic, mutually obligating relations with Southeast Asia, we need only look at its relations with the Philippines, which some Sinologists see as China's crucial link in Southeast Asia.

China's relationship with Southeast Asia may have a conventional appearance in trade agreements, commercial contracts, diplomatic notes and government missions. But it has a dimension which is less easily defined, more personal, more shadowy, more reminiscent of traditional China. It is the combination of these two dimensions which presents the real ambiguity in China's Southeast Asian policies. We cannot afford to find it too difficult to understand.
In this series of lectures on China’s foreign relations the only country to which I am devoting a single lecture (apart, for obvious reasons, from Australia) is Japan. The reasons for this singularity will, I hope, emerge from the lecture itself. The views I express in what follows derive in part from continuing discussions we had on China’s relations with Japan in the embassy in Peking and I respectfully acknowledge the contribution of embassy officers (as, indeed, I do in regard to the ideas expressed in all of these lectures, which reflect our arguments and discussions in Peking over the time I spent there). The reason I mention this background is not simply to acknowledge this contribution, particularly of the officer who had the task of drafting a paper embodying our thoughts on China’s relations with Japan, Mr Roger Brown, First Secretary of the embassy. I mention it also because it is an example of how the view from Peking could provide different and vivid perspectives, even on foreign relations, and perspectives which I still find valid now. The Chinese and Japanese Governments, of course, have no responsibility for my views; nor does the Australian Government.

China and Japan have a relationship which is perhaps unique, in the degree to which it is rendered more complex by psychological factors. The elusive, almost ineffable concept of what is popularly described as ‘face’—a combination of preserving one’s own dignity, ‘one-upmanship’ and going through the appearances of avoiding offending the sensibilities of
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others but still coming out on top—has been funda­
mental to the internal workings of both societies in
the past. The two most populous and powerful
countries in East Asia each evolved behavioural
norms of great subtlety, adapted to their respective
political systems, to govern individual human
relations. As a Western society, we experience this in
our own relations with each of these two countries.
But with them, it is a shared trait which is, at this
stage, probably their greatest handicap when
representatives of the two societies find themselves
face to face for any kind of transaction. The intricate
feints and manoeuvres before substantial negotia-
tions can begin on almost any issue are interminable.
This is as true of business negotiations as it is of
government-to-government contacts. However, in
the present phase of increased exposure to one
another, it is not beyond the ingenuity of the two
peoples gradually to channel the attention they pay
to these considerations into a well-ordered system,
the parameters of which are clearly, albeit intuitively,
understood by both sides. The time may come when
the very ‘orientalness’ of the two societies will be a
major factor facilitating a close understanding
between them.

As a by-stander, one can perceive the enveloping
importance of the shadow-play of face in the
China-Japan relationship but not easily articulate its
meaning. I doubt if the Chinese and the Japanese
themselves are able easily to do so. While describing
the relationship in more prosaic terms, therefore, we
must bear in mind that there is always this added
texture to the conduct of relations between the two
which tends both to facilitate and to complicate the
process of mutual adjustment.

Five important agreements (in the fields of trade,
civil aviation, navigation, fisheries and consular
affairs) have been signed since China-Japan relations
were normalised in September 1972. Despite the
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wider diplomatic ramifications of the sixth, a Treaty of Peace and Friendship, I believe that the political will exists on both sides eventually to find a solution to the deadlock over the 'anti-hegemony' clause which currently is impeding progress on any front towards the conclusion of the Treaty. I regard these agreements and the protracted negotiations which preceded most of them as an extension of the normalisation process between China and Japan, part of the business of getting to know one another. What, then, of the longer term possibilities of the relationship?

'All countries, big or small, are equal' is a principle the Chinese invoke to describe the basis on which they conduct their foreign relations. But the Chinese view of the world clearly acknowledges an existing inequality between the countries of the First, Second and Third Worlds, and Chinese practice in foreign relations is not so unsubtle as to apply mechanically an identical formula to the conduct of relations with every state. In terms of policy priorities, of importance to China, of degrees of warmth, intimacy and revolutionary solidarity, or the reverse, some are more, or less, equal than others.

Imperial China also propagated the idea that foreign intercourse was governed by a code of behaviour universally applied. But Imperial China also understood the facts of international politics as they then were just as well as its modern successor perceives the subtleties of the present power balance. Constantly alert to the possibility that some nation on China's periphery might one day consolidate its power to the point where it could affect China's interests, the rulers of traditional China were not unknown to have understood the necessity to accommodate to inescapable and pressing political realities which did not conform to the universal code.

There is much evidence that Japan enjoys a special status among countries in diplomatic relations with
China and Japan

today's China. Since diplomatic relations were established in September 1972 Japan has been given first priority among countries competing for China's attention and limited negotiating resources to discuss the six bilateral agreements mentioned earlier. Moreover, China's interest in establishing a broad formal framework within which relations can be developed in the future is in itself uncharacteristic.

China has permitted Japan terms for the continuation of an 'unofficial' relationship with Taiwan which no other country enjoys. The 'unofficial' Japanese office resident in Taipei and its Taiwanese counterpart in Tokyo perform a number of the functions of full diplomatic missions. In 1975, agreement was reached, without public protest from China, for the resumption on a 'private' basis of air services between Japan and Taiwan. There is no obstacle to the Taiwan flag carrier landing at Haneda airport sporting Taiwan insignia. Only the United States enjoys a position of dual representational privilege vis-à-vis China and Taiwan roughly parallel with that of Japan, the difference being that Washington's representatives in Peking and Peking's in Washington are 'unofficial', while US ties with Taiwan remain formal.

The access of Japanese diplomats in Peking to Chinese Ministers, Vice-Ministers and very senior officials is probably more frequent than that of any other non-socialist representatives. When the Japanese ambassador leaves his post or returns from abroad he is almost always granted an interview with either the Foreign Minister or a Vice-Foreign Minister. Most other Second World embassies would expect to see the Foreign Minister no more than about three or four times in a year. When a former Foreign Minister, Masayoshi Ohira, visited China in January 1975 he was received by Chairman Mao Tse-tung himself, a courtesy extended to very few foreign ministers in the latter years of Mao's life.
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The number of delegations received from Japan in a year is at least equal to the total number visiting from all other countries, and by official account the total number of Japanese visitors since 1949 is greater than for any other country. Among Second World countries only Japan has been allowed to establish permanent, semi-private trade promotion offices in Peking, independent of the activities of the Commercial Section of the Japanese Embassy. Presiding over relations with Japan is a kind of 'shadow' Foreign Ministry, the China-Japan Friendship Association, staffed by Japan experts and headed by Liao Ch'eng-chih, for many years China's leading personality in the conduct of relations with Japan. This is unique in the Chinese foreign affairs machinery.

Why is Japan important to China? I think this is not primarily because China sees Japan as a potential physical threat. It is because Japan, economically by far China's strongest 'Oriental' neighbour, and the only populous nation in Asia which could be termed 'developed', has, by virtue of its economic strength, acquired the power to influence major world events. It is because Japan may have an increasingly important role to play in contributing to China's own economic development. It is because Japan is in a geographical position strategically vital to China. And it is because Japan has close links with the United States, and shares with both China and the United States an interest in keeping North East Asia tranquil; in the Chinese view this can be equated partly, but not entirely, with keeping the Soviet Union's activities in the area in check.

The fear that there could one day be a resurgence of 'Japanese militarism' is voiced much less often now by Chinese leaders, but it is still at the back of their minds. It did, for example, form a part of the late Premier Chou En-lai's remarks to Prime Minister Whitlam in November 1973; it was identified as the abiding ambition of 'a handful of people' in Japan.
China and Japan in a People's Daily editorial commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of Chinese victory in the war of resistance against Japan in September 1975; and it rated a mention in a Foreign Ministry review of Chou En-lai's role in foreign affairs published in the same newspaper in January this year. We must assume that memories of the Japanese occupation remain vivid in Chinese minds and that latent apprehension is also an ingredient in China's approach.

There are also more deep-seated factors of abiding importance in the present and future relationship. For many centuries China and Japan have been aware that geography has left them too close to be complacent about each other. Even today many Japanese remain sensitive about the traditional Chinese claim to have been largely responsible for the 'civilising' of Japan, commencing in about the seventh century, the assertion that Japanese culture of that period and the succeeding few centuries was derivative. Much later, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Western influence had fully asserted itself in the region, China was uncomfortable about the relative ease with which Japan achieved its transformation into a modern industrial state. Feelings of insecurity, frustration and plain envy were undoubtedly engendered in Chinese leaders of the time, who were making so much heavier weather of a similar task (admittedly, in the face of more complex obstacles). Then Japan's long occupation of China in the 1930s and 1940s brought the first 'people-to-people' contact on a broad scale. It was of the most unfortunate kind. A conquering army is scarcely a good ambassador for its country and, probably because of the fully reciprocal national prejudices which already characterised the relationship at that time, the Chinese 'colonial' experience was a particularly bitter one.

The Japanese in Peking have from time to time turned some of their attention to the damaging effect
upon Japan's national image of the concentration in films shown throughout China upon incidents of successful guerilla resistance drawn from the period of the Japanese occupation. In these, a very clear stereotype of the Japanese soldier emerges. He is ugly, squat, awkward and jerky in his movements, makes peculiar whistling noises through his teeth and helpless guttural gurgles at moments of crisis, is given to fits of blind, uncontrollable rage, and is gluttonous, lecherous and inhumanly cruel—altogether a loathsome creature. The 'gut' reaction to the Japanese of a sizeable proportion of today's Chinese population, especially those of the older generation with good memories, may be influenced by this anachronistic propaganda; although we should bear in mind that the propaganda is officially directed at the militarists and their armed forces in China and not at the Japanese people.

