COLIN MACKERRAS

The Uighur Empire

According to the T'ang Dynastic Histories

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The Uighur Empire
According to the T'ang Dynastic Histories
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1 Julia Ching (trans. and ed.),
   *The Philosophical Letters of Wang Yang-ming*,
   1971
The Uighur Empire
According to the T'ang Dynastic Histories

A STUDY IN SINO-UIGHUR RELATIONS 744–840

Colin Mackerras, Editor and Translator
Preface

This work is a translation with introduction and notes of those sections of the chüan on the Uighurs in the Chiu T'ang-shu and Hsin T'ang-shu referring to the period 744 to 840. It was first published in 1968 as an occasional paper by the Centre of Oriental Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, under the title The Uighur Empire (744–840) According to the T'ang Dynastic Histories. In this second edition, however, I have greatly expanded the introduction and notes to the translations and revised some of my earlier conclusions, although the translations themselves have been left as they were apart from a few, mainly stylistic, changes. This remains a primarily Sinological work. Although I have used translations of Turkish and other non-Chinese early sources, I have paid very little attention to linguistic matters, since these lie outside the sphere of my competence.

Parallel texts in the translations section are placed opposite one another except when otherwise stated. Dates given in brackets in the translations refer normally to the main verb immediately preceding. Otherwise an explanatory note is added. The dates are accompanied where necessary by a reference to the appropriate text. Unless otherwise stated, references to the Chiu T'ang-shu, Hsin T'ang-shu, and T'ang hui-yao are to chüan 195, 217, and 98 respectively of these three works. Dates in parentheses are Western equivalents of a Chinese date just mentioned. Wherever possible the day, month, and year are indicated in completely numeral form. A date such as 27/3–24/4/822 refers to a point of time between 27 March and 24 April 822, but does not indicate the whole period.

The names and titles of Uighurs are normally romanised directly from their Chinese transcriptions, titles given by the Chinese emperor to a khaghan, khatun, or Uighur minister being placed in inverted commas as well as italicised. I have followed standard systems of romanisation throughout: the Wade-Giles for Chinese, but omitting the circumflex over the e and the breve over the u, and the 'Berlin School' for Turkish as exemplified in the Türkische Turfan Texte. In the introduction, note numbers in parentheses, e.g. (n. 159), refer to the notes to the translations.

Many of the texts parallel to the basic sources in Chiu T'ang-shu 195 and Hsin T'ang-shu 217 have been found through Haneda Tōru's great work on the Uighurs during the T'ang, 'Tōdai Kaikotsushi no kenkyū', and
Preface

my debt to Dr Haneda will be clear. I should like to thank Professor E.G. Pulleyblank of the University of British Columbia, who supervised me in the preparation of this work as part of a thesis at the University of Cambridge and made helpful suggestions on the revised manuscript before its publication, and Professor Liu Ts’un-yan of the Australian National University, who went to great trouble to check the translations. I am also grateful to Vera Zaitseff for translating the Russian material for me and Nobuko Gardiner for her assistance with some of the Japanese works used. Finally, I should like to thank Professor A. von Gabain for her useful comments on my first edition and for helping me to decipher which of the Chinese transcriptions referring to individual Uighurs are titles or ranks (given in italics), and which are proper names.

COLIN MACKERRAS
Canberra 1971
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Introduction

One of the most important themes in Chinese foreign policy throughout the ages has been China's attempt to weaken the threat of the warlike peoples of Central and Northern Asia and, where possible, to turn their vast power to her own advantage. In these aims the Chinese have in most periods achieved a considerable degree of success. The emperors of the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. to 220 A.D.) were able by war and diplomacy to stave off the incursions of the Hsiung-nu; those of the Sui (581–618) and early period of the succeeding T'ang (618–907) dealt similarly with the threat of the T'u-chüeh. In the years leading up to the great rebellion of An Lu-shan, which came close to overthrowing the T'ang, another people assumed enormous power in the Mongolian steppes. This was the Uighurs, and the T'ang court's success in persuading them to use their power to support it against An Lu-shan and his followers was one of the main reasons why the dynasty was able to survive the rebellion. It is their vital impact on the course of T'ang history that makes the Uighurs so interesting to the Sinologist.

The Uighurs were the leading tribe in a confederation of nine Turkic Tieh-le peoples,¹ and their name came to be used for the whole confederacy. During the period of their great power they inhabited Mongolia with their focal point in Karabalghasun on the Upper Orkhon River. Under the skilled leadership of ambitious rulers they were able to take advantage of divisions among the other powerful peoples of Central Asia and achieve a position of extreme importance in that area. The empire they founded lasted from 744 until 840, in which year they were expelled from their capital and split into various groups.

THE SOURCES

It is precisely because the Uighurs played so significant a role in the history

¹ The composition of the Uighurs is discussed by Pulleyblank in 'Some Remarks on the Toquzoghuz Problem', pp.35–42 and Haneda Tōru, 'Kyūsei Kaikotsu to Toquz O'yuz to no kankei o ronzu', pp.325–94. Both articles quote further bibliographical materials. The main tribe of the nine, the Uighurs, was itself divided into ten sub-tribes of which the Yao-lo-ko was the chief. Until 795, the Uighur rulers were drawn from this sub-tribe. There were other groups under Uighur rule apart from the nine Tieh-le tribes – for example, the Basmil and Kharlukh were conquered by the Uighurs and became absorbed into the confederation.
of the T'ang empire that the Chinese historians dealing with the period devote so much space to them.

The standard histories of the T'ang, the Chiu T'ang-shu (Old T'ang History) and the Hsin T'ang-shu (New T'ang History), contain extended sections on the Uighurs. Chüan 195 of Chiu T'ang-shu is a chronological description of the political history of the Uighurs during the T'ang. Chüan 217 of Hsin T'ang-shu is divided into two parts: the first gives Uighur political history up to 814 and the second completes their history for the T'ang period. It then goes on to add notes on some of the tribes which made up the Uighur empire, on other tribes related to the Uighurs and on the Kirghiz, the people who drove the Uighurs from Karabalghasun in 840. These two chapters provide us with the main connected accounts in Chinese literature of the Uighurs during the T'ang.

It is not my purpose here to describe or analyse these two works in detail. However, a few comments on their chapters on the Uighurs may be of some value. I leave aside the question of the Confucian moral value of each work, even though this was the main respect in which the compilers of the new hoped to improve on the Old T'ang History, since this seems to me of limited relevance to the modern historian.

One of the most important differences between the two accounts is that the Old T'ang History is much more precisely dated. It frequently gives dates to the month or day, while the New T'ang History rarely specifies more than the year. From this point of view the Old T'ang History is much more useful.

In most places the New History has recorded events somewhat more briefly than its predecessor. This seems to have been a deliberate policy of the compilers in all parts of their work. On the other hand, there is a considerable amount of material in the New History which is not found at all in the old. Even so, the section of the Chiu T'ang-shu on the Uighur empire is slightly longer than that in the Hsin T'ang-shu.

Although the compilers of the New History have clearly relied heavily on the old for their information on the Uighurs, they had at their disposal

2 CTS is traditionally ascribed to Liu Hsü. However, in actual fact, he was merely the chief minister who presented the work to the throne. The man whose labour contributed most to CTS was Chao Ying. See Chiu Wu-tai shih 89.10a; Chin Yü-fu, Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh shih, pp.103-4; Levy, Biography of An Lu-shan, p. 21.
3 Like CTS, HTS was compiled by numerous scholars. They are tabulated in Nien-erh shih k'ao-i 56.959-68. The greatest contribution appears to have been made by Sung Ch'i.
4 See in particular des Rotours, Le traité des examens, pp.56–71.
5 Ibid., p.57.
6 HTS, preface, p. 1b.
a number of works which were not available to the editors of the earlier
document. The latter wrote in a difficult and unsettled period and, as a whole,
their history is based to a very great extent on the original *T'ang-shu*,
completed about 759, and the *shih-lu* or *Veritable Records*, each of which
was an official account of part or all of an emperor’s reign. I think it likely
that the section of the *Old History* dealing with the Uighurs of the empire
period is drawn almost entirely from four works: the *Su-tsung shih-lu*,
*Tai-tsung shih-lu*, *Te-tsung shih-lu*, and *Mu-tsung shih-lu*, that is the
*Veritable Records of Emperor Su-tsung* (756–62), *Tai-tsung* (762–79),
*Te-tsung* (779–805), and *Mu-tsung* (820–4). It is striking that, although
the years 756–95 and 821–2 together account for less than half the century
or so of the Uighur empire, about 95 per cent of the *Old T’ang History* text
I have translated is devoted to those two periods.

Several other sources used for the *New T’ang History* Uighur biography
can be specified. One is the *Yeh-hou chia-chuan*, an account of the life of
the chief minister Li Pi (722–89) by his son Li Fan. It is unfortunately a
very unreliable work (n.159), but this has not prevented the editors of
the *Hsin T’ang-shu* from giving several passages based on it, including a
very long conversation between Te-tsung and Li Pi. Another is the *Li
hsiang-kuo lun-shih chi*, a collection of treatises of Li Chiang (n.245),
from which the compilers of the *New T’ang History* have extracted an
entire memorial for their chapter on the Uighurs (n.246).

Despite the use made of such works, it seems to have been through the
*Veritable Records* that most of the available information on the Uighurs
was preserved. It is therefore relevant to push our inquiry back further and
consider the sources of information used by the compilers of the
*shih-lu*.

The task of preserving court records fell to the *Shih-kuan*, or Office of
Historiographers. The various departments, courts, and ministries sent
in frequent reports to this office on matters of concern to them. For the
purposes of the chapters on the Uighurs, the two most important examples
were the Court of Diplomatic Reception and the Ministry of War.
Whenever an embassy arrived, the Court of Diplomatic Reception would
make an official inquiry into the geography, customs, clothes and products
brought as tribute [of the country whence the mission came], how far

7 See *Nien-erh shih cha-chi* 16.4a–10b; Chin Yü-fu, *Shih-hsüeh shih*, pp.102–3; Pulley-
blank, ‘The Tzyjyh Tongjiann Kaoyih and the Sources for the History of the Period

8 References in parentheses thus are to notes to the translations. Where no source is
given for a statement, it is usually the basic texts translated here. The dates given there
will enable the reader to find the relevant place.

3
THE UIGHUR EMPIRE

away it was and the name of its ruler.' Foreign names and titles were transcribed into Chinese characters in an appropriate way, and it is frequently only in this form that they have survived. The Ministry of War recorded 'the day armies returned; the generals made a report on the cities and fortresses which had fallen [to the emperor], the officers wounded or killed and the live-stock and goods captured'.\textsuperscript{9} In addition, provincial officials were required to send in reports of local events to the Office of Historiographers. All these records were preserved for the specific purpose of incorporation into the shih-lu.\textsuperscript{10} At the end of each reign, officials of the office would compile an account of the preceding emperor's rule.\textsuperscript{11}

When the compilers of the \textit{Old T'ang History} came to write a chapter on the Uighurs, they simply looked through the shih-lu and selected references to the Uighurs, which they wrote down with little or no change. They were not always concerned to connect the accounts properly, and their chapter hence lacked coherence. The men who compiled the \textit{New History} may have used more sources and placed more emphasis on the literary and moral value of their work, but the indirect or direct influence of the shih-lu remained strong and the same scissors-and-paste method of compilation is still in evidence.

There are other works besides the standard histories which give a connected account of the Uighurs. In \textit{chüan} 98 the \textit{T'ang hui-yao}\textsuperscript{12} has a section which relates a few events in their history during the T'ang. There is a similar section in \textit{chüan} 967 of the \textit{Ts'e-fu yüan-kuei}.\textsuperscript{13} Nevertheless, apart from the chapters in the standard T'ang histories, by far the most important sources for Uighur history in Chinese literature come from isolated references in certain works, and although these notices are usually parallel to passages in \textit{Chiu T'ang-shu} 195 or \textit{Hsin T'ang-shu} 217, they help to clarify these texts and to complete their accounts. The \textit{Ts'e-fu yüan-kuei}, which divides history into topics, notes in the section on embassies a number of missions from the Uighurs to the Chinese court not elsewhere mentioned; so too does the section on mutual trade. The basic annals of the two T'ang histories, especially the \textit{Old History}, sometimes complement the records of the Uighur chapters. It may be added, too, that in all these cases the influence of the shih-lu is still clear.


\textsuperscript{10} \textit{T'ang liu-tien} 9.10a.

\textsuperscript{11} See Chin Yü-fu, \textit{Shih-hsüeh shih}, p.100. It should be added that no shih-lu were compiled for the last five T'ang emperors until the Sung (ibid., p.96).

\textsuperscript{12} This work is discussed by des Rotours in \textit{Trait de	extsuperscript{es} exa	extsuperscript{men}s}, pp.92-3.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., pp.91-2.
In this respect, I have found the *Ts'e-fu yüan-kuei* particularly useful. It has quoted extensively from the *Veritable Records*,\(^{14}\) and in some instances its record appears to be closer to the original than the parallel passage in *Chiu T'ang-shu* 195.

The greatest of all Chinese historical works, the *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien*\(^{15}\) written in the eleventh century by Ssu-ma Kuang, contains copious isolated references to Uighur history, and because its dating is so precise, its style so coherent and clear, and its descriptions of events so detailed, it helps in innumerable places to clear up obscurities in the basic texts, and to date and complete the accounts contained in these works. Ssu-ma Kuang wrote a complementary work, the *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien k'ao-i*, in which he discusses discrepancies in the sources used for his great history. His notes are quite invaluable since they enable us to trace the sources of many of the statements made in his history and in other works where parallel passages indicate the same authority.\(^{16}\) It is thus possible to judge the reliability of much of our material. The *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* was annotated by Hu San-hsing in the thirteenth century. His notes give information on various items, such as the customs of tribes, and they are particularly useful for their geographical notices.

A general point of the utmost importance concerning these and almost all other Chinese historical works is that they are completely centred on China. Their compilers were interested in the Uighurs mainly insofar as these affected China's development. For this reason they made little attempt to give due weight to what was important to the Uighurs, but recounted at length Uighur activities in China. For instance, among the most important events in the history of the Uighurs was their conversion to Manichaeism, yet this is not even mentioned in the Chinese sources. On the other hand, the Uighur role in the defeat of An Ch'ing-hsü in 757, which was of peripheral importance for the Uighurs, is treated in great detail. It is not surprising that the Chinese sources should be deficient in this way, since Chinese Confucian historiography was aimed at the moral edification of future Chinese administrators and therefore regarded foreigners as a mere sideline. Yet there are many compensations for these drawbacks, and the relative lack of any other sources makes them the basis of our knowledge of the Uighurs.

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\(^{15}\) Several important studies have been made on this work. See especially des Rotours, *Traité des examens*, pp.74–81 and Pulleyblank, ‘Chinese Historical Criticism: Liu Chih-ch'iu and Ssu-ma Kuang’, pp.151–9.

\(^{16}\) On the uses of the *TCTCKI* see especially Pulleyblank, ‘Sources for the History’, pp.448–73.
Among non-Chinese sources, only Uighur and Arab material have much of importance to add. Two Uighur stele inscriptions deserve special mention. One was discovered at Shine-usu in Northern Mongolia in 1909.\textsuperscript{17} It is covered with runic Turkish characters which describe in the first person the exploits and wars of the second khaghan of the Uighur empire, Mo-yen-ch’o. Although badly worn, it yields information not otherwise available to the historian. The second was found east of the main street of the ancient Uighur capital, Karabalghasun, which had long lain in ruins. It was discovered by a Russian mission in 1889, and further fragments uncovered in 1890 and 1891. There are three parts of the inscription, one in Chinese, one in Sogdian, the other in Old Turkish.\textsuperscript{18} Of the three, the Chinese is by far the best preserved. Rubbings of it were given to the members of the Tsung-li yamen to decipher and the results of their work later published in Vasil’ev’s \textit{Kitaiskiiia nadpisi na Orkhonskiikh pamiatnikakh v Komul-Tsaidame i Karabalgasune}. The Chinese version has also been translated several times into European languages. The inscription appears to have been written in the early decades of the ninth century and is of the utmost historical significance for two major reasons: it is the only early source to describe the introduction of Manicheism among the Uighurs and also the only one to detail the extraordinary restoration of the Uighurs under the founder of the second dynasty of their empire.

These steles do not exhaust the Uighur sources, for among the amazing wealth of material found in the Turfan oasis, most of which deals with later periods, there are a few documents which have something to add about the Uighur empire. They are of particular interest for the religious, social, and linguistic development of the Uighurs and, as such, of only marginal concern for the present study. However, I have found them useful complements to the Chinese records.

The Uighur sources tend to be rhetorical, and are therefore prone to exaggeration. Further, most of them were not intended as primarily historical reports and their precision of detail is suspect. In the case of the gravestones, for instance, ‘the purpose of their composition is the glorification of a deceased hero’, as a result of which ‘numerous passages can be found that recall his noble deeds after a fashion which is epic rather

\textsuperscript{17} Ramstedt, ‘Zwei uigurische runeninschriften in der Nord-Mongolei’, p.10.

INTRODUCTION

than historical’.19 On the other hand, the authors of the steles certainly paid close attention to veracity and the accounts they wrote can normally be accepted as factual.20 There are also two respects in which the Uighur sources in general are preferable to the Chinese. Firstly, most are much nearer in time and place to any events which they describe. The Uighur who is entitled I-nan-chu in the Chinese transcription, and who helped write the Chinese text of the Karabalghasun Inscription, could well have actually witnessed the events he notes, or at least have heard about them from those who had done so. Secondly, the texts were written with a more sympathetic approach and were far more likely to record matters important to the Uighurs rather than those of significance to the alien Chinese.

Like the authors of the Turfan documents, the Arab historians report much more about the later Uighurs than those of the empire period. This is not surprising since the vast majority of the Uighurs lived much closer to Arab territory after the fall of Karabalghasun than their forefathers had done. The origin of almost all knowledge of the Uighurs from 744 to 840 in Moslem countries was a certain Tamīm ibn Bahr whose works have not survived. However, much of what he wrote has been preserved through quotations and references in other Moslem histories and geographies.21 Tamīm ibn Bahr actually visited Karabalghasun and travelled through Uighur territory. His information is thus first-hand, and even if he failed to understand all he saw, some information can be gleaned from what has survived of his comments, particularly those relating to the social history of the Uighur empire.

THE HISTORY OF THE UIGHUR EMPIRE

Although it is with Sino-Uighur relations that the Chinese sources – and the present work – are primarily concerned, it is necessary to fill in some background information with a brief survey of the main events and trends within the Uighur empire itself.22

19 Bazin, ‘Man and the Concept of History in Turkish Central Asia during the Eighth Century’, pp.95–6.
20 Ibid., pp.88–91.
22 Among the best Western-language treatments of early Uighur history may be cited Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources, vol. I, pp. 236ff; Grousset L’empire des steppes, pp.172ff; Hamilton, Les Ouighours à l’époque des Cinq Dynasties, pp.1ff; and Tikhonov, Khoziaistvo i obshchestvennyi stroi Uigurskogo gosudarstva, pp.22ff. Of particular interest from an antiquarian point of view is the pioneering work of Deguignes, Histoire générale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mogols, et des autres tartares occidentaux, 1756. There is a treatment of the Uighur Empire, based on Chinese sources, in vol. II, pp. 11–25, and it is still useful more than two centuries after its composition.
For some 150 years, from about 400 A.D., the entire Central Asian region from northern Korea to Karashar was dominated by the Juan-juan, and the ancestors of the Uighurs, the Kao-ch'e, lived under their control as subjects. In the middle of the sixth century, the Juan-juan were conquered by the T'u-chüeh, who used the T'ieh-le tribes to govern the wild regions of the north. In 582, the T'u-chüeh split into two political groups, the Eastern and Western, and the latter attempted to keep the T'ieh-le under their domination. However, early in the seventh century these managed to gain their independence and over the following 100 years or so assisted the Chinese in successful campaigns against several peoples, including both the Eastern and Western T'u-chüeh. In 647, the various T'ieh-le tribes were placed under Chinese protection. It is worth emphasising here that the Uighurs already had a tradition of alliance with China even before the establishment of their empire. This may have exercised some influence over their behaviour when they eventually became masters of the steppes, especially since the T'u-chüeh whom they replaced had so often been the target of their alliance with the T'ang.

Towards the end of the century the Uighurs again came under T'u-chüeh domination, and remained in this situation until the end of the reign of the famous Eastern T'u-chüeh khaghan Mo-ch'o (691–716). At that time they turned actively against their masters and were instrumental in bringing about the khaghan's death and the consequent weakening of his empire. From that time on they appear to have been independent and, according to the Old T'ang History, 'they gradually became powerful'. In fact, under Ku-li p'ei-lo the Uighurs were able, with assistance from the Basmil and Kharlukh, to overthrow the Eastern T'u-chüeh empire. However, the coalition which had accomplished this feat proved to be only temporary. No sooner had the T'u-chüeh been defeated than the Kharlukh and Uighurs turned against the Basmil and subjected them. It was then the turn of the Kharlukh to be the victims, and an easterly group was brought under the control of the Uighurs. This was shortly after Ku-li p'ei-lo had signalled the establishment of his empire in 744.

If Ku-li p'ei-lo was the actual founder of this Uighur state, it was left to his son Mo-yen-ch'o (747–59) to consolidate it. According to the Shine-usu Inscription, he strengthened the hold of the Uighurs over the

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24 CTS 195.2b, translated Pulleyblank, 'Some Remarks', p.39 and Chavannes, Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux, p. 93.
25 For this and other titles of Turkish origin (italicised) see the lists of Uighur khaghans and Uighur titles appended.
recalcitrant Basmil and Kharlukh; and it was also he who built the Uighur capital city and imperial palace.26

Mo-yen-ch'ō was succeeded in 759 by his second son Mou-yū Khaghan, under whom the Uighurs appear to have reached the apex of their power. From the point of view of his own people, the most important event of his reign was the introduction of Manicheism. In 762–3 Mou-yū met some followers of this religion in Lo-yang while he was there assisting the Chinese against the An Lu-shan rebellion. He became a convert and shortly after imposed his new faith on his own people. An Old Turkish text claims that the decision to take this step was greeted with joy by the Uighur populace.27 Nevertheless, he had encountered strong opposition from conservative elements in his own court (n.146) and considered it necessary to issue a law whereby groups of ten people should be set up, in each of which one man was responsible for the spiritual welfare of the other nine; it was the duty of each group leader to maintain enthusiasm for the religion among those under his charge and give 'good instruction' to anyone who fell into sin.28

Manicheism was founded by the Persian Mani (216–76).29 It was a missionary faith and its adherents succeeded in spreading it to a great many parts of the Eurasian continent. Mani believed in two opposing principles, good or light, and evil or darkness, the second of which was assisted by the material world and especially the human body. He taught that time should be viewed in three phases, in the first of which good and evil were separated, in the second mingled, and in the third again distinct. Man existed as body and spirit only in the middle phase and it was his duty to abstract himself from all matter. This would help bring on a great cleansing process, which Mani believed would usher in the third phase. When that time arrived, those who had succeeded in freeing themselves from the material world would live in the region of light, those who had failed in that of darkness.30 Mani's religion was led by a stratified clergy, termed 'the elect', of whom celibacy and fasting were required. The laymen, or auditors, were allowed to marry and eat normally, but

28 Ibid., p.419.
30 A concise and up-to-date treatment of Mani's doctrines can be found in Widengren, Mani and Manichaeism, pp.43–73. A bibliography on the subject is given pp.148–50. Klima has set Mani's teachings within the general framework of other doctrinal systems of his time in Manis Zeit, pp.203–16.
were expected to be fairly abstemious and generous in giving alms.\textsuperscript{31}

Manicheism had become regarded as a characteristically Sogdian religion and one of the main results of Mou-yü's adoption of the faith was a dramatic increase in the influence of the Sogdians at his court. Moreover, although there had been a Sogdian population in the empire before his time (n.145), their number rose significantly when he was converted to their religion. It has been suggested that a number of them were brought from Ferghana as slaves, but their importance to the Uighurs lay primarily in the impact of their culture and in their ability as architects and builders: Sogdian characteristics are present in the ruins of many buildings discovered in Uighur territory.\textsuperscript{32} The Sogdians came to form a kind of state within the Uighur state; and their supremacy in several professional groups enabled them to wield enormous power within the empire.

In the event it was his dependence on the Sogdians which led to Mou-yü's downfall. In 779 they advised him to take advantage of the state mourning which followed the death in June that year of the Chinese Emperor Tai-tsu and undertake an invasion of China. Mou-yü agreed to do this. His chief minister and first cousin Tun mo-ho was opposed to the plan; and when he saw the tide against him, murdered Mou-yü, together with many of his Sogdian supporters and advisers, and set himself on the throne. A period of anti-Sogdian rule began; it is probable that Tun also favoured a rejection of Manicheism and a return to the natural cults of the Turkic peoples (n.146).

After Tun mo-ho's death in 789, and especially after that of his successor To-lo-ssu the following year, Uighur power and prestige declined. At the court, the authority of the ruling Yao-lo-ko clan fell into the hands of the chief minister, General Hsieh yü-chia-ssu, while in the west, the same general suffered acute humiliation in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the fall of the Chinese and Uighur outpost Pei-t'ing. The conquerors of the region were the Tibetans, whose power in the area had greatly expanded and who had for some time been making territorial gains at China's expense.

In 795, rule of the Uighur empire passed to the Hsieh-tieh tribe. The new khaghan was called Ku-tu-lu and had been influential since the time of Tun mo-ho. In fact, he was probably the same man as the Hsieh yü-chia-ssu who had so recently failed to preserve Pei-t'ing.\textsuperscript{33} It was under this

\textsuperscript{32} Kyzlasov, \textit{Istoriia Tuvy v srednie veka}, pp.76–7.
\textsuperscript{33} See Abe Takeo, \textit{Nishi-Uiguru kokushi no kenkyü}, pp.191–2 and Yamada Nobuo, 'Kyūsei Kaikotsu kahan no keifu', p.94.
Map 1. Based partly on Tzu-chih t'ung-chien yin-chu.
man, known to the Chinese as ‘Huai-hsin’,\textsuperscript{34} that the Uighur empire witnessed an extraordinary restoration. ‘Huai-hsin’ succeeded in consolidating the power of his own clan at court. Pei-t’ing was retaken from the Tibetans and the empire extended as far west as Ferghana. The influence of the Sogdians and Manicheans had recovered even before ‘Huai-hsin’ actually ascended the throne and seems to have been stronger than ever under his rule (n.232).

The founder of the new dynasty died in 808 and was succeeded by ‘Pao-i’ Khaghan. His was also a prosperous reign and strong Uighur influence was retained in the west. This is evident from a Manichean hymn-book, completed under ‘Pao-i’ or possibly even later (n.232), where it is made clear that cities like Pei-t’ing, Hsi-chou (Kocho), Kucha, and Karashar were dependencies of the Uighurs.\textsuperscript{35} Nevertheless, ‘Pao-i’ also appears to have presided over some degree of decline in Uighur power, and towards the end of his life the Tibetans became more confident that they could overturn the empire and take its capital if they so desired (n.250). The Manichean clergy remained extremely influential and, despite the strong emphasis of their religion on self-denial, the court grew increasingly addicted to luxurious living.

With ‘Pao-i’ Khaghan’s death in 821 the forces of disintegration in the Uighur empire gathered momentum. Abroad, war broke out with the Kirghiz, powerful neighbours to the north, while at home, court intrigue wasted the power of the royal family, rebellion became a serious problem and, to add to everything, a bad season and severe winter in 839 killed much of the livestock upon which the Uighur economy was so dependent. In 840, the Kirghiz, invited by a rebel chief, attacked the tottering empire, killed the khaghan and took the capital.

An interesting and important history lay ahead of the Uighurs, especially in the cultural field, and a people of that name is still to be found in Sinkiang. But in fact their period of real power ended in the ninth century and, as the editor of the \textit{New T’ang History} jubilantly remarks, ‘their state in the long run did not rise again.’\textsuperscript{36}

The empire period was an important phase in the development of the Uighurs not only politically but also culturally and socially. The roots of

\textsuperscript{34} For this and other titles of Chinese origin (italicised and in inverted commas) see the list of Uighur khaghans appended.


\textsuperscript{36} \textit{HTS} 217B.4a, translated also by Hamilton in \textit{Les Ouïghours}, p.17.
INTRODUCTION

their later contributions in the fields of writing and art were planted through their adoption of Manicheism and absorption of Sogdian influence. In the social sphere, the empire period was of particular significance in that it witnessed a partial transfer from the totally nomadic existence of their ancestors to a more settled and sophisticated livelihood in which cities, commerce, and agriculture played an important role.\(^{37}\)

Before 744, the Uighurs ‘had no fixed dwellings, they roamed about in search of waters and pastures . . . . and they were excellent horseriders and archers’.\(^{38}\) However, it was not long after the empire was established that Mo-yen-ch’o built a capital city. Moreover, it appears to have been an impressive one. Tamîm ibn Baḥr reports that it included a magnificent royal castle and ‘twelve iron gates of huge size’.\(^{39}\) Mo-yen-ch’o is also known to have built another city on the Selenga River (n.11).

Concurrently we find the growth of commerce. Tamîm describes Karabalghasun as ‘populous and thickly crowded’ with ‘markets and various trades’.\(^{40}\) Archaeologists have also uncovered signs that there were among the Uighurs groups such as metallurgists, potters, engravers, blacksmiths, sculptors, stone-masons, weavers, and jewellers. They also seem to have mined iron-ore, copper, gold, and silver.\(^{41}\)

As the people settled down, increasing numbers of them took up agriculture. Once again Tamîm is our main source for this. He reports ‘villages lying closely together and cultivated tracts’ in the region near the capital, and Karabalghasun itself as a ‘great town, rich in agriculture’.\(^{42}\) Archaeologists have found evidence of irrigation and the use of millstones and pestles in Karabalghasun. They have even discovered signs that grain, such as millet, was buried with the corpses of some Uighurs.\(^{43}\) Their excavations provide striking confirmation of Tamîm’s claim.

Yet the process towards the settled life was a gradual one. Stock raising nomads remained extremely important in the Uighur economy and in the regions far from the capital and other great cities the old ways continued unchanged. The empire period saw the beginnings of the trend away


\(^{38}\) CTS 195.1a, translated also by Chavannes, Documents, pp.87–8.


\(^{41}\) Kyzlasov, Istoriia Tvey, p.85.


\(^{43}\) Tikhonov, Khoziaistvo, pp.29–30; Kyzlasov, Istoriia Tvey, p.85.
from nomadism, but certainly left much room for its consolidation in later periods.44

SINO-UIGHUR RELATIONS
Let us now turn to the principal object of this study – the relations between the Chinese T'ang and Uighur empires and the impact of the Uighur presence upon the great civilisation to the south-east. I propose to deal with this subject under five headings: Uighur assistance to China in times of crisis; Uighur violence in or near China's main cities; Tun mo-ho's reign; diplomatic relations and marriages; and commercial contacts. The history of these relations shows the Uighurs as the theoretical allies of the Chinese throughout almost all the period 744 to 840. However, it demonstrates also that under Mo-yen-ch’o, and even more so under Mou-yü, the Uighurs did not hesitate to exploit the Chinese dependence on them, but that under Tun mo-ho a much friendlier attitude towards China developed in Karabalghasun. During the first decade of the second dynasty, relations seem to have been almost completely severed. However, when they were resumed they were fairly friendly and, after a tense period under ‘Pao-i’, became more so from about 820. The attitude of the Chinese to the Uighurs remained more or less constant throughout. They were prepared to use their north-western neighbours for their own purposes, when the occasion demanded, and to extend diplomatic friendship towards them, but essentially they feared and distrusted the Uighurs as foreign barbarians.

Uighur Assistance to China in Times of Crisis
The history of Uighur aid to the Chinese government, which was one of the most important aspects of the relations between the two states, began during the reign of the second khaghan of the empire, Mo-yen-ch’o, under whom the Uighurs were able to gain a very powerful position vis-à-vis the Chinese.

It so happened that, just when the Uighur state had become united and strong, the Chinese T'ang empire under Hsüan-tsung was undergoing a sharp decline. In 751 a Chinese army was utterly defeated by Arabs and their allies in the famous battle of the Talas River, which meant for China the loss of all her positions in Kashgaria. In the same year an ill-advised attempt to subdue the new and friendly Thai kingdom of Nan-chao

44 See also Li Fu-t'ung, Hui-hu shih, pp.144-7. Li believes that the Uighurs had developed no agriculture during the empire period. He has worked exclusively from Chinese sources and appears to have overlooked the evidence cited above.
to the south-west of China ended in total failure, while in the north-east the Khitan were able to destroy a T'ang army under An Lu-shan. These catastrophes were the prelude to a much greater disaster, the rebellion of An Lu-shan (n.13), which meant for China, once so powerful and far-reaching an empire, the loss of almost all her foreign dominions and the decline of her central government, the authority of which was undermined by the intrigues of the eunuchs at court and by the armies of the military governors in the provinces.

An Lu-shan had for some years held high command in Ho-pei in the north-east of China, which was known for its separatist tendencies.\(^45\) He governed with skill and took care to keep in the good graces of the great dictator Li Lin-fu (d.752).\(^46\) In 751 he was called to court where he became intimate with the emperor and his favourite concubine, Yang Kuei-fei (d.756). In 754 the emperor wanted to confer a high title upon An Lu-shan, but the dictator Yang Kuo-chung (d.756),\(^47\) who was second cousin to Yang Kuei-fei but was not so favourably disposed towards An as his predecessor Li Lin-fu had been, refused to agree to the emperor's wish, claiming that Lu-shan was trying to revolt. Hsüan-tsung would not believe this accusation and, in February 754, made Lu-shan the Left Vice President of the Department of Affairs of State, the main official arm of the empire's administration. Feeling insecure among the intrigues of his enemies at court, Lu-shan asked permission to return to the north and, this being granted, he left the capital Ch'ang-an in March 754, nursing a grudge against Yang Kuo-chung, but also conscious of the superiority of his own military strength.

In December 755 An Lu-shan began his revolt. The following month he took Lo-yang and set up his own dynasty, declaring himself the emperor. The rebel advance was halted for a while at the T'ung Pass, where the Yellow River joins the Wei, and the invasion of Ho-pei from Shansi by the great general Kuo Tzu-i (697–781, n.18) seemed to be making progress towards defeating the rebels, when in July 756 the collapse of the T'ung Pass left the way to Ch'ang-an unguarded. An Lu-shan advanced towards the capital, whereupon the emperor fled towards Szechwan, and a few days afterwards Lu-shan took Ch'ang-an. This was the last of his triumphs, and the dynamic force of his rebellion was undermined, for shortly after, on

\(^{46}\) Li Lin-fu's biographies can be found in *CTS* 106.1a–5a, *HTS* 223A.5b–9b. His career is outlined by des Rotours in *Traité des fonctionnaires*, pp.201–2, and his ministry analysed by Pulleyblank in *Background*, pp.82–103.
\(^{47}\) On Yang Kuo-chung see for instance *CTS* 106.5a–9a; *HTS* 206.6b–9b; Pulleyblank, *Background*, pp.92–102; and des Rotours, *Traité des examens*, p.267.
Map 2.
Provincial boundaries are those from 733 until the rise of the military governors following the An Lu-shan rebellion. Based partly on Tsu-chih t'ung-chien yin-chu and T'ang ti-li chih-t'u
29 January 757, he was assassinated by one of his subordinates, Yen Chuang, in collaboration with his own son, An Ch’ing-hsü (n.34), who immediately took control of the rebels.

Meanwhile, the government was organising resistance. On 12 August 756, Su-tsung ascended the throne at Ling-wu and his father, the disgraced and now feeble Emperor Hsüan-tsung, abdicated. As part of his plan to defeat the rebellion, Su-tsung sent embassies to various foreign peoples, including the Uighurs, asking for help. At the head of that to the Uighurs were Li Ch’eng-shen (n.14), a scion of the imperial family, and the famous Chinese general P’u-ku Huai-en, himself of T’ieh-le origin (n.16). The khaghan declared himself willing to render assistance and sealed his agreement by offering his sister-in-law, whom he adopted as his daughter, to Ch’eng-shen as a bride. The emperor made a point of receiving both her and the Uighur embassy which brought her with extreme courtesy.

Although there was nothing unusual about such behaviour, it is clear that the emperor was aware of his weak position and of the value Uighur military might could be to him. This is shown from another incident of a similar kind which took place at about the same time. A certain Uighur general, Ko-lo-chih (n.22), who had rendered China minor service against one of the rebels Yin Tzu-ch’i, had felt humiliated at his low rank in the emperor’s court. When Su-tsung heard about this, he made a special point of honouring him with a personal audience.

The emperor’s anxiety to woo the Uighurs was made all the more pressing by the fact that a group of one of the T’ieh-le tribes, the T’ung-lo, had earlier joined An Lu-shan’s side. It is true that they defected from it, but did not join the government and so still formed a threat to Su-tsung. The great Chinese general Kuo Tzu-i, who was to play a vital part in the suppression of the An Lu-shan rebellion, formed a coalition with the Uighur khaghan Mo-yen-ch’o and defeated them near the north-eastern bend of the Yellow River on 7 December 756. However, although the incident was important in that it was the only occasion on which Mo-yen-ch’o himself took part in the fighting in China, it was an additional reminder to Su-tsung that he could not take Uighur support for granted. The khaghan had demanded that Kuo Tzu-i ‘pay respect to his wolf pennons’ before he would even discuss the campaign. Already it was obvious that the diplomatic concessions were all to be on China’s side.

It was not until 11 July 757 that the first important contingents of Uighurs, headed by Grand General To-lan (n.23) arrived at court. The man who was to lead the Uighurs throughout the wars which regained Ch’ang-an and Lo-yang for the T’ang, the khaghan’s eldest son Yeh-hu
arrived a little later with 4,000 cavalry. The small number of this force is interesting. The numbers involved in the battles to recapture the two capitals were enormous, yet with a force of only about 4,000 the Uighurs were able to play a decisive part in them. The emperor's eldest son, Li Shu, who was later to rule as the Emperor Tai-tsung, held a meeting with Yeh-hu and treated him with his usual courtesy. At the end of October, thirteen of the Uighur leaders, headed by Yeh-hu, came to Feng-hsiang (n.26), some distance west of their objective Ch'ang-an, and Kuo Tzu-i gave them an enormous banquet. It was only after these preliminary politenesses that the campaign actually got under way.

On 11 November 757, Li Shu took his forces to a point east of the Hsiang-chi Temple, which lay south of Ch'ang-an, and then went west towards the Feng River. Two days later, the T'ang forces prepared for battle, facing north from a position north of the Hsiang-chi Temple and south-west of Ch'ang-an. The rebels advanced from the city and the government forces were promptly thrown into confusion. The attempt to recapture Ch'ang-an seemed defeated, even though the commander of the forward guard Li Ssu-yeh (d.759) succeeded in maintaining the morale of his troops through his own personal courage (n.30). Though stripped to the waist he stood in front of his troops, shouting encouraging commands. All the soldiers were armed with long swords; they 'advanced like a wall and fearlessly struggled forward, scattering and destroying whatever came up against them'.

Meanwhile some rebel soldiers had secretly gone to the east of the government forces and were trying to move south in order to strike at their rear. However, at the critical moment, P'u-ku Huai-en and a force of Uighurs attacked and defeated them before the ambush was launched, and then headed north towards the rebel rear. The anti-T'ang troops were wedged in between the Uighurs, led by Huai-en, and Ssu-yeh, still in command of the forward guard of the government army. This action was decisive and the rebels were defeated. The following day, 14 November, Ch'ang-an was reoccupied by the T'ang armies. Interestingly enough, Huai-en suggested to Li Shu after the battle that the fleeing rebels be pursued, but the heir-apparent turned down the proposal on the grounds that Huai-en was too tired and should first recover his strength and that of his followers. Perhaps the next battles could have been prevented.

Before the Battle of Hsiang-chi, an agreement had been made between the Chinese and Uighurs that the latter would be given the right of plunder
Map 3. The course of the Heng River is unknown. Based partly on T'ang ti-li chih-t'u.
should the capital be retaken. Yeh-hu demanded the reward in accordance with the pact. Li Shu replied by saluting the Uighur leader, pointing out that the rebels were still in occupation of Lo-yang and asking that he should postpone his demand for reward until that city was retaken. Yeh-hu was taken by surprise, but we are told that he dismounted and responded to Shu’s courtesy by kneeling in front of him and clasping his feet in agreement to Shu’s proposal. Most people, notably the emperor, were much impressed by Shu’s diplomatic treatment of the foreign prince. This event long remained in the memory of the Chinese. It was considered by some a humiliation that their heir-apparent should salute a ‘barbarian’, but the incident was held up as an outstanding example of how a civilised people could impose its will on a foreigner through superior diplomacy.

The Uighurs left Ch’ang-an and marched towards the eastern capital Lo-yang, camping south of the Yellow River in Ch’ü-wo, which lay not far east of the great bend where the Wei joins the Yellow River. Meanwhile, the rebels under An Ch’ing-hsü, who was in Lo-yang, had gathered an enormous force to defend that city. A group of rebel ambushers had hidden in a neighbouring valley, so Yeh-hu sent out his general Chü-pi-shih t’u-po p’ei-lo and others, who exterminated the ambushers and then halted in the north of the adjoining mountain.

The rebel army had taken up a position near the foot of the same mountain and, on 30 November 757 (n.33), engaged in battle with Kuo Tzu-i. This was in Hsin-tien not far north-east of Ch’ü-wo. Naturally, the rebels were making good use of their position near the foot of the mountain and were gaining a distinct advantage over Kuo Tzu-i, whose army was spread out on the plain so that the rebels’ advance was downhill. Suddenly the Uighur contingent under Chü-pi-shih t’u-po p’ei-lo saw what was happening from the mountain and descended, bearing down upon the enemy rear. The rebels were taken by surprise and the day was won for the government. Once again a small number of Uighurs had proved decisive in a battle involving huge numbers of men. The sources speak of 100,000 severed heads lying about the plain. There is no need to take this figure at its face value but the number of killed must nevertheless have been large. An Ch’ing-hsü was informed of what had happened and fled towards the north, setting up his capital in Hsiang-chou, Ho-pei Province. After the defeat most of the rebels surrendered, and An Ch’ing-hsü himself died in April 759 (n.34). However, the rebellion was not yet over, for its leadership passed to Shih Ssu-ming and his son Ch’ao-i, whose final defeat was still some years in the future.

50 TCTC 220.7034–5.
Early in December 757, the government forces entered Lo-yang (n.33). The Uighurs took advantage of the agreement made at Ch'ang-an and plundered the city for three days. On 8 December, the emperor returned to the capital and six days later Yeh-hu made a triumphal entry into Ch'ang-an. He was given a tremendous welcome and received in audience by the emperor in the Grand Audience Hall. On 30 December, Su-tsung issued a decree which praised in extravagant terms the Yeh-hu upon whose forces the defeat of the rebels had so largely depended, and gave him an extremely high rank in the Chinese state.

The first phase in the defeat of the rebels was thus over, and it is quite clear from the preceding that Uighur assistance had indeed been of great significance in the government victories. Already the Uighurs had made use of this fact in their pillage of Lo-yang, the excesses of which even Li Shu had been unable to prevent. This was but the beginning of Uighur insults to the Chinese, and they were inflicted with impunity because both sides realised how great the emperor's debt to his so-called allies had been. This was a humiliation which the T'ang court was to be forced to suffer for some years to come.

In 759 the Uighurs once again sent troops to help the T'ang against the continuing rebellion. In October the preceding year Su-tsung had set up the 'army of the nine military governors', which, he hoped, would be able to eject An Ch'ing-hsü from his seat in Hsiang-chou (n.65). The Uighurs, led by Prince Ku-ch'o, accompanied the chief of the nine governors, Kuo Tzu-i, to the rebel stronghold. On 7 April a major battle took place outside it between the T'ang forces and the rebels, who were led by Shih Ssu-ming (n.61). In the event, the Uighurs were not able to repeat their triumphs of 757. The leadership of the government armies lacked cohesion and on the day of the battle a fierce dust storm arose to the decisive advantage of the rebel defenders of Hsiang-chou. The attempt to dislodge An Ch'ing-hsü ended in total failure (n.66).

This episode showed the Chinese that the Uighurs were not invincible and they would doubtless have enjoyed gloating over the fact had not their own success been so bound up with that of the Uighurs. It did lead the poet Tu Fu to question the value of Uighur aid and the wisdom of making diplomatic concessions to China's northern neighbours (n.70), but in the long run it did nothing to strengthen the T'ang ability to defy the Uighurs. In fact under Mo-yen-ch'o's successor, Mou-yü, its dependence became even more humiliating, since Mou-yü was a crueler man than either his predecessor or Yeh-hu and exercised even less restraint in exploiting his position.
INTRODUCTION

Early in June 760 Shih Ssu-ming succeeded in taking once again the eastern capital and second city of China, Lo-yang (n.84). In May 762 both Hsüan-tsung and his son Su-tsung died, so Shih Ch’ao-i, who had been in command of the rebellion since April 761 (n.61), seized the opportunity of the double mourning at court to try and solicit the support of the Uighurs. Certainly there was no need for him to manufacture lies in explaining the exhaustion of the imperial government. Local military governors ruled independently of Ch’ang-an, while the court itself was at the mercy of powerful eunuchs (n.78). He unwisely overstepped the bounds of truth, however, and told them also that the T’ang was without a ruler. He informed the Uighurs that they could seize unlimited wealth through raids on northern China. By September 762 the khaghan had come south and the following month reached as far as the northern arm of the Yellow River. In the desolation and lack of defences in that part of the country he had seen ample evidence to corroborate Shih Ch’ao-i’s description of T’ang weakness.

At about this time a eunuch ambassador, Liu Ch’ing-t’an (n.137), arrived from the Chinese court. Tai-tsung had ascended the throne on 18 May 762 and, since the flames of rebellion were still ablaze, he had decided to ask for help from the Uighurs whom he, as leader of the government troops in 757, had seen to be so effective in battle. Naturally the khaghan was surprised to see Liu Ch’ing-t’an, and refused to believe that he had really been sent by the T’ang government. The eunuch promptly sent a secret envoy to Ch’ang-an with the message that Mou-yü was approaching with some 100,000 men and that the state was consequently in acute danger. Not surprisingly, the court was extremely dismayed at this intelligence, and the emperor sent the official Yao Tzu-ang to check the truth of Ch’ing-t’an’s statement. Tzu-ang saw the Uighurs north of T’ai-yüan. He found that Liu had vastly exaggerated the number of their soldiers, which he placed at only about 4,000. This must have been encouraging news to Tai-tsung. But more welcome still was Yao’s report that the Uighurs had brought their khatun with them.

It so happened that Mou-yü’s wife was the daughter of P’u-ku Huai-en. It was through her that the situation was saved for the T’ang. She requested that a meeting should be arranged between her husband and father in T’ai-yüan. As Mou-yü’s father-in-law, Huai-en was easily able to convince the Uighur khaghan that Shih Ch’ao-i had lied and that there was indeed a T’ang ruler in Ch’ang-an. Mou-yü thought better of his plans to plunder China and immediately sent a memorial to the emperor offering him assistance against the rebels.
Discussions were then held between Yao Tzu-ang and the khaghan on the best route to approach the rebel stronghold in Lo-yang from their station near T'ai-yüan. Serious disagreements arose, because Tzu-ang was very anxious that the Uighurs should see as little destroyed land as possible during the journey, in order to keep up their morale. This implied slight annoyed Mou-yü who rejected two of Tzu-ang’s proposals before a compromise was reached.

By early November 762 a memorial had arrived at court from Yao Tzu-ang informing the emperor what had happened. Tai-tsung appointed his eldest son, Li Kua, the future Emperor Te-tsung, as generalissimo over all the forces. Meanwhile, the Uighurs had moved south from T’ai-yüan and camped in P’ing-lu Subprefecture (n.89), not far from Shan-chou. Li Kua, Yao Tzu-ang, and other Chinese leaders went across the Yellow River and held an interview with the khaghan to discuss the campaign against the rebels. It was then that a dreadful incident took place which coloured all Li Kua’s later relations with the Uighurs and implanted in him a deep hatred for his neighbours to the north-west.

Li Kua did not share his father’s belief that the Uighurs should be treated more or less as equals during critical periods of T’ang weakness. Whereas Tai-tsung had, when still heir-apparent, been prepared to salute Yeh-hu, the future Te-tsung refused to make any sign of respect when he entered the presence of the khaghan in P’ing-lu. This annoyed the Uighurs who demanded that he perform a ceremonial dance. A quarrel ensued between the khaghan’s ministers and Tzu-ang over whether this would be proper. In the end the latter said quite definitely that a Chinese heir-apparent would never carry out such a rite before a foreign khaghan. Mou-yü and his ministers, smarting under this insult and probably still irritated at Tzu-ang’s tactical victory over them during the discussions concerning the best approach to Lo-yang from T’ai-yüan, decided not to allow Tzu-ang to get away with this refusal. They had him and three other Chinese officials led away and given 100 strokes of the rod each, as a result of which two of their victims died. The Uighur chiefs were not prepared to go to the extent of insulting the Chinese heir-apparent in this way, so, on the pretext of his youth and lack of experience – he was only twenty years old (n.90) – they let him return to his own camp.

That the Uighurs were able to commit this outrage without any fear of reprisals may help to explain some of their later brutalities. Certainly, the incident suggests that Li Shu’s earlier policy of yielding on minor matters was a better one than his son’s. Li Kua’s less compromising attitude had cost him dear.
On 13 November 762, exactly five years after the Battle of Hsiang-chi, the government forces advanced from Shan-chou. The Uighurs and P'u-ku Huai-en's men went on as forward guard, Kuo Ying-i (d.766, n.98) and the eunuch Yü Ch'ao-en (d.770, n.99) bringing up the rear. Various contingents joined them on their way to Lo-yang. Meanwhile, Li Kua remained behind in Shan-chou. Shih Ch'ao-i delegated a spy to find out the exact plans of the government forces, but a Uighur official caught him and sent him as a gift to the emperor. On 17 November, the army reached a point north of Lo-yang. It is interesting to observe that one of Ch'ao-i's followers advised him strongly that if the government forces should include Uighurs, he should not attempt battle but go back to the defence of Ho-yang north-east of Lo-yang. The adviser had no doubt observed the decisive effect a small Uighur force could produce. Ch'ao-i ignored this advice and on 20 November his forces fought a battle with the government armies in the northern suburbs of Lo-yang (n.92). The rebels were totally defeated despite Ch'ao-i's attempt to bring up some choice troops at the critical moment. After several skirmishes, Ch'ao-i fled to the east yielding the city to the T'ang.

The Uighurs entered Lo-yang and remained there a few days engaging in terrible plunder and treating the inhabitants with shocking cruelty. The people were terrified of them and many sought refuge in the towers of two of the city's temples. The Uighurs replied to this by setting fire to the stupas. Thousands were killed or injured in an enormous and long-lasting conflagration. Even under Yeh-hu nothing of the sort had happened, and the incident is symptomatic of the great power of the Uighurs over the Chinese and their willingness to exploit it.

After this, the khaghan went with his men to Ho-yang, and there set up his camp. He used this place as his headquarters and, leaving his general An K'o to guard it, would himself sally forth on expeditions, allowing his men to pillage the surrounding territory. According to the Old T'ang History, the situation was so desperate and clothing so scarce that some people were forced to go to the length of using the Classics themselves to find protection against the cold. Kuo Ying-i was made Temporary Viceroy of Lo-yang, but he found himself totally unable to put an end to the destruction and, in the end, he and many others abandoned the struggle and took part in the plunder themselves. Many of the surrounding cities in addition to the countryside were ravaged. To the Uighurs this looting was no more than their due payment for the help they had given.

51 TCTC 222.7133-4, Cf. also des Rotours, Histoire de Ngan Lou-chan, p.349.
52 TCTC 222.7135.
Shortly after the battle for Lo-yang, the T'ang effectively recaptured the Province of Ho-pei from the rebels. P'u-ku Huai-en's son, Ch'ang (n.94), together with some Uighurs, pursued Shih Ch'ao-i north, engaging in a running battle with his forces over a long distance. They trampled on his men as they fled, so that the region was strewn with the blood and bodies of the dead. At length they arrived in P'ing-chou, in the neighbourhood of modern Peking. At this point Ch'ao-i decided that the end had come. He went into a forest north-east of Shih-ch'eng Subprefecture of P'ing-chou and there committed suicide (n.95).

