CIVILIZATION AND THE TYPHOON:

AMERICA, LAND REFORM AND "IRRATIONAL REVOLUTION"

IN THE PHILIPPINES, VIETNAM AND EL SALVADOR,

1950-1984

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I hereby declare that the following is my own original research work and has not previously been done or published elsewhere by myself or any other person.

Signed ..................................

Paul M. Monk
20 April 1989
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In writing a doctoral dissertation one runs up many debts of a personal and intellectual, as well, let it be said, of a financial nature. Mention of one's financial debts would be indelicate in the present context; failure to mention one's personal and intellectual debts would be equally indelicate.

My intellectual debts will be substantially evident within the body of the dissertation. The guiding spirits - one might almost say the tutelary deities - that inspired this inquiry were Hannah Arendt, Max Weber and Alexis de Tocqueville. I believe this will be evident at many points in the text. Numerous other influences must be left to the reader to discern. I feel it is appropriate, however, to single out Daniel Ellsberg's *Papers on the War* as an invaluable articulation of the kind of concerns that animate my own inquiries. His essays of the years 1967 through to 1972 have been among the pieces of writing that I have returned to again and again in thinking through my own readings and findings.

Personal debts are numerous and diverse and often of a nature that it is impossible to do justice to in a few words. Bruce Miller and John Girling encouraged me to undertake this ambitious inquiry in 1983 and I am now glad that they did so. Among the many people who have assisted me in various ways since then, I cannot omit to mention Andy Mishkin and Paul Croker, Phil and Patty Kropelnicki, George and Melva Thompson, Gary and Tessie Hawes, Scotty Sherwood and Tony and Janine Burgess, whose hospitality at different times facilitated my research field trip in North America in 1984-85. To one person above all, however, I wish to express particular gratitude and that is Jeanne Illo, for her love and intellectual companionship since 1985. More than anyone else she has shared the labor of this thing with me.
INTRODUCTION

In December 1918, en route to the Versailles Conference, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States remarked to his private secretary, Colonel Edward House, that that Conference must not become "another Congress of Vienna". He feared, he said, that "civilization" would be swamped by a tidal wave of ultra-radical revolution, unless such revolution was pre-empted by liberal and progressive leadership by the statesmen of the West. Alluding to the upheavals then already taking place in China, Mexico and Russia, he declared "civilization must be more liberal than ever, it must even be radical, if civilization is to escape the typhoon". Both the theme and the title of this dissertation are taken from this observation by the American President in the wake of the First World War.

Woodrow Wilson believed that the tumults in China, Mexico and Russia in the 1910's were "irrational" revolutions, but he had grave doubts as to the moral and political possibilities for "counter-revolution". This ambivalence and anxiety was not peculiar to Woodrow Wilson. It has exercised liberal and even conservative statesmen, both in the West and elsewhere, ever since the French Revolution. In the era of the Cold War, it has especially characterized American democratic self-consciousness. This dissertation is an effort to explore American discourse in that era, in particular, concerning mediation between "irrational" revolution and "counter-revolution". After setting the terms of debate in the context of the debates over the great eighteenth century revolutions and the problem of "totalitarian" revolution in the twentieth century, the dissertation narrows its focus to concentrate on American responses to the prospect of radical revolution in the Cold War era.

The upheavals that have gone on in the wide regions of the world until recently referred to as the "Third World" have had many causes, but a common and fundamental problem has been land tenure and its role in the adaptation of traditional agrarian systems to the exigencies of the modern global system of commerce. Land reform, in the sense of a reordering of property rights in agricultural resources to harmonize with rising demands for both political freedom and material well-being, has been and remains still one of the great issues generating dissent and violence in the "Third World" in a period of unprecedented political and economic change. Communist revolutionary movements have been consistent in trying to harness peasant discontent over land tenure conditions to their project for radical revolution. When, in the wake of the Communist revolution in China, American agricultural economist Wolf Ladejinsky declared that "the American agrarian tradition of forty acres and a mule" offered a pro-peasant development strategy that might be used with effect to outbid Communist appeals to the peasant masses of Asia and Latin America, he was, like Woodrow Wilson a generation earlier, appealing for American statesmen to be "more liberal than ever, even radical" in order to open a path to "rational" rather than "irrational" revolution. The quite specific focus of this dissertation is the fate of Ladejinsky's proposal and very similar ones in the conservative political climate of Cold War American foreign policy.

The dissertation encompasses three major and one minor case study. The three major case studies are the Philippines, to which two chapters are devoted; Vietnam and El Salvador. Between them, these cases span the entire period since 1950 and afford ample material for comparative and thematic analysis. The minor case study is Japan under American occupation. Wolf Ladejinsky was the chief architect of the land reform undertaken in Japan under the American occupation and it did much to vindicate his claims for the model of land reform he espoused. However, he was vilified by American conservatives on account of the land reform and his model of land reform as "rational" revolution did not become a major feature of American policies in Asia or Latin America in the decades that followed.

While the conclusion of the dissertation is that American land reform policies did not come near to fulfilling the vision of a Woodrow Wilson or a Wolf Ladejinsky in the Cold War era, the critique often levelled at those policies from the political "left" is found to be less than thorough. It has been alleged by such critics that the United States has seen land reform as "a major counter-revolutionary weapon" and as a "panacea" against Communist revolution, rushing, therefore, to implement it everywhere as a conservative social measure. It has been my consistent finding that the opposite is more nearly true: conservative American statesmen and officials have, in general, seen land reform as a revolutionary measure against the property rights of people whose large-scale approach to agriculture they identify with or have commercial interest in, and they have, therefore, actually opposed land reform in case after case. The confusions and violences that have resulted from this tangle of interests and misunderstandings have been tragic. The issues involved are far from being behind us. Debates over resource access and economic responsibility are, if anything, likely to become more acute in the years ahead. The analysis presented here and the narrative itself will, I hope, contribute to the long and difficult process of pinning down the interests and clearing away the misunderstandings that make for confusion and which generate such violence.
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"What were formerly called revolutions were little more than a change of persons, or an alteration of local circumstances. They rose and fell like things of course and had nothing in their existence or their fate that could influence beyond the spot that produced them. But what we now see in the world from the revolutions of America and France, are a renovation of the natural order of things, a system of principles as universal as truth and the existence of man, and combining moral with political happiness and national prosperity."

- Tom Paine [1791]

"[The] final object seems to me to be, in reality, to put the majority of citizens in a fit state for governing and to make it capable of governing. Faithful to their principles [English democrats] do not claim to force the people to be happy in the way that they judge most suitable, but they want to see to it that the people are in a fit state to discern it and discerning it, to conform to it. I am myself a democrat in this sense. To lead modern societies by degrees to this point seems to me to be the only way to save them from barbarism or slavery. All the energy and will that I possess will always be at the service of such a cause, represented as it is in this country by enlightened and honest men. You know that I am not exaggerating the final result of the great Democratic Revolution that is taking place this moment in the world; I do not regard it in the same light as the Israelites saw the Promised Land. But, on the whole, I believe it to be useful and necessary, and I work toward it resolutely, without hesitation, without enthusiasm, and, I hope, without weakness."

- Alexis de Tocqueville to John Stuart Mill [1835]

"...The conservatives do not realize what forces are loose in the world at the present time. Liberalism is the only thing that can save civilization from chaos - from a flood of ultra-radicalism that will swamp the world...Liberalism must be more liberal than ever before, it must even be radical, if civilization is to escape the typhoon..."

- Woodrow Wilson to Colonel House [10 December 1918]
CHAPTER ONE: REVOLUTION.


1. No word more economically encodes the discourse of modern politics and sociology than the word "revolution". With reference to secular developments since the eighteenth century, its uses have proliferated, almost to the point where the meaning, or any clear and distinct meaning, of the word has become somewhat obscured. Such phrases as "Agricultural Revolution" and "Industrial Revolution" have long since come to represent the chief aspects of what Karl Polanyi called the "Great Transformation" of modern times: the emergence of commercial and industrial civilization with its drastic alteration of human social relations and ecology.[1] The expressions "American Revolution", "French Revolution", "Russian Revolution", "Chinese Revolution" etc have become familiar and even unproblematic shorthand expressions for some of the immense political and social upheavals that have coincided with the global spread of the "Great Transformation". Which upheavals qualify as "revolutions" and which do not has, however, with the passage of time, become less rather than more clear. Was, for example, the Iranian upheaval of 1979, which within a year of the overthrow of the Shah had brought to power a fundamentalist Islamic regime, a "revolution"?[2] Then there are such recent coinages as "revolution of rising expectations", "sexual revolution", "cultural revolution", "information revolution", or, in the mouths of certain American politicians since at least 1961, "peaceful revolution"? The present study is an inquiry into not so much the course of certain "revolutions" as the discourse among Americans concerning the prospect of "revolution" in three small, tropical states. It cannot proceed without an effort to establish what are and have been the meanings of this evocative term "revolution".

2. A noted and influential American political theorist wrote, in 1968:

"A revolution is a rapid, fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership and government...Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups and wars of independence...Revolutions are rare...Most societies have never experienced revolutions, and most ages until modern times did not know revolutions...More precisely, revolution is a characteristic of modernization...Revolution is the ultimate expression of the modernizing outlook, the belief that it is within the power of man to control and to change his environment and that he has not only the ability but the right to do so."[3]

The claim that revolution "is a characteristic of modernization", indeed, the "ultimate expression of the modernizing outlook" is seminal, in suggesting that revolution is not a mere word for all manner of political upheavals and that it is connected in some fundamental way with the processes of "modernization". It is, at all events, to be distinguished from such other sorts of upheavals, endemic in historical societies, as "insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups and wars of independence". This last exception, incidentally, would seem to exclude, by implication, the "American Revolution" from the category "revolutions", classing it instead as a "war of independence". Moreover, description of the process of "revolution" as a
rapid and violent change of the values, myths and mode of government of "a society" tends to suggest that the meaning and roots of such "revolutions" are to be found in the internal development of that society. The international dimensions of "revolution" and their links with processes of "modernization" are thus not of pronounced significance in this definition of the term. We shall be most concerned with just these aspects of the matter, however, and for this reason will have to enhance the above attempt at a delimitation of the meaning of "revolution".

3. The word "revolution" has been used in recent times to translate classical works of history and political reflection, such as Aristotle's Politics or Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War [4], works which stand at the portals of Western civilization, but which, ipso facto, have nothing to do with "modernization". Such an anachronistic usage, however, serves the purpose of compelling one to set the conceptions of political strife and upheaval in the work of Aristotle and Thucydides side by side with modern "revolutions" and so gain a clearer perspective on just what sets modern "revolutions" apart from ancient or "medieval" political changes, and renders use of the term "revolution" in translating the classics anachronistic. Aristotle, in the fifth book of his Politics, attributed a major role to struggle between the rich and the poor, the few and the many, oligarchs and democrats, in the changes of regime type of which the classical Grecian world of his age had already witnessed a plethora. It is still possible, in reading the words of Thucydides, concerning, for example, the civil strife at Corcyra, or the Melian Dialogue [5] to find in them superb reflections of certain root aspects of human politics familiar down to the present. Yet neither Thucydides nor Aristotle saw or anticipated fundamental change in the character of human political orders and, in the case of Aristotle, it is even made explicit that this lack of anticipation of fundamental change was grounded in a belief that human technological capacities and the division of labor between master and slave in an agriculture-based economy were not subject to fundamental change. It is, however, from the eighteenth century on, precisely the growing awareness that fundamental change in these respects was occurring and that it had no foreseeable limit that underwrote the spirit and the course of modern "revolutions". We shall have to add numerous qualifications, of course, to this basic claim, but there seems no question that it is at this level that pre-modern and modern political discourse confront one another, as it were, across a great divide.

4. From Aristotle through to Machiavelli and, indeed, down to the time of the French Revolution, the terms now so commonly rendered in English translation as "revolution" were most often expressions connoting cyclic patterns of change with somewhat fatalistic connotations: the changes of things, the mutations in public affairs. Metabolai, Aristotle called them, or metabolai kai stasis: the changes, or changes with upheaval.[6] Two hundred years later, the Greek historian Polybius used the term politeion anacyclosis to describe what seemed to him to be a cyclic, wheel-like historical pattern of change in which states altered as they grew, matured and declined [7]. Cicero, a century later again, was wont to refer to mutatio rerum [the
change of things], or *mutationes rei publicae* [the changes in public affairs], not *revolutiones* [8]; and it is still these Ciceronian expressions that one finds in the writings of Machiavelli, in the sixteenth century, as descriptions of those endemic permutations of the political scene in Renaissance Italy, to which Machiavelli dreamed of seeing an end in the formation of a lasting republic on the Roman model.[9] Both in the American Revolution, with its explicit aspiration to the founding of a lasting republic, with distinct elements of *romanitas*, and in the French Revolution, of which none other than Robespierre was to remark that its aspirations were "writ large in the books of Machiavelli"[10], something was attempted which might be referred back to Aristotle's claim that the best and most stable constitution would be that in which a *balance* was maintained between the few and the many [11]. The *vicissitudes* of the French Revolution were bound up with this issue and its relation to the great processes of technological innovation and the shifting division of labor that were agitating European civilization by the late eighteenth century. It was at this point in time, in France, with some reference to the then recent political drama in North America and with *allusion* to the rising tide of technological and scientific innovation, that the word "revolution" began to assume the connotations that make its use in translating Aristotle or Thucydides, or Cicero, anachronistic.

5. The Latin infinitive *revolvere*, from which the word "revolution" derives, has connotations of the motions of a wheel, or of the motion of the stars "around" the earth, in the conceptions of pre-Copernican cosmology and it appears that the word *revoluzione* was taken from it in the thirteenth century and used as a variant on the classical terms for the cyclic changes to which political constitutions appeared to be subject. Yet this is, it is clear, the *opposite* of the connotations the word "revolution" assumed from the time of the French Revolution onward, which were, so to speak, those of an expanding universe. The earliest uses had astronomical or even astrological connotations as well as the sense of a mere return to a starting point. It is in these senses that we find the word used by Guicciardini, for example, in his *History of Florence* to describe the returns to power of the Medici and their enemies in the city at intervals in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.[12] Even in seventeenth century England, the overthrow of the monarchy in 1649 was not referred to as a "revolution", or at least no more so than was the restoration of the monarchy in 1660. Edward Hyde, Lord Clarendon, even observed: "the motions of these last twenty years have proceeded from the evil influence of a malignant star"[13] which suggests that "revolution", for Clarendon, still had very different connotations from those now associated with the word. The historiography of the Cromwellian republic in England between 1649 and 1660 suggests that even it has, since the early nineteenth century, been reinterpreted as a "revolution" with the events and language of the French Revolution very much in mind.

6. In all the archives on the French Revolution, perhaps no text stands out more, or offers a more fruitful interpretation of the meaning of what had occurred between 1789 and 1815 in France, than Alexis de Tocqueville's unfinished masterpiece
The Old Regime and the French Revolution. This remarkable book is not only an extraordinarily lucid reflection on the many astonishing and paradoxical aspects of the French Revolution, but a perhaps matchless vantage point from which to look both back to the French Revolution and forward to the even more astonishing and no less paradoxical aspects of the Russian, Chinese and other revolutions in the present century. There is no doubt as to what Tocqueville regarded as the most astonishing and the most paradoxical aspects of the French Revolution. The most astonishing was the radicalism of the thing. "No nation" he remarked in his Foreword "had ever before embarked on so resolute an attempt as that of the French in 1789 to break with the past..."[14]. Not only this, but that it offered a universal creed of human rights which in a "quite unprecedented" manner spread across Europe, despite the downfall of the republic created by the "revolution" in France itself.[15]

7. The greatest paradox, to Tocqueville's mind, was that this great "revolution" began by proclaiming universal liberty, but ended in the despotism of Napoleon. Of the whole process, from 1789 to 1800, he observed:

"...a government both stronger and far more autocratic than the one which the Revolution had overthrown, centralized once more the entire administration, made itself all-powerful, suppressed our dearly bought liberties, and replaced them by a mere pretense of freedom..." [16] From these observations by Tocqueville, in a sense, spring the abiding concerns of partisans of "our dearly bought liberties" since his time. Amid the fierce polemics between conservatives and radicals in the twentieth century, such reflections as those of Tocqueville offer a mediating perspective that brings the meaning of "revolution" into an unusually clear focus. We shall find his name invoked at the height of the Vietnam War, in 1966-67, in support of arguments against both reform and revolution; but, while it is clear that he was not a "radical" in the line of Rousseau, Robespierre, St Just or Babeuf, those central figures in the radicalism of the French Revolution, Tocqueville was not against either reform or revolution as such and he cannot be enlisted as a warrior on the conservative side of the Cold War. Rather, his concerns were of a kind that bridge the Cold War polarization between radical "revolution" and conservatism and it is in this that their great fascination and value still lies.

8. The decisive connotations of the modern usage of the term "revolution" enter the picture with Tocqueville's summation of the fundamental meaning of the French Revolution:

"What in point of fact it [the Revolution] destroyed, or is in process of destroying - for the Revolution is still operative - may be summed up as everything in the old order that stemmed from aristocratic and feudal institutions...Chance played no part whatever in the outbreak of the Revolution; though it took the world by surprise, it was the inevitable outcome of a long period of gestation, the abrupt and violent conclusion of a process in which six generations had played an intermittent part. Even if it had not taken place, the old social structure would none the less have been shattered everywhere sooner or later. The only difference would have been that instead of collapsing with such brutal suddenness, it would have crumbled bit by bit. At one fell swoop, without warning, without transition, the Revolution effected what in any case was bound to happen, if by slow degrees." [17] (emphasis added)
We see in this, perhaps, an anticipation of Karl Marx's theory that human history consisted of a series of great stages of social evolution, with higher stages gestating in the womb of earlier ones and being delivered under sometimes traumatic circumstances. There is no enunciation in Tocqueville of a vision of *industrialization* or *capitalism* as the sub-stratum or determinant of these epochal changes, though in the course of the nineteenth century both were to become indissolubly meshed with the more and more common perception that the world of "aristocratic and feudal institutions" was coming to an end in a manner far more fundamental than classical or medieval theories of human affairs had ever allowed to be possible.

9. What is crucial in Tocqueville's outlook, as represented in this passage, is his evident belief that "the Revolution" was not an isolated or eccentric historical accident, or just one more of those countless violent episodes familiar from millennia of past times, but an epochal process with universal implications and one which cried out to be understood in terms of social developments that had been underway for many years before the "abrupt and violent" events of 1789 and after.[18] Tocqueville went on to argue, at great length and with singular clarity, that the upheaval came in the end due to the accumulation of anachronism and frustration within a system of ancient institutions too slow to adapt to the changes growing up within them. Nothing is more fundamental to an understanding of twentieth century revolutions than this historical sense of their longstanding causes. Nothing has been more difficult in the Cold War era for the American conservatives, or even American liberals, to come to terms with than this historical aspect of the outbreak of radical "revolution" in various parts of the world.

10. Where Tocqueville touched most directly on what have become abiding political and sociological debates over modern revolutions was in his reflections on the destructiveness of the "abrupt and violent" upheaval that the French Revolution involved. Demolishing feudal and building modern institutions was, he commented, "a task calling for much patience and adroitness, rather than for the exercise of force and authoritarian methods" [19], but the character of the old regime itself and the sheer pressure for rapid and fundamental change drove things in the direction of violent and, as it were indiscriminate, change which had the effect of defeating many of the highest explicit or implicit purposes of the Revolution. It is important, in view of twentieth century developments, to register at this point the difference between a conservatism which deplores the passing of the old order and one which regrets, rather, the indiscriminate sweeping away even of the most valuable elements of the old order, with all that that over-zealous sweeping away entails. It is with such considerations that the expression "counter-revolution" - which was not coined before the French Revolution and would have had no meaning as applied to earlier connotations of the term "revolution" - entered into modern political discourse.
11. Tocqueville commented:

"It is indeed deplorable that instead of being forced to bow to the rule of law, the French nobility was uprooted and laid low, since thereby the nation was deprived of a vital part of its substance, and a wound that time will never heal was inflicted on our national freedom. When a class has taken the lead in public affairs for centuries, it develops, as a result of this long, unchallenged habit of pre-eminence a certain proper pride and confidence in its strength, leading it to be the point of maximum resistance in the social organism. And it not only has itself the manly virtues; by dint of its example it quickens them in other classes." [20]

Nevertheless, he described the monarchy on the eve of the Revolution as "brittle" and as collapsing "like a card castle" in the crisis of 1789; while he described the old feudal institutions as "ridiculous" and "ramshackle" and expatiated on the "grotesque and tragic" blindness of the aristocrats who would not see what was coming [21]. These things, combined with the naive belief of visionaries that "a sudden radical transformation of a very ancient, highly intricate social system could be effected almost painlessly, under the auspices of reason and by its efficacy alone" [22] produced a result which was "nothing short of disastrous" [23] precisely in that it consisted in the failure to found secure and lasting, free and modern institutions, though it uprooted and laid low a good deal, both for better and for worse, in the process.

12. This same concern has carried over, in magnified form indeed, to reflections on the outcomes of the great revolutions of the twentieth century. The question that it poses is whether some means might be found, in one case or another, to avert the more disastrous aspects of "revolution" while nevertheless bringing about that tendential dismantling of "aristocratic and feudal institutions", of injustices and irrationalities, of general backwardness and destitution which Tocqueville understood to be the fundamental task of the modern "revolution". That "task" must, however, be set rather more substantially within the parameters of economic developments and political discourse over the past two centuries and within the international system of human "civilization", before an inquiry into the American response to "revolutions" in the twentieth century can usefully be pursued.
1:2. Radicalism and Totalitarianism.

1. Between the late fifteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century, European trade and imperialism created for the first time a global system of human commerce [see Maps 1 and 2]. Between 1870 [or 1884] and 1914, that global system of European empires and burgeoning commercial rivalries drew almost every last corner of the globe into its orbit. Between 1914 and 1945 the whole system went through a massive crisis, involving a series of catastrophic upheavals both within Europe and around the globe. Both the First and Second World Wars and the appearance of regimes of mass mobilization, terror and domination of novel and terrible dimensions, in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in particular, in the 1930's, as well as the Great Depression, with its numerous political effects throughout the global system, were the visible results of this world-system crisis.

2. From its earliest phases, the modern world-system, to use Immanuel Wallerstein's term [24], had begun to cause the most momentous alterations in the global division of labor and the ecological patterns of the world. The emergence of industrial and finance capitalism in western Europe, which became the dominant phenomenon of the nineteenth century, was the core of a transformation of the material and cultural foundations of human civilization so radical that, throughout the whole period under discussion, not even the boldest theoretical speculations were able to comprehend its range and magnitude, or prescribe means of bringing it under tolerable control. If a savant such as Tocqueville had found reason, in the earlier decades of the nineteenth century, to reflect with both astonishment and some alarm on the accumulation of pressures for change which, blocked and dammed up, had burst forth with brutal and destructive suddenness in the French Revolution; the developments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and the energies that became pent up behind them were ominous indeed.

3. At the most fundamental aetiological level, the immense terror and destruction unleashed between 1914 and 1945 must be interpreted in these terms. Nor did 1945 appear, for many years afterward, to mark a clear resolution of the system crisis. Perhaps the greatest paradox of the entire process has been that, although the crisis originated in the core of the system, in the form of the First World War, followed by the Great Depression and the Second World War, the most momentous reactions against the system have, in every significant case, been on the margins of the system, or in its periphery, to use the world-system language of Wallerstein and Fernand Braudel. Despite claims in anticipation, and in the aftermath, of the First World War, and again of the Great Depression, that the crisis was that of capitalism itself; that which has gone under, in both the short and the long run, has been every obstacle to the extension and maturation of capitalist system growth. The old dynastic empires went first, in the wake of the First World War; the threat of militaristic imperialism met with defeat in the Second World War; and recent developments suggest that the "command economies" of the anti-capitalist states could be next in line for capitulation in the face of the world-system and its unstable, all-consuming
dynamism. It is within this context that we must situate the twentieth century revolutions and American response to them.

4. Let us revert at this point, for a moment, to the reflections of Tocqueville. In his efforts to describe and explain the "disastrous" course of the French Revolution, Tocqueville expressed his sense that radical ideas and, in particular, a dangerous idea of centralized state power, had spearheaded the most drastic thrusts of the Revolution. The commercial and cultural developments of the eighteenth century, he observed, bred a new species of economist or rationalist, impatient of obstacles to the thorough reorganization of human affairs:

"...men who carried audacity to the point of sheer insanity; who baulked at no innovation and, unchecked by any scruples, acted with an unprecedented ruthlessness. Nor were these strange beings mere ephemera, born of a brief crisis and destined to pass away when it ended. They were, rather, the first of a new race of men who subsequently made good and proliferated in all parts of the civilized world, everywhere retaining the same characteristics. They were already here when we were born and they are still with us." [25]

The misgivings that Tocqueville expressed here can be found also in the reflections of the German philosopher Georg Hegel on the French Revolution [26] and in the concerns of numerous savants thereafter right into the twentieth century. It was a fear that the dramatic surge in innovation and the tendencies to "rationalization" that the French Revolution seemed to herald, threatened to overwhelm the established institutions and culture of European civilization. The destructive ravages of upheaval, which were to come to such a climax in the twentieth century, were themselves a cause of concern; but the deeper concern was with the social and political problems posed by the more and more irresistible pressures for innovation and rationalization generated by the ill-understood modern world-system.

5. The colossal disorder of the world-system crisis, which seemed to Hannah Arendt, in the late 1940's, to have produced "rootlessness to an unprecedented depth" and to have brought the "structure of all civilizations" to "the breaking point" [27], fulfilled the worst fears of those who had viewed with foreboding the uncontrollable processes of innovation and "rationalization" in the preceding decades. The word "rationalization" in this context, borrowed with much deliberation from the reflections of Max Weber, need have no connotations more harmonious or cheering than the content Weber himself imparted to it, in describing industrial civilization as an "iron cage".[28] The dominant connotation must be the tendential integration of the regional parts of the globe [into the modern world-system], the functional parts of particular "societies" [into modern states] and the lifeworld of human beings in relation to both; such integration almost always occurring at the expense of that or those "at the margins", or otherwise in passive relation to the dominant process. Moreover, that the process has become one without apparent goal or firm foundation has long since created pervasive fears of its capacities for disintegration, not only of that which stands in its path, but from within. Movements of resistance to subordinate integration have, without notable exception, met with defeat, unless able to establish a position from which some negotiation on the
terms of integration has been possible. Among such movements of resistance which have fought a protracted war of position with the dominant core of the system, none has been more notable, or produced more awesome and ambiguous results, than the radical "Communist" movement, the character of which was decisively shaped by the crisis of 1914-1945.

6. In the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, between 1844 and 1895, one finds an attempt at an analysis and critique of the whole inner logic and scope of the new industrial capitalist system, the richness of which remains still unexhausted. However, their expectation that the internal rationalization of that system would be determined by the role of the mass of new urban-industrial workers at the core of the system, in relation to the expanded reproduction of capital, and would culminate in a radical Communist "revolution" in the most advanced capitalist states, has not been borne out. Instead, "revolutions" have occurred time and again in the periphery, and not in the core of the system and have been determined by the role of the peasants, rather than urban-industrial workers, in relation to the resistant integration of "peripheral" agricultures and states into the modern world-system. The aggregate consequence, by 1950, was a tendential polarization of the world around a confrontation between a coalition of the core states, led by the United States of America, and those states, led by the Soviet Union and China, which had established a position of unprecedented hostile independence from the capitalist world-system.

8. Coming, as it did, in the immediate wake of the calamitous series of crises between 1914 and 1945, this confrontation, dubbed from its outset the "Cold War", seemed to Hannah Arendt in 1950 to be "like the calm that settles after all hopes have died." [29] Fundamental to her concern was a fear, then carried somewhat further by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that this confrontation was, at bottom, nothing but a monstrous and hopeless collision between an imperialist capitalism liable to lapse into Hitlerian "totalitarianism" and the frightful Stalinist "totalitarianism" of the Communist world.[30] She clung to the idea of human freedom as what had to be renewed and sustained in the grave new world of the Cold War. Since, however, both the global effects of capitalist "freedom" and the political effects of Communist "freedom" were the very things which had become so problematic, so ambiguous, Arendt was in a position of acute precariousness, as she acknowledged. Neither traditional institutions, nor current realities, nor plausible predictions seemed to offer much assurance and, while the most radical critique of current realities was called for, the fruits of "radicalism" had seldom appeared so uninviting.[31] Yet there seemed no concept other than "freedom" on the basis of which Arendt could conceive of a defense of "civilization", much less of its renewal.[32] In this respect, she and those like her were heirs to the concerns of Tocqueville. Like Tocqueville's The Old Regime and the French Revolution, on account of its lucid humaneness, depth of historical reflection and exposure in point of time, Arendt's The Origins Of Totalitarianism provides a vantage point from which to ponder the crises of an age and a useful bridge between the ideological polemics of radicals and conservatives in the Cold War.
"Totalitarianism", like "revolution", is a word with a host of connotations, the exegesis on which leads us into the heart of twentieth century political and sociological discourse. Almost on a global basis, it now bears with it the names Hitler and Stalin in particular, and, since about 1978 that of Pol Pot. It summons the shibboleths: doublethink, Big Brother, GULAG, Auschwitz, Final Solution, Gestapo, Great Terror, "killing fields". It has its unique and sombre literature, among which, perhaps, Arthur Koestler's *Darkness At Noon*, George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *The Gulag Archipelago* are the most proverbial. It is bound in an inextricable fashion to the crisis of civilization in the twentieth century, just as the dominant connotations of "revolution" are bound to the modern world and its peculiar characteristics, from the late eighteenth century onward. According to Tocqueville, the root of the "democratic despotism", which he discontenanced in the French Revolution, had lain in the insistence of the economists - Turgot, Quesnay, LeTronne, Mercier de la Riviere - "well before the Revolution" that, in the interests of thorough and rapid reform and rationalization, state power should be undivided and unchecked [33]. The "totalitarian" outcomes of Communist revolutions can be attributed in considerable measure to the problem adverted to by Tocqueville. The setting aside of counterpoises to central authority, as Tocqueville expressed it, involving the destruction of both "institutions, ideas and customs inimical to freedom" and those "indispensable to freedom" [34], appeared to him to be an error of the gravest character. The *metastasis* of "totalitarianism" in the twentieth century, with its complex causation in the crisis of the modern world-system, caused such widespread revulsion and confusion for this reason above all and not simply because of its links with "modernization" or "revolution".

10. It has been suggested that the mainstream of modern western sociological thought, from Burke and Maistre in the late eighteenth century through to Weber and Michels in the early twentieth century has been constituted by a posture of "counter-revolution" [35]. A better expression, I believe, would be, "counterpoise". "Counter-revolution", after all, suggests defense of "institutions, ideas and customs inimical to freedom". "Counterpoise" better expresses the embattled and agonized concern with the identification and renewal of institutions, ideas and customs which might be regarded as *indispensable* to freedom. "Counter-revolution" at once draws a polarizing line and blurs the concerns of a Tocqueville, a Weber, an Arendt. "Counterpoise" suggests the balancing act, the tension, the precariousness and difficulties which have in fact beset serious sociological and political thought in the modern era.

11. Even such a distinction, of course, has an irreducible element of conservatism in it, which, if the genuine acuteness of the challenges of the Cold War era are to be grappled with, must be leavened with an appreciation of the conscience of "radicalism" and irreducible commitment to "revolution", or at least to an intelligible concept of "freedom". The historical and hermeneutic difficulties involved in this "leavening" are
formidable. To some extent, the inquiry that follows from this brief discursive reflection on "revolution", "radicalism", "totalitarianism" and the "modern world-system" is an attempt at an approach to such a "leavening" by way of a hermeneutic and exegetical exploration of American responses to the prospect of "revolution" in Vietnam, the Philippines and El Salvador. I can, however, at the level of depiction and suggestion, think of no more acute or provocative articulation of agonized radical consciousness amid the cruelties and moral dilemmas of the Cold War era, than the modernistic conclusion to Jay Cantor's *The Death of Che Guevara*. Cantor's narrative consciousness, confronted by the catastrophe of Pol Pot's "revolution" in Cambodia, coming in the wake of so much violence and oppression around the modern world, begins to fragment and lapses into incoherence, before, like Arendt, demanding renewal in full recognition of political realities. It is worth quoting at some length.

12. Having recounted a more and more crowded and dispiriting chronology of war, "revolution" and "counter-revolution" dating from the death of Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967, Cantor's narrative consciousness comes at last to Indochina in 1975:

"1975. Khmer Rouge offensive begins around Phnom Penh...Avoid this contradiction, escape from this pain. Now is the hour of the furnaces and only A state of emergency is declared by the Ethiopian government for the province of Eritrea. (The Cuban Army will assist the Ethiopian Army with its difficulties, a Communist government, an ally of the Soviet Union). The North Vietnamese Army takes Da Nang. In Cambodia, Marshall Lon Nol flees. Libyan The country surrounds...The Khmer Rouge take Phnom Penh. Now is the Libt imprls I can't read this story anymore The Khmer Rouge guerrillas, many of them not more than fourteen years old, evacuate all people in Phnom Penh to the countryside. A forced march that empties the hospitals...They're unlikely to make it aren't they. Make it from where to where?Im;

His

voice would be useful to explain here. Pieces of a new intrp It is gone from these pages The old people too All of them The Khmer Rouge do not explain, they enforce When the city is empty, the soldiers who are left disdain the buildings, make cooking fires in the streets. The country surrounds the All fall A curse falls on the city An image is this the promised end or image of

- No! (I open myself to his friend's anger, his correction.) This is no response! (he says). This is only an animal's howl of pain! You've misinterpreted the instruction you must take from the history you've been given. Your idealism (which no-one asked for) sours into irony. But your irony corrodes only you and not history. *Will you sit still?* Let his life interrogate yours; then improvise an answer - the next, the necessary step. Begin again! It all must be done over! 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984."[36]

To begin to "corrode" history, we must go back, once more, to a consideration of the roots of "revolution" and "counter-revolution", "totalitarianism" and counterpoise in the modern world.
1:3. Civilization And The Typhoon.

1. The French Revolution was, and was widely interpreted as, a threat to the foundations of feudal, monarchical and ecclesiastical civilization throughout Europe. Throughout the nineteenth century, as even Tocqueville's phrasing suggests, "the Revolution" as a process or tide of ideas, influences, tendencies, crises, appeared to threaten that civilization with a more and more inexorable fate. To call this process or tide "modernization" and link it with the "industrial revolution" scarcely begins to indicate its complexity. Above all, it does not provide an adequate sense of the movement of the "tide" around the world. That movement, as I have suggested must be apprehended at the level of the creation by the Europeans of a world-wide system of commerce and competing imperial powers: Immanuel Wallerstein's "modern world-system". As Theda Skocpol has written, in her comparative study of the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions:

"Within the matrix of the 'Great Transformation' [that is, world-wide commercialization and industrialization, and the rise of national states and expansion of the European states system to encompass the entire globe] political upheavals and socio-economic changes have happened in every country...[but] conceptions of modernization as an intra-national socio-economic process that occurs in parallel ways from country to country cannot make sense even of the original changes in Europe, much less of the subsequent changes in the rest of the world."[37]

While aetiological studies of particular "revolutions" or regional experiences of "modernization" draw one into labyrinthine causal and logical complexities, this framework of understanding is the most fundamental for enabling us to address the interconnectedness of "modernization", "revolution" and "counter-revolution" and their bearing on problems of "freedom", war and violence in the era since the French Revolution.

2. Having used Immanuel Wallerstein's term for the rise of the European-centred world system of commerce and states, I nevertheless do not propose to entangle myself in his specific theoretical claims concerning the workings of that system or its "future demise".[38] I confine myself, at this juncture, to an indicative and metatheoretical use of the term only. Perhaps the most succinct presentation of the metatheoretical framework so invoked is that by Fernand Braudel, with reference to the concentric rings model of the division of labor within an economic system sketched by the German economist Johan Heinrich von Thunen in 1826.[39] Braudel used the expression "world-economy" to describe such a system. Such a system, he observed, centred always on a great metropolis and its capitalism, with a hierarchized set of economic, political and cultural zones around it. The modern world system, of course, has been characterized by its unprecedented global scope and voracious dynamism, but the structure of a "world-economy" is all I want to bring into focus here. "Every world-economy", Braudel wrote in his last major work:

"is a sort of jigsaw puzzle, a juxtaposition of zones...a narrow core, a fairly developed middle and a vast periphery. The centre, or core, contains everything that is most advanced and diversified. The next
zone has only some of these benefits...The huge periphery...represents on the contrary backwardness, archaism, and exploitation by others..."[40]

His picture of some of the most backward zones of European "world-economies" on the eve of the rise of the modern world-system is a point of reference for understanding the great debates about imperialism and revolution in the era of the modern world-system, when the Americas, Africa, Oceania and Asia were drawn into the European orbit with such dramatic repercussions.

3. Adverting to the work of the classical economist David Ricardo of 1817 on "comparative advantage" as the basis of zoning in the expanding modern world-economy, Braudel commented that Ricardo's conclusions were "rather too reassuring":

"The division of labor on a world scale (or a world-economy scale) cannot be described as a concerted agreement made between equal parties and always open to review. It became established progressively as a chain of subordinations, each conditioning the others." [41]

Of the fate of subordinated zones, he wrote:

"The backward regions on the fringes of Europe afford many examples of these marginal economies: 'feudal' Sicily in the eighteenth century; Sardinia, in any period at all; the Turkish Balkans, Mecklenburg, Poland, Lithuania; huge expanses drained for the benefit of the Western markets, doomed to adapt their production less to local needs than to the demands of foreign markets; Siberia, exploited by the Russian world-economy; but equally, the Venetian islands in the Levant, where external demand for raisins and strong wines, to be consumed as far away as England, had already, by the fifteenth century, imposed an intrusive monoculture, destructive of local balance." [42]

Now "modernization" and "revolution" have each had the twofold character of identification with the maturation of the modern world-system as "progress" and reactions against its "chain of subordinations" and intrusions into "local balance". Ideological and political variations on these themes have been numerous indeed, but there can be no serious question that it has been these system themes and not intra-societal developments in any hermetic sense that have underlain the discourse and process of "the Revolution" in the modern era.

4. Moving backward and forward here, to bring our terms of reference into tolerable focus, we may now say that "counter-revolution" sensu strictu consists in opposition to the demands of the modern world-system from the standpoint of pre-modern ideas and political orders, whether in "core" or "peripheral" states. An ideal-typical representative of counter-revolution in this sense [let us call it classical counter-revolution] was the nineteenth century champion of the old order in continental Europe, Clemens von Metternich.[43] He has had his counterparts in almost every culture or state which has been confronted by the enormous pressures for integration into the modern world-system. The matter of "revolution" becomes so complex just because, in contradistinction from counter-revolutionaries, the "revolutionaries" have combined desire to seize upon modern ideas and "modernization" with various efforts to resist and even transcend the "chain of
subordinations" that the modern system of capitalism and state powers has created. Seizing upon what "modernization" appears to promise, the more robust elements within states or cultures drawn into the modern world-system willy-nilly, have created national states and socio-economic orders linked to its dynamics. Tremendous tensions between resistance, seizure and transcendence have been evident in the Communist "revolutions", producing a strange and alarming combination of spartan, semi-autarchic "isolation" in the manner of pre-modern utopias, such as those envisaged by Plato or Thomas More [44], and modern secular, industrial commonwealths. From the French Revolution on, the discourse of "modernization" and "revolution" has been both constituted and disordered by these pressures and tensions.

5. The character of classical counter-revolution, as articulated by Metternich in the first decades of the nineteenth century, its fundamental anti-modernism, provides a compelling introduction and counter-point to the basic character of "post-classical" counter-revolution, or the politics of "counterpoise", of subsequent periods. There is an arresting passage in Henry Kissinger's seminal book on conservative diplomacy in the "revolutionary age" of the early nineteenth century, which gives a most piquant insight into Metternich's outlook - and Kissinger's own:

"...his analysis of the nature of revolutions [written in 1820] is lucid and powerful...Up to the sixteenth century, Metternich maintained, the forces of conservation and of destruction had been in an increasingly spontaneous balance. But then there occurred three events which in time caused civilization to be supplanted by violence and order by chaos; the invention of printing and of gunpowder and the discovery of America. Printing facilitated the exchange of ideas which thereby became vulgarized; the invention of gunpowder changed the balance between offensive and defensive weapons; and the discovery of America transformed the situation both materially and psychologically. The influx of precious metals produced a sudden change in the value of landed property which is the foundation of a conservative order, and the prospect of rapid fortunes brought about a spirit of adventure and a dissatisfaction with existing conditions. And then the Reformation completed the process by overturning the moral world and exalting man above the forces of history..." [45]

[The United States of] America; its riches; the printing press, or its astonishing mutants in the technologies of mass communications; and, if not gunpowder, certainly the weapons of war, have remained at the centre of the spectrum of "revolutions" that have sprung from the modern world-system in the twentieth century. Indeed, that the United States of America should have become the object of attack by "radicals" in the twentieth century, as well as by a Metternich in an earlier era; that totalitarian revolutionaries quite as much as the most conservative counter-revolutionaries have clamped down on "the printing press" out of concern with the "vulgarization" of ideas; and that nuclear weapons, the ultimate in "gunpowder", should have brought into question the claims of all modernists that the world, in their hands, radical or counterpositive, was on a course of "progress", is indicative of the deep ironies of the Cold War era. The fundamental anti-modernism of Metternich is evident here, nonetheless, and it is clear that such an outlook stood athwart any sort of systematic adjustment to the exigencies and indeed the opportunities of the modern world-system. The crisis of pre-modern conservative civilizations in the century after Metternich's death, be it in Russia, China, India, Vietnam, the Islamic world or Latin America, has to a remarkable degree brought reactions
analogous to Metternich's and shown them to be sterile. The inexorable imperative to adjust or go under has been the leitmotif of the modern age.

6. As compared with the posture of classical counter-revolution, that of counterpoise found its ideal-typical articulation in the theories of constitutional and social reform which sprang from, or were inspired by, the British and American political experience, at the "core" of the nascent modern world-system in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The root principles of a mixed and balanced constitution espoused within this tradition, by such savants as Locke, Montesquieu and the founders of the United States of America, can be found as far back as the work of Aristotle, Polybius and Cicero, but it is their adjustment to the novel demands of the modern world which is of special importance and their gradual extension of ideas of human freedom and civil liberties far beyond the achievements of the republics of the ancient world. Their bearing on radicalism and "revolution", from the time of the French Revolution to the Cold War era is, of course, the chief concern of the present inquiry. It is, therefore, of more than passing significance that Metternich, unlike Tocqueville, should have seen precisely in the British Constitution and the American Revolution the seeds of all that he detested in the French Revolution and its effects in Europe.

7. The "lucid and powerful" analysis of "revolution" attributed by Kissinger to Metternich, involved Metternich in a view of the United States of America, in the 1820's, which has the strangest resonance in the Cold War era:

"These United States of America, which we have seen arise and grow, and which during their short youth already meditated projects which they dared not then avow, have suddenly left a sphere too narrow for their ambition, and have astonished Europe by a new act of revolt [in the Monroe Doctrine], more unprovoked, fully as audacious and no less dangerous than the former...in fostering revolutions wherever they show themselves, in regretting those which have failed, in extending a helping hand to those which seem to prosper, they lend new strength to the apostles of sedition, and reanimate the courage of every conspirator. If this flood of evil doctrines and pernicious examples should extend over the whole of America, what would become of our religious and political institutions, of the moral force of our governments, and of that conservative system which has saved Europe from complete dissolution?" [46]

That conservative system was to crumble in carnage and ruin with the First World War, almost bringing down "counterpoise" at the core of the modern world-system with it. With more or less radical revolutions then erupting all around the semi-periphery and periphery of the system, the apostles of counterpoise then found themselves beset by geo-political contradictions and dilemmas, which had been foreshadowed in eighteenth century debates among British statesmen concerning the American and then the French Revolution.

8. In the speeches of Edmund Burke, Charles James Fox, William Pitt and others before the House of Commons, and of Lord Chatham before the House of Lords
in the last three decades of the eighteenth century, concerning events in America and then France, American political debates on revolution in the Cold War decades find their closest antecedent. Burke's speech on conciliation with America's revolutionaries, of 22 March 1775, as compared with a letter he wrote to the Comte de Mercy in August 1793, conveys vividly the difference between the values of counterpoise and those of classical counter-revolution. Burke spoke in praise of the "fierce spirit of liberty" of the American revolutionaries, but was vehement in his call for the extirpation of the "Jacobin empire" and the "pernicious principle" it was founded on.[47] Chatham, likewise, on 26 May 1774, praised the "valour, liberty and resistance" of the American revolutionaries, declaring that it was rooted in British traditions of freedom and defiance of tyrannous government:

"This glorious spirit of Whiggism animates three millions in America, who prefer poverty with liberty, to gilded chains and sordid affluence; and who will die in defence of their rights as men, as free men. What shall oppose this spirit, aided by the congenial flame glowing in the breasts of every Whig in England, to the amount, I hope, of double the American numbers?"[48]

The answer to Chatham's question, of course, was: Tory imperialism and the bungling and conservative policies of His Majesty's government. The salient point, however, is that the same political values which prompted Chatham and Burke to defend the American Revolution led them to deplore the radicalism of the French Revolution.

9. Addressing the House of Lords on 5 February 1790, Burke declaimed:

"In the last age we were in danger of being entangled by the example of France in the net of a relentless despotism...Our present danger, from the example of a people whose character knows no medium is, with regard to government, a danger from anarchy; a danger of being led through an admiration of successful fraud and violence, to an imitation of the excesses of an irrational, unprincipled, proscribing, confiscating, plundering, ferocious, bloody and tyrannical democracy."[49]

In 1796, in his Letters On A Regicide Peace, Burke urged military intervention in France to destroy the revolution at its source. My purpose is not to argue that Burke was correct, either in his observations or his prescriptions, so much as to ask, with an eye to American Cold War foreign policies, how a statesman of Burke's ilk would propose to promote in regions prone to radical upheaval, a "fierce spirit of liberty" coupled with that "medium" of constitutional principle, the absence of which in the French Revolution so repelled him?

10. There were Whigs whose reaction, even to the more extreme aspects of the French Revolution, were much less violent than that of Burke. Chief among these was Charles James Fox. A great friend and party colleague of Burke's, until the debate on the French Revolution caused a rift between them, Fox responded to Burke in the House of Commons, on 5 February 1790, with the observation that:
"The scenes of bloodshed and cruelty which have been enacted in France, no man can have heard without lamenting; but still, when the severe tyranny under which the people had so long groaned is considered, the excesses which they committed in their endeavour to shake off the yoke of despotism may, I think, be spoken of with some degree of compassion; and I am persuaded that, unsettled as their present state appears, it is preferable to their former conditions, and...ultimately it will be for the advantage of this country that France has regained her freedom..." [50]

The government of Prime Minister William Pitt, in the 1790's, pursued a policy of "containment" of the French Revolution abroad and cracked down on its radical sympathizers within Britain, with the suspension of Habeas Corpus in May 1794 and again in April 1798 and passage of the Seditious Meetings Act and Treasonable Practices Act, which Fox deplored as votes of no confidence in the resilience of the British traditions and principles of freedom. Consideration of the question implicit in Burke's concerns was not pronounced in these years, except in the writings of British radicals such as Tom Paine.

11. The author of Common Sense and The Rights of Man and a participant in both the American and French Revolutions, Paine wrote in extenuation of the latter:

"As it is not difficult to perceive, from the enlightened state of mankind, that hereditary governments are verging to decline and that revolutions on the broad basis of national sovereignty and government by representation are making their way in Europe, it would be an act of wisdom to anticipate their approach and produce revolutions by reason and accomodation, rather than commit the issue to convulsions." [51]

Such wisdom did not commend itself to classical counter-revolutionaries. Indeed, even Burke's Reflections On the Revolution in France was banned in Spain by the Catholic Inquisition because it dealt with the subject of "revolution". Nevertheless, between the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the Versailles Conference at the end of the First World War, something which has come to be called "revolution from above" commended itself to a growing number of statesmen throughout the world, if for reasons more complex and harsh than that advanced by Paine. The modernization of Germany and Japan was achieved by such means, though conservative pressures led both countries along the road of militarization and into catastrophic wars. The failure of "revolution from above" in late Imperial Russia and in China between 1895 and 1945 prepared the ground for catastrophic radical revolution "from below".

12. There can have been few more shining and ill-fated champions of Paine's notion of "revolution" by reason and accomodation to avoid commission of the issue to convulsions than Woodrow Wilson, as President of the United States between 1912 and 1920. His ill-starred idealism found expression even before the First World War, in his awkward efforts to come to terms with the Mexican Revolution. His difficulties with the disorders and bloodshed in Mexico were to be followed by even greater difficulties in China and eclipsed altogether by his encounter with radical revolution in Russia and the rise of the Communist International in the wake of the First World War. In contrast with the classical counter-revolutionism of Metternich, Wilson's vision was one of rational progress and he believed that the American Revolution could offer to the world a correction of the
defects of the French Revolution and a better path to inevitable and monumental changes in the modern world. His view in 1913 of the revolution in Mexico, as summarized by Lloyd Gardner, constitutes an astonishing interlude, as it were, between the politics of Metternich, or indeed of Burke, and the radical path taken by the Russian and Chinese revolutionaries after 1917 and 1949 respectively:

"The American President was a lifetime student of political institutions and theory. He was convinced...that European intervention against the French Revolution had been a terrible mistake that had contributed to the less than firm foundation democracy had had in continental Europe ever since, a foundation now under greater stress than ever before. The American Revolution had succeeded, on the other hand, because it had been isolated from Europe's turmoil by an ocean and by the wisdom of the Founding Fathers in avoiding connections, political or ideological, with the Old World. What Mexico had to have, therefore, was an American Revolution, if it was to break free from foreign economic dominion, avoid a violent lurching back and forth between reaction and anarchy and, most important, not set the wrong precedent as the world moved out from under the shadow of the dying imperial order. The only sure way to have that happen was for the United States to seal off Mexico from European interference until that change had been accomplished."[52]

If this was "containment" of revolution, it was the antithesis, in principle, of what Pitt had undertaken in Europe in the period of the French Revolution. Wilson wanted to keep "imperialism" out, rather than keep "revolution" in. He reckoned, however, without the immense and intractable complexities of the modern world-system, if not of human affairs in general.

13. On 10 December 1918, aboard the good ship George Washington, bound for France to attend the Versailles Conference, Wilson highly conscious of the crucial role the United States of America had played in ending the First World War, discoursed with his private counsellor, Colonel Edward House, concerning "America's ability to fulfil the world's hopes". He was emphatic that the Versailles Conference "must not become another Congress of Vienna, another tragic victory for the enemies of progress". He told House:

"The conservatives do not realize what forces are loose in the world at the present time. Liberalism is the only thing that can save civilization from chaos - from a flood of ultra-radicalism that will swamp the world...Liberalism must be more liberal than ever before, it must even be radical, if civilization is to escape the typhoon..."[53]

First in Europe and then in the United States itself, however, he discovered that his evangelical vision, with its lack of a grounding in the concrete realities of power politics in the modern world-system, was unable to prevail against the more conservative and pragmatic policies of David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau and Warren Gamaliel Harding.

14. To the European statesmen, Wilson appeared to be an eccentric and impractical visionary, full of untried schemes of what the earthy Clemenceau called "noble simplicity". Lloyd George observed in private:
It was part of the real joy of these Conferences to observe Clemenceau's attitude toward Wilson during the first five weeks of the Conference...If the President took a flight beyond the azure main, as he was occasionally inclined to do without regard to relevance, Clemenceau would open his great eyes in twinkling wonder, and turn them on me as much as to say: 'Here he is, off again.' [54]

Wilson died with his dreams in tatters and the generation after his death, in 1924, brought with it typhoons of upheaval such as even he can scarcely have imagined. In the wake of the Second World War, American liberalism was confronted to an even greater extent than Wilson had conceived it to be in 1918, by the challenge to come to terms with a world in a state of manifold revolution. Yet it had developed, to that point, no means of making more realistic Woodrow Wilson's belief that the American Revolution, with its politics of counterpoise, could make a more liberating contribution than the radical politics of the French or Russian Revolution, to redressing the imbalances of a modern world-system of which the United States was, by 1945, the indisputable core state.
"The war that came in 1914 and that engulfed Europe for four terrible years, swept away monarchies and their trappings and with them the last meaningful vestiges of the old order. Deprived of their old authority figures, the peoples of Europe have tried ever since to establish new and lasting forms of governance and of social organization. The story of their successes and failures is still unfolding and will continue to unfold as long as men seek to increase individual freedom or to repress it. The beginning of that story - what has been termed "the opening act of a great and still unfinished social revolution" - was the freeing of the peasantry from the bonds of their servility."

- Jerome Blum (1978)

"We are becoming a metal country, a motorised country, a tractorised country. And when we have seated the U.S.S.R. on an automobile and the peasant on a tractor - let the esteemed capitalists, who boast about their 'civilization', try to catch us up then! We will then be able to see which countries can be 'classified' among the backward and which among the advanced."

- Joseph Stalin (1929)

"One man, one family driven from the land; this rusty car creaking along the highway to the West. I lost my land, a single tractor took my land. I am alone and I am bewildered. And in the night one family camps in a ditch and another family pulls in and the tents come out. The two men squat on their hams and the women and children listen. Here is the node, you who hate change and fear revolution. Keep these two squatting men apart; make them hate, fear, suspect each other. Here is the anlage of the thing you fear. This is the zygote. For here "I lost my land is changed:" a cell is split and from the splitting grows the thing you hate. "We lost our land." The danger is here. For two men are not as lonely and perplexed as one. And from this first "we" there grows a still more dangerous thing: "I have a little food" plus "I have none." If from this problem the sum is "We have a little food," the thing is on its way, the movement has direction. Only a little multiplication now and this land, this tractor are ours. If you who own the things people must have could understand this, you might preserve yourself. If you could separate causes from results, if you could know that Paine, Marx, Jefferson, Lenin, were results, not causes, you might survive. But that you cannot know. For the quality of owning freezes you forever into "I" and cuts you off forever from the "we"...."

- John Steinbeck (1939)
CHAPTER TWO: LAND REFORM.

2:1. Peasants and Modern Agriculture.

1. The word "peasant" derives from the Latin pagus, a rural district, which has also given us the word "pagan". It comes down to us from the Old French paisant and the Middle English paissaunt, a countryman. Both peasant and pagan are "outsiders", uncouth, barbarous, in centuries of "civilized" usage. From ancient times and right into the present century, the peasant mass has been looked upon by elites with some condescension and contempt, fear and disgust. When Karl Marx described the peasantry as "barbarism within civilization" he was not, as some anti-Marxist polemics have implied, expressing other than the common opinion of civilization's elites both then and as far back as records go. In his magisterial study of the breakdown of old, servile orders in Europe between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, Jerome Blum presented massive documentation of the squalor of peasant life under the old orders and of revulsion from and contempt for the peasant mass on the part of masters and educated observers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Twentieth century rural sociology has consisted overwhelmingly of studies by such "educated observers" of the "little tradition", the culture and society apart, the backwardness and "barbarism" of peasant communities, in the context of the tendential "modernization" of agriculture. Tocqueville wrote of the "peculiar forms" that modern ideas took in the "cramped and narrow" places that were peasant minds and observed that the rich and the poor were "sealed books to one another". After the French Revolution, the belief that the "seal" must be broken gradually took hold in Europe. The rise and spread of modern, commercial agriculture placed the traditional condition of peasants in question in a radical, fundamental manner. It underlies the crucial, explosive and paradoxical role of peasants in the great twentieth century revolutions that seemed to Woodrow Wilson to be "typhoons" of irrational violence that threatened to sweep away "civilization" itself.

2. Surveying the records and reflections of generations of educated observers of Europe's pre-modern agrarian scene, Jerome Blum noted the "almost unrelieved picture of inefficient and wasteful agriculture" in which the mass of servile peasants were sunk in "a vicious cycle of poverty" on the "narrow margin of subsistence" [1]. There was a growing sense in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, he observed, that the appalling condition of the peasants - which worsened as one moved eastward in Europe [2] - was to be attributed not to the innate human characteristics of the peasants but to the evils of a social order of exploitation, repression, depravation and humiliation [3]. Blum commented in passing that this old Europe resembled "the underdeveloped countries in the second half of the twentieth century" [4], but offered no systemic explanation for differences between western and eastern Europe or "developed" and "underdeveloped" countries in the twentieth century, except the retarded or uneven diffusion of modern scientific farming methods and the idea of the emancipation of servile peasants to convert them into prosperous small farmers. [5] The omission is significant. It is characteristic of a massive "development"
and "modernization" literature and it poses acute problems for a critical understanding of the politics of modernization and the nature of twentieth century revolutions. It is well represented by the observation of a noted contemporary American rural sociologist, Peter Dorner, that:

"The system of European feudalism of several centuries ago appears under modern conditions to be without redeeming qualities...It came into conflict with the evolving goal of creating strong nation states; proved ill-equipped to respond to the requirements of expanding markets; was too inflexible to accommodate the increased use of capital and failed to meet the needs of man's evolving conception of himself. It was inconsistent with the requirements of making the great change from an agrarian system to an industrial society. Reforming these agrarian systems, from the seventeenth century through the nineteenth, was part of the general social revolution that accompanied industrialization in western and central Europe." [6]

Even if an intelligible concept of "modernization" or "revolution" could be defined such that it was a process which occurred in single societies, sooner or later, depending on their aptitude or fortune, the conflict, contradictions and turmoil of the process are less than adequately conveyed by phrasing which suggests that the worst modern difficulties are vestiges of the feudal orders; and that the "great change" consisted of something as vague as a "general social revolution". Yet it is quite clear that we must grasp the modernization process in world-system terms, or the real processes of the "revolutions" involved elude us.

3. **Put in its bluntest form, the least that must be said in modification of the "diffusion" idea of modernization is that the stresses and conflicts to which it has given rise in "underdeveloped" countries have been due in large measure to the impact of commercial agriculture in a modern world-system context and not to the evils of pre-modern orders alone.** The evidence for this basic proposition is overwhelming. In Vietnam, the greatest unrest, from the early twentieth century on, occurred in regions most open to the spread of commercial rice and rubber production as well as taxation by the colonial state. In the Philippines, unrest has been most acute in regions where more traditional patron-client relationships of a "feudal" kind have been eroded by the growth of commercial rice production and in the sugar monoculture zones linked to foreign markets. In El Salvador, the rebellion of 1932 was the climax of peasant resistance to the encroachments of commercial coffee planters on communal lands; and in the 1980's, in much of Central America, including El Salvador, the greatest unrest has arisen in connection with the rampant growth of commercial cotton and cattle production for export. Such examples could be multiplied endlessly. It is, quite simply, systematically misleading to describe "feudalism" as the problem here, however exploitative, narrow and stultifying "feudal" orders have been; and it is clear that to prescribe "modernization" as the solution to such difficulties is both paradoxical and problematic. What manner of "modernization" will even begin to solve the immense tensions and problems generated in great measure by "modernization"? In seeking an answer to this question, we become immersed, of course, in the whole complex of the politics of modern "revolutions".
4. There is a core problem here concerning the modernization of peasants, or more precisely the impact of "modernization" on peasants. The pun on "core" is intentional. Peasants have, throughout most of "recorded history" been illiterate and their perceptions of their condition and problems has to be gleaned, sometimes by hermeneutic interpretation, from fragments of "folk" lore or the records of master classes concerning peasant rebellions and modes of life. It is, therefore, the observers from the "core" of civilization, from the elites, the urban, the educated, the industrialized, who have constituted what studies there have been of peasant mores and revolts. According to Teodor Shanin, rural sociology "as a discipline in its own right" had its beginnings only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Central and Eastern Europe, for the evident reason that there the peasants remained far more of a question-mark for modernist intellectuals than in the more industrialized western states. It had had beginnings in the United States, he remarks, even before it grew in Europe, though it focused there more on farming as an occupation than on "peasants". After the First World War, it was suppressed in much of Eastern Europe, by nationalists, dictators and Stalinists. Within the United States, it grew, but was slow to turn its attention to peasants in "underdeveloped" regions of the world, due, it seems, to the almost universal belief that peasants were an archaic stratum of human civilization which was on the verge of assimilation into an industrialized world. In this regard, the history of rural sociology clearly provides a fascinating and instructive study in the "sociology of knowledge". Before seeking to bring the rural sociological perspectives of the present inquiry into direct focus, therefore, it seems worthwhile to register the fact that the constitution of such perspectives and the archive, as Michel Foucault would describe it, on which they draw to define themselves, has been a recent development which has been bound up in an inextricable manner with the problems that the "core" has encountered in the "assimilation" of the peasant mass into its industrial civilization.

5. In two striking review articles of 1981 and 1982, Bruce Cumings and Theda Skocpol each drew attention to the impact of the Vietnam War on American peasant studies. Reviewing Jeffery Paige's Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World (1975); James C. Scott's The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (1976); Samuel L. Popkin's The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam (1979) and Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions (1979), Cumings wrote:

"These books were all written by people who either actively opposed the war in Indochina or who at least reflect critically on the causes of the revolutions there and the American reasons for opposing them. This recent American experience breathes through all these writings. Each book provides a sophisticated and scholarly inquiry into the sources of American conflict with Asian and other peasant societies - an inquiry that has for the most part been avoided by American society, most especially by its elites, who have done much to promote the willful amnesia that followed on the American debacle in 1975. Implicitly or explicitly, all the authors seek to come to terms with that conflict and its causes." [9]

Theda Skocpol, reviewing the same books by Paige and Scott, as well as Joel Migdal's Peasants, Politics and Revolution: Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World (1974) and Eric Wolf's
Peasant Wars In The Twentieth Century (1969), observed that modernists, in the United States as elsewhere, had, until the 1960's, tended to regard the peasants of the world as the:

"...repository of conservatism and tradition, of all that needed to be overcome by a revolutionary bourgeoisie or proletariat or by a modernizing elite. But once the United States became tragically engaged from the mid-1960's in a military effort to halt the Vietnamese Revolution, U.S. scholars quite understandably became fascinated with the revolutionary potential of the peasantry..." [10]

Nothing is more central to the present inquiry than this sense that its very subject matter has been constituted by modernists in uncertain and often high-pressured response to crises engendered by modernization. The present inquiry is not itself a rural sociological inquiry, or an exercise in agricultural economics. It is an attempt to interpret the response of the American government to the prospect of peasant revolution as engendered by "modernization" in three "peripheral" states before, during and after the Vietnam War.

7. The common point of departure of all modern rural sociology is the wretchedness and injustice of the old agrarian orders world-wide and the depravation and "backwardness" this inflicts on peasants. James Scott, who, for reasons that are unclear to me, has been criticized for "romanticizing" the old orders, made the baseline of his reflection on peasant "moral economy" the observation of R. H. Tawney that:

"There are districts [in China in 1931] in which the position of the rural population is that of a man standing permanently up to the neck in water, so that even a ripple is sufficient to drown him." [11]

Scott was trying to explain a phenomenon which had puzzled Tocqueville and has been at the center of much debate on peasant "revolution" in the twentieth century: peasant rebellion in the name of "conservative" demands, or as Tocqueville expressed it, with reference to peasant support for "counter-revolution" in the Vendee, peasant rebellion appearing to break out most precisely where the greatest "reforms" or the most "modernization" had taken place. His finding should occasion little surprise and less controversy than it has. Under traditional patron-client systems, peasants were exploited and repressed, but their expectations and subsistence rights were entrenched. Pre-modern peasant revolts, whether in Europe or China, were compounds of reaction to the erosion of established expectations and subsistence rights and millenarian visions of the removal of the feudal yoke. With the advance of modern commercial agriculture, peasants have again and again found themselves denied subsistence rights and deprived even of what access they had to productive resources under feudal orders. Karl Marx's eloquent description of the expropriation of the British peasantry by agricultural capitalism from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries [12] and Karl Polanyi's description of the uprooting of British peasant subsistence agriculture with the beginnings of the "Great Transformation" [13] provide archetypal pictures of processes that were repeated and are being repeated everywhere with the rise and maturation of the modern world-system. Any apparent paradox in the antinomies between peasant revanchism in the face of such expropriation and peasant efforts to seize such opportunities as modern agriculture may make available seem to me quite explicable, in principle, on the
basis that in each case the peasant or peasant community acts on an assessment of what it stands to gain or lose and seeks to minimize risk and insecurity according to the harsh calculus of marginal subsistence explicated so carefully by Scott. Moreover, his quite minute and illuminating delineation of the "shock field of modernization" with its world price system and modern state system of taxation and coercion, applied to Burma and Vietnam, appears to me to have rich application in the Philippines and Central America and to expose the genuine dilemmas that confront modernizers as well as peasants within the modern world-system.

8. Among the features of feudal or servile orders which were most indicted from the eighteenth century on and which continue to be so indicted, were the failure of the systems of tenure and of farming to utilize rural resources to maximum productive potential, thus depriving peasant, master and state of food, income and revenue; and the appalling condition of deprivation and squalor in which the mass of peasants lived. According as they have dealt with these problems, states in the modern world have assumed various political forms. Barrington Moore Jr, in the 1950's and early 1960's, sought to establish a typology of such political forms, publishing his findings in 1966 under the title *Social Origins Of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. The central thrust of this seminal work was that if, for whatever reason, capitalist modernizers do not or cannot effect a "revolution" that clears away feudal land tenures and emancipates the peasants, then the political consequences in the modern world seem likely to be fascism, communism or, at best, retarded development. In this view of modernization, land reform in the sense of consolidation of fragmented peasant holdings, abolition of serfdom and exploitative tenancy systems, breaking up of feudal landed estates and dissemination of multifarious farming skills and legal or economic knowledge among peasants become indispensable components of democratic capitalist development. However, throughout the modern world-system, capitalist agriculture has found many paths to "development" that have been not at all democratic. The one indispensable component of undemocratic capitalist development has been the subordination of peasantries to the demands of commercial export production in place of subsistence or local market production. This has necessitated "land reform" only in the sense of expropriation of peasants' communal or scattered holdings and termination of their claims on the noblesse oblige of their masters. It was common in the late nineteenth century and at least the first half of the twentieth century for modernists, whether "bourgeois" or "radical", to see in this the harsh but necessary precondition of industrialization: creation of a landless proletariat and generation of an agricultural surplus sufficient to feed a growing urban-industrial population and investible earnings from exports. The catastrophic world-system crisis of 1914-45 brought variations on Barrington Moore Jr's ideal types, or, more precisely, provided the greater part of the material for his construction of these ideal types, in a whirlwind of social and political upheavals. The case studies that form this inquiry are drawn, of course, from the Cold War era that followed that thirty year crisis. In each case, the question of land reform is posed in relation to putative American concerns with
democratic capitalist development and the prospect of communist mobilization of peasants to overthrow what have been undemocratic capitalist or semi-feudal regimes.

9. There is no doubt that land reform has been and continues to be one of the most fundamental and contentious issues in modern politics. Whether one looks to most of Africa, or Latin America, or South Asia, or Southeast Asia, or indeed to the ongoing debates over collective agriculture and economic responsibility in Communist states, or the farm crisis in the United States, problems of land tenure and land use are of pressing importance. Placed in the context of world-system food and fibre production, distribution and exchange, these problems are every bit as urgent at the close of the twentieth century as they have been at any period in the history of human civilization. What stands out from the debates on these problems, more or less wherever such debates are conducted, is the degree of ideological bad faith that characterizes positions taken by the participants. As Ronald Herring dryly remarked in 1983, in his outstanding study of land reform politics in South Asia:

"Without any evidence at all or with conflicting, ambiguous evidence or even in the face of flatly contradictory evidence, political and administrative elites have taken stands on the economics of land reform consistent with their ideological positions. The political right inevitably argues that land reforms will destroy agriculture; the left consistently argues that land reforms are necessary to 'unleash the productive forces of society'. The reformist center worries about incentives and moderation, but argues that changes are essential for the rationalization of agriculture..." [14]

The problem is a serious one and brings into question the whole basis of political discourse and what hope there is for what Paine called "revolution by reason and accommodation" to avert convulsions. Nor can it be said, as Herring makes clear, that the bad faith is a fault of conservatives alone. The root problem goes deeper than that and Communist revolutions have borne out, to an often egregious and grievous extent the harm that can be done by political or economic paradigms that become sealed off from critical assessment. Systematic and thorough critical assessment of social institutions and relations of production is, however, the most indispensable component of the process of modernization, if that word has anything but a merely technological - and in that case ominous and even terrifying - meaning. It is not possible not to be implicated, but it seems almost impossible to master the scope of the problem or to overcome the political and ideological inertia that binds us to it. What, therefore, is the "critic" to do?

10. Peripheral/undemocratic capitalist development has, across much of the world, produced appalling patterns of narrow elite luxury consumption, low utilization of rural labor, marginalization of millions of landless poor, over-production of primary commodities for export to core markets at the expense of local balance - Fernand Braudel's raisins and strong wine scenario - and stultified "peripheral" demand patterns which severely inhibit anything resembling "democratic" development. The arguments for radical land reform in most of the zones of the earth in which these conditions obtain are, on the basis of first principles of justice and economic development, all but incontrovertible. The problem is one of political and administrative means to the achievement of such radical land reform. It is not the
11. What is to be understood by the term "radical land reform"? The rhetoric of land reform and anti-radicalism has long since clouded the substance of the matter. In brief, I mean land to the tiller. The most common form of undemocratic capitalist land tenure pattern is share tenancy. Radical land reform would involve an attack on share tenancy as unrelenting as the attacks on slavery and serfdom of an earlier era. In such countries as India, Brazil, and the Philippines, hollow land reforms which effect no substantial removal of the evils of share tenancy have been common. Even where a land reform bill is enacted that seems serious, implementation can become hopelessly compromised by prevailing political and administrative inertia. Radical land reform may be enforced by an authoritarian central government willing and able to break through the resistance of landlords and their allies, but peasant mobilization in support of radical land reform and changes of administrative, judicial and political power to prevent the frustration of such reform are the surest paths to achievement of them. Here is where major difficulties arise and the following section of this chapter will seek to bring these into historical perspective.
2:2.  Communism, Peasants and Revolution.

1.  The foregoing discussion of peasants and agricultural modernization and, above all, the apodictic statement of position on radical land reform cannot, of course, be presented as other than the most indicative discursive opening to an argument on the subject. In particular, the claim that radical land reform entails a land to the tiller program and abolition of share tenancy (and other pernicious, exploitative or inefficient tenurial and labor practices) inevitably has about it a certain Kantian, or perhaps Rawlsian, character. That is to say, even if the proposition were to be granted on the basis of first principles of justice or economic development, instead of being mired in contentious debate, it would still collide with the objection that it is too abstract and idealistic and that in the "real world" of "original sin", class struggle, power politics and so on, no such principles of white and gold perfection can be made to operate. Moreover, the specific, as it were gravitational forces that weigh in against land reforms of so radical a nature are constituted in different ways from one country and even one region to another and there are endless equivocations to be made concerning cultural and geographic complications. Nevertheless, since such equivocations and objections lead us into an infinite regression of ideological dispute and substantive research, the proposition is put forward as a marker, to indicate, in the manner of all economic models, the theoretical criterion which will be used for purposes of critical assessment of "real world" debates on land reform in the Cold War era. Sustained defenses of the proposition at issue are widely available [15] and, as the discourse we shall be immersed in reveals again and again, the concept of land to the tiller is one which receives tacit acknowledgement, being honored in the breach, even where it is opposed or regarded as unattainable. This is especially so in American discourse on the matter, with which we shall be chiefly concerned.

2.  There is nothing controversial about describing the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels as the single most sustained and effective modernist critique of capitalism. The great crisis of 1914-45 and the Cold War have, however, rendered "Marxism" far more controversial on the world scene than seems warranted by the character of the writings of Marx and Engels themselves. The source of those controversies lies in, or at least it can be traced through, the transmutations of the international socialist and communist movement that are marked by the founding of the First International and its passing; the founding in its place of the Second International in 1889 and its disintegration on the outbreak of the First World War; the founding of the Third International, the Communist International or Comintern, by Lenin in the wake of that disaster; the founding of the Fourth International by Trotsky and the dissolution of the Comintern in the wake of the Great Terror in the Soviet Union and the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, which precipitated the Second World War; and the Sino-Soviet Split of the 1960's. The radical discontinuities in this hundred year history of the greatest oppositional movement within the modern world-system are of the utmost importance for a critical understanding of the Cold War. Two of them are of particular significance: the division between the social democratic politics of the Second International and the radical authoritarian politics of the Third International, which produced the
calamities of Communist totalitarianism; and the remarkable dislocation of the "revolution" from the urban industrial heartland of the core states to the vast para-modernized or "feudal" rural periphery. In the process, beginning with Lenin's daring and perilous seizure of state power in Russia in October 1917, the mass of peasants in the rural peripheral states were brought into the calculus of both revolution and world politics in a manner Marx and Engels had not anticipated. No discussion of Cold War debates over revolution and counter-revolution can even begin to make sense without bringing these massive geo-political factors into historical perspective.

3. The years of the Second International (1889-1914) coincided almost exactly with the great age of capitalist imperialism before the coming of the great crisis.[16] During these years industrialization proceeded at an unprecedented rate in the states of western Europe and large labor and socialist parties and trade union movements emerged to defend the claims of the new industrial proletariat in these states. After the death of Karl Marx and perhaps as an authentic development of his investigations and ideas, many of the leading figures within the Second International came to believe that a civilized rationalization of capitalism - a socialism of some form or other - could emerge from within the new industrial states by a gradual process of political organization and reform. There was, however, from the 1890's on to the outbreak of the First World War, a growing apprehension at the arms race between the imperialist states and a concern that a terrible imperialist war was coming. Efforts were made to formulate international plans for a socialist political and trade union intervention to prevent the mobilization and financing necessary for such a war. However, when the crisis broke, in August 1914, the various national sections of the Second International collapsed into almost uninhibited patriotism and war fever.[17] All plans for preventing or aborting the great imperialist war were reduced to tatters within days. Beginning with the Zimmerwald Conference in 1915, a few remnants of the anti-war activists began to search for a way to revive the cause.[18] The collapse of Imperial Russia in February 1917 and the seizure of power in Petrograd by the most militant wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party (the Bolsheviks), led by Lenin in Oct. 1917, altered perceptions of political realities and possibilities in war torn Europe in drastic ways. The rise of the Third International between 1918 and 1921 occurred in direct consequence of the First World War and failure of the Second International and amidst a bitter and savage civil war in the former Russian Empire. Its mood and purposes reflected these circumstances, as well as the rather implacable zeal of Lenin himself. Henceforth, the discipline of the socialist movement had to be far more rigorous and the attempt to bring down the imperialist and capitalist system more unrelenting and uncompromising, was the message of the Third International. The socialist parties of Europe split into those resolved to adhere to the politics of the Second International and those who identified with Lenin's Third International.

4. The seizure and retention of power by Lenin and the Bolsheviks in Petrograd in October 1917 was made possible not only or even primarily by the tight discipline and firmness of purpose of the Bolshevik cadres, but by the political impact
of Lenin's slogan "Land, Peace, Bread". The Imperial Army disintegrated in 1917 after three years of appalling slaughter, in which some five million Russian soldiers had been killed, overwhelmingly peasants. Lenin's slogan touched off the disintegration of remaining rural and urban authority structures and produced the conditions in which the Bolsheviks were able to mobilize support and defeat their political rivals.[19] It was a more or less improvised slogan on Lenin's part, but it was to have the most momentous repercussions.

5. In a sustained analysis of Lenin's arrival at the idea of a "peasant revolution" as a "solution" to the dilemmas in modernization faced by Russia, Esther Kingston-Mann concluded that Lenin's Marxian preconceptions and, to some extent his enduring prejudices, in regard to peasants were based on fundamental errors of fact and reasoning. Nevertheless, she observed, his political strategy was brilliant and, by comparison, the failure of nerve on the part of the other modernist parties in 1917 - the Constitutional Democrats, Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries - in deferring land reform until the end of the apparently interminable First World War, "established a pattern of fearful response to the threat of chaos and anarchy".[20] It left the victorious Bolsheviks, however, face to face with monumental problems of political order and economic development, for which the writings of Marx and Engels had provided no prescription or guidance whatsoever.

6. What Lenin had encouraged in 1917 was a sweeping, anarchic land to the tiller upheaval that broke the power of the old aristocratic and imperial landholders and so undermined, as Metternich had expressed it, "the foundation of a conservative order". What this had to do with socialism was much less clear. Moreover, Lenin's Bolsheviks had no roots in the countryside; they were an urban industrial party built more or less in anticipation of a capitalist development in Russia consonant with the Marxism of the Second International. Once the civil war came to an end and Lenin's new rulers took stock of the ruinous, impoverished and backward state of their "liberated" empire, a great debate began as to how this backward peasant country could recover from the ravages of war and then develop the industrial and cultural foundations of socialism. The implications of Lenin's victory were, in themselves "revolutionary", but more for the colonized and exploited in the periphery of the world-system than for the workers of the core states. What was decisive, as both conservatives and socialists of various kinds understood, was whether Lenin could demonstrate that socialism could be built from such a starting point in a manner less oppressive and exploitative than that of Western capitalism. During the 1920's the great debates on planning, industrialization, education and agriculture in the new Soviet Union took place with this understanding in view.

7. Decades before Lenin had appeared on the scene, the peasant masses of Russia had been the object of feckless efforts on the part of radical urban-based intellectuals to stir up rebellion against the old order. Indeed, it had been the failure of these
agitators to make any impression on the peasants that had facilitated the spread of Marxian ideas in Russia and the rise of the Social Democrat Party.[21] In his last years, Karl Marx corresponded with such Russian radicals as Vera Zasulich and Nikolai Danielson and argued - though his letters to this effect were not published until many years later - that Russia need not go through the turmoil and human misery of capitalist expropriation of the peasant masses and the mushrooming of squalid industrial cities, but might, under favorable conditions, build a humane socialism on the basis of the primitive peasant communal system and maintain a balance between rural and urban development.[22] Writing to Danielson in 1893, Engels expressed a far darker and more tragic vision, which proved to be accurate under circumstances he never foresaw. Since, he wrote, Russia was far more backward than England had been at the beginning of its industrial development and since it had to travel further faster and was much larger, it had to be expected that a stupendous human cost would be involved, a great bouleversement or upheaval, before Russia could consummate its modernization.[23] The First World War and the "revolution" of 1917 had been quite a "bouleversement", but as Lenin was very much aware, the real work of modernization had after that to be begun almost from scratch and under the most unfavorable of conditions.[24]

8. Lenin decided and declared that for the revolution to survive and advance toward a socialism he defined as a civilized association of producers, an alliance (smychka) between the urban-based revolutionaries and workers and the mass of peasants was indispensable. A means had to be found to win the confidence of the peasants and draw them into the immense and laborious task of constructing an industrial base able to improve the lives of the great mass of both urban and rural dwellers.[25] He had scarcely begun to try to come to terms with the difficulties of this smychka and industrialization when he died in January 1924. Over the next three to four years serious efforts were made to do so, both in and outside of the Bolshevik Party. In 1928-29 those efforts were aborted by Stalin and his faction who had gained ascendancy within the Party. What followed was a bouleversement of the most cruel and dismal kind - the forced collectivization of the peasants, the liquidation of the "rich" peasants (kulaks), to the number of several million human beings, by starvation and deportation and a hectic heavy industrialization and urbanization process prodigal in its waste of both human and natural resources. All this climaxed in the extraordinary and terrifying events of 1936-38, in which the Party itself was torn limb from limb, one or two million people executed and several million more deported into the vast system of forced labor camps known by their acronym: GULAG (Gosudarstvennoe Upravlenie LAGerei, or General Administration of [Corrective Labor] Camps).

9. Stalin called his bouleversement the Great Turn or Great Change (veliki perelom) and Robert Davies, in a recent meticulous study of the process has called it "the socialist offensive";[26] but the human costs and bleak, oppressive outcome of the Stalin years, which have given so many of its peculiar, sinister connotations to the word "totalitarianism", have long since posed the question whether this was a construction of "socialism" or a "great change" to something quite else. As Moshe
Lewin, author of the outstanding history of forced collectivization *Russian Peasants And Soviet Power*, has written:

"...the Soviet state was successful in organizing a large-scale squeeze of agricultural output from the peasantry, but failed as a manager and organizer of successful large-scale agricultural production...To base the economic activity of a whole branch and of a social class on "taking" without rewarding would be inconceivable without the application of mass coercion on a permanent basis...[which] contributed heavily to the hardening of Stalin's Russia into a bureaucratic police state." [27]

That this "hardening into a bureaucratic police state" had begun before forced collectivization and that Lenin himself, in his creation and handling of the political police (*Cheka*) bore considerable responsibility for the problem seems incontrovertible. It was a criticism or warning directed at Lenin by Rosa Luxemburg and Jules Martov and by Lenin's first Minister of Justice, Isaac Steinberg, as early as 1918, during the Red Terror of the civil war.[28] However, there still remained, until Stalin's Great Turn, sufficient room for critical assessment of Party policies that serious and substantial debates on economic policies could take place. It is the significance of these debates and the nature of their suppression at the end of the 1920's that I want to bring into the picture here, in order to distinguish the prospect of radical revolution and agrarian development from the shibboleth of totalitarianism.

10. Agrarian studies in Russia began to develop in the years after the decree "emancipating" serfs in 1861. In 1865, the Timiriazev Agricultural Academy was opened and, over the following decades, it gradually established a reputation as one of the foremost institutes of its kind in the world. The Bolshevik Revolution initially gave a tremendous boost to this institute as the spearhead of an energetic effort to grapple with the Soviet Union's immense agrarian challenges. In the words of Susan Gross Solomon, one of the foremost students of the 1920's agrarian debates in the Soviet Union:

"In the first decade of Soviet power, the field of rural studies was the scene of great activity. There had been research on the Russian countryside as early as the last two decades of the nineteenth century, but the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 brought with it unprecedented interest in the rural sector, upon which depended not only the economic prosperity but also the political stability of the new regime. With the Soviet government now assuming the role of patron and client of all the sciences, the field of rural inquiry burgeoned. New teaching and research centers were founded, new journals were created and talented young people were recruited.

As the field grew, its intellectual content broadened. In the first half of the 1920's (as in the previous decade) the most vital area of rural inquiry was agricultural economics. At mid-decade the field expanded to include questions characteristic of rural sociology." [29]

Thus, Russian rural studies and peasant studies, which may have laid the basis for a thorough and non-coercive *smychka*, began to flower under the aegis of the Bolshevik regime, but were cut down by Stalin. As Moshe Lewin, George Yaney and Robert Davies, among others, have observed, one cause of the calamities of forced collectivization was the sheer lack of understanding among the Stalin faction of how peasants thought and worked.[30] The global consequence was the creation of an image, even a paradigm of Communism as an anti-peasant, coercive and anti-intellectual path to "development". The implications for a world in which peasants had been and have continued to be among the most chronic victims of capitalist "development" were appalling.
11. At the center of the agrarian debates of the 1920's was a young Soviet agricultural economist by the name of Alexander Chayanov. Chayanov headed the non-Marxist school of thought known as the Peasant Economy or Operation-Production school. It was Chayanov and his colleagues and students who staffed and ran the agricultural academies, as well as the planning, cooperative and agronomic agencies of the government in the early 1920's [31]. The Peasant Economy school were concerned to build up a fund of knowledge on the practical production problems of the world of peasant small-holding agriculture. In a curious variant of Karl Marx's (or Alexander Herzen's before him) vision of a Russia in which development would follow a much more balanced and humane path than that of the "West", Chayanov published a utopian novel in which Russia, by 1984, had become a land without gigantic cities and with a prosperous free-hold cooperative agriculture. What Stalin created, instead, was described, even in anticipation of forced collectivization, by Bolshevik opposition leader Bukharin as "military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry".[32] There was, in the 1920's, a glimmer of hope that Bolshevik leaders such as Lenin and Bukharin would open a road of development in which Marxian and Chayanovian agrarian experts could labor to draw the peasant masses into a modern and humane world, but Stalin's road was not such a road.[33]

12. In a reflective essay on the question of agrarian "transition", i.e. the building of a "socialist" agriculture after a radical revolution, Mark Harrison has expressed rather well the significance, one might say the poignancy, of the truncation of agrarian debate and practical critical research in the Soviet Union by Stalin at the time of the Great Turn. The Soviet agrarian specialists in the 1920's, he observed, faced acute and unavoidable political dilemmas amid massive economic problems. For their work to be fruitful he wrote, there was a need for "a wide-open politics not mechanically identified with any one strategy or social class interest." The role of the agrarian specialists, their institutional agencies and their responses to various forces and problems at that time under a political regime that was far from "wide-open" becomes, therefore, a subject of the greatest importance, according to Harrison, but close exploration of this area in the climate of opinion generated by the Cold War was problematic, since the space for it became "extremely narrow - a kind of no-man's land between the trenches, shelled and undermined from both sides". He went on to remark:

"In thinking why we should trace out the alternative practices and strategies of the twenties, I am not trying to rewrite history...In reality, the political options of the twenties were not particularly wide open and the political and technical resources with which a more consensual cultural revolution might have been pursued were extremely limited...However, [forced collectivization] was not the only potential outcome present in the 1920's. From this point of view, the historian's task is to present the options which were discarded - in all their incompleteness and lack of finish - as well as the one actually taken."[34]

What I am attempting in the present inquiry is to approach this problem from another angle - the discarded prospects for American "Chayanovism" and a wide-open politics of development, in a Cold War context in
which, similarly, the political options were often "not particularly wide open". It seems conceivable that a cross-hatching of the debates of the pre-Stalin years in the Soviet Union and American debates over land reform in the Cold War years - "in all their incompleteness and lack of finish" - will contribute to at least a modification of the hard lines of ideological confrontation which have marked the Cold War and which have their roots in the world-system crisis of 1914-1945. In the concluding section of this chapter, I shall, therefore, turn to American agrarian politics, in order to bring into the picture the context of American response in the Cold War years to the prospect of revolutions in the "periphery" with a political character overshadowed by the figure of Stalin and the Soviet Union he built.[35]

13. Now, of course, the revolutions that the United States confronted after 1945, beginning with the most momentous of them all, the Chinese Revolution, were not in fact mere totalitarian "aggressions" by Stalin's bureaucratic police state. They were, with the exception of a number of the states of eastern Europe which were absorbed into Stalin's empire in the wake of the Second World War, rooted in long-standing crises in the countries in question. Nowhere was this more palpable and consequential than in the case of China. Here, after decades of turmoil occasioned by the impact of European and then Japanese commercial and military penetration of old Imperial China, the imperative need for a drastic national and social revolution to save China from disintegration and bring her into the modern world as a great power, led to a widespread belief that a strong party of revolution with a mass base had to be built. A series of abortive efforts to build such a party and inevitable divisions over such fundamental aspects of social revolution as land reform preceded the rise of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1920's.[36]

14. Unable to sustain itself against foreign and national conservative forces in the coastal cities, the Chinese Communist Party, from 1927 was driven to take Lenin's improvised appeal to the peasants a gigantic step further and base itself in the countryside among the peasants. Thus "Marxist" revolution became almost the antithesis of what Marx himself had expected. Instead of the maturation of a proletarian movement in the urban industrial heartland of a robust capitalist civilization, it had become a rebellion at the outermost margins of the capitalist world-system, in which, in the famous phrase of Mao Zedong, "the countryside surrounds the city" and masses of peasants quite unacquainted with capitalism become shock troops in a "socialist" revolution. The Chinese Communists demonstrated, however, an astonishing capacity to understand how peasants thought and to mobilize them according to peasant, not abstract ideological, concerns - and the cities fell. This victory was portentous indeed and encouraged radicals throughout much of the periphery to believe that "revolution" was everywhere possible.[37] In Mao's bold claim "the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind" one catches a resonant echo of Woodrow Wilson's fear in 1918 that "civilization" was threatened by a "typhoon" of "ultra-radicalism". Certainly, what the Chinese Revolution represented was an enormous challenge to "civilization" - the core states of the world-system and their allies in the periphery - to come to terms with the reaction that its impact on the "wretched of the earth" was creating. As the most
democratic and at the same time most advanced and affluent of core states by 1945, the United States, for so long rather self-absorbed, was compelled to bear the brunt of this challenge.
1. The immediate context of American involvement in the agrarian politics of Asia and Latin America in the Cold War has been the global struggle with Communism and the expansion around the globe of American capitalism and military power. However, in order to interrogate American postures and policies in regard to such agrarian politics, it is important to set these in the narrower constitutive context of American agrarian politics, from the founding of the United States through to the eve of the Cold War. There has been, since the 1790's, a major ideological tension within American political culture between the vision of Alexander Hamilton and that of Thomas Jefferson as to what form of state and economic organization were most desirable for the republic. It is, through many convoluted debates and controversies, the name of Jefferson which has continued to evoke concern with liberties, while that of Hamilton has been most evocative of state power and big capitalism. Throughout the history of the United States, these two strains have been embroiled in conflict and contradiction. Besides this ideological tension, the national experience of agrarian space and pioneer land settlement, followed by the closure of the frontier around 1900, has been a major influence on the political culture of the United States. The harsh realities of slavery and civil war in the nineteenth century are an element of America's past which cannot be omitted from an understanding of the agrarian politics of the United States without causing a grave distortion in perspective. The bitter debates about agrarian reform, including land redistribution, that followed the Civil War are a most instructive prelude to American responses to demands for land reform in Asia and Latin America in the Cold War years. The decades of debate over the slow, relentless destruction of the small farmer population of the United States by the forces of agricultural capitalism, between the 1880's and the New Deal, are likewise an indispensable background to American approaches to agricultural development abroad in the years since the Second World War. Without a critical perspective on this history, it is quite impossible to comprehend the real meaning of American rhetoric about land reform and "revolution" in the periphery of the world-system in the Cold War era.

2. The work of Frederick Jackson Turner is foremost among those associated with the "spatial" interpretation of the rise of American civilization. Writing and speaking in the 1890's, he gave voice to the concern that, with the "closure" of the western land frontier, the open horizon that had for so long been the guarantor of American freedom no longer existed and it was to be apprehended that social difficulties would now begin to grow for the more and more crowded republic.[38] Richard Hofstadter has pointed out that many of Turner's assertions about the role of the western land frontier in the rise of American civilization and freedom are vague and unsubstantiated.[39] Yet he also noted that Turner was by no means alone in his concerns at that time. His contemporaries, William Graham Sumner and Henry George, traced the course of American development in freedom and prosperity to the especially generous land-man ratio that existed in the expanses of North America.[40]
The noted economist, Francis Amasa Walker, declared in 1892 that, as a consequence of the exhaustion of the public domain: "reluctant as we may be to recognize it, a labor problem is at last upon us. No longer can a continent of free virgin lands avert from us the social struggle which the old world has known so long and so painfully."[41] Not coincidentally, it was at this time that the Darwinian notion of struggle and survival of the fittest gained much ground in the United States, as elsewhere in the capitalist world. A belief that something like this was an ineluctable development had long underlain sceptical assessments of the agrarian democratic political values of Thomas Jefferson.

3. Alexis de Tocqueville, then working on his great opus *Democracy In America* [42] foreshadowed this concern in a letter to his friend Ernest de Chabrol in 1831; and a generation later Thomas Macaulay had spelled out the matter in a letter to Jefferson's biographer, Henry S. Randall. Their concern was with an abundance that could not last and with political institutions and ideals built, they suspected, on a *romantic* foundation. "America finds itself for the present," wrote Tocqueville, "in a physical situation so fortunate, that private interest is never contrary to the general interest, which is certainly not the case in Europe . . . An immense field, of which the smallest part has yet been traversed, is here open to industry."[43] The outlook of Macaulay in 1856 was that democracy and Jefferson were synonymous, but to the credit of neither. He was contemptuous of the minimalist, democratic Jeffersonian state and informed the astonished Randall that:

"He had never uttered a word of approval for the democratic institutions of equality and majority rule. They must, he thought, eventually destroy liberty or civilization or both. America's fate under them was no less certain for being temporarily deferred. Her progress to date was in no way the result of Jeffersonian principles but rather of vast land and resources. So long as this natural abundance existed, "the Jeffersonian polity may continue to exist without causing any fatal calamity". *It would not be fairly tested until men crowded the land and grew hungry.* With what means, then, Macaulay asked, could the American government restrain the mad and ignorant majority? . . ."[44]

When Randall published his correspondence with Macaulay, following the latter's death in 1858, the Englishman's conservative views were denounced in the liberal American press as evidence that he identified with the American conservatives of the Federalist era led by Alexander Hamilton, and had learned nothing from the success of the democratic "revolutions" of 1800 and 1828 led by Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson. The Civil War, however, following hard on the heels of Macaulay's death, divided and dislocated the Jeffersonians and posed for the first time in ineluctable forms the harsh questions of property and power so long evaded in the "immense field" of the Jeffersonian world.

4. Those harsh questions of property and power arose, of course, over the institution of slavery and whether it should be abolished, confined within the old states of the south-east til it wither, or allowed to expand into the new states of the south-west, the mid-west and the far west. The name of Thomas Jefferson was bandied about in argument on both sides of the slave question (or rather among the various factions that debated it before the
Civil War), but the vaunted democratic and balanced institutions of the republic could not resolve the issue and, when the slave states opted to secede from the union, a war erupted which was to prove quite as bloody and bitter as the social conflicts of old Europe from which America was supposed to be free.

5. The idea of a major land reform in the slave states, involving the confiscation of rebel plantation land and its distribution to black farmers, was raised within a month of the beginning of the Civil War in 1861, by the abolitionist William Goodell.[45] In 1863, in the wake of President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, Claude Oubre reports, "rumours of confiscation and land distribution spread throughout the south. In parts of Mississippi and Alabama, blacks began to take over farmlands and to divide them up among themselves along with cotton seed and farm implements."[46] In 1864, as they marched through Georgia and South Carolina, the armies of General William Tecumseh Sherman "told the blacks that they were free and could have the land that they had made productive."[47] The U.S. Congress created the Freedmen's Bureau and "gave it control of the confiscated and abandoned lands with the stipulation that the land be leased in forty acre tracts to the freedmen."[48] However, the idea of such a land reform in the south was vetoed by President Andrew Johnson, attacked by large propertyed interests in the north as well as the south, failed to win the strong support of the Republican Congress and so was frustrated and defeated.[49] The ways in which land reform in the United States itself was frustrated and defeated in the 1860's and 1870's merit serious reflection, because this amounts to a clear refutation of blithe claims that the United States is, as a political culture, well-disposed to land reform. In the 1950's, land reform advocate Wolf Ladejinsky was to use the slogan "forty acres and a mule", evoking the image of radical populism and land reform in the United States before and after the Civil War, as a supposed invocation of American agrarian traditions that could be exported to Asia as an alternative "revolution" to Communism.[50] The truth is, however, that that slogan was more the sign in which land reform was defeated in the United States than the sign in which it conquered. And, as we shall see, Wolf Ladejinsky was to have this truth thrust upon him both in the United States and abroad in the 1950's.

6. In October 1865, President Andrew Johnson declared an amnesty and the restoration of confiscated lands for the defeated rebel slavers and planters of the south. In 1866, he vetoed a bill calling for the setting aside of three million acres to be distributed in forty acre plots, with a cabin and a mule, to freed black slaves. The result was a major struggle between the conservative President and the Republican Congress over the settlement of the south. Congress united to extend the life of the Freedmen's Bureau and passed the Southern Homestead Act, which called for sale of the public domain in the southern states to black farmers. In 1867, it passed the Radical Reconstruction Act, which initiated the enfranchisement of the black freedmen and the overturning of conservative, racist legislatures in the southern states. The radical Republicans were themselves divided, however, on the specific question of land reform, as distinct from homesteading (pioneer land settlement) and enfranchisement. It was a group of radical reformers around Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner which
requested enforcement of confiscation and the confirmation of titles to lands taken over by blacks under the auspices of General Sherman. However, they could not gather major support for this demand, as most of the Republicans were more concerned with voting rights for blacks than with land reform. They may have shared the desire of Thaddeus Stevens and his colleagues to restrict the power of the planters and extend democratic rights in the south, but they did not attach the importance that Thaddeus Stevens did to economic rights. Even radical Republicans like James Ashley of Ohio, challenged Thaddeus Stevens on his putting land reform ahead of the franchise as a means of confirming the freedom of the blacks:

"If I were a black man, with the chains just stricken from my limbs, without home to shelter me or mine, and you should offer me the ballot, or a cabin and forty acres of cotton land, I would take the ballot."[51]

Even if one cared to argue that men like James Ashley had as good a case as Thaddeus Stevens, the stark fact that must be pondered is the lack of support for land reform even among radical Republicans. And that fact becomes all the more stark when it is considered that after a decade of political struggle, the Radical Reconstruction was abandoned and, between 1876 and 1900, the blacks in the south, never having received land, lost even the franchise.

7. There was, of course, far more bitter opposition to both land reform and Thaddeus Stevens than that offered by James Ashley. Nor did that opposition, by which Thaddeus Stevens was branded a "Jacobin" and a demagogue, subside with the defeat of land reform and the death of Thaddeus Stevens in 1867. He continued to be vilified by conservative historians for decades thereafter, during which the entire Radical Reconstruction effort was condemned as a turbulent and hateful misadventure.[52] As late as 1968, during hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the nature of revolution, the name of Thaddeus Stevens would be used as a symbol for everything that was divisive and dangerous in what Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas called "a very bad period." Yet Thaddeus Stevens was urging the creation of a new stratum of small, free farmers, who would be good republicans and would cherish the democratic ideals of the state that had set them free and he was doing this through wholly legal and democratic channels. That he was condemned as he was is a powerful indication of what entrenched resistance there was and is in the United States against such radical land reform as he proposed.[53] The opposition of President Johnson, the opposition of the conservative Republicans, the opposition of the southern whites, to Thaddeus Stevens was opposition to land reform. It was a repudiation of the agrarian democratic republic whose ethos and ideals Thaddeus Stevens invoked before the U.S. Congress, when he declared:

"Nothing is so likely to make a man a good citizen as to make him a free holder. Nothing will so multiply the productions of the south as to divide it into small farms. Nothing will make men so industrious and moral as to let them feel that they are above want and are the owners of the soil which they till... No people will ever be republican in spirit and practice where a few own immense manors and the masses are landless. Small independent landholders are the support and guardians of republican liberty... ."[54]
Were these not the terms in which the cold scepticism of a Macaulay had to be answered, if the democratic ideals he derided were to be sustained?

8. There were, alongside Thaddeus Stevens, a number of democratic republicans who strove, with limited means, to bring about black land ownership in the period of Radical Reconstruction. Most notable among these was the group around Oliver Otis Howard, head of the Freedmen's Bureau. Their fate, as recounted by Claude Oubre, is an instructive anticipation of what was to happen to the efforts of similar American land reformers both within the United States and abroad sixty, seventy, eighty, one hundred years later.

"According to Howard, instead of assisting freedmen to secure land, (President) Johnson tried to remove every prominent officer who attempted to help the blacks... Southern white opposition to Negro land ownership was also a decisive factor in the failure of blacks to acquire land in the first few years of freedom. Beginning as early as July 3, 1865, southern communities and later that year, state legislatures enacted black codes which, for all intents and purposes, relegated the former slaves to a position of virtual slavery. Although the bureau immediately invalidated the black codes, enforcement of bureau directives depended entirely on the military force available. Unfortunately, the rapid demobilization of the Union army left vast areas of the South unoccupied and therefore under southern control... Bureau agents knew that their own lives were in danger (and some actually were murdered); yet, many faced this danger... men like Howard, Brown, Thomas, Sprague, Fisk, Ord and Granger were apparently interested in seeing the Negro as a land owner..."[55]

In the South after the Civil War, the democratic ideals of the radical Republicans were defeated along with land reform. One hundred years later, Martin Luther King Jr's "I Have A Dream" speech echoed and protested that enduring defeat. The cold scepticism of Macaulay, however, had been confuted by what happened. Far from democratic or "Jeffersonian" ideals winning at the expense of the central authorities or the interests of the propertied, the reverse had come about. The difference between Macaulay's conservatism and the political instincts of the conservative Republicans in the United States proved to be less great than his anti-democratic temper had led him to imagine.

9. The defeat of land reform in the southern states by 1876 did not end the white American farmers' dreams, since there still seemed to be an "immense field" for settlement in the western plains. Writing in 1879, the agrarian democrat Henry George still sang the praises of the open spaces as the basis of American freedom:

"This public domain--the vast extent of land yet to be reduced to private possession, the enormous common to which the faces of the energetic were always turned... has been the transmuting force which has turned the thriftless, unambitious European peasant into the self-reliant Western farmer... The child of the people, as he grows to manhood in Europe, finds all the best seats at the banquet of life marked 'taken', and must struggle with his fellows for the crumbs that fall, without one chance in a thousand of forcing or sneaking his way to a seat... All that we are proud of in the American character; all that makes our conditions and institutions better than those of older countries, we may trace to the fact that land has been cheap in the United States..."[56]
The public domain was, in sober fact, seized up in huge swathes by land companies and speculators, by railroad builders and ranchers.[57] Millions of small farmers took up freeholds, but their lot was hard and grew harder. Hamlin Garland, in his account of the western farmers in *Son of the Middle Border*, depicted a bitter scene:

"... of hardship and privation and thwarted hopes, of men and women broken by endless toil, the windows of their dreams shuttered by poverty, and the doors to an abundant life closed and barred by narrow opportunity ..."[58]

The truth was, that if the United States wished to sustain a large class of free farmers, it had to lend active assistance to them to construct a system of transport and markets and pricing that would support, rather than overwhelm them. American illusions to the contrary notwithstanding, this did not occur and, from the 1870's on into the twentieth century, a long, relentless grinding down process eliminated more and more of the small farmers or left them trapped in poverty or tenancy like so many of the farmers of the south. This secular trend gave rise to populist revolt and agitation in the 1880's and again in the 1920's and 1930's, culminating in the agrarian reform debates of the 1930's which form the immediate prelude to American land reform debates of the Cold War era.[59]

10. The Great Depression found American agriculture in a disordered state and made it worse. Herbert Hoover, then President of the United States, proposed measures for national recovery from the crisis, but these measures were no more than cosmetic. In the words of Sidney Baldwin, historian of the New Deal agrarian debate:

"[Hoover] was unwilling to stabilize prices, restrict crop production, withdraw submarginal lands from production, [or] provide adequate drought relief. [Who, therefore] seriously could have expected him to support the more daring reforms that were required to combat chronic poverty among the lower income families of the nation?"[60]

The poverty in vast tracts of the rural United States was real and deep. By 1930, 45 percent of America's farmers were tenants, not freeholders. In the state of Mississippi, the tenants amounted to 70 percent of the farmers. So marked was the trend against freehold that agronomist Richard T. Ely had warned in 1929 of the need for steps to be taken to halt the growth of landlessness and tenancy, lest they foster the rise of a radicalism of the Bolshevik kind that would attack the idea of private ownership of land itself as a plutocratic evil.[61] The call for reforms to check the proliferation of monopolies and the concentration of wealth and power in few hands had been heard in America since at least the 1890's. Very little had been done about it. Now a major social and economic crisis threw the big bankers and monopolists into unprecedented ill repute and something had to give.

