Before the Cultural Revolution, observers of the Chinese communist regime assumed that the traditional links between education and society still held. Certainly Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i both inherited the traditional ideas; but the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution revealed that each placed his own interpretation on them.

This study examines Party directives regarding the selection of students for higher education in the light of the conflict between 'proletarian' and 'revisionist' approaches. It also investigates, and refutes, the charges the Red Guards levelled against revisionist educational methods and argues that inequalities in the education system developed by default.

The changing role of higher education in an industrial society is a problem not confined to China. This monograph will therefore interest not only those especially concerned with the politics of China, but also students of comparative education.
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Education and University Enrolment Policies in China, 1949-1971
Robert Taylor
In 1949 the Chinese communist leaders were faced with enormous problems of national reconstruction. In their rise to power their appeal lay in their promise of national regeneration after a century of weakness. To achieve their goal of a strong China, they needed to train large numbers of scientific and technical personnel. Education was given high priority.

But the new rulers were nationalists as well as communists, and in their efforts to modernise they neither ignored nor rejected traditional Chinese political values, since these had a bearing on the role of education in society. In their adoption of Western technology they had to adapt that relationship to the needs of modernisation. There had been previous attempts to achieve a synthesis between these two goals, such as the reforms of the T’ung-chih Restoration in the nineteenth century and the policies of the Kuomintang during the 1930s.

One of the Ch’ing dynasty’s ‘self-strengtheners’, Chang Chih-tung, sought to establish modern educational institutions on Western lines, while at the same time preserving the political heritage of Confucianism. But the T’ung-chih reformers failed because they did not realise that institutions affect values; that the utilisation of Western knowledge would ultimately bring changes in Chinese political thought. The Kuomintang in its turn attempted to contain the promotion of modern technology within its own blend of Chinese and Western philosophy, but internal dissension and foreign invasion did not allow it to mould education in the image it desired.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has responded to an essentially similar situation. National identity had to be retained although it was necessary to adopt Western technology to reach the level of development of advanced industrial
countries. The Chinese leaders claimed that, in their policies of exploitation, the Western powers had shackled Chinese scholarship and prevented industrialisation by emphasising historical and literary studies and discouraging the training of technical experts.

For these reasons university enrolment policies prove a useful barometer to adjustments of political tradition and technological change in the years since 1949. The Chinese leaders themselves have described enrolment as the battlefield on which the struggle between differing views on educational policy has been fought. The events of the Cultural Revolution period demonstrate that this conflict over institutions and values has still not been resolved.

**Chinese and Soviet Traditions in Education**

Ideological commitment led the CCP to ‘lean to one side’, and the Soviet Union became its mentor in education, as in other fields. The CCP immediately began to eradicate the considerable influence of Western educational philosophy through the takeover of universities and colleges still under private or foreign auspices. In July 1950, before the major educational reforms, private bodies controlled 29 per cent and religious organisations 10 per cent of institutions of higher education. The next stage in the reform involved complete reorganisation of higher education on Soviet lines.

This suggested a rejection of the Chinese communists’ own educational experience since it involved compromises with the egalitarian objectives which they had set for the long term. What is more, in utilising bourgeois experts, the CCP had to employ prominent scientists and university teachers from the pre-Liberation period. Mao Tse-tung had earlier advanced theoretical justification for such action.1

The adoption of the Soviet pattern now demanded further adjustments. The main emphasis was to be placed on higher education, if necessary at the expense of the lower sectors of the educational ladder. The uneven geographical distribution of universities and colleges was to be perpetuated, at least for an indefinite period.2 The Chinese leaders had therefore decided in favour of capacity rather than equality. The utilisation of Western-trained Chinese scientists and the creation of young technical personnel took precedence over the long-term objective of popularising knowledge and moulding a new generation of proletarian intellectuals. Attempts were made, however, to remould the thinking of old intellectuals and create more willing supporters of the Chinese Communist Party.

But the Soviet educational system had evolved in a very different social and cultural environment and proved unsuited to the Chinese situation. The new Chinese educational system was never entirely modelled on the Soviet pattern. Party policies reveal continuing experimentation rather than determined acceptance or rejection of certain aspects of the Soviet model. The charges during the Cultural
Revolution that Liu Shao-ch'i consciously fostered a revisionist educational program based on that of the Soviet Union are unconvincing. But it does seem that Liu was prepared to accept the technocratic values that Soviet influence in higher education tended to promote, and that Mao Tse-tung ultimately refused to underwrite such an educational philosophy. Liu Shao-ch'i had realised that foreign institutions leave their mark on native values. To Mao, the new educational system, even though not an exact replica of its Soviet counterpart, represented a very real contradiction of his idea of the function of higher education. Mao's vision was an unconscious reflection of the traditional Chinese relationship between education and society.

The Confucian ethic was essentially humanist, for its sanction lay in the present rather than in the world to come. Justification by works rather than faith meant that the function of education was conceived as relating directly to the needs of society as a whole. The capacity of the individual had to be developed to the full not for its own sake but for the contribution it could render to the community. At the peak of the pyramid of the traditional educational system stood the amateur ideal of the scholar-official whose worth was to be found in his ability to achieve the correct ordering of human relationships in society. The superiority of the official was not innate but moulded in the continual application of certain acquired knowledge to the concrete conditions of everyday life. The scholar-gentry attained position through competitive examinations. The content of these was drawn from classical texts, which provided definite rules of conduct for human relationships. It was in the application of such prescriptions that the scholar-official stood supreme. His was an amateur ideal which was perpetually developed to further excellence as it worked in society.

The official hierarchy of the Chinese Empire can thus be considered an aristocracy of merit, but with a difference. The Confucian classical tradition taught that all men had a capacity to discern the correct ordering of human relationships, the cornerstone of good government. This quality of discrimination has been aptly defined as 'the evaluating mind'.\(^3\) Men were born equal and the 'divine spark' was to be found in all. They became different from one another through education.

Since man was naturally good, he could be correctly moulded by education. This belief in the malleability of mankind led to an optimistic appraisal of the miracles which could be wrought in the social and physical environment by the requisite training.\(^4\) Everyone was capable both of being educated and of being the educator, the passive and active participant in a continuous social endeavour. This is not to suggest, however, that the avenue to social mobility and political power, the Imperial examination system, was open to all in equal measure. In theory, the highest positions in officialdom could be reached by every man, whatever his social origin. But in practice economic circumstances limited such advance. In this sense
society itself was envisaged as an enormous laboratory in which the social qualities of both the rulers and the ruled were being continually retested. Imperial society was a vast educational process, since stress was always laid on the emulation of various human models of excellence. Yet in life even the good character of paragons of virtue had to be constantly underwritten by right conduct.

The role of education in society, postulated by the humanist ethic of Confucianism, provided an unconscious legacy which has influenced both the Kuomintang and the communists in their quest for an educational policy to direct national reconstruction. The policies of the Kuomintang in the pre-war period were, firstly, to attempt to assert party control over higher education and, secondly, to aim to give priority to academic disciplines directly related to the needs of economic development. One of the keys to Mao Tse-tung's victory over the Kuomintang was his genius in applying Marxism–Leninism to Chinese conditions. The early fiasco of Comintern policy in China and difficulties of communication forced the Chinese communists to chart their own road to power. Yenan, in spite of its vulnerability to Japanese attack, provided an oasis in which the Party could experiment with reform measures, especially in education.

As a result, by 1949 the Party had constructed a body of educational thought, which in certain respects bore little relation to Marxist thinking on the subject. For example, the idea that men are equal through their common possession of an evaluating mind would appear to be in direct conflict with the Marxist principle that an individual's ethical ideas are determined by economic conditions. The Yenan period saw the growth of a new amateur ideal moulded by the unity of officers and men, teachers and students. Education was directed towards the War of Resistance against Japan, which was in turn part of the greater endeavour of national liberation.

It is thus not surprising that the years since 1949 have seen a conflict between the unconscious legacy of the humanist ethic in Chinese education and the adoption of a Soviet organisational form, although both these traditions possess the common denominator of Marxism–Leninism, as witnessed by the Chinese vow to create worker and peasant intellectuals. The First National Conference on Higher Education, held in 1950, had laid down the objective of drawing worker and peasant cadres and youth into institutions of higher education, in order to train new style intellectuals.

But the Chinese political tradition together with the Yenan experience had led the Chinese leaders to give 'proletarian intellectual' a new interpretation. He would owe his status not merely to birth in the class demanded by Marxism–Leninism, but much more to his proven ability to act in the manner demanded by the CCP. The Party alone had the prerogative to designate both class status and proletarian consciousness. The implication was that just as the bourgeois intellectual could
ultimately hope to gain merit by right conduct, the worker or peasant element could be removed from that exalted state through negative behaviour.

However, the early years of communist rule saw the abandonment of the Yenan tradition in education, for at least in the realm of organisation reservations were expressed concerning the quality of institutions of higher education in the old liberated areas. But while the curricula and the institutional structure of higher education came to bear the imprint of the Soviet model, teaching methods were heavily influenced by the indoctrination techniques developed by the Chinese communists on their road to power.

The Reorganisation of Higher Education

As the universities were to train the large numbers of technical personnel needed for national reconstruction, the Education Ministry of the Central Government rather than the Education Ministries in the Administrative Areas assumed the ultimate responsibility for the leadership of higher education. But this sector was believed to be so crucial to the national economy that in 1952, at the height of the reorganisation of higher education, a separate Ministry was established to direct it. One of the more important duties of this new body was the control of certain key institutions, which themselves became the elite segment of the elite-mass structure beginning to emerge in higher education.

After establishing this new division of powers in higher education, the Party turned to the pressing question of curricula reform. For this purpose, Soviet specialist personnel were employed, Russian experts supervised Chinese instructors, new courses were introduced, and new teaching materials compiled.

The establishment of Soviet-type curricula would serve to further Chinese scholarship in the scientific field, but if that knowledge and its practitioners were to be utilised fully for economic development, the reform of the institutional structure of higher education would be equally necessary.

Under the new educational system institutions of higher education were divided into three categories. The first was the Comprehensive University, in which all the specialities in the natural and the social sciences were drawn together in one institution. In 1955 there were fourteen institutions of this kind. The second category was the Technical Institute, with a single scientific subject as its concern. The third consisted of the Polytechnical Institutes, such as the agricultural colleges. The comprehensive universities were to train scientific research personnel and teaching staff for higher education and high schools. In teaching, the objective of the comprehensive universities was to provide students with a high level of theoretical knowledge, whether in the natural or the social sciences. Despite frequent assertions to the contrary, the comprehensive universities in many ways became elite institutions. They were in any case designed to guarantee the existence of the
other two categories, and one Chinese source stated that the comprehensive universities were the signpost of national, cultural, and scientific development.\textsuperscript{10} In contrast, the functions of the technical and polytechnical institutes were to produce engineers and technical experts of all kinds.

Reform was not confined to the academic division of labour between different types of institution. Internally, the rearrangement of administrative structures and teaching units was undertaken in accordance with the Soviet model. Under this new system of academic organisation, the 'department', hitherto a teaching unit, became the body responsible for basic level administration in an institution of higher education. In its former place came the 'speciality' (the Soviet spetsialnost) as the new academic unit. Thus several specialities closely allied to one another in subject matter were grouped together in a department.\textsuperscript{11} The speciality system was envisaged as the most suitable means of training cadres for national construction, and its heavily specialised nature was deliberately designed so that its graduates might be fitted for specific positions in the country's program of economic development.

In addition to the creation of specialities, teaching and research guidance groups were established in each department. Among the most important tasks of these groups were the elevation of the academic and political quality of faculty and students, the planning of instruction programs, and the promotion of research. The teaching and research guidance groups became the basic unit of instruction, each being organised from all the lecturers in one particular course or courses similar in nature within a given department.\textsuperscript{12}

**Education and Society**

These measures were representative of the Soviet-type methods with which the CCP aimed to train the specialists needed for economic development, but they were supplemented by instruments of control which owed far more to Chinese political tradition than to the practice of Marxism–Leninism. The Chinese leaders had replaced the ideology of Confucianism with the credo of Marxism, yet in doing so they had merely changed the vehicle through which political control was expressed. In the beginning Soviet-type institutional measures and traditional native political controls were juxtaposed in an uneasy coexistence, and the latent conflict between them did not surface until the Cultural Revolution. Yet even in the thrust for rapid modernisation in the early years, the Party never lost sight of the question of what kind of society should be created in this new powerful China. In the long term alien ways of institutional control could not be permitted to interfere with the correct ordering of human relationships. How far imported institutions might eventually affect traditional values became the issue over which the conflict between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i on the training of revolutionary successors was conceived.
The fruits of education were directed not at the self-cultivation of the individual but towards service to society. Two main features of Chinese communist educational thought, the unity of theory and practice and collective study, bring out in sharp relief this subordination of the individual to the collective.

Both these features drew their inspiration from the Chinese communist theory of knowledge, according to which ability came not from natural endowment but rather from the struggle of practice. Ability was thus developed only through activity in the material world, and knowledge was only of value if it were directed towards changing the physical environment, in this case the promotion of national construction. Both ability and theory had to be tested and retested in practice. By extension, any hierarchical ranking which divided teacher and student was denied, for the Chinese communist theory of education claimed that both could contribute to learning. Learning was a two-way process, and the teacher had no monopoly of knowledge. The so-called teacher-centred philosophy was condemned.