And so the rebellion was over. The Chinese court bestowed handsome ranks and titles on the leading Uighurs as an expression of its relief. It was obvious that it had no choice but to turn a blind eye to their brutalities. Although later history demonstrates that these were by no means completely over, the Uighurs never again behaved quite so savagely as in the Lo-yang region in 762-3. One of the reasons may well have been their conversion to Manicheism, the seeds of which were sown just at this time. It was during his sojourn in Ho-yang and Lo-yang after helping crush the rebellion that Mou-yü came into contact with the Manicheans who converted him to their religion. It may well be that even a man like Mou-yü was affected with pity and remorse at the terrible suffering he had witnessed and helped cause, and that this was an important factor in the ability of the Manicheans to influence him so deeply.

Less than two years after Mou-yü's return to Karabalghasun after helping defeat Shih Ch'ao-i, Uighur contingents again set out for China to take part in a war there. This time they came not to support the T'ang but to assist a rebellion against it, that of P'u-ku Huai-en the khaghan's father-in-law, which shook Kuan-nei Province in 764 and 765. They were led not by Mou-yü, but by several of his senior subordinates including the chief of his own clan, the Yao-lo-ko, and the chief minister Tun mo-ho, probably the same man who was later to carry out a successful coup against him.

P'u-ku Huai-en had earlier been among the most loyal defenders of the T'ang government and it was a great shock and personal tragedy for Tai-tsung that such a man should turn against him, especially since he is known to have felt a deep respect for Huai-en and to have refused to regard him as a true rebel (n.129). The circumstances leading to this revolt were as follows.

When Huai-en had visited T'ai-yüan in 762 to convince the Uighur khaghan that the T'ang Dynasty was still in control of China, Hsin Yün-ching (d.768, n.143), who held command in the city, closed the gate to
him in the belief that he was about to rebel. We have seen that it was widely believed that the Uighurs were planning to overrun the country, and Huai-en's relationship by marriage to the khaghan made the general seem extremely suspicious to Yün-ch'ing. Nevertheless, Huai-en received no better treatment from Hsin when he visited T'ai-yüan after the rebellion to farewell the khaghan. Hsin sent the eunuch Lo Feng-hsien to court to cause trouble for Huai-en and on the way Lo was entertained as his enemy's guest. P'u-ku Huai-en was extremely friendly towards him and begged him to stay longer. When he refused, his host hid his horse as a joke, but the eunuch interpreted this as evidence that Huai-en was indeed planning rebellion and was trying to prevent the emperor from finding out about it. He reported in Ch'ang-an that P'u-ku Huai-en was plotting against the throne.

The great general, not unnaturally, felt insulted at having his name slandered thus and asked Tai-tsung to punish both Lo and Hsin. Tai-tsung attempted to patch up the quarrel, causing Huai-en to feel that he had lost face. Further suspicious circumstances came to the emperor's notice about Huai-en, and the emperor reluctantly demoted him. Immediately after this some officers seized Huai-en's son, P'u-ku Ch'ang, and killed him. This was the last straw, and Huai-en became convinced he had no choice but to try and overthrow the dynasty which seemed to him determined to blacken his name (n.106).

P'u-ku Huai-en's followers included not only Uighurs but Tibetans as well. These latter had constituted a particularly serious threat to China in the preceding period and even occupied Ch'ang-an for a few days in 763. Yet even this powerful support brought Huai-en little success in the first stage of his revolt late in 764. His forces made several sallies against cities near Ch'ang-an but suffered a serious defeat outside Pin-ch'ou at the hands of Kuo Tzu-i's son, Hsi (d.794). They then withdrew to prepare for further assaults later on (n.110).

In the autumn of 765, P'u-ku Huai-en renewed his rebellion. This time his armies were much larger than in the previous year and contained not only Tibetans and Uighurs but also contingents from several other foreign tribes. The rebel forces advanced to seize the regions north of the Wei River with the intention of following up their victories by attacking Ch'ang-an itself. In order to increase their morale, P'u-ku Huai-en informed his men that both Kuo Tzu-i, who was the ablest Chinese general of the day, and the emperor were dead. Although the government forces under Hun Kun (737-800, n.115) defeated a Tibetan attack on Feng-t'ien at the beginning of October 765 (n.116), the anti-T'ang armies were able by the
end of the month to surround and threaten Ching-yang. There Kuo Tzu-i had set up camp to resist any onslaught against the capital, which lay to the south-west just across the Wei.

It so happened that P'u-ku Huai-en had died late in September 765, and the news of his death reached the Uighurs and Tibetans surrounding Ching-yang towards the end of the following month (n.117) just as they were preparing to attack the city. The two groups of foreigners immediately started quarrelling among themselves over which group should take on the leadership. This fact came to Kuo Tzu-i's notice and he promptly sent an envoy to the Uighurs asking them to unite with him in pushing back the Tibetans. The Uighurs were surprised when the envoy claimed to have been sent by Kuo Tzu-i, whom they believed was dead. They did not accept the messenger as genuine and demanded to see Tzu-i himself. When this was reported to the general, he agreed to present himself as asked, even though his subordinates warned him that the Uighur request was probably a ploy aimed at killing him. Tzu-i came out of the city gate and stood in full view of the Uighurs. Even this did not convince the Uighurs who demanded, as a final proof, that he remove his armour. Tzu-i complied, and came forward on his horse alone, unaccompanied by body-guards. The Uighurs had no choice but to accept that P'u-ku Huai-en had lied to them; they immediately submitted themselves to Kuo Tzu-i's authority and agreed to help him fight the Tibetans (n.118). Furthermore, they apologised for their part so far in the rebellion and swore a solemn oath with him. On no other occasion did a Chinese receive from a band of Uighurs the respect and reverence with which the Uighurs now treated Tzu-i.

This sudden change of heart is not altogether surprising. It seems to me probable that the Uighurs' initial support for P'u-ku Huai-en was based more on tribal relationships than on outright opposition to the T'ang. Huai-en was not only of T'ieh-le extraction himself but also the father of their ruler's wife. His influence over the Uighurs had been apparent for some time. With his death was removed the principal reason why they should make war against the T'ang. Moreover, they had no love for the Tibetans and their alliance with their south-western neighbours was quite abnormal. It is important also that the Uighurs respected the qualities of courage shown by a man like Kuo Tzu-i. They had fought on his side during the An Lu-shan rebellion and their reluctance to oppose him is evident from the fact that P'u-ku Huai-en should have felt called upon to tell them that he was dead and would not be at the head of any T'ang army which might resist them. Finally, it is striking that the leaders of the Uighur
forces included Tun mo-ho who was later to initiate a decidedly pro-Chinese policy at the Uighur court. His loyalty to the T'ang was certainly none too firm, but I think it likely that, unless tribal and family relationships dictated otherwise, he was willing all through his career to adopt a friendly attitude towards the Chinese.

The day after Kuo Tzu-i and the Uighurs swore their pact, Tzu-i sent six Uighurs for audience with the emperor in Ch'ang-an. The emperor sent out a contingent under Po Yüan-kuang (d.786, n.124) to help against the Tibetans. Early in November 765, Yüan-kuang began with a short expedition to ascertain the power of the enemy, who, after fleeing from Ching-yang some days before, had gone along the Ching River to Pin-chou and now reached a point not far west of Ling-t'ai. Po found them much weakened by cold. The Tibetans had wrapped felt around them in a vain attempt to find protection against the freezing weather and were moving slowly forward on their homeward march. Yüan-kuang and the Uighurs seized the opportunity and early the following morning made a sudden surprise attack. Large numbers of men were killed or taken prisoner. A few days later, a second battle was fought against those who had succeeded in escaping, and the Tibetans were disastrously defeated.

This was the end of the war. Several hundred Uighurs went to the capital to receive rewards for their services. As usual, the emperor gave them sumptuous banquets and enormous quantities of silk in recognition of their assistance, even though it was necessary to impose severe financial hardships on the court officials to meet the cost. After that the Uighurs returned to their own country.

The campaign just discussed was the last time that the Uighurs gave the T'ang government major and effective military aid within China proper. Indeed in only one subsequent conflict, in 790, did T'ang and Uighur armies fight on the same side. The enemy was again the Tibetans and the object of the fighting was to retake from them the western Protectorate of Pei-t'ing. This had been as much under Uighur as Chinese influence (n.207). Furthermore, the war differed from that just described in that the military assistance of the Uighurs proved ineffective.

During the crisis of the An Lu-shan rebellion and the continuing troubles which followed it, the Chinese court had considered it necessary to concentrate the talent of the empire's best generals and choice troops at the centre of the country. As a result, the duty of governing the far western cities fell upon men of mediocre ability with inadequate soldiery to support them. The powerful Tibetan state took advantage of this situation and seized much territory from the Chinese. Virtually all Lung-yu Province
and further west fell into Tibetan hands (n.194), although the Provinces of Pei-t’ing and An-hsi in the far west remained, as far as the Chinese were concerned, under Chinese control. Naturally communications were difficult and it eventually became quite impossible for tribute or embassies to penetrate from the western cities to Ch’ang-an. Several missions were sent to inform the emperor of this unfortunate situation, but none of them got through to Ch’ang-an. Eventually in 781 (n.199), after a gap of more than a decade (n.200), an embassy was able to push its way through to court by taking a route through Uighur territory. Once this solution was found, all communications from the west relied on the acquiescence of the Uighurs for passage and the latter, seeing in this necessity a good means of making money, promptly charged an enormous transit toll. So, although the way was now open, it was still both difficult and expensive, and the toll made the Uighurs extremely unpopular among those forced by necessity to pay it.

Near the city of Pei-t’ing there lived some families of the Sha-t’o, a Turkic people at that time dependent on the Uighurs (n.193), and other Uighur subjects, the most important of whom belonged to the Kharlukh tribes. These people were not exempted from the toll and they considered that, since they had forfeited their independence to the Uighurs, they should at least enjoy free access through Uighur territory. They therefore secretly transferred their allegiance to the Tibetans.

If the various tribes had good cause to resent Uighur behaviour, the Tibetans also had their own reasons for wanting to take Pei-t’ing. It was a strategically placed city and in the event its loss meant the end of effective Chinese influence in the western regions (n.191). Moreover, in 784 the Tibetans had assisted the T’ang against the Chu Tz’u rebellion, to which I shall be returning later, and the arranged price for their intervention had been that the Chinese should cede them certain territories, including Pei-t’ing. However, the Emperor Te-tsung had gone back on the agreement after the rebellion was over.53 Tibetan reprisals for this breach of promise were prompt and devastating, and the appropriation of Pei-t’ing was the last of their acts of vengeance.54

It was in this context that the Uighurs undertook for the fifth time to assist China in a crisis and to prevent the fall of Pei-t’ing. They had much to lose if the campaign failed, not only the influence of their empire in the west but also the transit toll which they had charged for passage to Ch’ang-an in recent years. For the Chinese, on the other hand, this was much less

53 See Demiéville, Le concile de Lhasa, pp.170–1.
54 Ibid., p.182.
important than the An Lu-shan and P’u-ku Huai-en rebellions. At stake for the T’ang was not the dynasty itself but only its western outposts. To say that the Chinese were assisting the Uighurs would be just as accurate as the converse.

The Uighur chief minister and general, Hsieh yü-chia-ssu, who was already the principal power behind the throne and was later to found a dynasty of his own, went to the west to try and prevent the Tibetans from taking Pei-t’ing. In the middle of 790 he fought a battle with the allied forces of the Tibetans, Sha-t’o and others, but was defeated. The Chinese leader of Pei-t’ing, Yang Hsi-ku, fled to Hsi-chou. Hsieh yü-chia-ssu returned to Karabalghasun, but later the same year (n.206) he left with an enormous force on a second expedition, to retake Pei-t’ing. He summoned Yang Hsi-ku from Hsi-chou to help him, and the latter duly came. The combined Uighur and Chinese forces were unexpectedly attacked and decisively defeated with enormous losses. Hsi-ku escaped to Hsi-chou with his sadly depleted army but Hsieh yü-chia-ssu then persuaded the Chinese general to accompany him back to the Uighur capital. He had promised to repatriate Hsi-ku but, as it happened, killed him towards the end of 791. This betrayal appears to have been the result of the humiliation which must still have smarted within the Uighur minister and need not be interpreted to indicate any special hostility towards China on his part.

It is clear from the preceding that the period when the Uighurs were of vital use to the Chinese was over. And with it passed the era when the Uighurs could employ their military strength to insult the T’ang. Under the second dynasty, the Uighurs concentrated their attentions more on the territory to the west than on China, and although the T’ang still retained a lively fear of their northern neighbours (n.244), they felt free to turn down Uighur requests. There were ways in which earlier Uighur military assistance continued to produce ill effects on China, but the forces of the Uighur empire were never again invited to take part in a war alongside T’ang armies.

One final incident reveals how far the Chinese attitude had changed by the time the period of the Uighur empire was drawing to its end. In 821, P’ei Tu (c.765–839, n.279), one of the most distinguished officials of his time, was delegated by the Chinese Emperor Mu-tsung to suppress the independent military governor Wang T’ing-ts’ou (d.834). This man seized power without authority from Ch’ang-an in Ho-pei, where separatist inclinations remained strong. The Uighur general Li I-chieh came with 3,000 soldiers to give unsolicited help. The emperor was not so sure that he wanted the assistance and believed that the soldiers might be more
dangerous than valuable to China. He discussed the matter with his courtiers, and they decided that, in view of the high-handedness and cruelty the Uighurs had displayed during and after Shih Ch'ao-i's rebellion, their services should be refused. An ambassador was sent to tell them about this decision. He met them at Feng-chou not far from the north-western bend of the Yellow River. At first I-chieh would not accept the court's verdict. However, the emperor gave him 70,000 pieces of silk, whereupon he left for home with his men on 18 April 822. By that time, in fact, Mu-tsung had already decided to come to terms with Wang T'ing-ts'ou and abandon the campaign against him. Possible victory with Uighur assistance was deemed less desirable than compromise without it.

_Uighur Violence in or near China's Main Cities_

One of the results of the strong position gained by the Uighurs after they had helped crush the An Lu-shan rebellion was that they were able to carry out destructive acts in China's major cities. I have already cited cases of this sort in areas immediately affected by the campaigns against the rebels. However, Uighur violence was not confined to such places and lasted many years after the rebellion had been suppressed. In some cases one can ascribe it to the Uighurs' natural love for pillage, in others to their desire to take revenge for an insult. However, in few instances can we be really sure of the motives for the violence since the accounts are always presented to us from the point of view of the Chinese, who assumed the worst intentions in the Uighurs and were keen to blacken their name.

The first case occurred on 22 February 763, that is, not long after Lo-yang had been retaken from Shih Ch’ao-i, but in Ch’ang-an which had not been directly involved in the fighting against him. Some Uighur soldiers came to the capital from the battles against the rebels and at night hacked down one of the gates of the Imperial City, entering the Court of Diplomatic Reception. Perhaps they felt it was their right to lodge in that Court, since it was customary to house distinguished foreign visitors there.

Later on, Uighurs who did actually reside in the Court of Diplomatic Reception proved themselves on occasion equally offensive, and the authorities found it impossible to control them. Early in 771 or 772, some of the Uighurs broke out of the Court without warning and started attacking the children of the city. The officials tried to stop them, but to no avail. The Uighurs only grew more annoyed and some of their cavalry started hacking at the Han-kuang and Chu-ch’ueh Gates (n.132), which lay to the right and left of the Square of Diplomatic Reception leading from the
Imperial City into the residential areas. All the gates of the Imperial City were locked and the eunuch Liu Ch'ing-t'an was sent to put an end to the troubles. Liu had earlier had some experience in dealing with the Uighurs and succeeded in his mission.

These actions were the first of a series of such outbursts performed by the Uighurs during those years. In August 772 they made another similar volley in the capital. They came out into the wards and market-places of Ch'ang-an and made violent attacks on the people and their property. The leading official of the western half of the city, Shao Yüeh (n.133), did his best to make them desist. They turned upon him and pursued him up one of the main streets of the city, seizing his horse. Yüeh was lucky enough to escape, but the Uighurs were able to continue their ravage with impunity.

Another unpleasant incident occurred a few years later. In 774 or 775 a Uighur killed someone in one of the streets of Ch'ang-an. The Governor of the Capital, Li Kan (n.137), arrested him, but the emperor decided that it would be impolitic to punish the man, and he was let off without examination. On 16 October 775, another murder was committed by a Uighur, this time in the Eastern Market-place. He was taken to prison, but when the Uighur leader Ch'ih-hsin heard what had happened, he came out of the Court of Diplomatic Reception and broke into the gaol, setting the prisoner free and wounding the prison officials while he was about it.

Feeling against the Uighurs ran high everywhere in China that their presence was apparent. So it is to be expected that the violence was sometimes started by the Chinese themselves. In the middle of 778 a Uighur diplomatic mission passed through Ho-chung on its way home. This was a major city near the south-eastern bend of the Yellow River and lay on the normal route from Ch'ang-an to Karabalghasun. Some Chinese soldiers who happened to be stationed there pillaged the baggage of the Uighur envoys. This action so outraged the Uighurs that they replied by looting the wards and market-places of the city (n.144).

Apart from Ch'ang-an, the most important Chinese city to suffer at the hands of the Uighurs was Lo-yang, and I have already noted in the previous section how the city was affected. These two were called respectively the western and eastern capitals. T'ai-yüan, in present-day Shansi, also came under attack later in Tai-tsung's reign. From the point of view of the Uighurs this was an important town, being a major point on the route between the Chinese and Uighur capitals. On 22 February 778 a group of them made an onslaught against it, possibly to take revenge for the poor reception P'u-ku Huai-en and their khaghan Mou-yü had
received there from Hsin Yün-ching when the two had met with each other near T’ai-yüan both before and after the defeat of Shih Ch’ao-i. The Uighurs were afraid of Yün-ching, but he had died in 768 and the city was now governed by Pao Fang (n.139), whose bent was civil and artistic rather than military.

Pao sent out some troops to oppose the Uighur contingent. A certain Li Tzu-liang (733–95, n.140), advised him against accepting a challenge of battle from the Uighurs. He considered that it would be wiser to block their way north by placing a pair of ramparts on the road, and then to attack them from the rear. Pao Fang refused to follow this suggestion and on 27 February 778 his army was beaten severely at a battle in Yang-ch’ü just north-east of T’ai-yüan. The Uighur band proceeded home on their way to Karabalghasun but, shortly after, the Governor-general of Tai-chou Chang Kuang-sheng (n.141), intercepted them in the Yang-wu Valley near Tai-chou and defeated them.

The most striking feature of the incidents I have mentioned is that all of them occurred during the reigns of Mou-yü among the Uighurs and the Chinese Emperor Tai-tsung. They range from simple episodes like murder, such as can happen in any city, to full-scale battles such as those outside T’ai-yüan and Tai-chou. Their significance lies in the fact that in all cases except the last mentioned – Chang Kuang-sheng’s victory – the Chinese were virtually powerless to prevent the Uighurs from behaving as they pleased.

If episodes of the sort described happened in other periods of the Uighur empire, the historiographers chose not to record them. This in itself demonstrates that Sino-Uighur relations in fact reached their lowest point during Mou-yü’s reign, even though his forces had helped defeat Shih Ch’ao-i. In fact, one is tempted to conclude that the historians were implying by their selection of material that Tai-tsung had made a mistake in requesting Uighur aid against Shih Ch’ao-i. The impact of the Uighur armies does not seem to have been nearly as decisive in the 762 battle for Lo-yang as in those of 757 for the two capitals. Might not Ch’ao-i have been defeated without the Uighurs and a great deal of suffering and humiliation prevented?

Underlying the resentment of the Chinese against the Uighur presence was the fear that they might actually invade China. That such an event was likely had been obvious since 762 when it was averted by the narrowest of margins. There are signs that the possibility weighed heavily on the Chinese mind during the last few years of Tai-tsung’s reign. Not only did most of the incidents reported above occur at this time, but the Uighurs
also began making raids near the frontier areas. One against Hsia-chou in the Ordos took place in 775–6 but was repelled (n.138). In 778 Hun Kun was sent to the Chen-wu Army, stationed near the north-eastern bend of the Yellow River, in order to eject some Uighur soldiers who had been terrifying the people of the border regions (n.144). But a much more concrete sign of the Chinese fear of invasion can be seen in the fact that in March 776 they strengthened the Shuo-fang Army, a vital position for the defence of the borders, with the specific aim of preparing for a Uighur attack (n.138).

This was not an unreasonable move. Mou-yü did in fact plan an invasion at the end of his reign. As it happened, however, his forces did not march south. He was killed in a coup d’etat, the immediate aim of which was to prevent his proposed war against the T’ang.

**Tun Mo-ho’s Reign**

The leader of the coup and successor to Mou-yü was Tun mo-ho Khaghan, under whom a much more friendly attitude towards the Chinese evolved in Karabalghasun. Yet there were some extremely curious features of Uighur behaviour towards the T’ang during his reign and the path towards greater friendship was by no means a smooth one.

Tun mo-ho was anti-Sogdian and apparently also anti-Manichean (n.146). This in itself was one factor which cleared the way towards better relations with China. The influence of the Sogdians in the Uighur court hardly favoured China, and it was they who suggested to Mou-yü that he invade the Central Kingdom. Tun mo-ho is reported in the *New T’ang History* to have told Mou-yü, ‘The T’ang is a great state and has never acted treacherously towards us’. The historian may well have put words into his mouth to glorify China, but there is no reason to doubt that Tun mo-ho was favourably disposed towards his great southern neighbour at the time of his accession.

However, the new Chinese Emperor Te-tsung still nourished a deep hatred for the Uighurs because of the humiliation they had inflicted on him, as heir-apparent, during the interview at P’ing-lu just before the battle for Lo-yang in 762. Moreover, an incident at the beginning of Te-tsung’s reign in China and Tun’s among the Uighurs showed that it would not be easy to institute a pro-Chinese policy in Karabalghasun. What happened was as follows.

The Sogdians were particularly noted as a trading people and, in view of the influence which that people had enjoyed in Mou-yü’s entourage, it is not surprising that we find them assisting the Uighurs in their business
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affairs under his rule. When a group of Uighurs went to China to sell their horses, which was an annual affair, they would frequently take some Sogdians with them. Often these traders preferred to remain behind in Ch’ang-an where they would have more scope for their abilities than at Karabalghasun, and before long there was a not inconsiderable community both of Uighurs and Uighur Sogdians in the Chinese capital, doing trade and making large sums of money.\(^55\) They lived among the Chinese, adopted Chinese dress, married Chinese women and built fine houses. ‘They daily became more and more unrestrained, grasping and perverse, and the officials did not dare examine them.’\(^56\) Soon after his accession on 12 June 779, Te-tsung decided to try and put a stop to this competition which was deleterious to the trade of his own people. On 28 August that year he issued an edict that these Uighurs and Sogdians should refrain from wearing Chinese garb (n.150). He also directly ordered the Uighur chief T’u-tung, Tun mo-ho’s uncle, to take as many of them as possible back to Karabalghasun.\(^57\)

Accordingly, T’u-tung loaded up a train of camels in 780 and took the road, accompanied by a large number of the Sogdian and Uighur merchants. These were unwilling to part with their Chinese wives and concubines, so, realising that it would be impossible to obtain permission to take the women, they hid them in bags among the goods in the camel train. The whole procession stayed for three months in Chen-wu. Of course the women required food, and the Chinese official Chang Kuang-sheng—the victor over the Uighurs in the Yang-wu Valley in 778—noticed that the bill for supplying the train was too large. He sent an underling to poke the bags with an awl, and the presence of the Chinese girls was quickly discovered.

The Sogdians had heard of the change of régime in Karabalghasun and about the massacre which the new khaghan had perpetrated against their race. They therefore tried to flee from the party during the long stay in Chen-wu. T’u-tung kept a careful watch to prevent this, and very few succeeded in escaping. Finally, the Sogdians tried to come to an agreement with Chang Kuang-sheng and to persuade him to kill the Uighurs. Kuang-sheng adopted this suggestion, but decided to include the Sogdians in the massacre as well.

\(^{55}\) Pulleyblank (*Background*, p.41) points out that merchants of Sogdian origin were important in Chinese commerce before the An Lu-shan rebellion. However, the growth of trade conducted by Uighurs and Sogdians allied to the Uighurs does not appear to have become significant until after the rebellion.

\(^{56}\) TCTC 225.7265.

\(^{57}\) TCTC 226.7287–8.
He immediately informed the emperor of his plan, explaining that it would be an excellent way of cutting down Uighur power, since their strength depended largely on Sogdian aid and the economic benefits which the superior trading skill of this people was able to effect. Te-tsung may have hated the Uighurs but could not possibly sanction such an act. Kuang-sheng sent in three memorials hoping to persuade him to permit it (n.152). When this failed, Chang deliberately created a *casus belli* which would justify his design. He sent a junior officer to insult the Uighur leader by publicly refusing him the proper respect. T'u-tung was annoyed and, as Kuang-sheng had expected, had the officer whipped. Kuang-sheng replied by inviting the Uighurs, and also the Sogdians on whose suggestion he had devised the plan, to a banquet, where he gave them much to eat and drink and then killed his intoxicated guests (n.153).

Two Uighurs were spared. They were sent to Karabalghasun to tell the khaghan that the Uighurs had flogged a great general and had been planning to take Chen-wu, so that he, Kuang-sheng, had felt called upon to massacre them all. The wives and concubines of the dead men were meanwhile sent back to Ch'ang-an. The Uighurs demanded vengeance for this monstrous act, but Te-tsung took only token measures against Chang Kuang-sheng (n.154).

Some time later, the coffins of T'u-tung and other leaders were transported back to Karabalghasun with an embassy led by Yuan Hsiu (n.148). He had actually been sent to the Uighurs in July 780 to give the new khaghan formal recognition, but broke his journey in T'ai-yüan for a while because of the tense situation (n.155). When Yuan's mission arrived in the Uighur capital, its members waited about two months before they heard what Tun *mo-ho* was proposing to do. Eventually the message was delivered to them: the khaghan's ministers all considered that the Chinese envoys should be killed, but he himself could see no point in deliberate revenge, and had decided that the Chinese could atone for their crime by the immediate payment of all their debts due to the purchase of Uighur horses, a considerable sum amounting to 1,800,000 ligatures.

This decision of the khaghan's was extremely magnanimous. Not only was the compensation demanded no more than what he considered a just debt, but his action was taken for proper reasons and against opposition. It seems to me to indicate also a very strong desire to be on good terms with the Chinese. The khaghan could certainly have taken revenge and got away with it, and I think there can be little doubt what Mou-yü would have done under the circumstances. Although he might have expected far worse, Te-tsung was livid at the outcome of the whole affair, but since
he realised the power of the Uighurs and the justice of their demand, he
contained his anger and, in the latter half of 782, paid up the value of the
sum in gold, silver, and silk.

At about the same time as this, serious trouble was brewing in China, which
was yet again to bring the T’ang to the verge of destruction. It resulted
in the rebellion of Chu T’ao (744–85)\(^5\) and Chu Tz’u (742–84),\(^6\) in which
Uighur forces were once more involved – this time against the T’ang.

When Te-tsung had first come to the Chinese throne, he had taken
serious steps towards curbing the powers of the military governors in the
provinces. Seeing their influence threatened, some of these warlords in
the north-east decided to declare their total independence of Ch’ang-an.
Towards the end of 782 an entire official establishment was created under
the leadership of Chu T’ao, whose government was based on Yu-chou.
The emperor appealed for help from Li Hsi-lieh (d.786)\(^6\) of Hsü-chou,
who had been extremely loyal up to this point, but Li declared himself on
the side of the dissidents. Te-tsung’s position grew weaker still when an
army summoned to his defence mutinied in Ch’ang-an and even penetrated
the imperial palaces. Te-tsung fled to Feng-t’ien not far north-west of
his capital, and on 2 November 783 Chu T’ao’s elder brother Tz’u installed
himself as emperor. Chu Tz’u then attempted to advance on Feng-t’ien
but was thrown back by Li Huai-kuang (729–85).\(^6\) Although Li himself
joined the rebels the following March owing to the insulting behaviour
towards him of the chief minister Lu Ch’i (d.785, n.177), the tide began to
turn against the Chus and their supporters. At the beginning of 784,
Te-tsung issued an amnesty which persuaded several of their most
important leaders, including Wang Wu-chün (735–801),\(^6\) to defect to
the side of the T’ang, and the remaining rebel generals started quarrelling
among themselves. An attempt by Chu T’ao to advance towards the south
was decisively defeated outside Pei-chou by Wang Wu-chün, and Chu
Tz’u was murdered by his own men. Li Sheng (727–93)\(^6\) captured Ch’ang-
an with Tibetan assistance, and Te-tsung re-entered the city early in
August 784. Chu T’ao submitted soon after.\(^6\)

\(^{5}\) Chu T’ao’s biographies are given in CTS 143.1b–3a, HTS 212.1b–4b.
\(^{6}\) See Chu Tz’u’s biographies in CTS 200B.1a–4b, HTS 225B.3a–9a.
\(^{6}\) Li Hsi-lieh’s biography is given in CTS 145.8a–9b, HTS 225B.1a–3a and outlined by
\(^{6}\) On Li Huai-kuang see CTS 121.9b–12b, HTS 224A.7b–9b.
\(^{6}\) Wang Wu-chün’s life is recorded in CTS 142.4b–7b, HTS 211.4b–7b.
\(^{6}\) Li Sheng’s career is recorded in CTS 133.1a–11a, HTS 154.1a–5b, and summarised in
des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, p.857.
\(^{6}\) For the main events of the Chu rebellion see also Franke, Geschichte des chinesischen
The part of the Uighurs in these events was actually not of great significance and does not rate a single mention in the Uighur biographies in the standard histories. They took part only in the campaign of Chu T’ao and were not involved in the much more important battles nearer the capital.

In about 780 Chu T’ao took a Uighur woman as a concubine. She had earlier been married to the chief of the Hsi people, who lived north-east of Yu-chou, but when her husband died she started her return home. On the way she passed through the territory under T’ao’s control, and he asked to marry her. At least one group of the Uighurs was consequently well disposed towards T’ao, and a ta-kan came with an army of several thousand to assist him in his proposed march to the south. They were, as usual, given rich rewards for their promised aid, large quantities of jade, silk and also people.65

T’ao and his followers besieged Pei-chou, and the Uighurs pillaged the surrounding subprefectures.66 Wang Wu-chü'n believed Chu’s strength was largely dependent on his Uighur allies, but was nevertheless confident he could break the siege and defeat him.67 The ta-kan shared Wang’s belief in Uighur power and assured Chu T’ao that victory could not but be theirs. He told the rebel, ‘When we Uighurs fight with a neighbouring state in a country, we usually destroy several thousand of the neighbouring state’s cavalry with but 500 of our own, just as if we were sweeping leaves. Now we have so far received incalculable quantities of gold and silk, oxen and wine, and think it is time that we served you, the great king. Tomorrow, I suggest that you should ride your horse up to a high mound, and watch how we Uighurs cut down Wu-chü'n’s cavalry on your behalf, so that not a single one of his horses returns.’68

In the event Wang’s confidence was to be proved justified and the ta-kan’s ill-advised. The battle was fought on 29 May 784. Wang Wu-chü'n sent a battle commander to lie in wait while he himself confronted the Uighurs. The latter rushed against him, but he got his cavalry to rein in their horses and dodge the onslaught. The Uighurs appeared at Wang’s rear and this time he responded fiercely to their move. Suddenly the battle commander launched a devastating surprise attack from the side, and the Uighurs were scattered. The action was decisive and Chu T’ao’s forces were completely defeated.69 His southward thrust had been thwarted.

65 HTS 212.4a.
66 TCTC 229.7396.
67 TCTC 230.7427.
68 TCTC 231.7431–2.
69 TCTC 231.7432, HTS 211.6b–7a.
How can it be explained that the Uighurs, whose khaghan had so recently treated the T'ang so fairly, should suddenly turn against it and assist an anti-T'ang rebellion? Had the khaghan really decided to avenge himself after all? In view of his behaviour before and, even more, after this revolt, I think this is most unlikely. Perhaps the most striking feature of the Uighur force in the Chu T’ao rebellion was its leadership. Whereas the Uighur troops which helped against An Ch’ing-hsü in 757 had been led by the khaghan’s son, those against Shih Ch’ao-i in 762 by the khaghan himself and those in 764–5 on behalf of P’u-ku Huai-en by several chief ministers, the Uighur troops which supported Chu were led merely by a ta-kan. It seems to me probable that this man was the subordinate of a Uighur leader related to Chu T’ao’s concubine and that he belonged to the faction which wanted to avenge Chang Kuang-sheng’s massacre. Tribal allegiances must have been at the root of this curious case of Uighur assistance. The Chinese sources give no indication that Tun mo-ho himself supported Chu T’ao’s rebellion. I suspect that the ta-kan’s troops actually went to help him behind the khaghan’s back and contrary to his wishes.

Whatever the truth on this matter, the last years of Tun’s reign show a decidedly friendly attitude on his part towards the T’ang. On 2 October 787, an embassy arrived at the Chinese court from Tun mo-ho to give ‘tribute’ and ask for a marriage alliance. Te-tsung no doubt heaved a heavy sigh when he saw the embassy, and turned for advice to his respected chief minister Li Pi (722–89, n.159). The latter advised in favour of the marriage and pointed out that since the P’ing-lu affair, which still rankled with the emperor, a new khaghan, one favourable to China, had ascended the throne at Karabalghasun. Neither he nor the emperor raised the question of the Uighur part in the Chu T’ao rebellion, which underlines the insignificant impact that role had produced on the Chinese court. In the end Te-tsung overcame his bitter feelings towards the Uighurs. He yielded to Pi’s advice and from then on good relations between the two rulers were secure. He even went to unusual lengths to be polite to a Uighur princess who had accompanied the embassy from Karabalghasun.

In the euphoria which followed his marriage with the Chinese emperor’s daughter, Tun mo-ho became positively subservient to Te-tsung. According to the New T’ang History, ‘he sent up a memorial to the emperor which showed him extreme reverence and said, “In former times we were elder and younger brother, but now I am your son-in-law, your half-son” ’. Any hard feelings Tun may have felt owing to the Chang Kuang-sheng massacre seem to have evaporated by this time.

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Diplomatic Relations and Marriages

The occasion which brought about this dramatic improvement in Sino-Uighur relations was the diplomatic marriage between the Princess of Hsien-an and Tun mo-ho. The granting of brides to the khaghans was in fact one of the main aspects of diplomatic relations between the two states. Before dealing with it in detail, however, let us first turn to the general subject of Sino-Uighur diplomatic intercourse over the period 744 to 840.

The official embassies reported in the Chinese sources between the Uighurs and Chinese fall into four main categories. The first is that of missions from the Uighurs with no purpose other than what the Chinese call 'tributary'. The Uighurs did not recognise Chinese suzerainty over them and would have thought of them as good-will rather than as tributary embassies. They arrived at the Chinese court throughout the whole period of the empire, even when the relations between the two states were distinctly cool, except for one period of about a decade during Huai-hsin's reign.

The second category is that of embassies concerned with Uighur assistance to the Chinese government against rebellions. I have dealt with this subject elsewhere. The third is that of missions from the Uighurs to announce the death of their khaghan or khatun and those from China to announce the death of an emperor or 'appoint', that is recognise, a new ruler. All the khaghans of the empire period were formally recognised by the Chinese court, except the usurper of 790 and the last ruler, Prince Ho-sa, who reigned from 839 to 840.

The Chinese sources make frequent complaints that Uighur ambassadors failed to behave with due respect and politeness and sometimes even caused trouble by plundering the countryside. They also abound in moralistic little stories about how the Chinese dealt with this problem by superior diplomacy. It appears to have been mainly the Chinese innate resentment against the Uighurs that led to the writing and preservation of such accounts. Certainly, they cannot be dismissed as fabrications but do not in general appear to carry much significance for the reader who wishes to trace the course of Sino-Uighur relations.

The final category is that of embassies connected with a specific Uighur request made of the Chinese court. In 768 and 771 Manichean temples were built in China, apparently at the behest of Uighur missions. A further embassy early in 807 also asked that Manichean temples be

70 I have listed all these embassies in my 'Sino-Uighur Diplomatic and Trade Contacts', pp.221–38.
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constructed in Lo-yang and T'ai-yüan, and the court gave its permission (n.230). Manicheism was a religion the Chinese government did not like and had proscribed, except for foreigners, in 732. It was in fact principally the power of the Uighurs that persuaded successive emperors to tolerate it after Mou-yü's conversion. No sooner had the Uighur empire fallen than the Emperor Wu-tsung (840-6) instituted a systematic persecution against Manicheism, along with other foreign religions, and it died out in China after that time, except as a secret society.

But by far the most important embassies in this fourth category were those which asked for or welcomed a Chinese bride for the Uighur khaghan. Throughout Chinese history diplomatic marriages were a standard means of keeping the ferocity of the peripheral peoples at bay, so it is not surprising that embassies connected with these marriages are of paramount importance in revealing the state of diplomatic friendship between the two countries.

Mo-yen-ch'o asked for a marital alliance and was granted one in 758. The khaghan's bride was the Princess of Ning-kuo, the second daughter of Su-tsung (n.49), and she was of unusual significance in being the first daughter of a T'ang emperor to be given in marriage to a foreign ruler. Despite being honoured in this way, Mo-yen-ch'o did not, so far as is recorded, send an embassy from Karabalghasun especially to welcome his bride and he received that which brought her very coldly indeed. Nevertheless, he did subsequently send envoys to thank the emperor for the marriage.

Mou-yü married successively two daughters of Pu-ku Huai-en. Of the five Chinese princesses sent to the Uighurs who became the khatun, these were the only two who were not daughters of an emperor. No great ritual is reported in the sources connected with the marriage of these women with the khaghan and no embassies were sent to greet them. It is true that the first khagans enjoyed far less wealth than their successors. It is also true that Mou-yü married his first wife before he had ascended the throne and that by the time he married his second, P'u-ku Huai-en had rebelled against the T'ang. Yet the Emperor Tai-tsung had respected Huai-en so deeply that even after the general's rebellion he took this daughter into his palaces and brought her up as his own (n.129). It was consequently no slight to the Uighurs that she should be chosen to marry Mou-yü. The relatively blase manner in which the early khagans accepted their Chinese brides and their failure to show much appreciation were certainly symptoms of their cool feelings towards China.

72 Ibid., pp.154-5.
73 An account of the persecution against Manicheism is given ibid., pp.284-303.
On the other hand, when Te-tsung granted his eighth daughter, the Princess of Hsien-an (n.168), to Tun mo-ho, the Uighur khaghan went to a great deal of trouble to give her a splendid welcome. He sent out an enormous embassy of over 1,000 people, and a large number of horses as tribute to the court. Indeed, so large was the embassy that some of it was asked to stay in T'ai-yüan and not to proceed to the Chinese capital. As it happened, the princess in whose honour this mission was arranged lived a long time among the Uighurs. She became the wife of several successive Uighur rulers, of both dynasties, and died in 808.

The last Chinese bride given to a Uighur ruler of the empire period was the Princess of T'ai-ho, who went to Karabalghasun in 821 to marry 'Ch'ung-te' Khaghan (821–4). It is worthwhile to discuss this marriage and its preliminaries in some detail, since they are of tremendous value in determining the development of relations between China and the Uighurs of the second dynasty. Indeed this marital alliance is by far the best documented of all aspects of Sino-Uighur contacts during the years 795–840, and in those sections of the standard histories dealing with this subject there is very little material which is not related to the marriage in some way or another.

The Uighurs under 'Pao-i' Khaghan actually began pressing the Chinese court to grant them a princess as early as 813, when I-nan-chu was sent to make the request. Before the Chinese court could make up its mind how to react, a Uighur force of several thousand cavalry arrived at the P'i-t'i Springs on the north-western frontier. It was probably upon hearing about this development, which was interpreted in China as the beginning of a Uighur invasion, that I-nan-chu left Ch'ang-an without waiting for an answer to the request. Meanwhile the Chinese did what they could to strengthen the defences of the north-western border (n.243).

It seems to me extremely doubtful that this sudden sally towards China was intended to put pressure on the Chinese Emperor Hsien-tsung to agree to the marriage, since the invasion did not eventuate despite the prevarication of the Chinese court. Nevertheless, there were certainly many people in Ch'ang-an who believed that the Uighurs were planning to invade China (n.244) and there was one faction at court which advised the emperor to grant the marriage in the interests of the state's security.

This clique was led by Li Chiang (764–830, n.245), chief minister from 811 to 814. Shortly after he resigned, he sent a memorial to the emperor setting forth in detail the reasons for his view. He pointed out the inadequate defences of the borders and believed it would be inviting trouble under these circumstances to irritate the Uighurs. He also raised the
possibility that by refusing their request, the emperor would drive them into the arms of their traditional enemies the Tibetans, which could well result in an alliance between the two states against China. On the other hand, to grant the Uighurs a bride would intensify the Tibetan hostility towards the Uighurs by arousing their jealousy. The question of the cost of the marriage had naturally arisen, and many had suggested that it would be beyond the resources of the imperial treasury. Li Chiang’s estimate was that by comparison with the amount of money it would probably save the empire, the cost was but a negligible sum.

Hsien-tsung was unmoved by these weighty arguments. It was now more than a year since I-nan-chu’s departure and he had heard nothing further from the Uighurs. No invasion had taken place and the Tibetans had been very quiet for some years. Moreover, by this time Li Chiang’s influence had weakened at court, and the government was largely dominated by the powerful eunuch T’u-t’u Ch’eng-ts’ui, who was a bitter enemy of Li Chiang’s.

Early in 817 another embassy arrived from the Uighurs with a request for a marriage. At this time Hsien-tsung’s hands were full trying to defeat the rebellion of the independent military governor Wu Yüan-chi (n.251), which was not suppressed until later the same year. He ordered his officials to make an estimate of the cost involved in the marriage and found it to be exorbitant. The Uighur request was therefore refused, at least until conditions improved.

‘Pao-i’ did not leave the matter there. Early in 820 a third mission arrived to make a further petition for the marriage. This time Hsien-tsung at last gave his consent. The situation had indeed changed since 817. The independently minded military governors, who had worried every emperor since Hsüan-tsung, were temporarily quiescent. Moreover, Li Chiang’s arguments about the Tibetans made much better sense now, for in 818 they had broken a lull of over a decade and begun making raids against China’s borders. It was at about this time, too, that T’u-t’u Ch’eng-ts’ui was murdered and his clique defeated. The eunuch had been a great advocate of the use of military force in settling problems and his fall resulted in a transfer of governmental policy towards a milder approach. I think it likely that Hsien-tsung’s unexpected change of heart after seven years of resistance was connected with the palace coup (n.268).

The persistent Uighur requests for a marital alliance suggest that ‘Pao-i’ wanted good relations with China, an impression strengthened by the fact that the constant fear of the Chinese that he would back up his demands by military force came to nothing. It is true that the Sogdians,
who had formerly exercised an anti-Chinese influence at the Uighur court, were more powerful than ever under the second dynasty, but with the passage of time it had seemed possible to 'Pao-i' to be on good terms with his south-eastern neighbour without offending the Sogdians. The diplomatic events of the years 813–20 are significant also in showing that it was no longer the Uighurs who called the tune. The power balance had changed strikingly since the days of Mou-yü. Despite their massive military gains in the west under 'Huai-hsin', the Uighurs were already declining by 813 and the Chinese were able to refuse their demands without suffering humiliating reprisals. Te-tsung, who loathed the Uighurs, had succumbed to pressure for a diplomatic marriage with remarkable speed. Hsien-tsung, who felt, as far as we know, no particular personal feelings of animosity towards them, resisted their diplomatic pressure for seven full years.

As it happened, Hsien-tsung died, possibly through assassination, almost immediately after he agreed to the marriage, and it was left to his successor Mu-tsung to arrange it. He chose as 'Pao-i's' bride his younger sister the Princess of Yung-an, who was Hsien-tsung's fifteenth daughter. However, before she had left Ch'ang-an, 'Pao-i' also died and his successor 'Ch'ung-te' despatched a welcoming party to receive her. Although 'Ch'ung-te' was particularly anxious that his bride should be the same princess originally selected for 'Pao-i', Mu-tsung decided instead to send his father's seventeenth daughter, the Princess of T'ai-ho (n.260).

The policy of friendship towards China and, indeed, the growing luxury at the Uighur court are exemplified in the embassy which arrived in 821 to welcome the princess. It contained about twice as many people and ten times as many horses as that which Tun mo-ho had sent, in addition to camels and various items of luxury. The New T'ang History comments that 'Never before had a delegation from any of the barbarian states to China been as large as this one'. The emperor allowed only about a quarter of the mission's members to come to the capital. A Chinese embassy was sent to go back with the princess and the Uighur mission to Karabalghasun, and the whole was a train of unprecedented magnificence and size. The Chinese side was apparently also keen to restore friendly diplomatic relations.

In the event, Li Chiang's suggestion that the marriage would inflame Uighur-Tibetan hostility proved justified. No sooner had the Princess of T'ai-ho been ordered to marry the khaghan, than the Uighurs announced that they had sent forces to the far western districts of Pei-t'ing and An-hsi to ward off the attempts the Tibetans were making, or might make, to prevent the Princess of T'ai-ho from reaching Karabalghasun. Although
in the first instance China also suffered renewed Tibetan raids on her borders owing to the marriage, a Sino-Tibetan peace agreement was reached soon after and hostilities were discontinued. From a political point of view, the marital alliance with the Uighurs had definitely worked to China's advantage.

Embassies continued to come from the Uighurs to Ch'ang-an. The sources are too sketchy to provide any definite clue as to the state of Sino-Uighur relations after the Princess of T'ai-ho became the khatun. However, since the Uighur empire was declining rapidly and the final war with the Kirghiz had begun, it would have been very much against Uighur interests to provoke Chinese hostility. Moreover, the Princess of T'ai-ho remained among the Uighurs until after their empire collapsed and doubtless continued to act as a guarantor of Sino-Uighur friendship. Though the years 820–22 saw the height of cordiality between the two countries in the ninth century, it seems apparent that each side retained its attitude towards the other more or less unchanged until the Uighur empire fell in 840.

Commercial Contacts

A prominent feature of the relations between China and the Uighurs was the trade in Chinese silk for Uighur horses. This began after the defeat of the An Lu-shan rebellion on Uighur initiative and as a way of exploiting the Chinese. Every year the Uighurs would bring to China a certain number of horses which they traded at forty pieces of silk each. The Chinese were annoyed both by the high price demanded and by the inferiority of the horses they were compelled to buy. Nevertheless, the Uighurs did not hesitate to ask for higher prices still, and by the beginning of the ninth century were receiving fifty pieces of silk for every horse (n.134). The trade was undoubtedly a forced one which the Uighurs were able to impose from their position of power. In 773, the emperor tried to make a stand against it and permitted the trade of only 6,000 out of the 10,000 horses that the Uighur leader Ch'ih-hsin had brought to Ch'ang-an. The emperor also tried to shame the Uighurs into discontinuing the forced trade by making them generous gifts. These measures, however, did not produce the desired result of curtailing the trade and the horses continued to arrive every year, placing severe strains upon the Chinese economy.

The silk/horse trade persisted, with only short and intermittent breaks, right down to the end of the Uighur empire and after. The main recourse the Chinese used against it was passive resistance, that is, they made a practice of leaving the onus on the Uighurs to enforce payment for their
horses. It is true that this method met with some success and the number of Uighur horses in China for which no compensation had been made tended to grow. Yet the quantity of silk given to the Uighurs was substantial, and Tamīm ibn Bahr reports that the Chinese emperor sent the Uighur kaghan 500,000 pieces of silk every year.⁷⁴

In the course of time, Chinese silk became an important ingredient in the Uighur economy. It was used as a form of currency, helped increase the comfort of the court, and could be re-exported to other countries for more essential goods. To have cut the trade drastically would have created an unemployment problem and irritated the urban population of the Uighurs, who had come to regard it as a normal part of their lives. Those khaghas who wanted better relations with China would have found great difficulty in curtailing the trade, even if they had so desired. The economic disadvantages of the Chinese dependence on the Uighurs during the An Lu-shan rebellion lasted long after the military and diplomatic had disappeared.

One other aspect of the Sino-Uighur commercial relations deserves attention. I have already mentioned in an earlier section the presence of Uighur and Sogdian merchants in Ch'ang-an, who had actually taken up residence there. They may well have originally belonged to the class of people who brought Uighur horses to China for the kind of commerce just discussed, but in the course of time extended their activities to other fields of trade. Although Te-tsung tried to take action against them, his measures failed to solve the problems they created. In 787 there was still a large number of foreign merchants in the Chinese capital, not only Uighurs but others from further west. The Chinese government actually subsidised them, but found itself in such impoverished circumstances that it could not continue the payments. Because their route home had been cut off by the Tibetans, Li Pi suggested that they should either be repatriated by sea or by submitting to a toll to pass through Uighur territory, or be granted status as Chinese subjects, and given jobs officially. The foreigners had families in China and did not wish to leave. Most of them therefore chose to remain.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Minorsky, ‘Tamīm ibn Bahr’s Journey’, p.283. I have discussed the silk/horse trade in greater detail, including evidence for my statement that many Uighur horses remained a bad debt, and listed all the instances of the trade as reported in the Chinese sources in my article ‘Sino-Uighur Diplomatic and Trade Contacts’, pp.218–20, 238–9. It may be added that there were other products besides silk bought by Uighur traders, including tea. See HTS 196.10b–11a, and Feng Chia-Sheng and others, Wei-tu-erh tsu, vol. I, p.31.

INTRODUCTION

That these foreign merchants included Uighurs is shown through the further growth of their financial power in later decades. Not only were they successful in the buying and selling of products, they also established themselves as money-lenders. In 831 the government decided to act against this practice when Li Shen, one of the sons of the famous general Li Sheng who had acted so effectively against the Chu Tz’u rebellion in 784, fell into serious difficulties with the Uighur money-lenders. Shen was addicted to alcoholic drink, "he was wasteful and extravagant, and accumulated debts to the value of twenty or thirty million strings of cash". His son borrowed ‘Uighur money’ to the value of 11,400 strings of cash but could not repay it. The Uighurs brought an accusation against him, as a result of which Li Shen was dismissed from his post. The emperor promptly issued an edict, in which he bemoaned that the problem of Uighur money-lending had grown worse and forbade such loans for the future. Chinese were not allowed to hold any financial dealings with the Uighurs except for the purpose of legitimate trade, and were liable to punishment if they disobeyed.

The government was well aware that financial power leads to political power, and their reluctance to see leading families in the debt of the Uighurs is perfectly understandable. Yet it is extremely doubtful that the edict was more than marginally effective. Foreign merchants, no doubt including Uighurs, were still of great importance at the end of the T’ang, and the Uighur money-lenders continued their trade into the Sung, their financial power remaining as strong as ever. In other words, the influence of the Uighurs in Chinese financial circles, which was originally based on their enormous military power, survived the collapse of their empire. The economic repercussions of the assistance of the Uighurs to the T’ang during the An Lu-shan rebellion proved more durable than any other result of their intervention.

The Uighur community in China appears to have consisted principally of traders, diplomats, and Manicheans, and they clearly produced a fairly significant impact upon their country of residence. There was also a Chinese population among the Uighurs, as is evident from the fact that one

76 CTS 133.17a.
77 TFYK 999.26a-b. See also Hino Kaizaburō, ‘Kaikotsusen’, p. 38 and Ch’en Yin-k’o, T’ang-tai cheng-chih shih shu-lun kao, p.156.
79 See TCTC 253.8221 under 880.
version of the Karabalghasun Inscription was written in Chinese. We even know of a respected T'ang citizen of the Li clan who went to settle among the Uighurs and became adopted as a member of the Yao-lo-ko clan which ruled the empire until 795. In 792 he returned to China as a Uighur ambassador and was given a distinguished honorary title by the emperor. Chinese cultural influence among the Uighurs was undoubtedly fairly strong, not only through their trade but also through their princesses and the high sophistication of their art and architecture. Chinese builders worked among the Uighurs even in the early stages of the empire period (n.11).