11. Campaigning for the Presidency in 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt called for bold innovation:
"The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper the country demands, bold, persistent experimentation...Take a method and try it: if it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something. The millions who are in want will not stand by silently forever while the things to satisfy their needs are in easy reach..."[62]

Elected with a sweeping mandate for change, Roosevelt declared a "New Deal", a program of bold social and economic experiments to overcome the Great Depression and the accumulated ills and maladjustments of American society. As has long since been pointed out, the New Deal may have been "Jeffersonian" in its democratic spirit, but it was "Hamiltonian" in its approach to finance and government and the name of Jefferson was even invoked against it by various groups, including agrarian romantics who extolled the virtues of the small property-holders' democracy and called for the breaking up of the big conglomerates, but denounced the "evils" of government regulation, or Keynesian fiscal policy necessary to achieve the changes they demanded. 31 The men appointed by Roosevelt to tackle the problems of American agrarian society were not agrarian romantics in this sense. Henry A. Wallace, as Secretary of Agriculture; Rexford Guy Tugwell, as Deputy Secretary of Agriculture; Harry Hopkins, as head of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration; and the men they brought into their programs, might best be described, in the words of William Leuchtenberg, as "Veblenite social engineers" devoted to sound economic planning and social rationalization.[63] Working through the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, until it was purged of its Veblenites by Chester Davis in February 1935,[64] and then through the Resettlement Administration, Tugwell strove to bring major government attention to bear on the impoverished world of the tenant farmers, sharecroppers, migratory laborers; the neglected and forgotten rural poor of America, so graphically depicted in such novels of that time as Erskine Caldwell's *Tobacco Road* and John Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath*. He met resistance, vilification and frustration, and the reconstruction and amelioration of rural America that he envisaged never took place.[65]

12. Rex Tugwell, an agricultural economics professor at Columbia University in the 1920's and the driving force within the New Deal for agrarian renovation, attracted great numbers of enthusiastic young Americans into the Department of Agriculture: lawyers, agronomists, economists, social scientists, administrators, documentarists. When he set up the Resettlement Administration in May 1935, he had twelve staff. By the end of that year, he had a staggering 16,386.[66] He commissioned major photographic and film documentaries on America's rural condition - what Max Lerner was to call "the dark side of the crescent moon."[67] He sent out teams of officials to try to rouse demoralized and acquiescent tenants and sharecroppers in the south against rentiers and courthouse gangs. He initiated advanced land use planning, experiments in resettlement and construction of model communities and large scale relief for the millions of rural people uprooted by the Great Depression. In November 1936, he took Henry Wallace on a 2,000 mile tour of "Tobacco Road." The social landscape he toured was a sombre revelation to Wallace. He found the "Jeffersonian" dream gone to seed. "The exhausted faces of the farmers, diseased children, scrawny cattle, crumbling and overcrowded shacks and eroded fields," writes Baldwin, "made an indelible impact on
Neither Tugwell nor Wallace, however, was able to make an "indelible impact" on this rural scene.

13. Among the proteges of Rex Tugwell in the mid-1930's were a number of men who were to figure prominently in the land reform arena abroad in the years after the Second World War. Wolf Isaac Ladejinsky, an emigre from the Soviet Union and a former student in agricultural economics under Tugwell at Columbia University, was one. He was brought into the U.S. Department of Agriculture by Tugwell and worked in the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations. Another was Robert S. Hardie, a young and energetic economics major from rural Nebraska, who worked for the Resettlement Administration in Nebraska, Kansas, and the Dakotas on rural rehabilitation, farm loans, debt conciliation, migration and resettlement, and later in the 1930's became the regional director for Nevada, Utah, California and Arizona of the Farm Security Administration's Migratory-Labor Camp-and-Community Organization. Yet another was a young man called Lawrence Ilsley Hewes Jr., a recruit to Tugwell's office in the hectic and spirited months of 1935 and 1936. All three worked together in the late 1940's on the land reform in Japan which the American occupation directed. Ladejinsky went on to work in many countries, including South Vietnam in the 1950's. Hardie worked in the Philippines in the early 1950's. Hewes was to go on to work in India and South Vietnam. In each case these men carried overseas the idealism and vision of Rex Tugwell and Henry Wallace. In each case they met even more resistance and defeat as advocates of land reform abroad than they and their mentors had met in the United States in the 1930's, not only at the hands of foreign conservatives, but at the hands of the same conservatives within the United States who had opposed their efforts in the 1930's.

14. As Bernard Sternsher has shown, Tugwell was assailed by the conservative press and attacked by the big farm lobbies on account of his agrarian reform proposals and actual work for the New Deal between 1933 and 1937. William Randolph Hearst described the New Deal planners in 1936 as "Karl Marx Socialists, the Frankfurter radicals, Communists and anarchists, the Tugwell Bolsheviks, and the Richberg revolutionists."[69] Frustrated and disillusioned by the retreat of even the first New Deal administration from the bolder visions of 1933-35, Tugwell resigned in 1936. His parting shot at the failure of the Democratic Party to tackle rural problems in depth and against resistance, recalled in hindsight, might be set at the portals of a major examination of Aunerian policies on land reform overseas after 1945:

"If we have no intention of attacking poverty at its source, if we only intend to make owners out of a few of the better tenants, the administration ought not to have credit for really helping forgotten families; only for doing what democracies have usually done - helping those who needed help less because those who needed it more did not count politically . . ."[70]

The problems overseas, of course, would prove even more intractable than in the United States itself and would be complicated for Americans by the fact that, whereas men like Tugwell and Wallace bowed to
political defeat, in the world outside, as Woodrow Wilson had apprehended back in 1920, there were determined radicals summoning a "typhoon" of rebellion by the rural poor against the smugness and power of the propertied elites. Within the United States itself, the Resettlement Administration was checkmated in the mid-1930's. Its successor, the Farm Security Administration, found itself under persistent attack by the American Farm Bureau Federation, dominated as it was by big farm interests, and the pro-agribusiness Byrd Commission. The director of the Farm Security Administration, C. B. Baldwin, was called a "Communist" by Senator MacKellar of Tennessee in 1943. The efforts of the Farm Security Administration to organize tenants were denounced by Oscar Johnston of the National Cotton Council as "socialistic". In April 1946, the Farm Security Administration was emasculated and renamed the Farmers' Home Administration, and thereafter became a docile institution, timid and conservative, even as, in the years that followed, the number of small family farms in the United States declined steadily from 6.8 million in 1945 to fewer than 3 million by 1972. Against a background such as this, it becomes clear that sweeping land reform, as a radical, democratic initiative calculated to make the "developing" world "safe for democracy" would not by any stretch of the imagination have unanimous American support.

15. New Deal agrarian reform was defeated and in the thirty years that followed the process of concentration of rural land ownership in the United States proceeded almost unchecked. In 1966, Howard Bertsch, then director of the Farmers' Home Administration, reflected on the social consequences:

"Rural people are being pushed off the land by the brute forces of power and pressure, enticed off the land by the false promise of the cities. All this would not be so bad, if we could believe that the cities... could provide a haven for the farmers... squeezed out by the sweeping trends toward bigness and concentration of power. But the cities are piling up horror upon horror..."[74]

If this was so in the United States, the "horrors" of comparable processes of capitalist agricultural "development" in countries with much poorer cities and far greater demographic pressure were far worse in the same Cold War decades, but the United States was to present itself as a "model" of economic development for these agrarian countries of the peripheral zones of the modern world-system.

16. There were, by 1966, some 14 million rural poor in the United States, living impoverished and stunted lives in often primitive conditions. In surveying the history of all this in 1979, Willard Cochrane, by no means a romantic agrarian, observed that it "would seem socially desirable and economically logical to make a much greater effort" to bolster the small farmers and set limits to the process of concentration of land ownership. After outlining a series of policy options that might be exercised to achieve these ends, Cochrane concluded wryly:

"But in all probability the government will do none of these things in the foreseeable future. The impact of such policy steps would be too severe and the economic consequences too adverse for the leading farmers of the nation. Society will fuss and worry about this structural problem in farming; politicians
will give speeches about the injustice being done to those farmers going out of business and the great progress being achieved by those aggressive, innovative farmers acquiring the assets of their neighbors; and government will, until a crisis develops from the changed market structure in farming, pass only some cosmetic legislation. Government in the United States, at both the federal and state levels, has been *singularly ineffective* in dealing with social and economic problems resulting from changes in economic organization and structure that go in the direction of bigness or monopoly. And there is little reason to believe that government will suddenly become effective in dealing with a structural problem in the farming industry that involves a continuing trend toward fewer and fewer and larger and larger farms."[76]

It is against this background that one must read declarations of American officials, from time to time in the course of the Cold War, that the United States, being a nation built by small farmers, supports land reform and the small farmer around the world. The tragic and ironic character of such rhetoric is accentuated by its use in polemic exchanges with Communists whose model of agrarian development has too often been the anti-peasant obsession with huge [collective] farms enforced in the Soviet Union by Stalin.

17. In the preceding section, reference was made to the struggles of the economic planners and socialist visionaries in the Soviet Union in the 1920's to deal with the problems of Russia's agriculture and of the brutal and calamitous end to which their efforts came, when, in 1929, Stalin swept them aside and forced collectivization on the country at a pace and in a manner neither rational nor humane. It was argued that those planners were not irrational or inhumane men, but that they were defeated by political forces that were too powerful for them. In outlook and in the strenuous and imaginative efforts they made to grapple with overwhelming agrarian and political challenges, in each case to little avail, I want to suggest a parallel between the men around Rexford Tugwell in America in the 1930's and the men around Alexander Chayanov in Russia in the 1920's. The difficulties faced by the Russian planners were incomparably greater than those facing the Americans, and the political forces that overwhelmed them in the end were more brutal and sinister than those which defeated their American counterparts, but the two sets of men were not at all dissimilar and might, had they not been swept aside, have been able to understand one another and work together with some intelligence on problems of development in the years after the Second World War.[77] By then, however, Chayanov and most of his colleagues, as well as most of the more thoughtful Soviet Marxist theorists, were dead, having perished in the Great Terror or in Stalin's GULAG.[78]

18. There is an arresting passage in the memoir of Laurence Hewes which reminds one very much of the human situation of Alexander Chayanov and such notable colleagues of his as Nicolai Kondratiev or Vladimir Bazarov in the 1920's, or, for that matter, such Bolsheviks as Evgeny Preobrazhensky in the midst of Stalin's remorseless collectivization drive in the early 1930's:

"For months we had no regular life; we ate and slept as we could. Office hours were a bedlam of telephones, visitors, hourly crises; evenings and weekends were devoted to accumulated paperwork spewed
forth by our infantile field organization. We held fingers in dikes of improvisation against bureaucratic tidal waves; rushed fireman-like from one catastrophic threat to another; frantically recruited unknowns, then flung them unprepared into well-paid positions... Cash grants were poured into the northern and southern Great Plains; ill-nourished, apathetic sharecroppers and cotton tenants from the Atlantic seaboard to Texas began to eat regularly; food and medical care went to thousands of wandering families in Arizona and California. But Tugwell took no pride in conducting a first aid program; our real job was to cure the deeper malady..."[79]

In the years of the Cold War, caught up in something like Woodrow Wilson's proposed crusade against "irrational revolution," the United States of America was to send many men like Hewes abroad - trying to put fingers in dikes of improvisation, rushing fireman-like from one "catastrophic threat" to another--but it was to be hampered by domestic political conflicts that held the Rex Tugwells in check and even caused then to be vilified and that caused foreign Alexander Chayanovs and Vladimir Bazarovs to be vilified and even liquidated, to the point where the field would be reduced in appearance to a demonic struggle by "democratic civilization" against the "catastrophic threat" of Stalinism, with no political space remaining in which bold experiments and "rational revolutions" could be attempted. This we shall see again and again in the case studies that follow. This is in some measure tragic. If, as A. N. Whitehead said, the clash of doctrines is not a disaster, but an opportunity, then there is, in critical reflection on these causes of paranoia and bloodshed, a great opportunity to break down the fixations that have given us the Cold War and such horrors as the Vietnam War.[80] International politics, however, are so little governed by such critical reflection and the fixations in question are so rooted in struggles for power, that the patterns of "disaster" recounted in the case studies that follow seem as likely to be repeated in future as to give way to "rational revolutions."
"Our participation in Japan's recent agrarian reforms should be a matter of pride. It represents America at her best. We have demonstrated in Japan the harmony of democratic beliefs and economic justice for agrarian people. We should capitalize perhaps more broadly on this performance and in louder tones. It is highly necessary - indeed, at the moment it is crucial - that Asiatic people learn that Americans recognize the reality of their distress and the reasonableness of their aspirations. These struggling peasants need to know that we are positively sympathetic to their suffering; that in particular we earnestly desire to see their aspirations for a secure land tenure realized. It is clearly apparent that a great opportunity exists at this very moment for letting the people of Asia know that the American spirit of fair play, of equality and of freedom is a great dynamic force in the world and that it is on their side."

- Laurence Hewes (1955)

"With the victory of the Chinese Revolution and the outbreak of the war in Korea in June 1950, America's counter-revolutionary posture in Asia stiffened. As American armies sped to Korea, and her fleet moved into the Formosa Straits to repulse "Communist aggression," land reform was again hailed as a means to give the peasants a private property inoculation against communism. Excluding only the Mississippi Delta, in 1950, U.S. official policy called for the redistribution of land to owner-farmers everywhere in the world."

- Alfred W. McCoy (1971)

"Initially, at least, deep concern with transforming Japan outweighed considerations about the potential Soviet threat, the impact of China's civil war, or the nationalist uprisings in Southeast Asia. The middle-level planners in Washington and in SCAP believed that America's victory entitled and required the United States to remake Japan along liberal-democratic lines. . . Sensitive to Asia's historic agrarian exploitation, American reformers were determined to promote a peaceful revolution in landlord-tenant relations. During the initial reformist stage of the Occupation, lasting through early 1947, Washington encouraged SCAP to pursue a program that reflected the most progressive tendencies of the New Deal. Even as American domestic and foreign policy lurched to the Right, MacArthur and his aides remained committed to a reform agenda abhorrent to most of the general's conservative constituency in the United States."

- Michael Schaller (1985)

1. Immediately after the Second World War, as an occupying power in Japan, the United States initiated a major land reform. The land reform in Japan was part of an overall plan for the democratization and liberalization of Japanese society which it was the original object of the United States occupation forces to achieve. Among other measures for democratization and liberalization of Japan, however, land reform met with resistance and criticism from conservative Americans as well as conservative Japanese. At the same time, in the late 1940's, the chief object of American policy in Japan shifted from democratic reform to conservative reconsolidation of Japan as a bastion of capitalism in Asia in the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Japan was the cornerstone of United States policy in Asia by 1947. The land reform there assumes some significance for that reason alone. It assumes further significance in light of the fact that a number of the individuals who later worked in other parts of Asia on land reform worked together in Japan; and that the reform in Japan, along with similar programs in Taiwan and South Korea at that time, was to become something of a "model" of non-Communist land reform in the Cold War. It assumes particular significance because of the nature of the conservative opposition and criticism it met with in the U.S. itself, since that conservative opposition and criticism, rooted in decades of U.S. history, were to recur again and again in the subsequent decades whenever land reform became an issue in the Cold War.

2. Working in the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations in the 1930's, Wolf I. Ladejinsky wrote chiefly on Soviet and Japanese agriculture. Three of his first four papers on Japan were entitled respectively, "Farm Tenancy and Japanese Agriculture", "Agrarian Unrest in Japan", and "Japan's Agricultural Crisis". Years before the Pacific War, Ladejinsky drew attention to longstanding maladjustments in Japanese agriculture, the thwarting of social and economic modernization in rural Japan and its political side-effects, among which was the diversion of poor peasants into foreign wars by Japanese militarists. Writing in 1938, another close observer of both Soviet and Japanese affairs, William Henry Chamberlain, described agriculture as "at once the social foundation of Japan and its greatest economic problem." Some 40 percent and more of Japan's population continued to work in the rural sector, millions of them in grinding tenant poverty. From at least the early 1920's, many enlightened and radical Japanese had seen and indicted the rural blight, but little progress had been made by 1945 in its amelioration. In the standard history of the land reform in Japan under the U.S. occupation, Ronald Dore argued, in 1959, that, with or without war, the tenancy system was bound to be modified with the spread of literacy diffusing "the revolutionary ideas which stemmed from nineteenth century Europe," including Marxism, and the economic skewing of the modernization process by a stagnant agriculture. As early as the 1890's, in fact, there were calls for enlightened legislation to improve the lot of small farmers and tenants. The measures taken, however, were "neither impressive nor
There was an upsurge of liberal and left-wing thought in Japan after the First World War and a growth of subversive discontent among the laboring classes in the 1920's. The Japanese Communist Party was founded in 1922 and the Leninist National Farmers' Union with it. This brought more urgent calls for reform. It also prompted conservative reaction. The Nohon-shugi rural life movement, idealizing traditional peasant submissiveness and hard work and glossing over inequalities in rural society was fostered by the anti-reformers. After the military take-over in the mid-1930's, there was a repressive crackdown on land reform advocates and a number of them were imprisoned, including, in 1941, Hiroo Wada, later Minister of Agriculture during the U.S. occupation land reform. Japan went to war in 1937 unreformed and the war, lasting until 1945, exacerbated its agricultural problems. Ever heavier demands were made on the peasants, as "cheap labor and cannon fodder," in the words of Edwin Martin,[8] and only defeat in the war with America broke the grip of the ruling conservatives and opened the way for significant reforms.

3. Wolf Ladejinsky's early papers on both Soviet and Japanese agriculture marked him out as both modernist and progressive. His studies of Soviet collectivization in 1929 emphasized the economic dilemmas which appeared to have precipitated the collectivization in 1929, the grave difficulties involved in setting up large-scale mechanized grain farms without the material and cultural prerequisites, and the case against large-scale farm operations from a socio-economic point of view.[9] In these respects, his work may be set beside that of the Soviet economists of the 1920's - Bazarov, Kondratiev, Chayanov and others - whom Stalin had swept aside.[10] His writings on Japan pointed to inequitable land distribution, a retrograde tenancy system, sharp price fluctuations, a heavy tax burden, a huge debt burden and exorbitant interest rates as among the ills of Japan's rural sector. And he drew attention to the long frustration of agrarian reform by Japanese conservatives, commenting drily:

"... although talk about agricultural reform has become a favorite pastime of the leading political parties of the country, the farmers are still struggling against heavy odds."[11]

4. During the war years, the papers of Ladejinsky on Japanese agriculture came to the attention of a Department of State planner by the name of Robert A. Fearey. Private secretary to U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo, Joseph Grew, in the year before Pearl Harbor, Fearey was thereafter assigned to the Bureau of North East Asian Affairs and became a member of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee for the Far East, which, with the War Department's Inter-Departmental Committee, the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services and the Enemy Branch of the Foreign Economic Administration, drew up advance plans for the occupation of Japan.[12] Impressed by Ladejinsky's work, Fearey drafted a series of memoranda suggesting a major land reform in Japan, but encountered resistance from the old Japan hands, including ex-Ambassador Grew now an Under Secretary of State, who argued that land reform would only destabilize Japan and was in any case objectionable on philosophic grounds. However, in October 1945, Fearey was sent to Tokyo as an
assistant to George Atcheson, Jr., political counsel to General Douglas MacArthur, heading Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP), and so American "proconsul" in Japan. It would appear that land reform had already been placed on the SCAP's agenda,[13] but Fearey worked up a memorandum with Ladejinsky which laid out the arguments for land reform in Japan and prevailed on Atcheson to press the subject upon General MacArthur in an effort to overcome the resistance of conservatives both at SCAP HQ and in Washington. The effort was successful. On 9 December 1945, SCAP sent a memorandum to the Japanese Government calling, in the strongest terms, for a thorough and systematic land reform. The Agriculture Division of the Natural Resources Section of the SCAP, headed by Col. Hubert Schenck, was assigned chief responsibility for the envisaged land reform program. And in mid-December 1945, Wolf Ladejinsky himself arrived in Tokyo to work for Schenck. Among Schenck's other staff were two U.S. Army Captains, John Cooper and Robert S. Hardie, who were to go on to land reform work in other parts of Asia. Having succeeded in getting SCAP to issue the 9 December 1945 directive to the Japanese Government, the land reformers proceeded energetically to organize a major renovation of Japan's rural economy.

5. The substance of the Atcheson-Fearey Memorandum and the 9 December 1945 Directive are worth noting, with an eye to later developments and debates. On 26 October 1945, George Atcheson transmitted to both Douglas MacArthur at SCAP and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in Washington copies of a memorandum titled, "Japan: Agrarian Reform." In his covering note to Byrnes, Atcheson stated:

"It appears to us that the problem of agrarian reform is one of far-reaching importance and deserves careful attention in the current program for democratization of Japanese economy."[14]

In a longer covering note to MacArthur, Atcheson stated:

"There is attached, as of possible interest, a paper "Japan: Agrarian Reform" prepared by a member of my staff, in consultation with Far Eastern experts of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, prior to his departure from Washington.

"Perpetually depressed conditions in agriculture have enabled the military during recent decades to pose as the champions of the farming class [defending its interests against the privileged classes] and arguing with considerable success that the only real solution of the farmers' plight lies in overseas expansion . . ."

"The ruling and propertied classes have always strongly opposed the initiation of basic agrarian reforms and, judging by the small attention which the Higashi-kuni and Shidehara governments appear to have given the matter, will probably continue to do so. Although the Socialist and Communist Parties have announced intention to carry out agrarian reforms, the changes proposed seem ill-considered and inadequate, and occupy a subordinate position in their respective platforms.

"We would suggest as a possible course of procedure that the Japanese Government be instructed to initiate studies of the problem, and to draw up, in consultation with the appropriate sections of your Headquarters, a comprehensive reform program . . ."[15]

It is notable that Atcheson is here proposing that a land reform be initiated, rather than assuming such a policy to be already on SCAP's agenda, or that of the Department of State. It emerges that there was a
considerable resistance to the idea and that Atcheson, Fearey, Ladejinsky and the land reform proponents were involved in careful bureaucratic politics in an effort to push the idea through such resistance.[16]

6. The most telling testimony to this bureaucratic conflict is that of Ladejinsky, Fearey and other land reformers, in letters to the historian of the land reform in Japan, Ronald P. Dore, in 1957-58. By their account, very little of the debate had been recorded.[17] Laurence Hewes wrote to Dore:

"... I am pleading for a fuller recognition of what actually occurred, and to do this the ... interpersonal and unrecorded activities of the men, both Japanese and American who were on the spot become important. Your must consider, for example that there were men in high places in the Headquarters whose political and social views were every bit as conservative as those of the Japanese landlords. You must also remember that there were, on the side of the Japanese, in politics, in government, in the universities, men who were as liberal and progressive as any of the SCAP people. Let us say this ... to some of the Occupation people who felt the need for a strong land reform program, it appeared that there was a strong likelihood, if their recommendations were not handled very carefully, that their proposals would never reach MacArthur. There were ... men who stood between the agrarian reformists in the Headquarters and MacArthur, who viewed private property as sacred beyond any claims of social justice. I think it would not be far from truth, although of course you can't print it, to say that, to a considerable degree the men who wanted to implement a strong land reform program were confronted with a problem in manoeuver and internal organization strategy ... their great accomplishment was the 9 Dec. '45 Directive."[18]

The chief conservatives around MacArthur, to whom Hewes was presumably referring, were those military men heading SCAP - Courtney Whitney at the Government Section, William Marquat at the Economic and Scientific Section, Charles A. Willoughby at the Counter-Intelligence Corps - whom George Atcheson, writing to Dean Acheson, Under-Secretary to James F. Byrnes, in November 1945, described as "the Bataan Club," because of their attachment to MacArthur since his years as American "proconsul" in the Philippines. There was, before long, to be a considerable stiffening of conservative resistance to the whole democratization program of the occupation, the history of which had marked similarities to the domestic American conservative resistance to the New Deal.

7. The 9 December 1945 Directive, once issued, was phrased in the strongest language. It shows no marks of the conservative resistance to its passage referred to by Laurence Hewes. Nor does it bear the marks of the diplomatic niceties which hedge about advice to sovereign governments. This was not advice but a direct order. Over the signature not of MacArthur but of his subordinate, Colonel H. W. Allen, the Directive began:

"1. In order that the Imperial Japanese Government shall remove economic obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies, establish respect for the dignity of man, and destroy the economic bondage which has enslaved the Japanese farmer to centuries of feudal oppression, the Japanese Imperial Government is directed to take measures to ensure that those who till the soil of Japan shall have more equal opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labor."
"2. The purpose of this order is to exterminate those pernicious ills which have long blighted the agrarian structure...Emancipation of the Japanese farmer cannot begin until such basic farm evils are uprooted and destroyed..." (emphasis mine)[19]

The stark contrast between the tone of this Directive to the proud Japanese and the difficulties experienced by American advisers to the Nationalist Chinese at that same time point to a major problem U.S. land reformers were to encounter in the years ahead in the Philippines, Vietnam and El Salvador.[20] This, however, has been a commonplace theme and is an obvious consideration. More subtle, but hardly less of a major problem for the land reformers, have been the difficulties encountered in dealing with American conservatives in the great geo-political and social debates of the Cold War.

1. If, in 1945 and 1946, the American aim in Japan (as in Germany) was to democratize the country and uproot reactionism and fascism, beginning in early 1947 this began to change and the democratic reforms came under conservative fire. To begin with, Byrnes and Acheson in Washington found little use for the conservatism of Joseph Grew and the old Japan hands and pressured them out of office in fall 1945.[21] During November and December 1945, President Truman's envoy, Edwin Pauley, toured China, Japan, Korea and the Philippines, and reported that Japanese reparations and the proposed reconstruction of Japan presented to the U.S. "a unique opportunity" to propel all of East Asia to political stability and peaceful progress.[22] Owen Lattimore, travelling through the same countries, backed up this vision and warned of the danger of the U.S. being panicked by conservatives into falling back on "the old Japanese propaganda line of being the bulwark against Bolshevism in Asia."[23] In short order, Owen Lattimore's apprehensions proved justified: the conservatives did exactly as he feared they would. The overall consequences were momentous, as John Dower and Michael Schaller have shown. The U.S. took a defensive posture toward revolution in Asia and "New Deal" inspired reforms were more and more supplanted by military counter-insurgency aid to conservative regimes in an effort to prevent "irrational revolutions."

2. The conservative shift in America's Asia policy was rooted in geo-political considerations as mediated by substantially conservative Americans. It is clear that, in the immediate post-war period, U.S. strategic planning envisaged control of the Pacific and the East Asian littoral from a network of new island naval and air bases in the Marshall, Mariana, Caroline and Marcus islands, as well as in Japan and the Philippines. It was in this strategic context that promotion of anti-colonialism and reform in Asia was envisioned. This changed markedly after February-March 1947. While the social reforms had gone ahead in Japan (and in Germany) during 1946, American geo-political apprehensions had arisen over deteriorating situations in China, Indochina and Greece. The prolonged efforts of General George C. Marshall, during 1946, to mediate in the Chinese Civil War had succeeded neither in negotiating a political accord in China between the nationalists and communists, nor in getting Chiang Kai-Shek's regime to reform itself for its own political good. As the situation there worsened and conflicts elsewhere lent themselves to fears of widespread "irrational revolution," the men chiefly responsible for U.S. foreign policy and defense reorganized the whole framework of their concerns along new geopolitical lines.

3. In January 1947, President Truman named George C. Marshall to replace James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State. In May 1947, Marshall initiated a far-reaching reorganization of the foreign and defense policy bureaucracies. He created a body called the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) to "devise long-term programs for the achievement of . . . foreign policy objectives." George F. Kennan, a diplomat with long experience in Moscow, whose sombre and
sweeping geopolitical vision commended him to Marshall and to such prominent figures as Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal and Army Secretary Robert Patterson, was named to head PPS. In July 1947, the National Security Act was passed, creating a unified Department of Defense (DoD) headed by James V. Forrestal, a National Security Council (NSC), and a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In September 1947, Kennan told a select audience of the National War College that, on the world scene, there were five core zones of industrial and political power: the USA, Britain, Germany, Japan, and the USSR. American policy should, he said, concentrate on securing core zones one to four in a ring around core zone five, the USSR, in the interests of democratic capitalism.[24] During October and November 1947, he denounced what he called schemes for the socialist transformation of Japan by SCAP and demanded a major reversal of SCAP reform programs, especially the deconcentration of corporate (zaibatsu) industrial power and the encouragement of labor “radicalism.”[25] Kennan’s voice was but one in a chorus of conservative American voices at that time attacking the liberal, New Deal-style reforms in occupied Japan and this chorus prevailed in its demands for the curtailment of such reforms. The implications of this for American posture toward the turbulent revolutions brewing all over Asia by the late 1940’s became evident in the very language used by the American conservatives in their attacks on the reforms that had been pressed upon Japan under the aegis of SCAP.

4. An organized conservative lobby on American policies in Japan, styling itself the American Council on Japan, was formed in 1947, quite specifically to work against the SCAP reform policies, especially those involving purges of Japanese militarists, deconcentration of the zaibatsu, land reform and encouragement of activist labor unions. Army Secretary Kenneth Royall, his Under Secretaries William F. Draper and Tracy Voorhees, NSC chief Sidney Souers, Senators William F. Knowland, Brian McMahon and Bourke Hickenlooper, and such prominent non-governmental figures as Harry Kern, the "peripatetic [foreign] editor" of Newsweek, as Michael Schaller describes him, and corporate lawyer James Lee Kaufmann. Royall charged that SCAP was promoting a redistributive reform that went "beyond American philosophies" and threatened the basic "concept of private property." Kern and Kaufmann attacked the SCAP program as the work of "radical reformers" and "crackpots" and as a "declaration of war against capitalism." All this in the summer of 1947. Senator Knowland, a conservative Republican from California, in January 1948, attacked the SCAP reformers as "doctrinaire New Dealers, who found their activities limited in Washington and signed up for overseas occupation service."[26] In March 1948, Kennan travelled to Japan to inspect SCAP for himself. He described it as reminding him of the Kremlin under Stalin, argued that visionary reforms were out of place and called for the restoration of traditional conservative elites.[27] It is not without significance that he then visited the Philippines, whence he cabled W. W. Butterworth, chief of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs at Department of State, that America had little to offer and no obligations to the "vast Oriental world" outside Japan, which he described as "far from any hope of adjustment to the requirements of an orderly and humane civilization."[28] It is notable that Kennan should have made so pessimistic and even arrogant a
judgement of Asia in general. It is even more remarkable that he made it with implicit reference to the Philippines, both because the U.S. had for decades justified its control of the Philippines on the grounds that it was building an "orderly and humane civilization there," and because Kennan himself was an advocate of making Japan and the Philippines the chief bases of American power and "security" policy on the Asian littoral.

5. All this took its effect by 1948. Guy Swope, who had worked in SCAP's Government Section, returned to the U.S. in the spring of that year expecting to find work quickly with the new Economic Cooperation Administration, the foreign aid body which, over the ensuing thirteen years, was to be renamed successively, the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), and finally the Agency for International Development (AID), the name it has held since 1961. What he encountered, as he wrote to his SCAP colleague Justin Williams, was actual hostility at ECA, Department of State, and elsewhere, because of his SCAP background and his perceived membership of the "small group of long-haired boys . . . who have helped General MacArthur put over his socialistic schemes." He found himself "blackballed for that reason" and informed Williams that the anti-SCAP sentiment extended through "the powerful American interests" across both political parties and included both President Truman and Thomas Dewey, the Republican presidential candidate in 1948.[29] In the summer of 1948, MacArthur himself swung to the Right and began to cut back social reform in Japan and purge SCAP of its "radicals."

6. It is against this background that one must read the pronouncements of President Truman, Dean Acheson, Agriculture Secretary Charles F. Brannan and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Willard L. Thorp, in 1950-51, publicly avowing U.S. support for land reform in the countries of Asia and the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.[30] In a major address on international relations in San Francisco in October 1950, Truman declared:

"We know that the peoples of Asia have problems of social injustice to solve. They want their farmers to own their own land and to enjoy the fruits of their toil. That is one of our great principles also. We believe in the family-size farm farm. This is the basis of our agriculture and has strongly influenced our form of government."[31]

When Truman said of "the peoples of Asia" that "they" want farmers to own their own land, he might have been more precise. Did he exclude landlords and other conservative elites from "the peoples of Asia?" Or did he believe that they "wanted" their farmers to own their own land?" The ambiguous status of "private property" in all this lent itself to defence of landlords as much as promotion of tenure reform. Nor did the statement entail the least critical reflection on the history of the "family-size farm" in U.S. agriculture and government. There was, in short, nothing "more liberal than ever" in Truman's address, much less anything radical. In the terms of President Woodrow Wilson's challenge to American
liberalism, a generation earlier, to become "more liberal than ever" and even "radical", in order to save "civilization" from the typhoons of "irrational revolution"; there was nothing "more liberal than ever" in Truman's address, much less anything "radical". Yet the typhoon was blowing up ominously. China had been conquered by the Communists, who pressed through a massive clearance of landlords, bandits and other "counterrevolutionaries" during 1950-51 and completed a sweeping land to the tiller agrarian reform. War had broken out in Korea and in Indochina, as Communist insurgents pressed their claims to leadership of the national liberation and modernization of those ancient and long colonized cultures. Communists and peasant rebels were in arms in the Philippines and in Malaya. Land reform was by no means the only issue at stake in these struggles, but it was a critical one, which may be said to provide a sort of litmus test of the amount of liberalism, never mind radicalism, in American Cold War containment policies. A demonstrated capacity to render effective support to land reformers in changing societies struggling with turbulent processes of internal re-ordering, grappling with the strains of adjustment to the modern world-system, would show that post-classical counter-revolution had transcended the ossified conservatism that had doomed the classical counter-revolution of the age of Metternich and the last Russian Tsars. A demonstrated incapacity to do so would suggest otherwise.
3:3. What is True of China.

1. Even in the late 1950's, historians of the land reform in Japan, Laurence Hewes and Ronald Dore, were able to observe the quite dramatic improvements it had brought to the Japanese rural sector by the elimination of much of the landlordism and tenant poverty that had characterized it before the Second World War. An agro-industrial transformation which had already taken impressive steps in Japan between the Meiji Restoration and the 1930's, was quickened by the land reform of the late 1940's, helping to open the way to the extraordinary economic achievements of Japan as a nation in the ensuing decades. By the 1970's and 1980's, Japanese agriculture, even more than West European or American agriculture, had assumed a somewhat bizarre, overprotected character, but it was not characterised by the peasant backwardness and grinding rural poverty of the pre-Second World War era. As Mikiso Hane wrote in 1982, in a critical history of Japanese rural poverty:

"... rapid industrial and technological growth, together with the land reform program initiated by the occupation authorities, resulted in momentous changes in farm communities. The economic conditions and cultural life of rural Japan began steadily to approximate those of the urban population. By 1980, in most areas, the differences that had sharply divided the farming and urban communities in the pre-war years had become blurred."[31]

Howard Schonberger observed, in 1971, that the curtailing of the SCAP reforms after 1948, the so-called reverse course in occupation policies, meant that Japan developed in ways very different from those envisaged by the more liberal planners and reformers in the first flush of the occupation in 1945-46 [32]. Develop, however, it did, with astonishing dynamism and, from the standpoint of a critique of American Cold War foreign policies, both the success of the land reform in Japan, under special circumstances, and the attack on its architects and principles by American conservatives are what call for examination. If, in addition, the vision entertained by men like Lattimore and Pauley in 1946, of the scattering of Japan's concentration of industrial and commercial power around East and Southeast Asia and a vigorous effort to encourage the agro-industrial transformation of these regions, in a fashion autonomous of the Japanese core zone, be considered the chief casualty of the reverse course and the geo-political vision of George Frost Kennan, then the debate over the land reform in Japan assumes considerable significance for an understanding of subsequent debates concerning land reform and revolution in Southeast Asia.

2. The debate in the U.S. over the significance of land reform in Japan grew out of the wider debate over the reform policies of SCAP and the reverse course in general. It is clear that the land reform and other reforms were initiated as progressive measures to clean the "Augean stables" of Japan's "feudal", "fascist" past and to foster a modern, democratic capitalist society. To attack SCAP from the Left for not introducing "socialism" in Japan is to shoot wide of the mark, even supposing "socialism" to be readily definable and unequivocally desirable in Japan or
elsewhere. The debate on SCAP policies erupted because the American Council on Japan accused MacArthur and his "New Deal" men in the SCAP Government Section precisely of foisting "socialism" on Japan. The roots of the controversy in the politics of the New Deal were advertised by Harry Kern in *Newsweek* on 1 December 1947 when he described SCAP's reforms as "far to the Left of anything now tolerated in America."[33] In a polemic attack extending over the years 1947 to 1953, the conservatives repeatedly compared the SCAP reforms, including the land reform, "the expropriation of land in excess of five acres," to the social and economic reforms of the Russian Revolution or to the Soviet-directed reforms in Eastern Europe in the late 1940's.[34] Following the fall of China to the Communists in 1949, the attack was extended to the "China Crowd" and SCAP reforms were likened to Communist reforms in China. Now the views of this "Japan Lobby" were highly influential in shaping George F. Kennan's policy recommendations for the reorganization of U.S. geo-political priorities, in National Security Council memoranda 13/2 and 48/1 of October 1948 and December 1949, respectively. They were shared by John Foster Dulles, himself an active diplomatist in Japan in the years before he became Secretary of State, and they were to a considerable extent embodied in the U.S.-Japanese peace treaty signed in San Francisco in September 1951.[35] If land reform was to be pressed by American liberals in the Cold War context, it was quite clearly going to encounter considerable opposition at the highest levels of the foreign policy bureaucracies and in conservative circles in American business and public life. That was becoming manifest as early as 1948. An inexorable challenge facing those Americans who would press for such initiatives from that point on was the need to confront this conservative opposition and reckon with its roots and implications.

3. Testifying before the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations in May 1951, during a series of hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur declared, regarding the land reform in Japan:

"I don't think that since the Gracchi effort at land reform, since the days of the Roman Empire there has been anything quite as successful of that nature that has been not only to improve the food production but it has been to establish a political segment of society which before was nervous, irritable, exploitable, into one of the most sound conservative elements of the political life in Japan."[36]

In the context of MacArthur's losing battle with the Japan Lobby, the widespread problems of land tenure in Asia then and now, and the uses made since 1951 of the land reform in Japan as a trope in Cold War rhetoric, this passage is worth reflecting on. MacArthur's vague allusion to the Gracchi leaps to the eye. Why did he make it? The brothers Tiberius and Caius Gracchus were famous Roman land reform advocates, of course.[37] What is tantalizing in MacArthur's reference to them is his apparent unawareness that the Gracchi, between 133 and 121 B.C., failed to overcome patrician opposition to land reform in Roman Italy, were assassinated and in their defeat and death stood at the beginning of a century of upheaval, civil war and social strife which led to the downfall of the Roman Republic. Had MacArthur wanted to argue strongly for land reform in Asia, or to analyze the reasons for the relative success of land
reform in Japan, he might have done well to expatiate more broadly on the history of the Gracchi. The same might be said of Wolf Ladejinsky, land reform advocate, who, in a paper called "Agrarian Reform in Asia," was to assert in 1964 that the Gracchi had succeeded, because even after their deaths the Land Commission they had set up was not dismantled.[38]

4. There is no more incisive summation of the history of the Gracchi, bearing on this point, than that by Stockton:

"The tribunates of Tiberius and Caius Gracchus mark a watershed in the history of the later Roman Republic. Behind them we can discern pent-up forces waiting irresistibly to break through a barrier of unimaginative conservatism and entrenched interest ... More than usually, these years were in Leibniz's words 'charges du passe et gros de l'avenir'. Some men living at the time grasped that fact, however inchoately; others were blind to it; and some saw it, but refused to accept it, or hoped that some other way out might be found or simply determined to resist change for as long as possible ... The nobles were ready to fight for their interests vi et armis. It was that which made it certain that in the end a successful assault could not be mounted by tribunes, but only by men who championed 'Gracchan' causes and employed 'Gracchan' methods to secure imperium and with it clientalae, patronage, loyal veteran armies and immense disposable wealth with which to challenge the resources of the 'establishment'. It was Pompey who first grasped this truth fully, and who had the ability and energy and courage to exploit it. And it was Julius Caesar's army which decided the issue. Without that army at his back, Caesar would have joined Milo in exile at Marseilles, or his corpse would have followed that of Tiberius Gracchus into the Tiber."

5. It takes little imagination to find "Gracchan" causes in countries of mass peasant poverty in Asia and elsewhere after 1945. And as for "Gracchan" methods, the stirring up of the peasants, or enough peasants, workers and radical men of ideas by the disciples of Marx and Lenin, that they might conduct an assault on unimaginative conservatism and entrenched interest, merited sober consideration, one would have thought. One biographer of MacArthur dubbed him "American Caesar" and described the land reform as his "greatest achievement in Japan." He cited the reference by MacArthur to the Gracchi and commented that the brothers Gracchus "restored Rome's class of small independent farmers by restricting the amount of land a citizen might occupy and instituting greater subdivision of lands."[40] Leaving aside the error about the achievements of the Gracchi, MacArthur as land reformer filled the role, in Stockton's terms, of Caesar with the army at his back. The Japanese conservatives had been beaten in the Pacific War and this massive bloodshed opened the way for land reform. What, however, of the rest of Asia in 1945 or 1950? Was it not, indeed charge du passe et gros de l'avenir - surfeited with the past and swelling with the future? Was it not, indeed, held back by barriers of unimaginative conservatism and entrenched interest, both colonialist and "patrician"? And were not those barriers being defended vi et armis - with force and violence? And were not the armed "Gracchans" behind a Mao Zedong or a Ho Chi Minh seeking clientalae among the peasants in order to build imperium and avoid following "Tiberius Gracchus into the Tiber?" Had General MacArthur put some of these considerations to the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations in May
1951, or had some of the senators present raised some of them in response to MacArthur's allusion to the Gracchi, the terms of a real and searching debate on the subject might have been set. No such thing occurred; perhaps in part because the myth of the Gracchi as great reformers was, in such a context, not a point of historical observation but a sort of literary trope, mere color. Besides, ther has been minute debate over the land reform achievements of the Gracchi, and the historical literature affords ample scope for such unreflective allusions as that by MacArthur. The flatness of the allusion, however, is an indication of the topological simplicity of the senatorial hearings in which it is located.

6. Douglas MacArthur quickly passed from the land reform scene, but Wolf Ladejinsky, whose role in the initiation of land reform in Japan has been adverted to above, went on to become an advocate of land reform throughout Asia as a means to modernize and stabilize Asian societies and pre-empt "irrational revolutions." His views on land reform and what it might accomplish are, therefore, a benchmark for the assessment of U.S. policy on land reform and social revolution in Asia in the 1950's. In a 1948 paper called, "Trial Balance in Japan," Ladejinsky wrote of the land reform in Japan:

"It is the tale of a moderate, middle-class revolution, designed to create a stable system of capitalistic democracy. The changes that have been made have so loosened the fetters that held the Japanese people, that reactionary forces would find it difficult to tighten them again... Such reforms as the widespread ownership of land, the recognition of the right of labor to economic security, and the measures for the control of disease and the improvement of public health, so effectively carried on by SCAP, have been tangible evidence to the common people of Japan that we are actively espousing a new way of life and not merely opposing the old. It is this that distinguishes the American occupation of Japan from the occupation of other defeated countries by victors in wars, past and present."[41]

Conspicuous by its absence is any reflection by Ladejinsky on the reverse course and the attitude of the American conservatives to what he called a "moderate middle-class revolution." In May 1949, the liberal journal, New Republic, came out with a blistering attack on the reactionaries in the American Council on Japan for their assault on SCAP. Not so Wolf Ladejinsky. He was an agricultural economist, not a political economist and at no point in his career did he take stock of the intractable political and ideological dimensions of land reform as a problem in Asia or as a policy issue in the United States.

7. In an exchange of letters with Ladejinsky in August-September 1957, Ronald Dore raised the question of the significance of the Occupation in Japan and asked whether or not Ladejinsky considered such conditions desirable as a precondition of effective reform. Ladejinsky replied on 20 August:

"Your last point amuses me. No, I do not care to deal with a reform as a member of an occupation army. I'd rather have them do it in their own way - even if ever so slowly and incomplete in some vital respects. The beginning is important and time will take care of the rest. There is, of course, the risk that there might not be enough time."
Dore's response, dated 22 September, delicately posed the question of time, beginning and power, to which Ladejinsky seems never to have devoted more than superficial reflection:

"Glad to know that you prefer advice and persuasion to occupation and directive. But how difficult it must be to do these things gradually. If only societies could be injected with the sort of dazed receptivity for sudden and fundamental change that hit Japan in 1945-46, without having to suffer catastrophes first."

8. After a field trip to Szechwan in the late northern summer of 1949, to acquaint himself with the ill-fated land reform projects undertaken there by the Sino-U.S. Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in the last months before the Communist take-over, Ladejinsky lamented that the Nationalist (Kuomintang) government in China had not implemented the land reform legislation of the early 1920's, as this failure had cost it peasant support and thus political power.[42] Regarding the Communist victory in China as a "catastrophe"[43] brought about by Stalin's "three stage program of revolution" - struggle against foreign imperialism, peasant war, proletarian dictatorship - Ladejinsky called on the United States to champion "agrarian democracy" and take the leadership of the modern revolution away from the Communists:

"What is true of China is essentially true of other parts of the orient. Every densely populated farm area of Asia counts land-hungry, or just hungry, tenants by the million. Most of them would sell their souls to their governments for a piece of land in fee simple or for reasonable tenure conditions. The only question is whether these governments will heed the lessons of China's disastrous experience. It behooves us to make sure that they do. If for no other reason than enlightened self-interest in the contest with the Communists in Asia, the United States cannot be friendly to agrarian feudalism simply because we are against Communist totalitarianism. Our attitude should be one of positive support for agrarian democracy."[45]

9. Positive support for agrarian democracy? Suppose, however, that the defenders of "agrarian feudalism" dug in vi et armis or sought to modernize agriculture not by redistributive reform but by capitalist consolidation, at the expense of the rural poor coming and going? Suppose, further, that no powerful party of "agrarian democrats" had been able to weld peasant discontent into a wide, cogent political coalition, but that armed "Gracchans" under the banner of Marx and Lenin had done so? Suppose, finally, that hegemonic conservative propertied interests in the United States saw little to choose between "agrarian democrats" and Communist "Gracchans" and were disposed to back the patricians of "agrarian feudalism" and undemocratic capitalism vi et armis against the "Gracchans"? How, then, was Wolf Ladejinsky's generous but vague vision to be actualized? He seems never to have faced these questions squarely.
10. There are indications that Ladejinsky himself, as early as 1950, had backed himself into an impasse between the horror of radical revolution and the conservatism of the U.S. policy and corporate elites, neither of which was he apparently able or willing to systematically think through and politically analyse. He wrote in 1950:

"Many people wouldn't hesitate to approve of a revolutionary movement if it is the only way the common man can secure his elementary wants. But we must realize how serious a threat an agrarian revolution could be at this point of history, even if the upheaval seems justifiable from that point of view. The only way to thwart Communist designs on Asia is to preclude such revolutionary outbursts through timely reforms, peacefully, before the peasants take the law into their own hands and set the countryside ablaze. But reforms, if they are to have a lasting effect, must come not only from opposition to Communism but from a honest purpose and plan to raise the status of the peasantry."[45]

And again,

"Encouraging in the seemingly dismal situation in Asia is the fact that the American agrarian tradition of 40 acres and a mule or an Asian variety thereof offers a better solution of the agrarian problem than the new Communist ideology. This is quite apart from the consideration that the latest events in China and the implied threat to the rest of Asia oblige us to bolster our position there with something more lasting and effective than we have done this far..."[46]

11. It does not seem that Ladejinsky ever made a serious study of the American rural economy and its history. Quite as much as allusions to the Gracchi, this whimsical suggestion that "the American agrarian tradition" could be summed up in the phrase "forty acres and a mule," leaps to the eye as an uncritical rhetorical trope, interrogation of which would have revealed numerous difficulties for the proposition that was based on it. Would Ladejinsky have supported Thaddeus Stevens, in calling for "forty acres and a mule" for freedmen, in the Radical Reconstruction debates of 1866-67? There seems to be no record of his having given serious thought to the question. What did he make of the efforts and frustrations of his mentor Rexford Tugwell in the 1930's to achieve major agrarian reforms in the United States? What scant evidence there is suggests that he kept himself aloof from the controversies of the 1930's and concentrated on writing papers about Soviet and Japanese agriculture. Did he ponder the reflections of Frederick Turner and Vernon Parrington on the fate of Jeffersonian agrarian democracy in the United States? If he did, there is no trace of it in his writings. How, then, might he be taken seriously as an interlocutor by Asian revolutionaries? How was he to grapple with the conservative foreign policies of the United States on land reform? One is drawn to the reluctant and disconcerting conclusion that the answer to the first question is: he could not be, and the answer to the second question is: he did not do so.
12. **Wolf Ladejinsky's unwillingness to grapple with American conservatism did not stop American conservatives from grappling with him, however.** He worked in East Asia until 1954, but, on his return to the United States that year, was refused re-employment at the U.S. Department of Agriculture by Agriculture Secretary Ezra Taft Benson on the grounds that he had master-minded a "socialist" land reform in Japan and was a "national security risk." It was alleged that Ladejinsky had Communist affiliations because members of his family were still living in the Soviet Union. There were anti-semitic gibes cast at him. Even after an official investigation had cleared Ladejinsky of all these allegations, except that of being a Jew, Benson refused to re-employ him, or to endorse his return to the post of Agricultural Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, which had been his official job since 1950. Why? On the grounds that Ladejinsky was unsuitable in such a post, being insufficiently familiar with "American farm methods." As William Manchester phrased it, land reform *à la* Ladejinsky "was so radical that it shocked Americans who believed in large corporate farms" and Ladejinsky "was blacklisted by many Right-wing groups during the McCarthy years." [47]

13. **Ezra Benson's attack on Wolf Ladejinsky was, of course, no isolated or eccentric affair.** It belongs well within the pattern of U.S. domestic politics and was part of the conservative assault on the New Deal progressives as well as on reformers and geo-political progressives in the foreign policy bureaucracies. The experience of Farm Security Administration chief, C. B. Baldwin, in 1943 was of the same pattern as that of Wolf Ladejinsky in 1954. There were other such cases. Shigeru Yoshida, the conservative Japanese politician and friend to the American Council on Japan, observed in his memoirs that radical elements, "New Dealers" had flourished in SCAP until recalled to the United States and questioned by the Congressional Committee on UnAmerican Activities.[48] The Ladejinsky case coincided with the purge of the Chinese experts at the Department of State in "retribution" for the "loss" of China to the Communists. In the *New York Times*, 8 January 1955, a report by Dana Adams Schmidt on Ladejinsky and his work, appeared alongside a report by Elie Abel headed: "Vincent Criticizes Davies' Ouster By Dulles as Drastic and Cruel. Former Envoy Breaks Silence in Assailing Dismissal and Own Forced Retirement."[49] These were the so-called "McCarthy years," named for the Republican demagogue from Wisconsin, Senator Joseph McCarthy, who made a career of denouncing American public figures as "Communists." Senator McCarthy, however, was less eccentric than his tactlessness and irresponsibility made him appear and focus on his idiosyncracies ought not to distract us from the wide and deep conservative reaction of those years which provided him with his public opportunities.

14. **In the tangled and often polemical debates on land reform in the Cold War between Communism and the Pax Americana, all this history is too seldom remembered or pondered.** Consider, for example, the summation by Sidney Klein to his 1958 study, *The Pattern of Land Tenure Reform in East Asia after World War II:*
Two distinct patterns of land tenure reform emerged in East Asia after World War II, the non-communist pattern and the communist pattern. The non-communist pattern was characterized by efforts to eliminate the abuses of the existing social order in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. In these areas, genuine attempts at reform were made. The system of private ownership of land was, however, retained. In sharp contrast, the communist pattern viewed the reform movement as means to an end, with the end being abolition of the existing socio-economic order, including the system of private ownership of agricultural land. The Communist governments of East Asia viewed their land tenure movements as vehicles for travel over the road to collectivization and ultimately socialism.\[50\]

Klein's use of the binary opposition: "genuine"/"means to an end" has a strong Cold War flavor to it and conceptually precludes more nuanced reflection on the agrarian transformations in question. Why need it be presumed that a land reform which is a means to an end is not genuine? And were not the genuine American-supported land reforms a means to an end? Klein's use of this polemical binary opposition, however, is thrown into high relief by use of the same binary opposition sixteen years later in Gary Olson's leftist critique of American policy in which "genuine land reform" was juxtaposed with "more limited, controlled bourgeois rural reforms."\[51\] To be sure, Olson qualified the concept of genuine land reform such that it included varieties of dramatic redistribution: into family, cooperative or state farms, depending on local conditions,\[52\] but in antithesis to Klein, whose concept of genuine land reform is precisely what Olson called limited, controlled bourgeois. The land reforms in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, in particular, are cited by Klein as genuine; by Olson as bourgeois. And whereas Klein accused the Communist revolutionaries of using land reform as a political tool, a means to their ends and not those of the peasants, Olson charged that the United States had "consciously pursued strategies of agrarian change" to serve its ends and not those of the peasants. In Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, Olson asserted, "U.S. foreign policy actors began to develop an appreciation of land reform as a political tool."\[53\] Another critic of the U.S. land reform policy in Asia, writing in 1971, declared that in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, the U.S. found land reform to be a "major counter-revolutionary weapon."\[54\]

15. Description of such a land reform as that which the United States sponsored in Japan as a "counterevolutionary" operation makes sense if, and only if, one defines revolution as upheaval, or as a process led by "radicals" and ending in the creation of some form of radical polity. One is reminded of the polemical assertions by Lenin and Stalin that bourgeois reforms were instruments of counterrevolution. If, on the other hand, revolution is defined with closer reference to agro-industrial transformation and cultural/political modernization, the precise nature of which is conceived in other than utopian or teleological terms, then such polemical and reductionist binary oppositions as the above lose much of their force. When Olson held up the "socialist vision" and "genuine land reform" of the "popular People's Republic of North Korea" in contrast with the "inordinately high price in terms of human development" and political apathy produced by the "bourgeois" path in South Korea; or when Alfred McCoy, Elias Tuma, or other critics of "bourgeois" land reform, compare Communist agriculture uncritically and favorably with the land reforms in East Asia, there are solid empirical grounds for scepticism. When they write as if U.S. officials were
at one in seizing upon land reform as a "major counterrevolutionary weapon" they are missing the most salient point in the history of U.S. land reform policy: that to a great extent land reform has been opposed, ignored, watered down or otherwise frustrated by conservative Americans precisely because the redistribution of landed property in any systematic form seemed to them to be revolutionary. That U.S. land reformers were in general not pro-Communists does not make them "counterrevolutionary" except in the pernicious, polemical tradition in which the Communist Party is identified with the volonté générale and its critics as much as its enemies are consigned to the "dustbin of history." The tragedy of the best land reformers, on both sides of the geo-political divide referred to as the Iron Curtain, has been their political impotence, caught between hammer and anvil in the Cold War.

16. What is true of China, Wolf Ladejinsky exclaimed in 1948, is true of much of the rest of Asia. Here, as in other respects, Ladejinsky might be said to have been somewhat vague and unsophisticated. American failure to play the role of midwife to any sort of "rational revolution" in China in the 1940's, however, was of immense significance in the Cold War and the experience cried out for the most careful and searching reflection. Instead, of course, it induced a sort of conservative hysteria that cut right across the tendencies of Marshall and Acheson to try to come to terms with the matter in sober and responsible fashion. The challenge in China, short of embracing the Communist revolution, and in the event that the latter could not be reconciled with the Kuomintang regime, had been, as Tang Tsou wrote in 1963, to transform the Nationalist government so that "it could compete successfully with the Chinese Communist party both on the battlefield and in the realms of political, economic and social reform." He added: "It is obvious that the task confronting the United States was, at best, an extremely difficult one. It is even likely that no matter what the United States might have done, she could only have postponed, but not have averted, the final outcome." Written in 1963, these lines have about them an uncanny ring of prescience with reference to the American failure in South Vietnam. Yet it is not entirely clear that the writer was prescient, for he went on to suggest that, if the United States "had had ample resources and manpower to bring overwhelming power to bear on the Chinese situation", then, provided "she had subordinated her military activities to political policy and...had dealt skilfully with the Nationalist government, the chances of making China a great and friendly power would have been enhanced." Was it not, in considerable measure, the hubristic belief in America's ample resources and overwhelming power which led to the deep and destructive commitment in South Vietnam after 1963? In that case, of course, subordination of military activities to geo-political policy and domestic political policy, but not to concerted political policy for "rational revolution" in South Vietnam, created what Daniel Ellsberg called a "stalemate machine" at the cybernetic center of policy decision-making in the United States and led to the debacle of 1975.

17. The two contrasting American experiences in East Asia at the onset of the Cold War: the failure in China and the qualified success in Japan, had they been the subject of intense, constructive and comparative analysis in the 1950's, may have
provided sufficient instruction to American foreign policy makers in the Cold War to enable them to innovate more vigorously in efforts to challenge Marxist-Leninist insurgents in Asia and Latin America; or at least to avert what became the tragic debacle of the counterinsurgency war in Vietnam. Instead, notoriously, trauma and confusion followed from the failure in China; and Japan became the centerpiece in a conservative geo-political strategy in Southeast Asia. The case studies that follow represent a series of experiences in which the manner of failure in China and the manner of conservative response to land and other reforms in Japan were recapitulated with disturbing consistency. As a prelude to what was to occur, with some variations, in each of these cases, over a period of some thirty years and more, I can think of no more instructive epigraph than the reflection of Tang Tsou on what had occurred in China between 1941 and 1950:

"There were two aspects of America's method of dealing with the internal situation in China. The first was the handling of the military-political conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists...The second was the method of granting aid to the Kuomintang government and handling the struggle for power within Nationalist China...It is of the utmost importance to distinguish between these two problems, for much confusion has been created by the insistence of Generalissimo Chiang and his American friends that to give him unconditional, large-scale economic and military assistance was the only way to fight Chinese Communism. This confusion has been compounded by his tendency to see Communist conspiracy behind all political opposition to him...Actually, his refusal to undertake long overdue reforms created the very conditions which were exploited by the Communists in their rise to power. His oppression of anti-Communist Chinese politicians as well as those who entertained illusions of varying degrees about the Communists, led them to consider the Communist Party the lesser of two evils and drove them into the arms of the Communists. His successful resistance to American advice and pressure for reform produced deep frustrations and despair among American officials, which played an important part in the decision to withdraw from China. As long as the United States failed either to persuade or force him to take the necessary steps to make his regime viable, or alternatively to bring about his downfall, while helping to fashion a new political force to replace him, the necessary condition for the effective use of American aid did not exist. Nor did saving him from the Communists seem to be a worthy moral cause...The image of a corrupt, oppressive and moribund regime, headed by a chauvinistic ruler resistant to American advice, was an important factor in the unwillingness to use American forces in post-war China" [58]

The variation on this theme that was to be played out in South Vietnam, between 1954 and 1975, is so palpably present in this passage that it more or less smites the reader between the eyes. The histories of American involvement in land and other reform efforts, as measures to stave off radical upheaval in the Philippines and El Salvador, are less well known, but they, too, have been striking variations on the above theme and will be explored in chronological sequence, as well as comparative thematic perspective, in the following chapters of this inquiry.

18. It was in the Philippines, in the early 1950's, that the theme was first, on a modest scale, rehearsed, as if it were a minor prelude to the full, symphonic performance that followed in South Vietnam. In the case of China, Tang Tsou remarked in 1963, the "pattern was established during the Pacific War and the recall of Stilwell was its focal expression."[59] The efforts of "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell to get Chiang Kai-Shek to reform his armed forces and administration; and his deep frustration with and scorn for the corruption, narrow conservatism
and inertia of the Kuomintang regime; and his recall by President Roosevelt, in deference to the sovereign sensitivities of Chiang Kai-Shek, have been made the subject of a superb study by Barbara Tuchman Sand Against The Wind: Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911-1945 [60] If one were to choose a figure in the case of the Philippines who, even if in more obscure and less dramatic circumstances, paralleled Stilwell's role and experience in China, it would be land reform specialist Robert S. Hardie, who arrived in the Philippines in mid-1951 under instructions to prepare a prospectus for sweeping land reform in that country and resigned two years later in deep frustration. This episode followed on the heels of the Communist triumph in China and immediately preceded American commitment to defence of the anti-Communist regime in the South of Vietnam in 1954. In comparative perspective, and in the light of subsequent developments in the Philippines, it warrants more sustained reflection that it has received up til now.
"I will make a new song for Filipinos/... Where the peasants are asking questions, thinking of unity/Where the workers are organizing, knowing the strength of solidarity/Where the leaders are pointing the way to freedom/Where the Hukbalahaps are fighting for liberation/Where the Communists and Socialists are vanguarding the revolution/... Till my heart breaks with anger/Till the conscience of America awakes - /I will hurl this democratic song to where it all began."

- Carlos Bulosan (c. 1948)

"Chronic economic instability and political unrest among farm tenants has culminated in open and violent rebellion. The rebellion derives directly from the pernicious land tenure system; it is but the latest in a long and bitter series... In championing the cause of tenants, Communism wins their sympathies--just as governments (or supporters of governments), careless of causes, whose actions are limited to the suppression of symptoms and maintenance of the status quo, are bound to win their enmity... Continuation of this system fosters the growth of Communism and harms the U.S. position. Unless corrected, it is easy to conceive of the situation worsening to a point where the U.S. would be forced to take direct, expensive and arbitrary steps to ensure against loss of the Philippines to the Communist bloc in Asia-- and would still be faced with finding a solution to the underlying problem."

- Robert S. Hardie (1952)

"(There was a) major shift in the official policy of the United States toward foreign assistance in 1953, which was reflected in the recommendations of the mission in Manila concerning land reform. Whether the repudiation of Hardie's recommendations on land reform and the adoption of a more cautious approach to agrarian reform in general were directly connected with the change of administration in Washington is not clear. Certainly, Hardie's departure from Manila and Roland Renne's replacement as head of the Mutual Security Agency in the Philippines paved the way for a general re-examination of America's assistance there, and for a sharp shift in the official attitude toward rural reform... by the time Magsaysay assumed office, it was observable that the complexion of the Mission had changed on questions of tenancy regulation and reform there was not a single United States policy, but rather a number of policies, dictated in part by the inclinations of the individuals assigned to the operations mission at different times..."
CHAPTER FOUR: RED RAP ON HARDIE: THE PHILIPPINES 1950-54.


1. The history of rebellion in the Philippines was already a long one before the Americans invaded the country in 1898-1900. The numerous revolts which occurred from the time of the Spanish invasion of the archipelago, in the sixteenth century, until the American invasion, at the end of the nineteenth, are both discernible and important, as the roots of conflicts and debates which have filled Philippine political history in the decades since 1900 and are now, it seems, coming to a head. Together they suggest a process of internal social transformation in the Philippines, punctuated by violent upheavals. There was a long process of indigenous cultural resistance to the Spanish, against forced labor and against the imposition of Catholicism, marked by the revolts of Lakan Dula (1574), Magalat (1596), Tamblot (1621), Bankaw (1622), Sumoroy (1649), Maniago (1660), Malong (1661), Dagohoy (1744) and Palaris and Silang (1762).[1] Gradually, however, Catholicism itself became a cultural zone of conflict and revolt with Apolinario de la Cruz (1840), Jose Burgos, Mariano Gomez and Jacinto Zamora (1872), Papa Isio (1896) and Gregorio Aglipay (1902).[2] Transcending Catholicism and turning modern European ideas in turn into a zone of conflict and revolt, becoming both more critical and more cosmopolitan, Philippine resistance clothed itself in the language of liberal dissent with Jose Rizal, Graciano Lopez Jaena, Marcelo H. del Pilar and Antonio Luna and of liberal or social revolutionism with Andres Bonifacio and Apolinario Mabini, culminating in the archipelagic rebellion against the Spanish in the late 1890's. The Philippine rebels set up the Malolos Republic in 1898, but it became divided and was defeated by the American invaders. The rural-based social revolts of Vicente Lukban and Miguel Malvar, Simeon Ola and Macario Sakay (1901-1903) were afterglows of the Malolos Republic and its unresolved inner tensions.[3] The social critical activities of Lope K. Santos, Isabelo de los Reyes and Aurelio Tolentino (1902-1906) prefigured the emergence of labor organizations and socialist political agitation in the 1920's and 1930's led by Pedro Abad Santos, Jacinto Manahan, Crisanto Evangelista and Benigno Ramos. Out of all this, in the 1940's, grew the Hukbalahap Movement, under the influence of the Communist Party of the Philippines [4] and out of the Hukbalahap Movement and its defeat in the 1950's there emerged in the late 1960's the New People's Army.

2. When, between 1898 and 1903, the Americans annexed the Philippines from Spain [5] and crushed Philippine resistance, they inherited an archipelago which was, demographically and commercially as well as culturally and politically, just beginning to become a part of the general movement of the world economy. The chief features of internal transformation bearing on the rural crises that later erupted, were the internal colonization of the land frontier, notably, in the late nineteenth century, the Central Luzon plain, and the beginnings of sugar cultivation in the Visayas, both supporting the growth of a landlord class and burgeoning population of peasants without land titles.[6] The Americans, as an imperial power, presided
over the accelerated development of these trends and at no point thoroughly came to terms with their implications. Early attempts to redistribute land, by buying and breaking up the half million acres held by the religious orders around Manila [7], and to rationalize the land ownership situation, by introducing the Torrens titling system, seem to have contributed more to an accentuation than a mitigation of the social trends at work.

3. The ideological self-understanding of the Americans in the Philippines seems, from the beginning to have centred on a need to believe themselves benevolent in bearing and beneficent in their impact on the Filipinos.[8] Dean Worcester, of the Philippine Commission, which governed the colony in the first decade of the American era, was full of this sense of America's benevolence, when he wrote in 1914:

"Never before in the history of the world has a powerful nation assumed toward a weaker one quite such an attitude as we have adopted toward the Filipinos."[9]

Worcester fulminated against the Malolos Republic, which had resisted U.S. conquest, describing it as ruled by an upstart clique, "a Tagalog oligarchy, in which the great mass of the people had no share."[10] He asserted that the American protectorate alone stood between an arbitrary and corrupt oligarchic regime and progress toward broad-based democracy in the Philippines.[11] The most telling criticism of Worcester's outlook is that while he claimed American policies served to check the Filipino oligarchy and strengthen broad-based democracy, in sombre fact the policies pursued by the U.S. in the Philippines served on balance to check broad-based democracy and strengthen the Filipino oligarchy. Glenn May, in his persuasive study of the first decade and a half of the American period, tells us:

"American colonial policy during the Taft era did not have a dynamic impact on the Philippines. Educational reforms, viewed by many policy-makers as a key instrument of social engineering, brought Filipinos only marginally better schooling than they had received at the end of the Spanish period. Americans effected few significant changes in the Philippine economy: the ambitious economic programs of the Commission were not realized, primarily because of Congressional opposition. At the end of the Taft period, as at the beginning, Philippine society was dominated by a landed elite. Moreover, by giving *principales* political power (which they had lacked under Spanish rule) and by allowing easy access for their crops to the American market, American policy-makers effectively reinforced the dominance of that elite over Philippine communities. The net effect of American policies was not to implant popular government, but to nurture an oligarchy."[12]

4. May's conclusion regarding the period of the Philippine Commission is that "American policy-makers were unable to agree" on whether or how to basically change Philippine society.[13] If this was true in the earliest years of American rule, it became more so thereafter. During the Governorships of Francis Burton Harrison and Leonard Wood, the United States relinquished much of the administration of the country to the Filipino oligarchs, led by Sergio Osmeña and Manuel L. Quezon, and debated among themselves the utility of the Philippines as a possession.[14] Since the formation of the League for Peace and the *Partido Federal* in 1900, the Filipino *ilustrados*, largely a class of landowning patricians, had formed an alliance of convenience with the
Americans as a bulwark of political order against the prospect of social revolution. The Americans for their part sought in such an alliance the stabilization of their impulsive conquest. This was dubbed the "policy of attraction". There was thus constructed a major obstacle to broad-based democratic development. For the _ilustrados_ held land, wealth and power in such manner and such measure as to block both political and economic democracy and, as Peter Stanley puts it, "there was no tackling the core problems of land tenancy, labor and the distribution of wealth without alienating the Filipino elite and subverting the policy of attraction."[15] Thus it was that, in the words of George Taylor, "the United States... made no serious or effective effort to build a sound economic base for democracy in its half century of rule."[16] In this regard, both U.S. colonialists and Filipino _ilustrados_ prepared the ground for the social rebellions of the years since 1945.

5. The paternalistic claims of a Dean Worcester notwithstanding, the period of American administration in the Philippines was marked by the thorough entrenchment of the Filipino landed oligarchy within the "democratic" institutions the Americans set up. Commodity exports soared, while landlessness and tenancy increased steadily [Table 2 and Map 5]. The population began to increase rapidly [Table 1 and Map 4], without concomitant social or economic reforms to accomodate such an increase in numbers. All this was becoming evident even in the 1920's and 1930's, though it was to become much more acute in the 1940's and thereafter, but American ideological self-images cast something of a veil over it all. There were concerned Americans who observed the social significance of the peasant revolts of the early 1930's[17], but to do very much about the situation, the Americans would have had to "reach outside the whole existing structure of political participation."[18] That was not work for men such as Taft, Forbes, Harrison or Wood and no serious effort was made by the Americans to enfranchise or otherwise encourage and draw into the political arena the peasant masses, whose slow awakening to political consciousness and a sense of class grievance has been described as the "most significant socio-political development of the American period."[19] In the two decades before the Second World War, the Philippine Socialist Party, led by Pedro Abad Santos, the Workers and Peasant Union founded in 1930 by the same man; the Philippine Communist Party led by Crisanto Evangelista and Jacinto Manahan; the Sakdal movement led by Benigno Ramos, all organized around the cause of worker and peasant emancipation. Blocked by the landlords, unaided if not condemned by the Americans, driven to more and more searching theories of the frustration of reform in the Philippines, the labor organizers began to read and quote Karl Marx and to think in terms of armed revolt.[20]

6. Nothing would be more misleading than to suggest that the "awakening" of the Philippine peasant masses was a process uniform throughout the archipelago or univocal in its "class consciousness". Such as it was, it was partial, regional, often backward-looking in its normative orientation. It was, however, rooted not in centuries old _traditional_ relations so much as in the _crisis_ of those relations induced by "progress", as Kerkvliet has argued.[21] The accumulation of grievance and the stirrings of revolt were centred in those areas where both demographic
pressure and the tendential commercialization of agriculture were greatest [Maps 4 and 5]: Central Luzon and
the Visayas. Moreover, the peasant leaders were more and more conscious of the national economic and
international dimensions of their situation and attempted to use the formal democratic institutions
established by the Americans to advance their cause. The Sakdals in 1934 and the Socialists and
Communists in 1946 tried the method of electoral politics but, being thwarted by conservative domination
of the state and political culture, and seeing the United States as the guarantor of the oligarchic regime, they
then sought outside help from such international rivals of the U.S. as Japan, in the 1930's, and the
U.S.S.R., in the 1940's, though in neither case with any success.

7. Interviewed in Tokyo in May 1935, Sakdal rebel leader Benigno Ramos
told the New York Times: "We know the American government in the islands is so
strong that revolt against it means suicide. But what else can we do?"[22] The outlook
of these people is well-expressed by Brian Fegan:

"Peasant members held syncretic folk-Marxist ideas, adapted through the earlier idiom of folk-Catholic
ideas. Except on the issue of sources of external support - critically a source of arms - both strands shared a
view that the landlords and America were the enemy, and had such a hold on the political system that
peaceful reform was impossible. The first stream (Benigno Ramos' Sakdals) looked to Japan as a source of
arms. The urban intellectual leaders of the second more Marxist stream felt a rising was out of the
question, but ordinary members and middle-level leaders had vague hopes of guns from Russia."[23]

The Sakdals were crushed when they rose in 1935. Their heirs, the Hukbalahap, having begun to organize
before the Second World War, distinguished themselves in fighting a guerrilla war of resistance against the
Japanese between 1942 and 1945. However, when the Americans returned, the Huks found themselves set
upon as an enemy and disarmed, if not executed, while the Americans released and established in power
Manuel Roxas and other members of the old elite, who had collaborated with the Japanese. In 1946, the
Huks formed the Democratic Alliance and stood candidates for the new Philippine Congress, six of whom
were elected. However, Manuel Roxas barred the Democratic Alliance representatives from assuming their
seats in Congress and hit squads assassinated two of them. After some efforts at mediation, the Hukbalahap
leaders, with thousands of angry followers in Central Luzon, where tenancy had reached particularly high
levels among the rural poor [Map 5], raised the flag of revolt.[24]
4:2. Sound, Feasible and Adequate.

1. The Huk Rebellion was the best organized and most nearly successful rural rebellion in all the long history of such rebellions in the Philippines.[25] It was, of course, only one of many such movements against the pre-war order in Asia in the late 1940's. In early 1950, a few months before the outbreak of the Korean War, two American survey missions travelled through Japan and Southeast Asia to assess the economic and political situation: one was sent by the Army Department and consisted of Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, Robert West, and Director of the Department of Agriculture's Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Stanley Andrews; the other was sent by the Department of State and was headed by R. Allen Griffin, a former deputy director of the ECA mission in China and a friend of conservative California Republican Senator William Knowland.[26] The West/Andrews team, in the words of Michael Schaller, "worried that radical, anti-colonial insurgencies, especially in Indochina, imperiled regional integration," and urged that the U.S. help restore internal order in Southeast Asia lest it go the way of China and so that it could serve as a source of food and raw materials for Japan.[27] The Griffin Mission placed more emphasis on the social and economic side and resisted the efforts of Army Deputy Secretary Tracy Voorhees to secure U.S. military control of the proposed aid programs in Southeast Asia. It was the Griffin Mission's proposals, backed by Dean Acheson, which became the basis of aid policy from as early as March 1950.[28] To the Philippines, where President Elpidio Quirino had requested further U.S. assistance, the Bell Mission was sent by President Truman.[29] The Mission arrived in the Philippines on 10 July 1950 [30] and submitted a 107-page report, along with nine technical memoranda, to President Quirino on 12 October 1950.[31] This report, the Bell Report, called for reforms in the Philippines as a condition of U.S. aid,[32] including adjustments of the rural relations of production to render them both more equitable and more efficient.[33] Just what form such adjustments would take remained unclear.

2. There was considerable debate within the Department of State in 1950 over land reform in Southeast Asia. A memorandum from the Pacific and Southeast Asian Affairs (PSA) office to Dean Rusk at the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (FE) dated 13 October 1950 and headed, "Land Reform in South East Asia," captures the state and the spirit of the land reform debate:

"Mounting interest in 'land reform' . . . gives rise to the following observations. I wish particularly to offer them in view of the notion in some quarters that PSA (or FE) is unregenerate on these questions . . . It is often asserted that either without limit or "whenever practical" we must make every effort to shape our foreign policy, including but not confined to our aid programs, in order to effect agricultural reform. This is necessary, it is argued, either to steal the Commies' thunder or in its absence to create a society in which independent small proprietors will have the will and the strength to resist Communism. It is generally implied that the position in South East Asia is such that a policy of this nature is both necessary and in general (together with technical assistance for the peasants) almost sufficient to withstand Communism. I should like to confront the thesis (which is largely derived from experience in Japan, Korea, China and India) with certain observations which are of at least equal validity regarding S.E. Asian countries . . ."[34]
The author of the memorandum, Shohan, went on to argue that in Indochina and Thailand the Communists were not using land as an issue or working with the peasants and that, therefore, land reform was not urgent. This is significant in itself, as a way of approaching the problem, but of more immediate interest here is his conclusion that the Communists were using land as an issue and stirring up the peasants in the Philippines, so that "here the thesis is sufficiently sound to warrant political application".

3. Pursuant to the Bell Report findings, on 14 November 1950, President Quirino and ECA Administrator William C. Foster signed a formal agreement, the so-called Quirino-Foster Agreement, in which the Philippine President, in expectation of U.S. assistance, pledged "total economic mobilization and the bold implementation of measures to fulfil the aspirations of the Filipino people".[35] Meanwhile, U.S. Agricultural Attache in Manila, Merrill W. Abbey, was closely in touch with the complexities and difficulties of the rural Philippines. During 1950 and into 1951, in a series of cables to Washington, he urged upon his superiors the need for systematic study and thorough tackling of a situation he described as grave and even intolerable. "Without proper direction", he informed them "the underdeveloped areas can easily become another Luzon."[36] (emphasis added). In cables throughout the first half of 1951, Abbey pressed Washington to send to Manila agrarian experts able to pull the various Philippine rural affairs bureaucracies together, since they seemed uncoordinated and noncooperative;[37] objected that "no qualified American has made an exhaustive study of the subject with the view of correcting an intolerable situation;"[38](emphasis added); and insisted:

"Land policy problems will require the best technical assistance available from the U.S. Much of the success of U.S. aid programs are contingent upon the ultimate solution to several land settlement matters confronting the country."[39]

Abbey sent clippings from the Manila press to impress upon his superiors in Washington the agitated state of rural Central Luzon. One such clipping, from the Philippines Herald ran a headline that read: "Lack of Land Distribution System Under ECA Aid Program Deplored." Abbey described the piece as "self-explanatory." Of an article in the Manila Times in August 1951, pointing up discontent in Central Luzon as rooted in tenant grievances, he commented "Such [reports] are appearing constantly in the press."[40] He reaffirmed the Bell Report's finding, however, that there was "great inertia in the part of the [Philippine] Government to give really serious consideration to agriculture's many besetting handicaps and longstanding maladjustments."[41]

4. While Abbey pressed from Manila for positive action on land reform, the debate on the subject within the Departments of State and Agriculture was vigorous. Early in 1951, Richard Ely of PSA, who had been in the Philippines at the time of the Sakdal uprising sixteen years before, and who had written on American land tenure problems in the 1920's[42] wrote up a memorandum for his PSA colleague Leonard Tyson in which he remarked:
"I believe we should think in the direction of impressing on the landholding classes that they are sitting on dynamite, and unless they themselves bring about reform in the treatment of tenants, they cannot hope to survive; but I doubt if you can radically change the land system in the Philippines in our time except by Communist Revolution..."

Around the same time, in March 1951, an agricultural economist named Ferber, in the Far East Division of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations (OFAR), drew up a memorandum under the heading "Land Reform in the Philippines," which OFAR Far Eastern Division chief Wilhelm Anderson first edited, then circulated widely within State and Agriculture. Both the memorandum and Anderson's conservative emendations are strikingly indicative of the political scope of the debate on land reform within the bureaucracies at that point and provide a fascinating prelude to the dramatic events that were to follow in 1952-53.

5. The Ferber memorandum was as unequivocal in its summary account of Philippine agriculture as the Atcheson-Fearey memorandum had been in its account of Japanese agriculture in 1945:

"In all respects, the peasants are in a disadvantageous position as regards the moneylenders and landowning class. They are largely illiterate, unorganized (except for the leftist groups) and susceptible to intimidation and deception. Consequently, they are commonly deprived of their civil and economic rights. The prosperity engendered by the development of export crops has not proportionately increased the real income or prosperity of the peasant producers. In fact, the gap between the rich and poor is growing wider." [44]

The author observed that tradition, inertia and avarice sustained the "landowning class" and status quo. "In the political sphere," he added, "a landowning class maintains its ascendancy, running the government in its own interests." Moreover, "costly efforts to eradicate agrarian unrest by military action have proven futile" and there was an urgent need "to induce the governing Filipino class...to bring about fundamental changes in the Philippines' traditional agrarian relationships." Wilhelm Anderson edited the text massively at this point. He crossed out "landowning class" and substituted "large estate owners." He crossed out "a landowning class" and substituted "economically powerful group." The phrase "running the government in its own interests" he struck out all together and pencilled in a question mark over it. He crossed out "the governing Filipino class" and substituted "those governing the Philippines." Whether, in fact, the Philippine government in 1951 had the degree of autonomy from the interests of the landed class that Anderson's emendations to the Ferber analysis suggest was what stood to be revealed by any vigorous espousal of land reform in the bailiwick of that class on the part of the American government.

6. In the midst of all this debate and in response to Merrill Abbey's requests, in early 1951, the ECA put together a small team of agrarian experts to go to the Philippines to tackle the deep-rooted and worsening problems of Philippine agriculture. The "qualified American", in Abbey's phrase, who was sent by the ECA specifically to examine land tenure conditions, making "an exhaustive study of the subject with the view of correcting an
intolerable situation." was Robert S. Hardie, an agricultural economist who had grown up during the 1920's in a rural Nebraska town solely dependent on agriculture, and graduated as Bachelor of Science in agriculture in 1933, being immediately recruited to the New Deal's fledgling Federal Emergency Relief Administration. He had become, by 1938, regional director of the community and family services section of the Farm Security Administration's Migratory-Labor Camp-and-Community Organization, for Utah, Nevada, California and Arizona, a body whose work has been immortalized in the form of the Weedpatch Camp, in John Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath*; [45] and then, after war service, had been trained and dispatched to Japan [46], in late 1945, to work for the Economics Unit, Agricultural Division, Natural Resources Section, G.H.Q., SCAP in Tokyo, on the land reform program. As head of the Economics Unit, from July 1946 until July 1949, Hardie was a driving force in the administration of the land reform in Japan. In writing his history of the land reform in Japan a decade later, Laurence Hewes singled out Hardie for praise. Having recalled the work of other American agrarian specialists in Japan, Hewes observed:

"But it was Robert S. Hardie, a former artillery captain, originally from Nebraska, with a fund of experience on the social problems of agriculture, particularly among the agricultural migrants of California, who set the terrific pace of work which finally got the program in motion. His tremendous physical endurance and drive pushed through a daily output that taxed everyone around him, and forced many of the Japanese to the point of exhaustion. This contribution was essential in the face of all sorts of shortages, both in material and personnel. . ."[47]

Hardie brought the same qualities with him to the Philippines, but with less fortunate results, and it may be that Hewes, writing in 1958, singled out Hardie, his friend and colleague, for praise in part to balance the rough treatment Hardie received for his work in the Philippines.

7. Following his work in Japan, Hardie went to Cambridge University, to take a tripos in economics, and it was as he concluded his studies there, in early 1951, that he received a letter from his old colleague, Raymond Davis, by then head of the Agricultural Section of the MSA (as the ECA had by then been renamed), asking him to go to the Philippines on a two year assignment "to advise the Philippine Government on the formulation and administration of a thoroughgoing land reform program." Having no interest in accepting a job that might prove futile, Hardie pressed Davis on the seriousness of the Philippine government regarding land reform. "Following receipt," he recalled in 1986, "of assurances that the Philippine Government was genuinely interested in carrying out such a reform, I answered in the affirmative."[48] The basis of Raymond Davis's assurances to Robert Hardie was the Quirino-Foster Agreement of November 1950. While the U.S. Government may have been serious about land reform on the basis of this agreement, however, the commitment of the Philippine Government of President Elpidio Quirino was another matter, as Hardie was to discover.

8. Upon his arrival in the Philippines, Hardie, with his customary energy, "immediately began a study, as thorough as possible under the circumstances,
involving an examination of all available records and reports, interviews with responsible public officials and concerned private sources and extensive field trips."[49] It is evident that Hardie proceeded on the firm conviction that the assignment he had been given was to initiate the prompt design and implementation of "a land reform program of a scope and depth necessary for achievement" of the goals set down in the Quirino-Foster Agreement.[50] Of all people, however, it was Merrill Abbey who found the assignment and singlemindedness of Hardie unsettling, as a private letter he wrote in November 1951 to Ambassador Myron Cowen, then in Washington, makes clear:

"Dear Mr. Ambassador,

Just prior to your departure you will recall your request to have me look over the submitted Land Reform Proposal by Robert Hardie, Land Tenure Specialist, ECA, and to pass an opinion along to you. In as much as neither myself nor anyone in the Economic Section or for that matter in the Embassy, except the Chief of the Political Section, have been consulted, I feel that it is rather futile to pursue the subject when basic policy objectives have apparently already been predetermined.

"I believe Land Reform is of monumental importance from the U.S. political and economic point of view. Therefore, it behooves the Department to proceed slowly as wrong policy or incorrect implementation would have far-reaching repercussions . . . there is no simple solution.

"Mr. Hardie did an excellent piece of work in Japan and worked hard to prepare a Philippine prospectus . . . however, my chief criticism of the project to date is that it is almost a one man program (underscored in the original), namely Hardie's..."[51]

This is especially interesting given Abbey's persistent calls for thorough measures to be taken to deal with "an intolerable situation" in the Philippines. What is particularly noteworthy is Abbey's apparent concern that the sending of Hardie had been a political decision made according to policy objectives set in Washington and insufficiently coordinated with the U.S. economic and agricultural specialists in the Philippines itself.

9. Within six months of his arrival in Manila Hardie had drafted a land reform proposal and sent it back to Washington for circulation and discussion. That his proposal received endorsement at that time is clear from the cable traffic. Writing to Leonard Tyson at PSA, in late January 1952, OFAR's Wilhelm Anderson, whose conservative emendations to the Ferber memorandum of March 1951 have been noted above, commented concerning the Hardie draft proposal:

"This is in reply to your memorandum of 3 Jan. in which you request an informal appraisal of the soundness, feasibility and adequacy of the land reform program for the Philippines proposed by Mr. Robert Hardy (sic) . . . I have gone over Mr. Hardy's proposals with some care and find them sound, feasible and adequate for the tasks at hand. In saying this, I am not speaking for the Dept. Agriculture, which is vitally interested in the matter, but only for the Far East Division of OFAR. My ideas in this regard are shared by Messers. Marshall D. Harris and Arthur F. Raper, the land tenure and land reform experts of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, both of whom have read the report . . .

". . . I would urge you most strongly to encourage our Embassy at Manila to support Mr. Hardy's proposals by all available means. Time is of the essence. If political stability is to be achieved in the Philippines, the Government must be actively encouraged to take positive action to improve the lot of the rural masses.

"As far as Mr. Hardy's paper is concerned, I could suggest some refinements in language and construction, but these are minor matters. It does not seem to me we need concern ourselves with the minute details of
land reform legislation. This will be discussed in great detail by the committees of the Philippine Congress, and can be influenced effectively by our officials in Manila.

"My recommendations is that you and your associates in State support fully our Embassy and STEM officials in Manila to bring about rapid implementation of Mr. Hardy's proposals." [52] (emphasis added).

As the review of the proposal continued, Secretary of State Acheson cabled the Embassy in Manila:

"... In view strong U.S. interest and support land reform in PHILS along gen lines Hardie Report and in view PHIL commitment to broad recommendations Bell Report ...
"... What actions has ADMIN or Congress taken, and who constitutes support and opposition?
"... What are probabilities enactment?
"... What progress made on corollary measures such as rural credit and marketing?
"... What further action do you suggest by U.S. GOVT at this time?" [53]

This last question by Acheson became the leading one from April 1952 through into 1953, for as a long cable from Ambassador Spruance to Acheson dated 9 April makes very clear, the U.S. Embassy in Manila had few illusions as to the enthusiasm of the Quirino Administration for land reform. Spruance informed Acheson that the Embassy was pressing Quirino and his cabinet on a number of agrarian reform issues, and running into considerable resistance. As for action by the Quirino Administration, there had been none, save a "very weak statement" by Quirino in his State of the Nation message. Concerning the political and legislative context into which the Hardie proposal was about to be thrust, Spruance informed Acheson:

"General opinion here that large part House and a number of Senators will oppose liberalizing tenant rentals, other major land reform measures unless brought into line by other considerations than their own convictions and interests. Some feeling here that newspapers may give support to good tenancy legis and that if admin is prevailed upon to introduce bill ... there is some prospect of passage. Consider no prospect enacting this session land transfer program covering substantial part of tenant farmed land. "A large number of bills dealing with landlord-tenant relationships now in Congress. None has reached point of enactment and likelihood is that most will not have serious support. Probable effectiveness these bills in solving basic problems range from completely negative to very doubtful. MSA PHILCUSA bill considered much superior to any of those under consideration." [54]

10. Ambassador Spruance had few illusions concerning the willingness of the Philippine oligarchs to legislate a serious land reform and considered that to get such a program into being the United States would have to press them very hard. He cabled Acheson on 9 April 1952:

"... Fundamental reforms in such matters as land tenure, farm credit, etc. will, if effective, adversely affect interests property-owning classes who for all practical purposes at present run country. These groups will act only under pressure and we may expect no real reforms will come about as long as they observe that they can procrastinate on such questions without jeopardizing flow of U.S. assistance. If, fearful of charges of invasion of sovereignty, we continue loans and assistance of all kinds without even suggesting or intimating that we expect some positive action on part of Phil Govt then nothing will be done. If we meet every request for assistance with counter inquiry on progress being made on reforms recommended to Phil Govt and insist on discussing such things first we may hope to get reluctant action on some but not all of reforms we envisage as necessary. This is the strategy now being followed by Emb MSA. Public statements of U.S. officials either in Washington or Manila which touch on our program in Phils shld invariably include this theme." [54]
Washington, however, was undeterred at that time. On 18 April Acheson cabled Spruance:  

"Now that Inter-Agency COMITE on Land Reform has approved general terms Hardie Report, we consider it appropriate for AMB and Renne to communicate to Quirino and PHIL GOVT U.S. gratification for interest shown in this problem by Quirino ADMIN. U.S. conviction that reform essential to future PHIL progress and stability, and U.S. GOVT desire to support PHILS in meeting this problem . . . You may wish urge PRES estab necessary machinery for implementing land reform along Hardie Report lines including drafting of necessary legislation and also point out that improvement of lot of farmers is necessary and effective part of overall anti-COMMIE campaign."[55] (emphasis added)

Taking up the very phrasing of Wilhelm Anderson, Acheson, in the same cable, advised Spruance and Renne:

"The [Hardie] Report is sound, feasible and adequate for that segment of land reform which it deals with, namely conditions of land tenure . . . It is strongly recommended that the EMB and the STEM at Manila support by all possible means the recommendations of the report . . ." (emphasis added)

Thus, some months before the final completion of Hardie's report on land tenure and land reform in the Philippines, the program that he was drawing up had been reviewed carefully and strongly approved both in Manila and in Washington.

11. Robert Hardie's report, as completed in September 1952, ran to nearly three hundred pages, forty two of these making up the body of findings and recommendations, while the remaining two hundred and forty consisted of appendixes of statistical and documentary material. It was entitled Philippine Land Tenure Reform: Analysis and Recommendations. It shall be referred to here simply as the Hardie Report. On account of this piece of work, Robert Hardie was to be denounced as a "Communist" by Philippine conservatives; one American critic was to describe the report as "the most impractical and intemperately written" report ever done for MSA in the Philippines [56], while another suggested that Hardie "showed almost no understanding of [the] political realities involved" [57]. Still other critics have asserted that Hardie's work was part of a counterinsurgency scheme, that Hardie's aim was to pacify the Philippine peasantry "through the application of land reform as a technique of social control." [58]; that "the progressive aspects of his program were based on a technical assessment of the minimum requirements for defeating Communist-led insurgency" [59]. Yet the whole of Hardie's analysis was in terms of market economics and political liberty, not centralized state or collective ownership or political power; his sense of the realities of the situation does not appear to have diverged much from that of Spruance or Acheson and his recommendations went far beyond any minimum calculation of social control or counterinsurgency.

12. Hardie twice cited the Roman maxim salus populi suprema lex, the good of the people is the highest law, which seems rather like an allusion to John Locke's second treatise of government, where the same maxim is invoked in pressing the case
for the openness of government to correction and reform.[60] He was to find the Philippine
government less amenable to reform or correction than he had perhaps hoped, but he withdrew in discomfort
and frustration, not in cynicism, and the ungenerous estimates of his work by his critics have served to
consign to oblivion what was in fact a provocative and ill-fated proposal for "rational revolution" in the
Philippines. As a proposal for thoroughgoing land reform, the Hardie Report leaves all extant Philippine
legislation on the subject, from the 1954-55 bill down to the emasculated "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program" of the Aquino government in 1988, far behind. As a bold and lucid commitment to land
reform, it leaves all subsequent American involvement in land reform in the Philippines looking timid,
inconsequential and equivocal. It constitutes a matchless point of departure for those who would criticize
both Philippine legislation and American involvement in the matter, while not wanting to lapse into the
language of Leninism.

13. Hardie made a vigorous effort to pull together the inadequate data on the
Philippine rural sector that was available in 1951-52. His chief source of statistical data was
Vol. 2 of the 1938 Census of the Philippines. "Compilation and publication of the 1948 census data
respecting agriculture, long delayed for lack of funds, is progressing with the aid of ECA assistance," he
remarked in a note at the beginning of the Report.[61] Congressman Diosdado Macapagal of Pampanga
was to assert, in early 1953, that Hardie's recommendations were based on out of date census figures, but
this was a superficial and diversionary remark. Hardie consulted all those with updated knowledge and, as
the problems he addressed had worsened during the years after 1938, not improved, his figures were, if
anything, conservative, contrary to Macapagal's insinuation. That Hardie was a Communist or fellow-
traveller, as Eugenio Perez and other conservative Filipino officials were to allege, is sufficiently confuted,
one might think, by the second paragraph of his opening, summary statement:

"In the Philippines, agriculture furnishes a livelihood to nearly three fourths of the population and
accounts for about three fifths of the national income. The industry is plagued, however, by a pernicious
land tenure system which thwarts all efforts for technological improvement in agriculture. Chronic
poverty and unrest among tenants has culminated in open and violent rebellion which the Communists are
exploiting to the full. That tenants seek to become owners of the land they cultivate is \textit{prima facie}
evidence against their adherence to, or their understanding of, the basic principles of communism. This
knowledge affords little comfort, however, for the fact remains that misery and unrest among tenants is
being used to advance the goal of communism in Asia. The problem is not a post-war phenomenon; it
has been developing for years, deeply rooted in feudal customs."[62]

There was, however, nothing "minimal" about Hardie's analysis or recommendations.

"The causes of rural poverty and consequent unrest are not far to seek. (a) The smallness of farms acts to
limit potential gross income. As a national average, the tillable land area per farm is 3 hectares. Farms
containing less than 2 hectares of tillable land, constituting more than 1/2 the total farms, occupy less
than 1/5 the tillable land area. (b) Tenant frequency is high, averaging about 35% for the nation as a
whole and soaring to more than 70% in those areas where unrest is greatest. (c) Farm rentals are
oppressive. Most tenants pay 50% of the gross product ... as rent. (d) Net family incomes derived from
farm operations are woefully inadequate for a decent standard of living. Farm family income from outside
sources is insignificant. (e) Interest paid by tenants on borrowed money is grossly onerous. Annual rates
of 100% are common and rates of 200% and even higher are not unusual. The majority of small farmers
borrow regularly from year to year. (f) A lack of adequate and economic storage, marketing and buying facilities forces farmers to sell in a low price market and buy in a high. (g) Guarantees against ruinous prices are non-existent. (h) The development of institutions conducive to the growth and strengthening of democratic principles has long been neglected in the rural areas. (i) Other factors bearing on economic instability include minimum wages, taxation and inheritance.”[63]

14. Hardie’s picture of the Philippine rural economy recalls the indictment of American agrarian ills by Tugwell and Wallace, as by Steinbeck and Caldwell, in the 1930’s - the background of his own work and experience - and one has only to read his report to find the allegation that he was pre-occupied with "techniques of social control" or with minimal defence of American interests simply untenable:

"The land tenure system affects every phase of the nation’s social, economic and political life. Its correction is a matter of vital importance to numerous interests other than tenant farmers alone. (a) Political Stability: Open and violent rebellion, rooted in and fed by tenant discontent threatens the very existence of the Republic. (b) Agricultural Production: Generally speaking, in the Philippines concentration of land ownership is inimical to maximum production; abilities and incentives for efficient management tend to decrease as the size of holdings increase; tenants grow indignant of the marginal effect when half the gains derived thereby accrue to the interests of others. (c) Industry: Development suffers so long as rentier wealth lies dormant in land and is thus denied to the needs of industrial investment. (d) Fiscal Management: Tax burdens mount with increasing costs for maintaining law and order while initiation of fiscal policies vital to the entire economy must be held in abeyance for want of funds. (e) Morale: And then there are the effects of misery and unrest and violence on the individual citizen, his family, his church, which history will for many years continue to measure.”[64]

15. Hardie was forthright, concise and unsparing in his criticism of prior efforts at, or evasions of, land reform in the Philippines:

"... the term "social justice" has seen much service in written and spoken form. But all such implementing laws are weak in structure and limited in scope. They have been rendered ineffective by legal status for ambiguities, by judicial practices inspired by feudal culture, by lax enforcement, and through failure on the part of Congress to provide funds necessary for the accomplishment of stated aims. Responsibility for the enforcement of existing legislation is scattered through several Departments with little or no coordination of related interests. Administrators, strained by efforts to enforce ambiguous and piecemeal legislation, often appear to have adopted apathetic and indolent attitudes respecting remedial action.”[65]

Pursuant to this, Hardie trenchantly summarized decades of American awareness of and inaction on the land tenure problem in the Philippines:

"Numerous studies and reports on the Philippine Land Tenure problem have been prepared by qualified and properly constituted bodies since the origin of American Government interest in the Philippines. All have noted its pernicious character, recognized its implications and recommended remedial action. None have found to the contrary.”[66]

"... The land tenure pattern is an integral part of Philippine culture. The Americans inherited the situation from the Spaniards who, in the beginning of the 17th century, had carefully adjusted their colonial methods to harmonize with the social and economic structure of an earlier Asiatic form of feudalism. Although not satisfied with the situation, the Americans failed to take effective measures to correct it.”[67]
Finally, Hardie stressed that pioneer land settlement, or the "Mindanao first," slogan was no better than a
distraction from the chief problem. In this respect, he was refreshingly candid by comparison with many
disquisitions on Philippine agrarian problems before and since:

"The thought that the solution to Philippine agrarian unrest is to be found in the settlement of
underdeveloped areas, is based on a false appraisal of the problem. Firstly, world experience proves that
increases in population will alone serve to neutralize the planned effects of emigration. Secondly, the
acquisition of and settlement of such land by one in the status of a typical Luzon tenant requires cash
reserves he does not have. Lastly, and most basic, is the fact that these newly developed areas are after all
a part of the Philippines and subject to the laws and customs of the land. If not corrected, pernicious land
tenure practices which have led to violent rebellion in Luzon will continue being transported to the newly
developed area, thus spreading the misery and unrest. Land tenure reform is needed quite as much for
Mindanao as for Luzon. Settlement of new areas is an imperative, but it is no substitute for land tenure
reform..."[68] (emphasis added)

16. The political implications of Hardie's findings were such that out of
conservatism or delicacy he might have muted or softened the conclusions he drew
from them. That he did not do so was the single reason for the criticism and even abuse levelled at him
from right and left. Read in the light of subsequent and current developments, his plain conclusions seem
both prescient and incisive. The passages that follow were the most "controversial" in the Hardie Report,
simply because Hardie showed himself to be neither a Communist nor prepared to indulge the prejudices and
sensitivities of anti-Communist conservatives, nor willing to engage in vague wishful thinking. They read
very well and provocatively in the 1980's:

"Chronic economic instability and political unrest among farm tenants has culminated in open and violent
rebellion. The rebellion derives directly from the pernicious land tenure system; it is but the latest in a
long and bitter series. Communists have acted quickly and directly to exploit the situation as a part of the
general movement against capitalism in Asia--as they did in China and Korea. In championing the cause
of tenants, communism wins their sympathies--just as governments (or supporters of governments),
careless of causes, whose actions are limited to the suppression of symptoms and maintenance of the
status quo, are bound to win their enmity . . . Taking into consideration the landless as well as tenant
farmers, it is possible that the sympathies at least 35 percent of the population are open for bid--and this
in the rural areas alone.[69]

"... There is no reason to believe, unless the cause be remedied, that rebellion will not spread. Neither is
there any reason to believe that the rebellious spirit, nurtured by years of poverty and strife, will be
broken by the force of arms or appeased by palliatives in the form of a questionable security in Mindanao.
Relief from the oppressive burden of caciquism has been too long sought--and too long denied. Years of
privation, suppression, and empty promises, have served apparently to endow tenant demands with a
moral as well as an economic character. Tenants demand correction of the basic inequities which
characterize the agrarian pattern. Growth and development of a peaceful and democratic rural economy will
come into existence only when these basic inequities have been eliminated.[70]

"... Unless corrected, it is easy to conceive of the situation worsening to a point where the United
States would be forced to take direct, expensive and arbitrary steps to insure against loss of the
Philippines to the Communist block in Asia--and would still be faced with finding a solution
to the underlying problem..."[71] (emphasis added)

"Suggestions for "further study of the problem" and fears of "hastily conceived remedies" ring hollow
and as something less than original in light of the fact that officially constituted bodies have been
recommending remedial action since the time of Taft; and that, even now, open rebellion threatens the
very existence of the democracy in the Philippines. This is hardly a time when, to borrow from Tacitus, "indolence stands for wisdom"... Any action (or inaction) capable of interpretation by tenants as more procrastination would be an aid to the Communists."[72]

17. At the conclusion of Part III, Para 23 of his report, under the heading "Is Immediate Land Reform Justified?" Hardie stated categorically: "The evidence favoring an immediate and thorough land reform in the Philippines is overwhelming." He then proceeded to an extended discussion of the concept, order of priorities, legislative and financial organization and public information aspects of implementing such a reform. Of his numerous observations under various headings in the ensuing fifteen pages, perhaps the most interesting and most pertinent to analysis of Philippine land reform debates fall under the heading "Inadequacy of Existing Concepts:"

"In reviewing the record respecting the need for the abolition of tenancy and the establishment of owner farmers on privately owned tillable lands, one is struck by the fact that the thought behind such consideration has been confined almost exclusively to "landed estates." The term (and concept) permeates Philippine law and even writers of the Bell Report incorporated it into what might otherwise have been a specific recommendation. However satisfying the phrase may be to those who would "abolish feudalism," the term is absolutely ambiguous and has in the past served only to becloud apparently benevolent legislation with charges of discrimination. Existing law respecting the subject is, therefore, totally ineffective. Aside, however, from the ambiguity of the term "landed estates," the concept is subject to much more basic criticism. In the first place, it places the whole idea of reform in an extremely negative light—it would destroy large (?) estates rather than create owner-cultivators—the idea becomes one of "soaking the rich" just because they are rich and to help the poor just because they are poor. Secondly, it would confine opportunities for becoming an owner-cultivator to those "fortunate" enough to have leased from an estate owner. Aside from other faults involved in this criticism, the proposition becomes even more disturbing when one remembers that it is no more glorious to be a tenant of a small owner than of a large—that as a matter of fact, tenants of the larger and more economically secure owners the world over are usually subject to much more favorable treatment than are those who rent from small owners whose meager incomes make benevolence to their tenants a luxury they can ill afford. Thirdly, it limits what should be a vital and necessary reform to a haphazard, piecemeal discriminatory program. The courts have quite justly questioned the validity of considering such law as serving to improve "public welfare," have condemned it as a measure to satisfy few and selfish interests, and have, therefore, named action under it unconstitutional. Fourthly, the concept would not eliminate tenancy—but only "landed estates." A great deal of land capable for use as a source upon which to establish owner-operators of family-sized farms would be left untouched..."[73]

This offers a most instructive commentary on the whole debate concerning "retention limits" and "smaller landowners" which has for decades been a feature of land reform debate in the Philippines rather at the expense of concentrating on the abolition of tenancy and, as Hardie argued, "a positive program aimed at creating the maximum practicable number of owner-operated family-sized farms."[74]

18. Having examined all existing legislation and the bureaucracies involved in Philippine rural affairs, Hardie urged a veritable clean sweep and the setting of things on a new and sound footing. The laws governing acquisition of privately owned farm land should be repealed and replaced by a new code based on detailed recommendations as set out in Part IV of the report, he wrote. Laws respecting landlord-tenant relations "should be combined into one single law, purged
of ambiguities, extended to include all crops...and geographical areas in the Philippines" and so on.[75] (emphasis added) The bureaucratic machinery "scattered through three Departments with little or no coordination" and mandated under "piecemeal and impotent legislation" was, in his judgement, quite inadequate to the major tasks of agrarian reform and ought to be superseded by "an Authority created specifically for the purpose, working directly under the President."[76] The work ought and could be accomplished expeditiously, he argued. The land transfer could be accomplished within two years from the enactment of enabling legislation. Title registration would require another three years; amortization of tenant payments and retirement of bonds granted in compensation for land expropriated under the law "should require about thirty years."[77] It is of some interest to note that Hardie's computed timetable for a comprehensive land reform would have seen it enacted in 1953, and completed not later than 1985.[78] Considering that these years brought no such reform and that by 1985 the Philippine state and economy were in major crisis, from which the 1986 overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos has proven no more than a respite, this timetable is worth entering into the record. I include it here as Table 6.

19. At Para 32, "What Would Be the Educational and Informational Requirements For a Tenure Program?", Hardie stressed the need for wide and thorough dissemination of the objectives and progress of a genuine land reform program. This was to become an immediate bone of contention between the land reformers and President Quirino and, of course, it remains an issue of enormous significance. Hardie's characteristically lucid and plainspoken observations on this point, therefore, merit being registered:

"One half of the people in the Philippines are illiterate; the number of small farmers (particularly tenants) with experience in being able to decide their own questions--let alone to act officially in the solution of those of others--is negligible; many are without experience as members of organizations; few have access to current periodicals; many are awed by the law; many will be subject to the sabotaging arguments and acts to be expected from some landlords and all communists. And yet it is this very group who must be made to understand what the program holds for them--of the need for vigilant and intelligent cooperation if the program is to be successful.