Education and society were one. The techniques of theory and practice and collective study thus embraced two main functions: one, fostering specialist knowledge and the second, which guaranteed the first, ensuring the proper relationship between faculty and students.

Teaching methods based on the unity of theory and practice were laid down at the First National Conference on Education in 1950. These methods were designed to satisfy the urgent needs of national construction by producing scientific and technical personnel who wholeheartedly served the people. Far more important than scientific achievement per se was the attitude of the individual. Clear directions were given as to how theory was to be united with practice:

How do we make theory unite with practice? How do we make theory and practice one? Chairman Mao has directed us to fire the arrow at the target. The arrow is scientific theory, the target is the Chinese Revolution and national construction. We strive to use the arrow of scientific theory to hit the target . . . in order to solve all the problems of revolution and construction.

Nevertheless the Conference emphasised that the arrow of scientific theory should not be blunted by class or personal viewpoints: the arrow could not be fired under the system of production relations created by semi-colonial and semi-feudal rule.

But although China had been freed from the shackles of semi-colonialism and semi-feudalism, certain intellectuals had not yet abandoned the bourgeois attitudes, inherited from the old society. They saw the fundamental principles of Chinese communist education as abstractions and not for practical application. They failed to practise education as a weapon of class struggle. They did not accept that education must serve politics, and harboured attitudes of adaptive response towards educational reform.
Secondly, three clearly defined ideological evils came under attack. 'Experimentalism' was condemned as the pursuit of research for the sake of research, investigation for the sake of investigation. 'If investigation does not have an objective'—read 'social objective'—'it is labour to no avail'.\textsuperscript{17} At the First National Conference the Education Minister, Ma Hsü-lun, stressed the need to overcome two corruptions which sprang from the division of theory and practice. Doctrinaire thought divorced from reality had to be eliminated, and utilitarianism which took no account of long-term gain born of theoretical study had to be eradicated. The value of research was conceived in moral terms, and its function was utilitarian. The evil of utilitarianism was attacked only because its narrow attitude did not permit further leaps in knowledge.

Heterodox approaches to research work came under fire, and the question of correct attitudes towards teaching programs and methods received similar attention. Those who had achieved fame by conducting research all their lives and had neglected teaching were now accused of capitalist and individualist thought. Individual achievement was to be measured in terms of contribution to national construction in teaching and research. The high status which the university teacher had traditionally enjoyed was threatened by the thought reform process and by the adoption of new teaching methods. 'Collective study' is perhaps the best example of this. Under the maxim 'from the masses to the masses' this method was hailed as progressive educational theory.

Precisely because it did not serve the masses, the old collective style of teaching which had been employed in pre-Liberation times amounted to individual study. But it was a step forward compared to the 'transfusion method'. Transfusion teaching simply meant that the teacher taught and the students listened. The study process therefore involved a direct relationship only between one teacher and one student at any particular time.\textsuperscript{18}

In contrast, the CCP's idea of collective study meant not only interaction between the teacher and the individual student, but between individual students. But although the Party claims that collective study is more effective than individual study, the latter has not been abandoned. On the contrary, collective study must always have individual study as its basis. Collective study is not only a means of communicating information and ideas. Most important of all, learning is conceived not as a vehicle for individual achievement but for national construction. The cultivation of personal excellence is no substitute for the improvement of collective understanding. General standards are improved, and the goal of national strength is furthered. For this, the correct ordering of human relationships is indispensable.

Meanwhile, beneath the surface, the seeds of conflict on educational policy within the Party were being sown. Even in the early years of the regime a hiatus appeared between Soviet-type organisation and Chinese communist ideology.
What is more, on another related level the humanist ethic may have been well-suited to a society which was agrarian and functionally diffuse, but in an industrial economy the amateur ideal might be obstructive to national development.

One of the reasons suggested for the absence of an industrial revolution in China before the impact of the West has been the lack of social values conducive to enterprise outside the government bureaucracy. While there appeared an abundance of scientific and technological invention, the social environment did not favour its development. Professional expertise was seen as opposed to the humanist ethic, itself based in part on the Confucian theory of knowledge as outlined above. In the developing economy of China since 1949 specialist skills, although promoted by the state rather than private entrepreneurship, have been at a premium.

Now there was the danger that an industrial base would create new centres of power, that a new breed of technocrat would be able to bargain with society for its services. In time the proletarian and bourgeois theories of education were personified by the larger than life figures of Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i. But evidence suggests that the contradiction between the two educational lines was as much systemic as a clash between conscious personal wills. The functional specificity of the economy required the development of diverse specialisations. This could in the long term lead to opposing interests among academic disciplines, since some might come to enjoy greater priority and greater rewards than others. This might well cause inequalities within the educational system. Enrolment policies in the early 1950s were formulated on the assumption that the humanist ethic would counteract rivalry of this kind. There was then only one educational line.

Enrolment as an Educational Process

Enrolment was not only conceived as the connecting link between senior high school and university education but as an educational process in itself. Thus it is not surprising that during and since the Cultural Revolution enrolment has been considered by Mao Tse-tung and his supporters as the main battlefield on which the struggle between the two educational lines has been fought. Surveying twenty years of enrolment the theoretical journal Hung-chi noted: ‘Enrolment reform is an important part of the reform of the educational system as a whole. On the educational battlefield, conflict between the two classes and the two lines appears first of all in a concentrated form in enrolment.’

But the campaign of vilification against the ‘capitalist roaders’ in the educational field cannot conceal the outward unanimity on enrolment among the Chinese leaders during the early years of communist rule. It was only gradually that a hiatus began to appear between organisation and ideology, that organisation began to attain its own dynamic. The Maoist polemic of Cultural Revolution days was merely a reassertion in more radical guise of the policies expounded in the 1950s.
Echoing the traditional link between education and society, the implementation of enrolment was transformed into a study session, with concentration on both academic and ideological criteria. The cornerstone of a Chinese candidate's preparation for university enrolment was the strict subordination of personal interest to the needs of national construction. Entrance to higher education was not, however, to be confined to the graduates of senior high schools. Special arrangements were made to ensure the admission of worker–peasant elements in order to create a corps of proletarian intellectuals and to raise the quality of leadership in party and government.

Both categories of entrants were to prepare themselves for enrolment on the basis of three criteria of 'health'. The first was political, involving a correct understanding of the nation's university enrolment plans and their objectives. To satisfy the second, candidates were to revise their cultural and scientific studies. The third required concentration on physical fitness, not only to pass the enrolment examinations, but for study in the years ahead.20

Party publications on enrolment work placed stress upon two priorities, the political-ideological and the academic. Although both these conditions were crucial in the preparation of both types of candidate, the emphasis differed in each case. Senior high school graduates had received a very academic education, but the Party had reasons to doubt their ideological maturity. Almost by definition, the worker–peasant elements had already been moulded in the fires of production; politically they were sound, but in many cases they were lacking in scholastic attainment. Revision for enrolment was therefore designed to remedy the respective deficiencies of candidates.

Senior high school graduates

The carefully planned process of enrolment preparation was constructed to enable prospective students from senior high schools to provide the qualities and skills which the nation required of them, and to choose the academic discipline for which their previous scholastic attainments and natural aptitudes best suited them. The importance of the first question greatly outweighed that of the second. For example, Kuang-ming jih-pao (10 July 1953) stressed that the professional interest of senior high school graduates was as yet unformed, and that they were therefore not capable of deciding where their true interest lay. Individual interest alone was not a valid criterion. It had to take second place to national needs. But at the same time academic quality was emphasised because the demands of economic development made it imperative that individual aptitude be not entirely left out of account.

Until the mid-1950s there was a desperate shortage of qualified manpower, especially scientific and technological. The nation's educated youth consisted mainly of senior high school graduates, and in the years from 1949 to 1956 these
were in short supply. The educational periodical *Jen-min chiao-yü* gave an average ratio of $0.87:1$ for senior high school graduates in relation to new enrolment in higher education during the years 1953 to 1956.

At the same time the Party insisted that standards should not be lowered merely because there were too few potential candidates. Since there was a shortage of educated manpower, the regime was forced to strike a delicate balance between acknowledging individual aptitude and scholastic attainment, and persuading educated youth of national rather than personal interests. If compromises had to be made with a candidate's personal ambition, ideological preparation for enrolment became doubly necessary to counterbalance it. For this reason two kinds of preparation for senior high school graduates proceeded simultaneously.

On the basis of collective study principles, academic preparation of senior high school students took two forms: mutual help among students and guidance by teachers. A good illustration of this process was a report on schools in Nanking, where teachers helped senior high school graduates to make plans for revision of their studies. Teachers compiled the first drafts of these plans, lectured to the graduates on revision, and supervised self-study. In this way revision involved a special kind of active participation by students under the guidance of the teachers.

However, there was no lack of direction from the Central Government. Shortly before this process of revision began, the Ministry of Higher Education circulated outlines of the kind of material that enrolment examinations could be expected to contain. Furthermore, individual institutions of higher education had special handbooks printed to facilitate enrolment work, and national daily newspapers ran special features on colleges and universities.

If academic revision was important, ideological preparation was even more crucial in the case of senior high school graduates. The former was carried out through student self-help under central direction, the latter was performed by party and youth organisations. Organs of local government, for example the Cultural and Educational Bureau in Nanking, held extra study classes for higher school graduates in collaboration with the Youth League. These classes were concerned with political education, and model workers and heads of people's governments at various levels made reports to enrolment examination candidates. The prominent role that the Youth Leagues played in this process of preparation is also underlined by the fact that a substantial proportion of those seeking admission to higher education were members of that body. In 1953, for example, of the 50,000 or so senior high school graduates, over 30 per cent belonged to the Youth League, and in 1954 the equivalent figure was 50 per cent. The influence of the Party was channelled through this body, and it seems unlikely that any senior high school graduate would have been admitted to higher education if he were seriously objected to by the League.
RAPID HIGH SCHOOLS

Senior high school graduates needed ideological rather than academic preparation, but in the case of worker and peasant elements the stress was reversed. Worker–peasant rapid high schools were established to create a new generation of proletarian intellectuals. They had their origins in the Soviet Union and in function the Chinese institution was similar to its Soviet counterpart. The Government Administration Council ‘Decision on the Reform of the Educational System’, promulgated in 1951, stated that worker and peasant rapid high schools would admit worker–peasant cadres and industrial workers with a primary school education. To be eligible they would have to serve the requisite number of years in production work. The rapid schools would help them reach senior high school standard for entry to higher learning. Earlier, in his opening speech to the First National Conference on Education in 1950, the Education Minister, Ma Hsü-lun, called for the establishment of these schools.

But in spite of their egalitarian aim of creating worker–peasant intellectuals, the rapid schools contained within them the seeds of elitism. They had two objectives, firstly to provide desperately needed technical manpower, and secondly, and more importantly, to break the monopoly of bourgeois specialists. The best worker and peasant cadres were to be turned into technical experts. But it was likely that such elements might forget their correct class origins when further training had raised their professional status. The same was true of production workers. Specialist cadres might become more and more isolated from the rural and the urban proletariat whom they led, leaving the way open for the emergence of a privileged stratum, more ‘expert’ than ‘red’.

Meanwhile, the worker–peasant rapid high schools were launched with high hopes which were soon dispelled. There appeared a great deal of general information concerning these new institutions, but Chinese sources seem to have been extremely reticent about publishing concrete details on the organisation and number of the rapid schools. Nevertheless, there was no lack of polemic about the function they should serve. On 24 March 1952 the Hong Kong newspaper, Ta-kung jih-pao, stressed that institutions of higher education had opened their doors to workers and peasants and by so doing had turned higher education into people’s education. The newspaper then continued by making what later were proved to be exaggerated claims for the establishment of worker–peasant schools: ‘the majority of the institutions of higher education have set up worker and peasant rapid high schools to serve as preparatory classes for entry, to higher learning’. It was subsequently shown that a considerable number of universities had done nothing of the kind. But as late as 1 March 1954 Kuang-ming jih-pao echoed earlier optimism by asserting: ‘For the last three years each of the country’s institutions of higher education
has thoroughly addressed itself to the aim of opening its doors to workers and peasants. In the autumn of 1953 the first batch of graduates of worker and peasant high schools—more than 1,500 of them—entered institutions of higher education. Later in the year, 27 September, the same paper announced the admission of both worker–peasant revolutionary cadres and production workers to rapid high schools established at Peking University.

But in spite of such optimism, the task of establishing such schools was meeting with less than enthusiasm on the part of individual universities. During the early months of 1953 complaints were voiced in the press that in some institutions the significance of schools of this type had not been realised and that in others they had not been properly conducted. In some cases it would appear that the schools had not been established.