A great many Japanese one encounters in China today display a complex mixture of sentimentality and guilt when reflecting upon the period of the occupation. The protracted stay of so many Japanese families in a country with a closely related culture, and their intimate association with a phase of China's economic development, cemented an interest in China's fortunes stronger and more enduring than in any other country subject to Japan's war-time control. Even some of today's younger Japanese visitors become quite misty-eyed when their thoughts turn to their birthplaces in China's north-east. Groups of Japanese war veterans have begun making annual sentimental journeys to their former haunts in China, laying wreaths at memorials to the Chinese war dead, as if to expiate their own and their country's wrongdoings.

Chinese officials are very proper in their handling of possible Japanese discomfiture about the war. They must feel a moral advantage in their dealings
with Japanese, and certainly it is the case that, without great fanfare, travellers in China are periodically exposed to new evidence of Japanese atrocities during the occupation. But the atrocities, and the caricatures, are quite deliberately offset by official inculcation among the Chinese populace of the necessity for politeness, 'friendship', and forgiveness in their dealings with the Japanese. The Japanese are never made to feel directly hated in China. The two aspects are an essential part of the play on the nerve-ends of 'face'.

The victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, coinciding with Japan's post-war economic 'take-off', added further psychological complexity to the bilateral relationship. Not only did Japan, so recently vanquished, forge even further ahead of China on the economic front, but the Chinese also had now a new commitment to demonstrating to the rest of Asia and to the world the superiority in all fields of the diametrically opposed ideological system which they had espoused. In plain terms, it was Communism versus Capitalism. Japan's attachment to the United States was, throughout the 1950s and early to mid-1960s when China was directly threatened from that direction, greatly to the detriment of its relationship with China. Paradoxically, in recent years, although the Chinese generally refrain from making explicit public statements to this effect, in the face of what Peking perceives as a heightened Soviet threat, Japan's United States connection is seen as positive and to be encouraged.

At some point during the period when Japan's growth rate began to climb dramatically, probably after the effects of China's economic crisis at the turn of the first decade of Communist rule and of the Soviet withdrawal had been fully assessed, People's China reached an important political watershed when it tacitly acknowledged that this economic disparity, not just with Japan but with many other countries,
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was a long-term fact of life. Economic limitations were the result of underdevelopment; historical forces had deprived China of the advantages of the developed world, reinforced the developed world’s advantages and placed many more obstacles along China’s road to development. In time, this formulation also provided China with a valuable point of political identification with newborn countries across the whole spectrum of political persuasions which had in common the problem of economic backwardness. To be underdeveloped was to be morally superior to the developed countries. In terms of relations with Japan, Communism versus Capitalism was no longer quite the same preoccupation it had been. Because of the vast and very obvious economic disparity between the two it became possible for the Chinese to think of the relationship in terms of the somewhat less antagonistic division between underdeveloped and developed. By defining its position as in a different league from countries like Japan, China removed for itself some of the sense of urgency which it had previously felt to compete with Japan.

How close can China and Japan become? Japan itself has been relatively slow to aspire to a global political role commensurate with its economic status. However, the two ‘Nixon shocks’ of 1971 (the Guam Doctrine and the Kissinger visit to China), coupled with the 1973-4 oil crisis, were catalysts in making the Japanese realise that a higher political profile was essential if they were not to jeopardise vital national interests. The Chinese realise that Japan’s influence in world affairs and its regional status deriving from its economic activities are already large and can only grow larger. Consistent with its ideological commitments, China when settling its own policies must increasingly take into account Japan’s views on all international questions.

From China’s perspective Japan is in such a
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strategically important position that China must monitor with the most minute attention every nuance of Tokyo’s evolving foreign policy. Ideally, China would like to see Japan persuaded that its present refusal openly to take sides over the Sino-Soviet dispute is against long-term Japanese interests and that the danger of the Soviets attempting to ‘exercise hegemony’ over North Asia is real and imminent. China has at times become more vocal than Japan itself on the question of Soviet occupation of the disputed Northern Islands. China has adopted an uncritical position of Japan’s defence links with the United States. This has at its foundation the belief that these commitments represent a preferable alternative to allowing the Soviets more freedom of manoeuvre in North Asia. For about two years now, Chinese leaders have been urging that Japan should first work out the basis of its future relations with the US and only secondly turn its attention to China.

China’s attitude towards the future possibility of an accelerated build-up of Japan’s self-defence forces must inevitably be rather ambivalent. On the one hand, Peking must applaud Japan’s independent capacity to discourage Soviet ‘bullying’, on the other hand, China’s memories of Japan’s phase of military expansionism are sufficiently recent for it to remain sensitive to any upgrading by Japan of the priority which it attaches to military affairs. An unchanged United States military presence would suit the Chinese better, striking them as more likely to ensure their major goal of keeping North Asia tranquil.

Long before political relations were normalised in September 1972 China had recognised that, notwithstanding the political value of retaining the label ‘underdeveloped’, its own interests would be served by intensifying its commercial relations with the only developed economy in Asia. The majority of China’s early trading contacts were with Japanese ‘leftists’ but
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since the establishment of diplomatic relations the importance of ideology has been progressively downgraded as the economic stakes have grown larger. For several years before Japan severed formal relations with Taiwan, China was a party to another unique arrangement with Japan—the stationing of Memorandum Trade Offices in each other’s capitals. Following normalisation of relations in 1972, two-way trade jumped in two years to about 30 per cent of China’s total foreign trade. The number of Japanese businessmen in China at any one time far outnumbers the combined total of representatives from all other countries. At least eight major Japanese trading consortiums manage to maintain permanent offices in a Peking hotel (although their staff are treated by the Chinese as on a temporary basis and are required to renew their visas every three months). Japan is a source of sophisticated technology, complete industrial plant and high quality manufactured products in priority areas for China’s current development plans: the petro-chemical industry, fertiliser production, mineral extraction, computers, transport equipment and steel manufacturing. For Japan, China is a conveniently close source of foodstuffs (meat, including poultry, fish, beans), textiles (including silk) and a wide range of essential raw materials including coal, iron ore and petroleum.

The complementarity of the two economies and the added advantage of their geographical proximity is appreciated by both sides. Other things being equal, there would be an immense potential for co-operation between the two countries. Japan has the capital, the development skills and the advanced technology which China needs in order to accelerate its economic transformation and to give itself any chance of achieving the goal stated in January 1975 by Chou En-lai at the Fourth National People’s Congress of becoming a major economic power by
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the end of this century. For Japan, China’s commercial importance in the foreseeable future will tend to be concentrated in the latter’s marketable surplus of raw materials, reliable sources of which are vital for sustaining a high Japanese growth rate. Japanese interests are convinced that the full extent of China’s mineral wealth remains uncharted. Joint ventures to discover, dig out, process and share these resources in the most efficient manner would, these Japanese interests argue, be mutually advantageous.

For China, however, other things are not equal, at least for the time being. Political considerations still preclude the Chinese from commitment to joint ventures with anyone, even friendly, fraternal Romania. Ever since the withdrawal of Soviet know-how and the virtual cessation of the flow of its technology in 1960, the Chinese have found anathema any suggestion of building dependence upon outside economies into the economic infrastructure. The slogan ‘self-reliance’ is an embodiment of their determination not to let this happen again. As the Chinese have been at pains to emphasise, ‘self-reliance’ is not a commitment to autarky. China will have a continuing need for advanced technology from abroad in selected sectors of the economy and Japan has a good share of exactly what China needs. China remains determined, however, not to let any one country become inextricably interwined with its economic development. Memories of Japan’s war-time exploitation of the Chinese economy, coupled with suspicions of the capitalist ethic of which Japan is Asia’s most successful embodiment, place additional inhibitions upon the Chinese from changing the nature of their present commercial involvement with Japan. The time may come, however, when they may be prepared to make less easily reversible commitments.

Japanese officials and academics have for some time now been exploring ideas on how best to draw
China into a more substantial long-term relationship with Japan. There is one view which seems to have had some currency, that a relationship of mutual confidence that the two countries were not pursuing conflicting political goals, was the most that either side could expect to achieve. According to this view, it would be unrealistic at this stage to aim for the sort of intimacy existing between Japan and the United States, in which detailed consultations take place on many foreign policy issues while policy is still at the embryonic stage. For Japan, the political goal of continually widening the area of its understanding with China might be paramount, but it would be unwise to advertise this fact to the Chinese since differences between the two systems make the Chinese suspect ulterior motives where none exist. Instead, Japan should proceed by first adding even greater substance to the already substantial commercial relationship, on the one hand offering China whatever technology it requires for economic development (while paying due deference to Chinese sensitivities on the score of self-reliance), and on the other hand providing China with a reliable outlet for its raw materials. To demonstrate its good faith, Japan should consider binding itself to China through long-term contracts. The more China could be convinced that it played a role essential to Japan’s economic prosperity, the more confidence it would have that Japan would do everything in its power to prevent extraneous factors from upsetting the bilateral political relationship. Once China had the confidence, this approach could serve as the basis for further improvements in the state of political relations, which could include more frequent Ministerial visits in both directions and the initiation of regular officials talks.