"Land reform cannot be carried out in Manila. Decisions respecting status of individual land parcels and farm operators must be made on the spot by persons thoroughly acquainted with the real situation... Furthermore, the record shows public officials to have at times been subject to graft, and that the acts of Congress, although ostensibly favoring land reform, have been weak and ambiguous. Inasmuch as a majority of the public appear to favor reform, continuing and widespread publicity on the nature and accomplishments of the program is mandatory if the program is to accomplish its objective."[79]

20. On the basis of this prospectus, Hardie elaborated in seventeen pages his specific recommendations for a land reform:

"(1) To abolish insofar as practicable, the institution of tenancy in Philippine agriculture.

"(2) To establish to the maximum practicable degree a rural economy based on owner-operated family-sized farms."
"(3) To establish fair tenancy practices for that portion of farmers who continue to work the land as tenants.

"(4) To eliminate hindrances to the fruition of objectives set forth in (1), (2) and (3) immediately above."

The whole reform, under the direction of the proposed Land Reform Authority, should be guided at all times by the principles of

"(1) The fundamental dignity of man, and

"(2) Private rather than state, individual rather than collective ownership of land."[80]

While arguing zero-retention for absentee landlords and 4 to 8 hectares for owner-cultivators, Hardie stressed that precise retention ceilings, subject to the objectives of the comprehensive land reform, "are questions to be settled by appropriate officials within the Philippine Government."[81]

21. "My report . . . was completed, published and ready for distribution, by the fall of 1952," Hardie recalled thirty five years later:

"Heading the second paragraph of its Prefatory Statement was advice that it was 'intended to serve as the basis for policy discussion and program planning'. Copies of the Report were formally delivered by Dr. Roland R. Renne, Head of Mission (STEM) to Mr. Jose Yulo, Dr. Renne's counterpart in the Philippine Government. Though as far as I know the Government of the Philippines received the Report in a congenial manner, it never made an official response - neither by way of acceptance, rejection or suggestion for modification of the recommendations it contained. I was informed only that President Quirino did not want the Report made public. Though this request by the President violated an extremely important condition contained in the Quirino-Foster Agreement, the Mission chose that it was to be honored and I was so informed."[82]

22. A copy of the Hardie Report was also delivered by Ambassador Spruance to Philippine Foreign Secretary Joaquin Elizalde at the Foreign Office on 12 September 1952. Attached to it was a brief Aide Memoire which read in part as follows:

"It is the firm conviction of the Government of the United States that in most countries in the world, including the United States, economic progress and political stability are closely related to the prevailing systems of agricultural economic institutions . . .

"... The Ambassador of the United States and the Chief of the Mutual Security Agency Mission in Manila have been instructed to emphasize that it is the view of the Government of the United States that land reform is essential to the economic progress and political stability of the Philippines without which the menace of Communism cannot be permanently checked.

"The American Embassy and the MSA will be happy to provide further technical assistance to the Philippines in formulating a definite program of land reform. Furthermore, when the Government of the Philippines is prepared to move ahead with a positive land reform program, the MSA is prepared to provide funds and personnel in addition to those already being provided to aid in rapid and thorough cadastral surveys, title registration and clearance, and other measures needed to correct this major cause of agrarian unrest in the Philippines."
"The Government of the Philippines is urged to give early consideration to the questions raised and the suggestions made in the attached report with the assurance of continuing interest and encouragement of the Government of the United States in any effort to bring about improvement."[83]
You Spoke The Truth.

1. Ambassador Admiral Raymond Ames Spruance, a great naval commander in the Pacific War, was a man of few words, but effective action, and proved to be an excellent ambassador, "unusually adept at achieving agreements and understanding with quiet conversations."

Not by temperament an interventionist, and in this respect differing from his predecessor Myron Cowen, Spruance "made few statements for public release during his stay in the Philippines" and was described by the *Manila Daily Bulletin* on his departure from the Philippines in March 1955 as "the quiet ambassador." An old "Jeffersonian" American and admirer of Henry George, Spruance was repelled by the corrupt and patrician character of the Quirino Administration. In a letter to his daughter of late 1952, he remarked:

"All we can do out here is to point out what we think is wrong and the remedies, and hope to get enough honest and patriotic Filipinos in the Government to correct conditions. We can bring pressure to bear on the Government to pass the laws we think are necessary, but we cannot get the laws enforced against the wealthy minority who are now in control . . . all this is discouraging . . . ."

Spruance's tact and patience were tested by Quirino throughout late 1952, as the Ambassador waited for the Philippine President to comply with prior understandings and respond to or release the Hardie Report. In mid-October, Hardie and MSA STEM chief Roland Renne were invited to meet with President Quirino and his advisors at Malacanang, but at the meeting Hardie found himself "neither questioned nor consulted" and no comment was made on his Report. While awaiting a response to the Report during September, October and November 1952, Hardie "formulated and supervised the drafting of two legislative proposals, both of which were vital to a comprehensive land reform: one, a measure to regulate landlord-tenant agreements, the other designed to regulate agricultural labor relations." These proposals were duly submitted to the Quirino Administration, and were "treated in the same manner as the Report had been and was being treated." In mid-December, Ambassador Spruance decided that suppression of the Hardie Report by the Quirino Administration did not accord with the terms of the Quirino-Foster Agreement or conduce to achievement of the reforms envisaged therein, as in the Bell Report, and he decided to act.

2. By mid-December 1952, the Hardie Report had become rumor in Manila press circles, and Spruance decided to break a controlled story on 16 December. He called in a UPI journalist based in Manila, discussed the matter of land reform with him and encouraged him to file a story in New York publicizing the main arguments of the Hardie Report. The journalist, seeking a headline, seized upon the phrase on page 8 of the Hardie Report in which Hardie had warned of the possibility of deterioration of the situation in the Philippines "to a point where the United States would be forced to take direct, expensive and arbitrary steps to insure against loss of the Philippines to the Communist block in Asia." When the story was filed in New York, inquiries were made of the Department of State concerning its authenticity. There was a flurry of cables between the Embassy in
Manila and Department of State and Spruance took steps to balance and fill out the story for further press treatment. Efforts were made to suppress the story and on 20 December a modified version appeared in the *Philippines Herald*, datelined Washington 18 December. From there the story was taken up by the *Manila Bulletin, Daily Mirror, Manila Times, Manila Chronicle* and *Philippines Free Press*. The U.S. Embassy received a rush of requests for copies of the Hardie Report "from all quarters, including social science, agriculture and economics teachers and students."[91] The press and public reaction was overwhelmingly favorable. Having failed to smother the Hardie Report with silence, President Quirino and those around him were embarrassed by its release and sought to deflect its impact.

3. When, on 17 December, the Department of State cabled Spruance inquiring about the UPI story, Spruance responded that the Embassy considered it "lurid and sensational and not (rpt not) conducive to securing Philippine cooperation in solving this basic problem." His account of the press "leak" is an interesting study in diplomatic-press relations:

"...Emb learned that such a story was in making and arranged mtg yesterday between Symonds and Amb. at which time the whole land reform program was discussed, including Bell Mission and Hardie reports and two Phil Comite reports. Special emphasis was put on desirability of approaching land distribution realistically, excepting sugarlands from small individual holding breakup. Symonds' attention called to delay in issuing land titles and other pertinent and correctable phases of problem, but these which would have made a strong straightforward account left out in favor of sensational treatment. When Symonds left, Amb. believed a hard-hitting, constructive, factual story wld be outcome and deplores story as transmitted . . ."[92] (emphasis added)

Spruance contacted Foreign Secretary Elizalde, encouraged him to contact the Philippine Ambassador in Washington, Carlos P. Romulo, in an effort to suppress the story "if not (rpt not) already disseminated" and suggested Department of State "take parallel action if possible."[93] The Department of State responded that the story was already out but that the U.S. press "does not seem particularly interested." It was on 20 December that the first summary of the Hardie Report appeared in the Manila press, with a long article in the *Philippines Herald*, with which the Embassy expressed satisfaction. Concerning this summary of the recommendations of the Hardie Report, Spruance cabled Acheson:

"Writer obviously has access to complete Hardie report. Embassy of opinion Philippine Government well-conditioned for the First public account of Hardie Report by Embassy consultations with Elizalde ...and Quirino and feels no (rpt no) serious repercussions will be forthcoming. Other local newspapers have as yet made no (rpt no) mention of subject."[94]

4. If Elizalde and Quirino were "well-conditioned" to deal with the release of the Hardie Report, it was due to more than consultations with the U.S. Embassy. They were tough political animals and they fought back against Spruance's quiet, persistent pressure by singling out the language of the Hardie Report as objectionable and raising precisely the issue Spruance had anticipated in his 9 April 1952 cable to Acheson - Philippine sovereignty and U.S. intervention therein. Spruance cabled Acheson on 22 December:
"When Elizalde discussed Hardie Rpt Dec. 18 with Emb. officer, he took exception language of report which he said was insulting to independent nations. He said that when report originally scrutinized by Quirino, Pres. became irate and refused to study document seriously. Elizalde said Phil Govt could not use Hardie rpt as basis discussions land reform problem with U.S. While this remark made in heat of discussion, engendered by revelations in Symonds' art . . . it can nevertheless be taken as indication attitude Phil Govt toward land reform in general and Hardie rpt in particular."[95] (emphasis added)

On 23 December, Quirino arranged a "meeting" at Malacanang with a group of tenants and farmers from Pampanga, led by Congressman Diosdado Macapagal, at which these tenants told him, according to the official Malacanang press release, that the Hardie Report was misleading and there was no unrest in Pampanga. The release went on:

"They pointed particularly to that part of the report which recommended that all estates be bought by the government and then distributed among the people. They told the President that this is exactly what the Huks are preaching and they expressed grave concern about the matter.[96] (emphasis added)

Quirino had hit upon a red smear as a way to deal with the Hardie Report and though careful not to compromise himself by personally and publicly denouncing the Report, he seems to have encouraged others to do exactly that.

5. The foremost spokesman for the anti-Hardie smear campaign was House Speaker Eugenio Perez. Even as the Manila Bulletin serialized a condensed version of the Hardie Report on 24, 25 and 26 December, Perez publicly denounced what he called the "many radical ideas in the report which can be regarded as leftist in inclination," charged that MSA experts were getting their information from "unreliable sources with communist tendencies," and declared that there ought to be more thorough screening of MSA experts by the U.S. and Philippine Governments to ensure that radicals like Hardie did not come to work in the country. The release of a second MSA report, the McMillan/Rivera Report on rural living standards, at this point, raised conservative Philippine tempers even higher. Speaker Perez, in the words of Teodoro Locsin of the Philippines Free Press, "really hit the ceiling."[97] He called the McMillan/Rivera Report "malicious" and, along with the Hardie Report, an attempt to "incite the Filipino people against their government." Both were "communist-inspired" Perez asserted, deploring what he called the MSA's "program of hate" against the Philippines. Have they come here "to help or to criticize?" he asked.[98] He announced that he would ask President Quirino to file a formal note of protest with the United States Government against the MSA's activities.[99] If the U.S. wants to assist the Philippines, he declared, it should eschew sending "men of doubtful persuasions" and simply supply the Philippine Government with money to fund its own, perfectly adequate rural programs. Commented Locsin: "And, presumably, no questions asked. No accounting to be made."

6. Not all Filipino politicians joined the governing Liberal Party men in attacking the MSA Reports. Liberal Senator Quintin Paredes, as reported in the Christmas Day edition of the Manila Times, rebuked Perez for his insinuations that the U.S. had sent experts of
Communist persuasions or with other than benign intent. The Nationalist Party bosses were especially forthcoming in defence of the MSA Reports, seeing in the embarrassment of the Quirino Administration a chance to throw it off balance in the upcoming Presidential election of 1953. Senator Gil Puyat and Senator Cipriano Primicias, both Nacionalistas, were reported as repudiating the language and substance of Perez’s remarks. Senator Primicias informed MSA chief Roland Renne that the Nacionalist senators as a group applauded the veracity of the MSA Reports. He told Renne that the Hardie Report was not intervention in Philippine affairs and was opposed by Malacanang because it had told the truth. Jose B. Laurel, Jr. was reported as saying he would “place the opposition in the vanguard of the general agitation for implementation of the MSA-PHILCUSA Reports.”[100] (emphasis added) Senate President Eulogio Rodriguez described the Hardie Report as providing “a true picture” of Philippine agrarian affairs. Nacionalista Congressman Numeriano Babao, of Batangas, observed, in response to Perez’s diatribe: “To my knowledge, these American experts . . . (came) . . . with no other intention than to assist our country in its multifarious economic and social problems so that we could stand on our own feet.”[101] The U.S. Embassy drew encouragement from all this. Spruance cabling Acheson on 6 January 1953:

"...I believe current public discussion of these problems is very beneficial. It looks as if Nacionalistas might approve measures we feel essential to welfare Philippines and necessary to eliminate conditions producing recruits for Communists. Quirino as you know refused opportunity to take this side. A division on basis of principle between Liberals and Nacionalistas would be very healthy development in political life of Philippines."[102]

The breach between Elpidio Quirino and Raymond Spruance had been opened which, within just over a month, led the American Ambassador and his NSC/CIA counterinsurgency man, Edward G. Lansdale, to single out Elpidio Quirino’s Defense Secretary, Ramon Magsaysay, and throw U.S. backing behind him as a 1953 Presidential candidate against the incumbent Quirino.

7. On 7 January 1953, the U.S. Embassy staff and the leading members of the Quirino Administration held a conference at Malacanang "to discuss the situation created by the publicity of the Hardie Report on land reform and the McMillan/Rivera report on living conditions in the barrios."[103] Present at the meeting on the American side were Ambassador Spruance, DCM William Lacy, MSA Chief Roland R. Renne, Deputy MSA Chief Edward Prentice, Economic Counsel to the Embassy Daniel M. Braddock, and possibly others. Neither Robert Hardie nor Robert McMillan seems to have been present. On the Philippine side were President Quirino, Foreign Secretary Joaquin Elizalde, Secretary of Finance Aurelio Montinola, Governor of the Central Bank Miguel Cuaderno and Senator Tomas Cabili. The meeting was summarized in a long despatch by Braddock to the Department of State two days later. Describing the conference as having been "rather tense, but not unfriendly," Braddock noted that Quirino was prepared to approve of the two reports as "studies" but remonstrated strongly "against the implication which he regarded as contained in the reports that his administration was responsible" for the rural conditions described in them. Quirino burst forth against the "threat" of American "intervention in case the land tenure situation was not corrected,"
regarding which Spruance "replied to the effect that if conditions continued to provide a breeding ground for Huks, U.S. military aid to the Philippines would probably have to be increased." Braddock added: "The President again with much feeling, asked, "You subscribe to that statement (about "direct, expensive and arbitrary steps")? Then, getting better control of himself, the President said in effect, "you offer to help us maintain our internal stability, but in case we fail, because of lack of money, you believe the U.S. should take direct, expensive and arbitrary steps." The U.S. Ambassador responded that the U.S. only wanted to help the Philippines and reaffirmed "the need for effective land reform."

8. The character of the conference is captured best in Braddock's record of a part of the dialogue, in which the parading of nationalist pique is somewhat denuded of credibility by the evident and express desire of President Quirino to suppress the hard-hitting reports and with them both political damage to his cultivated public image and the pressure for a comprehensive agrarian reform:

CABILI: The publication was not sufficiently gone over. Can't we arrange a meeting to study it?
QUIRINO: That is what this meeting is for.
SPRUANCE: The Report has been gone over carefully and officially as a study.
QUIRINO: As a study it is excellent.
CABILI: Was its publication approved by MSA and the Embassy?
SPRUANCE: Yes, I ordered it.
QUIRINO: Factual studies I like. It is the manner in which the Report was presented that I object to.
MONTINOLA: The Bell Mission said many of the same things, but said them in a more acceptable fashion.
PRENTICE: Was not the Aide Memoire that transmitted the Report the official document?
ELIZALDE: As an MSA study, the Report contains many things that should have been left out. It most undiplomatic.
SPRUANCE: We tried to eliminate things which were likely to affect Philippine sensibilities.
ELIZALDE: Who said anything about sensibilities?
QUIRINO: The MSA is free to suggest anything if it wishes, but it is not free to criticize the Government. This Report is a threat.
CUADERNO: This kind of situation is why Sukarno didn't want MSA in Indonesia.
QUIRINO: As a study I accept it, but why publicize it? It should be a tool, a modus operandi, to help us carry out our objectives.
CABILI: We were not consulted about this Report.
MONTINOLA: It is destroying public confidence in the Government.
QUIRINO: Certain references to Government indifference and apathy in the Reports are having a bad effect on the public. These reports should not, for this reason, be treated as public documents.
SPRUANCE: Is not land reform of public interest?
ELIZALDE: But it is the language of the Report.
QUIRINO: I want to thank you for letting me get this out of my system. This matter should not come between us. These Reports are for us who have to solve the problems, but they are not for the newspapers and not for the working people...From now on I shall request that all these reports be kept confidential, which are controversial in nature and which put the Government on the defensive.[104] (emphasis added).

9. The "bad effect on the public" that so concerned Quirino seems to have consisted of a chorus of approval for the Hardie Report, language and all. Congressman Edmundo Cea (Nac., Camarines Sur) actually commended the "brutal frankness" of Hardie. Jesus
Bigornia, writing for the *Manila Bulletin*, chided "a touchy Philippine officialdom" for expressing "violent exception to a few hard truths."[105] Pablo Manlapit of the United Labor Political Action Committee told the *Manila Times* on 2 January that ULPAC had examined the Hardie Report and found "nothing which could justify the spirited criticism of the report coming from certain local political quarters." Manlapit described the Hardie Report as "factual, forthright, sincere, precise and accurate," declared that the conclusions arrived at were based on the facts found and that the recommendations "for improvement of an undesirable situation are well thought out, thorough and farseeing."[106] One Leon S. Cruz of Caloocan, Rizal, writing to the editor of the *Philippines Free Press*, rebutted Eugenio Perez's and Elpidio Quirino's assertions that what was needed was American money: "Speaker Eugenio Perez said that what the Filipinos need is money and more money. No, sir, he is wrong! What they need are honest and efficient leaders who can save democracy in this country, and can put into effect the good recommendations of the Hardie Report."[107] Nowhere was Perez better scouted than in the columns of the *Philippines Free Press*, which took him to task, as it did Quirino, for his diatribes against the MSA:

"Exaggerated, President Quirino said. A true picture, says Senate President Rodriguez. 'Rather than criticize the MSA Report,' he says, 'We must find means to implement its recommendations.'

"Those who would know the truth have merely to go to the barrios to find out who is lying. Or, to put it more gently, who is misinformed.

"Is it true that, as Speaker Perez phrased it, the American aid program has been converted by 'men of doubtful persuasions' into a 'program of hate' against the Filipinos? Is it further true that, as the Speaker put it, 'America wants to exact its pound of flesh for every half-pound that it gives to the Filipinos?'

"In the first place, it may be noted that the Speaker involves himself here in a contradiction. The first question implies that America means well by the Philippines, is ready to help for the sake of helping, but that its program of aid has been converted by American subversives into a program of hate against the country. Yet in almost the same breath the Speaker accuses America of being a murderous usurer (the Speaker's reference is to Shylock) demanding twice for what it gives, squeezing the heart's blood out of the Filipino people, shrieking for its pound of flesh. The Speaker should get together with himself."

Accompanying the *Philippines Free Press* article by Teodoro Locsin, in which these remarks were made, was a photograph of General Douglas MacArthur. The writer compared the Hardie Report with SCAP's land reform in Japan, and under MacArthur's picture placed the caption "Communist inspired?" Perhaps Locsin might have been given food for thought had he asked Ezra Benson, or Harry Kern and James Lee Kauffman of the American Council on Japan was SCAP's land reform "Communist inspired?"

10. The anti-Hardie lobby was extensive. As the *Manila Bulletin* noted in late December 1952, the views of Eugenio Perez were shared by Rep. Jose Y. Feliciano (Lib., Tarlac) of the House Committee on Agriculture, Rep. Diosdado Macapagal (Lib., Pampanga), chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Rep. Jose O. Corpus (Lib., Nueva Ecija), chairman of the Committee on Agrarian and Social Welfare.[109] The wealthy Jose Yulo, PHILCUSA chairman at odds with his deputy, Dr. Amando Dalisay, broke his silence on the subject on 7 January by, on the one hand, defending the Rivera/McMillan Report from attacks by Quirino and Perez, but washing his hands of the Hardie Report as an MSA document which was no responsibility of PHILCUSA.[110] Meanwhile, in a red rap
that was to last for months, Tito V. Tizon (Lib., Samar), chairman of the House Committee on UnFilipino Activities, having secured a copy of the Hardie Report from Jose Yulo at PHILCUSA, denounced it as "a gross misrepresentation of actual conditions."[111] On 3 January 1953, Amando Dalisay appeared before the CUFA and, in response to its questions regarding the charges levelled at Hardie by Eugenio Perez, told the Committee that Hardie had no Communist leanings. Pressed by Committee member Senator Francisco Delgado, Dalisay "asked the committee to invite Hardie for a full determination of the facts surrounding the conclusions and recommendations arrived at" in the MSA Report.[112] The culmination of Tizon's campaign against Hardie came, however, in April 1953, when he urged the Quirino Administration to insist that all copies of the Hardie Report be withdrawn from circulation and to "study the possibility of criminally prosecuting all persons responsible for the preparation, release and publication of the Hardie land reform paper."[113] The nature of the case was magnificently captured in a cartoon published on the front page of the Manila Daily Mirror on Saturday, 3 January 1953, under the caption "A Serious Offence." [Facsimile 1] The cartoon depicted the Hardie Report about to be burned at the stake and a hunchbacked figure, bearing the torch of bigotry, representing the CUFA and the landed interests. Bound to a stake and looking dismayed, the Hardie Report pleads: "What have I done?" The hunchback's cynical answer says it all: "You spoke the truth!"

11. The U.S. Embassy and MSA had anticipated resistance from Philippine conservatives to Hardie's land reform proposal, as Spruance's cables make clear. Nor were they apparently daunted by the initial vehement attacks on the Hardie Report. The conclusion to Braddock's 9 January despatch summarizing the 7 January meeting at Malacanang, indicates that they saw themselves as having delivered an enlivening push against such conservative inertia, while fully appreciating that such inertia remained a major obstacle to reform of any thoroughgoing kind:

"The Embassy is not encouraged to believe that the Malacanang conference will help much in settling the fundamental issue. It does not believe that the Quirino Administration is likely to undertake a genuine land reform program designed to liquidate the large landed estates.[sic] Some gain, however, has probably been made . . . The issue of land reform has been put plainly before the people, and will certainly play a part in the coming elections. The opposition party, if only to embarrass the Administration, has hailed the Reports as exposing the Government's neglect of a situation crying for attention, and to some extent has thereby committed itself to a reform program if and when it should come to power. "Our insistence on the need for land reform has undoubtedly put some strain on our general relations with the Quirino Government. Some of the language of the Reports has provided the Government with an excuse to charge the United States with a threat of intervention, and this aspect is currently receiving prominent play in one of the newspapers, the [Manila] Chronicle. But the harm done is not regarded as serious or permanent, and on balance the Embassy believes that the best interests of the United States have been served by the publicity which has attended the two Reports."[114] (emphasis added)

12. Under the bold heading "U.S. Intervention" on 17 January 1953, the nimble and tireless Teodoro Locsin wielded his pen once more with singular dexterity against Speaker Perez and the anti-Hardie lobby:
"... When the United States sent economic aid and military equipment, it was intervening in Philippine affairs. Of course. But the Philippine Government liked that kind of intervention; nobody made a squawk. Many officials got rich from the economic aid, if the country did not. And American arms not only contained Communism, they froze the feudal system that inspired the revolt in Central Luzon. "The 'era of good feeling' lasted quite a while. This month it came, more or less abruptly, to an end. The Hardie Report on the tenancy system . . . produced outrages of American intervention. Not only that. The documents were, according to one critic, Speaker Perez, "communist-inspired." The MSA documents had only one purpose: to discredit the administration and help bring about the government's fall— to the Reds. Protest must be made to Washington. This is, if not war, gentlemen, intervention . . ."[115]

Writing for the Christian Science Monitor in April 1953, David Sternberg, the paraplegic American journalist, resident in Quezon City since 1939 and an American intelligence agent in the 1950's and '60's, wrote that charges of U.S. intervention came chiefly from Quirino and the Liberals around him, including Diosdado Macapagal and Tito Tizon. "All other sources," he averred, "including the Manila press" regarded the MSA Reports with favor.[116] Diosdado Macapagal, who as President in 1963 was to claim that his land reform legislation would complete an "unfinished revolution" in the Philippines, was an outspoken critic of the Hardie Report. There were, to be sure, problems with the country's agriculture, he said on 27 December 1952, but "to say that the system threatens the very existence of the Republic is to be unduly alarmed, like being before a candle-light and seeing a conflagration."[117] (emphasis added). The Huk rebellion might have required action of some kind, but it had, Macapagal asserted, been quelled by Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay and no longer threatened the Republic.

13. It was Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay, in fact, who became the centerpiece in efforts by Spruance to oust Quirino and bring to power a reform-minded Philippine regime. In a controversial move that has still not received proper historical examination, the U.S. Embassy, with the clear encouragement of Washington, decided, in February 1953, to back Magsaysay against Quirino in the 1953 Philippine Presidential elections. It was a covert operation, with Lansdale and his team handling the candidate and funnelling hundreds of thousands of American dollars into the Magsaysay campaign chest. Though denounced ever since by Philippine nationalists as an imperialist conspiracy, this covert operation was not, in itself, a conservative move, but one which must be seen as an effort to avoid the sort of problem that Chiang Kai-shek had posed in China. Certainly, it involved blatant intervention in Philippine affairs, but that intervention needs to be kept in the perspective of a clear American perception that unless major reforms were implemented in the Philippines its tenuous democratic institutions were likely to collapse under the strain of increasing class conflict. The decision to back Magsaysay was closely related to the frostiness that came over relations between Spruance and Quirino as a result of their clash over the Hardie Report and, in consequence, both the support for Magsaysay and the Hardie Report came under fire from American as well as Philippine conservatives.

14. It was just as the conservative attack on the Hardie Report was coming to a head in the Philippines that there appeared, on 10 March 1953, an editorial in the Wall Street Journal belittling the report and linking it to American partisanship in the coming Philippine elections:
"There is an election coming up in the Philippines next November and a United States aid agency is just where it ought not to be - right in the middle of it. We got there by way of a little report on land reform...President Quirino took particular objection to a little phrase hidden in the report, written by Mr. Robert Hardy (sic). This special little phrase warned that the United States might have to take direct, expensive and arbitrary action to save the Philippines from Communism, unless poverty and unrest among tenant farmers were alleviated. How? By land reform, of course; by the Philippine government buying land and divvying it up among the farmers...but...the Philippine government just hasn't got that kind of money..."[118]

The inauguration of the Eisenhower Administration brought with it a notable conservative shift in America's foreign aid policies which was reflected in the Philippine case by a retrenchment on the land reform issue even before Magsaysay had been elected. From February onward Hardie felt support for the major land reform initiative he had espoused ebbing.[119] According to Raymond Davis, writing to Gary Olson in 1972, the Quirino Administration demanded Robert Hardie's recall in early 1953 and, when Washington refused to stand by him, Hardie resigned in disgust.[120] John Cooper's recollection of the matter in 1984 was even more poignant. Hardie, he reflected, "believed in his heart that this had to be done in the Philippines. He was determined to help the Filipino people." The vitriolic attacks on his Report and the abandonment of it by the U.S. government "nearly broke him emotionally and ruined his career with the Federal Government," inducing him to retire to a small farm and a teaching job in Missouri.[121]

Actually, Hardie did work again for the U.S. government. In 1962 he was engaged by Robert Nathan & Associates for A.I.D. to do a study of rural development in another country where the United States was then concerned about political stability and rural development - El Salvador.[122] Clearly, however, the vigor of his work was not conformable to the foreign policy priorities of the Eisenhower Administration. While reluctant to interpret his experience in terms of the American conservative reaction of the 1950's, the attacks on the China hands Vincent, Service, Davies, Lattimore, or the attacks on Wolf Ladejinsky,[123] Hardie still had strong feelings, more than thirty years later, about the abortion of his work in the Philippines:

"Convinced that all hope for a meaningful Philippine Land Reform Program had been effectively stifled, with completion of my contract, I returned to the U.S. in mid-summer 1953 and made no request for its renewal, having no desire to continue on with a once noble effort reduced to a charade and waste of public funds.

"In retrospect, I am firmly convinced that my decision thus made in 1953 was not alone the right one, but the only possible honorable one. Subsequent developments would seem to have supplied an abundance of proof in support of this opinion."[124]

15. Hardie's work deserves more prominent recognition in the history of the Philippine Republic than the hegemonic patrician memory or anti-American nationalist and communist historiography have accorded it. And it has a significance within the broader context of American policy transcending the personal fate of Robert S. Hardie of Nebraska and Missouri. For in the best American traditions of both political prudence and democratic faith, the policy thrust behind the Hardie Report in 1951-52 was a recognition of the social, economic and political needs of the Philippine Republic beyond the narrower concerns of American strategic policy. Had Communism
proved more benign or successful than it has and not assumed the frightful character stamped on it by Stalin, the warnings of a Hardie about the menace of Communism to the Philippines might justly be dismissed as merely conservative. Such was not the case and anti-Communism in the likes of Hardie must be considered as a rejection of totalitarianism, not of democratic modernization. When, in March 1954, the U.S. Mission in Manila drafted a land tenure study to replace the Hardie Report, the commitment to land reform was all but eliminated and all Hardie's emphases shifted to a concern with conservative political stability alone, accompanied by rather fatuous expressions of confidence in the capacity of the Philippine government to cope with the situation in the long run. This retreat was endorsed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in cables to the Embassy of May 1954, and despite much fanfare about the popular Magsaysay, there was no strong American push behind land reform after 1954 and what there was dissipated completely after Magsaysay's death in 1957. The passage of time in the Philippines would do much to fulfil the predictions of Robert Hardie, but his work was not well remembered by the Americans who came after him a decade or two or three decades later and for critics of American policies in the Philippines his report became a dead text, buried in the inertial and conservative character of policies they attacked in the last years of the Vietnam War.

16. Reference has been made, in the previous chapter, to Douglas MacArthur's allusion to the land reform of the Gracchi, as a sort of model for what SCAP had done in Japan. His allusion was criticized as vague and misleading. If, however, one were to mimic MacArthur and refer to ancient history by way of setting the abortive land reform work of Hardie in classical perspective, the analogue would have to be the defeat of a land reform proposal advanced by Scipio Aemilianus after the Third Punic War, with a view to redressing the decline of Rome's class of small farmers and so restoring the balance of the republic. This was not "a piece of narrow class legislation, directed primarily against the nobility or in support of the people" remarked Hugh Scullard; "it was an attempt to restore the balance in the interest of the whole community."[125] Scipio was a friend of the historian Polybius and had learned from him the Aristotelian theory of the cycle of growth and decline of states [politeion anacyclosis], according to which the most stable polity was one in which a balance was preserved between oligarchy and democracy. The analogy between this episode in Roman history and the defeat of Hardie's efforts in the Philippines becomes notable where Scullard observes:

"But apparently he [Scipio Aemilianus] misjudged the selfishness of the optimates [patrician landowners] and rather than provoke a major crisis which would merely hasten the process of anacyclosis, he desisted... Thwarted in one way, Scipio may have acted in another, we cannot tell. But if he did take any action it was clearly not sufficient to meet the needs of the day and the position gradually deteriorated until Gracchus demanded reform and precipitated revolution."

Scipio had desisted from pushing for reform for fear of provoking social strife and actually precipitating the downfall of the republic, the preservation of which had been the object of his policy. Coming after him, the brothers Gracchus refused to desist and were assassinated. Their deaths, as Theodor Mommsen long ago observed [126], made it evident that only a Gracchus armed - or a "prophet" armed, to invoke the famous
passage from Macchiavelli’s *The Prince* which inspired the titles to Isaac Deutscher’s monumental biography of that famous Gracchan Lev Davidovich Trotsky [127] - could hope to break the hold of the patricians on the state. The armed struggle ended, just as Scipio Aemilianus had feared, not in the renovation of the republic, but in the downfall of its representative institutions and the triumph of the despotism of the Caesars. Yet Scipio Aemilianus also had failed in his very moderation, one must reflect. Lacking either a creative vision or the political determination to insist on reform, he failed even as a conservative. In the aftermath of the Hardie Report, much the same might be said of U.S. policy in the Philippines. As the Philippine Sulla, like the Roman Sulla, failed in the 1970's to strengthen and buttress the Republic, the United States was driven or ought to have been, had its institutional memory been rich and proficient, to ponder the most "offensive" of Robert Hardie’s words of 1952:

"Unless corrected, it is easy to conceive of the situation worsening to a point where the United States would be forced to take direct, expensive and arbitrary steps to ensure against loss of the Philippines to the Communist block in Asia and would still be faced with finding a solution to the underlying problem." [128]

That passage, however, fell into oblivion after 1953 and the outlook that animated it was to be subjected to an ordeal by fire over the following fifteen years in South Vietnam.
"In our country, 'land and water' are synonymous for homeland. Heroically defending the homeland, our peasants are defending their 'land and water'. In order to win victory over the French colonizers and U.S. interventionists, to secure freedom and national independence, we need an invincible force. We have such a force in the peasantry. In the past seven years, they have proved their invincibility and their boundless patriotism . . . Hence, the time has come for our party and our government to carry out a correct agrarian policy, to give land and water to the peasants. This policy will add tenfold to our forces in struggle and will hasten our final victory."

- Ho Chi Minh (1952)

"From 1957 to 1960 the cadres who had remained in the South had almost all been arrested. Only one or two cadres were left in three to five villages. What was amazing was how these one or two cadres started the movement so well. The explanation is not that these cadres were exceptionally gifted, but (that) the people they talked to were ready for rebellion. The people were like a mound of straw, ready to be ignited . . . If at that time the government in the South had been a good one, if it had not been dictatorial, if the agrarian reforms had worked, if it had established control at the village level, then launching the movement would have been difficult."

- Viet Minh veteran (1967)

"Between 1955 and 1960, U.S. assistance to GVN land reform efforts amounted to about $5 million . . . no assistance was provided from 1960 to 1965, and from 1966 to 1968 assistance amounted to about $2.8 million. During this latter period, there were considerable differences of opinion among A.I.D., Embassy and GVN officials over the proper approach to land reform. Many U.S. officials believed that political support of the GVN by landlords was crucial and that land distribution would alienate powerful elements in the nation. They believed also that village officials would not implement the land reform plan and that the peasants were already Viet Cong supporters. As a result, the U.S. advisory team had no really effective land reform concept in mind to present to the GVN for consideration. A 1969 study showed that the U.S. assumptions were erroneous . . ."

- U.S. Comptroller General's Report to Congress (1973)

5:1. Peasants of the Tonkin Delta

1. The Saigon regime known throughout its brief history, as the Government of Vietnam [GVN] or Republic of Vietnam [RVN], fell before the conquering Communist armies of the Hanoi regime, known as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [DRV], in April 1975, because of congenital weaknesses which a generation of American aid and intervention had failed to remedy. There remain outspoken elements in the U.S. military and in conservative circles who maintain that the anti-war movement, political constraints on strategic war-fighting, the liberal press and the U.S. Congress are to be blamed for the debacle of the GVN, rather than political and strategic errors by the U.S. Government and the Pentagon, the defects of the GVN or the resilience and prowess of the Communist forces. This is a delusion that interferes with clear thinking about the causes of the Communist victory and of American failure. The Communist victory and American failure alike had ideological, organizational, social and geopolitical causes which made it at all times improbable that the conflict would end in American victory and Communist failure. The disintegration of the GVN in 1975, after the American military withdrawal from the war, was not that of a well-built nation betrayed and overwhelmed, it was that of a colonially-engendered rump government that had never demonstrated a capacity to command its own destiny.

2. Throughout the war in Vietnam and, indeed, from at least 1950, the American officials concerned with its conduct placed far more emphasis on the military side of the conflict than on its social and political side. There was, however, a diffuse awareness that Communist capacity to mobilize hundreds of thousands of peasant soldiers to fight against them and the GVN had social and political roots. Repeated reference was made in the discourse of American officials and in the press to the need for a "real," an "alternative," a "genuine," a "competitive," a "peaceful" revolution in South Vietnam which would wither the roots of the Communist revolution, isolate the Communist Party from the Vietnamese masses and so enable American arms to annihilate it. Among the tasks of any such "competitive revolution" was a major land reform which would have addressed the discontents of the mass of Vietnamese peasants and brought them enough market access and citizenship rights to dissolve the hold on them of the Communist Party's strategy for revolution. The debate over land reform among the Americans, from 1950 through to 1975 is a study in the dilemmas and contradictions inherent in the American position in Vietnam after 1954. Set against the background of American experience in China, the land reform in Japan, and Hardie's difficulties in the Philippines, that debate can be seen in clearer perspective than if examined in isolation. It must, however, be set against the background of the rise of Communism and peasant revolt in Vietnam, that it may be appreciated what the Americans were "competing" with in talking about their "competitive revolution."
3. The Communists had started their revolution in Vietnam decades before the Americans gave Vietnam any thought. In his *Papers on the War*, Daniel Ellsberg recounted how, in September 1968, he spoke to French strategist Andre Beaufre at the International Institute of Strategic Studies at Oxford. He sought Beaufre's thoughts on the Vietnam conflict, then raging at its bloodiest and already the ruin of Lyndon Johnson's Presidency. "I was there in 1947," Beaufre recalled.

"At first, of course, I did not see it, but before long, before 1950, I saw that it was too late for us. The Vietnamese we might have allied with to rally the people and confront the Communists were dead by then. The Communist apparatus had grown too large, it penetrated too deeply... It was no longer to be defeated by us."[1]

Ellsberg, who had already become acquainted with the history of U.S. policy as both a government official and one of the team of analysts who edited *The Pentagon Papers* for Robert McNamara, asked Beaufre: "When, then, was your last chance? When did it become too late?" Beaufre, laconically: "1947. At the latest. Perhaps 1946." Ellsberg's shock registers: "1946? It was the end of that year that the French began fighting. They fought for seven more years. Now the American thinks of his war, the Americans' war that started - depending on how you counted - four or five years or a decade from 1954." He comes back to Beaufre: "What year, then, did it become too late - if it ever did - for the Americans?" Beaufre: "1947."[2]

4. Vietnam was an old culture when the French entered Indochina in the eighteenth century and it had a history of stubborn resistance to foreign domination stretching back over two millennia. From the time of consolidation of French conquest in 1885 through to the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [DRV] by Ho Chi Minh on 2 September 1945, a series of resistance movements tried to organize against the French, but each in turn met with repression and proved ineffective. The First World War and the Russian Revolution shook the prestige of European "bourgeois" civilization and suggested to the more radical young Vietnamese nationalists, among them Ho Chi Minh, that Lenin's Third International offered a path to freedom and modernization. Unable to get a hearing for Vietnamese nationalism from Woodrow Wilson at the Versailles Conference in 1919, but inspired by Lenin's pamphlet *Theses On The National And Colonial Questions*, Ho Chi Minh joined the Third International as a member of the French Communist Party and helped to organize its Peasant International in Moscow in late 1923.[3] In December 1924 he was sent to Canton and, under the guidance of the Bolshevik Mikhail Borodin, set up the League of Oppressed Peoples of Asia and the Thanh Nien, or Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League, in June 1925.[4] The Thanh Nien called for republican and anti-colonial revolution, a land to the tiller agrarian reform, industrialization and the emancipation of women. This was the beginning of what became, in 1930, the Indochinese Communist Party. From modest beginnings and despite severe repression by the French colonial authorities, this party became the basis of what Beaufre was so ruefully to describe, in 1968, as the "apparatus" that had, by no later than 1947, "grown too large" and "penetrated too deeply" to be defeated by the French.
5. Almost as soon as it was founded the Indochinese Communist Party [ICP] was confronted with a violent test of its effectiveness and resolve. In February 1930, a conspiratorial group of Vietnamese nationalists, organized as the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang [VNQDD], who had formed their organization in 1925, inspired by the ideas and work of Sun Yat-sen in China, had risen against the French in Tonkin [refer to Map 7] and were crushed. Their leader, Nguyen Thai Hoc, was guillotined and eighty other prominent organizers executed. Hundreds of others were imprisoned or exiled. This removed a potential rival to the new ICP, but showed what fate might lie in store for a precipitate attempt at insurrection. A year later, thousands of peasants in north-central Vietnam, in the provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh, as well as in Cochinchina [refer to Map 7], rose in revolt against French land and tax policies and the ICP leaders were faced with a dilemma: to join the rebels out of principle, or to leave them to the mercies of the French out of prudence. After some debate, the party decided to join and try to help the peasant rebels, but their combined efforts were crushed with hundreds, even thousands, of peasants and numerous party cadres being killed or deported by the French authorities. Unlike the VNQDD, however, the ICP grew stronger from the experience of repression and began to build mass organizations in both the cities and the countryside.[5]

6. The peasant revolt in Nghe An and Ha Tinh prompted French colonial authorities to initiate investigations of rural conditions in Indochina [6] and when the Popular Front, a coalition of Socialists, Radicals and Communists, came to power in France in 1936, the repression was relaxed and ICP political organization was able to become much more open. The most notable of the rural investigations was that by the great French geographer Pierre Gourou, which was published in 1936 under the title The Peasants of the Tonkin Delta. Gourou presented what Christine White has described as a "devastating picture of peasant poverty in Tonkin" and his work made a strong impression on both colonial administrators of the Popular Front years and Vietnamese radicals.[7] The Popular Front broke down and fell from office, however, and then the Second World War broke out in both Asia and Europe and changed the whole political shape of things for the ICP and for the French.

7. As in China, so in Indochina, Japanese invasion provided unprecedented opportunities for the Communists to organize their guerrilla forces in the countryside and to gain recognition as an authentic nationalist force. A terrible famine in Tonkin in 1944-45, caused by Japanese exactions enforced by the French administration, which the Japanese had left in place after their occupation of Indochina, took hundreds of thousands of lives, probably a million [8], and it was the Communists, calling themselves the Viet Minh, who were both prepared and able to turn this to political advantage. As defeat loomed for the Japanese and their French puppets, in mid-1945, there was, as David Marr has described it, an unparalleled upsurge of patriotism throughout Vietnam and it was the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, who best understood this upsurge and "moved with alacrity to channel it in specific directions."[9] With the war's end, however, in August and September 1945, Chinese anti-Communist forces and British troops from India moved into Vietnam from north and south to disarm the
Japanese. The British connived in suppression in the Viet Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the south of the country and their support for the French in Saigon led to riots and strikes and when the news reached Hanoi, thousands of Vietnamese youths flocked to the banner of the Viet Minh to fight against the colonialists in the south. In the words of historian David Marr:

"The stage was set for thirty more years of upheaval and strife, in which first the French and then the Americans tried to ignore the August 1945 Revolution and to turn back the clock." [10]

Between 1945 and 1950, the Americans held aloof from the French effort to re-exert colonial rule in Indochina, being torn between sentiments of anti-colonialism and alliance with the French. The outbreak of the Korean War, in June 1950, however, cast the war between the Viet Minh and the French colonialists in the light of sweeping geo-political and ideological concerns about the advance of totalitarian Communism around the world and the decision was made to seek a French-controlled settlement of the conflict in Indochina.

8. It was in 1950, a few months before the outbreak of the Korean War, that the American Government first took note of the condition of agriculture in French Indochina. In March of that year the Economic Survey Mission led by R. Allen Griffin toured South East Asia. Its first stop was Indochina - Saigon, Dalat, Hanoi and Phnom Penh. Its Report No. 1, on Indochina, was printed in Washington in May. It was followed in August by a Department of Agriculture paper The Agriculture of French Indochina.[11] The perspective constructed by these two studies is of considerable interest, but it must be set against the already long-standing attention of the Communist Party to the agrarian question - dating back to the Thanh Nien program of 1925 with its call for a land to the tiller agrarian reform. Between 1945 and 1952, as it strove to hold together the Viet Minh national liberation coalition, the Communist Party held its hand on radical land to the tiller reform, for fear of driving patriotic landlords into the arms of the French. However, redistribution of French-held or collaborator-held land and rent reduction marked the work of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from the beginning of the war in 1947. As the war drew on and it became clear that the middle and poor peasants were the staunchest supporters of the Viet Minh, while a substantial number of landlords and rich peasants either supported the French or sought by various means to frustrate even the moderate land reform program of the DRV, more radical measures were undertaken, in the belief that the mass of poor peasants were the staunchest supporters of the regime. Between 1952 and 1956, before and after the 1954 Geneva Conference that ended the war with France - the First Indochina War, as it is now called - a truly radical land reform was pushed through, involving mobilization of peasants, people's court trials of landlords and collaborators, a massive redistribution of land to the poor and a purge of the Communist Party itself, all involving considerable violence. Together with the terrible famine of 1944-45, this radical land reform in the DRV - which, after the Geneva Conference, was confined to the northern half of the country - set the immediate standard against which any "competitive" land reform (an indispensable component of a "competitive revolution") would have to be measured. American official assessments of the DRV's land reform suffered, however, from various
errors and distortions which threw judgements out of plumb, in a manner which has all the marks of that
more pervasive depravation of judgement concerning Vietnam, to which the *Pentagon Papers* bear such
disconcerting witness. Those errors and distortions are worth putting in order as a prelude to discussion of
American debates over a "competitive" land reform, being an indication of the fog in which that debate took
place.

9. In making his massive human-geographic study *Peasants of the Tonkin Delta*, in 1935, Pierre Gourou had criticized an earlier study by Yves Henry,[12] whose survey had suggested that the overwhelming majority of farms in Indochina were *owner-operated*. The August 1950 U.S. Department of Agriculture study, *The Agriculture of French Indochina*, however, drew on Henry, not Gourou, in stating: "According to an estimate frequently cited, 98.7% of the agricultural holdings in Tonkin, 90% of those in Annam and 95.4% in Cambodia, but only
64.5% of the holdings in Cochinchena are operated by their owners."[13] Now, Henry's figures were estimates of the number of landowners who were not absentee landlords and Gourou found them inflated and misleading. Writing in 1954, however, Bernard Fall, whose commentaries on Vietnam were widely read and respected in the 1960's, cited *The Agriculture of French Indochina* as showing that in North and Central Vietnam 98.7% and 90% respectively of the total farm area was tilled by its owners. Christine White, a leading historian of the Viet Minh land reform, has commented:

"In this way, Henry's already misleading statistics on the high percentage of owner-operators among
landowners was changed into a false statistic, with no basis in colonial period statistics, on the percentage of
total farm area tilled by owners. He [Fall] then went on to argue that, *therefore, land reform was not necessary* [emphasis added] in those areas under Viet Minh control and 'the major problem lay rather in the immediate reduction of high and excessive land rents'. Since landowners do not have to pay any rent at all, let alone high and excessive ones, the analysis is a total *non sequitur*."[14]

As we shall see, the textual and inferential depravity of Fall's analysis in 1954 was to be anything but an exception in two decades of U.S. analysis of the peasant question and land reform in Vietnam.[15]

10. The great Tonkin famine of 1944-45, with its dramatic psychological and political effect on the peasants of the Tonkin [Red River] delta, appears to have been overlooked almost entirely by American official analysts throughout the First and Second Indochina Wars. Alexander Woodside and John McAlister adverted to it in work published in 1970, but neither was a government official and 1970 was very late in the Second Indochina War. Its history is worth briefly recounting here, since it adds a perspective to the violence of the DRV's land reform which is lacking in American official accounts of the latter. On 19 August 1942, Vichy French Governor Decoux made a war-time agreement to supply Japan with the entire exportable surplus of rice and corn from Indochina or a minimum of 1,050,000 tons of the highest quality white rice and 250,000 tons of corn. In addition, tens of thousands of hectares of arable land were converted to production of industrial crops such as oil seeds, peanuts, cotton and jute. Between 1941 and 1944, the area devoted to these crops increased from 25,000 to 121,700 hectares.[16] Now, Tonkin and northern Annam were historically poverty-stricken and
hunger-prone regions, dependent in part on rice imports from the south. In 1944, the harvest failed, exactions were not lessened and the authorities made but feeble efforts to bring relief supplies to the north.\[17\] The result was a human calamity on a scale which invites comparison with the horrible famines in the U.S.S.R. in 1933, and in China, both in 1943 and in 1958-62. In a population of about eleven million people, estimates of the number who perished of starvation at this time range from a minimum (official French) figure of 500,000 or 600,000 upwards to a widely quoted figure of 2,000,000.\[18\] Ngo Vinh Long has translated into English some contemporary accounts of the mass starvation.\[19\] Edwin Moise and Christine White point out that this scourge was bitterly remembered when, in the early 1950s, the Party brought landlords and collaborators ('despots' and 'traitors') before mass struggle meetings and special people's courts.\[20\]

11. The violence of the land reform in northern Vietnam between 1952 and 1956 suffered from egregious distortion between 1958 and 1975 due to its use as an occasion for anti-Communist propaganda by the Americans and the regime they supported in southern Vietnam in the Second Indochina War. The prelude to this violent land reform was French backing of the landlord class in the belief that the landlords and not the mass of poor peasants provided the most promising support for a return to French rule.\[21\] French "pacification" violence in the villages of Vietnam\[22\] and landlord evasions of the DRV's rent reduction decrees\[23\] served to harden the Communist Party's line on land reform. Rent reduction, as an alternative to land reform, proved most difficult to enforce in the face of landlord subterfuge, low peasant consciousness of rights or opportunities, and the presence within the Party itself of landlords and rich peasants who were not vigorous agents of agrarian reform. Pressure and anger built up and finally exploded in a campaign that broke the landlord class and purged the Party, involving thousands of executions and imprisonment of thousands more. The violence seems to have exceeded the bounds the Party had set for it and in 1956 Ho Chi Minh declared that "excesses" and "errors" had occurred and were to be regretted. What might have been examined soberly as a revolutionary upheaval was seized upon by the propagandists of the American-backed regime in Saigon and used more to try to blacken the image of, than to understand, the DRV and the alliance between the Communist Party and the peasants of the Tonkin Delta. This black propaganda campaign achieved such success, beginning in about 1958, that invented figures and images assumed the character of historical data and became so embedded in the literature that the corrective process still appears, in certain hardline anti-Communist circles, as a tendentious revisionism. Its history centers on the work of a refugee from Communist rule in Tonkin, Hoang Van Chi, and is worth recounting, as it throws considerable light on the distortions that marked the American debate on land reform throughout the Second Indochina War.

12. Hoang Van Chi's chef d'oeuvre was a book called *From Colonialism to Communism*. It was published under U.S. Information Agency auspices in 1964, though the allegations in it concerning the DRV land reform had been made in various forms for some years before that. In it, Hoang Van Chi affirmed the epigrammatic description of Ho Chi Minh, by French sociologist Paul Mus, as
"an intransigent and incorruptible revolutionary in the manner of Saint-Just."[24] He paid tribute to Ho as "this remarkable man [who] outshone all his rivals in both revolutionary tactics and political experience"[25] and observed "in retrospect, it appears that none of Ho's rivals ever had any serious chance of success."[26] He went on, however, to denounce Ho, his "sinister" party comrades and his "cruel and avaricious" peasant followers for the destruction of the landlord class, likening it to the Nazi liquidation of the European Jews:

"It would seem that Ho Chi Minh was engaging in genocide. On the whole, Hitler and Eichmann were less hypocritical than Ho and Mao since, by ordering the Jews to the gas chambers, the Nazi leaders at least accepted full responsibility for their crimes. The Vietnamese and Chinese leaders, on the other hand, preferred to watch the landowning class die a `natural' death (by starvation and social isolation), for which nobody would appear responsible."[27]

Even an incredibly violent purge of the landlord class in the DRV might have been consistent with mass support for Ho and the Communist Party, especially in the wake of an appalling famine and a cruel war, but Hoang Van Chi wavered between describing the Communist Party as the leader of a plundering peasant horde and accusing it of terrorizing these same peasants. He declared that "the landlord was a scapegoat to satisfy the cruel instincts of a few fanatics and to strike terror into the heart of the whole population."(emphasis added). The "sinister aim" of the Communist architect of the land reform, Truong Chinh, he asserted, was the "liquidation of the defenceless landowning class which had for years served the Resistance." He denounced the avarice and ressentiment of "the masses in underdeveloped countries . . . which leads them to give their support to Communism."[28] (emphases added). He described what he called a "guilt complex which haunted the peasants' minds after the massacre of about 5 percent of the total population", a complex which, he added, "has been euphemistically described in official Communist literature as 'the peasant's consciousness of being master of his own fate'."[29] American researchers such as Konrad Kellen, Joseph Zasloff and Anthony Russo, working for the RAND Corporation on interviews with captured Viet Cong in the 1960s, found abundant evidence that the peasants of the Tonkin delta [and of the Mekong delta] did experience Communist policies as making them "masters of their own fate."[30] A `guilt complex' was not in evidence. That there had been a violent revolution was in no doubt, but claims of a "massacre of about 5 percent of the total population" or "genocide" were not factual descriptions of what had occurred and put the whole matter in a lurid light.[31]

13. It was not until 1972 that Hoang Van Chi's allegations of "genocide" in the DRV were challenged or critically examined. As recently as 1984, Stanley Karnow uncritically accepted Hoang Van Chi's assertion that 5 percent of the DRV's population had been liquidated, without showing any awareness of the by then solid critical case against the assertion.[32] The writings of Bernard Fall in the 1960s[33] and Patrick Honey's writings on North Vietnamese Communism,[34] George Carver's 1966/68 essay "The Faceless Viet Cong",[35] William Bredo's observations on the subject in the 1968 Stanford Research Institute Report on land tenure in the GVN and his 1970 essay in Asian Survey,[36] Christine White's 1970 A.I.D. study on land reform in the DRV[37] and Senators Warren G.
Magnusson and Robert Packwood in 1970 hearings before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations [38], all drew on Hoang Van Chi's *From Colonialism to Communism*, at first or second hand, in declaring that 50,000 to 100,000 people were killed, or 50,000 killed and 100,000 imprisoned during the DRV land reform. Now 5 percent of the DRV's population would have been about 675,000 people. Hoang Van Chi had simply been inconsistent statistically - declaring at one point with Gerard Tongas [39], that 100,000 people had perished in the whole land reform process [40] and at another point putting the death toll at 5 percent of the population, [41] with no explanation of the discrepancy. Nor did any of those above-mentioned authors, if they cited *From Colonialism to Communism* at all, draw attention to, much less explain, this statistical discrepancy.

14. In 1969, Richard Nixon drew on Bernard Fall's work in declaring that 50,000 people had perished in the DRV's land reform. At a press conference, on 16 April 1971, he suddenly multiplied that figure by ten, asserting that in the DRV land reform "a half million, by conservative estimates...were murdered or otherwise exterminated." In July 1972, again at a press conference, he doubled this figure again, asserting that one million had perished, either by direct execution or 'in slave labor camps' [Facsimile 2]. Prompted by these public claims of a bloodbath in the DRV, Daniel Gareth Porter, then a PhD student of Vietnamese nationalism at Cornell University, inquired of President Nixon's staff what the source was for these huge figures. He was told it was Hoang Van Chi's *From Colonialism to Communism*. He then went to work on this book - its documentary base, its citation and usage of sources - and other materials in English, French and Vietnamese. He located Hoang Van Chi himself, then working as an instructor at AID's Washington DC Training Institute, and interviewed him. What Porter found was that Hoang Van Chi had mistranslated and fabricated primary sources and invented figures without any basis in fact [42]. In 1981, Christine White, who in 1970 had accepted Bernard Fall's bloodbath figures, re-examined the evidence for herself and came out in support of Porter's conclusions [43]. In 1983, Edwin Moise, having independently examined the evidence in the original sources and languages, for his major study *Land Reform in China and North Vietnam*, concluded also that Porter, not Hoang Van Chi or Bernard Fall, was substantially correct: he estimated the deaths in the DRV's land reform program at around 5,000 and certainly no more than 15,000. [44]

15. Quite apart from the effective manner in which it was presented, and the climate of conflict in the 1960's and early 1970's, Hoang Van Chi's allegation seems to have gained credence because Communism was widely equated with Stalinism and therefore with totalitarianism and mass terror. The grim image of Stalin's forced collectivization clearly overshadowed the interpretation placed on the DRV's land reform by many Americans who were at one or more removes from any detailed knowledge of the history of either of these events. Thus, for example, it was widely asserted that the DRV's land reform of 1952-56 was a violent *collectivization*, imposed on a recalcitrant peasantry by a fanatical and ruthless Communist Party, whereas it was a radical *land to the tiller* program, which drastically redistributed resources in "North Vietnam" in favor of the rural...
poor and broke the landlord class by confiscation, denunciation and repression. Collectivization took place only in 1958-60 and not even Hoang Van Chi asserted that it was brutal or bloody. Nevertheless, in 1970, William Bredo, chief author of the most systematic American study of land reform as an issue in South Vietnam, in 1968, specifically invoked the spectre of Soviet collectivization as a holocaust which "cost millions of lives, including those who were starved to death or shipped to Siberia as kulaks [sic]..." [45] That one might be a Communist and deplore what Stalin had done did not enter into such an assessment.

Bredo cited Hoang Van Chi's _From Colonialism to Communism_ as his source of information on the subject, wrote of 100,000 deaths in North Vietnam and asserted that through the DRV's land reform in the early 1950's "individual farm ownership was destroyed" [46] This simply was not true. Ironically, Bredo, having thus demonstrated his basic ignorance of what had happened in the DRV's land reform, lamented:

"It is remarkable to see the general lack of understanding of the origins and the lineage of the Viet Cong land reform program." [47]

Addressing the United States Senate in 1970, Senator Warren G. Magnusson spoke in support of the GVN's land to the tiller reform law - which it had, in a very real sense, taken 750,000 "Communist", 250,000 South Vietnamese and 45,000 American dead to bring about - and compared it to Communist land reform, which, he asserted, invariably results in "brutal and bloody collectivization" and the "wholesale slaughter" of resisting peasants. [48] It is in no sense necessary to idealize the Leninism of the Vietnamese Communists to see in all this a fundamental failure on the part of a generation of American government officials to come to terms with the roots and nature of radical revolution in Vietnam. [49] Yet it was on the basis of such flawed perspectives that the American government committed itself to a course of intervention against the Communists in the south of Vietnam after 1954. [50]
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1. "By the time major American involvement in Vietnam began, in 1954," wrote Alfred McCoy in 1971:

"belief in the success of agrarian reforms in Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan had elevated this program to the level of an infallible cure-all. In Vietnam, belief in the efficacy of land reform has been so strong that it marks both the beginning and the end of a complete cycle of sweeping rationalizations which American officials have devised to justify their continuing involvement."[51]

McCoy could hardly, in detail, have been more wrong. The history of the land reforms in Japan and Taiwan was, to be sure, held up by American advocates of land reform as an example of social transformation to set against Communist methods and policies. These advocates did not, however, enjoy a dominant position among "American officials" in 1954 or thereafter. The attack on Wolf Ladejinsky in 1954, precisely because of his land reform work in Japan, might itself have been regarded as an indication of the attitude of more conservative American officials to land reform. The fate of the Hardie Report in 1953 and the issuance of the Davis Report in its place in 1954, would appear to indicate that land reform was regarded by John Foster Dulles, for example, as something less than an "infallible cure-all" for the Philippines. Nor can it be said that land reform had been a "success" in the Philippines as of 1954. Moreover, while Wolf Ladejinsky was sent to South Vietnam in 1955 by MSA director Harold Stassen, he had no major policy thrust behind him and was possibly sent to Saigon to remove him from Washington, where he had become an embarrassment to the Eisenhower Administration. Throughout the 1950's the U.S. mission in Saigon was reluctant to push land reform, according to one historian of U.S. pacification efforts, "for fear of antagonizing conservative members of Congress" [52]. As for the claim that the end of the "cycle" - in 1969-70 - represented a rationalization of continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam, one must observe that the land reform initiative took years to build up, over the opposition of considerable elements in the U.S. Embassy, the State Department, the Pentagon and AID, and that it was rationalized, for example by its proponents Roy Prosterman and Warren Magnusson, precisely as a means of getting the U.S. out of Vietnam and possibly saving the GVN in the process.

2. When the Griffin Economic Survey Mission visited Indochina in March 1950, its adviser on rural affairs was Raymond Moyer, then an official of both the MSA and the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) in Taiwan. Report No. 1 of the Griffin Mission, including recommendations for an American aid program to the French and French-dominated forces in Indochina, may be regarded as representing the most reform minded official American opinion at that time. The authors noted that:

"A major revolution is raging in Vietnam...The revolutionaries (Viet Minh) are led by Communists, but the majority are probably non-Communist. Their ardent nationalism and antagonism toward the French are so strong that they have accepted Communist leadership in their struggle to drive the French from the country and achieve complete independence for Vietnam. Apparently, the majority of the
population is sitting on the fence, while even the "pacified" areas are honeycombed with agents of the Viet Minh..." [53].

The Mission observed that Ho Chi Minh "has been and still is personally immensely popular", but denied that Bao Dai was a French puppet [54]. They opined that Communist victory would mean "foreign domination and a vicious and unremitting kind of domination that would be worse than any of which the French were ever accused." The possibility of compromise with the Communists they concluded was "very small" and:

"It is no wonder that Bao Dai welcomes French military aid in quelling the rebellion [sic] of such a group." [55]

Bao Dai having been a puppet of the French before the Second World War, then of the Japanese during the war and of the French again in the early 1950's, this description of the political situation in Vietnam in 1950 was, to say the least, not very clear-sighted.

3. Two particular obiter dicta of the Griffin Mission's Report No. 1 bear examination, as setting the stage for the muffled debate on land reform that later took place. The authors of this report recommended support for Bao Dai as a moderate nationalist, recommended that various moderate reforms be undertaken to win the rural poor to the side of Bao Dai and then added that lack of "security" in the rural areas severely limited the feasible extent of such reform measures or American aid in support of same. The passages in which this was set down are a useful point of reference, especially the conclusions to each passage, which I italicize for this reason:

"Communism now derives its principal following on the issue of nationalism. Economic distress at the present time is mentioned in Communist propaganda, but it is secondary. Nevertheless, the need for rural reform programs is urgent, as was apparent in the Mission's trips in the rural areas in the Tonkin Delta and in the countryside around Saigon. Farmers in Vietnam are living in unjustified poverty and distress, only in part because of the present disturbed conditions. Some of this distress arises from lack of attention to health problems. Related to it are the existing conditions of agriculture. A great deal of improvement can be brought about through the improvement of irrigation, control of animal diseases, distribution of improved seeds and the use of commercial fertilizers. The current poverty, however, is also due to usurious interest rates, monopolistic control of rice marketing by Chinese merchants and high land rentals. In the conditions created by this situation, there exists an issue of which the Communists may some day decide to take advantage, if it happens that the present issue of nationalism has less popular appeal. If the Bao Dai government, on the other hand, seizes the initiative in this matter and establishes itself as the government of rural reform, it will possess a tremendous advantage." [56]

And again:

"The dominant element in planning any aid program in Indochina is the degree of law and order obtaining in areas of projected operations. Reasonable security for aid personnel obtains in Hanoi, Haiphong, Vientiane, Hue, Tourane (Danang), Phnom Penh and Saigon and in small towns in certain pacified or unaffected areas (the latter mainly in Laos and Cambodia)...The general insecurity of most of Vietnam places very severe limitations on the extent of aid operations that can be undertaken and is the reason why French and Vietnamese officials alike declare that the most effective economic aid that can be furnished Indochina is military aid." [57]
The Griffin Mission's reading of the situation in Vietnam amounted to a three-cornered assessment: Communism was judged unacceptable in Vietnam, but the Communists had the initiative under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. If the "moderate nationalist" [read "French colonial"] regime was to regain the initiative, it would, in the judgement of the Griffin Mission, have to press through a major rural reform, though land reform as such was not listed by them among the measures required. However, the Bao Dai/French regime could not control the rural areas and needed military aid even to be able to operate in them. What was not entered into by the Griffin Mission was the question whether the Bao Dai/French regime had the will, let alone the capacity, to press through such a rural reform, even given military aid.

4. Pursuant to the recommendations of the Griffin Mission, the MSA set up an office in Saigon in 1951. Early in that year President Truman set up an Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems. However, after the change of Administration from Truman to Eisenhower, in January 1953, the Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems was never reconvened.[58] Even this Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems had enunciated a policy outlook characterized by ambivalence on land reform. In the words of James Price Gittinger, who was to replace Wolf Ladejinsky in 1956 as land tenure adviser in Saigon:

"...a clear understanding existed that United States funds could in no instance be used to finance redistribution of land, even on a loan basis." [59]

MSA director in Saigon Leland Barrows was himself opposed to such use of U.S. funds, unless in blocked foreign exchange "available only for the importation of approved capital goods"[60]. Yet in the last years of the First Indochina War (1951-54), according to Gittinger, writing in 1961, U.S. specialists with MSA in Saigon so persistently pointed to the propagandistic shallowness and substantive defects of French/Bao Dai rural policy that relations between the U.S. Operations Mission and Saigon's Ministry of Agrarian Reform became acutely strained and the Americans "very nearly cut off their budgetary support" [61]. In fact, however, it was not cut off. Instead, American military aid increased and the prospects for land reform remained dim under any but Viet Minh auspices. Writing about all this in 1961, Gittinger suggested a parallel between the abortion of Robert Hardie's work in the Philippines in 1953-54 and the conservative posture of the United States in Vietnam throughout the 1950's. In both instances, he reflected, American policy served to reinforce unregenerate systems of rule and property and provided no clear support to progressive reforms that might avert the prospect of violent upheavals. [62]

5. If there was an official American consensus on land reform for South Vietnam in the 1950's, it would have to be said that that consensus was weighted against land reform. There simply is no evidence that it was regarded as, in McCoy's words, an "infallible cure-all". Following his sacking from the Department of Agriculture as a "national security risk" and a "socialist" in 1954, Wolf Ladejinsky was the subject of some public debate. Senator Hubert Humphrey was prompted to ask whether his sacking was not "a tip-off of a major change in U.S. policy [on
land reform] of which we have not been informed.".[63] That such a major change had occurred in the case of the Philippines seems clear. In January 1955, at the instigation of Raymond Moyer, Eisenhower's director of the MSA[FOA], Harold Stassen, offered Ladejinsky a job in the what had, since the 1954 Geneva Agreements ending the First Indochina War, become the de facto state of "South Vietnam". However, a few months later, Stassen himself was removed and replaced as FOA[ICA] director by the conservative Republican John B. Hollister, who went on a tour of the Far East and openly disavowed land reform as a U.S. foreign policy goal.[64] He also sacked Wolf Ladejinsky from the FOA[ICA] [65]. Ironically, Ladejinsky was then hired as personal adviser on land reform by Ngo Dinh Diem, but clearly his political weight in Washington or within the U.S. mission in Saigon was negligible.

6. Wolf Ladejinsky arrived in South Vietnam about six months after the 1954 Geneva Agreement. He had been preceded by Colonel Edward Lansdale of the Central Intelligence Agency, who had arrived in Saigon on 1 June 1954 to help organize sabotage operations and black propaganda against the DRV. On 17 November 1954, General James Lawton Collins had arrived in Saigon to take over from the French the training of Vietnamese soldiers for Bao Dai. Direct aid to Bao Dai from the United States began on 1 January 1955.[66] Under these circumstances, of U.S. commitment to the Saigon regime, Ladejinsky undertook a series of field trips into the Vietnamese countryside in early 1955.[67] He discovered, as his first field reports testify, "Asian landlordism at its worst".[68] He discovered that in Cochinchna 2.5% of the landowners held 50% of the cultivable land.[69] He discovered that, in what he oddly referred to as the Vietnamese "civil war" of 1946-54, the Communists had won control of the countryside as anti-colonialists [sic] and land reformers.[70] He discovered the Viet Minh had almost eliminated landlordism in the areas they controlled after 1946.[71] He discovered that the belated and half-hearted land reform decrees of the Bao Dai government between 1951 and 1953 had been ineffective propaganda devices, "hastily drafted half-measures which were never applied."[72] The regime had neither proposed nor organized any serious enforcement machinery for its decrees; legislated no expropriation or compulsory sale of land; and set high retention ceilings for landlords: 12 to 36 hectares in Tonkin, 15 to 45 in Annam [which, in a region of modest holdings, meant virtually no land reform at all], 30 to 100 in Cochinchina.[73] Under very different circumstances and in particular in the absence of a rival program that was being vigorously implemented, these proposals might have constituted a land reform of some kind, but under the conditions that existed in Vietnam in 1953 they were risible. Above all, as Christine White has written:

"...the most important distinction between the rival programs lay in differences in implementation. In the DRV areas, there was a mass mobilization to break the power of the landlords, while the Bao Dai government had no interest in reducing the power of the landlords."[74]

Yet even with these antecedents in clear view, Ladejinsky declared that the Geneva Agreement and the "evacuation of the visible Communist presence from South Vietnam" were an opportunity for the Saigon regime to exert control over the rural areas and, by pushing through its own thoroughgoing land reform and corollary measures, win the Vietnamese peasantry from its Viet Minh allegiance.[75]
7. The editor of Ladejinsky's papers, Louis Walinsky, noted that of Ladejinsky's first three major field reports from South Vietnam, in 1955, two were held up in Saigon for six and eight weeks respectively before being despatched to Washington and a third was "lost" by the State Department. [76] One might infer from this that there were people in both the Embassy and Washington who did not really want to know what Ladejinsky was telling them.[77] Ladejinsky's message in 1955 was clear: existing land reform programs in South Vietnam were inadequate; the Viet Minh were better motivated and disciplined than the soldiers of the Saigon regime; the latter could not control the countryside; the Saigon regime was not likely to prove a suitable or durable recipient of U.S. aid unless it sponsored a land reform-based political and social transformation of the countryside [78]. It is quite possible that Ladejinsky was shunted out of FOA/ICA in 1956 precisely because of his advocacy of these social reform views [79]. He was not alone in his views, but such views had no real influence on official policy. As late as the summer of 1955, it seems, pro-land reform thinkers in Washington "urged that the whole [land reform] question be re-examined with a view to pressing extensive transfer". The US mission in Saigon replied, however, that "land [re]distribution as a major political weapon cannot be exercised now" [80] (emphasis added).. More than a decade later, this would still be the reply of the Political Section of the Embassy in Saigon and of its Political Counsel, Philip Habib, in particular to Washington's calls for something to be done about land reform. Land redistribution was, of course, being used as a major political weapon throughout the whole period, and very effectively - by the Communists.

8. Undeterred by what he freely acknowledged to be formidable obstacles to land reform in South Vietnam, and notwithstanding his sacking by Hollister at the beginning of that year, in July 1956 Ladejinsky wrote to his associate of nearly twenty years, Raymond Moyer, by then ICA director for the Far East, and urged a bold, unequivocal, financial U.S. commitment to land reform in South Vietnam. The new President of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, had promulgated, under Ordinance 2, in 1955, an agricultural land rent reduction which had, Ladejinsky admitted, been inconsequential; but now Diem was, he told Moyer, "thoroughly convinced of the urgency" of a land to the tiller program. Ladejinsky suggested a U.S grant in aid of $30 million to finance the initial compensation payments to the landlords for the transfer of their lands to the tenants. He must have been aware of how this directly flew in the face of established policy, especially under ICA chief Hollister, but he appears to have thought that this policy blockage could be overcome. He wrote to Moyer:

"...the land must be given to the landless without delay and for well-known reasons. Procrastination will not do any longer - not if we are interested in the survival of Vietnam on the side of the free world...[T]hese are the realities of present day Vietnam...Hence the plea to be bold...I have in mind certain aspects of the so-called great debate relating to U.S. foreign aid practices in general."[81].
Anticipating by a decade arguments that Roy Prosterman was to advance in the late 1960's, Ladejinsky pointed out that $30 million for a land reform that could win Diem mass support was a much sounder investment than hundreds of millions of dollars spent to maintain even one U.S. division in the field in defence of a crumbling regime. Banking almost entirely on what he believed to be the personal qualities of Ngo Dinh Diem as a statesman, Ladejinsky averred that the "Herculean task" could be accomplished [82]. He never seems to have examined the situation from the point of view of a dialogue with that veritable "Hercules", the Vietnamese Communist Party, which had long since taken upon itself the tasks of overthrowing the French colonial Procrustes and cleaning the Augean stables of colonized Vietnam. Might it not have made some sense to do so, in order to accomplish the "Herculean task" of Vietnamese social revolution with a minimum of bloodshed and a maximum of economic gain and human emancipation? Something of this nature was called for under certain clauses of the Geneva Agreement, but neither American conservatives nor hardline Communists in 1955-56 could be described as at all open to such a dialogue. Nor could the recent experience of Stilwell and Marshall in China provide any encouragement to American liberals that such a dialogue, under conditions of virtual civil war and social revolution would prove fruitful. Besides, Marshall had been pilloried by the American conservatives for his work on China and the Korean War had hardened lines even further. If Wolf Ladejinsky, in 1956, the year of the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolution, had entertained any such idea he does not seem to have committed it to writing and had he done so he would undoubtedly have found himself even more isolated among American officials than he was on account of his advocacy of land reform.

9. The U.S. Government at no time in the 1950's made the commitment to land reform in South Vietnam that Ladejinsky sought in 1955 and 1956. Between 1955 and 1960, the U.S. supplied a total of $5 million for land development and agrarian programs in South Vietnam. The adequacy of this sum may be gauged by setting it against the initial, minimal $30 million for land reform called for by Ladejinsky. The figures are set in even sharper perspective if it is considered that, of those $5 million ($4.864 million, to be precise), only $282,000 was actually allocated for assistance to redistributive programs, according to U.S. AID's 1975 Terminal Report on American involvement in land reform in South Vietnam [83]. President Ngo Dinh Diem legislated a land reform, in consultation with Ladejinsky, in 1956, but set a retention ceiling of 125 hectares for Cochinchina and made no provision at all for land reform in Annam. He rejected Ladejinsky's advice that the 125 hectare retention limit be reduced, but Ladejinsky's own proposals were hardly radical. He appears to have accepted quite lightly the fact that Diem's program did not extend whatsoever to the Central Lowlands, bailiwick of his brothers Ngo Dinh Canh and Ngo Dinh Thuc. Nor does he appear to been concerned by the fact that the real thrust of the Diem program was not the abolition of tenancy but its institutionalization, by means of legal contracts on the basis of theoretically "reduced" rents: "down" to 25% compared to Bao Dai's notional 15% and the Viet Minh's tendential abolition of rent altogether along with tenancy. Diem's program, in fact, entailed the reintroduction and enforcement of landlordism by the government he led, the presumed Government of Vietnam [GVN], over wide areas formerly controlled by the Viet Minh. In the process, tenant organizations
and former Viet Minh sympathizers were harassed, imprisoned, liquidated. An official U.S. report, looking back on this period a decade later, engaged in some notable verbal acrobatics in concluding that the Viet Minh's effective land reform had "forced the GVN into the position of defending the landlords and their property", a commitment which "would seem to detract seriously from the psychological appeal [among the peasantry] of a return to GVN rule." [84]. Alfred McCoy, in 1971, tartly referred to this summary of things as "a masterpiece of understatement" [85]. Diem's program and method of rule were based on efforts to repress and control, not liberate and mobilize the peasant masses and U.S. policy, quite as much by design as by default, supported him in these efforts.

10. One American scholar, commenting on James Gittinger's assessment of agrarian reform in South Vietnam, warned, in 1959, that unenforced legislation could be worse than no legislation at all [86], but the root problem with the Diem program was that the very enforcement of it - badly, fitfully and incompletely enforced as it was - created resentment in many quarters. In any case, this scholar's warnings were brushed aside by the official land tenure advisers [87] and Communist propaganda against the program was dismissed as a product of the Party's fear of Diem's success [88], especially following the admission by Hanoi, in August 1956, that its own land reform program had involved "excesses and errors". Starting with the publication, in 1958, of Hoang Van Chi's *The New Class in North Vietnam*, a sustained propaganda attack was made on the DRV's land reform. Allegations that it had involved immense bloodshed were blown up and sedulously propagated. A disturbance in Nghe-An province in November 1956 was magnified into a supposed full-scale "peasant uprising" against the DRV regime, which, it was alleged, was drowned in blood by the disciplined soldiers of Ho Chi Minh [89]. When, conversely, the GVN's own program of repression and non-reform, or counter-reform provoked peasant rebellion, led by the Communist-led National Liberation Front, in 1960-61, it was, in turn, alleged that this was nothing but a terrorist conspiracy to disrupt the GVN's land reform program. The "insecurity" thus created was then cited as a reason why the land reform of the GVN could not be implemented. This was an awful bundle of contradictions and rationalizations and, unhappily, even Wolf Ladejinsky, after 1956, was not an exception to such a tendentious way of thinking.

11. The repressive nature of the Diem regime has been denied by its partisans ever since the 1950's and overshadowed by the repressive nature of the Communist regimes that have ruled Indochina since 1975. It was, however, harsh enough to lead so disillusioned and anti-Communist an emigre as Doan Van Toai to describe it as having been, from 1956 on, more and more "fascistic and totalitarian".[90] Edward Lansdale himself described it in 1961 as "a fascist dictatorship".[91] William Nighswonger described it in 1966 as having been "totalitarian".[92]. William Corson, a disillusioned U.S. Marine commander, described its rural policies in 1968 as "a counterinsurgency of terror and murder" [93]. Diem partisan Dennis Duncanson asserted in 1968 that the total number of "verifiable extra-judicial executions" under Diem's rule was thirty three [94], but the Party lost two thirds of its southern cadres by arrest or execution between 1956 and 1960 [95] and historian
Joseph Buttinger put the number of executions at "thousands" [96]. Anti-Communist Vietnam analyst Patrick Honey stated in 1959 that the majority of Diem's "50,000 to 100,000 political prisoners were neither Communist nor pro-Communist" [97] and in 1974 Alexander Kendrick cited a figure of 75,000 executions under the Diem regime, a figure which was accorded credence by historian William Turley, who, writing in the mid-1980's, concluded that "the number of politically motivated executions in the South during the 1950's probably exceeded the number in the North." [98].

12. The national Liberation Front, which Diem dubbed the Viet Cong, grew in response to this situation. George Carver, CIA analyst, asserted in 1968 that the National Liberation Front was "a contrived political mechanism with no indigenous roots" [99], but this was at best a half truth [100] and might, with at least equal justice, have been levelled at the Diem regime itself. Jeffrey Race, in his classic study of Long An province, concluded in 1972 that between 1956 and 1959 the Diem regime "demonstrated to the population that" if they insisted on significant reforms "there was no alternative to violence" [101]. A Viet Minh veteran told Race in 1967, looking back to the late 1950's:

"The people were like a mound of straw, ready to be ignited... If at that time the government in the South had been a good one, if it had not been dictatorial, if the agrarian reforms had worked, if it had established control at the village level, then launching the movement would have been difficult." [102].

In fact, Diem's efforts to control the rural population, through a series of experiments with so-called agrovilles and strategic hamlets, and his failure to effect rural reforms, together with the personalized, corrupt and divided character of his regime, made the launching of the Viet Cong insurrection possible.

13. It is against this background, as well as in the perspective of his own writings of the 1940's and 1950's on the urgency of land reform and pro-peasant policies in Asia, that one must set Wolf Ladejinsky's facile rationalization of the GVN's rural policies in his paper "Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam" which he contributed in 1961 to Wesley Fishel's book Problems of Freedom: South Vietnam Since Independence. Just as the NLF insurgency was igniting the rural "mound of straw", Ladejinsky, viewing the situation from within the Presidential Palace in Saigon, seems to have overlooked both the straw and the poorly armed guerrillas who were igniting it. After a few observations concerning the fumbling beginnings of the rural program in 1955-56, he remarked:

"In reality, the difficulties proved to be temporary. As the Ngo Dinh Diem government grew in strength and political stability, so did the acceptance of its measures."[103]

Now as conservative a partisan of Diem as Dennis Duncanson could write in 1968 that land reform had been "exposed as a pressing necessity [in Vietnam] since the crisis of 1930, but still not tackled"[104] and William Colby was to tell the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1970 that there had been a partial land reform legislated under Diem but that "by 1961-62, when the war began, they had not done very much of it."[105]; while the CIA's George Carver noted, looking back on the Diem years in 1968 that:
"Diem, in effect, reached his political high-water mark some time around mid-1957. After that, his methods of operation [led to a growing belief] that Diem had to be ousted before his methods of government made a Communist victory inevitable."[106]

Nevertheless, Ladejinsky, the tribune of the peasants and the advocate of serious land reform, felt able to write for Fishel "there is a strong possibility that the land will be fully in the hands of the tenants by the end of 1961."[107] What did he mean? No land in Central Vietnam was being transferred to tenants; no land under the 125 hectare retention ceiling was being transferred to tenants in Cochinchina and, according to all available records, the distribution to tenants even of French and other expropriated lands had ground to a halt by 1959, well short even of Diem's modest goals.

14. Ladejinsky's outlook at this critical point in time can only be described as puzzling. "Looking back at the behaviour of landlords in the past two years" he wrote "one is struck by the mildness, not to say the total lack, of opposition." He might meaningfully have added that they had little to oppose, but for some reason, the "mildness, not to say the total lack of" land reform does not seem to have been clear to him. He was able to observe that "the total number of Vietnamese landlords subject to the reform is only just over 2,000" but he drew no troubling inferences from this fact. To the contrary, he proceeded to what can only be described as an amazing summation of the situation in the countryside between 1955 and 1961:

"...little has been left of the militancy of late 1955, when the landlords spoke as if Ngo Dinh Diem's government were there to restore their former privileged position. This delusion was short-lived. When the landlords submitted to the rent reduction program, in effect they acknowledged that their position had undergone a radical change. President Ngo's well-known declaration that the land transfer was a necessary social revolution for the benefit of the tenants, served to disarm the landlords still further..."[108]

Only Radio Hanoi and "Communist agents in the countryside" were opposed to the GVN's program, Ladejinsky asserted, and, he added, "some tenants may prefer to become owners, but not the majority".[109]

Such irresponsible statements strongly suggest that, by 1961, Ladejinsky had lost touch with Vietnamese realities and had lapsed into wishful thinking, mesmerised by his own ideological preferences or by the famous interminable monologues of Ngo Dinh Diem, his paymaster and friend, with whom he habitually breakfasted at that time.[110]

15. "L'exasperation des Americains est visible dans les textes de l'epoque" writes Serge Thion, "meme si elle reste contenue".[111] [The exasperation of the Americans is patent in the documents from the period, even if it remains moderate]. Moderate indeed, one can only say of Wolf Ladejinsky in 1961; redolent of the mood of land tenure adviser Frate Bull in the Philippines in 1958, whom James Gittinger in 1961 criticized for recommending "only more of the same" inconsequential tinkering that had substituted for policy there since the departure of Robert Hardie, warning of "the future costs this irresolution will entail" [112]. The exasperation of an increasing number of Vietnamese
peasants, however, was *not* moderate and Ladejinsky appears to have quite lost touch with the current of peasant feeling. In the words of Serge Thion:

"La vaste population des petits fermiers ne pouvait voir que d'un oeil hostile le retour des grands propriétaires, dans les fourgons de la nouvelle armée sud-vietnamienne. Un nouvel appareil politico-policier s'installait dans les villages: nouvelle administration, police, milice et indicateurs reintroduisaient dans le village une structure d'autorité qui contrastait avec les comités de gestion locale mis en place de longue date par le Viet Minh." [113].

Vo Van Giau, President of the Federation of Tenant Farmers' Unions, might have warned Ladejinsky, as he informed David Würfel in 1957, that "very few" of the hundreds of thousands of tenancy contracts Ladejinsky and Gittinger believed operational were in fact enforced and that the tenant farmers' unions were in fact subject to GVN obstruction and harassment in defending tenant interests [114]. Kieu Cong Cung, as early as 1956, could have told him of the problems encountered by the so-called civic action cadres of the GVN, organized with the encouragement of Edward Lansdale, whose ostensible purpose was to challenge Communist access to and service to the mass of peasants: problems with organization and morale and of increasing domination by the political police of Ngo Dinh Nhu, the fascistic and eccentric brother of Ngo Dinh Diem and a power behind his rule.[115] No record that Ladejinsky has left, however, suggests that he was either in close contact or political sympathy with these people.

16. Implicit in Ladejinsky's misreading or misrepresentation of developments in South Vietnam between 1956 and 1961 was a repudiation of the insights that had set him apart as a "socialist" and a "national security risk" in the 1940's and early 1950's and the adoption of a premise shared by both the GVN elites and very many American officials: that the Communists were an alien and terroristic sect in the countryside, a tumorous growth whose surgical removal would be regarded by the Vietnamese peasants with gratitude, or at least with neutrality. It is numbing to find even Ladejinsky succumbing to this delusion. This flawed premise undermined South Vietnamese and American "pacification" programs from the 1950's to the early 1970's. That it might be an error never really sank in, although one of Robert McNamara's analysts observed in 1967:

"Diem's pre-occupation with security paradoxically interfered with his ability to compete with the Communists in the countryside. In effect he decided on a strategy of postponing the politicizing of the peasants until he had expunged his arch foes...In concluding that he did not have to reckon with peasant attitudes, Diem evidently operated from two related misapprehensions: that somehow the peasants would remain politically neutral while he eliminated the Communists and that the Viet Cong were essentially a destructive force." [116].

Jeffrey Race has shown how this and derivative misconceptions were endemic among the GVN elites in the 1950's and 1960's [117]. Eric Bergerud, like Race examining the social and military history of a crucial South Vietnamese province, Hau Nghia, reached the unequivocal conclusion that it was the Viet Cong and not the GVN that made reforms and enforced them, that offered challenge and dignity to the sons of peasants and that understood the calculus of rural grievances and power. After 1962, concluded Bergerud, only
massive violence could have uprooted the Viet Cong in Hau Nghia and the GVN would still have been faced with finding a solution to the underlying problem.[118]

17. Facts which Wolf Ladejinsky would not squarely face could not be expected to make much impression on American officials who knew even less about rural Vietnam and who saw the Second Indochina War as a war against Communist "invasion" of the GVN. The Diem land reform, even on paper, would have covered only 20% of riceland and 10% of tenant farmers, favoured mostly Catholic refugees from North Vietnam in an arc of land around Saigon, was accompanied by a bloody terror against former Viet Minh and other opposition elements, was further accompanied by repression of tenant mobilization in non-Communist unions and was virtually inoperable, in any case, by 1959 [119]. William Nighswonger, the first real historian of rural pacification in Vietnam, concluded in 1966, that American officials in general "had little contact with the peasants and lower officials who were in daily touch with the insurgency problem" and that they "had little training or experience with revolutionary warfare." Above all, he observed, the root problem was that "policy in Washington after 1956 discouraged intimate American awareness of Vietnamese political problems, which was necessary for adequate analysis of the Viet Cong threat." [120] What Nighswonger did not address in clear terms, or terms that admitted of a way out of the impasse in which the United States was finding itself in Vietnam, was the question: what, to be precise, did the Viet Cong threaten? Manifestly, to answer that they threatened the republic of South Vietnam would be to evade the question. What was at issue was American understanding of the said threat. However one perceived the institutional obstacles to such American understanding, the thing that cried out to be "understood", it seems plain, was "revolution" and the Vietnamese revolution in particular. By 1968, frustration and confusion over the ever bloodier and more futile effort to master the Vietnamese revolution had produced a threatening crisis in American politics and society rooted in division over "counter-revolution" and confusion over the nature of "revolution".
If We Had a Revolutionary Strategy.

1. Edmund Burke had deplored the lack of moderation in the French Revolution; Woodrow Wilson deplored the "irrational" and stormy nature of the Chinese, Mexican and Russian Revolutions. Both feared that "civilization" was threatened by such revolutions. What, then, was to be done? Edmund Burke urged intervention in France to extirpate the Jacobin revolution. Woodrow Wilson, one hundred and twenty years later, was reluctant to intervene in Mexico, because this looked like "counterrevolution". How, then, to make the world "safe for democracy"? How to check "irrational" revolution without espousing counterrevolution? Edmund Burke never raised the question. Woodrow Wilson never provided an answer. In the 1960's the United States was beset by the question and its lack of an answer was dramatized by the Vietnam War. The debate on land reform provides an especially instructive illustration of the problem. There was much confused debate on the nature of "revolution" as such. Certain moments in that debate throw the incertitude and basic conservatism of the American "Establishment" into sharp relief and offer a most useful perspective on the dilemmas of post-classical "counterrevolution".

2. Writing in 1965, Bernard Fall concluded his most sustained reflection on the disorders in Vietnam by invoking Hannah Arendt's controversial book On Revolution, published in 1963:

"In essence the Vietnamese problem of the 1960's is an American problem - and more, perhaps, a philosophic problem than an economic or a strategic one. Dr. Hannah Arendt, in her brilliant On Revolution, argues that "the French Revolution, which ended in disaster, has made world history, while the American Revolution, so triumphantly successful, has remained an event of little more than local importance." She adds that it is the French type of violent social revolution that "set the world on fire" and gave the word its present "connotations and overtones everywhere". In Vietnam, where we are faced, for more than one reason, with a typically "French" revolution, the United States has thus far refused to face up to the fact of revolution itself and has, therefore, failed to offer its own brand of revolution as an alternative. Making a case for "exporting" the American brand of revolution, Dr. Arendt avers that "fear of revolution has been the hidden leitmotif of post-war American foreign policy in its desperate attempts at stabilization of the status quo...as though...it was wealth and abundance which were at stake in the post-war conflict between the "revolutionary" countries of the East and the West." What is at stake in Vietnam in the 1960's, and on both sides of the demarcation line, is freedom, not living standards. And in the face of the fundamental challenge that issue presents to the West all over the world, the eventual survival or replacement of a particular leadership group becomes a relatively unimportant matter." [121].

The analysis thus offered suffers from being too vague. What did Fall mean by the last clause? That the overthrow [and assassination] of Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu, by their army officers, in November 1963, with American encouragement, was an admissible expedient? That the comic opera military cliques in Saigon during 1964-65 were "a relatively unimportant matter"? That the N.L.F. should be brought into the government? He did not make this clear. Nor did he specify what "revolution" America could export, or how. And asserting that "freedom", abstracted from "wealth and abundance" was the "real" issue between Communists and peasants on the one hand, landlords, collaborators with the French and Chinese merchants on the other, would seem to have been a mere recapitulation of the propagandist trope so rife in American
official pronouncements that the war was being fought in defence of the "Free World". Fall did not even set down just what he meant by "freedom" - from what or for whom. What was lacking was any thorough reflection on the nature of revolution. Three years later, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings on *The Nature of Revolution*, inviting a number of leading American scholars - but no revolutionaries - to present their views on the subject. These hearings took place in February 1968, at the height of the Vietnam War, in the immediate aftermath of the first wave of the Tet Offensive, at a time when social and racial tensions within the United States were fusing with the anti-war movement and becoming increasingly violent. Against such a background the hearings resonate with disturbing and fascinating significances.

3. What was the American Revolution that it might be exported to Asia, or Africa, or Latin America, in place of the ideas of the Russian Revolution, or even the French Revolution? Crane Brinton, author of *The Anatomy of Revolution*, told the senators of the Committee on Foreign Relations:

"The American Revolution was a successful nationalist revolution to drive out British rulers who had come to seem to many, probably most Americans essentially foreigners, but its course was certainly marked by social conflict: frontier against seaboard, radical against conservative, debtors against creditors, as those aftermaths of the revolution, the Whisky Rebellion, Shay's Rebellion and indeed the whole later Hamiltonian-Jeffersonian controversy brought out." [122]

Brinton, be it noted, emphasised nationalism, not constitutionalism, as the salient characteristic of the American revolution, [though it is questionable that the thirteen colonies of what later became the United States constituted a "nation" in 1776], thus providing no opening to the constitutional defects of the model of "nationalist" government the Vietnamese Communists proposed to put in place of French colonial rule. The drift, instead, was toward a conflation of nationalist revolution and American political culture. One exchange between Brinton and Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee might have come right out of the book, or film, *The Ugly American*, which a few years earlier [in 1958 and 1962, respectively] had rather nimbly dramatized the illusions and prejudices ingrained in official American thinking about the world beyond America's shores:

"SENATOR GORE: I have been rather proud of the American evangelical spirit. I don't know that history shows a more aggressive culture than the Judaeo-Christian culture...Did not infact the early revolution in the United States serve as a source of inspiration for the French Revolution?

MR. BRINTON: It did indeed, yes. There is no question about that...This, of course, is what Mr. Toynbee objects to in our policy since the end of World War II, that we have actually, as he calls it, deserted our own revolution.

SENATOR GORE: We have the best and we insist that our sense of values is superior and therefore we want to make them available to [every people on earth]. We are a little impatient when people do not accept them.

MR. BRINTON: Available is the key word." [123].
Among the exchanges at these hearings that fairly leaps off the page to the instructed and critical eye, is that between Crane Brinton, Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey and Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, concerning the Radical Reconstruction of the period 1866 - 1876 and that man Thaddeus Stevens, the radical land reformer in the Republican Party of the 1860's:

"SENATOR CASE: We have never gone through a revolution...we never had a class society and we never had to revolt against it...
SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I do not want to inject in here a sour note, but I think the senator from New Jersey has forgotten Reconstruction. I am not sure that just not hanging Jeff Davis was a sign of great sympathy and an attitude of forgiveness. That was a very bad period.
MR. BRINTON: Well, of course it was. But Robert E. Lee became a national hero shortly afterward...
SENATOR CASE: Thaddeus Stevens was not allowed to take over the country...
SENATOR FULBRIGHT: He did temporarily.
MR. BRINTON: But very informally.
SENATOR CASE: I wonder how far that would have gone.
MR. BRINTON: I submit the effects of that were not really worn off until, really, World War II.
SENATOR CASE: They have not even altogether worn off today.
MR. BRINTON: Not even now.
MR. BRINTON: No.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT: It was a very bad period." [124].

Buried as it is in hearings basically concerned with the Vietnam War, this is a fascinating and most revealing palimpsest on the text of American social history. The fantastic circumlocution by which the three interlocutors contrive to link the name Thaddeus Stevens to all that was "very bad" in the era of Reconstruction, excluding all mention of black codes, lynch-law and disenfranchisement, segregation and denial of civil rights to black Americans, excluding all mention of just what Thaddeus Stevens stood for and who opposed and defeated him and why, is nothing if not remarkable in the context in which it is set. If, in hearings on the nature of revolution, Thaddeus Stevens' non-violent, constitutional advocacy of a radical, democratic land reform in the post bellum American South, to break the power of the white landlord class and fully emancipate the black, ex-slave millions, was to be remembered, without demurral, in the forum of the Committee on Foreign Relations, as "very bad", what likelihood was there of the Committee comprehending the nature of revolution, or the Vietnamese revolution in particular? The problem was urgent and severe. Even as these senators and scholars mumbled over Thaddeus Stevens, thousands upon thousands of young Vietnamese guerrillas were being slaughtered by the overwhelming power of the American armed forces, in the effort to prevent a "Radical Reconstruction" in Vietnam. Yet these most learned and prominent Americans were unable or unwilling even to set their own country's history in critical perspective.

As of February 1968, Daniel Ellsberg, Harvard-educated economist, RAND Corporation and Defense Department analyst and systems theorist, brooded over the history - the "hidden history" as he called it - of American decision-making on Vietnam; the history which he later released to the public, in thousands of pages,
known ever since as *The Pentagon Papers*. He had been studying that history throughout 1967, for Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara, who had become troubled by the nature of American involvement in Vietnam and wanted the record of decision-making examined. Ellsberg's still private doubts, in 1967, were afloat in a rising tide of American doubt, social dissent and anti-war sentiment. A CBS documentary of 1967, titled *The New Left*, graphically captured on celluloid the voices and images that swelled this tide. Edited into a well-crafted film was Stokely Carmichael declaring to Black Power comrades:

"Today we have to fight to define ourselves as we see fit and get white society to accept those definitions."

Tom Hayden, of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), featured, observing quietly:

"We have found that when push comes to shove this society is very resistant to change - much more so than we thought seven or eight years ago."

Hubert Humphrey appeared, embracing racist Georgia Governor, Lester Maddox, who had earlier waved a pistol and prescribed ax handles as the answer to demands for racial equality. In the background, one hears Bob Dylan singing "something is happening here, but you don't know what it is, do you, Mister Jones?", words which have a haunting resonance in this context. And, as the film concludes, young voices sing "call it peace, or call it treason, call it love or call it reason, but I ain't a marchin' to war any more." There was, Ellsberg's immediate boss, Assistant Secretary of Defence John T. McNaughton reflected, a growing public feeling that the Establishment was "out of its mind". That it was "carrying things to absurd lengths."[125]

There was, in the New Left of the 1960's, a certain romanticism, but it was a romanticism tinged with bitterness and even in its rebellion against both the Establishment and the "Old Left" it was grounded in no very cogent understanding of the nature of revolution and no especially acute understanding of the virtues and genuine dilemmas of the Establishment.[126] There was, however, a deep and vital feeling that America somehow was wrong to be standing against "revolution" and that, to be true to its own spirit of freedom, it ought to be able to stand for "revolution".

6 . Did America, among its cultural resources, have a model of revolution to offer to others? James Thomson, Asia scholar, coming before the Committee on Foreign Relations after Crane Brinton, to present his views on *The Nature of Revolution*, was not at all sure that it did. He told the Committee:

"You know, it was Jefferson who said that the American Revolution was intended for all mankind...All I am asking, all I am suggesting, is that on the basis of experience, and particularly Vietnam experience, but also elsewhere, we stand back a few paces and re-examine...how entirely applicable our own experience is...We never had a real feudal class, we never went through that form of revolution that even many Europeans did...so we are hard put to understand some of the forces within revolutionary situations elsewhere in the world, and our techniques, which sound so good, may not, on further reflection, be very appropriate..."[127].

Louis Hartz, Professor of Government at Harvard University, told the Committee in similar terms that:
"...the old feudal enemies have been left behind in Europe and it is unnecessary to guillotine them...Hence the Americans have difficulty understanding not only the violence of French Revolutions abroad, but the fact that they always seem to "fail"." [128].

America, Hartz went on, had been defined in its beginnings by escape from revolution, in the seventeenth century, but was inexorably drawn into a twentieth century encounter with it, which activated anxieties and misapprehensions as old as, or older than, the United States itself. He described this figuratively as "a return voyage of the Mayflower" [129], a figure of speech which suggests that the widespread American notion of "Manifest Destiny" had to be stood on its head. As with so much else in the hearings, however, this culture-shaking idea was left more or less suspended in the air of the chamber and allowed to dissolve. And when James Thomson offered the less gnomic opinion:

"I myself feel emphatically that the wealthier nations of the world have an obligation to assist the agony of modernization of the rest of them"[130]

no-one present so much as asked for details as to how this might be done, or whether it was possible to be more precise concerning this "agony of modernization", the conflicts to which it gave rise and the relation to it over time of the "wealthier nations of the world".

7. It was John T. McAlister of Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, coming before the Committee to discuss the specific question of American intervention in Vietnam, who came closest to throwing the whole debate wide open, both as regards that intervention and as regards the social and political questions that it was burying under a rain of bombs. Quite plainly, McAlister told the Committee, as of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, both Hanoi and Saigon, both Ho Chi Minh and Ngo Dinh Diem considered Vietnam one and indivisible, so that the "foreign invasion" theory of North Vietnamese involvement in the war was nothing if not tendentious.[131] At bottom, he went on, a social revolution was afoot in Vietnam and "the Saigon government has no program in which it might share power with the peasants".[132] He then added, without equivocation: "we cannot sponsor an effective political alternative to this revolutionary movement." [133] Surely this ought to have electrified his audience; it ought to have thrown directly into discussion in that forum the differences between Woodrow Wilson and Lenin; between the League of Nations and the Third International, which had, all the way back in 1919-20, inclined Ho Chi Minh to cast in his lot with Communism. The ramifications were profound, the Vietnam War made them violently palpable, but, again, words laden with explosive meaning sputtered out in an exchange of superficialities.

8. McAlister told the Committee on Foreign Relations:

"The point is, that the Communists, particularly in Vietnam, have been more true to the genius of developing revolutionary strategies than have non-Communist groups; and the element of the Communist identity, of course, links them with other international Communist powers. Just as, let us say, speaking now in the abstract, if we had a revolutionary strategy for the transformation of underdeveloped countries, and
this resulted in their being a local indigenous elite that could somehow identify with a revolutionary free
world ideology, their coming to power would link them to [our] international system..."[134]

The italicized words warrant the most thorough meditation. They are a series of doors - the doors in
Bluebeard's Castle, perhaps, with the critical scholar or liberal or New Left romantic playing Judith to a
plutocratic Bluebeard? - opening into the many chambers of fate. Behind those sealed doors lie countless
censored records and all the caged violences of disordered systems. "Speaking now in the abstract". Open a
door and a whole past is revealed in a disturbing new light. "If we had..." - but are not these many chambers
sealed lest we have - "a revolutionary strategy"? Great Turn, Great Terror, Great Leap into famine; Left
Oppositionists machine-gunned by thousands in the tundra; tens and hundreds of thousands worked to death
in the permafrost of the Kolyma; the "killing fields" of Kampuchea...Revolutionary strategy? Slam the doors
and wedge them! For the "transformation of underdeveloped countries..." How? To what? By what means?
"Speaking now in the abstract". Was Woodrow Wilson not a thousand times justified in deploiring "irrational"
revolutions"? What, then, lies behind the sealed doors? "Liberalism must be more liberal than ever, it must even be radical, if civilization is to escape the typhoon". "If we had a revolutionary strategy..."
"When was your last chance? When did it become too late?" "1947. At the latest. Perhaps 1946". Do all
these sealed doors open onto chambers of horror? "That was a very bad period". "We cannot sponsor an
effective political alternative to this revolutionary movement...". Bluebeard's gloom, Judith's headstrong
impatience to dispel it, the deep night of Stalinism - such, from a certain perspective, has been the black
opera of the American contest with radical revolution since 1945, beginning with the experience in China,
and the 1968 hearings on The Nature of Revolution brought forth no real suggestion that American ideas or
power could change the scenario from a black opera into a nobler or more edifying spectacle.

9. Wolf Ladejinsky and James P. Gittinger departed South Vietnam in 1961
and for the next five years the United States had no land tenure adviser, no land reform
program and no financial commitment to any such program in South Vietnam. Between
1961 and 1966 the rebellion and American intervention to try to put it down grew in tandem. The removal
of Diem and his family in November 1963 did not improve the situation. By the end of 1965, the United
States had embarked on the process of full-scale military intervention in Vietnam, but there was no
consensus within the U.S. government as to what could be done to win the war against the forces of
revolution. Between 8 and 11 January 1966, U.S. officials responsible for the war in various capacities met
at Warrenton, Virginia, to discuss the "pacification" of South Vietnam [135]. The meeting was marked by
the failure to arrive at any clear sense of what might be done, as the following exchange, from a Rand
roundtable on pacification held four years later testifies. The speakers are Robert W. Komer, who had been
President Johnson's chief pacification coordinator from February 1966 until the summer of 1967 and Colonel
Robert M. Montague, who had been one of his executive officers at that time:

"MONTAGUE: The Warrenton Conference suggested centralizing Washington responsibility for all such
non-military matters in Vietnam as pacification, aid, land reform etc. There was a
discussion about organization. Pacification was the central theme. They went over the
ideas that everyone had accepted but had been unable to carry out up to that time
KOMER: The conference papers had some interesting things in them...This is one of the curses of our performance in Vietnam. All sorts of interesting ideas were advanced, reports written, conferences held, critiques made, research done, experiments started, but somehow there was all too little follow through from all this ferment. No-one grabbed the ball and ran with it, as far as I can tell." [136]

What exactly grabbing "the ball" and running with it would have consisted of at that juncture, the Rand roundtable discussion did not make clear. However, in the course of 1966 the debate over land reform resumed in U.S. policy circles and those who grabbed that ball and tried to run with it may be said to have found themselves being tackled by their own team.