The organs of leadership in very many institutions of higher education have still not been able to give the necessary attention to the subject of worker–peasant rapid high schools. In some institutions such work has been seen as a nuisance, and leading organs have been unwilling to set up worker and peasant rapid high schools. The Education Minister Ma Hsü-lun emphasised:

We must gradually put into effect the decisions concerning the establishment of worker and peasant rapid high schools appended to institutions of higher education, to act as preparatory classes. There are at present many rapid schools which have not been conducted well. There are naturally a number of reasons for this, but the fact that institutions have not given sufficient attention to this matter is the main reason. We trust that all will now take notice.

Nor did the results achieved by the few operative worker–peasant rapid high schools give cause for inspiration. Their success would obviously be judged by the ability of their students to adapt to the rigours of higher education. As it happened, many worker and peasant students who had graduated from these schools found it difficult to adjust to the study routine demanded by the universities. Graduates of the rapid high schools not only lacked the self-discipline required for sustained study, but their knowledge of even such basic subjects as mathematics, physics and chemistry was abysmally low. Even allowing for the originally low cultural level of these elements, the conclusion must be drawn that the rapid schools were not fulfilling their function of providing the students with an academic basis sufficient to equip them for higher education.

Various recommendations were put forward to remedy this situation. The study load of worker and peasant students was to be lightened so that they might concentrate on the main curricula. In addition, their Party and Youth League activities were to be curtailed during their first year of higher education.

While the Ministry of Higher Education criticised university authorities for neglecting rapid schools, the attitudes of individual faculty members came into focus. Teachers were accused of being unsympathetic to the special needs of
worker and peasant students, and in some cases appear to have been openly hostile. For example, on 1 March 1954 the *Kuang-ming jih-pao* noted that some teachers lacked sympathy with worker and peasant students. In certain cases leadership in institutions of higher education appeared to have neither understanding of, nor respect for, the studies of worker and peasant students. A considerable proportion of these faculty members would have been bourgeois academics inherited from the Kuomintang regime, who had not been remoulded sufficiently to understand the moral imperative of creating worker and peasant intellectuals. From the professional angle, they no doubt regarded the special effort needed to educate worker–peasant elements as academically unsound and probably believed that other priorities should be given precedence.

Nevertheless, the worker–peasant rapid high school program was not entirely without success. In the autumn of 1954 the Communist Party organ *Jen-min jih-pao* praised the example of the worker and peasant rapid high school attached to Ch’ inghua University: ‘this summer’s graduates were thirty in number and not only did all of them succeed in gaining entrance to a University through the enrolment examination system, but one of them came first among those from the North China area taking the examination for Ch’ inghua University’. The paper went on to proclaim the high calibre of worker–peasant students in the University. For example, of the twenty-eight worker–peasant students in one speciality, 80 per cent had reached the grade of excellent or good in the previous year.

In the absence of sufficient reliable evidence, it is difficult to account for the outstanding success of a few worker–peasant rapid high schools and the abject failure of others. Certainly, however, Ch’ inghua, like Peking University, was an institution of some prestige. It may well have attracted, or in some way have been able to recruit, the best from among worker–peasant elements.

The evidence quoted concerning the attitudes of faculty members to worker–peasant students also suggests that teachers were concerned primarily with academic performance. While they were prepared to encourage the promising among the proletarian contingent, they saw no reason to waste time on hopeless cases, into which category the majority of worker–peasant elements seemed to fall. In such a context the rapid high schools would become a limited avenue of social mobility for the very able. Both in the Party and in academic circles there seems to have been a fair degree of unanimity as to the desirability of fostering talent among workers and peasants. For this reason, it is difficult to chart the exact point at which the two educational lines of Cultural Revolution vintage first began to diverge.

As in other fields of educational policy, the latent conflict gradually came into the open through differing interpretations; in this case, as to the functions which the worker–peasant rapid high schools should perform.
SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF ENROLMENT
Rapid high schools were not the only provision designed to ensure the entry of worker–peasant elements to higher education. In any case in 1955 a joint directive of the Education and Higher Education Ministries announced that new enrolment in these institutions would cease. The directive called for a more gradualist approach to effect the entry of workers and peasants to higher education. In 1958 a Chinese source referred to the introduction of special classes in universities to enable worker and peasant elements to reach the standard of their fellow students. These classes were presumably designed to replace the rapid high school system, although in some cases extra courses of this kind had existed prior to 1955.

However, on 20 July 1971 Kuang-ming jih-pao accused bourgeois educational authorities of barring the entry of rapid high school graduates to institutions of higher education, as late as 1961. Even though such candidates received high examination marks, the so-called capitalist roaders refused to admit any of them on the grounds that worker–peasant children were not of high enough scholastic calibre. The raison d'être of rapid high schools was thus denied. But it must be remembered that this article appeared at a time when new enrolment policies were being launched. The need to discredit the revisionist educational line of Liu Shao-ch'i far outweighed dedication to statistical accuracy.

It seems more plausible that university authorities adopted a highly selective policy in admitting worker–peasant candidates. They were unwilling to expend effort on training students of indifferent quality who stood little chance of graduating. The charges levelled against the practitioners of the so-called revisionist educational line during and since the Cultural Revolution are not supported by enrolment statistics concerning worker–peasant students.

The success of the rapid high schools and other methods intended to facilitate the entry of worker–peasant elements to higher education would to some degree be reflected in the ratio of students of worker–peasant origin to total enrolment. During the Cultural Revolution Mao Tse-tung and his supporters gave much coverage in the media to the alleged injustices committed by the capitalist roaders against workers and peasants seeking higher learning. But statements such as these were clearly designed to achieve the desired effect at a time when new enrolment procedures were being launched.

Enrolment figures show that institutions of higher education did not adopt a deliberate policy of excluding students of worker and peasant origin. Their intention was to select students on the basis of purely academic criteria, and in 1962 the Peking Review could declare that 'half of China's total university enrolment today is of worker or peasant origin'.

Many of the charges against the revisionist educational line as related to individual
institutions would not be highlighted in statistics for higher education throughout the country. Nevertheless, it is significant that in April of 1962 half of the students at Peking University, perhaps the institution of greatest prestige where discrimination might have been expected to be most vigorous, were of worker–peasant background. In July 1971, when new educational policies were being launched, Kuang-ming jih-pao gave similar percentages for new entrants in 1962. Furthermore, the early 1960s were years when it was later claimed that the influence of the revisionist educational line had been at its height. There seems little doubt that worker–peasant elements were succeeding in gaining admission to higher education, through rapid high schools or preferential treatment in the enrolment process. In addition, their entry to higher education is amply demonstrated by an analysis of procedures for admission to universities and colleges.

The Administration of University Admissions

Admission procedures were to be determined by the leadership's conception of the demands of a developing economy. From the beginning of their rule the Chinese communists formulated enrolment policies in accordance with manpower needs. Enrolment plans were laid down by the Central Government, and the numbers of students to be allotted to individual subjects were based upon the kinds of national construction personnel required. Certain types of expertise were at a premium. Official complaints were heard that the majority of students wanted to be examined for entry to engineering and medical institutions while failing to consider the importance of other fields, for example, teacher training and the humanities. Nevertheless, the order of priorities was said to be as follows:

Naturally we need industrial construction personnel first of all. Next come medical personnel. Teacher training to produce high school teachers comes third. Fourthly, mathematics, physics, chemistry, finance, political science, law, agriculture, literature, and history personnel are all urgently needed.

In 1954, for example, 90,000 or so students were to be admitted, among whom those in engineering would represent 37.42 per cent and medicine 10.17 per cent. Orleans, basing his analysis on New China News Agency sources, confirms that there were 33,800 entrants to engineering subjects and 9,300 to medical fields in 1954.

Furthermore, the quota to be admitted to departments in individual institutions was allocated by the Central Government. An official handbook published in 1951 gave specific figures for academic units within a university. One entry stated: 'the numbers of new students to be enrolled this year in this institution are already being decided. The two departments of physics and mathematics will each enrol 40, chemistry will admit 60 . . . .' In the allocation of numbers of entrants to academic disciplines, individual institutions of higher education enjoyed virtually no freedom.
of initiative. Numbers were fixed by the Education Ministry, from 1952 to 1958 in co-operation with the newly formed Ministry of Higher Education.

**SEPARATE ENROLMENT BY INDIVIDUAL INSTITUTIONS: 1950–1951**

To ensure that enrolment work was implemented according to the national allocation plan, the CCP moved rapidly towards a unified system in the administration of university admission. During the period from the communist accession until the beginning of the Cultural Revolution the administration of admissions work passed through four distinct stages. Initially, the Central Government was faced with a situation not of its own making; all it could do was to set down the spirit and guidelines with which the new system of enrolment work was to be implemented. Before any aspect of educational reform was possible, rehabilitation was necessary. The universities had to enrol students, even though ideal procedures had not yet been carried into effect.

The considerable local variations in institutions of higher education throughout the country were mirrored in the cautious enrolment regulations for the summer of 1950. While these statutes established in great detail the categories of person who might be admitted, the content and timing of enrolment examinations, and the dates for registration, great flexibility was shown in the actual implementation of enrolment. For example, in 1950 and 1951, selection standards were relaxed as each institution undertook its own enrolment.

This is not to say that universities and colleges were completely free to exercise their own initiative even in the sphere of enrolment administration. Within the framework established by the enrolment regulations for the summer of 1950, overall control over the administration process was in the hands of the Education Ministries of the Large Administrative Areas. In effect, control by the area ministries represented the first step in the direction of unified enrolment. The 1950 Enrolment Regulations stated:

The Education Ministry of each Large Administrative Area will be able to exercise its own control within this schedule and will conduct joint or unified enrolment ... according to the concrete circumstances of that particular area. If unified enrolment presents difficulties, the Education Ministry of each Large Administrative Area may allow ... each institution to undertake its own enrolment. Nevertheless, each institution must connect its enrolment processes with the examination subjects officially laid down. Methods of enrolment must be reported ... to the Education Ministry of the central government via the equivalent Ministry of the Large Administrative Area.

But any independence that institutions enjoyed was limited to one aspect of enrolment, implementation. Certainly they had a considerable voice in the selection of students and admission standards. But even in this early period rules as to enrolment numbers, registration expenses, scholarships, examination areas, and
the establishment of enrolment committees were dealt with by the area education ministries, in accordance with decisions reached by the Central Government.

TOWARD UNIFIED ENROLMENT

The second stage, from 1952 to 1957, saw the transition to a fully-fledged system of unified enrolment. In 1952 and 1953 the Party put into effect unified enrolment by area, the major change being an attempt to achieve better co-ordination of enrolment to fit in with the country's overall needs. To this end, the enrolment numbers for every institution of higher education had to be reported to the Education Ministry of each Large Administrative Area, and these were to be then examined and approved on the basis of the country's national plan for enrolment. From 1954 onwards came a second phase of unified enrolment, this time on a countrywide basis.

SEPARATE AND UNIFIED ENROLMENT

An amalgam of separate and unified enrolment characterised the third stage in the years 1958 and 1959, entailing a slight devolution of authority to provincial bodies and a limited freedom of action to individual institutions of higher education. The Central Government had realised that the unified admission system had produced excessive centralisation, stifling local initiative and disregarding regional conditions.

With the implementation of these new measures, local authorities determined such concrete matters as the number of examination areas within a province and the actual organisation of examinations. But it was the duty of individual institutions within a given province, county, or city to carry out enrolment work jointly with mutual consultation concerning the students to be admitted and their distribution.46

Nevertheless, this local initiative had to be consistent with the allocation of numbers set down by the national plan, general guidelines concerning the country's overall needs being given by the Central Government. In addition, local educational authorities and institutions of higher education were exhorted to implement thoroughly the class line and to guarantee the political and academic calibre of new students. Any devolution of authority was limited to the implementation of admission work; the formulation of enrolment policies was still firmly in the hands of the Central Government.

There was, however, certainly greater attention given to local conditions. For example, the Directive of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Educational Work, 19 September 1958 stated: 'Under this unified rule, the different provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions have the right to lay down the academic qualifications required by their places in accordance with their own conditions, and report same to the Ministry of Education. The unified academic requirements set up for the whole country are to be abolished.'47
UNIFIED LEADERSHIP AND REGIONAL MANAGEMENT

A move to partially decentralise enrolment work seems to have been implied in the fourth stage (1960-5) which involved a system of unified leadership combined with regional management. During this period unified leadership came from the centre; provinces and cities managed admission work by establishing enrolment organs for institutions of higher education under their jurisdiction. This task was undertaken according to unified regulations laid down by the Central Government.\(^48\)

The allocation of numbers was perhaps the most important aspect of enrolment work, and economic priorities demanded that the final authority for the distribution of students among various disciplines come from the State Council. In 1952 a National Enrolment Committee was established to allocate numbers of students to institutions of higher education, according to economic plans.

The composition of this committee reflected the crucial importance of higher education to the national economy. One source stated in 1953 that among the members of the National Enrolment Committee were representatives from the Ministries of Higher Education, Education, Health, and Culture, the Second Ministry of Machine Building, the Central Committee of the New Democratic Youth League, and heads of certain institutions. Its chairman was the Minister of Higher Education, Ma Hsü-lun.\(^49\)

The *raison d'être* of the committee was to ensure that the requisite numbers of students were suitably distributed among various academic disciplines, to guarantee sufficient qualified manpower for national needs. In addition, the National Enrolment Committee had to address itself especially to the task of redressing the imbalance which existed between the number of candidates presenting themselves for university admission in the different administrative areas.