This approach would almost certainly eventually bring results but it strikes me as rather timidly underestimating the extent to which China has
already demonstrated its preparedness to have uniquely close relations with Japan in order urgently to reassure itself about the security of North Asia.

Quite apart from the psychological and historical factors I have mentioned, of which both sides must take account as the adjustment process continues, there remain a number of specific political problems which must be fully ventilated and on which they must come to terms before a relationship of complete confidence can be established.

The major potential irritant on the Chinese side remains the Taiwan issue. The Japanese Government has shown itself to be extremely susceptible to domestic pressures upon its foreign policy. Privately China almost certainly regards Japan as 'unreliable' on the question of Taiwan. It has no reason to be confident that the Japanese Government will resist the temptation to mollify pro-Taiwan supporters of the LDP by further consolidating its already significant 'unofficial' relationship with Taiwan. Although in their recognition negotiations China was persuaded to make special allowance for Japan's past close links with Taiwan, Peking's expectation would certainly have been that Tokyo would seek progressively to reduce the substance of the old relationship.

Although the continuing dispute over the anti-hegemony clause in the negotiations to conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendship has at times threatened to become a major point of disagreement and to impede progress in other spheres, both sides appear more prepared to see the issue in perspective and to tackle it in isolation. On the substance of the anti-hegemony clause disagreement, namely China's requirement that Japan inscribe an unmistakably anti-Soviet position into a public document, the Japanese seem satisfied that the Chinese now tacitly accept that Japan's refusal to co-operate cannot be equated with an expectation on Tokyo's part of
equally close and warm relations with both parties to the Sino-Soviet dispute.

On the question of high-level visits, 'face' is again a problem, with the question of reciprocity being raised constantly by one or the other side. The bilateral relationship suffers from the absence of personal understandings at the highest decision-making level, which such visits usually promote. The Foreign Ministers have met on 'neutral' territory in New York, but this sort of contact is all too rare for a relationship of such importance.

There remains a number of submerged issues which, although not a source of public friction at the moment, have not yet been discussed to the point where both sides are equally satisfied. These include, for example, the territorial dispute over the Senkaku (Tiao Yu) Islands, and China's persistent use of left-wing figures and organisations in Japan to increase public pressure on the Japanese Government at critical stages in bilateral negotiations. I mention these to underline the point that the relationship is more complex, and by geographical and 'familial' proximity more potentially troublesome, than that which the United States has with China.

What kind of conclusion, then, can one draw about Sino-Japanese relations? The relationship has still not progressed to the point where it is possible to be categorical about predicting its potential. My guess, however, is that the longer term prospect is for a uniquely close and interdependent association. China and Japan have already achieved a relationship appropriate to large peaceful neighbours with a common interest in regional stability and with a significant bilateral trade. I realise that the two countries cannot explore the potential of their relationship in isolation from the policies of other major actors on the international stage and that not all policy considerations which will be relevant in the future are in view at this moment. But as I suggested
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at the beginning of this lecture, the very orientalness of the two societies is potentially a mutually attracting force. Provided that they can come to terms with the problems of 'face' and other psychological problems deriving from their unique historical association, once certain potential irritants have been cleared away, these two major Asian powers are likely to achieve a much higher degree of intimacy and co-operation in their dealings than exists at present.

This prospect has in the past frequently been raised only in the shape of a frightening spectre, a spectre which the Soviet Union has recently been doing much to keep alive. While there would, of course, be some adjustments for other countries in the region to make should that sort of eventuality come to pass, the positive aspects of a close association between China and Japan deserve more attention. For much the same reasons (economic, strategic and political) as we accept and approve of the unity of Western Europe (which also happens to have grown from cultural and ethnic affinities and economic interdependence) I believe that we could have cause to welcome a more unreserved Sino-Japanese understanding. If we think of the China-Japan relationship as approaching a symbiosis between the two societies, which I believe it some day could do, the prospect is both fascinating in itself and pregnant with positive possibilities rather than fraught with dangers.
As ambassador in China, I spent far less time on the great affairs of state and the interpretive reporting on Chinese affairs than might be imagined. If an ambassador cares about the administrative efficiency of his embassy, and the welfare of his staff and their families, he will always spend a great deal of his time on administration, even if he is one of the few lucky enough to have an effective chief of staff. The administrative burden is naturally much greater in a newly established mission, particularly where, as was the case in Peking, we were in a political and cultural environment from which official Australia had cut itself off for a complete generation. But I often felt uniquely encumbered by administrative distractions; not at the centre of world politics but impaled on the end of a bureaucratic skewer.

My greatest satisfaction from my time in Peking is derived from the knowledge that in co-operative endeavour with very able members of the embassy staff we developed a pleasingly effective working relationship with the Chinese and a capacity for analysis of Chinese affairs. The bureaucratic problem, however, remains to me a matter of concern, and in due course I hope to write at greater length about both the general problem of the management of our foreign policy and the experience of the establishment of the embassy in Peking.

When I left Peking in November 1976, after three and a half years as ambassador, Australia-China relations had been transformed, beyond recognition (if you’ll forgive the pun). Not only had we restored the
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mechanisms of official government intercourse, broken for a quarter of a century, but we had a relationship of goodwill on both sides, symbolised by the cordial reception in Peking last year of a Liberal Party Prime Minister. We had a relationship which had successfully navigated the transition between the Labor and the conservative governments. We had a bipartisan China policy. We had a situation where, at the time of Chairman Mao's death in September 1976, both sides of the national Parliament joined in tribute to his contribution to mankind, a situation which, as Whitlam pointed out, would have been unthinkable a few years ago. We were back in business with China. That had been our objective. But what does it now mean, beyond the fact that we have simply moved from non-recognition to normalisation, bringing the relationship with China onto the same kind of footing as we and the Chinese have with other nations of varying importance to us both? How important is the Australia-China relationship? Is it all a one-way street? Is it possible in any way to influence official Chinese thinking? Can we really trust the Chinese? Can we be sure they will remain as friendly and peaceful as they apparently are now? What should Australia be doing next in developing relations with China?

The Australian relationship with China has an interest beyond what is important to us. In China's foreign relations, we represent both a type and a particular interest in the pattern of Chinese foreign policy. In the previous lecture, I dealt with the case of Japan. Australia is at the other end of the spectrum of advanced countries in the region; non-Asian, European in culture, having no traditional connection with Chinese culture, distant, alien, rich but not powerful, an industrialised nation of great self-assurance but great naïveté in its interaction with more than half of the world's population which
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inhabits the countries of the Asia Pacific region. How important is Australia to China?

In China's cosmology, Australia belongs to the Second World, China itself to the Third. It might seem that this places an automatic definition on the limits of Australia's importance to China, but this is not the case. Chairman Mao Tse-tung's three-tier analysis of the world situation is, in fact, an instrument of flexibility. It was developed after China's break with the Soviet Union and slow erosion of the Two Camps, socialist and imperialist, which had characterised the period of the Cold War. The Chinese had previously espoused the Two Camp theory but I believe it had imposed considerable strain on Chinese foreign policy, both because of what it demanded of China in submitting to the leadership of the Soviet Union and because of the inhibitions it placed on development of relations with other states. China, as a socialist state, was involved in a competitive situation with the capitalist world. There was an edge to its relations with capitalist societies, the necessity to prove a superiority of communism over capitalism. In the 1960s, the Chairman expounded a kind of development model of the world, comprising the two Super Powers as the First World, the developed countries as the Second World and the developing countries as the Third World. The 'struggle' in this model is not between the communist and the capitalist so much as between the less and the more developed, the exploited and the exploiters; and while this is said to involve contradictions between the Third and the Second Worlds, it also encourages countries in these two worlds to make common cause against the Super Powers. What this amounted to in practice is that Chinese foreign policy was now freed to develop relations with governments, of whatever complexion, from Vietnam to Chile, from Romania to Japan or New Zealand. This new model made much more
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sense of the principles earlier promoted by China of 'peaceful coexistence between states with differing social systems'. It also facilitated the development of state-to-state relations according to their relative importance to China without any binding mechanical formula. China's relations with Third and Second World countries vary enormously; Tanzania, Pakistan and Mexico are particularly well regarded by China, but none is Marxist-Leninist; socialist Cuba and Angola are Third World, but strongly disapproved; Romania is Second World, European and socialist and very close to China while still living in the periphery of the Soviet orbit; Japan is Asian but pre-eminently Second World and capitalist, and yet receives more attention from China than any other country in the world.

There is, therefore, no logic in Chinese policy or doctrine which predetermines the significance China might attach to a country like Australia. This being said, it would not be surprising if the Chinese had not had some private questions at the back of their minds as we moved into a formal relationship at the end of 1972. There was a recent history and a longer history. Since 1949, Australia had been an ally of the United States, fully supporting its China policy, joined with it in the anti-China SEATO arrangement, often acting as spokesman for the United States in the annual bid to exclude China from the United Nations, carrying the banner of fear-mongering propaganda against China in Southeast Asia. Australia had sent troops to Korea, Malaya, and Vietnam. Australia had played a not inconsequential part in frustrating the objectives of Chinese foreign policy for two decades. And for Chinese who paid any attention to Australia's domestic politics, they would know that support for the anti-China policies of Australian governments was not confined to the conservative parties; it had its strongest expression among sections of the Australian working class. The
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Chinese must also have been aware of the longer history of Australian attitudes towards China, of the way in which white Australians had responded to the first Chinese immigrants, of the fact that the uninformed image of China in Australia had played a large part in the historical development of Australian racism, reaction and cultural exclusiveness, which characterised our foreign policy for so long.