10. By January 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed by Senator J. William Fulbright, had begun to become critical of the conduct of the Vietnam War by the Johnson Administration. Johnson sought to seize the initiative, by vowing that the United States could continue the "Great Society" social reforms at home and still fight the war.[137] On 4 February he announced a major conference with his military chiefs and the leaders of South Vietnam, in Honolulu, and this Honolulu Conference (4-6 Feb. 1966) became a platform for bold, but vague claims that South Vietnam, too, would be given a "Great Society" program. The development of what became known as the "New Model Pacification Program" may be traced to this conference [138], but the initiation of a major land reform would prove to be another matter.

11. Robert Kleiman, in editorial comment on the Honolulu Conference for the New York Times, expressed his scepticism in regard to the land reform issue at the time:

"The one important area of agreement in Honolulu, apart from continuation of the military efforts, was on an expanded program of "rural construction". The expected doubling of American economic aid, however, will be futile, unless it is accompanied by a veritable social revolution, including vigorous land reform. Premier Ky cast some doubt, in his emphasis on moving slowly...Unless some way can be found to give more momentum to this effort, the new economic aid program will go down the same drain as all previous programs of this kind. [139]

Richard Critchfield, writing on the Honolulu Conference for the Washington Evening Star on 9 February 1966, was more sanguine:

"President Johnson's historic decision at Honolulu, backing an American-sponsored brand of social revolution as an alternative to Communism in South Vietnam, was warmly hailed today by veteran political observers. The Honolulu declaration was viewed as ending a post-war era of American foreign policy aimed at stabilizing the status quo in Asia.

The key phrase in the view of many diplomats here, was the offer of full American "support of social revolution, including land reform, based upon the principle of building upward from the hopes and purposes of the people of Vietnam".

Johnson's decisions to put political remedies on a par with military action are also regarded as a major personal triumph for Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and his top aide, Major General Edward G. Lansdale, the two main advocates of "social revolution" in South Vietnam...The Honolulu declaration appears to signify a major shift away from the policy of primarily military support established by President Kennedy in 1961 and closely identified with General Maxwell Taylor, Defense Secretary McNamara and
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Secretary of State Rusk...The Lodge-Lansdale formula was a striking departure, in that it saw the eventual solution not so much in Hanoi's capitulation as in successful pacification in South Vietnam...The Honolulu declaration amounts to almost a point by point acceptance of this formula and both its phraseology and philosophy bear Lansdale's unmistakable imprint..." [140].

That Henry Cabot Lodge and Edward G. Lansdale should have seemed to Critchfield to be probable architects or leaders of a "social revolution" in South Vietnam in 1966 seems almost humorous, but Critchfield was correct to the extent that these men had some appreciation for the social bases of the revolution then being fought for by Vietnamese peasants under Communist leadership. That left them, however, very far from being able to wrest such leadership away from the Communists.

12. In 1965, after a tour of service in India, where he worked for Ambassador Chester Bowles, Laurence Hewes, veteran of the Tugwell era in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, veteran of the land reform in Japan, author of memoirs of each of those experiences, returned to the United States a disillusioned man. He was, at the age of sixty four, he later wrote:

"...happily counting the months to retirement, very content at the prospect of no further foreign assignments. It seemed very plain that our overseas aid program of agricultural assistance to developing nations had reached a stalemate and that little was to be gained by continuing it, at least in its current form and with its current philosophical inclinations."[141]

His quiet was disturbed one day in late February 1966 by a phone call from Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman, who had been on a trip to South Vietnam after the Honolulu Conference and asked Hewes to make a trip there himself to assess the land tenure situation, AID Agriculture's work and the prospect for some sort of dramatic land reform. [142]. Hewes was reluctant:

"Like many Americans, I was particularly opposed to our involvement in Vietnam; we had no business to be there; particularly with our civilian aid programs closely tied to our military adventure in that region...Moreover, the argument that we were halting the spread of Communism was, it seemed, specious. We were doing much more harm to American morality and domestic solidarity than to any real threat from Communism, if, indeed, that was at all a serious threat to our national interest." [143]

Having been urged by Freeman, on the grounds that the request came right from the top, Hewes agreed to undertake the mission and flew to Saigon in early March 1966, via Chicago, Anchorage, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Phnom Penh.[144] His experiences in the field and in Saigon and the fate of his report on land reform in South Vietnam were to show once more that there was an abiding ambivalence toward land reform, within those circles most responsible for American foreign policy, which stood athwart any serious effort to bring it about in places such as South Vietnam.

13. On his arrival in Saigon, Laurence Hewes was greeted by AID officials, among them John L. Cooper, "my former colleague from Tokyo days" who "had been rushed from his AID Agriculture assignment in East Africa to join our team". [145] Cooper, he discovered, had "dug into the files to uncover a series of fruitless efforts to deal with the
Vietnamese rural and agrarian problems." [146] The two of them consulted with AID officials, military people and available reports and soon became sceptical about the official "mythology" on "security" in the countryside:

"Officially, U.S. authorities claimed as secure a large portion of the countryside...Cooper and I...gained the distinct impression that the entire...countryside varied from shaky to very shaky. We guessed it was possible that as much as 70% of the country was not "secure" at all." [147]

The two of them made field trips to selected villages in An Giang province, adjacent to Long An in the Mekong delta region [see Map 3] and then north along the coast to Ninh Thuan and Khanh Hoa, basing themselves at Nha Trang. [148] Their findings were hard hitting and recall the first field reports from South Vietnam of Ladejinsky in 1955-56, or the language of the Hardie Report in the Philippines in 1952:

"It seemed to us that the rural issues were socio-economic and political, rather than technical and production-oriented. If we were right, these central questions applied to the condition of land tenure and to the exploitation of tenants...a complete reorganization of the land occupancy structure was necessary. And this was not something that AID Agriculture, as presently constituted, was equipped to handle. Moreover, they were committed to a program based on conventional American methods which did not question the moral, political or ethical bases of the ownership of private property. Yet...if there was no effective challenge, either by the South Vietnamese government or by the U.S. AID, to prevailing land tenure arrangements...the war could not be won..." [149]

Their field research was cut short by stern warnings at Nha Trang that conditions in rural areas in Khanh Hoa and further north were too insecure for them to proceed. They returned to Saigon to prepare what, as Hewes recalled, "achieved brief notoriety as the Cooper-Hewes Report".[150]

14. The land reformers found that conditions in Saigon, also, were insecure for their purposes, but in this case because of obstacles posed by tangled bureaucratic rivalries and camouflaged ideological prejudices. No sooner were they back from the field than Lansdale made contact with them and indicated that he wanted to hear first hand what they had concluded from their field observations:

"Almost simultaneously, I [Hewes] was informed that the AID Mission Director also wanted to see me. When I arrived at the Director's office there was present the chief of the AID Agriculture Division. They told me flatly that I was not to see General Lansdale; relations with him amounted to contact with the Ambassador and I simply did not have the status to warrant such an interview. Since I had already arranged a meeting with the General and putting on a bold face, I told them that my chain of command was to Orville Freeman and through him to the President. If they liked, they could explain to General Lansdale their position while I cabled Freeman of my difficulty. Their opposition collapsed and I set off on foot for Lansdale's headquarters." [151]

Lansdale, who expressed astonishment that Hewes had dared to walk unguarded in the streets of Saigon, made a strong impression on the land reformer:

"One had the feeling that in that neat, slight, compact exterior, violence lay near the surface. This feeling was complicated by the sense that the General knew many things that were hidden from me." [152]
The result of their meeting, however, was a meeting not with Ambassador Lodge alone but with the entire top level of the American Mission:

"We met in a large room at the American Embassy, gathering around a large green felt covered table. Cooper and I sat immediately to the left of Ambassador Lodge; opposite to me was General Westmoreland...I recall that among those present were Deputy Ambassador Porter; Philip Habib, Counsellor for Political Affairs; Charles Mann, Director of the AID Mission; and Leroy Wehrle, Economic Counsellor to the Ambassador and Deputy Director of the AID Mission; and, of course, General Lansdale. There were others, mostly military and State Department staff people." [153]

Hewes and Cooper made their report and Hewes recalled that it "apparently came as a shock to many of the people at the table" [154]:

"I told the group my conviction that at the heart of the conflict was the land tenure arrangement which divided the rural people into landlords and tenants...Efforts by the U.S. or the Saigon government to preserve the old order were bound to fail and such failure meant the triumph of the Viet Cong. My recommendation was drastic - get rid of the landlords, abolish tenancy."[155]

Ambassador Lodge responded: "Why did we have to wait so long for a proposal that is so logical?" [156] The more senior Mission members present who were disposed to be critical seem to have held their fire at this meeting, although Hewes found himself "surrounded" after the meeting "by a group of younger State Department people" who "were hostile and angry." [157]. However, it seems that Habib and Mann, at least, were ill-disposed toward the Cooper-Hewes Report, but held their hand at the meeting, awaiting a more favorable moment to move against it.

15. Following the Embassy meeting in Saigon, the land reformers returned to Washington D.C. and there, on 3 May 1966, in Orville Freeman's office, at the Department of Agriculture, they presented their report once more at a top level gathering, which included U. Alexis Johnson from the State Department, William Gaud from AID, Robert Komer from the White House and Richard Helms from the CIA, as well as Dorothy Jacobson, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture under Freeman and others. Hewes' account of this meeting offers a matchless illustration of the character of the bureaucratic and ideological inertia on land reform in the United States at that time and, this study would suggest, most other times also:

"I repeated my Saigon performance. But this time the response was vocal and almost completely negative. No-one supported me; no-one had ever heard that the agrarian system of Vietnam needed to be changed. Besides, since my proposal involved American financing, the burden on the American people would be prohibitive...everyone, it seemed, was against me. My claims of the success of the Japanese land reform were brushed aside by saying that it was a special case."[158]

This opposition, which was in fact to be persistent, then underwent a fascinating temporary dissolution, as Hewes recounted:
"What happened next was quite dramatic. I shall never forget it. The door to the Secretary's office swung open and Vice President Humphrey angrily stalked in. He reached into a side pocket and brought out a copy of our plan. "What's going on here?" he asked. And when the Secretary summed up the proceedings, he roared: "What kind of a reaction is this to a very fine plan with which I am in entire agreement?" He went on to say that the attitude of the group was similar to Lincoln's cabinet meeting in debating the Emancipation Proclamation, when almost all the cabinet was against freeing the slaves...[A]s soon as Humphrey stopped speaking, Freeman proceeded to poll the group. Did they agree with my thesis and proposal? Whereas 45 minutes before they were eating me alive, the vigorous support of Humphrey completely reversed their attitude and each nodded his approval. I was somewhat scandalized at this reversal of position; it seemed such a craven yielding to a higher ranking authority. Didn't these men, I thought, believe in their original position, or were they just saying "yes" while not meaning it?" [159]

The latter would appear to have been the correct supposition. A few days after this meeting, Hewes was called to a further meeting in Jacobson's office, where he was confronted by "some of the younger, hostile State Department assistants along with Ambassador Unger and Philip Habib, the latter having just flown in from Saigon. It was the drift of the State Department argument that land reform was unnecessary, that the AID Agriculture program was sufficient." [160]

16. Yet another meeting followed upon Hewes' preparation of a two page memorandum summarizing his proposals for State and AID. It took place on the night of 19 May 1966 at the State Department and was attended by a number of State and AID officials and a panel of prominent agricultural consultants called in by AID: Abraham Weisblatt and Clifton Wharton of the Rockefeller-based Agricultural Council, Peter Domer of the University of Wisconsin, Vernon Ruttan of the University of Minnesota, and Robert Nathan, who ran a Washington-based rural development consulting firm. The meeting went on for hours, consisting partly of discussion and partly of a cross-examination of Hewes and Cooper. According to Hewes:

"None of the participants was willing to take an unequivocal stand for land reform excepting Cooper and I. It became clear, however, that both State and AID resented Freeman, Jacobson and I as outside intruders into what they considered their domain and their policy precinct...The final decision was to employ an outside firm of consultants to review the situation and confirm or deny our report." [161]

The outside firm of consultants hired by State and AID was the Stanford Research Institute, who were approached in mid-summer 1966. The whole episode was, to Hewes' mind, a "classical public administration scenario" and "a signal of no-confidence in our proposal." [162]

17. Philip Habib did not wait for the Stanford Research Institute to do its work, but independently arranged for a researcher at the Rand Corporation to undertake a critique of proposals for land reform in South Vietnam. The researcher was one Edward Mitchell and his report, under the title Land Tenure and Rebellion: A Statistical Analysis of the Factors Affecting Government Control in South Vietnam, which took a line antithetical in every respect to that of the Cooper-Hewes Report, is an item of considerable interest in the land reform debate of that time.[163] To get its policy significance into focus, however, it is important to consider its bureaucratic origins. It will be recalled that Richard Critchfield had, in the aftermath of the Honolulu Conference, singled out Edward
Lansdale, along with Henry Cabot Lodge, as the main advocate of "social revolution" in South Vietnam. Also that Lansdale had sponsored Cooper and Hewes in Saigon, arranging for their meeting with the whole Mission. It was Habib, not Lansdale, however, who controlled the Political Section of the Mission in Saigon and, as an interesting exchange between Komer and Montague at the 1970 Rand roundtable on pacification suggests, the two men did not get along well:

"KOMER: Lansdale arrived the second time in 1965. Frankly, I think that Ed Lansdale and his group, during this second tour in Vietnam, were very frustrated people. I do not believe they were given, after Cabot Lodge came, much scope.
MONTAGUE: The big problem was Habib.
KOMER: Basically, by the time Ellsworth Bunker arrived the die had been cast. Phil Habib, who ran the political side for Lodge...he and Lansdale just didn't get along...jurisdictional conflict mainly. Bill Porter wasn't terribly happy about the Lansdale operation either. I would say offhand that the Lansdale role in this period was limited." [164]

It was not until 1969 that Richard Critchfield interviewed Orville Freeman on the subject of land reform in South Vietnam, to be told by him:

"The American Embassy in Saigon opposed as a matter of policy efforts by the Johnson Administration to sponsor land reform in South Vietnam, starting in early 1966...After the Honolulu Conference, in February 1966, the Embassy informed Washington it opposed land reform on the ground it would create added political instability." [165]

Six months later, still in 1969, Frank Herbert, then a political correspondent for the Seattle Post-Intelligencer in Saigon, slammed Habib by name as a long time opponent of land reform:

"Habib was known to pound the table and shout down those who disagreed with him on land reform in meetings here. The documentary evidence is clear he not only fought against land reform in Vietnam, but sabotaged it...Files here make it clear how he undermined the effort of Ambassador Lodge to get Washington approval on a specific package of land reform...in the spring of 1967...Habib...put together a series of cables to key government figures...so much against reform that they set up a solid wall against the Lodge plan. This wall greeted the Ambassador on his arrival in Washington and he abandoned the plan." [166]

But let us not get ahead of our story. According to Hermann Kahn, Director of the Hudson Institute and a former Rand consultant, it was Habib who was chiefly responsible for commissioning the Mitchell study [hereinafter referred to as the Mitchell Report] [167] at the height of the debate in 1966 and it would appear that he did so in direct response not to a plan of Ambassador Lodge's, but to the Cooper-Hewes Report.

18. The argument of the Mitchell Report was one of unequivocal and forthright rejection of land reform in South Vietnam. The reasons given are instructive, though the reasoning itself was defective. Mitchell invoked the name of Alexis de Tocqueville, in citing the observation of the latter that, in 1789 and after, the French peasantry had risen against the ancien regime precisely where "social reform and progress had been most visible, whereas resistance to revolution sprang up in areas where the old order had been most completely retained." [168]. He then commented that American policy in Asia, between 1945 and 1966, had been based on assumptions antithetical to this and
that, in Vietnam, "the attention given by the Allies [sic] to economic development and reform in the midst of a major war is without precedent." [169]. If, he reasoned, land hunger, rural inequalities and Viet Cong promises of land to the tiller were the causes of insurgency in South Vietnam [170], then:

"...we should expect to find that the Viet Cong have been most successful, other things being equal, in the provinces where few peasants own their own land, the distribution of land holdings is unequal and land redistribution has not been carried out. [However, a] statistical analysis of factors affecting government control in South Vietnam reveals...that these provinces are precisely the areas of greatest security. The observed relationship is between greater inequality and greater government control - not the reverse. Whether measured in terms of ownership of land, size of farms, or lack of redistribution of large estates, inequality of land tenure seems to contribute to greater security." [171].

Coming in the wake of the Cooper-Hewes Report, to say nothing of other reports prior to it on the state of affairs in rural Vietnam, this finding of the Mitchell Report was, on the face of it, remarkable and most original. It appears all the more remarkable and original when it is considered that Mitchell never went to Vietnam.

19. The implicit theory of peasant agriculture and peasant rebellions that lies between the lines of the Mitchell Report is startling in its narrowness and crudeness. Above all, his explicit position was that the Saigon regime was and was best defended as an anti-modern, anti-democratic and unregenerate order.[172] That in itself was a remarkable posture to strike. But his use of data was flawed and his conclusions needed, in fundamental respects, to be turned on their heads. As one critic was to write more than three years later:

"The fact that land was more inequitably distributed in the GVN areas than in the Viet Cong areas, did not mean that the Viet Cong gained control in areas of equitable land distribution, but that in the areas they controlled, the Viet Minh and Viet Cong, through their land reform programs, caused the land to be more equitably distributed." [173]

A string of critics, between 1970 and 1976, were to take Mitchell to task for his fallacious reasoning [174], but the salient point about the Mitchell Report was not its reasoning; it was its use as a rhetorical weapon by Habib and his allies in the State and AID bureaucracies to fend off the arguments of Cooper and Hewes in 1966 and into 1967. In that respect, it was most effective.

20. In February 1966 Robert Komer was appointed Special Assistant to the President on pacification. He worked in Washington, at the White House, throughout that year, before deciding, in early 1967, that the job could not be done from eleven thousand miles away, whereupon he moved to Saigon and for much of that year operated as immediate coordinator of pacification programs in South Vietnam. His decision to move to Saigon coincided with the circulation of the Mitchell Report both in Washington and the Mission in Saigon, as well as the circulation in the same circles of a study which took a line very close to that of the Mitchell Report: a paper entitled *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities*, by Rand Corporation analyst Charles Wolf Jr. According to Wolf, it was not true, as a general rule, that popular attitudes and support play the decisive role in enabling insurgent
movements to get started, gain momentum and erupt in "liberation wars." [175]. The decisive factor, he insisted, was the insurgent infrastructure of cadres and enforcers. Root this out and the insurrection would collapse. Now Komer became known, in the anti-war literature, as the architect of the intensified repressive "pacification" in South Vietnam in the late 1960's, part of which was the notorious Operation Phoenix, the operation calculated to knock out the Viet Cong "infrastructure", in the course of which, by 1970, tens of thousands of Viet Cong suspects had been arrested and some 20,000 killed.[176] Komer, however, discussing the pacification efforts in 1970, described himself as having been, in 1966, a big proponent of land reform. Without mentioning Cooper or Hewes, he declared:

"We kept trying, but we just were getting nowhere over GVN and AID opposition. In fact, I soon concluded that pushing land reform would have to put to one side until we got more response from the GVN. It was almost entirely a U.S. initiative...just getting nowhere with the Vietnamese...I regard pressing for land reform as one of my failures in Washington and then in Vietnam [from] 1966 to 1968." [177]

An exchange between Komer and a former senior member of his staff, Richard Moorsteen, summed up something of the impasse at which things stood in 1966-67:

"KOMER: We were big land reformers...
MONTAGUE: Wasn't this over my dead body?
KOMER: Well, I was a big land reformer, then, with Moorsteen telling me I had rocks in my head!...At that time I was pushing land reform very hard and getting nowhere fast. Not until I got to Vietnam and saw the problems of executing land reform did I pull back..."

The extent of Komer's support of land reform as an idea, however, is unclear, apart from the fact that, by his own admission, he retrenched on the idea once he arrived in Saigon and found out how difficult it would be to get it done.

21. Thomas Scoville, of the Office of Current Military History, Department of the Army, and former member of the evaluation branch of the coordinated pacification administration Komer had created in Saigon, was an interlocutor at the 1970 Rand roundtable on pacification. He asked Komer:

"In your 27 April 1967 Memorandum to the President, you mentioned that we should press harder for radical land reform initiatives. By "radical" what did you have in mind? How would you assess the GVN on land reform? To what would you attribute its successes and failures? How hard did we press on land reform?...What was the U.S. position on land reform? In the 1950's, USOM had been reluctant to really push land reform for fear of antagonizing conservative members of Congress. Does this still hold true? That was a really important factor."[179]

These were all the right questions, but Komer's answers were vague and unilluminating. He remarked that he never heard fear of conservative Congressmen mentioned in the 1960's. His only other observation of any note was that, in 1966, he and his assistant William Leonhart had approached Wolf Ladejinsky about "going out to Vietnam and designing a new land reform program", only to be informed by Ladejinsky: "It's not necessary. I went out there in 1956-57 and designed a perfectly good land reform program and it was
executed."[180] This extraordinary retort by Ladejinsky can have done nothing to strengthen the belief of Komer that land reform in South Vietnam was a vital part of any "social revolution" to turn the tables against the Communists. What is equally remarkable, however, is that Komer should have made no mention whatever in this context of the Cooper-Hewes Report, of which, as Hewes has written, he certainly knew and with the recommendations of which, if Hewes' recollection was accurate, he had disagreed.

22. When interviewed in February 1985, Komer did not recall Philip Habib as having been opposed to land reform in South Vietnam in 1966-67:

"If Habib was opposed to land reform, I wasn't aware of it. Habib is a great pragmatist. He believed the land reform would only work under conditions of peace and would be destabilizing in war. He is a very able citizen...People were less opposed than unenthusiastic...Habib was less willing than I was to just push the landowners aside..." [181]

There seems, however, to be little evidence that Komer or those around him ever considered serious plans for pushing the landowners aside. The extraordinary thing is that Komer or, for that matter, the "great pragmatist" Habib could not accept that the GVN was destabilized precisely by its unwillingness or incapacity to undertake a major land reform, or other reforms. Perhaps the best indication of the clouded nature of Komer's recollection of the land reform debate of 1966-67 is his assertion, in 1985, that the Mitchell Report was a peripheral piece of work, "very thin" and "not representative of official U.S. views even in the mid-'60s" [182]. He claimed that it was not widely read and not influential. Yet Robert Sansom, author of a major 1969-70 study of land tenure and insurgency in South Vietnam, referred to the Mitchell Report as something initially classified, but read and cited in argument by "high-level U.S. officials in Washington" and as having been the subject of "widespread attention", being "immediately accepted by high-level officials in Saigon". [183]

23. Writing in 1969, Elizabeth Pond informed readers of the Christian Science Monitor that:

"The U.S. Embassy in Saigon [in 1967-68] agreed with the Rand study and informed Washington of its own opposition on grounds that land reform might increase political instability. And so inertia carried the day. Nothing was done."[184]

Frances Starner, writing in 1970, for the Far Eastern Economic Review, observed of the 1966-69 period:

"The American Embassy in Saigon could cite in support of its decision not to press for land reform, the finding of a Rand Corporation study that the landowning class was a major contributor to political stability in Vietnam." [185]

Similar observations were made by Jeffrey Race, also writing for the Far Eastern Economic Review [186] and William Bredo writing for Asian Survey, both in 1970. Wrote Bredo, who had headed the 1967-68 Stanford Research Institute team:
"...Throughout the period 1965 to 1968, there seemed to be sharp divisions of opinion within the GVN, the U.S. Mission to Vietnam, AID in Washington, the State Department and the White House over what importance to place on the land reform issue...On the U.S. side, for the most part, the forces who preferred the status quo tended to be in the ascendancy...".[187]

What can have clouded Komer's memory to the extent that he should have forgotten or confused something so fundamental as this? Perhaps the same source of confusion as that which led him to describe John Cooper as "constantly raising bureaucratic obstacles to land reform schemes" in 1966-67 and as "decidedly not a vigorous advocate of land reform"; and, when asked, did Henry Cabot Lodge listen to Cooper's advice, to respond: "I don't think Lodge even knew Cooper was there".[188]

24. It is somewhat ironic that John Cooper, whose name is linked with the Davis [Cooper] Report that displaced the Hardie Report in the Philippines in 1954 and articulated the retreat from land reform there by the U.S. Mission, should have been a vigorous proponent of land reform in South Vietnam more than a decade later, only to be remembered, by so prominent an actor in the Vietnam drama as Robert Komer, as an obstacle to land reform initiatives and someone beneath the notice of Ambassador Lodge. Cooper's own recollections in February 1985 were very different from Komer's:

"I was always jumping up and down, telling them you had to have land reform. But you did have the question on the part of some officials, do you really need land reform? Show us the facts, the statistics. And, of course, we couldn't. So we decided we ought to get an organization in to develop the facts. So we got the SRI [Stanford Research Institute team]."[189]

The man who, more than any other, finally got a land reform initiative accepted by the GVN and the U.S. government, Roy Prosterman, has written of Cooper:

"John Cooper, a career AID official who had been with MacArthur in Japan...argued courageously for land reform against superiors within the AID so hostile that he was ultimately stripped of all support personnel, before his transfer to South Korea, early in 1968. But during...late 1967, the intramural fight within the Mission, led by Cooper, was at its most heated and he strongly urged the expansion of the author's Cornell article into a fully fledged draft land reform bill. This was done in October 1967."[190]

Clearly, as pacification overlord, in Saigon in 1967, Robert Komer was an extremely busy man and we have his own testimony that, once he came out to Saigon and encountered difficulties in the path of land reform, he backed off from the idea. This must be held to explain his almost complete failure to recall the circumstances of and the chief characters in the intramural debate on land reform at that time. The least that can be said of the matter is that land reform simply was not an important part of his vast "pacification" program in the late 1960's.

25. On 27 February 1967, Ambassador Chester Bowles, who, it will be recalled, had been Ambassador in India when Laurence Hewes was there working for
AID Agriculture in the early 1960's, wrote forcefully to President Johnson calling for American pressure for a sweeping land reform in South Vietnam:

"You face a problem similar to that of Lincoln in regard to freeing the slaves. The arguments against the Emancipation Proclamation were similarly focused on the claims that: (1) it would upset many property (slave) owners in the border states; (2) that it could not be enforced in areas not occupied by the Union Army; and (3) that even after the war it would involve enormous administrative difficulties and expense. Nonetheless, only after Lincoln made the hard decision did the war become meaningful for most Americans...and to millions of onlookers overseas. For these reasons, I hope you will reject the old arguments about administrative difficulties, bad timing, loss to our property-owning friends etc and come out boldly for a sweeping, irrevocable land reform proposal. Only in this way can we make our present efforts convincing and meaningful to the honest doubters in the United States and in other countries..."[191]

Bowles recorded in his memoirs that President Johnson and his advisers had responded that his idea was "excellent, but that I should realize that the first order of business was to defeat the enemy; after that, they said, reform such as I suggested would be needed. Their views reminded me of the views that had led Chiang Kai-shek to disaster on the Chinese mainland in the 1940's."[192] Even as Bowles wrote to President Johnson, the SRI team was preparing to conduct its survey of rural conditions in South Vietnam - and the war was approaching its devastating climax.

26. AID's contract with the Stanford Research Institute became operative in July 1967, more than fourteen months after Cooper and Hewes had made their report to the highest levels of Saigon and Washington officialdom concerned with Vietnam. The team, headed by William Bredo, Robert O. Shreve and Roy L. Prosterman, arrived in Saigon in September 1967, mandated to:

"...conduct a research program designed to provide the necessary factual base on which suitable land tenure policies in Vietnam could be formulated and to overcome critical deficiencies in information on land tenure and land reform..."[193]

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that well over a violent decade had by then passed since Wolf Ladejinsky had written to Raymond Moyer, in July 1956, urging the initiation of a U.S.-financed land reform in South Vietnam to stabilize the GVN, arguing that a few tens of millions of dollars to this end would be far better spent and far cheaper than the costs of keeping even a single division in the field in support of a crumbling regime. By September 1967, the U.S. had spent a total of less than $1 million on anything resembling land reform in South Vietnam and had, as we have seen, no consensus as to its value or purpose; whereas it had close to half a million armed men in a country of fewer than 20 million inhabitants and was spending billions of dollars per month in an escalating and, to that point, entirely unsuccessful effort to beat the Vietnamese revolutionaries to their corner.

27. The SRI team's field research was interrupted in February 1968 by the unforeseen explosion of the Communist Tet Offensive and was never completed in Central Vietnam [194]. An interim report was submitted to AID in November 1967, under the title
Land Tenure In Vietnam: A Data Compilation, consisting of a narrative report and several volumes of basic documents and statistical materials [195]. The final report was not submitted until December 1968, under the title Land Reform In Vietnam, and, when it was, the impact was neither immediate nor dramatic, for the report itself, as Laurence Hewes observed, "unfortunately...was a research document containing no explicit call for action."[196] That research document is worth examining, even if cursorily, since it embodied the point to which diverse pressures had driven the outriders of AID by 1968. An attentive reading of the document reveals that that point was still not very advanced or bold, that in fact many of the old conservative reflexes still inhibited either clear or creative thinking on the subject of land reform.

28. The SRI Report presented a poor history of land tenure problems in Vietnam and bound itself to tendentious representations of the alleged "positive" goals of the GVN as compared with those of the Communists.[197] The GVN, it was asserted, had the intention to "enlarge the landownership base", whereas the Communist program was deceitful and hypocritical, since it envisaged ultimate collectivization.[198] The report admitted of Diem's Ordinance 57 "land reform" that "the results were not major, but asserted that it had come to a halt in 1961 due to "insecurity" in the rural areas [199]. It admitted that the GVN's rent reduction decrees had "substantially failed" and that the Viet Minh and Viet Cong had won peasant support by effective rent reduction and land redistribution.[200] It asserted, erroneously, that between 1953 and 1955, the DRV had made an "almost disastrous rush to collectivization" [201]. It muddied the history of the war, in conformity with official U.S./GVN propaganda, by stating vaguely that the Viet Cong "resumed revolutionary war in the republic of Vietnam after the Geneva Agreements in 1954" [202]. In short, as a rendering of accounts regarding the land reform question in South Vietnam, the SRI Report left much to be desired. It did, however, reach two quite clear conclusions, each of which was damaging to the outlook espoused by Habib, Mitchell, Wolf and many others who agreed with them: first, that the Viet Cong had a more effective land reform policy than the GVN [203]; second, that the overwhelming majority of tenant farmers (Ladejinsky's 1961 assertion to the contrary notwithstanding) very much desired to own their own land and did not seek "security" from the Viet Cong [204]. With these findings, the spell of the Mitchell Report might have been broken, had the issue simply been one of "critical deficiencies in information". That more intractable problems of entrenched interest and ideological prejudice were behind the rationalizations of the Mitchell Report seems clear, however, and the events that followed the submission of the SRI Report were to bear this out.

29. From as early as 1966 and certainly from the time of his work with the SRI team in 1967-68, Roy L. Prosterman became, as Frances Starner phrased it in 1970, "the chief engineer and the chief propagandist on the American side for a radical land reform." [205]. As Professor Prosterman was to go on to work in the Philippines (1972-75) and El Salvador (1980) on similar land reform "engineering" and "propaganda", it seems an appropriate moment to establish his identity. A graduate from Harvard Law School in 1958, Prosterman spent six months in the Air Force Reserve then joined the prestigious New York law firm Sullivan and Cromwell [206]. Prosterman
worked there for six years, but as a young Great Society liberal, disenchanted with the conservatism and legal positivism of New York corporate lawyers, he gravitated away from the Big Money to an interest in land law and justice in "developing" regions [207]. In 1965 he took a post at the Law School, University of Washington, Seattle, and it was there, in 1966, that he published a paper in the *Washington Law Review* under the title "Land Reform in Latin America: How to Have a Revolution Without a Revolution" [208], in which he argued the case for a U.S.-backed scheme of major, peaceful land reforms with generous compensation to landlords, though invoking the principle of eminent domain against recalcitrants, as a means of averting violent upheavals in Latin America, either the suppression or the success of which would cost far more than such a compensation scheme. The idea of a "revolution without a revolution" - meaning rapid and sweeping modernization without violent upheaval and totalitarian dictatorship - was, of course, consonant with a liberal rhetoric going back to Woodrow Wilson and familiar in John F. Kennedy's much-vaunted "Alliance for Progress", launched in 1962. Roy Prosterman believed that a vigorous foreign aid policy could translate hitherto hollow rhetoric into realities.

30. It was also in 1966 that Roy Prosterman became a personal advisor to Washington Senator Warren G. Magnusson. When, in the summer of 1967, the SRI project came up, Prosterman joined it as a legal consultant and drafted an article title "Land Reform in South Vietnam: How to Turn the Tables on the Viet Cong", which was published in the *Cornell Law Review* in November 1967 [209]. In Saigon, he had already shown the draft of this article to John Cooper before it was published and it became, from March 1968, the basis for efforts to draft a land to the tiller law. For months Prosterman lobbied tirelessly in Saigon and Washington D.C. for a major U.S. land reform initiative. The shock generated in the United States by the Communist Tet Offensive in early 1968 led the National Committee for a Political Settlement in Vietnam [NCPS], headed by Clark Kerr and Cyrus Vance, to take up the call for land reform and it was at one of their meetings that Congressman Ogden Reid, a liberal Republican from New York who had been a proponent of land reform since his visit to Vietnam the previous year with California Democrat John Moss, [210] introduced Prosterman to *New York Times* editorial board member Robert Kleiman and his wife, Mary Temple. [211]

31. In July 1969, Nguyen Van Thieu presented a land reform law largely based on Prosterman's ideas to the GVN National Assembly, but both in Saigon and in Washington there remained enough resistance to the idea that the bill was stalled for many months. Meanwhile, following a further visit to Vietnam in August-September 1969, under the auspices of the NCPS, Prosterman became a well-known figure in the halls of the U.S. Congress, through his briefings and lobbyings of senators and congressmen on the land reform issue. In commending Prosterman to the Senate Committee on Appropriations, on 28 August 1970, during hearings on the land reform just then getting under way in the GVN, Senator Henry Jackson declared:

"No-one has worked more untiringly than he [to promote land reform] as an essential step in the social, political and economic development of South Vietnam." [212].
The dramatic irony of these words should not be lost on the reader of this history. Nor should that of Senator Jackson's accompanying observation that this GVN land reform was a "genuine" reform, unlike Communist land reform, which was, of its nature, cynical and authoritarian.

32. It was Roy Prosterman and the land reform lobby, not official representatives of the U.S. Government, who seem finally to have prevailed on Nguyen Van Thieu to push a major land reform bill through the GVN National Assembly in 1970. On the basis of the SRI Report, AID suggested no more than a voluntary purchase plan in February 1969, which would have meant paying "compensation" to landlords who had "volunteered" to part with lands from which they were no longer able to extract rent. Robert Coate, California businessman, Democratic Party machine boss in northern California and member of NCPS, urged GVN Ambassador to Washington Bui Diem to advise President Thieu to adopt Prosterman's proposals instead of AID's. When Thieu did just that, Elizabeth Pond reported at the time, it "threw Washington into absolute shock". Frank Herbert reported from Saigon, in September 1969:

"Ultimately, we are getting land reform through the firm decision of President Thieu. His decision goes directly counter to many things he has been told by U.S. officials in the past..." [215].

However, even at that time, months before the U.S. Congress voted funds to back the GVN land reform, Herbert believed that the Embassy in Saigon had been turned around on the issue. He pointed out that it put together a paper reflecting "point by point elements hammered out by Roy Prosterman in the past four years." [216] In early 1970, Donald MacDonald was replaced as AID Director in Saigon by Robert Nooter, a man whom Roy Prosterman considers to have been "firmly pro-land reform". Willard Muller and Richard Hough, two "capable pro-land reform officials" [217], were brought in to manage the program. In March of that year the GVN legislature passed the land to the tiller law, amid many dissenting statements from legislators, even in a body that had long since been reduced to little more than a rubber stamp for President Thieu [218].

33. Forty years after the Nghe-An and Ha-Tinh peasant uprisings, forty five years after the founding of Thanh Nien, the anti-Communist forces in South Vietnam had, with reluctance and without unanimity, been brought to promulgate a serious piece of land reform legislation. It was, not surprisingly, too late to "turn the tables on the Viet Cong", though it seems to have contributed to a decline in Viet Cong recruitment in the early 1970's, but, impeded and sabotaged by landlord and warlord forces wherever they still had influence, it was never fully implemented. Coming under duress as it did and only after years of revolutionary struggle, the land to the tiller law must be described as in large measure the GVN's acquiescence in rural social revolution. The time for authentic initiative had passed long before. The war lasted another five bloody and exhausting years and at its end the GVN proved dramatically that it had failed to win mass support or to rally the peasant masses behind it as the DRV and the Viet Cong had been able to do for decades. Failure to achieve land reform was
not by any means the sole vice of the GVN, but it provides a major clue to its nature and brittleness. Failure to grapple seriously with this problem before 1970 - and even after 1970 - was not by any means the sole error of the United States in its crusade against Communism in Vietnam, but it provides a major clue to the conservatism and final demoralization of that crusade.

34. Jewett M. Burr was one of AID’s leading land reform advisors in South Vietnam during the land to the tiller program. He was land reform advisor for Military Region I, based at Danang, and forward planning officer for AID at the Associate Directorate for Land Reform in Saigon. In 1976 he completed a doctoral dissertation on the land to the tiller program in South Vietnam, one of only two more or less systematic studies made of it, the other being by AID’s C. Stuart Callison, also completed in 1976. Burr, who, in 1977-78 was to work for AID Washington on land reform in the Philippines, wrote in 1976, concerning implementation of land to the tiller in An Giang province, near Saigon:

"The inability, or the lack of desire, on the GVN's part to enforce the punitive provisions of the Law (chapter 5, articles 17-20), which called for fines and/or jail sentences for people impeding the implementation of Land to the Tiller, pried the lid from Pandora's box and permitted interference to assume pandemic dimensions in An Giang. The epicenter of complaint was usually found near urban settlements where a corrupt local power structure permitted scofflawlessness. The result of such activities had the effect of a shockwave, for it inhibited the performance of land reform officials working far from the important population centers. A GVN land reform training axiom stressed that cadre and officials had to believe that Land to the Tiller would succeed; they were told that the program's success or failure was in their hands. However, the GVN's propaganda had the force of a pop-gun if it would not employ its heavy legal artillery to overcome law-breaking. In An Giang, neither corrupt officials nor interfering landlords were ever brought to justice by the GVN, and the land reform program became one long downhill slide." [219].

And this was in a major province in the Mekong Delta, the region of which Stuart Callison concluded that Land to the Tiller had been a major success. Of the Central Vietnam region where he did most of his work, Burr concluded that Land to the Tiller was "a miserable failure by whatever yardstick used". The GVN power structure in Central Vietnam, "from Regional Commanders to the Hamlet Chiefs, were loathe to effect land reform" Burr wrote. The Regional Commanders "were little better than warlords and their provincial satraps, whether held through greed or fear, were chained to them. In every province, GVN officials turned a blind eye to the Government's policy of rent remission and LTTT [Land to the Tiller] goals." [220]. The revolution, it seems, was not to be had, even in 1970-73, without a revolution. The tragic paradox was that those who had shown themselves the most resolute [political] revolutionaries were Leninists and therefore repressive [social] revolutionaries.

35. Jewett Burr's conclusions regarding the degree of success of Land to the Tiller were far bleaker than those of Stuart Callison, though both were writing at the same time and both worked for AID. Neither seems to have been aware of the other's work and, as recently as 1985, Callison informed the present writer that he knew nothing of either Burr or his work. [221] Roy Prosterman, likewise, confessed ignorance of Burr's work. [222] The analyses of Callison and
Prosterman, focusing as they do on the degree of success of Land to the Tiller, between 1970 and 1975, in abolishing tenancy, modernizing agriculture and agricultural markets and beginning to unleash the enormous productive potential of the Mekong Delta, are useful as indirect contributions to the overcoming of "orthodox" Marxism, now afoot in China and, since the recent Sixth Party Congress, making a tentative appearance in Communist Vietnam. Burr's analysis, on the other hand, focusing as it does on the degree of failure of Land to the Tiller between 1970 and 1975 to overcome landlord and warlord resistance, administrative corruption and GVN inertia, is the most useful of the three as a contribution to the overcoming of "orthodox" anti-Marxism, whether of conservative [hit the infrastructure and forget about land reform], or liberal [revolution without a revolution] bent. Burr was harsh and outspoken, even bitter, in his verdict on Land to the Tiller's failure in Central Vietnam - the corridor through which the NVA swept to Saigon in early 1975:

"In short, the Central Vietnamese peasant was as humanly isolated as he had ever been, and it struck most prescient observers that only those who had joined the Viet Cong had found a way to break free of the stifling chains that ineluctably bound the peasant to land he could never call his own." [223]

To the last, Burr believed, the U.S. and GVN anti-Marxists wavered hopelessly between "competitive revolution" [a reluctant and confused option] and maintenance of "stability" by repression; and, as a result, achieved neither, leaving Central Vietnam an open ground to the Communist revolution and prone to collapse in 1975:

"...the duality of political purpose, the political schizophrenia ignominiously characterized by an ignorance of Central Vietnam and its people, doomed both Land to the Tiller and the GVN." [224].

And so it was that the curtain rang down on the black opera of the American war against "irrational revolution" in Vietnam.

36. Robert Sansom, reflecting on the failure of the U.S. to push decisively for land reform in South Vietnam before 1969-70, expressed some vexation with the readiness of U.S. officials in Saigon and Washington:

"...to grasp at any technological or bureaucratic or even academic device as evidence of a solution to the land reform problem or as evidence that the problem was unimportant." [225].

The Viet Cong-enforced social revolution, observed Sansom, brought benefits to eight million of the ten million people of the Mekong Delta, whereas the GVN put itself at odds with these same people, through its "complicity with the landlord" [226]. William Bredo, head of the SRI survey team, observed bluntly in August 1970 that there had been no "competitive revolution" in South Vietnam. "There was nothing revolutionary whatever in the U.S.-supported agrarian program", he wrote[227]. Roy Prosterman recalls being told vehemently by an AID official in Saigon in October 1967: "We're not going to give land to those damned Commies" [228]. In all the prolific American reflections on the American debacle since 1975, not excluding the spate of narcissistic cinematic psychodramas from Deer Hunter, to Rambo to Platoon, the rural
sociology and political culture of Vietnam have received less attention than the frustrations and pain of American soldiers trying to survive in a Catch-22 world. The inner contradictions of American policy thinking about revolution and those "damned Commies" have likewise been rather neglected, where interest has been concentrated on strategy. If "civilization" is not to suffer further batterings from typhoons of "irrational revolution" or "counterrevolution", these failures must be remedied.

37. Even those who, in 1970, espoused land reform on the U.S. side expressed no more than a superficial puzzlement at the failure of the United States to press for land reform in South Vietnam before that date. Robert Sansom's remarks resonate with significance in the context of this inquiry, where they were left rather stranded in his own:

"After its noteworthy role in the post-World War II Japanese land reform...it is not immediately obvious why the United States in the 1960's did not make land reform a centerpiece of its Vietnam policy. For an explanation, one is tempted by the conventional responses of disbelief in its importance, bureaucratic inertia, outright incompetence, or simply that other matters had a higher priority" [229].

Bredo's reflections on the same theme were equally superficial, reaching only the point where a thorough inquiry might have begun:

"The tardiness in distribution of the land is most remarkable to observe. Administrative bottlenecks certainly stood in the way. The growing opposition to the Diem government was also an important factor. It would seem, however, that the GVN, acting then with the support of the U.S. Mission in the late 1950's, did not have the administrative capacity required by a cumbersome land affairs administration, the essential political strength, the necessary revolutionary ardor, or full appreciation of the importance of policies such as land reform, which would seek to hold and win the loyalty of the rural population...

It is rather striking that, throughout the entire period from 1960 to 1965 under the Kennedy and early Johnson Administrations, no support whatsoever, either financial or in terms of advisory assistance, was given to the GVN to help carry through this most fundamental of social measures...Throughout the period 1965 to 1968, there seemed to be sharp divisions of opinion within the GVN, the U.S. Mission to Vietnam, AID in Washington, the State Department and the White House over what importance to place on the land reform issue..." [230].

Bredo's judgement, in 1970, was that "a drastic change [was] in order" [231]. He did not so much as mention that this had been precisely the conclusion of the young men who had founded Thanh Nien in 1925, the last of whom were still leading the bitter struggle against GVN landlords, warlords and U.S. B-52s, artillery and napalm in 1970, as Bredo put pen to paper. Quite certainly, from the point of view of Washington, in the intervening years "other matters had a higher priority".

38. The balance of this inquiry would suggest that the problem in even arriving at radical land reform as a firm foreign policy commitment in the United States was one deeply rooted in its own history and in its defensive stance vis-a-vis radical revolution in the international states system after 1945, and not one only of abstract "bureaucratic incompetence". Sansom, for example, in recalling the "noteworthy role" of land reform in the occupation and reconstruction of Japan, made no mention of the attack on Ladejinsky, or
the work of the Japan Lobby, or the conservative shift in U.S. foreign policy under President Eisenhower, if not before. It is instructive, therefore, to reflect on the words of pro-land reform senator, Warren G. Magnusson to the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations in August 1970. Describing Vietnam as beset by "peasant revolution" since the 1940's, Magnusson observed:

"Despite these incendiary conditions, until recently neither the GVN nor USAID officials have undertaken serious attempts to bring land reform to South Vietnam. The contrast with the Communists could not be more vivid." [232].

And again:

"Although President Diem and President Eisenhower made token statements about the importance of land reform, both Saigon and the American command lapsed into the belief that this was a more or less traditional military struggle, to be settled by traditional military means. The fallacy of this approach has been amply demonstrated." [233]

Magnesson then went on to declaim:

"Land reform, then, is one program that everyone can agree upon, if we discard the fears and misconceptions that surround this vital program. It seems appropriate to close by looking at land reform from the perspective of American foreign policy as a whole..." [234].

In the transition to modernity, Magnusson stated, land reform is a vital process, which the U.S. should support world-wide, thus dealing, by non-military means, "with the causes of violence rather the symptoms." [235]. ("Speaking now in the abstract, if we had a revolutionary strategy..."). Magnusson did not address and seems not to have grasped the magnitude of the policy reorientation he was calling for. His colleague Robert Packwood, addressing the same Senate Committee, articulated a similar enlightened outlook, without going to the roots of the matter any more than Magnusson did. Land reform is, he stated, if undertaken in a timely and prudent fashion, a peaceful revolution. Violent revolutions were brewing in a dozen places around the world for lack of such prudent reform. Communist land reform led to a decrease in agricultural productivity and unfreedom for peasants, he asserted, but:

"...the problem, it seems to me, is that the United States has not effectively offered an alternative; and, until we do, we will be faced with a continuous series of Vietnam-type crises built on peasant unrest around the world." [236]

His words were well chosen and most incisive, but went no further than those of Sansom, or Bredo, or Magnusson in plumbing the depths from which the American failure had come.

39. Addressing the same U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations session in August 1970 to which Packwood and Magnusson had spoken, Roy Prosterman offered a sombre liberal judgement on the U.S. effort to master the Vietnamese Revolution:
"In retrospect, the most disastrous of all Ngo Dinh Diem's policies in the late 1950's was probably that which promoted the return to the landlords of the extensive lands purportedly distributed by the Viet Minh to the peasantry in the 1945-54 period and reassertion of the landlords' traditional rights over their former tenants. The promotion of this worse than useless program - with the cooperation of American advisors who were unwilling to push for a major land reform...was surely one of the pre-eminent disasters of post-war American foreign aid." [237].

The chairman of the committee, Senator Gale McGee, asked Prosterman whether it was not true that land reform was impossible without stability and security - the old shibboleth, the old vicious circle - "you can't do it under anarchy...under guerrilla combat conditions..." [238]. Prosterman responded:

"The successive Saigon governments not only failed to mount competitive programs, but placed themselves firmly on the side of the landlords...Tragically, we spent years mounting pacification appeals that were basically irrelevant to the overriding concerns of the peasantry." [239].

"Irrelevant" is somewhat of an understatement. Antithetical would be closer to the mark. Between 1961 and 1975 an estimated 700,000 military and 400,000 civilian Communist revolutionaries or citizens were slaughtered by the U.S./GVN war machine. Those 700,000 military dead, Dean Rusk remarked with astonishment after the war was over, were the equivalent of perhaps 10,000,000 American military dead. Pacification cadres were not just wading through rice paddies by the early 1970's; they were wading through a river of Vietnamese blood. To describe their "appeals" under these circumstances as "irrelevant to the overriding concerns of the peasantry" is to see only the rice paddies and not the blood. It is to overlook the terrible consequences for the Vietnamese of the knotted policies of the United States.

40. Leslie Gelb, Paul Kattenburg, Robert Komer, Daniel Ellsberg, have all written insightful reflections on the decision-making processes that generated the irrationalities and futilities of the U.S. crusade in Vietnam in the 1960's and gave it such a Catch-22 character. It was, I think, Daniel Ellsberg who most economically described the cybernetic flaws in the U.S. foreign policy system, in his Papers On the War, published in 1972, Ellsberg suggested that bureaucracy as a system, the workings of U.S. domestic politics and especially the nature of the Presidency had been too often neglected by leftist critics of U.S. policy, in favor of more sweeping theories of imperialism and capitalism.[240] Looking at the bureaucratic system he knew from inside, he was struck by the extent to which fears rooted in the fall of China to Communism in the 1940's and the right-wing backlash in the United States in the 1950's appeared to govern decision-making processes within the White House and the State Department in the 1960's. What puzzled him, he tells us, is that officials appeared to act on such fears of possible "failure" and right-wing backlash without testing their reality and indeed in such a manner as to give such fears and shibboleths greater reality [241]. This is a problem of cybernesis, of feedback processes and the relation of the "mind" of a system to its "body" and to the "external world". Ellsberg's disquiet grew in the late 1960's and early 1970's, as he came to the conclusion that the American policy system was critically malfunctioning with regard to the Vietnam War, with more and more pathological results in terms of "mental" aberrations, "bodily" disorders and violence visited on the external world.
41. A systems analyst himself [242], Ellsberg was disturbed to find, as he studied the record of the decision-making behind the U.S. war in Vietnam that:

"...the U.S. government, starting ignorant, did not, would not, learn. There was a whole set of what amounted to institutional anti-learning mechanisms, working to preserve and guarantee unadaptive and unsuccessful behaviour: the fast turnover in personnel, the lack of institutional memory at any level, the failure to study history, to analyse or even record operational experience or mistakes; the effective pressures for optimistically false reporting, for describing "progress" rather than problems or failure, thus concealing the need for change, for learning..." [243].

Such a malaise in cognitive functioning, Ellsberg decided in 1971, could only be treated, or even recognized by the sufferer, if the mind of the system could be made to "begin systematically to discovery its own hidden history" [244]. The diagnosis is quasi-psychiatric, almost Freudian and lends itself to a reading of the U.S. trauma over the Vietnam War in terms of the communications theory of Jurgen Habermas. [245] There can be no doubt that it was in an effort to jolt the system into therapeutic reflection that Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times in 1971. [246] The assault made on him by the Nixon Administration in retaliation for that democratic and patriotic action belongs among the symptoms of the system's malady.[247] That, in the end, the prosecution of Ellsberg was dismissed because the Executive's agents burgled the clinic of Ellsberg's psychiatrist, in an effort to find information that might compromise him, is one of the truly delicate ironies of the whole affair.
"From the time of President Garcia, there has been what amounts to a stalemate between the landlords and their allies in Congress and in the executive departments and the elements favoring land reform. Apart from the peasants themselves, these elements consist of most of the press, perhaps most of the businessmen, a growing body of opinion which in the past few years has included technocrats inside and outside the government service and student groups. The most significant development during this later period has been the growth of disillusionment approaching the mutinous with the political system as it exists and functions today and with its capacity to achieve not only justice for the farm tenants but to move society in the direction that modernization requires."


"It seems important that the Congress address [the] inconsistency between its mandate to A.I.D. and broader foreign policy considerations. This inconsistency is particularly relevant to the question of what A.I.D. should do about future support of the agrarian reform program in the Philippines. In the past, the U.S. Embassy in Manila has discouraged the A.I.D. mission from "getting out in front of the Filipinos" on land reform. It seems clear that the only interest of the present Philippine government in land reform is to retain sufficient illusion of progress to continue its propaganda. If actual progress is to be resumed, the impetus must come from a new source, perhaps from foreign aid tied to tough performance standards. If such a fundamental and visible reform as land transfer is totally dropped from A.I.D. support, it could well appear that the dominant characteristic of U.S. policy toward the Philippines is embodied in the status quo and in the military bases for which we are now negotiating a new rental agreement."


"By the fall of 1985, it had become the professionals in the bureaucracies against the ideologues in the White House. From Abramowitz to Wolfowitz there was agreement that Marcos would not reform. Bosworth knew it and he was adding that in much of the country there simply was no government any more. Armacost knew it, having learned the hard way. Carl Ford and his staff at the C.I.A. had analyzed the situation accurately. Over at Defense, Armitage and Admiral Crowe realized that Marcos couldn't and wouldn't change, and they were growing increasingly worried about the bases...But just as these high level American officials couldn't influence Marcos, neither could they reach their superiors in Washington. Casey, Weinberger, Bush, MacFarlane, even Schultz...clung to Marcos...because their boss, Ronald Reagan,...refused to accept the fact that Marcos was as bad as everyone said."

6:1. The Language of Inertia.

1. The collapse of the Saigon regime in Vietnam in 1975 was a foreign policy debacle without precedent in American experience. The Communist victory in China had been more momentous, but the United States had not committed its prestige or resources to the anti-Communist cause in China to the extent that it had in Vietnam. The Vietnam debacle has been the cause of much confusion and recrimination among the defeated, as lost wars often are. For the purposes of this inquiry, debates over strategy and high politics, budgeting and public opinion are of marginal significance. Any claim of the United States to represent something other than "counter-revolution" in Vietnam hinged not on these things but on its implied preparedness to seek out and support prospects of marked "progressive" change in a manner and with an effect that would outbid the appeal of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology of "revolution". That doing such a thing would have entailed difficulties and dilemmas of quite intractable kinds is not a sufficient excuse for failure or retreat to conservatism; for it is due to just such "intractable" obstacles, experienced from within as it were, that Vietnamese revolutionaries had become Marxist-Leninists.

2. Doubtless, considered as "post-classical counter-revolution", the American effort to prevent the triumph of totalitarian Communism in Indochina - in so far as this was the aim of the exercise - was imbued in part with democratic ideals. If this was so, however, it again implied that something other than mere defence of the unregenerate old order or a government of corrupt cliques was at stake. Land reform was an acid test of what the "post-classical counter-revolution" was able or willing to even try to deliver as an alternative to totalitarian revolution. This is where democratic interest in the history of the conflict belongs, rather than in debates on strategy or squabbles over public opinion and its formation. Did the United States seriously try to promote major changes that would have challenged the Communist revolution in terms that did not simply reinforce Marxist-Leninist analyses of the situation and alienate masses of Vietnamese peasants? Not until at least 1970, as the foregoing account has shown. In the candid words of one of AID's leading land to the tiller administrators of the early 1970's, looking back on the Vietnam involvement more than a decade after he had worked there:

"I don't think it's true that people tried...The U.S. Embassy, if not opposing agrarian reform, was very equivocal, unsure and weak. Backing all those military clowns, seeking local stability through landlords. Now that turned out to be a lot of bullshit, but the Embassy dragged its feet. There was an awful lot of resistance to land reform in the Embassy, on grounds of political stability assertions and defensiveness about private property." [1]

It is in the harsh light of this sort of judgement of the Vietnam experience that one must return to a reflection on the so far less tragic, but in no significant sense less "equivocal, unsure and weak" American
involvement with the land reform issue in the Philippines from the time of Robert Hardie to the downfall of President Marcos in February 1986.

3. Robert Hardie's departure from the Philippines in August 1953 was followed by a major retrenchment in U.S. commitment to land reform in the Philippines. In the perspective of Ladejinsky's experience in Washington and South Vietnam of 1954-56 and that of Laurence Hewes and John Cooper in South Vietnam and Washington in 1966-67, the experience of Robert Hardie and the positions taken by MSA/FOA/ICA/AID Agriculture staff after his departure stand out in somewhat sharper relief than they might otherwise do. In particular, the distaste for sweeping measures that would involve major transfers of property ownership and the preference for programs of technical assistance with an emphasis on production rather than land reform can be observed to predominate within the U.S. Mission after the departure of Robert Hardie. These value orientations were especially evident in the positions taken by Raymond Johnson and James Emerson, the director and deputy director of the MSA/FOA Agriculture Division in Manila during 1954-55.[2] The political implications of such positions were conservative. It was, of course, with reference to just such positions that Laurence Hewes was to reflect, in 1965, on his return to the United States from India, that, for land reformers such as himself, there was no real future in the foreign aid program of the United States. Robert Hardie had reached a similar conclusion as early as the northern summer of 1953.

4. The emphatic character of Robert Hardie's disillusionment in mid-1953 leaves little room for doubt that, in his judgement at least, the retrenchment on land reform occurred within the U.S. Mission some months before Ramon Magsaysay was, with massive covert U.S. support, elected President of the Philippines in November 1953. This did not, however, become immediately apparent.[3] Moreover, Magsaysay stood for election on a platform of agrarian improvement and there remained within the U.S. Mission until well into 1955 men whose commitment to land reform in the Philippines shows every mark of having been genuine and serious. It was not until March 1954 that a report was prepared within the Mission which articulated the retrenchment from the land reform position staked out by Hardie and, even then, it was not publicized as the Hardie and McMillan/Rivera Reports had been, so that its implications only gradually became apparent. When Magsaysay presented the first of his agrarian bills, the Agricultural Tenancy Act, to the Philippine Congress in early 1954, it struck entrenched resistance in the landlord-dominated House of Representatives and much debate ensued over its provisions. A turning point was reached when it became known that the U.S. FOA Mission was content to see the bill emasculated.[4] Thereafter, the Magsaysay agrarian program as a whole lost whatever force it might have had and while various steps were taken to reorganize and perhaps strengthen rural affairs administration, no significant land reform was ever envisaged. What needs to be put in clearer perspective is the nature of and reasoning behind the American decision to retrench on land reform in this fundamental manner even after the American candidate had won office with something of a mandate for agrarian reform.
Early in January 1954, Joseph Dougherty, who had replaced Merrill Abbey as Agriculture Attache in late 1953, cabled the State Department that the Philippine Secretary of Agriculture, Salvador Araneta, had drafted a land reform bill and had asked Robert McMillan "to take the draft with him to the Mission, review it and make appropriate suggestions" to be considered by Araneta before the bill was submitted to the Philippine Congress [5]. Dougherty commented that the draft bill impressed him as "progressive and vigorous, practical and comprehensive" in its grasp of the land reform problem. Washington's response was to urge the setting up of a joint working group in the Mission to study the matter and draw up a position paper for the U.S. Embassy and the FOA. It was suggested that the "special knowledge and experience [of Claud] Clayton, [Raymond E.] Davis and [John] Cooper should be useful."[6] Claud F. Clayton was the Mission's agricultural economist; Raymond Ewell Davis its land settlement adviser and John Cooper its rural credit and cooperatives adviser. There was, at that time, no land tenure adviser, as, following Hardie's departure in August 1953, more than a year elapsed before Dr. Joseph R. Motheral arrived to take his place, in September 1954. [see Table 3.]. The joint working group, formed in late January 1954, consisted of Cooper, Davis and McMillan for F.O.A. and Daniel M. Braddock and Herbert K. May from the Embassy. Of these, McMillan had shown already that he regarded land reform to be urgent and important. The outlook of the other four is rather difficult to judge on the basis of anything but the evidence of the report the group produced some seven weeks after its formation. Chairman of the group was land settlement adviser, Raymond Davis [7] and it could be that the emphasis on pioneer land settlement, rather than land reform within the group's report reflected his chairmanship and perhaps the anti-land reform views of Raymond Johnson and James Emerson behind him. Certainly, the report, which has, for some reason become known as the Cooper Report rather than the Davis Report, warrants close attention, as marking an almost complete abandonment of all the emphases and recommendations of the Hardie Report.

The working group submitted its report to Ambassador Spruance and FOA Mission director Colonel Harry A. Brenn on 19 March 1954, under the title The Philippine Agricultural Land Tenure Study, with a covering memorandum. This is the document that became "known" as the Cooper Report, but I shall henceforth refer to it as the Davis Report, in the belief that this is a more accurate description of its authorship, even if it entails the risk of some confusion among those who know it as the Cooper Report. Unlike the Hardie and McMillan/Rivera Reports, this paper was never made a public document. Its departures from the positions advanced by those reports were, however, dramatic. The authors specifically rejected as infeasible any nationwide land transfer program [8] and, in the covering memorandum, struck an astonishing note of discord with the whole tenor of the 1952 M.S.A. Reports.

"In preparing this report, the committee has substituted the words 'land tenure improvement' in place of 'land reform'. This change was made because it is believed that the former term states the problem
in a positive manner and conveys more accurate description of the Philippine situation. Also, some local officials have indicated that connotations associated with the word 'reform' make its use for land tenure purposes in the Philippines undesirable." [9].

In the body of the Davis Report one finds total abandonment of Hardie's recommendations regarding the rationale for and proposed scope of land reform in the Philippines and its priority over tenancy regulation or land settlement schemes.

7. **There is no attempt made in the Davis Report to debate or confute Hardie's arguments; the Hardie Report is simply ignored and its recommendations replaced by altogether narrower and more conservative prescriptions.** Yet, looking back thirty years later, John Cooper observed:

"If they had financed and put through that program of Hardie's that they burned at the stake, the Philippines would be immeasurably further ahead today than it is. Instead they've been at it thirty years and they still haven't got it done."[10]

The concluding sentence here might better have been phrased: "Instead, they've *avoided* doing it for thirty years and have *allowed* every move in its direction to be *thwarted* by entrenched interests, so that, of course, it has *never* been done."[11] And Cooper might have added that, after Hardie, U.S. land tenure advisors in the Philippines for thirty years held to a passive, if not a complicit, attitude towards Philippine travesties of land reform; beginning quite clearly and specifically with the Davis Report, of which he had been a co-author.

8. The Bell Report had noted that growing public sentiment in favor of land reform in the Philippines in 1950 might prove all too transient once the Huk Rebellion was beaten down. Robert Hardie had noted that the Huk Rebellion constituted "a material shift in power" between landlord and peasant forces as compared with pre-war years and was thus a useful, if dangerous, impetus to change. The Davis Report noted only that rural conditions were used by the Huks "as an excuse for their dissident activities." [12]. Its authors went on to make the notable observation, utterly at odds with the Hardie Report in its whole tone and sense, that:

"...even under current tenancy practices, provinces with under 30% tenancy have virtually no unrest except as dissidents come in from adjacent communities and utilize undeveloped areas for their operations. In provinces with tenancy rates ranging from 30 to 50%, unrest is not a significant problem. In provinces with 50 to 60%, instances of unrest present a continuing problem, and provinces with over 60% of the farmers in a tenancy status have serious social unrest conditions requiring frequent military action." [13]. (emphasis added).

Displaying a confidence in the qualities and capacities of the Philippine government which analysts such as Ely, Abbey and Hardie had clearly not held, the authors of the Davis Report went on to assert:

"In brief, by vigorously enforcing an equitable landlord-tenant policy, pushing land *settlement*, purchasing cultivated lands in *overcrowded high tenancy areas* and carrying out certain supporting measures
tenure difficulties can be reduced to a minimum. *Such accomplishments will meet the present social unrest challenge. They will not provide a permanent solution to all land tenure difficulties in the Philippines, but they will bring the situation under control. If this is done, there is every reason to believe that the government can cope with future needs in this field.*" [14] (emphasis added).

It is not hard to understand why impatient critics of U.S. policy in the Philippines, such as McCoy and Olson, both writing in the early 1970's, found the Davis[Cooper] Report to be "cynical" and the above passages to be a calculus of counterinsurgency [15]. Nor is it necessary to share the somewhat indulgent and optimistic assessment by those authors of the achievements of communist revolutions in order to see the Davis Report as marking and defining a signal retreat from the nerve and imagination, the "rational revolution", embodied in the Hardie Report. Once again, anything that might reasonably be described as a creative challenge to the Marxist-Leninist ideology of radical revolution, went begging and in its place was set a shallow, defensive, conservative resistance to the "irrational" aspect of such a revolution.

9. The retrenchment on land reform was formalized by President Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in two cables to the Embassy in Manila, dated 6 May and 21 May 1954. In the first of these, Dulles informed Spruance:

"State, Agriculture and F.O.A. concur findings, recommendations *F.O.A./Embassy memorandum on land tenure improvement.* Will support you and USOM in assisting Magsaysay in manner which you deem advisable re. achievement objectives of program." [16].(emphasis added).

Given the unequivocal support for Hardie's recommendations from both State and Agriculture less than two years earlier, this endorsement of the Davis Report requires explanation. In the 21 May cable, Dulles spelled out what amounted, whether he knew it or not, to a point by point abandonment of the findings and recommendations of the Hardie Report. Whereas Hardie had found all existing Philippine land tenure law "weak in structure and limited in scope" and "rendered ineffective by legal tests for ambiguities, by judicial practices inspired by feudal culture, by lax enforcement" [17], Dulles advised that "the primary emphasis should be placed on uniform and forceful enforcement of *existing rice share tenancy legislation*" [18]. The explanation offered by McCoy and Olson in 1971 and 1974 was that the waning of the Huk rebellion relieved the reluctant American foreign policy-makers of the apparent need for sweeping land reform and enabled them to fall back on the "infinitely preferable" [19] conservative posture enunciated in the Davis[Cooper] Report. The division of American opinion over land reform in Vietnam would suggest that this is only part of the truth. Both McCoy and Olson wanted to include the Hardie Report in a continuous and seamless web of American counterinsurgency planning. It would seem to be more accurate to describe the Hardie Report as representing the liberal side of American thinking and the Davis Report the more conservative, with the two being not in a continuum but at odds. John Foster Dulles at State, like John Hollister at FOA, stood on the conservative side.

10. Given the whole process of analysis and inquiry that had occurred throughout 1951-52 concerning Philippine agrarian maladjustments and possible
reforms to remove them, the position of Dulles in May 1954 cannot be described as other than one of complete conservatism. That position, however, far more than the recommendations of the Hardie Report, may be said to have defined the scope of FOA/ICA/AID approaches to land reform in the Philippines from 1954 down to the present. It might be dubbed "the Dullesian agenda" and was economically summarized in Dulles' 21 May cable to the Embassy in Manila:

"...implementation of recommendations...will require political and administrative support heretofore largely lacking. Such support is also essential for enforcement of existing legislation, failing which there is not much point in fostering new legislation perhaps no more palatable to political leaders than that extant. Existing reports, studies, surveys, findings and recommendations have had little useful effect due to lack of sustained will to action. It is most essential now to make certain that there exists or is brought into being adequate political and administrative support effectively to enforce existing legislation. Therefore, careful consideration should be given to what can be done now, in the light of all competing and conflicting political forces, to marshal support for such enforcement. The use of limited resources, which tend to be dissipated if spread too thinly on too many fronts, can be more effective if concentrated on fewer programs. From experience elsewhere, it appears that rent reduction, if properly enforced, can be a most effective phase of a larger land tenure improvement program. After successful implementation of one or two major improvement programs such larger programs can be undertaken." [20]

It simply is not possible to reconcile these observations with the findings and recommendations of the Hardie Report, but they parallel the recommendations of the Davis Report of March 1954 and, as we shall see, it was not until the 1970's that any U.S. specialists departed from this "Dullesian agenda". When they did so, however, it was in unofficial capacities and had no more positive impact on official policy than had the Hardie Report a generation before them. The decisions of 1954 became, in effect, the plot point for a generation of FOA/ICA/AID involvement in "land reform" in the Philippines.

11. The realization that the United States had pulled back from strong advocacy of land reform in the Philippines in 1954 was registered by Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, sponsor of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, in the Philippine Senate in August of that year. Referring to the Davis Report, which he apparently knew only by hearsay, Senator Pelaez observed on the Senate floor:

"It was stated in the only report of the FOA that it is not possible to legislate over night and change from one system to another. This new report of the FOA took into account the lack of facilities - the fact that these tenants have to be nurtured into self-confidence and that this cannot be done over night. Why did PHILCUSA change its stand? The PHILCUSA has been working hand in hand with FOA. FOA, the former MSA, you will remember, Mr. President, issued the famous Hardie Report and the McMillan Report and other similar reports and...the originators of Senate Bill No. 98 were the experts of PHILCUSA, but the FOA issued another study...and practically reversed itself on many of the opinions stated in the Hardie Report."[21]

"Reversed" is not too strong an expression to describe what the Davis Report did with the "opinions stated in the Hardie Report". Whereas Hardie had called for comprehensive legislation to set rural social relations on a new footing in order that the rural economy might develop vigorously, the Davis Report blurred the entire issue of reform of tenurial practices in stating:
"The Philippines is a new and undeveloped nation, especially with respect to its agricultural resources. This means that agricultural planning must allow sufficient flexibility to permit the agricultural segment of the national economy to develop in the Philippines." [22]

This "flexibility" consisted, in effect, of leaving the tenancy system to work itself out in relation to the technical and commercial modernization of food and export agriculture and of taking what amounted to a laissez-faire approach to the social character of land settlement in the "undeveloped" areas of the country. Such a prescription could not have been further removed from the recommendations of the Hardie Report.

12. Robert Hardie had urged a land reform "extended to include all crops and geographical areas in the Philippines" and a retention ceiling of 4 to 8 hectares for owner-cultivators, zero for absentee landlords. The collapse of the land reform initiative after Hardie's departure from the Philippines becomes evident in considering that when President Magsaysay finally presented his Land Reform bill [Republic Act 1400] to the Philippine Congress, it called for the expropriation or government purchase of private lands in excess of 144 hectares. By the time the bill had passed Congress in September 1955, that retention ceiling had risen to 300 contiguous hectares of private ricelands, 1,024 hectares for private lands devoted to other crops and 600 hectares for corporations. [23]. Of this "Land Reform Act", one Philippine historian has written:

"Other provisions of the law which served the cause of the landlords rather than the tenants were: the estates could only be expropriated on the petition of the majority of the tenants (who, of course, could easily be coerced against making such a petition) and the manner of compensation to landowners was in cash and contingent on the capability of the Central Bank to underwrite the land certificates. Judging from the P60 million total disbursement for the purpose during the first five years of the expropriation program, those who shaped the law into final form succeeded in incorporating into it enough loopholes to guarantee its failure." [24]

Yet of the program of which this was the coping stone, Robert Hardie's replacement, Dr. Joseph R. Motheral, felt able to remark, in May 1956:

"In his struggle to emerge from a feudalistic tradition and centuries of colonial rule, the Philippine tenant is now offered genuine economic alternatives for the first time. The land reform [sic] program fashioned for him is the most complete and best integrated in the world today. Despite the striking accomplishments already recorded, much of it is still on the drawing boards. To convert these plans into action will call for all the energies, talents and integrity that can be brought to bear in this young republic." [25] (emphasis added).

In the context of the present inquiry, one cannot but compare this extraordinary claim with the claim by Wolf Ladejinsky in 1961 that the "land reform" program of President Diem, in South Vietnam, was a splendid and successful one. Had it been Robert Hardie himself who had made such a claim as that made by Motheral, one would have to confess as great a puzzlement, or exasperation, as with Wolf Ladejinsky in South Vietnam. However, Hardie was gone and believed no such thing.

13. The Land Reform Act was foredoomed to futility for reasons other than the absurdly high retention ceilings that it set.[26] Before it even came before the Congress,
President Magsaysay had failed to secure a realistic land assessment scheme or a hike in the land tax sufficient to finance the requirements of any sort of serious land reform law and to shift the basis of land ownership from criteria of social prestige, speculation and parasitic rentier "feudalism" to one of sound investment. The failure of land taxation reform was reflected in the fate of a report on land ownership and real property values prepared for the Philippine Department of Finance in 1954-55 by one Arturo Sorongon, under ICA auspices. Entitled *A Special Study of Landed Estates in the Philippines*, this report was based on a survey conducted between 18 January and 30 April 1954, covering every province except Sorsogon and every chartered city except Tagaytay, which was intended to tabulate, for taxation purposes, reliable evidence of the extent of land ownership concentration in the country [27]. The author, in his preface, acknowledged the assistance and advice of a number of ICA's technical staff in Manila: Dr Orville McDiarmid and Warren Wiggins (successive assistant directors for Economic Policy), Melville Monk (chief of the Finance and Trade Policy staff), Albert Noonan (Local Government Tax Advisor) and Dr. Joseph R. Motheral (Land Tenure Advisor).

14. Sorongon concluded that the data collected and presented in the large statistical annex to his report indicated the scope for a major taxation reform. He reported that, of a land area of 29,741,290 hectares in the Philippines, some 19% was classified as farm land in the 1948 *Census of Agriculture*: a total of 5,726,584 hectares. Of this area, he related, some 42%, or 2,407,939 hectares were owned in holdings of 50 hectares or above and that these lands were owned by no more than 0.36% of rural families in the Philippines.[28] Like the Hardie Report before it, however, this report, which may be referred to as the Sorongon Report, was put aside and for all practical purposes consigned to oblivion. Neither Sorongon's nor Hardie's nor McMillan's data or arguments were included in any of the ICA's "land reform progress" reports in the Philippines between 1955 and 1960 and no effort seems to have been made to use them as a benchmark for monitoring the rural scene in the Philippines. The Hardie Report, the McMillan/Rivera Report and the Sorongon Report became dead texts by no later than 1957 and only scattered copies survived, gathering dust in various archives and libraries, while tenancy and landlessness, rural poverty and exploitative use of the agricultural resources of the Philippines worsened in the 1960's and 1970's. Following Magsaysay's death in a plane crash in March 1957, even his attenuated rural program bogged down completely under his successor, President Garcia, paralleling the bogging down of President Diem's rural program in South Vietnam in the same years.

15. A far more accurate summation of the "achievements" of the Magsaysay program and the aspirations for it of the FOA/ICA Mission than that offered by Dr. Joseph Motheral was that delivered by deputy director of the Agriculture Division, James P. Emerson, in his 1956 end of tour report:

"Drastic and sudden changes in ownership at huge cost to the public treasury, with attendant economic and social chaos have been avoided to date."[29]
Perhaps, when he described the Magsaysay program as "the most complete and best integrated in the world", Motheral had meant simply that it had avoided the sort of perils that Emerson associated with sweeping land reform. Certainly, Emerson put the case more clearly. Clearer still and articulating a dissenting opinion from the position of Emerson - to say nothing of Motheral - was the judgement of Robert McMillan, the FOA Mission's sociologist and co-author of the 1952 McMillan/Rivera Report. In that 1952 report, McMillan and Rivera had written:

"In the Philippines, economic and political power is concentrated in the hands of a relatively small minority. Most of the responsibility for existing conditions and most of the moral obligation for initiating amelioration programs to improve the welfare of the generally inarticulate majority rests largely with this group. Should this responsibility and obligation be met with indifference, neglect or opposition, the possibilities are remote for achieving social and economic changes through peaceful means." [30]

That McMillan may have been a dissenting voice in the preparation of the Davis Report is suggested by his critical response to the passage of an emasculated Philippine Agricultural Tenancy Act, in a paper delivered in Urbana, Illinois, in September 1954, at the annual general meeting of the American Rural Sociological Society.

16. In contrast with the prescriptions of the Davis Report and in clear contradiction of the [later] statements by Emerson and Motheral as to the state of affairs in the Philippines and how satisfactory it was, McMillan reaffirmed the urgency of land reform in the Philippines to modernize relations of production, market structures and farming methods, in order to improve the country's prospects for coping with problems arising from rapid population growth in a deeply impoverished rural sector. He concluded, as he had two years earlier, that, since most political and administrative leaders in the Philippines were either landlords, akin to landlords, or ideologically and socially tied to landlords, "it is apparent that they will continue to assist landlords in maintaining the status quo." [31] The suppression of the Huk rebellion by the Philippine armed forces "with American aid" had served, he said, to decrease the felt need on the part of many landlords "for changes in the tenure system". He then told his fellow American rural sociologists:

"It appears inevitable that land reforms will be achieved sooner or later in the Philippines, either through evolution or revolution. The short-sighted landlords and large-scale farmers can retain their present stranglehold on Philippine agriculture only so long as the armed forces of the Republic can suppress dissidents effectively. On the other hand, unfair rental agreements, usury, widespread unemployment, rapid growth of population, relative lack of self-government in other factors provide fertile soil for sowing seeds of revolution." [32]

In the political climate of 1954 in the United States, this was a stand notable for its candor and its challenge to conservatism. What has to be emphasised, of course, is that McMillan, in stating these opinions, was a more and more isolated and dissentient voice within FOA/ICA circles, as far as land reform in the Philippines was concerned. The candid and vigorous language, in which he cast his strong opinions on the subject at the conservatives, contrasts sharply with the language of Emerson and Motheral and all but a very
few American voices, on the margins of official policy, for the following twenty years and more, as we shall see in some detail in the balance of this chapter. The language of Emerson and Motheral and their many colleagues over the years may be dubbed the language of inertia. Its futilities and circularities came to constitute the ingrained character of American policy discourse on land reform in the Philippines - and, as Laurence Hewes bore witness, not in the Philippines alone - after 1954.

17. Adoption of the Dullesian agenda from 1954 limited American involvement in "land reform" programs in the Philippines to technical tinkering and cosmetic measures. Nothing fundamental was seriously attempted. It is, perhaps, not altogether surprising that, in consequence, the biting MSA reports of 1952 not only lapsed from policy relevance but lapsed also from institutional memory. Nevertheless, the extent to which this occurred, under circumstances in which the problems addressed by these reports not only were not solved but worsened appreciably, is surely an important aspect of policy history over the years after 1954 - its shadow, as it were, or, to use Daniel Ellsberg's felicitous phrase, its "hidden history". Mnemonically selective reference to the Hardie Report is already notable in the omission of all mention of it from the Davis Report and in the brief and false statement by James Emerson, in his 1956 end of tour report, that release of the Hardie Report to the press in December 1952 had been "unauthorized" [33], whereas it is clear that Ambassador Spruance had ordered its release. Frate Bull, in his end of tour report as land tenure adviser (successor to Motheral) in 1958, glossed over the whole matter, again with nary a mention of the Hardie Report or its substance, while casually admitting that no land reform properly so-called had occurred in the Philippines to that time [34].

18. Perhaps there is no more remarkable testimony to the institutional amnesia that relegated the Hardie Report to the "memory hole" than the flattened and misleading account of U.S. policy on land reform in the Philippines in the 1950's given by noted American foreign aid historian John Dickey Montgomery, in an essay entitled "United States International Advocacy of Land Reform" which appeared in a book he edited under the title International Dimensions Of Land Reform, published in 1984:

"American efforts to introduce land reform to the Philippines brought the problem to the attention of Ramon Magsaysay, who used rural development as a major issue in his successful 1953 Presidential campaign. The Philippine government did pass a land reform bill after the United States had indicated its intention to offer aid for this purpose. Later, the United States sent Robert S. Hardie, a veteran of the Japanese reform, to help implement the Philippine venture. But Magsaysay's untimely death reduced American influence and Philippine interest in land reform and further action was delayed for about two decades." [35]

Given that Montgomery's essay was a reflection on the advocacy of land reform in the international arena by the United States, one can only find its muddled chronology and conceptual opacity on the subject of the
Hardie Report and its fate disconcerting. Montgomery wrote as an historian, although, as we shall see, he worked briefly in the Philippines in 1975 as a consultant on land reform.

19. Quite as notable as Montgomery's failure to recall the nature, timing and frustration of Hardie's work in the Philippines, was the failure of men who had worked in or on the Philippines at the same time as Hardie to recall these things at all, when questioned about them in 1986-87. John Melby, Philippines Desk Officer at the State Department in 1951-52, wrote to the author: "I know nothing about the Hardie Report."[36] Edward Lansdale, leading CIA officer in the Philippines, with Charles Bohannan, between 1950 and 1954, wrote: "The name 'Hardie' does not ring a bell at all. Are you sure you have it right?"[37]. The "institutional amnesia" at work here becomes significant for the policy process, of course, only where it can be found to affect those with a direct role in more recent land reform work in the Philippines. It is, therefore, of particular significance, perhaps, that Michael Korin, who was AID's land reform "facilitator" and then chief land reform adviser in the Philippines at the height of the land reform program under President Marcos, from October 1973 until October 1977, was entirely unaware, as late as December 1987, of the very existence, to say nothing of the substance or history, of the Hardie and McMillan/Rivera Reports.[38] Informed of their character, he expressed interest and spoke of obtaining a copy of the Hardie Report on his return to Washington from what was a field trip to Manila for AID. Yet three copies of the Hardie Report, including the original Mission draft, sat in an obscure file, forgotten and untouched, in the AID's own Communications and Media Division Resource Library, in the Magsaysay Centre, in Manila.

20. Michael Korin had worked with Jewett Burr in Vietnam, on the land reform of the early 1970's and had arrived in the Philippines to work on land reform from this Vietnam background [39]. Nevertheless, he did not discover and no-one was able, or found reason, to inform him of the existence and fate of the 1952 MSA reports in the Philippines. What, in any case, might he have learned from them? They were not written in the language of inertia, the language of the Dullesian agenda, which governed AID discourse on land reform in the Philippines and it seems quite probable that their "relevance" in 1973 would have appeared minimal. All they could offer was a sense of historical shock and dislocation of policy perspectives. Coming from Vietnam in 1973, one might have thought, Korin would have felt the need to seek out some such critical perspective on the land reform debate in the Philippines. It was there, in the Magsaysay Center, on file, between covers, in hundreds of pages of data and argument, but it did not come to Korin's attention. It seems a nice irony that this undiscoverable and muted piece of AID's own institutional history should have been filed out of the way precisely in the Communications and Media Division Resource Library that AID itself kept in Manila in the 1970's.
6:2. Data and Discourse.

1. Data on Philippine rural conditions derived from the 1960 and 1971 Censuses of Agriculture and other sources indicate quite plainly that, in the years after the passage of President Magsaysay's Agricultural Tenancy Act in 1954 and Land Reform Act in 1955, down to 1970, rural income distribution became more inequitable [see Table 28], landlessness and tenancy increased and the average size of small farm holdings decreased, while a disproportionate percentage of agricultural land remained in very few hands. [see Tables 24, 25 and 26]. Peasant organization remained weak and ineffective during most of this period, after the effort at radical rebellion made by the Huks from 1946 through til 1957 had been ground down. The remnants of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Huks (HMB), under the leadership of Jesus Lava and Casto Alejandrino after the surrender of Luis Taruc [16 May 1954], decided to attempt a peaceful and parliamentary struggle for socio-economic reform. The Garcia administration, however, outlawed both the CPP and HMB and "other similar organizations" under Republic Act 1700 [June 20 1957] and in the years that followed the CPP was hounded, with Alejandrino being arrested in 1960 and Jesus Lava in May 1964 [40]. The threat of radical revolution had, it seemed, been averted without significant social or economic reforms.

2. Passage of the Agricultural Land Reform Code [Republic Act 3844] in 1963, under President Macapagal, although it came with a rhetorical flourish about completing Magsaysay's "unfinished revolution" and declared tenancy to be "contrary to public policy" [41], made no significant advance on the Land Reform Act of 1955 as far as effectiveness was concerned. Macapagal's code set a nominal retention ceiling of 75 hectares, as compared with the Magsaysay bill's 300, but the legal and practical realities were such that almost no land changed hands. Even had enforcement been rigorous, of course, a retention ceiling of 75 contiguous hectares would have left most tenants completely outside the scope of the program. As Dante Simbulan observed in a major study of Philippine socio-economic elites, completed in 1965, the objective effect of all this conservative agrarian legislation was the proliferation, throughout the archipelago in the 1960's, of all those pernicious institutional practices which had triggered the Huk rebellion in the 1940's.[42] Plantation agriculture and export crop production flourished, but social ills associated with maldistribution of the fruits of agricultural production deepened and the ground was thus prepared for a recrudescence of radical rebellion, as Hardie and McMillan had predicted in 1952 and 1954.[43]

3. The election as President in 1965 of Ferdinand Marcos, with promises of, among other things, no more shortages or importation of rice, reduction of graft
and corruption to a minimum, punishment of those who have enriched themselves in office, no persecution of political enemies and faster land reform was not followed by delivery on these promises, any more than the election of Diosdado Macapagal in 1961 on a very similar set of campaign promises had been. While technical programs under the rubric of the "Green Revolution" did result in significant increases of rice production, the access of the mass of rural Filipinos to either productive resources or income did not show a corresponding improvement.[44]

As far as land reform was concerned, Marcos so failed to advance on the failures of the Macapagal administration that by 1968 AID, then headed by Wesley Haraldson, had withdrawn altogether from the program, on the grounds that it was an empty political gimmick without substance or credibility.[45] The extent of frustration with established institutions throughout the country as a whole in the first Marcos administration was not such as to conduce to mass rebellion, but it had begun to reach critical proportions among potential leaders of such a rebellion.

4. Francisco Sionil Jose, radical novelist and editor of the liberal journal of ideas Solidarity perhaps summed up the spreading mood of frustration in a forceful, if somewhat quixotic open letter to U.S. President-elect Richard Nixon in November 1968:

"The revolution will come because the twelfth hour is long passed and the compulsions toward change - violent though it may be - can no longer be reversed. Why will it come? Why will no-one be able to stop it? It will come because the oligarchy which controls the political and economic destiny of this country has been grossly irresponsible and has completely cut itself off from the aspirations of the many who are poor. It will come because the pressures from the poor can no longer be accommodated by our fledgling institutions of freedom. It is now time that we must think seriously of supporting a mass revolutionary party built upon class lines, so that the enemies of Philippine nationalism - the oligarchy and its allies, may be banished once and for all...Is the U.S. interested in developing democratic institutions here? Individual Americans are, but between individual Americans and the sugar lobby and other pressure groups in New York and Washington, the intentions are subjugated by cold business logic. We are actually of some value only to Americans with sugar, mining and some manufacturing interests. And, of course, of great value to those American business groups whose alliances with the Filipino oligarchy go deep and wide. Other than these, Americans just don't care. You should scrap military aid and devote all assistance to our land reform program, towards...making it possible for all tillers of the soil to own the land they till..." [46]

It was still, of course, quite possible to argue in 1968 that "revolution" was not in prospect in the Philippines. Besides, as the Vietnam experience had shown by then, even were a mass rebellion to occur and threaten the state with "revolution", there was no reason to believe that this would induce the United States to press for a dramatic land reform in the Philippines. There had been excellent opportunities to do so under conditions of relative political stability in 1954 and 1963, but the United States had shown no energetic interest in taking such opportunities. Even as, in the course of 1968, the Stanford Research Institute report on rural Vietnam and the agitation of Roy Prosterman and his colleagues began to bring genuine land reform onto Washington's agenda, amid a full-scale war that was costing the United States
billions of dollars per month, land reform had been abandoned in the Philippines as an active concern of the United States. It was in December of that very year that a small group of radical Marxists, having been expelled from the old Communist Party of the Philippines [CPP] for denunciations of the CPP leaders, formed a new party of armed revolution - the Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist) [CPP-ML] - with the idea of making just the revolution of which Sionil Jose had written. The re-election of Ferdinand Marcos as President in 1969, after the expenditure of a staggering fifty million dollars in his campaign [47], began a process of political symbiosis, in which the corruption and maladministration of the Marcos regime fed the efforts of the CPP-ML to organize a movement on Maoist lines of armed rural insurrection.

5. It was in 1970 that AID again entered the land reform arena in the Philippines. Early in 1970, at the very time when President Thieu, under the influence of the ideas of Roy Prosterman, pushed the land to the tiller bill through the South Vietnamese legislature, interest in the land reform problem in the Philippines seems to have been revitalized, perhaps not altogether by coincidence. It was in the northern spring of 1970 that AID held a full conference devoted specifically to land reform, in its annual spring review conference series. A great many papers were presented at this conference, including numerous country studies and a number of studies of the economic and political aspects of land reform at a comparative and theoretical level.[48] The country paper on the Philippines was authored by Harold Koone, of the AID Mission in the Philippines and Lewis Gleeck of the U.S. Embassy staff [49]. Coincident with the preparation of this study, a review of Philippine land reform was conducted by AID, the Philippine National Economic Council [NEC], the National Land Reform Council [NLRC], and the National Food and Agriculture Council [NFAC]. The NLRC was a body that had been formed under the provisions of the 1963 Land Reform Code to co-ordinate the work of the various bureaucracies responsible for rural affairs: the Land Authority, the Agricultural Productivity Commission, the Agricultural Credit Administration, the Land Bank and the Office of Agrarian Counsel. The conclusion of the review was, not very surprisingly, that the national land reform program had achieved very little since 1963. Indeed, it was found that fewer than 3% of the nation's grain growing tenants had even moved from share to leasehold tenancy under the program in those seven years, while a negligible number had become amortizing owners [50]. Given the retention ceiling and the loose framing of the code, of course, this should not have occasioned any surprise. It is instructive to note, however, that these were not the factors that the inquiry found to be the causes of the program's failure. Instead, the problems cited appear to have been simply technical problems of the logistics of implementation: "lack of transportation, communication and office equipment, an inefficient administrative structure and insufficient travel and administrative funds." [51]. The initiative coming from this review was one completely consistent with the Dullesian agenda of the late 1950's:
"It was decided that a one province pilot effort should be undertaken, designed to overcome the problems identified [sic]. The project would be given broad support and would be charged with determining if and how the national land reform and agricultural production programs could be greatly accelerated." [52]

The one province pilot project so designated was the Nueva Ecija Land Reform Integrated Development Program (NELRIDP), a joint project on the part of the NLRC, NFAC and Nueva Ecija provincial government, with financial and technical assistance from AID and the NEC.

6. In the perspective of the large claims made in 1956 for the Magsaysay land reform program and in 1963 for the Macapagal land reform program, to say nothing of the more serious proposals of Hardie and McMillan in 1952, the NELRIDP represented an extremely modest approach to the land reform issue in the Philippines. Moreover, it was launched in a province which had already, by 1970, been the scene of almost the only significant share-hold to leasehold transformation of tenancy practices in the country [53]. If one could assume that it marked a beginning, a sort of scientific experiment in the efficient administration of rapid land reform, the NELRIDP pilot project might merit defence on its own terms. However, what it marked, surely, was an acceptance, for all practical purposes, of the crippling limitations of the existing legislation. This is what was "Dullesian" about it. It was to be followed, in September 1971, by the passage through the Philippine Congress of the revised Code of Agrarian Reform, Republic Act 6389, which, to be sure, once more proclaimed the imminent end of tenancy and exploitation and which was itself to be followed, within a year, by the even more grandiloquent Presidential Decrees 2 and 27, under martial law, declaring sweeping land reform. The NELRIDP itself, however, did not constitute a major initiative. Indeed, in a memorandum to AID/Manila Director Thomas Niblock, dated 2-3 August 1971, marked "For Mission Use Only" and headed "One Year After: Land Reform in Nueva Ecija", Lewis Gleeck wrote that the NELRIDP was "not taken seriously by Filipinos" who assumed it to be "a ritualistic display"[54] Nor, as we shall see, did the nominally sweeping Marcos initiatives call forth very much more commitment to vigorous land reform in the Philippines on the part of the United States official Mission than the NELRIDP signified.

7. Ferdinand Marcos was, in many respects, the nemesis of the political system and style of leadership that had been pioneered by Manuel Quezon in the 1930's. The system had always been riddled with corruption and demagoguery, its democratic characteristics flawed by elite control of the only effective party machines and patronage networks. Marcos, a brilliant and in some respects ambiguous figure, rose through the system from the time of his entry into Congresss in 1949 as a thirty two year old protege of President Quirino, becoming a shrewd and tough practitioner of its unspoken rules. His relentless ambition was noted before he was first elected President [55]. His use of that office to gain control of enough power and patronage to entrench himself was the
distinguishing feature of his rule from 1965 through to the declaration of martial law in September 1972. His espousal of land reform in 1971-72 must be interpreted in terms of his determination to outbid and outmanoeuver all possible rivals for political primacy and not in terms of a sober and responsible philosophy of statemanship. Nevertheless, once he had embarked on a course of making himself a sort of princeps and breaking the grip of the old elite on the legislature, political machines and patronage, there was no reason to assume that he would not try to press through some sort of major land reform, as a means to his own ends. He was, for much of his rule, a rather subtle and canny tyrannis, but he was surrounded by clients and advisors and henchmen who had no desire to press through with land reform and in the end the sheer corruption of his regime ruined whatever developmental plans his more responsible advisors had been seeking to implement under the shield of authoritarian rule. It is against such considerations as these that one must weigh the land reform rhetoric of 1972 and the discourse among official or semi-official American personnel about land reform in the Philippines in the mid-1970's.

8. The declaration of martial law by President Marcos, on 22 September 1972, was as far as one can re-establish the intentions and planning behind it, not a grave measure of state security, but a carefully prepared coup d'etat, the purpose of which the perpetuation of the Marcos regime. [56] Nevertheless, it was accompanied by a fanfare of propaganda about the "New Society" that would be ushered in, over the opposition of the corrupt old elite and the totalitarian revolutionaries, under the firm, constitutional rule of the self-proclaimed guardian of the commonwealth. On 26 September 1972, four days after the declaration of martial law, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 2 (PD 2), which stressed the "pressing need to accelerate" land reform and "to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices which have not only retarded the agricultural development of the country, but have also produced widespread discontent and unrest." To this end, PD 2 announced "the whole country is declared a land reform area" [57]. Just under a month later, on 21 October 1972, President Marcos issued PD 27, the Emancipation of the Tenants' Decree, the preamble to which announced:

"Inasmuch as the old concept of landownership by a few has spawned valid and legitimate grievances that gave rise to violent conflict and social tension, the redress of such grievances being one of the fundamental objectives of the New Society. I, Ferdinand E. Marcos,...do hereby decree and order the emancipation of all tenant farmers as of this October 21 1972. This shall apply to tenant farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of share crop or lease tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not. In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area, or will now cultivate it." [58]

Compared with pre-existing legislation, the rhetoric was little different, but the retention ceiling had come down markedly. It remained to be seen whether the scope of the program meant what Marcos claimed for it
and whether he would be willing or able to take measures for the implementation of his decree which
previous administrations had eschewed.

9. In endeavouring to assess the ostensible, never mind the effective, scope of the New Society land reform program, one is confronted by severe anomalies in the available and official data. These anomalies are to some extent resolved by recent studies, drawing on the 1971 and 1980 Censuses of Agriculture, which were not released in full until 1986 [59]. There appear to be particular difficulties with data on the extent of tenancy of various types throughout the Philippines for the period from 1960 down to the fall of Marcos. According to Dante Simbulan, writing in 1965, by 1961 50% of Philippine farm operators were tenants [60] [see Table 26]. This represented a major increase in tenancy since the time of the Hardie Report a decade earlier and showed that, as Hardie had warned, the institution of tenancy, having reached extremely high levels in Central Luzon by the 1940's, was now proliferating throughout the country unchecked by the ineffectual legislation of the Magsaysay years. Joel Rocamora, writing in 1974, put the figure for tenancy nationwide in 1960 at 46%, which is significantly lower than Simbulan's figure, but within range of it, especially since his lower figure is dated earlier, not later, than Simbulan's. According to the 1960 Census of Agriculture, however, tenants of all types in 1960 numbered 864,538, which the Philippine government's National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) calculated as having represented some 39% of farm operators [61] [see Tables 36 and 38]. Joel Rocamora estimated that by 1971 the tenancy rate must have climbed to 60% and he calculated that, given the expansion of land under cultivation and population growth, this would have given a total for 1971 of some 4,000,000 tenants [62] [see Table 31]. Yet NEDA's 1984 Statistical Yearbook, drawing on the then unpublished 1971 Census of Agriculture, not only did not indicate any such increase in the level of tenancy or the numbers of tenants it showed a dramatic and completely unexplained decrease in both, between 1960 and 1971, to less than 29% of farm operators, or a total of 681,658 tenants of all types [63] [see Table 38].

10. Rocamora's total number of tenants seems excessive, since, if we take the total Philippine population in 1971 of approximately forty million and allow that 50% of the workforce were engaged in agriculture, then calculate for an average family size of five, it would appear that half the population were tenants or dependants of tenants, which would leave landless and landowning rural populations unaccounted for, even though it is widely agreed that the number of landless laborers was already substantial by then - and was to increase dramatically in the martial law years. Fairly clearly, therefore, Rocamora's figure of 4,000,000 tenants must be revised downwards, probably by more than half. The NEDA figures, based on official census data, conversely, are astounding. What they would suggest is so substantial
an increase in the number and percentage of fully-owned farm operations and a decrease in the number
and percentage of tenant-run farm operations during the 1960's, that one ought to have judged land
reform completely unnecessary, in 1971-72, on the grounds that somehow it was happening
spontaneously. It certainly was not happening under the government's land reform program. Indeed, if
NEDA's figures are to be believed, tenancy in the Philippines was lower in 1971 (i.e. before the
promulgation of President Marcos's PD 2 and PD 27) than at any time since about 1928.

11. If these astonishing figures are credited, a computational difficulty
then arises regarding NEDA's own data on the scope and accomplishments of
the land reform program of President Marcos's "New Society" as initiated by PDs
2 and 27 in 1972. NEDA's 1984 Statistical Yearbook indicated that a total of of 922,935
tenants benefited from either land transfer or shift to leasehold under the New Society program between
1972 and 1983. This suggests either that tenancy first increased sharply after 1971 (by 35%, or from
681,658 to 922,935 tenants) before being, on the face of it, completely abolished; or that the figure
of 922,935 beneficiaries of the New Society program is inflated by a massive overlap between land
transfer and leasehold contract beneficiaries, though no such overlap is indicated in the 1984 Statistical
Yearbook [63] [see Table 39]. This would still leave tenants on non-rice/corn lands unaccounted for,
since they were excluded from the scope of the New Society program from its inception and
numbered several hundred thousand, whereas NEDA's baseline figure of 681,658 tenants in 1971 was
specifically designated as including tenants of all types. In short, something is pretty clearly awry with
the NEDA data. Even the crudest estimate must at least double NEDA's figure for tenancy as of 1971
and there is good reason to consider its claims for the achievements of the New Society program
enormously inflated.

12. Tables 31 and 32 show two independent efforts, by critics of the New
Society land reform, to establish the statistical parameters of the program. The
discrepancies between them may be explained largely by observing that Kerkvliet [Table 32] accepted
quite conservative official data, which Rocamora and Panganiban had used in 1975 [see Tables 29 and
30], while Rocamora and O'Connor [Table 31], in 1977, extrapolated from 1960 data to construct high
estimates of their own. Concerning these extrapolations, it must be said that they appear to err on the
high side. For example, whereas NEDA reported that, in 1971, 8,493,735 hectares were under
cultivation in the Philippines (compared with the 5,726,584 hectares under cultivation according to the
1948 Census of Agriculture and 7,772,484 hectares under cultivation according to the 1960 Census of
Agriculture), Rocamora and O'Connor gave a figure of 10,100,000 hectares under cultivation by 1974,
without explaining the surge in cultivated area in a period when the arable land "frontier" was supposed
to have "closed". They allow only 310,000 hectares of their increase under the category "Total
Commercial Cropland”, which suggests that an additional 1,596,000 hectares were planted to food crops between 1971 and 1974, unless NEDA’s figure for 1971 was a gross underestimate. Rocamora and O'Connor stated further that, in 1960, 548,037 tenants were reported as producing crops other than rice and corn, but this figure does not tally with the 1960 Census of Agriculture and is certainly too high a proportion of the total number of tenants of all types listed there (to be sure, probably an underestimate in itself). In extrapolating a doubling of this figure (of non-rice/corn tenants), based on the nearly 100% increase in hectarage planted to sugar and coconuts between 1960 and 1971, they arrived at a figure of more than 1,000,000 tenants on non-rice/corn lands by 1971; whereas Kerkvliet, in 1979, put the total at 280,000. The vast discrepancy between these two calculations, if one does not summarily dismiss one or the other, is almost certainly to be explained with reference to the category of landless laborers, for which Kerkvliet gives an estimate of 4,000,000, while Rocamora and O'Connor, with their estimated 4,000,000 tenants, give no estimate at all for the landless laborer category. Given these shortcomings in the Rocamora/O'Connor calculations, Kerkvliet's conservative estimates should perhaps be taken as the more reliable data base for reasoning about the scope and achievements of the New Society program [65].

13. Adding landless laborers and tenants of all types together, Kerkvliet concluded in 1979 that even had the New Society program fulfilled its declared aim of emancipating all tenants on rice and corn lands down to a retention ceiling of 7 hectares, this would have brought benefits to only 8% of the rural poor, or some 440,000 peasants by the official estimates [see Table 32]. Now even going by the official estimates of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform as of 1984 - after the declared "completion" of the New Society program - only a very small fraction of the "targeted" tenants completed the emancipation process. Assuming Kerkvliet’s gross figures to be conservative and therefore perhaps on the low side, and if one uses the "emancipation patent" as the most immediate quantifiable index of land reform under the New Society program, it appears that no significant land reform occurred at all under the martial law regime between 1972 and 1979. Drawing on all available official data in 1986, Tadem calculated that the potential scope of the program extended to only 6.62% of the total agricultural labor force without land ownership, covering some 13.6% of cultivated land; while in terms of actual accomplishment, the program transferred ownership, signified by the acquisition of an Emancipation Patent, to no more than 14,344 tenants, or 2.27% of the potential beneficiaries, covering 15,778 hectares, or a mere 2.2% of the potential area of land [see Table 33]. While there were other aspects of the land reform program which affected a considerable number of other tenants, it is clear that the bold rhetoric that Marcos used in declaring his land reform in 1972 was not followed by anything like commensurate practical results. Given that he more than once announced that land reform was the "cornerstone" of the "New Society", its sine qua non, one is surely justified in observing that even in its own terms the program was a complete failure. By any more serious or ambitious yardstick, it was an abysmal failure. The monitoring of it by
AID Agriculture staff can be examined in light of these basic statistical facts and in light of the background narrated in this inquiry. Before turning to examine the discourse of AID on the Marcos program, however, it is worth considering some of the better known critiques of that program from outside AID, to establish what sort of point of reference they provide for assessment of AID documents on the subject. I shall consider three such critiques: that by Olson [1974], Rocamora/O'Connor [1977] and Kerkvliet [1979]

The first requirement for an adequate assessment of U.S. involvement in land reform in the Philippines before and since the Hardie Report, I believe, is to come to terms with the seriousness of that report and the meaning of its fate. It is, therefore, somewhat disappointing to find Olson in 1974, in the most sustained critical assessment of U.S. involvement in land reform in both Asia and Latin America up to that time, writing of the Hardie Report:

"Even Hardie's far-reaching proposal to eliminate tenancy totally was designed primarily for the protection of U.S. economic interests. Only coincidentally might his program have offered relief to the Filipino tenant farmer."[66]

Hardie's proposals were, Olson asserted, conceived as a "technique of social control" [67] and were intended first and foremost to bolster the Philippines as an American bastion in Southeast Asia. Curiously, Olson nevertheless went on to argue that Hardie misunderstood the "ultimate political objectives" of the United States government "in stressing agrarian change" [68]. At the same time, he expressed the belief that Magsaysay, if not Hardie, was "sincere" in his desire to see agrarian reform in the Philippines, but was deprived of critical United States support from 1954, due to an "abrupt about face" by the U.S. as regards such reform [69]. It was the Davis[Cooper] Report, he averred, which signaled this "abrupt about face" and he suggests that the change may best be explained by the defeat of the Huk rebellion and consequent lapse in enthusiasm for agrarian reform among both Philippine elites and American strategic planners [70]. This is a "more plausible explanation", he asserted, than that afforded by a conservative shift in U.S. foreign policy with the transition from the Truman to the Eisenhower administration. Yet he cast doubt on this claim himself, by observing that Magsaysay was serious about land reform and that there remained in the U.S. Mission after the departure of Hardie men such as Spruance, Renne and McMillan who were pro-land reform, but were "gradually recalled from Manila" in accordance with the new, more conservative policy line [71]. Finally, he confused the chronology of events, by citing Dulles' 6 May 1954 cable, without dating it, as if it supported the Hardie Report, whereas it indicated Dulles' backing for the recommendations of the Davis Report [72]. The least that can be said of all this is that Olson does not appear to have read the Hardie Report very closely and that he paid insufficient attention to the evidence that the change of administrations in Washington did have a significant bearing on the "abrupt about face" of the U.S. government on the land reform question in the Philippines.
15. Olson's account of the Hardie Report and its fate, because it suppressed or muddled the clear evidence that the Hardie Report represented a definite commitment to genuine land reform in the Philippines, collapsed the implications of the retreat from that commitment into an assertion that it had been no more than a rather cynical strategic measure in the first instance. It thus left no room for inquiring more systematically into the differences among U.S. officials or the resistance they faced from Philippine power-brokers when it came to pressing for land reform. This is all the more notable given Olson's recognition of the fact that Spruance, Renne and McMillan, as well as Hardie, were "land reformers" and his belief that they were recalled for this reason. Why Olson, an American himself, should have been able to credit Ramon Magsaysay with sincere interest in land reform while casting aspersions on the intentions of Robert Hardie is difficult to understand, even in ideological terms. The implications, however, are not difficult to understand at all. If even so hard-hitting and thorough a land reform proposal as Hardie's is to be dismissed as no more than a counterinsurgency strategem, then anything short of it must, a fortiori, be so dismissed and one is left with nowhere else to turn but the idea of radical revolution. This is virtually spelled out in Olson's conclusion, summing up U.S. involvement in the agrarian question in the Philippines from 1950 to 1973:

"Thus, for the immediate future, it might be argued that the less the Philippines land reform programs jeopardize the prevailing internal balance of power (and there is nothing in Marcos's latest decrees to suggest they would) the higher the level of U. S. enthusiasm for the programs. The extent to which these efforts dovetail with the interests of U.S. investors in the Philippines should also engender U.S. support. A dramatic increase in social instability, such as might accompany another Huk threshold, could require U.S. pressure on Manila for a high-risk land redistribution. This would be a last resort. Barring the appearance of such a phenomenon, one would anticipate U.S. support for carefully controlled measures that ameliorate rural poverty, but do not endanger the status quo." [73] (emphasis added).