The growth of higher education in China before the communist accession had been concentrated in a few cities, which made unified distribution of students more difficult, but for that reason even more necessary. This imbalance was compounded by the fact that North China had many universities but few senior high schools; in the south the situation was reversed. The uneven distribution of prospective students was one of the major justifications for unified enrolment.

For example, candidates in Large Administrative Areas where students were few, like North China, the North-East, and the North-West were, as a general principle, to be allocated for entry to institutions of higher education in their own areas, but places with a surfeit of prospective students like East China, the Central South, and the South-West would have their candidates registered for enrolment examinations in North China, the North-East, and the North-West.\(^50\)

In order to carry out unified allocation, the National Enrolment Committee
delegated authority to a hierarchy of enrolment committees at lower levels. Each of these committees was supervised by the educational authorities at the relevant level, although they were naturally subject to the enrolment body immediately above. For instance, educational authorities in provincial cities were instructed to organise enrolment work branch committees, composed of representatives from institutions of higher education and provincial government personnel. These branch committees were responsible for much of the actual implementation of unified allocation work, even though they came under the overall leadership of the Enrolment Committee of the Large Administrative Areas and the National Enrolment Committee. In this way, institutions of higher education performed an advisory function in the work of unified distribution; they provided specialist assistance to Party and government functionaries in such tasks as the conduct of entrance examinations and the assessment of students’ performance.

But always in the foreground stood the National Enrolment Committee, setting the targets, providing centralised leadership, and ensuring co-ordination. Even after the decentralisation measures of 1958, the national body still remained responsible for overall planning. It formulated the general principles of enrolment work, designed to achieve the Party’s two goals: training educated manpower for national construction and creating proletarian intellectuals.

**Qualified Applicants**

From the outset senior high school graduates formed the main pool of applicants for entry to institutions of higher learning, since their academically oriented curricula served as the most suitable preparation for higher education. But as the enrolment quota for universities and colleges exceeded the number of high school graduates until 1956, this deficiency had to be made good from other sources. There were difficulties involved here. In the early 1950s administrative and technical manpower was at a premium. Within China there was a desperate need for young educated cadres to consolidate administrative power at different levels, while outside China’s borders the Korean War further taxed the country’s available technical expertise and involved the enlistment of half a million high school and college students. The Chinese leaders thus had to strike a delicate balance between the utilisation of manpower, which had already been trained to certain levels, and the training of new resources of personnel within institutions of higher education.

The Party’s thinking on the most desirable sources of applicants and the qualifications for admission to higher education were embodied in the Enrolment Regulations for the summer of 1950. In view of the confusing situation existing at the time, these statutes were vaguely worded and clearly designed to accommodate both deviant cases and changes of policy. Nevertheless, they were to set the tone for future regulations on admission. In terms of general principles as to categories
of entrants, there were few significant changes later, as regulations issued in the early 1960s will show.55

The 1950 statutes listed the categories of people eligible to register for enrolment examinations. From these it can be seen that the regime intended to tap available talent wherever it might be found. But although all were equal in their eligibility to register for entrance examinations, the various categories of applicant did not enjoy equal freedom to study in the field of their choice.

The first and most important category of eligible applicant was composed of those who could show evidence and relevant documents of their high school education. This academic group aspired to ascend the next rung of the educational ladder, all its previous training having prepared it for this step.

The next two categories came from outside the educational system. The first was composed of past graduates of teacher training colleges who could show that they had been employed for two years since graduation. The second included graduates of higher vocational schools or vocational high schools who had evidence that they had since worked for two years. The Party wanted the second group to return to production as soon as they had graduated from higher education. When admitted to universities and colleges, these entrants were directed to study in fields closely associated with their former academic subject.56 Although on return to employment they might better their status, their chances of achieving upward social mobility were very restricted.

The fourth category of eligible applicant consisted of those with ‘a level of scholarship equivalent to that of senior high school graduation’.57 To show evidence of their qualifications they had to provide either certificates from educational authorities or documents from trade unions or political organs of the People’s Liberation Army.

In addition, certain groups of applicants were accorded preferential treatment under the broad range entry system. This meant that certain categories of entrants could be admitted, even if their performance in entrance examinations was not entirely satisfactory. According to the 1950 Regulations these included production workers who had worked for three or more years; revolutionary cadres and soldiers who had three or more years of service behind them; candidates from the minority peoples; and Overseas Chinese applicants.

Special arrangements were later stipulated for the recruitment of specialist cadres for examination registration. The Central Government decided upon the total number to be registered throughout the country, and then allotted a quota to each of the Large Administrative Areas. The area governments in turn allocated a certain figure, on the basis of which party and government organs at the level of hsien (county) or above would select candidates for registration. Those selected then presented relevant documents and certificates to enrolment committees.58
The method of selection suggests that as a general rule revolutionary cadres, having passed the examinations, would have been directed through unified enrolment to studies associated with their former employment. As an illustration of this, a Jen-min jih-pao article in May 1954 discussed enrolment from production centres, and referred to the selection of the best vocational high school graduates and 20,900 specialist cadres to enter ‘similar kinds of institutions of higher education’. Since such cadres, by definition, held leadership positions in production, it is not surprising that they were well represented in registration for disciplines like politics and finance, although one source noted applications for examination in literature and history.

The majority of cadres were allocated to subjects with which their employment had already given them familiarity. In some cases cadres were criticised for trying to insist upon entering fields of their own choice, by implication disregarding the national interest. Their entry to totally unfamiliar academic subjects would have compounded the difficulties they already faced in study. But they were given certain concessions. They could claim exemption from examination in foreign languages, one of the compulsory examination subjects, and if they had problems in their study, extra tuition classes were to be arranged for them.

By the mid-1950s the Party was intensifying its policy of admitting production cadres for three main reasons. First of all, the regime wished to create proletarian intellectuals, even if in the end the cadres admitted received only retraining, acquiring new expertise rather than intellectual breadth. While their status on return to production might be raised as a result, their opportunities for material advancement and upward mobility were nevertheless considerably fewer than those enjoyed by graduates of senior high schools. Secondly, the cadres’ presence, together with that of the revolutionary soldiers, was said to raise the quality of the student body as a whole. Thirdly, the practical aptitude and experience of the cadres would be of inestimable value in collective study, which in turn would increase their own worth on return to production. Theory was to be inseparably linked to practice. The Party’s attitude to the role of production workers in higher education was similarly expressed and clearly designed to serve an equivalent function but at a lower level of expertise.

It is worth noting that from 1958 onwards further concessions were given to certain categories of cadres, workers, and peasants, who could be recommended by local authorities for exemption from enrolment examinations. However, after entry, they would then have to take special examinations prepared by the institution of higher education in which they were going to study.

Candidates from the minority peoples and Overseas Chinese were not statistically significant in the context of enrolment, but their inclusion in the regulations reflected two major concerns of the Chinese communists. The preference given
to the minority peoples was no doubt intended to further the integration of non-Chinese ethnic groups into the national polity and economy. From the beginning of their regime the Chinese communists sought to win the favour of Overseas Chinese for practical as well as political reasons. Their approval would enhance the legitimacy of Chinese communist rule, while the recruitment of foreign educated Overseas Chinese youth of high scholastic calibre would help to provide needed specialist manpower.

**Primary School Teachers**

The various categories of applicants so far discussed took enrolment examinations, and if their results were considered satisfactory, they would be allocated to academic disciplines under the system of unified distribution. But certain entrants to institutions of higher education did not go through the process of unified enrolment. The selection of primary school teachers for teacher training colleges was a case in point. Because there was a considerable discrepancy between the standard of such applicants and that of senior high school graduates, special examinations were to be held for them outside the unified enrolment system. Clearly, the aim of the Central Government was to retrain these primary teachers in order to improve the quality of primary school education. Nevertheless, those primary school teachers being examined for entry to other institutions of higher learning were dealt with through unified enrolment.  

In conception, the regulations regarding qualifications for examination registration were designed to accommodate several different types of candidate. For example, among those taking part in unified enrolment in 1954 were 67,989 senior high school graduates, 3,961 worker-peasant rapid high school graduates, 5,847 of the best graduates from teacher training high schools, 17,523 serving cadres, 2,285 military cadres, and 19,352 social knowledge youth: 116,957 in all.

**Enrolment Examinations**

In view of the diversity of candidates, the CCP adopted flexible methods for the assessment of examination performance. But the Party also emphasised that political as well as academic criteria were at a premium, and determined study, fired by ideological fervour, received more attention than natural endowment in Chinese communist educational thinking. Nevertheless, the aptitude of individuals for particular subjects, whether because of production experience or personal preference, could not be left entirely out of account. Therefore, to some degree at least, the enrolment examinations can be seen as an attempt to test a candidate's aptitudes.

The examinations were intended both to bring together knowledge which the candidates had already acquired and to ascertain the nature of their ability for further
study. The content of the examinations was broad in scope, and designed to discover the true aptitudes of prospective students and to cover the many kinds of academic and production experience possessed by different candidates.

To enable candidates to prepare, the National Enrolment Committee published broad outlines of the subjects to be taken. The annual plan for enrolment examinations underwent slight revision but remained generally consistent over the years.

In 1954 nine examination subjects were named: the national language, political general knowledge, a foreign language (English or Russian), mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, history and geography. In addition to the compulsory subjects of national language, political knowledge, and a foreign language, the examinations were divided into two parts. Those applying for entry in the sciences, engineering, medicine, agriculture and forestry specialities were examined in mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology. Candidates in the humanities, political science and law, and finance and economics were to be tested in history and geography.

The three common examination subjects were of crucial importance for they were seen as guaranteeing the quality of all other academic disciplines. Political examinations were designed not so much to test aptitude in the acquisition of knowledge as to discover personal standpoints on particular current issues. Proficiency in one’s own language was naturally a sine qua non of successful study in higher education. Here the essay topic represented 60 per cent of the total marks in the national language examinations; half of this percentage was awarded for ideological content, and the subject of the essay always carried a political theme. For example, in 1953 the essay subject was ‘Recalling a revolutionary cadre whom I have known’. Unlike the political and national language examination, the foreign language prescription was based on academic rather than political criteria. The linguistic stipulation was necessary because scientific and technical subjects often required at least a basic knowledge of a foreign language.

**Unified Allocation**

In addition to compulsory subjects, candidates were examined according to the field in which they wished to specialise. For purposes of unified allocation, each candidate was required to fill in personal preferences for departments and institutions: three departmental preferences were to be named under each of which five choices would be made for institutions.

Under the system of planned distribution, the majority of candidates were allocated to institutions and departments on the basis of their examination performance. Generally speaking, whatever the discipline in which the candidate had applied to study, he had to reach a definite level of attainment in all the examination subjects in order to be admitted to higher education.

Unsatisfactory performance in the examinations was one of the main reasons...
for the rejection of candidates. But by performing adequately in the examination subjects prospective students had only cleared the first hurdle. After passing the examinations they were to be allocated by the enrolment committees to different institutions and departments. In carrying out this task, the committees were to bear in mind three main considerations: the needs of national construction, the preferences of the students, and the current standard of students at present in institutions of higher education.

It was at this point that the competitive aspect of the enrolment examination system came to the fore. Jen-min jih-pao stated categorically in September 1952 that the level of performance in the examination was to be the criterion in allocating those who had chosen the same preference.

In this process of allocation, the candidate's selection of departments was examined first, followed by his choice of institutions. For example, if a student's level of achievement in his first departmental preference was inadequate, and the institutions he had named for that particular preference had already taken in their full complement, his second and third choices of departments would be considered in turn.

General principles were adopted for the distribution of students who had not succeeded in being admitted according to their preferences. Those whose standard was inadequate were sent to institutions and departments for which few had expressed preference. For instance, applicants for medical, scientific, and technical subjects were often directed to agricultural fields or scientific curricula in teacher training. Unsuccessful candidates in such subjects as literature and history were allocated to humanities classes in pedagogical institutions. The quota of students laid down in the national plan had to be filled for all departmental subjects. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that such unpopular fields of study as geology, mining, and teacher training often received students of inferior quality.

Nevertheless, it was the proud claim of Kuang-ming jih-pao in July 1954 that the greater proportion of new students admitted to higher education had been granted their first preference. But it also acknowledged that some entrants would not be so fortunate because of the pressure of numbers and academic standards.

Even when a candidate had been admitted to a department, the allocation process was still not over. Departments consisted of a number of specialities, and after once more stating their preference, students were allotted to each speciality. At this point no examination was involved. It is a matter of conjecture how many students were actually given their preference by the departments' administrative personnel, who were in turn guided by Party organisations. Once again the most reputable specialities may well have been filled with the most able students.

But then the meritocratic implications of the unified allocation system were supplemented by an elitist tendency in the institutional structure of higher educa-
Courses in universities and colleges were divided into two types: basic courses (*pen k'e*) and special training courses (*chuán hsiu k'e*). These special training courses, usually two years in length, were stated to be of an academic standard equivalent to that of the basic courses; they only differed in their shorter duration and more concentrated curricula. Yet doubt was cast upon this claim when the Party considered it necessary to admonish students whom it accused of despising special training courses. What is more, the fact that their students were considered less than equal is suggested by the rationale given for their establishment.