Chinese leaders and officials of the People's Republic of China showed no sign of resentment of the Australian attitudes in their early dealings with Australia after recognition. They were cordial and co-operative, and extremely helpful in the practical problems associated with the establishment of the embassy. There was certainly a great deal of goodwill and an explicit undertaking that we should put the past behind us, a proposition put by Chou En-lai to Whitlam as early as 1971. There was even a degree of enthusiasm about our new relationship. But I think it was still the case that the Australian side saw much more importance in the bilateral relationship than the Chinese did, and that China was, more cautiously, waiting to see what might develop. We must bear in mind also that at about the same time as Australia was normalising relations with China, so were a large number of other countries including some of very immediate importance to China, such as Japan and the United States. The number of diplomatic missions in Peking almost doubled over a period of about ten years, and the most rapid expansion took place in the first half of the 1970s. Australia was a new diplomatic associate, competing for the time and attention of overworked and preoccupied Chinese leaders. The Chinese listened attentively to what we had to say, they responded, they made their own inputs. But there were few indications of how Australia might have impinged on the Chinese consciousness, of whether the Chinese might have regarded Australia as having any special significance.
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By mid-1975, a little more than two years after we established diplomatic relations, this situation had changed; and by the time I left Peking, it was clear that China regarded Australia as of some moderate importance. I say moderate because we in Australia have established an interesting record, particularly in this part of the world, of over-estimating our own importance, with sometimes ridiculous consequences, where the imagined influence which should accompany our alleged importance has been found seriously wanting. Clearly, we are not as important to China as Japan, or possibly even Korea or Vietnam, or perhaps even India in a negative way. But I have no doubt at all that China does now value our relationship. What happened to bring this about?

I can suggest a few landmarks which may have helped to focus Chinese attention. The Whitlam visit in 1973 was one. Dealing now as an equal, as it were, as Prime Minister, with the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, he was able to show a consistency of approach between Labor in Opposition and Labor in Government. This is no idle observation. The record of China’s relations with the European world had not been a happy one. It is strewn with broken undertakings, tainted with mistrust. Trust has become an unusually significant factor in China’s dealings with foreign leaders, and personal relations are of great importance. As what is known as a ‘friend of China’, the first Australian political leader to visit China and one who followed through with his 1971 promises immediately after his election in 1972, Whitlam now had an opportunity to develop at greater length his ideas about the world and the region. I was told that Chou En-lai is said to have enjoyed very much his talks with the Australian Prime Minister.

I think the 1974 trade exhibition in Peking, and the observations of Chinese visitors who came to Australia, must also have played some part, at least in drawing attention to Australia’s wealth and potential,
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the diversity and development of its agriculture, the application of high technology, the abundance of natural resources.

But perhaps more interesting is that in these first two years we were also learning how to handle our differences and disagreements. I am, personally, attached extremely strongly to the idea that in foreign relations goodwill develops best through mutual respect and that the more important we believe a relationship to be, the more important it is that we should not blink at what is unacceptable, bend to the wishes of the other party or be uncritical or over-accommodating where our own principles and national interests are at stake. The Chinese have this view. I am pleased to say that on a number of issues, Australia took a similar view. Nuclear testing was one. Another concerned some anti-China reporting in the Australia press and the affair of the Antonioni film on China; it was not that the Australian Government approved of this press reporting or of the Antonioni film, but that the principle involved was press freedom and the non-interference in the press by the government. There are some other issues over which I believe we ought to have been tougher than we were, and there is an unfortunate tendency in some sections of the Australian bureaucracy to give in too easily when things look difficult. But I know the Chinese, while they will always seek to press their own case to their own advantage, do respect governments which are prepared to take a firm stand on what they believe.

In the middle of 1975, it emerged, in the course of Foreign Minister Willesee's visit to China in June, that the Chinese had revised and upgraded their assessment of Australia's importance. Australia's 'natural' interest in Southeast Asia was acknowledged and seen as a point of identification with China's own interests. The Chinese referred to Australia's relations with the Third World as of some significance,
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and in response to some direct questioning we were reassured that our 'Second World status' offered no impediment to the development of relations. These and other indications seemed to mean that China now saw value in Australia beyond its minimum objective of normalising relations. Why?

I think China's interest relates to the Asia Pacific region. It's true that trade is not unimportant. We are a not too distant source of raw materials and possibly of some forms of technology, and a market small in population but high in consumption; the products of Chinese light industry probably have a greater potential among the 14 million people of Australia than, for example, among the people of fraternal Vietnam.

But the interest is as much political. The Chinese want a stable and peaceful environment in which they themselves have harmonious relations with their neighbours. This is required by their commitment to very ambitious economic goals; a peaceful neighbourhood with unrestricted opportunities for trade and the exchange of technology are major objectives of Chinese policy. Such an environment is required also to enable China to adjust its relations with the Super Powers and with Japan. China wants to establish an independent position between the powers engaged in Asia and this is made more difficult by conflict and competition. It is also made more difficult for the Chinese by the unwanted intrusion of the Soviet Union, which the Chinese would see as less likely to make headway if there is general regional harmony and co-operation.

China's relations with Australia serve this purpose. The Chinese recognise Australia's goodwill, but equally importantly, they recognise Australia's commitment to objectives similar to theirs. Whatever assessment they may make of Australia's real influence in the Asia Pacific region, they recognise that Australia is active in this part of the world and has
longstanding associations which could be useful in promoting regional concorde and entente. We are closer to ASEAN; our relations with Japan are of obvious interest. The Soviet Union is a factor but not a determining one. China's view of Australia had crystallised well before the advent of the Fraser Government, which of course has a different view of the Soviet Union from that of its predecessor. If anything, the Chinese were, for a time at least, more apprehensive than relieved at the prospect of a change of government in Australia because of the apparent ambiguities of the then Opposition coalition parties on policy towards Taiwan. The Soviet Union became an additional point of identification after the change of government, but I do not believe it altered or improved the quality of the relationship. There was certainly no question of alliance or defence co-operation or united action against the Russians. There was simply a shared view of Russian ambitions; and to the extent that the Australian Government sought to inhibit the extension of Russian influence in this region, this was simply contributory to the general objective of a peaceful Asian environment.

I have seen some suggestion that our relationship with the United States may be a factor in Chinese thinking. It is certainly true that the Chinese do not oppose our defence ties with Washington, but I am not aware of any initiative on China's part which might have suggested that they saw Australia as some kind of intermediary with the United States. They have their own direct channels of communication. I think it may be the case that they occasionally dropped opinions in our company which they knew would find their way to Washington, but they did the same with other governments and some, the French for example, had a more direct intermediary role than we ever had.

China's interest in Australia has another, more
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dynamic, dimension. If Australian policy were to be reversed, if Australia were to adopt an actively hostile attitude to China, to deny it access to our raw materials, to try to influence our neighbours to act likewise, to associate ourselves with the anti-Chinese position of Indonesia or even the Soviet Union, that would be potentially very difficult for China. China has an active interest, therefore, in maintaining Australian goodwill, and that is a point not widely appreciated in the Australian bureaucracy.

What, then, is China's importance to Australia? Are we not making too much fuss about a country which seems to set itself apart from the rest of the world?

By the end of this century China will be a dominant power, possibly the dominant power, in this region, in what we regard as the part of the world of greatest interest to Australia. I have encountered a considerable scepticism about this claim in Australia. To the sceptics, I would recommend that they cast their minds back twenty years to the time when a few voices in Australia were raised predicting a similar future for Japan. At that time, there were also sceptics and greatest among them were the government and the bureaucracy, who were the last to see what was happening in Japan. No one doubts the importance of Japan today.

China faces enormous difficulties in the future. It has a vast population which now expects to be fed and clothed and housed and employed and educated, because that is what the Chinese government has brought it to expect. China is a developing country, 80 per cent peasant, relatively poor, not generating all the technology it requires, with an annual steel production of something like only 25 million tons. Since 1960, when the Soviet Union pulled out, it has been the only Third World country of any significance which has been without any foreign aid. Because of its size it has to sustain a huge bureau-
cracy which in itself creates a host of problems, which Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party have been trying for almost forty years to combat. In relation to the other major centres of world power, China is still economically weak, strategically vulnerable. In the wake of Chairman Mao's death and the unmasking of the Gang of Four, the Chinese leadership has admitted to serious problems in the economy. By all the measures of Western economists China ought not to have survived the last fifteen years. But it has; and it has sustained a modest rate of growth, even by Western standards. It feeds its people, it registers progress. The Chinese have set themselves a goal of full mechanisation of agriculture by the end of this decade, and entry into the ranks of the world's advanced industrialised nations by the year 2000. This is an ambitious goal. I can see much that might happen to impede the Chinese attainment of that goal. But I am confident that in twenty-five years time they will have advanced a very long way towards it.

In China, population is manpower, an asset in the stage of developing technology. The initial period of Communist rule in China was one of reconstruction, in which the population consumed. Reconstruction was a slow process, because the Chinese Communist Party is committed to advancing the standard of living of the whole country as equitably as possible. When the goal of agricultural mechanisation is reached and manpower is released from agricultural work, China will already have a moderate industrial base and a literate, educated and in some part skilled, work force. The takeoff could be spectacular. Notwithstanding the acknowledged conservatism of the Chinese peasant, there is a potential for dynamic development in China which will, I believe, take Australia by surprise.