Olson did not document high levels of U.S. "enthusiasm" for Philippine land reform programs that did not "jeopardize the prevailing internal balance of power". He could have cited Motheral's fulsome comments of May 1956, but he did not and he simply overlooked the considerable evidence that U.S. enthusiasm for land reform in the Philippines was both rare and, when it did occur, linked to a clear belief in the need to alter the prevailing internal balance of power in the country. This was especially evident, of course, in the memoranda of Ely, Abbey, Spruance and Acheson in the early 1950's, as well as in the work of Hardie and McMillan, but it was to reappear in the mid-1970's, after the time Olson wrote. Nor was Olson's prediction concerning "another Huk threshold" borne out after 1974. Insurgency gathered momentum after 1975, but U.S. involvement in land reform was terminated in 1978 and when the Marcos regime became less and less stable in the early 1980's, the Reagan administration did not start to press for land reform in the Philippines. In short, a more nuanced account of the matter is needed than what Olson provided.

16. Writing in 1977, at a time when Roy Prosterman had already criticized the New Society land reform for limitations in scope and stagnation in
implementation - criticism to which we shall turn presently - Joel Rocamora and David O'Connor wrote, in a pamphlet titled The Logistics Of Repression And Other Essays:

"American support of the Marcos regime through military grants and sales and through massive loans to cover the Philippines' mounting balance of payments deficits is quite clear-cut. American responsibility for the failure of Marcos's land reform program is not as well understood. Criticisms of the program by American land reform experts give the impression of serious disagreements with the Marcos regime on this issue. Close examination of the program shows, however, that it is basically an American program in conception and that the main goal remains that of defusing agrarian unrest." [74] (emphasis added).

The argument here is very similar to the better known arguments by McCoy and Olson regarding U.S. policy objectives in respect to land reform in the Philippines (and elsewhere) in the 1950's. Indeed, Rocamora and O'Connor virtually paraphrased McCoy in describing land reform as "this most subtle of counterinsurgency instruments." [75]. Where such land reform programs fail, the inference seems to be drawn that they were never intended to succeed - as land reform. Where counterinsurgency also fails, however, the inference is not that it was never intended to succeed, but that other factors prevented it from succeeding. This reasoning is inconsistent, surely, and to that extent flawed. Quite apart from consideration of factors that can prevent a land reform from succeeding even where it is "intended" to do so, the line of argument advanced by Rocamora and O'Connor occludes the entire debate between land reform advocates and counterinsurgency theorists, as well as that between land reform advocates and economic/political pragmatists which actually constitute the history of U.S. policy on land reform in the international arena. This seriously impoverishes a critique of that policy pursued along such a line.

17. "None of the land tenure laws of 1955, 1963, 1971 or 1972 has faced up to the basic issue of land redistribution" Rocamora and O'Connor observed, while failing to add that this was the direct responsibility of the Philippine Congress and Executive, rather than something orchestrated by the U.S. Embassy. They hit hard, quite rightly, at the inadequacies of these laws, declaring:

"All of them have evaded this issue [of land redistribution] through a variety of mechanisms. They have [1] excluded lands planted to export crops and/or untenanted rice and corn lands; [2] allowed landlords to retain substantial amounts of their lands and/or provided loopholes for outright evasion [3] stipulated that the costs be Shouldered by already insolvent tenants; and created procedures and administrative structures which have hindered the implementation of land reform laws." [76]

There is, however, nothing original in these criticisms and nothing that Robert Hardie had not already written in 1952 concerning legislation then on the statute books. Nor do such criticisms differ substantially from those made by many American and Filipino advocates of land reform between 1954 and 1977. Moreover, in patent contradiction of their assertion that the Americans were "responsible" for the failure of Marcos's land reform program, Rocamora and O'Connor went on to state:
"For all of Marcos's dramatic pronouncements about land reform being the cornerstone of the New Society, many U.S. officials continue to doubt the seriousness of his intentions. [77]

Now, of course, this simply does not square with their previous argument and inclusion of this remark, among others, suggests that Rocamora and O'Connor had not thought through exactly what they were trying to prove. Having stated that the U.S. designed the New Society program and was responsible for its failure, it does not seem prima facie consistent to then state that U.S. officials doubted the seriousness of Marcos's intentions. If U.S. officials had designed and had sufficient influence over implementation of the New Society land reform that responsibility for its failure could reasonably be attributed to them, why do doubts about the seriousness of Marcos's intentions enter into the matter? If, on the other hand, Marcos's intentions were decisive, then how far can one reasonably assign responsibility for his failures to U.S. officials?

18. Somehow or other, both logic and evidence appear to suggest that one must fall back on a different position, which would diminish U.S. responsibility by casting doubt on the extent of U.S. involvement in and the seriousness or even the coherence of U.S. intentions regarding land reform. It is not surprising to find that Rocamora and O'Connor actually do just this, without, it would seem, perceiving the inconsistencies in their presentation of the case:

"At one level, one reason for the meager U.S financial commitment to land reform has been that there is far from a general consensus within the U.S. government on the appropriateness of its present involvement in the program. Lewis Gleeck, long-time director of U.S.A.I.D. Manila [an error of detail, since Gleeck was never A.I.D. director in Manila and the director at that time was Peter Cody - see Figure 11], for instance, has proposed the use of carrot and stick psychology, offering Marcos a big financial bonus to bolster his agrarian reform programs only if he will guarantee some results, but threatening withdrawal altogether if he does not produce them. Others view identification with the Marcos reform as a kind of self-incrimination, a threat to U.S. credibility, and so propose that U.S. support be low-key for the time being. One well-known American land reform expert, Roy Prosterman, has said outright that the Philippines has virtually given up on its crucial effort to transfer ownership of the land to one million small farmers, once stated to be the cornerstone of Marcos's New Society." [78] (emphasis added).

The scattered evidence here adduced by these authors points to an agitation of debate over land reform in the Philippines within American circles in the mid-1970's, which for the first time since 1953 raised the possibility of going beyond what I have called the Dullesian agenda. To press home a critique of U.S. involvement in the failure of land reform under Marcos, one must, I submit, explore this debate and inquire as to why, in the end, the Dullesian agenda was not transcended. In their haste to conclude that the U.S. is to be blamed for both the initiation and the failure of land reform in the Philippines, Rocamora and O'Connor, like Olson, became muddled about U.S. debates on the matter and so rendered a less than adequate account of the various positions held by U.S. officials and what stood athwart a serious
commitment by the U.S. government to, never mind successful implementation of, land reform in the Philippines.

19. Perhaps the most careful and consistent critical account of the Marcos land reform program in the 1970's, at least as it related to U.S. policy, was that provided by Kerkvliet in 1979. However, even Kerkvliet's case seems to me incomplete and subject to qualification on the matter of U.S. policy, land reform and counterinsurgency. Taking off from the suggestion that Marcos's program partook of the old elite paternalism of Quezon, Roxas and Quirino, whose "social justice" programs were intended to "reduce unrest without changing the system" [79], he commented:

"President Marcos's government has accomplished more land reform between 1973 and 1976 than it did in the preceding seven years. Its program, however, closely parallels previous land reform plans of Philippine governments. These attempts brought little improvement for the peasantry; mainly owing to four conditions in Philippine politics, conditions that have persisted during martial law. First, the purpose of land reform is to protect the regime from rural unrest rather than to redistribute substantially wealth and power to villages. Second, Filipino elites design and administer the agrarian program with scarcely any participation from villages, while landlords either resist its implementation or try to manipulate it in order to protect their own interests. Third, largely because of the first two conditions, the scope of land reform is narrow, only a small fraction of all peasants can potentially benefit. Finally, many of those villages who conceivably could benefit probably will lose out in the long run. In sum, the agrarian reform program in the Philippines seems headed for the same fate that has befallen other such programs in similar regimes - a little improvement for a few, but continued poverty and oppression for most. " [80]

Kerkvliet went on to point out that Marcos was himself a landlord on an immense scale, having acquired tens of thousands of hectares in Cagayan, Isabela, Negros Occidental, Davao, Panay and elsewhere even before 1972 [81]. Although peasant organization for marches, pickets, protests, court actions, in defense of tenure change was an indispensable support to serious land reform, Marcos imprisoned or hounded militant leaders of the peasant organizations in the 1970's, whether the CPP-oriented MASAKA or the militants of the Catholic Federation of Free Farmers [82]. Kerkvliet noted that numerous tenants were, under the Marcos regime, tractored out, intimidated, arrested, gaoled, but no landowners were ever arrested for instigating such abuses. DAR/MAR agents, he found, repeatedly caved in to landlords and settled disputes to the disadvantage of tenants [83].

20. The picture drawn by Kerkvliet is redolent of that reported by Jewett Burr as vitiating the GVN's Land to the Tiller program in An Giang province and the Vietnamese central lowlands between 1970 and 1975. It is all the more significant, then, to stress that Burr was an AID land reform adviser in Vietnam and worked again for AID in Washington after writing his PhD on the land to the tiller failures in Vietnam. If Burr was able to take so critical a view of a U.S.-sponsored land reform from within AID, it seems at least worth inquiring into what such critical views were expressed within American circles, even within AID, during the mid-1970's, concerning the land reform failures in the Philippines to which Kerkvliet referred in 1979. The most disappointing feature of Kerkvliet's critique of those failures is his rather one-dimensional assessment of the U.S. role in and
perspective on them. Like most critics of the U.S. role, since 1946, in the Philippine agrarian question, Kerkvliet anchored his position in reference to the Magsaysay years and the counterinsurgency schemes of Edward Lansdale and Jose Crisol. His account of U.S. policy in respect to land reform in the 1950's was based on an interview with Jose Crisol in 1969, the Davis[Cooper] Report, James Emerson's end of tour report of 1956, Frances Starner's *Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry* and Alfred McCoy's 1971 essay "Land Reform as Counterrevolution" [84]. He made no mention of or reference to the Hardie Report or the McMillan/Rivera Report, or the debate surrounding them, and he conflated resettlement and civic action projects - Lansdale's much-touted EDCOR scheme of the early 1950's - with "land reform", observing that Crisol "candidly described the resettlement programs, artesian wells projects and civic action as parts of the psych-war aimed at the soft core of the Huk movement."[85], without differentiating these programs from land reform as such. He observed, muddling the chronology of things in a manner that almost anticipated Montgomery's account of these things in 1984, that:

"Although Magsaysay and some others in the government may have become more interested later in land reform as a means to significant changes, most Filipino politicians and U.S. State Department advisors intended to concede only enough legislation and funding to keep rural discontent to a manageable level." [86].

Now, as the reader of the fourth chapter of this study will appreciate, the subordinate clause in the above statement, pivoting on the word "later", is rather confusing. Later than when or what? Later than the initiation, in 1950, of EDCOR schemes as part of the counterinsurgency campaign against the Huks, at the advice of Edward Lansdale? Later than the 1954 Davis Report? Later than the passage of Magsaysay's legislation in 1955? Kerkvliet did not make this clear and these events were separated by considerable intervals of time, during which a quite interesting and significant debate had taken place within the U.S. policy bureaucracies in Washington and Manila on land reform in the Philippines as a means to significant change in the country's economy and society.

21. By omitting all mention of this debate, as well as any discussion of just what "significant changes" Magsaysay really was "interested in" ["later"], or how U.S. "State Department advisors" regarded such prospective changes, Kerkvliet flattened the meaning and historiographic usefulness of what actually occurred in the 1950's and thereby impoverished his critique of U.S. policy over la longue duree. His representation of U.S. interest [more precisely, U.S. lack of interest] in land reform as a flat and linear policy of counterinsurgency, allowed for no inner tensions or contradictions in U.S. thinking about land reform in the Cold War and the result is to narrow, rather than extend the scope for critical revision of such thinking. Instead, the United States as such comes to appear as a mere arsenal of counterinsurgency and any reform proposals emanating from it become the object of suspicion and distrust. The unsatisfactoriness of this conclusion, even if it is implicit and not explicit, as it tends to be in hardline leftist critiques of U.S.
foreign policy or of "reformism" more generally, is best appreciated if the obverse proposition is posed: that all serious criticism of "revolutionary" transformations is more or less "counter-revolutionary". Not the least value of the MSA reports of 1952 is that they provide a point of reference for serious reform proposals not premised on either prior upheaval or a calculus of minimum measures to defuse unrest. That Kerkvliet, the historian of the Huk rebellion, in one of the better argued critiques of the New Society land reform, should have omitted all mention of those ill-fated reports, eliminates that point of reference around which a serious American interest in land reform in the Philippines might organize itself, in order not to find itself hemmed in and cut off by the narrow discourses of the Dullesian agenda, with its language of inertia, and the mobilization for "revolution", with its gravitation toward Leninism and anti-Americanism. Without such a point of reference, the language of inertia and the mobilization for revolution draw one into a conceptual vicious circle from which, as so much of the Vietnam experience had indicated by 1972, there can seem to be no exit.
6:3. The Vicious Circle.

1. Almost as soon as President Marcos declared martial law and announced that he would make land reform the cornerstone of the New Society he proposed to champion in the Philippines, Roy Prosterman arrived in Manila to advise his government on the drafting of appropriate legislation [87]. It will be recalled that this was a little over two years since Prosterman had addressed the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, along with Senators Packwood and Magnusson, on the subject of land reform in Vietnam, and had spoken in strong terms about the disaster of American unwillingness to push for a major land reform in South Vietnam in the 1950's. The observations of Senators Magnusson and Packwood at those hearings, in August 1970, were to the effect that land reform was, on a world scale, a vital program that the U.S. must support in an active and constructive manner. Prosterman was a personal advisor to Magnusson by then and may be regarded as the source of much of the latter's thinking on these things. According to Philippine rural affairs veteran Eligio Tavanlar, Prosterman's arrival in Manila was accompanied by an offer from Senator Magnusson, Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii and Thomas Niblock, the AID director in Manila, to find massive U.S. funding for the land reform that Marcos proposed, but Marcos declined the offer [88]. It would seem that the offer was made unofficially and that Washington backed off from any idea of financing the program or, indeed, appearing to dictate Philippine government policies [89]. However, from that time on for the next six years, Roy Prosterman took a keen interest in the New Society land reform program - and quickly became one of its sharpest and most persistent critics.

2. As early as April 1973, Prosterman informed AID Manila that the 7 hectare retention ceiling that the PD 27 program set for rice and corn landowners was too high and that, if it was adhered to, it would serve to undermine land reform of any thoroughgoing kind. His argument stands out as the most trenchant American position on the subject since the days of Hardie and McMillan, almost a generation before him, of whose work he shows no sign of having been aware:

"A seven hectare retention area will give total or substantial exemption to over 90% of the landlords, but will confer benefits on only 25% of the tenants. A variable exemption ranging from about 1.5 to 3.0 hectares and fixed on a province by province basis after the landlord declarations are submitted, will give total or substantial exemption to 66% - 75% of the landlords, but will confer benefits on 70% or more of the tenants...Based on the DAR data, one may tentatively estimate rough figures of 350,000 landlords and 1,000,000 tenant households. The across the board seven hectare retention area would affect roughly 25,000 to 30,000 landlords, while giving land to roughly 250,000 tenants; while the variable 1.5 to 3.0 hectare approach here described would substantially affect roughly 90,000 to 120,000 landlords, giving land to roughly 700,000 tenants...a land reform program of sufficient scope to be consistent with President Marcos's statement that reforms to succeed must be radical. Fundamentally, the question is...whether the Philippine landlords will so strongly oppose this standard...that this most fundamental program of the New Society is destroyed. On one fact we should all be clear: it is mathematically inevitable that land reform will be destroyed if the seven hectare retention area is preserved." [90]
One has only to compare such a statement with the nibbling ambitions of the NELRIDP or, better, with the fulsome claims of Motheral in 1956, or, at bottom, with the Dullesian agenda of the May 1954 cables, to appreciate that Prosterman was trying to get accomplished in the Philippines what he believed should have been attempted in Vietnam in the 1950's.

3. It should be remarked that Prosterman's data appear to have exaggerated the numbers of both tenants and landlords who were operating below the 7 hectare retention ceiling. According to a 1975 study drawing on Philippine government statistics dating from December 1973, some 63% of tenants worked on properties above 7 hectares, which is completely incompatible with Prosterman's belief that 75% of tenants worked on properties below 7 hectares. The same statistical source [see Table 30] indicated that 83% of landowners owned properties of 7 hectares or less, but did not differentiate between landowning farm operators, of whom their were many, and absentee landlords, which suggests that the percentage of landlords owning 7 hectares or less must have been considerably fewer than the 83% figure and nowhere close to the 90% which Prosterman cited. What is significant about Prosterman's use of the data is simply that he erred, if at all, on the side of urging a more radical land reform. The contrast between Prosterman's proposal and the Davis Report, more than twenty years before, which had explicitly confined its concern to areas of especially high tenancy and to bringing things "under control", deserves to be emphasised. Not since the Hardie Report had any American advisor or land reformer laid such forthright proposals on the table. His was not, however, the dominant voice in American discourse on the matter and he proved unable, over the years that followed, to effect a substitution of his proposals for the traditional tinkering and rationalization of non-reform that I have dubbed the Dullesian agenda.

4. The New Society land reform had already bottomed out on the sort of shoals indicated by Prosterman in April 1973 when, in mid-1974, Keith Sherper arrived in Manila, after having worked in Saigon on the land to the tiller program, to assume the job as chief land reform advisor in A.I.D.'s Agriculture Division in the Philippines. It fell to Lewis Gleeck, already an Embassy and A.I.D. officer of many years experience in Manila and co-author with Harold Koone of the study Land Reform in the Philippines for AID's 1970 spring review of land reform, to fill Sherper in on the background to U.S. involvement in the Philippine land reform program over the years [91]. American interest in land reform had been quickened again, Gleeck told Sherper, by overtures to A.I.D.'s Thomas Niblock from then Land Authority boss Conrado Estrella in 1969 [92]; by the 1970 AID spring review conference on land reform [93]; and by Marcos's proclamation of his "New Society" and its "democratic revolution" [94]. Gleeck's account offers a corrective to Olson's view, or Rocamora and O'Connor's, or Kerkvliet's, as he wrote to Sherper:

"It was clear from the Washington traffic that the USG [United States Government] wanted to be part of something that looked like real reform, but didn't want to get sucked into appearing to dictate GOP [Government of the Philippines] policies, or into financing the program." [95].
Gleeck focused on the organizational confusion of the initial years of the New Society program. From the U.S. side, involvement was modest in scale and ambition, but the constraints on it and the motivational ambivalence behind it must have seemed familiar to Sherper from his experience in South Vietnam.

5. Gleeck had written to Wolf Ladejinsky a few months before Sherper's arrival, asking the aging land reform proponent to come from his World Bank office in New Delhi to appraise the Philippine program, apparently describing it in very positive terms, for Ladejinsky responded:

"Thank you for your letter. You sound very optimistic and I hope developments justify you...I cannot make Manila before August...interested in what appears from your letter to be an accomplished fact..." [96]

That Gleeck actually appreciated how far Marcos's land reform was from "an accomplished fact", as of July 1974, is evident from his report to Sherper that:

"The atmosphere of the New Society was [sic] radical... DAR thought its day had come and rushed to do the President's bidding without any real plan or system...We were not aware, however, (nor was the President) of the faulty data base for the program. Although the DAR (and the LA before the DAR) had been doing little but gather data for almost ten years, the data were almost totally unreliable - which is perhaps the most critical indictment that could be drawn up against the defunct agency. No-one really knew how many tenants there actually were, how much land was involved, or what the profile of land ownership was! This ignorance has bedevilled the program ever since." [97].

Reference has already been made to the data problem, but while one must heartily agree with Gleeck that the lack of reliable tenure data by 1972 was a critical indictment of the Land Authority and the Department of Agrarian Reform, what his remarks to Sherper also indicate glaringly is that A.I.D. had made no effort during the decade before 1972 to keep the tenure problem in clear focus itself. This was further underscored by his added observation that:

"A.I.D. has been badly situated to do anything about this, as the most conspicuous aspect of our project, in contrast to all other mission projects, is that AID's contribution to the GOP program is a miniscule portion of the total. In addition, until Korin arrived [as land reform facilitator in October 1973, also from South Vietnam], we had no-one intimately familiar with land transfer and hence able to check effectively on actual performance..."[98]

The U.S. project to assist the New Society land reform program was, in short, an attenuated, almost nominal project, with a very weak base of operations. There is no evidence to substantiate the assertion by its critics that the New Society land reform program was a counterinsurgency operation designed and monitored by the U.S. government.

6. Given the history of the Hardie Report and the Davis Report more than twenty years before, it is significant, to say the least, that Gleeck should have remarked to Sherper in July 1974:
"This is where a new officer in charge should concentrate his attention: what things have we not been doing that we should do? What things should be done otherwise, or through other instruments? What measure of pressure is it appropriate to aspire to exercise when we provide so little assistance and where the question remains primarily one of political will? Also, and this is delicate, should the style of our operation, which has been buddy-buddy, be revised?" [99]

That the problem was one of political will and that pressure should be exerted to induce the Philippine government to expedite implementation of real land reform were not ideas that had been pronounced in U.S. policy since the time of Ambassador Spruance, Robert Hardie and Robert McMillan. Keith Sherper must have remembered the snarls that these ideas had got tangled in, during the 1960's, in South Vietnam. Lewis Gleeck had not arrived in Manila until 1962 and had served in the NATO area before that, not in Vietnam. He told Sherper, in July 1974, that it was "critical that an alarm be sounded at the shrinking size in the program." [100] (emphasis added). He did not mention insurgency (which was not, in 1974, a major problem), or link land reform to counterinsurgency. His question was whether the New Society program was going to prove to be a real land reform, or another sham of the sort Wesley Haraldson had shrugged off in 1965-66 as unworthy of U.S. interest or support. In an effort to establish this one way or another, Gleeck encouraged a number of land reform investigators to scrutinize the program. Of these, Roy Prosterman was the one who most candidly raised the issues of political will and pressure, in 1975, and, like Robert Hardie long before, he ran into strong opposition among conservative Filipinos and Americans and became persona non grata in Manila. The brouhaha over Prosterman was much less dramatic or substantial than that over Hardie twenty two years earlier, but it recapitulated it in striking ways and showed, once again, the obstacles that stood in the path of U.S. pressure for "rational revolution" even in a country so long in its sphere of influence as the Philippines.

7. Prosterman, in March 1975, presented a forthright critique of the failure of the New Society program, which is striking because of his integrated reference to the bureaucratic, financial and political aspects of that failure, the East Asia model of successful, small-holder-oriented reform, and the bitter experience of the U.S. in Vietnam. Noting that, after two years, the program was less than 1% complete, Prosterman commented, in language strikingly redolent of the Hardie Report:

"If President Marcos does not speed up the program - and it takes the man at the top to do that kind of thing - the Philippines may endure a cyclone [typhoon?] of revolution in the future. . . The Filipinos are, of course, totally free to lie down on any program they want, but I don't think they should enjoy a good press in the U.S. on asserted progress when in fact they have achieved so little..."[101]

He argued that the much higher rice production per hectare in Taiwan, South Korea and Japan than in the Philippines was an indication of the potential benefits of land reform. He added:

"The Philippines can definitely muster the administrative talent and call up the financial resources to do the job, if that's really what President Marcos wants."[102]
He was, he wrote, speaking to the sort of "realities not admitted to by Americans working with Diem on his make-believe land reform in Vietnam in the late 1950's" [see Table 14]. Given the importance of the issue, he concluded:

"...we should make it totally clear that the ball is in Marcos's court. If he flubs it, the Philippines may well become Asia's next tragedy. But it will not become America's." [103]

Was this a counterinsurgency plan, on Prosterman's part? Or, to put it a little differently, was this a counter-revolutionary proposal on Prosterman's part? Down to the present, critics on the left have not been lacking who have so described Prosterman's calls for a sweeping land reform in the Philippines. In the context of the present comparative inquiry, it must be placed alongside the recommendations of Wolf Ladejinsky in the late 1940's and early or mid-1950's for land reform in Asia, the recommendations of Robert Hardie and Robert McMillan in the Philippines in the early 1950's, the recommendations of Laurence Hewes in South Vietnam in 1966, as a candid expression of progressive, democratic, and also anti-totalitarian American thought. None of them succeeded in bringing about sustained U.S. efforts at "rational revolution", with the possible exception of Ladejinsky in Japan and Taiwan and the belated and but partial success of Prosterman in South Vietnam in 1969-70, but this surely does not erase the stark differences between their aspirations and those delineated in the stand taken by the American Council on Japan, the Davis Report, or the Mitchell Report. Dismissing them as "counterrevolutionary" or a calculus of "counterinsurgency" is to miss the point. They were, to revert to the historical simile used earlier in a position rather like that of Scipio Aemilianus or Tiberius Gracchus: wanting the public good and reform, but unwilling in the one case or unable in the other to find the means to bring about reform short of violent struggle.

8. "It is a time for candor", Prosterman stated in a memo to A.I.D. Manila, a week after the critique of the Marcos land reform just quoted was published in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer. He warned that, if the scope of the program was not dramatically widened and implementation pushed vigorously, "the entire program - even the portion relating to lands of over-24 hectare landlords - will be a dead letter by early 1976 at the latest with all of the political and agricultural consequences which that will entail."[104]. U.S. officials concerned to preserve smooth relations with the Philippine government were discomforted by Prosterman's public candor. In the July 1974 memo to Keith Sherper, cited above, Lewis Gleeck had written that the A.I.D. mission in Manila had done well by "supplying marginal inputs" and added "we have stayed out of trouble" [105]. Prosterman's attitude meant trouble and A.I.D. Manila did not want such trouble. The ingrained preference for the uncontroversial "marginal inputs" approach, conformable with the Dullesian agenda down through the NELRIDP project, found expression again and again in opposition to Prosterman's agitation for an all out effort.
9. Ironically, one of the spokesmen for the "marginal inputs" line, in the course of 1974, had been none other than the aging Wolf Ladejinsky. Then a salaried World Bank representative in India, Ladejinsky was invited to the Philippines by U.S. Ambassador William Sullivan and visited the country in August-September 1974 to assess the Marcos land reform program for the AID mission and for Robert McNamara, of the World Bank. On his return to India, he wrote to McNamara that the program was "not a complete failure, but not a great success story either." There was, in Wolf Ladejinsky's sage opinion, "a perceptible absence of zeal and zest on the highest levels...What has been lacking all along is firm enforcement, which is sine qua non in an effort of this kind." Unlike Prosterman, Ladejinsky hesitated to declare that such enforcement was readily possible in the Philippines, even given political will at the top. Nor did he link land reform to the question of insurgency in any direct or dire way. His focus was on the administrative side of the program. "This is" he observed "rather a 'soft' society, inspite of martial law" [106]. Significantly, his proposed remedy was to "sweeten" the deal for landlords, by increasing compensation payments. He made no mention of such variables as organization of and for the rural poor. His attention was given, as it had been in Diem's South Vietnam after 1956, to a vaguely defined and indulgently viewed top-down "softness", rather than to the challenge or potential of bottom up "hardness".

10. Six weeks after his visit to the Philippines, Ladejinsky wrote a letter of encouragement to Secretary of Agrarian Reform Conrado Estrella, urging that the land reform program be pressed through to "completion". He told Estrella:

"I believe that your guidance and the President's support will see it through for the good of the country. I might add also, and with no intent of flattery, that you will be carving out for yourself a lasting place in the history of the agrarian movement of the Philippines. This, my dear Mr. Estrella, is a privilege given to very few political leaders and to few administrators. I root for your place among the chosen few." [107].

Sending a copy of the same letter to U.S. Ambassador Sullivan, Ladejinsky remarked that it would strike him, no doubt, as "on the flattering side but, after all, [Estrella] also needs incentives." [108]. Thus did Wolf Ladejinsky pursue by flattery and tact the end that Roy Prosterman pursued by biting and candid criticism: enlightened and more or less equitable land reform in the Philippines. Neither approach had any discernible success in moving the Marcos regime in the direction of serious reform. Wolf Ladejinsky's approach had, of course, failed sixteen years before with Ngo Dinh Diem and, as has been recounted above, he ended up shutting his eyes to the emperor's nakedness in that case, as the GVN's Ordinance 57 "land reform" went nowhere. [109]

11. In January 1975, Duncan Harkin, an American visiting scholar at the Agrarian Reform Institute of the University of the Philippines, Los Banos, completed a paper on land reform in the Philippines in which, having stated that the productivity case for land reform in the Philippines was weak, he nevertheless stressed its
important role in the transformation of patterns of effective demand in the national economy and in the sociological transformation of the countryside [110]. The problem, he concluded, was finding the means to catalyse such a land reform. That same month, Lewis Gleck drafted a memorandum for AID Manila, in which he concluded plainly that all of the top technocrats in the Marcos government "put land reform well down on their list of priorities".[111] He did not add that land reform in the Philippines was surely at least as far down on the list of priorities of the White House, the National Security Council or the State Department in January 1975, though attention was straining toward the approaching denouement of the long U.S. entanglement in South Vietnam. What he did note, almost as a Habib or a Mann had done in South Vietnam in the mid-1960's, was that "USAID is, of course, not charged with seeking to influence decisions that are in essence political." [112] Perhaps not, but, as Ambassador Spruance had informed Secretary Acheson in April 1952, if no such effort was made by the U.S. aid mission in the Philippines then, in all probability, imperative reforms, among them land reform, *simply would not take place*; and, if they did not take place, then, as Robert Hardie concluded with some bitterness, the whole aid exercise verged on becoming "a charade and a waste of public funds". Gleck's formulation of what AID was [not] charged with doing was the language of inertia. If the thing did not require doing, then a clear and cogent study was called for that would redraw the map of Philippine realities with which AID would work. If, as repeated studies had underlined, the thing very much did need doing then some means had to be conceived to bring it about. The Dullesian agenda, or what Gleck had, in his briefing of Keith Sherper, referred to as the "marginal inputs" approach, had not conceived such means. It had operated, for all practical purposes, as AID had operated in South Vietnam until at least 1970 - tinkering and eschewing the hard political challenge. Yet in 1970, in the spring review paper for AID on land reform in the Philippines, Gleck had himself as much as pointed to the need for *bottom-up pressures from strong peasant organizations* to lever the reluctant elites into change [113]. The implications of such an observation were, of course, highly "political" and quite inconsistent with *dominant* political philosophies in the United States itself. It was for just this reason and, at bottom, no other, that John McAlister had told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1968 that the United States was unable to sponsor an effective alternative to the Communist movement in Vietnam and that notions of the United States having an approach to "revolution" to set against that of the Communists were something no more than "abstract".

12. As early as 1959, an American scholar investigating the need for strong peasant organizations in the Philippines and focusing on the attempt of the Federation of Free Farmers to replace the HMB and CPP in leadership of the peasants, reached the trenchant conclusion that:

"...it is highly questionable that any total reform which would reach down deeply into the very foundations of rural society can be initiated and pushed through to real completion unless the contemporary governing elite is replaced with a group genuinely concerned with the public welfare. For present Philippine political regimes have not indicated thus far that they possess either the administrative integrity or the
political morality necessary to deliver, as Magsaysay vainly promised, "the substance of democracy to the people." [114]

When, however, young militants, like Gerardo Bulatao in the FFF, sought to organize around this idea in the early 1970's, both President Marcos and FFF supremo Jeremias Montemayor saw their efforts as a "communist infiltration" which "threatened the integrity" of the FFF. The descriptions come from a report on Philippine peasant organizations in 1975 for AID, written by one Mark Van Steenwyck [115]. The FFF was purged of these militants by Montemayor in 1973, at the insistence of Marcos, but nothing was built up to replace the impetus that they had tried to provide, except the government-controlled peasant organizations, the Samahang Nayon which were anything but bottom-up militant bodies [116]. Yet in 1978 Lewis Gleeck himself was to lament that Marcos as a land reformer was "handicapped by the absence of an effective pressure group in the countryside", the FFF being lamed because "nearly half the opposition had defected to the subversive left and were under arrest or in hiding." [117] Thus did AID, over many years, chase its tail in a vicious circle - impelled toward seeing the need for reforms by recognition of the gross defects of the Philippine social and economic order; driven back toward counterinsurgency by the fear of radicalism and the inertia of U.S. foreign policy at the highest levels - and never getting anywhere.

13. In May 1975 a three man survey team - Jerome T. French of A.I.D.'s Technical Assistance Bureau, Jonathan Silverstone of A.I.D.'s Bureau for Program and Policy Co-ordination and John D. Montgomery of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government - submitted a report to A.I.D. Manila on the land reform program in the Philippines. The report bears the reader, witting or unwitting, firmly around the vicious circle just described, away from Prosterman's urgency and back to the policy equivalent of the 1954 "Dullesian agenda". Taken in the context of the American discourse on rural conditions in the Philippines since 1950, the French/Silverstone/Montgomery Report clearly followed certain deep circularities in that discourse. After drawing attention to the excessive burden of amortization payments weighing on ex-tenants and the parlous condition of credit financing [118] the survey team concluded that, although the program had bogged down, "like many reform attempts elsewhere", due to technical, bureaucratic and political difficulties [119], "the gloom is excessive and the disillusionment premature." [120]. The "lack of political will", they added, "may be more apparent than real" [121].

14. What, then, of Gleeck's observation of a few months earlier that there was a lack of political will to land reform among the Marcos regime's inner circle of technocrats? The French/Silverstone/Montgomery Report made no mention of the technocrats or of powerful, political figures; and, while finding that DAR bureaucrats "appeared much less zealous in Manila, where the decisions are made, than in the field where the problems are", the authors did not enlarge on this in their report. Their treatment of the composition of political will concerning land reform in the Philippines or its decomposition - was superficial even by comparison with Gleeck's and was certainly bland by comparison with Prosterman's pungent comments of March that year. Yet Gleeck himself was to
write in praise of the French/Silverstone/Montgomery Report, three and a half years later, that it "introduced a welcome realistic note into the discussion of that frequently oversimplified phenomenon called political will" [122]. To be sure, "political will" is a frequently oversimplified phenomenon - not least among Cold War conservatives - but it is not easy to see that French, Silverstone and Montgomery, in May 1975, had introduced any new or marked realism into U.S. discourse on Philippine agrarian politics and the "political will" to land reform in Manila. To the contrary, what stands out painfully from the report is its lapse into the oldest circular rationalizations of Philippine elite non-reform and U.S. acquiescence in that non-reform.

15. Prosterman's outburst in March 1975 threatened to open up a critical breach between the U.S. government and the Marcos regime on the land reform question. French, Silverstone and Montgomery stepped into the breach and sealed it before the thing got out of hand. "Political discourse", they averred, "requires hyperbole, especially perhaps in the circumstances which existed in the fall of 1972. It may be a sign of practical realism and not lack of political will or commitment, when responsible officials subsequently set their sights lower." [123]. This is a truism, but was it a realistic assessment of Philippine "political discourse" and the hyperbole of Ferdinand Marcos? Montgomery's muddled account, as late as 1984, of the history of land reform debate in the Philippines and of American involvement therein, suggests that he had no clear sense of Philippine political discourse, with its perennial hyperbole, corruption, mendacity, inertia and violence, any more than he had a clear sense of how U.S. policy on land reform in the Philippines had compromised itself over the years to avoid offending the "sensibilities" of [conservative] Filipinos, as Edward Prentice put it, in January 1953, to the irritation of Joaquin Elizalde. Certain "foreigners", French, Silverstone and Montgomery commented, with transparent reference to Prosterman, had "failed to understand Philippine political discourse" [124]. Ironically, it was they themselves who had done so.

16. Given their failure to grapple with the realities of agrarian politics in the Philippines, what might one have expected of French, Silverstone and Montgomery as regards recommendations for U.S. policy? Their recommendations, in fact, ran along well-established lines: major increases in the scale of the U.S. aid program would not be realistic; use of such aid as leverage would be "presumptuous"; a useful role could be filled by bringing along the technical, research and administrative staffs of the Philippine rural affairs bureaucracies [125]. One could almost have been reading John Foster Dulles's cable to Ambassador Spruance of 21 May 1954 - except that there was, in May 1975, no mention of "marshalling political support for land reform", so that French, Silverstone and Montgomery were in fact espousing no more than that minimalist version of the Dullesian agenda addressed by James P. Emerson in 1956 and Frate Bull in 1958, in their end of tour "progress" reports on land reform in the Philippines.
17. There was, in the French/Silverstone/Montgomery Report, no serious attempt to reckon with the fact that two decades of the sort of aid being recommended once more had not availed to bring meaningful land reform about in the Philippines, or even to build strong technical, research and administrative agencies with a cohesive and positive approach to the land reform problem. The crippling failure of the Land Authority/Department of Agrarian Reform or other bodies to keep clear and incisive data on land tenure between 1954 and 1974 went unmentioned. The actual disposition of political forces was not examined, nor was any recommendation made in the report that it be examined. The history of Philippine land reform legislation was not seriously assessed. The record of Ferdinand Marcos as both politician and land reformer was passed over without comment. The corruption of his regime was not listed as a factor to be taken into account. The sole concession to historical perspective came in the form of a recommendation to look straight ahead without blinking, moving steadily along what these policy analysts appear to have considered a long, shallow curve of "progress", but which, I submit, was the wide curve of the old vicious circle:

"since the friar land reform in 1903, the United States has not consistently supported agrarian reform in the Philippines. There might be some value if we were to show a more steady, enlightened interest and support, avoiding either over-promoting or completely rejecting the Philippine Government's efforts. The latter, if premised on the notion that the program is failing, may help to ensure just that effect, something which most critics presumably do not want." [126]

This superficially very reasonable recommendation invites recollection of James Price Gittinger's 1961 essay on land reform in U.S. foreign policy, in which he had remarked that such policy in the Philippine case, after the departure of Robert Hardie, had been infused with "a marked note of caution" and that Frate Bull, in 1958, assessing the [complete lack of] "progress" under that policy of "caution" had nothing to recommend but "more of the same" [127], an "irresolution", he had warned, which would entail serious future costs. It cannot be said that anything had occurred between 1961 and 1975 to indicate that Bull, rather than Gittinger, had best understood the nature of the challenge in the Philippines. The poverty of the French/Silverstone/Montgomery Report consisted in its failure to so much as ponder things in this sort of perspective.

18. The problems in rendering effective support to land reform in such countries as the Philippines ought not be underestimated out of impatience with conservative policies which fail to bring such effective support to bear. The fundamental problem, however, is clearly the lack of "political will" among ruling elites in such countries to implement a land reform susceptible of being supported in the first instance and their resistance to critical studies of implementation processes where they do initiate a land reform. Where such will is lacking or is ambiguous, the external "support" agent must labor to keep his own will and relation to the problem as clear and well-informed as possible, or else forfeit all effective involvement in the matter. Well before 1975, A.I.D. and the U.S. government had forfeited their hand in the matter of land reform in the Philippines, but neither understanding nor admission of this were in evidence at that date. One can trace a line of at least analytic
integrity from Hardie/Spruance through Gittinger to Prosterman, but this line diverges more and more from A.I.D. institutional orientation and U.S. official policy between 1953 and 1975. Richard Hough a veteran of the land to the tiller program in Vietnam described AID in 1985 as "a highly technical, introverted, resource-transferring institution and heaven help you if you have to deal with anything political or controversial" [128]. Michael Korin, another such veteran, before he became AID's leading land reform man in Manila between October 1973 and October 1977, presented the obverse side, as it were, of AID's self-image, in declaring that this is not so. AID is, rather, an institution which "has to accept the realities of the world and the way business is done" in countries such as the Philippines.[129]

19. There is, in this light, a certain poignancy to Lewis Gleeck's 3 September 1975 memorandum to Keith Sherper, entitled Misinformation on Land Reform, in which the veteran A.I.D. hand who, only two months before, had written that A.I.D. was not mandated to seek to influence "decisions that are in essence political", now contested just such a viewpoint coming from others:

"I must challenge head-on a viewpoint popular in our own agency and among our Embassy colleagues, which passes for realism and sophistication: [that] we must consider the problem of political will out of bounds...If the GOP falters, that's their problem...We mustn't substitute our determination for theirs, the argument runs. And, above all, we mustn't get out in front. Horrors, what if the program failed? How would we look? That argument, I have taken the liberty of saying to the Ambassador, where it doesn't amount to knocking down a straw man, is poppycock. The United States Government, and we as Americans, will be far better off if the record shows [that] we were, where necessary, a little in front, urging or encouraging the GOP to take the steps necessary to give substance to its claims that it seeks to do more for those who have less. Can you imagine our opponents in Moscow [or] Peking...instructing their representatives not to exert such influence as they possess, let alone might acquire? Have we forgotten, or do we now in fact not believe, that we are the good guys?"[130].

Almost anybody looks like a "good guy" compared with a Stalin or a Pol Pot, but what was Gleeck really trying to say here? He was among "ugly" Americans, building "Freedom Road" in the Philippines and supporting a dictator (of Maharlika, if not of Sarkan) with abundant arms and money. What "we" did he have in mind as constituting the "good guys"? Henry Kissinger, then U.S. Secretary of State? Regardless of whether one considers Kissinger as one of the "good guys" - and Gleeck is a professed admirer of Kissinger - he had no interest in the Philippines - mentioning it not once in the 2,700 pages of his memoirs, which Gleeck described in 1985 as a masterpiece of diplomatic history and literature [131] - and even less in land reform for such a country. Philip Habib, then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs? Habib has a formidable reputation as a diplomat, but his record in South Vietnam would suggest that he was no land reform enthusiast and Michael Korin describes him as having been "cautiously supportive" of what was itself a cautious and attenuated land reform commitment by the United States in the Philippines in 1976-77 [132]. The U.S. Department of Agriculture, by the mid-1970's, was even more agribusiness-oriented than it had been twenty years earlier, when Secretary Ezra Benson had attacked Wolf Ladejinsky as a "socialist" because of his land reform work in Japan.
20. Perhaps the U.S. Congress were Gleeck's "good guys"? But no, Gleeck himself was not even sure that the Congress was, after the Vietnam War, a responsible body, as far as foreign policy was concerned. He regretted the 1974 termination of A.I.D.'s "public safety" police-training program, in the Philippines as elsewhere, ascribing this to "an ideological tantrum on the part of the United States Congress". [133] Gleeck begins to appear as a Diogenes, bearing his lantern in the morning, looking for a "good guy" in the market-place. As he wrote this anything but cynical reflection in September 1975, the Pol Pot catastrophe was smiting Cambodia, and American power, defeated in Indochina, was entering its greatest crisis since the Second World War. There was, perhaps, a need among Americans like Gleeck to believe themselves to be the "good guys". Yet the dilemmas and divisions that had led Americans with similar self-images to frustration and failure in Vietnam had not even begun to be resolved. There was no exit from the old vicious circle in the direction indicated by French, Silverstone and Montgomery. And Gleeck, writing to his colleagues about "we...the good guys" was, if not bearing his lantern in the morning, simply whistling in the dark.

21. Not only was land reform in the Philippines not a major concern of the U.S. government in the mid-1970's, but the A.I.D. mission in Manila itself appears to have had no clear sense, under Directors Garnett Zimmerly and Peter Cody, of what it was trying to accomplish, as far as land reform was concerned. Jewett M. Burr, having, in 1976, completed his doctoral dissertation on the land reform in South Vietnam, with its stinging description of corruption, inertia and flawed policy, was, by early 1977, working for AID Washington on the Philippines. Given the observations he had made on the "schizophrenic" policy of the U.S. and the Thieu regime in South Vietnam in the early 1970's, it is of considerable interest to find him cabling Korin, who had worked with him in Vietnam [134], at that late stage in U.S. involvement in land reform in the Philippines, and stating:

"I'm asking you to think in terms of a mission strategy...for what is needed is a mission consensus..." [135].

The disarray on land reform in the Philippines to which this cable spoke led A.I.D., in late 1977, to convene a major conference on the matter in the RAND Corporation's Washington D.C. offices, attended by Keith Sherper, Peter Cody and Roy Prosterman, among others, though Korin was not there, having been reassigned to Indonesia a couple of months before [136]. The report that issued from that conference, written by Gerald C. Hickey, a veteran of many years rural work in South Vietnam, especially among the much-abused peoples of the Central Highlands, and AID's John Wilkinson, was to precipitate termination of U.S. involvement in the New Society land reform program, at the peremptory insistence of President Marcos, under circumstances recalling those of December 1952 and early 1953, when the Hardie and McMillan/Rivera Reports had been released to the public and had roused the ire of Philippine conservatives. The episode takes us for a heady spin around the vicious circle and anyone concerned with land reform under the Aquino regime and a prospective U. S. role in it, would do well to reflect on it.
22. The Hickey Report, as I shall refer to it, though it is sometimes more vaguely referred to as the Rand Report, did not emerge direct from the December 1977 conference in Washington D.C. It did not get into circulation until early 1978 and never became a front-page newspaper story or public debating point, as the Hardie Report had done a generation before it. Peter Cody and Keith Sherper, in particular, as ranking members of the AID Manila mission, do not seem to have expected that it would be phrased the way that it was, or that it would be disseminated outside the AID/RAND circle. They were furious when they discovered that a copy had been presented to a Philippine official in Washington D.C. with a challenge to address its hard-hitting findings. Hickey, for his part, found the attitude of Sherper and Cody overbearing and came to see them as "cabalistic, supercilious super-bureaucrats" [137]. The Hickey Report once more reiterated the sort of perspective on the rural Philippines which Prosterman had spoken for in 1975 and which had been so forcefully articulated in the Hardie and McMillan/Rivera Reports of 1952. The counter-views expressed, for the most part in internal memoranda, by AID Mission director Cody take us right around the vicious circle that was entailed in the Dullesian agenda and had become the well-worn path of AID land reform policies in the Philippines since 1954.

23. Cody's views as A.I.D. Manila director at the time of the Rand Conference and the Hickey Report, were spelled out in a memorandum he wrote for interim Ambassador David Newsom in January 1978. In this memorandum, he freely described the New Society land reform program as having reached an "impasse" which, though he avoided making this inference, pointed directly to "political will" and the organization of peasants as the crucial variables in the equation. Cody posed questions without offering any answers:

"...under certain conditions, decentralization and participation could make land reform a component of a more meaningful social process among the bureaucracies. But what are these conditions? And how can the Philippines move toward the position where these conditions obtain? Possibly this issue has taken DAR to its present impasse. After all, what mandate does DAR have and require to change the power structure in the rural areas, so that the forces of reaction can be made to yield to the forces of change?"

[139] (emphasis added).

The lack of any answer in Cody's mind to these questions is indicative of the fact that the Dullesian agenda which had been the basis of U.S. policy on land reform in the Philippines since the time of the Davis Report was every bit as much at an impasse by 1978 as was DAR. Serious attempts to answer such questions would at once have threatened to derail that agenda and that policy. Cody clung to the rails and his summary of the history of and rationale for U.S. program support for land reform in the Philippines over the years, as he presented it to Newsom, followed the vicious circle round in its resolute avoidance of "subversive" thoughts:

"The extremely low level of A.I.D.'s support and its restriction to highly technical areas conforms closely to precedents set by past USG policy. On both sides this has been a reflection of practical realism, but never a sign of lack of political commitment. What the USG could not deliver over an extremely short
period under an authoritarianism, it has delivered in the Philippines over a protracted period in the areas of administrative machinery, land surveys and records and, to a much, much lesser extent, in the form of strengthening local organizations." [140]

The only portion of this summary that is tenable is the sentence that begins it.

24. The assertion that there had never been a "sign" of lack of political commitment to land reform on the part of either the U.S. government or that of the Philippines since 1946 or 1954, or whenever Cody was dating his long view from, is risible. The reference to "authoritarianism" is confused and contradictory. Cody's wording implies that "authoritarianism" is the way to get land reform done "over an extremely short period", but does not explain why the authoritarianism of Marcos had not got it done in more than five years; and the proposition stands in contradiction with his earlier call for "decentralization and participation" in land reform. Having admitted that land reform was at an impasse, he nevertheless wanted to claim that the U.S. had delivered "over a protracted period" (the duration of which he left undisclosed) what it would have delivered "over an extremely short period under an authoritarianism", namely administrative machinery, land surveys and records and the strengthening of local organizations. Whence, then, the administrative paralysis, hopeless confusion over land tenure data and the lameness of peasant organizations such as the FFF that were so evident by 1978 and had been so not later than 1974?

25. Writing up their report on the December 1977 conference, even as Cody drafted the above memorandum to Newsom, Hickey and Wilkinson were incomparably more forthright as to the results and prospects of the Marcos land reform program and the role of U.S. policy therein than Cody was. In their preface to the report, Hickey and Wilkinson stated that the RAND seminar's point of departure had been the question posed at an April 1975 SEADAG conference on land reform at Baguio: "To what extent can a balanced and moderate program succeed in a nation marked by severe social, political and economic inequalities?". Concern was expressed at the RAND conference, they reported, over the bogging down of the land reform program of the Philippine government during 1976-77 and the seminar had pondered the social, economic, environmental and political contexts of land redistribution, Philippine program options and U.S. policy options. In the body of the report, following in the footsteps of Hardie, McMillan and Prosterman, Hickey and Wilkinson did not mince their words and, fairly predictably, the reaction of Malacanang, DAR and AID Manila officials caught in the crossfire was to take exception to their "intemperate and insulting language."

26. In the light of decades of history and with clear recollection of the fate of the Hardie and McMillan/Rivera Reports of 1952, the Hickey Report makes fascinating and sobering reading. All the problems stringently addressed by the 1952 MSA reports were found by Hickey and Wilkinson to have worsened in magnitude and complexity in the intervening generation. In particular, they drew attention to the grave population pressure on the environment in an unreconstructed economy; tenure insecurity and poverty themselves exacerbating deforestation, soil
depletion and waste of human and natural resources, with "implications staggering even in the near future." [141]. Even more explicitly than Hardie or McMillan, Hickey and Wilkinson identified the fundamental problem as "lack of political power in the hands of the rural poor." [142]. They stressed the need for comprehensive and integrated agrarian reforms, embracing not only rice and corn tenurial practices, but environmental considerations, population dynamics, production and marketing infrastructure, rural-urban migration, social and corporate organizations, timber and water resources, fisher people's rights, the status and structure of export crop production (sugar, coconuts, pineapples, bananas) and landless laborers' employment and working conditions".[143] They also took an overdue stand on the matter of political mobilization, democratic organization and the anomalies of "authoritarianism" as a path to reforms. Emancipation, they stated, is supposed to reinforce the freedom of peasant organizations to defend peasant interests, but martial law had circumscribed this freedom. The Marcos regime's New Society Movement and Samahang Nayon, they wrote, were merely devices for government control and manipulation, which made barrio council elections farcical. Genuine peasant organizations that "do emerge because they focus on issues that galvanize the villagers, tend to be regarded by the government and the military as subverse and dangerous." [144]. They went on:

"If genuine grass-roots planning is fostered by the Philippine government and AID, then both the Philippine and U.S. governments will have to face the issue of how they should view such emerging organizations as they demonstrate increasing militancy. It is hoped that American apprehension about Communist infiltration in the Philippines will not lead to opposition to any legitimate local protest." [145].

The long record of American assistance to the Philippine elites in suppressing just such vigorous or militant protests, down to the Van Steenwyck analysis of the FFF militants as "subverse and dangerous" in 1975 could provide little reassurance that the "good guys" would take the course urged by Hickey and Wilkinson.

27. Hickey and Wilkinson questioned established U.S. foreign policy priorities and indicted the results of decades of balance of power fixations and "trickle-down development". The historian of these matters rubs his eyes from a sense of deja vu, so closely does the final paragraph of the Hickey Report resemble the buried and forgotten words of Robert Hardie a generation earlier, before the Vietnam War and before Ferdinand Marcos:

"In the hope that the Philippine government can be encouraged to continue the reforms it began, AID should offer support to the agrarian reform program, tied to tough performance standards. If aid on such terms is refused, as well it might be, then at least the record will show that we tried...The U.S. should indicate nicely but firmly that it knows the facts. The U.S. should also indicate that it would be willing, as it was not in 1972-73, to support a genuine land transfer program...It should be noted that rental control laws in the Philippines do not work now and never have worked. The Filipinos must stop deluding themselves about land reform - it has not happened. It is desperately needed and will be more so the longer they wait. The U.S. must firmly eschew joining them in such self-delusion. The New People's Army has twice the strength now that it had when martial law was declared in September 1972. Because of the U.S. economic and political support of the Marcos government, U.S. military bases could be subject to guerrilla attacks...This might require a "protective response", leading to a situation where the U.S. could become
steadily enmeshed in helping the Marcos government's struggle against the New People's Army. All of the ingredients for the making of a quagmire are clearly present. The risks must be discussed at the highest level and the option - the only one that would make any sense if the base agreements are to be renewed - of conditioning payments and/or of carrying out the land reform must be explored. It seems to make no sense at all to say that this is strictly "military aid" for military bases and that economic aid or socio-economic changes play no role." [146] (emphasis added).

28. AID Manila, however, experienced the Hickey Report as "a bomb with a delayed action fuse" which "blew the whole enterprise sky high", which is to say, it jolted the policy preference of the Cody-led mission off the rails. When the report was shown to President Marcos, he curtly suggested that AID withdraw from a program it had stigmatized as a failure. Dismayed by this turn of events, Sherper and Cody moved quickly to assure the Philippine government that, in the words of Lewis Gleeck:

"...the report had no official character and...the United States entertained no views on Philippine land reform which could be reasonably regarded as offensive." [147].

This was virtually the epitaph on an era of U.S. involvement in land reform in the Philippines and a quite appropriate one, given its history; for the Marcos regime was not mollified by Cody's abject repudiation of the Hickey Report and was, in any case, preparing to announce the "completion" of the New Society's land reform program. AID, of course, remained on in the Philippines, for land reform had not been an important part of its raison d'etre there. All involvement in land reform, however, was terminated in 1978 and not renewed while Marcos remained in power. The Hickey Report having been repudiated as having no official character, one cannot say that the exercise ended with a bang. It ended with a whimper and it left behind it rural problems and an insurgency, with a contingent but potent nexus, that neither the Philippine government nor the U.S. government had come to terms with in all the years that separated the Hardie Report from the Hickey Report.

29. As the Marcos regime entered its terminal crisis, in mid-February 1986, Roy Prosterman once more trumpeted his belief in the urgent need for a major land reform in the Philippines:

"Having made eight extended visits to the Philippines between 1972 and 1975 at the invitation of the Marcos government, as an unpaid independent adviser on land reform, I am aware of how fundamental the problem is and how little has been done to solve it...Ultimately, a freely elected government may succeed to power, but if such a regime fails to carry out land reform - and diligence is far from assured given the pre-1972 record - it could well collapse, Kerensky-like before the peasant revolutionaries. Only land and not ballots alone will assuage the rural grievances; true democracy in the Philippines requires both."[148]

A matter of two weeks later, Marcos toppled from power and the freely elected government of Corazon Aquino assumed office. The doubts that Prosterman had expressed as to its probable diligence in the area of land reform appear to have been warranted. The explanation is not far to seek. As one American observer expressed it, writing in 1986, the country's "very fundamental agrarian problems" were so deep and so
serious as to be more than ever caught in the strongest and most complex "political and economic cross-currents":

"No other issue so directly tests the nature of the February revolution, no time has appeared better for a serious commitment to agrarian reform. Or has the problem become too serious for this kind of government to make and mobilize a broad commitment? That is the opportunity and the irony. Which will it be?"[149]

Wasted opportunities and ironies had marked American policies in the Philippines for decades by 1986; and the probable stance of the United States as far as land reform and rural strife in the Philippines were concerned had, by the mid-1980's, been made rather clear, in a tragic quagmire on the far side of the Pacific - El Salvador.
"WHEREAS, published U.S. government policies openly support social, economic and political reform and change inside many Central and Latin American states; and

WHEREAS, such U.S. policies have contributed to the destabilization of certain governments in Latin America; now, therefore, be it resolved by the National Executive Committee of the American Legion in regular meeting assembled in Indianapolis, Indiana, on 15-16 October 1980 that...

...we urge the Congress to re-establish the Internal Security Committee of both the House of Representatives and the Senate in order to identify and expose Marxist activities and subversive advisers inside the United States which contribute to the destabilization of nations inside the Western Hemisphere..."

- American Legion Foreign Relations Committee, Resolution 39.

"JACK KEMP: ...we are subsidising the confiscation of property and the promotion of socialism...During a very critical time in the history of Vietnam...a program of land reform was thrust upon the Vietnamese economy...Those areas in which the biggest land reform programs were implemented fell quickest to the Viet Cong...I don't want to see those same policies encouraged or continued...

CLARENCE LONG: Let me say, I think Mr. Kemp's apprehensions are well founded. I think this land reform program is going to turn into a bottomless pit, along with many of the other features. In fact, I talked with the business people down there, the whole chamber of commerce gathered around the table, and they are all convinced that the Duarte Government are a bunch of socialists. And there are many socialist aspects to this thing. I think you are not going to get very much production out of those land reform projects...The whole idea of land reform where you confiscate, and in this I agree with Mr. Kemp, is wrong, wrong, wrong. It is wrong economically and it is wrong from the point of view of social and political stability. There has never been anything in history that is more calculated to make people reach for their guns than to take their land away from them without compensation..."


"Last week this administration informed me that I must leave the Foreign Service...I and every other informed observer of the El Salvador scene understand the real reason I was ousted as Ambassador in an abrupt and arbitrary way. If you have, as this administration had, a ready-made doctrine which asserts that the solution for El Salvador lies with the introduction of large quantities of armaments and military advisers, then your first priority becomes the removal of an Ambassador who may complicate the application of your doctrine by presenting you with reports and analyses that do not agree with your preconceived theory...As in China and Vietnam, the message to the career Foreign Service could not be more bell-like in its clarity. Do not send in reports that conflict with preconceived theories and tailor your recommendations to what Washington policy-makers want to hear. Above all, be bland...There is a well-known refrain at the State Department that goes: "There are old Foreign Service Officers and there are bold Foreign Service Officers, but there are no old, bold Foreign Service Officers..."

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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE CRUCIBLE: EL SALVADOR 1960-84


1. On 10 June 1982, the following passage appeared in an editorial in the Wall Street Journal under the heading "Democracy When It Suits":

"As everyone knows, El Salvador had a popular election in March. The turnout was unexpectedly large, with some Salvadorans trudging long distances and braving Communist bullets to exercise their franchise. But, in the opinion of some U.S. Congressmen, the Salvadorans didn't vote for the right people. They leaned very heavily toward law and order, free enterprise candidates, often described as 'right-wingers'. And these elected representatives have been tampering with socialist economic policies that were thrust on El Salvador by the Carter Administration. The centerpiece of that program was a so-called 'land reform'. If you believe Bob White, the Carter Ambassador who crammed this policy down the throats of the Salvadorans, land reform was the only thing that saved El Salvador from Communism...It desperately needs alteration if the Salvadorans are to repair the enormous damage it has inflicted on their agricultural economy. American Democrats, however, are trying to block U.S. economic aid to El Salvador if its elected representatives so much as lay a finger on Bob White's land reform...

Politicians who would never have dared advocate seizure of farms, banks and trading companies here in the U.S., think such takeovers are just great for Salvadorans. The assumption seems to be that Salvadorans are a benighted race of people, who must experience socialism, before they can evolve to something better...

In truth, Salvadoran agriculture was not so much different from U.S. agriculture, before it was set upon by the U.S. State Department...Indeed, before coming under attack by Castro, Salvador was experiencing a development pattern not much different from the U.S. of an earlier era. It was industrializing rapidly, providing jobs for rural people and developing a middle class. Its businessmen act and talk much like their counterparts in the United States." [1].

How many readers of the Wall Street Journal were in a position to interrogate this fascinating construction of "reality"? Were, indeed, readers of the Wall Street Journal likely to be the sort of people disposed to dissent from such a construction of reality? To seek or assimilate information that might lead them to deconstruct such texts as the above and think in terms of a reconstruction of reality? The Wall Street Journal's editorial writer was nothing if not provocative. The astonishing declaration that El Salvador's pattern of development was "not much different from the U.S. of an earlier era" would leap off the page to the eye of a critical and well-informed reader; but who, among readers of the Wall Street Journal, was critical of the U.S. pattern of development, or well-informed about El Salvador? The very Bob White denounced by the Wall Street Journal in this passage, described El Salvador in 1980 as "one big Tobacco Road". How would that be understood by readers of the Wall Street Journal? What did it mean to Senator Jesse Helms, the arch-conservative from North Carolina, chairman of the powerful Senate Committee on Agriculture and one of White's bitterest critics in 1980?

2. To a quite astonishing extent, such a passage binds together all the themes of this inquiry. The language here resonates in American agrarian politics back through the New Deal debates all the way to the Radical Reconstruction years. The experiences of Robert Hardie, Wolf
Ladejinsky, and Laurence Hewes between 1953 and 1967 had been of collision with just such opposition as this. Lack of support for land reform abroad had been a disaster for America, Roy Prosterman told the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee in 1970. Land reform is a program everyone can agree on, his friend Senator Magnusson had told the same Committee. Everyone did not agree on it, however: not in 1953, not in 1966, not in 1970 and not in 1982. There can be few more instructive studies in this fact and what it means than the history of United States involvement in El Salvador for many years prior to the printing of the Wall Street Journal editorial just quoted.

Like the Philippines and Vietnam, El Salvador - so named by its Spanish conquerors - had a long history of human settlement before the Europeans arrived to force it to their uses. Lying along the chief routes of human migration and trade through the Central American isthmus, El Salvador supported a population of around half a million people, who had cultivated maize, squash, avocado, various kinds of bean, papaya, tomato, cotton, tobacco, indigo, cacao, prickly pear, maguey, henequen, jocote, elderberry, sapote, copal, gourd and calabash hundreds of years before the Spanish invasion.[2] Though the archaeology of the country has been neglected [3], it is clear that a number of small towns had been well-established long before the catastrophe of the Spanish invasion; towns such as Cihuatan, in the middle Lempa valley [see Map 1], with its temples and ball courts, which seems to have housed some ten thousand people [4]. This settled agrarian culture was botanically sophisticated [5] and ecologically durable; it understood itself in terms of a benign religion centered on the sacred maize and cocoa plants; it sustained itself on a communal basis, with no concept of private property in land. As the geographer, Browning, observed: "private and individual ownership of land was as meaningless as private ownership of the sky, the weather or the sea." [6]. Then Pedro de Alvarado and his plundering conquistadors marched down the Rio Lempa valley in Anno Domini 1524 and the land's long neolithic peace under the gods of rain, corn and cocoa came to a violent and calamitous end.[7]

4. El Salvador's "pattern of development" began with genocidal conquest, imposition of slavery and forced labor with prodigal expenditure of human life, expropriation of communal lands without compensation, displacement of human settlement by cattle-grazing, cultural disintegration among the native people, famine and epidemics of European diseases that, in combination, annihilated over ninety per cent of the native population in the space of some sixty years [8]. Whole regions of the country, previously settled, became waste lands. The coastal lowlands of La Paz and Usulutan became a pestilential wilderness for four hundred years. Spanish bandits, as Tom Paine would have called them, batten on what remained of the native population, extracted profits from the export of cattle and such native products as cocoa, balsam and indigo. When the collapse of the population caused the breakdown of cocoa and balsam production, the conquerors concentrated on cattle and indigo - as the latter replaced woad as an industrial dye in Europe in the late sixteenth century [9]. For several centuries, indigo became the staple export of El Salvador, now a tiny outpost of the burgeoning European world-economy. It was known as
"Guatemalan indigo", because the whole of Central America, during the Spanish imperial era, was administered as the Captain-Generalship of Guatemala, but El Salvador dominated indigo production to such an extent that, of the 9,721,800 pounds of indigo exported from Central America between 1783 and 1792, some 8,843,334 pounds came from El Salvador. A few hundred large haciendas became established, and the land-owning oligarchy continually thwarted periodic efforts of the Spanish authorities in distant Madrid to discourage indigo monoculture and destructive labor practices [10].

5. El Salvador's "pattern of development" was such that educated Spanish observers in the last decades of the imperial era, Pedro Cortez y Larraz in 1770 and Antonio Gutierrez y Ulloa in 1807, described its rural scene as one of destitution, squalor, demoralization, oppression and exploitation. Cortes y Larraz judged the residual peasant "Indian" society to be "beyond redemption" and urged its rapid and radical "Hispanicization". Both Cortes y Larraz and Gutierrez y Ulloa drew attention to the chaotic state of rural property registration and land law, with its confused jumble of communal and private tenures, untitled land use and unreconciled claims. This situation, however, lent itself to land-grabbing by the planter class, especially after they had achieved independence from Spain in 1821 and thus gained complete control of political and judicial power in the erstwhile colony. Already, in the 1830's and 1840's, the Salvadoran land-owning oligarchy was led by families who were to remain wealthy and powerful even into the 1970's - Alfaro, Regalado, Palomo, Duenas, Orellana, Escalon, Prado, Menendez. "Freed from colonial restraints" Browning remarks, these oligarchs "viewed the nation's land and people as resources to be used for their own benefit in any form of speculation they chose to embark upon."[11] In the last decades of the nineteenth century one form of speculation was chosen in particular, as indigo declined in value on the world market: the cultivation and export of coffee. That required use of the remaining communal lands in the fertile central highlands and use of the peasant population in labor. The pattern of development stamped on El Salvador at that time in the name of Ricardian economic liberalism and technological progress entailed entrenchment of the grossest social and economic inequities. One might ask, which aspects of all this constitute "a development pattern not much different from the U.S. of an earlier era"? There do appear to be some similarities with the slave-states of the Old South before and after the Civil War. Was this, perhaps, what the editorial writer for the Wall Street Journal meant? Or was the reference made to no more than the most recent years of Salvadoran history, with the earlier eras buried in decent oblivion? That may be so, since it was only over the last one hundred years that El Salvador entered onto the path of what might with some reason be called an American rather than a Spanish pattern of "development".

6. It was under President Rafael Zaldivar (1877-85) that El Salvador's landowning oligarchy, fully in control of the government, promulgated laws abolishing communal tenure of land, establishing repressive anti-vagrancy and labor codes and organizing rural militia and police to deal with well-justified "Indian" peasant recalcitrance. In the years that followed, more and more of the country's best land was planted
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to coffee and the peasant population compelled to serve the demands of coffee production. Coffee soared past indigo as an export and source of oligarchic profits [see Tables 40 and 42]. The old oligarchic families were increased by the arrival of a cluster of entrepreneurial novi homines coming from Europe and North America to make their fortunes in the coffee boom: Hill, Alvarez, D'Aglio, De Sola, Goldtree-Liebes, Deininger, Sol Millet, D'Aubuisson. These were the gilded years of Western economic imperialism on a world scale: years of the U.S.A.'s "winning of the West", of Mexico's Porfiriato, the European scramble for Africa, the commercial partition and humiliation of China by the European powers and Japan - climaxing with the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution and the Chinese Revolution in 1911, the coming of the First World War in 1914 and the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917. El Salvador was small beer in all these vast upheavals, but its time would come.

7. Under President Manuel Araujo (1911-13), before he was assassinated, the Salvadoran Army and National Guard were buttressed as internal security forces under special instruction by officers of the Spanish Civil Guard. In 1917, Dr. Alfonso Quinonez Molina set up the so-called Liga Roja (Red League), ostensibly a radical labor union but in fact an elite-manipulated armed militia and political machine, used to secure the election as President of Jorge Melendez in 1919 and of Quinonez Molina himself in 1923, after which it was suppressed, lest the agricultural workers begin to take "their" organization seriously [12]. Genuine labor unions began to form in the early 1920's and, in 1925, even as Thanh Nien was being formed in Canton by Ho Chi Minh, there were formed the first cells of a Salvadoran Communist Party. In 1926, the Confederacion Obrera Centroamericana was formed and, in 1927, the Anti-Imperialist League, based in Guatemala. In 1929, the Confederacion Obrera Centroamericana was renamed the Confederacion Sindical Latino-Americana and its organizing work in El Salvador was so effective that, on May Day in 1930, it was able to lead 80,000 rural laborers in a demonstration in the streets of San Salvador demanding labor reforms. Hard on the heels of this organizing came the Great Wall Street Crash of 1929 with its great depressive ripple effect around the New York/London-centered world-economy. In the United States itself, the onset of the Great Depression was met by Franklin D. Roosevelt's call for bold experimentation, sweeping reforms and social renovation. In Central America, it was met by the abolition of liberal constitutional forms and the rise of authoritarian police-states defensive of elite privileges [13]. The change in El Salvador was especially traumatic, involving large-scale bloodshed, and set the stage for decades of repressive politics, culminating in the civil war that erupted in 1980.

8. The perspective of U.S. officials concerned with El Salvador, as the social tension increased there between 1911 and 1931, may be gauged by juxtaposing the outlook of Dana Munro, chief of the U.S. State Department's Central America desk in 1918, with a famous despatch from U.S. military attache in San Salvador, Major Arthur Harris, on 22 December 1931. According to Munro in 1918:
"The perspective for the future of El Salvador seems brilliant. The political and social conditions are decisively improving and the prosperity of the republic, with its fertile soil and hardworking population, seems secure. The progressive spirit of the governing classes and their rapid absorption of foreign ideas, provide cause to believe that the control of the country by foreign interests, which are becoming more and more noticeable in these regions, can be avoided here. The introduction of foreign capital is, naturally, very necessary for the development of the country, as is the immigration of foreigners of a better class. But it is to be hoped that this can be effected without causing the impoverishment and collapse of the families of the national leaders. If the best people of the republic can continue in the future playing the role which they play at the moment in politics and agriculture, then the small country promises to remain as one of the most prosperous and civilized states of tropical America." [14] (emphasis added)

Thirteen years later, after the "best people of the republic" had indeed continued playing their long established role in politics and agriculture and had so expanded coffee production as to cause supply and price problems in the basic grains sector, while repressing, to the best of their ability, demands for social reforms, Major Arthur Harris reported to his superiors in Washington, in a much-quoted cable:

"I imagine that the situation in El Salvador today is similar to France before the revolution, Russia before her revolution and Mexico before hers. The situation is ripe for communism and the communists seem to have taken notice of that fact...It is possible to retard a communist or socialist revolution in this country for a number of years, let's say ten or twenty, but when it happens it is going to be bloody." [15].

The bloody upheaval anticipated by Major Harris, or at least a foretaste of it, occurred just one month later, in January 1932, but the peasant rebels and their communist leaders were crushed and many thousands of them massacred. Ten years of dictatorial repression followed, then another ten and then again ten more, punctuated by brief accessions to office of reformist groups, in 1944, 1948 and 1960. Yet, mirabile dictu, in 1967, David R. Raynolds, who had been an officer in the Economic Section of the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador under Ambassador Thorsten Kalijarvi in the early 1960's, published a book in which he, like Dana Munro half a century earlier, predicted a brilliant future for El Salvador [16]. Thirteen years later, in 1980, civil war erupted and thousands were again massacred, while some two billion dollars was siphoned out of the country by the elites, in a welter of terror and economic disorder. What was it in the outlook of the editor of the Wall Street Journal that he could not see this, or would not depict this, as other than an attack on a U.S.-style, prosperous El Salvador by Fidel Castro's subversivos and "socialists" in the U.S. State Department?

9. In 1931, a well-intentioned but politically impotent reformist, Arturo Araujo, was elected President of El Salvador. His reform proposals met with blunt rejection from the planters, bankers and internal security officers and his subsequent vacillations exasperated the labor unions and political radicals, led by a flamboyant Trotskyist intellectual named Agustín Farabundo Martí [17]. The U.S. military attache was anything but sympathetic to the beleaguered President Araujo. On 20 January 1931, a military intelligence report to Washington declared:

"Araujo is nothing but a labor agitator and admitted anarchist...It is certain that the State Department would have constant and serious difficulties with a man of the type of Araujo." [18].
The Communist Party began to prepare an uprising. Various intrigues were afoot among the conservatives and in early December 1931 young Army officers overthrew President Araujo and installed General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez as military dictator. The sequence of events over the following few months invites careful comparison with what was to occur in El Salvador in October 1979 and the months that followed. In both instances, young Army officers open to constructive change and concerned about national security yielded power to more conservative officers who, behind a shield of democratic rhetoric, prepared a brutal and bloody assault on the political left and labor organizations.

10. In both instances, the military coup d'etat was not immediately construed by many elements of the left as counterrevolutionary in intent. Indeed, on 12 December 1931, the left wing journal *Estrella Roja* (Red Star) editorialized:

"First of all, let us congratulate you on your golpe de estado. In reality, the blunders of Araujo imposed on the military the obligation of overthrowing him and as these blunders brought us to the point where the country was converted into the prey of his followers, then we agree that your act was heroic and necessary, but, and you must forgive the scepticism, [we] do not believe that you can solve the Salvadoran crisis which is indescribably more transcendant than your government can handle, the national crisis having roots more profound than the simple incapacity of Don Arturo; it is the inevitable result of the fact that there exists among us a capitalist class which, master of the earth and all means of production, has dedicated itself to a monoculture - coffee...One should not refuse indemnity to a capitalist class which, resigned to the inevitable, makes its own Night of August 4 and abolishes its own privileges. On the other hand, the revolution has little inclination to generosity if it encounters resistance..."[19]

Resistance was, in 1931 as in 1979, something of an understatement as to what the left was about to encounter and the right had no inclination to generosity, let alone a desire to abolish its own privileges in emulation of the French nobles in 1789. Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez and his internal security chiefs, notable among them Colonel Osmin Aguirre y Salinas, commander of the National Police, encouraged the left to come out into the open, while preparing to fall upon them in ambush [20]. Sympathetic Army officers warned the leftist leaders that their destruction was being planned, but this only sowed confusion within their own plans for insurrection. [21]. A number of them were seized and imprisoned, including Agustin Farabundo Marti, whereupon the insurrection erupted in disorder and fell into the trap laid for it. It was crushed within a few days, after which mobile execution squads of the National Guard, about 1,000 strong, and the National Police terrorized the rebellious coffee departments of the country, slaughtering at least 7,000 and perhaps as many as 40,000 peasants - pour discourager les autres, as it were [22]. The unreliable Army was violently purged at the same time [23], an unknown number of "Communists" in its ranks executed and, according to U.S. legation estimates, half of its rank and file expelled [24]. Agustin Farabundo Marti and several of his comrades were executed and others driven into exile, where one of them at least was tortured to death in the dungeons of Guatemalan dictator Jorge Ubico. This terrible matanza [slaughter] scarred Salvadoran political consciousness for decades afterwards and marked the beginning of decades of military domination of Salvadoran political institutions, in alliance with the landholding oligarchy.
Writing in 1981, U.S. "neo-conservative" ideologue Jeane Kirkpatrick characterized the regime of Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez as "Hobbesian" - an authoritarian "leviathan" state that checked social disorder and brought "civil peace" to El Salvador. [25] Such a judgement underpinned her defence of the Reagan Administration's support in the 1980's for what Kirkpatrick described as "moderately repressive" regimes, including that of the internal security chiefs in El Salvador. The nature of this leviathan state ought not, therefore, be glossed over. Following the wholesale slaughter of peasants, radical organizers and disaffected Army officers in the matanza, the young officers who had led the 2 December 1931 coup were themselves purged and replaced by more conservative elements. [26]. Even Colonel Osmin Aguirre y Salinas was removed from command of the National Police, lest he threaten General Hernandez Martinez's primacy. During the months following the matanza U.S. legation reports informed Washington that nothing was being done to address the underlying causes of the peasant insurrection [27]. The Regulation Law of 26 July 1932 introduced the system of identity cards (cedulas de vecindad) whose sinister uses, as late as 1984, have been dramatized in Oliver Stone's recent film Salvador; and further reinforced the decades old anti-vagrancy measures and rural police system. In August 1934, Hernandez Martinez created the quasi-fascist Partido Pro Patria (Fatherland Party) and in March 1935 conducted one man, one party elections, which won him official U.S. approval [28]. So established, he ruled until May 1944, but his leviathan proved unviable in the face of divisions within the internal security forces and resurgent labor unrest. It gave way, in 1944, to the first of a series of internal security regimes which sought legitimacy through a rhetoric of democratic reform and "national conciliation", but failed to produce either of these things and lapsed again and again into conservative repression. The result was a history of oligarchic-dominated "development" and inertial authoritarian politics punctuated by political crises in 1944, 1948, 1952, 1960, 1972, 1977 and 1979.

When Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez was overthrown in May 1944, he was replaced as President by General Andres Ignacio Menendez. None other than Colonél Osmin Aguirre y Salinas was appointed internal security chief and, following a five month period in which labor unions and democratic organizations were drawn out into the open, on 21 October 1944, Aguirre y Salinas, "with the apparent foreknowledge and consent" of Menendez [29], led a coup d'état and launched a violent repression of the labor and democratic bodies. He then installed General Salvador Castaneda Castro, candidate of the coffee barons, as President, in March 1945, and unified command of the internal security forces in the Ministry of Defence [30]. President Castaneda Castro was overthrown in the "revolution" of 14 December 1948 and replaced by a Revolutionary Council of Government, consisting of three officers and two progressive civilians. One of the officers, Colonel Oscar Osorio, proceeded to organize a political machine, the Partido Revolucionario de Unificacion Democratica (PRUD) and under its banner defeated Colonel Jose Asencio Menendez in an electoral contest and assumed the office of President in 1950; ruling until 1956. His reformist rhetoric of revolutionary democratic unification quickly lapsed into a conservative politics of divisive repression, under pressure from the coffee oligarchs, with attacks on "subversives" in the
National University and trade unions and declaration of states of siege in March 1951 and September 1952, culminating in promulgation of the harsh Law for the Defense of Democratic and Constitutional Order on 27 November 1952. His Defense Minister, Colonel Jose Maria Lemus, succeeded him as PRUD leader and President in 1956 and, though once more beginning with a rhetoric of democratic reform, soon earned the reputation of being a "harsh and dictatorial man". [31]. A U.S. recession that sharply reduced Salvadoran coffee export earnings in 1958-59, brought down PRUD and President Lemus on 26 October 1960 [32] and for three months a reformist civilian-military junta constituted the government of El Salvador. It was viewed with hostility by both the Salvadoran oligarchs and the U.S. government, however, with the latter condemning it as "Castro-Communist". On 25 January 1961 it was overthrown by Colonels Jose Adalberto Rivera and Anibal Portillo. Thereafter, PRUD was replaced by, or reconstituted as, the Partido de Conciliacion Nacional (PCN), the political face the internal security regime was to present, despite crises in 1972 and 1977, until it was overthrown by coup d'état on 15 October 1979.

13. If there has been a period in El Salvador's history when its development pattern became more and more "American", it was the PRUD/PCN era, especially the latter, from 1961 to 1979. These were the years of the most rapid and profitable expansion of agroexports throughout Central America with the assistance and active involvement of American financial and business interests and with aggressive and intimate internal "security" assistance from the United States government to maintain the regional leviathans as guardians of this economic growth. Cotton and beef were added to such regional crops as coffee, sugar and bananas between 1950 and 1979, with social and ecological consequences of a severe nature for masses of Central American peasants. As William Durham argued, in a brilliant little book published in 1979, just before the civil war erupted in El Salvador, the social problems of the country grew steadily worse in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's, because of the gross inequities in the distribution of the country's productive resources and wealth. [33]

14. It was patent throughout both the PRUD and PCN years that social and economic reforms were badly needed in El Salvador. The dominant agricultural export oligarchs, however, would tolerate no such thing. A recent study by Robert Williams has amplified Durham's findings [34]. In these years, food production, squeezed out by coffee, cotton, beef and sugar production on a few hundred large plantations and farms [see Tables 43, 44 & 45], fell behind population growth and when, in 1969, the Honduran oligarchs expelled some 300,000 Salvadorans from their country, in their own efforts to repress labor and tenant organization and to expand large-scale export production, the last "safety valve" for Salvadoran social pressures was shut off [35]. The decade of the 1970's saw a relentless build up of political frustration and violence [36], until, in 1979, the pattern of 1932, 1944 and 1960 was repeated: double coup d'état followed by military repression of the parties of major change. This time, however, the will to major change was not crushed as it had been in the past. In 1980 civil war
the United States entered into an armed struggle once more against radical revolution. To comprehend the nature of American involvement in El Salvador in the 1980's, however, it is necessary to go back to the end of the PRUD regime in 1960 and the beginning of the PCN regime in 1961. For the United States did not stumble into El Salvador in 1979-80. It had been implicated in the coming of the crisis for two full decades before that.
7:2. Public Safety and the Colonels.

1. Herbert O. Hardin was chief of the Latin America branch of the Public Safety Division of the ICA in the late 1950’s. The troubles of the President Jose Maria Lemus and the PRUD regime in El Salvador, in the northern summer of 1960, followed hard on the heels of the overthrow in Cuba of Fulgencio Batista by Fidel Castro, which had led to uncompromising land reforms and other radical measures during 1959. In March 1960, President Eisenhower instructed the CIA to prepare a clandestine invasion of Cuba to remove Castro [37]. Just six years earlier, the CIA had organized a similar operation and overthrown the reformist government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, afterwards overseeing the reversal of the land reforms and other reform measures that the Arbenz government had implemented over the opposition of the American-based United Fruit Company [38]. In August 1960, in this political context, Hardin, accompanied by David Laughlin, ICA’s chief Public Safety Adviser for Central America and the Caribbean, based in Tegucigalpa, travelled to San Salvador in response to a request from U.S. Ambassador Thorsten V. Kalijarvi for increased U.S. assistance to El Salvador’s internal security forces [39]. Following a rapid review of El Salvador’s internal "security" situation, Hardin and Laughlin, in a classified memorandum that will be referred to herein as the Hardin Report, praised the performance of the Salvadoran National Guard under PRUD and observed that El Salvador’s internal security forces in general "have excellent potential for development into very efficient organizations" [40]. Their recommendations to the end that this "development" occur became the basis for a quite elaborate program in the decade that followed, which was designed to preclude a "Cuban" outcome in El Salvador.

2. The Hardin Report called for a U.S. Public Safety advisory team of five members - Chief Officer, Immigration, Training, Records and Investigations advisors - to help develop the Salvadoran armed forces and political police into "very efficient organizations". It further specifically urged the integration of the country’s internal security forces under the control of a central intelligence and operational plans board:

"It is our belief that GOES (the Government of El Salvador) can effect the best coordination of its internal security forces through the overall guidance of an internal security board composed of members of ministerial level from the following ministries: Defense, Hacienda (Treasury), Interior, Justice. A representative of the President should also sit on the board. The board should, subject to Presidential approval, formulate national internal security policy and review and recommend to the President on internal security, coordinating operational plans..." [41].

Neither this nor other internal security plans could be implemented before Lemus and PRUD fell to a reformist coup d’etat in October 1960, but the plans were afoot and once Colonel Julio Adalberto Rivera had ousted the "Castro-Communist" interlopers in January 1961, with overt assistance from the United States government, an elaborate internal security rectification was undertaken on a secretive basis with the direct guidance of the ICA/AID, the CIA and the US Special Forces.
3. The intelligence coordination and operations board, whose creation had been urged by the Hardin Report was created in 1961 under the designation Servicio de Seguridad (SS), the Security Service. [42] To head it, President Julio Rivera selected a shadowy and sinister figure named Colonel Jose Alberto "Chele" Medrano, who had been semi-retired since 1954, when he had been implicated in a scandal involving the extra-judicial liquidation of hundreds of common criminals [43]. To assist Chele Medrano in creating the SS, the CIA assigned a certain Daniel Smith to the five man AID Public Safety team, as Investigations Adviser [44]. Adjunct to the SS was a rural militia controlled also by Colonel Medrano and known as ORDEN, which was also created in 1961 [45]. To assist Medrano in creating ORDEN, the US Special Forces assigned Colonel Arthur "Bull" Simons and a team of ten Green Berets [46]. The SS and its various intelligence sub-agencies within the Army, the National Guard, the National Police, the Treasury Police and the Immigration Police [47], were set up with the direct advice of the five man Public Safety team recommended by the Hardin Report. This team was headed, between 1961 and 1964 and again between 1967 and 1970, by one Roland R. Kelley [see Table 9], who, in 1965-66 worked on similar programs in South Vietnam [see Table 12 Appendix 5]. The SS was renamed the AIES (Agencia de Inteligencia de El Salvador) in 1964, the SNI (Servicio Nacional de Inteligencia) in 1967 and ANSESAL (Agencia Nacional de Seguridad de El Salvador) in 1972, the acronym by which it was "known" until at least October 1979.

4. Ancillary to ANSESAL was ANTEL (Administracion Nacional de Telecommunicaciones), created between 1964 and 1967, which, within its conventional headquarters behind the National Palace in San Salvador housed sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment and linked ANSESAL to U.S. facilities in Panama and police intelligence facilities in Guatemala City, Tegucigalpa and (until July 1979) Managua. Under President Fidel Sanchez Hernandez (1967 - 1972), ANTEL was directed by his brother, Colonel Vicente Sanchez Hernandez [48]. The group of colonels who exercised effective power in El Salvador after the October 1979 coup d'etat - Jaime Abdul Gutierrez, Jose Guillermo Garcia, Nicolas Carranza, Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova - had all been leading executives of ANTEL between 1975 and 1979 [49]. And while ORDEN and ANSESAL were officially abolished in November 1979, the apparatus was not dismantled, but merely camouflaged and kept in operation by Chele Medrano and one of his proteges: Major Roberto D'Aubuisson. Even these rudimentary facts are absent from most accounts of U.S. policy in El Salvador and certainly from all official accounts of it, but they constitute only the tip of an iceberg.

5. The creation of a more coordinated and efficient internal surveillance and security apparatus in El Salvador was accompanied by the creation of a US-based and just as secretive program for the monitoring and manipulation of Salvadoran rural problems and peasant organization. At almost the same time that Roland Kelley, Daniel Smith and Bull Simons were commencing their work on the SS and ORDEN, an organization called the
American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD - pronounced A-FIELD) was set up through AID and the AFL-CIO (the conservative US labor union movement headed by George Meany) with funds from a number of large corporations. Though it has been denied with vehemence by AIFLD, there seems reason to believe that there has been considerable involvement in its operations by the CIA. [50] One of its first contracts from AID was the creation of a peasant leadership training seminar, where Salvadoran peasants, among others could be instructed in "free labor development" [51]. This was in 1962, though the program did not become operational until 1965-66. In the interval, AID contracted Robert Nathan and Associates to hire a four man economic advisory team to assist the government of El Salvador in economic development planning. One of the men hired in this team, to advise on the Salvadoran rural sector, was none other than Robert S. Hardie, who had not worked for the US government since his controversial work in the Philippines in 1951-53. He worked in El Salvador from 1962 to 1964 [52]. Robert Nathan, it will be recalled, was to be among those agricultural experts summoned by AID in 1966 to challenge the findings of Laurence Hewes and John Cooper and their recommendations for land reform in South Vietnam.

6. In 1965 a certain Michael Hammer, twenty six years of age, polylingual, with four years in the U.S. Air Force and schooling in Switzerland behind him, graduated from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and went to work for AIFLD at Georgetown University running its peasant leadership training seminar [53]. His first seminar was conducted in November 1965, involving eighteen people. Two and a half years later, in June 1968, in San Salvador, he presided over the creation of an AIFLD-sponsored Salvadoran peasant organization, called the Union Comunal Salvadorena (UCS). From then, until he was shot dead in the coffee lounge of the San Salvador Sheraton Hotel on the night of 3 January 1981, Michael Hammer remained UCS's "control" in Washington. UCS and its links with AIFLD and with ORDEN and AIFLD's links with AID and with the CIA and the CIA's links with the SS are all alike submerged in the waters of the uninvestigable, classified, undocumented, deniable and "unthinkable". That such links existed, however, and that they existed long before the civil war in El Salvador broke upon world attention in 1980 and that they are deeply implicated in the coming and the course of that civil war, cannot plausibly be denied. That ANSESAL, ORDEN, the ANTEL colonels and U.S.-trained officers perpetrated the terror of the early 1980's cannot plausibly be denied. The precise U.S. role in that terror is obscure. However, any discussion of U.S. professions of innocence, helplessness, dismay or democratic ideals must begin with the realization that the agents and instruments of terror were deliberately and systematically created on the basis of the recommendations of Herbert Hardin, David Laughlin and Thorsten Kalijarvi in the 1960's, by operatives of AID, the CIA, and the US Special Forces.

7. In classified cables dated 8 May and 19 May 1961, Ambassador Kalijarvi described the erstwhile (October 1960/January 1961) reformist junta in El Salvador as "Castro-Communist" and a triumph of infiltration by "subversive forces" into the highest levels of government. His analysis of threats to the internal security of El Salvador, dated 8
May 1961, reads to an astonishing degree like the El Salvador White Paper produced by the Reagan Administration in February 1981 and powerfully adumbrates the thinking which led the U.S. government to help create the SS, ORDEN, ANTEL and the UCS in the 1960's:

"...in the face of the continuing threat to the stability of the area posed by a Sino-Soviet controlled Cuba, El Salvador's current capability to ensure its internal security requires strengthening on an urgent basis...Underground propaganda and other types of subversive anti-government activities continue to be carried out and reports of clandestine movements of personnel and arms across El Salvador's frontiers and coastline continue to be received...Threat stems from existence of some 500 hard-core Communists, with 5-6,000 active Castro-Communist sympathizers...and leaders provided by elements former junta government...These forces have potential for terrorism and sabotage, demonstrations, strikes and mob violence, which, if protracted, might turn into general strike and internal revolution..." [54].

When Kalijarvi left El Salvador, he advised in-coming ambassador, Murat Williams, to stick close to the elite who ran the country [55] and he left in place the beginnings of the internal security rectification programs already mentioned. How much was known beyond a very narrow circle about these programs, however, may be gauged from the fact that, in a highly classified 1967 report on internal security programs in Central America, C. Allan Stewart, former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, indicated that Daniel Smith, not Roland Kelley, was the CIA's immediate agent in the program and, as such:

"worked independently of the Public Safety program personnel stationed in El Salvador, [was] responsible to another agency...and worked from the CAS [Controlled American Source/Covert Action Staff of the CIA] office in San Salvador...[and did] not keep the Chief Public Safety Adviser aware of his activities..." [56].

This lack of detailed reporting to Roland Kelley by Daniel Smith may be presumed to have operated on a 'need to know' basis and as a means to 'plausible deniability'. Nevertheless, C. Allan Stewart informed his superiors in 1967, that:

"CAS is lending aid to an intelligence unit of 15 persons headed by Colonel Medrano directly responsible to the Presidential Palace" [57].

That unit, SS/AIES/SNI/ANSESAL, with Chele Medrano in the shadows behind it, was the brain behind the Salvadoran death squads in the 1970's and 1980's - until Medrano himself was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in March 1985. Around it were strung the National Guard, ANTEL, ORDEN, the AIFLD-sponsored UCS, AID and corporate investment in rapid Central American agro-export growth, Army rule in El Salvador and the power of the big oligarchic families, in a complex all but impossible to disentangle in search of the immediate agents of death squad violence.

8. It is only very recently that the documentary evidence for the existence of these covert operations in the 1960's has come to light. One has only to note the vagueness and confusion within even the best scholarship on El Salvador on the matter of the origins of ORDEN, up until at least 1984, to appreciate how little was known or guessed of the US role in the
founding of this organization for surveillance and repression. William LeoGrande and Carla Anne Robbins, writing in 1980, gave 1967 as ORDEN's founding date [58]; and Carolyn Forche and Philip Wheaton, also in 1980, stated that it "was created in 1967" [59]. Cynthia Arnson, in 1981, thought that ORDEN was "founded in 1968 by Medrano" [60]. In 1982, Thomas Anderson dated it to 1967 [61], while James Dunkerley speculated: 1964? 1965? 1968? [62]. In 1983, Robert Armstrong and Philip Wheaton drew close, writing for NACLA that "the precise origins of ORDEN are lost in the murky history of intrigue. It was begun some time in the 1960's - 1961, according to its founder Jose Alberto Medrano; 1968 according to other versions." [63]. Joan Didion, writing also in 1983, considered it to have been founded in 1968, though she qualified this by stating that it was "formally" founded in that year. [64] Even the judicious David Browning, writing as late as 1985, seems to have been guessing when he stated that ORDEN was created in 1969, in the wake of the war with Honduras and the rising clamour for land reform. [64] Craig Pyes, in late 1983, identified Medrano as, by the admission of US officials, a CIA "liaison" and head of the White Hand death squads in the 1960's, but described ORDEN as "formed in the mid-1960's" and was vague about the U.S. role in building ORDEN and ANSESAL, to say nothing of ANTEL and UCS [66]. It was Allan Nairn who, in mid-1984, reported that Medrano himself had told him in an interview:

"ORDEN and ANSESAL...grew out of the State Department, the C.I.A. and the Green Berets during the Kennedy era. We created these specialized agencies to fight the plans and actions of international communism." [67]

Yet a year or more later, even Robert Williams, in his outstanding book Export Agriculture and the Crisis in Central America, missed this detail as regards ORDEN and still described it as emerging in the mid-1960's, with no hint as to its roots in US covert operations [68]. Meanwhile, on 23 March 1985, Chele Medrano was slain by unidentified gunmen, much in the manner that, on 12 July 1977, the 82 year old Osmin Aguirre y Salinas had been slain, though the assassination of the latter is known to have been carried out by leftists. Chele Medrano had many enemies and it is not known who among them was able, in the end, to put an end to him - assuming that those who killed him were, or were sent by, his "enemies".

9. The years 1972-74 begin a hiatus in US covert operations in El Salvador, lasting until 1978, which render the links between the documented programs of the 1960's and the bloody events of the 1980's obscure. In December 1970, Medrano was removed from his high internal security posts and, following a sojourn of four months in the United States, he returned to lead a political organization to the right of the PCN, calling itself the Frente Unido Democratico Independiente [FUDI] [69]. In 1973, AIFLD was expelled from El Salvador with the PCN charging that it was a CIA front organization [70] and the CIA appears to have closed down its station in San Salvador, not opening it again until 1978 [71]. In 1974, the United States Congress voted to terminate the AID's Public Safety programs, following suspicions that had arisen during the investigations into the CIA in 1973-74 that those programs were not what AID claimed them to be. What links were severed during these
few years, what ones became informal, what ones were sustained by other means, simply has not been established by any researcher to date. It is as if the covert operations of 1961-73 enter a dark tunnel in 1972-74, from which, in 1980, there emerges mass terror. The question that requires an answer is: did the CIA lose touch with the Salvadoran internal repression organizations somewhere in that tunnel, or come through it with them?

10. One clue to the passage through the "tunnel" of 1972-78 may be the career of Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, a protege of Chele Medrano [72] a trainee under various American and other foreign programs, chief operational organizer of the terror of the early 1980's, political standard-bearer for the right-wing party ARENA from 1982 until replaced by agro-exporter Alfredo Christiani on 29 September 1985. Marginal and ambitious scion of an oligarchic family that had built its fortune in the years before the 1932 matanza, Roberto D'Aubuisson graduated from El Salvador's officer-training school at the beginning of the PCN era and specialized in military intelligence and counterinsurgency. He was sent abroad at various intervals for training in Panama, the International Police Academy in Washington D.C., Chile, Paraguay and Taiwan before 1978 [73]. He served under then General Chele Medrano in the war against Honduras in 1969 [74] and during the 1970's worked successively in the National Guard's Secciones de Investigaciones Especiales, under National Guard boss Colonel Ramon Alvarenga, one of the hard men of the 1970's death squads [75]; on the Army General Staff, where he became close to Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel Eduardo "Chivo" Iraheta; as Deputy Director of ANSESAL under Colonel Roberto Eulalio Santibanez in 1979 and, following the 15 October 1979 coup, as Director of ANSESAL, an appointment confirmed by junta power-broker Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez [76]. In January and February 1980, Medrano and D'Aubuisson, working in the shadows of intrigue off to the right of the divided ruling junta in El Salvador, used the ANSESAL and ORDEN files and apparatus to set up a political front organization [Frente Amplio Nacional (FAN)], while renaming ORDEN [officially disbanded by Decree No. 12 of the junta on 6 November 1979], the Frente Democratico Nacionalista (FDN) [77]. It is against this background that US treatment of D'Aubuisson and of the whole issue of the death squads in the 1980's must be examined with scrupulous attention to detail, if the "tunnel" question is to be answered with some assurance.

11. The role of ANTEL as a nerve center and communications channel for counterintelligence operations has largely escaped scrutiny. Writing in 1982, veteran US El Salvador scholar Thomas Anderson was apparently oblivious of ANTEL's nature, for he recorded with innocence that, in December 1980, in order to "mollify the PDC" (the Christian Democrat Party led by Jose Napoleon Duarte), Colonel Nicolas Carranza was transferred from his post as Deputy Minister of Defense "to the Presidency of the telephone company ANTEL". He did not note that Carranza and his superior at the Ministry of Defense, Colonel Jose Guillermo Garcia, as well as Gutierrez and Vides Casanova, had been leading ANTEL executives in the 1970's [78]. The four colonels here mentioned, whom I shall refer to as the ANTEL colonels, played central roles in the elaborate political intrigues and counterinsurgency
operations of 1979-85. These ANTEL colonels constituted a ring binding the post-October 1979 internal security apparatus together and linking it directly with the pre-October 1979 internal security apparatus.

12. When, in June 1976, the PCN mooted who should succeed then President Arturo Armando Molina, five colonels were considered, of whom two were dropped from the list because they had supported a tentative land reform proposal that President Molina had made in 1975-76. The three remaining candidates were Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, Jose Guillermo Garcia (then President of ANTEL) and Carlos Humberto Romero (then Minister of Defense), on whom the choice fell and whose "election" by fraud and violence was secured in February 1977 [79]. On 15 October 1979, President Carlos Humberto Romero was overthrown and Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez was placed on the junta that succeeded him. Gutierrez at once appointed Garcia Minister of Defense, Carranza his Deputy and Vides Casanova commander of the National Guard. When, in April 1983, then General Jose Guillermo Garcia resigned as Minister of Defense, he was replaced by then General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova. Simultaneously, the notorious commander of the Treasury Police, Colonel Francisco Moran, was replaced - by Colonel Nicolas Carranza [80]. Early in 1984, it was revealed by former ANSESAL Director, Colonel Roberto Eulalio Santibanez, by then a disgruntled exile in the United States, that Nicolas Carranza had been on the CIA's payroll since at least 1978 and that the death squad operations had been directed for all practical purposes by the ANTEL colonels [81]. Nicolas Carranza was, in the words of a seasoned American reporter, the "ideological idol of Salvador's far right" [82]. What the CIA were paying him to do remains unclear [83]. His role in relation to D'Aubuisson and the death squad operations is something to which we shall return.

13. Not the least puzzling piece in the jigsaw puzzle is the nature and role of UCS and its sponsor AIFLD in the tortuous train of events between 1965, when Hammer began his seminar course in Washington, and 1981, when, at the height of the civil war, he was slain in San Salvador. In a pamphlet, published in 1981 to contest allegations that its operations in El Salvador were part of a covert US operation, AIFLD stigmatized these allegations as tendentious and undocumented [84]. Carolyn Forche and Philip Wheaton, who made the allegations in two pamphlets published in 1980, had attempted to get to the bottom of AIFLD's links with UCS and had written of corruption, power-struggles and factionalism within UCS [85]. AIFLD's rejoinder was something of a whitewash, providing little or no new information on the subject. It appears that, following AIFLD's expulsion from El Salvador in 1973, the UCS became divided between supporters of Tito Castro, its longstanding director, and Jose Rodolfo Viera, a young UCS cadre who had been instructed in Michael Hammer's AIFLD seminar in 1967. Allegations of corruption were made against Castro and AIFLD contracted one John Strasma in 1976 to go to El Salvador and investigate the situation. Strasma absolved Castro of any wrongdoing, but the conflict was not settled at that [86]. Castro was ousted, despite support from Hammer himself, and Viera took over as UCS director.
14. There are indications that AIFLD never after that fully regained control of UCS. A similar process occurred some years later with AIFLD efforts to control the labor confederation Unido Popular Democratico (UPD), founded with AIFLD support in 1980. When UPD drifted to the left and criticized the Duarte government for political murders and failing to press dialogue with the insurgent FMLN/FDR, AIFLD tried to break up UPD and set up a rival organization. The effort met with little success and early in 1985 AIFLD director in El Salvador, Bernard Packer, was recalled to Washington [87]. So it was with UCS, though the details have not been put together as a matter of public record. In 1977, after Viera took over as UCS head, Jorge Camacho, a former criminal and an agent of ORDEN who had entered UCS through the patronage of Tito Castro some years earlier, broke away from UCS to form his own organization, ACOPAI [Asociacion de Cooperativas de Produccion Agropecuaria Integradas]. [88] In 1980, ACOPAI affiliated with UPD and by 1984 Jorge Camacho had become Vice Minister of Agriculture. [89] Attempts to ferret out exactly what AIFLD was trying to accomplish through UCS, ACOPAI and UPD converge on the 3 January 1981 killing of Michael Hammer, Mark Pearlman and Jose Rodolfo Viera in the coffee lounge of the San Salvador Sheraton, for which two former National Guardsmen were convicted on 13 February 1986, but the political meaning of which has never satisfactorily been deciphered.

15. Who was Michael Hammer and what was the purpose behind his peasant leadership seminar from 1965? Born in Paris in 1938, of German parents, Hammer grew up in Ecuador in the 1940's, before becoming a U.S. citizen. He spent four years in the U.S. Air Force, studied in Switzerland and then enrolled at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, already fluent in English, German, French, Spanish and Portugese. He graduated in 1964 and immediately took over AIFLD's peasant leadership program as contracted by AID [90]. A curious apprenticeship, one might think, for such a job. Over the following sixteen years he worked on this program in Honduras, Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil as well as El Salvador. After he was killed, AIFLD Deputy Director Sam Haddad and Assistant Director Jesse Freedman told journalists that he had been "obsessed" with the idea of a redistributive land reform in El Salvador [91]. Whether he had had a similar obsession in regard to Honduras, Colombia, Venezuela or Brazil they did not say. At that time (early January 1981), Mary Temple, in her capacity as executive director of the New York based Land Council for Rural Progress in Developing Countries, who had been associated with Roy Prosterman since 1967 [92], was reported to have been a friend of Michael Hammer's. Jeane Kirkpatrick, foreign policy fire-eater of the incoming Reagan Administration, was quoted as regretting the death of Hammer, whom she, also, described as a friend and colleague, with whom she had worked in the AFL-CIO and with whom she had shared common values [93]. Where Kirkpatrick's political view of the "Hobbes problem" in El Salvador intersected with Michael Hammer's "obsession" with the land reform issue there is unclear. The available evidence, however, would suggest that the Hardin Report and what flowed from it must be put at the center of an attempt to reconcile the two.
16. It has long since been alleged that AIFLD has strong CIA connections [94]. It is not at all inconceivable that Michael Hammer was himself a salaried CIA operations officer, running a program of the sort described in some detail by Philip Agee in 1975 [91]. Covering the slaughter of Hammer, Pearlman and Viera for the Washington Post on 5 January 1981, Christopher Dickey wrote:

"The role of the American Institute for Free Labor Development in El Salvador has been controversial. In the 1960's and early 1970's it was closely allied with the peasants' union, but the connection was broken after allegations that AIFLD had CIA connections. Those allegations have since been put to rest..." [96].