Furthermore, these training courses were confined to certain fields. An enrolment handbook, issued in 1955, stated that:

> in order to fulfill the country's economic construction needs... very many institutions have set up specialities of special training courses... Their aim is to train high level technical personnel with a definite theoretical basis... After graduation they will all be able to lead production... The special training courses will produce a great many cadres...

Special training courses were especially significant in such fields as agriculture, forestry, and teacher training.

Two main conclusions can therefore be drawn from an examination of the function of special training courses. First of all, as these courses were usually concentrated in fields like teacher training which were considered undesirable by the bulk of the students, it seems likely that their quality suffered as a result. It was through the special training courses that the least able students from the senior high schools were given a training which equipped them for a specific but limited function, for example, to fill posts in high school teaching where demand exceeded supply. Undoubtedly, numbers of primary school teachers, admitted outside the system of unified enrolment, would have been sent to courses of this kind, as would other elements taken in 'from a broad range'. Secondly, although revolutionary cadres and production workers received preference in enrolment, they were not necessarily admitted to institutions and specialities of the highest reputation. There is much evidence to suggest that they would have been instructed in the latest technological developments, and after this retraining they would have returned to direct the application of the modern techniques they had learned. In terms of opportunity they were by no means equal to other students.

Planned distribution promoted a meritocracy; the 'basic-special training course' system brought inequality of opportunity. A third ingredient now confirmed the emergence of an elite-mass structure in higher education: the concentration of candidate's preferences in certain academic fields, institutions, and geographical areas.

In spite of the Party's insistence that a person's contribution to the nation would be measured by the volume and sincerity of his effort rather than by the nature of the function he performed, prospective students were accused of dividing
specialities in order of merit when applying for enrolment registration. Technical subjects were especially favoured and in 1953 preferences for such fields represented 55 per cent of the total number of applications for enrolment, while teacher training, agriculture and forestry, politics, pure science, and the humanities inspired little enthusiasm among prospective students.

For this situation the propaganda media seem to have been at fault, since they clearly emphasised the importance of some fields, while neglecting to promote others adequately. For example, on 18 June 1952 the Hong Kong newspaper Ta-kung pao noted that numbers of women, influenced by Soviet films, had expressed a desire to enter technical colleges. Similarly, on 11 July 1952 the Jen-min jih-pao claimed that, having heard the report about a water-conservancy engineer, many wanted to study in that field. Perhaps some academic disciplines received too little advertisement in the media. The qualification must be added, however, that some technical subjects, for example geology and mining, were not popular, as students believed that, on graduation from such specialities, they would be sent to inhospitable and inaccessible regions.

What is more, in 1952 Jen-min jih-pao commented that some teacher training colleges did not enrol their full complement in the previous year and feared that this situation would have an adverse effect on national construction. Many students were reluctant to express preference for teacher training; among the reasons given were the lack of prestige and low salary. For instance, in July 1952 only 5 per cent registered teacher training as their first preference.

Some students were said to be unwilling to enter agricultural studies because they apparently harboured a bourgeois attitude towards manual labour, not wishing to soil their hands. Politics was believed to be a haven for inferior students who could only hope to become minor cadres on graduation.

Finally, many candidates failed to understand the important role played by comprehensive universities. The function they performed was crucial: their pure science curricula were the basis on which the specialist study of the technical and polytechnical institutes rested, while their courses in the humanities were the backbone of teaching in the rest of the educational system.

The pursuit of personal at the expense of national interest was an adverse reflection on the academic and ideological preparation which the candidates had received before examination. The senior high schools especially appeared to have been failing in their task. What is more, complaints were voiced in the press that students had concentrated their efforts upon scientific subjects at the expense of the humanities.

The elite-mass structure
In the years from 1949 to 1958 inequalities of educational opportunity were
perpetuated in three main forms, and an elite-mass structure was emerging in higher education. Firstly, famous universities sought to maintain their high standards; the specialities with the greatest prestige attracted high calibre students. The system of unified enrolment increased rather than decreased these tendencies. For the senior high school graduates at least, the enrolment examinations were competitive.

Secondly, on an organisational level, especially in technical and polytechnical institutes, a two-tiered academic system was being created, in the guise of basic and special training courses.

Thirdly, the special entry regulations, formulated to accommodate different categories of students, only increased the disparity between different sectors of higher education. In fact, the broad range entry system, far from furthering the educational opportunities of workers and peasants, actually confirmed the two-tiered structure which was emerging. In general, those admitted under this system, for example revolutionary cadres and production workers, were directed to certain specialities. These provided them with short-term training, closely connected with their production experience, and on graduation they returned to their original work. Even though their newly acquired knowledge might in some cases bring them promotion to higher leadership positions, their educational opportunities would nevertheless have been severely restricted. Compared with senior high school graduates they were less than equal.

By 1958 attempts to create a corps of worker–peasant intellectuals had met with little success. Both revolutionary cadres and children of workers and peasants were often of poor academic quality and found it difficult to adjust to university and college life. One Chinese source stated that those of worker–peasant origin only represented 36–42 per cent of the total number of students in higher education during the academic year 1957–8.85

In spite of the institutional arrangements designed to facilitate the entry of worker–peasant children, environmental and financial factors still tended to work against them. In the first instance, home environment placed workers and peasants at a considerable disadvantage. Nor must the financial obstacle be left out of account. Certainly, the universities did not charge tuition fees, and scholarships were available for those in need. But a student’s expenses, especially at the more famous institutions in Peking, would place a heavy burden on children from poor rural families and those of factory workers.86

More drastic measures were needed if the worker–peasant contingent in higher education was to be increased. Worker–peasant rapid high schools and the broad range entry system had been an attempt, on an institutional level, to train a new generation of proletarian intellectuals. This method had failed.
The Two Educational Lines

More radical measures were now undertaken, and in their full implications they represented nothing less than the entire revamping of the educational system, the hegemony of the Yenan philosophy over Soviet organisational structure.

Nevertheless, in order to intensify their measures to increase the number of students of worker-peasant origin in higher education, the Chinese communists did not entirely neglect institutional means. In 1958 new enrolment regulations were introduced under which workers and peasants, together with serving cadres who had ten years of revolutionary experience behind them, could enter higher education on the basis of recommendation and without examination.87

A new educational policy was forcefully expressed in the joint directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council, issued on 19 September 1958. Education was to serve the interests of proletarian politics and was to be integrated with productive labour. To achieve these objectives, part-time work, part-time study, and part-time farming, part-time study schools were established, mainly at the high school level but later also in higher education.

There seems to have been general agreement within the Party leadership concerning the creation of these institutions, although some sources have attributed their invention to Liu Shao-ch'i. Mao Tse-tung himself had already praised the part-time-work and part-time-study system launched by revolutionary teachers and students during a visit to Tientsin University earlier in 1958.88

The part-time work, part-time study institutions were justified in both political and economic terms. There was an acute shortage of schools. Large numbers of children were unable to receive an education, and the number of graduates at each educational level who could not proceed to the next higher rung of the ladder was increasing. Most institutions, particularly at the high school stage, were concentrated in the cities; there was inequality of opportunity between the urban and the rural areas. The part-time-work, part-time-study system would both diminish that inequality and pay its own way without need of public expenditure. In addition, the combination of education and production would provide new sources of manpower. Finally, but most important of all, the ideological goal of eliminating differences between mental and manual labour would be furthered.

The first examples of these institutions were at the high school level. For instance, industrial enterprises in the cities established technical high schools, which enrolled graduates from the full-time junior high schools. These would be trained as technicians needed by a particular enterprise. Simultaneously, agricultural high schools were organised in the rural areas; these admitted graduates from full-time senior primary schools and their courses were normally three years in length.89

Part-time work, part-time study institutions in higher education were few
compared with those at the high school level. Part-time higher education developed on two fronts; workers' universities were first established in 1958, and later certain full-time universities began to take the form of work and study.

One of the most notable examples of part-time higher education was the Kiangsi Communist Labour University, an institution which catered to local needs, offering courses in agronomy, farm machinery, stock breeding, forestry, fishery, and sericulture. Since theory was applied to practice, its students were proficient at both mental and manual labour.

The principle of combining education with productive labour caused such famous institutions as Ch'inghua and Futan Universities to set up factories. Students were instructed in the classroom and at the bench. The full-time universities were now creating 'all round worker-intellectuals'; and the new Ch'inghua was described as 'a living blueprint for the development of institutions of higher education'.

It was at this point that the conflict between the two educational lines, latent for so long, began to come to the surface, even though it did not erupt in full force until the Cultural Revolution. This conflict arose over the role part-time work, part-time study schools should play in the educational system. There is little doubt that they provided education for those who would otherwise have been denied it. Yet these schools were by no means equivalent in academic standard to the general high schools in the cities. Both types of part-time work, part-time study universities admitted graduates of senior high schools; but very few, if any, part-time work, part-time study high school graduates entered full-time higher education. Furthermore, because of the economic retrenchment policies which followed the Great Leap, enrolment in higher education decreased. By 1962 large numbers of high school graduates were being sent down to work in the countryside. Competition for entry to higher education now became more intense than ever before. In these circumstances, the part-time work, part-time study high schools did not serve as a channel through which workers and peasants could enter full-time higher education.

Rival interpretations

The two educational streams were placed side by side rather than co-ordinated: the elite-mass structure was being further crystallised. The educational system would have to move in one of two directions. The first alternative was for the part-time work, part-time study schools to continue to perform an auxiliary function: under the terms of the second, full-time universities would gradually come to take on the part-time form. An examination of materials published during the Cultural Revolution provides convincing evidence that it was on this issue that the two educational lines began to diverge. Liu Shao-ch'i and the so-called
peddlers of revisionist educational theory did not oppose or pervert the part-time system—as Mao Tse-tung and his supporters would have us believe. They placed a different interpretation upon its function.

Two fundamentally distinct educational philosophies were in conflict. Mao Tse-tung and his supporters believed in the integration of education and production labour as a value in itself; the whole educational system was to take on the form of part-time work, part-time study. Higher education was to be directly related to the needs of society. Education did not exist for the sake of education, for society itself was a vast educational process.

To the revisionists in the educational field, the part-time work, part-time study system was essentially supplementary education. It provided an education for those who could not enter the full-time universities, and it satisfied the economic need for technical personnel at various levels. The part-time schools were primarily instrumental; to the ‘revisionists’ there were two educational systems, and the quality of full-time education was to be promoted at all costs.

Lu Ting-yi, a former Vice-Premier and Director of the CCP Propaganda Department, who fell from grace during the Cultural Revolution, was accused of dividing the younger generation into two categories of people. The majority were to be trained as manual workers, and a small minority as a ruling elite. This theory came to be known as the ‘dual aim of education’. Clearly, the charges against the ‘revisionist’ group were being overstated to achieve the desired goal, but they nevertheless contained at least a kernel of truth.

Liu Shao-ch’i had been quoted as saying, ‘our country should have two educational systems. One is the whole-day, full-time school educational system. This whole-day school system cannot be abridged . . . If one cannot afford to go to a full-time school, he goes to a half-day school.’ Chiang Nan-hsiang, his follower, was more blunt about it, saying, ‘if you can afford it, go to a college, or else go to the farm’. Clearly, the charges against the ‘revisionist’ group were being overstated to achieve the desired goal, but they nevertheless contained at least a kernel of truth.

This theme was also pursued in the October 1971 issue of the theoretical journal Hung-ch’i which claimed that ‘Liu Shao-ch’i and Lu Ting-yi opposed education being combined with productive labour and promoted the capitalist “double lines system”’. They called for the implementation of the whole-day program, with the part-time work, part-time study schools as a supplement. They wanted to create two educational systems. The ‘revisionist’ interpretation meant full-time education was to be available to those with financial means and exceptional ability.

**Universalisation or elevation?**

Liu Shao-ch’i and his associates saw quality of higher education as paramount, and enrolment policies were to be directed to that end. It was not their policy to discriminate against worker and peasant candidates. But preference for such
elements in enrolment had to take second place to academic excellence. Those of proletarian origin were not to be denied entry, and talent was to be fostered wherever it might be found. In the last analysis, the clash between the educational lines centred on the respective weight to be given to universalisation and elevation.

The September 1958 Joint Directive of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council called for the vigorous development of secondary and higher education. Fifteen years were to be devoted to the universalisation of higher education and another fifteen years to its elevation. But Mao Tse-tung's principle that elevation must be achieved on the basis of popularisation was soon reversed, and by the early 1960s elevation was being emphasised.

While Liu Shao-ch'i and his allies acknowledged the important role played in education by productive labour, they were determined that academic standards in universities should not be sacrificed. One Red Guard newspaper accused Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the former Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the CCP, of emphasising scientific research at the expense of production work. In the case of one institution, so-called bourgeois academic authorities were not prepared to accept excellence in politics and production work alone as adequate qualifications for advanced scientific research, although significantly some worker and peasant students were selected.