China's influence in the region will be, in part, economic; and already some far-sighted Australian
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companies are thinking about how best to lay a base now for the economic relationship of twenty-five years hence. As a consumer of raw material and technology, and a supplier of low priced labour-intensive manufactured goods, China's importance to Australia could come to rival that of Japan's now. China's influence will also be cultural, by which I mean both what is commonly understood as Chinese culture and the political culture of the New China. As China projects itself outward, as the range of its contacts with foreign countries broadens and deepens, Chinese patterns of thought and behaviour will have a growing impact on the world we deal with in Asia. Above all, China's influence will be political, and inescapable. Wherever we move in this region, our interests and China's will abut. We will find ourselves beside or even within a Chinese sphere of influence. By this, I do not mean sphere of influence in the Western sense; but a region, a sub-system within the international system, in which Chinese cultural influence and political behaviour is dominant, but in which Asian and Pacific states are joined to China by voluntary association. I expect, for example, that there will be a much more intimate relationship between China and Japan, a country to which Australia's destiny is already tied. It is possible to envisage a coming together of these two countries on the basis of their history, culture and economic complementarity which might even mirror the development of post-war Europe. Southeast Asians will want to benefit from such a unity by association with it, and this will strengthen the already predictable political influence of China in Southeast Asia, which we confess to be the region of greatest importance to Australia.

The importance of China to Australia seems to me so certain as to be self-evident, and its political influence is already of some consequence to us. China is not an obviously active power in the region,
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but it is involved in a number of ways that Australia can only regard as positive. The Chinese are, as it were, holding the ring in North Asia. However passive, their stand on the Soviet Union is a part of the global balance. They are opposed to the forcible solution of the Korean question and have presumably made this clear to their North Korean friends. They have taken a positive and helpful attitude towards Japan/United States relations, urging the Japanese to give first priority to the alliance with the United States. In the East, China has been doing its best not to force the pace on the resolution on the Taiwan question. It has sustained a good working relationship with colonial Hong Kong. It declined the Portuguese offer to return Macao to China. In Southeast Asia it has endorsed ASEAN and the ASEAN proposal for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality; and it has a generally approving attitude towards the normalisation of relations between the Indo-China states and ASEAN. It has not pressed the United States on military withdrawal from Southeast Asia post-Vietnam. In our part of the world, the Chinese have specifically approved of ANZUS. In South Asia, a start has even been made on the long road back towards a more harmonious relationship with India. Throughout the region, the one government which is still strongly and vocally hostile to China is that of Indonesia where, in return, the Chinese say simply that they are ready to restore diplomatic relations whenever the Indonesians are ready. Chinese support for revolution in Southeast Asia is open, but limited by China's own doctrine and does not materially affect the course of revolution in those countries.

Even with its present potential, the Chinese capacity to influence our environment can be imagined if all the above policies were to be reversed. With the exception of Japan, there is no other country within the region which has such a capacity
to influence this part of the world in ways detrimental to Australia's interests, and by its own action, without the support of other powers, not even Indonesia which is regarded as of great importance to Australia. Australia must recognise this fact and begin to work for a much closer and more intimate relationship with China than we have now.

But there still seems to be a lot of resistance to the idea that China is important to Australia and that we ought to develop a much closer relationship than we have so far. I think few Australians now seriously believe that we should not have diplomatic relations with China; but there are many who question how far we could or should go. For many, there is an incapacity to cope with China, culturally or intellectually, a problem I have addressed in the first of these lectures. This is part of the legacy of our own earlier attitudes and self-persuasion concerning China; China is not a part of our intellectual universe, it is not for us a habit of mind. But for others, the objection seems to stem from other causes. The first is ideological or political; this is the objection which argues 'It's all very well to have relations, but we mustn't get too close to Chinese Communists', or even, as I heard last year from one very senior Australian official, we ought not to get involved in discussing high policy with the Chinese 'because the Americans would not like it'. I suppose we will always have to live with this kind of problem, but it seems to me very narrow-sighted in the 1970s, when even conservative Australian governments are committed to a close relationship with China.

The other main cause is in some ways more worrying; it is an incapacity to think in terms of a complex foreign policy, it is the either/or syndrome. You may recall that, before we recognised China, some people argued that we should not do so because it would upset the Americans or the Japanese or our friends in Southeast Asia. That is
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now history. But there is another interesting illustration. When diplomatic relations were first established, the Labor Government took some pains to point out that China was not the centre of Australia's foreign policy. This was intended to allay the quite unfounded suspicions of such an objective on the part of some of Australia's existing friends and to indicate that Australia was now embarked on a multi-faceted foreign policy. I regret to say that this statement was taken in some quarters as an opening to accord China an importance and priority well below that which was stated in official policy of the Australian Government. I must say I was surprised also at how often I heard or read that such and such an initiative in China was undesirable because it might be detrimental to our relations with another country or group of countries. As a reflex, this is not just a silly general proposition; it can also be damaging to our interests. I do not suggest that China ought to be accorded an importance it does not have. What I do suggest is that the challenge to our diplomacy is to develop an approach which can handle a variety of complex relationships, simultaneously, not choosing one over another, but assessing each in terms of its own importance to us.

I have a similar attitude to the question of whether what I recommend in respect of China might not carry the danger of getting too close to the Chinese, or too much within their influence. Apart from the fact that present Australian attitudes make that a remote possibility, it ought to be obvious that we must rely on diplomatic skill not to do so, and that ought not to be beyond our wit or capacity. We have yet to learn, however, how to combine intimacy with toughness in our foreign and diplomatic relations.

A related and more specific problem is the question of the Soviet Union. I have mentioned the Soviet factor in Chinese policy towards Australia; how is it a factor in Australian policy? I have been
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asked whether it is not the case that Australia put itself into 'the Chinese Camp' by associating itself with Peking's anti-sovietism. In my personal opinion this argument can be completely dismissed. There is no Chinese Camp; and in my understanding the Fraser-led Opposition had made up its mind about the Soviet Union long before it made up its mind on China. There was a coincidence of views with the Chinese in Peking last June, and that is all. Again, it is a question of diplomatic skill. If we share views with the United States we are not afraid to voice them publicly in Washington. We should do the same in Peking, if we see the need, or in Moscow or Tokyo or Jakarta for that matter.

If we grant that China is important to Australia, are the Chinese susceptible to influence? It is not appropriate for me to answer this question in any specific detail, but I can say that the answer is positive. The Chinese have been prepared to listen to our views. I believe it can be illustrated that in areas of mutual interest and concern China has been influenced by our thinking, and this illustrates an important general point about Chinese foreign policy. Modern China, no less than traditional China, has been quick to recognise when universal formulae do not accord with the reality of China's position and interests. Traditional China went on pretending but adjusted its behaviour to reality. Modern China changed the formula to one that gave it the flexibility it required. China understands that a stand-off opposition to the Second World would be damaging to its own interests and therefore also that to accord importance to another state in foreign policy is to accept the likelihood of having to take heed of its views. This is a point not widely appreciated in Australia.

The matter of influence raises a final question, concerning our working relationship with the Chinese and the management of this relationship.
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After the initial period of establishing the embassy in Peking we settled into a day-to-day relationship which was both effective in communication and, I believe, fruitful for both sides. I would not claim it was perfect; there must always be scope for improvement. But our relations were strengthened by a genuine rapport between the embassy and the Chinese government, which allowed a familiarity and informality in our social contacts which made our relations with the Chinese extremely pleasant. Australians have their own idiosyncrasies, and I admired the courtesy and flexibility of Chinese officials just as I appreciated their efforts to meet our sometimes importunate demands. We used to toast each other at dinners in what must have seemed like competitive praise for the other and self-abnegation; but I must say that I am genuinely grateful for the way in which they handled us and I hope I can record this more effectively in some later reflections on my life in Peking.

But what struck me most was the consistency of Chinese approaches to their relations with us. The Chinese, not unlike the Japanese, have a total approach to foreign policy. Trade, culture, science, recreation, sport, tourist delegations and so on are all regarded as part of the foreign relations effort, and indivisible, except where division is by design. It follows that every action is, if not always planned at least monitored, co-ordinated, and tuned to the requirements of overall policy. I don’t think the Chinese would claim that they are always correct, or never mistaken, or quick to move when they have been slow. But the management of their foreign policy is surprisingly effective in a way which gives them considerable advantage over countries which are incapable of responding in the same way. It is true, they have the advantage of a centrally controlled management of their society, but the example of Japan, and perhaps Singapore, suggests
that a similar approach is not impossible in a non-socialist state.

In Australia, we lack this capacity and unless we develop it this is going to make the adjustment to both China and Japan, and some other states both Asian and non-Asian, more difficult. It causes embarrassment, unnecessary conflict of interests and national disadvantage. Any government capable of co-ordinating its country's foreign activities will naturally take advantage, where it can, of those which do not. I have seen Australians giving voice to conflicting and competing interests in an actual negotiating situation with the Chinese. I have seen government objectives in China thwarted because major decisions of private enterprise were taken quite independently of government objectives, and, in the case of our failure to take up the opportunity to purchase Chinese oil, outside Australia. Because we lack the awareness and the will, we also lack the mechanisms for consultation or even fear them as a threat to our allegedly free enterprise system. Our government made some undertakings on trade with China; when certain industries felt the pinch we imposed restrictions on certain Chinese imports in a way in which, in my personal opinion, ultimately damaged our credibility with the Chinese. We have been demanding when it comes to our major exports to China; but on at least two matters, almost rudely offhand when it comes to China's major exports to Australia. I do not suggest that we need a bureaucratic monster to monopolise our foreign relations, even within the public service as proposed by the Foreign Affairs department to the Coombs enquiry. But it ought not to be beyond our intellect to devise ways of co-ordinating our policies which might present a united front in dealings with foreign governments on matters which affect our vital interests.
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This is, I repeat, primarily a question of understanding the societies we deal with and having the will to develop a more effective management of foreign policy as a whole. If we do not accept the importance of China to Australia and do not even understand why the Chinese behave as they do, we still have a very long way to go. The fault lies with our society and with our education system and until we are producing high school graduates with a grounding in Asian cultures and a grasp of Asian languages, as a tool and not as an end, we will not succeed. It will take a generation to make this transformation and we ought to begin now. If we do fail to work out a secure and independent position in relation to a dominant China or a combined North Asia, the fault will lie with us, not with them.