He did not indicate whose the allegations had been, or what form they took, much less in what manner they had "been put to rest" and his reference to UCS as the peasants' union was curious, since there were other major such unions with no ties to AIFLD which had been under attack during 1980 and for years beforehand. Furthermore, as Raymond Bonner pointed out in 1984, allegations of AIFLD having CIA connections were far from having "been put to rest". Bonner quoted Agee as stating that AIFLD training centers were headed by "salaried C.I.A. agents" and that William Doherty Jr., AIFLD Director, was "a key C.I.A. agent" [97]. Agee wrote that Doherty was a CIA agent directed by people at the CIA's headquarters Covert Action Staff [98].

17. Concerning Agee's credibility, Bonner had this to say:

"An analysis of Agee's book by the C.I.A. right after its publication in 1975 affirmed his reporting without exception and repeatedly referred to it as "complete" and "accurate", specifically including the parts about the A.F.L.-C.I.O. institutes such as AIFLD, according to Jonathan Kwitny, who provides a detailed look at AIFLD in his book Endless Enemies. Six former C.I.A. operatives, in interviews with Kwitny, corroborated Agee's assertions about the connection between AIFLD and the C.I.A." [99].

Michael Hammer, Bonner concluded, was almost certainly a CIA man. Dunkerley, in 1982, had concluded that "the AIFLD employees", meaning Hammer and Pearlman, "were in all probability working with the CIA" [100]. It is quite possible that Hammer, but not Pearlman was doing so. Pearlman was a former student of Roy Prosterman's at the University of Washington, Seattle, who was recruited to assist Hammer, Prosterman and another of Prosterman's proteges, Jeffrey Riedinger, in El Salvador in May 1980. Curiously, Richard Alan White, a harsh critic of U.S. policy, writing in 1984, took Sam Haddad and Jesse Freedman at their word and described Hammer as a dedicated land reform expert and idealist [101]. If that was so and the history of Hammer was more accessible, one would have to fall back on examining Doherty's use of Hammer. More fundamental is the question: if the peasant organization work of Hammer is to be construed as bona fide labor work and not as a covert program of manipulation and ultimate betrayal of the peasants of El Salvador, what rationale stood behind the contradiction between such work and the creation by Kelley, Smith, Simons and the others of Medrano's deadly network?
18. There was a US-sponsored pattern of development throughout Central America in the 1960's and 1970's which generated a boom in exports of coffee, sugar, cotton and beef and in doing so raised landlessness, discontent and repression to historic highs throughout the region. Throughout the entire period, US foreign policies were involved in the whole process in inextricable fashion. As Robert Williams has expressed it:

"Throughout the 1960's, US policy toward Central America nourished a monstrous contradiction. On the military front, the oligarchy was provided with a modern, well-equipped repression apparatus, capable of gathering intelligence and terrorizing the newly forming grassroots groups and their sympathizers. On the economic front, the wealth of the oligarchy was enhanced by the new opportunities for investment generated by export diversification and modernization. On the other side, Washington's modernization and export diversification program helped to create the class of landless peasants and slum dwellers...thereby creating conditions for the formation of peasant leagues and armed bands of peasants.

Even as a military repression apparatus was being equipped and trained for the oligarchy, Washington went against the wishes of the oligarchy by funding social programs. Land reform decrees were enacted that contained provisions recognizing the peasant perspective on rights to land. Peasant leagues and labor unions were sponsored by AID, and training programs for union leaders were established by the American Institute for Free Labor Development...Human rights organizations were given official US support, and political parties that recognized the basic rights of the poor were encouraged." [102].

There can be no denying the contradiction in all this. The question is, how "monstrous" a contradiction was it? It seems at least conceivable that the contradiction was not intended to be monstrous at all, but a means to the simultaneous inducement of rapid capitalist development and gradual democratization. That was the formula of the Alliance for Progress, as President John F. Kennedy called the Latin America policies of his administration from 1962. What was more and more monstrous was the grotesque disproportion between US commitment to the repression of rebellion against the social impact of rapid capitalist development and US assistance to human rights organizations or political parties that recognized the basic rights of the poor.

19. In late July 1965, before Michael Hammer had convened his first peasant leadership seminar for AIFLD in Washington, a Catholic organization calling itself the Federation of Christian Peasants (FECCAS) held the First Peasant Congress in El Salvador. In 1968, at the very time that AIFLD, through Hammer, was creating UCS, FECCAS convened the Second Peasant Congress in El Salvador and began to define an autonomous program for land reform and other rural social reforms. In 1969, Fr. Jose Alas established the first of the so-called Christian Base Communities, experiments in bringing to the impoverished campesinos the Medellin-oriented idea of "Scripture" [the Bible, the Book, the Word] as the germ of liberation, rather than as the secret book of fate and the inscrutable will of a hard God. There seems to be no evidence that AIFLD, or its political masters, considered supporting FECCAS, instead of or as well as sponsoring UCS. On the eve of the "tunnel period" of 1973-78, the beef boom came to El Salvador, with the 1972 Department of Agriculture approval of the first export meat-packing plant in El Salvador, for the packing of beef for the US fast food market.
As throughout the rest of Central America, not excluding democratic Costa Rica, the expansion of the beef industry was a direct cause of mass eviction of peasants from their land and of consequent rural strife. The zones of cattle- and of cotton-expansion in El Salvador were to become the core zones of guerrilla strength in the 1980's. It was, moreover, some of the biggest coffee oligarchs - Homberger, Quinonez, Hill, Prieto, Salaverria, Palomo - who dominated the new agro-export industries [103]. FECCAS soon collided with these interests, but UCS was characterized by its avoidance of confrontation with them. US policies contained no apparent provisions for checking the inroads of the agro-exporters on peasant lands and livelihoods, or for enjoining the radicalization of such peasant leagues as FECCAS in the 1970's, when agro-export expansion and repression reached intolerable limits. The model of development being applied and the commitment to repressive order were not such as to permit endorsement of militant peasant resistance to either of these things. Even on the most generous estimate of his personal motives and of AIFLD's purposes, therefore, Michael Hammer's work must appear as rather anomalous in the Central American context.

20. Under the pressure of the rapid and bewildering developments of the 1960's and 1970's, the traditional conservative Catholicism of El Salvador began to ferment. For an increasing number of peasants, slum dwellers, labor organizers, students, the old, hierarchical and otherworldly religion became discredited and gave way to a theology of communal renewal and political liberation, with disturbing implications for the conservative interests in the country. Robert Williams has given a superb summation of the roots of this religious ferment:

"Barbed wire meant prosperity and prestige for ranchers, but for those who grew corn it came to symbolize a crown of thorns, the harbinger of crucifixion and death...In the zones where seasonal migrants came to congregate, in the slums of the coastal towns and capital cities, and in the barren stretches yet untouched by commercial agriculture, a new religion took hold. The new Christianity recognized the centuries-old peasant concept of the right to land for life, and it offered a hope for leaving the land of bondage and entering the promised land...the landowner moved into the position of a pharaoh." [104]

By contrast, in 1960 a middle-class Christian Democratic Party [PDC] had been formed by a small group of men - Roberto Lara Velado, Abraham Rodriguez, Jose Napoleon Duarte and Hector Dada Hirezi among them - influenced by more conservative Catholic social doctrine, going back to Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Rerum Novarum [105]. By 1971-72, in alliance with the Social Democrats [Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario, or MNR] who had formed a party in 1967, and the Salvadoran Communist Party [PCS], formed back in 1930, the PDC was able to mount a major electoral challenge to the PCN, but found itself defrauded of victory by the entrenched powers both then and again in 1977. In a major study of the PDC, published, like William Durham's book, in 1979, on the eve of the civil war, Stephen Webre observed of the Christian Democratic philosophy:

"Prescribing against the possibility of social violence from below was a simple matter when compared to the necessity to manage elite attitudes. The PDC's vision of an ideal society, while moderate, required significant concessions on the part of an established oligarchy that had developed an elaborate moral
vision of its own to justify the existing order. While the goal of a revolution accomplished solely through Christian suasion and moral education is an attractive one to those who abhor bloodshed, one must be sceptical about its chances for success in any society, much less one such as El Salvador's, where the privileged have routinely demonstrated their willingness to employ any means whatsoever to preserve intact their advantages by stifling all but the most innocuous attempts at change."[106]

Throughout the 1970's, the PDC stumbled on exactly this dilemma and when the civil war erupted it was this dilemma that split the PDC, driving Roberto Lara Velado, Hector Dada Hirezi, Ruben Zamora and others to join the "armed Gracchans", while Jose Napoleon Duarte and others of like mind joined the ANTEL colonels in the ruling junta.

21. The 1970's brought a proliferation of armed insurgent groups and people's mass organizations in El Salvador [see Table 10]. Armed guerrilla groups calling themselves the Forces of Popular Liberation [FPL], the Popular Revolutionary Army [ERP] and the Forces of National Liberation [FARN] began a small scale, but relentless attack against the unregenerate optimates, those oligarchs whose forbears Dana Munro had described in 1918 as "the best people of the republic". The optimates, for their part, dug in to defend their privileges vi et armis. After a brief flirtation with cosmetic reforms in 1975-76, which met prompt and uncompromising resistance from the optimates, the PCN tightened its grip in 1977, under President Carlos Humberto Romero, and hundreds of dissidents and reformists started to fall victim to death squads operated by Colonel Ramon Alvarenga, commander of the National Guard, and oligarchs such as Roberto Hill. In an editorial of October 1977, in his rightwing newspaper Diario de Hoy, oligarch Enrique Altamirano deplored the lack of the "counterrevolutionary tradition" within the security forces, which, he asserted, "suffer, like the rest of the population, from the mania for freedom" [107]. The response of President Romero was promulgation of the Exceptional Law of the Defense and Guarantee of Public Order, in November 1977 [108]. The repressive measures adopted, instead of quelling social unrest, had the effect of inflaming it and El Salvador, like Guatemala to its north west and Nicaragua to its south east, entered into a spiralling political crisis in 1978.

22. Into this political atmosphere, in June 1977, came new US Ambassador Frank Joseph Devine. Concerning his impressions of the El Salvador to which he been assigned at that time, Devine recalled in his memoir, published in 1981:

"...the poor (in El Salvador) have been carefully kept in their place...In view of their small numbers in the face of the impoverished masses whom they are to control, the security services have used heavy-handed methods to instil a certain measure of fear and respect. In so doing, and particularly throughout the countryside, they have dispensed frontier justice in summary fashion, which until recently was accepted as part of the way of life..." [109]

Another American observer at that time of rising crisis was AID's Peter Askin, who was posted to El Salvador in 1977 and was to remain there until 1982. Looking back on the 1977-78 scene in 1985, he remarked:
"I watched the frustration build. You have the knowledge; you know that you were sitting on a human time bomb with all the arithmetic wrong...and you realized something had to give or something had to explode...The Embassy's assessment corroborated terribly skewed income distribution and that the number of rural poor was growing. Peasants began to organize around the Church and so on. Things were very close to anarchy by 1977-78 and it was very obvious that Romero was not coping..." [110].

Given the history, so far as it can be reconstructed, of U.S. Policy in El Salvador since 1960, one has to ask what "coping" would have consisted of at this point. The outlook of Devine would suggest that "coping" would have meant being able to keep the poor "carefully in their place".

23. A substantial report on the rural situation in El Salvador, prepared for AID by one Dwight Steen in 1977, which drew attention to the urgent need for land reform, ran into a brick wall in Washington. "I was told here in Washington that we don't do land reform" he related in December 1984 [111]. According to Mary Temple, it was in 1978 that the Land Council for Rural Progress in Developing Countries was formed and that through it AIFLD approached Roy Prosterman, asking him to look at proposals for serious land reform in El Salvador drafted by Salvadoran economist and Social Democrat Ivo Alvarenga back in 1971 [112]. Around the same time, in 1978, Major Roberto D'Aubuisson returned from a training sojourn in Taiwan and wrote a sixty-four page intelligence report for the National Guard which, according to investigator Craig Pyes, "became the text on the relationships between social reformers and Marxist guerrillas for the various Salvadoran intelligence services." [113] After working for Ramon Alvarenga in the National Guard's Special Investigations Section, D'Aubuisson moved up the ladder at this time, becoming Deputy Director of ANSESAL under Colonel Roberto Eulalio Santibanez [114]. The "monstrous contradiction" Robert Williams has described as existing at the heart of long-term US policies in El Salvador, was, it is clear, fast approaching its inevitable rendezvous with the realities of Central America by the end of 1978.
7:3. The Old, the Bold and the Dead.

1. In May 1979, U.S. diplomatic, military and intelligence officers from all over Central America held a "crisis management" conference in San Jose, Costa Rica.\[115\] The Carter Administration had been rocked, in January, by the fall of the Shah of Iran. President Somoza was struggling to fend off a massive popular uprising in Nicaragua. The Guatemala of President Romeo Lucas Garcia had been denied official U.S. economic and military assistance, since March 1978, because of right-wing terror involving 600 political murders per month and faced a resurgence of leftist guerrilla insurrection on an ominous scale. El Salvador was in the throes of its most destabilizing crisis since the last months of the Lemus regime in 1960, when the Hardin Report had been written. In March 1979, in tiny Grenada, in the far south-eastern reaches of the Caribbean, the Marxist New Jewel Movement, led by Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard, had overthrown the corrupt populist Eric Gairy.

2. Present at the San Jose conference were Ambassador Marvin Weisman and his DCM Lowell Kilday [Costa Rica], Ambassador Mari-Luci Jaramillo [Honduras], Ambassador-designate Frank Ortiz and Charge d'Affaires John Bennett [Guatemala], Ambassador-designate Lawrence Pezzullo and Charge d'Affaires Frank Tucker [Nicaragua], Ambassador Bill Luers [Venezula], Ambassador Ambler Moss [Panama], and what Frank Devine, in his account of the conference in 1981, described as "a sizeable representation from Washington, from the State Department and other agencies" [116]. Patricia Derian's Office of Human Rights, set up within the State Department by President Carter in 1977, was represented and its representatives voiced the opinion at the conference that dialogue with insurgent and dissident popular organizations was called for; that it was "time for a bit of experimentation and innovation" [117]. The minutes of the conference would make interesting reading. It is not clear from subsequent developments, however, whether the San Jose conference produced a consensus on Central America policies. There is every reason to see it as having been similar to the January 1966 Warrenton conference on Vietnam policies, which, by the admission of Robert Komer, had achieved very little.

3. From July 1979, following the downfall of Somoza in neighbouring Nicaragua, various schemes were hatched by military officers in El Salvador to remove President Romero and take control of the deteriorating situation in that country. Dismissed from command of the National Guard in April, Colonel Ramon Alvarenga began to talk with Iraheta, D'Aubuisson and others about a seizure of power [118]. A clandestine organization calling itself the Movimiento de Juventud Militar [MJM], the Movement of Military Youth, led by a certain Lieutenant Colonel Rene Francisco Guerra y Guerra, meanwhile, was consulting with civilian liberals such as Roman Mayorga Quirios, Rector of the Catholic University, and Juan Chacon, the rising twenty three year old general secretary of the FPL's mass organization, the Bloque Popular Revolucionario [BPR] [see Table 10],
which had been set up in 1975; about a possible reformist golpe de estado, harking back to the reformist juntas of May-October 1944, 1948 and October 1960 to January 1961. One of the officers taken into the confidence of the MJM group was the enigmatic Captain Francisco Mena Sandoval, Roberto Hill's security chieftain. This individual communicated what he knew of MJM's plans to Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez in September. Whether, from that point, Gutierrez and his allies among the conservative senior officer corps liaised with military and intelligence staff at the US Embassy is unclear. What is clear is that Gutierrez and Garcia, as agents of the senior and conservative officer corps, were alien to the core MJM group around Guerra y Guerra, the younger, reform-minded officers. The former made covert efforts to abort the MJM scheme, but in the end it was decided to subvert it from within [119]. The pattern is a familiar one to those acquainted with Salvadoran history since 1931 and it is crucial to an understanding of the confused and terrible events of 1980 that brought civil war to the country.

4. It was Guerra y Guerra and his MJM group who carried out the coup d'etat against President Romero on the morning of 15 October 1979 [120]. That morning Guerra y Guerra himself believed that Gutierrez was planning to have him assassinated [121]. This did not occur. Instead, Gutierrez, after some confused negotiations, was placed on the junta at the expense of Guerra y Guerra, who accepted the post of Under Secretary of the Interior [122]. There are several reports that the U.S. Embassy offered its support - provided that Gutierrez or Garcia and not Guerra y Guerra was placed on the new junta [123]. Guerra y Guerra himself has stated that he does not know of any US intervention of this kind [124], which would lead one to surmise that the emergence of the ANTEL colonels in the crucial positions of power after the coup d'etat was more a matter of luck than of good management on the part of the Devine Embassy. MJM agreed to the placement of Gutierrez and a conservative businessman, Mario Andino, on the junta because, by agreement, the other three members of the junta were to be Guillermo Manuel Ungo, leader of the Social Democrats, Roman Mayorga Quiros and Colonel Arnoldo Adolfo Majano, a senior officer whose sympathies were with the MJM. In the months that followed, it became all too clear that, once again, a double coup had taken place and neither MJM nor the progressive civilians were in control of things at all.

5. Even in critical accounts of U.S. policy there has been considerable confusion about the coup d'etat of October 1979 and the history of the junta that it brought to power. Since accounts more or less favorable to U.S. official policy have without fail described Gutierrez and his allies as being the "young, moderate and progressive", or even "radical", officers who initiated a regime of reform in El Salvador amid attacks from left and right, it is most important that the behaviour of the ANTEL colonels be examined in the clearest possible light. To this end, it seems worth explicating something of the confusion in the published accounts of the matter, that it may be seen where the problems of evidence and interpretation lie. According to New York Times correspondent Raymond Bonner, who made an heroic attempt to piece the story together in 1984, Ambassador Devine
refused to meet Guerra y Guerra, while the latter and Mayorga did not press for US help, judging Devine too conservative to be useful [125]. Yet historian Thomas Anderson stated, writing before Bonner:

"Clearly, something had to be done and many of the younger Army officers began to regard a coup by progressive moderates as the only way to avoid a civil war...They approached the U.S. Embassy and evidently received an encouraging response." [126].

Historian Walter LaFeber, writing after Anderson but before Bonner, concluded that "circumstantial evidence...strongly suggests that the United States encouraged the coup." [127], but did not offer any analysis of which part of the coup the US encouraged, through whom or how. If one is to believe Ambassador Devine's memoir, the US was caught on the hop by the coup and, while he alleged that Gutierrez had been a "principal figure in plotting the overthrow of Romero" [128], he insisted the US had nothing but an armchair role in the entire drama and that "all elements of the Embassy staff were under the strictest orders not to do or say anything that could be taken as encouragement for an illegal or unconstitutional act." [129] He then commented rather cryptically: "The two military members of the junta...though known professionally to military officers of our Embassy were unknown to almost all the rest of us." [130] Almost all the rest? Who was Devine excluding from "the rest of us" here? The CIA station chief, perhaps, whom the next ambassador, Robert White was to describe as having "an incorrigible bent to the right"? [131]

6. Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, writing, like LaFeber, in 1983, described the "pro-Pentagon faction" of the military as being in clear control of the new junta, but added ambiguously that the U.S. government "embraced the new junta as the answer to its prayers for a centrist solution" [132]. Philip Wheaton, writing back in 1980, and apparently relying on a State Department press release printed in the Washington Star, wrote:

"On 15 October 1979 the Carter Administration was informed that younger officers in El Salvador were planning [sic] a coup and did nothing to challenge them." [133].

Drawing further on a preliminary inquiry by his colleague Carolyn Forche, Wheaton added that the US Embassy rejected Guerra y Guerra as a candidate for the junta in favor of Gutierrez or Garcia and that "the so-called overthrow of Romero had been worked out ahead of time, with Romero agreeing to it, i.e. a palace coup." [134]. He did not speculate as to why the U.S. Embassy backed Gutierrez and Garcia against Guerra y Guerra, nor did he have details as to who had "worked out ahead of time with Romero" that there would be a palace coup. It certainly was not Guerra y Guerra, who was angered to find Romero was flown out to safe haven in Guatemala and Miami [135]. Nor was it the ANTEL colonels acting alone, for, according to James Dunkerley, Romero had made a special "medical trip" to Miami on 11 October 1979 for just twenty four hours, then had flown his family out to Miami on 13 October [136]. If these reports are accurate, it would appear that Guerra y Guerra and his young officers were gullied in subtle ways and crucial
aspects of the removal of President Romero and the implacement of Colonel Gutierrez were the effect of something other than US prayers for a "centrist solution".

7. One of the most intriguing attempts to put the story together is that by Jenny Pearce, published in 1981. Almost unique among published accounts of the events of 1979, Pearce's version of events relates what happened to the events of 1960-61 and also the events of 1972, when a brief reformist coup d'etat had occurred to put Jose Napoleon Duarte and the PDC/MNR/PCS coalition in power. Drawing on the testimony of Dr. Fabio Castillo, who was a member of the reformist junta of 1960-61, as well as a Presidential candidate for the Party of Renovatory Action [PAR] in 1967 [137], and remained involved in democratic political organization right through into the 1980's, Pearce recounted:

"In October 1960 a group of democratic young officers allied to middle-class reformers overthrew the corrupt government of Jose Maria Lemus, and announced their commitment to free elections and a literacy program. In hearings before a US House sub-committee in June 1976, Dr Fabio Castillo...recalled the role of the US military mission in El Salvador in encouraging a conspiracy to overthrow the new government..."The participation of US diplomatic and military representatives was at that time evident and open'..." [138]

Pearce identified Chele Medrano as "the closest collaborator of the US military agencies in El Salvador and the main liaison with the CIA" throughout the 1960's, though she appear to have got the chronology of the founding of ORDEN as confused as almost everyone else has done [139].

8. The intervention in February 1972, to restore the PCN regime, was, according to Castillo, also quite blatant:

"At about 8 o'clock in the morning, the headquarters of the insurgents agreed to receive the US military attache, who arrived in order to intervene on behalf of the military faction of the overthrown government, which at that moment was at the international airport, ready to flee the country. At 11 am unmarked planes flying in from unknown bases started to bomb the civilian population and the positions held by the insurgents. The bombardments were intense and bloody and lasted until 5 pm. During the raid rockets and missiles were used of a type not available to the army of El Salvador...A few days after the Constitutionalists' insurrection had been smashed, officers of that movement declared that they had been able to observe the participation of US personnel, using the US Embassy's communications facilities for the purpose of co-ordinating the operations..."[140]

Pearce seems to have believed that ANSESAL was a parallel command set up within the Army High Command only in January 1979 to prepare against the approaching crisis, "with control over the intelligence services and power to make high level decisions behind the backs of the supreme command" [141]. It was around that time that Roberto D'Aubuisson became Deputy Director of ANSESAL, but, as has been shown, its origins went back to the Hardin Report and the work of CIA operatives as far back as 1961. Pearce described Garcia, Gutierrez and Carranza as former ANTEL executives and ANTEL itself a
center of military intelligence [142]. She added that Garcia and Gutierrez were "both hardline officers with close ties to General Medrano, the founder of ORDEN" [143]. She quoted American journalist Carolyn Forche as having interviewed an MJM officer and having been told by him:

"The United States opposed the naming of Guerra y Guerra and instead proposed to us two names: Colonel Jose Garcia and Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez. We needed American support and we agreed to this..." [144]

Whether or not this was the means by which Gutierrez became a member of the new junta on 15 October 1979, his actions in the months that followed and the actions and public statements of the US government for months and years afterwards were quite consistent with something of the kind having been the case.

9. As well as appointing Garcia, Carranza and Vides Casanova to the key internal security posts, Gutierrez, with Santibanez and Garcia, arranged for the removal from the Presidential Palace of the files and records of ORDEN and ANSESAL, on the very morning of the coup, lest they fall into the hands of leftists and reformists in the incoming government [145]. Gutierrez appointed D'Aubuisson to head ANSESAL. Santibanez and some forty officers, including Colonel Rafael Flores Lima, President of ANTEL on the eve of the coup, moved out of active duty and even out of the country, in what appears to have been, at least in part, an elaborate shuffling of the command staff to confuse the ignorant and unwary. Almost all the forty officers in question were to return to active duty after the demotion and exile of Colonel Adolfo Majano, the reformist officer on the junta, which took place in three stages: May, September and December 1980 [146]. The shadowy Medrano, through his nephew and protege Colonel Marenco, penetrated and broke the cohesion of MJM within the Permanent Council of the Armed Forces [COPEFA] before the end of 1979 [147]; while D'Aubuisson, working with a core group of Army, National Guard, Treasury Police and ANSESAL officers and ORDEN agents, reorganized the internal security organs for a dirty war against the leftist and reformist organizations [148].

10. Now all this was in violent contradiction with the appointment by Mayorga, Ungo and Majano of Christian Democrat, Social Democrat, Communist and MJM people to numerous cabinet and government posts, notably in the Ministries of Labor, Agriculture and Education and their proclamation of a revolutionary agenda for change, including major land reforms, nationalization of banking and agro-exports, abolition of ORDEN and ANSESAL and a reaffirmation of basic democratic freedoms. Enrique Alvarez Cordoba, a radical oligarch who was to become first leader of the Revolutionary Democratic Front [FDR] when it was created on 18 April 1980, and was to be murdered, along with Juan Chacon and four other FDR officials, in a notorious security forces massacre in November 1980, was named Minister of Agriculture by the first junta. Salvador Samayoa, who was to join the FDR also in 1980, was named Minister of Education by the first junta. Whether or not US Embassy officers were involved in either
promoting Gutierrez or liaising with Medrano and D'Aubuisson at this point, the contradictions in the situation were patent. There was good reason to believe that one thing could lead to another and the military regime crumble altogether in the face of political mobilization by democratic and radical forces. In November the US sent a Defence Survey Team to El Salvador which, without consulting with Mayorga or Ungo, advised Gutierrez and the other ANTEL colonels that order and authority must be restored lest the situation get out of hand [149]

11. It was not long before the realities of what Gutierrez, Garcia, Carranza and Vides Casanova were on about bore in on Ungo, Mayorga and the high-minded reformers in the new government. Raymond Bonner interviewed them many months later and related their experience of a grim meeting between reformers and hardliners within days of the 15 October 1979 coup d'etat:

"A few days after the junta was announced, Colonels Garcia and Nicolas Carranza...called a meeting to introduce the civilians on the junta to the country's key military men. When the civilians arrived, they were stunned and disappointed to discover that the twenty five to thirty military officers present were not the young officers who had planned and executed the coup, but senior officers who had been placed in command positions by Garcia.

The situation was tense. Mayorga and Ungo argued that it was necessary not only to effect structural changes in the economy but to begin a process of democratization. They tried explaining to the officers that the society had been repressed for so long that demonstrations, both from the Right and the Left, were inevitable. "We told them, this is healthy, this is good, let them demonstrate", recalled Mayorga. The military men called it chaos and said it would lead to a Communist takeover...

A few weeks later, during another stormy session between the civilians and the officers, the former argued that, if the massacres didn't stop, there was going to be a terrible bloodbath. Colonel Vides Casanova, commander of the National Guard, stood up. He reminded those present that in 1932 the country had survived the killing of 30,000 peasants. "Today the Armed Forces are prepared to kill 200,000 or 300,000, if that's what it takes to stop a Communist takeover." Carranza spoke in agreement. Garcia nodded approvingly. Majano was silent." [150]

The terror had not begun in earnest at that time, but the men closest to US priorities in the region and in the country appear to have given notice that it was coming.

12. Interviewed in 1985, the Director of the U.S. State Department's Central America bureau, who had been stationed in El Salvador in 1979 as an AID officer, observed of the imbroglio in which the United States was inextricably involved by then:

"Of course, if you talk to Americans who have been down there for a while, or to leading Salvadorans, they'll tell you that the only solution in El Salvador is a bloodbath...this thing will be solved, they say, when there are 200,000 or 250,000 fewer people" [151]

It is not clear that the officer himself shared this opinion, nor is it clear that US officials at that time or in 1979 would have endorsed it; but it must be made emphatically clear that the ANTEL colonels on whom
US policies in El Salvador hinged between 1979 and at least 1984 were neither young, nor reform-minded and had threatened the reform-minded civilians with just this sort of bloodbath within a month of the overthrow of President Romero in October 1979. Given this, in addition to the evidence of longstanding U.S. commitment to the military regime in El Salvador and but feeble efforts to prompt anything resembling serious reform, it becomes most difficult to make out a case in defence of U.S. policies in El Salvador on other than paranoid assumptions about the character and intentions of the Salvadoran leftist forces and organizations. While that line of defence has been extensively used by official US spokespeople since 1979, there have also been persistent efforts to defend US policies as ones of support for a reformist and moderate government under siege by fanatics on both left and right. Considered in any but the most abstract terms, neither defence is at all convincing.

13. El Salvador was a seething cauldron of conflicting social forces by October 1979. The various guerrilla groups reacted differently to the 15 October coup. The ERP called for an insurrection, while the FPL was less incendiary but nevertheless denounced the coup as a plot by Washington to outmanouvre and defeat revolution. The PCS joined the junta, as did the MNR and PDC. BPR militants occupied the premises of the Ministries of Labor, Economics and Education on 25 October "demanding the release of all political prisoners, an increase in the $3 a day minimum wage and a freeze on food prices", but at the urging of Mayorga and Archbishop Oscar Romero they and the other guerrilla groups declared a thirty day moratorium on direct action at the end of October "to give the new government time to demonstrate it bona fides" [152]. Nevertheless, on 6 November, PCS general secretary Shafik Handal warned on public television that the government was infiltrated by fascist elements bent on foiling the reform plans of the junta, as announced in the 16 October "Proclamation of the Armed Forces". His claims, like the charges of the FPL, would seem to have been warranted. At the same time, rightist groups hostile to mooted reforms denounced the coup as a plot by the Carter Administration to hand the country over to the Communists [153]. The Pentagon and CIA pushed for "substantial increases in aid to the armed forces" and did not consult with Ungo and Mayorga about this, but with the ANTEL colonels [154]. Majano appears to have wavered, uncertain which way to go in the crisis, even as Medrano's men were undermining his base of support within the COPEFA. According to Anderson "a team of U.S. Army guerrilla warfare experts...visited the country in December 1979 and advocated a much more aggressive line." [155]

14. In the midst of all this, as LP-28 and BPR militants began leading land seizures in the countryside and the level of violence climbed, James Cheek took over the reins from Frank Devine as acting ambassador, since the appointment of Robert White had been held up by Jesse Helms in the Senate. Cheek entered into a head-on clash between the civilian reformers and the ANTEL colonels, over the insistence of the former that the security forces subordinate themselves to civilian authority; that Garcia and Carranza be sacked from the Ministry of Defense and that constructive dialogue with the revolutionary organizations be pursued. It is clear that he
would not back the demands of the civilian reformers against the ANTEL colonels at that time [156]. Matters came to a head during a stormy meeting of the military command, the cabinet and the junta at the Presidential Palace on 27 December [157]. The civilians issued an ultimatum; the offers of Archbishop Romero to mediate were rebuffed by the ANTEL colonels, and on 3 January 1980 Ungo, Mayorga and thirty seven leading members of the government, including the entire cabinet apart from Minister of Defense Garcia, resigned.

15. Speaking at the 27 December meeting, National Guard commander Colonel Vides Casanova told the civilians bluntly:

"Colonel Garcia is the man from whom we take the orders. We have put you into the position where you are and for the things that are needed here we don't need you. We have been running this country for fifty years and we are quite prepared to keep on running it." [159].

The mass resignation of civilians that followed from this did not, however, abort the belief among many officers and civilians that somehow or other the post-coup regime was a viable instrument for reform in El Salvador. On 9 January, a second junta was formed, with the PDC's Antonio Morales Erlich and Hector Dada Hirezi replacing Guillermo Ungo and Roman Mayorga. Among the conditions the PDC attached to its accession to the junta were the prompt implementation of a major land reform and the removal from office of Colonels Garcia, Carranza and Moran, the latter being the Treasury Police commander [160]. At this juncture, Jose Rodolfo Viera was appointed head of the [Salvadoran] Institute of Agrarian Transformation [ISTA] and he, in consultation with others at the Ministry of Agriculture and Grazing [MAG] and his UCS colleagues, began to draft plans for a land reform along the lines envisioned by Ivo Alvarenga eight years before. Viera phoned Michael Hammer, in Washington D.C., asking for help, telling him that some of the more radical people in San Salvador were suggesting that Cuban advisors be brought in [161]. Hammer contacted Roy Prosterman, in Seattle, and asked him to go with him to El Salvador to assist with the drafting and implementation of a major land reform [162]. Prosterman acceded to the request, but the circumstances under which he therefore went to El Salvador could hardly have been more ambiguous or unpropitious, from the point of view of the sort of values brought to similar work by Hardie in the Philippines in 1951 and Hewes in Vietnam in 1966 and Prosterman himself in 1967-70 in Vietnam and 1972-75 in the Philippines.

16. Against the background of the histories of ANSESAL, ORDEN, ANTEL, UCS and the 1979 coup d'etat here related, Roy Prosterman's arrival in El Salvador in early February 1980 to assist in the drafting of a land reform law must be looked upon with scepticism and might understandably be looked upon with suspicion, given that he came under the auspices of AIFLD and Michael Hammer. To understand the immediate context in which he worked, it is necessary to carefully reconstruct a complex web of events from the time of the dissolution of the first junta on 3 January 1980 through to the middle of May 1980.
These months brought a series of most dramatic developments which must be set in the clearest possible light if the meaning of Roy Prosterman's land reform work is to be understood at all.

17. The second junta, incorporating the PDC, but no other political party, in coalition with the ANTEL colonels, was formed on 9 January. On 22 January, the anniversary of the 1932 uprising, a huge demonstration was conducted by leftist organized peasants and their urban allies in San Salvador, between 100,000 and 200,000 people marching in the streets to demand land reform and the overthrow of the U.S. backed power of oligarchs and officers [162]. Robert White, looking back twelve months later, described the mood in Washington in January 1980, while he awaited confirmation of his ambassadorial appointment and was briefed on El Salvador, as gloomy. "El Salvador is lost" he was told by people in the State Department, the Pentagon and the intelligence community [163]. "When I went down to El Salvador one year ago" he recalled "there was not one intelligence analyst in Washington who said there was a prayer of the present government lasting more than a month or two." [164] The young Viera telephoned Michael Hammer at this juncture "to ask whether he could provide one or two consultants" to advise him on land reform law and it was Michael Hammer who asked Roy Prosterman "to perform this consulting function" [165], with his assistant Jeffrey Riedinger. They began work in El Salvador in early February 1980, their travelling expenses being paid by AIFLD and, according to press reports published in January 1981, their "salaries" being paid through the Land Council for Rural Progress in Developing Countries and Mary Temple, in New York [166].

18. James Cheek and the Embassy staff were in the meantime frantically trying to consolidate the coalition between the colonels and the PDC on the basis of some sort of combination of repression and reform. Hardline oligarchs were suspicious that Cheek was preparing their demise. Had not the Carter administration abandoned Somoza only months before? Medrano, D'Aubuisson and the ANSESAL staff were at work preparing a right-wing coup d'etat to eliminate even the Christian Democrats and remaining reformist officers from the government. The various leftist insurgent organizations and mass organizations were bracing themselves for a right-wing assault and trying to draw together against the threat. The MNR and PCS were moving toward an alliance with the armed insurgents. Roy Prosterman was stepping into a vortex.

19. By mid-February the drama seemed to be approaching some sort of climax. Archbishop Oscar Romero, of San Salvador, became an open critic of the government and on 17 February wrote a letter to President Carter pleading with him to "prohibit the giving of military assistance to the Salvadoran government" and to refrain from any form of intervention, military, economic or diplomatic that would hinder "the common people who are organized to struggle for their most basic human rights" [167]. Roberto D'Aubuisson appeared on public television to denounce Christian Democrat Attorney General Mario Zamora Rivas as being a "Communist" agent [168]. According to Thomas
Anderson, a restrained investigator not given to dramatic probings of U.S. policy in Salvadoran affairs, James Cheek at this point:

"...heard that there was a plot by D'Aubuisson and certain active officers to overthrow the junta on 24 February and he took vigorous action to forestall this possibility, arguing with Colonel Garcia and other officers that this would lead to civil war. The coup was barely forestalled..." [169].

Colonel Garcia and other officers? But this implies clearly that the plot by D'Aubuisson, which involved Carranza and Medrano apart from other officers [170], was sympathized with by Garcia "and other officers" and known to Cheek. It was a scenario redolent of that of 1944, when Osmín Aguirre y Salinas had overthrown President Menendez, with the latter's foreknowledge and consent.

20. On 22 February, two days before the date of the planned coup d'état, assassins entered Mario Zamora's home and shot him dead in the presence of his family and friends [171]. The next day the leftist insurgent organizations announced that they had formed a coalition under the name Revolutionary Coordinator of the Masses (CRM). Mario Zamora was a mediator between the left and right wings of the PDC and it seems that those who assassinated him wished to split the PDC on the eve of their grab for power [172]. The killing did indeed provoke bitter debate within the PDC over adherence to the government dominated by the hardline colonels and was to lead, within less than three weeks to a schism in the party. Now Roy Prosterman was in El Salvador at this time, working, according to his own account, with leading Christian Democrats, including PDC junta members Antonio Morales Erlich and Hector Dada Hirezi, and "young reform-minded officers" on the land reform law, which was to be promulgated on 6 March [173]. He has stated that he knew and knows nothing about all these intrigues [174]. Assuming Prosterman to have been an innocent outsider in what was happening around him, there would have been no particular reason for people in higher places to keep him informed of such matters at the time, though it seems odd that he gleaned nothing of it from either US, PDC or MJM sources whose positions were under direct threat from such a coup. That he should have found out nothing about these matters since 1980, despite years of concern with Salvadoran affairs and publication of a book in 1987 which includes a chapter on his work in El Salvador, rather undermines what claims he might make to being able to render a serious account of the politics of land reform in El Salvador.

21. There have, in fact, been a series of allegations made by critics of US policies in El Salvador since 1980 that Roy Prosterman was not an "innocent outsider" at all, but a conscious agent of covert US policies in which his land reform work was coordinated with the repressive work of the colonels to achieve the pacification of El Salvador. Before addressing these allegations, which go to the heart of the concerns of the present inquiry, it is essential to bring into the picture, in clearer focus, the question of the relations between the ANTEL colonels within the government of El Salvador, the Medrano/D'Aubuisson network, the landed oligarchy, the land reform proponents in and outside the government of El Salvador and the U.S.
Embassy between February, when Prosterman arrived in the country, and May, when certain events occurred that threw things into sharper perspective - and Mark Pearlman was brought in by Prosterman and Hammer to assist in the land reform program as it then stood.

22. If some sort of claim is to be sustained that the government of El Salvador was a "centrist" and reformist government, even after the dissolution of the first junta on 3 January 1980, then it would seem that either the Medrano/D'Aubuisson network must be shown to have been a rogue element, a sort of Salvadoran Organisation Armée Secrète [OAS] on the model of the terrorist group of that name put together by certain French colonels in Algeria in 1961-62 to resist President De Gaulle's concessions to the Algerian insurrection [175]; or that there was a division within the government between PDC and MJM land reformers on the one hand and hardline rightist elements on the other, with the former supporting land reform and the latter perpetrating mass repression. Political truth is seldom neat and clear and there seems to be some substance to each of these propositions at different points in time. There is also a third and seldom considered possibility: that even some of the hardline officers within the government were prepared, for their own reasons, to see many of the oligarchy's properties expropriated, both in order to quell the insurgent threat and in order to supplant the biggest oligarchs themselves and deepen the hold of the armed forces on the state and economy [176]. The challenge becomes locating Roy Prosterman, Michael Hammer and the US Embassy in this political vipers' nest.

23. Let us first consider the question of relations between the ANTEL colonels and the Medrano/D'Aubuisson network, along the lines of the "OAS" hypothesis. According to Craig Pyes, after the coup in October 1979 D'Aubuisson took himself off to Guatemala and there, financed by Guillermo Sol, Orlando De Sola and other big oligarchs who had removed themselves and hundreds of millions of dollars from El Salvador, re-established the nucleus of the ANSESAL command center [177]. Pyes makes no mention of the appointment of D'Aubuisson by Gutierrez as Director of ANSESAL immediately after the coup. This was the finding of Laurie Beckland in 1983 and Michael McClintock in 1984. Colonel Carranza confirmed D'Aubuisson's appointment and ANSESAL was reorganized under the designation Department 5 [D-5] Civic Affairs, in the Army General Staff Headquarters [178]. Nevertheless, Pyes was informed that D'Aubuisson made contact with the hardline Guatemalan death squad men of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional [MLN] led by Mario Sandoval Alarcon and with veterans of the French OAS itself, who had worked in Guatemala since the terror of the 1960's and in Argentina in the 1970's [179]. His account is confusing chronologically at this point, as he states that D'Aubuisson and his OAS/MLN advisers drew up "a secret plan for a campaign of terror aimed at seizing control of El Salvador's government" in April and May 1980, while he does not discuss the February plot [180].
24. According to another account, D'Aubuisson in fact travelled to the United States in April 1980 "hosted by the American Security Council and had meetings with a number of conservative senators and congressmen" before returning to El Salvador to attempt a coup [181]. There is no doubt that a further plot was hatched in April and early May, for on 7 May 1980 D'Aubuisson and twenty three others - two majors, four captains, five lieutenants and twelve civilians - were arrested by Colonel Majano at an estate outside San Salvador and documents in their possession were seized detailing assassination plots, terrorist organization strategies and coup plans [182]. It was McClintock who established that those arrested were not a rogue bunch at all, but under the protection of the ANTEL colonels:

"The active duty Army officers detained with D'Aubuisson...were not free-lance conspirators, but included leaders of the special intelligence group ANSESAL, acting on the authority of junta members Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez and Colonel Garcia, the Minister of Defense. Four years later...Carranza told an interviewer he was proud to have helped D'Aubuisson and ANSESAL at the time..." [183].

Their arrest precipitated a breach not between D'Aubuisson and the ANTEL colonels, but between Majano and the ANTEL colonels. Majano was stripped of his Army command by Gutierrez, Garcia and Carranza on 10 May. On 14 May D'Aubuisson and his co-conspirators were released unconditionally [184] According to Pyes, D'Aubuisson then wrote a letter to "a member of the high command" explaining his liaison with members of the OAS from Paris and Buenos Aires and that they had urged him "not to wait for the politicians to give the orders". All this, of course, suggests that so far from the Medrano/D'Aubuisson network being a rogue element at odds with the ANTEL colonels, the opposite was the case: the two groups were working together against the MJM and the PDC. To bring into focus the position of the US Embassy and the PDC in these things, we must return to the 22 February murder of Mario Zamora and what followed from it.

25. The killing of Zamora provoked strenuous protest from the PDC and demands for investigations into how it had happened. Since such investigations were not pursued by the internal security forces and it seemed to him that they were complicit in the slaying, Hector Dada Hirezi resigned from the second junta in protest on 3 March. Three days later, with Antonio Morales Erlich and Colonel Adolfo Majano still on the junta and Viera heading ISTA, on 6 March the long-awaited land reform law was promulgated. Immediately afterward, on 7 March, the ANTEL colonels declared a state of siege. This brought things to a head within the PDC. On 9 March Jose Napoleon Duarte, in the face of fierce dissent within the party, joined Morales Erlich and the ANTEL colonels in the junta, whereupon, on 10 March, repudiating Duarte's step, Roberto Lara Velado, Hector Dada Hirezi and the left wing of the PDC resigned from the party, denouncing the state of siege and the right wing of the party for its support of the ANTEL colonels. This is sufficient reason to describe the government of which Duarte was now a member as constituting a third junta. On 11 March Robert E. White presented his credentials as the new U.S. Ambassador, having been held up for some time by the objections of Senator Jesse Helms that White was
"an extreme leftist" whose arrival in El Salvador would be "like a torch tossed in a pool of oil" [185]. He could, indeed, scarcely have stepped into a more explosive situation.

26. Any serious attempt to get to resolve the apparent contradictions in US policies in El Salvador in 1980 must account for the appointment of Robert White, as US Ambassador to El Salvador at this critical time. Clearly a bete noire to the Salvadoran and American rightists, White was a man with a well-established record as a hardheaded American liberal who criticized the repressive policies of Stroessner, Somoza and Pinochet during major postings in Paraguay, Nicaragua and Chile in the 1970's [186]. If ever a U.S. Ambassador resembled in his character, his problems and his fate, the fictional US Ambassador to Sarkan, Gilbert MacWhite, in The Ugly American, it must be Robert White in 1980. In the film version of The Ugly American, released in 1962, starring Marlon Brando as Gilbert MacWhite, the latter is grilled by conservative US senators during hearings on his appointment, just as Robert White was challenged by Jesse Helms in 1979-80. In a "Factual Epilogue" to their book, written in 1957, William Lederer and Eugene Burdick commented of Gilbert MacWhite's fate:

"When we do get a good man - and, of course, we do get many, but not enough - we have a tendency to misuse them. The fictional Gilbert MacWhite of our book has his counterparts. He is an able, dedicated, intelligent man who puts tremendous energy into his work. In the end, in our story, he is forced to resign as much by his own sense of failure as by pressure from above." [187].

Robert White was to be forced to resign in February 1981, by the Reagan Administration and its new Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, because of his image among U.S. conservatives as a "social reformer".

27. A graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a Fulbright scholar to England, White had entered the US Foreign Service in 1955 at the age of twenty nine and had become a Latin America specialist. Of Irish Catholic stock and sturdy democratic persuasions and under instructions to encourage in El Salvador "something to the right of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua" [188], White signaled something of his temper within days of his arrival when, on 16 March, he attended Sunday mass celebrated by the outspoken Archbishop Oscar Romero who had, since 1977, become steadily more critical of the Salvadoran oligarchs and officers and by mid-March 1980 was denouncing the state of siege and declaring the right of an oppressed people to insurrection [189]. Just eight days later, on 24 March, Archbishop Romero was assassinated by an agent of D'Aubuisson's [190]. On 25 March the Carter Administration requested the US Congress to authorize some $5.7 million in emergency military aid to the Salvadoran security forces [191]. On 26 March the third junta was shaken when a further wave of government officials resigned in protest at the repression under the state of siege. They included Vice Minister of Agriculture Jorge Alberto Villcorta Munoz, Oscar Menjivar (Under Secretary for the Economy), Eduardo Colindres (Minister of Education), Rene Francisco Guerra y Guerra (Under Secretary of the Interior), Guillermo Quinonez (General Director of Health), Ruben Zamora, Hector Dada Hirezi (Minister for Foreign Affairs) and others. Meanwhile, Ambassador White found himself at odds with the CIA Station Chief, whom he later described as "a man with an incorrigible bent to
the right" [192]. He also found himself at odds with those back in Washington who believed that arms were the chief need in El Salvador. When the 7 May arrest of D'Aubuisson and his cohorts led White to support Majano, he found himself literally under siege by the Salvadoran right, his residence being surrounded by 100 PAN members who shouted "White is Red" and "Viva Reagan, Viva Jesse Helms" [193] and thereafter he found himself under siege by the U.S. right until he was sacked by the Reagan administration eight months later.

28. That reform and repression were not regarded as coordinated strategies for "pacification", from the point of view of those who resigned from the first and second juntas on 3 January and 3 March 1980 and from the government cabinet or administration in January and March 1980, must be established with some emphasis. It is most evident from the various letters of resignation which these numerous responsible officials submitted at those times. It should also be noted that these letters were open letters and were entered into the records of US Congressional hearings in 1981, thus being easily available to people seeking after that time to render a serious account of the politics of land reform in El Salvador. In their letter of resignation dated 3 January 1980, Guillermo Ungo and Roman Mayorga wrote:

"This new national project [the reforms proposed by the first junta after the 15 October 1979 coup d'état] clearly meant a break with the political-military framework which had prevailed for many decades. Further, it required the will to confront the minority interests of the Right, who would be hurt by the loss of their economic and political power. Unfortunately, the circumstances have substantially changed. Those minority interests have been strengthened daily, planning as they have been to return to the previous frameworks of former governments, temporizing, creating obstacles and finally impeding the developments set out in the Armed Forces Proclamation..." [194]

In their letter of resignation of the same date, Salvador Samayoa, Minister of Education, Enrique Alvarez Cordoba, Minister of Agriculture, Claudio Tona Velasco, President of the Agricultural Development Bank, and their colleagues, wrote:

"We took office with the conviction, not exempt from doubts, that an important sector of the Armed Forces was committed to supporting...a political project with an authentically popular content...Today events have demonstrated without a trace of doubt that the opposite has in fact occurred. We have been forced to submit ourselves to humiliations and threats, both subtle and blatant, on the part of certain commanders...they have let us know that, in their eyes, we have been "seated" in the government because they "put us there" and that they do not need us to do what needs to be done in this country...

We regret that the progressive sector of the Military Youth has been unable to proceed in a coherent manner with its own diagnosis of the present situation. We likewise regret that a Right that is both ignorant and unscrupulous continues to control the destiny of our people and, with such irresponsibility, has crushed our country's last chance for a democratic and peaceful solution of its crisis.

We now realize that, from the beginning, this political project was a manoeuvre against the people. Nevertheless, we do not regret having been part of the government, having committed all our energies and skills so that things could turn out differently. But we would spend a lifetime regretting any further collaboration with this government, now that everything is so very clear. Perhaps some of us - military and civilians - were naive at the beginning, but we are not willing to be dishonest at the end." [195]
Breaking irrevocably with the PDC on 10 March 1980, Hector Dada Hirezi, Roberto Lara Velado, Alberto Arene, Ruben Zamora and others wrote:

"...Regarding the program of structural reforms proposed by the party, we wish to make clear our complete agreement with and complete support for such reforms. Nonetheless, as we have also clearly stated, a program of "reforms with repression" runs contrary to the fundamentals of Christian Democracy. Agrarian reform must encompass not only the taking of lands from the major estate owners, but above all the economic and political participation of the peasant organizations. This has always been the position of the Christian Democratic Party. Elsewise, there is no explanation for our party having condemned the agrarian transformation of the National Conciliation Party as exclusionary of free and organized peasant participation, lacking of any support from organized peasant groups and, in fewer words, technocratic and authoritarian. How can this process succeed if the peasants are repressed on a daily basis merely for organizing themselves? How can this process hope to reach fruition when the organizations representing thousands of peasants have not even been consulted while, to the contrary, the daily and growing repression against those organizations renders impossible any dialogue with them? How can this process serve democracy, if far from the democratic framework in which the Party envisioned it taking place, it is carried out under a state of siege? It is because of these inconsistencies that we have struggled within the Party for an end to the repression and to resist the special war of counterinsurgency. However, given the present Party leadership, none of our pleas has been accorded any importance." [196]

On 26 March, Dada, Zamora [brother of the murdered Attorney General], Villacorta, Menjivar, Colindres, Quinonez and Guerra y Guerra resigned from the government, along with Alberto Arene, President of the Institute for Improving Cooperatives, Raul Valiente, Minister for Public Works, Roberto Badia, Minister of Public Health, Jorge Alberto Acosta, Arene's deputy, Mario Cerna Torres, Under Secretary of the Social Security Institute, Jose Jorge Simon Jacir, President of the Institute for Industrial Development and Luis Buitrago and Gabriel Siri, President and Vice-President of the Central Bank. The evidence seems convincing that the land reform as such was not conceived by this multitude of public officials and PDC leaders to be a diversion linked with repressive "pacification". Yet it suggests equally that the land reform was so conceived by some at least of the conservative leaders of the PDC and hardline officers in the "security" forces. Where did the US Embassy and the AIFLD team stand in this imbroglio?

29. The first critical accounts of US involvement in the 1980 land reform program in El Salvador did not appear until late in 1980. In November 1980, as the debate on El Salvador within the United States began to become heated, one critic wrote of agrarian reform in El Salvador:

"...reform and repression in El Salvador are complementary parts of a single US strategy to defeat the popular and revolutionary forces and to retain US control over that country through a ruling junta. Reform and repression are not, as the Carter Administration would have us believe, two opposing forces, the one to be supported, the other lamented. Rather, they are both essential parts of a single design for El Salvador..." [197]

A few months later, with a number of American citizens having been killed in El Salvador in the interval, including Michael Hammer and Mark Pearlman, another critic wrote that Roy Prosterman had worked hand in hand with Robert Komer in South Vietnam on pacification in the late 1960's and that he was doing the same CIA-directed work in El Salvador in 1980 [198]. This latter critic was a certain Peter Shiras.
Prosterman was offered right of reply, in the journal that published the allegations of Shiras, and he responded:

"Mr. Shiras' argument is flawed in its history, since, so far from being part of our government's "united strategy" in South Vietnam, the US State Department and the Agency for International Development had to be dragged kicking and screaming to a position of support for a major land reform - which did not come until the 1970's, in the twilight of US involvement...

My actual views...are that land reform and repression in South Vietnam as in El Salvador, so far from being "part and parcel of a united strategy" in fact operate at total cross purposes. A "reign of terror" or a "Phoenix program" such as Mr. Shiras alludes to, is wholly inconsistent with both the agricultural and political purposes of land reform." [199]

The account given in this study of Prosterman's work in South Vietnam lends the clearest possible confirmation to his retort to Shiras. The situation into which Prosterman had ventured in 1980, however, was so complex that the suspicions of his critics warrant closer examination.

30. A solid, representative critical account of Roy Prosterman and AIFLD's work on land reform in El Salvador to date is that written by Jenny Pearce in 1981. Pearce unfortunately provided no sources for much of her information, though in general it appears to be accurate, but her account is worth quoting at some length because it tallies so well with what have become widespread critical perceptions of the US role in the promulgation of the land reform in El Salvador on 6 March 1980 and its subsequent fate. Having barely forestalled the coup plans of Medrano, D'Aubuisson, Carranza, Garcia and other officers, the US Embassy, still, in late February, headed by James Cheek, sought to prompt the second junta to undertake what Cheek had described, back in December 1979, as a "clean counter-insurgency" in combination with certain reforms calculated to stem the process of political polarization that was threatening to tear the country apart [200]. Here we pick up Pearce's account of the coming of the land reform:

"The United States urgently needed a major initiative to bolster the junta, which it, almost alone, supported. The urgency is vividly illustrated by the story that in late February, shortly after the attempted right-wing coup, two State Department representatives had rushed to a hospital in Houston, Texas, where Colonel Gutierrez was recovering from an operation. They told him he had to return to El Salvador immediately to implement a land reform...

An agrarian reform had been planned since the fall of General Romero. Large numbers of AIFLD employees had entered the country at the time, taking over two floors of the Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador. AIFLD became the main instrument for channeling United States government recommendations on agrarian policy to the Salvadoran military. An AIFLD consultant, Roy Prosterman, arrived in the country in February to advise on the reform which was largely drawn up by and financed by the United States.

The announcement of the reform took a number of people by surprise. It had been drawn up in secret and even the technical personnel of the Ministry of Agriculture had not been consulted. Nor had the Church, the universities or the peasant organizations (except for the AIFLD-backed UCS). Only top ministerial officials, the military supreme command and the United States participated in designing a reform which struck experts immediately by the lack of planning and preparation which had gone into it..." [201]

It is regrettable that Pearce failed to list her sources of information, since several details here are most difficult to verify.
31. The story about Gutiérrez being in Houston and receiving the visit described by Pearce is not recorded in any other source known to the present author. The story that large numbers of AIFLD personnel entered the country immediately after the 15 October 1979 coup and took up two floors of the Sheraton Hotel is more widely reported, but it appears to be a rumor which has not been substantiated and has not been confirmed by AIFLD personnel interviewed by the present author. As for the land reform being drawn up "in secret", the basis for this claim appears tenuous, since Ivo Alvarenga, whose 1971 draft proposals formed the basis of the initial land reform law of 6 March, chaired a planning group which, until 3 January included Minister of Agriculture Enrique Alvarez, and which produced a law endorsed by second junta Vice Minister of Agriculture Jorge Villacorta, before his resignation on 26 March. That resignation was over the repression and not over alleged irregularities in the drafting of the land reform basic law. Ivo Alvarenga was later to write an open letter of over one hundred pages to his former MNR colleague, Hector Ogueli, by then in the Frente Democratico Revolucionario [FDR], setting out his belief that the land reform law was not a US counterinsurgency scheme, but a genuine law whose main lines had long been mediated by Salvadoran reformers who had no discernible links with the US and no affinities with the men of the death squads. There are, therefore, difficulties for the critical account of the motives and character of US involvement in the coming of the land reform. That a land reform was envisioned from the time of the October coup onwards, as Pearce wrote, is the baseline from which to reason that the idea of land reform as such was common to political groups across a broad front and it is, therefore, to their various motives at various turning points that close attention must be paid if a faithful account is to be reconstructed of who intended what and when and in alliance with whom.

32. The Basic Law on Agrarian Reform, as promulgated on 6 March 1980 as Decrees 153 and 154, consisted of a two phase program calculated to reduce the 2,000 or so biggest rural properties in El Salvador to a common level of between 100 and 150 hectares, or 247 to 370 acres. Phase I concerned properties exceeding 500 hectares, of which there were estimated to be 470, the fifty or sixty largest of which averaged 2,500 hectares. The 470 Phase I properties belonged to some 200 proprietors and these represented much of the cream of the oligarchic landed patrimony. Phase II affected properties ranging in size from 150 to 500 hectares, of which there were an estimated 1,788. The number of Phase II proprietors does not appear to have been specified in US documentation of the land reform process. Of the country's total land surface area of some 2,098,000 hectares, of which, in the 1971 Census of Agriculture some 1,500,000 were deemed arable, some 890,366 hectares were held in properties not exceeding 100 hectares [202] Of these, some 607,000 hectares were owned by roughly 34,000 farmers in units of between 5 and 100 hectares; while the remaining 283,000 hectares were divided into some 235,000 micro-farms of 5 hectares or less. Some 49% of the cultivated land was owned by 2% of landowners in properties exceeding 50 hectares; these 4,179 owners aggregating 715,682 hectares between them. No less than 64% of arable land was held by 4% of landowners in 1971 and all available evidence indicates that this distribution worsened quite dramatically in the eight years
between the 1971 census of agriculture and the 1979 coup d'etat [203] Even on the basis of the 1971 figures, if Phases I and II of the Basic Law of 1980 had been fully implemented, the top 2% of landowners would have remained the top 2% of landowners, so radically was ownership before the reform skewed in their favor. In other words, their violent resistance was to a reform that would have left them in a still highly favorable economic and social position within Salvadoran society. Phase II was, however, first postponed, then revised, then aborted completely [204]; while Phase I became the subject of endless strife, confusion and sabotage.

33. On 18 April 1980, the CRM and FDS formed a leftist coalition under the name Frente Democratico Revolucionario [FDR]. Ten days later, on 28 April 1980, Decree 207 was promulgated by the third junta, adding to the land reform of the Basic Law a Phase III, under the rubric "Land to the Tiller". This part of the land reform does appear to have been especially designed and urged by Roy Prosterman and to have taken place after the architects of the Basic Law had, in many case, resigned from the government at the end of March. It provided for the turning over of ownership to tenants of the land they farmed on properties under 100 hectares in extent. It is this part of the land reform which came under particular criticism from various quarters, including internal AID sources, for its alleged inappropriateness in the Salvadoran context and the manner in which it was foisted upon ISTA and MAG. In this connection, it is worth returning to Pearce's critical summation of the US role in the whole process. Having cited a much-quoted OXFAM study of 1981 on the defects of Phase III from an ecological and economic point of view, Pearce went on to observe:

"The problem was that Land to the Tiller had been developed for Vietnam by the same Roy Prosterman who now tried to apply it to El Salvador, with neither knowledge nor experience of the country. As the program had primarily political aims, this problem had not concerned its authors. In Vietnam, Land to the Tiller had been part of a rural pacification program known as Operation Phoenix. Prosterman believed that this kind of land reform, which basically rewarded loyal peasants with small plots while others were often terrorized and murdered (Prosterman denies being involved in the repression), would pave the way for a non-Marxist road to social change. As one US official commented on Land to the Tiller: "There is no-one more conservative than a small farmer. We're going to breed capitalists like rabbits." A US government memorandum quotes Prosterman's own justification for the program: "A key AIFLD consultant, University of Washington Law Professor Roy Prosterman, and his associate Mary Temple, urge us to look on the program - if not already too late - as a last chance to save El Salvador from a takeover by "a far-left so extreme the comparison with Pol Pot's reign in Cambodia would not be far-fetched." [205]

This quotation from the writing of Roy Prosterman and Mary Temple provides a useful lead into a more comprehensive assessment of their links with AIFLD and the land reform program, but to set the whole matter in a perspective from which we may reflect back on the sort of position against the land reform which the Wall Street Journal espoused in 1982 and which was quoted at length at the beginning of this chapter, the land reform process must first be depicted from more angles again than that of its critics on the left. Let us consider it, in turn, as recollected by a senior AID officer who was there at the time, in Peter Askin; an AIFLD technician who has been involved in El Salvador on and off since at least 1973 and has defended the program in print a number of times in recent years, in John Strasma; and then as seen by Roy Prosterman himself in his own published account of the matter.
Looking back on the 1979-80 events from his State Department office in 1985, Peter Askin offered the following summary of what had occurred as regards the coming of land reform:

"Enrique Alvarez Cordoba was the first person to sit down and try to work it out, with Jorge Villacorta - then they all just left, you see...Now, I do not know what the exact extent of the influence of Roy Prosterman or the U.S. Government was, but something dramatic had to be done and that something was land reform. The countryside was polarizing rapidly. Five ministries and three hundred fincas were occupied and the Army didn't know what to do. The junta's response was, let's not do what Romero did and fight force with force, let's dialogue and that simply didn't work and that's why the first junta flew apart...But the architect of agrarian reform was gone and when the third junta decided to get on with it, they had no program. So Viera turned to AIFLD and Mike Hammer. He was experienced and savvy, but he couldn't draw up a law...Villacorta left for Costa Rica, his life was threatened so much. AIFLD turned to the Land Tenure Center, which was not too interested, so they turned to Prosterman. I can tell you, though Senator Jesse Helms would like to tell you otherwise, that we as an aid agency were caught literally unawares on this thing...The Christian Democrats feel that land reform has been their area for many years, but while they claim they had a plan, I don't think they did...The military was damned scared over Nicaragua. Many officers regarded land reform as necessary to halt polarization and take a tremendously big arrow out of the quiver of the insurgents. I believe it did help to halt polarization..." [206].

In the perspective of the critical accounts of the matter by Wheaton, Shiras, Pearce and others, this is a fascinating and significant, if chronologically and politically somewhat muddled account of the matter.

Note that Askin saw Alvarez and Villacorta as the architects of land reform, not AIFLD or Prosterman. Alvarez, of course, left the government and joined the insurgent opposition on 3 January 1980. Askin confused the resignation of Alvarez [3 January 1980] and the resignation and flight into Costa Rica of Villacorta [26 March 1980] and dated Viera's appeal to AIFLD to the time of the third junta, which suggests mid or late March, whereas it occurred in mid or late January in the first two weeks of the second junta. Note further, that Askin introduced a detail missing from the critical accounts: i.e. that AIFLD, having been contacted by Viera, turned first to the Land Tenure Center [LTC], in Madison Wisconsin, but found no willingness there to get involved and then turned to Roy Prosterman. Were this the case, it would interpose a step between Hammer and Prosterman and allow a further ground for a possible argument that Prosterman was not affiliated with Hammer's well-established covert operation. It was not the case. According to William Thiesenhusen, of the LTC, he and Don Kanel at LTC were not contacted until late March and then by AID, not by AIFLD, and when they went to El Salvador they found Roy Prosterman already at work [207]. They were there at the time Archbishop Romero was assassinated and they declined to get involved any further, believing the situation to be out of control [208].

Askin's claim that the Army "didn't know what to do" and that the first junta did not want to use force, tried dialogue with the left and found that it "didn't work and that's why the first junta flew apart" may be a sincere recollection of what appeared to happen in late 1979, but it is clearly confused as regards motives,
judgements and factions within the first junta. Finally, his observation that AID was "caught literally unawares on this thing" reveals in a flash the set of priorities that AID had operated under since 1961 in El Salvador. As Dwight Steen had been told in 1977: AID did not "do land reform". Assuming that Askin was a middle echelon US official, who did not have access to the arcane and esoteric of US policies, or the pudenda of El Salvador's internal security organs, we might consider his muddled, but illuminating account of events representative of how things appeared to most people working in the US Embassy in San Salvador and in the State Department in Washington at the time. Retrospective published accounts, however, must meet higher standards of accuracy and critical assessment and it is interesting, therefore, to turn from Askin's "oral history" to the written histories offered over the past couple of years by Strasma and Prosterman.

37. John Strasma's account of the meaning and process of the land reform has been presented in a number of publications and addresses since at least 1985. The following excerpts from several of these seem to me to convey the gist of his argument over time:

"...Both the Left and Right demonstrated for change, but there was no consensus on a leader. Some conservatives urged repression; they looked nostalgically to 1932, when the army ended rural protests by killing about 30,000 campesinos. Instead, in 1979, reform-minded younger officers overthrew General Romero, the latest in a series of conservative army officers who ran the country for fifty years. The rebels asked the Christian Democrats for help; they agreed in exchange for agrarian reform and nationalization of the banks and coffee and sugar exports. The country pulled back from chaos, but rightist death squads in civilian clothes still killed hundreds of labor leaders and others suspected of holding leftist views, and a loose coalition of leftist groups began guerrilla warfare in the hills." [209]

"In El Salvador, the U.S. government is not on the wrong side...The land reform launched by the radical military-civilian junta of 1979-80 is slowly being consolidated at 60% of its potential goals...The reform itself was a Salvadoran idea, urged by both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. However, the Christian Democrats under Duarte carried it out, while the Social Democrats joined the guerrillas. The land reform had solid backing from the US under both President Carter and President Reagan. In 1982, this backing was crucial in preventing the Right from reversing the land reform when it was in power." [210]

"Land reform was hardly a new idea in El Salvador in 1980; it had been part of the platforms of Christian Democrats and other parties for years...However, little had been done because they were never in power...The coup of 1979 by younger reform-minded officers changed all that and reform was suddenly transformed from theoretical possibility to contentious policy..." [211]

The disconcerting thing about this superficially reasonable account of events is that it completely occludes critical reflection on the knotted and violent politics attendant on the land reform process Strasma describes as being consolidated by the mid-1980's. His brief, but suggestive account of the 1979 coup completely omits the double character of the thing and his description of the ANTEL colonels who approached the PDC in January 1980 as "the rebels" could only be justified if he was prepared to show that these officers were reformers at odds with the hardline death squad men and the oligarchs, but in fact they were the hardline death squad men and were rebels, if at all, only in the sense that they intended to preserve Army rule, if
necessary at the expense of some of the privileges of some of the top oligarchs. His claim that the Reagan administration, as well as the Carter administration, gave "solid backing" to the land reform is tendentious at best and brushes aside a whole crucial dimension of debate over US policy priorities in El Salvador, especially from 1981 onwards. His claim that the program was, by 1986, being "consolidated at 60% of its potential goals" is quite misleading, since, from May 1980 onwards, with the abortion of Phase II and the declension in scope of Phase III, the scope of the program dropped by well over half and perhaps more than two thirds, so that according to AID's own reckoning in 1986, it left more than 80% of the country's landless completely outside even the potential scope of the program [212]. It is hard to interpret Strasma's account as other than a rather feeble apologia for US policies in El Salvador; an apologia which does nothing to address, let alone confute, the chief suspicions and complaints of the critics of those policies.

38. For reasons that will be evident by now, no account of the land reform in El Salvador is of more intrinsic interest than that offered to us by Roy Prosterman. Professor Prosterman has been, as we have seen, an advocate of controversial land reform measures for over two decades and while there is no question of his anti-Communist political preferences, his critics on the left have gone so far as to allege that his work is not just anti-Communist in inspiration, but a self-conscious strategem of manipulative pacification. The whole spirit of the present inquiry into the nature and motivation of US involvement in land reform in relation to prospective radical revolution in such countries as the Philippines, Vietnam and El Salvador, demands that Prosterman's position and bona fides be subjected to the most searching and scrupulous cross-examination. The following excerpt, from his more or less definitive account of the land reform question in El Salvador, as he sees it, may serve as a sound point of departure for such a cross-examination, I think:

"The overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua...intensified concern within El Salvador over whether a non-revolutionary and reformist alternative might still be found for that country. It was against this background that moderate officers overthrew the dictatorship of...Romero on 15 October 1979 in a bloodless coup led by two army colonels, Jaime Abdul Gutierrez and Adolfo Arnoldo Majano...

The initial junta fell apart on January 3 1980, its three civilian members along with a number of cabinet members ascribing their resignations to their inability either to control the continuing unrest, particularly the campaign of violence abetted by the extreme right-wing elements of the security forces, or to reach definitive accord on a reform program. When Gutierrez, Majano and their allies among the moderate and progressive elements of the military then sought to enlist the Christian Democrats in the formation of a new government, the latter demanded as their price for joining the junta the quick promulgation of the promised reforms, especially land reform. This condition was accepted and a second junta was formed on January 9..." [213].

The first point to note is that, like Strasma, Prosterman does not break down the coup-makers into factions or provide an account of who the "moderate officers" were and who the hardliners were. This obfuscates critical problems. Let it be noted that this is true not only of the above paragraph, but of the sum total of Prosterman's published work and that it has not been resolved through correspondence with him on the part of the present author. Guerra y Guerra has vanished from the record and Gutierrez has usurped his place twice over, as it were. That Gutierrez is presented as allied with Majano in approaching the PDC in
January 1980 is not in itself incorrect, but it is misleading, especially given the rift that grew between Gutierrez and Majano in the following months. Nowhere in his work does Prosterman address this rift and what it meant. Nor does he anywhere record, or reflect on, the mass resignations of officials of the second and third juntas in March 1980, whose outlook, on the face of things, should have seemed to him to be the closest to his own. These considerations alone constitute grounds enough for critics on the left, even the moderate left, to regard Prosterman with less than complete confidence, I think. If one is not disposed to dismiss him at such a juncture as lacking in political seriousness, or to go further and accept the allegations of the left that he is a counter-insurgency strategist, perhaps even a CIA operations officer, not a pro-peasant reformer as he claims, then his account of things simply must be squeezed until some more tenable position can be established from which to assess his work, or it can be demonstrated that his critics may indeed be correct.

39. Walter LaFeber, in his recent study of the secular crisis in Central America and the US role in it, attributed to Roy Prosterman authorship not only of the land reforms in Vietnam and El Salvador but also "in Japan and Korea in the forties" [214]. An innocent enough error, presumably based on Prosterman's indefatiguable invocation of the East Asia [Japan, South Korea, Taiwan] land reforms as models of "democratic" land reform. It is, however, indicative of a disconcerting vagueness of detail in the history of US policy regarding land reform since the Second World War, which is by no means confined to the work of that particular historian. Roy Prosterman was a schoolboy and college student in the 1940's and a university student in the 1950's and had nothing to do with the East Asia land reforms. As has been noted, in 1958 he graduated from Harvard Law School and joined Sullivan and Cromwell. He left them in 1965 to go to Seattle and it was only after this that he took an interest in problems of land law and land reform.

40. Let us imagine Prosterman to be "on trial" as a "counterinsurgency expert" and subject to the cross-examination of a hostile counsel for the prosecution. Would the latter not find irresistible the temptation to insinuate that Prosterman may have been recruited to "the Company" while at Sullivan and Cromwell, where the Dulles brothers had been associated for many years, and then sent to Seattle as a deep cover agent? Would he not suggest further that the long liaison with Mary Temple in New York, from at least 1967, was part of a well-concealed operation? And would he not point out that, by coincidence it may be, it was also in 1965 that Michael Hammer began his peasant leadership seminar for AIFLD in Washington D.C.; that Prosterman's first article on land reform was a piece titled "Land Reform in Latin America: How to Have a Revolution Without a Revolution" [215]; that he and Hammer worked in many of the same countries in Latin America between 1966 and 1980, and that it was to Prosterman that Hammer turned in January 1980 when he wanted someone to assist his protege, Jose Rodolfo Viera, and the UCS? Strangely enough, Prosterman's leftist critics have neglected to raise even such broad circumstantial insinuations as these, alluding instead only to his work in South Vietnam; alleging very loosely indeed that it was part of the Phoenix program and linking his name with that of
Robert Korner as a counterinsurgency mastermind. The result is a weak case for the prosecution, which both Prosterman's own arguments and the available evidence serve to confound with little effort. We have seen how the same is the case regarding all too many leftist attacks on US land reform policy in the cases of the Philippines and Vietnam. The would-be prosecutors defeat themselves by their lack of stringent attention to detail and the critique must be stringent or it serves no cognitive, though it may serve a political propagandistic function.

41. To drive home this point, it is worth reflecting on Roy Prosterman's anti-Communism, with its roots in longstanding American "Jeffersonian" traditions. In his 1981 response to Shiras, he asked what would be the consequences of a withdrawal of US support for the [third] junta in El Salvador: a quick, painless FMLN/FDR victory and rapid transition to a democratic and prosperous El Salvador? He did not believe so, he wrote. To the contrary. Observing that there remained powerful support for conservative options in El Salvador, he predicted that the immediate result would be a right-wing coup. He added:

"The unfettered Right would launch a 1932-style real reign of terror and would simultaneously attempt to reverse and dismantle the reforms. The impact of such repression and attempted reversal would be to dramatically increase the numbers of those in armed opposition to the government - and a civil conflict would commence between two well-matched and utterly polarized extremes, each probably drawing on support from outside (the far-right forces almost certainly from Guatemala and quite likely from Argentina). The ultimate result, after incalculable death, hunger and suffering, might be a government of the Frente, or of an extreme Pol Pot faction on the Left, or of ex-Major D'Aubuisson or the 'death squads' on the extreme right. No-one can claim the ability to predict the result of such a conflict." [216]

I do not believe this can be gainsaid by mere ideological assertions about the benefits, real or imaginary, or the inevitable victory of revolutionary socialism.

42. As an example of a putative radical solution preferred by some of Prosterman's critics on the left, consider the conclusion by Pearce to Under The Eagle, written in 1981:

"Many apparently radical Third World governments have felt compelled by the dependence and vulnerability of their economies to modify their objectives in accordance with their need to attract foreign aid and investment. Only governments which totally reject incorporation into the present world economic system and who refuse to allow their economic and social development to be determined by the needs of international big business would be completely incompatible with the United States' interests. The Reagan Administration has not yet shown signs of appreciating these subtle distinctions. However, even if it were to do so and permit the opposition forces in El Salvador and elsewhere in the region to come to power...it would never tolerate the latter type of government, which, it could be argued, would be the only kind to allow the possibility of a truly democratic society with social justice for all." [217]

Unfortunately, the italicized phrases here, surely the keynote in Pearce's critical leftist worldview, must be met with the greatest scepticism. Superficially attractive and rational as her proffered solution may appear, the recent histories of countries like Albania, Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma and even Peru would suggest that
the option is, in dismal empirical fact, by no means an assured path to democracy, economic achievement or social justice for all. Prosterman, it is clear, sees the Marxist-Leninist left in terms of Chekist death squads, Stalinist mass murder, the calamities of Stalin's Great Turn and Mao's Great Leap Forward, the unimpressive record of command economies, the sinister closure of totalitarian societies and the horrors of Pol Pot's rule in Cambodia. However appalled one may be at Central American realities and however sceptical as to U.S. motives and policies there, Prosterman cannot, in all reason, in the 1980's, be hauled over the coals for eschewing Marxist-Leninist paths to social justice.

43. The line of critique Prosterman is open to springs not from the premises of his leftist critics, but from his own principles and application of them to his account of political realities in El Salvador and the United States in the 1980's. Consider Prosterman's admonition to his critics in his reply to Shiras:

"In a situation such as El Salvador's, where many lives are at stake, there are particularly important obligations; in any discussion of what U.S. policy should be, to be careful in getting the facts right, to be clear on what actions one wishes the U.S. to take based on those facts, and to be scrupulously honest about the likely consequences of those actions for the people of El Salvador. If the U.S. had a magic wand that it could wave, ending all the killing and transforming the Salvadoran government instantly into a Swedish-style democracy, the case for waving it would be very strong. Unfortunately, there is no course of action available that can lead to such an unambiguous, rapid and benevolent outcome. There are some courses of action, however - especially if the land reform is made a whipping boy for frustrations over entirely different policies - that can create an outcome an order of magnitude worse than what El Salvador is experiencing now." [218]

In the first place, the exasperated critic is entitled to retort: let the State Department, the White House, the Pentagon, the CIA apply such standards to themselves, with all their vast apparatus for ascertaining "the facts" and for "discussion" before holding court over those who, with far more meagre resources, view "the facts" critically and dare to dissent from official statements about them. In the second place, talk of magic wands and Swedish-style democracy seems patronizing toward Salvadoran democrats who have been striving for decades, without benefit of any magic wands, to attain basic democratic norms in their country; and laughable in the context of a US "security" policy in El Salvador which has placed secret obstacles in the path of these democrats, not excluding lethal traps.

44. Even on the most innocent reading of his own work and motives in El Salvador, Prosterman must be asked whether, in his zeal for the middle way, as he saw it, he had ever stopped to assess what had been occurring in El Salvador for many years before he personally took an interest in its problems. Why does he overlook the origins and work of ANSESAL, ORDEN and ANTEL? In response to a specific inquiry, he has stated that he does not know what ANSESAL was and knows of ANTEL only as "the telephone company" [219]. Why does he not discuss the dissolution of the second junta and the schism in the PDC in early March 1980, when the issue was precisely that contradiction between reform and repression which he himself, in 1981, claimed was his concern? Why is he so vague about the colonels and their politics? In response to
specific inquiries on this head, he has stated that he knows nothing about the career of Gutierrez before October 1979, can name none of the "young reform minded officers" around Gutierrez in 1979-80 except Colonel Torres (who headed FINATA, the Phase III implementing agency, when it was set up) and has never heard of Roland Kelley or Bull Simons [220]. He has glossed over the suspicions that AIFLD has CIA connections and that Hammer was running a CIA operation. He has stated that description of Hammer or Doherty as "CIA agents" would be "libelous" and manifest a "deliberate and even reckless disregard for the truth" and that, in any case, he is not aware of any such allegations even from the "wilder elements of the left" [221] This would appear to indicate that he has not read Agee, Kwitny, Bonner, McClintock, Wheaton or Barry, which is a strange omission on the part of someone writing a historical account of what happened in El Salvador in the 1980's. Moreover, the vehemence with which he repudiates the very idea that Hammer or Doherty may have been CIA agents does not conform with his professed complete ignorance about the details of the case. Why does he ignore the histories of FECCAS and UTC and other peasant organizations in El Salvador, discussing only the role of UCS? Why have his leftist critics not raised these questions before now? By any reasonable standard, the errors and omissions in his account of events in El Salvador are formidable for someone who has admonished his critics that one must be careful in getting the facts right and scrupulous in assessing the impact of U.S. policy on the people of El Salvador.

45. As in the case of Prosterman's work in South Vietnam (or Hardie's and McMillan's in the Philippines or Ladejinsky's in Japan for that matter), so with his work in El Salvador, his critics neglect to account for the debate within U.S. policy circles over land reform in relation to counterinsurgency priorities, so that it is all too easy to turn the flank of their attacks. The second half of 1980 featured intense debate over U.S. foreign policy priorities and this was carried over into the first years of the Reagan Administration. Prosterman's position is thrown into relief by a careful reading of his public criticism of Reagan Administration retrenchment on land reform, in the *New Republic* in August 1982, and of his criticism of AID's failure to provide adequate support to land reform in El Salvador throughout the Reagan years, in his 1987 book. Binding these criticisms together in 1987, he wrote:

"By summer (1980) the gathering momentum of the Reagan Presidential campaign led Salvador's far right to hope for reversal of U.S. support for the reforms, a hope that was inflamed after the election by a leaked 'transition team' report suggesting that pro-reform U.S. ambassadors in the region should be removed.

In June, Senator Jesse Helms succeeded - with virtually no public discussion or attention - in adding a provison to the 1980 U.S. foreign aid bill that specifically prohibited financing of land costs in the Salvadoran reform and even prohibited technical assistance for planning such financing.

Concomitantly, and almost certainly reinforced by the events just described, there was the upsurge in death squad activity directed at supporters of reform. This was starkly underlined in the case of the land reform by the assassinations of Jose Rodolfo Viera, Michael Hammer and Mark Pearlman in the coffee shop of the San Salvador Sheraton on January 3 1981." [222]
Echoing, as it were, Thomas Scoville's 1970 questions to Robert Komer, Prosterman and Riedinger in 1987 found that "throughout, many at AID and State have feared the power of Jesse Helms" [223]. They observed that "Washington's attention and that of the media focused increasingly on debates over military strategy" in the Reagan years and that when, in December 1983, Phase II was finally aborted, "the only visible reaction" was "a fatuous State/AID assertion that this effectively enacted Phase II" [224]. Nevertheless, for all their criticisms of program implementation, Prosterman and Riedinger at no point entertained the idea that U.S. policy in El Salvador required radical reassessment.

46. Between May and August 1980, 3,188 political killings were documented in El Salvador; between September and December another 3,364; and between January and April 1981 a total of another 7,780. This total of 14,332 political murders in a country of about 5,000,000 people, in the space of one year, is the statistical equivalent of about 600,000 such killings in the United States at the same time over the same period. In December 1980, Jeane Kirkpatrick described the regime in El Salvador as "moderately repressive" [225]. Colonel Sam Dickens of the American Legion declared in early 1981 that anyone trying to implement land reforms on the Salvadoran model in the United States would be "run out of the country on a rail" [226]. Of terror he did not speak. Kirkpatrick, reacting to the rape and murder of American missionaries, Dorothy Kazel, Ita Ford, Maura Clarke and Jean Donovan, by Salvadoran National Guardsmen, on 2 December 1980, dismissed them as agents of the FDR [227]; and concerning the murder of the FDR leaders, Enrique Alvarez Cordoba, Juan Chacon, Manuel Franco, Enrique Barrera and Humberto Mendoza by Army and National Guardsmen in uniform on 27 November 1980, she declared: "I must say that I find myself thinking that it's a reminder that people who live by the sword can expect to die by it." [228]. It seems clear that she did not mean by this remark that the ANTEL colonels and their cohorts deserved to be shot.

47. Jeanne Kirkpatrick was to write a book called Dictatorships and Double Standards and was for four years U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Her views and the views of Dickens were congruent with those of the Reagan aides who authored the November 1980 'transition team report' referred to by Prosterman and Riedinger. That report read in part, with evident reference to Ambassador Robert White:

"Ambassadors are not supposed to function in the capacity of social reformers and advocates of new theories of social change, with latitude to experiment within the country to which they are accredited." [229].

New theories of counterinsurgency, perhaps; new theories of social change, no. The poor were to be "carefully kept in their place" in the words of Frank Devine. On 6 March 1981, the anniversary of Decrees 153 and 154, President Reagan declared at a press conference, according to Prosterman and Riedinger, that his administration supported the land reform in El Salvador, but Robert White was sacked that very week [230].
48. Leaking of the transition team report coincided with the appearance of a
dissent paper, prepared by well-informed people within the US foreign policy
bureaucracies, which took a radical reassessment of U.S. policies in El Salvador to be
in order and described 1980 not as a year of dubious experiments with "social change"
in El Salvador, but as one of inexorable drift toward a counterinsurgency war-without-
exit. The coincident appearance of these two studies (or manifestos) marks a major watershed in US policy
in El Salvador and invites reflection on the policy histories iterated in the foregoing chapters of the present
inquiry. The Dissent Paper, in its very phrasing and perspectives on the uses of "intelligence" in policy
making, is redolent of the reflections of Daniel Ellsberg on *The Pentagon Papers* a decade earlier and
delineates clearly the path that the Reagan Administration did not take. It anticipated Robert White's biting
observations of March 1981 and after on the emasculation of foreign policy thinking by the rough riders of
the Reagan administration and constitutes a useful vantage point from which to look back to the Hardin
Report and on to the protracted expenditures of the Reagan Administration on small wars in Central
America:

"Candidate Reagan's foreign policy advisers have made deeply disturbing statements about their
plans for Central America and the Caribbean Basin. However, should President Reagan choose to use
military force in El Salvador, historians will be able to show that the setting for such actions had been
prepared in the last year of the Carter Administration...The views articulated in this paper are shared in
private by current and former officials at NSC, DoS, DoD and C.I.A. Employees from other agencies active
in El Salvador - but normally excluded from policy debates - also contributed to these notes...
The search for a non-military option in El Salvador must be urgently re-opened...the objective of
U.S. policy should be to promote the emergence of stable governments capable of effective management of
sorely needed reform programs...
Our support for a negotiated solution in El Salvador will serve notice to Guatemalan hardliners
that their time has run out. The chances for a less radical and a less traumatic transition in Guatemala will
be greatly improved...
Current policy, as we interpret it, is based on inaccurate intelligence and on the suppression within
various bureaucracies of verified contradicting information. The options and recommendations on which
policy decisions were made have been based on irresponsibly self-serving evaluations and analyses of
intelligence reports available within the agencies. Critiques and dissenting views were systematically
ignored. Underlying these apparent bureaucratic maladjustments one finds a fundamental lack of
understanding of general conditions and Central America and the Caribbean." [231].

The Dissent Paper's authors added that "gross misrepresentations" of the insurgent coalition, the
FMLN/FDR by conservative policy analysts in the U.S. were systematically blocking dialogue and
distorting communication on the conflict in El Salvador. The US government, they concluded, must seek a
"Zimbabwe solution" and meet with the FMLN and FDR leaders, not merely with "accomodating moderates
named by us beforehand, but with representatives of the toughest and least likely to compromise factions of
the coalition" [232]. The philosophic and ideological issues thus raised take us back to the debate on
China in the 1940's and run right through the bitter debates, still unresolved, on Vietnam. The position of
the Reagan Administration's leading figures on these issues was never in doubt.

49. The Reagan Administration advertised its outlook on the conflict in El
this paper before the US Congress that month, John Bushnell, Reagan spokesman, asserted that it contained proof of Soviet and Cuban material support for the FMLN. "This outside interference" he declared "dramatically changes the nature of the struggle in El Salvador from a national one to an international one with East-West dimensions". The White Paper was, as Robert White aptly phrased it "just an inept and hastily thrown together piece of propaganda" [233]. The "international dimensions" gambit was at best a rationalization of deep-seated prejudices and phobias, otherwise a crass and cynical species of "political truth" straight out of a novel by George Orwell. Given the twenty years of US material and logistic support for the internal security apparatus in El Salvador, never admitted to the US public, this conservative rhetoric about "outside interference" was hollow indeed. Nor will it do to brush off the implications of such deception and hypocrisy, either by vague chatter about a supposed "politics in the real world" or by allusion to the deceptions and hypocrisies practised by "the other side", since precisely what is at issue is the real character of the "real world" and since, even were the "real world" found to be the arena for a manichean struggle, as in sober fact it is not, it would still be the truth and not lies that we would have to know in order to resist the "other side".

50. What the White Paper signified was a deliberate occlusion of critical reflection on the real world and commitment to a demonological struggle against "Communism" and what Woodrow Wilson might have called "irrational revolution" in Central America. The certifications by President Reagan before the US Congress, on 28 January 1982, 27 July 1982, 21 January 1983 and 20 July 1983 that "progress" was being made on land reform and human rights in El Salvador and his veto on 30 November 1983 of a bill requiring further such certifications as conditions for continued U.S. aid to El Salvador, must be understood in this light. To reiterate the long and tawdry haggling over these certifications, dissecting them in search of meaning, like some ancient augur groping in the entrails of slaughtered creatures, would distract and weary the reader, or else would require monograph treatment on its own. After January 1981 no new initiatives were taken to extend the land reform in El Salvador and it became marginal to an interminable and exhausting war, which, as one US Embassy official confessed to Raymond Bonner in 1982, it intended to win, "and all the rest be damned" [234]

51. Among the many Salvadoran and American witnesses who appeared before the U.S. Congress in early 1981 in efforts to influence U.S. policy, three lucid democrats may be singled out as representing those "capable of effective management of sorely needed reform programs" in El Salvador. The policy of the Reagan Administration had consigned them to exile. They were young economist Carlos Frederico Paredes; Leonel Gomez Vides, former deputy director of ISTA under the slain Jose Rodolfo Viera; and the young officer and aide to Colonel Majano, Captain Ricardo Alejandro Fiallos. Opposed to them on that occasion were Enrique Altamirano and Manuel Enrique Hinds, ambassadors of the Salvadoran elite. All of them were, of course, addressing, in the US Congress, a body originally designed according to the political principles of Locke
and Montesquieu, concerning the balance of civil and political power, after an act of rebellion against unjust and arbitrary government. In that Congress, in 1848, Abraham Lincoln, Daniel Webster and John Quincy Adams had, without effect, denounced President James Polk's war of conquest against Mexico. In that Congress, in 1866, Thaddeus Stevens had, without success, called for radical land reform in the defeated slave states to fully emancipate black Americans. In that Congress, in 1952, Joseph McCarthy had denounced the alleged monstrous conspiracy on the part of Dean Acheson and George C. Marshall to hand over China and much of the outside world to totalitarian Communism. And in that Congress, just thirteen years earlier, in 1968, Senator Fulbright had discoursed with Senator Clifford Case, Senator Albert Gore, Crane Brinton, John T. McAlister and others on the nature of revolution. Mnemosyne would weep, however, in contemplating the historical amnesia that that Congress labored under in hearing the testimonies of Salvadorans in 1981; for against the pattern of the past those testimonies have a poignant resonance for those with ears to hear.

52. Carlos Frederico Paredes told the representatives of the American people:

"Gentlemen of the subcommittee, my name is Carlos Paredes. I am thirty years old and, although I am an economist by training, I have had varied experience in business, academia and politics. From 1975 to 1978 I was professor of development theory in the faculty of economics at the National University of El Salvador. In 1978, I was appointed director of the Department of Investment Promotion and Free Zone Development in the Salvadoran Institute of Foreign Trade. In October 1979, after the coup which toppled the regime of General Romero, I was asked to become the Director of Industry in the Ministry of Economics, a position which I held until May 1980. Finally, in June 1980, I joined the government cabinet as Under Secretary for Economic Planning.

On January 27, 1981, I resigned my position in the cabinet, as it had become clear to me that the civilian members of the government were unable to exert any control whatsoever over the security forces which, under the direction of the high command of the armed forces, were responsible for widespread violence and atrocities against the civilian population. Let us be clear in understanding that the overriding cause of the economic crisis in El Salvador is the violence which has occurred in the country during the past three years. This violence is the outgrowth of a long history of structural inequality and a political system which has enabled a small elite to monopolize the bulk of the country's wealth and has excluded the majority of Salvadorans from any meaningful political or economic participation...

[This] political conflict must be resolved before investing millions of dollars in aid, a large part of which is likely to wind up in Miami, along with the $1.5 billion which left the country between 1978 and 1980...

I am not among the group of businessmen who believe in seeking a violent solution to the problems which afflict my country. Nor do I believe, like some individuals, that both the political and demographic problems of El Salvador can be resolved through the elimination of the opposition, a process which would entail the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of people.

The problems of El Salvador will never be resolved through the kind of exclusionary solution sought by the extreme right. Rather, the solution to the current conflict must entail an entirely different process, one which entails the participation in the government by members of the Christian Democratic Party, the popular organizations, and, of course, the FDR, or opposition party in El Salvador. Such an approach would likewise require the implementation of reforms necessary for the modernization of capitalism...the establishment of a government characterized by broad social participation and a sense of justice." [235].

Like representatives of Chiang Kai-Shek, Ngo Dinh Diem or Nguyen Van Thieu before them, little characters in a familiar black opera, Altamirano and Hinds pleaded the innocence of the old regime in their
country, the wickedness of their enemies, the irrelevance or harmfulness of reforms, the need for more money and guns from the treasuries and arsenals of the United States of America to bolster its "friends" in their mortal struggle with "Communism" - all claims which, as we have seen, would be seconded by the editorial voice of the Wall Street Journal.

53. Altamirano's droll, inadvertent witticism, in remarking that the missionaries raped and slain in December 1980 had been killed "like many, many people in El Salvador, trying to run through a roadblock" [236], was a lie as a matter of empirical fact, which Secretary of State Alexander Haig also told around that time [237], but true enough as metaphor, if one considers the terminator machinery of ANSESAL/ORDEN/ANTEI and obdurate elite/military opposition to reforms to be a "roadblock" in the path of committed democrats and reformers. However, neither Haig nor Altamirano wanted to admit any such thing and both the Reagan Administration and the junta in El Salvador asserted, against all evidence to the contrary, that the terror in El Salvador was the work of uncontrollable elements outside of, or on the fringes of, the uncoordinated security forces of El Salvador. Altamirano's assertions to this effect at this particular hearing, in February 1981, above all his statement that the security forces were lacking in central coordination and control, fetched an immediate and vigorous interjection in unison from Paredes, Gomez and Fiallos:

"FIALLOS: Excuse me, sir. It is very important to clarify this point, with all due respect to Mr. Altamirano. I have been in the Army and I know that this division of power that he refers to does not exist. All orders, both to security forces and to the Army, come directly from the Defense Ministry...

PAREDES: We are fighting against the security forces of the Army and we are fighting right now against the High Command of the military forces of El Salvador.

GOMEZ: I think that is a very good point. We just want the Army under the law like the rest of us. That's all we want. We have a great deal of respect for this country. Just that we are here and that we have the ability to talk to people like you...

FIALLOS: I think it is of great encouragement, because I don't think if we were from Afghanistan or Poland we would have a similar situation in Moscow. And I want this to be part of the record. I really feel that..." [238].

The record of the hearings indicates that Fiallos's challenging evocation of Afghanistan and Poland and his appeal to American democratic ideology against American conservative ideology went begging. No-one on the subcommittee so much as asked him to clarify what he meant by the reference to these two cases of superpower interventionism in the internal affairs of small neighbours. It is significant and "of great encouragement" that he and his compatriots got the hearing that they did, but it was a less than adequate hearing and one which had a negligible impact on the foreign policy of the Reagan administration. Seven years after this hearing, of February 1981, Fiallos was still a political exile and the Reagan Administration remained committed to its small wars in Central America, while the Army in El Salvador remained the roadblock it had forever been to major reforms. By 1986 the FMLN was hardening itself into a unified Marxist-Leninist party and eighty per cent of El Salvador's rural poor remained outside the scope of a land reform program which in 1979-80 had been mooted as a means to the amelioration of their grievances,
while many of those within the program were struggling to make headway against the firm grip on the economy and political life still held by the landed, financial and military elites.

54. On 21 February 1984, there appeared an editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* calling attention to the problems of El Salvador's "reformed" agriculture and reminding sentimentalists at home that "if American politicians ever tried to inflict on American farmers what they have tried to inflict on Salvadoran farmers, they would quickly be handed their heads." Their heads, mark, not their hats. The phrase "American farmers" here must be read in the context of US history, with the clear comprehension that it does not refer to the majority of America's rural population in 1984, any more than in 1936, or 1920, or 1866, but to big farm interests and the financial and infrastructural agribusiness combines behind them. This editorial writer would, surely, look back, like Senator Fulbright of Arkansas, and see Reconstruction as a "very bad period" and Thaddeus Stevens as a dangerous "Jacobin". He would have no high regard for the New Deal and would, like George Peek or William Randolph Hearst, see Rexford Tugwell as a dangerous egghead or a "Bolshevik". This is on the assumption that he had looked back with any interest at all to such eras in America's past.

55. In such a view of history as this, even the right to insurrection admitted by Alexander Hamilton is not well remembered and rebels against abusive capitalism, conservative dictatorship, narrow and oppressive oligarchy, appear only as "terrorists", who must be compelled to submit to the yoke of "law and order" in the name of Hobbes. Their violence against elite presumption and old usage, or unhindered rule and profit, condemns them. There is nothing new, or democratic, or profound in such an outlook, however much so-called "neo-conservatives" or "realists" may espouse it. It may be found among the privileged and arrogant of all ages in history. Since the 1930's, if not the 1790's, Western conservatives have used the disasters and excesses of radical revolutions as shibboleths to ward off challenges to established orders of privilege and injustice.

56. It is, therefore, with a cold eye that one must read such pseudo-democratic rhetoric as that paraded by the editorial writer in the *Wall Street Journal* who, on 21 June 1984 - the perfect year for such writing - expostulated:

"...We wonder what would have happened if the [land] reform had been less ambitious and the U.S. money applied more heavily toward winning the war. The U.S. Congress seems to be more interested in vindicating the land reform than in the military struggle. In other words, the US has again badly scrambled its priorities. The Salvadoran people are paying the price..."[239]

Palimpsests like this, scribbled over the text of American and world history, would seem to have passed muster as "informed opinion" on Wall Street, to say nothing of the Reagan White House in 1984. It would seem presumptuous as well as naive to suggest that such opinion needed or needs "educating". The writers
and readers of the *Wall Street Journal*, after all, go to the best universities. Historical amnesia and distorted discourse are not the result of innocent ignorance alone, but of institutionalized practices of interest and power. Nor can those who would consider themselves historically reflective and accessible to critical reason hold out the serious prospect that radical and lasting solutions to the injustices of the world are to hand. Violences in oppression and rebellion, excesses of vengeance and hatred, will occur, therefore. They will occur amid the tragic furies and blind mendacities so inimitably described by Thucydides two and a half millennia ago in the first great work of reflective history. Those not so unfortunate as to be swept up in the strife and having the freedom to reflect upon it without immediate fear of violence, are left to ponder the furies and the mendacities in the hope that their records and reflections may prove useful to others, who, during abatements in the strife, seek to understand the tragedies which they witness.
CHAPTER 1: REVOLUTION

1. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1957. Writing in 1943-44, Polanyi appears to have believed he was witnessing the collapse of the capitalist world-system. His book was an effort to come to terms with the great crisis of 1914-45. Thus he wrote:

"No explanation can satisfy which does not account for the suddenness of the cataclysm. As if the forces of change had been pent up for a century, a torrent of events is pouring down on mankind. A social transformation of planetary range is being topped by wars of an unprecedented type in which a score of states crashed, and the contours of new empires are emerging out of a sea of blood. But this fact of demoniac violence is merely superimposed on a swift, silent current of change which swallows up the past often without so much as a ripple in the surface! A reasoned analysis of the catastrophe must account both for the tempestuous action and the quiet dissolution" (p. 4).

His central argument was that the liberal unregulated market mechanism, which began its work in England, took over the globe in the course of the nineteenth century, with fatal effect on traditional societies and states everywhere because of its completely indiscriminate impact on human beings ('labor') and the environment ('land') as market 'factors':

"A market economy must comprise all elements of industry, including labor, land and money ... But labor and land are no other than the human beings themselves of which every society consists and the natural surroundings in which it exists. To include them in the market mechanism means to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market" (p. 71).

But this, he argued, had the most alarming implications:

"...To allow the market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society; for the alleged commodity 'labor power' cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of a man's labor the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological and moral entity 'man' attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure, they would die as the victims of acute social distortion through vice, perversion, crime and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighbourhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the market administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to business as floods and droughts in primitive society..." (p.73).

Nearly half a century later, we are in an even better position than Polanyi to survey the social and ecological impact on the planet of the suction of 'labor' and 'land' into the modern world system.


FOOTNOTES
5. Thucydides, op. cit., pp. 242-244 and 400-408. His description of the strife at Corcyra and its place in the general conflagration of the Grecian world in 427 B.C. is among the most striking and memorable in his extraordinary history. Certainly, it compels one who would define 'revolution' in terms of 'modernization' and not in terms of 'insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups' etc. to refine the concept of 'modernization' so as to set its political repercussions apart from the political strife of earlier epochs. For nothing could be clearer, even if anachronistic translations do beguile the understanding, than the political and psychological similarities between the strife described by Thucydides and countless more recent power struggles. The Melian dialogue, of course, is among the most famous passages in historical literature, chiefly on account of the harsh words Thucydides put in the mouths of the Athenian ambassadors to the beleaguered Melians: "The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept."


7. Polybius, *The Rise of the Roman Empire*, Bk. VI:9, Penguin, 1979 (trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert), p. 309. Scott-Kilvert renders *politeion anacyclosis* "the cycle of political revolution, the law of nature according to which constitutions change, are transformed, and finally revert to their original form."

8. Cicero's usages are discussed by Hatto, loc. cit., p. 501.

9. Hannah Arendt noted Machiavelli's use of Cicero's terminology (*mutatio rerum/mutazioni del stato*) "in his descriptions of forcible overthrow of rulers and the substitution of one form of government for another." That Machiavelli did not use the term *revoluzioni*, Arendt took as an opening up of the conceptual space into which the world 'revolution' was to move more than two hundred years later: for Machiavelli, she observed, was concerned to discover a political truth on the basis of which the classic cycle of changes could be ended and "a permanent, lasting, enduring body politic" be founded. The extent to which this was the beginning of a break with classical political theory should not, perhaps, be exaggerated, since Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero were all alike concerned with the durability of constitutional forms. Machiavelli's thought broke most significantly with Christian political theory and became a major text for modern secular republican ideas. *On Revolution*, p. 36 See also Arthur Hatto, loc. cit., p. 503.


13. ibid., p. 505.


16. ibid., p. xi.

17. ibid., pp. 19-20.

18. Mirabeau declared to the Constituent Assembly at the dawn of the French Revolution: "Your laws will be the laws of Europe if you are worthy of them; the Revolution will make the round of the globe." Goethe told Karl August of Weimar at Valmy: "From today begins a new era, and you will be able to say that you were present at its birth." Friedrich Gentz, German translator of Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* and later secretary to Metternich, wrote: "[The French Revolution] is one of those events which belong to the whole human race. It is of such dimensions that it is hardly permissible to occupy oneself with any subordinate interest; of such


20. ibid., p. 111.

21. ibid., pp. 135-140.

22. ibid., p. 144.

23. ibid., p. 147.


25. Alexis de Tocqueville, op. cit., p. 157. The psychological portrait sketched here by Tocqueville became, of course, in the social novel of the nineteenth century, from Stendhal to Dostoevsky, that of the modern, rebellious intellectual. In her erudite philosphic reflection, *The Human Condition* (Charles A. Walgreen Foundation Lectures, University of Chicago Press, 1958, pp. 33 and 44), Hannah Arendt observed that the root of much of the centralism and rationalization for which Marx or "socialism" has been blamed, lies actually in the liberal utilitarian postulate of an implicit harmonization of social interests by the mechanism of the free market, which renders political discourse largely empty and sterile and points to a mere mechanization of things - corporate or communist. The 'strange beings' of whom Tocqueville, or Flaubert or Dostoevsky wrote were possessed in turn by the fascination with and romantic rebellion against the idea of such utilitarian rationalization.


"...Limitation to specialized work, with a renunciation of the Faustian universality of man which it involves, is a condition of any valuable work in the modern world . . . The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order . . . an iron cage . . . the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs . . . of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved."


30. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Verso, London, 1979, originally published in 1944. In their 1969 preface to the new edition, the authors wrote: "In a period of political division into immense power-blocks, set objectively upon collision, the sinister trend [of the transition to the world of the administered life] continues . . ." Their opening words in the work itself capture the bitter outlook shared with Arendt: "In the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant . . ."

31. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, p. ix:
"We can no longer afford to take that which was good in the past and simply think of it as a dead load which by itself time will bury in oblivion. The subterranean stream of Western history has finally come to the surface and usurped the dignity of our tradition. This is the reality in which we live. And this is why all efforts to escape from the grimness of the present into nostalgia for a still intact past, or into the anticipated oblivion of a better future, are vain."