Attacks on the revisionist educational line reached their peak during the Cultural Revolution. The approach of the Liuists was gradualist and pragmatic; popularisation was the final goal but in the short term elevation should receive priority. Political criteria in enrolment were seen as important but not overriding; worker-peasant candidates with sufficient ability would be admitted to higher education, but those of inferior calibre would be excluded. In practice, the criterion of academic ability had never been totally absent in enrolment prior to 1958, but never before had the case for an elitist system of selection been stated so blatantly.

The full implications of such a system were alien to the traditional relationship between education and society, postulated by Confucianism. Elitism was carried a stage further in 1965 when Lu Ting-yi recommended the adoption of two educational systems, the full-time and the part-time work, part-time study, each of which would train personnel to perform different functions in society. The elite-mass structure in higher education was being intensified.

Little treasure pagodas

This dichotomy was only one element in the two-tiered structure which was appearing in the educational system. Full-time institutions were now being placed in order of rank. One of the crimes alleged to have been committed by Liu Shao-ch'i and his supporters was the implementation of a policy of selective education designed to train an intellectual aristocracy. A December 1962 government directive
ordered provinces and municipalities to concentrate a considerable proportion of their educational resources on key institutions of primary and high school education. In the words of the Cultural Revolution these schools were called 'little treasure pagodas'. They were even more academically oriented than other full-time schools and placed much less emphasis on productive labour.\(^2\)

Disadvantages of home environment and financial circumstances had often prevented the entry of worker and peasant children in the past; the net result of these new conditions was to make their admission that much more difficult.

What is more, the university enrolment system had already been in operation for over ten years; it was not surprising that by the early 1960s some high schools had had more success than others in placing their candidates in famous universities. In order to maintain their reputation, the better high schools were ruthless in weeding out students who were of indifferent quality or who were considered unsuitable. This system worked against those of worker–peasant origin. In one case, of a class of more than fifty only thirty students were left at the time of graduation, and the majority of those eliminated were children of workers and peasants.\(^3\) The reputation of 'these key preparatory schools' was further enhanced when the 'capitalist roaders' in the old Peking Municipal Party Committee made a city-wide assessment of each middle school under its control after the university entrance examination results had been announced. This survey showed that large numbers of students from these key schools had been successful in gaining admittance to higher education.\(^4\)

These 'little treasure pagodas' were now to be further developed as nurseries for the better institutions of higher education. Talent was to be sought everywhere, but these schools would be one of the main channels through which promising youth were to be prepared for a place among an academic elite.

In October 1971 Hung-ch'i quoted Liu Shao-ch'i's remark that it was necessary to rely on naturally gifted high school students if the advanced levels of the rest of the world were to be reached.

Nor was Liu Shao-ch'i alone in envisaging a future led by a meritocracy of this kind. In a Report on the Work of the Government at the First Session of the Second National People's Congress on 18 April 1959 no less a figure than Chou En-lai justified an elite-mass structure of higher education in the following terms: 'in the first place, we must devote more energy to perfecting a number of "key" schools. We will then be able to train specialist personnel of higher quality for the state and bring about a rapid rise in our country's scientific and cultural level.'

As an example of a key institution of higher education Ch'inghua University was well in the vanguard. Chiang Nan-hsiang, the former Minister of Higher Education, opposed Ch'inghua students' taking part in the class and production
struggles. He spoke of the university’s pre-eminent position in education by claiming that the ‘Ch’inghua garden is the engineer’s cradle’.

But it was not exactly true to say, as the Red Guards did, that the doors of higher education were entirely closed to worker-peasant elements. The Liuists did not directly and consciously pervert the university enrolment policies which had been determined by the Party leadership as a whole. Initially the elite-mass structure in higher education developed by default. It was only later that the process was accelerated through differing interpretations of the directives issued in 1958 concerning educational policy, especially part-time work, part-time study. But it was a short step from the full-time part-time dichotomy to the hierarchical ranking of full-time institutions. Economic development was creating new centres of power.

Ever since their accession to power in 1949 the Chinese leaders had acknowledged the necessity of training large numbers of scientific and technical specialists for national construction. But these specialists had to be ‘red’ as well as ‘expert’. Certain sources would indicate, however, that Liu Shao-ch’i and his supporters came to conceive politics or ‘redness’ as an expertise in itself. In their view, functional specificity was carried one stage further. For example, at the 1957 Shanghai Cadres Conference Liu Shao-ch’i stated: ‘a small number of people studies the humanities, politics, and finance... because in future we shall still need party committee secretaries, people to manage enterprises, and specialists in literature and fine arts’.

Similar sentiments were expressed by the former Foreign Minister, Ch’en Yi, in a speech made to students about to graduate from institutions of higher education in Peking in 1961:

our society needs all kinds of personnel, of which one type consists of specialists who do political work, and political work is their specialism. There are also other specialist personnel who specialize in industry, agriculture, literature, geology... etc. The Party schools, the League schools, and other political schools are to train political work personnel; [other] institutions of higher education are to study all kinds of specialist knowledge, so that the students may become specialist personnel expert in their own field.

But there was always the possibility that politics might no longer be in command if it were relegated to the status of an expertise among other specialisms. By 1965 it appeared that a technocratic elite was being nurtured at the summit of the educational system.

Liu Shao-ch’i’s educational line was elitist in conception since it called for the training of anyone who was exceptionally able. It demanded a respect for the intellect accorded neither by the traditional relationship between education and society nor by the philosophy of Yenan. The Party’s goal in university enrolment policies since 1949 had been the creation of proletarian intellectuals; yet the limited social mobility of the Liuists provided merely for the admission of small numbers of
worker–peasant elements to the universities. But in order to adjust to their new environment worker–peasant children turned away from their class origins, and this negated the principle of their entry to higher education.

According to both the Maoist and Liuist conceptions, higher education was subordinated to economic needs. But there was one important difference between the two. The Maoist, unlike the Liuist, conception measured an individual’s achievement not so much by the expert function he performed as by the quality of his personal commitment to national goals. No privileged stratum of specialists must be permitted to hold a position from which it could bargain for the price of its services.

The Liuists saw students’ participation in production as essentially a means of increasing understanding of specialist curricula; to Mao Tse-tung the integration of education and productive labour was an article of faith as it guaranteed that intellectuals would not become alienated from the rest of society. One of the main charges against the Liuists during and since the Cultural Revolution has been that they promoted the separation of students from politics, from the masses, and from productive labour. The two major features of the Maoist conception of higher education were the creation of proletarian intellectuals and the integration of study with productive labour. These two ideals were to be given concrete substance in the new enrolment policies formulated during the Cultural Revolution.

The Cultural Revolution

On 13 June 1966 a Joint Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council announced the abolition of the entrance examination system. The year’s enrolment work would be delayed for six months in order to carry out the Cultural Revolution and to prepare new admission procedures. Significantly, the joint directive acknowledged that, although enrolment methods had undergone reform since Liberation, they were still contained within the pre-1949 examination system. As a result these methods had not furthered the Party’s educational policies, especially the admission of workers, peasants, soldiers, and revolutionary youth.

Since enrolment was a process in which both students and faculty participated, senior high school students had earlier made recommendation to the Party’s Central Committee concerning the reform of higher education entry requirements. The main substance of these proposals was the suggestion that graduates of senior high schools first go among the workers, peasants, and soldiers, to be tempered in the storms of the three great revolutionary movements. After this remoulding they would receive ideological diplomas for entry to higher education.

In addition, the students urged that large numbers of steadfast revolutionaries from among the workers, peasants, and soldiers tested in class struggle, should
be enrolled in higher education. Not only were senior high school graduates with a firm proletarian stand to gain entry, but others with the requisite class background and political quality were also to be admitted. Finally, the senior high school students launched fierce attacks on the special institutions which had been recruiting candidates of 'exceptional calibre'.

The new methods of university enrolment were based on a system of recommendation and selection. Students were chosen from among those recommended by the masses for their outstanding moral (read political), intellectual, and physical qualities. The same criteria were used to enrol students for senior high schools. By 1970 categories of eligible entrants were being laid down with greater clarity, and Kuang-ming jih-pao gave the main enrolment targets for scientific and engineering institutions.

The first category consisted of the best elements among workers and peasants who had come to prominence in the three great revolutionary movements, had three years or more of practical experience, were twenty years of age, and had reached a cultural level equivalent to that of junior or senior high school. The second group was composed of intellectual youth who had taken part in productive labour in the countryside or had returned to their native places. The third included members of the People's Liberation Army, and the fourth young cadres. Old workers and poor and lower middle peasants were not subject to the entrance restriction of age and cultural level.

Participation in the selection of students had now been carried one stage further. It was no longer confined to the educational authorities, faculty and students, but had been extended to society as a whole, in the form of the masses. But the participation of the masses was qualified, and in carrying out the process of selection they received guidance from party committees at various levels. Yet promotion of candidates by the masses was crucial, for only if the masses were mobilised could the quality of enrolment be guaranteed. Articles in the press claimed that workers chosen for entry to university were thoroughly investigated by the revolutionary committees. In some cases university enrolment leadership groups were set up by commune party committees to choose intellectual youth for admission to Peking and Ch'inghua universities.

The task of selection was not to be performed perfunctorily. Time and again the press instructed those responsible not to employ a simply professional viewpoint, not to see enrolment as an institution admitting a certain number, a unit sending a certain number of students. The enrolment process was designed to propagate Mao Tse-tung's educational line.

Enrolment candidates were also exhorted not to take their selection for granted. Mao Tse-tung thought-study classes were organised by factory revolutionary committees to provide prospective worker-students with ideological preparation.
Political education never ceased, as even those of the purest proletarian origin were capable of walking the 'revisionist road'.

Such universities as Peking and Ch'inghua were selected as models which other institutions should emulate, and their enrolment reforms set the tone for the rest of the country. The purpose of workers', peasants' and soldiers' admission to university was not merely symbolic; in the words of the Cultural Revolution they 'entered the university, managed the university, and used Mao Tse-tung's thought to reform the university', bringing the educational revolution to a new stage.

Nearly six hundred worker, peasant, and soldier students with practical experience were admitted to Ch'inghua from March 1969 onwards, while a later report announced the entry of 2,800 candidates from the same sources during the latter months of 1970. But, in spite of the importance of their political mission, the academic standard of at least some of these entrants was apparently very low. The old device of special study classes was used to make good the academic deficiencies of old workers being admitted to Ch'inghua.

Despite numerous references to the entry of worker–peasant elements, Chinese communist statistics provide neither separate figures for the different categories of entrants nor their destination within academic disciplines. But an examination of courses held by scientific and technological institutions gives a fair indication of the hierarchical structure which has existed in universities in the post-Cultural Revolution period.

Their own practical experience was of inestimable advantage to workers and peasants directed to study in certain academic fields. Practice helped them to understand theory. But it is likely that the majority of workers and peasants have been sent to classes which amount to vocational training in special skills. Workers and peasants academically inferior to senior high school graduates have been allocated to vocational training classes, designed to popularise new expertise and solve crucial questions which arise in production.

Scientific and technological universities have been given two tasks: the training of research personnel as well as technical manpower. Both elevation and popularisation have been given a place in the new universities. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the old dichotomy between basic courses and special training courses is appearing in a new guise, and some entrants are still academically more equal than others. Neither the reform of enrolment methods nor the reorganisation of curricula and specialities has prevented the re-emergence of the elite-mass structure in higher education.

Workers and agricultural universities

If within universities the old hierarchical structure was being perpetuated, equality between institutions of higher education had not yet been achieved. The Cultural
Revolution saw a renewed emphasis on various kinds of part-time education the best examples of which were the 'July 21 workers universities' and the 'May Seventh agricultural universities'. Both these types of university were characterised by the subordination of education to society and its integration with productive labour. The factory-run universities served a narrow vocational function; they could not be compared with full-time institutions in terms of quality.

The model for workers' universities was the one established at the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant in 1968. Its enrolment consists of production workers with an average of twelve years' standing and a cultural level equivalent to junior high school. These institutions are run by factories and designed to train technical personnel rapidly and economically. Their students come from the front line of production and return to it after they complete their two-and-a-half-year course of study.

Similarly, subjects taught in the May Seventh universities, established in the countryside, are linked with production and teach needed skills. In May 1970 Kuang-ming jih-pao outlined the conditions of entry to the May Seventh University established in Liaoning Province's Fuhsin Mongolian autonomous hsien: sound political thought, correct class origin, and practical experience of production, but without qualification of age or cultural standard. The students selected have all been of poor and lower middle peasant origin. Education and productive labour are fully integrated, since study periods are accredited as work points by production teams. No costs are borne by the state. After training, students become part of the technical skeleton of the hsien.

The university's teachers also undertake other work. They are selected after investigations by the hsien revolutionary committees, mainly from among the workers and poor and lower middle peasants with rich production experience. Both students and teachers are from the same origins. In this way, the Party claims, 'the workers, poor and lower middle peasants manage the university, are enrolled in the university, and teach in the university'.