There were, then, bright aspects in the relations of the Uighurs with China and they were anxious not merely to exploit but also to learn from the Chinese. It is worth repeating in conclusion that the sources on which our information is based are almost entirely Chinese, and this means that the Uighurs are almost always presented in a damning light. Their level of culture was no doubt inferior to that of the Chinese, but it is unnecessary to conclude that they were all 'barbarians'. Certainly they were capable of great cruelty, in which they had no monopoly, but the history of their relations with China shows a growing trend away from pure militarism towards an interest in civilian pursuits. Their later contributions in the artistic and literary spheres perhaps allow the conclusion that, even by 840, they had reached a higher level of sophistication than the Chinese histories would suggest. If sources are ever discovered which give a detailed treatment of relations with the T'ang during the empire period from a Uighur point of view, a drastic reappraisal of what I have written may become necessary. Until such a time, however, there is no alternative but to base any account of the subject on the Chinese historical documents.

81 Compare also Bazin's remark: 'Now, in Central Asia, in the eighth century, among the Turks as among their neighbours, the economic and cultural influence of China (not to speak of its influence in the strictly political sense, through the mediation of certain tribal chiefs) made itself felt more and more.' See 'Man and the Concept of History', pp. 92-3.
THE TA-MING PALACE

Lin-te Hall
(San-tien)

Tzu-ch'en
Hall

Yen-ying
Hall

Right Yin-t'ai
Gate

Western
Interior
Park

Grand Audience
Hall

Grand Imperial
Secretariat

Ming-feng
Gate

Left Yin-t'ai
Gate

Eastern
Interior
Park

Map 6.
The Chinese Texts

NOTE: Dates in parentheses are Western equivalents of a Chinese date just mentioned, those in brackets are based on sources other than the one translated.
In the third year [of T'ien-pao, 744], he [the Uighur ruler] attacked and conquered the Basmil. Having taken the title of Ku-tu-1u p'i-chia ch'üeh Khaghan, he once again sent ambassadors to court, and was accordingly given appointment as 'Huai-jen' Khaghan [746 THY].

When Su-tsung ascended the throne at Ling-wu in the seventh month of the first year of Chih-te (1–29/8/756), he sent [29/9–27/10/756 TCTC] the son of the late Prince of Pin, Ch'eng-shen, enfeoffed as Prince of Tun-huang, and the general, Shih Ting-fan, as ambassadors to the Uighurs, to cultivate good relations and to request soldiers. When they arrived at the [Uighur] royal camp, the khaghan gave his daughter to Ch'eng-shen as a bride and sent some chiefs to the Chinese court to seek a diplomatic marriage. The emperor enfeoffed the Uighur princess as P'i-chia Princess. Su-tsung was in P'eng-yüan, where he received them extremely graciously.
A PROCLAMATION came [746 THY] from the court appointing [the Uighur ruler] as Ku-tu-lu p’i-chia ch’üeh ‘Huai-jen’ Khaghan.4

At the Grand Audience Hall the guards of honour were standing guard. The President of the Department of the Grand Imperial Secretariat5 summoned the ambassador to his office and gave him the document of appointment.6 The ambassador went out of the gate [of the Grand Imperial Secretariat] and mounted an imperial chariot which took him to a gate of the Imperial City. There he descended from the chariot and horses, and walked with his pennants and emblems of office preceding him. Whenever a khaghan was appointed, this ritual was invariably followed.

The following year7 (745), [Ku-li] p’ei-lo [the Uighur khaghan] also attacked and killed the T’u-chüeh8 khaghan, Po-mei, and sent Tun Ch’o-lo ta-kan to court to offer tribute [26/4/745 TFYK 975]. The emperor appointed P’ei-lo as the Auxiliary Grand General of the Left Brave Guards,9 and enlarged his territory in width and breadth. The eastern extremity was [the territory of] the Shih-wei, the western, the Altai Mountains, and the southern controlled the Gobi Desert, so it covered the entire territory of the ancient Hsiung-nu.

P’ei-lo died,10 and his son, Mo-yen-ch’o,11 ascended the throne under the name of Ko-le Khaghan. He was roguish and prompt in action, and skilled in the command of soldiers.12 Every year he sent ambassadors to court.

Su-tsung ascended the throne [12/8/756 TCTC]. Ambassadors came to court asking leave to help in the fight against Lu-shan.13 The emperor issued an edict that the Prefectural Prince of Tun-huang, Ch’eng-shen,14 should make a pact with [the Uighurs], and further ordered P’u-ku Huai-en16 to accompany the prince to receive their soldiers. The khaghan was pleased at this, so he adopted his khatun’s younger sister as his daughter and gave her to Ch’eng-shen as a bride. [At the same time] he sent his great chiefs to court to seek a diplomatic marriage. The emperor, wishing to confirm his loyal feelings, immediately enfeoffed the barbarian’s daughter as P’i-chia Princess.

Immediately after this, the khaghan himself acted as general, and,
In the second month of the second year (23/2–24/3/757) the Uighurs again sent one of their chiefs, Grand General To-lan, together with fourteen others, to court [arrived 11/7/757 TFYK 976]. On the day wu-yin of the ninth month (20/10/757), the emperor promoted Ch’eng-shen to the rank of k’ai-fu i-t’ung-san-ssu, appointed him as President of the Court of the Imperial Clan, and gave him the Uighur princess as his chief consort. The Uighurs sent their crown prince, Yeh-hu, under whom were Ti-te, other generals, and over 4,000 troops and horses, to help China fight against the rebels. Su-tsung banqueted them and bestowed very generous gifts upon them. Also he ordered his Generalissimo, the Prince of Kuang-p’ing, to have an interview with Yeh-hu and to form an alliance of brotherhood. He treated him with extreme kindness and took him into his confidence. Yeh-hu was very pleased about this and addressed the prince as his elder brother.

On the day wu-tzu (30/10/757) some great chiefs, ta-kan and other Uighurs, in all thirteen people, arrived in advance at Fu-feng and met the generals and officers of Shuo-fang. The Vice President [of the Department of Affairs of State], Kuo Tzu-i, detained them for a banquet which he had arranged to last three days. Yeh-hu, the crown prince [of the Uighurs] said, ‘The state is in difficulties. When we have come from afar to render help, how can we have time for banqueting?’ Tzu-i insisted upon keeping them [saying that] when the banquet was finished, it would then be opportune to send out their armies. [When they were on the march], he gave them daily rations of two hundred sheep, twenty cattle and forty shih of rice.

The Generalissimo, the Prince of Kuang-p’ing, led [11/11/757 TCTC] Kuo Tzu-i and the others to [a position] twenty li east of the Hsiang-chi Temple and went west approaching the Feng River. The rebels had secretly placed [13/11/757 TCTC] some picked cavalry to the east of our large camps, and were about to attack the rear of our army. The Battle
uniting with the Military Governor of Shuo-fang,\(^1\) Kuo Tzu-i,\(^2\) fought \[7/12/756 TCTC\] the T'ung-lo\(^3\) and various other tribes, defeating them on the banks of the Yellow River.\(^4\)

The khaghan had had a meeting with Tzu-i \[4/12/756 TCTC\] in the Hu-yen Valley. Relying on his strength, he had drawn up his soldiers, and had made Tzu-i pay respect to his wolf pennons, before he would see him.\(^5\)

The emperor was in temporary residence at P'eng-yüan. Now a [Uighur] ambassador, Ko-lo-chih,\(^6\) was ashamed of his low rank at the court, so the emperor, not wishing him to feel offended, invited him up to his hall, and consoled him before sending him away \[25/1–22/2/757 TPYK 976\].

Grand General To-lan\(^7\) and others were sent soon after to court, and the heir apparent [of the Uighur khaghan], Yeh-hu,\(^8\) acted himself as general for 4,000 cavalry, who were coming to be at the emperor's disposal. The emperor accordingly appointed P'i-chia Princess as Chief Consort of the Prince [Ch'eng-shen], and promoted Ch'eng-shen to the position of President of the Court of the Imperial Clan. The khaghan also enfeoffed Ch'eng-shen as a yeh-hu, and gave him four banners, ordering him to share the generalship with his own Yeh-hu. The emperor ordered the Prince of Kuang-p'ing\(^9\) to see Yeh-hu and to swear brotherhood with him. Yeh-hu was very pleased, and sent his leaders, ta-kan and others on in advance to Fu-feng\(^10\) and to see Tzu-i. Tzu-i gave them all a banquet and drink for three days. Yeh-hu wanted to decline saying, 'The state is facing many difficulties. If we are to help fight the rebels, how can we dare to feast?' However, [Tzu-i] insisted upon it, so they stayed.

Once they were on the march they were given daily rations of twenty cattle, two hundred sheep, and forty \(hu\)\(^11\) of rice.

The armies for the battle of Hsiang-chi\(^12\) were drawn up on the banks of the Feng River \[13/11/757 TCTC\]. Some of the rebels were lying cunningly in wait, having ridden to the left of the imperial army, and were about to make a surprise attack on us. P'u-ku Huai-en signalled the Uighurs to ride up quickly, and they completely exterminated those that had lain in
Commander of the Left Wing of Shuo-fang, P’u-ku Huai-en, directed the Uighurs to drive them away and so relieve the government armies. Not a single horse came back, but, because of this action, we retook the Western Capital [Ch’ang-an] [14/11/757 TCTC].

In the tenth month (16/11–15/12/757), the Prince of Kuang-p’ing and the Deputy Generalissimo, Kuo Tzu-i, led the Uighur soldiers and horses to do battle with the rebels to the west of Shan-chou.

Before this, they had camped at Ch’ü-wo. Yeh-hu had sent his general Chü-pi-shih t’u-po p’ei-fu and others to go along the side of a southern mountain and then to go east and meet some rebel soldiers who were lying in wait in the valley. The general had completely exterminated these rebels.

Tzu-i had arrived in Hsin-tien, where he came upon a rebel army prepared for battle. He retreated several li. The Uighurs saw what was happening, and, crossing over the western slopes of the mountain, they carried aloft their white banners and hastened to attack. They appeared directly at [the rebels’] rear and the rebel hordes suffered a great defeat. Their armies went north, but were trapped or pursued for over twenty li. Men and horses were falling over and trampling on one another. There was an incalculable number of dead with more than 100,000 severed heads and corpses lying on the ground for thirty li [30/11/757 TCTC].

The rebel band led by Yen Chuang sent a mounted courier to inform An Ch’ing-hsü what had happened. The latter abandoned [1/12/757 TCTC] the Eastern Capital [Lo-yang] and fled north at the head of his band, fording the Yellow River. Yeh-hu followed the Prince of Kuang-p’ing and the Vice President, Kuo Tzu-i, into the Eastern Capital.

Before this, when they had retaken the Western Capital, the Uighurs had wanted to go into the city and pillage it, but had been firmly prevented by the Prince of Kuang-p’ing. But now, when they retook the Eastern Capital, the Uighurs immediately went into the treasure-houses, and took rich goods from the markets, the villages and city-wards. Their violent robbery lasted three days before it was stopped, and the quantity of goods [plundered] was immeasurable. The Prince of Kuang-p’ing also rewarded them with embroidered hair-cloth and precious stones. Yeh-hu was extremely pleased. Su-tsung had returned [8/12/757 TCTC] to the Western Capital, and in the eleventh month, on the day kuei-yu, Yeh-hu arrived [at Ch’ang-an] from the Eastern Capital [14/12/757 TCTC].

By imperial order, the officials had come [14/12/757 TCTC] to Ch’ang-lo
ambush. Then, coming behind the rebels, together with the Military Governor of Chen-hsi and Pei-t'ing, Li Ssu-yeh, they sandwiched them [between Ssu-yeh’s army and themselves]. The rebels suffered a great defeat and the imperial forces advanced and retook Ch’ang-an [14/11/757 TCTC].

Huai-en led the hordes of Uighurs, southern barbarians, and Arabs to surround the capital, then they went south and camped east of the Ch’an River. They advanced and camped west of Shan-chou. There was a battle at Hsin-tien [30/11/757, see n.33).

Before the battle, the Uighurs had arrived in Ch’ü-wo, from where Yeh-hu had sent General Pi-shih t’u-po p’ei-lo along the side of a southern mountain, emerging in the east in search of some rebels who were lying in wait in the valley. He had destroyed them and then camped to the north of the mountain. Tzu-i and others had a battle with the rebels, and our whole army pursued them. Then there was confusion and [our forces] retreated. The Uighurs saw from a distance what was happening, and, crossing immediately over the western slopes, with their banners behind them, they hastened towards the rebels and emerged at their rear. The rebels turned and looked round. Thereupon there was a great deal of scattering, pursuing, and fleeing for several tens of li. Men and horses were falling over and trampling on one another. The dead were innumerable, and the weapons of war, had they been collected together, would have been like a hill.

Yen Chuang, forcing An Ch’ing-hsü to go with him, abandoned [1/12/757 TCTC] the Eastern Capital and went north, fording the Yellow River.

The Uighurs pillaged the Eastern capital savagely for three days. Evil men led them around and the treasure-houses were stripped bare. The Prince of Kuang-p’ing wanted to stop them but could not. However, the elders [of the city] bribed the Uighurs with enormous quantities of silken fabric and embroidery and got them to discontinue the pillage.

[After it was all over] Yeh-hu returned to the capital. The emperor sent his officials to greet him in Ch’ang-lo. The emperor was sitting in the
Postal Station to welcome him. The emperor sat in the Grand Audience Hall [to receive him] and gave him a banquet and rewards. Yeh-hu, went up into the hall and his other chiefs were arrayed below the steps. The emperor bestowed upon them embroidered many-coloured silken fabrics, and gold and silver utensils. Furthermore, when they bade farewell before returning to their native country, the emperor spoke to them saying, 'That we have been able, on behalf of our state, to undertake a great operation and to bring to completion a righteous and brave work, is owing to your strength.' Yeh-hu sent up a memorial saying, 'The Uighur soldiers for battle will stay at Sha-yuan. But now I must go back to Ling-chou and Hsia-chou to collect some horses. Then we can retake Fan-yang and fight and destroy the remaining rebels.'

On the day chi-ch'ou (30/12/757), the emperor issued an edict which ran:

His [Yeh-hu's] merit has relieved our fearful difficulties, and his righteousness has made the survival of our state possible. Among distant countries, 10,000 li off, only he has had the virtue to be one with us in intention and to save the state. His virtue is unparalleled in ancient or modern times. The Uighur Yeh-hu is outstanding for his brave temperament, his pre-eminent birth and his rare gift in strategy. His words are always loyal and trustworthy, and the manifestations of his behaviour are gentle and good. His ability is the equal of that of 10,000 normal men. In rank he must be rated the first of all the barbarians. When cruel and perverted people confused the normal rules [of our state], and China was not yet at peace, the khaghan made an agreement with the state to act as its junior in a partnership of brothers. He made the armies of the father and son [Su-tsung and the Prince of Kuang-p'ing] prosper, he pushed forward his wise stratagems and fought those cruel rebels. 'With one beat of the drum, he excited the spirit of all'; having come from 10,000 li away, he defeated the enemy, and within twenty days the two capitals were conquered. His resolute strength was enough to pick up the peaks of mountains, and his intelligence was equal to penetrating the winds and clouds. Even in the face of urgent difficulties, he never overstepped his status. To be sure, [his merits are as brilliant as] the sun and moon hanging [in the sky] and [stories about him] shall be told and retold to our descendants. But would it be sufficient to bestow an enfeoffment of land on him for his service and pledge an oath by the Great River that I shall reward him? Among positions the most eminent is the Director of Public Works and among titles the highest is the enfeoffed prince. Therefore I make him a Director of Public Works and I accordingly enfeoff him as 'Chung-i' Prince. Every year there are to be sent for him to the Shuo-fang Army 20,000 rolls of silk, and it is fitting that he should send an embassy to receive this gift.
Grand Audience Hall. He invited Yeh-hu to mount the steps and had the chiefs sit below. He gave them a banquet and rewarded them. To each man he gave embroidered, many-coloured silken fabrics and utensils. Yeh-hu kowtowed and said, 'I shall leave some soldiers at Sha-yüan and I, your subject, shall return for provender and horses in order to retake Fan-yang and to stamp out the remaining robbers completely.' The emperor said, 'On my behalf you have exerted your righteous bravery to its utmost, and it is owing to your strength that we have achieved a great work.'

An edict was issued [30/12/757 CTS] that he should be promoted to be a Director of Public Works, that he should be given the title of 'Chung-i' Prince and an annual present of 20,000 rolls of silk, and should send an ambassador to the Shuo-fang Army to receive this gift.
On the day *jen-shen*, the first day of the fifth month of the first year of Ch’ien-yüan (11/6/758), eighty Uighur envoys, including To-hai *a-po*, and six Abbasid Arab chiefs, including Ko-chih, came simultaneously to court to have audience. When they arrived at the pavilion gate, they argued over who should go in first. The visitors’ and audience officials separated them into right and left and they entered at the same time through the east and west gates.

In the sixth month, on the day *wu-hsii*, there was a banquet in honour of some Uighur envoys in front of the Tzu-ch’en Hall [7/7/758 TFYK 976].

In the autumn, on the day *ting-hai* of the seventh month (25/8/758), the emperor issued an edict that one of his young daughters should be enfeoffed as the Princess of Ning-kuo, and that she should go out and be married [to the Uighur khaghan]. On the day of her departure for the Uighur territory, the emperor’s younger cousin on his father’s side, who was the Prefectural Prince of Han-chung, Yü, was to be specially promoted to be Trial President of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices, was to hold temporarily the rank of President of the Censorate, and was to fill the office of Commissioner Who Appoints and Names ‘*Ying-wu wei-yüan*’ *p’i-chia* Khaghan. The emperor’s nephew on his father’s side, the Left Secretary Sun, as Secretary of the Ministry of War, was to be given temporarily the rank of Vice President of the Censorate and President of the Court of Diplomatic Reception, and to act as deputy to Yü. Concurrently, [Sun] was to be made the Commissioner for the Rites and Entertainments of the [Wedding of the] Princess of Ning-kuo. The emperor especially sent the senior minister, *K’ai-fu i-t’ung-san-ssu* and Expeditionary Right Vice President of the Department of Affairs of State, the Duke of Chi State, P’ei Mien, to escort them as far as the beginning of the frontier.

On the day *kuei-ssu* (31/8/758), the emperor appointed and set up ‘*Ying-wu wei-yüan*’ *p’i-chia* Khaghan of the Uighurs. He sat in the Grand Audience Hall, and the Prince of Han-chung, Yü, received from him the imperial diploma.

On the day *chia-wu* (1/9/758), the Emperor Su-tsung, escorting the Princess of Ning-kuo, arrived at the Tz’u-men Postal Station in Hsien-yang. The princess wept and spoke to him saying, ‘The affairs of our state are serious. Even should I die, I shall not regret going.’ The emperor shed tears and returned.

When Yü reached his royal camp, *P’i-chia chüeh* Khaghan, dressed in
In the first year of Ch'ien-yüan (758), the Uighur ambassador To-yen a-po, together with some Abbasid Arab chiefs, including a certain Ko-chih, all came to court [11/6/758 CTS]. They struggled over who should go in first, so the official in charge sent them in at the same time through different gates.

Another ambassador came begging for a marriage [between the Uighur khaghan and a Chinese princess] and the emperor granted it. He married one of his young daughters, the Princess of Ning-kuo, [to the Uighur khaghan] and, at the same time, invested [31/8/758 CTS] Mo-yen-ch'o as 'Ying-wu wei-yüan p'i-chia Khaghan.

He issued an edict [25/8/758 CTS] that the Prefectural Prince of Han-chung, Yü, should temporarily have the rank of President of the Censorate, and be the Commissioner Who Appoints and Names [the Khaghan]; that one of the imperial clan, the Right Secretary, Sun, should combine with his own office that of Vice President of the Censorate and act as Commissioner for the Rites and Entertainments, and, in addition, act as deputy to Yü; and that the Right Vice President of the Department of Affairs of State, P'ei Mien, should escort them to the frontier.

The emperor gave a farewell for the princess [1/9/758 CTS] and accordingly went to Hsien-yang, repeatedly consoling and encouraging her. She wept saying, 'Our state is just now beset with many troubles. Even if I should die, I shall not regret going.'

When Yü arrived among the barbarians, the khaghan was sitting in his
a yellow-ochre robe and a barbarian hat, was sitting in his tent on a bed. His insignia and body-guards were extremely abundant. They led Yü before him, standing him outside the tent. The kaghan spoke to Yü saying, 'Prince, what relation are you to the Heavenly Khaghan?' Yü said, 'I am the cousin of the Son of Heaven of T’ang.' Again the kaghan asked, 'Who is it who is standing above you, the prince?' Yü replied, 'It is the palace eunuch Lei Lu-chün.' The kaghan again declared thus, 'The palace eunuch is a slave in status. How is it that he can stand above you, who are of noble birth?' Lei Lu-chün was afraid, he stepped aside and made himself lower.

Everybody was in his proper place. But Yü would not bow and remained standing. The kaghan declared thus, 'The leaders, nobility and subjects of both our states observe a rite. How can you not bow?' Yü said, 'The Son of Heaven of T’ang considered you, the kaghan, to have merit, and therefore he is having his daughter brought here and given to you in marriage. He is tying together a friendship through this marriage with you, the kaghan. Recently the women whom China has given to outside barbarians as wives have in all cases been [merely] daughters of members of the imperial clan and have been named princesses. The present Princess of Ning-kuo is the true daughter of the Son of Heaven. Also she has talents and a becoming appearance and has come 10,000 li to be married to the kaghan. The kaghan is to be the son-in-law of the Son of Heaven of the T’ang family. He should know the differences in grades of the rites. How can he conceivably remain seated on his bed while receiving the diploma of such an edict?' At that the kaghan stood up to take the edict and immediately received the imperial diploma of his appointment.

The following day the princess was appointed the khatun. The barbarian chief rejoiced over it and said, 'The Son of Heaven of the T’ang state is most high and has had his true daughter brought here.' The state seals, the silken fabrics, the multi-coloured clothes and garments and the gold and silver dishes which Yü had brought, the kaghan distributed down to the last one among his officials, chiefs, and others. When Yü was on the point of going home, the kaghan presented him with 500 horses and 100 pieces of sable fur.

In the eighth month (7/9–6/10/758), the Uighurs sent their prince, Prince Ku-ch’o, and their Chief Minister, Ti-te, and other brave men at the head of 3,000 troops to help China in her fight against the rebels. Su-tsung commended them for having come from so far, and gave them a banquet. He ordered that they be attached to the Expeditionary Camps of the Shuo-fang Army and made P’u-ku Huai-en superintend them.
tent dressed in a barbarian hat and an ochre robe. His insignia and bodyguards were splendid and majestic. They led Yü before him and stood him outside the tent. [The khaghan] asked him, saying, 'Prince, what relation are you to the Heavenly Khaghan?' Yü said, 'We are cousins.' Now, at this time a eunuch, Lei Ling-chü, was standing above Yü. [The khaghan] once again asked, 'Who is it who is standing above you, the prince?' Yü said, 'It is a eunuch.' The khaghan said, 'A eunuch is only a slave, and is he, despite this, standing above you, who are of royal birth?' Ling-chü hastened to make himself lower.

After that they led Yü into the tent, but he would not bow. The khaghan said, 'When one sees the ruler of a state, according to the rites, one should certainly bow.' Yü said, 'The Son of Heaven has condescended to notice that the khaghan has merit, and he is cementing the friendship by sending his beloved daughter. Recently, when China has made marriages with the barbarians, in every case it has been merely a member of the imperial clan. Now the [Princess of] Ning-kuo is actually the jade daughter of the emperor. She is virtuous and of becoming appearance, and has come 10,000 li to marry you. The khaghan is to be the son-in-law of the Son of Heaven. He ought to know something of the rites. How does he squat while receiving such an edict from the emperor?' The khaghan was ashamed, stood up to receive the edict and bowed to receive his appointment.

The following day the princess was honoured as the khatun. All the things which Yü had brought as presents the khaghan gave to the ministers and chiefs of his court. When Yü was returning home, he presented him with 500 horses, sable furs, white cotton, and other things.

Thereupon [the khaghan] sent the prince, Prince Ku-ch'ou, Chief Minister Ti-te, and others leading 3,000 cavalry to help China fight against the rebels. The emperor accordingly ordered P'u-ku Huai-en to take command of them.
the day *chia-shen* of the ninth month (21/10/758), the Uighurs sent the
great chief, General Kai, and others to give thanks for the granting of
the Princess [of Ning-kuo] in marriage. At the same time a memorial was
sent up to the effect that they had destroyed [an army of] 50,000 Kirghiz.63

There was a banquet in the Tzu-ch'en Hall and the emperor gave gifts
according to rank.

On the day *chia-tzu*64 of the twelfth month (29/1/759?), the Uighurs
sent three ladies to give thanks for the marriage of the Princess of Ning-kuo.
The emperor gave them a banquet in the Tzu-ch'en Hall.

In the second year of Ch'ien-yuan (759), the Uighurs, Prince Ku-ch'o
and others, led their armies, following Kuo Tzu-i and the nine military
governors65 to [positions] outside the walls of Hsiang-chou. There was
a battle [7/4/759 *TCTC*], [the outcome of which] was not favourable
[for the government forces].66 On the day *jen-tzu*67 of the third month,
the Uighur prince, Prince Ku-ch'o, the Chief Minister, Ti-te, and thirteen
others fled from Hsiang-chou to the Western Capital [arrived 19/4/759
*TCTC*]. Su-tsung gave them a banquet in the Tzu-ch'en Hall and rewarded
them according to rank.

On the day *keng-yin* of the same month (25/4/759), the Uighur prince
took his farewell and was about to take home his expeditionary camps.
The emperor gave them a banquet in the Tzu-ch'en Hall and made
presentations according to rank. On the day *i-wei* (30/4/759), the emperor
gave the Uighur prince, Prince Ku-ch'o, newly appointed as Auxiliary
Grand General of the Left Yü-lin Army, the rank of *yin-ch'ing kuang-lu
ta-fu* and appointed him as Auxiliary President of the Court of Diplomatic
Reception.

In the summer, in the fourth month (2-30/5/759?), the Uighur *P'i-chia
ch'üeh* Khaghan died.68 His eldest son, *Yeh-hu*, having previously been
killed, they set on the throne his younger son, *Teng-li* Khaghan, whose
wife became khatun.*

On the day *ping-wu* of the sixth month (10/7/759), one of the generals
of the Left Chin-wu Guards, Li T'ung, became the Trial President of the
Court of Diplomatic Reception, and temporarily assumed the office of Vice
President of the Censorate, acting as Commissioner for the Sacrifices of
Condolence for the Uighurs.

When *P'i-chia ch'üeh* Khaghan died,68 his court officials, governors-
general and others had wanted the Princess of Ning-kuo to be buried with
him. The princess said, 'In our Chinese law, when a woman's husband dies,

* Parallel text, p.69.
[The Uighurs] also sent their great chief, General Kai, and three ladies to thank the emperor for the marriage. At the same time they reported the achievement of having destroyed some Kirghiz.\textsuperscript{63}

The following year (759), Ku-ch'o and the nine military governors\textsuperscript{65} fought a battle near Hsiang-chou [7/4/759 TCTC] and the government forces were scattered.\textsuperscript{66} Ti-te and the rest fled to the capital [arrived 19/4/759 TCTC], where the emperor gave them generous presents and consoled them. Then they returned home.

Soon after, the khaghan died.

The people of the state wanted the princess to be buried with him, but she said, 'Among the Chinese, when a woman's husband dies, she mourns for him morning and evening. The period is three years, and that completes the ritual. The Uighur [khaghan] contracted the marriage over 10,000 \textit{li}, so
she immediately observes mourning. She weeps in the morning and evening, and for a period approaching three years she dons mourning clothes. That [the khaghan of] the Uighurs took me as his wife must mean that he admired the rites of the Middle Kingdom. If he had still been following the laws of his own country, why was it necessary for him to marry a wife from 10,000 li away? However, the princess also observed Uighur custom by slashing her face and weeping loudly. Finally, since she had no sons, she obtained permission to go home, and in the autumn, in the eighth month (27/8–25/9/759), the Princess of Ning-kuo came back from Uighur territory to China. There was an edict that all the officials should welcome her outside the Ming-feng Gate.

On the day *chi-ch’ou* of the ninth month of the first year of Shang-yüan (15/10/760), the Khaghan of the Nine Surnames of the Uighurs sent his high official *Chü-lu mo* ta-kan and others to court with a memorial inquiring after the emperor. On the day *i-mao* (10/11/760), twenty Uighur envoys came to the Yen-ying Hall and were received in audience with the emperor, who bestowed gifts on each of them according to rank. In the eleventh month, on the day *wu-ch’en*, the Uighur ambassador Yen-chih Chia-lo and nine others went to the Yen-ying Hall, where they had audience with the emperor, who bestowed gifts upon them according to rank.

In the first year of Pao-ying (762), Tai-tsung had just ascended the throne [18/5/759 TCTC], and, because Shih Ch’ao-i was still in Ho-Lo, he sent the eunuch Liu Ch’ing-t’an to seek an army from the Uighurs and to cultivate their old alliance. That autumn when Ch’ing-t’an entered the Uighur court [23/9–21/10/762 TCTC], the Uighurs had already been enticed by Shih Ch’ao-i, who had said that the Son of Heaven of the T’ang family had been repeatedly thrown into great mourning, and the state was in chaos and had no ruler. He therefore begged them to send out soldiers to come and seize the treasuries. The khaghan thereupon, leading his hordes, had gone south. This was already in the eighth month (24/8–22/9/762). Ch’ing-t’an gave him the letter containing the imperial orders and the state seal. When he arrived, the khaghan said, ‘I have heard that the T’ang family has no leader. How can it still produce letters with imperial
he must basically have admired China, and I cannot therefore be buried
with him.' At that they stopped [trying to persuade her]. However, she
slashed her face and wept, and thus also followed their customs. After-
wards, since she had no sons, she obtained permission to return home.

Yeh-hu, the heir apparent, had died before this, following a crime he had
committed, so the next son, I-ti-chien, ascended the throne under the
name of Mou-yü Khaghan.* His wife was the daughter of P’u-ku Huai-en.
She had been granted to him as a wife by the emperor when the khaghan
[Mo-yen-ch’o] had asked for a marriage alliance for his younger son.
At this point she became khatun.†

The following year (760), [the khaghan] sent the high official Chü-lu
mo-ho⁷³ ta-kan and others to court. They inquired together after the
Princess [of Ning-kuo]. They sent men in to have audience in the Yen-ying
Hall.

When Tai-tsung came to the throne [18/5/762 TCTC], Shih Ch’ao-i
had still not been destroyed, so he sent the eunuch Liu Ch’ing-t’an⁷⁶ to
[the Uighurs] to renew their alliance, and also to get them to send out
soldiers. By the time the ambassador arrived [23/9–21/10/762 TCTC], the
Uighurs had already been allured by Ch’ao-i, who had said that the T’ang
had been repeatedly in mourning,⁷⁷ and that the state had no ruler and was
in chaos. He had asked the Uighurs to enter China and seize the treasuries,
the wealth of which was unlimited.⁷⁸ The khaghan had immediately
led his armies and gone south. This was in the eighth month of the first
year of Pao-ying (24/8–22/9/762). When Ch’ing-t’an, bringing the edict
with him, arrived at his camp, the khaghan said, ‘People have been saying

* Parallel text, p.66.
† Parallel text, p.70.
orders?' The eunuch replied, saying, 'Although the Son of Heaven of our T'ang family passed away, the succeeding Son of Heaven and the Prince of Kuang-p'ing, produced by Heaven, brave and warlike, some years ago retook the two capitals with the help of the infantry and cavalry of the Uighur Yeh-hu, and defeated An Ch'ing-hsü. The emperor cherished the old friendship with the khaghan and has also given him several tens of thousands of pieces of silken fabric and raw silk every year. How could the khaghan have forgotten this?'

The Uighurs had already reached [a position] north of the Three Fortresses; they had seen abandoned fortresses and found that there were no frontier guards and that the prefectures and subprefectures were exhausted and had become empty walls. They consequently came to hold the T'ang in contempt. Thereupon they sent ambassadors north to seize soldiers, horses, granaries and provisions in Shan-yü. They also seriously abused Ch'ing-t'an. Ch'ing-t'an despatched an envoy to court and sent up a memorial saying, 'The Uighur khaghan Teng-li, is approaching with his whole state. He himself is coming with a horde of 100,000 men and I do not know how many sheep and horses'.

Everyone at the capital was very afraid. The emperor sent the Director of the Department of the Imperial Household Service, Yao Tzu-ang, to make haste to greet the Uighurs. He arrived at [a place] north of T'ai-yüan and south of Hsin-chou. Tzu-ang there secretly made a reckoning that their able-bodied men came to 4,000, their old, young and wives numbered altogether more than 10,000, their war-horses 40,000, and their oxen and sheep he did not record.

Before this, P'i-chia ch'üeh Khaghan had begged the emperor to give his son a wife, and Su-tsung had given him in marriage the daughter of P'u-ku Huai-en, so that by this time she had become the khatun.* She was coming with the khaghan and asked permission that they should be allowed to see Huai-en and his mother. The emperor ordered Huai-en to come from Fen-chou and see them in T'ai-yüan. Huai-en admonished [the khaghan] that he should not forget the state's favour and disobey China.

At first [the Uighur khaghan] wanted to go in from P'u Pass, then taking the road through Sha-yüan, to go towards the east from T'ung Pass and destroy the rebels. Tzu-ang dissuaded him in these words, 'Our state has frequently been meeting with trouble and rebellions. The prefectures and

* Parallel text, p.69.
that the T’ang has been destroyed. How can it still have embassies?’
Ch’ing-t’an replied on its behalf, ‘Although the former emperor passed
away, the Prince of Kuang-p’ing has already ascended the throne as Son of
Heaven. His benevolence and wisdom, his bravery and his warlike prowess
are in the same class as those of the late emperor. He was the one who
fought side by side with Yeh-hu, recaptured the two capitals and defeated
An Ch’ing-hsü. He has cherished a close friendship with the kaghan ever
since. Moreover the T’ang has made annual gifts of silken fabrics and raw
silk to the Uighurs. How can you have forgotten this?’

At this time the Uighurs had already passed the Three Fortresses.79
They had seen that the prefectures and subprefectures were overgrown
with thorny bushes and weeds, and that the beacon-towers,80 fortresses,
and defences were unmanned, and they came to hold the T’ang in contempt.
Thereupon they sent ambassadors north to seize soldiers, granaries, and
armouries in Shan-yü Protectorate,81 and they frequently spoke insultingly
to Ch’ing-t’an. Ch’ing-t’an secretly informed the emperor that 100,000
Uighur troops were moving towards the border.

The court was shaken and afraid, and so the emperor sent the Director
of the Department of the Imperial Household Service, Yao Tzu-ang, to
go and meet them, to receive them and also to observe their armies carefully.
He met them in T’ai-yüan and secretly ascertained that their soldiers were
scarcely 4,000, their young and weak more than 10,000, their horses 40,000,
and that they were accompanied by the khatun. The emperor ordered
Huai-en to have a meeting with the Uighur [kaghan] who accordingly
sent an embassy [12/10/762 TFYK 976] with a memorial for the emperor
begging permission to help the Son of Heaven in the war against the rebels.

The [kaghan of the] Uighurs wanted to enter P’u Pass, march straight
to Sha-yüan and then go east.83 Tzu-ang tried to dissuade him, saying,
‘Since the trouble and disorder began, the prefectures and subprefectures
have been ravaged and empty. We will not be able to find enough to feed
subprefectures are empty and impoverished. It will be difficult to find enough to feed our armies, and I am afraid that you, Khaghan, will lose hope. It would be better to take the road through T’u-men and advance straight, taking Hsing-chou, Ming-chou, Wei-chou and Huai-chou. The infantry and cavalry among the rebels are all in the Eastern Capital. The khaghan will seize their wealth, tie up his baggage and go south. This would be the best plan.’ The khaghan would not follow it. Again [Tzu-ang] said, ‘Take the road through Huai-chou and the T’ai-hang, and then go south along the narrow pass of Ho-yin and fall directly on the enemy’s throat. That would also be a better plan.’ The khaghan once more would not follow it. Again [Tzu-ang] said, ‘Take the road through Shan-chou across the T’ai-yang Ford. Eat millet from the T’ai-yüan Granary and then go east. Unite with the Military Governors from Tse-chou, Lu-chou, Ho-nan, Huai-chou and Cheng-chou and enter [the city] together with them. This is also a better plan’. The khaghan [agreed to] follow it.

Tzu-ang accordingly sent in a memorial to the emperor, who made the Prince of Yung, Kua, Generalissimo over his infantry and cavalry and promoted Huai-en to the rank of chief minister [6/11/762 TCTC]. He also caused Tzu-ang to combine with his own office that of a Vice President of the Censorate, and ordained that he and Wei Chü, formerly from Lu-fu, who was combining with his own office that of a Vice President of the Censorate, should become the Battle Commanders of the Left and Right Wings. The Secretary of the Department of the Grand Imperial Secretariat, Wei Shao-hua, acted as Assistant to the Generalissimo, combining with this office that of General Secretary. One of the Grand Secretaries of the Department of the Imperial Chancellery, Li Chin, combined with his own office that of Vice President of the Censorate, and acted as Superior Administrator of the Expeditionary Army for the Generalissimo.

They went east to meet Teng-li, the Uighur khaghan. The latter was camped north of Shan-chou and of the Yellow River. The Generalissimo, the Prince of Yung, led Tzu-ang and other followers to have audience with him [c.12/11/762 TCTC]. The khaghan upbraided the Prince of Yung for not performing a ceremonial dance in front of his tent, that being the ritual, and for his cavalier attitude. Tzu-ang made an excuse, saying that the Generalissimo was the true grandson of the late emperor [Hsüan-tsung], that the state was in mourning for two emperors and that it was thus not suitable that he perform a ceremonial dance. The Uighur courtiers, the chief ministers and the general, Chü-pi, questioned them saying, ‘The T’ang Son of Heaven and Teng-li Khaghan have sworn an oath of brother-
our armies. Furthermore, the rebels are in the Eastern Capital. If we enter Ching-hsing, and take Hsing-chou, Ming-chou, Wei-chou, and Huai-chou, we can seize the produce and treasuries of the rebels and then beat our drums down to the south. That is the best plan.' [The khaghan] did not listen. Tzu-ang said, 'If that is the case, then let us hasten to take the road through Huai-chou and the T'ai-hang, go south and occupy Ho-yang and seize the rebels by the throat.' Again [the khaghan] would not listen. [Tzu-ang] said, 'Let us eat the millet in the T'ai-yüan Granary and camp on the right in Shan-chou. Let us unite with the soldiers of Tse-chou, Lu-chou, Ho-nan, Huai-chou, and Cheng-chou.' The Uighur [khaghan agreed to] follow this suggestion.

The emperor issued a decree that the Prince of Yung should become Generalissimo over the infantry and cavalry of the empire, and promoted Tzu-ang to combine with his own office that of Vice President of the Censorate. He ordered that he and the General of the Right Yü-lin Guards, Wei Chü, should become the Battle Commanders of the Right and Left Wings, that the Secretary of the Department of the Grand Imperial Secretariat, Wei Shao-hua, should become Assistant to the Generalissimo, and that the Vice President of the Censorate, Li Chin, should become a Superior Administrator of the Expeditionary Army.

They went east to meet the Uighurs. On imperial orders [issued 7/11/762 TFYK 973] the Generalissimo went on ahead as the forward guard of all the armies and met the various military governors in Shan-chou. At that time the khaghan was encamped to the north of Shan-chou and the prince went to see him [c.12/11/762 TCTC]. The khaghan upbraided the prince for not performing a ceremonial dance. Tzu-ang made an excuse saying, 'When the state is in mourning for two emperors, the heir of an emperor and the grandson of an emperor cannot in propriety possibly perform a ceremonial dance.' The Uighur courtiers questioned him saying, 'The khaghan has the status of a younger brother of the T'ang Son of Heaven and of the uncle of the prince. How could he possibly not perform
hood, so now the khaghan is the uncle of the Prince of Yung in status. There is a proper rite a nephew should pay his uncle. How can he refuse to perform a ceremonial dance?’ Tzu-ang insistently made the excuse for him that, since he was in mourning, the rite would be improper, and declared again, ‘The Generalissimo is the eldest son of a T’ang emperor, and an eldest son is the heir apparent. How can the heir apparent to the throne of the Middle Kingdom possibly dance a ceremonial dance in front of a foreign khaghan?’ They resisted each other for a long time. Chü-pi thereupon had Tzu-ang, Li Chin, Shao-hua, and Wei Chü led away and given 100 strokes of the rod each. Shao-hua and Chü died within the night following the beating. In view of the prince’s youth and lack of experience in affairs, he was let free and allowed to return to his own camp.

Huai-en went on ahead as the forward guard with the Right sha of the Uighurs. When all the military governors had arrived, they united and attacked the rebels, defeating them. Shih Ch’ao-i fled with his remaining robbers. The Generalissimo, the Prince of Yung, retreated back to Ling-pao. The Uighur khaghan continued his advance to Ho-yang and, organising a camp, he remained there for several months. People for more than one hundred li around the camp were plundered, robbed, oppressed and abused, and that was not all they had to suffer. Huai-en acted constantly as rear guard to the armies. When the various military governors retook the prefectures and subprefectures of Ho-pei, P’u-ku Ch’ang, together with a horde of Uighurs, pursued Ch’ao-i and his men and trampled on them over more than 2,000 li, until they arrived at P’ing-chou. In Shih-ch’eng Subprefecture he [beheaded] Ch’ao-i and exposed his head as a warning to others and then returned home. Ho-pei [Province] was thus completely pacified. Huai-en went west from Hsiang-chou, out along the Kuo-k’ou road to the west. The khaghan marched north from [his settlement in] Ho-yang, out past Tse-chou and Lu-chou, met Huai-en and passed through T’ai-yüan. He sent an ambassador, Pa-ho-na, to memorialise the emperor, congratulating him on the retaking of the Eastern Capital and, at the same time, offering him as tribute the banners, flags and other things of the rebellious robber, Shih Ch’ao-i. When [Pa-ho-na] was about to take his leave and return to the barbarian territory, Tai-tsung invited him to take audience with him in the inner halls of the court and bestowed upon him 200 pieces of silken fabric.

Before this, when the Uighurs had arrived in the Eastern Capital, as soon as the rebels had been pacified, they had unrestrainedly practised all
a ceremonial dance? Tzu-ang firmly resisted him and said, 'The Generalissimo is the heir-apparent of the T’ang. He is to be lord over the Middle Kingdom, and yet you expect him to perform a ceremonial dance when he sees a kaghan?' The Uighur ruler and ministers, judging that they would be unable to make him yield, immediately had Tzu-ang, Chin, Shao-hua, and Chü led away and given 100 strokes of the rod. Shao-hua and Chü died within the evening. The prince returned to his camp. The officials and the army, considering that the prince had been insulted, were going to unite to punish the Uighurs, but since the rebels had not yet been destroyed, the prince stopped them.91

Thereupon, Huai-en went on ahead [13/11/762 TCTC] with the Left sha of the Uighurs. Ch’ao-i sent out a spy, but the Left sha caught him and gave him as a gift to the emperor. Together with the various generals, they attacked the rebels [20/11/762 TCTC]. They had a battle on the banks of the Heng92 River and routed them, then they advanced and reoccupied the Eastern Capital.93

The kaghan sent [2/12/762 TFYK 976] Pa-ho-na to congratulate the Son of Heaven and to present him with Ch’ao-i’s banners among other things. The Prince of Yung returned to Ling-pao. The kaghan camped in Ho-yang and remained there for three months. The people near the camps suffered plunder and abuse. P’u-ku Ch’ang,94 leading some Uighur soldiers, had a running battle with Ch’ao-i and trampled in the blood of his men for 2,000 li. He [beheaded him and] exposed his head as a warning.95 All of Ho-pei [Province] was pacified. Huai-en went through Hsiang-chou and Kuo-k’ou in the mountains to its west and returned to his camp. The kaghan went out through Tse-chou and Lu-chou, and, meeting with Huai-en, returned home [8/4/763 CTS 11] by way of T’ai-yüan.

Before this, when the Uighurs had arrived at the Eastern Capital, [their leaders] turned the armies loose to rob and plunder [c. 20/11/762
sorts of cruelties [c. 20/11/762 TCTC]. The men and women were frightened of them and all went up into the two towers of the Sheng-shan and Po-ma Temples in order to escape from them. The Uighurs wantonly set fire to and burned the two towers. The injured and dead numbered 10,000. The fire burned for several weeks. When they went to court to congratulate the emperor, [the Uighurs] were again unrestrainedly barbarous and seriously abused the officials.

The Military Governor of Shan-chou, Kuo Ying-i, was temporarily made Viceroy of the Eastern Capital. At the time the eastern commanderies had twice suffered rebellion. The Shuo-fang Army, the armies of Kuo Ying-i, Yu Ch’ao-en and others were unable to prevent the cruel disorders and so, together with the Uighurs, they relaxed all restraint, and plundered the wards and market-places even up to Ju-chou, Cheng-chou, and other prefectures. The houses, row upon row, were completely destroyed. Everybody was reduced to using paper for clothing, and there were even some who used the Classics as clothes.


Wang I, who was a Grand Councillor to the Emperor, but was combining with this office that of President of the Censorate, filled the position of ambassador and approached the expeditionary camp of the khaghan bringing with him the diploma. The khaghan and khatun, the Left and Right sha, the various governors-general, the inner and outer chief ministers and downwards were all promoted to receive net revenue from a fief of 2,000 families. There was an order that Wang I should approach in front of the royal camp and ritually invest the Left sha enfeoffing him as ‘Hsiung-shuo’ Prince, the Right sha as ‘Ning-shuo’ Prince, the Grand Governor-general as Prince of ‘Chin-ho’, General Pa-lan as ‘Ching-mo’ Prince and all the eleven governors-general as
The people had all fled for protection to the towers in the two temples, Sheng-shan and Po-ma, in order to escape from them. The Uighurs were annoyed and set fire to the temple-towers, killing more than 10,000 people.

By this time the Uighurs had been growing more and more barbarous and had been abusing and striking the officials. When they arrived at the capital, their soldiers hacked down the Han-kuang Gate at night and entered the Court of Diplomatic Reception [22/2/763 TCTC].

Just at that time, the Military Governor of Shan-chou, Kuo Ying-i, was Viceroy in the Eastern Capital. Together with the armies of Yü Ch’ao-en and Shuo-fang, he perpetrated violent deeds and, in the wake of the cruel disorders caused by the Uighurs, also plundered the territory between Ju-chou and Cheng-chou. In the country there were no houses left whole. Everyone covered themselves with paper for clothes. It was all because of the oppression inflicted by the robbers.

The emperor remembered the death of Shao-hua and the other and therefore he posthumously appointed Shao-hua Left Grand Councillor to the Emperor and Chü Grand Governor-general of Yang-chou. He bestowed on one of each of their sons an office of the sixth rank.

Thereupon he invested the khaghan calling him Hsieh tu teng-li ku-ch’o-mi-shih ho chü-lu ‘Ying-i chien-kung’ p’i-chia Khaghan. The khatun was called P’o-mo ‘Kuang-ch’in li-hua’ p’i-chia Khatun.

The Left Grand Councillor to the Emperor, Wang I, came as ambassador, approached their royal camp and gave them the imperial diploma. From the khaghan to the chief ministers, they were all appointed to receive the net revenue from fiefs of 20,000 families. Moreover, the Left sha became ‘Hsiung-shuo’ Prince, the Right sha ‘Ning-shuo’ Prince, the Grand Governor-general Prince of ‘Chin-ho’, General Pa-lan ‘Ching-mo’ Prince and the ten governors-general all became dukes of states.
dukes of states.\textsuperscript{105}

Shortly after, Huai-en revolted and went in the direction of Ling-wu.\textsuperscript{106} The former general of Shuo-fang, Jen Fu,\textsuperscript{107} Chang Shao\textsuperscript{108} and others, collected and gathered together the remnants of their hordes to the number of several tens of thousands. Then, in the autumn of the second year of Kuang-te (764), he led several tens of thousands of Tibetan\textsuperscript{109} hordes to Feng-t'ien Subprefecture. At the head of an army, the Military Governor of Shuo-fang, Kuo Tzu-i, resisted them and drove them back [6/11/764 TCTC].\textsuperscript{110}

In the autumn of the first year of Yung-t'ai (765), Huai-en sent out the Battle Commanders, Fan Chih-ch'eng and Jen Fu, as generals of armies. Moreover he enticed more than 200,000 of the Uighur, Tibetan, T'u-yii-hun,\textsuperscript{111} Tangut\textsuperscript{112} and Nu-la\textsuperscript{113} hordes to invade Feng-t'ien, Li-ch'iian, Feng-hsiang, T'ung-chou and other places.\textsuperscript{114} They submitted to his rebellious command. Before this, Kuo Tzu-i had made his camp in Ching-yang. Hun Jih-chin\textsuperscript{115} had camped at Feng-t'ien, and had pushed back their forward guard several times.\textsuperscript{116} Then they heard that Huai-en was dead.\textsuperscript{117} At the beginning of the tenth month (19/10-17/11/765), the Tibetan, General Ma-ch'ung-ying, and others led a withdrawal and, taking the old road through Pin-chou, were returning home. The Uighur leader, Lo ta-kan, and others led more than 2,000 of their cavalry to Ching-yang and begged permission to submit [27/10/765?]. Tzu-i granted it. At the head of a horde of several thousand men, wearing armour and with bows in full string, the Uighurs said through an interpreter, 'These men have come with good intentions, but they wish to see the President [of the Department of the Grand Imperial Secretariat].' Tzu-i said, 'I am the President.' The Uighurs said, 'We beg you to take off your arms.' Tzu-i immediately removed his helmet, spear and armour, urged his horse forward, and came out in front alone. The leaders of the Uighurs looked round at one another and said, 'That is certainly the man.'\textsuperscript{118}

At that time, the Grand Guardian to the Heir to the Throne, Li Kuang-chin,\textsuperscript{119} and Lu Ssu-kung,\textsuperscript{120} who was combining with his own office that of President of the Censorate, were on horseback, equipped for battle, at Tzu-i's side. Tzu-i introduced them to the Uighurs, saying, 'This is the Military Governor of Wei-pei, Li, the Grand Guardian.' Again he said, 'This is the Commissioner for the Provisions of the Shuo-fang Army, President Lu.' The Uighurs immediately dismounted, surrounded him and made obeisance. Tzu-i also dismounted. The Uighur hordes formed into a left and right flank, each with several hundred men, and gradually came forward. Some of Tzu-i's officers also hastened forward but Tzu-i signalled
At the beginning of Yung-t'ai (765), Huai-en led a revolt and induced some Uighurs and Tibetans to join him in invasion [20/9–18/10/765 TCTC].

After a short while, however, Huai-en died,117 and the two groups of barbarians began to struggle with each other for dominance. A Uighur leader went in secret to Ching-yang, where he saw Kuo Tzu-i and begged permission to change policy and to serve him. Tzu-i came at the head of some officers to pay respect at the Uighur camp. The Uighurs said, 'We wish to see the President [of the Department of the Grand Imperial Secretariat].' Tzu-i came out of the camp-gate under banners. The Uighurs said, 'We beg you to take off your arms.' As Tzu-i changed his dress, the leaders looked round at one another, saying, 'He is indeed the man.'118 At the time, Li Kuang-chin119 and Lu Ssu-kung120 were on horseback by his side. Tzu-i introduced them to the leaders and said, 'This is the Military Governor Such-and-such of Wei-pei and the Commissioner Such-and-such for the Provisions of the Shuo-fang Army'. The leaders dismounted and made obeisance. Tzu-i also dismounted to see them. Several hundred of the barbarians came round watching him. Tzu-i’s officers also came up. Tzu-i signalled the commissioners standing around him to withdraw. Furthermore, he ordered wine to drink with [the Uighurs] and gave them 3,000 pieces of silk to bind their heads [for the festive occasion].121 He summoned the khaghan’s younger brother, the Grand [Governor-
them to withdraw. Tzu-i ordered wine and drank with them, bestowing on them 3,000 pieces of silk to bind their heads [for the festive occasion]. Tzu-i took the hand of the Grand General of the Uighurs, the khaghan's younger brother, the Grand Governor-general Ho, who was a Yao-lo-ko, and others, and reprimanded them saying, 'Our state recognised that you Uighurs had performed meritorious deeds, and we rewarded you very generously. Why did you disregard our agreements and break faith by invading our princely capital districts? And now that it is necessary for us to fight against you, why do you submit? I am entering your camps without a body-guard and am leaving you free to seize and bind me. [But if you do so], the generals and soldiers under my command will certainly fight you.' A Uighur again said through an interpreter, 'Huai-en was ungrateful. He came and reported to our khaghan saying, "The Son of Heaven of the T'ang state has now already gone towards the region between the Yangtze and the Huai, and moreover the President [of the Department of the Grand Imperial Secretariat] is no longer in command of the armies". Because of that we dared come, but now we know that the Heavenly Khaghan is there in the capital, and that Your Excellency, Kuo, is indeed general. As for Huai-en, Heaven has killed him. Now we ask permission to drive out and kill the Tibetans and seize their sheep and horses, thereby repaying the state's mercy. However, Huai-en's sons are the brothers of our khatun, so we beg your permission to spare them from death.'