It is not just our education system. I think governments have been at fault for not accepting the domestic responsibilities which ought to accompany a foreign policy which gives first priority to the Asia Pacific region. The Australian bureaucracy is at fault for its blinkered preoccupation with internal struggles and its failure to adopt a more positive vanguard role within our society. I think the Australian media, overall, is failing to provide the Australian people with sustained and accurate reporting about Asian societies in a way which might enable Australians to make proper judgments about our Asian policies, about what is said to them about Asia by governments, academics, diplomats and others. It’s true, the media is also the creature of our education, or lack of it. There are, and have been, some outstanding correspondents in Peking, but their material is not widely used by the Australian media. And I’ve been struck by the number of working members of the media I’ve encountered in Australia who may be competent reporters and commentators on domestic affairs, but who seem to lack any frame of reference.
when it comes to reporting even the domestic Australian aspects of Australia's Asia problem. For example, having spoken to a journalist from *The West Australian* about our general failure to teach in high school Cambodian, Thai, Vietnamese, Tagalog, and other Southeast Asian languages, not to mention Chinese, I find a report that we teach all of these Southeast Asian languages before Chinese. Or a reporter from the *Australian* who quotes me as saying we sell to China not wheat and sugar, but wheat and rice; or the same reporter, having been told there must be post-Mao leaders of great competence but there can be no leader in China who can rival Mao's unique role in twentieth century history, who has me in direct quotes saying there will be many more powerful leaders than Mao in the future. It's of minor consequence to me that these things sound foolish. It's of greater consequence that historians use the press as a basic source material. But most of all, it concerns me that we are locked in a cycle of misinformation and lack of information. In the case of China, this is by no means because there is nothing to report. Attitudes in Australia are changing, but it's not surprising that you don't have to dig very deep to find the old prejudices and fears.

I would argue very strongly that we need not see the Chinese as a threat to Australia. I believe we can, if we make the effort, look forward to a beneficial relationship with China and I am personally convinced that we can enjoy very considerable goodwill in Peking. But we have to recognise that if we fail to accept the responsibility to equip ourselves adequately for a world in which Asia is not a progressive idea but the most pressing reality in our world, an Asia in which China is dominant, then we are not going to be able even to advance and protect our own interests. We have to equip ourselves to be able to deal with China. We have to tailor domestic policies, particularly in education, to serve our foreign policy
goals. We have to extend the range of issues on which we might influence the views of China as it assumes a more prominent regional role. We have to concern ourselves less with avoiding the imagined perils of falling under Chinese influence and more with preventing a situation in which we find ourselves on the outside, excluded from Chinese confidence but subject to Chinese influence because of the power it wields in this part of the world.
The interpretations of domestic politics in this lecture are very much a product of my attempts to analyse what was going on at the time. They are 'China as I saw it', and intended neither as an academic treatise nor an expression of emotional commitment. But they are also intended to be provocative. I have been amazed at how unquestioningly large numbers of Australians, including many of my friends on the left, had accepted a simple view of the Shanghai Four which they seem reluctant to abandon. My interpretation may well be wrong. But I hope it serves to provoke debate and questioning.

For years before Chairman Mao's death in September 1976 the world speculated about what would happen to China's policies after he died. Embassies in Peking were asked to submit their predictions on this question. Foreign ministries presented submissions to their governments on it. Academics wrote papers about it and one or two attempted full length books. Analysts played with variables such as Mao dying before Chou En-lai, Chou dying before Mao or both dying together. Foreign intelligence services many times predicted when the Chairman would pass away and some attempted remote medical diagnosis with the aid of television film clips and visitors' reports. The Diplomatic Corps in Peking buzzed to and fro collecting and disseminating the gossip and the rumours; the pollination of the morning's coffee conversation brought forth the evening cocktail party's bloom of fact. It is one wry testimony to his
lively greatness that foreigners could expend so much effort on the subject of Mao’s death. In fairness, Chinese people also wondered what might happen.

Now he is dead. Not only is he dead but he was preceded that year by two of his oldest and closest revolutionary colleagues, Chou En-lai in January and Chu Teh in July. In the same year China had three massive earthquakes, one of which is believed to have carried off more than six hundred thousand people, and across a dozen provinces there were serious natural disasters of other kinds. It was a political year which saw the ouster of the putative heir to Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, riots in Peking’s Tienanmen Square, a bomb attack on the Soviet Embassy in Peking, the rise to prominence of Hua Kuo-feng and the arrest of four of the most prominent members of the Chinese leadership, known now as the ‘Gang of Four’. Had foreign analysts known that all these events would occur within the year of Chairman Mao’s death, their attention to that central event would have redoubled and their predictions would, I am sure, have been doubly dramatic, spreading waves of concern through the chancelleries of Europe, America, Asia and Africa, not to mention Oceania.

The domestic policies of large powers at transitional periods are always approached with concern by foreign governments for the possible effect these may have on foreign relations. This is what concerned people about Mao’s impending demise. But the connection between domestic events and foreign policies does not begin with Mao’s death, and the best way of understanding what has happened since his death is to begin with the political drama which counterpointed his declining years, a kind of modern revolutionary, or counter-revolutionary, Peking Opera of outstanding contemporary significance.

In the roughly ten years since the Cultural Revo-
Chinese Foreign Policy, Mao and 'Gang of Four'

olution the central issue in Chinese politics and ultimately what the Chinese would call the principal contradiction, has concerned this group from Shanghai, the Gang of Four. Foreign observers, who up until the Cultural Revolution had tended to regard Chinese politics as an unshakeable monolith, now switched to a factional description of the Chinese political scene. This was justified to some extent by the factionalism which had emerged during the Cultural Revolution and to some extent also by the use of the terms 'Left' and 'Right' in China to plot the course of factional disputes. But with few exceptions, foreign observers were wrong in their description of the alignment of political forces at the centre of China and in the centres of regional power. There were alleged to be two main groupings, the leftists or radicals, based on the Shanghai Group now deposed, and the so-called moderates or pragmatists said to be represented by people like Premier Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. In my view, this piece of analytical perspex, when held up against what was actually happening in Chinese politics, simply didn't fit. It didn't even take proper account of the Chinese use of political terms, which does not follow the radical-to-moderate scale of Western political vocabulary. As Marxist-Leninists, the Chinese talk of both Left and Right opportunism, adventurism, extremism or other political deviation which is to the left and right of the correct line; and by this definition the opponents of a leftist deviation need not themselves be rightist or even 'moderate' but correctly revolutionary—assuming of course that there is, or was, a genuine leftist deviation. But there was not. The term 'Shanghai Radicals' was a Western invention. Inside China, before their downfall, the group was occasionally referred to by a very specific term tao-fan-p'ai, 'revolutionary rebels'. This term refers to the role they played in the Cultural Revolution and, depending on the context and the point
of view, its use could either be approving or perjorative and was not a measure of political stance. In my view, these people were not radicals or leftists, in the sense that one would normally expect from a radical group. There is no evidence of their having developed a consistent theoretical position, a coherent 'radical' doctrine, a concerted radicalism in action which might have stamped them as the true Maoists, the standard-bearers of the regenerative new wave of creative revolutionary Marxism-Leninism that was to succeed Chairman Mao. I admit that we in the Embassy found it easier to define what they were not than what they were. At first, we were inclined to argue simply that they did not always act in radical concert, and adopted 'radical' positions on some issues but not on others; which at the very least suggested that they were not ideologues but political opportunists. Later, as we wrestled with the problem of defining what they were about in action, to justify the position we had taken against many other foreign observers of China, we tried to get away from the standard definitions and succeeded only in producing some equally awkward substitutes which we ourselves found less than satisfactory. We did, however, for a time, find some merit in the term 'fundamentalist', which I, at least, understood in that context to mean someone not creative but imitative, self-righteous in speech but not necessarily righteous in action, assuming a right to tell everyone else how they ought to behave, preaching, declaiming, mouthing texts, presuming to decide between the good and the bad, the 'sinners' and the 'saved'. This is what may have given them the appearance of being 'Maoist Revolutionary' and therefore in Western interpretation, leftists. In the end, about six months before their overthrow, we had settled on calling them simply 'the Shanghai

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pursuit of personal political power through the economic weight of Shanghai and their control of China's largest, most industrialised and most advanced city.

In a word, they were poseurs. But they distorted Chinese politics for about a decade, and they very nearly succeeded in their bid to control the Party. How?