The new speciality: teaching, scientific research, and production

The abolition of entrance examinations in 1966 brought into focus not merely the system of university enrolment but also the academic organisation of higher education. The Maoist interpretation of the Party's educational line implied that the full-time universities would eventually take on a part-time form. Education would have to be integrated with productive labour, and this unity must become a value in itself rather than a means to an end. In order to strengthen proletarian leadership in the universities after the Cultural Revolution, worker, peasant and soldier specialists were recruited to undertake teaching, guarantee political quality, and promote academic reform.
At Ch'inghua, the link between education and society is being forged in three ways. First, worker participation in teaching strengthens proletarian leadership in the university. Secondly, since the teachers take part in production while teaching, the reform of intellectual elements is achieved. Thirdly, because the students both study and engage in labour, the integration of education and production is ensured. The implementation of these policies demanded changes in academic organisation.

In the Ch'inghua model, not only has the university established its own factories, but students have also been despatched to outside enterprises to carry out production work. A new type of speciality has emerged in which teaching, scientific research, and production have been brought together.

The unity between these three components has been formed in three different ways according to the nature of particular specialities. The majority of specialities have based most of their activity in the factories run by the university, some have generally focused their work on the co-ordination between the university and outside factories, while others have used the university laboratories as their sphere of operation. But the Party has emphasised that the university-run factories and laboratories are no substitute for the essential co-ordination between outside enterprises and the university. The ideal towards which the specialities must move is the integration of the three components in order to create a two-way link between education and society. Great successes have already been claimed for this new form of academic organisation. A corps of working-class technical personnel is being trained and scientific research is being furthered: the proletarian educational line is near to final victory.

**The Battlefield of Enrolment: Proletarian or Revisionist Victory?**

But appearances are deceptive. The reform of the specialities has been one triumph for the proletarian educational line, but its ultimate supremacy will depend on enrolment; for enrolment is the medium through which education and society are linked. As yet, enrolment does not appear to guarantee that the elite-mass structure, in existence prior to the Cultural Revolution, will not return in a new guise. Unfortunately, Chinese communist enrolment statistics are not sufficiently complete for definite conclusions to be drawn, but all the available evidence indicates trends directly opposed to the objectives of the proletarian educational line.

Worker–peasant elements have been admitted to universities, senior high school graduates tempered in production, proletarian control imposed on the universities, and the specialities reorganised to provide a structure within which the integration of education and productive labour may be better achieved. But ultimately the success of the new enrolment policies and the victory of the proletarian educational line will depend on three factors: the subordination of expertise to ideology (or 'redness'), the social composition and political quality of entrants to higher educa-
tion, and the presence or absence of revisionist tendencies among students. Enrolment since the Cultural Revolution will be examined in turn on these three counts.

**More ‘expert’ than ‘red’?**

In contrast to the two previous years 1971 saw a re-emphasis on expertise. Articles in the Chinese press provide clear evidence of the reaction against theoretical subjects among students. Attacks on techniques divorced from practice and politics in the Cultural Revolution years were the main cause of this reaction. In July 1971, for example, an article in *Kuang-ming jih-pao* made explicit this new stress on expertise: ‘we have taken measures to enable the students to devote seventy per cent of their time to professional study...and to encourage them to improve their professional technique’.26

The same source criticised the reluctance of students to study theoretical subjects: ‘in the past a few people spread the notion that if one studied mathematics, physics, and chemistry, one had nothing to fear; now they have moved to the other extreme, and do not want to be associated with those three subjects’.27 In the same way, while the rich experience already gathered by worker, peasant, and soldier students in revolution was invaluable, once they had entered the universities they were encouraged to concentrate on the study of theoretical subjects.28 Theory was still to be linked with practice, but theory must never be neglected.

This new tendency towards expertise, when seen in the same context as the other two factors, seems to be closer to Liu Shao-ch'i's than Mao Tse-tung's interpretation of the proletarian educational line. Experience in production still fulfils an important function in helping students to understand theory, but that role is now being conceived as being instrumental rather than valuable in itself.

**Social composition of new students**

The few details available concerning the operation of the 1966 enrolment regulations do not suggest that any significant changes have taken place in the composition of entrants to full-time institutions of higher education. Unfortunately, sources to hand are not specific concerning the numbers of each category of entrants, but articles in the Chinese press provide glimpses into the implementation of the new enrolment policies as they have affected the model institutions, Ch'inghua and Peking universities. The two basic principles of the new regulations, recommendation by the workers and peasants of intellectual youth and the selection of the best workers and peasants, have certainly been followed.

For example, it was reported that this year, at Ch'inghua and Peking Universities, through deliberation and recommendation of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and examination of the revolutionary committees at
each level, four thousand or so worker, peasant, and soldier students have been admitted, after being selected from each area.29

But in the case of both these principles it is doubtful whether the substance, as opposed to the form of the new regulations, has been observed. For example, recommendation by the workers and peasants of senior high school graduates may well have raised the political quality of university entrants, but it has not necessarily altered their social composition. The criterion of experience in productive labour has supplemented, not replaced, the academic qualifications of senior high school graduation. A considerable proportion of entrants are still senior high school graduates,30 as they were before the 1966 enrolment regulations. The Party claims that entrants to higher education have come from factories and people's communes; but this is not a radical departure from the old enrolment system. The device of broad range entry had always provided a channel of mobility for outstanding workers and peasants.

In any case, although few concrete details have yet been given in Chinese sources, many of the worker–peasant entrants have been reported as being Party members and in some cases Party secretaries.31 Some of these entrants have been described as middle-aged and are clearly being given the opportunity of higher education denied them in their youth. But they are in positions of at least local authority, and therefore cannot simply be classed as workers or poor and lower middle peasants.

Finally, in the face of the new emphasis on expertise, worker and peasant elements are as likely to be chosen for their production experience in relation to certain academic fields, as for their political quality. The limited social mobility and the fostering of exceptional talent, associated with Liu Shao-ch'i's interpretation of the Party's educational line, have reappeared in a new guise.

'Naturally red' or 'moulded red'?

Enrolment is the battlefield on which the conflict between the two educational lines has been fought. On that battlefield, the success of the new enrolment policies will be judged not only by the subordination of expertise to ideological fervour and the class composition of students, but by whether the ideological purity of their thought can be maintained. Cultural Revolution sources tell of students from worker and poor and lower middle peasant families who entered higher education and began to despise the labouring people from whom they had come.32 The elaborate measures taken since 1969 to prevent those enrolled from 'changing colour' appear to have had little effect. In the past two years numerous articles have appeared in the Chinese press accusing students of having such revisionist thoughts, and even those of proletarian origin have not been immune from infection.

From the beginning the Party has reserved the prerogative of ascribing class status 'Redness' is not naturally endowed, but moulded in the practice of revolu-
tionary struggle. Yet the years of productive labour and the integration of work and study seem to have fallen short of their objective, the preservation of the students' ideological purity. For instance, *Kuang-ming jih-pao* (30 July 1971) reported that a small number of students at Ch'inghua had been infected with the revisionist thesis and had given expertise priority at the expense of politics, saying, 'politics really amounts to insurance, but technique is in a different category; if you do not study well you will not be given a cheque'. As further evidence of their 'changed colour', it added, 'to be favourably compared in technique with capitalist expertise, that is what the promotion of politics is all about'. Many students of worker-peasant origin have by now forgotten the need continually to remould themselves. They feel that as they are themselves from the ranks of workers and peasants they need not concern themselves with political quality, only expertise. Expertise is all that matters.

**Conclusion**

The operation of the new enrolment regulations since the Cultural Revolution has not brought victory for the proletarian educational line. In the absence of more detailed and better organised statistics, no judgment can be definitive, but present tendencies point to developments very similar to those which Mao Tse-tung and his supporters attacked in the mid-1960s.

An elite-mass structure is appearing in higher education, both within and between individual institutions. Education has been integrated with productive labour, but only in the interest of greater expertise. The fostering of exceptional talent has produced a limited social mobility. Incentives have been given to those whose specialist contribution is vital for national economic development. Liu Shao-ch'i'i's interpretation of the Party's educational line has emerged victorious on the crucial battlefield of enrolment, and the Ch'inghua garden is still the engineer's cradle.
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Notes

1 'On New Democracy' (January 1940), Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume II (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1965), pp. 339-82.

2 In East China, one of the six Large Administrative Areas into which the country was divided during the period 1949 to 1954, there were said to be eighty-five institutions, representing $37.4\%$ of the total number, and Shanghai alone had 43 institutions, that is one-fifth of the country's places of higher education. Information given in the closing speech at the First National Education Conference by the Minister of Education, Ma Hsi-lun, Jen-min chiao-yü, July 1950, p. 13.

3 Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford, California, 1969), p. 48.

4 Ibid., pp. 82-3.

5 Ibid., p. 178.

6 'These institutions have trained thousands of revolutionary and construction cadres, their teaching contents and methods are all suited to real needs, and they have unified theory and practice. But they still retain the characteristics of short-term classes, and have not yet developed into proper institutions of higher education.' From the opening speech at the First National Conference on Higher Education by the Education Minister Ma Hsü-lun, Jen-min chiao-yü, July 1950, p. 11.

7 Institutions under the direct control of the Ministry of Higher Education included such outstanding centres as Peking University, Ch'inghua University, and the Chinese People's University: see Shih Ch'eng-chih, The Status of Science and Education in Communist China and a Comparison with that in USSR (Communist China Problem Research Series EC 30, Hong Kong, 1962), p. 27.

Earlier, in the Decisions on Higher Education passed at the Forty-Third Political Affairs Session of the State Council on 28 July 1950 it was stated: 'The institutions of higher education in the North China Administrative Area, apart from those already handed over to the leadership of provincial governments, will be directly led by the Central Education Ministry' (Jen-min chiao-yü, Sept. 1950, p. 67).
8 For details concerning Soviet aid in this context, see Cheng Chu-yuan, 'Role of the Soviet Union in developing Scientific and Technical Manpower in Communist China', Stewart E. Fraser (ed.), Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong, 1969), p. 522.

9 They were as follows: the Chinese People's University, Peking University, Nank'ai University, Tung Pei University, Futan University, Shantung University, Nanking University, Hsiamen University, Wuhan University, Chungshan University, Szechwan University, Yünnan University, Hsi Pei University and Lanchou University. This information was given in one of the enrolment handbooks, published annually by the Central Government, 1955 nien shu-ch'i kao-teng hsüeh-hsiao chao-sheng sheng-hsüeh chih-tao [Guidance on Enrolment in Institutions of Higher Education, Summer 1955], p. 167.

For information on the status of Ch'inghua University, see Note 10.

10 Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien pao, 6 July 1954. However, the qualification must be added that there were cases reported of candidates for entry to higher education failing to understand the important role played by comprehensive universities. Nevertheless, there remains no doubt about the elite status of such institutions as Ch'inghua and Peking universities. Strictly speaking, Ch'inghua is a polytechnical institute as it concentrates on technological subjects. However, the term Ch'inghua University has been retained here, since it is so used in many secondary sources on Chinese education.


14 The teacher-centred theory is discussed in Kuang-ming jih-pao, 13 April 1971.

15 Jen-min chiao-yü, Dec. 1950, p. 11.

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21 'Even if all the senior high school graduates were to have entered higher education there would still not have been sufficient numbers for enrolment needs. Owing to the results of expansion in senior high school education in the First Five Year Plan, by 1957 the ratio of senior high school graduates in relation to enrolment in institutions of higher education had increased to $1.79 : 1$ (Jen-min chiao-yü, Oct. 1957, p. 11). The maintenance of standards, in spite of the shortage of numbers, is discussed in Ch'ang-chiang jih-pao, 24 July 1952.
22 T'ou-k'ao ta-hsüeh shou-t'se [Handbook concerning Examinations for entry to Universities] 1951, p. 3.
24 Jen-min jih-pao, 26 Sept. 1952.
28 'Strive to Carry Out This Year's Higher Education Plan', Kuang-ming jih-pao, 19 Feb. 1953.
29 From a speech by Ma Hsü-lun in February 1953.
32 'The Peking Agricultural Institute, for instance, has opened a number of special courses where they can get special tutoring in
mathematics, physics and chemistry until they catch up with their classes. . . . In the Peking Aeronautical Institute, coaching classes started in 1954 . . . In Tungchi University in Shanghai, worker–peasant students who had difficulties in higher mathematics and the applied sciences are given special attention and an evening question and answer period with their teachers once a week' (Peking Review, Vol. I, No. 12, 20 May 1958, p. 16).