Grand Governor-general Ho and others, together with Chief Minister Mo-tu mo-ho ta-kan, Chief Minister Tun mo-ho ta-kan, Chief Minister General Hu-tu p'i-chia, Chief Minister Chieh-la p'ei-lo ta-kan, the Chief Minister and mei-lu, Grand General Lo ta-kan, Chief Minister Hai-ying ch'ueh ta-kan and others, including Tzu-i, were the first to take hold of their cups. The Grand Governor-general Ho asked for an oath. Tzu-i proposed the oath, saying, "Long, long live the great T'ang Son of Heaven! Long live also the Uighur khaghan! Long live also the generals and ministers of the two states! Should anyone rise treacherously in rebellion, turning his back on this pact and agreement, let him die before the ranks of the army and let his whole clan be massacred." The Grand Governor-general Ho and the others turned pale. When the cup came to them, they immediately said through an interpreter, 'We make our pact and agreement like the President.' They were all pleased and said, 'Before this, on the day that we left our native territory to come here, we had two magicians brought to us. They said, "This expedition will be extremely peaceful, and you will assuredly not fight against the infantry and cavalry of the
general] Ho,122 and others and, grasping them by the hand, reprimanded them, saying, 'The emperor remembered the meritorious service of the Uighurs and he certainly rewarded you with unswerving generosity. Why then have you turned your backs on him? And why now, when we are fighting you, have you so hurriedly submitted? I am about to enter your tents alone, but if you should kill me, my generals and soldiers could attack you.' The leaders anxiously deferred to him, saying, 'Huai-en induced us by saying that the T'ang Son of Heaven had fled to the south and that you, Sir, had been dismissed. That is the reason we came. Now we know that the Heavenly Khaghan is in the capital and that nothing has befallen you, we and the others wish to go back and rout the Tibetans, thereby repaying your generosity and mercy. However, Huai-en's sons are the younger brothers of our khatun and we wish to spare them from death.'

Thereupon Tzu-i took hold of his wine and the Grand [Governor-general Ho] begged to make a pact and to drink to it. Tzu-i said, 'Long live the T'ang Son of Heaven! Long live also the Uighur khaghan! And to the generals and ministers of the two states a similar toast! Should there be anyone who turns his back upon this agreement, let him die in the ranks of the army and let his whole clan be massacred!' The moment the barbarian Chief Ministers, Mo-tu mo-ho ta-kan, Tun and the others heard these words, their courage left them, and when the wine came round to them, they said at once, 'We swear unaltered Your Excellency's oath.' Before this the Uighurs had had two magicians who had said, 'On this expedition it is certain that you will not fight but will meet a great man, and then return home.' Thereupon they looked at one another, laughed and said, 'The magicians were not deceiving us.'
T‘ang house. You will see a great man and then return home.” Today we have led our army to see Your Excellency. Your Excellency has, with no suspicions of us, removed his [military] clothes and armour, and, as an unaccompanied horseman, given us an interview. The man with such a will is a brave man, and we will certainly not fight him. We have seen a great man, and the magicians stand corroborated.” In great delight they danced about prolonging the occasion. Tzu-i patted them on the backs. The leaders and others divided up the silk and head wraps and rewarded the magicians with them. They begged permission that the various generals should together attack the Tibetans.

In accordance with the agreement, Tzu-i next day, sent [c. 28/10/765] one of the chiefs who led the Uighurs, the k‘ai-fu, Ku-yeh-na, and five others to court in the capital for an audience with the emperor.123 Five days later, the Battle Commander of the Advance-guard of Shuo-fang, the k‘ai-fu, Po Yuan-kuang,124 the Prefectural Prince of Nan-yang, united with some Uighur infantry and cavalry in Ching-chou, and together they defeated a horde of more than 100,000 Tibetans and others in the Red Mountains [2/11/765?], forty or fifty li west of Ling-t’ai Subprefecture, decapitating more than 50,000 men. The 10,000 odd men whom they had taken alive as prisoners, the camels, horses, oxen and sheep, altogether formed a train of 100 li, whose numbers could not be fully recorded. They also got hold of more than 5,000 Chinese who had fallen prisoner to the barbarians.

Before this, Po Yuan-kuang and others had gone west of Ling-t’ai Subprefecture [1/11/765?] to ascertain how powerful the robbers were. Because the moon was bright, they thought that it would be better if it were darker, so the Uighurs got some magicians opportunely to call up wind and snow.125 At dawn there was a battle [2/11/765?]. All the Tibetans were bitterly cold and freezing. Their bows and arrows were all useless, they had wrapped themselves in felt and were slowly moving forward. Yuan-kuang and the Uighurs followed and killed them, covering the plains [with their corpses].

Moreover, P‘u-ku Ming-ch’en, Huai-en’s nephew, who was furthermore a brave general, came at the head of more than 1,000 cavalry to offer his submission [11/11/765 TCTC]. Shortly after, Tzu-i also sent to court for audience with the emperor 196 Uighurs, including Chief Minister General Hu-ti p‘i-chia and Lo ta-kan, who was Chief Minister, mei-lu and Grand General, k’ai-fu i-t‘ung-san-ssu and Trial President of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices. The emperor bestowed on them a banquet in the Yen-ying Hall, and made them extremely generous presents [14/11/765 TCTC].
The Battle Commander of the Advance-guard of Shuo-fang, Po Yuan-kuang, met with some Uighur soldiers in Ling-t'ai. There was snow and fog and it was extremely dark. The Tibetans had closed up their camps and relaxed their guard, so they routed them unrestrainedly, decapitating 50,000 people, taking alive prisoners numbering 10,000, seizing their horses, camels, oxen, and sheep and taking back 5,000 T'ang families who had been seized.

P'u-ku Ming-ch'en submitted [11/11/765 TCTC], and 200 men, including the Grand Governor-general Ho, came to court [14/11/765 TCTC]. There were innumerable presents bestowed. Tzu-i took Ming-ch'en for an audience with the emperor. Ming-ch'en was the son of Huai-en's elder brother and was a valiant general.
In the intercalary month (18/11-16/12/765), Tzu-i took P'u-ku Ming-ch'en from Ching-yang to the capital for an audience with the emperor [arrived 4/12/765 TCTC]. The Uighurs, bringing some horses with them to the capital, went to a banquet and then took their leave. During both the former and latter banquets, the emperor bestowed on them 100,000 pieces of silken fabric. After that they went home.

At the time the treasuries were empty, so the court officials went without their salaries. In the following months, the emperor gave them shou-li money, calling it exemption taxation money. He taxed the court officials' [income from this form of] taxation for the intercalary tenth, eleventh, and twelfth months (18/11/765-13/2/766) in order to supply [the Uighurs].

In the first month of the sixth year of Ta-li (21/1-18/2/771?), the Uighurs who were in the Court of Diplomatic Reception came out, without permission, to the wards and market-places and robbed the sons and daughters of the people. The officials who were there tried to seize [their captives] back, but [the Uighurs] beat them angrily and 300 of their horse-soldiers attacked the Chin-kuang and Chu-ch'üeh Gates. That day, all the gates of the Imperial City were locked. The emperor sent the eunuch, Liu Ch'ing-t'an, to pacify them and they thereupon desisted [1/3/772? TCTC].

In the seventh month of the seventh year (4/8-1/9/772), the Uighurs came out of the Court of Diplomatic Reception and went into the wards and market-places performing brutal deeds. They pursued the Prefect of Ch'ang-an, Shao Yüeh, up the street leading from the Han-kuang Gate, they seized the horse which Yüeh was riding and carried it off. Yüeh escaped, and the officials could do nothing about them [17/8/772 TCTC].

In the eleventh month of the eighth year (19/11-18/12/773?), 140 Uighurs returned to the barbarian territory [20/8/773? TCTC], with more than 1,000 chariots of letters and goods.
In the third year of Ta-li (768), ‘Kuang-ch’in’ Khatun died. The emperor sent [25/8/768 TCTC] one of his Right Grand Councillors, Hsiao Hsin, with proper credentials, to make condolence sacrifices. The following year (769), a younger daughter of Huai-en’s became ‘Ch’ung-hui’ Princess [2/7/769 TCTC], and the second wife of the khaghan. The Vice President of the Ministry of War, Li Han, holding his proper credentials, invested and appointed the khatun. The emperor gave her 20,000 pieces of silken fabric.

At that time, having barely anything he could use, the emperor unjustly took as taxation some mules and camels of the dukes and court-presidents and gave them to her for her transport. Some chief ministers gave her a farewell at the Chung-Wei Bridge [8/7/769 TFYK 979].

The Uighurs staying in the capital came in crowds and plundered the daughters and sons [of the people] in the market-places, and led some cavalry up to attack the Han-kuang Gate. [The officials] locked all the gates of the Imperial City. There was an imperial decree that Liu Ch’ing-t’an should pacify them and [the turmoil] was brought to an end [1/3/772 TCTC].

[Not long after, the Uighurs] came out again and pursued their trade in a violent manner. They seized the horse of the Prefect of Ch’ang-an, Shao Yüeh, and the officials did not dare to do anything about it [17/8/772 TCTC].
Following on the Ch'ien-yüan period (758–60), the Uighurs, taking advantage of their service to China, frequently used to send embassies with horses to trade at an agreed price for silken fabrics. Usually they came every year, trading one horse for forty pieces of silk. Every time they came they brought several tens of thousands of horses. There were many messengers waiting in the Court of Diplomatic Reception for a replacement. The barbarians acquired silk insatiably and we were given useless horses. The court found it extremely galling.

At that time there was a special edict which sent them away with generous gifts. This was to manifest the emperor's great mercy and also to shame them. That month the Uighurs sent the ambassador Ch'ih-hsin at the head of 10,000 horses to seek trade. Since the payment for the horses came out of the taxes in grain and money, Tai-tsung, not wishing to increase the burden on the people, ordered the officials to estimate the financial income for the year and allowed them to trade only 6,000 horses.

In the ninth month of the tenth year (30/9–28/10/775), a Uighur stabbed someone in broad daylight in the Eastern Market-place. The people in the market-place caught him and kept him imprisoned in Wan-nien Subprefecture. The Uighur leader Ch'ih-hsin heard about it and came from the Court of Diplomatic Reception. He burst into the prison of the subprefecture and carried off the prisoner, cutting and wounding the prison officials.

In the first month of the thirteenth year (2/2–3/3/778), the Uighurs invaded T'ai-yüan and passed Yii-tz'u and T'ai-ku. The Provisional Military Governor of Ho-tung and Governor of T'ai-yüan, Pao Fang, who was combining with his own office that of President of the Censorate, had a battle with the Uighurs in Yang-ch'ü. Our army was defeated. There were more than 1,000 dead. The Governor-general of Tai-chou, Chang Kuang-sheng, had a battle with the Uighurs in the Yang-wu Valley and defeated them. The Uighurs withdrew.

Before this, Hsin Yin-ch'ing had been in control of T'ai-yüan. The Uighurs were afraid of Yin-ch'ing and did not dare to pry into the city. As soon as he was replaced, knowing that Pao Fang had no knowledge of strategy, they thereupon dared to encroach into and molest the city. Fortunately, Kuang-sheng intercepted them, fought and defeated them. The people of the north were thereupon at peace.

When Te-tsung first ascended the throne, he sent
Following on the Ch'ien-yüan period (758-60), the Uighurs took even more advantage of their services to China by taking as a price forty pieces of silk for every horse they brought in as tribute. Every year they sought to sell several tens of thousands of horses, and the messengers followed one upon the other staying in the [Court of] Diplomatic Reception. The horses were inferior, weak, and unusable. The emperor gave them generous presents, wanting by this means to shame them, but they did not recognize this. They came again to the capital with 10,000 horses, but the emperor could not bear to place this burden on his people once again, so he paid for only 6,000 of them [5/12/773 TCTC].

In the tenth year (775?), a Uighur killed someone in one of the east-west streets of the capital [15/10/774 TCTC]. The Governor of the Capital, Li Kan, arrested him, but there was an imperial edict for clemency and he was not examined. On another occasion, [a Uighur] stabbed someone in the Eastern Market-place [16/10/775 TCTC]. He was bound and taken to the Wan-nien prison, but a [Uighur] chief seized the prisoner, injured the prison officials, and took him away. The people of the capital found it detestable and galling.

In the thirteenth year (778), the Uighurs made a surprise attack on Chen-wu, they made an onslaught on Tung-hsing and invaded [22/2/778 TCTC] T'ai-yüan. The Military Governor of Ho-tung, Pao Fang, had a battle with them in Yang-ch'ü. Fang was defeated [27/2/778 TCTC]. The injured and dead numbered 10,000. The Governor-general of Tai-chou, Chang Kuang-sheng, again had a battle with them in the Yang-hu Valley and defeated them [4/3-1/4/778 TCTC], whereupon the barbarians went away.

When Emperor Te-tsung came to the throne [12/6/779 TCTC], he sent
the eunuch, Liang Wen-hsiu, to announce to the Uighurs the tragic news [of Tai-tsung's death] and also to restore their old friendship. The khaghan, I-ti-chien, would not perform a ritual for him. Moreover, the Sogdians, who formed a normal part of the Uighur state, were trying to entice [the khaghan] by telling him how convenient and profitable China would be to him. The khaghan was thereupon about to take advantage of our court mourning, mobilise his nation, and come down south. However, his Chief Minister, Tun mo-ho ta-kan, admonished him, saying, 'The T'ang is a great state, and moreover it has never acted treacherously towards us. In a former year we entered T'ai-yüan and seized sheep and horses numbering several tens of thousands. We could count that a great victory. But because our way was difficult and obstructed, by the time we reached our own state, we were suffering from wounds, were wasted and almost exhausted. If we mobilise our forces now and do not gain a victory, how shall we return at all?' The khaghan did not listen to him so Tun mo-ho, taking advantage of the wish of some other people, attacked and killed him, and at the same time killed his relations and confidants and those of the Sogdians who had tried to entice him into invading China, in all 2,000 people. Tun mo-ho established himself on the throne and called himself Ho ku-tu-lu p'i-chia Khaghan. He sent his leader Chien ta-kan to accompany Wen-hsiu back to court. The emperor ordered the Governor of the Capital, Yüan Hsiu, carrying his own credentials, to take him his appointment as 'Wu-i ch'eng-kung' Khaghan.
a eunuch to announce the court mourning for his father's death and also to restore their friendship. At that time, the Sogdians were encouraging the khaghan to invade China. The khaghan wanted his entire army to go towards the border and, when he saw the ambassador, he would not perform a ritual for him. His Chief Minister, Tun mo-ho ta-kan, said, 'The T'ang is a great state and has never acted treacherously towards us. When we, in former days, entered T'ai-yüan, we seized several tens of thousands of sheep and horses, but, by the time we reached our own state, we were destroyed, wasted, and almost exhausted. So now when we mobilise our state and fight far away, if we do not win a victory, how shall we return at all? The khaghan did not listen to him. Tun mo-ho became annoyed and attacked and killed him and, at the same time, massacred nearly 2,000 people from among the khaghan's family, his clique, and the Sogdians. He immediately set himself up as Ho ku-tu-lu p'i-chia Khaghan, and sent the leader Chien ta-kan to accompany the ambassador [Liang Wen-hsiu] back to court.

In the first year of Chien-chung (780), the emperor issued a decree [28/7/780 TCTC] that the Deputy Governor of the Capital, Yüan Hsiu, carrying his own credentials, should take to Tun mo-ho the imperial diploma appointing him as 'Wu-i ch'eng-kung' Khaghan.

Before all this, whenever the Uighurs had arrived in the Central State, they had constantly had with them some Sogdians, who frequently stayed behind in the capital. In the course of time the number approached 1,000. They live there, their property flourished and they accumulated a very large amount of capital. On one occasion, the [Uighur] leaders, T'u-tung, I-mi-shih, a senior and junior mei-lu and others, who were on the point of returning to their own country, loaded up a train of camels and took to the road, staying for three months in Chen-wu. The supply bill was very dear and the expenses were unlimited. The Commissioner for the Army, Chang Kuang-sheng, secretly spied on them. They were all hiding women in bags. Kuang-sheng had sent a postal-station official to poke them with long awls and had thus found out about it. Already they had heard that Tun mo-ho had just ascended the throne and had killed many Sogdians. They were afraid and did not dare return [to the Uighur territory]. Very frequently they would try to disappear and escape, but T'u-tung kept a strict eye on them. So the Sogdians suggested a plan to Kuang-sheng, begging that he should behead all the
Uighurs.

Kuang-sheng agreed and immediately informed the emperor about it. He said, 'The Uighurs are not basically strong, but they are helped by the Sogdians. Now their state is in confusion and their soldiers are just now attacking151 and taking one another prisoner. If there is profit, then they are attracted to it, and if there is property, then they will join [with the owner]. But if there is no property nor profit, they will not be able to rescue their state from the chaos [into which it has fallen]. If we do not take advantage of this opportunity, but let them go home with their money, that would be tantamount to lending arms to robbers or supplying robbers with grain.'152

He then caused a subordinate army officer to fail publicly to give T'utung a due rite, so that he, in anger, whipped him. Accordingly, Kuang-sheng forced his soldiers to kill all the Uighurs and Sogdians153 and took several thousand camels and horses and 100,000 pieces of silken fabric [T'utung’s death 5/9/780 TCTC]. Moreover, he announced it as follows, 'The Uighurs flogged a great general and were planning to seize Chen-wu. I prevented them forcefully by massacring them before they could.' He sent the women in groups back to Ch’ang-an. The emperor summoned Kuang-sheng back to the capital and sent P’eng Ling-fang in his place. He sent a eunuch with the Uighur messenger, Yu ta-kan, [to the khaghan] to explain what had happened and say that in view of the situation he wished to break off relations with the barbarians.154 He ordered Yuan Hsiu to await orders in T’ai-yüan.

The following year (781 ?),155 he [Hsiu] went [to the Uighur capital] and accordingly took back four coffins containing the bodies of T’utung and the others. T’utung was the uncle of the khaghan. When Yuan Hsiu was approaching, the khaghan ordered his ministers to prepare chariots and horses and to go out and welcome him. [When they got there], his Grand Minister, Hsieh kan-chia,156 squatted on the ground and reprimanded Hsiu and the others for the affair of the murder of T’utung. Hsiu said, 'He himself died fighting with Chang Kuang-sheng. It was not the order of the Son of Heaven.' Again [the Grand Minister] said, 'You ambassadors are all responsible for crimes worthy of death. The T’ang has not massacred you itself. Does it [wish to provoke us into doing so and then] lay the blame on us?' He reviled them for some time and then left.

Hsiu and the others nearly lost their lives [as a result of all this]. Even after fifty days they had not had audience with the khaghan. The khaghan sent a report to Hsiu saying, 'The people of the state all desire your death. I alone am not of this mind. T’utung and the others are already
In the eighth month of the third year of Chen-yüan (16/9–15/10/787), the Uighur khaghan sent [2/10/787 TFYK 979] his leaders, Mo-ch’o ta-kan, General To-lan, Ho ch’üeh ta-kan and others, to court to give as tribute some products of the region and also to ask for a marriage alliance.¹⁵⁸
dead, so if I now killed you, it would mean blood for blood and would only increase the stain. I shall use water instead to wash away blood. Would not that be good? On my behalf, tell those in charge that the value of the horses for which you are in debt to us is 1,800,000 ligatures. You must pay us back quickly for them.' He sent his Auxiliary General, K'ang Ch'ih-hsin, and others to accompany Hsiu to court [arrived 11/8/782 TCTC]. The emperor restrained his feelings and bestowed on them some gold and silk.

Three years afterwards (783?), [the khaghan] sent [2/10/787 TFYK 979] ambassadors to present products from his region and to beg for a marriage alliance. The emperor was brooding over his former resentment and had not yet forgotten about it. He addressed his chief minister, Li Pi,

and said [16/10-14/11/787 TCTC], 'The marriage will have to wait until my son or grandson arranges it. I cannot do it.' Pi said, 'Is it the Shan-chou affair that Your Majesty is still bitter about?' The emperor said, 'Yes, that's right. And had it not been that at that moment the empire was facing many difficulties, and that I could not yet make retribution, I should not have discussed peace with them.'

Pi said, 'The one who so wronged Shao-hua and the others was Mou-yü Khaghan. Knowing that Your Majesty, immediately upon ascending the throne, would certainly make retribution for this grievance, he therefore planned to forestall you by creating trouble on the border, but his soldiers have not appeared, and he has been killed by the present khaghan. When the present khaghan first ascended the throne, he sent an ambassador to our court to inform you of it. His hair was hanging and still uncut and he was awaiting the orders of the Son of Heaven. Furthermore, when Chang Kuang-sheng killed T'u-tung and the others, although [the khaghan] secretly detained the ambassadors, he sent them home safely in the end, so he has not committed any crime.'

The emperor said, 'What you say is true, but on the other hand, I cannot possibly disregard Shao-hua and the others, so what shall I do?'

Pi said,

I, your subject, consider that it is not you who are disregarding Shao-hua, but Shao-hua who disregarded Your Majesty. Furthermore, I would say that it was the leader of the Northern Barbarians who came to Your Majesty's assistance. For, when you were heir-apparent and still young, you made light of crossing the Yellow River and entered their camps, which might be called a lair of wolves and tigers. If Shao-hua and the others were organising the affair they should first of all have decided on the rites to be followed at the meeting. I, your subject, should even so have thought it dangerous. Why did you go in alone?
I was formerly a superior administrator of an expeditionary army under the late emperor [Su-tsung]. Just then Yeh-hu had come and the late emperor respectfully gave him a banquet, in his own mansion. Even when we were discussing the strategy for battle, he did not give him audience. Yeh-hu summoned me, your subject, to his tent, but the emperor would not allow me to go, and said very politely, 'A host should entertain his guest, but will the guest entertain the host in return?' We went east and retook the capital and made an agreement saying, 'The land and adults will return to the T'ang, but jade, silk, and children will be conferred on the Uighurs.' Having fought and conquered, Yeh-hu wanted to carry out a savage pillage. Tai-tsung got off his horse and made him a courteous salute.162 The Uighurs thereupon went east towards the Lo River. I, your subject, disapproved of the Generalissimo's having saluted Yeh-hu in front of his horse, and thought that it was the fault of the emperor's assistants. But the late emperor [Su-tsung] said, 'The prince's benevolence and filial piety are enough to manage my affairs.' He sent down a proclamation to console and to encourage Yeh-hu. Yeh-hu was the uncle of Mou-yü.163

When Mou-yü came to China, Your Majesty, as heir-apparent, did not pay him respect in front of his tent, but the khaghan did not dare even slightly to infringe the rites towards Your Majesty, and you have never suffered humiliation. The late emperor paid respect to Yeh-hu and saved the capital city. If Your Majesty did not pay respect to the khaghan but, even so, firmly upheld your prestige before the barbarian, why is there a cause for resentment? But in weighing up the Hsiang-chi164 and Shan-chou affairs, which was right, for the late emperor to have suffered humiliation or for you to have upheld your prestige? Supposing that Shao-hua and the others had taken Your Majesty for audience with the khaghan and [Mou-yü] had then closed up the walls for five days, indulging in lavish drinking with Your Majesty, the empire's blood would, in that case, surely have run cold with worry. But Heaven helped you, the imposing and spiritual one, and caused the wolves tamely to submit. Mou-yü, like a mother, wrapped Your Majesty in a sable robe, cursed those around him and urged some horsemen to escort you back from his camp. This is why I say that it is Shao-hua and the others who have disregarded Your Majesty.

Supposing Mou-yü could be considered to have committed a crime, then the present khaghan has already killed him. The one on the throne is Mou-yü's first cousin. This man has done you meritorious service. Can we forget that? Moreover the Uighur khaghan has engraved a stone and set it up on the gate of his state. It runs, 'Should a T'ang ambassador come, let him know that we have in all ways and at all times rendered meritorious service to the T'ang.' Now he is making a petition for a marital alliance and will certainly lead his whole tribe south and look at us in expectation. Should you not respond to it, his resentment will certainly be deep. Be willing to agree to the marriage.165
In the tenth month of the fourth year (3/11–2/12/788), a Uighur princess and some ambassadors arrived in the capital from the barbarian country [16/11/788 TCTC]. Te-tsung attended at the Yen-hsi Gate to see them. At the time the Uighur khaghan was very pleased about the marital alliance and his rites were extremely respectful. He sent up a memorial to the emperor saying, ‘Before, we were elder and younger brother, but now I am your son-in-law, your half-son.’ He also reviled and cursed the Tibetan ambassadors and thereupon sent a total of fifty-six wives and concubines of the great chiefs and others to the capital to welcome the khatun. Altogether he sent more than 1,000 men who brought in 2,000 horses as presents for the completion of the marriage rites. Te-tsung ordered 700 members of the embassy to stay at Shuo-chou and T’ai-yüan while their chief ministers and leaders were, upon arrival [in Ch’ang-an], accommodated either in the Court or Guest-house of Diplomatic Reception or the Directorate of Works.172
Make an agreement with them on the basis of the former affair of the K'ai-yüan period (713–42),\textsuperscript{166} that if, like the T'u-chüeh khaghan, he style himself a subject, that if those who come as envoys to China do not exceed 200, that if their horses for trading\textsuperscript{167} do not exceed 1,000, and that if they do not take T'ang subjects beyond the borders, there will be nothing impossible in the request.

The emperor said, 'Very well.' He granted the sending out of a princess to the khaghan and the Uighurs also begged permission to agree to the conditions.

There was a proclamation that the Princess of Hsien-an\textsuperscript{168} should go out and marry [the Uighur khaghan] and another that the ambassador Ho ch'iieh ta-kan should see the princess in the Lin-te Hall. The emperor sent a eunuch in charge of introducing visitors to present to him a portrait of the princess which was to be given to the khaghan\textsuperscript{169} [embassy sent home 28/10/787 TCTC].

The following year (788), the khaghan sent out a crowd of more than 1,000, including his chief minister, the Governor-general of the Hsieh-tieh tribe. Together with them he sent his younger sister, Ku-tu-lu p'i-chia Princess, and fifty of the wives of the great chiefs to welcome the princess and also to bring in tributary gifts to court as presents for the completion of the marriage rites. On arrival at Chen-wu the Hsieh-tieh was violently robbed by some Shih-wei and died in the fight which ensued.\textsuperscript{171} There was an edict that 700 of his inferiors should be granted entry into the court and should be housed in the [Court or Guest-house of] Diplomatic Reception.\textsuperscript{172} The emperor was present at the Yen-hsi Gate to see the ambassadors [16/11/788 TCTC]. At that time the khaghan sent up a memorial to the emperor which showed him extreme reverence and said, 'In former times we were elder and younger brother, but now I am your son-in-law, your half-son. If Your Majesty is worried about the Tibetans, your son begs permission to dispose of them with his armies.' He also begged permission to change the name Hui-ho into Hui-hu,\textsuperscript{173} saying that they were swift birds of prey like falcons (hu).\textsuperscript{*}

The emperor wanted to have a formal feast in honour of the Uighur princess. He asked Li Pi whether this would be in accordance with the rites. Li Pi replied, saying, 'Su-tsung was the second cousin of the Prince of Tun-huang.\textsuperscript{174} [The khaghan of] the Uighurs gave him his daughter as a wife. When there was an audience with the emperor in P'eng-yüan, she, unaccompanied by her husband, made obeisance to the emperor at

\textsuperscript{*} Parallel text, p.108.
On the day *kuei-ssu* (21/11/788), the emperor gave them audience in the Grand Audience Hall. On the day *i-wei* (23/11/788), Te-tsung invited the Uighur princess to bring out her ambassadors and come to the Lin-te Hall. Everyone was given presents.

On the day *keng-tzu* (28/11/788), there was an edict that the Princess of Hsien-an should go out and marry the Uighur khaghan. A hierarchy of officials and subordinates was set up for her, corresponding to those of a royal prince's establishment. The Director of the Department of the Imperial Household Service and heir-designate of the Prince of T'eng, Chan-jan, became [30/11/788 *TFYK* 979] Commissioner for the Rites of the Marriage of the Princess of Hsien-an. Kuan Po became [5/12/788 *TFYK* 979] the Honorary Right Vice President [of the Department of Affairs of State] and the Commissioner for Escorting the Princess of Hsien-an and for Appointing the Uighur Khaghan.

In the twelfth month of the fifth year of Chen-yüan (21/12/789–19/1/790?), the Uighur Ku-tu-lu 'Ch'ang-shou t'ien-ch'ìn' p'ì-chia Khaghan died. The emperor suspended court for three days and the civil and military officials of the third rank and higher approached the Court of Diplomatic Reception to condole with [the Uighur] ambassadors who had come to court.

In the sixth month of the sixth year of Chen-yüan (17/7–14/8/790), the Uighur ambassador, I-chih-chia *ta-kan*, was about to return to the
After that they led the Uighur princess through the Yin-t’ai Gate. Three senior princesses awaited her within. She was conducted by an interpreter. When others bowed she responded to show reverence. They entered together with her. The emperor attended in one of the innermost halls of the palace. The senior princesses entered first and waited on him. The Uighur princess entered, made a bow and paid respect to him. After that, a court director of harem visits showed her to the place where the senior princesses were. Again an interpreter passed on her questions, and then they all went in together to the banquet hall. The Wise Concubine came down the stairs and waited for them. The Uighur princess made her a bow and the Wise Concubine replied to her bow. Again she bowed and received her. They ascended by the western stairs and sat down. When it was the emperor who made her presents, [the Uighur princess] came down from her place and bowed to receive them. When it was not the emperor, she merely left her mat to bow. The concubines and princesses all bowed in reply to her [23/11/788 CTS]. Before she returned home, she had been invited twice to a formal feast of this kind.

The emperor also set up a complete hierarchy of officials and subordinates for the Princess of Hsien-an [28/11/788 CTS], corresponding to those of an establishment of a royal prince. The heir-designate of the Prince of T’eng, Chan-jan, became [30/11/788 TFYK 979] the Commissioner for the Rites of the Marriage, and the Right Vice President [of the Department of the Affairs of State], Kuan Po, was to escort her, bringing with him, moreover, the imperial letter-diploma which appointed the khaghan as Ku-tu-lu ‘Ch’ang-shou t’ien-ch’in’ p’i-chia Khaghan and the princess as ‘Chih-hui tuan-cheng ch’ang-shou hsiao-shun’ Khatun.

In the fifth year of Chen-yüan (789), the khaghan died.
barbarian territory. The emperor gave him 300,000 pieces of silk as a price for his horses.

The President of the Court of Diplomatic Reception, Kuo Feng, combining with his own office that of President of the Censorate, filled the function of Commissioner Bringing the Diploma which Appoints the Uighur ‘Chung-chen’ Khaghan [Kuo Feng was sent by the emperor 31/12/789 TCTC].

In the fourth month of that year (19/4–18/5/790), ‘Chung-chen’ Khaghan was killed by his younger brother who usurped the throne. At the time, the Grand General of the Uighurs, Hsieh kan-chia-ssu, was in the west attacking the Tibetans and had not yet returned. His deputy ministers led the people of the state in rebellion, letting them free to kill the usurper, and put the son of ‘Chung-chen’ on the throne as khaghan [19/4–18/5/790 TCTC]. At the time he was fifteen or sixteen years old. In the sixth month (17/7–14/8/790), Hsieh kan-chia-ssu, having fought in the west, had returned and was about to arrive at the royal camp. The deputy ministers and others were afraid of a further dethronement. They did not want the Han ambassador [Kuo Feng] to know about it, so they detained Feng for several months before allowing him to return. When Hsieh kan-chia-ssu arrived, the khaghan and others came out of the city to the territory beyond to welcome him [and displayed] the state seals, utensils, and silk which Kuo Feng had sent. The khaghan, the deputy generals, ministers, and the others all prostrated themselves, and told him why they had removed the last khaghan and set up the present one on the throne. Moreover, they begged for an order, saying, ‘Only the Grand Minister can give him life or death.’ They gave Hsieh kan-chia-ssu all the presents of silk and utensils which they had displayed in order to please him.

The khaghan again made a bow and, weeping, said, ‘I am a child, I am foolish, young and ignorant. That good fortune has now made it possible for me to ascend the throne is only because of my reliance on you as on my father and khaghan. I [promise to] serve you as your own son.’ Hsieh kan-chia-ssu was moved by his humility, and thereupon he embraced him and wept loudly, then performed the rites of a subject and son to him. All the utensils and silk given to him he presented to the various generals and officers who had followed him on his expedition, keeping nothing for himself. From then on, [the Uighur] state was more or less at peace. After that, [the khaghan] sent the mei-lu, General Prince Ta-pi, to announce to us the sad news of the death of ‘Chung-chen’ Khaghan, and

* Parallel text, p.105.

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His son, To-lo-ssu, ascended the throne. The people of his own state called him Prince P’an-kuan, and the President of the Court of Diplomatic Reception, Kuo Feng, carrying with him his emblems of office, gave him official appointment as Ai teng-li-lo ku mo-mi-shih chü-lu p’i-chia ‘Chung-chen’ Khaghan.
also to ask for a commissioner to appoint the new ruler.\textsuperscript{190} When he arrived, the emperor suspended court for three days, and then he ordered officials of the third rank and above to approach the Court of Diplomatic Reception to condole with their ambassadors.\textsuperscript{*}

That year the Tibetans took Pei-t'ing Protectorate.\textsuperscript{191} Before this, Pei-t'ing and An-hsi had been making use of a route through Uighur territory in order to take their memorials to the throne, and had thus become dependent on them. The Tibetans\textsuperscript{192} had been making insatiable demands. Pei-t'ing being the closer, they had been seizing all its living necessities. Moreover, there were more than 6,000 families of the Sha-t'o tribes\textsuperscript{193} who were dependent on Pei-t'ing and who were also affected by the Uighurs' reckless behaviour, confiscations, and robberies which they particularly resented and found galling.

Before this, the tribes of the Kharlukh\textsuperscript{201} and the White-clothed\textsuperscript{202} T'u-chüeh had been normally at peace with the Uighurs, but they too were resenting their invasions and robbery, and because the Tibetans bribed them generously, they were enticed over to their side. The winter before, the Tibetans had led the Kharlukh and White-clothed hordes to go and make trouble in Pei-t'ing. The Uighur Grand Minister, \textit{Hsieh kan-chia-ssu}, led his hordes to relieve it and to destroy the Tibetans, but the Tibetans quickly attacked them \textsuperscript{[17/6-16/7/790 TCTC]}. Since the people of Pei-t'ing had felt bitter against the Uighurs, the whole city had submitted \textsuperscript{[to the Tibetans]} and the tribes of the Sha-t'o had also submitted. The Military Governor, Yang Hsi-ku, who was Honorary President of the Ministry of Works, escaped to Hsi-chou with a horde of more than 2,000 under his leadership. \textit{Hsieh kan-li}\textsuperscript{203} also returned home \textsuperscript{[17/7-14/8/790 TCTC]}.

In the autumn of the tenth year (794?), he rallied the entire force of 50,000 strong men\textsuperscript{204} of his state and, summoning Hsi-ku, led a repeat attempt, but suddenly they were defeated and the majority of them killed. \textit{Hsieh kan-li} collected together the remnants of his defeated forces and, day and night, fled back. Hsi-ku led his remaining hordes, barely 160 men,\textsuperscript{205} back to Hsi-chou. \textit{Hsieh kan-chia-ssu} deceived him, saying, 'Just come back with me to my royal camp. I shall send you back to your own court.' When

\textsuperscript{*} Parallel text, p.105.
Before all this, since the loss of Kuan-nei and Lung-yu at the end of T'ien-pao (742–56), the tribute road from An-hsi and Pei-t'ing had been cut off. The Military Governor of I-chou, Hsi-chou and Pei-t'ing, Li Yüan-chung, and the Provisional Military Governor of the Four Garrisons, Kuo Hsin, had several times sent ambassadors to report this to the emperor, but none of them had arrived. In the second year of Chen-yüan (786?), the ambassadors sent by Yüan-chung and the other made use of a route through Uighur territory and succeeded in getting through to Ch'ang-an. The emperor promoted Yüan-chung to the post of Grand Protector of Pei-t'ing and Hsin to that of Grand Protector of An-hsi. From this point on, although they were able to pass through by this route, the barbarians demanded and took an exorbitant price for the use of it. Six thousand families of different Sha-t'o tribes, who were in dependence on Pei-t'ing, also grew to resent their excessive demands. The three tribes of the Kharlukh, and the White-eyed T'u-chüeh, those who were normally subjects of the Uighurs, were particularly resentful and bitter. They all secretly submitted to the Tibetans, so they and the Tibetans, with the support of the Sha-t'o, together made trouble in Pei-t'ing. Hsieh kan-chia-ssu had a battle with them, but was not victorious. Pei-t'ing fell. Thereupon, the Protector, Yang Hsi-ku, fled to Hsi-chou at the head of his army.

With several tens of thousands of strong infantry, the Uighurs summoned Hsi-ku to lead his forces back to recapture Pei-t'ing [autumn 790, see n.206]. They were attacked by the Tibetans and suffered a great defeat. The majority of the soldiers were killed. Hsieh kan-chia-ssu fled back, and Hsi-ku gathered together the remnants of his army, leading them into Hsi-chou. Hsieh kan-chia-ssu deceived him saying, 'Just come back with me, younger brother! I shall send you back to the T'ang court.' After Hsi-ku got to his tent, he killed him [3–31/10/791 HTS 7].
they reached the royal camp, he detained him and did not send him home. Finally he killed him [3–31/10/791 HTS 7].

From this time on, An-hsi was separated and cut off, so nobody knew whether it survived or had been destroyed. Only the people of Hsi-chou were still definitely under Chinese protection.

Now that Hsieh kan-chia-ssu was defeated, the chariots of the Kharlukh overcame [the territory round] the Fou-t’u valley and seized it from the Uighurs. The Uighurs trembled with fear and moved all the north-western tribes, with their sheep and their horses, to the south of their royal camp in order to escape from them.

On the day keng-shen, the first day of the fifth month of the seventh year of Chen-yuan (6/6/791?), the Vice President of the Court of Diplomatic Reception, Yu Shan, combined [21/3/791 TCTC] with his own office that of President of the Censorate, and of Commissioner who Appoints the Uighur Khagan and [Deals with] Condolence Sacrifices.

That month (6/6–5/7/791?), the Uighurs sent the ambassador Lü-chih ta-kan and others to court to announce the death of the Younger
The Kharlukh also seized [the territory round] the Shen-t’u\textsuperscript{208} Valley. The Uighurs were greatly afraid and moved their tribes a little to the south in order to escape them.

That year (790), the kaghan was poisoned by the younger khatun, Princess Yeh. The khatun was the granddaughter of P’u-ku Huai-en. Huai-en’s son was a Uighur \textit{yeh-hu}, so the latter’s daughter was called Princess Yeh. The kaghan’s younger brother then set himself on the throne.\textsuperscript{209} At the time [\textit{Hsieh kan-}] chia-ssu was away attacking the Tibetans. The kaghan’s ministers led the people of the state against him, and together they killed the usurper [19/4-18/5/790 \textit{TCTC}]. The kaghan’s [To-lo-ssu’s] youngest son, A-ch’o, succeeded. When [\textit{Hsieh kan-}] chia-ssu returned [17/7-14/8/790 \textit{CTS}], the kaghan and the others came out [of the city] to greet him. They all prostrated themselves before him, told him the circumstances under which they had removed the last kaghan and placed the present one on the throne and said that only the Grand Minister could say whether [the new kaghan] should live or die. They brought out all the utensils and silk which Kuo Feng had bestowed on them and gave them to [\textit{Hsieh kan-}] chia-ssu. The kaghan bowed and also wept, saying, ‘That good fortune has now made it possible for me to carry on my father’s line, which was broken, is because of my reliance on you as my father.’ [\textit{Hsieh kan-}] chia-ssu, touched by his humility, embraced him, wept and thereafter served him as a subject. He gave all the utensils and silk to his generals and officers, keeping nothing for himself. Their state was then at peace.

[The Uighurs] sent the \textit{mei-lu}, General Prince Ta-pei, to court to announce [these events] and also to receive instructions.\textsuperscript{210,*}

There was a proclamation [21/3/791 \textit{TCTC}] that the Vice President of the Court of Diplomatic Reception, Yü Shan,\textsuperscript{212} should [take out a diploma] appointing A-ch’o as ‘Feng-ch’eng’\textsuperscript{213} Khaghan.

Soon after, Lü-chih \textit{ta-kan} came to announce the death of the Younger

* Parallel text, pp.100, 102.
Princess of Ning-kuo. The emperor suspended court for three days. Formerly, when Su-tsung had sent the Princess of Ning-kuo out to the Uighurs, the daughter of the Prince of Yung had escorted her. After the Princess of Ning-kuo returned to China, the daughter of the Prince of Yung had become khatun and the Uighurs had called her the Younger Princess of Ning-kuo. She had been paired successively with the two khaghans 'Ying-wu' and 'Ying-t' [Mou-yü], and when 'T'ien-ch'in' Khaghan [Tun mo-ho] had ascended the throne, she had left and lived outside. The two sons of 'Ying-wu' whom she had borne had been killed by 'T'ien-ch'in' Khaghan and she had died shortly after.

In the eighth month of the seventh year (3/9-2/10/791?), the Uighurs sent an ambassador to present to the emperor some Tibetan and Kharlukh prisoners whom they had defeated in Pei-t'ing, together with their cattle. Before this, some Tibetans had entered Ling-chou where they were defeated by a group of Uighurs [3/9-2/10/791 TCTC]. These had terrified them through a night attack with fire and forced them to retreat.

In the twelfth month (30/12/791-27/1/792), the Uighurs sent General Sha-chih to present to the emperor the Tibetan prisoner Grand Chief Chieh-hsin. Te-tsung attended at the Yen-hsi Gate to inspect him [6/1/792 TCTC].

In the seventh month of the eighth year (24/7-21/8/792), the Uighur, Yao-lo Ling, became the Honorary Right Vice President [of the Department of Affairs of State] [3/8/792 TFYK 976]. Ling was Chinese by blood and his surname was Lü, but he had gone among the Uighurs and become the adopted son of the khaghan, so he had taken the surname of the khaghan and become Yao-lo Ling. He had authority in the state, and when he came to court, the emperor favoured him and gave him very generous gifts. On this occasion the emperor gave him 70,000 pieces of silk for the horses he traded.

In the ninth month of the ninth year (10/10-8/11/793), the Uighurs sent ambassadors to court to give tribute.

On the day keng-yin of the sixth month of the eleventh year of Chen-yüan, an imperial diploma appointed [15/6/795 TCTC] the Uighur khaghan as T'eng-li-lo yü-lu mo-mi-shih ho lu-hu p'i 'Huai-hsin' Khaghan.
Princess of Ning-kuo. She was the daughter of the Prince of Yung.\textsuperscript{216} Before this, when the Princess of Ning-kuo had gone out to marry [the Uighur khaghan], she had gone as her escort [and to become the khaghan's concubine]. When Ning-kuo had later returned to China, she had remained among the Uighurs and become khatun. They had called her the Younger Ning-kuo\textsuperscript{217} and she had been successively the consort of the two khaghans, 'Ying-wu' [Mo-yen-ch'\textquoteleft o] and 'Ying-i' [Mou-yü]. When it came to the time of 'T'ien-ch'\textquoteleft in' [Tun mo-ho] Khaghan she had begun to live outside. When she had been the consort of 'Ying-i',\textsuperscript{218} she had given birth to two sons, but both had been killed by 'T'ien-ch'\textquoteleft in'.

That year (791), the Uighurs attacked some Tibetans and Kharlukh in Pei-t'\ing, conquered them and also presented the prisoners as gifts to the emperor.

The following year (792), the ambassador Yao-lo-ko Chiung\textsuperscript{222} came to court. Chiung was originally Chinese, of the Lü clan, but he had become the adopted son of the khaghan and had then taken the khaghan's surname. The emperor, because of the authority he held, gave him extremely lavish presents. He appointed him Honorary Right Vice President of the Department of Affairs of State \textsuperscript{[3/8/792 TFYK 976].}

In the eleventh year (795), the khaghan died without a son. The people of the state placed his minister Ku-tu-lu on the throne as khaghan, and an ambassador came [to inform the Chinese court] about it. There was a proclamation that the Director of the Department of the Imperial Library, Chang Chien,\textsuperscript{224} holding his emblems of office, should take out a diploma appointing him as Ai t'\textquoteleft eng-li-lo yü-lu mo-mi-shih ho hu-lu p'\textquoteleft i-chia 'Huai-hsin'\textsuperscript{225} Khaghan.\textsuperscript{226} Ku-tu-lu was originally of the Hsieh-tieh clan. He became orphaned when young and was adopted by a great chieftain. He was clever in argument and able in war. In 'T'ien-ch'\textquoteleft in's' time, he had on
In the fourth year of Yuan-ho (809?), Ai te-ho-li-lu mo-mi-shih ho mi li-chia Khaghan sent an ambassador to court to change their name to Hui-hu, the meaning of which signified that they circled round and round (hui) and were light and swift like falcons (hu).*

In the fourth month of the eighth year (4/5-1/6/813), the Uighur Commissioner for a Request for a Marriage Alliance, I-nan-chu, was about to return to the territory of the barbarians. The emperor gave him a banquet in the San-tien [8/6/813 TFYK 976] and bestowed on him silver utensils and silken fabrics.

That year (813), several thousand Uighur cavalry arrived at the P'i-t'i Springs and the border armies put themselves on the alert.243

* Parallel text, p.97.

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several occasions been master of an army, and all the chiefs admired and stood in awe of him. Because the Yao-lo-ko clan up to this time had been meritorious generation after generation, he did not dare call himself by the name of his own clan, but he seized all the khaghan's sons and grandsons and presented them to the [Chinese] court.

In the first year of Yung-chen (805), the khaghan died and there was a proclamation that the Vice President of the Court of Diplomatic Reception, Sun Kao, should go and offer condolences and take the diploma to appoint his successor as T'eng-li yeh ho chu-ju p'i-chia Khaghan.

At the beginning of Yuan-ho (806–21), the Uighurs came for a second time to court to present tribute. For the first time they were accompanied by some Manicheans. The laws of these latter prescribe that they should eat only in the evening, drink water, eat strong vegetables, and abstain from fermented mare's milk. The khaghan constantly had them participate in state affairs. Manicheans came to and from the capital every year. The merchants of the Western Market-place often did unlawful business with them.

In the third year (808), they came to announce the death of the Princess of Hsien-an, who had lived among the Uighurs under four successive khaghans, for twenty-one years in all. Shortly after, the khaghan also died. Hsien-tsung sent the Vice President of the Court of the Imperial Clan, Li Hsiao-ch'eng, to take out to the new khaghan his appointment as Ai teng-li-lo ku mi-shih ho p'i-chia 'Pao-i' Khaghan.

The third year following this an embassy came for the second time to court.

[The khaghan] sent I-nan-chu for a second time to ask for a marriage. Before the report of the outcome, the khaghan arrived with 3,000 cavalry at the P'i-t'i Springs. Then some of the soldiers of Chen-wu were sent to set up their camp at Mount Hei, and they repaired the Fortresses of T'ien-te in preparation for the barbarians.

The President of the Ministry of Rites, Li Chiang, sent up a memorial to the throne, which ran:

The Uighurs are very strong and the northern borders are deserted. Once they stir up trouble, our weak soldiers will not be able to withstand them, and
there will be no one to guard the isolated cities. If Your Majesty is concerned about this matter, he will increase the military equipment and repair the fortifications and set them in order. This would be the best plan for China and the great good fortune of the people. I, your subject, consider that the present dispositions of the borders do not fulfil their needs and that there are five causes for grave concern there. I beg permission to enumerate them.

The northern barbarians are covetous and grasping. All they care about is profit. This is the second year that their normal yearly consignment of horses has not arrived. Can it be that they have become satiated with the profit of silken fabrics? I suspect that what is happening is that they want [to wait till the autumn when] the wind will be strong and their horses fat, so that they can make a sudden invasion into China. Therefore I am sure that there will be trouble in store for the court, in regard both to preparation within and defence without. This is the first thing which should worry us.

Our armies have not yet reached full strength, our patrol system is not yet effective, our lances and armour are not yet ready, our walls and moats are not yet firmly established. The restoration of the T'ien-te Army has certainly made the barbarians suspicious and the evacuation of the Western [Shou-hsiang] Fortress has left the desert roads with nothing to depend on. This is the second thing which should worry us.

Now, if our fortresses are to protect our strategic places, and if we are to attack what is dangerous and to guard what is safe, we ought to make plans with our border generals. If then we content ourselves merely with keeping an eye on the distant River borders while thinking that we can control the situation from our exalted court, the barbarians will unexpectedly violate the borders and, in accordance with recent trends, we shall lose our advantages. This is the third thing which should worry us.

Ever since they have been our allies, the Uighurs have been fully aware of the natural layout of the mountains and rivers, and which frontier defence is manned and which not. If rebels were to plunder our various prefectures, for us to mobilise our forces would take at least ten days or a few weeks, while for them to take our men and animals prisoner would take at most a morning or an evening. By the time an imperial army could get there, the barbarians would already have returned home. If the robbers were to stay a longer time, our recruitments would increase more and more. This is the fourth thing which should worry us.

'The Uighurs and Tibetans are constantly at war with each other. Therefore the borders have nothing to provide against. At present the Uighurs are not even trading their horses with us. If the Uighurs should make a treaty with the Tibetans and relax their hostility, then our generals and their men will close up their walls and shirk making war, while the people of the frontiers will have to fold their arms and undergo calamity. This is the fifth thing that should worry us.
Moreover, Wu Shao-yang in Huai-hai is on the verge of death, but he would be able to take advantage of their changed situation. The various provinces would have to increase their frontier guards tenfold.

I, your subject, claim that it is fitting to comply with the marriage and so cause the rites to be preserved in the barbarian country. In that case, there would be what one might call the three profits. If the marriage eventuates, then the fire beacons will have no need to give the alarm, and it will be possible to put the fortresses and their battlements in order; there will be ample numbers of soldiers who will be able to build up strength and to lay in grain and in this way stabilise our armies. This is the first.

Having done away with the grievances which are wanting our attention in the north, we shall be able to turn our attention to the south, to take care of the regions west of the Huai and to extend our orders to the troubles which are almost played out there. This is the second.

If the northern barbarians rely on the fact that our [royal houses] are related [by marriage], then the Tibetan resentment will be deeper than ever before and their state will not be at peace. We shall sit and be free from attack by them, enjoying a long respite from their robbery and plunder [of our borders]. This is the third.

It would be extremely ill-advised on our part to reject [a course of action which would be] profitable to us in these three ways, and follow one involving these five sources of worry. Now, some say that the cost of sending out a princess will be great. I, your subject, say that this is not true. One third of the tax revenue of our empire is devoted to the borders. Now, the annual tax revenue of a large subprefecture of the south-east amounts to 200,000 ligatures. So if we use the revenue from one subprefecture to meet the cost of the marriage, is not that injuring little to obtain much? Now, if we are mean about the cost of the marriage and do not grant it to them, and if their prince's armies attack the north, we shall need at least 30,000 foot-soldiers and 5,000 cavalry, otherwise we shall not be able to ward them off and drive them away. Moreover, to ensure a complete victory will require at least a year. Will the provisions and supplies [we send] conceivably be as little as the tax revenue from one subprefecture?