They rose to power on the wave of the Cultural Revolution. Chairman Mao, finding himself at odds with leading colleagues in the Politburo and excluded, increasingly, from decision-making by his named successor Liu Shao-ch'i, in 1966 had used the Shanghai leadership and their propaganda organs, notably the newspaper the *Wen Hui Pao*, to launch a political counter-attack on what he regarded as the corrupted 'headquarters' of the Party in Peking. The Shanghainese supported him, and when the smoke began to clear in the closing stages of the Cultural Revolution, they had emerged in positions of power in the centre of the Chinese political system; they had also acquired for themselves a mandate, probably approved by the Chairman, to control the nation's art, literature, propaganda, and education, which gave them immense potential influence. From the time of the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, I believe Chinese politics has been a tussle about whether or not they would succeed to the ultimate power in China.

The Lin Piao affair of 1971 is not yet clearly in perspective. But the major struggle, it seems to me, was between this group and Chou En-lai and his supporters, not a struggle for the triumph or defeat of radicalism, but a struggle to prevent the Shanghainese from taking power. I cannot claim to have foreseen this, or even to have been fully aware of it at the time. But my view of the Gang of Four was formed before their downfall and not because I read it in the *People's Daily*. I had always believed, from
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the time of the Cultural Revolution, that Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, was at best anarchist, but probably lacking even as much theory as that and simply destructive, self-seeking, personally egotistical and histrionic. I have seen her preening before television cameras, at a formal farewell for Prince Sihanouk in the Great Hall of the People in 1975, in a way that must have seemed shamefully demeaning to other members of the Chinese leadership who witnessed it. Without cataloguing the behaviour of other members of the Shanghai Group, and even granting that one, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, may have been a more substantial politician than the others, I think there can be no doubt that the fact that they were prepared to hitch themselves to the coat-tails of a person such as Chiang Ch'ing simply because of the use that could be made of her connection with the Chairman makes them less than unsullied, hardly ideological purists, more opportunist even than some other casualties in Chinese politics who have pursued their ambitions by more straightforward means.

Some time in the early 1970s, possibly when Chou En-lai's illness was first diagnosed in 1972, I think Chou, with the support of the Chairman, decided that a more concerted effort was needed to head off the Shanghaiese bid for power. The result was a rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, once Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, denounced and vilified during the Cultural Revolution, and by the Shanghaiese particularly, as the 'number two Party person in power taking the capitalist road'. By January 1975, Teng had not only returned to active politics but he was, effectively, deputising for the ailing Chou En-lai, in fact if not in name in the actual inner circle within the Chinese Politburo, and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. In my view, Teng was put there, by Mao and Chou and with the active support of leading figures in the
present Chinese leadership including the new Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, to block the Shanghainese, and if possible get rid of them. The decline in the health of Chou En-lai throughout 1975 made his task more difficult and more urgent, and he set about it with a will that must have been buttressed by his own former humiliation at the hands of the Shanghainese. In speeches which only subsequently became public, he criticised Chiang Ch'ing and all her works; he seems to have challenged Wang Hung-wen to prove his ability by assigning him to resolve some factional problems which had been festering away in Chekiang Province for many months; in policy areas he began developing ideas which he knew would provoke the opposition of the Shanghainese, of Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, the theoretician of the four, and Yao Wen-yüan, who had control of the media, whose theories and press manipulation Teng's policies subjected to direct challenge.

In Peking, we were to a limited extent aware of what was going on, but we could not see the whole; nor, I suspect, could the Chinese people. They, more than we, could see the sudden shifts in the direction of political campaigns; they could see the reflections in the public media of strong debates among the leadership; they had more specific evidence of the behaviour of the Shanghainese, and in some cases direct experience of their political interventions. But they may not have seen just how the lines were drawn. Some who did, who took issue with the Four, found themselves removed from office, or, like the Director of The New China Newsagency, scrubbing floors. Others were bewildered by the erratic nature of the Four's directives and in the end, because Chiang Ch'ing sometimes purported to speak for Chairman Mao, they were uncertain as to what did represent the official policy of the Chairman and the Party Centre. Unfortunately, in January 1976, Chou En-lai died, before the issue could be resolved. For
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some time before this, we had understood Chiang Ch’ing to have been denied access to Mao, by Mao himself. Chou’s death seems to have given her an opportunity to regain access to the Chairman in a way that enabled her and her associates to manipulate his political authority to their own ends. At this time, Mao was, by all accounts, quite sound in mind, but incapacitatingly weak in body. His physical frailty must have limited quite severely his capacity to control the movement of day-to-day politics, to ensure that he was properly understood and his wishes transmitted in the way he intended. He was afflicted with some ailment which made speech extremely difficult, and the effort of an active mind unable to communicate must have been excruciating to him, as must have also been the reappearance of Chiang Ch’ing.

With the death of their principal active opponent and the advantage of access to the physically helpless Chairman, the Shanghainese now began their run in earnest. At the meeting which followed Mao’s death they tried, but failed, to have their candidate, Chang Ch’un-ch’iao, named Prime Minister. But they did succeed in moving Teng Hsiao-p’ing aside, and Hua Kuo-feng became acting Premier. They then went for Teng’s jugular in a bid to completely discredit him, the further object being, presumably, to discredit all of Teng’s associates still in positions of power. But Teng, in my opinion, had always had in mind a second option; if he could not push them out from above and was himself toppled, he would try to bring them down in an act of political judo. This he proceeded to do, with what I believe to have been the full knowledge of other Politburo associates. Teng stubbornly refused to admit to the political deviations with which he had been labelled, in a calculated attempt to provoke the Shanghainese.

From this point on their political ineptitude became increasingly manifest. They fell into Teng’s
trap, and became more frantic, more vicious and trivial in the attacks they made on him, to an extent which, I believe, ultimately disgusted the Chinese people. With Teng persisting in his refusal to ‘confess’ to the validity of their charges, the Gang of Four began publishing in the official media excerpts from Teng’s speeches and directives which allegedly showed him to be an unrepentant advocate of the restoration of capitalism in China. Chinese readers found the case to be unconvincing, and I am sure, on some issues, Chinese people began to think that Teng’s sentiments, of which hitherto they may have been unaware, had much to commend them.

The Gang of Four then made a political miscalculation almost beyond credibility; they turned their attack against Chou En-lai. The background to their fight with Chou En-lai over the years has yet to be fully clarified, but it is certain that they saw him as an enemy, an obstacle to their ambitions, not because he was ‘moderate’ or ‘pragmatic’ but because he was a genuine revolutionary, a dedicated nationalist and a matchless political craftsman. I think, in due course, we may find that many otherwise unexplained episodes in the last ten years, such as the curious business of the so-called ‘May 16th’ group, are related to this central conflict. In any event, in March 1976 the Gang of Four used their newspaper in Shanghai, the Wen Hui Pao, to float two apparently innocuous articles which Chinese readers realised contained quite specific slights against Chou En-lai. I was personally aware of this because a train in which I was travelling from Shanghai to Peking was stopped by students, at Nanking, calling for the exposure of the people who inspired the articles, accusing them of trying to seize power, and defending the late Premier. The next day in Peking massive and largely spontaneous demonstrations in memory of Chou En-lai pressed into the Tienanmen Square and
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around the martyr’s memorial, demonstrations which culminated four days later in the Peking riots.

The Gang’s motives in this attack on Chou seem to have been not only to discredit Chou himself, but, by bringing him into disrepute to open the way to wholesale criticism and removal of all the old revolutionary leaders who stood in their way. It was a stupid move, because Chou’s memory in China is sacrosanct.

The riots seem to have forced the issue of the succession, both to the Premier and to the sinking Chairman. They brought back into play some key Politiburo figures who are reported to have dissociated themselves in disgust from the Gang’s attacks on Teng Hsiao-p’ing. The immediate result appeared to be an advance for the Gang, as Teng was stripped of his offices (although not, significantly, of his Party membership).

To us in the Embassy in Peking it seemed that the battle had been joined, against a background of public opinion which was fed up with what we now called ‘the Smart Set from Shanghai’. But the lines were still obscure. It seemed to us that while Chiang Ch’ing, particularly, remained on the scene there could be no resolution to problems in the Chinese leadership. What we did not know was that, on the night of the 30 April, Chairman Mao had nominated Hua Kuo-feng as his successor. Fortuitously, the Chairman’s speech difficulty meant that he had to write down what he had in mind, which armed Hua with an effective counter to the Gang of Four’s misrepresentations of the Chairman’s alleged verbal instructions. Hua had the nod; he also had patience and a sound political instinct; and I believe he had the support of veteran leaders such as Yeh Chien-ying and Li Hsien-nien.

Why did Hua not move then, in May last year, to depose the Gang of Four? The Gang of Four still had some access to the Chairman, which might be used to
enlist support elsewhere. I think that Hua wanted to move slowly, to determine the extent of support for the Four and to lay plans for an effective strike against them. It's likely also that he did not want to precipitate a crisis before the Chairman's death. The Chairman was ordered by his doctors in early June not to receive any more foreign visitors and all in the leadership must have known he was dying. I think Hua also wanted some time to establish his political authority. Ironically, the tragic disaster of the terrible Tangshan earthquake gave him an opportunity; the chance to show himself as a man of decision, authority and compassion, able to carry the country through a momentous national calamity. Six weeks after the earthquake, the Chairman died, four weeks later the group from Shanghai was arrested in an effective surgical strike which left their political associates leaderless and exposed.

Throughout the period of this political turmoil the Chinese Government was engaged in the development of an active foreign policy which included opening up a broad range of new contacts with Second and Third World countries, as well as with Japan and the United States. The Gang of Four had been at the very centre of Chinese politics, with a say in decision-making. What influence had they had on foreign policy?