32. Concluding her great work, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt drew, arrestingly, on St. Augustine, in reflecting that the human capacity to renew life and social order is grounded in natality. While observing that "predictions are of little avail and less consolation," she nevertheless asserted: "Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the supreme capacity of man; politically it is identical with man's freedom [emphasis added]. *Initium ut esset homo creatus est* - 'that a beginning might be made, man was created', said Augustine [*De Civitate Dei*, Book 12, ch. 20]. This beginning is guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every man." (p. 479)


34. ibid., p. 167.


39. Concerning von Thunen, Schumpeter remarked:

"His peak achievement [was] his conception of an isolated domain of circular form and uniform fertility, free from obstacles to or special facilities for transport, with a 'town' (the only source of demand for agricultural products) in the center. Given techniques, cost of transportation, and relative prices of products and factors, he deduced from this the optimal locations (which under those assumptions would be ring-shaped zones) for the various kinds of agrarian activities - dairying, forestry and hunting included. A theory of rent, in some points superior to that of Ricardo, results as a byproduct. Though many people objected to such bold abstraction, this was the part of his work that was understood and recognized in his time. For us, it is important to realize its brilliant originality..." (*History of Economic Analysis*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1954; Tenth Printing, 1978, p. 466).


41. ibid., p. 48.

42. ibid., pp. 39-40.

43. Clemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar, Prince von Metternich (1773-1859), Prime Minister to the Habsburg Emperors of Austria and champion of the so-called Holy Alliance of the old dynastic powers of Europe against what Tocqueville called "the Revolution", in its most comprehensive sense.

44. Plato, *The Laws*, Penguin, 1970, especially Bk. IV, Section 6, "Magnesia and its People"; Bk. V, Section 9, "The Foundation of the New State" and Bk. XII, Section 26, "The Nocturnal Council". It was the closure of Plato's utopian republic against change and outside cultural influence that prompted Karl Popper to characterize it as the remote progenitor of the modern totalitarian state, in his polemic mid-twentieth century work, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. More's utopia, also, was characterized by its insular removal from the contagion of corrupt societies and the austere nature of its institutions. Neither utopia, of course, ever became a practical political project, after Plato's abortive effort to realize his ideas in Syracuse (*Seventh Letter*, in Edith Hamilton &
According to Gibbon (The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Everyman's Library, Dutton, New York, 1910, 1963, Vol. 1, Ch. X, p. 267, n2), Emperor Gallienus was, when he died, "on the point of giving Plotinus a ruined city of Campania, to try the experiment of realizing Plato's Republic...". Polybius had, four hundred years earlier, dismissed "Plato's celebrated republic" as an untried and abstract scheme of government (The Rise of the Roman Empire, Bk. VI:47, p. 342). David Hume expressed the same judgement in his essay "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" - both Plato's and More's "plans of government" were, he wrote, "plainly imaginary" and compared unfavorably with the seventeenth century utopia The Commonwealth of Oceana by James Harrington (Charles W. Hendel, ed., David Hume's Political Essays, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1953, p. 146).

Kissinger, to be sure, concluded that Metternich's conservatism was sterile because it was unable to respond with creative statesmanship to the challenge of "revolution" (op. cit., pp. 207, 302), but Kissinger clearly had altogether more respect for Metternich than did Taylor. His considered opinion is, perhaps, best encapsulated in his remark:

"Prince Metternich's policy should be measured not by its ultimate failure, but by the length of time it staved off inevitable disaster." (op. cit., p. 174)


Beloff, op. cit., p. 193.

Cobban, op. cit., p. 67.

ibid., p. 68.


ibid., p. 1.

CHAPTER 2: LAND REFORM.


2. ibid., p. 38.

3. ibid., pp. 47-49.

4. ibid., p. 116.

5. ibid., pp. 116-137, Ch. 6, "Techniques and Implements", and pp. 178-193, Ch. 9, "The Condition of the Peasantry."


   "By this term [archive] I do not mean the sum of all the texts that a culture has kept upon its person as documents attesting to its own past, or as evidence of a continuing identity; nor do I mean the institutions, which, in a given society, make it possible to record and preserve those discourses that one wishes to remember and keep in circulation... The archive is first the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events... the archive... reveals the rules of a practice that enables statements both to survive and to undergo regular modification. It is the general system of the formation and transformation of statements..."


10. Theda Skocpol, review article in *Comparative Politics*, April 1982, pp. 351-52. Samuel Popkin was quite explicit in ascribing his research to an effort to come to terms with traumatic experiences in Vietnam. Having gone to Vietnam from 1966 to 1970 as a pacification analyst for Simulmatics Corporation, itself contracted by the Department of Defence, Popkin recalled in 1979:

   "The moral and intellectual shocks of that experience left me with a compelling desire to comprehend all that I had observed and to assess the implications of it for my personal and professional beliefs." (*The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam.* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1979, p. x).


   "The rationalization of agriculture inevitably uprooted the laborer and undermined his social security..."


18. Robert Wohl, French Communism in the Making, 1914-1924, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1966 provides a superb account of the disastrous events of 1914 and after in which "fifteen years of anti-militarism and talk of insurrection [were] swept away in a few hours..." (p. 52). As the German offensive was blunted and the war of movement turned into the horror of trench warfare, with the French alone suffering 900,000 casualties in the first five months of fighting, a small group of internationalists - among them Alfred Rosmer, Jules Martov and Leon Trotsky - began to gather regularly at the office of the revolutionary syndicalist journal La Vie Ouvriere in Paris. It was almost a year before they or other avowed anti-war diehards felt able to do more than "poke sadly at the cold remains of the International" (p. 59). In Wohl's words:

"It was the Conference of Zimmerwald, appropriately held high above the European battlefields in the Swiss mountains near Berne in the first week of September 1915, that galvanized the dispersed elements of opposition in the [socialist] party and the unions and gave them a rallying cry, the skeleton of a program, and above all, perhaps, the assurance that they were not alone. A few determined men of different nationalities had come together and put on record their opposition to the War. With Zimmerwald the struggle against the War passed from individual rebellion to a new, more active stage of organized resistance" (pp. 62-63).

19. Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, Pluto Press, London, 1977, Vol. 1, Ch. XX, "The Peasantry", pp.402-420. "The subsoil of the revolution was the agrarian problem," he wrote. Since none but the Bolsheviks would assume responsibility for a peasant rebellion that would break the old order, they "were obliged to carry through in the first quarter of the twentieth century that which was not carried through or even undertaken at all in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries." There is, of course, no way to summarize here the complexities of the agrarian debates of 1917, but it may suffice to register the judgement of Lazar Volin that the Provisional Government chose to postpone all serious efforts at agrarian reform out of political inertia "even in the face of rapidly developing revolutionary emergencies and despite repeated warnings and proddings from its Socialist Revolutionary Minister of Agriculture, Victor Chernov, and from the land committees." (A Century of Russian Agriculture, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1979, pp. 121-122).


25. Moshe Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle, Pluto Press, London, 1975, is the single best introduction to Lenin's thinking on these and other critical matters in the final months of his life.


33. Cohen, op. cit., Ch. VI, "Bukharinism and the Road to Socialism." In his key article, "Notes of an Economist," published in *Pravda* on September 30, 1928, Bukharin wrote:

"...we must constantly keep in mind that our socialist industrialization must differ from capitalist industrialization in that it is carried out by the proletariat for the goals of socialism, that its effect upon the peasant economy is different and distinct in nature, that its 'attitude' toward agriculture generally is different and distinct. Capitalism caused the debasement of agriculture. Socialist industrialization is not a parasitic process in relation to the countryside...but the means of its greatest transformation and uplifting." (emphases added).

Commented Cohen:

"Bukharin was groping toward an ethic of socialist industrialization, an imperative standard delineating the permissible and the impermissible. Believing that the Soviet experience would be viewed in the mirror of capitalist history, and wanting the reflection to be more humane and beneficial as well as more productive, he saw an epic judgement in the making. Could Soviet Russia industrialize without emulating the atrocities of the capitalist model? If not, he seemed to suggest, the outcome would not be socialism. The means would shape the end" (p. 171).


34. Mark Harrison, loc. cit., p. 403.

35. This is written at a time when Gorbachev's regime is pressing for various kinds of political and economic, social and cultural openness and reform calculated to remove from the Soviet Union the incubus of Stalinism. The phenomenon itself of Stalinism has been the subject of a formidable literature. For a lucid reflection on the enigma and its roots, see Moshe Lewin's essays, "The Social Background of Stalinism," and "Grappling with Stalinism" in The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Inter-War Russia, pp. 258-85 and 286-314, respectively.


37. Maurice Meisner, Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic, Free Press, Macmillan, New York, 1977 provides an eminent survey of the achievements and failures of the Chinese Communists. Among the most controversial aspects of their rule were the Great Leap Forward (1958-62) and the Cultural Revolution (1965-75). The former precipitated a catastrophic famine on a scale even more staggering than that caused by Stalin's forced collectivization in the USSR in 1930-33. See Thomas P. Bernstein, "Stalinism, Famine and Chinese Peasants: Grain Procurements During the Great Leap Forward," Theory and Society, Vol. 13, 1986, pp.339-77; and Basil Ashton, Kenneth Hill, Alan Piazza and Robin Zeitz, "Famine in China, 1958-61," in Population and Development Review, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1984, pp. 613-45. The scale of the disaster staggers the imagination. Ashton, et al estimated that "measured by the absolute magnitude of its demographic impact - about 30 million excess deaths and about 33 million lost or postponed births - the 1958-61 Chinese famine was the largest in human history." Bernstein, however, emphasized that whereas Stalin declared war on the peasants and was prepared to inflict famine on them, Mao had no such intention. Rather, Bernstein argues, the disaster was a consequence of "unprecedentedly ambitious developmental goals...based on the [erroneous] assumption that a breakthrough had occurred in agricultural production..." Concerning recent agrarian reforms in China, see Tang Tsou, "The Responsibility System in Agriculture" in his The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986, pp. 189-218.


40. ibid., p. 58.

41. ibid., pp. 59-60.


47. ibid., p. 182.

48. ibid., p. 183.


51. Eric Foner, op. cit., p.134; see also Oubre, op. cit., p.188. The magnificently documented and probing discussion of this matter by Foner is an extraordinarily rich source of anticipations of Cold War debates on international reconstruction and land reform.


53. Foner, op. cit. p. 44, quotes the New York Times of 9 July 1867 as articulating "most clearly the fears felt by northern men of property":

"If Congress is to take cognizance of the claims of labor against capital...there can be no decent pretence for confining the task to the slave-holder of the South. It is a question, not of humanity, not of loyalty, but of the fundamental relation of industry to capital; and sooner or later, if begun at the South, it will find its way into the cities of the North...An attempt to justify the confiscation of Southern land under pretence of doing justice to the freedmen strikes at the root of all property rights in both sections. It concerns Massachusetts quite as much as Mississippi."


"This question cannot be answered precisely. Accurate data do not exist, even though the U.S. government collects enormous quantities of information. The few specific studies that have been made of landownership indicate the general direction of ownership patterns in the United States...land is disproportionately concentrated in the hands of non-farm corporations, absentee landlords, and large-scale producers. The concentration is occurring not only in states with traditions of large landed estates (California, Texas and Florida), but in eastern and midwestern states as well...[W]herever landownership patterns are examined in the United States, the nineteenth century trend of concentrating land in the hands of wealthy absentee individuals and corporations is continuing. Farms exceeding 1,000 acres increased from 28% of acres in farms in 1930 to 54% in 1969...yet in 1974 when they held 58% of all land in farms, they represented only 7% of America's farms. Landownership was even more concentrated in the largest farms: those with 2,000 acres and over represented 3% and controlled 46% of all land in farms...According to the 1974 Census of Agriculture, 330 million acres of land in farms - almost 40% of all private farmland - were owned by nonfarmers.

"As the number of farms dropped from 6.8 million in 1935 to 2.4 million in 1974, fewer and fewer persons owned more and more of the land and the number of farm families who owned all of the land they worked decreased by 62%. Rent payments to nonfarm landlords increased
threefold, from $491 million in 1940 to $1.5 billion in 1970...In the past rural sociologists, land economists and government officials argued that...debt-free, full ownership of farmland allowed maximum decision-making freedom to farm families. But as the price of farmland escalates, the limits of indebtedness are reached, and competition with agribusiness requires still further expansion, more and more farmers are unable to attain or remain within the full owner category..." (pp. 69-75).


Johnson went on to argue that the modern world-system in the 1980's resembled the United States of a century earlier in that it lacked strong, cohesive central direction. In both cases, he wrote, the tycoons of industry can be seen to have presided over "vast, complex economic undertakings that they do not fully understand, cannot control and often can only influence in marginal ways" (p. 66).


64. ibid., pp. 139-140.

65. ibid., p. 140: "Tugwell's chief assignment was...resettlement. He sought to move impoverished farmers from submarginal land and give them a fresh start on good soil with adequate equipment and expert guidance. But he never had enough money to do much. The RA [Resettlement Administration], which planned to move 500,000 families, actually resettled 4,441. A program on this scale hardly began to meet the problems of the cropper and tenant farmer."


71. Leuchtenberg, op. cit., p. 164, commented of Tugwell's defeat:

"At no time had Roosevelt seriously considered the creation of a planned economy, and to represent the events of 1935 as the defeat of the planners is to confuse shadow with substance. A planned economy had never been in the cards. Of the President's close advisers, only Tugwell had collectivist ideas; he had little chance to express them, still less to carry them out, and in 1936 he gracefully resigned."
73. ibid., p. 404.
74. ibid., pp. 416-17.
75. In a 1962 CBS documentary, *Harvest of Shame*, Edward R. Murrow presented the American public with an insight into the conditions of millions of migratory rural laborers in the United States. It was a glimpse into a world of poverty that had been scarcely ameliorated since James Agee and Walker Evans had ventured into it as poet and photographer in 1939 and created their ethnographic classic, *Let us Now Praise Famous Men*.
78. For useful biographical sketches of the leading figures in question, see Naum Jasny, *Soviet Economists of the Twenties: Names to be Remembered*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972. Chayanov is a minor figure in Jasny's account. His chief concern was with Vladimir Groman, Vladimir Bazarov, Abram Ginzburg and Nikolai Kondratiev.
CHAPTER 3: EAST ASIA AND THE COLD WAR.

1. Louis Walinsky (ed.), Agrarian Reform As Unfinished Business: Selected Papers of Wolf Ladejinsky (Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1977), appears to be the only significant collection of Ladejinsky's work in print.


7. ibid., p. 63.


16. Robert A. Fearey, letter to Ronald P. Dore, 13 Feb. 1958: "As regards Wolf Ladejinsky, he was the 'Far Eastern experts of the Dept. Agriculture' (there was only one and it was he) referred to in Atcheson's memorandum."


20. Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Oxford University Press, New York, 1985 pp. 9-13, 17), on Joseph Grew's position as the State Department's senior expert on Japan in 1944-45 and his relations with Byrne and Acheson. The balance of opinions in Washington regarding post-war reforms in Japan, as it stood in 1945, is presented by Schaller with a richness of detail which cannot be emulated in the present compressed
context. It is clear, however, that the challenge of "rational revolution" was at the pivot of this balance of opinions and it is the central theme of Schaller's book that American policy tilted at first toward and then away from [rational] "revolution" in Japan, between 1945 and 1950. The weight and character of the initial tilt toward "revolution" is well represented by Schaller's observation that:

"Initially at least most Americans concerned with Japan, (whether in Tokyo or Washington) supported a controlled revolution that would peacefully transform Japan from a state of feudal authoritarianism to a state of liberal democratic capitalism. Gross disparities in class, wealth and power, invited the seizure of power by extremists, be they Fascist or Communist. Despite his own critique of the New Deal and identification with Herbert Hoover's traditional conservatism, MacArthur endorsed his own subordinates' attack on the wealth concentrated among the zaibatsu business monopolies. Among other considerations, in his opinion, the elimination of extreme economic privilege was a prerequisite for protecting Japan from revolutionary upheaval...Some of the more conservative area specialists in the State Department, led by Joseph Grew, contended that Japan's dependence on imported raw materials and the need to keep its export prices low justified a degree of monopoly anathema in the West. Whatever the merits of their argument, the Japan hands lost much of their influence by the war's end. Neither Secretary of State James Byrnes, nor his Under Secretary Dean Acheson had much use for Grew and his clique, who were pressured out of office shortly after Japan surrendered. Equally important, a number of popular and scholarly accounts appeared in 1945 attacking the zaibatsu as a particularly odious feature of Japanese society. William Johnston's The Future of Japan; Owen Lattimore's Solution In Asia; Andrew Roth's Dilemma In Japan and Thomas A. Bisson's Japan's War Economy, along with many articles in Pacific Affairs, The Nation and Amerasia, all warned that a real transformation of the enemy was impossible unless the business conglomerates were dissolved and replaced by a 'democratic economy'." (pp. 30-31 emphasis added).

21. ibid., pp. 33-38. Edwin Pauley, a California oil entrepreneur and Democratic fund raiser, was selected by President Truman to head the special reparations committee set up in 1945 to implement reforms in the industrial economies of the defeated axis powers, Germany and Japan.

22. ibid., pp. 36-37. Schaller's sources are the Records of the U.S. Mission on Reparations (RG 59, the U.S. National Archives), a collection which includes staff diaries. The vision of Lattimore at the time is striking, not least in the context of ongoing international developments in the 1980's and Schaller uses it as a counterpoint to the theme of U.S. retrenchment on major reforms in Japan and elsewhere by the late 1940's:

"Going beyond internal reform, Lattimore stressed the need to transfer basic industries to China and Southeast Asia. Their industrialization would coincide with a new economic structure within Japan. Transfers would also ensure that "as Japan begins to recover, there will be more local strength to prevent aggressive expansion..." (emphasis added).

Lattimore recorded in his diary encounters with Japanese businessmen and politicians, who threw out to him this "old Japanese propaganda line", warning of "war between Russia and the West, saying the first battle had already been joined in China." It was the fall of China to the Communists in 1949 that precipitated the right-wing backlash in the United States of which Lattimore himself was to be so prominent a target.


25. ibid., pp. 87-88, 122-32. The deconcentration of Japanese industry, George F. Kennan maintained, posed a greater threat to Japan than did Soviet military power.

26. ibid., pp. 117-118. Schaller cites Knowland as denouncing the SCAP program for "bringing socialism", indeed the "most socialistic" policies "ever attempted outside Russia" to Japan. The conservative Chicago Tribune deplored what it called an effort to "New Dealize Japan". The Washington Times-Herald declared "if a bunch of New Deal socialists or semi-socialists have
framed up a socialist future for Japan, with everybody sharing the poverty and no big, efficient, privately-owned industries permitted to exist, we should all know about it.”

27. ibid., pp. 125-26. The observations about SCAP under MacArthur are drawn by Schaller from Kennan's correspondence with W. W. Butterworth, head of the State Department's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, in March 1948. The correspondence is held in Policy Planning Staff (PPS) Records and was obtained by Schaller under the Freedom of Information Act.

28. ibid., p. 126.


30. ibid., p. 3.


34. Howard Schonberger, loc. cit., pp. 344, 357.

35. ibid., pp. 348-50, 352, 357.


38. Wolf Ladejinsky, "Agrarian Reform In Asia," Foreign Affairs, April 1964, pp. 445-60. The history of the Land Commission, its achievements, its failures and the reactions of the patricians to it, is a subject of considerable fascination. From the point of view of U.S. policy in the Cold War era, one might wish that men like Wolf Ladejinsky had been less superficial than they were in their references to the Land Commission. Ladejinsky quoted Mommsen on the subject, observing that Chen-Cheng in Taiwan probably had not read Mommsen, but acted as if he had. One may regard Ladejinsky's assertion as resting, in a sense, on Plutarch's observation, long ago, that "the senate, to soothe the people after these transactions, did not oppose the division of public lands", where the "transactions" in question were the events leading to the slaughter of Tiberius Gracchus and 300 of his supporters in 133 B.C. One of the best parallels to this might be found in the attitude of a significant number of Salvadoran and U.S. conservatives toward the land reform of 1980 - in the months before and after the killing of Enrique Alvarez Cordoba (27 November 1980) and hundreds of his supporters. Yet Plutarch was only half right and the land tenure issue, among others, remained a bone of contention for a hundred years after the death of Tiberius Gracchus, right up to the collapse of the Roman Republic.


ibid., loc. cit., p. 129.

ibid., p. 132.

ibid., p. 132.

William Manchester, op. cit., pp. 599-600.


The conservative reaction against the land reform in Japan was bluntly presented by Harry E. Wildes in 1954, in his Typhoon In Tokyo: The Occupation And Its Aftermath (Macmillan, New York, 1954 pp. 224, 228-29, 231-33), where he observed that MacArthur, Schenck, Ladejinsky and others "gave less heed to real food shortages than to the elimination of fancied agricultural evils". Individuals who were urging more radical redistribution of rural resources were recalled, but Rikizo Hirano was replaced as Minister of Agriculture, charged with reactionary sabotage of land reform, and replaced by Hiroo Wada. The land reform itself, Wildes asserted, was not a great success, since it created too many tiny parcels, while the prohibition on resale of land was an obstruction to free enterprise. Yoshida's verdict on the land reform (op. cit., pp. 202-03), it should be noted, was not nearly so harsh, though allowances must be made for the aged Japanese statesman having written rather more diplomatically than Wildes was wont to do.


ibid., p. 17.

ibid., pp. 17-18.


ibid., p. 56.

ibid., p. 56.

ibid., pp. 88-89.

ibid., p. 90.

CHAPTER 4: RED RAP ON HARDIE: THE PHILIPPINES 1950-54.


9. ibid., p. 668.

10. ibid. p. 208.

11. pp. 197, 201-02, 205-06, 661, 673-74.


15. ibid., p. 270.


Sturtevant, Governor Frank Murphy even observed, in 1935, that the Sakdals might emerge as a genuine opposition party, to the benefit of Philippine democracy. This did not happen and the Americans do not appear to have made any effort to help it come about. See Sturtevant, 1958, op. cit., p. 169, n27.


24. Kerkvliet op. cit. pp. 143-50. See also Luis Taruc _Born Of The People_ Greenwood Press 1975 pp. 212-77 and Hernando Abaya _Betrayal In The Philippines_ New York 1946 pp. 134-50, 206-23, 250-54. Alvin H. Scaff _The Philippine Answer To Communism_. Stanford University Press 1955 is a text representative of official American reaction to the Huk Rebellion. See also Edward G. Lansdale, _In the Midst of Wars_. Harper & Row New York 1972, pp. 8-10. Lansdale, an advertising man in San Francisco until enlisted in Army Intelligence in 1941, finished the Second World War an Army Major and Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Armed Forces (G-2) for the Western Pacific. He worked in Manila from the end of the war until 1948. He then returned to the U.S. to teach at the Air Force’s Strategic Intelligence School, in Denver, Colorado. In 1949, he went to Washington D.C. to work as a Cold War policy analyst. Then, in August 1950, he was sent back to Manila by the National Security Council to help in the struggle against the Huks. He developed psychological warfare tactics based on his knowledge of American experiences in the Greek Civil War a few years earlier (ibid., pp. 4-14).

Stephen R. Shalom, in an extensively documented account of this period, has argued that the State Department and JUSMAG/Manila at no point encouraged President Elpidio Quirino to negotiate with the Huks, resolving that, although there was virtually no evidence of external support for the rebels, the case should be described and treated as a case of "Communist aggression". _The United States and the Philippines: A Study In Neo-Colonialism_. New Day Publishers, Quezon City 1986, pp. 1-32, 74, 215-16.


Edward Lansdale (op. cit. p. 19), writing in 1971, declared his shock on discovering, in 1950, that "curiously enough, Philippine and American officials barely mentioned the political and social factors in briefing me. They dwelt almost exclusively on the military situation. It was as though military affairs were the sole tangible factor they could grasp." On a trip outside Manila, in late 1950, he began, he wrote more than twenty years later, to get a sense of the outrage in the countryside against the corruption and thuggery of the Quirino Administration. He was, he wrote, appalled at the mounting polarization between two power groups he saw as unregenerate reactionaries and unreconstructed stalinists. "Surely" he exclaimed, looking back,
"the principles I believed in, the rights of man as a free individual, lay in between such harshly jumbled political and social terrain." (ibid. pp. 28-9). Certainly they did, of course, but Lansdale's work did not in any clear sense show how those principles might triumph in such terrain.


30. President Quirino had, in March 1950, set up a Philippine Economic Survey Mission, headed by Jose Yulo, but the idea of a commission of inquiry into Philippine public and economic affairs dated back to January 1950, when Quirino had visited the U.S. looking for aid. In Wurfel's words, "The economic discussions with U.S. officials which took place at this time resulted in a simultaneous announcement from Washington and Manila on February 11...to the effect that a high level commission would be created shortly to advise on the establishment of a sound and well-balanced economy in the Philippines. President Truman later gave President Quirino full credit for the plan. The *Manila Bulletin* credited Ambassador Cowen with major responsibility." ibid. p. 120.

31. ibid. p. 121.

32. ibid. pp. 122-25. August L. Strand, President of Oregon State College "headed the Agricultural Survey undertaken by the Mission". Vincent Checchi, "at that time chief of the Far Eastern Trade Policy branch of ECA and soon to become ECA mission chief for the Philippines" was a prominent member of the Bell Mission.

33. ibid. p. 134. Quirino immediately began a campaign to evade such reforms, partly by baldly asserting that they had already taken place. When Bell Mission spokesman, Edward Bernstein, described the Quirino Administration as corrupt and inefficient, in an address in New York prominently reported in the *Washington Post*, Quirino released an unsigned statement from Malacanang, angrily denouncing such allegations and charging, in turn, that the United States led the world in racketeering, graft and corruption, but disowned the statement before signing the Quirino-Foster Agreement on 14 November 1950. Ambassador Cowen was careful to declare, in July 1950, on the arrival of the Bell Mission: "When the Mission completes its survey, its report will indicate what can be done and how the U.S. can most fruitfully assist in the doing...But the Philippine Republic will be under no compulsion other than its own self-interest to accept such plan or assistance."


38. Restricted Cable No. 166. To: Officer-In-Charge, American Mission Manila. 9 March 1951. From: State Dept./Foreign Agriculture. DFB 5710.


41. Unclassified Cable No. 133. Merrill W. Abbey to State Dept. 24 July 1951 DFB 5710.


45. Immortalized by John Steinbeck in The Grapes of Wrath in the form of the benign Weedpatch Camp, detested by the "Bank of the West"-dominated "Farmers' Association" as a seed-bed of "Communism".


47. Laurence I. Hewes Jr., Japan: Land and Men. Iowa State College Press 1955 p. 68. Strangely, Alfred McCoy, in 1971, (op. cit. pp. 28, 47 n76) gave this book and page as a reference for his statement that, in 1950-51, Edward Lansdale urged Magsaysay "to adopt an immediate program of rural reform to erode peasant support for the Huk," Like Gary Olson, in 1974, McCoy appears to have conflated EDCOR and psych-war with land reform, which was a different undertaking and one with which Lansdale himself does not seem to have been directly connected. In any case, neither at p. 68 nor at any other point in his book, did Hewes make any reference to Lansdale or land reform in the Philippines.


50. ibid.


53. Confidential Cable. From: Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. To: American Embassy, Manila. 3 April 1952. DFB 5710.

54. Ambassador Raymond A. Spruance to Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Telegram 2542 9 April 1952. DFB 5710.


57. Frances Lucille Starner Magsaysay And the Philippine Peasantry. Stanford University Press 1961 p. 120.


63. ibid. pp. v-vi.

64. ibid. p. vi.

65. ibid. p. vii.

66. ibid. p. 5.

67. ibid. p. 3.

68. ibid. pp. vi, 9-10.

69. ibid. p. 7.

70. ibid. p. 7.

71. ibid. p. 8.


73. ibid. pp. 10-11.

74. ibid. pp. 11-12.

75. ibid. p. 20.

76. ibid. pp. 20-21.

77. ibid. p. 21.

78. ibid. pp. 21-22.


80. ibid. p. 25.

81. ibid. pp. 29 n10, 30 n12.


85. Lewis E. Gleek Jr., letter to the author 17 April 1986.


89. Hardie Statement p. 4.

90. ibid. pp. 5-6.

91. Ambassador Raymond A. Spruance to Secretary of State Dean Acheson. 7 Jan. 1953 1998. DFB 5710.

92. Spruance to Acheson 18 Dec. 1952 1776. DFB 5710.


94. Spruance to Acheson 20 Dec. 1952 1816. DFB 5710.

95. Spruance to Acheson 20 Dec. 1952 1832. DFB 5710.


23. Manila Times 16 April 1953.
114. Despatch 734. Daniel M. Braddock, AmEmb. Manila, to State Dept. 9 Jan. 1953. DFB 5710. Use of the phrase "large landed estates" by Braddock in this context is jarring, given Hardie's pointed repudiation of the notion that the land reform needed in the Philippines consisted simply in attacking big properties because they were big. See the Hardie Report pp. 10-11.


120. Gary L. Olson op. cit. p. 98 n44.


126. Theodor Mommsen The History of Rome. E. P. Dutton & Co. New York 1911. Vol. III. Ch. iii: "The Revolution." Mommsen, in fact, believed that the Sempronian Agrarian Law of 133 B.C., the land reform of Tiberius Gracchus, really did achieve so considerable a redistribution of public lands as to create some 75,000 new freehold peasant farmers. Census figures between 132 and 125 B.C. showed an increase in the number of registered citizens from 319,00 to 395,000, and Mommsen commented that this was "beyond all doubt solely in consequence of what the allotment commission did for the Roman burgesses." (op. cit. p. 96). Gaius Gracchus, he added, strengthened the commission "only to save the principle", not to extend land reform, "because the domain land intended for redistribution by his brother was already in substance distributed." (ibid. p. 103 emphasis added).

More recent scholarship, David Stockton has noted, casts doubt on these conclusions of Mommsen's. Hugh Scullard could still comment in 1959 that the census figures "almost certainly reflect the increase of land settlement" (From the Gracchi to Nero. 5th edition. Methuen London 1982 p. 30), but Stockton, in 1979, drew attention to the fact that the census data do not provide a reliable basis for an inference of this kind. He described the inference as "prima facie... tempting", but commented that it rests on the assumption that the census "recorded not the total number of male citizens, but only the number of adsidui, viz. those who were registered as possessed of at least the minimum property needed to qualify for legionary service." He observed that, on the one hand, Beloch, Fraccaro, Frank and Brunt have established convincingly that the census figures were not confined to adsidui but did record "all male citizens of every class and category"; and that, on the other hand, the adsiduus qualification may have been lowered anyway about 130 B.C., "in response to the legionary manpower shortage." (The Gracchi. Clarendon Press Oxford 1979 pp. 49-50), so that Mommsen's inference may very well be erroneous.

Gaius Gracchus attempted much more than land reform, of course. He clearly aimed at the overthrow of the oligarchic establishment and its replacement with a principate. Mommsen's learned commentary on the ambitions, downfall and political legacy of Gaius Gracchus shows quite clearly his concerns as a German national liberal, writing in the years after 1848, and anticipates, in many ways, Max Weber's remarks on the politics of Bismarck, in Economy And Society. It remains of considerable pertinence to the debate on the politics of Lenin and Mao and other modern radical revolutionaries:
"Now the Sempronian Constitution shows very clearly to everyone who is able and willing to see that Gaius Gracchus did not at all, as many good natured people in ancient and modern times have supposed, wish to place the Roman republic on new democratic bases, but that, on the contrary, he wished to abolish it and to introduce in its stead a Tyrannis - that is, in modern language, a monarchy not of the feudal or theocratic, but of the Napoleonic absolute type...an unlimited tribuneship of the people for life. In fact, if Gracchus, as his words and still more his works plainly testify, aimed at the overthrow of the government of the senate, what other political organization but the Tyrannis remained possible, after overthrowing the aristocratic government, in a commonwealth which had outgrown collective assemblies and had no knowledge of parliamentary government?..." (ibid. pp. 112-13 emphasis added).

What Gaius Gracchus lacked, in order to achieve this end, was gradually acquired by Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and finally used by Caesar and his heirs to overthrow the patrician government of the senate and with it the republic.

127. Niccolo Machiavelli The Prince. Penguin 1975 Ch. vi. p. 52: "...all armed prophets have conquered and unarmed prophets have come to grief."

CHAPTER 5: CONFUSION'S MASTERPIECE: VIETNAM 1955-75.

2. ibid. p. 21.
7. ibid. p. 86.
10. ibid. p. 370.
17. Huynh Kim Khanh op. cit. p. 301. He observed that, in their voluminous memoirs, the leading French colonial officials of the period, Decoux, Catroux, Legrand, made no reference at all to the 1944-45 famine in Tonkin. He added further, concerning the historiography of the famine:

"Nghiem Ke To, a VNQDD leader during the August Revolution, referred to the famine in one part of one sentence in a 524 page study of the 1945-54 period Vietnam mau lua (Vietnam In Blood And Fire Saigon 1954 p. 23). Tran Trong Kim devoted less than nine lines of his memoirs to this national tragedy. This fact alone reveals the level of political sophistication of the nationalists at the time. Although the neglect by Western historians (Bernard Fall, Joseph Buttinger, Dennis Duncanson) is explicable, it is more difficult to understand the fact that Vietnamese historians of the South during the U.S.-Thieu era also appeared to be unaware of the famine. Pham Van Son, for example, in two separate works dealing with this period - Vietnam tran dau su (History of the Struggles of Vietnam. Saigon 1959) and Vietnam tu san bien (Modern History of Vietnam 17 vols. Saigon 1968-72) made no reference to the famine of 1944-45."

This surely raises fascinating historiographic issues concerning the nature of evidence and 'amnesia' in the constitution of social knowledge and memory.

18. Perhaps the most judicious estimate is that of David Marr, op. cit. pp. 8, 234: "somewhere between one and two million people died of starvation in the north" and "in early 1945 more than one million Vietnamese [died] in a war-induced famine, including tens of thousands in the streets of Hanoi." Duiker 1981 op. cit. p. 83, credited "estimates of up to two million dead."


20. Duiker 1981 op. cit. p. 103:

"Whether or not the famine was a decisive factor in the Revolution, the Party leadership apparently thought that it was. In his 1947 study of the August uprising, Truong Chinh quoted Stalin on the need to find one focal issue that could become the central question of the revolution. In Vietnam, said Chinh, that issue was famine and he added that Communist-led armed demonstrations in front of government granaries were the key to the development of the movement in rural areas throughout the North."

21. Leon Pignon, political counsellor to French hardliner Admiral Thierry D'Argenlieu, advised him, according to historian Philippe Devillers:

"Our objective is clear: to transfer to the internal Annamite level the quarrel we have with the Viet Minh and enter the campaigns and reprisals as little as possible, leaving them to the native enemies of this party." (Histoire du Vietnam de 1940 a 1952. Paris Seuil 1952 p. 364).

Nevertheless, Serge Thion, in a recent essay on the subject, wrote:


23. Christine White op. cit. and Edwin Moise op. cit. are the authoritative accounts.


25. Hoang Van Chi From Colonialism To Communism pp. 32-33. His description of Ho as a cosmopolitan genius is worth quoting:

"He spoke a dozen foreign languages with great fluency and had travelled all around the world under a score of different names, spending half his time in prisons - possible in a Soviet prison too - and the rest in clandestine political activity...He studies Chinese classics in his boyhood, then continued his education by wandering through Europe and America, where he worked, observing
and learning all the time, from friends and through books. Later he received a careful and methodical training from the Comintern. Thus he had ample opportunity to learn from three different but equally valuable sources: Oriental, Western and Marxist. He was equally at home with a Vietnamese peasant, a Chinese warlord or a Western journalist."

26. ibid. p. 35. Here again, the commentary is notable and quite devastating in its implications:

"Nguyen Hai Than, disciple and successor of Phan Boi Chau, was beyond doubt a genuine patriot, but during his forty years stay in China he had fallen victim to the attraction of opium smoking. The former emperor Bao Dai, whom the French reinstated as 'Head of State' in 1949, for more than twenty years had had the reputation of being a playboy and of leading an immoral life. Last, but by no means least, is Ngo Dinh Diem, brought to power by American pressure in 1954 and now ruler of South Vietnam. Diem differs from Ho in every possible way. Whereas Ho renounces his family, Diem is surrounded by brothers, sisters, nephews and other relatives, close and distant, on whom he has bestowed all the key positions in his government and in the army. Also, while Ho will chat with workers and peasants in a friendly manner, Diem sits on a gilded chair as his feet are ceremonially washed by tribal chiefs, following a centuries old practice symbolizing the acknowledgement of a monarch's suzerainty."

Published in 1964, this passage was clearly written well before Diem's overthrow and execution in November 1963.


The terror that swept China in 1951-52, at the height of the Korean War, was certainly extremely bloody. According to Stuart Schram, in a biography of Mao Zedong published in 1966 and reprinted with revisions in 1967, a conservative estimate of the number of executions at that time would be about two million. The equivalent number of executions in England or France at that time, Schram pointed out, would have been about 150,000; while in the United States it would have been some 600,000 executions. The terror began with Mao's promulgation on 21 February 1951 of the "Regulations Regarding the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries", which provided death or long prison sentences for very broadly defined offences. Innumerable mass meetings were held, at which people were denounced and condemned. "Long lists of the names of executed 'counterrevolutionaries' appeared day after day in the newspapers." Chou En-lai put the number of executions at about 135,000, but Schram asserted: "The actual number was undoubtedly much higher. Hostile estimates have ranged as high as ten or fifteen million victims. A reasonable estimate would appear to be from one to three million victims all told." Schram Mao Tse-Tung Penguin 1967 pp. 266-67.

28. Hoang Van Chi From Colonialism To Communism pp. 189, 158.

29. ibid. pp. 208, 212.


Daniel Ellsberg has related how, in December 1964, Josef Zasloff briefed John McNaughton concerning the results of the first six months of RAND's project on "Viet Cong Motivation and Morale" which led McNaughton to make the extraordinary remark: "If what you say is true, we're fighting on the wrong side." Papers On The War. Simon and Schuster New York 1972 pp. 158-59. Ellsberg further quoted noted political journalist Theodore H. White as having commented, in a private report to the White House, in 1961: "What perplexes hell out of me is that the Commies, on their side, seem to be able to find people willing to die for their cause..." ibid. p. 158.

General Maxwell Taylor told a meeting of high-ranking U.S. national security officials in 1966:

"The ability of the Viet Cong continuously to rebuild their units and to make good their losses is one of the mysteries of this guerrilla war...we still find no plausible explanation of the continued
strength of the Viet Cong if our data on Viet Cong losses are even approximatively correct. Not only do Viet Cong units have the recuperative powers of the phoenix, but they have an amazing ability to maintain morale. Only in rare cases have we found evidences of bad morale among Viet Cong prisoners or recorded in captured Viet Cong documents." (Pentagon Papers Vol. III. p. 668. Beacon Press Boston 1971).


35. George Carver "The Faceless Viet Cong" reprinted in Wesley R. Fishel (ed) Anatomy of a Conflict Michigan State University Press 1966 pp. 316-18. Carver's phraseology makes it abundantly clear that he was paraphrasing Hoang Van Chi; as, for example, when he referred to Ho Chi Minh making "one of his celebrated weeping apologies" (cf From Colonialism To Communism p. 97) and when he averred: "Despite its incredible barbarity and violence, the Land Rent Reduction Campaign was but a preliminary - and a mild one by comparison to the Land Reform Campaign proper which followed." In From Colonialism To Communism (p. 192), Hoang Van Chi had written: "Despite its almost unbelievable violence, the Land Rent Reduction Campaign was but a mild preliminary to the Land Reform proper which followed it." At p. 318 n5 (Fishel op. cit.), Carver acknowledged Hoang Van Chi's From Colonialism To Communism as his source. Nonetheless, for some reason, he placed the combined death toll of the two campaigns at 100,000 and ignored Hoang Van Chi's other, sixfold higher estimate.


40. Hoang Van Chi From Colonialism To Communism p. 166.

41. ibid. p. 212.


"President Nixon has escalated his own rhetoric on the 'bloodbath' in North Vietnam, by multiplying the number of deaths as the argument became increasingly crucial to the rationale for American policy in Vietnam. In 1969 he used Bernard Fall's figure of 50,000 deaths President Nixon's radio/t.v. address Nov. 3 1969, official White House text). In 1971 he used the 500,000 figure...But on July 27 1972, the President reached a new level of rhetoric, declaring that more than one half million people were assassinated and another half million died in slave labor camps in North Vietnam (New York Times July 28 1972). An inquiry to the National Security Council produced only a list of references, of which Hoang Van Chi's 5% figure was the only primary source. His own staff was thus unable to explain how he arrived at his new total of one million deaths from the North Vietnamese land reform." (emphasis added).

44. Edwin Moise, *Land Reform in China and North Vietnam: Consolidating the Revolution at the Village Level* pp. 216-22. Moise is worth quoting, in registering the basic point at issue:

"Most accounts published in the West have described the land reform as a bloodbath; there have been widely varying estimates of the number of people killed. The highest estimate, made by Richard Nixon, is that 500,000 were executed and another 500,000 died in slave labor camps. What might be called the standard estimate, by Bernard Fall, is that about 50,000 were executed. D. Gareth Porter demonstrated a few years ago that these figures were completely unfounded. He discovered that various people in Saigon had been manufacturing counterfeit North Vietnamese documents and falsifying translations of genuine documents in order to support the idea that large numbers of people had been killed in the land reform. The documentary evidence for the bloodbath theory seems to have been spurious almost in its entirety..." (p. 217 emphasis added).

He added, at p. 222:

"The number of people executed cannot have been much higher than the Communist sources indicate, or there would have been more genuine evidence of it in the anti-Communist sources. Allowing for these uncertainties, the most that can be said is that the total number of people executed during the land reform was probably on the rough order of 5,000 and almost certainly between 3,000 and 15,000." (emphasis added).

White 1981 op. cit. p. 422 n25 cited the figures of 3,000 to 15,000 as arrived at by by Moise in his 1976 essay "Land Reform and Land Reform Errors in North Vietnam" *Pacific Affairs* Vol. 49 No. 1. Sept. 1976 and observed that it is "clear that this is the probable order of magnitude." (emphasis added). She indicated that concurrence on these figures was reached in discussions with Daniel G. Porter, David Marr and Georges Boudarel.

46. ibid. p. 747.
47. ibid. p. 746.

At an appropriate level of analogy, perhaps, we may compare the purges of the 1950's in the DRV to those in the USSR under Lenin, or during the years of the civil war (1918-21), rather than to the catastrophes of Stalin's Great Turn and Great Terror, or Mao's Great Leap Forward. George Leggett, in his authoritative study *The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police* Oxford University Press 1981, estimated the number of political executions by the Soviet Government in Lenin's period of rule (effectively 1918-1923) at upwards of 200,000. This is certainly a terrible number - proportionally about half as many as were executed in Chile in the first months of the Pinochet regime in 1973 - but it represented something like 0.15% of the population; nothing like 5%. Stalin's depredations, by contrast, if Robert Conquest's estimates are accepted, resulted in the deaths of some 10% of the Soviet population between 1929 and 1953. If the Porter, Moise, White, Marr, Boudarel figures for the DRV are correct, the executions during the land reform and purges of the early 1950's, a period of time roughly equivalent to that of Lenin's active tenure of office in the USSR, amounted to between 0.05% and 0.13% of the population, as compared with Hoang Van Chi's 5%. The Tonkin famine of 1944-45, by contrast, killed between 10% and 15% of the population, if the highest estimates are correct, and 4% to 5% even if McAlister's French figures of 500,000 to 600,000 deaths are accepted. Moreover, these dead were overwhelmingly poor peasants and they perished in one shocking year, whereas Stalin's crimes extended over more than two decades.

49. Eventually, the numbers count in the matter of the North Vietnamese land reform was "corrected", as indicated in the Comptroller General's Report to Congress, *Progress and Problems of U.S. Assistance for Land Reform in Vietnam*, General Accounting Office/AID Washington D.C. June
1973. Gabriel Kolko (Anatomy of a War 1986 pp. 65-66) picked up the corrigendum. So, also, in 1987, did Roy L. Prosterman and Jeffrey M. Riedinger, citing a figure of 5,000 executions, and drawing on the work of Edwin Moise of 1983 (Land Reform and Democratic Development, Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore 1987 p. 275 n37). Richard Nixon, however, as late as 1986, refused to acknowledge even a controversy on the matter, referred to no source other than Hoang Van Chi, and continued to claim that hundreds of thousands had been massacred (No More Vietnams pp. 36-7, 204, 208).

50. Daniel Ellsberg, appearing before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 13 May 1970, told Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey that he had once asked Hoang Van Chi "if North Vietnam, his native region, would be better off today if Ho Chi Minh had not headed the revolution and he said 'Oh yes' right away, which did not surprise me, because he is known as anti-communist. When I asked him to go into more detail, how it would be better, he said: 'My country would not have been destroyed or divided.' He said: 'If Ho Chi Minh had not headed the liberation, someone else would, not a Communist. If one other than a Communist had headed the liberation movement against the French, the United States would never have supported the French with money, weapons, planes and napalm and many of my countrymen would not have died..." Frankly, when I heard him say that, it made the hair on my neck stand on end, to realize as an American that the greatest reproach that a Vietnamese could make against Ho Chi Minh would be that he had been responsible for triggering a more or less reflex destructive action over twenty years, by the United States...". (Papers On The War p. 208).


52. Thomas Scoville to Robert W. Komer in Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program: 1966-69. RAND Corporation Washington D.C. May 1970 p. 70. Ian Coxhead, a student of McCoy's at the University of New South Wales, in 1981, was much closer to the mark in writing, in a thesis completed that year:

"Despite repeated affirmations of support for reform, the trend of United States actions in the Far East moved steadily away from sponsoring of land reform as an agent of social change. This drift stemmed partly from a dogmatic assertion of the inviolability of private property and rather more from the realization that America's best friends in Asia were those semi-feudal elites whose ascendancy was threatened by land reform." (Ian Coxhead Against the Tide: Wolf Ladejinsky and Agrarian Reform in Asia 1945 - 1975. UNSW BA thesis 1981 pp. 30-31. emphasis added).

For McCoy's account of Ladejinsky's treatment by Benson, see the abovementioned article in Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars Vol. 3. No. 1. pp. 32-33.


54. ibid. p. 74.

55. ibid. p. 74.

56. ibid. p. 86.

57. ibid. p. 94.


59. ibid. p. 197.


61. Gittinger loc. cit. p. 204.


64. Ian Coxhead op. cit. p. 34: "Ladejinsky was posted to South Vietnam in order to put the lid on an embarrassing political and electoral furore and not primarily on his merits as a land reformer." On Hollister's appointment, see *New York Times* 1 Dec. 1955 p. 23. See also Walt W. Rostow Eisenhower, Kennedy and Foreign Aid. University of Texas Press Austin 1985 pp. 94, 106, 109, 114, 125, 128. Rostow's study, unfortunately, does not address the question of land reform at all and the Ladejinsky case does not rate a mention. About the best that can be said about such omissions on Rostow's part is that they probably reflect the lack of commitment to or even interest in land reform among U.S. officials at the highest levels throughout the period with which Rostow was concerned.

65. Ian Coxhead op. cit. pp. 36-37. He added (p. 37 n51): The author's repeated efforts to obtain documents confirming this statement from the State Department and FOA/ICA under the Freedom of Information Act have, at the time of this writing, been unsuccessful." On Ladejinsky's dismissal by Hollister, see *New York Times* 5 Feb. 1956 - Charles E. Egan "Ladejinsky Ousted Again: 'Conflict of Interest' Cited."

66. Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* Penguin 1984, p. 180, gave it as the express opinion of the U.S. consul in Hanoi in 1952 that Bao Dai's cabinet consisted of a collection of "opportunists, nonentities, extreme reactionaries, assassins, hirelings and, finally, men of faded mental powers." In the early 1960's, Bernard Fall remarked of the men around Bao Dai that they had been a demoralized, frightened and decadent group, at a time when Vietnam required heroes.

67. Louis Walinsky (ed) *Agrarian Reform as Unfinished Business: Selected Papers of Wolf Ladejinsky* Oxford University Press 1979 pp. 215-289. According to Walinsky, when Colonel Lansdale arrived in Saigon in June 1954, he was interviewed by two American journalists, Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn, who had known Ladejinsky in Tokyo and told Lansdale he should get Ladejinsky out to Vietnam to help the Saigon government initiate a rural program that might appeal to the mass of Vietnamese peasants. Lansdale followed up the idea, through the US Embassy in Saigon, but Ladejinsky was unavailable at that time. Thereafter, Ladejinsky became available, following his ordeal at the hands of Secretary Benson, and FOA assigned him to Vietnam. Ladejinsky undertook at least five field trips between March and June 1955, the first into the region around Hue and Danang, which he referred to under its old name as Tourane; the next four into various parts of the Mekong delta region. His reports on these field trips are of great interest and it is extremely difficult to do them justice in the compressed scope of the present study. It should be stressed, however, that he reported with emphasis the "political and administrative vacuum in the countryside" as far as Saigon's rule was concerned and noted widespread disaffection from the rural policies of the Saigon regime as then constituted.

68. Ibid. p. 301.

69. Ibid. p. 301.

70. Ibid. pp. 231, 259, 302.

71. Ibid. p. 302.

72. Ibid. p. 303.

73. Ibid. p. 307.

74. Christine White *Agrarian Reform and National Liberation in the Vietnamese Revolution 1920 - 1957* PhD Cornell University 1981 p. 187. Richard Critchfield *The Long Charade: Political Subversion in the Vietnam War* Harcourt, Brace & World New York 1968 pp. 199-200, related a telling story of the failure of Bao Dai's land reform decrees, in the form of a confession by one of Bao Dai's officers, named, oddly enough, Pham Van Dong, that in 1953, as a pacification commander in the Red River delta, he had been unable to enforce the decrees, limited as they were, over the opposition of the provincial Catholic bishop, the Minister of the Interior and landowning supporters of Bao Dai. Some months later, he told Critchfield, the Viet Minh captured the province and so much for pacification.
Walinsky op. cit. p. 269. In view of subsequent developments, Ladejinsky’s conclusion to his final field trip report, of June 1955, appears worth registering here:

"Once a start has been made on the road towards a creative state, the sects can be mastered and the fairly widely accepted inevitability theory of a Communist victory in 1956 may turn out to be a dragon with drawn teeth. If, on the other hand, nothing far-reaching is ventured... on the theory that one must not "rock the boat", then the "quiescent anarchy" in the countryside is indeed explainable; the failure to accept President Diem's reform understandable; and a revolution from the bottom, rather than a controlled revolution from the top is perhaps inevitable." (p. 238).


Coxhead op. cit. p. 34.

ibid. p. 35.

ibid. p. 37. I can find no reason to dispute Coxhead’s conclusion.

Gittinger loc. cit. p. 204.


ibid. p. 269.


Alfred W. McCoy 1971 loc. cit. p. 34.


James P. Gittinger "Progress in South Vietnam’s Agrarian Reform." Far Eastern Survey Jan-Feb 1960 Vol. XXIX No's 1,2 pp. 1-5, 11-21. Gittinger remarked in the first part of this article: "Since the Geneva Accords were signed in July 1954, agrarian reform has been a key program of Ngo Dinh Diem’s government in the Republic of Vietnam and one which it has shown a marked determination to carry out - especially in its land transfer and land settlement aspects." And in the second part, referring explicitly to Wurfel’s 1959 misgivings, he asserted blithely: "Several of the criticisms levelled against the agrarian reform program by outside observers appear not to have materialized or else have been overcome." (p. 19 n9).

ibid. p. 19. Ladejinsky "Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam" in Wesley Fishel (ed) Problems of Freedom: South Vietnam Since Independence. Bureau of Social and Political Research. Michigan State University, Lansing 1961 pp. 153-175. It is difficult to interpret the skewed and defensive writing of these men in 1960-61 as other than something induced by myopia contracted through involvement in the programs about which they were writing. Yet it is puzzling in both all the same. Gittinger, for instance, was to write just eighteen months later, in his insightful and instructive paper "U.S. Policy Toward Agrarian Reform in Underdeveloped Nations" Land Economics Aug. 1961 that "there is a temptation in administering foreign aid policy to dodge the difficult problems of tenure change and hide behind a program limited to the support of services" (p. 196). He went on in the same paper to point a finger at U.S. ambivalence on land redistribution and to castigate U.S. policy-makers for backing off from the Hardie Report in the Philippines. He singled out Frate Bull’s 1958 report on a land reform program in the doldrums in the Philippines, deploring the fact that Bull "recommended only more of the same." He warned of the "future costs this irresolution will entail." He was able to see the Philippines in this sharp and clear perspective and still miss the problems near at hand in South Vietnam is truly cause for astonishment.
Edwin Moise *Land Reform in China and North Vietnam: Consolidating the Revolution at the Village Level* 1983 pp. 258-60, argued persuasively that the alleged bloody uprising in Nghe An probably involved almost no bloodshed and certainly was not a revolt against the DRV's land reform, but a riot associated with the complex social and inner party turmoil stirred up by the radical mobilization and rectification of errors campaigns.

Doan Van Toai, with David Chanoff, *The Vietnamese Gulag*. [precise reference mislaid].

Edward Lansdale recounted in his memoirs: "I warned Diem not to use totalitarian defences against the totalitarian threat of the Communists. They would frustrate the true yearnings of the people for freedom and lead to a resentment which could be aggravated and exploited by subversive political agents." *In the Midst of Wars*. Harper & Row New York 1972 p. 331.


William R. Corson *The Betrayal* Norton & Co. New York 1968 p. 137. A little further on (p. 149), Corson made the observation, rather discounting if juxtaposed with texts by such writers as Douglas Pike and Robert Thompson from the same time, which emphasised the terrorism of the Viet Cong - that "in terms of what the Vietnamese people have experienced in the past, the Viet Cong appears to be most humane."


Joseph Buttinger *Vietnam: The Unforgettable Tragedy*. Horizon Press 1977 p. 48. The numbers game, so notorious a feature of the Vietnam War from beginning to end, applied, even in the 1950's, to numbers of Viet Minh cadres. By common agreement, some 100,000 Viet Minh sympathizers (Paul Kattenburg, following Bernard Fall, thinks more like 300,000) including 60,000 "cadres" departed for the north after the July 1954 Geneva Agreement. The Pentagon estimated that 5,000 or 6,000 "cadres" remained in the south. Yet the GVN asserted that 100,000 "Communist cadres" rallied or surrendered in 1955-56 alone. *Pentagon Papers*. Beacon Press Boston 1971 Vol. 1. p. 328. Figures on Viet Cong terror are equally obscure and contentious. In 1968, Douglas Pike estimated that the Viet Cong had killed 61,000 GVN officials and village leaders since 1958, but in 1970 he put the total of Viet Cong assassinations from 1957 to 1972 at 36,725, including 15,894 between 1958 and 1968, of which 5,389 were dated to 1968 itself. Douglas Pike *The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror* 1970 p. 82. The 1970 figures are used without demurral by Guenter Lewy, in his much more recent study *America In Vietnam* (1978 p. 454) (see Table 13), but their digital precision is surely rather spurious.


Carlyle A. Thayer *The Origins of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam* PhD Australian National University 1977 pp. 260-78, 382-459. On the question of the creation of the NLF by Hanoi and the vexed debate over its southern roots, see George McTuman Kahin
"During the war, it was never in the interests of either the American proponents of intervention or officials in Hanoi to admit the extent of southern initiative in mounting the armed struggle against Diem and the role this played in the formation of the NLF. This has remained the case since the war, for acknowledgement of it clearly undermines the case of current American apologists for intervention, just as it earlier did that of those officials who shaped that policy. And for a post-war Hanoi government whose unexpectedly rapid and rough political and economic reunification of north and south has been attended by the shunting aside or demotion of many of the most prominent and dedicated leaders of the old NLF, it is apparently expedient to gloss over both the degree of their contribution to the struggle against American power and the extent of the revolutionary initiatives taken by the southern ex-Viet Minh...It is ironic that on this score there is today such a striking convergence between revisionists in the United States and Vietnam..."


102. ibid. p. 184.


Ralph B. Smith in his An International History of the Vietnam War Vol. 1. Macmillan 1983 p. 68. gave only this paper by Ladejinsky and Robert Scigliano's South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress Houghton Mifflin Boston 1963 as his sources of information on land reform under Diem - which he consequently understood to have removed land tenure grievances as a major issue in the war.


Jewett M. Burr, during the early 1970's the land reform specialist for CORDS in Military Region I, based in Danang, wrote a doctoral dissertation on the GVN's Land to the Tiller program of 1970-73, completing it in 1976. He commented in his preface:

"Traditionally massive tenancy made much of the Vietnamese peasantry subservient to a very small number of landholding gentry. Thus in the twentieth century, the revolutionaries' promise to equalize land ownership served to attract thousands of riceland tenants and labourers from the very lowest levels of Vietnamese society. However, for fifteen years following the division of Vietnam in 1954, the United States Mission to the Republic of Vietnam...little concerned itself with the significance of land reform as an inducement to revolution..." (Jewett M. Burr Land to the Tiller: Land Redistribution in South Vietnam 1970 - 1973 PhD University of Oregon 1976 pp. xx).


108. ibid.

109. ibid.

110. Edward Lansdale In the Midst of Wars 1972 pp. 355-56 declared:

"Wolf Ladejinsky, the American land reform expert, had left (sic) his position with the U.S. government at the time and Diem immediately employed him. The two men became close friends in 1956 and Ladejinsky was given a house next to the Presidential Palace and joined Diem at breakfast nearly every morning."
Gerald C. Hickey, one of the most experienced of all Vietnam 'hands', having worked in the Central Highlands for many years as an anthropologist, recalled Ladejinsky as "a mystique builder" who would not go out into the field in the late 1950’s, would not eat local food, feared being poisoned and was a disagreeable dinner guest in Saigon. He recalled being ranted at by Ladejinsky on account of critical reports he and Price Gittinger had written about GVN policy in the Central Highlands, and being told that such reports could never be shown to Diem. Interview with Gerald C. Hickey. East-West Center Honolulu 7 Sept. 1984.


113. Serge Thion loc. cit. p. 129.

114. David Wurfel "Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam" Far Eastern Survey June 1957 pp. 85-86. Vo Van Giau informed Wurfel in 1957 that "very few" of the hundreds of thousands of contracts Ladejinsky and Gittinger believed operational were infact enforced and that the Tenant Farmers' Unions were subject to GVN obstruction and harassment in defending tenant interests.

115. William Nighswonger Rural Pacification In Vietnam Praeger 1966 p. 36. Pentagon Papers Vol. 1. pp. 307-08. Kieu Cong Kung tried to create a rural cadre (prototype of persistent such efforts in the 1960's under C.I.A. auspices) to rival the Communist cadre system which was in some places already two decades old. Lansdale thought Kung's scheme was on the right track in 1955-56. He himself, however, concluded, in 1967:

"As it happened, the cadres became preoccupied with Diem's Anti-Communist Campaign and their operations came under bureaucratic attack from Saigon agencies unwilling to allow the civic action teams to carry their programs to the people. Both influences converted the cadre into exclusively propagandistic and political instruments and drew them away from social and economic activities. In late 1956, civic action was cut back severely. In 1957, Kieu Cong Kung died and Nhu absorbed the remnants into his organization."

The civic action scheme actually had French colonial antecedents - the so-called GAMS, or Groupes Administratifs Mobiles. Pentagon Papers Vol. 1. p. 306. William Corson, an ardent proponent of civic action, in the form of the CAPS (Combined Action Platoons) in the 1960’s, argued in 1968 that Lansdale's civic action-centred pacification strategy was pushed aside by the Pentagon from 1957 on and "put into eclipse by the straight line soldiers, until Henry Cabot Lodge picked Lansdale off the shelf and asked him to resume the Other War once again in 1965."


The idea of civic action-based pacification was escalated after 1966 into Robert Komer's New Model Pacification Program. The soberest and most damning verdict on the whole business is perhaps that of C.I.A. veteran Douglas S. Blaufarb: "This fumbling for levers and devices to produce instant political legitimacy in a country that was a blank mystery to most Americans contrasts sadly with the purposefulness and grasp of the party of Ho Chi Minh." The Counterinsurgency Era. Free Press New York 1977 p. 208.


123. ibid. pp. 15-17.

124. ibid. p. 19.


127. Reference as at n.124, ibid p.39.

128. ibid. pp. 84-85.

129. ibid. p. 110.

130. ibid. pp. 116-129.

131. ibid. pp. 156-57.

132. ibid. p. 159.

133. ibid. p. 161.

134. ibid. p. 161.

135. *Pentagon Papers* Beacon Press Boston 1971 Vol. II. p. 539: "The efforts of those advocating reorganization began to bear edible fruit in December 1965 and January 1966, when a conference was held at Warrenton, Va., to which the Mission sent an impressive collection of Mission Council members: Deputy Ambassador Porter, USAID Mission Director Mann, JUSPAO Director Zorthian, Political Counsellor Habib, General Lansdale, C.I.A. Station Chief Jorgenson and Brigadier-General Collins representing Westmoreland. From Washington came the second and third echelons of the bureaucracy: Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; Rutherford Poats, Assistant Administrator of AID; Major General Peers, SACSA; Alvin Friedman, ISA; William Colby and Peer de Silva, C.I.A.; Chester Cooper, White House and Sanford Marlowe, USIA. Other participants included Major-General Hutchins, CINCPAC; Rufus Philips of Lansdale's group; Charles Zwick and Henry Rowan of BOB; George Lodge, the Ambassador's son; Desmond Fitzgerald, C.I.A.; and Leon Goure, RAND."


Joseph Alsop commented: "...there was a big Madison Avenue element in all the talk about 'pacification' during the Hawaii meeting and Vice-President Humphrey's subsequent trip to Vietnam." Elizabeth Pond wrote, in the Christian Science Monitor 11 Feb. 1966: "If Saigon and Washington fight South Vietnam's economic and social war as vigorously as they fight its military war, the Communist thrust against that country will fail. Yet this is the biggest 'if' of the war. Over and over lip service has been paid to the inescapable need of winning over the peasantry. But time and again this has come to naught."

142. ibid. pp. 2-3.
144. ibid. p. 4.
145. ibid. p. 4.
146. ibid. p. 5.
147. ibid. pp. 5-6.
148. ibid: pp. 7, 11-12.
149. ibid. pp. 15-16.
150. ibid. pp. 18-19.
151. ibid. p. 19.
152. ibid. p. 20.
154. ibid. p. 21.
155. ibid. pp. 21-22.
156. ibid. p. 22.
157. ibid. p. 23.
158. ibid. p. 24.
159. ibid. pp. 24, 27.
160. ibid. p. 28.
161. ibid. p. 29.
162. ibid. p. 31.


167. Frank Herbert loc. cit: "According to Hermann Kahn, director of the Hudson Institute and consultant to the Johnson Administration, Habib was chiefly responsible for the RAND Corporation study on land reform."

Roy Prosterman, writing in 1987, seemed a little vague as to who precisely commissioned the RAND study: "The background to the RAND Report and the political maneuvering underlying its wide dissemination have never been fully clear. Richard Critchfield, interviewing former Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman for the Washington Evening Star on March 6 1969, indicated that the report was commissioned by anti-land reform officials in the U.S. mission, perhaps in part to undercut the generally pro-land reform sympathies of the previous ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge." Roy L. Prosterman/Jeffrey M. Riedinger Land Reform and Democratic Development pre-publication draft p. V:39. The published version, Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore 1987 pp. 131-32, differs slightly, deleting "interviewing former Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman for" and substituting "citing remarks by Hermann Kahn of the Hudson Institute."


169. ibid. p. 422.

170. ibid. p. 422: "This point of view, attributed to Ambassador Lodge by Richard Critchfield in a Washington Star article, entered approvingly into the Congressional Record Feb 17 1966 by Senator Jacob Javits. It is also affirmed by George McT. Kahin, in a memorandum published in the Congressional Record April 13 1967."

171. ibid. p. 422.


"From the point of view of government control, the ideal province in South Vietnam would be one in which few peasants farm their own land, the distribution of landholdings is unequal, no land redistribution has taken place, large French landholdings existed in the past, population density is high and the terrain such that accessibility is poor." (emphasis added)

173. Robert L. Sansom The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta pp. 230-31. Sansom did not take issue with Mitchell's reading of Tocqueville, as I have done, but he did observe that Mitchell's analogy between eighteenth century France and twentieth century Vietnam was misconceived and that a better analogy would have been twentieth century Mexico or China. He also commented: "The fact that land was more inequitably distributed in GVN areas than in Viet Cong areas, did not mean that the Viet Minh and Viet Cong, through their land reform programs, caused the land to be more equitably distributed."

174. Charles Stuart Callison Land to the Tiller in the Mekong Delta: Economic, Social and Political Effects of Land Reform in Four Villages of South Vietnam. PhD Cornell University 1976 p. 88 n183: "Mitchell's study was used as a bad example - how not to use multiple regression techniques - in a social statistics course at Harvard University in the summer of 1970. It has been attacked both in print and in unpublished papers. The field research of Robert Sansom and the Stanford Research Institute apparently helped turn official positions around."

178. ibid. p. 48.
179. ibid. pp. 70-71.
180. ibid. p. 71.
182. ibid.
192. ibid.
194. ibid. p. vii.
195. ibid. p. iii.
197. William Bredo/Robert O. Shreve op. cit. p. 2
199. ibid. pp. 10, 13-14, 139.
200. ibid. pp. 25, 139, 142-43.
201. ibid. p. 27.
202. ibid. p. 28.
"Perhaps nothing cuts through the fog of anti-land reform rationalizations more clearly than this voice of the tenant farmers themselves, crying out for ownership of the land and the war be damned."


ibid.

Roy L. Prosterman/Jeffrey M. Riedinger Land Reform and Democratic Development 1987 p. 139.

Charles Stuart Callison Land to the Tiller in the Mekong Delta etc 1976 pp. 102-115 offers the single best summary of this process. Some of the statements by GVN legislators on the bill during debate on it throw a revealing light on divisions within the GVN on the subject even in 1970:

Rep. Dang Van Phuong: "A red wave is threatening to inundate the South and here we have a program to block it."

Senator Trinh Quang Quy: "The justice of the LTTT will leave the VC no place to stand."

Senator Hoang Kim Quy: LTTT amounts to "a social democratic and humanitarian revolution."

Senator Tranh Can: LTTT is "unpopular, socially destructive, is sowing confusion in the countryside, and is moreover uneconomic, immoral and counterprogressive as well."

Rep. Duong Van Ba: TTT is just an electoral gimmick by Thieu. The GVN cannot even implement it.

Senator Vu Minh Tran: LTTT is a U.S. idea. The GVN is being led by the nose and the corruption of GVN officials will sabotage the program.
Rep. Le Quang Hien: LTTT "is a plot to subvert the republic."

Senator Tran Ngoc Oanh: LTTT would "take land from our friends to give it to our enemies" and the fragmentation of holdings it would bring would be "inefficient."

Rep. Tran Ngoc Chau: There are only Communist sympathizers left in the countryside to benefit. GVN soldiers and refugees will miss out.

Senator Le Tan Buu: tenancy is a "benign bondage, forcing the tenant to produce more so that he can both pay his rent and still eat."

Senator Hong Son Dong: instability and sabotage will block implementation of the program. [emphasis added]


226. ibid. p. 233.


231. ibid. p. 744.


234. ibid. pp. 155-56.

235. ibid. p. 156.


237. ibid. p. 160.

238. ibid. p. 163.

239. ibid. pp. 165-66. John Cooper, looking back over those decades in 1985, reflected:

"I think it was a mistake not holding elections in 1956...If we'd worked with Ho Chi Minh from 1945...In those days we had no idea...Ho came in 1945 and begged the U.S. for help...As his
position became weaker, Diem backed off on land reform as landlords were his only supporters...The U.S. fell into the same regressive logic; I'm sure that was true."


242. Daniel Ellsberg graduated with honors from Harvard University in 1952 and went on to graduate studies in statistics and cybernetics. In 1958 he joined the RAND Corporation's Economics Department. In 1962 he received a PhD from Harvard. In 1964-65 he worked at the Pentagon, as a Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense. In 1966-67 he worked on and in Vietnam, with General Edward Lansdale and Ambassador William Porter. In 1967 he became one of Robert McNamara's analysts in the major study of Vietnam War decision-making, which, in the form it took after he made some 4,000 pages of it public documents in 1971, became known as the Pentagon Papers.


244. ibid. p. 19.

245. James Greenfield, foreign editor of the New York Times in 1971, who was put in charge of the Pentagon Papers project by his superiors, told Michael Charlton in 1976, regarding the decision to publish the documents: "After all, we had a country as near an open psychological revolt almost as you could get, and we said isn't this information that the people of this country ought to have?" Michael Charlton/Anthony Moncrieff Many Reasons Why: The American Involvement in Vietnam. Penguin 1979 p. 185.

246. Ellsberg related: "The process of reaching these conclusions was, quite simply, the most frustrating, disappointing, disillusioning period of my life." 1972 op. cit. pp. 197-98 (emphasis added).

He discussed the matter with Charlton after the war was over [Charlton/Moncrieff op. cit. pp. 174-81]. He told Charlton: "Nixon's policy was to continue the war, in contrast to what the public had been led to believe in the 1968 election and in the course of 1969. Second, after reading the Pentagon Papers, especially the early parts, I discovered what was quite a new thought for me, that this policy could not be changed by working within the Executive Branch alone. My entire life, professional life, had been spent on helping the President ultimately have better information on which to base decisions. Suddenly it was apparent to me from this twenty year old history, more than twenty years, that a succession of Presidents had gotten quite adequate information on Vietnam, as realistic or as pessimistic as I could provide, and had chosen to continue the war..." [pp. 177-78].

Regarding the act of leaking these documents, Ellsberg declared: "...my assumption was that I would be thrown into jail for the rest of my life." [p. 179]. "How did you justify it to yourself?" Charlton pressed Ellsberg. The latter responded: "...I came to realize that I had been very wrong in imagining that I had the right to conceal from the public all this information that had been in my possession as an official, or a consultant all those years. Having discovered that I'd been wrong all those years, I decided to start doing what I should have done in the first place..." [p. 180].

Charlton asked him: "So how did the photocopies get from you to the New York Times, as they subsequently did, to become public knowledge?" Ellsberg replied: "I first gave them to Fulbright in November of 1969 and had given them all to him by the spring of 1970. Several times it looked as though hearings were about to be held and they weren't. By the spring of 1971, two more invasions had taken place - the invasion of Cambodia in 1970, the invasion of Laos in 1971. It seemed likely that escalation was going to go still further, as it did in the fall of 1971 with renewal of the bombing of North Vietnam and ultimately the mining of Haiphong in 1972. So I felt that I couldn't wait any longer in informing the public of this history, for what it was worth, so that they could better exercise democratic influence on our policy there. There was a question as to what newspaper might be willing to print these. I went first to the Times because they are the most authoritative, and the most likely to print large amounts of documents." [p. 181].
Robert McNamara, having read parts of the *Pentagon Papers* in 1967, is said to have remarked to a friend: "You know, they could hang people for what's in there." [David Halberstam *The Best and the Brightest* Penguin 1983 p. 769]

On 17 May 1973, Ellsberg testified at some length before a joint hearing by the U.S. Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Government Operations, concerning Government Secrecy and Public Dissent. He informed these Committees that the world of U.S. Government secrets had, since the Second World War, become vast and ramified beyond their imagining and beyond all rational justification. "The security system" he opined "is an education in contempt for law" and spelled the death of the democratic spirit. He related how he had warned Henry Kissinger in 1969, having known him academically for a decade by then, that he was about to drink deep of the potent draught of secrecy, which, Ellsberg said, he considered to be "like the potion that Circe gave Ulysses' men that turned men into swine and made fools of them." He went on: "After a year of his indoctrination, I came upon Henry Kissinger living on Circe's island...I wanted to tell him to read the *Pentagon Papers*, to learn from them, to learn as I had...I asked him if he had read them. He said "No." I said he should at least read the summaries or members of his staff, like Winston Lord, should read these and learn lessons from them. His answer was: "But do we really have anything to learn from these studies?" At which point I recognized a man who had been eating honeydew for a year and that the Republicans couldn't learn from the Democrats any more than the Democrats could learn from the French. I said: "Yes, this is twenty years of history; I do think you have a lot to learn from it." He said "But we make decisions very differently now." I said; "Cambodia did not look so different." He said: "Cambodia, you must understand, was made for very complicated reasons." Secret reasons, which could not be exposed to the Senate or Congress, and therefore couldn't be discussed or argued with; reasons so foolish and yet their foolishness could not be exposed by democratic give and take because they couldn't be discussed." I said: "Henry, there hasn't been a miserable policy in Vietnam in the last twenty years that was not made for very complicated reasons." [Fain/Plant/Milloy *The Intelligence Community* Bowker, New York, 1977. pp. 505-11].


247. Barbara W. Tuchman *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam* 1985 p. 461: "A plumbers' group, to locate leaks, was established in a basement office next door to the White House, and orders came 'right out of the Oval Office' (according to later testimony) to get something on Ellsberg. The result was the burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office, with the object of framing him as a Soviet agent."


Raymond Johnson was MSA/FOA/ICA Agriculture Division chief in Manila from August 1952 until July 1955. His opposition to Hardie's recommendations would seem to have been recorded by David Würfel, in 1960, in the latter's claim that Hardie found himself involved in a "heated debate" within the U.S. Mission, against opponents "from Dr. Renne at the top down to the Chief of the Agriculture Division and including at least one of Hardie's fellow technicians in the Agriculture Division." See Würfel *The Bell Report And After: A Study of the Political Problems of Social Reform Stimulated By Foreign Aid* (PhD, Cornell University 1960) p. 509. Since Würfel claimed that the "heated debate" erupted almost as soon as Hardie circulated his proposal within the Mission, and since Johnson did not replace Edward Bell as chief of the Agriculture Division until almost the time of the submission of the Hardie Report to Malacanan (August-September 1952), it is possible that the man Würfel was referring to was actually Bell rather than Johnson. If this was the case, the "fellow technician" referred to might, ironically, have been Johnson himself, since he was Agriculture Production Advisor from January to August 1952, before taking over from Bell. Unfortunately, Würfel did not name most of the parties to the "heated debate". Nor did he cite interviews with any of the participants, except Robert Hardie himself. Nor did he indicate the precise nature of the issues in the "heated debate". Yet so far as the present author has been able to ascertain, the available historical records do not carry any traces of such a "heated debate" and Robert Hardie himself wrote in 1986 that he had had no significant differences with Dr. Renne or other members of the Mission during 1951-52. (Robert S. Hardie, letter to the author 20 April 1986).

3. Stamer 1961 op. cit. pp. 137-38: "Surprisingly, this change in the American position on agrarian reform received little or no public acknowledgement. As late as 1955, the Manila press seemed totally unaware that the United States mission had reversed the stand on land reform which was enunciated in the Hardie Report; even in Congress it was not generally recognized that the Hardie recommendations no longer represented the official attitude of the United States...This is documented to some extent in Senate records on the debate on Senate Bill 90..."

The articles by Teodora Locsin in the *Philippines Free Press*, between April and August 1955, are an interesting illustration of Stamer's observation here concerning the Manila press. Under the heading "The President's Bill [House Bill 2557, the Land Reform Act]: Nationalism As Nonsense", on 23 April 1955, Locsin wrote: "Nothing remotely resembling land reform has, so far, been accomplished in the Philippines and there is very little that the United States can do about it." He added, in phrases that acquire enhanced significance in the context of the present study:

"The United States government has assigned Wolf Ladejinsky, the Agricultural Development expert who did the land reform job in post-war Japan, to South Vietnam; the Americans are sponsoring land reform there, to discourage the people from going to the Reds. Whether it is too late or not one cannot say, but the United States government apparently sees...the need. It is land reform in South Vietnam - or else!" [emphasis added]


"Senate Bill 90...should not be supported in its present form, because it seeks to solve the tenant problem solely by a sweeping nationwide transfer of titles to tenants. This is not considered practical...Such a program would bring about extreme financial difficulties for the economy, have little chance of Congressional approval, and involve more complicated administrative problems than can feasibly be dealt with successfully in the Philippines..."

In the body of the *Davis Report* itself, at p. 30, the authors stated: "It is not feasible to make tenants the owners of the land they till through a nationwide land transfer program..."


11. Teodoro Locsin observed drily, in April 1955: "Congress is mainly composed of landlords and their lawyers; to expect land reform from it would be to expect blood from a turnip, water from a stone." *Philippines Free Press* 23 April 1955 p. 2. Indeed, he commented bitterly: "...even if both House and Senate were to approve [the Land Reform Act] there is no indication that it would be implemented. The chances are that it would be one more of those dead laws that clutter up our statute books. Congress may pay lip service to land reform; that is the popular, the 'political' thing to do these days; Congress is not expected to take it seriously." *Philippines Free Press* 9 April 1955 p. 4. When the Land Reform Act was finally legislated, he described it as "a futile, mutilated, queer piece of legislation". *Philippines Free Press* 16 July 1955 p. 2: "Congressmen Mutilate President Magsaysay's Land Reform Bill".

The enduring realities of Philippine politics may be grasped by the simple observation that almost exactly the same phrasing as that used by Locsin in 1955, in reference to the Magsaysay Land Reform Act, was used, with every justification, by commentators, including the aged Locsin himself, in 1987-88, in reference to the Aquino land reform legislation.

12. *Davis Report* p. 21: "It has become increasingly clear that effective measures to improve land tenure conditions would destroy the major social issue which the Huk leaders have been exploiting as an excuse for their dissident activities." The report went on to quote Huk leader Luis Taruc, from an interview with Benigno Aquino, published in the *Manila Bulletin* on 16 Feb. 1954:

"The Pampanga rebel leader reiterated his belief that his movement is a just and a valid cause. He said that he would neither compromise nor surrender, if the reforms he and his followers have been demanding since they took up arms are not granted by the government. His foremost demand has not changed. It is still the complete revamp of the country's tenancy laws 'to afford the masses of our people the chance to live decently' or at least a liberal and humane application of present tenancy laws."

13. *Davis Report* p. 34.


19. The phrase is Olson's 1974 p. 87. "U.S. interest in land reform" Olson wrote "was confined within narrow strategic parameters. If stability could be achieved without risking the oligarchy's position, land reform would be avoided altogether." p. 86.

20. Dulles 21 May 1954, as in n18.


23. During Congressional debates, ceilings of 500 hectares for riceland and 1,024 hectares for other crops were suggested. *Philippines Free Press* 16 July 1955 p. 69. The final ceilings were 300 hectares for individual owners and 600 for corporations. *Philippines Free Press* 6 August 1955 p. 5: "Land Reform Bill Doomed".


26. *Philippines Free Press* 16 July 1955 p. 69: "The measure as changed by the House is shot through and through with loopholes which will enable the landlords - with the aid of clever lawyers - to defeat its purpose." As Leon O. Ty observed, the original bill had stipulated that lands in excess of 144 hectares were to be expropriated where there was evidence of marked agrarian unrest; but, in the final version, the law read, 300/600 hectares and where there was "justified" agrarian unrest. Manuel Cases, (LP La Union) called this piece of legislation the "Landlord Tenure Bill...because it is more favorable to the landlords than to the tenants". None of this prevented House Speaker Eugenio Perez from describing the bill as "dangerous", on the grounds that it "would drastically alter our age-old system of land tenure" and result in "deprivation of private property." *Philippine Free Press* 6 August 1955 p. 5.


30. Robert T. McMillan/Generoso Rivera *The Rural Philippines.* MSA/PHILCUSA Office of Information Manila Oct. 1952. p. 86. This study will henceforth be referred to in the present study as the *McMillan/Rivera Report*. This study was a sociological survey of thirteen selected, widely separated rural barrios, out of the estimated 17,403 such barrios in the Philippines. It was conducted between 15 December 1951 and 1 March 1952. It involved interviews with 3,479 heads of households. It compiled a great deal of fascinating data on social and physical conditions in these sample barrios. This data was tabulated in the report at pp. 47-114. Its authors acknowledged the assistance of Arthur F. Raper, Amando M. Dalisay, James P. Emerson, Mark B. Williamson and some 200 Filipino staff.

32. ibid. p. 32.


39. ibid.


These and other country studies and analytic papers presented at the 1970 Spring Review Conference contained a great deal that was both lucid and positive, but their impact on policy seems to have been negligible. AID veteran Richard Hough remarked of this matter, in 1985: "AID as an institution has never taken agrarian reform as a serious instrument of development...There is a major conflict over whether land reform actually works in economic terms...The 1970 Spring Review papers were filing cabinet studies that never had a positive policy impact...The inactivity of AID and its non-acceptance of land reform were based on premises debunked in the Spring Review." Interview with Richard Hough, Washington D.C., 8 Feb. 1985.


50. Basilio N. de los Reyes "Can Land Reform Succeed?" in Frank Lynch SJ (ed) *View From the Paddy: Empirical Studies of Philippine Rice Farming and Tenancy*. Philippine Sociological Review Vol. 20. No's 1 & 2. Jan/April 1972. IPC, Quezon City, 1972 pp. 79-100. The article includes comments by David Christenson of AID, Jose Drilon Jr, then Director of the Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture, Los Banos; Akira Takahashi, Japanese geographer at the Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo; and Assa Marom, Israeli rural organization and farm management specialist.

Gleeck and Koone observed in their 1970 AID study: "Objectives were not quantified in 1963, but when...Marcos became President in 1966, he announced that he would convert 350,750 tenants into lessees by the end of 1969. As of September 30, 1968, 13,377 farmers had obtained leasehold contracts, and on December 31, 1969, 28,616 farmers had such contracts." p. 47. "This is far too few to affect the basic land tenure structure. The ownership pattern in Philippine agriculture has not changed appreciably over the past 20-30 years." p. 79. "The most significant development during this period has been the growth of disillusionment approaching the mutinous with the political system as it exists and functions today and with its capacity to achieve not only justice for the farm tenants, but to move society in the direction that modernization requires." p. 77.


52. ibid. p. 84.

53. ibid. p. 84.

54. Lewis E. Gleeck Jr., Consultant, Office of Rural Development, Memo. 2-3 August 1971, ORD to Director Thomas Niblock "For Mission Use Only": "One Year After: Land Reform in Nueva Ecijia" p. 2. This memorandum as a whole, running to six pages, is an interesting document, worth citation at some length. Gleeck remarked to Niblock:

"From the Mission's end of the telescope, it is clear that the principal value of the project thus far has been again to document...how many are the obstacles faced by an external agency in promoting Philippine economic development...They include the all-pervading political atmosphere, the gap between resources and proclaimed government objectives, the viciousness of inter- and intra-bureaucratic struggle, the by now ingrained skepticism of both officials and voters towards the government's intentions and the motivations of officials, the strength of traditional social relations and behaviour in rural areas, the operation of new factors - technological, economic, social and political - which have disturbed but not changed these relations, and finally, the intractable problem of marrying specific Mission goals to ongoing government programs which are only partially compatible with these goals." pp. 1-2.
"...To us, increased mobility, visibility and activity on the part of land reform teams are evidence both of the new project and of a new determination; to the official and farmer it is more generally assumed to be preparations for a new electoral campaign, from which he is accustomed to expect favors, if he votes or promises to vote properly. 'The real substance of power is in the hands of the mayor, his heavily armed bodyguards and the chief of police.' p. 4.

MASAKA, the PRRM and the Catholic Church's social organizations were all lacking in firm direction and influence, Gleeck observed: "All of these elements function as a leaven in the...dough of tradition, but none offer the prospect of becoming true engines of development or change." p. 6.

55. See, in particular, the string of articles that appeared in the Philippines Free Press in 1965, before and after the Presidential elections.

Until very recently, the only full-scale political biography of Ferdinand Marcos was the eulogistic and unscholarly political pulp work by Hartzell Spence, Marcos of the Philippines World Publishing Co., New York, 1969 (2nd edition), much of which reads almost like a parody in retrospect. Raymond Bonner, in his critical expose of U.S. relations with Marcos, first published in New York in 1986, put things in a more sober light. The first serious attempt at a political biography is Lewis Gleeck's President Marcos and the Philippine Political Culture. Gleeck appears to lean over backwards to depict Marcos as a hero who fell into corruption. A later biographer, if the subject finds one, may well dispute Gleeck's findings on the achievements of Marcos, but the book is a valuable historical document and far more serious than Spence's.


Gleeck, in the eighth chapter of his biography of Marcos, entitled "A Stalemated President Despairs of Democracy (1969-Sept. 21 1972)", characteristically attributed motives of anguish and statesmanship to Marcos, which are difficult to credit:

"Some time during 1969-71, the attacks on his regime by the corrupted alliance of politicians and press, as well as the revolutionaries and subversives, forced Marcos not only to develop more effective countermeasures against the latter groups, but to dream of a transformation in the political culture which had checkmated his efforts to promote national development. Martial law could probably quell the revolution and cripple the subversives, but the idea of a garrison state was unattractive to the President's thinking and temperament. On the other hand, since the faults of society were widely acknowledged, and the conflict between its values and the objectives of national development and modernization were crystal clear, it was tempting to envisage a reconstruction of society..." p. 113.

The Lopez-owned Manila Chronicle seems to have been a particular target of Gleeck's assertions concerning the corruption of the Philippine press. The Philippines Free Press he described as having waged a crusade against corruption "unceasingly, unsuccessfully, and finally nihilistically and self-destructively" (p. 13) and as having vented a "visceral hatred" toward Marcos in 1970-72 (p. 24). Certainly the Philippines Free Press was candid and unsparring in its questioning of the case for martial law in August and September 1972. Thereafter, it was suppressed by Marcos.


58. i/5/9

60. Simbulan 1965 pp. 81-88. See especially the data assembled by Simbulan at p. 88 and reprinted in this study as Table 26.

61. *NEDA Statistical Yearbooks 1975* p. 141 and *1984* pp. 320-21. This data is reprinted in this study as Tables 36 and 38.


64. ibid. pp. 322-24. See Table 39, infra.

65. Tadem Dec. 1986 op. cit. p. 4., reprinted in this study as Table 33.


67. ibid. p. 83.

68. ibid. p. 83.

69. ibid. p. 84.

70. ibid. p. 84.

71. ibid. p. 84.

72. ibid. p. 84.

73. ibid. p. 93.


75. ibid. p. 63.

76. ibid. p. 70.

77. ibid. p. 76.

78. ibid. p. 76.


80. ibid. pp. 113-14.

81. ibid. p. 121.

82. ibid. p. 122.
84. ibid. p. 119.
85. ibid. p. 119.
86. ibid. p. 119.
88. *Solidarity* No's 106 & 107 1986 "Agrarian Reform Now!" p. 8. Tavanlar asserted: "U.S. Ambassador [sic] Niblock, with the presence of U.S. Senator Inouye, who was the chairman of foreign aid in the U.S. Senate and Senator Magnusson, who was the chairman of finance in the U.S. Senate, were here. We talked to Marcos together and they were willing to give us [a] $7 billion grant to buy this land from the landlords. We did not take it. Marcos said to me in the privacy of his office: "Tavy,...we don't want to use their money.'" Tadem exclaimed incredulously: "$7 billion and Marcos rejected it?" Tavanlar rejoined: "$7 billion and Marcos rejected it."
89. Olson 1974 p. 90 would seem to have got some vague sense of this startling episode. He wrote: "It was reported that the United States would provide the necessary funding if Manila seriously pushed the program. This public statement [which he attributed to "one local AID official", whom he did not name, or otherwise identify] touched off a furor within higher levels of the agency in Washington, because it was both unauthorized and untrue." See also ibid. p. 101 n73.
91. Lewis E. Gleeck Jr. Memo, to Keith W. Sherper 10 July 1974. AID Manila. *Some Accomplishments and Problems of the Agrarian Reform Project 1971-1974.* Gleeck had been in the Philippines for twelve years by then, since 1962, and had been one of the U.S. officials most closely connected with the land tenure question for a number of years, co-authoring a paper on it, with Harold Koone, for AID's Spring Review conference on land reform in 1970.
92. ibid. pp. 2-3. According to Gleeck, Estrella, at a chance meeting with AID's Thomas Niblock, in Davao, reproached Niblock "for the alleged antipathy or indifference AID had shown towards land reform in the Haraldson years, neglecting to add that Haraldson had carefully investigated the GOP [Government Of the Philippines] program as it then existed and found it without real substance, stagnating under the weight of political sloganeering, inadequate funding and a charter of activities which seemed mainly to provide employment for a large number of government employees." *Bulletin of the American Historical Collection* Vol. V. No. 2. Manila April 1977 pp. 63-67.
93. Gleeck to Sherper 10 July 1974 p. 1. Niblock attended the meeting, as did "most of the leading lights in the field, including Roy Prosterman, but not Wolf Ladejinsky."
94. ibid. pp. 2.
95. ibid. p. 3.
98. ibid. p. 3.
99. ibid. p. 3.
98. ibid. p. 3.
99. ibid. p. 3.
100. ibid. p. 4.
102. Doughty ibid.
103. ibid.
112. ibid. p. 3.
116. This purge, which included Ludovico Villamor, Gerry Bulatao, Charlie Avila, Noel Mondejar, Luis Ialandoni and others, was protested in a long collective letter to Jeremias Montemayor, drafted at the Divine Word Mission Seminary in E. Rodriguez Ave, Quezon City, on 18 July 1973. The letter referred to the arrest by the Philippine Constabulary of the above-mentioned FFF
militants and others between 28 June and 1 July 1973. Following the first wave of arrests, an FFF executive meeting voted Montemayor "full and complete emergency powers to safeguard the security of the organization, to cleanse its membership and leadership of all taint of infiltration/subversion and to make arrangements with the government for this purpose..." The signatories of the letter charged Montemayor with "deceit and bad faith", gross nepotism (in that seven members of his family were receiving salaries from the FFF) and receipt of funds from undisclosed sources abroad, the amounts and their uses being concealed.


119. ibid. p. 5.

120. ibid. p. 6.

121. ibid. p. 10.


125. ibid. p. 25.

126. ibid. p. 25.


131. Interview with Lewis Gleeck, Los Banos, 30 April 1985.


137. Referring to it as the "Rand Report", then AID Manila Agriculture Division chief James Beebie presented this document to the author in December 1986 as the point of departure for an inquiry
into the problem of land reform in the Philippines. His appreciation of the Hickey Report was refreshing, but entailed the startling implication that the "history" of the problem could be dated from 1978. Beebie's successor, Robert Resseguie, in November 1987, expressed boredom with the land reform debate and appeared to have no historical grasp of it at all. Interview with Robert Resseguie, Magsaysay Center, Manila, 24 November 1987.

140. ibid. pp. 8-9.
142. ibid. p. 22.
144. ibid. p. 10.
145. ibid. p. 11.
146. ibid. pp. 33-34.
CHAPTER 7: THE CRUCIBLE: EL SALVADOR 1960-84


3. ibid. p. 20.

4. ibid. p. 25. This may be contrasted with the great cities of Mexico, such as Teotihuacan (flouruit circa 200 B.C. - 800 A.D.) with its 100,000 inhabitants, and the Aztec capital, Tenochtitlan (founded in 1345 A.D. and destroyed by the Spaniards in 1521 A.D.) with its 250,000 inhabitants. Nigel Davies The Ancient Kingdoms of Mexico. Penguin 1983 pp. 85-113, 170-91.

5. Bernal Diaz remarked in the second chapter of his account of the Spanish conquest of Mexico how he planted there orange pips which he had brought with him from Cuba. "The trees came up very well" he says, "for when the pappas (Indian priests) saw that these were different plants from any they knew, they protected them and watered them and kept them free from weeds." The Conquest of New Spain, trans. S. M. Cohen. Penguin 1973 p. 42.


7. Linda Newson: "The Depopulation of Nicaragua in the Sixteenth Century" Journal of Latin American Studies. Vol. 14 No. 2 pp. 253-86. Newson estimated the pre-Conquest populations of Central America at: Guatemala 2,000,000; Honduras and Belize 750,000; Nicaragua 1,200,000; El Salvador 500,000; Costa Rica 400,000; Panama 1,000,000. She was using Radell's figures as given in his essay "The Indian Slave Trade and the Population of Nicaragua in the Sixteenth Century" in W. M. Denovan (ed) The Native Population of the Americas in 1492. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press. 1976. p. 291. On the basis of these figures, the population of Central America is estimated to have collapsed to the staggering extent of a 97% decline between 1520 and 1600.


14. Dana Munro, 1918, quoted in Pearce op. cit. p. 22.


17. Agustin Farabundo Marti, known as 'El Negro' because swart, wore a red star on his lapel with a picture of Leon Trotsky on it. Arrested in New York in spring 1928, during a police raid on the premises of the Anti-Imperialist League, then released, Marti went to Nicaragua and fought for Cesar Augusto Sandino against the U.S. marines, then intervening (not for the first time) in that country. It seems Marti visited the U.S.S.R. some time in 1930, with his Salvadoran comrades Juan Pablo Wainwright, Modesto Ramirez and Miguel Marmol. On his return to El Salvador, he was gaoloed and went on a hunger strike that gained him national fame and considerable popularity as a prisoner of conscience, in May 1931. Having tried unsuccessfully to steer popular anger away from the disastrous course of insurrection, Marti was arrested, tried and executed during the matanza. Wainwright fled the country, but was captured by police in Guatemala and tortured to death in the dungeons of Jorge Ubico. Marmol survived a firing squad and lived to tell the story the bloodbath. Roque Dalton, a controversial figure on the Salvadoran left in the 1960's, wrote a history of the matter himself under the title *Miguel Marmol: Los Sucesos (the Events) de 1932 en El Salvador* (San Jose, Costa Rica. Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana 1972). It was Marti, of course, who became the eponymous hero of the FMLN - the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front - in 1980. Dalton, who bore more resemblance to Marti than to the earthier Marmol, was executed in 1975 by fellow revolutionaries Joaquin Villalobos and Sebastian Erquilla, on charges of being a C.I.A. penetration agent and provocateur.


20. McClintock op. cit. p. 108. Drawing on Salvadoran accounts by Abel Cuenca and Rocque Dalton, McClintock found that Hernandez Martinez spent his first weeks in office preparing a co-ordinated assault on the Left and the peasantry to physically eliminate the danger of insurrection. Thus the matanza was planned before the uprising and was not a mere violent spasm in response to it.


22. Anderson op. cit. pp. 130-37 estimated that the number killed was probably of the order of 10,000 to 15,000, though he cited estimates as low as 7,000 and as high as 40,000. Dermot Keogh, writing a decade later, thought that "the figure 30,000 may be an underestimate" (McClintock op. cit. p. 142 n77). Salvadoran historian Gregorio Bustamante in his *Historia*
**Militär de El Salvador** (San Salvador 1935 and 1951 pp. 106-07) referred to estimates of "over 30,000" but himself stated that the total was "no less than 24,000 persons murdered." An extract from Bustamante is reprinted in Leiken/Rubin (eds) op. cit. pp. 94-95.

23. Dermot Keogh op. cit. p. 13, cites a cable from A. J. Rodgers, British Consul in San Salvador, referring to a Government of El Salvador survey which had described half the soldiers in the Army as "Communists". McClintock op. cit. p. 144 n106.


27. ibid. p. 121.


32. ibid. p. 154.

33. William H. Durham *Scarcity and Survival in Central America* Stanford University Press 1979. Grappling with "Malthusian" demographic perspectives on conflicts over access to resources, especially land, in El Salvador and Honduras, and on the 1969 war between the two states, Durham concluded: "These conflicts were a response to relative rather than absolute resource scarcity" p. 164. In other words, not absolute lack of land in proportion to population but extremely skewed control of such land for the production of export crops was the chief cause of poverty and social conflict in both countries and of the war between them.

Walter LaFeber, in his *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*. W. W. Norton & Co. New York 1983 p. 172, cited a C.I.A. survey of Latin America, dated 1 April 1964, which described El Salvador as "one of the hemisphere's most stable, progressive republics". This extraordinarily superficial and irresponsible intelligence report must be set against the background that Durham and before him Browning has described and, further, as we shall see, against the background of active C.I.A. and other U. S. government measures to reinforce in El Salvador not processes of progressive reform but institutions of elite control and repression.


McClintock op. cit. pp. 166-70 provides a fascinating discussion of the case. That Ernesto Regalado-Duenas was killed by rightist, not leftist, elements was the opinion also of a former girlfriend of his, as related to the author in an interview in San Salvador on 3 October 1984. McClintock adds that, when acquitted of the killing in June 1971, Chele Medrano went to the United States and thereafter organized the hard-right political organization FUDI (*Frente Unido*...
Democratico Independiente) (p. 167). This body was the lineal progenitor of the Frente Amplio Nacional (FAN), organized around Chele Medrano and Roberto D'Aubuisson in January 1980 and it, in turn, of the Alianza Republicana Nacional (ARENA), organized in early 1982 to contest national elections with the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the old Partido de Conciliacion Nacional (PCN).

For a Salvadoran account, see Jorge Pinto El Grito Del Mas Pequeno. Editorial Comete y Licenciada Victoria Eugenia Montes. Mexico City 1986. Ch. xiii pp. 160-66. Pinto notes that Ernesto Regalado-Duenas, grandson of General Tomas Regalado, grand nephew of Francisco Duenas and son of Tomas Regalado, who, while he lived, was the leader ("llevo de batuta", literally the baton-bearer) in the counsels of the so-called "fourteen families", the toppmost group of the ruling class, appeared to be, on the death of his father, heir to the leadership of the oligarchic elite (p. 161). Pinto writes of intrigues within the elite to dominate the military, which prompted the security organs of President Fidel Sanchez Hernandez to assassinate Ernesto Regalado-Duenas and blame the killing on leftist terrorists. This assassination was, Pinto exclaims, the Salvadoran equivalent of the killing of the elder Somoza in Nicaragua, or of Castillo Armas in Guatemala, or of Rafael Trujillo, in the Dominican Republic (p. 162). No account known to the present author even comes close to recording and analysing the social and political relations between the Salvadoran elite and the Salvadoran armed forces in the 1960's and 1970's, but it could be that a full investigation of the killing of Ernesto Regalado-Duenas would open the door to such an account. Certainly such an account of these things is required if the violent history and byzantine politics of El Salvador in the 1980's are to be thoroughly understood.


In his brilliant modernistic novel The Death of Che Guevara,Vintage Books. Random House. New York 1984 p. 224, Jay Cantor has a bitter young Che, witness to the U.S. covert invasion of Guatemala, write to his father in June 1954: "Are you a Communist, Ernesto?" your friend, old man Isaías, asked me in that field. He was shocked at that thought. The United States, he said, is our ally. We have a shared concern for the worth of the individual. Wasn't that stupid, father! Criminally stupid! You taught me in those walks about the city that the United States is a callous top-hatted magician turning dead people into round gold coins. They are our enemies, father, now and forever, yours and mine. They destroyed the Guatemalan Revolution as if they
were crumpling the page of someone's story. They condemned the Indians to death, death from parasites, death from cold, death from hunger, all for a few more gold coins. Am I a Communist, father? I, child of the conquistadors, plantation-owner's son, petit-bourgeois? No, I'm not. Nor are those who, like Fortunoy and the Guatemalan Party call themselves Communists, but only talk, sitting around their glass kitchen-tables - and so betray the masses. But I could change myself. It was given to me to act. I could bind Marx's truth to me."


One cannot help but smile a little wryly on reading, in this light, Christopher Dickey's report that one U.S. diplomat described the Treasury Police in 1983 as "a secret society, like the SS", meaning, of course, the Nazi SS. *New Republic* 26 December 1983 p. 18.


According to Pinto [1986 op. cit. pp. 52, 150], Medrano was himself a protege in the 1940's and early 1950's of Colonel Adan Torres Valencia, then chief of military intelligence and commander of the San Carlos barracks, the main army garrison in San Salvador. Concerning their relationship, Pinto wrote:

"Desde la asuncion del mando de Sanchez Hernandez habia sido nombrado Director de la Guardia Nacional el coronel Jose Alberto Medrano, militar siniestro que habia participado en la represion contra los obreros en 1952, siendo entonces mayor del ejercito y jefe de investigaciones criminales de la policia nacional. Mentor de Torres Valencia, habia jefe de inteligencia ejercito y comandante del Cuartel San Carlos. En los regimenes anteriores ostento el cargo de jefe nacional de la C.I.A..." (p. 150) [emphasis added]. That is: "After the assumption of power by Sanchez Hernandez [1967], Colonel Jose Alberto Medrano, a sinister military man, who had participated in the repression of the workers in 1952, when he had been an army major and chief of criminal investigations for the National Police, was named director of the National Guard. He had been trained by [?] Torres Valencia, when the latter was chief of military intelligence and commander of the San Carlos barracks. Under earlier regimes [prior to 1967], he [Torres Valencia?] had played a role as chief national [agent] for the C.I.A..." [my translation].

If Torres Valencia before Medrano and then Medrano himself were, as seems to have been the case, chief C.I.A. liaisons in El Salvador, while D'Aubuisson was both a protege of Medrano and trained in Washington D.C. and Panama, at U.S. government facilities, then the road to terror would appear to have been paved by the U.S. for some three decades before 1980.

Regarding the killing of common criminals and dissidents, Pinto states that Medrano, under instructions from Torres Valencia, had been personally responsible for the torture of political prisoners and the execution of thieves [ladrones]. He adds:

"Medrano se habia jactado en diversas ocasiones de ser el responsable, del orden y de la tranquilidad del pais por haber fusilado a quince mil delincuentes: decia que el personalmente llevaba a cabo las ejecuciones en la azotea del edificio de la Policia Nacional."

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Not having independent confirmation of the huge figure of fifteen thousand extra-judicial executions in the early 1950’s - a large-scale terror in itself, in a country which then had some three million people - I have deliberately understated the claim in the body of the present text.

44. McClintock op. cit. p. 61. Daniel Smith had worked on public safety programs in South Vietnam in 1960 prior to being posted to El Salvador. See Table 15.

45. ibid. pp. 204-05.


47. According to McClintock [op. cit. p. 203], the Immigration Police were developed into a political surveillance organization with especial thoroughness under the AID’s Public Safety program between 1962 and 1974. The AID assistance was directed at "improving its investigative and records operations to enable rapid identification and exclusion of undesirable aliens and more effective control over all foreign nationals in the country." [Hardin Report p. 3]. Between 1961 and 1974, the Immigration Police grew from a staff of 21 to a staff of 350.


This connection dated back to the 1940’s, when Serafino Romualdi, who was to become executive director of AIFLD on its creation in 1962, worked for Nelson Rockefeller in the O.S.S., whence he moved to the A.F.L.’s International Affairs Dept. and helped to create ORIT, the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers in 1948. Now Romualdi travelled to El Salvador in 1952 at the invitation of the PRUD regime of Oscar Osorio to help develop an “anti-Communist” trade union front. He described the PRUD as reformers who “set their mind and enthusiasm to remake El Salvador into a modern developing country with constitutional guarantees for all citizens and a favorable climate for the investment of domestic and foreign capital.” Tom Barry/Deb Preusch The Soft War: The Uses and Abuses of U.S. Economic Aid in Central America. Grove Press New York. 1988 p. 242. The ninth chapter of this book, "AIFLD: Agents and Organizers", offers an exceptionally well-informed summary of the work of AIFLD in Central America from 1962 to 1988].


Hardie's work in El Salvador was, in his understanding, part of "a pilot project within the purview of the Alliance for Progress fostered by the Kennedy Administration." He did not perceive his role as other than a technical one. "The Nathan team", he wrote in 1988, "consisted of but four persons: a chief and one advisor for each of the financial, industrial and agricultural sectors. My duties involved close association with responsible officials in the National Planning
Offices and in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. While my prime concern focused on formulating a general plan for agricultural development, I also devised and justified plans to support loans approved to finance modest operations in the fields of small farmer credit, livestock improvement and irrigation development. He does not seem to have been aware of any parallel operations by AID and the Special Forces to create ORDEN, the SS [ANSESAL], ANTEL or the program in Washington that later spawned the UCS. Of the social and economic scene in El Salvador in 1962-64, he recalled in 1988: "During the period of my stay in El Salvador, while evidence of widespread need for basic improvements in both the social and economic sectors was not difficult to come by, there actually, at that time, was no marked display of widespread or organized unrest." Robert S. Hardie, letter to the author, 27 October 1988.