The emperor did not listen to him.
On the second day of the twelfth month (28/12/813?),252 the emperor gave a banquet [20/2/817 TCTC] to eight Uighur Manicheans who were returning to their own country. The emperor ordered them to go to the Grand Imperial Secretariat to see the ministers of state. Before this, the Uighurs had asked for a marriage alliance. Hsien-tsung had ordered officials to estimate the cost. The expenses for the ritual ceremonies had been evaluated at 5,000,000 ligatures. As there was trouble within the empire to suppress,253 the court could not afford the cost of this marriage. Manicheans were trusted and respected among the Uighurs, so it was to these [Uighur Manicheans] that the ministers of state were ordered to say that [the marriage alliance] was not possible.

Thereupon there was a proclamation that the Vice President of the Court of the Imperial Clan, Ui Hsiao-ch'eng,254 should go as an ambassador to the Uighurs, and that the Doctor of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices, Yin Yu,255 should be his deputy and that they should proclaim the answer [of the court] to the [Uighur] request.

In the first year of Ch'ang-ch'ing (821), P'i-chia 'Pao-i' Khaghan died, and the emperor suspended court for three days. He ordered all the officials of the third rank or higher to approach the Court of Diplomatic Reception and to condole with his ambassadors.

In the fourth month (6/5–3/6/821), in the Grand Audience Hall, the emperor gave the Uighur leader appointment [25/5/821 TCTC] as Teng-lo yü-lu mo-mi-shih chü-chu-lu p'i-chia Khaghan.258 The Director of the Imperial Workshops, P'ei T'ung, became an Honorary Left Grand Councillor to the Emperor, holding in addition to his own the office of President of the Censorate, and, bearing his credentials, he became also the Commissioner Who Appoints and Sets up [the New Khaghan], and, at the same time, the Commissioner for Condolence Sacrifices.

In the fifth month (4/6–2/7/821), 573 Uighur chief ministers, governors-general, princesses, Manicheans and others came to court [4/6/821 TCTC] to welcome the princess.* They were lodged in the Court of Diplomatic Reception. There was an imperial order [1/7/821 TCTC] that the Princess of T'ai-ho260 should go out to the Uighurs and become their khatun. As was fitting, the emperor ordered the Secretary of the Department of the Grand Imperial Secretariat, Wang Ch'i,261 to go to the Court of Diplomatic Reception and proclaim it.

* Parallel text also, p.116.

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When the Uighurs had begged for the marriage, some officials calculated the cost at 5,000,000 ligatures. Since he was at that time fighting against the strong military governors within the empire, the emperor sent the Vice President of the Court of the Imperial Clan, Li Ch'eng, and the Doctor of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices, Yin Yu, to go [to the Uighurs] and proclaim that it was not possible.

When Mu-tsung ascended the throne [20/2/820 TCTC], the Uighurs had again sent Ho ta-kan and others to court to make a firm petition for a marriage, and the emperor [Hsien-tsung] had granted it. Shortly after, however, the khaghan died.

An ambassador took out to the Uighur capital the document appointing his successor as Teng-lo yü-lu mo-mi-shih chü-chu p'i-chia 'Ch'ung-te' Khaghan.

When the khaghan had ascended the throne, he sent I-nan-chu, the Governor-general Chü-lu, a Ssu-chieh and others, and also the Princess Yeh-hu, to court to welcome the princess.* And 2,000 chiefs of tribes brought in, as tribute, 20,000 horses and 1,000 camels. Never before had a delegation from any of the barbarian states to China been as large as this one. There was a proclamation allowing 500 of them to come to Ch'ang-an and detaining the rest in T'ai-yüan, and one ordering [1/7/821 TCTC] the Princess of T'ai-ho to go out [and be the khaghan's wife]. The

* Parallel text also, p.116.
The Grand General of the Left Chin-wu Guards, Hu Cheng,262 acting as the Honorary President of the Ministry of Finance and bearing his emblems of office, carried out the office of the Commissioner Who Escorts the Princess into Uighur Territory and Who Gives the Khaghan his Appointment [appointed 2/7/821 TFYK 979]. The President of the Court of Imperial Banquets, Li Hsien,263 was promoted to hold, concurrently with his own office, that of Vice President of the Censorate and also to carry out the office of Deputy Commissioner. The Doctor of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices, Yin Yu, was transferred to the post of Censor of the Court of Palace Affairs and carried out the office of Assistant.

The Tibetans were making incursions [9/7/821 TCTC] into the Minor Fortress of Ch’ing-sai because of the Uighurs’ marriage alliance.266 The Prefect of Yen-chou, Li Wen-yüeh,267 collected an army, routed and drove them out. The Uighurs sent up a memorial [16/7/821 TCTC] saying, ‘Ten thousand of our cavalry have gone out to Pei-t’ing, and ten thousand of our cavalry have gone out to An-hsi. We [plan to] push back the Tibetans in order to welcome the Princess of T’ai-ho and to bring her to our country.’

The same month (4/6-2/7/821), the emperor gave orders [1/7/821 TCTC] for the Princess of T’ai-ho to go out to marry the Uighur khaghan and ordained that it was proper to set up especially for her an establishment of officials corresponding to those of a royal prince’s.

Ever since the death of the Princess of Hsien-an, the Uighurs had often returned to court and sincerely begged that the emperor should continue his former good relations with them [through a marriage alliance], but for a long time he had not granted the request. Their petitions had become increasingly pressing until the end of Yüan-ho (806-21), when Hsien-tsung, because the northern barbarians had rendered very notable service to the imperial house, and because the Tibetans had in recent years caused worry on the borders, finally granted them a wife.268 Having granted the marriage, Hsien-tsung died [14/2/820 TCTC], and Mu-tsung ascended the throne [20/2/820 TCTC]. After a year he enfeoffed his tenth269 younger sister as the Princess of T’ai-ho and made ready to send her out to marry the Uighur [khaghan].

Teng-lo ku mo-mi-shih ho pi’i-chia Khaghan sent I-nan-chu, Governor-general Chü-lu and a Ssu-chieh270 and, apart from them, some chief ministers, one of his sons-in-law, some mei-lu271 and a superior administrator, Princess Chien and Princess Yeh-hu, and some ta-kan with more than 1,000 camels and horses to come to court to welcome the Princess of T’ai-ho and to bring her to the Uighur state.272*

* Parallel texts, p.114, 115.
princess was the daughter of Hsien-tsung. The emperor set up for her a [princess’s] establishment. The Grand General of the Left Chin-wu Guards, Hu Cheng,262 and the President of the Court of Imperial Banquets, Li Hsien,263 bearing their emblems of office, were to watch over her and to escort her, and the President of the Court of the Imperial Treasury, Li Yüeh,264 was to become the Commissioner for the Marriage Rites. They gave her appointment [22/8/821 TFYK 979] as ‘jen-hsiao tshan-li ming-chih shang-shou’265 Khatun. There was an announcement to this effect in the ancestral temples.
Mu-tsung attended at the left side of the T’ung-hua Gate [28/8/821 CTS 16]. All the escorting officials of the embassy stood according to rank in front of the Chang-ching Temple. Their emblems and insignia were very abundant. The men and women poured out of the city to watch.

In the eleventh month (29/11–27/12/821), the Military Governor of Chen-wu, Chang Wei-ch’ing, sent up a memorial [19/12/821 TFYK 979] saying that, of the 3,000 soldiers he was to send to Yu-chou according to the imperial edict, he had already sent out 1,000 and would send out the remaining 2,000 when the Princess of T’ai-ho had crossed the border. He also sent up a memorial to the effect that an official letter transmitted from T’ien-te said that 760 Uighurs, leading camels, horses, and chariots in a train, had arrived at the Huang-lu Springs to await and welcome the princess. The Prefect of Feng-chou, Li Yu, sent up a memorial saying that he had welcomed the Princess of T’ai-ho and 3,000 Uighurs below the Ch’ing Springs and had made plans to drive off the Tibetans.

In the second month of the second year (26/2–26/3/822), the emperor bestowed 50,000 pieces of silk on the Uighurs as a price for their horses and, in the third month (27/3–24/4/822), he again bestowed 70,000 pieces of silk on them as a price for their horses.

That month (27/3–24/4/822), P’ei Tu was demanding the submission of the rebels in Yu-chou and Chen-chou and punishing them. The Uighurs asked permission to follow Tu with an army in his fight to punish and suppress them. The court discussed the matter and [recalled that], when the Uighurs had retaken the two capitals at the beginning of Pao-ying (762–3), they had taken advantage of China’s debt to them for their meritorious service and had been overbearing, unrestrained and difficult to manage. Because of this, the court unanimously agreed that it was not possible. The emperor thereupon sent a eunuch ambassador to stop the Uighurs and to order them to return home. At this time they had already reached the northern border at Feng-chou and would not obey [the order]. The emperor issued a proclamation that 70,000 pieces of silken fabric be brought out and bestowed on them. Only then did they go home [18/4/822 TCTC].

In the fifth month (25/5–22/6/822), the emperor ordered an embassy to invest and set up Teng-lo ku mo-mi-shih ling p’i-chia ‘Li’ Khaghan. He sent the minor eunuch official T’ien Wu-feng to take the state seals and gifts loaded in twelve carriages, to go as ambassador to the Uighurs and to bestow [the gifts] on the khaghan and the Princess of T’ai-ho.*

* Parallel text, p.123.

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The Son of Heaven attended at the T'ung-hua Gate [28/8/821 CTS 16] to farewell the princess. Crowds of officials stood in order of rank and farewelled her along the road.

The princess crossed the border.
In the intercalary tenth month of the second year of Ch’ang-ch’ing (18/11–16/12/822), the Grand General of the Chin-wu Guards, Hu Cheng, the Deputy Ambassador and President of the Court of Imperial Banquets, Li Hsien, the Commissioner for the Marriage Rites and President of the Court of Imperial Insignia, Li Jui, the Deputy Ambassador and Vice President of the Court of the Imperial Clan, Li Tzu-hung, the Assistant, the Secretary of the Ministry of Forests, Chang Min, and the Doctor of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices, Yin Yu, having escorted the Princess of T’ai-ho, arrived back at the capital from Uighur territory.

They all said,

When the princess should still have had two nights to go before reaching the Uighur royal camp, the khaghan sent several hundred cavalry to come and beg that they could go ahead of the train with the princess by a different route. Hu Cheng said, 'It cannot be done.' The barbarian ambassadors said, 'Formerly when the Princess of Hsien-an came, she went ahead when she was several hundred li from the Hua Gate. Why do you now resist us?' Cheng said, 'Our Son of Heaven has proclaimed that we should escort the princess and hand her over to the khaghan. At present we have not yet seen the khaghan. How could it be fitting that we should let her go on ahead?' The barbarian ambassadors then desisted.

When we got to the barbarian court, we selected an auspicious day to give the princess her appointment as the Uighur khatun. The khaghan first ascended his tower and sat facing the east. He had had a large felt tent set up below the tower to house the princess, and sent a group of barbarian princesses to teach her barbarian customs. Not until then did the princess remove her T’ang clothing and put on barbarian clothes, for which an old woman waited on her. She came out in front of the tower and made an obeisance towards the west. The khaghan was sitting looking at her. The princess bowed down a second time and, when she had finished, she re-entered her felt tent. She removed what she had previously been wearing and put on the clothes of a khatun, a single-coloured robe and a large mantle, both crimson, and a golden decorated head-dress, pointed in front and straight behind. She came out to the tower and bowed down to the khaghan as in the first part of the ritual. The barbarians had set up a large sedan-chair with a curved screen in front of which they had arranged a small throne. Some ministers led the princess on to the sedan-chair. A minister of each of the nine clans of the Uighurs carried the sedan-chair and they followed the sun, turning to the right around the court nine times. Then the princess descended from the chair and went up the tower where she sat with the khaghan facing the east. From then on, whenever the ministers and the inferior courtiers made obeisance [to the khaghan], they bowed also to the khatun.

The khatun had her own royal camp and ordered that two ministers should
When she had reached within 100 li of the Uighur royal camp, the khaghan wanted the princess to go ahead of the train along a by-road so that he could see her privately. Hu Cheng forbade it. The barbarians said, 'Formerly the Princess of Hsien-an acted thus.' Cheng said, 'The Son of Heaven has proclaimed that we should escort the princess and hand her over to the khaghan. At present we have not yet seen him, and she cannot go on ahead.' They then desisted.

After that the khaghan ascended his tower and sat facing the east. Below he had set up a felt tent to house the princess, and he requested that she should wear barbarian clothing. A matron waited on her for this purpose. [The princess] came out, made an obeisance to the west and then withdrew. She dressed herself in the clothes of a khatun, a single-coloured, crimson robe and a large mantle. She wore a golden cap, pointed in the front and back. Again she came out and made an obeisance [to the khaghan] after which she mounted a sedan-chair with a curved screen. Nine ministers carried the chair to the right around the court nine times. When she got down from the chair, she ascended the tower and sat with the khaghan facing east. The ministers all presented themselves to the khatun in order [according to their rank]. She also set up her own royal camp and two of the ministers called on her regularly. When Cheng and the others were going home, the khatun gave them a great banquet and, sobbing with grief, treated them with special affection. The khaghan made generous presents to the ambassadors.
keep her frequent company in her tent. Cheng and we others were about to return home. The khatun gave us a banquet in her tent and wept bitterly. On the final day, the khaghan accordingly presented us Han ambassadors with generous presents.

In the first year of T’ai-ho (827), the emperor ordered a eunuch envoy to take 200,000 pieces of silk to the Court of Diplomatic Reception and to proclaim that it was a gift to the Uighurs as a price for their horses. In the first month of the third year (8/2–8/3/829), a eunuch envoy presented the Uighurs with 230,000 pieces of silk as a price for their horses.

In the third month of the seventh year (25/3–23/4/833), the Uighur, Li I-chieh, and others arrived at court bringing camels and horses and announced that the khaghan had died on the 27th day of the third month (20/4/833) and that his younger brother, Prince Sa, had been appointed as khaghan.291 The emperor suspended court for three days and ordered all civil and military officials of the third rank and above, and all officials of the Department of Affairs of State of the fourth rank and above to approach the Court of Diplomatic Reception and to condole with his envoys. The General of the Left Brave Guards and Viceroy of the Imperial City, T’ang Hung-shih, became General of [the] Chin-wu [Guards] and held concurrently with his own office that of President of the Censorate. Holding his emblems of office, he performed at the same time the function of Commissioner Who Enters the Uighur Court to Perform Condolence Sacrifices and Who Appoints and Sets Up [the New Khaghan].292

In the sixth month of the ninth year (30/6–28/7/835), [Uighur envoys] came to court. The Uighurs brought in seven women archers skilful on horseback and two Sha-t’o children, all presented by the Princess of T’ai-ho.293

At the beginning of K’ai-ch’eng (836–41), their minister, An Yün-ho,
At the time, P'ei Tu was involved in reducing Yu-chou and Chen-chou to order. The Uighurs sent Grand General Li I-chieh with 3,000 soldiers to help the Son of Heaven pacify Ho-pei. Those discussing the situation with the emperor wished to prevent a repetition of the previous disasters, so [the Uighurs'] help was refused. The soldiers had already reached Feng-chou, but an ambassador was sent to give them very generous presents and got them to leave.

The year that Ching-tsung ascended the throne (824) the khaghan died and his younger brother, Prince Ho-sa, ascended the throne. The emperor sent an embassy to give him appointment as Ai teng-li-lo ku mo-mi-shih ho p’i-chia 'Chao-li' Khaghan and bestowed on him twelve chariots of silken fabric.

At the beginning of his reign, Wen-tsung presented the Uighurs with 500,000 pieces of silk as a price for their horses.

In the sixth year of T'ai-ho (832), the khaghan was killed by his ministers, and his nephew, Prince Hu, ascended the throne. His ambassadors came to court to announce the fact. The following year (833), the emperor sent the General of the Left Brave Guards, T'ang Hung-shih, and the heir-designate of the Prince of Tse, Yung, holding their emblems of office, to give him appointment as Ai teng-li-lo ku mo-mi-shih ho chü-lu p’i-chia 'Chang-hsin' Khaghan.
together with the prince, Ch'ài-ts'ao, wanted to usurp Prince Sa Khaghan's power. Prince Sa Khaghan found out about it and killed Ch'ài-ts'ao and An Yün-ho. There was another Uighur minister, a certain Ch'üeh-lo-wu, who was keeping some soldiers outside and he, in resentment [against the khaghan] for having executed Ch'ài-ts'ao and An Yün-ho, killed Prince Sa Khaghan [839 HTS], and Prince Lu-chi became the khaghan.

There was a general, Chü-lu mo-ho, who fled because he hated Chüeh-lo-wu. At the head of 100,000 Kirghiz cavalry, he attacked the Uighur fortresses, killed Lu-chi, beheaded Chüeh-lo-wu, and burned and almost completely destroyed [the Uighur court]. The Uighurs scattered and fled all over the barbarian territory [840 TCTC].
In the fourth year of K’ai-ch’eng (839), his minister, Chüeh-lo-wu, made trouble by leading some Sha-t’o in an attack on the khaghan, who committed suicide. The people of his state set Prince Ho-sa on the throne as the khaghan. Just that year, there was a famine and pestilence, and also heavy snowfalls. Many of the sheep and horses died. The Chinese court had not yet issued an appointment. Wu-tsung ascended the throne [20/2/840 TCTC] and the heir-designate of the Prince of Tse, Yung, went to announce the fact to the Uighurs. He thus found out about the disorder of their state.

Before long, the great chief Chü-lu mo-ho, together with the Kirghiz, brought together 100,000 cavalry and attacked the Uighur fortresses, killed the khaghan, executed Chüeh-lo-wu and set fire to their royal camp [840 TCTC]. All the tribes were scattered.
Notes on the Translations

1 The Basmil were a Turkic tribe. The short notes on them in HTS 217B.9a–b remark that when they were defeated in 744 their chief A-shih-na Shih, who had shortly before been recognised as their khaghan by the Chinese emperor, fled to Pei-t'ing and later to Ch'ang-an. Their territory and the main body of their people were annexed by the Uighurs (cf. Chavannes, Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux, pp.85–6, translating the section on the Kharlukh in HTS 217B.8b–9a). This latter Turkic people had also assisted in the suppression of the Basmil, but an easterly splinter-group was soon after subjected to the Uighurs (Chavannes, p.86). For a short bibliography on the Kharlukh see Sinor, Introduction à l'étude de l'Eurasie Centrale, p.240.

2 The early section of CTS 195 (1a–3a) has been rendered into French by Chavannes (Documents, pp.87–94). His translation stops at this point.

3 'Huai-jen' means 'cherishing benevolence to the emperor' THY 98.1744 and TFYK 967.13a state, under 744, that the Uighur ruler called himself Ku-tu-lu p'i-ch'iu-ch'ueh Khaghan and, under 746, that the emperor appointed him as 'Huai-jen' Khaghan. TCTC 215.6860 places both facts under 744, but probably relied on a text which did not date the second separately, for example CTS. The present HTS text has also made a mistake about the date of the appointment. This is clear from the fact that events known from other sources to have taken place in 745 are dated simply 'the following year' just after the description of the appointment. The same comment can be made about WHTK 347.2718c which copies the first four paragraphs of HTS word for word. Compare also PIT 126.46aa which is based on HTS 217B.2b–3a.

4 The whole of the biography on the Uighurs in HTS has been translated into Russian, though without much commentary, by Father Iakinf Bichurin in his Sobranie svedenii o narodakh, obitavshikh v Srednei Azii v drevnie vremena, published originally in 1851. For the early section down to the point where my translation begins, see vol. I, pp.301–8, and for the empire period from 744–840, vol. I, pp.308–34. An even earlier translation was made, without annotation, into French by Bishop Claude Visdelou in the fourth volume of the Bibliotheque Orientale, published in 1779. That part of this chian dealing with the Uighurs before 744 is given on pp.128–32, and that describing their history for the period 744–840 on pp. 132–52.

5 The main work in a European language on T'ang administrative terms is des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires et Traité de l'armée, in which an enormous amount of information on the subject can be found. I refer the
reader to this extremely well indexed work for details on administrative terms occurring throughout the present study. A valuable summary on the structure of the T'ang official service can be found in des Rotours, *Le traité des examens*, pp.3–25.

6 Imperial orders were issued in various forms which differed according to the occasion and nature of the edict and were the responsibility of the Department of the Grand Imperial Secretariat. For details see des Rotours, *Traité des fonctionnaires*, pp.174ff. The kind used when a title was conferred on a foreign prince (or an empress or heir to the throne appointed) was called *ts'e-shu*. See *T'ang liu-tien* 9.3b. The diploma of appointment itself, however, was called *ts'e-ming*. In the present case the envoy is merely the delegate whose job it is to take the diploma of appointment from the emperor to the khaghan. From the Uighur point of view, 'appointment' by the Chinese emperor was no more than formal recognition, since the Uighurs certainly considered themselves an independent state.

7 *HTS* makes a mistake in placing Po-mei's death in the year following Ku-li p'ei-lo's appointment by the emperor (see n.3). Probably Tun Ch'o-lo ta-kan came to Ch'ang-an, among other purposes, to tell the emperor that the Uighur leader had assumed the title of khaghan and was laying territorial claims. The emperor would then give him a Chinese title, appoint him as khaghan, and recognise his territorial claims all on one occasion.

8 On the Eastern T'u-ch'üeh and other peoples who had been important powers in Mongolia in the period before 744 see especially Liu Mau-tsai, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten zur Geschichte der Ost-Türken (T'u-küe)* and Chavannes, *Documents*. The biographies of the Eastern T'ü-chüeh are given in *CTS* 194A.1a–17a and *HTS* 215A.3a–13b, 215B.1a–3a. These passages have been translated into German by Liu Mau-tsai in *Die chinesischen Nachrichten* (respectively pp.132–80 and pp.181–231). Further bibliography can be found in Sinor, *Introduction*, pp.234–9.

9 Under 26 April 745, *TFYK* 975.20b reports that the Uighur leader Ssu-li 息力 (mistake for Ku-li 骨力) p'ei-lo and his younger brother beheaded Po-mei (khaghan of the Eastern T'ü-chüeh) and sent the head to Ch'ang-an; the leader was given the rank of an Extramunary Grand General of the Right Brave Guards. The date clearly refers to the last event, since the Chinese historiographers would hardly have known the date of incidents in T'ü-chüeh or Uighur territory to the day. *TCTC* 215.6863 places Po-mei's death in the month 6/2–7/3/745 but does not date the passage specifically or mention that a rank was bestowed on Ku-li p'ei-lo. *TFYK* 971.15a reports Tun Ch'o-lo's arrival at court in the month 30/9–29/10/745. *HTS* has probably drawn this information either from *TFYK* or an earlier source on which *TFYK* itself relied, probably the *Hsian-tsung shih-lu*.

10 *THY* 98.1744 and *TFYK* 967.13a place P'ei-lo's death in 747. *TCTC* 215.6863 reports his death in 745 but does not date the passage specifically.
Perhaps the author did not know the date but wanted to include the information of the khaghan’s death and his son’s accession. The Shine-usu Inscription implies that Ku-li p‘ei-lo lived until the ‘year of the pig’ (747), but died either in that year or shortly after. See Ramstedt, ‘Zwei uigurische runeninschriften in der Nord-Mongolei’, pp.16, 48.

Much more of Mo-yen-ch’o’s career can be learnt from the Shine-usu gravestone inscription, which has been translated, insofar as it is still decipherable, by Ramstedt (pp.12–37). The text describes how Mo-yen-ch’o organised the empire, brought surrounding tribes to submission, and completed the subjugation of the Basmil and Kharlukh. There is also mention of a city built on his orders on the Selenga by Chinese and Sogdians (pp.35, 62).

The first two sentences of this paragraph are almost identical in wording to a passage in THY 98.1744. Its source must have been either THY or the work copied by THY.

An Lu-shan (biographies CTS 200A.1a–4a, HTS 225A.1a–5b) was the leader of the most important rebellion in the history of the T’ang. On the background and sources for the rebellion and for An Lu-shan’s life until 752 see particularly Pulleyblank, The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan. The biography in CTS 200A of Lu-shan and his son Ch‘ing-hsü has been translated with notes by Levy (Biography of An Lu-shan, pp.31–92). A short summary of An Lu-shan’s life is given in des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, pp.712–14. For the whole life and rebellion of An Lu-shan see especially des Rotours, Histoire de Ngan Lou-chan, where the An Lu-shan shih-chi is translated (pp.1–355) with copious annotation. The general history of the period is covered by Franke in Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches, vol. II, pp.428ff.

Li Ch‘eng-shen (d.758) was the great-grandson of the Emperor Kao-tsung. He was the son of Li Shou-li, Prince of Pin, who was the son of Li Hsien, son of Kao-tsung. See HTS 70B.36a. Su-tsung was also the great-grandson of Kao-tsung, but through a different line. He and Ch‘eng-shen were thus second cousins. See Li Ch‘eng-shen’s biography in CTS 86.7b and HTS 81.5a.

Li’s ming is given as Ch‘eng-shen 緾 in some texts and as Ch‘eng-ts’ai 緾 in others. The Po-na edition of CTS and HTS gives Ch‘eng-shen throughout except in HTS 70B.36a. The Palace edition of 1739 sometimes gives Ch‘eng-shen (for instance CTS 86.12b, 195.4b; HTS 70B.36b, 217A.5a) and sometimes Ch‘eng-ts’ai (CTS 10.9b; HTS 81.7b). The SPPY edition regularly writes Ch‘eng-ts’ai (for instance, CTS 10.5b, 86.7a, 195.3a; HTS 70B.31a, 81.4b, 217A.3a). TCTC 218.6998 and WHTK 347.2719a write Ch‘eng-ts’ai, while PIT 126.46ab (quoting HTS 217A) and TFYK 979.14a–b write Ch‘eng-shen.

The term for ‘royal camp’ here is ya, which is used interchangeably with
ya-chang in this chapter to denote the headquarters of the khaghan either at his court in Karabalghasun or on expedition. See also Hamilton, Les Ouighours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties, p.27. The significance of the term ya is explained by des Rotours in Traité des fonctionnaires, pp.224-6.

The P’u-ku was one of the nine T’ieh-le tribes of the Uighur confederation. See Pulleyblank, ‘Some Remarks on the Toquzoghuz Problem’, p.39; Hamilton, ‘Toquz-Oyuz et On-Uyur’, p.45. P’u-ku Huai-en, who served the T’ang faithfully against the An Lu-shan rebellion but later led a revolt himself, was descended from the ruling family of this tribe. According to the biography of the P’u-ku (HTS 217.7b), he was the son of the P’u-ku chief Ko-Lan-pa-yen, but the biographies of Huai-en in both the standard T’ang histories (CTS 121.1a and HTS 224.1a) claim that Ko-lan-pa-yen was the father of I-li-ch’o, himself the father of Huai-en. According to this more detailed version, Huai-en was the grandson of Ko-lan-pa-yen. See also Nien-erh shih k’ao-i 56.958 and Hsin Chiu T’ang-shu hu-cheng 19.329-30.

The office of Military Governor of Shuo-fang was set up by imperial order on 29 October 713 (THY 78.1425). The headquarters of its incumbent lay in Ling-chou. He had some 64,700 men under his control and their job was to defend the empire against foreign invasion (YHCHTC 4.92). See also des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, p.798 and ‘Les grands fonctionnaires des provinces en Chine sous la dynastie des T’ang’, pp.291–2.

Kuo Tzu-i (697–781, biographies CTS 120.1a–12b and HTS 137.1a–7b) was the most important of the Chinese generals of this period. He rendered invaluable assistance to the imperial court during the An Lu-shan rebellion and was largely responsible for its successful suppression. He also served against the Tibetans. He expelled them from Ch’ang-an when they occupied it in 763, and in 765 repulsed a Tibetan invasion. In 762 he received the title of Prefectural Prince of Fen-yang and in 768 became a chief minister. He was thus one of the highest officials in the empire. An outline of his career is given by des Rotours in Traité des fonctionnaires, p.853.

The T’ung-lo were one of the nine T’ieh-le tribes that made up the Uighur confederation (see Pulleyblank, ‘Some Remarks’, p.39). Consequently, the main body of the people was probably allied to the Chinese government. However, there were groups of dissenters who had joined the rebellion (cf. des Rotours, Histoire, pp.167, 248, translating An Lu-shan shih-chi 2.7a, 3.5a, and introduction above). The particular T’ung-lo group mentioned here had deserted the rebellion and left Ch’ang-an for the north. They then invaded Shensi and thus posed a threat to Su-tsung. See Pulleyblank, ‘A Sogdian Colony in Inner Mongolia’, p.341.

TCTC 219.7007 and a following note (TCTCYC 219.7007) enable us to place this battle more precisely, north of Sheng-chou.

The Hu-yen Valley was eighty li east of Hei-shan, which lay due north of
the Middle Shou-hsiang Fortress (TCTCYC 202.6393). See map 2, 1A. On the wolf pennons see Feng Chia-sheng, and others, Wei-tou-erh tsu shih-liao chien-pien, vol. I, p.36.

22 Ko-lo-chih was one of the generals sent by the Uighur khaghan to help China against the rebels. The news of his arrival in Fan-yang with an army of 2,000 men and his march towards T’ai-yüan had caused Yin Tzu-ch’i, one of An Lu-shan’s generals (An Lu-shan shih-chi 1.15b; des Rotours, Histoire, p.106) to give up plans of making military gains in south China and come to the rescue of T’ai-yüan (TCTC 219.7006-7; CTS 200A.7b; Haneda Töru, ‘Tödai Kaikotsushi no kenkyü’, p.195).

23 To-lan was the name of a T’ieh-le tribe (see Hamilton, Les Ouighours, p.1). This man may have been a member of this clan. The name To-lan is not, however, listed among the nine T’ieh-le tribes which made up the confederation of the Uighurs. See Pulleyblank, ‘Some Remarks’, pp.39ff.

24 Yeh-hu was the transcription of a Turkic title, yab’tu. See Hamilton, Les Ouighours, p.102. Chinese sources call this particular yeh-hu simply Yeh-hu or the ye-hu, and I shall refer to him throughout as Yeh-hu.

25 The Prince of Kuang-p’ing was Li Shu, the eldest son of Su-tsung and the future Tai-tsung. See CTS 11.1a and des Rotours, Histoire, p.296.

26 Fu-feng (map 2, 1B) was the name of a commandery from 1 March 742 to 27 August 756, when it was renamed Feng-hsiang. It was given the status of a superior prefecture (as shown in map 2) on 28 January 758. See THY 68.1191 and des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, p.683. At the time of the banquet mentioned above it was therefore called Feng-hsiang, not Fu-feng. However, one of the fourteen subprefectures was called Fu-feng. See YHCHTC 2.37–40.

27 A hu and a shih of grain were equal in T’ang times. However, a hu was a measure of capacity being equal to 103.54 litres or approximately 23 English gallons, while a shih was a measure of weight being equal to 72.544 kilogrammes or approximately 160 English pounds. See Balázs, ‘Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte der T’ang-Zeit (618–906)’, p.44.

28 One li was approximately equal to 540 metres or a third of an English mile (ibid., p.43; Pulleyblank, Background, p.227).

29 The Hsiang-chi Temple, founded in 706, was not far south of Ch’ang-an. See map 4 and also des Rotours, Histoire, p.295.

30 The text here does not bring out the decisiveness of the actions of P’u-ku Huai-en and the Uighurs. The imperial forces had been facing north towards the city with Li Ssu-yeh in charge of the forward guard, Kuo Tzu-i of the central, and Wang Ssu-li of the rear guard. The rebels advanced from the north just outside the city and the government forces were thrown into confusion. Li Ssu-yeh kept up the morale of his men by his personal bravery. It was in these circumstances that the rebels attempted a decisive action by bringing up the light infantry referred to above in CTS. See
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TCTC 220.7033. Li Ssu-yeh's biographies are found in CTS 109. 7a–9a and HTS 138.1a–2a. He was one of the nine military governors mentioned below in n. 65 and died in 759 following a wound contracted at the Battle of Hsiang-chou, on which see introduction. Wang Ssu-li's biographies are given in CTS 110.6b–7b and HTS 147.1a–2a, and his career is outlined in des Rotours, Histoire, pp.211–12. He too was one of the nine military governors and his army was, apart from Li Kuang-pi's, the only one of the nine not routed at the Battle of Hsiang-chou. He died of natural causes in 761.

31 TCTC 220.7040, like the present HTS text, leaves the initial Chü out of this title. However, according to Chavannes ('Notes additionnelles sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux', p.29), chü-pi-shih was a common word in the titles of Turkic princes. CTS's version of the name is therefore probably correct.

32 The reading p'ei-fu 布 in CTS (Po-na edition) is a mistake. The Palace edition (CTS 195.5b) and the SPPY (p.3b) give p'ei-lo 翁. HTS and TCTC 220.7040 support this version. See also PIT 126.46ab. P'ei-lo was the transcription of a Turkish title (Hamilton, Les Ouighours, p. 139).

33 TCTCI 220.7040–1 compares the dates given in various sources for the Battle of Hsin-tien (map 3) and the re-entry of the government forces into Lo-yang. FYCC gives 19 November for the battle and 23 November for the re-entry and these dates are supported by the basic annals of HTS (6.3a). The Nien-tai chi gives 30 November for the battle and the basic annals of CTS (10.6a) 3 December for the re-entry. The Shih-lu (presumably the Su-tsung shih-lu) gives no date for the battle but claims that Shan-chou (near Hsin-tien) was reoccupied on 3 December. Ssu-ma Kuang accepts the dates of the Nien-tai chi and Hsing-Shu chi (which he has not previously mentioned in the section), that is 30 November for the battle and 3 December for the re-entry. This seems plausible since the dates given by FYCC and HTS 6 would leave only five days between the reoccupation of Ch’ang-an, after the Battle of Hsiang-chi, and the Battle of Hsin-tien. See also des Rotours, Histoire, p.296, and Levy, Biography, p.84.

34 An Ch’ing-hsü (biographies CTS 200A.4a–5b and HTS 225A.5b–7a) was the second son of An Lu-shan. When the latter was assassinated on 29 January 757, leadership of the rebellion fell to Ch’ing-hsü with Yen Chuang among his chief advisers and supporters. After the Battle of Hsin-tien most of the rebels, including Yen Chuang, surrendered. Only 1,300 exhausted troops still followed Ch’ing-hsü and his resistance petered out. He died in April 759. Some say he was strangled, others that he was allowed to commit suicide. See Levy, Biography, p.91, for various versions and compare des Rotours, Histoire, p.317. It may be added that An Ch’ing-hsü had been in Lo-yang throughout the preceding months. The present texts on the Uighurs do not make the mistake of HTS 6.3a in claiming that An
Ch'ing-hsü had fought personally at the Feng River (map 3). Other examples of similar errors suggesting Ch'ing-hsü's omnipresence could be cited. See Nien-erh shih cha-chi 16.13a–14a and Levy, Biography, pp.22–3.

TCTCKI 220.7040 quotes the Shih-lu to the effect that An Ch'ing-hsii abandoned Lo-yang on 1 December. It is interesting to note that the passage of the Su-tsung shih-lu here given is strikingly similar in wording to the parallel sections of the CTS text translated above, which is clearly based on the Shih-lu. Probably the part of the CTS Uighur biography covering Su-tsung's reign is derived from that work. Compare Pulleyblank, Background, pp.3–5, where it is demonstrated that CTS 200A is based almost entirely on the Su-tsung shih-lu.

See the details of this incident in the introduction above, p. 20.

TCTC 220.7043 places Yeh-hu's return to Ch'ang-an in the tenth month rather than the eleventh. CTS is clearly mistaken since there is no day kuei-yu for the eleventh month. The day kuei-yu of the tenth month corresponds to 14 December 757. See Takeo Hiraoka, Tōdai no koyomi, pp. 173–4.

This edict is contained also in TTCLC 128.690–1. There are slight discrepancies between the two versions. Those that affect the meaning will be pointed out below. CTW 42.4a–b contains the edict, and although there are very slight divergencies in language from CTS, there is none in meaning.

TTCLC reads chih 志 'determination' instead of i 義 'righteousness'.

This is a quotation from the Tso-chuan, the tenth year of Duke Chuang. The Chinese is a four-character phrase running i-ku tso-ch'i — (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. V, pp.85, 86).

TTCLC reads pai-wan 百萬 instead of wan-li 萬里. The text would then read 'with myriad forces he defeated the enemy'.

TTCLC reads thirty days instead of twenty, being actually closer to the truth.

A Director of Public Works was a chief minister and was first rank, first grade. See des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, pp.19–20. To give so exalted a title to the Uighur prince was consequently an extremely high honour.

Chung-i means 'loyal and righteous'.

TFYK 971.20a (translated in Chavannes, 'Notes additionnelles', p.94) has a parallel text, in which the Uighur ambassador is called To-i-hai 多乙亥 a-po, and the Arab chief Nao-wen 阿文 instead of Ko-chih 開之. Chavannes writes that he suspects the i-hai in the Uighur ambassador's name to be the cyclic designation, since the day jen-shen, which is given in the text as the first of the month, is in fact the ninth. However, according to Takeo Hiraoka, Koyomi, p.174, the day jen-shen is indeed the first of the month.

The Abbasid Caliphate, which ended with the fall of its capital Baghdad
to the Mongols in 1258, had only shortly before been founded (750). See a short bibliography on the dynasty in von Grunebaum, *Classical Islam*, pp.211–12, 215. A brief account of its early history is given pp.80–98. According to the standard histories (*CTS* 198.17b, *HTS* 221B.12a) the Abbasids had sent an embassy to court ‘to render tribute’ at the beginning of the Chih-te period (756–8). Arab forces assisted in the battles against the An Lu-shan rebellion and the mission no doubt discussed the question of military support for the T’ang government. Of course, the Abbasids did not consider their embassies to China as the bearers of ‘tribute’. Indeed, during the reign of Mahdi (775–85), missions were sent to various countries, including China, to demand tokens of submission. See Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, pp.201–2.

47 The job of these visitors’ and audience officials, of whom there were sixteen, was to bring those people who were to have audience with the emperor into the imperial presence and hand over any tribute brought (*Tang liu-tien* 9.7a–b; des Rotours, *Traité des fonctionnaires*, pp.187–8). The formalities involved in such audiences were extremely complicated. They are described in the *K’ai-yüan lî* (quoted in *TT* 131.685c–6a) and summarised by Liu Mau-tsai in *Die chinesischen Nachrichten*, pp.422–3. The emperor sat in a specially arranged tent at the north wall of the hall where he happened to be staying. Since it is not clear precisely where the audience mentioned in the text above took place, the gates cannot be identified.

48 The day *wu-hsü* does not exist for the sixth month. *TFYK* 976.2a reports this incident on the day *wu-hsü* of the fifth month, which corresponds to 7 July 758. See Takeo Hiraoka, *Koyomi*, p.174.

49 The Ch’ing scholar Chao Shao-tsu (1752–1833) criticises the T’ang histories for calling the Princess of Ning-kuo ‘a young daughter’ (*yu-nü* 幼女). He points out that the biographies of the princesses in *HTS* (83.11a) list her second among Su-tsung’s seven daughters and record that she had been married twice before being given to the khaghan. According to *THY* (6.65) her second marriage was to the Uighur ruler and Chao accepts this in preference to *HTS*, but even so she could hardly be called ‘a young daughter’. See *Hsin Chiu T’ang-shu hu-cheng* 19.329.

50 The complicated ritual whereby princesses were appointed as brides for foreign dignitaries is described in *K’ai-yüan lî* (quoted in *TT* 129.677a–b). The edict in which Su-tsung enfeoffed his second daughter and sent her out to marry the khaghan is preserved in *CTW* 42.4b–5b.

51 According to the genealogy in *HTS* 70B, Li Yü was the Prefectural Prince of Han-chung (p.39b), the son of Li Hsien (p.37b), and the grandson through this man of Emperor Jui-tsung. Li Yü was thus the first cousin of Su-tsung, for the latter was also the grandson of Jui-tsung. Li Yü’s biographies are given in *CTS* 95.4b and *HTS* 81.9a. According to the latter, he
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was an intensely musical man.

52 Ying-wu wei-yüan means 'brave and warlike, aweing the distant lands'.

53 According to HTS 70B.35b, Li Sun was the son of Li Ch'i-ju. The latter was the son of Li Su-chieh (p.35a), who was the son of Kao-tsung (p.34a) and hence the brother of Ju-i-tsung. Sun was consequently the second cousin, not the nephew, both of Li Yu and Su-tsung, for all three men were great-grandsons of Kao-tsung through different lines.

54 The diploma of appointment is included in TTCLC 129.696 and CTW 367.13a–b. It is dated the month 16/12/757–13/1/758, that is a few months before it was issued, and was written by Chia Chih (718–72), whose biographies are given in CTS 190B.12a–13b and HTS 119.3a–4a, being summarised by des Rotours in Le traité des examens, p.176. At this time Chia was a Secretary of the Department of the Grand Imperial Secretariat. One of the jobs of such people was to edit the rough drafts of diplomas and other imperial documents. See des Rotours, Traités des fonctionnaires, p.180.

55 The Heavenly Khaghan was of course the Chinese emperor. According to CTS 3.1a ‘from then [19/5/630] on, the north-western barbarians all asked the emperor to honour himself with the title of “Heavenly Khaghan”’. See also Liu Mau-tsai, Die chinesischen Nachrichten, p.241. Though the phrase was frequently applied to the emperor, it was also used by the Uighurs to refer to their own khagans (cf. Pelliot, ‘Neuf notes sur der questions d’Asie Centrale’, p.241 and below, appendix A (i)).

56 See also the research of Kuang P’ing-chang (‘T’ang-tai kung-chu ho-ch’in k’ao’, pp.23–49), which confirms that the Princess of Ning-kuo was the first daughter of a T’ang emperor to be married to a foreign ruler.

57 The term ‘jade daughter’ (yü-nü 玉女) in HTS could be a reference to the Li-chi (book XXII, section 4): ‘Hence the language of a ruler, when about to marry a wife, was:— “I beg you, O ruler, to give me your elegant daughter [yü-nü], to share this small state with my poor self . . . ”’ (I have followed Legge’s translation in Li Chi, Book of Rites, vol. II, p.238). However, some editions (for instance Palace, HTS 217A.7a and SPPY, p.4a) give sheng-nü 生女 instead of yü-nü. This would mean ‘flesh-and-blood daughter’ and, in view of the parallel text in CTS, makes better sense than ‘jade daughter’.

58 Li Yu’s outburst has been translated into French in Demiéville, Le concile de Lhasa, p.6.

59 The text here translated ‘100 pieces of sable fur’ runs tiao-ch’iu pai-tieh 韞裘百疊. However, some editions write tiao-ch’iu po-tieh 白鷇, which is the same as the HTS text. They include the Palace (CTS 195.7b) and SPPY (p.4b). See also CTSCKC 65.8b. It may be added that the particular type of cotton called tieh was one of the usual items of Uighur tribute to the Chinese court in the tenth century. See Hamilton and Beldiceanu, ‘Recherches autour de gars, nom d’une étoffe de poil’, pp.332–3. A reference given by Müller in ‘Uigurica II’, p.70 suggests that it was customary to write
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upon po-tieh. For further discussion on it see Stein, *Innermost Asia*, vol. II, p. 579.

This word translated 'Prince' is t'ë-le, a transcription of a Turkic title, tegin, applied among the T'u-chüeh to the sons and brothers of the khaghan. See *TT* 197.1068a, translated in Liu Mau-tsai, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten*, p.498. The known cases of t'ë-le among the Uighurs of the period of the present study were also close relations of the khaghan. In the dynastic histories, the forms t'ë-le, t'ë-ch'in, and t'ë-ch'ën are interchangeable as transcriptions of tegin. For discussion of these and other Chinese renderings of the title, see ibid., pp.496–8; Hamilton, *Les Ouigours*, p.156; Pelliot, 'Neuf notes', p.255.

The rebellion did not collapse entirely after the recapture of the two capitals by the government forces. The Battle of Hsiang-chou (map 2, 2B) was one of the most important of all the rebel victories. Shortly after the battle, which was fought on 7 April 759, the victorious rebel general, Shih Ssu-ming, brought about the death of An Ch'ing-hsü and took command of the rebellion. On 22 April 761, Ssu-ming's son Ch'ao-i, who had been beaten in an encounter with imperial troops, assassinated his father to escape the consequences of his fury. Ch'ao-i then took the title of the emperor and assassinated his brothers. It was not until his suicide in 763 that the great rebellion was finally over.


The Kirghiz lived at this time on the Upper Yenisei. They later came south and were responsible for the fall of the Uighur empire. See *HTS* 217B.10b–13a and Radloff, *Die alttürkischen Inschriften der Mongolei*, pp.425–6. A bibliography on the Kirghiz can be found in Sinor, *Introduction*, pp.246–8. *CTS* has actually written 'the day chia-wu of the twelfth month', a day which does not exist. *TFYK* 976.2b and *TFYK* 979.16a give this date as the day chia-tzu of the eleventh month. This day does not exist either. However, the day chia-tzu of the twelfth month is 29 January 759, and the day chia-wu of the eleventh month is 30 December 758 (Takeo Hiraoka, *Koyomi*, p.175). The Chinese texts, especially *TFYK*, frequently confuse tzu 子 with wu 午 in their cyclical dates.

*CTS* 10.9b records that, on 27 October 758, Su-tsung set up an army under the command of nine military governors for the specific purpose of defeating An Ch'ing-hsü, who was then in Hsiang-shou. The nine are listed there. I refer the reader to des Rotours, *Traité des fonctionnaires*, p.824, where the
passage in question is translated. The army contained 200,000 men and was
led by Kuo Tzu-i, who was in fact one of the nine.

For more details on the Battle of Hsiang-chou see An Lu-shan shih-chi
forces began at a disadvantage since there was no agreement on strategy
between their leaders Li Kuang-pi and Kuo Tzu-i. A dust storm blew up
and completed the confusion. The biographies of Li Kuang-pi (708–64)
can be found in CTS 110.1a–6b and HTS 136.1a–4b, and his career is
outlined by des Rotours in Traité des fonctionnaires, p.823. See also Franke,

The day jen-tzu of the third month, given for this event also in TFYK
973.17a, does not exist. TCTC 221.7072 records that the Uighurs returned
to the capital on 19 April.

P’i-chia ch’üeh Khaghan, named here in CTS, was in fact the title of the
first ruler Ku-li p’ei-lo (744–7). CTS does not mention that the first khaghan
died in 747 nor does it record the accession of Mo-yen-ch’o. The editor of
the Uighur biography of CTS seems thus to have been under the impression
that only one khaghan had ruled from 744 to 759. However, this can be
shown to be untrue from THY 98.1744–5 and TFYK 967.13a, both of which
record the death of Ku-li p’ei-lo in 747 (see also n.10 above) and THY that
of his successor in 759. Teng-li and Yeh-hu were thus the sons of Mo-yen-
ch’o, not of Ku-li p’ei-lo. See also Haneda Töru, ‘Kaikotsushi no kenkyü’,
p. 192–3.

The date given here for the khaghan’s death (2–30/5/759) is supported
in THY 98.1745. However, it was probably at that time that the Chinese
court learned that the Uighur khaghan had died, and his death had no
doubt occurred shortly before. See below appendix B (ii).

TCTCYC 221.7076 describes the mourning ceremony for the dead among
peoples north of the Gobi. The body was placed in a tent. The members of
the dead man’s family each killed an ox and a horse which were then
arranged in front of the tent and sacrificed. The mourners went round the
tent on horseback seven times, after which they went up to the entrance of
the tent. There they slashed their faces with a knife. This was done seven
times. A passage in TFYK gives a description of mourning ceremonies for
a khaghan among the T’u-chüeh. The first section is almost identical in
wording to that given by Hu San-hsing, who must have copied from TFYK
or its source. TFYK goes on to report that the mourners selected an
appropriate day and burned the corpse together with the horse and other
things the dead man used when alive. Later on they buried the ashes in a
pit. On the same day the earlier ceremony described also by Hu San-hsing
was repeated. A stone was set up saying how many men the dead ruler had
killed during his life and the heads of the sacrificed animals were all hung on
the top of poles (TFYK 961.21a–b). These customs were probably followed
also among the Uighurs and it is interesting to note that upon the death of P'u-ku Huai-en, who was of T'ieh-le extraction (see above, n.16), his body was cremated before burial (CTS 121.8b). According to archaeological evidence, it was the custom to bury the horse and other possessions with the corpses not only of khagans but of other Uighurs as well. See Kyzlasov, *Istoriia Tuvy v srednie veka*, pp.65ff, where finds from Uighur graves are discussed in detail. However, it may be remarked that the customs prevailing among the Kao-ch'e ancestors of the Uighurs during the Wei dynasty (386–534) were somewhat different. According to the *Wei-shu* (103.28a), a large hole was dug and the corpse placed within it in a sitting position; it was then fitted with a bow, knife, and spear, just as if the man were still alive, and the mourners rode on horseback around the still open pit. See also Li Fu-t'ung, *Hui-hu shih*, pp.180–1; and especially Jaworski, ‘Quelques remarques sur les coutumes funéraires turques d'après les sources chinoises’, pp.255–61 and the following ‘Remarques complémentaires’ by Kotwicz (pp.261–6) in which further bibliography is cited. The slashing of the face among the Uighurs appears to have been a symbol of loyalty, which could be used on occasions other than to mourn for a dead khaghan. In his poem ‘Ai wang-sun’, Tu Fu remarks that when the Uighurs (whom he calls Hua-men) agreed to help China against the An Lu-shan rebellion in 756, they ‘slashed their faces to swear they will avenge our wrong’. See *TKPS* 9.1a–2b. The poem has been translated into German by von Zach in *Tu Fu's Gedichte*, pp.85–6 and into English by William Hung in *Tu Fu*, vol. I, pp.101–2. I have followed Hung’s translation. Further renderings of this and other poems by Tu Fu are noted by Hung and von Zach, and it is unnecessary to detail them here.

The princess arrived in Ch'ang-an on 18 September 759 (*TCTC* 221.7080). Tu Fu wrote a poem called ‘Chi-shih’ shortly afterwards commenting on the event. It runs in William Hung’s translation (*Tu Fu*, vol. I, p.146):

> We hear that even the Uighurs [Hua-men] were defeated [a reference to the Battle of Hsiang-chou]; So the marriage alliance did not turn out to be advantageous. We pity the princess of our august Court Who is barely able to cross the river and return alive. In these dreary autumn days, she no longer dresses her hair in a chignon And has grown so thin that her fine clothes hang loose about her. The hordes of rebels are still demanding battle. Amazing, so many of our hopes have come to nought.

The poem can be found in *TKPS* 15.9a–b and has been translated into German by von Zach in *Tu Fu's Gedichte*, p.181.

The gate here called Ming-feng 明 鳳 was normally called the Tan-feng 丹 鳳 Gate. The name was changed to Ming-feng in 758, but shortly after changed back again (*Ch'ang-an chih* 6.6b). Its position is shown on map 6. *TFYK* 979.16a records an embassy, apparently led by the same man, in the month 23/1–21/2/760. Moreover, *TFYK* 976.3a reports that on 22
April, seventy-four men, including Chü-lu mo-ho ta-kan, were given audience with the emperor. Clearly, the embassy had actually been sent by the khaghan some time earlier and the date given here in CTS was that of one of its arrivals at court from its place of residence in Ch'ang-an, not of its despatch from Karabalghasun.

73 CTS has omitted the character ho from Chü-lu mo-ho ta-kan’s title by mistake. Mo-ho was the Chinese transcription of the Turkish title ba’ra. See Hamilton, Les Ouighours, p.147.

74 The day wu-ch’en of the eleventh month does not exist. However, there is a day wu-ch’en for the twelfth (22 January 761, Takeo Hiraoka, Koyomi, p.177) and CTS must have written eleventh rather than twelfth by mistake.

75 Four audiences given by the emperor to Uighurs in the Yen-ying Hall in 760-1 are noted in the sources. Their dates are 22 April and 5 October 760 (TFYK 976.3a) and 10 November 760 and 22 January 761. See also Mackerras, ‘Sino-Uighur Diplomatic and Trade Contacts’, pp.224-5.

76 Ho-Lo is the territory between the Yellow River and its tributary, the Lo. See map 4. On Liu Ch’ing-t’an see below, n.137.

77 Two emperors had died within a fortnight of each other not long before. Hsüan-tsung died on 3 May 762 (TCTC 222.7123) and Su-tsung on 16 May (TCTC 222.7124).