Three months after their overthrow, on the first anniversary of Chou En-lai's death, an article appeared in the People's Daily under the name of 'The Theoretical Study Group of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' which, in reviewing Chou En-lai's lifelong contribution to foreign affairs, had this to say about the Gang of Four . . .

The Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao anti Party 'gang of four', and Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao were jackals from the same lair. To realize their ambition to usurp supreme Party and State
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leadership, the 'gang of four' used every conceivable means to meddle in foreign affairs work in a bid to seize the diplomatic power of the central leading organs. In diplomatic activities, they put themselves above Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, attacked Premier Chou, elbowed out Chairman Hua, got themselves into the limelight and energetically created counter revolutionary opinion internationally. They worshipped things foreign, fawned upon foreigners, maintained illicit foreign relations and practised national betrayal and capitulationism in a big way, and sold out important classified information of the Party and the State. They pigeonholed articles criticising Soviet revisionism and forbade their publication. They obstructed our country from developing relations with other countries and disrupted her normal foreign economic and cultural exchanges. They looked down upon the third world and energetically practised great-power chauvinism. Premier Chou waged a tit-for-tat struggle against the 'gang of four'. He firmly opposed Chiang Ching issuing statements to foreigners without authorisation and divulging classified information of the Party and the state. He severely criticized the 'gang of four' for engaging in metaphysics and great-power chauvinism in relations with foreign countries.

These charges are none too specific, in the sense that they don't tell us what were the precise episodes or policy decisions affected by the Gang of Four. I think it is the case that this passage refers to their endeavours to run foreign policy rather than their success in doing so, and to isolated events which did not seriously alter foreign policy over the longer term. Indeed, immediately after the smashing of the Gang of Four, I was told by Chinese officials that
their influence in foreign policy had not been great because foreign policy was conducted according to what is known as 'Mao's Revolutionary Line in Foreign Affairs' and that this had not been subject to serious interference. It's still possible to identify some matters which might be what this People's Daily article is referring to. For example, one of the Gang of Four, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, became involved in receiving foreign visitors, in a way which at the time suggested a division of labour but which could have reflected competition for control of foreign policy. The Foreign Minister himself, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, was removed from office after the smashing of the Gang for reasons which apparently relate to his association with them. Before this, we at the Embassy had also heard that Chiang Ch'ing had attacked two prominent women in the Ministry, Vice-Minister Wang Hai-jung, and Tang Wen-sheng, an interpreter for Mao and Chou and a Deputy Director of the Ministry's Asian Affairs Department (and that both had taken a rather courageous stand against her). On the question of 'looking down on the third world', some of my African colleagues had from time to time complained of being treated as less than equal in Peking.

There are two specific episodes which bear the stamp of Chiang Ch'ing, and neither could be described as radical. One was her famous interview with the American academic, Roxane Witke, an exercise in personal self-aggrandisement quite out of character with the style of Chinese revolutionaries. The other was the second visit to China of Richard Nixon. In my view, there were probably two reasons for this Chinese invitation to Nixon. One was the 'old friends' syndrome in Chinese foreign policy, by which individuals who have played an important role in developing relations with China continue to be accorded a special place in the minds of China's leaders. The other was to remind Nixon's successor
of the commitments entered into by the US during Nixon’s first visit in 1972. But the handling of the visit was theatrical and overplayed, and counter-productive in the United States. I believe the theatricality was the work of Chiang Ch’ing.

In policy, there was some visible evidence of frequent changes in direction in the cultural relations field, which may have been due to the Gang of Four. But the one area where their influence was most clearly manifest was in foreign economic policy. All foreign observers had been aware of recurring debates about foreign economic policy; and there was some disruption to foreign trade, at the Canton Fair and in relation to the import of technology and the export of China’s oil. If anything, this interference was arbitrary and maverick. It may have had the appearance of a leftist policy, but it might more properly be labelled either ultra-leftist or what the Chinese might call ‘Left in form but Right in essence’. It seems to me now that what they were about was political posturing. It was easy for people from Shanghai to preach self-reliance to the rest of the country, given the relatively high level of development in that city. I think, moreover, that they were interested in developing the economic weight of Shanghai to enhance their own political power. Hence, imported foreign technology was in some measure in competition with Shanghai; and the export of raw materials might deprive Shanghai of some of the needs of its industry. There is some evidence also that the Gang of Four was even prepared to promote the interests of Shanghai to a point which involved economic ‘warfare’ with neighbouring provinces.

Had the Gang of Four succeeded in their bid to control the Chinese Politburo, I think we would have seen not a leftist foreign policy, but a tendency to erratic behaviour, which would have been very difficult to deal with, because I believe the Gang of Four
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to have been irresponsible as well as incompetent. Instead, there has been a steady continuity in Chinese foreign policy. This seems to bear out the assurances we received at the time of Mao's death, although there was public admission in the speech of Politburo member Wu Teh following the smashing of the Gang of Four, that within China as well as abroad there was a period of concern and uncertainty. I'm not convinced, however, that had the Gang of Four succeeded they could have pursued an irresponsible foreign policy for very long; because this would have been damaging to China's interests in a way that would have created difficulties for them at home.

The pattern of Chinese foreign policy has not varied, not even in respect of relations with the Soviet Union, where some, including some Russian observers, had expected change after Mao's death. I should mention, however, that I believe change in policy towards the Soviet Union is possible even if not immediately likely, a problem which is discussed in the second of these lectures. The only areas in which I would expect to see change are foreign economic policy, which should settle down to a greater predictability, and perhaps also, the general approach to contacts at the popular level, and between academics and creative and performing artists and writers.

Is this kind of continuity not surprising after more than a generation of domination of Chinese foreign policy by these two men, Mao and Chou? I think not. Radical reorientation of a country's foreign policy is not such a frequent phenomenon in today's world. More particularly, in societies which are basically stable the prospects for, indeed the compulsion towards, really significant redirection of foreign policy are not usually great. Australian foreign policy, for example, underwent quite considerable change under the Labor Government; but this was delayed
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change because of the nature of our Parliamentary system and the abnormally long rule of the conservative parties; and it was in many respects only formalisation of change towards which the conservative parties were already being impelled by 1972, which they now accept almost totally and which has general public endorsement. Chinese foreign policy has been adjusting together with external change partly because there is no government-opposition mechanism to create divisions which delay change, partly because the Chinese leadership has had a capacity to publicise its policies internally in a way which ensures support, and partly because it is a feature of the system that there must be constant updating of the analysis of the world and China's national interests and the relation between the two. I regard China as a fundamentally stable society with a recent history of instability in the leadership. I know of few other societies which could have survived the Cultural Revolution intact; and I find it curious that foreigners could still describe the society as unstable when it has come through the events of last year at such relatively low cost in terms of local disturbance and leadership conflict.

I think also that we should not dismiss Mao's 'Revolutionary Line in Foreign Affairs' as mere sloganeering. Mao's analysis of the world is the continuing authority for Chinese foreign policy, and it seems to me that his analysis is constructed in such a way as to secure independence for China and a peaceful environment by prescribing the limits of change within a range determined by China's domestic policies. The Chinese have said they wish to mechanise agriculture by 1980 and to become an advanced industrialised nation by the year 2000. These are ambitious goals. They demand a peaceful and stable environment. China does not want to become embroiled in conflict, nor does it welcome the distraction of conflict between others in the
region in a way that might require redeployment of resources for defence spending. I think it follows that China is interested pre-eminently in harmonious relations with neighbouring states, in the development of trade including the cultivation of markets for Chinese exports, in the creation of conditions favourable to the ready exchange of technology, in the evolution of a much greater degree than exists at present of co-operation between the states of the Asia Pacific region. Mao's doctrine does not demand, except for defence, military confrontation between China and foreign states; it prohibits it, and China's own experience, particularly with the Japanese occupation, reinforces the doctrine and the conviction.

The main possibilities for change lie in the pattern of China's relations with the Soviet Union and the United States which are considered separately in these lectures. But there remains a question about the longer term. Will China always cleave to these objectives, for example in twenty-five years, I have been asked. Frankly, I don't think anyone can honestly pretend to have a certain answer to such a question about China, or for that matter, Japan, or Indonesia, or Australia. But my own guess is that the ingredients in current Chinese politics and society are more conducive to continuity than to radical departure, and that if China does have the opportunity to develop its society in a relatively stable international environment then it will not depart from these basic objectives. The outcome, of course, depends partly on us, on those countries in this region, in our dealings with China.

I ought to add, finally, a word about the new Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Hua Kuo-feng. Hua's political position, it seems to me, is in the mainstream of the Chinese Revolution. His revolutionary experience includes almost three decades of administration of the policies of the new
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Chinese State at the local and provincial and central level. His exposition of Chinese foreign policy before the death of Mao would not lead me to expect departure from the Mao line. He has a new Foreign Minister who is another of Chou En-lai's longtime associates. I think it would be a mistake to regard Hua as non-revolutionary or 'revisionist'; we ought to be very wary about getting ourselves once more into the business of attaching labels. He is a revolutionary; he is a man of his age; his background in domestic Chinese politics ought to give him the perspective to see the important connection Mao made between domestic preoccupations and foreign policies. One must assume continuous debate, disagreement and dispute in any political system; but to the extent that we are able to assess it, Hua's position seems secure. It is partly the experience of having listened to Hua's extended presentations on Chinese foreign policy before he became Chairman that makes me confident that Chinese foreign policy after Mao will continue in the familiar pattern of recent years.