56. McClintock op. cit. p. 205, citing C. Allan Stewart, Office of Public Safety, "Report on Visit to Central America and Panama to Study A.I.D. Public Safety Programs". A.I.D. Washington D.C. 1967. This document is referred to by McClintock, and will hereinafter be referred to, as the Stewart Report.

57. McClintock op. cit. pp. 205-06.


68. Williams 1986 op. cit. p. 171.

69. McClintock op. cit. p. 167: "Medrano was acquitted [of a murder charge in the Regalado case] in June 1971 and immediately left the country for the United States, where he remained for several
months. In July, the recently formed FUDI, backed by the landed families of Ahuachapan, applied for legal recognition. It stood for resistance both to the agrarian reformist tendencies represented by Sanchez's irrigation law, and against the official party's increasing solicitude for the interests of the landed families which had diversified into finance and industrial development, and required new degrees of state intervention in investment, planning and international marketing. When Medrano returned from the United States in October 1971, he was acclaimed FUDI's leader and presidential candidate for 1972. "His source is Webre 1979 pp. 159-61. The Ahuachapan landed elite were led by the Salaverria family, who remained close to Medrano and involved with D'Aubuisson into the 1980's.


Dunkerley [1982 p. 111] appears to have believed AIFLD was expelled in 1976, not 1973. He wrote: "...In May 1976, Chief of Staff Colonel Miguel Rodriguez was unfortunately arrested in New York for attempting to resell 10,000 machine-guns to the Mafia. The Rodriguez affair strengthened the hand of the U.S. Ambassador in El Salvador, Ignacio Lozano, who from the summer of 1976 exercised considerable pressure on both Molina and Washington on the question of human rights. Molina's eventual expulsion of AIFLD and the conduct of the 1977 election widened the gap even further..."

71. In his recent book on the C.I.A., which suffers from having no footnotes, no bibliography and not even an essay on sources in it, Bob Woodward of the Washington Post remarked that, on becoming Director of Central Intelligence, in January 1981, "Casey was dumbfounded to learn that the C.I.A. had closed its station in El Salvador in 1973 to save money and had reopened it only in 1978. That left a five year gap. How could that be? What was going on at the C.I.A.?..." Veil: The Secret Wars of the C.I.A. 1981-1987. Simon & Schuster. London 1987 p. 39. John Ranelagh, whose book on the C.I.A. was in preparation at the same time, does not appear to have been told this. He recorded an interview with Stansfield Turner, Casey's predecessor as DCI, on 29 July 1983, in which Turner told him how he had warned President Carter, in 1978, that El Salvador, "a small country and of no particular immediate significance" was "going to blow up some day" because it had "a terrible social structure" and was "controlled by four hundred people". The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the C.I.A. Sceptre. Hodder & Stoughton. London. 1988 p. 679.

Ranelagh's anecdote does not confirm Woodward's, but is not incompatible with it. There is some indirect confirmation of Woodward's report that the C.I.A. had no station in operation in El Salvador between 1973 and early 1978, in Raymond Bonner's casual observation that the C.I.A. station chief in El Salvador in early 1980, whom Ambassador White dismissed not long after arriving, because the COS had an "incorrigible bent to the right", "had been there for about two years". Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and El Salvador. 1984. p. 164.

The affect on the C.I.A.'s Central America operations of the public investigations into and attacks on the Agency in the mid-1970's has nowhere, to my knowledge been systematically studied. Two aspects of it demand further examination, if the Agency's monitoring of the death squad operations in El Salvador in the 1980's is to be thoroughly clarified: the purge of the covert action staff by DCI Turner, in which such veterans as Henry Knoche, Louis Latham, Cord Meyer, William Wells, Campbell James and Theodore Shackley lost their tenure and which added weight and recruits to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), established in 1975 by David Atlee Phillips, erstwhile chief of C.I.A. Latin American and Caribbean Operations; and Frank Carlucci's work as Turner's Deputy from 1977, when he spoke of a five year plan to repair the damage of the public investigations of 1974-76 "by creating a truly
"clandestine corps of operations officers" Ranelagh op. cit. p. 600; Agee/Wolf op. cit. pp. 301-13 [emphasis added].

72. Christopher Dickey "Behind the Death Squads" New Republic 26 December 1983 p. 18: "According to U.S. officials in San Salvador, Medrano in his heyday often referred to three of his more capable junior officers as 'mis tres asesinos': my three murderers. One was named Eduardo Avila. Another was Guillermo Antonio Roeder. The third was Roberto D'Aubuisson."


"A graduate of the Salvadoran military academy, D'Aubuisson was also trained at the U.S. Army's school in Panama and the International Police Academy in the suburbs of Washington D.C. In Taiwan he studies 'Communist infiltration'. McClintock [op. cit. p. 218] established that: "...When General Medrano was deposed, Lieutenants D'Aubuisson and Jose Antonio Castillo were considered so close to him that they were given a short term assignment to the Military Attache's office in Nicaragua, safely out of harm's way. General Medrano came to some accommodation with the Army high Command, however, and is credited with winning for D'Aubuisson and Castillo plum assignments to attend the Public Safety Program's International Police Academy in Washington D.C. Both returned to serve as top intelligence officers...D'Aubuisson...first in the National Guard, then in the Army General Staff, and finally near the top of the Presidential security agency [ANSESAL], as deputy director..."
government and the military was severed in the 1979 coup...Some members of ARENA's leadership collaborated with the national security forces in the planning and operation of a "dirty war" of counterinsurgency to physically eliminate their political enemies. ARENA members said this meant polarizing the country and eliminating their enemies from the left to the political center.

This war "by assassination" which was made to appear the random violence of independent groups of fanatical rightists, was in many cases organized with high-ranking regular army officers and operated out of the intelligence offices of the National Guard, National Police and Treasury Police, as well as out of many military garrisons...

"There is one man in particular, very strong, who is over him [D'Aubuisson] and lets him risk himself" explained a foreign military expert close to the National Guard. The "one man", the highest ranking officer in the network mentioned by insiders, was former Vice Minister of Defense Colonel Nicolas Carranza. Carranza was the number two man in the Salvadoran military until December 1980, when U.S. concern about human rights abuses helped to pressure him from his post."

The final phrase here, unfortunately, marks where Pyes was thrown off the scent, for Carranza's removal as Deputy Minister of Defense was followed by his appointment as President of ANTEL, leaving him in a powerful and even better concealed internal security position than before.

Roberto Eulalio Santibanez, by early 1984 serving as Salvadoran consul in New Orleans, was sacked from that post by Salvadoran President Alvaro Magana, for revealing to the U.S. press and some politicians that Carranza had received at least $US90,000 from the C.I.A. since no later than October 1979 and possibly since before the coup and that Carranza, along with other leading active-duty officers, including D'Aubuisson, was the chief organizer of the death squads. See Karen De Young International Herald Tribune 2 April 1984 p. 3. and Stephen Kinzer "Ex-Security Man Links Top Officials To Salvadoran Death Squads" New York Times/ Melbourne Age 5 March 1984.

McClintock op. cit. pp. 352-53 provided a trenchant summary of the case, which seems worth inserting into the record at this point:

"...Only recently has evidence emerged that the U.S. government may have exercised direct control over the top Salvadoran army officers who controlled the country after October 1979, and who led the armed forces to adopt the option of mass "counter-terror" as the main thrust of its counterinsurgency program.

In March 1984, a source first described only as a former high-ranking Salvadoran officer revealed to members of the U.S. Congress and the press that the U.S. government - through the C.I.A. - paid a retainer to and effectively employed top military figures in the post-October 1979 governments. Identified by Newsweek as former ANSESAL chief, Colonel Roberto Eulalio Santibanez [Newsweek 2 April '84 'Congress Talks Back'], the source maintained that top members of the army high command, notably Defense Minister Colonel Jose Guillermo Garcia (1979-83), Deputy Defense Minister Colonel Nicolas Carranza (later ANTEL chief and head of the Treasury Police), National Guard chief Colonel Eugenio Vides Casanova (1979-83), now a general and Minister of Defense, and intelligence officer Roberto D'Aubuisson had been personally responsible for the development and administration of El Salvador's death squad assassination program..."
within the Salvadoran military and to report on political and military developments." [emphasis added]


85. Forche/Wheaton 1980 op. cit. passim.

86. All of this is an obscure area, which William Bollinger's work seems likely to further open up. The account here given was based on interviews with:
- Jorge Camacho (Ministry of Agriculture and Ranching, San Salvador 2 October 1984).
- Roger Burbach (Berkeley, California, 12 October 1984).

The precise link, if any, between UCS and ORDEN needs clarifying. Camacho, it appears, is a former criminal and ORDEN thug, who entered UCS in its early years, but broke with it in 1977 to form his own organization, ACOPAL.


89. ibid.


94. It was Philip Agee who made the claim that AIFLD was a C.I.A. operation and that William Doherty, AIFLD director, was a prominent C.I.A. operative. Jonathan Kwitny established that AIFLD was still C.I.A.-connected in 1984 and that Agee's claims had been confirmed as true by the C.I.A. itself [Endless Enemies pp. 341-44, 346-48, 353-54].

For evidence that both AIFLD and William Doherty, and such other affiliates of the covert action network as FTUI (Free Trade Union Institute), Freedom House, PRODEMCA (Friends of the Democratic Center in Central America), were still at work under NSC/C.I.A./AID direction and funding in 1986-87, see Tom Barry/Deb Preusch The Soft War: The Uses and Abuses of U.S. Economic Aid in Central America. Grove Press. New York 1988. Ch. ix. The role of Doherty is clearly crucial. Not only is he AIFLD director, but he was also founder and director of PRODEMCA, whose administrative director is his daughter-in-law Adrienne Doherty.

The executive director of FTUI, Eugenia Kemble, is on the executive committee of PRODEMCA, as is Bayard Rustin, chairman of Freedom House. Writing in 1985, Michael McClintock confused Eugenia Kemble with Mary Temple, in describing Roy Prosterman's off-sider as "Mary Kemple" (op. cit. p. 268). By about 1984, the whole network was under the aegis of the National Endowment for Democracy, set up in 1983 by the NSC to provide a suitable public and institutional cover for C.I.A. and NSPG (National Security Planning Group) channelling of funds into covert operations.


98. Agee op. cit. p. 368.


100. Dunkerley op. cit. p. 178.


103. ibid. p. 104.


106. ibid. pp. 67-68.


108. ibid. p. 115.


110. Interview with Peter Askin, State Department, Washington D.C., 15 Feb. 1985. Askin worked for AID in El Salvador between 1977 and 1982, with the exception of the five rather critical months of April to September 1980, which he spent in Guatemala. The AID mission in El Salvador was reduced, during these five months, to seven or eight people, "for security reasons", Askin informed the author.


112. Interview with Mary Temple, New York, 16 Jan. 1985. According to Roy Prosterman (letter to the author, 9 March 1988), the Land Council for Rural Progress in Developing Countries was not set up in 1978, but in 1980, coincident with his acceptance of a position with AIFLD to work in El Salvador. According to Barry and Preusch, it was in the "late 1970's" that the American Political Foundation, precursor of the National Endowment for Democracy, was set up. If the Land Council for Rural Progress in Developing Countries was an offshoot of the APF - as PRODEMCA became an affiliate of NED - then 1978 becomes both a plausible and interesting date for its creation. If the Woodward anecdote is correct, it was in 1978 that the C.I.A. re-opened a station in El Salvador.

With such a portentous name, one might wonder what the Land Council really amounted to. According to Roy Prosterman (letter to the author, 9 March 1988), it was never more than an informal, coffee-table gathering of people "interested" in land reform in Central America. Yet Robin Gomez, AID veteran since 1961 and AID Director in El Salvador in 1985-86, while unable to identify the acronym PRODEMCA, described the Land Council for Rural Progress in Developing Countries as "Roy Prosterman's outfit in New York, run by that woman, Virginia somebody, his offsider..." [Interview with Robin Gomez, Manila Dec. 1987]. By "Virginia", did he, perhaps, mean Eugenia? Eugenia Kemble, executive director of FTUI, which had been set up in 1979 and was an affiliate of the AIFLD? Yet it was Mary Temple who ran the Land Council in New York.
Gomez was not the only one to conflate Eugenia Kemble with Mary Temple. McClintock did the same in 1985 [see n91 supra]. Reporting for the New York Times [5 Jan. 1981], on the assassination of the AIFLD land reform advisors and Jose Rodolfo Viera in San Salvador, Timothy Phelps described Mary Temple as "executive director of the Land Council, a group of independent private organizations promoting agrarian reform in developing countries."

114. McClintock op. cit. p. 221.
115. Devine op. cit. p. 123.
116. ibid. p. 123.
117. ibid. p. 125.
118. Dunkerley op. cit. p. 127.
120. ibid. p. 153.
121. ibid. pp. 153-54.
128. Devine op. cit. p. 142.
129. ibid. p. 140.
130. ibid. p. 144.
134. Ibid. p. 248.
135. Bonner op. cit. p. 155: "Guerra y Guerra was furious that Romero had been allowed to leave the country. He wanted to place the general on trial, to answer for the corruption and killing. But Guerra y Guerra was overruled by Gutierrez. The coup de grace to the young officers' coup was soon to follow..."
ibid. p. 214. Pearce wrote that an OPS [Office of Public Safety] program was started in El Salvador only in 1967, but it is clear that Roland Kelley had been running a Public Safety training program there since at least July 1960, that is, even before the Hardin Report and well before the January 1961 coup d'état [see Table 50]. It was in 1967 that the Stewart Report was written and Stewart found the "public safety" apparatus solidly in place by then [McClintock op. cit. pp. 61-62].

140. ibid. pp. 219-20.
141. ibid. p. 221.
142. ibid. p. 221.
143. ibid. p. 221.
144. ibid. p. 221.
145. McClintock op. cit. pp. 221-22:

"To the military governments of the 1970's, ANSESAL and ORDEN were indispensable and consequently were kept under close Presidential control. Threatened with the dissolution of both at the time of the October 1979 coup, the army general staff moved to conceal ANSESAL and reorganize ORDEN to permit the minimum of disruption. According to recent reports, ANSESAL's - and ORDEN's - offices and records were transferred to the army general staff headquarters on the very day of the coup. Although ANSESAL chief Colonel Roberto Eulalio Santibanez reportedly supervised the transfer, direction of ANSESAL from the army general staff was to have fallen to its previous second chief, Major Roberto D'Aubuisson. The appointment was kept secret from the civilians brought into the October junta and from the reformist officers who had demanded that officers responsible for intelligence work under Romero be cashiered...The secret reassignment of D'Aubuisson to ANSESAL was confirmed by junta member Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez and then Deputy Defense Minister (and later Treasury Police head) Colonel Nicolas Carranza. The reorganized ANSESAL was set up as part of the general staff's "Section 5" (Civic Affairs)."

"The reformers had officially abolished ORDEN, the old informant network. But...military officers suspicious of the young reformers secretly re-established - and expanded - much of the old intelligence system into a grass-roots intelligence network that fed names of suspected subversives to military and paramilitary death squads. Four days after the coup, D'Aubuisson said in an interview, he was assigned by members of the high command to help reorganize ANSESAL inside a military compound under the chief of staff's office - out of reach of civilians in the new junta..."We found ourselves obliged to close ANSESAL and open another" Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez, a conservative member of the new government, said in an interview. "So we called D'Aubuisson, sent him over there, to avoid that the information [in] the old ANSESAL files should be taken out of there." Gutierrez...said the move was necessary to keep the files out of the hands of leftist infiltrators in the new government. A new version of the intelligence agency was re-established in Department 5, the "Civic Affairs" section of the army general staff, military sources said. The little known agency is in charge of jobs ranging from image-building tasks, like road construction, to covert actions. Extreme rightists have dominated the department, according to U.S. and Salvadoran sources."

147. Dunkerley op. cit. p. 136. An aide to Colonel Majano told Dunkerley in 1980, concerning the officers' organization, COPREFA: "Colonel Marenco is head of that now. He is Chele Medrano's nephew and protege. He reorganized COPREFA in a few months (Dec. 1979 to April 1980). Eighty per cent of its membership changed, all of them [the new faces] loyal to Garcia. Garcia is not one of us. What you hear about the repression is true and it comes from Garcia's group."

150. Bonner 1984 pp. 159-60.
I am in decided agreement with Christopher Dickey as regards the quality of Bonner's book on El Salvador and find his verdict on it worth recording:

"This was a time (Dec. 1980), clearly, when the press should have been alert to every nuance. Detailed news stories should have appeared every day and books should have been written to analyze what was happening. But El Salvador was still a story on the back pages. Even the death of the nuns was not given sustained attention, and when John Lennon was shot on Dec. 8 in New York, there was suddenly no time or space for news from El Salvador. Almost all of us went home for Christmas, returning only as the 'Final Offensive' began. Raymond Bonner stayed. He was determined to find the patterns behind the violence, or at least to expose the lies we all knew we were being told. Later he was pulled out of El Salvador, amid rumors that he had become obsessed, had lost his objectivity. Then, in Washington - among piles of documents extracted by the Freedom of Information Act and smuggled out by friendly sources - he finally found what he was looking for. "Distortions, disingenuous statements, tortuous interpretations, half-truths have characterized Congressional testimony and public declarations" Bonner writes. "Salvadoran government atrocities have been covered up. Efforts by Congressional committees to obtain information have been met with evasive answers. Bonner's is an angry book, full of moral indignation at the Carter Administration for failing to live up to its own standards, and at the Reagan Administration for not having any. But quite apart from his passion, his careful sifting of facts from the quagmire of official deception should from now on define the terms of debate about what has happened - and is happening - in El Salvador. What many people have asserted, Bonner, finally, has managed to prove." New York Review of Books 14 June 1984 pp. 26-31 "The Saving of El Salvador." p. 26.

The U.S.I.A. Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador, when I spoke to him in October 1984, had a rather different opinion of Bonner:

"MONK: Did you ever meet Raymond Bonner when he was down here?
HAMILTON: Oh, don't talk to me about Raymond Bonner. He makes my blood boil. I can tell you, I must have worked with hundreds of journalists down here and Bonner is one of the few I could not communicate with. Bonner is an advocate journalist. His book should be subtitled A Tendentious and Misleading Account of U.S. Policy in El Salvador.
MONK: Ah, so you have read his book?
HAMILTON: Well, no, I haven't. I don't feel I want to contribute to his financial upkeep...
MONK: Do you think it is likely that anyone on the Embassy staff or in the State Department will read Bonner's book and write a sustained critique of it?
HAMILTON: Well, no, not...No, I don't think so."


156. Bonner op. cit. p. 166-67:

"Cheek met with Ungo and Deputy Foreign Minister Hector Ogueli to ask them to keep their moderate socialist MNR party in the government. They replied that they could participate in the government only if there were assurances that it would have control over the armed forces, that senior military commanders, including Garcia, were removed, and that there would be a dialogue with the revolutionary organizations. Cheek could make no such assurances. 'It was a deaf dialogue', Ogueli said of the conversation with Cheek..."

157. ibid. p. 162.
158. ibid. p. 162:
"Ungo, Mayorga and at least thirty seven of the highest ranking government officials, including the heads of all the independent government agencies, resigned. The next day, January 4, Andino joined them, charging that the colonels in the army had capitulated to 'rightist tendencies'. Archbishop Romero, in his Sunday homily, praised those who had resigned for what they had tried to do for their country. And repeating an earlier plea he made in person, the Archbishop called on Colonel Garcia to resign 'out of honesty and as a sign that he seeks the genuine good'. Garcia ignored the plea. He was the only one of the eleven cabinet ministers who did not resign."

Not all those who resigned did so out of anti-rightist feeling, it should be noted. Dr. Luis Nelson Segovia, Minister of Justice, and Manuel Enrique Hinds, Minister of the Economy, in the first junta, both resigned, but these were men with close ties to the conservative business association ANEP and both had opposed the reform agenda of the first junta. See Bonner's comments at op. cit. p. 163 and Pearce 1982 p. 223.

159. Bonner op. cit. p. 162.

160. ibid. p. 167.


"Immediately on his appointment to head the government land reform agency, Viera, who retained his position as leader of the UCS, was asked to review and offer recommendations on the draft land reform law prepared under the October junta. Viera telephoned Michael Hammer in Washington and asked for one or two consultants to advise him and the UCS executive board on the draft law. 'Make it quick, he told Hammer. 'Some people here are urging me to bring in advisers from Cuba.' After some discussion with Hammer, Viera invited us to El Salvador for an initial meeting in early February."

When, in 1987, Prosterman and Riedinger published Land Reform and Democratic Development, their description of these events differed in three details: Mary Temple was omitted from the picture; the statement about "Cuban advisors", attributed in 1981 to Viera, was omitted; and instead of Viera inviting them to El Salvador, it was Hammer himself who did so. Thus:

"Immediately after his appointment to head the land reform agency, Viera was asked to review and offer recommendations on the draft land reform law that had been prepared under the October junta. He telephoned Michael Hammer to ask whether he could provide one or two consultants to advise Viera and the UCS executive board on the draft law, and Hammer, in turn, asked the present authors to perform this consulting function..." [Prosterman/Riedinger 1987 op. cit. p. 149].

Mary Temple had co-authored with Prosterman and Riedinger not only the above-mentioned article in World Affairs, but also one under the title "Land Reform and the El Salvador Crisis" which appeared in International Security Vol. 6. No. 1. Summer 1981 pp. 53-74. She was identified in this piece as executive director of the "Land Council". It was clearly stated there that Mary Temple went with Prosterman and Riedinger to El Salvador in February 1980, but by 1987 this had ceased to be clear.

162. Ivo Alvarenga's letter (p. 10) gives the figure 200,000. The figure 100,000 is widely cited.


166. Philip Wheaton (SCAAN op. cit. p. 260): "Temple is the Executive Director for an organization called 'Land Council for Rural Progress In Developing Countries' based in New York and apparently paying Prosterman's salary." The source for this tiny piece of information was not given by Wheaton, though the first part of it may have been based on the 5 Jan. 1981 newspaper reports of the deaths of Hammer, Pearlman and Viera.


171. See n168 supra.


176. Leonel Gomez Vides, ex-deputy director of ISTA under Viera and its effective operational director, who fled El Salvador in January 1981 to escape death squads, told a U.S. Congressional sub-committee in March 1981: "What is the nature of the Salvadorean army? And by the army mean the five hundred or so officers who lead the Salvadorean army, the National Guard, the National Police and the Treasury Police? Your left says they are an instrument of the oligarchs. The State Department says they are people willing to learn, who want to do what is best for the country. Your right-wing says they are anti-communist and pro-American...The Salvadorean army is not held together by an ideology of anti-communism. It is held together by a vast network of corruption...The army is bent upon a war to exterminate all possible challenges to its power." Quote in Pearce 1982 p. 224.


180. ibid. p. 166.

181. Dunkerley op. cit. p. 150.

182. Bonner op. cit. p. 204.


On Jesse Helms, see the excellent piece by Elizabeth Drew in The New Yorker 20 July 1981 pp. 78-95. This is quite an illuminating essay on the so-called New Right. Drew provides useful portraits of Helms and such leading members of his circle as Joseph Coors, Paul Weyrich, Richard Viguerie, James Lucier and John Carbaugh; a group had put together the National Conservative Political Action Committee, the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, and a string of tax-exempt foundations, such as the American Family Institute, the Institute of American Relations (1974), the Institute on Money and Inflation (1976), and the Foreign Affairs Council (1979). These were set up because the Brookings Institution was considered too liberal and the American Enterprise Institute too academic. Carbaugh, thirty five years old in 1981, was the financial wizard of the cabal, a high liver who kept three red convertibles and was known for taking people to lavish champagne lunches at Le Leon D'Or, one of Washington's most expensive restaurants (p. 86).
The description of Helms' political philosophy by Lucier, then 46 and, like Carbaugh, a former aide to Strom Thurmond who had then joined the staff of Jesse Helms, enables one to locate that "philosophy" within a long tradition of American anti-intellectualism and anti-modern "fundamentalism" and its terms of reference are worth noting:

"...Helms is not right-wing. He's not even political. The issues he's involved in are pre-political...Ever since Descartes, the emphasis has been on the mind to the exclusion of the rest of the person. That was revolutionary...Politics is a modern invention. Politics doesn't apply when you get back before the Enlightenment...You can draw a straight line from Descartes to Marx...The right and the left are just expressions of how fast you're going to push on the accelerator...Ford and Kissinger are only...the right wing of the revolution." (p. 85) [emphasis added].


186. Bonner op. cit. p. 182.


189. Ibid. pp. 69. 186.

190. Ibid. p. 178. Bonner drew on the findings of Pyes and Beckland, who in turn based their account on State Department cables and interviews with U.S. diplomats in El Salvador. The State Department refused to release the cables in question to Bonner. According to Ambassador White, testifying before the U.S. House Sub-Committee on Western Hemisphere Affairs in February 1984, D'Aubuisson was the architect of the assassination "beyond any reasonable doubt" and had also had the assassin eliminated to cover his traces.


195. Ibid. pp. 70-71.


Anderson 1982 op. cit. p. 84, described White as believing, "like Devine and Cheek before him", that the [third?] junta was the best hope for El Salvador, "though he declared that some elements in the Army were the enemy within. He appeared to believe that the PDC could rally moderate elements and avoid civil war." In 1981, Robert White testified to the U.S. Congress that Duarte was caught between the extreme right and the "Pol Pot left". Anderson effectively captured the attitude that followed from this: "Men such as Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora appear in this scenario as mere window dressing. They would be disposed of in the moment of victory, when the left would throw off the mask of moderation and present itself, fangs and all, to the world." (p. 96).


200. James Cheek, serving in Ethiopia by 1987, did not respond to a letter and questionnaire from the author, and so, unfortunately, his account of the events of 1979-80 in El Salvador could not be utilized in this study.


203. The most systematic and thorough study of the matter is that by Robert Williams, in his superb book Export Agriculture and the Crisis in Central America, published in 1986.

204. On the history of Phase II, see Prosterman/Riedinger 1987 op. cit. pp. 153-54. Phase II was the subject of much controversy, above all because of confusion as to how much land it covered and, therefore, how greatly its abortion narrowed the scope of the land reform program.

205. Pearce 1982 pp. 233-34.


208. ibid.


212. Had Phases I, II and III been fully implemented in 1980, some 60% or even 70% of the Salvadoran rural poor stood to benefit in some manner. Abortion of Phase II cut this back to perhaps 55 % of the rural poor. As Prosterman and Riedinger wrote, in 1986-87, the actual scope of Phases I and II, as implemented, benefited somewhere at most 20% of the rural poor. AID's Michael Wise, in 1985, estimated the beneficiaries as totalling some 18% of the rural poor [Wise Agrarian Reform in El Salvador: Process and Progress. AID San Salvador July 1985]. To describe this as consolidation of the land reform "at 60% of its potential" seems to be stretching things somewhat. Pressed on this and other matters in late 1987, however, Strasma showed a disappointing lack of interest in clarifying the history of El Salvador's land reform or the politics of the terror. He wrote:

"Many people in El Salvador in 1980 to 1982 did atrocious things. However, it is most unclear that the guerrillas were good guys...I have no interest in spending time trying to document the actions of any of the parties in El Salvador's past." [John Strasma, letter to the author March 1988].


220. ibid.

221. ibid.

222. Prosterman/Riedinger op. cit. p. 158.

223. ibid. p. 160.


225. John M. Goshko "Castro's Trojan Horses vs Reagan's Crusaders." *Washington Post* 28 Dec. 1980. pp. A1-A2. Goshko refers to a televised debate between Jeane Kirkpatrick and Patricia Derian. He quotes Kirkpatrick as remarking: "If we are confronted with the choice between offering assistance to a moderately repressive autocratic government which is also friendly to the United States and permitting it to be overrun by a Cuban-trained, Cuban-armed, Cuban-sponsored insurgency, we would assist the moderate autocracy." This was two or three months before the Reagan crusaders issued their fraudulent El Salvador White Paper, which was supposed to prove - for the first time - that Cuba, the USSR, Vietnam, Ethiopia, the PLO etc had been pouring hundreds of tons of light arms into El Salvador to assist the FMLN.

226. *United States Policy Towards El Salvador.* 1981.(as at n 194) pp. 211. 217. Colonel Dickens stated: "The truth is, with agrarian reform El Salvador is now an economic basket case...The architects of these reforms are with us today...If these reforms are so advanced, why are we not implementing them in the United States? The answer is obvious. Anyone suggesting they be implemented would be run out of the country on a rail. At best they are socialist and at worst they are communist..."


228. *New York Times* 3 Dec. 1980. Bonner op. cit. pp. 214-16, reported that the C.I.A. considered the incident to be "the work of the security forces." Anderson 1982 op. cit. p. 91 provided an account which is worth noting because he got the date wrong by three weeks (giving it as 6 Nov. 1980, when it was 27 Nov. 1980) and because of the odd way he phrased his reasoning on the matter:

"A spectacular massacre took place on 6 November. The directors of the FDR were meeting clandestinely in the Jesuit secondary school, located a few blocks from the U.S. Embassy, in central San Salvador. *Two hundred uniformed* men cordoned off the area and the FDR leaders were seized. The tortured bodies of Enrique Alvarez Cordoba, Juan Angel Chacon Vasquez, head of the BPR, Manuel Franco (UDN), Enrique Barrena (MNR) and Umberto Mendoza (FAPU) were recovered the next day...The massacre raised several interesting questions. How did it happen that the leaders of the FDR felt it safe to meet in the enemy-held capital without bodyguards? Were they betrayed by someone, a Jesuit perhaps, whom they trusted? How could such an operation as their seizure be carried out in broad daylight, in such a location, without military cooperation?..."

This last question is rather arch, surely. Having written that two hundred uniformed men cordoned off a whole area in downtown San Salvador and that they, not a disguised squad of right-wing terrorists (as the junta claimed publicly in the days following the incident) seized the FDR
leaders, he asks for an explanation of how this can have occurred without military cooperation. Is this not a rather coy avoidance of the candid statement that the ANTEL colonels had done this thing - which would expose U.S. support for them to intensified opprobrium?

On 8 Dec. 1980, *Time* magazine (p. 27 "Brazen Murder") described the junta as "powerless" to prevent such atrocities. But those who felt powerless and aggrieved - Ungo, Mayorga, scores of leading administrators and finally Majano himself - had resigned from the junta and the government or were very soon to do so; whereas Gutierrez had been in alliance with Garcia, Vides Casanova, Carranza and the other hard men of the right, including D'Aubuisson, from the outset.

229. Juan De Onis "Reagan's State Dept. Latin Team Aska Curbs On 'Social Reformers'." *New York Times* 4 Dec. 1980. The report was authored by Reagan aide Pedro A. San Juan and John Carbaugh, of the Helms outfit. De Onis erroneously named the latter Frank Carbaugh, or merely a printing error. Robert Pastor and David Aaron, on Zbigniew Brzezinski's staff, were among those who came under fire in this report. See Bonner op. cit. pp. 218-19.


232. ibid. pp. B15-16. A synopsis of the *Dissent Paper* appeared in the *Boston Globe* on 28 Nov. 1980. In an essay on the subject (SCAAN 1983 op. cit. p. 107 n14, William LeoGrande commented: "The report has a rather mysterious history. The State Dept. denies that it was an official dissent channel document, but several Dept. officials have told the author that the paper cites existing intelligence reports accurately. This suggests that it was either written by analysts within the government, or by someone with access to classified material."

233. Robert White, interview with Jeff Stein in SCAAN op. cit. p. 121.

234. Bonner op. cit. p. 239.


236. ibid. p. 388.


Map 1: The European World Economy on the eve of the Modern Era, c. 1500 A.D.

"...The expanding European economy, represented by its major commodity trades on a world-scale. In 1500, the world economy, with Venice at its centre, was directly operating in the Mediterranean and Western Europe: by way of intermediaries. The network reached the Baltic, Norway and, through the Levant ports, the Indian Ocean.

"In 1775, the octopus grip of European trade had extended to cover the whole world: this map shows English, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese and French trade networks, identifiable by their point of origin. (The last named must be imagined as operating in combination with other European trades in Africa and Asia). The important point is the predominance of the British trade network, which is difficult to represent. London had become the centre of the world ..."

Map 3: The Philippine Islands: as presented in the McMillan/Rivera Report, 1952

Map 4: Population Distribution in the Philippines at the time of the Hardie Report

Map 5: Distribution of Farm Tenancy in the Philippines by Province at the time of the Hardie Report

Map 6: The Provinces of South Vietnam in 1968

Map 7: The Depression Rebellions in Vietnam, 1930-31

Data derived from unclassified HES reports for February 1968 have been adopted to reflect security requirements for land reform and administration. The basic criterion used was freedom from intimidation and assassination, which results in a somewhat more pessimistic view of the security situation than that given in the HES Hamlet Plot for February 29, 1968 from which the data were derived.

Map 9: - General Relief Map of El Salvador

Source: Browning (1971).

Source: Browning (1983).
Map 11: Numbers of Beneficiaries in El Salvador, by Province, in Phase III of the 1980 Land Reform (Decree 207)

Source: Browning (1983).
Table 1: Population Explosion in the Philippines (1799-1950) coincident with its incorporation into the European World Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population in millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1799</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Robert T. McMillan/Generoso F. Rivera, The Rural Philippines, MSA, Manila, October, 1952, p.13. Extrapolated to cover the period since 1948, the curve would become almost vertical, as the population has trebled in these forty years.
Table 2: Rising Level of Share Tenancy in the Rural Philippines during the American Colonial Period

Chart 1. Incidence of farm tenancy, 1903–1948: Central Luzon and national averages compared. Central Luzon average based on official census data for Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Pangasinan.

Table 3: American Land Tenure Advisers in the Philippines 1951-1960

1. For the Land Tenure Project:

Robert S. Hardie                  July 1951 to August 1953
Joe R. Motheral                  September 1954 to August 1955
Frate Bull                       December 1955 to April 1957*

2. For the Land Development Project:

Ray E. Davis                    November 1952 to February 1957


3. US Technicians Assigned to Land Tenure and Development Project:

Robert S. Hardie                  August 1951 to August 1953
Ray E. Davis                     November 1953 to February 1957
Joe R. Motheral                  September 1954 - September 1955
Frate Bull                       December 1955 - April 1958
Eddie Daniel                    August 1958 to September 1960

Table 4: "l'Equipe improvisée a Tokyo"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>South Vietnam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooper, John L.</td>
<td>46-51</td>
<td></td>
<td>52-58</td>
<td>66-68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis, Raymond H.</td>
<td>46-48</td>
<td>52-59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardie, Robert S.</td>
<td>46-49</td>
<td></td>
<td>51-53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jensen, Bernhardt</td>
<td>49-51</td>
<td>52-56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladejinsky, Wolf</td>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>49-51</td>
<td></td>
<td>55-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raper, Arthur</td>
<td>47-49</td>
<td>52-54</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williamson, Mark</td>
<td>45-51</td>
<td></td>
<td>51-52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5: Philippine Legislation on Land Tenure and Landlord Rural Administration prior to 1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Purpose of Legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C'wealth Act No.20</td>
<td>11 July 1936</td>
<td>Authorized expropriation or purchase of portions of large landed estates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C'wealth Act No.260</td>
<td>12 April 1938</td>
<td>Appropriated 2 million pesos for action on C'wealth Act No.20.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C'wealth Act No.378</td>
<td>23 August 1938</td>
<td>Authorized leasing of estate lands by the government for sub-lease to qualified persons'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C'wealth Act No.420</td>
<td>31 May 1939</td>
<td>Created a government corporation to act on C'wealth Act No.378.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C'wealth Act No.538</td>
<td>26 May 1940</td>
<td>Suspended actions for ejectment of tenants from estates subject to government purchase or expropriation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C'wealth Act No.539</td>
<td>26 May 1940</td>
<td>Authorized acquisition of private lands for resale in small lots; created agency and appropriated funds for this end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Exec. Order) No.191</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Created Rural Progress Administration to promote small landownership and to improve the living condition ... of the rural population'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Exec. Order) No.206</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Incorporated Rural Progress Administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C'wealth Act No.41137</td>
<td>December 1933</td>
<td>Set conditions for tenancy contracts in sugar lands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C'wealth Act No.4054</td>
<td>27 February 1933</td>
<td>Rice Share Tenancy Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C'wealth Act No.608</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Regulation and arbitration tenancy disputes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic Act No.3430</td>
<td>September 1946</td>
<td>Rice Share Tenancy Act amending C'wealth Act No.4054.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic Act No.4425</td>
<td>May 1946</td>
<td>Amending and Revising C'wealth Act No.608.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Paragraph 30. What estimate can be given as to the time required to carry out the tenure reform envisaged in this paper?

The answer to this question is dependent on many variables, but in our opinion, in deference to political as well as administrative considerations involved, such an answer should be strongly influenced by a policy of speed. Experience in other countries would indicate that the land transfer phase of the reform - the purchase and sale of lands affected by the law - could, be accomplished within about two years from the date of enactment of enabling legislation. Completion of title registration will probably require in the neighbourhood of another three years. Amortization of tenant payments and retirement of bonds should require about thirty years, though the law should make provision for an extension of this period in instances of adversity beyond the control of land purchasers.

Assuming, that principles to characterize reform legislation are decided in the relatively near future, and in accordance with the foregoing, it would appear that the following time schedule is possible of attainment:

(a) Assuming, early settlement of policies and principles and establishment of an appropriate administrative authority, legislation could, be drafted in time for consideration by the Congress convening in January 1953;

(b) Provided legislation is enacted during the session opening in January 1953, a Land Commission System could be established and ready to start operations by July 1953;

(c) Provided the above schedule is met, land acquisition could be accomplished by July 1955.

(d) Then, title registration could be completed by July 1958.

(e) And bonds should be retired and purchase contracts settled by about 1980 - the latter not later than 1985.

Source: Hardie Report pp 21-22 [emphases added].
Table 7: Colonial French Land Concessions in Vietnam - Their Distribution by Region and Changing Distribution over Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Hectares</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Area Cultivated (ha)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>301,076</td>
<td>Tonkin</td>
<td>197,769</td>
<td>65.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Annam</td>
<td>25,033</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cochinchina</td>
<td>78,274</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>470,000</td>
<td>Tonkin</td>
<td>136,000</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Annam</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cochinchina</td>
<td>308,000</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>909,300</td>
<td>Tonkin</td>
<td>134,400</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Annam</td>
<td>168,400</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cochinchina</td>
<td>606,500</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Christine White (1981)

Table 8: Comparison of Colonial French and Comprador Vietnamese Land Holdings in Vietnam, as of 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Holdings (has)</th>
<th>Area Cultivated (has)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europeans and companies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Indochina</td>
<td>962,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Cochinchina alone</td>
<td>608,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. All Indochina</td>
<td>1,299,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Cochinchina alone</td>
<td>1,159,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,261,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"...it was the land granted in concession by the colonial government to French and Vietnamese landlords and communal land appropriated by village notables which were the object of spontaneous peasant struggle during the revolutionary movements of 1930-31 (the Nghe-Tinh Soviets) and the August Revolution of 1945. These were the categories of land ownership that were seen as the most pressing social injustice, as land stolen from their rightful historical owners."

(White 1981 pp 40-1)
Table 9: Land Ownership in French Vietnam c 1940

a. Farm Owners/Cultivators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tonkin</th>
<th></th>
<th>Annam</th>
<th></th>
<th>Cochinchina</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Small</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-5 ha [0-12.4 acres]</td>
<td>946,500</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>646,700</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>183,000</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-50 ha [12.4-124 acres]</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>8,990</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>65,750</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Large</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50 ha</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Aggregated Land Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tonkin</th>
<th></th>
<th>Annam</th>
<th></th>
<th>Cochinchina</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Small</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-5 ha [0.12.4 acres]</td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>345,000</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-50 ha [12.5-124 acres]</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>850,000</td>
<td>37.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Large</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50 ha [Over 124 acres]</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>1,035,000</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Land</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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Table 10: Land Reform in North Vietnam 1952-1956
Equalization of Access to Land Among the Peasant Masses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Land Owned Before Reform Ha/person</th>
<th>Owned or Used Before Reform</th>
<th>Land Owned After Reform</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle Peasants</td>
<td>.126</td>
<td>.168</td>
<td>.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Peasants</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: The Stanford Research Institute Land Tenure Research Team in South Vietnam 1967-68

Research Participants in Project

Project Director: Dr William Bredo, Development Economist
Project Field Director: Mr Robert O. Shreve, Development Economist

Principal Contributors:

Mr Michael J. Aylward, Public Administration Specialist
Dr Morris O. Edwards, Political Scientist
Mr Frederick Goshe, Technical Writer
Dr Robert M. Reeser, Agricultural Economist
Mr Donn E. Seeley, Operations Analyst
Mr Paul S. Slawson, Development Economist
Mr William J. Tater, Agricultural Economist

Consultants:

Dr Raymond J. Jessen, Agricultural Statistician, University of California, Los Angeles
Mr Gerald C. Sumner, Agricultural Statistician, University of California, Los Angeles
Mr Leonard C. Moffitt, Land Use Planner and Sociologist, Independent Consultant
Dr R. Michael Pearce, Political Scientist, Pacific Technical Analysts, Inc.
Dr Paul S. Taylor, Economist and Rural Sociologist, University of California, Berkeley
Mr Waldo M. Sands, Land Use Specialist, Independent Consultant
Prof Roy L. Prosterman, Land Law Specialist, University of Washington, Seattle
Dr Egil Krogh, Jr., Land Law Analyst, University of Washington, Seattle
Mr Nguyen Van Thuan, Rural Advisor, Independent Consultant
Mr Nguyen Van Toai, Administration Advisor, Independent Consultant

SRI Professional Staff:

Miss Gertrude D. Peterson, Research Sociologist
Mr Constantine Glezakos, Statistician
Dr John M. Hutzel, Political Scientist
Mr Alexander T. Cole, Agricultural Economist
Mr Ronald L. Rasch, Political Scientist
Miss Irene M. Longwell, Computer Programmer

SRI Research Assistants:

Miss Claudia Grill
Mrs Nancy E. Lawry
Miss Francesca Mayer
Miss Ocea C. Goldupp
Mr Randall L. Barrick
Miss Nguyen Le Chi
Mr Gary D. Fitzpatrick

Seconded from US Agencies (Vietnam):

Mr John Fasullo, MACCORDS/Vietnam
Mr John Saunders, USAID/Vietnam
Mr Milton Spence, USAID/Vietnam

Technical Services:

Mr Nguyen Khoa Phon Anh, Director, Center for Vietnamese Studies
Mrs Nguyen Thi Huong, Associate Director, Center for Vietnamese Studies
Table 12: Estimated Land Use in the Republic of Vietnam 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hectares</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total area for RVN</td>
<td>17,326,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total agricultural land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Riceland</td>
<td>2,935,621</td>
<td>16.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other crops</td>
<td>(2,300,000)</td>
<td>(13.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(635,621)</td>
<td>(3.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total forest land</td>
<td>5,620,000</td>
<td>32.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation land</td>
<td>19,057</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Undeveloped arable land</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>20.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other unclassified land</td>
<td>5,251,322</td>
<td>30.3</td>
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Table 13: VC\NVA Assassinations and Abductions, 1957-1972

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Assassinations</th>
<th>Abductions</th>
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<tr>
<td>1957-60</td>
<td>1,700 (est)</td>
<td>2,000 (est)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,300 (est)</td>
<td>1,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,118</td>
<td>1,118</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>1,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>1,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>1,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,732</td>
<td>3,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3,707</td>
<td>5,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>5,389</td>
<td>8,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>6,202</td>
<td>6,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5,951</td>
<td>6,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3,573</td>
<td>5,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4,405</td>
<td>13,119</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36,725</td>
<td>88,499</td>
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Table 14: Historical Data Relating to Expropriation and Distribution of Land Under Ordinance 57, 1956-67
Republic of Vietnam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Ambassador</th>
<th>Political Section</th>
<th>Public Safety</th>
<th>USIA/USIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1965</td>
<td>Maxwell Taylor</td>
<td>Melvin L. Manfall</td>
<td>Dudley R. Britton</td>
<td>Barry Zorthian, PAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U. Alexis Johnson</td>
<td>John T. Bennett</td>
<td>Roland R. Kelley</td>
<td>Frank W. Scotton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dep Amb</td>
<td>John D. Negroponte</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1967</td>
<td>Ellsworth Bunker</td>
<td>John A. Calhoun</td>
<td>John F. Manopoli</td>
<td>Barry Zorthian, PAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eugene M. Locke</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Henry L.T. Koren</td>
<td>Philip C. Habib</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edward G. Lansdale, Spec Ass</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barry Zorthian, Dir Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samuel D. Berger</td>
<td>John D. Negroponte</td>
<td>Charles E. O'Brien, Dep Chief PSA Adv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Robert W. Kommer</td>
<td>Theodore G. Shackley Jr</td>
<td>Kenneth R. Parsons, PSA Field Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dep for Pacification, R-1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1969</td>
<td>Ellsworth Bunker</td>
<td>Martin F. Herz, James F. Mack, O-7</td>
<td>Theo E. Hall, Dep Chief</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Samuel F. Berger</td>
<td></td>
<td>Charles E. O'Brien, Dep Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Theodore G. Shackley Jr</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1970</td>
<td>Ellsworth Bunker</td>
<td>Martin F. Herz</td>
<td>Frank E. Walton</td>
<td>Edward J. Nickel, JUSPAO,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samuel D. Berger</td>
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<td>Theo E. Hall, Dep Chief</td>
<td>William A. Durham,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>William E. Colby</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>June 1950</td>
<td>Donald R. Heath</td>
<td>Edmund Gullion, Couns of Leg Cons Gen</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1952</td>
<td>Donald R. Heath</td>
<td>Edmund Gullion, Couns of Leg Cons Gen</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1954</td>
<td>Donald R. Heath</td>
<td>Randolph Kidder, Couns of Embassy</td>
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<td>George M. Hellyer, PAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1958</td>
<td>Elbridge Durbrow</td>
<td>Howard Elting Jr, Couns O-1, Douglas S. Blaufarb, 2nd Rec Cons Pol Off R-4</td>
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<td>Chester H. Opal, PAO</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1960</td>
<td>Elbridge Durbrow</td>
<td>Joseph A. Mendenhall, William E. Colby, 1st Sec Pol Off, R-3</td>
<td>Dudley J. Britton, R-5, Daniel F. Smith, R-6, Frank E. Walton, Chief PSA</td>
<td>Chester H. Opal, Marion E. Brown (Librarian) S-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>AID Director</td>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------</td>
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<td>June 1950</td>
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<td>William Leonhart, 2nd Sec VC, FSO-5</td>
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<td>John C. Donnell Jr, Asst Att, FSS-8</td>
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<td>October 1954</td>
<td>John H. Tobler, FOA</td>
<td>Douglas S. Blaufarb, ATT, FSR-4</td>
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<td>James P. Gittinger, Asst Agric Reform Exper, R-5</td>
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<td>July 1956</td>
<td>Leland Barrows</td>
<td>George A. Carver, Ind Adv, R-6</td>
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<td>George A. Carver, Ind Adv, R-6</td>
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<td>July 1962</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lawrence Pezzullo, 2nd Sec, QSO, Admin Section</td>
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<td>Henry C. Bush, Pub Adm Educ Adv, R-3</td>
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<td>Ray E. Davis, Pub Adm Adv, R-3</td>
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<td>Richard C. Holbrooke, FS Off, O-8</td>
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<td>William Nighswonger, RVFA Dev Off, R-6</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Alfred M. Hunt, Dep Dir</td>
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<td>Henry C. Bush</td>
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<td>Leroy Wehrle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>AID Director</td>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
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<td>May 1967</td>
<td>Donald MacDonald, Dir</td>
<td>Daniel Ellsberg, Int Rel Off, R-1, OCO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>L. Wade Lathram</td>
<td>Robert A. Anlauf, Agric Cred Coop Adv, R-6, AID</td>
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<td>September 1968</td>
<td>Donald MacDonald, Dir</td>
<td>John L. Cooper, Land Reform Adv, R-1, AID</td>
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<td>Charles A. Cooper, Assoc Dir, R-1</td>
<td>John D. Marks, Asst Prov Rep, O-8, AID</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leland E. Fallon, Land Reform Adv</td>
<td>Ray E. Davis, Asst Area Dev Off, R-7, CORDS</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Keith W. Sherper, Land Reform Adv</td>
<td>Shepard C. Lowman, CORDS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>September 1969</td>
<td>Donald MacDonald, Dir</td>
<td>Robert A. Anlauf, Agric Cred Coop Adv, R-4, AID</td>
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<td>George D. Jacobsen, Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Eddie F. Daniel, Agric Econ Adv, R-3, AID</td>
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<td>Michael J. Korin, Agric Adv Area, R-4</td>
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<td>Robert A. Anlauf, Agric Cred Coop Adv, R-4</td>
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<td>Carmen D. Deere, Int Develop Intern, R-7, AID</td>
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<td>Leland E. Fallon, Chief Land Reform, R-3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R-4</td>
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Table 16: Inroads of Operation Phoenix on the "VCI" (1968-71)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Captured</th>
<th>'Rallied'</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>11,288</td>
<td>2,229</td>
<td>2,559</td>
<td>15,776</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>8,515</td>
<td>4,832</td>
<td>6,187</td>
<td>19,534</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6,405</td>
<td>7,745</td>
<td>8,191</td>
<td>22,341</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971 (May)</td>
<td>2,770</td>
<td>2,991</td>
<td>3,650</td>
<td>9,331</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>28,878</td>
<td>17,777</td>
<td>20,587</td>
<td>66,982</td>
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Table 17: War Costs and Casualties 1965-1974

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VCNVA Dead Counted As Military Deaths</th>
<th>VCNVA Dead Counted As 2/3 Military, 1/3 Civilian</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allied Dead</td>
<td>282,200</td>
<td>282,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communist Dead</td>
<td>666,000</td>
<td>444,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Dead</td>
<td>948,000</td>
<td>727,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civilian Dead</td>
<td>365,000</td>
<td>587,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,313,000</td>
<td>1,313,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Civilian</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>45%</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Aircraft</td>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
<td>Helicopter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Losses (to 1972)</td>
<td>3,689</td>
<td>4,857</td>
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Sources: Lewy 1978, p.453, Kolko 1986 p.190
Table 18: The Stalemate Wave (1950-70) as seen by David Ellsberg in 1971

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Truman’s Program</th>
<th>Eisenhower’s Program</th>
<th>Kennedy’s Program</th>
<th>Johnson’s Program</th>
<th>Nixon’s Program</th>
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<td>Guerrilla War</td>
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Table 19: Directors of the U.S. Agency for International Development in the Philippines 1951-76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Roland Renne</td>
<td>July 1951 - May 1953</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harry Brenn</td>
<td>August 1953 - March 1957*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul D. Summers</td>
<td>October 1957 - May 1962**</td>
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<tr>
<td>James H. Ingersoll</td>
<td>May 1962 - May 1965***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wesley Haraldson</td>
<td>May 1965 - December 1970****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Niblock</td>
<td>January 1971 - August 1975*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garnett Zimmerly</td>
<td>August 1975 - November 1976</td>
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</table>

* Transferred from Manila to ICA in Iran, at that time a bigger mission than the Philippines ICA.

** Previously deputy director and then director of ICA's Office of Far Eastern Relations (1953-57). Began the police-training program.

*** Prominent Chicago businessman. Became close to Alejandro Melchor.

**** Fresh from a highly successful tour as USAID Mission Chief in Taiwan. He encountered an upsurge of anti-Americanism. Faced increasing Washington demands for evidence that the assistance being given in fact brought development - refused to be intimidated by either Manila or Washington. Critical of the Marcos land reform performance in the 1960s as mere political gimmickry.

***** Career USAID officer. Worked in Afghanistan, Korea, at IBRD. Presided over AID Manila funding from $27.2 million (1970) to $62.7 Million (1972). The police-training program terminated 'by an ideological tantrum on the part of the United States Congress'.

Table 20: MSA Agriculture Division Staff Roster 1951-55.

AGRICULTURE DIVISION ROSTER, August 1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Occupant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Chief    | RAY G. JOHNSON (August 1952-July 1955)  
|          | Edward J. Bell (September 1951-August 1952) |
| Deputy Chief | JAMES P. EMERSON (February 1955-present)  
|          | Acting Chief (August 1955-present) and  
|          | Assistant to the Chief (July 1952-February 1955)  
|          | Mark B. Williamson (May 1951-July 1952) |
| Agriculture Production Advisor | HOWARD W. REAM (October 1954-present)  
|          | Joseph E. Walker (April 1953-June 1954)  
|          | Ray G. Johnson (January 1952-August 1952) |
| Agriculture Information Specialist | HAROLD E. CHRISTIE (August 1954-present)  
|          | James P. Emerson (October 1951-December 1953) |
| Animal Production Specialist | FRANK E. MOORE (September 1952-present)  
|          | Paul A. Gantt (July 1951-September 1953) |
| Animal Husbandry Advisor | JAMES A. ROBINSON (May 1952-present) |
| Irrigation Engineer Advisor | Theodore R. Thompson (June 1953-July 1955)  
|          | Position transferred to Public Works Division, May 1954  
|          | Vernon W. Baker (January 1952-July 1953)  
|          | Fred H. Larson (January 1952-July 1952) |
| Pump Irrigation Engineer | William Reeves (November 1954-present)  
|          | Position transferred to Public Works Division, May 1954 |
| Entomologist | J. ALEX MUNRO (April 1955-present)  
|          | Henry K. Townes (July 1952-June 1954) |
| Fertiliser Distribution Specialist | Forrest H. Turner (June 1953-March 1954)  
|          | Ivan E. Miles (December 1951-May 1953)  
|          | Duties now combined with Soils Management Advisor |
| Rice Advisor | LAWRENCE C. KAPP (August 1953-present)  
|          | Loren L. Davis (February 1952-December 1952) |
| Agricultural Extension | LAURENCE W. DORAN (April 1952-present)  
|          | John V. Hepler (February 1950-November 1954) |
| Home Economics Extension Advisor | BEATRICE BILLINGS (March 1952-present) |
| Rural Organization and Youth Advisor | HARPER S. JOHNSON (April 1952-present) |
Agricultural Extension Advisor

LEONARD NEFF (Scheduled to arrive September 1955)

District Agricultural Extension Advisor (Cebu)

HENRY L. ALSMEYER (December 1953-present)

District Agricultural Extension Advisor (Tarlac)

STUART C. BELL (April 1954-present)

District Agricultural Extension Advisor (Naga)

EDWIN C. BOOTH (October 1954-present)

District Agricultural Extension Advisor (Cayayan de Oro)

VIRGIL M. PROFFITT (October 1954-present)

District Agricultural Extension Advisor (Laguna)

MOSHER D. BUTLER (October 1954-present)

District Home Demonstration Advisor (Cebu)

JEANETTE C. HOSBACH (August 1953-present)

District Home Demonstration Advisor (Naga)

ALICE ELISABETH SMITH (March 1955-present)

District Home Demonstration Advisor (Cagayan de Oro)

CHARITY B. SHANK (April 1955-present)

District Home Demonstration Advisor (Ilagan)

WILLIE VERMILLION (Scheduled to arrive September 1955)

Agricultural Research Advisor

LELAND E. CALL (September 1951-present)

Fiber Research Advisor

Otto A. Reinking (May 1950-May 1952)
(Consultant November 1954-March 1955)

Soils Management Advisor

(To be filled)
Clement L. Orrben (July 1951-March 1955)

Forest Management Advisor

PAUL W. BENARD (August 1952-present)

Forest Products Utilization Advisor

GEORGE HUNT (April 1954-present)
(Employed by Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations)
Winslow L. Gooch (July 1951-July 1953)
(Deceased May 1954)

Rural Credit and Co-operatives Advisor

JOHN L. COOPER (September 1951-present)

Land Settlement Advisor

RAY EWELL DAVIS (November 1952-present)
Milton C. Cummings (June 1951-December 1951)
Land Tenure Advisor
Joseph R. Motheral (September 1954-August 1955)
Robert S. Hardie (July 1951-August 1953)
Leonard M. Berlin (October 1951-February 1952)

Cadastral Engineer

Agriculture Economist
CLARK C. MILLIGAN (May 1955-present)
Claud F. Clayton (November 1952-November 1954)

Social Science Advisor
ROBERT T. McMILLAN (October 1951-present)
(Position transferred to Economic and Industrial Development Staff, October 1953)

CONSULTANTS
Rice Price Policy
John D. Black (November-December 1954)

Fisheries
Herbert E. Warfel (May-June 1952, September 1952-January 1953)

Foot-and-Mouth Disease
Charles U. Duckworth (March-April 1954)

Land Reform
John Baker, Edwin Johnson, V. Webster Johnson (October-November 1952)

Agricultural Extension
M.C. Wilson (January-February 1955)

AMERICAN SECRETARIES
Miss Dorothy Sherman (May 1954-present)
Miss Miriam E. Fricken, Administrative Assistant
Mrs. Helen C. Dahl, Administrative Assistant
Mrs. Thelma E. Carroll
Mrs. Patricia Hamilton
Mrs. Charlotte Selz
Miss Ann Wright
Miss Barbara A. Meylor
Miss Helen Brownell

FILIPINO STAFF
Mrs. Asuncion M. Nepomuceno (August 1952-present)
Miss Maxima B. David (January 1952-present)
Miss Isabel C. Regalado (June 1952-present)
Mrs. Fortunata T. Vasquez (October 1952-present)
Mrs. Rosa E. Rasgonio (July 1951-April 1955)
Miss Salome O. Moreno (January-November 1953)
Mrs. Amparo G. Celestino (February-September 1952)
Mr. Mariano Conception, Statistician (February 1952-October 1953)
CORNELL CONTRACT GROUP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Field of Specialisation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.M. Brunson</td>
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<td>Maralin G. Cline</td>
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<td>S.N. Fertig</td>
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<td>Paul R. Hoff</td>
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<td>Delmar C. Kearl</td>
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<td>Lyle E. Nelson</td>
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<td>A.G. Newhall</td>
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<td>Almon J. Sims</td>
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<td>Kenneth L. Turk</td>
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<th>USIA/USIS</th>
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<td>Consul General</td>
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<td>Emmet O'Neal</td>
<td>Thomas H. Lockett</td>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>Myron Melvin Cowen</td>
<td>Vinton Chapin</td>
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<td>July 1952</td>
<td>Raymond Ames Spruance</td>
<td>H. Merrell Benninghoff</td>
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<td>Daniel Braddock</td>
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<td>Carl Boerger</td>
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<td>Paul Kattenburg</td>
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<td>July 1960</td>
<td>John D. Hickerson</td>
<td>John Gordon Mein</td>
<td>Carl A. Betsch</td>
<td>Richard Barnsley, PAO</td>
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<td>Chief Police Adviser, R-4</td>
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<td>Henry L.T. Koren</td>
<td>Robert H. Whitmer</td>
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Table 21: Principal US Diplomatic and Aid Personnel in the Philippines, 1946-1980 (cont'd)

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<tr>
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<th>USIA/USIS</th>
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<tr>
<td>July 1962</td>
<td>William E. Stevenson</td>
<td>Max V. Krebs</td>
<td>Carl A. Betsch</td>
<td>Lewis C. Mattison, PAO</td>
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<td>James M. Wilson Jr, DCM</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1970</td>
<td>Henry A. Byroade</td>
<td>Francis Underhill</td>
<td>William Simmler Jr Chief PSA R-3</td>
<td>Henry L. Miller, Jr.PAO</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1978</td>
<td>Richard W. Murphy, Donald R. Toussaint, DCM</td>
<td>Robert H. Wenzel</td>
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<td>Horace G. Dawson, PAO</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 1980</td>
<td>Richard W. Murphy, James D. Rosenthal</td>
<td>Herbert S. Malin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>AID Director</td>
<td>AID</td>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>1946</td>
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<td>Clarence Boonstra, Agricultural Attaché</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>John M. Beard, Senior Econômico Analyst</td>
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<td>1948</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Temple Wanamaker, 2nd Sec, Vice Consul, FSO-5</td>
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<td>1950</td>
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<td>Edward E. Rice, 1st Sec, Consul, FSO-3</td>
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<td>July 1952</td>
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<td>Merrill W. Abbey, Agricultural Attaché</td>
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<td>Harry A. Brenn</td>
<td>Edward S. Prentice, FOA-3, Dep Dir</td>
<td>James P. Emerson, Asst, Agric. Chief, FSS-3</td>
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<td>John L. Cooper, Rural Credit Coop, FSS-2</td>
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<td>July 1956</td>
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<td>July 1958</td>
<td>Paul D. Summers</td>
<td>Daly C. Lavergne, Dep Dir, R-1 Frate Bull, Land Tenure Adv, S-2</td>
<td>Richard L. Hough, Prog Analyst, R-6</td>
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<td>Eddie F. Daniel, Agri, Ec Adv, R-3</td>
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<td>July 1960</td>
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<td>Leland A. Randall, Dep Dir, R-1</td>
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<td>David B. Bales Rural Youth Adv, R-4</td>
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<td>July 1964</td>
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<td>Frank D. Ozment,</td>
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<td>May 1967</td>
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<td>David Christenson</td>
<td>Bernard Zagarin, ADB Dir</td>
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<td>David Christenson,</td>
<td>Frederick W. Traeger, Agr Att</td>
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<td>Wesley C. Haraldson</td>
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<td>Frederick W. Traeger, Agr Att</td>
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<td>Harold D. Koone, Rur Dev Off, R-3</td>
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<td>June 1972</td>
<td>Thomas C. Niblock</td>
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<td>Garnett A. Zimmerly</td>
<td>Glenn R. Samson, AGR</td>
<td>Paul Rex Beach, ADB</td>
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<td>Michael J. Korin</td>
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<td>Lester E. Edmond, ADB US Dir</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 1980</td>
<td>Anthony Schwarzwalder</td>
<td>John E. Riesz, AGR</td>
<td>Lester E. Edmond, ADB US Dir</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 22: Agribusiness in the Philippines: Corporate Banana Growers, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporate Group</th>
<th>Hectares Planted to Bananas 1980</th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
<th>Banana Exports (1979) (12 kg cartons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DELMONTE GROWERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AME Farming Corp.</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>3,001,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta Farms, Inc.</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>1,081,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evergreen Farms, Inc.</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1,501,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FJ Dizon &amp; Sons, Inc.</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>787,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmington Agro-Development Inc.</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>1,787,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijo Plantation, Inc.</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td>2,339</td>
<td>4,267,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laparday Agricultural &amp; Development Corp.</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>1,716</td>
<td>3,467,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marsma Estate Plantation</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,298</td>
<td>3,935,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Vista Management Dev. Inc.</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>522,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STANDARD FRUIT CORPORATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checkered Farms</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>17,503,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Farms</td>
<td>1,024</td>
<td>813</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamond Farms</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>604</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANFILCO Farms/Small Growers</td>
<td>4,084</td>
<td>3,976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNITED FRUITS CO.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togum Agricultural Dev Co. Inc.</td>
<td>5,835</td>
<td>6,940</td>
<td>19,146,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>&quot;INDEPENDENT&quot; GROWERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davao Fruits Corp.</td>
<td>3,516</td>
<td>3,311</td>
<td>7,078,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desidai Fruits Enterprises</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>2,093,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twin Rivers Plantation Inc.</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,167</td>
<td>2,385,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabahoy Agricultural Corp.</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Apo Fruits</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>234,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calinan Agro-Dev. Inc.</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soriano Fruits Corp.</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>767,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEI-Agricultural Dev. Corp.</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>289,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guiting Agricultural Dev. Corp.</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 23: Trends in Philippine Rice Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PRODUCTION (000 ha)</th>
<th>AREA (000 ha)</th>
<th>YIELD kg/ha</th>
<th>NPK/ha kg</th>
<th>% area</th>
<th>% area irrigated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>3,861</td>
<td>3,185</td>
<td>1,212</td>
<td>7.18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>4,053</td>
<td>3,153</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>7,859</td>
<td>3,381</td>
<td>2,326</td>
<td>39.18</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 24: Breakdown of Philippine Arable Land Ownership in Properties 50 hectares and Above


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area category (Hectares)</th>
<th>Number of Owners</th>
<th>% Rural Families</th>
<th>Area Owned</th>
<th>% Total Farm Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50-200</td>
<td>11,770</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1,142,196</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201-800</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>435,25</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>801-1,000</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>286,885</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 and over</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>515,466</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>13,859</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>2,379,804</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 25: Land Ownership in the Philippines According to the 1948 Census of Agriculture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type/Area</th>
<th>% Population Owning Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Agricultural Land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 ha and above</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-99 ha</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19 ha</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>below 5 ha</td>
<td>26.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
<td>65.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Non-Agricultural Land (including mineral land, forest, swamp)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without</td>
<td>97.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Total Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bataan</td>
<td>17,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batangas</td>
<td>100,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohol</td>
<td>101,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulacan</td>
<td>74,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capiz</td>
<td>81,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cauta</td>
<td>80,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cebu</td>
<td>213,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iloilo</td>
<td>44,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laguna</td>
<td>64,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leyte</td>
<td>185,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negros Occ.</td>
<td>172,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nueva Ecija</td>
<td>84,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pampanga</td>
<td>70,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangasinan</td>
<td>173,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rizal</td>
<td>120,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarlac</td>
<td>60,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambales</td>
<td>24,490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 27: Hectares Purchased by the Government for Land Transfer 1933-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Hectares Purchased for Transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933-55</td>
<td>4,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-63</td>
<td>19,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-70</td>
<td>3,857</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 28: Rural Income Distribution in the Philippines 1956-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Total Rural Income Accruing to</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowest 20%</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second 20%</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third 20%</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth 20%</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 20%</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 10%</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 29: Area Harvested in Main Crops 1961 and 1971 in '000 Hectares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CROP</th>
<th>196</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palay</td>
<td>3,198</td>
<td>3,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>2,046</td>
<td>2,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarcane</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coconuts</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>2,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Use Category (Hectares)</td>
<td>Tenanted Area</td>
<td>Tenant Farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hectares</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 and above</td>
<td>410,366</td>
<td>30.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.00 to 99.99</td>
<td>139,030</td>
<td>10.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.00 to 49.99</td>
<td>134,248</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.01 to 23.99</td>
<td>189,722</td>
<td>14.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.01 to 12.00</td>
<td>53,804</td>
<td>11.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.00 and below</td>
<td>316,027</td>
<td>23.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>1,343,217</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 31: Breakdown of OLT Scope, by J.E. Rocamora, 1977

Hectarage Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Hectares under Cultivation</td>
<td>10,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rice and Corn Lands</td>
<td>6,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Grain Food Crops</td>
<td>920,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Commercial Crop Land</td>
<td>2,780,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenanted Rice and Corn Lands</td>
<td>3,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAR (1972) est. Tenanted Rice/Corn Lands</td>
<td>1,767,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAR (1973) est. Tenanted Rice/Corn Lands</td>
<td>1,343,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAR (1976) est. Tenanted Rice/Corn Lands</td>
<td>1,058,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice/Corn Tenanted Lands above 7 has Retention Limit</td>
<td>564,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice/Corn Tenanted Lands above 1975 Retention Limit</td>
<td>464,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lands Purchased for Redistribution through Land Bank</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tenancy Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Tenants in Philippines**</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rice/Corn Tenants</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAR est. Rice/Corn Tenants (1972)</td>
<td>1,078,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAR est. Rice/Corn Tenants (1976)</td>
<td>644,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligible Beneficiaries (1976)</td>
<td>230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rizing Tenants as of 30 June 1976</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Rocamora and O'Connor commented that the figure "is, of course, a guesstimate" extrapolated from 1960 Census figures on the assumption that 46% tenancy in 1960 had become at least 60% by 1972 and that 1.3 million hectares of tenanted grain lands had become 3.8 million in the same period, with a corresponding leap from 1.08 million to 4 million tenants. The authors added that since the 1960 Census counted 548,037 tenants on non-grain cropland and since hectareage under such crops has more than doubled in the intervening years while the tenancy rate has increased, a figure of 1 million tenants on these lands would be a conservative estimate. They concluded, "For reasons of its own, the government has not released the results of the 1970 Census. Estimates of the number of tenants must, therefore, remain uncertain. Most students of Philippine agriculture are convinced, however, that government estimates of the number of tenants in the country are much too low."

### Table 32: Breakdown of OLT Scope by B.J. Kervliet, 1979

**Hectares by Crop:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Numbers of Landless Peasants by Category:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice/Corn Tenants</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Tenants</td>
<td>280,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Laborers</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operation Land Transfer Scope:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Peasants (heads of Households)</td>
<td>5,280,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minus Rural Laborers</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Non-Rice/Corn Tenants</td>
<td>280,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Tenants on Farms less than 7 has</td>
<td>560,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>= Tenants Eligible for OLT 1972</strong></td>
<td>440,000  (≈ 8% of Total Peasants)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 33: Philippine 'New Society' Agrarian Reform Accomplishment As of 31 December 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Accomplishment</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Land Redistribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. EPs under OLT</td>
<td>427,623 FBs*</td>
<td>14,344 EPs**</td>
<td>2.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>630,680 EPs</td>
<td>15,778 has (est)</td>
<td>2.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>716,520 has.</td>
<td>15,778 has (est)</td>
<td>2.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Deeds of sale under landed estates program</td>
<td>56,302 FBs</td>
<td>12,270 FBs</td>
<td>21.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87,682 has.</td>
<td>19,610 has.</td>
<td>22.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89,220 lots</td>
<td>15,061 deeds</td>
<td>16.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Patents under resettlement and rehabilitation</td>
<td>78,450 FBs</td>
<td>16,998 FBs</td>
<td>21.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>565,079 has.</td>
<td>95,117 has.</td>
<td>16.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>216,459 lots</td>
<td>22,393 patents</td>
<td>10.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Certificates of Agricultural Leasehold (CAL)</td>
<td>527,667 FBs</td>
<td>248,488 FBs</td>
<td>47.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>562,030 has.</td>
<td>260,465 has.</td>
<td>46.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>872,232 CALs</td>
<td>327,885 CALs</td>
<td>37.59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* FB - farmer-beneficiary  
** As of 31 January 1986

Table 34: Decline in Real Rural Wages in the Philippines 1960-84

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Farm Wage Per Diem</th>
<th>Farm Wage in Constant 1972 Prices Per Diem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>5.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>5.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>5.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>5.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>4.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>5.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>5.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>4.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>4.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>3.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>3.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>6.41</td>
<td>4.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td>4.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>8.97</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>9.89</td>
<td>5.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>10.05</td>
<td>4.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>10.44</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>11.72</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>12.51</td>
<td>3.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>13.94</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 35: NEDA Data (1975) on Farm Size & Areas, By Crop 1960 and 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>No. of Farms (1000s)</th>
<th>Area in Farm (1000s Has)</th>
<th>Average Size of Farm (Has)</th>
<th>% Total Area in Farms of 10 Has+</th>
<th>% Total Area in Farms of 200 Has+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Farms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarcane</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>249.4</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abaca</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>209.0</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coconut</td>
<td>440.3</td>
<td>148.8</td>
<td>1,938.6</td>
<td>734.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palay</td>
<td>1,041.9</td>
<td>407.1</td>
<td>3,112.1</td>
<td>1,037.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>378.6</td>
<td>180.3</td>
<td>949.3</td>
<td>516.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>228.5</td>
<td>156.2</td>
<td>1,257.7</td>
<td>641.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a. = Data Not available
p = Preliminary Data obtained from twenty four(24) provinces out of 66

Source: NEDA Statistical Yearbook 1975 p. 141 Table 5:3

Table 36: NEDA Data (1975) on Number of Area of Farm Units By Tenancy Type 1960 and 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Tenancy</th>
<th>Number of Farms 1960</th>
<th>% of Total 1960</th>
<th>Area in Hectares 1960</th>
<th>% of Total 1960</th>
<th>Number of Farms 1970</th>
<th>% of Total 1970</th>
<th>Area in Hectares 1970</th>
<th>% of Total 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>3,506</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>47,008</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>2,205</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>16,887</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed amount of Produce</td>
<td>34,145</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>88,911</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>34,874</td>
<td>11.76</td>
<td>89,304</td>
<td>11.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Produce</td>
<td>745,426</td>
<td>86.22</td>
<td>1,677,857</td>
<td>83.88</td>
<td>235,588</td>
<td>79.39</td>
<td>618,114</td>
<td>76.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash and Fixed amount of produce</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash and Share of Produce</td>
<td>10,847</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>34,083</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>34,083</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent Free</td>
<td>29,816</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>55,918</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>14,800</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>49,800</td>
<td>6.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>30,105</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>92,248</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>9,265</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>32,557</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>864,538</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>2,040,201</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>296,702</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>806,312</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NEDA Statistical Yearbook 1975 p.141 Table 5.4.
### Table 37: NEDA Data (1984) on Farm Sizes and Areas By Crop 1960 and 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>No. of Farms (1000s)</th>
<th>Area in Farms (1000s Has)</th>
<th>Average Size of Farm (Has)</th>
<th>% Total Area in Farms over 10 Has</th>
<th>% Total Area in Farms over 50 Has</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Farms</td>
<td>2,166.2</td>
<td>2,354.5</td>
<td>7,772.5</td>
<td>8,493.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarcane</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>249.4</td>
<td>368.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abaca</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>209.0</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coconut</td>
<td>440.3</td>
<td>432.5</td>
<td>1,938.6</td>
<td>2,152.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palay</td>
<td>1,041.9</td>
<td>981.9</td>
<td>3,112.1</td>
<td>2,661.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>378.8</td>
<td>514.2</td>
<td>949.3</td>
<td>1,493.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock &amp; Poultry</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>437.3</td>
<td>415.6</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>211.2</td>
<td>344.2</td>
<td>838.4</td>
<td>1,330.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Drawing on 1960 and 1971 Censuses of Agriculture

### Table 38: NEDA Data (1984) on Number and Area of Farms By Tenancy Type 1960 and 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Tenancy</th>
<th>Number of Farms (1000s)</th>
<th>% Distribution (1000s)</th>
<th>Area in Hectares (1000s)</th>
<th>% Distribution (1000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,166,216</td>
<td>2,354,469</td>
<td>7,772.5</td>
<td>8,493.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Owner</td>
<td>967,725</td>
<td>1,364,990</td>
<td>44.67</td>
<td>57.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Owner</td>
<td>310,944</td>
<td>268,665</td>
<td>14.35</td>
<td>11.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenants (All types)</td>
<td>864,528</td>
<td>618,658</td>
<td>39.91</td>
<td>28.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>13,506</td>
<td>5,680</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share</td>
<td>745,426</td>
<td>569,277</td>
<td>34.41</td>
<td>24.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Share</td>
<td>34,145</td>
<td>49,864</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent Free</td>
<td>29,816</td>
<td>39,310</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>41,645</td>
<td>17,527</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>2,487</td>
<td>2,458</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other forms of tenure(?)</td>
<td>20,522</td>
<td>36,698</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Operation Land Transfer</th>
<th>Leasehold Operation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Tenant Recipients</td>
<td>Area (Has)</td>
<td>CLTs Issued/Printed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>32,594</td>
<td>36,885</td>
<td>64,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>46,006</td>
<td>82,384</td>
<td>72,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>115,588</td>
<td>249,728</td>
<td>173,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>25,717</td>
<td>39,840</td>
<td>35,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>51,352</td>
<td>64,608</td>
<td>72,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>44,224</td>
<td>63,525</td>
<td>61,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>22,310</td>
<td>23,410</td>
<td>85,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>21,350</td>
<td>29,014</td>
<td>33,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10,324</td>
<td>15,617</td>
<td>16,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>21,800</td>
<td>40,709</td>
<td>30,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>18,694</td>
<td>39,126</td>
<td>24,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>21,216</td>
<td>54,647</td>
<td>24,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>430,679</td>
<td>739,493</td>
<td>644,415</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 40: Comparison of Net Values of Indigo and Coffee Exports from El Salvador between 1864 and 1916
(Values in US Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Indigo</th>
<th>Coffee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>1,129,105</td>
<td>80,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>2,619,749</td>
<td>663,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>1,160,700</td>
<td>1,673,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1,460,300</td>
<td>2,909,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>892,092</td>
<td>4,806,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>595,000</td>
<td>24,132,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Browning (1971)

Table 41: Coffee as a Percentage of Salvadoran Exports between 1901 and 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Browning (1971)
Table 42: Agricultural Production in the Salvadoran Coastal Lowlands, 1950-1963

(Metric Tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Seed</td>
<td>9,321</td>
<td>119,768</td>
<td>+ 1,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Fibre</td>
<td>5,565</td>
<td>71,441</td>
<td>+ 1,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>39,015</td>
<td>63,134</td>
<td>+ 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>9,453</td>
<td>11,941</td>
<td>+ 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>130,307</td>
<td>153,246</td>
<td>+ 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>16,471</td>
<td>14,475</td>
<td>- 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Browning (1971)

"... In coastal El Salvador, cotton displaced corn, but not to the extreme degree that occurred further south in Nicaragua. Between 1948 and 1950-51, when the first agricultural census was taken, corn plantings dropped by more than 8,000 acres in El Salvador's eight most important cotton-producing municipios. By 1950-51, cotton already claimed more than 20% of the cropland and corn 50%. Twenty years later, corn had been reduced to a third of the cropland and cotton had expanded to more than one half ... the two largest corn-producing municipios in El Salvador in the early 1950s (San Miguel and Jiquilisco) were transformed into the two largest cotton-producers by the early 1970s."

- Robert Williams, 1986

Table 44: Value of Central American Cotton Exports, 1951-1978

Source: Robert G. Williams Export Agriculture and the Crisis in Central America, 1986 p. 29
Table 45: Value of Central American Beef Exports (1960-1980)

Source: Robert G. Williams, *Export Agriculture and the Crisis in Central America*, 1986, p.90
Table 46: The Cotton Elite of El Salvador

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Name</th>
<th>Bales of Cotton (1972-73)</th>
<th>Cotton-related Investments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wright</td>
<td>17,327</td>
<td>Insecticidas de El Salvador, S.A. (INDESSA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Textilera del Pacifico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Productos Agroquimicas de C.A., S.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RAIT, S.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garcia Prieto/Salaverria</td>
<td>10,197</td>
<td>Textiles Taxumal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Textiles del Pacifico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duenas</td>
<td>9,507</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kriete</td>
<td>7,667</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristiani</td>
<td>6,057</td>
<td>Industrias Quimicas, S.A. (IQSA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SEMILLAS, S.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill/Llach Hill</td>
<td>5,903</td>
<td>Textiles Taxumal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Textiles del Pacifico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guirola</td>
<td>5,137</td>
<td>Industrias Quimicas, S.A. (IQSA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalton</td>
<td>2,683</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>2,607</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homberger</td>
<td>2,223</td>
<td>Fertilizer-import business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llach Schonenberg</td>
<td>2,070</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borgonovo</td>
<td>1,687</td>
<td>Semillas, S.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daglio</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>Industrias Quimicas, S.A. (IQSA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottebohm</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avila-Meardi/Meardi-Palomo</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lopez-Harrison</td>
<td>1,073</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Quintales of raw cotton were converted to bales by using the lint yield of .368 and bale weight of 480 pounds. Colindre’s table does not specify raw cotton, but if the calculations were made on the assumption of cleaned cotton, these few families would have been responsible for two-thirds of the crop that year, and the Wright family would have been cultivating 28,000 acres of cotton, nearly three times the land area they own. Also, it is common practice in Salvadoran cotton statistics to measure in units of ginned cotton. These families produced a total of 78,278 bales of cotton in 1972-73, 33% of exports.

Table 47: Oligarchic families' exports of coffee, cotton and sugar from El Salvador as of 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Coffee (quintales)*</th>
<th>Cotton (quintales)</th>
<th>Sugar (quintales)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regalado</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guirola</td>
<td>72,107</td>
<td>67,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llach/Schonenberg</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill-Llach Hill</td>
<td>49,500</td>
<td>77,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duenas</td>
<td>45,500</td>
<td>124,000</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alvarez Lemus</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meza Ayau</td>
<td>41,100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sol Millet/Luis Escalante</td>
<td>36,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daglio</td>
<td>35,500</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alvarez</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaverria</td>
<td>31,500</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Deininger</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfaro</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalton</td>
<td>21,500</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Garcia Prieto</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>92,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Avila Meardi</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liebes</td>
<td>18,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alvarez Dews</td>
<td>16,000</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>De Sola</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kriete</td>
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<td>Christian Burkard</td>
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<td>51,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Salaverria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bonilla</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schwartz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bustamante</td>
<td>8,000</td>
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<td>123,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alvarez Meza</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soler</td>
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<td>Henriquez</td>
<td>7,500</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rengifo</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>34,00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hornberger</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sol Meza</td>
<td>6,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belismelis</td>
<td>5,500</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* 1 quintale = 46 kilograms
List incomplete, omitting, inter alia, Wright family.

Table 48: Leading Coffee Export Firms in El Salvador as of 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>% of Total Coffee Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. H. De Sola y hijos</td>
<td>14.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cia. Salvadorena de Cafe</td>
<td>8.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Exportadora Liebes</td>
<td>7.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Daglio y Cia.</td>
<td>6.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Prieto</td>
<td>5.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Mauricio Borgonovo</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Cafeco S.A.</td>
<td>4.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Battle Hermanos</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Miguel Duenas</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Llach</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Salaverria, Duran y Cia</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Christian Burkard</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Agro Industrias Homerger</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Jose Antonio Salaverria</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Salmar</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Rodrigo Herrera Comego</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Arnoldo Castro Liebes</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Industrias de Cafe S.A.</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Bonilla Hijos</td>
<td>1.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. Esther de Rengifo Nunez</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Regalado Hermanos</td>
<td>1.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. Armando Monedero</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. J. Hill</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Empresa Cafetalera Sol Millet</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Carlos Schmidt</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Acres</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aguilar</td>
<td>1,488.2</td>
<td>Melendez</td>
<td>1,306.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfaro</td>
<td>5,138.8</td>
<td>Mendoza de Cross</td>
<td>1,477.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alvarez</td>
<td>4,602.7</td>
<td>Menendez Castro</td>
<td>1,176.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alvergue Gomez</td>
<td>2,048.5</td>
<td>Menendez Lorenzo</td>
<td>1,546.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrientos Sarmiento</td>
<td>1,530.6</td>
<td>Menendez Salazar</td>
<td>1,966.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baum</td>
<td>3,034.4</td>
<td>Meza (Ayau, Alvarez,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ortega)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneke</td>
<td>1,083.6</td>
<td>Sol, Calderon, Quinonez</td>
<td>4,247.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borja</td>
<td>5,905.0</td>
<td>Milla Sandoval</td>
<td>1,349.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bustamante</td>
<td>6,816.8</td>
<td>Orellana</td>
<td>2,717.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carranza Martinez</td>
<td>1,545.8</td>
<td>Padilla y Velasco</td>
<td>1,626.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daglio</td>
<td>1,869.8</td>
<td>Palomo</td>
<td>1,316.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalton</td>
<td>1,480.4</td>
<td>Parker</td>
<td>1,893.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deininger</td>
<td>3,295.9</td>
<td>Pena Acre de Espinoza</td>
<td>1,054.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Sola</td>
<td>2,581.2</td>
<td>Romero Bosque</td>
<td>1,831.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duenas</td>
<td>5,713.0</td>
<td>Saca</td>
<td>2,072.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regalado Duenas</td>
<td>6,424.7</td>
<td>Salaverra</td>
<td>7,808.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallardo</td>
<td>1,484.8</td>
<td>Salguero Gross</td>
<td>1,091.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giannmattei</td>
<td>5,490.2</td>
<td>Sandoval Langeneger</td>
<td>1,175.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guirola</td>
<td>13,682.6</td>
<td>Schmidt (Moron, Herrera)</td>
<td>1,054.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gutierrez Diaz</td>
<td>2,464.5</td>
<td>Schonenberg</td>
<td>1,018.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hernandez</td>
<td>1,140.6</td>
<td>Sol Castellanos</td>
<td>2,864.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Langeneger de Bendix</td>
<td>1,452.5</td>
<td>Sol Millet</td>
<td>2,146.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Letona de Trigueros</td>
<td>1,152.0</td>
<td>Urrutia Fantolli</td>
<td>1,555.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Magana</td>
<td>13,778.1</td>
<td>Venetulo</td>
<td>3,005.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Martinez</td>
<td>1,234.7</td>
<td>Vilanova Kreitz</td>
<td>2,407.0</td>
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**TOTAL:** 149,557.7

**= (ACRES):** 369,407.5

Source: Durkerley loc. cit.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Ambassador</th>
<th>Political Counsel</th>
<th>Public Safety Chief</th>
<th>USIA/PAO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1960</td>
<td>Thorsten V. Kalijarvi</td>
<td>William B. Sowash</td>
<td>Roland R. Kelley</td>
<td>Robert F. Delaney</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1964</td>
<td>Murat W. Williams</td>
<td>Douglas S. Speicher</td>
<td>James A. Brooke</td>
<td>Joseph C. Walsh</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 1968</td>
<td>Terrance Leonhardy (DCM)</td>
<td>Eiler R. Cook</td>
<td>Roland R. Kelley</td>
<td>Eugene J. Friedmann</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1974</td>
<td>James F. Campbell</td>
<td>Maurice J. Gremillion</td>
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<td>William Mateer</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1978</td>
<td>Frank J. Devine</td>
<td>Herbert T. Mitchell Jr.</td>
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<td>Vytautas Dambrava</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1980</td>
<td>Robert E. White</td>
<td>William H. Hallman</td>
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<td>Howard A. Lane</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 1982</td>
<td>Deane R. Hinton</td>
<td>Robert Driscoll</td>
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<td>Donald Hamilton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1984</td>
<td>Thomas R. Pickering</td>
<td>James F. Mack</td>
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<td>Donald Hamilton</td>
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</table>


Source: Foreign Service Lists, as provided to the author by Mr William Hamilton of the US State Department.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Economic Counsel</th>
<th>AID Director</th>
<th>AID Agriculture</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>July 1960</td>
<td>David R. Raynolds</td>
<td>Harry W. Miller</td>
<td>W. Clinton Bourne (soil classification)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Joseph Carwell</td>
<td></td>
<td>Curtis J. Spalding (food &amp; agriculture)</td>
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<td>June 1962</td>
<td>David R. Raynolds</td>
<td>Harry W. Miller</td>
<td>W. Clinton Bourne</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Melville A. Shaw</td>
<td></td>
<td>Curtis J. Spalding</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philip M. Burnett</td>
<td></td>
<td>Guy E. Mabie (agriculture cooperatives)</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1964</td>
<td>Herbert N. Higgins</td>
<td>Robert W. Herder</td>
<td>W. Clinton Bourne</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Melville A. Shaw</td>
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<td>Curtis J. Spalding</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Robert J. MacQuaid</td>
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<td>Guy E. Mabie</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1967</td>
<td>Benjamin R. Maser</td>
<td>Henry R. Weisman</td>
<td>Carrol F. Devoe (development)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Robert MacQuaid</td>
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<td>Theodore T. Foley (development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1968</td>
<td>Robert J. MacQuaid</td>
<td>Paul Oechslie</td>
<td>Theodore T. Foley (development, rural)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Richard B. Owen</td>
<td></td>
<td>Virgil C. Peterson</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1970</td>
<td>John Fersch</td>
<td>Paul Oechslie</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Richard F. Meunzer</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1972</td>
<td>Paul De Pedroza</td>
<td>James P. Derum</td>
<td>Glenn C. Holms (food &amp; agriculture)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Clyde D. Taylor</td>
<td></td>
<td>David E. Weisenbom (agriculture economics)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Allen M. Hale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1974</td>
<td>Paul De Pedroza</td>
<td>Edwin A. Anderson</td>
<td>Jack R. Morris (food &amp; agriculture)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clyde D. Taylor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Timothy C. Brown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1976</td>
<td>Ralph Winstanley II</td>
<td>Edwin A. Anderson</td>
<td>James W. Brock</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1978</td>
<td>J. Peter Becker</td>
<td>Adelmo Ruiz</td>
<td>James W. Brock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1980</td>
<td>James P. Bell Jr</td>
<td>Charles Stockman</td>
<td>Harry C. Bryan (resident in Guatemala)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1982</td>
<td>Bonnie M. Lincoln</td>
<td>Martin Dagata</td>
<td>Robert Anlauf (resident in Guatemala)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1984</td>
<td>Bonnie M. Lincoln</td>
<td>Martin Dagata</td>
<td>Robert Anlauf (resident in Guatemala)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1986</td>
<td>John H. Curry</td>
<td>Robin L. Gomez</td>
<td>Robert Anlauf (resident in Guatemala)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Foreign Service Lists, as provided to the author by Mr William Hamilton of the US State Department.
Table 51: Leading Groups on the Insurgent Left in El Salvador by 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guerrilla Commander</th>
<th>Guerrilla Group</th>
<th>Popular Organization</th>
<th>Civilian Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shafik</td>
<td>FAL (PCS)</td>
<td>UDN Union</td>
<td>PCS Communist Party of El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handal</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion</td>
<td>Democratico Nacional (1969)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvador</td>
<td>FPL Fuerzas Popular de Liberacion</td>
<td>BPR Bloque Popular Revolucionario (1975)</td>
<td>MNR Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cayetano</td>
<td>Popular de Liberacion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpio*</td>
<td>ERP Ejercito Revolucionario Popular</td>
<td>LP-28 Ligas Populares de Febrero 28 (1977)</td>
<td>MPSAC Movimiento Popular Socialista Christiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joaquin</td>
<td>FARN Fuerzas de Resistencia Nacional</td>
<td>FAPU Frente de Accion Popular Unificada (1974)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villalobos</td>
<td>PRTC Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos</td>
<td>MLP Movimiento de Liberacion Popular (1979)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roca,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castillo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

* Obit 12 April 1983

Table 52: Chronology of key events, 22 February - 26 March 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Table of Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 Feb</td>
<td>Mario Zamora Rivas assassinated following denunciation by D'Aubuisson.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Feb</td>
<td>CRM issues its Programmatic Platform of the Revolutionary Democratic Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Mar</td>
<td>Hector Dada Hirezi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the second junta, resigns in protest at the repression and Zamora's assassination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Mar</td>
<td>Decree 153 - Basic Law on Land Reform - promulgated by second junta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Mar</td>
<td>The ANTEL colonels declare a State of Siege.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Mar</td>
<td>Jose Napoleon Duarte joins the junta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Mar</td>
<td>Robert E. White presents his credentials as Ambassador.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Mar</td>
<td>Ambassador White attends mass celebrated by Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Mar</td>
<td>CRM calls a general strike.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Mar</td>
<td>Archbishop Romero delivers his last, ringing sermon, denouncing the repression in the name of God and declaring the right to insurrection against an oppressive government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Mar</td>
<td>Archbishop Romero assassinated on D'Aubuisson's orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Mar</td>
<td>Carter Administration asks Congress for additional $5.7 million in military aid for El Salvador's armed forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Mar</td>
<td>Resignations of Jorge Villacorta (Deputy Minister of Agriculture), Oscar Menjivar (Minister for the Economy) and Eduardo Colindres (Minister of Education).</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### TABLE 53: The Victims of the Death Squads in El Salvador (1979-83)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>1,030</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>8,024</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2,644</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>1,922</td>
<td>2,311</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>1,395</td>
<td>13,353</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>355</td>
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<td>701</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>5,976</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>377</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31,206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 54 - Analysis of Social Background of Death Squad Victims 1979-82 (by %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Peasants</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Professionals</th>
<th>Religious</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Richard Alan White, op.cit., loc.cit.
Table 55: Escalation in US Military assistance to the Salvadoran Armed Forces 1978-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Aid ($US)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-79</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>25,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>82,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>136,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>300,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>377,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(annual average)

"We do not need more arms in El Salvador from any source. I am opposed to any further military aid for the Junta; it will not solve our basic problem. The US relationship to the military should be political; move them to dialogue."

"We do not see the necessity for (further) increases (in military aid to El Salvador)."
- Walter Stoessel, Under Secretary of State, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (March 1981).

"Our goal in El Salvador is not a military victory."
- Thomas Enders to Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1981).

"We've never been looking for a military victory."
- Ambassador Deane Hinton to Christopher Dickey (1982).

"The policy being pursued does not seek a military victory."
- General Wallace Nutting to Senate Foreign Relations committee (1983).

"The Reagan policy was to 'defeat the guerrillas militarily. Period. And all the rest be damned' said a Foreign Service Officer who was in El Salvador for more than two years during the Reagan Administration. Classified cables confirm his statement."
Facsimile 1: "A Serious Offense" - the Fate of the Hardie Report as Reflected in a Cartoon

I just got a cable from Ambassador Bunker. I had asked him what had happened to civilians in the new offensive. You recall in my speech of May 8th, I said 20,000 civilian casualties, including women and children, have resulted because of the deliberate shelling of the cities and the slaughtering of refugees indiscriminately by the North Vietnamese.

The number is now 45,000, including women and children, of which 5,000 are dead.

I asked him for the number of refugees. It is higher than I had thought. There have been 660,000 made homeless by the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam, this newest invasion to date; 600,000 of them are still in refugee camps, away from their homes.

Looking back over the period of this very difficult war, we find that since 1965, there have been 600,000 civilian casualties in South Vietnam as a result of deliberate policies of the North Vietnamese Communists, not accidental, but deliberate.

In North Vietnam, in the period from 1954 to 1956, in their so-called land reform program, a minimum of 500,000 were murdered, assassinated and, according to the Catholic Bishop of Da-nang, whom I talked to when I was there in 1956, in South Vietnam, in addition to the 800,000 refugees who came south, there were at least a half-million who died in slave labor camps in North Vietnam.

Now, I did not relate this series of incidents for the purpose of saying, because they did something bad, we can do something bad.

What I am simply saying is, let's not have a hypocritical double standard. The state anything with regard to what happened in the negotiations.

I will only say that we are negotiating with the desire of ending this war as soon as possible. The fastest way to end the war and the best way to do it is through negotiation. We would hope that public figures in their comments will not do anything to undercut the negotiations, that Congress, its actions, will not in effect give message to the enemy, "Don't negotiate with the present Administratic wait for us, we will give you what you want in South Vietnam."

3. Missile Sites on Dikes

Q. Mr. President, to follow up the first question, if I may, there had been reports that SAM sites have been put on top of some of those dikes or dams. Does your policy rule out the bombing of a particular area where the SAM sites are?

A. I have seen those reports, Mr. Lagoor. As you know, the Secretary of Defense has made some indirect comments about it. The situation there is such that we would lean against taking SAM sites on targets that would result in civilian casualties of a substantial amount.

However, I have not seen in recent days any reports indicating that a such SAM sites will be hit and in view of the present debate, I think we are going to be very careful with regard to hitting them. We would do so only in order to protect American fliers who otherwise would hit down by the SAM's.

4. Mental Illness and Politics

### PROJECT ASSISTANCE FOR LAND REFORM

#### U.S. Dollars 1955-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assistance 1955-60</th>
<th>Dollars (by fiscal year)</th>
<th>Counterpart Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration of agrarian reform project</td>
<td>$282,000</td>
<td>$3,257,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land development project</td>
<td>$4,582,000</td>
<td>$6,794,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>$4,864,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$10,051,285</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assistance 1966-68</th>
<th>Dollars (by fiscal year)</th>
<th>Counterpart Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land reform project</td>
<td>$2,778,000</td>
<td>$550,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$7,642,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$10,602,132</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Supporting Schedules

#### Dollar Assistance Support (by FY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Administration of Agrarian Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project (#430-11-120-089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>$282,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>171,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4,000 (est)10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$282,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### USS Equivalent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Administration of Agrarian Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$282,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Remarks: Dollar assistance includes $205,000 of commodities, i.e., 17 jeeps, 275 motorbikes, 180 bicycles, surveying and drafting, equipment. Two advisers (Gittinger and Ladejinski) were financed as were travel grants to GVN officials to other Asian nations to observe land reform administration. Counterpart financed salaries and related costs of 700 field surveyors plus certain related GVN staff.

#### Land Development Project (#430-11-120-144)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dollars (by FY)</th>
<th>Counterpart (VNS000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>$3,207,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>924,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>241,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$4,582,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>VNS237,800</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### USS Equivalent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dollars (by FY)</th>
<th>Counterpart (VNS000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$4,582,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$6,794,285</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Remarks: $4,421,000 of the dollar assistance was for commodities, primarily construction materials, vehicles, and equipment.

#### Land Reform Project (#730-11-120-311)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dollars (by FY)</th>
<th>Counterpart (VNS000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>VNS —</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>$1,182,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>(est)1,582,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,778,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>VNS$5,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### USS Equivalent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dollars (by FY)</th>
<th>Counterpart (VNS000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$2,778,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$350,847</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Remarks: Virtually all the $1,196,000 obligated in FY 66 & 67 were for the technical services of (i) 3 advisers, (ii) EARI cadastral team, (iii) SRI research team. A small amount was used for transport for field staff and specialized equipment.

At Press Conference, He Says
F.O.A. Chief Is Responsible for Judgment, if Wrong

By W. H. LAWRENCE
Special to The New York Times.
WASHINGTON, Jan. 12—President Eisenhower took the middle of the road today in the Wolf Ladejinsky "security risk" case.

Faced with a barrage of questions at his first news conference since Dec. 16, the President upheld the right of two sets of Administration officials to reach conflicting decisions whether the 55-year-old Russian-born Far Eastern agricultural expert was a security risk.

He supported Ezra Taft Benson, Secretary of Agriculture, in his decision that Mr. Ladejinsky might be a "risk" and therefore should not be retained in government service.

At the same time, he upheld the right of Harold E. Stassen, director of the Foreign Operations Administration, to decide Mr. Ladejinsky was not a risk and to give him a new job, dealing with land reforms in Vietnam.

The President appeared unaware that top White House officials had intervened and approved Mr. Stassen's decision to hire Mr. Ladejinsky before it was announced.

The President said that Mr. Stassen had stand responsible for the decision if something should turn up to show that his judgment was wrong.

Although the F. O. A. had described Mr. Ladejinsky's job as a sensitive one, the President referred to it as one not so sensitive that he could damage the United States.

Tell of the Special Group

Taking a broader look at the over-all security-loyalty program, President Eisenhower said the Administration constantly was seeking ways to improve it and had a specialized group, centered in the Justice Department's Internal Security Division, making posts with the Department of State in the Far East.

The President said that, when he made the statement about the Ladejinsky case, he had remarked that it would scare him. He said he had not inquired into all the circumstances and it was his impression that the State and Agriculture Departments felt the same way about the case.

It was only later, he reported, that he had learned Mr. Ladejinsky had written a book in which he was particularly critical of communism and condemned it.

It was clear, the President said, that Agricultural Department officials attached more importance to a past association, which was Mr. Ladejinsky's employment for a time by Amtorg, the Soviet purchasing agency.

Another question was whether he saw the need for a basic revision of the security program as a result of the Ladejinsky case. Fourteen of the thirty-two questions that followed dealt with security matters for the Ladejinsky case itself.

Eisenhower's Recollection

As the President told the story of the Ladejinsky case, he had received a brief summary of the take of the State Department report on the case. He was asked whether he had told the Secretary when he described his reaction to Mr. Ladejinsky's record as presented to him by Mr. Benson.

The President said he had meant to convey the idea that he would not repeat the adjective "presumable" before doubt.

The President was asked again about his use of the word scared when he described his reaction to Mr. Ladejinsky's record as presented to him by Mr. Benson.

The President agreed that the unresolved conflict between Mr. Benson and Mr. Stassen was an over-all question of the security program.

He indicated public hearings could not be expected for several weeks.

No reference apparently was made to the Ladejinsky case in the President's New Year's address, and he wished the reporters and correspondents a Happy New Year, and made a brief comment about the trouble in Costa Rica.

He then threw the conference open to questions.

Continued From Page 1

under study every day by honest men. He knew of no problem that occupied so much of the time of his Cabinet members, both individually and collectively.

If, at some future time, the advisability of such a special commission was indicated, the President said, he would, of course, call on such a group.

President Eisenhower was in a good mood at this, his first meeting with the press in four weeks. He entertained an unusual number of detailed questions about a single case in which he said he did not have the details.

Dressed in gray—his suit, the tie and shirt all were of the same color—he came into the Old State Department Building across West Executive Avenue from the White House three minutes late. He wished the reporters a Happy New Year, and made a brief comment about the trouble in Costa Rica.

Then he threw the conference open to questions. The first was whether he saw the need for a basic revision of the security program as a result of the Ladejinsky case. Fourteen of the thirty-two questions that followed dealt with security matters for the Ladejinsky case itself.

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Letters to The Editor

A Case Against Staying in Vietnam

Now that the American people are once again debating the issue of Vietnam, we desire to contribute to that discussion by presenting our own views, which reflect both personal judgments and years of professional research on the Vietnam war and related matters. We are expressing here our views expeditiously-and speaking for the RAND Corporation, of which we are staff members; there is a considerable diversity of opinion on this subject, as on other issues, among our RAND colleagues.

We believe that the United States should decide now to end its participation in the Vietnam war, completing the total withdrawal of our forces within one year at the most. Such U.S. disengagement should not be conditioned upon agreement or performance by Hanoi or Saigon—i.e., it should not be subject to veto by either side.

It is our view that, apart from persuasive moral arguments that could lead to the same conclusion, there are four objections to continued U.S. efforts in the war:

1. Short of destroying the entire country and its people, we cannot eliminate the enemy forces in Vietnam by military means; in fact “military victory” is no longer the U.S. objective. What should now also be recognized is that the opposing leadership cannot be coerced by the present or by any other available U.S. strategy into making the kinds of concessions currently demanded.

2. Past U.S. promises to the Vietnamese people are not served by prolonging inconclusive and highly destructive military activity in Vietnam. This activity must not be prolonged merely on demand of the Saigon government, whose capacity to survive on its own must finally be tested, regardless of the outcome.

3. The importance to the U.S. national interest of the future political complexion of South Vietnam has been greatly exaggerated, as has the negative international impact of a unilateral U.S. military withdrawal.

4. Above all, the human, political, and material costs of continuing our part in the war far outweigh any prospective benefits, and are greater than the foreseeable costs and risks of disengagement.

The opponent's morale, leadership, and performance all evidence his continuing resiliency, determination, and effectiveness, even under extremely adverse conditions (in no small part because of his conviction that he fights for a just and vital cause). Estimates that the opponent's will or capacity (in North or South Vietnam) is critically weakening because of internal strains and military pressures are, in our view, erroneous. Even if a new strategy should produce military successes in Vietnam, substantially reduce U.S. costs, and dampen domestic opposition, Hanoi could not be induced to make any concessions (e.g., cease-fire or mutual withdrawals), so long as they implied recognition of the authority of the Saigon government. Thus, to make the end of U.S. involvement contingent upon such concessions is to perpetuate our presence indefinitely.

Our participation in the war will also be unjustifiably prolonged if we tie total withdrawals to basic changes in the policies and character of the South Vietnamese government. The primary interest of the present Saigon leadership is to perpetuate its status and power, and that interest is served not by seeking an end to hostilities through negotiations but only by continuing the war with U.S. support. Their interest is thus directly opposed to ours. For the same reason, the present Saigon government is not likely to seek the long-awaited improvements and "broadening" of its base. The United States should not obstruct favorable political change in Saigon by unconditional support of the present regime. Yet, we believe, the United States should in no way compromise or postpone the goal of total withdrawal by active American involvement in Vietnamese policies. Such interventions in the past have only increased our sense of responsibility for an outcome we cannot control.

Our withdrawal might itself produce the kinds of desirable political changes in Saigon that the U.S. presence seems to have inhibited, including the emergence of a cohesive nationalist consensus; and it might give better focus to our alliance relationships elsewhere in the world by bringing our Vietnam policy into line with the President's declaration in Guam on the limits of our partnerships.

As for global U.S. interests, the original rationale for a large scale U.S. military effort in Vietnam—the prevention of proxy victories by the USSR or Communist China—has long since been discredited. Moreover, we regard the Vietnamese insurgency as having special characteristics that cannot be considered typical of or exerting decisive influence on other revolutionary movements in Asia or elsewhere. We do not predict that only good consequences will follow for Southeast Asia or South Vietnam (or even the United States) from our withdrawal. What we do say is that the risks will not be less after another year or more of American involvement, and the human costs will surely be greater.

Daniel Ellsberg, Melvin Gurтов, Oleg Hoeffding, Arnold L. Horelick, Konrad Kellen and Paul F. Langer.

Santa Monica, Calif.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Book Title</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Location, Year</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
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</table>


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