78 The deplorable state of the empire on Tai-tsung’s accession is outlined by Franke in Geschichte, vol. II, pp.463-4. Eunuchs had become all-powerful at court and the military governors in the provinces become virtually independent of the central government (see also des Rotours, ‘Les grands fonctionnaires’, pp.305-14). The continuing rebellion begun by An Lu-shan and the threat of invasion by the Uighurs added to the new emperor’s worries.

79 The Three Fortresses were the West, Middle, and East Shou-hsiang Fortresses. They were set up in 711 to defend the empire against the T’u-chüeh. See des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, pp.796-7. Their positions are shown in map 2, 1A, 2A.

80 The object of the beacon-towers was to give the alarm in case of invasion. Texts have been collected on them by Chavannes in Les documents chinois découverts par Aurel Stein, pp.xi-xiii.

81 Shan-yü Protectorate (see position map 2, 2A) was the seat of the Chen-wu Army which comprised 9,000 men and 1,600 horses (YHCHTC 4.92). See also des Rotours, ‘Les grands fonctionnaires’, pp.255-7.

82 Pi-chia chüeh Khaghan was the title of Ku-li p’e-i-lo. CTS has made a mistake, since the current khaghan was the son of Mo-yen-ch’o. See above n.68.

83 The various routes proposed in this passage can be traced from maps 2 and 4.

84 The rebels under Shih Ssu-ming captured Lo-yang once again on 7 June 760. See des Rotours, Histoire, p.332.
85 A note to the geographical monograph of HTS calls this ford Ta-yang 太陽 rather than T'ai-yang 太陽. The note goes on to say that the name Shan Ford was also used and that a pontoon bridge was built at the ford in 637. See HTS 38.2b. YHCHTC 6.167, which calls the ford T'ai-yang, adds that the bridge was 76 chang long and 2 chang wide. One chang was about 3 metres (10 English feet). See Balázs, 'Beiträge', p.43.

86 The T'ai-yüan Granary (see position map 3) was among the six great granaries of the empire's metropolitan regions. In 749 it contained 28,140 shih of grain. The relative quantities of grain in the six in that year are given in TT 12.71a and tabulated by Twitchett in Financial Administration under the T'ang Dynasty, p.192. He adds that the stocks were at the immediate disposal of military forces dependent on the central power. On p.85 he has given a chart in which the granaries in the region of Ch'ang-an and Lo-yang are shown. It may be noted for comparison that the reserves in the T'ai-yüan Granary were minute compared with the 5,833,400 shih in the Han-chia Granary in Lo-yang.

87 Li Kua, the Prince of Yung, was the eldest son of Tai-tsung and the future Emperor Te-tsung. See CTS 12.1a and des Rotours, Histoire, p.349.

88 There are no biographies in CTS or HTS for Wei Chü, Wei Shao-hua or Li Chin and I am unable to supply further information about them, except that TFYK 997.13a calls Wei Chü a 'former Military Governor of Shuo-fang'.

89 TCTC 222.7133 specifies the khaghan's camping place as Ho-pei, which, according to a note in TCTCYC (222.7133), was a subprefecture of Shan-chou. It was situated just across the Yellow River from the city (see map 3). However, the name of the subprefecture was changed from Ho-pei to P'ing-lu in 742. See YHCHTC 6.170.

90 Li Kua was born on 27 May 742 (CTS 12.1a) and was thus only twenty years old at the time of the incident described.

91 TCTCKI 222.7133 quotes TTSL's version of the end of this story. There the phrasing is intended to leave the impression that it was the Uighurs who lost face, not the Prince of Yung. It runs: 'The Prince of Yung respectfully carried out the imperial edict. His words and expression were unyielding, and the barbarians did not dare to treat him but with respect. At the time the people blamed them. The officials and the army united to surround them and were about to punish them for their extreme discourtesy, but because of the expedition planned for the east, the prince stopped them.' Another passage of TTSL reads: 'The several tens of thousands of people there were terrified and lost colour, but the Prince of Yung maintained his composure and reprimanded them loudly; the khaghan then withdrew.' Clearly HTS has used TTSL since the information in the last sentence of the above HTS text, which closely resembles TTSL, is not included in CTS. Ssu-ma Kuang (TCTCKI 202.7133) has also quoted a sentence from the Chien-
chung shih-lu which reads that ‘the [future] emperor stood firm and did not yield’. Both these shih-lu evidently related the whole story of this incident (without which the passages quoted in TCTCKI would be meaningless) and the standard histories have probably drawn on one or both of them. TFYK 997.13a–b records the whole event almost word for word the same as the paragraph above in CTS and has obviously copied it or its source.

The parallel texts in P‘u-ku Huai-en’s biographies in CTS (121.3a) and HTS (224A.2b) read Huang-shui 黄水 instead of Heng-shui 橫水. However, the basic annals of CTS (11.3a) record that the battle was on the banks of the Heng-shui implying that it was in the northern suburbs of Lo-yang. See also TCTC (and TCTCYC) 222.7134, WHTK 347.2719b, and PIT 126.46bb. Although the Heng River is little known and the Huang (Yellow) River runs not far north of Lo-yang, the latter is never called shui, but always ho. The readings in CTS 121.3a and HTS 224A.2b are therefore incorrect. See also Hsin T‘ang-shu chiu-miu 20.224.

Further details of the Battle of the Heng River are given in the introduction, above, p. 25.

P‘u-ku Ch‘ang was the son of P‘u-ku Huai-en. There are scattered references to him in the standard history biographies of Huai-en (see above, n.16). He was murdered in 764, and it was this which finally drove Huai-en to revolt against the T‘ang (TCTC 223.7162).

TCTC 222.7139–40 states that, after his defeat, Ch‘ao-i killed himself in a forest (which a note in TCTCYC claims was north-east of Shih-ch‘eng Subprefecture of P‘ing-ch‘ou); Li Huai-hsien, Military Governor of Fan-yang, got hold of his head and sent it to the capital, where it arrived on 17 February 763. Various sources on the final fate of Ch‘ao-i are given and analysed in TCTCKI 222.7140 and des Rotours, Histoire, p.350. Li Huai-hsien had earlier been a commander in the rebel forces. After his defection he was honoured by the court but later attracted its suspicion by his independent stance. He was assassinated on 8 July 768. His biography is given in CTS 143.1a–b, HTS 212.1a–b and summarised by des Rotours in Histoire, p.347. It may be added that Tu Fu wrote a poem called ‘Wen kuan-ch‘un shou Ho-nan Ho-pei’ expressing his joy at the suppression of Shih Ch‘ao-i’s rebellion. It can be found in TKPS 13.13b and has been translated into English by William Hung in Tu Fu, vol. I, p.193 and into German by von Zach in Tu Fu’s Gedichte, p.322.

The Po-ma Temple, which is traditionally regarded as the cradle of Chinese Buddhism (see a short discussion in Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China, vol. 1, pp.31–2), was situated east of the Shang-tung Gate in Lo-yang. See des Rotours, Histoire, p.332. The Shang-tung Gate was the main gate leading into the northern section of the city from the east. For a map of Lo-yang see map VI in des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, at end. I have been unable to find further information on the Sheng-shan Temple.
NOTES ON THE TRANSLATIONS

97 Although this shocking incident was the most important result of the Uighurs' sojourn near Lo-yang as far as the Chinese were concerned, there was, from the point of view of Uighur domestic history, a much more significant outcome of these few months. The khaghan was in constant contact with some Manicheans in Lo-yang and was eventually influenced by them to impose their religion upon his own people. Chavannes and Pelliot have dealt with this subject in their definitive article 'Un traité manichéen retrouvé en Chine', pp.189ff. There are scattered references to Manicheans later in the CTS and HTS texts translated above.

98 In 765 Kuo Ying-i became Military Governor of Chien-nan in the south-west of China. He behaved so arrogantly that he provoked a revolt, as a result of which he was killed in 766. His biographies are given in CTS 117.1b–2b and HTS 133.2a–b, and outlined in des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, p.847.

99 Yu Ch’ao-en was a eunuch who became a confidant of Tai-tsung’s. He accompanied the emperor when the latter fled from Ch’ang-an at the time of its occupation by the Tibetans in 763, and influenced the emperor in favour of Buddhism. He later fell from favour and was strangled on 10 April 770. See his biographies in CTS 184.7a–8a and HTS 207.4b–6a, and an outline of his career in des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, p.844. See also Franke, Geschichte, vol. II, pp.472–3.

100 I have here followed the rendering given by Chavannes and Pelliot of this word. See ‘Un traité manichéen’, p.189. They give evidence for accepting it, but still regard it as uncertain.

101 The meanings given above in CTS for the Turkish words differ widely from those provided by Müller in ‘Uigurica II’, p.95. His renderings are as follows: hsieh tu-teng-mi-shih is equivalent to il tutmiis and here means ‘holding the empire’; han (or ho in the Karabalghasun Inscription quoted by Müller, and TCTC 223.7145) is Turkish alp and means ‘heroic’; chu-ru is a transcription of külüg and means ‘glorious’; p'i-chia is the same as bilgä and means ‘wise’ (see also Müller, ‘Der Hofstaat eines Uiguren-Königs’, p.209). Only in the last instance does CTS’s version bear any resemblance to Müller’s. The Chinese titles mentioned mean ‘brave and righteous, building up service to the T’ang’ (Ying-i chien-kung) and ‘bright and loving, beautiful and glorious’ (Kuang-ch’in li-hua).

102 Short notes on Wang I are given in CTS 165.1b and HTS 143.9a. According to the latter, he was a modest man with a gentle nature. He became the Military Governor of Shan-nan-tung (see map 2, IB, 2B).

103 The word translated ‘grand’ is hu-lu 胡祿, which is a transcription of a Turkish word. The characters occur in the title of the khaghan ‘Huai-hsin’ (795–808). Hamilton (Les Ouighours, p.140) puts them into Turkish as ultu, which means ‘grand’ (p.158).

104 Hsiung-shuo means ‘frightening the north’, Ning-shuo means ‘pacifying the
north’, Chin-ho means ‘The golden river’ and Ching-mo means ‘tranquillising the desert’.

The number of governors-general mentioned in the two texts is interesting. According to THY 98.1744 (translated in Pulleyblank, ‘Some Remarks’, p.39), the Uighur government included eleven governors-general, one appointed for each of the nine T’ieh-le tribes of the confederation, and one each for the Basmil and Kharlukh. Probably the chief of the main tribe of the eleven had the title Grand Governor-general, while those of the other ten were called simply Governor-general.

105 In theory there were 10,000 families in the domain of a prince and 3,000 in that of a duke of state (des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, p.43). However, although the Uighur leaders here mentioned would have been entitled to taxation from tenant-families because they were to receive revenue from fiefs (cf. ibid., p.50), it is unlikely that they received much financial gain. A man who held an honorific rank enjoyed the right to a large land-holding, but in practice rarely received more than a small proportion of his entitlement. See Twitchett, Financial Administration, p.8. The same was probably true of the fief-revenue mentioned in the texts above.

106 The course of events leading up to P’u-ku Huai-en’s rebellion is given in TCTC 222.7147-8, 7159ff and outlined by Franke in Geschichte, vol. II, pp. 465-6. See also introduction above, pp. 26-7.

107 Jen Fu is called a Tangut leader in TCTC 223.7176, but I have found no references to him outside texts concerning the revolt under discussion above.

108 Chang Shao was the nephew of Hun Shih-chih, who was temporarily in command of Ling-chou when Huai-en decided to revolt. Hun was doubtful about the wisdom of Huai-en’s plans, so the latter got Chang Shao to kill him. (This is the account of HTS 217B.8a; on the slight discrepancies concerning the death of Hun Shih-chih see Hsin Chiu T’ang-shu hu-cheng 16.264; Hsin T’ang-shu chiu-miu 4.31.) Shao then took over the men formerly under his uncle. These were presumably a part of the ‘hordes’ mentioned in CTS above. However, P’u-ku Huai-en distrusted Shao. He turned against him for the murder and, according to TCTC 223.7162, punished Chang so severely that he died not long after. It should be added that Ssu-ma Kuang himself claims that Chang Shao took command of Huai-en’s rebellion after the latter’s death late in 765 (see below, n.117) and was killed shortly after by a rival general (TCTC 223.7177).

Hun Shih-chih had earlier been the leader of the Hun people and belonged to the family which had exercised this role for several generations (HTS 217B.8a–b). The Hun was one of the nine tribes which formed part of the Uighur confederation (see Pulleyblank, ‘Some Remarks’, pp.39–41, Hamilton, ‘Toquz-Oyuz’, pp.27, 54).

109 The Tibetan state had grown very powerful from the earlier half of the seventh century. From that time on, it was a constant enemy of China’s
and, after the An Lu-shan rebellion, succeeded in gaining enormous tracts of territory at China's expense. In 763 some Tibetans actually occupied Ch'ang-an for a few days. The incursions of the Tibetans were of great importance in the decline of the T'ang. There are chapters on the Tibetans in *CTS* 196A.1a–15a, 196B.1a–16b, and *HTS* 216A.1a–13a, 216B.1a–9b. These four chapters have been translated into French by Pelliot in *Histoire ancienne du Tibet*, pp.1–36, 37–78, 79–109, 110–40. Unfortunately, Pelliot had hardly begun the annotation and his work was published posthumously.

In his 'The Early History of Tibet', pp.439–526, Bushell has given an English translation of a version in which the Tibetan biographies in the two standard histories have been combined together, although passages derived specifically from *HTS* are given in smaller print.

*TCTC* 223.7166 reports that Kuo Tzu-i set out on this particular venture on 16 September 764, and the text goes on to give details of the campaign. In point of fact Kuo Tzu-i himself did no fighting. The Uighurs and Tibetans made three separate sallies. They first approached Pin-chou but, because it was extremely well defended, made no attempt to take it. They then threatened Feng-t'ien not far to the south-east, as reported in *CTS*. According to *FYCC* (quoted in *TCTCKI* 223.7168), Kuo Tzu-i displayed an army of several tens of thousands outside the western gate. The Uighurs, Tibetans, and others, led by Huai-en, arrived before dawn on 6 November 764. They had believed Tzu-i to be unprepared for them and wanted to make a surprise attack. But when they saw the army, they took fright and did not dare join battle. They then returned to Pin-chou and attacked it on 11 November but were repulsed. The following day they fought a battle with Kuo Tzu-i's third son Kuo Hsi (d.794, biographies *CTS* 120.13a–14a and *HTS* 137.8a–b) but were disastrously defeated. After that they withdrew. Other sources give a different date for the battle with Kuo Hsi (*TTSL* 5 November; *Pin-chih* 15 November) but Ssu-ma Kuang accepts the account of *FYCC*. See *TCTCKI* 223.7168.

The T'u-yü-hun had dominated the Kokonor region from the fourth century until their territory was conquered by the Tibetans in 663. See notes on them in *CTS* 198.5b–8b and *HTS* 221A.5b–8a and bibliographies concerning them in des Rotours, *Traité des fonctionnaires*, p.899 and Sinor, *Introduction*, p.234.

Notes on the Tangut (Tang-hsiang), who lived south of the T'u-yü-hun until the seventh century, are given in *CTS* 198.1b–3b and *HTS* 221A.1a–3b. They were subjugated by the Tibetans c.678 (*CTS* 196A.4a; *HTS* 216A.5a; Pelliot, *Histoire ancienne*, pp.9, 89; Bushell, ‘The Ancient History’, p.450), after which most of them migrated into the Ordos region. In 814 the Chinese government re-established the prefecture of Yu-chou in Kuan-nei (map 2, 1A, 2A, 1B, 2B) to govern them (Pulleyblank, 'A Sogdian Colony', p.342.) They achieved distinction in the eleventh century through
the foundation of the Hsi-Hsia state, which was destroyed by the Mongols in 1227. Their early history is outlined by Olbricht in 'Die Tanguten und ihre Geschichte bis zur Gründung von Si-Hia', pp.142–54. On their history in the Five Dynasties period (907–60) see especially Hamilton, Les Ouïghours, pp.101–14. Sinor (Introduction, pp.251–3) gives a short bibliography on the Tangut but it concentrates mainly on the Hsi-Hsia period.

According to TCTCYC 198.6249, the Nu-la lived between the Tangut and the T'u-yü-hun. The tribe is mentioned among the T'ieh-le tribes in a passage in TFYK 974.16b (see also Chavannes, 'Notes additionnelles', p.32), but is elsewhere called a T'u-chüeh tribe (ibid., p.96, translating TFYK 976.3b). This latter text claims that more than 1,000 Nu-la people were attached to the Chinese empire in 760.

TCTC 223.7176 reports that the Tibetans advanced from the north to Feng-t'ien, the Uighurs following behind them; Jen Fu and others from the east to T'ung-chou; while the T'u-yü-hun and Nu-la came in from the west.

Hun Jih-chin was the original name of Hun Kun, the son of Hun Shih-chih (on whom see above, n.108). He was consequently of T'ieh-le extraction and the first cousin of Chang Shao. He served the T'ang against successive rebellions, those of An Lu-shan and his son, Shih Ch'ao-i, P'u-ku Huai-en and Chu Tz'u. Although his prowess was chiefly military, he also became, towards the end of his life, the President of the Department of the Grand Imperial Secretariat and a Director of Instructions, the latter an honorary title carrying the first rank, first grade. He died on 1 January 800 at the age of sixty-three. His biographies are given CTS 134.9b–14a and HTS 155.6a–8a.

According to TCTC 223.7176–7, the Tibetans Shang Chieh-hsi, Shang Tsan-mo (on whom see Demiéville, Le concile, pp.290–1) and Ma-ch'ung-ying arrived at Feng-t'ien on 4 October, to the great dismay of those in the capital. Hun Kun, however, rode out himself with 200 followers to attack them and even succeeded in capturing one of their generals, suffering no casualties himself. The next day, the Tibetans attacked the city but were driven off. A few days later they withdrew and Hun Kun pursued them, killing over a thousand of their soldiers. See also the biographies on the Tibetans (CTS 196A.14b and HTS 216A.12b), translated by Pelliot in Histoire ancienne, pp.34–5, 109. See also Bushell 'The Ancient History', p.480.

TCTC 223.7177 reports that Huai-en died on 27 September 765. A note in TCTCKI 223.7177 explains that this date is based on the TTSL supported by other works, including Pin-chih, but that Huai-en's biography in CTS (121.8b) places his death on the day after. The news of his demise did not reach the Uighurs and Tibetans until 27 October (TCTC 223.7180). This latter date can be taken as likely but not certain.

144
The sources contain important divergencies concerning the events which these passages describe.

The story according to TCTC 223.7180–2 is as follows. The Uighurs and Tibetans surrounded Ching-yang on 26 October 765, but no battle followed. The next day they again surrounded the city, but because the news suddenly arrived that P'u-ku Huai-en was dead, they started to quarrel among themselves for dominance. Kuo Tzu-i found out about this and sent envoys to ask the Uighurs to help him fight the Tibetans. The Uighurs, who had been told by Huai-en that Kuo Tzu-i and the emperor were dead, refused to believe that the envoy was genuine. They asked to see Kuo Tzu-i in person and, despite warning from his generals, Tzu-i came out of the city, showed himself to the Uighurs and, having thus dispelled their doubts, made a pact with them. On 2 November 765, there was a battle with the Tibetans near Ling-t'ai and the Tibetans were defeated. Three days later they were again defeated east of Ching-chou.

There is a long section in TCTCKI 223.7182–4 where the accounts of the divergent sources are given. In fact it is principally in the dates that the texts quoted disagree. Those given in FYCC have been accepted by Ssu-ma Kuang. TTSL records that the pact between Kuo and the Uighurs against the Tibetans was made on 6 November and that the battle with the Tibetans west of Ling-t'ai took place on 9 November. Pin-chih states that the Uighurs pressed on Ching-yang on 11 November and that the battle at Ling-t'ai was fought on 17 November. (A more detailed account of the various reports is given in the first edition of this book, pp. 136–8).

Two problems arise: which of the various dates given are correct and what was the actual order of events? All accounts are inherently plausible. TCTCKI notes that the author of FYCC, Ch'en Hung, was actually in Kuo Tzu-i's army. Indeed, Ch'en himself reports that he followed Tzu-i out of the city to meet the Uighurs. It is mainly for this reason that Ssu-ma Kuang accepts its dates. Ch'en Hung's presence in Ching-yang strengthens his credibility, but does not prove his dates reliable. One may agree with Ssu-ma Kuang, but only with strong reservations.

CTS and HTS both report that the Uighurs submitted to Tzu-i before describing how they asked to see him and thus miss the whole point of the latter incident. The dialogue on pp. 78–81 makes it clear that the Uighurs submitted as soon as they found out that Huai-en had lied to them and that Tzu-i was still in command. HTS's assertion that a Uighur leader went in secret to Ching-yang and saw Tzu-i does not make sense in this context and should be discarded. Probably TCTC's account of the event can be accepted as correct.

Li Kuang-chin was the younger brother, by a different mother, of Li Kuang-pi (see above, n.66). Short notes are provided on him in CTS 110.6b and HTS 136.4b, where the titles mentioned in the CTS text above are
confirmed. It should be added that there are biographies of a Li Kuang-chin also in *CTS* 161.1a–b and *HTS* 171.1a. In many places *CTS* 161 gives information identical to that in the notes just cited. However, this second Li is clearly a different man, since he is said to have been granted the imperial surname Li, as a reward for his services, in 811, and died in 815 at the age of sixty-four. He was thus born in 751. Yet *CTS* 161.1a claims that he assisted Kuo Tzu-i in taking the two capitals during the An Lu-shan rebellion. Since these events took place in 757, the second Li Kuang-chin was but a child of six at the time. Clearly the editors of *CTS* have confused the two men of the same name. *HTS*, on the other hand, has avoided this mistake. Compare *Shih-ch'i shih shang-ch'üeh* 91.2b–5a.

120 See Lu’s biographies in *CTS* 122.2b–3a, *HTS* 138.5b–6b. Lu held a series of official posts and titles, but, according to the histories, was disliked by Tai-tsung and consequently not as successful as his ability warranted. His merits were recognised upon Te-tsung’s accession in 779, and he was called to the capital. He died at the age of seventy, apparently not long afterwards.

121 The expression *ch' an-t' ou* ‘bind the head’ carried a special significance in T’ang times. A note by Hu San-hsing in *TCTYC* 223.7147 runs: ‘At dinner parties held by the people of the T’ang, when somebody performed the rite of dancing for the gathering when merry with wine, he was presented with silken goods, and it was called *ch' an-t' ou* binding the head.’ He adds that courtesans who danced at banquets were also given similar presents and quotes the phrase ‘when the dance is over, she binds her head with her brocade sash’ from a poem by Tu Fu called ‘Chi-shih’. (See *TKPS* 16.29a–b and the translation by von Zach in *Tu Fu’s Gedichte*, pp.294–5).

Hu San-hsing is commenting on a story just related in *TCTC* (223.7147) which tells how in 763 the eunuch Lo Feng-hsien visited P’u-ku Huai-en while on his way to court to report that Huai-en was planning to revolt (see introduction above). The latter gave Lo entertainment, and ‘when merry with wine, Huai-en arose and danced, so Feng-hsien gave him silk to bind his head’. (See also P’u-ku Huai-en’s biography in *CTS* 121.4b where the incident is related in almost identical words).

The phrase *ch' an-t' ou* occurs in other places too. After the campaign against the Tibetans which followed the incident under discussion in the *CTS* and *HTS* texts translated above, Kuo Tzu-i returned to court. In March 767 he was again seen there after a successful attempt to forestall another incipient rebellion. This time he was given an enormous banquet by some senior government leaders. ‘They spread out 200 pieces of silk as the expense of Tzu-i’s binding his head (*ch' an-t' ou*)’ (*CTS* 120.10a). The poem to which Hu San-hsing refers is not the only one in which the phrase occurs. In Tu Fu’s ‘Ch’un-jih hsi-t’i nao Hao shih-chüan hsiung’ (*TKPS*
2.1a–b, translated by von Zach in *Tu Fu’s Gedichte*, pp. 323–4) we find the remark: ‘While they [two beautiful girls] dance, let us watch their flower-like faces. Before our cups they will bind their heads with the brocade sashes given to them.’

In the *CTS* and *HTS* passages above, Kuo Tzu-i is honouring the Uighurs by giving them the chance to follow a contemporary festive custom. They are to hide the long tresses characteristic of Turkic men (see below, n. 161) by bringing them up behind the head and tying them with a broad band. This is not a reference to a Uighur custom, as implied by Li Fu-t’ung in *Hui-hu shih*, p. 182, but to a Chinese.

The *HTS* text which I here translate ‘The Grand [Governor-general] Ho’ actually runs 可胡禄. The text has omitted the characters tu-tu 都督 by mistake. The word hu-lu (which means ‘grand’, see above n. 103) clearly qualifies tu-tu, as in the parallel *CTS* text. Probably the editor of the *HTS* chapter did not know the meaning of hu-lu and believed it simply part of the man’s name.

The only source quoted by Ssu-ma Kuang in *TCTCKI* 223.7182–4 which actually mentions this mission is *TTSL*, which dates the arrival at court 8 November. It goes on to record the battle near Ling-t’ai under the following day. The date for this battle conflicts with other sources (see n. 118) and the date of the embassy is also possibly inaccurate. The *Shih-lu* text calls the Uighur chief Shih 石 -yeh-na, not *CTS*’s Ku 古 -yeh-na. See also *CTSCKC* 65.9a, where *CTS* is said to call him Yu右-yeh-na.

Po Yüan-kuang was of T’u-chüeh extraction. He performed active military service on behalf of the T’ang not only in this battle but during the An Lu-shan rebellion and in 768 against the Tibetans when they attacked Ling-chou. He died in 786. He is given a short biography in *HTS* 136.6a and is mentioned in the Tibetan biographies (*CTS* 196A.15a, 196B.1a; *HTS* 216A.13a, 216B.1a). See also Pelliot, *Histoire ancienne*, pp. 36–7, 109–10 and Bushell, ‘The Ancient History’, pp. 481–2.

The Arab traveller, Tamim ibn Bahr al-Mutawwi’i, who visited the Uighur empire about 821, writes: ‘And of the wonders of the country of the Turks are some pebbles they have, with which they bring down rain, snow, cold, etc., as they wish.’ See Minorsky, ‘Tamim Ibn Bahr’s Journey to the Uyghurs’, p. 285. For further comments and bibliography see also Pelliot, ‘Sur la légende d’Urüz-khan en écriture ouigoure’, pp. 299–301. On the opposition of the magicians to the new religion of the Uighurs (Manicheism), see Marquart, ‘Guwaini’s Bericht über die Bekehrung der Uiguren’, pp. 488–9; Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources*, vol. I, pp. 257–8; and below, n. 146.

In the K’ai-yüan period (713–42) the bureaucracy was paid in money and grain, and allowed various perquisites, like state-provided servants. The sum of money, grain-ration, and scale of perquisites were all clearly laid
down according to the rank of the official (TT 35.201c; THY 91.1654–5). After the An Lu-shan rebellion began, official salaries were cut drastically and an edict of 30 September 759 ordained that the salaries and rations of officials in the capital should be suspended altogether (THY 91.1655). One of the means devised by the government to remedy this situation was to impose additional taxation on the people. In 758–60 the ch'ing-miao ch'i'en (green sprout money), a tax in cash on acreage under crops, was introduced for this purpose. See Twitchett, *Financial Administration*, p.37.

Under the T'ang there were many types of special labour services which required selected taxpayers to spend some two months a year in a particular kind of job. However, it was possible to gain exemption from these duties – and also from military service – by paying what was known as exemption taxation (tzu-k'o) (ibid., pp.30–1 and Chü Ch'ing-yüan, T'ang-tai ts'ai-cheng shih, pp.102–17). The shou-li here appears to be a tax paid for exemption from manual labour. It is mentioned in both THY 91.1655 and TT 35.202a as a form of government income used to pay officials after the An Lu-shan rebellion. In the present case the court officials were paid from money derived from the exemption taxes.

The Uighurs are reported to have used Hsiao Hsin's expedition to their territory as an opportunity to press for prompter payments for the horses they traded. They appealed to the help they had given China as a reason why she should be willing to agree to their demands. However, Hsiao Hsin silenced them by a reminder of their part in the P’u-ku Huai-en rebellion. Hsiao Hsin died in 791 at the age of about ninety. His biographies are given in CTS 146.4b–5a and HTS 159.2a–b.

Ch’ung-hui means 'venerated and virtuous'. The text of the appointment of P’u-ku Huai-en’s younger daughter as ‘Ch’ung-hui’ Princess is given in TTCLC 42.207 and CTW 415.10a–b, and is dated 2/7/769. The emperor had been deeply upset at the rebellion of P’u-ku Huai-en, whom he greatly respected, and had refused to regard him as a true traitor (TCTC 223.7177). After Huai-en’s death, Tai-tsung had taken this daughter into the palaces and brought her up as his own daughter (TCTC 224.7208). The document of appointment was written by Ch’ang Kun (729–83), on whom see CTS 119.10b–11b; HTS 150.2a–3a and des Rotours, *Traité des fonctionnaires*, pp.196–7.

Li Han (d.784) was a distant cousin of the emperor’s, being a great-great-great-grandson of the first T’ang ‘ancestor’ T’ai-tsu. See HTS 70A.18a. He is given short biographies CTS 126.2a–3a and HTS 78.3a. The real hero in Chinese eyes of this mission was actually Han’s assistant Tung Chin (biographies in CTS 145.3a–4b and HTS 151.1b–3a), who died in 799 at the age of seventy-five. The Uighurs again brought up the subject of the silk/horse trade, complaining that the price they were receiving was inadequate. They threatened violent action against the ambassadors. Li
Han was afraid, but Tung Chin pointed out in firm words that it was not because of her lack of horses that China allowed the trade; that many people were dissatisfied with the quality of the horses they were buying and considered them too old. The border officials had wanted to take strong measures against the trade, but the emperor had forbidden this course because the Uighurs had been so helpful to the T'ang during the An Lu-shan rebellion. The Uighurs were most impressed by Tung Chin; they surrounded and paid him respect. See TCTC 224.7208.

131 For further information on 'Ch'ung-hui' Princess and the poetry written about her in the late T'ang see Kuang P'ing-chang, 'Ho-ch'in k'ao', pp.51–2.

132 In reporting that the Uighurs attacked the Chin-kuang and Chu-ch'üeh Gates, CTS does not actually contradict HTS's statement that they attacked the Han-kuang Gate since they could have attacked all three. Probably, however, CTS gives Chin-kuang 金光 rather than Han-kuang 含光 by mistake. The Han-kuang and Chu-ch'üeh Gates were very close both to each other and to the Court of Diplomatic Reception, where the Uighurs were staying. Furthermore, they were both gates to the Imperial City which the Chinese found it necessary to lock. The Chin-kuang Gate, on the other hand, was some distance from the Imperial City. Finally, there is a parallel text in TFYK 997.13b which is almost identical to the CTS paragraph translated here, but gives Han-kuang, not Chin-kuang. The positions of the gates are shown on map 5.

133 Shao Yüeh (biographies in CTS 137.4a–b and HTS 203.4a–5a) had earlier assisted the great rebellion both under Shih Ssu-ming and Ch'ao-i. After the latter's defeat he surrendered to the T'ang and joined the staff of Kuo Tzu-i. In 782 he was implicated in a crime committed by a friend and banished; he died in exile. See also des Rotours, Histoire, p.10. Ch'ang-an Subprefecture, of which Shao was prefect, was the western half of Ch'ang-an City. See map 5.

134 According to an edict of 720, one piece of silk should be 4 chang long and 1.8 ch'ih wide. See TT 6.33a (cf. also Balázs, 'Beiträge', pp.43–4; 1 ch'ih was about 30 centimetres or 1 foot; 1 chang about 300 centimetres or 10 feet). Waley reckons that a piece of silk represented the product of about one day's work, that is one woman produced one piece of silk in one day (The Life and Times of Po Chü-i, p.221). It may be added that the price of the horses tended to fluctuate, since both sides constantly strove for a better deal. Towards the beginning of the ninth century, the Ch'iñese began giving shorter pieces of 3 chang long, made of inferior coarse silk. This led the Uighurs to complain through their khatun (the Princess of Hsien-an) and in 807 the emperor ordered that such practices be stopped. See Po Chü-i's poem 'Yin-shan tao' in Po-shih Ch'ang-ch'ing chi 4.10a–b. See also Ch'en Yin-k'o, T'ang-tai ch'eng-shih shih shu-lun kao, pp.155–6, Feng Chia-sheng, Wei-wu-erh tsu, vol. I, p.31 and Waley, The Life and Times, p.55. In a
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letter Po Chü-i wrote to the kaghan in 809 it becomes plain that the price of the horses at the time was fifty pieces of silk each; it had risen since the Ch'ien-yüan period (ibid., and 'Yü Hui-hu k'o-han shu', contained, among other places, in CTW 665.7b–9a and Po-shih Ch’ang-ch’ing chi 40.35a–36b).

See also Franke, Geschichte, vol. II, pp.469–70.

The taxation system under Tai-tsung is discussed in Twitchett, Financial Administration, pp.35–9. See also Chü Ch’ing-yüan, Ts’ai-cheng shih, pp.17–27.

Li Kan is given a short biography, together with Liu Ch’ing-t’an, in CTS 118.11b. Li had become the Governor of the Capital for the second time in 773. He was later appointed Vice President of the Ministry of War. He was on very good terms with Liu Ch’ing-t’an and the two plotted against the government at about the time of Te-tsung’s accession. Their plans were discovered and Te-tsung had them executed.

In point of fact, the Chinese had feared military attacks from the Uighurs for some time before this. According to FYCC (cited in TCTKI 225.7236), 1,000 Uighur cavalry had invaded Hsia-chou (see map 2, 1A) in the month 27/12/775–25/1/776 but were driven off and withdrew. On 17 March 776, the Shuo-fang Army was strengthened and its soldiery increased in preparation for an attack. (TCTKI 225.7236 quotes the TTSL as dating this move in the second month, 24/2–23/3/776. TFYK 992.20b gives the day hsìn-ssu of the first month; this day does not exist, but hsìn-ssu of the second month corresponds to 17 March; see also Takeo Hiraoka, Koyomi, p.196.) The place-names mentioned in this paragraph can be located on map 2, 1A.

Pao Fang was orphaned young and, despite grinding poverty, succeeded in educating himself and entering the bureaucracy. He is said to have governed T’ai-yüan well. He held a series of appointments, being finally President of the Ministry of Works. His interests lay much more in poetry than in military matters. He is given short biographies in CTS 146.1b and HTS 159.1a–b.

One of Pao Fang’s subordinates, Li Tzu-liang (733–95), suggested to him that no attack should be made on the Uighurs at first. Rather, two walled fortifications should be built on the road to block their return home and soldiers sent to man them. By the time the Uighurs had reached the walls a large army should have been sent out to block their rear. Li believed that an attack which would sandwich the Uighurs in this way could hardly fail to lead to victory. Pao turned down the suggestion and sent an army out to fight the Uighurs immediately. The implication in both the CTS and HTS texts above that Pao went to do battle with them himself appears to be false. See Li Tzu-liang’s biographies in CTS 146.1b–2b and HTS 159.1b. Compare also TCTC 225.7250–1.

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141 Chang Kuang-sheng assisted the T'ang against An Lu-shan. On one occasion the horse of the great general Wang Ssu-li (see above, n.30) was shot dead and Chang immediately gave Wang his own. Wang asked his name, but he refused to tell it, so Wang made a note of his appearance and later made numerous attempts to find him. Ssu-li actually succeeded in this venture some years later and, in delight, gave Chang much help in his career. It was owing to Wang's patronage that Kuang-sheng, who had been a subordinate of Hsin Yün-ching (see n.143) in Tai-chou, succeeded him as its governor-general. Wang Ssu-li died in 761, so Chang's appointment to the position must have been made before or at about that time. When Chu Tz'u (see introduction above) founded his own opposition dynasty in 783, Kuang-sheng joined him and was given a high post in his administration. He later surrendered to the T'ang, but his part in Chu's rebellion was not forgiven and he was beheaded. See his biography in CTS 127.2a-3a.

142 A parallel text in TCTC 225.7251, like CTS, calls this valley Yang-wu. Its position is shown on map 2, 2A.

143 Hsin Yün-ching distinguished himself in the war against Shih Ssu-ming and was made the Governor-general of Tai-chou. He later became Governor of T'ai-yüan and it is in this capacity that he is best known. His administration was so good that he was eventually made an Honorary Vice President of the Department of Affairs of State. He died at the age of fifty-four on 14 October 768, that is some ten years before the time to which the present CTS text refers. His biographies can be found in CTS 110.8a and HTS 147.3b.

144 Ssu-ma Kuang adds two other details, not included in the standard histories, concerning the Uighurs at the end of Tai-tsung's reign. On 29 April 778 some Uigher envoys returning home passed through Ho-chung (see map 2, 2B). Some soldiers robbed their baggage and they replied by looting parts of the city (TCTC 225.7251). Although CTS leaves the impression that the problem of incursion by the Uighurs had been solved for the time being, Ssu-ma Kuang records that the inhabitants of the border regions were still very much afraid of them, and that a number of their soldiers had remained in north China. Kuo Tzu-i suggested that Hun Kun (see n.115) should be sent to the Chen-wu Army (see position map 2, 2A). This proposal was taken up with the desired effect: the Uighurs withdrew (TCTC 225.7252).

145 The Sogdians (Chiu-hsing hu, literally 'barbarians of the nine surnames') are a fascinating and important feature of T'ang history. They travelled and settled as traders and carriers of art and new religions in many parts of Central Asia, the steppes and China. For a discussion on them see especially Pulleyblank, 'A Sogdian Colony', pp.317–56. Following Pulleyblank, I have everywhere translated Chiu-hsing hu as 'Sogdians'. Certain surnames, especially K'ang and An, were characteristically Sogdian (ibid.,
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pp.320-3). The Uighurs K’ang Ch’ih-hsin and An Yün-ho, mentioned above pp. 93 and 122, 124 respectively, were no doubt of Sogdian origin. One of the reasons why the Sogdians were so favoured by I-ti-chien (Mou-yü Khaghan) was because of their connections with Manicheism. Although Sogdians could be found in Uighur territory before his time (see Ramstedt, ‘Zwei uigurische runeninschriften’, p.35), it appears to have been principally after Mou-yü was converted to Manicheism in 762-3 that the influence of the Sogdians became so great among the Uighurs.

It has been suggested by the Japanese scholar Tasaka Kōdō in his article ‘Uiguru ni okeru Manikyō hakugai undō’, pp.223–32, that this coup d’état was not merely anti-Sogdian but also anti-Manichean. A Turkish text translated into German and transliterated by Bang and von Gabain in ‘Türkische Turfan-Texte II’, pp.414–18 reveals that Mou-yü had encountered a good deal of opposition in his own court to his conversion to Manicheism and to his policy of establishing it as the Uighur state religion. The leader of the opposing group is not named but he is specified as a tarqan (ta-kan) on p.415. Tasaka Kōdō (p.226) draws particular attention to the CTS phrase that Tun was ‘taking advantage of the wish of some other people’. This, he claims, is a clear reference to the anti-Manichean faction at the Uighur court who were still unhappy at the rise of Sogdian influence. Tun mo-ho was himself a ta-kan and although, as Tasaka admits (ibid.), there is no evidence that the anti-Manichean tarqan mentioned in the Turkish text was Tun himself, at least both tarqan can be associated with a clique hostile to the new influence. Tasaka Kōdō also draws attention (pp.229–31) to the title which Tun adopted when he became khaghan. This did not include either of the phrases ai teng-li-lo or chün teng-li-lo. These are transcriptions of the Turkish ay tängridä and kün tängridä and mean respectively ‘by the god of the moon’ and ‘by the god of the sun’ (cf. Chavannes and Pelliot, ‘Un traité manichéen’, p.282). They are Manichean phrases and are found in the titles of all the main khaghans after Tun mo-ho. Mou-yü’s title had even included the phrase zaḥag ‘i mānī which means ‘emanation of Mani’ (Müller, ‘Uigurica II’, p.95 and ‘Der Hofstaat’, pp.208–9). Tasaka claims that Tun’s title of Ho ku-tu-lu p‘i-chia Khaghan, which lacks Manichean phrases, is a further sign of his hostility to the religion. It may be added further that a man called Tun mo-ho was among the leaders of the Uighur contingent which helped Kuo Tzu-i defeat the Tibetans in 765. These Uighurs had brought magicians with them who had, according to CTS (see above), called up wind and snow to assist in the war. Whether this report is true or not is irrelevant here. The main point is that the presence of the magicians is a sign that the influence of the natural Turkic religion was still strong among the Uighurs (cf. Li Fu-t’ung, Hui-hu shih, pp.171–2 and Feng Chia-sheng, Wei-wu-erh tsu, vol. I, p.37).

That Tun mo-ho, probably the same man as this khaghan, should have
allowed magicians to accompany a campaign in which he took a leading role can be taken as further evidence of his opposition to Manicheism. A bibliography on the religion of Central Asia is given by Sinor in Introduction, pp.349–51.

TFYK 967.13b and THY 98.1745 date this coup d'état 779. TCTC 226.7282 places it under 780 just before reporting Tun mo-ho’s appointment by the emperor. The account of the coup is intended merely as an explanation for Tun mo-ho’s appointment; it need apply only to this event and not necessarily to the preceding coup.

Yüan Hsiu is given a biography in CTS 127.3a–4a. It states that Yüan had earlier married the daughter of Wang I (see above, n.102) but had left her over a ‘petty resentment’. This caused ill feeling among the Wang family who even made a formal accusation against him. Later, another son-in-law of Wang I’s became the Governor of the Capital. When Yang Yen became chief minister in 779 he wanted to get rid of the Governor. He had heard of the clash between Yüan Hsiu and the Wang family and consequently had him appointed as the Deputy Governor to spy on his superior. However, contrary to Yang Yen’s expectations, the Governor and his Deputy got on well, so Yen immediately had Hsiu sent off to the Uighurs. In point of fact, Hsiu’s trip turned out to be a very dangerous one but Yang Yen could not have foreseen this. It may be added that Yüan Hsiu later encouraged Chu Tz’u’s rebellion (on which see introduction above) and became a high-ranking minister in the opposition government. Even after Chu’s death he refused to surrender, but was killed by his subordinates. Yang Yen did not last long in power, being disgraced in 781 (des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, p.5). His biographies can be found in CTS 118.6b–11b and HTS 145.7a–10b. On his important financial measures see Twitchett, Financial Administration, pp.39ff, 112–14, 157–60.

Wu-i ch’eng-kung means ‘warlike, righteous and achieving merit’.

On 28 August 779 the new emperor, Te-tsung, had issued an edict that Uighurs in Ch’ang-an should wear Uighur clothes and refrain from imitating Chinese garb. One reason for this was that many Uighurs living in Ch’ang-an had been able to mislead or marry Chinese women by adopting Chinese clothes. See TCTC 225.7265; Franke, Geschichte, vol. II, p.470; Hino Kaizaburō, ‘Tōdai no Kaikotsusen’, pp.40–1. The Uighurs in the train under discussion here probably consisted mainly of those who had been influenced by the edict to return home. They would certainly wish to hide any Chinese women who accompanied them.

The character translated by ‘are attacking’ is 朽 which does not make sense here and is a corruption. The Palace edition (HTS 217A.12a) and SPPY (p.7a) both make the same mistake. The parallel text in TCTC 226.7288 gives 破 which means ‘attack’.

At the end of Tai-tsung’s reign, Chang Kuang-sheng had been transferred
from his position as Governor-general of Tai-chou (see n.141) to that of Protector of Shan-yü, a post he combined with that of Commissioner for the Chen-wu Army (stationed in Shan-yü, see n.81) and Vice President of the Censorate. Tai-tsung had secretly asked him to devise a plan of action against the Uighurs (CTS 127.2b). However, TCTC 226.7288 claims that Chang asked the new emperor Te-tsung three times for permission to carry out a massacre but was refused each time.

Chang Kuang-sheng’s biography in CTS (127.2b) adds that he ordered T’u-tung and his followers to a banquet and, when they were drunk, had them seized and killed. It may be noted that much of the information contained in the three paragraphs beginning ‘Before all this, whenever the Uighurs’ can be found also in Chang’s CTS biography. However, there are sections in HTS 217A which show, by their absence in CTS 127, that the editor of HTS has drawn upon a source other than CTS 127. It may be that both CTS 127 and this part of HTS 217A are based upon a single third source, probably the Te-tsung shih-lu.

TCTC 226.7288 notes that the eunuch was called Wang Chia-hsiang. The Uighurs asked that Chang himself be sent so that they could take revenge. The emperor refused this request. To appease them, he dismissed Chang Kuang-sheng from the post he had held since returning to the capital (General of the Left Chin-wu Guards) and made him Tutor to the Prince of Mu, Li Shu. The latter, who died in 791, was the fourth of Tai-tsung’s twenty sons. By 780, he was Te-tsung’s oldest living younger brother, Tai-tsung’s second and third sons having died before then (CTS 116.6b–7b, HTS 82.9b–10a). It may be added that this was not a very convincing disgrace since a general of an imperial guard and a tutor to a prince both carried the same status: third rank, second grade (des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, pp.503, 531, 629).

This and the following paragraph are very similar, both in content and expression, to a passage in the CTS biography of Yuan Hsiu (127.3a–b), which is found almost verbatim also in TFYK 663.17a–b. There can be no doubt that it is based directly either on one of these two texts or an original source. It is striking also that HTS contains no separate biography of Yuan Hsiu. The only material difference between the accounts of CTS 127 (or TFYK 663) and HTS 217A is in the date. CTS and TFYK 663 state merely that Yuan remained in T’ai-yüan ‘a long time’ before going to the Uighurs, while HTS 217A specifies ‘the following year’, i.e. 781. TCTC (227.7330) reports the whole expedition under 782, but the real date Ssu-ma Kuang wishes to state precisely is plainly that of Yuan Hsiu’s arrival back in Ch’ang-an after his trip to Karabalghasun, and this he gives as 11 August 782. The earlier section of Ssu-ma Kuang’s account need not refer to 782. It may be that the original source on which CTS 127 relied stated the year of Hsiu’s departure for the Uighur capital clearly, but I think it equally
likely that the editor of *HTS* 217A simply guessed the date.

There is some confusion over the characters representing this Grand Minister. In Po-na they are given as *Hsieh kan-chia* 㝏干迦 and in the edition used by Hu San-hsing (see *TCTCYC* 227.7330) as *Hsieh kan-chia* 伽. The Palace Edition (217A.12b) and SPPY (p.7a) both write *Hsieh kan-chia-ssu* 㝏干迦斯. Actually there are many variants in other passages and it is unnecessary to detail them all here. Müller has shown, however, that these characters represent a title, not a name, and are a Chinese transcription of *Il ügäs* which means ‘glory of the empire’ (*Uigurica II*, pp.93–4). The title occurs numerous times in texts actually written among the Uighurs. See, for instance, Müller, ‘Der Hofstaat’, p.211, ‘Zwei Pfahlinschriften aus den Turfanfunden’, pp.22, 26 and ‘Ein Doppelblatt aus einem manichäischen Hymnenbuch’, p.9. Further references on the subject of this title can be found in Ecsedy, ‘Uigurs and Tibetans in Pei-ting (790–791 A.D.)’, pp.97–9. Some texts (such as *THY* 98.1746–7; *TFYK* 663.17a, and *WHTK* 347.2719c–20a) write *yü* 于 in place of *kan* 干 in the transcription of this title. This reading (*yü*) can be accepted as more accurate. See also Haneda Tōru, ‘Kaikotsushi no kenkyü’, pp.218–19.

In theory, a ligature or string of cash contained 1,000 coins, each of which had a hole in its centre so that it could be fitted on to the string. One ligature came to about 9½ English pounds of copper. See Pulleyblank, *Background*, p.227. In practice, it was so common to deduct a few coins from the string that ligatures of 980 were officially tolerated in many periods. In 821 a standard string of 920 was imposed, and the number fell further still as the T’ang neared its end. See Twitchett, *Financial Administration*, pp.81–2.

A passage in *TCTCKI* 233.7505–6 runs as follows: ‘According to the *Shih-lu*, “On the day ting-yu of the eighth month (2/10/787), the Uighurs sent Mo-ch’o ta-kan to court to give as tribute some products of the region and also to ask for a marriage alliance. On the day *kuei-hai* of the ninth month (28/10/787), the emperor sent the Uighur ambassador General *Ho ch’ueh* back to his own country. Before this, *Ho ch’ueh* had brought forward his ruler’s order begging for a marriage and the emperor granted him the Princess of Hsien-an. He ordered him to see her in the Lin-te Hall and also ordered that a picture of the princess be sent to him to show to the khaghan. He recompensed him 50,000 pieces of silk as a price for his horses and granted the trade, then sent him away.” ’ Under the date 2 October 787, *TFYK* 979.16b includes a passage the first sentence of which is almost identical to that from *CTS* quoted above on p.92. The following sentences are identical to the *KI* passage quoted from ‘the emperor granted him the Princess of Hsien-an’ onwards. The *TCTCKI* and *TFYK* passages are probably both quotations from the original *Shih-lu*, but each has omitted certain details. *CTS* is clearly based on the *Shih-lu* here and the inclusion of so specific a name as General To-lan in the embassy, included in *TFYK*
but not in TCTCKI, cannot have come out of thin air. As usual, the date must be taken as referring to the embassy’s arrival at court, not to the time the khaghan actually despatched it.

Li Pi (722–89) was a trusted adviser of Su-tsung and held ranks at court during some periods of Tai-tsung’s reign. In 787 he was enfeoffed as Marquis of Yeh and in the same year became chief minister, a position he retained till his death. The biographies of Li Pi and his son Fan are given in CTS 130.3a–5b, HTS 139.3b–7b and outlined by Ecsedy in ‘Uigurs and Tibetans’, p.103. It may be added that the HTS biography contains much material not found in CTS and the extra information appears to be based on Li Fan’s Yeh-hou chia-chuan (cf. Nien-erh shih cha-chi 17.15a–b and Shih-ch’i shih shang-ch’üeh 89.7b–8a), which unfortunately does not survive integrally. This work is also the source of the present conversation between Li Pi and Te-tsung. According to TCTCKI 233.7505, it dates the conversation in the month 16/10–14/11/787 and TCTC has reported it in some detail under that month. The date is probably correct since the Uighur embassy asked for the marriage on 2 October and the emperor granted it on 28 October. However, it is worth remarking that the YHCC is not a reliable source, as can be seen from the conditions surrounding its composition: ‘In the T’ai-ho period (827–36), Fan was imprisoned, pending death [by execution], for a crime. He was afraid that the achievements of his late father would be forgotten, so he begged a prison official for some waste paper and a bald brush and thus completed the chuan’ (CCTSC 2B.19b). See also HTS 139.7b; CCSLCT 7.191; WHTK 198.1662b.

It will be recalled that Te-tsung, then heir-apparent, had refused to perform a ceremonial dance before Mou-yü at Ping-lu of Shan-chou. Four of his assistants had been beaten as a result. See above, pp. 72-5.

The idea in Li Pi’s mind is that Tun mo-ho would not formally declare himself the khaghan without the approval of the T’ang emperor. However, this reference to cutting the hanging hair is obscure. The symbol of reaching maturity in China was to bind up the hair, but certainly not to cut it. Nor does cutting the hair seem to have been a reference to any Uighur custom. The token of submission to China by peripheral peoples was to ‘untie the tresses’ (chieh-pien), which were for the Chinese a symbol of barbarism. Mature Turkic men wore long tresses which hung down to the back. The question of hair styles among the peripheral peoples of the T’ang and other eras is discussed in some detail by Demiéville in Le concile, pp.207–12.

Yeh-hu was actually the elder brother of Mou-yü (Teng-li Khaghan).

Yeh-hu was the leader of the Uighur forces which had helped win the Battle of Hsiang-chi in 757. See above, pp. 56-9.

It is clear from the report of this conversation in TCTC 233.7504 that another reason why Li Pi wanted the marriage to go ahead was that he hoped
it would cause the Uighurs to assist China against the Tibetans. In the preceding period, this people had actually been a far greater threat to China than the Uighurs and had been annexing China's western dependencies. Te-tsung's government had already concluded a pact with them in 783 but it was not effective for long and in 786 war broke out again between the Chinese and Tibetans. Plans were made for a further treaty to be concluded on 8 July 787, that is only a few months before this conversation, but the Tibetans used the occasion for further war and even took the Chinese ambassadors prisoner. See Demiéville, *Le concile*, pp.291-2; Franke, *Geschichte*, vol. II, pp.480-1; TCTC 232.7486ff; CTS 196B.4a-7b; HTS 216B.2a-3b (translated Pelliot, *Histoire ancienne*, pp.45-54, 113-18 and cf. Bushell, 'The Ancient History', pp.490-9).