35 Kuang-ming jih-pao, 20 July 1971, p. 3.
36 T'ou-k'ao ta-hsüeh shou-t'se, 1951, pp. 2–3.
37 Wen-hui pao, 12 May 1954.
38 Leo. A. Orleans, Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China (Washington, 1961), pp. 131 and 136.
39 These figures refer to the enrolment plan formulated for Chiaotung University (T'ou-k'ao ta-hsüeh shou-ts'e), 1951, p. 42.
40 Wang Hsüeh-wen, p. 59.
41 The Enrolment Regulations for Summer 1950 were published in Jen-min jih-pao, 29 May 1950.
42 As mentioned above, until 1954 China was divided into six Large Administrative Areas. There were Education Ministries in these areas which occupied a position between the National Ministries of Education and the Provincial Departments of Education. A detailed outline of the educational administrative structure is to be found in Tsang Chiu-sam, Society, Schools, and Progress in China (Oxford, 1968), pp. 82–4.
43 The exceptions to this rule were the institutions of higher education in the five provinces and two cities of North China where, as indicated in another context, control was vested in the Education Ministries of the Central Government.
44 Jen-min jih-pao, 29 May 1950.
45 The 'examination areas' played a key role in unified enrolment. These were located in provincial capitals and cities throughout the country. The prospective student registered for and took the enrolment examination in the area nearest to his home. There were 77 of these areas in 1954, according to the Jen-min jih-pao, 25 May 1954. Joseph C. Kun gives the same number for that year and 91 for 1957, 'Higher Education: Some Problems of Selection and Enrolment', China Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 8, Oct.–Dec. 1961, p. 137.
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48 Wang Hsüeh-wen, p. 60.
49 Ta-kung pao (Tientsin), 8 July 1953.
50 Jen-min jih-pao, 18 Sept. 1953.
51 Jen-min jih-pao, 25 May 1954.
52 Kun, pp. 136–7.
54 Shih Ch’eng-chih, The Status of Science and Education in Communist China and a Comparison with that in USSR, p. 10.
56 This ruling was made clear in the ‘Regulations Concerning the Enrolment Examination of New Students in the Country’s Institutions of Higher Education for Summer 1951’, reproduced in the Kuang-ming jih-pao, 13 June 1952. The relevant section reads as follows: ‘graduates of vocational high schools (including technical schools, normal schools, medical and other vocational high schools), must present a document of recommendation from the production departments where they have served the regulation period of two or three years, and they will enter a department to study the same subject that they studied originally, or one closely allied to it’. A later source refers to the selection of the best vocational high school graduates for higher education enrolment examination registration, but at the same time does not mention the two-year employment stipulation. This policy is presumably to be interpreted as a further attempt to utilise talent wherever it might be found, and such students would have been of exceptional calibre (Jen-min jih-pao, 25 May 1954).
57 The expression ‘a level of scholarship equivalent to that of senior high school graduation’ was a device used to accommodate those who had formerly studied in vocational or technical colleges, who had failed to complete the course, but who had subsequently carried out self-study in the field concerned. Again, the intention was to tap talent wherever it might be
found (T'ou-k'ao ta-hsüeh shou-t'še, pp. 33-4). This rubric also appeared to apply to those who had graduated a long time before from senior high schools, but only provided that they had not previously been examined for institutions of higher education and were under twenty-seven years of age. This provision is mentioned in Kuang-ming jih-pao, 25 July 1953. Individuals in the above categories naturally had to provide evidence of their status in the form of documents from local authorities or educational institutions.

58 Jen-min jih-pao, 19 June 1954.
60 Jen-min jih-pao, 15 Aug. 1954.
61 T'ou-k'ao ta-hsüeh shou-t'še, 1951, p. 98.
63 Moreover, in addition to primary school teachers, there were cases in which graduates of teacher training schools (at high school level), admitted by teacher training colleges, did not take part in unified enrolment (Kuang-ming jih-pao, 25 Sept. 1953).
64 Jen-min jih-pao, 15 July 1954. Statistics for some, though not all of these categories, were published in Kuang-ming jih-pao, 6 Aug. 1954, but the figures given in this later version were only slightly different from those provided in the previous source, except that 20,407 cadres were said to have taken the enrolment examinations as opposed to the 17,523 mentioned earlier.
65 Jen-min chiao-yü, April 1957, p. 11.
67 A foreign language was not compulsory in the years from 1955 to 1958 (Price, p. 168). In any case certain categories were able to claim exemption from the foreign language examination, for example, serving cadres, revolutionary soldiers, production workers, and primary school teachers who applied for enrolment in the humanities. This did not, of course, apply to those wishing to enter foreign language specialities.
68 Kun (pp. 143-4) quotes the 1959 examination outlines which give different subjects for various specialisations in agriculture, forestry, and medicine. For example, certain specialisations
within the fields of agriculture and forestry were to be examined in mathematics, physics and chemistry but not biology, while all other fields were to take biology, chemistry, and physics, but not mathematics. Again, biochemistry and biophysics required papers to be taken in chemistry and physics, while candidates for medical fields in general were examined in biology, physics, and chemistry but not mathematics.

Even as early as 1951 complaints were being voiced as to the candidates' attitudes to the political knowledge examination. 'Prospective students have recently bought books on terminology and memorized them . . . politics examinations are mainly to see . . . where we stand on particular issues' (T'ou-k'ao ta-hsiieh shou-t' se, 1951, p. 9).

Kuang-ming jih-pao, 27 July 1952. The number and nature of preferences and departments to be filled in by each candidate varied, especially over time and by area, particularly in the early years before unified enrolment was fully operational. For example, during this period attempts were made to ameliorate the uneven regional distribution of candidates. Kun (pp. 146–7), in quoting an article on enrolment in the Central-South Region in 1958, stated that each candidate had to name more than ten institutions and narrow fields of study on his application form.

Wen-hui pao, 6 October 1953. The standards reached by examination candidates would certainly have varied from year to year, and region to region. In September 1953 the Kuang-ming jih-pao stated that the averages for marks scored in the examination subjects as a whole were higher than in the previous year. The percentage of students who received a total exceeding a certain mark differed widely from area to area. In descending order of merit the areas were listed as follows in 1953: the North-East, North China, East China, the Central South, the North-West, and the South-West (Kuang-ming jih-pao, 25 Sept. 1953).


Ta-kung jih-pao (Hong Kong), 31 Oct. 1952.

For a rather critical assessment of this aspect of the enrolment
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process, see Chang Ch’ing, Jin-jih Pei-ta [Peking University Today] (Hong Kong, 1954).

76 The institution of special training courses was announced in the Temporary Regulations for Institutions of Higher Education. Clause 9 stated: ‘The universities and colleges, in order to adapt themselves to the urgent needs of national construction, must establish, with the prior approval of the Central Education Ministry, special training courses . . .’ (Jen-min chiao-yü, Sept. 1950), p. 68.
77 Jen-min jih-pao, 11 July 1952.
79 Wen-hui pao, 6 Oct. 1953.
81 Ta-kung jih-pao (Hong Kong), 31 Oct. 1952.
82 Ta-kung jih-pao (Hong Kong), 18 June 1952.
84 Jen-min jih-pao, 18 Sept. 1953.
85 Peking Review, Vol. I, No. 12, 20 May 1958, p. 16 gave the following percentages: 1952–3, 20·46%; 1955–6, 29·20%; 1956–7, 34·29%; 1957–8, 36·42%. It must be added, however, that Chinese statistics do not always make explicit what is meant by ‘students of worker–peasant origin’. But it seems probable that children of workers and peasants together with cadres and production workers would be included in this category.
87 Kun, pp. 144–5.
88 Such views are very wide of the mark, as is illustrated by an examination of Chinese communist sources. In a translation of a document entitled ‘Chronology of the Two-Road Struggle on the Educational Front in the Past Seventeen Years’ (Chiao-yü ko-ming, 6 May 1967), reproduced in Chinese Education, the following statement appears: ‘In May [1958], at the enlarged conference of the Central Political Bureau, Liu Shao-ch’i advanced his revisionist black advocacy for “two kinds of
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89 In addition, various types of specialised agricultural high schools were later established, for example technical and normal schools. The latter admitted graduates from full-time junior high schools, and their specialised courses were three to four years in length: Fang Cheng, ‘Reform Work in the Chinese Communist Educational System’, *Tsu-kuo yüeh k’ăn* [China Monthly], Hong Kong, No. 11, 1965, reproduced in *Chinese Education*, Vol. III, No. 4, Winter 1970–71, p. 260.

90 Spare-time, as opposed to part-time, institutions are outside the scope of this study. As Orleans points out, spare-time and correspondence colleges should be placed under the category of adult rather than higher education: Leo. A. Orleans, ‘Communist China’s Education: Policies, Problems and Prospects’, in *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, Vol. 2 (Washington, 1967).

91 Fang Cheng, p. 260.


93 Orleans (*An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, Vol. 2, p. 509) indicated that most of these schools ran only four courses: political subjects, language, arithmetic, and agricultural knowledge, and were directed towards local needs.

94 One scholar estimated that the number of students enrolled in institutions of higher learning stood at 955,000 during the academic year 1960–1 but fell to 819,000 in 1961–2 and 820,000 in 1962–3 (Chu-yuan Cheng, ‘Scientific and Engineering Manpower in Communist China’, in *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, Vol. 2, p. 529).


'The most important task of the university is to pay attention to scientific and technical research and experiment', a statement attributed to Teng Hsiao-p'ing by a Red Guard newspaper, published at Ch'inghua University, *Ching-kang-shan*, 6 May 1967.

At the Shanghai Institute of Mechanical Engineering a teaching system based on a combination of workers, teachers and students was introduced in 1958. Furthermore, the institute operated a factory. But academic authorities at the Institute were said to have opposed the selection of worker and peasant students who were excellent both in politics and production work, to undertake scientific research. They were clearly unwilling to compromise academic standards, but the fact that they did not reject all such students suggests that they were prepared to accept those who reached the requisite academic level. 'The Reform in Education at Colleges of Science and Engineering as Viewed from the Struggle Between Two Lines at the Shanghai Institute of Mechanical Engineering (An Investigative Report)', Hung-ch'i, No. 3, 1968, pp. 7–13, reproduced in *Chinese Education*, Vol. II, No. 3, Fall 1969, pp. 8–9.

The word 'Liuiists' is used here as a convenient term to describe the group in the educational world which came under attack during the Cultural Revolution. Several of these figures were closely associated with Liu Shao-ch'i and appear to have supported the so-called revisionist educational line. They were substantially in agreement as to the goals which education should pursue, but as suggested earlier in this monograph it would be an overstatement to suggest that they consciously and deliberately opposed an educational line of their own to that being supposedly promoted by Mao Tse-tung. Much rather did they place their own interpretation on current educational policy.

Price, pp. 269–70.


An example of an institution with a large percentage of its students entering higher education was the Peking No. 31

5 ‘Struggle to Establish a Socialist Scientific and Technological University’, by the Workers and Liberation Army Mao Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Team, stationed at Ch’inghua University, Kuang-ming jih-pao, 22 July 1970.


7 Wang Hsüeh-wen, p. 64.


9 These ideas were contained in a letter sent on 6 June to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Mao Tse-tung by the fourth class of the senior third grade at Peking No. 1 Girls’ Middle School. The ideological diplomas would theoretically be awarded by the workers and poor and lower middle peasants (Wang Hsüeh-wen, p. 58).

10 Such attacks appeared, for example, in the letter sent by students at Peking No. 1 Girls’ Middle School (Peking Review, Vol. IX, No. 26, 24 June 1966, pp. 18–19).


13 China’s first Mao Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Team entered Ch’inghua on 27 July 1968. This team was formed by workers from Peking in co-operation with Liberation Army fighters (Peking Review, Vol. XII, No. 14, 4 April 1969, p. 10).


15 ‘In the Midst of the Struggle to Carry Out the Party’s Educational Aims, We Must Train Worker, Peasant and Soldier Scholars’, by the Workers and Liberation Army Mao Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Team Stationed at Ch’inghua University (Kuang-ming jih-pao, 30 July 1971).


17 See an article on workers’ short-term training classes written by the Education Group of the East China Petroleum Institute Revolutionary Committee, Kuang-ming jih-pao, 13 April 1971.

18 The one-year veterinary classes organised at the North-West Agricultural College are a case in point (‘Take the Agricultural University to the Villages’ by the Revolutionary Committee of the North-West Agricultural College, Kuang-ming jih-pao, 16 Aug. 1971). Also, see the article on workers’ short-term training
classes written by the Education Group of the East China Petroleum Institute Revolutionary Committee, Kuang-ming jih-pao, 13 April 1971.

19 In 1972 there was a renewed emphasis on the raising of academic standards in higher education. In the wake of a new stress on quality of education, it appears in retrospect that even at the height of the Cultural Revolution key institutions managed to maintain traditional academic curricula and high quality teaching methods. Thus, even if universities of prestige did provide short-term training and classes, in many cases regular full-time courses seem to have continued. By extension, the elite-mass structure between institutions of higher education was being perpetuated. This is not, however, to deny that length of study, for example at Ch'inghua, has recently been shortened from six to three years: Editor, 'Recent Developments in Chinese Education', Current Scene, Vol. X, No. 7, July 1972, pp. 1–6.

20 Named after a directive of Mao Tse-tung, dated 21 July 1968.

21 In his directive of 7 May 1966, Mao Tse-tung stated: 'the school system must be shortened, education must be revolutionised, and the situation by which the capitalist class intellectuals rule our educational institutions cannot continue' (Hung-ch'i, No. 10, 1971, p. 40).


24 Kuang-ming jih-pao, 6 May 1970.


28 'Worker, Peasant, and Soldier Scholars Must Go from Practice to Study' by Ch'en Wei-min, a new scholar in the Chinese Literature Department of Peking University, Kuang-ming jih-pao, 3 Mar. 1971.

29 'Warmly Hail the Worker, Peasant, and Soldier University Students Striding into the New-Style Socialist Universities. The Hopes of Millions of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Have
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