166 This is perhaps a reference to the diplomatic marriage in 722 between the T'u-ch'i-shih khaghan, Su-lu, and the Princess of Chiao-ho. Su-lu had been a source of great anxiety to the Chinese court which tried to win him over by diplomatic means. See HTS 215B.9a translated in Chavannes, *Documents sur les Tou-kiue*, p.81 (see also pp.284-5). CTS 194B.7a (translated Chavannes, *Documents*. p.43) describes the T'u-ch'i-shih as 'a particular tribe of the Western T'u-chüeh'. Yet the two certainly retained separate identities. Furthermore, I have found no record of any conditions laid down for the marriage (cf. also Kuang P'ing-chang, 'Ho-ch'ìn k'ao', pp.45-7). The T'u-chüeh themselves were granted only one diplomatic marriage, but it occurred before the K'ai-yüan period, and no conditions of the kind Li Pi mentions are recorded for it. In 713, the Princess of Nan-ho Subprefecture was given in marriage not to the T'u-chüeh khaghan, Mo-ch'o, but to his son (TFYK 979.4a-b). See also Kuang P'ing-chang, 'Ho-ch'ìn k'ao', pp.39-40. The T'u-chüeh asked several times for a marriage alliance with China, but were refused each time.

167 The parallel text in TCTC 233.7504 writes 'branded horses' instead of 'horses for trading'. TCTCYC 233.7504-5 gives a note on the branding of horses under the T'ang. It consists of a quotation claimed by Hu San-hsing to be from T'ang liu-tien but, as Haneda Töru has pointed out ('Kaikotsushi no kenkyü', p.283), actually from THY (72.1305-6). T'ang liu-tien 17.11a contains a similar passage, but it is not nearly as detailed as THY, which gives the specific branding marks placed on horses from foreign peoples including the Uighurs.

168 HTS 83.13a-b and THY 6.65 list the Princess of Hsien-an eighth among the eleven daughters of Te-tsung.

169 See also above, n.158. This paragraph is clearly based either on the Te-tsung shih-lu or a text which followed it, such as TFYK 979.16b or THY 98.1746. On the significance of the portrait see also Kuang P'ing-chang, 'Ho-ch'ìn k'ao', p.52.

170 The Hsieh-tieh was a T'ieh-le tribe. It is not mentioned among the nine
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T'ieh-le tribes which formed the Uighur confederation at the time of the empire's foundation. However, the fact that a governor-general of this tribe came as ambassador to China in 788 attests that the Hsieh-tieh belonged to the confederation by that time. Pulleyblank suggests ('Some Remarks', pp.41–2) that it had done so since the beginning and that the division of the Uighurs into nine had become political rather than ethnic. See also Hamilton, 'Toquz-Oyuz' pp.27, 46–7. From 795 the khagans of the Uighurs were drawn from the Hsieh-tieh tribe.

171 According to TCTC 233.7514–5, a group of tribesmen, including some from the Shih-wei, made trouble in Chen-wu on 19 August 788. The Military Governor of Chen-wu, T'ang Ch'ao-ch'en, asked the Uighur embassy to help him fight the trouble-makers. The action was successful from T'ang's point of view, but led to the ambassador's death. The Shih-wei were a Khitan tribe who lived east of the Uighurs in the west of what is now Heilungkiang province and eastern Mongolia (map 1). See des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, pp.788–9 for further bibliography. Notes on the Shih-wei can be found also in CTS 199B.9b–10b and HTS 219.6b–7b.

172 It is curious that HTS should give the number 700 for those allowed into Ch'ang-an, while CTS should state that the same number were to stay in Shuo-chou and T'ai-yüan. HTS has probably made a mistake in copying. The CTS version is supported by THY 98.1746 and TFYK 979.17a. Moreover, since Te-tsung is known to have been reluctant to grant this marriage and to have hated the Uighurs, it is surely most unlikely that he would want any but the leaders of the Uighur delegation in his capital. The Guest-house of Diplomatic Reception was beside the Court of the same name (see map 5). It was 'where those among the four barbarians who came to China to study or offer tribute to the court were given residence' (Ch'ang-an chih 7.5a).

173 The date of this change of name is given differently in the various sources. In his TCTCKI 233.7515, Ssu-ma Kuang mentions six separate works and I list each of them with its version of the date: the Uighur biography in CTS (195.11a), 809, Hsü hui-yao and T'ung-chi, the seventh month (27/7–24/8) of 789; HTS (the present text), 788; YHCC and Pei-huang chün ch'ang-lu, the seventh month (6/8–4/9) of 788. Ssu-ma Kuang himself prefers the evidence of YHCC, Pei-huang chün ch'ang-lu, and HTS and gives as his reason that Li Pi had died by the seventh month of 789 so the matter would not be mentioned in the YHCC if it had taken place at that time. Most writers have accepted a date before 789. They include the members of the Tsung-li yamen who deciphered the Karabalghasun Inscription (see Vasil'ev, Kitaiskiiia nadpisi na Orkhonskikh pamiatnakh v Komo-Tsaidame i Karabalgasune, Russian text, p.35, Chinese, pp.22–3), Chavannes and Pelliot ('Un traité manichéen', p.180), Franke (Geschichte, vol. III, p.410) and Ecsedy ('Uigurs and Tibetans', p.94). I, too, accepted this
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date in the first edition of the present book, p.142, and in 'Sino-Uighur Diplomatic and Trade Contacts', p.230. I now believe, however, that there is considerable doubt about the date, and my reservations are based on the value of the YHCC as a source (see above, n.159). It seems clear that HTS has based the date on this source since the long conversation between Li Pi and the emperor over the wisdom of granting the marriage relies upon it, and so does the paragraph immediately following the item about the change of name. Li Fan wrote the YHCC specifically to glorify his father and, while in prison, might easily have been mistaken in recalling that the change of name took place at the same time as the Princess of Hsien-an was sent out to marry the Uighur khaghan. There remains the Pei-huang chiün ch'ang-lu, which also supports the early date. This work is categorised as biographical, it was in three chüan and its author was the same Li Fan who wrote the YHCC. See CWTM 2.111, Sung-shih 203.20b. I have been unable to find further information about it, but suspect that it was one of the numerous abstractions made of YHCC.

The sources for the date 789 seem to me more reliable. The Hsü hui-yao is quoted by Su-ma Kuang as saying: 'In the seventh month of the fifth year of Chen-yüan (27/7-24/8/789) the Princess [of Hsien-an] had arrived at their royal camp and the Uighurs sent Li I-chin to ask that the character ho in their name be changed to hu.' The Hsü hui-yao was a work in forty chüan written by Yang Shao-fu and others and completed in 852; it was later incorporated into the THY. See CCSLCT 5.155; YH 51.32b–33a; WHTK 201.1681b–c; cf. also des Rotours, Traité des examens, pp.92–3. The THY 98.1746, of course, includes the Hsü hui-yao version and it is made perfectly clear that the change of name occurred after the Princess had arrived at Karabalghasun. TFYK 967.13b also reports it under 789. These works are based on court documents and carry more weight than Li Fan's.

The T'ung-chi by Ch'en Yüeh of the T'ang is simply a chronological account of the T'ang in 100 chüan from the Wu-te period (618–27) to the Ch'ang-ch'ing (821–5). It is more fully called Ta-T'ang t'ung-chi (CCSLCT 4.106, CWTM 2.49, WHTK 193.1632a, YH 47.30a). It is probably based ultimately on the same source as the Hsü hui-yao or even that work itself.

The origin of CTS's date (809) is unclear, but in view of the many works preferring an earlier date, CTS can probably be discarded here. Some later standard histories followed CTS's account (for instance Chiu Wu-tai shih 138.3b, translated in Hamilton, Les Ouighours, p.61; Sung-shih 490.12b) but appear to be in error. On the other hand, WHTK 347.2720a and PIT 126.488a follow HTS, the latter interpreting the somewhat confused dating of HTS as referring here to 785.

174 The Prince of Tun-huang was Li Ch'eng-shen. See above, n.14.
175 There was a Yin-t'ai Gate at the northern extremity of each of the Interior
Parks in the Ta-ming Palace. The one referred to here is no doubt the Right Yin-t'ai Gate, since the Lin-te Hall was just to the north of that gate. See map 6.

176 In HTS 70B.11a, Li Chan-jan is given as the grandson of Li Hsiu-yüan, who was the youngest son of Li Yuan-ying (p.9b). Yuan-ying was the Prince of T'eng and the son of the Emperor Kao-tsu (p.1a). Li Chan-jan was consequently the great-great-grandson of Kao-tsu. He has no separate biographies in the standard histories.

177 Kuan Po's biographies can be found in CTS 130.7a–8b and HTS 151.1a–b. He had become chief minister in 782, but this was not to his credit. The real power lay with the infamous Lu Ch'i (disgraced 784, died 785; biographies in CTS 135.1a–4a and HTS 223B.1a–3a) who had the man appointed only because he believed that Kuan could be manipulated. This turned out to be correct. Su-ma Kuang reports that 'Po's opinions were inaccessible, for when he got up and wanted to speak [in the presence of the emperor], Ch'i eyed him and made him stop' (TCTC 227.7335). Kuan Po accompanied the emperor to Feng-t'ien when he fled there at the time of the Chu Tz'u rebellion in 783. He gave up his position as chief minister soon after. He died early in 797 at the age of seventy-eight.

178 Chao Ch'ing (736–96; biographies CTS 138.1a–3b and HTS 150.3a–4a), who was chief minister from 792 until his death, was Kuan Po's deputy on this mission. He actually wrote a work called Pei-cheng tsa-chi in one ch'üan in which he recorded the events of the expedition (CCSLCT 7.190; WHTK 198.1662c). Unfortunately, it seems to be lost. On the other hand, a poem called 'Sung Hsien-an kung-chu' by Sun Shu-hsiang mourning her departure survives in Ch'üan T'ang-shih 17.94b. See also Kuang P'ing-chang, 'Ho-ch' in k'ao', p.53.

179 Ch'ang-shou t'ien-ch'in means 'long-lived, beloved by Heaven'. Chih-hui tuan-cheng ch'ang-shou hsiao-shun means 'wise, graceful, upright, long-lived, filial and obedient'.

The date given in CTS refers of course not to the time of the kaghan's death but to that when the Chinese court heard the news. TCTC 233.7520 states that on 23 December 789, 'the emperor heard that the Uighur T'ien-ch'in Khaghan had died'. See also below appendix B (ii).

180 Kuo Feng was the son of Kuo Yuëh (d. c.782; biographies in CTS 120.12b–13a and HTS 137.7b–8a), who was the eldest son of Kuo Tzu-i (see above, n.18). Feng was killed by Tibetans on 10 September 801. See TCTC 236.7597 and cf. CTS 196B.11a–b and HTS 216B.5a (translated Pelliot, Histoire ancienne, pp.63–4, 123–4). See also Bushell, 'The Ancient History', pp.507–8.

181 Chung-chen means 'loyal and upright'.

This and the following paragraph of CTS have been translated in Ecsedy, 'Uigurs and Tibetans', p.86. Her paper also discusses with copious annota-
tion the whole campaign of the Uighurs and Tibetans in Pei-t'ing in 790 and 791.

184 The parallel text in HTS (see p.105) claims that the khaghan was poisoned by the younger khatun, who was a granddaughter of P’u-ku Huai-en, through his son. However, no other text mentions that Huai-en had a son who went among the Uighurs, although two of his daughters married the Uighur khaghan. The HTS text is certainly corrupt, despite the fact that PIT 126.48ab quotes it without criticism, and all other early parallel texts support CTS’s version that it was the khaghan’s younger brother who murdered him. TCTCKI 233.7521 notes the discrepancy but accepts the Te-tsung shih-lu, which is in fact the same as CTS. TCTC places the event under the third month (21/3–18/4/790) but does not date it specifically. It dates the following coup d’etat which put ‘Chung-chen’ Khaghan’s son on the throne in the fourth month (19/4–18/5/790). THY 98.1746 and TFYK 980.14a agree with CTS’s account of both assassinations, except that TFYK does not date them to the month, but only the year (790). It may be noted that CTS and TCTC appear to be departing from their normal dating procedure here in that the months they give for the death of ‘Chung-chen’ Khaghan and that of the usurper actually refer to the events and not to the time the Chinese court learned about them. This is shown by a report in TFYK 976.5b, which relates that mourning at the Chinese court for ‘Chung-chen’ Khaghan began on 13 January 791. This was soon after the news reached Ch’ang-an, but nearly a year after the event itself.

185 This is probably the same Hsieh kan-chia-ssu (Il ügäsi) who had met Yuan Hsiu outside Karabalghasun a few years earlier. See above, n.156 (cf. also Ecsedy, ‘Uigurs and Tibetans’, pp.98–9).

186 TCTC 233.7521 puts A-ch’o’s age at fourteen. However, TFYK 663.17b agrees with CTS’s account that he was fifteen or sixteen and THY 98.1746 says he was sixteen. There is no way of finding out the correct figure and probably the Chinese sources intended only to give an approximate age to emphasise that A-ch’o was still very young.

187 No doubt it was the Chinese court rather than Kuo Feng that the deputy ministers wanted to keep in ignorance of what was happening. To detain Feng would hardly be a way of denying him knowledge. See the account of his return to Ch’ang-an below, n.190.

188 The character ch’en 錦 ‘displayed’ is omitted in the Po-na edition, but included in Palace (195.16b) and SPPY (p.9b).

189 The Palace (195.17a) and SPPY (p.9b) editions write ch’en ‘displayed’ in place of tseng 素 ‘gave’ and the sentence would then read: ‘All the utensils and silk displayed he presented . . . ’ But the Po-na version translated above makes better sense (cf. CTSCKC 65.9b).

190 TCTC 233.7522 adds some information about this embassy:

They sent the mei-lu, Prince Ta-pei to accompany Kuo Feng back to
court to announce the death of 'Chung-chen' Khaghan and also to ask for a document of appointment. Before this, Uighur ambassadors coming to China had been arrogant and rude in their ritual and bearing, and the prefects had behaved towards them as equals. When the mei-lu got to Feng-chou [map 2, 1A] the prefect Li Ching-lüeh [750–804; biographies in CTS 152.5b–6b and HTS 170.9a–b] .... said to the mei-lu, 'I have heard that your khaghan has just died and I want to hold a mourning rite for him'. Ching-lüeh first sat against a high mound, while the mei-lu lowered his head, bent his back and wept in front of him. Ching-lüeh soothed him saying, 'The khaghan's death has increased your sad and loving feelings.' The mei-lu's arrogant demeanour and fierce spirit vanished altogether. From then on, when Uighur ambassadors arrived, they paid respect to Ching-lüeh in his court and his prestige spread beyond the borders. In the winter, on the day hsin-hai of the tenth month (29/11/790), Kuo Feng arrived back [in Ch'ang-an] from the Uighurs. This moralistic little story, showing how diplomacy could control Uighur arrogance, is contained also in Li Ching-lüeh's biographies.

191 'That year' refers to the sixth of Chen-yüan, most of which fell in 790. According to THY 73.1330, the final surrender of Pei-t'ing to the Tibetans actually took place in the twelfth month of the sixth year, i.e. 9/1–7/2/791. However, we shall see later that the Chinese and Uighurs had given up the attempt to recapture the city a few months earlier. Stein (Innermost Asia, vol. II, p.554) remarks on the strategic geographic situation of the area near Pei-t'ing and there is no doubt that the city's loss meant the end of Chinese colonisation in Turkestan for the time being (ibid., pp.579–81; Demiéville, Le concile, p.182). The history of Pei-t'ing in the half-century leading up to its fall to the Tibetans has been examined thoroughly by Abe Takeo in Nishi-Uiguru kokushi no kenkyu, pp.150ff. Further bibliography is given by Ecsedy in 'Uigurs and Tibetans', p.93. See Pei-t'ing's location in map 1. The Palace (CTS 195.17a) and SPPY (p.9b) editions write 'Uighurs' here in place of 'Tibetans' given in Po-na. The parallel text in CTS 196B.10a (translated Pelliot, Histoire ancienne, pp.59–60; Ecsedy, 'Uigurs and Tibetans', p.83) specifies that it was the Tibetans, not the Uighurs, who were making insatiable demands. It also adds that Pei-t'ing was near the Tibetans 近羌. This phrase has been changed in the present text to 近遠 'being the closer' and in TCTC 233.7520 to 近離尤近 'especially close to the Uighurs' (cf. the translation of the latter text in Chavannes, 'Chinese Documents from the Sites of Dandän-Uiliq, Niya and Endere', p.536). Abe Takeo believes that the original sense of the passage was as it survives in CTS 196B, namely that Pei-t'ing was close to the Tibetans and that it was they who were making insatiable demands and seizing the living necessities of the people. He claims that Ssu-ma Kuang altered this original meaning; and that the CTS 195 phrase 'Pei-t'ing being the closer' is a
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193 These Sha-t'o, originally a tribe of the Western T'u-chüeh, had come under Uighur rule in 789, but gone over to the Tibetans in 790. In 808 they asked for Chinese protection and were settled in the Ordos region. The following year they were moved to northern Shansi. See Pulleyblank, ‘A Sogdian Colony’, pp.342–3. The rulers of the Later T'ang dynasty (923–36) came from this people. See also des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, pp.827–8. Further bibliography on the Sha-t'o can be found in Pinks, Die Uiguren von Kan-chou in der frühen Sung-Zeit, p.182. See their location in 790 on map 1.

194 By 790 the Tibetans had taken possession of virtually the whole of Lung-yu Province. The statement that Kuan-nei was also lost is, however, exaggerated (see locations map 2, 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B). The gains of the Tibetans which followed the An Lu-shan rebellion are considered in detail by Demiéville in Le concile, pp.169ff.

195 Demiéville has demonstrated (ibid., p.170) that I-chou (see map 1) had already fallen to the Tibetans by 781. He claims that Li Yüan-chung’s title, the Military Governor of I-chou, was only nominal.

196 This name was actually given to the man by the court, it being common practice to confer the imperial surname Li on meritorious persons. His original name was Ts’ao Ling-chung (TCTC 227.7303). He has no separate biographies in the standard histories under either name.

197 The four garrisons were Kucha (Chiu-tz'u), Kashgar (Su-le), Karashar (Yen-ch'i), and Khotan (Yü-tien). See also des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, p.806. The history of the term ‘four garrisons’ is discussed in Chavannes, Documents, pp.113–14. See their locations on map 1.

198 According to TCTC 227.7303, Kuo Hsin was the younger brother of Kuo Tzu-i. However, Hsin’s biographies in the standard histories (CTS 120.16b and HTS 137.10a) both claim that he was the son of Kuo Yu-ming (d.773), who was the half-brother of Tzu-i through his mother. Presumably he had taken the surname Kuo out of deference to his famous elder brother. Kuo Hsin had taken up his post in the Four Garrisons at the end of Su-tsung’s reign (c.762). The notes on him in CTS have been translated by Chavannes in ‘Documents from Dandän’, pp.533–4.

199 The date given here (786) is incorrect, and several early texts date this information in the second year not of Chen-yüan but of Chien-chung (781). They include THY 73.1329 and TCTC 227.7303 and Kuo Hsin’s biographies in both the standard histories (see n.198). Cf. Demiéville, Le concile, p. 170.

200 According to TCTC 227.7303, it had been more than ten years since a mission had last got through from An-hsi and Pei-t'ing to the capital. See also the translation by Chavannes in ‘Documents from Dandän’, p.535.

163
It will be recalled (see n.1) that a group of the Kharlukh had been incorporated into the Uighur empire soon after its foundation. However, many of them remained independent and became a notable power between the Uighurs and Tibetans. The three tribes of the Kharlukh were the Mou-la, P'o-fu, and T'a-shih-li (TCTCYC 233.7520). There are actually several different readings for the first two of these tribes. The subject has been well treated already and there is no need for further detail here. I refer the reader to the copious bibliography of Ecsedy in 'Uigurs and Tibetans', pp.96–7. Only HTS (and its derivatives like PIT 126.48ab) write 'white-eyed' T'u-chüeh in place of CTS's 'white-clothed'. Other early sources support CTS. They include THY 73.1330; CTS 196B.10a (cf. Pelliot, Histoire ancienne, p.60 and Bushell, 'The Ancient History', p.504) and TCTC 233.7520. HTS's reading can be discarded here. Compare also CTSCKC 65.9b. White clothes in fact often carried a special significance. In particular they were used by Manicheans (cf. Chavannes and Pelliot, 'Un traité manichéen', p.262; Hamilton, Les Ouighours, pp.49–50). White raiments were also symbolic of the movement against the Abbasids of the Governor of Khorasan, Abü Muslim, who was murdered in 755. One of his followers began a revolt c. 775 and even appealed to the Turks (T'u-chüeh) for help; his rising was not put down until about 783. In 806 a further revolt broke out, led by Rāfi' ibn Layth, who even took the city of Samarkand. He too was at first assisted by Turks, among other people from the east, and was not suppressed until 810. See Barthold, Turkestan, pp.198–200. It may also be noted that Barthold quotes one Arab writer as referring to 'the existence in the villages of Transoxania of the religion of the "people in white raiment, whose rites resemble those of the Zindiqs"' (ibid., p.200). Minorsky remarks ('Tamim ibn Bahr's Journey', p.296) that 'the Zindiqs' was the normal term used by Arab writers to refer to the Manicheans. It is possible that there was a connection between the 'white raiments' worn by Abü Muslim's party and those of the Manicheans.

A parallel text in CTS 196B.10a writes 'The Hsieh kan-chia-ssu returned home defeated' 頓伽迦斯不利而還. CTSCKC 65.9b quotes one edition of CTS as giving 頓伽迦斯不利亦還, while the present Po-na edition omits the third to fifth characters. The transcription Hsieh kan-li is surely a mistake resulting from the ignorance of the Chinese writers of Turkic titles. See also Ecsedy, 'Uigurs and Tibetans', p.98.

The term I have translated 'strong men' is ting-chuang. In China the word ting meant an adult, in T'ang times normally one from twenty to fifty-eight years old. However, these figures were not constant (des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, p. 73; Twitchett, Financial Administration, pp.25–6). I think it unlikely that the editor of CTS here intended to imply any specific ages in the men who followed Il ügäsi.

Po-na actually writes 六十百, but this is clearly incorrect. The Palace
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(195.17b) and SPPY (p.10a) editions give 百六十，which means 160. CTS 13.5a and TCTC 233.7521–2 place the Sino-Uighur attempt to recapture Pei-t’ing under 790. However, CTS 196B.10a and THY 73.1330 describe the affair under the autumn of 791, while HTS 7.7b (followed by PIT 126.48ab) reports the death of Yang Hsi-ku under the month 3–31/10/791. Although CTS, above, dates the affair 794, it places this passage as though it referred to 790, for the next date given is 791. Whether 790 or 791 is the correct date for this second phase of the Pei-t’ing war is uncertain. However, TCTC gives the clearest and most coherent account of the war and A-ch’o’s accession and is the only text to report Il üğäsi’s return to Karabalghasun between the battles in its proper place chronologically. Perhaps its evidence and that of CTS 13 are the most reliable we have. See also Ecsedy, ‘Uigurs and Tibetans’, pp.99–101. In any case, since Yang Hsi-ku went back to Karabalghasun with Il üğäsi after the second battle, there is no reason to reject HTS 7’s date for the death of Hsi-ku.

Des Rotours claims (‘Les grands fonctionnaires’, p.250) that ‘le protectorat général de Ngan-si [An-hsi] disparut définitivement en la sixième année tcheng-yuan (790)’. Both An-hsi and Hsi-chou became the centres of Uighur states after the fall of the Uighur empire. See Pinks, Die Uiguren von Kan-chou, pp.61–2 and especially Abe Takeo, Nishi-Uiguru, pp.231–85. Abe Takeo’s views are summarised in his article ‘Where was the Capital of the West Uighurs?’, pp.443–50.

It is important to note that in trying to rescue the region of Pei-t’ing from the Tibetans the Uighurs were not merely helping the Chinese court, since they themselves had exercised some control there. Minorsky writes that ‘towards the middle of the eighth century the Uyghurs already had Bishbaliq [Pei-t’ing] under their sway’ (Hudūd al-ʿĀlam, p.272). See also Abe Takeo, Nishi-Uiguru, pp.150–1. Other texts attest to substantial Uighur influence, if not outright domination, in cities of the western regions. See Müller, ‘Zwei Pfählinschriften’, pp.6–13, 22–4, 26, and the comments of von Gabain in ‘Steppe und Stadt im Leben der ältesten Türkten’, pp.56–8.

TCTC 233.7522 calls this valley Fou-t’u. WHTK (347.2720a) and PIT (126.48ab) have relied on HTS and called it Shen-t’u. However, this seems to be a mistake and fou-t’u is a transcription of the Buddha’s name or can mean ‘stupa’. Abe Takeo has shown that the valley lay in P’u-li Subprefecture, that is some 200 li to the east of Pei-t’ing (see Nishi-Uiguru, pp.165–7 and the map facing p.564). See also TT 191.1030c; Chavannes, Documents, pp.12, 305; and Ecsedy, ‘Uigurs and Tibetans’, pp.101–2. Abe rejects a note in TCTCYC 233.7522 which claims that the Fou-t’u valley lay northwest of Mt Ötükän, the sacred forest of the Turkic peoples (discussed by Pelliot in ‘Neuf notes’, pp.212–19). However, Tasaka Ködö suggests that there could have been two valleys by this name (‘Chû Tô ni okeru seihoku henkyô no jôsei ni tsuite’, pp.174–5). He considers that in the present
context it is more likely that the reference is to the Fou-t'u valley north-west of Mt Ötükän. This notion seems to me to be strengthened by two factors: (i) the TCTCYC note refers directly to the present event when the Kharlukh seized the territory round the Fou-t'u valley from the Uighurs; (ii) tribes moved from the region of P'u-lei would have been western Uighur groups, not north-western as CTS specifically states.

209 See above, n.184.
210 See above, n.190.
211 The date here is curious. TCTC 233.7523 claims that the emperor sent the ambassador on 21 March 791. It might be possible to conclude that CTS's date refers to the handing over of the appointment in Karabalghasun, except for two factors. Firstly, the dating to the day of a Chinese embassy always refers to the order despatching it from Ch'ang-an. Secondly, both THY 98.1747 and TFYK 965.8b place this mission under the second month (10/3-7/4/791) and THY specifies that the edict of appointment was issued at that time. Probably the editor of CTS has simply copied the date incorrectly (see also below, n.212).
212 TCTC 233.7523 and THY 98.1747 also give the ambassador's surname as Yü 赵. However, Suš-ma Kuang writes (TCTKI 233.7523) that he is following the Uighur biographies in CTS and HTS, but that the Shih-lu has K'ang 康 instead. TFYK 965.8b also gives K'ang. Suš-ma Kuang has clearly relied on the Shih-lu for the date of the mission and as the basic source it must be accounted the most reliable. CTS has copied the surname (and date) inaccurately. The ambassador was probably of Sogdian origin: this is suggested by the surname K'ang (see above, n.145).
213 Feng-ch'eng means 'showing sincerity to the emperor'.
214 THY 98.1747 dates this embassy the fourth month (8/5-5/6/791).
215 The character kan 千 in the transcription of the Turkic title tarqan is actually omitted by mistake in Po-na. It is included in the Palace (195.18a) and SPPY (p.10a) editions.
216 THY 98.1747 says that the Prince of Yung was called Yüan. Li Yüan was the sixth son of Hsüan-tsung. He became the Prince of Yung in 724. He was the father of fifty-eight children. His biographies are given in CTS 107.3b and HTS 82.3a.
217 The standard histories do not report this khatun's appointment as princess by the Chinese court. However, an edict survives in CTW 49.1b-2a and TTCLC 42.207 appointing an unnamed Uighur princess. It is dated 13 June 767 and Kuang P'ing-chang has shown that it refers to the Younger Princess of Ning-kuo. See 'Ho-ch'in k'ao', p.51. She also suggests (ibid.) that the princess could be the same person as a Princess of Ning-kuo who is said in TFYK 979.16b to have led the delegation which arrived in Ch'ang-an on 16 November 788 to welcome the Princess of Hsien-an.
218 The first Princess of Ning-kuo went out to the Uighurs in September 758.
and the khaghan, Mo-yen-ch’o, died the following year. Moreover, we know that Tun mo-ho killed many members of Mou-yü’s family as part of his coup d’état. Surely the two sons mentioned here were those of Mou-yü, not of Mo-yen-ch’o, and CTS has simply made a mistake.

219 Both TCTC 233.7524 and TFYK 995.15b report this embassy in the ninth month (3-31/10/791). In TCTC the battle in Ling-chou is given under the eighth month. Tasaka Kōdō (‘Seihoku henkyō’, pp.175–6) doubts this report of a Uighur victory in Pei-t’ing, which he says was made to the court by the Uighurs to cover up their earlier disastrous defeat in the same city. That concerning the fight in Ling-chou, however, can be accepted as genuine.

220 This paragraph in CTS is translated in Ecsedy, ‘Uigurs and Tibetans’, p.84.

221 Parallel texts in TCTC 233.7525 and TFYK 995.16a call this man by his full name, Shang Chieh-hsin.

222 There is some confusion in the Chinese texts over this man’s name. HTS and some editions of CTS (for instance Palace, 195.18b; SPPY, p.10a) give his surname as Yao-lo-ko, while TFYK 976.5b and the Po-na edition of CTS write Yao-lo. The first is certainly more accurate. Yao-lo-ko was the standard Chinese transcription of the Turkish YaYlaqar, which was the surname of the ruling Uighur clan. See Henning, ‘Argi and the “Tokharians”’, p.555 and Hamilton, Les Ou’ighours, p.3. The given name of the ambassador is written Ling 靈 in CTS, Chiung 夏 in HTS and Hao 灰 in TFYK 976.5b.

223 The day keng-yin does not exist for the sixth month. TCTC 235.7568 reports this appointment under the day keng-yin of the fifth month, i.e. 15 June 795 (see Takeo Hiraoka, Koyomi, p.220). CTS’s reading can be rejected.

224 Chang Chien had actually been once before to the Uighur capital, since he was a member of the embassy which escorted the Princess of Hsien-an there in 788. He died at the age of sixty while on a mission to the Tibetans in 804 to 805 and his corpse was brought back to Ch’ang-an. His biographies are contained in CTS 149.10a–11b, HTS 161.1a–2b. He is of unusual interest in that there is a short biography of him also in the only surviving shih-lu of the T’ang, the Shun-tsung shih-lu (3.10). See also the translation of Solomon in The Veritable Record of the T’ang Emperor Shun-tsung, pp.26–7. The notes on Chang Chien are placed under 16 May 805, the day he was posthumously appointed President of the Ministry of Rites.

225 Huai-hsin means ‘cherishing sincerity to the emperor’.

226 The sources do not agree concerning the time of A-ch’o’s death. TCTC 235.7568 places it under the fourth month of the eleventh year of Chen-yüan (24/4–22/5/795). CTS 13.11a dates it specifically 21 March 795, but TFYK 976.6a–b makes it clear that this date applies not to the khaghan’s death but to the court mourning in Ch’ang-an for his death, see below appendix B (ii). TFYK 967.13b dates A-ch’o’s death the tenth year (794) and THY
98.1747 specifies the fourth month of that year (4/5–2/6), but this date no
doubt also refers to the court mourning.

There is some disagreement also on the date of the despatch of Chang
Chien to appoint the new khaghan. CTS 13.11b and TCTC 235.7568
date the despatch 15 June 795. CTS 149.11a (Chang Chien’s biography)
and the Shun-tsung shih-lu 3.10 (translated Solomon, The Veritable Record,
p.26) merely indicate the eleventh year (795). TFYK 967.13b and THY
98.1747 place it under the tenth year (794). TCTC and CTS 13 give the
most precise date for Chang Chien’s despatch. Furthermore, the position
of their statement in the text confirms that the news is dated the eleventh
year through intention. On the other hand, the position of THY’s and
TFYK’s statements in their texts would have been the same even had they
dated A-ch’o’s death and Chang Chien’s despatch the eleventh and not the
tenth year. Probably THY gives 十年 (the tenth year) rather than 十一年
(the eleventh year) by mistake and TFYK has copied the error. See also

The khaghan in question here is presumably ‘T’ien-ch’ìn’ (Tun mo-ho),
the last named in this text before this point. It cannot be a reference to
‘Huai-hsin’s’ immediate predecessor, since we are told he had no sons.

It is striking that the Chinese standard histories should devote so little
space to the reign of a dynastic founder. ‘Huai-hsin’ was in fact one of the
most important of all the Uighur khaghans. It is probably to the career of
this khaghan that the second half of the Karabalghasun Inscription refers.
See below appendix A(i).

The khaghan mentioned here was probably ‘Huai-hsin’ under a different
title. See appendix A(ii).

CTS 14.10a reports this embassy, dating it exactly 8 February 807. It is
recorded also that on 22 February the Uighurs asked to build temples in
Ho-nan (Lo-yang) and T’ai-yüan and that the request was granted (pp.10a–
b). The two cities were obvious choices. Lo-yang was where Mou-yü had
met the Sogdians who converted him to Manicheism and T’ai-yüan was a
usual stopping place for embassies or armies travelling between Uighur
territory and Ch’ang-an. See also TFYK 999.20a and Chavannes and

The editor of this chapter of HTS may well have believed that this meant
‘for the second time since the current khaghan came to power’. But in the
light of the arguments presented in appendix A (ii) it must be reinterpreted
to mean ‘for the second time since diplomatic relations had been reopened’.

It is striking that this should be the first Uighur delegation to China to be
accompanied by Manicheans. There is a strong implication here that
Manichean influence had actually increased in Karabalghasun since ‘Huai-
hsin’s’ restoration. The strength of Manicheism under the new dynasty is
attested also in non-Chinese sources. A Manichean hymn-book (fragments
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of which are given with transliteration and translation in Müller, 'Ein Doppelblatt', pp.7-28) had been begun under Mou-yü but left incomplete for many years. It was finished during the reign of Ai teng-li-lo ku mo-mi-shih ho p'i-chia Khaghan. (Both 'Pao-i', 808–21, and 'Chao-li', 824–32, reigned under this title. Hamilton, Les Ouïghours, p.141 and Henning, 'Argi and the "Tokharians"', p.566 believe the first to be the relevant khaghan here, Müller himself, 'Ein Doppelblatt', pp.36–7, the second.) Furthermore, the Arab traveller Tamīm ibn Baḥr, who visited Karabalghasun in the early 820s, claims that Manicheism was found outside the capital, but was the dominant religion inside it. See especially Minorsky, 'Tamīm ibn Baḥr’s Journey', pp.283, 296, 302–3 and compare Minorsky, Hudūd al-Ālam, p.268.

Chavannes and Pelliot ('Un traité manichéen', p.265) translate 晴 酪 as de lait et de beurre, but add (pp.269–70) that 酪 could mean ‘fermented milk’. 晴 can mean ‘mare’s milk’. Bichurin (Sobranie svedenii o narodakh, vol. I, p.331) translates the characters as kymis, that is ‘fermented mare’s milk’. This substance has been commonly consumed in Mongolia since time immemorial and in the present context is the most likely meaning of these two characters. Chavannes and Pelliot ('Un traité manichéen', p.270) admit that this is a possible rendering.

The Eastern Market-place had become a residential area, forcing the merchants to move their business to the Western Market-place (map 5). See Ch'ang-an chih 8.11b and Waley, The Life and Times, p.31.

Apart from the first two sentences, this paragraph is based on the T'ang kuo-shih pu (3.66), a work written about 825 (see des Rotours, Traité des examens, p.107). The T'ang kuo-shih pu was among those works available to the writers of HTS, but not to those of CTS, who wrote in more difficult and turbulent times. Compare Nien-erh shih cha-chi 17.1a–b. This would explain why there is no parallel text in CTS. A copiously annotated translation of this paragraph and parallel texts can be found in Chavannes and Pelliot, 'Un traité manichéen', pp.264ff.

I have translated a THY text parallel to this in appendix A (ii). There it is made clear that the princess was the wife of all four khagans. The custom whereby one khaghan could take over his predecessor’s wife as his own is exemplified also in the case of the Younger Princess of Ning-kuo. Compare Li Fu-t’ung, Hui-hu shih, p.181.

Pao-i means ‘protecting righteousness’.

See above, n.173.

Possibly the second embassy under ‘Pao-i’. The first could have been that which reported ‘Huai-hsin’s’ death in 808.

I-nan-chu was the title also of one of the authors of the Karabalghasun Inscription. See between lines 1 and 2 of the stele in Haneda Tōru, ‘Kaikotsushi no kenkyu’, p.305. Schlegel assumed him to be the same man as the one mentioned in the present texts (Die chinesische Inschrift auf dem uiguris-
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*chen Denkmal in Kara Balgassun*, p.9). However, *i-nan-chu* was a transcription of Turkish *iinanč* (see Chavannes and Pelliot, ‘Un traité manichéen’, p.183), which was a title (Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours*, p.152). Two men of this title are mentioned in Müller, ‘Der Hofstaat’, pp.210–11.

According to *TFYK* 976.8b, *I-nan-chu* was the leader of the embassy which came to court in 810. If the two men of this title were the same person, this would explain the significance of *HTS*’s ‘for a second time’.

*TCTC* 239.7701–2 reports that the Uighur arrival was memorialised on 19 November 813. The Po-na edition of *CTS* actually writes *Hu-ti* 鶴鶴 here. However, this is clearly a mistake. The Palace (195.18b) and SPPY (p.10b) editions give *P'i-t'i*, and parallel texts such as *HTS*, *LHKLSC* *i-wen*, p.3, and *TCTCYC* 239.7702 corroborate the latter version. *TCTCYC* 239.7702 adds that the *P'i-t'i* springs were 300 li north of the West Shouhsiang Fortress. See map 2, 1A.

The Five Fortresses of T’ien-te were probably the West, Middle and East Shouhsiang Fortresses (map 2, 1A,2A) and two others which it is impossible to determine. See des Rotours, *Traité des fonctionnaires*, p.743. The East Shouhsiang Fortress had been severely damaged by flooding from the Yellow River in 812 (*TCTC* 238.7689), and by 813 the West Fortress had also suffered greatly (*YHCHTC* 4.112). Following the suggestion of his chief minister Li Chi-fu (758–814), but against the advice of Li Chiang (see n.245), the emperor had decided that the defence of the empire would be best preserved by moving all but a few of the soldiers formerly stationed there to the T’ien-te Army (*TCTC* 239.7700, *YHCHTC* 4.112–13). *CTS*’s vaguer statement that ‘the border armies put themselves on the alert’ seems more accurate than *HTS*’s report. Li Chi-fu’s biographies can be found *CTS* 148.3a–6a and *HTS* 146.2b–6b and his career is outlined in des Rotours, *Traité des examens*, p.276.

The precise significance of the Uighur move to the *P'i-t'i* springs is unclear. However, I doubt that it was connected directly with the proposed marriage alliance, since the Uighurs do not appear to have carried their incursions further even though the emperor gave no favourable answer to *I-nan-chu*’s request. This *HTS* paragraph is based very closely on Li Chiang’s *LHKLSC* *i-wen*, p.3. Li may have believed that the Uighurs made the military move to put pressure on the Chinese emperor, but parallel texts, such as *CTS* and *TCTC* 239.7701–2 do not corroborate his opinion. It may even be that *I-nan-chu* left the capital as soon as he heard of the sally without waiting for an answer to the request for a marriage. It is abundantly clear from the evidence which follows, however, that the Chinese were somewhat afraid of a Uighur invasion at this time. They were aware that the Uighurs had regained their strength in the few years preceding 813. In 810 the emperor decided, on the advice of Po Chü-i and others, to negotiate with Wang Ch’eng-tsung (d.820; biographies *CTS* 142.9a–12a and *HTS* 211.7b–9b).
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whose rebellion in western Ho-pei the imperial forces had been unable to suppress. One of Po's reasons for suggesting this course was that the failure of the military operations against Wang had impressed the Uighurs with China's weakness (see Po-shih Ch'ang-ch'ing chi 42.14a, translated Feifel, Po Chü-i as a Censor, p.232. The war against Wang Ch'eng-ts'ung is discussed in great detail by Feifel, pp.114–55.) In 814 Li Chi-fu suggested that Yu-chou (map 2, 1A) be re-established, one of his reasons being 'to prepare for the Uighurs' (LHKLSC i-ween, p.5; YHCHTC 4.105–6 and cf. Pulleyblank, 'A Sogdian Colony', p.342). Finally, Li Chiang's memorial given above in HTS (under 814) leaves no doubt of the fear of the Uighurs which prevailed in Chinese circles at this time.

245 Li Chiang (764–830) had an extremely distinguished official career, and became chief minister in 811. He was a bitter opponent of the powerful eunuch T'u-t'u Ch'eng-ts'ui (d.820; biographies CTS 184.9b–10b and HTS 207.7a–b), and the latter had been sent away from the capital the day before Li's appointment. Li resigned because of ill health early in 814, that is just before this memorial, and became the President of the Ministry of Rites. No sooner had he left the post than his eunuch enemy was back in the capital. Li later became the Military Governor of Shan-nan-hsi (map 2,1B). He was injured by rebel soldiers and died soon afterwards. See his biographies in CTS 164.7a–10b and HTS 152.5a–10a.

246 This memorial was taken directly from Li Chiang's works. According to CCTSC 4A.26b–27a, the Li Chiang lun-chien chi contained seven chüan; it had been edited by Li Chiang's nephew Hsia-hou Tzu (biographies CTS 177.16b–17a and HTS 182.9b–10a) and was prefaced the Ta-chung period (847–60) by Chiang Chieh. A work called Li hsiang-kuo lun-shih chi, written by Li Chiang and prefaced 851 by Chiang Chieh, survives today, but it contains only six chüan. This must be the same as the Li Chiang lun-chien chi, with the seventh chüan missing. In addition, there exists a short work, LHKLSC i-ween in one chüan. In this book (p.3) the entire memorial reproduced in HTS above is given, the two texts being identical apart from a few characters which do not alter the meaning. It seems to me extremely likely that the LHKLSC i-ween is in fact the seventh chüan of the Li Chiang lun-chien chi mentioned in CCTSC. The evidence for this is a passage in Wang Ying-lin's YH (61.17b–18a). There we are told that Li Chiang's nephew transmitted some of his writings which were then edited by Chiang Chieh into seven p'i'en. The work known to Wang Ying-lin was called Li ssu-k'ung lun-shih chi and contained seven chüan. In the first three, Li discussed twenty-seven matters and in the last four forty-three. In the surviving LHKLSC there are twenty-eight sections in the first three chüan and thirty-four in the last three. The i-ween has nine, so the last three and i-ween combined contain forty-three, precisely the number given by Wang Ying-lin.
Various other versions of the same work are mentioned in the bibliographies of the Sung and Yuan. CWTM 5.378 refers to a Li Chiang lun in three chüan and HTS 60.8b to a Li Chiang chi in twenty chüan. YH 61.18a also mentions an edition in twenty chüan. The precise relationship of all these books to one another is unclear. However, there is no doubt that the compilers of HTS knew the works of Li Chiang. Chao I has given evidence that HTS based some of its biography of Li upon them (Nien-erh shih cha-chi 17.15b) and it is not surprising that HTS should have included the present memorial. On the other hand, Li's writings do not seem to have been available to the editors of CTS.

247 Although the expected invasion did not eventuate, the very incomplete records in TFYK 999.25b show that the flow of horses resumed in 815. See also my article ‘Sino-Uighur Diplomatic and Trade Contracts’, p.239.

248 The T'ien-te Army was in fact restored to its original place in 814. It had been created in 753, but had been later moved. See YHCHTC 4.112 and des Rotours, Traité des fonctionnaires, p.796. Compare also above, n.243.

249 Po Chü-i claimed that both the Tibetans and Uighurs knew everything that happened in China through their secret agents. See his memorial in Po-shih Ch'ang-ch'ing chi 42.14a and the translation of Feifel in Po Chü-i, p.232.

250 Relations between the Uighur empire and the Tibetans were never friendly and the reader will already have noticed that virtually all glimpses concerning the subject show the two states at war with one another. A few specific cases of the period in which the present memorial falls can be noted. In 808 the Uighurs attacked the Tibetans and seized Liang-chou (see map 1) from them (TCTC 237.7651). Late in 813 they attacked their southern neighbours west of Liu Valley, itself north-west of Hsi-chou (TCTC 239.7701; a following note in TCTCYC records the location of the Liu Valley, see map 1). But the most important case concerns a time slightly later than this memorial and is an interesting commentary on Li Chiang's fear that the Uighurs and Tibetans would make a treaty. In 822 a Chinese ambassador to Lhasa had seen the famous Tibetan general and chief minister Shang Ch'i-hsin-erh during his journeys to and from his destination. Shang had said to him: 'The Uighurs are a small state! In the year ping-shen (816), I crossed the desert and pursued them to within two days' march of their walled city. I planned to destroy it once I had arrived, but just then I heard that my own state was in mourning and returned home.' (CTS 196B.15b, translated also Pelliot, Histoire ancienne, p.75, Bushell, 'The Ancient History', p.519. See also HTS 216B.7a, Pelliot, Histoire ancienne, p.131). The national mourning to which Shang refers was no doubt due to the death of the Tibetan ruler in 815, but the name of the monarch in question is unknown. See Demiéville, Le concile, p.234, and pp.281–90 on Shang Ch'i-hsin-erh, the son of Shang Tsan-mo (see n.116).
Wu Shao-yang was the adopted younger brother of Wu Shao-ch'eng. When the latter died (809), Shao-yang killed Shao-ch'eng's son. He became a military governor and performed acts of great destruction. However, he was able to assuage the emperor by sending him large gifts. In Li Chiang's mind here he typifies the strong, hereditary military governor, able to wield power independent of the throne. Shao-yang died in 814 shortly after this memorial was sent to the emperor. However, if Li Chiang and the government hoped that this would mean an end to the troubles in Huai-hsi (map 2, 2B), they were to be disappointed. Wu Shao-yang's eldest son, Yuan-chi, took over his position without permission from Ch'ang-an. Huai-hsi was strategically important and its military governor was, in Waley's words, 'in a position at any moment to cut the line of river and canal transport by which grain reached the Capital from the east and he was also within striking distance of the Eastern Capital at Lo-yang' (The Life and Times, pp.90–1). The emperor therefore decided to overthrow Yuan-chi by force. The attempt went very badly at first and it was only in 817, when Pei Tu (see below, n.279) was put in charge of operations, that Wu was defeated. Pei's men captured their opponent alive and the rebellion collapsed (ibid., p.123). Yuan-chi was beheaded soon after. The biographies of the Wus are given in CTS 145.9b–13b and HTS 214.2a–5a.

There are interesting discrepancies in the texts concerning embassies in 813 and 817. Eight texts refer to a Uighur embassy to China in 813: (a) CTS, above, p.108 (middle paragraph); (b) TFYK 976.9a; (c) TFYK 979.17b; (d) HTS above, p.109 (sixth paragraph); (e) HTS 164.10b–11a; (f) THY 98.1748; (g) CTS above, p.114 (first paragraph); and (h) LHKLSC i-wen, p.3. It is true that texts (d) and (h) are not specifically dated, but their positions in their respective texts before Li Chiang's 814 memorial and parallel texts enable us to date them 813.

Four other texts refer to Uighur ambassadors at the Chinese court in 817. All give a statement parallel to text (g). (i) TCTC 240.7730; (j) TFYK 976.10a; (k) TFYK 979.17b–18a; and (l) HTS above, p.115 (first paragraph). Text (l) is not specifically dated, but its position in the text after Li Chiang's 814 memorial and parallel texts enable us to date it 817.

It is clear, then, that there were two distinct embassies, one in 813 and the other in 817. Both asked for a marriage, but probably only the 817 embassy was answered definitely that the request was refused, at least until the situation in China had improved. Texts (e) and (g) appear to be misplaced. Text (e) records under 813 the embassy in connection with which Yin Yu went to the Uighurs, but probably the editor confused the 813 embassy with that of 817. As mentioned before, texts (i), (j), (k), and (l) are all parallel to text (g) and this text must therefore belong in date with the other four. It is dated 'the second day of the twelfth month'. Now it is most unusual in this chapter for days of the month to be numbered.
normal rule is for them to be arranged according to the cycle of the stems and branches. I think it almost certain that text (g) gives the date as 'the second day of the twelfth month' by mistake and should have given instead 'the second month of the twelfth year', which corresponds to 20/2-21/3/817. This would accord with the dates given in texts (i) and (j) (that in text (k) specifies only the year). See Haneda Tōru, 'Kaikotsushi no kenkyū', pp.223, 285. Chavannes and Pelliot, 'Un traité manicheen', pp.280–2, translate the parallel texts (k) and (g) and discuss the discrepancy in date between them. They conclude that (g) is correctly dated and (k) falsely. However, they appear to have overlooked the other texts mentioned above.

253 The problem caused by the independence of the military governors was a general one at this period (cf. Feifel, Po Chü-i, pp.172–4). However, these texts appear to be referring specifically to Wu Yüan-chi (see above, n. 251) who was not captured until November 817. See TCTC 240.7741–2.

254 The ambassador is called Li Ch'eng in TCTC 240.7730 and TFYK 979.17b–18a, but Li Hsiao-ch'eng in HTS 164.10b–11a and CTS 165.14b. It will be recalled that Li Hsiao-ch'eng was the name of the ambassador who took 'Pao-i's' appointment to him in 808. This seems to be the same man since his title is given as 'the Vice President of the Court of the Imperial Clan' in each case. He has no biographies in the standard histories under either name.

255 The biographies of Yin Yu (767–838) are given in CTS 165.14b–16b and HTS 164.10b–12a, and his career is outlined in des Rotours, Traité des examens, p.183. Both biographies report a curious story about this mission. They claim that the khaghan tried to make the Chinese ambassadors stay among the Uighurs as his subjects and even displayed the military strength of his army to put pressure on them to agree. Of course Yin Yu resisted the demand and the khaghan did not dare to press the question.

256 According to TCTC 241.7779, Hsien-tsung actually received Ho ta-kan's embassy at the end of his reign and granted the khaghan a marriage. On 14 February 820 Hsien-tsung died, and six days later Mu-tsung ascended the throne. THY 98.1748 reports that in the month 17/4–15/5/820, Mu-tsung received the embassy and enfeoffed his ninth younger sister as the Senior Princess of Yung-an with the intention of sending her to the Uighurs. The embassy was sent back to the Uighur court on 17 April (TCTC 241.7779) and the princess was to go later. The khaghan died, and his successor sent an embassy to fetch the bride. However, because the former khaghan was dead, the emperor decided to send another of his younger sisters in the place of the Senior Princess of Yung-an and he enfeoffed the newly chosen sister as the Princess of T'ai-ho (see below, n.260). The Princess of Yung-an is given a very short biography in HTS 83.15a. There it is reported that she became a Taoist nun in the T'ai-ho period (827–36). See also THY 6.66. Kuang P'ing-chang comments ('Ho-ch'in k'ao', p.54): 'I suspect that her
basic motive was that she did not want to marry a foreign ruler.' For some reason, which the sources do not indicate, 'Ch’ung-te' Khaghan had been especially anxious to marry this particular princess. According to THY 6.77, 'he made a strong request for [the Princess of] Yung-an, but in the end the emperor did not allow it'.

257 Ch’ung-te means 'honouring virtue'.

258 Two essays on this khaghan's appointment, both by Po Chü-i, survive in CTW 666.1a–2b, TTCLC 129.697, and Po-shih Ch’ang-ch’ing chi 33.3b–6a. The first is dated 26 May 821, the second simply 821. These essays were the actual documents of appointment, which Po Chü-i wrote on the command of the emperor. This khaghan seems to have been given appointment twice, firstly by P‘ei T‘ung and then by Hu Cheng. This explains why there are two documents of appointment. Po Chü-i had been summoned to the capital when the emperor Mu-tsung ascended the throne. Waley (The Life and Times, p. 132) comments that 'Within a few weeks of his return he was back at his old job of writing Imperial rescripts', that of a Secretary of the Department of the Grand Imperial Secretariat (see above, n.54) (Compare Po’s biographies in CTS 166.17a and HTS 119.5b). The phrase 'old job' in Waley’s remark is a reference to Po Chü-i’s career in Ch’ang-an between 808 and 810. At that time he had written numerous documents to and for the emperor, including letters to the Uighur khaghan (see above, n.134). However, his official status was not the same in the two periods. On Po’s career in 808 to 810 see especially Waley, The Life and Times, pp.47–76, and Feifel, Po Chü-i.

259 Ssu-chieh was the name of one of the nine T’ieh-le tribes of the Uighur confederation. See Pulleyblank, ‘Some Remarks’, p.39 and Hamilton, ‘Toquz-OYuz’, pp.27, 54.

260 The Princess of T’ai-ho was the seventeenth of Hsien-tsung’s eighteen daughters. She was probably the youngest of Mu-tsung’s sisters at this time since her only small sister died young. See her biography in HTS 83.15b. The Princess of T’ai-ho lived among the Uighurs until after their empire collapsed. The story of her recapture and return to Ch’ang-an in 843 is outlined in Kuang P’ing-chang, ‘Ho-ch’in k’ao’, pp.55–6 and Waley, The Life and Times, pp. 203–4.

261 The biography of Wang Ch’i (760–847) is given in CTS 164.2b–4a and HTS 167.7b–8b, and summarised by des Rotours in Traité des examens, p.182. It will be seen from his title that he was roughly contemporary in this post with Po Chü-i; indeed the two men were good friends of long standing (see Waley, The Life and Times, p.32).

262 For biographies of Hu Cheng (758–828) see CTS 163.2a–b and HTS 164.8a–b. Both accounts mention the mission which took the Princess of T’ai-ho to the Uighurs. They comment on the upright and frugal manner in which Hu led it and record that he refused a Uighur demand that the
delegates should change into local garb once they had crossed the border. The Po-na edition of CTS 195 incorrectly writes Hu's given name as 姚. The Palace edition (p.19a) corrects it to 姚, the form given in both the biographies in the Po-na edition of the standard histories.

Li Hsien was the fifth son of Li Sheng (727–93) who had been responsible for the defeat of the Chu Tz'u rebellion in 784. In 828 Hsien became the Military Governor of Ling-nan (modern Kwangtung), but died the following year at the age of fifty-five. See his biographies in CTS 133.16b–17a and HTS 154.6a.

The only separate biographies of a man by this name are in CTS 146.2b–3b and HTS 78.10b–11a, but the person there discussed died in 800. The editor of HTS has mistakenly given Yüeh 耀 for Jui 耀, the name given in a parallel text in TFYK 979.18b. Although Li Jui has no separate biographies in the histories, CTS later mentions him as The Commissioner for the Marriage Rites in this mission, the same position Li Yüeh is said to hold in the present text. A man called Li Jui 耀 is also reported to have gone as ambassador to the Tibetans in 825 (CTS 196.B.16a; Pelliot, Histoire ancienne, p.76; Bushell, 'The Ancient History', p.522). PIT 126.48bb has followed HTS's mistake.

Jen-hsiao tuan-li ming-chih shang-shou means 'benevolent and filial, upright and beautiful, intelligent and wise, superior and long-lived'.

The Tibetans had also attacked Ch'ing-sai in 820. See CTS 196.B.14a and HTS 216B.6a (translated Pelliot, Histoire ancienne, pp.70, 127, and cf. Bushell, 'The Ancient History', p.515). In HTS 216B.6a and HTS 8.2a it is called a beacon-tower. The context here suggests that it lay in the region of Yen-chou (map 2, 1A), but I have been unable to locate it more precisely than that.

Li Wen-yüeh has no separate biographies in the standard histories. However, those of the Tibetans report that late in 819 he staved off a fierce attack by the Tibetans on Yen-chou. Among the leaders of the assault was the chief minister Shang Ch'i-hsin-erh (see above, n.250). It lasted about a month and came very near to capturing the city. It was only through Li Wen-yüeh's brilliant leadership and personal bravery that the Tibetans were eventually forced to withdraw. See CTS 196B.13b and HTS 216B.5b (Pelliot, Histoire ancienne, pp.70, 126; Bushell, 'The Ancient History', pp.513–14).

It is striking that Hsien-tsung should have agreed to this marriage just at the end of his reign after having resisted it for so long. The first of the two reasons given here in CTS had been equally valid earlier in his reign. The second, however, can be accepted as a genuine reason. In 818 the Tibetans began making numerous raids on the western borders and in the Ordos region. That described in n.267 was quite typical. Moreover, since Hsien-tsung had come to the throne, relations with the Tibetans had been peaceful.
until this new series of onslaughts began. It was reasonable that he should hope to intensify the conflict between the Tibetans and Uighurs by granting the latter a marriage alliance. As it turned out he calculated correctly. Moreover, in 821–2 a Sino-Tibetan peace alliance was concluded, and each side guaranteed to refrain from trying to seize territory from the other. See CTS 196B.13a–15b and HTS 216B.5b–7a (Pelliot, Histoire ancienne, pp.68–75, 126–31; Bushell, ‘The Ancient History’, pp.511–19).

A second reason (suggested by Kuang P’ing-chang, ‘Ho-ch’in k’ao’, p.54) was that there was peace in the provinces. Waley writes that from the beginning of 819, ‘there no longer remained any considerable part of China that was not under the control of the Central Government – a situation that was at this period quite abnormal, and indeed only lasted for about eighteen months’ (The Life and Times, p.131).

I am tempted also to relate Hsien-tsung’s unexpected change of mind to the palace coup at the end of his reign. One clique led by the powerful eunuch T’u-t’u Ch’eng-ts’ui (see n.245) had wanted Hsien-tsung’s eldest son to succeed to the throne. An opposing faction had favoured the future Mu-tsung. Just before Hsien-tsung died (possibly at the hands of an assassinator), T’u-t’u’s party was decisively defeated, and both he and his proposed future emperor murdered. This resulted also in certain changes of policy, the main one being a transfer of emphasis from the use of military force to a decision to pare the imperial armies. (See Ch’en Yin-k’o’s treatment of this coup and the ensuing change in military policy in T’ang-tai cheng-chih shih, pp.106ff.) The new attitude would seem to have favoured a marital alliance with the Uighurs. However, I put forward this suggestion only tentatively, since the precise date that Hsien-tsung agreed to the marriage is unknown, and it could therefore have preceded the coup. Furthermore, I have been unable to find evidence to confirm that T’u-t’u opposed the marriage. His bitter hostility to its most important proponent, Li Chiang, and his overall support of military action as against negotiations suggest such a conclusion, but are a long way from proving it.

269 THY 6.77 and 98.1748 refer to the Princess of T’ai-ho as Mu-tsung’s fifth younger sister. However, the same texts call the Princess of Yung-an (above, n.256) his ninth younger sister. In the biographies of the princesses in HTS (83.15a) the latter is placed fifteenth among Hsien-tsung’s daughters. The Princess of T’ai-ho is seventeenth but the intervening daughter died young. CTS’s claim that it was his tenth younger sister that Mu-tsung sent to the Uighurs can therefore be accepted and is supported by TFYK 979.18b. The age of the Princess of T’ai-ho at this time is unclear. However, Mu-tsung was born in the seventh month (21/7–18/8) of 795 (CTS 16.1a) and was thus not quite twenty-six when he ordered that the princess be sent out to the Uighurs. The princess was somewhat younger than that.

270 See above, n.259.
This text, which runs 阮錮 司馬兼公主一人 葉護公主一人, could also mean ‘a mei-lu who was concurrently a superior administrator, one [unknown] princess, and Princess Yeh-hu . . . ’ This is because the character chien 参 (to act concurrently as) can follow the title to which it refers. However, in historical texts on the T’ang, it almost always precedes the title.

This paragraph belongs chronologically before that on p. 114 beginning ‘In the fifth month, 573 Uighur chief ministers’. The parallel text in HTS (the paragraph beginning ‘When the khaghan had ascended the throne’) appears to be based entirely on a single source, since the idea of a vast embassy, only 500 of whom were allowed into Ch’ang-an, flows so smoothly. It contains information not found in CTS and so must be drawn from a work other than that, probably the Mu-tsung shih-lu. In TFYK 979.18a–b, there is a text which begins with a passage almost identical to the paragraph in CTS beginning ‘In the fifth month, 573 Uighur chief ministers’. It is followed by one nearly the same as the paragraph in CTS p. 116 beginning ‘Ever since the death of the Princess of Hsien-an’ and then by one very similar to the paragraph in CTS p. 116 beginning ‘The Grand General of the Left Chin-wu Guards’. I suspect that there was only one original source for all the paragraphs mentioned. The TFYK 979 text seems to have followed it closely but omitted a short passage at the beginning upon which the present CTS paragraph about I-nan-chu, Governor-general Chü-lu and so on is based. The editor of CTS has rearranged the material.

I have here translated the characters 使至百寮 given in the Po-na edition. In the Palace (195.20a) and SPPY (p.11a) editions, the character 使 is placed immediately after 百 instead of at the beginning. The phrase could then read either ‘the escorting embassy and all the officials’ or ‘all the officials of the escorting embassy’. Although texts in CTS 16.11a and TFYK 979.19a support the sense of the Po-na edition, a work almost contemporaneous with the event under discussion agrees with the parallel HTS text that there were officials other than those of the escorting embassy present on this occasion. This is the T’ang kuo-shih pu (2.45) which adds: ‘The princess stopped her carriage at the emperor’s temporary residence. All the officials made repeated obeisance to her. A eunuch was about to order them to leave the residence, so she replied to their obeisances and withdrew.’ This adds further to the colourful atmosphere already obvious in the standard histories.

The poets Wang Chien and Yang Chü-yüan (c. 760–832) each wrote a poem mourning the departure of the Princess of T’ai-ho. They are called respectively ‘T’ai-hoifting-ju ho-fan’ and ‘Sung T’ai-ho kung-chu ho-fan’. They can be found in Chiian T’ang-shih 11.57a, 12.47a.

There are no separate biographies for Chang Wei-ch’ing in the standard histories. The troops he is here reported to have sent to Yü-chou had
no connection with the princess’s train, the route of which passed nowhere near that city. *TCTC* 242.7801 notes that on 13 November 821, shortly before this memorial, the rebel Wang T’ing-ts’ou (see below, n.279) had sent troops to attack Yu-chou. Chang’s soldiers must have been intended to help cope with the rebellion. See the location of Yu-chou on map 2, 2A.

The biography of Li Yu (d. mid–829) is given in *CTS* 161.6b–7a. He was best known for the important role he played in the capture of Wu Yuan-chi (see above, n.251) and the consequent collapse of Wu’s rebellion.

A parallel text in *TFYK* 979.19b gives Liu 柳 instead of Ch’ing 柳 for the name of these springs. I have been unable to locate them under either name. The position of the Huang-lu Springs is also unknown to me.

Texts in *TFYK* help to clarify the progress of the Princess of T’ai-ho’s train.

(a) *TFYK* 979.19a reports under the month 30/10–28/11/821 that a memorial came from Feng-chou (map 2, 1A) that 500 Uighur cavalry had arrived at the border to welcome the princess. They came well in advance since the princess did not reach the border till late December 821 or January 822 (see d).

(b) A memorial, dated the month 29/11–27/12/821, reports a letter from the T’ien-te Army as stating that a Uighur contingent had arrived at the Huang-lu Springs to welcome the princess. (See *CTS* and *TFYK* 979.19a.)

(c) According to another entry under the month 29/11–27/12/821, the Prefect of Feng-chou, Li Yu, memorialised that he had welcomed the princess and 3,000 Uighurs at the Liu (Ch’ing) Springs (see *CTS* and *TFYK* 979.19a–b).

(d) *TFYK* 980.17a mentions under the month 28/12/821–26/1/822 a further memorial from Feng-chou reporting that sixty-four Uighurs, accompanied by P’ei T’ung, had gone to the P’i-t’i Springs. This must have been a welcoming contingent from the Uighur capital, since P’ei T’ung had gone to Karabalghasun before this. Probably the train crossed the border near the P’i-t’i Springs late in December 821 or in January 822.

(e) Finally, *TFYK* 979.19b tells us that on 6 February 822 Cheng Ho, having escorted the Princess of T’ai-ho to the Uighurs, returned to China. Possibly he represents the first arrival of the train in Karabalghasun. He must have returned to China ahead of the main body of the delegation, which did not arrive back in Ch’ang-an until late in 822.

P’ei Tu (c.765–839) is given biographies in *CTS* 170.1a–13b and *HTS* 173.1a–7a, and his career is outlined by des Rotours in *Traité des fonctionnaires*, p.903. Apart from several short periods of disgrace, he was Chief Minister from 817 until near the end of his life. It will be recalled (n.251) that P’ei had rendered effective service against the rebellion of Wu Yuan-chi. In the seventh month (2–30/8) of 821, trouble erupted in the north-east when Wang T’ing-ts’ou, who was of Uighur origin, seized power without the authority of the government. Late in September 821, P’ei Tu was
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ordered to suppress 'the rebels in Yu-chou and Chen-chou' (see locations in map 2, 2A), that is Wang T'ing-ts'ou and his followers. As it happened, P'ei Tu was not as successful against Wang T'ing-ts'ou as he had been against Wu Yuan-chi. After a few months he was recalled to Ch'ang-an, where he arrived on 12 April 822, and soon after became head of the government. The emperor had decided to abandon operations against Wang T'ing-ts'ou and he was 'forgiven' on 27 February. Although in fact trouble later flared up again, the rebellion of Yu-chou and Chen-chou was formally over. Wang T'ing-ts'ou died at the end of 834 (see his biographies in CTS 142.13a–15a and HTS 211.9b–11a). P'ei Tu's unsuccessful attempt to defeat Wang T'ing-ts'ou is described in the biographies of the two men, and in other sources including TCTC 242.7796ff; CTS 16.11ff and HTS 8.2a–b.

A problem arises here because the present CTS 195 text is placed under the month 27/3–24/4/822, that is slightly later than the formal end of the war. A parallel text in TFYK 973.19a records that 3,000 Uighurs led by Li I-chieh left for home on the 23rd day of the third month (18 April) 822. It then goes on: 'Before that, P'ei Tu had been demanding the submission of the rebels in Yu-chou and Chen-chou'. There follows an account very similar to that found above in the present CTS 195 text. TFYK and CTS must be based on a single original source, probably the Mu-tsung shih-lu, but the editor of CTS has overlooked the characters 先 is 'before that' and so misdated the passage. Cf. Haneda Torn, 'Kaikotsushi no kenkyü', pp.232–3. The parallel text in HTS has noted the role of Li I-chieh and omitted any specific date.

280 Only Lo-yang, the Eastern Capital, was involved in 762.

281 This paragraph is a corrupt text parallel to the second paragraph on p.123 The text is misdated and misplaced. The character chao 昭 before li 禮 in the khaghan's title is omitted by mistake. The title should read 'Chao-li' (manifesting rites) Khaghan, as given above in HTS. See also below, n.288.

282 There were two distinct embassies involved here. The first, headed by Yü Jen-wen, was sent on 9 April 825 and brought the appointment to the khaghan (TCTC 243.7843). The second, headed by T'ien Wu-feng, was sent on 4 July and brought the state seals and gifts, loaded in twelve carriages (TFYK 976.11b). Neither Yü nor T'ien is given biographies in the standard histories.

283 TFYK 979.19b dates this return in the tenth month (19/10–17/11/822) instead of the intercalary tenth month, as given in CTS.

284 Neither Li Tzu-hung nor Chang Min is given a biography in the standard histories. On Hu Cheng, Li Hsien, Li Jui and Yin Yu, see above, respectively notes 262, 263, 264 and 255.

285 The whole of this account given by the embassy of their trip to Karabalghasun, down to 'presented us Han ambassadors with generous presents' is included in TFYK 979.19b–20a almost word for word the same as in CTS.

180
As Kuang P'ing-chang has remarked, it is an official report to the court and must be based on the Mu-tsung shih-lu; it may be assumed that the rituals by which the Uighurs accepted the princess as their khatun had been followed also for the Princesses of Ning-kuo and Hsien-an. See 'Ho-ch'in k'ao', p.55.

286 The phrase Hua Gate (Hua-men) is obscure. It is found frequently in Chinese poems of the T'ang. In those of Tu Fu mentioned above in notes 69 and 70, Hua-men means simply 'the Uighurs'. Tu Fu also wrote a poem called 'Liu Hua-men' in which he regretted China's need to depend on the Uighurs against rebels and bemoaned their presence in China. The poem concludes 'If the Uighurs (Hua-men) must really be kept back [as protection against rebels], There will be all the more misery for China to endure.' (see TKPS 14.8b-9b, translated von Zach, Tu Fu's Gedichte, pp.120-1). In the poem by Yang Chü-yüan mentioned in n.274, the term Hua-men occurs in the same sense of 'the Uighurs'. Other examples could be cited to illustrate this usage. However, in the present CTS text, the context suggests rather that the Hua-men was symbolic of the Uighur capital.

287 See above, n.279.

288 THY 98.1749 and TFYK 967.14a give 823 as the year of this khaghan's death and his successor's accession, rather than HTS's 824. TCTC 243.7840 reports the news under 824. Since the appointment for the new khaghan came in 825, the later date is more likely, because the Chinese court was usually very prompt in appointing new Uighur khaghans (cf. Haneda Tōru, 'Kaikotsushi no kenkyü', pp.230-1).

289 TFYK 967.14a and THY 98.1749 refer to Prince Ho-sa as his predecessor's younger cousin on his father's side. HTS and TCTC 243.7840 call Ho-sa the deceased khaghan's younger brother.

290 See above, n.282.

291 TFYK 967.14a, THY 98.1749 and TCTC 244.7879 support HTS's report that the khaghan was killed by his ministers in 832 and was succeeded by his nephew Prince Hu. TFYK 980.19a dates Ho-sa's death the month 24/4-22/5/833. (The notice actually writes the fourth month of the tenth year, but since there was no tenth year of T'ai-ho and since the preceding notice is under the sixth year and the following under the eighth, the text is clearly mistaken and means the seventh year 833, and not the tenth.) CTS 17B.9b dates Ho-sa's death 27 April 833. TFYK 976.12b makes it clear that the court mourning in Ch'ang-an began on 27 April 833. It appears, then, that the khaghan died in 832 but the news of his death did not reach Ch'ang-an till 833. TFYK 980 and CTS 17B have confused the date of the khaghan's death with the date of the court mourning for his death. The present CTS 195 text is obviously inaccurate, since the news of an event in Karabalghasun on 20 April 833 could not possibly have reached Ch'ang-an by the end of the month 25/3-23/4/833. One plausible explanation pointed
out by Haneda Tōru ('Kaikotsushi no kenkyū', p.231) is that Li I-chieh actually reported the khaghan to have died on the 27th of the third month of the previous year (1/5/832). This CTS text is also inaccurate in the name given for the khaghan (Prince Sa instead of Prince Hu) and in his relationship to his predecessor (younger brother instead of nephew). In both cases the editor of CTS 195 has confused the newly established khaghan with the preceding one.

292 Chang-hsin means 'manifesting sincerity'. The document of appointment survives in CTW 75.9b–10a and in TTCLC 129.697–8. There are no biographies for T'ang Hung-shih in the standard histories. The essay of appointment agrees with HTS that the second ambassador was the heir-designate of the Prince of Tse but names him as [Li] Jung 宸 instead of [Li] Yung 宸. He is given no biographies in the standard histories under either name, nor is he mentioned in the genealogy of the imperial family in HTS 70. The only Li Yung 宸 mentioned there was the eighth son of Mu-tsung, the Prince of An (see CTS 175.3b; HTS 82.14b; HTS 70B.52b).

293 TFYK 980.19a reports this embassy, dating it 16 June 835.

294 TCTC 246.7942 calls this man Ch'ai-ke 齊 instead of Ch'ai-ts'ao 曹. A following TCTCIK passage quotes the present CTS text as calling the man Ch'ai-ke. However, the Po-na, Palace (195.21b) and SPPY (p.12a) editions all refer to him as Ch'ai-ts'ao.

295 The Po-na edition of CTS and that quoted in TCTCIK 246.7942 write Lu-chi 露穀 for the name of this khaghan instead of HTS's Ho-sa 鳩. However, the Palace edition (CTS 195.22a) and SPPY (p.12a) both give the name as in HTS (cf. CTSCKC 65.12a). THY 98.1749 calls him Ho-sa 鳩. The Po-na CTS seems to have transcribed the name inaccurately. Haneda Tōru ('Kaikotsushi no kenkyū', pp.287–9) accepts the forms sounding Ho-sa as correct and points out that it is clear from the various sources, especially THY, that the minister Chüeh-lo-wu and Ho-sa Khaghan were in fact one and the same person.

296 According to TCTC 246.7947, the war between the Kirghiz and the Uighurs had been initiated by the Uighurs and had been going on for more than twenty years; the Uighurs had been defeated several times. The Kirghiz had sworn that they would seize 'the golden tent' of the Uighurs. The text adds that the golden tent was the tent where the khaghan lived (cf. HTS 217B.12a–b). It was considered the heart of Uighur power, since gold was symbolic of imperial rule. The golden tent is mentioned also by the famous Arab traveller Tamīm ibn Bahr, whose visit to the Uighur capital took place shortly after the Princess of T'ai-ho married the Uighur khaghan. Tamīm ibn Bahr reports that the tent was covered with gold and could be seen from far off even outside the city. It was superimposed on the flat top of the khaghan's castle and could hold 100 men (Minorsky, Hudūd al-'Ālam, p.268 and "Tamīm ibn Bahr's Journey", p.283). It had probably been brought
from China along with the Princess of T’ai-ho (ibid., pp.294–5,300). The Uighurs were not alone in possessing a golden tent; the Tibetan ruler at that time also had one. See Demiéville, *Le concile*, pp.202–3.
Two problems in the history of the Uighur Empire

i. THE IDENTITY OF THE 'HEAVENLY KHAGHAN' IN THE CHINESE KARABALGHASUN INSCRIPTION

The second half of the Chinese version of the Karabalghasun Inscription describes the heroic deeds of a man called \textit{t'ien k'o-han}, i.e. the 'Heavenly Khaghan'. There has been considerable controversy among scholars over the identity of the ruler under discussion in this part of the inscription.

The stele is headed with the title (Ai) \textit{teng-li-lo ku mo-mi-shih ho p'\textit{i-chia}} Khaghan. (The first character, Ai, is actually not in the inscription but is thought by most scholars to have been obliterated.) After an introduction relating briefly the foundation of the empire and naming the khaghans down to Mou-yii, it mentions the Uighur part in the suppression of the Shih Ssu-ming rebellion, and in lines 8 to 10 relates how Manicheism was introduced among the Uighurs. These three lines have been particularly well covered by Chavannes and Pelliot in 'Un traité manichéen retrouvé en Chine', pp.190-8. In line 11, the stele enumerates the khaghans from Tun \textit{mo-ho} down to the one known to the Chinese as '\textit{Huai-hsin}' (but omitting any reference to a usurper in 790). The lines following this (12ff) deal with the exploits of the 'Heavenly Khaghan'. They relate his military victories over his enemies, his recapture of Pei-t'ing and his extension of Uighur authority far to the west; they describe, in fact, a remarkable restoration of the Uighur empire. Schlegel believed that the Heavenly Khaghan was the Chinese emperor (see \textit{Die chinesische Inschrift auf dem uigurischen Denkmal in Kara Balgassun}, pp.74, 91). However, scholars such as Vasil'ev (see \textit{Kitaiskii nadpisi na Orkhonskikh pamiatnikakh v Komo-Tsaidame i Karabalgasune}, Russian text, p.20) early recognised that \textit{t'ien k'o-han} was a reference to a Uighur khaghan. The problem rests in deciding which one.

Writers on the Uighurs have mostly been divided between \textit{Ai teng-li-lo ku mo-mi-shih ho p'\textit{i-chia}} Khaghan, known to the Chinese as 'Pao-i' (808–21) and '\textit{Huai-hsin}'. Some of the principal proponents of the view that the Heavenly Khaghan is 'Pao-i' are Chavannes and Pelliot ('Un traité manichéen', pp.179, 199), Wang Kuo-wei (\textit{Kuan-t'ang chi-lin}, pp.993ff), Yamada Nobuo ('Kyüsei Kaikotsu kahan no keifu', pp.96–7), and Haneda Tôru ('Tödai Kaikotsushi no kenkyû', pp.317–23). Among those supporting the opposite opinion (i.e. that \textit{t'ien k'o-han} is '\textit{Huai-hsin}') could be listed the members of the Tsung-li yamen who deciphered the stele (see Vasil'ev, \textit{Kitaiskii nadpisi}, Chinese text, pp.11–12, 17), Radloff (\textit{Die alttürkischen Inschriften der Mongolei}, p.285), Tasaka Kôdô ('Chû Tô ni okeru seihoku henkyô no jösei ni tsuite', pp.177–9), and above all Abe Takeo (\textit{Nishi-Uiguru kokushi no kenkyû}, pp.182–93 and 'Where Was the Capital of the West Uighurs?', pp.439–42).
The principal arguments in favour of the former identification are as follows.

(i) The stele is headed with ‘Pao-i’s’ Turkish title, and one would therefore expect him to be the principal hero of the monument (especially Pelliot and Chavannes).

(ii) The stele appears from its heading to have been written under ‘Pao-i’, so he must be the t’ien k’o-han, since this term was normally used to refer to a current and not to a deceased ruler (especially Haneda Töru). (iii) Just after reporting ‘Huai-hsin’s’ accession, the stele refers to a Ho p’i-chia Khaghan, who can be seen from the context to be the same as the Heavenly Khaghan. It would be very strange to give a title immediately after reporting the accession of a khaghan unless that title referred to a person other than the khaghan just mentioned, and in any case Ho p’i-chia Khaghan seems a much more likely abbreviation of Ai teng-li-lo ku mo-mi-shih ho p’i-chia Khaghan (‘Pao-i’) than of T’eng-li-lo yu-lu mo-mi-shih ho hu-lu p’i-chia Khaghan (‘Huai-hsin’) (especially Haneda Töru). (iv) The argument that no accessions are reported after ‘Huai-hsin’s’ proves nothing, since the reported exploits of ‘Pao-i’ could have taken place before his accession to power (especially Yamada Nobuo).

The point here refuted by Yamada was in fact the main one advanced by Radloff for the identification of t’ien k’o-han with ‘Huai-hsin’, and Henning considers that this last view is supported by the Sogdian version of the Kara-balghasun Inscription (‘Argi and the “Tokharians’’, p.550). Abe Takeo acknowledges that the stele is headed with ‘Pao-i’s’ Turkish title and thinks it must therefore have been written under him. However, he does not agree with Haneda Töru that one can conclude from this that the Heavenly Khaghan is ‘Pao-i’. He points out that the term should more appropriately be applied to the dynastic founder (‘Huai-hsin’). In fact, Hansen had already raised the possibility that the ‘Heavenly Khaghan’ could be a dead ruler in his study of the Sogdian inscription (‘Zur soghdischen Inschrift auf dem dreisprachigen Denkmal von Karabalgasun’, p.25). Even Chavannes and Pelliot acknowledged that the first time the phrase t’ien k’o-han appears it refers to ‘Huai-hsin’, but they claim this case as exceptional because it occurs in a section where the man is being addressed in direct speech. Abe Takeo continues his discussion (Nishi-Uiguru, pp.185-6) by remarking that Ho p’i-chia Khaghan is just as plausible an abbreviation of ‘Huai-hsin’s’ title as of ‘Pao-i’s’. A glance at the two titles surely shows this to be true. Haneda Töru’s contrary argument seems to be based on the unnecessarily rigid view that the words used in the abbreviation must all be together in the original.

Abe Takeo builds his theory around the importance of ‘Huai-hsin’ as a dynastic founder. Even before his accession as khaghan in 795 he had been the most important minister in the state, and Abe claims (pp.190-1) that he was in fact the same person as the Hsieh kan-chia-ssu (Il ügäsi) mentioned so frequently in the Chinese sources. (This is in fact suggested very strongly in the Sogdian inscription where the phrase il ügäsi is included in ‘Huai-hsin’s’ title, which he is said
to bestow on others; see Hansen, ‘Zur soghdischen Inschrift’, pp.18–19). Furthermore, there are phrases in the Karabalghasun Inscription particularly characteristic of dynastic founders which are applied to the ‘Heavenly Khaghan’ of the monument. One is the notion, found in line 13, that ‘he was rumored to have had a supernatural birth’ (Abe Takeo’s translation in ‘Where was the Capital?’, p.441). This would be particularly easy to apply to somebody who, as HTS reports of ‘Huai-hsin’, was orphaned young. There is no need to go here into the very complicated question of the legend surrounding the birth of the Uighur dynastic founder. (The details of the myth are given in Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources, vol. I, p.247; Marquart points out its Manichean origin in ‘Guwaini’s Bericht über die Bekehrung der Uiguren’, p.490.) Suffice it to remark that Abe Takeo takes the legend as a ‘myth devised by the new ruling house to hallow the transfer from one tribe or clan to another’ (‘Where Was the Capital?’, p.441).

To analyse thoroughly all that has been written on the above subject would require a full-length monograph in itself and is not my purpose here. Abe Takeo appears to me to have established a convincing case (i.e. that the stele was written under ‘Pao-i’ but that its second half records the exploits of ‘Huai-hsin’). It is important, however, to note the point made by Yamada Nobuo. Although he believes the t’ien k’o-han to be ‘Pao-i,’ he still accepts that the remarkable achievements of the Heavenly Khaghan were carried out under the reign of ‘Huai-hsin’ (see ‘Kyüsei Kaikotsu’, p.96). The great restoration of the Uighurs and the recapture of Pei-t’ing can therefore be accepted as products of ‘Huai-hsin’s’ reign, whatever the identity of the Heavenly Khaghan.

The date when the inscription was written is a separate problem. Radloff believed (Die alttürkischen Inschriften, p.285) that the stele was set up in ‘Huai-hsin’s’ reign. However, most scholars have rejected this view, including those who equate t’ien k’o-han with ‘Huai-hsin’. Abe Takeo’s view has already been mentioned and Tasaka Kōdō claims it was written a few years before or after ‘Pao-i’s’ death in 821 (‘Seihoku henkyō’, pp.179–80). Wang Kuo-wei, who equated t’ien k’o-han with ‘Pao-i’, thought the date should be placed after ‘Pao-i’s’ death (Kuan-t’ang chi-lin, p.991). Schlegel believed that the title at the head of the stele referred not to ‘Pao-i’ but to a later khaghan of the same Turkish title, appointed by the Chinese as ‘Chao-li’ (824–32). However, to arrive at this conclusion Schlegel inserted the names of several successive khaghans at the bottom of lines 15, 17, and 18 where the text is missing (see Die chinesische Inschrift, pp.125–6); his view has found little support among later writers. Even if one accepts that t’ien k’o-han is ‘Huai-hsin’, there is no need to assume that the stele was written during his reign, and an equation of the title at the head of the stele with ‘Huai-hsin’s’ is definitely forced. It is not only different from but also shorter than the title given for ‘Huai-hsin’ in the Chinese sources, and while the latter sometimes abbreviate the Turkish titles of the Uighur khaghans, the title at the head of an important Uighur stele can be assumed to
be complete. It is more reasonable to conclude that the khaghan named at the
beginning of the inscription is 'Pao-i', since the title given there coincides with
that the Chinese sources write for 'Pao-i' (except for the missing, and probably
obliterated, Ai at the beginning).

The full text of the Chinese inscription is contained among other places in
Radloff, *Die alttürkischen Inschriften*, facing p.290 (translation into German,
pp.286–91); Schlegel, *Die chinesische Inschrift*, at end (translation into German,
pp.127–34); Haneda Tōru, 'Kaikotsushi no kenkyū', pp.305–10; and Vasil'ev,
*Kitaiskia nadpisi*, p.III, following Chinese text, p.23 (translation into Russian,
text, pp.20–6). Notes on further translations and other works containing
the text are given in Schlegel, *Die chinesische Inschrift*, pp.V–VI; Chavannes and
Pelliot, 'Un traité manichéen', pp.177–8; and Haneda Tōru, 'Kaikotsushi no
kenkyū', pp.303–5.

## ii. THE DATES OF THE KHAGHANS 'HUAI-HSIN' AND 'PAO-I'

A difficult problem is raised by the statement in *HTS* 217A.10b which runs:
'In the first year of Yung-chen (805), the khaghan ['Huai-hsin'] died and there
was a proclamation that . . . Sun Kao should . . . take the diploma to appoint
his successor as *T'eng-li yeh ho chu-i-lu p'i-chia* Khaghan.' Most scholars have
accepted it at face value and concluded that 'Huai-hsin' died in 805. They
include Haneda Tōru ('Kaikotsushi no kenkyū', pp.215–16, 301), Tasaka Kōdō
('Seihoku henkyō', pp.176, 180), Feng Chia-sheng (*Wei-wu-erh tsih-liao
chien-pien*, vol. I, p.27) and Hamilton (*Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*,
pp.140–1). I, too, accepted it in the first edition of this book, p.157. However,
Yamada Nobuo has put forward the suggestion in his article 'Kyūsei Kaikotsu',
pp.95–108, that in fact this *T'eng-li yeh ho chu-i-lu p'i-chia* Khaghan was none
other than 'Huai-hsin' himself and that he did not die until 808.

The Chinese sources give a somewhat contradictory picture of the khaghans
between 805 and 821. I tabulate them below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>HTS 217; TCTC</th>
<th>TFYK 965. 11a–12b</th>
<th>THY 98. 1747–8</th>
<th>TFYK 967.14a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>805</td>
<td><em>T'eng-li yeh ho chu-i-lu p'i-chia</em> Khaghan</td>
<td>In one place as in <em>HTS</em> 217, in another as in <em>TFYK</em> 967</td>
<td><em>Ai teng-li-lo yu-te mi-shih chu-i-lu p'i-chia</em> Khaghan (d. 811)</td>
<td><em>Ai teng-li-lo ku-te mo-shih chu-i-lu p'i-chia</em> Khaghan (d. 811)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>808</td>
<td><em>Ai teng-li-lo ku mi-shih ho p'i-chia 'Pao-i'</em> Khaghan</td>
<td><em>Ai teng-li-lo ku mo-mi-shih ho p'i-chia 'Pao-i'</em> Khaghan</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>No report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>812</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>As in <em>TFYK</em> 967</td>
<td><em>Chūn teng-li-lo ku-te mi-shih ho p'i-chia</em> Khaghan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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It is clear that these accounts are extremely confused, and the transcriptions, even for khaghans who by their date of accession should be identical or nearly so, show significant differences. Now if we consider the title given for Mou-yü in CTS (see above, p.76) with that in a Turkish text transliterated and translated by Müller in ‘Der Hofstaat eines Uigurenkönigs’, p.209, we find that the second is substantially longer. CTS writes Teng-li (tängridä) hsieh tu-teng-mi-shih (il tutmis) han (alp) chü-lu (külig) ‘Ying-i chien-kung’ p’i-chia (bilgä) Khaghan. The Turkish text has Ulu’ ilig tängridä qut bulmis ärdämin il tutmis alp qutluq külig bilgä ui’ur Khaghan, zahag ‘i mäni (see also ‘Uigurica II’, p.95). In fact, the Chinese sources sometimes omit sections of the full title. The main point here is that it is not always possible to identify a khaghan definitely by his transcribed Chinese title.

We are on safer ground in considering matters relating specifically to the view of the Chinese court on the khaghans. One aspect of this is the Chinese appointed title. The Chinese sources give an invested title for all the khaghans from ‘Huai-jen’ (Ku-li p’ei-lo) down to ‘Huai-hsin’ (except for the usurper of 790 whose reign was extremely short) and again from ‘Pao-i’ to the end of the empire period (again with one exception: the last khaghan, who enjoyed only a very short reign). The khaghan supposed in HTS 217A, THY 98 and TFYK 967 to have come to the throne in 805 has no appointed title, nor have those claimed in THY 98 and TFYK 967 to have acceded in 812. This suggests very strongly that the titles given there are actually those of khaghans who had come to the throne earlier.

Another aspect of this problem is the dates of court mourning for khaghans. These are stated quite clearly in TFYK 976 and listed below in appendix B (ii). Again there is no statement for 805, 811 or 816. The reason for this may well be that no khaghan died in those years. In the case of the year 805, this hypothesis is confirmed by a record in TFYK 980.14b–15a, which reports Sun Kao’s mission of that year to appoint the khaghan but makes no reference to the death of a previous khaghan.

More positive evidence in the Chinese sources that ‘Huai-hsin’ did not die in 805 can be found in a statement in THY 98.1747–8. There we read: ‘In the
second month of the third year (1-30/3/808), the Uighurs sent a delegation to court to announce the death of the Senior Princess of Hsien-an. The emperor suspended court for three days. The princess was the eighth daughter of Te-tsung. She had originally gone out to marry ‘T’ien-ch’in’ Khaghan. When he died, his son ‘Chung-chen’ Khaghan ascended the throne. When ‘Chung-chen’ Khaghan died, his son ‘Feng-ch’eng’ Khaghan ascended the throne. When ‘Feng-ch’eng’ Khaghan died, the people of the state set his minister on the throne. This was ‘Huai-hsiri’ Khaghan. They all followed the barbarian custom and each in succession honoured the princess, who lived in barbarian territory for twenty-one years in all and then died’. HTS (see above under 808) gives a similar account, saying that the princess lived among the Uighurs under four successive khaghans and died in 808, shortly before the current khaghan. Why does THY, which lists the four khaghans, stop with ‘Huai-hsiri’? Where is the fifth khaghan, supposed to have acceded in 805? His curious absence here suggests strongly that he was in fact ‘Huai-hsiri’ Khaghan and died in 808.

It remains to explain why some Chinese sources record the death of a khaghan and the accession of a new one in 805. ‘Huai-hsiri’ Khaghan was a dynastic founder, among the most important of all the Uighur rulers, yet the Chinese sources are almost completely silent about him. The reason was surely that during the period 795 to 805 there were no relations between the Chinese and Uighur courts. In 805 relations were re-established and, to signify their continuing recognition after so long a break, the Chinese sent Sun Kao to reappoint ‘Huai-hsiri’ Khaghan. The court realised that this was the same khaghan it had already recognised in 795, hence the lack of Chinese appointed name. However, the historiographer did not realise this. He assumed the former khaghan had died. It is also possible that the original record did not mention ‘Huai-hsiri’ s’ death under 805 but that later historians simply assumed he had died then because of the reappointment.

The confusion in the sources over the date of ‘Pao-i’ Khaghan’s accession can also be explained. THY 98.1748 disagrees with HTS (see above) in the date, giving 816 (Yüan-ho 11) in place of HTS’s 808 (Yüan-ho 3), but the two texts agree that the man who took the appointment out to ‘Pao-i’ was Li Hsiao-ch’eng. Surely the two texts are referring to the same event, but THY has miscopied + — instead of 三.

If this explanation is correct, then the reports in THY 98 and TFYK 967 that there was a khaghan who reigned from 805 to 811 must be rejected. Tasaka Kōdō (‘Schoku henkyō’, pp.203-4) accepted the statement of these two works but believed that ‘Pao-i’ had come to the throne in 811 (being appointed in 812) and that the Chiin teng-li-lo ku-te mi-shih ho p’i-chia Khaghan mentioned in them under 812 was ‘Pao-i’ under a slightly different title. The latter part of his argument can be accepted, but the discussion presented here points to the conclusion that ‘Pao-i’ acceded not in 811 but in 808.

Not all the above material is given by Yamada Nobuo. On the other hand, I
have omitted his arguments from the Karabalghasun Inscription which rest on
the assumption that *t'ien k'o-han* was 'Pao-i'; a hypothesis I believe to be false,
see Appendix A (i). Nevertheless, I have based the case for the conclusion that
there were only two khaghans between 795 and 821 ('Huai-hsin', 795–808;
'Pao-i', 808–821) very closely on Yamada's article. His arguments stand up
perfectly well without the necessity of further supporting evidence from the
inscription and I believe his conclusions are correct. They have been accepted
also by Abe Takeo (Nishi-Uiguru, p.189).
Chinese emperors and Uighur khaghans (744–840)

i. CHINESE EMPERORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emperor</th>
<th>Day of Accession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hsüan-tsung</td>
<td>8 September 712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-tsung</td>
<td>12 August 756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tai-tsung</td>
<td>18 May 762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te-tsung</td>
<td>12 June 779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shun-tsung</td>
<td>28 February 805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsien-tsung</td>
<td>5 September 805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mu-tsung</td>
<td>20 February 820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ching-tsung</td>
<td>29 February 824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wen-tsung</td>
<td>13 January 827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu-tsung</td>
<td>20 February 840</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ii. CHINESE COURT MOURNING AND THE DEATHS OF THE UIGHUR KHAGHANS

It is difficult to determine exactly when each khaghan died. The Chinese sources sometimes give the date of a khaghan’s death to the month and occasionally even to the day. Fortunately, however, TFYK 976 has preserved records of the dates of the court mourning for the deaths of some of the khaghans. These show that, where dates to the month or day are given for a khaghan’s death, the author has usually confused the date of death with that of the court mourning in Ch'ang-an. Given the nature of Chinese historiography, it is not surprising that a precise date to the day or month should refer to an event in China, rather than to one among the Uighurs. I list below the dates of the court mourning in Ch’ang-an for the khaghans as they are given in TFYK 976. There are no statements for khaghans before Tun mo-ho (‘T’ien-ch’in’) or after Prince Ho-sa (‘Chao-li’).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Khaghan</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'T’ien-ch’in'</td>
<td>23 December 789</td>
<td>TFYK 976.5a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Chung-chen’</td>
<td>13 January 791</td>
<td>TFYK 976.5b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Feng-ch’eng’</td>
<td>21 March 795</td>
<td>TFYK 976.6a–b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Huai-hsin’</td>
<td>4 April 808</td>
<td>TFYK 976.8a, see</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Appendix A (ii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Pao-i’</td>
<td>31 March 821</td>
<td>TFYK 976.11a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Ch’ung-te’</td>
<td>no statement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Chao-li’</td>
<td>27 April 833</td>
<td>TFYK 976.12b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
iii. UIGHUR KHAGHANS ACCORDING TO THE STANDARD HISTORIES*

744 Ku-li 
Appointed title: Ku-tu-lu p’i-chia chüeh ‘Huai-jen’

747 Mo-yen-ch’o
Appointed title: ‘Ying-wu wei-yüan’ p’i-chia

759 I-ti-chien
Appointed title: (according to CTS, above, p.76) Teng-li hsieh tu-teng-mi-shih han chu-lu ‘Ying-i chien-kung’ p’i-chia

779 Tun mo-ho (or )
Appointed title: ‘Wu-i ch’eng-kung’

789 To-lo-ssu
Prince P’an-kuan
Appointed title: ’Feng-ch’eng’

808 Appointed title: Ai teng-li-lo ku mi-shih ho p’i-chia ‘Pao-i’

821 Teng-lo ku mo-mi-shih ho p’i-chia
Appointed title: (according to CTS, above, p.114) Teng-lo yü-lu mo-mi-shih chü-chu-lu p’i-chia

824 Prince Ho-sa

* Titles of Chinese origin are in inverted commas as well as italicised.
Appointed title: *Ai teng-li-lo ku mo-mi-shih ho p'i-chia 'Chao-li'* 艾登里囉波沒蜜施合毗伽昭禮 Khaghan

832 Prince Hu 胡
Appointed title: *Ai teng-li-lo ku mo-mi-shih ho chü-lu p'i-chia 'Chang-hsin'* 艾登里囉波沒蜜施合句錄毗伽彰信 Khaghan

839 Prince Ho-sa 霍跋

A complete list of the Uighur khagans of this period, giving Turkish names and titles, variants and references can be found in Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours*, pp.139–41. See also Haneda Tōru, ‘Kaikotsushi no kenkyū’, pp.298–302. Further variants of the titles of the khagans from 795 to 824 are given above in Appendix A (ii).
Glossary of official terms

i. CHINESE OFFICIAL TERMS*

*chang-shu-chi 報書記 – general secretary
Chi-shih-chung 拾事中 – Grand Secretary of the Department of the Imperial Chancellery
chiang-chün 將軍 – general
Chiang-tso chien 將作監 – Directorate of Works
ch’ien-chiao 軍 – military governor
chien 監 – director (of a directorate or department)
chien-chiao 檢校 – honorary
Chi-nu 金吾 Guards
ch’ing 卿 – president (of a court)
Ching-chao yin 京兆尹 – Governor of the Capital
chou 州 – prefecture†
chii 郡 – commandery, prefecture†
chii-tao 郡王 – prefectural prince
Chung-shu she-jen 中書舍人 – Secretary of the Department of the Grand Imperial Secretariat
Chung-shu sheng 中書省 – Department of the Grand Imperial Secretariat
fu 副 – deputy
fu 府 – superior prefecture
fu 傅 – tutor (to a prince)
hou 侯 – marquis
Hsiao-wei 醮衛 – Brave Guards
hsien 縣 – subprefecture
hsien-fei 賢妃 – wise concubine
hsing （-chün）行（軍） – expeditionary (army)
Hu-pu 戶部 – Ministry of Finance
Hung-lu ssu 鳥臀寺 – Court of Diplomatic Reception
k’ai-fu 開府
k’ai-fu i-t’ung-san-ssu 開府儀同三司 (honorary)
Kuang-lu ssu 光祿寺 – Court of Imperial Banquets
hung 開 – duke
hung-chu 開主 – princess

* This list does not include the titles of commissioners appointed only for one specific occasion.
† Between 742 and 758 prefectures were called chüin. In this work I call them chou throughout.
GLOSSARY OF OFFICIAL TERMS

Kung-pu - Ministry of Works
lang-chung 郎中 - secretary (of a ministry)
Li-pu - Ministry of Rites
ling 令 - prefect (of a subprefecture) or president (of a department)
liu-hou 留後 - provisional
liu-shou 留守 - viceroy
Men-hsia sheng 門下省 - Department of the Imperial Chancellery
p'an-kuan 判官 - assistant
Pi-shu sheng 祕書省 - Department of the Imperial Library
p'ing-chang-shih 平章事 - chief minister
ping-ma shih 兵馬使 - battle commander
Ping-pu - Ministry of War
po-shih 博士 - doctor
san-ch'i ch'ang-shih 散騎常侍 - Grand Councillor to the Emperor
san-chih chiang-chün 散支將軍 - auxiliary general
shang-shu 尚書 - president (of a ministry)
Shang-shu p'u-yeh 尚書僕射 - Vice President of the Department of Affairs of State
Shang-shu sheng 尚書省 - Department of Affairs of State
shao-ch'ing 少卿 - vice president (of a court)
Shao-fu chien 少府監 - Directorate of the Imperial Workshops
shao-yin 少尹 - deputy governor (of a superior prefecture)
shih 使 - commissioner
shih 試 - trial
shih-kuan 史官 - historiographer
Shih-kuan 史館 - Office of Historiographers
shih-lang 侍郎 - vice president (of a ministry)
ssu-k'ung 司空 - Director of Public Works (honorary)
ssu-ma 司馬 - superior administrator
ssu-t'u 司徒 - Director of Instructions (honorary)
ta chiang-chün 大將軍 - grand general
T'ai-ch'ang ssu 太常寺 - Court of Imperial Sacrifices
T'ai-fu ssu 太府寺 - Court of the Imperial Treasury
T'ai-tzu t'ai-pao 太子太保 - Grand Guardian to the Heir to the Throne
tao 道 - province
Tien-chung sheng 順中省 - Department of the Imperial Household Service
Tien-chung shih yü-shih 順中侍御史 - Censor of the Court of Palace Affairs
tsai-hsian 直隸 - chief minister
ts'e-ming 略命 - diploma of appointment
Tsung-cheng ssu 宗正寺 - Court of the Imperial Clan
tu-hu 都護 - protector (of a protectorate)
tu-hu fu 都護府 - protectorate
tu-tu 都督 - governor-general (of a government-general)*

* This office was also important among the Uighurs; Turkish, tutuq.
The Uighur Empire

**Tu-tu fu** 都督府 – government-general  
**T'ung Chung-shu Men-hsia p'ing-chang-shih** 同中書門下平章事 – chief minister  
**T'ung-shih she-chen** 通事舍人 – visitors' and audience official  
**Tz'u-shih** 刺史 – prefect (of a prefecture or superior prefecture)  
**Wang** 王 – prince  
**Wei-wei su** 衙尉寺 – Court of Imperial Insignia  
**Yin**尹 – governor (of a superior prefecture)  
**Yin-ch'ing kuang-lu ta-fu** 銳青光祿大夫 (honorary)  
**Yü-lin** 羽林 Army  
**Yü-pu** 虞部 – Ministry of Forests  
**Yü-shih chung-ch'eng** 御史中丞 – Vice President of the Censorate  
**Yü-shih ta-fu** 御史大夫 – President of the Censorate  
**Yüan-shuai** 元帥 – generalissimo  
**Yüan-wai** 員外 – auxiliary

ii. **Titles Used Among the Uighurs**

*a-po* 阿波 – Turkish, *apa*  
*Chü-li* 丘録 – Turkish, *küüg*  
*Chü-pi-shih* 車鼻施 – Turkish, *kübiš*  
*Ch'üeh* 闕 – Turkish, *kül*  
*Ho* 合 – Turkish, *alp*  
*Hsieh yü-chia-ssu* 額于伽斯 – Turkish, *il ügäši* (see n.156)  
*i-nan-chu* 伊難珠 – Turkish, *inanč*  
*k'ö-han* 可汗 – Turkish, *qa'yän* (kaghan)  
*k'ö-tun* 可敦 – Turkish, *qatun* (khatun)  
*Ku-tu-lu* 骨咄祿 – Turkish, *qutluγ*  
*Mei-lu* 梅錄 – Turkish, *bıruq*  
*Mo-ho* 莫 (or 末) 賀 – Turkish, *ba'yă*  
*p'ei-lo* 裴羅, Turkish, *boyła*  
*p'i-chia* 毘伽 – Turkish, *bilgä*  
*Sha* 殺 – Turkish, *sad*  
*Ta-kan* 達干 – Turkish, *tarqan*  
*T'e-le* 特勒 – Turkish, *tegin*. I have translated this word throughout as ‘prince’ (see n.60)  
*T'u-po* 吐撥 – Turkish, *tupar*  
*Tu-tu* 都督 – Turkish, *tu-tuq*  
*Yeh-hu* 葉護 – Turkish, *yab'yu*

* This list does not include official titles applied only to khaghans in the present monograph. For these titles I refer the reader also to Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours*, pp.145ff.  
  The precise functions of most of them among the Uighurs for the period 744 to 840 are not clearly known. Indeed, some are no more than descriptive adjectives and probably involved no specific functions.
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One of the most important aspects of China's foreign policy throughout its entire history has been its attempt to contain the threat of the warlike peoples of Central and Northern Asia and, when possible, to turn their vast power to China's advantage. In the years leading up to An Lu-Shan's attempts from 755 to overthrow the ruling T'ang dynasty, the Uighur people amassed great power in the Mongolian steppes, and their military aid contributed largely to the defeat of the Chinese rebels. The Chinese emperors in return sought to gain diplomatic influence over their neighbours by granting princesses in marriage to the Uighur khaghans.

This book, originally published as an Occasional Paper of the Centre of Oriental Studies in 1968, contains translations of two long extracts dealing with the Uighurs from the standard histories of the T'ang, extensively annotated and with an introduction explaining the significance of the Uighurs, their history, and their relations with the T'ang. The annotations and introduction are substantially expanded and revised in this new edition.

This is a work of great importance for Sinologists and scholars interested in Central Asia and Mongolia.

After post-graduate study on the Uighurs at Cambridge University, Colin Mackerras spent two years from 1964 to 1966 in Peking, where he did further research on the Uighurs and on the Chinese theatre. He is the author (with Neale Hunter) of China Observed, an account of his time in the People's Republic of China, and of forthcoming books on the modern Chinese theatre and the rise of the Peking opera. He is at present a Research Fellow in the Department of Far Eastern History at the Australian National University.

The calligraphy on the front cover is a passage from the Hsin T'ang-shu. The representation of the Uighur tribesman is taken from the San-ts'ai t'u-hui (1607).

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